



THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1869.

No. IV.

Art. I.—*Morell on Revelation and Inspiration.*

Morell's Philosophy of Religion has been long before the public, and its anti-evangelical character has been generally understood. There are, however, some reasons why it should, at the present time, receive some further notice, especially with regard to its views of Revelation and Inspiration. These views have obtained a wide currency. They are so speciously put forth under the forms and names, and as if in the interest, of evangelical religion, that many are disposed to regard them with favor; and some have adopted parts of them as not only consistent with the evangelical belief on these subjects, but as relieving that belief of many errors and difficulties with which it has been unnecessarily encumbered. Morell's work is a type of the class of writers who oppose the commonly received views with regard to revelation and inspiration, both in the views themselves and in the manner in which they are advocated. It has become the common method of the opponents of evangelical truth, while endeavoring to destroy the evangelical faith, to put forth their doctrines under the guise of evangelical terms. Thus, the terms "Divinity of Christ," "Vicarious Sacrifice," "Justification by Faith," are phrases which

have had, for ages, a distinctive and established meaning, as expressive of the system of evangelical faith; they have been used in a reverse meaning, to indicate doctrines directly opposite to that system, and utterly destructive of it. Why this change of names? Why is it now attempted to destroy the evangelical faith, under the guise of friendship? Is it the homage which error [unwittingly] pays to truth? Or is it that the evangelical scheme is so in accord with Scripture, and has so commended itself to the conscience and judgment of people who are earnest in religion, that its very garb disarms suspicion, and is worth adopting, even by its enemies who are laboring to destroy it?

It will be noticed how very much of the speciousness of Morell's views is owing to this change of the meaning of terms. He regards "Christianity as a Revelation from God" (p. 127). "The idea of Revelation," he says, implies "a case of intelligence in which something is presented directly to the mind of the subject, in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself; intelligence which our own efforts would have been unavailable to attain, and in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known" (p. 131). "Revelation in the Christian sense," he regards as "that power by which God presents the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind" (p. 148).

He distinguishes between Revelation and Inspiration. The presentation of the object to the mind is Revelation; that elevation of the intuitional consciousness, which enables the mind to apprehend the object, is Inspiration. Inspiring, as God's work, consists in "the special means employed by God to induce the highest spiritual intuition at some period of the world. He calls these special means "Divine arrangements," and the result, a "miraculous elevation" "of the religious consciousness." These "Divine arrangements" and the "miraculous elevation," he says, are "what we mean by Inspiration." He speaks of "the superhuman element;" "extraordinary influences;"—"assuredly the most extraordinary instrumentalities to work upon the minds of the apostles, and to raise them to a state of spiritual perception and sensi-

bility, such as has never before been realized at any other period of the world;" "a Revelation," and "Divine arrangements, through the medium of which the loftiest and purest conceptions of truth were brought before the immediate consciousness of the apostles, and through them, of the whole age; at a time, too, when, in other respects the most universal demoralization abounded on every side." And though Morell holds that the inspired man has no faculty beyond what all men possess in common, and though the subjective intellectual process differs not in kind from any other process of intuitional consciousness, he is careful to say, "we are not by any means intending to shut away out of sight the Divine agencies which were employed in introducing the Christian Revelation specifically to mankind."

Could we stop here, and receive these terms, definitions, and disclaimers, in their ordinary sense, and as they would naturally and almost necessarily be understood, we should be obliged to conclude that Morell does not differ essentially from the common evangelical belief with regard to Revelation and Inspiration. Many have so concluded, and have been led so to conclude by the passages which we have cited. But we shall see that by "Revelation," or the direct presentation of intelligence "by the immediate agency of God himself," Morell does not mean the communication or direct impartation of any intelligence to the mind of one more than to the mind of another; nor the objective presentation of any thing before the mind of one, that is not equally presented before the minds of others at the same time. There is simply a natural presentation of objects, before the natural capacities of all. The presentation is Divine, because God made all objects, and presents them before the faculties of all, to be apprehended by their natural powers, according to the degree of the elevation of intuitional consciousness in each; with no peculiar faculty in any, nor with any intellectual process in one different from the intellectual process in the other. Morell's "Revelation" is simply the natural revelation of deism.

And Morell's "Inspiration," though he calls it "supernatural," "Divine," and "miraculous," is simply the elevation of

intuitional consciousness by "arrangements" that give to all, at the same time and under the same circumstances, an equal advantage. It is "supernatural" only as God works all things above nature; and "miraculous," only as Divinely effected by natural means. The circumstances, and the Divine work, are alike to all.

In such Revelations and Inspirations, therefore,—and so Morell holds,—absolute truth, either in morals or religion, is never reached. No such absolute truth is ever imparted by the Divine agency, but each one advances *toward* the truth according to the degree of exaltation attained by his intuitional consciousness. Prophets and apostles made grand attainments, but they were imperfect, and never reached absolute truth. The Old Testament writers were indeed quite up to their age, but their religious views, and their views of morality, were so low, as to make it horrible to regard their teachings as the Word of God, or as to be received as of Divine authority. Apostles were inspired, but not so inspired as to be able to teach absolute truth; much less were they inspired or commissioned to *write* any thing to be received as of Divine authority. Their inspiration was simply an imperfect elevation of their intuitional consciousness, to reach such views as they were able, in the natural use of their natural faculties, extraordinarily elevated by natural means, and according to natural laws. They gave, not the Word of God, but a transcript of their own advanced, but imperfect consciousness. A revelation "by word or pen," Morell holds to be impossible; and useless, if it were possible, since it can convey no higher views to the one whom it addresses, than he has already attained in the elevation of his intuitional consciousness. The Bible, therefore,—Morell holds,—is not inspired. It is no standard of faith or duty. No doctrine should be attempted to be proved by it. We ourselves, according to our goodness and intuitional exaltation, are as truly inspired as prophets and apostles. We may use the Bible as a help, but by no means as an authoritative standard. It is a help, as all good books are helps, but by no means a guide to be followed implicitly or as a rule.

What then is the standard? Where shall we find the Gos-

pel in its simplicity and in its purity? Morell says we must seek for it "in the clear elimination from *all systems*, or rather from the religious intuitions of all good men, of the vital elements of Christian faith and love and joy." But why eliminate from "*all* systems?" What security is there that we shall find it in these? Morell says, "the religious intuitions of the human mind, in accordance with their very nature, grow up to an *ever-increasing perfection*, in *humanity at large*, when it is brought under the influence of Christian ideas and principles." But if these intuitions in humanity at large are naturally growing up to "an ever-increasing perfection," to what shall we make the *final* appeal? Morell has thought of that. He says, "the highest appeal must be the "*Catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified humanity, in its eternal progress heavenward?*" Oh, then, the standard to which we are to make our final appeal, is "in an eternal progress!" Where are we to find "the catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified humanity?" When we have found it, how shall we determine the degree of "progress" which it has reached at present? Plainly, we ourselves must judge of that; and having searched "all systems," and examined "the religious intuitions of all good men," we must judge for ourselves what in them is right and true. No certain truth is attainable; no standard of truth is possible. Man can only judge for himself of the degree of "eternal progress" toward truth which "humanity" has reached, and run the hazard of changes in the eternal progress yet to come!

Is this Christianity? Is it Revelation, or Inspiration? Is it not, rather, Naturalism as opposed to Revelation or Inspiration; and Rationalistic Deism as opposed to Christianity?

But let us be more particular, in order to be certain that we have characterized Morell's philosophy justly, and to show more fully that such is the religion which he proposes for the acceptance of mankind. Morell regards "Revelation" as necessarily signifying "*a mode of intelligence;*" and next, undertakes "to determine *what mode of intelligence* it is, which the term Revelation implies" (p.129). He shows, as he supposes, "that there are two modes of intelligence possi-

ble to man in his present state:" the "*intuitional* and the logical." "In the former, we arrive at truth by a direct and immediate gazing upon it,"—when we come in contact with the external world through the senses, it is a "*perception;*" when "we have a direct knowledge" of "higher and more spiritual realities" through "the interior eye of consciousness," it is an "*intuition.*" "In the logical mode of intelligence, on the contrary, we arrive at truth *mediately*," by calculation or inference of our own, or by some definition or explanation from the lips of another. "These two modes of intelligence, then, are the *only two* adapted to the present state of the human mind. To imagine a third mode is a psychological impossibility."

He goes on to show that Revelation can be only through the *intuitional*, and not through the *logical*. Nothing can be a *revelation* to us that is told, communicated, or described to us. No power, no intelligent being, can so *reveal* any thing to us. Our intuitional consciousness must be so elevated as to see the truth in the exercise of our own powers. Revelation and Intuition are alike in this, "that the object of intelligence is in each case "presented *directly* to our contemplation."

They agree also in this, that the "knowledge involved," is, in each case, "presented to us immediately *by God.*" Thus: "our knowledge of the material universe is a revelation." "As far as its real nature and mode of communication is concerned, it must be *always* a revelation"—a "Divine manifestation"—"to the human reason." So "forms of beauty, and the high ideas embodied in *nature*" are "immediate manifestations of the thoughts of God to the human mind." We must have faculties for the purpose; God must present the object; "if either be wanting, there is no Divine manifestation." "The process by which we gaze admiringly upon the wonders of nature, is a mode of intelligence that implies, in its generic sense, a direct revelation *from God* himself." The case is still plainer "when we turn to the higher sphere of intuition"—of "the true, the beautiful, the good." There is this further agreement between Intuition and Revelation, Morell supposes, in that the "knowledge imparted" could not have been gained by our own efforts, nor derived from the

data of any other and previous knowledge. There is no intermediate step or process: the object, the truth, the beauty, the eternal law of right, are seen immediately in themselves; no logical process can reach them; they cannot be *told* us; we must see them ourselves, or they can by no means be *revealed* to us. When we ourselves immediately behold them in direct intuition, and when the things which we behold are presented to us by God, then the process of intelligence is a case of Divine Revelation. "The light which first broke in upon chaos" was "in the strictest sense a revelation." "So we may say, in perfect truth, that the universe is a revelation to the human mind"—"as much a revelation as every thing else which comes home to our consciousness by direct and immediate presentation." In all this Morell holds that in Revelation, nothing is told or communicated to one man more than to another. Nothing is objectively presented before one which is not at the same time objectively placed before others; and that, "by the direct agency of him who is the source of all truth and goodness and beauty." The only difference is that the intuitional consciousness of one is more elevated than that of the other. Nor is any thing directly told, or in any way communicated, or a knowledge,—as of religious truth or of future events,—imparted *ab extra*, to one, by any process that is not equally employed in the case of others. Such *telling*, or *communicating*, as a revelation either of religious truth, or of a knowledge of future events, Morell holds to be impossible.

But, really, is this so? Such a notion seems so strange, and so subversive of every idea hitherto considered as involved in Revelation or Inspiration, that doubtless ample proof will be required that this is Morell's position. Let Morell speak for himself. On page 135, he says: "There is, however, one more process coming within the province of the logical faculty, which might appear at first sight to be far more compatible with the idea of a revelation; and through the medium of which, indeed, many suppose that the actual revelations of God to man have been made." "The process to which I refer is that of verbal exposition. Could not a revelation from God, it might be naturally urged, *consist in an exposition of truth,* made to us by the *lips* or *pen* of an *inspired messen-*

ger; that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a *logical exposition of doctrines*, which it is for mankind to receive, as sent to us on Divine authority?"

Morell answers, no. He has considered the matter well; the Lord cannot do it. He means no irreverence; but the Lord has limited himself by the constitution which he has given to the human mind; and he cannot do it. No "inspired messenger," can, "*by lips or pen*," set forth a message from God, which "it is proper for mankind to receive as sent to us on Divine authority" (p. 136). And this he argues at length. This principle draws deep. If this be true, then "the word of the Lord" never came to any prophet predicting any judgments, or foretelling the riches of the Divine mercy, and the glories of the Redeemer's kingdom. There has never been a "thus saith the Lord," which it is "proper for man to receive as sent to us on Divine authority." Holy men of God spake a vision out of their own intuitional consciousness, and not, as "they were moved by the Holy Ghost." They never spoke any thing "not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but in words which the Holy Ghost teacheth." Paul was much mistaken when he commended the Thessalonians because when they received the word of God, which they heard of him, they "received it not as the word of man, but as it is in truth, the word of God." It was no word of God; it was but Paul's imperfect exposition of his own imperfect intuitional consciousness. Morell distinctly declares that the Bible is neither inspired nor a standard of religious truth. He acknowledges no volume, and no utterance, as the word of God. No, a revelation could not be made by "*lips* or *pen*" to be received "as on the authority of God." It can be made "only in the form of religious intuition," nor can it be a revelation save to him to whom it comes as a personal intuition.

But how unphilosophical is this theory; how contrary to facts; how utterly opposed to the declarations of Scripture!

Unphilosophical; for no man can know that God cannot make a communication to the mind of man, in just that method. And men, contrary to the assertion of Morell, have already all the ideas necessary for the full comprehension of such a message in words; *e. g.*,—that "Babylon shall be

destroyed," and by whom, and under what circumstances. And not only so, but Divine tokens can be given, that such a revelation, "by lips" or "pen," may properly be received as on the authority of God.

Morell's notion is also contrary to facts. The thing has been done, and often done. Many and many a prediction of occurrences which no human mind could foresee, has stood written for ages, and the exact and wonderful fulfilment was demonstration that the message was from God. So of the religious truth, that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" men might already be possessed of all the ideas necessary to comprehend such an utterance, so that expressed by "lips" or "pen," it could be sufficiently understood for the purpose of their salvation. And how can any man know that God could not impart such knowledge of a coming Messiah, and so reveal the great salvation, without elevating the intuitional consciousness of the inspired man to see all these future events by his own natural powers; and without so elevating his consciousness as to foresee, of itself, and to comprehend, the mystery of God manifest in the flesh, and of redemption by blood? These mysteries were, in fact, so revealed. A series of prophets, in different countries, and for a series of ages, spoke of a coming Messiah. No one saw the whole. Age after age, and prophet after prophet, added another and another particular, which no human consciousness could be elevated to see by its own intuition, or see it with no special presentation of any thing objective, and no especial communication, beyond what was made to other men. What human intuition could see that God was to be incarnate? That the Saviour should be born in Bethlehem; of a virgin; of the lineage of David? What human intuition could have foreseen, and fixed the time, so that the Messiah should come while the second temple was standing, and before the ceasing of the daily oblation, and in the height of the Roman empire? And then the seeming contradictions of these prophecies: that the Saviour should be a child, and yet the Everlasting Father, the Mighty God? That he should be a king of everlasting and boundless domin-

ion, and yet despised, cut off as a transgressor, and have his grave with the wicked? The prophets themselves could not reconcile these seeming contrarieties. They searched diligently, "what, or what manner of time, the spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow." But it was revealed unto them, that they searched these things not for themselves but for later believers; and later believers saw their complete and exact fulfilment. Yet Morell thinks it all impossible! He has considered the matter: nothing like this could have been so revealed "by lips or pen," to be received "as on the Divine authority." He holds—what no man can know—that God could not so have communicated these things to the human mind! No other way was possible in the case, save to exalt the intuitional consciousness, which all men have in common, and—as we shall see—to exalt it by natural means, so that men shall, in the exercise of their own powers, see all these mysteries of redemption for themselves! How unphilosophical this view! How unscriptural! How contrary to the facts! For, we repeat it, no man can know that God cannot—beyond the exercise or exaltation of any natural power—directly communicate these mysteries and these future events to the mind of man. And the Scriptures constantly represent that the doctrine of Christ and him crucified was a mystery hid in God from the foundation of the world. Eye had not seen it, nor ear heard it; neither had it entered into the heart of man. But God had revealed it by his spirit. No intuitional power of man could have penetrated into the secret of the Divine purpose of redemption; "for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so, the things of God, knoweth no man, but the spirit of God." Not only were these Divine mysteries revealed as to the matter, but inspired men so recorded them, under the Divine direction, that they themselves, even by diligent searching, were unable to comprehend what, or what manner of time, the spirit of Christ which was in them did signify. And apostles, to whom the full revelation of Christ was made, spoke them, "not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth."

These are not only the declarations of Scripture, but the facts themselves show that such must have been the method of communication. Morell's scheme is, therefore, every way unphilosophical, contrary to Scripture, and contradictory to the facts in the case. So in the prediction of many things, which involve no such mystery as the mystery of Redemption; no man can know that God could not reveal these future events save by exalting the intuitional consciousness of the man, so that he could see things future by the exercise of his own power. No man can prove, in any instance, that such future events were foreseen by the mere exercise of the human intuitional faculty. For example: "it was revealed" to Simeon, "that he should not see death, till he had seen the Lord's Christ." Can any man know that this knowledge could not have been directly imparted to Simeon, by the Spirit of God? Can any man know so much of the methods possible to the Holy Spirit, as to be able to know that this was not, and could not have been, the method by which it was revealed to Simeon, that he should not die till he had seen the Lord's Christ? On the other hand, can any man show that the intelligence was communicated to Simeon on Morell's plan of revelation, viz., by exalting Simeon's natural power of intuition so that he should foresee the time of Christ's coming, and of his own death, by his own faculties, without any communication of the intelligence *ab extra?*

Morell is consistent in this view. He holds that no revelation was ever made in any other mode than the one which he describes. "The aim of revelation" was not "formally to expound a system of doctrine," but to educate the mind gradually to see truth for itself through the intuitional consciousness (p. 140). "Judaism was propædeutic to Christianity, but there was no formal definition of any one spiritual truth in the whole of that economy." What! No declaration in words, of the unity of God, and forbidding idolatry; when it is said, "Hear, O Israel, *the Lord thy God is one Lord: thou shalt have no other Gods before me?*" So Morell says, that "there is no formal exposition of doctrine in the whole discourses of the Saviour." What! No exposition of Christian morals by the "lips" of Christ, in the Sermon on the Mount?

No declaration of the work of redemption, when Christ says, "*The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many?*" No doctrine, when he says, "*Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you?*" No *doctrine* preached by apostles! No *truth* to *be believed* as of Divine authority, when apostles went forth preaching Christ and him crucified, and when in their preaching they turned the world upside down? Oh, no! No doctrine at all! Morell holds that they went forth on a simple mission of educating the intuitional consciousness! Paul, indeed, could say, "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." John could say," If there come any unto you, and bring not this *doctrine*, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God-speed." Oh, no! No *doctrine!* "No formal exposition of Christian doctrine!" No particular gospel exclusive of "*another*," and that may be distinguished from *another!* No declaration of a Divine method and offer of salvation, which if men receive and follow, they shall be saved, and which, if they believe not, and obey not, they shall be damned! But only a general, undefinable mission of educating the intuitional consciousness, was the work of Christ and the mission of apostles!

It is time now to inquire about Inspiration. On Morell's scheme, what power, or faculty, has the inspired man beyond other men? What is presented to his mind? What influences are brought to bear upon his mind, beyond what is presented to other minds, and beyond the influences which are brought to bear upon the other minds around him at the same time?

As to *power* or *faculty*, Morell says, p. 159: "It is a *higher potency of a certain form of consciousness which every man to some degree possesses.*" And, p. 148, "Inspiration does not imply any thing new in the *actual processes* of the human mind: *it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess;* it indicates *rather the elevation of religious consciousness.*"

That is, God tells nothing; communicates nothing to the inspired man more than to others; objectively presents

nothing more. But let Morell explain this for himself (p. 148).

"We must regard the whole process of inspiration, accordingly, as being in no sense *mechanical*, but as purely *dynamical;* involving not a novel supernatural faculty, but a faculty already enjoyed, elevated *supernaturally* to an extraordinary power and susceptibility." (Observe how, and what it is)—"indicating in part an inward nature so perfectly harmonized to the Divine, so freed from the distorting influences of passion and sin, and so recipient of the Divine ideas circumambient around it, so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven, that the truth leaves an impress upon it which answers perfectly to its objective reality."

Here is no *telling*, or *communicating*, any thing to the inspired man; no *presentation* of any object before him more than to others; but his mind being freed from distorting influences, and harmonized to the Divine, becomes "so recipient of the Divine ideas *circumambient around it*," that it sees more than others of a different character, around whom "the Divine ideas are equally circumambient."

The "circumambient ideas" are the *Revelation.* Freeing the mind from passion and sin, harmonizing it with the Divine, till it becomes recipient of the Divine ideas, is *Inspiration.*

But Morell speaks of the mind being elevated "*supernaturally*," and of "*miraculous* elevation." What is this? Morell says: "The *supernatural element* consists in the extraordinary influences employed to create these lofty intuitions, and to bring the subject into perfect harmony with truth."

Well, what are these "*extraordinary influences?*" Are they influences of the Holy Ghost? Are they truly "supernatural," or are they wholly natural, and working by natural [*i. e.*, by ordinary and established] laws? They are wholly natural. Morell has but changed the meaning of the words "supernatural" and "miraculous." He ignores entirely any influences of the Holy Ghost. It does not appear that he has any belief at all in the Holy Ghost, as inspiring men by leading them into all truth, bringing all things to their remembrance, showing them things to come, and giving them what

to say, so that it is not they that speak, but the spirit of their Father which speaketh in them. The "extraordinary influences" which he specifies are all outside circumstances, objectively presented to others as well as to the inspired men. Morell specifies, in the case of the apostles, their "personal experience of the life, preaching, character, sufferings, and resurrection of Christ, together with the remarkable effusion of spiritual influences which followed his ascension," as "assuredly the *most extraordinary instrumentalities* to work upon the minds of the apostles, and to *raise them to a state of spiritual perception* and sensibility, such as has never been fully realized at any other period of the world's history." "Jesus Christ is a revelation." But he was objectively presented to others besides the apostles. They saw his life and heard his preaching. If these "extraordinary influences" and "extraordinary instrumentalities" were the "supernatural element" in inspiration, then were not others also inspired?

But Morell specifies "Divine arrangements" and "miraculous elevation." He does so, indeed; but his "Divine arrangements" are nothing out of the ordinary course of Divine providences, and his "miraculous elevation," he is careful to tell us, is by a natural miracle, and that he is only affirming—"what is constantly done in the case of outward miracles themselves"—"that God always employs *natural means*, whenever it is possible to do so, in order to accomplish his *supernatural purposes*." The common idea of the Inspiration of the Holy Ghost is not found in his scheme. He discards it as "mechanical."

Since, then, nothing is objectively presented, and so revealed to one more than to others around him, and since the elevation of consciousness takes place according to natural laws, in whom does the inspiration take place?

Morell teaches that it takes place in all men, according to their degree of goodness; and that, subjectively, it is identical with what takes places in men of genius. On p. 78, in reply to the objection that if "intuition be the direct presentation of truth," it should be infallible, he answers, that "if our intuitional nature were absolutely perfect, then indeed its results would be infallible." "If we were to imagine our minds

to be perfectly harmonized, morally, intellectually, religiously, with all truth—if we can imagine them without any discord of the interior being, to stand in the midst of a universe upon which God has impressed his own Divine ideas"—"then, indeed, we should comprehend things *as they are*. A mind, so harmonized with nature and with God, would perceive at one glance the processes and end of all things; just as Goethe, without the labor of any inductive reasoning, saw the metamorphosis of plants; just as genius in the philosopher grasps the hidden analogues;" "just so a high spiritual sensibility feels the reality of moral and religious truth long ere it is verified or logically expounded." And, p. 178, "Genius is a remarkable power of intuition;" "a power which arises from the inward nature of a man being in harmony with that object, in its reality and its operations." So, p. 174, "in affirming that the inspiration of the ancient seers and of the chosen apostles was analogous with these phenomena, we are in no way diminishing its heavenly origin, or losing sight of the supernatural agency by which it is produced." "God employs natural means, whenever it is possible to do so, to accomplish even his supernatural results." But what are the natural means to accomplish the supernatural result of Inspiration? Morell does not leave us in doubt: "Let there be a due purification of the moral nature, a perfect harmony of the spiritual being with the mind of God, a removal of all inward disturbance from the heart, and what is to hinder the immediate intuition of Divine things? Not only do we now comprehend its nature [viz., of inspiration], not only do we feel its sublimity, not only does it rise from a mere mechanical force to a phenomenon instinct with grandeur, but we are taught"—mark here what we are taught—"we are taught, that in *proportion* as our own hearts and our nature are brought into harmony with truth, *we may ourselves approach the same elevation.*"

Inspiration, then, takes place, according to natural laws, in all men according to their degree of goodness. We ourselves may approach the same elevation as prophets and apostles, in proportion as our hearts are purified, and our natures brought into harmony with truth.

But how is it that the knowledge is of Divine origin, since it is humanly acquired, and by natural processes and natural means, and without having it objectively and directly imparted to them by Divine communication? Morell provides for this difficulty. "Knowledge is Divine because humanity itself is Divine. It comes from God because we came forth from God." "The truth that knowledge is Divine remains; but it remains *not* to bear witness to the delusiveness of the human faculties, *as though they never could have perceived the truth, had it never been imparted to them objectively, but rather to show that our spiritual knowledge is Divine, for just this reason*, that man who realizes it is himself a child of the Divinity, and is permitted to gaze upon that world from which he came" (p. 282).

But had prophets and apostles received that degree of inward goodness which rendered their teachings infallible? An important question, since, unless we can gauge their spiritual attainments, we cannot tell, on Morell's plan, what degree of authority to allow them, or what degree of credit to allow to the Bible. On this point Morell answers, unequivocally, No. They had not reached that degree of goodness which made their teachings infallible. The writers of the Old Testament were inspired; a little more than other men of their day; but they taught an "impure and imperfect morality"—"one frequently at variance with Christian principles"—"and highly revolting to our best and religious sensibilities," if we suppose them to come direct from a "Holy God." Their inspiration could but exhibit their own "religious consciousness." This was "the spirit of humanity, on its pathway to Christian light and love"—"the purest representations both of their own natural and individual vitality." "Hence, accordingly, the imperfections both in moral and religious ideas are mixed up more or less with all their sacred writings" (pp. 160, 161, 162).

It cannot fail to be observed here, how sadly Morell mistakes and misrepresents the morality and piety of the Old Testament. It does not, as he supposes, inculcate the spirit of "fierce war and retaliation"—"hatred of enemies," and other vices which he attributes to it. Nowhere are the sins, even

of the heart, more thoroughly condemned than in the Old Testament. At no time, more than at the present, had the words of the Psalmist a higher appreciation, when he says: "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes; the fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever; the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." Nowhere is there found a more spiritual, or a more exalted religious experience than is delineated in the Psalms. If we compare the spiritual attainments of any man that ever lived, with the attainments demanded in these, we may say, with emphasis: "I have seen an end of all perfection; but thy commandment is exceeding broad." Our Lord himself, when he gave his Golden Rule as the sum of moral duty to our fellow-men, said: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye the same to them, *for this is the law and the prophets.*" But Morell holds the morality of the law and the prophets to be defective and obsolete, far behind "*the spirit of humanity* in its pathway to Christian light and love."

What, then, does Morell mean, when he says of these Old Testament writings, that "they stand before us their own witness to the truth?" and when he speaks of them as "the wondrous symbols;" "the miraculous history;" "the sublime devotions;" "the halo of glory which nothing can obscure?" "*Their own witness to the truth?*" What, to permanent and unchanging truth? Oh, no: nothing of the kind! They "present us with facts—facts in the religious life of a people; facts in the *progress* of the human mind *toward* a loftier view, which speak for themselves." "Herein lies their inspiration, and in this sense, and in this alone, can we maintain our hold on the Old Testament canon as a spiritual and Divine reality, profitable for doctrine" (p. 170).

"The spirit of humanity," then, "on its pathway to Christian light and love," has left the Old Testament behind. Come we then to the New Testament, to whose writers he attributes "the highest inspiration ever yet reached." He denies that these *writings* were or contain a revelation, or that they were inspired, or that they are the word of God, or that they contain that word. They are indeed "*veritable representations*

of the religious life, which [the writers] had derived by special inspiration from heaven." But that inspiration was the simple intuition of very good, yet imperfect men; a record of their own consciousness, according to the degree of elevation which they had then attained, and their writings are no standard for us. But tell us, were not their memories guided, and their minds led into all truth, by some special aid of the Comforter? Or if not this, was there not, at least, some special *superintendence*, so that we may confidently rest on their teachings as safe and sufficient guides?

Morell answers, and answers distinctly, p. 172: "If it be said that the providence of God must have watched over the composition and construction of a canonical book, which was to have so vast an influence on the destiny of the world, we are quite ready to admit it, and even to assert it; but in the same sense Providence watches over every other event which bears upon the welfare of man, *although the execution of it be left to the freedom of human endeavor*."

That is all. They gave an account of their own intuitional states, while they were imperfect, and their intuitions could not possibly have infallibility, or their utterances be regarded in any sense as the word of God. They gave a human record of fallible and imperfect intuition; and as to Divine superintendence, they had no providential superintendence even, save as Providence watches over all events which are "*left to the freedom of human endeavor*."

As to the logical parts of the New Testament, Morell holds that these could be in no manner inspired. "To some it might doubtless appear very irreverent to speak of errors in reasoning, as occurring in the sacred writings; but the irreverence, if there be any, lies on the part of those who deny their possibility." "To speak of *logic*, as such, as being inspired, is a sheer absurdity." Infallible conclusions cannot, he holds, be secured in that way "by any amount of inspiration whatever."

No: the Lord could not do it. Paul need not think to *reason* with us out of the Scriptures to prove that "by deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified" in the sight of God; nor to prove justification by faith, the Scriptures are no rule, and reasoning can have no inspiration.

But can an infallible inspiration ever be given? And can a record of this be given, which shall at least be a *human* record of an inspired and infallible intuitional consciousness? Morell thinks the first possible; he is not so certain of the last, since there is no certainty that men are ever inspired to speak or to write, but only in the mental intuition. We ourselves—all men—"indefinitely approved the same elevation," as prophets and apostles, *in proportion* "as our hearts are purified, and our nature brought into harmony with truth." As that "proportion" approaches perfection, we approach infallibility in our intuitional consciousness. And when our moral nature is entirely pure, and undisturbed, in perfect harmony, then, Morell holds, our intuitions must be infallible (p. 78).

But may we not go to the Bible for instructions, in order that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto every good work? Morell forbids it. It is true that the apostles reasoned out of the Scriptures, and so did some other disciples, mightily convincing the Jews that Jesus was the Christ. It is true that our Lord rebuked his disciples for not receiving the Scriptures as authoritative, and for not understanding what the Scriptures so clearly taught: "O fools, and slow of heart, to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." But Morell allows no such searchings of the Scriptures for doctrines of final truth. How differently he views these things from the way in which our Lord views them!

But if the Bible is not the word of God, nor any final standard of truth, and if we may not search it as a final guide as to what we shall believe concerning God, and what duties God requires of man—nor to know what we must do to be saved—where then shall we go? Well did one of old say, "Lord, to whom shall we go, *thou* hast the words of eternal life." But Morell is at no loss. He sends us somewhere else. He has formed a better standard than the Bible. He has found a better exposition of the simplicity of the Gospel of Christ than the New Testament. Hear: "*I contend, there-*

fore, most earnestly, for this position; that the simplicity of the Gospel of Christ is to be sought in the clear elimination from all systems, or rather from the religious intuitions of all good men, of the vital elements of Christian faith, and love. and joy" (pp. 24, 81).

Plato, Confucius, Phasters, Vedas, "all systems" must be laid under contribution! Or would he limit his meaning to "all systems" calling themselves Christian? How shall we determine what to eliminate from these systems? By what test shall we determine whether any tenet belongs to the "elements of Christian faith and joy?" How shall we come at "the religious intuitions of all good men?" How shall we determine their degree of goodness, so that we may judge that they have any thing worth eliminating? Is not "the spirit of humanity" still on its march "*toward* Christian light and love?" Do not "the religious intuitions of the human mind, in accordance with their very nature, grow up to an *ever-increasing* "*perfection* in humanity at large?" Where then shall we rest? To what is the final appeal?

Morell is very explicit on this point. "The theology of every age is the formal statement of the truth which these intuitions convey, and consequently *the highest appeal must be to the catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified humanity in its eternal progress heaevnward.*"

Farewell, prophets! Farewell, apostles! Farewell, Bible! Farewell, Jesus of Nazareth! The highest appeal is no longer to you, but to "*the catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified humanity, in its eternal progress heavenward.*"

Where shall we find that catholic expression? Oh, we must "eliminate" it "from all systems." "Purified humanity!" Where is it? Has it reached a resting-place, where we may find the truth? Oh, no! Purified humanity is on an "*eternal progress.*" What then is the present stage of its progress? Who is to gauge for us the degree of "perfection" and "progress" which it has already reached? Plainly each one must judge of these things for himself. The only standard by which he is to judge is himself. Neither prophets, nor apostles, nor humanity, in any stage of progress or perfection, is any standard of certitude. Poor, erring, lost man is left without a guide, save as

he is persuaded that he is himself Divine, and his intuitions from God, since "he himself came from God." No revelation or inspiration has authority over him, any further than it commends itself to his own consciousness. Such is the conclusion which Morell draws himself. He holds that the Bible is no standard of religious truth; and even if it were so in itself, it could be no "basis of religious certitude," since when we arrive at its meaning through interpretation, "the actual text would be the reason of the interpeter" (p. 287).

Is this scheme capable of being developed into any form of evangelical religion? To us it seems utterly opposed to all revealed religion. Indeed, in his definition of "subjective Christianity," he wholly omits every thing that distinguishes Christianity from unchristian Deism. He defines "subjective Christianity" as "that form of religion in which we are conscious of absolute dependence and perfect freedom being harmonized by love to God" (pp. 116, 123). Here is no Christ in the religious experience; no redemption from the curse of the law; no death in sin; no renewing of the Holy Ghost; no recognition of our being bought with blood. It is such a subjective Christianity as no Christian ever had, or ever can have. Indeed, why should not Morell leave these things out of his Christianity? They are truths which no mere intuitional consciousness of man could ever reach, and which Morell will not allow us to search out from the Scriptures. They are mysteries hid in God, which none of the mere intellectual princes of this world knew; but God has revealed them to us by his Spirit. Morell recognizes no Holy Spirit, unless, indeed, he might give that name as Chevalier Bronson does, to "the whole humanity;" "God as existing and working in the sentiment and feeling of the Church, or whole humanity;" so that the Bible is only "a leaf in the past progress of developing truth *by the whole humanity, or Holy Ghost.*" Rejecting the Bible as the word of God, or as a standard of religious truth; and making the final appeal to the "Catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified *humanity* in its eternal progress heavenward," how *can* such a scheme differ at all from the peculiar views advocated by Theodore Parker—views utterly destructive of every thing belonging peculiarly to Christianity?

