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Art. I.—*Introduction to a New System of Rhetoric.*

I. Rhetoric is the Art of Discourse.

The definitions which have been given of rhetoric are almost as numerous as the books written on the subject. Quintilian, after having enumerated a great many of them, adds, "There are a thousand other definitions.... since a foolish desire, as I think, has prevailed among the writers of treatises on rhetoric, to define nothing in the same terms that another had already used—a vainglorious practice which shall be far from me." The marrow of them is, that rhetoric or oratory is the science, or the art, or the faculty, or the power, of persuasion. Yet Quintilian criticises them all, and gives as his own, "Rhetoric is the art of speaking well." Among the moderns, Archbishop Whately limits the art to argumentative discourse in prose. It is hoped that the definition here adopted from the work on rhetoric by Professor Henry N. Day, of New Haven, will be justified by what follows.

II. There is both a science and an art of rhetoric.

The distinction here indicated is exhibited in the following particulars:—

1. Science is determinative, art is creative.

Science is the knowledge of laws; art applies knowledge to the production of what did not before exist. The knowledge of the laws of mechanics, or æsthetics, or rhetoric, is a department of science. A steam engine, or a Venus di Mediei, or an oration, is a product of art.

2. The sphere of science is more comprehensive than that of art, but art is nobler than science.

The reason why the sphere of science is more comprehensive than that of art is, that there is a vast amount of actual and possible knowledge which is incapable of being applied to production: many things which are capable of being known are incapable of being reproduced by human art. The reason why art is nobler than science is, that production or creation is a higher exercise of our faculties or powers than mere knowing. As "faith without works is dead," so also is knowledge. The science of discourse is to the art simply the means to the end.

3. The science of discourse determines in systematic form the laws and methods of the art.

Science, in general, explains the principles which govern the methods and processes of art. Thus physical science educes and explains the processes which the great Creative Artist has followed in the production of the natural world. In the same way, the works of human art become the subjects of scientific investigation, in order to determine the laws of their production. Hence there is a science, either actual or possible, of war, medicine, engineering, architecture, poetry, rhetoric, and every other art. In this way, Aristotle, from the works of Homer, Æschylus, Sophocles, and other great poets, expounds the laws of poetry; and from the speeches of Pericles, Demosthenes, and other great orators, the laws of oratory.

4. Rhetoric is both a teaching and a practical art.

The science of rhetoric, having thus determined from the works of the great masters of discourse the laws by which they are governed, founds upon these laws a system of rules and precepts, for the purpose of instruction in the art. Such a system is the teaching art of rhetoric, *rhetorica docens*. We use the word in this sense when we say, Rhetoric teaches us to convince and persuade others. The practical art, *rhetorica utens*,

is the application of such rules and precepts to the production of discourse. This is the sense of the word in the expression, His rhetoric is either good or bad.

III. Rhetoric is a liberal art, and either a useful or a beautiful art, according as the governing end or aim of discourse is utility or beauty.

The arts are classified upon several different principles, as either mechanical and liberal, or useful and beautiful. Such classifications are often convenient, though always inadequate.

1. The mechanic arts are those which do not require a liberal culture.

The training which these arts require has immediate reference to the practice of them. They include what are commonly called the trades, such as blacksmithing, shoemaking, and house-painting. All that is necessary to the successful practice of any of these arts is, that the artisan should have learned his trade.

2. The liberal arts are those which require a liberal culture.

In addition to the training of the mind and muscles which belongs to the preceding class, the liberal arts require a more general and extensive culture, for the purpose of developing personal power in the artist. For in order to become an able soldier, or a skilful physician, or an accomplished sculptor, a man must be acquainted with other departments of knowledge besides those which pertain immediately to the practice of his own art—he must be liberally educated. Such arts are commonly called professions, in distinction from the mechanic arts, or the trades.

1. The useful arts are those which have utility for their governing end or aim.

These arts include most of the trades, though not all, together with many of the professions, such as those of medicine and law.

2. The beautiful or fine arts are those which have beauty for their governing end or aim.

The supreme object of the fine arts is the realization of the beautiful; in other words, the giving of body or sensuous form to the idea of beauty, for the gratification and culture of the

taste, or the æsthetic faculties. These are such as poetry, music, painting, sculpture, the dramatic art, and landscape gardening.

Remark: It is not to be understood from this distinction between the useful and beautiful arts, that the fine arts are not useful, for such they may be, and often are, in the highest degree; nor that the productions of the useful arts are not beautiful, for often they are eminently so; but only that the leading or governing aim in the one is utility, in the other, beauty. Hence, in the useful arts, beauty may be sacrificed to utility, but not utility to beauty; and in the fine arts, utility may be sacrificed to beauty, but not beauty to utility.

5. Neither rhetoric nor architecture is adequately characterized in the preceding classification.

The above classifications, though often convenient, as has been said, are neither rigorous nor exhaustive, inasmuch as they fail to characterize several of the arts, among which are rhetoric and architecture. Both these, indeed, are liberal arts, because they require a liberal culture; but in each of them, sometimes beauty, at other times utility, supplies the governing end or aim. Thus, in the Greek temple, beauty is the end which determines the whole structure; but in the public buildings of modern times, in the most beautiful dwelling-houses, and even in the palaces of kings, this aim is combined with, and modified by, that of utility. In like manner, the art of discourse sometimes has beauty for its leading object, as always in poetry, which therefore is strictly one of the fine arts. At other times, this object is utility, with beauty as one of the principal means of attaining it, as in oratory. Hence both of these arts must be classed as either useful or beautiful, according as the governing aim which they propose to themselves in any particular case, is utility or beauty.

Remark: This close connection between the useful and the beautiful in these arts makes it evident that in them it is never safe to leave either idea out of view. In fact, the true aim in both is to realize the beautiful in useful appliances, and the useful in beautiful forms.

IV. Discourse is thought embodied and expressed in articulate language, for the purpose of communicating it to other minds.

This definition, which is unfolded in the following particulars, is more specific than any hitherto given, and has reference to the whole treatment of the subject in this work.

1. The faculty of thought and of discourse is one and the same faculty.

This is plainly indicated by the etymology of the word discourse, and by the derivation of its several meanings from the primary root. It is derived from the Latin word *discurro*, which signifies to run over the different elements of anything. The particle *dis* has the force of distinction, with reference to the analytic process which is alike fundamental in thought and in language. From *discurro* we have *discursus*, which, in the later Latin authors, signifies the discursive faculty of the mind, the faculty of thought and of discourse. From *discursus* in this sense, through the French *discours*, is derived the English word discourse, which has the following closely related meanings:—

(1.) The faculty of discourse, identical with *discursus*, in which sense it is used by Milton, as in the address of "the affable archangel" to Adam, where, speaking of the soul, he says:—

> Reason is her being,
> Discursive or intuitive: discourse
> Is oftenest yours, the latter most is ours.

Again, by Shakspeare:—

> Sure He that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and godlike reason
> To rust in us unused.

(2.) The exercise of this faculty, derived from the preceding by one of the most common processes of thought and of language. It is used in this sense in the following couplet from Dryden:—

> The vanquished party with the victors joined,
> Nor wanted sweet discourse, the banquet of the mind.

(3.) The finished product of the faculty, or thought embodied and expressed in articulate language, for the purpose of communicating it to other minds; which

is now the common meaning of the word, and the one in which it is always used in this work.

2. Discourse always addresses itself to an object-mind.

This is true of all the varieties of discourse; its aim is always the communication of thought to other minds. Otherwise discourse is incomprehensible. It is equally true of all the fine arts. Painting and sculpture speak to the eye—they require those who shall behold their productions; music and poetry and oratory address the ear—they require to be heard in order to be appreciated. Language itself depends upon the ear—deaf people are also dumb. Even written language addresses itself to the ear through the imagination.

Hence it is not a little surprising that some authors have found the differential characteristic of poetry to be, that "it seeks expression for the sake of expression alone, without reference to an object-mind." For surely Homer, when he invoked his Muse "to sing the wrath of Achilles," had in view an audience who should hear what she had to sing. Milton, also, in the seclusion of his study, and in the deeper solitude of his blindness, could not compose his Paradise Lost without mental reference to that "fit audience though few," which he hoped to find. And what shall be said of the whole realm of dramatic poetry, which professedly is addressed to those who are to witness the dramatic action? Even monologue implies an object-mind, although, in this case, the subject and the object are the same; or, as it has been expressed by a great poet, the tongue talks to the ears:—

> Why, then, I trust, the orator, your tongue,
> Found favor with the audience, your ears.

V. Rhetoric properly covers the whole field of discourse, including both poetry and prose, which, indeed, cannot be logically distinguished.

It is obvious from the definition of rhetoric as the art of discourse, that logically it includes the art of poetry, inasmuch as poetry is a form of discourse. On the other hand, this definition is confirmed and established by the unquestionable fact, that the laws of rhetoric apply to poetry precisely as they do to prose. The great epic, dramatic, lyric, and all other poems,

are constructed on rhetorical principles, and are the subjects of rhetorical criticism, precisely, and to the same extent, as the oration itself. Hence, also, nearly all the rules and precepts of Horace's Art of Poetry, as are well known, are equally applicable, and of equal importance, in both prose and poetry. This is the reason why the examples of rhetorical excellence, in the books on this art, are drawn from poetry quite as freely as they are from prose. In fact, the distinction between these two kinds of discourse cannot be precisely defined, because it does not turn upon any one principle, and because they overlap, so to speak, and shade off into each other. There are, however, the following several points of difference by which, in a loose or general way, they may commonly be distinguished.

1. Prose depends more upon the understanding, poetry more upon the imagination.

The meaning of this statement is, that the materials of discourse are furnished by the imagination to a greater extent—that this faculty is more frequently and boldly addressed—that it has a more full and free range, and that its function is every way of greater importance—in poetical than in prose discourse. Hence poetry allows and requires a more free and copious use of the figures of speech, all of which depend upon the imagination. On the other hand, prose discourse proceeds from, addresses itself to, and makes its demands upon the understanding, particularly the reasoning faculties, more than poetry; and hence it requires greater clearness and logical precision of thought.

2. The governing end or aim of poetry is beauty; that of prose may be either beauty or utility.

True poetry always aims to express beautiful thoughts in beautiful forms of articulate language, for the gratification and culture of the æsthetic faculties. It can never leave this aim out of view. This is the determining character of poetry as one of the fine arts, of which, indeed, it is the beautiful queen. Prose, on the other hand, may have either beauty or utility for its governing end or aim. It may even at times, though rarely, dispense altogether with beauty, especially where, in order to attain it, clearness and precision of statement, or energy of expression, would have to be sacrificed.

3. The sphere of prose is more comprehensive than that of poetry; the sphere of poetry is more elevated than that of prose.

The sphere of prose is co-extensive with the whole field of thought. Every possible theme or subject may properly be discussed in prose. But poetry is limited to beautiful themes, or, at least, to such as are capable of æsthetic treatment. Its chosen subjects are great religious and moral ideas and sentiments—patriotism, glory, love, pity, hope, joy, and whatever is adapted to awaken the deepest and most universal passions of the human soul. Force must be applied to poetry before it can be made to touch any abstract or unimpassioned theme.

4. The rhythm of prose is free; that of poetry is subject to metrical laws.

The rhythm of prose is essentially free, that is to say, it is incapable of being reduced under invariable rules. But poetry, by reason of its near relationship to music, has its rhythm subject to determinate and rigorous metrical laws.

From such points of difference, these two species of discourse may commonly be distinguished from each other. There is, however, a third species, in which they are indistinguishably blended together, and which is neither one thing nor the other. Examples of such poetical prose are the Télémaque of Fénélon and Ossian's Poems. But it is only in the hands of a master that this kind of discourse can be redeemed from reprobation. Those who most affect it are immature minds, and half-educated people. The best purpose which it seems capable of serving is that for which it is here introduced, namely, to prove by example that the functions of rhetoric in prose and poetry cannot be logically distinguished.

VI. Practically rhetoric is limited to the art of discoursing in prose.

Notwithstanding rhetoric covers thus the whole field of thought, there are the following reasons why it must be limited practically to the art of prose discourse :—

1. The poetic endowments are not universal.

The poet must be endowed by nature with a certain force of imagination, with deep, tender sensibilities, and with an ear for

rhythm and harmony in language, which qualifications seem to be comparatively rare. Consequently there are many persons who are incapable of becoming poets; and for these a course of instruction in this branch of the art of discourse does not seem to be indispensable. On the other hand, the faculty of discourse is universal, and requires to be well developed and cultivated in all men.

2. Poetry can be adequately treated as an independent art.

In this respect poetry is properly compared to elocution, which, though logically a department of rhetoric, as we shall see, is yet capable of being treated as an art by itself. The art of poetry has been so treated by Horace. Where this is done, only the field of prose composition is left to be covered by rhetoric.

3. The time appropriated to a liberal education is limited.

The time which is commonly allowed for a course of liberal education is not sufficient for the study of any but the most indispensable branch of the art of discourse, which, of course, is that of prose composition.

It should, however, be well understood, that poetical studies are a most important aid to the attainment of excellence in prose. Those who would perfect themselves in this art, cannot safely neglect the study of the poets, nor the practice of poetical discourse. For it is in poetry that we find the most perfect examples of rhetorical excellence. Also it is probable that the qualities which go to make the poet are not so rare as is commonly supposed; and these qualities, when properly cultivated, are conducive, in the highest degree, to excellence in prose. Hence the poets, even those of moderate excellence, with hardly an exception, stand in the front rank of prose writers. Milton, Dryden, Scott, Byron, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Lessing, Göthe, and Schiller are notable examples. Such poetical studies, contrary to the common opinion, tend to clear up in the minds of young writers the distinction between prose and poetry, and to put them on their guard against that vicious blending of the two kinds which has just been stigmatized. For very few if any of the poets have ever condescended to write poetical prose.

VII. Rhetoric is properly divided into two parts, discur-

sion* and style; of which the former treats of the thought in discourse, and the latter, of the expression of it in articulate language.

This division rests upon the distinction which is admirably exhibited in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, as follows: "There are two things which principally claim our attention in every discourse, the sense and the expression; in other words, the thought, and the symbol by which it is communicated. These may be said to constitute the soul and the body of an oration, or, indeed, of whatever is signified to another by language. For as in man each of these constituent parts hath its distinctive attributes; and as the perfection of the latter consisteth in its fitness for serving the purposes of the former; so it is precisely with these two essential parts of every speech, the sense and the expression. Now it is by the sense that rhetoric holds of logic, and by the expression she holds of grammar." The meaning of this last sentence is, that rhetoric, as to the composition of the thoughts to be expressed, is founded on the science of the laws of thinking, and as to the expression of these thoughts, on the science of language.

VIII. A complete rhetorical system includes discursion, style, and elocution, which treat respectively of the intellectual, the verbal, and the oral forms of thought.

The preceding analysis of discourse, as consisting of thought and expression, is not an ultimate one; for each of these parts consists of two elements. Thought in discourse is composed of the subject-matter, and the intellectual form; and expression of the verbal or written form, and the spoken or oral form. But, properly, there cannot be a department of rhetoric corresponding to the subject-matter of discourse. For this embraces all the objects of knowledge as these exist out of the mind, and before they have been worked up for the purpose of communicating them to other minds. Such, *e. g.* are the truths of geometry and the facts of history, before they have been exhibited by the geometer or the historian. Previous to this they are the subjects

* This part of rhetoric has hitherto been called invention. The reasons which have constrained the author to reject this name, and to introduce a new one, are given in the sequel.

of investigation, which, as we shall see, is not a rhetorical process. We have, therefore, as the proper subjects of treatment in rhetoric, only these three forms of thought, namely, the intellectual form, the verbal or written form, and the oral or spoken form; corresponding to which we have three divisions of the art, discursion, style, and elocution.

1. The subject of discursion is the intellectual form into which thought is cast for the purpose of communicating it to other minds.

Rhetoric, in this department, has for its object to determine and prescribe the rules and methods we must follow in giving to our thoughts those intellectual forms which are required for this purpose. We have such forms of thought, *e. g.* in Euclid's Geometry, in which the truths of this science (the subject-matter of his discourse) are worked up, with masterly rhetorical skill, for the purpose of making them known to others. For the processes by which he arrived at these truths may have been, and no doubt in most cases were, very different from those which he has chosen to follow in communicating them to the world. Every proposition might have been otherwise demonstrated, and a different arrangement might have been adopted. The intellectual form which he has chosen in preference to all others for the exhibition of these truths, is the evidence of his great rhetorical power.

2. The subject of style is the verbal or written form, which is the expression in articulate language of the intellectual form.

Style in rhetoric has for its object to prescribe and determine the rules and methods we must follow in giving to our thoughts those verbal forms which are best adapted for the communication of them to other minds. It applies to the expression of thought as written, and as mentally composed in words; and its highest excellence consists in its adaptation or conformity to the intellectual form of the thought.

3. The subject of elocution is the spoken or oral form, which is the delivery by the voice to the ear of the verbal form.

Elocution has for its object to determine and prescribe the rules and methods we must follow in giving to our thoughts

those oral forms which are best adapted for the communication of them to other minds; and its highest excellence consists in its adaptation to the intellectual and verbal forms of the thought.

Remark: Whilst all these three departments are obviously essential to a complete rhetorical system, each of them may be treated separately as an independent act. Thus Cicero has a separate treatise on invention, covering the ground of discursion. The modern writers confine themselves mostly to observations on style; and elocution is commonly taught as an art by itself, as in the author's work on the "Sources and Elements of its Power." The present work, therefore, will include only the other two departments of the art of discourse.

IX. Discursion is a branch of applied logic co-ordinate with investigation.

The distinction between investigation and discursion is essential to right views of rhetorical science and art. In order to make it clear it is necessary to determine the precise relation of both these processes to logic.

Pure logic, then, is the science of the laws of thinking; in other words, of the laws by which the discursive faculty is governed in its primary operations of discriminating, comparing, classifying, and concluding upon the materials of thought. These laws, being thus determined by the science of logic, are applied for two very different purposes, namely, for the purpose of discovering truth, and for the purpose of communicating thought. Hence we have the two distinct but co-ordinate processes of investigation and discursion.

1. Investigation is the application of the laws of thinking to the discovery of truth.

This is the subject of what is commonly called applied logic; but, properly, it is logic applied to only one of two co-ordinate objects. It is the province of this branch of applied logic to determine and prescribe the laws by which the discursive faculty must be governed in all its inquiries. It teaches us how to apply the laws of thinking to the discovery of truth—to the acquisition and increase of knowledge.

2. Discursion is the application of the laws of thinking to the communication of thought.

This is the co-ordinate branch of applied logic. Its province is to determine and prescribe the laws by which the discursive faculty must be governed in the communication of thought. It teaches us how to apply the laws of thinking to the exposition of the results obtained by investigation, and of all the materials of thought. In doing this, it discriminates, characterizes, and classifies all the processes by which thought ever is or can be communicated in articulate language, namely, analysis and synthesis, narration, description, exemplification and comparison, induction and deduction: and it explains what modifications these processes undergo, and how they are combined, in order to effect the several aims or objects of discourse, namely, explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion. Thus it determines and prescribes the rules which all the sciences, in expounding their principles and laws, methods and results, must obey—rules which bind the mathematician and the physicist no less rigorously than the historian, the poet, and the orator. Every form of discourse, even conversation, upon whatever subject, and for whatever object, must follow these processes, and conform to their laws.

Such is the distinction between the function of the discursive faculty in this department of rhetoric, and that which it performs in investigation—a distinction which we shall find to be of the utmost importance in all the subsequent treatment of this whole subject.

X. The rhetorical procedure is different from, and often the reverse of investigation.

There are, at least, three points of difference between investigation and all rhetorical procedures: they differ, first, in their aims; secondly, in the knowledge of the truth which they imply; and, thirdly, in their order of precedence.

1. The aim of investigation is the discovery of truth; that of rhetoric is the communication of thought.

This point has been sufficiently illustrated.

2. The truth which investigation aims to discover is, of course, unknown; whilst the thoughts which rhetoric aims to communicate, must be known beforehand.

There is obviously no place for investigation after the truth

is known: here necessarily this process ends. On the other hand, rhetoric assumes as known whatever the speaker or writer wishes to communicate. For in order to discourse upon any subject we must be furnished with the requisite knowledge. Apart from this, discourse wants its essential character of rationality. But this knowledge of the subject, *e. g.* chemistry, or geology, or politics, we acquire and possess as chemists, or geologists, or political philosophers, not as rhetoricians. As rhetoricians, our whole business is that of giving to our thoughts those forms which are best adapted for the communication of them to other minds.

3. The complete results of investigation are the raw materials of rhetoric.

Rhetoric begins where investigation leaves off, although it is not confined to the results of this process; for it works up also, for its own purposes, all other materials of thought, as these are taken in by the mind in original consciousness and perception.

It follows from this, that the function of the discursive faculty in rhetoric is, in a certain sense, the highest of all the intellectual operations. For the intellectual form which it gives to thought is the most perfect form. Until thought attains to this it is never fully elaborated. Hence, according to all experience, nothing makes us so conscious of the imperfection of our knowledge, or exerts such an influence to perfect it, as the work of communicating it to other minds. It has been well said, that "we never perfectly understand ourselves until we are able to make ourselves understood by others." Rhetoric, moreover, implies or brings into exercise all the faculties of the human mind—perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, imagination, fancy, taste, sensibility, and will; and from the products and results of all these modes of mental activity, as its materials, in the form of intuitions, conceptions, judgments, conclusions, emotions, passions, purposes, and volitions, it weaves the manifold and variegated web of discourse. In the words of Cicero, *Ut hominis decus ingenium, sic ingenii ipsius lumen est eloquentia.* The same thought is frequently expressed, also, by the great national and royal poet of the Hebrews, wherever he speaks of the tongue—that is, the faculty of discourse—as the glory of human nature.

These are the principal points of difference between rhetorical thinking and investigation. Hence it is often found that the best way to communicate knowledge is not only different from, but precisely the reverse of that by which it was acquired in original investigation. And this is the explanation of what is so commonly observed, that a man may stand at the very head of his department in the knowledge of it, and yet be the feeblest of teachers.

XI. The rhetorical procedure sometimes coincides with investigation.

Notwithstanding the differences just pointed out, there are at least two points of agreement between these processes, which also are of very great importance. These are, first, that they depend upon the same general faculty of the mind, namely, the discursive faculty; and secondly, that they are governed by the same ultimate logical principles or laws of thought. From the influence of these points of agreement there are at least two cases in which the processes coincide, more or less nearly, so that they can be carried on together, without the consciousness of any difference between them. These are the following:—

1. When the truth to be discovered is anticipated.

The truth which is the object of investigation, instead of being absolutely unknown, is often anticipated, or guessed, before it has been proved. In this case, the process of investigation resolves itself into that of proving a proposition to the investigator's own mind, which naturally coincides, more or less nearly, with that of proving it to the mind of another person.

2. When the speaker identifies himself with his audience.

The speaker or writer, having fully before his own mind the conclusion to which he wishes to lead his audience or readers, but which is unknown to them, will often find it prudent to identify himself with them, in order to disarm their opposition, and to carry them through a course of investigation, in order the more surely to reach the result at which he aims. In this case the rhetorical procedure will coincide, more or less nearly, but not absolutely, with investigation. One reason why the two do not coincide perfectly is, that many steps of

the original process by which the truth was discovered, require to be suppressed in the communication of it.

Both these cases, as has just been said, are of great importance, but they do not vitiate the fundamental distinction between the two processes which has been established.

XII. Rhetoric is an art the ground of which is not covered by any other, and which assumes the results of all other studies as its materials.

We have seen how the art of discourse stands related to logic, investigation, and elocution: it remains to define its relations to the science of language, æsthetics, and belles-lettres or literature, in order to show that the ground which it occupies is not covered by any other art or study.

These relations, in their most general form, may be expressed in the statement, that rhetoric employs the results of all other arts and studies as its materials in the production of discourse. But there are more special and characteristic differences, such as the following:—

1. Rhetoric differs from the science of language in that its aims are more comprehensive and more elevated.

The science of language in its relations to this art, includes lexicography, etymology, and syntax. The first of these depends in part upon the second; but the second and third are properly included in grammar. Now lexicography teaches us the meanings of words from their etymology and use. Rhetoric does not teach but presupposes this knowledge, yet it requires that all words should be used in their true and legitimate meanings.

Grammar teaches the etymology of words, that is, their composition and derivation; and also their syntax, that is, their combination with each other, so as to express the logical relations of thought. These relations are exhibited in what are called, from Aristotle, "the Categories." They are such as the following: unity and multiplicity, expressed in the singular and plural numbers of substantives; substance and quality, expressed in the substantive and adjective; cause, action, and effect, expressed in the relation between the subject and the verb, and between the verb and its object; also, time and mode

of action, expressed in the various tenses and moods of the verb, and by the use of adverbs. The numerous particles of language are employed for the more full and precise expression of these and similar relations.

Now rhetoric does not teach this use of language, although it requires that it should be correctly used for these purposes. It takes up all the results of the science of language, and weaves them together in connected discourse, expressive of the feelings, sentiments, and voluntary states of the discoursing mind, with the aim of producing a rational effect upon other minds. This whole work of rhetoric lies beyond and above the sphere of the science of language.

The difference between rhetoric and grammar may be further evinced by the following examples, in which the language is grammatically correct, but rhetorically false: "Therefore is it that, by a law rubric, and by a special sentence thereof, we cannot fail to take the wolf, if we make our hedges higher than the windmill, whereof somewhat was spoken by the plaintiff." Here the grammar is faultless, every clause is significant and perspicuous; but, rhetorically, the sentence is absurd, because it expresses no connected meaning. Again: "The moon was casting a pale light on the numerous graves that were scattered before me, as it peered above the horizon, when I opened the small gate of the churchyard." Here, also, the grammar is correct, but the rhetoric is false, from the improper collocation of the clauses. Rhetoric requires that it should read thus: When I opened the small gate of the churchyard, the moon, as it peered (?) above the horizon, was casting a pale light on the numerous graves that were scattered before me; or thus: The moon, as it peered above the horizon, when I opened the small gate of the churchyard, was casting, etc. In many other ways, a sentence may be grammatically correct, and rhetorically false, but these examples are sufficient to show that the sphere of rhetoric is not covered by grammar.

2. Rhetoric differs from æsthetics in that the one is the art of discourse, whilst the other is the science of the beautiful.

This distinction is so broad that it would be unnecessary to reproduce it here, if it were not that beauty is of such indispensable importance in discourse that a constant tendency

manifests itself to confound these two studies with each other. But we see in the above definitions, that they differ from each other, first, as art differs from science. Secondly, and more particularly, æsthetics, from the study of the beautiful works of nature and art, determines the laws of the beautiful, in systematic form, including the beautiful as it appears in discourse. Its aims and results are the development and culture of the æsthetic faculties. But here it stops: it produces nothing which did not before exist. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is a grand productive art. Its product is discourse; of which beauty is either the supreme end, as in poetry, or it is one of the most indispensable means of accomplishing its ends, as in prose. In both cases, rhetoric relies upon æsthetics for the knowledge of the laws of beauty, and for that culture of the taste which is indispensable to the successful application of them in the production of beautiful discourse. Consequently it does not teach, but it presupposes the knowledge of this science, requiring that discourse, wherever it is capable of it, should be conformed to the laws of beauty.

3. Rhetoric differs from belles-lettres in that the one teaches the laws of discourse in systematic form, whilst the other does not.

The term belles-lettres is used in a very vague sense, but the studies which properly belong to it in the college curriculum are such as the following: It explains something of the nature of language and of eloquence. It carries the student through a course of literature; directs his attention to the finest works and passages in history, poetry, and oratory; and endeavors to inform and enrich his mind with the knowledge and spirit and style of the best authors. Hence is apparent the reason why rhetoric, after the department of invention had been eliminated from it (of which more hereafter) naturally fell into the hands of the professors of belles-lettres, and was identified with the studies of this department of education. In fact, nothing remained of the art but the study of style as exhibited in the best models of fine writing. A rhetorical exercise consisted merely in "writing a composition," which the professor would revise and correct, with almost exclusive reference to grammar and style. The student was not required to

discriminate the processes of narration, description, exemplification, comparison, induction, and deduction; nor was his attention called to the question, whether his aim in writing was to explain to the understanding, or to convince the judgment, or to excite the feelings, or to move the will: much less was he instructed in the laws by which these several processes are governed, or drilled, with laborious practice, in the application of them to the production of discourse. For belles-lettres teaches none of these things.

Rhetoric, on the other hand, as here laid down, treats formally and systematically of all the processes of discourse, and determines, in the form of rules for the practical guidance of the student, the laws by which these processes are governed. As we have seen, it discriminates, characterizes, and classifies all the processes by which thought ever is or can be communicated to other minds; and it exhibits the modifications which these processes undergo in their combinations with each other, in reference to the various aims of discourse. Also it teaches the proper construction of discourses, and the laws of their different parts in relation to each other, and to these different aims. And it requires of the student diligent and laborious practice, prescribing for him appropriate exercises in these several processes, each by itself, and in their various combinations with each other.

XVI. The systematic study of rhetoric is useful and necessary, notwithstanding all objections.

It is in place here to offer some observations upon the utility of this branch of a liberal education, with special reference to the objections which have been urged against it.

These objections resolve themselves into three classes, namely: first, those which regard rhetoric as an art, and which are equally valid against the systematic study of every other art; secondly, those which regard it under the misconception embodied in the word invention; thirdly, those which confound it with belles-lettres or literature, or maintain that its ground is fully covered by these studies. Now these last have been sufficiently refuted under the preceding head. The second class are the most forcible which have ever been urged against this study,

having prevailed at one time, as we shall see, in banishing it from education. But these derive all their force from the notion that the principal function of rhetoric is that of teaching how to find out what to say upon any subject. Whilst it was thus conceived of, although, in spite of this error, the systematic study of it was one of vast practical utility, yet the defence of it labored under almost insuperable difficulties. Now all these difficulties are obviated, all these objections are completely set aside, by the conception of the art which is here given, as that of the communication of thought to other minds. The only remaining class, namely, those which are supposed to lie against rhetoric as an art, may be very briefly disposed of here, inasmuch as they are equally valid against the systematic study of every other art, and are such as have been elsewhere and at length refuted by the author of this work.

This class of objections takes some such form as the following: Since confessedly it is from the study of the great works of art that the science of art proceeds, these works must have been in existence prior to any systematic knowledge of the laws upon which they depend, or which underlie and account for their production. Accordingly we find that, in the order of time, Homer, Eschylus, and Sophocles, the poets, go before Aristotle and Horace, with their systematic treatment of the art of poetry. In like manner Pericles and Demosthenes, the orators, go before Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, with their systems of rhetoric; as, also, Cicero, the orator, before Cicero and Quintilian, the rhetoricians. Again, in modern times, Shakespeare is before Schlegel and Coleridge. Hence it seems evident that the systematic or scientific study of the laws of art is not necessary to the production of its greatest and most perfect works.

This is all very plausible, but it does not bear examination. It seems to be sufficiently refuted by such considerations as the following:—

1. The greatest artists have always been profound students of their own arts.

Excellence is unattainable otherwise than by laborious study. It may be safely affirmed that nothing truly great was ever produced without profound meditation and study of what was necessary to produce it; and that the greatest artists have al-

ways worked in self-conscious mastery of the science, or general laws, of their own arts. Neither Demosthenes nor Shakespeare can be regarded as exceptions to this rule.

(1.) Formerly, indeed, it was fashionable to speak of Shakespeare, the greatest of all artists, as an untutored genius, ignorant of all method, and unconscious even of the excellence of his own productions. But this notion is found to be wholly untenable by later and more profound criticism. At the present time it is almost impossible for any one to read and understand *Hamlet*, and not see that the author worked in clear, self-conscious possession of the laws of poetry and of the dramatic art—without being convinced that he could have rendered a better reason for the construction and disposition of every scene, and for every expression in it, than any of his critics have done. This notion originated from the fact that so little is known of his personal history, and from his transcendent perfection in his art, as exhibited in concealing it, according to the maxim: *Ars est cělare artem.* The same remark is equally applicable to Homer. Whilst the absurd notion that Shakespeare was unconscious of the immortal excellence of his works, is abundantly refuted by his own declarations, of which the following lines from his Sonnets are examples:—

> Yet do thy work, Old Time; despite thy wrong,
> My love shall in my verse ever live young.
> . . . . . Not marble, nor the gilded monuments
> Of princes, shall outlive this powerful rhyme.
> . . . . . Your praise shall still find room,
> Even in the eyes of all posterity,
> That wear this world out to the ending doom.

(2.) We have much more full information with respect to the personal history of Demosthenes, and of the studies by which his oratorical excellence was attained. We know that Antipho, Gorgias, Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, and a host of other systematic writers on the art of rhetoric, preceded him; and that he was a diligent student of their works. We are informed by

Plutarch that he kept Isaeus, the rhetorician, in his house four years, and paid him ten thousand drachmas (a large sum of money in those times) in order to perfect himself in oratory under his instructions. In fact, his laborious studies were often made a reproach to him by the envy of his conquered rivals.

The historical truth with respect to the development of Athenian oratory seems to be this, that it was due to the action and reaction between theory and practice. The practice of the art, no doubt, was first in the field. Its first feeble productions became the study of those who aimed at the attainment of greater power. Hence was obtained the first systematic or scientific knowledge of oratory. From the application of this knowledge, the practical art advanced to greater excellence; and from the more perfect works thus produced, more complete systematic treatises were elaborated; by the study of which, again, was attained a still higher success in practice. The final result of this course of development we have in the orations of Demosthenes, and in the rhetoric of Aristotle. And such, doubtless, when rightly understood, have been the relations between science and art throughout their whole history.

2. The artist must know what his art requires.

It would seem to be self-evident that the artist, in order to be truly such, must, in some way, be possessed of whatever knowledge the practice of his art requires. Hence the only question to be considered is, what is the best method of obtaining this knowledge? Evidently it must be acquired in one or the other of the two following ways:—

(1.) The uninstructed student may apply himself to ascertain what his art requires in each particular case as it comes before him in practice. This method, if he be endowed by nature with a superior genius or aptitude, may be successful. He may come to know what his art requires in every such case, whilst, at the same time, he is quite ignorant of the general law which governs that and all similar cases. The truths and principles upon which his practical success depends may possess and inspire his mind, and, with adequate practice, may guide his hand, whilst, at the same time,

he cannot be said to possess them in a systematized or scientific form. Hence it sometimes happens that truly great artists are unable to explain the reasons of their procedure, even in their best works.

Now the obvious disadvantages of this method are, that it throws away all the precious results which have been wrought out by others who have gone before in the same path, and requires a vastly greater amount of labor than would be otherwise necessary. These difficulties are such, it is safe to say, as were never voluntarily encountered by any sensible man to whom the better way was open, and such as were never overcome by any but men of extraordinary natural endowments.

(2.) The other method of acquiring the requisite knowledge, is the systematic study of the art in its general laws, as these are deduced from the experience and productions of its great masters; which laws the student applies as rules for his guidance in each particular case, as it comes before him in practice. This is the method here advocated upon the ground of the following advantages:—

(*a.*) It saves an immense amount of time, which otherwise must be wasted in blind efforts and fruitless experiments: and no man can afford to waste his time in any roundabout way of acquiring knowledge, whilst the direct path lies open before him. Whoever thinks otherwise is naturally incapable of becoming an artist in any true sense of the word. Every sensible man will go directly to his object by the shortest way. For the longer we live and work, the more are we impressed by the sorrowful exclamation of Wagner in the Faust:

> "Ach Gott! die Kunst ist lang!
> Und kurz ist unser Leben."

