THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1856. DOUGLAS AT SPRINGFIELD IN 1857. LINCOLN'S
REPLY. THE GREAT DEBATE. ELOQUENT DEFENCE OF THE
DOCTRINES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. RESULT OF THE CONTEST.
THE pressure of the slavery contest at last fully organized the Republican party, which held its first convention
for the nomination of President and Vice-President at
Philadelphia, on June 17, 1856. John G. Fremont was
nominated for President, and William L. Dayton for
"V ice-President. Mr. Lincoln's name was prominent before the convention for the latter office, and on the informal ballot he stood next to Mr. Dayton, receiving 110
votes. Mr. Lincoln' s name headed the Republican electoral ticket in Illinois, and he took an active part in the
canvass, but the Democrats carried the State, though
only by a plurality vote. Meanwhile, Senator Douglas embraced every opportunity to keep himself and his doctrines before the
people, but whichever way he turned, he found his
vigilant antagonist constantly in his front. For twenty
years the two had been so invariably opposed to each
other in politics, that whenever Mr. Douglas made a
speech, the people instinctively anticipated a reply from
Mr. Lincoln; and there was a special Providence in thus
opposing to the wily, deceptive sophistries of the former
the clear, incisive common sense of the latter, which the
multitude could not avoid comprehending. Early in
June, 1857, Senator Douglas made his famous speech in
Springfield, which was universally accepted as a declaration that he meant to sustain all the acts of the Lecompton Convention, even though a proslavery
constitution should be formed, the responsibility for the adoption of
which he meant to fasten upon the Republican party,
since it was anticipated that the members of that organization in the Territory would refrain from voting. He
further indorsed the Dred Scott decision in this same
speech, and, in discussing the Utah rebellion, proposed to
end the difficulty by annulling the act establishing the
Territory. Mr. Lincoln promptly took issue with him
upon all these points, in a speech also delivered at
Springfield, two weeks later. He declared himself in
favor of "coercing" the people of Utah into obedience,
and while he "did not admit or deny that the Judge's
method of coercing them might not be as good as any,"
he showed how Mr. Douglas abandoned his principles,
and "his much-vaunted doctrine of self-government for
the Territories," by suggesting such a plan. He then
defended the course of action which the Republicans in
Kansas had adopted, and ridiculed mercilessly the mythical "Free State Democrats," of whom so much had been
said. Next he discussed the Dred Scott decision, and
showed that, in denouncing it, he had not gone so far as
Mr. Douglas himself had done in applauding General
Jackson for disregarding the decision of the same tribunal
upon the constitutionality of the National Bank. Quoting
from the Dred Scott decision some expressions in which
Chief Justice Taney intimated that the public estimate of
the black man was more favorable then than it was in the
days of the revolution, Mr. Lincoln replied to the implication in the following forcible manner:
This assumption is a mistake. In some trifling particulars the condition of that race has been ameliorated; but, as a whole, in this
country,
the change between then and now is decidedly the other way; and their
ultimate destiny has never appeared so hopeless as in the last three or
four years. In two of the five States New Jersey and North Carolina
that then gave the free negro the right of voting, the right has since
been
token away; and in the third New York it has been greatly abridged,
while it has not been extended, so far as I know, to a single additional
State, though the number of the States has more than doubled. In those
'lays, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate
their slaves; but, since then, such legal restraints have been made
upon emancipation as to amount almost to prohibition. In those days, legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their
respective
States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State
constitutions
to withhold that power from the legislatures. In those days, by common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to the new countries
was prohibited; but now, Congress decides that it will not continue the
prohibition, and the Supreme Court decides that it could not, if it
would.
In those days, our Declaration of Independence was held sacred by all,
and thought to include all; but now, to aid in making the bondage of
the
negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, sneered at, construed,
hawked
at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they
could
not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly
combining
against him. Mammon is after him; ambition follows, philosophy follows, and the theology of the day is fast joining the cry. They have him
in his prison-house; they have searched his person, and left no prying
instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy
iron doors upon him; and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with
a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different
men,
and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they
stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and
matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more
complete than it is.
It is grossly incorrect to say or assume that the public estimate of
the negro is more favorable now than it was at the origin of the Government.
No one would have been more surprised than Mr. Lincoln himself, could the fact have been revealed to him,
when uttering these words, that through him as an humble instrument in the hands of Providence, and in the
brief space of eight years, a vast change would be brought
about in the status, of that class, whose sufferings and
wrongs he thus eloquently depicted. In this same speech Mr. Lincoln turned from the course
of his argument for a moment, to demolish, in his characteristic manner, the absurd charge which his opponent
had demeaned himself by repeating, that, in laboring to
secure the negro his rights, the Republicans desired to
place him on a complete political and social equality with
themselves. He said:
There is a natural disgust, in the minds of nearly all white people, to
the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the white and black races; and Judge Douglas evidently is basing his chief hope upon the chances
of
his being able to appropriate the benefit of this disgust to himself. If
ho
can, by much drumming and repeating, fasten the odium of that idea
upon his adversaries, he thinks he can struggle through the storm. He
therefore clings to this hope, as a drowning man to the last plank. He
makes an occasion for lugging it in from the opposition to the Dred
Scott
decision. He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of
Independence includes ALL men, black as well as white, and forthwith
he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to
argue gravely that all who contend that it does, do so only because
they want to vote, eat and sleep, and marry with negroes! He will
have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now, I protest against
the counterfeit logic which concludes that, because I do not want a black woman for a slave, I must
necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either. I can
just leave her alone. In some respects, she certainly is not my equal;
but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands,
without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal, and the equal of
all others.
We have thus presented the leading points in these
two speeches, because the discussion was the prelude to
the famous Senatorial contest of 1858, which gave Mr.
Lincoln a national reputation, not only as an able debater
and eloquent orator, but as a sagacious and wise politician wise enough to stand inflexibly by principles of
the soundness of which he was himself satisfied, even
against the judgment of earnest friends. On the 4th of March, 1857, Mr. Buchanan had taken
his seat in the Presidential chair. The struggle between
freedom and slavery for the possession of Kansas was at
its height. A few days after his inauguration, the Supreme Court rendered the Dred Scott decision, which was
thought by the friends of slavery to insure their victory,
by its holding the Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional, because the Constitution itself carried slavery all
over the Territories of the United States. In spite of this
decision, the friends of freedom in Kansas maintained
their ground. The slaveholders, however, pushed forward their schemes, and in November, 1857, their Constitutional Convention, held at Lecompton, adopted the
Lecompton Constitution. The trick by which they submitted to the popular vote only a schedule on the slavery question, instead of the whole Constitution, compelling
every voter, however he might vote upon this schedule.
to vote for their Constitution, which fixed slavery upon
the State just as surely, whether the schedule was adopted
or not, will be well remembered, as well as the feeling
which so unjust a device excited throughout the North.
