Prof. W. Lea

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THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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POETICAL QUOTATIONS:

BEING

A COMPLETE DICTIONARY

OF

THE MOST ELEGANT

Moral, Sublime, and Humorous Passages

IN

THE BRITISH POETS.

The speculative may here find experience; the flattered, truth; the diffident, resolution; the presumptuous, modesty; the oppressor, mercy; the proud, humanity; and the powerful, justice. Youth and age may improve equally by consulting it:—the one it directs—the other it admonishes: Whilst it amends the heart it informs the head, and is, at the same time, the rule of virtue, and the standard of poetical eloquence.—*Hayward.*

BY J. F. ADDINGTON.

IN FOUR DUODECIMO VOLUMES.

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The compiler of these volumes, in executing the pleasing and arduous duty which he has imposed upon himself, has had recourse to the writings of more than *Three Hundred* British Poets of the present and three preceding centuries; of which but a comparatively small proportion are accessible to the public generally; and many of them are little known to the Polite Scholar.

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This work has been adapted to the purposes of a book of reference by an *alphabetical* arrangement: and by the aid of the *numerical* and *chronological* order of the quotations, the curious reader may, at a glance, view the progressive steps which have been made in the structure, copiousness and harmony of our language, as well as recur at will to the selections from any favourite author throughout the four volumes.

In making the selections, especial care has been taken to exclude every thing that could excite or nourish a vicious thought, or awake a blush on the cheek of innocence. It will, on the contrary, be found that the general tendency of the quotations is to strengthen the best moral feelings where they exist, and where they do not, to implant and nourish them.

NOTICES OF "POETICAL QUOTATIONS."

From the National Gazette, by Mr Walsh.

Mr John F. Addington has issued, in this city, the first volume of a work entitled "*Poetical Quotations*, being a complete Dictionary of the most elegant, moral, sublime, and humorous passages in the British Poets." Mr Addington states, in his preface, that he has had recourse to the writings of more than three hundred British poets of the present and three preceding centuries. His plan is to be executed in four volumes duodecimo, of more than three hundred pages each. The work has been adapted to the purposes of reference by an alphabetical arrangement: and chronological order is observed in the quotations. Strict care has been exercised as to the moral character of all. We cannot but commend this enterprize. The design is highly useful, and the execution, so far, strikes us as quite respectable.

From the United States Gazette of Philadelphia.

The first volume, containing A. to D. is now before us, handsomely printed, with an engraved title and vignette; and we profess ourselves edified in a view of the ceaseless industry that for many years must have been employed in the compilation of so much chaste poetry, affording such apt quotations for writers or texts for essayists. The volumes, we think, will be conducive to good taste and good morals, which, by the way, are always in unison; and, to borrow one of the quotations, we may say the work will all

——"of these four ends produce,
"For wisdom, piety, delight and use."

Denham.

From the Democratic Press of Philadelphia.

The title of this work conveys some idea of what it ought to be, but none of its execution. Its arrangement is excellent; and passages, on any subject, can as easily be found as words in a dictionary.

The compiler, Mr John F. Addington of Philadelphia, has faithfully executed the work he proposed. He has, in good faith, diligently read, and with good taste and sound judgment selected from "the British Poets," all their most admirably conceived and elegantly expressed passages. Here, in a reasonable

compass, are the best specimens of the best British Poets, in all ages and in every range :—satirical and humorous, sublime and moral, witty and pathetic ;—but here is nothing which can offend against the purest mind or tinge the chastest cheek.

Mr Addington has indeed conferred a favour on the public, by the manner in which he has executed this most desirable and agreeable parlour book. The quotations appear to have been copied accurately, and the proofs read with care. The work has one other merit which will give it value with the lovers of Poetry—the compiler has so carefully noted the author and the poem from which each selection is made, that the work at large can easily be found and referred to. The mechanical part, the paper, type and presswork, is what it ought to be in a book which deserves to have a very general circulation, and to be very frequently consulted for profit and pleasure.

From the Daily Chronicle of Philadelphia.

We have received a copy of the first volume, which is a duodecimo of the largest size, very handsomely printed, and adorned by a vignette title-page engraved for the work. The compiler tells us that he had recourse to the writings of more than three hundred British Poets, of the present and three preceding centuries. As usual in such compilations, the extracts are placed under proper heads, in alphabetical succession.—In each of these divisions, too, a chronological arrangement has been observed, which, as Mr Addington remarks in his preface, presents the reader with a view of the progress of our language.

From the Saturday Evening Post of Philadelphia.

We pronounce this work to be highly valuable, as a compendium of all that it professes in the line of *quotation*. And we recommend it to a discerning public, in the hope that it will meet with due encouragement. We think the method of arrangement contributes much to its usefulness as a literary *desideratum*, and it will be found one of the *most complete* selections of excellent poetry now extant.

From the Saturday Bulletin of Philadelphia.

The volume before us is the first of the series, and is alphabetically arranged, including the letters A. to D. The advantages of the classification are numerous. As a book of reference it is particularly valuable, and should be found on the desk of every polite scholar, who may find any striking sentiment he desires to see, illustrated in these pages.

THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

FOR JULY 1830.

REVIEW.

Essays and Dissertations in Biblical Literature. By a Society of Clergymen. Vol. I. Containing chiefly translations of the works of German critics. New York. G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1829. *Pp.* 567, 8*vo.*

The importance of biblical literature is gradually rising to its appropriate value in the estimation of many of our clergymen. To those whose acquirements and taste have led them to feel a deep interest in the progress of theological literature in our country, and whose biblical studies have made them sensible of the want of more ample means for extending their researches, the attention recently awakened to this subject cannot fail to be highly gratifying. For deep and original investigation in this productive field our country has hitherto laboured under peculiar disadvantages, which, although diminished by the productions of every passing year, must long continue to be felt. Our public libraries are not stored with ancient manuscripts, accumulated by the contributions and collections of successive centuries; our geographical location cuts us off from many important facilities of acquiring a radical knowledge of oriental languages, literature, and cus-

toms; and our theological and literary institutions have not, until recently at least, afforded the requisite means and encouragements for profound research. Few men of talents possess the means of pursuing their studies beyond the narrow limits prescribed for admission to professional engagements, nor has the tone of public sentiment afforded adequate patronage to warrant the appropriation of much time and expenditure upon extensive investigation.

But in all these respects we are happy to perceive decisive indications of improvement. The gradual development of the treasures accumulated in the ancient libraries of Europe, by the publication, from time to time, of the most valuable articles in various forms and languages, is constantly rendering access to the originals less important. The printed copy of a useful document, if accurate, will be as valuable an assistant in our researches as the musty manuscript, and will in most cases afford the additional advantage of translation, collation, or commentary, which may essentially facilitate our labours. Thus the deficiencies of our libraries are in a course of supply from the overflowings of those of our more favoured neighbours, and the elements of profound investigation are accumulating around us without the wearisome process of ransacking dusty shelves and examining corroded masses of ancient manuscripts. The multiplication of elementary books, journals of travellers and missionaries, and increasing intercourse, are constantly rendering easier the acquisition of oriental literature. The political changes and revolutions in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean, and the interest felt in the efforts of missionaries, are directing the attention of the community so strongly to that quarter, as to create a popular sentiment in favour of any pursuits connected with the east, especially if designed to illustrate the scriptures. Nor is it among the least gratifying characteristics of the present age, that our theological seminaries of various denominations are making special efforts to give prominence to the claims of biblical literature, and to furnish increasing facilities to young men of promising talents to pursue their studies beyond the mere prescribed routine. And last, though not least among the cheering improvements of the day, we may name the improving character and increasing number of publications, both original and imported, on the various topics embraced in this branch of theological science.

We rejoice in this progress, not only because we consider the subject important in itself, but especially because we are

persuaded that the assistance of this department of theology will soon be required in a peculiar manner, and to an extent hitherto unknown, to sustain the interests of truth. The prominent aspect which error and infidelity are assuming, the talents and learning enlisted in their support, and the unwearied assiduity with which they are rallying and organizing their hosts, admonish us to put on our armour and prepare for the contest. The spirit of free inquiry is gone forth; the doctrines of revelation are undergoing a radical investigation; sentiments are no longer revered for having been held sacred by the best of men, from time immemorial; the truths which established the faith and nourished the piety of our fathers, are called in question with as little hesitation as the speculations of yesterday; and new efforts of inventive genius are daily put in requisition to expose weak points in the foundations of our faith, and to construct new instruments to undermine or storm the citadel of truth. The social fireside and the popular meeting; the legislative discussion and the industriously-circulated periodical; the speculations of the philosopher, obtruded upon the community after the hand that recorded them has mouldered in the tomb; and even the sacred desk—"I name it, filled with solemn awe," are seized as occasions or employed as vehicles to render objections to the received system of religious truth, popular and influential. In this process the cause of piety must suffer, and the souls of multitudes be deluded, if the advocates of the truth are not qualified to maintain the system with equal talent, learning, and industry. Whatever therefore lays claim to the least agency in diffusing a profound knowledge of the scriptures, clear views of their authenticity and canonical authority, familiar acquaintance with their essential facts and truths, and correct principles of interpretation, cannot fail to be welcome to every intelligent Christian, and especially to the clergyman, who feels himself in a peculiar manner appointed in the providence of God, and "moved by the Holy Ghost," to stand forth as a "defender of the faith." No age of the church perhaps has more imperiously required a firm phalanx of able ministers of the New Testament to preach in demonstration of the spirit and of power the unsearchable riches of Christ, and contend earnestly by all legitimate means for the faith once delivered to the saints.

But as our object in noticing the work before us is not to make it the text of an essay or dissertation of our own, but to give some account of its contents, to recommend it to the careful attention of our readers, and at the same time to express

our dissent from some of the positions maintained in it, we proceed to a detailed examination of the various discussions which fill its pages. Seldom has a volume issued from the American press replete with such deep and varied learning, applied to its appropriate objects with so much judgment and taste. The general design of the work is "to advance the cause of biblical literature, principally by placing within the reach of students some treatises which are not now readily accessible." The articles are all, with one exception, translated from the German or Latin works of Michaelis, Tittmann, Storr, Eichhorn, and Gesenius; names which no lover of German literature, or connoisseur in the higher walks of theological science, can pronounce without respect, although we regret that some of them have been enlisted on the side of neology, or rationalism. Few traces of these erroneous opinions appear in the pieces introduced into this work; and when they do occur, the translators have omitted them, where it could be done without injury to the connexion, or accompanied them with cautionary notes. We deem this course on the whole judicious; for while we exceedingly dislike the practice of garbling the works of valuable writers, we consider it a far more serious evil to import foreign errors, or foreign arguments, in support of native error.

The volume opens with a "History of Introductions to the Scriptures, by William Gesenius, translated from the German by Samuel H. Turner, D.D. Professor of Biblical Learning and Interpreter of Scripture in the General Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States." The article was written for the "General Encyclopœdia of the Sciences and Arts, by Ersch and Gruber," and republished, with the other articles in that work referring to the Bible, in a separate volume, at Leipzig, in 1823. This volume contains in a small compass much valuable information on the History, Criticism, Antiquities, Translations, &c. of the Bible, from the pens of De Wette, Niemeyer, and Gesenius. The essay before us is very brief, and consequently superficial and unsatisfactory. Several works, by no means unimportant, are entirely omitted, most of which however the translator has referred to in a note. The author sets out by defining the appropriate limits, and pointing out the proper subjects or materials of an Introduction to the Scriptures; and then mentions the principal works which have successively appeared bearing this title, or discussing the subjects which it indicates. This branch of theological science has

been cultivated more extensively in Germany than any where else. "It gives, on the particular books, discussions respecting their authors, and times of composition, genuineness and integrity, contents, spirit and plan; and also, as the subject requires it, respecting the original language, its earliest history, and so forth; and further, in general respecting the origin of the Bible collection, or Canon, its original language and versions, the history of the original text, and other matters of this kind."

The material elements of a work of this class are arranged by our author in the following manner: the history of the cultivation of the Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Hellenistic languages, writing, and literature; the history of the Canon, or of the collection, arrangement, and ecclesiastical (we would also add, divine) authority of the books; the history of the original text, the various changes which it has undergone, and the means of improving it; and the hermeneutical part, which exhibits the aids for understanding the Bible, and directions for the application of them. The historical sketch, which constitutes the body of the essay, often furnishes little more information than the name of the author in his proper place in the succession, and the title of his work in a note, and utterly disappoints our expectation of seeing the principal works characterized and estimated according to their respective merits. The principal introductions to the New Testament are thus described:

"After the very learned preparatory works of Richard Simon, the first who published an introduction to the New Testament was J. D. Michaelis. His work was a very imperfect manual, which in later editions was greatly improved and enlarged, and by Herbert Marsh was enriched with learned additions and corrections. But the marked progress which biblical criticism and exegesis had made towards the end of the last and in the beginning of the present century, was conspicuous in the manuals respectively, of Hänlein, whose work is particularly distinguished by its agreeable composition, of J. C. Chr. Schmidt, who abounds with clear and unbiassed views, and of J. L. Hug, who excels all his predecessors in deep and fundamental investigations. Eichhorn has also extended his inquiries to the subjects comprehended in the introduction to the New Testament, but has published no more at present than the particular introduction. The subjects, in this department, which have engaged the attention of the inquirers, as of principal importance, and have occasioned many hypotheses and learned controversies, are the following: the arrangement of the manuscripts according to recensions and classes, (Griesbach's system of recen-

sions); the manner of illustrating the agreement of the first three gospels; the chronology of Paul's epistles, and, since the publication of Schleiermacher and Bretschneider's works on this subject, also the authenticity of the gospel of John, and of the epistles to Timothy."

Beyond the limits of Germany the author finds only two writers worthy of notice: Lanigan, an Italian, and Horne, who "both comprehend the Old and New Testaments, and the latter the exegetical helps also, as biblical antiquities, geography, and other subjects of this kind. In addition to the various works named or described, a catalogue is given of the German journals and reviews which have discussed particular topics, and reviewed the various books which have appeared from time to time in this branch of theological science. These are numerous, and some of them have extended to many volumes; indicating decisively the strong hold which investigations of this kind have taken, in the popular feelings of the more intelligent classes of the community. It is an undoubted fact, as our author states, that "other nations are far behind the advances which have been made by the Germans," though we should hesitate to subscribe to the reasons he assigns for the deficiency; which are, that the Bible is not studied elsewhere with so much ardour, and that the doctrinal views of divines in other countries "are opposed to the results to which many of the disquisitions tend." We should not be easily persuaded to believe that the Bible is not as faithfully and as profitably read in England and our own country as in Germany; and if the fruits of piety actually exhibited were taken as the criterion of the fidelity with which English and American Christians search the scriptures, we should have little fear of mortification in the comparison. But in the other reason assigned, there may be truth in the view which the author takes of the subject. It is not, however, in foreign countries alone that these results, so deleterious to the best interests of piety, are deplored and opposed. This opposition is nowhere so decided, and so powerful at this very time as in the heart and throughout all the borders of Germany; and no where else has it enlisted so much talent, and such an extent and variety of learning in the cause of truth. The ablest veterans of the neological school, who had long boasted of their triumph over the established system of their church, and had been deemed invincible by their admiring followers, have recently been assailed in the name of the Lord of Hosts, pursued through all their ample range of classical and oriental learning,

and discomfited on their own ground. Some of those who still survive are sinking into neglect and losing their influence, while others are approximating to the truth and spirit of the gospel, and associating with their more evangelical neighbours in disseminating its salutary blessings. It ought, however, to be remarked, that there is nothing in the nature or tendency of these investigations in themselves, if conducted in a proper spirit and manner, from which piety or orthodoxy, even in its "most straitest" forms, need shrink. The translator, in a note to the passage under consideration, very justly remarks, "Disquisitions of the kind referred to, do by no means tend to the results with which the German neologists have satisfied themselves. They tend to a fundamental acquaintance with scripture, to a confirmation of its claims as the inspired word of God, and to a sound and incontrovertible system of religious faith, founded in all its parts, not on metaphysical philosophy, or traditional authority, but on the Bible, and nothing but the Bible." For the truth of this we might appeal to the characters of the most profound biblical critics of every age, from the days of Jerome to the present time; but the subject has been too often discussed, and is in its very nature too plain to need further illustration in this place.

The next article in the volume is a "Treatise on the Authenticity and canonical authority of the scriptures of the Old Testament, by John Godfrey Eichhorn; translated from the German by J. F. Schroeder, A.M. an assistant minister of Trinity Church, New York." It presents, in the compass of about eighty pages, a compendious view of the testimonies and arguments on which our belief in the genuineness and authenticity of the Old Testament rests. The introductory paragraphs embrace some important general observations. The diversity of style, the "march of thought and range of imagery," and the gradual change of manners developed in the successive books, demonstrate them to be the works of different authors; while the nature of the case, and the utter absence of any conceivable motive, forbid us to think of an agreement between different writers of different ages to impose upon the world so extensive and influential a forgery. "The very reasonings that argue for a Homer, maintain even the authenticity of all the particular books of the Old Testament;" and "as yet no one has been able to oppose with arguments the integrity and credibility of any writer of the Old Testament; but every discovery in ancient literature has hitherto been some new confirmation of the sacred books." All the books, of which the

writers are known, "are impressed with the seal of the integrity of their authors;" and where these are not known, "internal considerations always show, that we are *compelled* to recognise them as authentic." "The Book of Joshua, for instance, the author of which is unknown, enters so deeply into the particulars of the most ancient geography, that miracle upon miracle must have been wrought on an impostor, if he could have been in a situation to compose it *thus.*"

Before introducing the direct evidences and testimonies of authenticity, an observation is premised in which we cannot acquiesce. We insert it entire.

"The very nature of the origin of many scriptures of the Old Testament renders it necessary that ancient and modern passages and sections must interchange in them. Very few proceeded from the hand of their authors in the form in which we now have them. The separate constituent parts of many had long been extant as special works, before they became united with certain parts now added to them. Should even the Mosaick writings, in their present order, not be those of Moses; yet they have been collected from Mosaick documents, and have merely been disposed by a more recent hand. Our Psalms, according to their existing arrangement, first attained their present extent after the captivity, by the combination of several larger and smaller books of Psalms. The materials of our Daniel were originally separate, in treatises that had been composed in different dialects. The golden proverbs of Solomon have been increased by accessions: even in Hezekiah's time, there were additions made to them."

We are not prepared to adopt any of the statements of which this paragraph is composed, without much greater limitations and qualifications than the known sentiments of the author allow us to prescribe. The translator has omitted some connected passages on account of the "peculiar sentiments which they advance," and referred us to Jahn's Introduction for proof that the Pentateuch is in reality "the work of Moses," and "not a compilation of recent date."

We are unable to perceive what it is in the "nature of the origin of many scriptures of the Old Testament," which renders an interchange of ancient and modern passages and sections necessary, at least to any considerable extent. The writers of the books containing the national history of the Hebrews, both before and after their separation, unquestionably used the records, official annals, and other public documents of the kingdom whose history they describe; and they may have occasionally introduced extracts. In some instances the historian interweaves with his narrative the oracles of

prophets, the effusions of inspired poets, and the speeches, decrees, letters, or remarks of the individual whose history he is writing.* Some of these documents may have existed long before the writer's age, though probably very few will be found by examination. We may admit also that the editor, or editors, who revised the books, when arranging them into their proper place in the canon, added or inserted some remarks, changed perhaps some geographical names, and in Deuteronomy appended a whole chapter. Marginal notes may, by the carelessness or officiousness of transcribers, have been transferred to the text, and other slight variations must have occurred in the course of time, and frequent transcription, to render the text now in some degree different from what it was when it issued fresh from the hands of the author. Hence the various readings which characterize the existing manuscripts, none of which, in all probability, accurately represent the autograph in any one book. With these exceptions, which materially affect very few of the books, we see no reason for admitting this interchange, or succession of ancient and modern passages, which, however we might limit, it would make strange patchwork of the sacred volume, and would certainly affect in a serious degree the genuineness, if not the authenticity, of the inspired books. Unless we are prepared to yield the question of genuineness, we must maintain that we possess them substantially, in matter and form, as they were published by their respective authors. It is true they exhibit marks of having been revised, arranged, and prepared for permanent use, public and private, at a period subsequent to the composition of most of them, but the changes and additions thus made, so far as can now be ascertained, did not substantially affect the character or component parts of any single book. The Psalms, at least many of them, existed without doubt as separate compositions; some of them perhaps a long time before they were collected into a volume; and the Proverbs of Solomon, "which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, copied out," contained probably in the last seven chapters of the book, may have been then first added to the collection previously made; but the materials were of the same

* See 1 Kings, xiv. 29, and xv. 7. 1 Chron. xxvii. 24, and xxix. 29. 2 Chron. xxiv. 27. 2 Sam. i. 18. 2 Chron. xii. 15, and xiii. 22. Ezra i. 1—4. After the separation, the Chronicles of the two kingdoms are separate documents. Compare 1 Kings xv. 7, 31, and xxii. 39, 45.

character, prepared by the same hand, and of course they constitute a whole, as genuine and authentic, as if they had been transcribed in successive chapters and verses, by the hand of the royal author.

But we are more particularly anxious to vindicate the Pentateuch from the insinuation here thrown out against its genuineness, as a real work of Moses.

From the speculations of Carlostadt, Spinoza, Astruc and Paine, to the criticisms of Eichhorn, Vater, and De Wette; infidels and theologians co-operating in unholy concert; the Mosaic origin, and of course the divine authority of the Pentateuch, has been a favourite object of attack. It seems to have been considered the most questionable portion of the whole series of God's revelations, the most vulnerable point in the citadel of the christian faith. Yet scarcely two of these critical cavillers can agree in their theories, or rely on the same mode of explaining the actual phenomena of the books, as they have been transmitted to us in the sacred volume. While some imagine they find evidence of composition at a period long posterior to the time of Moses, when or by whom they cannot decide; others, compelled by internal evidence and historical testimony to refer them to the age of Moses, represent them as a series of fragments, partly composed by Moses, and partly by other unknown hands; some of them, as Vater* and De Wette,† extend this fragmentary character to all the books; while others, as Astruc, Eichhorn and Jahn, limit it to Genesis, and maintain that Moses found these documents among his people, and collected, arranged, revised, and modernized them, and incorporated them into his history. Yet they cannot agree as to the number and extent of these documents,‡ which they distinguish by the use of the divine names Jehovah and Elohim, by a difference in the style and mode of narration, by repetitions of the same truth or fact, and by inscriptions or other expressions indicating the commencement or the end of a section. These are probably the "documents" to which the

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* Commentar ueber den Pentateuch. Vol. III. p. 393, &c.

† Lehrbuch der historisch Kritischen Einleitung, in die Bibel, A. and N. T. § 150—155.

‡ Astruc, who first advanced the theory, (in his Conjectures sur les Memoires originaux dont il paroit, que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genese,) reckoned twelve, Eichhorn two, Vater many, greater or smaller, Ilgen three, &c.

author alludes in the passage before us, and which he calls Mosaic, because they passed through the hands of Moses and received his sanction and revision; yet we hardly know how to reconcile the declaration with the doctrine he elsewhere maintains, that these documents were arranged and prepared, and all the other books written by Moses himself, with the exception of the last two chapters of Deuteronomy.* Being accustomed to consider the whole as the work of Moses, and finding it every where quoted and referred to as such, in the Old Testament and in the New, by ancient writers, Jewish as well as Christian, we are by no means disposed to relinquish the opinion; nor do the discordant assertions and reasonings of Eichhorn, of Jahn, of Vater, of De Wette, or of Augusti, render it in our estimation untenable. Perhaps the hypothesis, as maintained by Eichhorn and Jahn, is not utterly incompatible with the authenticity and inspiration of the book of Genesis, (yet it cannot be a genuine work of Moses, and where then is the evidence of its authenticity?)

Nearly all the writers of the Old Testament cite or refer to the writings or the law of Moses, but nowhere give us a description of the particular books included in these writings. In Joshua, i. 8, and viii. 31, 34. and xxiii. 6, the book of the law, or of the law of Moses, is distinctly mentioned, with reference in the contexts to historical circumstances, threatenings, and promises, contained in the Pentateuch; and in ch. xxiv. 26, we are informed that he made an addition, or appended a supplement to the book of the law of God, which must have been the farewell address of Joshua, recorded in this chapter, if not, as we deem more probable, the whole book bearing his name in substantially its present form. Here then, as early as the days of the immediate successor of Moses, we see his writings expressly mentioned as one entire and inspired work. As we follow the course of the sacred history, we perceive the same evidence in succeeding ages of the Jewish theocracy. David, at the close of life, admonishes his son and successor to keep the charge of the Lord his God, to walk in his ways, to keep his statutes, and his commandments, and his judgments, and his testimonies, as it is written, (or as they are written) in the law of Moses. (1 Kings ii. 3. compare 1 Chron. xxii. 13.)

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* See Augusti's Grundriss einer historisch kritischen Einleitung ins Alte Testament, § 101.

The variety of expressions employed forbids our applying the reference to the decalogue simply, or any particular injunctions or statutes. In still later periods of the Jewish history, numerous references to the Pentateuch occur under the various titles of the book of the law of Moses, (Neh. viii. 1), the law of Moses, (2 Chron. xxiii. 18. Ezra iii. 2), the law of Jehovah, (1 Chron. xvi. 40, and 2 Chron. xxii. 12, 13); and in 2 Chron. xxv. 4, a passage is quoted literally as "written in the law in the book of Moses." The historical parts of the Old Testament every where abound with similar instances, and the Psalms and prophecies are full of allusions in various forms to these writings; (compare Ps. cx. 4, with Gen. xiv. 18—20. Isaiah, liv. 9, with Gen. viii. 21. Isaiah li. 12, with Gen. xii. 1, and see also Psalms lxxviii. cv. cvi. cxxxv. cxxxvi, &c.) The Pentateuch, therefore, has been known, read, quoted, and referred to in every period of the Jewish history, and always as the sole, entire work of Moses, containing the laws and revelations of Jehovah. In the New Testament the references and quotations are so numerous, as to render it altogether unnecessary here to name any.* Could this representation be consistent with the accuracy of inspired truth, and would it have occupied so conspicuous a place in the inspired volume, if so large an integral part of the whole as the book of Genesis were not the work of Moses, but the collected fragments of some unknown writers of preceding ages? Can we then admit the supposition, that these writings, in their present order, as one entire work, are not the genuine productions of Moses, without diminishing, if not destroying, our faith in their authenticity and inspiration? Or had the work existed, as the rhapsodies of Homer are said to have done, for any considerable time after Moses, in separate fragments, even on the supposition that he composed them, or any part of them, as the expression "Mosaic documents" seems to intimate, and as the author elsewhere admits,† would it have been so uniformly referred to and quoted, even from the days of Joshua, as one work, one book, one law of Moses? The supposition is incredible,

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* The translator of the essay before us, in a note appended, gives a list of nearly a hundred "direct quotations" from the Pentateuch, among which are twenty-two from the book of Genesis alone.

† I. G. Eichhorn's Urgeschichte, pt. i, p. 180. Gabler's edition.

and we believe capable of being satisfactorily disproved. But our limits forbid us to pursue it further at present.

We pass on to notice the remark on the prophecies of Daniel, which contains an assumption that we hold to be altogether gratuitous. We admit of course that the book presents different subjects, forming sections sufficiently distinct to be intelligible as separate documents, written also in different languages. But does the fact, that various subjects are arranged together without any effort to exhibit a connexion between them, prove that they were originally separate documents? Does mere divisibility demonstrate the necessity of division and independent origin? Internal evidence,* historical tradition, (for the Jews, with one or two exceptions, never questioned it), and New Testament testimony, prove it the work of one author, who must have lived contemporaneously with the events recorded in it. If this be so, we have no possible ground to deny that it was written by Daniel; and if this is established, we have little concern to know, whether the various parts were written at one or at different periods; whether the successive sections were recorded on one roll or more. The difference of language in different parts of the book forms no objection either to its unity or its genuineness; for, from his situation, Daniel must have been as familiar with the Aramaean (and not the Syriac, as inaccurately translated in chapter ii. 4.) as with the Hebrew; and peculiar circumstances, with which we are unacquainted, may have created a peculiar necessity for the Chaldaic or East Aramaean dialect in a part of the book. This portion may have been published in a separate form for the use of the Chaldeans, who would not have understood the Hebrew. Yet even on this supposition, the Hebrew introduction (chap. ii. 1—3.) must have been translated, for the Chaldaic portion is so intimately connected with the Hebrew, as not to be intelligible if separated from the Hebrew preface. How little ground is there, therefore, for an argument from the different languages against the original unity of the book?

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* See Jahn's Introductio in Libros sacros, &c. pt. ii. § 150. De Wette (Lehrbuch der Einleitung, &c. § 256,) proves it to be the work of one author, although he denies its genuineness. Michaelis rejected only the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters, but Eichhorn, Bertholdt and others question the whole book. The arguments pro and con may be seen at length in Bertholdt's Einleitung, Volume IV, § 387.

But we trust we have said enough, if not to evince the untenability of the assumptions in the paragraph before us, which we have interpreted according to the known sentiments of the author, yet to enter our caveat against such insinuations and unwarrantable modes of speaking of the sacred books, on which our faith and our hopes are founded. We have no fear of the judicious application of criticism to the inspired writings, and we would cordially say with our author, "higher criticism must fulfil its office" for "the writings of the Hebrews" as well as the "classics of Grecian and Roman antiquity;" but we utterly disapprove of such indefinite and unqualified assertions, and abhor the ungodly spirit which can approach the sacred volume with the cold indifference of a commentator on Homer or Plato, and apply the arbitrary canons of a licentious criticism, regardless of the holy sanctions of divine authority and inspiration.

The simple object of our author in the essay before us, is to establish, by historical testimony alone, the canonical authority of those books to which Christ and his apostles referred in their teaching, and to which they ascribed divine authority. "At that period there was in Palestine a collection, which made up a complete whole, and in the New Testament was sometimes comprised under the appellation scripture, or holy scriptures; sometimes paraphrased by law and prophets, or by law, prophets, and Psalms." That this collection was the same which we now possess in the Old Testament, is the precise point of inquiry; and he proceeds in the investigation with the intelligence of an able advocate, judiciously introduces the principal witnesses, examines and cross-examines them skilfully, weighs their testimony candidly, and gives his verdict clearly and satisfactorily. In the examination of witnesses, he has not taken so wide a range as many others have done, and has relied principally on the testimony of Philo, Josephus, Melito, Origen, Jerome, and the Talmud. The New Testament is also mentioned as evidence, but is very briefly disposed of, in a manner by no means corresponding with its importance in the list of witnesses, or with the critical examination which the others have received. The translator has endeavoured to supply this deficiency by appending a list of the direct quotations from the Old Testament, and some judicious references. We cannot trace the course of the investigation, and will only add the substance of the result.

"From the remotest period, the Jews glowed with a sacred re-

verence for their national writings. In the language of Josephus, 'it was, so to speak, innate with them, to regard these as divine instructions; in their solicitude they ventured not, as he assures us, to *add*, or to *take away*, or to *alter* any thing, although some of the writings had a very high antiquity.' (§ 29.) Even by the greatest calamities, which the mad spirit of persecution gathered around them on account of their sacred books, they did not permit their reverence to be repressed. How could a nation, with these sentiments, suffer to be ranked with their sacred books, such as were of inferior value and authority; in case it had been made out and generally decided, *how many* and *what books* were entitled to divine authority?

"This also was settled. As far as we can go back in their history, just there, where the Apocrypha unites the broken thread of Hebrew literature, we find express mention of a sacred national library of the Hebrews, as the several parts of it were strictly determined. It thus appears, that it was begun soon after the Babylonian captivity; or that, from the writings, which in regard to contents, authors, and date of composition were so different, there was made a complete whole, with a view that, for the future, no new writings should be added to them; although, from the want of accounts, we are not now able to specify in *what year*, and *why* additions at that period ceased to be made.

"In short, HISTORY ATTESTS, THAT AFTER THE BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY, AND INDEED SOON AFTER THE NEW ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HEBREW STATE IN PALESTINE, THE CANON WAS FULLY SETTLED, AND AT THAT TIME COMPRISED ALL THOSE BOOKS WHICH WE NOW FIND IN IT."

The annunciation of this decision, so satisfactory to our faith in the plenary authenticity of the Old Testament, suggests a correlative inquiry of some interest and importance. If all the credible witnesses agree so decidedly in their testimony for those writings only which were written by holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, how did the apochryphal books find their way into the sacred collections of the primitive Christians? The Jews distinguished carefully between the "works of the prophets" and other writings; and it does not appear that they ever regarded any other as of divine origin. Among Christians, however, after the days of the apostles, as early as the existing records carry us, these books seem to have been held in undue estimation, and some of them quoted and described as belonging to the inspired canon. Barnabas cites a passage from the fourth book of Esdras, with the formula λεγει ο κυριος, Clemens of Alex.

quotes Tobit, Jesus, Sirach, and Wisdom, as scripture, γραφη, and the book of Baruch as inspired scripture, θεια γραφη. Origen informs us that the Jews neither use the books of Tobit and Judith, nor have them in Hebrew, but the churches use Tobit. The council of Laodicea (An. 360) prohibits the use of uncanonical books, but places in its catalogue of the canonical, Baruch, and the epistle of Jeremiah; the council of Hippo (An. 393.) name Tobit, Judith, and two books of the Maccabees; and the councils of Carthage (An. 397, and 419) insert the same books. Cyril mentions Baruch and the epistle of Jeremiah.* Ambrose considers the apochryphal books as inspired; and even Augustine calls the books of the Maccabees canonical;† and Jerome informs us that the council of Nice was said to have numbered Judith with the holy scriptures.‡

To explain this phenomenon several distinguished writers have adopted the hypothesis of an Alexandrian, or Hellenistic canon, which differed from that used in Palestine, and embraced all the books now found in the Septuagint. But there is little positive evidence to sustain the opinion, and accordingly Eichhorn in the essay before us, and other judicious critics, reject it; for otherwise, says Storr,§ how could Josephus, after naming the twenty-two books, say, "No one has ventured to add or take away, or change any thing in them." The principal reasons urged by Eichhorn against the hypothesis are, the relation in which the Jews of the two countries stood to each, which though not intimate, was sometimes so near that Philo was sent by his brethren to Jerusalem, to present offerings in their behalf in the temple; that the son of Sirach and Philo agree with Josephus and the New Testament in calling their ancient sacred books by the same periphrasis, "law, prophets, and other writings;" that the son of Sirach distinguishes the work of his grandfather, an apochryphal book, from the sacred books of his countrymen; and that Philo,

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* See Alexander on the Canon, p. 55.

† We insert the whole sentence, part of which is quoted by Dr. Alexander on the Canon, p. 61. Horum supputatio temporum non in scripturis sanctis, quae canonicae, sed in aliis invenitur, in quibus sunt et Maccabæorum libri, quos non Judaei sed ecclesia pro canonicis habet propter quorundam martyrum passiones. De Civitate Dei. L. XVIII. c. 36.

‡ Augusti Grundriss einer—Einleitung, &c. § 56, and De Wette, Lehrbuch, &c. § 25—27, and 300, 308, from whom these statements are collected.

