The History of Galatia, B.C. 232-64

DURING this period only isolated glimpses are afforded us into the fate and fortunes of Galatia, as the Gaulish tribes came into relations with the western peoples, whose history is better known.

Before describing the scattered facts, we may summarise the general result as follows. The Galatian power on the whole declined; and finally the skilful and vigorous Pergamenian policy, by gradually introducing Greek civilisation into the country and forming a philo-Greek party, was on the point of destroying the Galatic isolation, and bringing the tribes under Pergamenian and Hellenistic influence, when Rome interfered to preserve the Galatian independence. The result was a strong reaction against Hellenism and a recrudescence of the old barbaric and Celtic character: the philo-Greek party in Galatia seems to have been annihilated, and Galatian isolation and dissimilarity from the surrounding Graeco-Asiatic peoples was maintained.

The amalgamation of the immigrant Celtic and the old Phrygian population in Galatia seems to have proceeded rapidly after 189 B.C.; and there ensued a decided growth in Galatic strength, unity and vigour, and this reinvigorated nation began to press outwards on its weaker neighbours and to enlarge its bounds, no longer by mere raid, but by occupation. Finally it was able with Roman help to maintain itself against the united Asiatic and Greek reaction under Mithridates, and to emerge from that terrible struggle stronger and greater than before.

As we saw, the Gauls played no part in the later wars of Attalos. The cis-Tauran dominion of the Pergamenian king lasted only for a few years. Seleucus Keraunos (226-223) started personally for a campaign in Asia Minor, when he was poisoned by a Gaul named Apatourios, doubtless a leader of mercenaries in his service.1 Under his successor Antiochus the Great, Achaios recovered the Seleucid dominion in Lydia, Phrygia, etc. Thereafter he rebelled against his cousin, King Antiochus, once more endangering the Seleucid realm in Asia Minor. Attalos now began to recover his power; and, in order to strengthen himself, brought over from Europe a Gallic tribe, the Aigosages, with whose aid he made a raid in B.C. 218 into Aeolis and then eastward across Lydia into north Phrygia as far as Apia. Thereafter he settled the Gauls in the Hellespontine Phrygia, where, however, they were destroyed by Prusias, King of Bithynia, in 217-16.

The northern part of Phrygia seems henceforth to have remained subject to Attalos, probably by arrangement with Antiochus the Great. The latter had Attalos as his ally, while besieging Achaios in Sardis, which he captured in 214. During the following years Attalos became possessed also of Phrygia Epiktetos, the region of Kotiaion and Dorylaion, which previously belonged to the kings of Bithynia. Perhaps this acquisition was the result of the war with Prusias in 207-6. That Attalos’s dominion reached to the neighbourhood of Pessinus, and that he cultivated friendly relations with the great sanctuary there, is proved by the following events.

In B.C. 205 the Sibylline Books were found to promise victory in the Carthaginian War to the Romans, if they brought the Great Idaean Mother from Pessinus to Rome. This pointed to an active Eastern policy in Rome; it implied that the state must come into closer relations with the eastern Mediterranean peoples; and in view of Hannibal’s settled plan of uniting those peoples in an anti-Roman league, the new Roman policy was prudent.

Five ambassadors with five quinqueremes were sent to Delphi, and the Oracle referred them to Attalos. Attalos seized the opportunity of linking his fortunes to the great republic of the west, welcomed the ambassadors, and in person conducted them to Pessinus. Through his influence the sacred stone, the symbol of the goddess, was delivered to the Romans, and brought in state to Rome. Along with the sacred stone, the whole Phrygian ritual, with its eunuch priests, was established in Rome.

In this transaction it is obvious that the Gauls had no part. The power of Attalos extended close up to Pessinus, and he was in direct relations with the governing priestly hierarchy. The Gauls did not need to be consulted, and therefore cannot have had any footing in Pessinus. As we shall see, it was not till between 189 and 164 that they succeeded in establishing themselves in that city.