(*b.*) It enables the student to avail himself of all the precious results which have been wrought out by the labors of those who have gone before him. These re-

sults, in every department of science and art, are almost incapable of being over-estimated. None but those who are ignorant of them can despise them: nor even they, without exemplifying the maxim which has been enunciated and enforced by a great authority in physical science, that "whoever undertakes to make new discoveries, in any department of knowledge, without having made himself acquainted with what is already known in that department, is a fool."

(*c.*) It guards the student from innumerable errors and failures, which he cannot avoid in any other way. For very few if any valuable results, in art or science, have ever been reached without a great number of unsuccessful experiments. What innumerable attempts to solve the problem of the physical universe had failed before the final discovery of the law of gravitation! How could it be otherwise in any other department of knowledge? Similar errors and failures have preceded every step of progress in the art of discourse, and are sure to be repeated by every one, to his unspeakable loss and sorrow, who disdains to put himself on his guard against them, and to walk in the strait and narrow way which is opened before him by the systematic study of the art.

(*d.*) It places distinctly before the mind of the student what he has to do, and teaches him how to do it. Thus it imparts encouragement, stimulus, and quickening to his mind, and renders his rhetorical exercises a source of delight instead of disgust. For the repugnance to "writing compositions" which is so commonly felt by learners is mostly due to the want of definite aims, and to ignorance of the specific processes by which such aims are to be accomplished. It is dark before and dark behind. Hence discouragement and disgust are inevitable. But the systematic study of this art teaches the student, first of all, in every exercise to place distinctly before his mind the aim, that is, the effect upon other minds which he wishes to produce; and it instructs him in the nature and laws of the

particular process by which he must proceed in order to effect it. Thus the writing of a composition ceases to be a blind procedure. The student knows precisely what he has to do, and how to do it; and his work, as his practice goes on, becomes at once both easy and delightful. No one without some such experience as the author has had for many years in teaching this art as here laid down, can form a conception of its influence in imparting encouragement, stimulus, and quickening to the minds of generous young men, who address themselves in earnest to its delightful exercises.

(*e.*) Finally, it furnishes the student with sure principles of criticism for the just appreciation of his own productions and those of others. The whole art of literary criticism is founded upon rhetoric. But what is of still greater importance is, that it enables the student to form some just appreciation of his own productions. Without it he never knows for certain whether he is right or not. He falls into grievous errors without knowing how they are to be remedied—without even being conscious of them; and, after his most successful efforts, he is liable to painful misgivings: as it often happens in the case of eminent men who have never enjoyed the advantages of a regular education, that they lack the quiet and assured manner which they otherwise would have, because they never know how much other people may be able to criticize them even in their best performances.

XVII. The word invention, as hitherto employed to characterize the functions of the discursive faculty in rhetoric, is a misnomer: this is evinced from its origin, influence, and meaning.

It seems proper and necessary to conclude this Introduction with some further exhibition of the reasons which have led the author to reject this word, and to introduce a new one, although, if the preceding determination of the object and sphere of rhetoric be correct, it follows that *invention* cannot be the appropriate name for the function of the discursive faculty in this

art. This will lead us to trace the history of the word, and of the erroneous conception which it expresses.

1. It originated in the error that rhetoric must teach the subject-matter of discourse, or, how to find out what to say upon any subject.

We have seen that the range of discourse is unlimited; that its proper subject is the whole domain of knowledge and of thought. This obvious view led the ancient rhetoricians into the natural error that rhetoric must teach the subject-matter of discourse, and that the orator, as such, professed the knowledge of whatever was to be said upon all subjects. This position is defended by Cicero under the character of Crassus, in the treatise *De Oratore* (the most eloquent and inspiring work that was ever written on the subject of eloquence) as also by Quintilian in his Institutes; and it pervades all the books of the ancients on oratory, giving a loose form and a confused coloring to all their statements and discussions. No one who has not given special attention to the subject can imagine how great this confusion is, nor how perfectly it is all cleared up by running through it the distinction here established between the functions of the discursive faculty in rhetoric and in investigation. It was upon the ground of this error that these books were made to include elaborate treatises upon the mental, moral, and political sciences. For ancient oratory was almost confined to political assemblies and courts of justice; in which, of course, political and judicial matters constituted the whole staple of discourse. How, then, could anything be the art of oratory which left the student in ignorance of politics and laws, without the knowledge of which he could not open his mouth before these august assemblies? Again, all discourse was addressed to the faculties of the mind, so that the orator's success must depend upon his knowledge of the nature and laws of these faculties. Hence mental and moral science had to be included in their works on this art. Accordingly we find in Aristotle's Rhetoric not only a treatise on political science, but also elaborate discussions of the emotions and passions, pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, good and evil. It is surprising he did not perceive that his method required him to give a systematic exposition of the nature and laws of all the mental faculties, inasmuch as discourse is necessarily addressed

to them all. Such, then, was the erroneous conception of the function of rhetoric, namely, that it must teach the student how to find out what to say upon any and all subjects, in which the name invention, as used in this art, originated.

2. It expresses an unworthy and degrading conception of the art of discourse.

It was always felt by many serious and thoughtful persons, that the notion expressed by this word was unworthy and degrading to this queen of the arts. For gravely to sit down to the business of hunting up, and finding out, what to say upon any subject, is, at best, a school-boy exercise; nor does this express what actually takes place in the rhetorical exercises of the school-room, much less in serious discourse, with any practical aim. The only reason which can justify a man in undertaking to discourse upon any subject or occasion whatsoever, is that he already has something to say, something which he wishes to communicate to others. Consequently it is not only no function of rhetoric to teach how to find out what to say, but this is no legitimate form of intellectual activity.

Hence this notion has never failed to exert a degrading influence upon the art. The confusion which it has introduced into the books on the subject has been already noticed; but how pernicious it became, and what degradation it brought upon the practical art, in the hands of the Greek sophists, has never yet been fully appreciated. The fact, indeed, that rhetoric fell into contempt, and that its professors, as represented by Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato which bears his name, became almost infamous, is well known; but the true cause of all this has never before been pointed out. Even Socrates, who, in that famous dialogue, pours out his scorn upon rhetoric, comparing it to cookery, and the schools of the rhetoricians to cook-shops, failed to discover where the false notion lurked; and consequently his arguments and ridicule, as directed against the art of discourse itself, of which he was perhaps the greatest master that ever lived, are totally without force.

The orators, in the mean time, both Greek and Roman, continued to study and defend it, though under great disadvantages, from the imperfection of their analysis, which did not enable them to distinguish the true function of rhetoric from that of

investigation; and the wonder is, that even men of such transcendent genius and insight into the nature of eloquence as Demosthenes and Cicero, could attain to such excellence in the practical art, whilst their science and theories remained in the perplexity and confusion which are inseparable from the notion that rhetoric teaches how to find out what to say on any or every subject.

3. This error was the occasion of the banishment of the art from education.

This erroneous conception continued to vitiate and confuse rhetorical science throughout the intervening ages, and even subsequently to the revival of letters in the sixteenth century. But the mighty impulse communicated to the world's thought at the Protestant Reformation, caused the absurdity of including all the departments of knowledge in the art of rhetoric to be perceived. The notion of an art, the object of which was to teach them how to find out what to say, could not fail to be recognized as puerile and absurd by the great and living minds of that epoch. For they were epoch-making men precisely for this reason that they already had something to say—something, indeed, which was too great for utterance. Hence, in the course of time, that part of rhetoric in which this absurd notion was developed and applied, was eliminated from the books on this subject; the whole department of invention was dropped; and rhetoric itself was thus reduced to the mere husk and shell of a negative criticism upon words and style. This extreme is represented in Blair's Lectures, and in most of the contemporary authors. But mere criticism of style, divorced from all stimulus and inspiration of the faculty of discourse, such as had been derived from the sources treated under invention, was soon found to be not only useless, but positively injurious. For it developed the critical faculties so far in advance of those upon which execution depends, that the student became disgusted with his own productions and discouraged. Hence the whole art of rhetoric, together with logic, upon which invention was founded, ceased to be regarded as any branch of a liberal education. Both rhetoric and logic were driven from the schools.

4. This error has hindered the modern attempts to restore the art to its true place in education.

Notwithstanding the general contempt in which rhetoric was held during this period, it never ceased to be felt by the most profound thinkers on the subject, that the art of discourse ought to have some legitimate place in education. Hence a number of attempts were made, from time to time, to revindicate its importance. But none of these have been more than partially successful, chiefly, as it would seem, for the reason that they have loaded themselves with the word invention, and with many of the errors which it carries with it. One such attempt we have in the Philosophy of Rhetoric, by Dr. Campbell of Edinburgh, a work scarcely inferior to that of Aristotle, but which follows a similar and equally vicious method. For whilst it leaves out Aristotle's discussions of political science, it is largely occupied with an equally irrelevant exposition of the emotions and passions which eloquence aims to excite. Archbishop Whately formed a much more precise conception of the function of this art; and among the many evidences of original and vigorous thinking which this author has left us, it is not the least that he conceived and executed the design of giving to the world the substance of Aristotle's great work, purged of its irrelevant discussions of mental, moral, and political science. To this publication, more than to any other, is due the late reawakened interest in rhetorical studies, which has restored to them a place in education; and its great influence is mostly explained by the fact, that it brings back into the art nearly all that was ever legitimate in the department of invention. Professor Day, with less genius but more scientific precision, has followed in the same line of thought; and, from the rich thesaurus of Whately, Campbell, Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle, he has elaborated a rhetorical system, which, notwithstanding grave errors and defects (but for which the present work would never have been undertaken) is, in the judgment of this writer, incomparably the best ever given to the world.

In this brief notice of the attempts which have been made to restore the department of invention to rhetoric, and rhetoric to education, it would be unfair to pass over the profound but unpublished work of the lamented Professor Hope, of Prince-

ton College; who, in the printed syllabus of his lectures, has left us good evidence that, if his life had been spared, he would have worked himself clear of the error contained in the word invention, and would have produced a better system than any of the preceding. Notwithstanding, even he, though in full sympathy with Whately and Day, has reproduced in some pregnant statements the old error from which these authors had freed themselves, namely, that rhetoric includes mental science. Thus he says: "In rhetoric we seek to lay down the art by classifying and reducing to practice the scientific principles, *i. e.* the laws of human nature, which underlie and account for the phenomena." Now the principles of rhetoric do indeed rest upon "the laws of human nature," or, more precisely, upon the laws of the human faculties, as expounded by mental science, just as the principles of sculpture rest upon anatomy; but it is no more the business of rhetoric to classify or expound these laws, than it is of sculpture to do the work of anatomical science.

It must be confessed, however, that these attempts to revindicate the importance of rhetoric in education have not been entirely successful. As distinguished from belles-lettres, it is still regarded in some of our colleges as hardly worthy of being taught: in others the teaching of it consists of little else than the criticism of words and style; whilst the terms rhetoric and rhetorical are still popularly used more frequently, perhaps, in a bad than in a good sense. The reason of this seems to be, that the name invention, as characteristic of the function of the discursive faculty in rhetoric, has been retained by all these authors, together with the fundamental error inseparable from it, that the object of this art is to teach us how to find out what to say. For although they recognize the distinction between investigation and invention, and repudiate the notion that the orator, as such, professes all knowledge, yet they fail to educe and apply the logical consequences of this distinction; in consequence of which they fall under the necessity of casting their instructions into confused and incongruous forms; and while they labor to teach us how to find out what to say, they do not succeed in teaching us how to give our thoughts the intellectual forms which are best adapted for the communication of them to other minds. But under the rigorous conception of

the function of rhetoric here given, we shall find all that is valuable in these authors, and in the ancient rhetoricians—results which are above all price—even more available than they are in their own systems.

5. The word invention has a different and settled meaning in literature and art.

In this sense it is nearly or quite synonymous with *originality*, and is applied to the faculty of discovering hidden analogies, and forming new combinations of thought—a faculty of which the imagination is the predominant element. In the fine arts, as in literature, this is the faculty by which the artist invents new themes, and new embellishments for old ones; which enables him to explore untrodden paths of thought, and to work out unexampled results. In the arts of industry, it is the faculty which originates all new inventions, such as the steam-engine and telegraph, and those which properly come under the protection of patent laws. In science, it is the faculty of discovery, by which truths before unknown, such as was the law of gravitation, are anticipated before they are proved. Hence the word invention properly characterizes a function of the discursive faculty in investigation, rather than that which appropriately belongs to rhetoric. Its continued use in the old rhetorical sense, therefore, tends to confuse not only its well-authorized meaning, as here given, but also the distinction between investigation and the rhetorical procedure (upon which, as we have seen, so much depends) and to perpetuate the error in which this use of it originated.

XVIII. Discursion is proposed as a substitute for invention in rhetoric on the grounds of its derivation, appropriateness, and necessity.

It is only after long reflection, and not without much hesitation, that the author ventures to propose this new word for adoption into the nomenclature of rhetorical science and art. It will be seen that it is regularly derived from *discurro*, the root of the word discourse, according to the same law by which *discussion* is derived from *discutio*, and *excursion* from *excurro*. It is hoped that the appropriateness and necessity of it, if not sufficiently evident from the preceding discussions, may be

more fully evinced by the following considerations: We have seen that the precise function of the discursive faculty in rhetoric, is to think our thoughts into the forms which are best adapted for the communication of them to other minds. Now, for all the specific processes of this function we have distinctive names; as, first, analysis and synthesis; secondly, narration, description, exemplification, and comparison; thirdly, induction and deduction. We have, moreover, distinctive names for all the more general processes of this function which have reference to the practical aims of discourse, namely, explanation, conviction or confirmation, excitation, and persuasion. But for the function itself, in its most general form, which includes all these processes, we have no name, either in Greek or Latin, or any of the modern languages. The reason of this extraordinary fact is, that the erroneous notion of rhetoric which has been stigmatized, brought in the word invention to cover this ground. Since, therefore, we have here a common conception, clearly defined, and distinct from all others, it seems as if we ought to have a name for it. Since, also, this conception is of paramount importance in the art of discourse, inasmuch as it includes all the various processes of rhetorical thinking, it seems not unreasonable that we should be allowed to find an appropriate name for it. And since, in fine, all these processes, taken together, constitute the function of the discursive faculty in discourse, it is hoped that the name Discursion, being regularly derived, will not be deemed inappropriate, nor too bold an innovation.

XIX. Discursion includes the exhibition of the primary processes of thought in discourse, the manner in which these processes are employed in order to accomplish its aims, and the construction of discourses.

In the treatment of this department of rhetoric it will be found convenient to divide it into three parts, as follows:—

1. The primary processes of thought in discourse; in which the essential nature of these processes will be exhibited, together with the immutable laws by which they are governed.
2. The manner in which these processes are employed in

order to effect the aims of discourse; in which it will be shown how they are combined with each other, and what modifications they undergo in such combinations.

3. The construction of discourses; in which the results of the two preceding parts will be brought to bear upon the construction of discourses, with reference to their several practical aims. This part will include the treatment of the divisions of discourse, namely, the introduction, the proposition, the discussion, and the peroration, exhibiting the laws by which they are governed in their relations to each other, and to the practical aim.

What effect the successful execution of this plan will have upon the art as hitherto exhibited, and with what propriety the result may be characterized as a new rhetorical system, may be understood by those who are familiar with the subject, in part, from this Introduction, and more fully from the work itself.

ART. II.—*The Life and Letters of Frederick William Faber, D.D., Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri.* By JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, of the same Congregation. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1869.

A WRITER in the *London Quarterly*, some years ago, in speaking of the single influence of Dr. Newman in infusing into the Tractarian party that tendency to Rome which at last led so many of them astray, says: "Of all those who in these late years have quitted the Church of England for the Roman Communion—esteemed, honored, and beloved, as were many of them—no one save Dr. Newman appears to us to possess the rare gift of undoubted genius." This we believe will be admitted, and we think it equally true that one at least who followed Dr. Newman into that communion deserves, as far as his love for the Lord Jesus and his self-sacrificing zeal are concerned, to be held up as a model—Frederick William Faber. In his numerous devotional books, in all his correspondence, and in his hymns, almost all of which are of the highest order for beauty, tenderness, and spirituality, there breathes sweet

humility, childlike trust in Jesus as the Saviour of the lost, and the most loving submission to the Divine will. Some of his hymns have found their way into Protestant collections, such as "Hymns of the Ages," and have met with much favor. The first of his remarkable series of spiritual books, entitled, "All for Jesus," is the one on which his reputation as an author mainly rests; but all his books were eagerly welcomed at the time of their publication, and were immediately translated into different languages. And there is much in them which is fitted to excite healthfully the devotional feelings of the pious who are not of the Church to which he belonged, and who have no sympathy with it, to suggest to them profitable thought, and to incite them to faithfulness in the performance of duty. That which is false in them can easily be discriminated, and separated from that which is good and true.

The author of Faber's Life tells us that his books extend to a wide circle "the benefit to be derived by those whose good fortune it was to hear many of them delivered in the same form from the chair of the oratory. Original and characteristic, their every line recalls to any one who ever formed part of Father Faber's audience, the power and fascination of manner and voice which brought his teaching home to every listener's heart." And yet this man, whose self-sacrificing piety and loveliness of Christian character all must acknowledge, was, during almost the whole period in which he so earnestly sought the good of others by his incessant toil, as sincere and thorough a Romanist as if he had drunk in the system with his mother's milk. How one educated in the Protestant faith can become a sincere Papist it is difficult for us to understand, and to many minds the thing seems impossible. But it must be remembered that for an Anglican or Puseyite to become a Catholic is a very different thing from the conversion to Romanism of any other intelligent Protestant. No one disputes that there are sincere Anglicans or Puseyites, and a Puseyite is already almost a Catholic. But even if the sincerity of some who profess to have been converted to the belief of the monstrous doctrines of transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, the supremacy of the Pope, purgatory, the worship of the saints, and the adoration of the Virgin, must be admitted, still there are probably

some who have secret doubts as to the possibility of such persons being true Christians. But as long as one retains with these errors, however inconsistently, the essential truths of the gospel, his holding them is not incompatible with piety. Whoever is a true worshipper of Christ is born of God, and that the subject of this biography worshipped and loved the Saviour it is impossible to doubt.

The total change which took place in his religious opinions was the natural result of the training he received at Oxford, where he took up his residence at the time that the Tractarian movement was in progress, and also to the powerful influence of the great leader of the movement, by whom so many of the younger men around him were fashioned and biased. We can hardly form an estimate of what Newman's power as a party leader was over those who were "within the charmed ring." What Faber thought he owed to him may be seen from the language he employed in the latter part of his life in dedicating one of his works to Newman, "to whom," he says, "I owe the faith of the Church, the grace of the sacraments, and the habit of St. Philip, with much more that love knows and feeds upon, though it cannot tell in words, but which the last day will show." The life of one who was so intimately connected with the change of religious thought arising from the Oxford movement, has an interest for all who wish to study its early progress.

Frederick William Faber was born at the Vicarage of his grandfather, the Rev. T. Faber, Vicar of Calverley, in Yorkshire, on the 28th of June, 1814. His childhood was passed in the city of Durham, his father having been appointed Secretary to the Bishop of Durham shortly after Frederick William's birth. He was first sent to school at Kirkby Stephen, in Westmoreland, where his poetic faculty, which was early developed, was fostered by the beautiful scenery of the lake country. His intimate familiarity with this region is shown in some of his published verses. Subsequently, he studied at Harrow under Dr. Langley, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, a man of great gentleness of character, and to his wise and paternal direction he always professed himself to be much indebted. In 1832 he was matriculated at Baliol College, Oxford, but though

he was a man of great scholarly tastes, and his attainments were considerable, his career at Oxford cannot be called a brilliant one. He seems to have applied himself with undue partiality to favorite studies, such as poetry and divinity. He was remarkable even at this time for graces of person and manner, and his prepossessing appearance and superior talent, together with conversational gifts of a high order, made him a general favorite.

The tender piety which beams from Faber's maturer devotional works seems to have filled his heart from boyhood, and whether it can easily be accounted for or not, it is plain that his conversion subsequently to the Romish faith did not extinguish, nor even lessen it. How thoroughly his heart and mind were taken up with religious themes, we can see in almost every letter. He writes from Oxford:—

"Now I am but a boy of 21, and on me has all this devolved. In what danger do I stand of pride, of assumption, of self-sufficiency! and what injury would accrue to the cause of Christ from any inconsistency in my Christian walk! Oh, my dearest A., do I not need your prayers? . . . Often when I am in companies where religion is not named, where earth and the things of earth are dominant, the still soft accents of the voice of Christ fall with meek power upon my ear: 'Rise up, my love, my fair one, and *come away*.' And yet I do not sufficiently come forth from the world, and take my stand manfully beneath the banners of my Lord." Again in another letter: "It has pleased God, ever since I have been wakened to a sense of my own utter helplessness, and convinced of the love of my Redeemer, that I should enjoy to an almost unexampled degree the use of the means of grace, more particularly in the study of religious books. These must now be in a great measure closed; and I must look to God with trembling hope that He will preserve my spirituality of mind by an additional outpouring of His Holy Spirit upon me; for I have already had occasion to deplore the deadening effect of so much heathen reading upon the soul's health. A fearful responsibility rests somewhere in the matter of modern education. The absence of nearly all those characteristics which should mark Christian instruction, the familiarizing the susceptible mind of boyhood with representations of crime and unnatural lusts which the Apostle says it is a shame even to make mention of, the entwining around the remembrances of early study the fictions of an impure mythology—these will be fearful items of account at the day of judgment. I am by no means for expelling the classics, but reducing the monstrous excess to which the study of them has been pushed. A Christian takes care that nothing shall be presented to his boy at such a critical age, save those solemn and eternal truths which *must* have an abiding place in the soul of a redeemed sinner: is this the case? far from it. . . . But these impurities he has painfully to *work out* from an unknown language, where the

impression is of course deeper and stronger. Now I ask what is this but a plain and practical denial of the doctrine of man's depravity? What is this but to plunge your boy into that temptation against which he is taught to pray? And is not this a mockery of God?"

When he came to Oxford, the Tractarian party had already been formed, and he became an enthusiastic admirer of Newman, who was then preaching at St. Mary's, Oxford. Under his influence he threw himself eagerly into the movement for the extension of the principles expounded in the Tracts for the Times. It was not easy, however, for him to emancipate himself from the effects of the religious education he had received in childhood, for the spiritual training of his parents had indoctrinated him with Calvinistic views, which were traditional in his family. There was evidently for a short time a struggle in his mind, and he even seemed disposed to withdraw from the teaching of the Tractarian party, for he wrote to one of his friends: "I have been thinking a great deal on the merits and tendency of Newmanism, and I have become more than ever convinced of its falsehood... I believe Newman to be an eminently pious, humble-minded Christian, but I think that he has sat at the feet of the early contemplative philosophers with unscriptural humility... What makes me fear most is that I have seen Newman himself *growing* in his opinions; I have seen indistinct visions become distinct embodiments; I have seen the conclusion of one proposition become the premise of a next, through a long series: all this is still going on—to my eyes more like the blind march of error than the steady uniformity of truth—and I know not where it will stop."

But the influences which he was under at the University soon resumed their power, and he became a zealous advocate of Anglican principles. He did not, however, foresee, whilst carrying out those principles to the utmost, that their natural development would lead him to the Roman communion.

Having failed once or twice, not in his examinations but in his competition for distinguished place, he obtained, in 1837, a fellowship at University College, and also carried off the Johnson divinity scholarship. His position being thus secure, he began to prepare himself for orders. Desirous of obtaining some acquaintance with the works of the earlier Christian

Fathers, he joined Dr. Newman in his scheme for completing the library of the Fathers, undertaking as his share of the work to translate the books of St. Optatus against the Donatists. In the long vacation of 1837 Mr. Faber, on a visit to Ambleside, formed a friendship with Wordsworth. In after years he used to describe the long rambles which they took together over the neighboring mountains, the poet muttering verses to himself in the intervals of conversation. In 1839 he was promoted to the priesthood in the Church of England at Oxford, having been ordained deacon two years before. The summer of 1840 was spent in another visit to Ambleside, where much time was devoted to parochial work, and during the two months in which he took care of the parish, he preached two sermons every week. During the autumn of this year he published a small collection of poems which met with great success. In 1841 the Rectory of Elton, in Huntingdonshire, was offered him by his college. Upon notifying his intention to Mr. Wordsworth to accept, the latter replied, "I do not say you are wrong, but England loses a poet." He endeavored to desist entirely from the pursuit of poetry, but nature in the end got the upper hand of his resolutions. "*Temperance* in poetry," he said to a friend, "is most difficult, yet a plain duty in a priest; but *abstinence* I could with some small difficulty practise, but Keble thinks it would be wrong."

Mr. Faber's feelings towards the Romish Church were now so changed from what they had been formerly, that he desired, in his office of Rector, to imitate the methods which she pursued in dealing with the souls committed to her care. He determined therefore, before entering upon his new duties, to examine those methods closely in Catholic countries, especially in Rome. Having provided himself with letters from Dr. Wiseman to Cardinal Acton, he left Elton for Rome on the 3d of April, 1843. The Tractarian party with which Faber was identified, although essentially Roman Catholic, had no thought as yet of severing themselves from the Anglican establishment, for they cherished the delusion that some way could be found of connecting themselves with the Roman See. Neither were they as yet convinced that there was no salvation except in complete subjection to the Pope. "The one thing necessary to

prove," said Faber, "is that adherence to the Holy See is essential to the *being* of a Church—to the *well* being of all churches I admit it is essential." It was with reference to this hope that Pope Gregory said to Faber, upon his being admitted to a private audience with his Holiness shortly after his arrival in Rome: "You must not mislead yourself in wishing for unity, yet waiting for your *church* to move. Think of the salvation of your own soul." This advice pressed upon him heavily, and in his perplexity and fear lest his soul might perish should he remain out of communion with Rome, he suffered much anguish of mind. In words strange to a Protestant ear, he writes: "If we are not now in the One Church but in a concubine, so long as it be a doubt we may hope that in the endurance of that last mercy, Purgatory, we shall be knitted into the true body... If I try to pray, if I try to love Christ, if I meditate on the passion, all is in the mist and in the dark. I think—all must begin with the one Church; are you in it? if not, of what good is all this? You have had it put before you—look at her catholicity, unity, sanctity, fruitful missions, clear miracles, wonderful saints, ancient things! You pray in vain because you have not really humbled yourself before the Church so revealed to you; you confess in vain; you communicate in vain; so thoughts rush upon you."

Whilst in Rome Faber devoted himself to the study of Italian in order that he might study the numerous lives of Saints published in that language. He also spent six or eight hours a day in reading Roman Catholic works on theology, hagiography, and practical religion. Dr. Wiseman's letters secured him the attention of some of the clergy, who visited with him the "holier" churches, and convents "famous for miracles and the residence of Saints." Surrounded by such influences he became more Roman every day. He continued, however, to have mental struggles, and the distress which he suffered resulted in physical ailments which affected him all his life. At last he went home to Elton so completely Romanized in all his views and feelings, that upon resuming his parochial duties he modelled his pastoral operations entirely on the system pursued by the Catholic Church. His letters at this time speak of his being engaged in frequent prayer, and the decline of his health told a

clear tale of abstinence and penance. His medical attendant ascribed many of his attacks of illness to want of proper nourishment, and sometimes he fainted in the church while reading prayers. He habitually wore a thick horsehair cord tied in knots around his waist. The pains he took to conceal his austerities, show the sincerity with which he practised them.

It was only in deference to the judgment of Dr. Newman that Faber had not before this left the Anglican communion for that of Rome. This greatest leader of the Puseyites was at that time living in seclusion at Littlemore, two or three miles from Oxford, as yet uncertain what course it would be his duty to pursue. The delay which he had imposed upon himself he also recommended to those who sought his counsel. Newman himself tells us in his Apologia, that from 1843 he refused in any sense to direct others; that he could not presume to unsettle them as he was unsettled, when he had no means of bringing them out of that unsettlement; that he could not point to them a place of refuge which he was not sure that he should choose for himself. And as late as January, 1845, he wrote to a friend: "This I am sure of, that nothing but a simple, direct call of duty is a warrant for any one leaving our Church; no preference of another Church, no delight in its services, no hope of greater religious advancement in it, no indignation, no disgust at the persons and things among which we may find ourselves in the Church of England. The simple question is, Can *I* (it is personal; not whether another, but can *I*) be saved in the English Church? am *I* in safety were I to die to-night? Is it a mortal sin in *me* not joining another communion?" (*Apologia Pro Sua Vita*).

The misery inflicted upon Faber by his sensitive but perverted conscience is seen in what he wrote to Newman with reference to this delay: "I only wish to be where God wills me to be: but then sin deafens one. He may speak, and I not hear: He may *have* spoken, viz., at Rome, and I not have heard. What they said about finalis gratia there, sometimes runs like cold steel through me. Do what I will, I cannot outgrow the fear of being '*damned*' as out of the Church: and so I too much overlook the risk of the same awful event through

my own sinfulness and ineffective penance." He earnestly requests Dr. Newman to revoke the prohibition which the latter had laid on him of invoking the blessed Lady, the Saints and Angels.

Mr. Faber continued in his parochial charge at Elton about two years, and notwithstanding the struggles of his mind, every moment was employed in the discharge of his duties. But in the autumn of 1845 many of his friends, and among them Dr. Newman, whose faithful satellite he ever seemed to be, were received into the Roman Church, and then he hesitated no longer. He was admitted on the 17th of November, and was confirmed and made his first communion on the following day. His last interview with his flock, which he loved with all his heart, was very sorrowful. There happening to be many converts to the Romish faith settled at Birmingham, Mr. Faber and his companions went there, and, taking possession of a small house, they were formed by him into a sort of community. Their general purpose was to assist the parochial clergy in visiting the sick, giving instruction, and similar duties. Such was the beginning of the Wilfridian community of Brothers of the Will of God. In order to obtain money for the support of the new community Mr. Faber visited Italy. The distinguished convert was of course received in Rome with great affection, especially by the ecclesiastics who had known him on his former visit. Cardinal Acton fell upon his neck and kissed him. The Pope gave him an interview. The English College offered him a home. He returned to Birmingham to set about the more complete organization of the community, according to rules which he had devised during his absence from it. His thoughts often reverted to his little society while absent, and he frequently despatched a long letter to one or other of its members. We will present our readers with an extract from one of these letters, which will give them some idea of the childlike simplicity of his character, and of the sincerity with which he had embraced the doctrines of the Romish religion. The extract will also show with what affectionate solicitude he regarded his little band in England.

"My dear William:—I had not time to say as much to you as I could have wished before I came away, about your wish to become a monk. I think it is

God's Holy Spirit who has put that wish into your mind; but a great deal will have to be done on your part before it can be fulfilled. You must remember that in becoming a monk, you give yourself altogether to Almighty God, body as well as soul, mind and will and liberty, and all you are, and all you have. To be sure, this is but a little, a very little sacrifice to make to Jesus in return for the unspeakable one He has made and makes on the altar every day for you; but it is a hard sacrifice for us weak sinners to make; and because it is a sacrifice of *love* Jesus counts it a great sacrifice, and not a little one. How happy, how very happy are those who have strength given them to make this sacrifice to the Lord, to crucify themselves unto the world, and to die to it and to its most tempting pleasures here, that they may live to Jesus and Mary hereafter. But our Lord says in the gospel, that when a man wishes to build a tower, he ought first of all to sit down and count the cost. Now, my dear William, the Christian perfection at which you aim is just such a tower, a very high tower, for its top reaches heaven itself. . . . The world *is* a pleasant place, far too pleasant a place to live in; you can marry, you can have a home; God may bless you with children, you can have rest, and ease, and comfort, and holiday, and all this without sin; you may save your soul in the next world without putting up with a monk's hardships in this. Now this is a very bright picture, a picture any one might fall in love with. What is it, then, which makes men turn their backs on all this and fall in love with a poor, rough, uncomfortable dress, with short sleep and long praying, with hard lying and coarse eating, with fasting and discipline, and teaching the stupid, and nursing the sick and attending the dying, and dull silence and stiff obedience, fighting and fighting and fighting till one's head aches, and one's appetite fails, and one is sick with the weary fight. What makes a young man like you in love with all manner of comfortless things like these? What was it you were thinking of, William, when you threw your arms around me the other day, and begged of me to make you a monk? You know you asked of me far more than I could do; it is grace and grace only which can make men monks, and I need rather to be prayed for as the filthiest leper in the doorway of God's Church, than to be spoken to as you spoke to me then; but what were you thinking of when you made such a request? I will tell you what was in your mind, even though you might not be aware of it;—it was the three and thirty years in which our blessed Saviour, the Almighty Creator of the world, lived, and moved, and spoke, and ate, and drank, and slept, and watched, and prayed, and suffered on his own earth for you and me; it was the five sweet adorable wounds of his hands, and feet, and side which like so many sweet singing-birds sang to your heart, and you loved the music of them more than the gayer and the louder songs of the world. . . . Do you long with a sort of holy impatience for the dull life of a monk? or was it only a feeling of love to me which made you long not to be separated from me? And if once you were a monk, do you feel humbly sure that by God's grace you should not repent of it? . . . . With regard to what I remember were your besetting temptations, I would say that of all kinds of Catholic devotion, none is so proper for you as the continual memory of the PRESENCE of God. Your work will not allow you to make long prayers; but no work stands in the way of remembering the presence of God. Get in the habit of often saying short sentences to Him, such as, 'O my God, I love thee;

make me love thee more. Jesus keep me pure,' and such like. Get the habit of thinking of God whenever you hear the clock strike, and say, 'God give me perseverance;' and take every means you can to keep yourself united to God by thinking of his presence . . . . Do your best to keep always in mind, in any manner which you find easiest and pleasantest, the presence of Almighty God, and learn to *love* that presence as well as fear it. Remember, William, how that presence is about you now; how priest after priest comes in on a morning who has had Jesus, the real Jesus within him; and day and night He lies upon the Cathedral altar with only one little star of light to burn before Him and do Him honor . . . . God bless you, William; pray very, very often for me lest I should fall away."

Very affectionately yours,

FREDERICK WILFRED FABER."

Arrangements having been made upon Faber's return to Birmingham for removal to more commodious quarters, the Wilfridian community, in the course of the year 1846, moved to Cheadle, a fine estate near Birmingham, given them by Lord Shrewsbury. They named it St. Wilfrid's. Their first work here was to open a school for boys, and pupils came in rapidly.

Mr. Faber, from a sense of unworthiness, had put off ordination to the priesthood as long as possible, but about this time he was ordained deacon and priest by Dr. Wiseman at Oreott. Just before his ordination he addressed the people in these words: "For eight years of my life I was a Protestant clergyman. . . During those eight years I gave up my life to the poor, lived among their children, was continually in their cottages or at their death-beds; and as an Englishman bred and born, no object was so dear to me as the English poor, so miserably neglected, ill used, or coldly treated as they are now; and now that I am on the point of being ordained a Catholic priest, I feel even more strongly than ever the desire to devote all my health and strength to win my poor countrymen to the true light of the gospel, to console them in all their tribulations whether of body or of soul, to sacrifice my own ease and comfort for them, and knowing as well as I do the trials and difficulties of the poor, to endeavor to make the yoke of Jesus to them what he himself called it, a light yoke and merciful."

The brothers of the community now engaged more effectually in missionary work. They mapped out a wide extent of coun-

try into districts, and devoted their days to a systematic visitation of every house within their limits. Crowds came on Sundays to St. Wilfrid's, and the chapel was soon overflowed. In addition to these labors, Mr. Faber superintended the translation from the Italian and other foreign languages of a series of the Lives of the Saints. A part of the literary work he did himself, but the most of it he committed to other hands.

