THE TRUE THEORY OF MORAL FREEDOM

We have already discussed: I. The Necessitarian Schemes. II. The Teaching of Edwards. III. The Teaching of Dr. Hodge. We have found them all akin, conducting the mind to the same logical conclusion-NECESSITY. IV. We now propose to present the true and only rational theory of moral agency, or moral freedom.

1. What is a motive to an action of will? Motive is anything which may operate as a reason for action or as an influence to it. "In regard to the operation of motive," says President Fairchild, "there is great danger of misconception. There is a strong tendency to transfer the mechanical idea of force and motion to the facts of moral action. Motive does not move the will. The agent himself, the moral person, assumes his attitude of will in view of the motive, which he makes the occasion, or reason of his action.

Motives are necessary to moral action, because there must be something to arouse the mind, something to be done, something for the choice to terminate upon, in all moral action; and out of this object the motive arises. There could be no obligation without motive; obligation implies something to be chosen or regarded for its own sake.

Again, let us remember that the motive is the reason for the action-that in view of which the agent, in the exercise of his will, decides or determines. The motive does not determine the action, in the sense of being the cause of it. It excites the moral agent to a choice; but the moral agent is the cause of his own action; and with the same motives acting upon him objectively, he has full power and freedom to put forth one action or another. The motive furnishes the occasion for the action" but the agent is the cause of it. "Motives address us through two channels, and thus there are two classes of objective motives appealing to us; and therefore there are two classes of subjective motives, that is of reasons accepted by men for their action. These two channels are the understanding, or the intelligence, and the feelings. A course of action may commend itself to our intelligence as useful, right and proper, and therefore obligatory; or to our feelings, as agreeable or disagreeable, desirable or undesirable.

Thus in moral action two courses are always open to us, and only two. All motives reduce to these two classes, and all character is formed under one or the other of these two forces, reason and impulse; and these two classes of motives are, probably, always present objectively, to every moral agent, and one of them is accepted subjectively" (Fairchild's Theology, pp. 40-42).

"A demand is sometimes made for a sufficient reason why the agent acts as he does; why one man is sinful, another virtuous. There is no ground for demanding a reasonable reason-one which justifies the action. There can be no such reason for a wrong action, but there is always a sufficient motive for the action. The sinner does what he likes to do instead of what he ought to do. Every one knows the operation of this motive in his own consciousness. The motive for wrongdoing is perfectly apparent-the only reason for the action, (gratification of the sensibility). Nor do we need to look for the cause of any moral action. To look for such cause out of the man himself, in the exercise of his own will, is to make the man a machine, and to set aside personal responsibility" (p. 42).

Now we are prepared to consider the question whether the will is always, as Edwards says, "as the strongest motive," or "as the greatest apparent good." President Fairchild gives this admirable and lucid answer: "There are two possible affirmative answers to this question, (both of them wrong). (1) The will must be as the strongest motive by necessity; it cannot act against the strongest motive; this is pure necessitarianism, and leaves no room for freedom. (2) The will is always as the strongest motive, but not as a matter of necessity, simply as a fact. The true answer to the questions is, No, NEITHER AS A NECESSITY NOR AS A FACT.

How do we measure the strength of motive? There are two ways-by the judgment or reason, and by the sensibility or feeling. The two standards are entirely different, but the will is not always as the strongest motive, tested by either standard. It is not always as the best judgment; for the sinner always acts against the true reason as presented by his judgment. Nor is it always as the strongest feeling; the good man often obeys his judgment against his feeling.

If the strongest motive be defined as the motive that prevails, then the answer to the question is determined by definition. But in this case the will determines for itself what motive shall be the strongest by yielding to the one or the other. The will then determines the motive, and not the motive the will" (pp. 43, 44). In other words, the free moral agent, himself gives the strength to the motive.

2. Let us consider the nature of choice. It is commonly supposed by many writers that only three elements enter into a choice. The conditions of choice are (1) an end. (2) A motive state. (3) An impulsive decision. Were this all, and choice was an immediate effect of motive, impulse, then necessity would often at least, be the result. But if it is an act of personal agency, through reflection and judgment, then we are free. And this is the simple truth. There is (4), a power of suspending choice, to give time for reflection and judgment. This follows the motive state, and delays decision, so that the decision does not immediately follow the motive state. The connection is broken, and the moral agent in his action is perfectly free.

This is what distinguishes the conduct of a true man from that of an animal. The first three facts named above, viz., an end, a motive state, and a decision, might all be affirmed of an animal. But what distinguishes the choice of a moral personality is that it may be and always ought to be, the result of a rational use of the intelligence. Without such reflection our conduct is very like that of the brutes. Miley well says: "If the elective volition is in immediate sequence to the motive impulse, it must be a necessary effect of that impulse. There can be no intervention of our personal agency, whereby the result can be prevented or modified. (There would be no time for it). A motive can only act in one of two modes: either as a solicitation or inducement to the mind, as a personal agent, the end of which he may either accept or refuse, or as a causal efficience immediately determining the mind to the end. In the latter case there can be no personal agency in the resulting volition. The causal force of the motive determines the action of the mind, just as the weight determines the action of the balance. Hence THE MOTIVE MUST BE AN INSTANT CAUSE TO A COMPLETE EFFECT OR IT NEVER CAN CAUSE THE CHOICE" (Vol. II, p. 285).

