





THE  
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JULY, 1868.

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No. III.

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ART. I.—*The Trial of the Rev. William Tennent.*

OF the names conspicuous in the early history of the American Presbyterian Church, there are few more remarkable than that of Tennent. Among the members of the distinguished family which bear the name there is no one whose history is so familiar or so attractive as that of William Tennent, junior. The remarkable events in his early life, so extraordinary indeed as to appear supernatural, have given a deeper interest to his biography, and made his life appear more like the creation of romance than like the sober statements of history. Incredible as the narrative may now appear it is nevertheless true, that in the last fifty years his biography was as generally read and as firmly believed by the multitudes of intelligent Christian people as that of any other remarkable man who has adorned the annals of the American Church. It seemed, at least in the judgment of his biographer, to be founded on facts so clearly established or so well authenticated, however extraordinary they may appear, as not to admit of doubt or denial. So well authenticated indeed did they appear to be that, while the narrative was deemed by many to bear intrinsic evidence of mistake or error, and by others to be absolutely incredible, no serious attempt has ever been made

to investigate their truth or to examine the foundation upon which they were alleged to rest. The object of the present article is to examine the truth of one only of the remarkable events of his life, viz., that which relates to his indictment for a crime and his deliverance from conviction by the testimony of a witness whose attendance was induced by the influence of a dream. The narrative is as follows:

“The time of which we are now speaking was remarkable for a great revival of religion\* in which Mr. Tennent was considerably instrumental, and in which a Mr. David Rowland, brought up with Mr. Tennent at the Log College, was also very remarkable for his successful preaching among all ranks of people. Possessing a commanding eloquence as well as other estimable qualities, he became very popular, and was much celebrated throughout the country. His celebrity and success were subjects of very serious regret to many careless worldlings, who placed all their happiness in the enjoyment of temporal objects, and considered and represented Mr. Rowland and his brethren as fanatics and hypocrites. This was specially applicable to many of the great men of the then province of New Jersey, and particularly to the chief justice, who was well known for his disbelief of revelation. There was at this time prowling through the country, a noted man by the name of Tom Bell, whose knowledge and understanding were very considerable, and who greatly excelled in low art and cunning. His mind was totally debased, and his whole conduct betrayed a soul capable of descending to every species of iniquity. In all the arts of theft, robbery, fraud, deception, and defamation, he was so deeply skilled and so thoroughly practised, that it is believed he never had his equal in this country. He had been indicted in almost every one of the middle colonies, but his ingenuity and cunning always enabled him to escape punishment. This man unhappily resembled Mr. Rowland in his external appearance, so as hardly to be known from him, without the most careful examination.

“It so happened, that Tom Bell arrived one evening at a tavern in Princeton, dressed in a dark parson’s-gray frock.

\* It was not far from A. D. 1744.

On his entering the tavern about dusk, the late John Stockton, Esq., of that town, a pious and respectable man, to whom Mr. Rowland was well known, went up to Bell, and addressed him as Mr. Rowland, and was inviting him to go home with him. Bell assured him of his mistake. It was with some difficulty that Mr. Stockton acknowledged his error; and then informed Bell that it had arisen from his great resemblance to Mr. Rowland. This hint was sufficient for the prolific genius of that notorious impostor. The next day Bell went into the county of Hunterdon, and stopped in a congregation where Mr. Rowland had formerly preached once or twice, but where he was not intimately known. Here he met with a member of the congregation, to whom he introduced himself as the Rev. Mr. Rowland, who had preached to them some time before. This gentleman immediately invited him to his house, to spend the week; and begged him, as the people were without a minister, to preach for them on the next Sabbath, to which Bell agreed, and notice was accordingly given to the neighbourhood. The impostor was treated with every mark of attention and respect; and a private room was assigned to him, as a study, to prepare for the Sabbath. The sacred day arrived, and he was invited to ride to church with the ladies in the family wagon, and the master of the house accompanied them on an elegant horse. When they had arrived near the church, Bell on a sudden discovered that he had left his notes in his study, and proposed to ride back for them on the fine horse, by which means he should be able to return in time for the service. This proposal was instantly agreed to, and Bell mounted the horse, returned to the house, rifled the desk of his host, and made off with the horse. Wherever he stopped he called himself the Rev. David Rowland.

“At the time this event took place, Messrs. Tennent and Rowland had gone into Pennsylvania, or Maryland, with Mr. Joshua Anderson and Mr. Benjamin Stevens, (both members of a church contiguous to that where Bell had practised his fraud,) on business of a religious nature. Soon after their return, Mr. Rowland was charged with the above robbery: he gave bonds to appear at the court at Trenton, and the affair made a great noise throughout the colony. At the Court of

Oyer and Terminer the judge charged the grand jury on the subject with great severity. After long consideration the jury returned into court without finding a bill. The judge reproved them in an angry manner, and ordered them out again. They again returned without finding a bill, and were again sent out with threatenings of severe punishment if they persisted in their refusal. At last they agreed, and brought in a bill for the alleged crime. On the trial, Messrs. Tennent, Anderson, and Stevens appeared as witnesses, and fully proved an *alibi* in favour of Mr. Rowland, by swearing that on the very day on which the robbery was committed they were with Mr. Rowland and heard him preach in Pennsylvania or Maryland. The jury accordingly acquitted him without hesitation, to the great disappointment and mortification of his persecutors, and of many other enemies to the great revival of religion that had recently taken place, but to the great joy of the serious and well disposed.

“The spirits hostile to the spread of the gospel were not, however, so easily overcome. In their view an opportunity was now presented favourable for inflicting a deep wound on the cause of Christianity, and, as if urged on by the malice of man’s great enemy, they resolved that no means should be left untried, no arts unemployed, for the destruction of these distinguished servants of God. Many and various were the circumstances which still contributed to inspire them with hopes of success. The testimony of the person who had been robbed was positive that Mr. Rowland was the robber; and this testimony was corroborated by that of a number of individuals who had seen Tom Bell personating Mr. Rowland, using his name, and in possession of the horse. These sons of Belial had been able, after great industry used for the purpose, to collect a mass of evidence of this kind, which they considered as establishing the fact; but Mr. Rowland was now out of their power by the verdict of not guilty. Their vengeance, therefore, was directed against the witnesses by whose testimony he had been cleared, and they were accordingly arraigned for perjury before a Court of Quarter Sessions in the county, and the grand jury received a strict charge, the plain import of which was, that these good men ought to be indicted. After an examination of

the testimony on one side only, as is the custom in such cases, the grand jury did accordingly find bills of indictment against Messrs. Tennent, Anderson, and Stevens, for wilful and corrupt perjury. Their enemies, and the enemies of the gospel, now began to triumph. They gloried in the belief that an indelible stain would be fixed on the professors of religion, and of consequence on religion itself, and that this new light, by which they denominated all appearance of piety, would soon be extinguished for ever.

“These indictments were removed to the Supreme Court; and poor Mr. Anderson, living in the county, and conscious of his entire innocence, could not brook the idea of lying under the odium of the hateful crime of perjury, and demanded a trial at the first Court of Oyer and Terminer. This proved most seriously injurious to him, for he was pronounced guilty, and most cruelly and unjustly condemned to stand one hour on the court-house steps, with a paper on his breast, whereon was written in large letters, ‘This is for wilful and corrupt perjury;’ which sentence was executed upon him.

“Messrs. Tennent and Stevens were summoned to appear at the next court; and attended accordingly, depending on the aid of Mr. John Coxe, an eminent lawyer, who had been previously employed to conduct their defence. As Mr. Tennent was wholly unacquainted with the nature of forensic litigation, and did not know of any person living who could prove his innocence, (all the persons who were with him being indicted,) his only resource and consolation was to commit himself to the Divine will, and if he must suffer, to take it as from the hand of God, who, he well knew, could make even the wrath of man to praise him; and considering it as probable that he might suffer, he had prepared a sermon to be preached from the pillory, if that should be his fate. On his arrival at Trenton, he found the famous Mr. Smith, of New York, father of the late chief justice of Canada, one of the ablest lawyers in America, and of a religious character, who had voluntarily attended to aid in his defence; also his brother Gilbert, who was now settled in the pastoral charge of the Second Presbyterian church in Philadelphia, and who had brought Mr. John Kinsey, one of the first counsellors of that city, for the same

purpose. Messrs. Tennent and Stevens met these gentlemen at Mr. Coxe's the morning before the trial was to come on. Mr. Coxe requested that they would bring in their witnesses, that they might examine them previously to their going into court. Mr. Tennent answered that he did not know of any witnesses but God and his own conscience. Mr. Coxe replied, 'If you have no witnesses, sir, the trial must be put off; otherwise you most certainly will be convicted. You know well the strong testimony that will be brought against you, and the exertions that are making to accomplish your ruin.' Mr. Tennent replied, 'I am sensible of all this, yet it never shall be said that I have delayed the trial, or been afraid to meet the justice of my country. I know my own innocence, and that God whose I am, and whom I serve, will never suffer me to fall by these snares of the devil, or by the wicked machinations of his agents or servants. Therefore, gentlemen, go on to the trial.' Messrs. Smith and Kinsey, who were both religious men, told him that his confidence and trust in God, as a Christian minister of the gospel, was well founded, and before a heavenly tribunal would be all-important to him; but assured him it would not avail in an earthly court, and urged his consent to put off the trial. Mr. Tennent continued inflexible in his refusal; on which Mr. Coxe told him that, since he was determined to go to trial, he had the satisfaction of informing him that they had discovered a flaw in the indictment, which might prove favourable to him on a demurrer. He asked for an explanation, and on finding that it was to admit the fact in a legal point of view, and rest on the law arising from it, Mr. Tennent broke out with great vehemence, saying that this was another snare of the devil, and before he would consent to it he would suffer death. He assured his counsel that his confidence in God was so strong, and his assurance that he would bring about his deliverance in some way or other was so great, that he did not wish them to delay the trial for a moment.

"Mr. Stevens, whose faith was not of this description, and who was bowed down to the ground under the most gloomy apprehensions of suffering, as his neighbour Mr. Anderson had done, eagerly seized the opportunity of escape that was offered, and was afterwards discharged on the exception.



“Mr. Coxe still urged putting off the trial, charging Mr. Tennent with acting the part rather of a wild enthusiast, than of a meek and prudent Christian; but he insisted that they should proceed, and left them in astonishment, not knowing how to act, when the bell summoned them to court.

“Mr. Tennent had not walked far in the street, before he met a man and his wife, who stopped him, and asked if his name was not Tennent. He answered in the affirmative, and begged to know if they had any business with him. The man replied, ‘You best know.’ He told his name, and said that he was from a certain place (which he mentioned) in Pennsylvania or Maryland; that Messrs. Rowland, Tennent, Anderson, and Stevens had lodged either at his house, or in a house wherein he and his wife had been servants, (it is not now certain which) at a particular time, which he named; that on the following day they had heard Messrs. Tennent and Rowland preach; that some nights before they left home, he and his wife waked out of a sound sleep, and each told the other a dream which had just occurred, and which proved to be the same in substance, to wit, that he, Mr. Tennent, was at Trenton, in the greatest possible distress, and that it was in their power, and their’s only, to relieve him. Considering it as a remarkable dream only, they again went to sleep, and it was twice repeated precisely in the same manner to both of them. This made so deep an impression on their minds that they set off, and here they were, and would know of him what they were to do. Mr. Tennent immediately went with them to the court-house, and his counsel on examining the man and his wife, and finding their testimony to be full to the purpose, were, as they well might be, in perfect astonishment. Before the trial began, another person of a low character, called on Mr. Tennent, and told him that he was so harassed in conscience for the part he had been acting in this prosecution, that he could get no rest till he had determined to come and make a full confession. He sent this man to his counsel also. Soon after, Mr. Stockton from Princeton appeared, and added his testimony. In short, they went to trial, and notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the ablest counsel, who had been employed to aid the attorney-general against Mr. Tennent, the

advocates on his side so traced every movement of the defendant on the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday in question, and satisfied the jury so perfectly on the subject, that they did not hesitate honourably to acquit Mr. Tennent, by their unanimous verdict of not guilty, to the great confusion and mortification of his numerous opposers. Mr. Tennent assured the writer of this, that during the whole of this business, his spirits never failed him, and that he contemplated the possibility of his suffering so infamous a punishment as standing in the pillory, without dismay, and had made preparation, and was fully determined to deliver a sermon to the people in that situation, if he should be placed in it."

To the foregoing narrative the following statement is added by the author: "The writer sincerely rejoices, that though a number of the extraordinary incidents in the life of Mr. Tennent cannot be vouched for by public testimony and authentic documents, yet the singular manner in which a gracious God did appear for this his faithful servant in the time of that distress which has just been noticed, is a matter of public notoriety, and capable of being verified by the most unquestionable testimony and records."

Now the only remarkable part of this narrative is the statement that the witnesses were induced to attend the trial by the influence of a dream, and that the counsel in the cause and other witnesses were providentially present without procurement in time to establish the innocence of the accused. The writer does not certainly mean to assert that either the dream or the unsolicited attendance of witnesses or counsel were "capable of being verified by the most unquestionable testimony and records." The records can extend only to the facts of the indictment and the acquittal.

The narrative proceeds, "This special instance of the interference of the righteous Judge of all the earth ought to yield consolation to pious people in seasons of great difficulty and distress, where there is none that seems able to deliver them. Yet it ought to afford no encouragement to the enthusiast who refuses to use the means of preservation and deliverance which God puts in his power. True confidence in God is always accompanied with the use of all lawful means and the rejec-

tion of all that are unlawful. It consists in an unshaken belief that while right means are used, God will give that issue which shall be most for his glory and his people's good." We admit in its utmost extent the soundness of this principle, and shall have occasion hereafter to invoke its application to the present inquiry.

The narrative first appeared in the General Assembly's *Missionary Magazine* for 1806. It is stated by Dr. Ashbel Green (Jones' *Life of Green*, page 310), "that the article may be considered as the joint production of Dr. Boudinot and myself. Dr. Boudinot was an executor of Mr. Tennent's will; he first wrote the article on the condition that I would promise to modify it and to correct other things in the memoir. I gave the promise and fulfilled it." It is believed that this magazine contains the first printed statement that ever appeared of the life of Tennent. If there be an earlier, I have not been able to discover the least trace of it. There are now in existence numerous accounts\* of this particular incident in his life, but it is believed that they are all founded upon the narrative of Dr. Boudinot. The most material incidents in the narrative were furnished in the year 1805 by Dr. Thomas Henderson to Dr. Boudinot at his request. He states explicitly in the narrative that he heard them, not from Mr. Tennent himself but from his own parents, who were members of Mr. Tennent's church, and who received them from the lips of Mr. Tennent.

The whole narrative rests upon the statement by Dr. Henderson of what his father and mother told him, that Mr. Tennent had told them. It is hearsay evidence at second-hand. Not one of the parties concerned in the narrative pretends to have the least personal knowledge of the facts. The events transpired in 1742. They were first reduced to writing in 1805, more than sixty years after they had occurred. The statements would not be received as evidence of any transaction, however trivial, in any court of justice. The narrative

\* *Assembly's Magazine*, Vol. II., No. 3, March 1806, pp. 97, 156. Alexander's *Log College*, pp. 168, 229, 231, 346. Allen's *Biographical Dictionary*, verb. "Tennent, W.," p. 718. Webster's *History of the Presbyterian Church*, pp. 188, 189, 387, 393. Sprague's *Annals of the Am. Pulpit*, Vol. III., p. 55. *Proceedings of the N. J. Hist. Soc.*, Vol. VI., p. 31, Judge Field's Address.

bears upon its face the clearest evidence of its origin and character. It lacks precision and certainty in all its details. "It was *not far* from the year 1744" when the transaction occurred, it was in a congregation where Rowland had formerly preached, but whether in Amwell, Hopewell, or Maidenhead, is not stated, nor is it now known by tradition or otherwise. The name of the person robbed is not mentioned. "Messrs. Tennent and Rowland had gone into Pennsylvania or Maryland." The person who had attended as a witness was either the proprietor of the house or a servant of the house in which Mr. Tennent lodged. The names of the witnesses are not given, nor the place where they resided. In fact every particular by which the accuracy of the statement might have been tested is omitted. It bears all the marks of a narrative transmitted by tradition. It lacks every element of a narrative resting upon the memory of the witness by whom it is related. On these grounds alone, fully admitting the veracity of the witnesses, it could not be received as evidence of any fact, however probable, much less of a miracle or of any superhuman event. It seems probable that some of the facts were detailed to Dr. Boudinot by his father-in-law, Mr. Stockton, but Mr. Stockton died in 1757, fifty years before the narrative was written. Mr. Tennent died in 1777, nearly thirty years before the narrative was written. Mr. Boudinot was not two years old at the date of the transactions. Dr. Henderson was unborn.\* It would be safe then to reject the whole narrative as utterly unworthy of credit and unsupported by any witness who speaks of facts within his own knowledge.

But when an attempt is made to assail or to question the truth or credibility of statements made by men of undoubted veracity and high character, which have been received as true for more than half a century, and which relate to events which occurred a century and a quarter ago, something stronger than the improbability of the narrative or the inconclusive nature of the testimony may reasonably be expected. Statements may be true though unsupported by legal evidence. Fortunately there still exists record testimony of the most material facts

\* He was born August, A. D. 1743.

relating to this transaction. Before entering upon an examination of the evidence it is proper to state for a clearer understanding of the facts, that there were in New Jersey at the time of the transaction, three distinct tribunals having criminal jurisdiction. The first and lowest was the Court of Quarter Sessions, composed of the justices of the peace of the county, who were ordinarily not lawyers. This court had jurisdiction to inquire of and to indict for all offences, from the highest to the lowest, but could try only for mere misdemeanors.

The second was the Court of Oyer and Terminer, which was composed of one or more justices of the Supreme Court, joined with the justices of the Sessions. This court had jurisdiction over all offences, from the highest to the lowest, both for indictment and trial. Its jurisdiction was paramount, and when it came into the county it superseded the jurisdiction of the Sessions and tried indictments for offences of every grade, whether found in that court or in the Quarter Sessions.

The third was the Supreme Court, into which indictments found either in the Quarter Sessions or Oyer and Terminer might be removed for trial, whenever the importance of the cause, the difficulty of the questions involved, or the ends of justice might require it.

The minutes of the Supreme Court and Court of Common Pleas are perfect, or nearly so, from 1714 to the present time. The minutes of the Courts of Oyer and Terminer are very defective. They had no fixed place or time of meeting, but met by special appointment. In most of the counties they had no regular clerk or book of minutes. The clerk of the Common Pleas, or some one temporarily appointed by the court, usually acted as clerk, and the minutes were kept on loose sheets or rolls of paper, which were usually filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, where many of them still remain. But they are very defective, and none whatever can be found for Hunterdon County during the period to which our inquiries relate.

It should be remembered also that at that time the Supreme Court sat alternately at Burlington and Amboy. The Hunterdon County courts were held at Trenton. Maidenhead was the present township of Lawrence.

The first and most material evidence is the record of the trial and conviction of Joshua Anderson, who is alleged in the narrative to have been indicted with Tennent, and to have been convicted. It contains a full statement of his indictment, trial, and conviction. Omitting the formal parts which are not essential to the narrative, it is substantially as follows:

“Be it remembered that heretofore, at a court of Oyer and Terminer and general jail delivery, held by adjournment at Trenton, in and for the county of Hunterdon, on Monday the 15th day of June, in the fifteenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second, by the grace of God of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, king defender of the faith, &c. Before the Honourable Hunter Morris, Chief Justice of the province of New Jersey, Archibald Home, and William Morris, Esquires, and others, his associates. \* \* \* By the oath and affirmation of at least twelve honest and lawful men of the said county of Hunterdon, empanelled, sworn, charged, and affirmed to enquire for our said Sovereign Lord the King, for the body of the said county of Hunterdon. It is presented that Joshua Anderson, late of Trenton, in the said county, labourer, on the sixteenth day of June, in the fifteenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second, at a court of Oyer and Terminer and general jail delivery, held by adjournment at Trenton, before the Honourable Robert Hunter Morris, Esq., Chief Justice, and others his associates, being a witness then and there produced, and by the court aforesaid in due form of law sworn to testify the truth in a certain cause between the King and John Rowland, upon an indictment for a certain misdemeanor, then in the said court depending, and before the said justices by a *jury* of the county in due form of law brought to be tried, he, the said Joshua Anderson, upon the oath aforesaid to the said Joshua Anderson, in due form of law administered, falsely, voluntarily, and corruptly did swear and to the jury aforesaid then and there sworn and charged to try the issue of traverse joined between the King and the said John Rowland upon the indictment aforesaid, gave in evidence and deposed *that he the said Joshua Anderson, saw and spoke to Joseph Jones at Benjamin Stevens his house at Maidenhead, on Wednesday, the eleventh*

day of October, one thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight, about ten or eleven of the clock in the morning, he the said Joshua Anderson standing in the door, or at the door. When in truth and in fact, the said Joshua Anderson did not see and speak to the said Joseph Jones at Benjamin Stevens his house, at Maidenhead, on Wednesday the eleventh day of October, one thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight, about ten or eleven of the clock in the morning, he the said Joshua Anderson standing in the door or at the door, as aforesaid. And so the aforesaid Joshua Anderson, before the justices aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, falsely, voluntarily, and corruptly, perjury did commit against the peace of our said Sovereign Lord the King that now is, his crown and dignity, &c.

“And afterwards, to wit, the aforesaid Monday, the fifteenth day of June in the fifteenth year aforesaid, at the said court before the justice aforesaid, came the aforesaid Joshua Anderson, and saith he is not guilty of the above indictment in manner and form, as he therein stands charged, and of good and evil thereupon, puts himself upon the country, and Joseph Warrell, Esquire, Attorney-General doth alike. And upon this the said Joshua Anderson gave bail for his personal appearance at the then Court of Oyer and Terminer. And afterwards, to wit, on Saturday, the 31st day of October, in the fifteenth year aforesaid, at a Court of Oyer and Terminer, held at Trenton, came the said Joshua Anderson, according to the said recognizance, and thereupon it was ordered that his recognizance should be continued, and the said court adjourned until the first Tuesday in December then next following, at ten o'clock, A. M. And on the said first Tuesday in December the said court was held before the Honourable Hunter Morris, Chief Justice, and his associates, and on the said day the said Joshua Anderson appeared in his own proper person, according to his said recognizance, and now at this day, that is to say the said first Tuesday in December, in the fifteenth year aforesaid, Josiah Furman, and eleven other jurors empanelled, and called, do come, who being elected, tried, and sworn to say the truth of and concerning the premises, do say upon their said oath that the aforesaid Joshua Anderson *is guilty* of the premises in the before-mentioned indictment against him,

imposed in manner and form as in and by the said indictment is laid to his charge.

“All and singular which said several premises being fully shown, seen, and understood, by the said court here, it is thereupon considered by the said court that the said Joshua Anderson do pay for a fine unto our said Sovereign Lord the King the sum of fifteen pounds proclamation money. That on Saturday, this fifth day of this instant (December), he stand on the top of the court-house stairs before the great door for the space of two hours, between the hours of ten in the morning and two in the afternoon, with his face towards the street, with a paper fixt on his breast, on which to be written in large characters the words following, namely, *Wilful and Corrupt Perjury*; that he be bound to his good behaviour for two years, himself to be bound in the sum of one hundred pounds, and each of his sureties in the sum of fifty pounds, and that he stand committed till the security be given and till his said fine and fees be paid.”

This record establishes beyond doubt the following facts :

1. That John Rowland was tried before the Court of Oyer and Terminer commencing on the fifteenth day of June, 1741.
2. That Joshua Anderson was indicted at the same term of the court for perjury committed on that trial.
3. That Messrs. Tennent and Stevens were not indicted with him.
4. That his indictment was not removed to the Supreme Court.
5. That he was not condemned to stand for one hour on the court-house steps, but *two hours*.
6. That the perjury consisted in swearing that he saw and spoke to Joseph Jones at Benjamin Stevens' house at Maidenhead on Wednesday 'the 11th day of October, 1738, about ten or eleven of the clock in the morning.
7. That Anderson did not demand a trial, nor was he tried immediately; but that the cause was postponed from time to time for six months, from June until December.

By comparing these facts with the averments contained in the narrative it will be perceived how utterly erroneous those statements are. Every material fact is inaccurately stated,



including the sentence itself. This demonstrates that the writer of the narrative, although he avers that his statements were "capable of being verified by the most unquestionable testimony and records," never could have seen the record, or that he made his statements without the least regard to it.

The attentive reader will observe, that by the record it appears that the indictment is found on the 15th of June, 1741, and the crime is charged to have been committed on the 16th of the same month. So that the indictment appears to have been found before the crime is committed. This apparent anachronism is explained by observing that the whole term is in law for many purposes regarded as one day, and all indictments are alleged to have been found on that day. If therefore the first day of term was the 15th of June, all the indictments found at any time in term would appear to have been found on that day, though perhaps not really found till some days later in term. The fact appears to have been that Rowland's trial commenced on the first day of term, to wit, on Tuesday the 15th of June, that Anderson was examined as a witness for the defence on Wednesday the 16th, that his testimony appeared so clearly to be false, that the chief justice directed the matter to be laid before the grand jury, who at once indicted Anderson. We see no ground for the allegation that "he was most cruelly and unjustly condemned." He appears to have been a labouring man, probably ignorant, a warm friend and partisan of Rowland, and his devoted adherent during all the excited controversy then raging between the old and new side, which defied the authority of the Synod, and rent the church asunder. It may have been that in the excitement of the moment, in the warmth of his zeal to serve his friend and pastor, he was betrayed into hasty and ill-advised speech which rendered him legally guilty.

As has been stated, Anderson was indicted alone in the Oyer and Terminer at June 1741. Tennent and Stevens were indicted in the Hunterdon Quarter Sessions on the 6th of August following. As the precise time and manner of indictment may be of interest, I give an extract from the minutes of the court.

"At a court of General Quarter Sessions of the peace and

County Court for holding of pleas before his majesty's judges and justices of the peace for the county of Hunterdon, held at Trenton on Tuesday the fourth day of August, in the fifteenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, &c., King anno-que Dom. 1741.

"Proclamation made for all manner of persons who will sue or complain to give their attendance, &c., and the court opened.

"Present, Benjamin Smith, John Dagworthy, Thos. Philips, and Thomas Cadwallader, Esq's, Judges. William Atlee, Charles Clark, and Philip Ringoe, Esq's, Justices.

"The sheriff returns his precept and pannel. The grand jury called, and twenty-three appearing, they are sworn, and being charged by Benjamin Smith, Esq., they withdraw with a constable to attend them.

"Thursday, August 6th. The grand jury come into court, and being called over they all appear, and bring in the following bills, namely, (*inter alios.*)

THE KING, v. BENJAMIN STEVENS.	}	Indictment for perjury. The defendant being charged with his indictment, he pleaded not guilty, &c.
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THE KING, v. WILLIAM TENNENT.	}	Indictment for wilful and corrupt perjury. On motion of the Attorney General the usual process ordered. <i>Per curiam.</i>
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"Tuesday, the 27th of October, Anno Domini 1741.

THE KING, v. WILLIAM TENNENT.	}	<i>Certiorari</i> read, and on motion of the Attorney General ordered to be filed. <i>Per cur.</i> "
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This is the last entry on the subject to be found in the minutes of the Court of Common Pleas. The cause was removed by a writ of *certiorari* to the Supreme Court, as appears by the following entry in the minutes of that court.

"New Jersey Supreme Court of the term of November in the fifteenth year of the reign of George the Second, A. D. 1741.

WILLIAM TENNENT, ads. DOMINI REGIS.	}	<i>Nov. 3d.</i> On a <i>certiorari</i> from the Quarter Sessions at Hunterdon.
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“The defendant appears by Mr. Smith, his attorney, and his appearance is accepted by the Attorney-General, and it is ordered, on motion of Mr. Smith, that the defendant’s appearance upon the recognizance be respited till the time of trial of this cause.

“March term, 1742, also in the fifteenth year of the reign of King George the Second.

WILLIAM TENNENT, <i>ads.</i> DOMINI REGIS.	}	<i>March 16th.</i> On motion of Mr. Smith, ordered that there be a struck jury of the County of Hunterdon to try this cause, and that the sheriff return the list of the freeholders of the said county to Archibald Home, Esq., at Trenton, in three weeks, and that forty-eight freeholders be struck out of the list in the usual manner, in the presence of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General, and the defendant or some person by him appointed in this behalf, and that the Attorney-General have leave to strike out twelve, and that the defendant, or some person in his behalf, strike out twelve more of the said freeholders, the jury to be struck at the court-house in Trenton on Wednesday the 14th day of April next.”
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This is the last entry in relation to the indictment against either Tennent or Stevens to be found either in the minutes of the Common Pleas or of the Supreme Court. And for the further development of the case we must rely upon the facts disclosed by Mr. Tennent’s narrative and upon the attendant circumstances. It appears by the foregoing extracts from the minutes of the court that Tennent and Stevens were indicted for perjury in the Hunterdon Quarter Sessions at June term 1741. Stevens was present, and gave security for his appearance at the then next term. Tennent was not present, and process was ordered to be issued against him. No farther proceeding appears to have been adopted against Stevens, and it is probable that by consent or by understanding between the attorneys his case was to abide the issue of Tennent’s trial, or at least was to be postponed until Tennent’s cause was first tried. Process was issued against Tennent, and he gave security for his appearance to answer the indictment. A *certiorari* having been issued to remove the cause into the Supreme

Court, returnable to October term 1741, and the defendant's appearance entered there by Mr. Smith, his attorney, his appearance upon his recognizance was respited until the trial. A jury for the trial of the cause was ordered to be struck before Justice Archibald Home on the 14th of April, preparatory to the trial of the cause at the then next session of the circuit in Hunterdon. It thus appears that the friends of Mr. Tennent were vigilantly guarding his rights. That Mr. Coxe was employed as his attorney at Trenton, and Mr. William Smith, a personal friend of Mr. Tennent, and subsequently a trustee with him of Princeton College, and one of the ablest counsel at the New York bar, was employed to conduct his defence. He was the attorney upon record, and appears to have taken every step which vigilant counsel could do to guard his client's rights.

We have seen that the jury had been ordered to be struck, subpœnas issued for the witnesses on the part of the defence, and the cause set down for trial at the June term, 1742. We know that at the time Mr. Tennent was the pastor of a church at Freehold, nearly thirty miles distant from the place of trial, and that he had been discharged from attendance upon his recognizance until the day of trial. We are informed by himself, that the only preparation he had made for the occasion was to write a sermon to preach from the pillory in case of his conviction, and probably this was all that he knew anything about. But what had his counsel or his friends done for him? What would they, as men of sense, naturally have done? Let it be remembered that the defence was simply an *alibi*. The only question at issue was whether the person that stole the horse was or was not John Rowland. The perjury for which the defendants were indicted consisted in swearing that on the day of the robbery they were with Rowland in Pennsylvania or Maryland. There must have been many witnesses of that transaction by whom the truth could readily have been established, and there was ample time to procure these witnesses. There is no pretence that they were unable or unwilling to attend. Now what would counsel to whom the defence of the defendant was committed have naturally done? They would certainly have secured the attendance of a sufficient number

of witnesses to have identified Rowland, and to have proved the *alibi* beyond all peradventure. It was their duty to have taken every means to have secured their attendance without fail, and yet we are assured by Mr. Tennent, that on the very morning of the trial and a few moments before the opening of the court he found his counsel in conference at Mr. Coxe's; that they gravely required Mr. Tennent and Mr. Stevens to bring in their witnesses that the counsel might examine them before going into court, to which Mr. Tennent, *not* Mr. Stevens, gravely replied, he did not know of any witness but God and his conscience. Doubtless he answered conscientiously, but must he not have known if he exercised one practical thought about the matter, that Mr. Rowland was a competent witness for him. He had been acquitted of the charge, was an entirely competent witness, and certainly knew better than any one else, whether he was in New Jersey or not the day the horse was stolen. Mr. Stevens was also a competent witness, for although indicted for the same offence, they were separate indictments, and though not an impartial, he was nevertheless a competent one. Mr. Tennent's reply was doubtless according to his own knowledge. The fact was, he had no knowledge whatever of the matter. He was nowise concerned in the preparation of the cause for trial. It had been committed to other hands. We do not know certainly by whom the preparation was made, but the strong probabilities are that it was made by Mr. Stevens under the advice and direction of the counsel. He was indicted for the same offence as Tennent. His witnesses were Tennent's witnesses. The defence in both cases was identical. He was a gentleman in the prime of life,\* residing near Trenton, well acquainted with the community and perfectly competent to make the necessary preparation. He was present at the conference of counsel at Mr. Coxe's house on the morning of the trial, and no doubt furnished information as to the witnesses in attendance. It is incredible that legal gentlemen should have neglected all the ordinary precautions in a trial of so great moment. They doubtless

\* He died on the 14th day of May, 1763, aged 64 years, as appears from an inscription on his tombstone in the ancient burying-ground at Lawrence. He must therefore at the time of the trial have been 43 years of age

knew well beforehand who the witnesses were, what they were to prove, and what means had been taken to secure their attendance. If they had not, their conduct would have been open to the gravest censure. No counsel of three years standing and of the humblest capacity would ever have ventured to neglect the summoning of the witnesses, or to postpone acquiring a full knowledge of their testimony until the hour of trial. Such conduct on the part of Coxe and Smith would have been alike incredible and unpardonable. Let the circumstances be considered. Their client was a clergyman of eminence, the pastor of a large and wealthy congregation, charged with a crime utterly destructive of his standing and character, utterly unacquainted with legal proceedings, or the proper means of making his defence. It is incredible that under such circumstances the most careful and elaborate preparation should not have been made, or that any means should have been omitted calculated to strengthen his defence, and to insure his acquittal.