In the fall of 1847 Dr. Newman returned from Rome, empowered by the Pope to establish in England the Congregation of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. The first idea of an English Oratory had originated with Dr. Wiseman. Philip Neri, the founder of the Congregation, and a canonized Saint of Rome, was born 1515, of a noble family at Florence. At the age of nineteen he went to Rome, and was ordained priest. In 1559, in concert with the celebrated Baronius and other friends, he established the Congregation of the Priests of the Oratory, for mutual improvement, study, preaching, and the instruction of youth. Having been approved by the Pope, it was introduced into many cities of Italy, and subsequently into Spain, Portugal, the Indies, and other countries. Spiritual reading, preaching, saying paters and aves, singing, and mental prayer, constitute the principal services of the Oratory. Four discourses of half an hour each are preached every day except Saturday, which is left free for the sake of hearing confessions. The Oratory is opened every evening, any one being at liberty to enter except women. The Priests of the Congregation ordinarily say mass every morning. At the table they listen to spiritual reading two-thirds of the time; the other third is spent in proposing two questions; one on some moral or Scriptural subject, the other relating to a case of conscience. The fathers propose them by turns, morning and evening, and every one answers in succession, as it seems best to him. The Oratories are all independent of the one at Rome, and each one governs itself.

Dr. Newman having established his Oratory at Birmingham, soon afterwards admitted to his congregation Faber and the entire Wilfridian community. According to the rules of the congregation, each Oratorian is required to fulfil the term of three years' noviceship, in order to be practised in its exercises;

but at the end of six months Faber was dispensed from the remainder and appointed master of novices. About this time it was resolved to carry out a project often discussed before, of erecting an Oratory in London. Newman preferring to remain at Birmingham himself, the detachment sent to London was placed under Faber. Though more immediately governed by Faber, however, they were still considered to belong to the congregation at Birmingham, and Newman was still their Superior. It was shortly after the erection of this Oratory in King William street, London, that Newman delivered in the church belonging to it his celebrated lectures on Anglican difficulties, which were instrumental in determining some to become Catholics. His audiences were admitted by tickets, and comprised many persons distinguished in the literary and intellectual world, among whom were Thackeray and Charlotte Bronte. About eighteen months after the establishment of the Oratory in London, it was thought to have acquired sufficient strength to stand alone, and it was therefore released from its dependence on the congregation at Birmingham, and Faber was chosen its Superior.

From the time that Faber began his labors in London he was never well. His work was overwhelming, and the nervousness arising from ill health, as well as constant physical pain, made it still more burdensome. "I am but a wreck of a man," he writes, "my brain quite wrought out with lecturing and constant pain. However, the great thing is for God to have what He is pleased to will; if work, work; if suffering, suffering. *Sit nomen Domini benedictum.*" Again: "Now look here, it was five years last Sunday fortnight since I began All for Jesus. Since then I have written: 1. All for Jesus. 2. Growth in Holiness. 3. Blessed Sacrament. 4. Creator and Creature. 5. Edition of my Poems with three thousand new lines. 6. Sir Lancelot, immensely changed. 7. Foot of the Cross. 8. New Hymns, besides the thirty new ones now. 9. Bethlehem. 10. Conferences. 11. Ethel's Book. Also, 12. Innumerable Preachings. 13. Three books partially prepared. 14. Confessing and directing. 15. Business as Superior. 16. Correspondence. 17. A certain amount of intercourse with God. 18. The bearing of pain when I could do nothing else. It is

plain that life can't be lived at this rate. But my mind is now like a locomotive that has been started with neither driver nor stoker." In another letter: "The last six months have been on the whole very hard to me, from pain and from serious matters of government and responsibility. I was unhappy about the statistics furnished about us, as I have always felt that numbering penitents and converts was in St. Philip's eyes like David numbering his people. It is a most un-Oratorian spirit. So I pray God we may forget both the facts and figures we sent. I have forgotten them already. . . . There is hardly a day your trouble does not weigh upon me and stir my sympathies. I am weighed down with sorrows and cares of my own, but they seem only to make me feel the sorrows of others more keenly and more affectionately."

In the fall of 1851 it was judged advisable that Father Faber should give up all work for a few months, and try the effect of a total change of scene. He started on a journey to the Holy Land, but fell very sick by the way, and went no farther than Italy. He wrote from Rome the following letter in relation to the shrine of St. Philip Neri and the relics of that Saint. When it is considered that Faber, when he wrote it, was an intelligent, grown-up man, his credulity almost surpasses belief. Yet no one who reads his letters can doubt his sincerity. In some respects he was all his life a little child. With the exception of a few such men as Faber, it is not to be believed for a moment that the educated prelates and priesthood of the Romish Church have themselves a particle of faith in what they teach the people concerning their Popish legends. We do not know what to think of the man who does not feel intense indignation at the bare thought of Pope, Cardinals, and Priests all encouraging the people to reverence the disgusting pretended relics with which their churches are filled. Let it be remembered that the highest Romish authorities in all countries continue to this day to give their sanction to *what they know to be* imposition on the credulity of the people; and can it be doubted that even the most bigoted person, if he knew the real facts, would question the truth of a system which rests so extensively on known and deliberate deception? But here is a part of the letter. "The Superior of the Chiesa Nuova, Padre Colloredo, was quite lov-

ing, and told me that as soon as the church was looked at the Ave Maria, Santo Padre's shrine [St. Philip Neri's] should be opened and lighted up. . . . A wondrous consolation it was to see the dear Saint lying so calmly, his feet resting on the end of the coffin, and his hands crossed in front, and that grand crown upon his head. I was a good deal overcome by it, *as well as by the relics, which are like a life of him*, the crumbs he left at his last supper, the crocefissa senso croce, the bag of supposed relics WHICH HE WORKED MIRACLES WITH—but you know and have seen them all."

He came home far from well enough to resume his toils; but there was a great deal to be done, and he never spared himself. As the community had long ago outgrown the little establishment in King William street, the erection of a new Oratory at Brompton was now begun. Father Faber superintended the work, not intermitting his other labors, which consisted in preaching, visiting the sick, giving retreats and missions, and performing literary operations. Before the conclusion of the year 1852 he sent to the press an essay dedicated to Cardinal Wiseman, on the "Interests and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints." It contains a minute account of the influence upon the spiritual life of the study of Hagiography. The following passage on the English Bible, which has so often been attributed to Dr. Newman, occurs in it:—

"If the Arian heresy was propagated and rooted by means of beautiful vernacular hymns, so who will say that the uncommon beauty and marvellous English of the Protestant Bible is not one of the great strongholds of heresy in this country? It lives on in the ear like a music that never can be forgotten, like the sound of church bells which the convert hardly knows how he can forego. Its felicities seem often to be almost things rather than mere words. It is part of the national mind, and the anchor of national seriousness. Nay, it is worshipped with a positive idolatry, in extenuation of whose grotesque fanaticism, its intrinsic beauty pleads availingly with the man of letters and the scholar. The memory of the dead passes into it. The potent traditions of childhood are stereotyped in its verses. The power of all the griefs and trials of a man is hidden beneath its words. It is the representative of his best moments,

and all that there has been about him of soft, and gentle, and pure, and penitent, and good, speaks to him forever out of his English Bible. It is his sacred thing which doubt never dimmed and controversy never soiled. It has been to him all along as the silent, but O how intelligible, voice of his guardian angel; and in the length and breadth of the land there is not a Protestant with one spark of religiousness about him whose spiritual biography is not in his Saxon Bible."

With the establishment of the Oratory at Brompton, began the last period of Father Faber's life. One year followed another without bringing any change to his occupations, and his frequent and severe illnesses were the only interruptions to his work. But even during illness, except in cases of extreme suffering, he was an indefatigable reader. Besides theological works, he read most of the publications of the day on natural science. Whatever had any bearing on spiritual life and mystical theology he sought for eagerly. He was most careful in preparing everything he preached, nor was he willing without such preparation to address the children of the schools, though his gifts singularly fitted him for extemporaneous speaking. He used often to say that what was not carefully prepared was not worth listening to. His last few sermons were preached under the pressure of painful illness. One of these concluded with the following remarkable passage: "The devil's worst and most fatal preparation for the coming of Antichrist is the weakening of men's belief in eternal punishment. Were they the last words I might ever say to you, nothing should I wish to say to you with more emphasis than this, that next to the thought of the precious blood, there is no thought in all your faith more precious or more needful for you than the thought of eternal punishment." In the beginning of the spring of 1863 the hope of checking his disease was finally given up. He received the farewell visits of Cardinal Wiseman and Dr. Newman, and many other friends. He lingered, however, through the following summer, his mind continuing perfectly clear and calm. In September attacks of delirium became frequent. In expectation of his death the sacraments of his Church were frequently administered to him. On the morning of the 26th his spirit gently passed away. In Faber were

united uncommon energy of will, with great gentleness of character and a forgiving and loving spirit. One of the last things he said was: "I have nothing to forgive anybody for, nothing against a single member of the community. I would give my life for any one of them." And a letter which he wrote shortly before he died concluded with the words: "Increased sweetness to others, increased thoughtfulness and legislation for the tiny comforts of others, and a snubbing of the body's inventive appetite for lots of little things and little extras not absolutely wanted; these are what I set before myself in illness, and then, seeing how little way I have the pluck to go, I am made a trifle at least more humble and self-hating."

A new impulse was given to Roman Catholic devotion in England by the hymns and popular services of the London Oratory—the one directed, and the other written by Faber. He rendered no greater service, however, to those of his own faith, his biographer thinks, than by the publication of his works. In eight years, between January, 1853, and December, 1860, he wrote and published eight closely-printed volumes. This remarkable series of spiritual works have made his name widely known and loved among reading Catholics throughout Europe and this country.

One great lesson taught by this biography is the lesson of charity, and that we should be cautious in assuming that a man is not a Christian because he is a Romanist. Undoubtedly, when we obey the injunction of the Scriptures to pray for "all saints," we pray for many who are in the Church of Rome. Even a Romish priest who prays to the Virgin, and who teaches the people to pray to her, as Faber certainly did, may be, like him, an humble worshipper and lover of Jesus. And though he may practise austerities, he may do so in a different spirit from that which actuates the masses in his own Church, for instead of being full of self-righteousness, he may have no confidence in his own righteousness. This charity does not require us to admit that to be true which is false, nor make us afraid to pronounce a flaming Roman Catholic professor a child of the devil who shows himself to be one. It would not be enlightened charity which would make us think that perhaps, after all, the licentious Roman Catholic priests of Spain and Italy, and

the brutal priests of Ireland, are Christian men. Charity rather clarifies the vision than causes us to confound things that differ. We may admit that the Papacy is the Mystical Babylon, the Scarlet Woman, the Antichrist drunk with the blood of the Saints, "the great Whore which did corrupt the earth with her fornication," and yet believe that God has a people in the Church of Rome who live and die within her pale.

Art. III.—*A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life.* By W. R. Alger. Philadelphia, 1864.

The Verdict of Reason upon the Question of the Future Punishment of those who Die Impenitent. By Henry M. Dexter. Boston, 1865.

Stuart on Future Punishment. Republished by the Presbyterian Publication Committee. 1867.

These are some of the books issued within a few years upon the subject of Future Retribution. This is one of the questions connected with Christianity which no amount of discussion in the past suffices to settle for the present. Each generation opens for itself the question of destiny. Infidelity and errorists constantly revive the old and oft-refuted objections; and thus impose upon the Church the necessity of rediscussing what has been gone over an hundred times. The editor remarks in his Introduction to the third book on our list: "There is no book more imperatively demanded by the religious controversies of the day than the one which we now reproduce. First issued thirty-seven years since, it has gone out of print, and is little known to the present generation: but the questions which it discusses and settles are among those which now most agitate the Christian mind." That there is such an interest in the question of destiny, appears in many ways. The large sale of "Gates Ajar" and kindred books, the fact that two sermons on "The Heavenly State" and "Future Retribution," by Henry Ward Beecher, first published in the "Plymouth Pulpit," have been specially called for in so marked and persistent a manner as to

be reprinted *—show that the public mind is alive on this momentous question. Is not the pulpit too reticent? It is a "living question." Ought not the ministry meet it kindly but fully, even at the risk of the accusation of "preaching hell and damnation?" Quietly but widely error is scattering its seeds of doubt and disbelief. They are found in many a magazine and newspaper read by our youth. Who can tell how many of our young men have imbibed universalist notions from reading the ninth chapter of the popular "Recollections of a Busy Life," by Greeley, in which, under the caption of "My Faith," he makes a special plea for the doctrine that all will finally be saved.

The first work at the head of this article is a thesaurus of ancient and modern, pagan and Christian teachings on the condition of the soul after death. It gives evidence of much reading. The rationalistic spirit of the book may be gathered from the following extract:—"The conception of Ahriman, the evil spirit bearing death, is interwrought from the first throughout the Zoroastrian scheme. In the Hebrew records, on the contrary, such an idea appears but incidentally, briefly, rarely, and only in the later books. The account of the introduction of sin and death by the serpent in the garden, dates from a time subsequent to the commencement of the captivity," p. 140. Constantly opportunity is sought to cast discredit upon the main doctrines of the Bible, as held by evangelical Christians. He proceeds upon the principle that the religions of antiquity are to be treated with more consideration than Judaism and Christianity. Every conjecture and doubt is to be placed against the truthfulness of the Bible, rather than in its favor. How much his biblical arguments are worth, may be judged from the following respecting the translation of Enoch and Elijah. "It says nothing about translation or immortality, nor can anything of the kind be legitimately deduced from it. Its plain meaning is no more nor less than this: Enoch lived 365 years, fearing God and keeping his commandments, and then he died," p. 145. "If the ascension of Elijah to heaven in a chariot of fire did really take place, and if the books held by the Jews as inspired and sacred, contained a history of it at the time of our Saviour,

* See Publisher's Notice.

it is certainly singular that neither he nor any of the Apostles allude to it in connection with the subject of a future life," p. 146. He perverts and misrepresents evangelical doctrines, and denominational views. He hates "the hell of Christianity." His own creed is, the good will be happy in the future world simply because they are good; and the wicked will be unhappy for a season, until the good in them predominates. The book is valuable for its sketches of the mythologies of the pagans respecting the future state; and especially for the literature on this whole subject, being a catalogue prepared by Ezra Abbott. This gives the titles of 5300 works, and in what libraries in this country they are to be found, which will afford valuable help to those who may desire to enter largely into an investigation of the doctrine of a future life.

Moses Stuart's work is confined exclusively to this point: an investigation of the meaning of ἅδης, ταρταρόω, γέεννα, αἰων, ἀιώνιος, and the corresponding Hebrew words *holam* and *sheol*. This is performed with that thoroughness which he always brought to such investigations.

Dexter's book is the opposite of this, in that he regards the question of future retribution in the light of reason. His opening sentence is, "Is it reasonable that God should punish eternally those who persist in sin and die impenitent?" This he answers in the affirmative. In the second chapter he lays down the principles on which reason must decide this and similar problems. These are so general in their application, as well as needful in the subject before us,—which depends largely upon a correct interpretation of words and phrases of Scripture,—that we think our readers will be gratified to have them. "Reason, as I have defined it, is our ultimate judge in matters of religion." By which he means, "*Reason always demands that we should have evidence, immediate or mediate, in order to believe; but it does not insist that the truth be completely within the comprehension of the reason, or unclouded by mystery of any description.*" * "Yet, when interrogated upon so vast and wide a question as the eternal punishment of those who die in impenitence, she replies, that she cannot without help an-

* McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 426.

swer it; but has cause confidently to rely upon help from God to enable her to answer it. She decides it to be clear that he has sent her the aid which she needs, in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and so remits us to their pages for her final verdict. She decides that it is the highest dictate of Reason for us humbly and faithfully to receive whatever we find in those pages soundly interpreted." But what are sound principles of interpretation?

1. "*We must take the whole Bible as our revelation, or none of it.*" If one person has a right to discard such and such portions, others may reject different portions, until the whole would be disbelieved; and the Bible, like a cask with the hoops knocked off, would fall to useless fragments.

2. "*The language of the Scriptures must be interpreted by the laws of language, honestly, honorably, and without twisting or forcing, to suit any preconceived theory, or any existing logical necessity.*" Calvin says, on interpreting Scripture, "I do not love strained meanings."

3. "*The Bible must be so interpreted as to be self-consistent.*" This is very necessary when considering the word "*all.*"

4. "*Among the possible senses of a given passage of the Word, that which is plainest, and most likely to strike the mind of an unprejudiced reader of common intelligence and culture, is likeliest to be right.*" Hence the agreement of Evangelical Christians on certain doctrines becomes the voice of the Spirit. Thus the church and the believer may know what is truth.

5. "*The Bible is to be dealt with as a progressive revelation.*" *

6. "*The Bible is to be understood naturally, and from the position occupied by its own speakers and audiences.* If we wish to know what Christ really meant to teach on any given occasion, we must try to settle exactly what he would naturally have been understood to mean by those who heard him; and in nine cases out of ten that is his real meaning; *always*, I think it is safe to say, where he does not avowedly speak in parable

* See *Progress of Doctrine in the N. Testament*, Bernard. Reviewed in the October No., 1868.

or prophecy unexplained, or with some similar limitation or modification, expressed or obviously understood."

7. "*We cannot expect to understand it all, or perhaps, indeed, little of it fully.* God, eternity, heaven, hell, the soul—these are themes that run at once far out beyond any present human power of complete comprehension. We cannot expect to make everything which it contains consistent with everything else in the Bible—not because of its non-consistence, but because our minds are not yet developed enough, our range of study is not yet broad enough, to fit us to see that consistency."

8. "*Where two interpretations are possible, that one is probably truest which has most commended itself to the Christian experience of the past.* That stands a very strong chance of being truest which can claim the coincident faith and love of the church of Christ during all these ages: not necessarily of the church in its hierarchical forms, as men are apt to look at it."

9. "*Where two interpretations seem to be possible, that is often probably truest which we naturally like least.* I do not mean to intimate that the Bible is against our natural instincts, or adverse to our innocent tastes; but that many of its doctrinal teachings, being medicine for our disease of sin, are apt to seem bitter to our spiritual palate."

10. "*Where two senses are possible, that must be most reasonable which is on the whole safest for man;*" *i.e.*, in which he will run the least risk of woe. The book is a lucid treatise, full of cogent argument, written for the region of Boston, where the teachings of Theodore Parker and T. Starr King necessarily tinge all theological discussions.

Concerning the future state of the soul, Evangelical Christians agree in what has been the unvarying doctrine of the church, as expressed by Councils and Confessions. The soul exists in another world; in that world there is a place of happiness and a place of misery; the manner of life on earth determines to which of those abodes men go, for there is no transfer from one to the other. Those who dissent from this doctrine may be divided into three classes. *Universalists*, who claim that all punishment for sin is inflicted in this life. *Restorationists*, who contend that after a period of punishment all in hell shall be admitted into heaven. *Annihilationists* who

hold that the wicked at death, or after a season of misery, are destroyed and cease to exist. The first two we propose now to discuss. The third may appear at another time.

It seems to us that the controversy on this topic may be brought within much narrower bounds than are generally observed. For the wider range the discussion takes, the more opportunity is furnished to the whole school of Universalists for plausible and specious arguments, of which they avail themselves with great skill. Each party resorts to the Bible. But how shall the Scriptures be used? Now while the Old Testament does certainly teach, and constantly presuppose the future existence of the soul, it must be admitted that the New Testament presents the clearest and most satisfactory instruction, and describes with some definiteness the condition in which man shall exist hereafter. But Universalists take such words as *hell*, and *everlasting*, and defining their meaning from the indefiniteness of the Old Testament, insist that such shall be the sense of the same words in the New Testament. And when we explore with them the Old Testament, we must often make explanations and distinctions, just in themselves, but which are bewildering to the mass of readers, and therefore become weakness instead of strength to our arguments. We insist that the New Testament, from the very character of its revelations, is the portion of Holy Writ which must furnish the conclusive evidence. Life and immortality are brought to light there. These truths were known more or less distinctly when Christ came. So that in his teachings he did not attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, nor the fact of future punishment for the wicked. He assumed these to be admitted by the multitudes which gathered around him, as well as by the Jews of Jerusalem. But he cast a light upon those doctrines such as no man before nor since has been able to give. He made clear and distinct life and immortality. There can be no doubt about that. He whose dwelling-place from eternity had been in the realm of spirits became flesh, and revealed to man what He had seen in the invisible world. He testified what He had seen (John. iii. 11). Now it is from the testimony of such an eye-witness that our decisive proofs must come. And there is no lack of such testimony. Little do

those surmise that the Christ, whose teachings they would make alone authoritative, discarding the Epistles, is almost our sole authority for the doctrine of eternal punishment. Indeed this whole question of future retribution might be determined without going outside of the four Gospels. It is remarkable that the Apostles have very little to say on this matter. In the Acts, and the entire body of the Epistles, there is mention made only *thirteen* times of the condemnation of the wicked hereafter, whereas the Gospels have no less than *forty-six* distinct statements, of which *twenty-four* are in Matthew.

Restricting ourselves therefore to the New Testament, we propose to consider two of the three classes of errors mentioned above.

The first theory is, that all men receive merited punishment in this life, so that there is no necessity for the dispensation of divine justice to extend beyond the grave. Death emancipates the soul from all evil tendencies, and thus it is at once prepared to enter the purity and bliss of heaven. "This is the distinctive doctrine of some modern universalists. It is disappearing from its recent earnest advocates, who, as a body, will undoubtedly exchange its arbitrary conceptions for more rational conclusions." Alger, p. 564. Whether this expectation will be realized admits of grave doubt, judging from the history of the past.

About the year 1818, Hosea Ballou, a universalist clergyman, advanced the doctrine that all punishment is restricted to this life. Previously, a limited punishment in the future had been universally taught by that sect. This made a great stir, and was ardently opposed. But his sentiments, being much more acceptable to the unrenewed heart, became the most popular. Those opposed to him found themselves in the minority, and withdrew from the Universalist Association, and formed an independent body in 1831, under the name of Universal Restorationists. Their growth has been small. This form of Universalism is spread abroad by books and tracts which explain away those many passages of God's word which admonish the finally impenitent of wrath beyond the grave. It is argued in these publications that the term *hell* signifies simply the place of departed spirits, without reference to punishment there. Let us look at this.

The word hell comes from the Anglo-Saxon *helan*, to cover, hence a covered or obscure place.

> Else would the waters ouerflowe the lands,
> And fire devour the ayre, and *hell* them quight,
> But that she holds them with her blessed hands.
>
> *Faerie Queene*, B. iv., c. 10.

"The word hell comes from the Anglo-Saxon *helan*, to cover or hide, hence the tiling or slating of a house is called in some parts of England (particularly Cornwall) *heling* to this day, and the covers of books (in Lancaster) by the same name."*

The word is employed by the translators of our Bible in two senses. 1. Agreeably to its etymology, to denote the unseen place of departed souls, which was supposed by the ancients to be under the surface of the earth.

In this usage it corresponds to the Hades of the Greeks, the Orcus of the Romans, the Sheol of the Hebrews. This notion was current among the early Christians. Nor has the idea altogether passed away from our modern phraseology. We speak of "going down to hell." And the creed has it, "he *descended* into hell." 2. The other signification attached to the word by our translators is that of a place of torment.

The three Greek words, *hades*, *gehenna*, and *tartarus*, are translated by this single word *hell*. And, used in the two senses just described, it covers these three terms. But the question will arise, does the word *hell*, in any given text, have the general signification of the state of the dead, or the specific, of a place where the wicked are punished? This may be known sufficiently by the English reader from the context, *e.g.*, In hell he lifted up his eyes, being *in torments*. Luke xvi. 23. Our Lord speaks of the *damnation* of hell: Matt. xxiii. 39; hell-*fire*, Matt. v. 22; *destroy* in hell, Matt. x. 28. But the question must conclusively be settled by an appeal to the original terms. We propose, for the purpose of narrowing discussion on this point, to pass by all those texts in which the word *hades* is used; which word we admit does often denote only the realm of departed spirits, but which sometimes refers to that part of it where the souls of the reprobate are gathered.

* Adam Clarke, *Com. on Matt.* xi. 23.

We may state here, to show how unimportant the word *hades* is in determining future punishment from the New Testament, that the word occurs only eleven times; and of these but four are in the Gospels.* It is not the word our Lord employs when warning sinners of woe beyond the grave.

We take up the two words, which we contend are never employed with any other bearing than to denote the misery which exists in the other world. These are, γέεννα and ταρταρόω. Gehenna is a contraction of a Hebrew word spelled in Greek, signifying the valley of Hinnom, which was near Jerusalem, and had been the place where those abominable sacrifices were offered when the idolatrous Jews burned their children alive to Moloch and Baal. A particular spot in the valley was called Tophet, or the fire-stove, in which the children were burned. After the return of the Jews from Babylon, as idolatry was extinct, in order to show their abhorrence of the locality, this valley was made the dumping-ground for the offal of the city.† Two ideas were associated in the Jewish mind with this valley—the sufferings of the victims who had been immolated there, and the corruption and filth. It became naturally a symbol of the abode of the wicked hereafter, just as *paradise*, from the original meaning of a garden or park, came to designate heaven. "It is certain," says Prof. Barrows, "that in our Lord's day the Chaldee G'Hinnom and the Greek Gehenna had come, in well-established usage, probably long before the beginning of the Christian era, to signify hell, *i. e.*, the place of torment for the wicked; and that this was the only sense of the word." Lightfoot asserts, "it might be shown by infinite examples, that the Jews expressed hell, or the place of the damned, by this word. Evidence is entirely wanting, so far as we can ascertain, that at the time of Christ the one word *gehenna* was ever used in any other sense than to denote the place of future punishment."‡ "That the word *gehenna* was common among the Jews is evinced by its frequency in the oldest Rabbinical

* Matt. xi. 23, xvi. 18; Luke x. 15, xvi. 23. In all these, save the last, there is no reference to the future state of man.

† It has been generally held that a fire was constantly burning there to consume this garbage. But this is discredited by Alexander, Robinson, and others.

‡ *Life and Death Eternal*, by Prof. Bartlett, Chicago.

writings. It was employed by them, as all confess, in order to designate *hell*, the infernal region, the world of woe. In no other sense can it in any way be made out that it is employed in the New Testament." Stuart's *Future Punishment.* Even Alger is obliged to admit this. "This is a fact about which there can be no question." p. 328.

This word, in its well-defined sense, is found eleven times in our Lord's discourses. We quote a few: "Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers! how can ye escape the damnation of *hell?*" —*gehenna.* Matt. xxiii. 33. "I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into *hell*"—*gehenna.* Luke xii. 15. "Whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of *hell-fire*"—*gehenna.* Matt. v. 22. So in ver. 29, "It is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into *hell*"—*gehenna.* So in the next verse, where the same principle is applied to the right hand. In the parallel passage in Mark ix. 43, 45, and 49, where the same sentiment occurs, we have the same word, *gehenna.* Now it is impossible, without setting at defiance all laws which control language, to maintain that the word translated *hell* in these verses means only the under-world, or abode of the dead.

But we have another word. In 2 Pet. ii. 4, we read that God spared not the angels which sinned, but cast them down to hell (tartarosas). As Matthew, in writing for the Jews, employed the term *gehenna*,* because with it was associated the idea of woe, for the same reason Peter uses *tartarosas* in writing to the "strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia." The Greeks knew nothing about the valley of Hinnom, but they were familiar with the idea of suffering in an abode their poets called Tartarus, and which among them was as common as our word hell.

In searching for the meaning of hell, there is not alone the word itself, but we encounter the *idea* of future punishment. This is discoverable everywhere in the New Testament. This is the spear's head, weighty as Goliath's, fastened to the shaft of each warning, as it issues from the mouth of Jehovah. "Ex-

* Luke uses it but once.

cept ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." "Flee from the wrath to come." "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries." See also 2 Thes. i. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 7; James v. 20; Jude 6 and 13; 1 Jno. v. 16. The same appears in our Lord's teachings, which assume future rewards and punishments. "There is an hour coming when those that are in their graves shall come forth, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." "Whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven." "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment than for you." His exhortations are such as teach us that impenitent men are in great peril, a peril which reaches over into the next life. "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." "Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life." The same idea appeals to us from the exhortations of a merciful God. "Let us therefore fear lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it." "Looking diligently lest any man fail of the grace of God." These are a few out of many which we might quote.

Man's conduct does determine his condition after death. But the question now arises, is that condition fixed and final? Those Universalists who admit the existence of a hell, deny, however, that those in it are never to come out. They contend that probation does not close with the end of the present life. "By the immutable laws which the Creator has established in and over his works and creatures, a free soul may choose good or evil, truth or falsehood, love or hate, beneficence or iniquity. . . . The condition and means of repentance, reformation, regeneration, are always within its power, the future state being but the unencumbered, intensified experience of the spiritual elements of the present, under the same divine constitution and laws. This is the belief of Unitarians, Restorationists, and the general body of believers known as Liberal Chris-

tians." "Stronger motives will be applied for producing repentance, and grander attractions to holiness be felt, and thus at some time or other even the most sunken and hardened souls will be regenerated and raised up to heaven in the image of God." Alger, 564, 429. Some maintain that the period of punishment is determined by the degree of guilt contracted on earth. This doctrine of limited punishment is the old form under which universal salvation first appeared, and which it retained from the days of Clement Alexandrinus and Origen down to the present century.

This theory of limited punishment does not lie on the surface of Scripture. It can only be wrought out by a wresting of words from their connection, or from their well-accepted meaning. Two of these now demand our attention, *ἀιών* and *ἀιώνιος*, *forever* and *everlasting*.

This latter word *aiōnios* occurs seventy-one times in the New Testament. Of these, in fifty-one instances the term is attached to *life*—eternal, everlasting life, describing the state of the righteous. Fourteen times it is applied to God, and heavenly things, in the evident sense of endless; *e. g.*, "eternal weight of glory," "eternal in the heavens," "eternal redemption," "eternal spirit." Seven times this same word is used in connection with punishment of the wicked. This is the word invariably used when the duration of man's future is described. In sixty-five cases it is undisputed that the word means eternal. Must it not signify the same in these seven? Nor can a single passage be cited in which this word, *aiōnios*, referring to the future destiny of man, has any other signification than endless. It is true, three instances are adduced where, it is claimed, a limited period is intended. Rom. xvi. 25; 2 Tim. i. 9; Titus i. 2. But in these, *aiōnios* is connected with *chronos*, and the translation is, since or "before the *world began*." A closer rendering would be, "before everlasting time." By which this idea is conveyed: in each of these passages Paul is speaking of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of eternal life, which God had appointed before man came into existence. And this period of man's existence, which is unending, he denominates *eternal time*. Just as Jesus Christ, in 1 Tim. i. 17, is denominated "the King of eternity," or "eternal King," so in these

passages it is the *chronos* of eternity, or eternal time; thus, as it were, dividing eternity into two portions: one prior to man's creation, the other since. But waiving this explanation, and admitting these three instances as exceptions, we contend, in the first place, that they do not directly speak of man's future. They refer to what God proposed before the creation of man. Again; what are three exceptions to sixty-eight instances directly to the contrary? Is it not presumption to establish a doctrine upon the effort to break down the well-settled meaning of a word by citing such exceptions?

There is a phrase, *eis ton aiōna*, and its plural, by the application of which Restorationists produce an impression favorable to their doctrine. In some places this is translated *forever*, *e.g.*, no fruit grow on thee henceforward forever. Matt. xxi. 19. "He that eateth of this bread shall live forever." John iv. 14. "The Creator, who is blessed forever." Rom. i. 25. In other instances the expression is translated *world*, *e.g.*, heareth the word, and the cares of *this world*, *aiōnos toutou*. Matt. xiii. 22. "The harvest is the end of *the world*," *tou aiōnos*. "The children of *this world*," etc. Luke xvi. 8. "Deliver us from this present evil world." Gal. i. 4. These examples will show that sometimes the noun aiōn denotes eternal, and sometimes it has a limited signification. Now because it evidently has this limitation in some cases, we are told it may have when applied to the punishment of the wicked. But such a conclusion has hardly the shadow of a probability, and for the reason that this word is *never used by our Saviour in his descriptions of future misery*. Indeed it is employed only nine times in reference to man's future state, and of these, seven are by our Lord, where he declares those who believe in him shall "never die," "never thirst," "live forever," "never perish." There will be no dispute about these. The two other are found in 2 Pet. ii. 17, and Jude 13. Now, supposing there were an uncertainty in these, would it be safe to build a doctrine on two disputed exceptions, when there are seven proving the contrary?

There is a reduplication, *tous aiōnas*, *tōu aiōnōu*, *forever and ever*, which we bring forward as perhaps almost decisive in the application of the word *eternal*. This phrase is used twenty-two times, and without an exception in the sense of eternal.

And this is applied to the woe of the wicked hereafter thrice, and most distinctly. Rev. iv. 11, xix. 3, and xx. 10.

To sum up the argument on the word *everlasting*, we find that one form of the word, the adjective *aiōnios*, occurs seventy-one times. In all but ten of these (which apply to the punishment of the wicked) Universalists themselves admit that it denotes unending; and there is no substantial reason to exclude these. We find another form of the word, the noun *aiōn*, which sometimes has a limited sense, but more frequently unlimited; but this is not the word employed to denote the extent of future punishment, except once by Peter and once by Jude. Whereas the reduplication of the noun—*forever and ever*—never is used with limitation; and this is affixed thrice to the future woe of the wicked. So that as philologically we investigate the meaning of eternal, we discover nothing worthy the name of a reason why we should limit its signification. "It is well understood that the words forever and everlasting are used to express a duration commensurate with the nature of the thing spoken of. 'Everlasting mountains' are coeval with creation, and to endure as long as the earth. 'A servant forever' is a servant for life. We cannot take the sense which the word has in connection with a certain thing, and by it prove or disprove anything relating to a totally different thing. . . . Two things are beyond dispute: 1. Forever and everlasting are applied to future retribution. 2. These terms always mean *the whole*, as to duration, of that with which they stand connected. If applied to life, it is the whole of life; if to the existence of the world, it is the entire period of existence; and when applied to Jehovah, it applies to his whole eternity. It always means *the whole* of something. Is it the whole of future existence? No one can base a denial of it on the ground that the word, when applied to human life, means only a few years, or a limited duration when applied to the earth." *

Again, we ask the advocates of this limited punishment, by what authority they admit a word to mean unending, when applied to the happiness of the righteous, but claim that it does not mean eternal when denoting the punishment of the bad?

* *The Great Concern*, by N. Adams, D.D., Boston, p. 154–5.

Read this: "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." How can a distinction be made? With this very text Augustine meets the Restorationists of his day. "If both are *æternum*, certainly either both should be understood of long duration with an end, or both of perpetuity without end. Equal things are contrasted; on the one hand eternal punishment, on the other eternal life. But to say of this one and the same term, that eternal life shall be without end, but that eternal punishment shall have an end, is absurd."* We cannot refrain from expressing our observation, that there is a mass of ignorant confusion found in the books of Universalists when they manipulate this term everlasting. It is evident to the English reader, who will stop to compare a little; but an investigation of the original of the New Testament reveals the utter worthlessness of the position, with a distinctness that cannot well be set forth.