§ Lehrbuch der Christl. Dogmatik. Vol. I. p. 231. See also Mueller's Belehrung vom Kanon des Alten Testaments, p. 211.

although acquainted with them, and occasionally borrowing phrases from them, does not cite a single passage, or make any use of them to establish his opinions. It may be further added, that the high regard for the Septuagint professed by the Hellenistic Jews, and the claims of inspiration set up for the translators, were limited principally, if not altogether, to the Pentateuch.* There is no evidence that any other books were translated in the reign of the "second Ptolemy," and Josephus expressly says† "that he did not receive the whole scripture; but only the law was furnished by those who were sent to Alexandria to make the translation." The Hellenistic Jews read these books in the Synagogues,‡ but it does not appear that they ever introduced the sections of the prophets, as their Hebrew brethren did; for the same cause; for their introduction did not exist beyond Palestine. The prophets were read in the apostles' days at Antioch, in Pisidia, and probably throughout western Asia, but no decisive evidence has been adduced to prove the use of the Greek version. The earliest information we have of this entire translation is furnished by the son of Sirach, more than one hundred and fifty years after the version of the law in the days of Ptolemy Philadelphus, but he does not say how long it had been published. The probability is, that it was made at different times by different persons, as the difference in the execution of the various books is too great to permit us to believe they were all translated by one individual, or at one time by several individuals in concert. Philo dwells upon the Pentateuch and expends much labour in illustrating it, but seldom mentions or uses the other books. Josephus does not speak of them at all, unless he includes them under the name of the Law, which is not probable, as he makes a distinction clearly in the passage already quoted; and the writers of the Talmud, while they make honourable mention of the Greek Pentateuch, pass the other books in silence.§ These circumstances render it highly probable that these portions of the version were never held in the same estimation by the Hellenists; their canonical authority conse-

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* See Reinhardi Opuscula Acad. Tom. I. p. 15, &c.

† Preface to Antiquities, § 3.

‡ Reinhardi Opus. &c. p. 29. Vitringa De Synagoga Veteri, L. 3. part 2, maintains that the Septuagint was never publicly read till the sixth century; and Walton on the other hand supposes our Saviour read it in Nazareth.

§ Reinhardi Opuscula, Vol. I. Disput. i. § 8.

quently was less carefully guarded, and their contact with apocryphal books less cautiously avoided. No rigid laws, like those adopted by their Hebrew brethren, guarded the accuracy of copies made from time to time; transcribers were permitted to attach to various books additions or appendices at pleasure, to engross on the same rolls or in the same volume other books, which were never admitted to be canonical or inspired. Thus the apocryphal books, now found in the Septuagint and Vulgate, and most modern Bibles, except those published by the English and American Bible Socicties, were gradually inserted in the Hellenistic copies of the sacred volume. In this form the manuscripts fell into the hands of the early Christians, few of whom possessed learning or critical acumen enough to distinguish between the precious and the vile; and as the Greek and Latin Christians generally were ignorant of the Hebrew, they could not refer to the originals to ascertain the truth. The high regard they cherished for the sacred volume would naturally extend itself to all the books, especially as they observed, that the apostles not unfrequently quoted passages from various parts of the collection, as "scripture given by inspiration of God." This evil propagated itself in silence probably to considerable extent before it was noticed by any ecclesiastical writer, or counteracted by any synod or council. Hence the Christians were the first, and in fact the only advocates of the inspiration of these apocryphal writings; for the Jews never deemed them canonical, and were therefore prepared consistently to reject them, when the controversy with the Christians arose. Having thus found their way into the church, and having been canonized, as Augustine observes, not by the Jews but by the church, they have maintained their place in the sacred volume and in the estimation of the unenlightened multitude, even to the present day, notwithstanding the efforts of fathers, the decisions of councils, and the flood of light shed on all scriptural subjects since the days of the reformation.

An "essay on the life and writings of Samuel Bochart; by William R. Whittingham, A.M. chaplain and superintendent of the New York protestant episcopal public school," occupies the next place in the volume, and is the only original article it embraces. Bochart is a name of such eminence in the history of the literature and interpretation of the Bible, that it may well excite surprise that so little is known of him; and we are gratified indeed to be favoured with so full a sketch of

his history. His character and writings are well worthy the attention of biblical scholars. Mr W. has exhibited much industry and patient research in this essay, and displayed a familiar acquaintance with his voluminous works. Bochart was born at Rouen in 1599, studied at Sedan, Saumur, Leyden, and Oxford, with several of the most distinguished men of that age, and was afterwards ordained to the ministry and settled as pastor of the protestant church at Caen, a considerable town in the west of France, distinguished by an ancient university. Here he devoted himself to profound study, and the unostentatious discharge of pastoral duty. The even tenor of his life was only interrupted by an occasional controversy with his catholic neighbours, and a visit in company with his friend Huet to Sweden by invitation of the celebrated Christina. Here he was permitted to examine a collection of oriental manuscripts, with extracts from which he afterwards enriched his works. "After his return the only incidents which variegated his days were the publication of his works, and the removal or change of his colleagues, until his earthly labours were terminated in 1667. As a specimen of Mr Whittingham's style and manner, and as an example which might serve to stimulate the literary zeal of the pastors of our day, we insert a paragraph or two from the first part of the essay.

"However extraordinary it may appear, the pastoral duties of our author during this period were the occasion and the source of the monuments of wonderful erudition, which he has left to perpetuate his fame. He undertook, and accomplished the composition of a course of sermons to his congregation on the book of Genesis, from the beginning of the book to the 18th verse of the 49th chapter. These sermons, fairly written out with his own hand, he left among his other papers, to his family. Bochart was not one who would content himself with a superficial or a partial view of any subject. While engaged in the study of the sacred writings for the purpose of eliciting from them practical instructions for his flock, he could not pass over the difficulties which they occasionally present, nor leave unexamined any, even the nicest, question respecting the facts which they contain. The description of Paradise in the second chapter of Genesis excited him to a closer investigation of the real situation of that happy spot than had ever before been instituted; which resulted in the treatise De Paradiso Terrestri, now extant, though in a very imperfect state, in the third volume of his works. In like manner, almost every chapter presented some points not suited to be the themes of public discourses, and affording

occasion for the exercise of his deep research and unvaried erudition. The chronology and geography of the sacred volume,—its natural history,—the origin of the names of men and places which it records, and the more intricate portions of its history, were not matters to be neglected by our studious pastor. While plainer, and perhaps more useful, subjects formed the matter of his weekly instructions to the people, these were the favourite objects of his esoteric labours, and in these he was gradually accumulating the astonishing mass of learning, which he at length digested into his Sacred Geography and Hierozoicon."

We add the portrait of his literary acquisitions—a picture truly characteristic of the age which he adorned.

"It would be superfluous to say any thing respecting the *erudition* of Bochart, after what has been already brought in evidence upon the subject. In Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Chaldee, and the Rabbinical dialect, he may be considered as a perfect scholar. Few attain a more thorough knowledge of the Arabic and Syriac languages than he possessed. The Aethiopic he first made himself acquainted with by means of the Prodromus of Athanasius Kircher, and afterwards studied under Ludolf, who resided as his preceptor for some months under his roof. Of this and the Punic, however, he never accounted himself master, although his knowledge of them was equalled by very few, until toward the close of the eighteenth century, when the materials and means of information had exceedingly increased. Of the modern languages, after the fashion of the day, he knew only his native tongue, and never attained to any degree of elegance of composition even in that."

His works on the geography and natural history of the Bible constitute an era in the history of these sciences, and contain a treasure of rich and varied learning; which, although in a great measure superseded by the more tasteful and less cumbersome researches of modern days, may still be consulted with advantage. The analysis of his works, which forms the second part of the essay, is very full, and affords some valuable information. We had marked several passages for quotation, but omit them to avoid extending the article to an undue length.

Our attention is next arrested by two critical dissertations from the pen of the illustrious Storr, who, as a light shining in a dark place, with a few able and faithful associates at Tubingen and Stuttgard, maintained the truth as it is in Jesus, through the darkest period of neological aberration in Germany. They conducted the able periodical, which was designated by some of its contemporaries a *Seltenheit* (rarity), be-

cause it advocated the inspiration of the scriptures. Storr published many works, principally critical and expository, devoted to the illustration of the scriptures, but most of them are small; and some commentaries on whole books and two volumes of sermons have been published since his death, which occurred in 1805. His Biblical Theology, and Opuscula Academica, from the first volume of which the pieces before us are taken, are so well known, and exhibit his intellectual character and religious sentiments so fully, that we need say little to recommend the essays before us to the careful attention of our readers. The first is a "Dissertation on the meaning of 'the Kingdom of Heaven' in the New Testament, translated by Manton Eastburn, M.A. Rector of the church of the Ascension, New York." The author's Latin style in biblical investigations forms a singular contrast with the simplicity of his German, and Mr Eastburn's version has transferred more of its peculiarities into our mother tongue than we should have deemed possible. The interest of the perusal, if not the value of the investigation, is certainly diminished by the stiffness of its style, the abundance of its references to texts for illustration or proof, and especially by the unusual number and extent of the notes; which however embrace a valuable series of criticisms on particular texts, or important terms and phrases. The reader who has perseverance to surmount these obstacles, and trace out the references, will find matter enough in the essay to reward his toil. By 'the kingdom of Heaven' the author understands the reign of the Messiah; and the particular topics which he discusses are its commencement, its perpetuity, its extent, and its periods.

The "Dissertation on the Parables of Christ, translated by W. R. Whittingham, A.M." we have read with deeper interest, because the discussion itself is more important, is less encumbered with notes, and is presented in more classical English. The long involved sentences of the original are judiciously divided, and the meaning in general elicited with much accuracy. But we have not room for detail or quotation. We hope the whole dissertation will be carefully studied by all whose official duty calls them to interpret the parables of the New Testament for popular edification.

The next and longest article in the volume is, an elaborate effort to prove that "No traces of the Gnostics are to be found in the New Testament; by C. C. Tittman, translated from the Latin by Manton Eastburn, M.A." The author, like his con-

temporary Storr, has the merit of having maintained the truth at the Saxon capital, during the reign of darkness, after having for some time occupied a theological chair in the ancient university of Wittemberg. The history and opinions of the Gnostics have been a favourite topic of investigation with the German divines; but before the labours of Mosheim about the middle of the last century, little more than scattered shreds and discordant traditions had been collected. Ittigius, on the Heresiarchs of the apostolic age, and Beausobre, on the Manichees, had collected some valuable information, but it was reserved for Mosheim to make a full collection, to organize it into systematic form, and exhibit this ancient heresy in its genuine character. To this subject he devoted much time and attention. More than one-third of the first volume of his Institutiones Hist. Eccl. Majores* is occupied with it, and he afterwards revised and improved the illustration successively in his commentaries on the state of the church before Constantine, and in his history of the Ophites. Contemporary with him, and pursuing similar investigations with a different object, Brucker brought out the same results, so far as the origin and character of the Gnostic philosophy were concerned. These were followed by Walch, in his extensive history of heresies, who by laborious research exhibited the same general principles, and of course educed corresponding conclusions, which were also sustained by Michaelis, and ably advocated by Semler, in his introduction to Baumgarten's work on Theological Controversies. Then came Tittman, in the vigour of youth and the conscious strength of talent and learning. He undertook to question the facts, to deny the principles, and to overturn the results established by the independent yet concordant labours of his predecessors; and on the ground he has taken he stands, we believe, alone; even those who approximate the nearest, admit that he has gone too far. Within the last fifteen or twenty years the subject has been again revived, and illustrated with new light by an ample investigation of oriental records; many of which are ancient and authentic, and either totally unknown to, or but partially examined by earlier writers. The publications of Neander, Lewald, Hahn, and Luecke, constitute a new era in the history of these researches, and we regret that

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* This is not the work translated by Maclaine, but another on a much more extensive scale.

some of these works, or collections from them, had not been adopted instead of the work before us; to the examination of which we now apply ourselves.

With some professions of modesty the author boldly enters the arena, wields his weapons with no humble measure of apparent self-confidence, and occasionally breaks out into strains strongly savouring of vituperation. We cannot easily exonerate the introductory statement, in which he exhibits the doctrine he intends to oppose, from the charge of exaggeration, the commonplace artifice of controversial zeal. He admits, evidently with reluctance, "that about the time of Christ, and a little before, there was in use among the Persians and neighbouring nations" "a certain kind of philosophy, or even of theology, which, as it flourished in the east, may be termed oriental; although it was unknown by this appellation to all antiquity, and embraced opinions respecting God and the origin of all things, both moral and natural, especially the latter." This is the substance of what Mosheim maintains, and almost in his own words, which literally translated are as follows: "In the better known provinces of Asia and Africa, a certain singular kind of philosophy flourished, which treated of God, of things not perceivable by the senses, and finally of the origin of this world; and which its advocates were accustomed to call γνωσις, or *knowledge;* but others named it the *oriental philosophy* or *doctrine,* unquestionably because they wished to distinguish it from the philosophy of the Greeks."* Brucker describes the same system as "originating from the relics of Zoroaster's doctrine a little before the Christian era, and attracting a multitude of followers in Asia; of whom not a few, migrating into Egypt, contaminated not only the philosophy, principally the Pythagorico-Platonic, but also the religion, both of the Jews and Christians, producing among the former the Cabalists, and among the latter the heretics, commonly called Gnostics, from the higher philosophy to which they laid claim."† Such is in substance the oriental philosophy, described by these writers; yet Tittman represents them as maintaining "besides this

* Institut. Hist. Eccl. Majores, Vol. I. p. 136.

† Bruckeri Institutiones Hist. Phil. Per. II. part i. lib. i. c. 3.

In his larger work (Vol. II. p. 639) referring to the passage of Mosheim, quoted above, Brucker remarks, "Qui vidit et detexit, fuisse circa nati Salvatoris tempora, in notioribus Asiae atque Africae regionibus singulare quoddam philosophiae genus, quod divinarum rerum cognitionem caeteris

philosophy, another of a peculiar and different character, from which, as the fountain head, the Gnostic system sprang, not only in the time of Christ, but even long before, and which already in the time of Christ and his apostles had spread from Egypt and Syria into Asia Minor and Greece; was well known among the Jews in Palestine; was favourably regarded by many; was made use of in numerous instances for the purpose of confusing and deceiving the minds of Christians; was diligently practised and studied with the view of corrupting the pure doctrine by sundry errors, and of thus weakening, unsettling, and at length altogether overthrowing the foundations of the Christian religion, while as yet in its incipient and growing state; and "defiled the whole world with its iniquitous doctrines;" so that the apostles were obliged seriously to admonish Christians; to prove the wickedness of the system in their writings; and to establish and defend the truth of Christianity against these its worst enemies; and so that, moreover, traces of this philosophy are found in their writings, both in allusions to it, in refutations of it, and in the mention of it by name." Of this peculiar system we find not the least trace in either Mosheim or Brucker, in the passages referred to; nor does it appear by any thing that has fallen under our notice that any other writer has maintained this theory.

After a brief introduction he enters upon his task, and very properly divides his investigation into two parts; one historical, the other philological. The historical portion is principally occupied in the examination of a few testimonies from early writers, and in controverting the expositions and inferences which other historians had made. The witnesses on whom our author relies are few and brief in their testimony.

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praestantiorem sibi vindicans, orientalis doctrinae a vetustissimis philosophis ad se derivatae gloriam sibi vindicavit, exque ea secta plures cum ad Christianam religionem se contulissent, preceptaque sua cum hac praepostere conjungere conati essent, exorta esse illa heresium examina quae Gnosticorum nomine superbientia, muscarum instar per omnes Asiae atque Africae ecclesias pervolitarunt, et nugis ineptissimis simplicitatem sanctissimae religionis contaminarunt, ad Judaeos quoque et ipsos Gentiles progressae, domesticam utrorumque philosophiam misere corruperunt, sententiarum monstra excogitarunt, fanaticismum late regnantem confirmarunt et auxerunt, librorum spuriorum segetes disseminarunt, pessimisque doctrinis totum commacularunt orbem.

It will be observed that the author is here describing the progress and effects of the Gnostic doctrines after the publication of the gospel.

Irenæus refers the origin of the Gnostics to the time of Anicetus in the second century. Clemens of Alexandria declares, that during the reign of Adrian, the inventors of heresy made their appearance and propagated their doctrines. Hegesippus assures us, that before this time (the reign of Adrian) "those who were endeavouring to corrupt the sound standard of the preaching of the gospel lay hid in dark obscurity," and did not emerge to disturb the peace of the church till after the death of the apostles, and those who had heard the preaching of our Lord. This testimony is confirmed by a passage of Eusebius, showing that "the heresy of Basilides began in the reign of Adrian," and another from Irenaeus, testifying "that there lived at the same period one Carpocrates, the founder of a sect called Gnostics." This is followed by a quotation from Firmilian, showing that the "execrable heresies" of Marcion, of Apelles, of Valentine, and of Basilides, arose at a period subsequent to the age of the apostles; and Tertullian proves the same fact, by asserting that the heresy could not precede the true doctrine, "for in all cases truth precedes the resemblance of it; the likeness comes afterwards;" and that accordingly, Marcion the Pontic pilot, Valentine the follower of Plato, and other heretics came after the time of the apostles, "who pointed out by name the enemies of the Christian religion who were then in existence; but among these did not make any mention at all of the Valentinians, the Marcionites, or the Gnostics."

Such is the substance of the patristic testimony on which the author reposes the historical strength of his cause; which however he further corroborates by a negative argument, drawn from the silence of ecclesiastical writers on occasions where some information might have been expected. He deems this argument cogent, because it is altogether improbable that sagacious writers would have failed to notice a system, which, as the authors and supporters of the opposite opinion suppose, not only began before the time of Christ, but was, besides this, in such reputation, was so celebrated and favourably received through all the world, as to have admirers and disciples both very numerous in multitude, and distinguished for the elegance of their genius and learning. (We might ask, by the way, where this representation is found among the advocates of the opposite opinion?) Then follow references to some passages in Josephus and Philo, in which no mention is made of Gnosticism, and a paragraph on the obscurity of the origin

of the system; and the historical portion of the work concludes with an attempt to disprove the existence, before the Christian era, of any such oriental philosophy as he had described in his introductory statement. Now we believe the whole legitimate force of his testimonies may be admitted—though we should question some of his expositions and inferences—in full consistency with the opinion, that Gnostic sentiments and doctrines had been published long before our Saviour's advent, and were known and alluded to by the writers of the New Testament. Mosheim and Brucker may be too unqualified in their statements; we are not disposed to come forward as their advocates; yet we are persuaded there is evidence enough to satisfy any candid inquirer, that many of the characteristic opinions of the Gnostics had been published more or less extensively through the world at an early period; had gained footing both among Jews and Gentiles; had exercised an influence unfavourable to the progress of the Gospel, and perverted the minds of many who received the doctrines of truth. The way was thus prepared for the full development of that heterogeneous mass of religious and philosophical truths, speculations, and absurdities, afterwards propagated by the different sects of the Gnostics. If this be true, where is the difficulty of supposing that the sacred writers alluded to them, and were led by the inspiring spirit to exhibit such views of truth as were most likely to meet and counteract them, and to define and illustrate such terms as were already enlisted in the cause of error, and would be most frequently employed or perverted to heretical purposes. But we proceed to inquire for some positive information on the subject, and we do this the more cheerfully, as the recent researches in this productive field of investigation enable us to go forward with ease and certainty. We have only to regret that our limits will confine us to a mere abstract.

The nations of the east, among whom knowledge and civilization originated, are generally characterized by greater vigour of imagination, and ardour of feeling, than the natives of the colder regions of the west and north. This peculiarity of constitutional organization affected in a greater or less degree the whole character of individuals and nations. The poetry, the philosophy, and even the religion of the oriental nations, if not different in their essential principles, assumed different forms correspondent to the variety of constitutional character, and national manners and customs. But as the various nations, from time immemorial, differed from each other in languages,

laws, manners, and institutions, each of course would exhibit some peculiarities; and even where derived from the same family, would in the course of ages imperceptibly establish its own usages and modes of thought. Hence every nation had its own system of philosophy; its own forms of religion; and its own style of literature; and where the same original system was adopted, especially in religious opinions, it was so modified by each, as to assume various forms and accompaniments. In the progress of civilization, and especially in the course of war and conquest, the intercourse of nations became more extended; the different opinions and systems came in contact more frequently, and comparison, investigation, controversy, conversion from one sect to another, and the combination of various opinions or systems into heterogeneous creeds, were not unfrequent. Perhaps no series of events ever occurred more fertile in results of this kind, than the conquests of Alexander, and the reign of his successors. The various forms of Grecian philosophy and theology were then transported into Egypt and the heart of Asia, and planted by the side of the Asiatic systems—Sabian, Chaldean, oriental, whatever may be their appropriate names and characters; and the followers of Plato and Aristotle thrown into contact with the disciples of Zoroaster. New light was elicited by this intercourse; a new direction was given to the speculations of the philosopher and religionist, and new modifications of opinion and of practice were the result. Perhaps no spot on earth collected a greater number of the followers of these discordant systems, or presented a greater mass of heterogeneous opinions, modes of thinking, and rites of worship, than Alexandria, under the reign of the Ptolemies. This splendid capital, like Athens at a former period, and Rome in after ages, might not inappropriately be termed the literary metropolis of the world; whither inquirers after knowledge; advocates of science; amateurs of the arts; inventors and propagators of new opinions, flocked together as if drawn by one common attraction from all quarters of the civilized world, and rendered it a perfect Babel of confused opinions, and an arena for the display and contests of the most discordant sentiments, which all the various habits, and all the wild imaginations of numerous and distant nations could produce. In its distinguished academy, a multitude of literary men from all nations indiscriminately were supported by the government, with full liberty to explore the inexhaustible treasures of its library; and Zenodotus and Aristarchus, Apol-

lonius and Theocritus, with many other celebrated philosophers and poets, pursued their respective studies together. Here a new era was established in the history of ancient literature, and a new channel opened for the current of thought and sentiment.* Among the crowds assembled at Alexandria, the Jews were honoured with distinguished privileges; and multitudes dragged from their country by conquest, or driven by internal dissension, or attracted by Egyptian honours, here established their permanent residence;† and as many of them, especially the more literary and ambitious classes, soon adopted the Greek language—the language of the court and the intelligent part of the community—the scriptures of the Old Testament were translated, perhaps rather for their use, than to grace the royal library.‡

This celebrated school was the cradle of Gnosticism in the Christian church. Here now, as formerly in Greece and Chaldea, the line of demarcation was widely drawn between the philosopher and the illiterate; the initiated religionist and the vulgar man; the speculating idealist and the contracted materialist. The former, pursuing their proud speculations, alike despised the ignorant multitude; and whether those speculations took for their text the Platonic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, or the Eastern philosophy, the mysteries of Eleusis or Isis, or the visions and revelations of the Jewish Scriptures, they afforded ample scope for the workings of Oriental and Grecian imagination. The Jews, as well as the Greeks, engaged in these investigations, and aspired to the honour of initiation into the mysteries of the philosophical and religious systems which grew in process of time out of them. Here are found the earliest traces of the peculiar sentiments which distinguished the Gnostics at the period when the surviving fragments of early ecclesiastical history first present them to our notice. Whether these first buddings of the system were of Greek or oriental origin has been a subject of controversy. The Christian fathers and the earlier modern writers uniformly ascribe them to the Grecian, especially the Platonic philosophy; while later and more extensive investigation has traced many of them to Asiatic sources. In the Alexandrian

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* Luecke ueber Johannis Schriften. Vol. I. p. 164. Conversations-Lexicon, Art. *Alexandria* and *Alex. Zeitalter.*

† Joseph. Antiq. XIV. 7, 2, and XII. 1, & Jewish Wars, II. 18, 7.

‡ Sturzius De Dialecto Macedonico et Alex. § I. Horne's Introd. II. 166.

school—we use this term because it has been frequently so applied, and we know no better word that could be substituted—a modified and orientalized Platonism unquestionably held a prominent place, and gave a colouring to all the other parts of the system—all the parts and principles adopted from the Jewish and Christian revelations; and in the Syrian school the ancient philosophy of Chaldea and Persia is more distinctly discernible.* There can be little doubt, therefore, that the whole system in all its protean forms originated in the attempt to combine the heterogeneous materials of the Greek and Asiatic philosophy with the truths and facts of the gospel; and the predominance of one or the other of these component elements constituted the characteristics which distinguished the different schools into which they were divided. Of the existence of all their elements prior to the Christian era there can be no doubt; and of the tendency to such combinations as afterwards produced the Gnostic doctrines, testimonies reaching to an early date are not wanting. Michaelis has traced them back as far as the time of the translation of the Septuagint, in which he has detected some vestiges.† In the works of Philo the approximation is much more apparent. It is seen in the philosophical speculations which he engrafts upon the Mosaic system; in the allegorical mode of interpretation by which he endeavours to accommodate the Jewish records to the Platonic philosophy in the orientalized form in which he maintained it; and, above all, in the distinction derived from Oriental sources and afterwards adopted by all the Gnostics, between the invisible and ineffable God, shut up in his own glory, and exalted above all likeness, material forms, or comprehension (ὁ ων, το ον, αρρητον, αορατον, &c.) and his revelations, powers, or emanations, in successive subordinate beings (ο λογος του οντος—δυναμεις του οντος, &c.) inhabiting the regions of light (φως) and deriving originally their existence from him as the life (ζωη) and source of being.‡ "Is Philo," our author asks, "on that account to be called a Gnostic, or a votary and defender of the oriental philosophy?" Certainly not; but he is to be held a good witness for the existence and publication of such opinions as the Gnostics afterwards held, before the

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* Neander's Gnostische Systeme, p. 2. Geiseler's Lehrbuch der Kirchen Geschichte, vol. ii. p. 119.

† Syntagma Commentationum. No. 13, p. 251.

‡ Neander's Einleitung. Niemeyer De Docetis, cap. 2. Gieseler, &c.

composition of the books, especially the later books of the New Testament. And if they had been published—if they were at that time operating upon the minds of Jews or of Christians, and presenting an obstacle to the progress of the gospel, or an instrument for its perversion, might it not naturally be expected that some effort would be made by the inspired writers to counteract their influence?

To what extent these sentiments prevailed among the Jews we have no means of ascertaining; but from the talents and intelligence of Philo we have reason to suppose that his works exerted considerable influence among his Hellenistic brethren. The rigid opinions and ascetic character of the Essenes have also been brought forward as witnesses on this subject, with what justice we are not prepared to say, or called upon to inquire. Our author objects to their testimony, because they were a Jewish sect; (but could they not be Jewish, and still adopt more or less of these speculations?) and because the "philosophy under discussion rejected the whole law," but it is known that the Essenes adhered to it. This rejection, however, is only true of one part or class of the Gnostics; while another class, derived from the Jews,* retained the law, and interwove with their system many of the peculiarities of Judaism. Philo did not deem it necessary to reject the law in order to make room for his philosophical speculations, and might not the Essenes have received many kindred opinions from the east and other foreign sources, and still retain their national religion? "Gnostics there were," says Eichhorn,† "in every ancient religious institution which was connected with sacred writings, after its disciples had adopted a different mode of education. There were Gnostics among the Jews, both before and after the birth of Christ; those who lived before employed themselves in sublimating the Jewish religion, and those in after ages the Christian." "Tittman," he adds, "has indeed substantially proved that Gnostic *parties* or *sects* first existed in the second century; but Gnostic *opinions* prevailed earlier, as history clearly proves."

In order to give a fair development of the subject, it would be necessary to trace the history of the Gnostics through the

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* See Neander's Gnostische Systeme.
† Einleitung in das Neue Testament, vol. ii.

varied forms of opinion and practice which successively distinguished the different schools; to inquire to what extent and under what forms these sentiments had been previously published; and to compare them in detail with the language of the New Testament. But this would require a volume, and we have already exceeded our intended bounds. We must, therefore, pass over the philological part of the work, although its importance would warrant a more extended examnation.

A single remark on the translation. In general it is plain and perspicuous, exhibiting very accurately the meaning of the original. We are inclined to believe the translator might have spent his strength to better advantage on some more important subject; though we should not regret the publication of this, if the facts could be thoroughly discussed and the truth impartially presented to the public. But we have no expectation that this will be done, and perhaps the time and attention of our learned theologians might be employed in more important investigations. We should be glad however to see a condensed but comprehensive outline of the result of the modern researches on this subject. We are aware it would require a considerable extent of reading and laborious research; but since the subject has been brought forward, especially in this partial form, we think it desirable that the truth should be known; and the application of these results to the interpretation of the New Testament would constitute an important contribution to our stock of exegetical theology.

The "History of the Interpretation of the prophet Isaiah by W. Gesenius, translated from the German by Samuel H. Turner, D.D." which follows next in order, is an interesting document. It constitutes, in the original, the second and largest part of the introduction to the author's elaborate commentary on Isaiah. The whole introduction displays no ordinary measure of learning and research. Its principal topics are the life, character, writings, and interpretation of the prophet. As the prophecies of Isaiah have always been deemed one of the most important portions of the Old Testament, they have received more attention from theological writers, than perhaps any other prophetic book, and Jews and Christians of all names and ages from the days of Origen to the present time have vied with each other in the application of talent and learning to their illustration. Many of the clearest predictions of the Messiah and some of the fundamental doctrines of the

gospel system are here presented; and are often quoted and referred to by Christ and his apostles. Hence a correct apprehension of the meaning of this prophet must have an important bearing on the interpretation of the New Testament, and the system of doctrines we derive from the Scriptures. The difficulties which the expositor must encounter in the study of these prophecies are fully commensurate with their importance; and accordingly, many essential discrepancies, both in the principles of interpretation adopted and in the results elicited, characterize the principal writers. Hence it becomes a matter of substantial importance, as well as of high literary interest to ascertain what has been effected, and by whom, for the exposition of this prophet. This has been accomplished to a considerable degree in the brief history before us—exhibiting a condensed view of the ancient Greek, Chaldee, Syriac, Latin, and Arabic versions of the book; and of the Christian fathers, Jewish Rabbins, and modern theologians who have rendered themselves illustrious by expositions of it. The English commentaries, however, with the exception of Poole and Lowth, are passed over in silence—an omission deserving notice, as the author, having spent considerable time at an English university, cannot be supposed ignorant of the existence of the leading works which have controlled the opinions, established the faith, and nurtured the piety of English Christians.

The earlier and more important versions are minutely described, and their characteristic modes of interpretation illustrated by many examples. In the quotation of these examples, the original passages, when Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Greek, are introduced, and generally, with much accuracy. The early expositors are more fully described than the later, and the largest space is allotted to Ephrem the Syrian, and the Jewish writers of the middle ages, from whom considerable extracts are introduced. The translation in the first part of the essay is well executed, but the latter portion is not so accurate. If the translator will throw his eye on page 437 he will perceive that he has missed the sense of two passages, in the same paragraph. The words "was ihm meistens wohlgelingt" are rendered, which to his ear is generally euphonic, instead of "in which he is generally successful." A sentence or two after we read, sometimes in this way the exposition acquires additional force, "einigemal ist dadurch auch der Erklaerung Gewalt angethan worden," i. e. "sometimes violence is thus done to the exposition." We have noticed several other cases in which

the translator's attention has flagged. We would refer the gentleman, merely for his own satisfaction, to one or two instances. On page 458, the sentence "one should not begin, &c.;" on page 400, the first part of the paragraph relating to David Kimchi; on page 476, "in the latest work of Eichhorn, &c." It is no grateful task to notice such blemishes in a work, for the most part so well executed. It would be easy to select whole paragraphs faithfully translated, and many passages rendered in a manner truly felicitous. We know not how to make a more appropriate transition to the remaining article than by inserting the general description of the ancient Syriac versions of this prophet.

"Among the old versions, the third place in point of time belongs to the Peshito *Syriac*, which, resting on the authority of the two last, and, moreover, conducted by more correct principles of interpretation and translation, meets the demands of a correct and faithful translator far better than those, and nearly in the same manner, as Symmachus and Theodotion. The author translates from the Hebrew text, not without knowledge of the language, with selected use of the Alexandrine version, more rarely of the Chaldee, but frequently also independently of both, agreeably to his own feeling and judgment. Where he does not happen to follow the Septuagint, he preserves the figures and tropes, and from arbitrary introduction of opinions he is freer than almost any other ancient translator, so that the name of *Peshito*, that is, the *simple and faithful*, is most appropriately applied to his work. Since also the character of both tongues favours this close approximation, the imitation is sometimes to be called masterly."

"A treatise on the use of the Syriac languages, by John David Michaelis, translated from the German by John Frederick Schroeder, A.M." &c. closes the volume before us. It is merely an extract from the dissertation prefixed as an introduction to the author's Syriac Chrestomathy. The whole piece bears evident marks of having been hastily written. Its style is diffuse, and its reasonings and illustrations rather loosely thrown together. It is translated from the second edition, "corrected and enlarged by the addition of the author's valuable notes;" but on comparing the portion here translated with the first edition, we find few additions of any importance, and no improvement in style or manner. Unfortunately the translator has transfused into his version all the diffuseness of the original, and introduced considerable additional vagueness by frequent inaccuracy and occasionally essential mistakes in

the translation. No piece in the whole volume indicates so little care and skill in the execution. We shall notice in passing a few of the more palpable variations from the original.—"A book is printed, and lies long upon the shelf as an ornament not in use; for it does not immediately serve the purpose of the learned; and too little indeed was he favoured by fortune that could buy it. How commonly does this occur! It is a chance, if within a hundred years of the printing of an old outlandish book, any one can *guess* all for which it might be useful, and of which the editor perhaps never once thought." p. 488. Ein Buch wird gedruckt, und steht in Buechersaelen lange zur Zierde muessig, den es faellt gerade dem Gelehrten nicht in die Hand, der es anwenden koentte: und er war wohl vom Glueck zu wenig beguenstiget, es kaufen zu koennen. Welch ein gewoehnlicher Zufall! Beynahe ist es ein Gluck, wenn man innerhalb hundert Jahren nach dem Abdruck eines alten auslaendisches Bucks, alles erraeth, wozu es nuetzlich seyn koennte, und woran vielleicht der Herausgeber nicht einmal dachte. A book is printed, and stands useless a long time as an ornament in the bookshop; for it does not directly fall into the hands of the learned man who is competent to use it; and he (the learned man) may be too little favoured by fortune to be able to purchase it. What a common occurrence! It is almost a mere chance if, within a century after the reprint of an ancient foreign book, any one can discover all the purposes for which it may be useful, and of which perhaps the editor never even thought.—"But still the New Testament may hence derive much for its elucidation." p. 500. Jedoch ohne dass das Neue Testament viel Erlaeuterung davon borgen kann; yet so that the New Testament cannot derive much elucidation from it.—"This removes a great obscurity in the passage." p. 502. Dis breitet eine grosse Dunkelheit ueber die Rede aus. This diffuses great obscurity over the discourse.—On the same page a clause is omitted after the words, "Many strangers called upon his name," yet they were not on that account to be immediately received.—In page 511 it is said of the Syriac version of the Scriptures, "sometimes it contributes by its own to set forth other readings of the Masorites." Bald traegt sie das ihrige mit bey, eine andere Leseart der Masorethischen vorzuziehen. Sometimes it contributes its influence to render a different reading preferable to the Masoretic.—"Geography becomes possessed of those regions in

which the Syriac language was formerly spoken, &c." p. 526. Schon dadurch gewinnet die Geographie der Laender, in denen die Syrische Sprache ehedem geredet ist. The geography of the countries in which the Syriac language was formerly spoken is thereby improved. We had marked many other passages in which the author's meaning is not given, or imperfectly exhibited, or associated with some variation or additional shade of thought, but neither our object nor our space requires us to point out all the failures which the treatise exhibits.