The mental facts of choice then are the following:

a. The conception of an end. Choosing is choosing something. Whatever it is, it must be mentally apprehended in order to be chosen. Mere instinct may lead to its end without mental forethought, as when birds build their nests or bees their cells, or beavers their dam, but rational mind cannot act in this way. It must consider the end to be chosen, and is a fundamental element of choice.

b. The mind must be in a motive state with regard to this end. There must be some kind of interest in it, arising from appetite or desire or reason or moral nature, which moves to action or choice.

c. In personal agency there always may be, and always ought to be, an action of the judgment respecting the ELIGIBILITY OF THE END. "Such reflection and judgment are necessary to a proper personal agency in choice."

d. When the judgment has made its estimate of the value of the end to be chosen, the choice is made in the light of self-pleasing, or prudence, or duty. Thus in free moral agency there is the power of rational self-action. In the exercise of this power, ends are considered, motives are weighed, results are reflected upon, and the choice is made in perfect freedom, with the consciousness of the power of contrary choice.

3. Further observations confirming this doctrine of freedom of choice.

(1) We have seen that choice is a rational election of some end. The rational element lies in the fact that it is for a reason mentally apprehended and approved. And this reason is the true motive of the choice. There must be actual motives and also contrary motives to solicit a choice between them. A mere, appetence or incitement in the sensibilities is not a true rational motive. There must be a good reason for their gratification outside of themselves. Hunger and thirst prompt us to eat and drink; but their mere gratification is not the true reason for action. We eat and drink to live; otherwise we might eat and drink to excess and to our death just for gratification. Beasts do that way, for this is animal life; but it is not the life becoming a free moral agent. Parental affection, followed simply as a motive impulse, often fails of duty, leading to the unwise indulgence and lack of government of the children, which ends in their ruin. The proper action can be reached -only by reflection and judgment, which is essential to rational choice. Miley goes so far as to say that "volitions which spring immediately from spontaneous impulses in the sensibilities are not choices, but purely executive volitions, put forth for the attainment of the ends of such impulses." An animal lives that way because he is without the requisite faculties for rational choice of a high end. But man cannot live a noble life by simply following impulses. Our old teacher at Yale, Dr. Samuel Harris, denned sin as "the failure to obey the dictate of right reason." A man who weakly follows the promptings of his sensibilities, without reflective choice, is a sinner, living below the level of possibility and duty. He has the power of rational choice and moral freedom and is not using it. In this, consists his sin. Life is worthy of man only as it proceeds from his personal agency, and this would be a nullity without this power over our motives and volitions which can release us from the absolute domination of our spontaneous impulses. There must therefore be in us a power of suspending choice until we have time to reflect, in order to conduct life virtuously and rationally.

(2) In habits men largely omit this rational suspension of choice, and act immediately from impulse without reflection. In this consists the danger of all evil habits. They were formed without due reflection, perhaps in thoughtless youth; and they are followed in the same way, often leading to eternal ruin unawares.

(3) Let it be remembered, here, that this power of suspension of choice and rational reflection is not self-acting. It is an endowment of free-moral agency which we know we have and which it is our duty to use. The fact that many do live a thoughtless, unreflecting life of impulse and spontaneous desire, does not militate against the truth of free moral agency. People often possess other powers which are allowed to lie dormant. There are people with rare poetical gifts who will live and die "mute, inglorious Miltons." Every one knows there are people with noble musical gifts who never touch an instrument. There are born artists who never paint, and natural orators who never tread the rostrum or sway the masses. It is sufficient for our argument to show that we have the power of free moral agency, or, as it is so often called, free will, whether we always use it or not. We simply know it is a fact that volition is often deferred for hours or days or even months; men wait to investigate, to obtain more light, to deeply ponder the great concerns of life. All great and noble lives in science and philosophy, in art and literature, in statesmanship and patriotism, in philanthropy and piety, are the result of such rational deliberate choice. That such men are the product of impulse is unthinkable. In truth, reflection must be the daily habit, and the highest practical reason the guide of every such life. Hence the power of rational suspension of choice must belong to moral agency, and every good life is a witness to this great central fact of our being.

(4) What is more, this power of suspension of choice is immediate. We know it by experience, and it must be so, or the volition would immediately follow the impulse and there would be no rational choice. There is, there must be "an intrinsic power of immediate self-movement, a power to pause and reflect when under the impulse of motive, a power whereby the mind may turn itself to such facts or principles as may concern the present inclination, or call them up and hold them under deliberation. For all this there is required no other power or reason than what is ever at the command of a rational agent, so long as his proper agency remains" (Miley). Otherwise a sane and Christian life is impossible and we are the victims of impulse, as helpless as the wheels in a machine-shop, or the stars in their courses. Without this power we would not be rational agents or moral beings.