In this theory of a temporary punishment we have not merely the one word *everlasting* to overcome, but we encounter the *idea of continuance of misery.* The inspired penmen nowhere employ language connected with future woe which can teach that it is temporary. On the contrary, the descriptive terms are such as, "*unquenchable* fire;" "worm that *never dieth;*" "the wrath of God *abideth;*" "shall *not see* life." Everywhere it seems to be implied that the condition to which unrepented sins bring men is fixed and final. "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" "He that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost hath *never* forgiveness;" and as Mark gives it, "neither in this world, nor *that which is* to come." Is not the idea of permanence indissolubly connected with these threats?

Then consider the many parables in which the rewards of the righteous and the wicked are portrayed, and you notice that they hasten onward to the final consummation, and leave each in the condition to which their career conducts them. We are not told what led the five virgins to be wise, and the five to be foolish. With a few opening sentences we are introduced to the conclusion; and when the foolish attempted to

* *De Civ. Dei.* Quoted by Hagenbach, *History of Doctrine.*

compensate for their guilty carelessness, their time had passed. The door was shut, nor did it open. In the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus three verses give their history on earth, while ten are devoted to describe their condition in the future. And it is asserted there is no passing from the one place to the other. You may examine those parables which set forth the consequences of different courses of life on earth, and you will find that with marvellous agreement they teach the hopeless condemnation of the finally impenitent. The house founded on a rock stood; the one built on the sand fell, and was swallowed up in the flood. The tares were burnt up. The man without the wedding garment was bound hand and foot, and, thus helpless, was cast into outer darkness, and there left. And on the other hand, there is not one parable which even hints at the restoration of the condemned. The bold terrific language of our Lord, asserting their changeless state, has not a word of qualification. Amid the many teachings which fell from his lips on this topic, why should so important a question be passed in silence, if the theory of universal salvation be correct?

There are terms and expressions of frequent occurrence in the New Testament which are so handled by Universalists as greatly to strengthen their position; *e.g.*, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of *the world*." "This is indeed the Christ, the Saviour *of the world;*" and other similar passages where the word *world* occurs. But surely we cannot extend that term to cover every man, woman, and child in the world. This would be contrary to the accepted usage of the word *world* in Scripture and in all languages. We may, in passing, just give an example. Luke states that about the time of our Lord's birth a decree was issued by Augustus, "that all the world should be taxed." This did not mean that every kindred and tongue under the whole heaven should be taxed. Again, such expressions as these are quoted: "God our Saviour will have *all* men to be saved." "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw *all* men unto me." "For God hath concluded *all* in unbelief, that he might have mercy on *all*." Christ is said to "reconcile *all* things unto himself." In Universalist writings a vast deal is made out of these and

corresponding texts, and we believe there is more need to have them expounded publicly, with an eye to universal salvation, than with reference to the contested theological dogmas clustering about them. Without pausing to give explanations of these texts, which are familiar to the readers of this Review, and which can be found in commentaries, we call attention to the general fact, that these texts occur almost without exception in the Epistles, where inspiration is discoursing about the glories of redemption, the blessedness of the righteous, and the precious promises encouraging men to repentance. In no instance are they found where the punishment of sin is spoken of, or the condition of the ungodly hereafter.

And further, by exaggerating or misapplying such words and phrases we can prove the universal damnation of the human race. "If any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of his." Rom. viii. 9. But the Scriptures declare that the *world* hateth Christ, Jno. vii. 7: that the *world* cannot receive the Spirit of truth, "because it seeth him not neither knoweth him," Jno. xiv. 17: the *world* is condemned, 1 Cor. xi. 32. So in the use of the word *all*. "Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment upon *all*." Jude 14 and 15. "He is a holy God, He is a jealous God, He will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins." Joshua xxxiv. 19. These quotations show how unsafe is the attempt to frame a doctrine from isolated passages of the Bible. Regard must be paid to the topic considered. That must cast light upon terms and phrases. Scripture must be compared with Scripture. And doing this we discover no intimation that rejecters of the Gospel shall secure the benefits of the Gospel; but, on the contrary, it is positively stated they shall not be saved, they shall not enter into rest, they shall not see God, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin. Prof. Shedd well remarks in his excellent work on Homiletics, "It is an error to study the Bible without generalizing its teachings, and acquiring some conception of it as a whole. Single, unconnected texts are oftentimes dangerous half-truths or positive untruths. Nothing but the power and impression of isolated passages of Scripture keeps Universalism in existence. The moment that that denomination shall begin to understand and interpret the contents of the

Bible as a self-consistent *whole*, it will begin to die. Texts of Scripture, says Donne, are like the hairs in a horse's tail. Unite them, and they concur in one root of strength and beauty; but take them separately, and they can be used only as snares and springs to catch woodcocks."

And now we summon infidelity to render its interpretation on what God's Word teaches as to future retribution. In 1858 Theodore Parker, in a letter to Rev. Dr. Adams, of Boston, wrote these lines: "To me it is quite clear that Jesus taught the doctrine of eternal damnation, if the Evangelists—the first three, I mean—are to be treated as inspired. I can understand his language in no other way. But as the Protestant sects start with the notion—which to me is a monstrous one—that the words of the New Testament are all miraculously inspired by God, and so infallibly true; and as this doctrine of eternal damnation is so revolting to all the humane and moral feelings of our nature, men said, 'the words must be interpreted in another way.' So as the Unitarians have misinterpreted the New Testament to prove that the Christos of the fourth Gospel had no pre-existence, the Universalists misinterpreted other passages of the Gospels to show that Jesus of Nazareth never taught eternal damnation." Says another distinguished advocate of final restoration: "And yet I freely say that I do not find the doctrine of the ultimate salvation of all souls clearly stated in any text, or in any discourse that has ever been reported from the lips of Christ. I do not think that we can fairly maintain that the final restoration of all men is a prominent and explicit doctrine of the four Gospels.* Rénan admits that "Paradise and Gehenna shall have no end." Thomas Paine and other infidels have made similar concessions, admitting that the New Testament does teach the doctrine of eternal future punishment.

In contemplating this theme pious men have shrunk from this terrible conclusion, and some have hoped there might be a reprieve; but have confessed they could discover no warrant for it from the Bible. The sentiments of many find expression in the words of Mr. Beecher, in the sermon on "Future Pun-

* T. S. King's *Two Discourses*, p. 5. Quoted in *Great Concern*, by Dr. Adams.

ishment," already referred to. "Now, I have felt every difficulty that any man has ever felt. In my thought I walk around about the terrible fact of the future. I, too, take into account the Fatherhood of God, and I look upon the unpitied nations of the globe, and with inexpressible longing and anguish, for which there is no word, I have sought relief. But there is the plain, simple testimony of Jesus Christ. I cannot get around that, nor get over it. There it is. I have nothing to say. I cannot fathom the matter. A child can ask me questions that I cannot answer." It is well known that Mr. Beecher, for some time, has been preparing a life of Christ. To such a conclusion that study has brought him. We quote again: "Let me say that any theory which takes off the pressure of responsibility that rests upon every man, that removes from any conscience the burden that Christianity puts there, or lessens his feeling of the awfulness of sin, is un-Christlike and dangerous. Christ placed the burden of fear on unrepentant men's consciences; and any one who takes off that burden of fear is not Christlike." And with this solemn utterance he closes: "Men and brethren, we are standing on the verge of the unseen world. All the thunderous din of this life ought not to fill our ears, so but that we can hear the Spirit and the Bride that say to every man, through this golden air to-day, 'Come, come!' And that lonely and solemn sound, like that of the surf beating on the shore from the broad Atlantic, that all day and all night sounds on, and is never still—that sound comes from the other world, and says to us, 'Beware, beware of that punishment of sin which overhangs the other and the under-life forever and forever.'"

The advocates of Universalism avoid Bible ground. Nine-tenths of their arguments are humanitarian appeals. What one says of a volume by one of their ablest writers is true of all: "The body of the work consists of 468 pages; of these only 67 are devoted to the Scriptural argument. So far as our observation goes, they have always begun with the proposition, that the received doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked cannot be consistent with God's goodness, and therefore cannot be true; and after laboring at great length to fortify this position, they have *then* come to the work of bringing the declarations

of Scripture into harmony with it." * Now if the Scriptures are the only rule of faith, then we must be extremely cautious about receiving a doctrine which avoids the Bible in this way, especially a doctrine respecting which one of the chief Biblical scholars of the day remarks, "There is no doctrine that contradicts the Holy Scriptures in a more unwarrantable manner than that of the so-called *Apokatastasis.*" †

This doctrine of Restoration, which is the first development of universal salvation, did not originate in exegesis of Scripture. Men were led to it by processes similar to those which influence men in these days. Some were led by dwelling exclusively on the love of God. "With great zeal Clement maintained this doctrine, as one necessarily grounded in the universal love and justice of God, with whom is no respect of persons. The beneficent power of our Saviour, he affirms, is not confined barely to the present life, but operates at all times and everywhere. But the Alexandrians went still further, and supposed as the ultimate end of all a universal redemption, consisting in the annihilation of all moral evil, and a universal restoration to that original unity of the divine life out of which all had proceeded (the general *apokatastasis*)." ‡ In Origen it was the result of speculation. He asserted "the tenet of a plenary and inalienable power in the human will to overcome sin. The destiny of the soul is thus placed in the soul itself. The power of free-will cannot be lost, and if not exerted in this world it still can be in the next; and under the full light of the eternal world, and the stimulus there experienced, nothing is more probable than that it will be exerted. At the same time he admitted that this doctrine might easily become dangerous to the unconverted; and sometimes speaks of an eternal condemnation, and the impossibility of conversion in the world to come." § This talking on each side of the question has led Neander to query "whether this also was not one of those points upon which his views became changed at a later period of his life." Yet others resisted the church doctrine on future punishment, be-

* Delitzsch *Biblical Psychology*, p. 552.

† Article by Prof. Barrows in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1858.

‡ Neander, vol. i., 656, Torrey's translation.

§ Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. ii., 416.

cause it made them uneasy in their sins. Respecting the progress of this doctrine, a century later than Origen, Neander states: "For the most part, in the great cities of the East, it arose by no means from a more free and earnest reflection on religious subjects, but from a lack of Christian seriousness, and a superficial and trifling mode of judgment." "They would fain reason away the doctrine of eternal punishment, simply because this doctrine presented terrifying images which disturbed them in a life too deficient in point of moral strictness and purity. God, they imagined, could not so severely judge the weaknesses of mankind. Those declarations of Holy Scripture respecting everlasting punishments contained nothing but terrifying threats."

At a meeting held in New York, recently, to make arrangements for the celebration of the first centenary of Universalism in these United States, the following statement was made by Horace Greeley. "There certainly was a time in the history of the Christian church when the greatest and most honored apostles of that church were open and avowed in the proclamation of their conviction, as well as their hope, that in the providence of God all souls should at length be reconciled unto their Father and Judge. There came a darker age for Christianity, in which this sentiment was condemned, and its preaching as a Christian doctrine forbidden." We have no doubt but that this statement will be repeated many times before this celebration has passed over. Let us inquire, therefore, what are the facts. John's Gospel was written probably near the close of the first century. That certainly gives no intimation of the doctrine of restoration. Clement Romanus, who was perhaps the person mentioned by Paul in Philip. iv. 3, was one of the most distinguished Roman Christians. He became bishop of Rome toward the close of the first century. He writes: "While we are in this world, we should repent with our whole heart for whatsoever evil we have done in the flesh, while we have yet the time for repentance, that we may be saved by the Lord. For *after we shall have departed out of this world we shall no longer be able to confess our sins, or repent in the other.*" Polycarp, the pupil of John, and prominent in the second century, said, when asked to recant by the Roman proconsul, "You threaten me with fire which

burns but for a moment, and will soon be extinct; but you are ignorant of the future judgment, and of the fire of eternal punishment reserved for the ungodly." Justin Martyr, of the same century, abounds in the strongest language on this doctrine. Tatian, who wrote one of the Apologies; Theophilus, bishop of Antioch in Syria, and a prominent writer; Athenagoras, one of the most accomplished and able writers of the early church, —all of whom lived in the second century,—have spoken of the eternal punishment of sin. So does Irenæus, the famous church father and pupil of Polycarp. The leaders of the next century, Tertullian and Cyprian, are plain in their utterances. Says the latter: "God has also prepared eternal punishments. He has prepared the light that none can approach unto, but he has also prepared the vast and eternal gloom of perpetual night." * Gibbon declares of this early period: "The primitive church, whose faith was of a much firmer consistence, delivered over, without hesitation, to eternal torture the far greater part of the human species. . . . It was *unanimously* affirmed that those who, since the birth or the death of Christ, had obstinately persisted in the worship of the dæmons, neither deserved nor could expect a pardon from the irritated justice of the Deity." † And in a foot-note he says, "The Jansenists, who have so diligently studied the writings of the fathers, maintain this sentiment with distinguished zeal." The views of Origen were almost wholly confined to his school. They never prevailed in the Western Church. Didymus and Gregory Nazianzen adopted his views. And this particular doctrine was maintained with great logical acuteness, in works written expressly for that purpose, by Gregory of Nyssa. But with these few exceptions the prominent men of the ancient church held that the everlasting destiny of the soul was decided before death.

Much might be added respecting the effect of Universalism upon the heart and purposes of men. Withholding our own thoughts, we desire to present those of one whose utterances are weightier than ours. "It is impossible to prevent the doctrine

* For these quotations we are indebted to an article in the *N. Y. Observer*, by Rev. John Waugh.

† Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. xv. 11.

of the finite duration of future punishments, let it be stated ever so guardedly, from being perverted in various ways, by the great mass of mankind, to their own injury." "It is often said by Cicero and others, that all philosophers, both Greek and Roman, are agreed in this, that the gods do not punish. But as soon as this opinion of the philosophers began to prevail among the people, it produced, according to the testimony of all the Roman writers, the most disastrous consequences, which lasted for centuries." "The papal sale of indulgences, which became general during the twelfth and the succeeding centuries, had a tendency, in the same way, to diminish the fear of positive divine punishments. The result of this delusion was equally deplorable in this case as in the one before mentioned: the greatest immoralities prevailed throughout Christian lands until this evil was arrested by the Reformation, and the fear and the love of God were both awakened anew in the hearts of Christians. A similar result took place in England, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when some rationalist philosophers, during the reign of Charles II., undertook to emancipate the minds of men from the fear of positive divine punishments. The effect of their efforts is well known from history. Frivolity of spirit, immorality, sins of impurity, and all the dreadful consequences of forgetting God, suddenly prevailed. The principles of these English philosophers were gradually diffused through France by the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, and others; and after 1740 they were also adopted and disseminated by some even in Germany. The history of our own times shows us sufficiently what has been the result of these principles here." Knapp's *Christian Theology*, pp. 547 and 553. Reference in these last lines is to the state of things in Germany at the opening of this century.

Article IV.—*Plan in History.*

The events which constitute the material of history take place in successive periods and within certain limits. This introduces the two ideas of Time and Place, or Chronology and Geography, which Dr. Arnold calls the two eyes of history. They may, however, with greater significance, be styled its wings, for without them there could be no progress. But neither of these ideas pertain to the Infinite, for in him there is no limitation or change. He is before all time, and, as a totality, is in all space. But with his creatures every event, by a law of limitation, has a when and where it happened.

Time commenced with succession, and succession with creation. It may be called the finite of eternity, as place is the definite of absolute space.

For the measurement of time into day and night, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, God has provided with wonderful exactness. Sun, moon, and stars are his undeviating chronometers, which never lag behind nor move with a second's undue rapidity. What hour the clock now strikes,—how long it is since the beginning, neither the horologists nor the geologists can tell us. And if they could, it would give us no new feature of the historic course except its velocity.

But for amplitude, fertility, and diversity of race, Providence has spread out the whole surface of land and water, hills and valleys, soil and sands, generating local affinities and ethnical dispersions. The capacious bosom of the earth he has filled with its richest treasures and bounties, exciting to investigation, feeding commerce, stimulating industry, and keeping the world a ceaseless student of the handiwork of its Maker.

Hence Geography is a providential condition of History, and a preparation for it. Facts have a local value as well as figures. "Give me the map of any country," says Victor Cousin, "its configuration, its climate, its waters, its winds; give me its natural productions, its flora and zoology, and I pledge myself to tell you, *à priori*, what will be the quality of man in that country, and what part its inhabitants will act in history."

These ideas of time and place suggest the more fundamental

one of Plan, and a personal Planner. The Plan is more clearly indicated by the relations of order and of law, by the subordination of means to ends, and by the drift of history towards a final object. It is far more than the juxtaposition of dateless events or their chronological arrangement. It is more than their connection and progress in the line of cause and effect. It is more than the concentrated forces now working silently in the revolving centuries, and now breaking out in startling crises and revolutions. It is something that lies deeper, spreads wider, and rises higher than any or all of these. It comprises all the facts and forces which constitute the epochs and the ages which have occurred, and will occur, in the processes of history and the progress of the race. This underlying and all-comprehending Plan *grasps* all, holds all, and directs all. It is God's idea of the origin, development, and destiny of the human family, and is the plane on which the historic course is now proceeding.

Glance at the variety and vastness of its comprehension. No department of investigation is so extensive or so rich as this which it opens. It runs backward to the birth and infancy of the race as its starting-point. It contemplates the first man standing alone in the midst of the fertility and beauty of his primeval home. It takes up his relations to the lower creatures around him, and to the Creator above him.

From this beginning it advances in a logical and chronological series of events, extending its area through oppositions and harmonies, as by the lengthening sides of a triangle. It augments its material with the ever-recurring seconds of time, and by a geometrical progression in the continuous propagations of the children of men. It traverses an ever-widening ocean of conflicting events, and is borne along on the waves of an ever-flowing flood of harmonious facts. It comprehends the various stages of ignorance and knowledge, of discipline and advancement. It comprises all secular and sacred history,—the history of individuals, families, tribes, nations, and races; of war and of peace, of improvements and deteriorations, revolutions and rebellions, anarchies and oppressions, of science and philosophy, of literature and art, of the church and its doctrines, its heresies, its deformations, reformations, and its ultimate triumph. What-

soever relates to man is included in the unity and sweep of his vast plan,—past, present, and future. How rich its harmonies! how vast its domain! how sublime its movement!—so vast, so sublime, that the wild dream of the German poet can hardly be pronounced extravagant.

"God called man in a dream into the vestibule of heaven, saying,—'Come up hither and I will show thee the glory of my house.' And to his angels who stood about his throne he said, 'Take him, strip him of his robes of flesh; cleanse his affections; put a new breath into his nostrils; but touch not his human heart.' A moment and it was done, and the man stood ready for his unknown voyage. Under the guidance of a mighty angel, with sounds of flying pinions, they sped away from the battlements of heaven. Some time on the mighty angel's wings they fled through Saharas of darkness, wildernesses of death. At length, from a distance not counted save in the arithmetic of heaven, light beamed upon them. They sped on in their terrible speed to meet it, and the light with lesser speed came to meet them. In a moment the blazing of suns was around them,—a moment, the wheeling of planets; then long eternities of twilight; then again, on the right hand and the left, more constellations. At last the man sank down, crying, 'Angel, I can go no farther; let me lie down in the grave, and hide myself from the infinitude of the universe, for end there is none.' And from the glittering stars there came a choral shout, '*End there is none.*'"

But the plan of providence is as minute as it is comprehensive. All general schemes involve in their execution a carrying out of each particular part. Every architect, with the design of the edifice draws minutely all the specifications. History is a moral edifice with which the Parthenon, model of Phidian art and Doric beauty, can bear no comparison. Man's knowledge is imperfect, even in his limited sphere; and if in his first draft he does not secure each item necessary to the accomplishment of his design, he experiments and mends it in his next. But the Infinite is no experimenter. He never mends an old plan nor makes a new one. He perceives from the first the minutest part equally with the mightiest, and the place and bearing of each in the general movement.

A particular providence, as a part of the divine plan, is philo-

sophically demonstrable from a general one. Indeed they are so almost identical that they mutually include each other, as the whole the parts, and the parts the whole. The greatest events often turn on the minutest. No epoch in history, or important fact, can be fully explained without the unimportant ones that helped to make it so. The fall of the apple, by which Newton is said to have discovered the principle of gravitation, was as really prearranged by providence as the great law which it brought to light. On the lance that missed Napoleon at Kylau, and the bullet that struck Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen, turned the tramp of armies and the fate of nations. Such a perfect network of little things and large is history!

It would be as unphilosophical to say that God sends the great showers that water the earth, but not the little drops of rain; that he ripens the rich harvests, but not the small ears of corn, or heads in the golden wheat-fields, as that his providential plan is general but not particular. If the nations and dynasties are all numbered, so are the hairs of our head. If our escapes and rescues in danger are providential, so are our exposures and preservations. Does the escape come through acquaintance with the laws of Nature and by prayer? So does exposure often from ignorance of these laws and want of prayer. But the ignorance and the knowledge, the prayer and the prayerlessness, have their place in the providential plan equally with the dangers and the rescues.

Prayer does not alter the plan of Providence, nor disturb its unity, but comes in as a means of its accomplishment. As expressive of piety towards God, it is loyalty to the divine government. It is an elemental harmony in the music of providential events—a link that joins the status of the prayerful to the favoring divine will, as prayerless disloyalty does that of the profane with the disfavor of that will.

This free-will of the dependent subject which is involved in piety and prayer, is, to some, a disturbing element, as in conflict with law and the stability and regularity of the providential course. Law is fixed, they say, and calculable. Volition is variable, capricious, and hence incapable of prevision and fixity in a plan.

But is not moral freedom a fundamental fact? Is it not veri-

fied by the testimony of consciousness—that voice from man's innermost, truest nature? If its utterings are false, no testimony can be taken as trustworthy, for all historical evidence rests on the validity of our faculties as reported by our consciousness.

And as to a place in the prearranged plan of providence for piety and prayer, historical theology claims it as a first truth, defensible from the omniscience of God, against both fate and false philosophy. Does not this omniscience include as well the events depending on the free agency of mind as those that depend on the unfree operations of matter? Do not the natural and moral, in their inter-dependence, make up the one scheme of providential moral government?—two parts as foundation and superstructure. Did God make inert matter, and impart to it properties and laws so as to know exactly its forces and plan its movements? And did he not make free mind also, and impart to it laws of freedom and responsibility? Has he constructed in man, his last and best work, a machine so complex and difficult that he does not know how to manage it?

Does the government of inanimate nature come into the sweep of divine providence, and the intelligent and higher realm lie outside? Where control is most needed, is it just there that it fails? Where wisdom, knowledge, and administrative skill would be pre-eminent and illustrious, is it entirely wanting? He that made the eye, shall he not see? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear?

But if events depending on human freedom cannot come into the divine foresight, how is it that so many of them have actually appeared beforehand in prophecy? Yet this foretelling of events, and in the minuteness of circumstantial detail, is as indubitable as the events themselves; and it makes as real a part of history.

Foresight is the eye of providence, as plan is the soul of history. A planless providence is no providence. And any one that sees only the past is partially blind. But God is not blind. Divine sight extends in every direction and to everything. It is all-seeing, all-knowing, and all-comprehending. It is like the four beasts which John the Revelator saw before the sea of glass,—full of eyes. Or, rather, he who made the eye and the

ear as the organs of man's sight and hearing, needs no instruments or organs, gains nothing by study, and loses nothing through forgetfulness. For the remotest future he requires no telescope; for the minutest present, no microscope; and for the infinitude of ever-recurring changes and combinations, no kaleidoscope.

When dwelling alone in the plenitude of his undisclosed perfections, if we may be allowed the illustration, and unmoved save by a desire to create other beings and impart to them of his own blessedness, God held in mind from eternity the whole pictorial of providential history. Every world and every atom, with all their properties, laws, and motions, their attractions and repulsions, their balancings and harmonies, were there; every man and beast, every thought and motion, every birth and every death, every act of sin and every act of holiness, every martyr and every murderer, the minutest rustling leaf and the mightiest crash of worlds—all were there, in the exactest order of nature and of time, each in its just relations to everything, and everything to each.

Thus, back of the creation of man, back of the origin of matter, back of all finitude and of everything but God, away in the depths of the Infinite Mind, the All-originating Will, lies the vast providential scheme which is now slowly but wisely unfolding. This plan, in its comprehensive unity, is the key-note in history. It rules its rise, its progress, and its end. There is but one plan of providence, one course of history, one universe, because there is but one originating and unifying Will. All laws of intelligence, volition, thought, feeling, memory, and motion; all attractions and repulsions, revolutions and counter-revolutions by evil and by good—all find their centre and explanation in the unity of this Divine plan. Through all it moves onward steadily, from the great First Cause to its culmination in the grandeur of a final cause. And ever, under the calm or agitated surface, there is a deep, strong current of concord. All conflicts and struggles end in this. All minor discords lead to this richer harmony.

From this unity of plan the next step is to that of a Person who is the sole and sovereign Planner.

As the projector of such a scheme for the world's course, he

must be one, and absolutely independent. He is not a mere mask, as the term *persona* etymologically imports. He is not either an abstraction, a force, a law, a divine order or substance, as the pantheistic philosophers variously account Him; but an intelligent, free, conscious being, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable.

And to the philosophic objection that the conception of an infinite person is impossible, that the idea of personality loses all significance except within the province of the finite, it is in point to say—

First, that this is a mere assumption respecting the capacity of the human intellect.

Second, that it is contradicted in the experience of a large majority of the best thinkers, by their conception of a person whom they regard as the Infinite and Supreme.

Third, an infinite person is as capable of conception, of apprehension, as an infinite thing. And it is more like that in ourselves of which we are conscious. For, although we cannot comprehend the Infinite, cannot measure the measureless, yet He is distinctly cognizable to our faculties as separate from and above all that is finite, all that is capable of limitation or measurement.

The idea of an enclosed field is finite, but remove the fences and it becomes infinite. A line with two ends is finite; without the ends it is infinite. Thus the finite suggests the infinite, as what is crooked, by comparison, does what is straight, and that which is imperfect and dependent the perfect and absolute. So if the infinite in the person of God baffles us, it baffles us everywhere, and everything baffles us.

All other beings, however elevated, have some kind of dependence—the child on the parent, the parent on the king, and he on the King of kings. But as this infinite Ruler receives His being from none, neither does He His government. He was not constituted sovereign by the suffrage of His creatures, for they could not confer what they did not possess, or act in any way before he gave them being. He could not receive his dominion from a predecessor, for He had none, and His kingdom is from everlasting. As the plan of providential government originated without the counsel of any, so its execution

goes on without the consent of any. All other authority and law flow from His—His, from Himself. Other governments are derived from, or dependent upon His; His upon nothing but His own infinitude of wisdom, justice, and love.

This train of thought leads naturally to the absoluteness of providence in history. The term absolute has two meanings. When applied to human rulers, it usually suggests the idea of wrong and tyranny, because, from human fallibility and selfishness, no one can long hold unlimited power without abusing it. But when applied to the Supreme, the word has no such significance.

The God of history is absolute because he is independent. There is no one to control or compete with Him, because He has no superior or equal. His plan originated wholly in His own mind, or, more exactly, was always in His mind. What could there have been out of Himself to move Him to this when there was nothing in the universe besides Himself? What necessity was upon Him for creating these worlds, and swinging them into their orbits just as they now move, since there was none for His making them at all, save in His desire to reduplicate in others something of His own felicity? He was under no obligation to bring chaos out of nothing. Nor, having done this, was He compelled to bring order and beauty and fertility out of chaos, except by His own love of order and beauty and beneficence.

But even with the creation of man, and with a providential history thus far drawn out, who shall say that it was not at His option to sustain or not sustain what He had made? Why might He not have suffered the race to fall into non-existence, as He did suffer it to fall into sin?—yea, have remanded the whole material world back into chaos, and chaos into nothing? What hindered? No want of sovereignty, surely. For all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing before Him. What hindered? Nothing but the good pleasure of His will. That was all.

This is the compressed essence of God's absoluteness in history; this, the only law or limitation which can in any proper sense be affirmed of His government, His own good-pleasure. "He doeth all things after the counsel of His own will." He

made the chain of the created universe and holds it in His own hands, though He is not chained.

But what is this good pleasure of God, this infinite and free absolutism in history? Is it arbitrary or tyrannical? Is it a caprice or fancy? The farthest possible from these. To say that God's providential rule is absolute, is simply to declare that the force of all the attributes and excellences of the divine nature—wisdom, justice, power, and love—is engaged in a plan of administration, of which history is the progressive accomplishment. To say that He pleaseth this or that, is the same as to say that there is an infinitely wise and good reason for it.

While, therefore, an absolute monarchy is the worst form of human government, unless the people are very ignorant and turbulent and the ruler very intelligent and just; and while a republic—the best for an enlightened and virtuous people—is quite impossible for the divine government, since God does not reign by the suffrage of the people; for Him, the absolute form is not only the most perfect, but the only one possible. And for the world it is infinitely the best, because it is the absolutism of justice and love in every department, and for every even the meanest and basest subject.

The universality of the scheme is a necessity from this view of its absoluteness and unity. The dominion of earthly potentates is limited by geographical boundaries, mountains, seas, and rivers. All the great empires, the Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman, left large masses of the earth's population outside of their influence and beyond their power. But what boundaries are there to God's providential sway? and what territories lie beyond it? Temporal rulers may travel out of their empire, or they may die and their sceptre pass to another. But the Eternal never dies, nor moves beyond his right to rule kings, and princes are as much His subjects as are their people. He holds them as strictly responsible to Him for the right use of their power, as He does their most abject vassals.

Nations, as such, exist only on this mundane stage, and the course of providental justice runs with them to the fall. Hence national injustice and wrong, however hoary with age, or honored by eminence, or guarded by the technicalities of law, find no immunity at the high court of infinite equity, though Prov-

idence sometimes waits long and almost wears out the patience of the saints. But reparation will come, if not in ameliorating peaceful amendments, in rioting revolutions, in bloody insurrections, in clarifying rebellions or anarchies, in purifying pestilence or famine, in one or in all, sooner or later it will come in the retributive visitations of historic justice.

"My Lord Cardinal," said Anne of Austria to Richelieu, with a terrible earnestness, "God does not pay at the end of every week, but HE PAYS."

This unity of plan, with its endless variety and absoluteness, dominates all the harmonies of history and all its discords. Every one of the numberless suns and systems that revolve in infinite space with their inhabitants, all laws of intelligence and thought, all attractions and repulsions of evil and of good, find their explanation in this all-comprehending divine plan. Down deep under the agitated surface of history, in the disturbances of the most tumultuous times, the historic eye will discover a slow, quiet movement and a law of progress, like the immense seas of ice in Alpine glens under a summer sun—always moving, yet always there.

ART. V.—1. *Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature. Third edition, greatly enlarged and improved.* Edited by WILLIAM LINDSAY ALEXANDER, D.D., F.S.A.S. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866.

Article on Wine. By Rev. ISAAC JENNINGS, Congregational Minister, Kelvedon, Essex, England. Vol. III., pp. 1108–1112.

2. *A Dictionary of the Bible, comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History.* Edited by WILLIAM SMITH, D.D. In three volumes. London: John Murray. Vol. III., art. Wine, pp. 1774–8.

3. *Remarks on Our Saviour's Miracle of Turning Water into Wine, in Lange's Commentary* on John, chap. ii. By Rev. PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary.

4. *Bibliotheca Sacra for January*, 1869. Art. I., entitled "*What Wine Shall we Use at the Lord's Supper?*" By Rev. T. Laurie, D.D.

More than thirty years ago a section of the active promoters of total abstinence from intoxicating drinks became strongly persuaded that if the wine, whose sparing use is treated as not sinful in Scripture, is fermented, and, when taken in excess, capable of inducing intoxication, this fact must prove a serious hindrance to their cause. They deemed expediency too feeble a basis for it. They accordingly sought to remove this supposed obstacle by a new and unprecedented exegesis of the Scripture teachings respecting wine. They undertook to show that the wines of Scripture were of two kinds, fermented and unfermented, and when spoken of with reprobation the former alone were meant; when mentioned with approval, the latter exclusively were intended. This interpretation was new to the church, and has since gained the acceptance of a minimum of Christendom, or, with the exception of we know not how considerable a party in this country, of the Protestant and Evangelical Church. The first extended defence of this exegesis was in two English books, respectively styled "Bacchus" and "Anti-Bacchus," which were drawn forth by the offer of a prize of one hundred sovereigns for the best essay on the "Benefits of Total Abstinence." The former, by Mr. R. B. Grindrod, took the prize. The latter, by the Rev. B. Parsons, so nearly equalled the former as to be preferred to it by one of the three judges who made the award. These books were republished in this country, the latter revised and amended by the Rev. John Marsh, secretary of the American Temperance Union. The late Mr. E. C. Delavan, long prominent in Temperance movements, and a leading promoter of the views in question, brought the above books to the Rev. Dr. John Maclean, then Vice-President, and afterwards President, of the College of New Jersey, with the request that he would carefully examine them. To this Dr. Maclean consented, with the understanding that he should publish the results of that examination to the world. The consequence was that, in the year 1841, he subjected them to a searching review in the April and October numbers of this

journal. He proved conclusively in these articles, after a thorough survey of the sacred and classical literature of the subject, that the ancient writers, inspired and uninspired, knew nothing of unfermented and unintoxicating wine, and showed the fallacy of all the arguments to the contrary adduced by the above writers, whose books are the chief repository of facts and reasonings in that behalf, from which its later advocates have been, directly or indirectly, supplied. Even Dr. Lees, the author of the "Temperance Commentary" on the Scriptures, who is now referred to as the supreme authority in this sort of exegesis by its advocates, has drawn largely from these store-houses, and added little of serious moment to their arguments. He does not even pretend to answer Dr. Maclean. Few critiques were ever recognized, by friend and foe, as more candid, thorough, and annihilating than that of Dr. Maclean on these productions. The question was for a long period set at rest, at least among the readers of this journal, and in the then Old-School Presbyterian Church. By most Scriptural commentators, especially the German and Continental, it is not even referred to or recognized as a question.*

* Thus Tholuck, defending the miracle at Cana in Galilee (*Commentary on John*, Philadelphia edition, pp. 104–5), does not hint at any attempt ever being made to justify it on the ground that the wine made was unfermented. He rather proposes one, for barely suggesting which Dr. Maclean has been soundly abused. He says: "But not merely the *possibility*, but the *conformity to any good purpose, and the propriety* of this miracle particularly, have been called into question. While the miracles of Christ on other occasions were worthy of honor as the emanation of his mercy, this, which was an abetting of the luxury of a banquet, seems almost immoral. But we have already intimated that we must suppose that a family, with which the mother of Jesus was on intimate terms, was a poor and pious one, and for their poverty there is a palpable evidence in the want of wine on an occasion when in Palestine such a deficiency could scarcely occur, except with very poor persons." "This is now the second honor (the first was his presence)," says Luther, "that he presented to the poor couple at their wedding good wine—he had perchance no gold nor jewel to give them."

Maldonatus: "Voluit Christus non solum præsenti inopiæ subvenire, sed multum etiam vini sponso remanere, tum ut illius paupertatem sublevaret, tum ut diuturnum testimonium ac monimentum esset facti miraculi." "Christ desired not only to relieve a present necessity, but that a quantity of wine might remain for him who had just married, alike that He might assist him in his poverty, and leave a lasting witness and memorial of the miracle that

We had, until quite lately, supposed what a most eminent divine said recently in reference to a proposal to discuss it, that it had become a "dead issue." Although attempts to answer Dr. Maclean's articles have not been wanting, yet they have been entirely unsuccessful, especially as to the fundamental issues concerned; indeed, those issues have for the most part been purposely or ignorantly evaded by writers on the other side.