Morell omits no opportunity of extolling Schleiermacher. Nothing in his scheme gives us any intimation that he too does not hold, that sin, in the sight of God, is no *sin*, but only a necessary process of development; that sin demands no punishment, save that itself is a source of evil; that it demands no redeeming sacrifice, no satisfaction of Divine justice; that atonement is only a reconciliation effected in the mind of the sinner; and redemption a simple subjective purification and exaltation, which is a natural process and not a regeneration.

But, it may be asked, does not Morell reclaim the evangelical elements of Christianity in his objective definition? "In this point of view," he says (p. 123.), "we may define Christianity as that religion which rests upon the consciousness of redemption through Jesus Christ." These words sound well. But what does he mean by redemption?—Redemption by blood? Christ bearing our sins in his own body on the tree? So that Christ was a propitiation brought forth in his blood? Nothing like it. No such idea is hinted at in his whole philosophy; but a redemption, and a process of redemption, that excludes it. He himself immediately explains what he means by redemption. "The redemption of the world, in the most general acceptation of the term, involves the notion of a universal change of mankind from one, and that an evil condition, into a better and holier state" (p. 124). That is all! Redemption from the *curse* of the law; the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost himself, are strangers to his whole philosophy. He has no place nor functions for these.

But suppose he does not specify these as elements of Christianity—though without them Christianity is not—does he not imply them? He sets forth a scheme in which there is no need of them, and no place for them; a scheme which is spoiled utterly if these are not excluded. But may we not, in consistency with his scheme, search the Scriptures, and fill up for ourselves what is deficient on the doctrines of sin, depravity, redemption, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost? He does not allow us to search the Scriptures for any doctrine, but only to use them as helps to elevate our own intuitional powers. And we know to how many, who leave the Scriptures, and set up their own alleged intuitions for truth, Christ

crucified is a stumbling-block, or foolishness; atonement by blood an absurdity shocking to reason and derogatory to the character of God.

We might go further; we have unearthed but a few of the limbs of the monster of a religion indicated by the scheme of Morell; but these are quite sufficient to determine its genus. These *disjecta membra* cannot be constructed into any thing like the religion of Christ; they belong, of necessity, to another Gospel, which is not another, but a religion at war with any evangelical scheme of Christianity known to the Church since Christianity began.

Art. II.—*Christian Work in Upper Egypt.*

In proceeding now to give the reader, in accordance with our third division, some acquaintance with one of the native congregations, we shall embrace the opportunity presented by the journey from Osiout to Kous—the congregation which it is our purpose to sketch—to refer to a sphere of mission work which has not yet been alluded to.

One of the most interesting and successful departments of the recent evangelistic efforts in Egypt has been the dissemination of religious literature throughout the land. Commenced at first on a very humble scale, it was afterward carried on with so much system and energy, that it may now be said that there is scarcely a town or village between Luxor and Cairo which has not received the Word of God, in whole or in part, either by the direct visitation of the missionary or by the instrumentality of its own inhabitants. And the stations which are now occupied as so many centres were first cultivated in these tours; some of the best individual fruits of mission labor in the land are the product of the seed thus sown broadcast; and there can be little doubt that after years will see the springing forth of "first the blade, then the ear, and after that the full corn in the ear," in many other places. The soil, as we have seen, has not been of the most promising

description, but the seed is quick and powerful, and though it may seem to fall into the ground only to die, yet, if well watered, it will yet spring forth and yield much fruit.

The first attempt to act upon the Christian population of the upper country took the shape of furnishing boxes of Bibles, Testaments, and religious books to as many travellers as would take the trouble to distribute or sell them in the course of their journey, and the favorable reports brought back by these travelling missionaries of the avidity with which the books were received, and of the demand for more of the same, led the way to more systematic effort in this direction. In 1860 a Nile boat was accordingly purchased by the American Mission for the purpose mainly of colporteuring in the Nile valley, and one or more trips have annually been made since that time. Another and smaller boat was added two years later, and has since been almost regularly employed in the work. And, as a result of these labors, it is estimated that between seventy and eighty thousand volumes, chiefly Scriptures, whole or in part, and religious publications, have been scattered throughout the land, and it may be added, in illustration of the reception with which the work was met on the part of the natives, that only a very small number of these were given away; the great mass being sold at an average of twenty-five cents per volume.

The amount of labor presented by these figures may be inferred from the following summary of one such journey During the tour (which extended from March 1 till May 10) the missionary visited 63 towns and villages, some of them both in going and coming. Sold Scriptures, &c., in 40 places. Read and expounded the Scriptnres in 50 towns and villages, and had regular service in 7. Had conversations on religions subjects with 62 Coptic priests, 40 or 50 monks, and 2 bishops. Left 3 colporteurs to sell books in the large towns and the villages around them. Distance traversed by boat, 1,160 miles; ditto on land, on foot or on donkeys, 200 miles.

And the general reception by the people of these visits is indicated in the following sentences from the same source: "Wherever we went we found at least one or two enlightened men who welcomed us with open arms. We were urged to

pass the night at every village we visited, with, I think, but two exceptions, and it was only under promise of an early return that they permitted us to leave. At one place, which we visited in going south, they refused to pay for the books which they had bought until we should return. This they did, they said, to secure our calling on our way back."

One other quotation on the subject of these evangelistic labors, for the sake of the picture it contains. It is only part of a sentence: " . . . . an earl, though too weak to walk, riding through an Arab village, and selling Testaments to the astonished natives who crowded around him; and his good lady, day after day, keeping our book accounts, filling our colporteuring bags, selling penny tracts, and administering to the ailments and bodily wants of the little, dirty, sore-eyed Arab boys, who crowded down to their boat." It is interesting to know that the nobleman who thus distinguished himself was the late Earl of Aberdeen, who, sent to Egypt to seek for health, found an outlet to his unflagging zeal for the spread of the Gospel in the practical way here indicated. Starting from Cairo in the end of 1860, with their dahabeeyah stored with books, and accompanied by Father Mikhaeel, a converted Coptic monk, whom we shall meet again, to act as expounder and evangelist, he and his lady spent the Nile season, in large measure, in this manner; and when they returned northward in the following spring, it was found that they had sold four hundred and seventy Bibles, thirteen hundred and sixty Testaments, nearly one thousand Gospels of St. John, thirty-two Pentateuchs, sixty-three Psalters, twenty Coptic and Arabic Gospels in parallel columns, and about four thousand small books and tracts. Their visit to Upper Egypt will be long remembered, and old Father Mikhaeel gets quite enthusiastic in rehearsing his recollections of " milord." Would that their conduct were less singular!

Of the external and more prominent results of this system of labor, the station at Osiout is the first to meet us on the way from Cairo, and concerning it enough has already been said. Next in order comes Ekhmim, a town the Coptic population of which numbers about five thousand; and the American mission is represented among them by a native

agent, who teaches a school during the week, conducts service on the Sabbath, and gives instruction to the many who drop in and out at other times. A good specimen of a Copt is this man. For years the secular agent and right hand of the last Patriarch, he became thoroughly acquainted with all the abuses and corruptions of the church and clergy, so that when afterward he came under the influence of missionary teaching, the denunciations and exposures which his bold and unfearing nature, thus enlightened, forced him to make, were as damaging as they were pointed. Afterward employed by the mission, he was sent on a colporteuring tour up the river, and coming in the course of it to his native town of Ekhmim, he on his own responsibility opened a boys' school in a house which was his own property. On being remonstrated with for thus taking a step for which the mission was not prepared, he replied to the effect that wrong he might have done, but now that he had commenced it would be better to continue, and continue he would; a few piastres a week would feed him, and surely the Presbytery would not refuse that. And this was a man who had a position of such influence. Whether from his quieter way of living, or from advances in the Divine life, is not settled, but we believe from personal observation that he is now much more subdued in character and less inclined to public and direct attacks on his former co-religionists than he used to be; and his energies are now expended in training the twenty or more boys who daily attend him, in the elements of education, and in acquaintance with the Scriptures. This work he has not been allowed to carry on unmolested; the enmity excited against him among the higher clergy of the church in Cairo reached him even in Ekhmim. In the summer of last year (1867), the present Patriarch visited that town, and, when in obedience to his summons, Bishetty presented himself, his holiness at once exercised his despotism and gave vent to his wrath by dealing him a blow on the face, and ordering the soldiers and others who formed his retinue to cast him out of the town—yea, should he refuse, to cut him in pieces and toss him into the river. The poor man was roughly used, but beyond that he escaped, and left the town. An attempt was afterward made to bring this ecclesi-

astical assailant to justice, which only succeeded in making palpable the connivance of the government with the oppressive and tyrannical conduct of the Patriarch, of which this was only one instance. Bishetty, however, returned to the town and to his work, and, curiously enough, this fact of itself, and the failure of the Patriarchal threats to exterminate him, were regarded by his townsmen of the Moslem faith as a victory on his part. At the last dates he was following the peaceful tenor of his way, and doing substantial though quiet service.

But of all the places in Upper Egypt in which the work of reformation has made any progress, the town of Kous is perhaps the most interesting. Situated about midway between Kenah and Luxor, and not far from the very old town of Koftos—from which, according to many, the name of Copt is derived—it contains from nine thousand to ten thousand inhabitants, of whom a large proportion, perhaps one-sixth, are Christians. In external appearance and general characteristics it differs little from other such towns, while, ecclesiastically, it is the seat of a bishopric, and has no want of inferior clergy. But the reformatory movement of which it has for years been the scene, the characters which the movement has produced, and the trials through which they have passed, give it an interest and importance which may well detain us over it somewhat longer than its position might at first seem to warrant.

This work of reformation is now represented by a Presbyterian congregation regularly organized, with its elders and deacons, and native pastor, a membership of twenty-five, and a roll of adherents running up to thirty or forty more; and a day-school attended by a daily average of about twenty-five boys. Every afternoon, an hour before sunset, the congregation assembles for the reading of the Scriptures, and prayer; on Sabbath morning, the word is preached after the Presbyterian ritual, and other meetings of a religious character are held as circumstances permit or suggest. Suppose you take the trouble to look in at one of these meetings. We think you will be repaid, for you will see some things quite characteristic. For instance, you will be at once struck with the appearance of the church, and it is to be hoped, for your own

sake, that a showy ritual, or the pomp and circumstance of a highly wrought service, do not enter very deeply into your idea of Divine worship. You will find this church here to consist of an upper room, of which one side is entirely open, and leads to the uncovered terrace which forms the roof of the lower story. The floor of both room and terrace is of mud; the pews are represented by several straw mats spread along by the side of the walls; and an old book packing-box, set on end, and surmounted by a divan cushion, does service for reading-desk and pulpit. And the simplicity of the house is only equalled by the unadorned appearance of the worshippers. On none do you find a superabundance of clothing, and many wear only the loose blue cotton shirt of the fellaheen, which, open in the breast, exposes to view the brown chest of the wearer. All wear the large turban, but you have the full variety of color: red, white, and black. All are bare as to their feet—their large, gouty-looking *bauchles* having been left in the doorway; and many, especially of the older men, carry their inseparable companion—a long tobacco-pipe. They are of all ages, from boys attending school to the men of fourscore. Several are almost blind, some wholly so in one eye; some have a severity of countenance worthy of a fifth century ascetic, combined in one or two cases with an expression of determination to do as they may think right, let come what may; or varied in others by the placidity of the *mens conscia recti*, which, in some again, almost passes into a feeling of pride at the superiority and the implied danger involved in their protesting position. Others again strike you by their appearance of entire receptivity, as they sit before you cross-legged, open-mouthed, open-eyed, and open-eared, under the address of the preacher; and some of the older occasionally surprise you by an expression of the particular feelings produced by his message. There is yet another feature in this congregation, which however, will hardly meet your eye. In the rear room, behind the preacher, of which the door is covered with a red screen, is assembled the female audience, —which sometimes numbers as many as twenty-four or twenty-five. All of them, you will be told, are more or less acquainted with the truths of the Gospel, and not a few have the most

unusual pre-eminence of being able to read and even to write, and yet withal, are so desperately modest, that they will scarcely unveil before even lady visitors.

The leader of this band of Gospellers, as they love to call themselves—Angeeliyeen—in contrast with the Takliediyeen, or Traditionists, who cling to the ways of their fathers—is a notable man—would be notable anywhere, and pre-eminently so in a land of mummies, dead and living. Represent to yourself a man of, say fifty years of age, straight as a rush, above the usual height, broad-chested, and proportionally well built. Imagine a forehead not broad, but high and square, large nose, full mouth, and the national eye, large and oval, with a sparkle even in repose, which hints at latent fires behind. Add to the face a white beard and mustache carefully trimmed; surmount the head with a red turban of liberal dimensions; throw over the body the blue frock of the fellah, and place the bare feet in a pair of roomy shoes, and you have before you an approximate idea of Fam Stephanos—the Luther of the reformation work in Egypt. Grave and dignified as the Wurtemberg reformer may be supposed to have been, and yet with large possibilities of laughter—a man who by his presence would command respect anywhere, and who roused to passion might make a crowd to quail. All that you can read in half an hour's intercourse; and the more you learn of him will confirm the impressions.

The son of a Coptic scribe, he was born at once into the service of the government, and the prejudices and traditions of the national church. Blessed with an inquiring mind, endowed with intellectual powers of no mean order, he early commenced a search after the true and substantial, which ultimately resulted in his parting company from both Church and State. The Coptic language was studied for the sake of the stores which it was supposed to contain, so that he has the pre-eminence of being about the only man in Egypt who knows any thing of the speech of his fathers; and no effort was spared to gratify his increasing taste and growing thirst for knowledge. From his general superiority and his special linguistic accomplishments, he was elected a Shemmas in his church, and was thus brought into close contact

with the character and conduct of the clergy, and was led by duty no less than by choice, to read much in the Scriptures. Of course knowledge derived from two sources so fundamentally opposite, must, if cultivated long enough, end in a commotion of some sort, and come the climax certainly did, although in a way and at a time little expected by him, or any one else.

He had grown to years of maturity, and acquired a position of considerable influence, both officially and socially—indeed, his name is said to have been long famous in all Upper Egypt as that of a man of strictest integrity and unswerving honesty, qualities so rarely found in his calling (tax-collector) at the present day, as in the old times, when its name was properly allied to that of harlot. Gradually he had been getting away from his sect, both in feeling and belief, and ultimately the growing discord broke into a tremendous explosion.

It was the night of Good Friday. Most of the Copts and many of the Moslems had gathered in excessive numbers and great spirits to witness the ceremonial of the year. And the ceremonial—what think you it was? We do not suppose you would ever imagine, and therefore we may as well tell you at once. It was a play—a tragedy, too. The theatre was the Coptic church; the actors, the Coptic clergy; the drama, the crucifixion and burial of the Saviour. Yes, astounding as the blasphemy sounds to our nineteenth century ear, it is nevertheless a fact—a fact, too, which even to the present day receives an annual repetition. Well, the ceremony was getting on, the company was in good key, and the clerical actors were warming to their work, when just in the midst of the crucifixion one of the audience starts up, rushes on to the chancel, seizes the image in a pair of brawny arms, and hurls it into a corner with some such exclamation as: Out of this with your wooden gods! And then, turning to the audience, he gives them such a sound rebuke that they flee to a man—priests as well as people, partly, doubtless, from sheer astonishment, but partly also in dreadful consternation. The idol-breaker, thus left in possession of the field, is Fam, the tax-collector. He has wrought himself into a passion now, and when he comes to

speak of it afterward he vows that he acted as he did in spite of himself.

Such scenes, indeed, are not infrequent in church history, and one especially comes to hand in which our Scottish reformer appears in a somewhat similar character.

"In the galleys of the river Loire, whither Knox and the others, after their castle of St. Andrews was taken, had been sent as galley slaves—some officer, or priest, one day presented them an image of the virgin mother, requiring that they, the blasphemous heretics, should do it reverence. Mother? Mother of God? said Knox, when the turn came to him; this is no Mother of God; this is a '*pented bredd*'—a piece of wood, I tell you, with paint on it. She is fitter for swimming, I think, than for being worshipped, added Knox, and flung the thing into the river. It was not very cheap jesting there; but come of it what might, this thing to Knox was, and must continue nothing other than the real truth. It was a *pented bredd;* worship it he would not."

And so in the case before us this ceremonial was to Fam a horrible blasphemy, and come of it what might, he, for one, was resolved to resist and, if possible, abolish it. The immediate issue of his action has already been mentioned, but the final consequences are not yet exhausted, so far even as he is concerned. And to finish the story of that outburst it may be mentioned, that afterward, when they supposed the paroxysm, or afflatus, or whatever it was, had time to pass away, one or two of the leaders came to the reformer, and, trembling for the result, besought his advice as to what they should now do. They had crucified their Lord, but they had not buried him! Woe to them, for, poor sinners, what should they do? "Go and bury your God before he stinks," was the not over gracious reply—and so, permission being granted, they resumed their mockery, taking up the image from the corner to which it had been flung, consigning it to a prepared tomb, and raising it on the third day. The entertainment, however, had lost its spirit for that year, and it was a time before former superstitions recovered from the shock; but as late as a year ago the drama had resumed its sway, and was gone through with by all the par-

ties concerned with something of the enthusiasm of a Christmas pantomime.

As for Fam, from that day forward he never entered the church. Henceforth his way lay in the opposite direction, and the prospect had and even still appeared threatening and full of both dangers and difficulties; yet now that the decisive step had been taken, he began to feel more comfortable than he had done for long. And he did not walk alone: his influence and his teachings soon gathered him a following; so that when the missionaries in their colporteuring itineracies visited Kous, it was like lighting upon an oasis in the desert. Everywhere else their instructions had necessarily been of the simplest character, and based upon the merest elements of Gospel religion; but here for once loftier ground had to be taken, and we have been told by one who was among the first to visit the town that, from early morning till sundown, for three consecutive days, was he plied with questions by this man. Over the whole range of theology, apologetics and dogmatics, exegetical and historical, was he able to travel, and though his queries were not unfrequently characterized as much by the wish to puzzle as the desire for instruction, yet the impression left on the missionary's mind was favorable in the extreme not only as to his intelligence and mental power, but also as regarded his practical Christianity.*

By and by the Mission Presbytery was encouraged by the growing spirit of evangelism among the people of Kous to appoint the priest Mikhaeel to settle among them for a time, and do his best to form them into a native congregation. In less than a year afterward the design was accomplished, a

*In his narrative of the evangelistic trip made in company with Lord Aberdeen, Dr. Lansing notices this man at some length. The following paragraph, containing the first reference to him, will bear quotation: "This week Lord Aberdeen made an excursion to Negadeh and Ghous, where he sold books for eight hundred piastres. Father Mikhaeel, when they returned, was in ecstacies about a man named Fam Stephanos, whom they had found in Ghous. He said he had spent a day and a night with him in most interesting converse; that he had got far beyond the A B C of controversy about images, confession, &c., and that they spent the time in discussing the high mysteries of religion, and in investigating and explaining difficult passages of Scripture. I afterward became acquainted with this man, and found that in intelligent piety he justified Mikhaeel's high encomiums."—*Egypt's Princes*, 235.

congregation was organized, with Fam, of course, as one of its elders, and Mikhaeel chosen as pastor; and at the meeting of the Presbytery in February, 1867, the pastor elect went through his "trials," and received Presbyterial ordination. Shortly afterward, he proceeded to his charge.

The narrative belongs to history, and was at the time laid before at least a portion of the American public; but our story would be incomplete without some reference to the persecution of which this little nucleus of a congregation was the subject in the summer of 1867.

Such conduct as that which we have described on the part of Fam could not but attract the attention of the church authorities, but so long as the movement of protest was confined to himself and a handful of his friends, the best policy was to be quiet. By and by, however, as the spirit of protest grew, which led to the settlement of an evangelist in their midst, the effect on the hierarchical mind was manifested by the removal in disgust of the bishop from his seat in Kous to the town of Negadeh, on the opposite side of the river; while the organization of a Presbyterian congregation seems to have been the last drop required to fill the cup of Episcopal indignation. The expedition of extermination, to which allusion has already been made in speaking of Bishetty at Ekhmim, was forthwith undertaken, and although his holiness, the Patriarch, had, ere his arrival at Kous, been somewhat subdued by the watchful attitude assumed by the American consulate, yet his determination to make an example of the so-called Gospellers in that town was in no way diminished. At first, indeed, he and his followers tried their best, by means fair and unfair, to win back the renegades, but when every attempt only resulted in ignominious failure, the bold resolution was resorted to of getting the government to banish the ringleader Fam to the centre of Africa. Having thus disposed of the mainmast, they said the ship would soon dispose of itself. And sooth to say, they so far succeeded in their infernal purpose, that Fam and two of his companions were actually dispatched on less than half an hour's notice in a special boat under a guard of soldiers, whose ostensible object was to convey them to the Egyptian Soudan, there to act as scribes,

but whose badly-concealed intention was to dispose of Fam by the way. Yes, the so-called Christian Patriarch allied himself to the Moslem ruler for the banishment of a man who chose to think for himself and to worship as his conscience directed. And the Moslem government was only too glad of the opportunity to strike a secret blow at a movement now assuming uncomfortable proportions, even though it should be through an old, tried, and faithful servant, while at the same time it was loud in its boasts of Egypt being a land of religious liberty, exceptionally great, and in its protestations to vindicate at all hazards "the convictions and consciences of its subjects." It was a strange combination truly, but one from which every thing was to be feared, for the Christian was a Coptic Patriarch and the Moslem authorities were Turks, and it were perhaps hard to say which would be the most deceitful, tyrannical, and generally unscrupulous.

It was the writer's, in many respects, good fortune to visit Kous in the midst of the troubles. The final blow had not yet fallen, but it was daily expected, and the little company was in a state of great suspense and depression. All were sad, many were apprehensive of the worst, a few were strong in the faith of a good cause and a reigning Lord, and Fam himself never rose so high as he did in this emergency. At the time the writer published an account of the plot and its execution, and may be permitted to quote here the following "one or two brighter features" of the sad story:—

"If Fam has been banished," the narrative concludes, "he has proved himself a true hero. Calm and dignified, he has suffered his fate. No ebullitions of temper, much less symptoms of wavering, have marked his time of trial. While those around him were in the depths of gloom and despair, he was lively and cheerful; while some whispered compromise, by asking leave to resign his post under government altogether, he preferred to leave his lot in the Lord's hands." And I am told that when leaving his friends and home; when the last summons came from the court, and when his exile for life had become all but certain, he rose to the height of genuine eloquence in exhorting them to acquit themselves like men; to preach the Word notwithstanding all that had happened; nay, rather all the more on that account. I can imagine that that scene must have been an affecting no less than a picturesque one. The patriarch of threescore—gray hairs, loose cotton gown, high, red turban, standing in a little boat, and with outstretched arms, which the loose sleeves leave bare, administering consolation and encouragement to the small band of friends who have so long lived upon his teaching, and looked up to him in every case of trial or time of difficulty, but are

now sorrowing and heavy-hearted at the prospect of his exile. The roll of martyrs is not yet closed, and the name of Fam Stephanos is not the least worthy furnished by this land of Egypt."

Fortunately for the credit of this nineteenth century, the fears under which the foregoing was written were not realized —the influence of the consulates of Britain and America having been successful in breaking up the conspiracy and procuring the return and release of the exiles; and so, instead of being doomed to a watery grave in the depths of the Nile, Fam was brought back to his native place, to spend, he hoped, the rest of his days in peace and zealous labor for the cause dear to him on its own account, and doubly so on account of what he has suffered in its service. May his bow long abide in strength.

Art. III.—*Recent Scholarship.*

Scholarship has undergone an important change within the last fifty years. Although concerned with things of the past, and rehandling apparently the same material continually, it is as the husbandman recultivates the same soil, obtaining from it yearly new crops; and as special gifts for agriculture give to the old landscape new features, or draw from it a new kind of produce, so special gifts addressed to the pursuits of learning unearth from the ruins of the past new lessons, or place the old in such new light as to make it a real addition to the treasures of the present. Scholarship, hand in hand with science and art, has been largely promotive of the culture and comforts of modern times, and has not failed in a progress of her own, passing readily to one style of work when another is done. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, employed in reviving the study of the Greek and Latin classics and the original text of Holy Scripture; in the sixteenth, and early part of the seventeenth, in unfolding the structure of those languages in themselves with their respective traditions and history, and the cognate languages of the Hebrew, and with

these weapons fighting in the war of the Reformation; in the latter part of the seventeenth, and onward, turning all to the service of a new and rapidly increasing literature, by the end of the eighteenth it had reached to a minuteness of criticism, fast descending to pedantry, when new fields began to open, and new principles to be unfolded, leading into a career of discovery which throws all previous attainment into the shade.

The last quarter of the eighteenth century, together with the first twenty years of the nineteenth, was a transition period, during which a number of scholars, in various quarters, incidentally, though for the most not without long persevering labor, fell in with interesting discoveries outside of the old and beaten track, or deep beneath it; and a few, by what was deemed an erratic taste, chimerical and unprofitable, pursued the study of languages entirely foreign to both the sacred and classical affinities. The singular capacity and enthusiasm of Sir William Jones carried him into the world of unexplored, or but partially explored languages, like a young knight-errant in quest of adventures. Others followed in the same spirit: great linguists, like Leyden and Murray, who without any apprehension of language as the science, which it is, and only groping blindly after general principles, labored to grasp as many as possible of the idioms of the world. In this kind of attainment, the most extraordinary was Dr. Alexander Murray, professor of Oriental languages in the University of Edinburgh, who closed his brief career of thirty-seven years in 1813. Others occupied themselves in making collections of words and of specimen translations of the Lord's Prayer from various quarters, such as had often been made before as matter of curiosity. Of that kind the greatest were the works of Pallas and Adelung. The former, composed by order of the Empress Catharine II. of Russia, and published in 1787 and 1789, contained two hundred and seventy-three words, in two hundred languages. The "Mithridates," commenced by J. C. Adelung, and continued by Professor Vater and Frederick Adelung, from 1806 to 1817, was designed to present a general view of the relations of all languages to the members of their respective groups. It was a great step toward science

in that the languages were all arranged in classes and subdivisions; but necessarily superficial, as not founded upon the true basis of comparative study.

Of similar import were the attempts to arrive at principles of universal grammar and of the formation of language, in such works as "the Hermes," "Monde Primitif," and "Diversions," of Purley. Conjectural, fanciful, and fruitful of little but possibilities, as they were, those feelings after a science of language, as alchemy stumbled into chemistry, had much to do with the early thinking of men who subsequently effected more solid work.

Christian missionaries among the heathen, with the purpose of reaching truly, and without risk of mistake, the understanding and convictions of those to whom they were sent, found it indispensable to begin with thorough exploration of the dialects they had to use. No mere hypothesis, however beautiful, would answer their purpose; nothing but positive fact and practical principle. Collection of the actual words spoken around them, discrimination of the relations actually observed in the use of those words and of the meanings which the people understood in them, were closely to be pursued. These labors soon extended into the production of complete dictionaries and grammars of a great variety of tongues, some of them never presented in letters before. Protestant missions to the heathen in their present systematic style, commenced only in the last years of the eighteenth century. But brief as is the intervening period, the ethnological, as well as philological material thus collected, has now accumulated to an enormous amount. And Bible societies, following the footsteps of missionary enterprise, have turned all to the account of introducing into every dialect, thus mastered, a translation of the Holy Scriptures. Catholic missionaries have, no doubt, furnished men of learning equal to the Protestant; the Jesuits, Schall, De Nobilis and Beschi, have perhaps never been excelled in the learning proper to their respective fields; but Protestant missionaries, from their labors to render the Word of Revelation and other religious books into all languages, have produced a reflex benefit to the learning of the Christian world. Those translations, while carrying divine truth to the heathen, have brought

the languages of previously illiterate races to the knowledge of Christian scholars. In missionary dictionaries, grammars, translations, a complete apparatus has been provided for the study of many a form of human speech which would otherwise have remained unknown. Moreover, the reports furnished by the missionaries to their respective churches, as well as occasional correspondence, published in their periodicals, have added in a similar and still larger degree to the mass of ethnological knowledge, which is continually increasing. Of all workers at the foundations of ethnical science, the most productive are the Christian missionaries.

The demands of a commerce, which now follows the coasts of the ocean, have created a remunerative occupation for men whose natural gifts or attainments give them facility in the use of various languages. In the British colonial service and foreign trade the dialects of all the principal nations of the world, and of many of the inferior, are called into requisition. And similar, if not so extensive or imperious, are the demands of national and commercial business under the governments of Russia, France, and America.

Large collections of material naturally suggest classification and completeness. Expeditions have been undertaken at the expense of governments and by individuals with their own means, to complete the survey of the earth's surface, of its inhabitants, of their languages, and of all else that is most interesting about them. And foundations for the science of language have been laid, which, though far from complete, are at least certain and immovable.

In that structure the corner-stone was knowledge of the Sanskrit, for which we are indebted to the British rule in India. True, the first Europeans of modern times to become acquainted with that ancient tongue were some of the Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century; but their knowledge was unproductive of any general interest in the subject. After the conquest of Bengal, in the battle of Plassey in 1757, and by the treaty of Allahabad in 1765, the East India Company resolved to govern their Hindu subjects in accordance with Hindu laws. But these were contained in the Sanskrit language. An epitome of the most important law-books was

forthwith drawn up by a committee of Brahmans under appointment of the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, and printed in London in 1776. Several officers in the company's service proceeded to qualify themselves to make use of the original sources. Knowledge of Sanskrit became indispensable to the completeness of a legal education under that government. But the distinct beginning of the pursuit as a branch of scholarship was made by Sir William Jones, H. T. Colebrooke, Sir Charles Wilkins, and one or two other British residents of Bengal, who, in 1784, formed the Asiatic Society at Calcutta. In the first instance, those gentlemen proceeded, with the aid of learned Brahmans, to master the books of law and works of elegant Sanskrit literature, implicitly following the instructions of the Sanskrit grammars, vocabularies, and commentaries, which had all to be translated for them by their pundits. Subsequently, as they grew into fuller understanding of the language, they felt free to shape their knowledge more into accordance with European science, and prepared an easier path for their successors by the compilation of grammars in the English. A dictionary, Sanskrit and English, was an arduous undertaking, and, although commenced early and by several persons, collecting from the native vocabularies, was not completed, until, taken up anew from the beginning by Professor Wilson, it was brought out in 1819.

The first illustrious group of laborers was followed by another, which grew up under the instruction thus accumulating. Meanwhile, the subject had secured for itself an interest among the scholars of Germany, France, and Denmark, by whom it was handled philosophically from the beginning. But the current deepened as it flowed. Commencing with the slender, but enthusiastic orientalism of Frederick Schlegel, it soon enlarged into the profound and far-reaching criticism of Bopp and Burnouf. The study of Sanskrit is still prosecuted with zeal and progressive success; and in most of the universities of Europe professors are employed to teach it. One after another, departments of its literature, at one time utterly impracticable, have been interpreted, and to some degree by the help of that science which itself was the first to suggest. Still, in the hands of a gifted few, among whom are

to be counted Weber, Lassen, Whitney, and Müller, Sanskrit scholarship is every year adding to its skill and the mass of its information.

At first the books studied were those written in the later Sanskrit, with which the pundits were best acquainted. The more ancient were held sacred, and submitted to foreign inspection with great reluctance, and, as it afterward appeared, were imperfectly understood by the most learned Brahmans, while to the greater number they were entirely unreadable. For the Sanskrit is a dead language, and in its oldest form was obsolete at least six hundred years before the Christian era.

It is in the attainments leading to a knowledge of those ancient books that the most valuable philological gains have been made, as well as the most important for the study of religion. Only of recent years have the difficulties of the Veda, its obsolete dialect and antiquated allusions, been handled with success. The Sanhita, or collection of hymns, of the Sama-Veda, has been rendered into English by Mr. Stevenson. And a translation of the hymns of the Rig-Veda was one of the last enterprises of the late Professor H. H. Wilson.* An edition of the original text of the latter has just been completed in England by Prof. Max Müller, at the expense and by the direction of the East India Company. Translations of some of the hymns have appeared in the "History of Sanskrit Literature," by the same eminent scholar, who now advertises his intention to translate all the hymns as far as he deems their meaning to be ascertainable.†

To the mind of Sir William Jones, richly furnished with Greek, Latin, Persian, and other lore, the very first acquaintance with Sanskrit suggested the idea of new and most interesting linguistic affinities. He augured truly of its importance as throwing light upon the classical languages of Greece and Italy, but could not conceive of the breadth of its scientific value. Standing in such relation as it does to the idioms of Persia, Armenia, and Europe, Sanskrit has become the key to the deepest mysteries of the whole class, the generative prin-

* It was carried to the extent of about half the collection.

† The first volume, containing the hymns to the Maruts, or storm gods, has already appeared.

ciple of comparative philology. Interpretation has taken a higher stand and proceeds with a firmer criticism. Etymology is no longer a play of fancy with accidental similiarity of sounds. If not yet a perfect science, it is at least pursued scientifically. Much universal truth of language has been ascertained positively and forever, and classified according to relations intrinsic to the subject. The Semitic languages, and those which extend from the Ganges, by way of Persia, Armenia, and the whole breadth of Europe and both continents of America to the Pacific Ocean, have been explored in the light of the newly-discovered relations; and much has been done toward bringing the Chinese and its cognates under the same scientific treatment.