But we are not left to supposition as to this fact, for the narrative proceeds, "Mr. Stockton appeared and the advocates on his side so traced every movement of the defendant, on the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, in question, and satisfied the jury so perfectly on the subject, that they did not hesitate honourably to acquit Mr. Tennent." By the defendant here is intended Mr. Rowland, (not Tennent,) because it was his movements they were interested in tracing. This they must have done by means of witnesses brought from the congregation where they spent the Sabbath on which the horse was stolen. Men who are no dreamers, and who were not brought to the place of trial by a dream. The man and his wife at whose house they stayed on the Saturday night preceding the Sabbath when the horse was stolen, were only two of numerous witnesses who were in attendance, and doubtless the counsel had secured such a number of witnesses as to prove the innocence of the defendant past all doubt, and to render his acquittal absolutely certain.

But why should Mr. Tennent have stated, as he undoubtedly did, that the witness informed him that he was brought by a dream. Judge Field in his lecture before the Historical

Society, already alluded to, suggests with great plausibility that the man and his wife had been summoned to attend, and that the dream was a consequence of anxiety of mind resulting from the anticipation of a long and unusual journey and absence from home. Perhaps an equally plausible explanation of the matter may be, that the man seeing Mr. Tennent and recognizing him upon the morning of the trial, sought an interview with him in order to ascertain from him precisely what he desired to prove, and finding him entirely ignorant not only of his person, but of the object of his attendance, thought it best to avoid any further explanation of the matter, or perhaps understanding his character, designed to impose upon his credulity. Those familiar with the habits of unlettered people know well how often when asked for the sources of their information which they are unwilling to disclose, they do it by an evasive reply, as "a bird told me," or "I dreamed it." In many parts of the country to this day nothing is more common than such evasive replies. The writer well recollects that within a few years a gentleman of respectability and intelligence, when asked for the source of his information, had replied to an impertinent inquirer, "I dreamed it." He was compelled to disclose in open court the fact that he had so stated untruly, and his credibility was attacked on that ground. But whatever may have been the motive for the statement, there is no reason to suppose it true. There was no occasion for the supernatural intervention. The means of deliverance were sufficiently obvious and within the power of the party. There is no reason to believe that they were not used earnestly and effectually. That Mr. Tennent may have fully believed the narrative is highly probable. With his nervous and excitable temperament, and his love of the marvelous, he would readily have believed it, and would have been far more gratified to have been rescued in that way than in any other.

William Smith was not only his attorney but his personal friend, associated with him subsequently as one of the first trustees of Princeton College, and sympathizing probably, to some extent at least, in his religious views. He was bound not only by his duty as an attorney but by the obligations of sym-

pathy and friendship, to use every honourable effort for the vindication of his character, and to effect his acquittal from an infamous charge which, if established, would have destroyed at once his reputation and his usefulness. To the mind of a professional man it appears absolutely incredible that a man of the character of William Smith should have been guilty of conduct at once so unprofessional, so dishonourable, and so utterly at war with all the instincts of a man, a lawyer, or a Christian, as to have neglected all preparation for the defence, or to have intrusted the preparation to a man of Mr. Tennent's character.

But there is another portion of the narrative which is, if possible, more extraordinary and incredible. After stating Mr. Tennent's rejection of his counsel's advice to take advantage of a technical defect in the indictment and thus effect his escape, the narrative proceeds: "Mr. Stevens, whose faith was not of this description, and who was bowed down to the ground under the most gloomy apprehensions of suffering as his neighbour Mr. Anderson had done, eagerly seized the opportunity of escape that was offered, and was afterwards discharged on the exception." Mr. Stevens was indicted, according to the narrative, for the same offence as Mr. Tennent, viz., for perjury in swearing that on the day the horse was stolen Mr. Rowland preached in Maryland or Pennsylvania. His offence was identical with that of Mr. Tennent. If one was guilty, so was the other. The innocence of one established the innocence of the other. If Mr. Tennent was innocent, Mr. Stevens could not be guilty. Mr. Tennent had just been triumphantly acquitted by the jury, the witnesses were in the court-house, his counsel were there, all the means of establishing his innocence were at hand, and yet his faith failed him, and he resorted to a technical exception to escape a fair trial, and thus left the public under the impression that he feared to meet the charge directly upon its merits. I repeat again, that if Mr. Stevens was willing to commit such an absurdity his counsel never would have permitted it. It is an invariable rule with counsel that if the defence can be met directly, and if there is a reasonable hope for escape by trial upon the merits, never to resort to a mere technical exception. It by no means



establishes the innocence of the defendant; on the contrary, it usually leaves an impression upon the public that the defendant is really guilty and fears the result of a trial upon the merits. But what had Mr. Stevens to fear even if his faith, as the narrative alleges, had been smaller than a grain of mustard seed. The *alibi*, upon which he relied for his acquittal, had just been triumphantly established. The plea of guilty would have been alike absurd and injurious. It is safe to affirm that the narrative cannot be true. The fact probably was, that the Attorney-General, seeing that the evidence was conclusive against him, abandoned the prosecution, and by leave of the court caused a *nolle prosequi* to be entered. Mr. Tennent in his profound ignorance of legal proceedings, and knowing only that Mr. Stevens was discharged without a trial, and that that mode of escape had been offered to him by quashing the indictment, concluded that Mr. Stevens must have escaped in that mode. But however we may account for the mistake, it is due to the character of Mr. Stevens and to the cause of truth, that he should not rest under the imputation alike injurious to his intelligence and integrity.

Besides, of what avail would have been such a means of escape? It could not possibly have effected the deliverance of the defendant. If the court had pronounced the indictment defective, they would have ordered the defendant to have given security for his appearance at the next term of the court, and a new and valid indictment would have been found against him. Nothing would have been gained by it but a temporary delay, which, under the circumstances, as the witnesses were all in attendance, could have been of no possible service to the defendant.

It will be perceived that in what we have said we have taken as true every part of the narrative which is not shown to be erroneous by unquestionable record testimony, or by circumstances so strong as to compel the disbelief of a fair and impartial mind. We fully admit the perfect integrity of all the witnesses whose veracity is involved, the perfect integrity of Mr. Tennent, his unqualified belief in all the statements which he made. But admitting all this, we see no reason to credit the narrative which he has given, or the statements

which have been made upon his authority, but regard them as alike erroneous and incredible. The misstatements may have arisen either from his ignorance of the nature of the proceeding, from his misapprehension of the real character of the transaction, or from the mistake or failure of memory of others. But from whatever cause the errors may have arisen, and whether our hypothesis as to the real facts of the case be true or erroneous, certain it is, that the narrative in all its material facts and circumstances is either established by the record to be untrue, or is rendered by the facts of the case utterly incredible. We accept the principle of the author of the narrative, that God gives no encouragement to the enthusiast who refuses to use the means of preservation and deliverance which God puts in his power. True confidence in God is always accompanied with the use of all lawful means. We assert, therefore, with perfect confidence, that his deliverance was not effected by supernatural means, and that the attendance of the witnesses was not procured by a dream.

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## ART. II.—*Social Liberty.*

So interwoven in their mutual relations are all the elements of knowledge, that we can hardly select any subject of investigation that may not become interesting to us, even intensely interesting, if we constrain ourselves to think about it with care. And yet our interest in a subject is no proof of its importance, or of the truth of the views we entertain about it; for men are often deeply devoted to very trifling subjects, and often allow their interest in particular subjects or aspects of subjects to become so intense and onesided as to run into a selfishness of opinion that overcomes all respect for the opinion of others and for established customs and institutions, and begets censoriousness, schisms, fanaticism, and persecution. We save ourselves from this, when we bear in mind that no subject can be adequately learned without an adequate examination of it in its relation to other subjects, to persons and things around

us, and to its actual or possible influence in our own life and in that of society and of the world.

Studied in itself, and without reference to its place and functions among the moral and physical dynamics of the world, no subject is worthy of, or can maintain in us any enduring interest. A watch is but an ingenious toy, when considered irrespective of its notation of time by moving in harmony with the rotation of the earth. Man himself is felt to be fearfully and wonderfully made, only because of the countless relations in which he is fitted to stand to other created things. Anatomy, physiology, and psychology have an abiding interest, only because they open the door to the knowledge of these relations, and impart to us new skill and fresh zeal in performing the functions of our life.

Yet we must not insist on this cautionary principle in an absolute and one-sided way; but must treat it in its relations to the natural process of human improvement in knowledge, by the union of thought and action: for we cannot always study a subject in its relations before acting upon it, and can never be sure that our knowledge or skill is adequate to any given occasion, unless we have tried it, or have sufficient evidence of its trial by others. We must act on such knowledge as we have, or even without knowledge, else we should never act at all, and should never be sure that we have any real knowledge. The child must start with an inarticulate voice in order to acquire articulation; it must prattle before it can talk, and creep before it can walk. Reflection is not one of its intellectual functions, for its mind contains few or none of the materials which that process requires: and yet it must act. A far reaching reflection must have a large stock of knowledge of principles and facts in order to operate easily and reliably; but when reflection must pass into action, it must act according to the convictions given by the knowledge which it has, or supposes it has, or submit to be condemned for insincerity.

We are all mere children and learners in regard to the great mass of principles and relations that are living and acting all around us, and the task of learning how little we know is a very hard one. To children all things seem plain and easily understood: and so they seem to us when we allow our reflec-

tions to stop at the surface of things, and our inquiries to be satisfied with words; but, when we look more closely, we find that all things are full of mystery. And so Job learned when, in the sequel of his long colloquy with his friends, God opened his mind to the wonders of his providence and constrained him to confess—"I have uttered things that I understood not, things too wonderful for me, which I knew not."

Even our very language is full of mysteries, when we study it carefully. There is no conception, outside of some arts and sciences, that may not be expressed by several words: no word that may not be differently understood by different persons. And when we limit the meaning of our words by their position in sentences, there is no sentence that may not be misinterpreted by some of our hearers, because we have not been careful in stating it, or because of some misleading sentiment or prejudice or incapacity in the hearer, or because of the inherent and inevitable indefiniteness that belongs to the very nature of human ideas, and therefore of human language.

How infinite are the variety and degrees of our sensations, and how small the number of words of common language by which we express them! For the sense of touch we have such words as hard and soft, warm and cold, rough and smooth; and for that of taste such words as sour, sweet, bitter, nauseous: but who can possibly name all the kinds of feeling, taste, smell, sound, and colour, and all the degrees and mixtures of these various sensations? In relation to some of them, the language of art and science has gone far beyond the reach of ordinary attainments, and still falls immeasurably short of our actual experience. No language would be fit for human use that would have exact expressions for all the various shades of phenomena and of perception, and no such language could be understood. What some, therefore, would call perfection of language would be a gross defect, because untrue to human nature: for this has no such exactness of perception: and moreover things and facts have no such regularity of determination, as is implied in the demand for such accuracy of language.

And when we turn to such words as express moral affections and qualities: such as love, hatred, joy, courage, prudence, and

rashness: their kinds, gradations, and complications are far beyond the possibility of expression by any language attainable by man, and especially by any one that is to be the common language of a people. How many are the expedients, by means of adverbs, emphasis, look and gesture, in order to supply these defects; and how liable we are still to be but half understood! No one can exactly measure the meaning of a tone, a gesture, a frown or a smile, any more than of the words which it accompanies and attempts to enforce. Much of the meaning of language depends upon the temperament, intelligence, and morality of the person who uses it. A gross, sordid, or depraved man cannot agree in expression or in thought with a moral and spiritual man in the application of the word *good*. A robber calls good what an honest man calls wicked. The most uncouth and useless toy may be beautiful and good for a child, if, by its bright colours or strange motions, it calls the child's faculties into exercise in an unusual way.

All the words of common language are very like the ordinary materials, mineral, vegetable, and animal, by which we are everywhere surrounded: each may be applied to a great variety of uses, and we cannot know its meaning until we see it in its place and relations among other words constituting an intelligible sentence, or unless the thing it represents be pointed out to us. Each is, as it were, a chaos of undistinguishable materials until it is practically limited and defined; or as a forest for the variety of its contents and uses. All the dwellers around that forest, and all who use it, see it in different aspects, each according to his point of view or his habits of thought or observation, or as he has played about its outskirts or explored its dark recesses. Each word is, as it were, a great cavern of thought, which the child sporting at its entrance, or timidly avoiding its haunted precincts, or cautiously peering into its gloomy chambers, scarcely suspects that he does not understand. A child talks of goodness as freely and confidently as the most enlightened moralist; but its idea of goodness hardly rises above what is pleasant to its untrained taste, or adapted to its little plays. It cannot define this idea; even in philosophy its definition is not settled; and yet all can

use the term with that reasonable accuracy which alone can be exacted of human language. The idea grows with the mind, but always retains an identity like to that which exists in man himself, in his growth from infancy to manhood and old age.

All languages abound in words which have a sort of indefinite aspect until limited and defined by other words, and also a sort of infinite capacity until so limited. Time, space, number, cause, motion, substance, form, spirit, truth, goodness, justice; all can use them more or less intelligently. As expressions of relations of things and of persons or of some actual fact, and put in connection with other words that restrain their infinite tendency, they are real and true conceptions. But divested of all relations, and regarded in their absolute aspect, they become nothing, they express nothing. Time absolute is void; space absolute is void; but as receptacles of things and events, they are essential elements of knowledge. Justice absolute is nothing; but, as expressive of the relations of men to men, it is an essential element of social order. Truth absolute is nothing; but as expressive of relations between intellect and objects, or of conformity of thought or expression to actual facts, or of the harmonious correlation of all created things, it is an essential element of all intelligence.

We trust these remarks may be of some service in preparing the way for the consideration of the idea expressed by another word, which is in every mouth—LIBERTY—and help us to arrive at a reasonable understanding and application of it. Let us try to do it with scientific freedom, and scientifically; and this, for real things, means inductively.

Volumes of metaphysical, ethical, and political discussions have been written upon it by many of the ablest minds known in the history of philosophy; and yet when they give us definitions of it, these all break down by being carried out to their consequences in their systems, where they all run into inevitable contradictions, and require a new trial. Our discussion of the subject now must necessarily be less ambitious, if it is to have any practical value. All systems built upon ideal definitions must end as these do, and can never come down to the actual, where there are no real contradictions. There is a sort

of infiniteness about them, and moreover a necessary blending with each other, that refuse to be subject to the limitations and analysis of logic, and throw it into utter confusion. All our ideals and ideal definitions partake of this character. Thus our idea of liberty has very often been treated so as to reject or impinge upon that of the providence of God; often so as to justify the wildest license and anarchy. Thus also our idea of the providence of God has been treated so as to destroy all creative liberty. When we found our ideas upon facts and experience, and moderate our idealizing tendency by respect for the real and the practical, and by considering every principle in its proper correlations, there is no necessity of our ideas becoming thus erratic and unmanageable.

In our thoughts about liberty, therefore, let us not venture to soar into the regions of the infinite, where no fact or being can become an object of observation. As in other studies give us something actual to start from. Time is the measure of events; therefore give us events, if we are to have an idea of time that is true for us. Space is the measure of things and of the intervals between them; therefore give us things, and we shall get an idea of space that is true for us and them. Truth is a relation of intellect to objects; therefore give us these two factors, and we may get the fact of their connection. Absolute liberty is nothing for our minds, for such ideals never can be reached until man becomes infinite. But human liberty as a matter of fact of human consciousness, and as a quality of human activity, is a real thing submitted to our observation and reflection, and entitled to a high place in our philosophic aspirations.

Liberty, for us, is a quality of human activity, exercised upon objects within our reach, and upon the conceptions which our experience and reflection afford; therefore give us the human being, its objects and its acts, and we may learn what human liberty is and whither it tends. Give us these as the foundation of our investigations, and we may learn to attribute to our reflective and instinctive activities those limitations and restraints that are necessary to make liberty a profitable subject of meditation and a practical and orderly element of life.

Liberty as we have stated it, and as it appears in fact as an element of humanity, and therefore like all the other elements of our nature and along with them, is limited in its capacity and has an innate tendency to grow. It is infantile at the first, yet it grows or may grow to be manly. Human activity depends on the human mind, and therefore human liberty must have the same dependence. Beyond our capacities we can have no liberty.

No matter how much a man wishes, he cannot make something out of nothing, or work without means and instruments and objects to work upon. He must use the materials which God has created and put within his reach, and must use them according to their nature and his own. He cannot make fire-arms out of cornstalks, or grow corn out of pebbles. He cannot at his will convert a barber or a lawyer into a skilful mechanic, or make ignorance do the work of intelligence, or vice perform the functions of morality. He cannot by his will or any amount of social will or law convert a savage into a fit companion for civilized men; for both parties would object to the change which such association requires; and nature would object to it; it can be brought about only by a process of growth, and not at all by the command of any will.

Man's will can be exerted over other beings only in consistency with their respective natures. If it be a growing nature in tree or beast or man, our will must take it, for present purposes, according to its present state, and for higher purposes, must wait until its growth develops its higher nature. We do not value wild horses as we do trained ones. The sapling cannot supply the mature wood that is wanted for enduring workmanship, nor wood, hay, and stubble supply the materials for fire-proof buildings.

Every man thinks, and no other can restrain the current of his thoughts; but no man can reflect on subjects of which he has no degree of knowledge. No will of man or law of man can make a man out of a boy, or impart to him the affections, intelligence, or energy of a man, or to the wild Indian the taste, manners, forms, and respect that belong to cultivated natures. To impart such liberty and capacity is not a function of social law, whether God-given or man-given, but of inner life and



growth; and no system of law or philosophy can be complete that does not include or imply this natural element of growth and leave room for it, as we do in planting orchards. Here human liberty is limited by impassable natural barriers.

But let us follow our subject more closely in its social aspect, for in that we have the greatest interest. It is so great a subject that we cannot take a full survey of it, but must make only a small path through it. Man is, by nature a social being, and, because of his natural organizing and systematizing tendency, he is also by nature a political being. He is everywhere a member of society more or less organized, surrounded by, and in constant intercourse and fellowship with other beings constituted like himself. These fellow-beings are the objects upon which his social liberty is daily and hourly called upon to calculate its action. And here again his will, for its present purposes, is subject to insuperable natural limits; for it must take men as they are, and deal with them or use them according to their present nature, and cannot will them to be different from what they are, or to have higher or other capacities than they have. If he has power and they are timid, he may force them to *act*, in some things for which they have capacity, according to his will; but he cannot force them to think or feel according to his will. Nay, if he seeks to force them to love or respect him, he is sure to excite their enduring hate or distrust.

Man is not free to control his affections as he pleases. He cannot love or hate, respect or despise, or be indifferent at will; for these affections arise spontaneously on the presentation of the objects or occasions that excite them according to his character, and are themselves elements of the will's activity. A generous man cannot love censoriousness, suspicion, and harsh treatment. An envious man hates the goodness or the success which he cannot imitate. A man of fine moral taste admires all that is beautiful or magnanimous in human conduct. The carnal mind cannot love spiritual things. All these sentiments proceed from an underlying disposition that gives character to the will's activity and can be controlled by it only so far as it can modify them by its control of the process of mental growth.

Men are not free to speak, or write, or walk, or dress, as they

please; for these acts belong to social life, and are necessarily restrained by their social purposes. We are not at liberty to speak or write Greek to a German when our purpose is to be understood; or to condemn and abandon the language of the people because it seems to us to abound with faults, or even to correct it as we please. We are not at liberty to disregard the decencies of dress of the society to which we belong, by putting on the garb of a clown or a wild African, or no garb at all. In the crowded walks of life, we are not at liberty to jostle or run over the slow, the feeble, and the heedless, who occasion our impatience or obstruct our haste. We may be selfish and overbearing even in asserting the rule of the road—"keep to the right."

In times of great popular excitement no man is at liberty to arrest the rushing tide of opinions and sentiments, or to turn it as he pleases, or even to go on his way regardless of it, for he has no power to do so. He will hardly succeed in turning aside to let it pass. If in sympathy with the movement, he will naturally fall in with it and feel free in it, and may count as an active force in its sweeping turbulence, or as an inert weight which it bears along to increase its momentum. If not in sympathy he must expect to be accounted, for the time, as of no social value, or even as a public enemy, and may console himself with the reflection that social as well as individual standards of value, of men as well as of things, are transitory and changeable—"man looketh on the outward appearance, but God looketh in the heart." In such times moderate men have no favour with any party, and moderate counsel has few followers, and society has to run the risk of falling alternately into the hands of opposite leaders, each as extreme as the other.

We are not at liberty, because we have not power, to lay aside at once the habits of feeling, thought, and action that have grown into our nature, even when convinced of their pernicious tendency. We cannot, at will, make ourselves, our tempers, and our tasks fit each other, because we cannot thus mould ourselves or others into harmony and sympathy, but can only grow into them. We may most diligently and sincerely school ourselves against every symptom of hate, envy,

suspicion, fault-finding and the like, and think we are fully guarded against them; but often a spark is sufficient to rekindle the passion that shatters all our fortifications; often in anguish of soul we cry, "who will deliver me from the body of this death!"

We are not free to arrest or direct at will the currents of our thought and sentiment, because they have a life upon which liberty and the will themselves depend: a life that has depths we cannot sound, recesses which we cannot explore, and threads which run out into society and towards the infinite far beyond our reach. We are not free to reject the influence of our associations, of the family, sect, party, age, and country to which we belong. These constitute the intellectual and moral atmosphere in which we live and move, and we cannot overcome its penetrating power, because we have not intelligence and disposition and vital energy to do so; perhaps we should not be social beings if we could.

We are not free to reject at will the systems that come to us by tradition; they are the bone and sinew of our youth, and none of us live to outgrow them entirely; they adhere to us and inhere in us like characteristics of races and families, often through many generations, though some make important additions to them. Some receive them so badly that they remain all their lives destitute of any settled principles, their minds without any character, like a body without bones or limbs, a shapeless mass. Some cast them off, through the influence of degrading associations, and soon become helpless and hopeless outcasts, unless saved by some of their roots yet remaining, and which are still susceptible of spiritual influences. A vast amount of our principles come to us in this way, without any will, or original observation or reflection of ours: often with an ancestry that can be traced back through many centuries, and they stick to us often in spite of our disorganizing rationalism and fretful agitations, until some other element grows up and takes their place. The old bark maintains its functions until the new grows under and supersedes it: when it is otherwise the tree dies.

Traditionary or inherited opinions have a life in them only because they are part of *our* life; and they must be used and

exercised. Like inherited wealth, they have a conservative value that saves from utter want and ruin; but they must be put to the risk of a trial in true life-struggles, if they are to be a means of our profit and growth. They are man's natural inheritance as a member of society, implying faith in each other; and therefore they are the natural means of securing such a degree of social uniformity as is necessary for social harmony, and seldom so sharply defined as to forbid proper social development. Man, by his ignorant will, cuts down a defective institution; nature gets clear of it by favouring the growth of better ones, which in due time take its place.

It is not reason, but ignorant rationalism that would proscribe all laws, institutions, and opinions that cannot show their legitimate and logical descent from what it calls general principles; for social growth is not a logical process from recognized general principles down to their details, but the reverse, from details to their principles. No man, therefore, can substitute his own reasoned principles of action for the traditional rules and laws which usually guide him in the details of his daily life, and society would not understand him if he should do it. By attempting to do so, he would fall into social and practical imbecility. And so it is with a people; they must work by settled and definite rules and not by principles, or fall into disorder: and hence the morality of a people breaks down when their institutions, usages, laws, opinions, prices, estimates of men and things become deranged or exposed to contempt by the logic of rationalistic reformers.

In times of great social danger, we are not free to act individually as we please, for society must act together by a common will, and no opposing will can be allowed with patience. Even when the fear of danger is unfounded, there is no real liberty to disprove the danger and discourage the efforts to avert it. The excitement of fear cannot endure without suspicion and perhaps hate, those who do not sympathize with its belief, its sentiments and its plans; and it refuses to hear the most settled principles of wisdom, or recasts them into conformity with its transient affection.

Even the state is not at liberty to act on its own feelings and opinions, or on those of majorities, or of its officials. Its

liberty is limited by its relations to other states and a regard for their liberty, as well as by the nature of its functions as protector of social order and individual rights. All around it feels itself hemmed in by natural and artificial boundaries, social differences, and national limitations, which it must respect. It cannot legislate at pleasure even about the conduct of its own citizens or subjects; for no civil law can reach the sources of human conduct and suppress or mould the passions and sentiments from which they flow. And yet there must be law; for ruffians cannot be left free to do as they please, else they would expel or subjugate those who love peace and order. But law is seldom a creature of the human will, scarcely so even in those parts of it called constitutional, which ordain the forms and machinery by which rights are vindicated, and power regulated and restrained. It is *generated* rather than created by society, according to its circumstances, its morality, its industry, and its comprehension of civil functions and individual rights. It cannot therefore "condemn the sin in the flesh," the natural dispositions of society; for it is generated out of and founded on them, and administered by them, and partakes of their carnal weaknesses; and it is only religion that can accuse them of defect, by directing us to higher standards, and calling us to "walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit," so as to improve both us and them.

The great mass of laws of every country consists of what is called unwritten or common law, the usages, customs, and morality of the people, and of their different trades and occupations, all generated in the long process of natural development, and not created or ordained in any statutes. Like the law of the family, generated in and growing with the family, but enacted by no one. Like the laws of trade, generated and growing with the trade, but instituted by no will; though sometimes collected and codified as already existing. Like the laws of schools, religious denominations, and parties, generated and growing up out of the character of each, even when received by faith. The law of one family cannot be the law of another family until generated there; no will of man can make it fit. No part of it can become state law until generated by the life of the state. And so it is with the law of sects, parties,

classes; they cannot be general laws of society until generated out of the free life of society itself. To attempt to plant them where they have not grown may be fatal to their life; the unwilling soil rejects them. Man loves his own children and cannot, by force of law, be made to love those of others. The products of his own life and those which he receives by faith and love, he cherishes and fosters. What is generated by others and imposed upon him can be accepted only by force, and will remain as a memorial of the wrong done to human nature, and a monument of the folly of human arbitrariness in matters which it cannot control. For this reason it is naturally impossible that society can wisely grant the liberty of citizenship to a class even of kindred beings, who know not how to enter into recognizance of surety of the peace, by showing a kindred inheritance of social training and by submitting their dispositions and conduct to the existing social law. The wild buffalo cannot herd with the domesticated one, the Indian with the civilized man.

For the same reason no state has liberty or capacity to maintain a system of laws which the people have outgrown. There is no such thing as living fossils, or as dead shells for living beings. In the growth of a people, the new form imperceptibly throws the old one off and takes its place. Thus pagan institutions give way before the growth of Christian principles, preparing a new soil for a new growth of law. Thus the feudal system mouldered down as the principles and forms of modern life grew up. And thus barbarous laws, usages, customs, and morality always recede with the advance of civilization. Not by might, nor by power, nor by the will of man can such things be done, but by the Spirit of the Lord.

No actual system of law can come up even to our ideal or theoretical system, though that too must be defective, and no state has liberty or power to require that it shall. Even the administrative system must always fall below the ideas which we form of perfect constitutions, however careful we may be to have it officered by men trained for the purpose. No man can regulate his own business according to his idea of perfection. No general can train and manage an army according to his ideal tactics and strategy; no captain a company. No man

can mould his children's life as he will, however high may be the reverence or respect in which they hold him. Much less can a state thus mould the conduct of its citizens, however high may be their respect for law. Nothing tends more directly to wear out this wholesome and necessary respect than the frequent tinkering at laws and institutions in which impatient politicians and reformers are so prone to indulge, not knowing the true nature and germinating principles of law. The law is a most sacred thing for those who are growing up to a comprehension and observance of its order and its principles, and who count upon it in their business arrangements, and it cannot be made the sport of speculative minds, or of alternating parties or excitements, without losing that respect which best secures its power in the advancement of society.

The stern father or ruler, earnestly convinced of the truth or value of his principles, may persistently and sincerely attempt to enforce them by his will, but he must inevitably fail. He may obtain the outward submission which force can command, but the inward approbation and consent, which makes conduct true to life, can only be generated out of the vital forces of the family or people, and not created by his will; and the force which he employs, if not made welcome by respect and affection for its subjects, can result only in generating a system of hypocrisy and mental and moral slavery, which would be the very opposite of his intentions. Even kindness misdirected and misapplied, or forced upon unwilling minds, or too eagerly pressed, must breed alienations, enmities, and divisions.

Again, no legislative will has power to change customs and institutions at its bidding. Ignorance, habit, custom, prejudice, have a *vis inertiae* in them that stands as an invincible barrier in the path of agitators and innovators, attempting by force and law to change their course. The knees of age, experience, and wisdom are not supple enough to bend before every new idol which such men may set up. Social wisdom freely accepts the advice—"whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same things."

We are not at liberty to make progress, as individuals or as a people, by squandering the wealth or experience or order which we have acquired. Our social order is common pro-

erty, and can be parted with only by common consent arising from a common growth, and not at the will of speculative leaders. Wise men do not sell their homes and farms and abandon their accustomed business, in order to buy an acre of oil territory and take to smelling and boring for oil. To them stability of industry gives surer promise of returns in moral and material wealth.

Is there then no such thing as liberty? That object which has caused so much hope and so much hate, so much anarchy and so much despotism, so much ambition and so much disappointment, so many intestine and international wars, and so many splendid monuments of civilization, of which history tells us; is it nothing but a mere phantom of our fallen nature, vainly striving to recover itself? No, it is a real thing, real as justice, goodness, truth, mercy, order, or any other quality of human activity, and no more difficult of comprehension.

But it is not that ideal thing which loose thinkers so much worship and so love to glorify, and by the eulogy and pursuit of which they have so often turned the world upside down. It is not freedom to live according to nature, in the usual meaning of that expression: for vegetables and animals all do that, while for rational beings, liberty must be some higher quality. It is not freedom to claim every sort of equality with all men and demand that all shall be equally esteemed; for stubborn and most obvious facts repel this, and no man of sense really wishes things to be so, for every man of any worth aspires to excellence and esteem, and this aspiration has its appointed reward in the order of Providence, though it may not be of a spiritual and eternal quality. Envy at the eminence of others admits our own aspirations, while it prevents their success. Thoughts and acts, and things and men, are essentially different and unequal, whatever may be their generic and fundamental resemblances. In a young nursery all the trees are approximately equal; but in an old forest they are indefinitely different. In savage life differences are but little noticed, except those of age, sex, and physical energy; but in civilized life differences range from the dullest ignorance to the brightest science, from the most pitiable folly to the most revered wisdom, from the most stolid imbecility to the grandest energy,



from the lowest vice to the highest morality; and no will or theory of man can change this. And yet every man, as an element of the social body, may alike claim that his condition and his interest shall be considered in ascertaining the true law of society.

Liberty is not that thing which loose thinkers glorify as liberty of conscience, by which they not uncommonly mean their own liberty to compel other people to live according to *their* conscience. Such liberty may be perfectly sincere, and so far it is to be respected; and yet it may and often does fall under the condemnation of being a disturber of social order, and a retarder, rather than a promoter of social progress, because of its ignorance of the principles and processes of human development. It does as unfitting a thing as giving sacred things to dogs and casting pearls to swine; for it attempts to impose as law that for which there is no receptive disposition, because no adequate preparation of spiritual growth. Each man's conscience for himself and his own conduct, is a most sacred principle of liberty; but for his action upon others, it is of no possible value, unless united with a regard for their conscience or by some sympathy with it, and with a sincere regard for a practical system of social order. The conscience that acts with our conscience must be educated in harmony with it, or have with it a reciprocating and generous faith, or it must have such common purposes or aspirations as induce the demand for leaders and for submission to *their* law, else its acts will be insincere and slavish.

Conscientious men may be the most disorderly members of society, by insisting in a selfish way on their own views in matters of social action. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors were conscientious in their piracy, in an age when bravery was considered the highest virtue, and property and life of no value without it, and when strangers were considered enemies; and yet their sincerity does not prove that piracy is right. Many murderers act according to their conscience in slaying their enemies; and yet we may not say that murder of our greatest enemy is right. We cannot therefore appeal to our own conscience in justification of our social conduct, except so far as that conscience is guided by God's law; often it is essentially

anti-social and selfish and accepts no outer law; and no selfish element can control our conception of social liberty.

Human liberty implies society, and therefore it must be social. It does not therefore mean the liberty of the childish or ignorant mind, nor even of the philosopher, unless each be socially regarded, that is, in its adaptation to grow up to, or to elevate the social standard. A child or a savage has no comprehension of social relations, and therefore may ignorantly violate them, and disturb or retard social order according to his influence; and it may be so even with a philosopher, who would apply his standards to test the conduct of ignorant men; and still each of them may have a social *feeling* that will hold him in reasonable harmony.

Liberty as a real thing, is a quality of human activity, and therefore must be in relation with its other qualities, and so far limited by and subjected to them as is necessary to our social nature. It is not liberty of *will* alone, but of *all* the functions of the mind, each of which must have its appropriate movement; otherwise the whole will fall into disorder. Liberty for one is vain without liberty for all. Stop or remove a single wheel of a watch and the power of the mainspring is useless. A watch is good when all its parts move in harmony and with ease and accuracy in the performance of the work for which it was made. And so liberty is good for the individual when all the elements of the mind have their appropriate movement and growth, according to their nature and the circumstances in which activity is called for. It is good for society when all the elements of society have their appropriate share in the movement of society, according to their several capacities and according to the circumstances in which society is placed. It always implies the self-determining character of the mind, without saying how far this self-determination extends. No two minds can be known to have it in the same degree. With one it faints in circumstances which in another rouse it to a noble energy. Sometimes one function of the mind acts with such energy and liberty as to bring all the other functions into complete subjection. And sometimes all society is pervaded by this superabundant energy of one mental function over the others; and this gives rise to what is called the spirit of the

times, and to those moral and intellectual epidemics, that give character to particular ages in the history of man, as well as to the more transient commercial and political excitements. No law can regulate such things, except by suppressing this free play of mental functions, and arresting all human progress. It is not by law, but by moral and religious growth, that such social excitements can be corrected.

