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Art. I.—*Truth, Charity, and Unity.*

Truth is either the reality of things, or such a representation in thought, word, or other signs of thought, as correctly sets forth such reality. To say that the human soul is made for truth as its formal object, its aliment and life, is only saying that it is intelligent and rational. To say that it is not preconformed to the truth, and to apprehend and enjoy it, is to declare it unintelligent, irrational, sottish, brutish. It then feeds on, and is governed by delusions, shams, unrealities. And in so far as human minds, singly or collectively, have lost the love and relish for truth, or incline to accept and obey untruths, they have fallen from their normal uprightness and integrity into depravity and blindness. God made man upright, but he hath sought out many inventions. He has so swerved from his high estate, as to turn reason, his crown and glory, into a minister of unreason, which is his degradation and shame. Madness is in the hearts of the sons of men, for they are fully set in them to do evil. They hate the light and refuse to come to the light, because their deeds are evil. Hence man's only true rectitude, and true well-being, lie in knowing, believing, loving, obeying, living the truth. All iniquity begins and ends in believing and acting lies. A life

of sin and unbelief is but a living, concrete, incarnated lie. These propositions are their own evidence. And if they were not, infallible authority implicates all sin with deceit and blindness. It tells us of "all deceitfulness of unrighteousness in them that perish, because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause shall God send them a strong delusion that they should believe a lie; that they all might be damned that believe not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." 2 Thess. ii. 10, 11, 12.

According to the definition with which we started, truth has objective being and validity, independent of the percipient mind. The only exception to this is, the acts or states of the mind itself—and these only before or during, but not after their occurrence. If the mind has once had any thought, feeling, purpose, any act or state, no subsequent act, apprehension, or conviction can alter it. And beyond this, no view or thought of our minds can alter or modify anything, or the truth in respect to anything. All the flippant talk and pretension, so common in some quarters, about given propositions being true to him who holds, maintains, or professes them; that error is truth to him who believes so, whatever it may be to others, is worse than puerile. Truth is intrinsic and immutable, whether we accept it or not. The contrary of it, by whomsoever accepted, is false. His thinking it true cannot make it true, however inconvenient the consequences. If one leaps over a precipice, or down Niagara, it does not help him that he supposed the law of gravitation would pause in its action. If any believe there is no God, no Christ, no Holy Ghost, no redemption, no judgment, no heaven, no hell, this alters nothing. It does not annihilate them. If by faith he does not find them true for his salvation, by unbelief he will find them true for his perdition.

There is, however, a just sense in which the word truth is used subjectively: not for the standard or representation of reality; but for conformity to that standard in word, life, and action, particularly in our communications to others. In this sense we speak of men of truth, meaning men who live and act and speak the truth, especially the latter, *i. e.*, veracity.

Taken on every side, truth is the object, source, standard, measure, and conformity to it is the sum and essence, of all excellence, intellectual, moral, and spiritual. It is only in knowing, loving, and obeying the truth that a rational substance finds its true and proper being and development, felicity and glory. All deflection from, or loss of, the truth, is for it abnormity, debasement, and perdition. Hence the Absolute Perfection of any being is his Absolute Truth. The root of all God's moral perfection is that he is infinite in truth, of which he is the prime source, standard, and norm. And the summation and climax of the glories of Him who hath a name above every name, and embodies every human and divine excellence, lie in this, that He is the Truth. As the Eternal Word, he evermore articulates in creation, providence, and redemption, the truth to the intelligent universe. His glory as the Only Begotten of the Father, is that he is full of grace and Truth.

It is then a first principle that all goodness supposes fealty to the truth, as its ground, essence, and fruit; and that all depravity begins and ends in treason to the truth. What then are our chief obligations to the truth?

Comprehensive of all else is the supreme love of it, involving of course the paramount desire to know and obey it. This does not imply impossibilities. It does not imply in a rightly regulated mind a desire to attain that Omniscience which is the exclusive prerogative of the Infinite Mind. But it does imply a desire to know the truth on all subjects about which we know and think, or ought to know and think anything. It does not aspire to the *omne scibile.* But it abhors all falsehood, and dreads all error and delusion in regard to any subject, and especially any on which it ought to have genuine knowledge. This includes a supreme desire to know the truth on all matters requisite for our guidance in our duties to God and man, in our various stations and relations; including first, religion; secondly, morality; thirdly, our special vocation. All need, and ought to seek, essentially the same light in regard to the two former, the principles of which are essentially the same for all men of every age and nation. The last varies endlessly with the special occupations and responsibili-

ties of individual persons. The only law here is, that we seek to know the truth in respect to whatever we have cause to know, or think, or teach, or say, or do anything whatsoever. Nor are we to seek truth here or elsewhere, merely in its utilitarian aspects or on utilitarian grounds. It is to be sought for its own sake, as in itself inestimably precious. All truth and knowledge are in themselves beyond price. The possession of them is in itself a high endowment of the soul, which expands, sublimes, and irradiates it. It is the search for truth, as such, that discovers it, and with it, its uses. And this search is a grand moral and intellectual gymnastic. Ignorance starves, error poisons, truth nourishes and invigorates the soul —especially truth in regard to God, immortality, revelation, and redemption.

But even in regard to that religious truth, the knowledge of which is incumbent upon all, various degrees of fulness and exactness of knowledge are demanded, according as we are called simply to practise and live it, or beyond this to teach it, or beyond this withal, to teach and train the teachers of it. Whoever assumes to practise any of the learned or skilled professions, and to make prescriptions for the souls or bodies or estates of men, without some due knowledge therefor, rushes unbidden into responsibilities to which he is unequal, and perpetrates a fraud upon all whom he induces to trust his counsel.

The love of the truth evinces itself, 1. In earnestness, or a profound sense of its inestimable value, and of the correlative obligation to acquire, maintain, and propagate it. "Buy the truth and sell it not." Buy it at any price. Sell it not at any cost. Such is the language of all true souls. No upright mind can be indifferent to the truth or disparage its importance. To be so, is to abnegate both reason and faith, and deny its own intelligent nature. Without earnestness, morality and religion are phantoms, and character has no back-bone. He who has no zeal for the truth, particularly moral and religious truth, zeal to know, to uphold, inculcate and disseminate it, wants the first elements of soundness and substance of character. He who says truth, error, falsehood, are all one to him, does thereby proclaim himself an outlaw, a scoundrel,

"a liar from the beginning." He who says, as a meteoric revolutionist in theology once said, "he can accept as many creeds as are offered him," proclaims, if he knows what he says, not his liberality, but his utter scepticism and unbelief in religion, or else his simple idiocy and madness. It is the same as saying that we can believe a thing is and is not at the same moment, and swallow contradictions, truth and lies with equal relish. He who says,

> **For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,**
> **He can't be wrong whose life is in the right,**

does thereby avow his contempt for all faith, for all truth determining his modes of faith, and for all life inspired by such faith, and shaped by such truth. And yet there is such a thing as bigotry into which earnestness may degenerate. Indeed, bigotry is simply zeal for certain sentiments, so blind, narrow, distorted, shrunken, ossified, that it is no longer zeal for truth, but zeal for sect or self, shibboleth or party. In order that earnestness may not fossilize itself into such an odious counterfeit, it must be tempered with candour. We therefore say:

2. That the supreme love of the truth begets and evinces itself in candour, or openness to all light and evidence which more perfectly manifest the truth, and a readiness to give them all just weight. It is evident that he who wants this, wants the supreme love of the truth. And this is the true antidote to all bigotry, which is the stubborn and blind adherence to some false dogma or set of dogmas; or an extravagant magnifying of their importance, if true; or a refusal duly to appreciate other views and systems, their evidences and merits. The bigot, even if holding the truth, virtually turns it into error by obstinately closing his eyes to the evidence of other and correlate truths, which he denies. He is so afraid for the little angle or segment of truth he holds, that he dare not let in upon himself the light which would reveal other truths equally important, lest it should somehow damage or belittle what he does hold. In short, he is afraid of light, lest it should dispel his darkness. Hence, if he be a creature of life and feeling, he is apt to be bitter, intolerant, and uncharitable towards such as differ from him. He sticks in the mere shell of traditional or

partisan views, without candidly weighing and testing these and antagonistic views in the light of Scripture and reason. And he is uncomfortable when any light is offered which might expose the weakness of his position. Bigotry, therefore, is inconsistent with fealty to truth, and both it and fanaticism are the sure offspring of the want of candour in receiving and weighing evidence of truth.

Fanaticism is vehement and passionate devotion to some error, or, what is very much the same, to some truth exclusive of other truths which surround and qualify it. Such extravagant ardour in behalf of one idea, even if true, regardless of related ideas and truths which bound and modify it, is often the worst form of error, and developes that ultraism so common in this country, where the "abundance of the thing has originated the word." It sometimes has the poison of bigotry in it, although the latter is often passionless, and free from the intemperate and virulent heat, which ever and anon inflames fanaticism, and drives it rough-shod over the most sacred truths, obligations, and affections. Fanaticism usually thrives most in crowds, (*circum fana*) amid the excitement of numbers, the overbearing current of phrenzied, popular, or partisan feeling, goading men often to sacrifice to some overmastering passion, principles which they have always counted sacred. Its very nature, like bigotry, is hostile to the love of truth, above which it exalts self and party, shibboleth and hobby.

