POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN
MISSOURI.--THE STATE ELECTIONS OF 1863.
GENERAL FREMONT IN MISSOURI.--THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL
HUNTER.--EMANCIPATION IN MISSOURRI.--APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL
SCHOFIELD.--THE PRESIDENT AND THE MISSOURI RADICALS.--THE PRESIDENT TO THE MISSOURI COMMITTEE.--THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
SCHOFIELD.--THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHURCHERS.--LETTER TO ILLINOIS.
--THE ELECTIONS OF 1863.
THE condition of affairs in Missouri had been somewhat
peculiar, from the very outbreak of the rebellion. At
the outset the Executive Department of the State Government was in the hands of men in full sympathy with
the secession cause, who, under pretence of protecting
the State from domestic violence, were organizing its
forces for active co-operation with the rebel movement.
On the 30th of July, 1861, the State Convention, originally called by Governor Jackson, for the purpose of
taking Missouri out of the Union, but to which the
people had elected a large majority of Union men, declared all the Executive offices of the State vacant, by
reason of the treasonable conduct of the incumbents, and
appointed a Provisional Government, of which the Hon.
H. R. Gamble was at the head. He at once took measures to maintain the national authority within the State.
He ordered the troops belonging to the rebel Confederacy
to withdraw from it, and called upon all the citizens of
the State to organize for its defence, and for the preservation of peace within its borders. He also issued a proclamation, framed in accordance with the following suggestions from Washington:--
WASHINGTON, August 3, 1861.
To His Excellency Gov. GAMBLE, Governor of
Missouri:
In reply to your message, addressed to the
President, I am directed to
to say, that if, by a proclamation, you promise security to citizens
in arms, who voluntarily return to their allegiance, and behave as
peaceable
and loyal men, this Government will cause the promise to be
respected.
SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.
Two days after this, Governor Jackson, returning from
Richmond, declared the State to be no longer one of the
United States; and on the 2d of November, the legislature, summoned by him as Governor, ratified a compact,
by which certain commissioners, on both sides, had
agreed that Missouri should join the rebel Confederacy.
The State authority was thus divided--two persons
claiming to wield the Executive authority, and two
bodies, also, claiming to represent the popular will-one adhering to the Union, and the other to the Confederacy in organized rebellion against it. This state of
things naturally led to wide-spread disorder, and carried
all the evils of civil war into every section and neighbor
hood of the. State.
To these evils were gradually added others, growing
out of a division of sentiment, which afterwards ripened
into sharp hostility, among the friends of the Union
within the State. One of the earliest causes of this
dissension was the action and removal of General Fremont, who arrived at St. Louis, to take command of the
Western Department, on the 26th of July, 1861. On the
31st of August he issued a proclamation, declaring that
circumstances, in his judgment, of sufficient urgency,
rendered it necessary that "the Commanding General of
the Department should assume the administrative power
of the State," thus superseding entirely the authority of
the civil rulers. He also proclaimed the whole State to
be under martial law, declared that all persons taken
with arms in their hands, within the designated lines of
the Department, should be tried by court-martial, and, if
found guilty, shot; and confiscated the property and
emancipated the slaves of "all persons who should be
proved to have taken an active part with the enemies of
the United States." This latter clause, transcending the
authority conferred by the Confiscation Act of Congress, was
subsequently modified by order of the President of
the United States. 1
On the 14th of October, after a personal inspection of
affairs in that Department by the Secretary of War, an
order was issued from the War Department, in effect
censuring General Fremont for having expended very
large sums of the public money, through agents of
own appointment, and not responsible to the Government; requiring all contracts and disbursements to be
made by the proper officers of the army; directing the
discontinuance of the extensive fieldworks which the General was erecting around St. Louis and Jefferson City, and
also the barracks in construction around his head-quarters; and also notifying him that the officers to whom he
had issued commissions would not be paid until those
commissions should have been approved by the. President. On the 1st of November, General Fremont entered into an agreement with General Sterling Price,
commanding the rebel forces in Missouri, by which each
party stipulated that no further arrests of citizens should
be made on either side for the expression of political
opinions, and releasing all who were then in custody on
such changes.
On the 2d of November, General Fremont was relieved
from his command in the Western Department, in consequence of his action in the matters above referred to, his
command devolving on General Hunter, to whom, as
soon as a change in the command of the Department had
been decided on, the President had addressed the following letter:--
WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861.
Sir:--The command of the Department of the West
having devolved
upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestion,
knowing how hazard ous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific
lines of
operation, as so much always depends on the knowledge of localities
and
passing events. It is intended, therefore, to leave considerable
margin
for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
The main rebel army (Price's) west of the
Mississippi is believed to
have passed Dade County in full retreat upon Northwestern Arkansas,
leaving Missouri almost free from the enemy, excepting in the
southeast
part of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems
desirable--as you
are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too
long a
line from your own base of supplies and re-enforcements--that you
should
give up the pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps
of
observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present
termini of railroads, then recruit the condition of both corps by
re establishing and improving their discipline and instruction,
perfecting
their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable
quarters.