Judge Douglas had sustained the Dred Scott decision, "but
he could not sustain this attempt to force upon the people
of Kansas a Constitution against their will. He took
ground openly and "boldly against it denouncing it in
the Senate and elsewhere as an outrage upon the people
of Kansas, and a violation of every just Democratic principle. He declared that he did not care whether the
people voted the Slavery clause "up or down," but he
thought they ought to have the chance to vote for or
against the Constitution itself. The Administration had made the measure their own,
and this opposition of Douglas at once excited against
him the active hostility of the slaveholders and their
friends, with whom he had hitherto acted in concert.
The bill was finally passed through Congress on April
30th, 1858, under what is known as the English Bill,
whereby the Constitution was to be submitted to the
votes of the people of Kansas, with the offer of heavy
bribes to them, in the way of donations of land, etc., if
they would accept it; and the people, in spite of the
bribes, voted it down by an immense majority. Judge Douglas's term was on the eve of expiring, and
he came home to Illinois after the adjournment of Congress, to attend in person to the political campaign, upon
the result of which was to depend his re-election to the
Senate. His course on the Lecompton bill had made an open
breach between him and the Administration, and he had
rendered such good service to the Republicans, in their
battle with that monstrous infamy, that there were not
wanting many among them who were inclined to think it
would be wise not to oppose his re-election. But the Republicans of Illinois thought otherwise. They knew that he was not in any sense a Republican.
They knew that on the cardinal principle of the Republican party, opposition to the spread of Slavery into the
Territories, he was not with them; for he had declared
in the most positive way that he "did not care whether
Slavery was voted down or up." And they therefore
determined, in opposition to the views of some influential
Republicans, at home as well as in other States, to fight
the battle through against him, with all the energy that
they could bring to the work. And to this end, on the
17th of June, 1858, at their State Convention at Springfield, they nominated Mr. Lincoln as their candidate for
the Senate of the United States. The circumstances we have briefly sketched invested
the campaign about to open with national importance.
The people of the whole Union saw that the struggle then
initiated in Illinois must ultimately extend to other States,
and they knew that they would soon be compelled themselves to pass upon
the questions there to be decided. None doubted that the principle of "Popular Sovereignty''
would be thoroughly examined, for the reputation of the
two combatants as men of extraordinary ability was established. It was the universal expectation that each
aspirant for senatorial honors would display peculiar
caution in opening the struggle, in order to prevent the
other from gaining any undue advantage; but Mr. Lincoln scorned every appearance of subterfuge or evasion.
His opinions had become sharply defined and clearly
crystallized during the contests through which he had
passed in the years preceding, and in his speech to the
Convention which nominated him, signifying his acceptance of the honor conferred upon him, he expressed himself so unreservedly and frankly that even his supporters
were for the moment startled. In a speech delivered at Chicago, July 9, the first
after Mr. Lincoln's nomination, Senator Douglas alluded
to this address as having been " well prepared and carefully written." In reply, Mr. Lincoln said, " Gentlemen.
Judge Douglas informed you that this speech of mine was probably carefully prepared. I admit that it was.
I am not a master of language. I have not a fine education; I am not capable of entering into a disquisition
upon dialectics, as I "believe you call it." In the address
thus alluded to, Mr. Lincoln struck the key-note of the
campaign. Its exposition of his political creed, and his
statement of the important points at issue, is so succinct
and complete that we reproduce it here. It is as follows:
MR. PRESIDENT, AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION: If we could
first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better
judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year
since a policy was initiated with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation, of
that
policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly
augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been
reached
and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe
this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do
not expect the Union to be dissolved, I do not expect the house to fall,
but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one
thing,
or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the
further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the
belief
that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will
push
it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as
well as
, new, North as well as South.
Have we no tendency to the latter condition?
Let any one who doubts carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination piece of machinery, so to speak compounded
of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider
not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted; but also let him study the history of its construction, and trace,
if he
can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace, the evidences of design and
concert
of action among its chief architects from the beginning.
The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the
States by State Constitutions, and from most of the national territory
by
Congressional prohibition. Four days later commenced the struggle
which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened
all the national territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.
But so far Congress only had acted; and an indorsement by the people,
real or apparent, was indispensable, to save the point already gained
and
give chance for more.
This necessity had not been overlooked, but had been provided for, as
well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty, "otherwise called" sacred right of self-government;" which latter
phrase,
though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so
perverted in this attempted use of it as to amount to just this: That
if
any one man choose to enslave another, no third man shall he allowed to
object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in
the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of
this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to
exclude
it there from; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form
and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to
the
Constitution of the United States." Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter sovereignty," and "sacred right of
self-government." "But," said opposition members, "let us amend the bill so
as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory may exclude
slavery." "Not we," said the friends of the measure; and down they
voted the amendment.
While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a law-case, involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having
voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then into a Territory
covered by the Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave for a
long
time in each, was passing through the United States Circuit Court for
the
District of Missouri; and both Nebraska bill and lawsuit were brought
to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was
" Dred Scott," which name now designates the decision finally made in
the case. Before the then next presidential election, the law-case came
to, and was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United States; but the
decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the
election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the
leading
advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of
a,
Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and
the
latter answers: "That is a question for the Supreme Court."
The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement,
such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly
four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly
reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing president, in his ^last annual
message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the
weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court met again;
did not announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument. The presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but the
incoming President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the
people to abide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be.
Then, in a few days, came the decision.
The reputed author of the Nebraska bill finds an early occasion to make
a speech at this capital, indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and
vehemently
denouncing all opposition to it. The new president, too, seizes the
early occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly construe that
decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had
ever been entertained.
At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author
of the Nebraska bill, on the mere question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution was or was not, in any just sense, made by the people
of Kansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is
a
fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be
voted
down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration that he cares not
whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other
than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public
mind the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and
is ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle.
