THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

APRIL, 1871.

No. II.

ART. I.—*The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined.* By DR. DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS. Translated from the fourth German edition by MARIAN EVANS. Two volumes. New York: Calvin Blanchard. 1860.

A New Life of Jesus. By DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS. Authorized Translation. Two volumes. London and Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate. 1865.

The Life of Jesus. By ERNEST RÉNAN, Membre de l'Institut. Translated by CHARLES EDWIN WILBOUR. New York: Carleton. 1868.

"THAT in the person and acts of Jesus no supernaturalism shall be suffered to remain," Strauss avows to be "a principal, if not the sole consideration," * with the modern sceptics. Did not Jesus, however, perform those supernatural acts which prove him to be a superhuman person? Did he not do, indeed, those very works of God which demonstrate that he is the very God as well as very man?

But says Strauss: "Such a course of events [as that of miracles] is never recognized by historical investigation, in so far

* *New Life of Jesus*, Preface, p. xii.

as it is permitted to follow its own laws. . . . It is the problem of historical investigation not merely to discover what has really taken place, but also the mode in which one thing has been caused by another. But history must renounce this latter most honorable part of her problem the moment she is ready to admit the existence of miracle, interrupting, as it does, the causation of one thing by another." *

In what sense, however, we ask, does "the existence of miracle" imply any "interrupting of the causation of one thing by another?" Only in the sense that it implies that, in addition to the finite causes, the infinite Cause may sometimes play a part in mundane matters. So if "historical investigation" should ever become confronted with a miracle, she would by no means be called upon to relinquish the effort "to discover the mode in which one thing has been caused by another." She would merely be required to relinquish the effort, as futile as it is unphilosophical, to discover the mode in which a thing which could not possibly have been caused without the immediate agency of God, can yet be made "explicable" solely "from the operation and co-operation of finite causalities."

But confining herself to that other part of her problem, which is "to discover what has really taken place," does "historical investigation" ever become confronted with a miracle? Does she find any satisfactory evidence of such a state of facts?

But says Strauss again: "If the so-called dogmatic systems unite in considering miracles impossible, the sceptical and critical systems must at least pronounce them to be . . . undemonstrable."†

Why, however, are "miracles undemonstrable?" First of all, it is asserted, because they are "events contradicting all previous experience."‡ Yet this is precisely the fact to be determined. Mr. Hume, and Dr. Strauss, and many others, have never seen a miracle. Other parties profess to have seen them in abundance. And before miracles are pronounced to be contradictory to the experience of these latter persons,

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., pp. 196, 197.

† *Id.*, Vol. I., p. 197.

‡ *Id.*, p. 199.

either their evidence to what they profess to have seen must be impeached, or what they really saw and supposed to be miracles must be otherwise accounted for.

But miracles are said to be undemonstrable, again, because they are "events demonstrably contradicting the laws of nature."* Yet such is not the case. The agencies of nature, man included, are merely not able to perform a miracle. So neither are those agencies, man excluded, competent to construct a city, or write an epic, or prove a proposition. If a man, however, does what the other finite causalities are incapable of doing, does it therefore follow that the laws of nature have been violated? Indeed, what law of nature is more fixed and certain than this very one, namely, that it always pertains to the higher powers to do, within the limits of their capacities, what to the lower is impossible? Suppose, therefore, it should be pronounced a contradiction to the laws of nature that the dead should be restored to life. All that, with a truly philosophical exactness, could be intended by the assertion, is this, namely, that it would be a contradiction to the laws of nature that all finite agencies whatever, man included, should bring the dead to life. But would it be a contradiction to the laws of nature that God should do so? So far otherwise, if God only possesses the requisite power to effect a resurrection, and employs it for that specific purpose, it is precisely as much a law of nature that *He* should raise the dead, as it is that the poet should produce a poem with the proper effort.

It is, accordingly, a hopeful sign of dawning common sense among "the critical and sceptical philosophers," that Rénan does not contend that miracles are either "*impossible*" or "*undemonstrable*," but limits himself to the position that "there has been hitherto no miracle proved."†

The question thus arises whether the miracles of Jesus, in particular, can be established by the proper proof.

In the records which we possess of the earthly career of Christ, miracles are constantly narrated of him. To deny this the effort has indeed been made, but with what success

* *New Life of Jesus*, p. 200. † *Life of Jesus*, p. 44.

Strauss shall briefly show us. For instance: "Paulus maintains," says he, "that the text does not state that Jesus walked on the water, and that the miracle is nothing but a philological mistake, since *περιπατεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης* is analogous to the expression, *στρατοπεδεύειν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης*, and signifies to walk, as the other to encamp, over the sea, *i. e.*, on the elevated sea-shore. According to the meaning of the words, taken separately, this explanation is possible. Its real applicability in this particular instance, however, must be determined by the context. Now this represents the disciples as having rowed twenty-five or thirty furlongs (John), or as being in the midst of the sea (Matt. and Mark), and then it is said that Jesus came toward the ship, and so near that he could speak to them, 'walking on the sea.' How could he do this if he remained on shore? To obviate this objection, Paulus conjectures that the disciples in that stormy night probably only skirted the shore; but the words, 'in the midst of the sea,' . . . are too decidedly opposed to such a supposition for it to be worth our further consideration. But this mode of interpretation encounters a fatal blow in the passage where Matthew says of Peter that, 'having come down from the ship, he walked upon the water,' for as it is said shortly after that Peter began 'to sink,' walking merely on the shore could not have been intended here, and, if not here, neither can it have been intended in the former instance relating to Jesus, the expressions being substantially the same.

"But if Peter, in his attempt to walk upon the water, began to sink, may we not suppose that both he and Jesus merely swam in the sea, or waded through the shallows? Both these suppositions have actually been advanced. But the act of wading must have been expressed by *περιπατεῖν τῆς θαλάσσης*, and had that of swimming been intended, one or the other of the parallel passages would certainly have substituted the precise expression for the ambiguous one. Besides, it must be alike utterly impossible to swim twenty-five to thirty furlongs in a storm, or to wade to about the middle of the sea, which certainly was beyond the shallows; a swimmer could not easily be taken for a spectre; and lastly, the prayer of

Peter for special permission to imitate Jesus, and his failure in it from want of faith, point to something supernatural." *

Indeed, had we only leisure for amusement, no richer or rarer could we desire than just to linger here, until we had seen not merely Paulus, but all his disciples and descendants, thus scourged by Strauss, with mingled argument and ridicule, from subterfuge to subterfuge, far from the presence of every scholar and logician. But rested and refreshed by what little we have witnessed, we now must address ourselves again to work.

Since, therefore, as Rénan has it, "the four narratives of the life of Jesus are unanimous in vaunting his miracles,"† how is this to be accounted for?

"In my former work," says Strauss, "I offered the idea of the Myth as the key to the miraculous narratives of the gospel. . . . It is in vain, I said, in the case of stories like that about . . . the miraculous feeding and the like, to make them conceivable as natural events; but, as it is quite as impossible to imagine things so unnatural to have really happened, all narratives of this kind must be regarded as fictitious. If it were asked how, at the time to which the appearance of our gospels is assigned, men came to invent such fictions about Jesus, I pointed above all to the expectations of the Messiah current at the time. When men, I said, —first a few persons, then a continually increasing number,— had come to see the Messiah in Jesus, they supposed that everything coincided in him which, according to the Old Testament prophecies and types, and their current interpretations, was expected of the Messiah. . . . Jesus might have uttered words of severe reproach against the desire for miracles on the part of his cotemporaries, and those words might be still living in tradition; but Moses, the first deliverer of the people, had worked miracles, therefore the last deliverer, the Messiah, and Jesus of course had been he, must likewise have worked miracles. Isaiah had prophesied that at that time, *i. e.*, the time of the Messiah, the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall hear; then will the

* *Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., pp. 558, 559. † *Life of Jesus*, p. 237.

lame man leap like a deer, and the tongue of the stammerer speak flowingly. Thus it was known in detail what sort of miracles Jesus, having been the Messiah, must have performed. And so it happened that, in the earliest church, narratives might, nay, could not fail to be, invented, without any consciousness of invention on the part of the authors of them." * "But when we thus point out that an unconscious invention of such accounts was possible far beyond the limits within which they are generally considered admissible, we do not mean to say that conscious fiction had no share at all in the evangelical formation of myths. The narratives of the fourth gospel, especially, are for the most part so methodically framed, so carried out into detail, that, if they are not historical, they can apparently only be considered as conscious and intentional fictions."†

This, therefore, is what Strauss is pleased to call his "peculiar apparatus for causing the miracles of the evangelical history to evaporate into myths."‡

Only it must not be supposed that he proposes to draw his materials for its practical application solely from the sources specified above. He proposes to draw them indeed from every quarter of the compass. If a given feature of the gospel narratives of the miracles of Christ did not originate traditionally in some Messianic type or prophecy, then it did in some doctrine, faith, or notion current with the early Christians, or if in none of these, why then in something else. Besides, when the case is very desperate, it always remains to fall back upon "the unconscious poetry of legend, such as prevails in the first three gospels," or "the more or less conscious fictions the existence of which we cannot overlook in the fourth gospel."§ And with such an "apparatus," and with such a vast variety of resources and resorts, how could the critic ever fail to cause the slightest vestige of the miracles of Christ to vanish from our view?

The problem, however, which Dr. Strauss proposes by his mythical hypothesis to solve is this, namely, how, though Jesus disclaimed performing, and was not believed to perform, mira-

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., pp. 201, 202.
† *Id.*, p. 208.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 214.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

cles while living, he yet became accredited with performing them in the traditions which arose about him after he was dead, but prior to "the time to which the appearance of our gospels is [by him] assigned."

But that Jesus disclaimed performing, and was not believed to perform, miracles while yet living, is, of course, too much for Strauss to take for granted, and so he makes the show of seeming to prove the point. "According to Mark," says he, "Jesus returned a summary answer to the demand for a sign on the part of the Pharisees, and that no sign whatever should be given to that evil and adulterous generation. In Matthew and Luke he adds: 'No sign but the sign of the prophet Jonas.' This is explained, indeed, in Matthew by the well-known reference to Jesus' three days' stay in the grave, as prefigured by the prophet's three days' stay in the belly of the whale. But this addition is wanting in Luke . . . Luke, as compared with Matthew, has preserved the more original account. [Still], according to the strict sense of the words, by the expression about the sign of Jonas, even if it is to be referred to the Resurrection, all other miracles . . . to be performed by Jesus, are refused by him." *

It so happens, however, that when the critic has thus far proceeded to his unalloyed delight, he has exhausted all the evidence even appearing to look in the direction of his dogmatic interest. He is accordingly compelled, on the reverse side of the question, forthwith to continue: "It is true, indeed, that the answer which Jesus gave to the messengers of the Baptist, appealing as he did to a series of miracles which he was performing, and to the performance of them as a sign of his Messianic commission, appears to stand in the sheerest contradiction to this refusal to perform signs and wonders." †

And from this dilemma, how does the critic propose, therefore, to extricate himself? Why, in this very simple manner. "To this detailed account," says he, "of the miracles which any one might see him perform, Jesus adds the words: 'And blessed is he who shall not be offended in me.' . . . 'How,' he means to say, 'you do not see me perform the miracles

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., pp. 362, 363. † *Ibid.*, p. 363.

which you expect from the Messiah? And yet, I am daily opening, in a spiritual sense, the eyes of the blind, the ears of the deaf, making the maim walk uprightly, and giving new life to those who are spiritually dead. He who sees of how much more worth these spiritual miracles are, will take no offence at the want of material ones.' "*

Now this is indeed a certain way of putting things, but we must not fail to scrutinize the matter somewhat more carefully. How, therefore, did the critic ever come to paraphrase the words of Christ in question as he does above? In this way: "The Baptist," he says, "had sent to ask him whether he was the promised Messiah, or whether they were to look for another, and John must have asked the question when he heard of the works, *i. e.*, the miraculous doings of Jesus. If he asked the question on receiving this information, he cannot have been offended in Jesus; he must, therefore, have disbelieved the information, or, like the Pharisees, have considered the works of Jesus to be works of the devil, but this last . . . is not to be thought of. The only point he could have been in doubt about was whether those miracles, the like of which had been performed by the prophets of the Old Testament, did also on this occasion announce only a prophet, or, lastly, and once for all, the Messiah. But this pardonable doubt could not be designated by Jesus as being offended in him. These words seem rather to have been uttered against those who were offended at his not performing the miracles expected of the Messiah, and then the miracles to which he appealed immediately before, as those which any one might see him perform, are to be understood in a spiritual sense of the moral effects of his doctrine. 'How,' he means to say," etc.

But, first of all, is it possible to suppose that "the miraculous doings of Jesus," of which John had heard in prison, and to which Jesus himself appealed on the occasion in question, in proof of his Messiahship, were not of a material, but only of a spiritual character? The critic himself shall furnish us some data, in view of which this question must be answered. "Meanwhile," he says, "however Jesus might disclaim the

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., pp. 364, 365.

performance of material miracles, it was supposed, according to the mode of thought of the period and of his cotemporaries, that miracles he must perform, whether he would or not. As soon as he was considered a prophet, . . . miraculous powers were attributed to him, and when they were attributed to him, they came, of course, into operation. From that time, wherever he showed himself, sufferers regularly crowded around him in order only to touch his garments, because they expected to be cured by doing so. And it would have been strange indeed if there had been no cases among all these in which the force of excited imagination . . . produced either actual removal, or temporary mitigation of their complaints, and this effect was ascribed to the miraculous powers of Jesus. Whether exactly such a case as that of the woman with the issue of blood was thus curable by excitement of the imagination may be doubted, but it is undeniable that in many cases the account given in the gospels may have exactly corresponded with the fact . . . Such a mode of healing by exciting the force of imagination was especially possible in the case of diseases which themselves rested half on imagination, and which were at that time the fashionable form of complaint among the Jews, possession by devils. . . . Besides the supposed demoniacal diseases, that is, diseases of the mind and nerves, those maladies which in the gospels are commonly designated as cases of paralysis, *i. e.*, lameness, contraction or distortion of particular limbs or the whole body, were most adapted to being removed, wholly or partially, temporarily or entirely, by a strong impression upon the mind." *

This much, therefore, the critic must and does concede. "The sufferers who regularly crowded around Jesus" were physically diseased. Even if the demoniacs were not possessed of devils, they were yet disordered in the "nerves" as well as "mind." Whatever may have been the precise "complaint of the woman with the bloody issue," the *symptom* of "the bloody issue" was not exactly spiritual. No more were those other "cases of paralysis, *i. e.*, lameness, contraction or distortion of particular limbs or the whole body," spiritual. Now, whether

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., pp. 365–368.

these parties were cured by those "miraculous powers" which Jesus really possessed, or only by those which they "attributed to him" in their imagination, does not matter, for the present. Certain it is that their maladies were material, not spiritual, and that they believed Jesus miraculously cured them.

It hence results that "the miraculous doings of Jesus," of which John had heard, and to which Jesus referred the messengers of John in proof of his Messiahship, were not "the moral effects of his doctrine." He did *not* mean to say: "Though you do not see me perform the miracles which you expect of the Messiah, yet I am daily opening, in a spiritual sense, the eyes of the blind, the ears of the deaf, making the maim walk uprightly, and giving new life to those who are spiritually dead." And when Dr. Strauss endeavors to put any such construction on his words, he only deserves to have it retorted upon him that perhaps a Paulus is not the only party who is "fond of lending to the hallowed personages of primitive Christian history views of the present age." * But what Jesus *did* mean to say is this: "Go and shew John again the things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up." And, surrounded as he was at the time by physical sufferers, the messengers of John had no choice but to understand him as pointing them to his material miracles in vindication of his Messianic claims and character.

But what did he mean by saying: "And blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in me?" He surely did not mean that they should be blessed who were not "offended at his not performing the miracles expected of the Messiah," for, as appears above, those were precisely the miracles which he told the messengers of John they saw and heard he *did* perform. But here was the difficulty. Though performing the proper Messianic miracles, *Jesus was not such a Messiah as the Jews expected.* At this were the Jews offended. And this it was that caused even John to doubt. About "the miraculous doings of Jesus" there could be no question. But

* *Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., p. 456.

how could he be the promised Christ, and yet so utterly disappoint all the Messianic hopes and dreams of Israel?

Besides, why did Dr. Strauss dismiss this whole question as to whether Christ disclaimed working miracles, after glancing at only the merest item of the evidence? It was well indeed for him to notice the words of Jesus about "the sign," and those also to the messengers of John. But why should he so strangely forget to notice such further words of Christ as these: "Stretch forth thy hand;" "Take up thy bed and go unto thy house;" "I will, be thou clean;" and many others? If it was all along his intention conveniently to ignore the evidence *almost en masse*, he would have immeasurably more deserved the respect of scholars had he ignored it *altogether*. For, as it is, he appears to have depended, and did depend, in making out his point, far more upon our *permitting him to suppress almost the entire evidence*, than anything beside. But this permission we cannot grant him. We must insist that he pay some specific attention to those other pertinent words of Christ which he has refused so much as to mention. Those cited above, for instance, he cannot, from his own point of view, reject because they are recorded in John, for they are recorded in the synoptic gospels; nor yet because they are peculiar to Mark or Luke, for they are reported in Matthew. Indeed, according to all the most rigid sceptical canons of "historical criticism" which he has himself invented to reduce and destroy the speeches of Jesus in the gospels, he was bound to meet and grapple with these words. From his own stand-point of determining the historic sayings of Christ in our possession, he can no more set *them* aside than he can the Sermon on the Mount, and every other word of Christ. And yet, simply because they are fatal to his dogmatic system, he does not even refer to them. A very logical and scholarly way indeed of making it out that Jesus disclaimed working miracles! Notwithstanding which manœuvre, the undeniable historical truth is that, so far from disclaiming, Christ habitually claimed to work them.

Nor, the time has now arrived to say, were the miracles which Christ professed to work, and was believed by his cotemporaries to work, only such as is possible for Dr. Strauss

to attribute to "the force of excited imagination," if he worked them. "The lepers" of which Jesus spoke to the messengers of John, for example, were scarcely "cleansed" by the action of their fancy, nor were "the dead raised up" merely by those "miraculous powers" which they mistakenly supposed Christ must have possessed because he had come to be "considered a prophet."

It hence results that Dr. Strauss invented his celebrated "apparatus for causing the miracles of the evangelical history to evaporate into myths," to do a work of the most utter supererogation. That apparatus was contrived, as was remarked above, to solve the problem how, though Jesus while living disclaimed performing, and was not believed to perform, miracles, he yet became converted into a miracle-worker by traditions arising about him after his death, but prior to the time to which the appearance of our gospels is assigned by certain sceptics. *But historically the critic had no such problem before him to solve. Christ, while living, professed to perform, and was believed to perform, not spiritual, but material, not imaginary, but actual miracles.* Posthumous traditions did not need, *or have the chance*, to foist upon him the character of a miracle-worker, because he claimed and attained that character long before he died. So it is respectfully suggested that Dr. Strauss should hereafter issue his mythical hypothesis of the miracles of Christ under its only proper title, which is: "LOVE'S LABOR LOST."

But the question still remains whether, though while living Christ professed to perform, and was believed to perform, miracles, he *did* perform them.

That he did so, it has already been seen that the evangelical narratives of his life unanimously attest. But are those records worthy our credence?

Now it is indeed true, as Strauss remarks, that "the credibility of the narratives should not be concluded from the assumed origin of the book that contains them." * To us who devoutly regard the Bible as the Word of God, the gospel evidence to the miracles of Christ is the evidence of God, and so decisive. But since the sceptical parties to this debate do not admit the

* *Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., p. 510.

Bible to be the Word of God, we must either bring them over to take common ground with us as it regards the inspiration of the gospels, or else we must go over, argumentatively, and take common ground with them, before the argument can proceed another step. The latter course is the one which we propose to take. No inspired authority shall be claimed, therefore, in the present discussion, for the gospel witness to the miracles of Christ.

On the other hand, the sceptics must not request us to go so far as to concede, as Strauss has it, that "the gospels, or even one of them, could not be taken as truly and fully historical for the simple reason that they contain supernaturalism,"* or as Rénan has it, "since they are full of miracles."† For this is most palpably and most flagrantly to beg the whole question, the very point in dispute being whether the evangelical narratives of the miracles of Christ are true or false. When Rénan, therefore, propounded "this principle of historical criticism, that a supernatural relation cannot be accepted as such," he should have limited himself to saying, that "the duty of the historian is . . . to seek what portion of truth and what portion of error it may contain."‡ And when Strauss long before promulged his canon to the same effect,§ he should have only remarked, as elsewhere, that "what immediately lies before us is a statement respecting which we have to discover whether it embody a fact or not."‖

Do the gospel narratives of the miracles of Christ, therefore, embody a fact or a fiction? Are they true or are they false?

Dr. Strauss, as it is well known, has subjected these narratives to all "the crucibles of criticism" which the inventive and prolific scholarship and genius of the modern sceptics have been able to concoct. The result is, on his part, the announcement that, "of our evangelical accounts of miracles, not one has been recorded by an eye-witness, but all on the contrary by those who had received them from the tradition of others, and who show, by the whole tendency of their writings, that they were disposed to do anything rather than to try the tradition they received by a critical test."¶

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., p. 34. † *Life of Jesus*, p. 17. ‡ *Ibid*, p. 45.
§ *Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., p. 71. ‖ *Ibid.*, p. 46. ¶ *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., p. 200.

Though perfectly familiar with every step in the process by which Dr. Strauss professes to have reached this conclusion, as it regards "our evangelical accounts of miracles," candor compels the confession that we cannot share it with him, and for reasons already given to the Christian world by a vast array of writers of the profoundest research and the most brilliant logical capacity and culture. But no matter. For the purpose of the present argument, let the conclusion in question be supposed established.

According to the supposition, therefore, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were not the eye-witnesses of the miracles of Christ which they record, but were dependent for their entire information on the subject, upon the traditional reports which they received from others. And this would matter very much indeed to Dr. Strauss if he had only succeeded above in showing that it was by these traditional reports, arising in the interval between the death of Christ and the assumed epoch at which our gospels were written, that the miracles of Christ were foisted on him. That miracles, invented and accredited to Jesus only by tradition, had merely been recorded in writing, could not, of course, render them historical. But unfortunately for this view of the case, it has already been demonstrated that, while yet living, Christ professed to perform, and was believed to perform, not spiritual, but material, not imaginary, but actual miracles. And *this* foundation of fact at least was at the basis of those traditional reports from which it is alleged the authors of our gospels received their sole information as it regards the miracles of Jesus.

But they did not subject those reports to "a critical test?" So be it. We can, however, very easily pass them through the proper "crucibles of historical criticism."

Taking, therefore, the supposed traditional reports of the miracles of Christ precisely as they stand recorded in our gospels, "what portion of truth and what portion of error do they contain?" What facts ever gave rise to those reports? In other words, with what reason did Christ profess to perform miracles, and for what cause did his cotemporaries believe that he *did* perform them?

But, driven to deal with this aspect of the question, Strauss

is silent. Not so Rénan. He—so apparently superficial, but really more deeply penetrative than Strauss—perceiving that the modern sceptics *must* grapple with this aspect of the question, attempts to do so.

Rénan, then, has not been so short-sighted, in comparison with Strauss, as even to make the effort to have Jesus converted for the first time into a miracle-worker by the posthumous traditions which arose about him. He cannot, indeed, from his point of view, say that Jesus worked miracles while living. But he does say, and must say: "We will admit, therefore, unhesitatingly, that acts which would now be considered traits of illusion or of hallucination, figured largely in the life of Jesus." * Elsewhere he speaks of the supposed miracles of Christ as being "the power of the great Founder, . . . those very acts which made men believe on him."† Not that he concedes all such acts narrated of Jesus in the evangelical records to be historical. On the other hand, "it is impossible," says he, "among the miraculous stories, the wearisome enumeration of which the gospels contain, to distinguish the miracles which have been attributed to Jesus by popular opinion, from those in which he consented to take an active part."‡ "In most cases," he alleges, "the people themselves, from the undeniable need which they feel of seeing in great men and great events something divine, create the marvelous legends afterwards."§ Besides: "Who knows whether the celebrity of Christ as an exorcist did not spread about without his knowing it? Persons who reside in the East are sometimes surprised to find themselves, after a little time, possessed of great renown as physicians, sorcerers, or discoverers of treasure, without being able to discover any satisfactory account of the facts which have given rise to these strange imaginings." ‖

All of which conceded again for the sake of argument, it still remains that there are *some* miracles of Christ narrated in the gospels "in which he consented to take an active part," and "which made men believe on him." And what of these? Why, according to M. Rénan, to the cotemporaries

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 237. † *Ibid.*, p. 231. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 232.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 45. ‖ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

of Jesus these acts were miracles, but to us moderns they are merely "traits of illusion or hallucination." Thus, as to "Mary of Magdala, according to the language of the times, possessed of seven devils," it is enough, he thinks, for us to hear that "Jesus, by his pure and gentle beauty, calmed this troubled organization."* And again of a certain feeding of the people in the desert: "thanks to their frugality, the sacred flock lived there; they naturally believed that they saw in that a miracle." †

But that to offer no other method than this of converting the miracles of Christ recorded in the gospels into mere hallucinations, is only flippant nonsense, Rénan is aware. He accordingly proposes to grapple with his problem also in a manner more worthy of a "Membre de l'Institut." And now his language is: "Observation, never once contradicted, teaches us that miracles only occur in periods and countries in which they are believed in, and before persons disposed to believe in them. No miracle was ever performed before an assembly of men capable of establishing the miraculous character of an act. Neither men of the people nor men of the world are competent for that. Great precautions, and a long habit of scientific research are requisite. In these days have we not seen nearly all men the dupes of gross prestiges or puerile illusions? Marvelous acts, attested by every inhabitant of small towns, have become, under a more severe scrutiny, acts of felony. If it is certain that no cotemporaneous miracle bears examination, is it not probable that the miracles of the past, all of which were performed in popular assemblages, would present to us, were it possible for us to criticise them in detail, their share of illusion? . . . Let a thaumaturgist present himself to-morrow with testimony sufficiently important to merit our attention; let him announce that he is able, I will suppose, to raise the dead; what would be done? A commission composed of physiologists, physicians, chemists, persons experienced in historical criticism, would be appointed. This commission would choose the corpse, make certain that death was real, designate the hall in which the

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 157. † *Ibid.*, p. 191.

experiment should be made, and regulate the whole system of precautions necessary to leave no room for doubt. If, under such circumstances, the resurrection should be performed, a probability, almost equal to certainty, would be attained. However, as an experiment ought always to be repeated, . . . the thaumaturgist would be invited to produce his marvelous act under other circumstances, upon other bodies, in another medium. If the miracle succeeds each time, . . . supernatural act do come to pass in the world. But who does not see that no miracle was ever performed under such conditions? that always hitherto the thaumaturgist has chosen the subject of the experiment, chosen the means, chosen the public?"*

To which we answer, first of all, that because certain pretended "cotemporaneous miracles" have turned out to be "gross prestiges or puerile illusions," by no means proves that those of Christ will turn out to be the same. All alleged miracles, past or present, must stand or fall by themselves, and according to their own evidences. Indeed, it will serve to put this aspect of the subject before us in the proper light to notice here some words of Strauss. "The Christian considers," says he, "the miracles of the original history of the Jews and Christians credible, but those of the Indian, Egyptian, Greek mythology as fabulous and ridiculous; the Jew acknowledges the miracles of the Old Testament, but repudiates those of the New, etc., etc. Now the Christian faith calls upon science to do the same, and not indeed to disallow the miracle altogether, but to allow it to exist within the Christian circle, and especially within that of original Christianity. Science, however, . . . will refuse, even though those who intercede with her may happen to be Jews or Christians, to be science, and especially historical investigation, in the interest of Jews, Christians, or others."†

That certain mere religionists, who have written on the Christian miracles, deserve these stinging words of Strauss, perhaps is true. It is not true, however, that any Christian of average common sense will ask of science that she become a partisan in dealing with the miracles recorded in the Bible.

* *Life of Jesus*, pp. 43–45.

† *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., p. 196.

Paul and Pythagoras, Simon Peter and Simon Magus, Elijah and Apollonius, Moses and Vespasian, Jesus and Mahomet,—all persons professing to perform miracles, ancient or modern, Gentile, Jew, or Christian,—have an equal right to come before science with their prodigies. And when they do so, science will be no partisan between them, but will judge them, one by one, solely and impartially according to the evidence which they develop before her of working, or not working, miracles.

But this present argument is concerned only with the miracles of Christ. And judged by themselves, in the light of their peculiar evidence, and without fear or favor from scientific circles, are these special miracles, miracles indeed, or mere "hallucinations?"

They were indeed performed neither before "a scientific commission," such as Rénan calls for, nor in a scientific age or country. They were "performed in popular assemblages, in periods and countries in which they were believed in, and before persons disposed to believe in them." Being "performed under such conditions," it is not impossible that they may have been "illusions." Nor is it, on the other hand, impossible that they may have been real miracles. Which were they, illusions or miracles?

Now, it is perfectly palpable that "a scientific commission" did not need originally to witness the marvelous acts of Christ to determine whether they were miracles or not. The presence or the absence of such a commission could not change the character of those acts, whatever may have been their character. That they were not performed in the presence of such a commission, therefore, amounts to nothing. But if they will not bear *inspection* by "physiologists, physicians, chemists," and the like, if they will only serve "to dupe men of the people and men of the world," that is quite another matter.

In the days of Christ, such a commission as is above suggested could not sit in judgment on his miracles, for the simple reason that the proper persons to compose it did not then and there exist. But they do exist to-day. And let M. Rénan summon them together, being as careful to see that they, every one, are true religious sceptics, as that they

all possess "great precaution and a long habit of scientific research."

Jesus announces to this selected body of modern scientific sceptics,—"that he is able, I will suppose, to raise the dead." They are, of course, incredulous. Still they go with Christ to Bethany. They, with all the "precautions necessary," arrive before a sepulchre. Within it lies a corpse. That, in this case, "death was real," cannot be doubted. For, even if Lazarus was only in a death-like swoon when he was buried in this tomb, he has been in it four days already, and must be dead in truth by this time. And yet, responsively to the command of Christ, Lazarus comes forth a living man again. Can our commission doubt that Jesus has raised the dead?

But our commission wishes to see this "experiment repeated." Jesus forthwith offers to conduct them, first, to the house of "a certain ruler," and then to the gates of "a city called Nain," where he will "reproduce his marvelous act, under other circumstances, upon other bodies, in another medium." But Rénan merely remarks to his commission that it is indeed true that "fame has already attributed to Jesus two or three events of this kind," * and then dismisses them and the whole investigation which they started out to institute into the resurrections related of Christ in the gospels.

We can but regret indeed that he disbanded his commission so soon, for, besides the resurrection narratives, we find many others of a miraculous nature recorded of Jesus in our evangelical accounts. But in the absence of said commission, perhaps we, "men of the people and men of the world," may decide what to think about the rest. For instance: We are at a wedding in Cana of Galilee with Christ. To be sure we cannot vaunt a single "chemist." Still we will need to be very much inebriated before we can fail to be certain whether Jesus has converted water into wine. Or we go homeward with an anxious father to whom Christ has said: "Go thy way; thy son liveth." On arriving at his house, though we are not "physicians," assuredly we can tell if this father's son is well or not. Or some five thousand of

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 304.

us happen to be with Jesus in a desert. Among us all we have but "five barley-loaves and two small fishes." Christ, however, with this slender store, feeds us to the full. Have we, "the sacred flock," eaten real food, or, as Rénan says above, only feasted on "frugality?" Though not men of "scientific research," we surely ought to know.

All of which has been said, of course, upon the supposition that "the miraculous stories" recorded of Jesus in the gospels are, in some general sense, historical. And, upon that supposition, it has been demonstrated, even to the satisfaction of a modern sceptical scientific commission, that the miracles of Christ were no "hallucinations," but miracles in truth.

Rénan, however, does not concede, but denies, that those "miraculous stories" are, even in a general sense, historical. He justifies himself, in part, for doing so, by presupposing that the efforts made to prove the point by certain sceptical writers who have preceded him, have been successful. "The criticism in detail," says he, "of the texts of the gospels, in particular, has been done by M. Strauss in a manner which leaves little to be desired."* But, as was seen above, M. Strauss does not himself claim that he has established anything more by such criticism than this, namely, that "of our evangelical accounts of miracles, not one has been recorded by an eye-witness, but all on the contrary by those who have received them from the tradition of others, and who show, by the whole tendency of their writings, that they were disposed to do anything rather than to try the traditions they received by a critical test." And, as it was also seen above, in the argument with Strauss, those alleged traditions of miracles performed by Christ recorded in the gospels, are possessed at least of this historical worth, that, while living, Jesus professed to perform, and was believed to perform, them. Thus far, then, "our evangelical accounts of miracles" remain within the realms of history. And who can out-Strauss Strauss as a critic of the text?

M. Rénan, however, has a method of his own for seeking to banish these accounts beyond the limits of our credence. "A

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 12.

supernatural relation," says he, by way of key-note, "always implies credulity or imposture."* And his meaning by this will appear more and more clearly as the argument advances.

This, therefore, is his scientific solution of "that something which took place at Bethany and was regarded as a resurrection." "It seems," says he, "that Lazarus was sick, and that it was indeed in consequence of a message from his alarmed sisters that Jesus left Perea. . . . Perhaps Lazarus, still pale from sickness, caused himself to be swathed in grave-clothes, as one dead, and shut up in his family tomb. . . . Martha and Mary came out to meet Jesus, and . . . conducted him to the sepulchre. The emotion which Jesus experienced at the tomb of his friend, whom he thought dead, may have been mistaken by the witnesses for that groaning, that trembling, which accompanies miracles. . . . Jesus . . . desired to see once more him whom he loved, and the stone having been removed, Lazarus came forth with his grave-clothes, and his head bound about with a napkin. This apparition must have been regarded by all as a resurrection."†

In view of which, after remarking of a certain other hypothesis of the miracle in question, that "it abases Jesus as only naturalists and mockers have abased him," even the partial Strauss must say: "The theory is not made much better by following Rénan, and taking the raising of Lazarus to have been an intrigue of the family of Bethany. . . . But Jesus, was *he* blinded by so coarse a trick? Or, still worse, was he a party to the deception?"‡

There are two parties, therefore, to be considered in this transaction, Jesus and his friends. And, first, the latter. "Wearied out," says Rénan, "by the ill-reception with which the kingdom of God met in the capital, the friends of Jesus desired a great miracle which should have a great effect upon Hiersolymite incredulity. The resurrection of a man well known in Jerusalem would be more convincing than anything else. . . . Faith knows no law but the interest of what it believes to be the truth. The end which it pursues being absolutely holy, it makes no scruple about invoking bad argu-

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 45. † *Ibid.*, pp. 304, 305.
‡ *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., p. 234.

ments, . . . when good ones do not succeed. . . . If this prodigy is not genuine, so many others have been! Thoroughly persuaded that Jesus was a worker of miracles, Lazarus and his sisters may have aided the performance of one, as so many pious men, convinced of the truth of their religion, have sought to triumph over human obstinacy by means of the weakness of which they were aware. The state of their conscience was that of the Stigmatists, the Convulsionists, the Obessed nuns." *

After which remarks we, of course, do not need to add anything by way of explaining the part played by the friends of Rénan's Jesus, in aiding him to perform that hallucinatory resurrection, of which our wild religious romancer has for the first time conceived, in this scientific nineteenth century, as having taken place in the ancient town of Bethany. But whether the historical friends of the historical Jesus were morally capable of such "an intrigue," is quite another question. Of this even Strauss above seems far more than doubtful. And well he may be, in the light of all the authentic records we have of what the first disciples of Jesus sacrificed, endured, and suffered, for the sake of righteousness and conscience.

But, the friends of Christ aside, what of Christ himself? Why, we are told, that "we must also recollect that in this impure and oppressive city of Jerusalem, Jesus was no longer himself. His conscience, by the fault of men and not by his own, had lost something of its primitive clearness."† And from this it is perfectly apparent, that M. Rénan proposes to answer the question put to him by Strauss above in the affirmative, and say that, if Jesus could not have been "blinded by so coarse a trick," as he imagines was contrived for him at Bethany, then, "still worse," he *could* have been "a party to the deception."

Only Rénan is too subtle a rhetorician to say this thing of Christ quite too baldly. He must, to save himself from the scorn of an outraged and revolting Christendom, put it in the midst of certain explanatory and apologetic pleas for Jesus, as

* *Life of Jesus*, pp. 303–306. † *Ibid.*, p. 304.

a tricky thaumaturgist. And into these pleas we will now examine briefly, not because they demand the slightest answer, but solely because, from the immense circulation and the vast influence of the volume in which they occur, they deserve exposure.