We regret that this essay is not more attractive and forcible; for we consider the subject important, and invested with claims much stronger than are here presented. The author himself informs us, that it was not his intention to exhibit a full view of the subject, but merely to state such circumstances as he considered important to those who were about to use his book in learning the language. For several important arguments he refers to other works, and his remarks on the facility of its acquisition, and its value as a medium of access to the Hebrew, are omitted by the translator. The character of the language itself; its affinity with the Hebrew and Chaldaic of the Old Testament; its substantial identity with the vernacular tongue of our Saviour and his disciples, and the antiquity of the Peshito version, conspire to render it a subject of considerable importance to every independent and intelligent interpreter of the scriptures. The facility with which it may be acquired, especially by those who are acquainted with the Hebrew, will be an additional inducement to the study. "Of all the oriental languages," says Michaelis in the fourth section of the treatise before us, "the Syriac and Chaldaic are the easiest, and the Hebrew the most difficult. I could wish, therefore, that the Syriac might be studied first. Even those who only intend to learn the Hebrew, and dread the study of all other oriental languages, would thus facilitate their labour, if they would follow my advice; and I believe I could enable a class of the same views and proficiency to acquire the Syriac, Chaldaic, Arabic, and Hebrew in the same time that many apply to the Hebrew alone." This is probably exaggerated; but other judicious orientalists place it first in point of simplicity and facility of acquisition. The means also for acquiring it are constantly increasing by the publication, especially in Germany, of elementary books of all kinds, adapted to all classes of learners

The translator has furnished in a brief appendix a list of the most common of these works, but has omitted several recent and valuable publications; such as Oberleitner's Chrestomathy, and the selection of Ephrem's Hymns arranged as a Chrestomathy, with an excellent vocabulary by Hahn and Seiffart. We should certainly recommend the New Testament and Dathe's edition of the Psalms to the early attention of the student, as the language is easier than that of any other introductory work we have seen. We cannot subscribe to the commendation appended to the notice of Tychsen's Elementale, as we happen to know by experience resulting in despair, that it presents obstacles almost insuperable to the learner, who is not furnished with the means of supplying its deficiencies. The want of a comprehensive lexicon, adapted to the whole range of Syriac literature, as far as it comes within the reach of the student, is seriously felt by oriental scholars. For the New Testament, Buxtorf, Schaaf, or Zanolini; and for the Old Testament, and perhaps some other works, Castell's Lexicon in the London Polyglott, and Michaelis's improved edition of the same work in a separate form, may suffice; but no general lexicon adapted to the wants of the student, who would pursue his researches beyond the mere elements and the versions of the Bible, has yet appeared. Quatremere de Quincy at Paris, and Professor Bernstein of Breslau, have long since promised works of this character, which, from their high reputation as oriental scholars, are expected to accomplish for Syrian lexicography what Hoffman has done for its grammar, and Gesenius for the Hebrew.

Except for missionaries destined to western Asia, and oriental professors, we consider this subject important only in reference to the illustration of the Scriptures. In this we desire the assistance of every auxiliary which ancient and modern literature can supply, and all the means which philology can furnish, to render more intelligible and more impressive the revelations of God. These are the life of our souls, and every thing else in comparison is unworthy the attention of an immortal spirit. However discursive our wanderings in literary pursuits, we must come back with childlike simplicity to the gospel of the grace of God, if we would secure our own comfort and edification as christians, or feed others with the bread of life, pure and unadulterated. For this purpose the oracles of God must be distinctly understood and clearly in-

terpreted. The languages in which they were published must be studied. What judicious instructor would attempt to explain any other ancient documents without a knowledge of the language in which they were written? We should ridicule the preposterous pretensions of a public lecturer on ancient literature, who, unacquainted with Latin or Greek, should attempt to expound Homer or Cicero; and is it wiser, with similar incompetency, to engage in the exposition of the revelations of the Bible, on which the everlasting welfare or misery of our souls depends? Can the accredited expositors of this system of truth meet the demands of their own consciences, or satisfy the just expectation of the churches, by relying on the translations and interpretations of fallible men? Oh let us drink the waters of life pure from the fountain, since God by his special providence has kept it open, and given us easy access! But something more than the mere knowledge of the languages, and the amount of reading requisite to acquire those languages, is indispensable to constitute an intelligent interpreter of the Scriptures. The manners, customs, opinions, civil and literary history, and institutions political and ecclesiastical of the favoured people to whom they were given; the kindred languages, literature and history of the surrounding nations; the geographical position and natural history of the regions described or referred to, may all be employed as auxiliaries to illustrate the phraseology and allusions employed by the sacred writers. Profound thought, laborious investigation, and extensive reading are indispensable for the full development of the treasures of God's word. But, at the same time, we would impress upon the attention of students, the necessity of a practical and devotional perusal of the Scriptures. It is not by critical study alone, or principally, that the spirit of piety is nourished in the bosom, and invigorated to its appropriate energy. Let it be ever borne in mind, that the labour of ascertaining precisely the truth revealed by all the critical and exegetical auxiliaries within our reach, is one thing; the practical consideration of the truth thus ascertained, the honest application of it to the conscience, and the continual recurrence to its truths, precepts and promises for direction, instruction and consolation, are another and very distinct operation. If the latter be neglected, the former will prove comparatively useless and often dangerous; leaving the soul to famish in the midst of a "feast of fat things," or to be led into the devious paths of error by the

unrestrained impulse of an inventive imagination. A judicious combination of both is necessary to the preservation of an enlightened and healthful tone of piety, and indispensable to the formation of a successful expositor of the sacred records. Neither can be neglected by ministers of the gospel without serious disadvantage. Let them never lose sight of the inspired admonition, which spreads before them the pages of revealed truth, and enjoins: "Meditate upon these things; give thyself wholly to them: that thy profiting or improvement may appear to all."

REVIEW.

The Works of Dugald Stewart. In Seven Volumes. Cambridge. Published by Hilliard and Brown. 1829.

Few men of the present age have received so liberal a share of public approbation as the late Dugald Stewart, and none have manifested a more spotless integrity, or a more sincere regard for the best interests of man. So often have talents and acquirements been sold to vice, or employed wholly in schemes of selfish ambition, that it is doubly cheering to meet with those who have consecrated their high powers and attainments to the cause of philanthropy and virtue. A brief account of the life and writings of Dugald Stewart, and an estimate of his character, will not then, we trust, be unacceptable to our readers.

Dugald Stewart, son of Dr Matthew Stewart, professor of mathematics in the university of Edinburgh, was born Nov. 22, 1753. His early days were passed partly in Edinburgh, and partly in Ayrshire, whither his father retired during the intervals of the academical sessions. At the age of seven, he was placed at the grammar school, where he attracted the attention and excited the hopes of his instructors by the quickness of his apprehension, and the facility with which he acquired and expressed in his own language the ideas of the authors he perused. After leaving the school, he entered the university, and attended on the instructions of the distin-

guished men at that time connected with the institution. With these, his situation in his father's family allowed him familiar intercourse, which was doubtless of more profit than any public instructions. Nor were his advantages in this respect confined to the officers of the university: he enjoyed the society and friendship of most of the eminent men of Scotland, and particularly that of Adam Smith, the celebrated author of the "Wealth of Nations."

In 1771, when he was eighteen, he repaired to Glasgow to receive the instructions of Dr Reid. He immediately engaged the confidence and affection of his instructor, and here was the commencement of that warm and continued friendship, which forms so amiable a trait in the characters of both.

He had attended but one course of lectures in this place, when, by the declining health of his father, he was obliged to return and undertake the instruction of the mathematical classes in the university. This task he performed with singular success. Notwithstanding the high reputation and acknowledged talents of Dr Stewart, the number of pupils considerably increased under his son.

When he had arrived at the age of twenty-one, he was appointed assistant professor of mathematics, in which situation he continued for a little more than ten years, when, on the death of his father, he succeeded to the vacant chair. During this time, besides instructing in mathematics, he often lectured with great acceptance for the other professors, particularly on moral philosophy for Dr Ferguson, and on rhetoric and belles-lettres for the successor of Dr Blair. These lectures were unwritten, and were composed on the day of their delivery, while walking in his father's garden. These facts, together with the promptness and ability which he ever manifested in assisting his associates during the whole of his academical career, attest the extent of his acquirements, and the facility with which he could direct his attention to the various departments of knowledge.

In the same year in which he succeeded to the chair of his father, an exchange of professorships was effected with Dr Ferguson, by which he became professor of moral philosophy. In imparting to his pupils the principles of this science, to which he informs us he was early attached, and in otherwise promoting its advancement, he acquired his brilliant reputation. He continued to discharge the duties of this office till 1809, when his health obliged him to retire: previously,

however, he had succeeded in effecting the appointment of the late Dr Brown as his associate and successor. From this time, until his death in 1828, he was employed, as his health would permit, in preparing for the press a number of his works, which we shall notice in their order.

Before proceeding to our account of the writings with which he has favoured the world, we would dwell on one or two circumstances of his education. The first is, in reference to the free intercourse he was allowed with his professors and other eminent men. This rendered his advantages superior to those of almost any with whose history we are acquainted. Many have studied at more celebrated universities, but few have enjoyed the instruction, much less the personal friendship, of such men as Robertson, Smith, and Reid. He probably derived more improvement from their private conversations than their public prelections. By the latter, principles may be learned, but not the method of their deduction. We have placed before us the result of labour—the most advanced efforts of superior mind. Yet even this is but of little use. The object of education is to learn to perform similar labour. Unless we know the process by which these truths are acquired, we cannot perform it, and proceed to the development of others more abstruse. A splendid edifice may be shown us, its different parts designated, and the rules of its proportion made known. But will this enable us to begin at the quarry, and construct one similar or superior? In order to this, the process must be spread before us. So in regard to principles of science. We wish to know the manner in which they are acquired; the mode of pursuit which the successful have adopted. Then we are prepared to proceed in our own deductions, and these and the principles we have learned are valuable aids.

Another circumstance in the education of Stewart which we shall briefly notice, was the fact of his being called at so early an age to impart instruction. This was doubtless highly conducive to his mental improvement, and laid the foundation of his character as a teacher, on which his reputation most firmly rests. It gave him a command of his acquired knowledge, which young men seldom attain. Though their knowledge may be accurately stored in their memories, yet it seldom passes through that process of assimilation which is essential to mental growth. To this process, the attempt at communication is favourable. A definiteness of conception,

and clearness of arrangement is then sought for, the need of which was never before experienced. Were our young men to spend a few years in this employment before engaging in the active duties of their profession, we think they would find it of great advantage.

We now proceed to treat of the writings of Professor Stewart in the order of their appearance. In 1792, seven years after he had been made professor of moral philosophy, he published the first volume of his "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." With this it is probable our readers are better acquainted than with any other of his works, as it has been studied in most of our colleges, and had a very general circulation. We consider it as the most valuable of his productions. It contains, indeed, few principles which are not to be found in Reid, or preceding writers, yet they are more clearly brought forward, in a style, if not the best adapted to philosophical writing, at least idiomatic, flowing, and melodious. Some of the subjects are treated in a manner exceedingly interesting: we refer in particular to the chapter on association, imagination, and memory. The first of these recommends itself in an especial manner to the student of belles lettres and criticism. Indeed the volume abounds with valuable remarks, though to all it contains we do not yield our assent. On a discussion of the points of difference it is unnecessary to enter at present, as we have, for the most part, treated them in a former number of our work, to which we refer our readers for our views on *attention, conception, abstraction, association, nominalism, &c.*

More than twenty years elapsed before the second volume of his Elements appeared. In the mean time, he was called to the melancholy task of writing the biography of three of his distinguished friends; that of Adam Smith in 1793, of Robertson in 1796, and of Reid in 1802. These consist of notices of their lives, brief, because the incidents of a literary life are few, and of general observations on their works, for the most part too general for utility. The power of nicely portraying character is not apparent. Hence these efforts of Mr Stewart have properly been termed "a union of general criticism with literary history."

In 1793 he also published his "Outlines of Moral Philoso phy," which is a syllabus of the course of lectures he was accustomed to read before the university. It contains most

of the principles which are expanded and illustrated in the "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," and "The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers." It was designed only for the students attending on his lectures.

In 1810 appeared his Philosophical Essays, which were written at Kinneil House, a seat belonging to the duke of Hamilton, on the banks of the Frith of Forth, whither he had retired on resigning his professorship. In this work, he informs us, it was his intention to expand and illustrate more fully some of the doctrines contained in the first volume of his Elements, and to discuss some collateral subjects.

The preliminary essay contains an able vindication of the utility of mental philosophy from the attacks of the Edinburgh Review. The volume, then, is divided into two parts. The subjects treated in the first are the origin of our knowledge, the idealism of Berkely, the influence of Locke on the French systems of philosophy, the theories of Hartley, Priestley and Darwin, and the philological speculation of Horne Tooke. In these essays there are many remarks interesting to the lovers of mental science, but no very definite impression follows their perusal.

The second part of the volume treats of the more interesting subjects of beauty, sublimity, and taste. Believing in the original adaptation of certain objects to awaken the emotions of sublimity and beauty, and which would therefore be denominated beautiful and sublime, he proceeds to illustrate the manner in which he supposes these terms were applied, "by transition," to other objects. Colour and altitude, he thinks, occasioned the first ideas of beauty and sublimity, and hence received the first application of these terms. It is interesting to follow him in this supposed process of generalization, though we know not that it sheds any new light on the philosophy of the mind.

Taste, the subject of the next essay, is not considered as an original faculty of the mind. He first proceeds to trace "the gradual progress by which it is formed." But this and the succeeding essay, "*On the culture of certain intellectual habits connected with the first elements of taste*," do not possess sufficient connection, and embrace too great a variety of topics to allow of an analysis. There is, however, exhibited by the writer, an elegance of mind, a correctness of judgment, a familiarity with the objects of taste, that induce

us to believe that his talents were adapted to excel in the departments of belles lettres and criticism, rather than in the abstruse labours of metaphysical disquisition.

We would here briefly remark on taste, as perhaps there may exist on this subject a want of distinct apprehension, that when it is asserted that taste is not an original faculty, the idea arises that it is entirely arbitrary and conventional. But this is far from truth, for its principles are evidently laid in human nature. The difficulty is occasioned through want of a distinct notion of the meaning of the term faculty, a term which even Stewart, notwithstanding his usual precision, has employed in a very indefinite manner. It expresses, as we have before had occasion to observe, the action of the thinking principle in reference to particular objects, or perhaps we should rather say, particular classes of objects. The operations of the mind, though multifarious, are capable of arrangement into certain classes, from their relation to certain objects. All those, therefore, which are exercised on, or occasioned by particular objects, and are thus distinct from others, are for convenience referred to a separate faculty. Now, the question is, whether the operations of mind, in reference to what are termed objects of taste, are sufficiently distinct from all others to be referred to a separate faculty? That there are principles of taste is admitted by all. The question relates to the amount of difference between the result of these and other principles. We shall leave it to our readers to decide for themselves.

In 1813 appeared the second volume of his "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind." This would have attracted little attention, but for the previous fame of the author. As it is, we believe, it is seldom read. It contains some valuable thoughts, but they are familiar to those who are acquainted with the works of Reid, Beattie, and Campbell. There is a precision in the use of terms which is commendable, but this cannot atone for its diffuseness and want of connection. It is proper to state, that this may in part be owing to the frequent interruptions to which the author was subject while composing. He remarks in his preface, "I have repeatedly had occasion to regret the tendency of this intermitted and irregular mode of composition, to deprive my speculations of those advantages, in point of continuity, which, to the utmost of my power, I have endeavoured to give them But I would willingly indulge the hope, that this is a blemish

more likely to meet the eye of the author than the reader; and I am confident, that the critic who shall honour me with a sufficient degree of attention to detect it, where it may occur, will not be inclined to treat it with an undue severity."

There is certainly less connection apparent than the author seems to suppose. Every train of thought in a well disciplined mind has some degree of connection; but that this may be rendered apparent to other minds, a more rigorous process of condensation is necessary than Stewart was accustomed to exercise.

About the same time, we believe, were published the Preliminary Essays to the Supplement to the Encyclopedia Brittannica. In this it was intended to exhibit "A General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Moral and Political Philosophy in Europe, from the Revival of Letters." This work has received high commendations, but without reason. It can with no propriety be termed a "History of Philosophy," but should rather be entitled *Miscellaneous Observations on various Writers.* We expect a history of philosophy to afford us a condensed and clear account of the various systems that have been adopted, and the peculiar opinions of successive writers. Mr Stewart assumes the reader's possession of this knowledge, and proceeds to criticism and general remark. Hence the work is far less valuable than Enfield's imperfect abridgement of Brucker. We hesitate not to affirm, that from the most attentive perusal of the work, the reader will not become acquainted with the peculiar system of a single philosopher.

We are not pleased with the importance which, in these essays, is attached to the writings of the infidel Hume. In this, Mr Stewart is censurable, in common with Reid and Brown. They all seem to forget his scepticism in their admiration of his talents. We are unable to account for this in men of such sound principles, and who would seem to have had at heart the good of the human race. When a man honestly errs, even on points of fundamental importance, he should be treated with kindness and respect; but if he wilfully pervert the truth, and task his mind to perplex the distinctions of right and wrong, and to tear asunder the bonds that unite society and government, he never should be mentioned but with indignant scorn.

The third volume of his Elements appeared in 1827. The subjects are "language, imitation, the varieties of intellec-

tual character, and the faculties by which man is distinguished from brute animals." The remarks on the first topic for the most part consist of comments and criticisms on Smith's Theory of Language, the general principles of which are adopted. Without engaging in that discussion in which so much time and talent have been wasted, viz. that of the origin of language, we must be permitted to observe, that the opinions of those philosophers, who represent man as placed at first in the world without language, and, in short, in a state differing little from the brutes, appear to us ineffably absurd. It is inconsistent with the continuance of his existence, and the narrative dictated by the holy spirit: and we are surprised that it should have been adopted by one so judicious as Stewart, and who has so often acknowledged the authority of the sacred writings.

The observations on the remaining topics of the volume, though interesting, are very miscellaneous, and far from being characterised by originality or profoundness.

The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, in 1828, was the last publication of this accomplished scholar. As this work has not probably met the eye of many of our readers, we will endeavour to acquaint them with some of its contents. In explanation of the large space allotted to the doctrines of natural religion in these volumes, he informs us that "this part of the work contains the substance of lectures given in the University of Edinburgh in 1792—3, and for almost twenty years afterward." The peculiar dangers to which young men were at that time exposed, from "the inundation of sceptical or rather atheistical publications, which were then imported from the continent," led him thus to expand this part of his subject.

"Another circumstance," he remarks, "concurred with those which have been mentioned, in prompting me to a more full and systematical illustration of these doctrines than had been attempted by any of my predecessors. Certain divines in Scotland were pleased, soon after this critical era, to discover a disposition to set at naught the evidence of natural religion, with a professed, and I doubt not, in many cases, with a sincere view to strengthen the cause of Christianity. Some of these writers were probably not aware that they were only repeating the language of Bayle, Hume, Helvetius, and many other modern authors of the same description, who have endeavoured to cover their attacks on those essential principles on which all religion is founded, under a pretended zeal for the interest of revelation. It was not thus, I recollected, that

Cudworth, and Barrow, and Locke, and Clarke, and Butler reasoned on the subject; nor those enlightened writers of a late date, who have consecrated their learning and talents to the further illustration of the same argument. 'He,' says Locke, who has forcibly and concisely expressed their common sentiments, 'He that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if we would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the light of an invisible star by a telescope.'

"This passage from Locke brought to my recollection the memorable words of Melancthon, so remarkably distinguished from most of our other reformers by the mildness of his temper and the liberality of his opinions: 'Wherefore our decision is this; that those precepts which learned men have committed to writing, transcribing them from the common reason and common feelings of human nature, are to be accounted as not less divine than those contained in the tables given to Moses; and that it could not be the intention of our Maker to supersede, by a law given on stone, that which is written with his own finger on the table of the heart.'"

We have inserted the above, chiefly for the benefit of those in our owncountry, who are disposed to undervalue natural religion through fear of Unitarianism.

Our active principles are divided into, 1st, our instinctive, 2d, our rational and governing principles. Under the former are included our appetites, desires and affections; under the latter, self-love, by which is meant the desire of happiness, and the moral faculty. On reading the first part, which treats of our appetites, desires and affections, we were greatly disappointed. We did not look for any thing very acute or systematic; but as he had been for so many years devoted to this study, and had enjoyed such advantages for observing human conduct, we had reason to hope for an accumulation of facts and practical remarks, which are most needed and most valuable in this department of mental science. Instead of this, we have little more than a mere enumeration of the desires and affections, to which he thinks all our active principles are referable on analysis.

We think that two much importance has been attached by the Scotch philosophers to analysis. This remark, however, does not apply so much to Stewart, as to some of his contemporaries. They would seem to represent it as the sole business of the metaphysician. Hence the ignorant and superficial have inquired whether any new powers have, by this means, been *discovered*, or any hitherto unknown regions of mind

explored? Analysis, when used in reference to mind, signifies the separation of a complicated process of thought, in order to determine of what principles of our nature it is the result. We do not expect to discover any new faculties; any but what have been exercised in some degree by all mankind; but we wish to acquire a more definite knowledge of these. When we have done this, when we have learned from what principles the complex operations we have examined arise, we then know what principles need culture, and what repression. Our power over our mental operations is thereby increased, as our power over matter is increased by an intimate acquaintance with the laws of attraction and gravity. Analysis, then, is to be prosecuted, not as an end, but as a means. We are next to trace the operation of those principles we have learned, in their various modifications, and from them to deduce practical rules. This is especially important in regard to our active powers, since they are the sources of all our actions, and exert so controlling an influence in the modification of the intellectual operations, and in the formation of character. A bare enumeration of the original principles to which our active powers, in the complex state they appear to us, are reducible, were it perfectly correct, would be of little practical use: yet little else has been attempted by any philosopher with whose writings we are conversant. He who shall worthily treat this subject, will forever free the science of mind from the charge of inutility, and will transmit his name to posterity by the side of Shakspeare.

But the part of the work under review which treats of our moral powers, is not liable to the charge we have brought against the foregoing. It is the best treatise on this subject which has appeared. The author, not aiming at originality, has judiciously collected whatever was valuable on this subject in preceding writers; especially has he strengthened his positions by the authority of Butler, the author of that enduring monument of thought, the analogy of religion to the constitution and course of nature.

He contends for the existence of the moral faculty as an original principle of our nature, and not resolvable into any other principle or principles more general; and answers the objections of different writers to the reality and immutability of moral distinctions, and to the universality of the moral faculty among mankind. He then proceeds to analyse the operations of this faculty, and finds them to consist of, 1 The perception of

an action as right or wrong; 2. An emotion of pleasure or of pain, varying in its degree according to the acuteness of our moral sensibility; 3. A perception of the merit or demerit of the agent.

He next summarily disposes of the question, what is the foundation of moral obligation? "It is absurd," he says, "to ask WHY we are bound to practise virtue? The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being who is conscious of the distinction of right and wrong, carries about him a law which he is bound to observe," &c. He closes this part of the work by considering "certain principles which co-operate with our moral powers in their influence on the conduct." These are, 1. A regard to character; 2. Sympathy; 3. The sense of the ridiculous; and 4. Taste. All the above topics are treated with clearness, and for the most part, with truth. In dwelling on those last mentioned, he has given us an example of the course desirable to be pursued in the study of our active powers, viz. that of explaining their mutual influence. But his remarks here are very brief.

One assertion is made by the author in the course of his remarks which we do not understand, as was probably the case with himself. He states as an inaccuracy in the philosophy of Hutcheson, "the application of the epithets virtuous and vicious to the affections of the mind. In order to think with precision on this subject, it is necessary for us always to remember, that the object of moral approbation is not affections but actions." P. 187. Again, he says, "to the strictures already offered on Hutcheson's writings, I have only to add, that he seems to consider virtue as a quality of our affections, whereas it is really a quality of our actions, or (perhaps in strict propriety) of those dispositions from which our actions immediately proceed." P. 443. By actions, he must mean either bodily actions, or mental and bodily united. But we cannot conceive it possible that he should assert that bodily actions, considered separate from the volitions which occasion them, are virtuous or vicious, and that these terms are applicable to these actions alone. If he means bodily and mental actions united, that is, volitions with their effects, then he admits all we contend for, in allowing that "in strict propriety," virtue is a quality "of those dispositions from which our actions," that is, our volitions with their effects "immediately proceed." Disposition in this case can mean nothing different from affection.

But if he does mean by actions, bodily actions, and by dis-

position, volition, and means to assert that the affections or principles which lead to volition, have no moral character, are neither virtuous nor vicious, he contradicts a truth that is self-evident, or, at most, one that is acquired by a single deduction; which is, that those principles of the mind which invariably occasion virtuous or vicious volitions, are themselves virtuous or vicious. That all mankind in all ages have made this deduction, appears from the fact, that in all languages, phrases are found expressive of virtuous and vicious disposi tions, inclinations, affections, &c. That some few, under the influence of a favourite hypothesis, may have denied this, does not disprove it, any more than the fact that some have denied the first principles of knowledge, disproves the existence of such principles.

Having treated of our moral powers, the "various branches of our duty" furnish the next subject of discussion in these volumes. "The different theories" says Mr Stewart "which have been proposed concerning the nature and essence of virtue, have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action, such as a rational self-love, justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God." To avoid this error, he proposes, first, "to consider our duties in detail, and after having thus laid a solid foundation in the way of analysis, to attempt to rise to the general idea in which all our duties concur." He accordingly proceeds to consider the duties we owe 1, to God; 2, our fellow-creatures; and 3, ourselves.

An examination of the principles of natural religion forms a necessary introduction to the consideration of the first class of our duties. Previously to the exhibition of the argument for the existence of Deity, "the foundation of our reasoning from cause to effect" is discussed, and "the reality of our notion of power or efficiency" vindicated from the objections of Hume. The evidences of the existence, moral attributes, and government of God, and of a future state, are then set forth with clearness and force, and with a fine glow of moral eloquence peculiar to the author.

In treating of our duties he is more interesting than any ethical writer we have read, as he aims at establishing principles instead of enumerating precepts. Having considered our various duties, they are found to agree with each other in one common quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same autho-

rity—the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word, virtue. This is the only definition he gives of virtue.

We have not attempted to give an analysis of this work, but to acquaint our readers with some of the more important subjects discussed. We would particularly recommend it to their attention, as none of the writings of Stewart will more richly repay a careful study.

In the appendix to this work, the learned author undertakes a defence of the self-determining power of the will. We cannot enter on this long controverted subject at present, but perhaps we may find an opportunity of discussing it in some future number of this work.

We have now taken a cursory survey of the labours of the late Dugald Stewart. In expressing our opinion of his talents, we need employ but few words, as it may be learned from the observations we have already made.

We do but repeat, when we say, that he was characterized by a facility in acquiring knowledge, a refinement and elevation of feeling, and sobriety and soundness of judgment, rather than by acuteness, comprehensiveness, and strength. As a metaphysician he has been overrated. This has been owing to a variety of causes. He entered on his career at a period peculiarly favourable for attracting the public attention. The writings of Hume, which had been extensively read, had occasioned perplexity and doubt on all subjects relating to mental and moral science. As this is a state of mind in which it is unpleasant to remain, many who were bewildered, as well as those whose principles had continued unshaken, rejoiced on the appearance of the sober doctrines of Reid. Beattie and other writers had contributed to render them exceedingly popular, when Stewart came forward to adorn them with his eloquence, a gift which he possessed in an eminent degree. Add to this his admirable talents for instruction, his intimate acquaintance with every department of literature, his uniform dignity, uprightness, and benevolence, and it is not surprising that his writings were received with a favour beyond their intrinsic merit.

We have dwelt on this subject, not from any sinister desire to lessen his reputation, but out of regard to the interests of mental science. It has been repeatedly asked in England, what are we to expect from the cultivation of a study which,

in the hands of *such a man as Stewart*, has produced so little?

But if we have not as high an opinion of his intellectual character as is sometimes entertained, we yield to none in our admiration of his moral worth. In this, he was far superior to his distinguished successor. Brown had greater acuteness, originality, and rapidity of thought, but he was influenced by an inordinate ambition, and often preferred novelty and ingenuousness, to soberness and truth. Though of an amiable disposition, yet he was not possessed of that warm and extended regard for the interests of humanity, which forms so noble and prominent a trait in the character of Stewart.

The same causes which we have noticed as having given undue celebrity to the writings of Stewart, have occasioned the diminished interest with which the science of mind is at present regarded in Scotland. Too high expectations were raised, a too rapid progress anticipated: these have been followed by a reaction.

All who are acquainted with this science, know that its progress must be slow, and that it can never acquire the certainty of demonstration. But let those who on this account deem it unworthy of cultivation, at least remember, that it numbers among its votaries some of the brightest ornaments of our race. We need but mention Bacon, Locke, Berkely, Butler, Leibnitz, Edwards, &c.

One word as to its prospects in our own country. They are, on the whole, encouraging. A taste for it is evidently increasing, and provision is made in most of our colleges for the study. But a spirit of rash speculation has gone abroad, which is, we fear, inconsistent with that cautious procedure requisite for the acquisition of truth in this difficult science.

There exists, too, an error in respect to the time proper for its study. It is introduced, we believe, into many academies and boarding-schools, but no benefit will result. Its successful study requires a discipline of mind, and a development of the reasoning faculty, rarely found even in the later stages of a collegiate course. Before this period it should not be studied; and, in regard to theological students, it may very properly be included in their professional course.

CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT AGE.

The object of this article is to direct the attention of thinking minds to the character of their own times. To us it seems to be the incumbent duty of intelligent men to know the character of their own age, not only because God has placed them in it, but because they may have influence in improving its aspect, and because they act under its influence. Whatever gives character to popular sentiment and action, should be carefully considered and well understood. There is a predominant influence under which men act, and by which the whole community is more or less swayed. The importance of correctly estimating this influence, will be obvious to those who consider its relation to all the concerns of human life. The prevailing spirit of the age should be well examined and carefully estimated, because it influences all the social relations, regulates the intercourse of human society, and operates on all the elements of the social state, not excepting the thoughts and feelings of men. It carries in its influence stability or caprice, happiness or misery, life or death. Its effects extend down the course of time, and form the subsequent age. All the interests of man, all the political interests of the nation, and all the religious interests of the church urge, to the consideration, due estimate, and proper direction of an influence so powerful. Nothing can excuse intelligent men from this examination for themselves, nor from exertions to secure a public sentiment, which shall combine a high intellectual character with unbending moral principle.

The customs of society are gradually introduced and perpetually changing by the operation of causes, which are not often contemplated, and which are entirely unknown to multitudes. But those causes govern the intercourse and pursuits of a community more effectively than the laws of the country, or the laws of God. For the time being, it is difficult to oppose the current of habits, or suddenly to change the prevailing customs of the age. But customs may change: and it may become the character of an age or country to change the prevailing habits, and break loose from all the established regulations of the community. Innovation, rather than improvement, may be the spirit of the times; and change, rather than reform, may mark the progress of a nation or church. The reverse may

also be the case. At one time, it is quite enough to put down all efforts for improving the social state, or the habits of the church, to raise the cry of innovation. Every prejudice is awake; the public mind is jealous; every thing new must be wrong, because the fathers had it not. At another time it is sufficient to set aside the most wholesome regulations to call them ancient. Whatever is new is popular, because it sets aside some former regulation under the name of antiquated usage. Thus men are always the slaves of custom. The habit of hearing, or telling, or doing some new thing, is as much the prevailing spirit of some times, as it is of others to resist every encroachment upon the old habits and prejudices of the fathers. It is therefore necessary to examine carefully the causes which operate to give stability and obstinacy to prejudices, whether political or religious; and what overturns the customs, opinions, doctrines and institutions of the fathers. The latter is immensely important to be understood, because habits and opinions, sanctioned by time, and hallowed by the associations of parental and filial relationships, and by lessons at the domestic fireside, are not easily swept away. The thing is, however, done. The spirit of innovation goes forth; the human mind becomes restless, and nothing satisfies; all the relations of life are broken up, or modified by the spirit of the age. The current breaks forth in various directions, and sweeps away whatever time, prejudice or philosophy may have interposed. Government and religion share the common influence, and are modified by the prevailing spirit. These include the most important interests of man, and are, therefore, made the grand objects of the influence. They must subserve the popular cause, or all their ties be dissolved.

The question now occurs, how are we to ascertain the character of the present age, and by what standard shall we estimate it? In answer, it is conceded that there is much difficulty in conducting an examination impartially, and perhaps more difficulty still in forming a proper estimate of the principles involved. But the concession of difficulty is not to be understood as a concession of impossibility. It may be very difficult, and yet not impossible. It requires care and skill to discern the true relations of facts and principles when we are so near them. It is like viewing a picture, whose blended colours soften in the distance, and from the proper station give so striking a resemblance that none would mistake its character; but approach very near it, and the eye of an artist

alone could discover the resemblance. To the unpractised eye it appears coarse daubing. It is therefore to men of thought and judicious observation the appeal is made. Those are the men who ought to know the character of their own age, and be able to discern the signs of the times. The responsibility resting on them is imperative.

Some aid in solving this question may be gained from the history of other times. The connexion between causes and effects, principles and practice, the influence of power, of intelligence and ignorance, have passed and repassed in public view, and their record is transmitted to us in the pages of history. By carefully tracing those connexions, which the experience of centuries shows to be laws of Providence and laws of mind, we may gain important aid in estimating the character of our own times. Especially may we derive advantage from the history of that age which immediately preceded our own. That has had a very important influence in forming the present. A familiar and accurate knowledge of the principal events in the last two centuries would enable us to form an enlightened estimate of what we now see and hear. By comparing the past with the present, we see what changes have taken place, and by tracing the progress of those changes, we may ascertain what has caused them, and what has given character to the age.

But the full discussion of this subject would require a view of our literature, science, arts, agriculture, commerce, internal improvements, government, morals and religion. All these are connected with the subject, and serve to develope the character of the age in which we live. But our limits will not permit so extensive an examination as the above departments would involve. Occasional reference to the facts, in some or all the departments which serve to illustrate the general character, is all that can be attempted in this article.

The present is an *intellectual* age. This is its true estimate, its highest eulogium and best character. Were its moral estimate equal to its intellectual, its rank would be like the sun in his rising glory compared to the star of evening. But the influence of moral principle and religion has comparatively little controul in forming and regulating public sentiment.

The cultivation of intellect holds a prominent place, in the calculations of respectable men, in all departments of human society. Intellectual efforts are combined with all the opera-

tions and occupations of men, in a manner and to an extent altogether unprecedented. It is not intended that all men, or even all in high stations of influence, love intellectual culture or effort. There are multitudes who feel no such emotion, and there are men of wealth and influence who feel discomfited and greatly embarrassed by the popularity given to intellectual pursuits. It disturbs their indolence, or interferes with their love of money. It is not intended that no other general character belongs to the age; but its intellectual is prominent, and exerts an influence so extensive, as properly to describe it. The facts which illustrate this character are very numerous, and the causes which have formed it are some of them important. It falls in with our present design to glance at a few of them.

We may consider the causes which have formed the intellectual character of the present age, as commencing their operation in the fourteenth century. At first they operated strongly against the darkness and superstition of the times; and those who employed their instrumentality to accomplish the object, suffered martyrdom. But the elevation of mind which they had manifested produced an effect not to expire.