In like manner the Zend-Avesta, or Holy Scripture of the ancient Persians, for many ages a sealed book to even the hereditary and jealous priesthood who protected it from destruction, has been rendered once more intelligible by the same comparative criticism. Preserved from ancient time by the remnant of the Parsees still living in India about Bombay, where their fathers found refuge from Mohammedan persecution in Persia, they speak a language which those who believe in them had entirely forgotten. The words which the Parsee repeats in his worship had, until recently, no longer any significance to his mind, and only a traditional and ritual import in practice. The greater was the difficulty to European scholars when first their attention was turned to the subject. And their attention could not fail to be turned to it when Europeans became masters of Bombay. No pundits were to be obtained to explain the words or the laws of that forgotten tongue. English residents at Bombay and in the neighborhood first made modern Europe acquainted with the existence of the Parsee manuscripts, some of which were brought to England and deposited in public libraries, but without any attempt being made, for many years, to decipher them. In 1754, Anquetil du Perron, a young Frenchman, then pursuing Oriental studies at Paris, obtained sight of some fac-similes from those manuscripts, and fired with zeal, determined to go out to India and learn their meaning from the priests of their religion, little dreaming that the priests themselves could

be ignorant of it. Being poor, he enlisted as a soldier among the troops going out in the French service to Pondicherry. His character and purpose were discovered before he left France, and other and better means of attaining his end were provided for him. The enterprise resulted successfully. After many adventures, in various parts of India, and a residence of several years among the Parsees at Surat, he returned to Paris with copies of their sacred books, and a translation of them made by himself, with the aid of Parsee priests, not from the original, but from a modern Persian version. His work, containing an account of his labors and travels, and translation of the Zend-Avesta, appeared in 1771, in three quarto volumes. It was full of mistakes of the gravest nature. But a real translation of the Avestan text was at that time impossible. And the work of Anquetil, with all its errors, continued to furnish the only idea which the world had of the Parsee sacred books until a few years ago.

A more thorough knowledge of Sanskrit, and especially of its most ancient Vedic dialect, was needed in order to comprehend the language in which those books were written. And much had to be done in settling the principles of comparative philology before the intimate affinities of those two languages were found out, or it was conceived that a knowledge of the one would be any introduction to the other. To that end, the Oriental researches of Rask and Olshausen, eminent Danish scholars, and the comparative grammar of Bopp, led the way. A little treatise, "On the Age and Genuineness of the Zend Language and the Zend-Avesta," was published by Rask in 1826. He was one of the earliest European students of Sanskrit, and "a general linguistic investigator of rare talents and acquirements." He had travelled in Persia and India, and had brought home to Copenhagen a valuable collection of Avestan manuscripts. His essay was far in advance of any thing that had yet appeared, for establishing the character and value of the Avesta and the relations of its language. It included also a very greatly improved analysis and determination, absolute and comparative, of the alphabet of the latter. In the same year, Olshausen, a professor in the University of Kiel, was sent by the Danish

government to Paris, to examine and collate the Avestan manuscripts lying there, and upon his return the publication of a critical edition of the Vendidad, "one of the three great divisions of the Avesta," was commenced by him. Its first part, containing four Fargards, or "chapters," appeared in 1829, a lithographed text with full critical apparatus; but nearly the whole edition was soon after destroyed by fire, and the prosecution of the undertaking was abandoned. Olshausen's material has since passed into the hands of Spiegel. In the year of that calamity, 1829, there appeared in the Asiatic Journal of Paris "the first contribution to the study of the Avesta," from a scholar destined to do more than any, or all others, to place that study upon a true and abiding foundation; to whose investigations the progress of Avestan science was to be linked for many years to come. This was Eugene Burnouf. He was professor of Sanskrit in the College of France, and already known as a zealous cultivator of the knowledge of the Orient, to which he had, in conjunction with Lassen, contributed, in 1826, the well-known "Essai sur le Pali." His attention became, very naturally, at that period, directed toward the Zoroastrian texts; and a slight examination and comparison of them with the translation of Anquetil, led him at once to important results, with reference to the character of the latter. He found it highly inaccurate, and so full of errors as to be hardly reliable even as a general representation of the meaning of its original. Among the manuscripts brought home by Anquetil, however, he found another translation, intelligible to him, which was plainly much more faithful than that of the French scholar." * It was a Sanskrit version of a part of the Avesta, namely, the Yasna, made some three hundred years before Anquetil by two learned Parsee priests, Neriosengh and Ormuzdiar. Burnouf, accordingly, laid aside Anquetil, and commenced the Avesta anew with the aid of Neriosengh, and the Sanskrit language. In 1833 appeared the first volume of his proposed translation of the Yasna immediately from the original, with a copious commentary. In that work he undertook to "give an account of

* Prof. Whitney, in the "Journal of the American Oriental Society." Vol. v., p. 362.

every word in the Zend text," "to parse every sentence, and establish the true meaning of each term," * by careful analysis, and by comparison with cognate words in Sanskrit. This large volume of eight hundred quarto pages covered only the first of the seventy-two brief chapters of which the Yasna consists. But its great importance lay in opening up the true avenue to the resolution of the difficulties surrounding the subject. Subsequently, the ninth chapter of the same book was treated in a similar manner; but after the year 1844 the author's attention was turned away to other investigations, not less difficult nor less important, which occupied him to the end of his days. Meanwhile, the method thus inaugurated was adopted and pursued by others, until, in the hands of Westergaard and Spiegel, the whole Avesta, in its text and substantial meaning, was laid before the public.

Westergaard, a Dane, professor of Oriental languages in the University of Copenhagen, and one of the most learned Sanskrit scholars of his day, took up the task so well begun by his countrymen, Rask and Olshausen. To all the collections of material at his hand in Europe he added a journey to Persia and India, in the course of which he considerably enlarged his manuscript stores. His work contemplated a critical edition of the whole Avestan text, a complete vocabulary and grammar of the Avestan language, pointing out its relations to other Iranian dialects, with their history and European affinities, a translation of the whole Avestan canon, with critical notes, a view of the civil and religious institutions of the Parsees, and a history of the nations of Iran until the time of their overthrow by the Mohammedans. It was to be published at Copenhagen, but in the English language, as that of a larger public than the Danish. The first volume appeared in 1852 and 1854, and contained the promised edition of the original text with critical notes, and a history of Avestan manuscripts and their preservation.

Dr. Spiegel, of the University of Erlangen in Bavaria, with similar attainments, and possessed to a great extent of the same resources, undertook about the same time a similar enterprise. His edition of the text and translation came out

* Max Müller. "Chips from a German Workshop." Vol. i., p. 138.

simultaneously, the former at Vienna and the latter at Leipsic. The first volume of the translation appeared in 1852, the second in 1859, and the third, completing the work, in 1863; the various parts are accompanied with historical and critical introductions and notes in the German language, followed up by a commentary upon the whole in two volumes, the last of which has appeared since the beginning of the present year (1869).

Immediately after the publication of Spiegel's translation, a wealthy Parsee gentleman, resident in England, engaged a competent scholar to render it into English for the use of his countrymen.* Parsees are now furnished with the meaning of their own sacred books through the labors of European learning. What they have lost with their own ancient tongue, they have recovered through the language of foreigners.

Accordingly, it is only since 1859 that the sacred books of the Parsees can be said to have spoken in a modern tongue, or to have reached the understanding of a modern mind. The religion of that great people which burst upon history in the campaigns of Cyrus, and under Darius, gave laws to the world, which held the dominion of Western Asia, from India to Ethiopia, for two hundred years, and which, after many fluctuations of fortune, remains a nation still, has never been presented to Europe in its true light until a few years ago. Greeks misunderstood it; Romans knew about it only what they learned from the Greeks; and Mohammedan conquest drove it into obscurity. The religion of Persia was represented, according to the fancy of writers, as a religion of Magi, as a worship of fire, as a polytheistic idolatry. Never, in Europe, has it spoken for itself until now: and now it appears that those charges were erroneous. The countrymen of Cyrus and Darius were not polytheists, and did not worship fire, nor any other idol, but one Almighty God. The result of investigation is the establishment of one of the grandest facts in the ancient history of religion. Why did Cyrus show such favor to the Jews? Among the idolaters of Assyria and Babylonia, among idolaters everywhere in his new dominions, he found this captive and scattered people the worshippers of

* Bleeck's Translation of Spiegel's "Avesta."

one God, and recognized their cause, so far, as his own, and that of his own people. The voice of their God he accepted as that of his own. Why did Cambyses and his Persians treat the gods of Egypt with such bitter contempt, but that they held them to be no gods?

Later changes in the religion of Persia have added much to the obscurity which has rested upon that ancient creed. Quite as effectually have Brahmanical corruptions concealed the true character of the old religion of India. Only within a few years has the Veda surrendered any of its treasures to modern times. Even Brahmans had lost all true knowledge of their own scriptures. Nor have the learned presented us yet with the whole body of the latter in a version entirely satisfactory to themselves. Many of Professor Wilson's renderings of the Vedic hymns are conjectural; and it is also true that a number of the Avestan words Spiegel has simply transferred, without pretending to translate, as the translators of the English Bible have left such words as Selah, Neginoth and Maschil to the conjecture of the reader. More thorough is the rendering of the Avesta upon which Dr. Hang is now engaged, and of which he has recently published the "Gathas," or sacred songs, which constitute the basis and most ancient part of the collection. Such is also to be said of Max Müller's translations of Vedic hymns contained in his "History of Sanskrit Literature;" and the highest anticipations may reasonably be entertained of his now projected version of the whole.

The earliest of the great achievements of modern hermeneutic art to secure popular recognition for itself was that which unlocked the secret of Egyptian hieroglyphics. To that discovery the key was found in the bilingual and triliteral inscription on the Rosetta stone. A broken slab of basalt, inscribed with writing both Greek and Egyptian, and the Egyptian in both the hieroglyphic and popular characters, was discovered by the French soldiers in Egypt, while excavating at Rosetta to lay the foundations of a fort. It was captured by the English while on the way to France, and deposited in the British Museum. Fac-similes were thence distributed to the learned throughout Europe. Twenty years elapsed

from its discovery ere the value of it was understood. Dr. Young, an Englishman, made a beginning to decipher it, proceeding only a little way.

The real triumph in the Rosetta stone, after all, remained with France. It was in 1822 that Champollion produced his celebrated paper before the French Academy, in which he first unfolded the hieroglyphic, as, in the main, a phonetic system. A new field was opened for research, and a new life inspired into Oriental studies. As the first of the labors which followed, we enjoy the antiquarian information contained in the voluminous works of Champollion, of Rosellini, of Wilkinson, of Lepsius, of Bunsen, of Brugsch, and of many others, in a series down to the present day, whereby we actually know more of life among the Egyptians of three thousand years ago than of our own German forefathers before Charlemagne.

None of the great achievements of recent scholarship could have been what it is standing by itself. They have all mutually sustained each other. Knowledge of hieroglyphic writing opened into an unknown language, the ancient Egyptian, and that had to be reached through the study of the Coptic, or Christian Egyptian, with the aid of its cognates. Sanskrit learning has thrown light upon the Zend, and the Zend upon the Sanskrit, and upon later Persian, and later Persian has reflected its light back into an earlier age. Deciphering of cuneiform writing and antiquarian research put their hands together to sustain the labors of comparative philology; but without comparative philology neither of them could have uttered an intelligible meaning. While Rask, and Westergaard, and Wilson, and Burnouf, and Bopp, and Lassen, were laboring among the affinities of the Indo-European tongues, and slowly ascertaining the laws and significance of the ancient and sacred members of that class, which have been obsolete more than two thousand years, others were exploring the long-forgotten alphabet of Assyria. Those writings, which had for ages challenged and defied the ingenuity of scholarship, might still have defied it, but for the new discoveries in the relationship of languages.

Among the ruins of the ancient cities of Babylonia, Assy-

ria, and Persia, monuments are found inscribed with lines of characters shaped like wedges or arrow-heads. These wedge-like strokes are drawn vertically, horizontally, and obliquely in groups, and arranged in straight lines. Many such inscriptions have been recently disinterred; others stand open to the sky on the walls of ruined palaces or temples, and on tablets hewn in the mountains. Conspicuous among the latter is one near Kermanshah, on the western frontier of Persia. It is cut in the mountain of Behistun, upon the face of a perpendicular precipice, at the elevation of three hundred feet from the valley, and consists of a central picture with four hundred lines of cuneiform writing.

The earliest attempt to decipher those inscriptions attended with any success, was made by Professor Grotefend, of Göttingen, in the beginning of the present century. Without such help as Egyptologers had in the Rosetta stone, he succeeded, by an ingenious and careful process, in opening a brief and narrow, but reliable, path to their interpretation. It was well known from ancient authorities that, at Persepolis, there was a palace as well as burying-place of the ancient kings of Persia. Extensive ruins on the site of that city presented every indication of belonging to a palace, and the inscriptions found upon it were reasonably referred to some of the great and prosperous among those kings. Of the inscriptions some were in the Pehlevi, or later Persian, and had been partly deciphered by De Sacy, who had found the titles and name of a king often repeated. It occurred to Grotefend as most probable that the cuneiform writings were also royal records of royal exploits. He then proceeded to assure himself that the ruins really belonged to the time of the Achæmenian kings. By comparing two groups of figures, which occurred frequently in the inscriptions, as to their length and general appearance, with all the names upon the list of Persian kings, he found that no two consecutive names corresponded to them save those of Darius and Xerxes. He next ascertained the spelling of those names in the old Persian language. That spelling was then compared with the groups. A step of conjecture had to be taken, and the smaller groups of arrow-heads so distributed as to correspond to the letters

in the Persian spelling of those proper names. Several letters were thus conjecturally assumed and applied to other portions of the inscriptions, careful analysis being made of their elements. Slowly, and through numberless failures, did the persevering decipherer establish one letter after another, until a considerable portion of the alphabet was determined.

It was in 1802 that Grotefend announced his first success; but it attracted little notice. His method was described in an appendix to the third edition of Heeren's "Ideen," published at Göttingen in 1815, and more fully in the English translation of that work, in 1833, when it first became known to English readers. So far it had been unproductive. To this date must the real beginning of general interest in the subject be referred. Much earlier nothing could have been effected more than was done. But now Indo-European philology had assumed form and established some of its fundamental principles. Three years later, treatises on the cuneiform writing were issued by Professor Lassen of Bonn, and Burnouf of Paris, corroborating Grotefend's method, and making additions to the twelve letters which he had discovered.

Meanwhile Major (now Sir Henry) Rawlinson, British resident at Kermanshah, in Persia, had, in 1835, commenced the study of the actual monuments. Of the great inscription at Behistun, which, from its elevation at such giddy height, still remained uncopied, he secured a complete transcript by having himself suspended by ropes to the face of the precipice. Without knowledge of the coincident labors of Lassen and Burnouf, but like them versed in Sanskrit and Persian, and acquainted with Grotefend's progress, he reached the same conclusions to which they came, as appeared by his announcement from the borders of Persia, in the same year (1836) in which their treatises appeared in Europe. Lassen continued to pursue the subject in occasional articles in the "Journal for Oriental Knowledge." Rawlinson, two years later, sent to the Royal Asiatic Society his first communication on the Behistun inscription, in which he gave a transcript of its commencing paragraphs in Roman characters, with a translation, which was followed by a summary of the whole, with some further details touching the alphabet. In 1846 he came out

with a full exposition of the Persian cuneiform system, and a complete translation of the inscription at Behistun. From that date the Persian variety of the cuneiform writing must be regarded as mastered. Criticism may still question the accuracy of the rendering given to some particular word, or the power of some rarely occurring letter; but no reasonable doubt can any longer rest upon the substantial meaning of the translation, or the principles of the grammar of the dialect thus raised from the dead. All thus claimed as discovery has been severely criticised. By the uninformed of the principles and methods employed, it has generally been encountered with distrust; by some classical scholars disputed: but by those who have truly followed the process of deciphering, and best understand it, hailed as a real triumph. And the final test of its correctness is that everywhere, consecutively applied, it brings out a consistent grammatical meaning. In order to feel the weight of this fact, let any one construct an alphabet false to the sounds employed in English words, and then try to decipher one English sentence, of ordinary length, by its means. The alphabet whereby we read sentence after sentence and column after column, in true grammatical order, is a true alphabet. It is an argument which no man can resist who has experience of it. Dr. Spiegel, translator of the Avesta, has examined critically the work of his predecessors, and stamps the result with his approval. In a volume, published at Leipsic in 1862, he has summed up the results in a full translation of the Persian inscriptions, accompanied with the original text in Roman characters, a grammar and vocabulary of the language, with a brief history of the process whereby they have been ascertained.

Among the victories of modern scholarship, no other has been achieved over so many difficulties and so obstinate. The unknown characters were accompanied by no key to explain their nature, whether ideographic or phonetic, or whether it had any other significance than that of ornamentation; and when first deciphered, they opened into an unknown tongue, where every thing was strange save the proper names. Interpretation could not have gone much further but for the attainments by that time made in knowledge of Vedic

Sanskrit and Zend. Upon spelling the words of the inscriptions with the alphabet as deciphered, they were found to present a striking similarity to the latter. Further examination demonstrated them to belong to a dialect of Persian not far removed from that in which the sacred books of Zoroaster were written, and having, like that, a near affinity to the ancient Sanskrit. The Avesta was itself, at that date, yielding its meaning only stingily and by fragments as wrested from it by the severest examination and cross-examination. A new witness was now introduced from the Persian monuments, at an important stage in the inquiry—a witness whose scanty but valuable testimony received indispensable explanation from that which it helped to explain.

Still, the work is far from being complete. Among several varieties of cuneiform writing only one is fully mastered The external difference of style consists in different conformation and combination of the wedge-like strokes, and number of graphic signs, which correspond to underlying differences of language. The three varieties which appear upon the trilingual tablets of Persia are called by the names of Assyrian or Babylonian, Scythian or Turanian, and Persian. Most ancient of all is the Turanian, next is the Assyrian, such as are found in the ruins of Nineveh and Calah, and most recent of all is the Persian. It is also the simplest, the lines being plain and regularly formed wedge-shape, and the alphabet limited to thirty-six characters. It is this variety which is satisfactorily explained. By its aid on the trilingual tablets, that is those on which all three varieties appear, some progress has been made in unravelling the difficulties of the other two. The Babylonian covers the Semitic tongue of Babylon and Assyria. The monuments exhumed by Mr. Layard from the ruins of Nineveh passed under the eye of Rawlinson, on their way to England. Having just then finished his work with the Persian inscriptions, that eminent scholar immediately turned his attention to those newly discovered, which had come to light at the very juncture when there were men prepared to decipher them. The amount of material under this head is very extensive. Besides the great number of inscriptions dug up in the ruins of the cities of Northern Assyria, a vast

mass of tiles and cylinders covered with writing, real library tablets, are found in the ruins of Babylon. The former vary in size from eight inches by six to two inches by one and a half, or less, and the writing upon them is very minute, from six to ten lines in an inch, with occasionally words so much smaller that sixteen lines might be contained in an inch. They are made of hard dried clay. The cylinders are generally from four to seven inches long, and six or ten in circumference; but many are larger, according to the length of the writing to be inscribed upon them. Such books, for they are really treatises upon a great variety of subjects, have been discovered in thousands, and are now deposited in the British and other museums of Europe. Although many are broken or defaced, yet a great number are in a state of perfect preservation. From time to time we hear from Sir Henry Rawlinson, as he makes some new addition to discovery in that field to which his investigations seem to be now chiefly addressed. Of the third variety less is known. It is thought that it contains a language of the Turanian class.

As large additions have been made to the treasures of Assyrian and Babylonian monumental literature, since 1843, by the researches of Botta, Layard, and others, among the ruins of ancient cities lying scattered along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, much light has been thrown upon the otherwise lost history of those early seats of civilization.

A few years before and after 1820 constitute an era in the history of scholarship. Several of the enterprises, which have revolutionized, or greatly advanced their respective departments, were commenced, if not executed, about that time. In 1819 appeared the first edition of Wilson's "Sanskrit Dictionary," making that language accessible to the scholar in his own study; also the first volume of Buttmann's "Large Grammar," entering upon a truly scientific treatment of the Greek language; and the first volume of Grimm's "German Grammar," a work which, in its completeness, presented a thorough comparative discussion of the German and Scandinavian languages, establishing and illustrating, for the first time, some of the most important principles of philological science. Three years before, Bopp had published his "Conju-

gation System of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Persian, and German Languages," in which he opened the history of comparative philology. In 1822, Champollion brought out his discovery in Egyptian hieroglyphics. In 1823 appeared Morrison's "Chinese Dictionary." In 1826, Burnouf and Lassen commenced their illustrious career with their joint treatise on the Pali, and Niebuhr was rising to the conception of his critical history, delivering his first course of lectures at Bonn. Within that epoch also the original text of the Buddhist sacred books first came before the eyes of a European.

Buddhism, in its history and many of its practices, had long been subject of discussion among the learned of the West; and it had long been believed that it was originally an Indian religion, expelled from that country by hostility of the Brahmans; but it was not until the time now mentioned that Buddhism, as it expounds itself, was accessible. Its doctrines were received in Europe at second hand. The sacred books which teach them were unknown. That deficiency was now supplied, by a singular conjunction of events, from four different quarters at the same time. In 1824 Mr. Brian Houghton Hodgson, resident for the East India Company in Nepal, published his discovery of the original Sanskrit text of the Buddhist scriptures. He had procured a catalogue of all the volumes belonging to the priesthood of that country, and then copies of the books themselves, and fully ascertained their character, and that, when the Buddhist books were destroyed elsewhere in India, they had been preserved together with the religion which they teach, among the mountains of Nepal; and that, at a very early date, a translation had been made of them all into the language of Thibet. Copies of those books, to the number of about sixty volumes, Mr. Hodgson forwarded to the Asiatic Society of Bengal. From 1824 to 1839, similar collections he presented also to the Asiatic Societies of London and Paris in 1835 and 1837, respectively. He published also, in 1841, a number of valuable essays on the literature and religion of the Buddhists.

At this juncture Alexander Csoma de Koros, a Hungarian, appeared at Calcutta. He had travelled on foot from Hungary to Thibet, and thence into India. His journey, first

undertaken from desire to ascertain the origin of his own nation, had been delayed in Thibet by the interest which he took in the language, and subsequently in the literature and religion of that country. He now presented to the Oriental scholars of Calcutta a valuable analysis of the religious books of Thibet, which was printed in the twentieth volume of the "Asiatic Researches." From that analysis, it was sufficiently established that the principal part of the Thibetan scriptures was a translation from the Sanskrit books, found by Mr. Hodgson in Nepal.

About the same time, Isaac Jacob Schmidt, of St. Petersburg, pursuing the study of the Mongolian language, found another version of the Buddhist books, from which he translated portions.

From 1826, English residents in Ceylon had occupied themselves with investigations into the literature of that island. These inquiries soon resulted in bringing to view a fourth set of Buddhist books, in this case written in the Pali, an ancient dialect of Sanskrit, and the sacred language of Ceylon. From these, as originals, are copied the sacred books of Burmah and Siam. Thus there are two great sources of Buddhist propaganda: the Sanskrit in the north, and the Pali in Ceylon. From the former have translations been made into the Thibetan, the Mongolian, the Manchu, the Chinese, and Japanese, and from the latter have they been carried into the peninsula of Farther India.

Large collections of Buddhist manuscripts have been taken to Europe, but little has yet been done in rendering them into any language of the West. Such a work was undertaken, in his own masterly manner, by Burnouf. Taking the Sanskrit original for the basis, he compared it carefully with the different versions now put within his reach. The first fruit of that effort, printed in 1844, was a volume entitled "Introduction to the History of Buddhism." A second volume appeared after his death, in 1852, containing "a translation of one of the canonical books of Nepal," with valuable notes and appendices. That work remains where Burnouf left it; but several treatises have followed from different hands, on the religion and history of Buddhism, especially as it is in China,

Tartary, Thibet, and Ceylon, and as it was anciently in India.

Much truth of history has also been elicited by careful comparison of ancient authorities, not merely on the broad ground of their ostensible subjects, but also in their incidental remarks and in what they often unconsciously imply; by bringing together matters of history really pertaining to the same head, but whose importance has hitherto been overlooked from their being scattered obscurely among the writings of miscellaneous authors, by carefully collecting, sifting, and weighing, as related to some general thread of history, fragments from the *débris* of ancient literature. Thus have many important facts been assigned to their proper places, and isolated portions of history exhibited in their due connection. Errors, probably, have been made, but some of old standing have been demonstrated and removed, and in other cases a history almost entirely lost has been to some degree restored. Utterly lacking as ancient India is in chronology, one or two epochs have by this minute criticism been established beyond all reasonable doubt. The history of ancient Rome has received, from the labors of Niebuhr and Momsen, a new interest and a higher value. Otfried Müller has almost raised from the grave the history of Orchomenos, and of the ancient Dorians; and Movers, in his "Phœnicians," has effected almost a miracle of restoration by the same means. A new life has been breathed into the history of Greece, and the relations of the Hebrews to the world, as a religious people, have been exhibited with a breadth and power, which the traditionary historians never dreamed of. Minute and careful criticism of facts already possessed, has discovered in them, when combined according to their true relations, an amount of implied history which, in ordinary reading, we should never have been aware that they possessed.

One of the distinguishing features of recent scholarship is universality. Not that any sensible man now aspires to know every thing; but each branch of learning is conceived of as comprehending all that really belongs to it. Etymology, for example, is no longer limited to the changes upon words in a given language, but, in its scientific sense, comprehends the

modifications and affections of words in all languages, and from language to language, the world over. History no longer contents itself with records of dynasties and governmental action, it descends to the manners and customs and events among the humblest, and aims to present a true picture of the whole life of a nation, in the light of universal principles.

A second feature is that the different departments of learning have been brought nearer to each other: their borders overlap and constitute a mutual support. Philology has rendered important services to history, and both have sustained ethnology, while receiving help from it.

Clear and comprehensive thinking leads inevitably to science, which is just knowledge defined and classified. As the fruit of recent scholarship we have two distinct, yet nearly allied, sciences, namely that of language and ethnology. And if, history is not a science, recent scholarship has done more than any thing else to bring it up toward that standing.

And, finally, the work of comparing the forms of human speech, leads to a similar comparison of the habits of human thinking, on the very top, as well as at the bottom, of which lie the hopes and fears and beliefs of religion.

Thus, we have reliable witnesses on the subject of religion from the ancient civilization of Eastern Asia, from that of the south and centre and southwest of the same continent, and from that of the adjoining part of Africa: in short, from all the great seats of pre-Hellenic culture. They are the oldest literary productions in existence. And among them the most ancient testimony is borne by the book of Genesis, some of the Egyptian and Babylonian monuments, the Rig-Veda and the Gathas of the Avesta. The monuments are fragmentary, like the headings of a chapter, a military bulletin, or an epitaph; the Rig-Veda and Gathas are hymns; Genesis alone presents the form of narrative. And whether preserved at first by writing or by oral recitation, in whole or by parts, it retains also more of the historical character than any other to which a similar antiquity is ascribed. It also takes a much wider view of the world and of human life beyond the strict sphere of religion than does the Veda or the Avesta. Its chronology, if not at

all points without difficulty, is at least continued from the earliest time without a break. The Veda and Avesta "take no note of time," and are recognized of the antiquity to which they belong by the relations of their languages and comparison of other circumstances. Among the monuments are found evidences of a carefully recorded chronology; but, like themselves, it is fragmentary. A precision of dates similar to that of the Hebrew was observed by the Egyptians, subsequent to the eleventh dynasty of their kings; but so many are lost, that it has become the most difficult problem of Egyptology to harmonize or unite those that remain. Earlier than the eleventh dynasty there are none.

The narrative of Genesis, according to the Hebrew chronology, comes down to about twenty-four hundred years from the creation of man. The oldest Egyptian monuments, until the end of the twelfth dynasty, and some of the Babylonian, belong to the same period. And although the collections of the Veda and of the Avesta were not made so early as even the end of it, the hymns which constitute their most sacred portions cannot be of much less antiquity. The religion of the Avesta was ancient in the days of Darius Hystapis. It had even then passed through the period of its primitive purity; had been the religion of a polished and wide-spread people; had suffered some degree of subsequent depression, under the usurpation of Gomates the Mede, from which Darius says that he rescued it, and assigned it to the honor and singleness of authority which it had in the days of his ancient forefathers. Darius was an admirer of antiquity, and thought much of his own long line of regal descent, and informs us that he was the ninth in a succession of kings. And if the religion which he restored to its purity was that of his countrymen in the days of his earliest royal ancestor, which he leaves us no room to doubt was his conviction, the antiquity of its introduction among them must be carried much further back. In order to become the sole national religion, embodying all the cherished traditions of the people, it must have been observed among them for many generations. And, whether originally written or not, the Gathas of the Avesta are certainly coeval with the establishment of the worship of Ahura-Mazda as the

national religion. For they are its essential parts, as much so as the Gospels to Christianity.

All these remains are greatly anterior to the earliest productions of the Greek language; anterior to the earliest information that can be obtained of mythology in its classical form; anterior to the subject of the Homeric poems, in which we first meet with that mythology, lying away back in the antiquity to which Æschylus refers the immediate antecedents of his Prometheus. No literature of Europe comes to us from an equal depth of ages.

ART. IV.—*The Church Question.*

"No one, who has come to feel any interest in the CHURCH QUESTION, can regard with indifference the movements which are made in favor of union among the different Presbyterian bodies of the country at this time."—JOHN W. NEVIN, D. D.

A PROFOUND mind looks beyond the common observations of life. The deeper movements of history are carefully studied. Ordinarily, only the outward phenomena are observed; the inquirer after truth searches after the inner substance. The thoughtful Newton could see in the falling of an apple the certain evidence of an unseen power. Reflection led to the discovery of the *law of gravitation.*

Those whom God brings upon the stage of history for holy and solemn purposes possess the conscious power to move in the world of pure thought: the proper sphere of the true, the beautiful, and the good. At the appointed time, and in subordination to some great thought, the man who is born to think, enters upon his solemn mission. Conscious of the presence of Him who says: "Lo, I am with you," the earnest thinker lives in constant communion with the unseen world.

A mission thus providential, has been claimed in behalf of John W. Nevin, D. D. A writer says: "And when, at last our age shall fully recognize the fact that such men as Bush-

nell and Nevin are teachers sent from God, and they are gathered to their fathers, even the rabbins and doctors of the law, who have all their lives been casting stones at them, may bring their wreaths to garnish their sepulchres."

In behalf of scientific theology, it becomes a solemn duty carefully to inquire into the relation such so-called "*teachers sent from God*" sustain to the philosophical thinking of the present age. If true that Dr. Nevin is a "teacher sent from God," it is a matter of no small consequence to all Protestant denominations, as well as to the Roman and Greek churches, to know something about the views of so great a theological scholar and teacher. This is the more important when it is remembered that Dr. Nevin may be regarded as the originator of a certain provincial and so-called *churchly* system of theology, known as *Mercersburg Theology.*

It is certainly a curious circumstance to find an eminent theologian, himself formerly a Presbyterian, *at present* an advocate of a so-called churchly theory, which virtually ignores the orthodoxy of Presbyterianism. If views held in the past are known to be false, it may well be a matter of importance to inquire into the supposed orthodoxy of the *new* theology. For any theological or philosophical scholar to be a "teacher sent from God," there must be positive evidence of the fact itself. No mere theory can be allowed to stand; solid proof is demanded. If this be not at hand, it must follow that there can be no absolutely certain assurance of any truth in the new theology.

The teaching of Christ, preserved in history by himself, is positive. No human authority, whether that of pope, priest, or council, can add to, or take from, the Will-Book of Christ. "*If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this Book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the Book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the Book of Life.*"

Whether the human mind can explain the teaching of Christ is not a question of primary importance. The fact that man *cannot* explain what light is does not destroy the knowledge of the existence of light. The world did not exist any the less certainly, when as yet there was no knowledge of the law of

gravitation. The same holds true in the higher world of organic life. No sane mind can call into question the fact that *flowers bloom.* Just as surely the wisest philosopher *cannot* explain what that life is, the presence of which is certainly actualized in the beautiful tints of the flower. Divine facts may be known: to *explain* is an infinitely different thing. If true that the human mind *cannot* understand what life is in the lower spheres of creation, it is evident that infinitely less can be known in the world of *personal being.*

> "I tremble at myself,
> And in myself am lost."

The careful scientific scholar is not to be cheated by a mere show of words. Human life is too solemn a reality to be trifled away in admiring visionary theories. Absolute certainty is demanded; authority that cannot be called into question must be at hand; or all is vain. Theology has to do with the most solemn of all human interests. He who advances any new theory must see well to it that there shall be no room to doubt the absolute certainty of the *principle.* Deny, for instance, the truth of the *law of gravitation*, and at once the present system of astronomy, as apprehended by the logical understanding, is at an end. The same of a theological system. To know God in Christ by a living faith is one thing; to theologize, in any proper sense, is a vastly different thing. Even a little child may know there is light; to explain *how* or *what* light is may challenge all the powers of the profoundest philosopher. In the end, for all practical purposes, the philosopher's knowledge is not any more certain than that of the child. The sublimity of the Saviour's words is clear: "*Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall in nowise enter therein.*"

As a science, theology is based upon the power of human apprehension. In so far as the finite mind can *know* the truth, just that far, and no farther, there is absolute certainty. The very moment that theory is substituted for *knowing*, that instant all is uncertainty. If there be no power to *know* the truth, then it must follow that theology, as a science, is an impossibility; and if theology is an impossibility, it is certain

that Christianity is false. But man does possess the self-conscious power to know God. Jesus says: "*This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.*"

It matters little what theologizers may say, or what philosophers may affirm: *Jesus Christ* is neither philosopher or theologizer. With the heroic Apostle, the Christian may truthfully say: "*I* KNOW *whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him.*" Here is certainty; no theory; no human imagination; no churchism; no priestly trickery. Instead of this clear and positive *personal* relation of the *knowing* soul to Christ, Dr. Nevin substitutes a philosophical theory. In this way, it is pretended that a more *churchly* theology is absolutely necessary in order to cure the evils of Protestantism, and especially the terribly desolating spirit of Puritanic Presbyterianism. Evidently the issue here raised by a profound scholar is one of vital importance. However lightly a self-confident Mercersburg theologian may regard Presbyterianism, it is not yet clearly a settled fact that Dr. Nevin is a "teacher sent from God." Until this important question shall have been intelligently settled in the affirmative, it might be well for the advocates of the *new* theology to be a little more modest and vastly less self-confident.