Of course, both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously
employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these
two
points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious co-operation
with
Lane on the Kansas border, it would be very easy to concentrate, and
repel any army of the enemy returning on Missouri on the southwest.
As it is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before
or
during the approaching cold weather, before spring the people of
Missouri
will be in no favorable mood for renewing for next year the troubles
which have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this.
If you take this line of policy, and if, as I
anticipate, you will see no
enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus force
which you
can withdraw from those points, and direct to others, as may be
needed
--the railroads furnishing ready means of re-enforcing those main
points,
if occasion requires.
Doubtless local uprisings for a time will continue
to occur, but those
can be met by detachments of local forces of our own, and will ere
long
tire out of themselves.
While, as stated at the beginning of this letter, a
large discretion must
be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit
of Price,
or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis,
will be
exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole
force
engaged in it. Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
The Commander of the Department of the West.
General Hunter's first act was to repudiate the agreement of General Fremont with General Price, and, on
the 18th of November, General Halleck arrived as his
successor.
The action of General Fremont had given rise to very
serious complaints on the part of the people of Missouri;
and these, in turn, had led to strong demonstrations on his
behalf. His removal was made the occasion for public
manifestations of sympathy for him, and of censure for the
Government. An address was presented to him, signed by large numbers of
the citizens of St. Louis, those of
German birth largely predominating, in which his removal
was ascribed to jealousy of his popularity, and to the fact
that his policy in regard to emancipation was in advance
of the Government at Washington. "You have risen,"
said this address, "too fast in popular favor. The policy
announced in your proclamation, although hailed as a
political and military necessity, furnished your ambitious
rivals and enemies with a cruel weapon for your intended
destruction. The harbingers of truth will ever be crucified
by the Pharisees. We cannot be deceived by shallow
and flimsy pretexts, by unfounded and slanderous reports.
We entertain no doubt of your ability to speedily confound and silence your traducers. The day of reckoning
is not far distant, and the people will take care that the
schemes of your opponents shall, in the end, be signally
defeated." The General accepted these tributes to his
merits, and these denunciations of the Government, with
grateful acknowledgments, saying that the kind and affectionate demonstrations which greeted him, cheered and
strengthened his confidence--"my confidence," he said,
"already somewhat wavering, in our republican institutions."
The sharp personal discussions to which this incident
gave rise, were made still more bitter, by denunciations
of General Halleck's course in excluding, for military
reasons, which have been already noticed,2 fugitive
slaves
from our lines, and by the contest that soon came up in
the State Convention, on the general subject of emancipation. On the 7th of June, 1862, a bill was introduced
into the convention by Judge Breckinridge, of St. Louis,
for gradual emancipation, framed in accordance with the
recommendation of the President's Message. By the
combined votes of those who were opposed to emancipation in any form, and those who were opposed to the
President's plan of gradual emancipation, this bill was
summarily laid on the table. But on the 13th, the subject
was again brought up by a message from Governor Gamble, calling
attention to the fact that Congress had
passed a resolution, in accordance with the President's
recommendation, declaring that "the United States ought
to co-operate with any State which might adopt a gradual
emancipation of slavery, giving to such State, at its discretion, compensation for the inconvenience, public and
private, caused by such a change of system." This message was referred to a special committee, which reported
resolutions, recognizing the generous spirit of this proposal, but declining to take any action upon it. These
resolutions were adopted, and on the 16th a Mass Convention of Emancipationists, consisting of one hundred
and ninety-five delegates from twenty-five counties, met at
Jefferson City, and passed resolutions, declaring it to be the
duty of the next General Assembly to pass laws giving effect
to a gradual system of emancipation on the basis proposed.
At the State election, in the following November, the
question of emancipation was the leading theme of controversy. Throughout the State the canvass turned upon
this issue, and resulted in the choice of a decided majority
of the Assembly favorable to emancipation. But the division in the ranks of this party still continued, and crave
rise to very heated and bitter contests, especially in St.
Louis. During the summer, the main rebel army having
been driven from the State, and the Union army being of
necessity in the main withdrawn to other fields, the State
was overrun by reckless bands of rebel guerrillas, who
robbed and plundered Union citizens, and created very
great alarm among the people. In consequence of these
outrages, Governor Gamble ordered the organization of
the entire militia of the State, and authorized General
Schofield to call into active service such portions of it as
might be needed to put down marauders, and defend peace
able and loyal citizens. The organization was effected
with great promptness, and the State militia became a
powerful auxiliary of the National forces, and cleared all
sections of the State of the lawless bands which had inflicted so much injury and committed so many outrages.