Recently it has become evident, that since the discussion of this subject has ceased in the church for a generation, under the prevailing impression that the truth in the premises was alike unquestioned and unquestionable, the constant and unanswered promulgation of the contrary doctrine, in more or less of the total abstinence literature of the time, has silently borne its natural fruits. Having been quietly circulated without the notice or criticism of that vast body who hold the plain scriptural doctrine on the subject, a section, we know not how large, of our ministry and people seem to have imbibed it, mainly, we shall believe, until we see evidence to the contrary, because they have not seen the weight of evidence on the other side. When Dr. Maclean recently published a brief summation of the doctrines triumphantly vindicated by him thirty years ago, in refutation of Dr. Herrick Johnson's advocacy of the contrary view, his positions were met by a storm of denunciation and vituperation. They were denounced as "strange," idiosyncratic, the vade-mecum of dram-sellers and dram-drinkers. The like measure was meted out from the same parties to Dr. Duryea, for placing total abstinence on the only possible scriptural ground: that of expediency. The few remarks made by us at the close of our Assembly article have evoked outbursts of flippant, pettifogging misrepresentation, perversion, calumny, and abuse, which we seldom see except in the advocates of unscriptural and fanatical principles. In all this, if some have tried to do their best, they have, let us in all charity hope, done their worst. Quite a number have even stigma-

had been wrought." In fact, under the circumstances stated, the vast quantity of wine is accounted for in a very satisfactory manner. Thus, then, this miracle is an expression of love on the part of Christ, and to his disciples, as we read, "a stimulus of faith."

tized it as the height of abominations to maintain that our Saviour made fermented wine at his first miracle. Some have even taken the avowed infidel ground, that if fermented wine is allowed in the Bible, or was made by Christ, they will reject Christ and the Bible alike.*

To this position various outside Temperance Associations have long been trying to urge the Church. The American Temperance Society abounds in tracts and treatises to this effect. The New York Temperance Association, at its late meeting in Syracuse, voiced their spirit as follows:—

Resolved, That, deeming the use of fermented wines at the communion table very dangerous to reformed inebriates, and entirely unfit as an emblem of the blood of Christ, we earnestly entreat all Christian ministers and churches to abjure such use at once and forever. Adopted unanimously.

It also seconded the effort now so industriously made to cow down all ministers who maintain that the wines of Scripture are fermented, as follows:—

We believe the attempt of certain ministers of late to prove that the Scriptures sanction the use of intoxicating drinks are misleading in exposition, pernicious in influence, and to be regretted as coming from Christian teachers.

It likewise objected to the medical use of alcoholic drinks.

We do not wonder at their failure to enlist the co-operation of the great body of the friends of temperance, of which they complain in the following terms:—

"The general complaint among the special friends of the measure is that,

* Says the *N. Y. Evangelist* of June 22, in an article entitled the "Temperance Discussion:"—

"One writer—we are happy to say *only* one—uses very coarse language in abuse of this aged servant of Christ, whom all who know him regard with affectionate veneration. He represents Dr. Maclean as 'degrading Christ.' 'classing him with brewers and distillers,' and exclaims with indignation: 'What! accept a brewer, distiller, or manufacturer of intoxicating wine as my Saviour? Convince me that Jesus of Nazareth was such, and I will relinquish on the instant a faith I have fostered for more than thirty years, and will unite in the cry, Away with Him! Crucify Him! crucify Him!' Thus the fury of his zeal leads him to frenzy, if not to blasphemy." So comments the *Evangelist*. We grieve that so much has appeared even in religious journals only a little short of it, and requiring only the consistency of remorseless logic to match it.

although the feeling in the State is preponderatingly for Temperance, the men and women who should take the most zealously active interest are with difficulty enlisted in the matter. The semi-annual meetings come on every year, but the same men meet and strive, but under every discouragement. Few new advocates come forward, though thousands raise their voices or use the pen against this most malignant of social abominations."

But we do wonder that they should find the echoes and co-adjutors they have, in this crusade against Christian ministers for maintaining Christian truth. We therefore think it a duty to lay before our readers what we deem conclusive evidence, that the wine of the Bible, of Bible lands, and the wine used by our Saviour at the institution of the sacred supper, is fermented, and capable, if used in sufficient quantities, of producing intoxication; and hence, that all attempts to found temperance and total abstinence on the contrary doctrine must inevitably result in arraying the latter against the Bible and against Christianity, and operate disastrously upon temperance and religion.

We begin by setting before our readers a full transcript of a compact, scholarly, and conclusive article, in regard to the wines of Scripture, from the third revised edition of Kitto's *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*, edited by William Lindsay Alexander, D.D., of Edinburgh; republished in this country by Lippincott, of Philadelphia. Dr. Alexander refused to edit it, though urgently requested, until the publishers consented to give up the old stereotype plates, and "reset the whole work, with such alterations as might be necessary to bring it up to the present state of Biblical knowledge." The importance of this production to our present inquiry arises not only from its eminent ability, scholarship, and candor; from the conclusiveness of its argument as to the character of the wines of Scripture, and from its very masterly summation of the whole subject, but also from the fact that it supplants and answers the article on this subject in previous editions by Dr. Lees, the champion commentator on the other side. A change has also been made in the authorship and position of the article on the Lord's Supper; the original having been written by Dr. Lees, that in the present edition by Rev. Robert Halley, D.D. The author of the former article, who has been put in place of Dr.

Lees, is Rev. Isaac Jennings, a Congregational minister of England, whose paper on this subject is the best evidence of his fitness to prepare it. We insert this article at full length, without, of course, endorsing every sentence of it, not only as argument, but as a testimony of present Christian scholarship. And we shall corroborate it by numerous other equivalent witnesses, which we think will evince the absolute fatuity, if nothing worse, of attempting to conduct the temperance reformation on the platform that the permitted wines of Scripture are unfermented, and of stigmatizing those who deny this, even though total abstainers in their practice, as the allies of dram-sellers and drunkards. We are constrained to this treatment of the subject on account of the persistent, disingenuous attempts to represent the view we maintain as a special *Princeton*, or *Princeton Review* idiosynacrasy, an old and stale device of the opponents of the doctrines of our standards pure and simple. We think it easy to show that the consensus of the great body of respectable scholarly and Christian authorities is with us.

Mr. Jennings begins by saying: "This subject requires to be treated in this place as a purely Biblical question, independently of all party controversies which have arisen on the wine question, as it is called, in connection with total abstinence. The writer, a total abstainer for many years, is fully persuaded that the theory or practice of total abstinence has no legitimate connection with the investigation in hand.

"I. Wine, denoting properly the fermented juice of the grape, is used in the A. V. as the rendering of several Hebrew and Greek words. To these our attention must, in the first place, be directed.

"1. יַיִן, *yayin*, according to Gesenius, from יוּן, *yon*, an unused root, having the force of *fervendi, æstuendi;* according to Fürst, from *vin*, like the Arabic *vayin*, Aeth. *ven*, Greek Γοῖνος, et sic porro ceteris in linguis, Arm. gini; Lat. Vinum; Eng. wine; LXX. οἶνος, ἀσκὸς, γλεῦκος. Others take the word to be of Indo-European extraction, from the root *we*, to weave, or *wan*, to love. The meaning of the word, therefore, is re-

garded by some as uncertain, but apparently without reason, as Gesenius is clearly right in his derivation of it.

"This word, the most commonly employed in the O. T. Scripture for wine, occurring about 142 times, is also the most comprehensive, including, like the corresponding English word, wines of all sorts, although used also in a more restricted sense, to denote *red* wine. That *yayin* was intoxicating admits of no question. Noah planted a vineyard and drank of the *yayin* and was *drunken* (Gen. ix. 21); Nabal drank *yayin* and was *very drunken* (1 Sam. xxv. 36, 37); the 'drunkards of Ephraim' were 'overcome with *yayin*' (Is. xxviii. 1), or rather knocked down, or, as Gill paraphrases it, 'smitten, beaten, knocked down with it as with a hammer, and laid prostrate on the ground, where they lie fixed to it, not able to rise.' Jeremiah says: 'I am like a drunken man, and like a man whom *yayin* hath overcome' (xxiii. 9).

"But, although intoxicating, yet it was not only permitted to be drunk, but was also used for sacred purposes, and is spoken of as a blessing. Thus, in Jacob's blessing on Judah: 'His eyes shall be red with *yayin*, and his teeth white with milk' (Gen. xlix. 12). So in God's promise to restore his people to their own land: 'I will bring again the captivity of my people . . . and they shall plant vineyards and drink the *yayin* thereof' (Amos iv. 19). 'Drink thy *yayin*,' says the preacher, 'with a merry heart, for God now accepteth thy works' (Eccles. ix. 7). The Nazarite, at the expiration of his vow, was permitted to drink *yayin* (Num. vi. 13–20); the Israelites were permitted to drink *yayin* at their feasts (Deut. xiv. 24–26); *yayin* was used in the sacred service of Jehovah, being poured out as a drink-offering to him (Exod. xxix. 40; Lev. xxiii. 13; Num. xv. 5). Hence it not only 'maketh glad the heart of man' (Ps. civ. 15), but also 'cheereth both God and man' (Judg. ix. 13), its cheering effects being symbolically transferred to the Divine Being.

"The intoxicating quality of *yayin* Dr. Tattam confirms by Rabbinical testimony. 'The Mishna, in the treatise on the Passover, informs us that four cups of wine were poured out and blessed and drunk by each of the company at the eating of the Paschal lamb; and that water was also mixed with the wine,

because it was considered too strong to be drunk alone. Pesachim, cap. vii. 13; x. 1. In Hieros. Shabb. fol. xi. 1, we read, 'it is commanded that this rite be performed with red wine.'

"Babylon. Shabb. fol. lxxvii. 1: 'Sharon wine is of famous report, with which they mix two parts of water.'

"'Babylon. Beracoth, fol. 1: "Their wine (יין) was very strong, and not fit for drinking *without being mixed with water.*" The Gemara adds: "The cup of blessing is not to be blessed *until it is mixed with water.*"'

"The *Jerusalem Talmud* says: 'It became a man nobly to entertain his wife and children (at the Passover), that at this feast they might be merry with wine,' יין.

"'To meet the objection, How can intoxication be hindered? The Rabbins replied: "Because wine between eating does not intoxicate a man." Hieros Talm.' (Dr. Tattam's reply to a Pamphlet by Rev. W. Ritchie on the Scripture Testimony against Intoxicating Wine, pp. 8, 9.)

"2. תִּירוֹשׁ, *Tirosh*, from יָרַשׁ, *yarash*, to possess, 'Mustum, novum vinum ita dictum quia inebriat, cerebrum occupat' (Ges. *Thes.* 633). So Fürst, 'Mustum uvis expressum, a. v. יָרַשׁ, occupare, acquirere, comparare' (Concord. 525. 2). Dr. Lees, it is true, says that it is so called because 'it constituted one of the most valuable possessions of the Jews' (*Temp. Quest.* p. 114). The word occurs about thirty-four times in the Bible, rendered in the LXX. by three distinct terms, *οἶνος, ῥώξ, μέθυσμα*, sometimes in connection with *yayin*, sometimes with oil, and sometimes with words denoting the edible productions of the earth. Does it denote an intoxicating, or a non-intoxicating beverage? The latter has been asserted, but, as would seem, without reason. The contrary appears to be the truth. Hosea says (iv. 11): 'Whoredom and wine (*yayin*), and new wine (תִּירוֹשׁ, *tirosh*), take away the heart.' Here the use of the phrase 'take away the heart' implies the tendency of *tirosh* to 'blunt the moral feelings and derange the intellect.' The testimony of the Rabbins is to the same effect. They say: 'Tirosh is new wine; the liquor of the grapes first pressed out, which easily takes possession of the mind of man' (Sanhedr. lxxvi. 1). 'If thou abuse it thou shalt be poor; if thou rightly use it

thou shalt be head' (Joma lxxvi. 2). Again in the Gemara: 'Wherefore is it called *Tirosh?*' 'Because all who are drawn to it shall be poor' (Tattam's *Reply*, 5). Such is the testimony of the Rabbins, who ought to know something of their own language. In accordance with this, the Targumists Onkelos and Jonathan render *tirosh*, in every instance of its occurrence, except in three cases where there is no word, or the word for vineyard, by the word חמר, *chamar* (Tattam, 5, 6).

"That *tirosh* denotes not 'vine-fruit, the produce of the vine in the solid form of grapes, raisins,' etc., but *wine* properly, is sufficiently plain. Thus (Prov. iii. 10), 'Thy presses shall *burst forth* with new wine,' *tirosh*. (Is. lxii. 8), 'The sons of the stranger shall not *drink* thy wine,' *tirosh*. (Joel ii. 24), 'The fats shall overflow with wine (*tirosh*) and oil.' This, according to the author of *Lo Yayin*, is an 'image of abundance;' the 'vats *piled up* with fruits *so full*, that what was put on would *roll off to the ground*, because they could hold no more!' (p. 54).

"It is, however, argued from Micah vi. 15, that *tirosh* means grapes. Thou shalt tread *tirosh*, but shalt not drink the wine. *Tirosh* is here represented as being *trodden*, and must, therefore, it is concluded, be *grapes*. But in Is. xvi. 10, *yayin* is represented as being trodden: 'The treaders shall tread no יַיִן (*yayin*) in their presses.' Is *yayin* also grapes? Surely one must be very prosaic not to be capable of understanding such modes of expression. It is also argued, from the occurrence of the word along with *corn* (Gen. xxvii. 28), that *tirosh* is a solid substance. The very opposite conclusion is, however, the natural one. Corn and wine are the two principal and representative kinds of food—the former of solids, the latter of liquids. Bread and water occur very often together (*ex. gr.* Ezek. iv. 17; 1 Sam. xxv. 11, etc.). Is *water* then a *solid?*

"3. חֶמֶר, *Chemer*, from *chamar*, חָמַר, *æstuavit, ferbuit* Chaldee form, חֲמַר; LXX. *οἶνος, καλός*; 'Vinum a fervendo, et fermentando dictum' (Ges. *Thes.* 493). The word occurs eight times, twice in its Hebrew, and six times in its Chaldee form. In Deut. xxxii. 14 it is (in the A. V., after the Vulg.) treated as an adjective and rendered '*pure*'—'the *pure* blood of the grape,' instead of 'the blood of the grape—wine,' *chemer*. The

Rabbins call it *pure* or *neat wine* (*i. e.* no water being mixed with the juice of the grape), 'because it disturbs the head and the brain' (Tattam). They regarded *chemer* and *tirosh* 'as equivalent terms.' This pure, powerful wine was permitted to the Israelites (Deut. xxxii. 14); and is spoken of with approbation by Isaiah: 'In that day sing ye unto Him, A vineyard of red wine (חֶמֶר, *chemer*); I the Lord do keep it' (xxvii. 2, 3). And Cyrus and Artaxerxes commanded that *chemer* should be given to the people of Israel 'for the service of the God of heaven' (Ezra vi. 9).

"4. שֵׁכָר, *Shechar*, from שָׁכַר *shachar*, *inebriavit se;* LXX. *σίκερα, οἶνος, μέθυσμα, μέθη*; Vulg. *Vinum*, '*temetum*, an inebriating drink, whether wine prepared or distilled from barley, or from honey, or from dates' (Ges. *Thes.* 1440). So Fürst, who adds, 'or any other kind of intoxicating drink comprehended under the name *τῶν σικέρων*.' Jerome says: 'Sicera (שֵׁכָר) Hebræo sermone omnis potio quæ inebriare potest, sive illa quæ frumento conficitur, sive pomorum succo, aut quum favi decoquuntur in dulcem et barbaram potionem, aut palmarum fructus exprimuntur in liquorem, coctisque frugibus aqua pinguior coloratur (*Ep. ad. Nepotianum*). In the A. V. the word is rendered *strong wine*, Num. xxviii. 7; and occurring along with *yayin*, *strong drink*, Prov. xx. 2; Is. v. 11, 22. Onkelos on Num. xxviii. 7 calls it 'old wine;' Rabbi Solomon, Rabbi Eleasar, Aben Ezra, and others call it 'intoxicating wine.' 'The word means strong drink, from whatever substance made' (Tattam). It was used as a drink-offering in the service of God (Num. xxviii. 7); and was, notwithstanding its highly intoxicating property, permitted to the Israelites (Deut. xiv. 26).

"A vain attempt has been made, by connecting the word etymologically with *sugar*, to prove, in the face of the clearest evidence to the contrary, that it was a sweet, *non*-intoxicating syrup (see Dr. F. Lee's works). The word is employed in the following passage in such a manner as to show decisively that it denotes an intoxicating drink:—Lev. x. 9, where the priests are forbidden to drink wine or *shechar* when they go into the tabernacle; 1 Sam. i. 15, where Hannah, charged with drunkenness by Eli, replies it is not so: 'I have drunk neither wine nor *shechar;*' Ps. lxix. 13, where the Psalmist complains: 'I

was the song of the drinkers of *shechar*,' A. V. 'drunkards;' Prov. xx. 1: 'Wine is a mocker, *shechar* is raging, and whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise;' Prov. xxxi. 4, 5: 'It is not for kings to drink wine, nor for princes *shechar*, lest they drink and forget the law;' Is. v. 22: 'Woe unto them that are mighty to drink wine, and men of strength to mingle *shechar;*' Is. xxviii. 7: 'They also have erred through wine, and through *shechar* are out of the way: the priest and the prophet have erred through *shechar*, they are swallowed up of wine, they are out of the way through *shechar;*' Is. xxix. 9: 'They are drunken, but not with wine; they stagger, but not with *shechar*.'

"*Shechar* may have been a sweet beverage, as sugary as Dr. Lees or any one else chooses; but it was most certainly *intoxicating*.

"5. עָסִיס, *Asis*, from עָסַס to tread; LXX. *νᾶμα, γλυκασμός, οἶνος νέος, μέθη*, Targ. חֲמַר מְרַח, pure wine; Vulg. dulcedo, mustum; *must*, that which is expressed from grapes by treading, or from pomegranates (Ges. *Thes.* 1054). Henderson says: 'By *asis* is meant the *fresh wine*, or juice of the grape or other fruit which has just been *pressed out*, and is remarkable for its sweet flavor and its freedom from intoxicating qualities' (*Com. on Joel* i. 5). Yet its intoxicating quality seems intimated in Is. xlix. 26: 'They shall be drunken with their own blood as with sweet wine' (*hasis*); Joel i. 5: 'Awake, ye drunkards, and weep . . . because of the new wine (*hasis*); for it is cut off from your mouth.' It is promised by God as a blessing, Joel iii. 17, 18; Amos ix. 13.

"6. סֹבֶא, *sobê*, from סָבָא, *saba, potavit*, idque intemperantius, *gurgitavit*, to drink to excess, to tope (Ges. *Thes.* 932); LXX. *οἶνος*; Vulg. Vinum. The noun occurs only in two places, but the verb and participle often; the latter to denote drunk, a drunkard, a toper. Gesenius renders the noun in Is. i. 22 *vinum*, but in Hos. iv. 18, *compotatio*, a drinking bout, a carouse; so Henderson, Dathe, etc. The LXX. must have followed a various reading in this place. *Sobè*, then, means some (or perhaps any) kind of intoxicating drink.

"7. מֶסֶךְ, *mesek*, from מָסַךְ, *masak*, *miscere*, to mix, to mingle; wine mixed with water or aromatics; LXX. *κέρασμα*; Vulg. *Mistum*. It occurs only once, Ps. lxxv. 9; but the participial noun מִמְסָךְ, *mimsak*, in Prov. xxiii. 30, Is. lxv. 11, in a

similar sense=wine highly spiced, to improve its flavor and enhance its intoxicating power. [Meni.]

"8. שְׁמָרִים, *Shemarim*, from שָׁמַר, *shamar*, *servavit, reservavit, aservavit,* to keep, to preserve, to lay up; LXX. τρυγέας, φύλαγμα, δόξα; Vulg. *Fæces*, *Vendemiæ*, A. V. lees, dregs, wine on the lees. The word occurs five times, and always in the plural. It is used both of lees and of wine preserved on the lees;—of lees, Ps. lxxv. 9; Zeph. i. 12; Jer. xlviii. 11; in all which passages it is used in a figurative sense; in the second and third the form of expression is proverbial, being used of individuals and nations—'de iis qui desides, atque otiosi sunt, vel certe vita utuntur quieta, tranquilla, metaphora a vino petita, quod diu in cella reconditum fæcibus superjaciet et intactum asservatur, quo validius fit vinum odorque fragrantior' (Ges. *Thes.* 1444); it is used of wine, Is. xxv. 6, where the prophet foretells the rich provision of Gospel blessings under the figure of 'a feast of fat things, of wines on the lees,' *Shemārim*, well refined, מְמֻקָּקִים, *defecated, i. e.* 'Vinum vetus et nobilissimum a fæcibus purgatum' (Ges.), or, 'cum fæcibus servatum (Hefenwein), quod defecatum et clarificatum in conviviis opiparis apponitur' (Fürst, *Concord.* 1177). The word is used of lees, according to some, 'from their preserving the strength and flavor of wine' (Alexander); according to others, as 'Id quod ad ultimum usque reservatur et remanet—fæces, utpote quæ in imo vasis fundo subsident' (Fürst). This 'Vetus et nobilissimum vinum' is spoken of approvingly in the last-cited passage.

"9. אֲשִׁישָׁה, *ashîsha*, LXX. λάγανον ἀπὸ πηγάνου, πέμμα, ἀμορίτης, *i. e.* a cake from the frying-pan, a baked cake, a sweet cake—variation of rendering truly. The Targ. of Jonathan on Exod. xvi. 31 uses *ashishyan* for the Heb. *tsapihith*, a flat cake. 'The traditio Judaica' is a *narba dihamra*, a jar of wine. A.V. has flagons, flagons of wine. Critics are pretty generally agreed that it does not denote wine or any other drink, but a *cake;* such as was prepared from dried grapes or raisins pressed, or compacted into a certain form. Cakes of this kind are mentioned as delicacies with which the weary and languid are refreshed (2 Sam. vi. 19; 1 Chron. xvi. 3; Cant. ii. 5); and wine offered in sacrifice to idols (Hos. iii. 1). They differed from *tsimmuk, i. e.* grapes dried but not compacted into the form of

cakes; and also from *dbaeleh*, *i. e. figs* pressed into cakes. So Gesenius, who derives the word from *ashash*, to *press*, although Ginsburg would derive it from a similar form denoting to *burn*. The evidence seems in favor of a cake, especially a grape cake, in which latter sense it certainly occurs Hos. iii. 1, where, however, it is written more fully, or rather with the addition of *anabim*, grapes, which fills up its meaning, *ashishey anabim*, *cakes of grapes*. Dr. Tattam, resting on the authority of Rabbins whom he quotes, seems inclined to abide by the rendering of the A. V. (See *Reply*, pp. 13, 14.)

"Three other words may here be noticed:—חֹמֶץ *chometz;* LXX. *ὄξος*, but in Prov. x. 26, *ὄμφαξ*, *uva immatutum*, sour grapes; so Syr.; Vulg. *acetum;* A. V. *vinegar*, rightly.

"עֲנָבִים, *anābim*, Hos. iii. 1; A.V. wine, but properly grapes. See above, under *ashisha*.

"יֶקֶב, *yekeb;* A. V. wine (Deut. xvi. 13), but incorrectly, as the word denotes a *winepress*.

"In the N. T. several words are employed denoting wine:—

"(1.) *οἶνος*, comprehending every sort of wine.

"(2.) *γλεῦκος*, sweet or 'new wine,' which, as well as the former, seems, from the use made of it (Acts ii. 13), to signify wine of an intoxicating quality: 'These men are full of new wine;' to which charge Peter replies: 'These men are not drunken as ye suppose' (v. 15)—although Dr. Lees' interpretation is fairly admissible: that the language is that of mockery, as if we should say of a drunken man: He has taken too much water. The *γλεῦκος* was the fruit of the grape so kept as to preserve its sweetness, 'perhaps made of a remarkably sweet, small grape, which is understood by the Jewish expositors to be meant by *sorek* or *sorēkah* (Gen. xlix. 11; Is. v. 2), and still found in Syria and Arabia' (Alford *on Acts* ii. 13). Suidas: *τὸ ἀποσταλάγμα τῆς σταφυλῆς πρίν πατηθῆ*.

"(3.) *Γέννημα*, or *γένημα τῆς ἀμπέλου*, fruit of the vine—wine (Luke xxii. 18).

"(4.) *Οἶνος ἄκρατος*, pure wine (Rev. xiv. 10)—*οἶνον ἄκρατον εἶναι λέγομεν, ᾧ μὴ μέμικται τὸ ὕδωρ, ἢ παντάπασιν ὀλίγον μέμικται* (Galen *in Wetstein*, cited by Alford). Here the phrase is used figuratively.

"(5.) Ὄξος, sour wine, or vinegar (Matt. xxvii. 48; Mark xv. 36, etc).

"(6.) Σίκερα, A. V. 'strong drink;' Hebrew *shechar*, 'any strong drink made of grapes' (Robinson, Alford, etc.)

II. Some Historical Notices *of the use of wine in the Bible.*

"The first notice we have of wine in the O. T. is in the case of Noah, who 'planted a vineyard and did drink of the wine (*yayin*) and was drunken' (Gen. ix. 20, 21). The culture of the vine no doubt existed before, but the patriarch now resumes the occupation which had been interrupted by the flood. 'Nowhere does the vine grow spontaneously in such abundance and excellence as in the region of Ararat in Armenia, and the Eastern Pontus; but, no doubt, the culture of the vine was of remote antiquity, invented by one nation and spread to other countries; for thus only can the remarkable circumstance be accounted for that wine bears the same name in almost all eastern and western nations' (*Kalisch*, Gen. ix. 20, 21). 'It may be added that the Egyptians attributed the manufacture of wine to Osiris, the Phœnicians and Greeks to Bacchus, the Romans to Saturn' (*ibid.*)

"The next notice of wine is in the history of Lot, whose daughters 'made their father drink wine' (*yayin*), so that he became stupidly intoxicated (Gen. xix. 32, etc.) It next occurs in Isaac's blessing pronounced on Jacob: 'The Lord give thee plenty of corn and wine' (*yayin*) (Gen. xxvii. 28). The next notice of the juice of the grape is in connection with Egypt, (Gen. xl. 11), when the chief butler says, 'I took the grapes and pressed them into Pharaoh's cup.' Are we to take these words according to their strict literality? And did the kings of Egypt, at the time, drink the unfermented juice of the grape only? However that may be, and although an affirmative answer seems demanded, yet we know that the vine was cultivated in Egypt from very ancient times, representations of the process of the manufacture of wines being found on tombs belonging to the 4th dynasty; that wine was used almost universally by the rich; that it was freely drunk at the banquets of both men and women, and even excessively, as the monuments abundantly

testify; that it was drunk even by the priests and offered in the temples to their gods. All this is now well ascertained, notwithstanding the contradictory statements of Herodotus on some points (see Rawlinson's *Herod.* ii. 103, 126; Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, i. 144, etc.)

"In the laws of Moses, wine is frequently mentioned. It was commanded to be offered to God as a drink-offering (Num. xv. 5, 7, 10). This furnishes the key to the peculiar language of Jotham's parable: 'Wine that cheereth God and man' (Judg. ix. 13), an exposition much preferable to that which renders the words: 'the gods and men;' for wine was offered to God as the drink of the Great King, the symbol of our best spiritual things which we offer in his worship. Wine was forbidden to the priests during the performance of their sacred duties in the tabernacle (Lev. x. 9,) which prohibition seems to have originated in the offence of Nadab and Abihu, who, most probably, 'transgressed through wine.' At other times the priests were at liberty to drink wine. To the Nazarites, while under their vow, not only wine but vinegar, and the fruit of the vine generally, in every form, was prohibited (Num. vi. 3, 4). The Israelites were at liberty to drink wine even at their national sacred festivals when rejoicing before the Lord (Deut. xiv. 22–26). The Rechabites are mentioned as very peculiar in their abstinence from wine, as well as their refraining to live in houses, and are commended, not for their abstinence, but for their obedience to their ancestor (Jer. xxxv.).

"Wine was used by the Jews in the celebration of the Passover; for the account of which see Passover, and Tattam's *Reply to Ritchie.*

"The Rabbins have a curious tradition, that at the great feast which shall inaugurate the coming of the Messiah, he shall drink wine made from grapes which grew in Paradise during the six creative days, and preserved in Adam's cave for that great occasion (Othonis *Lex.*, art. 'Vinum;' Buxt. *Syr. Jud.* 460).

"It appears to have been an ancient custom to give medicated or drugged wine to criminals condemned to death, to blunt their senses, and so lessen the pains of execution. To this custom there is supposed to be an allusion, Prov. xxxi. 6, 'Give strong drink unto him that is ready to perish,' and an illustration

is furnished by the soldiers giving Jesus 'wine mingled with myrrh,' or, which is the same, 'vinegar'=sour wine; 'mingled with gall'=a bitter drug, without specifying the kind (Mark. xv. 23; Matt. xxvii. 34). '*Omnes a synedrio ad mortem damnati potarunt* יין חי, *vino vivo*, (h. e. optimo, forti) ut diriperetur intellectus ejus, ad confirmandum id dicitur, Prov. xxxi. 6, etc. De perituro dicetur, id fieri, ut obliviscatur mortis, quæ est infortunium ipsius' (Schoet. *Hor. Heb.* 236). To the same custom some suppose there is a reference in Amos ii. 8, where the 'wine of the condemned' (A. V.) is spoken of. The margin reads, instead of condemned, 'fined or mulcted;' so Gesenius; Henderson, *amerced.* The wicked here described, in addition to other evil practices, imposed unjust fines upon the innocent, and spent the money thus unjustly obtained upon wine, which they quaffed in the house of their gods. As Dathe renders: 'pecunias hominibus innocentibus extortas compotationibus absumunt in templis deorum suorum.'

"*Mixed* wine is often spoken of in Scripture. This was of different kinds. Sometimes it was mixed with water to take it down (Is. i. 22); sometimes with milk (Songs v. 1); and sometimes, by lovers of strong drink, with spices of various kinds, to give it a richer flavor and greater potency (Is. v. 22; Ps. lxxv. 8). The 'royal wine,' literally wine of the kingdom, יֵין מַלְכוּת, *yayin malkuth* (Esther i. 7), denotes most probably the best wine, such as the king of Persia himself was accustomed to drink. 'Wine of Lebanon' is referred to in such a way as to indicate its peculiar excellence—'the scent thereof shall be as the wine of Lebanon' (Hos. xiv. 7). Hence it is thought to have been distinguished by its grateful smell. But זֵכֶר means, as the margin renders it, *memorial*, and includes odor, flavor, and refreshing influence. And modern travellers attest the excellence of the wine of Lebanon. The 'wine of Helbon, or Chalybon,' is mentioned as one of the importations of Tyre (Ezekiel xxvii. 18), and was very famous.

The vine abounded in ancient, as it does in modern Palestine; and wines of various degrees of excellence were made. The wines of modern Palestine are represented by modern travellers as being of excellent quality. The sweet wines are particularly esteemed in the East, because they are grateful to

the taste, very exhilarating; and some of them will keep for a long time. They were therefore preferred by those who were addicted to drinking, and commonly selected for the tables of kings. Their inebriating quality is alluded to by the prophet Isaiah: 'I will feed them that oppress you with their own flesh, and they shall be drunken as with sweet wine' (Is. xlix. 26).

"'The testimony of travellers respecting the spirituous nature of the wines of Palestine accords with that of the sacred writers. . . . It is observed by *Thevenot*, that the people of the Levant never mingle water with their wines at meals, but drink by itself what water they think proper for abating its strength. While the Greeks and Romans by mixed wine understood wine united and lowered with water, the Hebrews, on the contrary, meant by it wine made stronger and more inebriating by the addition of powerful ingredients.

"'The wines of Palestine are generally kept in bottles made of leather, or goat-skins, sewed or pitched together. In these the process of fermentation took place, and the wine acquired its proper degree of strength.

"'In the absence of anything like chemical analysis, these are the data from which we must draw our conclusions concerning the nature of the wines referred to by the sacred writers. Some of them are represented to have been sweet wines, which, if not the strongest, are known to have been very strong. The grapes from which they were produced were remarkable for their richness and excellence; the climate of the country being such as to favor the growth and development of those principles which, during fermentation, were converted into alcohol. And as the grapes of that country are now known to furnish very rich and spirituous wines, we may infer that the ancient were similar in their character; since there is abundant evidence that the climate has not suffered any material change for three thousand years.

"'I should not omit, in confirmation of this view of the spirituous nature of the wines of Palestine, to advert to the modes in which they were kept. It is now well known that when mixtures of alcohol and water are put into bladders, the water evaporates and leaves the alcohol in a more concentrated form. And it is asserted that wine which has been kept in bottles

closed by pieces of bladder firmly tied over the mouth, in a few weeks acquires the strength and flavor which would be imparted to it only by several years' preservation in the ordinary way. Now, it is probable that the leather bags in which these wines are put would produce a similar effect upon the liquor, which, after the process of fermentation had ceased, would soon attain its complete and appropriate alcoholic character.' (Prof. Silliman, *Amer. Jour of Science and Arts*, 1834, quoted by Kitto *on Psal.* lxxv. 8).

"'The wine was generally contained in large ox-skins ranged round the store-room, and quite distended with liquor. The larger skins seem to have answered to casks; the smaller goat and kid skins, to barrels and kegs in the comparison, to be chiefly used in conveying to customers the smallest quantities required. Individuals rarely keep large stores of wine in their houses, but get a small supply of a goat-skin or two from the wine-store. This seems also to have been the case with the ancient Jews, for Nehemiah, although holding the rank of governor, had no store of wine, for we read he had a supply of wine every ten days (Neh. v. 18). The large skins in the wine-store we have mentioned are supported above the floor on frames of wood' (Kitto *on Job* xxxii. 19). Similar methods of storing and keeping wine were common to the Greeks and Romans.

"III. *Now what is the teaching of the Scriptures in respect to the* use *of wine?*—They make no distinction between intoxicating and non-intoxicating wines—never allude or refer to such a distinction. Yet wine, יַיִן *yayin* = *οἶνος*, is constantly spoken of in precisely the same way that corn, and oil, and milk are spoken of, namely, as a blessing sent by God for the use of man. It was enjoined to be used in the service of God. It is employed as a symbol of the highest spiritual blessings (Is. lv. 1, 2). The use of it was common among the Jews, as it is among the people of all wine-producing countries. It was forbidden to the Nazarites alone, and that only while under their vow. The use of it is in one case distinctly prescribed by Paul to Timothy (1 Tim. v. 23). Jesus Christ came 'drinking wine' as well as 'eating bread' (Luke vii. 33, 34), and in one instance miraculously produced a supply of wine when it was

needed (John ii.) We attach great importance, religiously and theologically, to these facts. Jesus was no ascetic. He gave no countenance to asceticism. By drinking wine—freely using the blessings of God's providence—he testified against the error, afterwards called Gnostic and Manichean, which would attach impurity to that which enters the mouth, and vindicated the liberty of his followers to use 'every creature of God' as good and fit for food, and to be received with thanksgiving by them as those who 'believe and know the truth' (1 Tim. iv. 3, 4). But this error repelled, and this liberty asserted, none are obliged to drink wine or to eat meat if they prefer not. There is liberty on this side also. They may abstain if they choose. Paul expressed his readiness to abstain from 'flesh' and 'wine' to secure the good of a brother, or to avoid occasioning him injury (Rom. xiv. 21; comp. 1 Cor. viii. 13). The same liberty is ours; and if a great practical good may be attained by abstinence, Christian benevolence calls us in this direction.