Dr. Nevin says: "We have reason to stand on our guard against the inroads of an unchurchly spirit. For as it is full of danger, so is it extremely plausible and insidious also in its approach. It comes to men like an angel of light, professing to lead them the only sure way to righteousness and heaven. It magnifies the inward and spiritual, and affects to call the soul away from a religion of forms and outward show. 'God is a spirit,' it tells us, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth.' He looks upon the heart, and not on empty rites, however solemn and imposing. Religion is a personal thing; a transaction between every individual separately and his Maker; and all reliance on church privileges and church ordinances is to be deprecated, as full of peril to the immortal soul. In such style, fair and captivating, does this unchurchly spirit erect itself into notice and

power, pretending to exalt Christ and magnify repentance and faith, at the cost of all that is comprehended in the idea of the Church, 'which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.' But let us beware of its smooth pretences. It is a spirit that will conduct us in the end to poverty and starvation. It will leave us without a liturgy, without sacraments, without history."—See *Sermon, the Church*, p. 27.

Thus this so-called "teacher sent from God" is pleased to describe what he elsewhere calls Puritanical Presbyterianism. Speaking of his own churchly *idea*, as this is supposed to be in harmony with ancient notions, Dr. Nevin says: "The reigning temper of Protestantism, in its present Puritanic form, is against it, not only having no sympathy with it, but absolutely intolerant of its presence."—See *Mercer's Rev.*, vol. x., p. 180.

A truly scientific scholar will not rest satisfied with any mere show of words. Admitting that this theologian is a profound philosophical scholar, it does not follow that he has been authorized to pronounce the final doom of "the reigning temper of Protestantism." Very far from this is the work of a modest lover of the truth as it is in Jesus. The theological or philosophical writer who thus speaks of Puritanic Protestantism, clearly lays himself open to all the legitimate laws of logical criticism. Let him accept the consequences.

I. Mercersburg Theology, as a System, is based upon a False Principle. In vain attempt to understand any particular doctrine belonging to a system, so long as the underlying principle is not clearly apprehended. Astronomy, for instance, cannot be intelligently understood without constant reference to the law of gravitation. The same of a theological system. Dr. Nevin himself is too correct a scientific scholar not to have seen the force of this assertion. He says: "The true sense of the church question . . . . . is not found in those points around which the controversy is most commonly made to revolve. The first matter needing to be settled is not the right of any outward historical organization to be considered the church or a part of the church, but what the church itself must be held to be in theory or idea; not the force and value of any institution or usage or order which may be set forward

in any quarter as evidencing the presence of the church, but what this presence in any case must be taken to involve and mean. If men have no common notion or conception of the church, some taking it to mean much, and others taking it to mean very little or almost nothing at all, it can never be more than a waste of time for them to dispute concerning the modes of its being, or the proper methods of its action. Only when the *idea* of the church has been first brought to some clear determination, can the way be said to be at all open for discussing, either intelligently or profitably, such questions as relate only to the manner in which the idea should be, or actually may be, anywhere, carried out into practice."—See *Mercer's Rev.*, vol. x., p. 187.

It will be observed that Dr. Nevin admits that the "*theory or idea*" of the church must be the determining *principle* of a churchly system. He affirms very truly that only when the "theory or idea" has been brought to some clear determination, can there be any room for intelligent argument. His own logic may very properly be accepted. A more profound inquiry at once starts into being: *Whose idea shall be regarded as of normal authority?* Dr. Nevin may entertain his idea; Dr. Newman may claim the same privilege; last of all, there remains no absolutely binding authority. But Dr. Nevin appeals to the *Creed*, and says:—

"All confessionalism, all denominational symbolism, to be of a truly catholic, and not merely sectarian character, must refer itself ultimately to the Apostles' Creed as the primary basis of the universal Christian faith."—See *Mercer's Rev.*, vol. xv., p. 102.

This again is only the sound of words. All earnest Christians can affirm that they accept the fact as embodied in the Creed: *There is a holy Catholic Church.* But this does not settle the question involved. It is not the *fact* that there is a church about which there is any difference of views; it is the infinitely different question: *Whose* IDEA *shall be regarded as normal?* Dr. Nevin seems to have settled down upon the preposterous notion that *his* idea must be regarded as being identical with the fact itself. High-sounding pretensions may not always be taken for the truth, as will clearly be seen

on examining the claims to orthodoxy put forth by this "teacher sent from God."

Accepting Dr. Nevin's own logic relative to the discussion of the church question, he is open to the charge, solemn and momentous in its consequences, of being *an unreliable speculatist.* This will appear from an inquiry into the true meaning of the "*theory or idea*" underlying, as a principle, the Mercersburg system.

Dr. Nevin says: "If any thing in the world is certain, we think it is, that no such Catholic unity, whether in theology or in worship, or in church-life, can ever be reached except on the basis of the old Creeds, taken in their old, only true historical sense."—See *Mercer's Rev.*, vol. xv., p. 109.

The historical scholar knows that the word *Catholic* it not of Apostolic origin: it is not found in the writings of the Apostles. To determine the historical meaning of the word as used in the Creed, it is necessary to refer to those writers who first used it. Even this will not throw any light upon the Apostolic idea of the Church. Though used to define the meaning of the Creed, yet it is historically certain that the word was not found in the Creed during the first ages of the Church. Even *Rufinus* makes no mention of the use of the word *Catholic* as being identical with the general use of the Creed. The Apostolic Church did not use this word; it was *unknown* in its relation to the *original* Creed. In the Apostolic Church no creed existed, except that delivered by the blessed Lord himself: "*Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.*" This short and simple Creed is that Foundation to which the ancient Fathers appeal. In confirmation of the truth of this assertion, the venerable *Voetius* has quoted many passages, among which are the following: *Athanasius*, in his epistle *to all everywhere that are sound in the faith*, and in his *oration against Sabellius, and against the Arians*, says: "The whole sum and body of our faith is comprised in the words of our baptism, and is founded on that Scripture: 'Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost'"

Augustine, in his discourse on the Creed, says: "Our Lord Jesus Christ himself hath furnished us with this standard of doctrine, and no man of piety entertains any doubt respecting that canon of the Catholic faith, which was dictated by him, who is himself the object of faith. Our Lord Jesus Christ, I say, after his glorious resurrection from the dead, and shortly before his ascension to the Father, bequeathed to the disciples these mysteries of faith, saying: 'Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'"

Here is the TRUE *Apostolic Creed:* any other view cannot stand; any other is without Divine authority. Primarily, it does not matter what the ancient fathers may have *added;* their *additions* have no binding authority for the conscience. In truth, the creed, in its present form, is simply a human *exposition* or *expansion* of the original *Apostolic Creed.*

For Dr. Nevin to attempt to confound the present *form* of the creed with the *original Creed*, is simply a case of unmitigated paralogism. This he has done; and this neological fallacy underlies the *principle* upon which his *new* theology rests. Modern theologizers, as in this case, should bear in mind that Christ and his Word go before the church and the words of so-called fathers. When men attempt, without Divine authority, to add to the express Word of Christ, they must be careful to distinguish between what is human and that which is from him, of whom it is truthfully said, "*Never man spake as this man.*" Christ himself commands his ministering servants to go first of all and disciple all nations. This done, they are to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. All this is plain. The Redeemer deals with men as with intelligent personal beings; there is no room for abstractions, for human theories or notions. Faith in the sense of the original Creed implies the self-conscious power to *know* Christ. The Christian life is pre-eminently a personal thing. Only because Dr. Nevin had a "*theory or idea*" of his own, did he ever consent to abandon Apostolic certainty in order to take up the notions of the ancient bishops. This is clear from his own words. He says: "We know that it was not composed strictly by the

Apostles; that it took form gradually; that there were different creeds in the first centuries; and that, among these, the formula of Rome finally gained credit in the fifth and sixth centuries, so as to become, for subsequent times, what is now denominated the Apostles' Creed."—[See *Xtn. Lit.*, pp. 60–1.

It is here admitted, in accordance with what every historian knows to be true, that the *form* of the Creed, as it now stands, is not of Apostolic origin; but, as all must admit, the present Creed in form is in perfect harmony with the corruptions of the Romish hierarchy of the *sixth* century. The arrangement of the articles was according to the mind of the Romish priesthood of the *fifth* and *sixth centuries*. This is Dr. Nevin's own admission; a fact clearly confirmed by history.

Every scientific scholar, in behalf of Gospel truth, must see that Dr. Nevin has planted himself upon a rotten foundation. He does not start from the true Apostolic norm, but from the FORM the Creed assumes in the interest of Romanism; by necessary consequence his new theology, as a system, must run into *abstract formalism*. That such has been, and now is the actual issue of Dr. Nevin's system, is clearly confirmed by historical facts.

Bearing in mind that the true Apostolic norm of faith stands related in the way of *personal self-consciousness* to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, there is no room to conceive of any *mediate* relation in and through the Church. On the other hand, it is clear that the relation the self-conscious soul sustains to Christ must go before the actual Church. The Lord does not teach that faith in form must go before the living, concrete reality. For this reason no mention is made in the *original Creed*, of faith in the Church; and this for the reason, that as well might it have been required to speak of faith in the existence of an actual world. The man who is possessed of a sound mind does not need to be told that there is an actual world. This he *knows*. The same of the Church. The primary inquiry relates to the question: *How the soul ever came into the world?* To be a Christian is to be already in the kingdom of Christ. The all-important question centres in knowing, *How the soul is to be brought into the kingdom of God?*

No earnest mind is willing, in view of the solemn issue involved, to accept any "*theory or idea*" that is based merely upon human authority. Neither pope, priest, or council can decide the question here raised. Theologizers may have their "theory or idea" more than any such idle phantom is demanded. There must be a Divine norm; no priestly conceit springing from the corruptions of the hierarchy of the *fifth* or *sixth* century, can have any binding authority. The *formal* Creed, as it now stands, may be received, on the ground that the doctrines therein contained are in agreement with the teachings of Christ; but when a theorizer, as in the case of Dr. Nevin, attempts to affirm that the system of theology that ruled in the mind of the Romish hierachy of the fifth or sixth century, is authoritatively the Christian system, then must every sincere lover of the Gospel of Christ protest against any such monstrous perversion of Christianity.

All admit that Dr. Nevin is not only an eminently learned theologian, but that he is also a profound philosophical logician. This only renders it the more important that the *principle* underlying his so-called churchly theology should be clearly brought to light. It is no small matter to find an eminent scholar continually hurling his thunder against what he is pleased to call Puritanic Presbyterianism; and all this in the interest of a system based upon neological fallacies. *Mercersburg Theology*, as a theological system, has no existence beyond the speculative philosophy held and taught by Dr. Nevin. This is simply a working over of the rationalism of Schelling, Hegel, and others of Germany, and must be regarded, in the end, as *historical idealism;* of which even the *Danish Martensen* thus speaks: "The philosophic idealism of our day has, in many respects, become formalism."—[See *Marten. Dog., Clark's Ed.*, p. 331.

That there is no misrepresentation the following will show. Dr. Nevin says: "The Church exhibits itself to us under two aspects, which are in many respects very different, and yet both alike necessary to complete its proper conception. In one view it is the *ideal church;* in another it is the *actual church.*" Again: "We take *idea* here in its true sense, by which it expresses the very inmost substance of that which

exists, as distinguished from its simply phenomenal character in time and space. As such it is not opposed to what is actual, but constitutes rather its truth and soul. All life is ideal, that is, exists truly in the form of possibility before it can become actual; and it is only in the presence and power of this potential life, this invisible, mysterious living nature which lies beyond and behind all outward manifestations; that these last can ever be said to carry with them any reality whatever. In this sense only do we speak of an ideal church." Again: "The ideal church is the power of a new supernatural creation, which has been introduced into the actual history of the world by the incarnation of Jesus Christ; and which is destined to go on, causing 'old things to pass away and all things to become new,' till it shall triumph in the end over all sin and death, and the whole world shall appear transformed into its image and resplendent with its glory. As such a power, it is actually at work in the world already, and has been so since the time of Christ. . . The new creation is already at hand; not developed indeed to its last necessary results; but as an active force, all sufficient for its own ends, and really comprehended in the order of the world's history as it now stands. It is exhibited to us in the Church."

Again: "The principle of this new creation is the Lord Jesus Christ. . . The fact thus accomplished in his person, was at the same time a fact for all time. It included in itself all the resources of life and salvation that were needed for the full redemption of humanity, onward to the grand millennial triumph in which it is destined to have its end. The Church through all ages is the repository of these resources. The life with which she is filled, the powers that are lodged in her constitution, were all comprehended originally in the person of Jesus Christ, and are still the revelation only of the grace and truth which came by him in the beginning."

Again: "The general attributes of the ideal church as thus described, are not difficult to be determined. It is a living system, organically bound together in all its parts, springing from a common ground, and pervaded throughout with the force of a common nature. In its very conception, therefore, it is catholic; that is, one and universal. . . . In her ideal

character again, as the article of the creed implies, the Church is absolutely holy and infallible, free from error and free from sin. Her constitution is derived wholly from Christ, who is the truth itself, and in whom the whole righteousness of the law is completely and forever fulfilled. Hence the Church is represented to be the organ and medium by which the world is reclaimed from the power of error and transformed into a holy life."

"Lastly, the Church, under its ideal character, includes in itself the necessity of a visible externalization in the world. Without this necessity, it could not be real, in any of the respects that have been already mentioned. For it is a fixed law in life, that every spiritual force which it comprehends must take some outward form, in order to become complete. . . The outward must be joined to the inward, to give it either reality or strength."—[See *Sermon*, *The Church*, pp. 1–10, *passim*.

Like Plato, in his Republic, Dr. Nevin may have conceived the notion of the existence of a church such as is clearly unknown in this world. This ideal church can have no existence save in the imagination of a speculative theorist. Of this, the evidence is at hand. A scientific scholar forces the inquiry: *How does the ideal exist?* If by this ideal is meant a human conception of a Divine thought, then plainly it follows that Dr. Nevin is attempting to explain the mind of the Almighty, of whom, even the inspired prophet says: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the LORD. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."

The utter falsity of this philosophical idealism comes more clearly into view in the following explanation of the *actual church*, of which, Dr. Nevin says: "This is exhibited to us in history, as it reaches from the incarnation of Christ to the present time, and is destined to run forward still, to the end of the world, as it now stands. It is the kingdom of heaven, as it is found revealing itself in the way of actual life among men."—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

Plainly, the "*theory or idea*," like any other visionary

abstraction, is supposed to be identical with the "*substance.*" This is clear from what follows. Dr. Nevin continues, by saying: "With all their difference, however, the actual church and the ideal church, it must always be borne in mind, are in the end the same. . . The history of the actual church then, is but the presence and life of the ideal church itself, struggling through a process of centuries to come to its last, full manifestation. . . The ideal church can have no reality save under the form of the historical; and the actual or historical church can have no truth, except through the presence of the ideal."—*Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

All this is seemingly very philosophical. To any careful student of philosophy there is nothing either original or profound in this distillation of German rationalism. The writings of the speculative metaphysicians of Germany abound in efforts to explain the phenomena of the higher world of pure thinking. In attempting to investigate the facts of creation, the German mind seems naturally to run into the *philosophy of the absolute.* Dr. Nevin has gone to an extreme in the direction of neological idealism. No German metaphysician of prominence has attempted to construct a "theory" of the Church of Christ on the basis of idealism. Because of this fact, Dr. Nevin has very properly observed, that his "idea" of the Church is more Anglican than German.

It must be borne in mind, that the "theory or idea," as now set forth in Dr. Nevin's own words, is the *principle* underlying *Mercersburg Theology.* A more remarkable example of philosophical sophistry could hardly be found than that here brought into view. Dr. Nevin says: "*The principle of this new creation is the Lord Jesus Christ.*" What does this mean? Is Christ, in relation to the Church, nothing more than the law of gravitation in its relation to astronomy? Virtually, Dr. Nevin annihilates the personality of Christ in order to the harmony of his system. This will be proven hereafter. The point now to be kept in view centres in the sophistry used to conceal the real principle underlying this false system. It is not Christ, but Dr. Nevin's "theory or idea," that constitutes the *principle.* In this lies concealed the neological fallacy which underlies this false system. Dr. Nevin

assumes that his "theory or idea" is identically the Divine fact. In the end, this kind of false logic would make Mercersburg Theology identically the Divine instead of the human. No assumption could be more false.

To bring out still more clearly the falsity of the *principle*, it is only necessary to bear in mind that this "theory or idea" falls back upon a certain metaphysical conception of the person of Christ. Dr. Nevin, it has been shown, affirms that the ideal church and the actual church *are in the end the same.* He goes on to say: "The Church is the historical continuation of the life of Jesus Christ, in the world."—[See *Sermon*, *The Church*, p. 16.

Here is a strange confusion. The ideal and the actual are the same: and *this* the continuation of the life of Christ. Now, all Christians *know*, that Christ is the personal God. What does Dr. Nevin mean when he says that the Church is Christ? This, his strange "theory or idea" involves. He must be allowed to explain, by saying: "We do not derogate from the glory of Christ, by believing and asserting a real historical revelation of his life in the Church. . . . This is what we are to understand by the *objective* character of the Church." . . . "The objective life-bearing character of the Church, to be of any force, must express itself through its visible organization, the ordinances and institutions by which its presence is revealed and upheld in the world."—[See *Sermon*, *The Church*, p. 24.

The ideal is now the *objective*. And what is meant by this form of expression? This inquiry can be answered in no other way than by keeping clearly before the mind, the "theory or idea" entertained by Dr. Nevin. This refers itself, at once, to his notion of the person of Christ. He does not aim to teach that the Church is Christ. By no means; and yet, this is what his "theory" does involve. A distinction is made "between the individual personal life of Christ, and the same life in a *generic* view."—[See *Mys. Presence*, p. 160.

It is this *generic life*, in the view of Dr. Nevin, that constitutes the *objective* or *ideal* church. This generic life "passes over" into the sphere of the subjective in and through the functions of the priesthood, which constitutes the "*organ of*

the body of Christ, and as such it is the bearer of a Divine, supernatural power."—[See *Sermon, The Church*, p. 25.

It is this *generic* life, regarded as *the whole*, that is supposed to constitute the *catholic*. Strange, and yet true, Dr. Nevin pretends to teach that this anomalous "theory or idea" is identically the view of the ancient church. As well pretend, in a similar way, that Ignatius, Polycarp, Clement of Rome, and other apostolic fathers, were all German rationalists. As used by the earliest fathers, the word catholic is clearly a synonym for *true*, or *orthodox*. Thus, in the *epistle concerning the martyrdom of Polycarp*, the most ancient use of the word *catholic* clearly implies that the church at Smyrna intended to address the true Church of Christ, and not the assemblies of the heretics: "The Church of God which sojourns at Smyrna, to that sojourning in Philomelium, and to all the congregations (παροικίαις) of the holy Catholic Church."—[See *En. Epis. Ch. Smyrna. Intro.*

The next writer who uses the word is Ignatius, who says: "Wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church."—[See *Epis. to Smyr.*, chap. viii. Just before, this father had been speaking of heretics, and gives this exhortation: "It is fitting that ye should keep aloof from such persons, and not to speak of them either in private or public, but to give heed to the prophets, and above all to the Gospel."—*Ibid.*, chap. vii.

To pretend to affirm, as Dr. Nevin does, that the ancient use of this word had any allusion, even the most remote, to his *generic life* "theory or idea," is simply preposterous in the extreme. Cyril, of Jerusalem, defines the use of the word still more explicitly: "It is called catholic, because it extends from one end of the earth (γης) to the other."—[See *Cat. XVIII.* § 11. Augustine is equally explicit: "The Church is catholic: hence in the Greek is called καθολικὴ, which is diffused (diffunditur) throughout the entire world."—[See *Epis.* 170.

In view of historical testimony thus clear and direct, it is surprising to find that Dr. Nevin should speak of his "theory or idea" in these words: "Such undoubtedly is the sense of the ancient formula, 'I believe in the holy *Catholic* Church,'

as it meets us in the faith of the early Christian world."—[See *Mercers. Rev.*, vol. iii., p. 4.

It has been proven that such is *not* the sense of the word, *catholic*, as used in the ancient church. If additional testimony were needed, it may be found in the decision of the Council of Trent. In the catechism of the Council of Trent, the standard of the Romish hierarchy, are these remarkable words: "We are bound to believe that there is one holy Catholic Church; but, with regard to the persons of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, we not only believe them, but also believe IN them; and hence, when speaking of each dogma, we make use of a different form of expression, professing to believe the holy, not IN the holy Catholic Church; by this difference of expression, distinguishing God, the Author of all things, from his works, and acknowledging ourselves debtors to the Divine goodness for all these exalted benefits bestowed on the Church."—[See *Cat. Coun. Trent.* p. 79.

Thus it is clearly established that neither the ancient, nor the Romish church, ever understood the word, catholic, to mean a *generic whole.* Dr. Nevin cannot escape the charge of being at fault in pretending to accept "*the old creeds, taken in their old, only true historical sense*," when in reality he rejects the "old, only true historical sense," in order to advocate the claims of a "theory or idea" altogether unknown in the history of the creed.

The truth is now clear. Dr. Nevin stands on no historical foundation: his "theory or idea" is his own: it has its origin in his own *private judgment* speculations; and, as such, is entitled to no more confidence or respect than that due to the "theory or idea" of any other profound metaphysician: that of Strauss is deserving of equal regard.

This *generic life theory* is in itself utterly visionary; it exists only as an abstraction. This is proven from the fact that it involves a false view of *personal* life. It is imagined that *law* in its relation to material form constitutes *life.* If so, then the law of gravitation in its relation to the material form of the earth, and the earth again, in its relation to the universe, constitutes life. This being true, the universe is the

organic whole. In the end, there remains the pantheistic notion, that law and life are in eternal identity: consequently, there can be no personal God. Evidently, Dr. Nevin has studied this abstraction in the light of *German transcendentalism*. It was *Schelling* who originated this wild *creationism*. Attempting to grapple with the great ideas of this master mind, Dr. Nevin has shown himself unable to follow his teacher. It is no original notion, so far as Dr. Nevin is concerned, to conceive of an advance in the history of Christianity, to a form of church unity which will take up into itself both Romanism and Protestantism. In the development of his great ideas, Schelling finds in the sphere of Christianity the same threefold movement which runs throughout his entire system. The first, he discovers in Romanism—the religion of Peter, which he regards as the objective. The second, he finds in Protestantism—the religion of Paul, which is believed to be in harmony with the subjective consciousness. The third, he conceives, will be the religion of John, which is regarded as the union of the two preceding, in love. The first and second are believed to be passing away: the next form of Christian unity, that based upon love, will conquer the objective religion of the Romanist and the subjective consciousness of the Protestant, in the deeper unity of love.

Taking up the great thought of Schelling, which, while it certainly has some truth, has never been scientifically wrought out, Dr. Nevin imagined that his generic life theory would meet the issue. In this way, it has been assumed by Mercersburg theologians that this so-called churchly system is yet destined to become the central power of the church of the future. All this is a *delusion*. Schelling himself has clearly failed to solve, in a scientific way, the profound Christology involved in the Gospel by John. Equally certain it is, that Dr. Nevin has proven himself a weak echo of the far more profound views of Schelling.

Among theological and philosophical writers of this country, it may be a new thing, comparatively, to speak in such high terms of Schelling. But truth is truth. The correct scientific scholar, at all acquainted with the history of metaphysical speculations, well knows the power of what Schelling

has written. At the same time, it is clear that by no possibility could even the profound Schelling ever prove that there either is, or can be, any such identity of the *subject-object* as that involved in his notion of the absolute, and much less in the absurd generic life theory as held and taught by Dr. Nevin.

In the solution of the church question, there is an element of truth in the view of Schelling, but only in so far as he speaks of the unity of the Church in love. All earnest minds must, sooner or later, come to see that there is, in the Gospel by John, a view of the person of Christ, not yet clearly and adequately apprehended in history. Toward this more profound Christology, the mind of the Christian world is struggling. In so far as Dr. Nevin has been able, by his eminent learning and Christian earnestness, to awaken a deeper interest in this country among theological scholars in the general subject of Christological study, to the same extent has he labored in the Lord toward the accomplishment of great good. This much, coming generations, if not the present, must and will allow.

The mistake made by Dr. Nevin centres in his attempting to make the *form* of the creed, as it now stands, the basis of a system. This is fallacy. No system can ever find in the creed the proper *principle*. For this reason Dr. Nevin only deceives himself when he supposes that his system rests upon the creed; it rests, as shown, upon his false "idea" of a generic life, as this is supposed to stand related to the person of Christ.

Still stronger proof of the fallacy of this so-called creed theology is found in the fact that even heretics, in all ages of the Church, profess to believe the creed. Arians and Socinians alike receive this ancient symbol, and even appeal to their faith in the creed as an evidence of their entire orthodoxy. *Martensen* is correct, therefore, when he says that those who appeal to the creed as a basis only deceive themselves: they do not accept the creed, as it is, but their own *private judgment exposition* as their basis. This is emphatically true of Dr. Nevin. That the exposition itself is false may again be proven from a deeper view of the bad philosophy underlying his generic abstraction.

The "theory or idea" is simply a *negative* abstraction. Schelling himself felt, in his later years, that mere *idea* does not involve *life*. He started out on his imaginative career by assuming that the absolute is the ground of all things. He had not gone far before he found that he must plunge with Spinoza into the mäelstrom of *pantheism*. To defend himself against this charge, he undertook to supplement his earlier writings by discussing the *positive*. This he did by attempting to show that the *idea* and *being*, as the *objective* and *subjective*, in their identity must constitute the *subject-object*. Reflection must convince any profound mind that with all Schelling's wonderful power in the sphere of pure thinking, he yet fails to reach the gospel conception or view of the personality of God. His imaginative abstraction is at last simply the finite grasping after the infinite. To pretend that the human mind, as the created, can comprehend the infinite, is only the idle dream of the philosophical enthusiast. The finite can *know* that the infinite is; but to comprehend belongs only to God himself. Dr. Nevin, following the example of Schelling in the interest of the philosophy of the absolute, finds in Christ the ground of salvation. Thus far his Christological investigations are in harmony with what the Gospel affirms. When he attempts to make his generic abstraction identical with the ground, he goes contrary to Christian philosophy. Idea is *not* being. The Gospel affirms no such pantheistic abstraction.

A. S. V.

ART. V.—*Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations, with Historical Introductions.* By WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, D. D. Vol. IX. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1869.

As we have had repeated occasion to explain the plan and the peculiar features of this truly great work, it is quite needless for us to repeat what we have said on these points. No other living man but Dr. Sprague could have produced such a work; and from its magnitude, and the difficulties in which the publishing business in our country was involved, in consequence of our civil war, we at one time feared that he might be compelled to leave it in an unfinished state. We are sure that the many friends of Dr Sprague, in the various denominations, to the memory of whose eminent ministers he has erected so noble and durable a monument, will most cordially join in the prayer, that he may be spared to publish the one remaining volume, which will fill up the round number, ten, and will complete this noble and unique series of Annals of the American Pulpit.

The subjects of the portion of the work now before us, are taken from the Lutheran, the Reformed Dutch, the Associate, the Associate Reformed, and the Reformed Presbyterian churches. As these denominations are either largely made up of foreign elements, or are limited in numbers and extent of territory, the present volume may not obtain so wide a circulation as those which preceded it. This much, however, may be honestly said of it, that in intrinsic interest, it does not fall behind any other in the series. It, of course, includes the names of men whose reputation and influence extended far beyond the limits of the particular communion to which they belonged; but even among the mass of those who were less widely known, whose memory would have soon perished, but for this work, there are many, the records of whose humble labors will be read with pleasure, by every large-hearted Christian of whatever section of the household of faith. We may have made the remark before, but if so, it will bear

repeating, that one of the pleasant features of these annals is this, that they compel all who peruse them, whatever may be their theoretical notions of church fellowship, to enjoy the communion of saints; for widely as those whose names figure in them differed in polity and forms of worship, in their ideas of church order, and even of doctrine, we discover among them all, saintly men, whose character and labors prove that true religion in its essence and results is everywhere the same.

Our design, however, in this article, is not to criticise the work, of which this volume is a fresh instalment, but to seize the occasion which its publication supplies, of directing the attention of our readers to the history of those smaller branches of the Presbyterian family, which have furnished materials for one half of it. These are the Associate, the Associate Reformed, and the Reformed Presbyterian churches. There are many intelligent persons, familiar with the names of these bodies, who are quite ignorant of their origin, their points of difference, and of the way in which they were planted in our country. All that they know of them is, that they are of Scottish extraction, and represent the most rigid type of Scottish Presbyterianism. Within the limits of a single article, only a sketch of their history is possible; yet, brief as it must be, it may still supply some hints and cautions of practical value to those whose hearts long for, and who are laboring hard to accomplish the organic union of the scattered tribes of Israel.

These bodies are the American representatives of Scottish Presbyterianism in its sturdy adherence to the Calvinistic theology, and Presbyterian polity and discipline on the one hand, and, we are sorry to add, on the other, its tendency to division, or its disposition to overestimate the importance of tenets essential neither to Christian faith nor Christian living. They ever have been, and still are, slow to recognize the distinction between things essential and non-essential within the sphere of religion. Hence to understand properly the position and character of these bodies, it will be necessary to glance at the history of the Presbyterianism which they represent, in its native seat, in Scotland.

That history, we are bold to affirm, is, on the whole, a very noble one. Mr. Froude, in spite of his prejudices as an Englishman, an Oxonian, and an Episcopalian, fully confesses that to the faith and the polity which Scotland received from John Knox and his fellow-reformers, she, under God, owes all the greatness she has won during the last three centuries. It renovated her universities, it created her parish schools, it broke the feudal chains in which the mass of her population had been bound for ages, it fired her peasantry, as well as many of her gentry and nobles, with a zeal for civil and religious freedom, which the floods of persecution could not quench; in a word, all the finest traits of Scottish character, and all the triumphs which Scottish genius has won in poetry, literature, science, philosophy, and commerce, are, directly or indirectly, the products of her Presbyterianism. This much every intelligent and fair-minded man, of whatever party, will admit. And yet this history has some features which we would gladly ignore, if we could. The "perfervidum ingenium" which Buchanan marked as one of the characteristic traits of his countrymen, was carried with them into their religion, and while it produced glorious results in one direction, its influence was disastrous in others. One effect of it, as we have already intimated, was that they could hardly dispute about any topic however remotely connected with religion, without running the risk of breaking up their church fellowship. Sects, for the most part, are the outgrowth of difference of opinion in regard to forms of polity, or worship, or fundamental articles of faith; but it is a remarkable fact, that not one of the numerous divisions which have arisen within the bosom of Scottish Presbyterianism was the offspring of a controversy about doctrine properly so called. All these parties, or churches, hold to the same confession and catechisms; the same mode of government; the same forms of worship; and, so similar was the style of preaching that obtained in them all, that a stranger passing from one congregation to another could not possibly have discerned to what branch each belonged, even when these churches would have no more communed together than would the Jews and the Samaritans of old.

The first division among the Presbyterians of Scotland was that between the Resolutioners and the Protesters, as the two parties were styled, and it occurred in the period which old-fashioned seceders and the more modern Free Churchmen are accustomed to call "the purest times of the church of Scotland," in 1651. It originated in the question, who should be admitted into the army? To understand it, a brief historical explanation will be necessary. On the execution of Charles I., the Scottish people, recognizing his son as their lawful sovereign, took measures to recall him from exile, and to seat him on his ancestral throne as king of Scotland, and Charles II. It was, however, necessary for him to subscribe the Solemn League and Covenant, and to swear that he would maintain the faith, polity, and independence of the church; but the supple conscience of Charles found no difficulty in complying with these conditions. A much more serious ground for trouble was the decided hostility of Cromwell, against whom the coronation of Charles was a virtual declaration of war. Common sense dictated that if Scotland was to make head against this great captain and his terrible Ironsides, she must employ her entire military strength. But here a difficulty arose out of the fact that all those who preferred prelacy, and those who would not sign the Solemn League, were by law excluded from the army, as well as from all civil offices. They were styled Malignants, and no doubt many of them deserved the name they bore. They might be very bad men, but they would make capital soldiers, and it was certain that they would fight zealously for Charles. In this great crisis of the kingdom, the Estates were anxious to secure the military help which these Malignants were quite ready to give, and proposed to set aside the law of exclusion. But, though the matter was a purely secular one, it was deemed advisable to have their act formally sanctioned by the church, and accordingly resolutions to this effect were introduced into the General Assembly, and passed by that body, though against an earnest protest of a large minority.

The strife became more and more bitter as it was carried down from the Assembly into synods and presbyteries, and but for the restraining hand of Cromwell, and those fierce

fires of persecution to which both parties were subjected for twenty-eight long years, the Presbyterians would, most probably, have been then split into two hostile organizations, each one claiming to be the true Reformed Church of Scotland.

But the first division among Scottish Presbyterians which assumed an organic and permanent form, was that which is now known as the Reformed Presbyterian Church. It dates from 1690. It was very small in its beginnings, and has always been, as it still is, in point of membership, one of the very least of the Presbyterian tribes. Strange to say, the number of its ministers and congregations in the United States is larger than that of the entire British Isles. When, in 1688, the Stuart dynasty was overthrown by William of Orange, the effort which had been made for so many years, and with such ruthless violence, to force prelacy upon Scotland, was brought to a sudden end, and her own long down-trodden church resumed her ancient place, as the established church of the kingdom. Yet the way in which this reinstatement of the church was effected, or "the Revolution Settlement," as it is commonly called by Scottish historians, was considered to be radically defective, because there was no formal recognition by the Church herself of the second reformation of 1638, nor of the binding obligation of the national covenants, and because the reason assigned by William for the change was, not the divine authority of Presbyterianism, but the simple fact that "it was most agreeable to the inclinations of the people." On these grounds, a small and extreme section of Presbyterians, consisting of those who, during the latter part of the persecuting period, had been followers of Cameron, Cargill, and Renwick, and were called Cameronians, Covenanters, and society people, refused to accept the Revolution Settlement, and of course remained outside of the pale of the national church. But they consisted only of a few feeble "societies;" they had no ecclesiastical organization, and for sixteen years they were wholly destitute of an ordained ministry. In 1706 they were joined by the Rev. John McMillan, who remained their sole pastor until 1742, when, by the accession of the Rev. Mr. Nairne, the way was open to form a presbytery, under the name of the Reformed

Presbytery. Though they bear the name of Covenanters, their views on the subject of covenanting, and of the binding obligation for all time of the national covenants of Scotland, are not essentially different from those held by other sections of the Scottish church. Their most distinctive principles have reference solely to the nature of civil government, and are such as prevent them from recognizing the lawfulness of the existing government in Britain or America, by an oath of allegiance, or by exercising any of the political functions of the citizen.