If
he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is
the
only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott
decision " squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled
down,
like temporary scaffolding like the mould at the foundry served through
one blast and fell back into loose sand helped to carry an election, and
then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point the right of
a people to make their own constitution upon which he and the Republicans have never differed.
The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's " care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in
its
present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. The
working points of that machinery are:
First. That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no
descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the
sense of
that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point
is
made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the
benefit
of that provision of the United States Constitution, which declares that
" The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States."
Secondly. That, "subject to the Constitution of the United States,"
neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from
any United States territory. This point is made in order that individual
men may fill up the Territories with slaves without danger of losing
them
as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the institution through all the future.
Thirdly. That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free
State makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts
will
not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave
State
the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not to
be pressed immediately, but, if acquiesced in for awhile, and
apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical
conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott,
in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with
any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free
State.
Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska
doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion,
at
least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down
or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially, also,
whither we are tending.
It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back, and run the
mind over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things
will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were
transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only
to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders
could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted niche
for the Dred Scott decision to afterward come in, and declare the
perfect
freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. "Why was the amendment, expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down? Plainly
enough now: the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the
Dred Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even
a Senator's individual opinion withheld till after the presidential
election?
Plainly enough now: the speaking out then would have damaged the
perfectly free argument upon which the election was to be carried. Why
the outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the delay
of a re-argument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in
favor of the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and
petting of a spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is
dreaded that he may give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after indorsement of the decision by the President and others?
We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the
result of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different
portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and
places, and by different workmen Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James,
for instance and when we see these timbers joined together, and see
they exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and
mortices exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the
different pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece
too
many or too few not omitting even scaffolding or, if a single piece be
lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet
to
bring such piece in in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe
that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one
another from the beginning, and All worked upon a common plan or
draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.
It should not be overlooked that, by the Nebraska bill, the
people of a State, as well as Territory, were to be left "perfectly free," "subject
only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating
for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly, the people of a
State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United
States; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely territorial
law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State
therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein
treated as being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by
Chief-Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions
of
all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of
the
United States neither permits Congress nor a territorial legislature to
exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to
declare
whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a
State, to exclude it. Possibly, this is a mere omission; but who can be
quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a
declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude
slavery
from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill; I
ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in
the one case, as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the
point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge
Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and
almost the language, too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion, his
exact language is, "except in cases where the power is restrained by the
Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over
the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction." In what cases the power
of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is
left an
open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint on
the
power of the Territories, was left open in the Nebraska act. Put this
and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may,
ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that
the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude
slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected, if the
doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up," shall
gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a
decision
can be maintained when made.
Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in
all the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably
coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present
political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly
dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their
State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme
Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power
of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would prevent
that consummation. That is what we have to do. How can we best do it
?
There are those who denounce us openly to their own friends, and yet
whisper us softly, that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there
is
with which to effect that object. They wish us to infer all, from the
fact that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the
dynasty;
and that he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he
and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and
that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a
living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead
lion,
for this work, is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose
the advances of slavery? He don't care any thing about it. His avowed
mission is impressing the " public heart" to care nothing about it. A
leading Douglas democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent
will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave-trade. Does
Douglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He
has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he
resist
it? For years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to
take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it
is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheapest?
And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of
slavery to one of a mere right of property; and as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave-trade how can he refuse that trade in that "
property" shall be " perfectly free" unless he does it as a protection to
the
home production? And as the home producers will probably not ask the
protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.
Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser
to-day than he was yesterday that he may rightfully change when he
finds himself wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer
that he will make any particular change, of which he himself has given
no intimation? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inference? Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's
position, question his motives, or do aught that can be personally
offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and we can come together on principle, so that our cause may have assistance from his great ability, I
hope
to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But, clearly, he is not now
with us he does not pretend to be he does not promise ever to be.
Our cause, then must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own
undoubted friends: those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the
work who do care for the result. Two years ago, the Republicans
of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did
this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with
every external circumstance against us. Of strange, discordant, and
even hostile elements, we gathered from the four winds, and formed
and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a
disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then, to
falter now? - now, when that same enemy is wavering, dissevered, and belligerent?
The result is not doubtful. "We shall not fail if we stand firm, we
shall
not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate, or mistakes delay it; but,
sooner
or later, the victory is sure to come.
The first paragraph of this speech has become famous
in our political history, and the whole address, with its
bold utterance of truths which many, even of Mr. Lincoln' s supporters, did not at that time care to face, was a
fitting prelude to the great contest which was to follow.
Although, as its author admitted, it had been carefully
prepared, he had not consulted with any of his friends
regarding it, and none of them, even those with whom he
was the most intimate, knew of the positions which he
intended to take, until they heard them enunciated from
the platform in Springfield, on that memorable June 17.
Three weeks later (July 9), Senator Douglas arrived in
Chicago, where his friends welcomed him with the most
ostentatious demonstrations. On the same day he made
a speech, reviewing Mr. Lincoln's address to the Springfield Convention. He spoke of Mr. Lincoln as "a kind,
amiable, and intelligent gentleman, a good citizen and an
honorable opponent," and then proceeded to reply to
the speech in question, assuming a tone of superiority
almost amounting to superciliousness. He was especially
severe upon the introductory passage of Mr. Lincoln' s
address, in which he asserted his belief that the Government could not endure half slave and half free. Mr.
Lincoln was himself present during the delivery of
Senator Douglas' s speech, and on the next evening took
occasion to reply to it before an immense assemblage,
specially convened for that purpose. After a few introductory remarks, Mr. Lincoln thus alluded to the famous
phrase which had become the watchword of the Democratic party for the campaign:
Popular sovereignty! everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us for a
moment inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty. What is
popular sovereignty? We recollect that at an early period in the
history
of this struggle, there was another name for the same thing Squatter Sovereignty. It was not exactly Popular Sovereignty, but Squatter
Sovereignty. What do those terms mean? "What do those terms mean
when used now? And vast credit is taken by our friend, the Judge, in
regard to his support of it, when he declares the last years of his life
have
been, and all the future years of his life shall be, devoted to this
matter
of popular sovereignty. "What is it? "Why, it is the sovereignty of the
people! "What was Squatter Sovereignty? I suppose, if it had any significance at all, it was the right of the people to govern themselves,
to be
sovereign in their own affairs, while they were squatted down in a
country not their own while they had squatted on a Territory that did
not belong to them, in the sense that a State belongs to the people who
inhabit it when it belonged to the nation such right to govern themselves was called " Squatter Sovereignty."