Bigotry and fanaticism beget all uncharitableness, which is equally hostile to the love of the truth. Hence,

3. Another element in the love of the truth is charity. This is equidistant from an undiscriminating indifference to truth on the one hand, and that bigotry, fanaticism, and intolerance, which mistake some little fragment for the whole, erect minima into maxima, and molehills into mountains. Charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in the truth," and cannot be indifferent or otherwise than earnest to know, maintain, and propagate it. But charity, while intolerant of error, in proportion to its magnitude, is kind and tender towards the errorist. It strives to take the most favourable view of his case; to find some explanation of his aberrations consistent with his moral integrity. In short, it "believeth all things, hopeth all things,

endureth all things" as regards the errorist, while not sparing his error. It "suffereth long and is kind, envieth not, vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up."

Another great office of charity and candour united, is justly to estimate the relative importance of given truths and their contrary errors—to avoid alike exaggerating or underrating them. Bigotry and fanaticism transgress on either side. They belittle great things, and magnify the little—tithe mint, anise, and cummin, and neglect the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith. But perhaps there is no sphere in which mistake and obliquity of judgment are easier or more common. That may be little in itself, which is great by reason of its relations, surroundings, and implications. A tooth is a very insignificant part of an animal; yet it is in some cases so characteristic and essential, that Cuvier was able from a single tooth to reproduce the skeleton of an extinct species. The mouth, the nose, the eyes, the tongue, the throat, the lungs, the brain in man, are severally very small parts of his body; but they are essential, some of them to life, some to articulate speech, or other functions of intelligence, all of them to an unmaimed and unmarred humanity. Can we say as much for the nails or hair, for leanness or corpulency, the little finger or toe? The pins of a frame are the least in magnitude, and yet far more essential to its strength than some of the heavier joists and studs. The law of the Lord is perfect. Hence our Lord will sooner let heaven and earth pass away, than one jot or tittle thereof fail. God, Christ, faith, love, repentance, regeneration, sin, grace, &c., are single words, mostly monosyllables. And yet, undeniably our eternity hangs on our relation to these, and each of them, and that in their true meaning. There is such a thing as sticking in the letter which killeth, to the loss of the Spirit which giveth life. There may be a great tenacity of the mere letter of a creed, without insight of its true meaning and scope as intended by its framers. And yet the Arian controversy is proof that a single iota may be so placed as to make all the difference between holding the supreme divinity and the mere creaturehood of our Lord Jesus Christ. Here then is a fundamental article of Christianity depending on the difference between *ὁμοούσιος* and *ὁμοιοούσιος*.

How much more is immediately involved here than in the by no means unimportant controversy between sublapsarian and supralapsarian? or, between those trinitarians who do, and do not accept the eternal generation or filiation of the Son? And do not such things even go more to the marrow of Christianity than the mode of baptism or exclusive singing of Rouse's version?

But still farther, candour and charity make a broad distinction between the importance of the knowledge and belief of certain doctrines to the private Christian, or as conditions of admission to the Lord's table; and the same regarded as qualifications for office in the church, particularly the sacred ministry. Ignorance and error in many things may and must be tolerated in private Christians, which are intolerable in those who are "set for the defense of the gospel," and must be "apt to teach" it, "able to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints." One may have piety which gives a right to the sacraments, who is too full of ignorance and error to be fit for the ministry. Although he may not directly reject any doctrine, the acceptance of which is immediately essential to salvation, he may reject or ignore those which the Scriptures teach, and which are essential to the spiritual prosperity and fullest growth, if not to the salvation of the soul; or which are essential to the logical consistency, the effective defense, and the permanent preservation of fundamental Christian doctrines. And it is no breach of charity to insist on some of these points in ministers, even though not exacted of private Christians, or made a ground of disallowing the ministerial standing of those in other communions who do not accept them. In the illustrations which follow, it is not meant of course that all shortcoming in any single doctrine should necessarily be a bar to licensure and ordination; but the clear rejection of the whole, or even of some chief parts of them is a very different matter.

Thus, if we take the doctrine of imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity as the ground of their condemnation, and their consequent abandonment to sin and misery, degradation and perdition, which some have flippantly styled "imputed nonsense," no one would judge belief in it essential to salvation.

Christ may be received without it. Yet the Bible clearly asserts that, "by the offence of one, (judgment came) upon all men to condemnation," and that "the judgment was by one to condemnation." Thus only can the race have had any probation before its fall, by being tried in the trial of its first progenitor and representative. Thus alone can the tremendous evils to which it is born have any ground in sin as their meritorious cause, or be due to anything but the mere sovereignty of God. Thus alone can the undeniable facts of our fallen state be relieved, not of all mystery indeed, but of dire perplexities that thicken and lower upon any human hypothesis. So in rejecting Imputation, one of the firmest scriptural and rational supports of the doctrine of original sin is cast away. Not only so. But if the idea of imputation carries the absurdities which its adversaries charge, then a serious blow is given to the Scriptures themselves, which are full of imputation, word and thing. And not only so, but logically and by immediate consequence this overthrows justification by the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer. For first, this result of necessity follows, if the very idea of imputation is absurd. And secondly, Rom. v. 12, *et seq.*, expressly and manifoldly asserts a similitude between the manner of our condemnation through Adam's sin, and our justification through Christ's obedience and righteousness. And if not justified through Christ's righteousness, all that remains is our own righteousness—which let him trust who will, and who dare! Nor are these logical consequences averted, they are rather necessitated by mediate imputation, as it is called, substituted for the *im*mediate imputation of Adam's sin. For the gist of this mediate scheme is that Adam's sin is imputed because, as fallen and sinning, we virtually sanction and endorse it, and so incur its guilt through our personal sin. This does not explain the fall of our race by a probation in Adam, the issue of that probation in his sin as our representative, and the consequent imputation of that sin to his posterity, as the judicial ground of their loss of Divine favour and lapse into sin and misery. But it explains the fall of the race by the personal fall of each individual through a sovereign divine constitution. And as, according to Rom. v. 12, *et seq.*, the manner of justification by

the obedience and righteousness of Christ is one with that of their condemnation for Adam's sin—if this is on account of their own antecedent sin, then their justification through Christ's righteousness is on account of their own antecedent righteousness. This subverts the whole gospel system of salvation by the alone merits of Christ. Hence the reason why imputation even of Adam's sin, if not essential to piety, or even to the substance of evangelical preaching, is essential to the integrity of any theological system which long preserves intact the materials of such preaching, the truth as it is in Jesus. Hence its prominence in the great Reformation symbols and theology.

So again, on a superficial view, it may seem a tenuous and shadowy question whether the native dispositions of the soul are not only corrupt, but sinful and guilty—or whether the feelings and desires that prompt volition, or dispositions lying back and causative of acts, have moral quality, and consequent merit or demerit. But it is of the most immediate and profound practical moment. It touches the very springs of experimental religion. For this goes as deep as, but not below, our moral nature and character. If only volitions or purposes have moral character, then religious experience does not go beyond these. It does not reach the feelings, desires, dispositions, "heart." This is the logical consequence of the dogmas that sin, holiness, moral character, pertain only to acts. It exiles religion from the heart, its proper seat, out of which are the issues of life. And the logical is always tending to be the practical result of any doctrine which is permanently and widely accepted. This case has been no exception. The question of ability is of equal moment. If man is able *propriis viribus* to do and be all that the gospel requires, all that is involved in true Christian piety, then true Christian faith, love, holiness, involve no more than man unaided by the Holy Spirit can do, which is certainly contrary to the uniform and most express testimony of Scripture. This doctrine of plenary ability therefore lowers the whole standard of piety by inevitable logic. And here, as elsewhere, theory must in due time become practice. Much is said in some quarters of moral inability, under which term a great truth is expressed, while

a common perversion of it masks a great error. All ability and inability to discharge moral and spiritual duties are of course moral. They pertain to our moral nature or state. But some maintain that moral inability means simply a want of will, which the will can remove, and not also a want of power, which by his will the sinner is wholly unable to remove. It means not that he cannot, but only that he will not. This is using the term "moral inability" to mask ability, contrary to the Scriptures, to the creeds, the prayers, the experience of Christians. Those who do this are wont to contrast natural with moral ability and inability; to say that man is naturally able, but morally unable to obey the gospel. But such language is loose and misleading. There is here no necessary contrast between natural and moral. Man is at once naturally and morally depraved, and unable to deliver himself from his bondage to sin. This, however, has reference to his nature as depraved, not as originally created. He has whatever of power is involved in possessing the essential faculties of humanity, though in a depraved moral state, from which he is neither naturally nor morally able to deliver himself, until born again from above. The real question here is not whether one holds to a moral or natural, but whether he holds a real inability, irremovable except by Divine grace.

The same importance attaches to the difference between a real divine sovereignty, predestination, and election, and the view which in any manner makes the eternal purposes of God hinge on the foresight of faith, good works, or any choice and volitions of the creature. On the latter system God's whole government and providence over moral agents must be contingent on their choice and permission—and hence tend to anarchy and chaos, while his people owe it to themselves and not to God, that they differ from others. They have no security but their own strength for perseverance in holiness or the continued stability of heaven itself. What a foundation this for humility, gratitude, faith, hope, and assurance!