The next and much more important division in the Scottish church was that known as the Secession, in 1733. The immediate occasion of this movement was a vote of censure on the Rev. Ebenezer Erskine, of Stirling, by the synod of Fife, in consequence of his having somewhat sharply criticised, in his opening sermon, certain acts of the Assembly with reference to the settlement of ministers. These acts were all designed to strengthen the power of patrons, and to make the call of the people a mere nullity. It was ordered that Mr. Erskine should be rebuked by the moderator of the synod. Against this sentence he protested, and appealed to the next General Assembly, which confirmed the foolish action of the synod, and ordered that Mr. Erskine should be rebuked by the Moderator at its own bar. Against this final decision Mr. Erskine presented a protest, in which he was joined by three of his brethren, viz., Messrs. Wilson, Moncreif, and Fisher, who thus became his companions in suffering, and his co-workers in the progress of the affair.

We have not time to trace the successive steps by which the breach was consummated, nor is it necessary for our purpose to do so. It is, however, only justice to these original seceders to say, that a voluntary separation from the national church was not in all their thoughts. If their protest had been quietly received, the troublesome business would have ended; but in an evil hour the Assembly chose to look upon the protest of the four brethren as a high insult to its dignity, and took steps which in the course of a very few months issued in the suspension of the protesters from the office of the ministry; and in creating a breach which, the subsequent efforts of wiser and better men could not heal. A very dif-

ferent spirit characterized the Assembly of 1734; the high-handed tyranny of the preceding Assembly had aroused the piety of Scotland into unwonted energy, and all the offensive proceedings against the four brethren were annulled. If they had simply ignored the act suspending them, and had gone on with their pastoral duties, waiting to see the result of the intense excitement which their treatment by the Assembly had awakened all over Scotland, the threatened breach would unquestionably have been avoided. But unfortunately for such a result, they did not possess their souls; they formed themselves into a presbytery under the name of the Associate Presbytery, before it was possible for their friends in the church to rally round them, and thus they took up a position with over much haste, from which, perhaps, conscientious conviction, perhaps, also, pride of consistency, would not allow them to withdraw. They thus became truly seceders, for although originally thrust out by a tyrannical decree, that decree had been annulled, and themselves honorably restored to their position in the ministry and in the church. By refusing to return, they made, as we have said, of their own accord, a secession from the Established Church of Scotland. Of course it was necessary to assign reasons for their separation, and these were found in certain evils of administration which were no doubt great and growing, yet evils whose existence, as they themselves confessed, would never have caused them to leave the church, but for the personal injuries to which they had been subjected, and for the removal of which they would have been as free to labor within the Established Church as without her pale.

The secession thus begun was soon strengthened by the accession of several ministers occupying prominent positions, who carried with them large portions of their congregations. Every provision was made for the sustenance of its life as that of an independent church—a church, however, which held with a firm grasp, the ancient standards of the Church of Scotland. In 1745, the presbytery had increased so much in membership, that it was deemed necessary to assume the form of a synod, under the name of the Associate Synod. Every thing betokened a rapid growth of the new body, but

the bright prospect was quickly darkened. At the first meeting of the new synod a question was raised which led to hot debates; and within less than two years, the secession, though still in its infancy, was split into two bitterly hostile bands, each claiming to be the Associate Synod, while the one which had caused the division went so far as to depose and excommunicate their former brethren. The occasion of this fierce debate and sad division was a question in regard to a clause in the Burgess oath then in use in a few of the towns of Scotland, and which was required to be taken by those who wished to acquire the right of burgesses. The clause was in these words: "I profess and allow with my heart the true religion presently professed within this realm, and authorized by the laws thereof—renouncing the Romish religion called Papistry." The question turned on the meaning of the words "the *true religion presently professed.*" One party insisted that they simply meant the true religion as exhibited in those confessions of faith which had been sanctioned by Church and State in former times, in other words, the Protestant religion as opposed to Popery, and that the oath, therefore, might safely be taken by any one. The other party maintained that by "presently professed," must be understood religion as it was professed at that very moment, not in symbolic books, but in the actual doings of General Assemblies, and hence that no seceder could consistently take such an oath, and that the church was bound to require her members to abstain from it. As the toleration for which one party pleaded was scouted by the other as disloyalty to truth, separation was inevitable; and as each side claimed to be the secession, and its highest court, the Associate Synod, it was necessary somehow to distinguish them, and hence their distinctive names came to be those of burghers, and antiburghers. They were nearly equal in numbers when they started upon their separate career, and they continued to be so until their reunion in 1820.

The burgher synod, after a prosperous growth of nearly half a century, was agitated by a discussion in regard to the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion. The controversy arose out of the proposal to append the following note

to the formula of questions proposed to ministers: "As some parts of the standard books of this synod have been interpreted as favoring compulsory measures in religion, the synod hereby declare that they do not require an approbation of any such principles from any candidate for license, or ordination." Nothing could appear more harmless, to most people, or less likely to disturb anybody's conscience, since it left even those who believed in "compulsory measures" to retain their opinion; yet a small minority—a very small one indeed, it is only just to say—were so much troubled by the innovation, that they renounced the authority of the synod, and formed a new presbytery, under the name of Original Burghers. Thus, in 1797, the burgher branch of the secession was divided into two distinct sects, but very unequal in point of numbers, which were popularly known as New, and Old Light Burghers.

In the antiburgher branch of the secession, the power of the civil magistrate, in religious matters, became the subject of a protracted and earnest discussion, in consequence of a revision of its testimony; the issue of which was, in 1806, a small secession, headed by Dr. Thomas McCrie, the biographer of Knox; and which took the name of the Constitutional Associate Presbytery. The two sections, however, were popularly known, as the New, and Old Light Antiburghers.

The next breach in the Church of Scotland, after the secession of Erskine and his associates, was that which resulted in the formation of the Relief Church. This body owed its origin entirely to one of those many outrageous acts of ecclesiastical tyranny, which marked the reign of moderation, so called, in the established church. In 1751, the Rev. Thomas Gillespie, of Carnock, was deposed from the ministry, and thrust out of his parish, simply for declining to take part in one of those violent settlements which were so common in those days. He was the victim of oppression, and as his oppressors haughtily refused every appeal for redress, as they barred the door after they had cast him out of the national church, a return to it was impossible. A few years afterward he was joined by two other ministers, and, in 1761, they constituted themselves into a presbytery, bearing the

name of the Presbytery of Relief. They took this title to intimate that the sole object of their distinct organization was, to obtain relief from the intolerable evils of patronage. They put forth no "testimony" of their own, but were content with the old standards of the church; their views of Christian communion and forbearance were more liberal than those of any other body in Scotland, and they were consequently never disturbed by any of those questions about non-essentials, which split the older secession into so many hostile factions.

In the early part of the present century, it must be confessed that the Presbyterianism of Scotland exhibited quite a motley aspect; being represented by the established church, the Reformed Presbyterian, the Secession in its fourfold branches, and the Relief Church. And, if any one had judged of the genius of the system, simply from its development in Scotland, he might not unnaturally have concluded that there must be some element in it, of necessity, hostile to ecclesiastical unity. Yet this conclusion would be really groundless, for all these sects, numerous as they were, really maintained but one system of faith, polity, and worship; and their dishonoring strifes and divisions can all be traced, partly, perhaps, to some feature of Scottish character, but mainly to the connection of Presbyterianism with the State.

Before leaving this branch of our subject, it may not be improper to say, that at the very period when the spirit of division had reached its acme in Scotland, the breath of a new and better life began to be felt in her churches. Good men, who had been for years wrangling about the powers of the civil magistrate and cognate topics, were now startled by the earnest cries that reached them from the perishing heathen. On the platform erected by the recently founded missionary and Bible societies, brethren long sundered began to meet, to feel a common sympathy for the unevangelized millions, and to discover that the matters on which they were completely agreed, were immeasurably more important than those on which they differed. As they came to know each other better, the desire for reunion was awakened, measures looking to this end were cautiously adopted, and finally, in 1820, the

good work was positively commenced by the union of the two larger branches of the secession, under the name of the United Associate (or Secession) Church. Some twenty-six years afterward, this last named body and the Relief Church were happily united, under the name of the United Presbyterian Church, now one of the most powerful bodies in Scotland; and to-day, the union of the United Presbyterian and the Free Church is regarded by all who are acquainted with the state of things in Scotland, as an event certain to be accomplished in the not distant future. Scotland, in all the branches of her old and renowned church, is as firmly wedded to Presbyterian faith and polity as she ever was, but her sons understand better than did their fathers to distinguish between things essential and non-essential; they have discovered that the vast field of the world of humanity has claims upon their sympathies and efforts, as well as their own little fraction of the earth; and that the success of the missionaries whom they are sending forth to labor among the ignorant masses of their own great cities, or among the heathen of Africa and Asia, does not in the least depend upon their notions about the descending obligation of the national covenants, nor about the power of the civil magistrate. And hence the old tendencies to division are so rapidly giving place to the new tendencies to union.

But it is time now to turn to the consideration of the various offspring of Scottish Presbyterianism in the United States. No attempt was ever made by the Established Church to extend itself in our country, in the colonial times, or even to look after those who were kindred to it in faith and polity; partly, perhaps, from the lack of missionary zeal, and perhaps also because it could exercise no ecclesiastical authority outside of the kingdom of Scotland. Hence all the churches of this class in this country owe their origin to some one of the dissenting bodies.

The first who came were Reformed Presbyterians, or Covenanters, but the exact date of their arrival it is impossible to fix. It must have been, however, prior to 1741, for in that year there was a solemn public recognition of the Solemn League and Covenant, by a small society of people in Eastern

Pennsylvania, aided by the Rev. Alexander Craighead. Mr. Craighead himself was a member of the synod of Philadelphia, but he held and preached even while in that connection, the doctrine of the descending obligation of the Scottish covenants; and in consequence of this opinion, he, for a short time, withdrew from the synod. The first Covenanter missionary and minister, properly so called, who labored on this side of the Atlantic, was the Rev. John Cuthbertson, who was sent out by the Reformed Presbytery of Scotland in 1752, and for twenty years served the few small and scattered societies of Covenanters. Being joined by the Rev. Messrs. Lind and Dobbin in 1774, the way was opened for the formation of an American Reformed Presbytery. Its principles were, of course, identical with those of their brethren in Scotland, and were, no doubt, deemed to be as applicable in all respects to their new field of service as to their old one.

The secession cause was first planted in the New World by those who represented its most rigid type, viz.: the Antiburgher Synod of Scotland. In 1752, the Rev. Messrs. Gellatly and Arnot were sent out by that body to labor in the then colonies, and were charged to constitute themselves into a presbytery subordinate to that synod, immediately upon their arrival, which they did, taking the name of the Associate Presbytery of Pennsylvania. From time to time, it received accessions from Scotland, of ministers, the record of whose holy lives and useful labors will be found in the volume before us. The Burgher Synod was also urged by some local societies here, to send out some of its standard-bearers, and, in 1764, the Rev. Messrs. Clark, Telfair, and Kinlock, came to America, though they attempted to form no independent organization. They must have quickly seen the folly of transferring the local disputes of Scotland to these distant regions, where burgess oaths were totally unknown, and the very name could hardly be understood. They accordingly fell in with their brethren of the other side, though the terms of their agreement were not satisfactory to the Antiburgher Synod, to which the presbytery was nominally subordinate.

The Associate Reformed Church was the result of an attempted, but as we shall see, an incomplete endeavor to

unite the two bodies before named. When the old thirteen colonies had sundered all political relations with the mother country, and had assumed a new and independent form of government, it seemed as if the way had been providentially prepared for the amalgamation of the Associate and the Reformed Presbyteries. For, granting that those politico-religious matters which had kept them apart, were as important as they imagined them to be, every unprejudiced man must have seen that they could be so only in Britain and Ireland. Whereas, in this new country, under its institutions, where Church and State were totally and forever separated, they had passed into the category of purely speculative points, in regard to which, those who meant to serve their own generation must agree to differ. Such, evidently, was the view of the case by such men as Dr. John Mason of New York, and others, who, like him, were active in promoting the union. Negotiations to this end were begun, and continued as far as possible, while the war of the Revolution was in progress; and finally, in 1782, the two bodies were united, under the name of the Associate Reformed Synod of North America, on a basis consisting of ten articles. The basis is certainly a very odd one, and it looks as if the parties in treaty for union, felt that they must have an instrument of this sort, but did not know very well what to put into it so as to give it the requisite dimensions. The first four articles are exceedingly brief, and relate to the design of the death of Christ, the nature of faith, the extent of the gospel offer, and the condition of the covenant of grace,—doctrines, in reference to which, these parties had always been perfectly of one mind. Then follow three articles, longer and more elaborate in statement, on the origin of civil government, the proper rule for the magistrate, and his moral qualifications. The last two, and only pertinent ones, declare that the united body shall adhere to the Westminster confession of faith, the catechism, the directory for worship, and propositions concerning church government; and that it shall have the full exercise of church discipline, without dependence upon foreign judicatories.

Though all the members of the Reformed Presbytery, and all the members of the Associate Presbytery except two,

entered into this union, the event proved that the time had not fully come for such a measure, or that it was sadly mismanaged, perhaps by being pushed forward with over-much zeal and haste. Instead of lessening division, it increased it; the only result being the addition of a new denomination to the two already existing, while all three so closely resembled each other, that those outside of them could hardly understand wherein they differed. On either side of the new body there was left a small germ of Covenantism and Secessionism, and although the Associate Reformed Church was much the largest and most influential of these denominations, yet from these germs there grew up, in process of time, two others which reached quite respectable proportions, each with a synod known as the Reformed Presbyterian, and the Associate. All three advanced in numbers, as the country advanced in population, partly by natural increase, but mainly by emigration from Scotland and Ireland. The design of the founders of the Associate Reformed body evidently was to make it a purely American church, having as its simple basis the old standard of the Church of Scotland, modified on the one article relating to the civil magistrate. But they could not get entirely rid of their old secession theories regarding testimony bearing, and church communion; and the consequence was, that the growth of the new denomination was greatly impeded, and its peace so disturbed, that for a time it was split into three fragments.

The Reformed Presbyterian Synod held on its way for many years, maintaining its ancient testimony respecting the national covenants and civil governments, and against the manifold evils of Church and State, as vigorously as their fathers had done in the glens and on the heather hills of Scotland. But gradually the influence of American ideas and institutions told upon its members. As native-born Americans, they found it very hard to keep aloof from politics, and to denude themselves of their rights as citizens. The question naturally arose, whether the obligations of citizenship were inconsistent with their duties as Christians; and it was answered in two directly opposite ways. The consequence was that the synod was, in 1832, split into two sections, known as

the New School and Old School Synod. They remain apart at the present moment, but the prospect now is that the New School will soon be absorbed into one of the larger branches of the Presbyterian Church. But the old banner of the covenant, and the old faith of the Covenanters, has still not only a goodly company of zealous followers, but a far larger band of them than can be found in Scotland and Ireland combined. The American Reformed Presbyterian Synod has now a larger number of ministers and congregations than the Scottish and Irish synods ever had in their best days. How strange it is, that while in the land of its birth the denomination has almost ceased to exist, the most antique type of Covenantism should still flourish with apparent vigor on American soil and amidst American institutions.

This sketch of the history of Scottish Presbyterianism in the United States would be incomplete, if we did not mention the fact that the Associate, and the Associate Reformed Churches,* whose departed worthies are commemorated in the Annals, have ceased to exist under those names. In 1858 these two bodies were happily combined into one, which bears the name of the United Presbyterian Church. It is hardly necessary to say that they have found that in union is strength. Their power, resources, and influence, while in a disjointed condition, were altogether vastly inferior to what they now are. The united church has over six hundred congregations, and some five hundred pastors; she has her colleges and theological seminaries well equipped and sustained; she has her Boards of Missions, of Education, and of Publication; and she has her missionaries laboring in China, in India, in Syria, in Italy, and in Egypt, not a few of whom have proved themselves to be among the most efficient and successful heralds of the Cross now at work in the foreign field.

These two bodies are now the sole representatives of Scottish Presbyterianism in the United States. In saying this, however, we do not mean that they represent the existing

* In South Carolina and Georgia there is still an Associate Reformed Synod existing, having some fifty or sixty members. The only point of difference between it and the Presbyterian Church is that of psalmody.

Presbyterianism of Scotland, as it is found in the established, the free, or the United Presbyterian Church. True, they have not yet got rid of that old bone of contention, the power of the civil magistrate in religious matters, and the proper relation of the Church to the State; but they have begun to see that it is a proper subject for mutual forbearance, they are drawing near to each other, and there is a degree of intercourse between themselves and all other classes of evangelical Christians which would have been deemed, in former times, decisive proof of laxity of principle and declining piety. It is the Scottish Presbyterianism of the covenanting and secession type of the last century, though in some respects modfied and softened, which still has its representatives among us.

How long they shall maintain their separate existence it is impossible to predict. Those who hold that a variety of denominations is an essential condition of the continued purity and aggressive power of Protestantism, would probably affirm that, on the whole, it is better for things to remain as they are; that the great Presbyterian family will do more for the cause of Christ and humanity through its several divisions, than it could if they were all gathered into one organic whole. For ourselves, we reject this theory in all its parts. He who can bring good out of evil, has made, and will make, sectarian strife and rivalry work out his own gracious purposes, but this does not change its real nature, nor warrant us to call evil good. In all the sections of Presbyterianism we are confident that there are thousands who are longing and praying for the coming of the day when they shall all be one, not only in faith, but in organization. So far as regards the United Presbyterians, there is only one serious obstacle in the way of this consummation so devoutly wished, viz., their doctrine concerning psalmody—that the Old Testament Psalter alone should be used in divine worship. The Reformed Presbyterians, on this point, hold precisely the same position, but their special hinderance lies in their views of the moral character of our government, and the obligations of those who accept and exercise the rights of citizenship.

We have no expectation that these brethren will abandon

their theories of psalmody, and of civil government. We do not deem it necessary that they should do so, in order to their becoming organically one with those who are so closely allied to them in faith and polity. All that is requisite, as it seems to us, is that they should come to a better understanding of the meaning and bearing of the rule which St. Paul laid down for the contending Roman Christians. Suppose that a man sings a hymn, or accepts and uses the rights of citizenship, if he gives unmistakable evidence that "God has accepted him," who has a right to judge him? He who believes that he should only sing the Psalms of David, to the Lord he sings them; he who feels free to sing uninspired hymns, to the Lord he sings them; he who accepts the position of a citizen, to the Lord he accepts it; he who declines that position, to the Lord he declines it. "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." When this Divine rule of mutual forbearance is properly comprehended, and universally received, the day will be close at hand when the long standing divisions of Presbyterianism will cease.

ART. VI.—*The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary, and Municipal.* A Treatise. By THOMAS HARE, Esq., Barrister-at-law. Third Edition, with a Preface, Appendix, and other additions. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green. 1865.

Cumulative Voting.—Speech of CHARLES R. BUCKALEW of Pennsylvania, in the United States Senate, July 11, 1867.

Report of the Personal Representation Society to the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York.

WITHIN the last ten or twelve years, the subject of minority representation has been awakening considerable attention, both in Europe and this country. As early as 1854, Lord John Russell introduced in a bill, in the British Parliament, a provision, that in cities and boroughs returning three members, no elector should vote for more than two, which would have the effect of permitting a minority of two-fifths of the

constituency to return one member. The design was to obviate the dissatisfaction of large numbers of electors forming the minorities in popular constituencies. Take, for example, a constituency of twenty thousand, of which we will suppose that twelve thousand are the major, and eight thousand, the minor portion. The plan proposed was to give the majority two representatives, and the minority one. Arithmetically, the minority eight thousand are only placed on an equality with six thousand, or half the majority, and might still complain of the disproportion. The plan met with no favor.

In 1857, soon after the general election in Great Britain, Thomas Hare, Esq., published a pamphlet recommending the importance of the principle of personal representation. In the same year, Mr. Thomas Garth Marshall suggested the cumulative vote, which Lord Grey admitted would be a great improvement under any circumstances. To apply this system generally, he proposed, by enlarging some borough boundaries and merging other boroughs into their counties, to create electoral districts, with a maximum and minimum of voters, returning three or four members. For example, the voters in a constituency of three thousand, electing three members, may give their three votes to one candidate, which would enable a combination of 751 voters to return a member, and prevent the injustice of allowing 1,501 to suppress the voices of 1,499. This arrangement, however, provides only for the representation of one of, perhaps, many minorities.

On the Continent, the subject attracted attention, and methods were proposed for securing the representation of minorities; the first, in a tract published at Geneva in 1862, by A. Morin; the other, by Drs. Burnity and Varrentrapp, at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, in 1863. The earliest notice of this system in America appeared in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, in 1860.

The writings of Thomas Hare, Esq., have done more than those of any other man in showing the necessity, and suggesting the method, of a change in elections whereby constituencies might be more fairly represented in the bodies chosen for this purpose; and the particular plan he recommends has secured the signal advantage of coming before the public with

the sanction of that eminent man, Stuart Mill. As already mentioned, his first publication was a pamphlet in 1857, shortly after the general election of that year. The interest the scheme awakened led eventually to the publication of an extended treatise of some 350 pages, the third edition of which was published in 1865. It will be the aim of this article to unfold Mr. Hare's scheme as presented in this volume, and some of the modifications which have been proposed in this country.

It is the object of this treatise to show that the attainment of a perfect system of personal representation is not opposed by any difficulties inherent in the subject; and that such a system is not only consistent with the due and just representation of every class and interest, as well as of the public which comprises all, but that it affords the most permanent and certain mode of representing and expressing the special views and opinions of all interests and classes; and that it also goes very far to remove, even if it does not entirely obviate, all the sinister influences which have been hitherto found to prevail in the collection of the suffrages of the electors. The electoral arrangements proposed, Mr. Hare undertakes to show, require no operation that can not readily be executed by instruments which the administrator will always have at his command; and they prescribe no duty which any person of ordinary capacity is not competent to perform. With a view to avoid any expressions which might be vague and indeterminate, to render the proposal definite and precise, and enable its practicability to be readily and distinctly considered, he has wrought the whole scheme into the form of a supposed electoral law, the clauses of which are considered in the several chapters.

Mr. Hare estimates that about half a million of voters in Great Britain, according to the present system, are incapable of securing a representation by any act of their own. In the general election of 1852, he says, the aggregate number of votes polled by the majorities where the seats were contested was 291,118, while the minorities polled 199,994. These numbers may, with sufficient accuracy, be treated as represented by three and two; and if the same calculation be extended to

the whole of the constituencies, and taken as expressing the silent and suppressed differences of opinion where no contest was attempted, it would appear that 500,000 electors are not represented, except, by a sort of fiction of law, their opinions are supposed to be expressed by other means. The public loss is surely not trifling. To what a multitude of subjects of public and private interest have the thoughts and studies of large numbers among that half million of voters been directed! Looking at the place which representative institutions are apparently destined to fill in the government of mankind, it becomes of the highest importance to consider whether means can not be found to eradicate the vice in their constitution which deprives the State of the benefit of the judgment—it is to be feared of a large number—of the most calm and dispassionate, as well as of the most instructed and thoughtful of its people. The problem is, how to render representation in fact what it is in name—to make it universally truthful, and to give to the best elements in every constituency their best and most perfect expression. If the present method of obtaining the concentration of the national reason be compared to operations connected with the material world, the analogy at once displays its unscientific character. Two-fifths of the intelligence of the country is lost in the process. It is a waste of material which would have been a reproach to any operation in physical science in its rudest day, even if the material so lost were only of the average value of that of which the constituencies are composed. But it is far more lamentable; it is considered that the material thus lost comprises a very large proportion of the best moral and intellectual elements of society, while the process of local condensation to which the numerical majorities owe their success has done much to extinguish independent thought, convert men into machines, and thereby deteriorate the result of the votes by which the supposed representative assembly has been actually chosen.

What Mr. Hare proposes to accomplish is simply this: to give every voter his equal share in an elected representative, instead of giving to every voter his chance of being one of the majority which elects a representative, along with his risk of

being one of the minority, which does not elect a representative, and is practically disfranchised. And his scheme is this:—He proposes that a registrar of voters be appointed for each of the three kingdoms, who may not only superintend the business of local registration, but be charged with the duty of collecting and computing the number and quotient of voters, and—where votes from more than one constituency are contributed toward the election of the same candidate—the arrangement of the votes according to the names of the candidates indicated in the voting papers. At the conclusion of the poll in the several constituencies, a telegraphic dispatch from every returning-officer might communicate to the general registrar of the kingdom the number of votes that had been polled; and these numbers being added together, and the aggregate number divided by the number of representatives to be chosen, the product or quotient will be the maximum of the constituency sufficient to secure the election of a member. The registrars at an election for members of Parliament having ascertained the number of votes polled in every constituency, shall divide such total number by 654 (the number of members to be chosen), rejecting any fraction of the dividend which may appear after each division, and the number of said quotient shall be the quota, or number of votes, entitling the candidates, respectively, for whom such quota shall be given, to be returned as members to serve in Parliament. Every candidate for whom the full quota of votes shall be polled, shall be returned as a member to serve in Parliament. The proposed law provides for the entry and publication of the names of all candidates, and for regulating the form of the vote, and the order of appropriating the excess beyond those required for any candidate. The provisions of the law are exceedingly minute, and seem fitted to meet every imaginable contingency, extending through thirty-three sections.

In the preface to the third edition of this treatise, the author notices the objections to the method proposed by him, derived from the criticism of seven years, and says they may be summed up in these three: 1. That it is too complicated to be practical; 2. That it is hostile to our local system; 3. And that it would admit of abuse from party organiza-

tion. As to the alleged complexity, the system, he maintains, while it gives to every elector the most ample choice of candidates, makes a vote effectual in the election of one only. It is therefore necessary to provide for the probability that men of great popularity and eminence will have a large number of votes, many of which would be thrown away, if means were not given to the electors of transferring them to another candidate, in case the first they have named be elected without their aid. Accordingly, the form of the voting paper, without making it compulsory on the voter to name more than one candidate, yet permits him to insert a second name under the first, a third under the second, and so on, at his discretion. So far as there is any thing to be done by the voter, this is the whole extent of the complexity.

A vote is to be given to the candidate placed second on the paper, if the first has enough votes without it; but how many are enough?—and how is that to be known? The simple course is to ascertain how many persons vote, and to try how many votes each member to be elected would have if the votes were equally divided. On the morning following election day, the entire number of votes would be known. If 654,000 people had voted, and there were 654 members, 1,000 would be enough (or be the quotient, or quota) for each member; and if any candidate had more than 1,000, the excess beyond that number would be transferred to the successive candidates on the voting-papers. Even this achievement in arithmetic is not required from any elector. It is an operation to be performed by the registrars, to whom the numbers are reported. To determine which of the voting papers shall be taken to make up a member's quota, and which shall go to the next candidates, a series of simple rules are provided, in which the appropriation is made to depend on locality, and on the number of alternatives the voting-paper displays. These rules are to be applied by the registrars; it is only necessary that the voter should be satisfied that they are impartial and just. He has only to look to his own voting-paper, which will be deposited in his own town, that he may at any time refer to it, and see by the

indorsement to which of his favorite candidates it has been appropriated.

Secondly, as to the effect of the method on local elections. The apprehension of a disregard of localities is probably owing to the fact that the first step in the method is to add together all the votes given, in order to compute the quota. Hence it is imagined that the whole country is in some manner made one electorate, whereas, in truth, the computation is nothing more than a momentary operation to arrive at a common measure of the constituencies without any purpose of blending them together. It is true that any elector, however humble in rank, or feeble in influence, may pass by the candidates for his own constituency, and propose, instead of them, any other candidate he might prefer, in some other constituency; yet, without any interference with the voters of such constituency, or the legal subdivisions of the electoral field.

The third objection would have weight against the proposed method, if, indeed, it created one electorate, if every member were chosen for the whole kingdom, and by no county or town in particular,—each party might safely produce a printed ticket for its own followers, and be certain that, to the extent to which they adhered to that ticket, the candidates named upon it, one after the other, would make up their quotas or majorities, until the whole strength of the party is exhausted, and it can elect no more. The proposed method, however, is not that of a single electorate. The representatives would be chosen by seven or eight hundred distinct constituencies, acting separately and apart. The voting-paper in every constituency would be different, and no uniform ticket could be safely used. Every candidate will require his name to be placed first, or first after some one certain of being elected, or it will probably be of no use to him. Parties may, indeed, adopt the use of printed voting-papers, leaving blanks at the head, or near it, for the local candidates, and inserting below the names of other principal candidates of their side. The extent of the use of these papers, or "tickets," would measure the popular sympathy with the party whose opinions it expressed, and would give them the moral weight of such

adherence. It is a desirable mode of gathering a knowledge of popular opinion and sentiment.

Such is Hare's scheme, as presented by himself. His treatise enters into a very able discussion of the fundamental principles pertaining to the subject. But this, to those who have not the patience or time to read what he has written, may tend to make the change he proposes appear more formidable, and its method more complex than they really are. As stated and explained by John Stuart Mill, the plan proposed is as follows: According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be entitled to have a member for themselves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the house; and every candidate that obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes would, as at present, be given locally, but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate in whatever part of the country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to be represented by any of the local candidates, might aid, by their vote, in the return of the person they liked best among all those throughout the country, who had expressed a willingness to be chosen. This would so far give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise disfranchised minority. But it is important that not those alone, who refuse to vote for any of the local candidates, but those also who vote for any of them and are defeated, should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they had not succeeded in finding in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting-paper, containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost in his preference. His vote would only be counted for one candidate; but if the object of his first choice failed to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, the second, perhaps, might be more fortunate. He may extend the list to a greater number in the order of his preference, so that, if the names which stand near the top of the list either can not make up the quota, or are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it may assist in returning. To obtain the

full number of members required to complete the House, as well as to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the suffrages, it is necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return; the remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes counted for the next person on their respective lists, who needed them, and could, by their aid, complete the quota. To determine which of the candidate's votes should be counted for his return, and which set free for others, several methods are proposed, into which we shall not here enter. He would, of course, retain the votes of all those who would not otherwise be represented; and for the remainder, drawing lots in default of better, would be an unobjectionable expedient. [Mr. Hare says nothing of drawing lots, but in the electoral law of which he gives a draft, minute rules are prescribed, directing the order of appropriation of the voting-papers, and for regulating the order of appropriating the excess of votes, beyond those required for any candidate.] The voting-papers would be conveyed to a central office, where the votes would be counted, the number of first, second, third, and other votes given for each candidate ascertained, the number of the quota would be allotted to every one who could make it up, until the number of the House was complete; first votes being preferred to second, second to third, &c. The voting-papers, all the elements of the calculation, would be placed in public repositories, accessible to all whom they concerned.

In his "Considerations on Representative Government," Mr. Mill gives the plan this high commendation: "The more this scheme is studied, the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impression of its perfect feasibility, and its transcendent advantages. Such and so numerous are these, that, in my conviction, they place Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government." He argues that it would secure representation in proportion to members of every division of the electoral body, every minority in the whole nation, sufficiently numerous to be entitled to a representative; and that every member would be the representative of a unanimous constituency. Every

member would represent a thousand, two thousand, five thousand, or ten thousand electors, as the case might be. He would represent persons, and not mere land or bricks and mortar. Mr. Mill further contends that of all the modes of national representation, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives.

In a speech, delivered in May, 1867, in Parliament, on submitting a substitute for a clause of the Reform bill, he took occasion to advocate Mr. Hare's scheme, and after giving an account of it, similar to the above, he says of Mr. Hare, that he is "a man distinguished by that union of large and enlightened general principles with an organizing intellect, and a rare fertility of practical contrivance, which together constitute a genius for legislation." Mr. Mill, as he states in his "Representative Government," regards something like the Hare plan specially adapted to, and that he looks with anxious hope to its reception by, the American people. "If it had been suggested," he says, "to the enlightened and disinterested founders of the American Republic, democracy would have been spared one of its most formidable evils. It is to the American Republic that the eyes of the Old World will turn for a spectacle of what self-government can accomplish. Its unexampled progress is the marvel of these modern ages. Surpassing all other people in the arts of peace, as they minister to the universal comfort and well-being—attaining a not less distinguished though unhappy eminence in the art of war—a nobler work remains for them—that, rising like a strong man in his strength, they shake off the parasites that prey on the credulity and folly, and pander to the vices of the public, and become the leaders of mankind in the far greater art of government."

The subject has also awakened much attention among thoughtful Frenchmen. In the *Débats*, M. Prévost Paradol, in an able comment on the English Reform Bill, remarks: "The strangest thing of all is to find Mr. Stuart Mill urging a proposal calculated to prevent the absolute dominion of the multitude. But though a radical, Mr. Mill is a philosopher and lover of fair play, and has only expressed the preoccupation of many people in England, especially those who think it

the interest of society not to dispossess of its political influence the enlightened and independent portion of the country." M. Paradol attaches great importance to cumulative voting. He says: "If we, Frenchmen, look at our own position, if we cast up the votes given throughout France, to the liberal or democratic opposition, can we possibly admit that that opinion is fairly represented by the fifteen or twenty members it numbers in the chamber? We have, therefore, a direct interest in closely following the debate on cumulative voting in England; it relates, in short, to the political status of minorities, under the *régime* of universal suffrage. This is a question which affects all the world alike, for no one can hope to find that kind of suffrage always docile; and when the wind blows, that stagnant pool becomes a stormy sea."