"Time," says Rénan, therefore, "has changed into something very grievous to us, that which was the power of the great Founder, and if ever the worship of Jesus grows feeble in the heart, it will be because of those very acts which made men believe on him."* "It would be departing [however], from right historical methods to listen too much in this to our repugnances, and in order to evade the objections which might be raised to the character of Jesus, to suppress facts which, in the eyes of his cotemporaries, were of the first order. . . . Must we sacrifice to this unpleasant aspect of such a life its sublime aspect? Let us beware of it."†

If Jesus was, however, such a thaumaturgist as Rénan would transform him into, how shall we manage to respect him?

In the first place, though there are no miracles of Christ recorded in the gospels in which he must not have "consented to take an active part," yet, in this age of free scientific historical invention about his life, it would not be "departing from right historical methods" too much for Rénan, did we fancy some. Let that "singular event" which, according to our critic, took place at the tomb of Lazarus, therefore, be imagined such a miracle. Christ, then, according to the supposition, would not be "a party to the deception." The whole affair would be simply "an intrigue of the family of Bethany." The worst that could be said of Jesus is that he was capable of being "blinded by so coarse a trick." So far, his moral character stands intact, though in point of intelligence we must form of him a very low opinion.

But what of Jesus as a thaumaturgist, in connection with those miracles actually narrated of him in the gospels, and in all of which he must have "consented to take an active part?"

"A thaumaturgist of our day," says Rénan, "unless of ex-

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 231. † *Ibid.*, pp. 236, 237.

treme simplicity, as has been the case with certain outcasts of Germany, is detestable, for he performs miracles without believing in them; he is a charlatan. . . . Almost all the miracles which Jesus thought he performed appear to have been miracles of healing. . . . Jesus had no idea of a rational medical science any more than his cotemporaries; he believed with all the world that cures were to be effected by religious rites. . . . Persuaded that the touch of his garments, the imposition of his hand, did good to the sick, he would have been unfeeling had he refused to the suffering an alleviation which it was in his power to accord. . . . One of the cures which he oftenest performs is exorcism. . . . The disorders . . . were very slight. A gentle word often sufficed to drive away the demon." *

From the stand-point of Rénan, therefore, Jesus, thus far, though a thaumaturgist, was no charlatan. He really believed that he cured disease and cast out devils by his miraculous powers. He did not suspect that the cures were merely psychical effects. His great misfortune was that he did not know the very alphabet of modern science.

It so happens, however, that among the cures which Jesus supposed he performed, there were such cases as that of leprosy, congenital blindness, and the like. How now the case is changed! How now can he believe he works a miracle, unless he does so? So when he essays to walk upon the sea, either he must supernaturally support his going upon the waters, or else his alleged ignorance of "a natural order governed by laws," will not prevent his sinking far enough beneath the surface quickly to discover that he must either take at once to swimming, like an ordinary mortal, or else be drowned together with his delusion that he can work the miracle attempted. And so, also, in the vast majority of the marvels recorded of him: either he must have worked the miracle, or else he could not have believed he did so; in which latter event no greater "charlatan" ever has existed.

But it is not after all the real purpose of Rénan "to evade the objections which might be raised to the character of

* *Life of Jesus*, pp. 231–235.

Jesus," if he was a tricky thaumaturgist. Indeed, he has distinctly depicted Christ above in one transaction, in which no miracle-worker could have been engaged, whose "conscience had [*not*] lost something of its primitive clearness."

Had not Jesus, however, some sufficient reason not to be overscrupulous in this matter of pretending to be a worker of signs and wonders? "It was the received opinion," says Rénan, "that the Messiah would perform many . . . Jesus had, therefore, . . . either to renounce his mission, or to become a wonder-worker."* "Had Jesus died at the period . . . [before he became a thaumaturgist], there would have been in his life no page that wounds us, but . . . the truth would not have been promulgated, and the world would not have profited by the immense moral superiority which the Father had imparted to him."†

But, we reply, if Jesus was a real miracle-worker, the truth would have then been promulgated by him, even though he were no thaumaturgist. Besides, if he were this latter character, how could the world ever be profited by his immense moral superiority? If God ever imparted it to him, he surely lost it on his turning thaumaturgist. Moreover, according to this doctrine of his becoming a trickster rather than to renounce his mission, we shall have, not a Jesus, but a Jesuit.

Perhaps, however, we have been judging Jesus according to too strict and high a moral standard. "We must recollect here," says Rénan, "that the essential condition of true criticism is to comprehend the diversity of periods, and to lay aside those instinctive repugnances which are the fruit of a purely national education."‡ "By our extreme scrupulousness in the employment of the means of conviction, by our absolute sincerity and disinterested love of the pure idea, we all, who have devoted our lives to science, have founded a new ideal of morality."§

Now it is but charitable to suppose that, during his early studies for the Romish priesthood, M. Rénan may have been taught that Jesus was indeed a Jesuit—the very founder, in fact, of that double-dealing brotherhood. And, upon this

* *Life of Jesus*, p. 230.
† *Ibid.*, p. 116.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 303.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

hypothesis, when he forsook his hopes of holy orders, and devoted himself to science, it was not unnatural that the "new ideal of morality" with which he then for the first time became acquainted, seemed to him to be of a scientific origin. But by this time he ought to know that not science, but Jesus, created this ideal. And judged, therefore, by his own moral standard, if Jesus was a Jesuit in practice as it regards his thaumaturgy, we can only detest him. The moral and religious teaching of Jesus, indeed, can still compel respect, but his moral and religious character can only compel our scorn.

Such, therefore, by way of specimen, are some of the explanatory and apologetic pleas for Jesus, as a thaumaturgist, with "the wearisome enumeration" of which M. Rénan's work is filled. They only need to be divested, however, of his charming rhetoric, and even superficially exposed, to show how despicable that Christ must be in whose behalf such pleas are requisite.

Still, they are only offered by M. Rénan to assist us in laying aside our modern scientific "repugnances" to supposing Jesus was a thaumaturgist, either of so low an intellectual order that he could have been blinded by his intriguing friends into believing he really worked the miracles which they merely foisted on him, or else so debased in point of morals that he could play a conscious part in their deceptions.

But, historically, Jesus either was such a thaumaturgist, or he was not. If he was, despite our scientific "repugnances," let us know the truth. But was he? Quietly to assume that he was, M. Rénan, despite his "extreme scrupulousness in the employment of the means of conviction," does not hesitate. It would have been, perhaps, not unbecoming a devotee of science to make some historical effort to prove so grave a charge against alike the mental and the moral character of Christ. Yet Rénan does not make it. So subtle a writer knew his dogmatic interest far too well for that. Had he done so, even Strauss would have been against him, as long before he was against so many others. Thus, says he: "How, if Jesus were conscious that the youth was alive when he met him, could he, with a good conscience, receive the praise which . . . the multitude lavished on him . . . on account of the deed? Ac-

cording to Paulus, he was himself uncertain how he ought to regard the result, but if he was not convinced that he ought to ascribe the result to himself, it was his duty to disclaim all praise on account of it, and if he omitted to do this, his conduct places him in an equivocal light, in which he by no means appears in the other evangelical narratives, so far as they are fairly interpreted." * Again: "This view of the matter would place the character, and even the understanding of Jesus, in the most equivocal light. . . . We cannot ascribe such conduct to him, because it would be in direct contradiction to his general conduct, and the impression which he left on his cotemporaries."† Once more: "We can as little here, as in a former case, impute to Jesus the foolish presumption of giving, before he saw the alleged corpse, the positive assurance that he yet lived."‡ Or thus: "He [Baur] knew as well as any one that with a personality of such immeasurable historical effect as that of Jesus evidently was, there cannot be a question of adaptation, or playing a part; . . . that with such a personality every item must have been conviction."§ Without drawing any farther, therefore, upon the testimony of the hostile Strauss, as might be done almost *ad libitum*, certain it is that the historical Jesus was not either, intellectually, devoid of common sense, or, morally, capable of being a shameless thaumaturgic trickster. And yet, upon the sheer assumption, as base as it is baseless, that he was so, and upon that only, is it that the hypothesis of Rénan for resolving his alleged miracles into mere "hallucinations" ultimately has the slightest basis. That is to say, the final, if not the primary and only reason, why Rénan would summon his scientific commission together and have them sit in judgment on the miracles of Christ, with all the precautions requisite, is precisely this, namely, to determine either how the intriguing friends of Christ imposed their tricks upon him, or in what manner Jesus can himself be detected in playing his deceptive part in the marvelous thaumaturgy. Once obliged to face, before the world of scholars, the historical truth that Jesus was possessed at least of common sense and common honesty, Rénan's hal-

* *Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., p. 534.
† *Id.*, pp. 519, 520.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 536.
§ *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. I., p. 312.

lucinatory solution of his miracles is obliged either to flee and hide itself away, or else to abide the scorn and execration which alone it merits.

And of this feature of Rénan's Life of Jesus, Strauss, of course, is well aware. Yet, says he: "It has its faults, but only one fundamental error. . . . Whatever may seem to us [German sceptics] as faults, are partly what, in its native country, will be esteemed as merits contributing to its circulation, while, on the contrary, several peculiarities by which the author of the present work hopes to earn the approbation of his countrymen will, on the other side of the Rhine, cause displeasure, or weariness. I joyfully hailed the work of Rénan, on its first appearance; . . . on closer acquaintance I accept it respectfully, and though by no means tempted by its example to alter my own plan, I may say that all I wish is to have written a book as suitable for Germany as Rénan's is for France."*

The "only one fundamental error" of the work of Rénan in the eyes of Strauss is, that "he proscribes the discourses of the fourth gospel as incompatible with an intelligible history, yet ascribes to the narratives of that gospel a higher credibility than to those of the others."† The feature of the work above referred to does not impress his German ally and admirer as worthy of specific mention among its faults. He seems rather to regard it as being among those very merits of the volume contributing to its circulation in its native country. From which we plainly perceive how desperately resolved the modern sceptics are that, by reason of one resort or another, "in the person and acts of Jesus no supernaturalism shall be *suffered* to remain." Strauss for the Germans, and Rénan for the French! If the one fails to prove that the miracles of Christ were mythically manufactured for him by the traditions which arose about him after he was dead; if the one (so soon as not permitted merely to *seem* to notice the evidence which in truth he only *shuns*), must then concede that Jesus, while living, professed to perform and was believed to perform such grievous acts as miracles;—what reason to despair? Does it not still remain for the other

* *New Life of Jesus*, Preface, p. xviii.

† *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 43. Comp. p. 140.

to proclaim that all such "acts would now be considered traits of illusion or of hallucination?" To be sure, to say this latter thing amounts to nothing, for the modern sceptics, unless they either can prove that Jesus was intellectually capable of being blinded into believing that he really worked a miracle, when he but performed in fact a thaumaturgic trick contrived for him by his disciples, or else can make it out that Jesus himself was morally capable of playing a conscious part along with his adoring friends in common feats of jugglery. To be sure, also, Strauss himself must insist that all we credibly know of Christ is precisely to the reverse of either supposition. And this was known by Rénan quite as well as Strauss. But, no matter. Those hated miracles of Christ must somehow fall. What cannot be done in the light of history, can at least be attempted in the face of history. If the world cannot be convinced, it often is deceived.

This, therefore, is the whole key-note to Rénan's Life of Jesus. Distinctly perceiving, in view of all the preceding sceptical efforts, and chiefly those of Strauss, to get rid of the supernatural person and acts of Jesus, that the undertaking never could be accomplished, except in sheer defiance alike of proof and logic, he proposed to solve the problem after quite another fashion. Since proof and logic *must* fail us, he said, I will see what can be done through the force of the requisite assumptions, supported and rendered deceptive by all the artful arts of the skilful rhetorician.

Of great genius, but no conscience; profoundly penetrative, but perfectly unscrupulous; of immense information, always accurately, or inaccurately, employed to suit his purpose; at once a master and a study for the very Jesuit in every illusive use of language; having never the least compunction about the means and the methods by which he can produce conviction;—for these leading reasons, this Rénan that we speak of was pre-eminently adapted to produce such a life of Jesus in the interests of modern scepticism as he coolly had concocted.

His work in due time was given to the world. All were startled, many were captivated, and some were converted by it to the sceptical faith. Not having been thus far adequately

exposed before the common people,—however clearly certain scholars comprehend its real character,—it still continues to have its day. And simply because this literary venture could help along the sceptics in its way, and for a season, the veteran Strauss comes rushing to the Rhine with cordial greetings for "its gifted author."

But suppose any volume whatever had been published in modern times, which undertook *to support* the supernatural person and acts of Jesus after such a fashion as Rénan has adopted *to destroy* them? Strauss does not need informing that he would have been among the very first to burn it up forever with mingled argument and scorn. When it comes to dealing with Rénan, however,—how could he but embrace his brilliant and subtle ally?

We thank Strauss for this very affectionate, but most unguarded demonstration with Rénan at the Rhine. It lets us into a secret of the leading modern sceptics well worth our knowing and recording. If they cannot expel the superhuman Jesus from the faith of men by fair means, they will resort to foul.

But, *disciples* of these sceptics, what of you? Do not let your hostility of heart to the superhuman Jesus, suppress your moral instincts and pervert your honest judgment. Morally, intellectually, ought *you* to deal with Rénan, as the shameless Strauss has done? For in this warfare which we wage, his Life of Jesus is not a legal man-of-war, but a common pirate. According to every sacred compact between the scholar and the scholar, you ought to join the very orthodox, and hunt this bold and base marauder forever from the seas, and never permit another like him to help along your cause. Broadside for broadside, we, the evangelical party, will meet and try our fortune with every commissioned vessel in your navy, and never cry for quarter. But you ought yourselves to sink your Rénan to the bottom. Not that we ask in this your service because we need it, but that you ought in this to manifest your self-respect and honor.

Finally. "Jesus," says Strauss, "cannot, as the evangelists report, have rebuked the wind and the sea, unless he was either conscious of unconditional power over nature, or a miserable

braggart and impostor."* Again: "If, according to Matthew, Jesus said to the captain: 'Go thy way, and as thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee,' . . . he must either have been . . . a performer of miracles in the sense of the most decided supernaturalism, or, if he attributed to himself such miraculous power as this without any good ground, he was a wild enthusiast; while, if he ascribed it to himself with the consciousness that he did not really possess it, he was an audacious cheat and impostor. . . . No one but either an impostor, who was as inconsiderate as he was shameless, or a man who was conscious that he could put an end to illness, would declare that a sick person at a distance, represented as dying, would not die."†

But was Jesus either a braggart, or an impostor, or an enthusiast, or a cheat, or a charlatan? Strauss no more would hear of this than would the most devout believers in the miracles of Christ. Indeed, the unquestionable historical truth that Jesus was precisely to the reverse of such a character, in either of its phases,—this is the most fatal weapon which he ever uses against the school of Paulus, nor is there any other more often in his hands. This is the sword, in fact, with which he most delights to deal the final blow, with whatever foe he gets the chance to thrust it through and through the heart.

Is it not possible, however, for Strauss to say that the words of Jesus which he specifies above, and all the kindred ones recorded in the gospels, are not historical? To deny all things in history subversive of a private speculation is not indeed impossible to the scientific sceptics of this enlightened age. Still, before that Strauss can *prove* these special words of Jesus not historical, he must assign some further reason to the scholar than the simple one that they are fatal to his personal opinions about the miracles of Christ. *He must get rid of them, if at all, according to some impartial canons of historical criticism applied with fairness to the gospels.* And if he rejects those canons in vogue among the orthodox, he must accept those in vogue among the sceptics,—*at least, his own.*

* *New Life of Jesus*, Vol. II., p. 242. † *Ibid.*, p. 203.

But here again he finds himself precisely in the same dilemma that he was fastened in above. He cannot pronounce these words of Jesus unhistorical because they are peculiar to John, for they are recorded in the synoptical gospels; nor yet because they are peculiar to Mark or Luke, for Matthew is their voucher. *The only possible way for him to get rid of these fatal words of Jesus is to concoct some still more historically destructive canons of historical criticism for the gospels than he has already concocted. But that would be tantamount to undertaking to demonstrate the proposition that every word of Christ in our possession, without exception, is a simple fiction. When he undertakes that, all students will merely overwhelm him with ridicule. But until he does undertake that, he has no alternative left him but to confess that, according to his own published criteria for determining what are the historical words of Christ in our possession, the special words of Christ in question undoubtedly are historical.*

It hence results that, according to his own showing above, M. Strauss has again no alternative left him as a scholar and logician, but to come out and say that the historical Jesus was undoubtedly a person, "conscious of unconditional power over nature;—a performer of miracles in the sense of the most decided supernaturalism." And when Strauss has thus been compelled, on his own grounds and with his own weapons, to make this concession, what other sceptic will care to dispute this question further with us who hold to Jesus as the God-man?

It would indeed still be pertinent to inquire whether Christ performed miracles by his own personal, or only by a delegated power. But this is an aspect of the subject with which Strauss and Rénan refuse specifically to grapple. In this they show their prudence. For after it has been proved that Jesus worked a miracle at all, there is no stopping then, this side of his being the God-man. He was not empowered of God to work his miracles, as any man might be. He not merely worked them for himself, but also empowered his disciples to work them in his name, as God alone could do. Knowing this to be the only position supported by the evidence, our critics both agree, as a specific topic of debate, to pass this point in silence.

That is to say, it is only the Jesus of a speculative scepticism who is a purely human being. The Jesus of history is the very God, as well as very man. And this latter is the Jesus whom we will trust and love and serve and worship forever and forever, as our most adorable, because divine, Redeemer.

Art. II.—*The Life and Times of David Zeisberger, the Western Pioneer and Apostle of the Indians.* By Edmund de Schweinitz. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1870. pp. 747.

The author of this sumptuous volume, whose name stands on the title in true Moravian simplicity, is a bishop of that church, resident in its ancient settlement in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The work itself has unusual attractions from its value as a contribution to the history of Christian Missions among the Indians in this country, it may be said from 1549 to 1870; from its fascinating delineations of the habits and characteristics of our aborigines; from its details of the life of the remarkable man who is the subject of the biography; from the exciting and impressive exemplifications given of the spiritual and humanizing power of true faith in the Son of God, and its triumphs under persecution; and from the style in which the whole narrative is written, which, in our opinion, for beauty and even eloquence, as well as clearness, aside from the other merits of the production and the pre-eminence of its theme above all merely civil history, entitles the name of its author to rank with those of Prescott, Motley, and Bancroft. There is everything in the mechanical construction of the book to aid in the advantage and gratification of its perusal. Everything about it evinces care and completeness. There has been no hurry to get it into the market, and taste has not been sacrificed to economy; the paper and printing could not be better, and we have read faster than we supposed if there is one typographical slip in the seven hundred and fifty pages

worth calling an *erratum*. Of course, such a work is not without a copious index, but it has also a "geographical glossary" of great convenience for reference, as it furnishes an alphabetical list of the numerous places named in the forty-eight chapters, with their topography.

The name of Zeisberger had become known in Christian history through the works of Loskiel and Heckewelder; but Bishop Schweinitz has based his work on a large amount of original materials preserved in the archives of the Moravian church at Bethlehem, Litiz, Philadelphia, and the Ohio Gnadenhutten. These valuable repositories include copious manuscript journals and correspondence of the missionary himself, his own unpublished history of the Indians, diaries kept at the mission stations, besides collections of his manuscripts deposited in the libraries of the American Philosophical Society at Philadelphia, and of Harvard University.

It would be enough to justify the production, and mark the permanent value, of such a history as this, if no more could be said in reference to it than this one sentence—it gives the life and times of a man whose designation in 1744, when an inmate of the "Brethren's House" of Bethlehem, was *destinirter Heidenbote* (destined to be a messenger to the heathen), and who, from that date till his death in 1808, was fulfilling that destiny; sixty-two years of the period being passed in actual residence with the race to whose reclamation and conversion he had wholly devoted himself.

Zeisberger was born in a village of Moravia in 1721, and by descent belonged to the church of the Bohemian Brethren, whose evangelical status, as the followers of Huss, anticipated the Reformation by more than half a century. His parents came to Georgia in 1736, with a small number of other refugees from Romish oppression. David was left to finish his education at Herrnhut, but in a few years joined his family in America, and was one of the company that at the breaking out of the English-Spanish war, in 1739, took their way northward; so that he was among the founders of Bethlehem, on the Lehigh, in 1741.

"I long to be truly converted to God, and to serve Him in this country," was the young man's profession to Bishop

Nitschmann, on the deck of the vessel, at the very moment of sailing for Europe in unwilling obedience to an appointment by the elders as one of the escort of Count Zinzendorf. With the consent of his superior he hurried ashore and returned to Bethlehem. Soon afterwards he experienced the great spiritual change he desired.

"One day the young men of the community reverently united in singing at their dinner-table, in the way of grace, a German hymn treating of the love of Christ. Its words pierced his heart like a two-edged sword. He burst into tears, left the table, and spent the whole afternoon in weeping and praying, until he found the peace of God which passeth all understanding. In the holy fire of his first love he resolved to devote his life to the spread of the Gospel among the aborigines of his adopted country, and immediately made known this determination to the elders of the church."

We have given a synopsis of the first chapter of the life. In the second we have an interesting record of the condition of the Indians, to whom Zeisberger gave his principal labors, as it was at the beginning of the earliest European settlements. The third chapter gives a picture of New York and Pennsylvania as they appeared when he began his mission in those colonies, with particular reference, of course, to the position of the Indian tribes. Then follows another most instructive and entertaining sketch, embracing a condensed view of the civil and religious state of the Delawares and Iroquois, who are to occupy so prominent a place in the subsequent biography. Every page is so full of novel interest and happy composition, that we are not impatient at the delayed introduction of the hero himself; and for the same reason, besides the more intelligent preparation for appreciating his work, we welcome the fifth chapter, which is given to an outline of the missionary operations among the Indians previous to the times of Zeisberger, embracing no less a space than 1549–1745. The first of these years is the date of the landing of a Dominican friar in Florida, who almost immediately met his death at the hands of the savages he had gone to evangelize. The Jesuits began their courageous and zealous work in Canada in 1611, and from 1634 to 1647 not fewer than forty-two fathers and eighteen helpers traversed the territory of the natives in the vicinity

of the frontier lakes. If cruelties sometimes drove them to the forests to save their lives, they left their testimony along their paths, by writing the name of Jesus, and carving the figure of the cross, on the bark of trees. The tortures of their own Inquisitions at home were visited upon some of these martyrs by the savages; they were cut, scorched, scalded, cased in burning pine with rosin and consumed with slow fire; but the fiercer the barbarians proved themselves, the more clearly (such was the missionary argument) it became the duty of Christians to seek their conversion. After the English conquest of Canada, however, most of the Romish missions were given up.

In 1649, at the instance of the clergy of New England, a society was organized for the advancement of civilization and religion among the tribes in that part of the country, and John Eliot, the translator of the Bible, labored for forty-four years in the great work. He was followed by other Protestant evangelists. The name of David Brainerd arose in this connexion in Massachusetts and New Jersey, half a century later.

The first Moravian missionary to the Indians was Christian Henry Rauch. He baptized the three earliest converts at Oley, Berks county, Pennsylvania, in 1742, by their new names of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. They were members of the first Moravian mission church, organized in the same year with ten members, in Dutchess county, New York. But we must pass over page after page of episodes of the most absorbing incidents, related in the very best manner of an accomplished writer, to reach the principal character.

Zeisberger left his training-school in the Brethren's House of Bethlehem, in 1745, for his first visit to the Indian country. He proceeded to the Mohawk valley, New York, with a view of perfecting his knowledge of the language of those nations. But his studies were abruptly checked by orders from Albany for his arrest, and his conveyance thence as a prisoner to New York, where he was examined before Governor Clinton and his council on an absurd suspicion of being in the service of France against the British government. He studied Mohawk in jail, and upon his release returned to Bethlehem,

having learned a lesson, more important than language for the life of a missionary. It was a trifling but significant beginning of the reproaches and sufferings he should have to experience for the sake of Christ and the heathen.

One of the strangest features of this Life and Times in the middle of the last century, is the contrast between the state of the country then, and as we know it in its present population, means of intercommunication, and culture of every sort. To read of some of the richest counties of New York and Pennsylvania as they were when traversed by the Indian missionaries, must present an almost incredible picture to the minds of the present generation. From Bethlehem to Albany was a greater journey than now from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and when Zeisberger, on his escape from the perils of a charge of treason, set out with Bishop Spangenberg on missionary business for the Iroquois confederacy in Onondaga county, New York—the county of Syracuse—the *vicinity* (as we now go) of Utica, Auburn, Oswego—the itineracy is like this: May 24, on horseback to Tulpehocken; a week at Shamokin (Sunbury, Pennsylvania), preaching to Indians; June 7, took the *trail* for Onondaga; first night at Warrior's Camp, so named on the spot, because two Iroquois joined them at their fire; "plunged into a fearful wilderness" in Lycoming county, the ground for miles a morass, forests impenetrable to the sun; 10th, bivouacked at a salt-lick; 11th to 17th, through Tompkins, Cayuga, and Onondaga counties, over wild wastes, with but one place of habitation—a Mohican village—to their destination. On the return-journey to Bethlehem, they nearly perished by the way from want of food and shelter, and even the Indians in their company gave up effort as useless.

We next find Zeisberger (1748) at Shamokin, on the principal trail to the South, and "one of the most formidable strongholds of Paganism in the land." He was fluent in the Mohawk, and here began to prepare an Iroquois dictionary. He explored afoot the two branches of the Susquehanna in search of wigwams and villages, and reported to the Mission Board at Bethlehem. When Bishop (also Baron) de Watteville and Bishop Cammerhoff undertook a tour, after the

apostolic fashion of Moravian prelates, to seek for souls for Christ's fold, Zeisberger accompanied the party as interpreter, and passed through the unopened coal-regions of the Lehigh to Wyoming, where they found some Nanticokes; and the Lord's Supper was then observed for the first time in that beautiful valley. Thence the Christian company proceeded to Shamokin, and the sachem, who had years before heard the gospel from Zinzendorf, was so touched by the repetition of the good tidings to his soul, that he afterwards travelled to Bethlehem to hear more of Christ, and there made a profession of his faith in Him.

In 1749 Zeisberger received full ordination to the ministry, and made Shamokin his headquarters. But he was called away by a more important event, the reopening of Onondaga, with the consent of the Six Nations, for the establishment of a mission among them. He set out with Bishop Cammerhoff, in the primitive simplicity of the first apostles, on a journey which counted more than sixteen hundred miles, before they brought their report to Bethlehem. In a canoe, with a Cayuga chief for guide, they ascended, for ten days, the Susquehanna to the present boundary of New York, stopping at night and making a bark-hut to sleep in, living on game, and occasionally meeting a convert, or having an opportunity to speak a gospel-word to unbelievers, who had, however, heard of them enough to recognize their errand. Taking to horseback, what were then the swamps of the present fertile Tompkins county gave the missionaries four days' hard riding before they reached Lake Cayuga, and some days more, by Lake Skaneateles, to Onondaga. The members of the native council were too besotted by drink to attend to business, and, to give them time for recovery, the missionaries made a détour to the tribes bordering on Lakes Seneca and Canandaigua. The adventures of these journeys are too numerous to quote. The scenes disclosed are so peculiar, so romantic, so different from anything in civilized communities, or from what is to be met with in the Indians of our own day —whose aboriginal habits are more or less qualified by their association with the whites—that we can only recommend these narratives in full to all who like to find a book combin-

ing the richest entertainment with instructive information. Not the least impressive quality of the scenes through which we are carried by the descriptive talent of the author is that presented by the holy, devout, single-minded, philanthropic character of the Christian ministers and their converts, when placed by the side of those who were yet in the bondage of Satan, and whose violence, inhumanity, and debasement, moral, social, and religious, can be characterized by no softer term than infernal. On the one hand we see exemplified the Saviour's words, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free;" on the other, "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth." Not that we would insinuate that the Indian, without the fear of God, is worse than men of other races, or that he is wholly destitute of good traits; but we speak of the peculiarly strong light in which natural depravity and the gift which is by grace are beheld when both come together, as they do so frequently in this volume, on the same page.

In 1751, after some months' absence in Europe, on an errand to represent the interests of the American branch of the church at Herrnhut, the indefatigable traveller visited several of the stations in Pennsylvania, and found them prosperous in the industry of the people and in the increase of conversions. Savages who heard the good words of preaching and witnessed the happy devotions of their brethren after the flesh, would carry the tidings to their distant homes, and prepare the way for the entrance of the gospel among themselves. Mention is made of a Shawanee who travelled three hundred miles, from the Ohio to Gnadenhutten, to learn more of Christianity and its regeneration. In 1751 Zeisberger was gratified in being sent again to Onondaga, having become better assured of a good reception by the fact that the Iroquois had adopted him as a brother in the nation. His journey this time was by sloop from New York to Albany, and on foot with a packhorse the rest of the way. But he could not get a basis for his mission. The introduction of strong drink was the source of such debaucheries and riotings that the voice of purity and peace could gain no attention. He visited the

Indian stations in other parts of New York and New England, where his presence must have been animating to his brethren in the great mission. We cannot pretend to follow him in all his journeys. The book in this respect, as well as in others, resembles the Acts of the Apostles, where the first missionaries to the Gentiles are always in motion, collecting new churches, visiting older ones to "see how they do," and considering it a good part of their work to confirm the faith and urge the zeal of acknowledged disciples. The French and English wars, when the name of Washington comes in; the growing disaffection of the Colonies to the mother-country and among themselves, brought new complications into the political relations of the Indians, in which the Christian converts and their peaceful principles were involved. Then came Braddock's defeat, and wars between the savage tribes and their massacres of white communities, and then the slaughter and burning of ten Christian converts at Gnadenhutten on the Mahony, which Zeisberger escaped by being providentially detained for several hours by a militia company, on suspicion, as he was making his way to the spot. From 1756 to 1761 he was busy in missions to various settlements, including some in North Carolina; attending to treaties for the tribes with the colonies; holding conferences for the adjustment of difficulties arising from the wars; resting fifteen months at Litiz, in the capacity of Superintendent of the Brethren's House; writing an Iroquois grammar, and finishing an Iroquois-German dictionary. Through the two years (1762–3), after the close of the French and Indian war, he was busy in taking advantage of the new openings for his more congenial work of preaching, and some remarkable awakenings and conversions attended it.

Bishop Schweinitz's chapter on the Pontiac War and the Paxton Insurrection, with the scenes that accompanied the carrying of Christian Indians to Philadelphia for protection, and their removal from place to place to defend them from city mobs and riotous white men, more savage than those they hunted for their destruction, is the most concise, impartial, and graphic we have ever read of those disgraceful incidents in Pennsylvania history. The missionary and friend of the

oppressed people was, of course, conspicuous and fearless in their cause. Scarcely one half of them survived the sixteen months' sojourn in Philadelphia. They were not permitted to re-occupy their former flourishing home at Nain, though but two miles from Bethlehem, and Zeisberger led them to a new locality in Bradford county, on the Susquehanna, near the present Wyalusing. It was a five-weeks' journey of terrible distress and peril. The new town (Friedenshutten) was rapidly built, plantations staked off, comforts abounded, songs to the Divine goodness were heard everywhere, and before the year ended a great revival of religion had taken place, a number of wild Indians, from various tribes, heard the word, witnessed its effects, carried home the blessing in their own souls, and rehearsed the truth to their people. "This feature of the mission," remarks the biographer—and it applies to all gospel-work—" is apt to be overlooked. Statistical tables are counted the law of success. But however correct this may in general be, success was conditioned, in the case of the aborigines of our country, not alone by the number actually added to the church through baptism. The impression made upon individuals who never built themselves lodges in Christian villages; the impulse which visiting warriors received to aims higher and holier than those of barbarism; above all, the ray of light from the Cross streaming into their souls as they sat in some forest-sanctuary, or stood in the shade of a tree beneath which a travelling missionary had stopped to proclaim Christ—a light, perhaps, never quenched, but, intensified through the Spirit of God, showing grace, forgiveness, and heaven—this, too, must be taken into account. Many a death-bed, at which no evangelist ever prayed, may thus have been cheered by the presence of the Christian's hope; many a wigwam, never visited by a messenger of peace, may thus have become a home of peace."

Zeisberger now made his sixth and last visit to Onondaga. The Moravians were succeeded in their ministry of the Six Nations by the "Connecticut Correspondents of the Society in Scotland." In 1776 began the forty years' missionary work, among the Oneidas, of Samuel Kirkland (father of President Kirkland, of Harvard), who had just graduated at Princeton.

The United Brethren now turned their attention more exclusively to the Delawares (the Lenni-Lenape) and western tribes; and we find the subject of our sketch taking another long walk through a roadless stretch of country to the headwaters of the Alleghany, in Potter county—being probably the first white man who penetrated those forests of Northwestern Pennsylvania. His journey terminated at three straggling villages on the river, in Venango county, at which, as at other places on his route, occurred some of those drama-like scenes which abounded in his life. "Never yet," he wrote, "did I see so clearly depicted in the faces of Indians both the darkness of hell and the world-subduing power of the gospel." The meeting to which this remark has reference has been made the subject of a large painting by Schuessele, of Philadelphia, and of an engraving by Sartain. Zeisberger took three families from another of his stations, and with them formed a Christian colony—the first Protestant mission beyond the Alleghanies. Seven huts, inhabited by six families, soon encircled the mission-house. The remoteness and wildness of this station may be estimated by the fact that in 1769 the hunters returned from their autumnal chase with the peltries of more than two thousand deer. This missionary's journal has become historically valuable as well as amusing, from the fidelity with which he recorded the hunting, military, sanitary, religious, and all other customs of those times, as they came under his observation in flitting from place to place. His biographer has skilfully reduced the details into more legible compass and more polished form. Among the incidental items in Zeisberger's manuscripts to which the lapse of a century has given increased interest, is the statement that in the immediate vicinity of his Venango settlement he had seen three kinds of oil-springs, and that the Indians purified the natural oil by boiling, and used it inwardly and outwardly as medicine. "It can also be used in lamps; it burns well." Anthracite and petroleum were practically as hidden from the eyes of those who were at that time capable of turning them to account, had they known them, as were the railway and the steam-power.

As Zeisberger administered the first Protestant sacraments

in the valley of the Alleghany, so he preached the first Protestant sermon in Ohio (Tuscarawas county) in 1771. Its subject was the corruption of human nature and the efficacy of the one atonement. Here he founded the new town of Schonbrunn, and the first church-bell of Ohio sounded from its congregation-house, as the Moravians well named their places of religious assembly. The first white child born in Ohio (July 4, 1773) was the son of a missionary, and received baptism from Zeisberger. His Ohio mission, at this time, had representatives from nine tribes, and in one month twenty converts were baptized. More than one of the native head-men were led to join the church, on the same impulse as that which was expressed by the Delaware chief who brought his family from the Susquehanna and built himself a house in Schonbrunn: "We have no greater wish on earth than to become Christians." One of the most striking and beautiful passages in the Life is the account of the first use which the missionary-pioneer made of his own translation of the Easter Morning Litany of his church, which embodies the Moravian Confession of Faith, and is used annually at that festival, and, when practicable, in the nearest association with the "very early in the morning" of the resurrection, by assembling in the consecrated burial-ground. "When it was yet dark" the church-bell called the Indians to their humble sanctuary, whence they went in procession to the cemetery. Zeisberger read the minister's part in the native language, and the congregation sang or spoke the responses, including a repetition of the Lord's Prayer, and a sweet-toned hymn. "Loud and full of joy, ringing far over the plateau and into the depths of the forest, rose the final amen." Bishop Schweinitz has made his description of the service more effective and affecting by printing the vernacular Delaware with the English version.