Were Christ's sufferings and death a true and proper satisfaction to Divine justice for the sins of God's people; a penal and substitutionary infliction in place of the punishment of the believer? Or was his death a mere governmental expe-

dient for the good of the universe, dictated by benevolence, a display of the Divine abhorrence of sin without punishing it, or having any regard whatever to distributive justice, as a municipal government destroys a house in order to save a city from conflagration? The former certainly is the scriptural representation, and accords with the deepest experience of God's people. The latter virtually obliterates the Divine justice, and radically changes our fundamental conceptions of sin, punishment, and reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ. It penetrates sooner or later to the very core of experimental piety.

Many other issues might be named of like moment in their logical and theological consequences, and ultimate practical tendencies. But these will suffice, and have been adduced because of the danger of their being now overlooked or underrated in great concerns in which they should have a commanding influence. Charity does not require, it forbids us to be indifferent to them. It does not permit us to erect them into terms of communion with those who otherwise give credible evidence of piety. But it does demand that we require in those that we induct into the office of teaching, or preaching, and defending Christianity, the recognition of the great truths on these subjects set forth in the Scriptures and our standards, while we fully recognize the unquestionable ministerial standing and brotherhood of those duly commissioned by other churches holding the Head, who do not see with us in these points. But while charity requires in the teachers and defenders of the Christian religion, a knowledge not only of the central citadel, but of the outworks of the system, it proceeds according to scriptural measure and within reasonable bounds. It does not insist on uniformity in small points, in things indifferent or unrevealed, or in mere philosophical explanations of things revealed. It cannot demand or permit any super-scriptural tests of righteousness in matters of morality, of civil government, or philosophy, which the Bible has placed among things indifferent. It may indeed be of the first importance whether one be Realist or Nominalist, whether he holds the philosophy of Locke, Reid, Berkeley, Edwards, Hamilton, or Kant. But unless as applied by its adherents, it involves con-

tradictions of Christian truth, not merely remote and inferential, but direct and immediate, it cannot without breach of charity be made a bar to ordination. It would be worse than puerile to make the relative length, or the rhetorical structure of prayers or sermons, singing with or without the aid of choirs and instruments, speculations as to the interior constitution of the Trinity, the questions whether human nature is a trichotomy or dichotomy, tests of ministerial standing in any communion. So of opinions on crude scientific theories, geological, ethnological, chronological, and all else the like, so long as they do not run to a positive denial of the authority or truth of Scripture or its doctrines.

Hence it appears, how superficial or irrelevant are some phrases current on this subject, which are plausible only to those who do not look through the sound to the sense. Says the *American Presbyterian Review* for January, 1868, p. 137, "We agree in the substantives but differ in the adjectives." Well, what then. Look at the following instances of such agreement—God is gracious, God is not gracious. God is three in one, God is not three in one. The Son of God is incarnate, the Son of God is not incarnate. The sufferings of Christ were penal and vicarious, they were not penal and vicarious. Scriptural church government is prelatical, it is not prelatical. Is not this agreeing in substantives and differing in adjectives? And is it not enough to show that all this may be without the possibility of organic or any other unity desirable as such unity is?

It is common to urge in behalf of complete organic union between those Christian bodies that are in earnest controversy on great doctrinal issues, that the points on which they agree are more important than those on which they differ. This is certainly and delightfully true of all who hold the Head, even Christ—who hold enough of saving truth to render salvation possible. It is true as relates to Presbyterians, Close-communion Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Congregationalists. And it is a ground for mutual recognition, fellowship, and manifold coöperation as Christians. But here the differences on minor points of external polity and rites, are obviously such as to preclude any present possibility of organic unity.

And between some of them doctrinal differences are important enough to render it unprofitable.

It is, however, said that the incorporation of these sects into one organic body, on the basis of teaching and preaching only the points in which they agree, to the exclusion of all in which they differ, would greatly augment the spiritual and evangelical power of the church, by concentrating it upon the very marrow of the gospel, those more important points in which they agree, unencumbered by the lesser points in which they differ. We earnestly long for that consummation when the points of difference may be so attenuated as to render this reasoning just. But that, for the present, it is the merest chimera, appears from the following considerations. 1. This provides for feeding souls with the *minima*, not the fulness and richness of saving truth. As the body may *live* on what is insufficient for its growth and strength, so the soul may *live* on what is insufficient for its spiritual thrift and vigour. 2. If things in which we differ from others are unimportant or injurious to be taught, why are they taught in the Scriptures, as we believe they are? Shall we presume to declare it useless, and worse than useless, to teach what God has revealed? 3. Shall we dare bind ourselves not to teach any part of that word, which God has charged us to preach, to shun to declare any part of "the whole counsel of God;" to refuse to teach *all* the things which Christ has commanded us to teach men to observe and do, in giving us the commission to preach the gospel? 4. The body can live with the arms and legs amputated. It can live upon bread and water only. Is such then the best condition of the body, or this most nutritious diet? And is it best, most nutritive to our souls, or conducive to the progress and triumph of the church, that the souls of men be fed with only so much of justification by faith alone as is common to us with Arminians and Pelagians? And is the normal and ideal church to be organized simply on the basis of the Apostles' Creed, as some contend, without note or comment, which Universalists cordially adopt? Surely all this is beyond the pale of argument and open questions.

Another great element in the love of the truth is consistency. This virtue involves the mutual harmony of our convic-

tions, professions, and practice. The love of the truth will strive to bring our whole being into conformity to itself. Nor will it be content that our principles, professions, or conduct should contradict the truth, which one or the other of them must do, if they contradict each other. Not only so, but consistency may have respect to the mutual relation of past and present opinions. Every upright man, as he desires to follow the truth, desires consistency between his past and present beliefs, because all truth is consistent with itself. Hence the proverb, "consistency is a jewel." But all consistency is to be discarded which is itself inconsistent with the supreme love of the truth, and with that candour which is open to all evidence that manifests the truth, even though it should disclose the error of our past opinions and the necessity of correcting them. A stubborn adherence to past beliefs against light and evidence, merely to avoid the charge of inconsistency, or the humiliation of change, is immoral and unchristian. No one can afford to claim infallibility like the Pope. No one can with a good conscience cling to his opinions from any motive lower than the love of the truth—or refuse to weigh evidence which bears against them. But we can hardly believe that any evidence can overturn intuitive self-evident truths, or the indubitable affirmations of God in his word.

And even in regard to doctrines less immediately obvious, the truly upright and consistent man will be slow to think them groundless, or to renounce them, while ready to give a fair consideration to any new evidence, or evidence before unobserved by him, to the contrary. He who is conscientious in the formation of his opinions, will look so carefully and thoroughly into their grounds, that he will not easily change them, or find them at fault. He who easily and often changes his opinions, or who changes them from any motives lower than the supreme love of the truth, is entitled to little weight, and little confidence among his fellow-men. He shows thus that he dare not trust himself. How then can he expect others to trust him? He is constantly undoing his own work and performing a process of self-negation. Unstable as water he shall not excel. True consistency is that alone which consists with and is regulated by a supreme love of the truth—equi-

distant from that trifling and volatility which are carried about by every wind of doctrine on the one hand, and from a blind and stubborn immobility against light and evidence on the other.

As already intimated, however, this view does not apply to axioms. Candour does not require us to listen to arguments to prove that two straight lines can enclose a space—that two bodies can occupy the same space at the same moment, that justice, kindness, veracity, fidelity, honesty are not obligatory, however there may be room for honest question as to the application of some of these truths. Nor does it apply to first and fundamental truths in religion, natural and revealed, which if not absolutely self-evident, are established by proofs so near it, that arguments against them deserve to be listened to, only for the purpose of refuting them, and by those whose duty it is to refute them. Such truths as the being of God, the Divine origin and authority of his word, the fall of our race, the reality and guilt of sin, the ruin of man, his need of salvation, the trinity, incarnation and redemption, the resurrection, judgment, heaven and hell, the true Christian can hardly consider open questions. This is quite a different class of doctrines from those which bear upon the nature of the relation of our sin to Adam's sin, the difference between supra and sublapsarian, moral and natural inability, the precise relation of the atonement to the elect and all mankind, the mutual relation of faith and repentance. Although there is truth, important scriptural truth on these subjects, yet it is less obvious, more within the sphere of legitimate debate and controversy, and of possible new light that may give riper views, than the obligation to love God. Any pride of consistency inconsistent with the supreme love of the truth is wicked.