Now I wish you to mark. What has. become of that Squatter Sovereignty? What has become of it? Can you get anybody to tell you now
that the people of a Territory have any authority to govern themselves,
in regard to this mooted question of slavery, before they form a State
Constitution? No such thing at all, although there is a general running
fire, and although there has been a hurrah made in every speech on that
side, assuming that policy had given the people of a Territory the right
to govern themselves upon this question; yet the point is dodged. Today it has been decided no more than a year ago it was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and is insisted upon to-day, that
the
people of a Territory have no right to exclude slavery from a Territory,
that if any one man chooses to take slaves into a Territory, all the
rest
of the people have no right to keep them out. This being so, and this
decision being made one of the points that the Judge approved, and one
in the approval of which he says he means to keep me down put me
down I should not say, for I have never been up. He says he is in favor
of it, and sticks to it, and expects to win his battle on that decision,
which says that there is no such thing as Squatter Sovereignty; but
that
any one man may take slaves into a Territory, and all the other men in
the Territory may be opposed to it, and yet by reason of the
Constitution
they cannot prohibit it. When that is so, how much is left of this vast
matter of Squatter Sovereignty, I should like to know?
The Lecompton Constitution and its fate were next discussed, and then Mr. Lincoln proceeded to reply to the
inferences which his opponent had so characteristically
but unwarrantably drawn from the introductory paragraph of his Springfield speech. He said:
In this paragraph which I have quoted in your hearing, and to which I
ask the attention of all, Judge Douglas thinks he discovers great
political heresy. I want your attention particularly to what he has inferred from
it. He says I am in favor of making all the States of this Union uniform
in all their internal regulations; that in all their domestic concerns
I am
in favor of making them entirely uniform. He draws this inference from
the language I have quoted to you. He says that I am in favor of making
war by the North upon the South for the extinction of slavery; that I
am
also in favor of inviting (as he expresses it) the South to a war upon
the
North, for the purpose of nationalizing slavery. Now, it is singular
enough,
if you will carefully read that passage over, that I did not say that I
was in
favor of any thing in it. I only said what I expected would take place.
I
made a prediction only it may have been a foolish one, perhaps. I did
not even say that I desired that slavery should be put in course of
ultimate extinction. I do say so now, however, so there need be no longer
any difficulty about that. It may be written down in the great speech.
Gentlemen, Judge Douglas informed you that this speech of mine was
probably carefully prepared. I admit that it was. I am not master of
language; I have not a fine education; I am not capable of entering
into
a disquisition upon dialectics, as I believe you call it; but I do not
believe
the language I employed bears any such construction as Judge Douglas
puts upon it. But I don't care about a quibble in regard to words. I
know what I meant, and I will not leave this crowd in doubt, if I can
explain it to them, what I really meant in the use of that paragraph.
I am not, in the first place, unaware that this Government has endured
eighty-two years half slave and half free. I know that. I am tolerably
well acquainted with the history of the country, and I know that it has
endured eighty-two years, half slave and half free. I believe and that
is
what I meant to allude to there I believe it has endured, because during
all that time, until the introduction of the Nebraska bill, the public
mind
did rest all the time in the belief that slavery was in course of
ultimate
extinction. That was what gave us the rest that we had through that
period of eighty-two years; at least, so I believe. I have always hated
slavery, I think, as much as any Abolitionist I have been an Old Line Whig I have always hated it, but I have always been quiet about it until this new era of the introduction of the Nebraska bill began. I
always
believed that everybody was against it, and that it was in course of
ultimate extinction. [Pointing to Mr. Browning, who stood near by.]
Browning thought so; the great mass of the nation have rested in the
belief that slavery was in course of ultimate extinction. They had
reason so to believe.
The adoption of the Constitution and its attendant history led the
people to believe so; and that such was the belief of the framers of
the
Constitution itself, why did those old men, about the time of the
adoption
of the Constitution, decree that slavery should not go into the new
Territory, where it had not already gone? Why declare that within twenty
years the African Slave Trade, by which slaves are supplied, might be
cut off by Congress? Why were all these acts? I might enumerate more
of these acts hut enough. What were they hut a clear indication that
the framers of the Constitution intended and expected the ultimate extinction of that institution? And now, when I say, as I said in my
speech
that Judge Douglas has quoted from, when I say that I think the opponents of slavery will resist the farther spread of it, and place it
where the
public mind shall rest with the belief that it is in course of ultimate
extinction, I only mean to say, that they will place it where the founders
of this Government originally placed it.
I have said a hundred times, and I have now no inclination to take it
back, that I believe there is no right, and ought to be no inclination
in
the people of the free States to enter into the slave States, and
interfere
with the question of slavery at all. I have said that always; Judge
Douglas has heard me say it if not quite a hundred times, at least as
good as a hundred times; and when it is said that I am in favor of
interfering with slavery where it exists, I know it is unwarranted by
any thing I have ever intended, and, as I believe, by any thing I have
ever
said. If, by any means, I have ever used language which could fairly be
so construed (as, however, I believe I never have), I now correct it.
So much, then, for the inference that Judge Douglas draws, that I am
in favor of setting the sections at war with one another. I know that
I never meant any such thing, and I believe that no fair mind can infer
any such thing from any thing I have ever said.
These speeches in Chicago and those that had preceded
them made it evident that the struggle was to take the
shape of a personal contest between the two men, and in
every respect, physically, mentally, and politically,
they were thoroughly antagonistic to each other. Each,
moreover, recognized the other as the embodiment of
principles to which he was in deadly hostility. Judge
Douglas was the champion of all sympathizers with
slavery at the North of those who openly advocated it,
and still more of those who took the more plausible and
dangerous part of not caring whether it'' was voted down
or up." Mr. Lincoln's soul was on fire with love for
freedom and for humanity, and with reverence for the
Fathers of the country, and for the principles of freedom
for all, under the light of which they marched. He felt
that the contest was no mere local one; that it was comparatively of little consequence which man succeeded in the fight, but that it was all-important that the banner of
freedom should be borne with no faltering step, but "full
high advanced." And thus through the whole campaign
he sought with all his power to press home to the hearts
of the people the principles, the example, and the teachings of the men of the Revolution. At the time of the delivery of the speeches in Chicago,
to which we have already alluded, there was no understanding regarding joint discussions. One week later, however, both spoke in Springfield on the same day, but before different
audiences; and one week later, Mr. Lincoln
addressed a letter to Douglas, challenging him to a series
of debates during the campaign. The challenge was Accepted, and arrangements were at
once made for the meetings. The terms proposed by Mr.