The year 1774 brought new wars, precipitated by the rupture between Virginia and Pennsylvania, caused by the ambitious projects of Lord Dunmore, the Governor of the former colony. The exigencies of Zeisberger's people, which arose from this event, bring on the historical stage one of its greatest Christian heroes. White Eyes was a Miami chief

and the leading warrior of that tribe. A tour in the colonies from New York to New Orleans had the effect of producing an enthusiastic purpose of elevating his countrymen to the state of civilization which he had witnessed, and he was ready to welcome the Christian teachers as his auxiliaries. When the Dunmore trouble arose, White Eyes was no longer the fierce warrior, but took the side of pacification and neutrality. He had evinced, before this, a leaning to Christianity. "Brother," said a convert, himself but recently an eminent warrior and orator in his nation, "you remember our ancient friendship. We agreed to tell each other if either of us should discover the true way to happiness, so that both of us might walk therein. I wish to redeem that promise. I wish to testify to you that I have found this way, and that I am following it up. It is the Word of God. This leads to salvation and life eternal. Come, go with me; share my happiness." White Eyes answered, with tears, that he often thought of becoming a Christian. He proved his sincerity in ways which in an Indian chief surpass common examples. He returned from his successful interview with Dunmore for conciliation, and made a noble speech to a council of his people, called by him to receive his report. Alluding to an angry exclamation he had heard on the way, that "the Delawares would not in all eternity accept the Gospel," he told them, "we will never be happy until we are Christians. This, I say, was the real object which I pursued all summer. I rejoiced in it, for it is good; and because I rejoiced in it, no trouble was too great for me, no hardships were too severe. But now scarcely is peace concluded and our country delivered from danger, before I come back to my own fire. I hear that my people will not in all eternity accept the Word of God. This grieves me. All my trouble, anxiety, and labor have been in vain!" "A big sob," continues the writer, "shook the speaker's frame. He could say no more, but wept aloud. The Christian deputies wept with him. Strange sight! A national assembly of the Delawares awed into painful silence by the praises of the Gospel from a heathen's mouth; and he, the hero of the Lenni-Lenape, a man of war and blood, shedding tears of penitence before them all; and a band of their great

men, baptized, and now men of God, mingling their tears with his. It was an epoch in Delaware history."

White Eyes declared he would renounce his connexion with the tribe, of which he was the right-arm, if they would not disavow the impious sentiment he quoted, and grant full religious liberty to the Christian Indians and naturalize them and their evangelical teachers as part of the Delaware nation. He entered into Zeisberger's plan of forming a Christian State in the midst of the Indian domain as a centre of civilization and religion, and gaining the recognition of it on every hand, just as the Israelites among the heathen claimed to be the people of God. He was anxious to go to England and lay the matter before the king in person, and secure, if possible, the realization of the scheme by royal authority. But the unsettled state of colonial affairs prevented the chief's design. Afterwards he petitioned Congress to send a minister and teacher to his people, and mechanics to instruct them in trades; but as ministers of another church than the Moravian were supposed to be in view, if the petition were successful, those already on the ground declined to encourage the application. White Eyes died at Tuscarawas in 1778, and our author's opinion is that "no unbaptized native" (for it seems he never was formally admitted to the church) "of any tribe or name, did so much for the mission and the gospel." It should be noted here that the grand council of the Delawares fully adopted the suggestions of White Eyes and Zeisberger, and not only decreed religious liberty, but advised the nation to adopt the Christian religion. The best kind of prosperity attended the villages on the Tuscarawas. Religious inquiry pervaded the natives in every direction. The chapels were crowded. Visitors came to admire the united excellencies of the fruits of self-government, industry, and piety. Agriculture flourished. The settlements were models of order and neatness. "Men of judgment and distinction, coming from the eastern colonies, were often filled with astonishment when they here beheld Indians not only civilized, but changed in all their habits and growing rich." The text of one of Zeisberger's sermons at the capital was well chosen: "The glory of the Lord is risen upon thee," and so

was the name of the new town Lichtenau—"a Pasture of Light."

In the early years of our Revolutionary War the influence of Zeisberger and Kirkland in maintaining the neutrality of the Indian nations was of immense advantage to the American cause. If the British had succeeded in confederating the northern and western tribes on their side, not less than ten thousand painted braves would have been in the field. Of the western missionary's exertions, as a statesman and Christian, during his three years' abode at Lichtenau, the reader of this Life will find a full account, in connexion with a general history of the progress of the struggle for independence in the wide region under his inspection. In the complications of the period his liberty and life were often exposed, but he refused to leave his post. "The Lord will not look upon my remaining here as foolhardiness. I make no pretensions to false heroism, but am by nature as timid as a dove. My trust is altogether in God. Never yet has he put me to shame, but always granted me the courage and the comfort I needed. I am about my duty; and even if I should be murdered, it will not be my loss, but my gain, for then will the fish return to his native element."

It is impossible to abridge the details of the chapters that cover this period, but they are full of new testimonies to the wisdom, courage, and zeal of the apostolic man. We pass on to 1781, when sore trials befel the peaceful villages, involving, of course, Zeisberger and his five clerical associates in the Ohio mission, one of whom was John Heckewelder. Upon an untrue report that the believing Indians were assisting the American colonies, the British commandant at Detroit authorized an expedition to break up the missions, and to bring the teachers or their scalps to Detroit. A band of three hundred savages entered, under pretence of friendship, the happy towns in the Tuscarawas valley, took possession of everything, at first condemned the missionaries to death, but finally, after a general pillage and terrific riot, dragged the whole Christian population from their fields and homes, and amidst cruel sufferings carried them to a desolate wilderness on the Sandusky, where they left the people to take care of themselves, while

the missionaries were summoned to appear at Detroit. They were examined before a military council and pronounced innocent of the charges on which they had been abducted from their homes. Much sympathy was then shown them, and their wants were attended to; but this was a poor reparation for the losses and sufferings which not only themselves, but their whole church had to endure. Zeisberger and his companions rejoined their congregation at the Sandusky, and in their characteristic patriarchal way, spent the first fortnight of their return in building a rude church as a memorial of their gratitude for the present close of their persecution. They spent the winter at this encampment, which has been called "Captives-town," suffering cold and famine, until the greater number wandered in different directions seeking relief. At this juncture a new order came from Detroit, summoning the missionaries away from their scattered flock, to appear again, for reasons not given, at the military post from which they had just been released.

But all the terrors of the preceding narrative are outdone in the recital of the thirty-fifth chapter, headed "The Massacre at Gnadenhutten, 1782." The particulars are too horrible to be quoted, though in their perusal one cannot help admiring the able manner in which the historian's pen has performed its painful duty. We must sum it up in a sentence. Some of the poor Indians straggled back from Detroit to their desolated and desecrated valley, and without their beloved pastors, only to be invaded by a horde of treacherous American militia-men, who, after determining by vote to kill and scalp all whom they found, executed their own diabolical sentence in cold blood, with clubs, tomahawks, and knives, upon twenty-nine men, twenty-seven women, and thirty-four children. The corpses, with the whole village, were then burned together. Soon after this massacre, a similar one, of which the Delawares were the victims, took place at Pittsburgh, and there seemed to be a general dispersion of the Christian Indians by the persecution of both white and red men, to whom they had given no provocation, unless it were seeking and praying for the enlightening and saving of their souls.

The British commandant at Detroit gave the ministers a kind reception, ascribed his recall of them to the necessity of keeping on good terms with the tribes who sustained the royal cause, and offered to sustain and protect them in Detroit, if they would consent to remain. Zeisberger was over sixty years of age; thirty-eight of those years had been spent in such toils as we have sketched; but instead of sinking in despondency or accepting an opportunity of rest, and devolving the missions on his younger brethren, he started a fresh enterprise—the collecting of the remnant of the church he had pioneered along the Susquehanna, the Alleghany, the Ohio, the Tusearawas, and the Muskingum, and colonizing them on the hunting-grounds of the Chippewas along the Huron river. A New Gnadenhutten arose there, with only fifty-three persons; forty-three converted Shawanees and some others were soon added; 1783 brought the general peace of the United States; hopes were indulged that Congress would grant some reservation of land as a permanent refuge for the Indian converts; but now came the discussions concerning the legal interpretation of treaties and rights of territory, which kept the people most concerned in their settlement, in a long uncertainty. As no enlargement of the mission could be soon expected, Zeisberger, Edwards, and Heckewelder took the entire charge of what there was on the Huron, while Jungman, Senseman, and Jung, so long their associates, returned to Bethlehem. But the veteran leader did not yet find a place of rest. The record of 1786 is of perilous pilgrimages with his little flock from Detroit by Lake Erie to the Cuyahoga, Ohio, and thence to New Salem, founded by them on the Huron river, the site of the present Milan, which "grew to be a thriving town and a centre of Christianity, whose light beamed over the Indian country." Natives of various tribes heard of Christ there, and a large number professed the faith. The town was sometimes crowded with the heathen who came purposely to learn the gospel: "A revival began," says the bishop, "genuine and deep as in former times. Nothing like it had been known since the abduction from the Tuscarawas; and nothing like it occurred again in all the subsequent history of the mission. There were other

seasons of prosperity, but they could not be compared with this. The palmiest days of the mission came back again. The western wilderness rang anew with the fame of its apostle, and the village of the Christians was once more the rock to which the heathen came thirsting for the waters of life."

About this time Congress gave a fresh impulse to the progress of their northwestern territory by the new ordinance for its government, and appointing General St. Clair to be its first Governor. It also made large grants of land to the Moravian missions, which were held in trust for the Christian Indians, by the "Society of the United Brethren for propagating the Gospel among the heathen," instituted for the purpose in 1788. At New Salem Zeisberger devoted himself particularly to three schools, in all of which he gave daily instruction, and translated into Delaware a selection of hymns and a harmony of the evangelical history of the Saviour's Passion. In 1790, when the prosperity of the little settlement was at its height, and their spiritual head was thinking of opening a new village (for his policy seems to have been to multiply and disperse the centres of light rather than encourage the growth of large towns), hostile tribes, on a claim of boundary-rights, brought the confusion of war once more into the affairs of the Brethren. Zeisberger concluded that the most effectual safeguard for his people was to remove them for a time entirely out of the reach of hostilities, and accordingly the happy settlement on the Huron was broken up, and the removal eventuated (1792) in their gathering into a new village, called Fairfield, on the Thames, in Canada, where the British government, two years afterwards, gave them an entire township for their residence and plantations. The age of seventy-five years brought no desire of retirement from or relaxation of the indefatigable worker. In Fairfield he adopted the laborious device of addressing the converts personally, or in families, by letters, on topics most suitable to each, requiring written replies to be handed him by his correspondents, which he read and commented on in their presence. The following incident is characteristic:—

"Toward the end of the year 1797, Zeisberger perceived that a contaminating influence was beginning to proceed from some of the neighboring settlements.

The converts grew careless, and fell into open sin, especially drunkenness, of which even national assistants were guilty. Determined to resist such evils at the very outset, he convened the entire membership, on the tenth of December, in a special council. He addressed them with all the fire of his youthful years, and the authoritative dignity of his matured age, beseeching them to repent and turn to God. The effect was wonderful. The Spirit that convicts of sin was poured out upon that meeting. A general and deep emotion ensued. One by one the Indians arose and publicly acknowledged their transgressions. It was not a mere momentary excitement. The weeping and mourning and rending of hearts continued for days. Little companies gathered for prayer and confession. Every face was full of shame; every mouth overflowed with self-reproach; the whole town presented the appearance of a penitential fast. A celebration of the Lord's Supper sealed this return to their covenant."

It was not until 1798 that the way was opened for a return of the exiles to their old homes in the States. Many remained in Fairfield, but Zeisberger accompanied a faithful band, and with them established his last town, on the west bank of the Tuscarawas, and named it Goshen. "He left the mission [in Canada] in a prosperous state spiritually, and the town growing in resources and importance. Three hundred acres were under cultivation; two thousand bushels of corn were annually furnished to the Northeast Trading Company; an extensive trade in cattle, canoes, baskets, and mats was carried on; and five thousand pounds of maple-sugar were made and sold every winter. Moreover, the station was well calculated to become the starting-point for other missions in the west." In 1802 we find the persevering and venerable apostle completing his Delaware hymn-book, and instructing the various young missionaries who entered the field. He complained, however, of the degeneracy of the new evangelists, who required well-laden pack-horses for their journeys, whereas the former fashion was to "go out into every part of the wilderness with scanty provisions, but a firm trust in God." A Moravian church of white settlers sprang up, with the name of Beersheba, in his neighborhood, whose place of worship he dedicated in 1805, and a colony from Fairfield came down and settled near New Salem. The Ohio mission now numbered six stations and twelve evangelical laborers.

Three years of life on earth remained to the pioneer who had seen such wide-spread results from the Divine favor on his indomitable zeal, but they were crowded with what in

human view, were disastrous changes. The influx of strangers, traders, and other whites, brought the irresistible temptations of spirituous liquors among a people whose strict prohibitory laws had been sufficient to protect when left to themselves. In one quarter, Tecumseh, prophet and warrior, incited the Indians of the reservation to revolt, and broke up the Chippewa and White River stations. A debauched clan of Monseys, and the intrusion of white settlers, destroyed another. Zeisberger was too infirm for new exertions against the overwhelming calamities which were thickening around him, and he began to die. He had lately added to the literary department of his pastoral employments a translation of a German Harmony of the Gospels, which was first printed in New York in 1821. "Why shall I stay here?" he would say; "I can be used no longer. My work is done." Yes, and "well done, good and faithful servant!" His fatal sickness came upon him in October, 1808. His testimony was, "Lying here, often sleepless, on my bed, I have employed the time in reviewing my whole past life, and find so many faults and so much cause for forgiveness, that nothing remains to me but the Saviour's grace. Nevertheless, I know that I am His. I trust in the efficacy of His atoning blood, which makes one clean from all sin. The Saviour is mine. The Saviour's merits are mine. Some Christians die rejoicing with joy unspeakable and full of glory. This is not my case. I leave the world as a poor sinner. My spirit God will receive. I am certain of that. This mortal with all its sinfulness I leave behind." On the seventeenth of November, the tolling of the Goshen chapel-bell announced his approaching demise. The Indians silently entered in groups, and surrounded his bed, singing hymns "treating of Jesus the Prince of life, of death swallowed up in victory, and of Jerusalem, the church above. He occasionally responded by signs expressive of his joy and peace. Amid such strains, at half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, he breathed his last without a struggle, and went to God." He was in the eighty-eighth year of his age, and had lived sixty-two years with the Indians.

In another work by the accomplished author of this Life, it is stated that "the indefatigable labors of the [Moravian]

Church among the aborigines of this country extend, now, through a period of one hundred and twenty-eight years. They have been carried on in Georgia, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Canada, Kansas and Arkansas Territory; and have resulted in converts, either singly or in larger numbers, from the Mohicans, Wamponoags or Pokanokets, Delawares, Menissings, Iroquois or Six Nations, Cherokees, and Chippewas, while the Gospel was preached to many other tribes. The only stations which remain at the present day are New Fairfield, New Westfield, and New Spring Place."

The volume from which this is quoted is entitled "The Moravian Manual," published at the Moravian Publication office in Bethlehem in 1869, which we commend to such of our readers as wish to be possessed in a small compass (207 pages) of a compendious history of this ancient body of believers, an account of the present condition of the church as it exists in its three Provinces—the American, the Continental, and the British—its Foreign Missions, its Constitution, Doctrine, Ministry, Worship (embracing its beautiful Ritual), and Discipline. An Appendix furnishes valuable Historical Tables, the first date of which is A. D. 836, "First Christian Church dedicated in Moravia, at Neitra, through the influence of Latin Christianity," and the last is A. D. 1868, "Forty-eighth Provincial Synod, convened at Bethlehem, preparatory to the General Synod," which met in 1869. A separate table gives the chronology of the Foreign Missions, from Greenland 1733 to Central Asia 1850, the summary of which gives 15 Mission Provinces, 87 Stations, 313 Missionaries and female assistants from Europe and America, 1111 Native assistants, 238 schools, nearly 30,000 scholars, and more than 70,000 converts.

Art. III.—*The Moabite Stone.**

1. *La Stèle de Mesa roi de Moab*, 896 *av. J. C. Lettre à M. Le Comte De Vogüé.* Par Ch. Clermont-Ganneau, Drogman-Chancelier du Consulat de France à Jérusalem. Paris: J. Baudry, 1870.
2. *Die Siegessäule Mesa's Königs der Moabiter. Ein Beitrag zur Hebräischen Alterthumskunde.* Von Dr. Konstantin Schlottmann. Halle. 1870.
3. *The Moabite Stone; a Fac-simile of the Original Description, with an English Translation, and a Historical and Critical Commentary.* By Chrestain D. Ginsburg, LL. D. London: Longmans. 1870.

Till about two years ago there stood amidst the ruins of the ancient Dibon, in the heart of the old country of Moab, a very curious Stone inscribed with ancient letters. It had stood there for upwards of two thousand seven hundred years, all but unchanged in that rainless climate, and it might have stood for many thousands more but for Frankish curiosity and Arab greed. The region which stretches away from the eastern shores of the Dead Sea to the great wilderness beyond

* We take pleasure in introducing to our readers the author of this Article, the Rev. Thos. Croskery, of Londonderry, Ireland. His rank as a writer appears in the fact that he is the author of the following articles in the great British Reviews:—"The Irish Roman Catholic Priest," *Eclectic Review*, November, 1863. "Darbyism and Lay-Preaching," *Eclectic Review*, September, 1864. "Plymouthism and Dr. Whately," *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, July, 1865. "A Catechism on the Doctrines of the Plymouth Brethren." [This little work has been translated into Italian, and is largely circulated in Italy. It is now in the sixth edition, and 20,000 copies have been sold.] August, 1865. "The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland," *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1865. "The Irish Church," *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1866. "The Liberal Theology," *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, April, 1867. "Scottish Christianity and Mr. Buckle," *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1868. "The Irish in America," *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1868. "Ministry," *London Quarterly Review*, January, 1869. "The Separatist Theory of a Pure Church," *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1869. [This article has been published in a separate form by the Nisbets.] "The Settlement of Ulster," *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1869. "Anglicanism in Ireland," *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, July, 1869. "The Irish Land-Question," *British Quarterly Review*, January, 1870. "Ultramontanism," *London Quarterly Review*, January, 1870. "The American Press," *British Quarterly Review*, January, 1871.

has always been more or less inaccessible to travellers, and only twice or thrice during the present century have European travellers ventured to penetrate its depths. The Bedouin tribes, who acknowledge no law but force and opportunity, lurk everywhere near the ruins of its ancient cities; and Moslem bigotry, to which the intellectual tastes and scientific zeal of Europe are a complete enigma, has guarded its mysterious stones and treasures from the fruitless curiosity of ages. We are inclined to believe that the harvest of further exploration in this wild and interesting country must await the time when these regions shall come under the tranquil guardianship of some civilized and enlightened government. The Moabite stone, so strangely discovered by the zeal and enterprise of a Prussian missionary, deserves all the interest its discovery has excited, for it is the oldest Semitic stone record in existence, and it furnishes us with the only extant specimen of ancient Moabitic literature. It is within a hundred years of being as old as that glorious Temple of Solomon, whose cyclopean foundations—the masonry of 2800 years—English explorers have been lately searching with such admirable energy and skill; and was, in all probability, set up in Dibon, in the kingly pride of Mesha, in the very year that Elijah the Prophet was translated to Heaven. The inscription is, in fact, older than two-thirds of the Old Testament. Its antiquity, therefore, places it far beyond the range of common history. It must be admitted, however, that in point of sustained historic interest it cannot vie with the marvellous sculptures of Assyria, and that it is not destined either to fill up any vast lacunæ in ancient history, or, indeed, to make any considerable addition to our stock of historical knowledge; but clearly the light of history, such as it is, has burst in upon us from a new and unexpected opening, giving us some interesting glimpses of an ancient people, not indeed remarkable for their civilization or power, and who had but little action on the destinies of the great world, but who dwelt in immediate contact with the Israelitish people during the whole period of their marvellous history. The inscription of king Mesha reads, as has been remarked, like a chapter in the Bible. It silences the observation often made before the

Assyrian discoveries that there was no human confirmation of many of the historic facts related in the Bible. It rebukes the pretensions of the high *a priori* order of philological and historical criticism, for it shows the historical basis of the Old Testament to be confirmed in a manner to defy all skepticism. The inscription is also important for the light it throws upon the language of that great Phenician people—the English of antiquity—whose commerce covered every sea, whose legions disputed the empire of the world with the ambition of heroic Rome, and whose tongue supplied the elements of all those alphabets which are now used by the most civilized nations of Europe. Altogether, the Moabite inscription is so interesting and important in a biblical, palæographical, and linguistic sense, that we propose in the following pages to furnish a brief account of it.

The stone was first discovered on the 19th of August, 1868, by the Rev. F. A. Klein, a member of the Prussian community at Jerusalem, who had been travelling in the land of Moab under the protection of the son of an Arab sheikh. It is necessary to state that the priority of discovery has been variously claimed by England, France, and Germany. M. Clermont-Ganneau, dragoman and consul of the French government at Jerusalem, a young Semitic scholar of great promise, claims it for himself. The erudite and energetic Mr. Grove, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, claimed it for Captain Warren; but, so far as we know, he has since relinquished this claim. The facts of the case, briefly related, will settle this question. No matter who may have first heard of the stone—and all three, Ganneau, Warren, and Klein, claim to have heard of it through Bedouin Arabs—it was Mr. Klein who first saw it *in situ* in the month of August, 1868, and succeeded in copying a portion of the inscription. Neither Ganneau nor Warren ever saw the stone at all. The nature of this discovery having been made known by Mr. Klein on his return to Jerusalem to Professor Petermann, of Berlin, who was then acting as Prussian consul in the city, an energetic effort was at once made to obtain a Firman for the stone that it might be secured for the Berlin museum. But M. Clermont-Ganneau was equally anxious to obtain the

stone for France, and actually offered £375 for it, though the Pasha of Nablous had agreed to procure it for the Prussian consul for £80. Unhappily, difficulties arose, partly through the cupidity of the Arab owners of the stone, who, when they came to understand the value attached to it by the Europeans, suspected it was worth its weight in gold, and partly through their superstition, for they imagined that its removal or loss would bring a blight on their crops; for they lighted a fire under it, and after it was thoroughly heated, they dashed cold water upon it, and broke it in pieces. The fragments of the broken stone were then distributed among the granaries of the neighborhood as charms in blessing the corn. We agree with Dr. Ginsburg that but for "the unwise measures adopted by M. Clermont-Ganneau," the Moabite stone might have been recovered unbroken and placed in some European museum. But fortunately during these negotiations for its possession, M. Ganneau succeeded through Arab help in obtaining a complete paper-cast or "squeeze" of the stone while still unbroken, but its value was greatly impaired by the fact that, in a scuffle among the natives around the stone, the paper was torn into seven pieces, and, besides, was considerably injured and soiled. Shortly after, Captain Warren obtained by Arab aid a still better impression of the two largest pieces, which when compared with another impression taken of the same fragments by M. Ganneau's Arab agent, was found to furnish a satisfactory restoration of the text. Other pieces were afterwards recovered. Professor George Rawlinson has expressed a hope that all the fragments of the stone will be gathered and the monument put up at Paris. It is evident from these facts that Germany must be held as having substantiated its claim to the priority of discovery, but France is fairly entitled to the priority of interpretation; for, as Professor Schlottmann, of Halle, remarks, it was M. Ganneau who first recognized the great importance of the inscription, put himself to great expense and trouble in obtaining copies of it, and by his restoration and interpretation of the text, made it accessible to scientific research.

The stone was originally three feet five inches in height and one foot nine inches in width and thickness, rounded at the top

and bottom to nearly a semicircle, with an inscription of thirty-four lines running straight across it, the space between the lines being an inch and a quarter. The complete text is still a matter for doubt, and we may expect from time to time further corrections and additions. There are lacunæ in all the lines except six, which are perfect. There are calculated to have been eleven hundred letters on the stone, but only six hundred and sixty-nine letters have been successfully restored. M. Ganneau has already issued two revised texts, with learned and elaborate annotations.* We shall now furnish a translation of the inscription, supplying some of the lacunæ according to the best of our ability. These lacunæ appear within brackets. We follow Dr. Ginsburg's translation for the most part:—

TRANSLATION.

1. I, Mesha, am son of Chemoshgad,† King of Moab,
2. the Dibonite. My father reigned over Moab thirty years, and I reigned
3. after my father. And I made this stone‡ for Chemosh§ in Korcha‖ [a stone of]

---

* The literature of the Moabite Inscription is already very ample. German scholarship holds, as usual, the most distinguished place in this field. The first publication was from M. Ganneau, who sent to Count de Vogüé a brief account of the stone, together with his first attempt to reconstruct the text and a French translation. Among German scholars, the first to take the field was Professor Schlottmann, of Halle, the well-known translator and commentator on the Inscription of Eshmunazar, who published an elaborate treatise upon the stone about a year since. He was followed by Professor Ewald, Dr. Neubauer, Professor Nöldeke, of Kiel; Professor Haug, of Munich; Professor Shräder, of Giessen; Dr. Geiger, of Berlin; and Dr. Ginsburg, a German scholar residing in England. Professor Rawlinson published an article on this subject in the English *Contemporary Review.*

† "*Chemoshgad*" has its analogies in words like Baalgad. (Josh. xi. 17.)

‡ "*Stone,*" lit. a high place. The spot where the Moabite stone was found was not elevated, but rather sunken. But a pillar or stone, with a monumental character, was still designated by the word *bamath.* The Septuagint renders the word *bamoth,* not only by τὰ ὑψη, *high places,* but also by στήλαι, *pillars.*

§ "*Chemosh,*" the god of the Moabites. (Num. xxi. 29; Jud. xi. 24; Jer. xlviii. 7, 13, 46.) As he is also called "the god of the Ammonites," and Baalpeor is called "the god of the Moabites" (Num. xxv. 1), and Moloch is called "the abomination of the children of Ammon" (1 Kings xi. 7), we naturally infer that these three names, as well as Baal (Num. xxii. 41), belong to the one heathen god worshipped by the Moabites and the Ammonites, and other heathen nations. The worship of Chemosh was cruel (2 Kings iii. 27) and licentious (Num. xxv. 2, 3).

‖ "*Korcha,*" evidently a fortified suburb of Dibon. It is curious to find the

4. [Sa]lvation, for he saved me from all despoilers and let me see my desire upon all my enemies

5. And [Omr]i,* King of Israel; and he oppressed Moab many days, for Chemosh was angry with his

6. [la]nd. And his son [Ahab] succeeded him. And he too said, "I† will oppress Moab." In my days said [Chemosh]

7. And I will look upon him and his house, and Israel perishes forever. Now Omri took the land

8. Medeba‡ and occupied it [and they oppressed Moab, he] and his son, forty years §

9. On it Chemosh [had mercy] in my days; and I built Baalmeon,‖ and made therein the ditch and I [built]

10. Kirjathaim.¶ And the men of Gad were dwelling in the land [Ataro]th from of old, and the K[ing of I]srael built

11. A[t]aroth,** and I assaulted the wall and captured it, and killed all the wa[rriors of]

12. the wall, for the well-pleasing of Chemosh and Moab, and I removed from it all the spoil and [of-]

13. fered it before Chemosh in Kirjath, and I placed therein the men of Shiran†† and the m[en of Zereth]

14. Shachar.‡‡ And Chemosh said to me, "Go take Nebo§§ against Israel;" [and I]

---

word in Isa. xv. 2, but there it is translated "baldness." The allusion is to Moab. Perhaps it is an instance of *Paronomasia.*

* "*Omri,*" King of Israel from 929 B. C. to 918 B. C.

† Dr. Ginsburg, forgetting that "*abad*" is an intransitive verb, meaning simply "to perish," and that it is only in one of its causative forms, the Hiphil, that it signifies "to destroy," makes "Israel" the speaker, and represents him as saying—"I will destroy it (Moab) forever." It is well known that in the facsimile of the Moabite inscription there is a lacuna of at least three or four letters in which the nominative to the verb "*amar*" originally stood, and that at the commencement of this void space the down curvature of the letter "*Caph*" is distinctly visible after "*amar.*" The "*Caph*" is evidently the first letter of Chemosh.

‡ "*Medeba,*" a Moabite city east of the Jordan. (Num. xxi. 27–30.) The Amorites selected it as their battle-ground in the fight with Joab, and took refuge in its strongholds after their defeat. (1 Chron. xix. 1–15.) Its ruins still exist.

§ "*Forty years.*" The calculation of this period will be submitted elsewhere

‖ "*Baalmeon,*" a city built by the Reubenites (Num. xxxii. 38), at two hours' distance from Medeba. Its ruins are now called *Maein.*

¶ "*Kirjathaim,*" a town of Gad, first mentioned in the battle of the kings (Gen. xiv.) as "Shaveh-Kirjathaim"—"the plain of Kirjathaim." "The children of Reuben built" it (Num. xxxii. 37), and Ezekiel represents it as exposed "to the men of the East." (Ezek. xxv. 9.) Its ruins are called *Kureiyat.* It was evidently sacred to Chemosh.

** "*Ataroth,*" a city of Gad. (Num. xxxii. 34.)

†† "*Shiran,*" supposed to be *Sibam* (Num. xxxii. 3), or Sibnah.

‡‡ *Zereth-Shachar,*" a Reubenite city beside Sibnah. (Josh. xiii. 19.)

§§ "*Nebo,*" a city between Medeba and Baalmeon, connected with the mountain of that name from which Moses got his view of the land of Canaan.

15. went in the night and I fought against it from the dawning of the morning till noon, and I took

16. it, and slew in all 7,000 [men, but I did not kill the women

17. And maidens] for [I] devoted [them] to Ashtar-Chemosh;* and I took from it

18. [the ves]sels of Jehovah † and cast them down before Chemosh. And the King of Israel built

19. Jahaz ‡ and occupied it when he made war against me; and Chemosh drove him out before [me and]

20. I took from Moab two hundred men, all chiefs, and fought against Jahaz and took it,

21. In addition to Dibon. I built Korchah, the wall of the woods and the wall

22. of the mound, and I built its gates, and I built its towers and

23. I built the palace; and I made the prisons § for the men of . . . . with[in the] wall.

24. And there was no cistern within the wall in Korcha, and I said to all the people, "Make for

25. yourselves every man a cistern in his house. And I decreed the separation at Korcha with the men

26. of [I]srael.‖ I built Aroer, and I made the road across the Arnon.¶

---

* "*Ashtar-Chemosh.*" One of the phases by which Chemosh is intended to be represented; probably, as Schlottmann imagines, it was an androgynous deity. Ashtar, the masculine companion to the feminine Ashtarte, appears here for the first time in the religions of Canaan, and Schlottmann finds in Ashtar-Chemosh the original of the Aphrodite mentioned by Aristophanes, the name of the bearded Venus Amathusia, "*Eadem mas et femina.*" "At the licentious worship of this androgyne, the men wore women's garments, whilst the women appeared in male attire, with weapons."

† "*The vessels of Jehovah*" will be afterwards explained.

‡ "*Jahaz,*" a Reubenite city. (Josh. xiii. 18.) Here the Israelites conquered Sihon, and thus possessed themselves of the whole country. (Num. xxi. 23; Deut. ii. 32.)

§ "*The Prisons.*" Often in royal palaces. (1 Kings xxii. 7.)

‖ "*Decreed the separation.*" This is a difficult passage. Dr. Ginsburg translates it: "And I dug the ditch for Korcha with the [chosen] men of Israel." We cannot accept this version of the passage. The objection is that "*michretheth*" is a verbal noun, from "*karath,*" "to cut," but it never means cutting in the sense of "digging"—*that* is usually expressed by the cognate verb "*karah*"—for it is applied to the cutting of wood or other inanimate objects for sacrificial purposes, especially to the cutting in pieces of animals intended as sacrifices, and between whose divided parts the individuals entering into solemn engagements were in the habit of passing. Hence the common Hebrew expression, "to cut a covenant." Professor Schlottmann is of opinion that it refers to a covenant of perpetual separation from Israel, which Mesha ratified with all due religious solemnities. This is decidedly our opinion.

¶ "*The road across the Arnon.*" Traces of a paved Roman road are still to

. 27. I built Beth-Bamoth,* for it was destroyed; I built Bezer,† for it was cu[t down]

28. by the fifty m[en] of Dibon, for all Dibon was now loyal; and I sav[ed]

29. [from my enemies] Bikran,‡ which I added to my land, and I bui[lt]

30. [Bethgamul]§ and Beth-Diblathaim,§ and Beth-Baalmeon,§ and I placed there the Mo[abites]

31. [To take possession of] the land. And Horonaim : . . . there dwelt therein.

32. And Chemosh said to me, "Go down, fight against Horonaim,‖ and I . . . . . .

33. . . . . Chemosh in my days. And . . . . . .

34. . . . . year . . and I . . . . .

We shall now proceed to indicate the importance of this inscription. The very sound of the language and the names of the cities mentioned on the stone convince us that we are, indeed, brought face to face after the lapse of many ages with the old land and people of Moab. It was a country on the eastern side of the Dead Sea, traversed by high mountain-ranges and steep precipices, but also blessed with green valleys and fruitful pastures. The river Arnon, whose steep, wall-like banks formed a natural barrier against the tide of invasion, divided Moab into two almost equal parts; but after the invasion of Canaan by Joshua, the northern half was taken and possessed by Reuben and Gad, and the Arnon became the exact northern boundary of the Moabite kingdom. But a warlike race like the Moabites could never abandon their claim to their lost territory; and so, age after age, they were

be seen on either side of the ravine, and very probably stand upon the basis of Mesha's ancient road and bridge.

* "*Beth-Bamoth.*" Probably identical with Bamoth (Num. xxi. 19), and Bamoth-Baal. (Num. xxii. 24.)

†† "*Bezer,*" one of the cities of refuge on the east side of the Jordan. (Deut. iv. 43.)

‡ "*Bikran,*" supposed to be identical with Eglaim. (Isa. xv. 8.)

§ ["*Bethgamul,*"] provisionally supplied to fill up a lacuna, and correctly, perhaps, as the name appears in Jerem. xlviii. 23, grouped together with Beth-Diblathaim and Beth-Baal-Meon, these last-named cities being probably identical with Almon-Diblathaim (Num. xxxiii. 46, 47) and Baalmeon, already mentioned. Schlottmann believes that the "Beth" here designates the presence of a temple in both cities.