In the period 232-200 the Gauls of Galatia were not active in western Asia Minor. Whatever was the reason, the agreement concluded with Attalos when they were settled in Galatia, was strictly observed by them for a time. Apparently they turned their attention northwards, and their unsuccessful siege of Herakleia on the Euxine may be referred to this period.2

The alliance with Morzeos, King of Paphlagonia, which we find existing in 189, apparently as an old-standing connection, would be useful in this siege.

Shortly after 200 they were turning their attention westwards once more. In 196, the year after Attalos died, they were threatening Lampsakos on the Hellespont, and that city procured from Massalia in Gaul a letter of recommendation to the Tolistoagii.3 All the chiefs of the Gauls had renounced their friendship with Pergamos before 189, with the single exception of Eposognatus,4 one of the Tolistoagii. This formal renunciation of friendship implies that the Galatian tribes had begun to observe international courtesies, and wage regular war in place of raids.

Probably the Galatian tribes were on bad terms with Pontus during this time. In 189 the Trocmi must have dreaded attack from the east, for they sent their wives and children for safe keeping among the Tektosages.

In 189 the consul, Cn. Manlius Vulso, in order to strike terror once for all into the nations west of the Halys, led an army against the Gauls, who had fought for Antiochus against Rome at the battle of Magnesia.

The Tolistobogii with their families and the warriors of the Trocmi occupied Mount Olympus, evidently a hill of no great height,5 probably part of the low range on the right hand as one goes from Pessinus to Ancyra.6 Manlius defeated them with immense slaughter,7 and captured 40,000 prisoners to be sold as slaves. Then he proceeded to occupy Ancyra, and thereafter defeated the Tectosages, who had concentrated on Mount Magaba (probably south-east from Ancyra); the slain Gauls are estimated at not more than 8000, and of the captives no estimate is given.8

Content with these severe blows, Manlius finally made peace, stipulating only that the Gauls should no longer make those armed raids in western Asia Minor, which had been the terror of all the cities for about eighty years.9

The stipulation is significant. It shows that the danger of a Gallic raid was still ever present to the peoples of western Asia Minor: the victories of Pergamenian and Seleucid armies over the Gauls had not been so decisive as to tame the unruly Galatian barbarians. According to Roman ideas, the consul was fully justified, now that Rome had interfered decidedly in Asian affairs, in ensuring peace by making the Roman power felt all round the limits which the republic for the present set to itself, viz., the Taurus mountains and the Halys river. That he carried out this policy with a spirit of greed and rapine is true; but it is a mistake to regard the expedition as a mere plundering raid. The blow against the Gauls was inevitably demanded by Roman policy.10

Taken in connection with the Paphlagonian alliance, the Heracleian siege, and the threatening of Lampsakos, the terms concluded by Manlius show how powerful and menacing was this Galatic state in the heart of the Græco-Asiatic world as late as 189. The Roman allies were more gladdened by the defeat of the Gauls than of Antiochus himself, such was their hatred of those terrible barbarians11 and their never-ceasing terror of a possible attack at any moment. The relief which was felt all through Asia carried the fame of the Romans even to Syria and Palestine, and a confused recollection of the results of the Galatian war was part of the foundations of their reputation in the eyes of Judas Maccabaeus, and induced him to seek alliance with them against his Seleucid foes in B.C. 161. 12

In this war we observe that the chiefs of the Galatae were divided. One of the tetrarchs, Eposognatus, sided with Eumenes and the Romans. A small party among the Galatae was now inclined to prefer the alliance with the west, the side of civilisation, though the vast majority rallied to the standard of barbarian independence. In the following years the former party grew stronger.

But, while ready to strike down the Galatic pretensions to terrorise Asia, the Romans were not disposed to encourage Eumenes too much; and their subsequent policy shows a settled intention of discouraging his schemes and preventing his acquiring a decided supremacy in Asia. The aim of Rome was to keep the various interests in Asia balanced uneasily against one another, and draw the hopes of all towards herself. As usual, she governed by dividing and by preventing the concentration of power in any hands but her own; and the immediate necessity was to keep Eumenes weak by encouraging the Galatian tribes.