On the 19th of September, the States of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas
were formed into a military district,
of which the command was assigned to General Curtis,
who was thoroughly in sympathy with the friends of immediate emancipation and the supporters of General
Fremont in his differences with the Government. He had
control of the National forces in his district, but Governor
Gamble did not give him command of the State militia.
The differences of political sentiment between the two
sections of the Union men of the State came thus to be
represented, to some extent, by two organized military
forces; and the contest between their respective partisans
continued to be waged with increasing bitterness, greatly
to the embarrassment of the Government at Washington,
and to the weakening of the Union cause. This continued
until the spring of 1863, when the President removed
General Curtis from his command, and appointed General
Schofield in his place. This gave rise to very vehement
remonstrances and protests, to one of which, sent by telegraph, the President made the following reply:--
Your dispatch
of to-day is just received. It is very painful to me that
you, in Missouri, cannot, or will not, settle your factional quarrel
among
yourselves. I have been tormented with it beyond endurance, for
months,
by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to
your
reason. I am now compelled to take hold of the case.
A. LINCOLN.
To General Schofield himself, the President soon after addressed
the following letter:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
May 27, 1868.
General J. M. SCHOFIELD:
DEAR SIR:--Having removed General Curtis and
assigned you to the
command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be of
sorre
advantage to me to state to you why I did it. I did not remove
General
Curtis because of my full conviction that he had done wrong by
commission or omission. I did it because of a conviction in my mind that
the
Union men of Missouri, constituting, when united, a vast majority of
the
people, have entered into a pestilent, factious quarrel, among
themselves,
General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one
faction, and
Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to
reconcile
the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until I felt it
my duty
to break it up somehow, and as I could not remove Governor Gamble, I
had to remove General Curtis. Now that you are in the position, I
wish
to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble
did it, but to exercise your own judgment, and do right for the
public interest. Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the
invaders
and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and
persecute the people. It is a difficult role, and so much greater will
be the
honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall
abuse
you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by
one
and praised by the other. Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
This action gave special dissatisfaction to the more radical Unionists of the State. They had been anxious to
have the Provisional Government, of which Governor
Gamble was the executive head, set aside by the National
authority, and the control of the State vested in a Military
Governor clothed with the authority which General Fremont had assumed to exercise by his proclamation of
August 31st, 1861; -- and the Germans enlisted in the
movement had made very urgent demands for the restoration of General Fremont himself. Several deputations
visited Washington, for the purpose of representing these
views and wishes to the President--though they by no
means restricted their efforts at reform to matters within
their own State, but insisted upon sundry changes in the
Cabinet, upon the dismissal of General Halleck from the
position of Commander of the Armies of the United States,
and upon other matters of equal magnitude and importance.
The following report of President Lincoln's reply to
these various requests was made by a member of a committee appointed at a mass meeting, composed mainly of
Germans, and held at St. Louis on the 10th of May:
although made by a person opposed to the President's
action, it probably gives a substantially correct statement
of his remarks:--
Messrs. EMILE PRETORIOUS, THEODORE OLSHAUSEN, R. E. ROMBAUR, &c.:
GENTLEMEN:--During a professional visit to
Washington City, I presented to the President of the United States, in compliance with
your instructions, a copy of the resolutions adopted in mass meeting at St.
Louis
on the 10th of May, 1863, and I requested a reply to the suggestions
therein
contained. The President, after a careful and loud reading of the
whole
report of proceedings, saw proper to enter into a
conversation of two hours' duration, in the course of which most of the
topics embraced in the resolutions and other subjects were discussed. As
my share in the conversation is of secondary importance, I propose to omit it entirely in this report, and, avoiding
details, to communicate to you the substance of noteworthy remarks made by the
President.