‖ "Horonaim," on the borders of Edom. The Edomites had evidently occupied it. The name of the enemy, however, is among the missing words. Both Isaiah and Jeremiah group Horonaim among Moabite cities.

in conflict with the Israelites for its recovery. Hence the bitter hostility of Balak, and the cruel tyranny of Eglon; hence the struggle with Saul, and the subjugation by David, regardless of his Moabite descent and of the asylum given by the Moabites to his parents. At length they appear no more in the sacred history till the reign of Ahaziah, king of Israel, when Mesha, king of Moab, revolted from his allegiance. A campaign under the leadership of the three kings of Israel, Judah, and Edom, was undertaken against him; but though great losses and sufferings were inflicted upon his dominions, his independence was successfully maintained, and we hear no more of his paying the ancient tribute. The history of this campaign is given with much fulness of detail in the third chapter of the second Book of Kings. It is evident that a considerable amount of intercourse always existed between the people dwelling on opposite sides of the Jordan; for we find pious Israelites going to Moab in a time of famine, and intermarriages frequently take place between the people of the two nations. Moab will always be interesting to our minds as the land of Ruth, the grandmother of David; as the place where the bones of Moses rest till the resurrection; as the region to which Elijah belonged, for "he was a man of Gilead"—a name given to the whole district east of the Jordan—and as the country where our blessed Lord passed the last five months of his ministry. This was the period of his Peræan journeyings. It is interesting to think that, within a few miles, perhaps, of king Mesha's triumphal *stèle* at Dhibân, our Saviour must have uttered the parables of the Prodigal Son and the Good Samaritan, and cured the Ten Lepers and the woman with an issue of blood.*

Let us now give a brief explanation of Mesha's inscription, that we may be the better prepared to understand how far it confirms the Bible narrative. Mesha is undoubtedly the Moabite king referred to in the third chapter of Second Kings, as a vassal of Israel reigning over a country abounding in cattle and pastures. His father Chemoshgad was evidently a

* Dr. William Hanna, of Edinburgh, shows that the record of this Peræan ministry is to be found in the eight or nine chapters extending from Luke ix. 51, to xviii. 6; also Matt. xix. 1; Mark x. 1; John x. 40.

native of Dibon—as he is called the Dibonite—the place where this monument was found. It was an hour's journey to the north of the Arnon, and was one of the places through which the Israelites passed on their journey to Canaan. In Isaiah's time it was still a Moabite city.* It is the opinion of Dr. Ginsburg that Chemoshgad was the founder of a new dynasty, as we may infer from the mention of the thirty years of his reign and of his son's immediate succession to the throne. There is no allusion to Mesha's grandfather as a king. As we read of two other Meshas—one a son of Caleb,† and the other of the tribe of Benjamin,‡ which, we remember, was once partly in subjection to Eglon, king of Moab—the dynasty may have been of Jewish extraction, though it had long parted with its old religious traditions. It appears that Omri, king of Israel, who "did worse than all the kings that were before him," soon after his accession to the throne of Israel, laid hold upon Medeba, a fortified town of great strategical importance, from which like a skilful general he could throw out his army in different directions, and command the whole neighboring country. Well might Isaiah cry—"Moab shall howl over Medeba!"§ His son Ahab maintained a garrison on the same spot; and so, for the space of forty years, speaking in round numbers, Moab was oppressed by Israel. But long before Ahab's death Mesha had been reigning over Moab; and now, when he hears that his cruel oppressor has died on the bloody battle-field of Ramoth-gilead,‖ he takes advantage of the confusion in Israel to throw off his allegiance, marches rapidly with his warlike hosts across the Arnon and invades the old territory of Moab, which had been wrested five hundred years before from his fathers. The work did not seem difficult. There was a strong Moabite element in all the towns to be invaded; the Israelite garrisons were weak on account of the Syrian war; the new king, Ahaziah, was possessed of an easy and unwarlike disposition, and would hardly attempt to turn the tide of Moabite invasion without the help of Jehoshaphat, the king of Judah, who was now, however, captive and powerless. The first work of Mesha, in all prob-

* Isa. xv. † 1 Chron. ii 42. ‡ 1 Chron. viii. 9. § Isa. xv. 2.
‖ 1 Kings xxii. 35, 36.

ability, was to storm Medeba ; for he would not venture to attack Baalmeon with Medeba on his flank strongly garrisoned with Israelites. Baalmeon, a Reubenite city, was two hours' distance to the west, and Mesha fortified it strongly not only because it lay exactly between Nebo and Kirjathaim—the two cities that were next to be attacked—but because it would afford a refuge in case of his meeting a successful resistance in the neighborhood. Kirjathaim, a city devoted to the worship of Chemosh, the Moabite god, surrendered without a struggle, and Mesha left it after destroying it. He then marched to Ataroth, a town with a Gadite population, carried it by storm, and slew all the inhabitants. He then peopled the city with "the men of Shiran," believed to be Sibmah, and the men of Zereth-Shahhar * (both in the neighborhood of Baalmeon and Kirjathaim), whose loyalty as Moabites could be trusted to hold the city. Mesha next meditated a bolder stroke. He marched back in front of his own fortified places to assault Nebo, apparently one of the principal seats in this district of the worship of Jehovah, but not spoken of as a fortified place, though it was possessed of wealth and made a strenuous defence. Marching all night he came upon it under cover of darkness, and carried it successfully after a bloody battle of six hours. He then slew 7,000 of the male inhabitants, and devoted the women whom he spared, along with the vessels of the Israelitish Temple at Nebo, to the service of Ashtar-Chemosh. Jahaz is the next place to make a stand against him, but unsuccessfully, for the Israelites withdraw and Mesha peoples it with Moabites. Thus, this enterprising and skilful king made himself master of the whole Moabite territory from the Arnon to the head of the Dead Sea, and afterwards turned his attention to an enemy in the south, probably an Edomite chieftain, who had taken possession of Horonaim, the city of Sanballat, the Horonite, not far from Zoar. The attack upon Edom explains the readiness with which the king of Edom afterwards joined the campaign of kings Jehoram and Jehoshaphat against Moab.† The independence of Moab having been recovered by war, Mesha, like a wise sovereign, devotes

* Joshua xiii. 19. † 2 Kings iii.

himself to the peaceful task of building and improving its cities. His first undertaking was the building of Korcha, which, as we have said, was a fortified suburb of Dibon. He inclosed the parks, surrounded the city with a wall, and built a palace for himself with a prison connected with it after the manner of the Jewish and Babylonish kings. He also commanded cisterns to be constructed; for, in fortified places likely to be exposed to long sieges, such receptacles could not possibly be dispensed with. His next act seems to have been the ratification, with all due solemnities of religion, of a national covenant enjoining a perpetual separation from Israel, probably also a covenant of perpetual hostility against it. But the greatest civil achievement of his reign was the construction of a road across the Arnon, which must have been of extraordinary length as well as of immense height. The ruins of ancient roadways across the river are still to be seen. Mesha seems also to have built Beth-Bamoth, near Dibon, a place probably devoted to the worship of Baal;* Bezer, one of the three cities of refuge east of the Jordan, destroyed by fifty Gadite soldiers because they could not hold it against Mesha; Beth-Diblathaim, supposed to be between Dibon and Nebo, and Beth-Baalmeon, taking due precaution to occupy these last-named cities with a Moabite population. These were the brilliant achievements which king Mesha inscribed on his triumphal stone more than two thousand five hundred years ago.

Much of the interest that surrounds this ancient monument depends upon an exact determination of the date of its construction. It is admitted on all hands that the Mesha of the *stèle* is the Mesha of Second Kings; but Oriental scholars are not agreed upon the exact year of its erection,—some holding that it was set up about the second year of the reign of Ahaziah, king of Israel—896–894 B. C., according to our commonly received chronology—and others, that it was not set up till 884 B. C.—the first year of the reign of Jehu, king of Israel. Count de Vogüé, Professor Schlottmann, Professor Rawlinson, and the writer of an article in a quarterly contemporary, hold

* Numb. xxi. 19; xxii. 24.

to the former date, and discover the successful campaign of Mesha in the rebellion which is briefly noticed in 2 Kings i. 1: "Then Moab rebelled against Israel, after the death of Ahab," while they find in 2 Kings iii. the account of that combined assault of the three kings which was the punishment of this remarkably bold and successful rebellion. Dr. Ginsburg, on the other hand, selects the later date, and imagines that he can find in 2 Kings iii. only a somewhat different version of Mesha's triumphal inscription, remarking, that the apparent contrariety of the two accounts is no more remarkable than the conflicting descriptions given by the English and French of the battle of Waterloo, or by the French and Germans of the battle of Woerth. The question, then, simply is, Was the stone set up before or after the campaign of the three kings? We maintain that it was set up either in the last year of Ahaziah's reign or in the first year of Jehoram's, to commemorate Mesha's successful invasion of Reubenite territory during the two years that elapsed from the death of Ahab to the accession of Jehoram; and we further hold, that the biblical narrative in 2 Kings iii. refers to transactions subsequent to that invasion, and entirely different from anything recorded on the stone. In the first place, let it be considered that the inscription localizes the contest to the country north of the Arnon—which was Reubenite territory, though once in the possession of Moab—and that the biblical account in 2 Kings represents the campaign of the three kings as confined to the region south of the Arnon, Kir-hareseth, the chief fortress of Mesha, being in the southern border of Moab. Again, the inscription speaks of but one adversary, the king of Israel, and 2 Kings mentions the three kings of Israel, Judah, and Edom. Dr. Ginsburg maintains that the expression—"He saved me from all despoilers"—evidently refers to the three kings; but is it not far more probable that he has in view the successive hostility of Omri and Ahab, if not also the king of Edom, referred to at the end of the inscription, and upon whom he had already inflicted a terrible blow?* We must also remember that 2 Kings does not speak of Mesha invading Israelitish territory

* 2 Chron. xx. 23.

at all, but defending his own with more or less success, while the inscription speaks of nothing but a successful invasion. In the one case we have the three kings "beating down the cities" of Moab; in the other, Mesha storming successfully city after city of the Reubenites. But it is quite incredible, on the supposition that the inscription and the biblical narrative refer to the same events, that Mesha should have made no allusion to the sacrifice of his only son, which took place upon the walls of Kir-hareseth. This terrible incident in the siege would have a profound interest to Mesha on political as well as personal grounds, for his son was heir to the Moabite throne; and it is altogether out of the question to imagine that the transaction would have been passed over in silence if it had happened prior to the erection of the *stèle*. It has been objected to our view, that it allows only two years for all the events inscribed upon the stone, not only for the conquest of more than a dozen fortified cities, but for the subsequent fortification of them and the construction of the causeway across the Arnon. But when we consider the royal slackness or the military feebleness of King Ahaziah, we cannot be surprised at the rapid succession of Mesha's victories; and we may be perfectly certain that the king of Moab would not lose a moment of time, after such successes, in fortifying all the strong places he had got into his hands, in anticipation of Israel returning with powerful allies to recover them. The bridge across the Arnon would be a more formidable undertaking, but it was clearly vital to the security of his conquests that the causeway should be constructed without a moment's delay, as it afforded an easy and rapid way of communication between Moab proper and the newly-acquired territory. We believe, then, that the period of two years * is sufficiently long for the accomplishment of all the exploits recorded on the stone, and that the powerful resistance offered by Mesha, in the second or third year of his rebellion, to the assault of the three kings—an assault which utterly failed to reduce him to his old subjection—is sufficient evidence to prove that he had turned the brief respite allowed him to very admirable

* We might say, nearly three years, for Jehoram may not have invaded Moab till the end of the first year of his reign.

account. Dr. Ginsburg advances another objection to our view, viz., that the forty years of Israelitish oppression referred to on the stone cannot possibly terminate so early as the reign of Ahaziah. His calculation of the forty years is as follows: "i., the five years out of Omri's reign; ii., the twenty-two years of his son Ahab's reign; iii., the two years of his grandson Ahaziah's reign; and iv., the twelve years of his second grandson Jehoram's reign, (5 + 22 + 2 + 12 = 41)." The year 924 B. C. is Dr. Ginsburg's starting-point, for in that year, he says, Omri subjugated Moab. We cannot accept these calculations. There is no evidence on the stone for Dr. Ginsburg's assertion that "Mesha's reign extended over the whole forty years of his thraldom;" the inscription merely states that the forty years' oppression began with Omri. Neither is there any evidence that the "subjugation of Moab took place in the days of Mesha"—if by the days be meant the reign of Mesha. It is far more likely that it took place during some part of the thirty years of Chemoshgad's reign. Professor Schlottmann's calculation makes up the forty years in the following manner: 1, the four years of Omri's disputed reign and of civil war with Tibni; 2, the twelve years of his sole and undisputed reign as king over Israel; 3, the twenty-two years of his son Ahab's reign; and 4, the two years of the reign of Ahaziah, son of Ahab. Dr. Ginsburg, however, very properly objects to this calculation of Omri's reign as sixteen years in all, because 1 Kings xvi. 15–29 clearly proves that the twelve years of his reign are not exclusive of his joint reign with Tibni. But the objection of Dr. Ginsburg that Omri was not likely to have engaged in a hostile expedition against Moab immediately after his accession to the throne and during the distractions of a civil war, is not equally tenable; for Omri was evidently—as "captain of the host"—a man of distinguished energy and ability, and would regard the instant subjugation of Moab—the ancient and inveterate enemy of Israel—as one of the most politic and popular enterprises he could undertake, securing the adhesion of all Israel to his royal interests.*

* Omri, as "captain of the host," may have invaded Moab before he ascended the throne at all, and Mesha might even call him king of Israel, as he afterwards became so.

We believe, then, that the Moabite oppression referred to by Mesha may be fairly reckoned from 929 B. C.—the year in which Omri and Tibni began to dispute the succession to the throne of Israel—and counting the twelve years of Omri's reign, the twenty-two of Ahab's, and the two of Ahaziah's—(for we are entitled to count the years of the rebellion, as Israel had not yet practically recognized the independence of Moab)—we have thirty-five or thirty-six years, which may fairly be regarded as equivalent to forty years, regarded as a round number. Dr. Ginsburg himself makes the concession "that, if required, the forty years may also be taken as a round number; and that any figure between thirty-five and thirty-nine may constitute it, and that less than thirty, or even thirty-five, cannot reasonably be admitted." The date, then, of the inscription, is, in our opinion, 896 B. C., the very year—according to Hebrew chronology—of Elijah's translation.

We shall now proceed to inquire whether the Moabite stone throws any new light or adds any new facts to Bible history. It is a remarkable confirmation of the Scriptures that the *stèle* contains the names of no less than a dozen places mentioned in the book of Numbers, and that a single chapter in Jeremiah—the forty-eighth—contains ten of them. But the monument is of great value on account of the new light that it throws upon the history of the period between the reigns of David and Omri. We know that David waged a most sanguinary war against the Moabites, slaying two thirds of the inhabitants and making the rest tributary to his rule.* This exceptional harshness has always been a mystery to Bible-readers, especially when it is remembered that David was himself, by the maternal side, of Moabitish blood, and that the king of Moab had shown great kindness to David's parents in a time of deep family distress. The Moabites then drop out of view. We hear no more of them for a period of about eighty years, except to know that some of Solomon's wives were Moabites, and that Chemosh, the god of the Moabites, was worshipped at Jerusalem; and we are led to expect that David's crushing campaign has so effectu-

* 2 Sam. viii. 2; 1 Chron. xviii. 2, 11.

ally prostrated this warlike people that for two generations at least they will be powerless for rebellion. The Bible narrative leads one to believe that they had remained submissive to foreign rule till the death of Ahab. But the Moabite stone as clearly implies that they had recovered their independence, at least within the period of a single generation, after the time of David, for it expressly mentions that Omri reconquered them. The meaning of this is that up to 929 B. C.—the date of Omri's accession, and, therefore, forty years after David's campaign—they were independent of the Israelitish power. Some have conjectured that they recovered their independence during the confusion and distraction of Jeroboam's reign—(975 B. C.)—but Dr. Ginsburg is strongly of opinion, following Professor Schlottmann, that Solomon, partly through the influence of his wives, and from other considerations, voluntarily ceded their independence. We can hardly suppose that the nation, with all its remarkable vigor and elasticity, could have so soon recovered from the effects of a virtual decimation as to wrest its independence by force of arms from Israel. The Moabite stone is further useful in explanation of Bible facts. We read in 2 Kings iii. of the tremendous blow inflicted upon Moab by the three kings, but the language of the chapter evidently points to an inconclusive campaign. They had failed to reduce Moab to its ancient subjection. But in Isaiah* Moab is represented as in possession of the leading cities mentioned on the stone, and as displaying a great advance in military power, and general civilization. This was nearly two hundred years after the campaign of the three kings. Thus, Moab, in fact, never lost its hold on the dozen cities which Mesha took from the Reubenites after Ahab's death, and the campaign of the three kings which some have regarded as a crushing and successful blow to Moab, did not at all succeed in relaxing its hold upon the North-Arnon territory. The Moabite stone, moreover, throws light upon the established worship of the Transjordanic tribes of Israel. Mesha says in his account of the capture of Nebo, that he took from it "the vessels of Je-

* Isa. xv., xvi.

hovah" and dedicated them to his god Chemosh. These vessels must have been used in some tabernacle or sanctuary devoted to the worship of Jehovah; and the conclusion is obvious that the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and the half tribe of Manasseh, isolated by the Jordan from the Temple-worship at Jerusalem, had established a similar sanctuary for themselves. Thus, Jerusalem was at that time the religious centre for Judah, Dan and Bethel for Israel, and Nebo for the Transjordanic tribes. The Moabite stone confirms the old Jewish tradition that the Jews erected places for worship from time immemorial wherever they lived. The stone also proves that, at the time of its erection, the sacred name—"Jehovah"—was commonly pronounced by the Israelites, else the Moabites could not have known how to write it. We must go very far back in history to find a period in which the *Tetragrammaton* was pronounced by the Jews; for it never occurs in the Septuagint, the Apocrypha, or the New Testament. But Jewish writers are clearly wrong in fixing the origin of this habit so far back as the time of Moses, for here is evidence, on the face of the Moabite stone, that the Israelites were in the habit of pronouncing the "incommunicable name" nearly seven hundred years after his time.

But it would be difficult to overrate the linguistic importance of the stone. It tends to settle a number of vexed points in Hebrew literature, and Dr. Ginsburg is fully justified in his observation—"It is not too much to say that every Hebrew grammarian and lexicographer will henceforth appeal to the language of the Moabite stone for the elucidation of certain forms and phrases, the exact date of which has hitherto been unknown." The inscription, for example, settles the question of the division of words. It has been strenuously maintained that "the sacred books of the Hebrews could not have had a regular division of words;" but here is a stone with the oldest alphabetic writing yet discovered, in a language about identical with biblical Hebrew, which has the words divided by points, and the text itself divided into verses by vertical strokes. This proves the soundness of the Masoretic division of words. Again, it has been maintained by some critics, in reference to the *scriptio plena* and *scriptio de-*

fectiva in the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Scriptures, that the vowel-consonants—*Ehevi*, or *matres lectionis*, as they are technically called—when they indicate a vowel, did not exist in the primitive text of the Hebrew Bible, but were introduced at a later period by the Masorites. But the Moabite stone proves that the vowels were from the earliest times represented in Hebrew by the consonants *Ehevi*.

It is admitted on all hands that the palæographical importance of the stone is supreme. We have here an alphabet a century and a half earlier than any other inscription in the same species of writing, and three centuries older than the Eshmunazar inscription. The Moabite stone shows "the very characters in which Ahab and Elijah may have corresponded with each other;" the very forms of the letters in which Moses wrote the Pentateuch or God wrote the Ten Commandments on tables of stone. The characters are Phenician, so called from the supposed fact that the Phenicians invented them. The Phenician writing is that from which the Greek, the Roman, and the other European alphabets—including the very letters that print this article—are derived. We have here in fact "the veritable prototype of modern writing," and the very characters which before 700 B. C. were common, as Count de Vogüé has shown, to all the races of Western Asia, from Egypt to the foot of Taurus and from the Mediterranean to Nineveh, and which were used in Nineveh itself, in Phenicia, Jerusalem, Samaria, Moab, Cilicia, and Cyprus. The Moabite stone throws light upon the number of letters in the ancient alphabet from which the Greek letters were derived. Nearly the whole of the Greek alphabet is here. Herodotus mentions that the Phenicians introduced letters among the Greeks; Pliny states that the alphabet thus introduced originally consisted of sixteen letters. Dr. Donaldson and others conclude that "the original Semitic alphabet contained only sixteen letters." We know now that the Phenician and the Hebrew alphabets contained twenty-two letters; for we have the alphabetic psalms, such as the 119th, the initial letter of each period or stanza following the order of the alphabet in the form of an alphabetic acrostic, to prove that there were just twenty-two letters in the Hebrew alphabet. Attempts

have been made by biblical critics to neutralize this evidence by representing the aerostic Psalms as of a Post-Babylonian date. But here is the Moabite stone with an alphabet at least 900 years before Christ—may we not say, very much older, for Mesha's alphabet could not have been invented near his own times?—and twenty-one of the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew and Phenician alphabets appear upon it. There can hardly be a doubt that *teth*—the lost letter—did originally occur in the word *ataroth* in the eleventh line of the inscription. It is also interesting to remark how nearly the shape of the letters on the Moabite stone accords with the archaic Greek of the earliest inscriptions. In fact, we see here "the original shape and power of the characters by which western thought has expressed itself since the dawn of civilization."

We remarked at the commencement of this paper that Mesha's triumphal stone furnished the only extant specimen of ancient Moabitic literature. It is exactly fifteen years since the great inscription of king Eshmunazar, discovered at Sidon by the Rev. W. Thomson, an American missionary, supplied Oriental scholars with the only extant specimen—of any length—of the Canaanitish or Phenician literature known to the world. The learned Bochart clearly established the fact two centuries ago, that the Phenician language must have been cognate with biblical Hebrew; a conclusion which was still further confirmed by the learned investigations of Gesenius, published in the year 1837. But the Eshmunazar inscription put the matter beyond the possibility of dispute, for it appeared written in the Phenician character, which was also that used by the ancient Hebrews and by all the Shemitic races, including the Moabites, as the Dibon monument proves. The language is Hebrew, resembling in some respects what biblical critics call "the later Hebrew," but containing at the same time a number of undoubtedly archaic forms. Now, the study of Mesha's inscription proves that the Moabite language approximates even more closely to the Hebrew than the Phenician, in its system of punctuation, in its forms of the different parts of speech, in its syntax and its numerals. In fact, Dr. Ginsburg supplies at the end of his

learned treatise a very carefully compiled vocabulary of the Moabite stone, the whole of which—with a few trifling exceptions—is to be found in the Hebrew Scriptures.

In drawing these observations to a close, we cannot but remark that this Moabite confirmation of the Bible comes at a most seasonable conjuncture when the attacks of critics have been turned with such persistent audacity against the authenticity of its historical books. Hopes were entertained by Volney and other infidels that the ruins of empires known to exist in the East contained, and would one day reveal, a complete refutation of Scripture history; and even such distinguished men as Lord Macaulay and Sir George Cornewall Lewis, have not been slow to express their incredulity as to Nineveh history and decipherments. But it is now all but universally conceded, even in the face of the latest Colenso criticism, that Bible history is perfectly safe. The Moabite stone is the latest addition to our evidences; and we question whether a single Assyrian slab, now lying in the British Museum, contains, in the same small space, so many remarkable coincidences as this Dibon inscription—coincidences between the Bible record and the curiously lettered stone, obviously undesigned, and embodying a large number of incidental facts and allusions to events existing at the time of their authors. Farther exploration in Moab may bring to light new evidences. After all, it is only in very recent days that the explorer has set to work to traverse the great deserts which stretch their unbroken gloom over regions which once swarmed with vast populations; and it is hard to conjecture what new and insulated facts may come to light, from all kinds of unexpected quarters, to bridge across the many chasms in our ancient histories, and to throw, perhaps, a world of illustration upon Bible-story. Moab is now a wonderful monument of the truth of ancient prophecy: "Because thou hast trusted in thy works and in thy treasures thou shalt also be taken; and Chemosh shall go forth into captivity with his priests and his princes together. And the spoiler shall come upon every city, and no city shall escape; the valley also shall perish and the plain shall be destroyed, as the Lord hath spoken. Thou daughter that dost inhabit Dibon, come

down from thy glory and sit in thirst; for the spoiler of Moab shall come upon thee, and he shall destroy thy strongholds."* The strongholds are no more; the Bedouin lurks amidst their ancient ruins; but the time will surely come, when the scientific traveller will search the treasures of Moab with effect, and the skill of European scholars will be tasked to decipher her ancient stones and rend the mysterious veil which has for ages hid her glory from our eyes.

Art. IV.—*An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent.* By John Henry Newman, D. D. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1870.

A book which will teach men how they can assent to dogmas of which they have never heard, and feel indefectibly certain of inferences which fall short of demonstration or its virtual equivalent, might well be regarded as a valuable contribution to Roman Catholic theology. We are not overstating the matter when we affirm that this is the somewhat difficult task which Dr. Newman has set himself to accomplish. The work could not have fallen into better hands; and when we say that the learned author has embarked all his genius, culture, and metaphysical acumen in the enterprise, it is superfluous to add that his book is well worth reading. Dr. Newman is master of a simple, clear, untechnical English style; his pages teem with felicitous illustrations drawn from all quarters; and the essay abounds in passages revealing such depth and delicacy of psychological observation, that the reader whose tastes are at all philosophical will be charmed by the book even if he does not accept its teachings.

Here our commendation must end. In what follows, we propose to examine the leading positions which the author has taken, and, for the most part, we shall have to express our dissent.

* Jer. xlviii. 7, 8, 18.

Part I., embracing 136 pages, consists of a philosophical exposition of assent. The single point which the author wishes to make good is, that there are two kinds of assent—notional and real. A few words will suffice to indicate the links in the argument. Assent has to do with propositions. A proposition must be apprehended before it can be assented to; we must be able, that is to say, to impose a meaning on its terms, or at least on its predicate. For example: we may not know what "trade" is, but if we know what "interchange of goods" means, we can apprehend the proposition, "trade is the interchange of goods." The child who is told that "lucern is medicago sativa of the class diadelphia and order decandria," cannot assent to the proposition; it is Greek to him; but if he is told that "lucern" is food for cattle, and is shown cows grazing in the meadow, he can apprehend the proposition. To assent to a proposition is "to acquiesce in it as true." Propositions are notional or real. Notional propositions are those of which one or both of the terms are common nouns, as, "man is an animal." Real propositions are those of which both terms are singular nouns, as "Philip was the father of Alexander." As the proposition is notional or real, so is the apprehension of it, and as there is notional and real apprehension, so there is notional and real assent.

It is hardly supposable that Dr. Newman has been led to put so much stress upon this distinction between notional and real assent, out of pure love of philosophical discrimination. His philosophy, we may be sure, is ancillary to the system of religion which he approves. It would have saved his readers a great deal of trouble if Dr. Newman had told them plainly, what purpose the distinction, which he has introduced, was meant to serve. He has, however, carefully kept this out of sight, and the critic is left to form his own theory as to the author's motive in giving the book to the world.

Now, there underlies the whole of the author's discussion of this subject, the assumption, as it seems to us, that religion means only an assent to propositions embodying religious truth. If religion is chained to propositions, and the most a man can do is to assent to them, then what is the difference between the *amen* of the worldling and the *amen* of the Christian? Let

it be granted that religion may be defined as an assent to the propositions embodied in the creed of the church, and it at once becomes imperative to distinguish between the assent of a pious man and the assent of a licentious man. Dr. Newman's plan is to split the *genus* assent into the *species*, notional and real. So that a man, he says, may give notional assent to religious propositions, and so far forth be a theologian, but his assent must be real before it is entitled to the name religion. We shall try to show that Dr. Newman has failed in his attempt to distinguish between notional and real assent, but before that, we will say that, in our judgment, the way to distinguish between religion and theology, is to lift the former above the sphere of mere assent. The difference between the man who says *amen* to a creed, and the man who worships God, is not a difference in assent, but a difference between assent and assent *plus*—something else. It is a difference which the Reformed theologians indicate by the words *assensus* and *fiducia*,—which Dr. Chalmers happily expressed by the words *assent* and *consent*. It might, indeed, be said that the difference in the two cases is one of degree: that one man assents more positively than another; but Dr. Newman's *kinds* of assent, we doubt not, are the effect of his denying that there are *degrees* of assent. To admit degrees of assent, would be to open the door for doubt,—would be to provide an inclined plane whereby men might slide down from certitude to suspicion and unbelief. If assent is all that Rome requires, it becomes evident that assent must be unconditional. This, apart altogether from philosophical considerations. This is the difficulty which meets Dr. Newman. Religion means assent to religious propositions. But men assent who are not religious. What is to save us from absurdity? What door of escape is open? Says one: get out by the door of "degrees." Say that some believe feebly and some believe strongly, and that religion is a strong assent. But Newman has barred that door, in spite of Locke. He says, and rightly, in our opinion, that there are no degrees of assent. What is to be done, then, but make a door? and make it accordingly, he does. Henceforth let *kinds* do duty for *degrees*.

Another matter seems to have been in Dr. Newman's mind.

The *credenda* of the Church of Rome involve doctrines and statements which few people ever heard of, and which few could attach any meaning to. How is it possible for every member of the Church of Rome to give assent to everything she teaches? The matter is not difficult if the distinction between notional and real assent is kept in view. For assent may be given to every proposition by changing its form, or, more correctly, by substituting its equivalent. Thus, the child could not assent to the proposition "lucern is medicago sativa," &c., because he does not know what medicago sativa is; but he can assent to the proposition "that lucern is medicago sativa is true," for he knows what "true" means. "True" is a notion, though, and he gives a notional assent. His mother's word is enough to guarantee that the proposition is true. So, any dogma of the Church of Rome—any statement she is committed to—can be assented to in a notional way. And, in fact, every Romanist assents *implicite* to everything the Church of Rome teaches, or ever will teach, because he gives a real assent to the Church's infallibility. "The 'One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church,' is an article of the creed, and an article which, inclusive of her infallibility, all men, high and low, can easily master and accept with a real and operative assent. It stands in the place of all abstruse propositions in a Catholic's mind, for to believe in her word is virtually to believe in them all. Even what he cannot understand, he can believe to be true, and he believes it to be true because he believes in the Church." So that the distinction which at first looks like a mere philosophical subtlety is, we discover, a matter of serious importance. It disposes of two very perplexing questions. (1.) How shall we distinguish between vital religion and theological opinion on the principle that religion cannot transcend assent? Answer. By distinguishing between the assents. The latter is only notional and not real assent. (2.) How can a man assent to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, without knowing what her teaching is? Answer. A real assent to the Church's infallibility, implies a notional assent to the truth of everything she ever has declared or ever will declare.

No wonder that Dr. Newman endeavors to make good the

distinction between notional and real assent, with a refinement which is excessive.

His reasoning, however, is open to very serious criticism.

1. It is not true that general and singular propositions are respectively equivalent to propositions regarding notions, and propositions regarding things. Yet the author's distinction is based on this assumption. Thus: "What do the terms of a proposition, the predicate and the subject, stand for? Sometimes they stand for certain ideas existing in our own minds and not outside of them; sometimes for things simply external to us, brought home to us through the experiences and informations we have of them. . . . Now, there are propositions in which one or both of the terms are common nouns as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existing; such as 'man is an animal.' . . . These I call notional propositions, and the apprehension with which we infer or assent to them notional. . . . And there are other propositions which are composed of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and individual, as "Philip was the father of Alexander;' 'the earth goes round the sun.' . . . These I call real propositions, and their apprehension real."

In regard to the issues involved in these passages, there is, of course, room for difference of opinion growing out of different philosophical theories. But let us submit these statements to the test of two very different logical systems.

Logicians of the sensational school, like Mill and Bain, regard the terms of propositions as names. Thus:—

Names stand for { 1. Individuals, 2. Classes, 3. Qualities, } forming, { 1. Singular, 2. General, 3. Abstract, } Propositions, } concrete.

Newman says that a real proposition is one that stands for things and has to do with the concrete. But, according to the above table, general propositions have to do with things, too, and are concrete. If the word "man" is a label which may be stuck to a million of *things*, it certainly stands for what is concrete and real in those things as truly if not as far

as the word "John," which belongs to one particular thing. On this system, the true division would have been into abstract and concrete nouns, the concrete being again divisible into those which stand for individuals and those which stand for classes.

Nor is it true even under this system that singular propositions always refer to "things out of the mind." "Hercules slew Cacus," is a singular proposition, yet we are disposed to think that neither Hercules nor Cacus ever had an existence outside of mythology. Dr. Newman is extreme in requiring that singular propositions should always refer to *things*. If so, these things may be ideal, fictitious, notional. What are we to do with the host of singular propositions which might be culled out of romances, poems, mythologies; what with the characters in Dr. Newman's own "Tales?" He does not claim for them, surely, an existence out of his mind.

Thus, Dr. Newman's mode of dividing propositions into notional and real would not be accepted by Mr. Mill; nor would it fare much better at the hands of Dr. Mansel, a good representative of the opposite school. The latter * does not allow any logical place at all to the Singular Proposition, for he defines a concept as a "collection of attributes, united by a sign, and representing a possible object of intuition," and a judgment as a "combination of two concepts related to one or more common objects of possible intuition." Dr. Newman himself complains that it has come to pass "that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be, and are diluted or starved into abstract notions." . . . that "'man' is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by our senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us. He is attenuated to an aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification. Thus his appellation is made to suggest not the real thing that he is in this or that specimen of himself, but a definition. If I might use a harsh metaphor, I should say he is made the logarithm of his true self, and in that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of

* *Prolegomena Logica*, Am. ed. p. 68.

logarithms." Precisely: and there would be very little thinking done if we could not shorten the process by means of such *logarithms*—or concepts, that is to say. It is the fate of a word to become a concept, if we believe Mansel, by becoming part of a proposition. There is some ground for this view of the matter. It is true, indeed, that in the proposition, "Peter did outrun John," the words Peter and John stand for two individuals, and the proposition is, therefore, in that sense, singular. It is also true that in giving our assent to that proposition, neither Peter nor John is necessarily in consciousness. It may be a concept made up of certain attributes which we suppose to be realized in a person called Peter or John. At all events, in the word "outrun," in the the predicate, we have a concept. So, too, the word "earth" stands for a well-understood object, but if we will interpret our consciousness in the assent we give to the proposition, "The earth goes round the sun," we shall discover that "earth" is the symbol of a concept, the sign uniting certain attributes which we believe to co-exist in a certain object. In a word, whether we think, or speak, or assent to propositions, symbols take the place of things, and the only difference between individual and general terms of a proposition is, that in the one case the concept represents one object, and in the other a plurality of objects. Strictly speaking, therefore, all propositions are notional, or have a notional element, and even if they are not, it is certain that Singular Propositions are not always real—do not, that is to say, always stand for real things.

2. But granting, even, the validity of the distinction between notional and real propositions, it is not so apparent that there can be notional and real assents. We may assent to a notional proposition, or we may assent to a real proposition, but a notional and real assent we do not so readily understand. Suppose we substitute singular, general, and abstract for notional and real, and then talk of a singular assent, a general assent, and an abstract assent, and we shall see how absurdly we are using words.

The reason that the expressions notional and real assent do not impress us so readily with their absurdity is, that they

are equivocal, and leave the idea on the mind of an unguarded reader that the one is a more reliable, tangible assent than the other. Get rid of the equivocation, however, and the expressions become nonsense at once. If the words notional and real had been confined to propositions and not been made to qualify assent, it would have been impossible for the author to have wasted time in trying to show how notional assents may become real. A great deal of very fine writing becomes valueless, so far as argument is concerned, when we insist that Dr. Newman shall stand by his definitions. It is true that the story of Cæsar's assassination may bring up very vivid images to the mind; it is true that a proposition may open up a wider range of thought to some minds than to others; but after all, it is with the propositions we are dealing, and notional assent (tolerating an absurd expression) is assent to a notional proposition. It is the proposition which determines the kind of assent, not the subjective state of the person assenting. It ought to be a simple matter to determine whether a proposition is singular or general. It is bad enough to speak of notional and real assent, but to speak of assent to the same proposition as both notional and real in succession is strange indeed.

3. But the absurdity of Dr. Newman's distinction is nowhere more apparent than in its application to theology. All that the author has said is but a prelude to the chapter on "Religious Assents." He is anxious to make it clear that we can give a real assent to dogmatic theology. A real assent we must give, or, whatever we may be as theologians, we are *minus* religion.

Now, if anything is clear, it is that assent has to do with propositions; that assent moreover, by Dr. Newman's own definition, is notional or real as the proposition is notional or real. How Dr. Newman can expect men to assent *really* to a series of propositions concerning the Being of God, *every one of which is only notional*, passes our comprehension. We do not wish to be understood as setting a lower estimate on scientific theology than Dr. Newman. There is much that he says on the subject of religious assents with which we very fully agree. We are confident, however, that the act of reli-

gion which brings a man face to face with God is one thing, and the act of assent to a proposition embodying religious truth, a very different thing. Literature peoples the imagination with most vivid pictures, but it is a very tame interpretation of that state of consciousness, to say that we are *assenting* to a series of propositions. Poetry, we fear, would go a-begging in this world, if the most that men could do is to assent to the propositions which set it forth. A mother would assent to the proposition, "I love my child;" but it would be a very chilly affection which could be satisfied with a propositional statement. We assent to the statement, "Christ is our Redeemer," but we have gone beyond it when we are in communion with Him. If religion is assent only, it is but assent, and there is an end of it. Dr. Newman has provided us no criterion whereby the heartless *amen* of the worldling can be distinguished from the whole-hearted consecration of the Christian. Dr. Newman has tried hard to establish a distinction between notional and real assent. But the argument limps at every step.

The reviewer of Dr. N.'s book in the *Catholic World* for February, 1871, says, p. 605, 2d column, 2d par.: "Indeed, we think that the sense in which the author uses the terms (notional and real) is somewhat wider than that in which he has defined them"—a naïve concession, to be sure—wrapping up the whole argument against the essay. The weakness of Dr. N.'s position it, seems to us, is the fact that his definitions will not serve the dogmatic purpose of his book.

The second part of Dr. Newman's essay is occupied with a discussion of Assent and Inference. The word Certitude gives us the key to the problem which the author tries to solve in this part of his volume. The maxim of Bishop Butler, that "probability is the guide of life," will not sustain the position of Dr. Newman. Nothing short of an absolute certitude can sustain the Church of Rome in the position which she arrogates. To put her pretensions to the test of argument, and rest satisfied with only a balance of probability, granting that probability to amount even to "moral certainty," would be paralyzing. She can grip the sceptre of

spiritual sovereignty only by having an indefeetible certitude that she is right. If, however, it should happen, as we judge it does happen, that the argument in defence of her elaims falls short of demonstration, how is the laek to be supplied? How is the ehasm between the probable and the proved to be spanned? The man who could fairly answer this question would deserve to be eanonized, so valuable would be his eontribution to Roman Catholic Apologetics. It remains to be seen how Dr. Newman's labors will be appreciated at Rome.

The author nnder review disputes the position taken by Locke, that assent admits of degrees, and we think he has the best of the argument. Inferences, says Newman, may be strong or weak as they are well or ill supported, but assent is unconditional. "We might as well talk of Degrees of Truth as Degrees of Assent." We can illustrate the point we are eonsidering by taking the proposition "The Scriptures are plenarily inspired." Now, it is contended by those who agree with Locke, that men may assent to this proposition with varying degrees of emphasis. Some may be morally certain that the Scriptures are plenarily inspired; some may be of opinion that they are; some may have a suspicion that they are not. But Dr. Newman would say that these so-ealled degrees of assents to the same proposition are really uneonditional assents to different propositions, namely, the Sscriptures are beyond doubt inspired—are probably inspired—are possibly not inspired; in other words, that they are "not variations of assent to an inferenee, bnt assents to a variation in inferences."