(5) Oftentimes, the instant application of a principle previously thought out and settled, or a right habit rationally formed, may take the place of suspension of choice. In other cases a clear intuition of duty may suffice, being so instant a vision of the right that no delay for reflection may be necessary. Consciousness bears us witness that this power of suspending choice belongs to the moral agent himself, and is a part of his moral equipment, as a rational being. In other words a rational agent can act rationally.

(6) Objections may be urged against the reality of this power in view of the blindness of moral ignorance, the perversion of error, the enervation of vice, and the thralldom of evil habit. We may admit that rational agency may be greatly enfeebled, or, possibly, entirely overborne, by the force of evil habit and vicious tendency; still the truth remains with regard to undestroyed moral agents. By a right use of the powers of our personal agency, in the discharge of our moral obligations, we may reach the highest measure of self-command and moral freedom. All have hours for reflection, time to decide on rules of action. It is possible to make it a rule of life always to pause and reflect about every solicitation of doubtful moral bearing, until it shall become a permanent habit of our mind. Thus it will become more and more easy to pause and reflect, and gather strength from the weightiest reasons to resist solicitations to evil.

(7) It is a matter of consciousness that we have power over motives, and motive states. For instance, we know that we can dismiss a present object of thought from mind and replace it with another, or call another subject up for thought and reflection. While it is true that feelings are involuntary, and thought is often spontaneous, or not consciously voluntary, yet we have a voluntary control of our mental faculties. We may dismiss one subject which has interested us, and now becomes a motive, and take up another and bestow upon it profound and exclusive thought. Thus there are two modes of mental activity; the spontaneous, and the self-chosen or self-directed. It is the latter that has produced those great achievements in science, philosophy, art, literature, and statesmanship that have been the glory of the race. Now this power over our faculties to direct attention and thought involves power over motives and motive states to change them, bring them to an end, or to summon others in their stead. We know we have it. It is a matter of experience in every life. People will turn from an interesting conversation, or lay down a most interesting book, or some article in a newspaper which has profoundly moved them, to take up a stale, uninteresting task because it is the thing to be done. This thing may be tested any day, and proved to a demonstration. Thus we are not bound to the satisfaction of any appetence, since we can separate ourselves from the motive object, and can summon a counter influence. We can hold down a fiery impulse by a cool judgment, and take time to reflect, and summon the weighty reasons of piety. We can see, by a little reflection, that if we were without this power over motives and motive-states, our lives would be bound in necessity and we would be as helpless under the power of influences as the tides are helpless to resist the attraction of the moon. But we know that it is not so. The conclusion is inevitable. We can set aside unworthy motives, and cease thinking of unworthy things; we can enthrone the rational and the moral in our lives, over the incitements of appetite and passion, and thus escape the doom of being the passive victim of impulsions to evil.

(8) The question may be asked, is this power used? We promptly answer, Yes, in countless thousands of noble lives. But we are discussing the reality of the powers God has given us, and not the use or the neglect of them. Many use them; and all might use them. Therefore we are all free moral agents truly the author of our character, and justly responsible for our conduct.

(9) It may further be asked whether we have a true capacity for motives which would help us to a pious and holy life. Here we manifestly reach the crucial point, and the profoundest issue of the whole subject. Without hesitation we answer in the affirmative. Voltaire said: "Man is a religious animal." Whatever he may have meant by it, it is certain that man has a capacity for the deepest religious experiences. He can know God and enjoy Him. That means fellowship with God.' And that means that we can share the thoughts and feelings, and aims and purposes that glow in the heart of God. It all means that "there must be in us a capacity for motives of morality and religion, else there can be no actual motive to -the choice of either, and without the proper motive neither can be- chosen. Without the choice neither is possible." The life could not rise into the moral and religious sphere. We must have this capacity for moral and religious motives, or we are only animals, under no obligation to live a moral and religious life.