A very large degree of subjection is not incompatible with rational liberty. All of us are more or less in subjection; for all of us have duties which we are bound to perform; parents to children, masters to servants, individuals to society, rulers to the people; and yet all may be free in the true sense of the word, that is, so far as is proper for our own interest and improvement, and so far as we can fit into the great movement of society, and so far also as to improve it, if we have skill to deal with it without deranging its order and development. There is a liberty of children as well as of adults, of savages as well as of civilized people, of the ignorant as well as of the learned, of subjects as well as of rulers, and of all according to their dispositions, capacities, and circumstances. For all it is different in form, and yet for all it is fundamentally the same. One may be free in almost any circumstances if he learn how to use them well. In a very bad state of society the weak sometimes find a protection and freedom in a condition of slavery, which they could not have without it. Epictetus was free to become the greatest philosopher of expiring paganism, though he was the slave of a freedman.

A child must have liberty for its language, plays, plans, joys, mistakes, and even its quarrels, if it is to learn to be a man; and yet it must be in subjection to parents and teachers, and grow into subjection to the order of the family, and to the traditional customs, opinions, and order of society, if it would take its proper place as a social being. How cheerfully in its plays it submits to the rules of the game and tries to learn them! How cheerfully it submits to the inferiority that belongs to its age, even when aspiring to a higher place! How cheerfully ignorance submits to the superiority of wisdom, when not prevented by some misleading passion or some charlatanism which it mistakes for wisdom.

Even ignorance must have freedom to act as it can, otherwise it will remain ignorance. Men act in order to learn, and learn in order to act, and thus we are warned that the progress of reason is obtained, as a truly social growth, by a perpetual alternation of theory and practice, each enlightening and confirming the other; and thus neither by itself can ever construct a vigorous, intelligent, and well balanced character, or found a consistent, enduring, and practical system of knowledge. Both individuals and peoples have to work out their own progress in civilization, and in doing so they must discover and correct their ignorance for themselves; for, even when instructed by the teaching and example of others, it requires much patience and effort to appropriate this as their own. And in this God helps them, by the instinct of imitation strongly seated in their nature, which is continually saving them from the weakness and disorganization of rationalism, and acting as one of the strongest forces in producing that degree of uniformity that is necessary to social unity, and making even bad institutions endurable.

The Chinese do not complain of the bondage of their law, though it has fossilized the character of the nation. The subjects of King Dahomey do not complain that his rule is tyranny, though he deals with the liberty and lives of his subjects according to his brutal nature. They imitate the customs and patience of their ancestors, and know nothing better, and could manage nothing better. The Jews did not complain of the narrow legalism of their rulers, and Christ did not come to destroy the law; but he taught the principles by which they were to outgrow it and gradually cast it off. In a high state of popular excitement parties do not complain of their leaders, if faithful to their banners, though, like Marius and Sylla and Robespierre, they trample down all law, sacrifice the public liberty, and flood their partisan altars with the best blood of the nation. It is energetic leaders and strong measures, rather than good men and wise counsels, that excitement demands, and, while it continues, it is content even with corruption, if it helps to bear onward the favourite banners, and supplies the food which excitement feeds on, at least until satiety brings exhaustion and disgust.

And yet there can be no system of government that will not by some be felt to be a bondage. To selfish and disorderly minds respect is bondage and turns into envy. The selfish office hunter finds fault with the law and government which he does not administer. The envious man, whining at the success of others in business, or at their higher standing in public esteem, finds fault with law and society for their gross partialities. The religious zealot complains that the law does not allow him to suppress the form of religion which he hates. The bigoted partisan hates the very institutions which shelter him from the ruin of anarchy, if they stand in the way of his favourite theory, even so far as to forget the desolation, demoralization, poverty and famine that follow the footsteps of rebellion. The slave of fashion, habit, vice, ostentation, does not feel the yoke he loves severe or heavy; but he complains of any law, custom or principle, that interferes with the free indulgence of his passion, at least until he feels it gall.

It is apparent, therefore, that any law or institution depends for its general fitness upon the habitual disposition of the people who are subject to it. When this is set right, it will naturally change the form of its liberty and of its law. What is bondage to one is freedom to another, according to the different habits of their minds. We are all in bondage to outer law, subject to some rule of action not created by ourselves; we love or hate it according to the state of our inner life. We cannot live or act without some such subjection, unless by running into utter selfishness, which rejects all duty and unfits us for social life. God has made us so, and we would not have it otherwise. So far as man is governed only by the dispositions that are within him, call it conscience or what you will, he is selfish, lawless, and tyrannical. So far as any power, king, counsel, or party, acts thus, it too is selfish, lawless and tyrannical, even in passing laws which are formally valid. And so it is with a nation when it acts on its own disposition, regardless of the rights of other nations. Law, when it truly expresses social usages and customs, and morality, is the vital medium of social movement; and it is as absurd to complain of it, as an obstacle to liberty, as for a bird to complain of the obstruction of the atmosphere which sustains its flight and its freedom.

Social liberty is therefore a complex conception, composed of inner states and dispositions, and of outer law and circumstances. It is subjective as well as objective—the adaptation of men to society, the society to which they belong—the co-adaptation of all the elements of the mind to its proper movement and development. Law also is subjective as well as objective, a rule fitted to the general habits of the people and changing and growing with them. Pawnee law cannot be law for Pennsylvanians until they fall back into Pawnee barbarism. Pennsylvanian law cannot be fitted for Pawnees until they rise to Pennsylvanian civilization. When the Pretorian bands ruled the destinies of Rome, the law, so far as it affected them, had to be fitted to their taste. If the British and Hindoos were united under one law, with equal political rights, it would have to be Hindoo law, as that of the vast majority. But this cannot be; the law must fit the people. The British and the Hindoos must have different laws until they grow alike. He would be a miserable tailor who would take his own body as the standard of all the garments of his customers—a miserable hotel-keeper who would insist that his guests should live according to his tastes.

And it is this subjective element of law and liberty, this dependence on the inner state of man, that prevents either from ever becoming a fixed constituent of social life: it can never be. They must change because man changes. They must grow and decay because man grows and decays. Men and society are prone to excitement; we should be worth nothing if we were not. Excitement, at least to the degree of earnestness, is necessary to all energetic action, but we know not how to measure and moderate it; and hence it becomes unstable, excessive, and disorderly. In its very nature it is out of rule. It would abate at once, if it should begin to seek the law, the outer rule, that ought to guide it. Radically, therefore, it is opposed to every law that stands in its way.

Thus the excitement that runs into rebellion levels all law, and, like an advancing army, sweeps all civilization from its path, and the countervailing excitement is in danger of doing the same. Its subjects are not conscious of their sins, for they do not stop to hear the law that tells them of their duty, or

read the resolutions, rules of life, constitutions written in their thoughtful hours. It is so in private and public excitements, in families, churches, classes, parties, nations. The habits and morality of a lifetime yield to a moment's gust of passion. The church forgets its law of faith and love and appeals to force and even fraud for success. It has called Mahometans, pagans, and infidels to its aid against its brethren and in support of its religion. Or it raises its sacred banners and lends the thunder of its spiritual artillery on one side or the other in the carnal wars of political differences; and it does so sincerely and with as much wisdom as belongs to human nature. Thus always the firm foundations of law and moderation are shaken by the excesses of excitement. Thus an excited neighbourhood executes its will, called Lynch law, by a Lynch court. Thus the war-spirit sweeps away all laws, forms, and institutions that lie in the line or on the flanks of its march and within reach of its foragers and bummers.

On the other hand, the respect for order, the other element of liberty, may run to an extreme and "gender to bondage." The systems of Chinese and Japanese unity are not worthy of imitation, though they have stood longer than any other known system of government. They indicate the value of social order, and also the vice of giving it a too rigid form. We could not imitate them, though we should perish in trying our own way, blundering though it may be. A dead shell of society indicates a dead or dying mind within it. Spanish excitement grew and hardened into Spanish bigotry by persecuting the Jews and Moors, and left to the people an inheritance of social asphyxia. Spartan and Venetian life died out by aristocratic hardening of its form, a disease for which there is no known remedy but revolution.

How then shall we moderate between these two elements of liberty, the individual and the social, the inner life and outer rule, the changing and the enduring? There is no law of definite proportions in the combinations of thoughts and sentiments that constitute the motives of human action, and no law of gravitation by which we can calculate their influence on each other; and therefore we must always be content with general results expressive of approximate truth. We have

even no language for such things, like the hard and sharp terms of geometry; for every word expressive of growing things has and must have a plasticity that fits it for very various application without injury to its essential nature. And it is this very plasticity of language that enables tyrants and demagogues to use it often more effectually than true patriots can. Liberty has been made the watchword of oppression in all ages, because the idea can be so easily presented in a false aspect. A mathematical demagogue is impossible, because numbers, circles, and angles have no growth or decay.

But there is a general principle of moral affinity that fits men to each other and each man to society, and this principle is "the law of liberty," "the royal law" of human association, "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," "honour all men." The very fact that men are growing beings, starting life at different times and under different circumstances, makes them different; and the fact that they are social beings demands that their differences should be recognized in social arrangements, so that the laws may have a general adaptation, and yet admit specific differences according to the various moral life of different localities, as well as of different times, and even leave out, for the time being, those elements that are yet to grow up to adaptation, such as children in all cases, and savages in a civilized system; and subject, with special rigor, those comparatively few that have grown up into selfishness, vice, or any other form of social disorder.

This "royal law" of respect for each other has been the true bond of society ever since history began, and without it, however imperfectly developed, there could have been no civilization and no history. It is an essential element of all true statesmanship. The arbitrary will of monarch or of class rejects it, and then has no other method of ruling except the Machiavellian one of force and fraud, the effect of which always is to maintain social excitement or induce social torpor, either of which is death. Rome and Greece, as vital elements of advancing civilization, perished by the excitement of arbitrary rule of people and of classes. In China and Japan the same method gave a mould to society that excludes all growth. Such systems could not bear proximity to an advancing civilization.



Love is the harmonizing principle of the social world. It is beautifully analogous to the principle of gravitation in the physical world, the balancing of the dispersive power of repulsion and the unitive power of attraction, giving us cosmos out of chaos, variety in unity, liberty and order both for the parts and for the whole. It is kindness to inferiors and reverence for superiors. It makes us bear and even allow the foibles and errors of youth and ignorance, and the excitement of selfishness, and submit with cheerfulness to the imperfections of laws and institutions which can be corrected only by being outgrown in the progress of society. It is a disposition always tending to become mutual, and thus to enlarge its sphere and more and more fit all to each and each to the whole. It is an inner principle that lightens the yoke of imperfect society by exciting the wish and the hope of contributing to its improvement, and makes its possessor feel a real and true liberty, a liberty that respects society even in the midst of the obstacles and trials caused by the faults of others. It is not law, but the fulfilling of law, in the old sense of the word fulfilling, the complement (*πλήρωμα*) of law, for ever permeating its form and structure and adapting it to the condition of society, as the mother adapts her love to the state and growth of her children, and thus for ever tending to keep law in harmony with liberty, and to combine them with itself in a threefold unity—law, liberty, and love.

Thus it becomes plain that law is not inconsistent with liberty, nor liberty with it; that it is the form which society takes as part of its nature, and which, because part of itself, must always share in its changes of both improvement and decay. Just as the tree with its inner life and outer form, the lobster and its shell, the soul and the body, and every other combination of principle and form, each changes in functions and substance according to its developement, and therefore in the law of its action. Thus, for man in his present state, actual law and actual liberty must always be imperfect, but especially so when either element is stimulated in advance of the other.

But God has not left us to helpless mourning over our unachieved ideals; for if we keep in mind the great function of human life, which is to grow in all the spiritual graces and moral and intellectual qualities which have their germs in our

nature, though smothered under the ruins of the fall, and trust in God to help us, we are sure to be always advancing upon our ideals, and they to be always receding and rising before us.

Faith, always respecting and building upon old foundations, and yet always aspiring towards higher and more spiritual views of things, after purer affections, nobler sentiments and more generous deeds, and ever seeking to know the unseen and spiritual and to learn and overcome our ignorance and sins, is always inviting man onward and upward to a better life and law and liberty, and forbidding him from the carnal passions that tend to anarchy, and from the no less carnal *inertia* that tends to social death in a contracted and bigoted legalism. It is only thus that every divine creation, every people, every building of God "fitly framed together, *groweth* into a holy temple," "a habitation of God through the Spirit," and not by law; for law, so far as it is true, merely defines *existing* moral forces according to their phenomena; they are *generated and grow* only by His Spirit.

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ART. III.—*The New Englander*, April 1868, Article IV., entitled, "*The Princeton Review on the Theology of Dr. N. W. Taylor.*"

IN this article Professor Fisher, of Yale College Theological Seminary, devotes sixty-four pages, or nearly one-third of the entire number, to the analysis of Dr. N. W. Taylor's Theology, presented in about 15 pages from the 11th to the 26th inclusive, of the article on *Presbyterian Reunion* in the January number of this journal. His object is to prove that the representation of this theology there given is "unfair." He says, "we are not so uncourteous as to say, nor so uncharitable as to think, that Dr. Hodge has meant to make an unfair representation; we simply assert, and expect to prove that it is unfair." (P. 286.) A personal acquaintance with Dr. Fisher leads us to give the fullest credit to this avowal of courtesy and charity, even if polemical ardour has at times urged him unconsciously to over-

step them. Nor have we any doubt of the sincerity and earnestness of his conviction in the premises. We take great pleasure in recognizing the learning, dialectic keenness, and controversial tact displayed in the article before us. At the same time, so far as it is an attempt to sustain the above charge against Dr. Hodge, of having made an "unfair representation" of Dr. Taylor's system of theology, or rather of those peculiarities of his system known as Taylorism, or New Haven Divinity, which distinguished it from other systems, we must, with all respect, pronounce it unsuccessful. He will take no offence, if, *mutatis mutandis*, we adapt and apply his own language: "We may remark once for all, that we are not so uncourteous as to say, nor so uncharitable as to think, that Dr. Fisher has meant to make any unfair representation; we simply assert, and expect to prove that it is unfair." Of course it will not be expected that we should examine in detail the multitude of extraneous or collateral allegations, suggestions, references, quotations, to say nothing of reflections, implied or expressed, upon Dr. Hodge, the *Princeton Review*, and the Old-School Presbyterian Church, which from time to time crop out in this extended article. To do it would occupy our whole number. We leave the *New Englander* and its readers in undisturbed possession of all this, *rabies theologorum*, and all. If we had the room, we have not the time, nor the taste to traverse it. Nor do we fear that any of the parties touched or aimed at by it will suffer loss thereby. We shall, with the slightest exceptions, confine ourselves to the simple issue now raised:—Was the representation of the peculiarities of Dr. Taylor's theology given in the article on *Presbyterian Reunion*, and characterized by Dr. Fisher as "unfair," really so? Was it true or untrue? This is a momentous question historically and practically, in its bearing on great movements in the past, present, and future, and on the persons and parties therein implicated. Before proceeding, however, to the direct inquiry, whether Dr. Fisher has proved Dr. Hodge's representation of the New Haven Theology unfair, we invite attention to a few preliminary observations which will dispose of some of the more plausible and telling points in his article.

1. He has repeatedly quoted from the "*Outlines of Theology*," an excellent work by Dr. A. A. Hodge, Professor of Theology in Allegheny Seminary, and son of Dr. Charles Hodge of Princeton, author of the article on *Presbyterian Reunion*, as if the latter were the author of both productions. He thus makes a show at times of quoting him against himself. We cannot permit ourselves to doubt that this was due to pure inadvertence or grave misapprehension on the part of Dr. Fisher. Surely he would not knowingly attribute to Dr. Charles Hodge what was not his. And yet the slightest attention to the names on the cover of this Journal, and the title-page of the *Outlines*, would have prevented the mistake. Although both father and son hold and teach the same system of theology, yet this is consistent, in two independent minds, with a difference in circumstantial details of statement and explanation—especially in passing from theology proper to the correlated points of philosophy. It is probable that even here, any apparent discordance between the two is only seeming, if the alleged discrepant passages be taken with, and interpreted through, their original surroundings.\* But however this may be, it needs no argument to show, that, although it may be proper for an adversary to quote one against the other, and gain whatever aid he honestly may from this source, it is a great breach of truth and justice to do this, as if he were quoting either against himself. Jonathan Edwards, the son, may be fairly quoted over against his father, if the fact be so stated. But he may not be so quoted with an assertion or implication that it is the father's own writings that are so quoted against himself. It is certainly against all the laws of controversial ethics to quote Dr. Addison Alexander against his father, and at the same time to say or imply that it is quoting the latter against himself.

2. Dr. Fisher makes much of passages in the writings of Augustin and the later adherents of his theological system, which assert or imply that all sin is voluntary, or that moral

\* Dr. Charles Hodge in a notice of his son's work (*Princeton Review*, 1860, pp. 759-60,) says that he "in reading the book is conscious of contact with a mind exterior to his own, and differing from it in its modes of thought and expression." There is nothing in Dr. A. A. Hodge's account of the genesis of his book, in the preface, to warrant, or even suggest, a different view.

quality pertains only to voluntary acts and states. These he arrays in aid of Dr. Taylor's doctrine that all sin consists in voluntary disobedience to known law, and that there can be no holiness which is not an act of will. But he gives abundant proof that he well understood the difference between the meaning of the terms "will," "voluntary," etc., as used by Dr. Taylor and his adherents, and as used by the preceding theologians whom he quotes in this behalf. Until a comparatively recent period, the standard distribution of the mental faculties was into understanding and will. "Will" and "voluntary" were made to include all the non-cognitive faculties of feeling, including affection and desire, as well as will in the narrower sense of the mere volitional faculty of choice and purpose, to which it is now very commonly restricted. When, then, these writers spoke of sin or holiness as being voluntary, they affirmed it of the feelings, desires, and affections, with regard to moral objects, no less than of the volitions. They affirmed it of the will as including all these, not as excluding any of them; and this not of its exercises merely, but also of its permanent states, dispositions, or habits, whether innate, acquired, or infused by the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, Dr. Taylor sharply separated the entire range of sensibility from the will, and denied moral quality to all but the exercises of the latter. This distinction between the will and the sensibilities accords with much current modern usage. But the denial of moral quality to the desires, and feelings, and dispositions in regard to moral objects, formerly included under the term *will*, and now seldom so included under it, is one of the peculiarities of the New Divinity. It is obviously no answer to the complaint against this system, that it limits sin and holiness to acts of the will with respect to known law, exclusively of the sensibilities, which comprehend the feelings, emotions, desires, and affections with regard to moral objects, to cite passages from Augustinian and Calvinistic divines to the effect that all sin, including even native concupiscence, or that all holiness, including even holy feelings and dispositions, is voluntary. For they held that all in the soul which is non-cognitive is voluntary, and that this term includes not merely the deliberate choices, but the spontaneous tendencies and outgoings of the soul, its dispositions,

feelings, desires with regard to moral objects. This broad, even if it were a loose, and with some even an inconsistent use of the terms *will* and *voluntary*, renders all quotations from them, of the character above described, to support Dr. Taylor's theory, nugatory. Dr. Fisher shows himself aware of the fact in question, if not of its logical consequences. He speaks of "the importance of the distinction between the sensibility and will, or of the threefold classification of the mental powers, which *Dr. Taylor was among the first to introduce*. The writers before him had commonly followed the old division of the mind into understanding and will. By failing to distinguish carefully the involuntary part of our nature from the will proper—the elective faculty—they had often fallen into a confusing ambiguity." (P. 311.) If this is so, then any statement of theirs, that all sin or holiness is voluntary, is no proof of identity with Dr. Taylor's doctrine on this subject. Nor does the fact that President Edwards held a moral inability, or an inability consisting solely in the want of will to what is spiritually good, prove that he held with Dr. Taylor on this subject, as Dr. Fisher so confidently affirms. (P. 327.) Quite the contrary, as Dr. Fisher himself seems not to wholly overlook. For he connects "the importance of the distinction between the sensibility and will," above mentioned as held by Dr. Taylor, with the maintenance of "natural ability being a real power and not an incapable faculty." (P. 311.) That is, the difference between Dr. Taylor and preceding theologians is important to the maintenance of a natural ability which is a "real power," sufficient perfectly to obey God's law, and to remove all moral inability thereunto. Edwards indeed held the sinner's inability to be moral. So do nearly all Calvinists, not excepting those who hold it to be in one sense natural or even physical, (*φύσει*). But this is not inconsistent with its being real. And it is not inability if the sinner has "a real power," such as Dr. Fisher says Dr. Taylor held to, for its removal. Did Edwards hold to any such "real power" in the sinner as this? Was Dr. Taylor at one with him here? Was such a "real power" in the sinner the impotent conclusion reached and avowed by Edwards as the result of his great Treatise on the Will? Was this what he was wont to set forth in his sermons,

in his practical and experimental treatises? Was the tone of his addresses to sinners on this subject that of Dr. Taylor, and modern New Divinity men? Did he assert that ability in the sinner which Dr. Fisher assures us Dr. Taylor asserted? He not only can if he will; but Dr. Taylor uttered his protest against what he considered a necessitarian evasion by affirming that "he can if he won't?" Did not Dr. Taylor and his followers claim to have made a great advance upon Edwards and the New England divines, as well as the old Calvinists, on this subject? But all this is too plain for argument. Dr. Fisher himself tells us that Edwards "rules out the question of the power of contrary choice, in the ordinary understanding of that phrase, by his definitions. To ask if a man can repent, or if he can repent if he choose, or if he can repent if he will, is either mere tautology, or involves the blunder of an infinite series of choices." "Edwards continually treats the question whether a man *can* choose otherwise than he does, as absurd." (Pp. 292-3.) The question just here is not which doctrine is true or false, but what was Edwards' view? He claims one result of his Treatise on the Will to be, the removal of objections to the "Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity and corruption of man's nature, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is *utterly* unable without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do anything that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight." *Ex uno disce omnes*. All claims of agreement with Dr. Taylor on the part of other divines who either adopted the old distribution of the mental powers into understanding and will, or who used the resulting phraseology which it had rendered current; and all claims that they were inconsistent with themselves or the Calvinistic system, because they said that all sin and holiness are voluntary, are alike groundless and unfair, however sincerely urged.

3. It must be borne in mind still further that Dr. Hodge's representation of Dr. Taylor's system is not proved "unfair" by any contrary or inconsistent expressions uttered or written by him, unless they are such as to prove that he did not publish and maintain the views ascribed to him, or that they were casual and eccentric aberrations, and not permanent and

characteristic elements of his system. For, 1, it is undoubtedly true that he claimed and supposed himself to be within the great essentials of the Calvinistic system, though striving to mould them into harmony with his peculiar doctrines; while his opponents regarded these peculiarities as explaining away and making null what was most essential in the doctrines of original sin, inability, regeneration, election, and perseverance. Of course his language and thoughts often implied more of these doctrines than consisted with those peculiarities of his system, which excited the deepest repugnance. 2. As the human mind is preformed to truth, and the Christian mind to Christian truth, so the adoption of the most grievous errors does not always prevent the contrary truths from instinctively asserting themselves in the soul, often without consciousness of the incongruity or inconsistency. This is among the most familiar facts. Arminians are not proved speculatively sound on election, predestination, perseverance, and special grace, because they often use language implying these truths in praying or preaching. Idealists do not therefore cease to be idealists, because they constantly speak and act as if the external world were real. Pantheists are none the less so, though their ordinary speech and action imply that men, animals, plants, &c., have a being at once distinct from each other and from God. Dr. Bushnell did none the less affirm that the substitution of the pains of innocence in Christ for those of guilt in sinners, if it were true, would "prove in God the loss or confusion of all moral distinctions," although he insisted in the same treatise, that true culture in piety required the use of an altar-form implying this very substitution.

The three considerations we have just presented, contain all the refutation needed of some of the most plausible and effective parts of Professor Fisher's elaborate article. The question then returns, pure and simple: did Dr. Taylor and his coadjutors, the New Haven divines, teach and maintain, as alleged in the article on *Presbyterian Reunion*, controverted by Dr. Fisher? Or was that representation unjust? And here issue is joined.

And first, in regard to the fundamental and fontal doctrine of the nature of free-agency, and of virtue and vice as connected



with it, which constitutes the grand premise for most of the detailed principles of his system, has Dr. Hodge misrepresented it? He quotes Dr. Taylor as saying, that "moral agency implies free-agency—the power of choice—the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action." He says of this and another analogous passage quoted with it, "it is here as distinctly asserted that free-agency implies plenary ability, as that doctrine was ever stated by Pelagius himself.

Dr. Taylor was fully aware of his agreement with Pelagius on this fundamental principle. In vol. ii. page 132, he says, "Here I am constrained to ask, whether in all this theology, both Catholic and Protestant, theologians in maintaining the doctrines of grace, have not extensively maintained opinions—philosophical dogmas, unscriptural principles, and held them as essential doctrines of the word of God, which are palpably inconsistent with, and utterly subversive of, God's authority as a lawgiver? Without referring to more remote incongruities on this subject, may it not be said to be a prevalent doctrine of the Christian church from the time of Augustin, and emphatically in the two great divisions of the Reformed church, known as the Calvinistic and Arminian, that 'God commands what man *cannot* perform,' 'that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;' 'that God did not lose his right to command though man lost his power to obey?' The error of Pelagius is, not that he maintained man's ability without grace, but that man does *actually* obey God without grace." It is a mistake to say that Pelagius held that 'men do actually obey God without grace.' So that this shadowy difference between him and Dr. Taylor on this point vanishes. Dr. Taylor here consciously places himself in avowed opposition to the whole Christian world, Catholic and Protestant."

Dr. Fisher complains of this representation as unjust to Dr. Taylor—1. that it "keeps out of sight so far as practical impression is concerned, Dr. Taylor's associated doctrine of moral inability." In answer to this, we submit that the doctrine is given in Dr. Taylor's own words, which must be responsible for their own "practical impression," whether for better or for worse. We also ask attention to the proofs presented under

our second preliminary observation, upon Dr. Fisher's own authority, of the assertion by Dr. Taylor of the most absolute plenary ability for good or evil on the part of every sinner and every moral agent. These might, and in subsequent parts of this article will, be easily and largely multiplied. We submit still further, that such plenary ability is in itself a negation of inability! The two terms are mutually incompatible and contradictory with reference to the same subject. A moral inability is none the less a real impotence which excludes the "real power"—the *he can if he won't*, ascribed by Dr. Fisher to Dr. Taylor. What sort of inability is this "power to act, despite all opposing power?"\* The moral inability admitted by most Calvinists before Dr. Taylor, excluded the ability for its own removal. It was contrasted with natural ability, not as implying that it does not pertain to human nature as fallen, or is not a real inability, but that it consists not in a lack of natural faculties, but in a corrupt moral state of those faculties, whereby they are "indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good," and "they that are in the flesh cannot please God."

Besides, it is a necessary logical result of this unlimited plenary ability which in so many ways is asserted to be an overmatch for "all opposing power;" that it excludes from the soul everything but its essential constitutional faculties, and their acts: everything of the nature of enduring but contingent moral states, which determine the acts of the will. The admission of anything of this kind, of the nature of abiding moral character, disposition, bias, inclination, or whatever else it may be called, and whether it be natural, acquired, or infused by grace, is, as the New Haven divines themselves at times said, utterly incompatible with this view of free-agency. Thus, as quoted by Dr. Hodge, p. 65, they say, a moral being "can be regarded only in two points of view—the substance of the soul with its essential attributes on the one hand, and its actions on the other. If there is sin in the mind previous to and independent of these actions, the substance of the soul must be itself sinful."† This was said to parry the doctrine of any original sinful dispositions prior to

\* *Christian Spectator*, 1831, p. 417.

† *Ibid.* 1829, p. 347.

the voluntary transgression of known law. But if good for that, it is obviously good for a great deal more, as we shall yet more fully see. Certainly, it is conclusive against all moral inability, all permanent, ruling, moral bias or character, determining the will, however originated, and against any regeneration which is not the sinner's own act. It does not even leave room for any enslaving power of habit and custom in sin, such as Pelagius conceded,\* or for that "tendency of sin to self-perpetuation," in asserting which, Dr. Fisher, on very slight grounds, insists that Taylorism surpassed Pelagianism. Pp. 324-5.

Dr. Fisher next complains that Dr. Hodge identifies Dr. Taylor's doctrine with that of Pelagius, on this subject. Dr.

\* Pelagius, as quoted by Neander, *Church History*, vol. ii. p. 611, Torrey's translation, says, "Longa consuetudo vitiorum, quæ nos infecit a parvo, paulatimque, per multos corruptit annos, et ita postea obligatos sibi et addictos tenet, et vim quodammodo videatur habere naturæ." "Accordingly," says Neander, "they explained the passages concerning the law in the members, (Rom. vii.) as referring to this influence of bad habits. . . . Although the Pelagians denied that there was any such thing as hereditary corruption in human nature, yet they agreed with Augustin in recognizing the maxim of experience, that sin in humanity continually acquired greater dominion. They adopted the opinion of a progressive deterioration of mankind; and upon this they argued the necessity of counteracting influences by the various revelations of God and the various means of grace which God had employed. This deterioration they explained, as in the case of humanity at large, so in the case of individual man, from the force of bad customs, by means of which evil had become a second nature."

Now we submit that the New Haven divines, making the most of their generic governing purpose and self-perpetuating tendency of sin, or moral inability, have asserted no greater propensity to it in mankind than this. And this is a sufficient answer to the charge of injustice in denominating their system Pelagian in this respect, on account of these features in it, a charge frequently preferred by Dr. Fisher.

We submit still further, that alike in Dr. Taylor and Pelagius, this dominion of sin in man, however caused, and in whatever degree, is in contradiction to the radical principles of their system, viz., plenary ability to be holy or unholy at all times from the very nature of free-agency: the impossibility of any sin or holiness except in acts; and of predicating anything of the soul except its substance and essential attributes on the one hand, and its acts on the other. It is these principles that the great body of the church has protested against, as irreconcilable with some great principles of Christianity, with which Dr. Taylor attempted to reconcile them. But they will not be reconciled. In the long run one must give way to the other. Herein, as so often happens, Dr. Taylor's faith was one thing, the philosophy with which he sought to prove it, another. With this we now have to do.

Taylor himself recognizes the identity in the passage quoted, so far as "ability without grace" to fulfil all righteousness is concerned. He only claims to differ in this, that Pelagius did, while Dr. Taylor did not hold that sinners *do* obey the gospel without grace. Dr. Hodge pronounces this alleged difference "shadowy," and that it is a mistake to say that Pelagius held that "men do actually obey God without grace." To this Dr. Fisher objects that Dr. Taylor means by grace, an "inward supernatural operation of the Spirit," of which Pelagius "made little or nothing," meaning by it, outward revelation, providence, &c.

We do not think, that, on this point, Pelagius had thought himself through with the same precision as on some others, or as some of his successors. He used the word *grace* with some vagueness, now for external, and now for internal aids from above. But he held what fully justifies the above representation of Dr. Hodge. In answer to the charges of Augustin, and other North African bishops, he said, "Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus, nos indigere Dei semper auxilio." Again, "In omnibus est liberum arbitrium equaliter per naturam; sed in solis christianis juvatur a gratia." Here he asserts a dependence of the will on grace, and that this grace is special in Christians. Neander, in his very able and judicial analysis of Augustinianism and Pelagianism, says, "Although the doctrine of God's supernatural communications had no such place in the Pelagian system as it had in the system of Augustin, by reason of the doctrines systematically unfolded by Augustin respecting the relation of the creature to the Creator, and respecting man's corruption; yet even in the Pelagian system, that doctrine formed a point of attachment in the recognition of a moral degeneracy of human nature in general and in its idea. . . . True, the Pelagians made no such distinction, and no such opposition between nature and grace, as Augustin did; and, inasmuch as they did not hesitate to apply the latter term to designate *all* communications of the love of God, they moreover sometimes embraced together, under the general conception of 'grace,' all the moral and spiritual powers which God had conferred on human nature; but they did not, on this account, by any means deny

that there were supernatural communications of the love of God, through which there had been bestowed on man's nature, what it never could have attained by means of powers communicated to it at creation, and they applied the term grace to both."\* Neander still farther shows the essential similarity of the two schemes, when he tells us that "Pelagius and his followers, in their doctrine concerning grace, were particularly strenuous only in maintaining its *opposition* to any theory which impaired the freedom of the will. They supposed all operations of grace to be conditioned on the bent of the free-will, and all means of grace to be effectual only according to the measure of the different tendencies of the will: they denied all constraining influences of grace on the free-will. Augustin, on the other hand, reckoned it as necessary to the conception of grace, that it should exclude all merit; and with this belonged, in his own view, all conditioning of grace on the different states of recipiency on the part of man."† Certainly Pelagius did not surpass Dr. Taylor in the might he ascribed to the human will, or the extent to which he conditioned the efficacy of grace upon its consent, as will yet more fully appear. Passing from this point, Dr. Hodge says:

"As Dr. Taylor and Pelagius agreed in this fundamental principle as to free agency and ability, so they agreed in the conclusions which they drew from it. These conclusions follow by a logical necessity.

1. The first of these is, that all sin consists in the voluntary transgression of known law." Dr. Fisher also lays down as first of a series of principles maintained by Dr. Taylor, that "all sin is the voluntary action of the sinner in disobedience to a known law." P. 308.

2. Dr. Hodge says, "a second inference from these principles is, that there can be no original or hereditary sin, no sin derived by descent from our first parents." He proceeds to show that this inference was held both by Pelagius and Dr. Taylor, by incontestable proofs. Dr. Fisher tells us, that before Dr. Taylor's time, New England theology "rejected imputation in

\* Neander's *History of the Christian Religion and Church*. Torrey's translation, vol. ii, pp. 612-13.

† Id. p. 614.

every form; but outside of the Hopkinsian school, it associated with this denial a vague theory of an hereditary sinful taint, or a sinful propensity to sin, propagated with the race—what Dr. Taylor termed ‘physical depravity,’” *i. e.* stigmatized and rejected as such. Again, says Dr. Fisher, “There is in men, according to Dr. Taylor, a bias or tendency, sometimes called a propensity, or disposition to sin; but this is not *itself* sinful; it is the cause or occasion of sin. Dr. Hodge, referring to this view, says, “It is true that Dr. Taylor admits that men are depraved by nature; that is, that such is their nature that they will certainly sin. But this was admitted by Pelagius, except in a case here and there among millions.” Dr. Fisher says, “we do not know what is the authority for this last statement.” On this point we quote the following from Neander. “In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he (Pelagius) says, remarking on the passage in v. 12, the word ‘all’ is to be understood here as referring only to those who had sinned like Adam, and not to such as Abel, Isaac, and Jacob; the apostle says *all*, because compared with the multitude of sinners, the few righteous amount to nothing.”\* Dr. Fisher also complains, under this head, that Dr. Hodge does not make enough of Dr. Taylor’s moral inability. It is sufficient here to refer to what we have said, and shall say elsewhere, on this subject.