The primary causes which gave the impulse were the study of the gospel, and the spirit with which it imbued the minds of such men as Wickliff, Hugo, and Jerome of Prague. Whenever men gained access to the holy scriptures, studied carefully with a desire to understand them, to imbibe their spirit and govern their conduct by them, it gave buoyancy to feelings and energy to thought. But the sixteenth century was the era of an influence united and persevering, that stimulated the human intellect, and gave a new character to a large portion of the world. The revival of religion awaked the spirit, and the revival of letters became the medium of its extension. Religion threw off its austerity, and superstition assumed its primitive simplicity, and became united with learning, from which it had been so long divorced. Religion and learning once united, authority and force could no longer bind the human intellect. In spite of papal superstition and civil despotism, the reformation advanced, and as its subjects became more numerous they became more intellectual. Arts and sciences improved, and became powerful auxiliaries in effecting the happy change then taking place in Europe. Before religious reformation was firmly established, science had begun to dawn, and the arts had received an impulse which

promised well to the world. The art of printing had been discovered and improved: the press began to exert its potent influence over mind and manners. The magnetic attraction had been applied to navigation, America had been discovered, and commerce begun to exert a stimulating influence. Every thing partook more or less of the intellectual character. The progress was continued, and the march of intellect was triumphant, until the power was acknowleged in all countries where the spirit of reformation had come. The connexion between the enterprise of that period and the intellectual character of the present age, is easily traced in the changes of government, the improvement of arts and sciences, and in the character of the church. But we are not now about to write this history.

Governments have since been administered more by intellectual than physical power. At first, intellectual influence was combined with force; then physical power was either laid aside, held in reserve to repel invasion, or to quell insurrectionary movements against law and intellectual power. At present the administration of governments, diplomatic intercourse and military operations are managed principally by intellectual skill. The same is true of all agricultural and mechanical operations. The applications of physical power are vastly improved, putting in requisition all the efforts of mind, accomplishing in little time and with physical ease the mightiest achievements. Our country participates largely in this mental energy. Intellectual improvement is every where manifest.

The general diffusion of knowledge among all classes, is a strong fact to illustrate our share in the intellectual character of the age. The press exerts its influence in all parts of our land, at the firesides of the whole community. Thousands of pens are employed to raise our intellectual character. Vehicles of intelligence, books of all descriptions, from the little tract to the large folio; from the trifling anecdote to the grave discussion of abstruse principles, are multiplied and circulated. In a large portion of these productions there is an elevation of thought and unprecedented research. The journals of the day, instead of being mere chronicles of facts, have a literary and scientific character, and cannot be profitably read without intellectual effort.

The natural sciences are receiving increased attention, and the absorbing interest with which they are pursued in all their departments, and by multitudes, shows a prevailing taste for

mental research. Popular sentiment gives intellectual acquirements a high estimate in all the learned professions and places of trust. With our nation, it is characteristic to call into exercise the whole intellectual power, not to cherish an aristocracy of learning, but to value most highly the mental culture of all. We wish to be thought and actually to *be* an intellectual people. The various improvements for purposes of intercourse, commerce and wealth, combine multiplied applications of science and art. The inventions and enterprises every day springing up, illustrate the character of a people fond of intellectual research. Such are some of the facts which show the progress of mental culture, and develope the character of the present age. We have made this rapid sketch preparatory to some remarks on the connexion of this spirit with religion, and its influence on the church.

Without recurring in detail to the history of past ages, it will be sufficient to state that the influence of intellectual research broke the spell of superstition over half Europe, and seemed at one time to indicate the speedy and entire prostration of papal tyranny. But the division of the protestant interests into contending sects, weakened the power of their arguments, and gave the Papists an opportunity of arousing their intellectual strength to avert the progress of reform. Driven from their strong holds of authority and brutal force, they sought by new artifices and deception to secure their influence. Sophistry and specious argumentation, with less of pomp and splendour, are now employed in propagating their dogmas. These, combined with unwearied enterprise, are giving success and extension to the Romish interests in this and other countries. But there is an apparent change in the papal character; a professed accommodation to the intellectual character of the age. We are inclined to believe it is matter of policy and not principle. The great ruling passions of human nature, the love of money, desire of power, and thirst for fame, have been cherished for centuries in the Romish priesthood, under the names of self-denial, humility, and contempt of honour. It is to be expected that craft and subtlety will be associated with religious error, especially when intellectual effort is governed by those master passions of men. When vigorous mental efforts procure wealth, power and fame, the impulse is strong, and cannot be resisted. Men must be, or seem to be, wise. There is at this time an affectation of learning and intellectual research in the priesthood of the

Romish communion. But every effort is made to prevent the people from investigating the truths of religion, in the only volume where they can be found in their original purity and simplicity. Formerly the maxim was unblushingly advocated and repeated, that ignorance was the parent of devotion, and knowledge was dangerous to the interests of piety; now, in that same church, always right, unchangeably infallible, there is an affectation of knowledge, independence of thought, and freedom from all disabilities. These facts show the influence of public sentiment over the conduct of the infallible church in doctrine as well as government. The truth is, nothing can openly stand before or against the influence of a public sentiment, so powerful as that which obtains at the present day. It is, therefore, matter of policy and necessity for every religious sect to associate their peculiar interests with popular sentiment and influence as far as possible. The more effectually this is done the more certainly they expect to succeed in extending those peculiarities. All professed reliance on intellectual agency, to propagate the dogmas of the Romish faith, is homage to the character of the present age. The papal church differs widely in this country from what it is in those countries where it predominates, and differs in spirit every where from what it was some ages past. We do not suppose that the church itself has changed its radical principles of faith or government. Her antichristian principles cannot be relinquished without her becoming protestant. Her transubstantiation, her multiplied sacraments, her clerical celibacy, her withholding the Bible from the laity, her auricular confession, her doctrine of purgatory, remission of sins, works of supererogation, supplications to the saints; her claims to infallibility, and right to lord it over the conscience, must be superstitiously held, or the whole fabric will fall. If one point be yielded, the whole claim is endangered. But with all these errors in her creed, she professes to accommodate herself to the spirit of the age, and claims to be learned, candid and liberal. This is because public sentiment forces a constrained homage to intellectual freedom.

The protestant church, in all her branches, is divorced on principle, from infallible human authority and the force of bigoted intolerance. She has so long cherished intellectual inquiry and critical investigation, that she has enlightened public sentiment, and now every thing which would interrupt such investigation is extensively reprobated. But this intellectual

research has led men in different directions to the formation of multiplied sects and denominations, distinguished by their philosophy and speculation more than by any original appeal to divine authority.

It was to be expected that divisions into sects, by reason of clashing opinions, would be the result of intellectual emancipation from human dogmas and bigoted superstition. When men come to examine the documents of inspiration for themselves, they will disagree in many details of interpretation. There are many plain matters of fact, and some fundamental principles, in which it may be expected they will all agree, so long as they admit in common the *divine authority* of the documents. But when they come to their full interpretation, they will understand many things differently, because they will bring to the task different degrees of intelligence and different principles of philosophy. By far the greatest portion of those religious opinions which divide the protestant church and disturb the harmony of her intercourse, originate in philosophical speculations. Many of them are not sustained, or sought to be sustained by divine authority. The facts, therefore, of different sects and clashing opinions, are evidences of the intellectual character of the protestant church. In this view only we now contemplate them. Of their proper estimate we shall have something to say before we close.

The character of the protestant clergy is intellectually elevated, and the taste of the people demands a high degree of mental cultivation in the pulpit. The preaching of protestant theologians is generally elevated and intellectual. The people will not bear to be fed with dogmas or rant; their food must be served up in a style of mental research. There, doubtless, may be much incoherent jargon and unmeaning rant in some protestant pulpits, but the general character of what is most popular and acceptable, is well digested and intellectual. This has not always been true of the protestant clergy since the reformation. The intelligence and mental improvement of the ministry have varied at different times. If we mistake not, there was a falling off, some half a century since, in the cultivation of science and literature, almost universal in this country. In this retrograde of knowledge, the clergy participated to a great extent. During some twenty-five or thirty years previous to the last twenty, we think the intelligent observer will at once perceive the illustration of our meaning in the introduction of vast numbers to the ministry, with very

slender acquirements in scientific or theological learning. We wish not to make invidious comparisons between the protestant denominations, or we could point to facts all over the country to illustrate our meaning. But for the last fifteen or twenty years, there has been a rapid elevation of learning in the ministry. The protestant clergy have taken the lead, in the rapid improvement of literature and science. At present they are the principal instructors, directors, and patrons of science throughout the land. Our colleges, academies, high schools and seminaries, are generally directed and taught by them. This is a fact which strongly proves the intellectual character of the clergy. Our theological schools sustain an elevated character for intellectual research. Theology is studied as a science, and more learning is brought to bear on the subject, more philosophical investigation connected with it, than has been known at any former period of our history. The theological press keeps pace with the schools, or rather precedes them in the elevation of intellectual character. Theological periodicals may be taken as the index of the prevailing taste, if not of the general talent and investigation of the ministry. He who writes for the clergy, must, in this country, accommodate himself to their taste, or they will not sustain him. He must precede them somewhat in profound investigations and intellectual speculations, or they will not read. It is very obvious that periodical publications of high intellectual character have recently been multiplied, and we think they are better sustained than at any former period. More metaphysical speculations, more argumentative discussion, and more biblical literature, now issue from the press, than has been known before. By this means the spirit of theological inquiry is diffused over the land, the intellectual powers of the whole reading community are excited, and the press becomes a potent instrument in forming the character of the church.

These remarks may be sufficient to define the character which we contemplate, in its general prevalence, and in some of its more prominent features. But the estimate of its value is yet to be made.

To make a due estimate of this intellectual agency, we must consider its *influence* and its *tendency*. In this disposition to make every thing intellectual, speculation is often substituted for fact, while much of the pure gospel of Christ is obscured, suppressed, or denied. Its influence, therefore, on the

doctrines of religion, on the interpretation of the Bible, on practical godliness, and on public morals, must be examined.

In the moral estimate of the character in question, it should be repeated that its influence has wrought much and permanent good for the church and the world. It has paralyzed the arm of ecclesiastical tyranny, torn off the guise of superstition, and broken the shackles of bigotry. It has achieved for the religious, as well as the political world, a noble triumph. God has employed intellectual power to reform the worst abuses in church and state, and to dissolve the unholy alliance of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But after all, the true estimate of intellectual influence is only the instrument or medium through which truth has been discerned, and moral principle brought to bear on the best interests of mankind. Moral principle has been the great reforming agent; divested of this, intelligence would be as powerless as the philosophy of Plato, or of Aristotle, in reforming the world.

Intellectual research, guided by facts and sound moral principle, must always be effective in the promotion of truth and righteousness. This is no speculative theory; it comports with the laws of human agency, and is demonstrated by the history of our world. But there is no safety in speculative theories not founded on facts, or separated from moral principle. No community was ever reformed by abstract speculations or the mere light of reason. Wise men of this age rely more upon moral principle in reforming enterprises, than upon the refined cultivation of intellect. Both are necessarily combined in all the efforts to reform the population of our country. The Sunday school would accomplish nothing without its moral principle. Tracts, addressed to intellectual culture alone, would be powerless. The observance of the Sabbath stands more upon its moral bearings than its intellectual. The missionary enterprise could accomplish nothing with only the frigid speculations of philosophy. The temperance efforts would stop in a month, if appeals to the conscience were left out of the account. Moral principle is the life and soul of all these enterprises of improvement and reform, but intelligence is the medium of approaching the springs of action. Public sentiment must be enlightened in order to bring home to men's business and bosom the influence of moral considerations. But without deducting at all from the proper estimate of intellectual power and cultivation, it should be remembered that it

is quite possible to misapply the power, and abuse the elevation to which it has raised our country.

As a philosophical fact, the cultivation of one faculty to the neglect of all others, will produce a character disproportionate, and either positively bad, or less valuable than a less cultivated but well balanced mind. Intellectual research increases the power of abstract discrimination, and induces a speculative habit, but leaves the heart untouched. The sensibilities diminish, and the affections neither kindle into life nor rise in purity. High intellectual attainments, unconnected with moral principle, in their very best character, have an unhappy influence on the mind. They lead men to a high estimate of their own power, to adopt a wrong standard of their own character, and ultimately to place more confidence in the deductions of their own reasoning or speculation, than in a "thus saith the Lord." This is to be expected from those who accredit not the revelation of God; but it is worth an inquiry, whether much of the infidelity and atheism of our country, is not from the speculative disposition of the age. This much is fact, that when a highly cultivated intellect is not only without the guidance of moral principle, but under the government of immoral and vicious propensities, great evils must be the result. That we may not be misunderstood, we repeat that the evil springs not from the cultivation of intellect, but from the neglect or abuse of the moral faculty; from a perversion of knowledge, and the power of attaining and using it. So much for the influence of philosophy.

Now, as to the existing state of things, we think that the interests of religion and morals are suffering from speculation, separated from truth as its guide, and divorced from moral principle as its controuling agency. All attempts to reform or govern the world by intellectual philosophy, speculation, or unsanctified efforts of human reason, must fail. The Bible, the revelation of God, has been the great moral power of reform. Leave this out of the question, and all the mightiest efforts of human intellect cannot reform men or preserve social order. The ancient philosophers could not do it; the mighty advocates of reason in France could not secure a single year's repose; nor can the free thinkers of this age and country do more than their predecessors have done. They may triumph for a little season over the institutions of God, and over the influence of religious men, by a specious pretension to intelli-

gence, reason, and love of country, loudly and widely echoed through the land, but will assuredly corrupt the people, and destroy the dearest rights of freedom. A population so intellectual as this cannot be stationary. Divorce public sentiment from moral principle, and that based on the revelation of God, and we shall move backward with rapid and ruinous steps. As advocates for the Bible and the best interests of man, we could not avoid this application of our principle to the violent efforts in our country to put religion under intellectual disgrace, and elevate to popular favour the long since refuted speculations of infidelity.

But our remark that religion and morality are now suffering from the unhallowed influence of speculation, is principally intended for application to that denominated theological. Were we writing the natural history of error, we might begin with the undue confidence in speculative opinions always induced, when men form their religious theories without the Bible. When once a man has acquired as much confidence in the result of his own reasonings as in God's word, it is certain that he will go astray in his investigations. What precise form of error he will adopt, or how far he will err, it is impossible to determine. He may become a Pelagian, Unitarian, Universalist, Swedenborgian, or something different from them all, and as wide from the truth. Abstract speculations are sure to induce self-confidence and self-complacency in error.

There is in our country a fondness of abstract theories, and too much speculation substituted for practical knowledge. This has led to a great diversity of theological systems, to support which, their advocates have examined, criticised, tortured and perverted the word of God, until they seem to have believed them substantiated and irrefutable. Each theory, however, must be capable of improvement, nothing is stable that rests on speculation, and every new advocate adds or subtracts something, until the theory loses its original features and its connexion with the scriptures of truth. This has been the case in other ages, but none has been so prolific in theories as the present, both in Europe and this country. From very slight departures from the truth to the impenetrable abstractions of neology, every step is taken by some theory; some intellectualized system, receding farther and farther from the simplicity of the gospel.

There are, it is true, many errors which are the offspring

of ignorance, prejudice and vanity, having little to do with intellectual speculations. But these are not properly systems or theories, but insulated falsehoods, sometimes absurd and monstrous. They are too crude and heterogeneous to be collated and systematized.

But there is a class of theories, speculative and connected, in regular gradation. They commence with the first principle of Pelagian heresy and terminate with the last sweep of Unitarian blasphemy. The first step in this philosophy is the self-determining power of the human will, and the last is the entire sufficiency of human reason to guide men in duty and in the way to life and happiness. The first commences by bringing metaphysical philosophy to aid the revelation of God, and the last closes by setting aside the whole authority and spirit of revelation. We think this system-making, this theorising spirit may be observed in many pulpits, and in a large portion of theological publications. Instead of a plain exposition and enforcement of God's own truth, we often hear the preacher attempt to establish some speculative theory, feeding immortal minds with husks instead of nutritious food. In some of those theories there may be much of divine truth incorporated, but it suffers much from the amalgamation. Whenever philosophy is the most prominent, revelation is obscured. At best, it is the philosophy of religion, not its living practical character. It may not always be the intention of such preachers or writers, but the impression is extensively if not uniformly made, that religion is subservient to philosophy; that reason is the guide, and revelation only a convenient and valuable auxiliary. Granting, for one moment, and for the sake of argument, that the philosophy is true, still we ask why make it so prominent? Certainly the word of God is able to make us wise unto salvation. It is that word which is "sharper than a two-edged sword;" by it men are convinced, not by speculative theories. The people of God are sanctified through his truth, not the speculations of philosophy. But we deny the right of any man to place his own speculations before the word of God, and we deny the truth of the philosophy in question. Let the truth be established by divine authority, then if philosophy can serve to explain, or illustrate it, there may be an appropriate and profitable use for it; not otherwise. We doubt not there is a true philosophy of religion, and it may be satisfactory to many minds to investigate it, in connexion with that authority to which they submit

in meekness and faith. But the mischief is done by the misapplication of this truth, by giving revelation a speculative character, and urging its claims on the ground of philosophy, not divine authority. The conscience is required to approve, not because God has said it, but because reason adopts it.

The speculations to which we allude, are not controuled by divine authority, but made to modify the whole system of gospel doctrine.

And here we might sketch that train of concatenated principles which afford the easy gradation, by which so many of our theologians have passed from speculative orthodoxy, through latitudinarian schemes, to the ultimate verge of all that bears the name of Christianity. Lest we should assume, out of place, the pen of the polemic, we forbear; and content ourselves by alluding to some of the later conclusions of these speculatists, in whose estimation the character of Jesus Christ is that of a good man, but not divine, according to the legitimate course of this scheme. Since no proper satisfaction to divine justice could be made by one for another, and since it was neither necessary nor possible, there could be no necessity for a divine Saviour. Besides, philosophy knows nothing of a *trinity* of persons in the Godhead, and since no explanation can be given of such a doctrine, reason decides that it is impossible. No matter how positively the scriptures assert the doctrine of the trinity or divinity of Jesus Christ, it must be either interpolation or a metaphor.

As for the *inspiration* of the scriptures, it is admitted in the scheme that some facts and truths scattered here and there, in different parts of those writings, have been communicated by God to men; but the composition is purely human. By far the greatest part of what was originally contained in those scriptures, consisted of facts previously known, historical works, traditions, superstitious views of the people, concessions to the customs and opinions of the age, and some speculations of the writers. There is, however, a revelation from God in the book, found principally in the words uttered by Jesus Christ, which however were not fully, and in some instances not correctly recorded; at the same time it must be recollected that much of what was correctly and faithfully registered, may have suffered by time and frequent transcription. Reason and philosophy alone can guide us in ascertaining what part is revelation.

Thus, all confidence in the book of God's revelation is

unsettled. Men must be capable of judging what ought to be revealed and what is actually revealed. The result of the whole is, that reason is the guide, and entirely sufficient without any revelation from God.

The influence of these speculative hypotheses on *practical godliness* is injurious. It weakens the bond of divine authority upon the conscience, and men come habitually to feel less impressed with the sentiment of accountableness. God's sacred word is contemplated with less devout reverence, and less anxiety is cherished to know precisely the mind of the Spirit. The speculative theory is more carefully examined than the life giving word. A philosophizing disposition kindles not the heart's devotion, like summoning the whole soul before the divine word, to try the feelings and actings by its simple declarations. The whole tendency of the scheme is to produce a laxity of sentiment and moral feeling, which must be attended with a corresponding laxity of conduct.

It ought certainly to be a fact, that, with an increase of knowledge, there should be an increase of pious feeling, devout worship and cheerful service of God. The more deep and thorough a Christian's knowledge of God's word in its pure doctrines, holy precepts and precious promises, the more devout should be his worship, and the more constant his obedience. This accords with the representation given in the holy scriptures, and must be admitted. But the more superficial and speculative his knowledge, the less consistent and persevering will be his devotion and service.

The fact is certain, that, in this speculative age, there is a defection in the tone and consistency of practical religion. This is manifest from one end of the land to the other. There are some precious exceptions; but we are persuaded that among the mass of those who profess religion, there is a mournful defection. Almost every where may be seen more conformity to the world; more importance attached to fashions and etiquette; and more temporizing policy in social intercourse and commercial transactions, than was common with our pious forefathers. Christians may employ their intellect as much on subjects of religion, but there is less of the heart put in requisition. In this estimate something, doubtless, may be accredited to an impression, common in ripened years, that there is less godliness because more of the existing corruptions are seen. But after all due allowance for this impression, often somewhat erroneous, it will be readily admitted

that there is less ardent piety in most, if not all parts of the church, than there was before the refinements of speculation commenced.

How much of this defection is to be ascribed to the influence of speculations in theology, may not be easy to determine with precision, and it is not necessary here to decide. That they have had an agency is manifest; that other causes have operated is fully admitted. But so far as speculation absorbs the attention, the sense of moral obligation is weakened, which always tends to the defection of piety. Facts, in very many parts of the church, afford melancholy evidence of the influence and its results. The danger of defection increases because the disposition to speculate is advancing. It is yet due here to state, that many men of piety and christian example preserve their zeal for the spirituality of religion, who indulge in some of these philosophical hypotheses. They may be too strongly bound by the living influence of godliness, to be broken loose by the tendency of their speculative philosophy. But the same cannot be expected from their young disciples. These begin with metaphysical speculations; give them a higher place in their system of theology; and permit them to have greater influence over their feelings and conduct. There is reason to apprehend a gradual increase of the influence until it shall assume the entire controul. The history of all speculative errors shows their tendency to lower the standard of piety, and of all heretical opinions to a defection of morals.

Public morals are suffering throughout this country from the influence of speculative philosophy. This is a necessary consequence of lowering the standard of piety. When the standard of the latter is abated, the standard of the former sinks. Let it be once doubted that the Bible is the code of ethics to be universally adopted as the standard of public as well as private morals, the whole community must feel the injury. The only safety of morals is gone. All other barriers against vice and corruption are thenceforth swept away. The Sabbath, that monument of God's sovereignty, and bulwark of moral influence, finds feeble support in speculative philosophy, and all the institutions of religion become inefficient restraints. This is a matter so obvious, that we think it needless to spread out its details. Any accurate observer can fix his eye on the illustrations in those countries, and in those parts of our country, where speculative philosophy has

taken the place of revelation. It is a fact every where demonstrated, that whatever relaxes gospel influence, injures public morals. It is a fact which should pass into a maxim, and be inscribed in letters of light on every pulpit, on every enterprise, on every press, and on every legislative hall in the land.

Our limits admonish us to waive, for the present, an examination of other characteristics belonging to the present age. But in concluding this article, the question presses upon us, how is the intellectual character of this age to be preserved and improved, and how are the evils of theological speculation to be prevented? This is a question of absorbing interest to all who love solid research and the orthodox faith, and to all who desire the prevalence of ardent piety and correct morals. In all its bearings there is much to arouse every energy of the Christian, and make him adhere more firmly to the pure word of God, as his rule of faith and manners. We cannot now reply in detail; but with reference to the last part of this question it readily occurs to say, that every good man should sedulously guard himself against indulging in speculative philosophy.

Two things must not be omitted, which are immensely important at the present time. One indispensable requisite is the cultivation of a deep, heartfelt and humble piety. This includes a constant sense of human weakness, liability to error, need of spiritual illumination, careful meditation on God's word, and earnest prayer for direction. For the ministry of reconciliation such piety is unspeakably important.

Next to this ardent, living piety, we place the attainments necessary to a thorough knowledge of the Bible; not merely its excellent translation, but the precise meaning of the text; the mind of the Spirit. These include the qualifications for scriptural interpretation. To execute this work judiciously and safely, those languages in which the word of God was originally communicated must be *extensively and well* understood. It is comparatively easy to get possession of a few philosophical speculations, and apply them to the scriptures; but to understand the original language of the Bible, the words, phrases, idioms, usage of speech, unusual senses, and all that belongs to grammatical interpretation; *hic labor, hoc opus est.* Where shall we find the men who have acquired all this? Not certainly among those who use so freely their philosophical theories. Where shall we find the men who seek to attain such

an acquaintance with the only medium through which God communicated to us his revelation? They are extremely few in this land, few in the ministry, and few among those who are preparing for this sacred office. This is a subject which should occupy more thoughts in the church, and more attention in the schools of theology. Something must be done to elevate the standard of biblical knowledge, and thereby depress the philosophizing theories. It has been said that the church needs men of active labour more than men of learning; but the truth of this is questionable, unless learning means skill in metaphysical and philosophical theories; then it is true, and the fewer of such the better. But the church in this land is greatly deficient in men of biblical learning. The mischiefs of perverted learning can never be prevented or obliterated by ignorance, however active and laborious. Sound biblical knowledge and plain gospel truth must be restored to their places, and then the work will be done.

REVIEW.

A Letter from a Blacksmith to the Ministers and Elders of the Church of Scotland; in which the manner of Public Worship in that Church is considered; its inconveniences and defects pointed out, and methods for removing them humbly proposed. 12*mo.* *Pp.* 80. *R. P. & C. Williams. Boston.* 1824.

This letter was originally published in Scotland, between seventy and eighty years ago, and though purporting to be the work of a "Blacksmith," was, no doubt, written by one accustomed to literary pursuits, who wished, under the disguise of an humble mechanic, to exhibit his strictures with less pretension, and consequently with more force. The writer also presents himself before his readers as a zealous Presbyterian, an honest and devoted friend of the church of Scotland; and professes, in this character, to be earnestly desirous of her reformation as to various points in her mode of worship. His proposed reformation, however, is all of such

a character, as to leave little room for doubt, that he is not what he professes to be, but an Episcopalian at heart, under Presbyterian colours; and that his desire is not so much to *reform* as entirely to *revolutionize* the worship of the church of *Scotland*, and reduce it to an entire conformity with that of her southern sister.

The publication in this country (which has recently come to our knowledge) is made by our Episcopal neighbours, evidently for the purpose of turning into ridicule the Presbyterian mode of worship, and thus, indirectly, recommending liturgies. This is evident, from the slightest inspection of the names of those booksellers in the title page for whom the work was particularly printed, and also, from the advertisement at the close, respecting the places and rates at which it may be obtained for extensive circulation, by the dozen or hundred. Of this, however, we make no complaint. We are perfectly willing to have our worship and order, as well as our doctrines, subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and will cordially thank any man, or body of men, who will point out to us an error, and enable us to correct it. In the exercise, then, of the same liberty which we are willing to yield to others in reference to our opinions and practices, we shall use the freedom to make such remarks on the letter under consideration, as appear to us adapted to place in a full light the subject of which it treats.

When this literary "Blacksmith" finds fault with the church of *Scotland* for neglecting the stated reading of the scriptures in her public service, we have every disposition to unite with him, and to say, that wherever such neglect exists, it ought to be corrected. But such neglect makes no part of presbyterianism. So far as it has existed, or now exists in *Scotland*, it is contrary to the express injunction of her "Directory for the Public Worship of God"; and we rejoice to know, that while the same injunction is contained in our own "Directory," it is generally followed in those parts of the church with which we are most acquainted.

Again, when the writer enters his protest against some of the circumstances which have been allowed to attend the ancient mode of administering the *Lord's supper* in the church of *Scotland*, he may at least be heard without rebuke. Indiscretions and irregularities, we doubt not, have often been admitted on such occasions, against which all lovers of pure and undefiled religion will be ready to lift up their voice. Yet,

we have no hesitation in saying, that while we like levity, eccentricity, fanaticism, or any species of unhallowed passion, in the management of sacred things, as little as our neighbours, we had much rather see the life and power of pious affection, even though occasionally attended with some undesirable ebullitions, than the lifeless coldness of formality; freezing up every thing, not so much in that vital, and beautiful, and healthful *order* which God has appointed, as in the rigidity of spiritual death. When *Whitefield* preached, and when the power of that truth which he dispensed was made effectual to the hopeful conversion of thousands, some irregularities, no doubt, occasionally occurred, which his friends lamented, and which he himself, in the end, did not attempt to justify. Yet would not every enlightened friend of the Redeemer's kingdom unfeignedly rejoice, if scenes, such as that holy man of God was permitted to witness, even with all their accompaniments, should pervade the world? When the pious are collected, roused, and animated to peculiar feeling; and when the ignorant and impenitent are awakened, impressed, convinced of sin, and brought to the Saviour, the enlightened friend of religion will "thank God, and take courage," even though he should see something to deplore mingling itself with the apparent triumphs of the cross.

But as the greater part of this little volume is taken up with statements and reasonings intended to discredit *extemporary prayer* and to recommend *liturgies*, we shall principally attend to this general object in the sequel.

We by no means think the use of prescribed forms of prayer unlawful. There are multitudes of excellent people who think them convenient, attractive, and edifying. With these we find no fault. May they experience in the use of them more and more of that comfort and edification which they seek! We should think ourselves acting an unworthy part, if, in relation to such a point, we were capable of attempting to disturb the devotions, and ridicule the preferences of any serious Christians. Millions, we question not, through the medium of precomposed forms, have been built up in faith and holiness unto salvation. And if any serious persons find such forms better adapted to promote their spiritual benefit than extemporary prayer, they would not be faithful to their own souls if they should reject the use of them. Nothing, therefore, that we are about to offer, has for its object to make con-

verts to our mode of worship. We would, on no account, wound the feelings or unsettle the convictions of any pious Episcopalian who has been long accustomed to consider the use of the Book of Common Prayer as a *sine qua non* to his Christian devotion. But when the zealous advocates of liturgies go further, and undertake to judge for others as well as themselves; when they attempt to cover with ridicule every other mode of social prayer than that which *they* have thought proper to adopt; when they represent extemporary prayer as indecorous, ridiculous, and fanatical; when they pronounce those who find it for their edification, and deem it a duty to pray without a stinted form, to be acting the part of rebels and schismatics, criminally departing from God's prescribed plan, and rejecting, as some have asserted, what all sober, regular Christians, in all ages, have used, there is surely no impropriety in saying a word in our own defence. This, and this only, is the object of all that shall follow. Not to disparage the opinions or the practices of our neighbours; but simply to assign some of the reasons why we cannot unite with them; and why we are constrained to think that they have not yet adequately considered the grounds of our decision. It is no part of Christian meekness to hear our sacred things, from time to time, misrepresented and vilified, without taking the trouble, or feeling a disposition to lift a voice in their favour.

The questions which the contents of this book call upon us to discuss, are such as these—Is there any warrant in *scripture* for prescribed forms of prayer? Have we any evidence that they were at all in use in the three or four first ages after the apostles? Is *confining* ourselves to written forms, on the whole, expedient and useful? We shall endeavour to answer each of these questions with as much candour and brevity as possible.

1. Is there any warrant in scripture for the use of prescribed forms of prayer?

The writer of this little volume, indeed, very unceremoniously and confidently asserts, that the use of liturgies has been uniform in the church in all ages; that all men, all religions, and at all periods until the *fifteenth* century, (we suppose he means the *sixteenth*), have agreed as unanimously in the use of forms of prayer for public worship, as they did in the belief of a God; that God himself prescribed forms of prayer for the Jews; that the worship of the syna-

gogue was by such a form; that our Saviour prescribed a form to his disciples; nay, that it is evident our Saviour generally used a form of prayer himself, in pouring out his own heart to his Father in heaven!

These assertions may do very well for a "Blacksmith," who may be supposed to be more familiar with his anvil than either with the Bible or with ecclesiastical history; and who may be ready to adopt, without examination, and to repeat by rote what others, little less ignorant than himself, may have said in his hearing. But that they have scarcely a shadow of truth in them, every well informed person must know.

With respect to the Old Testament church, we know of no evidence that they had any forms which could with propriety be called a *liturgy*, at any period of their existence. They had psalms and other inspired writings which were either read, recited, or sung; and they had some forms of words with which they were accustomed to perform certain rites, and to bless the people. But the church of *Scotland* had all these, and more, at the date of this letter; yet our "Blacksmith" charges them with having *no liturgy*. And the Presbyterian church in the United States has, and constantly uses, all these; yet we were never considered as having a liturgy, so far as we know. With respect to forms of prayer in the Jewish synagogue, the writer before us is very positive that they were in constant use. But we know not on what grounds this assertion is made. The Old Testament scriptures do not give the least hint of the existence of such forms of prayer. Josephus and Philo are both profoundly silent respecting them. And nothing can be more evident to every candid reader, than that the *eighteen prayers*, as they are commonly called, mentioned by Vitringa, Prideaux, and others, are forgeries; that is, they carry on their face that they were not composed, as is alleged, before the advent of the Saviour, but since the dispersion, when there was neither temple nor sacrifice. We do not positively assert that there were no forms of prayer used in the ancient synagogue service; but we do say, with fearless confidence, that there is no clear evidence that there was any such thing. And we must further say, that if prescribed forms of prayer not only existed, but held so important a place in the worship of the Old Testament church, as some modern friends of liturgies are disposed to imagine, it is, indeed, passing strange that we do not find, in all the inspired writings, or in any other authentic work, the least hint or allusion respecting them.

If forms of prayer had been indispensable, or even invariably used, in social worship, in all ages, as the writer before us imagines, we might have expected Moses, and Ezra, and Nehemiah, and Solomon, above all others, to have employed them, on the great public occasions on which they were called upon to address the throne of grace as the mouth of assembled myriads. Yet, we presume, no one can peruse the prayers which they employed, without perceiving that they could not have been written before they were used; but came warm from the heart, and were afterwards committed to writing by the direction of God.

With respect to the New Testament dispensation, we apprehend that the slightest impartial inquiry will convince any one, that we have quite as little solid evidence from this, in favour of liturgies, as from the Old. Much use, indeed, in this controversy, has been made of that form of prayer which our Saviour taught his disciples, at their particular request, commonly called the *Lord's Prayer*. But we are persuaded that a candid attention to every circumstance connected with the delivery of that prayer, will convince any one that it furnishes no proof whatever of either the necessity or duty of prescribed forms of devotion. We believe that it was never designed by our Lord to be adopted as a permanent and precise *form* of prayer; but only as a *general directory*, intended to set forth the topics, or general matter of prayer; and our reasons for thinking so are the following:—This prayer, taken alone, is not, strictly speaking, adapted to the New Testament dispensation. When it was delivered, the Old Testament economy was still in force, and the setting up of the New directed to be prayed for as future. It contains no direction for asking in the name of Christ, as the express injunction of our Saviour renders now necessary. It is not delivered in the same words by the several evangelists, and of course, we cannot suppose the use of the *ipsissima verba*, to say the least, indispensably necessary. We hear no more of its use, by the inspired Apostles, or the primitive Christians, during the Apostolic age. And it was not for several centuries after that age that this form of prayer was considered as proper to be introduced into the service at every season of public worship. For these reasons we are persuaded that the Lord's Prayer was never intended to be used as a strict form; and, of course, that it affords no argument in favour of prescribed liturgies; and in this opinion we are fortified by the judgment of many distin-

guished individuals, ancient and modern. Augustine expresses the decisive opinion, that Christ, in delivering this prayer to his disciples, gave it as a *model*, rather than a *form*. He says expressly, that he did not intend to teach his disciples what *words* they should use in prayer, but what *things* they should pray for; and understands it to be meant chiefly as a directory for *secret* and *mental* prayer, where words are not necessary. —*De Magistro, cap.* 1. In this opinion Grotius agrees, as appears in his commentary on Matthew vi. 9.