Manlius had charged the Galatians to keep peace with Eumenes;13  but very soon a war broke out, in which they, along with Pharnaces of Pontus and Prusias of Bithynia, fought against the Pergamenian king.14 Ortiagon, a chief of the Tolistobogii,15  aimed at supreme power among the Gauls;16 but in 181 several chiefs are mentioned, implying that the ordinary tetrarchic or cantonal system17 continued. As Polybius conversed with Ortiagon’s wife at Sardis, while other chiefs are mentioned as the regular allies of Pharnaces,18 it is probable that two factions existed after 189 in Galatia: one headed by Ortiagon favoured a Pergamenian alliance and consolidation of the country after the analogy of a Greek kingdom; the other favoured the Pontic alliance, and the old Gaulish tribal system. The latter party proved stronger, and Ortiagon had to retire with his family into Pergamenian territory.

But it soon became evident to the Galatians that a Pontic alliance meant a Pontic tyranny. Pontic armies domineered in Galatia. In these circumstances the same chiefs, Carsignatus and Gaizatorix,19  that had previously led the Pontic faction, now joined Eumenes in B.C. 181; and the Pergamenian king marched through Galatia intp Cappadocia to join his ally Ariarathes; but, when they were about to attack Pharnaces in his own land, the Roman ambassadors ordered both sides to cease hostilities. At last in 179 peace was concluded, one condition being that Pharnaces should abandon all attempt to interfere in Galatia, and that his agreements with Galatian chiefs should be invalid.

Thus the Pergamenian faction apparently gained the upper hand in Galatia for a time after B.C. 179; and Galatian auxiliaries are mentioned in the Pergamenian armies 171 and 169. 20 Among them Carsignatus, the former ally of Pharnaces, is mentioned, showing how completely the friendship of Eumenes was adopted in Galatia, and making it probable that Ortiagon’s policy of unifying Galatia was at an end. Eumenes had learned, with his usual tact, that a Greek system of monarchic government could not be forced on the Gauls. It is, however, highly probable, as Van Gelder has rightly recognised, that at this time the amelioration of Galatian manners and the introduction of more civilised ways into the country, was gradually and cautiously fostered by the patient skill and administrative ability of Eumenes.

The magnificent temple at Pessinus, whose construction Strabo assigns to the Attalid dynasty, was probably built or at least begun during this period.

But Roman jealousy of Eumenes’s success stopped the pacification of western Asia, which Eumenes was carrying out so skilfully. True and loyal as the king had been to Rome, he was accused falsely of favouring the Macedonians, though he had actively assisted Rome against them. In 167 the Galatians, instigated by Prusias, invaded his country, under a chief named Advertas, and nearly succeeded in destroying his monarchy,21 and the Romans would not permit him to punish the nation. In the following years they lent ready ear to Bithynian and Galatian ambassadors complaining of Eumenes.

In spite of the Roman covert opposition, Eumenes again proved victor. A peace was concluded in 165 with the help of the Romans, guaranteeing the freedom of Galatia, but binding the Gauls to abstain from raids like those of 167 and 166. Thus Eumenes’s Galatian ascendancy was ended, and the reactionary Galatian party was triumphant.

This war had evidently been carried out by the reactionary party in Galatia, and was marked by a recrudescence of the old barbarous custom. The handsomest captives were sacrificed to the Gods; the rest were speared; and even those whose hospitality the Gauls had previously enjoyed were not spared.22

About 164-160 there was a long dispute between the Galatians and Ariarathes of Cappadocia as to certain border country, which the Trocmi had tried vainly to seize.23 At first the Roman favour inclined to the Galatians, but Ariarathes bought the favour of all ambassadors, and finally of the senate; and the dispute was probably decided in his favour (which Polybius evidently considered to be just).

To the years immediately following belongs a correspondence between Eumenes or his successor Attalos II (158-138) and the high priest of Pessinus.24 The high priest who had assumed the priestly sacred name Attis, was a Gaul,25 but an adherent of the Pergamenian faction; and the correspondence shows that there was a good deal of dissension among the Gauls and intriguing for and against the Pergamenian influence, which had its chief centre at the great hieron of the Pessinuntine Goddess. Pessinus, then, had by this time come under Galatian power, and a Gaul was high priest. Now, an inscription of the Roman period shows that half of the college of priests who ministered at the hieron of Pessinus were of Gaulish birth, so that the priest who ranked tenth in the college was fifth among the Galatian priests; and this seems to prove that an arrangement must have been made dividing the priesthoods between the old priestly families and the Gaulish conquerors26 (doubtless all of the Tolistobogian tribe, to whom Pessinus belonged).