Veracity necessarily flows from the love of the truth. This is adherence to truth in our communications to our fellow-men, whether in word or by other signs of thought. The rule here is that our communications to others should be true in the sense in which we believe they are understood at the time of making them by those to whom we are making them. This exhausts our obligation in the premises. If we do not believe them true in the sense in which we believe the other party

understands them to be true, at the time of making them, we are guilty of conveying to him a false impression with the design to deceive. This is the essence of a lie, which is a false representation made to another with the intent to deceive. If a true representation be made to another which is believed to be false, there is the intent, form, guilt, though not the matter of a lie. But if a false communication be made which is believed to be true, then there is the matter, but not the intent and form and guilt of a lie. While we are obliged to state only the truth, as we believe ourselves understood, we are not responsible for inferences which any may make from it, especially if he be an inquisitor into secrets which he has no right to extort. Our obligations to such terminate with telling them no falsehood. We may let out as little light upon them as we please, and leave them to make their own deductions from it. Parables, allegories, tales, and the like, do not infringe upon veracity, unless they involve deception and the intent to deceive. They are at times the most effective vehicles of truth to the mind, and the employment of them for this purpose is sanctioned by our Saviour's example. Feints in war are no violations of truth, because they do not purport or promise, either directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, to convey information to the enemy. The latter is responsible for whatever construction he puts upon them. But suppose a flag of truce violated. Such an act receives and merits the instant condemnation of mankind. These are not exceptions to the obligation to speak the truth whenever we profess to convey information to our fellow-men. Here the obligation is absolute, that "putting away lying every man speak truth with his neighbour." It is the indispensable condition of confidence between man and man. When "truth is fallen in the streets equity cannot enter. Yea, truth faileth, and he that departeth from evil maketh himself a prey." Universal distrust sets man against man, and destroys the ligaments of society. Social dissolution and anarchy supervene.

And if veracity is essential to all social order and peace in secular relations, much more is it indispensable to all mutual confidence and fellowship in the church. This is a truism that hardly needs stating. Surely a man cannot be at the same

time a Christian and a liar who hath his part in the lake of fire. And yet, while no Christian can consciously or designedly practice lying, there are grades of veracity among men whose piety we would not think of questioning. There are men who are delicate and exact in their discrimination between shades of truth and falsehood; and whose conscience will not permit them to be less than scrupulously accurate. Others are duller and slower to perceive such distinctions, and have less trouble of conscience about overlooking them in their statements. All observers of men, even good men, must have observed such differences. But perhaps they are nowhere among Christians more painfully observable than among heated polemics and controvertists. No class of Christian men need to be more on their guard against this infirmity, than those who are called to the defence of what they deem the truth—lest they be left to violate the truth, thinking thus to defend it. In no way are mutual confidence, fellowship, and unity more effectually impaired.*

An eminent branch of veracity is fidelity in keeping our

* A striking illustration is afforded in the last article of the *American Presbyterian Review*, for January, 1868, in the remarks of the writer upon the Article in this Journal for October, 1867, on Dr. Duffield's account of the theology of the New-school Presbyterians. The *American Presbyterian Review* assumes that our article claimed that *all* New-school Presbyterians hold Dr. Duffield's views, and that these views comprise every distinctive doctrine of Taylorism; and that it made other groundless claims, which, of course, it makes easy work of denying and ridiculing—but which it had no shadow of pretext or excuse for imputing to that article. What it did claim, and what, as yet, there has been no attempt to disprove, was, 1. That several doctrines attributed, as late as 1863, by Dr. Duffield to the New-school Presbyterians were antagonistic to Old-school Theology, and the Confession of Faith. 2. That some of them were the doctrines of Dr. Taylor. 3. That Dr. Duffield's Article was proof that the toleration of these doctrines was within the "historic sense" in which our common standards had been accepted in the New-school body, and must, therefore, be a part of the doctrinal basis in the united church then fixed upon by the Joint Committee. The article expressed the strong hope that "this doctrinal scheme does not predominate in that (the New-school) body now." The *American Presbyterian Review*, instead of refuting, or even stating, these positions, has chosen to direct its shafts at others of its own making—with no other effect than to stir a little of the *odium theologicum* which it charges upon us. How much such criticism will do to restore that "mutual confidence" which the reviewer justly insists upon as essential to a desirable reunion, is well worthy of his consideration.

word and fulfilling our promises. A promise is the voluntary raising of an expectation in the mind of another by words or other signs of thought, that the promiser will do or refrain from doing some given thing. Every promise not only incurs the ordinary obligation of veracity in our communications to others, but is still further binding, inasmuch as, in every lawful promise, we are able to make our statements true, and have created a right in the promisee to have them made true. As in the case of veracity, promises are binding in the sense in which the promiser believed the promisee to understand them at the time of making them. By common consent of mankind promises carry the most sacred obligation, and covenant-breakers are outlaws from society, and the enemies of their kind. Where no reliance can be placed upon promises each one becomes an Ishmaelite, his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him. The only circumstances that release the obligation of a promise are, first, the impossibility; secondly, the immorality of its performance; or thirdly, a release from the promisee. While impossibilities cannot be performed, yet if the impossibility were known, or, with reasonable care, might have been known at the time of promising it, there is sin in making such a promise which ought to be repented of. A promise to commit sin is better kept in the breach than the observance, else we have a short process for legitimating all iniquities. No one has a right to make, keep, or receive such a promise. The only duty of all parties to it, from first to last, is repentance. If promises are binding in the sense in which the promiser believed the promisee to understand them at the time of making them, then there can be no question in regard to one subject now agitating the nation, and, to its great disgrace and discredit, seriously disputed. We refer to the national obligation to pay its 5-20 bonds in coin. This subject is legitimately within our province, because it is not so much a matter of politics as of national morality. Corrupt and dangerous views on this subject are current among the people and politicians of both the great political parties. Whatever technical pleas may be founded on the omissions of the loan act, none are bold enough to deny that the agents and officers of the government gave the takers of the loan to understand that

it would be paid in coin; that Congress, the executive, and the country well understood this, and took no action to the contrary; that the loan would not have been taken upon any other understanding. According to every moral construction, therefore, the national faith is pledged to pay these loans in coin. Any refusal, or failure so to pay them, is consequently a breach of national faith. The more ingenious the pretexts on which the obligation is evaded, the more disastrous will be the consequences to the future credit, strength, and life of the nation.

This subject has applications both wide and obvious. Among them is the whole subject of trust-funds and endowments, given and accepted on certain conditions and for specific purposes. The moral is plainer even than the legal obligation of the trustee to abide by the compact. The class of trust-funds which more especially concern the church are those given to and accepted by her, or some of her organizations or members, for purposes of charity, and the promotion of truth and holiness, or the founding and support of her great educational or missionary institutions. The moral and Christian obligation to appropriate funds so given to the uses and upon the conditions for which they were given, is too clear to need argument. Funds given and accepted for the purpose of founding a Professorship of Divinity, conditioned that the incumbent shall teach orthodoxy and Trinitarianism, as in the case of the Hollis Professorship of Harvard, cannot be perverted to the teaching of Unitarianism, without a gross moral breach of trust, whatever may be adjudged by the civil courts. This has been the universal judgment of the Trinitarians of this country. So funds given and accepted by our Theological Seminaries, or by the General Assembly in their behalf, upon the condition, express or implied, that they shall be devoted to the inculcation of the doctrines of our Confession, as accepted by the Old-school Presbyterians, or that they shall be kept under the guardianship and administration of the Old-school Assembly, cannot be devoted to the support of contrary doctrines, or placed under the control of the adherents of contrary doctrines without a breach of faith. Nor does the mere consent of some donors always and of necessity release their donations, unless all parties consent. For there is a mutual

contract between them all as well as with the trustees. Each donor gives in view of the general conditions, which bind all, and the special conditions which each previous donor has annexed to his gifts. A release of and by all the donors, and by the trustee, may be sometimes required in order justly to release any. Any institution founded and endowed to sustain the Calvinistic system as stated in our formularies, cannot be perverted to teach contrary doctrines without a flagrant breach of trust.

The question, in what sense, or what degree of strictness creeds are binding upon those who subscribe or otherwise accept them is germane to this subject. The principles already laid down lead us to the accepted doctrine on this subject, viz., that they are binding *secundum animum imponentis—i. e.*, according to the intent of the church or ecclesiastical authority imposing the creed. If the acknowledged usage of a church demands a strict subscription and full acceptance of the articles of faith as stated in her formularies, then, unless the contrary is stated at the time, assent to them means all and singular the doctrines of the formulary, as therein stated. But if the usage of a church allows laxer terms of subscription, so that those holding opposite doctrines on some of its articles are nevertheless recognized by the church as accepting them, within her meaning and intent in imposing them, as in the strong case of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church, then this latitudinarian acceptance of them is not in bad faith, or the violation of any promise, however otherwise objectionable.

We are now prepared briefly to consider the relations of truth to unity in the church. Here we cannot improve, although we may explain, in itself and its applications, the grand old maxim attributed to Augustine, *In necessariis unitas, in non necessariis libertas, in omnibus charitas.* In essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity. The whole force of this depends on the word "essentials." Essential to what? The answer to this will disclose the corresponding liberty. Is it the truths that are essential, inasmuch as the belief of them is necessary, to Christian character? Then the correspondent unity only extends to this class of

truths, and it subsists between all real Christians of whatever name or organization. It is a unity in the essentials of Christianity, and holds between all partakers of the common salvation who themselves hold the Head, even Christ. This lays the foundation for mutual recognition, fellowship, and coöperation as Christians—having one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, even as they are called in one hope of their calling. Eph. iv. Of course liberty to differ in regard to all but the essentials of Christianity is consistent with this sort of unity. But, as all history and fact show, this degree of unity is compatible with differences which are utterly incompatible with unity of church organization—and even consists with a want of outward ordinances, ministry, sacraments, as among the Friends. It is needless to specify the familiar differences on church government, ordination, sacraments, the entire range of ecclesiology, which, while they continue, utterly preclude a complete organic union between Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians. In order to unity in church organization, therefore, far more things are necessary and essential than are essential to Christianity. Still, in ways innumerable, they may not only be "all one in Christ," but manifest their unity even in manifold forms of union and coöperation, organized and unorganized, in behalf of Christ, his cause, people, in works of faith and labours of love. Although in present ignorance and infirmity, complete organic ecclesiastical union is impracticable, "nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing."