Again; we would ask the most zealous friend of liturgies, whether written forms of prayer were used in *any* of the instances of social worship recorded in the apostolic history? Had Paul a written form when he kneeled down and prayed with the elders of Ephesus, on taking leave of them, to see their faces no more? Did Paul and Silas make use of a *book* when, at midnight, they "prayed and sang praises to God, in the prison at Phillippi? Had Paul a prescribed form when, at Tyre, he "kneeled down on the shore and prayed" with a large body of disciples, with their wives and children, who had kindly visited him and ministered to his wants, when he touched at that city in the course of a long voyage? Can we suppose that the body of pious people, male and female, who had assembled at the house of Mary, the mother of John Mark, to pray for the liberation of the apostle Peter, made use of a form in pleading for the welfare and usefulness of that eminent minister of Christ? Is it possible to suppose that the church at Ephesus was furnished with a liturgy, when Paul, in writing to Timothy while there, thought it necessary to give him such pointed and specific directions concerning some of the topics proper to be introduced in public prayer? We have never heard of any one so unreasonable as to imagine that there could have been a written form used on any of these occasions, or, indeed, on any other recorded in the New Testament history. The primitive Christians, it is true, had psalms and hymns, and probably a uniform mode of administering sacraments and blessing the people; but so have the Presbyterian church, and, indeed, all other churches which reject prescribed forms of prayer in public worship. In short, if there be the smallest shred of evidence that a liturgy, properly so called, was ever used in any of the apostolic churches, it has never met our eye; and it would be strange, indeed, if any thing of that kind were in constant use, or even in use at all, without some trace of it, more or less distinct, appearing

in the inspired history, or, at least, in some of the epistles to the various churches.

The next question which demands our notice is, Have we any evidence that liturgies were at all in use during the first three or four centuries after the apostles?

The advocates of liturgies generally assert, without hesitation, that they *were* in constant use during the period in question. Yet they have never been able to produce evidence of such a fact. Still they abate nothing of the confidence of assertion. We are reduced, then, to what is commonly considered by logicians a hard task, viz. that of *proving a negative.* Yet even *this*, we think, in the present instance, may, without much difficulty, be done.

When the learned Bingham, in his *Origines Ecclesiasticæ*, and other writers of similar views, assert, and endeavour to prove, that liturgies were in use in the ages immediately succeeding that of the apostles, they endeavour to make good their assertion by such testimony at the following:—That the early Christians had evidently psalms and hymns which had been reduced to writing, which were well known among them, and which they united in singing; that they had, for the most part, a form of words, which was commonly employed in administering baptism and the sacramental supper; and that in blessing and dismissing the people, they commonly adopted the usual apostolical benediction, or some other well known form of a similar kind. These writers have not a single fact or testimony to show in support of their assertion but something of this kind. Now it is plain, that all this may be granted without in the least degree helping their argument. We have all this, as is well known, and as was before observed, in our worship; and yet we are generally considered as having no liturgy. Nay, we know of no church on earth, of regular organization, that has not psalms and hymns, and every thing just described. But the simple and only proper question here is, Had the Christian church, during the first three or four centuries after Christ, *prescribed forms*, according to which she conducted her *ordinary prayers* in public worship? If she had, it has certainly remained a secret to this time. No hint to that amount, that we have ever seen, has survived in all the remains of antiquity. But so much has survived that speaks a contrary language, that we cannot think it will be difficult to satisfy every impartial reader, that, during the period in ques-

tion, extemporary prayer, or in other words, prayer conducted according to the taste and ability of each officiating minister, for the time being, was the *only* method of public prayer in use in the Christian church.

If there had been in use among the early Christians forms of prayer, in conformity with which their public devotions were conducted, prayers would, of course, have been then *read*, as they are now by all who use liturgies. But any expression indicative of any such fact has never met our eye in the records of the first four or five centuries. The phrases αναγινωσκειν ευχας, or *preces legere*, or *de scripto recitare*, &c. &c. which were so common centuries afterwards, never, so far as we know, then occur. We may, therefore, legitimately infer that the thing indicated by those phrases was neither known nor practised in those times.

But more than this; the most respectable writers who undertake to give us accounts of the worship of the early Christians, make use of language which is utterly irreconcilable with the practice of reading prayers. Justin Martyr tells us, in his second *Apology*, that as soon as the sermon was ended, the congregation all *rose up*, and offered their prayers to God. *Standing* in prayer was, beyond a doubt, the usual posture at that time; certainly the invariable posture on the first day of the week, or the Christian sabbath, on which it was accounted a sin to kneel, (kneeling being chiefly, if not entirely confined to days of fasting and humiliation.) On this account it was customary for the preacher to close his sermon with an exhortation to his hearers to stand up and pray for the divine blessing. The conclusion of Origen's sermons furnish many examples of this, of which the following is a specimen: "Wherefore, standing up, let us beg help from God, that we may be blessed in Jesus Christ, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." And again, "Wherefore, rising up, let us pray to God, that we may be made worthy of Jesus Christ, to whom be glory and dominion, forever and ever. Amen." And again, "Standing up, let us offer sacrifices to the Father, through Christ, who is the propitiation for our sins, to whom be glory and dominion, forever and ever. Amen."—*Homil.* 19, *in Jerem.; Homil.* 2, *in Cantic.; Homil.* 1, *in Isaiam.*

In describing the prayers thus offered up, the following account is given by some of the earliest and most respectable writers. Justin Martyr tells us, that the president or presiding minister in the worship of the congregation, prayed

(οση δυναμις) "with his utmost ability."—*Apol.* 2. *Origen* speaks of public prayer in the same manner. "We worship," says he, "one God, and his one Son, who is his 'Word and Image,' with supplications and honours, *according to our ability*, offering to the God of the universe prayers and praises through his only begotten Son."—24 *Contra Celsum*, *lib. viii. p.* 386. And again; "But the Grecian Christians in Greek, the Romans in the Latin, and every one in his own proper language, prays to God and praises him *as he is able.*" *Ibid*, *p.* 402. The same writer, speaking of the different parts of prayer to which it was proper to attend, mentions first *doxology*, or adoration, and says, "He that prays must bless God (κατα δυναμιν) *according to his power or ability.*"—*De Oratione*, *sect.* 22. And in the same work, in a preceding section (the tenth) he says, "But when we pray, let us not *battologise*, (i. e. use vain repetitions,) but *theologise.* But we battologise when we do not strictly observe ourselves, or the words of prayer which we express; when we utter those things which are filthy either to do, speak, or think; which are vile, worthy of reproof, and opposed to the purity of the Lord." Why this caution at all, if they had regular prescribed liturgies?

Tertullian, speaking on the same subject, says, "We Christians pray for all the emperors, &c. looking up to heaven, with our hands stretched out, because guiltless; with our heads uncovered, because we are not ashamed; *denique*, *sine monitore*, *quia de pectore*," i. e. "lastly, without a monitor, *because from the heart.*"—*Apol. cap.* 30. We learn also from Origen, that they were accustomed to pray with *closed eyes*, which was wholly irreconcilable with reading a liturgy. "Closing" says he "the eyes of the senses, but lifting up those of the mind."—*Contra Celsum*, *lib.* 7, *p.* 362.

Every pastor or bishop at this time was considered as charged with the duty of conducting, *according to his ability*, or *taste*, the public devotions of his congregation; and hence there was great, nay, endless *diversity*, as among us, as to the *manner* in which this part of the public service was performed. Socrates Scholasticus, the ecclesiastical historian, who lived in the beginning of the fifth century, speaking of public prayer, expresses himself in the following unequivocal and strong language. "Generally, in any place whatsoever, and among all worshippers, there cannot be two found agreeing to use the same prayers."—*Hist. lib. v. cap.* 21. Surely this

could not have been alleged if there had been public, prescribed forms in use. In nearly similar language Sozomen, the contemporary of Socrates, and who wrote the ecclesiastical history of the same period, after asserting and describing the general uniformity of the public worship of Christians at that time, remarks, notwithstanding, that "It cannot be found that the same prayers, psalms, or even the same readings, were used by all at the same time."—*Hist. lib.* 7. *cap.* 19. Augustine, in like manner, who was contemporary with Sozomen, speaking on the same subject, says, "There is freedom to use *different words*, provided the *same things* are mentioned in prayer."—*Epistolæ*, 121. And to show that the prayer usually offered up in his day was extemporary prayer, he speaks of some presiding clergymen "who might be found using barbarisms and solecisms in their public prayers," and cautions those to whom he wrote against being offended at such expressions, inasmuch as God does not so much regard the language employed as the state of the heart.—*De Catechiz. Rudib. cap.* 9. Chrysostom tells us that, in his judgment, it required more confidence or boldness (παῤῥησίαν) than Moses or Elias had, to pray as they were wont to do before the Eucharist.—*De Sacerdot. Orat.* 3. 46. But what good reason can be assigned why such confidence or boldness was necessary if they had the prayer in a book lying before them, and they had nothing to do but to read it.

The general fact, that it was left to every pastor or bishop in the first ages of the church, to conduct the public devotions of his congregation as he pleased, appears evident from a great variety and abundance of testimony. The circumstances indeed which have been already stated are sufficient themselves clearly to establish the fact. But many other testimonies might be cited to prove the same thing. A single one from Augustine will suffice. That father, having occasion to show that numbers of his brethren in the ministry had many things in their public prayers, especially in the administration of the Lord's supper, which were contrary to soundness in the faith, assigns this reason for the fact. "Many light upon prayers, says he, which are composed not only by ignorant babblers, but also by heretics; and through the simplicity of their ignorance, having no proper discernment, they make use of them, supposing them to be good."—*De Baptismo contra Donat. lib.* 6. *cap.* 25. How could this possibly have happened, if the church at that time had been in the use of public pre-

scribed liturgies? And the remedy which Augustine and his contemporaries suggest for this evil, is quite as decisive in its import as the evil itself. The remedy was for the weaker and more illiterate pastors to consult their more wise and learned neighbouring pastors, who might discern and point out any improprieties in prayers. This whole matter will be better understood by adverting to the fact, that as early as the age of Augustine, many men had crept into sacred office, and some had even been made bishops, who were unable even to write their own names. This appears from the records of several ecclesiastical synods or councils about this time, in which bishops, when called upon to subscribe the canons of those councils, were obliged to get others to write their names for them. The following is a specimen of some of the signatures of those councils. "I, Helius, bishop of Hadrianople, have subscribed by Myro, bishop of Rome, being myself ignorant of letters." Again, "I, Caiumus, bishop of Phœnicia, have subscribed by my colleague Dionysius, because I am ignorant of letters." These examples of illiterate ecclesiastics at once illustrate and confirm the complaint of Augustine.

No wonder that such ecclesiastics were unable to conduct the public devotions of their respective congregations in a decent manner, and therefore resorted to their more capable neighbours to patch up prayers for them; and no wonder that, with their simplicity and ignorance, they were often imposed upon by corrupt compositions.

And, by the way, even when liturgies were brought into general use and fully established, there was no uniformity even among the churches of the same state or kingdom. Every bishop, in his own diocese, adopted what prayers he pleased, and even indulged his taste for variety. This fact itself, we had almost said, is decisive that liturgies were not of apostolic origin. For if any thing of this kind had been known as transmitted from inspired, or even primitive men, it would, doubtless, have been received with universal veneration. It would have been cherished with a reverence similar to that for the inspired scriptures, and held fast with devout firmness. But no such thing appears. Instead of all this, as the practice of using forms of prayer gradually crept in as piety declined, so the circumstances attending their introduction and prevalence were precisely such as might have been expected. They were adopted by each pastor who felt the need of them, or was inclined to make use of them; and, by and by, when

prelacy came in, each bishop within his own diocese took such order in reference to the subject as his character and inclination might dictate. This would lead, of course, to almost endless diversity. Accordingly, it is a notorious fact, that when the reformation commenced in England, the established Romish church in that country had no single, uniform liturgy for the whole kingdom; but there seems to have been a different liturgy for the diocese of every bishop. And when, in the second year of king Edward's reign, the principal ecclesiastical dignitaries of the kingdom were directed to digest and report one uniform plan for the public service of the church, they collated and compared the five Romish missals of the several dioceses of Sarum, York, Hereford, Bangor and Lincoln, and out of them formed a liturgy. So that the missals in use in five popish bishoprics constituted the basis of the first liturgy of king Edward, and consequently of the book of Common Prayer, as now used in Great Britain and the United States. And this, no doubt, is the fact to which the celebrated earl of Chatham referred, when, in a debate in the British house of lords, more than half a century ago, he said that the church of England presented an aspect of a singularly motley character; that she had a *popish liturgy*, *Calvanistic articles*, and an *Arminian clergy*. It is sincerely hoped that this statement will not be considered as arising from any disposition to cast odium on the liturgy of the Protestant Episcopal church. It is, in many respects, a noble composition. We do not wonder that those who admire and love it are so numerous. Still its history ought to be known, and both the nature and design of the publication under review compel us, in justice to our argument, to make this statement. And, indeed, notwithstanding all the beauty and excellence of the English liturgy, it certainly bears, in some of its parts, very distinct traces of its origin, especially as it exists at this time in England. The alterations which it has undergone in this country have, it is true, divested it of most of its seriously objectionable features. Yet there are still passages even here which enable an accurate taste to discern something of "the tang of the old cask." On these we have no disposition to dwell. It has been the means of sincere and profitable devotion to millions; and that none may be disturbed in their edifying use of it, is our unfeigned desire. But to return to the early ages of the Christian church, which we are engaged in examining.

It was before stated, that we not only find no traces of any books, or prescribed forms of common prayer in the first three or four centuries of the Christian history; but that we do find a number of facts, incidentally stated, which are wholly inconsistent with their existence. Some of these facts have been already mentioned. Another very significant one is, that in the second, third, and fourth centuries, it was not considered as lawful, in any case, to commit to writing the prayers and the other parts of the service used in administering the Lord's supper. It was not thought proper that any other than communicants should be made acquainted with them; and in order to accomplish this object, committing them to writing, in any form, was solemnly prohibited. Basil, who flourished towards the close of the fourth century, tells us expressly, that the words which they used in blessing the elements were not written; and that what they said, both before and after the consecration, they had not from any writing. Now, when we consider that, of all the parts of the public service, as there are none more solemn, so there are none which have been more carefully regulated by prescribed forms than the Eucharist; we may confidently conclude, that if there were not, at the period referred to, and from the very nature of the case could not be any written forms for that ordinance, there were none for any other part of the public service.

We read of some of the early churches being supplied with copies of the sacred scriptures; but not a word of their being supplied with prayer books in any form. When the buildings in which the early Christians worshipped were seized, and an exact scrutiny made of their contents by their pagan persecutors, we read of copies of the Bible being found, and vessels for administering the communion, and other articles very minutely specified; but not a hint respecting forms or books of prayer. We meet with frequent instances of reading psalms, reading other portions of scripture, reading narratives of the sufferings of martyrs, reading epistles from other churches, or distinguished individuals; but not a syllable of reading prayers. Now all this is wonderful, if prayer books and reading prayers had been then as common as many of the zealous friends of liturgies assert, and would persuade us to believe. The very first document in the form of a prayer book that we have met with, is a Libellus Officialis, mentioned in the twenty-fifth canon of the Council of Toledo, Anno Domini 633. This, however, seems to have been rather a brief

"Directory for the worship of God," than a complete liturgy. It was a document given to every presbyter at his ordination, to instruct him how to administer the sacraments, lest through ignorance of his duty in reference to those divine institutions, he should offend Christ. "Quando presbyteri in parochiis ordinantur, libellum officialem a suo sacerdote accipiant, ut ad ecclesias sibi deputatas instructi accedant, ne per ignorantiam etiam in ipsis divinis sacramentis Christum offendant."

With respect to the alleged liturgies of St Mark, St James, and that of Alexander, all enlightened protestants, as we believe, agree that they are manifestly forgeries; and with regard to the liturgies attributed to Chrysostom and Basil, Bishop White, an English prelate, who lived in the reigns of James I. and Charles I., delivers the following opinion: "The liturgies," says he, "fathered upon St Basil and St Chrysostom, have a known mother, (to wit, the late Roman church,) but there is (besides many other just exceptions) so great dissimilitude between the supposed fathers of the children, that they rather argue the dishonest dealings of their mother than serve as lawful witnesses of that which the adversary intended to prove by them."—*Tracts against Fisher, the Jesuit, p.* 377.

The result, then, is that liturgies were unknown in the primitive church; that, as piety declined, the clergy began to need external aids for conducting the public devotions of their congregations; that this matter, however, continued for several centuries to be managed by each pastor for himself; that in the exercise of this individual discretion, frequent blunders occurred, through the gross ignorance of the clergy, and sometimes blunders of a very unhappy kind; and that liturgies did not finally obtain universal prevalence until the church had sunk into a state of darkness and corruption, which all protestants acknowledge to have been deplorable.

The only question which remains to be considered is, whether confining those who minister in holy things to prescribed liturgies in public worship, is, on the whole, expedient and useful? Having spent so much time in the preceding discussion, we shall answer this question with great brevity.

We are constrained, then, to answer it, in general, in the NEGATIVE. It is, indeed, both expedient and useful that prē-composed prayers should be repeated from memory, or recited from a book, by those who, from weakness, or want of presence of mind, *need* such help; that is, who cannot pray in a

connected and edifying manner without such aid. For we shall ever maintain, that it is better, far better, to read or recite a good prayer, than to utter a bad one extemporaneously. But a question worthy of very grave consideration is, whether any man who is unqualified to pray without a form, is fit to be a minister of the gospel? We think there is a life, a simplicity, and a touching and moving power in prayers poured forth from a pious and feeling heart, which cannot, ordinarily, be approached in reading written forms. We think, too, that there is so great a variety in the exigencies, sufferings, situations, hopes, and joys, of individual believers, of each particular congregation, and of the church at large, at different times, and at the same time in different places, that being *confined* to the same *precise* form of words for ages together, is by no means most conducive to the edification of the body of Christ. We cannot help believing, that the constant repetition of the same words, independent of this variety of situation and exigence, tends to produce with many, dullness, and a loss of interest. It is in our apprehension, also, no small evil, when the *gift* and the *grace* of prayer are not daily called into exercise, and thus eventually repressed. Bishop Wilkins, though a friend to the use of forms of prayer where they were needed, argues strongly against yielding ourselves entirely to such "leading strings," as he emphatically calls them, and expresses the opinion, that giving vent to the desires and affections of the heart in extempore prayer, is highly favourable to growth in grace.—*Gift of Prayer, chap. ii. p.* 10, 11. We are persuaded, further, that where religion is in a lively state in the heart of any minister, and especially when it is revived among the members of his church generally, there is a feeling of constraint on being confined to forms of prayer, which will either vent itself in extempore prayer, on particular occasions, or will lead to languor and decline under the repression.

Besides, one of the first principles of prescribed liturgies seems to be questionable. Why should men who lived three or four hundred years ago understand prayer, and be able to prescribe forms for it, better than the pious and learned divines of the present day? Why should we, of the nineteenth century, consent to bind ourselves as apprentices in prayer to men who lived at the dawn of the reformation, when we decline doing so as to *preaching?* Surely nothing but long habit could reconcile any to such principles. In consequence of

adopting such a principle, and acting upon it, the church of England is at this hour tied down to a form of prayer, over the *diction* as well as the *sentiments* of which some of her most devout sons mourn in secret. And even in the United States, persons who have no belief in the doctrine of *baptismal regeneration*, nay, who consider it as an unscriptural and pestiferous error, are yet obliged either to profess their belief in it, in solemn addresses to the Great Searcher of hearts, or to pause in the midst of elevated devotion, and refuse to adopt the sentences which evidently contain it. We are not ignorant that much is said about praying in the very language of the ancient church. In reply, we say, show us prayers found in the Bible, or formed by apostolic men, and we will venerate and adopt them; but when we are told of the duty of adopting prayers formed in the sixth, seventh, and subsequent centuries, we are just as little convinced as we should be, if told that we ought now to pray in *Latin*, because many centuries ago that language was employed in public worship by those churches whose vernacular tongue it was.

We have weighed well all the objections which the book before us, and other works in favour of liturgies, have often urged against extempore prayer, and have no hesitation in saying, that when carefully and impartially compared with the objections to liturgies, the balance is manifestly in favour of the extempore plan. It may be somewhat difficult, at first, for those who have been all their lives accustomed to forms, to unite with entire comfort in free prayer. But the difficulty, as we have had occasion to know, is soon surmounted, and, finally, almost, if not altogether vanishes. In this as in most other respects we are creatures of habit, to an extent which nothing but experience could reveal. But, in fact, if extemporary prayer be made up chiefly, as it ought to be, of the thoughts and language of scripture, no pious person who loves his Bible, and is familiar with it, will have any material difficulty at all in following him who leads, and entirely uniting with him. And as to the allegation that extempore prayer is so often chargeable with improprieties both of thought and language, and is so frequently poor, jejune, and unsatisfactory, we can only say that every thing human is imperfect: that these imperfections are always most indulgently regarded by those who are most deeply pious, and who lay more stress upon thoughts than language in the worship of God; and that where there is a *tolerable* amount of piety, talents, and learning in the ministry

of any church, which it is the absolute duty of every church to maintain, the evil in question, however real, will generally be found much less than is commonly supposed. Besides, this difficulty is by no means confined to free prayer. It would be easy for us to relate a series of anecdotes respecting the use of liturgies, quite as much calculated to cover it with ridicule as any thing contained in this book, or any other book we have ever seen, is to expose to derision extemporary prayer. We could muster up, we have no doubt, quite as long and as amusing a catalogue of ludicrous improprieties as our adversaries have ever done. But on a subject so intimately connected with the feelings and rites of devotion, we forbear. We have been often assailed with such weapons; but we "will not return evil for evil." Much rather would we contribute all in our power to the comfort and edification of all our brethren in Christ, however they may differ from us in modes and forms, and however prone they may be to treat our faith or worship with reproach. There is, however, one use which we wish to make of the little sectarian missile before us, which we cannot but hope and pray may render it a blessing in disguise. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.* Many of our ministers are by no means so attentive as they ought to be to the character of their public prayers. If they bestowed more thought on the devotions of the pulpit; if they were more careful to store their minds with appropriate scriptures for this part of their public duty; if they abounded more in devotional composition; and above all, if they laboured more in private, with their own hearts, to cultivate the spirit and the gift of prayer; we should find them performing this part of their ministerial service with more dignity, and in a more simple, scriptural, touching, and edifying manner. They would give less occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully. Nay, perhaps it would not be going too far to say, that the prayers of the sanctuary would be among the most attractive, impressive, and beneficial parts of the whole public service. If those who are invested with the sacred office, as well as those who are candidates for it, could be persuaded to direct serious attention to this matter, we might soon hope, under the divine blessing, to witness the most beneficial results.

It seems to be the impression of some pious men, that all kinds of preparation for public prayer is an unjustifiable opposing or stinting of the influence of the Holy Spirit. That this is not only an error, but a mischievous error, we are deeply

persuaded. Why preparation for bearing the desires of the people to God in prayer, should be more objectionable, or less a duty, than preparation for bearing the message of God to the people in preaching, we cannot conceive. Why diligent and devout study should be considered as unfriendly to the work of the Holy Spirit in one department of the work of the sanctuary, more than another, we find no solid reason, either in the nature of things, or in the instructions of the Bible. And in this opinion it is evident, that our venerable fathers concurred with us. The following extract from our "directory for the public worship of God," is decisive as to their views, and shall close our remarks.

"It is easy to perceive, that in all the preceding directions there is a very great compass and variety; and it is committed to the judgment and fidelity of the officiating pastor to insist chiefly on such parts, or to take in more or less of the several parts, as he shall be led to by the aspect of Providence; the particular state of the congregation in which he officiates; or the disposition and exercise of his own heart at the time. But we think it necessary to observe, that, although we do not approve, as is well known, of confining ministers to set or fixed forms of prayer for public worship; yet it is the indispensable duty of every minister, previously to his entering on his office, to prepare and qualify himself for this part of his duty, as well as for preaching. He ought, by a thorough acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures; by reading the best writers on the subject; by meditation and a life of communion with God in secret, to endeavour to acquire both the spirit and the gift of prayer. Not only so, but when he is to enter on particular acts of worship, he should endeavour to compose his spirit, and to digest his thoughts for prayer, that it may be performed with dignity and propriety, as well as to the profit of those who join in it; and that he may not disgrace that important service by mean, irregular, or extravagant effusions."

REVIEW.

August Hermann Francke. Eine Denkschrift zur Saecularfeier seines Todes. Von D. Heinrich Ernst Ferdinand Guerike, *Licentiaten und Privatdocenten der Theologie bei der Universitæt in Halle. Halle.* 1827. 8*vo.* *Pp.* 474.

It is well observed by the author of the work before us, that in the reformation true religion came off conqueror from a contest which no other religion could possibly have survived; a contest not with foreign, but intestine foes; with dialectic subtlety; with speculative pride, with a corrupt but imposing superstition, and with spiritual wickedness in the highest places. Yet this conquest, splendid as it was, was achieved by the simple preaching of Christ crucified. The doctrine of justification by faith alone was the main-spring, the vital principle of this grand work throughout. Luther particularly seems to have been actuated, to the end of life, by an irresistible influence impelling him to preach this doctrine as a fundamental truth. His heart, his life, his writings, and we had almost said, the age in which he lived, were full of it.

The subsequent declension into formal orthodoxy, which took place in the Lutheran church, though melancholy in itself and its effects, is easily accounted for. The pernicious controversies in the church itself upon matters of mere form, and the unprofitable war which it waged against the papists, with scholastic arms, by degrees withdrew the attention of the clergy from the scriptures. The other consequences were inevitable. Preachers and people soon learned to content themselves with an adherence to the dogmas of the church, without regard to the influence of religion on the heart or life. This attachment to the form became, as usual, more bigoted in proportion as the substance was neglected. The slightest deviation from the formularies were denounced as fatal heresies. Theology assumed an aspect exclusively polemical. Exegesis was regarded as entirely secondary to scholastic dialectics. In the most celebrated universities, the only distinctions recognized in the instruction were dogmatics, homiletics and polemics. Olearius endeavoured in vain to institute a school of exegetical theology at Leipsic, and

Carpzov's Lectures on Isaiah closed with the first chapter. A clergy educated on these principles, could bring into the pulpit nothing better than the quibbles of an antiquated logic, or the angry brawls of hackneyed controversy. The Bible remained sealed to the bewildered people, their souls grew lean through the want of spiritual food, and they perished for lack of vision.

But it was not the will of God that this lamentable state of things should long continue. The first prognostic of a change was apparent in the efforts of Calixt, at Helmstadt, to place the evidences of religion on a historical, instead of a metaphysical foundation, by recalling the attention of divines to the apostolic age. It was not at this point, however, that the revolution was to take its rise. By losing its practical character, religion had declined; by resuming that character, it was to rise again. The first movement of this kind began among the laity. The total want of spiritual nourishment in the ordinances of the church, drove many devout laymen to an intercourse with God and their hearts, and to a private study of the truths of Christianity, which could not fail to quicken in some measure the putrescent mass around them. But the want of sound biblical instruction, and of mental cultivation, unhappily involved them in the snares of extravagant fanaticism. In a country like Germany, such instruments could operate no lasting or extensive change. A combination of sound judgment and ripe learning with the spirit of vital piety, was called for, to influence the people through the clergy upon the one hand, and the clergy through the people on the other. Such agents Providence eventually furnished, in the persons of Arnd, Gerhard, and Andreæ. Yet even these men, valuable as were their labours, only paved the way for one who was ordained to introduce a new and happy era in the German church—Philip Jacob Spener. This celebrated character was born in Alsace, in 1635; received his education at Strasburg; travelled in France and Switzerland; and in 1663 was settled in Strasburg as a preacher. Soon afterwards he was appointed senior minister of Frankfort, and in 1686 court preacher at Dresden, and confessor to the elector of Saxony. His last removal was to Berlin, where he became provost of the church of St Nicholas in 1691, and where he died on the 5th of February 1705.

The grand object of this excellent man's labours was to divorce theology from its pernicious union with the jargon of

the schools, and again bring it home to the bosoms of men as a practical concern, by restoring the Bible to its proper rank, as the only fountain of religious truth. He urged the necessity of coming to the study of the scriptures, before the adoption of a system of opinions, and maintained that no man could truly preach the gospel, who had never experienced its transforming power. Against the prevailing style of preaching, he was warm in his denunciations, insisting that the only subjects lawful in the pulpit were the great practical doctrines of redemption and sanctification. These views he exhibited and vindicated with great force in his *Pia Desideria*, first published as a preface to Arnd's Sermons. Nor did he in his zeal for the improvement of the clergy turn his back upon the people. On the contrary, he was almost the first who strove to break the habit of dependance upon public ordinances and observances, which would naturally flow from such a state of things as then existed, and to prove the necessity of personal religion to the private christian. Such, indeed, was his zeal for the promotion of this object, that, besides his indefatigable labours as a preacher, he established what he called *collegia pietatis*, that is, conferences, meetings for religious conversation and the reading of the scriptures. His influence appears to have increased as he advanced in his career. It was greater at Dresden than at Frankfort, and at Berlin than at Dresden. With the elector of Brandenburg his opinion had such weight that he was employed to form the theological faculty in his new university at Halle. To this happy circumstance that infant institution was indebted for the advantage of beginning its operations under the salutary influence of pious teachers.

As might have been expected, Spener's efforts to revive religion, while they operated happily on many, only served to render others still more obstinate in their attachment to the letter of the truth, and more bigoted in their defence of frigid orthodoxy. This spirit was exhibited most strongly in the Saxon universities, especially at Wittenberg, where the orthodox or high church party bestowed upon Spener and his fellows in contempt the name of *pietists*, a term corresponding very nearly, both in its literal and sarcastic import, to *puritans* in English. Among those who shared with Spener the honourable ignominy of this appellation, and became his successors in the work of reformation, the greatest was Augustus Hermann Francke.

Francke was born at Lubeck in 1663, but removed with his parents not long afterwards to Gotha. He was privately instructed until thirteen years of age, when he entered the gymnasium at Gotha, and rose quickly to distinction. From the first he enjoyed the inestimable advantage of a religious education, and at the age of ten besought his mother to allow him a private chamber where he might retire for his devotions. Here, as he informs us, he was wont to pray that his course in life might be so ordered as to promote God's glory most effectually. Still, according to his own account, his ruling passion at this time, and throughout his academical career, was a thirst for literary eminence. In his sixteenth year he removed to the university of Erfurt, where he pursued the study of Hebrew, geography, philosophy, and history, for some months, and then removed to Kiel. Here he resided in the family of the distinguished theologian Christian Kortholt, and studied ethics and metaphysics as preliminary to theology. Here, too, he acquired English, a circumstance which may have had some influence upon the after course of his opinions. In 1682 he went to Hamburg for the purpose of acquiring Hebrew under the direction of the celebrated Ezra Edzardi, who counselled him to learn the first four chapters of the book of Genesis, by the help of a translation, till the sense of every word was perfectly impressed upon his mind. When this was accomplished, Ezra bade him be of good cheer, for he was now acquainted with a third part of the Hebrew language, and advised him to peruse and reperuse the Bible before entering upon minute verbal investigation. Accordingly he returned to his own home at Gotha, where he read the Hebrew scriptures seven times in one year; at the same time he learned French.

After a residence of eighteen months at home, he accepted the invitation of a student of theology at Leipsic to become his room mate and direct his Hebrew studies. At the same time he continued his professional pursuits under Olearius and others. In 1686, in conjunction with Paul Anton, who was afterwards professor of theology at Halle, he established a Philobiblical society at Leipsic. The primary design of this association was philological improvement, and its exercises consisted in reading and remarking upon passages of the Greek and Hebrew scriptures. In course of time, however, the remarks thus made assumed a character more practical, and a corresponding change took place in the objects of the institu-

tion. So popular did this society become, that a public place was soon required for their assemblies, and Alberti, the professor of theology, assumed the direction of it ex officio. In this way Francke, even before his conversion, was instrumental in promoting the same cause to which he was in after life devoted.

Having spent four years at Leipsic, Francke went to Luneburg for the purpose of pursuing exegetical studies under the pious and learned Sandhagen. This city he was wont to call his spiritual birth place, as it was here, according to his own account, that he first experienced a change of heart. We have already spoken of his early religious education. We may add, that one of the first books with which he was familiar was Arnd's *Wahres Christenthum* (True Christianity). We have also recorded his own statement, that throughout the course of his preparatory studies, the desire of learning, wealth and honour, had uncontrouled possession of his heart. Nevertheless, from the time that he turned his face more directly towards the ministry, he was conscious of the want of something to prepare him for the office. He felt that his affections were divided, or, more properly, engrossed with earthly objects; that, to use his own expressions, "his theology was in his head, not in his heart," and so strongly did the sense of this deficiency oppress him, that during his abode at Kiel, he was accustomed to pray earnestly for the removal of this undefined impediment to his success. At Leipzic he evinced his attachment to the scriptures by the part which he took in the formation of the biblical societies; but this consciousness that he still wanted something, though he knew not precisely what, still haunted him. At the same time, he admits that he had no just views of his own character, necessities and helplessness, nor even of his sinfulness in making worldly honours and emoluments the objects of his best affections.

He had now been seven years engaged in the study of theology, was perfectly familiar with the letter of the scriptures, and had gone through the routine of studies with uncommon assiduity. At this period, (while yet at Leipsic), it pleased God to give him daily more and more conviction of his own unworthiness, as well as more and more solicitude to change his situation. But although he was now impressed with a full belief of the necessity and importance of conversion, he found himself so entangled with the things of this world, that he despaired of being able to extricate himself and lift his affec-

tions higher. This exterior difficulty seemed to be removed by his change of situation when he went to Luneburg. Cut off there from the worldly society to which he was accustomed, and brought into contact with consistent and exemplary Christians, he now found that there was an obstacle more serious than mere external circumstances. He felt more than ever the necessity of a change, and the existence of some obstacle within himself to its production. While in this state of mind, he received an appointment to preach in St John's church, and finding himself no more disposed to regard the service as a mere exercise in eloquence, he felt deeply solicitous so to perform the task as to edify his hearers. He was still engrossed with these thoughts when he fell upon the text, (John xx. 31), "These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name." While reflecting on the meaning of these words, and on the difference between imaginary and true faith, the thought occurred to him, that he was himself destitute of this important quality. It was in vain that he endeavoured to withstand the strong conviction which now fastened on his soul. It was in vain that he reverted to his books and even to the scriptures for relief. He could find it neither in God's word nor man's. In the agony of his soul, he prayed that if there was indeed a God, he would have compassion on him. While in this state of mind, he resolved, unless some change should occur, to abstain from preaching, rather than preach against his conscience. "For," to borrow his own most expressive terms, "I felt too sensibly what it was to have no God, upon whom I could lay hold; to bemoan my sins without knowing wherefore, or who it was that caused my tears to flow, or whether there was in reality a God who was offended with me!" "In such anguish," he continues, "I knelt down upon that Sunday, and called upon the God and Saviour, whom I knew not and believed not in, for deliverance from this miserable situation, if indeed there was a God and Saviour. The Lord heard me, heard me instantly. All my doubts vanished. I was assured in my own heart of the grace of God in Christ. All sorrow and uneasiness departed from me, and I was inundated as with a flood of joy. I had bent my knees in great distress and doubt; I rose again with unutterable confidence and joy. I felt as if through all my past life I had been lying in a profound sleep, and performed all my actions in a dream, and as if I had now for the

first time been awakened. I was perfectly convinced that all the world with all its pleasures could not produce in the human heart such delicious joy as I experienced, and I saw distinctly, that after such foretastes of God's grace and goodness, the world with its charms would have little power to allure me." On the Wednesday following he preached upon the text which he had chosen, with great inward satisfaction. From this hour Francke dated his conversion, and in this hour, as he himself declared in his last prayer in the garden of the orphan-house, forty years afterwards, God opened in his heart a spring from which exhaustless streams of joy and consolation had been flowing ever since.