Even our inherited depravity does not alter the fundamental facts of our nature. "The moral life of humanity," says Miley, "is double-a life within a life. With all the facts of evil there are the more widely prevalent facts which evince the common sense of moral obligation and responsibility, and the common appreciation of obedience to the duty of morality and religion as the supreme excellence and wisdom of human life. These facts require as their necessary source, a subjective state which constitutes a capacity for the motives of morality and religion, and hence conclude its reality." These are the paramount motives of human life. They are drawn from God and the eternal world, and carry with them the issues of eternal destiny. We can command such motives. It is done by placing the mind in practical relations to great truths of revelation and God and duty and eternity, until we are affected and drawn "by the power of the world to come." Conscience and moral reason are realities in every one still under probation, and, for ought we know, are the eternal possession of every moral being. They only wait for the proper reflection to rise into activity of profound interest in the concerns of the soul. Even the seemingly thoughtless can pause and reflect, while moral duty and the eternal interests which hinge upon it shall rise into view, as of all things supremely important. So the worldly mind can deeply concern itself with heavenly things. And the sensual can be moved by things that are spiritual and pure. Even habits of evil can be broken; for they are not the outgrowth of moral impotence. Nor are they the consequence of the disuse of moral powers but of their abuse, through a long course of willfully chosen sin, from a persistent resistance to the spontaneous protests of conscience and the clear apprehensions of moral reason, and the warnings and pleadings of the Spirit of God. This is a matter of consciousness, known to every soul. We know we can choose good instead of evil, have done it, and always ought to do it. When we do not do it we are the victims of the penalty of self-condemnation.

V. THE PROOFS OF FREE MORAL AGENCY.

1. From the testimony of our own consciousness. Remember that consciousness means that knowledge which every one has of his own sensations or mental states, or of what passes in his own mind. Professor Tappan defines consciousness as "The necessary knowledge which every one has of his own operations, or the power and act of self-recognition. Consciousness implies two things; first, a knowledge of all our mental exercises; and, secondly, a knowledge of ourselves as the subjects of those exercises or mental states. "In consciousness," says Professor Mahan, "we not only know mental phenomena as they are, but we know also the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of such phenomena" (Intellectual Philosophy, p. 5O). When we are angry or pleased, love or hate, remember or fear, choose or refuse, we are immediately sensible of the fact. The knowledge of it is not the result of reasoning; it is not derived from investigation, but rises immediately and spontaneously in the mind. Knowledge derived from consciousness is as certain as our intuitions of primary truths, as surely as we know that an effect must have a cause, or that we ourselves exist. It is even more certain than the knowledge derived from sensation. Sights and sounds may deceive us, but consciousness never does. It needs no arguments, for it carries its own demonstration. We are compelled to yield ourselves up to the insanity of universal skepticism before we can doubt it for a moment.

Here then we find our first argument for the freedom of the will, or free moral agency, or the freedom of man in the use of his will. This conviction of a self-determining power, or a control of the will belonging to us, is as universal as man. A few fatalistic philosophers and necessitarian theologians may raise a dust, and befog themselves and a few others on the subject; but everybody in practical life comes back to the decision of common sense, or the common judgment of mankind, that every man has within himself the power of rational choice, and that in making his decisions, he was beyond the reach of compulsion. President Fairchild affirms that, "the proof of freedom is found only in our consciousness, and can be found nowhere else. We know that we are free and that is the end of the argument; it is a fact of consciousness. Other arguments for freedom are often presented, but they are only different ways of presenting the fact of the consciousness of freedom, or are different indications of the fact. The fact that we hold ourselves bound by duty or obligation to a certain course of action is a good argument for the freedom of the will. But the perception or conviction of the obligation presupposes the consciousness of freedom. The view is sometimes presented that we infer our freedom from our consciousness of obligation. But it is not merely a logical inference. The consciousness of freedom is the logical antecedent of that of obligation, and the thought of freedom must come before, or with, the thought of obligation." We believe he is right, and most of the arguments at least are only varying forms of the argument from consciousness. However we will state some of them as confirmatory of the main argument.

2. All men have a sense of blame when they do wrong. Ralston says: "Am I charged with the commission of a crime? Convince me that the force of circumstances rendered its avoidance absolutely impossible, and I can no more blame myself in the premises than I can censure the tree that fell upon the traveler as he was journeying on the highway." People censure themselves for the commission of crime and for sin of every kind, because they are conscious that under the very same circumstances they might have done otherwise-might have done right. It is the infallible verdict of the soul.

3. Another argument for the self-determining power of man is drawn from universal history. We find in the literature of all ages and all nations common modes of speech, terms and phrases expressive of the universal idea that men are consciously free from necessity in forming their decisions and choices, and shaping their conduct. Men speak or write about the acts of their minds, or the determinations of their wills as though they were free. They express blame, or praise of themselves or others, thus recognizing this principle of freedom as it lies in all minds. They condemn wrong on the express ground that, under the same circumstances and conditions, the wrong-doer might and should have done right.

4. Universal laws bear witness to the freedom of the will, or free agency. By the laws of all civilized nations; criminals are punished upon the universal supposition that they might have avoided the crime. If it could be anywhere proved that a criminal committed his crime from necessity, because of influences or forces, or conditions, that made it impossible for him to do otherwise, there is not a civilized government on earth that would punish that unfortunate victim of necessity. All governments punish criminals, because it is universally recognized that men are free in their acts, and there is no excuse for crime.

All the sanctions of criminal laws are enacted to encourage virtue and deter from vice and crime on the direct supposition that men are free in their conduct, and can respond to encouragements to right doing. Every police station and jail and prison, every grated window and prison-wall, and scaffold and electric chair and guillotine proclaims the universal conviction of mankind that even the worst of men, under the very circumstances in which they committed their crimes, might have done otherwise.