Dr. Hodge proceeds:

“3. A third inference which Pelagians drew from their views of free agency, is that God of necessity limits himself in the creation of free agents. They are from their nature beyond his absolute control. If free agency involves the ability to choose and act contrary to any amount of influence which can be brought to bear upon free agents, without destroying their freedom, then God cannot control them. He cannot prevent sin, or the present amount of sin, in a moral system. Neither can he convert whom he pleases. He can persuade and argue; but men may, and multitudes do, resist his utmost efforts to bring them to repentance. These inferences the New Haven divines adopt and avow. ‘Moral agency,’ says Dr. Taylor, ‘implies free agency—the power of choice—the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence

\* See Neander’s *History*, Torrey’s translation, vol. ii. p. 612.

to prevent such an action.' *Lect.* vol. i. p. 307. 'Moral beings, under the best moral system, must have power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they can under this system, viz., sin, and that God should prevent their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. It may be true that such beings, in this respect, will do what they can do—that is, will sin—when of course it would be impossible that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent their sinning without destroying their moral agency.' Vol. i. pp. 321–322. In his sermon on sin, he says: 'The error lies in the gratuitous assumption, that God could have adopted a moral system, and prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin.' Again, 'Would not a benevolent God, had it been possible to him in the nature of things, have secured the existence of universal holiness in his moral kingdom?' Again, 'Who does most reverence to God, he who supposes that God would have prevented all sin in his moral universe, but could not; or he who affirms that he could have prevented it, but would not?' The doctrine held by all Christendom, that God can effectually control free agents, without destroying their nature, is regarded by the New Haven divines as a most dangerous error. *Spect.* 1832, p. 482.

"God according to their theory prevents all the sin he can; he brings all the influence he can to secure the conversion of every man. If he fails, it is because men effectually resist his utmost exertions for their salvation consistent with their free agency. Let it be remembered that we are not giving our inferences from Dr. Taylor's principles; but simply stating the inferences which he and his associates draw for themselves and present as Christian doctrine."

Dr. Fisher objects to this, (p. 328) as follows: "Dr. Taylor did not hold as Dr. Hodge represents that he did, that God 'cannot prevent sin or the present amount of sin in a moral system,' also that it is unjust to attribute to the New Haven divines the unqualified proposition that God 'cannot effectually control free agents without destroying their nature.'" We are entirely willing to leave to our readers to judge whether the foregoing extracts from the New Haven divines do not fully justify all

the comments made upon them against the above objections of Dr. Fisher, without further argument. We simply quote in corroboration of our view, and in justice to Dr. Fisher, from a communication published by him in the *New Haven Palladium* and other journals, since the appearance of the article under review, in correction of an inaccuracy in the representations of Dr. Taylor's views on this subject, made by him in that article. "He (Dr. T.) maintains that it cannot be demonstrated that God can exclude sin from a moral system, *from the nature of agency*; nor can it be proved (that is, demonstrated) from facts, —since wherever sin is actually prevented, its prevention *may be* due to the system with which all the sin that does exist is certainly connected.

"This inaccuracy, which I notice in looking over my article, is immaterial, as far as the distinctive principles of Dr. Taylor are concerned. The possible incompatibility of the prevention of sin by the divine power, with the best system, is the doctrine on which he finally rested his refutation of the skeptical objection to the benevolence of God. At the same time, he contended that there can be no demonstrative proof that a moral being who *can* sin, will not sin, and hence no complete, decisive proof, that sin can be kept out of any moral system by the act of God.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

Yale College, April 25th, 1868."

Dr. Fisher further objects to the corollary from these premises that "God brings all the influence he can to secure the conversion of every man," in the different forms in which it is put in the article on *Reunion*. He, however, says that Dr. Taylor's real view was presented, in the following words quoted by Dr. Hodge from the *Spectator*. "He (God) brings all those kinds, and that degree of moral influence in favour of it (the sinner's compliance with the gospel invitation) which a system of measures best arranged for the success of grace in a world of rebellion allows." This is illustrated elsewhere by the case of a father seeking the recovery of recreant children. He may put forth less influence on one and more on another than he otherwise would, on account of the foreseen effect upon the recovery of the remaining children. Should he exert his utmost



power to reclaim some one, or the utmost power requisite for success, the good result might be more than counterbalanced by the necessary consequent loss, or failure, of the influences requisite to reclaim others greater in number or importance. (P. 332.) The statement above objected to, and other equivalent statements, will be relieved then of all pretence of injustice to Dr. Taylor's views if put thus—God brings all the influence he can to insure the conversion of every man, *that is compatible with the most effective possible exercise of his power for the conversion of all men.* This, however, so far from relieving Dr. Taylor's scheme of the charge of limiting God's power over moral agents, of making him dependent on their consent for the success of his renewing grace, and of holding that he accomplishes the salvation of as many as the might of the human will leaves possible to his omnipotence, confirms and aggravates it. It not only limits his power over sinners individually and collectively, but it makes a quantitative apportionment and partition of what power he does and can exercise, more becoming a finite than an Infinite Being. It supposes that the full exertion of his power on some persons involves an exhaustion or diminution of his power to operate upon others. This is utterly repugnant to every proper conception of the true infinitude and perfection of God, which, after all their outgoings, still remain in unchangeable, indivisible, and indestructible fulness.

Dr. Hodge further argued, that this theory of free agency, in its necessary logical results, and the consequences drawn from it by the New Haven divines, militates against the Calvinistic doctrine of effectual calling, in the words following:

“Of course it also follows from this theory of free agency that there can be no such thing as ‘effectual calling’ in the Augustinian sense of those words. By effectual calling is meant such an exercise of the power of the Holy Spirit on the soul of a sinner, as effectually, or inevitably, secures its regeneration and conversion unto God. It is, as all Augustinians maintain, from its nature ‘irresistible,’ although its effect is not to coerce but to render the sinner willing in the day of God's power. The New Haven divines explicitly deny this. Regeneration is defined to be, not an act of God, but an act of the sinner himself. It is the act of choosing God as a portion,

or source of happiness. But the fundamental principle of the system, repeated over and over, is that a free agent can and may act contrary to any amount of influence which can be brought to bear upon him, short of destroying his freedom. He can, therefore, and multitudes do, effectually resist the utmost efforts of the Spirit of God to secure their salvation. 'In all cases,' it is said, 'it (the grace of God) may be resisted by man as a free moral agent, and it never becomes effectual to salvation until it is unresisted.' 'God offers the same necessary conditions of acceptance to all men; desires from the heart that all men, as free agents, would comply with them and live; brings no positive influence upon any mind against compliance; but, on the contrary, brings all those kinds, and all that degree of influence in favour of it upon each individual, which a system of measures best arranged for the success of grace in a world of rebellion allows, and, finally, saves, without respect of kindred, rank, or country; whether Scythian, Greek, or Jew, all who, under this influence, work out their own salvation, and reprobates all who refuse." *Spect.* 1831, p. 635. Again, "the means of reclaiming grace, which meet him in the word and Spirit of God, are those by which the Father draws, induces just such sinners as himself voluntarily to submit to Christ; and these means all favour the act of immediate submission. To this influence he can yield and thus be drawn of the Father. This influence he can resist, and thus harden his heart against God. Election involves nothing more, as respects his individual case, except one fact, the certainty to the Divine mind, whether the sinner will yield to the means of grace, and voluntarily turn to God, or whether he will continue to burden his heart till the means of grace are withdrawn." *Id.* p. 637. The Arminian doctrine of sufficient grace was never stated in clearer terms than in the above quotation. Dr. Hodge also shows the scheme in itself, and the views of its authors, inconsistent with infant regeneration.

Before remarking on Dr. Fisher's objections to this, we take occasion to say that it explicitly contradicts a groundless statement by him on p. 332, that Dr. Hodge agrees with Dr. Fitch in "not teaching that grace is, properly speaking, irresistible."

Dr. Fisher objects to the foregoing representation of Dr.

Taylor's view of Regeneration, as making it "not an act of God but an act of the sinner." In proof of its injustice, he quotes Dr. Taylor as saying that "the Spirit of God is the author of the change in regeneration. I cannot suppose it necessary to dwell on this fact in opposition to Pelagian error, and the proud self-sufficiency of the human heart." We submit that this proves nothing against the exegesis of the foregoing citations given by Dr. Hodge, and objected to by Dr. Fisher. There are various senses in which "the Spirit of God may be the author of this change." The truth and the preacher are spoken of as causes of it. But they are instrumental causes, while the Spirit of God is the efficient cause. When a phrase used by an author is susceptible of various meanings, every rule of construction requires that he should, as far as possible, be interpreted in consistency with himself, especially his distinctive and characteristic principles. Now, Dr. Fisher himself being witness, whatever agency Dr. Taylor held God to exert in regeneration, it was such that "the change in regeneration is the sinner's own act." P. 334. The phrase of Edwards, "God produces all and we act all, for that is what he produces, viz., our own acts," may be in point to vindicate this, when it is made to appear that, by God's producing holy action he did not mean to include what is transparent in his writings, the production of a new holy disposition or principle, antecedent to and causative of such acts.\*

The following citations from Dr. Taylor's great article on the Means of Regeneration in the *Christian Spectator* for 1829, not only imply that regeneration is wholly the sinner's act, but seem to make that act inconsistent with the sinner's belief in that lowest form of moral inability attributed to Dr. Taylor by his supporters, which makes it a mere "will not" in place of a "cannot." Thus, "common sense decides that if it is a known fact that the sinner, under a present call to duty, will not act, unless God do more for him than he is now doing, then let the sinner wait till God does do, more. Why should he act or attempt to act, or even think of acting, though called by the summons of God to instant duty? . . . No matter as respects the

\* See *Religious Affections*, part iii., Sec. i.

*reasonableness* of acting, what the ground of certainty is, that he shall not act, if the certainty be known or believed. That criminal perverseness of heart is the ground of the certainty does indeed make a very material difference in respect to the sinner's *obligation to act*. Still, if in this case *he knows he shall not act*, the futility and consequent unreasonableness of acting are as obvious as if certainty were caused by chains of adamant. Action, too, in this case, would be in the most absolute sense impossible. . . . We say then that the sinner under the call to present duty, is authorized to believe in the *practicability* of present duty." Pp. 704-6.

Does not this reasoning imply that regeneration is the sinner's act, so within his power as to be at all times "practicable" to him; while it is made impracticable by his entertaining any belief in his moral inability, or need that God should do aught that as yet he has not done, to accomplish his conversion?

Dr. Hodge finally shows the bearing of Dr. Taylor's doctrine of free agency on election and decrees. He says, "it follows from the New Haven theory of free agency and ability, that there is no such thing as predestination and election in the ordinary and accepted sense of those terms." The reason is obvious. All antecedent purposes on the part of God, with respect to the actions of the human will, are in respect to a power to act against "all opposing power" and "influence" to prevent it, and therefore, instead of surely determining those actions, must be conditioned by them and the foresight of them. This foresight, instead of proper foreordination of actions, is the Arminian and not the Calvinistic and Pauline doctrine.

That the New Haven divines made this application of their theory to the doctrine of election appears sufficiently in the citation from the *Spectator* made by Dr. Hodge, which we have reproduced under the last head. After stating that the sinner can yield to or resist the influence employed for his conversion, they say, "election involves nothing more, as respects his individual case, except one fact—the certainty to the Divine mind, whether the sinner will yield to the means of grace, and voluntarily turn to God, or whether he will continue to harden his heart till the means of grace are withdrawn." But if more

proof be needed, let the reader consider such passages as the following. "We would ask Dr. Fisk, whether in employing these means in the manner he does, God did not foresee what individuals would comply and be saved? Now what is this but a personal election to salvation?" *Christian Spectator*, 1831, p. 622. "Whatever is the degree of influence which he uses with them, it is not in its nature irresistible; but men as free agents still keep to their guilty choice in resistance to it; or through its operation, freely give up their idols and place their heart in God." *Id.* p. 632. If this be so, the conversion of the sinner is not due to what God does for him more than for the unconverted, but to what he himself does more than they. And election is the purpose on the part of God that they should comply, who he foresees will comply. And so they earnestly object to what they call "that Antinomian scheme, which makes grace terminate on dispensing with free agency by an act of mere omnipotence creating a new heart, and thus leaving none of the elements which constitute the moral certainty of conversion in the agent himself." *Id.* p. 133. Is this Calvinism? Is it Scripture? That any of the grounds of the certainty of conversion lie, not in God's electing love and omnipotent grace, but in the sinner himself?

"As to that explanation of the doctrine" (of election) "which denies that God is dealing with free agents who have the absolute power of choice, and who can resist all measures taken for their welfare, and which resolves renewing grace into a simple act of creative Omnipotence, we frankly admit, that it does load the doctrine with the charge brought against it by Dr. Fisk, that God first plunges men by direct omnipotence into the pit of sin, where they are utterly helpless, and then by an omnipotent act of partial grace, delivers a part and leaves the remainder unavoidably to perish. But we utterly deny this explanation." *Id.* 1831, p. 635. Comment is unnecessary. Will it be claimed after this that Dr. Hodge has misrepresented the New Haven divinity on Election and Predestination?

As further evidence of the opposition between the New Haven and Augustinian view of predestination, Dr. Hodge adduces the adoption, by the advocates of the former, of *scientia media*, to explain the relation of the acts of free-agents to the Divine

foreknowledge. This *scientia media* was originally introduced for the very purpose of avoiding the Augustinian view of the subject. Knowledge is either of things possible, or of things actual, *i. e.*, existing either *in the past, present, or future*. They cannot pass from the category of things merely possible to be, to that of things which certainly shall be, without some ground of certainty that they shall be, some actual futuration of them. But no ground of certainty or futuration of the acts of free-agents, could exist for eternal ages before their existence, but the eternal purpose of God himself. And, therefore, there could be no other ground of the possibility of God's foreknowledge of these acts. That cannot be known as certain, which is not somehow made certain. And the future acts of free-agents could not thus be eternally made certain, otherwise than by the Divine predestination. To avoid this conclusion, the *media scientia* was invented, which, it was claimed, lies between the knowledge of things possible, and of things actual, whether now or formerly existent, or as made future by decisive predetermination, and, can eternally foresee the acts of free-agents which have the "elements of their certainty" in themselves, and not in an antecedent Divine decree. This has been the favourite resource of the adversaries of the Calvinistic system, and has been historically associated with opposition to it. This is sufficiently shown in Turretine's statement of the question, which forms the title to his chapter on the subject, in these words: *An præter Scientiam Naturalem, et Liberam, detur in Deo Scientia quædam Media?* NEG. CONTRA JESUITAS, SOCIN. ET REMONST. Loc. 3, questio 13. And the New Haven divines, by adopting it, show with whom, so far forth, they affiliate on the doctrines of Election and Predestination.

Dr. Fisher, however, claims that this adoption of *scientia media* as the explanation of the relation of the acts of free-agents to the Divine foreknowledge, is unjustly alleged as proof of Arminian proclivities on this subject. Taken in connection with the citations already made from the New Haven divines, on election and fore-ordination, we are quite willing to leave the whole matter to the candid judgment of our readers, so far as the charge of injustice in our representations is concerned.

Dr. Fisher, however, attributes to the New Haven divines a principle bearing upon this and other doctrines, which, on its own account, and the due understanding of their system, requires distinct consideration. He says, in regard to the problem of reconciling the universal decrees and providence of God with full power in men to avoid sin and perform their duty:

“The true solution of the problem, in Dr. Taylor's view, is in the union of the doctrine of the previous certainty of every act of the will—a certainty given by its antecedents collectively taken—with the power of contrary choice. . . He held to a connection between choice and its antecedents, of such a character as to give in every case a previous certainty that the former will be actually what it is. The ground, or reason of this certainty, lies in the constitution of the agent and the motives under which he acts; that is to say, in the antecedents taken together. The infallible connection of these with the consequent, the Divine mind perceives; though we may not dogmatize on the exact *mode* of his perception. The precise mode of the connection between the antecedents and consequent, Dr. Taylor did not profess to explain; but he held that the same antecedents *will* uniformly be followed by the same consequent.” Pp. 306–7.

Such a power of contrary choice as this, freed from the other and incompatible prerogatives attributed to it by these theologians, already brought to view, never would have aroused the repugnance to Taylorism so widely and intensely felt, nor could it have convulsed the church. It is a mere hypothetical and formal, not an actual power of contrary choice. Such actual contrary choice is precluded by “a connection between choice and its antecedents of such a character as to give in every case a *previous* certainty that the former will be what it actually is. The ground of this certainty lies in the constitution of the agent and the motives under which he acts, that is to say, in the antecedents taken together.” There is an “infallible connection of these with the consequent which the Divine mind perceives. If this consequent *i. e.* choice be thus indissolubly connected with what precedes, and with a certainty sure to Omniscience, does not this connection surely preclude the contrary choice? And if “the same antecedents will uniformly be

followed by the same consequent," *i. e.*, the same volition, is not the contrary prevented by "the constitution of the agent, and the motives under which he acts?" Dr. Fisher refers to some passages in the article of Dr. Fitch where he calls to his aid the *media scientia*, which the former interprets according to this view, and in opposition to Arminianism. Upon all this we remark:

1. It is, in itself considered, simply the doctrine of common Calvinism, and catholic Christianity in regard to the relation of predestination and foreknowledge to the acts of free-agents. According to this, free-agency and antecedent certainty coincide, so that all free acts are rendered certain by antecedent causes, which reach back to the Divine decree, and are, in themselves, and the choices rendered certain by them, the objects of that decree. If this is all that Dr. Taylor meant by his power of contrary choice, then he made no advance upon preceding theologians relative to this point, and the spinal column of his chief improvements in theology is gone. A power of choice, by whatever name called, be it free-will, contrary choice, anything we please, whose actions can be controlled by antecedent causes at the sovereign pleasure of God, which render them certain, without impairing their freedom, and without any detriment to free-agency, is not the power which Dr. Taylor brought forward as the basis of a new theodicy; of new and momentous modifications of the whole doctrine of sin, grace, and predestination; which divided or convulsed the American church, and placed him in conscious and avowed opposition to the Protestant and Catholic church. It is not that power which has been exhibited, in the extracts from these divines, that have been placed before our readers. A power in whose actions the same antecedents will be always followed by the same consequent, and whose acts can be made antecedently certain, without damage to free-agency, is not the power to act despite all opposing power and influence, which therefore accounts for the entrance and prevalence of sin, and the limited redemption of sinners from it, because the nature of free-agency made it impossible for God originally to prevent sin in a moral system, or subsequently to exclude it therefrom by the power of his grace, without destroying its essence. Such a power does not



interfere with the most sovereign, unconditional, eternal election; the most absolute predestination, the unfrustrable efficacy of grace, whenever, wherever, upon whomsoever, it may please God to exercise it. But the power of contrary choice maintained by the New Haven divines is of a far different order; as the following, in addition to previously cited descriptions of it by its advocates, abundantly show.

“It will not be denied that free moral agents *can* do wrong under every possible influence to prevent it. The *possibility* of a contradiction in supposing them to be prevented from doing wrong is, therefore, demonstrably certain. Free moral agents can do wrong under all possible preventing influences. Using their powers as they *may* use them they *will* sin; and no man can show that some such agents *will* not use their powers as they *may* use them. But to suppose them to use their powers as they *may* use them, and yet to suppose them to be *prevented* from sinning, would be to suppose them both to sin and be prevented from sinning at the same time; which is a contradiction.

. . . “But this possibility that moral agents will sin, remains (suppose what else you will) so long as moral agency remains; and how can it be proved that a thing *will not* be, when for aught that appears it *may* be. When in view of all the facts and evidence in the case, it remains true that it *may* be, what evidence or proof can exist that it *will not* be.” *Christian Spectator*, 1830, p. 563.

“We know that a moral system necessarily implies the existence of free agents, with the power to act in despite of all opposing power. This fact sets human reason at defiance in every attempt to prove that some of these agents will not use that power and actually sin.” *Id.* 1831, p. 617.

“But if holiness consists in voluntary action, then the fact that God secures it in moral agents for a *time*, is no proof that he can secure its continuance for ever. The nature of free agency precludes such assertions respecting God, as truly as it does respecting an earthly parent or king. Not, indeed, because God has not more power than man, but because it *may be* true, that some moral agents, (all of whom can sin under any exertion of power) *will* sin.” *Id.* 1830, p. 561.

“It is to no purpose to say that God can do as he pleases; for if there are creatures, who as he knows beforehand would resist all his efforts to prevent them from sinning, then he never chose to prevent them. It is to no purpose to say that God has prevented some of his moral creatures from sinning; this is no proof that some of his moral creatures, all of whom can resist any supposable influence, *will not* resist it. It is to no purpose to say that God is omnipotent, for who knows that omnipotence can accomplish what may involve a contradiction.” *Christian Spectator*, 1830, p. 564.

Equivalent citations might be indefinitely multiplied. They describe a free-agency, which is an utter negation of the power in God to predetermine its actings, by any antecedents which ensure the certainty of acting in any given way, to the exclusion of the contrary. Let any antecedent influence whatever be employed possible to Omnipotence, let any predestination or foreknowledge whatever be supposed, still “this possibility that moral agents will sin remains, (SUPPOSE WHAT ELSE YOU WILL) so long as moral agency remains. And how can it be proved that a thing will not be, when for aught that appears it may be? When in view of all the facts and evidence in the case it remains true that it may be, what evidence or proof can exist that it will not be?” This is only one of almost numberless forms in which these writers put this their cardinal doctrine. Let what will be supposed, such a possibility of choosing either way remains, that there can be “no evidence or proof” that it will choose either way to the exclusion of the other. There can be no such “evidence or proof,” because there can be no antecedents, no decisive influence, fixing the choice in any given way, and therefore no preceding certainty, evidence, or proof that it will be so.

Hence it follows that the only possible foreknowledge of the acts of such free-agents, must be the *media scientia* aforesaid, if it were possible or conceivable, *i. e.*, a knowledge of that of which there is, at the time of knowing, no evidence, proof, or certainty, *i. e.*, of that which cannot be an object of knowledge, because utterly unknowable.

This is totally different from the case which Dr. Fisher puts under this category, p. 331, where he says, “Dr. Hodge him-

self, (he should have said Dr. A. A. Hodge), resolves the foreordination of sin into *scientia media*. "God knowing certainly that the man in given circumstances would so act, did place that very man in precisely those circumstances, that he should so act." This is not *scientia media*, a foreknowledge of what is not antecedently fixed by a Divine decree; of the acts of a power to act "despite all opposing power," so that there can be no antecedent "evidence or proof" that it will not act in either way, suppose what else you will against it.

The radical principle of the New Haven system, (whatever contradictory statements its advocates may be impelled by the inherent force of truth to make), therefore does require that *media scientia* which they impressed into its service, as anti-Augustinians before them had used it, in explaining the possibility of God's foreknowledge. Had they held the Augustinian doctrine, or merely that God foresees the actions of free-agents that are predetermined, because God knowing that they would act in a certain manner in certain circumstances, determined to place them in such circumstances, they would not have found it necessary to call in the aid of *media scientia*. The *scientia visionis* is ample for this. But it is not adequate to foreknow the acts of a power to act "despite all opposing power," "because it *may be true* that some moral agents, (all of whom can sin under any exertion of power), will sin;" and "this possibility remains, suppose what else you will, so long as moral agency remains." And since it is equally a possibility of sinning or not sinning, while it remains true that either may be, "what evidence or proof can exist that it will not be?" And if no such "evidence or proof can exist," how can it be certain to any, even Infinite Intelligence?

It was not merely or principally as a proposed solution of the mystery of moral evil in the universe, or even of the sincerity of the gospel offer, and the practicability of obeying it without special grace, a grace in every conceivable degree of it, thus made resistible, that the dogma in question aroused such wide and earnest opposition among Calvinists and others. If good for these purposes, it is good for a great deal more. It is good, not only against the decrees, but the providence of God, his "most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing

all his creatures and all their actions;" against, as we have seen, personal, eternal, and unconditional election; against the certain perseverance and preservation of the saints from apostasy on earth: against the certainty of their perpetual fealty to God in heaven; against the sure, eternal, and indefeasible stability of all holy beings, yea, of God's throne itself. And were not glimpses of such obviously logical consequences of the dogma in question, in the line of the argument of these divines themselves, when in refutation of their adversaries, they urge that, "if holiness consists in voluntary action, then the fact that God secures it in moral agents for a *time*, is no proof that he can secure its continuance for ever. The nature of free-agency precludes such assertions respecting God, as truly as it does respecting an earthly parent or king." "There is no way to prove *a priori* that beings who *can sin will not sin*, but by first proving that they *cannot*." The *Christian Spectator* for 1830, pp. 553-4, has the following language: "Dr. Taylor asked, 'who can prove *a priori*, or from the nature of the subject, that a being who *can sin will not sin*?' Dr. Woods replies, that 'it results with *absolute certainty* from the nature of God, that he will *not sin*, though in your sense of the word he has power to sin.' Now we say that this is *mere assertion*, and not proof. Let us have the *a priori* argument which proves the assertion."

The *argumentum ad hominem* so often cast by Dr. Fisher and others upon Augustinians, because they admit that Adam, though created holy, was also capable of falling into sin, as if they, therefore, in this instance admit the power of contrary choice against which they so strenuously protest, is wholly groundless. Whatever they admit in this case, it is no power to act "despite all opposing power," or without antecedent decisive grounds of certainty not inconsistent with perfect freedom. They are not, therefore, cut off from the arguments against Dr. Taylor specified by Dr. Fisher, p. 207 and elsewhere.

In the article reviewed by Dr. Fisher no attempt is made to set forth Dr. Taylor's ethical theory, which offended the moral sense of many even more than the doctrines of free agency and its corollaries, we have been considering. It entered largely into his analysis of regeneration. But as it is so largely rejected by those who embrace other parts of Dr. Taylor's

scheme, and has no necessary connection with his doctrine of contrary choice, it was not essential to the purpose of that article to exhibit it. Besides, as Dr. Fisher shows, Dr. Taylor at length sought to make self-love and benevolence "love of our own highest happiness and that of the universe" one and the same complex state. Also at times, to make it appear that the happiness which he held inspires all choice, is not the object chosen, but simply that subjective pleasure of choosing as we please, which attends all choice. We have no room or occasion here to repeat the exhibition we have before given of the final presentation made by Dr. Taylor of his ethical scheme in his published works, or of our objections to it. We simply deem it due to historical truth and justice to bring before our readers, in Dr. Taylor's own language, the real doctrine which caused a revulsion of mind far enough from being confined to Old-school men. In the *Christian Spectator* for 1829, p. 21, Dr. Taylor said:

"This self-love or desire of happiness is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice which supremely fix on any object. In every moral being who forms a moral character there must be a first moral act of preference or choice. This must respect some one object, God or Mammon, as the chief good or as an object of supreme affection. Now whence comes such a choice or preference? Not from a previous choice or preference of the same object, for we speak of the first choice of the object. The answer which human consciousness gives, is that the being constituted with a capacity for happiness desires to be happy; and knowing that he is capable of deriving happiness from different objects, considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived, and as in this respect he judges or estimates their relative value, so he chooses or prefers one or the other as his chief good."

We do not propose any argument upon this. We only say that these forms of statement constrained protests, not only on the part of Old-school men, but vast numbers of New-school adherents of Dr. Taylor, nay, from devoted followers and admiring pupils, such as Dr. Dutton, who took occasion even in a eulogistic discourse to express his earnest dissent from this peculiarity of his system. We submit, therefore, that the New

Haven divines are themselves responsible for whatever injurious impressions of their views on this subject have become current, however Dr. Fisher may tell us that Dr. Taylor "regarded the outcry against him on this subject as mostly the offspring of ignorance," or however Dr. Hopkins, reversing his former principles, may have in any measure come to take similar ground.

Dr. Fisher cites the case of Dr. Hopkins in confirmation of his remark, that Dr. Taylor would have excited less antipathy and alarm, had he promulged his views as a philosopher and not as a theologian. This is quite likely. When applied to theology they touch all that is dearest and most momentous to man. They stir the depths of his soul. They seize the attention of vastly greater numbers. But then this immunity from earnest antagonism would have been at the expense of proportionate celebrity of the author, and influence of his writings. He would have been less opposed because less felt.

It is impossible to argue such vague allegations against Old-school preachers as are contained on page 344. Dr. Fisher has been very unfortunate in his hearing of them, if he has not heard the echo of the Master's preaching: "Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "All that the Father giveth me shall come unto me." "Him that cometh I will in no wise cast out." "No man can come to me except the Father who hath sent me draw him." This is Christ's preaching. Whether all its parts can be reconciled to the view of human wisdom or not, so we believe and so we preach; as ambassadors of Christ, as though God did beseech by us, we pray men in Christ's stead to be reconciled to God; to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in them to will and to do, of his good pleasure.

With what Dr. Fisher says of the eminent gifts, the religious zeal, and the commanding influence of Doctors Taylor, Fitch, and Goodrich, we heartily concur. As teachers, preachers, controvertists, and polemics, they were men of merited renown. They were the leading and trusted expositors, defenders, and propagators of what was known as New-school Theology in the American church. The chief promoters of this theology elsewhere, whether Congregational or Presbyterian, were in inti-

mate and confidential communication with them, depended on their aid and counsel, and found in the *Christian Spectator*, their acknowledged organ, copious supplies of armour, offensive and defensive, made ready by their dialectic and polemical skill. Nor can it be doubted that their endeavours, and those of their coadjutors, Congregational and Presbyterian, to reconstruct theology, were due to the conviction that the doctrines of sin and grace, and especially of the sinner's inability, as they had been accepted among Calvinists generally, presented formidable obstacles to the success of preaching, the vindication of Christianity, and the progress of practical religion, particularly in the form of revivals of religion. In this we think they were mistaken. No less were Pelagius and Arminius mistaken in supposing that a consciousness of inability and dependence discourage effort and progress in religion. Our own strength is weakness. We are strong only in the Lord and the power of his might. But into this we cannot now go. It is no part of our present object to discuss the merits or demerits of New or Old-school theology, in the *personnel* of their chief defenders or propagators, in their logical, practical, and historical results, except so far as this has been in some degree incidentally involved in vindicating the representation which had been given in our pages, of some leading distinctive features of the system known as New Haven Divinity. We are very glad that Dr. Fisher has so elaborately pointed out whatever he supposes "unfair" in that representation; and thus furnished the opportunity for a fuller exhibition of the evidence on which it rested, and for correcting any inaccuracy, however slight and immaterial, which he has been able to suggest.

To review these controversies is to us an unwelcome task. And we distinctly disclaim all responsibility for rekindling the dying embers of past conflicts which may result. But necessity is laid upon us. Each doctrinal basis of reunion thus far offered to our acceptance has distinctly provided for the allowance in the united church, of whatever doctrinal liberty each of the churches to be united has allowed, as not inconsistent with the essentials of Calvinism. Unless we proceed blindly then in fixing the doctrinal basis of a great church for ages, we must ascertain what systems of doctrine have been thus allowed

in the respective bodies to be united. To ignore or shut our eyes to this, or to practise any disguise, concealment, evasion, or equivocation here, is to trifle with as great a trust as was ever committed to mortals. It is to open the way for endless discords and incurable apostasies till time shall be no longer. Whatever is done or left undone, for the future of the great Presbyterian church of our country, let us at least know what we are doing: what type of doctrine we are investing with all the privilege and authority of orthodoxy. If it be of heaven, let us adopt it. If of men, let us reject it.

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ART. IV.—*Ireland. The Church and the Land.*

THE two principal questions of interest at present regarding Ireland, are the disendowing of the Established Church, and the settlement of the relations between landlord and tenant. These questions are closely related to each other. Nine-tenths of the landlords in Ireland are members of the Established Church. Hitherto they have looked upon its property as their own—a sacred and inviolate trust, to be maintained at all hazards for God, for their country, and for themselves. Dublin College is not exclusively attended by the adherents of the Established Church; Roman Catholic and other dissenters may be educated there; but the rule and management of its course of study, its revenues, and its discipline, belong solely to the Church of England. The wealth of that celebrated seat of learning is thus to be reckoned as a part of the property of the church. It is very convenient, in a country where the laws of primogeniture and entail assign real estate to the eldest son, to have the army, the navy, the church, and the college, available for the younger children. It is seldom that men act on single motives. People are generally influenced in their conduct by various considerations; while they are liable to deceive themselves and others by supposing that the purest and least selfish of their motives are the only springs of their actions. The Established Church in Ireland has long



been considered as the bulwark of Protestantism. Semi-Popery or Puseyism has not made much progress there. As a converted Romanist, who became a missionary of the Irish Presbyterian Church, once declared in Synod: "Moderator! we have not much Puseyism in this country; for we have too much of the *raal* thing here." The landlords of Ireland have been justly proud of the unmistakable Protestantism of their church; and they have felt that duty to God concurred with their own interests in calling upon them to maintain and defend her endowment and privileges. Forty years ago, the Roman Catholics of Ireland woke up at the call of O'Connell. A cry was raised, not without reason, that the church was in danger, but compromise prevailed. Tithes were converted into rent-charge, and were to be collected by the landlords with the ordinary rent from the tenants; a number of the Protestant bishopricks were suppressed; Roman Catholic emancipation was conceded with certain restrictions, which have gradually become obsolete or have broken down; and the day of final settlement for the church seemed to be indefinitely postponed. In the meantime, the Presbyterians of the North, quite as much from their hatred of Popery as their love of Protestantism, have supported the cause of the Established Church. Enjoying themselves about £40,000 sterling, annually, by grant of the Imperial Parliament, they have been willing that the Church of England should possess her ample revenue of half a million sterling a year. The ranks of the Orange Association, which was organized for the support of the church and state, were largely recruited from among the Presbyterians. The celebrated Dr. Cooke, so distinguished for his eloquence, was always ready to take his stand with the defenders of the church. At a great meeting, held at Hillsborough, in 1832, he published the banns of matrimony between the Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches, a union which was never, so far as history records, been fully consummated. His whole life has been devoted more or less to the maintenance of Protestant unity and the Established Church. It may be that now, in his old age, he may live to see the overthrow of a system he has done so much to support. We have already alluded to the compromises which were made when Catholic emancipation was granted. Among these was

the sacrifice of the forty-shilling freeholders. The franchise of voters had been so low as that ; but, chiefly for the protection of the Established Church, that low class of freeholders were disqualified and debarred from voting ; and the constituency was diminished in the counties in proportion. A new policy was then adopted by the landlords. Instead of multiplying small farms, for the purpose of increasing parliamentary influence, the process of driving out the small farmers and consolidating many farms into one, was commenced. Thousands of families were turned out of their houses, to find refuge either in the poor-house, or on this side of the Atlantic, to sow the seeds of Fenianism at home and abroad. No doubt other motives concurred with the purpose of doing all this for the safety of the church. The potato famine and the subsequent pestilence thinned the population and drove away multitudes, many of whom died by ship fever on our own shores. It was profitable also for the country that the farms should be enlarged ; but the manner of doing it was often heartless and tyrannical ; and it was accompanied with another great source of complaint :—the landlords began steadily to refuse to let their land, except from year to year. No leases were granted. All the occupiers must be *tenants-at-will*. Here is the chief root and cause of Fenianism. The Irish farmer has no home. Except in the north of Ireland there are hardly any manufactures. When a family is evicted they cannot go, as they would in England or Scotland, to a neighbouring town, and obtain remunerative employment. They must have land at any price and on any terms, the alternatives being the poor-house or the United States. Millions of pounds sterling have been sent home by those emigrants to bring out the sufferers to the land of Goshen beyond the sea.