The acquisition of Pessinus by the Tolistobogii must be assigned to the period between 189 and 164.

In these long wars it is evident that the Trocmi occupied the most unfavourable, and the Tectosages the most favourable situation. The Trocmi were close to Pontus; the Pontic kings were always trying to assert their authority over Galatia; and in every war the Trocmi would suffer most. They were evidently cramped for room, for they had made many attempts to seize parts of Cappadocia;27 but ultimately failed, at least in part. They then probably turned their efforts in another direction. They could not go north, for the allied Paphlagonia prevented them. Bithynia was too strong on the north-west; Pergamos pressed them on the west and south-west.

On the south alone was Galatic expansion comparatively easy during this period. Here lay the open, defenceless country of Lycaonia. Under the Seleucid kings Lycaonia was shut against them, for it was the gate to the Seleucid Phrygian and Lydian territory, and must be kept open and safe at all costs. But when the Seleucid power was driven out, and confined to the country south and east of Taurus, then Lycaonia was the most distant and defenceless part of the Pergamenian territory. Moreover, as Pisidian Antioch was made a free state, Lycaonia was nearly cut off from the Pergamenian realm; and a glance at the map will show how difficult it must have been to maintain Pergamenian power in Lycaonia when thus separated. What, then, was the lot of Lycaonia in the century following the constitution of the Pergamenian kingdom in 189?

The authorities, Polybius and Livy, are both agreed that Lycaonia was assigned to Eumenes in 189. On the other hand, it is certain that Lycaonia was not part of the Pergamenian kingdom in 133, for the whole kingdom passed to Rome and became the Roman Province Asia. The assured fact then is that, if Livy and Polybius are right,28 Lycaonia dropped out of the Pergamenian realm between 189 and 133.

Now, Ptolemy mentions a country called the “Added Land,”29  which was at some period tacked on to Galatia. It lay on the west side of Lake Tatta, and therefore must have originally belonged to Lycaonia, and been taken and added to Galatia, just as the “Acquired Phrygia”30 had been taken from Bithynia and added to Phrygia about 206.

Further, Pliny31 mentions that a part of Lycaonia was given as a tetrarchy to Galatia — making one of the twelve tetrarchies into which Galatia was divided.

Evidently these facts must be taken together, the tetrarchy taken from Lycaonia was “added” to Galatia; and the time when this occurred was when Lycaonia was protected neither by the Pergamenian nor by the Seleucid kings, between 189 and 133. We may go further, and say that the time was probably about 160, when the Galatae had failed to get the accession of territory from Cappadocia which they desired, and when the Roman influence protected the Cappadocian bounds as settled by the Imperial State; and the Galatae, pressed in on all other sides, found expansion easiest on the Lycaonian frontier.

It is not a real objection to this identification that Ptolemy excludes Iconium from the “Added Land,” while Pliny says that Iconium was the capital of the Lycaonian tetrarchy added to Galatia. As we shall see, p. 105 ff, the double division of Lycaonia into the Tetrarchy or Added Land and Lycaonia Proper32 gave place later to a triple division into the Added Land, the Lycaonian Diocese, and Cappadocian Lycaonia; and that is the system which Ptolemy tries to describe, though as usual he makes mistakes.

Thus about B.C. 160 Galatia was greatly extended, having taken in Pessinus and probably Lycaonia as far as Iconium and Lystra.33 This expansion must have taken place with the consent of the sovereign Rome, and is doubtless connected with their anti-Pergamenian bias at this time. The Galatians were encouraged in order to counterbalance the strength of Pergamos.