Douglas whether intentionally or unintentionally does
not appear were such as to give him the decided advantage of having four opening and closing speeches to Mr.
Lincoln' s three; but Mr. Lincoln, while noticing the inequality, did not hesitate to accept them. The seven joint debates were held as follows: at Ottawa, on August 21st; at Freeport, on August 27th; at
Jonesboro, on September 15th; at Charleston, on September 18th; at Galesburg, on October 7th; at Quincy, on October 13th; at Alton, on October 15th. These seven tournaments raised the greatest excitement throughout the
State. They were held in all quarters of the State, from
Freeport in the north to Jonesboro in the extreme south.
Everywhere the different parties turned out to do honor
to their champions. Processions and cavalcades, bands of
music and cannon-firing, made every day a day of. excitement. But far greater was the excitement of such oratorical contests between two such skilled debaters, before
mixed audiences of friends and foes, to rejoice over every
keen thrust at the adversary, to be cast down by each
failure to parry the thrust so aimed. It is impossible to
present here any thing more than the barest sketch of
these great efforts of Mr. Lincoln. They are, and always will be, to those who are interested in the history of the
slavery contest, most valuable and important documents.
In the first of these joint debates, which took place at
Ottawa, Mr. Douglas again rung the changes upon the
introductory passage of Mr. Lincoln's Springfield speech,
"a house divided against itself," etc. Mr. Lincoln reiterated his assertion, and defended it in effect, as he did
in his speech at Chicago. Then he took up the charge
which he had previously made, of the existence of a conspiracy to extend slavery over the Northern States, and
pressed it home, citing as proof a speech which Mr.
Douglas himself had made on the Lecompton bill, in
which he had substantially made the same charge against
Buchanan and others. He then showed again, that
all that was necessary for the accomplishment of the
scheme was a decision of the Supreme Court that no
State could exclude slavery, as the court had already decided that no Territory could exclude it, and the acquiescence of the people in such a decision; and he told his
hearers that Douglas was doing all in his power to bring
about such acquiescence in advance, by declaring that
the true position was, not to care whether slavery'' was
voted down or up," and by announcing himself in favor
of the Dred Scott decision, not because it was right, but
because a decision of the court is to him a "Thus saith
the Lord," and thus committing himself to the next decision just as firmly as to this. He closed his speech with
the following eloquent words:
Henry Clay, my beau-ideal of a statesman, the man for whom I fought
all my humble life Henry Clay once said of a class of men who would
repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation, that they
must, if they would do this, go back to the era of our independence, and
muzzle the cannon which thunders its annual joyous return; they must
blow out the moral lights around us; they must penetrate the human
soul, and eradicate there the love of liberty; and then, and not till
then,
could they perpetuate slavery in this country! To my thinking, Judge
Douglas is, by his example and vast influence, doing that very thing in
this community, when he says that the negro has nothing in the Declaration of Independence. Henry Clay plainly understood the contrary Judge Douglas is going back to the era of our Revolution, and, to the
extent of his ability, muzzling the cannon which thunders its annual
joyous
return. When lie invites any people, willing to have slavery, to
establish
it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us. "When he says, he "
cares
not whether slavery is voted down or voted up," that it is a sacred
right of self-government, he is, in my judgment, penetrating the human
soul, and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in
this
American people. And now I will only say hat when, by all these
means and appliances, Judge Douglas shall succeed in bringing public
sentiment to an exact accordance with his own views when these vast assemblages shall echo back all these sentiments when they shall come to
repeat his views and to avow his principles, and to say all that he says
on
these mighty questions then it needs only the formality of the second
Dred Scott decision, which he indorses in advance, to make slavery alike
lawful in all the States old as well as new, North as well as South.
The debate at Freeport the second of the series took
place August 27, and was marked by Mr. Lincoln answering a series of seven questions proposed by his opponent.
We give the interrogatories and the replies, as follows:
Question 1. I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did
in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law
?
Answer. I do net now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.
Q. 2. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he
did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the
Union,
even if the people want them?
A. I do not now, or ever did, stand pledged against the admission of
any more slave States into the Union.
Q. 3. I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a Constitution as the
people
of that State may see fit to make?
A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into
the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see
fit to make.
Q. 4. I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?
A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia.
Q. 5. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?
A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States.
Q. 6. 1 desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of
the
Missouri Compromise line?
A. I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the
right
and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.
Q. 7. I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition
of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?
A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and,
in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the
slavery question among ourselves.
Before answering these questions, Mr. Lincoln notified
Mr. Douglas that he should insist upon the right to propound an equal number to him, if he desired to do so,
and before closing submitted these four interrogatories:
Question 1. If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and ask
admission ii to the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number
of inhabitants according to the English bill some ninety-three thousand
will you vote to admit them?
Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way,
against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from
its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?
Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of
political
action?
Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard
of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?
To these questions he received, as he undoubtedly expected, only evasive replies. He also, in the course of
the debate, pressed home upon his opponent a charge of
quoting resolutions as having been adopted at a Republican State Convention which were never so adopted, and
again called Douglas's attention to the conspiracy to
nationalize slavery, and showed that his pretended desire
to leave the people of a Territory free to establish slavery
or exclude it, was really only a desire to allow them to
establish it, as was shown by his voting against Mr. Chase's amendment to the Nebraska bill, which gave
the leave to exclude it. In the third debate, which took place at Jonesboro, Mr.