During the past year, public attention in this country has been repeatedly called to this subject. A late number of the *Galaxy*, a monthly magazine, contained a forcible article relating to it, by Mr. David G. Croly. He enumerates some of the faults of our present electoral system, as stated by eminent publicists; such, for example, as the separation of the whole voting population into two great parties, and giving undue power to small majorities; it leads in practice to the non-recognition of minorities, and their non-representation in our legislative bodies; it condemns to private life the wisest, best, and most original minds in the country. He illustrates the working of the present system by taking, as a casual example, the election of 1866, in the State of New York. The total vote was 718,841, of which 366,315 were Republican, and 352,526 Democrat. Were each party represented in the Legislature in proportion to its vote, the Senate would have seventeen Republicans and fifteen Democrats, and the Assembly sixty Democrats and sixty-two Republicans; yet, in the former body, there were only six, and in the latter, but forty-six Democrats. Notwithstanding this great disproportion, 35,000 Republicans in the city of New York have only one representative at Albany, when their number entitles them to five. They have no representatives in Congress, when, under a just system of representation, they should have two out of the six. Mr. Croly gives in a table the last vote taken in the

several States, and shows what the actual representation was, and what it should have been if proportioned according to the strength of the minorities. Thus, for example, in Maine, the Republican vote was 69,369, and the Democratic 42,111, represented in the Legislature by one hundred and sixty-nine Republicans and thirteen Democrats, and in Congress by five Republicans and no Democrats. In a proportionate representation, there would have been, in the Legislature, one hundred and twelve Republicans and seventy Democrats, and in Congress, three Republicans and two Democrats. In Pennsylvania, the Republicans cast 307,274 votes, and the Democrats, 290,096, and were represented in the Legislature by eighty-three of the one party and fifty of the other, and in Congress by eighteen of the one and six of the other. A proportionate representation would have made these numbers, in the Legislature, sixty-nine and sixty-four, and in Congress, thirteen and eleven. This writer regards the machinery of the Hare plan as not applicable in every respect to this country. Our members of Congress, for example, could not very well be elected from the country at large; but there is no good reason why they should not be chosen by each State at large. He enumerates the advantages which would arise from the adoption of some scheme securing the representation of minorities, such, for example, as the removal of the evils of the convention and caucus system; the elevation of the best and most trusted men to legislative office; the depriving of minority votes, such as "the Irish vote," "the liquor-dealers' association," and the like, of the undue influence they now exert, because of their assumed power to turn doubtful districts, and win party victories; and would save us from much questionable legislation, and secure to the majority the true ruling power; and it would bring home to every elector the feeling of actual and personal responsibility.

The subject of cumulative voting was introduced in the Senate of the United States by Hon. Charles R. Buckalew, of Pennsylvania, in a speech delivered July 11, 1867. He says that, by the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the power of regulating the manner of electing members of Congress; and in virtue of that power, has already abolished

the system of electing them by what was called general ticket. It came to be discovered that this plan of choosing Representatives in Congress, was a complete mode of stifling the voice of the minority in a State. Each voter voted for as many candidates as there were Representatives in Congress to be chosen from his State, giving to each candidate one vote. A bare political majority might send the entire delegation to the lower House of Congress. Congress interposed, and passed a law providing that Representatives in Congress shall be selected from each State, where more than one is to be chosen, by districts. Now, it was in order more effectually to provide for the representation of minorities that Mr. Buckalew proposed his amendment to an act, under consideration in the Senate, in these words: "Each elector shall be entitled to give as many votes as there are Representatives assigned to his State by apportionment of law, and he may give one vote to each of the requisite number of persons to be chosen, or he may cumulate his votes and bestow them at his discretion upon one or more candidates, less in number than the whole number of Representatives to be chosen from such State. What is meant by a system of cumulative voting," he says, "is this, that an elector in any State, whether he belong to the majority or the minority, can give his vote for some candidate or candidates, who will be elected, and who will actually represent him in the Congress of the United States. That is all there is in it. It is a device by which there shall be actual, instead of sham representation in Congress; by which men who come here into the people's hall shall represent the men who vote for them, and nobody else, and by which it shall not happen, that nearly half the people of the United States shall have no efficient or fair representation when the laws are made." What is proposed, he says, is, that in a State entitled to nine members, for example, in the House, an elector may go to the polls and vote for nine members, if he choose, giving each candidate one vote, or he may bestow his nine votes upon four candidates, if he choose, or upon one, or upon any other number less than the whole. Nothing further is necessary than that the votes so taken shall be reported, counted by the

Secretary of Commonwealth in a State, and the returns signed by the Governor, in the usual way, and sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The scheme requires no machinery; no involved legislation; no difficulty in putting it into execution. In illustrating how this scheme would work, he takes the case of Vermont, a State with 60,000 voters, forty thousand of which are members of one party, and twenty thousand of the other. By act of Congress, that State is entitled to three members. The numbers stated are very nearly the exact numbers of voters in that State. Every one at a glance can see what ought to take place. The majority, having 40,000 votes, should choose two members of Congress from that State, and the minority, having 20,000, should elect one member. The system of cumulative voting renders just that result certain—renders it morally impossible that any other should take place; and why? Because the minority cumulating their votes upon a single candidate can give him 60,000; each elector giving his candidate three votes. The 40,000, constituting the political majority in the State, if they attempt to vote for three candidates, can only give them forty thousand. If they cumulate their votes upon two candidates, which is what they are entitled to, they can give them 60,000 votes each; so that two men will be elected to Congress representing the majority, and one man, representing the minority; and it is impossible for either one of those interests to prevent the other from obtaining its due share of representation. He further illustrates the working of this scheme by taking the case of Pennsylvania, in the last Congressional election, entitled to twenty-four members. The majority party polled 303,790 votes, and the minority 292,351, the difference being 11,439. Judging by the actual number of votes polled by each party, at that election, there should have been an equal division of Representatives in the House, standing twelve to twelve; or if a Representative should be assigned to the majority, on account of the excess of its vote, the numbers should stand thirteen to eleven. But, in point of fact, the result is that the delegation stands eighteen to six. Under this system of cumulative voting, what would have taken place? As each political interest in the State knows

that its vote is about the same as that of the opposing one, and that, if it attempt to obtain more than its fair share of representation, it may actually lose, instead of gain, it will be forced to concentrate its votes upon twelve candidates, or upon thirteen at the most, and it is impossible that by any ingenuity or device whatever, it can increase its representation in Congress above what its actual numbers entitle it to.

Mr. Buckalew states briefly the arguments by which he thinks cumulative voting may be sustained. In the first place, this plan is one of justice. In the next place, a system like this would bring into public life, and keep in public life, many able men who are now excluded. Again, one great advantage of this system is, that it abolishes *gerrymandering* in the States, cuts it up by the roots. In the last place, this system will be a most valuable check upon fraud at elections. The main source from which electoral corruption issues is the strong temptation set before candidates, in districts any thing like close, to corrupt a few votes, and thus turn the scale. When one candidate resorts to this mode of promoting his interests, the opposing candidate feels justified in retaliating in the same way. There is the putting of corruption against corruption in the closely-contested districts. As the country becomes denser in population, as wealth accumulates, as the various interests of society become more diverse, its affairs more complicated and dependent upon legislation, this evil of electoral corruption must increase and swell in volume.

This subject has been brought before the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, by a report of the Personal Representation Society, of the city of New York. It shows that in the elections of 1866, the change of about 200,000 votes would have given the minority a victory at the polls, and that such a distribution of the votes, as would have resulted in small local majorities in the various districts, might have given the same surplus of votes in the representative body to the present minority, as is now held by the dominant party. And it argues that, when out of 3,706,000 of the country the dominant party hold its large surplus representation only by the tenure of an excess of but 200,000, *i. e.* about five per

cent of the whole vote, it should from motives of self-protection as well as of justice, while in power, make a provision for the fullest possible representation of its members, so that if, by the chances of party-strife, it should happen to become the minority, it can still make its legitimate influence felt. The plan which the report proposes to the Convention is thus described :—

"The State of New York has about 800,000 voters. If it be desirable to have no more than the number of members which compose the present Assembly, by dividing the number of votes by 128, the number of seats, you have a quotient of a trifle over 6,000 votes necessary to elect a representative, as the minimum number of proxies or powers of attorney. We do not mean that the candidate shall actually procure a certain number of powers-of-attorney made out in due form, but to express our meaning of the legal and logical significance of a vote, each vote being regarded as a power-of-attorney. Every person receiving at any election for members of Assembly, a larger number of votes than the minimum quota fixed by law, should be deemed elected, and each member should cast, in the legislative body, upon every measure or act coming to a vote, the number of ballots cast for him, and which he represents, be they six thousand or twenty thousand. To obviate the objection, if it be thought to have any force, that the plan proposed might result in giving us too few members of the Assembly, by the concentration of a great number of votes on a few popular men, the State might be divided into Assembly districts sufficiently large to give the fullest expression to the then prevalent popular opinions, and restrict the choice of voters to candidates residing in such districts. The people, then, in point of fact, would, upon every measure, vote through their agents, the Representatives, as though they were owners of shares of stock in a railroad, or mining corporation, with like effect."

Such are the plans proposed by Mr. Buckalew in the Senate of the United States, for the election of Representatives in Congress, and by the Personal Representative Society to the Constitutional Convention of New York, for the election of members of the State Legislature.

Whatever may be thought of any of the plans proposed,

the great importance of the subject, when we take into account the place which representative institutions hold, and are destined to hold, in the governments of the world, can not be called in question. And there can be little doubt that our existing States offer facilities for introducing some such plan, with less inconvenience than the older and differently constituted governments of Europe. Here, if any where, some practical method will be ascertained and tested. The justice of the thing will commend it to the people when once the end which is sought to be attained is understood, and the great interests of society will enforce it more and more on public attention.

There are certain limits to which the reform, if practicable at all, must, from the necessity of the case, be confined. It is clear that minority voting can be rendered effective only in the election of members of representative or legislative bodies; and that it can have no application to a great variety of officers elected in this country by the people. In all cases, of course, in which the power is unitary, and the office can have but one incumbent, as in the chief magistracy of the United States, of the individual States, and of incorporated cities, the votes of the minority are as destitute of effect, in carrying out the object for which they were cast, as if they had all been blank. "The problem of filling one office by one incumbent, by the votes of a constituency, admits of but two solutions. Either a majority or a plurality must elect. If a majority, all the minority votes are of course wasted; if a plurality elects, and the candidates are more than two, it frequently happens that a majority of the votes are wasted by division. The same impossibility, and for precisely the same reasons, bars the proportional representation of minorities in the federal Senate. Only one of the two Senators to which each State is entitled can be elected at the same time. Even if we suppose the Legislature which chooses the Senator to have been elected on the proposed system of minority representation, it will make no difference. When that Legislature comes to vote, its majority, representing the majority of the people, necessarily controls. The majority principle must have a controlling influence in the operation of free institutions. No scheme of

representation would be fair which did not give the control to the majority. It is not effective voting strength, but only that their true proportionate strength may appear, and thus their moral weight be increased, which is sought to be obtained by a more equitable representation of minorities. In the national government the reform admits of being applied only to the election of the lower House of Congress; and even in this case, in those new or small States, whose population entitles them to but one or two Representatives, it could not be applied. But the most suitable theatre for the initiation of this reform, or for the trial of the experiment, would be in electing the Legislature of a State. Of one thing we are sure that the country is in no danger of its premature adoption, as minorities, who alone can expect advantage from it, have no power to introduce it.

The question may arise whether this method of voting admits of any application in church courts, for example, like those of the Presbyterian Church. Of course, there is, or ought to be, no such call for reform in the manner of voting, to guard important interests in the Church, as in the State. Questions touching doctrine and policy are not submitted to large masses of voters of every degree of intelligence. The Church has but few places of honor and emolument to confer; and for men to electioneer for these few places would be taken as the best evidence of their unfitness for them. It would be a dark day indeed for the Church, if it were thought necessary to resort to caucusses and conventions to carry favorite measures or elect favorite candidates. As long as our Presbyteries are composed of educated and truly good men whatever may be the mode of voting, no essential injustice will be done, or be long beyond the reach of remedy.

Still, the principle of minority representation might, in the election of commissioners to the General Assembly, be introduced into all those presbyteries entitled to four or more representatives; and it is easy to conceive of circumstances in which its adoption might answer a valuable purpose. It might be highly important not only to a minority in a presbytery, but to the cause of truth and justice, that the views of such minority, in a given case, should be represented by a

commissioner to the General Assembly. But this, according to the present mode of election, would be impossible, unless the majority, influenced by an enlightened sense of the importance of such representation, should yield.

Let us, then, see how this system would work in a presbytery, if applied to the election of commissioners to the Assembly. We suppose that it is of sufficient size to entitle it to at least four representatives; and that forty are present at the election. Dividing the number of votes cast by the number of representatives to be chosen, we have, presuming that all voted, the quotient ten as the number or quota of votes each candidate must receive to secure his election. If, then, a minority of 15, 10, or 12 in such a presbytery wish to have their views represented in the Assembly, they have it in their power to elect one of the commissioners; while a united majority have it in their power to elect the other three. The minority may, at the same time, cast their votes for three of the candidates voted for by the majority, who, in such case, would be chosen unanimously. But this system, it will be seen, provides no remedy for a minority less in number than the quotient derived by dividing the number participating in the election by the number of commissioners. A minority of nine in the case above described could have no representative. And the system would admit of no application to small presbyteries entitled to send one minister and one elder, just as it admits of no application to States that are represented by one or two members in Congress; for the number of voters divided by two gives no minority to be provided for, but divides them into two precisely equal parts.

While on this subject, we cannot forbear referring to what many deem an anomaly in the plan of settling certain important questions by vote, in the law, as it stands, in the Presbyterian Church. The law referred to is the one providing that before any overtures or regulations, proposed by the Assembly, can become a part of the constitution of the church, they must transmitted to all the presbyteries, and receive the approval of at least a majority of them.—*Form of Government*, ch. xii. 6.

This provision is clearly intended to prevent a minority

from introducing change in the constitutional rules of the church. It recognizes the right and authority of the majority to decide and determine, in every such matter. But as presbyteries are constituted and are likely to be constituted in this country (large portions of which are new and missionary ground) for some time to come, this provision, instead of securing to the majority the right of deciding in such matters, puts it in the power of a minority to effect constitutional changes, if proposed and sent down by a General Assembly. Any one, taking up the table presenting a summary view of presbyteries, appended to the minutes of the General Assembly, can satisfy himself of the truth of this, in a few moments. If, for example, we count the presbyteries reporting 17 ministers, and under, together with their churches, we find 78 presbyteries, having an aggregate of 805 ministers, and 1,159 churches. The remaining presbyteries number 55, having 1,494 ministers, and 1,461 churches. It is easy to see, therefore, how a question which has been decided by a majority of the presbyteries may yet have been decided against the will of the majority of those voting; in other words, how it may be decided by the minority. The 55 presbyteries named above, have 2,955 entitled to a vote, while the 78 have almost a thousand less. If these 78 should vote against, or in favor of, some proposed change, and the remainder the other way, there would be a majority of 23 presbyteries; while there would be the excess, as already named, of nearly a thousand voters, in favor of a contrary decision. These figures are derived from the table appended to the minutes for 1867; but a similar result will be reached if the calculation be made from the table given for the last or the present year.

In view of the necessary changes, which, it is presumed, will be incident to the reunion expected soon to be consummated, it is respectfully submitted, whether any modification is desirable and practicable to insure the right of control with the majority of the church, along with due weight secured to the minority. And it has been suggested, whether some provision of this kind would not effect the object; to wit:—

When the vote is taken, let due record be made of the number voting in the affirmative, and of the number voting in the

negative, in each presbytery, and a certified copy of the same be sent to the Assembly, and a majority of the aggregate vote be required to give effect to any change in the constitution. It seems to many, whatever may be said or thought as to any call for guarding the rights of minorities, in ecclesiastical proceedings, that the rights of the majority, in this particular, at least, need additional protection.

ART. VII.—*Moral Philosophy, or the Science of Obligation.* By JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, President of Oberlin College. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1869.

FROM the author's preface, it appears that he has given us the substance of the system of ethics, and of the psychology and metaphysics of theology, which have grown up in Oberlin College under his predecessor, President Finney, Professor Morgan, and other teachers, during the last thirty years. Although he claims that it has its germ in the theories of Edwards, and his pupil, Samuel Hopkins, he claims originality in developing and elaborating it to its present fulness and completeness. He tells us that, "no reference is made, in the following pages, to the recent able work of President Hopkins, for the simple reason that the manuscript was prepared before that work was published. The appearance of that work might seem to render this unnecessary; but, while the leading principle in the two treatises is the same, the methods of development are, of course, entirely different. And it cannot be amiss to view the same general doctrine from different stand-points." The close resemblance in some of the presentations of both books, in which they differ from all others, is very striking. We believe it will serve an important purpose, if we set before our readers the leading features and logical consequences of this scheme, as they are traced by a clear, bold, straightforward thinker, who does not flinch from following it wherever it honestly carries him, even if "down Niagara."

He defines moral philosophy to be "the science of obligation or duty," but adds that, "obligation, the theme of ethical philosophy, admits of no definition, except by a synonym. The idea conveyed by the term is a simple one, incapable of analysis. Its import is manifest to every rational being, given immediately in his own thought. It cannot be imparted from one to another, and every attempt at definition or elucidation proves abortive" (p. 13). He then shows the futility of Paley's and Dr. N. W. Taylor's attempts to define it. "All such definitions tend to bewilder." All this is true and well stated. As far as it goes, it is a basis for a true system of ethics. It disposes of all his objections to the view which, with an abortive attempt at smartness, he designates the "Rightarian Theory," and declares is "maintained, with special forms of statement, by the great majority of writers on morals, and is perhaps the prevalent doctrine of the Christian world" (p. 130); viz., that "the rightness of the action is the reason for its obligatoriness, and the chief motive for its performance." He denies that the grand motive for action is "the rightness of the action." This contradicts the universal and intuitive judgments of our race. If any thing is intuitively evident, it is that we are bound to do right acts because they are right. Their rightness and obligatoriness are identical, or mutually co-inherent. All right acts are obligatory, and all obligatory acts are right. Both are mutually convertible and alike undefinable, except by their synonyms, because they are alike ultimate and simple. In his definition of moral philosophy, and account of obligation, therefore, Dr. Fairchild has demolished his own objections to the doctrine of right as the ultimate and characteristic element of virtue. But he nevertheless nullifies the value of all this concession by maintaining that we are obliged only to be benevolent; that the sense of obligation arises only in view of good and the promotion of good, and that the only good is happiness. He says:—

"The term happiness is used in this treatise, not in the low, restricted sense given to it by some writers, but as comprehensive of all satisfaction, blessedness, well-being, from the lowest forms of animal pleasure to the highest joys which dwell in the bosom of God. In this sense it is absolute good,

and the only absolute good. In the presence or thought of this good, obligation is perceived. The intelligence sees the good to be an object of value, and with that perception arises the idea of obligation, of duty to respect it, to treat it as a good, to will it to all sentient beings, to stand ready to promote it, and, as occasion or opportunity arises, to put forth effort to promote it.

"Our own good is included in this absolute good, the good of being, and hence is a proper object of our regard. It is as valuable as that of our neighbor, and no more valuable. This is the place which the intelligence gives it, the place which it occupies in the primary obligation to choose or will the good; but as an object toward which effort is to be directed, our own good sustains to us a very different relation. It lies within our reach as no other good does, and hence arises a special obligation to promote it" (pp. 26–7).

"But what is that good which the intelligence recognizes, and in the presence of which obligation is seen the good which every moral being is bound to respect?" His answer is, that it is the "satisfaction of sensibility." Fulness of satisfaction is completeness of good. "It is well-being, or happiness, or blessedness—all words of the same general import."*

He defines absolute good to be "that which is valuable in itself and for itself." This consists in the satisfaction of sensibility—satisfaction in every form in which it can exist." In every form of iteration he assures us that happiness is the only absolute good. "Relative good, on the other hand, is good that is valued for its uses. It is good for the purposes it can serve in the satisfaction of sentient beings" (p. 22). "Well-being, satisfaction, happiness, then, is true good—the *summum bonum*, not merely in the sense of the highest good, but

* Blessedness and happiness are not terms of identical import. Happiness is the genus of which blessedness is the species. Happiness may belong to all sentient beings—brutes, men, angels. Blessedness can only belong to holy beings, who are indued with moral purity, loving rectitude for its own sake, glorifying God for his infinite moral excellence. Much confusion is thrown into discussions on this subject by the advocates of the happiness scheme, by confounding mere happiness or pleasurable sensations, of whatever sort, with blessedness.

of the final, ultimate, absolute good—that in which all other goods terminate and find their value. To determine this good was the inquiry of the ancients in their pursuit of the *summum bonum.* Socrates evaded the question, when he was pressed by Aristippus, the sophist: 'Do you ask whether I know any thing good for a fever?' 'No.' 'Good for ophthalmia?' 'No.' 'Well, if you inquire for a good that is good for nothing, I neither know it. nor do I want to.' And yet the good which is good for nothing is that only which has intrinsic value—the only good we regard on its own account" (p. 25).

"A good that is good for nothing" is language of small punning and paradox, but it is surely "good for nothing" else. It reminds us of like phraseology in Dr. Hopkins's work. What is intended, however, to be asserted with emphasis and point is, that happiness is the only thing that is good intrinsically, and not as a means to some other good; and that other things are good only relatively, or as they are a means of happiness.

This scheme, although not the epicurean or selfish, is utilitarianism, notwithstanding the earnest disclaimers of Drs. Fairchild and Hopkins. The very essence of utilitarianism is, that actions are not good by reason of any intrinsic rightness, but because they are, or are designed to be, means of promoting happiness. After all his extravagant and paradoxical statements and hypotheses to relieve his theory of this imputation (pp. 111–15), he concedes the whole in the midst of them. He tells us "the obligation to benevolence arises immediately on the perception of good, while the obligation to form purposes and put forth executive acts does not arise until it is ascertained that such purpose or act will probably or possibly be useful. The obligation to executive action is conditioned upon perceived useful tendency; the obligation to benevolence is independent of tendency." There is much more of the like. We need not waste our time on a distinction so tenuous and without a difference. If it is not utilitarianism to say that the obligation to perform or purpose actions is conditioned upon their perceived useful tendency, then we look in vain for any system to which the term is

applicable. We take pleasure, however, in adding, that although this system is utilitarian, it is not the selfish scheme which not only founds all obligation to act upon perceived tendency of the action to promote happiness, but upon known tendency to promote the happiness of the agent. He strenuously opposes the systems of Paley and Dr. N. W. Taylor in terms to which we may again refer. His doctrine is, that benevolence is the whole of virtue, which is vastly nobler and less degrading than the selfish form of utilitarianism, however it may tend to this result. Still, it has the taint of making happiness the only ultimate and intrinsic good, that should be sought as such for its own sake. It is entirely arbitrary and without warrant in making benevolence the only virtue, or the whole of virtue. It is a great injury to the cause of morals and religion, and sound theology, to exclude from the category of virtues other acts and qualities which the conscience intuitively affirms to be obligatory. Moreover, the author effectually cuts the nerve of this whole system, when he says, in order to repel the charge of utilitarianism :—

It is not the worth, or value, or tendency of benevolence, that is its most significant characteristic, but its obligatoriness; and its value, worth, tendency, depend upon its obligatoriness, rather than its obligatoriness upon its value or tendency. No consideration of tendency or usefulness ever enters into the original perception of the obligation of benevolence" (p. 114). It seems, then, that the worth, or value, or tendency of benevolence depends on its obligatoriness. This we have already been told by the author is simple and undefinable. It is its rightness. But benevolence is not the only virtue that is immediately seen to be obligatory, *i. e.*, to possess obligatoriness or rightness. Justice, veracity, fidelity are quite as fully, immediately, and unmistakably seen to possess it. This cannot be successfully questioned. Why, then, does it not invest them and each of them with all the "worth," "value," "tendency," —all the prerogatives and authority of benevolence? By what pretence of authority or reason, is benevolence, of all the virtues, immediately seen to possess obligatoriness, and made the exclusive virtue, or the whole of virtue, on account of such perceived obligatoriness? Dr. Fairchild, therefore, clears his

scheme of the charge of utilitarianism only by really coming back in effect to what he confesses to be the doctrine most widely accepted, but discords, applying to it the ugly vocable, "Rightarian."

To what actions does morality attach? The author, recognizing the division of the mental faculties into intellect, sensibility, and will, says: "The element of morality is found in the will alone. To this and this only, does obligation directly attach" (p. 17). He denies morality to any movements of intelligence and sensibility, because they are "governed by necessity." "Power for any act, in the sense of ability to do or not to do, is a self-evident condition of obligation to that act. Ability to do, in its proper sense, carries with it the ability not to do; and thus free-will is an essential attribute of personality."

We have thus presented the fontal principles of the system set forth by our author. Let us now inquire how he develops them, in logical inference, and detailed application to various important subjects.

1. In the analysis of particular virtues. They are all forms of benevolence. "Justice as a virtue is but another name for benevolence dealing with the interests and deserts of men. . . To secure to a moral being his deserts, is a virtuous act when benevolence requires it: it is a sinful act when a proper regard for all good (happiness) forbids. The final appeal is to this standard, and justice becomes virtue by being benevolence." As well might it be said, benefiecnee to others is a virtue, when justice permits it; it is a sin, when justice forbids it. Benevolence and justice are not identical, though complementary to each other. Neither are they antagonistic, though different from each other. Because justice cannot be exclusive of benevolence no more proves it identical with benevolence, than benevolence is proved to be a form of justice, because it cannot guiltless violate justice.

"Self-denial is benevolence holding in subjection the desires and passions, and putting personal interest in its proper place —a readiness to forego self-indulgence at the bidding of benevolence" (p. 44),—and we add, no less at the bidding of holiness, justice, and truth.

"Veracity is benevolence, exercised in communicating impressions of facts to our fellow-men. Truthfulness in communication from any other than a benevolent motive is not the virtue of veracity." Suppose, then, that one is rigidly truthful because he knows it to be right, and this, too, even though it should sometimes militate against his benevolent feelings—though it should seem worse for the happiness of men that the truth, and better for it that falsehood, should be uttered, is he destitute of the virtue of veracity? If so, who has it? It is quite in keeping with this to teach that "if, under any circumstances, proper regard to the highest good would admit of deception, then the claims of veracity cease" (p. 314).

Humility "is benevolence exercised in conceding precedence to others, and in accepting cheerfully the place which falls to us." Could any analysis of humility be more inadequate, and may it not exist wholly irrespective of benevolence?

"Faith is a benevolent attitude of mind accepting the evidence of facts, and bestowing confidence upon the persons to whom it is due." The foregoing sentence would be equally true, if the word benevolent were erased. The faith here described is, *per se*, irrelative to benevolence. Evangelical faith trusting in Christ, indeed works by love, just as it purifies the heart, and overcomes the world. But though inseparable from these results, it is not to be confounded with them. So he tells us, "obedience is *benevolent* submission to authority." It is submission to authority. It may be from other conscientious motives than of benevolence.

2. In regard to the nature of sin. It is defined by our author to be a "refusal to meet obligation or duty, a refusal to be benevolent, or to will the good of being as itself valuable. Its sinfulness consists in refusing to be benevolent. In all these cases the sinful element is the same—the neglect of good, the refusal to be benevolent. Apart from this element, there is no sin in yielding to desire." Of course, neither depraved desire itself, nor the depraved feeling which leads to it, can be sinful; sin and holiness can pertain only to non-benevolent acts of the will. "The sin is in the unbenevolent choice." "Let it not be forgotten that the sin is not in the desires or passions themselves, nor even in their gratification

but in the constant refusal to accept the good as the aim of life" (p. 38). "The intellect and sensibility cannot be morally depraved; there is no sin in them. They may be diseased and perverted, and these perversions may become occasions of sin. But in all moral beings, depraved or undepraved, the sensibility must, from its very nature, operate as an impulse to self-indulgence. To resist this impulse, from a regard to good, is virtue; to yield to it, and neglect the good, is sin. *The idea of a sensibility in harmony with virtue, so that to follow its impulses will be virtuous action, involves a contradiction.*" This speaks for itself, and clearly contradicts Scripture, conscience, and Christian experience. Where, then, are heavenly holiness and blessedness?

3. Those who make benevolence the whole of virtue, as a class, very naturally, make selfishness the whole of sin, and its essence. Dr. Fairchild, however, takes different ground, and denies not only that all sin consists in selfishness, in which we agree with him, but that any sin consists in it, or, as we understand him, that selfishness is possible. Desperate as the conclusion is, he embraces it, at the imperious behest of his system and his logic, with heroic consistency. "Selfishness must in the end annihilate itself. In fact, it is only from ignorance that it can ever exist. It is from the beginning only a blunder. The truly selfish man, in the sense above defined, a man seeking his own highest good, needs only to learn the good which comes from benevolence, and he becomes virtuous at once because his good requires it. . . We have reached the conclusion, then, that is impossible for a finite moral being to pursue his own highest good, or his own good at all, as his supreme end. In such a pursuit he must take intelligence as his guide, otherwise he does not pursue the end proposed at all; and one of the first facts which reason offers to him is that benevolence is essential to happiness, and benevolence is the choice of all good as the supreme end. Thus he ceases to pursue his own good as supreme," &c., &c. (pp. 35–36).

We have often been charged with unfairness in maintaining the ultimate logical and practical identity of the selfish and benevolent forms of the happiness or utilitarian theory. If happiness is the only good, surely the first concern of all is to

get as much of it, and as soon, as they can. If this is only to be achieved by securing the happiness of others, then so be it. But suppose it were otherwise, shall he not still seek his own highest good? And if happiness be the only absolute good, who shall hinder his supreme pursuit of it?

But does not a scheme which makes selfishness impossible by making it self-annihilating, annihilate itself? Can it not exist without instantly ceasing to exist, and passing, by the above "chemistry of thought," into consummate benevolence and perfect sanctity? Such views only show the extremely unnatural and artificial character of the scheme to which they belong. Besides, his reasoning on this subject is open to all the objections he arrays (pp. 103–12) against the Paley and New Haven theories, which maintain the former, that virtue is "doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness;" and the latter, that "there can be no motive," "except in the form of good or happiness to the agent," and that this is his only possible or conceivable motive to promote the happiness of others. He objects to this, that it "corrupts benevolence," as it surely does. But it is precisely by such motives that, as we have seen, he makes selfishness develop into benevolence.

4. The only possible influence on sinners which God can exert, according to our author, is not immediate, efficacious, and irresistible, but suasory and contingent upon the will of the sinner. "It is not power, but persuasion that is brought to bear. In no other manner can Omnipotence itself secure right moral action. Neither virtue nor sin can be imposed by any extraneous force, however great. A change in moral character is not the work of power, but of motive" (pp. 63–4). The rankest Pelagian could not more fully assert that regeneration (if such a thing be admitted by this philosophy) is effected by the power, not of God, but of the sinner.

5. The author identifies objective right and expediency. "The truly expedient must be that which, on the whole, is promotive of good. In this sense, it is identical with objective right. The final test of the objective right, is its bearing upon good—well-being; we have no other means of knowing it. It is urged by some, that finite beings can never know with

certainty, what is expedient on the whole, and hence, must have some other guide. It is true, that the knowledge of the expedient is never absolute, but it is just as sure as our knowledge of the outwardly right. The only absolute knowledge of the right which finite beings can have, pertains to the rightness of the fundamental duty of benevolence. This governs the state of the heart, but other conditions determine the outward conduct. In outward conduct, finite beings must govern themselves by apprehended tendencies and consequences. That, and that only, must be done, which, on the whole, seems profitable, and is conducive to the general good. But does not this principle sanction the corrupt maxim, that the end justifies the means? So far as pertains to the grand end of all action—the universal good—the maxim is not corrupt. This end justifies any and all means which tend to promote it, and all men sustain the maxim" (pp. 169–70). We think the Jesuits will ask no more than this. The end they pursue they deem the highest. They ask only that it be conceded, that this end "justify any and all means which tend to promote it."

6. Our author admits no sins of ignorance. "The fundamental primal duty of benevolence is known to all moral agents—the duty to be honestly regardful of every good." But there is ignorance of objective, outward duty, of the things which are objectively right in conduct, and which would be duty, if they were properly understood. No mortal knows, perfectly, the objective right; probably none but God thus knows it. But these unknown objective duties are not duties, until they become known. . . As a principle of morals, the maxim (that ignorance of the law excuses no one) is utterly false. . . If the present darkness be the result of past neglect of light, there is sin in the past; but present light is the measure of present duty" (pp. 71–2). Did Paul, then, sin in doing the many things which he verily thought he ought to do against the name of Jesus of Nazareth?

"Why, then," he well asks, "is a revelation needed, if there be no such ignorance as is necessarily fatal?" "It is not to reveal unknown duties—duties actually binding upon us,

and which we sin in not performing. There are no such duties." The first need is to furnish additional motives to the performance of duties already known. The second is to bring to light courses of conduct which become duty when revealed. The nearest approach which we find to any recognition of the distinctive element of Christianity in this account of the need of revelation, is the following: "Especially that exhibition of the Divine character involved in the incarnation and atonement, is needed to inspire men with benevolence." And is this all for which that exhibition is needed?