But even where such ecclesiastical differences do not hinder organic unity, there may be doctrinal differences among adherents of the same polity and order which forbid complete organic union. The High and Low Church Episcopalians of this country are tending towards a separation on the ground of deep doctrinal differences. Each side profoundly earnest in its convictions of what the other denies, their organic unity forces constant and bitter contentions, which may be softened by separation, and the better opportunity it would afford for "endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." In like manner the Presbyterian Church was rent in

twain thirty years ago by similar causes, and with a visible growth of peace and unity between the two bodies ever since, till they are now earnestly negotiating to see if the way be clear for organic reunion. There are not only the doctrines essential to Christianity; but those which, being scriptural, are essential to the integrity, strength, defence, and conservation of the Christian system. Those who earnestly believe it essential to the due support of Christianity, that the doctrines of Calvinism as set forth in our Confession, should be preserved intact and entire as against opposing systems, cannot in conscience promote organic union on a basis which admits to the ministry those who reject these doctrines and espouse the contrary. While they may coöperate in other ways with Presbyterians of a different mind on this subject, they can hardly advocate founding an ecclesiastical organization which provides for a ministry who shall teach the contrary of what they believe essential to the integrity, fulness, and strength of the religion of the Bible, and of the doctrinal system of their symbols.

Moreover, what may not be essential on general grounds as a basis of mere ecclesiastical organization and unity, may in some cases be essential to it for the faithful administration of certain trusts which any branch of the church has accepted. If funds have been bestowed on the condition that they should be controlled by a body maintaining certain doctrines, then that body forfeits them if it consents to changes whereby these funds shall be administered in the interest of opposite doctrines. If the funds given during the last thirty years to institutions on the express condition that they should remain under the supervision of the Old-school Presbyterian General Assembly, and true to the doctrines of that church, then that church and those institutions cannot become antagonistic to these doctrines, without forfeiting the moral right to those funds. If they were given and accepted on the understanding that they should be devoted to that type of Christianity known as Old Calvinism, in opposition to Taylorism and the like, then it becomes essential to the moral right of the Assembly to retain these funds, that it should not organize or reorganize upon a basis that allows the advocates of these antagonistic systems

to control them. And on this further ground, it is essential to our moral integrity that doctrinal unity be required, not only to the extent of what is essential to Christianity, but of what is essential to the system known as Calvinism. This too, not as permitting whatever others say or think, is not inconsistent with what they mean by Calvinism or Reformed Theology, but as excluding what we and those who entrusted their funds, understood at the time of our accepting them, to be essential to the system set forth in our Confession.

Complete organic union can result in peace and edification only when it is founded on agreement in doctrine and polity in matters deemed by the parties essential to the integrity of the scriptural system. Such a union, first among all Presbyterians, and then among all Christians, is a consummation devoutly to be wished. We hail the signs which foretoken its near approach. But premature forcing of the form of outward unity, before a sufficient oneness of doctrinal and ecclesiastical principles has been attained, will only hinder and delay the real blessing we seek, and for which we trust God is preparing the way. It will give an Ishmael and not an Isaac, the real child of promise. For a union that is cemented by truth and love let us labour and pray without ceasing till all obstacles are overcome. And may God hasten it in his time!

Art. II.—*On the Study of the Mathematics as an Exercise of Mind:*—(Discussions on Philosophy, &c.,* Am. ed. pp. 257–324):—By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Prof. of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.

By all candid scholars, the just reputation of Sir William Hamilton for wide and accurate erudition is frankly acknowledged. His attainments in ancient and modern learning,—if we except the departments of Oriental languages, of mathematical and physical science, and technology,—have probably not been equalled since the days of the younger Scaliger. His

* This essay appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, as a reply to a pamphlet "On the Study of Mathematics," by the Rev. Wm. Whewell, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge.

writings are everywhere enriched with bounteous gleanings from almost every field of intellectual effort. A man armed at all points in the history and literature of the "questions of the ages," with a certain fondness for controversy, and wielding a trenchant and pitiless pen, few cared to become his adversaries in any discussion.

It may be for these reasons that, during his lifetime, no adequate reply seems to have been attempted to his criticisms, in the essay before us, upon the study of the mathematics. It is to be regretted that this was not done,—even, if possible, upon the line of defence (as against his main argument) which is held in the following pages, and which appears to develope itself under the very movement of his attack. For it would seem desirable,—if not in the interest of truth, at least for the satisfaction of the curious,—to have the fullest display to which his great ability was competent, of every point of strength in his own position, under the trial of actual conflict.

He properly excludes from a discussion upon the "subjective effect" of the study of mathematics as an exercise of mind, all consideration of the "objective results of the science," if these be regarded merely in themselves and out of connection with the mental culture they may occasion. If the effect of this study as an intellectual exercise, be as pernicious as he endeavours to show, it should be at once discarded from every course of liberal education.

He enters upon the discussion with an appearance of candor and calmness, for he says, "the expediency is not disputed of leaving mathematics, as a coördinate, to find their level among other branches of academical instruction. It is only contended that they ought not to be made the *principal*, far less the *exclusive* object of academical encouragement." (P. 260.) On the latter question we agree with him entirely, but we shall soon see how deplorably low is the level he assigns to the mathematics. Elsewhere, also, he is *temperate* enough to say that the study of the mathematics "is useless, even detrimental, if not applied temperately and with due caution; for instead of invigorating, it may enervate the reasoning faculty, and is, therefore, a study undeserving an indiscriminate encouragement in a liberal education of the mind." (*Appendix* iii. p. 739.)

But Sir William soon becomes an advocate, and the study of mathematics,—or the University of Cambridge,—(which he seems to regard as convertible terms,) is the prisoner at the bar, whom he is personally desirous of convicting. For he has gone but a little way in his pleading, when, speaking of the "fact" that the mathematics cultivate "a smaller number of faculties than any other study," he says:

"This fact is not denied even by those who are most decidedly opposed to the *total banishment* of the mathematics from the sphere of a liberal instruction." (P. 268.)

There is at issue, then, for mathematics as a liberal study, a question of life and death. If the reasoning of this able prosecutor be correct, the study should be degraded from the high position it has ever held in the schools, and used, hereafter, as a mode of punishment equivalent at best with that of the pillory or the rack.

After his review of Mr. Whewell's book, Sir William proceeds:

"It is an ancient and universal observation, that different studies cultivate the mind to a different development; and as the end of a liberal education is the general and harmonious evolution of its faculties and capacities in their relative subordination, the folly has accordingly been long and generally denounced, which would attempt to accomplish this result by the partial application of certain partial studies." (P. 267.)

Aristotle supports this opinion; and we may regard the principle as sufficiently established, that *the exclusive cultivation of any branch of study is undeniably hurtful.* The cultivation of any one faculty or limited set of faculties, far from assuring the equal development of the rest, rather causes an overshadowing of them, and, therefore, for them as well as for the whole mind, a retarded growth. Let us bear in mind this important law, for we shall have frequent occasion to refer to it in the sequel.

Recognizing the fact that this law forbids as well the exclusive pursuit of philosophy as that of mathematics, our author goes on to add:

"The difference between different studies, in their contracting influence, is great. Some exercise, and consequently

develope, perhaps, one faculty on a single phasis, or to a low degree; while others from the variety of objects and of relations they present, calling into strong and unexclusive activity the whole circle of the higher powers, may almost pretend to accomplish alone the work of catholic education. If we consult reason, experience, and the common testimony of ancient and modern times, none of our intellectual studies tend to cultivate a smaller number of the faculties, in a more partial or feeble manner, than mathematics." (P. 268.) Admitting, for the present, that the mathematics exercise a smaller number of faculties than any other intellectual study, (which is, however, demonstrably false), we are no less prepared to appreciate their value as a mental training, if it be shown that they are *peculiarly* fitted for the improvement of the faculties in question. Mathematical study trains the mind to a habit of orderly thought in abstract conceptions, by imposing on it a certain course of development in as far as concerns the ideas with which it is employed,—an advantage this study alone can so well afford as being alone so perfectly fitted for an orderly arrangement, and one which is of the utmost benefit to those who may thereafter tread the obscure paths of philosophical speculation. No better corrective to biassed tendencies of thought, actual or potential, anywhere exists. The capacity of attention, also, is improved thereby to an extent other studies cannot, without extraneous advantage, secure,—by that unflagging application which is required not only to see the connections between given extremes, but to discover and to prove them, wherein, moreover, is cultivated shrewdness of observation and the faculty of invention. Of all this, however, we shall speak more in detail hereafter.