"But while liberty to use wine as well as every other earthly blessing is conceded and maintained in the Bible, yet all abuse of it is solemnly and earnestly condemned. In the book of Proverbs the warnings against such abuse are frequent and severe (xx. i.; xxiii. 29-35; xxxi. 4–7). It is the same in the N. T. (1 Cor. vi. 10; Gal. v. 21). 'Be not drunk with wine —not given to much wine.' Such are its precepts—precepts which would have little or no force, or even meaning, were wine not intoxicating, and were there not some peculiar danger incident to its use. If wine were not intoxicating, the apostle might as well have exhorted them against drinking too much milk, or too much water. He takes for granted the right to use; he recognizes the danger incident to the use; but instead of prohibiting, he cautions and exhorts against excess. *Moderation* in eating and drinking is the broad Christian law. *Abstinence* from some kinds of food may become a duty under peculiar circumstances. Self-denial, in relation to things lawful, is often imperative. Wine is good; is a gift of God. It may be used with advantage; it may be abused, but not innocently, or with impunity. It may be declined in the exercise of Christian liberty; it ought to be declined, if doing so helps for-

ward the cause of humanity, morality, and religion, and promotes the glory of God.

"(Ges. *Thes. Ling. Heb. et. Chal.;* Fürst's *Concord. Vet. Test. Heb. et Chal.;* Tattam's *Reply to Ritchie;* Otho, *Lex. Rabbin. Phil.;* *Works of* Dr. F. Lees, 2 vols.; Kitto's *Pict. Bib.;* Smiths' *Dic. of Greek and Rom. Antiquities*, art. 'Vinum;' Buxtorf's *Synagoga Jud.*, cap. x. xi.; *English Cyc.*, art. 'Wine,' etc.; Denman, *The Vine and its Fruit;* Redding's *Description of Wines, Ancient and Modern;* Wilkinson's *Anct. Egyptians*, 2 vols.)"

In like manner Rev. Wm. Latham Bevan, in the article on Wine in that great work, Dr. William Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, after an able and scholarly examination of the whole subject, in which he particularly notices the positions of Dr. Lees, gives the following confirmatory judgment:—

"The impression produced on the mind by a general review of the above notices, is that both *yayin* and *tirôsh*, in their ordinary and popular acceptation, referred to fermented, intoxicating wine. In the condemnatory passages no exception is made in favor of any other kind of liquid passing under the same name, but not invested with the same dangerous qualities. Nor again in these passages is there any decisive condemnation of the substance itself, which would enforce the conclusion that elsewhere an unfermented liquid must be understood. The condemnation must be understood of *excessive use* in any case; for even where this is not expressed, it is implied; and therefore the instances of wine being drunk without any reproof of the act, may with as great a probability imply the moderate use of an intoxicating beverage as the use of an unintoxicating one."—*Smith's Dictionary*, Vol. iii. p. 1776.

"The Pastoral Epistles contain directions as to the moderate use of wine on the part of all holding office in the Church, as that they should not be πάροινοι (1 Tim. iii. 3; A. V. 'given to wine'); meaning insolent and violent under the influence of wine; 'not given to much wine' (1 Tim. iii. 8); 'not enslaved to much wine' (Tit. ii. 3). The term νηφαλεος, in 1 Tim. iii. 2 (A. V. 'sober'), expresses general vigilance and circumspection (Schleusner, lex. s. v.; Alford in loc.) St. Paul advises Timothy to be no longer a habitual water-drinker, but to take a little wine for his health's sake (1 Tim. v. 23). No very satisfactory reason can be assigned for the place which this injunction holds in the epistle, unless it were intended to correct any possible misapprehension as to the preceding words 'keep thyself pure.' The precepts above quoted as well as others to the same effect, addressed to the disciples generally (Rom. xiii. 13; Gal. v. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 3), show the extent to which intemperance prevailed in ancient times, and the extreme danger to which the Church was subjected from this quarter."—*Id.*, Vol. iii. p. 1778.

"With regard to the uses of wine in private life, there is little to remark. It was produced on occasions of ordinary hospitality (Gen. xiv. 18), and at festivals, such as marriages (John ii. 3)."—*Id.*, p. 1777.

Coming to our own country (seldom, if ever, do continental commentators appear to be aware that any question has arisen as to the old church doctrine on the subject), Dr. Philip Schaff, who may be taken as a fair representative of the scholarship and tone of Union Theological Seminary, and indeed of our highest evangelical scholarship, which he adorns, in his late edition of Lange's Commentary on the Gospel of John, remarking on our Saviour's miracle at Cana, pronounces the distinction of fermented and unfermented wine, the one condemned, the other approved of God, as a modern figment held by only a few commentators. He affirms that "to lay down the principle that the use of intoxicating drinks as a beverage is a sin *per se*, is to *condemn* the greater part of Christendom, to contradict the Bible, and to impeach Christ Himself, who drank wine (He was slanderously called a wine-bibber), who made wine by a miracle, who instituted the holy communion under the symbols of bread and wine, and commands us to commemorate the shedding of his blood by drinking of the fruit of the vine until we shall drink it anew with Him in His Father's kingdom. There can be no higher and safer rule than the command and example of our Saviour; while, on the other hand, every principle of morals or rule of conduct which reflects on him *must* be unsound and mischievous."—John, chapter ii. 1–11; Lange's John, note by P. S., p. 111.

Dr. Schaff, in the same connection, states: "Total abstinence from wine, or from meat, or other things in themselves innocent and lawful, can be sufficiently defended as a moral duty under certain circumstances, on the ground of expediency and charity, from regard to our weak brethren, or the good of the community. This is the position taken by Paul. 1 Cor. viii. 13; Rom. xiv. 13–23. Considerations of health, climate, nationality, and condition of society must also be allowed due weight in this question."

We have a like verdict from Andover, which, while rarely charged with excess of conservatism, is confessedly eminent in

sacred learning and scholarship. In the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1869, is an able and candid article, entitled, "What Wine shall we use at the Lord's Supper?" By Rev. T. Laurie, D.D., formerly missionary of A. B. C. F. M. We shall have occasion to refer to this at considerable length. Meanwhile it is sufficient, just here, to quote his testimony in harmony with that already adduced. Dr. Laurie practises total abstinence, and at the polls votes for prohibitory laws against the sale of intoxicating liquors.* He says:—

"A remarkable instance of striving to commit the Bible to the figment of an unfermented wine is found in the articles under the words 'Wine' and 'Fruit,' in Kitto's *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*, written by Dr. F. R. Lees. But nothing could be better fitted to prejudice an Oriental scholar against the temperance reformation than to put these articles into his hands. In the improved edition of this valuable Cyclopædia, just completed by Dr. W. Lindsay Alexander, Professor of Theology to the Congregational Churches of Scotland, the article of Dr. Lees is left out, and a much more accurate and reliable statement of the whole subject, by Rev. Isaac Jennings, a Congregational minister in Kelvedon, Essex (England), is inserted in its stead.

"How can it be said that 'the lawful use of wine in Scripture is always connected with *tirosh*, and that *yayin* is always mentioned with disapproval?' No doubt '*yayin* is a mocker, *shaekar* is raging, and whoso is deceived thereby is not wise' (Prov. xx. 1), but it does not aid us in keeping men from being so deceived to suppress a part of God's truth, or explain it away. The end does not sanctify the means. No good cause is promoted by unsound arguments. Our warnings are best heeded when men see that we state the truth precisely as it is. It is much better for the cause to follow reverently the teach-

* Dr. Lee's *Temperance Bible Commentary*, with the usual candor and charity of this class of writers, attributes this and other like productions to "the instinct of conservatism, the motive of self-justification, and the bribery of appetite."—*Appendix*, p. 446. This, however, is not unworthy of one who can argue that our Saviour did not make fermented wine at Cana, because "the process of fermentation is one of decay" (p. 304). What, then, of the miracle of the loaves?

ings of God's word than to wrest one scripture in favor of what some might deem the most telling arguments. The temperance reformation cannot afford to meet the terrible reaction that must inevitably follow such a course. Even on the low ground of expediency it is not wise to place the cause in antagonism with a book which is moulding the character of the world, and every day exercises a mightier and more extensive sway; a book, too, that never requires the use of wine except at the communion table, or as a medicine prescribed by another than the party who is to use it.

"Is it needful to sum up the argument? Has it not been shown from the established meaning of the word, from the customs of Bible lands, and from the testimony of holy Scripture, that wine is the fermented juice of the grape, and that such is the element appointed by the Saviour to be the memorial of his blood in the sacrament of the supper?"

Wines of Bible Lands.

We now quote from the testimonies he adduces of several eminent missionaries in Bible lands as to what is meant by the word wine, or the Scriptural words translated into it there. For he justly observes: "We have no accounts of the customs of Bible lands so reliable as those of missionaries familiar with biblical literature, and equally so with the daily life of the people among whom they dwell."

Dr. Justin Perkins says: "Inquiries have often been made of me on the subject of the wines of Persia, and I may here state the facts in the case. The juice of the grape is used in three ways in Persia. When simply expressed it is called 'sweet,' *i.e.* sweet liquor. It is not drunk in that state, nor regarded as fit for use, any more than new unsettled cider at the press in America; nor is it even called wine till it is fermented. A second and very extensive use of the grape is the syrup made from boiling it from this sweet state, which resembles our molasses, and is used in the same way for sweetening, but is never used as a drink. This is in fact neither more nor less than Oriental molasses. The third use of the juice is the distillation of it into arrak, or Asiatic brandy. The wines of Persia are in general much lighter than those of Europe, but

they are still always intoxicating. In making these statements I throw down no gauntlet for controversy on the much vexed wine question, but wish simply to communicate information. Were I to hazard the expression of personal feeling on the general subject, it would be that of the deepest regret for any approximation in the tendency of the age to the removal of the sacred landmarks of Scripture institutions."— *Residence of Eight Years in Persia*, p. 236.

Rev. Benjamin Labaree, Jr., who has been seven years a missionary among the Nestorians, writes to his father, Dr. Larabee, late President of Middlebury College: "First, in regard to the character of the wines produced. With the most careful inquiries I have been unable to learn that any wine is ever manufactured in the country which is not intoxicating. The various kinds made differ more or less in their intoxicating powers, but all are fermented, and all, sooner or later, produce the same effect. The simple unfermented juice of the grape is never used as a beverage. The very Syriac word for wine, by its very etymology, signifies fermented." It may give this testimony of Mr. Larabee more weight with the friends of temperance to add, that the whole letter earnestly maintains the principle of total abstinence, in opposition to the moderate drinking, so-called, of Europe and the East.

Dr. Eli Smith, long resident in Syria, and to whom Robinson's *Biblical Researches* are largely indebted for their minute and accurate information, says: "In regard to the wine used at the sacrament I have questioned both Papal and Greek priests, and received the same answer. It must, they say, be perfect, pure wine. If unfermented it will not answer, nor will it if the acetous fermentation be commenced. The acknowledgment of the necessity of fermentation by the Papists is worthy of special notice, inasmuch as they reject fermented bread. This rejection is owing to their belief that our Saviour used unleavened bread at the institution of the ordinance, and their admission of fermented wine consequently indicates a belief that he used fermented wine. To this, so far as I have observed, the custom of the Jews in Palestine now corresponds. In 1835 I called on the chief Rabbi of the Spanish Jews in Hebron, during the feast, and was treated with unleavened

bread and wine. Finding the wine fermented, I asked him how he could consistently use it or have it in his house. He replied, that as the vinous fermentation was completed, and there was no tendency to the acetous, it did not come within the prohibition of the law; and that if any wine was found at the beginning of the feast in danger of running into the acetous fermentation it was removed."—*Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1846, pp. 385–389.

Dr. C. V. A. Van Dyck, who has been for more than a quarter of a century in Syria, and is perhaps more familiar with the Arabic language and literature, and more intimately acquainted with the customs of the people, than any other foreigner, writes to me as follows: "In reply to your question about wine for communion there is not, and, as far as I can find out, never was (in Syria) anything like what has been called unfermented wine. The thing is not known in the East. Syrup is made of the juice of the grape, and molasses, as you know, but nothing that is called wine is unfermented. They have no unfermented drinks but water of liquorice-root. Raisins are sometimes soaked until they swell, and then eaten, and the water drunk, but it is never called wine, or supposed to be related to wine.

"The native churches, Evangelical, Maronite, Greek, Coptic, and American, all use fermented wine at the communion. They have no other, and have no idea of any other.

"The Jews not only use fermented wine at their feasts, but use it to great excess, especially at the feast of Purim (Esth. ix. 26–28), when, according to the Talmud, a man is bound to get so drunk as not to know the difference between 'Cursed is Canaan' and 'Blessed is Mordecai.' At the Passover only fermented wine is used. As I said before, there is no other, and they have no idea of any other.

"From the above you can easily infer my judgment as to the proper wine for the sacrament—the same as the blessed Saviour used when He instituted the ordinance, namely, the juice of the grape so fermented as to be capable of producing intoxication when taken in sufficient quantity. The wines of the East differ in the percentage of alcohol which they contain, but all the various kinds are used by the native churches and by the Jews. They take that which chances to be at hand, just as the Saviour took that which was at hand at the Passover."

Dr. Laurie adds what he had already proved. The word "wine," according to the best lexicographers, means "the fermented juice of the grape." However they may differ on other points, all agree in this. To these witnesses Rev. J. H. Shedd, missionary at Oroomiah, Persia, a most ardent advocate of total abstinence, adds his unambiguous testimony in an able communication to the *Interior* of July 20. He says:—

"We have not found the true position to be what some call the advanced Bible ground, that fermented wine is a thing in itself unclean and accursed. My experience of nearly eleven years in the East has not furnished the least basis for the distinction made between fermented and unfermented wines in the Bible, or in Bible lands. At least we should find it utterly impossible to argue such a point with men who speak the Arabic and Syriac languages. They would reply that the very name of wine—a word from the root *Hhamr*, to ferment—means *fermented*. The Syriac version, too, was made very near the time of the apostles, and this is the word used. The most diligent inquiries of those on the ground, and most familiar with the people in Turkey and Persia, can find no unfermented wine. The people know nothing of the luxury spoken of by classical writers, and nothing of any method of preserving the juice of the grape from becoming intoxicating. The testimony of all familiar with the East is the same."

The Wine Proper to be Used at the Lord's Supper.

We think the evidence conclusive that the "fruit of the vine" used by our Lord, and appointed by him to be used in the sacrament of the Supper, which is to show forth his death till he come, was in the form in which it was known to the people as a drink, *i. e.* wine proper, or the fermented juice of the grape. Such has been the nearly unanimous judgment and practice of the Christian church from the beginning. We believe this, not any adulterated counterfeit of it, but the pure juice of the grape in the form known as wine, the proper and divinely-constituted element for the cup in the Lord's Supper, and that without this there is a circumstantial, though not necessarily fatal, defect in the mode of its administration. Notwithstanding this, there

may be a blessing in it, as in the Word and ordinances universally, in spite of defects in their human administration. Pious Romanists, who are denied the cup altogether, may yet receive a blessing through the bread received in faith. The Friends may receive spiritual grace, though so misguided as to reject the Sacraments, and not suffer fatally, though they suffer loss thereby. We do not suppose that in two cases personally known to us, in which the officials in charge provided currant wine unknown to minister, session, and church, until it was over, they forfeited the blessing because of a substitution of which they were not cognizant. Still, we believe that the normal elements for this feast appointed by our Lord are those which ought to be used, and alone have the promise of blessing. They cannot be intentionally changed on account of any supposed evil in them which we think we see, and our Lord did not see, without directly reflecting on him. We would not be a party to such a procedure, or look for the Master's blessing upon it. But the doctrine that all alcoholic beverages of whatever kind, in whatever amount taken, are poison, and that, as such, their use is always condemned in Scripture, enforces the exclusion of what the world and the Scripture knows as wine from the Lord's table, and the exclusive use of unfermented liquor at the sacred feast. Nor can the doctrine that *all* making, sale, and use of intoxicating stimulants as a beverage is a sin, be logically carried out without forcing this issue. Indeed, everywhere the men who are urging the one are urging the other—the banishment of fermented wine from the Lord's table. If it is always a poison, which it is a sin under any circumstances to taste, why not here? And are we not, in logical consistency, to look for attempts to insure the banishment of it from the Lord's table by the authority and discipline of the church? We are not quite come to this yet. Nor shall we, as we trust.*

* We have already brought before our readers the resolution of the New York Temperance Society enjoining the church to "abjure the use of fermented wine at communion." We also find the following, in the circular issued by a maker and vender of what he calls non-alcoholic wine for communion, put forth as an argument to church officers to purchase the article he makes. He naturally sets it out in its full and unqualified strength, as follows:—

"In 1869, when, as Recording Steward of the M. E. Church of this place

It has even been made a matter of reproach, often of vulgar calumny and abuse, by those who are forcing these new and unscriptural doctrines upon us, that we venture to discuss or question them, as if we thus gave some side thrust at, or were dividing, the friends of temperance. We expressly and utterly disclaim it. Whatever responsibility exists for any divisions on this account, rests on those who force this issue, not on those who meet it and whom they compel to face it.

In addition to citations already made from high sources confirmatory of these views, we add a few others. Rev. Mr. Shedd, in the article before quoted, says:—"Nor can we use the doubtful interpretation that makes the Bible bless the unfermented wines and curse the fermented. Such a distinction is *not known*. Wine is wine. It is the proper element to be used at the Communion, the best symbol that Christ could have chosen. Its use

(Vineland, N. J.), it became my duty to procure wine for the Lord's Table, I resolved to supply an unintoxicating wine or none. I could not think that 'the fruit of the vine' our Lord used at his Last Supper could be the same his Father had anathematized, through inspired men, as 'the wine of astonishment, 'the poison of dragons, and the cruel venom of asps,' 'that biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder.' I could not believe 'the cup of blessing' Paul gave at 'the communion of the blood of Christ' could be the wine of 'the wrath of God,' which Hosea, under the penalty of a solemn 'woe,' had warned us not to give to our neighbor, which Solomon had warned us not even to 'look upon,' and which Isaiah had described as 'the cup of his fury'—'the cup of the wine of the fierceness of his wrath.' I could see clearly that there were two wines described in the Bible—one intoxicating, demoralizing, and poisonous, and therefore prohibited and condemned; the other *un*intoxicating, harmless, and nutritious, and therefore allowed and encouraged—the one made the emblem of God's wrath, the other of his love.

"Besides, from childhood I had frequently felt intoxicated from the mere taste of the wine at the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper; so much so that, at times, I would find myself holding on to the end of the pews as I passed them to resume my seat. Some consider this an idiosyncrasy."

We confess ourselves of this number; a very bad one it must be, the like of which we never saw or heard of before, except in the case of those rebuked by the Apostle (1 Cor. xi. 21). Notwithstanding the wicked abuse of both elements by these Corinthians, we do not find that the Apostle's remedy was a change of elements. It was rather the sober and devout use of them. As to cases well authenticated of any person receiving harm from the proper eating the bread or drinking the cup, we know of none. We believe, if taken with due reliance on God's grace, such harm is impossible; that it occurs, if at all, only to diseased persons, and as often with one element as the other.

is lawful if you can detach it from all tendency to drunkenness in yourself, and from all injury to others. Some in Bible times have used wine to answer the purpose for which we now use tea and coffee, and who knows but such men and times will come again?"

Again, answering objections to abstinence from wine, he says:—"'But Christ made wine.' Very truly; He came to seek and to save the lost; every act and item of His life He used to this intent. He performed a striking miracle. The act itself was not sinful, and, under the circumstances, it was eminently adapted to its object, viz.: to manifest His glory, and to confirm the faith of those who witnessed it. The thoughts of all were elevated from a mere convivial entertainment to the claims of the Son of God. Let us follow this example. If we can find the time and place when making wine, or giving it to others, or drinking it ourselves, is a decided means of bringing men to trust in Christ as their only Saviour, then let us do it. But where is the Christian in Persia, Turkey, or America who acts from such a conviction in drinking wine? With wine and all its interest on the side of sin; with spiritous liquors lying in wait to hurry the victim to ruin which his example starts on the road, where is the man to advocate wine-drinking as a Christian duty to which he is impelled by zeal for the Church, the souls of men, and the honor of God? He that drinketh, as well as he that abstaineth, should do it from a real conviction—that thus he most honors the Lord."

We add from an article on the Lord's Supper (Kitto's *Cycl.*, 3d ed., vol. iii., pp. 850–851), by Rev. Robert Halley, D.D., Principal of New College, London. This, too, is in place of one taking opposite ground in a former edition, by Dr. Lees.

"Although Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul say Jesus 'took the cup,' no one of them tells us what liquid it contained. That it contained wine there can be no reasonable doubt; but whether it was fermented or unfermented, undiluted or mingled with water, has been the subject of frequent controversy. We may with good reason suppose that our Lord took a cup of the wine which was usually drunk at the passover, and that, we have no doubt, was fermented wine, diluted with water. That it was fermented we infer from the frequent refer-

ences of Jewish authorities to the reason for introducing it at the paschal feast, to cheer and exhilarate the company in remembrance of their possession of the promised land; which exhilaration, we presume, could not be got out of water in which raisins had been steeped, though in later times it has been the Jewish practice to provide unfermented wine. The later practice has arisen from the excessive scrupulosity of the Jews about the presence of leaven in the wine of the passover. So customary was it for the Jews to '*mingle* their cup' when they 'furnished their table,' that we should expect to find the custom observed at the passover. The rabbinical authorities confirm such expectations, as they give very particular directions about the due proportions of the mingled water and wine. That this was the practice of the early Christians in celebrating the Eucharist, is evident from many citations of the fathers. Thus in the account of Justin we read: 'Bread and a cup of wine and water are brought to the president.' Irenæus speaks of the diluted cup (*temperamentum calicis*) and of the mingled cup (*mistus calix*). Reference is made to the mingled drink (the κραμα of the Greeks and mistum of the Latins) by Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theodoret, and many other Greek and Latin writers. In the Romish Church the mingling of wine and water is not only retained, but elevated into a great mystery and symbol of the blood and water which flowed from the wounded side of Jesus. An ancient sect mentioned by Epiphanius used only water, and another milk instead of wine."

Rev. Dr. Laurie, in the article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* already quoted, after showing that the lexicographers agree in defining wine as "the name of the liquor obtained by the fermentation of the juice of grapes, and, in less strict usage, beverages prepared in like manner from the juices of many other fruits," proceeds to ask: "Now why prejudice a good cause by denying the fixed meaning of a well-known article, and arraying against that cause the settled use of language? There is no greater hindrance to a favorable reception of the arguments for temperance among those who have not yet become the slaves of a debasing appetite, than the suspicion that how-

ever plausible they appear, yet they contain a lurking fallacy, which needs only to be brought out to spoil them all. Now, why confirm such prejudices by doing violence to the acknowledged meaning of words? What is an intelligent man to think of the unfermented wine which some insist shall be used at the sacrament when he reads such definitions?"

Writers generally agree that our Saviour used the ordinary wine provided for the Passover. Thus L. Coleman, D.D.,* says: "The common wine of Palestine is of a red color. Such was the wine which our Saviour used at the Sacrament, as it would seem both from the nature of the case and the declaration: 'This is my blood.'"

Why then imperil the cause of temperance, as promoted by the pratice of total abstinence, by undermining faith in the obvious meaning of the word of God as understood by the Church in all ages; by putting it on grounds against which the convictions of its most devoted, pious, and intelligent friends, and of the great majority of Christian scholars and divines, are arrayed; which innovate upon the Holy Sacrament; which must tend to narrow its influence to the small minority who can be gained over to such views; and which, so far, enlist in their defence more of misrepresentation and vituperation than of truth and argument, candor and charity?

[The ethical, Scriptural, and ecclesiastical relations of total abstinence will be discussed in our next article.]

ART. VI.—*Testimonies of the General Assemblies of the Presbyterian Church in the United States against Intemperance.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

THIS is the pamphlet ordered to be printed by our last Assembly, containing the collective deliverances of past Assemblies on Temperance. It was also ordered to be sent to all ministers, and read to all churches in our body. Before directly discussing the questions it presents, we propose to give a brief

* *Ancient Christianity Exemplified*, p. 437.

history of the course of the temperance reformation as connected with total abstinence from intoxicating beverages, since the peculiar phraseology of many of these testimonies cannot otherwise be understood.

The movement, which now runs back through nearly half a century, to abate or extinguish the evils of intemperate drinking, by inducing men to wholly abstain from some or all classes of intoxicating stimulants, has had three great forms of development. In its early stages, abstinence from distilled liquors, otherwise called spirituous liquors or ardent spirits, along with the temperate use of fermented drinks, was all that the original temperance reformers inculcated or sought to accomplish. Of these, Rev. Nathaniel Hewit, D.D., often called the "Apostle of Temperance," was a representative and typical specimen. This method of assaulting intemperance and checking the drinking usages of the people held sway during the first ten years of the temperance reform in our country, after which it came into conflict with and largely gave way to the doctrine of total abstinence from all that can intoxicate. The extent of the reformation accomplished under this system of procedure was truly wonderful, whether we consider the number of persons who adopted it, the radical change wrought in their habits and in the drinking usages of society, or the diminution in the use of fermented liquors which came in the wake of abstinence from ardent spirits. The reasons which led the original temperance reformers to confine their plan of abstinence to distilled liquors were: 1. It would have been vain to attempt more. It was all the people could then bear. Congregations in which Dr. Hewit hurled his thunderbolts of terrific eloquence at these highly alcoholic and acrid beverages, were often stung to fury, and cried out against him as a raving maniac. We well remember the infuriated outburst of the people where we lived in our childhood, when he first proclaimed his new and strange doctrine there. They said he had run mad. Any attempt, therefore, to go further would have failed. 2. They saw that nearly all the drunkenness and intemperance then in society was directly due to the use of distilled spirits, and that intoxication from the mere use of fermented liquors was rare and exceptional. For reasons yet to appear, this was far more the case then than

now. They believed, therefore, that so far as they could stop the use of distilled liquors, they would nearly or quite put an end to intemperance; a conclusion greatly strengthened by the benign results of their first experiments in the matter. Even those who still became inebriated by the excessive use of fermented liquors were supposed, and generally with truth, to have contracted the appetite which led to this abuse from a previous habitual indulgence in distilled liquors. 3. A still more imperative reason with many of them for limiting the abstinence movement to ardent spirits was, that they thus avoided any seeming or real collision with the teachings of the Word of God and the example of Christ touching the use of wine. They could, as was their wont, denounce ardent spirits as wholly noxious, poisonous, and unlawful, except when prescribed as a medicine, without including wine in this condemnation, or raising any scruples as to its sparing use, especially on festive and sacramental occasions. It was long before even most of the leaders of the temperance reform gave up wine at weddings, and to this day the Church of God, a few exceptional cases aside, holds fast to its use in the sacramental cup. We judge from an able and stirring paper, which conveys facts and statistics enough on the horrors of intemperance to startle the most torpid, presented at the last meeting of the Evangelical Alliance at Amsterdam, that this is now the theoretical and practical basis of the temperance movement on the Continent, while it appears from this and other documents that expediency, as unfolded by the Apostle, Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii., x., is the only ground on which the ear of that representative assemblage of Protestant Christendom was sought in behalf of abstinence, whether from distilled or from other intoxicating liquors. The paper on "Philanthropy and Intemperance" read before that body by C. Bleibtzen, Pastor and Second Inspector of the Rhenish Westphalian Deacon's Institution at Duisburg, and published in the volume of proceedings of the Alliance, says: "I must explain that I am dealing especially now with those drinks which in Germany are called burnt or distilled." P. 576. He afterwards eloquently adds:

"I believe that every one who makes even a general claim to the name of a philanthropist—a lover of his kind—must be

touched with deep compassion at the sight of the multitude of unhappy slaves to drunkenness, and must and will ask himself the question, 'Can I do anything to stem this torrent of evil?' And if we go further, and call ourselves *Christian* philanthropists, then we are bound to be guided by the spirit of Him who said, 'A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another as I have loved you.' This love demands of us that we look steadily into the sin and sorrow of our fellow-men, and consider by what way and means we can come to their relief. First of all, we must set them a good example of renunciation, and not ourselves touch a drop of brandy, or any other spirituous liquor, rum, liqueurs, etc., or even punch. If any are prepared, also, to give up wine and beer with the teetotallers, I, of course, shall have nothing to say against it. I am not prepared, however, to urge as a universal rule and duty abstinence from all intoxicating beverages, though I do demand of every Christian philanthropist, not only for the sake of his own physical and moral, temporal and eternal welfare, but also especially for the sake of the influence which he must desire to exert upon his intemperate fellow-men, the most conscientious moderation in their use. But one Christian calls this legality, and, in the name of Christian liberty, he will not be deprived of his daily glass of liqueurs out of the familiar corner-cupboard. Let me ask, in return, is this Christian self-denial? Does not the freest of all Christians, the Apostle Paul, say: 'It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak?'"

The following extract from a paper on "Temperance," read before the same body by the Rev. John Rodgers, M.A., London, in behalf of total abstinence from all that can intoxicate, puts it exclusively on the same Apostolic ground of expediency guided by Christian love, wholly disclaiming all pretence of the intrinsic sinfulness of the mere use of these beverages:

"It is calculated that 60,000 of our fellow-creatures die drunkards every year in our country. We want to save some of those that are hurrying to a drunkard's grave and the awful realities that lie beyond, and to prevent others from filling in the ranks as they are thinned by death. We believe this to be a complete specific in each case:—Abstain from these drinks

altogether. And in order to encourage the drunkard to abstain, and in order to encourage those that are weak and easily liable to be overcome to keep on the safe side and totally abstain, we invite the sober and the strong, for the sake of their weaker brethren, to adopt this principle of total abstinence. If it is calling for an act of self-denial, is not this according to the spirit of the Gospel? 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself.' Was not this the spirit that animated our Divine Master—self-sacrifice and self-denial for the good of others? 'Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, though He was rich, yet for our sakes became poor.' 'Learn of me,' He says. It behooves us to do this in everything, desiring to have the same mind in us that was in Him. And I submit that one important way of thus imitating Christ is that taught by the great Apostle of the Gentiles, who drank so deeply of his Master's spirit. 'It is good (says he) neither to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak.'"

Towards the end of the first decade of the total abstinence movement in this country, on this basis, a second stage of its development appeared. A large proportion of its leaders and adherents extended its scope beyond distilled liquors to all beverages of any kind, which, drunk in whatever quantity, could intoxicate. This became the prevailing standard of temperance reformers. The great mass of temperance societies adopted a pledge to this effect as a term of membership, in place of the pledge to abstain from distilled liquors, on which they had previously been organized. And in the early stages of the movement these pledges were of great service in the mutual support thus given by good people to each other, and so greatly needed by them in breaking the bondage of habit and the tyranny of industrial and social usages which treated these liquors as essential, like food, to the sustentation of the laborer; as the life of all festivities and convivial occasions; and as a necessary element in decent hospitality. But after the "new departure," which excluded fermented as well as distilled liquors from use, a portion of the total abstainers, which has been increasing ever since, till it now includes the great majority of them, declined longer to sign special pledges or join special societies for this

purpose, because they judged that these expedients had answered the special end which gave rise to them, of making an effective and permanent breach in the drinking usages of Christian society; because their vows as professing Christians and their obligations as good men included all duties touching intoxicating drinks; and especially, because many of these associations showed a tendency to secrecy, with the usual foolish parade and paraphernalia of secret societies, or to propound false and unscriptural doctrines; to despise the Church of God; to dictate to it and denounce it, its ministers and members, however saintly and exemplary, if they refused submission to the control of these outside voluntary organizations.

The reasons of this extension of the pledge and practice of abstinence so as to include fermented liquors, were the disappointment and impatience felt by the chief promoters of the movement at encountering what all great reformatory movements must sooner or later encounter, a pause in its progress attended with various symptoms of reaction; the increasing evidence that an intemperate appetite for intoxicating drinks once contracted, whether from the free use of distilled or other liquors, would sate itself to inebriation upon vinous, malt, or other light drinks, however mildly impregnated with alcohol; that fermented liquors had come to be largely adulterated with the products of distillation and other equivalent infusions; that because wines were allowed and spirituous liquors were not, the latter were often made, compounded, sold, and drank in different forms, under the name of wines. But what was more potent than all, and gave to most of the foregoing reasons their highest potency, was the logical consequence of one of the leading arguments employed in favor of total abstinence from distilled spirits by most of its promoters, including those who shrank from some of these logical results when they came to distinctly apprehend them. This argument was that *alcohol, in every form and degree of its use, is a poison, and injurious to the physical, moral, and intellectual powers of men.* If this were true, of course it was a complete and conclusive answer to every plea for the use of ardent spirits. But it was equally conclusive against the use, and the lawfulness of using, wine and all fermented liquors. If it were good for anything,

it was good for everything. As it is wrong for any man to take poison as a beverage, so it is a sin to drink any wine or cider, if they in any and every quantity are poisons. Hence inevitably emerged what is known historically as the "Wine Question," which is the third stage of this movement, and in some of its aspects remains a *quæstio vexata* to this present. The effect of this was not to arrest the tendency to make total abstinence from all intoxicating drinks the common basis of aggressive temperance movements, but to divide its adherents into two classes, between whom earnest controversies have hitherto been waged, because the principles involved are deemed on both sides vital and fundamental. If alcohol, in any and every combination, form, and degree of it, is poison, and all drinking of any liquor as a beverage containing any portion of it is sin, it follows that either the wine permitted, in its moderate or sparing use in Scripture, and made by our Lord for a wedding in his first miracle, is unfermented and unintoxicating, or the Bible sanctions sin, our Saviour committed sin, and has made a poison one of the elements to be imbibed by His people at the sacrament of His love, in order to show forth His death till He come. The second horn of this dilemma of course was repudiated by all but infidels. But a small proportion of Christian believers have been able to accept the former, or to admit that the wine allowed in Scripture was unfermented; or, taken in excess, unintoxicating, for reasons given in our last article, which need not be repeated here. The more judicious friends of total abstinence, therefore, have not dared to put it in an attitude of antagonism to the Word of God, and which, by necessary implication, impeaches its morality, or that of our Lord, or which sets it against the nearly universal historical belief and the present scholarship of Christendom. By this they do not mean to charge those who hold that the wines made by our Lord, and allowed in Scripture, are unintoxicating, or that it is sinful to drink intoxicating wine, intend to impeach His morality or that of the Bible. It seems strange that it should be necessary to say this, and yet it is needful to cut off occasion from those who seek occasion to parry the force of argument by such petty perversions and insinuations. All that we mean is, that, on the supposition that the wine made and drank by Christ,

and allowed as to its temperate use in Scripture, is intoxicating if used in excess, a position which we think cannot be successfully impugned, then the doctrine that all making or drinking of beverages, in whatever circumstances, that can intoxicate is sinful, does, by necessary and immediate logical consequence, impeach the morality of Christ and His word, whatever may be intended. Judicious Christians dared not impale the temperance cause on such an alternative as that. And they dared not in conscience expose their faith and religion to be thus sapped at its foundations.* They were and are conscience-bound in the matter. And unless some other basis for urging total abstinence could be found, they felt bound to let it go—however dear—their Saviour and their religion were still dearer. But they found such a basis in the law of Christian expediency and the dictates of Christian love, which bid us forego the use and enjoyment of things in themselves innocent, when we perceive that such self-denying abstinence will promote our own or others' edification, in accordance with the exhortations of the Apostle, Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii., x.—as already set forth in our quotations from British and Continental Temperance Reformers, the true import of which Scriptures we propose carefully to examine in a subsequent stage of this article. It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that here was found a ground for urging total abstinence which did not logically involve any impeachment of the morality of Christ or His word, on the one hand, nor necessitate any wresting of the Scriptures, by strained rationalistic exegesis, into a non-natural meaning on the other.