1. |
The President
said that it may be misfortune for the nation that he
was elected President. But, having been elected by the
people, he meant
to be President, and perform his duty according to his best
understanding,
if he had to die for it. No General will be removed, nor
will any change
in the Cabinet be made, to suit the views or wishes of any
particular
party, faction, or set of men. General Halleck is not guilty
of the charges
made against him, most of which arise from misapprehension
or ignorance,
of those who prefer them. |
2. |
The President
said that it was a mistake to suppose that Generals
John C. Fremont, B. F. Butler, and F. Sigel are
"systematically kept out
of command," as stated in the fourth resolution; that, on
the contrary,
he fully appreciated the merits of the gentlemen named; that
by their
own actions they had placed themselves in the positions
which they occu pied; that he was not only willing, but anxious to place
them again in
command as soon as he could find spheres of action for them,
without
doing injustice to others, but that at present he "had more
pegs than
holes to put them in." |
3. |
As to the want
of unity, the President, without admitting such to be
the case, intimated that each member of the Cabinet was
responsible
mainly for the manner of conducting the affairs of his
particular depart ment; that there was no centralization of responsibility for
the action of
theCabinet anywhere, except in the President himself. |
4. |
The
dissensions between Union men in Missouri are due solely to
a
factious spirit, which is exceedingly reprehensible. The two
parties
"ought to have their heads knocked together." "Either would
rather
see the defeat of their adversary than that of Jefferson
Davis." To this
spirit of faction is to be ascribed the failure of the
legislature to elect
senators and the defeat of the Missouri Aid Bill in
Congress, the passage
of which the President strongly desired. |
The President said that the Union men in Missouri who are in favor
of
gradual emancipation represented
his views better than those who are in
favor of immediate
emancipation. In explanation of his views on this
subject, the President said that in his speeches he had frequently
used as
an illustration, the case of a man who had an excrescence on the
back
of his neck, the removal of which, in one operation, would result in
the
death of the patient, while "tinkering it off by degrees" would
preserve
life. Although sorely tempted, I did not reply with the illustration
of the
dog whose tail was amputated by inches, but confined myself to argu ments. The President announced clearly that, as far as he was at
present advised, the radicals in Missouri had no right to consider
themselves the
exponents of his views on the subject of emancipation in that State.
5. General Curtis was
not relieved on account of any wrong act or great
mistake committed by him. The system of Provost-Marshals,
established
by him throughout the State, gave rise to violent complaint. That
the
President had thought at one time to appoint General Fremont in his
place; that at another time he had thought of appointing General Mc Dowell, whom he characterized as a good and loyal though very
unfortunate soldier; and that, at last, General Schofield was appointed,
with a
view, if possible, to reconcile and satisfy the two factions in
Missouri.
He has instructions not to interfere with either party, but to
confine him self to his military duties. I assure you, gentlemen, that our side
was as
fully presented as the occasion permitted. At the close of the
conversation, the President remarked that there was evidently a "serious
misunderstanding" springing up between him and the Germans of St. Louis,
which
he would like to see removed. Observing to him that the difference
of
opinion related to facts, men, and measures, I withdrew.
I am,
very respectfully, &c.,
JAMES TAUSSIG.
On the 1st of July the State Convention, in session at
Jefferson City, passed an amendment to the Constitution,
declaring that slavery should cease to exist in Missouri
on the 4th of July, 1870, with certain specified exceptions.
This, however, was by no means accepted as a final disposition of the matter. The demand was made for immediate emancipation, and Governor Gamble and the members of the Provisional Government who had favored the
policy adopted by the State Convention, were denounced
as the advocates of slavery and allies of the rebellion. In
the early part of August a band of rebel guerrillas made
a raid into the town of Lawrence, Kansas, and butchered
in cold blood over two hundred unarmed citizens of the
place. This brutal act aroused the most intense excitement in the adjoining State of Missouri, of which the opponents of the Provisional Government took advantage
to throw upon it and General Schofield, who had command
of the State militia as well as of the National forces, the
responsibility of having permitted this massacre to take
place.
A Mass Convention was held at Jefferson City on the 2d
of September, at which resolutions were adopted denouncing the military
policy pursued in the State and the delegation of military powers to the Provisional Government.
A committee of one from each county was appointed to
visit Washington and lay their grievances before the
President; and arrangements were also made for the appointment of a Committee of Public Safety, to organize and
arm the loyal men of the State, and, in the event of not obtaining relief, to call on the people in their sovereign capacity to "take such measures of redress as the emergency
might require." In the latter part of September the committee appointed by this convention visited Washington
and had an interview with the President on the 30th, in
which they represented Governor Gamble and General
Schofield as in virtual alliance with the rebels, and demanded the removal of the latter as an act of justice to
the loyal and anti-slavery men of the State. The committee visited several of the Northern cities, and held
public meetings for the purpose of enlisting public sentiment in their support. At these meetings it was claimed
that the radical emancipation party was the only one
which represented the loyalty of Missouri, and President
Lincoln was very strongly censured for "closing his ears
to the just, loyal, and patriotic demands of the radical
party, while he indorsed the disloyal and oppressive demands of Governor Gamble, General Schofield, and their
adherents."
On the 5th of October President Lincoln made to the
representations and requests of the committee the following reply:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, October 5,
1863.
Hon. CHARLES DRAKE and others, Committee:
GENTLEMEN:--Your original address, presented on the
30th ult., and
the four supplementary ones presented on the 3d inst., have been
care fully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties claiming
my
attention, together with the great length and importance of these
documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for not having responded
sooner.
These papers, framed for a common object, consist
of the things demanded, and the reasons for demanding them.