Early in the discussion, our author has drawn a lucid contrast between mathematics and philosophy; the former, pure and abstract; the latter, not likewise so, but applied and concrete. To make a fair comparison, we should consider along with the pure mathematics a system, in the words of Sir Kenelm Digby, of "abstracted metaphysical speculations." Philosophy, in general, can be considered as consisting of an observational and a speculative element, including in the latter all processes in which it is necessary to employ reasoning. By

observation, the premises are furnished whereon speculation, for the most part, is founded; though the latter is required, to some extent, in giving the results of observation a scientific arrangement, and in extending, by its own methods, the premises thus afforded. To this combination of the two elements may be given the name of observational or applied philosophy. In pure speculation all the premises are either assumed or deduced from the results of observation, and hence all the premises are *data*, upon which we proceed to reason. This constitutes pure, or speculative philosophy, and forms, perhaps, the great bulk of philosophy in general. This division corresponds, in many essential particulars, to that of mathematics into the applied and the pure. It may be urged, indeed, that, whilst there is a system of pure mathematics, independent of all observation or application, which *may* be taught, there is no corresponding system extant of pure philosophy. To this we may satisfactorily reply by simple reference to that trite exemplification of the practicability of both teaching and studying it, even to an exclusive extent, which we find in the scholastic era of philosophy. Brucker tells us that the whole of education, at that time, consisted in "disputation, metaphysical speculations, and the like *deliria*."* Speculative philosophy is exposed to study, in a form almost pure and distinct, in the *metaphysics* proper. This is Kant's "Metaphysic of Nature, or of speculative reason," which "contains all pure reason-principles from mere conceptions (consequently excluding mathematics) of the *theoretic* cognition of all things."† "All *general reasoning*, says Horne Tooke, "is merely metaphysic;"‡ and Isaac Taylor: "A mathematical theorem is the product of the human mind. . . . The same also may be affirmed of whatever is purely metaphysical, for this also is a *product of thought*."§ We may, therefore, treat metaphysics as embodying pure philosophy in the form of a separate science and an independent study.

* *Hist. Crit. Phil.*, vol. iii., p. 712, Leipsic.

† *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ii. *Trans. Method.* 3.

‡ *Diversions of Purley*, vol. ii., c. 4, p. 94.

§ *World of Mind*, iv.

Whether speculative philosophy constitutes a better mental training than the pure mathematics is the real question before us, and to exhibit more readily the comparison, we shall follow Sir William Hamilton's argument in the discussion of *his* question,—considering these "rival sciences" as to "their different *objects*, their different *ends*, and their different *modes* of considering those objects," if these indeed be different.

Under the first head, our author remarks:

"Mathematics are conversant solely about certain images; but Philosophy is mainly occupied with realities." (P. 272.)

Not so with the metaphysics; and we shall presently explain that pure mathematics are not "conversant *solely* about certain images;" they discuss the relations of thought to thought in conceptions of quantity,* as pure philosophy discusses the relations of thought to thought in conceptions of other "realities." In the latter, there can be no appeal from those thoughts to the "realities" they concern, for this appeal can be granted only in observational philosophy. Therefore conceptions, and *conceptions alone*, without reference to "realities," are the objects of both the contrasted sciences.

"As to their ends and procedure to these ends." Under this head Sir William asserts, that "the whole science of mathematics is virtually contained in its data," (a threadbare error,) but that "in philosophy the science is not so contained; its principles are merely the rules for our conduct in the quest, in the proof, in the arrangement of knowledge. In mathematics we always depart from the definition; in philosophy, with the definition we usually end." (P. 273.) This, as to *definition*, is after Kant,† and though under unacknowledged indebtedness to him throughout this portion of the essay, our author is

* But, also, of *quality*. Aristotle, indeed, says that "mathematics discuss *form;* they do not regard *substance*." (*Analyt. Post.* lib. i., c. 13.) Sir William doubtless draws his remarks above from Aristotle, and succeeds in preserving something of the *sound*, yet for his purposes the meaning must be something very different. "Nature," truly said Thomas à Kempis, "is crafty." The Stagirite, of course, recognized the truth universally acknowledged, that "mathematics speculate about the abstract." (*Metaph.* x, 3, 7; see, also, *Plutarch, Sympos.* lib. 8, qu. 2.)

† *Kritik d. r. V.*, ii. *Trans. Meth.* (731.)

in fundamental variance with that philosopher. Note the far profounder analysis of the German:

"*Philosophical* cognition is the cognition of reason from conceptions; *mathematical*, from construction of conceptions. . . . . In this form, then, the essential difference of these two kinds of cognition of reason consists, and does not rest upon a difference in their *matter* or *objects*. Those who thought of distinguishing Philosophy from Mathematic, by stating of the former that it had merely *quality*, but the latter only *quantity* for an object, have *taken the effect for the cause*. The form of mathematical cognition is the cause that this cognition can relate only to quantity."*

Under the preceding topic, Sir William has asserted this very distinction of quantity and quality as that of the respective objects of mathematics and philosophy, (pp. 272–3.) "Philosophy is the *research of causes*," he triumphantly affirms; alas, that our great philosopher should have failed, in the judgment of a greater, by taking an effect for its cause, here upon the very threshold of the argument which calls forth this valuable definition!

The fundamental difference between mathematics and philosophy is not found, then, in the difference of their matter or ends. It depends upon the fact that the signs through which we achieve and retain the conceptions about which the former are employed, are, in general, wholly adequate and answerable to the conceptions themselves, whereas in the latter they are never so; and in this, we are therefore compelled to multiply the signs and usually to be content with probable results at last. This multiplication of signs is really that approach to a *definition*, which is represented above as the usual end of philosophical research. In mathematics we are usually passing from adequate sign to adequate sign, from definition to definition; in philosophy we are frequently engaged in adding partial to partial, in order to reach, as nearly as may be, the adequate sign,—in order to attain an approximative definition.

To return to the statement that "the whole science of mathematics is virtually contained in its data." If so, in conse-

* *Kritik d. r. V.*, ii. *Trans. Meth.* (713.)

quence of the identity of the reasoning process, speculative philosophy is contained in its data, in the same proportion and manner. But, in mathematics the data must be either axioms or definitions, or both. As regards axioms, Locke shall speak for us:

"Farther, it is evident, that it was not the influence of those maxims, which are taken for principles in mathematics, that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the hypotenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the two other sides. The knowledge, that the whole is equal to all its parts, and if you take equals from equals, the remainders will be equal, &c., helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration; and a man may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths."*

With respect to the *definitions*, which are doubtless the data our author intends, we notice that these embody our knowledge of the objects or quantities which are compared with a view of arriving at the knowledge of their relations. Now the relation between two objects cannot exist or be contained in the objects themselves; so the knowledge of that relation cannot be contained in the knowledge of the objects. From the latter, we, by an act of the mind, deduce the former; but if this were contained in that, no other act of the mind would be necessary to apprehend it, than the cognitions of the objects in themselves. Take the simplest possible relation borne by two numbers, the most clearly, one might suppose, contained in the very definitions of the numbers. Take the numbers *three* and *six*, defined each as the aggregation of so many units. Under this definition, the cognitions of the two are accurate and complete; yet we shall never derive from them a knowledge of the relation of these numbers, as identical with that of *one* to *two*, until by an additional act of the reason, we

* *On the Human Understanding*, bk. iv., c. xii.

conceive the units of the second number as aggregated into two equal sums and apprehend that their union in this form can make no change in their total.

Kant says:

"Let us give the conception of a triangle to a philosopher, and let him find out, after his method, what proportion the sum of its angles may bear to the right angle. He has, now, nothing but the conception of a figure which is enclosed in three right lines, and in it, the conception of as many angles. Let him now reflect upon this conception as long as he likes, he will bring out nothing new. He may analyze and make clear the conception of the right line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but cannot come to the other properties *which do not at all lie in these conceptions.*"*

Lastly, as to the "different modes of considering their objects." Here Sir William says:

"Both in geometry, by an ostensive construction, and in arithmetic and algebra, by a symbolical, the intellect is relieved of all effort in the support and presentation of its objects; and is therefore left to operate upon these in all the ease and security with which it considers the concrete realities of nature. Philosophy, on the contrary," &c. (P. 274.)

In geometry (and similar remarks apply to arithmetic and algebra) we prove a proposition not as true of the "ostensive construction," which assists us in conceiving the abstractions it represents, but as true solely of these abstractions, which in themselves are quite as "unimaginable" as those considered in philosophy. A mathematical point or line is an abstraction than which the pure idea of *being* is, possibly, alone higher. In mathematical investigations, the mind is, indeed, relieved by the concrete figure in which it views the abstract, but in like manner it is relieved in philosophical speculations, by considering the abstract as existent in the "concrete realities of nature," and vicariously contemplating the latter. It seems, indeed, but a shallow philosophy at best, which can here find ground of essential difference. The human mind ever quails before the intense simplicity of the abstract, and instinctively

* *Kritik d. r. V., Trans. Meth.* (716.)

recoils upon the concrete. From the contemplation of the human will, for instance, we fall back upon its expression in action, and from that of God, upon the consideration of his attributes in their manifestations.