On this ground the great majority of Christian total abstainers in this and other countries rest. If it is undermined, the cause of temperance, as dependent on abstinence, is also undermined. For, in our opinion, not one in twenty who practise it, does so, or feels any obligation to do so, on any other ground. Still there has been a numerous body of abstinence men outside of, and more or less within, the Church who have not been satisfied with this view. They think it leaves some liberty in the matter to each person's conscience and judgment as to abstaining or not abstaining, and that no adequate headway can be made against

* Dr. Hewit and other pioneers in the temperance cause held this ground to the last.

an evil so enormous as the intemperance which begins with moderate drinking, unless all drinking, making, and vending intoxicating liquors be treated as a sin in its own nature; or, at any rate, disciplinable, if not as a sin *per se*, yet as always tempting men to sin. This ground most of them perceive cannot be taken, so long as the wines of Scripture made by Christ, and by Him constituted the sacramental symbol of His blood, and not forbidden as to their moderate use, were intoxicating. Hence the persistent efforts of exegetical ingenuity to worm another meaning out of them. They have first concluded that wine which taken in excess may intoxicate is so abominable a thing, that the Saviour never could have made it, used it, or allowed it in any circumstances; and that if He did, no sufficient motive could be brought to bear upon men to abstain from it under altered circumstances. They even speak of it as an abomination and a marvel for any Christian minister to hold what ninety-nine hundredths of all ministers and Christians do believe and have believed on this subject. And then they set themselves to find out some exegetical process that shall grind that meaning out of the Scripture. This is one way. It is another, and far more excellent, to take the Word of God in its plain and obvious sense, and to trust and conform to it, even if it confound us by its mysteries.

Dr. Herrick Johnson declares, that "the doctrine of Christian expedieney in its application to the wine question (on the hypothesis that Christ made fermented wine at Cana), is not worth a puff of empty air." * Perhaps this is so with reference to Dr. Johnson's view of this question. St. Paul, however, made another deliverance: "It is *good* neither to eat meat, nor DRINK WINE, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." Tens and hundreds of thousands of Christians have been swayed by it, and felt it good for this reason not to drink wine, without undertaking to judge those who think and do otherwise as to its temperate use. Nearly all abstinence from intoxicating drinks in Christian society is practised on this ground. If there were no other difference between our present circumstances and those of our Saviour's day, there is not only

* *New York Evangelist* of April 20.

the vast abundance of distilled liquors, but the prodigious adulteration of them, and of all kinds of liquors, especially wines, which so often retain the name while they undergo a real transubstantiation into the veritable whiskey mixed with drugs and poisons passing under their name. Is not here a ground of the expediency of abstaining from wine unknown in our Saviour's time? Besides, it has long been a familiar observation, that the people of northern countries have far stronger propensities to drunkenness than those nearer the tropics. Moreover, in a country where distilled liquors were unknown it was impossible that intemperance should have prevailed on the scale which it reaches in countries where they abound. Let those pooh-pooh at the doctrine of expediency as a motive to abstinence from intoxicating drinks who will—let them plant themselves on the supposed firmer basis of the intrinsic sinfulness of all wine drinking whatever, and the unintoxicating character of the wines of Scripture—all such build on the sand. We have no idea that the great body of the Christian Church will ever accept or rest in that interpretation of Scripture.

Some habitually speak of those who believe the wines of Scripture fermented as if they were the enemies of all righteousness and the advocates of all abominations. Suppose that all their fulminations against these brethren strike not only them but their Adorable Master! They may well be targets for envenomed shafts which cannot hit them without first piercing Him.

This analysis of the successive phases of the total abstinence movement, while important for other purposes, is especially so for the due understanding of the successive testimonies of the different Presbyterian Assemblies contained in the pamphlet before us. In regard to a large part of these there can, of course, be no difference of opinion. They are divisible into various classes:

1. As far back as 1812 against not only "actual intemperance," but all those habits and indulgences which tend to produce it.

2. In various forms from 1818* to 1837, taking ground, first

* We notice, however, that the pamphlet before us says of the Assembly of 1818: "They enjoined, therefore, 'the officers and members of our Church to abstain even from the common use of ardent spirits.'" As quoted in *Baird's*

against the use, then against the manufacture and sale, of "distilled" liquors, sometimes called "spirituous liquors," but more generally "ardent spirits," or "strong drink." There was, for reasons before stated, a studied avoidance, during this period, of all declarations or testimonies condemning all use of fermented drinks. Thus, in their strongest deliverances, they avoided even the appearance of collision with Scripture, the example of Christ, and the ordinances of His house, while they also declared that "*they would by no means encroach on the rights of private judgment.*" In 1834 and 1835 they speak of the use, manufacture, and sale of *ardent spirits as a common drink* as "immoral," and in 1835 recommend professing Christians to set the example of "total abstinence" from "inebriating drinks," for the first time.

After this we find, with a single exception, that the declarations of the Assembly related to intoxicating liquors universally, and not to distilled liquors exclusively. The church having been divided, each branch, prior to reunion, had its own way of dealing with the subject. The N. S. body strenuously urged on its members abstinence from all intoxicating beverages, and from all implication with the traffic and manufacture. It also recommended prohibitory legislation, with earnest efforts to promote it. In most of this action we heartily concur.

But the deliverances which, in our judgment, declare the truth of God in respect to intoxicating drinks, and by which we intend to abide, God helping us, until he gives us further light, are those of the General Assembly (O. S.) from 1840 and before 1865. These are as truly authorities for our guidance within the order of the last Assembly as any others that may conflict with them. Conformity to these is as truly conformity to the action of that Assembly as is conformity to any other deliverances of either body inconsistent with them. One is as much reaffirmed as another. If the deliverance of 1865 was included in the order to print, so were those of 1842-3-8.

Digest, the words "earnestly recommend" are used by the Assembly in place of "enjoin." A considerable difference. Dr. Baird is right. "Enjoin" is wholly a version of the compiler.

And, so far as we can understand the meaning and intent of the last Assembly's order, any one of these deliverances is no less and no more authoritative than any other, even its own. The catena of testimonies then which, not to the exclusion of many others, especially constitutes our platform, because it articulates and emphasises what is either omitted, or less explicitly stated elsewhere, is the whole series issued by Assembly O. S. up to 1865. They are as follows:

In the Assembly of 1842 (O. S.), p. 16.

"*Overture No.* 15. The question whether the manufacturer, vender, or retailer of intoxicating drinks should be continued in the full communion of the Church. The committee recommended the adoption of the following resolution, viz.: That whilst the Assembly rejoice in the success of the temperance reformation, and will use all lawful means to promote it, they cannot sanction the adoption of any new terms of communion. Which was adopted."

In the Assembly of 1843 (O. S.), p. 189, it was

"*Resolved*, That the records [of the Synod of Pittsburg] be approved except so far as they seem to establish a general rule in regard to the use and sale of ardent spirits as a beverage, which use and sale are generally to be decidedly disapproved, but each case must be decided in view of all the attendant circumstances that go to modify and give character to the same.

The Assembly of 1848 (O. S.)* adopted the following minute in reference to temperance and other secular societies for moral ends:

"The Church of Jesus Christ is a spiritual body, to which have been given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God, for the gathering and perfecting of the saints in this life to the end of the world. It is the great instrumentality of the Saviour, through which, by His eternal Spirit, He dispenses salvation to the objects of His love. Its ends are holiness and life, to the manifestation of the riches and glory of divine grace, and not simply morality, decency, and good order, which may to some extent be secured without faith in the Redeemer or the transforming efficacy of the Holy Spirit. The laws of the Church

* Pp. 58, 59.

are the authoritative injunctions of Christ, and not the covenants, however benevolent in their origin and aim, which men have instituted of their own will; and the ground of obligation which the Church, *as such*, inculcates, is the authority of God speaking in His word, and not *pledges* of *honor* which create, measure, and define the peculiar duties of all voluntary associations. In this kingdom of God the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners, and no church judicatory ought to pretend to make laws which shall bind the conscience, or to issue recommendations which shall regulate manners, without the warrant, explicit or implied, of the revealed will of God. It is, hence, beside the province of the Church to render its courts, which God ordained for spiritual purposes, subsidiary to the schemes of any association founded in the human will and liable to all its changes and caprices. No court of Christ can exact of His people to unite with the temperance, moral reform, colonization, or any other society which may seek their aid. Connection with such institutions is a matter of Christian liberty. Their objects may be in every respect worthy of the countenance and support of all good men, but in so far as they are moral and essentially obligatory, the Church promotes them among its own members,—and to none others does its jurisdiction extend—by the means which God has ordained for the edification of His children. Still, in the exercise of their Christian liberty, as good citizens, as patriotic subjects of the State, from motives of philanthropy and from love to God, Christian people may choose to adopt this particular mode of attempting to achieve the good at which all moral societies profess to aim; they have a right to do so, and the Church, as long as they indorse no false principles and countenance no wrong practices, cannot interfere with them. Recognizing these propositions as the truths of the word of God, this General Assembly, as a court of Jesus Christ, cannot league itself with any voluntary society, cannot exact of those who are subject to its discipline to do so, but must leave the whole matter where the Scriptures leave it, to the prudence, philanthropy, and good sense of God's children, each man having a right to do as to him shall seem good.

"These societies must appeal not to church courts, but to

church members. When they proclaim principles that are Scriptural and sound, it is not denied that the Church has a right, and under certain circumstances may be bound, to bear testimony in their favor; and when, on the other hand, they inculcate doctrines which are infidel, heretical, and dangerous, the Church has a right to condemn them. In conformity with these statements the General Assembly has no hesitation in cordially approving of abstinence from intoxicating drinks *as a matter of Christian expediency*, according to the words of the Apostle in Romans xiv. 21, 'It is good neither to eat flesh nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak,' and in expressing its affectionate interest in the cause of temperance; *and would recommend to its ministers and elders who have become connected with temperance societies, to use every effort to prevent the introduction of any other principle as the ground of their pledge*, and to throw around these institutions those safeguards which shall be the means of rescuing them from the excesses to which they are liable from influences opposed to or aside from the Gospel of Christ."

This is our confession of faith in the premises to which we religiously adhere. It has for its chief articles:

1. That, while desirous to promote temperance by all lawful means, no new terms of church communion are to be sanctioned for this or any other good end.

2. That while the use and sale of ardent spirits as a beverage is ordinarily to be disapproved, yet it is not necessarily, and in all circumstances, such an immorality as is disciplinable by the Church. Much more is this true of merely fermented liquors. The use, making, or vending of either may or may not be a disciplinable immorality, according to circumstances. And church courts must deal with each case, not as being necessarily an immorality, but according to the circumstances which give it character.

3. The Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners. No outside associations, however benevolent, may dictate laws to the Church. Nor may any church judicatory pretend to make laws which shall bind the conscience, or to issue recommendations which shall regulate manners, without the warrant, expressed or implied, of the revealed will of God. Therefore

the whole matter of total abstinence should be left where the Scriptures leave it, to the prudence, philanthrophy, and good sense of God's children, each man having liberty herein to do as to him shall seem right, upon his accountability to God.

4. Abstinence from intoxicating drinks as a matter of Christian expediency, according to the words of the Apostle in Romans xiv. 21, is to be unhesitatingly and cordially approved, *and every effort should be made to prevent the introduction of any other principle as the ground of total abstinence, or of any pledge thereto.*

This injunction we shall do our best to follow.

We differ from the declaration of the last Assembly only in so far as it is at variance with the foregoing, in affirming, *unconditionally, and irrespective of circumstances*, "the manufacture, sale, and use of alcoholic stimulants as a beverage, to be contrary to the spirit of God's Word, and wholly inconsistent with the claims of Christian duty." We see not how, on any fair interpretation of the Scriptures, this fails to array the "spirit of God's Word" against its express teachings, and our Saviour's example.

We could go, too, very far with the former deliverances of our New School brethren in favor of stringent legal restraint, even up to prohibition, if not always adopting their precise phraseology. This we avowed two years ago, in the following words: "We will heartily join in efforts to promote abstinence on this ground (expediency), even to the extent of supporting prohibitory legislation so far as the public will sustain it."—*Princeton Review*, 1869, July No., pp. 412, 413.

The next great deliverance of the Assembly (O. S.) differed from all others that we have met with in our own or other communions. Admitting that all obligation to total abstinence from the making, vending, or using intoxicating drinks is founded, not on their intrinsic immorality, but on expediency, and basing its extended argument wholly on the Apostle's appeal to Christians to abstain from certain things indifferent on this ground, it concludes that the refusal thus to abstain is a disciplinable offence; thus taking the new, and, as we think, self-contradictory ground, that the performance of acts from which the Apostle dissuades us, on the ground of Christian expediency,

constitutes a disciplinable offence and a bar to communion. Let us, therefore, look a little into the ethical relation of things indifferent, also of liberty and expediency as related thereto, and to the deliverance in question.

Meanwhile, if any perceive inconsistency in these deliverances, or that some of them taken together with others thus constitute a "confused and contradictory medley," we cannot help that. It is certain that although some persons have undertaken to put the ban upon all further discussion and criticism of the action of the last Assembly in the premises, and all attempts to render future testimonies consistent with themselves and the truth of God, that action is differently interpreted by different parties. Thus Dr. Mears, in the *Interior*, had felicitated himself and his readers that "By this last action the Assembly and the Church is pledged not only to total abstinence, but to prohibitory law, and the liquor traffic as a disciplinable offence."

Upon which the *Interior* of June 6 remarks: "It (the action aforesaid) is a protest against any indulgence on the part of Christians in the use of alcoholic drinks of any kind as a beverage, and against any complicity in the liquor traffic. We fail to see in it, however, any assumption of what is called the 'radical ground,' anything that indorses prohibitory law as a measure of reform, or any assertion of what is, or is not, disciplinable. It is true that in 1854 and '55 the New School Assembly took strong ground in favor of prohibition, but we suppose the action of the Assembly referring to 'testimonies of former Assemblies,' to be general in its character, and not designed to reaffirm in the United Church the position of one branch, in a matter which the other branch was careful not to indorse, and which is in a degree—that is to say unless prohibition is construed to mean restriction—contrary to its traditions."

Now to the main point.

Since total abstinence from these intoxicating beverages, therefore, cannot be enforced on the ground of intrinsic sinfulness or immorality in the mere use of them as a beverage, it only remains that it be placed on the same grounds on which all other morally indifferent actions are placed. All such ac-

tions are to be done or left undone according as the agent, in the special circumstances of each case, judges doing or not doing them to be of good or evil tendency to himself and others. And while tendencies to promote other and inferior kinds of good and evil, such as health, wealth, and worldly happiness, or the contrary, are not to be underrated, what is paramount and overmastering is the tendency to promote moral good or evil. When a man clearly sees that the tendency of an act, as compared with its omission, is to promote the moral welfare of himself or others, he equally sees it to be his duty to perform it, and if evil, to refrain from it, unless he has blunted his moral sense. Accordingly, the obligation to do or forbear things indifferent depends, first, on circumstances, and next, on the view the agent takes of the tendency of the act in those circumstances.

Giving money to a beggar is an act indifferent. Our obligation in regard to it varies with circumstances and the view we take of them, whether we are able to give, whether he needs it, whether it will encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether he will use it to procure needful food, raiment, or shelter, or spend it for vile liquor. No further illustration is necessary to show the heaven-wide difference between the relations of moral obligation to things indifferent and things intrinsically right or wrong. Does it, however, depend on circumstances, and the view we take of those circumstances, whether we ought to love and obey God, confess Christ, do justice, love mercy, maintain truth, abstain from fraud, intoxication, profanity, and blasphemy? This on the one hand. On the other, it is equally clear from what we have already adduced, that actions indifferent, although not intrinsically moral or immoral, nevertheless are not without relation to moral obligation, but, in their own way, fall within its scope, and often under its most stringent and relentless gripe. Suppose, *e. g.*, in the instance above noted, one is confident that the beggar who solicits his money will spend it in a drunken frolic, on the one hand, or that he will use it to keep himself or family from perishing by cold or starvation on the other. Is there not obligation, even the categorical imperative which allows no release from it, in either case? But, then, suppose some other

person or persons apprehend the matter differently, and take a different view of what the beggar will do with the money, and of what is duty in the premises. Then their duty is different. But may one of these parties judge or condemn the other, or set up himself as a standard or law to the other, making the matter a term of Christian communion, and enforcing it on pain of excommunication? Of course not. To do so would be not only to usurp God's prerogative, but, not unlikely, to reject whom God has accepted. But would this be so in case of discipline for adultery, theft, profaneness, drunkenness, denying or betraying our Lord? Obligation reaches each kind, but with different conditions and limitations. With regard to one class of actions it is variable in its requirements; with regard to the other immutable; shaped by circumstances in the former, independent of all circumstances in the latter.

Here we find the clue to several problems which often lead to no small perplexity and embarrassment, and are wont to be enveloped in a haze of needless confusion and obscurity. The first of these lies in the term *expediency*, as applied to this and other departments of ethics. In strict propriety, expediency is applicable to actions indifferent, and to them only. It denotes simply that relation of them to moral obligation which we have just pointed out. Such actions are expedient when they are promotive of good, especially moral good, and inexpedient when the contrary; and if they are in this sense expedient or inexpedient in the view of the agent, it is for this reason so far forth obligatory to do or not to do them.

In these things, expediency, as above defined, is the true ground, criterion, and measure of obligation. And when it is applicable, that is, in things indifferent, it is not a low, or lax, or unworthy ground of moral action, as it has grown fashionable with some of our extreme *doctrinaires* in regard to total abstinence to style it. It is the legitimate and only possible basis of moral obligation in such cases. Whence, then, has arisen this degrading association of expediency with looseness or corruption of moral standards? Simply from its perversion. It has been forced beyond its true sphere of application to things indifferent, and applied to things intrinsically good or evil. Here it is utterly irrelevant, and can only serve to distort and vitiate the

whole subject of morals. Whatever is in itself right is in itself binding; whatever is in itself wrong, for that reason ought not to be done whether expedient or inexpedient, if such an alternative were possible, and not in its very conception solecistical. Even Cicero pointed out that virtue was the supreme good and vice the ultimate evil. That, since the expedient is that which is promotive of good, and the inexpedient that which is promotive of evil, they can have no application to that which is *in itself* supremely good or evil. It is therefore debasing the whole subject of morality to interject questions of expediency here. Hence when men apply the test of expediency to actions in their own nature good or bad; or when they estimate and determine their duty therein by calculations of profit and loss; or when they are known as men of expedients in matters where they should know no law but the law of rectitude, we justly associate with such characters more or less of moral debasement.

Withal, there are systems of ethics like Paley's, and all the utilitarian schemes which found morality, and the elementary idea of obligation itself, on the tendency of acts to promote happiness or unhappiness in the agent or others. They deny any such a thing as intrinsic moral good or evil. They found all on expediency, and know nothing higher. They know not even expediency, as indicating the tendency to further what *in itself is morally good;* but only as a tendency to promote happiness, and therefore, and therefore only, morally good. Hence the term *expediency*, on account of this perversion of it, has come in many minds to be associated with a certain laxness or depravation of moral standards. And when so perverted or extended beyond its due limits, the association is just. But expediency has its legitimate ethical sphere in respect to things indifferent. This has been recognized by the profoundest moralists, heathen and Christian. And by none is it articulated more precisely or emphatically than by the great Apostle, when he declares "all things are lawful, but all things are not expedient," *i. e.*, not all things indifferent are expedient, and consequently proper to be done.

In passing, we digress a moment to say that much of the arguing on this subject is about as fair, discriminating, and conclusive, and just as much dependent on catching and twisting

words out of their obvious meaning as determined by the context, as if one should contend that in the above phrase, "all things are lawful," or when he elsewhere says, "I become all things to all men," Paul had obliterated all distinction between good and evil, sanctioned the most nefarious conduct, and opened the floodgates of universal licentiousness. Such is the character of the criticisms we have seen on the brief remarks made by us in regard to abstinence from intoxicating drinks in our last number.

Our next position is, that, in respect to the expediency or inexpediency of indifferent actions, each one must judge for himself, weighing all pertinent considerations conscientiously, in the fear of God, and according to the best light he can get. The judgment of other men is not his law, nor is he bound by it, if contrary to his own. He may attach what weight he sees fit, and is bound to attach reasonable weight to the judgment of others, in making up his own. But, nevertheless, he must act upon his own judgment thus conscientiously made up. And herein, so far as the mere ethical nature of the act is concerned, and aside of the prohibitions of lawful government, civil or parental, while accountable to God, he is free of man, who may not wrench from him a liberty which God has not withheld by making that a test of goodness and piety, or term of Christian communion, which God has not so made. Our readers can hardly deem it necessary that we should make expressly an exception which of course is implied in such cases, viz., of prohibition by competent secular authority. Has not the State power to draft men into the army, to require vessels to undergo quarantine, to compel hackmen to buy a license and display their numbers, and a thousand other things, which, without such prohibition, would be morally indifferent, and no man could erect into a criterion of righteousness or term of communion? This is not because these things are morally evil in their own nature, or because on this account men have a right to treat them as such; but because they are prohibited by the powers that be, which are ordained of God, and "whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." All things indifferent are fully subject to the authority of civil government. It has power to command anything not inhibited

by its own constitution, that does not involve disobedience to and rebellion against God. The only sphere in which the framing and administering of law in the premises devolve in any degree directly upon us is in the Faculty of the College of New Jersey. With all our associates in authority here we join in enactments prohibiting the use of intoxicating drinks, as likewise of fire-arms and other like things in that institution. This creates an obligation on the part of the students to refrain from them as prohibited by competent authority.

For the same reason it is clear that the *mere* doing or not doing a thing indifferent cannot be erected into a test of piety, a term of communion, or ground of Church discipline. It is only articulating more definitely and expressly what has already been said. He that eateth and he that eateth not are not to judge one another. They are to receive whom God has received, however weak in the faith, and not to refuse or cast out those whom Christ does not cast out, or to make that a bar to communion which He does not.

Here we reach what we deem the weak point in the argument of the deliverance of the O. S. Assembly of '65, an able, extended, and elaborate paper, arguing some of the most intricate questions of Christian casuistry, which have long tasked and perplexed the masters in this department; issuing them with little or no opportunity for debate, in an assembly greatly reduced at the heel of the session, impatient to leave, the doubting or opposed members preferring, in the hurry and impatience of the moment, to let the paper pass, with this most convenient sort of go-by, to showing their hand in opposition when there was no opportunity to show their reasons, and no alternative consequently but to reap the usual reward of fidelity to truth in such cases—being held up to opprobrium by ultraists, as allies of tipplers and tippling-shops. If this course is not most courageous, it is very common in such cases. And of the reaffirmation of it in subsequent General Assemblies, the same thing for substance may be said.

But to the distinguishing point of this paper: it agrees with the maturer declarations of previous O. S. Assemblies, that the making and selling of intoxicating drinks is not, in its own nature, and hence as such, in all circumstances

sinful. "That the practice of manufacturing and retailing intoxicating drinks, is in its own nature sinful, we do not affirm, and need not, therefore, consider it in this sense an offence against the laws of Christ's house. But that it tempts others to sin and mars their spiritual edification, is too obvious to require proof." On this last clause hangs the whole subsequent argument of the paper, maintaining that it is a just bar to communion. This also is coupled with the argument and conclusion of the Apostle, in regard to using our liberty with respect to eating meat that has been offered to idols, so as to wound the consciences of weak converts from idolatry, and tempt them to sin, by eating this meat with conscience of the idol. This conclusion of the Apostle, which this paper makes the great premise for its own conclusion that such making and selling of intoxicating drinks is a bar to communion, is in the following words: "When ye so sin against the brethren, ye sin against Christ," see 1 Cor. viii. The paper proceeds to argue that what the Scripture pronounces a sin, it of course authorizes and requires us to make a bar to communion. On a superficial and hasty glance this may appear plausible, and not easily controvertible. But a more searching glance will at once detect its oversights and fallacies, and bring to light the inherent difficulties of the subject.

The first and great fallacy running through this paper is that which vitiates so much reasoning, and underlies much of the inconsequent arguing and uncharitable denunciation of good men and divine truth, that have so greatly marred the edification of weak and strong brethren on this whole subject. It is the familiar *fallacia accidentis* of confounding things, in their essence merely, with some of their accidents, or their different accidental conditions with each other. Men eat what they buy in the markets. Raw meat and vegetables is what they buy; therefore, they eat raw meat and vegetables. This might seem to some, very smart arguing. Most, however, would think it neither keen nor weighty. Now, the extracts already made show that the paper in question is constantly confounding the essence of making and selling intoxicating drinks, as such in any and all circumstances, with certain very common accidents, but not necessary or universal properties of the same. While

it does not assert that it is in its own nature a sin, it asserts without any qualification as to time, place, or circumstance, "that it tempts others to sin, and mars their spiritual edification, is too obvious to require proof." Now that it is often, or commonly so, may be admitted. That it is so in all instances, and in its own nature, cannot be admitted without declaring that the first miracle of Christ tempted others to sin, and marred their spiritual edification, and flying in the face of the nearly unanimous judgment of the Church; this, too, as confirmed by the most recent and competent critical scholarship. Other parts of the paper speak of the Apostle's argument, on which it builds its whole reasonings and conclusions, as applying "to the *use* of intoxicating drinks when manufactured and sold as a *common* beverage." Here, then, it is not the sale, but the "use" of intoxicating drinks that is marked as a disciplinable offence, and this not absolutely, but under a certain accidental condition, viz., that these drinks be "manufactured and sold as a common beverage," that this be the purpose for which they are made and sold, to be not merely a beverage, but a "common beverage." We should think such a set of conditions would insure an immunity from church discipline to all drinkers, by rendering conviction impossible. For though one might be convicted of using intoxicating liquors, in how many cases could it be proved that the particular liquor that he drinks is made and sold with the design of its being not only a beverage, but a "common beverage"? Then, in the next sentence, it is not the use, but the preparing and selling them *for this purpose*, that are made to constitute the sin. "When prepared and sold *for this purpose*, those who do so sin against the brethren," etc. Although the presumption may be very strong that most manufacturers and venders of such drinks do it mainly to supply the demand for them as a common beverage, yet it is no less to be presumed, until the contrary is proven, that they mean to supply any legitimate demand for them as well, whether medicinal, sacramental, for the arts, or as a beverage not common, but sparingly and seldom used, only on rare and special occasions. For notoriously and undeniably there are all these uses of intoxicating liquor, besides that of a "common beverage." How is it to be proved from the *mere* making and selling of it, aside of any

special proof of such intent, that it is for the "purpose" of making it under the condition of its being a "common beverage," instead of the other, and some at least legitimate objects named above?

Still another accident of selling, repeatedly signalized in this paper as what gives it a pernicious character, is retailing it. "That a manufacturer, *or retailer* of intoxicating drinks *for the purpose mentioned*, is guilty of an offence proved to be such from Scriptnre, the foregoing remarks clearly demonstrate." "The retailer is the proximate agent in tempting many to drink to drunkenness, and in forming in others the appetite for strong drink which leads to brutal intoxication." But then again, it is repeatedly said that the "manufacture and sale," irrespective of distinctions of wholesale and retail, is a disciplinable offence. Now it is true that a large proportion of retail trade in liquors has the malign purpose, character, and effects ascribed to it above, and as such, *when these can be clearly proved upon it*, it is justly obnoxious to the discipline of the Church. But this may be without its being true that all retailing these liquors, as such, has this character, or that it can be in no case legitimate in purpose, manner, and degree. And still further, the proof that retailing them is always iniquitous and a just bar to communion, would not prove that the wholesale traffic is always and necessarily of this character, or that all making and selling, under any and every condition, is such, and may righteously be dealt with as such by the Church. It is, however, difficult to see what can be lawfully made and wholesaled, which may not be distributed in such smaller quantities at retail as are needful for its lawful uses.

Thus it appears that the paper in question is at fault for vacillation in its grounds, for confounding the accidental with the essential,* the particular with the universal; for shifting

* This confounding the accidental with the essential runs through and underlies the whole argument to prove that the Scripture wines must be of two kinds, fermented and unfermented, intoxicating and unintoxicating, because wine is sometimes mentioned with approval as a blessing, and again with condemnation as a curse. Is it not in the one case spoken of with reference to the accident of being lawfully used, and in the other of being used to excess, and so made a cause of drunkenness? Is any other view necessary, or even adequate to make the Bible consistent? This arguing is about as conclusive as if when

from selling at retail to all sale; from making and selling as a common beverage, to using what is made for such a purpose. Suppose such a deliverance in Christ's time, whom and where would it have struck? And do we not see enough to show the unwisdom of adopting, or readopting papers thus long, elaborate, and bristling with the toughest points of casuistry, on the most momentous subjects, without stopping to discuss even the phraseology, when the phraseology is everything?

But we go still further. Our second and great point is, that while one may sin against the brethren and against Christ by not walking charitably in the use of their Christian liberty, yet this sin is a violation of that class of obligations technically called imperfect, not because as before God they are tainted with defect, but because they are not judicially enforceable before human tribunals. This is not saying that there is not an abundance of liquor selling and drinking that is subject to church discipline—of which more very soon. But it is saying, that as there is a possible making, selling, and drinking of intoxicating liquor which is morally indifferent, then the use of one's liberty herein, to this extent is not a proper subject of church discipline; and that if, within these limits, there be merely that lack of Christian charity against which the Apostle exhorts, as being a sin against the brethren and against Christ, yet the lawful and scriptural antidote to it is not excommunication, but precisely the expostulation which the Apostle used when treating of this subject, in his three great deliverances thereon, Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii., x. That the uncharitable use of Christian liberty, so as to stumble, or hinder the edification of weak brethren, was like a similar misuse of Christian liberty in the inadequate giving of our substance in charity, and countless other shortcomings and omissions from which the Church and religion may suffer—a matter to be dealt with by appealing to Christian love, and shedding light on the conscience, but not by being made a term of com-

money is said to "answer all things," and the love of money to be the root of all evil, two kinds of money, genuine and counterfeit, instead of the same kind of money, reasonably or unreasonably loved and sought, were intended—as if, when wealth and honor from men are spoken of, now as blessings, and now as evil, two kinds of wealth and two kinds of honor were spoken of—and not one and the same kind, properly or improperly sought and regarded.

munion; and under these conditions, leaving each to his own liberty with regard to man, and in view of his accountability to God, we think demonstrable from the following considerations: 1. From the subject-matter to which it relates. It refers exclusively to the mutual duties of two classes of Christians, one of whom regarded certain things in reality morally indifferent as sinful, while the other, with fuller knowledge and stronger Christian insight, regarded and treated them as innocent, and had no scruples, on their own account, about doing them. The former class consisted either of Jewish converts, as in Rom. xiv., who were still so far in the twilight of Christian knowledge as to think the observance of the sacred days peculiar to the Jewish dispensation, and of abstinence from certain meats prohibited under it as ceremonially unclean, still binding upon Christians. The case dealt with in the First Epistle to the Corinthians is that of heathen converts who supposed that eating meats which had been offered to idols involved some sort of homage to those idols, or contracted the guilt of idol-worship. The more enlightened converts, however, knew that the Jewish sacred days and forbidden meats, and meats that had been offered to idols in sacrifice, were simply like other days and other food, and that observing, using, or abstaining from them was simply indifferent. Now the danger was, as the context shows, that a breach of charity might be committed by the parties concerned in two ways: *a.* That the better instructed would despise the less informed for their blind scrupulosity, and repel them by their overbearing pride of superior knowledge; and on the other, that the weaker class would judge and condemn the others as sinners for neglecting these uncommanded observances. This appears clearly from the Apostle's charge to both parties, Rom. xiv. 2, 3: "For one believeth that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him." *b.* There was the still greater danger, because so liable to be overlooked or ignored, that those having the superior knowledge would do without hesitation those things which they knew to be innocent and their weaker brethren believed sinful, in circumstances when their example would tempt the latter to imitate them by

doing what, though it to the former was by itself innocent, yet to the latter would be sinful, because they believed it so. For no man can do what he believes sin, *i. e.*, intend to commit sin, without therein sinning. For this reason he exhorts them to dispense with meats when the eating of them would lead to such results: "For meat destroy not the work of God. All things indeed are pure, but it is evil to him who eateth with offence. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." *Id.*, verses 20, 21. Precisely the same analysis is given in 1 Cor., chapters viii., x.: "If any of them that believe not bid you to a feast and ye be disposed to go, whatsoever is set before you eat, asking no questions for conscience' sake. But if any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice to idols, eat not for his sake that showed it, and for conscience' sake, for the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof; conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the other. For why should my liberty be judged of another man's conscience?" Chap. x., 27–29, so also in chap. viii. he says: "We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is none other God but one. . . Howbeit there is not in every man that knowledge: for some with conscience of the idol unto this hour eat it as a thing offered to an idol. But meat commendeth us not to God: for neither if we eat, are we the better; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse. But take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak. For if any man see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him which is weak be emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols; and through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ. Wherefore, if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend." 1 Cor. viii. 8–13.

It is quite clear then to what the Apostle's reasonings and expostulations are applicable. The case that in our day would be most closely analogous to it would be that of converts who had been trained in the usages of the ritualists, and, while truly receiving and received by Christ, still believe that the

observance of Lent, Good Friday, and other church days, abstinence from meats on Fridays, or in the ways and times prescribed in Lent, are of religious obligation. Here is a case to try the wisdom and charity of the well-instructed Christian who knows better. He is not to despise or disregard their scruples. He is not to put on proud or overbearing airs towards them. He is not, if he can so do, *with fidelity to other claims of truth and duty*, to refuse to abstain from meats, or to attend religious services on these church days, when by refusing to do it his example will lead these weak brethren to disregard them while believing them obligatory, and thus to do what to the eye of their conscientious conviction is sin. In short, he must act charitably towards his neophyte brethren, and instead of causing them to stumble, must do what he can to promote their edification; and, without causing their fall, to lift them up to the light and strength and liberty of the gospel. But of the extent to which he must go in doing this, to which he *may* go without indorsing popery, prelacy, or ritualism, without treason to the truth and the God of truth, he must be the ultimate human judge, responsible for the use of his liberty to that Master to whom alone he stands or falls. Nay, he might carry his sinful compliances so far as openly to betray his lord, and so deserve excommunication. Suppose that these converts should insist that, unless he kept fast on Fridays and during Lent, or attended service on Good Friday, or counted beads, or went to the confessional, he was no Christian and should be debarred from communion. What then? Instead of complying, is it not his duty to vindicate the truth by refusing conformity? Was not this the case of Paul himself, in like circumstances, who circumcised Timothy in accommodation to Jewish prejudices, and in other things became as a Jew to the Jews; but when the Jewish converts undertook to make circumcision essential to justification, withstood them to the last? He refused to circumcise Titus "because of false brethren unawares brought in, who came in privily to spy out our liberty, that they might bring us again into bondage, to whom we gave place by subjection; no, not for an hour; THAT THE TRUTH OF THE GOSPEL MIGHT CONTINUE WITH YOU."—Gal. ii. 3, 4, 5. Nay, he declared, "if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you

nothing." How then would the argument of the paper of '65 have been confronted by the Apostle? One might very well consent to immerse or be immersed, in order to promote brotherly love with persons of immersionist proclivities. But the moment it is insisted on as essential to religion, that is another matter. In reference to the great subject of our discussion, using or abstaining from intoxicating drinks, the case precisely analogous to those put by the Apostle would be that of one who did not regard the sparing use of wine as a beverage as sinful, having to shape his course with respect to others who do so regard it. The Apostle's argument would be apropos to the former to induce him to abstain, out of respect to the scruples of the latter, until it were insisted on as a test of piety, or term of communion; in which case as devout and holy a man as Dr. Archibald Alexander would, on rare occasions, drink a glass of wine in rebuke of such a heresy, and in practical assertion of Christian liberty, although habitually practising entire abstinence. A still closer parallel to the case argued by the Apostle, as related to this subject, is the signing of some pledge of total abstinence. There have been times when large numbers enlisted in temperance associations have insisted, not only on total abstinence, but on all signing some pledge to practise it; and that those who refused to sign such pledge were doing great injury to the cause of temperance, vastly more than the hardest drinkers could do. They have made this a test of temperance rectitude and orthodoxy, and hurled reproach and defamation at the devoutest men, and total abstainers too, who could not see their way clear to sign the papers they presented. Now here is an act indisputably indifferent, which one may do or not do, as he shall judge expedient out of respect to the conscientious scruples of others, or to prevent their falling into what to them is sin, by imitating his innocent example. But suppose the signing of such pledges, or joining of Rechabites, Templars, or other organizations, is insisted on as a test of righteousness or term of communion. Can it then be submitted to *salva fide et salva conscientia?*

2. The fact that eating meat is put by the Apostle on the same footing as drinking wine in relation to these subjects, is decisive of the whole question now in issue. It shows that, how-

ever we may be moved by the impulses of Christian love to abstain from the one or the other, and however there may in some circumstances be sin in not so abstaining from them, or either of them, such abstinence is not enforceable by church discipline, and could not be made a bar to communion without danger of excluding some whom Christ has received. For who but Romanists would think of enforcing abstinence from meat, and this on certain days, by exclusion from the Lord's table?