He denies that there is "sin, blameworthiness is an honest, conscientious error. It is not the objective right that determines duty, but the right as apprehended. Conscience, then, taken as our best judgment of duty, is our only guide; and as a guide to rectitude or virtuous conduct, the subjective right, it is *infallible*. The judgment may fail as to the objective right, but conscience indicates all obligation" (pp. 79-80). This annuls the normal authority of the Divine law and every other objective standard, and enthrones in the chair of infallibility the judgments of the individual conscience—exalting over the right as it is, "the right as apprehended" by each man, *i. e.*, the infinite medley of moral and religious delusions sincerely espoused among men. It destroys all standards and all foundations. If there is any point upon which the Bible fixes criminality, it is false moral judgments. "Woe to them that call evil good and good evil, that put light for darkness and darkness for light." If they hear not the law and the testimony, it is because they have no light in them." Where is the Word of God? Does it not teach us that the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit; that the mind and conscience, even of corrupt nature, are defiled? Blindness, darkness, ignorance, deceiving and being deceived on spiritual subjects, are surely everywhere set forth as among the dire and criminal characteristics of sin. And any scheme which ignores or denies this is alike superficial, pernicious, and unscriptural. As might be expected, the scheme culminates in avowed

PERFECTIONISM,

which is advocated in the chapter on the "Unity or Simplicity of Moral Action" (pp. 85–101). He states his problem thus: "Can virtue and sin co-exist in the same heart? It is perfectly possible that they should alternate, because either is always in the power of every moral agent. The virtuous man can become sinful; the sinful man can become virtuous. Can the same man be both at the same time? With few exceptions, writers on morals and theology answer this question in the affirmative; but if the foregoing views of the nature of moral action, of sin and virtue, be correct, the question must be answered in the negative." He proceeds to argue, "that virtue, being simply the choice of the happiness of the sentient universe, and vice simply and purely the refusal of such choice, the one is of necessity a negation and exclusion of the other." Their co-existence is neither conceivable nor possible, but upon the hypothesis of a dual action of the will, which in effect involves two wills and a double personality, and even then there is no proper co-existence, for we have essentially two persons, instead of one. If virtue and sin, then, are confined to the action of the will, there would scarce seem room for argument; and if they are not confined to the action of the will, they are no longer virtue and sin. In answer to the argument to prove imperfect goodness from the lapsed state of our moral nature since the fall, he says that, "by the law of nature, obligation and ability go hand in hand. A law which is not accommodated to human infirmity is no law of duty or obligation." In reference to the diminution or loss of ability for holiness, caused by sin, he says: "Men can by their own sinful act diminish their power to do, and to the same extent their subsequent obligation to do." Although, then, by sinning, they became servants of sin, the bondage excuses its own continuance and all its fruits. As to wrong thoughts and feelings, these, it seems, "do not fall within the field of obligation," as this pertains exclusively to the will. As to the claim that "the choice of good, though genuine, may lack intensity," he raises the question whether we can predicate different degrees of intensity, of that ultimate

attitude of the will which alone is moral action," or whether it is not emotional rather than volitional. "In that case, the regulation of the intensity of our action lies out of the field of obligation."

In answer to the nearly universal convictions and testimony of men, and especially of Christians, on this subject, he says: "The general impression of deficient goodness is admitted, and the fact of the deficiency is also admitted; but it is a deficiency which arises from the alternation of good and evil in the heart, and not from their co-existence. A brief retrospect of a good man's experience will bring into view things to approve and things to condemn, and hence the impression he has of a mixed life and character." "The probability would seem to be that all virtuous beings, in reference to their momentary moral state, are equally praiseworthy. They differ in the permanency of their fidelity, in the intensity and energy of their virtuous activities, in the success with which they apply the law of benevolence to all outward actions, and in the magnitude of the powers and energies subjected to that law."

His doctrine is plain enough without further citations. It is simply this:—

1. Moral character must be wholly good or wholly bad.

2. Therefore Christians have sinless perfection so long as they are Christians at all. The moral faults and deficiencies which it is admitted generally defile them, occur not while they are Christians, but when they fall from grace and cease to be Christians. The Christian life is a constant series of such falls and recoveries, of lapsing from piety to irreligion, from a state of salvation to a state of perdition, and *vice versa*.

3. There is no moral quality of good or evil in any mental exercise or state, except volitions, purposes, or choices. No affections, feelings, emotions, desires of the soul, are worthy of praise or blame. They are all out of the field of obligation, morality, religious experience, responsibility, and, however bad, involve no moral imperfection. This can pertain only to the wrong choice of the will, in refusing benevolence. Nearly all that the Scriptures and the Church include in the

term "heart" is thus swept from the sphere of moral responsibility.

4. There can be no sin or holiness in moral dispositions back of acts which choose or refuse benevolence or the universal happiness. There can be no native sinfulness, no sin whatever, until the soul, having perceived benevolence to be supremely and solely obligatory, voluntarily refuses it: an experience in the genesis of sin, which we venture to say no human being can recall, or recognize as his own. On this scheme there is no need or possibility of infant regeneration or redemption.

5. According to it, as we have already seen, the transformation of the soul from a state of sin to a state of holiness by the almighty power of God, is a sheer impossibility.

6. The great moment of the incarnation and atonement is the furnishing of motives to benevolence.

7. There are no degrees of goodness. All good men are perfect, and so equally good.

8. That strength and invincibleness of unholy dispositions which are removable only by Divine grace, are their own excuse.

9. All this, it is alleged, is a logical consequence of the doctrine that holiness consists purely and simply in benevolent choice, and sin in the refusal of it; and there can be no obligation beyond our ability, even when the inability consists simply in sin, or the strength of sinful dispositions. We confess, that if the premises be granted, which we utterly deny, it is difficult to withstand the reasoning by which conclusions so unscriptural and monstrous are reached. The author clearly shows how Dr. N. W. Taylor, and Mr. Metcalf, his disciple, starting with these principles, are drawn into this vortex, in spite of all their efforts to shun it. He quotes the former as saying: "While such is the peculiar and exclusive character of the benevolent and selfish preference, every moral being is doomed by a necessity of nature to place himself under the absolute dominion and control of the one or the other of these preferences. The preference of one of the only two objects of moral choice excludes the other from all thought except to oppose and resist it, and therefore shuts off all controlling influence from it as an object to be attained, as it were, by its utter

annihilation." "And yet," adds Dr. F., "Dr. Taylor, in other places, discards the doctrine of simplicity of action, but without explaining the grounds of its rejection." Metcalf puts in the following caveat, the form and necessity for which sufficiently explains his ground: "In some parts of this treatise, the author has found difficulty in expressing what he conceives to be the exact truth, without implying more than is true. Although, in some instances, his language may seem to imply that there can be no true virtue in a man's character when that character is not perfect in holiness, or entirely free from sin, or that he can perform no part of his duty without performing the whole, yet he has not designed to convey this sentiment." "And yet," says Dr. H., "he has not undertaken to show how one can perform a part of his duty without performing the whole. There ought to be some strong reason for rejecting a view which seems an inevitable deduction from the very nature of moral action." We have several strong reasons for rejecting this particular view, among which we only stop to give the following: "IF WE SAY WE HAVE NO SIN, WE DECEIVE OURSELVES, AND THE TRUTH IS NOT IN US." 1 John i. 9. "IF I SAY I AM PERFECT, IT SHALL PROVE ME PERVERSE."—Job ix. 20.

Although from this and other sources we have sad evidence that these principles are infesting some branches of the American church, and thus require to be exposed and withstood, yet we flatter ourselves that they have lost whatever vitality and influence they may have ever had in either branch of the Presbyterian church.

ART. VIII.—*Materialism.—Physiological Psychology.*

BY materialism is meant the hypothesis, that all the substances in the universe are matter in some form, gross or refined; that there is no such thing as spirit which is not some form of matter, and so that this matter is absolute *summum genus*, which comprehends all being under itself. This doc-

trine, which reduces the soul or spirit to sublimated matter, has had many adherents, and is now revived and boldly propagated by able and zealous advocates, who propose to revolutionize science, education, religion, society, under its influence, and conformably to its leading dogma. This is due, in part, to the natural reaction from the contrary extreme of idealism as developed into German transcendentalism, and in part, to the great influence of Compte in France, and John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Alexander Bain, Darwin, Huxley, and others, in Britain, aided withal, by the prodigious strides of modern physical science, too prone in its intense search after truth in its own domain, to shut the eye of reason and faith against the realms of spirit.

Opposed to this hypothesis, is the opposite extreme of idealism, just mentioned, which resolves all being into spirit and spiritual exercises or states.

A third scheme, without resolving mind into matter, or matter into mind, yet asserts the essential identity of the two, by resolving them into a *tertium quid*, which is neither the one nor the other, but a resultant of both. But the fourth and common view, which is that of the Bible, the Church, and in accord with the intuitive judgments of the human race, as shown in all language and history, is that of a dualism of mind or spirit, and matter, according to which they are wholly different in kind, and neither is any form or degree of the other, or by any creative power transmutable into it. This is the true doctrine. Our present object is very briefly to consider materialism, and to point out the insufficiency of the arguments for it, and the conclusiveness of the arguments against it.

1. The first argument in its behalf is negative. It is simply that no one can prove *a priori* that it is impossible for God to endow matter with powers of thought, feeling, and will. One may hold this and be no materialist. John Locke maintained it without being a materialist, although it must be conceded that, in some aspects, his philosophy was sufficiently sensuous and materialistic. But this, if admitted, only proves the possibility, not the truth, of materialism. But even this negative argument may be questioned, as will

appear at the proper place, in view of the divisibility of matter, and the indivisibility of the sentient and intelligent principle within us.

2. There is the admitted implication of the body and its organs in psychical exercises and states. This may be without their being identical. It inevitably results from the mysterious union of body and mind, conceded on all hands. If they are thus united, such implication of the one in the acts of the other is a necessary consequence. But because the body, or some of its members and organs, is involved, either actively or passively, in the states or exercises of the mind, it does not follow that the mind is identical with these members or organs, or that its activity is their activity. Because the mind sees only through the eye, it does not follow that the mind is the eye, any more than the eye is a telescope because we can see distant objects only with the aid of a telescope, or that it is light because we can see objects only in the light. The brain is involved in all psychical states, and especially acts, also the heart and the whole circulatory system in feeling. Thinking and feeling are largely conditioned by, and largely condition these organs. But this proves nothing in regard to their mutual identity, any more than the buoyancy and vigor, the lassitude and feebleness of the body being conditioned by the purity or impurity, the heat or cold, of the air it breathes, proves that the body, its respiratory or circulatory apparatus, are one substance with the atmosphere, or other surroundings which affect it.

3. A third argument in behalf of materialism is but an expansion of that last mentioned. We refer to the reciprocal influence of body and mind. The facts which illustrate and prove this are many and striking, many of them so obvious, that it is among the most familiar and generally recognized phenomena. As to the influence of the body on the mind, it appears first in the dependence of the mind on the organs of sense for all knowledge of the outer world. 2. In the fact that the growth, vigor, and decay of mind from infancy to old age are, to a great extent, concurrent with those of the body. 3. The influence of sickness and health, of elasticity or depression in the body in producing corresponding conditions of

the mind. 4. The great and palpable power of alcoholic, narcotic, and other stimulants which act immediately upon the body, in producing exhilaration, intoxication, frenzy, delirium, ending in stupefaction of the mind. 5. The fact that mental derangement and insanity often originate in a distempered body, and that the first efforts in lunatic asylums for the restoration of the patient are directed to the cure of corporeal maladies: and not only so, but that the same causes which beget bodily also beget psychical disease. A remarkable case of this is noted, in which the miasm which produces intermittent or periodical fever, produced insanity every alternate day. But this influence of the body on the mind is among the most familiar truths, known among all men, and embodied in the poet's neat proverbial phrase:—

Mens sana in sano corpore.

Phenomena evincing the influence of the mind on the body are no less obvious and frequent if less noted. They are such as the great influence of hope and cheerfulness in preserving health and promoting recovery from disease, of which the known efficacy of bread-pills, and infinitesimal doses of what is called medicine, are notable illustrations; the notorious influence of fear and panic in producing sickness and spreading epidemics; the effect of sudden startling intelligence, and paroxysms of joy and fear, in exhilarating or prostrating and paralyzing the body, of which the vulgar proverbial phrase "frightened to death" expresses the common conviction. The hair of a Sepoy about to be shot to death in the last Indian war became gray in half an hour; and there are well-authenticated cases of children and others dying from fright. Excessive mental activity, care, anxiety, or overworking the intellect by uninterrupted and unrelieved strain, often produce immediate or gradual prostration of health. The want of due nightly, Sabbath, and other periodical rest for the mind surely shortens life, if it do not suddenly terminate it. All weariness of the intellect from severe and protracted exertion begets proportionate bodily languor. This surely proves that in our present state the mind affects, not that it is, the body.

4. But besides these familiar phenomena proving the reciprocal action of mind and body, there are others, perhaps, which the investigations of physiology have recently brought to view, and which are much emphasized by the advocates of what is called physiological psychology. It is claimed: 1. That the energy of consciousness—of the mind in intelligence, feeling, and will, operates through the nervous system ramified through the entire body, but more especially concentrated in the brain. Facts innumerable prove this. It has always been more or less recognized. A lesion of the nerves or brain is apt to be attended with some mental disturbance. And *vice versa*, serious mental lesions are sometimes if not always attended or followed with some morbid state of these organs. 2. There are some facts going to show that given forms of mental training, culture, acquisition, produce a permanent enlargement or other modification of these organs. It is admitted, however, that no such uniformity can be traced in the coexistences and sequences of such phenomena as to warrant any valid induction in the premises, much less the doctrines of phrenology. 3. It is claimed, and we are inclined to believe that facts will bear out the claim, that all exercise of mind involves the expenditure of a proportionate amount of nerve-force. At all events, abundant facts prove the intimate sympathy and concurrence of psychical and nervous activity.

Conceding, however, the utmost for all such facts, they only prove that the brain and nervous system are the organs of the body most specially implicated with the activity of the mind; that they are especially its instruments and organs; but they show, no more than the previous facts noted, that they are consubstantial with the soul—no more than the eye or the ear are the intelligent principle which sees and hears, instead of being the organs and instruments through which it perceives.

5. Closely allied to the foregoing is the argument from the late discoveries in regard to the correlation, conservation, and transmutation of forces. Physical science has discovered that heat, magnetism, electricity, and galvanism are mutually convertible, and that either of them, on passing away or being spent, does not, therefore, cease to exist, but passes into one of the others, or some other form of existence. The propul-

sive power of steam we all know is but a transmutation of the force of heat. And the same is true, to a great extent, of chemical forces—nay, of the propulsive power of falling water—for this is lifted, by the force of heat, in the form of vapor, to the heights whence it has previously fallen, where, condensed into rain, it feeds the springs and rivulets, which, in their descent, carry the water-wheels and the machinery attached to them. In like manner it is said that food ministers to or is converted into nerve-force, which, in turn, is psychical force, and, therefore, psychical force is the force of matter. This view is pressed, *usque ad nauseam*, by Prof. Youmans, as the basis of his materialistic views of education, culture, &c. But all material forces may be convertible into each other and into nerve-force. And this may be, as already conceded, the instrument, organ, condition, of the mind's activity, in our present state, without being the mind.

It is believed that the foregoing summation presents the argument for materialism in its utmost strength. It can hardly be claimed to be conclusive, or demonstrative, even if uncontroverted. It amounts, at the most, only to some probability or presumption of the identity of body and mind, even if there were no opposing evidence. But the proofs to the contrary are numerous, cumulative, and irresistible.

PROOF THAT MIND AND MATTER ARE DIFFERENT SUBSTANCES.

By matter we understand all substance which occupies space —not all that is in or at any point in space, but whatever fills a definite portion of space, however small. Mind is the conscious principle or substance—whatever knows, thinks, feels, desires, or wills. That one of these is not the other is neither proved nor disproved by some weak and fallacious arguments which have been, from time to time, advanced on this side. But it is shown,—

1. By the intuitive convictions of our race. It is among the most intimate convictions of mankind, independently of all reasoning, that the mind or spirit within us is distinct from and superior to the body it inhabits; that the sentient and rational principle is incorporeal and immortal. Hence, the

human body has been invested with a peculiar sacredness in the eyes of all people, as being the temple for the indwelling of what is so much more exalted than itself. This is not of itself conclusive. But it is a mighty *a priori* presumption. These native instincts, radicated in human nature, are implanted by our Maker, who is a God of truth, and has not made our constitution a lie or an imposture, but in harmony and correlation with the truth.

2. Matter is divisible; mind, indivisible. From the very nature of matter, as extended, it is divisible. This *a priori* argument is confirmed by *a posteriori* fact. But we cannot cut asunder the soul or intelligent principle within. Parts of the body may be cut off. But the mind remains intact, entire, undivided. We cannot separate, except for purposes of thought, the intellect from the feelings and the will. There is nothing deeper or more intimate to our consciousness than that, amid all changes, partings, dissolutions of the body, the *ego*, or self, remains undivided and indissoluble. While it is so in its own nature, this does not mean that he who made cannot destroy it.

3. Mind has intelligent, free, self-directive activity. Matter, so far as we know its manifestations and properties, has not such power. We do not go the length, as was so long the fashion, of saying that matter is in every sense inert. On the contrary, it is often endowed with active properties, and in its lowest potency has at least a *vis inertiæ*, together with a power of excluding other bodies from the space it occupies. But all matter possesses, besides this, the power of attraction, repulsion, cohesion. Besides this, many bodies have powers of affecting sentient agents, such as odor, flavor, savor, sound, besides manifold chemical, magnetic, electric, and galvanic powers. It is absurd, therefore, to make it a part of the definition of matter that it is necessarily or always inert, until we are prepared to pronounce gunpowder and steam inert. But while matter has energy, it has no intelligent, free, self-directive energy. Mind has this energy, as is attested by the universal consciousness. Therefore mind is a substance radically and specifically different from matter.

4. The body perishes; the mind lives disembodied between

death and the resurrection. Here we indeed pass from the region of natural and philosophic to scriptural proof, so far as the certainty of it is concerned. By our natural faculties we know that the body perishes and dissolves at death. If, then, the spirit or soul survives, as our instinctive longings and beliefs indicate, then the soul is immaterial, of a different substance from the body. But however doubtful this may be left by the light of nature, it is rendered certain by the sure word of prophecy, which shineth as a light in a dark place: by the indubitable word of Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived. This teaches us that when "the dust returns to the earth as it was, the spirit returns to God who gave it." That when Christians are "absent from the body, they are present with the Lord." And it tells us of the "spirits of the just made perfect" in heaven, whose bodies lie in the dust awaiting resurrection and reunion to their glorified spirits. There can be no doubt that the scriptural doctrine is, that the spirits of believers, and indeed unbelievers, exist out of the body between death and the resurrection. To such a separation at death, too, the light of nature not obscurely points. If so, then the spirit is not body.

5. God is eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably perfect in power, knowledge, goodness, holiness, justice, and truth. Such perfection and immortality are no attributes of matter. God is boundless and infinite. But this is impossible to matter. It occupies space. But no one will claim omnipresence for it. Therefore God is a Spirit which is not matter. And it is as a Spirit that he has knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness. But herein man is in the image of God. He is so, then, in his spiritual nature, which is therefore incorporeal. That his spirit is united to his body, is no more proof that it is his body, than the incarnation of our Lord is proof that he, as to his divine nature, is material. He himself tells us, not as if it were a new revealed truth, but as if it were an admitted and known principle: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me have" (Luke xxiv. 39).

The sum of the whole matter, then, is, the intuitive judgment of the race declares the mind immaterial. Matter is extended and divisible; mind is unextended and indivisible.

Mind has intelligent, free, self-directive activity. The forces of matter are blind and incapable of self-direction. Revelation teaches that the spirit survives the body at death, and therefore is not the body; also, that it is in the image of God, who is eternally and immutably perfect, and therefore not divisible and corruptible matter.

PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

We are thus prepared to estimate the claims of that so-called physiological psychology, founded on the hypothesis of materialism, which is now becoming loud, if not blatant, in its pretensions. This system declares against the study of consciousness as the true avenue to psychology, and remands us to physiological and anatomical investigations. Compte and his followers ridicule the "illusory psychology" founded on the study of consciousness.* The facts on which these pretensions are based have already been referred to. They are those proving the implication of the body, as a whole, or in some of its organs, and especially the brain and nervous system, in the exercises and states of the soul, as shown in various forms and degrees of the reciprocal influence of the body and mind.

But what do all these phenomena establish in opposition to the principle that we know the facts and laws of mind, only as we know consciousness? Do we know any thing of the soul, except as we know its exercises? Are not these what we must first know, in order to know any thing else about the mind, its faculties, states, and laws? And what are these but exercises of consciousness? Can we know any thing about perception, sensation, memory, desire, will, &c., except as we

* See also *The Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, by William Henry Maudsley, part i., chap. i.

The Culture Demanded by Modern Life, by E. L. Youmans. On page 377 he tells us "the doctrine which has prevailed in the past, and still prevails, is doomed to complete inversion; that the bodily organism which was so long neglected as of no account, is, in reality, the first and fundamental thing to be considered; and that, in reaching a knowledge of mind and character through the study of the corporeal system, there has been laid the firm foundation of that science of human nature," &c., &c.

know their conscious exercises? Will any amount of external, physiological, anatomical, phrenological observation show us the first glimmer of what these are, that has not already been learned from consciousness? Could any mere inspection or measurement of bumps, skulls, facial angles, brain, or nerve, give us the "first mental fact," or the nature of a single faculty, which we did not otherwise know from consciousness? But, it is asked, do we not find that certain conditions of body precede, accompany, or follow certain exercises of mind? Certainly. We have granted all this. But what, then? Do we not learn these exercises of mind in the study of consciousness? Do we not learn what it is to remember or to reason by studying the conscious acts of remembering and reasoning? Having thus learned them, we may have observed what phenomena in the body or other surroundings precede, accompany, follow, or condition them. We may find that good digestion and buoyant health promote intellectual activity. But are these mental phenomena? But it is alleged that the thorough study of mind requires attention to the language, acts, and institutions of men in themselves, and as they are recorded in history and literature. Granted. But does this militate against the position we have maintained? What are the words and acts of men but the exponents and outworkings of the inward thoughts, feelings, and purposes, *i. e.*, of their consciousness? What is such reference to the universal language and deeds of men but an appeal to universal consciousness, and a testing of disputes as to our own or other's consciousness by comparison with the collective consciousness of our race in its divers manifestations? The advocates of this physiological psychology propose to reconstruct education, society, morals, and religion in accordance with it; to make physical science, pure and applied, the chief element in education; to banish from it the classics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, Christianity, and to replace them with physiology, biology, and a semi-brutish sociology, founded on mere bestial gregariousness. Indeed the whole system is little else than a refined animalism.

Hence, in its very nature, it is degrading and demoralizing. It is destructive of religion, which has its seat in our spiritual

nature, and must worship God, who is a spirit, in spirit and in truth. Materialism has ever been, and must be, the implacable foe of Christianity and spiritual religion. It is the ally and support of sensuality and vice. It gravitates toward the level of the brutes that perish, and cries out from the sty of Epicurus, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." It now comes in as a flood under the pressure of the positive philosophy, and other forms of crude science or philosophy falsely so-called. May the Spirit of the Lord lift up a standard against it!

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Studies in Philosophy and Theology. By Joseph Haven, D. D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1869.

Professor Haven has here collected his more important addresses and articles scattered in different reviews. The topics treated are of the first importance, and some of them are handled with great ability. The author is a clear thinker and writer, and his style, always neat and classic, sometimes rises to elegance and brilliancy. Under the head of Philosophy he gives: 1. The Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton; 2. Mill *versus* Hamilton; 3. The Moral Faculty; 4. Province of Imagination in Sacred Oratory; 5. The Ideal and the Actual. Under the head of Theology he gives us: 1. Natural Theology; 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity; 3. Theology as a Science—its Dignity and Value; 4. Place and Value of Miracles in the Christian System; 5. Sin as related to Human Nature and the Divine Mind; 6. Arianism. Some of these pieces are brief monograms; others are searching and elaborate discussions.

The critique on Hamilton and Mill displays considerable ability, and presents a just estimate of the fatal faults of the latter. We think, however, that while some of Hamilton's defects are well indicated, others are ignored or denied. We quite agree with Dr. Haven's objections to Hamilton's analysis of causation, and of the freedom of the will. We think they are both implicated with that doctrine of nescience, and of the relativity of knowledge, so prominent in his writings, and so antagonistic to those sounder views on other topics which constitute the real value of his system. But we understand Dr. Haven to defend Hamilton on these points, and Mansel's application of them to prove that the "Limits of Religious Thought" shut out the infinite and absolute from the sphere of possible knowledge, while in regard to all things, we know them not as they are, but only in relation to our faculties, which may or may not truly cognize them. But if we cannot truly know or apprehend God, how can we believe in him? We think that, while welcomed by many sound thinkers on their first appearance, these speculations of Hamilton and Mansel have, on deeper reflection, come to be generally repudiated by the Christian, however cherished by the sceptical mind.

The author's analysis of the Moral Faculty, with a single exception, which we have before had occasion to point out, is singularly able and satisfactory. In the telling blows which he hurls at every form of utilitaranism, including the selfish and happiness schemes, we welcome him as a strong coadjutor. We only regret that he should object to "the view which resolves virtue into the Divine character, and makes right originally inherent in the Divine nature."

In his article on the Trinity, while generally sound and judicious, we think his recoil from the virtual tritheism of Emmons has swung him full far toward the opposite extreme. He, indeed, clearly rejects Sabellianism. His objection to the use of the word "individuals," to denote the personal distinctions, is too unqualified, and tends to sink the Divine persons into mere attributes of the Deity. "Individual" is a word applicable alike to what is numerically and logically one, whether person or substance. We, of course, insist, with our author, that there are not three individual substances or Gods. But we equally insist that there are three individual and unconfounded persons, subsistences, hypostases, in the one substance of the Godhead—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, which, though in substance one, are equal in power and glory.

The article on Sin, with much to approve, of course presents much matter for criticism. It strenuously maintains a native depravity which is not sinful, and involves no guilt, and therefore denies original sin and guilt, imputed and inherent, and all sin whatsoever, until the child, grown to the period of moral agency, makes a wrong choice in its first voluntary act. This subject is too extensive to be discussed in a short notice. While he presents the plausible and superficial objections to what he styles the "Princeton" doctrine, which he admits to be the prevailing doctrine of the reformed symbols and theologians,—objections, nearly all of which, in addition to many others, lie with equal force against his own system,—he does not hit, or even aim at, or apparently understand the strong points of the doctrine against which he hurls sensational paragraphs, and bristling exclamation points. Let him show, if he can, that most of this vehement rhetoric does not bear equally against Rom. v. 12–21, compared with Gen. ii. 3, nay, against all fact and the very providence of God itself. The great difficulty is the universal fact of sin, which confronts every theory. We will only express our satisfaction that, notwithstanding this, the author utterly repudiates Dr. Taylor's explication of the existence of sin, viz., the inability of God to prevent it without destroying moral agency.

The Marriage of the King's Son, and the Guilt of Unbelief. Two Sermons. By Rev. William James. With some Memorials of his Life. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869.

A large number of appreciative friends and admirers, beyond the immediate family of the gifted and lamented author, will prize this memorial of him. He was a divine of decided mark for native endowments, culture, enterprising investigation, original thought, and for force, brilliancy, and impressiveness in the pulpit. The two sermons here published are characteristic specimens of his preaching. Two letters from him are also worthy the place given them in the volume, while nothing could surpass the extracts from Dr. Sprague's Funeral Discourse, and the view of his character by Dr. Henry Neill for justness and delicacy of delineation.

The Gospel Treasury, and Expository Harmony of the Four Evangelists, in the Words of the Authorized Version, having Scripture Illustrations: Expository Notes from the most approved Commentators: Practical Reflections: Geographical Notices: Copious Index, &c., &c. Compiled by Robert Mimpriss, author of the "System of Graduated Simultaneous Instruction," &c., &c. Two volumes in one. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869.

We think this a very copious and valuable repository of matter for Sabbath-school teachers, and all who desire to see the records and narratives of the

evangelists harmonized, so as to exhibit a connected view of our Lord's life and ministry. Indeed it is of high value for ministers and theological students. We regret that in solving the problem of furnishing so large a quantity of matter at a moderate price, the publishers have been forced to use a type so small as to be suited only to strong eyes.

A Scripture Manual, alphabetically and systematically arranged, designed to facilitate the finding of Proof-texts. By Charles Simmons. Second stereotype revision. Thirty-sixth edition. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869.

This book collects and arranges the texts of Scripture topically, and groups together those that bear upon particular subjects. This, if well done, is a great help to preachers and others having occasion to investigate with care the teachings of the Bible on the matters with which they have to deal. How far the present volume supplies a want not provided for, by other analogous treatises of Locke, Gaston, West, &c., we have not been able to examine minutely enough to warrant an opinion. We only judge from the great number of editions through which it has passed, and the great number of explicit and unqualified testimonials to its excellence, from the most eminent divines and preachers of the country who have used it, that it supplies an important desideratum.

The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry. By James M. Hoppin, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Yale College. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869.

The practical department of ministerial training is that on which all the others depend for their ultimate efficiency. Hence it is constantly rising into importance in our theological seminaries, and in the estimation of the Church. Professor Hoppin, in this large and elegant volume, has presented to the public his course of instruction in the various branches of this department; the composition and delivery of sermons, and the pastoral office in its several aspects and relations. Although we do not discover any pre-eminent force or originality of treatment, yet we see a constant exhibition of thorough study, true taste and culture, large and well digested information, acquaintance with the literature of the subject, judicious counsel, and true earnestness, candor, and charity. We do not hesitate to commend the work as of decided value to ministers and candidates for the ministry. The author, of course, shows himself a Congregationalist. But he does not parade offensively any Congregational propagandism.

Presbyterian Doctrine Briefly Stated. By Rev. A. A. Hodge, D. D., author of "The Atonement." Presbyterian Board of Publication.

A timely and powerful tract, adapted to that universal circulation which it ought to obtain. It is a strong, clear, discriminating, but short and pregnant exhibition, first, of the great truths of our common Christianity, and second, the distinctive principles of Calvinistic doctrine and Presbyterian polity. We hope it will be read by and benefit thousands, who would never read or digest a fuller treatise.

God's Thoughts fit Bread for Children. A Sermon preached before the Connecticut Sunday-School Teachers' Convention, at the Pearl Street Congregational Church, Hartford, Conn., Tuesday Evening, March 2, 1869. By Horace Bushnell. Published by request of the Convention. Boston: Nicholas & Noyes. 1869.

A characteristic discourse of the author, brilliant, original, full of breathing thoughts and burning words on a great subject, marred by little that is erratic, and abounding in truthful and edifying suggestions. After showing that the thoughts of God as articulated in his word are the best pabulum of the soul, whether in childhood or manhood, he comes to a criticism of some fashions in Sunday-schools which merit serious consideration. He says:—

"It appears to me, though perhaps I am wrong, that we hold this Sunday-school work in a very light way, such as demands a kind of re-institution to put it on a right footing. The unfortunate word *school* appears to let up, a good deal, the pressure of Christian ideas. Who teaches, in what manner, with how much or little responsibility, is not so much considered, save by a specially conscientious few. And the work is a good deal secularized to the children, as if the making up of a good time for them were a considerable part of the plan. The jolly, no-religion songs, the amusing stories and droll illustrations that illustrate nothing, the uncaring manner of the memorizing, school-training recitations,—all these produce, when taken together, an atmosphere of general unchristliness."

A Complete Manual of English Literature. By Thomas B. Shaw, M. A. Edited with notes and illustrations, by William Smith, LL. D., with a Sketch of American Literature, by Henry T. Tuckerman. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869.

We are glad to see this new edition of Shaw's English Literature—a work which for a number of years has been favorably known to the public. The author, a graduate of St. John's College, Cambridge, was professor of English literature in the Imperial Alexander Lyceum, and afterward in the University of St. Petersburg. This latter position he held at the period of his death, in 1862. He was a ripe scholar in his department, and a conscientious, painstaking teacher. This book gives us the most valuable results of his studies. It contains a large amount of information, enumerating most of the English authors, and their works; and characterizing both, with much care, in their relations to the development of literature. It is not, however, a work of profound insight; but its chief value arises from its comprehensiveness, accuracy in dates and details, and from the evident conscientiousness with which the labor has been performed. The sketch of American literature, added by Mr. Tuckerman, is also one of great value. The book is cordially recommended to all lovers of that glorious monument of human thought which is contained in the English language.

Rhetoric; a Text-Book, designed for use in Schools and Colleges, and for Private Study. By the Rev. E. O. Haven, D.D., LL. D., President of the University of Michigan. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1869.

This book embodies the methods and results of the author's own experience in teaching rhetoric.

"Part I. explains the primary elements which composition employs; words with directions how to obtain a copious, and correct, and efficient vocabulary.

"Part II. explains and illustrates....Figures of speech and thought.

"Part III. shows how these elements are combined and actually employed, and their result in style, and in the leading kinds of written and oral productions.

"Part IV. naturally follows as an investigation of invention as an art, showing how material may be best acquired and employed, according to previous directions.

"Part V. contains some general principles and directions pertaining to elocution."

The author takes substantially that view of rhetoric which was in vogue previous to the masterly works of Archbishop Whately and Professor Day. Hence he makes little of invention, and employs himself chiefly in matters of style; in respect to which his work is not without value.

Elements of Logic; Comprising the Substance of the Article in the Encyclopædia Metropolitan, with Additions. By Richard Whateley, D. D. New edition, revised by the author.

Elements of Moral Science. By Francis Wayland, D. D., LL. D. Revised and improved edition.

These two standard works are published by Gould & Lincoln, Boston, and by Sheldon & Co. New York.

The Divine-Human in the Incarnate and Written Word; and some Thoughts on the Atonement older than the Creeds. By a Member of the New York Bar. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1869. Sold in Princeton by Stelle & Smith.

This anonymous writer touches some of the profoundest topics of human thought, of Christian theology, and of present discussion. He is very pronounced against the anti-supernaturalism of the positivists, pantheists, and other sceptical destructives of the present time. He maintains a true revelation of God, both in Nature and Providence, both in the Incarnate and Written Word. But while he rebukes the extravagance of conceited scientists who scout all belief in supernatural beings, agencies, and interpositions as relics of superstition, he shows an intense and bitter repugnance to the verbal and plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, and to the Christian doctrine of atonement. While admitting a supernatural influence, beyond the mere inspiration of genius, in the Bible, he claims that "there is in these records a human and fallible element running through their cosmogony, chronology, history, biography" He adopts Robertson's view, that the Bible is "inspired, not dictated. It is the Word of God, the words of man; as the former, perfect; as the latter, imperfect . . . I believe bibliolatry to be as superstitious as false, and almost as dangerous as Romanism." This, of course, destroys the normal authority of the Bible as the Word of God, and renders it vain to attempt to prove any doctrine by adducing the testimony of the Bible in its favor.

The effect of this is seen in removing all barriers to the author's assaults on the substitution of Christ's sufferings for those of the sinner. The doctrine of vicarious sacrifice seems to be his special abhorrence. After dwelling on the efficacy of Christ's example upon his followers, he explodes and raves in such blasphemies as the following:—

"But has it ever been considered how a God of truth and justice could punish his son for sins of which he was not, in fact, but only assumed to be guilty?

How does this satisfy justice? Or is justice a blinded demon, that only demands so much suffering and blood, and cares not where it comes from?