Trogus mentions34 that Lycaonia and Cilicia were given in 129 to the sons of Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, in reward for the help their father had given to Rome in the Asian revolt. It is fairly certain that the expression Lycaonia et Cilicia, used by Trogus, describes the same stretch of country in Lycaonia and Cilicia which is mentioned by Strabo, pp. 535, 537, as having been given to the kings of Cappadocia by the Romans:35 this territory stretched from Derbe on the west by Kybistra to Kastabala on the skirts of Mount Amanus, and was called the Eleventh Strategia of Cappadocia, so that it includes all that part of Lycaonia which was not in the Galatic tetrarchy.

The testimony of Trogus, when rightly understood, thus corroborates our conclusion as to the tetrarchy. Lycaonia now consisted of two parts: one was attached to Galatia as an “added tetrarchy,” and one to Cappadocia as an “eleventh Strategia”.

Thus, for some years the history of Galatia shows the Gauls fluctuating between the Pergamenian and the Pontic alliance. The former represents the tendency to civilisation and order; and had it triumphed, Galatia might have adopted Greek manners and law. But the party which favoured the Gaulish manners and the old barbarian methods gained the upper hand, thanks chiefly to the moral support that Rome, jealous of Pergamenian power, gave them.

In the following century, when the Pontic kings roused the Greeks of Asia Minor against Rome, the Galatian tribes, as the faithful allies of the Italian state, were thrown into still more violent antagonism to the Greek element in Asia.

Thus the Galatians were kept free from Greek civilisation. Against it they allied themselves first with the Asiatic barbarism of Pontus and thereafter with Roman order. The progress of the tribes was from Gaulish barbarism to Roman manners; and only when the Roman spirit found itself too weak to assimilate the Asiatic Provinces and allowed the Greek spirit free play, did the tribes turn towards Greek civilisation (see Sections 13, 14).

After 160 the strength of the Pontic kingdom appears to have grown greater. Mithridates III Philopator Philadelphos Euergetes (169-121), son of Mithridates II, brother of Pharnaces I (190-169), father of Mithridates the Great (121-63),36 had a glorious and successful reign. He aided Attalus II in 154 against Prusias, became an ally of Rome, and sent troops to their aid in the Third Punic War, and again during the rebellion in Asia, 131-129.

In 129 Great Phrygia was granted to Mithridates III by Manius Aquillius; and though the Senate did not confirm the Consul’s acts, yet Mithridates seems to have ruled Phrygia till his death in 121. But it seems impossible that he could rule Phrygia, unless he possessed the ascendancy in Galatia.37 Yet Van Gelder’s suggestion that between 160 and 130 Galatia lost its independence and passed under the Pontic domination, is improbable and unnecessary. The existence of two opposite parties in Galatia, one favouring the civilised Pergamenian and afterwards the Roman alliance, and one the barbaric and Pontic connection, furnishes a sufficient explanation. At this period the Pontic party was triumphant. But the ascendancy of Pontus, by which Galatia was now surrounded east and west, was likely soon to arouse the jealous and independent spirit of the Gauls. Rome, too, was on the watch against any Asiatic state that was growing more powerful than its neighbours.

Two measures of Rome, in 126 and 121, against the Pontic rule over Phrygia are mentioned. In 126 the Senate declared the acts of Aquillius inoperative, and recognised Phrygia as a free country. That decree of the Senate remained inoperative; and in the negotiations between Mithridates the Great and the Roman officers in B.C. 88, it is assumed on both sides that Phrygia had been given by the Romans to his father Mithridates Euergetes. This unanimous assumption must be taken to represent the actual fact; and recently it has been confirmed by an important inscription of the Phrygian city, Lysias, quoting a Senatus-consultum of B.C. 116, 38 in which the Senate recognises as valid all the arrangements of Mithridates Euergetes, implying obviously that he had been de facto ruler of Phrygia till his death in 121. Then, in the troubles that ensued, the Senate interfered to regulate Phrygia, and confirmed all that the king had done in the country, but took it away from his son Mithridates the Great.