Lincoln showed that Douglas and his friends were trying
to change the position of the country on the slavery
question from what it was when the Constitution was
adopted, and that the disturbance of the country had
arisen from this pernicious effort. He then cited from
Democratic speeches and platforms of former days to
prove that they occupied then the very opposite ground
on the question from that which was taken at the time he
was speaking. He also brought out in strong relief the
evasive character of Douglas's answers to the questions
which he had proposed, especially the subterfuge of "unfriendly legislation," which he had set forth as the means
by which the people of a Territory could exclude slavery
from its limits in spite of the Dred Scott decision. It is a noteworthy fact that when Mr. Lincoln was preparing these questions for Douglas, he was urged by some
of his friends not to corner him on this last point, because
he would surely stand by his doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty in defiance of the Dred Scott decision, "and
that," said they, "will make him Senator." "That may
be," said Mr. Lincoln, with a twinkle in his eye, " but if
he takes that shoot he never can be President." Mr. Lincoln' s sagacity did not fail him here. This position which Douglas took of "unfriendly legislation,"
was a stumbling-block which he was never able to get
over; and if the contest between them had brought out
no other good result, the compelling Douglas to take this
ground was a most important point gained. In the fourth joint debate at Charleston, Mr. Lincoln
brought forward and spoke at length upon the evidence
of a charge previously made by Judge Trumbull against
Douglas, of being himself reponsible for a clause in the
Kansas bill which would have deprived the people of
Kansas of the right to vote upon their own Constitution. He stated this point as follows:
The bill that went into his (Mr. Douglas's) hands had the provision in
it
for a submission of the Constitution to the people; and I say its
language
amounts to an express provision for a submission, and that he took the
provision out. He says it was known that the bill was silent in this
particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was not silent when you got
it. It was vocal with the declaration, when you got it, for a
submission of the Constitution to the people. And now, my direct
question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill
silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those
particular harmless words. If he had found the bill silent and
without this provision, he might say what he does now. If he supposes it was implied that the Constitution would
be submitted to a vote of the people, how could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary to strike them out? How
could he infer that a submission was still implied, after its express
provision had been stricken from the bill? I find the bill vocal with the
provision, while he silenced it. lie took it out, and although he took out
the other provision preventing a submission to a vote of the people, I
ask,
why did you first put it in? I ask him whether he took the
original provision out, which Trumbull alleges was in the bill? If
he admits that he did take it out, I ask him what he did it for? It looks to us as if he
had
altered the bill. If it looks differently to him if he has a different
reason
for his action from the one we assign him he can tell it. I insist upon
knowing why he made the bill silent upon that point, when it was vocal
before he put his hands upon it.
Mr. Douglas, it is needless to say, could not parry this
home thrust. In his efforts to do so (for Mr. Lincoln gave
him several opportunities subsequently to explain his
position), he invariably lost his temper. In view of the
discussions now in progress in many parts of the country, the following
passage from Mr. Lincoln's final rejoinder to Mr. Douglas, in this debate at
Charleston, possesses peculiar interest.
Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from
me an answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro citizenship.
So far as I know, the Judge never asked me the question before. He
shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly
that I am not in favor of negro citizenship. This furnishes me an occasion for saying a few words upon the subject. I mentioned in a certain
speech of mine which has been printed, that the Supreme Court had
decided that a negro could not possibly be made a citizen; and without saying what was my ground of complaint in regard to that, or
whether I had any ground of complaint, Judge Douglas has from that thing manufactured nearly every thing that he ever says about my disposition to produce an equality between the negroes and the white people.
If any one will read my speech, he will find I mentioned that as one of
the points decided in the course of the Supreme Court opinions, but I
did
not state what objection I had to it. But Judge Douglas tells the people
what my objection was, when I did not tell them myself. Now my opinion
is that the different States have the power to make a negro a citizen
under
the Constitution of the United States, if they choose. The Dred Scott
decision decides that they have not that power. If the State of Illinois
had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I
have to say about it.
In the fifth joint debate, that at Galesburg, Mr. Lincoln
defended the Republican party from the charge of being
sectional, and in the course of his speech he thus pointedly
sketched the difference between the supporters of Mr.
Douglas and their opponents, as regarded the manner in
which they respectively looked upon the free and slave
States:
The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any
odious distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether
unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious
distinctions between the free and slave States. But there still is a
difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and the Republicans in
this. I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on
the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any
difference
between slavery and liberty that he is in favor of eradicating, of
pressing
out of view, the questions of preference in this country for free or
slave
institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the
idea
that there is any wrong in slavery. Every thing that emanates from him
or his coadjutors in their course of policy, carefully excludes the
thought
that there is any thing wrong in slavery. All their arguments, if you
will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is
any
thing whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches,
and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him as his
declaration that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or down"
you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit
that
slavery is wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot
logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down.
Judge Douglas declares that if any community want slavery they have a
right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no
wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he
cannot
logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He insists that,
upon the score of equality, the owners of slaves and the owners of
property of horses and every other sort of property should he alike, and hold
them alike in a new Territory. That is perfectly logical, if the two
species of property are alike, and are equally founded in right. But if
you
admit that one of them is wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong. And from this difference of sentiment the belief
on the part of one that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing
from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that
wrong; and this other sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy
sprung
from that sentiment which will tolerate no idea of preventing that wrong
from growing larger, and looks to there never being an end of it through
all the existence of things arises the real difference between Judge
Douglas and his friends on the one hand, and the Republicans on the
other. Now, I confess myself as belonging to that class in the country
who contemplate slavery as a moral, social, and political evil, having
due
regard for its actual existence amongst us, and the difficulties of
getting
rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all the Constitutional
obligations
which have been thrown about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy
that
looks to the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the
time
when, as a wrong, it may come to an end.
Mr. Lincoln also, after again calling attention to the
fraudulent resolutions, and giving strong proof that Douglas himself was a party to the imposition, showed that he
had failed to answer his question about the acceptance
of the new Dred Scott decision, which, he said, was "just
as sure to "be made as to-morrow is to come, if the Democratic party shall "be sustained" in the elections. He then
discussed the policy of acquiring more territory, and the
importance of deciding upon any such acquisition, by the
effect which it would have upon the Slavery question
among ourselves. In the next debate, at Quincy, besides making some
personal points as to the mode in which Douglas had conducted the previous discussions, he stated clearly and
briefly what were the principles of the Republican party,
what they proposed to do, and what they did not propose
to do. This exposition is at once so lucid and succinct that we
give the passage at length. Mr. Lincoln alluded to the assertion made by
Judge Douglas at Galesburg, that he (Mr. Lincoln) desired to avoid the
responsibility attaching to the " enormity" of the principles he advocated, and
said that he would heartily state those principles, as well
as it was in his power to do, "in all their enormity,"
which he did as follows:
"We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery. It is a matter
of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element. It is the opinion
of
all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon it, that it is a
dangerous element. We keep up a controversy in regard to it. That controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion, and if we can
learn
exactly can reduce to the lowest elements what that difference of
opinion
is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for discussing the different
systems
of policy that we would propose in regard to that disturbing element.