The things demanded are--
First. That
General Schofield shall be relieved, and General Butler be
appointed as Commander of the Military Department of Missouri.
Second. That
the system of enrolled militia in Missouri may be broken
up, and National forces be substituted for it; and
Third. That
at elections, persons may not be allowed to vote who are
not entitled by law to do so.
Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and
wrong to Union
men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case as
presented, fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the
enrolled
militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can
be
explained on a more charitable, and, as I think, a more rational hypothesis.
We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a
main question;
but in this case that question is a perplexing compound--Union and
slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of
at
least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying
nothing
of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union with,
but
not without slavery;
those for it without,
but not with;
those for it with
or without, but
prefer it with;
and those for it with or without,
but prefer it without.
Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are
for gradual, but
not for immediate,
and those who are for immediate,
but not for gradual
extinction of slavery.
It is easy to conceive that all these shades of
opinion, and even more,
may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all
being
for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a
different
way of sustaining the Union. At once, sincerity is questioned, and
motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is
spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion.
Deception
breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns.
Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be killed by
him.
Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be
among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes
abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to
confusion.
Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men
make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best serve for the
occasion.
These causes amply account for what has occurred in
Missouri, with out ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The
newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that
the
evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Fremont,
Hunter,
Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. If the former had greater
force
opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it.
When the organized rebel army left the State, the main Federal force
had
to go also, leaving the department commander at home, relatively no
stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with
confidence
that no commander of that department has, in proportion to his
means.
done better than General Schofield.
The first specific charge against General Schofield
is, that the enrolled
militia was placed under his command, whereas it had not been placed
under the command of General Curtis. The fact is, I believe, true;
but
you do not point out, nor can I conceive how that did, or could,
injure
loyal men or the Union cause.
You charge that General Curtis being superseded by
General Schofield,
Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead as Provost Marshal General. No very specific showing is made as to how this did
or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, however, the condition
of
things, as presented to me, which led to a change of commander of
that
department.
To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a
system of searches,
seizures, permits, and passes, had been introduced, I think, by
General
Fremont. When General Halleck came, he found and continued the sys tem, and added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to
levy
and collect contributions from noted rebels, to compensate losses,
and
relieve destitution caused by the rebellion. The action of General
Fremont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of system
which
General Curtis found in full operation when he took command of the
department. That there was a necessity for something of the sort, was
clear; but that it could only be justified by stern necessity, and
that it
was liable to great abuse in administration, was equally clear.
Agents to
execute it, contrary to the great prayer, were led into temptation.
Some
might, while others would not, resist that temptation. It was not
possible to hold any to a very strict accountability; and those yielding
to the
temptation would sell permits and passes to those who would pay most
and most readily for them, and would seize property and collect
levies
in the aptest way to fill their own pockets. Money being the object,
the
man having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be a victim. This
practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real
additional
evil, that it could be, and was plausibly charged to exist in
greater extent
than it did.
When General Curtis took command of the department,
Mr. Dick,
against whom I never knew any thing to allege, had general charge of
this
system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into almost
unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the necessity and
magnified the
evils of the system, while the other ignored the evils and magnified
the
necessity; and each bitterly assailed the other. I could not fail to
see
that the controversy enlarged in the same proportion as the
professed
Union men there distinctly took sides in two opposing political
parties.
I exhausted my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to
convince both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent
in the
case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory over
the other.
Plainly, the irritating system was not to be
perpetual; and it was
plausibly urged that it could be modified at once with advantage.
The
case could scarcely be worse, and whether it could be made better
could
only be determined by a trial. In this view, and not to ban or brand
General Curtis, or to give a victory to any party, I made the change
of
commander for the department. I now learn that soon after this
change
Mr. Dick was removed, and that Mr. Broadhead, a gentleman of no less
good character, was put in the place. The mere fact of this change
is
more distinctly complained of than is any conduct of the new
officer, or
other consequence of the change.
I gave the new commander no instructions as to the
administration of
the system mentioned, beyond what is contained in the private letter
afterwards surreptitiously published, in which I directed him to act
solely
for the public good, and independently of both parties. Neither any
thing you have presented me, nor any thing I have otherwise learned,
has
convinced me that he has been unfaithful to this charge.
Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General
Schofield; and
the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is pressed as evidence of
that imbecility. To my mind that fact scarcely tends to prove the
proposition.
That massacre is only an example of what Grierson, John Morgan, and
many others might have repeatedly done on their respective raids,
had
they chosen to incur the personal hazard, and possessed the fiendish
hearts
to do it.
The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose
to protect the
Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into
Missouri.
While no punishment could be too sudden or too severe for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of the threatened
remedial
raid into Missouri was the only way to avoid an indiscriminate
massacre
there, including probably more innocent than guilty. Instead of condemning, I therefore approve what I understand General Schofield did
in
that respect.