When Mithridates the Great succeeded in 121, he was a child; and his mother Laodice ruled with full power. The Romans acted on their usual principle of reducing the strength of the leading power in Asia Minor: they now took away Great Phrygia from the Pontic rule, and made it nominally free, though of course really dependent on Rome and the governor of the Province Asia. The anti-Pontic party among the Galatae at the same time recovered the ascendancy; and they fought against Mithridates in the operations that inaugurated his first war with Rome.39

Yet the Senate’s decree of 126, though an empty form, was appealed to by Sulla in the winter of 85-84, to prove that Mithridates the Great had never possessed any right to Phrygia. Sulla was resting his argument on an inoperative decree, which had been contradicted by the course of history. Similiarly, when he went on to maintain that Phrygia had been made free and not tributary, his contention may probably have been justified by the nominal action of the Senate; but the actual fact disproved his argument. Phrygia, if nominally free, was treated by the Romans as subject, or at least dependent. Phrygian contingents were enrolled in the armies that fought against Mithridates, and the Roman officers, after their defeat on the river Amneias, tried to collect a new army of Phrygians, but found them too unwarlike to be of any use. The epitome of Livy, LXXVII, when it says that Mithridates in 88 entered Phrygia, a Province of the Roman people, may be using an expression technically too strong; but, practically, when Mithridates crossed the Phrygian frontier, he was invading a country that was treated by the Romans as dependent upon, and part of, their Empire.

But in 88 Mithridates overran western Asia Minor down to the Aegean Sea; and Galatia now once more passed under the Pontic ascendancy. The only people in Asia from whom Mithridates apprehended any serious opposition were the Galatians; and to guard against it he summoned all the chief men, to the number of sixty, to Pergamos, where he had established his court, and massacred them all except one, who escaped.40 Those tetrarchs who had not come to Pergamos, he killed by secret attacks. Only three tetrarchs escaped.

At this point our authorities again permit a glimpse of the divided spirit, which seems to have been a fatal weakness to the Galatians: Mithridates massacred indiscriminately his friends and his opponents among the tetrarchs.41 There was therefore a party that favoured and one that had opposed him.

The result showed that the old Gaulish spirit was still strong among the Galatae. Instead of being disheartened by this blow, the nation united; the party that had favoured the Pontic cause and facilitated Mithridates’s victory, evidently joined heartily in the resistance. Eumachus, who had been sent as satrap to Galatia, was expelled along with the garrisons which he had intended to station in the Galatian fortresses; and the Galatians henceforth were the hearty allies of Rome in the wars, which terminated in A.D. 66 in the complete defeat of Mithridates.

The massacre of the tetrarchs was a critical event in Galatian history. It drove the Galatae over entirely to the Roman side; and the connection lasted long, for the war was protracted. Not long after it we find the Galatian army, at least in part, armed and disciplined in the Roman style. Whereas Greek and Pergamenian civilisation had apparently failed to make much impression in Galatia, the Roman organisation exercised more influence, as is not unnatural, since the Galatae were still a western people at heart, essentially unlike the Greek and Asiatic peoples around them. As Mommsen says at a later date, “in spite of their sojourn of several hundred years in Asia Minor, a deep gulf still separated these Occidentals from the Asiatics”. At the same time the massacre weakened the old tetrarchic system, partly by reducing the number of the great nobles, partly probably by convincing the nation that the division into twelve tetrarchies was a serious weakness against external attack.

In B.C. 74, at the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War, Eumachus, the Pontic general, overran Phrygia and subdued the Pisidians and Isaurians and Cilicia, as Appian says (designating42 as Cecilia that territory which Trogus calls Lycaonia et Cilicia and Strabo calls the Eleventh Strategia).43 The countries attacked by Eumachus, therefore, were the territories lying round Galatia as enlarged by the Lycaonian tetrarchy. When this tetrarchy is taken into account, the references made by Trogus and by Appian become consistent with one another, and give an outline of the fate of the entire region lying between North Galatia and Cilicia Campestris.

Thereupon, Deiotaros, one of the tetrarchs who had escaped the great massacre, attacked Eumachus and drove him out. In 73 Lucullus carried the war into Pontus, and Galatia was free henceforth from Pontic armies.