Assent is one thing, certitnde another. To assent to a proposition is "to acquiesee in it as true;" certitude is the perception of a trnth with the perception that it is true; or the consciousness of knowing as expressed in the phrase, "I know that I know." Certitnde implies investigation. Very little of our information can be said to possess the eharacter of eertitnde. We give our assent to inferences whieh we have neither the time nor the ability to verify for ourselves, and we do so, as Dr. Newman says, on the principle of *cuique in arte suâ credendum est.* It is so with religions truths. "There were whole nations in the middle ages, thns steeped in the Catholie faith, who never used its doctrines as matters

of argument or research, or changed the original belief of their childhood into the more scientific convictions of philosophy." And there are numbers in the Protestant Churches to-day whose assent is not the result of investigation. The world, indeed, would be in a poor plight if men could put confidence in no inferences which they had not arrived at themselves by personal investigation. Yet, in some sense, they must find and give a reason of the faith that is in them.

A man must become a student though, if he wishes to be certain. Suppose a Roman Catholic is unsatisfied with an unintelligent assent to the doctrines of the Church of Rome. What is he to do? Inquire? No, says Newman; that would never do. To inquire would be to doubt; to doubt would be not to assent; not to assent and be a Catholic is to be in the Church and out of it at the same time. "If seeking includes doubting, and doubting excludes believing, then the Catholic who sets about inquiring, thereby declares that he is not a Catholic. He has already lost faith." What then? can a man reach certitude only by ceasing to be a Catholic? Not that exactly. He can *investigate*,—a valid enough distinction, we allow, but it is a question whether a man is in a position to be a fair seeker after truth who is subjected to such limitations. The Romanist may investigate, but his conclusions are ready-made. And so the Church of Rome stifles thought; puts a premium on ignorance; is in open conflict with science; perpetuates its dogmas by making it sinful to call them in question.

Certitude, moreover, is indefectible. "Once certitude, always certitude," says Dr. Newman, somewhat oracularly. "When [the mind] once becomes possessed of a truth, what is to dispossess it? but this is to be certain; *therefore once certitude, always certitude.* If certitude in any matter be the termination of all doubt or fear about its truth, and an unconditional conscious adherence to it, *it carries with it an inward assurance, strong, though implicit, that it shall never fail.*" The italics are ours, and they serve to show how Dr. Newman, though subtle enough generally, can fail sometimes to discriminate between things which differ very materially. The dogmatic statement, "once certitude, always certitude," has a

very different meaning from the statement that certitude is attended with the feeling "that it shall never fail." We are certain, let us suppose, of a fact of history. We have an "inward assurance" that our certitude "shall never fail." But that is no guarantee that it will not fail. The certitude, that our certitude of a fact in history will not fail, needs another certitude behind it, and so on, to infinity. I may—it is conceivable—have the certitude that I shall not die. But that will not make me immortal.

It is a shallow argument to say that the failure of an alleged certitude is only proof that the certitude never existed. If the indefectibility of certitude could be proved from other evidence, there would be some cogency in the argument, by way of replying to objections. Thus, if we can prove the doctrine of perseverance of the saints out of God's word, it is a sufficient reply to an objector who points us to one whose life is, as he might say, a practical refutation of the doctrine, to say that the absence of grace is proof positive that the man never had grace, and that his Christian profession was a piece of hypocrisy, or that he was self-deceived. And we mean nothing inconsistent with that full certitude in the case of real Christians which accepts as true what is true, and always will so accept it, so far as the essentials of Christianity are concerned, being kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation. The Christian knows in whom he has believed, and that nothing shall be able to separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

This is perfectly consistent with another fact, with which Dr. Newman's scheme is inconsistent, viz.: that in many matters even Christians become uncertain of or reject what they once deemed certain. This is still more largely and flagrantly true of unbelievers, all of which we shall soon see Dr. N. is compelled, virtually or expressly, to confess.

A man must be infallibly guided in any given matter before he can be sure of an indefectible certitude therein. Dr. Newman has anticipated, but he has not answered, this objection. He says: "Certitude is directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before me. Infalli-

bility, on the contrary, is just that which certitude is not; it *is* a faculty or gift, and relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter." If Dr. Newman intends these sentences, which are perfectly true, to be an answer to the objection above stated, he is certainly "wide of the mark." We do say that infallible certainty respecting the case involved, is needful in order to justify the statement that any particular certitude is indefectible. We are certain of a "fundamental truth," let us suppose; we feel sure that our certitude will never fail. But misled by speculative subtletics, we may not feel so sure to-morrow. If we were invested with infallibility the case would be different. Whatever we were certain of, under those circumstances, we should be certain of indefectibly. Christians, indeed, have unfailing certitudes of the Being and perfections of God, the infallible truth of His word, and of the fundamentals of Christianity expressed by that word, and the Holy Spirit its author. But Dr. Newman's answer to an objection, based on the frequent changes some make in their assents, is a point-blank admission that not all certitude is indefectible. "How is certitude possible at all," Dr. Newman represents an objector as asking, "considering it is so often misplaced, so often fickle and inconsistent; so deficient in available criteria? And as to the feeling of finality and security, ought it ever to be indulged? Is it not a mere weakness or extravagance, a deceit, to be eschewed by every clear and honest mind?" Properly enough, Dr. Newman treats the objection as of little weight. "Suppose," he continues, "I am walking out in the moonlight, and see dimly the outlines of some figure among the trees:—it is a man. I draw nearer:—it is still a man. But I come quite close to him and put out my arm. Then I find for certain that what I took for a man is but a singular shadow, formed by the falling of the moonlight on the interstices of some branches or their foliage. Am I not to indulge my second certitude because I was wrong in my first? . . . Or again: I depose, on my oath in a court of justice, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that I was robbed by the prisoner at the bar. Then, when the real offender is brought before me, I am obliged, to my great confusion, to retract.

Because I have been mistaken in my certitude, may I not at least be certain that I have been mistaken?" By all means; but how do these illustrations affect the integrity of the aphorism, "once certitude always certitude?" Dr. Newman's gun, it seems to us, does more execution at the breech than at the muzzle.

It is objected, moreover—and Dr. Newman's statement of the objection is much more forcible than his reply to it—that the loss of religious certitude is a matter common enough in the world. "Are not Jews certain of their interpretation of their law? yet they become Christians; are not Catholics certain about the new law? yet they become Protestants." And Dr. Newman replies by saying: "It is conceivable that a man might travel in his religious profession all the way from Heathenism to Catholicity through Mahometanism, Judaism, Unitarianism, Protestantism, and Anglicanism, without any one certitude lost, but with a continual accumulation of truths, which claimed from him and elicited in his intellect fresh and fresh certitudes." That may be, but it does not follow that one man in changing his religion does not part with a certitude, because another man in changing his adds to his certitudes. In other words, it is no argument against a sum in subtraction, that there is an arithmetical process called addition. There is one well-attested instance of a loss of religious certitude which even Dr. Newman does not dispute. We are not at liberty to make much use of it in this discussion, for, says our author, Paul's "conversion, as well as his after-life, is miraculous." Well, Dr. Newman, how about Luther's conversion? Was it miraculous, too? If we read history rightly, he lost a certitude respecting the Church of Rome, which, on Dr. Newman's theory, was impossible, short of a miracle. It is immaterial which horn of the dilemma Dr. Newman prefers. The latter, however, would not be a bad argument for Protestantism.

The logical course, as it seems to us, would have been to determine, the first of all, whether certitude is attainable at any price, and then to discuss the question of its indefectibility. Dr. Newman, however, has adopted a different plan. He has

discussed its indefectibility first, and started in quest of certitude afterwards. It turns out, too, that ratiocination is not equal to the task of leading us up to certitude, and its defects are supplemented by a faculty contrived for the purpose. We are led, therefore, to discuss the author's views on the subject of inference, and, rightly or wrongly, we find ourselves again assuming an antagonistic attitude. The following sentences will prepare the reader for the author's depreciating view of logic. "Let all thought be arrested and embodied in words. Let language have a monopoly of thought, and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language. Let every prompting of the intellect be ignored, every *momentum* of argument be disowned which is unprovided with an equivalent wording as its ticket for sharing in the common search after truth. Let the authority of nature, common sense, experience, genius, go for nothing. Ratiocination, thus restricted, and put into grooves, is what I have called Inference, and the science which is its regulating principle, is Logic." Language, then, is an impediment to thought. We confess we have been accustomed to take a different view of the matter. Indeed, we have been in the habit of setting very slight value upon the thoughts which lack means of expression. It is common enough for men to suppose that they have thoughts for which they have no suitable words, but our judgment is that speech is quite equal to the task of clothing all the ideas which men commonly have. When we are affluent in thought we shall not be poverty-stricken in language. Dr. Newman seems to keep pace with Dr. Bushnell and other eccentric religionists in depreciating logic and language as fatal to their systems. Logic is a failure; "it can only conclude probabilities; first, because its premises are assumed, not proved, and secondly, because its conclusions are abstract, and not concrete." . . . Inference comes short of proof in concrete matter because it has not a full command over the objects to which it relates, but merely assumes its premises. In order to complete the proof, we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms in which the assumptions may be proved; and then, still farther back, we are thrown upon others again to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms. . . .

But even now the difficulty is not at an end; it would be something to arrive at length at premises which are undeniable, however long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common measure of minds, which are accepted by some, rejected by others; in which, and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to truth, and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates, because they are evident in no other way. . . . We are not able to prove by syllogism that there are any self-evident propositions at all; but supposing there are (as of course I hold there are), still, who can determine them by logic? As an illustration of the statement that Inference fails because it is based on assumed premises, the author discusses a disputed passage in Shakespeare, and shows that it opens up "the consideration of myths, pious frauds, and other grave matters which introduce us into a *sylva*, dense and intricate, of first principles and elementary phenomena belonging to the domains of archæology and theology," and that men will come to different conclusions according to the mental bias with which they begin investigation.

It is furthermore charged against logic that its conclusions are abstract and not concrete. Thus: "'all men die; therefore Elias has died.' But he has not died, and did not die. He was an exception to the general law of humanity; so far, he did not come under that law, but under the law (so to say) of Elias." There is truth in what Dr. Newman says in regard to the character of much of our knowledge, only he errs when he holds logic responsible for our ignorance. If men have conflicting views on questions of literary criticism, it is not the province of logic to reduce them to unity. If, as Dr. Newman shows, historians are at loggerheads in regard to Roman history, it is not the fault of logic. It only proves that historical science is in a very unsettled condition. The fact is that logic is not an instrument which we use, as a lame man uses a stick. It is not like a telescope whose services we can dispense with when we get another of higher power. There are

certain well understood laws which all reasoning must follow. A logical system is simply a scientific exhibition of the laws of thinking. There is no more use in finding fault with it than there is in finding fault with our eyes. We must make up our minds to do without inferential knowledge altogether, or else be satisfied to submit it to logical tests.

The difficulties suggested by Dr. Newman, in the passages above quoted, we think, can be made apparent and accounted for at the same time, by distinguishing between deductive and inductive logic. Deductive logic is formally demonstrative. Inductive logic is formally undemonstrative.

Thus the syllogism:

All men are animals;
John is a man: ergo, etc.

is a demonstration. Indeed, the conclusion is so evident that there is a very general tendency to regard deductive logic as of very little account. Particularly is this the case with inductive logicians as Mill and Bain. Mr. De Morgan, however, well observes (*Formal Logic*, p. 44), "Inference does not give us more than there was before, but it may make us *see* more than we *saw* before: ideally speaking, then, it does give us (in the mind) more than there was before. But the homely truth that no more can come out than was in, though accepted as to all material objects, even by metaphysicians—who are generally well pleased to find the key of a box which contains what they want, though sure that it will put in no more than was there already—has been applied to logic, and even to mathematics, in depreciation of their rank as branches of knowledge."

The inductive argument is formally undemonstrative. The conclusion covers more ground than the premises. It is in reality an argument from the particular to the universal, based on a belief in the uniformity of nature.

It is very evident, then, that deductive syllogisms, though formally correct, may lead to false inferences. For the premises are either self-evident propositions, or conclusions deduced therefrom, or inductions; and in either case there may be room for discussion.

Thus we may argue:

Intuitive beliefs are true;
Belief in the external word is intuitive;
Therefore it is true.

But the minor premiss happens to be a bone of contention in philosophy, and it must be vindicated, as it can be, before the inference is valid.

Again.

Every man has his price;
Fabricius is a man;
Therefore he has his price.

But Fabricius happens to be a man of a very different stamp. The syllogism, though formally correct, does Fabricius gross injustice. The difficulty lies in the major premiss, which is an induction, and, however well it may apply to the generality of men, must not be regarded as absolutely true.

Dr. Newman is not far wrong, therefore, in saying that our knowledge rarely amounts to certitude, so far as logical process is concerned. Suppose, then, we concede that probability of indefinite degrees is all that we can look for: nay, that all knowledge rests on belief, that Faith is the Atlas which carries the whole world of reasoning on its back. What then? It would seem as if there was an end of certitude. And if certitude is to be understood in a strict mathematical sense, it is a word, we must confess, for which there is very little use beyond the formal and apodictic sciences. There is, however, the phrase "moral certitude," which expresses the repose which the mind enjoys in regard to inferences, and other judgments, which, though not absolutely demonstrative, are so little removed from demonstration that we feel no doubt regarding them. And when we use the word certitude, with reference to most of our inferential knowledge, we suppose that "moral certitude" is all that is meant. Moral certitude, however, may be as sure as any other certitude. Dr. Newman dislikes the expression, nevertheless. He is on the lookout for his peculiar "indefectible certitude." He has discovered an "illative faculty," which plays the stage-coach to the logical railroad, picking us up where ratiocination lands us, and taking us to our destination.

We have little hope that we shall be able to give our readers a clear understanding of what this "illative sense" is, as our space will not allow us to make long quotations. It is "an extra-logical judgment . . . is not common sense alone, but sometimes a special sense, demanding special qualifications." Again: "It [the mind] determines, what science cannot determine, the limit of converging probabilities and the reasons sufficient for a proof. This power of judging about truth and error in concrete matters, I call the illative sense," etc.

It not only carries us on from the point where logic halts, but it takes us under its care at the onset. It disposes of perplexing questions which materially affect reasoning: such as, the statement of the case; first principles; the *onus probandi*, etc. In fact, so wide a scope does the author give the "illative sense," that there would seem to be very little use of reasoning at all, and the shortest road to certitude and peace of mind would be for each man to vote himself infallible, and under the sanction of his "illative sense" allow himself to be indefectibly certain of whatever he particularly wishes to be true. While we discard, however, such "illative sense" as Dr. Newman sets up in place, and in disparagement, of logic, we do not mean to be understood as denying or ignoring the pregnant fact, that men are evermore carrying on the reasoning process irrespective of all knowledge, and all forms of logic.

Dr. Newman, moreover, at times, puts to the credit of the illative sense (supposing it to exist), what fairly belongs to logic; and, as the advocate of fair play, the writer feels bound to call attention to it. Logic, Dr. Newman says,—and he is right about it,—would not lead a Protestant to the certitude that he ought to join the Church (of Rome). Thus the syllogism:

All Protestants are bound to join the Church;
You are a Protestant: ergo, etc.,

would set a man thinking; would raise a great many questions to which he could not give certain answers. But though his inquiries should lead him to a series of probabilities only, he might, continues Dr. Newman, be certain that he ought to

join the Church. This is an instance in which the "illative sense" enables a man to draw a conclusion in advance of syllogism. But we submit: is not a man's certainty that he ought to join the Church of Rome one thing, and the certainty that the Church of Rome is the only true Church another? Now, granting that the inquirer could get no further than the point of believing that the balance of probability is in favor of the Church of Rome, might he not logically, and without any special "illative sense," argue thus:

I ought to join the Church which has preponderating evidence in its favor.

But the Church of Rome has, etc.,

Therefore I ought, etc.;

and might he not feel *certain* that he ought?

Then, there are certitudes so called, put to the credit of the "illative sense," which, strictly speaking, are only "moral certitudes," and for concluding which, logical process is perfectly competent.

Are we quite sure that every man shall die? Newman says we are, but that we lack evidence to justify it, and falls back on the "illative sense." But Elias did not die. We believe in the second coming of Christ. How can we be certain, indefectibly, that that event will not occur in our day? We have a "moral certainty," a firm persuasion, growing out of our confidence in the uniformity of nature, and the testimony of Scripture, which leads us to expect death; but for giving us that, the services of an illative sense are quite superfluous.

Certitude, Dr. Newman tells us, is the result of investigation. Yet investigation, he also tells us, so far as it runs in logical grooves, does not lead to certitude. We will not criticise this apparent incongruity. But we venture the remark, that for a man to feel absolutely and indefectibly certain of an inference which he knows at the same time to be undemonstrable and incapable of certain proof—of an inference, mind, not of a first truth—is a psychological impossibility. It would be so to us, at all events, and Dr. Newman says, that in these matters "egotism is true modesty."

But, supposing that we do reach certitude in the way Dr.

Newman suggests: of what use is it? To take the case which our author cites, wherein Niebuhr, Clinton, Sir George Lewis, Grote, and Mure, all disagree: suppose that each of these historians arrives at certitude by means of his "illative sense," in regard to a certain question—the Trojan war, for example, and that each is a different certitude; then whose illative sense is to be trusted? It becomes necessary for each to arrogate to himself infallibility before he can enjoy the repose of certitude. We object, therefore, to this hypothesis of Dr. Newman's, because its tendency is to set up a purely subjective standard of truth, and is, in reality, a subtle phase of the doctrine taught long ago by Protagoras, and revived of late by Mr. Grote.*

That something is needful besides logic to convince a man of the truth of Romanism, we concede without any reluctance. That Dr. Newman has called into being, therefore, an "illative sense," to do what neither the five senses, nor common sense, nor the moral sense, will do, is not surprising. A man can make short work with spiritual doubt, if he can only place himself under the control of this sense. He can make himself reason-proof; he can live in an atmosphere tainted with Protestantism, and be in no danger of catching the infection. We have not, therefore, the faintest expectation that even this criticism will have any salutary effect on Dr. Newman. He has entered the chamber of certitude and turned the key. The outside world may call upon him to give a reason for his faith, but he answers not; may seek to convince him of his error, but in vain. He is certain—that is enough—and he comforts himself with the maxim of Ambrose, printed on the title-page of his book: "Non in dialecticâ, complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum."

The closing chapter of the volume is intended as an application of the doctrine of the "illative sense" to religious inferences. It would be hard to find, in the same compass, a better summary of the evidences of Christianity. With all, or nearly all, that the writer says, excepting, of course, the incidental allusions to Roman Catholic doctrines, the Protestant reader

* See Dr. McCosh: *Defence of Fundamental Truth.* Am. Ed. p. 245.

can very heartily coincide. Indeed, an unpractised reader might suppose that the author is making common cause with Protestants against infidelity. But such is not the case. To our mind, the chapter looks like an adroit, plausible, but specious argument for the Papacy. By the absence of a controversial tone, by emphasizing the doctrines held in common by Protestants and Romanists, Dr. Newman means to insinuate the idea that Rome has all that Protestantism has;—but more; that Protestantism rests on probable reasoning, while Rome offers certitude. This, indeed, was the argument employed in opposition to the Reformers. And in their zeal to meet argument by refutation, they took ground which has been much controverted. Thus, Principal Cunningham says,* in that scathing review of Hamilton: "The Romanists then, as well as now, were accustomed to allege that it was impossible for Protestants to have any *certainty* of the soundness of their views, or of the safety of their position; that though they might be able to produce plausible and apparently satisfactory pleadings in support of what they taught, they could have no adequate ground for perfect assurance of its truth; while Romanists had a firm ground for absolute certainty in the testimony or authority of the Church. . . . Protestants, in dealing with this allegation, were not unnaturally led to maintain, that upon all these subjects they had, or might have, not merely a probable persuasion, but a strict and absolute certainty, and to labor to unfold the grounds of the certainty to which they laid claims. It was here that many of the Reformers were led to propound views which appear to have been somewhat extreme and exaggerated, both in regard to the kind and degree of the certainty they contended for, and the grounds on which they professed to establish its reality and legitimacy. Protestants are not infallible any more than Papists." We do not understand this, however, as denying that all Christians may be made sure by God's word and Spirit of fundamental Christian verities; certainly we maintain no less.

To the argument that Protestants rest on probable evidence,

* *Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*, page 114.

we shall make no reply. A combination of probabilities may often amount to the strongest possible proof. If ratiocination will not make out an apodictic demonstration for us, it will lead us to "moral certitude." At any rate, God's word will. There is, at all events, as much evidence for Protestants as there is for Romanists in regard to the points in which we are one. And this evidence is certain and conclusive. It behooved Dr. Newman, as a Romanist, to show that there is as much evidence for the doctrines peculiar to the Church of Rome, as there is for those which that Church holds in common with Protestantism. Had he proved that there was the same moral certainty in both cases as the fair result of reasoning, then we admit the argument would have been all on his side. We are afraid, however, that there is a very wide evidential hiatus, of which the author must be painfully conscious, when he undertakes the discussion of the differentia of Protestantism and Romanism. We apprehend that it is a perilous leap, even under the stimulation of the "illative sense," from the religion of the Bible to the religion of the Pope.

Beautiful as the closing chapter of Dr. Newman's volume is, and much as we admired it, we could not read it without suspicion. It was a trap, baited, we thought, to catch unwary Protestants. And such is our opinion still. We feel toward it very much as Laocoon felt toward the Trojan horse:—

> "Aut hoc inclusi ligno occultantur Achivi,
> Aut hæc in nostras fabricata est machina muros,
> Inspectura domos, venturaque desuper urbi;
> Aut aliquis latet error: equo ne credite Teucri,
> Quidquid id est, *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*"

ART. V.—*The Constitution of the Person of Christ.*

A PAMPHLET has lately been issued by the Rev. Dr. Howard Crosby, entitled, "The True Humanity of Christ." It was first preached as a sermon to his own congregation, and after-

wards published in *The Baptist Quarterly.* It has awakened no little interest among thoughtful men, and has been received in some quarters with a degree of approbation which occasions a demand for its careful examination.* If its doctrine is correct, the long-cherished faith of the church concerning the Person of Christ must be reconsidered and stated in a very different formula. Confessedly its teaching is not that of "the vast mass of orthodox believers;" it is not "the practical creed of the present day with the Reformed Churches." It is an attempt to establish a theory respecting our Lord's Person, which has been occasionally supported by friends of the Gospel, and which it is thought will remove certain supposed or real difficulties in connexion with a subject which is essentially supernatural and superrational, so that "the true and unmysterious manhood of Christ" may be made plain and palpable.

We are wholly confined to the Bible in this matter. Neither philosophy nor science can help us. Curious inquiries, conjectures, and speculations, are all out of place. We may know what God himself reveals, and we can know nothing more. To scatter the clouds and darkness that encompass the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity, to shed one ray of light upon this "great mystery of Godliness," beyond what is done by the Bible, is simply impossible; and the Church of God, in its accepted symbols, has ever sought to confine itself strictly within the limits of the Divine Word.

In our examination of the positions of Dr. Crosby, our object is not simply to demonstrate their untenableness. We think his publication affords a timely opportunity to reaffirm the old and generally-received doctrine of the Constitution of the Person of Christ.

Owing to the condition of our times and the prevalence of certain forms of error, it is not at all surprising that undue emphasis should be placed on particular parts of this high subject. The controversy with American Unitarianism has doubtless had a tendency to so magnify the Divinity of our

* The pamphlet edition of this essay is neither dated nor paged. Consequently it is impossible to do more than put our extracts from it in quotation-marks.

Lord, as to obscure, or unduly put into the background, his proper and complete Humanity. But this is a limited and temporary evil, whose cure will be found, not in any new or sporadic doctrine on the subject, but in an intelligent recurrence to, and reiteration of, the ancient and standing doctrine, by means of which all the forms of error in the past have been triumphantly met and overthrown.

The Humanity of Christ is so patent to any reader of the Bible, that it has scarcely ever been questioned. Doubts concerning it have never obtained a footing in the Church. His birth and childhood and manner of life, make it perfectly clear that the Christ of the Bible was a real man. The aim and effort of the Church has been, not to establish the fact that Jesus of Nazareth was a man, but that, being a man, he was, at the same time, none other than the Second Person of the Godhead, the Divine Lord of glory; in other words, that he was God Incarnate.

The essay of Dr. Crosby is well meant. It is avowedly put forth in the interest of Revealed Truth. To his mind, the Humanity of Christ has been overshadowed and well-nigh nullified among Christians, by the prominence given to his Divinity, and they have thus been debarred from "his sympathy and love." While admitting most freely all that the Scripture has to say concerning his higher nature, he thinks that an unnecessary and unwarrantable interpretation has been placed upon many of its declarations, and it seems to be his opinion that the creeds of the Church are answerable for the (to him) erroneous views that so widely obtain. Our estimate of the importance of clear and full statements of the Perfect Humanity of Christ, is as high as Dr. Crosby's; and we can enter into his feelings, and appreciate the state of mind in which he has undertaken its maintenance and illustration: but we are persuaded that in his zeal for the Truth, he has not only darkened counsel by words without knowledge, but has also furnished a weapon to the adversaries of the truth as it is in Jesus, of which, as we learn, they have not been slow to avail themselves. Our readers will presently be able to judge of the correctness of this opinion.

The pamphlet opens with an argument to prove the entire

"truthfulness" or "truth of Jesus." This means that he was a person in whom all the elements of a perfectly adjusted and balanced character and life were combined. Wisdom, justice, sympathy, gentleness, a kindly fellowship, equanimity, and the like, were constantly manifest in him. We suppose that the design of the author is to establish the real Humanity of Christ. On this it is only necessary to remark, that, from the nature of the task before him, he has been led into one or two statements that are not warranted by the record. He says, "His conversation was eminently practical, having cognizance of, and relation to, the many-sided duties and incidents of daily life. There were no assumptions of higher knowledge or higher rank; there was nothing haughty or supercilious in his demeanor, no affected distance in manner or habits, no enshrouding of his person in mystery." Now, Christ did declare himself to be a Supreme Prophet, Priest, King, and Judge; the true Messiah, the Son and equal of God, one with the Father. He did assume to call men to faith in him as a complete and everlasting Saviour from sin, death, and hell; he did, in the language of the author of "Ecce Homo," lay claim, "persistently, with the calmness of entire conviction, in opposition to the whole religious world, in spite of the offence which his own followers conceived, to a dominion more transcendent, more universal, more complete, than the most delirious votary of glory ever aspired to in his dreams." It is true that there was "nothing haughty or supercilious in his demeanor, no affected distance in manner or habits;" but it is not true that there was "no enshrouding of his Person." He was the enigma of Palestine. He once asked his disciples: "Whom do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?" And they said: "Some say that Thou art John the Baptist; some, Elias; and others, Jeremias, or one of the prophets." And only those who saw in him "Christ, the Son of the living God;" who believed that in him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," could solve the great mystery.

In the next place, the pamphlet affirms "the Supreme Godhood of Christ." And, while by no means exhaustive even in the way of outline on this point, it is very satisfactory. Dr.

Crosby concludes this part of his essay by saying: "The Supreme Godhood of Jesus Christ is thus a truth as clear as the light of day. Every page of the New Testament receives its peculiar force from this fundamental fact, and there is no avoidance of its power but in the rejection of the Scripture itself. The Christ of the Bible is God over all."

Moreover, he is very distinct in the avowal that Christ is but one person. He teaches most distinctly that He has two natures, the human and the Divine, in a single person. He even charges that "the Reformed churches have gone over to a virtual duplication of the person of Christ." The authority for this statement he does not give, nor do we think it can be verified in the form in which it is made.* But with this we do not now concern ourselves. It is exceedingly satisfactory to know, that with regard to the uni-personality of Christ, he is in agreement with all the creeds of the Church in all ages.

In regard to Dr. Crosby's statement of these three essential factors in the person of Christ, we have no difference with him.

His next position, and it is the one with which the essay is chiefly concerned, is remarkable and startling. His doctrine is not altogether new. From time to time individuals of otherwise accredited orthodoxy have held it, or something like it, but it has never prevailed to any extent; it has not found a place

*We are reminded here of some remarks of the late Principal Cunningham, which are worthy of thoughtful consideration: "There is reason to fear that professing Christians in general, and even ministers of the Gospel, are too apt to rest satisfied with very vague and indefinite conceptions of the person of Christ, and to contemplate Him too much in general as a glorious and exalted being, who came down from heaven to save sinners, without distinctly regarding Him as being at once very God and very man—a real possessor of the Divine nature, and at the same time as truly and fully a real partaker of flesh and blood like ourselves. This is the view given us in Scripture of the person of our Redeemer: and it is only when this view of His person, in all its completeness, is understood and realized, that we are duly honoring the Son, and that we are at all fitted to cherish and express the feelings, and to discharge the duties, of which He is the appropriate object—to love Him with all our hearts, at once as our Creator and our Elder Brother—to rest in Him alone for salvation—to yield ourselves unto Him as alive from the dead—and to rely with implicit confidence on His ability and willingness to make all things work together for our welfare, and to admit us at length into His own presence and glory."—*Historical Theology*, vol. i., p. 320.

in a single creed of the Church; and it is regarded as so untenable that a goodly proportion of our "bodies of Divinity," as well as our commentaries, do not even mention it, contenting themselves with the statement and defence of the received account of our Lord's person. Dr. Crosby's arguments are largely his own. We doubt whether De Pressensé, or any accepted advocate of his doctrine, would defend it on the principles and in the methods of the essay before us.

It is a theory based upon a peculiar interpretation of the words of Paul in Phil. ii. 7. ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, which in our version are translated, "He made Himself of no reputation," and which may be, and frequently are, rendered, "He emptied Himself." Dr. Crosby does not attempt to establish the meaning he puts upon these words by an exegesis of the passage, but by what he considers the necessities of the case. The generally accepted view of the language, in his judgment, makes it impossible to maintain the real complete and perfect humanity of Christ, and hence the doctrine of the κένωσις, or incarnation of the second person of the Godhead, must be what it affirms.

This theory defines or describes the *condition* or *state of the essential Deity* of our Lord during His humiliation. It ascribes to the infinite, ineffable, and eternal nature of Christ, that which, as it appears to us, is utterly destructive of all fundamental ideas of the One only living and true God. It teaches that when the Second person of the Trinity, the Word that was in the beginning with God and was God, became incarnate,* He laid aside, or was in some unaccountable way dispossessed of, the attributes of His Divinity during the period of His humiliation; He practically, to all intents and purposes, ceased to be the living God for the space of thirty-three years. As He appeared in the flesh, He was virtually

* Dr. Crosby says: "The Scriptures assure us that the Logos *became* flesh (not *assumed* flesh)." We are not disposed to make any man an offender for a word; but the assertion that Christ *became* flesh, taken in connexion with the explicit denial that He *assumed* flesh, expresses a doctrine of the Incarnation which we had supposed was buried beyond resurrection among all Christians; a doctrine, however, to which the one we are examining is so akin, that this reference to it was not altogether unexpected.

only a man. He was not Himself aware of anything but His Humanity. For Him to have been conscious of His Divinity would have destroyed the complete verity of His human nature.

That we do not misapprehend or overstate the doctrine will be made abundantly evident in what follows.*

We are told, "It was necessary for Jesus to go to the Father before He could confer the gift of the Holy Ghost upon His Church. *He must regain the use of His Godhead* before this Divine action could be performed." "It was at the resurrection that Christ *reassumed the full powers of his Godhead.*"† "There is not and ought not to be *a vestige of Deity in His conscious life* till after the resurrection." Such forms of expression as these are constantly recurring throughout the essay. "The *dormancy* or *quiescence* of His Divine nature." "Its *efficiency* was in some mysterious way *paralyzed* in the person of Christ." "*A present active Divinity* destroys," etc. "*A present active Godhead* would have destroyed," etc. "Christ was always God, but He was not always directly conscious of his Godhood" (a very singular expression; as if He could be indirectly conscious of such a thing as essential Deity) "even when assured of His Godhood" (we do not see how Christ could be *assured* of His Godhood and at the same time be unconscious of it) "nor could He exercise its powers."‡

Now a dormant, inefficient, inactive, unconscious Deity in the Lord Jesus or in any person of the Trinity, or in any conceivable circumstances, is a contradiction in terms. It is impossible to think, to construe to the mind, such a thing as

* The italics in the extracts are ours.

† The language "full powers" is not intended to imply that He retained and used some of them. Subsequent quotations and the nature of the argument show this.

‡ Dr. Crosby in one place speaks of the inadequacy of our language to express his ideas. We gladly give him the benefit of this reservation; but we much doubt whether his ideas would have been more clear or correct, in any language, earthly or heavenly. He says in a note, "Christ's essential Deity (we hold) existed necessarily at all times and in all places. We only speak of His *conscious* and *efficient* Deity. We assert that His Deity was (*for lack of a better word*) dormant." We may inquire, Was it *dormant at all times and in all places* for thirty-three years?

inefficient omnipotence, *i.e.*, Infinite Power brought into such a condition that the Person possessing it cannot exercise it,—the very conception of Almightiness in that of efficiency. So, too, *unconscious Omniscience* is an unthinkable idea; an Omniscient Being, knowing all things, yet not knowing that He knows them, yea, knowing nothing beyond the ability of a person "of acute observation," or at most of one who has some special revelations. Equally beyond the grasp of the mind is the conception of an Omnipresent Being, essentially and actually everywhere present, the Illimitable One, and yet consciously nowhere present, not even within the limitations of a mortal body.

Christians are accustomed to speak of God (1) as to His Being or essence and attributes, and (2) as to the Mode of His Existence. There is but One God; and this One God is the ever and everywhere Living and True God; "a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Jesus Christ was this very God, and Dr. Crosby, as we have seen, most explicitly affirms it; but if He was God, He was immutably so, both in His essence and in His attributes; He was so "at all times, in all places;" from eternity to eternity unchangeably the same. There was no instant of His existence in Heaven or on Earth in which He was not all-wise, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good. To assert the contrary is to assert *mutability* of Him who is "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

And then, as to the Mode of the Divine Existence. This One only living and true God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost of Revelation; and the Divine nature or essence, with all its attributes, is numerically and identically the same in each and all these Three; and their union in that nature is from Eternity. Now, because of His Incarnation, to sever the person of the Son from the common Deity so as to make Him unconscious of its possession and incapable of its use, is fatally to mar the God of the Bible, who is not the Father alone, nor the Son alone, nor the Holy Spirit alone, but the Father, Son, and Spirit subsisting in a common, undivided, indivisible nature. Whatever affects that nature in one of the persons of the Godhead necessarily affects it in the oth-

ers. The cessation of the activity of Deity in Christ, involves the same thing in the Father and the Holy Spirit. If Deity is dormant, it is the Deity of the Father as well as that of the Son; and it was as improper for Christ to say "My Father worketh hitherto," as it was to say "and I work." The conception of an Eternally Divine Person unconscious, ignorant of His eternal nature, is an impossibility.*

But to return to Dr. Crosby's argument. He attempts to fortify his statements by a reference to several attributes of the Deity, which he maintains could not have had place or power in the conscious life of our Redeemer. Of course, if it can be shown that the Lord Jesus in His Incarnate state was incapable of working miracles, incapable of seeing and knowing all things, incapable of being omnipresent, by virtue of His own Divinity, the conclusion is inevitable that His Divinity (if, after this, it could be said He had Divinity at all) was dormant, and inefficient, and paralyzed.