In 1688 Francke left Luneburg for Hamburg, where he spent some months in delightful Christian intercourse, a privilege which no man knew better how to estimate. While in this city he was led, by new views of the imperfection of education, to open a private school for children, a circumstance to which he was accustomed to look back with gratitude and satisfaction. To his brief experience in this business he traced most of the improvements which he was the means of introducing into Halle. The results of this experience he has recorded in his book upon the education of children.

Deeply impressed with our Saviour's words to Peter, *when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren*, he determined to return to Leipsic. This step he seems to have taken with a full expectation of the contempt and opposition which he must encounter. After spending two months with Spener at Dresden, and gaining more insight into his opinions and designs, he commenced a course of exegetical and practical lectures in the German language on the Epistles to the Philippians, Ephesians, and Corinthians. Such was the number that attended his instructions, that the rector of the university threw open to him one of the public halls, and even there many were obliged to stand at the doors and windows.

The effect of these lectures, and of the Philobiblical societies, which were now revived with tenfold spirit, was soon evident. The practical tendency of Francke's instructions, and the unction of piety by which they were pervaded, were, by the blessing of God, made instrumental in the conversion of many souls. At the same time, his anticipations of contempt and opposition were completely realized. The unusual number, both of citizens and students, who thronged his lecture

room, excited envy, while his religious sentiments aroused the enmity of many. His lecturing in German instead of Latin was denounced as an unwarrantable departure from academic usage. He was accused of rendering the way to heaven more thorny than it ought to be; was charged with hypocrisy and pride; and branded with the odious name of pietist. A sort of inquest was held by public authority for six successive days, before which Francke and several others were arraigned; but though the whole theological faculty, the clergy, and the consistory, were against him, he was cleared. The faculty, however, issued a decree that the magistri of the university should not presume to lecture on theology, in consequence of which he was obliged to relinquish his instructions, and soon left the place for ever. In this step he was quickly followed by his friends Schade, Anton, and Thomasius.

But no sooner was this door of usefulness closed, than Providence set another open. In June 1690 he received and accepted a call to St Augustine's church in Erfurt. Here he found a kindred spirit in John Joachim Breithaupt. Both preaching the same doctrines, and inspired with the same zeal, they entered into one another's plans with ardour. Both, but particularly Francke, drew multitudes to church, not only from the city but the country, papists as well as protestants. Besides their public ministrations, they held meetings in their houses for religious conference; and Francke, in addition to his other labours, lectured daily on the Bible to the Erfurt students. These zealous operations could of course not be continued in a catholic city, without opposition on the part of the prevailing party; but unhappily the Lutherans themselves, and Francke's own colleagues in the ministry, concurred in denouncing him as an innovator, enthusiast, and pietist. He was accused of circulating pernicious books among the people, and on this charge was brought before the magistrates. When he repelled the charge indignantly, a packet was produced which had been intercepted at the post, and which, it was supposed, would confound the heretic for ever. On opening it, however, it was found to contain nothing but New Testaments. His enemies were overwhelmed with shame, and the proceedings against him, far from contracting his operations, called the attention of the public to the scriptures, and led multitudes to purchase.

He had now resided fifteen months in Erfurt, when an electoral decree unexpectedly arrived, requiring him to leave

the city within forty-eight hours, assigning as the only reason, that he was the founder of a new sect, which his highness did not choose to countenance. The citizens petitioned in favour of their pastor, but of course without effect. Francke, after lodging with the magistrates a solemn protest against these proceedings, prepared for his departure. The short space allotted for that purpose he spent chiefly with his friends in his own house, consoling and exhorting them.

The duke of Gotha, when informed of these proceedings, expostulated warmly with the elector, and invited Francke to reside in his own dominions. At the same time several other princes made efforts to secure him. The duke of Saxe-Coburg offered him a professorship, and the duke of Saxe-Weimer the rank of a court preacher. But he looked upon his course as already designated by the hand of Providence. On the very day that he was ordered to quit Erfurt he had received an invitation from the elector of Brandenburg, in compliance with which he now accepted the professorship of Greek and Oriental languages in the new university of Halle, at the same time taking charge of St George's church at Glaucha in the neighbourhood. This society he found in a deplorable condition. His predecessor not only had not preached the gospel, but had led a grossly immoral life, while the state of manners and opinion generally in the place was entirely hostile to true piety. Francke retained the charge of this church thirteen years, at first alone, and afterwards in connexion with an adjunct pastor. At the end of that period he became pastor of St Ulrich's church in Halle. Here, as in Erfurt, he preached boldly and incessantly the doctrines of grace, as clearly taught in scripture, with the same success and the same opposition. The professorship of Greek and Oriental languages he held till 1699, when he was appointed a professor of theology. This station he retained until his death.

No sooner did Francke enter on his duties as an academical instructor, than he gave himself to the great object of delivering theology from its scholastic fetters, and making it at once a scriptural and practical study. He zealously inculcated the sentiment, that the first object of the student of theology must be, to learn by experience in what Christianity consists; and then how it may be most successfully communicated to others. There has probably never been a teacher more successful in making his instructions always practical, and certainly none who could avail himself of such extensive learning, and yet

perceive so perfectly the spirit of religion. For the most part, unfortunately, ardent piety has flourished in the absence of profound acquirements, and learning has appeared to exercise a blasting influence upon the heart. But Francke, though unquestionably an accomplished scholar, and a zealous advocate of learning, had the happy art of bringing all his acquisitions into their appropriate place as handmaids of religion.

The department of theology which he selected as the field of his exertions, was that of exegesis; but besides his lectures on this subject, he delivered others upon pastoral theology. None of his official performances, however, can compare, upon the score of practical religious influence, with his *Lectiones Parænetic*æ or Exhortatory Lectures to students of theology, which have been published, and from which Dr Guerike gives copious extracts. They are full of animated personal appeals, and of excellent suggestions on the means of uniting diligent and efficacious study, with an assiduous cultivation of the heart. Many, very many, we are told, traced their first genuine impressions of religious truth to these discourses.

Besides his strict official duties as a lecturer, Francke rendered no small service to the university, by instituting private societies and schools among the students, subsidiary to the public system of instruction. Among these none was more important than the biblical societies (*collegia biblica*) in which the members exercised themselves in the study of the Greek and Hebrew scriptures, under the direction of a public teacher. Of the same description was the catechetical institute, intended to prepare the candidates, by previous practice, for the business of catechizing their parishioners, to which he justly attached great importance. Besides these, he organized, and personally watched over, private schools in pulpit eloquence, and other branches more or less connected with the subjects which he taught. In addition to all this, like most of his countrymen in similar situations, he composed and published much. His influence, direct and indirect, of course was very great, and being what he was, that influence was, of necessity, most salutary. It was seen in its effects upon the students of theology, and through them upon those with whom they came in contact. It extended to the remotest regions from which pupils came to Halle, and many a soul, to whom Francke and Halle were both utterly unknown, has owed its conversion, under Providence, to this seat of learning and this man of God.

But the work with which Francke's name is most completely and durably identified, is the foundation of the orphan-house at Halle. Of this establishment he was the sole projector, and there is probably no instance upon record more impressive of a great work, accomplished through the strength of faith, almost without means, and in the face of difficulties. In the year 1694, being deeply affected with a view of the gross ignorance in which the children of the poor were growing up, he determined to exert himself to better their condition. His first efforts were restricted to the furnishing of books, for which purpose he set up a box in his own house with this inscription, "Whoso hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?" "Every man as he purposeth in his heart, not grudgingly, or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver." About three months after he set up this box, one individual contributed four dollars, which so animated Francke, that he resolved to institute a free-school, and accordingly forthwith employed a poor student to instruct a number of poor children daily, in a room adjoining his own study. In the course of a few months some of the citizens proposed to send their own children to the same instructor, paying a small sum weekly, to which Francke consented, and the number of pupils was thus raised to sixteen. To the poor scholars, besides their gratuitous instruction, alms were given once or twice a week. In the summer of 1695 a lady at a distance wrote to Franke to obtain a private tutor for her children. Not being able to procure one at the time, he informed her that if she would send them to Halle, he would furnish them with teachers. The proposal was accepted, and a foundation laid for the royal public school, which in 1709 already numbered twenty-three teachers and seventy-two pupils. In this same summer (of 1695) above six hundred dollars were put into his hands for charitable purposes, part of which he distributed among poor students, and laid out the rest upon his school. The number of pupils soon became too large to be accommodated in the parsonage, in consequence of which he hired two apartments in a neighbour's house, and separating the poor children from the others, placed each class under its own teacher. But as he could not long fail to observe that all the good effected in the school was liable to be counteracted out of doors, he conceived the plan of educating some poor children altogether, that is lodging, feeding, gov-

erning, as well as teaching them. In this he was confirmed by the seasonable grant of an annuity of five and twenty dollars, upon the strength of which he determined to receive one orphan, but as four presented themselves at the same time, he took them all, trusting in Providence to bear him out. The same implicit confidence induced him to receive five others shortly afterwards, all of whom he placed in pious families, entrusting the direction of their education to a student of theology named Neubauer. Three individuals contributed nearly a thousand dollars to further his design, with which he not only paid the debts of his establishment, but bought and enlarged the house in which the children were instructed. His next step was to collect the orphans, twelve in number, from the private families where they were lodged into the school house, where they were accommodated with their guardian Neubauer. At the same time he received four and twenty needy students of the university as boarders without charge. In the summer of 1696, the male and female orphans were divided, and soon after the children of the citizens were formed into a separate school, and from these schools resulted in the end a regular gymnasium, which in 1709 contained two hundred and fifty-six pupils, divided into seven classes, and in 1730 numbered above five hundred.

The number of inmates now increased so rapidly, that Francke found it necessary to provide new accommodations, and accordingly he purchased a hotel just out of Halle for the purpose; but finding it not altogether suitable, he determined to enlarge it by erecting a new edifice. In pursuance of this resolution, the foundation of the present orphan-house was laid on the 24th of July (N. S.) 1698. At this time the number of the orphans was one hundred, besides whom seventy poor students were gratuitously boarded. At the time when this building was commenced, Francke was without the means of paying for it, and yet found it necessary to make regular weekly payments to the workmen. Of course, he was often in extremity, being obliged to lay out every penny of loose change, and sometimes to dispose of valuable articles, in order to provide the school with candles. At no time, however, were the children made to go without a meal, or the labourers without their hire. Each day's work upon the walls was opened with prayer, and each week closed with an exhortation to the workmen. The work thus piously conducted prosper-

ed; for within a year the house was under cover, and at Easter 1701 entirely finished.

Francke has himself given a minute and interesting statement of the almost innumerable instances in which he was delivered from apparently inextricable difficulties by interpositions of an overruling Providence. Some of these cases are so very remarkable, from the coincidence of time and place, and the exact correspondence of the supply with the emergency, that on other testimony they might seem suspicious. But coming from such a quarter, they can only be regarded as impressive proofs of the certainty with which Divine Providence sustains the few that trust implicitly in him, even in the extremest exigencies. And it deserves to be mentioned that in almost every case these providential succours were immediately preceded by importunate supplication. In process of time, the fruit of this confidence and faith was reaped in the patronage bestowed upon the institution by all classes, both at home and in foreign parts, by kings, nobles, ministers of state, professors, soldiers, citizens, domestics, widows, orphans. Frederick I., king of Prussia, took a lively interest in the establishment, contributed one hundred thousand building stones, and thirty thousand tiles to the new edifice; gave one thousand dollars twice in money, and allowed it many privileges. On the other hand, an apothecary of Leipsic supplied the institution gratis with all medicines, until it was able to supply itself. By the many benefactions, of which these are single specimens; by the unremitting zeal of Francke himself; by the ability and faithfulness of his assistants; but, above all, by the grace of God; the orphan-house grew in prosperity and influence so rapidly, that before the founder's death it had attained its present amplitude of plan, comprehending not only an asylum and a school, with a dairy, brewery, and other household offices, but also a library of eighteen thousand volumes, a museum, a laboratory, a dispensary, an infirmary, and an extensive establishment for the printing and sale of books. At the time referred to, besides one hundred and thirty-four orphans, under ten male and female guardians, it instructed (chiefly gratis) two thousand two hundred and seven children in its different schools, by means of one hundred and seventy-five teachers, maintained six poor widows, and kept open table for two hundred and fifty-five poor students and a number of the poorer children.

It was impossible that an establishment so noble should escape reproach. It was considered as a strong hold of pietism, and of course aroused the enmity of the opposing party. An orthodox professor wrote a book against it, with a title which may thus be rendered into English: "The Orphan-house at Halle, seeking support and wealth by means of the encumbered Martha, and not, as it pretends, of the best part—choosing Mary."* But the opposition was not limited to theologians. In all classes of society, this unique monument of God's grace and man's faith found some to disapprove and vilify it. To one the plan appeared absurd and rash, to another too expensive and magnificent, while a third looked upon it as an interested speculation. At the very time when Francke was praying for just enough to supply the next day's exigency, he was thought by some, and said by many, to be rolling in wealth. The men of the world were unable to conceive how an institution upon such a scale could rise so rapidly without an immense capital, so that the very smiles of Providence were the occasion of exciting envious suspicions. Those suspicions, however, were innocuous. The orphan-house has lived and prospered through the changes of a most eventful century. To borrow the idea of our author, the long procession of true servants of Christ Jesus, who have gone forth from its walls, bear witness to its character, and if they should hold their peace, the very stones might be expected to cry out.

The mention of these facts reminds us that we have attempted no detail of the vexatious controversies in which Francke was involved, from the time of his settlement at Halle till his death; and our limits warn us that we can barely touch upon the subject here. In the same year that he entered on his office, the authorities at Berlin, being anxious to secure the learned jurist Stryk, of Wittenberg, to teach at Halle, found that he was violently prejudiced against the pietists in general, and Francke in particular; so violently that he utterly refused the offered place, except upon condition of Francke's previous removal. Accordingly a number of highly honourable places, ecclesiastical and academical, were offered to Francke's choice to induce him to remove, but he refused. The finger

* The quaintness of the original is perfectly inimitable—"Das durch die geschäftige Martham, und nicht, wie vorgegeben wird, durch die das beste Theil erwählende Mariam, seinen Unterhalt und Reichthum suchende Waisenhaus in Halle."

of God he thought too manifest in bringing him to Halle to be disregarded. It was in vain that persuasions, promises, and threats of deposition were employed. He still maintained his place, and well it was for all parties that he did, for Stryk being finally prevailed upon to conquer his repugnance, was no sooner made acquainted with the hated pietist than he became his fast and zealous friend, and continued so till death. But other and more implacable opponents soon arose among the clergy of the place, by whom Francke and his colleague Breithaupt, who had followed him from Erfurt, and was now his co-professor, were regarded as heretical enthusiasts. The pulpits of the orthodox or high church party soon became the vehicles of personal abuse. The charge of heresy, so confidently urged, compelled the attention of the court, and in November 1692, a commissioner from Berlin held an inquest at Halle, the result of which was an acquittal of the pietists, and an implied condemnation of the conduct of the clergy. This disturbance was succeeded by a cessation of hostilities at Halle, but Francke found himself forced into a controversy with external foes. Orthodox Lutherans, in various quarters, who assailed him, first generally as a pietist, and afterwards as an impugner of Luther's version, which he had been bold enough to censure in a monthly series of *biblical annotations*. No sooner was he freed from the vexation of this contest, in which he was supported by John Henry Michaelis and other learned friends, than the old dissensions with the clergy were revived. This was partly brought about by Francke himself, who delivered from the pulpit strong denunciations of false prophets, which, though free from personalities, were readily applied by the people, and the persons who were really the objects of them. This was met by intemperate retaliation on the other side, producing such disorder that another commission was sent down, which succeeded, after some time, in effecting an apparent reconciliation. Francke disavowed all personal allusions in his sermons; the clergy qualified and softened their expressions, and the whole was terminated by a pacific sermon from one of the commissioners. This truce was never broken. The two parties held their own opinions and let one another rest; and when Francke died, his funeral discourse was preached by one of his most virulent opponents, in the most laudatory terms. The only theological controversy in which Francke was afterwards engaged, was occasioned by a work of Dr Mayer's, who, alarmed at the translation of

Francke's writings into Swedish, wrote a catechism to counteract the poison. The first question—*What are the pietists?* was answered in this strain: "They are fanatics, who, under the appearance of true godliness, corrupt and persecute the Lutheran religion, and by their apparent sanctity delude poor souls, who, having eyes but seeing not, and having ears but hearing not, follow the footsteps of their leaders, and hasten with them to eternal damnation!" The last question is as follows: "In what part of the Bible has the Holy Ghost described the pietists? *Ans.* In 2 Timothy, iii. 1—9." The only other controversies in which Francke was engaged, was that relating to the orphan-house, which has been already mentioned.

In connexion with Francke's varied labours, which we have already spoken of, we may mention his zealous co-operation in Von Canstein's measures for distributing the Bible, and in the king of Denmark's missions to the East. Ziegenbalg and Plütschau, the first missionaries to Hindostan, were selected upon Francke's recommendation, and maintained a correspondence with him while he lived. He also manifested a strong interest in the conversion of the Jews, though the want of opportunity and leisure limited his personal exertions. He had, however, the satisfaction of baptizing several converted through his ministry, and preached, on the occasion, from Luke, ii. 22, 32.

The constant and laborious occupations in which Francke, as we have seen, employed himself, were only interrupted, during forty years, by occasional journeys to recruit his health. In 1713 he attended the funeral of Frederic I., as deputy from Halle, and while at Berlin, extorted from the new king this valuable testimony: "Francke is a good man; he speaks the truth to *every body.*"

His last extensive journey through the different provinces of Germany, in 1717, was something like the progress of a sovereign. Multitudes thronged to hear the pietist; to see the founder of the orphan-house. The largest churches were completely filled, with multitudes of every sect and name, eager to hear him preach. In some places he was entertained at the public expense, and conducted in procession through the streets; in others his approach was apprehended as a fearful evil. In the latter case, however, he had, for the most part, only to appear, in order to be welcome. His sincerity, his lowliness, his overflowing love, disarmed suspicion and

refuted calumny. Is this pietism? men would say; then the Saviour and his followers were pietists. At Ulm, receiving no request to preach, he attended, as a hearer, on a sermon by an orthodox professor, in which he heard himself described, with every circumstance necessary to identify him but his name. The city magistrates, confounded at this incident, and dreading the displeasure of the court, where Francke was known to be in favour, could devise no better mode of making peace, than by inviting Francke to preach himself on the ensuing Sabbath. When the day arrived, an immense multitude assembled to enjoy the retaliation, which consisted in a practical discourse upon the nature of true faith. The whole city, with one voice, declared for Francke, and conspired to do him honour.

We have extended our desultory sketch so far, that we can neither go into details of his last sickness, nor descant upon his character. His constitution, naturally strong, was worn down by exertion, and after exhibiting upon his death-bed a most edifying example of faith, patience, peace of conscience, and joy in the Holy Ghost, fell asleep on the 8th of June, 1727, in the 65th year of his age. The whole city thronged to see his body and assist in its interment.

The work from which we have derived these statements was occasioned by the recurrence of the hundredth anniversary of Francke's demise, and was designed as a commemorative tribute to his character, embodying in one work the materials which had been scattered through a number of authorities. Besides the mere details, it contains just views and apposite reflections which we have not room to borrow. For ourselves, we shall only add, that if of any man it may be said, that *being dead he speaketh*, it may be said of Francke. To three classes, in our own country, he may thus be said to speak, with special point and emphasis. To the speculative scholar, who despises warmth of heart as incompatible with learning; to the pious student, who renounces mental culture as the bane of true religion; and to those of either order who believe themselves excused from active effort by their virtues or their acquisitions; the example of Augustus Hermann Francke says, in most impressive language, *Go and do likewise.*

REVIEW

Of an Article in the June number of the Christian Spectator, entitled, "Inquiries respecting the Doctrine of Imputation."

In our number for January last, we presented our readers with a condensed view of the early history of Pelagianism. In the course of that article, it fell in our way to express our belief in the doctrine of imputation, our conviction of its importance, and of its being generally received among orthodox Christians. This doctrine, our readers are aware, has long been, nominally at least, rejected by many of our New England brethren. Without much argument on the subject, it has been discarded as intrinsically absurd; and it has not unfrequently been presented as an unanswerable argument against other doctrines, that they lead to all the absurdities of this exploded dogma. We have long been convinced, that the leading objections to this doctrine, arose from an entire, and to us, an unaccountable misapprehension of its nature as held among Calvinists. We, therefore, thought it proper, and adapted to remove prejudices, to state the common views on this subject, that our brethren might see that they did not involve the absurdities which they imagined. Unfortunately, as far as the author of the article under review is concerned, our object has not been answered. The writer, who signs himself *A Protestant*, is evidently much dissatisfied with our opinions. His object, in his communication to the Spectator, is to impugn several of our statements, and to present his difficulties with regard to the doctrine itself. To our surprise, these difficulties are almost all founded on the very misapprehension which it was our object to correct. Although our readers, we think, will sympathize with us in our regret at many of the statements of this author, and feel hurt that he should have allowed himself to make the unguarded imputations contained in his piece, we are not sorry that we are called upon, by this direct appeal, to state more fully our views on this subject, and the grounds on which they rest.

Before proceeding to the doctrine of imputation and of the protestant's difficulties, there are one or two subjects on

which we would make a passing remark. This writer attributes to us great subserviency to the opinions of the fathers. Such expressions as the following clearly convey this imputation. "Can any one inform me to what age this 'orthodoxy' belongs; and where the history of it is to be found among the fathers whose authority is so much relied on by this historian?" Page 340. "Can the historian honestly say, with all his attachment to the fathers, &c." "Last of all, I would particularly request, if any writer should favour me with an answer to these inquiries, that *reasons*, and not *names*, may be given in support of his statements. If it be suggested that none but a heretic could ask such questions, I would reply, that there are minds in our country which are not satisfied that calling hard names is argument; or that the *argumentum ad invidiam* is the happiest weapon which a meek and humble Christian can use. Men are apt to suspect that such arguments would not be employed, if better ones were at hand in their stead. I only add that I am *A Protestant.*" And so are we, however unworthy that gentleman may think us of the title. We would not knowingly call any man master upon earth. We profess to believe, with him, that the Bible is the religion of protestants; and that it matters little what men have taught, if the word of God does not support their doctrines. As we agree with him in these leading principles, we hope that he will agree with us in certain others. While we hold that the opinions of men are of no authority as to matters of faith, we, at the same time, believe that much respect is due to uniform opinions of the people of God; that there is a strong presumption in favour of any doctrine being taught in the Bible, if the great body of the pious readers of the Bible have from the beginning believed and loved it. We are free to confess, that it would startle us to hear, that there was no antecedent probability that the doctrines of the deity of Christ, atonement, native depravity, are really taught in the word of God, if it can be made to appear that the church, in all ages, has believed these doctrines. And we think that a man places himself in a very unenviable situation, who undertakes to prove to the men of his generation, that the great body of the good and pious before him, were utterly mistaken, and that he alone is right. Here is a phenomenon, which any man who assumes this position is bound at the outset to account for, that the Bible, a plain book, as protestants call it, should have been utterly misunderstood

for more than a thousand years, by its most careful and competent readers. It will not meet this case, to tell us, that this man or that man has held this or that absurdity; or that whole ages or communities of men, who neither read nor loved the scriptures, believed this or that heresy. This is not the question. It is simply this, is it not probable that what the vast majority of the most competent readers of a plain book, take to be its plain meaning, really is its meaning? We take it for granted, that the protestant would answer this question in the affirmative; and that, if arguing with Unitarians, he would not scruple to appeal to the fact, that the unprejudiced and pious en masse of every age have understood the Bible as teaching the divinity of Christ, as a presumptive argument in its favour. We suspect that he would go further, and that in giving the exposition of any passage he would fortify his own conclusions, by stating that he did not stand alone, but that others of the accurate and the learned had arrived at the same results. Now we think that a man who would do this, ought not to sneer at us on this very account. We know that it is easy to ring the changes, on want of independence, subserviency to the fathers, slavery to a system, and so on, but what effect does all this produce? It may excite prejudice, and lead the superficial to join in a sneer against men whom they suppose to a pitiable extent inferior to themselves; but does it convince any body? Does it weaken the legitimate force of the argument from the concurrence of the pious in any doctrine? Does it produce any favourable impression on that class of readers whose approbation a writer should value?

We say, then, that the opinion of the church is entitled to respect, if for no other reason, at least as a presumptive argument for any doctrine, in favour of which this concurrent testimony can be cited. Whether the church has, with any important uniformity, held the doctrine of imputation, is a mere question of fact, and must be decided accordingly. If it can be fairly proved, let it pass for what it is worth. It binds no man's conscience; yet the protestant himself would hardly say, that it was to him or others a matter of indifference. He greatly mistakes if he supposes that the opinion of a man who lived a thousand years ago, has any more weight with us than that of an equally pious and able man who may be still living. His telling us, therefore, that some of

the men, who are called fathers, held sundry very extravagant opinions, is really saying very little in answer to the argument from the consent of the good and great as to the plain meaning of a plain book. We are not now assuming the fact, that the church has, with perfect unanimity, gathered the doctrine of imputation from the word of God; but exhibiting the ground and nature of the respect due to the uniform opinion of God's people.

There is another point of view in which, we presume, the protestant will agree with us in thinking this opinion entitled to respect. Truth and piety are intimately related. A man's moral and religious opinions are the expression of his moral and religious feelings. Hence there are certain opinions which we view with abhorrence, because they express the greatest depravity. Now we say, and the protestant doubtless will join us in saying, that it is no very desirable thing for a man to throw himself out of communion with the great body of the pious in every age, and place himself in communion of language and opinion with the opposers of vital godliness. We think that any man, who had any proper sense of the deceitfulness of his own heart, the weakness of his understanding, and of the vital connexion between truth and piety, would hesitate long before he avowed himself opposed to the views which have for ages been found in connexion with true religion, and become the advocate of doctrines which the opposers of piety have been the foremost in defending.

These are mainly the grounds on which our respect for the opinions of the church rest, and these remarks show the extent of that respect. So far the protestant would go with us; further we have not gone. If we have cited the concurrent opinion of the church improperly; if we have supposed the great body of the people of God to have believed, what they did not believe—let the protestant set us right, and we shall be thankful. But do not let him join men, with whom he would scorn to be associated, in running over the common places of free inquiry, minds that think, &c. &c.

A word as to the argumentum ad invidiam. We are of the number of those who agree with this writer in thinking that "this is not the happiest weapon which a meek and lowly Christian can use," nay, that it is utterly unworthy of his character to use it at all. We think, too, that the charge

of having used it should not be lightly made. Unless we are mistaken as to the nature of this argument, the charge, in the present instance, is unfounded. We understand an argumentum ad invidiam to be one, which is designed, not to prove the incorrectness of any opinion, but to cast unmerited odium upon those who hold it. Such was not the design of the article to which the protestant objects. Every one knows, that within a few years, there has been more or less discussion in this country respecting sin and grace. We thought it would be useful, to present our readers with a short historical view of the various controversies which have existed in the church on these subjects. We commenced with the earliest and one of the most important; and gave, to the best of our ability, an account of the Pelagian controversy. We called no man a Pelagian, and designed to prove no man such, and therefore made little application of the history to present discussions. So far as the modern opinions differ from the ancient, there was no ground for such application, and none such was intended. So far as they agree, it is no more an argumentum ad invidiam to exhibit the agreement, than it is to call Belsham a Socinian or Whitby an anti-Calvinist. If no man agrees with Pelagius in confining morality to acts of choice; in maintaining that men are not morally depraved, before they voluntarily violate a known law; and that God cannot prevent sin in a moral system, then is no man affected by the exhibition of the Pelagian system. But if there are those who assume this ground, and proclaim it, it does them no injustice to say that they do so. So long, however, as these brethren hold to a moral certainty that all men will sin the moment they become moral agents; that the first sin leads to entire moral depravity; and that an immediate influence of the Spirit is necessary in conversion, they differ from that system in these important points. Wherein they agree and wherein they differ, should be known in justice to them, as well as for the benefit of others. How far the assumption of the fundamental principles of a system has a tendency to lead to its thorough adoption, every man must judge for himself. For ourselves, we fear the worst. Because, we think consistency requires an advance, and because history informs us, that when men have taken the first step, they or their followers soon take the second. Now, we ask, what is there

invidious in this history of opinions, or in this expression of apprehension? apprehension of what? of injury to the cause of vital piety. Is there any sin in expressing this apprehension, when conscientiously entertained? Suppose we had gone further than we did, and exhibited, what we supposed our readers capable of observing, the exact points of agreement and disagreement between the two systems, would there have been the least injustice in such a proceeding? We think not, and therefore think the charge of using the argumentum ad invidiam out of place. Let us now request our author to review his own piece, and ask himself, what is its whole spirit and tendency, (we do not say design). Is it not to cast on us the odium of being opposed to free investigation, of "calling hard names for argument," of being held in bondage to a system, of relying on *names* instead of *reasons;* in short, of being anti-protestants? Would not a little reflection have prevented his casting this stone?

There is a sensitiveness about *some* of our New England brethren, that has often surprised us. If any one in this quarter ventures to question the tendency of their opinions, or express apprehension as to their results, all of love and catholicism that there is within them, is shocked at the suggestion, and we are borne down with the cry, "you are breaking the bonds of charity," "you argue ad invidiam," &c.; and yet these same brethren can find it in their hearts to say, that we are setting "in motion all the enemies of religion;"* that our doctrines (though known to be held by a decided majority of evangelical christendom) are exploded absurdities;† that we believe in physical depravity and physical regeneration; and teach, "that God first creates a wrong essence, and then creates a right one; first plunges into the fire and then pulls out again;"‡ (a misrepresentation as gross as the language is irreverent.) They do all this, without appearing to dream that there is aught in it to justify complaint, or to trouble the waters of peace. However, let this pass. We love peace, and shall try to promote it. Our

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* Prof. Stuart's Examination of the Review of the A. E. Society, p. 93.

† Review of Harvey and Taylor on Human Depravity in the Christian Spectator.

‡ Fitch's Inquiry and Reply, p. 89.

readers will soon see that we need our full share of self-command and forbearance.

The Protestant quotes, on p. 339, the following passage from our former article. "Now we confess ourselves to be of the number of those who believe, whatever reproach it may bring upon us from a certain quarter, that if the doctrine of imputation be given up, the whole doctrine of original sin must be abandoned. And if this doctrine be relinquished, then the whole doctrine of redemption must fall; and what may then be left of christianity, they may contend for that will; but for ourselves, we shall be of opinion, that what remains will not be worth a serious struggle." He then proceeds, "Here then permit me to inquire, have men no sins of *their own* from which they need to be redeemed? Or is it true, as the historian's position seems plainly to imply, that the whole object of Christ's death was, to redeem men from a sin which is *not their own*? And is this sin, then, which (to use the writer's own words) is not 'strictly and properly *theirs*, for those not yet born could not perform an act;' (p. 90.) is this sin so much greater than all the sins that men have themselves committed, in their own persons, that the death of Christ, or the redemption wrought by him, is not even to be named as having respect to these transgressions, and nothing of christianity is left, unless you assume the position, that redeeming blood is designed simply to expiate *original* sin? Can any one inform me to what age this 'orthodoxy' belongs; and where the history of it is to be found among the fathers, whose authority is so much relied on by this historian?" Again; on p. 341, he quotes Rom. iv. 15, as an argument against imputation, "Where no law is, there is no transgression," and then inquires, "But how can this be, where there is not only *original* sin prior to all knowledge of law, but original sin so great as to absorb the whole of the redemption of Christ; so that the redemption is annulled, if we consider it as expiating the guilt of actual violations of known law, and there is nothing left in the gospel worth contending for."

We must now be permitted to take our turn as interrogators. We seriously, then, put it to that gentleman's conscience to say, whether he really believes that the conductors of this work, or our historian, which is the same thing, actually hold that "the whole object of Christ's death was,

to redeem men from a sin which is not their own," and has no reference to "actual violations of known law?" If he does, we can only express our astonishment at the readiness, with which he can believe his brethren capable of holding and advancing the most monstrous opinions, in the face of their open and repeated declarations of adherence to a confession, which notoriously teaches the very reverse. We cannot, however, think, that the writer, whoever he may be, seriously entertains this idea. Our complaint is, that he should have been so heedless as to seize on the first impression which an isolated passage made on his mind, and without stopping to inquire whether he apprehended its meaning aright, or whether his interpretation was at all consistent with the known opinions of the conductors of this work, should at once proceed to hold up and denounce this first and false impression as the "orthodoxy" of the Biblical Repertory. The gentleman, on the slightest reflection, will perceive, that just so far as confidence is reposed in his discrimination and judgment, the readers of the Spectator will be led to believe that we hold, "that redeeming blood is designed simply to expiate original sin," "that the redemption is annulled if we consider it as expiating the guilt of actual violations of known law, and there is nothing left in the gospel worth contending for." He must know, too, that those who adopt this idea, on the faith of his assertion, must be filled with astonishment and contempt for men who, they suppose, hold this opinion; and moreover, that the Spectator will go into many hands, where a correction from us of this marvellous misapprehension can never come. He may hence judge how serious an injury may be done, in one inconsiderate moment, by ascribing, on utterly insufficient grounds, obnoxious opinions to his brethren. Let us now see what reason the gentleman has for this wonderful statement. We had ventured to agree with the Christian Spectator, No. 2, p. 349, that the doctrine of original sin could not be consistently held, if that of imputation were abandoned. And we had made bold to say, with president Edwards,*

* "It will follow, says Edwards, on our author's principles, (that is, on the denial of original sin, and the assertion of sufficient power to do our duty,) not only with respect to infants, but even *adult* persons, that redemption is *needless*, and Christ is dead in vain."—*On Original Sin*, vol. ii. p. 515.

that the rejection of the doctrine of original sin rendered redemption unnecessary. Why? Because actual sins need no redemption, as the author most amazingly supposes? No. But because, as Edwards supposed, and as we suppose, the salvation of men could have been effected without it, by merely preserving pure and unfallen children from sinning, and thus needing a Saviour. Had our author attempted to show that God could not do this; or that these doctrines are not thus intimately related, we should not have had a word to object as to the propriety of such a course, whatever we might have thought of his arguments. But that a paragraph, which expresses nothing more than he might find in any and every Calvinistic book he ever condescended to look into, should be so interpreted, as to make us teach an almost unheard of doctrine, is indeed passing strange. Why has he not discovered, and long ago denounced this palpable absurdity of Calvinism? for surely we have said nothing new upon the subject. We hope, indeed, that the readers of the Spectator will have discrimination enough to see, what that gentleman's rapidity of mind prevented his discovering, that the paragraph in question contains nothing but a common and very harmless opinion, which the majority of them, we trust, have heard from the nursery and pulpit from their earliest years. We shall not be expected to say much in reply to the "inquiry," "to what age this orthodoxy (making the death of Christ refer only to original sin) belongs?" As it is the poles apart from any doctrine which we have ever believed or taught, we feel no special interest in the investigation. We must, therefore, leave to the discoverer of the heresy the task of tracing its history. Our present concern is with the doctrine of imputation.