3. Still further, this conclusion respecting the Apostle's meaning is clinched by his forbidding either party to judge or condemn the other. "Let not him which eateth not, judge him that eateth, for God hath received him." So far, therefore, as Paul's argument for abstaining from things indifferent which may wound weak Christians is concerned, it in its very nature precludes making excommunication its penalty for refusing so to abstain. It forbids those who abstain to judge those who do not. Instead of excommunication of one party by the other, he forbids it alike to both.

Unless, therefore, we are utterly astray in our whole conception of the scriptural view of expediency and liberty with respect to the disuse of things indifferent, it is only applicable where excommunication is *in*applicable. Whatever may be true, therefore, of the doctrine of the deliverance of 1865 with respect to the disciplinable character of the pure and simple making, selling, and drinking of intoxicating beverages, the argument adopted to prove it is fallacious. It is always hazardous for deliberative bodies to vote not only doctrines or measures, but extended arguments to sustain them, especially without thorough discussion. New judges have often been advised by their seniors that they will be less likely to go far astray if they do not amplify the reasons for their decisions. Documents of that length, importance, and difficulty, ought to be circulated in print among the members of a church court some time before voting upon them, that they may be thoroughly understood, examined, criticised and perfected preparatory to final action upon them. So was it with the basis of reunion adopted by the Assemblies of 1869; so is it with every act of any importance before our legislatures, State and national.

It is an incidental confirmation of the view we have taken of

the non-disciplinable character of the cases dealt with by the Apostle, and made the basis of the deliverance of 1865, that those who maintain that all use, making, or selling of intoxicating beverages is a bar to communion, are more and more deserting and disparaging the expediency ground for total abstinence founded on Paul's reasonings (Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii. x.), as altogether too weak for their purposes. Hence they give it up, risk their whole cause on the success of the effort to extract from the Scriptures an unconditional condemnation of all use of intoxicating beverages—with what success, our readers have had opportunity to know.

Another very questionable principle, at least in the application of it made in this paper, is, that "whatever would prevent the admission of one to the sealing ordinances of the church on his first application, ought, if found in connection with his character or conduct after his admission, to exclude him from her communion. This is so evident as to require no proof." It is perfectly true that the inward qualifications for the due partaking of the Lord's Supper are the same at the first and all subsequent communions. But it is not true that the proof of the presence or absence of these qualifications, that should control church courts in admitting or excluding persons from communion, is of the same kind in both cases. In reference to the first admission to the Lord's table, the applicant is to be examined for such positive proof of such knowledge and piety as indicate a credible profession. The burden of such proof is upon him, and unless he furnish it he is to be excluded. In the eye of the church court the presumption is against receiving him until he present credible evidence of his fitness to partake aright. Hence, they are to examine him with reference to his knowledge and piety. But after his first admission to the Lord's Supper, the presumption is always in favor of his fitness to come; and, as against any prohibition by the authorities of the Church, he has the right to come without further examination by them for positive proof of his knowledge and piety, and until they can prove against him ignorance or scandal, which, in the judgment of charity, are inconsistent with piety. And here the burden of proof rests upon the session. They must prove that he is ignorant or scandalous. The whole

relation of the parties as to burden of proof is shifted. Hence it is the practice everywhere to debar men from a first entrance to the Lord's table on a state of evidence which would by no means warrant their subsequent excommunication. This, while it does not affect the question what may or may not be a term of communion in the abstract, does affect its concrete application, and renders the whole argument of the paper, as related to this point, irrelevant and inconclusive. There might be a way of using, making, or vending intoxicating drinks which would induce just hesitation about first admitting to the communion, but which would induce still greater hesitation about excluding one who had been once admitted. But while we dissent from the deliverance of '65 as too sweeping and unqualified in itself, and still more from the arguments it gives, as contrary to Scripture, we nevertheless earnestly maintain the doctrine on which the O. S. Assembly had settled in a series of matured deliverances preceding this, already adverted to, viz.: They are so true that we will emphasize them by repetition: —

1. That abstinence from intoxicating drinks as a beverage, in the circumstances in which we are now placed ought to be urged upon Christians on the ground of expediency, and from motives of Christian love, in order to assist the abatement of the drinking and intemperance which now have such baleful prevalence.

2. That we ought to be very particular to urge it upon the ground of expediency alone, lest we reflect upon the example and teachings of Christ.

3. That those who prepare, sell, or use intoxica ting liquors in a way to foster and tempt to drunkenness and intemperance, should be dealt with by the Church as befits the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of each particular case.

4. All intoxication and intemperance is itself immoral and unchristian, and amenable not only to the denunciations of moralists and preachers, but to the discipline of the Church.

We must not, however, construe the mere making, preparing or drinking, or offering to be drunk, in any and every circumstance, of anything and everything that, taken in any excess, can intoxicate, as necessarily tempting to drunkenness. Otherwise we charge Christ, who once made wine, and by some use of it afforded a pretext to his scoffing foes for the wicked cal-

umny that he was a "wine-bibber;" and Paul, in cautioning persons against being "given to much wine," thus giving implied allowance to a little in some circumstances, with tempting to intoxication and intemperance. This will never do. It is difficult to define what constitutes a criminal incitement or temptation to sin. We must shape our definitions so as not to charge God, in the course of Nature and Providence, with tempting men, since he "is not tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man." Yet under his ordering the earth is full of what man, not by the proper use of them, but by his depraved abuse of them, become the incitement or temptation to sin. In this sense again God is said to have tempted Abraham, *i. e.*, he tried him. He put him in circumstances involving strong motives to disobedience, antagonizing with the principle of faith and obedience which ever ought to suffice, as it did then suffice, to overpower them. This was a trial of Abraham's faith, but not a temptation in the sense of soliciting, alluring, or instigating to evil, such as that wherewith God tempteth no man. And it is an eminent type of that trial of men's spirit in all things as to whether they will make a right or a wrong use of those gifts, bounties, occasions, and opportunities which he is pleased to bestow upon them.* The whole of life is such a moral probation, as Butler and other great Christian apologists have had abundant occasion to signalize. Nay, the word of God itself is purposely put by its divine author, not with apodictic demonstration, like the problems of Euclid, but in such a way as to depend for its acceptance on the fairness, candor, and right disposition of the reader and hearer. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness." "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." Christ often speaks in parables, so beautifully instructive to babes in Christ who receive them with childlike simplicity, but nevertheless to the

* Calvin, commenting on the miracle of Cana, John ii. 8, says: "Sed mirum est quod Christus frugalitatis magister vini et quidem prestantissimi, magnam copiam largitur. Respondeo, quum nobis quotidie Deus largum vini proventum suppeditat, nostro vitio fieri si ejus benignitas irritamentum est luxuriæ; *quin potius hæc temperantiæ nostræ vera est probatio, si in media affluentia parci tamen ac moderati sumus.* Quemadmodum Paulus gloriatur, se ad utrumque edoctum esse, ut abundare et esurire sciat. Phil. 4, 12."

very end of giving cavillers their chance, and testing their fairness or perverseness; as he himself declares, "that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand." Luke viii. 10. We can barely touch this great and difficult subject. Our only object is to call attention to its difficulties and the exceeding danger of any hasty or heedless disposition of it; to caution against definitions of temptation that by logical consequence would make God and Christ tempters to sin, not in this matter merely, but in the whole course of administration in the realms of Nature, Providence, and Grace; against laying down terms of membership in the Church which would bar out the Head of the Church, and especially to show the necessity and safety of those deliverances of past Assemblies which, refusing to say that the making, selling, or use of intoxicating liquors as such in all circumstances is a disciplinable offence because it tempts men to sin, direct the various church courts to deal with each separate case according to its own circumstances, and judge whether it evinces a guilty complicity with the promotion of intemperance or not.

These views will be confirmed if we consider how far our definitions of what constitutes guilty and disciplinable tempting, if good and sound, will hold in application to other departments of human conduct, as well as what respects intoxicating drinks. We will specify an instance or two:—

1. We reproduce what we said in a former number (July, 1869, pp. 413, 414) on the enormity of the social and domestic sins to which prevailing extravagance and luxury give birth, and predicated in part upon what the Assembly of 1869 declared, and is unquestionably true, on the subject, viz.: That for infanticide and its affiliated social evils this extravagance and luxury are largely responsible. After enumerating several causes of these abominations, the Assembly say, "an influence not less powerful than any of these is the growing devotion to fashion and luxury of this age."

On which we remarked:—

"There is no region in which good men are more in danger of being misled by superficial and fanatical views, than in that wherein God hath called us unto liberty, at the same time charging us not to use our liberty as an occasion to the flesh,

but by love to serve one another. We are left to our liberty as to dress, equipage, and general cost and style of living, so long as we are able to sustain it honestly and keep within the bounds of decency. And yet, as we shall soon find, our Assembly justly laid to the charge of the luxury and extravagance now in fashion, that they promote the present alarming growth of licentiousness, including the horrible crime of infanticide! Does the enormity of drunkenness exceed this? And would it not be true that if people were to abstain from all luxuries and ornaments, they would greatly lessen the temptation to these crimes and promote social purity, together with whatever is pure and lovely and of good report? What then? May the Church interdict on pain of excommunication all use of ornaments and luxuries as a sin, in order to lessen the present fearful excess in them, and the direful consequences of which it is so prolific? No. This is an unwarrantable and dangerous interference with Christian liberty. It could never be carried out without putting Christianity in a straight-jacket and rending our churches into fragments. Yet who can doubt that there is great sin in much of this luxurious self-indulgence, this costly ostentation, this 'splendid misery and shabby splendor'? How ought the pulpit, the press, and all Christian teaching and persuasion, to beseech, persuade, warn, thunder against it? Yet if all this fail, can the Church demand of her ministers to preach upon the *duty* of total abstinence from *all* ornaments and luxuries, because it seems as if such abstinence in Christian people would have some tendency to abate the dreadful evils in question? It is, however, none the less the clear duty of Christians to lay these things to heart; to deny the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, and to shun the appearance of evil; and of ministers to warn them thus to abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against their souls, on peril of losing these souls. But there is a range of liberty in the manner of doing it, for the use of which they are accountable, not to man, but to that Master to whom they must stand or fall."—*Princeton Review*, 1869, pp. 413, 414.

We had prepared similar illustrations, the bearing of which must be obvious to our readers, in respect to dancing, tobacco, etc. But want of space compels us to omit them.

Much unwarrantable effort has been made to cast odium upon those who have felt conscience-bound to take a true stand for the only scriptural ground of total abstinence, by charging, in various forms, that their discussions afford aid and comfort to drunkards and dram-sellers. To which we answer that this can only be by a perversion of the truth, for which the truth and those who defend it are not responsible. But we believe the whole extent of this is nothing, or an infinitesimal next to nothing, which has been immensely and inexcusably exaggerated. But whether so or not, the truth necessary to vindicate our Saviour and His Word, and to keep the temperance cause off the breakers which will wreck it, must not be kept back because perverse men will wrest it, even as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction. This is incident to the declaration of all truth, and especially truth in correction or refutation of ultraisms. No doubt there were Sabbath-breakers who quite exulted over our Lord's rebuke and refutation of the extreme rigor of Jewish doctrine on the subject. It is very certain that Antinomians exult when legalism is rebuked, and have always been ready to continue in sin that grace may abound. Legalists, also, by a like one-sided distortion, luxuriate in the declaration that only they who keep Christ's commandments are His friends. The wicked turn the very grace of God into lasciviousness, and respond to His electing love, "Why doth he yet find fault?" What great awakening ever occurs in which the surrounding bar-rooms of the vicinage are not using perversions of the very truths that inspire it to confirm their wickedness and animate their revels? Why, in a drinking-shop with which it was once our fortune to make war till it became a dry grocery, and its keeper a deacon of the Church, there was once a mock celebration of the Lord's Supper itself. Was this glorious ordinance at fault? And is it not time for respectable men to have done with these petty flings about the writings of their adversaries being quoted and perverted in tippling shops? Is not all this true of the Word of God itself?

What, then, shall be done to promote temperance and withstand intemperance?

1. All attempts to advance this or any other good cause by placing it on unscriptural foundations, or by wresting the Word

of God out of its plain and obvious meaning, as it has been and still is understood by the great body of Christian believers, will prove worse than abortive. They must react against any cause, so far as it employs them, by setting them against God's everlasting truth. We are having sad experience of this now. We believe that a principal reason why so many temperance organizations have enlisted the small co-operation of which they complain, is the unscriptural footing of the "new departure" that has been adopted. We believe that the great reason why vast numbers who signed pledges of abstinence twenty years ago, and have since gone to drinking, has been that they find that the reasons as to the intrinsic sin of drinking any alcoholic beverage, then urged upon them as the conclusive reason for signing such pledges, are not sustained by the Word of God.

2. The system of uncharitable and calumnious attack upon those who cannot accept the doctrine that the wines of Scripture are not intoxicating, and of attempting to overawe them by misrepresenting, perverting, and then vilifying them and their sentiments must cease, or it will react terribly against any agency which adopts it.

3. The vast extent, evils, and woes of intemperance, together with the special causes which in present circumstances render total abstinence from intoxicating beverages an important and necessary means of arresting it, must be set forth and urged upon all as a ground for such abstinence, to which the impulses of a Christian love should constrain them. We should strive to show them that such an exercise of Christian liberty is expedient for the edification of their brethren and the welfare of the people.

4. Let due diligence be given to enforce all existing laws in restraint of drunkenness, drinking, and vending such liquors. If few States have prohibitory laws, or having them are able to enforce them, there are few that have not laws prohibiting the selling of intoxicating liquors to minors and drunkards, or to any without license. The simple enforcement of these laws would often exert a powerful influence for good. So also of laws against the sale of adulterated liquors. When needful laws are wanting, let them be sought and provided. Few States would refuse some legislation in restraint or prohibition of the

sale, at least in its most dangerous forms. Michigan has lately passed a law making every man who sells liquor, so as to induce drunkenness, responsible in damages to the family of the drunkard. We have not the exact words, but are informed that this is the principle of the law. Indeed, it is doubtful whether even the common law could not be availed of for such a remedy. We have seen it stated that a husband lately recovered damages in a suit against an apothecary for selling opium or laudanum constantly to his wife for six months, knowing that she used it for purposes of narcotic inebriation. Why might not the same principle hold and be enforced with reference to like sales to produce alcoholic inebriation?

Above all, let our great reliance first and last be on the Word and Grace of God. This is our great and only sure defence against intemperance and other sins. Let us, then, obtain that for ourselves and others, and we are sure of victory. "For the grace of God hath appeared unto all (all kinds of) men, teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the Great God, even our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." Tit. ii. 11–14.

Art. VII.—NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The Doctrine of the Church: A Historical Monograph. With a full Bibliography of the Subject. By John J. McElhinney, D.D., Milnor Professor of Systematic Divinity in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Ohio. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 819 and 821 Market St. 1871.

This is a scholarly, candid, and valuable production. It presents an able analysis of the historical doctrine of the Church, as it was successively developed by patristic, mediæval, reformed, and later theologians. While the author favors three orders in the ministry as requisite to the perfection of visible church organization, he strenuously opposes the doctrine that they are necessary to the being of the Church or the validity of church administrations. On this great issue he stands, and shows that the catena of church authorities stands strong for the Protestant doctrine of ecclesiasticism. He sums the whole up, and exhibits the true issue thus in his concluding paragraphs:—

"In the light of these facts, Luther's memorable declaration, 'The great question between the Papists and us is the question concerning the Church—Which is the true Church?' stands fully vindicated. That this is indeed the fundamental question between the Romanist and the Protestant sufficiently appears from the tenor of their respective answers.

"The answer of the Romanist is, that the true Church, the Catholic Church militant, is that world-wide organization which has its centre of unity in the successor of St. Peter, in the apostolical see of Rome; that upon connection with this visible corporation depends the spiritual relation of the members of Christ's mystical members to the Head; that only through the mediation of this body, as represented by its priesthood, the sole dispensers of its sacred mysteries, is living union with Christ secured and maintained.

"The Reformers of the sixteenth century, disregarding the tradition of centuries, and going back to the original tradition of the apostles as preserved in the New Testament, give an answer to the question—What is the Church?—in the well-known definitions embodied in the first Protestant Confessions: The Church of Christ is the community of the children of God, the collective body of the truly faithful—a body which, as an organized whole, must needs be invisible, even as its glorified Head is invisible; but which yet possesses a real, though imperfect visibility in the form of particular churches, which are severally distinguished by the notes of a true Church, and are thus

identified as forming constituent parts of the one body of Christ in its earthly essence.

"Between these two doctrines of the Church, the mediæval or Roman, and the evangelical or Protestant, there is no tenable middle ground. This is the great lesson of our history. One or the other of these two positions must be maintained: either the Church Catholic is one and the same with the collective whole of the churches of the Roman obedience, exemplifying as it does, in completeness, the theory of a visible organic unity, 'Catholic unity,' as its advocates claim, or the visible Church Catholic, so called, is one and the same with the collective whole of the particular churches which severally confess the faith of Christ crucified; a collective whole presumptively identified with the mystical body of Christ, visibly one considered as the aggregation of all particular churches, each maintaining in its purity the faith once delivered to the saints."

Plutarch's Morals, translated from the Greek by several hands, corrected and revised by William W. Goodwin, Ph.D., Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University, with an introduction by Ralph Waldo Emerson, in six volumes, 8vo. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1870.

It is probable that "Plutarch's Lives" has made a deeper impression upon the minds of a greater number of generous young men than any other book that was ever written, except the Bible. These beautiful volumes include all of Plutarch that remains to the world, except the "Lives." In this reprint from the fifth English edition published in 1718, revised and corrected with great labor, Prof. Goodwin has rendered a great service to the lovers of Plutarch and to the world. For although a new translation from the Greek text, corrected and restored where it is corrupt, so far as this is possible, by modern criticism is still a great desideratum, yet it is doubtful whether it would supersede this monument of the copiousness and riches of the English language, when it was, to say the least, vastly more flexible than it is now.

Plutarch, beyond comparison, is the most entertaining, and, in certain respects, the most instructive, of all the ancient authors, whether Greek or Latin. We grow tired at last of Homer and Sophocles, of Herodotus and Plato, of Plautus and Virgil, Cæsar, Cicero, and Seneca; but we never tire of Plutarch. He is a perpetual refreshment—so genial, so human, so full of good sense, so full of sympathy with all that is heroic and sublime.

In such a brief notice of this work it is almost impossible to say anything that is worth saying. But let any one who is not already a lover of Plutarch take up the first volume in a bookstore, and read over the short introduction by Emerson, and he will surely find it difficult to leave without carrying with him the whole work. Hear

what King Henry IV. of France writes to his wife Marie de Medicis: "You could not have sent me anything which could be more agreeable than this news of the pleasure you have taken in this reading. Plutarch always delights me with fresh novelty. To love him is to love me; for he has been long time the instructor of my youth. My good mother, to whom I owe all, and who would not wish, she said, to see her son an illustrious dunce, put this book in my hands when I was almost a child at the breast. It has been like my conscience." Montesquieu took from this author his definition of law, and says of him, "I am always charmed with Plutarch." Emerson says of this work: "I know not where to find a work—to borrow a phrase of Ben Jonson's—'so rammed with life,' and this in chapters chiefly ethical, which are so prone to be heavy and sentimental. No poet could illustrate his thought with more novel or striking similitudes. His style is realistic, picturesque, and varied; his sharp objective eyes see everything that moves, shines, or threatens in nature, or art, or thought, or dreams. . . . His vivacity and abundance never leave him to loiter or pound on an incident. . . . His surprising merit is the facility with which he deals with his manifold topics. . . . His own cheerfulness and rude health are also magnetic. . . . We sail on his memory into the ports of every nation, enter into every private property, and do not stop to discriminate owners, but give him the praise of all. 'Tis all Plutarch's by right of eminent domain, and all vests in this emperor."

Mediation: The Function of Thought. Andover: Warren F. Draper.

The following is the brief synoptical analysis of this work issued by the publisher.

"This volume forms one part or chapter of an unfinished work unthe titie of 'Thoughts on Mediation; or, The Relation of Christ to the World.' The author reasons that as Christ and his apostles claim the reasonableness of his doctrine, and appeal to the honest conviction of men for its acceptance, we may justly inquire for the solution of this problem; or, that the truths evolved by the doctrine of Mediation will throw strong lights on everything touched by them, and give new significance to all we conceived before.

"The author proposes in this volume to show the base which exists in the normal constitution of humanity for the doctrine of Mediation; and also that this base is as wide and as universal as the whole scope of human thought. He proceeds with a profound and suggestive discussion of the function of thought in man as distinguishing him from all other animals, not only in degree but in kind. These specific functions are classed as, I. That of Language. II. Proportion, or the relation of forms, subdivided under three heads,—Pure Mathematics, Applied Science, and Art. III. Jurisprudence or Law. In all which

man is not only superior, but essentially different from all the animals. By language he has general ideas, society; through proportion he has form, beauty, art, mathematics; from law, order, government, morals."

We find on a cursory examination much in this little volume which justifies the foregoing representation. It is particularly profound, and suggestive in regard to the distinction between human and brute intelligence. It is obviously true, also, that thought is a mediating process by which we both mediate our knowledge of single objects through general notions or concepts, and proceed from matters of cognition given by intuition to other judgments, founded upon them. But what light this can be made to shed upon the Redemption of Christ we do not yet see.

Diatessaron: The Life of Our Lord, in the Words of the Gospels. By Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Professor in the Berkeley Divinity School, Author of "A Harmony of the Gospels in Greek," etc., etc. Andover, Mass.: Warren F. Draper.

This work combines in one continuous narrative the events of the life of Christ as recorded by all the evangelists. His genealogy, conversations, discourses, parables, miracles; his trial, death, resurrection, and ascension, are placed in the order of their occurrence; and in the foot-notes references are made to passages in the Old Testament relating to Christ or quoted by him.

It will greatly assist the study of the life of Christ, in connection with the other biographies of Him, and harmonies of the Gospels of which the press has of late been so prolific. It is specially adapted for use in the family, in Sunday schools, and Bible classes. We are glad to see, also, that the same author and publisher have issued harmonies of the Gospels, both in Greek and English, constructed on the same principle.

A Harmony of the Four Gospels in Greek, etc. By Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Prof. in the Berkeley Divinity School. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1871.

This Harmony presents in several respects a fuller apparatus to the student than any hitherto edited. It gives the text of Tischendorf's 8th edition, marking its variations from the common text by different type, and collating others. O. T. quotations are given in full in the margin, and a very valuable feature is a synoptical table of the arrangements of Greswell, Stroud, Robinson, Thomson, and Tischendorf, thus exhibiting their essential agreement amid much diversity in detail. The author agrees with Robinson as to the length of our Lord's ministry, and the time of the imprisonment of John the Bap-

tist, and the commencement of the ministry in Galilee, and as to the division of the whole work by the feasts in John; while he corrects, in the main, Robinson's inconvenient dismemberment of the long passage of Luke ix. 51—xix. 28. Those accustomed to Robinson's Harmony will therefore find the transfer to this easy. Much valuable matter is contained in the introduction and foot-notes, and the execution of the whole is clear and admirable. Breaking the synoptical table of authors into divisions would make it more quickly intelligible. The work seems to be the result of great painstaking, and will certainly be sought by all students of the subject.

A Harmony of the Gospels in English, etc. By Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Prof. in the Berkeley Divinity School. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1871.

This is the companion-work to the former. Its text is that of the authorized version, with emendations from critical changes in the Greek text, and the further correction of errors in regard to which critics and commentators are substantially agreed. The valuable apparatus of the Greek Harmony is reproduced here, so far as the nature of the case admits, and the edition offers to the English reader the full practical benefit secured to scholars by its fellow. Its use in Christian families will greatly promote vivid and accurate conceptions of the nature and contents of the Gospel narratives.

The Mission of the Spirit; or, The Office and Work of the Comforter in Human Redemption. By Rev. L. R. Dunn. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871.

This volume contains much which strongly attracts us. It so completely attributes real piety to the supernatural work of the spirit in the soul, and has so much that is genuinely scriptural and experimental, that we rank it immeasurably above the semi-Pelagian and rationalistic expositions of the subject which too often appear in an evangelical guise. It is written, too, with fervor and life, albeit occasionally, as on the very first page of the preface, a little ambitious and turgid. It is due to truth to add, however, that on such matters as the witness of the spirit, and the admissibility of grace, it is somewhat controversial and thoroughly Wesleyan.

Commentary on the New Testament. Intended for Popular Use. By D. D. Whedon, LL.D. Volume III., Acts—Romans. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871.

This commentary displays the vigor, sometimes rude and rough, for which Dr. Whedon is distinguished. He writes with force, and when free from polemic or partisan bias, is apt to speak to the purpose, and

shed important light on the reasoning or application of the sacred text. But he is intensely polemic, and whenever he confronts Calvinism it seems to have very much the effect which water has on one afflicted with hydrophobia. See his exegesis of Rom. ix., in which, among much more the like, he tells us—"We offer no solution of the problem, that amiable and clear intellects, like Albert Barnes, cannot not only advocate doctrines that are morally so abominable, but can advocate them with reasonings so futile. But we are almost compelled to believe from such specimens of pitiable logic, that the divine penalty imposed upon the ablest intellects for holding the abhorrent dogma (election) is to be smitten with mental imbecility in defending it," p. 357. This will suffice. This sort of polemics seems to us too heated and rabid for a "Popular Commentary."

The Problem of Evil. Translated from the French of M. Ernest Naville. By John P. Lacroix, Professor in the Ohio Wesleyan University, and Translator of Pressensé's "Reign of Terror." [The only authorized translation.] New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871.

A new translation and an American edition of a work we have before commended to our readers, and which treats the great problem in hand from the Christian stand-point of the fall of all men in the fall of the first man; adopting, however, the realistic rather than the federal solution.

Life of John Bunyan, with Notices of some of his Cotemporaries, and Specimens of his Style. By D. A. Harsha, M.A., author of "Life of Philip Doddridge, D.D.," etc. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

The countless readers of the Pilgrim's Progress must be eager to know the life of its marvellous author. This want is happily met in the present volume. It also gives a taste of Bunyan's style and power as an author, in many memorable selections from his works, which withal illuminate the whole subject of free grace and holy living as no other uninspired man has done.

The Kindergarten. A Manual for the Introduction of Froebel's Sytem of Primary Education into Public Schools; and for the use of Mothers and Private Teachers. By Adolph Douai. With 16 Plates. New York: E. Steiger. 1871.

The system of education, which this is an attempt to naturalize among us, is thus described by Miss Elizabeth F. Peabody, who has studied it in Germany, and is laboring to promote it in this country:

"It is exceedingly important," says that lady, "that *Froebel's* method should be carefully studied and fully understood; because many of the schools called Kindergartens are only parodies of the true

Kindergarten, and their faults and failures must not be allowed to disgrace the true principle. *Froebel* took his first lesson from the mother's talk and play with her child, and making this his model, returned it to her, broadened and systematized. 'The instinct that makes a mother play with her baby is a revelation of a first principle, giving the key-note of human education,' and upon it *Froebel* modulated his whole system. The children are taught to play, not 'restrained from play and given lessons to learn,' as many think, and pronounce it barbarous cruelty; but taught unconsciously to themselves through their plays. *Froebel's* idea is to follow the plan of Nature in all her works, and to develop the child gradually, as a plant or a flower is developed. Children are plants. Hence the name *Kindergarten*, children's garden; and the beautiful word *Kindergärtner*, children's gardener, instead of the old harsh, much abused, time-worn *teacher*."

Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law. By George Sharswood. Philadelphia: S. & J. W. Johnson & Co., No. 535 Chestnut street. 1870.

Whatever Judge Sharswood produces bears the imprint of his eminent talent and diligence. The topics treated in this volume are of interest not merely to the professional lawyer or law student, but to all thoughtful or cultured minds. While they are treated with freshness and vivacity, learning and acuteness, they are none the less simple and intelligible, evincing in all respects a mind "apt to teach." The range of subjects is broad and of general interest, including the Profession of Law, Legal Education, the Relation of Law to Moral Science, Commercial Integrity, Natural, Civil, Common, and Feudal Law, together with codification.

The Moabite Stone. By the Rev. B. F. De Costa. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1871.

Another worthy contribution towards elucidating a topic that has largely enlisted the attention of scholars and antiquarians, and was discussed at some length in our April number of this year.

The True Site of Calvary, and Suggestions Relating to the Resurrection. By Fisher Howe, Author of "Oriental and Sacred Scenes." With an Illustrative Map of Jerusalem. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.

This contribution to the clearing up of a difficult but interesting point is of value for the information it carefully gathers up, and happily reflects the taste, culture, and research of a prominent Presbyterian elder, employed in elucidating the Word, the Death, and the Resurrection of our Lord.

The Coolie, his Rights and Wrongs. By the Author of "Ginx's Baby," Author's Edition. New York: George Routledge & Sons. 1871.

This volume of nearly 400 pages, at the low price of 50 cents, gives copious information and statistics on the whole origin, organization, actual working, and results of Coolie labor in quarters where it has been most largely and thoroughly employed.

Addresses and Proceedings at the Celebration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Founding of the American Whig Society of the College of New Jersey. Princeton, N. J., June 29th, 1869. Princeton: Stelle & Smith, Publishers. 1871.

We have in this volume a full and faithful report of the interesting exercises of the Centennial of the American Whig Society. For the preparation of this report, for the able historical sketch of the Society, and for the efficient and successful manner in which the arrangements were planned and executed, great credit is due to Prof. H. C. Cameron. The volume contains much that is of interest to the graduates of the College as well as to the graduates of the American Whig Society. The typographical finish of the work is very fine.

Crystals. By Anne M. Mitchell. Author of "Freed Boy in Alabama," "The Golden Primer," etc. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1334 Chestnut street.

The Maiden Martyr of Scotland. By Matthew Mowab. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

These books are well adapted to interest and instruct Sabbath-school children.

The Way Lost and Found: a book for the Young, especially Young Men. By the Rev. Joseph F. Tuttle, D.D., President of Wabash College. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

The Story of a Pocket Bible.

Theodore: a Story About Baptism. By a True Baptist.

The Way to Mount Zion, and other Tales.

Life in Narrow Streets. By Julia Carrie Thompson.

Lessons of Experience; or, Tales from Real Life.

Riches Without Wings. Illustrated by Lessons from Life.

Mark Thoresby; or, The Evangelist Among the Indians: a Narrative of the Seventeenth Century. By the Author of "The Story of a Pocket Bible."

A Basket of Barley Loaves. By the Author of "The High Mountain Apart," and "Sacramental Sabbath."

The Theban Legion: a Story of the Times of Diocletian. By the Rev. Wm. Blackburn, D.D.

Republics; or, Popular Government an Appointment of God. By the Rev. John Crowell, D.D.

These books are all published by the Presbyterian Board. In their number and variety they are an evidence of the activity of the reorganized Board. We regard them as very suitable for home, family, and Sabbath-school reading. We consider them an excellent substitute for the light sensational books which are so much perused at the present day.

A Working Church. By the Rev. W. T. Wylie.

This tract, also published by the Board, contains a very full and minute plan for developing the activities of church members.

The Holy Bible according to the Authorized Version (A.D. 1611), with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation. By Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter. Vol. i., part i. *Genesis—Exodus.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 684 Broadway. 1871.

This is the first volume of the American reprint of what is known as the "Speaker's Commentary," so called because its plan was first suggested by Right Hon. J. E. Denison, Speaker of the House of Commons.

As is well known, it is prepared by a number of leading divines and historians connected with the English Church, selected by an eminent committee on account of their peculiar fitness for the work. It is intended to be of especial benefit to the great body of believers, and not alone to the comparatively small circle of scholars who make Biblical research the aim and occupation of their lives. The first volume of the American edition comprises the first two English volumes, and includes the first five books of the Bible, thus constituting the only complete commentary on the Pentateuch, in a single volume, in the English language. The first instalment is edited by Rev. Harold E. Browne, author of *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, Rev. F. Cook, General Editor of the Commentary, Rev. Samuel Clark, and Rev. T. E. Espin. The American volumes will be uniform with Lange, and, although cheaper than the English, they are identical as to matter, as they are printed from duplicate plates, but superior in binding and general appearance.

Having received this volume just as we are going to press, no critical and thorough examination of it is now possible. A cursory glance impresses us favorably with the plan of the work and its execution. We notice, also, that it rejects the mythical explanations of the Creation and Apostasy, and holds sturdily to the fall of all men in the

sin of the first man. It takes similar ground with regard to the historic verity of the deluge and other analogous subjects.

Messrs. Charles Scribner & Co. have issued, in admirable style, the first volume of Dr. Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology, which they announce in the following terms:—

"The first volume will treat of Theology proper; the second and third of Anthropology, Soteriology, and Eschatology. The department of Theology includes the Origin of the Idea of God, the Being of God, the Anti-theistic Systems of Atheism, Polytheism, Materialism, and Pantheism, the Nature of God, the Divine Attributes, the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, the Decrees of God, Creation, Providence, and Miracles; the department of Anthropology includes the Nature, Origin, and Antiquity of Man, The Fall, Sin, and kindred topics; Soteriology includes the Plan and Purpose of God in Reference to the Salvation of Man; and Eschatology includes the State of the Soul after Death, the Second Coming of Christ, the Resurrection, Judgment, End of the World, Heaven, and Hell. The plan of the author is to state and vindicate the teachings of the Bible, and to examine the antagonistic doctrines of different classes of theologians. The work, therefore, will be both didactic and argumentative."

Just at the moment of going to press and too late for critical notice, we have received the following excellent works from the Carters':—

The Parables of Our Lord. By the Rev. William Arnot.

Nature's Wonders. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D.D., Author of "Bible "Wonders," "Bible Jewels," etc.

The Rift In The Clouds. By the Author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars."

Shall We Know One Another? and other papers. By the Rev. J. C. Ryle, M.A. Third Edition.

The comparative dearth of important new publications during the last quarter, leads us to postpone our usual resumé of literary intelligence to the next number.