We are told "that no *action* of our Saviour's earthly life, from Bethlehem to Calvary, exhibits divinity." This is a very candid and consistent utterance; but as it contravenes

* Dr. Crosby appears to feel the force of this, and endeavors to escape it by saying, in a note, "I use 'person' in the ordinary sense of individuality, or oneness of efficient being, and not in the technical and extraordinary sense in which we apply it to the persons of the Trinity. No orthodox believer denies that Christ was a separate and single person (or hypostasis) in the Trinity, but the vast mass of orthodox believers make Christ, as God-man, a double person in the ordinary meaning of that word, as applied to all beyond this mere corporeal frame." He is thus made not the "God-man," but the "God and man." We think this unfair, and a begging of the very question under discussion. The words person, individuality, and being, are left without determinate meaning. Still, we are willing to accept his account of "person" as far as it goes. While "individuality or oneness of efficient being" is a far more extraordinary account of the word than that which he applies to the persons of the Trinity, *separate* and *single* persons, it is just as applicable to an army or a congress or any corporate body of men, or to a dog or a horse or any unintelligent animal, as it is to a man, or an angel, or a spirit. The orthodox faith admits that Christ was a double, or more properly a compound, person, *i. e.*, he was one person with two natures, ascribing to the one individual efficient being Christ Jesus perfect Godhood and perfect manhood; and it denies that he is *God-man*, in the sense of his being a *tertium quid*, a person with his natures intermixed, or in any sense that would make it improper to say he was God and man. On the use of the word "person," we would refer the reader to Bishop Waterland's works, Vol. II., page 650.

the well-nigh universal judgment of Christian scholarship and piety, the arguments of the two or three pages devoted to it, are hardly sufficient to establish it. It has been generally understood that when Christ sent forth His disciples commanding them to work all their miracles *in His name*, there was in this a marked discrimination between His own miracles and theirs. The very fact that the miracles were to be wrought *in His name*, implied original authority and power on His part to do such works. How this could be, while His Deity was dormant and He was unconscious of it, we must leave Dr. C. to explain. Beyond all question, the power in the disciples to work miracles was the direct bestowment of Christ. Not an intimation is given that He was delegating to them what had been in like manner previously delegated to Him. "Behold *I give* unto you power to tread on serpents and scorpions and over all the power of the enemy." Luke x. 19. "And *He gave* them power and authority over all devils and to cure diseases." Luke ix. 1. If the record seems to make it appear that the Apostles wrought some of their miracles without reference to the name of Christ, we may not infer a neglect of their Lord's commandment: we need only recall His oft-repeated direction, and assume an accepted obedience to it in every instance. The argument of Dr. Crosby puts Christ and His disciples on precisely the same level in this matter. He says, "There is a popular fallacy that our Saviour spake in working miracles with an authority peculiar to Himself, while others who wrought miracles modestly spake in the name of God. The sacred record will not bear out this theory, except for burial." We think that any reader of the lives of Christ, and of those mere men who wrought miracles in His name, if he has no theory to establish, could not avoid seeing and feeling the immensity of the difference between them; a difference which has been almost universally noted in all ages.

When Dr. Crosby tells us that Christ wrought all His miracles through power or authority "delegated" to Him by His Father, he does this in order to argue Christ's inability to work them by virtue of His own Omnipotence. But this is an unwarranted inference. The Unity of the Divine nature

and the personal distinctions of the Father and the Son in that nature compel a different conclusion. The Father is the Fons Redemptionis as well as the Fons Trinitatis. He is first, in order of relation and of operation. He is represented as originating the plan of Redemption. "God (the Father) so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son," and the Son is represented as acting in obedience to the will of the Father, who gives Him "commandment" what He shall say and what He shall do. But this does not reduce our Lord to the same level with creatures. For while Christ is the only and eternal Son of the Father, He is at the same time equal with Him. "I and my Father are one." They are "the same in substance, and equal in power and glory." And hence we find such language as this: "The Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father do: for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doeth. . . For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth *whom He will*." * "If I do not the work of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in Him."† The Lord Christ was sent into the world by His Father, and in the fulfilment of the will of His Father He wrought His miracles, and so complete and undivided was the Divine nature in both, that He could do nothing of Himself. His works, by the necessities of an infinite nature, must be in perfect concurrence with the will of His Father: but they were all Christ's own works, wrought by that Omnipotence which was the same in Him and in His Father.

Considerable stress is laid upon the statement, "The miracles were wrought to prove He was *sent of God*, not to prove that He was God." This is partly true; but it is also true, that while the miracles accredited Him as the Messiah, the manner of their performance, in connexion with His own assertions of His essential oneness with the Father, do demonstrate His Divinity. "This beginning of miracles did Jesus

* John v. 19–21. † John x. 37, 38.

in Cana of Galilee, and *manifested forth His glory;*" not merely His *mission*, but His *glory*.

But Dr. Crosby not only thus denies Omnipotence to Christ during His humiliation, he divests Him also of conscious Omniscience. Quoting certain passages * that are usually interpreted to imply this attribute of Divinity, he says: "Now there is nothing in these passages which could not apply to a man of acute observation, especially if inspired of God." Our Lord's seeing Nathaniel, when only a superhuman vision could have seen him, is ruled out in like manner, though Nathaniel himself was persuaded of His Divinity by it: "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God," an expression which the Jewish mind interpreted as meaning, "equal with God." His knowledge of the history of the Samaritan woman is similarly disposed of. "Now," says Dr. C., "when we add to these negative testimonies the positive declarations of Christ's lack of knowledge while in His humiliation, we are completely debarred from ascribing to Him a present efficient omniscience." But we cannot believe that the people of God in reading these and such like Scriptures have been blinded from the beginning. They have discerned, not the inspiration of a man, not special revelations to a man, not acute observations in a man, but signs and proofs of "God manifest in the flesh." When we read that "Jesus did not commit Himself unto them, because He knew all men, and needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man;" † "Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not and who should betray Him;" ‡ when we read these and such like statements, we are persuaded that we are reading of an Omniscient personage, and conclude with the disciples, "Now we are sure that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee." §

And the same conclusion is drawn from His prophecies. His foretelling His betrayal by Judas, His triple denial by Peter, His own death and His resurrection by His own power on the third day, the destruction of Jerusalem and the disso-

* Matt. ix. 4; xii. 25; Mark xii. 15; Luke vi. 8; xi. 47; John ii. 24, 25.

† John ii. 24, 25. ‡ John vi. 64. § John xvi. 30.

lution of the Jewish state, the chequered course and ultimate triumph of His Kingdom, the end of the world, the general resurrection, His second coming, the final Judgment, and everlasting retributions in Heaven and Hell; can we read these things, and mark the tone and manner in which they were announced, without the profound conviction that they were spoken, not by special revelation from His Father, because His Godhood was "dormant" and He "could not exercise its powers," but by One whose personal, all-comprehending knowledge was the reason of their utterance?

And how shall we understand such words as the following, which were spoken during the period of his humiliation: "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father." * "All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son and he to whom the Son will reveal him." † "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." ‡ "The Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that Himself doeth." § "Before Abraham was, I am." ‖ Assuredly, if Christ was "unconscious of his Divinity," if there was "not a vestige of Deity in his conscious life" before his crucifixion, such language is perfectly unintelligible. This intimate, profound, universal knowledge of "the deep things of God" cannot be the result of revelation; it must be a matter of personal immediate consciousness. If Christ's knowledge of the secrets of the human heart; if his insight into the near and distant future, can be accounted for on the supposition of the absence of "efficient Omniscience," his complete knowledge of the Infinite and Eternal God, as expressed in the above and similar utterances, can be explained on no such hypothesis. It stands a demonstration of the presence of immediate, most efficient Omniscience.

Another Divine attribute, of which, according to Dr. Crosby, our Lord had no consciousness, is Omnipresence. He says: "Regarding the absence of any conscious Omnipresence in

* John x. 15. † Matt. xi. 27. ‡ John i. 18.
§ John v. 20. ‖ John viii. 58.

Jesus, while in his state of humiliation, we can educe no positive proof, because, in the nature of the case, no act of his life would suggest his Omnipresence, his body being only in one place at one time." And, referring to John iii. 13, he says: "Here, the Son of man is said to be in heaven while on earth. Of course, His *body* could not have been in both places; therefore He must have been there as out of the body; and as the passage implies a conscious existence, the Son of man must have had two distinct conscious existences—one on earth and one in heaven—one in the body, and the other not confined to the body." And as this is regarded as an incredible condition of things, the translation is incorrect, and an attempt is made to better it. We suppose every other proof-text on this point would be dealt with in like manner. We have no space to follow him in his exegesis; nor is it needful, since he admits that "doubtless the passage can be so rightly rendered," *i. e.*, as it is rendered in our version. The failure of "positive proof" arises from the limitation of Christ's *acts* to His *body*, which could be "only in one place at one time." Such *acts* as Christ might do in the body, certainly could not exhibit His ubiquity. This can be known only by testimony. *Words* may, and words do, evince it. For this very Jesus, who was incarnate on the earth, was, at the same time, "in the bosom of the Father;" "He was in the Father and the Father in Him;" He was "wherever two or three were gathered together in His name;" "in heaven and on earth." As, however, our author supposes that the impossibility of Christ's manifesting and accrediting His Omnipresence was owing to the fact of His being "in the body," we need not dwell upon his remarkable statement. The same mode of reasoning will hold good concerning Christ in His glorified state. If the proof of His Omnipresence is dependent on the limitations of His bodily existence, as His *body* is now just as really localized and limited as it was during His humiliation, His ubiquity can of course never be proved by His "acts:" in both states, it must be proved by evidence appropriate to the case.

Dr. Crosby remarks: "No *action* of our Saviour's life exhibits Divinity. His *words* do, but His actions do not."

This is a distinction beyond our comprehension, so far as his argument is concerned. It seems to deny and nullify it altogether. For the argument is based upon the assumption that "Deity in Christ was dormant;" He was "unconscious" of His being God. "His *acts* afford no evidence of His Divinity, but His *words* do." If they do, the common doctrine concerning His person is secure. It is true that Dr. C. quotes *words* from Christ to show that He could not have known that He was God, that He "could not exercise" the Divine attribute of Omniscience; and remarks: "Is it anything but trifling to say that the *man* Jesus did not know, but the *God* Jesus did? Was not He who spake to the four disciples *one* person? Was He a double who could deceive His disciples by equally affirming or denying personal action of Himself as one thing or the other?" But how will the case stand when other words of our Lord prove the very reverse, and evince a most lively and certain consciousness of Deity? And what is very singular, the Doctor himself gives a number of them. While he holds that the Divine nature was dormant in Christ during His humiliation, he also says that "its *essence was there, for it is impossible for Deity to become extinct*, but its efficiency was in some mysterious way paralyzed in the person of Jesus." In the essay he aims to establish the perfect and supreme Godhood of Christ by referring to such passages as these: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;" "All men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father;" "I am the Bread of Life;" "Come unto *Me* and I will give you rest;" "Before Abraham was, I am;" "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." To these we add: "I am the Light of the world;" "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life;" "I am the Resurrection and the Life;"—and we ask, how could Christ have uttered such words, if "there was not a vestige of Deity in His conscious life?" On their very face they imply a most profound and vital knowledge of His own supreme absolute Divinity. Verily, if His *acts* failed to exhibit His Divinity, His *words* abundantly supply the lack. Perhaps the statement, "Christ was not directly conscious of His Divinity, even when assured of it," is designed as an escape from the inevi-

table consequenees of this admission ; but if so, is not this an enigma surpassing any that Samson ever propounded ?

The Apostle Paul tells us that "God was *manifest* in the flesh ;" * and John says, "The Life was *manifested*, and we have seen it and bear witness, and show unto you that Eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was *manifested* unto us." † So Nathaniel, and the man born blind, and the centurion at the cross, confessed. Peter and the disciples and the devils frequently declared, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of God, the Son of the living God." ‡ So hundreds believed and acted upon their faith. A dormant, inefficient, paralyzed Deity was not that which was manifested unto them, but a living, glorious, Omnipotent Deity. They "beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth ;" § and in failing to see it, men were justly open to the rebuke of our Lord to Philip: "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip ?"

This ruling out every vestige of conscious active Deity from Christ during His whole career from the manger to the Resurrection, seems to us sad work. We do not wonder that the enemies of His Divinity find in Dr. C's position a great help in their efforts to show that he was a mere man. The kind of Divinity which our Lord possessed may be honestly and earnestly called "essential," "supreme," and the like, but if it was capable of what this essay aseribes to it, it may well be doubted whether Socinians would find much difficulty in allowing it. Abstract all *efficiency* and *activity* and *consciousness* from it, and what remains may easily be rejected as the assertion of "the one only living and true God."

It is true that there was much concealment of the Divine majesty and glory in Christ during his stay upon the earth ; that in his Incarnation he veiled from human eyes much of that which angelic hosts had adored in his pre-existent state, and that the constant manifestation of his Deity as it was revealed, *e. g.*, on the Mount of Transfiguration, would have been

* 1 Tim iii. 16.

† 1 John i. 2.

‡ Matt. xvi. 16; Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Matt. xiv. 33; Luke iv. 41 ; John vi. 69, and xi. 27.

§ John i. 14.

incompatible with the work He had undertaken to perform. Still there were sufficient evidences of it; bright gleams and vivid signs of it frequently broke forth and compelled the faith of beholders. Especially was this the case with His disciples, to whom it was given to know more of the "Kingdom" and its King than to others. His miracles and words of wisdom and knowledge, and sometimes his looks and gestures, gave convincing evidence of a present active Deity. We freely admit that the veil of his flesh hid from human eyes much, very much, of His glory, though we cannot admit that it concealed it from His own infinite vision. But enough was seen to prove that He was the eternal and only-begotten Son of God. And this leads us to the true doctrine of the "Kenosis" of Phil. ii. 7, the sense in which our Lord "emptied himself." The Apostle states it with entire clearness in the immediate context. He emptied Himself (*a*) by "taking on Him the form of a servant," (*b*) by "being made in the likeness of men," (*c*) by being "formed in fashion as a man, and becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." * There was in His very Incarnation a temporary obscuration of the "glory which He had with the Father before the world was," † but which upon His ascension was unveiled in the exaltation and glorification of His humanity. Accordingly it is said, "God hath given Him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." ‡ The eyes of creatures, of angels, and of men might not see the effulgence of His Divinity during His humiliation, but that effulgence was no more put out than is the sun when veiled by clouds or eclipsed by the moon, or when the world is wrapped in the darkness of the night.

It will not be inappropriate to give a few statements on this subject from received standard authorities. "He emptied

* De Wette, quoted by Alford, *in loco*, says: "The manner and form of the *κένωσις* is given by the three following participles, *λαβών*, *γενόμενος*, *εὑρεθείς*."

† John xvii. 5. ‡ Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11.

himself of the μορφὴ θεοῦ, he ceased while in this state of exinanition to reflect the glory which He had with the Father." * "The estate of Christ's humiliation was that low condition wherein He, for our sakes, emptying Himself of His glory, took upon Him the form of a servant in His conception and birth, life, death, and after His death, until His resurrection."† "When our Lord is said to have made Himself of no reputation," or to have emptied Himself, which signifies much the same, we are not to suppose that He lost anything which He had before; or that He ceased to be in the *form of God*, by taking on Him the *form of man.* No: He had the same *essential* glory, the same *real* dignity which He ever had, but among men concealed it; appeared not in majesty and glory like to God, but divested Himself of every dazzling appearance, and every outward mark of majesty and greatness, condescending to appear, and act, and converse as a man, like unto us in all things, sin only excepted. In this sense it is that our Lord *emptied* Himself. He came not with any pomp or ostentation of greatness, He laid aside His God-like majesty, and disrobed Himself, as it were, of all outward glories, becoming a man, a miserable man, and in that nature suffering, bleeding, and dying for us." ‡ "Though nothing could possibly be taken off from the essential glory of the Deity, yet that Person appearing in the fashion of a man, and form of a servant, the glory of it, as to the manifestation, was eclipsed, and He appeared quite another thing than what indeed He was and had been from eternity." § "He concealed Himself under the meanness of the flesh, and humbled Himself by assuming the form of a servant, and laid aside His external majesty in obedience to the Father." ‖ "Deus non potest exinaniri per gloriae imminutionem, sed per ejus occultationem, non apud Deum *intrinsece* sed *extrinsece* quoad homines." ¶

In regard now to the other part of our subject, we will simply quote what Dr. Crosby teaches concerning it, and answer him, not by taking up his account in detail, but by mak-

* Alford, *in loc.*
‡ Waterland, works, vol. 2, pp. 111, 112.
‖ Calvin's Institutes, vol 1, p. 385.
† Larger Catechism, Quest. 46.
§ Owen, works, vol. 2, p. 134.
¶ Turretin, works, vol. 2, p. 277.

ing, in the space remaining to us, as plain a statement as we can of the received scriptural doctrine of the constitution of the person of our Lord. We find such sentences as the following in the essay before us: "When Jesus said He did *not* know, did He all the while know perfectly well? It is a strange theology that teaches this of Him who was the Truth." "When Jesus was asleep, was He all the time awake? Did He have only the semblance of sleep? Was he acting a part?" "And so when He was a babe, He was a very babe. A present active Godhood would have destroyed the babe and made a monstrosity." "Omniscience could not have been exercised by the Jesus who was growing in wisdom." "What sort of a humanity is that which has a Divine activity inseparably attached to it?" "How is Christ made like unto His brethren, if He is a duality of consciousness, while they have but a single consciousness to fall back upon?" "With this view of the κένωσις of Christ, we can understand why our Saviour cried out to the Father, in Gethsemane, and not to His divine nature, and why He could feel forsaken of God upon the cross. A consciously acting Deity in Christ at this time is not simply a mystery, but a contradiction." "The mystery is . . . not in the confusing presence of Godhood and manhood together in their conscious acting." It is very evident from some of these extracts, that in assailing the common faith concerning the person of Christ, Dr. Crosby is fighting a shadow. That Faith does not so unite His two natures as to confound or commingle them, to humanize the Deity, or deify the Humanity. There is no *confusing* presence of Godhood or Manhood in His sacred person in the just statement of the Church doctrine. The two natures are entire and distinct, without conversion, composition, or confusion in the One person, Christ Jesus, whose one and only personality is from eternity.

In the Bible, the Lord Jesus Christ is presented to us *as a perfect man*, having a true body and a reasonable soul. He was conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary. He was an infant in his mother's arms. He grew in stature and in wisdom, and in favor with God and man, as his years multiplied. He was subject to his parents and to Cæsar. He ate

and drank, slept and woke, worked and rested, as do other men. He had all the natural affections of a man, and as such he suffered and died and was buried.

He is also presented to us *as perfect God.* The essence and the attributes of absolute Divinity were His. He was in the beginning with God, and was God. He was God over all blessed forever: God manifest in the flesh; that Eternal life which was with the Father; one with the Father, He being in the Father and the Father in Him; He was the Creator and Upholder of the worlds, knowing all things and everywhere present.

This Jesus, who was thus at the same time perfect man and perfect God, is presented to us in the Bible as but one Person, one self-conscious, intelligent Agent. His Humanity and His Divinity subsisted under a single Ego. Whatever He did, whatever He said, whatever He suffered, was done and spoken and suffered by one and the same individual person. The "child born, the Son given," was the same person who was the "Mighty God, the Prince of Peace." He who was "in the beginning with God and was God," was the very person who was "made flesh" and lay a babe in the manger of Bethlehem. The Jesus of whom it is said "He grew in wisdom," was at the same time "filled with wisdom." He who, sitting weary by the side of Jacob's well at Sychar, said to the woman of Samaria, "I thirst," was the very same person who said, "If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water." He of whom it was said, "The foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay His head," is He of whom it was said, He "is the Only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father." He whose hunger was satisfied at the board of the family in Bethany, was the very person who said, "I am the living Bread which came down from Heaven; if any man eat of this Bread he shall live forever." He who lay "asleep in the hinder part of the ship," was "that person" who upheld all things by the word of His power. He who said, "*I* and *My* Father are one," said also, "*My* mother and *My* brethren are they," etc. He who said,

"Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in Heaven, neither the Son, but the Father," was the same who said, "As the Father knoweth Me, even so know I the Father," and "the Father loveth the Son and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth." He who expired on Calvary, was the very same person of whom it is written that "He only hath immortality." The occupant of Joseph's tomb was He who cried, "Lazarus, come forth," and said, "I am the Resurrection and the Life." He who "purchased the Church" was God (the Son), yet He did it with "His own blood." These are a few of the ineffable contrasts given in the Scripture concerning Jesus Christ, and we might multiply them indefinitely. They reveal to us a transcendent, incomprehensible union of two natures, infinite and finite, in one person; and that person not a man, as was Peter, or James, or John, in whom such contrasts were impossible, but the Second Person of the Godhead, who had assumed into His personality our nature, a true body, and a reasonable soul. His Divine nature was of course unchangeable, incommunicable, indivisible. He was just as truly God after, as He was before, His Incarnation: and He was just as truly man as any other human being: only the personality which held and acted this human nature, was that of the eternal Son of the Father. The two natures were entire, distinct, unconfused. His Divinity, filling heaven and earth, immensity and eternity, was the very same with that of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and it no more interfered with His human body or soul than it does with the bodies and the souls of other men. And His Humanity, finite and weak, and capable of increasing knowledge, and subject to sickness and injury and death, did not prevent the ceaseless activity of His Divinity in all its proper relations and operations.*

"The distinction between a *nature* and a *person*," says Dr. Shedd, "is of as great consequence in Christology, as in Trinitarianism; and the Chalcedon divines were enabled, by care-

* We need not speak of the "*Communicatio idiomatum;*" in which the properties of the two several natures, and the actings of Christ under both natures as Mediator, Prophet, Priest, and King, are all ascribed unto His single Person. A succinct account will be found in Owen's Works, vol. I., pp. 233–235.

fully observing it, to combine all the Scripture data relating to the Incarnation, into a form of statement that has been accepted by the church universal ever since, and beyond which it is probable the human mind is unable to go in the endeavor to unfold the mystery of Christ's complex Person, which, in some of its aspects, is even more baffling than the mystery of the Trinity." * The following is the deliverance of the Council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451: "We teach that Jesus Christ is perfect as respects Godhood, and perfect as respects manhood; that He is truly God and truly a man, consisting of a rational soul and a body; that He is consubstantial with the Father as to His Divinity, and consubstantial with us as to His Humanity, and like us in all respects, sin excepted. He was begotten of the Father before creation, as to His Deity; but in these last days He was born of Mary the Mother of God, as to His Humanity. He is one and the same Christ existing in two natures without mixture, without change, without division, without separation, the diversity of the two natures not being at all destroyed by their union in the person, but the peculiar properties of each nature being preserved, and concurring to one person, and one subsistence." The language of our Confession of Faith is equally clear and precise. "The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance, and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take upon Him man's nature, with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin; being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God, and very man, yet one Christ, the Mediator between God and man." Conf. ch. 8, sec. 2. This statement is admirably analyzed and illustrated in the Commentary on the Confession, by Dr. A. A. Hodge, pp. 190–196.

The union of the two natures in Christ was strictly a hypostatic or personal one, *i. e.*, it was a union of each nature to His

* *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. I., pp. 407, 408.

person, and not a union of the two natures as such to each other; for they each remain without mixture, composition, or confusion. The sacramentarian theology of our day makes the union direct between the natures, and is bearing its legitimate fruit. And the teaching of some, that the personality of Christ was something peculiar, arising upon the union of the two natures, "a *resultant* of that union which is neither a human person, nor a divine person, but a theanthropic person," is equally aside from the Church statement. The only personality which belonged to Christ was that which he had "in the beginning," when, being God, He was "with God." The union of the *Divine* nature with the *person* of Christ was from eternity. His personality and His Divinity are coeternal. The assumption of humanity in time did not affect the integrity of either His divine nature or eternal personality, it only added to His personality, a finite nature, a true body and a reasonable soul, a nature now common to ourselves and the Eternal Son of God.

We have already exceeded the limits we had proposed to ourselves in this article, and we must bring our remarks to a close.

Dr. Crosby deeply feels, and not too deeply, the importance of maintaining the veritable humanity of our Lord. He endeavors to divest it of needless mystery, by associating it with a dormant Divinity. But this, as we have seen, is only augmenting mystery, not removing it. He has conceived of the Church doctrine in a manner contradictory to its most positive statements. According to this doctrine, "there is no confusing presence of Godhood and manhood together in their conscious acting" in the person of Christ. There is no such relation or acting of the Deity in connection with the humanity of our Lord as either to deify the latter or dehumanize the former. It stands out perfectly clear. He was not only a true and complete man, but He was just like ourselves, with the single exception of sin. The *infirmities*, which are the lot of our nature in its fallen state, were His. Unlike Adam in Paradise, He came into the world a babe in weakness and dependence. He was a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief; and, through a profound experience of poverty, reproach

and suffering, was qualified to enter into our temptations, and sympathies, and interests. This is a matter of simple revelation. These are statements, not within the "metaphysics" of Christology, but within the words of scripture. Unless thus taught, we would repudiate them altogether. Being thus taught, they become matters of simple, child-like, unreasoning faith. And here we rest. The only key that fits all the wards and moves the bolt of this wonderful lock, the only clue that guides us through this supernal labyrinth, is the hypostatic union of two complete, distinct natures, infinite and finite, in the one person of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Art. VI.—*Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon, with Notes, critical, explanatory, and practical, designed for both pastors and people.* By Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 549 and 551 Broadway. 1870.

In the valuable contributions to biblical literature which have been given to the American public within the last few years, the writings of Solomon have not been overlooked. Perhaps for the study of no portion of the Old Testament has a better apparatus been furnished. 1. In 1846, Dr. George R. Noyes, Professor of Hebrew, Harvard University, published "A new translation of the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Canticles, with introductions and notes, chiefly explanatory." 2. In 1851, Professor Moses Stuart published his "Commentary on Ecclesiastes." 3. In the succeeding year followed, from the same distinguished teacher and scholar, "A Commentary on the Book of Proverbs." 4. Not long after appeared Dr. George Burrowes' exposition of the Canticles. 5. And last year, in addition to the work at the head of this article, appeared the translation, as a part of Lange's *Bible-work*, under the general supervision of Dr. Schaff, Dr. Otto Zöckler's Commentaries on Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the

Song; the first translated and edited by Pres. Charles A. Aiken, of Union College; the second translated by Prof. William Wells, and edited by Prof. Tayler Lewis, L.L.D., both of the same College, with annotations, dissertations, a new metrical version, etc.; and the third translated, with additions, by W. Henry Green, D.D., of Princeton.

Dr. Cowles appears to have written under the conviction that the full sense of Solomon's writings is not ordinarily reached by the great mass of readers; that he has more beautiful and worthy thought than is ordinarily supposed, and also more profound wisdom and counsel toward a virtuous and happy life. He has evidently pursued the only course which could commend the results of his studies; that is, he has sought to ascertain the precise meaning of the inspired author, by carefully weighing the very words in which he wrote, while very wisely, as it seems to us, he has not thought it best to spread out on his pages the operose process by which he reached these results. The spirit of earnest piety that pervades his work is truly refreshing. In his ardor as a scholar and a critic, he has not allowed himself to overlook the great moral teachings of the writings on which he comments. In his preface to Proverbs, he says, "I send forth these notes on the Proverbs of Solomon in the hope that they will be specially useful to the young—a hope which so manifestly filled the bosom of Solomon when he wrote them, and addressed so many portions of them in the touching words, 'My Son.'"

Prof. Cowles, in the part of his work on Proverbs, does not attempt anything like a general analysis of the book, or an analysis of particular parts or chapters, as from the nature of it, consisting as it does of sayings, maxims, or apothegms, each one of which is distinct and complete in itself, this would be extremely difficult. It may not, however, be impossible to discover some *nexus* by which it may be found that they are arranged according to a regular sequence of subjects, or by which they may be distinguished into separate classes. Prof. Stuart attempts something of this sort, and marks six leading divisions of the book, or he notes "six different titles," as showing where a new and separate composition begins. He finds a general title, introductory to and descriptive of the

whole, in ch. i. 1–7. 1. Proverbs not written by Solomon, but incorporated by him, ch. i. 8—ix. 18. 2. "The Proverbs of Solomon," ch. x. 1—xxii. 16. 3. "The words of the wise," or proverbs of other wise men commended by him, xxii. 17—xxiv. 34. 4. Proverbs of Solomon which the men of Hezekiah copied out, ch. xxv. 1—xxix. 27. 5. The words of Agur, ch. xxx. 6. Words of Lemuel and eulogy of the virtuous woman, ch. xxxi. He notices at length the distinguishing characteristics of these several parts, and follows them, as distinct divisions, in the preparation of his Commentary. Zöckler's divisions are almost identically the same. He makes five instead of six, by including the words of Agur and Lemuel, and the eulogy of the virtuous matron, in one. We cannot avoid thinking that Dr. Cowles' Commentary would have been improved if he had at least recognized those divisions which appear in the Book of Proverbs itself. If it has a plan, it seems indispensable to a right interpretation of it as a whole, and in its several parts, that that plan should be recognized, and held constantly in view. To give a correct analysis of any writing is to put into the possession of the reader, even the plainest, the key to its true interpretation. This is a matter, we are convinced, which ought not to hold a second place even to grammatical criticism, or the ascertaining the meaning of words by study of the original.

Dr. Cowles seems to have approached the Song of Solomon with considerable hesitation, and to have paused long whether he should write upon it, or pass it without remark. This hesitation did not arise because he felt any doubt that it is an accredited portion of the inspired word; but from his difficulty in determining, first, whether the scope and aim of the book admit of being satisfactorily pointed out; and secondly, whether a book so thoroughly oriental in its conceptions and imagery can be read and studied with profit in our times. He seems to have concluded that to give reasons for passing it by would involve more or less discussion of the main questions at issue in the book. He appears to have commenced his investigations with a strong leaning toward the literal construction of the book as opposed to the allegorical, and to have been constrained, as he progressed, to abandon that view

completely. As an allegory, he understands it as representing the covenant relation between God and his people, in which mutual love and fidelity are the central elements; God, on his part, ever-loving toward his people, and his people, on their part, in duty bound, and solemnly binding themselves, to responsive love and eternal fidelity to their God.

But it is that portion of Dr. Cowles' book which relates to Ecclesiastes in which we have taken the greatest interest, as it is that on which he seems to have written with the greatest degree of interest to himself, and, in our judgment, with the greatest success. On the question of the Solomonic authorship, his argument is clear and conclusive. Of Hengstenberg's assertion that "the book of Ecclesiastes was not only not composed by Solomon, but does not even pretend to have been," he says with great pith, "This assertion may be left to the reader's good sense. Any one can see what the author of the book says of himself." His remarks on the style and dialect, as touching this question, are very weighty and scholarly.

But it is to the prominence assigned to a future state and final judgment in Ecclesiastes, to which we wish to call special attention. We have a profound conviction that the great truth, lying at the basis of this book of Holy Scripture, is, that it is a day of future recompense which can alone redeem this world, man and his affairs, and even the material world, from being regarded as an inexplicable mystery, or as the greatest vanity imaginable. As illustrating the ability with which our author handles this subject, and as a good specimen of his style and manner, we cite his comment on chapter iii. 11: "He hath made everything beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end."

"The first clause is plain, referring, however, not to God's works of creation, but rather to his works in providence, the same which are sketched in verses 1–8, and therefore is better rendered *done* than 'made.' In this endless shifting of human scenes, God has always done everything well in its *time* —this word 'time' here looking back to its use in verses 1–8. Working with the noblest ends, and guiding his work

with infinite wisdom, he evermore doeth all things beautifully, yea, infinitely well. The second clause demands our special attention. Critics have explained it variously. The translators of the English version seem to have understood it to say that though God had made all things so beautifully, yet he had put such love of the world into the hearts of men that they cannot find out his works thoroughly in all their relations and bearings. But this sense is too revolting to be accepted. We must not attribute man's love of the world to God as if it were his gift to man—much less still as given for such a purpose, viz., that man might not be able to understand God's works thoroughly. Fortunately, there is not the least occasion to give the words a sense so repugnant to both Scripture and reason. It may interest the reader to see some of the various constructions given to this passage. The writer on Ecclesiastes in Smith's Bible Dictionary gives the doctrine of the verse thus: 'The heart of man with its changes is the mirror of the universe, and is, like that, inscrutable.' Rosenmüller translates it: 'He hath done all things beautifully, each in its own time, and although he hath implanted in their mind a sense of eternity, yet they do not attain to the knowledge of the whole work of God from the beginning even to the end.' Hengstenberg thus: 'He maketh everything beautiful in his time; eternity also hath he put in their hearts so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.' Prof. Stuart thus: 'Everything hath he made beautiful in its season; moreover, he hath put intelligence in their heart without which no man can find out the work that God doeth from beginning to end.' Prof. S. changes the text in the case of the word rendered in the English version 'the world,' but by Rosenmüller and Hengstenberg 'eternity.' Such a change should, in my judgment, never be made, except under an imperative necessity, and on some adequate authority, neither of which exist here. Besides, it is very tame and inept to say that without intelligence [the intellectual faculty] no man can understand 'the whole work of God from beginning to end.' . . .

"The test-words in the passage are two: that which is translated in our English version, 'the world,' and by others,

'eternity;' and the particles which follow it, rendered 'so that,' or 'without which.' I translate, 'God hath done (and is ever doing) everything beautifully in its season; also he hath put eternity in their heart, without which man will not (or cannot) find out the work that God doeth from beginning to end.' That is, he hath given man the thought or idea of eternity, and without its aid no man could ever understand these works of God in providence in all their just and far-reaching relations. For, these providential agencies of God in their plans and results reach onward into eternity. They lap over from this world into the next, unfinished here, to be completed there. Retribution for the deeds of earth, beginning sometimes here, is to be finished there. The frustration of human plans for time has an outlook to the hopeful compensations of eternity. As already suggested, the first test-word is the somewhat common one in Hebrew rendered the 'world,' or 'eternity' [olam]. In the sense of *world* this word occurs nowhere in the Old Testament. On this point the best critics seem now to be agreed. But in the sense of *eternity*, *i. e.*, long indefinite time, it occurs very frequently, and in this book of Ecclesiastes five times, viz., chap. i. 4, and ii. 16, and iii. 14, and ix. 6, and xii. 5. Such testimony to this point ought to suffice. The next words would read literally, From [or because of] the absence or non-existence of which man will not find out, etc., the plain sense of which is *without which*, *i. e.*, on the supposition that man had not this idea of eternity, he would not, or could not, find out the work that God doeth here in his providence, from beginning to end. This is the first and most obvious sense of the original words. . . . Without the idea of eternity, man might find out some of God's works and ways, at least in some of their bearings and relations. But those methods of God's providential government over men which embrace the moral discipline of suffering here, correlated to glorious compensation there; or his long-suffering endurance with sin here, to be set right at last by swift and just retribution there, can by no means be understood by the human mind, save with the aid of this idea of eternity. Whenever we take in the whole range of those far-reaching plans of God, which

stretch 'from the beginning to the end,' we must have eternity in our hearts; and hence he has given it. Thus every several point, I might say every *word*, of this passage, harmonizes admirably with the construction above given, leaving, it would seem, nothing more in the way of sustaining proof to be desired."

Dr. Cowles' interpretation is so clearly conformed to the grammatical requirements of this passage, and, at the same time, so admirably fits in with the general drift of Ecclesiastes, it is evident that he is right. Zöckler, instead of "world," translates, *he hath set eternity in their heart.* And so also do Bauer, Michaelis, Des Vœux, Adam Clarke, and others. And Hitzig, Umbreit, and Hahn, instead of "so that," translate *without which.* Our author defends, in connexion with other passages, the same views as to Solomon's knowledge of a future, immortal, and accountable state. On the words, chap. xii. 14: "For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil," he says it is vain to assert, as many German critics have done, that Solomon knew nothing of a final judgment. The fact that he had such knowledge does not rest on this one verse alone, and cannot therefore be set aside by severing as they do, capriciously, the closing verses of this chapter from the rest of the book, and ascribing them to some compiler of a later date. For the doctrine of a future judgment appears repeatedly throughout this book. It entered deeply into the moral and religious system of its author. He felt in his own moral nature the fitness of it, and the demand for it, and he saw, in the anomalies and imperfections of moral government in this world, that there must be another scene of judgment for the deeds of earth.

Art. VII.—*An Essay on Professional Ethics.* By George Sharswood. Second edition. Philadelphia: T. & W. Johnson & Co., Law Booksellers and Publishers. 1860.

When we originally received and noticed this volume, we intimated the hope of returning to the subject it so ably treats in a more extended article, at the earliest opportunity. No time has happened to be convenient till the present, which, as our readers well know, is opportune in more senses than one. The substance of this admirable essay was originally delivered in lectures to the Law-Class of the University of Pennsylvania. It is therefore more especially a book on professional ethics in application to legal practice, and the title, stamped on the cover, is "Legal Ethics." The honored author now adorns the bench of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nothing better could be done to elevate the legal profession, and disseminate just views about its duties, than the republication and wide circulation of this sound and judicious essay. We are indebted to it for some of the suggestions we are about to offer, and shall occasionally refer to it.

The present profound agitation of the public mind on the true standard of professional morality, and especially in application to legal practice, no less than the great intrinsic importance of the subject, summons those who have been led to give attention to it, to contribute what they can to aid in forming right opinions upon it. Having been led in various ways, and for a long time, to consider the subject in some of its aspects, we have concluded to set before our readers the result, so far as space permits.