If this is not true, then all good men should band together in a crusade against all criminal laws and penalties and penal institutions, and arouse a public sentiment of pity and sympathy for all wrong-doers; such men should be pitied and not blamed. But this very notion mocks the common verdict of mankind, proving to a demonstration the universal consciousness of men, that sins and crimes deserve punishment because the sinner and criminal are free and might have done otherwise.

5. The action of a sinner's mind in repentance proves his freedom. Does he lament necessary conduct? Does he come before his fellowmen and his God, and make a humiliating confession that, "with the same character and environments and impulses and motives" which he had, his conduct was "inevitable" and his behavior unavoidable? Does he dare to approach his Maker and tell Him, that his evil behavior "was fixed from all eternity"? We know he does nothing of the kind. In a case of genuine repentance there is no trifling, no philosophical excusing of sin, or calling it a "necessity." On the other hand, there is a deep humiliation and contrition and self-abasement, and confession of guilty commission of avoidable sin. An honest sinner throws all Calvinistic philosophy to the winds when he repents.

6. The convicting work of the Holy Spirit bears witness to our moral freedom. The conduct of the Holy Spirit may be' depended upon to be in harmony with truth. He is "the Spirit of truth." Does he tell the sinner that in all his excesses, and vile deeds, and wicked choices, he was a poor unfortunate, a sad victim of irresistible motives, that his base deeds were all "determined with unalterable certainty" and "effected by the providence of God"? Every man on earth that has ever been convicted for sin knows better.

The Spirit arraigned him as guilty and deserving of the frowns and condign punishment of a holy God, because all the time he was pursuing his wicked sins, he might have been obeying his Maker and blessing the world.

7. The Scriptures everywhere address man as a being capable of choosing aright; as possessing a control over his own volitions and as being held responsible for the proper exercise of that control. Moses said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live" (Deut. 30: 19). "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve" (Josh. 24: IS). Now to choose is to determine the action of the will; and these men were called upon to do it for themselves. But if their wills were fixed by antecedent causes, or motives beyond their control, such words are but a solemn mockery of .human helplessness. Jesus said of the Jews: "How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not (Matt. 23:37). "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life" (John 5:40). And Jesus denounced woes upon them for their obduracy and unwillingness. Now would the holy Jesus have thus upbraided them, if their conduct had been "fixed," and their choices "necessary"? It is akin to blasphemy to affirm it.

8. The very idea of Freedom is properly advanced as an argument for the fact of freedom. This idea, it is said, must be explained. "Now do we obtain it? There is nothing out of ourselves to suggest it? Everything in the heavens above, and 'in the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth,' is bound in the chain of cause and effect, and cannot suggest the idea of freedom, nor even of necessity. The idea of necessity is the correlative of that of Freedom; neither can come without the other. The idea or conception of Freedom comes from the consciousness of freedom within ourselves, and the idea of necessity in the same way." These arguments are all good and prove the case to a demonstration. But we will adduce one more.

9. The rewards and penalties of the next world demand freedom in this. If all human conduct is "necessary" and "fixed," and "determined with unalterable certainty," then each creature does what he cannot help doing, and all alike are carrying out divine foreordination. Why should one party be praised and another blamed? On such a theory there can be no character in conduct, and consequently no blame and no desert of punishment. All men would be like so many stones helplessly in the hands of the architect. One stone is put in the foundation down in the mud and the other is polished and placed in the tower. If men are used in that way, by the supreme architect of the universe, why praise or blame anybody for anything? Men cannot help reasoning in this way. Logical minds can not help coming to the conclusion that if we are punished in the next world we must be free in this, or we cannot, by any possibility deserve punishment.

10. It is objected to this doctrine that it is inconsistent with God's foreknowledge. These writers think that God foreknows future events only because he knows all present causes; and all future events are linked to these, in the chain of cause and effect. Hence the cause of an act of a free-being, who shall live a thousand years hence, is now in existence, and thus God is enabled to foreknow that act. No assumption of Calvinists is more gross than this, that God cannot foreknow unless he foreordains, or knows the result of an endless chain of causes and effects. Fairchild answers thus: "This links all events, finally, in the chain of cause and effect, and does away with freedom. But the proposed explanation of God's foreknowledge is a groundless assumption. It is limiting the divine nature to human conditions, making God's foreknowledge mere FINITE PRESCIENCE. God may know the future directly, immediately, the method is mysterious to us" (Fairchild's Theology, p. 46).