"Calvary a tragic sham! Innocence treated as guilt by infinite wisdom! Holiness tortured as sin by infinite justice! Person and penalty altered by infinite truth! Forgiveness tendered after the debt is satisfied by infinite sovereignty! God of mercy! What a blasting caricature of every Divine attribute!

"After all this play of imputatious and cross-purposes; after all this theological thimble-rigging; these shifts and contrivances; this stretching up into the heavens to construct governmental props to God's throne, for fear his empire might suffer untimely disruption," &c., &c.

No wonder that a mind thus infuriated against the substitution of Christ's sufferings for the sinners', should set itself against the infallible truth of that word whose central doctrine is that Christ bore our sins, and became a curse for us; and knowing no sin, became sin for us, that we might be the righteousness of God in him.

Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets; Lectures on the Vocation of the Preacher, illustrated by Anecdotes, Biographical, Historical, and Elucidatory, of every order of Pulpit Eloquence from the Great Preachers of all Ages. By Edwin Paxton Hood, Minister of Queen's Square Chapel, Brighton. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869. Sold in Princeton by Stelle & Smith.

This volume is mostly composed of lectures delivered to the students of Mr. Spurgeon's Pastors' College, or training school for ministers. It is what its title-page indicates. With a dash of the overstrained, affected, and sensational, it is still valuable and instructive to all who are desirous of cultivating, or fond of studying, pulpit eloquence. The selection which has most impressed us is that passage of an unknown preacher, given, pages 141–2, from the text, "Many are called, but few are chosen."

Philip Bruntley's Life Work, and How he Found It. New York: M. W. Dodd.

Uncle John's Flower Gatherers; a Companion for the Woods and Fields. With Illustrations. New York: M. W. Dodd.

A pleasant volume, in which instructions in botany are arrayed in the charms of story and dialogue.

Man in Genesis and Geology; or, the Biblical Account of Man's Creation, tested by scientific theories of his Origin and Antiquity. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., LL. D. New York. Samuel R. Wells, Publisher, 389 Broadway.

An examination of this little volume, dedicated to Professor Dana, bears out the following succinct statement of its purpose and character:—

"To reconcile revelation with science; to go back through ethnology to the origin of the human race; and to examine critically the theories of the philosophers and writers on the development theory, in order to arrive at the facts, and thus settle the question, is the object of the author."

The method of reconciliation adopted, so far as the days of creation are concerned, is substantially that of Dana and Guyot, who regard them as so many successive geologic ages, in which the different orders and forms of being were

successively produced, until the present cosmos, culminating in man as the crown of the whole, was completed. Dr. Thompson confronts the development theory with crucial facts and crushing arguments. He shows that mind cannot be evolved from matter, the rational spirit from mere animal sensations and instincts. He also considers, in the light of the latest discoveries and discussions, the crude views lately propounded by some scientists and sceptics in favor of the anti-biblical and indefinite antiquity of man. He is disposed to give full credit and importance to all the facts which science can establish in this field or elsewhere. He follows Dr. Guyot largely here, especially the views advanced by him in his recent lectures on this subject, soon, we are glad to announce, to be published. Most who have thoroughly studied the matter are now insisting on the necessity of some revision of the accepted Scriptural chronology, in order to reconcile it with some of the alleged facts and discoveries bearing on this subject. Dr. Thompson gives more weight to some of these than we think they deserve. And in regard to some of the theories about the mode and times of the evolution of the cosmos from chaotic vapor, and the beginning of the human race, of which many of our Christian scientists even, seem as sure as the axioms of geometry, we confess we wait for light. We quite agree with the writer in the *Anthropological Review*, approvingly quoted by Dr. Thompson, as saying: "It may be safely said that there is no opinion current among our scientific men—not even of those opinions whose claim to the title of principle appears most unquestionable—that is not essentially *provisional*, liable to modification, or even revolution, under the pressure of increased knowledge."

This of itself should be a caution to all scientists against arraying their supposed discoveries against any clear averment of the Word of God.

Dr. T. well shows that, allowing the utmost weight to all discoveries claimed to be antagonistic to the Bible, there is no real weight in these "oppositions of science falsely so called." This volume abounds in eloquent passages, and closes with valuable chapters on the Sabbath, and on marriage.

Institutes of Ecclesiastical History, Ancient and Modern; in Four Books, much corrected, enlarged, and improved from the Primary Authorities. By John Lawrence Van Mosheim, D. D., Chancellor of the University of Gottingen. *A new and literal translation from the original Latin, with copious additional Notes, original and selected.* By James Murdock, D. D. In three volumes. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

It is quite unnecessary to point out the merits of Mosheim's "Ecclesiastical History," so long a standard text-book for theological students, which, although supplemented, has not been superseded by the great works of Giesler, Neander, and others, who treat it after other methods. Murdock's translation and annotations have long been acknowledged to be the most scholarly, accurate, and complete yet produced for English students. It was the great life-work of the distinguished translator. No historical, parochial, or clergyman's library is properly furnished without this work. We are glad to see that these three massive volumes are furnished by the Carters at the low price of $7.50.

The New Testament; or the Book of the Holy Gospel of our Lord and our God, Jesus the Messiah. A Literal Translation from the Syriac Pespito Version. By James Murdock, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

The accurate and scholarly qualities of the learned translator appear in this volume, which, while, it gives us the old and true gospel, and "not another," still presents it to the exegete and student of Scripture in the new lights and sides brought to view in its translation through another tongue.

A Commentary on the Confession of Faith, with Questions for Theological Students and Bible Classes. By the Rev. Archibald Alexander Hodge, D. D., Author of "The Atonement," and Professor of Didactic and Polemical Theology in the Western Theological Seminary of Allegheny, Pa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This seasonable volume gives us *multum in parvo.* The clear analysis and articulate exposition of the import of the several articles of the Confession, not only in what it affirms, but what it denies, with a summary of the reasons and proofs of the same, are effected with remarkable brevity and force. We know not where, in so small a compass, so large a body of solid divinity can be found, in a form profitable to all, but eminently convenient and serviceable to students of theology, and to teachers and members of advanced Bible and catechetical classes in our congregations. The lucid, logical, and complete divisions under every article, with the capital series of questions at the close of each chapter, make it a manual for theological study, quite unrivalled. It supplies a real desideratum. Dr. Shedd said, in the Assembly of 1868, at Albany, in proof of the substantial soundness of the new school body, and of their seminaries, that no book was so much "thumbed" by their students as Hodge's "Outlines of Theology." The reason is that it does a work and meets a want that had not previously been provided for. What was done in that volume is done in this far more completely and compactly. We predict for it, therefore, a wide circulation among students and all others interested in a sound theology. L. H. A.

The Secret of Swedenborg: being an Elucidation of his Doctrine of the Divine Natural Humanity. By Henry James. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1869.

If none but a sublime genius could have written this book, it must have been a genius supersublimated till it lost sight of itself, of truth, and reality, by living—or rather starving—in a region of abstractions spun out of itself. It has reeled out of itself a confused medley of Swedenborgianism and Pantheism, now sinking to the abysmal depths of the former, and anon rising to the transcendental mist-world of the latter. Any thing like an intelligible analysis of the book is impossible, in a short notice, if not altogether. Its antichristian tone and drift are sufficiently manifest in passages found almost anywhere, *ad aperturam libri.* Take the following from the author's prefatory advertisement:—

"I hope the day is now no longer so distant as once it seemed, when the idle, pampered, and mischievous force which men have everywhere superstitiously worshipped as divine, and sought to placate by all manner of cruel, slavish, and mercenary observances, may be utterly effaced in the resurrection lineaments of that spotless unfriended youth, who in the darkest hour, allied his own Godward hopes only with the fortunes of the most defiled, the most diseased, the most disowned of human kind.

"The conception we naturally cherish of God in his creative aspect is that of an unprincipled but omnipotent conjuror or magician, who is able to create things —*i. e.*, to make them to be absolutely, or in themselves, and irrespectively of other things—by simply willing them to be; and to unmake them, therefore, if they do not happen to suit his whim just as jauntily as he made them. Now, there is no such unprincipled power, nor any semblance of such a power, on the hither side of hell" (p. 178).

We can commend this volume, therefore, only to those claimants of a "divine natural humanity," who can find food for their souls in speculations as baseless as they are Christless, and often Godless; and which soar only because of a tenuity which seeks the thin air—which are, if not shadows, less than the shadow of a shade.

Aspects of Humanity, brokenly mirrored in the ever-swelling Current of Human Speech. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1869.

This book has its principal aim so "brokenly mirrored" in fragments of prose and verse, that we have not as yet comprehended it.

The White Foreigners from over the Water: the Story of the American Mission to the Burmese and Karens. Published by the American Tract Society. New York.

This interesting volume combines the treasures of real history and biography, of true information in regard to one of the leading missionary fields, and noblest missionaries (Dr. Judson), with all the charm of romance.

Shining Light. By the author of the "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

A vivid epitome of the Christian life in its upspring and growth, enlivened by striking examples and illustrative facts.

The Prophet Elisha. By John M. Lowrie, D. D., author of "Esther and her Times," &c. To which is prefixed a Memoir of the Author. By the Rev. William D. Howard, D. D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church of Pittsburg, Pa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Dr. Lowrie was specially gifted in one favorite line of authorship: unfolding and portraying groups of subjects, persons, and events, which cluster around the great personages of Scripture. The several volumes of this kind which he gave to the public in life were among the higher treasures of our Christian literature. They are alike expository, doctrinal, experimental, and practical. They will only sharpen the appetite of the Christian public for this posthumous volume, which reproduces their chief characteristics. It is rendered more valuable by the biography of its author, one of the most sterling ministers of our church, and whose death, while yet in his meridian, was so widely mourned.

Jenny Geddes; or, Presbyterianism and its Great Conflict with Despotism. By the Rev. W. P. Breed, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

As this volume is mainly a simple and popular exposition of the principle and history of Presbyterianism in its contests with Prelacy, Popery, Erastianism,

&c., &c., we think its leading title should have been in accordance with its leading character, rather than the name of the heroine of the short story which introduces the principal discussion. It is a good book of its kind, but it is not mainly a novel or story, and therefore a title which suggests this is out of place. This criticism, however, does not militate against the merit of the book as such, which is very decided.

Essay on Divorce and Divorce Legislation, with special reference to the United States. By Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL. D., President of Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

No subject more urgently needs discussion, so as to command public attention, than the sanctity of marriage, and the Scriptural grounds of divorce. And nowhere could it find more competent treatment than at the hands of President Woolsey. He takes the high Scriptural ground as the only allowable ground of divorce, and thoroughly sifts the incidental and accessory questions connected therewith. He gives a succinct history of usages and laws, civil and ecclesiastical, in Christendom and in the ancient cultivated nations. He brings before us an account of the legislation and judicial action in the different States of our own country on the subject, and exposes and warns against that growing laxity of opinion and practice in the premises which threaten the very foundations of domestic peace and purity, of social order, of morality and religion. If any thing could show the need of able and earnest treatment of this subject, it is the appearance of a work advocating polygamy on grounds of Scripture and expediency, commended to public attention by George William Curtis and F. B. Sanborn.

A Compendious German Grammar. By William D. Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit, and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. New York: Leypoldt & Holt, F. W. Christern. Boston: S. R. Urbino. 1869.

It is only necessary to name the author of this grammar to insure for it the attention of all who are seriously engaged in mastering German. We feel safe in this *a priori* judgment, the only one possible for us in regard to a book received just as we are going to press.

Reminiscences of James A. Hamilton; or, Men and Events at Home and Abroad, during three-quarters of a Century. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

In the same package also we have received this massive octavo of 650 pages. The author, a son of the great Alexander Hamilton, and himself at one time acting Secretary of State in General Jackson's cabinet, has enjoyed uninterrupted intercourse with the successive constellations of leading public men, from his father's military and political friends of the Revolution, and the early formative periods of our national government, through subsequent eras and administrations until now. The volume, therefore, is a vast repository of letters, facts, and other matters relating to our public affairs and public men, at once instructive and entertaining, while they furnish materials for history.

The Epistle of Paul to the Romans. By J. P. Lange, D. D., and the Rev. F. R. Fay. Translated from the German by J. F. Hurst, D. D., with additions by P. Schaff, D. D., and the Rev. M. B. Riddle. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869.

Although this grand volume reached us just as we were about sending our last notices to the press, thus precluding any thorough or critical examination, we gladly pause to express the conviction of its great value which a very cursory glance at its contents has produced. We rate it far higher than any previous volume of this edition, of Lange's Commentaries, valuable as they all are. Dr. Lange prepared the exegetical and doctrinal parts; the Rev. F. R. Fay, his son-in-law, and pastor at Crefeld, Prussia, the homiletical sections. The English edition is the result of the combined labor of the Rev. Dr. Hurst, the Rev. M. B. Riddle, and the general editor, Dr. Schaff. The annotations, discussions, and supplementary interpolations of Dr. Schaff add immensely to its value. He appears to have laid himself out to bring the Commentary on what he esteems the "Epistle of Epistles," to the utmost possible perfection, with an enthusiasm, learning, and earnest thinking which befit his high theme. It is such a complete thesaurus of the literature of the subject,—and this thoroughly mastered and digested, exegetical, doctrinal, and practical,—that no clergyman's library can afford to be without it.

In the glance we have given it, we notice the elaborate exposition of chap. v. 12, *et seq.*, and the view of original sin thence evolved. While we regret that Dr. Schaff discards the strictly federal system, and sees cause to controvert views on this subject, which we have felt called on to defend, we rejoice nevertheless that, taking the realistic interpretation of Augustin's system, he heartily maintains that the race sinned in Adam and fell with him in the first transgression; that this sinning of the race in the first sin is thus the ground of its fall into sin and misery; and that he cordially rejects all those semi-pelagian views which deny any imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and logically tend to the denial of every form of original sin. We understood it to be maintained also in the commentary on chap. ix. that predestination and election are sovereign and free, wholly independent of foreseen faith and good works.

Whatever may be our differences with any utterances of this, as of all uninspired works, we again express our high appreciation of this volume as among the noblest contributions to our biblical literature.

The Cross and the Crown; or, Faith working by Love, as exemplified in the Life of Fidelia Fiske. By Rev. T. D. Fiske, D. D. (pp. 416, 8vo.) Boston: Congregational S. S. and Pub. Soc.

This memoir has a rare subject, and is executed with rare taste and skill. Miss Fiske's name is both a precious treasure and a living power in the churches, and this choice volume will explain and justify the fact, and spread more widely that influence which was so blessed in Persia, at Mt. Holyoke, both before and after her missionary career, and in the many Christian communities that she visited in behalf of missions after her return to her native land. Her natural endowments were extraordinary, both in respect to power of acquisition and ability to impress and control others. Of the many noble men and women who have served the master in the missionary work, few have been so furnished as she for eminent service, and few will wear a brighter crown.

The Mill on the Floss. By George Eliot. Household Edition. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1869.

This is one of the household edition of Eliot's novels of uniform style with the edition of Thackeray by the same house, which has been so favorably received. We need not say that the novels of this authoress have a high rank with the novel-reading public.

Bible Wonders. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., Author of "Safe Compass," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

Little Effie's Home. By the Author of "Donald Fraser," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

Harry Blake's Trouble. American Tract Society. New York.

PAMPHLETS.

Church History the Exponent of Godly Life and Doctrine. A Lecture delivered by the Rev. Wm. M. Blackburn upon his Inauguration into the Chair of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History, in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the Northwest. Chicago, September 3, 1868.

At this late hour we are glad to call the attention of our readers to this timely and able inaugural, which treats a great subject with force and pertinency. It has been left unnoticed hitherto, through inadvertence.

A Letter to the Alumni of Dartmouth College, on its Hundredth Anniversary. By Nathan Lord. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869.

Dr. Lord, the venerable ex-President of Dartmouth College, has here given what we suppose are intended as his last counsels to the large body of graduates, in whose education he has taken an honorable and conspicuous part. The letter exhibits very strongly the venerable author's well-known personal intellectual, and religious characteristics: his originality, learning, conservatism, orthodoxy, and, of course, his pre-millennial advent leanings. We thiuk the large pamphlet, on the whole, gains nothing by the long note in which he reviews the controversy between Drs. McCosh and Hopkins. The venerable author, we think, hardly comprehends the point of it.

The Relation between Religion and Politics. By J. H. McIlvaine, Professor of Belles Lettres in Princeton College. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1869.

This bold and vigorous discourse was delivered in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, in Philadelphia, on the Lord's Day, July 4, 1869, and published by request of the congregation. The theme is confessedly one of the most important, formidable, and perplexing that can engage our attention. With Dr. McIlvaine's powerful denunciations of the prevailing political corruption and venality, and of that divorce of religion from politics which many, even in the church, contend for, and still more practice, we warmly sympathize. We quite agree with his main proposition, at least within certain limits, that "Christian people are bouud to act politically for the building up of the kingdom of Christ." That is, we hold, first, negatively, that they are not at liberty to support or practice irreligion and ungodliness in politics any more than elsewhere; and next, affirmatively, that they are bound so to conduct in politics and elsewhere, as to further, to the extent of

their ability, all good and to repress all evil—here as everywhere, to do all to the glory of God. The doctrine that men in politics, in dealing with the civil relations of men, are not bound by the obligations of religion, is simply monstrous and atheistic. Thus far all is quite clear. How far these great ends can be promoted by forming distinct political organizations for the promotion of a particular type of religion, is another and more complex question. Its solution depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. On the one hand is the fact, that unless the overwhelming preponderance of popular sentiment favor it, such third parties on single moral and religious issues usually serve only to drain the purest, and strengthen the foulest of the great political parties. For the answer to this objection, and modes of obviating it, on the part of those who think otherwise, we refer our readers to Dr. McIlvaine's stirring discourse.

Basis of Reunion for 1869. *A Letter to the Ministers and Ruling Elders of the Presbyterian Church.* By Rev. Samuel Miller, D. D.

Dr Miller has here amplified the great points of his speech in the Assembly against reunion. While we honor him for his fidelity, and, until the latest phase of the reunion movement, have felt that many of the considerations adduced by him were entitled to great weight, we think their pertinency is now outrun by the logic of events. Before the bombardment of Sumter, proposals and arguments for conciliation and peace were in place. After that, the only practical question for every man was, Which side shall I support? And after Lee's surrender, the only question for the South was, not whether to accept the situation, but how to make the best of it. After the departure of our New School brethren in 1838, the question for each Presbyterian was not how to preserve unity, but which branch of the sundered church he should join. So now, the real question is not, whether we shall, or shall not, have reunion. After all the discussions for and against it, and the previous action of our presbyteries in favor of it on the basis of the standards, pure and simple, when our New School brethren accepted that basis, and all parties agreed to refer the matter to the presbyteries, it ceased to be really an open question. By the leadings of Providence, it is devolved on us not to oppose it, but to assist in guiding it to the best results.

One important service has been done by Dr. Miller in this letter. He has shown by statistics that the Old School body has the larger proportionate increase of members by profession. We do not allude to this for the sake of any invidious comparisons with our New School brethren. Every thing of this sort is especially to be deprecated at this time. We rejoice a thousand times in all their prosperity. But it has often been urged in favor of departures from our confession, often called New School, such as the peculiarities of Barnes, Beman, and Duffield, that they are more promotive of revivals, religious activity, and increase, than the Old School system of our simple standards. We think facts prove that our system of doctrine, like the word of God, from which it is taken, is pre-eminently "quick and powerful" in the promotion of experimental and practical religion. This should not be lost sight of in moulding our Presbyterian future. L. H. A.

Inaugural Discourses of Professors Morris and Nelson. Delivered at Lane Seminary, on the Thirty-second Anniversary, May 13–14, 1868. Cincinnati. 1868.

The first of these discourses, by Professor Morris, is entitled the "Supernatural Reality of the Church of God." The second, by Professor Nelson, the "Relations of the Christian Truth to the Christian Life." It will gratify those interested in the future of the united church to know that these themes are well treated. Dr. Nelson strikes the true key-note when he says: "Religious experience, which, in any degree, disregards Scriptural truth, is so far spurious,—is so far morbid. Its fervors are fevers; its growth is inflation; its raptures are delirium."

Eating and Drinking Unworthily. By the Rev. George S. Mott. Presbyterian Board of Education.

A very judicious and much needed exhibition of the true qualifications for the Lord's table, in harmony with the Scriptures and our confession in faith.

We are happy to announce as in press a volume entitled "Judaic Baptism," by Rev. James W. Dale, Pastor of the Media Presbyterian Church, Delaware Co., Pa., designed to succeed and form a complement to his great work entitled "Classic Baptism," which has been received by the great mass of Pedobaptists as alike original, exhaustive, and unanswerable, so that, in four months, a second edition of it has been called for.

The Periodic Law. By the Rev. George A. Leakin, A. M., of Baltimore. New York. Pott & Amery, Cooper Union.

This little volume has been for some time before the public, but until lately it had not come into our hands.

The topic is one of interest to thinking men, and the author, though the time has not come for its complete exposition, deserves credit for the way in which he has broached it. As a tentative effort, while no more was possible, it will do its work, and can hardly fail in the end to add to our stock of rules for the conduct of life.

Two or three points may require a little reconsideration before another edition is issued. In regard to natural laws, there seems an error in conception and mode of expression, as in the first paragraph. Says an eminent physician: "The subject of the periodic law revives the impressions which I have received from time to time of the instrumentality of that law in the seasons; the periodical and destructive visitations of the elements," &c. Now laws in nature are not instruments; they are rules, or modes of operation—the instruments being substances or powers of substances, material or spiritual. Forces act regularly, and hence we speak of the laws of their operation.

Again, the results of mere averages should be distinguished from the periodic occurrence of events. Averages may be determined where the periodicity of particular events is not apparent. In the case of births, deaths, suicides, &c., the uniformities noticeable do not seem to us proper illustrations of the periodic law. But as this may admit of different representations, we merely suggest it as a topic for the author's reflection.

Let us add, uniformity of results from uniformity of causes is to be expected;

and this, in many cases, results in uniformity of events; but in most cases, where averages are spoken of, the various complications of causes renders the observable periodicity impossible.

Upon the whole, we commend this little volume to the perusal of thoughtful men, and can hardly doubt that good will come of its publication. The author deserves recognition as having at least put the "*prudens quæstio*," which is "*dimidium scientiæ*," and contributed something toward its solution.

The Intelligence of Animals. With Illustrative Anecdotes. From the French of Ernest Benardt. With Illustrations. Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway. 1869.

It would be difficult to find any book more attractive, alike to the general reading public and to the philosopher. The facts and narratives related are in the highest degree instructive and entertaining to all, while they throw light upon some of the most difficult problems before the psychologist in regard to the distinction between human and brute intelligence. It is one of Scribner's popular series of "Marvels of Nature, Science, and Art."

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

IN these summer months but little of the publishers' work comes to the surface. The autumn will doubtless show that the printers have not kept holiday through the quarters preceding. The most memorable issue of the summer, common consent will declare to be Mr. Gladstone's "Juventus Mundi," another of the splendid monuments of his genius, learning, and culture which England's Premier can so well rear. Two recesses of Parliament, in 1867 and 1868, furnished him the time and opportunity to prepare this valuable and brilliant sketch of "The Gods and Men of the Heroic Age." Mr. Gladstone is grandly refuting the popular prejudice against the shrivelling power of classical culture. Ruskin's new work is pronounced one of his finest productions, and draws from the same rich old fountain. Its title is "The Queen of the Air: being a Study of the Greek Myths of Cloud and Storm."

Renan's "St. Paul," which is coming out almost simultaneously in French, German, and English, we do not find under the heading "Minor Fiction."

The exegetical issues of the quarter are easily enumerated. They are Drake's "Notes on the Prophecies of Amos," with a new translation; Bassett's "Book on the Prophet Hosea;" Didham's "New Translation of The Psalms," Part I. (Psalms i.–xxv.); a translation of Schenkel's "Sketch of the Character of Jesus;" Bourn's "Christ in the Pentateuch;" a translation from the Portuguese of "Fra Thomé de Jesu's Sufferings of Jesus" (said to be by Dr. Pusey); Gwynne's "Moses: an Essay on the Deliverance and Journeyings of Israel;" Leathes' "Witness of St. Paul to Christ" (the Boyle Lectures for 1869—a continuation of the Lectures of 1868 on the Witness of the Old Testament to Christ). Rev. J.

G. Wood's Bible Animals is unquestionably the most complete and attractive work of its kind (8vo., pp. xxix. 652. Longmans). It is to be promptly republished by Messrs. C. Scribner & Co., and will be one of the most popular and useful of their issues. Other houses are also contemplating its republication.

In the department of dogmatic and ecclesiastical literature we find Hessey's "Catechetical Lessons on the Book of Common Prayer;" McIntyre's "Sabbath; the Rest of the Seventh Day;" "Church Restoration: its Principles and Methods;" "In Spirit and in Truth: an Essay on the Ritual of the New Testament;" C. J. Hemans' (son of the poetess) "History of Mediæval Christianity and Sacred Art in Italy;" Haddan's "Apostolic Succession in the Church of England;" Sadler's "Bible the People's Charter;" Cazenove's "Some Aspects of the Reformation." Two more volumes of T. and T. Clark's Ante-Nicene Christian Library have appeared, Vol. II. of "Clement of Alexandria," and Vol. I. of "Tertullian." Two volumes on the Irish Church Question are Dr. W. M. Brady's "Essays on the English State Church in Ireland;" and "The Light of the West; a Historical Sketch," &c. By a graduate of Cambridge.

We add Rigg's "Harmony of the Bible with Experimental Physical Science;" Moister's "Conversations on the Rise, Progress, and Present State of Wesleyan Missions in various parts of the world;" Gould's "Origin and Development of Religious Belief," Part I.; Havergall's "Ministry of Song;" and Miss Winkworth's "Christian Singers of Germany" (Vol. VI. of the Sunday Library).

A volume of Dr. Bannerman's sermons has lately been published; also, "Plain Speaking on Deep Truths," a volume of sermons by M. F. Sadler; a volume of Cambridge University sermons by Rev. W. S. Smith, on "Christian Faith;" a volume of the sermons of Dr. Goode, Dean of Ripon; and a volume by Samuel Minton, on "The Glory of Christ."

Pusey's "Eirenicon," Part II., is a letter to Dr. Newman "in explanation chiefly in regard to the reverential love due to the ever-blessed Theotokos, and the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception." Many possessors of the "Lyra Germanica" will be glad to add to it a volume of "Historical Notes, Memoirs," &c., complied and translated by Theodore Kubler. A new edition of Keble's "Psalter," with its beautiful and characteristic versions, has come out in style uniform with the memoir, which has just appeared in a second, somewhat improved edition.

Haig's "Symbolism; or Mind, Matter, Language, as the Elements of Thinking and Reasoning, &c.," and R. G. Hazard's "Letters to John Stuart Mill on Causation and Freedom in Willing," are almost the only contributions to philosophical literature.

Of a philosophical nature, and of very considerable value, are A. J. Ellis's work on "Early English Pronunciation, with Especial Reference to Shakespeare and Chaucer" (Part I.), and Abbott's "Shakespearean Grammar." Two valuable contributions to our knowledge of one department of our literature are Henderson's "Proverbs and Quotations," and especially W. C. Hazlitt's "English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases." The Arnold Prize Essay for 1869 is J. A. Doyle's "American Colonies previous to the Declaration of Independence." A geographical and historical work that also has reference to our continent is Brown's "History of the Island of Cape Breton," with accounts of the discovery and settlement of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. G. A. Sala's "Rome and Venice" will attract attention.

A few biographies must complete our present survey: Madame Guizot de Witt's "Countess of Derby (the Lady of Latham);" "The Life of Madame Louise de France (Mother Thérése de St. Augustin);" Sadler's "Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson;" Sir James Clark's "Memoir of Dr. Conolly;" and Hosack's "Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers."

GERMANY.

Our gleanings in the exegetical department for the past quarter are very meagre. We find occasion to chronicle an additional volume in Keil and Delitzsch's series of Commentaries on the Old Testament—Keil's Commentary on the Prophet Daniel; a little treatise by C. P. Caspari—an introduction to the Book of Daniel; Noack's "*Turraqah und Sunamith*"—the Song of Solomon presented with reference to its historical and local background; Ehrt's "Time of the Composition and Completion of the Psalter," with a special view to the question concerning Maccabæan psalms; Wieseler's "Contributions to the Right Estimate of the Gospels and Evangelical History"—in continuation of the author's well known and valuable Synopsis; J. G. Müller's "Exposition of the Epistle of Barnabas;" Rönsch's "Itala and Vulgate: the Idiom of the Itala of the Primitive Church and the Catholic Vulgate, with Reference to the Speech of the Roman Populace."

One of the most important works in the department of dogmatics is the new edition of Calvin's Institutes, published in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, under the editorship of Baum, Kunitz and Reuss (2 vols. 4to). We note besides Van Endert's "Theology (doctrine of God) in the Patristic Period, with Especial Reference to Augustine;" Gerlach's "Last Things; Exhibited according to the Doctrine of the Scriptures, with particular Reference to Schleiermacher's Eschatology"—a volume consisting of three discussions of "The ecclesiastico-religious significance of the true doctrine of the means of grace, with especial reference to the Lord's Supper," by Drs. A. von Hachs and Th. Harnack; Pichler's "Theology of Leibnitz;" Delitzsch's "System of Christian Apologetics"—a volume of lectures of an apologetic character, delivered in Bremen by men like Luthardt, Tischendorf, Lange, Zöckler, Gess, Uhlhorn, &c.; and E. Müller's *Theologia Moralis* (Catholic, Vienna).

In the department of ecclesiastical history and biography, perhaps the most important work is Kampschulte's "Life of Calvin, including his Church and State in Geneva" (Vol. I.) Vol. II. of Mörikofer's Life of Zwingle is also just published, together with Mönckeberg's "Matthias Claudius;" Palacky's Collection of documents illustrating the life, doctrine, trial, &c., of Huss, and the religious controversies in Bohemia in A. D. 1403–1418; Vol. II. of Friedrich's "Ecclesiastical History of Germany" (Merovingian period); Vol. III. of Bindemann's "Life of St. Augustine"—treating of his Episcopal life and work; and Parts 2–6 of the new and uniform edition of Hagenbach's "Church History." We may add here A. W. Zumpt's very elaborate discussion on the year of our Lord's birth; and Schletterer's "History of Sacred Poetry and Church Music, in their connection with political and social development, especially among the German people" (Vol. I).

Within the range of philosophical literature we observe the recent appearance of Vol. I. of the third edition of Zeller's "History of Greek Philosophy;" Alberti's "Socrates;" Steinschneider's "Life and Writings of Al. Fabari, the Arabic Philosopher, with notices of Greek science among the Arabs;" Vol. I. of Plitt's "Aus

Schelling's Leben," Vol. II. of Teichmüller's "Aristotelian Studies;" Part II. of Vol. V. of Kuno Fischer's "History of Modern Philosophy;" Dühring's "Critical History of Philosophy" (one vol.); Struve's "Life of the Soul, or Natural History of Man;" Körner's "Genesis and Growth of the Human Spirit" (2 vols.); Horwicz's "Outlines of a System of Æsthetics;" and the continuation of Von Kirchmann's "Philosophical Library," through Part 29 (the series, thus far, including various works of Kant, Hume, Berkeley, Spinoza, and Grotius, with original papers, notes, &c., by the editor, and in the case of Berkeley, by Ueberweg).

Of a more miscellaneous character are Bruhns' "Life of Encke;" L. Von Ranke's "History of Wallenstein;" Vol. II. of Von Sybel's Miscellaneous Historical Papers; Vol. I. of Gindely's "History of the Thirty Years' War;" Benfey's "History of Linguistic Science and Oriental Philology in Germany" (Vol. VIII. of the "Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland"); Vol. I., Part I. of a new edition of Grimm's German Grammar; Schliemann's "Ithaca, Peloponnesus, and Troy;" a Lecture of Lauth's on the "Historical Results of Egyptology;" Wüstenfeld's "Dwellings and Wanderings of the Arabian Tribes;" Part I. of Dümichen's "Results of the Prusso-Egyptian Expedition of 1868;" and Vol. I., Part I. of Naumann's "Musical Art in the History of Civilization."

FRANCE.

In theology and exegesis the more important issues of the quarter are Bannard's "L'Apôtre St. Jean;" Renan's "St. Paul;" Planet's "Dieu d'après la foi;" Maistre's "Introduction to the Evidences of Christianity" (being Part I. of a work which will be valuable if it equals the promise of the title; "La Grande Christologie Prophetique et Historique, Philosophique et Théologique Archéologique, Traditionnelle, &c.); Alauxs "Progressive Religion, a Study in Social Philosophy;" Meignan's "World and Primitive Man according to the Bible;" Tissandier's "Studies in Theodicy;" Martin's "Future of Protestantism and Catholicism." In history we find announced among recent publications Chevallard's "Church and State in France in the 9th Century—Life and Writings of St. Agobard, Archbishop of Lyons;" Langlais' "Armenian Historians of the 5th Century," being Vol. II. of his larger "Collection of Armenian Historians, Ancient and Modern;" Pilliers' "Benedictines of the Congregation of France" (2 vols.); Taillandier's "Bohemia and Hungary;" Vol. III. of Lenormant's valuable "Manual of Ancient Oriental History;" Lefebvre de Béhaine's "History of the Cabinets of Europe during the Consulate and Empire; Germany in 1809 and the alliance of Tilsit;" Gerard's "France and China" (2 vols.); Reaume's "J. B. Bossuet and his Works."

In philosophy, philology, &c., we note Marrast's "Hegel's Philosophy of Right;" Leroy's "Christian Philosophy of History;" Gréard's "Abélard and Héloise," the letters in the Latin text with translation, and a philosophical and literary preface; A. de Gasparin's "Equality;" L. de Rosny on the "Origin of Language;" Bancel's "Revolutions in Speech;" Leflocq's "Studies in Celtic Mythology:" Mowat's "Ancient and Modern Proper Nouns: a Study in Comparative Onomatology;" Count Vogué's "Central Syria—Semitic Inscriptions;" Allard's "History of Criminal Justice in the 16th Century;" Guizot's "Political and Historical Miscellanies;" Vol. V. of Taine's "History of English Literature" (contemporary authors).