The charge that General Schofield has purposely
withheld protection
from loyal people, and purposely facilitated the objects of the
disloyal,
are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not arraign the
veracity
of gentlemen as to the facts complained of, but I do more than
question
the judgment which would infer that these facts occurred in
accordance
with the purposes of General Schofield.
With my present views, I must decline to remove
General Schofield
In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish it
were
convenient to assign him a suitable command.
In order to meet some existing evils, I have
addressed a letter of
instruction to General Schofield, a copy of which I enclose to you.
As to the "Enrolled Militia," I shall endeavor to ascertain, better
than I
now know, what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, that
your proposal to substitute National force for the "Enrolled
Militia,"
implies that, in your judgment, the latter is doing something which
needs to be done; and if so, the proposition to throw that force
away, and to
supply its place by bringing other forces from the field where they
are
urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. Whence shall they
come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or Grant, or Steele, or
Rosecrans?
Few things
have been so grateful to my anxious feelings, as when, in
June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so
promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant,
then
investing Vicksburg, and menaced from without by General Johnston.
Was this all wrong? Should the Enrolled Militia then have been
broken
up, and General Heron kept from Grant to police Missouri? So far
from
finding cause to object, I confess to a sympathy for whatever
relieves our
general force in Missouri, and allows it to serve elsewhere.
I therefore, as at present advised, cannot attempt
the destruction of
the Enrolled Militia of Missouri. I may add, that the force being
under
the National military control, it is also within the proclamation in
regard
to the habeas corpus.
I concur in the propriety of your request in regard
to elections, and
have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I do not
feel
justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the
political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to
time I
have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The
public knows it well. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it
obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each
agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish
both
to agree with me in all things; for then they would agree with each
other, and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They,
however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their right.
I,
too, shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in
Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me, and not to either Radicals
or
Conservatives. It is my duty to hear all; but, at last, I must,
within my
sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.
Your
obedient servant, |
A. LINCOLN. |
INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL SCHOFIELD.
EXECUTIVE: MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 1,
1863.
General JOHN M. SCHOFIFLD:
There is no organized military force in avowed
opposition to the Gen eral Government now in Missouri, and if any shall reappear, your
duty in
regard to it will be too plain to require any special instruction.
Still,
the condition of things, both there and elsewhere, is such as to
render
it indispensable to maintain, for a time, the United States military
establishment in that State, as well as to rely upon it for a fair
contribution
of support to that establishment generally. Your immediate duty in
regard to Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that
establishment, and to so use it, as far as practicable, to compel
the excited people there
to let one another alone.
Under your recent order, which I have approved, you
will only arrest
individuals, and suppress assemblies or newspapers, when they may
be.
working palpable injury
to the military in your charge; and in no other
case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form,
or
allow it to be interfered with violently by others. In this you have
a
discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness, and
forbearance.
With the matter of removing the inhabitants of
certain counties en
masse, and of removing certain individuals from time to time,
who are
supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving
to
your own discretion.
Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to
you to be necessary
restrictions upon trade and intercourse. I think proper, however,
to.
enjoin upon you the following: Allow no part of the military under
your command to be engaged in either returning fugitive slaves, or
in
forcing or enticing slaves from their homes; and, so far as
practicable,
enforce the same forbearance upon the people.
Report to me your opinion upon the availability for
good of the en rolled militia of the State. Allow no one to enlist colored troops,
except
upon orders from you, or from here through you.
Allow no one to assume the functions of
confiscating property, under
the law of Congress, or otherwise, except upon orders from here.
At elections see that those, and only those, are
allowed to vote, who
are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those
laws
the restrictions laid by the Missouri Convention upon those who may
have participated in the rebellion.
So far as practicable, you will, by means of your
military force, expel
guerrillas, marauders, and murderers, and all who are known to
harbor,
aid, or abet them. But in like manner you will repress assumptions
of
unauthorized individuals to perform the same service, because under
pretence of doing this they become marauders and murderers themselves.
To now restore peace, let the military obey orders;
and those not of
the military leave each other alone, thus not breaking the peace
them selves.
In giving the above directions, it is not intended
to restrain you in
other expedient and necessary matters not falling within their
range.
Your
obedient servant, |
A. LINCOLN. |
The condition of affairs in this department continued to
be greatly disturbed by political agitations, and the personal controversies to which they gave rise; and after a
lapse of some months the President deemed it wise to
relieve General Schofield from further command in this
department. This was done by an order from the War Department, dated
January 24th, 1864, by which, also,
General Rosecrans was appointed in his place. In his
order assuming command, dated January 30th, General
Rosecrans paid a very high compliment to his predecessor, for the admirable order in which he found the business
of the department, and expressed the hope that he might
receive "the honest, firm, and united support of all true
national and Union men of the Department, without
regard to politics, creed, or party, in his endeavors to
maintain law and re-establish peace, and secure prosperity through out its limits."