I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms,
is no
other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong
and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it
a wrong we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We
think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the
states
where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the
least, that
extends itself to the existence of the whole nation. Because we think it
wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong.
We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its
growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there
may
be some promise of an end to it. We have a due regard to the actual
presence of it amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in
any
satisfactory way, and all the Constitutional obligations thrown about
it.
I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the nation,
and
to our Constitutional obligations, we have no right at all to disturb it
in
the States where it exists, and we profess that we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it. We go further than
that; we don't propose to disturb it where, in one instance, we think
the
Constitution would permit us. We think the Constitution would permit
us to disturb it in the District of Columbia. Still we do not propose to
do that, unless it should be in terms which I don't suppose the nation
is
very likely soon to agree to the terms of making the emancipation
gradual, and compensating the unwilling owners. Where we suppose we
have the Constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the
actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about
it.
We also oppose it as an evil, so far as it seeks to spread itself. We
insist
on the policy that shall restrict it to its present limits. We don't
suppose
that in doing this we violate any thing due to the actual presence of
the
institution, or anything due to the Constitutional guaranties thrown
around it.
We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that
when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a
mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any
other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves,
we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled;
but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule, which
shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong,
which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to
favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of
that
decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in
that
way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging
and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation
for
spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting
it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established
upon this subject.
I will add this, that if there be any man who does not believe that
slavery is wrong in the three aspects which I have mentioned, or in any
one of them, that man is misplaced, and ought to leave us. While, on the
other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over the necessity springing from its actual presence, and is
impatient of the Constitutional guaranties thrown around it, and would act
in
disregard of these, he too is misplaced, standing with us. He will find
his
place somewhere else; for we have a due regard, so far as we are
capable
of understanding them, for all these things. This, gentlemen, as well as
I can give it, is a plain statement of our principles in all their
enormity.
Mr. Douglas replied to Mr. Lincoln in a manner which
proved that he felt the arguments which his antagonist
had advanced to be actually unanswerable, and in opening his rejoinder Mr. Lincoln used this language:
I wish to return to Judge Douglas my profound thanks for his public
annunciation here to-day, to be put on record, that his system of policy
in regard to the institution of slavery contemplates that it shall last
forever. We are getting a little nearer the true issue of this
controversy, and
I am profoundly graceful for this one sentence. Judge Douglas asks you,
"Why cannot the institution of slavery, or rather, why cannot the
nation,
part slave and part free, continue as our fathers made it forever?" In
the
first place, I insist that our fathers did not make this nation half
slave
and half free, or part slave and part free. I insist that they found the
institution of slavery existing here. They did not make it so, but they
left
it so, because they knew of no way to get rid of it at that time. When
Judge Douglas undertakes to say that, as a matter of choice, the fathers
of the Government made this nation part slave and part free, he assumes
what is historically a falsehood. More than that: when the fathers of the Government cut off the source of slavery by the abolition of
the slave-trade, and adopted a system of restricting it from the new
Territories where it had not existed, I maintain that they placed it
where they understood, and all sensible men understood, it was in the
course of ultimate extinction; and when Judge Douglas asks me why it
cannot continue as our fathers made it, I ask him why ho and his friends
could not lot it remain as our fathers made it?
It is precisely all I ask of him in relation to the institution of
slavery,
that it shall be placed upon the basis that our fathers placed it upon.
Mr.
Brooks, of South Carolina, once said, and truly said, that when this
Government was established, no one expected the institution of slavery to
last until this day; and that the men who formed this Government were
wiser and better than the men of these days; but the men of these days
had experience which the fathers had not, and that experience had taught
them the invention of the cotton-gin, and this had made the
perpetuation
of the institution of slavery a necessity in this country. Judge Douglas
could not let it stand upon the basis on which our fathers placed it,
but
removed it, and put it upon the cotton-gin basis. It is a question,
therefore, for him and his friends to answer why they could not let it
remain where the fathers of the Government originally placed it.
The seventh and last joint debate took place at Alton,
October 15. According to the schedule previously agreed
upon, Mr. Douglas had the opening speech. Mr. Lincoln,
in his rejoinder, made a thorough and exhaustive review
of the slavery question in its relations to the Democratic
party. He showed that the doctrines of that party, with
reference to this question, were not those held at the time
of the Revolution; traced the development of the agitation which had resulted from the efforts of the Democracy
to put slavery upon a different footing, and sketched the
dangers and difficulties in which this attempt had involved the country. He thus expressed his opinion of
the way in which this agitation might be terminated:
I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a
crisis should have been reached and passed. I have stated in what way I
thought it would be reached and passed. I have said that it might go
one way or the other. We might, by arresting the further spread of it,
and placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the
public mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate
extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed forward until
it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new,
North as
well as South. I have said, and I repeat, my wish is that the further spread of it may be arrested, and that it may be placed where the public
mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate
extinction.
I have expressed that as my wish. I entertain the opinion, upon evidence
sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this Government placed that
institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in
the
course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask why they made provision that
the source of slavery the African slave-trade should be cut off at the
end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the new territory we owned at that time, slavery should be forever inhibited?
Why stop its spread in one direction and cut off its source in another,
if
they did not look to its being placed in the course of ultimate
extinction?
Mr. Lincoln then demonstrated that the whole controversy turned upon the vital question whether slavery
w r as wrong or not, and proved that the sentiment of the
Democratic party, as it then existed, was that it was not
wrong, and that Douglas and those who sympathized
with him did not desire or ever expect to see the country
freed from this gigantic evil. Upon this point he said:
The sentiment that contemplates the institution of slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of the
Republican party. It is the
sentiment around which all their actions all their arguments circle from
which all their propositions radiate. They look upon it as being a
moral,
social, and political wrong; and while they contemplate it as such,
they
nevertheless have due regard for its actual existence among us, and the
difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all
the constitutional obligations thrown about it. Yet, having a due regard for
these, they desire a policy in regard to it that looks to its not
creating
any more danger. They insist that it should, as far as may be, be
treated
as a wrong, and one of the methods of treating it as a wrong is to make
provision that it shall grow no larger. They also desire a policy that
looks to a peaceful end of slavery at some time, as being wrong. These
are the views they entertain in regard to it, as I understand them; and
all
their sentiments all their arguments and propositions are brought within
this range. I have said, and I repeat it here, that if there be a man
amongst
us who does not think that the institution of slavery is wrong, in any
one
of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is misplaced, and ought not to
be
with us. And if there be a man amongst us who is so impatient of it as a
wrong as to disregard its actual presence among us, and the difficulty
of
getting rid of it suddenly in a satisfactory way, and to disregard the
constitutional obligations thrown about it, that man is misplaced, if he is
on
our platform. We disclaim sympathy with him in practical action. He
is not placed properly with us.