But Dr. Ralston points out one more inference from this argument as surprising as it is logical. "This objection," he says, "labors under the serious difficulty that while it aims to destroy the free-agency of man, it really would destroy the free-agency of God. For if what is foreknown as certain must also be necessary, and cannot possibly be otherwise, then, as God foreknew from eternity every act that He would ever perform, He has, all the while, instead of being a free-agent, acting after "the counsel of his own will," been nothing more than a passive machine, acting as acted upon by stern necessity. This conclusion is most horribly revolting; but, according to the argument of necessitarians it cannot possibly be avoided." God like man would be a victim of necessity, and stern, relentless fate is on the throne of the universe. The monstrosity of the result shows the worthlessness of the argument. It is perfectly manifest that God's foreknowledge of His own acts does not destroy His free-agency; no more does His foreknowledge of the future acts of men make them necessary, and destroy man's free-agency.

VI. Some irresistible inferences to be drawn from the foregoing truths.

1. It is contrary to consciousness and Scripture and reason, to hold to the thought of MORAL INABILITY. It is one of the great five points of Calvinism. But it is an error like all the rest -of them. Many Methodist writers use the term, -but always unwisely. It is wholly inconsistent with their system of theology, which is the best in the world. We have seen that man has freedom of will, or is a free-moral agent. That means, of course, to do his duty, to obey God. The willing aright, or choosing aright is obeying. "If there be first a willing mind it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." "In this passage, we are plainly taught that if one wills as God directs he has thereby met his obligation; that he has done all that is naturally possible to him, and nothing more is required. The Bible in this text expressly limits obligation by ability" (Finney's Theology, p. 339). "But is it not true, as is affirmed, that men instinctively and necessarily affirm their obligation to be able to obey God, while they at the same time affirm, that they are not able? We answer, no. They affirm themselves to be under obligation simply, and only, because deeply in their inward being lies the assumption that they are able to comply with the requirements of God. They are conscious of ability to will, and of power to control their outward life directly, and the states of the intellect and of their sensibility, either directly or indirectly, by willing. Upon this consciousness they found the affirmation of obligation. But for the consciousness of ability, no affirmation of moral obligation, or of praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness, were possible.

"It is true indeed that God requires of men, especially under the Gospel, what they are unable to do directly in their own strength. Or more strictly speaking, He requires them to lay hold on His strength, or to avail themselves of His grace, as the condition of being what He requires them to be. Through grace we are able to be more than conquerors and we are able to avail ourselves of God's grace, so that there is no proper inability in the case" (p. 340). "There is no inability but a wicked disinclination to obey God." Man possesses the natural ability to obey all the requirements of God. The law of God ever requires obedience, so that must be possible. That which requires absolute impossibilities, is not and cannot be moral law. Moral law is the law of nature, and what law of nature would that be that should require impossibilities? This would be a mockery of a law of nature. What! a law of nature requiring that which is impossible to nature, both directly and indirectly! Impossible!" (p. 363).

It is argued that "Adam's first sin plunged himself and his posterity, descending from him, into a total inability of nature to render any obedience to God." We admit the sad effects of the fall upon our entire nature; but we deny the inference of moral inability to will so as to please God. The body was injured by the fall; but we have a body left, sufficient for the demands of duty. The mind was injured; but we have a mind left. The memory was injured; but we have a memory left, to which God often appeals. Our conscience was injured; but we still have a conscience left to which God often appeals. Our sensibilities were deranged by the fall; but we still have a sensibility left to which God may appeal and does appeal. Our moral reason was injured and our intuitions; but we still have a moral reason sufficient to respond to the appeals of God. By a parity of reasoning, our will was injured and weakened; but we still have a will-power left, injured though it is, sufficient to respond to God's appeals. And God always appeals to it, and demands an obedient response. The truth is, the whole theory of moral inability is a theological fiction, contrary to consciousness, conscience, moral reason, the voice of Scripture, and all the appeals of a just and holy God.

2. Let us now consider the term GRACIOUS ABILITY. We find it often used in Methodist writings; but we doubt the wisdom of using it. The logical inferences that must go with it are not in harmony With Methodist theology. We magnify ability, and rejoice in grace; but "gracious ability" means too much. Let us review: a moral being-a person, as we have seen must be possessed of three attributes, -intellect, sensibility, and free will. These are the essential attributes of moral being.

Ability means nothing more than the possession of these essential faculties which enable us to make the moral choices and perform the duties of a moral being. Ability to obey God is simply the possession of a power, adequate to make the choices which God requires. Now a being without either intellect, or sensibility, or free-will, would not be a moral being, and could not be a creature of moral obligation, any more than a horse or a stick of wood.

Grace is unmerited favor. Its exercise consists in bestowing that which, without a violation of justice, might be withheld. Now those who use this phrase seem to mean this: "By the first sin of Adam, he and all his posterity, lost all natural power and all ability of every kind to obey God; that therefore as a race, man would have been wholly unable to obey the moral law, or to render God any; acceptable service whatever. That is, the race, as a consequence of Adam's sin, would have been wholly unable to use the powers of nature in any other way than to sin. They would have been able to sin or disobey God but entirely unable to obey Him. They would have had power to act only in one direction-in the way of opposition to the will of God.