Before closing this notice of the perplexities and annoyances to which the President was subjected by the
domestic contentions of Missouri, we may mention, as an
illustration of the extent to which they were carried, the
case of Rev. Dr. McPheeters, who had been silenced by
General Curtis for preaching disloyalty to his congregation in St. Louis. The incident gave rise to a good deal
of excitement, which was continued throughout the year.
Towards the close of it the President wrote the following
letter in reply to an appeal for his interference:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, December 28,
1863.
I have just looked over a petition signed by some
three dozen citizens
of St. Louis, and their accompanying letters, one by yourself, one
by a
Mr. Nathan Ranney, and one by a Mr. John D. Coalter, the whole rela ting to the Rev. Dr. McPheeters. The petition prays, in the name of
justice and mercy, that I will restore Dr. McPheeters to all his
ecclesiastical rights.
This gives no intimation as to what ecclesiastical
rights are withdrawn.
Your letter states that Provost-Marshal Dick, about a year ago,
ordered
the arrest of Dr. McPheeters, pastor of the Vine Street Church, prohibited him from officiating, and placed the management of affairs
of the
church out of the control of the chosen trustees; and near the close
you
state that a certain course "would insure his release." Mr. Ranney's
letter says: "Dr. Samuel McPheeters is enjoying all the rights of a
civilian, but cannot preach the Gospel!" Mr. Coalter, in his letter,
asks:
"Is it not a strange illustration of the condition of things, that
the question who shall be allowed to preach in a church in St. Louis shall
be decided by the President of the United States?"
Now, all this sounds very strangely; and, withal, a
little as if you
gentlemen, making the application, do not understand the case alike:
one affirming that his doctor is enjoying all the rights of a
civilian, and
another pointing' out to me what will secure his release!,
On the 2d of
January last, I wrote to General Curtis in relation to Mr. Dick's
order
upon Dr. McPheeters; and, as I suppose the doctor is enjoying all
the
rights of a civilian, I only quote that part of my letter which
relates to
the church. It was as follows: "But I must add that the United
States
Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the
churches.
When an individual, in a church or out of it, becomes dangerous to
the
public interest, he must be checked; but the churches, as such, must
take care of themselves. It will not do for the United States to
appoint
trustees, supervisors, or other agents for the churches."
This letter going to General Curtis, then in
command, I supposed, of
course, it was obeyed, especially as I heard no further complaint
from
Doctor Mc. or his friends for nearly an entire year. I have never
interfered, nor thought of interfering, as to who shall or shall not
preach in
any church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one
else
to interfere by my authority. If any one is so interfering by color
of my
authority, I would like to have it specifically made known to me.
If, after all, what is now sought, is to have me
put Doctor Mc. back
over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that, too,
will be
declined. I will not have control of any church on any side.
A. LINCOLN.
The Presbytery, the regular church authority in the
matter, subsequently decided that Dr. McPheeters could
not return to his pastoral charge.
The victories of the Union arms during the summer of
1863--the repulse of the rebels at Gettysburg, the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the consequent
restoration of the Mississippi to the commerce of the
nation--produced the most salutary effect upon the public
sentiment of the country. There was a good deal of
partisan opposition to specific measures of the Administration, and in some quarters this took the form of open
hostility to the further prosecution of the war. But the
spirit and determination of the people were at their
height, and the Union party entered upon the political
contests of the autumn of 1863, in the several States,
with confidence and courage.
The President had been invited by the Republican State
Committee of Illinois to attend the State Convention, to be held at
Springfield on the 3d of September. Finding
it impossible to accept the invitation, he wrote in reply
the following letter, in which several of the most conspicuous features of his policy are defended against the
censures by which they had been assailed:--
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 26,
1863.
Hon. JAMES C. CONKLING:
MY DEAR SIR:--Your letter inviting me to attend a
mass meeting of
unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois, on
the 3d
day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable for
me
thus to meet my old friends at my own home; but I cannot just now be
absent from here so long as a visit there would require.
The meeting is to be of all those who maintain
unconditional devotion
to the Union; and I am sure that my old political friends will thank
me
for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble
men
whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the
nation's
life.
There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To
such I would say:
You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how
can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First--to
sup press the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are
you
for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second
way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If
you
are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force,
nor yet for dis solution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.
I do not believe that any compromise embracing the
maintenance of
the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly
opposite
belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army.
That army
dominates all the country, and all the people, within its range. Any
offer
of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to
that army, is simply nothing for the present; because such man or
men
have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if
one.
were made with them.
To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and
peace men of the
North get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a
compromise
embracing a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army
can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can
ultimately
drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army.