Says Isaac Taylor:

"In metaphysical treatises, examples are appealed to *almost at every step,* for the purpose of assisting the mind in its efforts to retain its hold of abstract notions. We cross and recross the line from the abstract to the concrete continually, lest we should lose our path."*

"Mathematics," our author has asserted, "are conversant *solely* about certain images." If we have argued correctly, this is not true; but it *is* true that mathematics are "conversant about images" in the sense we have suggested, and in the same sense philosophy can pretend to no conversance with the abstract. The abstractions in both are strictly *unimaginable.*†

We may conclude, then, that metaphysics form no better mental exercise, in any direction we have contemplated, than the pure mathematics.

We might, also, upon this point, draw an argument from authority, the sole legitimate use of which, however, would lie in the exhibition of the effect which *too devoted* an application to abstract philosophy has upon the mind, and it could not weigh against the general study, except in so far as this may tend to induce such an application. Sir William Hamilton has employed a similar method unfairly, because directly,—confounding the excessive with the proper cultivation of mathematical studies. He has charged the mathematics with cultivating a kind of imagination conducive to fanciful speculations; but philosophical speculation itself must develope such an imagination more surely and more extensively than any other pursuit. If a visionary tendency be found in philosophic mathematicians, we can see no reason for ascribing it rather

* *World of Mind,* iii.

† Mr. J. S. Mill, (*System of Logic,* c. v. bk. ii.) contends that mathematical abstractions are, also, *inconceivable;* and the "great logician" makes some extremely illogical remarks in this connection. Hartley has doubtless the true doctrine, in *Observations on Man,* i., p. 357, (London.)

to their mathematics than to their philosophy, when at the same time we find philosophers, not mathematical, whose speculative vagaries have been unequalled. "Philosophy," says Christianus, in the colloquies of Erasmus, "is a very sterile and sad affair."* This, indeed, has been the despairing experience of many a seeker for truth and light within the too gloomy confines of philosophy. Yet after all the disastrous failures, the shame, the sorrow, the despair, of the past, we confess to no greater admiration than that which we feel for the ceaseless efforts of the human mind, put forth for the attainment of truth on the field of speculative philosophy; a field saddened, it is true, by unnumbered defeats, yet shining with the trophies of many a victory and bright with many a good-omened ray from the centre of the unknown Truth.

Yielding this just homage to Philosophy, we are yet none the better prepared to attempt the dislodgment of the Mathematics from their proper niche in the temple of Education. We believe the mathematics to be the best preparative training for minds unaccustomed to continuous application, and hence the best introductory to the study of philosophy itself. As treating of the pure and absolute in quantity, they lead the mind to contemplate an essence, as Plato says, which is fixed, eternal, unchangeable; a contemplation allied to that which is exercised in the loftiest aspirations of philosophy. Here we find a high, possibly the highest, recommendation of the study in the very condition on which Sir William Hamilton would doom it to oblivion. Indeed, in this direction, the true palladium of the study is, that it "compels the mind to use pure reason in the pursuit of pure truth."†

We find Sir William quoting authority for the opinion just advanced, (see p. 295.) And *this* "faint praise" he himself allows:

"Although of slender, and even ambiguous utility, as a gymnastic of the intellect, mathematics are not undeserving of attention, as supplying to the metaphysician and psychologist some interesting materials of speculation." (P. 310.)

* *Conv. Prof.*, p. 92, Leyden, 1729.

† *Plato, Repub.*, l. vii., p. 526, b.

Seneca, after showing that the pursuit of the liberal studies, —which, as he expressly reckons, comprise only mathematics and the study of language,—does not lead directly to (the practice of) virtue, which is the highest philosophy, proceeds:

"Wherefore, then, do we instruct our sons in these studies? Not because they can bestow virtue, but *because they prepare the mind for receiving it.*"*

It is well known, also, that Pythagoras and his disciples held that mathematics, in the words of Stanley, "abstract the soul from sensibles, *preparing and adapting her for her intelligibles*," and that "diverting the mind from corporeal things (which never are permanent in the same manner and state) they bring it, by degrees, to the contemplation of eternal, incorporeal things."†

Plato says:

"This study (geometry) is to be cultivated for the sake of pure knowledge, ... of the knowledge of the ever-existent and not all of that, which is subject to generation and destruction. . . . . Geometry is an inquiry into that which is essentially eternal. It has a tendency, therefore, to draw the soul to truth; and prepares for philosophic contemplation, by applying to elevated topics (the thoughts) which now we improperly attach to inferior subjects."‡

Aristotle distinctly names the mathematics a "speculative philosophy," and enumerates the science as a part of true learning. He says that "it is a *primary* duty of philosophy to discuss the principles of those matters, of which, though common, the mathematician makes *special* use."§

Dr. Thomas Brown says:

"It is by the diffusive tendency of its spirit, almost as much as by its own sublime truths and the important application of these to general physics, that the study of geometry has

* *Epist.* 88.

† *Lives Philos.*, part ix., c. 1, (*doct. of Pythag.*); after *Porphyry, De vit. Pythag.*, 46, 47, (p. 80.)

‡ *Repub.*, lib. vii., p. 527, b.; ed. H. Stephani. There are other readings not essentially different.

§ *Metaph.*, lib. v., 1, 7; and lib. x., 4, 1 and 2.

been of such inestimable advantage to science. Those precise definitions which insure to every word the same exact signification in the mind of every one who hears it pronounced, and that lucid progress in the development of truth which gives even to ordinary powers almost the same facility of comprehension with the highest genius—[elsewhere he qualifies the science as of *difficult acquirement:* Lect. 33.]—are unquestionably of the utmost benefit to the mathematical student, while he is prosecuting his particular study, without any contemplation of other advantage to be reaped from them. But *there can be no doubt* that they are, at the same time, *preparing his mind for excellence in other inquiries,* of which he then has no conception; that he will ever after be less ready to employ, and *be more quick-sighted* than he would otherwise have been *in detecting, vague and indefinite phraseology, and loose and incoherent reasoning.*" *

Bacon's testimony is very similar:

"In the mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use of the pure mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it." †

Which remarks, in turn, may have been suggested by those of Plato, referring to mathematical studies:

"By each of these studies, a certain organ of the soul is purified and revived, after it may have been polluted and blinded by other kinds of study,—an organ better worth preserving than ten thousand eyes, for by it alone is truth perceived." ‡

Locke, also, says:

"I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind an *habit of reasoning closely and in train;* not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that, all having got the way of reasoning, which that

* *Philosophy of Mind,* Lect. v.

† *Advancement of Learning,* bk. ii., vol. i., p. 199, Montagu's ed.

‡ *Repub.,* lib. vii., p. 527.—In this, as in other things, Plato follows Pythagoras. See Porphyry, *De vit. Pythag.* 46, 47.

study necessarily brings the mind to, *they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge*, as they shall have occasion. For in all sorts of reasoning, every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration."*

In the next place, our author proceeds to show that the training afforded by the mathematics is not a logical exercise. This question is discussed under three heads; 1st, as to form; 2d, as to vehicle; 3d, as to object-matter.

First, then, as to form. The considerations are here urged that the truth of each step in mathematical study is intuitively clear to consciousness, and that consequently it "educates to no sagacity in detecting and avoiding the fallacies, which originate in the thought itself of the reasoner." (P. 278.) On the contrary, we contend that through "the mistaken and imperfect attempts at demonstration made by himself and others,"—which consideration Mr. Whewell advances but Sir William Hamilton does not seem to understand,—"the student of mathematics is presented with examples of the most natural fallacies," (p. 278), and hence *is* trained to "sagacity in detecting and avoiding them." We shall see, hereafter, that our author wholly denies any exercise of the invention as legitimate to the study of mathematics, and in this lies the reason of his refusing to recognize the truth of Mr. Whewell's remark. In any proper cultivation of the science, the exercise of invention is necessarily secured. Indeed, the elucidation of every step would necessitate an almost impossible prolixity, and invention is required in passing from one given extreme to another, for the discovery of the intermediate processes of proof. It is no argument against our position that "of the sciences, mathematics alone have continued to advance 'without shadow of turning,'" but only another proof of the superior facilities afforded in this science for detecting and avoiding fallacies; for no one, we suppose, will deny the fact, which can be established by illustrious examples, that there have been many fallacies entertained and defended during this advancement. The facilities for detection are mainly found in the generally evident absurdity of fallacious conclu-

* *Conduct of the Understanding*, § 7.

sions, and they react, of course, to bestow the power of apprehending beforehand and avoiding these errors. "The necessity of its matter, necessitates the correctness of its form." No, we answer; though the true form may be said to be fixed by the necessity of its matter, yet this does not prevent the occurrence of false forms in the thought of the reasoner. Logic, as the doctrine of the form of reasoning, is little needed, it is true, in this science, inasmuch as absurd conclusions are generally evident as such. Even elsewhere the practical use of logic has been doubted. The syllogism, Locke hath said, is of use only to "help us (as, perhaps, may be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes; and yet," he adds, "I would fain see the man, that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism." *

But does not this study "fortify the reason against the danger of fallacious thought by the invigorating exercise it furnishes to that faculty?" "To this," answers our author, "it is equally incompetent; for an intuitive proposition, (which is the nature of each step in mathematical demonstration,) demands an absolute minimum of thought, and the reason, therefore, in this study, is determined to its feeblest energy and hence to its most limited development." (Pp. 279–280.) Here, again, is denied the occurrence of any false demonstrations or any exercise of invention, in the experience of the mathematical student; and, besides, these objections must hold in the same sense against *all* logical reasoning, for in this universally, as in mathematics specially, every step is an "intuitive proposition."