Last summer the writer travelled extensively in the south of Ireland, as well as in the north, and had some opportunity of seeing the changes that had taken place since he had visited those parts thirty years before. The increased size of the farms was the most striking feature of the landscape. Some of the old roofless homesteads remained just as they had been stripped twenty years ago, but most of them had disappeared, leaving only a green knoll, and sometimes a few fragments of masonry, where there had been at one time a not-unhappy

home. The most improved property that the writer saw in the south, was the estate of Lord Derby. Instead of leaving his tenants to make improvements at their own cost and risk, which is the general plan in Ireland, Lord Derby has erected good dwelling-houses and other buildings for his tenants, has expended large sums on draining and fencing; and he had just completed a noble rural school-house, at an outlay of £1500. As Lord Stanley, more than thirty years ago, his lordship was the chief originator of the Irish National System of Education. He now puts his schools under the care and instruction of the National Board, while he liberally undertakes himself to pay the teachers. It is said, however, that notwithstanding all this, he too refuses to grant leases to his tenantry. He cannot trust Roman Catholic voters with the independent exercise of the franchise.

We have seen that the land question mixes itself up in Ireland with the question of a Church Establishment. It may be as well, therefore, before speaking of the proposed changes to be made by Parliament, that we should briefly explain the peculiar circumstances of the north of Ireland in regard to *land tenure*. In the days of Queen Elizabeth and of her predecessors, the north of Ireland had been the most turbulent and rebellious of the four provinces. The celebrated chieftains O'Neil and O'Donnel had, however, submitted to the English government, and had been confirmed in their estates and titles by King James, when the Guy Fawkes plot was discovered; and as Roman Catholics, both O'Neil and O'Donnel, being suspected of being privy to the conspiracy, fled to the Continent; the six counties of Ulster, Donegal, Tyrone, Derry, Fermanagh, Cavan, and Armagh over which they had been rulers, were confiscated. The actual owners of the land were dispossessed; the whole province was divided among adventurers from Scotland and England, under the direction of certain men who were called *undertakers*. By the terms of the royal grant, King James prohibited the system of yearly tenancy; but those terms were disregarded by the undertakers, who soon assumed to themselves the rights of land owners. Still the original conditions of the settlement have exercised an important influence. It is to this source chiefly we must trace the famous and peculiar

TENANT-RIGHT OF ULSTER, to which we will revert presently. The landlords of that part of Ireland have adopted the same policy as their confreres of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught. Leases are refused even to the Presbyterian tenantry; and the nominees of the landlords are almost invariably returned to Parliament. Yet it must be admitted that the landlords of Ulster, as a class, are not rack-renters, neither indeed are the Irish landlords generally. This is abundantly proved by the fact that the tenant farmers of Ireland have had as much as seventeen or eighteen millions sterling in the banks as the result of their earnings. What is wanted is not *reduction in rents*, but *security of tenure* and compensation for improvements; that the Irish farmer shall have a home which, for a fixed period of years, and for a certain rent, he can call his own; that he shall not be driven as a serf to the hustings by any landlord's agent, but shall be allowed to exercise the rights of a British freeman without being afraid of becoming an outcast. The ballot might, as some think, yield him that security; but that is a remedy which is neither very desirable nor very attainable. It ought to be the privilege of a British subject to vote, openly and aboveboard, for the man whom he chooses to be his representative. Before concluding, we hope to point out another and more excellent way of attaining the same desirable object. We have already alluded to the peculiar tenant-right of Ulster, and have briefly indicated its origin. It is not established by law, but it is generally recognized by custom. When a farmer has made up his mind to emigrate, or to leave his farm, he can obtain a considerable amount for his good-will from the incoming tenant. He must generally obtain the consent of the landlord or his agent for the transfer; but, in most cases, that is not withheld. If it were generally *refused*, *Ulster would soon become another Tipperary*, and more terrible. It is not at all unusual for Ulster farmers, who have had no lease of their homesteads, to sell their good-will of their farms for as much money as will bring them and their families out to this country, and purchase for them besides more land than they occupied in Ireland. It is a strange state of affairs, but it is not less true and real.

Last summer the writer paid a visit of a few days at the town

of Carlow. The county around it is the smallest in Ireland. More than twenty years ago its representation was contested by O'Connell. Many thousand pounds were expended in opposing him; and he failed in the contest. The boys of Kilkenny, in their mad patriotism, thought they would come and help him with their *shilelahs*. O'Connell's committee-room was in the house where our friends resided; and, from the drawing-room windows, he implored his misguided friends not to advance, while, at a short distance up the street, stood a file of soldiers with cannon, charged with grape-shot, ready to receive them. The commanding officer stood beside the gun, with lighted match, shouting, "Come on boys, here's the girl will talk to you." Since O'Connell's defeat, Carlow has been represented by Tories, though nine-tenths of the people are, as Roman Catholics, opposed to Protestant Toryism.

Just before leaving Ireland last July we paid another visit to a most intelligent farmer in the county of Londonderry. Our friend had been educated at an excellent agricultural school, and had been employed for five or six years by the Flax Society of Belfast, to introduce the culture of flax in the West and South of Ireland. One day he pointed out to the writer in a newspaper an advertisement notifying the farmers of county Derry that they must register their names as voters. "Now," said he, "not one in a hundred will attend to that announcement. They do not care about the franchise." "What then," said we, "will become of the constituency?" "Oh," said he, "that will be attended to by the landlords. They will register their tenants, as they register their horses for a horse race."

In 1852 there was a contested election for the county of Londonderry, at which a Presbyterian representative was returned. The numbers were—Presbyterian voters, 2,800; Roman Catholic, 1,400; Episcopalians, 400. After the election many of the voters were dispossessed of their farms by their landlords, who would allow them to receive no compensation. The people were taught a lesson of submission; and, at present, there is not a single Presbyterian representative from all Presbyterian Ulster. The city of Londonderry returns a Liberal, but all the rest of Ulster returns a firm phalanx of twenty-nine

Conservatives—a very Malakoff of Toryism. As a general thing, the towns in Ireland are not prosperous. There is no competition for dwelling-houses; and the tenants, being free to vote as they please, for the most part return Liberals. To this rule Belfast is a remarkable exception. It is both prosperous and conservative. The ghost of Protestant ascendancy still reigns in the capital of Ulster.

If time permitted, it might not be without interest, were we to advert to the early history of Ireland, in regard to the tenure of land, and in regard to the form of Christianity which first prevailed in that country. It has been well ascertained that, according to the old Brehon laws, the *people*, and not the *chieftains*, were the owners of the soil. The right of possession was similar to that which prevailed among the Israelites by the laws of Moses; and many believe that the system of land tenure, which prevailed anciently in Ireland, was brought by the original settlers from the East. In regard to religion, Roman Catholic writers represent St. Patrick as a missionary sent by the Church of Rome to convert a nation of pagans. Such is the view presented by the late lamented D'Arcy McGee, in his history of Ireland. But Protestant writers assert, and indeed we think they prove, that the early church in Ireland resembled the eastern churches rather than those of the west, and that St. Patrick himself was no Romanist. A curious and valuable tract, called the Confession of St. Patrick, which is still extant, affords no trace of Popish doctrine. Hence the Church of England claims to be the true representative of the ancient Irish Church. But it is an historical fact that every *parish* in Ireland had its *bishop*; and, consequently, the Presbyterians have some claim. One thing is certain, however, that when Henry II. came over to subdue Ireland, it was under the authority of a Pope's bull, that heresy might be suppressed, and that the Holy See of Rome might reign in the Isle of Saints alone. What a singular retribution! Romish Ireland is now the great thorn in the side of Protestant England.

It is of small importance now, however, to revive these old questions. We live in an age when men are more inclined to look forward than backward; when newspapers are more read than ancient histories. The British House of Commons has

decreed, by overwhelming votes, that the Anglican Church of Ireland shall be disendowed. After centuries of possession, little more than one-tenth of the people are found within the pale of her communion; and even the Presbyterians of Ulster are about as numerous as the adherents of the Established Church. Her mission to Ireland has failed in regard to the masses of the people. Even Mr. D'Israeli has given way, and has informed Mr. Gladstone, as we learn by ocean telegraph, that he will, on this subject, contend with him no longer.

We may now, therefore, ask what results will be likely to follow from the inevitable disendowment? Just the same as has followed in Canada and the British colonies, where there is no Established Church. The Anglican bishops in the dominion of Canada are increased in numbers as they are required. They already number fifteen. But the Established Church of England has been striving for a similar increase at home for many years in vain; while the Irish bench of Protestant bishops was actually lessened in number many years ago by acts of Parliament. As a Protestant, we believe that the Irish Episcopal Church, possessing immense wealth in her membership, and vast learning in her clergy, as well as maintaining evangelical truth in her standards, will soon exhibit an energy and acquire a popularity, which she never could have done as an establishment.

But other important results may be anticipated. Allusion has been made to the interest which the Protestant landlords of Ireland have always held in the establishment. Honour and conscience called on them to protect the church; and for this purpose they have reduced their tenants to a state of serfdom or vassalage. Friends to the church must always, at all hazards, be returned to Parliament. The franchise has been made a mockery by the refusal of leases to the tenantry. The real interest of the landlord in his estate has been looked on as a minor consideration. Land is let at less than its value; but the occupying tenant must vote as the landlord pleases. This system will now be abandoned as unnecessary and injurious. Leases will be granted which will secure the tenant for his labour and his outlay. The seventeen or eighteen millions now locked up in the banks will be withdrawn, and be

employed in building substantial houses, in constructing drains and fences, and in other improvements. Confidence and good feeling will be promoted; discontent and outrage will be arrested; sectarian animosity will abate; and Ireland will become a peaceful part of England's home empire.

We do not mean that all this will follow immediately. Time must be allowed for the great change and transformation. Other measures must be added by parliamentary enactment. The present owners of land in Ireland must be allowed more freedom in regard to its management and alienation. The laws of primogeniture and entail, by which the eldest son inherits the entire real estate, must be modified. We were lately reading a book on this subject by an eminent Irish gentleman called Hancock, in which he gives a remarkable illustration of the injurious working of this system. An enterprising man in the north of Ireland, wishing to establish a certain branch of manufacture, had his attention called to a neighbourhood that was densely peopled. He applied to the owner of the estate for fifty acres of land on which to build a village, and fifty acres of bog, from which he could obtain peat as a fuel for raising steam power. The landlord was delighted with the application; and he determined to give the land at a nominal rent, that he might increase the value of his other property. The lawyers were directed to make out the papers; but they soon discovered that by the law of strict entail, the owner of the estate could not give a long lease; and he was even debarred from taking less rents than the fair market value for his property. On this the manufacturer applied to another landlord, who was not so much restricted; the mill was built in a neighbourhood where he had to use coal for fuel; and yet in fifteen years he made a fortune, while, of course, the landlord and his tenantry shared in his prosperity.

During a visit that we paid an old friend at Limerick last summer, we had much conversation on the state of the country. The object of his life had been to be a landowner—to leave an estate to his family; and therefore, his sympathies were entirely with the present system. He could see no wrong in the refusal of leases. Every man, he thought, had a right to do what he likes with his own. Seeing that a direct argument could make



no impression, we tried a different method. "What is the population of Limerick?" said we. "About sixty thousand." "Very many of them are badly off?" "Yes, half starving." "Why do you not establish machinery on the Shannon? How many feet of a fall could be gained by a canal from the head of the rapids?" He did not know; but he supposed the fall would be considerable. "Who are the owners of the land between the city and the head of the rapids?" "It all belongs to two brothers." "On what tenure do they hold their land?" "By strict entail." "Well, then they could not give a long lease; no canal can be built, and no water power can be established."

Let it not be objected here that Limerick is inhabited by lazy Celts and ignorant Roman Catholics. Those same Celts, when brought across the Atlantic, do nearly all the ditching and draining of the States, and do the heavy work of constructing railways. But they are not really so lazy even at Limerick. A young Scotchman called Tait, came to that city twenty years ago, and was engaged in a large dry-goods establishment. He could not make his department pay, and he was dismissed as an unprofitable servant. Not cast down, however, he looked out for some contracts for clothing, which he fulfilled successfully. He continued steadily to advance till, at last, the American war broke out, and he made contracts for supplying both North and South with army clothing. He had a number of blockade runners, none of which were captured; and, at the close of the war, he had realized an enormous fortune. Any one who passes over Blackfriar's railway bridge, in London, across the Thames, may see on the south side of the river, at his left hand, a very large building with enormous letters painted on it, "Tait & Co's Army Contracts." He now supplies France and other continental states as well as England, with clothing for their soldiers. Besides his factory in London, he employs at Limerick, in a set of mean, cheap buildings, such as can be built on short leases, no less than nine hundred operatives. At the time of our visit he was chosen a second time Mayor by acclamation; and we were told that he will be elected member for the city on the first vacancy. His second installation as Mayor, was signalized by the completion of a noble

monument in a public square, commemorating his virtues and benefactions. Let no one say that the people of Limerick are either lazy or ungrateful.

In the year 1823 we often saw, riding in the streets of Belfast, an old gentleman, extremely bent with years, having a servant in livery following him. It was the Marquis of Donegal, a lineal descendant of Sir Arthur Chichester, by whom the settlement of Ulster by the Scotch was contrived and superintended. His lordship, at the time we saw him, was living on a pittance of £6,000, allowed to him by his creditors to keep him from starving. Fifty years before, when he came of age, he had an income of £80,000, mostly derived from estates, which included Belfast within their limits. But his lordship was fond of the gaming table; and he ran enormously in debt to a certain Irish gentleman who owned a fashionable club-house in London. In order to wipe out old scores, he married Miss May, his creditor's daughter. The young marchioness soon showed that she had a hereditary taste and talent for gambling, as well as her noble husband. So the candle burned at both ends, till, in his old age, his estates were held in trust for his creditors. Meanwhile his son, the present Marquis, came to his majority, and found himself in straitened circumstances. If he could have waited a few years, death would have given him the estates without incumbrance. But the young man required cash as well as his father; they joined together, therefore, as they had by law a right to do, in cutting off the entail, so as to give long leases and raise money on the property. The people of Belfast were, in this way, enabled to secure lots for building. Mills and factories were erected, public works were carried on; and a great swamp became the most prosperous commercial city in Ireland, and one of the most flourishing centres of trade in the British empire.

We have now slightly sketched the present condition of Ireland. The English government has ruled them no less than seven centuries. Terrible cruelties, enormous crimes have been perpetrated there by the oppressed and by their oppressors. The present century, however, has witnessed an entire change of British policy in reference to that country. Protestant ascendancy has been gradually abandoned. Difference in reli-

gion has been less and less regarded; and now, with wonderful unanimity, the Parliament of Great Britain has decreed that all sects shall stand on the same footing. Who can fear the issue of such a measure?

“*Magna est veritas, et prævalebit.*”

The truth which triumphed in the first age of Christianity over the philosophy of Greece, and the idolatries of Rome, is the same now as it was in the days of the apostles. It cannot be that Rome should triumph. Popery is like a stately tree growing in an old demesne. Its branches still bear fruit and foliage, but it is decayed at the heart. The Pope requires to be guarded against the Romans by Canadian bayonets. Take away all cause of complaint from Ireland; remove all civil disabilities on account of religion; leave truth and error to fight their own battles, unaided by force or intimidation; bigotry will disappear, and persecution on account of creeds will cease for ever.

We are convinced, from what we learned in our late visit to Ireland, that Fenianism is not deeply rooted in Irish soil. It is an exotic of transatlantic origin. The heat of a Presidential campaign may warm the viper into life for a few weeks occasionally on our border—but its days are numbered. It will soon take its place with Know-nothingism and other defunct conspiracies; while Ireland, emancipated from every remaining bond of subjection, will take her place beside the sister island, as a willing member of a grand, indissoluble and glorious confederacy.

ART. V.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America met, in the Second Presbyterian Church of Albany, New York, on Thursday, May 21, 1868, at 11 A. M.

In the absence of Dr. Gurley, the Moderator of last year, the opening sermon was preached, by request of the Assembly, by the Rev. E. P. Humphrey, D. D., the last Moderator present, from John xii. 24. He also presided until a new Moderator was chosen.

On motion of Rev. Dr. Eagleson, it was resolved, that in all elections by this Assembly a majority of all the votes cast be necessary to an election.

The following resolution was offered by Rev. A. Munson:

“Inasmuch as the Presbytery of Nassau has admitted to a seat in its body a signer of the Declaration and Testimony, and is, therefore, *ipso facto*, dissolved; therefore

“*Resolved*, That its commissioners to this body are not entitled to their seats.”

This was laid upon the table.

The Assembly then proceeded to the election of Moderator.

Rev. George W. Musgrave, D. D., was nominated by Rev. Dr. L. J. Halsey; Rev. J. G. Monfort, D. D., by Judge H. H. Leavitt; Rev. Robert Davidson, D. D., by Rev. John Hancock; Rev. A. G. Hall, D. D., by Rev. Dr. Woodbridge; Rev. A. Happer, M. D., of the Chinese Mission, by ruling elder Breiner.

On the first ballot Dr. Musgrave received 103 votes; Dr. Monfort 71 votes; Dr. Hall 36 votes; Dr. Happer 25 votes; Dr. Davidson 6 votes.

On the second ballot Dr. Musgrave received 139 votes, and was elected; Dr. Monfort 85 votes, and Dr. Hall 20 votes.

Ruling elder Robert McKnight was elected Temporary Clerk by acclamation.

On motion of Rev. Dr. S. I. Prime, it was made the order of the day for to-morrow, at 11 o'clock, to receive the report of the Committee on Reunion.

As Reunion was the chief subject before the Assembly, and gave to its deliberations and proceedings their special interest and importance, so it will constitute the leading topic in the review of its acts upon which we are now entering. We propose, therefore, both for our own convenience and that of our readers, first briefly to dispose of such other matters as require notice, and then to present as one whole, unbroken by other topics, a digest and analysis of the reports, discussions, and acts of the Assembly on the subject of Reunion.

*Southern Presbyterian Churches.*

On motion of Rev. Dr. Humphrey, Chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, certain papers relating to the Southern Presbyterian Church, and its condition, were taken from the hands of that Committee and referred to a special committee of five ministers and four ruling elders.

The Moderator subsequently announced as such committee—*Ministers*—S. J. Nicolls, D. D., A. A. Hodge, D. D., M. B. Grier, D. D., George Hill, L. Merrill Miller, D. D. *Ruling Elders*—W. F. Allen, David Keith, Robert Carter, and James M. Ray.

Rev. Dr. Humphrey also presented a memorial, from sundry ministers and elders residing in and near the city of Philadelphia, suggesting that steps be taken for opening correspondence with the Southern Presbyterian Church.

On motion of Dr. Humphrey, this memorial was referred to the Special Committee of Nine.

Upon the recommendation of this Committee, this subject was finally disposed of by the adoption of the following resolutions:

Whereas, the Synods of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Memphis, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, with the several Presbyteries under their care, have, with the exception of the Presbytery of New Orleans in the Synod of Mississippi, voluntarily withdrawn from our connection and organized themselves into a separate church; therefore

*Resolved*, That the Permanent Clerk is directed to drop their names from the list of our Synods and Presbyteries, and they are no longer to be regarded as a part of the Presbyterian Church under the care of this Assembly, with the exception of

the Presbytery of New Orleans, which is hereby attached to the Synod of Nashville.

*Resolved*, That the Assembly does hereby recognize the organization into which these Synods have formed themselves, as a separate and independent church, sustaining to us the same relation which we accord to other branches of the Presbyterian Church, and hereafter it is to be treated accordingly by all the courts under our care.

*Resolved*, That the Assembly also takes this occasion to say that while it cannot justify these brethren in separating themselves from the church of their fathers, it regrets their withdrawal, and expresses the earnest hope that they may see their way clear to return to their former relations.

Knox Presbytery of Georgia, composed entirely of coloured ministers and churches, also applied for admission to our body. The request was granted, and this Presbytery was attached to the Synod of Baltimore. It was represented in the Assembly by the Rev. Joseph Williams, an aged and venerable man, once a slave, whose hard, broad hands bespoke his former status, while his address to the Assembly on the Report of the Freedmen's Committee, quite charmed and melted all by the wisdom, earnestness, and culture which it displayed. We hope that in all this we have the earnest of a great work begun in evangelizing and elevating the emancipated millions of our land, and of the important part which our own church will take in it. We rejoice in the blessed fruits already resulting from the labours of our Freedmen's Committee.

The difficulties in the border states growing out of the Declaration and Testimony, and other causes, were referred to the Synods of Kentucky and Missouri for adjustment. The whole spirit and attitude of the Assembly, as shown in the action already recited, and in judicial case No. 1., which we are about to bring before our readers, in regard to difficulties growing out of the war, and the Declaration and Testimony, are eminently kind and conciliatory.

#### *Judicial Business.*

Rev. Dr. Monfort, Chairman of the Judicial Committee, reported

Judicial Case, No. 1.—The complaint of Alexander M. Cowan

against the action of the Presbytery of Sidney, which was put upon the docket.

The other cases were disposed of without being directly tried by the Assembly.

The first case was duly heard and issued by the Assembly, being the complaint of Rev. Alexander M. Cowan against the Presbytery of Sidney, Ohio, for refusing to enroll him as a minister, because he had signed the protest of several churches in the border states against the action of the General Assembly upon questions relating to the political condition of the country, growing out of the rebellion, and which protest is known in the church as the "Declaration and Testimony." The appellant had refused to recant his opinions or withdraw his signature from such protest, as required by the action of the General Assembly in 1867.

After hearing the parties and calling the roll, Dr. Backus offered the following, which was adopted:

The General Assembly having heard the complaint of Mr. Cowan, deems that the Presbytery have acted entirely in accordance with the direction of the Assembly of 1867; but inasmuch as the emergency that called for the action of that and other previous Assemblies has passed; and inasmuch as throughout our bounds persons entirely loyal to the church have scruples in respect to its constitutionality, and especially of the orders of 1866; and inasmuch as Mr. Cowan declares that in signing the Declaration and Testimony he had no intention to rebel against or show any disrespect to the church, but merely to protest against what he regarded as an unconstitutional act; and inasmuch as he desires to adhere to the General Assembly and be subject to its authority; therefore,

*Resolved*, That his case be referred to the Presbytery to which he belonged, with instructions to deal tenderly with his scruples, and if, in the judgment of said Presbytery, he can be restored in accordance with the spirit of the action of 1867, that the Presbytery have authority to restore him without further acknowledgment than stated above in the hearing of the Assembly.

*The Boards.*

We had prepared separate notices of each of the Boards, and of the reports, discussions, and other action upon them, but the demand upon our space required for an adequate presentation of the proceedings of the Assembly, in regard to the overshadowing subject of reunion, compels us to omit them. We barely call attention to two points among many of great interest and importance. The first is the great results already achieved by the labours of the Freedmen's Committee; the high promise of their future operations; the plans which they are devising and projecting for the permanent and thorough evangelization of this people; and their just claim upon the aid and sympathy of the church in developing their nascent enterprises. These points will be found embodied in the Assembly's resolutions on the subject, published in all the reports of their proceedings.

The other point is the slender and wholly insufficient contributions to our Boards, and preëminently the Missionary Boards, which sustain the living workers in the field. The Board of Foreign Missions is still burdened with a debt only less than that at the close of the preceding year. Unless the contributions of the people to it largely increase, it must soon adopt a severe and damaging retrenchment that must cut to the quick. Our Board of Domestic Missions has kept out of debt only by reducing the allowance to the missionaries, in these times of unequalled dearness of living, twenty-five per cent. Should these things be? Tell it not in Gath! Publish it not in Askelon!

The whole subject of liberal giving, and systematic benevolence, requires to be brought home to the understanding, heart, and conscience of our people, as it has never yet been. The Assembly had a committee on systematic benevolence, which reported some excellent resolutions. These were of course adopted. This, however, is but a single step towards the result, and will accomplish nothing unless we go further. We have a great work before us, if we would lift the great mass of our people to a just sense of their privilege and responsibility in the premises. Dr. Breckinridge said, "if we would get more



money we must have more piety." This is a part of the truth. Piety and pious giving act and re-act upon each other, for reciprocal increase. Dr. Backus, in his special report on the reorganization of the Board of Missions, stated another equally important truth; that the stunted contributions to our Boards did not arise from any special penuriousness of our people, but from a neglect to ply them with the proper means and agencies to draw out their piety in the form of liberal, hearty, and systematic giving. Rev. Dr. Clark, corresponding delegate, uttered another equally important truth, when he said, "the greatest want in all denominations is that of proper *congregational* organizations for Christian work." When this whole matter is dealt with in conformity with these principles, instead of starving out our missions and missionaries, each of the mission boards, we trust, will be invigorated and amplified by annual receipts of not less than half a million.

*Dr. McCosh's Acceptance of the Presidency of Princeton College.*

The friends of this oldest Presbyterian college, and of high Christian education, will be happy to know that the Assembly joined in the general gratulation inspired by the accession of this eminent man to the Presidency of Nassau Hall.

On motion of Dr. S. I. Prime, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

*Resolved,* That the General Assembly has heard with great satisfaction the acceptance by the Rev. Dr. McCosh of the Presidency of the College of New Jersey, at Princeton, which institution was founded by the Synod of New York and New Jersey, which at that time was the Supreme Judicatory of our Church, for the special purpose of raising up an educated ministry.

*Foreign Correspondence.*

Other churches with which we are in correspondence were unusually well represented. Dr. Fisher of the New-school Presbyterian Church, and Elder William Getty of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, appeared as delegates from the Philadelphia Convention. Dr. Fisher's address, to which we may again refer, bore strongly on the subject of reunion. He

laid before the Assembly the Philadelphia basis of Presbyterian union, which, with other papers relative to the same subject, was referred to a committee, consisting of Drs. Charles Hodge, Eagleson, and Nicolls, and ruling elders Henry Day and J. S. Taylor, who subsequently reported the following resolutions :

*Resolved*, 1. That agreeably to the request of that Convention, this General Assembly appoint five representatives, (three ministers and two elders) to meet with the representatives to be appointed by the several bodies whose delegates constituted the Convention, for the purpose of conferring on a plan of union among those churches.

*Resolved*, 2. That in the judgment of this Assembly, if a more intimate union be found inexpedient or impracticable, our representatives be instructed to confer with the representatives of the other bodies on some plan of confederation of the separate Presbyterian churches in the United States.

The report was adopted, and Rev. Dr. Musgrave, Rev. Dr. A. T. McGill, Rev. Dr. E. P. Humphrey; and ruling elders Hon. Robert McKnight and George Junkin, were appointed a committee under the first resolution.

Rev. Henry Darling, D. D., appeared as delegate from the New-school, and made an address on the subject of Reunion, which made a very favourable impression on the Assembly; to this we may again refer.

Dr. A. R. Thompson represented the Reformed (Dutch) Church. Dr. H. N. Pohlman appeared as the first representative of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod. The information he gave respecting his body, and the earnest appeal he made for our fraternal sympathy and prayers, deeply affected the Assembly.

Perhaps, however, the body was interested in no address more than that of Pastor George Appia, from the Waldensian Church. The simple and graphic account which he gave of this body of witnesses for Christ, touched all hearts, and won a ready commendation of his appeal, for aid in behalf of the gospel in Italy, to the prayers and sympathies of our churches.

*Theological Seminaries.*

The report of the Committee on the Theological Seminaries, through Dr. Backus, their chairman, presented little beyond the usual routine. A considerable decrease in the number of students in attendance, in most of them, was indicated, and has been gradually developing itself of late. This is due partly to the decrease of candidates in the church since the loud outcry about an excess of ministers, the impossibility of finding employment for many, and the stunted support of those in actual service. We are glad to learn from the Board of Education that the current has turned in this respect, and that the number of candidates beginning their academical education is again on the increase. Another circumstance to be considered is, that during the war several seminaries outside of our church were imperfectly organized, and had more or less of their chairs vacant. A few coming to us from each of these, made a large aggregate, though abnormal, increase. Now that all these institutions have become fully manned and equipped, this source of supply has of course much diminished.

Rev. Nathaniel West, D. D., was elected Professor of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History in Danville Seminary, and Rev. William M. Blackburn, to the same chair in the Seminary of the Northwest.

*Reunion with the New-school.*

On the second day of the session, Dr. Beatty, Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Old and New-school bodies on Reunion, submitted a report recommending the following amended basis for adoption by the two bodies.

PROPOSED TERMS OF REUNION BETWEEN THE TWO BRANCHES OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Joint Committee of the two General Assemblies of the Presbyterian Church, appointed for the purpose of conferring on the desirableness and practicability of uniting these two bodies, deeply impressed with the responsibility of the work assigned us, and having earnestly sought Divine guidance, and patiently devoted ourselves to the investigation of the question

involved, agree in presenting the following for the consideration, and, if they see fit, for the adoption of the two General Assemblies.

Believing that the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom would be promoted by healing our divisions; that practical union would greatly augment the efficiency of the whole church for the accomplishment of its divinely appointed work; that the main causes producing division have either wholly passed away, or become so far inoperative, as that reunion is now "consistent with agreement in doctrine, order, and polity, on the basis of our common standards, and the prevalence of mutual confidence and love;" and that two bodies, bearing the same name, adopting the same constitution, and claiming the same corporate rights, cannot be justified by any but the most imperative reasons in maintaining separate and, in some respects, rival organizations; and regarding it as both just and proper that a reunion should be effected by the two churches, as independent bodies, and on equal terms, we propose the following terms and recommendations, as suited to meet the demands of the case:

1. The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted, "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;" it being understood that this Confession is received in its proper, historical—that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed—sense; it is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the United Church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches; and the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall be approved as containing the principles and rule of our polity.

2. All the ministers and churches, embraced in the two bodies, shall be admitted to the same standing in the united body, which they may hold in their respective connections

up to the consummation of the union; imperfectly organized churches shall be counselled and expected to become thoroughly Presbyterian, as early, within the period of five years, as is permitted by the highest interests to be consulted; and no other such churches shall be hereafter received.

3. The boundaries of the several Presbyteries and Synods shall be adjusted by the General Assembly of the united church.

3. The official records of the two branches of the church, for the period of separation, shall be preserved and held as making up the one history of the church; and no rule or precedent, which does not stand approved by both the bodies, shall be of any authority, until reëstablished in the united body, except in so far as such rule or precedent may affect the rights of property founded thereon.

5. The corporate rights now held by the two General Assemblies, and by their boards and committees, shall, as far as practicable, be consolidated, and applied for their several objects, as defined by law.

6. There shall be one set of Committees or Boards for Home and Foreign Missions, and the other religious enterprises of the church, which the churches shall be encouraged to sustain, though free to cast their contributions into other channels, if they desire to do so.

7. As soon as practicable after the union shall be effected, the General Assembly shall reconstruct and consolidate the several permanent Committees and Boards, which now belong to the two Assemblies, in such a manner as to represent, as far as possible, with impartiality, the views and wishes of the two bodies constituting the united church.

8. The publications of the Board of Publication, and of the Publication Committee, shall continue to be issued as at present, leaving it to the Board of Publication of the united church to revise these issues, and perfect a catalogue for the joint church, so as to exclude invidious references to past controversies.

9. In order to a uniform system of ecclesiastical supervision, those Theological Seminaries that are now under Assembly control may, if their Boards of Direction so elect, be transferred to the watch and care of one or more of the adjacent Synods; and the

other seminaries are advised to introduce, as far as may be, into their constitutions, the principle of Synodical or Assembly supervision; in which case they shall be entitled to an official recognition and approbation on the part of the General Assembly.

10. It is agreed that the Presbyteries possess the right to examine ministers applying for admission from other Presbyteries; but each Presbytery shall be left free to decide for itself when it shall exercise the right.

11. It shall be regarded as the duty of all our judicatories, ministers, and people in the united church, to study the things which make for peace, and to guard against all needless and offensive references to the causes that have divided us; and, in order to avoid the revival of past issues, by the continuance of any usage in either branch of the church that has grown out of our former conflicts, it is earnestly recommended to the lower judicatories of the church that they conform their practice, in relation to all such usages, as far as is consistent with their convictions of duty, to the general custom of the church prior to the controversies that resulted in the separation.