By gracious ability seems to be meant that, by virtue of the universal atonement, the help of the Holy Spirit is given to every human being, and, while grace lasts, they are endowed with a gracious ability to obey God."

Now we will let Finney, with his inexorable logic, point out what would logically follow, though we greatly abbreviate his argument.

1. Finney says: If this doctrine of natural inability and gracious ability be true, it inevitably follows that but for the atonement of Christ and the bestowment of gracious ability, no one of Adam's race could ever have been capable of sinning. For in this, case the whole race would have been wholly destitute of any kind or degree of ability to obey God. Consequently they could not have] been subjects of moral government, and of course their actions could; have had no moral character. It is a first truth of reason, a truth by all men and everywhere necessarily assumed in their practical judgments, that a subject of moral government must be a moral agent, or that moral agency is a necessary condition of anyone's being a subject of moral government. Moral character cannot otherwise justly be predicated of his moral actions, any more than of a horse, or of a lunatic, or of an idiot.

2. It must follow that both Adam and his posterity would and could have sustained to God only the relation of necessary, as opposed to free agents, had not God bestowed upon them gracious ability. But that either Adam or his posterity lost their freedom or free-agency by the first sin of Adam, is not only a SHEER BUT AN ABSURD ASSUMPTION. To be sure Adam fell into a total alienation from God, and his posterity followed his example. He and they have become dead in trespasses and sins. Now (but) that this death in sin consists in, or implies the loss of free agency, is the very thing to be proved. But this cannot be proved.

3. It follows that, when the Holy Spirit is withdrawn from man, he is no longer a free moral agent, and from that moment he is incapable of moral action, and of course can sin no more. Hence, should he live any number of years after the Spirit's withdrawal, neither sin nor holiness, virtue nor vice, praiseworthiness nor blameworthiness could be predicated of .his conduct. The same will and must be true of all his future eternity.

4. If the doctrine in question be true, it follows that from the moment of the withdrawal of the Gracious Ability or Holy Spirit, man is no longer a subject of moral obligation. It is from that moment absurd and unjust to require any duty of him. Nay to conceive of him as being any longer a subject of duty; to think or speak of duty belonging to him, is as absurd as to think or speak of the duty of a mere machine. From the moment of the withholding of a gracious ability, he ceased to be a free and became a necessary agent, having power to act in but one direction. Such a being can by no possibility be capable of sin or holiness. Suppose he still possesses power to act, contrary to the letter of the law of God. What then? This action can have no moral character, because, act in some way he must, and he can act in no other way. It is nonsense to affirm that such action can be sinful in the sense of blameworthy. To affirm that it can is to contradict a first truth of reason. Sinners, then, who have quenched the Holy Spirit, and from whom he is wholly withdrawn, are no longer to be blamed for their enmity against God, and for all their opposition to him. They are, according to this doctrine, as free from blame as are the motions of a mere machine.

5. If the doctrine in question be true, there is no reason to believe that the angels who fell from their allegiance to God ever sinned but once. If Adam lost his free-agency by the fall, the angels did so too. If a gracious ability had not been bestowed upon Adam, it is certain, according to this doctrine in question, that he never could have been the subject of moral obligation from the moment of his first sin, and consequently could never again have sinned. The same must be true of devils. If by their first sin they fell into the condition of necessary agents, having lost their free agency, they have never sinned since, and they are not now to blame for all they do to oppose God and to ruin souls. According to the supposition they cannot help it and you might as well blame the winds and waves for what they do as to blame Satan for what he does.

6. There is not and never will be any sin in hell, for the plain reason that there are no moral agents there. They are necessary agents, unless it be true, that the Holy Spirit and a gracious ability be continued there. If they deny to the inhabitants of hell freedom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to obey God, they must admit or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no sin in hell, either in men or devils.

7. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God is an absurdity will further appear, if we consider that it is a first truth of reason, that moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral agency implies freedom of will or, in other words, it implies a natural ability to comply with obligation. This ability is necessarily regarded by the intelligence as the sine qua non of moral obligation, on the ground of natural and immutable justice. A just command always implies an ability to obey it. A command to perform a natural impossibility would not, and could not, impose obligation. Suppose God should command human beings to fly without giving them power; could such a command impose moral obligation? No, indeed! But if he did give them power relative to the command, the bestowment would not be grace but justice (Fin-ney's Theology, pp. 341-348).