The word profession is sometimes vaguely used to denote any pursuit whatever, just as perception is often vaguely used for any cognitive act whatever, although strictly it denotes only cognition through the senses. But technically, and more commonly in vulgar use, it does not refer to all occupations indiscriminately, but only to those which are didactic or advisory in their nature, and imply such special knowledge, learning, or culture, in any given kind, as qualifies for giving such instruction or counsel. All understand this, and nothing else, in such phrases as professional pursuits, professional

ethics, studying or practising a profession. Hence it has been common to speak of the three learned professions, divinity, medicine, and law, because they are essential to civilized life in all countries and ages, *i. e.*, needful for man's guidance as to his soul and body, for time and for eternity, in relation to himself, society, and his God. They are learned professions, because none are fit to practise them without the special learning and training, in the department involved, resulting from a long course of preparatory study.

As they are mainly guiding and advisory in their nature, so by common consent of the cultivated world they are termed liberal—*liber*, free from bondage to anything lower than truth, goodness, the highest welfare and nobility of man. They who practise them must indeed be supported by them. "They that preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel." This, indeed, is an axiom. But nevertheless, aside of all material support or pecuniary rewards which they bring, all worthy pursuit of them supposes a delight in the knowledge and discovery of truth in them for its own sake; a pleasure in giving right counsel to, and thus promoting the well being of, others *per se;* also a high satisfaction in occupations which chiefly task their higher nature and minister to the physical, moral, or intellectual welfare of their fellow-men; some, or all these combined. Some of them are free also from degrading bondage to mere livelihood in this: that while indeed their votaries must live of their professions, nevertheless each particular professional service may be, and often is, or, unlike other services, ought to be, free of any special stipulated compensation for itself as such. The minister may have his salary, indeed; but when called on to render spiritual counsel, or other ministerial service within or without his congregation, does he stop to ask whether he shall be paid for it? Will the worthy physician, when called on to prescribe to a person dangerously sick or wounded, refuse until he is made sure of his regular fee? Will the high-minded lawyer never undertake the cause of one liable to suffer for want of professional counsel until he is sure of the ability of the client to reward him handsomely? To such lawyers as will not, we commend the careful study of the noble views propounded by Judge Sharswood on this subject.

It is obvious that this definition of a profession is broad enough to bring within it not only those devoted to divinity, law, and medicine, but literati, scientists, editors, teachers, engineers, architects—all, in short, whose occupations are essentially intellectual and didactic, requiring a special intellectual training and aptitude. However they may guide the manual and bodily labors of others, these services themselves are essentially psychical and incorporeal. The higher grades of teaching are so emphatically professional, that those admitted to them are entitled "professors" by way of eminence; because, as in all professions virtually, they eminently *profess* competency to instruct in their specialty.

Before proceeding to discuss the special point before us, *i. e.*, the ethics of legal practice, we will premise a few words on the obligations binding, not upon this or any one profession exclusively, but upon them all alike.

1. As their distinctive function is giving light or guidance, in their several specialties, to those who seek and need it, they are bound, under all circumstances, to adhere to and maintain the truth therein. They are not only under the obligation common to all to adhere to truth and honesty—they are under the additional and special obligation which arises from their *professing* to be able and ready to give the light and guidance which men need in the specialties of their profession. Hence as a necessary prerequisite to this, they are bound to make all due effort to know the truth in the matters concerning which they offer to give professional counsel or instruction. This does not mean that they must be infallible, or know the *omne scibile* of their own special departments. But it does imply that they use all possible zeal, diligence, and study to master the great principles, truths, and facts of the department they occupy, and whatever also pertains to the particular case which they take in hand. How can they impart knowledge which they do not possess, or give out light from darkness, or acquire the requisite knowledge of their profession generally, or of each case individually, without ample preparatory and subsequent habitual and persevering study? Notoriously, lawyers and clergymen fail of success without study. Even genius, without systematic study, can reach only a transient

and meteoric brilliancy in these departments. Mere talents, or genius, without study, fall below a decent mediocrity of achievement here, and end in utter and disgraceful failure. If it is sometimes or largely otherwise, as to pecuniary rewards, in medicine, it is because medical practice is largely of such a nature that it is not, like nearly all other professions, capable of being passed upon by competent judges. The professional practice of clergymen and lawyers, and in nearly all other professions, is in itself, or its results, in the presence of those competent to judge of its merits, and capable of knowing whether it betrays inexcusable ignorance or culpable negligence. But not so with the physician. How is it possible for ninety-nine in a hundred of his patients to know about his medicines, their nature, efficacy, or adaptation to the case for which they are prescribed? And, in case of recovery, or a fatal issue, how impossible is it for most of them to know it was by the help, or in spite, of the doses administered? This is what facilitates the prodigious success of quacks and makers of nostrums and panaceas in this profession. The manufacture of patent medicines is, next to the seizure of great railroad franchises or the ingenious robbery by stock-watering and plundering, the surest road to coarse and ostentatious opulence afforded in our country. And if the prince of railway robbers and gamblers dazzles the fashionables at watering places with four-horse turnouts, gayly caparisoned, the prince of patent-medicine quacks eclipses him with six steeds and proportional attendants, all aglare and ablaze with trappings not less brazen and gilt than their owner. While these features of medical practice tempt vast numbers of practitioners to neglect the study necessary to keep them abreast of the times, and acquainted with the ever-varying forms of disease, with discoveries in materia medica, and details of practice, on the other hand we rank among the noblest of our professional men those many physicians who surmount these temptations to indolence and ignorance. The studious physicians of our own and past days belong to the highest order of intellectual men. Although outside of the profession, we are free to confess that no kind of literature whatever impresses us more strongly with the ability, the culture, the discrimination in thought

and mastery of style, than the higher class of medical books; especially the standard treatises on medical practice. We well recollect hearing the late Dr. J. Addison Alexander (and there could be no higher authority in such matters) express his wonder at the power of style of the standard medical writers, and lamenting the comparative inferiority and helplessness of other professions in this respect.

Next, it is true that in all professions the obligation is full and unconditional to speak the truth and the truth only to all parties with whom they have professional or other intercourse. This obligation is complete in regard to all intercourse with our fellow-men, personal or professional. If, in regard to matters which affect their own actions or the advice they give to others, the professions are bound to the utmost exertions and sacrifices to know the truth; if they must buy it at whatever cost and sell it not for any price; so they are under a primary, immutable, and indispensable obligation, not merely as professional men, but as rational and accountable beings, to lie not one to another, to bear not false witness, to speak the truth and the truth only in all their communications to each other. From this they cannot free themselves by entering any profession, guild, fraternity, order, or pact whatsoever. It is before, it underlies, conditions, and survives all possible relations and covenants into which men may enter. Any promises to the contrary, if made, are void *ab initio*. They are conspiracies against the truth and against the God of truth. The only duty with regard to them, if made, in every stage of them up to their final consummation, is to repent of them, and treat them as nullities in all respects, except as they are sins to be repented of. No promise to lie or to commit other sins can exempt the promisor from the obligation of the moral law, otherwise we have a facile method of legitimating all iniquities. It is another question *how much* of the truth we are bound to disclose in any given case. This will vary with occasions. But thus much is forever binding, that so far as we speak, or avowedly or impliedly make communicatious to our fellow-men, we speak the truth and nothing but the truth. We cannot come under any obligation to which this is not paramount.

Professional relations cannot alter this obligation unless by intensifying it. The clergyman, for example, in imparting spiritual counsel and instruction to men, lies not only under the obligation common to all men to speak the truth; but under the additional obligation involved in his professing to speak the truth of God, and as God's ambassador, on subjects too of infinite moment, and involving eternal destinies. His only defence is that he has not only no way falsified the message confided to him, but that he has kept back nothing profitable to his hearers, through cowardice or dislike of it; that, rightly dividing the word of truth as to persons, times, and seasons, he has not shunned to declare the whole counsel of God.

And do not all other professions incur a special obligation to adhere to the truth in their communications to those who pay them for it, and put special trust in them for it? And can they be exempted from the obligation to declare the truth, so far as they say anything, to all others? To others they may tell as little truth as they judge right. But what they say as true must be true. To those whom they allow to employ them to obtain true light, guidance, or skilful service, they are bound to render all the truth, light, skill, and diligence, which will promote the interest or cause which they thus take in hand.

This obligation thus to adhere to the truth involves the obligation of perfect uprightness and integrity. Truth and righteousness go together. They are correlates, and reciprocally involve each other. Not that there is no truth but moral truth, no virtue but veracity—but that no one can be righteous who violates the truth, or falsifies in anything, and that whoever keeps truth in all things, must keep moral truth; he must keep his word of promise, and preserve all good fidelity in all things with which he has to do. An example or two will show how, in these things, truth and righteousness coalesce and are mutually complementary. If editors adhere to truth they will not allow the paid advertisements of dealers recommending goods, wares, lands, houses, stocks, bonds, or anything whatsoever to appear to the reader as if they were their own editorials or had their editorial endorsement, unless they

themselves have satisfactory evidence that these articles are worthy of the recommendations so given under their editorial *imprimatur:* unless, whether paid or not, they would feel that they were doing their unwary readers a service in persuading them to make such investments. As such a course is a violation of truth, it is equally a violation of rectitude. And we fear, unless rumor is all at fault, that editors (we trust not editors of religious journals) are not wanting who are destined some day to incur the execrations of many honest and frugal people of small means, who have thus been induced to place their little savings or patrimony in flashy securities, from the confidence they placed in the editorial opinions of their favorite journal. If what is an advertisement, appears as such, then no deception is practised. All parties are put upon their guard. The reader of the advertisement knows that it is from an interested party. If he puts undue confidence in the glowing representations, he cannot blame the editor. He must blame himself, *caveat emptor.* There are, however, obvious limits to the privilege of publishing fraudulent or immoral advertisements. So if an architect or engineer employed by an owner to furnish plans and specifications, and needful superintendence in the erection of a building or other structures, acts in collusion with contractors or dealers having interests adverse to the owner; if, receiving bribes or commissions from these, he advises and plans disadvantageously for his employer but advantageously for them, so as to give them a lucrative contract or job of work or materials in connection with it, to the owner's injury, is not this perpetrating the most flagrant falsehood and iniquity all at once? and all the more so if the professional adviser, paid for giving his best counsel and assistance to his employer, takes a commission for the jobs thus procured for others through the faithless advice given to the former? Yet we have had personal knowledge of such things even in the building of a church-edifice; and we wish we had no reason for believing this the only, or a very rare, instance of such things.*

* Dr. J. G. Holland, in *Scribner's Monthly* for March, gives the following typical illustrations of what all tolerably informed persons know to be a "growing vice of business:"—

Another very obvious and important principle applicable to all professions is, that, while it is incumbent on them to do what they honestly may, to prevent the commission of sin and crime, and to neutralize its disastrous effects when committed, it is their solemn duty no way to assist in its commission. The clergyman must do his utmost to prevent sin, and to apply the divine remedies for its cure when committed. But he is never to assist, or in any way promote, its commission. The physician must discountenance vice, especially where it genders physical maladies. He must do what he can to relieve and cure disease by whatever cause induced, no matter how sinful. But he may not in any way lend his aid to the commission of sin, as *e. g.*, abortion, or any form of infanticide, whether ante-natal or post-natal. And in like manner the lawyer, while he may and ought, within the limits of professional integrity, shortly to be defined, to render professional assistance to defendants and culprits arraigned to answer for their alleged wrongs and crimes, he is not on any consideration, nor for any compensation, to use his professional skill to aid men in the perpetration of crime, as in the virtual stealing of

"Incident No. 1.—A builder of furnaces was called upon recently to name a price for heating a large structure in a large city. He offered to put in his apparatus for $30,000. After repeated conversations with sundry persons interested in the contracts, he was told that the man who should secure the job would be obliged to pay a percentage to them—in this case amounting to $3,000—the bill, of course, to be rendered in such a form as to make him a party to the fraud upon the owners of the building. He told them that he wanted the job, but that as he also had a desire to go to heaven when he died, he was afraid he should be obliged to decline their conditions. He also suggested that he should like to bid for the job with others, and was informed that not a single contract on the building had been given to the lowest bidder. Then he was politely bowed out of the presence of the gentlemen who could not use him. He went home, and as an experiment, sent them a proposal to put in his apparatus for $25,000. From this he never heard; and some man with a more convenient conscience got the contract and gave the percentage.

"Incident No. 2.—A piano-forte manufacturer sold an instrument, at his regular retail price, to a gentleman of New York. Within forty-eight hours he was called upon by three musicians, every one of whom demanded his percentage upon the sale of the piano, claiming that it was bought upon his recommendation. The purchaser, to make sure of getting the best instrument, had separately consulted all these men, and they had happened to agree upon this maker. The result was, that the maker paid each man the amount of his claim, and said nothing, though he parted with considerably more than his profits on the piano-forte.

property, the breach of truth, oppression, extortion, robbery by fraud and under the forms of law. These propositions are their own evidence.

From these general principles of professional ethics we pass now to consider their special application to those points of legal practice in regard to which most doubt or perplexity prevails.

1. Has the legal practitioner any choice of his cases, or must he take all for which his services are sought, be they right or wrong? It is difficult to see how this could ever have been made a question. It never could except as a piece of special pleading offered by those seeking to defend the advocacy of iniquity for the wages of iniquity. Lawyers have liberty to accept or reject cases offered them *de facto* and *de jure*. Every lawyer in large practice does it in fact. Every lawyer may do it of right. Not only is every lawyer at liberty to reject cases offered him, he is bound to reject them if they require him to commit or to advocate any breach of truth and justice in conducting them. And whenever a

When asked by the friend to whom he told the story, why he submitted to such an imposition, he replied that he did not dare to do otherwise; that if he had refused to respond to these exactions, the musicians would have turned against him, and transferred their recommendations to other makers."

He adds, we are sorry to say too truthfully, "Many a product of ingenuity and toil is obliged to buy every inch of its way to the consumer; and a thousand improvements which affect the public convenience and comfort fail of adoption unless their profits are shared with the influence and power to which they appeal. Congress and the Legislatures do not monopolize the lobby, for the lobby is everywhere. Black-mail, commissions, bonuses, gifts, the feathering of private nests among the recesses of great corporate interests, positions sought, won, and used for purposes of theft—all these things are so common that they have ceased to be remarkable; and they argue sadly against our boasted progress in Christian civilization.

"We do not expect to rid the world of thieves; but the danger is, that honest men will not be able to do business at all without the adoption of their corrupt machinery, the prostitution of integrity, and the sacrifice of self-respect. How far are multitudes of our good houses from this position now?"

The examples here given of professional advisers receiving or extorting large sums for advising contrary to the interests of the parties involved, from parties in adverse interest, we trust as yet are exceptional enormities outside of the professions here implicated. We hope the higher order of musical professors and architects have not yet sunk so low as to advise or act against the interests of their employers for a price.

client requires his lawyer to infringe morality in the conduct of a case, it is his right and his duty to throw it up. If his only alternative is to give up it, or give up his fealty to the moral law, his true course is no longer doubtful.

2. When a lawyer undertakes a case for a client, he thereby binds himself to fully task his diligence and skill to present the law and evidence in their utmost force to the triers; subject always to the obligation which is anteeedent to this and conditions every other, not to violate truth and justice. His client's interest should not fail through lack of zeal, effort, vigilance, and prudence in the attorney. If it does, the latter is unfaithful to his promise, has betrayed the trust he has assumed, has sacrificed the cause he had undertaken to guard, through culpable negligence and indolence.

3. In what sense and how far is he, as the representative of his client, to do whatever the latter would do, or demands that he shall do, no matter how abhorrent to truth and justice? This question has already been virtually answered. He cannot without fault allow his client's cause to suffer through lack of due industry and painstaking. On the other hand, he may not sacrifice truth or integrity, or practise any fraud or trick whatsoever, to gain it. Judge Sharswood well says: "Lord Brougham, in his justly celebrated defence of the Queen, went to very extravagant lengths upon this subject; no doubt he was led, by the excitement of so great an occasion, to say what cool reflection and sober reason certainly never can approve. 'An advocate,' said he, 'in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in the world, and that is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences; though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion.'" No doubt many advocates too often thus conduct cases of human law as if the divine law were *quoad hoc* null, and act before earthly courts as if the court of Heaven were extinct. But the true lawyer, like every

true man, will spurn such Iscariot morality. His standard is more truly voiced in the following eloquent words of the late William Curtis Noyes to the young men of his own *Alma Mater*. Would that all young aspirants for the legal profession might hear them and imbibe their lofty spirit:—

"No honorable lawyer will ever, by trick or chicanery, by any imposition upon a court or jury, by an intentional perversion of the law or the facts of the case, pollute his forensic robes. While his duty to his client requires him to present in argument every just consideration which may influence the determination, and to array his facts and to present his views of the law in their most imposing form, nevertheless, it is a duty resting upon higher sanctions, and affecting his whole position and future life, not to say or do anything which a conscience enlightened by religion may not approve. The theory that an advocate speaks as his client would speak, and in his place and stead only, is false when applied to justify any departure from propriety, sincerity, or truth. No man, for himself or for another, may do either of these things and be blameless. No lawyer may place himself in the stead of the murderer, the thief, the perjurer, the dishonest litigant, and utter their language, and be blameless. No forensic robe was ever made to cover crime, dishonesty, or dishonor, nor to enable its wearer to imitate the voice and use the language of felons and cheats."

This is no mere lofty rhetorical flight. It is only what is literally expressed in the oath which Pennsylvania exacts of her lawyers, quoted by Judge Sharswood, "to behave himself in the office of attorney according to the best of his learning and ability, and with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to the client; that he will use no falsehood, nor delay any man's cause, through lucre or malice."

4. May an advocate undertake to defend what seems to him the wrong side of a case? This is one of those interrogatories to which a categorical yes or no would be an inadequate or misleading answer. Some such cases he may rightfully, some he even ought to, undertake. Some he ought not in any manner to abet or countenance with his professional aid. A blind fanaticism or unreasoning ultraism may easily decide that it is a prostitution of legal talent to appear in behalf of, or what seems *prima facie* to be, the wrong side, and fulminate anathemas against all who do it. This is one extreme. To say that a lawyer is at liberty to espouse any cause however nefarious, or support it by any means however

unprincipled, is simply abominable. This whole subject is involved in difficulties, and it is hard to lay down any universal rule which will solve every concrete case. Each case, as it comes before the lawyer, must be decided for itself, in view of all its circumstances, and not upon any mere abstraction. Yet a few simple principles need only to be stated to vindicate themselves and dissipate nearly all practical perplexity. Premising always that under no circumstances is the lawyer to commit immorality or utter falsehood, or say he believes that true which he does not believe true, we observe :—

a. That a great difference arises between the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant, prosecutor or accused, as regards this subject. A person sued or prosecuted, however at fault, is usually entitled to counsel who will see that he is not convicted or mulcted contrary to law and evidence, or in an unjust measure, or on principles which would expose innocent men to unjust loss or punishment. It is quite otherwise with bringing a suit or prosecution which the lawyer regards as groundless beyond any reasonable doubt. Here it is his plain duty to discourage litigation or a prosecution which is but persecution; and, if he cannot succeed in stopping it, to refrain from promoting it. If there be reasonable doubt, if the sole reason of that doubt be confidence in the client's solemn asseverations, this may sometimes be just ground for not discouraging, and for taking part, in a judicial ascertainment of the truth, whether on the side of the plaintiff or defendant, the accuser or accused. And here let it be observed, that the onus of the case, or of *prima facie* evidence, is different in the cases of plaintiff and defendant. As all parties are presumptively innocent till the contrary appears, so no one can be justified in bringing or conducting a suit against any person till there is some *prima facie* evidence against him. On the other hand, the defendant is not to be presumed legally guilty, or in fault, until his guilt is judicially established by legal evidence, which bears sifting by opposing counsel.

b. Hence it is to be observed that counsel, in appearing on either side of a case, do not thereby necessarily declare or imply a belief that the merits of the case are with their clients unless they expressly say so, which they have no right to do

unless they really believe so. They only indicate their belief that it is a proper case for judicial inquisition and decision, and that this requires the earnest and thorough presentation of the evidence and law on the side they represent. That is all that they commit themselves to by voluntarily appearing in the case, unless they expressly avow more. The responsibility of the decision they leave with the triers. Their office is simply to show the strength of proofs on their own side, and the defects and flaws of the opposite, and *vice versa*.

c. This brings into bold relief a principle of the first importance in the premises, viz.: that in disputed cases truth is most effectually elicited by investigation conducted by opposing counsel before competent and upright triers. This has been the judicial experience of all generations. Thus is the case most effectually probed, and the truth effectually searched out and sifted. The injurious effect of the contrary system is illustrated by the substitution of a judge-advocate for opposing counsel in military tribunals. This provision is supposed to secure greater impartiality. It in reality hinders impartial investigation, and substitutes for it the one-sided bias and prejudice which may happen to sway the judge-advocate. This fact should limit the advocate's refusal to appear, under the limitations already set forth, for what he deems the wrong side, to extreme cases.

d. Evidence often appears in the course of a trial which reverses the whole aspect of a case. The celebrated water-mark case is typical of a whole class, and is so well told by Dr. Bushnell that we give it in his words:—

"A suit upon a note-of-hand had long been pending in one of the courts of our commonwealth, payment of which was resisted, on the ground that it was and must be a forgery, no such note having ever been given. But the difficulty was, in the trial, to make out any conclusive evidence of what the defending party knew to be the truth. His counsel was, in fact, despairing utterly of success; but it happened that, just as he was about closing his plea, having the note in his hand, and bringing it up, in the motion of his hand, so that the light struck through, his eye caught the glimpse of a mark in the paper. He stopped, held it up deliberately to the light, and behold the name, in water-mark, of a company that had began the manufacture of paper after the date of the instrument! Here was evidence, without going far to seek it—evidence enough to

turn the plaintiff forthwith into a felon, and consign him, as it did, to a felon's punishment."—Bushnell on *Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 367.

The following from Judge Sharswood's book, pp. 31 and 32, also sets in a strong light the practical difficulties of the subject:—

"On the other hand, and as illustrative of the practical difficulty which this question presented to a man with as nice a perception of moral duty as perhaps ever lived, it is said by Bishop Burnet of Sir Matthew Hale: 'If he saw a cause was unjust, he for a great while would not meddle further in it, but to give his advice that it *was so;* if the parties after that would go on, they were to seek another counselor, for he would assist none in acts of injustice; if he found the cause doubtful or weak in point of law, he always advised his clients to agree their business. Yet afterwards he abated much of the scrupulosity he had about causes that appeared at first unjust. Upon this occasion there were two causes brought him, which, by the ignorance of the party or their attorney, were so ill represented to him, that they seemed to be very bad; but he, inquiring more narrowly into them, found that they were really very good and just; so after this he slackened much of his former strictness of refusing to meddle in causes upon the ill circumstances that appeared in them at first.'"

It does not always follow that the confession of guilt is a sufficient reason why the party should not have benefit of counsel. It is among the curious but indisputable phenomena of the human mind, and especially of criminal psychology, that accused persons who are innocent will sometimes confess guilt, especially if they know that circumstantial evidence bears hard upon them, in the hope of thus buying their peace, or faring better with the court, or sometimes from an unaccountable freak of glorying in crime, or some other form of fatuity. And at the worst, he may require professional aid to prevent undue severity. Here, too, as before indicated, there is a difference in the positions of the plaintiff or prosecutor on the one hand, and the defendant or accused party on the other. If there must be litigation, it is best conducted by honorable and competent opposing counsel. But on the former party rests the responsibility of originating it. If, on his own representations or from other evidence, it is clear he has no *prima facie* cause of action, he ought to be so advised. And if he persist in prosecuting his suit, it is questionable how far an honorable lawyer can assist him in such groundless and injurious harassing of innocent men. How can he, for pay, sell

himself to the work of procuring or inflicting gross injustice on others? And in the case of defendants, too, who, on their own showing, have not even a *prima facie* show of any legal or moral defence, why should he not decline to assist them in refusing to fulfill their righteous and legal obligations? Doubtless he is under the necessity of trusting his client's statement of the case till the contrary appears, and he must act accordingly. But if he may sell his acquirements and services to him in order to bring before the court whatever of truth, law, and justice is on his side, must he also sell *himself* to be used as an instrument of injustice and outrage? True, he is not to usurp the functions of judge and jury by determining in advance that judicial inquiry may not elicit new facts, and reach another decision, in any case which has a plausible show of being controvertible; but, at the same time, where there is no *show* of any case for his client, morally or legally, how is he justified in trying to fabricate one, and thus burden courts and harass his adversary?

e. The question emerges here, of pleading in defence laws which release men in any case from their righteous obligations, such as the statute of limitations, against enforcing debts against public enemies, and much more the like. On this it is to be observed, first, that public policy and the promotion of justice among men require that the civil laws should not compel, or even attempt to compel, the performance of all obligations which men owe to each other. On this the whole distinction of perfect and imperfect obligations, determinate and indeterminate duties, is founded. How many duties do husbands and wives, parents and children, owe each other which it is impossible, or inexpedient, for the civil law to attempt to enforce? They are duties *coram Deo*, *coram conscientia*, and so far perfect; but not perfect in the sense of being enforceable by any human tribunal, civil or ecclesiastical. The experience of ages has proved that, for reasons that need not be specified here, it is not expedient that debts which the creditor has allowed to sleep unclaimed for a certain period of years should be legally collectible. It passes them over from the sphere of perfect to that of imperfect obligation, leaving it, like so many other duties, entirely to the conscience

of the debtor to discharge them. This does not affect their moral obligation. But if such a law is expedient, it cannot be a law unless it be enforced. And it cannot be enforced unless advocates will urge it in the courts. It is perfectly proper for them to contend that the courts ought not to enforce such a claim against their clients, and at the same time to advise these clients that it is morally binding. It may or may not be. The neglect of the party to claim it for so long a period may be connected with circumstances which greatly aggravate the hardship of after-payment. If unrighteous, the lapse of time may have effaced the evidence for the defence, and made the statute of limitations the only shield from injustice. But it may be observed of all this class of laws, which merely refuse the legal enforcement of moral obligations, that they are matters wholly within the discretion of the Legislature. If constitutional, courts and lawyers have no province and no discretion except to enforce them and assist in their enforcement—bating exceptional cases. Ordinarily all else must be left to the conscience of the party, not only in the case of the law above cited, but of all similar or analogous laws of which it is a fair specimen.

f. It is another and deeper question, what part courts and counsel may with a good conscience take in the enforcement of laws positively unrighteous, in the sense not merely of suffering wrong, or compelling men to suffer wrong, but of requiring them to *do* wrong, to commit sin. Here, too, we would say that there is a wide range of actions morally indifferent *per se*, in which the fact that our lawful rulers command or prohibit them is enough to determine their moral relations to the people, judges, juries, and lawyers. It may be so in the case of some semi-moral actions in which the moral element and the positive element largely intermix and obscure each other. Many cases are in a twilight region of doubt and perplexity. Here, too, each one must be remanded to his own conscience; he is entitled to the benefit of all doubts, and to the charitable judgment of his fellow-men. But, to make our meaning clear, we take strong, undoubted instances, which are always best for illustrating principles. Suppose, then, that a law enjoins a clear act of disobedience to God,—blasphemy,

profaneness, theft, robbery, lying, slander. Whatever be the consequences, we ought to obey God rather than man. To obey the rulers of this world when they take counsel together against the Lord and his anointed, is to second and abet them in their rebellion. As it is every man's duty to disobey such laws, so it is the duty of every man to refrain from all agency or participation in the enforcement of said laws. For a lawyer or executive officer to take part in their enforcement, is to aid and abet the rebellion of rulers against the moral law and God its author. Sooner throw up cases, emoluments, office, everything, than be a partner in such a conspiracy! than, *e. g.*, help burn men for steadfastly professing the true faith.

g. The question arises, how far counsel may avail themselves of mere technicalities of law to gain their cause. We quite agree with Judge Sharswood that here very much depends on his estimate of the cause itself—whether in his conviction his client's cause is just or unjust. It may happen that a client whose cause is righteous is unable to command the evidence which would prove it; nay, that such evidence, though otherwise at command, is ruled out by these very legal technicalities. In such a case he is justified in parrying his adversary and putting him at bay by every resource, not contrary to truth and honesty, which legal technics afford. He may not falsify. He may not, for example, procure delays by any false statements by himself or his clients as to the materiality of absent witnesses, or other difficulties. But he may make the most of whatever truth, fact, or law will most tend to thwart the adverse party. He may require him to prove every iota of his case, however technical and practically unimportant. But it is quite otherwise if he be convinced that justice is against him. While he may insist that the adverse claim be legally established, he is not justified in pressing mere technicalities to the utmost against it.

h. We have said that there is a great difference between the position of plaintiff and defendant as to the claim of either for professional assistance when his cause is apparently unjust, simply because the plaintiff originates the litigation. This, however, must not be stretched too far, or held according to

the letter which killeth instead of the spirit which giveth life. It may be that the plaintiff in form is the defendant in fact, and *vice versa*, as happens with plaintiffs and defendants in error. So it may be in the origin of a case. The defendant may be the real originator of the litigation, by plundering the property or assailing the life and character of others, while he refuses all redress which cannot be extorted from him by due course of law. He, then, is the responsible cause of the litigation, and is entitled to no more professional aid than the least meritorious plaintiff, while the plaintiff is entitled to the best legal services he can command. The real assailant is he who refuses justice, and every equitable mode of settlement, until the law extorts it from him. In such case his adversary, whether nominally plaintiff or defendant, should receive all possible assistance in bringing the law to do its perfect work.

This brings us to the conclusion to which we are urged by want of space, leaving much unsaid which it would be in place to say. We wish now to add, with whatever emphasis we can command, that no lawyer, however eminent, can for any price allow himself to sell his professional skill and knowledge to render service in carrying out schemes of rapacity, fraud, plunder, robbery, to a successful consummation, without at the same time selling himself into a partnership in the crime. He might as well become a Judas at once and betray his Master for thirty pieces of silver, as thus to betray all that "is pure and lovely and of good report" for a price. The pretence that men, by being lawyers, can exert all their powers to assist knaves, whether nominally plaintiffs or defendants in court, in committing depredations, small or great, on the property of their fellow-men, under the forms of law, without being to all intents accomplices in the crime, is as absurd as to say they can assist them in robbing a man's person or house without being accomplices in the deed. To assist parties with the most astute special pleas in bringing and keeping causes arising out of such nefarious enterprises before courts bribed, or generally believed to be bribed, by their clients, and always ruling so as to warrant such a belief, and at the same time to assist equally in preventing their being brought before tribunals confessedly incorruptible,—is there a lower deep of professional

debasement than this? We deal with principles, not with persons. We say not, because it is not judicially ascertained that such deeds have been done in this day, and in this land, when and where many of us have been fain to discern dawnings of the latter-day glory. We trust that the wide-spread conviction that they have been committed will prove groundless. But be this as it may, there is no mistake, and can be none, about their ethical character. We would as soon take part with the vilest felon as with such a conspiracy. We do not believe such things can long prosper. The triumphing of the wicked is short. They walk in darkness and know not at what they stumble. Let them be sure their sin shall find them out. When the profession whose noble function is to minister in carrying out the principles of eternal justice through the instrumentality of human tribunals, is prostituted to the furtherance of injustice; nay, when the very fountains of law and justice are polluted in the corruption of the bar and bench which are appointed to administer it, then the heart of the body-politic is fatally poisoned. Judicial purity is the last palladium of national virtue and freedom, when all other safeguards are gone. If this is lost all is lost, save what the religion of Christ may reclaim and preserve. This is the salt of the earth. God grant that it, too, may not lose its savor, of which there are too many omens, and leave us utterly to perish in our own corruption. Surely God reigns, and diabolism shall not lord it over the universe. If the wrath of the evil one is great, it is because "he knoweth he hath but a short time."

Art. VIII.—NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The Life and Times of John Huss; or, The Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century. By E. H. Gillett, Professor of Political Science in the University of the City of New York. Third edition, with important additions. 2 vols., 8vo. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

The Reformation is commonly represented as the work of one or two men, a grand conception of Luther and his friends, which they put into shape, and finished up before they died; and is consistently spoken of in the past tense; whereas it is a progress, which had been going on for two hundred years before Luther, and is going on still; and in which the work of Luther and his fellow-laborers was only a great juncture. One effect of Dr. Gillett's book will be to correct that mistake, at least as far as pertains to one great province of the Christian world. In purifying the Church from the mass of mediæval error, prolonged patience and suffering as well as energy were needed. The stages at which the latter was successful naturally became the more conspicuous; and they have increased in number with the progress of events. Most important among them was that which occurred in the early part of the sixteenth century; but it could never have succeeded, if the movements in England and Bohemia under Wyckliffe and Huss respectively had not led the way, and if the public mind had not long been agitated by a deep sense of its necessity.

The title of this work but imperfectly indicates its subject. It is a history of the reformation in Bohemia, from its beginning, in the fourteenth century, until its crushing disaster in the seventeenth; but it also describes the condition of the Roman Catholic Church, in the time of papal schism, the convoking, and the causes which led to the convoking, of the Council of Constance, and relates at considerable length the most important action and debates of that body. The narrative then follows the effects which the teaching and death of Huss produced in Bohemia, and the military and civil as well as ecclesiastical conflict which ensued, until, at the end of a hundred years, the interest unites with that of the Reformation in Germany and Switzerland. In a narrower and more rapid current it compresses the succeeding events, as respects Bohemia, until in the end of the thirty years' war all evangelical Christians were driven from that country; and terminates with a brief glance at that now state of existence into

which the scattered members of the "Bohemian Brethren" emerged in the eighteenth century, when they started on that career of missionary activity which has made their name famous among Christians.

A book which has already earned its standing in the world of letters needs no recommendation, and has little to fear from criticism. But for the sake of those who have not read it, we would remark that this work of Dr. Gillett is one of real historical merit, and as interesting as it is profitable in perusal.

The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ, freely translated from the German of W. F. Gess, with many additions. By J. A. Reubelt, D.D., Professor in Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1870.

The positions here taken, and maintained by a thorough analysis and collation of the Scripture testimonies on the subject, are, for the most part, those involved in the accepted orthodox doctrine of Christ—that He is the One Only and Eternally-Begotten Son of God, Very God, consubstantial, coeternal and coequal with the Father; and also, since and by the Incarnation, very man, born of a woman, and, as completely human, growing through infancy, childhood, and boyhood, to full manhood; that being thus truly God and truly man, he is nevertheless but One Person, in the two human and divine natures. Here, however, the agreement of our author and translator with the orthodox doctrine, stops, and a broad hiatus opens between them. We say author and translator; yet, from the liberty taken in the translation, we are not always sure that it exactly represents more than the Christology of the latter. This, at all events, is what the book offers to its readers. With much that is learned, discriminating, and valuable, of course it must be largely judged by its distinctive feature. This can be done most accurately from the very words of the publisher, prepared, we take for granted, by Dr. Reubelt:—

"The church Christology is treated with respect, but thoroughly criticized. Its history is given in its leading features of every view or doctrine that has been at any time held, the constituent parts are given, and it is shown what elements of truth it embodied, and what errors from Ebionitism, Docetism, Gnosticism, down to the views held in the nineteenth century. Proper stress is laid on the humanity proper of the Saviour, which the orthodox view does, indeed, not deny, but virtually ignores, or at least underrates; this feature of the book may make it acceptable to those Unitarians who really believe in the divine mission of Jesus, and love their Saviour; at the same time the divinity proper of Jesus is maintained, as well as the reality of the Incarnation. The common orthodoxy has no real incarnation;

it conceives of the Logos having united himself in some mysterious manner with the man Jesus, thus giving us a man *and* a God, which is certainly not the Christ of the New Testament. The common orthodoxy does not know what to make of the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. The book in question is written in the interest of the so-called κενωσία, or rather of the reality of the Incarnation; that this view is beset with difficulties, is freely admitted, but the difficulties are lodged in their proper place."