12. The terms of the reunion, if they are approved by the General Assemblies of 1868, shall be overtured to the several Presbyteries under their care, and shall be of binding force, if they are ratified by three-fourths of the Presbyteries connected with each branch of the church, within one year after they shall have been submitted to them for approval.

13. If the two General Assemblies of 1869 shall find that the plan of reunion has been ratified by the requisite number of Presbyteries in each body, they shall, after the conclusion of all their business, be dissolved by their respective moderators, in the manner and form following, viz., Each moderator shall address the Assembly over which he presides, saying, "by virtue of the authority delegated to me by the church, and in conformity with the plan of union adopted by the two Presbyterian churches, let this Assembly be dissolved; and I do hereby dissolve it, and require a General Assembly, chosen in the same manner, by all the Presbyteries in connection with this body, and all those in connection with the General Assembly meeting this year in —, to meet in —, on the — day of May,

A. D. 1870; and I do hereby declare and proclaim that the General Assembly thus constituted will be the rightful General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, now, by the grace of God, happily united."

Signed, by order of the Joint Committee,

CHARLES C. BEATTY, *Chairman.*

EDWIN F. HATFIELD, *Secretary.*

*Philadelphia, March 14, A. D. 1868.*

After the reading of the report, it was moved that half an hour be spent in prayer for the divine guidance in the Assembly's deliberations and acts in relation to this grave matter.

The motion was adopted, and the Assembly was led in prayer by Mr. Day, Dr. E. P. Humphrey, Dr. Monfort, and Dr. Charles Hodge.

Judge Leavitt presented the following resolutions:

*Resolved,* That the Report of the Joint Committee on the basis of the Reunion of the two branches of the Church now made, be, and the same is hereby approved and adopted by the Assembly, and it is ordered that it be sent down to the Presbyteries for their final action.

*Resolved,* That the Presbyteries be requested to report to the Stated Clerk their action, approving or disapproving the proposed Basis of Union, before the meeting of the Assembly in 1869.

*Resolved,* That the Stated Clerk be directed to cause to be printed at an early day — thousand copies of the entire report of the Committee for distribution to the ministers and sessions of the churches.

After considerable discussion of various propositions, the Assembly finally determined, by a vote of 124 to 101, to make the resolutions the first order of the day for this afternoon, and to make their consideration continuous, except when it shall be interrupted by orders of the day heretofore fixed.

The discussion of them was carried on according to the above vote, until the final vote was reached on May 30, the ninth day of the session. The debate, as a whole, was characterized by that ability, earnestness, dignity, and courtesy, which became the body, the subject, and the occasion. The principal topic of discussion was the first article, containing the doctrinal basis,

as being at once far the most difficult and most momentous—the pivot of the whole movement. For if this could be adjusted to the satisfaction of both the great contracting parties, or the mass of both churches, there was little doubt that other points could be arranged. If the differences here proved irreconcilable, the adjustment of other matters would signify little.

The following telegram was received on Monday morning:

HARRISBURG, Pa., May 23.

*Rev. Wm. E. Schenck, D. D., Permanent Clerk, Assembly, Albany:*

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, in session at Harrisburg, Pa., sends fraternal and Christian salutations to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church holding its sessions in Albany, N. Y., with the suggestion that the first morning hour of Tuesday be devoted by both Assemblies to prayer for Divine guidance in their deliberation and action upon the Report of the Joint Committee on Reunion.

J. G. BUTLER, *Clerk.*

The Clerk was directed to respond by telegraph, informing the Assembly at Harrisburg that the proposition was acceded to, and sending Christian salutations.

Upon certain points there was entire unanimity throughout the Assembly, with possible individual exceptions, too slight to be noted.

1. All desired reunion upon a safe basis, and as soon as it can safely be accomplished. Chancellor Green said what must have impressed all in contact with the Assembly: "He believed every man in this room is in favour of union if it can be done with safety."

2. The dissatisfaction with the doctrinal basis, presented in the first article of the terms of union recommended by the Joint Committee, was equally unanimous. This appeared in all the speeches, votes, the protest and answer, and in all private conversation relative to the subject. This dissatisfaction was not equally strenuous in all, but it was so universal that we have met with but a single avowal to the contrary. All felt that the words, "it being understood that this Confession is to be received in its proper historical—that is the Calvinistic or Reformed—sense;" and especially the following, "it is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explain-



ing, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the united church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches," constitute an awkward and mischievous incumbrance, which they would greatly prefer to have withdrawn from the terms of the compact. The reasons will appear as we present an outline of the debate and subsequent action.

3. The real issue was whether, notwithstanding this and other lesser objections, the plan of union should be adopted and recommended to the Presbyteries for their sanction without amendment, trusting to the efficacy of other measures that might be devised, and the power of orthodoxy in the united church, to neutralize the evils of the obnoxious clause.

On the affirmative, it was argued by Messrs. Hunt, Day, McKnight, Beatty, Green, Blauvelt, Monfort and others, that there is no alternative but to accept or reject the platform as it is, *verbatim et literatim*; that to amend it is to reject it, and this would indefinitely postpone and seriously jeopard reunion, alarm and alienate our New-school brethren, disappoint the church, and destroy much good anticipated from the speedy consummation of the measure.

The part of the doctrinal article objected to is indeed a blemish, but all human compositions have their defects, not excepting even our Confession of Faith. If we wait for a perfect form of compact, we make reunion impossible and defer it for ever.

In regard to the doctrinal question, some contended that there never had been any serious difference between the two bodies, that the original disruption was caused, not by doctrinal but by ecclesiastical differences, that the doctrinal controversy originates with the clergy, and pertains to the fine-spun theories and speculations of theologians and professors, and that laymen do not understand, appreciate, or care anything about them. Others, who did not go quite this length, agreed with these in insisting, that, whatever doctrinal errors once infested the New-school body, were now, for the most part, abandoned and outgrown. Indeed a great doctrinal improvement in it, was testified to and conceded on all sides. Drs. Fisher and Darling bore strong testimony in this respect, as

also that they had got rid of the Congregationalism and Voluntaryism, which contributed much to the original discord and disruption. It was strenuously insisted by these gentlemen, and by all the advocates for adopting the proposed basis unaltered, that, however most of the New-school brethren had interpretations and explanations of doctrine different from us, yet they can and do agree with us in standing fairly and squarely on the Confession; that it will not answer to be too rigid; some diversity and liberty of thinking must be allowed. We have differences among ourselves. Quotations were freely made from this journal and the utterances of its editor, to the effect that it is sufficient to receive the Confession as it is, without insisting on anybody's philosophy or explanation of it; to receive the essentials of the system of Calvinism it contains, without every minute unessential phrase, or all the peculiarities of any one school.

Although the Confession pure and simple is conceded to be a better basis than when coupled with the modifications of the first article, yet it was maintained that the first clause of the addition, known as the Philadelphia Convention basis, viz., that it should be received "in its historical, *i. e.*, the Reformed and Calvinistic sense," was inserted by the New-school brethren to satisfy the Old-school that they did not ask for any broader license, and was meant to be restrictive rather than latitudinarian; that the residue, known as the "Gurley amendment," was inserted at the instance of the New-school members of the Joint Committee, who would have been content with the Philadelphia Convention basis, had they not seen what led them to fear that the Old-school construed it as restrictive of their former liberty. But both Drs. Beatty and Montfort announced their purpose, if the basis were adopted without alteration, to move or favour as the basis, a vote of preference for the Confession alone, and that the New-school Assembly be requested to concur in such an amendment. (The opinion has been expressed by persons familiar with the Assembly, that this announcement secured many votes for the basis as it is, which otherwise would have been withheld. We know not on how reliable grounds).

It was said that the churches in New York City were almost a unit for the reunion; that the Presbyterian body would

gain immensely in power, standing, influence, and in economy and efficiency of evangelistic operations upon its consummation. In reference to the danger to the funds of Princeton Seminary, pointed out in the Report of the Legal Committee of the Assembly,\* it was said that considerations of money were too paltry to be weighed against the moral and Christian advantages and obligations of reunion; that every dollar so lost would immediately be more than replaced; that the danger itself was very slight, that reunion would bring with it any contingencies, in which the courts would sustain suits to alienate those funds.

\* The following is from the portion of the Report signed by Chancellor Green and William A. Porter, Esq., of the Assembly's Committee on the legal questions involved in reunion here alluded to.

"On the 5th of May, 1843, James Lenox, Esq., conveyed to the Trustees of the Seminary the ground now occupied by the library and the house of one of its professors. He accompanied the grant with this condition, which for convenience we have divided into two sections: (1.) 'Provided always, nevertheless, and upon this condition, that if at any time or times hereafter, the said parties of the second part [that is the Trustees of the Seminary] shall pass from under the supervision and control of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, *now commonly known and distinguished as the Old-school General Assembly, and its successors*, or (2.) if at any time or times hereafter, the leading doctrines declared in the Confession of Faith and catechisms of the Presbyterian Church, such as the doctrine of universal and total depravity, the doctrine of election, the doctrine of the atonement, the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity, and of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to all his people for their justification, the doctrine of human inability, and the doctrine of the necessity of the influences of the Holy Spirit in the regeneration, conversion, and sanctification of sinners, as these doctrines are now understood and explained *by the aforesaid Old-school General Assembly*, shall cease to be taught and inculcated in the said seminary, then, and in either such case, the grant and conveyance hereby made shall cease and become null and void, and the said premises shall thereupon revert to the said party of the first part, his heirs, or assigns, as in his first and former estate.'

"The second branch of this condition would probably not be violated in the eye of the law, until the doctrines there specified shall cease to be taught in the seminary. On some of these doctrines it is in vain to deny that the two branches of the church are wide apart; and while we agree with our brethren that we cannot, as lawyers, undertake to examine and pronounce upon the effect of these differences of opinion, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact so well known to theologians on both sides, that such differences do exist. Nor can we hesitate to point attention to the peril which may ensue to this property and to other property similarly situated, if in consequence of the terms of a

The speech of Dr. Musgrave, which evidently had great power over the Assembly, took its own ground, which deserves to be separately stated. He took an active part in the measures which led to the separation of the New-school. He differed from those who maintained that "other than doctrinal questions divided the church thirty years ago. Doctrinal questions mainly led to that division. Would Christian men have objected, if their sons were to be trained in orthodoxy? Would we have found fault with the Home Missionary Society, if it had sent forth sound ministers? Can any man be made to believe so? No, the Home Missionary and Education Societies, as we believed, designed to subvert our faith and revolutionize our church. . . . We believed our faith and polity in danger, and hence we felt bound to resist them. . . . Our New-school brethren *went out voluntarily*, and were not *turned out*. We never intended to cut off those from the Synods. . . . I have never regretted that division. I am satisfied it was for the

union with any other body, the doctrines specified in this deed, as understood and explained by the aforesaid *Old-school* General Assembly, may cease to be taught in the institutions thus endowed.

"There is less difficulty in determining the results which must flow from violating the first branch of the condition imposed by Mr. Lenox, viz., if the trustees of the seminary shall pass from under the supervision and control of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, now commonly known and distinguished as the *Old-school* General Assembly, and its successors. In that event the property is to revert to himself and his heirs. The Trustees are, by the express terms of the deed, to be under the supervision and control of the *Old-school* General Assembly as *distinguished* from any other; in other words, from the *New-school* General Assembly. We are of opinion that if these Trustees should pass from the supervision and control of the former Assembly as distinguished from the latter, or if they should be controlled and supervised by an Assembly known by another name, or constituted differently from the Assembly thus specially described by Mr. Lenox, the valuable property conveyed by his deed will be placed in jeopardy.

"On the 25th of April, 1862, Robert L. and Alexander Stuart conveyed to the Trustees of this seminary \$50,000 in bonds of the Federal Government, and inserted in their deed the same condition in substance which has been quoted from that of Mr. Lenox, except that in the event of a breach of the condition, the money is to become the property of the American Bible Society. They had previously presented to the Trustees of the seminary the library of the late Dr. Addison Alexander on nearly the same terms, except that on the violation of that trust the library is to become the property of the Trustees of The College of New Jersey. The views which we have expressed respecting the gift of Mr. Lenox, will apply to the gifts of the brothers Stuart."

good of both parties. If it had not occurred, our church would have been corrupted. We have felt the results of that division in thirty years of harmony and prosperity. How is it; and how has it been with our New-school brethren? They have recognized us as standard-bearers, and as presenting the purest type of Presbyterianism. Our polity has been attractive; and for the last few years they have been coming back to the safe ground, upon which we planted ourselves, and they turned their backs. They found that their Congregational allies were not friends, but enemies; and they have now their own boards for their work as a church. The causes of the division have been largely removed. Slavery is dead. Voluntaryism is no longer popular with them. Our New-school brethren have also approached us *doctrinally*. I believe them much sounder, as a body, than they were thirty years ago. They will not now tolerate things which they tolerated then; nor do we now call men to account for a word. We now allow differences of opinion amongst ourselves, which we did not then allow. . . . I conscientiously believe that nine-tenths of them are substantially as orthodox and sound as we are ourselves. A few still adhere to their old heresies. But these will soon be gone, and their errors will be corrected by a perfect sanctification in glory. But we do not want a basis tolerating fundamental errors, and subverting our faith. Our New-school brethren should be plainly told that we can tolerate no such errors. I said so in the Philadelphia Convention, and I say so again. I would have no union in which errors cannot be disciplined. We enter into this union because they say they agree with us. Let us then unite, but let us discipline them if they are not with us. We shall be in the majority, and with Dr. Breckinridge's half, we shall have a *large* majority. My opinion is that every real heretic should be disciplined for his heresy. With this understanding, let us enter into this union.

“Now, one word as to this basis. I did, in the Philadelphia Convention, cordially accept Professor Smith's amendment, that the Confession of Faith should be received in the Calvinistic or Reformed sense. And *why* did I accept it? He made a speech in which he said that New-school men were falsely accused of subscribing to the Confession of Faith in a different sense from

ours. And so he brought in this amendment, using Dr. Hodge's words as found in the *Princeton Review* for July, 1867. Our New-school brethren agreed to this. I said I would not have offered that amendment myself, as I preferred a simple subscription to the Confession, but that I would accept it. I said, 'If my clan, my brethren, were satisfied with this as the sense in which the basis was accepted, they would be satisfied with the basis itself. I love my people. I do believe that Presbyterians are the best people on God's earth. But as some have thought that this amendment is ambiguous, and as I believe the Gurley amendment is worse, I would rather get rid of the whole of them, and take a subscription to the Confession of Faith as the basis of union. Then no man can say we are innovators. Thus we stand just where our fathers have always stood. Is it not the formula of the constitution? Is it not the formula of the New-school? Then if we take that simple, pure ground—if we get down to the solid rock, we have no necessity for Dr. Smith's amendment, or Dr. Gurley's amendment, and we stand just where both churches profess to stand. Some persons cannot understand what you mean by 'historical,' 'Calvinistic,' and 'Reformed' senses, and their suspicions once awakened, cannot be allayed. They will understand this plain, simple basis, for they know what the Confession means and teaches. Besides the adoption of such a basis as the simple Confession of Faith, is the best way to protect our funds, as no alteration of our constitution can then be charged upon us. I do not say that this union may not be worth one hundred thousand dollars. I would not put it in the balance against money, but if without any sacrifice of principle, we can defend our charter, and protect our property, it is better. I am glad to hear that some brethren intend to offer this amendment, and to take the 'Simon pure,' the real granite rock as a foundation for our union. . . Formed upon the right basis, this reunion will strengthen and encourage us. . . My opinion is that it will come. How soon, I know not. I am not impatient. I am not disposed to rush this matter through without caution, and without proper care."

Rev. Dr. Eagleson, who had been prominent in the Philadelphia Convention, followed Dr. Musgrave in a few remarks

of hearty concurrence with him. He added: "When the telegraphic despatch of last Monday morning came, it met a response in my bosom. I was then led to form a resolution to labour to carry out this union on a proper, scriptural orthodox basis. I am in favour of a union of all branches of my Presbyterian brethren, even with those of the Southern Church, on such a basis. I wish a union of all the Presbyterian churches of this land. I feel that the glory of our country, our Zion, and our God requires that our church shall be national as in former years. I am prepared for this in head and heart. And with this hope in view, I have prepared an amendment to the first article of the basis, as follows:

Strike out the following words:

"It being understood that this Confession is received in its proper historical—that is the Calvinistic or Reformed sense—it is also understood that various modes of believing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the united church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches."

The article will then read as follows:

1. The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted, "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;" and the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall be approved as containing the principles and rule of our polity.

He stated in a terse form, eleven points in which the basis thus amended would be preferable to the original, and gave notice that, if it were adopted, he should move that it be telegraphed to the New-school body at Harrisburg, with a request that they also would adopt it. It was after this, and after the views and principles involved therein had manifestly obtained a strong prevalence in the Assembly, that Dr. Monfort proposed to meet the case by moving, after the adoption of the committee's plan *without amendment*, a supplementary reso-

lution of preference for such an amendment, and asking the New-school Assembly to concur in it.

It will be seen that the ground taken by Dr. Musgrave differs from that taken by many of those who advocated the committee's basis without amendment, in several particulars.

1. The main cause of the separation of the New-school from us, was doctrinal differences. Other causes were subordinate and derived their chief power from this.

2. The secession of the New-school was voluntary, because they did not choose to submit to the measures justly adopted by the Assembly to purge the church from doctrinal errors.

3. These errors were grave enough to justify the measures adopted by the Old-school to suppress them.

4. Great good has resulted from the division in arresting the corruption, and promoting the purification of doctrine and polity in both churches, especially the New-school, until probably nine-tenths of them are soundly Presbyterian in doctrine and polity.

5. Hence, reunion with them is safe if it can be effected on a proper basis, and its consummation is probably not distant. But the only proper basis is the Confession of Faith pure and simple. All additions to or qualifications of this, not excepting those of the Philadelphia Convention, but especially the "Gurley Amendment," should be discarded, as ambiguous, indefinite, and fitted to excite distrust and alienation, heart-burnings and strifes.

6. Our New-school brethren should distinctly understand that all errors contrary to the fundamentals of the Confession are to be extirpated by discipline, whether hitherto tolerated in either body or not.

7. Important and desirable as reunion is, it should not be driven through with any such haste as will place it on an unsound and hazardous basis.

Still another *sui generis* speech, which occupied ground peculiar to itself, was that of Dr. Shedd. Although in most of its main positions not essentially differing from Dr. Musgrave's, yet it set them forward from other stand-points and surroundings, and with an aim in some degree different. He made an argument for accepting the Joint Committee's basis as it is, and contri-



buted much to swell the vote given for it. Following Dr. Humphrey's powerful speech on the other side, he commenced by saying, that he spoke "rather as a witness than an advocate. His position had given him peculiar facilities for knowing about the New-school body. The question is, What is the New-school Presbyterian Church at this day? Is it or is it not a Calvinistic body? It matters not what it may have been in the past. He should agree with the gentleman who had just spoken, and with all the gentlemen who had spoken on that side of the question, in regard to the early controversies and causes of the disruption. He had no doubt that there were various serious doctrinal divergencies in 1837—doctrines that were indeed to be lamented, and that could not remain in the church without increasing discord, and increasing corruption. Whether the best method was taken to eliminate them, he would not say; but that it was their duty to eliminate them, he agreed most heartily. In regard to the general character of the two churches, he agreed with the gentleman who had just spoken. The Old-school were undoubtedly a body who held to a stricter interpretation of Calvinism, but there are those among them who would not insist upon so much strictness as the member who had just sat down, would insist upon. He presumed he would agree with that brother as to the doctrine of Calvinism in the Confession, and that they should put in their theological chairs those who hold strictly to those doctrines. He thought he had a right to speak in regard to the other body. Holding the views he did, he had been permitted to hold a theological Professorship in one of the New-school Theological Seminaries, and he knew that nothing he was called upon to teach awakened the least suspicion or anxiety. In the Old-school Presbyterian Church there are several Theological Seminaries. The New-school Presbyterian Church has three of them—one at New York, one at Auburn, and one at Cincinnati. With regard to the position of the Faculty at New York, from the beginning to this day, there had been a respectable minority of Old-school men, and the Board to-day is as thoroughly Calvinistic as any fair-minded Presbyterian would ask. The same might be said of the Seminary at Auburn. With regard to the institution at Cincinnati, that

Church has lately put into the Theological Chairs two gentlemen above criticism. If they are not Calvinistic, is it likely that they would put into their institutions such men? No book is more thumbed in these Seminaries than Dr. A. A. Hodge's *Outlines of Theology*. There is a great difference between New-school Presbyterian theology and New-school New England theology. Of the latter, Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor is the truest representative. His system, and every system founded on the power of contrary choice, as maintained by him, is incompatible with Calvinism. But there is an Old-school theology of New England which is free from this taint, and, if differing from us in smaller matters, is clear and strong for the great essentials of Calvinism. The New England theology which has place among New-school Presbyterians is chiefly of this type. They are a Calvinistic body to all intents, and Calvinistic doctrine would be greatly promoted, not only among ourselves, but among Congregationalists by the proposed union."

He portrayed vividly the great increase of strength and influence for good to be hoped for from the proposed union. It would greatly strengthen Calvinism.

In regard to the doctrinal basis proposed, he thought it meant the Confession of Faith pure and simple, and that was all. He thought if shown to any Presbyterians of other lands, they would judge it thoroughly Calvinistic in its meaning. The words "Calvinistic and Reformed" had been introduced by Dr. Smith to satisfy the Old-school. He and others had worked hard to bring the New-school body up to it. If you now substitute a simple statement of the Confession, these faithful men in the New-school would feel that they were throwing away something which they had worked out of their body at very great cost.

If any man would prove that the New-school body was an Arminian body, he would oppose the union as heartily as any man. "He did not believe they could make Calvinism and Arminianism work together."

This address of Dr. Shedd made all the stronger impression on the Assembly, on account of his great earnestness, his love of Calvinism, his condemnation of Taylorism and Arminianism, his frank admission that doctrinal errors which ought to be

eliminated gave rise to the original division; his strong conviction that the proposed basis ensured the essentials of Calvinism; that the New-school body now hold firmly by these; and that immediate union with them upon it was the surest way to protect and promote the Calvinistic system of doctrine, and repress the contrary.

Against the approval of the proposed basis of union unaltered, Drs. Breckinridge, Charles Hodge, Humphrey, Backus, Mr. Woods and Judge Findlay, urged the following considerations. Although some single individual may have occasionally thrown out something inconsistent with, or eccentric to it, the following is a fair summation of the argument presented on that side.

First, as to the question in issue. This is not as to the present substantial orthodoxy of the great body of the ministers of the New-school church. They rejoiced in the testimony given on that subject, and had no wish to question it. But the question is, on the adoption of the doctrinal basis of union under consideration. However sound the present New-school ministry, this doctrinal article, as viewed by them, may and does provide for the toleration of errors utterly subversive of our standards and the Calvinistic system. There is nothing inconsistent in this. Men may be high Calvinists themselves, and yet hold to very lax principles of subscription. President Dickinson was a high Calvinist in his own belief, and yet held that all should be tolerated as sufficiently accepting our standards, who hold the essentials, not merely of Calvinism, but of the Christian religion. The same is true of many in the Anglican, and American Episcopal Church. It was undeniably true of many who acted with what was known as the New-school party, before and after the disruption. They held that the system known as Taylorism, should be tolerated, which Dr. Shedd, and many, if not all, on the other side, say is contrary to Calvinism. The question, therefore, is not what the New-school ministry believe, but what they tolerate, and, by the terms of the contract now under discussion, expect to bind the united church to tolerate through all time, or until such time as three-fourths of the body may change the constitution in this respect,

and whether we ought, in fidelity to truth, righteousness, and unity itself, to consent to such a compact?

In settling this question we are to bear in mind, 1. That the Gurley amendment gives whatever liberty of "viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating" the doctrines of the Confession has been enjoyed in either body. 2. It seems to restrict this liberty within the limits of what does not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system. Of these the former is a clause of liberty, the latter of restriction. The following questions instantly arise: Who shall determine what does or does not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system? What is the criterion in this matter? The New-school answer that this is determined by the other clause, securing the allowance of whatever has been allowed in either body, and treated therein as not inconsistent with the integrity of the system. So their journals, and their representative men privately and publicly, say. So all the declarations and arguments of their speakers, and of the Report of their Committee adopted by their General Assembly itself, maintain. So they understand the compact. So we know they understand it. As to those who maintain that the compact is safe, because this liberty is hedged in by what is essential to the integrity of the Calvinistic system, this, standing by itself, is indefinite. The question, what is thus essential? is *adhuc sub judice*, if not among the great mass of theologians, yet, as between us and the New-school. What we have deemed and treated as essential to it, they have not. And hence they argue that the real criterion of what is consistent with the integrity of the system, within the meaning and intent of this article, is what has been tolerated as such in either of the bodies.

But suppose we say otherwise; that the real standard of "integrity" is what we, the Old-school body, have uniformly treated as such: that this controls the clause giving liberty to hold whatever views of doctrine have been allowed in either bodies; the New-school undeniably understand it otherwise, and as above; that this past liberty of theirs controls all else, and is to be accounted and treated as what does not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system. In this view, it is, at best, ambiguous. The New-school enter into the compact believing

it secures them a certain liberty without which it would be unacceptable to them. The Old-school believe it involves a denial of that liberty; otherwise it would be unacceptable to them. Thus the Reunion is inaugurated with an open contest as to the very terms on which they have come together, on the most vital question of all. It becomes disunion. Its consummation on this basis becomes a declaration of war, a drawn battle between the parties, bringing back the strifes and heart-burnings which forced and precipitated the original disruption. This interpretation then does not vindicate the article. It loads it with a fatal ambiguity, at once destructive of itself, and of all the vast interests hinging upon it.

We come, then, to the other alternative. This compact, as understood by the New-school, means, and will secure, the free and unmolested toleration in the united church of whatever has been tolerated in the New-school church. The effect of this must be, 1. To put us all at sea, so far as any definite standard of doctrine is concerned. For how difficult will it be, if a candidate under examination avows any exceptionable doctrines, and claims that they have been allowed in the New-school church, to prove the contrary? 2. However this may be, it will, on this hypothesis, certainly bind the united church to tolerate all modes of "viewing, stating, illustrating, explaining" doctrines that have been tolerated in the New-school church. Now it was contended by the New-school men in 1837 that the doctrines allowed by them, which were so offensive to the Old-school, were only certain "modes of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating certain doctrines"—not the rejection of anything essential in the doctrines themselves. What were, then, these views thus allowed by the New-school as consistent, and condemned by the Old-school as inconsistent, with the system of our standards? Among them were these: That all sin and holiness consist in voluntary action, in the violation or observance of known law, and that nothing but such action has moral character. Hence, original righteousness in Adam at his creation, created holiness in men by re-generation and sanctification, original sin, and native sinfulness are impossible. No covenant was made with Adam for himself and his posterity, and in no sense did his descendants sin in him.

The sinner has plenary ability in himself to fulfil the law and receive the gospel. Imputation, whether of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, is absurd. Christ's sufferings were not penal and in satisfaction of Divine (distributive) justice, but a governmental expedient to meet the requirements of benevolence, or a benevolent regard to the general good. God could not exclude all sin, or the present degree of it, from a moral system, etc., etc.

These doctrines, and such as these, the New-school construction of the basis in question requires us to tolerate. Old-school men count them subversive of the system of our Confession. New-school men have regarded them as consistent with its integrity. They are doubtless as honest and sincere as we. This is not in question. Neither is their orthodoxy. It is simply a question of greater strictness or looseness in terms of subscription. We hold to the stricter view. They have held to the broader. This they would have the united churches bound to, by virtue of the article in question—bound to allow the doctrines above enumerated without ecclesiastical hindrance.

If it be questioned that the above doctrines have been tolerated in the New-school body, conclusive evidence is found in the writings of Barnes, Duffield, Beecher, the ecclesiastical prosecutions and trials of these men, the controversies and journals of the period, the writings of the New Haven divines, whose pupils and supporters, holding their system in full, formerly at least, found free admission and unquestioned standing in their Presbyteries. If looking into these is raking up old controversies, this is not our fault, nor have we any option in the matter. It is utterly impossible otherwise to know what this fundamental article of the compact means, and what the doctrinal basis proposed to us is. It is no answer to say that the doctrines of these men are held by few at present. The point is, that this article provides for the future toleration of them in all.

If our New-school brethren meant little, or meant nothing by it, why did they insist upon it, and why did the negotiations of the Joint Committee come to a dead-lock till it was inserted?

To incorporate this new element, thus understood, in our constitution, binding us to the allowance of such doctrines, is to

subvert our standards, undo our history, revolutionize our body, and make an end of the concrete reality known as the Old-school Presbyterian Church. Never was the church brought to a more solemn crisis. Will not the Assembly pause before taking the fearful and irreversible step?

These things are not said in the interest of disunion, but of union. The speakers expressed not only their desire, but their expectation, of reunion at an early day, and on a safe basis. They believed that the New-school was growing more orthodox and assimilated to us, and would soon be ripe for union in form, growing out of a real unity in doctrine and life. But they could not believe them ready for union on safe terms, so long as they insisted on a doctrinal basis so loose and vague as to contain within itself the seeds of heresy and strife, if not of disintegration. The true way to promote union was to insist on a basis at once safe, known, commanding the confidence, and satisfying the conscience of our people. Such is our Confession of Faith, pure and simple, not as blurred and darkened by the proposed codicil to it. The unity prayed for by Christ was not organic unity, which consists merely in being under one government, and is found along with the greatest diversity and opposition of doctrine, as in the Greek, Latin, and Anglican churches, but not between the Presbyterian churches of the United States, Canada, and Scotland, which, in each of the several countries, are subjected to their own several Synods or Assemblies. It is that unity of faith, love, and hope in Christ and in truth, which subsists between these latter bodies without organic unity.

The undeniable danger to some of the chief endowments of Princeton, from union on the Gurley amendment, although not a paramount consideration against principle, is quite too important to be despised, unless necessity is laid upon us. The increased economy of mission and other evangelistic work resulting from reunion, had been earnestly pressed on the other side. It was of no more weight on one side of the balance than peril to our funds on the other. Neither should weigh against the interests of truth and righteousness.

The allegation that this doctrinal dispute is all a quarrel of ministers, theologians, and schools, about which the laymen

know nothing and care nothing, was met by Dr. Humphrey, by citations of the recorded votes in the proceedings against these errors in and before the year 1837, from which it appeared that they were supported by larger majorities of elders than of ministers. And it will be found that now the eldership keeps fully abreast of the ministry in their doctrinal interest and insight. Dr. Humphrey closed his speech on Thursday evening by proposing the following amendment to Article I, under discussion :

“In approving of the foregoing article as part of the terms of reunion between the two branches of the Presbyterian Church, this Assembly desire it to be distinctly understood that no form of doctrine heretofore condemned by the General Assembly of either body shall be deemed consistent with the system of doctrine taught in our common standards.”

At the suggestion of the Moderator this, with all other amendments, was deferred till the vote on the resolutions of Judge Leavitt should be reached.

On Friday afternoon, May 29th, a short time before the vote was to be taken, the following telegram was received, and ordered to be recorded in the minutes :

HARRISBURG, Pa., May 29th, 1868.

*Rev. W. E. Schenck, D.D., Permanent Clerk, General Assembly, Albany, N. Y.*

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, in session here, informs the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, now holding its sessions in Albany, N. Y., that after an informal expression of dissentient opinions upon single articles of the proposed terms of reunion, the basis as reported by the Joint Committee was approved and directed to be overtured to the Presbyteries by an unanimous vote, four members being excused from voting.

By order of the General Assembly,

J. GLENTWORTH BUTLER,  
*Permanent Clerk.*

*The New-school Construction of the Doctrinal Basis.*

• The report of the Committee of the New-school Assembly, to whom was referred the report of the Joint Committee at the beginning of their session, prepared by Dr. Hickok, its chair-



man, was then read. Want of space alone prevents us from giving it entire. Having been presented to that body as an authoritative summary of the reasons for, and answer to the objections against adopting the plan of the Joint Committee, it is of great importance as showing the construction put upon it by them. It is mostly occupied with the doctrinal basis, and meets the objections raised against it, in portions of the New-school church, in the following manner.

“Various methods of viewing, stating, explaining, and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession of Faith, are to be freely allowed in the united church, as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches, only they must not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system. And now who shall decide whether the views do impair the integrity of the system? If there be a strenuous and rigid umpire, such will doubtless be found intolerant of opinions and interpretations contrary to its own. A mind cautious and jealous of all encroachment on religious liberty will doubt, and in proportion to his fears he will hesitate or object.

“But is the danger here really formidable? Admit the majority of the ecclesiastical body must decide, but in the way the members of our Presbyteries now will have their standing in the united church there, will they be unsafe and exposed to oppression? Aside from the manifest liberality, and confidence, and love which there must be in the members of the opposite branch, before three-quarters of its Presbyteries shall vote us together, there are three quite impregnable safeguards. The man whose sentiments do not violate the Calvinistic system cannot be hurt. And if the fear still is, that in the opinion of the judicatory the sentiment may be in violation of the integrity of the Calvinistic system, and that the opinion of the judicatory must rule, the answer at once is, not the judicatory on its own opinion, but the judicatory as convinced that the opposite branch of the church has allowed, or not allowed the sentiment to be in consonance with the Calvinistic system. If the man is not out of the pale of his former church's orthodoxy, he cannot be in danger from any ecclesiastical court's rigidity or bigotry. Danger from this cannot be further pressed without directly questioning the candour and honesty of the judicatory,

and then we are at once beyond all Christian redress or regulation. . .

“One other source of apprehended difficulty only need now be mentioned. It is in the expressed agreement that the Presbyteries possess the right to examine ministers applying for admission from another Presbytery. The position from which the objection comes is, that the Presbyterian Church is a confederate body, and the confederacy is a unit, and membership in one place with fair paper of transfer confers the right of membership in all places in the confederacy. This is doubtless safe practice and principle in all ordinary cases. But extremities become often necessities.