[1] Galatic mercenaries regularly served in the Seleucid armies and were courted by rebellious satraps: compare Polybius, V 53, 3 and 8; 79, 11; XXI 20; Livy, XXXVII 8 and 38; Appian Syr. 6 and 32. Galatic mercenaries in the Egyptian armies, Polybius, V 65, 10; 82, 5.)

[2] Memnon 28, the only authority, says that the siege occurred “before the Romans entered Asia,” i.e., before 190.)

[3] Lolling and Mommsen, Mitth. Instit. Athen., VI, p. 96 ff, 212; Mommsen, Rom. Gesch., Ed. 8, I, pp. 724, 742, (transl. II, pp. 447, 469).

[4] Livy, XXXVIII 18, 1.

[5] The operations, as described by Livy, prove this.

[6] It is the watershed between the Ancyra stream and the Ilidja-Su.

[7] Estimates of slain vary from 10,000 to 40,000.

[8] Livy, XXXVIII 27.

[9] Ibid., 40.

[10] Such is Mommsen’s view, as against the superficial opinion that Manlius was a mere piratical raider.

[11] Immanium barbarorum, says Livy, XXXVIII 37.

[12] 1Ma 8:2: the passage illustrates the vague and inaccurate conceptions of the Jews as to the Roman exploits.

[13] Livy, XXXVIII 40.

[14] Trogus, XXXII prolog.

[15] He fought at Mt. Olympus, where no Tectosages were engaged; and his wife was with him, while the women of the Trocmi had been sent to Mt. Magaba.

[16] Polyb., XXII 21.

[17] See section 8, p. 72.

[18] Polybius, XXIV 8, 6.

[19] Gaizotorios in Polyb., XXV 4.

[20] Livy, XLII 55, XLIV 13.

[21] Livy, XLV 19.

[22] Diodor, excerpt, de Virt. et Vit. 31, 2, p. 582, referred to this period by Van Gelder, p. 265, rightly.

[23] Polyb., XXXI 13.

[24] Best published by Domaszewski in Arch. Epigr. Mittheil. Oesterreich, 1884, p. 95 ff.

[25] His brother bore the Gaulish name Aiorix.

[26] Professor A. Körte found and published the inscription Mittheil. Inst. Athen., 1897, pp. 16, 39; and accepts the above interpretation, Philolog. Wochenschrift, 1898, p. 1 f.

[27] Incidentally, we note that this implies a very scattered system of habitation among the Gauls. For their numbers their territory was not really narrow. But evidently their system consisted in a parcelling out of the territory in lots to the tribal aristocracy.

[28] Here one need not estimate the value of the conjecture advanced in Cities and Bish. of Phrygia, pt. I, p. 285. It must either remain uncertain, or be absolutely set aside, unless new evidence should be found. Livy, XXXVIII 39, had before him Polybius, XXII 27, as the MSS. have it now.

[29] Προσειλημμένη, V 4, 10. The word has been corrupted in many MSS.

[30] Ἐπικτητος.

[31] Nat. Hist., V 95.

[32] Called Lycaonia ipsa by Pliny, V 95 (using an old authority).

[33] There were fourteen cities in the tetrarchy, and it seems impossible to make up that number without going as far south as Lystra, which moreover was closely connected with Iconium, being only eighteen miles from it.

[34] Justin, XXXVII 1, 2.

[35] So rightly Bergmann, de Prov. Asia, pp. 16, 17.

[36] I follow Th. Reinach, against the older opinion, in spite of some serious difficulties in his view (acknowledged fully by himself). He has also remodelled the whole Mithridatic genealogy, and reduced the number of kings.

[37] So Van Gelder, p. 277, rightly argues.

[38] Cities and, Bish. of Phrygia, pt. II, p. 762.

[39] Appian, Mithr., 11 and 17.

[40] Plutarch, de Mul. Virt., 23, and Appian, Mithr., 46, doubtless, are describing the same plan. The whole families of the tetrarchs were massacred, as Mommsen says, Rom. Hist., transl., ed. II, vol. IV, p. 46.

[41] Appian, l.c.

[42] So Bell. Civ., V 75, see below, p. 109 note.

[43] See above, p. 64 f.