It has struck us as somewhat surprising, that while the protestant represents us as teaching a doctrine involving the greatest absurdities, the editors of the Spectator regard the matter in a very different light. They think we have renounced the old doctrine, and are now teaching one which is substantially their own. They say,

"We have inserted the above communication (the protestant's) at the particular request of a respected correspondent, whose familiarity with the subject entitles his inquiries to a serious consideration. We cannot but think, however, that the question respecting

the imputation of Adams's sin to his descendants, has become, in this country at least, chiefly a dispute about words. The historian, if we understand his statements, has abandoned the ground of Edwards and other standard writers, on this subject. He states, unequivocally, that Adam's 'first act of transgression,' was 'not *strictly* and *properly* that of his descendants, (for those not yet born could not perform an act) but interpretatively or by imputation.' P. 90. Now Edwards affirms the direct contrary. 'The sin of the apostacy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them, but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs, and on *that* ground God imputes it to them.'—*Orig. Sin*, p. 4, chap. 3. Stapfer too lays down the doctrine of imputation in the same way." Again; "We are glad likewise to see him proceed one step farther. He not only denies that we had any share in the *act*, but even in the guilt of Adam's first sin, in the ordinary acceptation of that term. He tells us, 'that the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to another;' that 'imputation does not imply a transfer of moral acts or *moral character*, but the opposite of REMISSION.' To impute, according to this explanation of the term, is simply to *hold* the descendants of Adam SUBJECT to the '*consequences*' of his fall, though not sharing in the act nor its criminality." "Now in this statement, all who bear the name of Calvinists will unite; and they all regard it as exhibiting a cardinal doctrine of the gospel. And we cannot but think that most of the disputes on this subject, result simply from a diversity in the use of terms."—Pp.342, 343.

We presume the protestant will consider these remarks of the editors as reflecting rather severely on his want of discrimination. Certain it is, that one or the other must be under a great mistake. For if our statement is substantially one in which "all who bear the name of Calvinists will unite," and which "they all regard as exhibiting a cardinal doctrine of the gospel," then it is very strange that the protestant should hold us up as teaching so many absurdities, and so unceremoniously sneer at our orthodoxy. In this difference between the editors and their correspondent, we very naturally take sides with the former, and wish to be considered as teaching nothing but plain common Calvinistic doctrine. There is a question at issue, however, between the editors and ourselves. Have we abandoned the old doctrine, as they affirm, or have they been labouring under a misapprehension of its nature? Here, then, we have a question of fact, and with the protestant's permission, we shall appeal to names for its decision.

We would say in the out-set, that the views which we

have expressed, are those which we have always entertained, and which we have always understood our brethren, who believe the doctrine of imputation, to hold. If there is any departure, therefore, in them from the opinions of "standard writers on the subject," it is a departure of long standing, and widely extended. We are persuaded, however, that the Spectator is mistaken as to this point, and that the view which we have presented of imputation, is that held by Calvinists and the Reformed churches generally.

As we are not prepared to adopt the Spectator's exposition of our opinions, we proceed to state how we hold the doctrine in question. In imputation, there is, first, an ascription of something to those concerned; and secondly, a determination to deal with them accordingly. Sometimes one, and sometimes the other idea predominates. Thus, in common life, to impute good or bad motives to a man, is to ascribe such motives to him. Here the first idea alone is retained. But when Shimei prayed David, "Let not my lord impute iniquity unto me," he prayed that the king would not lay his sin to his charge, and punish him for it. Where the second predominates. Hence, not to impute, is to remit. "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity," that is, blessed is the man whose iniquity is pardoned. To impute sin, therefore, "is to lay it to the charge of any, and to deal with them according to its desert."—*Owen.* If the thing imputed be antecedently ours, then there is merely a recognizing it as such, and treating us accordingly. If it be not ours, there is necessarily an ascription of it to us, on some ground or other, and a determination to deal with us according to the merit of the thing imputed. When Paul begged Philemon to impute to him the debt or offence of Onesimus, he begged him to regard him as the debtor or offender, and exact of him whatever compensation he required. When our sins are said to be imputed to Christ, it is meant, that he is treated as a sinner on account of our sins. And when Adam's sin is said to be imputed to his posterity, it is intended, that his sin is laid to their charge and they are punished for it, or are treated as sinners on that account. In all such cases there must be some ground for this imputation; that is, for this laying the conduct of one to the charge of another, and dealing with him accordingly. In the case of Paul it was the voluntary assumption of the

responsibility of Onesimus; so it was in the case of Christ. The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, is the union between them, which is two-fold, a natural union, as between a father and his children, and the union of representation, which is the main idea here insisted upon. A relation admitted on all hands. The Spectator affirms it, when he says, "that Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but for his posterity also, as is clearly implied in the sentence.

What we deny, therefore, is, first, that this doctrine involves any mysterious union with Adam, any confusion of our identity with his, so that his act was personally and properly our act; and secondly, that the moral turpitude of that sin was transferred from him to us; we deny the possibility of any such transfer. These are the two ideas which the Spectator and others consider as necessarily involved in the doctrine of imputation, and for rejecting which, they represent us as having abandoned the old doctrine on the subject. We proceed now to show that they are mistaken on this point.

In proof of this we would remark in the first place, on a fact that has always struck us as rather singular, which is, that while those, who hold the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, do, at the same time, hold the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to us, we seldom or never hear, (from Calvinists at least,) the same objections to the idea of imputation in the two latter cases, as in the first. Is there any one who has the hardihood to charge the whole Calvinistic world (who taught or teach the doctrine of imputation) with believing, that Christ personally and properly committed the sins which are said to be imputed to him? or that the moral turpitude of these sins was transferred to him? Now, we ask, why is this? Why, if the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, supposes that they were the personal actors of his transgression, the imputation of our sins to Christ does not make him the agent of our acts? Why, since at every turn we are asked if we have ever repented of Adam's sin, is it not demanded of us, if Christ ever repented of our sins? We have never been so unhappy, as to have our hearts torn by being told that we believe and teach, that the blessed Saviour was morally a sinner; that our "moral character" was transfer-

red to him. If this is imputation, if this "transfer of moral character" is included in it, we have not words to express our deep abhorrence of the doctrine. We would hold no communion with the man who taught it. And if this is what our brethren mean to charge us with, then is the golden cord of charity forever broken; for what fellowship can there be between parties, where one accuses the other of blasphemy? We do not harbour the idea, however, that our brethren can seriously make such a charge. Nor can they imagine, that when we speak of the imputed righteousness of Christ, we are so insane as to mean that we personally performed the acts of his perfect obedience, and in person died upon the cross. Neither can they suppose that we mean to assert, that his moral excellence was transferred to us.* They never ask us whether we feel self-approbation and complacency for what Christ did; why then ask us if we feel *remorse* and self-reproach for what Adam did? We say then, that the fact, that Calvinists speak in the same terms of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, that they use of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and illustrate the one by the other, is an a priori argument, we should hope, of conclusive force to prove, that they do not consider either the idea of personal identification, or transfer of moral character as included in the doctrine of imputation.

There is another presumptive argument as to this point, drawn from the common technicalities of theology. What is meant by calling Adam a public person, a representative, a federal head, as is so constantly done by those who teach the doctrine of imputation? Are not these terms intended to express the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity? A union of representation is not a union of identity. If Adam and his race were one and the same, he was not their representative, for a thing cannot represent itself. The two ideas are inconsistent. Where the one is asserted, the other is denied. They therefore who affirm that we sinned in Adam as a representative, do thereby deny

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* We know there have been some pitiable instances, in which such ideas have been advanced, by certain Antinomians; but we are not speaking of the ἐκτρώματα of the human head and heart, but of a common doctrine of a large and pious portion of the christian world.

that we sinned in him personally. When our formularies say that Adam was "a public person" or representative, and that we "sinned in him," it is to make them affirm and deny the same thing in the same breath, to quote them as teaching that we were personally one with him and personally acted in him. With the same propriety it might be asserted that Alexander of Russia personally signed the treaty with the Turks, because he did it in his minister.

The same terms are used in reference to Christ, who is called the head, representative and substitute of his people, and they all express the nature of the relation which is the ground of imputation, and are absolutely inconsistent with the idea of personal identity and consequent transfer of moral character. When the Spectator, therefore, congratulates us on having rejected a philosophy which confounds all notions of personal identity, he does so under a wrong impression. The fact is, there is no philosophy about it. We do not mean to say, that no man has ever philosophized on this subject, or that there have not been men, who taught a mysterious union of the race with Adam. What we mean to deny is, that such speculations enter at all into the essence of the doctrine of imputation, or are necessary to it. In every doctrine there are certain ideas, which constitute its formal nature, and make it what it is; so that if they are rejected, the doctrine is rejected. It would be the most unreasonable thing in the world, to require of a man who undertakes to defend any doctrine, to make good all the explanations of it which have ever been given, and to justify all the modes of expression ever employed respecting it. What a task would this impose on the advocate of the doctrine of the trinity, of the deity of Christ, or of any other doctrine. This is a task which we would never undertake, and have not now undertaken. Our business is, to make it appear, that the notions of personal oneness, community in action, transfer of moral character, are no part of the doctrine of imputation; not that none of the schoolmen or scholastic divines ever held any of these ideas. For what have they not held? We know, that it is often asserted, that Augustine and his followers held the personal unity of Adam and his race. Döderlein, Knapp, and Bretschneider all assert it, and assert it, one after the other, on the same grounds. But we would remark, in the first place, that we are not pre-

pared to believe this; first, because the passages, which these writers produce in proof of their assertion, do not make it out. The same forms of expression occur in the Bible, and in the writings of men who expressly reject this idea, and even the doctrine of imputation itself. Dr. Hopkins uses as strong language on the connexion of Adam and his posterity, as we have ever seen quoted from Augustine. And, secondly, because, there are modes of expression adopted by Augustine on this subject, in explanation of the ground of imputation, inconsistent with this idea. Turrettin quotes and explains Augustine thus: "*Quicunque*, inquit August. ep. 106, *ex illo multi in seipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno, unus homo erant*, unitate non specifica, vel numerica, sed partim *unitate originis*, quia omnes ex uno sunt sanguine, partim *unitate repræsentationis*, quia unus omnium personam repræsentabat ex ordine Dei."—Tom. 1, p. 679. According to this, Augustine taught that we were one in Adam, because he was our common father and common representative, in which there is no mysticism. Let it be admitted, however, that Augustine did give this explanation of the ground of imputation. Do we reject the doctrine because we reject the reason which he gives to justify and explain it? It might, with as much propriety be said, that every man rejects the doctrine of the trinity, who does not adopt every title of Athanasius's exposition of it. It is therefore no special concern of ours, what Augustine held on this point. What we affirm is, that this idea is not essential to the doctrine, and is not embraced by the great body of its defenders. Any man, who holds that there is such an ascription of the sin of Adam to his posterity, as to be the ground of their bearing the punishment of that sin, holds the doctrine of imputation; whether he undertakes to justify this imputation, merely on the ground that we are the children of Adam, or on the principle of representation, or of scientia media; or whether he chooses to philosophize on the nature of unity, until he confounds all notions of personal identity, as president Edwards appears to have done.

As it is in vain to make quotations, before we have fixed the meaning of the terms which are constantly recurring in them, we must notice the allegation of the Spectator, as to our incorrect use of certain words, before we proceed to bring any more direct testimony to the fact, that the views

which we have given of the doctrine of imputation are those commonly entertained among Calvinists on the subject. The words *guilt* and *punishment* are those particularly referred to. The former we had defined to be, liability, or exposedness to punishment. We did not mean to say that the word never included the idea of moral turpitude or criminality. We were speaking of its theological usage. It is very possible that a word may have one sense in common life, and another, somewhat modified, in particular sciences. A legal or theological sense of a term may, hence, often be distinguished from its ordinary acceptation. It is, therefore, not much to the purpose, when the question relates to the correct theological use of a word, to quote Dr. Webster's Dictionary, as an authority on the subject. We must appeal to usage. Grotius, who, we presume, will be regarded as a competent witness, in his treatise *De Satisfactione Christi*, uses the word constantly in the sense which we have given it. Thus in the phrase, "De auferendo reatu per remissionis impetrationem apud Deum."—*Opera Theol.* vol. iii. p. 333. On p. 336, "Sanguis pecudum tollebat reatum temporalem, non autem reatum spiritualem." A little after, "Hinc καθαιρεῖν est eum reatum tollere, sive efficere remissionem." In all these cases guilt is that which is removed by pardon, i. e. exposure to punishment. Turrettin, "Reatus theologicè dicitur obligatio ad poenam ex peccato." Tom. i. p. 654. Owen, "Guilt in Scripture is the respect of sin unto the sanction of the law, whereby the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment."—*On Justification*, p. 280. On the same page: In sin there is, "its formal nature as it is a transgression of the law; and the stain or the filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law." Again, "He (Christ) was alienae culpae reus. Perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt upon him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin." Edwards says, "From this it will follow, that guilt, or exposedness to punishment, &c."—Vol. ii. p. 543. Ridgeley, vol. ii. p. 119, "Guilt is an obligation or liableness to suffer punishment for sin committed." If there is any thing fixed in theological language, it is this sense of the word guilt. And if there is any thing in which Calvinists are agreed, it is in saying, that when they affirm "that the guilt of Adam's sin

has come upon us," they mean, exposure to punishment on account of that sin. It would be easy to multiply quotations, but enough has been produced to convince the Spectator, that our sense of the word is not so "peculiar" as he imagined.

"The word punishment, too," he says, "has a peculiar sense, in the vocabulary of the historian."—P. 344. Here again he appeals to Dr Webster, and here again we must dissent; not so much from the doctor's definition, as from the Spectator's exposition of it. The Dr says, that punishment is "any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offence." To this we have no special objection. But that the crime or offence must necessarily belong personally to the individual punished, as the Spectator seems to take for granted, we are very far from admitting; for this is the very turning point in the whole discussion respecting imputation. Punishment, according to our views, is any evil inflicted on a person, in the execution of a judicial sentence, on account of sin. That the word is used in this sense, for evils thus inflicted on one person for the offence of another, cannot be denied. It would be easy to fill a volume with examples of this usage, from writers ancient and modern, sacred and profane. We quote a few instances from theologians, as this is a theological discussion. Grotius, (p. 313), in answering the objection of Socinus, that it is unjust that our sins should be punished in Christ, says, "Sed ut omnis hîc error dematur, notandum est, esse quidem essentiale poenæ, ut infligatur ob peccatum, sed non item essentiale ei esse, ut infligatur ipsi qui peccavit." On the same page, "Puniri alios ob aliorum delicta non audet negare Socinus." If he uses the word once, he does, we presume, a hundred times in this sense, in this single treatise. Owen says, "There can be no punishment but with respect to the guilt of sin personally committed or imputed."—P. 287. Storr and other modern and moderate theologians, use the word in this sense perpetually. Storr says, "Leides, durch einen richterlichen Ausspruch um der Sünden willen verhängte Leiden, Strafe heisst," that is, "Every evil judicially inflicted on account of sin, is punishment."—*Zweck des Todes Jesu*, p. 585. No one has ever denied that in its most strict and rigid application, punishment has reference to personal guilt; but this does not alter the case, for usage, the

only law in such matters, has sanctioned its application in the manner in which we have used it, and that too among the most accurate of theological writers.

Having fixed the sense in which these terms are used by the writers to whom we shall refer, we will now proceed to establish our position, that the doctrine of imputation, as taught by standard Calvinistic authors, does not involve, either the idea of a personal oneness with Adam, so that his act is strictly and properly our act, or that of the transfer of moral character.

Our first testimony is from Knapp, whom we quote, not as a Calvinist, but as a historian. In his Christliche Glaubenslehre, section 76, he says, "However various the opinions of theologians are respecting imputation, when they come to explain themselves distinctly on the subject, yet the majority agree in general as to this point, that the expression, God imputes the sin of our first parents to their descendants, amounts to this, God punishes the descendants on account of the sin of their first parents." This testimony is no otherwise valuable, than as the opinion of an impartial man, as to the substance of the doctrine. That there are various views, explanations and modes of defending this doctrine, no one ever dreamed of denying, and it would stand alone, in this respect, if there were not.

Turrettin (*Quaest.* ix. p. 678), thus explains his views of this subject. "Imputation is either of something foreign to us, or properly ours. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours, in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions, whom he punishes for crimes properly their own; and in reference to what is good, the zeal of Phineas is said to be imputed to him for righteousness.—*Ps.* cvi. 31. Sometimes that is imputed which is without us, and not performed by ourselves; thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins are imputed to him, although he has neither sin in himself nor we righteousness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not of the former, because we are treating of a sin committed by Adam, not by us." (Quia agitur de peccato ab Adamo commisso, non a nobis.) We have here precisely the two ideas excluded from the doctrine which we have rejected, and which the Spectator seems to think essential to it. For Turrettin says, that in this case the thing imputed, is something without us,

(extra nos, nec a nobis præstitum,) and secondly, the moral turpitude of the act is not transferred, for it is analogous, he tells us, to the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us, and our sins to him, licet nec ipse peccatum in se habeat, nec nos justitiam. That there must be some ground for this imputation is self-evident, and this can only be some relation or union in which the parties stand to each other. This union, however, according to Turrettin, is nothing mysterious, nothing which involves a confusion of identity. The union which is to serve as the ground of imputation, he says, may be threefold, "1. Natural, as between a father and his children; 2. Moral and political, as between a king and his subjects; 3. Voluntary, as among friends, and between the guilty and his substitute." The bond between Adam and his posterity is twofold, "1. Natural, as he is the father, and we are his children. 2. Political and forensic, as he was the prince, and representative head of the whole human race. The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not only the natural connexion which exists between us and Adam, since, in that case, all his sins might be imputed to us, but mainly the moral and federal, in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our head."

All the arguments which Turrettin urges in support of his doctrine, prove that he viewed the subject as we have represented it. He appeals, in the first instance, to *Rom.* v. 12—21. The scope of the passage he takes to be, the illustration of the method of justification, by comparing it to the manner in which men were brought under condemnation. As Adam was made the head of the whole race, so that the guilt of his sin comes on all to condemnation, so Christ is made the head of his people, and his obedience comes on all of them to justification. On page 681, he says, "We are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way (eadem ratione) in which we are constituted righteous in Christ: but in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness. Therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin, otherwise the comparison is destroyed." Another of his arguments is derived from the native depravity of men, which, he says, is a great evil, and cannot be reconciled with the divine character, unless we suppose that men are born in this state of corruption as a punishment. As this evil has the nature of punishment, it necessarily supposes some antecedent sin, on account of which it is inflic-

ted, for there is no punishment but on account of sin. "It cannot, however, be a sin properly and personally ours, because we were not yet in existence. Therefore, it is the sin of Adam imputed to us." Non potest autem esse PECCATUM NOSTRUM PROPRIUM ET PERSONALE, QUIA NONDUM FUIMUS ACTU. Almost the very form of expression quoted from us by the Spectator to prove that we have abandoned the old doctrine of imputation.

In order to evince his sense of the importance of the doctrine, he remarks on its connexion with that of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and says that all the objections urged against the one, bear against the other; so that if the one be rejected the other cannot stand. We shall give in his own words a passage from page 689, which appears to us very decisive as to the point in hand. "Voluntas ergo Adami potest dici singularis actus proprietate, *universalis repræsentationis jure*, singularis quia ab uno ex individuis humanis profecta est, universalis quia individuum illud universum genus humanum repræsentabat. Sic justitia Christi est actus unius, et bene tamen dicitur omnium fidelium per divinam imputationem; ut quod unus fecit, omnes censeantur fecisse, si unus mortuus est, omnes sunt mortui."—2 *Cor.* v. 15. Is it possible to assert in clearer language, that the act of Adam was personally his own and only his, and that it is only on the principle of representation that it can be said to be ours?

These quotations from Turrettin we think abundantly sufficient to establish our assertion, that the doctrine under consideration neither involves any confusion of personal identity, nor any transfer of the moral turpitude of Adam's sin to his posterity. As Turrettin is universally regarded as having adhered strictly to the common Calvinistic system, and on the mere question of fact, as to what that system is, is second to no man in authority, we might here rest our cause. But we deem this a matter of much practical importance, and worthy of being clearly established. Misconceptions on this subject have been, and still are, the means of alienating brethren. They are the ground of many hard thoughts, and of much disrespectful language. It is not easy to feel cordially united to men whom we consider as teaching mischievous absurdities; nor is it, on the other hand, adapted to call forth brotherly love to have oneself held up to the

public as inculcating opinions which shock every principle of common sense, and contradict the plainest moral judgments of men. We hope, therefore, to be heard patiently, while we attempt still further to prove that our doctrine is such as has been so often stated.

We refer in the next place to the testimony of Tuckney, not only because he was a man of great accuracy and learning, but also because he stands in an intimate relation to our church. He was a member of the Westminster assembly of divines, and of the committee which drafted our confession of faith.* He is said also to have drawn up a large portion of the larger catechism. He is, therefore, a peculiarly competent witness as to the sense in which our formularies mean to teach the doctrine of imputation. In his Prælectiones Theologicæ, read, as royal professor, in the university of Cambridge, and published in 1679, there is a long and learned discourse on the imputation of Christ's righteousness. In the explanation and defence of this doctrine, he enters into an accurate investigation of the whole subject of imputation. This discourse abounds in the minute scholastic distinctions of the day, which it is not necessary for our purpose to detail. It will be sufficient to show that his view of the subject is the same as that which we have presented. In reference to the two passages, 2 *Cor.* v. 21, and *Rom.* v. 18, he says, "We have a most beautiful twofold analogy. We are made *the righteousness of God* in Christ in the same way that he *was made sin* for us. That is, by imputation. This analogy the former passage exhibits. But the other, (*Rom.* v. 18) presents one equally beautiful. We are accounted righteous through Christ, in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam. The latter is by imputation, therefore also the former."—P. 234. The same idea is repeatedly and variously presented. As, therefore, he so clearly states, that in all these cases imputation is of the same nature, if we can show (if indeed it needs showing) that he does not teach that our sins are so imputed to Christ, as to make him morally a sinner, or his righteousness to us, as to make us morally righteous, we shall have proved that he does not teach such an imputation of Adam's sin to

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* Reid's Memoirs of the Lives and Writings of the Divines of the Westminster Assembly, vol. ii. p. 187.

his posterity as involves a transfer of its moral character. The cardinal Bellarmin, it seems, in arguing against the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, urged the same objection which we are now considering, maintaining that if Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, then are we really inherently righteous in the sight of God. To this Tuckney replies, "Who of us has ever been so much beside himself, as to pretend that he was inherently righteous, in the sense of Bellarmin, so that he should think himself pure and immaculate?"—P. 226. The same sentiment is still more strongly expressed on page 220. "We are not so foolish or blasphemous as to say, or even think, that the imputed righteousness of Christ renders us formally and subjectively righteous." And adds, we might as well be made wise and just with the wisdom and integrity of another. "The righteousness of Christ belongs properly to himself, and is as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attribute of a thing, or its essence itself." Bellarmin, however, as so often happens in controversies of this nature, admits the very thing he is contending against. Tuckney quotes him as confessing, "Christum nobis justitiam factum quoniam satisfecit Patri pro nobis, et eam satisfactionem ita nobis donat et communicat cum nos justificat, ut nostra satisfactio et justitia dici possit, atque hoc modo non esse absurdum siquis diceret nobis imputari Christi justitiam et merita cum nobis donentur et applicentur ac si nos ipsi Deo satisfecissemus." On which our author remarks, that neither Luther nor Calvin could more appropriately describe justification by imputed righteousness.

To the other objection of Bellarmin, (which proceeds upon the same erroneous supposition, that imputation conveys the moral character of the thing imputed,) that Christ must be regarded as morally a sinner, if our sins were imputed to him, Tuckney replies, "Although we truly say that our sins are imputed to Christ, yet who of us was ever so BLASPHEMOUS as to say, that they were so imputed as if he had actually committed them, or that he was inherently and properly a sinner, as to the stain and pollution of sin." Bellarmin admitted that our sins were imputed to Christ, quoad debitum satisfaciendi, and his righteousness to us, quoad satisfactionem, and the protestants replied, this was all they contended for.

We do not know how it could be more pointedly or variously denied, that the transfer of moral character is included in this doctrine. The testimony of Tuckney is the more valuable, as he not only clearly expresses his own opinion, but utterly denies that any of his fellow Calvinists ever understood or taught the doctrine in this manner.

The same views are presented by Owen, who carried matters as far as most Calvinists are wont to do. In his work on justification, this subject naturally presents itself, and is discussed at length. A few quotations will suffice for our purpose. The imputation of that unto us which is not antecedently our own, he says, may be various. "Only it must be observed, that no imputation of this kind is to account them, unto whom any thing is imputed, *to have done the things themselves that are imputed to them.* That were not to impute, but to err in judgment, and indeed to overthrow the whole nature of gracious imputation. But it is to make that to be ours by imputation, which was not ours before, unto all the ends and purposes whereunto it would have served if it had been our own without any such imputation. It is therefore a manifest mistake of their own, which some make the ground of a charge on the doctrine of imputation. For they say, if our sins were imputed unto Christ, then must he be esteemed to have done what we have done amiss, and so be the greatest sinner that ever was: and on the other side, if his righteousness be imputed unto us, then are we esteemed to have done what he did, and so stand in no need of pardon. *But this is contrary unto the nature of imputation*, which proceeds on no such judgment, but, on the contrary, that we ourselves have done nothing of what is imputed unto us; nor Christ any thing of what was imputed unto him."—P. 236.

Again, on the same page, "Things that are not our own originally, personally, inherently, may yet be imputed unto us, ex justitia, by the rule of righteousness. And this may be done upon a double relation unto those whose they are, 1, federal; 2, natural. Things done by one may be imputed unto others, propter relationem fœderalem, because of a covenant relation between them. So the sin of Adam was, and is imputed unto all his posterity, as we shall afterwards more fully declare. And the ground hereof is, that we

stood in the same covenant with him, who was our head and representative."

Here then it is asserted, that the sin of Adam is not ours, "originally, personally, inherently," and that the ground of imputation is not a mystic oneness of person, but the relation of representation.

On page 242 he says, "This imputation (of Christ's righteousness) is not the transmission or transfusion of the righteousness of another into them that are to be justified, that they should become perfectly and inherently righteous thereby. For it is impossible that the righteousness of one should be transfused into another, to become his subjectively and inherently." Neither is it possible, according to Owen, that the unrighteousness of one should be transfused into another. For these two cases are analogous, as he over and over asserts; thus, p. 307, "As we are made guilty by Adam's actual sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us." On page 468 he says, "Nothing is intended by the imputation of sin unto any, but the rendering them justly obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin. As the not imputing of sin is the freeing of men from being subject or liable unto punishment."

It would be easy to multiply quotations to almost any extent on this subject, from the highest authorities, but we hope that enough has been said to convince our readers, that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin includes neither the idea of any mysterious union of the human race with him, so that his sin is strictly and properly theirs, nor that of a transfer of moral character. This we are persuaded is the common Calvinistic doctrine.

It is proper to state, however, that there is another theory on this subject. About the middle of the seventeenth century Placæus, professor in the French protestant school at Saumur, rejected the doctrine of imputation, and taught that original sin consisted solely in the inherent native depravity of men. In consequence of his writings, a national synod was called in 1644-5, in which this doctrine was condemned. The decree of the synod, as given by Turrettin and De Moor, is in these words: "Cum relatum esset ad synodum, scripta quædam alia typis evulgata, alia manu exarata pro-

diisse, quæ totam rationem peccati originalis sola corruptione hæreditaria in omnibus hominibus inhærente definiunt, et primi peccati Adami imputationem negant: Damnavit Synodus doctrinam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem haereditariam posterorum Adae ita restringit, ut imputationem excludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam: Adeoque censuris omnibus ecclesiasticis subjiciendos censuit, Pastores, Professores, et quoscunque alios, qui in hujus quaestionis disceptatione a communi sententia recesserint ecclesiarum Protestantium, quae omnes hactenus et corruptionem illam, et imputationem hanc in omnes Adami posteros descendentem agnoverunt, &c."—*Tur.* p. 677.

In order to evade the force of this decision, Placæus proposed the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation. According to the latter, (which is the common view,) the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity, as the ground of punishment antecedently to inherent corruption, which in fact results from the penal withholding of divine influences; but according to the former, the imputation is subsequent to the view of inherent depravity, and is founded upon it, as the ground of our being associated with Adam in his punishment. This distinction, which Turrettin says was excogitated ad fucum faciendum, merely retains the name, while the doctrine of imputation is really rejected. "For if the sin of Adam is only said to be imputed to us mediately, because we are rendered guilty in the sight of God, and obnoxious to punishment, on account of the inherent corruption which we derive from Adam, there is properly no imputation of Adam's sin, but only of inherent corruption."—P. 677.

Our readers may find a long account of the controversy which arose on this question in De Moor's Commentary on Mark's Compend, vol. iii. p. 262, et seq. One of the most interesting works which appeared at this time, was the tract by the celebrated Rivet, intended to prove that all the protestant churches and leading divines held the doctrine of imputation as it was presented by the national synod of France in opposition to Placæus. In a commendation of this work the professors of theology at Leyden, express their grief, that among other doctrines recently agitated in France, that of the imputation of Adam's sin had been called in question, "Cum tamen eo negato, nec justa esse possit origi-

nalis naturae humanae corruptio, et facilis inde via sit ad negationem imputationis justitiae secundi Adami." While they rejoiced in the unanimous decision of the French synod, they deeply regretted that any should disregard it, and endeavour to disseminate a doctrine "contrarium communi omnium ferme Christianorum consensui, solis Pelagii et Socini discipulis exceptis." They recommend strongly the work of their colleague Rivet, who, they say, had endeavoured, "Synodi nationalis decretum tueri, dogma vere Catholicum stabilire, bene sentientes in veritate confirmare, aberrantes in viam reducere auctoritatibus gravibus, et *universali totius orbis Christianorum consensu*."—*Opera Riveti*, tom. 3, p. 223, or *De Moor*, tom. 3, p. 274.

Instead of writing an article, we should be obliged to write a volume, if we were to take up and fully discuss all the subjects, relevant and irrelevant, presented in the protestant's inquiries. We have followed our own judgment in the selection of topics, and touched on those points which we thought most likely to be interesting and useful. We feel, therefore, perfectly authorised to dismiss, at least for the present, the history of this doctrine. Turrettin, the French synod, the professors of Leyden, the Augsburg Confession, assert as strongly as we have done, its general prevalence among orthodox christians. The second article of the Augsburg Confession runs thus: "Item docent, quod post lapsum Adae, omnes homines naturali modo propagati nascentes habeant peccatum originis. Intelligimus autem peccatum originis, quod sic vocant Sancti Patres, et omnes orthodoxi et piè eruditi in Ecclesia videlicet reatum, quo nascentes propter Adae lapsum rei sunt iræ Dei et mortis aeternae, et ipsam corruptionem humanae naturae propagatam ab Adamo." These quotations will at least satisfy our readers, that we have not been more rash in our assertions than many others before us, and is as much, we think, as the protestant's inquiry on this point calls for. Our principal concern is with the editors of the Spectator, who have presented the most interesting subject of investigation. We revert, therefore, to their statement, that Edwards, Stapfer and "other standard writers on the subject," taught the doctrine of imputation differently from what we have done. That this is not correct, as relates to the great body of the Reformed Theologians, we have, we think, sufficiently prov-

ed. How the case stands with Edwards and Stapfer we shall now proceed to inquire.

As Edwards appears to have borrowed, in some measure, his views on this subject from Stapfer, we shall begin with the latter. We must, in the outset, dissent from the remark of the Spectator, that Stapfer is to be regarded as a "standard writer" on the doctrine of imputation. So far from it, the synod of Berne refused to sanction his views on the subject, as inconsistent with the doctrines of the reformed churches*. And in his work, as now printed, he apologizes for his statements on this point, and endeavours to make it appear, that they do not involve a departure from the common doctrine, (Theol. Pol. vol. 4. p. 562.) with how much success the reader may judge. On page 156, in answer to the common objection that imputation is inconsistent with justice, he says, in substance, no one could accuse God of injustice, if in virtue of a divine constitution, had Adam remained holy, his posterity had been holy also; and therefore no one should complain, if in virtue of the same constitution, they are born in the image of their unholy progenitor. And then says expressly, this is the whole amount of imputation, "Peccati autem primi imputatio *in nulla alia re consistit* quam quod posteri ejus et eodem loco habentur et similes sunt parenti." And plainer still a little afterwards, "dum Adamo similem dare sobolem, et peccatum ejusi mputare unum idemque." This, as we understand it, is precisely Dr Hopkin's doctrine; that in virtue of a divine constitution the posterity of Adam were to have the same moral character that he had. This too is the Spectator's doctrine; he says, "that Adam was not on trial for himself alone, but by a divine constitution, all his descendants were to have, in their natural state, the same character and state with their progenitor."—P. 348. And yet these brethren denounce, in no very measured terms, the old doctrine of imputation: It is rather singular, therefore, that they should quote Stapfer as a "standard writer" on that doctrine, who asserts their

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* This statement is made confidently, although from memory. In the first copy of his work which fell into our hands, this fact is stated, and our impression of its correctness is confirmed, by the nature of his opinions as now presented, and his apology for them.

own view nearly totidem verbis. As to the passage which the Spectator produces to prove that he held the old doctrine as they understand it, (that is, as including personal union and transfer of character,) it amounts to very little. The passage is this: "God in imputing this sin (Adam's) *finds* this whole moral person (the human race) ALREADY a sinner, and *not* merely constitutes it such." He says, indeed, that Adam and his race form one moral person, and so would Turrettin and Tuckney, and so would we, and yet one and all deny that there was any personal union. The very epithet *moral*, shows that no such idea is intended. When lawyers call a corporation of a hundred men a legal person, we do not hear that philosophy is called in to explain how this can be. And there is no need of her aid to explain how Adam and his race are one, in the sense of common Calvinists. But he says, God finds "this whole moral person ALREADY a sinner?" yes, he denies antecedent and immediate imputation, and teaches, that it is from the view and on the ground of inherent hereditary depravity imputation takes place. This is mediate imputation, "quæ haereditariae corruptionis in nos ab Adamo derivatae intuitum consequitur, eaque mediante fit;" and which Turrettin says, is no imputation at all, "nomen imputationis retinendo, rem ipsam de facto tollit." Though we do not believe that Stapfer held either of the ideas which the Spectator attributes to him, identity or transfer, it is of little account to us what his views on these points were, as we think it clear that he rejected the doctrine of imputation, as held by the Reformed generally. He appeals indeed to Vitringa and Lampe to bear out his statements. How it was with the former we do not pretend to say, but as to Lampe, the very passage which Stapfer quotes contradicts his theory. Lampe says, "Gott hætte die Nackkommen Adams nicht in Sünden lassen gebohren werden, wenn seine Schuld nicht auf seine Nachkommen wære übergegangen," *i. e.* "God would not have permitted the descendants of Adam to be born in sin, if his guilt had not come upon them." Here the guilt of Adam (exposure to punishment on account of his sin) is represented as antecedent to corruption and assumed to justify it, and not consequent on the view of it. This is the old doctrine. That this is the fact, is plain from the quotations which we have already made. "Imputation being denied," say the

Leyden divines, "inherent corruption cannot be just." So Turrettin and Calvinists generally argue; of course imputation is antecedent to corruption. The Spectator must have seen, that Stapfer's statement was inconsistent with the old doctrine, had he recollected, how often it is objected to that doctrine "that sin cannot be the punishment of sin."*

We are inclined to think that president Edwards agreed with Stapfer in his views of this subject; because he quotes from him with approbation the very passage which we have just produced; and because his own statements amount to very much the same thing. In vol. 2, p. 544, he says, "The first being of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to Adam's posterity, or rather, the co-existence of the evil disposition implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, it is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequence of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself." We think that Edwards here clearly asserts the doctrine of mediate imputation; that is, that the charge of the guilt of Adam's sin is consequent on depravity of heart. According to the common doctrine, however, imputation is antecedent to this depravity, and is assumed to account for it, that is, to reconcile its existence with God's justice. The doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which was so formally rejected when presented by Placaeus. Turrettin in the very state-

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* We do not teach, however, "that sin is the punishment of sin." The punishment we suffer for Adam's sin is abandonment on the part of God, the withholding of divine influences; corruption is consequent on this abandonment.

ment of the question says, "It is not inquired whether the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to us, because, on account of original sin inherent in us, (depravity of heart), we deserve to be viewed as in the same place with him, as though we had actually committed his sin," p. 678, "but the question is, whether his sin is imputed to his posterity, with an imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent." It is of the latter he says, "nos cum orthodoxis affirmamus." The imputation consequent on depravity of heart is precisely that which the old Calvinists declared was no imputation at all of Adam's sin, and which they almost with one voice rejected. It is on the ground of this theory that Edwards says, as Stapfer had done, that "the sin of the apostacy is not theirs, (mankind's) merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them."—P. 559. That is, imputation, instead of being antecedent, is consequent, and founded on the view of inherent depravity. When the Spectator, therefore, quotes this sentence as contradicting our statement, we readily admit the fact. It not only contradicts us, however, but is, as we have shown, utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of imputation as taught in the Reformed churches. To say, either that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, because it is inherent in us, (or is truly and properly ours), or that it becomes thus inherent, or thus ours, by being imputed, is, as Owen, Turrettin, Rivet and others over and over affirm, to overthrow the whole nature of imputation. It might with as much justice be asserted, that the righteousness of Christ is first inherently and subjectively ours, and on that ground is imputed to us; or that our sins were subjectively the sins of Christ, and on that ground were imputed to him. Turrettin, in so many words, asserts the very reverse of what Edwards maintains. The latter says, "the sin is truly and properly ours;" the former, "*non potest esse peccatum nostrum proprium et personale.*"

The fact is, that Edward's whole discourse on this subject was intended more to vindicate the doctrine of native depravity than that of imputation. It is for this purpose that he enters into his long and ingenious, though unsatisfactory argument on the nature of unity, and the divinely constituted oneness of Adam and his race. He hoped, in this way, the more readily to account for the existence of moral corrup-

tion, and this he makes the ground of imputation. We are surely, therefore, not to be burdened with the defence of Edward's theory on this subject, which, we think, we have abundantly shown is not the doctrine commonly received among Calvinists, but utterly inconsistent with it. As he had rejected all of imputation but the name, it is no matter of surprise that his followers soon discarded the term itself, and contented themselves with expressing the substance of his doctrine in much fewer words, viz. that God, agreeably to a general constitution, determined that Adam's posterity should be like himself; born in his moral image, whether that was good or bad. This is Stapfer's doctrine, almost in so many words; and Edwards quotes and adopts his language.