“And now, suppose we take this doctrine of previous examination in cases of last extremities, or even to suppose it to be held as very commonly allowable, what danger of oppression is there? Let the examination be as common or as rigid as it may, the judicatory can do nothing against the man who is still within the pale of orthodoxy, according to the allowance of the old body with which he is in sympathy. The united church is to fellowship the orthodoxy of both the present churches.

“Considerations like these induce your Committee to the conviction that if the ‘terms and recommendations’ are not all that one would wish, and even in some things are what one would wish they were not, yet at the most they are not open to an oppressive or dangerous use. There is a defence erected over which nothing but dishonesty can come to work us harm. The blessing of union so accomplished need not be feared, as if about to be counterbalanced by coming injuries.”

The pith and point of all this, it was urged upon the Assembly, is, that it furnishes most decisive evidence that the New-school church understand the Gurley amendment as guaranteeing the allowance in the united church of whatever has been allowed in their own church; that such former allowance in their own church is the criterion which determines that it does not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system; that judicatories, however rigid their examination, “can do nothing against the man who is still within the pale of orthodoxy according to the allowance of the old body with which he is in sympa-

thy." They must rule not in their own opinion of what is essential, but "as convinced that the opposite branch of the church has allowed, or has not allowed the sentiment to be in consonance with the Calvinistic system." And to act otherwise is to violate "candour and honesty." "Nothing but dishonesty" can go athwart these principles in the united church. With this construction of the doctrinal article all the speeches of their leading men coincided. So also have their leading journals and men spoken on all occasions.

Dr. Stearns, moderator of their Assembly, and a member of the Joint Committee which framed the basis, said: "As to the basis of the Joint Committee, it is about as good as men in general would be able to concoct; and about as good as could be devised in the English language. Under this basis, with its conceded rights of stating, explaining, and illustrating doctrine, Albert Barnes never could have been tried for heresy. It gave full liberty in the pulpit. Ministers might preach as they pleased. Nobody could call them to account, unless they came in direct contact with the Confession of Faith. It gave full liberty—such as was heretofore allowed in the separate bodies." Dr. H. B. Smith, also a member of the Joint Committee, said: "Neither of the branches had a right to say that its own interpretation was the only correct interpretation. If he supposed that the basis would prevent free inquiry or new views of the Bible and the Confession, he should not vote for that basis. Liberty was the very life of the church. It should not be bound finally to any particular interpretation. On such a basis both schools could stand." Dr. Nelson, another member of the Joint Committee, said: "To the objection that the article was susceptible of different constructions, he replied by showing that the same was notoriously true of the Confession of Faith itself and even of the inspired word of God."

Rev. Arthur Swayze, representing those of the other branch who had been opposed to the first article, lest it should compromise their former liberty, said: "I came to this Assembly opposed to the basis proposed by the Joint Committee, in no spirit of captious hostility, but in the love of my brethren, and in a strong desire for the maintenance of the honour of our beloved church. The first article seemed to me to ignore the

real question at issue, which is not—whether an historical Calvinistic theology shall be allowed in a Calvinistic church, but—whether the various types of theology, taught and publicly allowed in our branch of the church, should be allowed in the united church, as not impairing the Reformed or Calvinistic system. I have, I am glad to allow, some new light on that matter, and I am willing to accept that article, chiefly because it is attended with the explanation of the Committee, and also by the explanation of the Special Committee of Nine, and because the discussion has drawn from the lips of Dr. Hickok, Dr. H. B. Smith, Dr. Stearns, and indeed all the speakers in favour of the articles, the full and earnest declaration that they would not for a moment entertain the idea of reunion on this basis, if they did not understand that, by the proposed terms, the same liberty will be freely allowed in the united church that is allowed in our branch. These explanations and declarations become historical, belong to the basis itself henceforth in the eyes of the world, and for this reason I am happy to add my voice of assent, and if the difficulties of the tenth article can be surmounted, to join with others in hastening the consummation for which we have all devoutly prayed.”

It is past all doubt, therefore, that the New-school body regard the doctrinal basis presented by the Joint Committee, as binding to the allowance, in the united body, of whatever doctrines have been tolerated at any time in their own body, and as making all action in the new body antagonistic to such doctrines a breach of faith. The real question is thus again proved to be, not how orthodox they are, but whether we shall enter into a compact establishing, in their estimation at least, such a doctrinal basis for the Presbyterian Church of the United States for all time?

The debate on the side of the negative was closed by Dr. Charles Hodge, in a short speech mainly devoted to the removal of misapprehensions of the real issue, and ending with the following words: “What do we want? We ask for the adoption of the Confession of Faith and catechisms, pure and simple. When a man is asked what original sin is, we wish him to give the answer of those standards. Our New-school brethren say they have adopted them since 1837. Then make this your

simple basis, and adopt Dr. Humphrey's amendment, and I am for union. I have no more to say, except to express the hope that the Holy Spirit may hover over us, and guide us in our deliberations."

As the time fixed for the vote approached, Dr. Monfort, after saying that the New-school had never endorsed the errors complained of in the debate, made the following announcement, which it is understood had much influence in persuading the Assembly to the form of action and series of votes subsequently adopted.

"We wish to have the report carried through as it came from the hands of the Committee; and then I am willing to bring forward Dr. Eagleson's amendment, as a separate motion, and if passed, to send it to the New-school Assembly, and if adopted by them, this will be the doctrinal article in the basis of reunion."

The moderator announced that the time for taking the vote had arrived.

Dr. Breckinridge moved that each article be voted on separately, and that the vote be counted, and that the yeas and nays be called on the vote for the adoption of the whole. Carried.

The paper of Judge Leavitt was read. Then the first article of the basis of reunion proposed by the Committee, was read, and its adoption moved.

Dr. Eagleson moved the amendment to Article I. already mentioned, of which he had given previous notice. Laid on the table.

Mr. D. W. Woods moved to strike out all from "it being understood" to "separate churches." It was moved to lay this on the table.

Ruling elder George Junkin asked for the yeas and nays on laying this amendment on the table. Not granted. The amendment was then laid on the table.

Dr. Humphrey moved as an amendment to insert after the words "separate churches," these words: "The Assembly desires it to be distinctly understood that no form of doctrine heretofore condemned by either Assembly, shall be held or taught in

the united church; nor shall a man who holds it be licensed to preach the gospel." Laid on the table by a vote of 155 to 80.

Mr. E. B. Miller moved to amend the first article as follows, viz., "The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; and all questions arising in consequence of such reunion, and all matters requiring adjustment thereto, shall be settled and determined by the re-united church, according to the principles and policy of said standards." Laid on the table.

Dr. John C. Backus moved to strike out these words, viz., "As they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches." Laid on the table—162 to 80.

On motion it was ordered that all the amendments proposed be entered on the minutes, and the votes upon them counted.

The Rev. George Hill then moved that the yeas and nays be called in voting for the first article. The yeas and nays were called, and the moderator announced that the first article had been adopted by a vote of 187 to 78, two being excused from voting. The Assembly now adjourned to Saturday morning, May 30. When the subject was resumed, several amendments were offered to the 2d, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th articles, and rejected.

The adoption of the first resolution of the paper of Judge Leavitt was moved.

The Rev. S. J. Nicolls, D. D., moved to amend, so that it would read, "receive the report and approve the basis." It was moved to lay the amendment on the table. Lost by a vote of 84 to 124. The amendment was then adopted, and the first resolution as amended, adopted. Yeas, 188, nays 68, excused, 1.

The second resolution was then adopted, and the blank in the third ordered to be filled with five thousand, thus providing that this number of the Joint Committee's Report be sent to the ministers and ruling elders of the church, the expense to be borne by the Board of Publication.

Upon the question of adopting the whole, including the last two resolutions of Judge Leavitt, Dr. Backus moved its postponement in order to present a substitute prepared by his Presbytery. The substitute was read by Dr. Backus, and pro-

vides that the question of reunion be postponed, and that a committee of five be appointed to confer with the several branches of the Presbyterian Church with regard to a union of all, and report at the next Assembly. The motion of Dr. Backus was tabled, and the resolutions as a whole agreed to.

Dr. Monfort then offered the following:

While the Assembly has approved of the Report of the Joint Committee on Reunion, it expresses its preference for a change in the first item on the basis, leaving out the following words, viz.: "It being understood that the Confession is received in its historical, that is, the Calvinistic or Reformed sense. It is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the united church, as they have been in the separate churches." The Assembly believe that, by leaving out these clauses, the basis will be more simple and more expressive of mutual confidence, and the Permanent Clerk is directed to telegraph this proposed amendment to the Assembly at Harrisburg, and if that Assembly shall concur in the amendment, it shall become of effect as the action of this Assembly also.

This was adopted; that relating to a change of doctrinal basis unanimously. Drs. Beatty and Reed, and elders Day and Carter were appointed a committee to proceed forthwith to Harrisburg, and urge its adoption by the New-school Assembly.

Dr. Humphrey gave notice that, in behalf of himself and others, he should protest against the action of this Assembly upon the subject of union, and gave notice to all who joined in such protest to meet together after the morning adjournment.

MONDAY MORNING, June 1, 1868, 9 o'clock.

Previous to the opening services, the Moderator stated that the committee to the Assembly at Harrisburg desired the prayers of this Assembly in behalf of the object for which it had been sent. The Assembly was then opened with singing, reading the Scriptures, and prayer by the Moderator.

The Permanent Clerk read a telegram (unofficial) from the Clerk of the Assembly at Harrisburg, stating that the telegram

from this Assembly had been received, but owing to the fact that eighty members had already left, it was doubtful whether the Assembly would think it proper to take up the matter again, and consider the proposed change.

On Monday afternoon the calling of the roll on the case of Rev. Mr. Cowan was suspended to hear the protest of Dr. Humphrey and others against the action of the Assembly touching reunion. Previous to hearing the protest, Dr. Hall asked leave to present the following paper, which he said would render the protest unnecessary, if adopted by the Assembly:

*Resolved*, That this Assembly desires it to be understood that the first article of the Report of the Joint Reunion Committee, which is the doctrinal Basis of Union, and which was adopted on Friday last by this Assembly, is not to be interpreted as giving license to the propagation of doctrines which have been condemned by either Assembly, nor to permit any Presbytery in the united church to license or ordain to the ministry any candidate who maintains any form of doctrine condemned by either Assembly.

This paper was adopted unanimously by the Assembly.

Rev. Dr. Humphrey—The resolution of Dr. Hall is no part of the terms sent to the New-school Assembly, and hence does not meet the case, and obviate the necessity for the protest which I now offer.

Dr. Humphrey then read the protest signed by himself and fifty-two others, which was ordered upon record. Drs. Shedd, Monfort, Prime, and the Hon. Messrs. Leavitt and McKnight were appointed a committee to answer it. The protest and answer will be given in another article, in which they will receive distinct consideration.

After the protest had been read, Dr. Backus moved to telegraph to the Assembly at Harrisburg the paper of Dr. Hall, just passed by the Assembly. It was moved to lay this on the table, but the motion was lost.

Mr. D. W. Woods said that the refusal on the part of some was an effort to deceive the other Assembly as to what our views really were.

Dr. Prime scorned the idea of bad faith, and said he hoped the resolution would pass. In this matter nothing was to be



gained by keeping anything hidden. The best way was to be free and open; this was just what the advocates of reunion desired.

The motion was then adopted.

Rev. Dr. Monfort offered a resolution that a committee of five be appointed to act with a similar committee of the New-school Assembly to report to the first Assembly of the united church, such amendments of the Constitution as may be deemed necessary.

Dr. Breckinridge opposed the resolution, and announced that he should do all he could to defeat the adoption of the reunion basis by the Presbyteries. He pointed out what he regarded as some of the difficulties in the work of the proposed committee. The resolution gave the committee illimitable power over the boundaries of the Presbyteries, and over the proposal of changes in the constitution. He concluded by moving to lay the resolution on the table. Lost—ayes, 70; noes, 80.

The resolution was then adopted.

Before the adjournment on Tuesday afternoon, the members of the committee sent to Harrisburg returned, and reported verbally the result of their mission to the Assembly: "That the committee were received with great cordiality and kindness, and that important business which was before that body was postponed at once to hear their communication. The members expressed a desire to comply with the action of this Assembly, but in consequence of the necessary two-thirds not being present, it was unable to adopt the proposition of your body in addition to the basis, as it was of the nature of a change. If it had been presented two days previous, it would have been adopted. There was an entire willingness on the part of the brethren of that body to give assurance of their readiness to unite on the basis of the common standards. They believed their mission had resulted in much good, although it seemed on the face not to have been successful. It proved to them that there was an earnest desire on our part to know their hearts, and to agree with them on some measure for a union of the churches."

The Assembly then united in singing the 117th hymn, after which the Moderator made a fervent prayer and dissolved the

Assembly, ordering another one to be held in the Brick Church (Rev. Dr. Spring's) at New York on the third Thursday in May, 1869.

The import and effect of the Assembly's action on reunion, seen in the light of the discussions and facts which preceded or accompanied it, are in some respects perfectly clear and indubitable, and in others exceedingly dubious and perplexing. In regard to most of the former kind withal, the body was, with immaterial, if any exceptions, unanimous. In regard to the latter it was divided, as well as obscure and uncertain in its action, and probably divided very much because of this obscurity and uncertainty.

The Assembly was substantially a unit on the following points, as its votes unmistakably show.

1. In the ardent desire for reunion, if it can be accomplished on safe basis.

2. In the hearty disapprobation of the doctrinal basis contained in the first article of the proposed plan, so far as it includes anything beyond the Confession of Faith pure and simple, and in the earnest desire to amend it accordingly.

3. In a great aversion to reunion on any basis but our common standards, or on a basis which in any manner qualifies it, or gives it an ambiguous or indefinite significance or authority. All the speeches, Dr. Monfort's resolution, and the committee sent with it to the Harrisburg Assembly, prove this.

4. In the refusal to assent to any terms of reunion which imply a compact or obligation to tolerate in future candidates for licensure or ordination any form of doctrine which has been condemned by either Assembly, and of course those forms of doctrine condemned by our Assembly, which the other body have been extensively supposed to allow. Dr. Hall's resolution means all this. It was unanimously adopted. The substance of it has been twice proposed to the Assembly before, in the form of amendment to the basis. While rejected in that form, in conformity to a foregone and ill-advised conclusion not to alter the basis itself, but to cure its defects by supplemental resolutions, it was well understood when first offered, that many who declined to vote for it at that time and place, would vote for the substance of it at another stage of the proceedings.

A motion to reconsider it some time after its adoption, was also voted down by an overwhelming majority. It was therefore the deliberate mind of the Assembly. And if further confirmation were needed, the protest of the minority, and answer of the majority furnish decisive proof. The latter document says:

“The authors of the protest first speak of a series of doctrinal errors and heresies, which may be concisely stated as follows: (1.) There is no moral character in man prior to moral action, and therefore man was not created holy. (2.) There was no covenant made with Adam, his posterity did not fall with him, and every man stands or falls for himself. (3.) Original sin is not truly and properly sin bringing condemnation, but only an innocent tendency leading to actual transgression. (4.) Inability of any and every kind is inconsistent with moral obligation. (5.) Regeneration is the sinner’s own act, and consists in the change of his governing purpose. (6.) God cannot control the acts of free agents, and therefore cannot prevent sin in a moral system. (7.) Election is founded upon God’s foreknowledge that the sinner will repent and believe. (8.) The sufferings of Christ are not penal, and do not satisfy retributive justice. (9.) Justification is pardon merely, and does not include restoration to favour and acceptance as righteous.”

It proceeds to declare that the New-school church cannot claim these doctrines to be consistent with Calvinism, “because such a position, if taken by the New-school church or any church, would simply be self-stultifying and absurd.” “Not a man on the globe possessed of a sane mind and acquainted with the subject of doctrine” would maintain that the reception of such doctrines would not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system. They ask allowance for nothing lower than “the theology of Richards.” We are not considering the merits of the protest or answer here. We only cite this additional proof of the unanimous and settled determination of our Assembly to enter into no compact tolerating these doctrines.

We wish explicitly to guard against the conclusion hastily adopted by many, that the doctrinal basis in the first article of the proposed plan of union binds the Old-school to tolerate any

doctrines that may have hitherto been allowed in either body, in case it should be adopted. This we have shown to be the New-school construction of it. It has also been inconsiderately pressed by some opponents of the article in arguing its great faults. But it is equally capable of a construction which permits the Old-school to determine for themselves and in accordance with their past history, what is essential to the integrity of the Calvinistic system, and what doctrines at any time allowed in either church are inconsistent with it. We are therefore not bound to the looser construction of it, when it is equally capable of the stricter. Especially are we in no manner bound by it, after the passage of Dr. Hall's resolution officially notified to the other body. The Assembly's answer to protest also takes similar ground. The fatal objection to this basis is not its positive and necessary endorsement of the doctrines which went under the name of New Divinity at the time of and after the disruption, but *its fatal ambiguity*: that it is capable of contrary meanings on the most vital points; that it is adopted in these contrary senses in the two bodies respectively; that hence it brings the germs of discord and strife, if not of disintegration, into the united church.

For reunion on a basis conformed to the principle of the supplementary resolutions of Drs. Monfort and Hall, unanimously adopted by the Assembly, all parties would go with the utmost cordiality and earnestness. On this our body would be a unit. But here the two elements in the Assembly begin to diverge.

1. The minority insisted that the principles of these supplementary resolutions should be incorporated, in the form of amendments, into the basis itself, and that, so amended, it should be proposed to the New-school Assembly for their concurrence. If they accept it, then we have union on a basis acceptable to all, and without needless peril to truth and unity. If they decline, they, and we, and all others, will know beyond all doubt the real difficulty, what each side insisted on, and in what way each was responsible for the result, and what needs to be done further to prepare the way for union. Unless the majority in our Assembly are wholly mistaken in their estimate of the doctrinal state of the New-school body, the latter would not long delay compliance with terms so fully in

accordance with their own convictions, and with the demands of truth, peace, and unity. This the majority steadfastly refused to do. They rejected every form of amendment fitted to bring the basis into harmony with their own subsequently declared preferences and convictions. They voted to approve the committee's basis pure and simple, and recommend it to the Presbyteries for their adoption. But no sooner was this done, than they joined the minority in voting virtually that it was unsatisfactory; that the obnoxious clauses were better stricken out, and they sent forthwith a Commission to Harrisburg to obtain the concurrence of the other Assembly in the proposed amendment. Thus, they immediately, in effect, disapprove of what they have just before approved, and recommended to the Presbyteries. In this disapproval we entirely concur. They then adopted Dr. Hall's resolution, thus precluding the lax construction to which the Committee's doctrinal basis had been proved liable, in case the New-school Assembly should decline the proposed amendment.

2. In consequence of this circuitous way of meeting a very plain case, the matter goes before the two churches and their Presbyteries, as it seems to us, under a great cloud of uncertainties and ambiguities. It is far from certain what is sent to them, and requires a sober second thought to know what will be the effect of affirmative action thereupon.

1. Supposing there had been no action by the Assembly beyond the mere adoption of Judge Leavitt's resolutions approving and recommending the basis of the Joint Committee, there is the inherent ambiguity of this basis, *per se*, as shown in the debates, and in the proof already adduced from Dr. Hickok's report, etc., that the New-school body construe it as binding the united church to tolerate whatever they have tolerated, and the evidence furnished by Dr. Hall's resolution, that our body construe it as prohibiting whatever doctrines have been condemned by either Assembly. If the requisite number of Presbyteries in each church then adopt it, though they may adopt the same words, they do not, in intent, adopt the same thing, the same basis. They may adopt the same letters, but the same in sound only, not in sense. On the most material point they adopt contradictories of each other. It is said

each adopts the same platform. It might as well be argued that white is black, because white is a colour; black is a colour; therefore, white is black. Surely the two great Presbyterian churches of the United States owe it to themselves and their posterity, to truth and the God of truth, to found their compact of union on a basis which is not one of mutual stultification, nor full of the germs of perpetual mistrust, discord, and strife.

2. But this difficulty aside, what is actually sent down by the Assembly to our Presbyteries? Is it the Joint Committee's basis by itself, as it stood on the adoption of Judge Leavitt's resolutions, or that basis as controlled by Dr. Hall's resolution afterwards adopted and sent officially, by direction of the Assembly, to the New-school body? We think, according to every moral, if not legal intendment, it is the latter; that what the Assembly has approved and recommended to the Presbyteries is, in common honesty, just that and nothing else. We think this will be a very common view in our church. But then it is plain that this is not what the New-school body have sent down to their Presbyteries. On this construction, then, the Presbyteries of the two churches, in ratifying this basis, do not ratify the same thing, even *pro forma*, much less in fact. On the other hand, the same motives which resisted and prevented the amendment of the basis in the Assembly, will also tempt large numbers to claim that the Assembly approved and recommended the basis without conditions. So, if the basis is endorsed by the necessary three-quarters of the Presbyteries, without any qualifying expressions, the contest will be endless in what sense it was accepted. This is not the best way to real union. But suppose they adopt qualifying or amendatory expressions. If they vote to adopt or approve the plan sent down to them by the Assembly, all this will go for nothing. If they accept, they accept, no matter what expressions of desire or preference for the Confession pure and simple they may couple with it. No matter even if they say they accept it, in the sense of Dr. Hall's amendment, or in any other sense. Still, acceptance is acceptance. If three-quarters of the Presbyteries pass it as the Assembly did, and then append both Dr. Monfort's and Dr. Hall's resolutions, or whatever else, as an antidote,

still they adopt it, and they found the united church on that basis. When this is once done, its amendment, or the substitution for it of the standards pure and simple, will be vastly more difficult. What could not be gained in order to union, will not, we fear, be yielded when union is secured without it.

The only way, therefore, we are sorry to be obliged to say, to avoid the evils, the interminable strifes and fatal contentions of a basis loaded with ambiguities so grave that the contracting parties undeniably interpret it in senses directly contradictory, *is to reject it*. Otherwise, union is inaugurated with the seeds of perpetual disunion. *But let this rejection be followed by a request or overture to the next General Assembly to negotiate a plan of union, having for its doctrinal basis our common standards pure and simple.* Meeting almost within speaking distance of the other Assembly, such negotiation will be practicable and easy. When both bodies confide in each other sufficiently to ratify union on this granitic stratum, then may we hope it will abide on this deep and broad foundation. But how can it last on the shifting quicksands of undeniable ambiguities and equivocations? That this is the path, the only path to that true and safe reunion, so much desired by us all, seems to us perfectly plain. Let us have a basis conformed clearly and unambiguously to the principles involved in the supplemental and unanimous resolutions of the Assembly. Let us stand upon our Confession pure and simple. With Dr. Musgrave, we say, let us "get down to solid rock." Here we can stand, and, it is to be hoped, have a union firm and enduring. If, as we trust, what the majority say of the doctrinal position of the New-school church be well-grounded; if we can judge from the reported reception of the Committee to Harrisburg, that body cannot long be unwilling to meet us here. Until they can, judging from the unanimous action of our Assembly, that agreement in doctrine and polity, which the initiatory resolution of our Assembly at St. Louis, proposing the Joint Committee on Reunion, laid down as its indispensable pre-condition, is proved not to exist. But this obstacle, if such witnesses as Dr. Shedd are right, cannot last long. Then we shall have a basis on which all the Presbyterian bodies of the country may at length unite. The "Gurley amendment" will be a formidable

hindrance to such union with other Presbyterian bodies. It will confine our union with other bodies to the New-school, and prevent that ultimate pan-presbyterian unification, which is now so much the object of prayer and hope. So the terms "Reformed," "Calvinistic," &c., however significant in discussions, when superimposed upon our standards, answer about the same purpose as if we should say, they are to be taken in a sense broad enough to include the "Old-school New England Theology," or "Dr. Richards' Theology." These terms, as used by Dr. Shedd and other orthodox men who understand them, have a definite and not unsafe meaning, but, in a Confession of Faith, would unsettle every thing. However proper in discussions, such provisoes are utterly out of place in church creeds. They only vacate and nullify them. The course indicated may, though we hope it need not, delay the formal consummation of reunion for a year. It will promote its extension through all the Presbyterian bodies, and its duration through the ages. And in the long future, whatever trials may come upon it, we may hope it will be written of it, "And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, AND IT FELL NOT, FOR IT WAS FOUNDED ON A ROCK."

We cannot permit ourselves to doubt that this will be the ultimate yet speedy solution of the problem, whereby all will rejoice in real union, while the other alternative will satisfy none. Dr. Prime says in the *New York Observer* of the Gurley amendment, "It is a foolish clause. If it means anything, it adds to the basis, and that ought to be the Confession only. If it means nothing, it ought to have been left out. It does amount to just nothing at all. It tolerates diversities of explanation, where integral doctrines are not involved. But such diversities are necessarily allowed in both churches, and always will be, in every Protestant church, and when it is known that both sides prefer the basis without the clause, it is truly to be regretted that it remains. It can only do harm, however, in suggesting evil which will not exist, either with or without the amendment." Elder Henry Day said to the Harrisburg Assembly: "He felt as if this Assembly *must* pass the amendment, because the whole power and opportunity now rested



with this body. The plain men of the church wanted this amendment, because it wiped out all ambiguity, and left the old tenets of their fathers pure and simple. They could not exactly understand what 'Calvinistic sense' and 'Reformed sense' meant. The New-school committee had said that their property was all safe under this basis. But the Old-school committee had reported that there were certain trusts, amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, that would be placed in a delicate position by this little change in the basis of the church, as embraced in the first article, and it was this difficulty which the proposed amendment obviated. The Old-school, with this amendment, had advanced a step ahead of the New-school, and had burned their ships behind them. They could not and would not retreat."

It appears that in the New-school body 117 voted for, and 36 against reconsideration. But some 80 members had left. The rule required two-thirds of all that had voted on the question before, and it was lost. The impression was, however, that, had the body been full, it would have passed by a large majority. It would seem therefore that they will have little difficulty in uniting on this basis; and there can be little doubt that, after thorough reconsideration, it will prove far more acceptable to the great mass in both bodies than any substitute for, or modification of it. We are glad to learn that an influential movement is already begun in the central portion of our church to bring the matter to this happy issue.

ART. VI.—*The Protest and Answer.*

IMMEDIATELY after the adoption of the resolution in the late General Assembly, approving of the terms of union between the Old and New-school branches of our Church, the Rev. Dr. Humphrey gave notice for himself and others of protest against that decision. As that protest and the answer to it are of permanent interest, we propose to insert them entire, with a brief comment.

“The undersigned respectfully request that the following protest be entered upon the Minutes of the Assembly:

“We do not now protest against the reunion of the two branches of our church, nor against the measures inaugurated for the accomplishment of that object, but simply against the terms of union approved by the Assembly and its action in relation to them.

“The first article of the plan proposes that ‘the reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards,’ . . . ‘it being understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the united church as they have been hitherto allowed in the separate churches.’

“Under this term of the compact, we shall be bound to allow all those forms of doctrine which the New-school Church has hitherto allowed. This interpretation the article in question will, in our judgment, fairly admit; it is so interpreted by the other party to the contract, and it is so understood by the public.

“We protest against its adoption, first, because it utterly unsettles our standard of doctrine. That standard ceases to be the system of doctrine contained in our Confession, but that system, as interpreted by the New-school Church in their past history. Secondly, because that article binds us to approve of doctrines which our General Assembly has formally condemned.

“We distinctly disavow any intention of imputing error in

doctrine to the mass of our New-school brethren. With equal distinctness and earnestness we disavow any impeachment of their sincerity or integrity. We only say that they regard as consistent with our standards forms of doctrine which our branch of the church has officially, earnestly, and constantly condemned. What those are, may be learned by a reference to the Minutes of the Assembly of 1837, by which they were condemned.

“Some of the more important of the errors thus specified or implied, are:

“1. The denial of original righteousness. It is assumed that moral character presupposes moral conduct, and therefore that there can be no moral character prior to moral action; consequently, it cannot be true that man was created after the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

“2. As it regards our relation to our first parents, it is denied that there was any covenant made with Adam; that all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. On the contrary, it is maintained that every man stands or falls for himself.

“3. As to original sin, while it may be admitted that men are depraved by nature, and come into the world with a bias to sin, it is denied that there is anything of the nature of sin, or any desert of condemnation, until there is the personal and voluntary violation of known law. On this subject our standards teach, in accordance with the Scriptures and with the faith of every historical church in Christendom, that the inherent, hereditary corruption of nature derived from Adam, is truly and properly sin. This great doctrine is the foundation of the whole plan of redemption, and is professed and symbolized in every act of infant baptism.

“4. In reference to the inability of sinners, it is taught that the distinction between moral, natural, and gracious ability, is worthless. Inability of any kind is inconsistent with moral obligation.

“5. It is taught that regeneration is the sinner's own act. It consists either in the change of his governing purpose, or in

the choice of God, instead of the world, as the source of happiness. It is not the act of God, because God cannot effectually control the acts of free agents. He cannot prevent sin, or the present amount of sin, in a moral system. He can enlighten, persuade, and remonstrate; he can use all means of moral suasion, but he cannot efficaciously or certainly determine the will. He, in fact, does all he can do, consistently with their liberty, to convert all who hear the gospel. This is in direct contradiction to the Scriptures and our standards, which teach that regeneration is effected by the mighty power of God, analogous to the power which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead; and, therefore, that the action of the Spirit in regeneration is sovereign, certainly efficacious and irresistible.

“6. Election to life is not founded on the mere good pleasure of God. He elects those whom he foresees he can persuade to repent and believe.

“7. While it is admitted that the work of Christ may be called a satisfaction to the law and justice of God, if by justice we understand a benevolent regard to the interests of his moral government, it is denied that it was a satisfaction to distributive or vindicatory justice. It is denied that his sufferings were penal or vicarious in the established sense of that word, securing the salvation of none, but simply rendering the salvation of some possible. They were not judicially inflicted, so that those to whom the merit of his obedience and death is imputed, are free from the demands of justice, and become righteous in the sight of the law.

“8. Justification, according to our standards, is an act of God's free grace wherein he pardons all our sins, and accepts us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us and received by faith alone. This is denied. In what is called justification nothing more occurs than when the Executive pardons a criminal, and that criminal is restored to his civil rights. He is not declared just. There is no imputation to him of righteousness. There is no pretence that he has satisfied the demands of the law. This error, therefore, involves the denial of the essential idea of justification as presented in our standards.

“We are far from believing, or insinuating, that these doctrines are generally approved by the New-school Church. We have no doubt they are repudiated by many in that church as sincerely as they are by us. But they are allowed by them as consistent with the system of doctrines contained in our Confession. This fact is notorious. It is confessed and avowed. These doctrines have been for years matter of public discussion. They have been taught in some of the theological seminaries of our land. Students from those seminaries, professing these errors, are freely admitted into the New-school Presbyteries. Men of the highest eminence in the other branch of the church, teach them publicly from the pulpit and the press. They are contained, more or less of them, and some of the most serious, in books and tracts issued by the Publication Committee of the New-school body. They are openly avowed in some of the periodicals sustained by the ministers of that church, and apologized for by others. These are not matters of speculation belonging to the schools; but concern doctrines taught in the Catechism, and presumed to be known even by the children of the church.

“There are other points in the proposed terms of reunion to which we have strong objection, which, out of regard to the pressure on the time of the Assembly, we abstain from mentioning. There are two provisions of the plan, however, which we cannot overlook. In the eighth article, it is provided that the publications of the New-school Committee of Publication, ‘shall continue to be issued as at present,’ until otherwise ordered.

“Although the whole church cannot be justly held responsible for all the works issued by its Board, it becomes thus responsible when it deliberately sanctions their publication. Believing, as we do; that there are books published by the New-school Committee, containing doctrines inconsistent with our Confession, we are constrained to protest against the sanction given to their publication.

“Again, in article fourth, it is provided that ‘no rule or precedent, which does not stand approved by both bodies, shall be considered of any authority, until reestablished in the united body, except in so far as such rule or precedent may

affect the rights of property founded thereon.' This unsettles to an indefinite degree our past acts and deliverances. It is well known as one of the characteristic differences between the two bodies, that the one holds a much higher doctrine as to the prerogatives of church judicatories than the other. The Congregational element which, from the beginning, has so largely pervaded the New-school branch, has naturally led our brethren in that branch to resist, in many cases, the exercise of powers which Old-school men believe to belong, by Divine right, to the courts of the church, and especially to the General Assembly. This being the case, we know not to what extent we are renouncing our Presbyterian principles in the adoption of that article.

"We respectfully protest, not only against the terms of union as they have been adopted by this house, but also against the action of the Assembly in regard to them.

"In our view the parties to this negotiation for reunion are the two General Assemblies. They were to endeavour to agree on the terms of union, and when agreed, to send them down to their respective Presbyteries. It cannot be supposed that our General Assembly intended so to tie its own hands, or so to strip itself of its most important prerogatives, as to commit to any ten or fifteen men the work of deciding on what terms a union confessedly so momentous in its consequences, should be consummated; reserving to the Assembly the poor prerogative of adopting those terms as a whole, or of rejecting them as a whole. The duty of the Joint Committee, in our judgment, was simply to confer among themselves as to the terms of union, and when agreed, to refer them to the two Assemblies, for those bodies to consider; to modify, to adopt some and not others, or to approve or reject the whole. In this way, a basis mutually acceptable might have been intelligently adopted. Now we are in the dark. These terms admit of a twofold construction. This Assembly may, and probably does, put one interpretation upon them, and the New-school Assembly an opposite one. Thus, if this plan be carried through, we shall be hurried into a union with cross purposes, which must inevitably result in the renewal of our former troubles.

“Instead of the Assembly taking this view of the case, no modification of the proposed terms were allowed. Amendment after amendment, to the number of six or eight, was summarily laid on the table without debate. These amendments were not offered in a factious spirit, or with the design of preventing reunion, but with the honest purpose of putting the terms into a form in which, with a good conscience, they could be adopted by the Presbyteries which we represent.

“We regard this as a wrong done to the minority, and a much more serious wrong done to the churches.