In an
effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the enemy would
improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all.
A compromise, to be effective, must be made either
with those who
control the rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the
domination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow
me to
assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from
any
of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has
ever
come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the
contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any
such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and
kept a
secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of
the
people, according to the bond of service, the United States
Constitution;
and that, as such, I am responsible to them.
But, to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about
the negro.
Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself
upon
that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while
you, I
suppose, do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any
measure
which is not consistent with even your view, provided that you are
for
the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation; to which you re plied you wished not be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked
you
to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from
greater
taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.
You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and
perhaps would have
it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I
think
the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war
in
time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves
are
property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the
law of
war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when
needed?
And is it not needed whenever it helps us and hurts the enemy?
Armies,
the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it;
and
even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized
belligerents
do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a
few
things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the
massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.
But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is
not valid. If it is
not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be
retracted, any
more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to
think
its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after
the retraction than before the
issue? There was more than a year and a
half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the Proclamation was
issued,
the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice
that
it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their
allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us
since
the issue of the Proclamation as before.
I know, as fully as one can know the opinions of
others, that some of
the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our
most
important victories, believe the Emancipation policy and the use of
colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the
rebellion,
and that at least one of those important successes could not have
been
achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers.
Among the commanders who hold these views are some
who have
never had any affinity with what is called "Abolitionism," or with
"Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military
opinions. I submit their opinions as entitled to some weight against
the
objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are
unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good
faith.
You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some
of them seem
willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then,
exclusively, to
save the Union. I issued the Proclamation. on purpose to aid you in
saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance
to
the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an
apt time
then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I
thought that
in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes
should
cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his
re sistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever
negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for
white
soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you?
But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do
any thing for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their
lives
for us they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the
promise
of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.
The signs look better. The Father of Waters again
goes unvexed to
the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to
them.
Three hundred miles up they met New-England, Empire, Keystone, and
Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in
more
colors than one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot, their part
of the
history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great
national
one, and let none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it. And
while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even
that is not all. It is hard to say that any thing has been more
bravely and
well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro', Gettysburg, and on many
fields of less note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web feet be forgotten. At
all
the watery margins they have been present, not only on the deep sea,
the
broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou,
and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made
their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic--for the
principle
it lives by and keeps alive--for man's vast future--thanks to all.
Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it
will come soon,
and come to stay; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all
future
time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there can be
no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they
who take
such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there
will
be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and
clinched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have
helped mankind on to this great consummation, while I fear there
will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart
and deceitful speech they have striven to hinder it.
Still, let us
not be over-sanguine of a speedy, final triumph. Let us be
quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that
a
just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.
Yours, very
truly, |
A. LINCOLN. |
The result of the canvass justified the confidence of the
friends of the Administration. Every State in which elections were held, with the single exception of New Jersey,
voted to sustain the Government; and in all the largest
and most important States the majorities were so large as
to make the result of more than ordinary significance. In
Ohio, Vallandigham, who had been put in nomination
mainly on account of the issue he had made with the
Government in the matter of his arrest, was defeated by a
majority of nearly one hundred thousand. New York,
which had elected Governor Seymour the year before,
and had been still further distinguished and disgraced by
the anti-draft riots of July, gave a majority of not far from
thirty thousand for the Administration; and Pennsylvania, in spite of the personal participation of General
McClellan in the canvass against him, re-elected Governor
Curtin by about the same majority. These results followed a very active and earnest canvass, in which the
opponents of the Administration put forth their most
vigorous efforts for its defeat. The ground taken by its
friends in every State was that which had been held by
the President from the beginning--that the rebellion must
be suppressed and the Union preserved, at whatever cost
--that this could only be done by force, and that it was
not only the right, but the duty, of the Government to use
all the means at its command, not incompatible with the
laws of war and the usages of civilized nations, for the
accomplishment of this result. They vindicated the action
of the Government in the matter of arbitrary arrests, and
sustained throughout the canvass, in every State, the
policy of the President in regard to slavery and in issuing
the Proclamation of Emancipation as a military measure,
against the vehement and earnest efforts of the Opposition.
The result was, therefore, justly claimed as a decided verdict of the people in support of the Government. It was so regarded by all parties throughout the country, and its effect upon their action was of marked
importance. While it gave renewed vigor and courage to the friends of the Administration everywhere, it developed the division of sentiment in the ranks of the Opposition, which, in its incipient stages, had largely contributed to their defeat. The majority of that party were inclined to acquiesce in the deliberate judgment of the country, that the rebellion could be subdued only by successful war, and to sustain the Government in whatever measures might be deemed necessary for its effectual
prosecution:-- but the resolute resistance of some of its more
conspicuous leaders withheld them from open action in this direction.
|