We are bound in candour, however, to state that we are not able to reconcile the view here given of Edward's doctrine, with several passages which occur in his work on Original Sin. Thus, in page 540, he says, "I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only: it is also owing to the just judgment of God." And in the same paragraph, "God, in righteous judgment, continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind: all are looked upon as sinning in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin." But how is this? If these special influences are withheld "for this sin," and as a "righteous judgment," then assuredly the sin for which this righteous judgment is inflicted, must be considered as already theirs, and not first imputed after the existence of the depravity resulting from these influences being withheld. According to Edwards, depravity results from withholding special divine influences, and according to this passage, the withholding these influences is a just judgment for Adam's sin; then of course this sin is punished before the depravity exists, but it cannot be punished before it is imputed, the imputation, therefore, according to this passage, is antecedent to the depravity. But according to the other passage quoted above, the depravity is first and the imputation subsequent. We are unable to reconcile these two statements. The one teaches immediate

and antecedent imputation, which is the old doctrine; the other mediate and consequent, which the old writers considered as a virtual denial of that doctrine. However this reconciliation is to be effected, we have said enough to show that neither Stapfer nor Edwards can be considered "standard writers on this subject," and that old Calvinists are under no obligations to defend their statements.

We hope our readers are now convinced that we have made good our position, that neither the personal identity of Adam and his posterity, community in act, nor transfer of moral character form any part of the doctrine of imputation as taught by standard Calvinistic writers.

We have left ourselves very little room to notice the protestant's difficulties. As they are almost all founded upon misapprehension, they are already answered by the mere statement of the doctrine. On page 340 he has the following sentences: "The writer in question holds, that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, to their guilt, condemnation and ruin, without any act on their part.—P. 90. Of course, then, from the moment they began to exist, that moment they were involved in this imputation. This he does most expressly affirm, by adopting, on page 94, the statement of "ancient commentators," that David "contracted pollution in his conception." Here are two great mistakes. First, the writer does not discriminate between imputation and inherent depravity. He grounds his assertion, that we teach that all men are involved in the imputation of Adam's sin from the first moment of their existence, because we said that David was conceived in sin; as though these two things were one and the same. He should have remembered that Dr Dwight, and a multitude of others, hold one of these doctrines and reject the other. The Spectator, who understands the subject better, says, that we teach that "native depravity is a punishment inflicted on us for the sin of Adam." We hardly teach, however, that the punishment is the thing punished. This confusion of the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity runs through this writer's whole piece, and vitiates all his arguments. The second mistake here is, that imputation makes the thing imputed subjectively our's; which is a contradiction in terms, or as Owen says, is "to overthrow that which is affirmed." "To be alienae culpae reus, makes no

man a sinner." The same mistake is the ground of his inquiry, how Paul could say of Jacob and Esau, before their birth, that they had done neither good nor evil, if the doctrine of imputation is correct? This doctrine does not affirm that they had done either good or evil. When it is affirmed that the sin of Adam is imputed to them, it is thereby said that *they* did not commit it, and that it is not subjectively theirs.

Most of the other difficulties of the protestant are founded on the principle that "*a knowledge of law and duty is necessary, in order that sin should exist.*" Supposing we should admit this, what has it to do with imputation? There have been men who adopted this principle and built their theology upon it, who still hold this doctrine. The whole difficulty results from the protestant not discriminating between two very different things, the imputation of Adam's sin, and native depravity. All his queries founded on this principle, go to show that children cannot be morally depraved before they are moral agents, but have nothing to do with imputation. This is not the time or place to answer these inquiries, but we would ask in our turn, how Adam could be holy before he voluntarily obeyed the law, as the protestant, perhaps, still holds, if a child may not be unholy, before he voluntarily transgresses it?

The true question appears to have glimmered for a moment on the protestant, when he asked: "Is it a scripture doctrine that the guilt of others is imputed to men as their own?" What does this mean? Does he intend to ask whether the (moral) guilt of one man is ever transferred or transfused into others? We apprehend, not. The question, here, must be tantamount to this: Is the sin of one man ever punished in another? for he asks, how is this imputation of guilt to be reconciled with Ezek. xviii. 20? "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father; neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son, &c." The protestant will hardly maintain that the Israelites, to whose murmurs the prophet gave this reply, believed that the sins of their fathers were infused into them, their "moral character" transferred to them. Their complaint was: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge," that is, our fathers sinned and we are punished for it. To be punished for the sin of another, then, is, according to the protestant's doctrine, for this once at least, to have the guilt of that sin

imputed. This is our doctrine too. Now, does the gentleman mean to ask whether it is a scripture doctrine that one man ever bears the iniquity of another? If he does, it is easily answered. God says of himself that he is a jealous God, "visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon their children," a solemn and often repeated declaration.—*Ex.* xx. 25. xxxiv. 37. *Num.* xiv. 18. Job says from his observation of divine providence, "How oft is the candle of the wicked put out? God layeth up his iniquity for his children."—xx. 19. Jeremiah says "Thou recompensest the iniquities of the fathers into the bosoms of their children after them."—xxxii. 18. *Lament.* v. 7, he says, "Our fathers sinned and are not; and we have borne their iniquities." Surely the gentleman's question is answered in the only sense it can possibly bear in the connexion in which it stands. If it be said, that these expressions are to be taken in a general and popular sense, and not as affirming the doctrine of imputation; very well—then why quote them on the subject? The one form affirms precisely what the other, in a given case, denies. As to the question, how the assertion that one man ever bears the iniquities of another, (*i. e.* the doctrine of imputation) is to be reconciled with Ezekiel, it is no special concern of ours. That is, it is as much obligatory on the protestant as on us, to say, how two passages, one of which affirms and another denies the same thing, are to be brought into harmony. One thing, however, is certain, that Ezekiel cannot be so construed as to assert, that no man ever has, nor ever shall bear the iniquity of another; for this would make him contradict positively what is more than once asserted in the word of God. The context, it is presumed, will show the meaning of the prophet, and the extent to which his declaration is to be carried. The Jews complained that they had been driven into exile, not for their own sins, but for those of their fathers. The prophet tells them they had no need to look further than to themselves, but should repent and turn unto God; and assures them, that they should have no more any occasion to use that proverb, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge;" but that the principle on which God would administer his government towards them, would be, that every man should bear his own burden. Is any thing more asserted in this passage, than a general purpose of God as to his deal-

ings with his people? And is there any thing inconsistent, in this general declaration, with those other passages in which one man is said, under peculiar circumstances, to bear the iniquity of another? And can such a passage, containing nothing more than a general principle, from which, even as it regards temporal affairs, there are many solemn departures recorded in the word of God, be brought up in contradiction to other solemn declarations, in which God declares he would act upon a different principle? This passage asserts nothing in opposition to any doctrine of ours. We admit, in its full force, that it is a general principle in the divine government, that every man shall bear his own burden; but we do not admit that because this is the case, there can be no such connexion between one man and another, that one may not justly bear the iniquity of the other. A declaration, therefore, which, at most, has reference only to the private and personal sins of individuals, bound together by no other tie than consanguinity, and which, even there, is only true as a general principle, can never with any propriety be made the ground of an argument, in reference to cases entirely dissimilar. The protestant, however, may be much better qualified than we are, to reconcile the declaration of Ezekiel with those quoted from Moses and Jeremiah, and with the obvious departures from the principle it contains, recorded in the word of God and observed in his providence, and it is surely as much his concern to do this as ours.

The concession which the gentleman has here unintentionally made, is, however, important. According to him, for one man to bear the iniquity of another, is to have his guilt imputed to him. This is our doctrine, and the doctrine of the Reformed churches. This is what is meant by imputation, and nothing more nor less. That this is the case is evident, not only from the numerous quotations already made, but also from the fact that Calvinists constantly appeal to those passages in which Christ is said to have borne our sins, as teaching this doctrine. He is said to bear our iniquities, precisely in the sense in which in Ezekiel it is declared that "the son shall not bear the iniquities of the father." If, therefore, as the protestant thinks, the passage in Ezekiel denies the doctrine, the other passages must assert it, in reference to Christ. Now let it be remembered, that these

Calvinists affirm, that we bear the sin of Adam, in the same sense (eadem ratione, eodem modo) in which Christ bore our sins, and what becomes of all his objections?

Our wonder is, that when the protestant had caught the glimpse of the doctrine, which is betrayed in this paragraph, he should in the very next, entirely lose sight of it, and ask, "Whether the first principles of moral consciousness do not decide, that sin, in its proper sense, is the result of what we have done ourselves; not of what was done for us without our knowledge or consent? I ask, in what part of the Bible are we called upon to repent of Adam's sin? And finally, whether the historian would honestly say, with all his attachment to the opinions of the fathers, that he has ever so appropriated Adam's sin to himself, as truly to recognize it as his own, and to repent of it as such?"—P. 342. That is, imputed sin becomes personal sin. The old mistake. Just before, to impute the sin of one man to another, was not to render that sin personally his, but merely to cause the one "to bear the iniquity" of the other, in the Hebrew sense of that phrase. He never could have imagined, that when Ezekiel declared "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," he meant to say, that the son shall not have his father's sin made personally and subjectively his; when he quoted the prophet, therefore, he must have seen that to impute sin, meant to cause those to whom it is imputed to bear the punishment of it. We regret that our author did not arrive at this idea sooner, and that he did not retain it longer, as it would have saved him the trouble of asking all these questions, and us the trouble of answering them.

We have frequently been asked, by young men, if we have ever repented of Adam's sin, and have uniformly, to their obvious discomfort, answered in the negative. Knowing the sense in which the question was put, it would have confirmed their misconceptions to have answered otherwise. We have never so appropriated that sin as to recognize it as properly and personally our own, or as the ground of personal remorse. We have always considered this question as unreasonable as it would be to ask us, if we have ever felt self approbation and complacency for the imputed righteousness of Christ. That there is a very just and proper sense in which we should repent of the sin of Adam, we readily admit; and are perfectly aware that old writers insist much

upon the duty. Not however on the principle that his sin is personally ours, or that its moral turpitude is transferred from him to us; but on the principle that a child is humbled and grieved at the misconduct of a father; or that we are called upon to repent of the sins of our rulers, or of our nation, or of our church, (as was the case with the Corinthians);* not as personally guilty of their sins, but in virtue of the relation in which we stand to them. It is just and proper, too, that we should recognize the justice of that constitution by which we bear the sin of our first father, remembering "that he was not on trial for himself alone," but also for us, and consequently, that we fell when he fell, and should, therefore, bow before God as members of an apostate and condemned race.

We have now gone over those inquiries of the protestant which we consider it important to notice, and answered them to the best of our ability. If there is any thing in our reply adapted to disturb christian harmony and brotherhood, we shall deeply regret it. Some apology, however, will be found in the fact, that we have been held up by the protestant to the contempt and reprobation of the public for doctrines which we never held, and which we never, even in appearance, advanced. As this has been done ignorantly, we feel no manner of unkindness towards the writer, whoever he may be, although we think he was bound to understand what our doctrines were, before he thus unqualifiedly denounced them. There is not here a mere misapprehension of our meaning, which might be as much attributable to our want of perspicuity, as to his want of discrimination; but there is an entire misapprehension of the whole doctrine of imputation, as held by common Calvinists. We are aware that some excuse for this is to be found in the manner in which president Edwards has presented the subject. But a man who undertakes to write on any doctrine, and especially severely to censure his brethren, ought to extend his views beyond one solitary writer, who, as in the case before us, may prove to be no fair representative of its advocates.

Our main object has been attained, if we have succeeded

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* This is one of the cases to which old writers refer for illustration. See Goodwin's works, vol. 3, p. 372.

in disabusing the minds of those brethren who have been accustomed to reject and contemn the doctrine of imputation, under the impression that it teaches a "oneness with Adam in action," and a "transfer of moral acts or moral character" from him to us. That this is not the doctrine, we hope we have abundantly proved. Nothing more is meant by the imputation of sin, than to cause one man to bear the iniquity of another. If, therefore, we bear the punishment of Adam's sin, that sin is imputed to us; if Christ bore the punishment of our sins, those sins were imputed to him; and if we are justified on the ground of Christ's righteousness, that righteousness is imputed to us. The question here arises, is this scriptural doctrine? As this, after all, is the main point, we regret that our limits absolutely forbid a full and satisfactory answer. As the decision of this question turns on principles which it would require much time and space fully to discuss, it would be in vain to argue about details while these principles remain unsettled. The difference of opinion on this subject, although manifested here, does not commence at this point, its origin lies further back, in diversity of views on the divine character and government.

Let us see, however, what the difference between our brethren and us, as to the doctrine of imputation, really is. They agree with us in saying, that Adam was the federal head and representative of his race. Many of them use this precise language; and the Spectator employs a mode of expression perfectly tantamount to it, when he says, "Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but for his posterity. They agree with us also in saying, that the descendants of Adam suffer the consequences of his fall. What these consequences are, is a subject on which there is great diversity of opinion. Many maintain that the only direct consequence of the fall is mortality, or liability to temporal death; others, as Dr Dwight, (who may be taken as an example of a large class,) say that depravity, or corruption of nature is this consequence;* others, as the Spectator, "that by a divine con-

* See his Sermon on Human Depravity derived from Adam. His doctrine is that "human corruption" is the consequence of Adam's sin. By corruption, he means depravity of heart, or nature, antecedent to actual transgressions, or to moral agency. Because he says, "Infants are contaminated in their moral nature, and born in the likeness of apostate Adam." This is irresistibly proved, he

stitution, all his descendants were to have, in their natural state, the same character and condition with their progenitor; the universality and certainty of sin, therefore, are not the result of imitation or accidental circumstances, but of a divine constitution," (p. 343); others again, as the old Calvinists, say that the consequence of the fall was, that the same penalty which Adam incurred, came upon his posterity. Now it is evident that there is one difficulty, and it is the main one, which presses all these schemes in common, viz. that all mankind are made subject "to those consequences which Adam brought upon himself personally by his fall."—*Spectator*, p. 343. It is therefore evidently uncandid, though very common, for those who deny the doctrine of imputation, to represent this difficulty as bearing exclusively on that doctrine. They ask, with the utmost confidence, how it can be reconciled with the justice or goodness of God, that millions of innocent beings should suffer for a crime which they never committed? as though this difficulty did not press their own theory with equal (and, we think, tenfold greater) force. For what greater evil, for moral and immortal beings, can there be, than to be born "contaminated in their moral nature," as Dr Dwight teaches; or under a divine constitution, as the Spectator says, which secures, "the universality and certainty of sin," and that too with undeviating and remorseless effect. It is, as Coleridge well says, "an outrage on common sense," to affirm that it is no evil for men to be placed on their probation under such circumstances, that not one of ten thousand millions ever escaped sin and condemnation to eternal death. It is, therefore, idle to assert that there is no evil inflicted on us in consequence of Adam's sin, antecedent to our own personal transgressions. It matters not what this evil is, whether temporal death, corruption of nature, "certainty of sin," or death in its more extended sense; if the ground of the evil's coming on us is Adam's sin, the principle is the same.

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says, "by the depraved moral conduct of every infant who lives so long *as to be capable of moral action*."—P. 486, vol. i. Again, on p. 485, he says, this depravity is proved by the death of infants. "A great part of mankind die in infancy, before they are or can be capable of moral action; in the usual meaning of that phrase."

The question then is, is this evil of the nature of punishment? If it is, then the doctrine of imputation is admitted; if not, it is denied. The Spectator thinks this a mere dispute about words. We think very differently. A principle is involved in the decision of this question, which affects very deeply our views, not only of the nature of our relation to Adam, and of original sin, but also of the doctrines of atonement and justification: the most vital doctrines of the Christian system. The distinction, on which so much stress is laid by many who deny the doctrine of imputation, between mere natural consequences and penal evils, though it may be correct in itself, is not applicable to the case before us. An evil does not cease to be penal, because it is a natural consequence. Almost all the punishment of sin, is the natural consequence of sin: it is according to the established course of nature, (*i. e.* the will of God, the moral governor of the world,) that excess produces suffering, and the suffering, under the divine government, is the punishment of the excess. Sin produces, and is punished by remorse. The fire that "is not quenched," and "the worm that never dies," may, for what we know, be the natural effect of sin. It matters not, therefore, whether mortality in Adam and his descendants be a natural consequence of eating the forbidden fruit (from its poisonous nature,) which is a very popular theory, or whether death is a direct and positive infliction. Nor would it alter the case if native depravity was a natural result, as many suppose, of the same forbidden fruit, by giving undue excitability and power to the lower passions; because these effects result from the appointment of God, who is the author of the course of nature, and were designed by him to be the punishment of sin. We think the position of Storr is perfectly correct, that the consequences of punishment are themselves punishment, in so far as they were taken into view by the judge in passing sentence, and came within the scope of his design.—*Zweck des Todes Jesu*, p. 585.

But, admitting the correctness of this distinction, we do not see how it is applicable to the present case, that is, how Dr Dwight, and those who think with him, would make it appear, that the moral corruption of the whole human race, was the *natural* consequence of Adam's sin; much less how the Spectator can make it out, that "the universality and

certainty of sin," is the natural consequence of that offence. Indeed, he appears to abandon that ground, when he says, that this certainty is by "divine constitution." Here then is an evil, not even a natural consequence, our being born under a constitution which secures the certainty of our being sinners, and the ground or reason of this evil is of course not our own sin, but the sin of Adam. Is this evil a penalty? According to our view, it unquestionably is. It is an evil judicially inflicted on account of sin; it comes from God as the moral governor of the world. The Spectator, however, and many others, deny that the evils we suffer on account of Adam's sin are of the nature of punishment. The ground on which they do this, is, that it is utterly unjust, that the punishment due to one should, under any circumstances, be inflicted upon another. The assumption of this principle, without removing any difficulty, greatly aggravates the case, by representing that as a matter of sovereignty, which we regard as a matter of justice. The difficulty is not removed, for the difficulty is, that we should suffer for a crime which we never committed; but this the Spectator admits. The evil may be *materialiter* precisely the same, the question is now merely as to its formal nature. Is it then more congenial with the unsophisticated moral feelings of men, that God should, out of his mere sovereignty, determine that because one man sinned all men should sin; that because one man forfeited his favour, all men should incur his curse; or because one man sinned, all men should be born with a contaminated moral nature; than, that in virtue of a most benevolent constitution, by which one was made the representative of the whole race, the punishment of the one should come upon all? We know that a man's feelings are very much modified by his modes of thinking, and consequently, what shocks one person, may appear right and proper to another; and, therefore, these feelings can be no certain criterion in such a case as this. For ourselves, however, we are free to confess, that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being penal inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative, and in violation of a covenant, in which, by a benevolent appointment of God, we were included. Besides, is it not necessary that a moral

being should have a probation, before his fate is decided? When had men this probation? Not, according to Dr Dwight, in their own persons, for they are born depraved, and consequently under condemnation. Not in Adam—for this supposes that his sin forfeited for us the divine favour, or is the ground of our condemnation; but this is imputation. Is it then more unjust to condemn mankind for the act of their natural representative, in whom they had a fair and favourable probation, than to condemn them without any such probation? Determine, out of mere sovereignty, to call them into existence depraved, and then condemn them for this depravity? Nor does the Spectator's view much relieve the difficulty. For a probation to be fair, must afford as favourable a prospect of a happy as of an unhappy conclusion. But men are brought up to their trial, under a "divine constitution" which secures the certainty of their sinning; and this is done because an individual sinned thousands of years before the vast majority of them were born. Is this a fair trial? Would not any man in his senses prefer to have his fate decided, by the act of his first father, in the full perfection of his powers, intellectual and moral, than to have it suspended on his own first faltering moral act of infancy, performed under a constitution which secures its being sinful? According to the Spectator, therefore, the probation of man is the most unfavourable possible for that portion of the race which arrives at moral agency; and those who die before it never have any, at least not in this world. The race as such is not fallen: for this implies the loss of original righteousness and of the divine favour. The former, however, was never possessed; the latter, by one half mankind, never forfeited, and for them no Saviour can be needed.

The principle, which the Spectator so confidently lays down, is, in our apprehension, decidedly anti-scriptural, subversive of important doctrines, and requires a mode of interpretation to reconcile it with the word of God, which opens the door to the utmost latitudinarianism. This expression of opinion is not intended ad invidiam; very far from it. If there is no foundation for this apprehension, the expression of it will pass unheeded; and if there is, it deserves serious consideration. The Spectator will agree with us in saying, that any objection brought against a doctrine taught in the

Bible, or supposed to be taught there, is answered if it can be shown to bear against the providence of God. If, therefore, the assertion, that it is unjust that one man should, under peculiar circumstances, suffer the penalty due to another, can be shown to militate with facts in the dispensation of the divine government, it is thereby answered. Is it then a fact, that the punishment due to one man, has ever, in the providence of God, been inflicted on others? We think no plainer case can be cited, or well conceived, than that of the fall itself. God threatened our first parent with certain evils in case of disobedience; he did disobey; the evil is inflicted not only on him, but on his posterity. If any part of this evil is antecedent to personal sinfulness, then the ground of it is Adam's sin. But it is admitted, on almost all hands, that some evil is inflicted antecedently to personal ill-desert; some say, it is temporal death, others corruption of nature, the Spectator certainty of sinning, (an awful infliction!) it matters not what it is, it is evil inflicted by a judge in the execution of a sentence—and that is punishment. We think, therefore, that it is arguing against an admitted fact, to maintain that one man can never bear the iniquity of another.

Although one instance, if fully established, is as good as a thousand to show that the principle of the Spectator is untenable, we may refer to others recorded in the scriptures. The case of Achan is one of these. The father committed the offence, and his whole family were put to death by the command of God. Was not the death of the children, in this instance, of the nature of punishment? It was evil, not a natural consequence, but a positive infliction, solemnly imposed on moral agents, by divine command, for a specific offence. It is on the ground of this and similar examples; as the punishment of Canaan for the act of Ham; of the sons of Saul for the conduct of their father, 2 *Sam.* xxi. 8, 14.; of the children of Israel for the sin of David, 2 *Sam.* xxiv. 15 and 17; that Grotius, the jurist and theologian, says "Non esse simpliciter injustum *aut contra naturam pœnæ*, ut quis puniatur ob aliena peccata."—*De Satisfactione*, p. 312.

The objection, therefore, of the Spectator, founded on the supposed injustice of one man ever being punished for the sin of another, we consider as answered; first, because it bears with equal, if not with accumulated force,

against his own doctrine of evil consequences; and, secondly, because we think it militates with facts in the providence of God, and if valid, is valid against the divine administration.

We have other reasons, however, for the opinion which we ventured to express that the Spectator's principle was anti-scriptural. It contradicts the positive assertions of scripture, as we understand them. We can only refer to two instances of this kind. In the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, from the twelfth verse to the twenty-first, we consider the apostle as not only asserting, but arguing on the principle that one man may bear the iniquity of another. His object is to illustrate the method of justification. As we have been condemned for a sin which is not our own, so are we justified for a righteousness which is not our own. That we have been thus brought under condemnation, he proves from the universality of death, the penalty of the law. This penalty was not incurred by the violation of the law of Moses, because it was inflicted long before that law was given; neither is it incurred, in all cases, by the actual violations of a law which threatens death, because it comes on those who have never actually violated any such law; therefore it is for the one offence of one man that the condemnatory sentence, (the κριμα εις κατακριμα,) has passed on all men. The disobedience of one man is no more simply the occasion of all men being sinners, than the obedience of one is merely the occasion of all becoming righteous. But the disobedience of the one is the ground of our being treated as sinners; and the obedience of the other is the ground of our being treated as righteous. This view of the passage, as to its main feature, is adopted by every class of commentators. Knapp, in his Theology, quoted above, sect. 76, in speaking of the doctrine of imputation, says, "That in the Mosaic history of the fall, although the word is not used, the doctrine is involved in the account." In the writings of the Jews, in the paraphrases of the Old Testament, in the Talmuds and rabbinical works, the sentence, "the descendants of Adam suffer the punishment of death on account of his first sin" frequently occurs, in so many words. This doctrine of imputation was very common among them, he says, in the times of the apostles. "Paul teaches it plainly, *Rom.* v. 12—14, and there brings it into connexion with the

christian doctrines. He uses, respecting it, precisely the same expressions which we find in the writings of the Rabbins." On the following page, in reference to the passage in *Rom.* v. 12—14, he says, that the doctrine of imputation is here more clearly advanced than in any other portion of the New Testament. "The modern philosophers and theologians," he remarks, "found here much that was inconsistent with their philosophical systems. They, therefore, explained and refined so long on the passage, that they at length forced out a sense from which imputation was excluded; as even Doederlein has done in his system of theology. They did not consider, however, that Paul uses precisely the same modes of expressions which were current among the Jews of that age respecting imputation; and that his cotemporary readers could not have understood them otherwise than as teaching that doctrine; and that Paul in another passage, *Heb.* vii. 9, 10, reasons in the same manner. Paul shows, in substance, that all men are regarded and punished by God as sinners, and that the ground of this lies in the act of *one* man; as, on the other hand, deliverance from punishment depends on one man, Jesus Christ." He immediately afterwards, says, that, unless force is done to the apostle's words, it must be acknowledged, that he argues to prove that the ground on which men are subject to death, is not their personal sinfulness, but "the imputation of Adam's sin."*

Zachariæ, of Goettingen, understands the apostle in the same manner. In his Biblische Theologie, vol. ii. p. 394, 395, he says, "Imputation with Paul is the actual infliction on a person of the punishment of sin; consequently the sin of Adam is imputed to all men, if there is any punishment inflicted on them on account of that sin. His whole reasoning, *Rom.* v. 13, 14, brings this idea with it. Sin is not imputed according to a law, so long as that law is not yet given; yet punishment was inflicted long before the time of Moses. His conclusion, therefore, is, where God punishes

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* Knapp does not himself admit the doctrine of imputation, at least, not without much qualification. He does not deny the apostle's plain assertion of the doctrine, however, but gets over it by saying, that he is not to be interpreted strictly, but as speaking in a general and popular sense

sin, there he imputes it; and where there is no punishment of a sin, there it is not imputed." "If God, therefore, allows the punishment which Adam incurred to come on all his descendants, he imputes his sin to them all. And in this sense Paul maintains that the sin of Adam is imputed to all, because the punishment of the one offence of Adam has come upon all." On page 386 he gives the sense of *Rom.* v. 18, thus, "The judicial sentence of God, condemning all men to death, has passed on all men, on account of the one offence of Adam." This is precisely our doctrine. It matters not, as far as the principle is concerned, how the θανατος in this passage is explained.

Whitby has the same view. He insists upon rendering ἐφ' ᾧ, "in whom," because, he says, "It is not true that death came upon all men, *for that*, or *because*, all have sinned. For the apostle directly here asserts the contrary, viz. That the death and condemnation to it which befel all men, was for the sin of Adam only." "Therefore the apostle doth expressly teach us that this death, this condemnation to it, came not upon us for the sin of all, but only for the sin of one, *i. e.* of that one Adam, *in whom all men die.*—1 *Cor.* xv. 22."

We refer to these authors merely to make it appear, that even in the opinion of the most liberalized writers, the plain sense of Scripture contradicts the principle of the Spectator, that one man can never be punished for the sin of another. This sense, we are persuaded, cannot be gotten rid of, without adopting a principle of interpretation which would enable us to explain away any doctrine of the word of God. The older Calvinists, as we have seen, considered the denial of imputation, or in other words, the assumption of the principle of the Spectator, as leading to the denial of original sin or native depravity. They were, therefore, alarmed when some of their French brethren rejected the former doctrine, though they at that time continued to hold the latter. Their apprehensions were not unfounded. Those who made this first departure from the faith of their fathers, very soon gave up the other doctrine, and before long relapsed into that state from which, after so long a declension, they are now struggling to rise. Without any intention of either casting unmerited odium on any of our brethren, or of exciting unnecessary apprehensions, we would seriously ask, if there is

no evidence of a similar tendency in the opinions of some brethren in this country. The doctrine of imputation has long been rejected by many, both within and without the bounds of our own ecclesiastical connexion, who still hold, with Dr Dwight, to native depravity, or that men are born "contaminated in their moral nature." How this can be just, or consistent with the divine perfections, if not a penal infliction, it is difficult to perceive. We are, therefore, not surprised to find that some of the most distinguished theologians of this school, now deny that there is any such contamination of nature; or that men are morally depraved before they are moral agents, and have knowingly and voluntarily violated the laws of God. These gentlemen, however, still maintain that it is certain that the first moral act in every case will be sinful. But this seems very hard: that men should be brought up to their probation, under "a divine constitution" which secures the certainty of their sinning. How this is to be reconciled with God's justice and goodness any better than the doctrine of Dr Dwight, we are unable to discover; and therefore apprehend that it will not long be retained. The further step must, we apprehend, be taken, of denying any such constitution, and any such dire certainty of sinning. And then the universality of sin will be left to be explained by imitation and circumstances. This, as it appears to us, is the natural tendency of these opinions; this has been their actual course in other countries, and to a certain extent, also, among ourselves. If our brethren will call this arguing ad invidiam, we are sorry for it. They do not hesitate, however, to say, that our opinions make God the author of sin, destroy the sinner's responsibility, weaken the influence of the gospel, and thus ruin the souls of men.

But if the Spectator's principle, that one man can never suffer the punishment of the sins of another is correct, what becomes of the doctrine of atonement? According to the scriptural view of this subject, Christ saves us by bearing the punishment of our sins. This, as we understand, is admitted. That is, it is admitted that this is the scriptural mode of representing this subject. Our brethren do not deny that the phrase "to bear the iniquity of any one," means to bear the punishment of that iniquity, as in the passage in Ezekiel, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," and in

a multitude of similar cases. Where, therefore, the Bible says, that "Christ bore our sins" it means, that he bore the punishment of our sins; or rather, as Grotius says, it cannot mean any thing else. "Peccata ferre patiendo, atque ita ut inde liberentur alii, aliud indicare non potest, quam poenae alienae susceptionem."—P. 300. And not only the scriptures but even the Greek and Latin authors who use this phrase, he says, "semper imputationem includunt." This, however, on the Spectator's principle, must be explained away; and the ground be assumed, that the scriptures mean to teach us only the fact that Christ's death saves us, but not that it does so by being a punishment of our sins. But if this ground be taken, what shall we have to say to the Socinians who admit the fact as fully as we do? They say, it is by the moral impression it produces on us; our brethren say, it is by the moral impression it produces on the intelligent universe. If we desert the Bible representation, have they not as much right to their theory as we have to ours? This is a subject we cannot now enter upon. Our object is, to show that this is no dispute about words; that the denial of the doctrine of imputation not only renders that of original sin untenable; but involves, either the rejection or serious modification of those of atonement and justification.

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Illustrations of the Exodus, (printed on large quarto atlas, with proofs on India paper) consisting of six views, from drawings made on the spot during a journey through Arabia Petræa, in the year 1828. By W. H. Newnham, Esq., and engraved on stone by J. D. Harding. The scenes portrayed are those in which the principal events recorded in Exodus occurred.

The Young Child's Prayer Book. Parts I. and II. Boston. Gray and Bowen. 12mo.

The Child's Prayer Book. Boston. Gray and Bowen. 12mo. Pp. 32.

The Youth's Prayer Book. Boston. Gray and Bowen. 12mo. Pp. 55.

Moral and Religious Gleanings; or Interesting Stories. Compiled from various authors. By Thomas Latimer. Philadelphia. W. Stavely. 18mo. Pp. 118.

Discourses, Reviews and Miscellanies. By William Ellery Channing. Boston. Carter and Hendee. 8vo. Pp. 603.

The Evil of Theft, exhibited in the History of James Forrest. By the Author of "Sabbath School Scenes." Boston. James Loring. 18mo.

An Offering of Sympathy to Parents bereaved of their Children, and to others under affliction; being a collection from manuscripts and letters not before published. Boston. S. N. Dickinson. 18mo. Pp. 224.

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The Pleasantness of a Religious Life opened and proved. By Matthew Henry. Boston. Pierce and Williams. 18mo. Pp. 166.

The Evangelical Spectator. By the Author of the "Evangelical Rambler." Revised by the Rev. G. T. Bedell. Philadelphia. W. Stavely. 12mo.

ERRATA IN THE NO. FOR APRIL.

On page 273, line 10, for "eminent or imminent," read "emanant or immanent."
On the same page, line 22, for "imminent" read "immanent."

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THE

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