“Under this head we especially protest against the laying the first amendment, offered by the Rev. Dr. Humphrey, upon the table without consideration. That amendment simply provided for fidelity to our former testimony against false doctrines. The action of the Assembly, however intended, we regard as a virtual renunciation of our former status, and as committing the church, contrary to the Constitution, which is and must continue to be binding on our conscience, to recognize as orthodox the errors which it has hitherto condemned.

“Grateful to God for the Christian spirit, which, notwithstanding our conscientious differences, has characterized our deliberations, we submit, with all deference, this our protest to the judgment of the Assembly and of the churches.”

This protest was signed by about sixty members of the Assembly, several names having been added after the adjournment.

#### *Answer to Protest.*

In reply to the protest against its action on the terms of union, the Assembly observes:

“The authors of the protest first speak of a series of doctrinal errors and heresies, which may be concisely stated as follows: (1.) There is no moral character in man prior to moral action, and therefore man was not created holy. (2.) There was no covenant made with Adam, his posterity did not fall with him, and every man stands or falls for himself. (3.) Original sin is not truly and properly sin bringing condemnation, but only an innocent tendency leading to actual transgression. (4.) Inability of any and every kind is inconsistent with moral obligation. (5.) Regeneration is the sinner’s own act, and consists

in the change of his governing purpose. (6.) God cannot control the acts of free agents, and therefore cannot prevent sin in a moral system. (7.) Election is founded upon God's foreknowledge that the sinner will repent and believe. (8.) The sufferings of Christ are not penal, and do not satisfy retributive justice. (9.) Justification is pardon merely, and does not include restoration to favour and acceptance as righteous.

"These doctrinal errors the authors of the protest are careful to say are repudiated by the great mass of the New School church. They say that 'they are far from believing or insinuating that these doctrines are generally approved by the New-school church'—that 'they do not impute these errors to the majority, or to any definite proportion of our New-school brethren.'

"The charge that is made in this protest, and the only charge made in this reference is, that while the other branch of the Presbyterian Church repudiate these doctrines for themselves, they at the same time hold that they are *consistent with the Calvinism of the Confession of Faith*. The authors of the protest allege that it is the judgment of the New-school body that a person can logically and consistently accept the Westminster symbol, and then nine or ten Pelagian and Arminian tenets, at one and the same time. This is the substance of their charge.

"The Assembly pronounces this allegation to be without foundation, because :

"1. Such a position, if taken by the New-school church, or by any church whatsoever, would simply be self-stultifying and absurd. That a great religious denomination, which from the beginning of its organization in 1837, down to the present time, has held up the Westminster Confession as its symbol, has compelled every one of its ministers and elders to subscribe to that symbol, and has received its membership into church communion upon professing faith in the doctrines of that symbol; that an ecclesiastical body which has thus stood before the other churches of this and other lands as a *Calvinistic* body, and has been reckoned and recognized as such, should at the same time be jealous in behalf of the distinguishing doctrines of Pelagianism and Arminianism, and insist that these latter are *consis-*



tent with the former, and are to be tolerated in a Calvinistic body, is too much for human belief. The entire history of the church does not present such a phenomenon as that of a denomination adopting, before the world, a definite type of doctrine, and at the same time claiming that exactly the contrary type of doctrine is compatible with it, and must be tolerated within its communion. If the New-school church are really doing what the signers of this protest allege they are, then their position before the churches and the world would be as absurd as would have been the position of the Nicene church if, at the very time that it adopted and defended the Trinitarianism of Athanasius, it had insisted that the tenets of Arius or those of the Humanitarians were consistent with those of the great father of orthodoxy, and must be allowed in the catholic church. The human mind, even in its natural condition, never did work in this manner, and never will; and still less will the human mind, when renewed and sanctified by Divine grace, be guilty of such a palpable inconsistency.

“2. These very errors, charged by the signers of the protest as allowed by the New-school Presbyterians, have already been distinctly repudiated by them. The Auburn Convention, held in 1837, under the influence and doctrinal guidance of that excellent and sound divine, the late Dr. Richards, specified sixteen doctrinal errors, which contain the very same latitudinarian and heretical tests mentioned in the protest, rejected them *in toto*, and set over against them sixteen ‘true doctrines,’ which embrace all the fundamentals of the Calvinistic creed. This Assembly regards the ‘Auburn Declaration’ as an authoritative statement of the New-school type of Calvinism, and as indicating how far they desire to go, and how much liberty they wish in regard to what the terms of union call ‘the various modes of explaining, illustrating, and stating’ the Calvinistic faith. We believe that a large number of our New-school brethren would prefer the modes of ‘explaining and illustrating’ the tenets of Calvinism which are employed by the authors of this protest themselves, and that the other portion of the body claim only that degree of variation from these modes, which would be represented by the theology of Richards and the Auburn Declaration.

“3. The Assembly is fully satisfied that any instances of laxity of doctrine among the New-school which have been exhibited are exceptional cases, and that the great body of the other church sincerely and firmly stand upon the basis of our common standards. The many disclaimers of the unsound views charged, and declarations that the standards are received as received by us, which have been made by distinguished and representative men, and in the periodicals of the New-school church, leave no room to doubt that the interests of sound doctrine will be safe in the united church.

“4. That the allegation of this protest is unfounded, is proven by the fact that the New-school church have adopted, by a unanimous vote, the basis of doctrine presented by the Joint Committee. Whatever may be the preferences and opinions of individuals respecting particular clauses in the first article in this basis, this General Assembly holds and affirms that it not only commits, but *binds* any ecclesiastical body that should receive it to pure and genuine Calvinism. It will be so understood by all the world. For it expressly lays down the Westminster symbol as the doctrinal platform, and expressly requires that no doctrine shall be taught that is not Calvinistic in the old, ancestral ‘historical’ meaning of the term, or that ‘impairs the integrity’ of the Calvinistic system. We affirm that there is not a man upon the globe possessed of a sane mind, and acquainted with the subject of doctrine, who would assert that the list of errors and heresies mentioned by the signers of this protest is ‘Calvinistic’ in the accepted and historical signification of the term, or that their reception would not impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system.

“And it must be distinctly observed, that if any doctrines had been hitherto allowed by the New-school body, which ‘impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system,’ they are not to be allowed in the united church under the terms of union. Such doctrines are condemned; and any who may teach them will be subject to discipline. It is the testimony of some of the protesters themselves, that the great body of the New-school are sound in doctrine; our own body being the large majority in the union, when fortified by the accession of the great body of sound men in the other, will establish and confirm the tes-

timony of the Church to the truth; will preserve it, by God's help, from error, and maintain intact, while it extends, the purifying and saving power of our venerated Confession.

"5. The errors and heresies alleged in the protest are combatted and refuted in the theological seminaries of the New-school.

"Such seminaries in any denomination are important exponents of its doctrinal position and character. The Assembly know that in the three seminaries of our New-school brethren, Westminster Calvinism is fully and firmly taught. The professors in these are obliged to subscribe the Westminster Confession, and heretical teaching throws the professor out of his chair by the very constitution of these seminaries. The Assembly notice this point particularly, because the authors of the protest assert that the doctrinal errors specified by them 'have been taught in some of the theological seminaries of the land.' This is not the proper manner in which to affix so grave and damaging a stigma upon our New-school Presbyterian brethren. The authors of this protest ought to have made this allegation, not in the way of insinuation, but by distinct assertion and proof. Many things are 'taught in the theological seminaries of the land,' which are not taught in the *Presbyterian* seminaries of the land, either New-school or Old.

"6. The protest alleges it to be a 'notorious fact,' that the New-school Church insists that the heresies mentioned are compatible with Calvinism. If the alleged fact has been so 'notorious,' as the protest affirms, it would certainly have been known to this Assembly, and would have made it simply impossible to have secured for the basis of the Joint Committee, or for any other conceivable basis, any favourable consideration. The idea of reunion would not have been entertained for a moment.

"Furthermore, this Assembly emphatically holds up to the church and to the world that it receives into its ministry and membership those who adopt 'the system of doctrine taught in our Confession,' and that it never has held, and does not now hold, that its ministers or members shall 'view, state, or explain' that system in any other than the words of the Holy Scripture and our standards; and to show that this is the sen-

timent not only of the Assembly, but of the protesters themselves also, the Assembly here cites the testimony of one of the signers of the protest, whose words have been referred to in the discussion just closed. Says Dr. Hodge:

“‘If a man comes to us, and he adopts ‘the system of doctrine’ taught in our Confession, we have a right to ask him, Do you believe there ‘are three persons in the Godhead—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—and these three are one God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory? If he says, Yes, we are satisfied. We do not call upon him to explain *how* three persons are one God; or to determine what relations in the awful mysteries of the Godhead are indicated by the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. If we ask, Do you believe that ‘God created man, male and female, after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, with dominion over the creatures?’ and he answers, Yes, we are satisfied. If he says that he believes that ‘the covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself, but for all his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression,’ we are satisfied. If he says that he believes that the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it,’ *we are satisfied*. If he says, Christ executes the office of a priest in his once offering himself a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice, and reconcile us to God, and in making continual intercession for us,’ we are satisfied. If he says he believes justification to be ‘an act of God’s free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone,’ we are satisfied: Is not this what is meant when a man says he adopts our ‘system of doctrine?’ Is not this—nothing more and nothing less—that which we are authorized and bound to require? God grant that we may unite on terms so simple, so reasonable, and, I must hope, so satisfactory to every sincere, humble, Christian brother.’—*Remarks of Rev. Charles Hodge, D. D., in the Philadelphia Convention.*

“The Assembly cannot enlarge the basis beyond the platform of God’s truth as stated in our standards, and it would not narrow the basis by taking one tittle from the form of sound words therein contained. We declare our willingness to unite with all those who profess their faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and their adoption of ‘the Confession of Faith and Form of Government’ of our beloved church.

“The protestants object to the eighth item of the basis, because it makes the united church responsible for the publications of the New-school Committee. This is a misapprehension. The publications of the New-school Committee and our Board are to be issued as now, with the imprint of each, until the new Board shall prepare a new catalogue, for which alone the united church will be responsible.

“Again, the protestants object to the fourth article as unsettling past acts of our church. This is a matter of necessity where the action of the two bodies differ. It is believed, however, that except in the case of the imperative clause of the examination rule of 1837, no important difference can be found. If it is otherwise, the united church is the proper body to establish its own usages. We do not believe that our brethren of the New-school church have now any sympathy with Congregational views of government, or any objection to usages that are strictly Presbyterian.

“The various amendments proposed by the protesters were laid on the table, not because they were contrary to the sentiment of the Assembly, but because, under the circumstances, it was not possible to engraft them upon the terms of the union, and, in the judgment of the Assembly, were not essential to the integrity of the Calvinistic basis on which the union is to be effected.

“WM. T. SHEDD,  
J. G. MONFORT,  
S. IRENÆUS PRIME,  
H. H. LEAVITT,  
ROBERT MCKNIGHT,

“*Committee on Answer to Protest.*”

As many of the opponents of the terms of union, as presented by the Joint Committee, avowed their desire for reunion, provided the amendments proposed by Drs. Eagleson and Humphrey were adopted, it has been asked, why they persevered in their protest after Dr. Hall's resolution, identical with the amendment proposed by Dr. Humphrey, had been passed by an unanimous vote. The answer to this question is, 1st. That the protest had not only been prepared and signed, but Dr. Humphrey had obtained the floor for the purpose of reading it, when he gave way for a moment to Dr. Hall that he might present his resolution, which was adopted without debate. Under these circumstances no one had the right to withdraw the protest, had it been desirable to do so. 2d. But, in the second place, the whole ground of protest remained. The thing objected to, was the approbation of the proposed basis. The vote expressing that approbation remained unaltered, and therefore, the ground of protest remained. 3d. There is an essential difference as to their effect between Dr. Humphrey's amendment and Dr. Hall's resolution. Had the former been adopted it would have altered the basis; and, if sanctioned by the other Assembly, been sent down to the Presbyteries and constituted an integral part of the terms of reunion. On the other hand, Dr. Hall's resolution is no part of the basis; it was not sanctioned by the other Assembly, and the Presbyteries are not called upon to approve or disapprove of it. Every candid man, therefore, will admit that those who would have been satisfied with the adoption of the two amendments, those of Dr. Eagleson and of Dr. Humphrey, were perfectly consistent, under the circumstances, in persisting in their protest.

A second remark which we have to make on these documents and the action of the Assembly is, that the friends of the basis renounced their own principles. They took the ground that the terms proposed by the Committee were of the nature of a contract, which the Assembly had no right to alter, but which, as is the fact with the Presbyteries, it could only approve or reject as a whole. On this ground they justified laying on the table every amendment proposed. As this is a summary, arbitrary, and disrespectful mode of action, except

in cases of obvious necessity, its adoption by the majority can be vindicated only on the ground that they believed the basis to be unalterable. But having carried it through, they immediately proposed an essential alteration and sent a deputation all the way to Harrisburg to secure the sanction of the New-school Assembly. This is precisely what the minority desired to accomplish, and what the majority refused to allow. If proper at one time and when proposed by the majority, it was certainly proper at another time and when proposed by the minority.

A third and still more important remark is, that the majority conceded the propriety and importance of the amendment urged by the minority, and sanctioned the objections made to the doctrinal basis. Those objections were first, that the basis is vague and indefinite; and secondly, that it is ambiguous. Both of these grave objections the Assembly acknowledged to be well-founded. The former, by the unanimous adoption of the resolution to strike from the first article the so-called 'Gurley amendment,' and make the Confession and Catechism 'pure and simple' the standard of doctrine; and the latter, by a like unanimous adoption of Dr. Hall's resolution, declaring the sense in which the doctrinal basis was understood by the Old-school body. The adoption of these resolutions gives the sanction of the whole Assembly to the ground taken by the minority, and works an effectual condemnation of the basis as it stands.

Fourthly. It is obvious that the Assembly has placed itself in the anomalous position of sending down for the approbation of the Presbyteries terms of reunion, which it, with perfect unanimity, itself condemned. It did indeed approve *pro forma* of the proposed terms of union, but this was done with the avowed purpose of altering them; and that alteration was accordingly attempted, and failed only for want of time. There might be some reason in this course on the part of the Assembly, as its vote of approbation was not intended or expected to be final. But it is not so with the Presbyteries. If they approve of the basis, it passes beyond their power. The churches by that vote are united on the terms proposed by the Joint Committee. Those terms can, in the case supposed, be modified only with the concurrence of three-fourths of the Presbyteries of the united church.

This is perfectly clear and perfectly certain. And yet it is studiously ignored. The Presbyteries are urged to adopt the basis, and signify, if they please, the alteration they desire, and trust to the next Assembly to see that alteration carried into effect. But this is a delusion, or something worse. The two Assemblies, which are to meet in New York next year, cannot alter a line or a word of the basis, if the requisite number of Presbyteries vote to approve. Their whole business will be to count the votes and announce the result. When Congress proposes an amendment to the Constitution, it is referred to the States. If three-fourths of their number adopt it, it is thereby a part of the Constitution. Congress has no longer anything to do with it.

Consider the condition we shall be in, should this basis be adopted. The Old-school Assembly has unanimously declared that it understands it in one way; the New-school Assembly, with like unanimity, announces to the world, (in the adoption of Dr. Hickok's exposition and report,) that it understands in a different way. If we come together, one of two things must happen. Either both parties adhere to their interpretation of the basis, and then there will be inaugurated a scene of confusion and conflict such as the church in this country has not yet seen. Or, one party must secretly intend to adopt the interpretation of the opposite party. This can hardly be imagined. For the Old-school to adopt the interpretation of the basis given by Dr. Hickok, and sanctioned by the New-school Assembly, is, we believe, impossible. It would involve the renunciation of all their principles, pledges, and conscientious convictions. We have too much respect for the numerous good and intelligent men, who advocated the adoption of the proposed basis, in and out of the late Assembly, to think for a moment that they purpose any such disloyalty to the truth of God committed to their care.

Fifthly. The action of the Assembly has disclosed a basis in which both parties in our branch of the church can cordially unite, and that is, the Confession of Faith and Catechisms without note or comment. This is all we have ever demanded, or have a right to demand; so far as the standard of doctrine is concerned, and our Assembly has unmistakably indicated, in



the unanimous adoption of Dr. Hall's resolution, what they mean by this. To this basis no reasonable objection can be made.

No one doubts the importance of organic union, when there is real unity in faith and discipline, among bodies occupying the same territory. The Old-school has constantly professed a willingness to unite with any or all the Presbyterian churches in this country, who are sufficiently one in principle and practice to live together in peace. And Old-school men have never been extreme in their demands as to the conditions for such union. The misrepresentation that they require doctrinal agreement in anything beyond the simple statements of our common standards; that they are strenuous for assent to their own theories and interpretations, has so often been answered that the repetition of that misrepresentation is no longer excusable. Dr. Hall's resolution is no addition to the basis. It is no interpretation of the Confession of Faith. It is simply an authoritative announcement of what the Old-school Church means by adopting the "system of doctrine" contained in that Confession. It means that the doctrines constituting that system should be adopted in the form in which they are stated in the standards of the church. If a man says, he believes that "the covenant being made with Adam, not only for himself but for all his posterity, all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him, in his first transgression;" he is not to be allowed to teach from the pulpit or the press, that there was no such covenant formed with Adam; that we did not sin in him, nor did we fall with him in his first transgression. If he professes to believe that "the corruption of our whole nature, commonly called original sin," is, "both in itself and in all the motions thereof, truly and properly sin," he is not to be allowed to teach that there is no sin but the voluntary transgression of known law, and that a man's original sin is his own first voluntary violation of God's law. It is well known that adopting standards of doctrine is apt to become an empty form. Rationalists in Germany adopted the Augsburg Confession; Socinians in Geneva adopted Calvin's Catechism; men of all shades of doctrine, from Romanism to Pelagianism, subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles. This is against

the conscience of Old-school Presbyterians, and they are determined never to sanction such modes of subscription.

If men were only calm and candid, they would see that there are only two methods of reunion, honest or honourable, between the Old and New-school churches. The one is, that we, by an alteration of our Constitution regularly effected by a vote of three-fourths of the Presbyteries, should agree to allow all the forms of doctrine hitherto tolerated in the New-school body. This Dr. Beatty, Dr. Shedd, and every member of the late General Assembly said, cannot, and ought not to be done. The other is, that the New-school should adopt our principles, and require the doctrines of the Confession to be adopted in the form in which they are therein stated. This is the ground which their representatives assumed in the Philadelphia Convention, but which the New-school Assembly in adopting Dr. Hickok's report, unanimously renounced.\* What their Presbyteries will do, remains to be seen. As we said in our January number, the responsibility rests on the New-school. The Old-school are in fact agreed on the doctrinal basis—not that proposed by the Joint Committee, but that basis as modified and interpreted by the Assembly. It is sheer madness to attempt to rush the Committee's basis through the Presbyteries, by all the devices of political campaigning; and worse than madness to attempt to accomplish that object by representing those who oppose that basis as opposed to reunion on all terms; and by endeavouring to persuade the Presbyteries that they must vote for the Committee's basis, or give up reunion. The course for the Presbyteries is perfectly simple and honest. Vote against the basis, and state clearly the ground on which they are willing to stand. Then the responsibility will rest, where it properly belongs, on the New-school body. We are willing to unite on the basis of our common standards, without explana-

\*The Rev. George Hill, in the *Presbyterian Banner*, June 24th, states that Dr. Hickok said that "As they (the New-school) regarded the basis as binding them to tolerate the Old-school doctrine of immediate imputation, so they regarded it as binding us to tolerate—well (said he) to give it a definite form—Taylorism." This, to be sure, adds nothing to what he said in his report to the New-school Assembly. It is merely confirmatory. It need hardly be said that no honest Old-school man can vote for the basis on that understanding.

tions. If they are willing to take that ground, well and good. If not, the fault is their's and not our's.

With regard to the answer to the protest, we would respectfully submit, in the first place, that it does not meet, or even notice, the principal objections therein urged. It does not attempt to show that the first article, containing the doctrinal basis, is not vague and indefinite, or that it is not ambiguous. This indeed could not be done, because there had been read before the Assembly the interpretation of that article adopted by the New-school Assembly, which our Assembly unanimously repudiated. It was, therefore, known and admitted by every member of the body that the doctrinal basis was understood in one way by our Assembly, and in a different way by the Assembly of the other body. This overwhelming objection to its adoption, the Answer does not condescend to notice.

In the second place, it undertakes to show that the errors specified in the protest were not, and could not be, tolerated in the New-school Church. We presume this assertion struck every member of the Assembly with astonishment. The fact was and is notorious. It had been admitted over and over on the floor of the Assembly. It was admitted by Dr. Darling, representative of the New-school body, in his address; it is acknowledged by the authors of the answer itself, though they say only in "exceptional cases." It was moreover affirmed by leading New-school men in the public papers, and claimed as a right by New-school Presbyteries. These doctrines are taught with the greatest clearness in books published by the New-school Committee, and over the names of some of their most prominent men. The assertion, therefore, that they have not been, and are not now tolerated in that Church, created the utmost surprise. The argument in support of this assertion is still more extraordinary. The position that the errors specified "are consistent with the Calvinism of the Confession of Faith," is declared to be "self-stultifying and absurd." It is said that for a church to adopt the Westminster Confession and yet insist that "the distinguishing doctrines of Pelagianism and Arminianism" "are to be tolerated in a Calvinistic body, is too much for human belief. The entire history of the church does not present such a phenomenon as that of a denomination

adopting before the world a definite type of doctrine, and at the same time claiming that exactly the contrary type of doctrine is compatible with it, and must be tolerated in its communion"! How is it that the authors of this answer forgot that the Rationalistic Lutherans of Germany signed the Augsburg Confession; that the clergy of Geneva continued to profess faith in their Calvinistic symbols long after they were avowedly Socinians; that the Heidelberg Catechism continued the Confession of the Reformed Churches in Germany and of Holland, while a large body of the ministers were Pantheists and Deists; that the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in this country, with their Calvinistic creed, tolerate all forms of doctrine higher than Socinianism; that the Church of Scotland, with the Westminster Confession, was for generations in the hands of the "moderates," who openly derided the doctrines of that Confession. How then can it be said to be impossible and absurd that a church professing Calvinism should tolerate doctrines incompatible with that system? The authors of this answer pronounce the theology of Dr. Taylor of New Haven to be Pelagian, yet they know that he signed a strictly Calvinistic creed, and professed to be a Calvinist to the day of his death. We do not see the wisdom or utility of controverting admitted and unquestionable facts. It is a fact, beyond all dispute, that the errors specified in the protest are taught without let or hinderance in the New-school body; and if, as they understand them, the proposed terms of union bind us to tolerate all the forms of doctrine which they tolerate, they bind us to tolerate those errors. The only way in which we can reconcile this part of the answer with the self-respect of its authors, is that they make a distinction in their own minds between sanctioning and tolerating, and that it is the former and not the latter which they intend to deny. But it is to be remembered that the protest does not charge the New-school with sanctioning but simply with tolerating the errors in question. This distinction is entirely overlooked in the second paragraph of the answer.

It is there said, "The Auburn Convention, held in 1837, under the influence and doctrinal guidance of that excellent and sound divine, the late Dr. Richards, specified sixteen doc-

trinal errors, which contain the very same latitudinarian and heretical tenets mentioned in the protest, rejected them *in toto*, and set over against them sixteen 'true doctrines' which embrace all the fundamentals of the Calvinistic creed." In reference to this statement, we would remark, 1st. That the Auburn Declaration, as we understand, is identical with the doctrinal statement included in the protest presented by the New-school minority in the Assembly of 1837 against the testimony against certain errors set forth by that body. That statement was written, as has always been publicly asserted without contradiction, not by Dr. Richards, but by Dr. Duffield, recently deceased. 2. We demur to the statement as to the satisfactory character of that "Declaration." 3. It matters not how orthodox that Declaration may be. There is no more difficulty in reconciling the adoption of that declaration and the toleration of the specified errors, than the adoption of the Westminster Confession with such toleration. The question is not, What the New-school believe or profess? but, What do they tolerate? The Episcopal Church professes the Thirty-nine Articles, but it tolerates almost every form of doctrine. The men in the New-school whom we personally know, who are the most orthodox in their own convictions, are the most strenuous in demanding toleration for those who differ from them. This appeal, therefore, to the Auburn Declaration amounts to nothing. It affords no proof that the errors specified in the protest are not freely allowed in the New-school church.

Again, the answer says, "That the allegation of this protest is unfounded, is proven by the fact that the New-school church have adopted by a unanimous vote, the basis of doctrine presented by the Joint Committee." What does this prove, when the New-school Assembly officially declares that it understands that basis as providing for the free tolerance of every form of doctrine which the New-school has hitherto allowed.

Again, the answer says, "This Assembly emphatically holds up to the church and to the world that it receives into its ministry and membership those who adopt 'the system of doctrine taught in our Confession,' and it never has held, and does not now hold, that its ministers or members shall 'view, state, or explain' that system in any other than the words of the Holy

Scripture and our standards; and to show that this is the sentiment not only of the Assembly, but of the protesters themselves also, the Assembly here cites the testimony of one of the signers of the protest, whose words have been referred to in the discussions just closed. Says Dr. Hodge." Then follows an extended extract from the report of the "Remarks of Dr. Hodge in the Philadelphia Convention." It is a great gratification to us that the Assembly, in adopting the answer to the protest, endorses the ground taken by Dr. Hodge in the Philadelphia Convention. We believe it to be the true ground. Let the basis of doctrine be the Confession and Catechisms without note or comment; and require that the doctrines should be adopted in the form therein stated. For ourselves we should be willing to license, or ordain any candidate for the ministry, (so far as his orthodoxy is concerned,) who would intelligently and cordially answer in the affirmative the several questions in the Shorter Catechism. As much as this we believe the Church is bound in conscience and good faith to demand. More than this it were unreasonable to require.

In another paragraph of the answer, it is said, "The authors of the protest assert that the doctrinal errors specified by them 'have been taught in some of the theological seminaries of *our land.*' This is not the proper manner in which to affix so grave and damaging a stigma upon our New-school Presbyterian brethren. The authors of this protest ought to have made this allegation, not in the way of insinuation, but by distinct assertion and proof." This statement was heard with painful surprise. The protest gives no excuse for this misrepresentation. It had been mentioned in the discussion on the floor of the Assembly, that New-school men had stated in the public papers that their Presbyteries freely received students from Andover and New Haven holding the doctrines taught in those institutions. In obvious reference to that statement, the protest says, speaking of the specified errors, "They have been taught in some of the theological seminaries of our land. Students from those seminaries, professing those errors, are freely admitted into the New-school Presbyteries." Here is no reference, or allusion, expressed or implied, to the Seminaries of the New-school church. Covert insinuations is the last thing that can be justly charged against the authors of the protest.

There is only one other remark we have to make on this answer, and that is one of grateful acknowledgment. It unequivocally denounces the doctrines specified in the protest as "Pelagian and Arminian," and declares them to be entirely inconsistent with the system of doctrine taught in our standards; and that they ought not to be, and cannot be allowed in any Calvinistic body faithful to its creed. As the answer was written by such men as Drs. Shedd, Monfort, and Prime, and adopted by the Assembly as its own, it is an authoritative exhibition of the sense of the Old-school body, in all its branches, as to what is to be the principle of subscription in the united church, should the contemplated union be consummated.

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## SHORT NOTICES.

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*The Imperial Bible Dictionary, Historical, Biographical, Geographical and Doctrinal; including the Natural History, Antiquities, Manners, Customs, and Religious Rites and Ceremonies mentioned in the Scriptures, and an Account of the several Books of the Old and New Testament. Edited by the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Author of "Typology of Scripture," "Commentary on Ezekiel," &c. Illustrated by numerous Engravings. London: Blackie & Sons, Paternoster Row; and Glasgow and Edinburgh, 1867. Vol. I. pp. 1007. Vol. II. pp. 1152.*

This is a truly magnificent work, in its design and execution. It is an imperial octavo as to size; printed in clear type, in double columns, illustrated by nearly thirty fine steel engravings, and several hundred well executed wood cuts. The scope of the work is indicated in the extended title-page printed above. The learned and distinguished editor has been assisted in this laborious enterprise by the most distinguished biblical scholars of Great Britain, whose initials are attached to the articles they severally contributed. The work is, therefore, a storehouse of biblical knowledge; a library condensed into a couple of volumes. In this age of the multiplication of books devoted to the illustration of the Scriptures, it is of great moment that they should, as in the present instance, be under the control of gifted men, in whose soundness in the faith and reverence for the Divine word the church has a well-grounded confidence. We hope that the attention of our

American publishers will be directed to the circulation in this country of a work which has so many claims on the religious public.

*Nearing Home.* Comforts and Counsels for the Aged. Compiled for the Board of Publication. Philadelphia: Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 464.

This is a collection of pieces in prose and verse, the poetry greatly predominating, adapted, as the title indicates, for those advanced in life.

*Helena's Household.* A Tale of Rome in the First Century. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 580 Broadway. 1867. Pp. 422.

This is an interesting and instructive book, designed as an exhibition of Christian life during the early age of the church. The great success of the works of this class by the author of the Schönberg-Cotta Family, has encouraged other writers to cultivate the same inviting field. These works are equally instructive as vehicles of historical and religious knowledge.

*Catholic Orthodoxy and Anglo-Catholicism, a Word about Intercommunion between the English and the Orthodox Churches.* By J. J. Overbeck, D. D. London: Trübner & Co., 60 Paternoster Row. 1866.

The ground taken in this work is antagonistic both to popery and protestantism, and especially to protestantism as now concrete in the Anglican Church. His standard and ideal church is the Eastern. That has orthodoxy without taint of heresy or schism. Among essentials of orthodoxy, are the authority of the church as paramount to the Scripture, and its authoritative interpreter, the consequent infallibility of the church, and such an intercommunion of saints as involves invocation of those that are dead. The Anglican church is destitute of these, and therefore of orthodoxy. Hence, it is severed from the church-catholic as a dead branch. Moreover its very non-communication with the other branches of the church is fatal. All insulation is death. Hence, the Romish church though orthodox on the subject of infallibility, invocation of saints, etc., is fatally vitiated. It has torn and insulated itself from the other branches of the church-catholic by its assertion of the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome. The primacy of the Roman Bishop may be admitted, but his divine supremacy is a doctrine at once heretical and schismatic. Hence popery is to be condemned.

The book is mainly addressed to the Church of England. It maintains it to be the duty and safety of that body to regain its lost orthodoxy on the forementioned subjects, and to seek reunion with the Eastern church. This also is the true goal



for the Roman church. He analyzes with much shrewdness and keenness the Broad, the Evangelical, and High Church parties in the Anglican bodies. He derisively names them respectively the Latitudinarian, the Platitudinarian, and the Attitudinarian parties. While his criticisms are often just and lively, of course the main drift of his book is wide of the truth. It needs no refutation here. But it shows considerable learning, theological insight, and polemical force. It gives much information touching the Eastern church, or the intellectual stand-point of its adherents. It is withal racy and readable beyond the average run of polemical publications.

*Discussions in Theology.* By Thomas H. Skinner, Professor in Union Theological Seminary. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1868.

The venerable author has given us a new edition of the collection of miscellanies first published in various periodicals, which appeared in a volume, if we mistake not some years since. Though mostly theological, as the title indicates, they are not exclusively so. Among the most valuable are the two articles on "Preparation for preaching," and "Delivery in preaching." We know not where else so many precious thoughts on these subjects can be found in so short a space. Of the three chief forms of preparation—memorizing, reading from a manuscript, and extemporizing *after a full and self-possessed mastery of the subject*—he greatly prefers the last. So do we, and we think the church is drifting more and more towards this view.

Of the theological articles two have specially arrested our attention—those on the Atonement and on Impotence of Will. We are glad to read, "we ground the necessity for an atonement, under the circumstances supposed, in the perfection of the Divine Nature, and the necessity that God always acts worthily of himself. Sin calls for punishment, and God cannot disregard the demand; cannot—if it be necessary that the Deity retain the glory of his nature inviolate. Of this the proof is in itself. The difference between good and evil, holiness and sin, is essential and immutable, and to this difference no upright being can be insensible." He thus takes the true starting-point for this doctrine, rooting it in the eternal and immutable rectitude and justice of God. This is wholly at war with the governmental scheme, which makes it wholly a governmental expedient. Although we do not find Dr. Skinner so accurate in all the detailed unfolding of the doctrine, as in its fundamental principle, and although, as an advocate of indefinite or universal atonement, he falls into some of the reasonings and expressions which belong to the governmental

theory, yet, as he starts from the true stand-point, so his whole tone is higher and more scriptural than that of most writers on that side.

In regard to impotence of the will, he styles the "will not a real cannot." He tells us, "the question has been asked, 'can man regenerate himself?' This is asking whether man can do a work proper to God, or whether that which is begotten and born of God may also be begotten or born of man. Man has *no power of any kind*, directly to regenerate himself. . . . The work of regeneration is no more his work than his generation or creation. For this work man has no natural power." So say we. If all had said thus, the Presbyterian church, in our opinion, would never have been divided. If all or nearly all now say it, and handle other doctrines accordingly, the most serious obstacle to genuine and lasting reunion on the basis of our Confession pure and simple is removed.

*Scriptural Baptism defended, and Anabaptist Notions Proved to be Anti-Scriptural Novelties.* By John Levington. Fourth Edition. Philadelphia Methodist Book Room, 1018 Arch street. S. W. Thomas, Agent.

This book is characterized by a pith and force of argument which the title-page foreshadows. The writer does not stand on the defensive merely, but moves directly upon the enemy's works. It is an excellent volume for circulation in regions where pastors and flocks are annoyed by anabaptist tactics, which often for a time mislead the unstable and unwary. We, of course, do not intend to endorse the Arminian theology which occasionally is interwoven with the author's defence of infant baptism.

*A Manual of the Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.* By John C. Lowrie. New York: William Rankin, Jr., 23 Centre street. 1868.

The need has long been felt of such a complete summary, or rather repository, of information concerning the whole mission field, work and history of our church, as this seasonable and well prepared volume contains. It concludes with a brief enumeration of the unevangelized nations, and of the various Protestant missions. Its preparation could not have fallen into better hands.