On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let
me say a word. Has any thing ever threatened the existence of this
Union,
save and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we
hold
most dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. "What has ever
threatened our liberty and prosperity, save and except this institution
of
slavery? If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition
of
things by enlarging slavery by spreading it out and making it bigger?
You may have a wen or cancer upon your person and not be able to cut
it out lest you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to
engraft it and spread it over your whole body. That is no proper way of
treating what you regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of dealing
with it as a wrong restricting the spread of it, and not allowing it to
go
into new countries where it has not already existed. That is the
peaceful
way, the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set
us the example.
On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as
not being wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of this day. I do
not mean to say that every man who stands within that range positively
asserts that it is right. That class will include all who positively
assert
that it is right, and all who, like Judge Douglas, treat it as
indifferent, and
do not say it is either right or wrong. These two classes of men fall
within the general class of those who do not look upon it as a wrong.
And if there be among you anybody who supposes that he, as a Democrat, can consider himself "as much opposed to slavery as anybody," I
would like to reason with him. You never treat it as a wrong. What
other thing that you consider as a wrong, do you deal with as you deal
with that? Perhaps you say it is wrong, but your leader never does, and
you quarrel with anybody who says it is wrong. Although you pretend
to say so yourself, you can find no fit place to deal with it as a
wrong.
You must not say any thing about it in the free States, because it is
not
here. You must not say any thing about it in the slave States, because
it
is there. You must not say any thing about it in the pulpit, because
that
is religion, and has nothing to do with it. You must not say any thing
about it in politics, because that will disturb the security of " my
place."
There is no place to talk about it as being a wrong, although you say
yourself it is a wrong. But, finally, you will screw yourself up to the
belief that if the people of the slave States should adopt a system of
gradual emancipation on the slavery question, you would be in favor of it.
You would be in favor of it. You say that is getting it in the right
place,
and you would be glad to see it succeed. But you are deceiving yourself.
You all know that Frank Blair and Gratz Brown, down there in St. Louis,
undertook to introduce that system into Missouri. They fought as valiantly as they could for the system of gradual emancipation which you
pretend you would be glad to see succeed. Now I will bring you to the
test. After a hard fight they were beaten, and when the news came over here you threw up your hats and hurrahed for Democracy. More than
that; take all the arguments made in favor of the system you have proposed, and it carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong
in
the institution of slavery. The arguments to sustain that policy
carefully
excluded it. Even here to-day you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me
because I uttered a wish that it might sometime come to an end. Although Henry Clay could say he wished every slave in the United States
was in the country of his ancestors, I am denounced by those pretending
to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might sometime, in
some
peaceful way, come to an end. The Democratic policy in regard to that
institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of
the
least degree of wrong about it.
Besides the speeches made in the course of these seven
joint debates, Mr. Lincoln delivered at least fifty other
addresses to the people, in all parts of the State, during
the canvass, everywhere expounding his views and declaring his sentiments with the same frankness and manliness. The chief interest of the contest, however, centred in their joint debates, and with every succeeding encounter the feeling in the State, and throughout the country, became more intense. As the day
for final decision approached, Illinois fairly blazed
with the excitement. While Mr. Douglas fully sustained his previous reputation, and justified the estimate
his friends had placed upon his abilities, he labored under the comparative disadvantage of being much better
known to the country at large than was his antagonist.
During his long public career, people had become partially accustomed to his manner of presenting arguments
and enforcing them. The novelty and freshness of Mr.
Lincoln's addresses, on the other hand, the homeliness
and force of his illustrations, their wonderful pertinence,
his exhaustless humor, his confidence in his own resources, engendered by his firm belief in the justice of
the cause he so ably advocated, never once rising, however, to the point of arrogance or superciliousness, fastened upon him the eyes of the people everywhere, friends
and opponents alike. It was not strange that more than
once, during the course of the unparalleled excitement which marked this canvass, Mr. Douglas should have
been thrown off his guard by the singular self-possession
displayed by his antagonist, and by the imperturbable firmness with which he maintained and defended a position once assumed. The unassuming confidence which
marked Mr. Lincoln's conduct was early imparted to his
supporters, and each succeeding encounter added largely
to the number of his friends, until they began to indulge
the hope that a triumph might be secured in spite of the
adverse circumstances under which the struggle was commenced. And so it would have been, had party lines
been more strictly drawn. But the action of Mr. Douglas with reference to the Lecompton Constitution when it
was before the United States Senate, and the bitter hostility of the southern wing of the Democratic party to
wards him, had led very many Republicans, and some of
high consideration and influence in other States, to favor
his return to the Senate. They deemed this due to the
zeal and efficiency with which he had resisted the attempt
to force slavery into Kansas against the will of the people, and as important in encouraging other Democratic
leaders to imitate the example of Douglas in throwing off
the yoke of the slaveholding aristocracy. This feeling
proved to be of much weight against Mr. Lincoln in the
canvass. In the election which took place on November 2d, the
popular vote stood as follows:
Republican............................................................................126,084
Douglas Democrat.................................................................121,940
Lecompton Democrat................................................................5,091
Mr. Lincoln, therefore, had the people been permitted
to decide the question directly, would have been returned
to the Senate, since he had a plurality of four thousand
one hundred and forty-four votes over Mr. Douglas; but
the State legislature was the tribunal that was to pass
finally upon it; and there, fortunately for the country,
as the future showed, but unfortunately for Mr. Lincoln at that time, the Democrats had secured an advantage, by
means of an unfair districting of the State, which it was
impossible to overcome. Notwithstanding the immense
gains made by the Republicans, their opponents had, in
the upper branch of this body, fourteen members to their
eleven, while in the lower House these two parties stood
forty Democrats to thirty-five Republicans. This state
of affairs secured Mr. Douglas a re-election, although the
fact that he was fairly beaten on the popular vote, robbed
his triumph of much of its lustre. An overruling Providence, the workings of which can now be clearly traced,
but which were then inscrutable, by securing this result,
ultimately gave the nation for its chief magistrate the
man best fitted to carry it safely through the most trying
period of its history. |