A few clauses will show that Dr. Reubelt's theory of κενωσία is just that of Dr. Crosby, which has been already criticized in the article on the "Constitution of Christ's Person," in our present number. To the decisive arguments there presented against this view our readers can recur. We will only add to what is there stated, that this seems to us one of those modes of thinking which has grown out of German Pantheism, according to which the Absolute develops itself in man and nature, which in turn are at length reabsorbed into the Absolute. He speaks of "the eternal influx of life from the Father into the Son, by which he is the Son," as "suspended during the earthly life of Jesus," p. 338. "If while on earth Jesus had actually possessed his divine life as the Logos, and had lacked it only as to his human nature, this prayer (John xvii. 5) would have been unintelligible," p. 333. He speaks of the "self-divesting act of the Logos, suffering his eternal consciousness to be suspended in order to regain it many months afterwards as a human, gradually-developing self-consciousness, at the same time laying aside his omniscience and eternal holiness," etc., p. 348. These passages sufficiently indicate what is distinctive in the book. Those who desire to search the arguments for this view, will find it more thoroughly presented, in itself and as related to the whole person of Christ, than was possible in Dr. Crosby's monogram. The volume also contains, in an appendix, some reasonings of value from Gess, Julius Muller, and Delitzsch, on the theories of Traducianism, Creationism, and Pre-existentianism, as related to original sin.

Ad Clerum: Advices to a Young Preacher. By Joseph Parker, D. D., author of "Ecce Deus." Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1871.

Making all allowance for frequent dashes of extravagance and eccentricity in this volume, we have no hesitation in pronouncing it a work of unusual power and utility, which no young minister ought to be without, and older ones would be all the better for having, and both alike for reading and pondering its contents. And all the more so, if his probing the faults of preachers and pastors reaches the quick of

some foible or frailty of their own which is a drawback to their usefulness. His "advices" are not limited to one angle or side of ministerial life. They run through the whole circle of things affecting ministerial efficiency and usefulness in the closet, the study, the pastorate, the pulpit. He is seldom commonplace, never tame or pointless. With a style fresh, racy, and vivid, and by means of live metaphors, pictures, pen-and-ink sketches of characters, real and imaginary, he sets every idea he wants to express, every ministerial virtue and failing, in bold, not to say startling relief. For this purpose he avowedly pushes many of his portraitures to the point of exaggeration, and his exaggerations at times to the point of caricature. He spares no pains to make clerical faults and follies appear ridiculous; and he applies the caustic to moral, intellectual, and official warts and ulcers that are stubborn against all gentler treatment. But all is made subservient to bringing the ministry up to his own simple yet sublime ideal, when he says, "I hold that no ministry is successful that does not work in men a profound conviction of the sinfulness of sin, and an earnest desire to know Jesus Christ and his blessed salvation." P. 226.

But we will give the beginning of one of his portraitures—a fair sample of many—and let it speak for itself.

"Another class of unsuccessful men may be ironically described as *hyper-super-intellectualists*,—something, in spite of the ugly word, very aerial and sublime. These magnificent and unapproachable royalties, throned among the stars, and clothed with clouds of many colors, expend their lives in one desperate determination to say something that is not in the New Testament. The moment they are about to put one word of gospel into their sermons, they recoil from the vulgarity as from a temptation to be profane. As a consequence, they excel in *not* preaching the gospel. They delight to prove to their pew-holders that they 'are abreast with the foremost thinking of the day;' they refer with great familiarity to 'a certain modern school of thought,' and with infinite skill gibbet neo-platonists, transcendentalists, pantheists, and positivists, before a wondering if not applauding audience. But their chief joy,—O, their sweet, precious, transporting joy, their joy of joys, their dancing, screaming, delicious joy!—is to discourse upon a most mysteriously dangerous individual called *Comte*. When a reverend snob of the hyper-super class can bring in the name of *Comte*, he is sure that it will instantly show the greatness, and the might, and the majesty, and the glorious glory of the learned minister. He would not for the world refer to Baxter, or Henry, or Doddridge, or Watts; Owen, and Bates, and Charnock, and Howe, he does not deign to know;—he knows *Comte* (as far, at least, as translations can reveal that personage), and is not *that* the last reach of culture, the crowning-point of attainment?" P. 190, 191.

Woman: Her Dignity and Sphere. By a Lady. American Tract Society, New York.

This little volume is exceedingly well written, and abounds in judicious views, happily expressed, as to the proper training, culture, spirit, manners, Christian development, and activity of women. We notice, incidentally, that it proscribes dancing and private theatricals. Without endorsing all her reasonings on these subjects, *e. g.*, that drinking in a bar-room, or dancing in a ball-room, or attending public theatres, have no more evil in them than the private indulgence of the same practices, since circumstances impart to many practices their greatest evil or chief aggravation, we are yet clear, 1. That if there is nothing positively sinful in simple parlor cotillions and square dances, the cause of religion is not promoted by them. 2. We quite agree with Bishop Cox and some Roman bishops who have condemned waltzing and the forms of dancing known as "round," "German," etc., as positively lascivious and demoralizing. The whole subject of amusements calls for earnest and thorough re-discussion.

A History of God's Church from its Origin to the Present Time. By Enoch Pond, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine. Philadelphia: Ziegler & McCurdy. 1871.

This portly volume of 1066 pages we have examined with great pleasure. It is the fruit of years of study of the venerable author while engaged in giving instruction in the institution with which he is connected.

The feature which has struck us with the greatest interest is the very large space given to that part of ecclesiastical history commonly denominated sacred history. No less than four hundred and fifty pages are devoted to the period from the beginning to the advent of Christ; and more than a hundred pages additional to the New Testament and apostolic history. This, in our judgment, is no undue proportion. As there has been so much disposition manifested to undervalue and neglect the inspired records, we think Dr. P. deserves special commendation for thus exalting them to their true place. Let not the students from our theological halls go forth better versed in the writings of the uninspired, than in those of the inspired historians of the church.

The introductory chapter relates to the Philosophy of History. It is ably written, and rebukes with just severity the pretence made in certain quarters, in our day, to a science of history which would enable its writers to forecast the future, or to construct a true record of

the unwritten periods of the past. We entirely agree in the conclusion to which Dr. Pond comes, that there is more true philosophy of history in Edwards' "History of Redemption," though it be but a fragment, than in all that has been dreamed out by the transcendentalists of Germany in the last half-century.

The style of Dr. P. is perspicuous, and is often elegant, if not eloquent. We would have preferred to have the title run, "A History of the Church of God," &c. A striking and pleasing portrait of the author accompanies the volume.

The Young Lady's Guide. American Tract Society, New York.

This is a much larger volume than "Woman," and made up of contributions from several eminent Christian authors of both sexes. With much the same standards as that, it sets them in new and varied aspects. There is just now an urgent and increasing need of a literature powerful enough to seize the female mind and raise it to some proper conception of womanly beauty, refinement, vivacity, and usefulness—redeem it from the danger of degenerating into mere gaudiness, frivolity, impotence, and emptiness on the one hand, or the coarseness of the woman-suffrage viragos on the other. The present extravagance of dress and costliness of self-indulgent living cannot continue and increase without sapping the foundations of domestic purity, religion, morality, and the national life.

St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. A Revised Text, with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations. By J. B. Lightfoot, D.D., Hulsean Professor of Divinity, and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo, 402 pp. Uniform in style with Ellicott and Henderson. Andover: Warren F. Draper.

This Commentary contains an Introduction to the Epistle, Dissertations, a Critical Greek Text, Critical and Exegetical Notes, and detached Notes or brief Dissertations. A distinguishing feature of the work is its extended Introduction, detached Notes, and Dissertations. The following are the topics discussed: The Galatian people; the Churches at Galatia; the Date of the Epistle; Genuineness of the Epistle; Character and Contents of the Epistle; Were the Galatians Celts or Teutons? the Brethren of the Lord; St. Paul and the Three; Revised Text and Commentary; St. Paul's sojourn in Arabia; St. Paul's first visit to Jerusalem; the name and office of an Apostle; various readings in ii. 5; the later visit of St. Paul to Jerusalem; Patristic accounts of the collision at Antioch; the interpretation of Deut. xxi. 23; the words denoting "Faith;" the faith of Abraham; St. Paul's infirmity in the flesh; the various readings in iv. 25; the

meaning of Hagar in iv. 25; Philo's Allegory of Hagar and Sarah; the various readings in v. 1; Patristic Commentaries on this Epistle; Index.

The work throughout manifests learning, exegetical insight, and a judicial habit of mind. It, with Eadie and Ellicott, furnishes ample means for mastering this Epistle, and the relations of Catholic Christianity to the Jewish perversions of it. Both the Commentary proper and the appended Dissertations are able and valuable. He deems St. Paul's thorn in the flesh an excruciating physical malady.

History of the Sandwich Islands Mission. By Rufus Anderson, D. D., LL.D., late Foreign Secretary of the Board. 12mo, pp. xxiv., 408. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 1870.

This volume is one of the fruits of the comparative leisure gained by the honored Ex-Secretary of the A.B.C.F.M., when he resigned the post which he had so long and so usefully filled. And it is a question whether by this change of labors he has not actually advanced the deepest and most permanent interests of the cause to which his life has been consecrated. The discussion of the theory of missions, and the unfolding of missionary history in connection with the more important fields occupied by the Boards, are certainly indispensable to the intelligent prosecution of such labors by the Church. The author's "Foreign Missions, their relations and claims," presents the ripest results of thought and experience as to the theory. The volume before us is the first of several designed to show what actual results have been reached, and by what stages, in different fields with which he has so long sustained relations of the closest intimacy. We know of no more competent witness nor any abler narrator of the facts which, by the grace of God, it is his privilege to record. We commend the volume before us as a very complete and exceedingly interesting exhibition of God's marvellous work at the Sandwich Islands, and as in itself abundantly vindicating the missionary enterprise against all cavillers.

Hours of Christian Devotion. Translated from the German of Dr. A. Tholuck, with a Preface by Rev. Horatius Bonar, D. D. Boston and Dover. 1871.

The reading of a very few of these delightful meditations will explain and justify to any reader the enthusiastic and touching tributes of respect and love paid to their author a few weeks since on occasion of his academic semi-centennial. His consecrated genius and learning show themselves here not in elaborate commentaries or exhaustive

theological treatises, but in the pouring out of rich results of study and experience for the practical benefit of private Christians. This tasteful volume will find a welcome to many a Christian home, and not only will lovers of Tholuck be multiplied, but his burning desire be gratified that Christ be more widely proclaimed and glorified.

Letters of Spiritual Counsel and Guidance. By the late Rev. J. Keble, M. A., Vicar of Hursley. Edited by R. F. Wilson, M. A. Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 1870.

It is inevitable that these letters should be thoroughly characteristic. No man ever lived who was more free from assumption and seeming than Keble. A part of this correspondence is in reply to letters of inquiry in regard to points involving doubts or duties. Others were his spontaneous expression of sympathy, solicitude, and interest, or the suggestion of his views on important religious and ecclesiastical topics. We need not say that we should not put the book into the hands of a friend for his "counsel and guidance," in the matters here discussed. But we have found many gems of thought, feeling, and expression—many beautiful illustrations of Keble's character, personal and official—and some valuable material for more correct and reliable judgments on the nature and tendencies of hyper-ecclesiasticism even when restrained by so much of goodness as was in him. How could intense humility and pastoral solicitude be better expressed than in "Think of one most unworthy, who depends partly on you, to 'cover the' sad 'multitude of his sins?'" What Christian wisdom in the suggestion that "the approbation of Him who sees in secret depends not on conscious emotions, but on sincere endeavors to obey Him. . . . Our conduct He leaves to ourselves, but our feelings He keeps in great measure in His own hands." Or in this: "We are sad children, and must deal cunningly with ourselves; and sometimes a very simple precaution, undertaken and kept in the fear of God, and prayer, and as in the presence of Christ, will baffle a very deep and dangerous snare of the enemy." But the letters are also full of the confessional, and the Real Presence, and neutrality towards Rome, and distrust of revivals in Ireland, and the like.

The Victory of the Vanquished. A Story of the First Century. By the Author of the "Chronicles of the Schonberg-Cotta Family." New York: Dodd & Mead. 1871.

This book evinces more of the power of the original Schonberg-Cotta tale than any other subsequent volumes of the author, some of which would quickly have been forgotten, had it not been for the

celebrity of her first work. The scene is laid in the first century, amid the beginnings of Christianity, in Rome, Greece, and Judea. Many of the leading personages and great historical facts of this period are vividly portrayed. It thus has the combined fascination of history, biography, and the novel.

The book, though designed for entertainment, has a high didactic aim. It analyses and delineates the social and moral condition of the civilized world when Christ came. It displays the profound need of a Redeemer evinced in the degradation of the world and its despairing wails for relief. The remedial power of the Gospel is beautifully illustrated in the descriptions given of various converted persons and families who are fit types of its purest and sweetest efficacy upon men of every sort and condition, high and low, rich and poor, male and female, bond and free.

The Wise Men: Who they were, and how they came to Jerusalem. By Francis W. Upham, LL.D., Professor of Mental Philosophy in Rutgers Female College, City of New York. 12mo, 245 pp. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869.

This is an interesting discussion, containing many illustrations of the subject, drawn from various sources. It holds that the words translated "the East," in Matt. ii. 1, 2, are definite geographical terms—the first, or the far East, meaning Persia; the second, the East, Babylonia. It holds to the influence of the conjunctions of planets discovered by Kepler, and recently verified at Greenwich Observatory, upon the journey of the Wise Men, the star being a new star attendant upon the conjunctions. The most interesting part of the book is the illustration of the spread of Jewish beliefs and expectations among the Eastern peoples, and the chapter on the relations of the Persian and the Hebrew religions. Whatever opinion be entertained of the position taken, the book is freshly written and repays perusal.

Old Song and New. By Margaret I. Preston. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

Poetry is often the wild cry of untutored emotion. Such is not Mrs. Preston's. The experience of a life tried in sorrow has deepened the sentiment of her poems, but all has passed through the alembic of a pure, mellowing imagination, and comes out clothed in beauty. A luxuriant sense of the loveliest things in the present life, deeply colored with the hopes of a better, gives a hearty enjoyableness to the whole. The versification is true and musical, with perhaps a little too frequent indulgence in the masculine feature of overrunning the exact

rhythm. No other female writer of our day commands more gracefully the choicest poetic diction.

Report of the Commissioner of Education made to the Secretary of the Interior, for the Year 1870, *with accompanying Papers.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870.

We have in this volume nearly 600 closely-printed octavo pages, comprising a mass of statistical and other authentic information in respect to the state of education of every grade in all the States and Territories of the United States, which we do not know where else to find. The national government has facilities for collecting such materials which are not enjoyed elsewhere. We are glad to observe the lofty ideal which the author of the Report, and head of the National Bureau of Education, Hon. John Eaton, Jr., presents of education as he would have it apprehended and aimed at in this country:—

"What is so generally termed education, that work limited to elementary, secondary, and superior instruction, will present a harmony excelled only by that of the spheres; each study, the languages ancient and modern, and the sciences, arts, and industries, will have its place, and all these will be supplemented by the work of the home, the press, the pulpit, the forum, the workshop, the making, the administration, the adjudication of laws; presenting a structure of society penetrated by principles illustrating correctly the relation of the human and divine; a structure which, wherever it touches human life, restrains all its tendencies to vice, crime, and degradation, and inspires it to efforts of intelligence and virtue." P. 9.

Hand-Book for Funerals. Prepared by the Rev. William P. Breed, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1334 Chestnut-street.

We are glad that the Presbyterian Board has published this neat and convenient manual for use at funerals. We think that ministers will feel under special obligation to Dr. Breed for arranging in so compact a manner so great a variety of Scripture passages appropriate to the sad occasions upon which they are so often called to officiate.

The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan. Most carefully collated with the edition containing the author's last additions and corrections. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1334 Chestnut-street.

We think that the Board has done a good work in publishing a smaller edition of the *Pilgrim's Progress.* It is certainly highly desirable that a work so full of spirituality, and so attractive and useful to all classes of readers, should be published in a style and at a rate which will put it within the reach of all.

The Moravian Indian Boy. A Tale of the Pilgrimage of the Moravian Indians from the Susquehanna to the Muskingum. By the author of "The Berry-Pickers."

The Child Captives. A True Tale of Life among the Indians of the West. By Mrs. Margaret Hosmen, author of "Chinaman in California," etc., etc.

Both of these books are published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication. They are neatly printed and appropriately illustrated. The former shows what the grace of God can accomplish by a mere boy. The latter illustrates, in a thrilling story, the great truth of God's providential care. Both of them are well fitted for a place in Sabbath-school libraries.

Westminster Lessons. Prepared for the Presbyterian Board of Publication by Rev. Henry C. McCook.

From the brief examination which we have been able to give this series of Sabbath-school questions, we judge them to have been very carefully and thoroughly prepared. The statement of the historical and geographical connection of the Scripture lesson, the analysis of facts, and the explanatory notes, will furnish much assistance to the teacher and scholar in explaining and understanding the Scriptures. We consider them well adapted to secure the end for which they are designed.

Memoir of Samuel B. McPheeters, D. D. By Rev. John S. Grasty. St. Louis: Southwestern Book and Publishing Company. Louisville: Davidson Bros. & Co.

A classmate and friend desires to call public attention to this Memoir, and to add his testimony to the peerless excellence of the true man and Christian minister whose life it records. There was a noble collection of men in Princeton Seminary during the years from 1843 to 1847, including Wm. M. Scott, Theodore L. Cuyler, Charles Phillips, William H. Green, Beverly T. Lacy, Abraham Gosman, Charles W. Keilas, Samuel D. Alexander, Richard Richardson, Joseph R. Mann, Manly, and others early dead, and other noblemen still living, yet less known to the world. Among all these Samuel B. McPheteres stood the equal of the foremost in intellect, and clearly set apart above all by the singular fulness and exquisite proportions in which he possessed all the qualities of head, heart, and manner which constitute the social prince. Then, and in all the developments of his after-life, he was beyond all the men of our generation the writer has known, as a man the noblest, sweetest gentleman, as a minister the most persuasive advocate, and as a Christian the most heavenly-minded saint.

The testimony to the truth of this estimate afforded by his Memoir is wonderfully copious, consistent, and effective. Some twelve or more different writers, all intimate friends and true lovers, sketch his character and manner of life, as they severally witnessed it from his boyhood in Raleigh, North Carolina, to his triumphant death in Mulberry, Kentucky. As a boy with his family and playmates—as a college, law, and theological student with his professors and companions—as a preacher among the humble slaves and their masters in Nottaway and Prince Edward, Va.—as a popular pastor in St. Louis—as a suffering witness for what he verily believed to be loyalty to Christ's crown-rights—and as a languishing invalid pastor and recumbent preacher in his last rural charge amid those wonderful scenes of grace which shed a halo over his last years—in all these situations the natural and supernatural graces of the man shine in all their incomparable perfectness. He presented the same remarkable attractions and exerted the same magical influence upon the most different classes of men. The poor negroes of his earliest charge regarded both the man and his preaching with singular enthusiasm, and traditions of his wonderful words and ways linger among them until now. The same precisely may be said of the impression he made upon the most highly cultured members of the congregations to which he afterwards ministered, both in city and country. It was impossible for any good man to know and not to admire and love him. In later years he made great advances in general culture, and in tact, energy, and power, as an ecclesiastical counsellor and leader. Gentle, tender, and gracious as a woman, he was as wise in counsel, as brave and strong in action, as any man.

As to the position he assumed during the late war, concerning the political obligations of ministers, and as to the essential independence of the civil power of the purely ecclesiastical functions of all religious bodies, whatever may be thought of their general truth or wisdom, *three* things at least are certain.

1st. He was no rebel. He more than once intelligently and freely took the most stringent oaths of allegiance to the government, and he kept them all faithfully, both in their letter and their spirit. No man ever charged him with a breach of them in a single particular. He wrote to me personally that he had always kept his faith to the government as spotless as a wife to her husband, and his word is as good as the oaths of a regiment. Governor Gamble and the Hon. Edward Bates, Attorney-General of the United States in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, both knew him intimately, guaranteed his loyalty, and sympathized with him in his trials.

2d. Whatever may be thought of the soundness of the principles for which he suffered, or of the wisdom with which he applied them to current events, and attempted to maintain them in opposition to some of his brethren, there can be no shadow of doubt that he verily thought that he was called to stand up in an evil day for the honor of Christ and for the spiritual independence of His Church. With his honest convictions he could not have acted differently. His statement of principles, and his action in conformity with them, were perfectly consistent from the beginning of the troubles to the time of his death.

3d. Whatever may have been the prevalence and violent expression of unchristian prejudices and passions among the men of either side with whom he came in contact, he at least always maintained Christian charity unwounded either by thought or word. His spirit was chastened with sorrow, but never excited to bitterness. All his public and private utterances were beautifully consistent with the entire spirit and character of his own eminently lovely life. His letters all corroborate the testimony of his wife, that at no time during his years of trial did he, even in the privacy of home, speak a word that would have compromised him if known to the whole world.

For the last five years of his life he was the well-beloved pastor of the rural congregation of Mulberry, Kentucky. Here the beauty and glory of his life culminated and ripened fast for heaven as gently as the rich autumnal twilight melts into the perfect day. For more than three years he was confined to his couch, and preached and talked with his people always in a recumbent position. His house, the home of all his people, was thronged with constant visitors. From his couch the patient sufferer, at home and at church, talked and preached with radiant countenance, and with matchless sweetness and spiritual power. A perennial dispensation of the gracious Spirit of the Lord was kindly granted them. Many were converted, and the entire church walked with their angelic pastor on the heights of Beulah, in constant view of the celestial city, and under the perpetual inspiration of its hopes and joys. Thus one of the humblest, gentlest, loveliest of mankind exultantly bore testimony to the all-sufficiency of his Lord. One who saw him but a little while before the last fatal outbreak of disease said, "Nor shall I ever forget the glowing countenance and fervid words with which he spoke of the New Jerusalem. It was just an echo of the sweet notes of Bernard:—

"'For thee, O dear, dear country,
Mine eyes their vigils keep;
For very love beholding
Thy happy name, they weep;

The mention of thy glory
Is unction to the breast,
And medicine in sickness,
And love, and life, and rest.'

"And this loving hope lit up his soul in the very last moment of his life." A. A. H.

PAMPHLETS, &c.

Protestantism. A Discourse delivered in the First Presbyterian Church of Fort Wayne, Indiana, January 15th, 1871. By Thomas H. Skinner, Jr., Pastor of the Church.

This discourse is so eloquent and able on one of the great themes now nearest the Christian heart, that we do not wonder its publication was asked by the audience. It presents in strong array the points of Romish weakness and Protestant strength. We have only space to present his answer to the contrast so often and triumphantly set out by Romanists between the alleged unity of Rome and the divisions of Protestantism.

"Let me refer to a few particulars: (*a.*) We are one in receiving the Bible as the word of God, the only and the infallible rule of faith and practice. (*b.*) We are one in the acknowledgment of Christ as the head, the sole teacher, and Priest and King of the church. (*c.*) We are one in holding to the apostasy, inherent depravity, and actual sinfulness of the race, and to the necessity of the grace of the Holy Spirit for its recovery, renewal, and salvation. (*d.*) We are one in the understanding of the chief articles of the Bible faith, the great supernatural verities of Revelation. (*e.*) We are one in our views of the place which preaching has in the edification of Christians and the salvation of the lost. (*f.*) We are one in holding to the right of private judgment, the direct responsibility of each individual to God in His word. (*g.*) We are one in holding to the necessity of an orderly ministry, to church government, the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper, and the Sabbath worship of God in the sanctuary. (*h.*) We are one in making these elements of union paramount, dominant, and controlling. (*i.*) And we are one in repudiating all human, all creature interposition between God and the soul, leaving each and all to stand fast in the liberty wherewith God has made them free.

"Now let men magnify our differences to the utmost; while such union as this exists, we need not be troubled or shaken in our minds. Yea, we should rejoice that by reason of these differences the spirit and life and power of truth and grace is more free. To have all Christians Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, or Methodists, or Baptists, or Lutherans, would be, not only to have fewer professing, but fewer real, Christians."

A Comparative View of Religions. Translated from the Dutch of J. H. Scholten, Professor at Leyden. By Francis T. Washburn. Reprinted by permission from *The Religious Magazine and Monthly Review.* Boston: Crosby & Damrell. 1870.

We discover learning and ingenuity, with some observations of more or less value concerning the upspring and development of the different religions of the world, in this pamphlet. But we do not perceive any evidence that the author, though regarding the religion of the Bible as purer, regards it as any more God-given or infallibly inspired, than Buddism, Confucianism, or Islamism. His doctrine is that "As the ancient productions of the Indian literature, originally the expression of the popular thought of India, were elevated by the Brahmins into Veda, holy, inspired Scripture, so also the religious literature of Israel took the expression of a closed canon, so that which was once the expression of the religious life became now the rule of faith." P. 27.

Opening of Walker Hall, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., October 20, 1870. Address by W. A. Stearns, President, with other Exercises.

The account given in this pamphlet of Walker Hall shows it to be an edifice for college lectures and recitations unsurpassed in the country. It was opened almost simultaneously with Dickinson Hall in Princeton College, a building of like grade and accommodations for similar purposes. The former was erected largely by the liberality of the gentleman, now deceased, whose name it bears; the latter, by the liberality of a gentleman whose modesty led him to prefer that it should bear the name of an honored ancestor, also the honored first President of the College, or of the preliminary institution out of which it grew—a name illustrious in the annals of the American Church. While other parts of this pamphlet are interesting, the address of President Stearns is its principal feature. This was in all respects worthy of the high occasion. It is a very thorough analysis of the American College, an institution which is no mere copy of old-world gymnasia, colleges, or universities, but is the special growth of our own country. This address clearly indicates its distinctive features, and would be a capital supplement of Prof. Porter's late book on the same subject. We greatly deplore the recent tendency to run liberal education chiefly in the grooves of physical science, pure or applied; or to substitute crude university organization and methods for the old sound and ripe training of our colleges, and to leave the youth in them to their own impulses as to habits and manners, morals and religion, so long as these do not interfere with the recitations and lectures.

The Great Commission: A Sermon before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at their Meeting in Brooklyn, N. Y., October 4, 1870. By Rev. Jonathan F. Stearns, D. D., of Newark, New Jersey.

The special interest which attaches to this able discourse arises from the fact that it is the valedictory of our New-School brethren to the American Board, as the organ of their Foreign Missionary work. Of course this leave-taking was solemn and tender, and involved the severing of many sacred and endearing associations. Dr. Stearns puts the case simply and clearly: "Our brethren of the other branch of the church had an established and widely-operating missionary organization. By the reunion its responsibilities became our responsibilities. It was fairly to be expected that we should rally around that, and employ our best strength to give it efficiency." P. 18.

Proceedings of the Second Annual Session of the American Philological Association, held at Rochester, N. Y., July, 1870.

We can only advise our readers of the many learned and able papers described in this pamphlet, and give the following announcement:—

1. The Third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in New Haven, Ct., commencing on Tuesday, July 25, 1871, at three o'clock in the afternoon.

2. All persons intending to be present are requested to send notice to that effect not later than July 1st, 1871, to the Secretary of the Local Committee, Mr. A. Van Name, New Haven, Ct.

3. All persons intending to read papers at the next meeting are requested to send notice to that effect, to the Secretary of the Association, at as early a day as convenient.

By order of the Executive Committee.

An Address delivered at the Laying of the Corner-Stone of the New Buildings of the White Female Department of the House of Refuge, September 5, 1870. By James J. Barclay, President of the House of Refuge.

The Restoration of the Pope: A Discourse delivered in the West Spruce-street Presbyterian Church. By Rev. W. P. Breed, D. D., Pastor. Published by request. Philadelphia: Sherman & Co., Printers, 1871.

We have only space to give the titles of these excellent discourses.

Art. IX.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Before the appearance of our next number the first volume of the "Speaker's Commentary," as it is sometimes called, will be inviting the attention of our readers. It owes this name to the fact that the Speaker of the House of Commons was one of the originators, and has been one of the chief promoters of the work. Thirty or forty of the foremost Biblical Scholars in the Church of England are co-operating in the preparation of the work under the direction of an able Committee. Among the actual contributors are Archbishop Thomson (York), Bishops Jackson (London), Browne (Ely), Jacobson (Chester), Hervey (Bath and Wells), Alexander (Derry), and Thirlwall (St. David's), Deans Mansel (St. Paul's), Payne Smith (Canterbury), Howson (Chester), and Jeremie (Lincoln), with other scholars like Prof. Rawlinson, Westcott, Lightfoot, Kay, Lee (Dublin), Plumptre, etc. The immediate editorial oversight rests with Canon F. C. Cook, of Exeter, who is himself a contributor to a limited extent both in the Old and the New Testaments. The Pentateuch will be published within a few weeks by Murray, in London, and Charles Scribner & Co., in New York, and will in the American edition be comprised in a single volume of about 1,000 pages—the authors of this volume being Bishop Harold Browne, Canon Cook, and Rev. Messrs. S. Clark and T. E. Espin.

The sudden and deeply-lamented death of the learned and large-hearted Dean Alford will attract a new attention to his familiar works, and excite a sad interest in two or three works sent to the press a few weeks before he died. One of these is "The Riviera: Pen and Pencil Sketches from Carras and Genoa," a work illustrated in part by woodcuts from his own drawings. Another is "The Coming of the Bridegroom," a small volume of Advent sermons. A third, which had not appeared when he died, is sermons on "The Lessons of the War." A work on the Old Testament, for which he had made thorough preparation for several years, and for whose publication arrangements had just been made, will probably be lost to us. It was due to him and to his intimate friends among the cultivated and accomplished Dissenting clergymen of London, that one of them, Rev. Dr. Stoughton, should be found among the pall-bearers at his funeral obsequies—a

thing said to be without a precedent. It is creditable to both parties, and a hopeful sign that some of the same group of Dissenters are among the warm friends and welcome guests of the Prime Minister of England.

The latest additions to the valuable theological series published by Messrs. T. and T. Clark (Edinburgh), are Vols. XVII. and XVIII. of the Ante-Nicene Library, containing the Clementine Homilies, and Vol. III. of Tertullian, with fragments of Victorinus and Commodianus; and in the Foreign Theological Library, Vol. II. of Delitzsch on Hebrews, and Schmid's Biblical Theology of the New Testament (which is not to the mind of the rationalistic critic of the *Athenæum*).

Bagster has just published in one quarto volume of 950 pages all of Tregelles' valuable edition of the Greek New Testament that is ready. The Book of Revelation and the Prolegomena, which will be the fourth section and will complete the work, are now in press.

The Rivingtons are bringing out a new edition of Melvill's Sermons just as his death is announced. His fame twenty years ago as Canon of St. Paul's and Golden Lecturer at St. Margaret's will, for years to come, invite attention to his published discourses.

The Bampton, Boyle, and Hulsean Lectures for 1870 are not unworthy of a place in their respective series. The Bampton Lectures were delivered by Rev. Dr. Irons, on "Christianity as taught by St. Paul," and, with the supplementary matter introduced into the published volume, constitute a valuable addition to our theological literature. The Boyle Lectures were delivered again by Prof. Leathes, of King's College, London, and had for their subject, "The Witness of St. John to Christ." The Hulsean Lectures, by Rev. F. W. Farrar, were on "The Witness of History to Christ."

Blunt's Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology is completed. The exegetical works of the last six months are easily chronicled: a Commentary on Psalms by Dr. W. Kay; Thiselton's "Story of Job, and Meditations on Passages of the Book of Job;" a second series of J. Baldwin Brown's "Misread Passages of Scripture;" Dr. James Hamilton's "Moses the Man of God;" and Vol. II. of Spurgeon's "Treasury of David" (Psalms 27–52). Hoole's translation of the "Shepherd of Hermas;" Van Oosterzee's "Theology of the New Testament;" Savile's "Truth of the Bible—Evidence from the Mosaic and other Records of Creation, the Origin and Antiquities of Man, the Science of Scripture, and from the Archæology of different Nations of the Earth;" Ginsburg on "The Moabite Stone;" Macduff's "Memories of Patmos;" Macmillan's "The True Vine, or the Analogies of our

Lord's Allegory;" and "The Recovery of Jerusalem," an account by Capts. Williams and Warren of their archæological researches at the Holy City, are all in their way accessory to the work of the Biblical Student.

The more important additions to doctrinal and ecclesiastical literature are Vol. II. of S. Baring Gould's "Origin and Development of Religious Belief;" Swainson on the Athanasian Creed; Watson's "Ante-Nicene Apologies: their Character and Value;" Goulburn's "Principles of the Cathedral System;" Archbishop Manning's "Petri Privilegium" (a collection of recent pastoral letters); a translation of "Anti-Janus" (an able defence of ultramontane doctrine, by Prof. Hergenröther, of Würzburg); J. Baldwin Brown's "First Principles of Ecclesiastical Truth;" Part III. of the spirited and able "Letters from Rome, by Quirinus," completing the work; a revised edition of Heard's "Tripartite Nature of Man;" Principal Shairp's "Culture and Religion;" Freemantle's "Doctrine of Reconciliation to God by Jesus Christ;" and Dr. J. H. Newman's Essays on "Scripture and Ecclesiastical Miracles" (a revised edition).

In the department of Church History we see announced Vol. I. of a new edition of Robertson's History of the Christian Church; Jevons' "History of the Gallican Church: Sketches of Church History in France from the Concordat of Bologna, 1516, to the Revolution;" Lumley's "Early Dissent, Modern Dissent and the Church of England;" Maguire's "Pontificate of Pope Pius IX.;" Pocock's "Records of the Reformation, 1527–1533;" Peddie's "Dawn of the Second Reformation in Spain;" Lobley's "The Church and the Churches in Southern India;" Barclay's "Word and Work of Christ in New Zealand;" and Miss Wedgwood's "Wesley and the Evangelical Reaction of the XVIIIth Century." Vols. I. and II. of Tyerman's "Life and Times of Wesley" have recently appeared; also "Life and Letters of Dr. Urwick;" Mrs. Oliphant's "St. Francis of Assisi," the last volume of the *Sunday Library;* a Memoir of Bishop Cotton, of Calcutta; Memorials of Bishop R. D. Hampden; and Vol. I. of "The Life and Labors of S. Thomas of Aquin," by Prior R. B. Vaughan.

To our present report of recent religious literature we add only Carpenter's "Religious Influence of Art" (the Burney Prize Essay); Shalders' translation of Naville's "Problems of Evil;" Rule's "Holy Sabbath instituted in Paradise and perfected by Christ;" "Rain upon the Mown Grass," a collection of sermons by Rev. S. Martin, one of the foremost of the preachers of London; "Beacons and Patterns; or, Lessons for Young Men," by Dr. Landels, the distinguished Baptist

preacher in London; "The History and Literature of the Israelites," by C. and A. de Rothschild; two collections of Lectures and Tracts by Keshub Chunder Sen, edited by Sophia D. Collet; and Sen's "English Visit" (a collection of his principal addresses in Great Britain, brought out by the same editor).

Among the interesting contributions of the season to general history and biography are Malet's "History of the Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia, in 1866;" a new edition of Rawlinson's "Five Great Monarchies;" Vol. II. of Creasy's History of England; Vols. I. and II. of Ihne's History of Rome; Vol. III. of the translation of Curtius' History of Greece; a new edition of Sharpe's History of Egypt; Col. Taylor's "Student's History of India;" Holland and Hozier's "Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia;" a Life of I. K. Brunel, the distinguished engineer; a Life of Gen. Richard Deane (one of the judges of Charles I.); Anderson's "Life of the Duke of Kent;" Gilfillan's Life of Sir Walter Scott; Life and Letters of R. H. Barham (author of the "Ingoldsby Legends"); "Familiar Letters of Sir Charles Bell;" Vol. I. of the "Life and Letters of Hugh Miller," by Peter Bayne; Lady Wallace's translation of Van Grieum's Life of Alexandra Feodorowna, Empress of Russia; Vol. I. of a new and greatly enlarged edition of Hosack's "Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers;" Foss' "Biographia Juridica," a very complete and valuable biographical dictionary of the Judges of England from the time of the Conquest; and J. R. O'Flanagan's "Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Keepers of the Great Seal of Ireland from the earliest times."

Of a literary character are Dean Milman's Essays; J. W. Kaye's Essays of an Optimist; Prof. Seeley's Lectures and Essays; Maguire's Essays on the Platonic Ethics; H. Morley's "Clement Marot, and other Studies;" one more translation of Homer's Iliad, said to be fairly vigorous and successful, by J. G. Cordery; and Vols. I. and II. of the long-expected edition of the works of Alexander Pope, commenced by Croker, continued by Cunningham, and now completed by Rev. W. Elwin.

We close our memoranda of the half-year with "A Fragment on Mackintosh," by James Mill; St. George Mivart's "Genesis of Species," an able reply to Darwin; Vol. III. of Max Müller's "Chips from a German Workshop;" a second edition of Prof. Müller's Sanscrit Grammar; Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India; Burns' Rome and the Campagna; Lady Belcher's "Mutineers of the Bounty;" Glaisher's "Travels in the Air;" Airy on Magnetism; and Proctor's "The Sun: Ruler, Fire, Light and Life of the Planetary System."