"But it may be asked, Is there no grace in all that is done by the Holy Spirit to make man wise unto salvation? Yes, indeed, I answer, And it is grace and great grace, just because the doctrine of a natural inability in man to obey God is not true. It is just because man is well able to render obedience, and unjustly refuses to do so, that all the influence that God brings to bear upon him to move him to obedience, is a gift and an influence of grace. The grace is great, just in proportion to the sinner's ability to comply with God's requirements, and the strength of his voluntary opposition to his duty. If man were properly unable to obey, there could be no grace in giving him ability to obey, when the bestowment of ability is considered relatively to the command. But let man be regarded as free, as possessing natural ability to obey all the requirements of God, and all his difficulty as consisting in a wicked heart, or, which is the same thing in an unwillingness to obey, then an influence on the part of God designed and tending to make him willing is grace indeed. But strip man of his freedom, render him naturally unable to obey, and you render grace impossible, so far as his obligation to obedience is concerned" (p. 349). "The difficulty to be overcome is everywhere in the Bible represented to be the sinner's unwillingness alone. It cannot possibly be anything else; for the willingness is the doing required by God." The strong language often found in Scripture upon the subject of man's inability to obey God, is designed only to represent the strength of his voluntary selfishness, and enmity against God, and never to imply a proper natural inability" (p. 35O).

"I reject the dogma of a gracious ability because it involves a denial of the true grace of the Gospel. I maintain that the Gospel, with all its influences, including the gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert and sanctify the soul, is a system of grace throughout. But to maintain this, I must also maintain that God might justly have required obedience of men, without making these provisions for them. And to maintain the justice of God in requiring obedience, I must admit and maintain that obedience was possible to man" (p. 352).

We think Finney's reasoning on this point is unanswerable. It would be far truer to the teaching of Scripture, and consciousness and reason, to say that WE HAVE AN IMPAIRED NATURAL ABILITY PLUS GRACE, than to say that we have lost all natural ability to obey God and have only a TEMPORARY GRACIOUS ABILITY instead. The inevitable logical inferences are too grave and startling, to accept the doctrine that lies back of this unfortunate term, inconsistent with the true doctrines of Methodism.

Dr. Miley closes his great discussion as follows: "This is the doctrine of a rational and real freedom. It rests upon no false ground, and is constructed with no irrelevant or irreconcilable principles. Every vitally related fact of psychology and personal agency has its proper place and office. The theory of a valid and responsible freedom under a law of MORAL INABILITY is OF ALL THEORIES THE MOST IRRATIONAL. It requires that the good be chosen, not only without actual motive, but also against the dominance of inevitable counter motive. By so much does it sink below the liberty of indifference or the freedom of mere arbitrary volition. The doc trine here maintained is clear of all these errors. Personal agency is the ground of truth. This agency must be a reality, else there can be no place for the question of freedom. If a reality it must have all requisite faculties. Then freedom should no longer be a question in issue. Its denial involves a denial of personal agency in man. Personal agency and free-agency are the same. For required choices sufficient motives are within our command. This is rational freedom. It is not the freedom of moral impotence, impotence in the very seat of the necessary potency. It is the freedom of personal agency, with power for required choices. It is sufficient for the sphere of our responsible life. Spontaneous impulses often tend toward the irrational and the evil. But we can summon into thought and reflection and into the apprehension of conscience and the moral reason, all the countermotives of obligation and spiritual well-being as they may arise in the view of God and redemption and the eternal destinies. With these resources of paramount motive, and the light and blessing of the Holy Spirit, ever gracious and helpful, we may freely choose the good against the evil. This is the reality of Freedom in Christ" (Vol. II, pp. 306, 307).

The most compact statement of the doctrine of free-agency we have seen is by Dr. Daniel Steele in Binney's Compend (pp. 111-113). There is no dominance of motives, no Calvinistic necessity, no moral inability, no gracious ability in it. Every sentence is a nugget of pure gold. It ought to be written on the fly-leaf of every minister's Bible, in the interest of truth and clearness of thought. It is as follows: "Though man is fallen and sadly depraved, so that there is in his nature a strong tendency toward sin, yet does he retain the Godlike attribute of freedom. In every volition of a moral nature, he is free to will the opposite. No decree of God, no chain of causation behind his will, no combination of elements in his constitution, compel his moral acts. The gracious aid of the Holy Spirit, is only suasive not necessitating. Acts 7:51, Eph. 4: 30; 1 Thess. 5: 19. The free will is a self-determining, original cause, itself uncaused in its volitions. It is a new and responsible fountain of causation in the universe. Proof 1: Consciousness: "I know I am free and that is the end of it."-Dr. Samuel Johnson.

2. Such freedom is involved in the feeling of moral obligation, and in the sense of guilt for our misdeeds.

"If man be punished in the future state God must be the pun-isher.

"If God be the punisher the punishment must be just.

"If the punishment be just, the punished might have done otherwise.

"If the punished might have done otherwise they were free agents.

"Therefore, if men are to be punished in the future world, they must be free in this."

1. The Scriptures everywhere assume that men are free to obey God's law, and to comply with the conditions of salvation. Prov. 1: 23-31; Matt. 23: 37; John 7: 17.

2. If men's acts are the effects of causes arranged by God, then either God is the author of sin, or, His own acts being the effects of some necessitating cause, such as the strongest motive, or the constitution of His nature, the universe is under the iron law of Fate, and sin is an illusion and an impossibility."

To which we say, Amen, and Amen.