Having thus established the proposition that in this study the mind is almost entirely inert, Sir William finds no difficulty in deducing the facility of mathematics. He declares that the mathematics are "only difficult because they are too easy," and that "as repressing the activity of all the nobler and more pleasurable energies of thought, they become,—though in themselves the easiest of all rational studies,—the most arduous for those very minds, to which studies in themselves most arduous are easiest," and finally,—"In mathema-

* *On the Human Understanding*, bk. iv., c. 17, § 6.

tics dulness is thus elevated into talent and talent degraded into incapacity!" (P. 282.) Protagoras said well that there are two sides to *every* question,* or "that there is nothing in nature but doubt; that a man may equally dispute of all things, and even of *this*, whether a man can equally dispute of all things;"†—and, it is clear, we now need not be astonished that philosophers have thought it a duty laboriously to refute the celebrated sophism of the Liar. Every unprejudiced reader must be ready, in deep amazement, to invoke the shades of Archimedes, of Leibnitz, and of Newton. Indeed, there is needed no more substantial argument against our author's position; for, as we shall presently see, feeling himself its weight, he has attempted to avoid it, to his own destruction.

We have already said that Sir William denies (first virtually and afterwards explicitly, at p. 287), that the study of the mathematics demands any exercise of the invention. *This* is the rotten foundation upon which all of his present deductions rest. Thus, he has constructed and discussed an imaginary plan of study, which excludes all independent thought, and, in as far as concerns the mere process of reasoning, reduces the mind to the *contemplation* of simple identity; a plan, which nowhere exists; a plan, which is practically impossible, for it would require an almost infinite increase in the number of books embracing the course of mathematical study. A similar method pursued with regard to any other study, not entirely empirical, would lead to similar results; the mind would be reduced to the unvarying consideration of identity; every true argument would be spread out in a tiresome series of intuitive steps, and every fallacy would lie exposed in all its hideous length. For, truly Condillac said, "metaphysical analysis and mathematical analysis are *precisely the same thing*."‡

On page 283, Sir William says: "We are far from disparaging the mathematical genius which invents new formulæ, or new and felicitous applications of the old;"—and again: "Unlike their divergent studies, the inventive talents of the mathematician and philosopher in fact approximate;" and, on p. 323,

* Laertius, *in vitâ Protag.*

† Montaigne, *Essays*, bk. ii., c. xii. (Hazlitt.)

‡ *La Langue des Calculs*, c. 16: p. 217.

still more strongly: "Mathematical invention and philosophical genius *coincide.*" If then, the exercise of invention be necessary to any extent, and we have shown it to be so to *some* extent, in the prosecution of the study, just so far will, under the above admission, mathematical *coincide* with philosophical study in its effect as an exercise of mind. Nay, more, the successful student of mathematics is, so far forth, a philosopher of genius! Still more,—an institution of learning which would allow any portion of a mathematical course to be studied, without securing beyond suggestion of doubt, a cultivation of the invention far greater even than that which is necessitated, would be false to the suggestions of reason and to the plainest obligation of its birthright. Sir William Hamilton's imaginary plan of study would be a most flagrant instance of a good abused. The exercise of the invention being, then, both requisite and legitimate to this study, it follows, *on Sir William Hamilton's own admission*, that, in the faculties they exercise and the cultivation they furnish, *the studies of the philosopher and the mathematician approximate and largely* COINCIDE. How false, therefore, the assertion that the study of mathematics "condemns to inertion all the nobler and more pleasurable energies of thought!" Just in proportion, moreover, as the invention is drawn upon, is the difficulty of the study increased. This difficulty can, therefore, be almost indefinitely augmented.

To support his astounding statement that "in mathematics dulness is elevated into talent, and talent degraded into incapacity," Sir William favours us with the following citations:

"'Those,' says the *Chian Aristo*, 'who occupy themselves with the mathematics *to the neglect* of philosophy, are like the wooers of Penelope, who, unable to obtain the mistress, contented themselves with the maids.'"

With the *doctrine*, here, we perfectly agree. If Aristo, however, did say this (and some attributed the *bon mot* to him), he doubtless pirated it from Aristippus,* as probably did also Bion.† As Aristo's judgment, in general, cannot be

* Diog. Laertius, lib. ii., s. 79.

† The Borysthenite. See Plutarch, *De lib. educ.* 7, c: vol. ii., Paris, 1624.

applauded, our author might have had older and better authority. He who can apprehend no distinction between things, except solely between the virtues and vices,* must necessarily be unable properly to distinguish the relative importance of mathematics and philosophy. Besides, the contrast drawn by these philosophers lay not against mathematics alone, but against—*τὰ ἐγκύκλια παιδεύματα* (vel, *μαθήματα*), the whole curriculum of *liberal study*.

"'The mathematician is either a beggar, a dunce, or a visionary, or the three in one,' was long an *adage* in the European schools."

We shall see that these pleasantries may be retorted upon the philosopher.

"Bayle, the impersonation of all logical subtilty, is reported by Le Clerc, 'to have confessed that he could never understand the demonstration of the first problem in Euclid.'"

Whether this was Bayle's or Euclid's fault, we are not told. Bayle it is, who makes the wise remark that any one wishing to attack the mathematics and to conduct the contest with success, "must be not only a good philosopher, but a *very profound mathematician*."† He, therefore, himself never undertook it; and Sir William ought to have profited by his example. As it is, however, we may generously regret that Sir William has not lived to add to Bayle's one other illustrious example, in which perseverance has been crowned with flattering success. Senator Wade, as we are informed in the public prints, "read Euclid *fifty times over* before he could understand him."

"Wolf, the mightiest master of the higher criticism, was absolutely destitute of all mathematical capacity, nay, remained firmly convinced that the more capable a mind was for mathematics, the more incapable was it for the other noblest sciences."

This conviction of Wolf's, under his absolute want of mathematical capacity, cannot be of much value to mankind; though the proposition, involving, as it does, its own formal converse,

* *Cicero de Finibus*, lib. iv., c. 17.

† *Dictionaire, voce* Zeno, (the Epicurean). Note D.

may supply the probable explanation of his remarkable ability in criticism.

"'A dull and patient intellect,' says Joseph Scaliger, the most learned of men,—'such should be your geometers. A great genius cannot be a great mathematician.'"

These were precisely the sentiments to be expected from the wounded vanity of this distinguished scholar but unsuccessful mathematician.

"Not content," says Montucla, "with the celebrity which he enjoyed as a profound scholar, he aspired to attain the first rank among mathematicians. The discovery of the quadrature of the circle appeared to him as an assured means thereto. . . . . He published his rare discovery in the book entitled Nova Cyclometria, in 1592; and the air of assurance with which he announced it, imposed upon many people, who did not hesitate to crown him with the laurel of the geometer; but those to whom alone it belonged to decide upon geometrical merit, judged far differently. . . . . Clavius showed that from the pretended quadrature of Scaliger, it followed that the circumference of the inscribed dodecagon was greater than that of the circumscribed circle. He did not stop with that; Scaliger's despicable solutions of the trisection of an angle and of the inscription of polygons, were treated with no greater indulgence. His paralogisms, his perpetual contradiction of the most fundamental principles of geometry, were clearly exhibited; and to render the criticism still more bitter, he displayed the humiliating contrast of the gross mistakes of Scaliger with his self-confidence and the insulting manner in which he had treated Euclid and Archimedes. There was but one voice on this subject—at least among geometers."*

Thus perished the mathematical aspirations of this famous scholar but most "maladroit quadrateur."

Nor did the elder Scaliger fare better, when he entered the field of applied mathematics. Wallis cites his puerile errors as to the parallax of comets, as an instance of the "disgrace of an ignorance of mathematics."† So that father and son might

* *Histoire de la recherche sur la Quad. Cerc.* c. v., art. vii.

† *Oratio Inauguralis*, p. 9.

have derided the mathematics with nearly equal propriety and effect.

We must add to Sir William's slanderous citations, an extract from himself:

"Be it remembered, that mathematics and dram-drinking tell, especially in the long run. For a season, I admit, Toby Philpot may be the Champion of England;—and Warburton testifies—'It is a thing notorious, that the *oldest mathematician* in England is the *worst reasoner* in it.'"*

All of which may be regarded as conclusive against the mathematics. The wit, we may be thankful, is beyond dispute; and philosophers and philosophy have been the objects of equally faultless humour.

For instance, Anaxippus sings:

> "Ah me! you are a philosopher!
> And wise *in words* are all your kind,
> But the brains, indeed, of a horse, I fear,
> Serves each of you for mind!"†

Chrysippus, a distinguished member of the fraternity, says that "a philosopher will stand on his head three times, if you pass his hat round in the meanwhile."‡

Not necessarily a beggar nor always a dunce, however, was the ancient philosopher, but often a dissipated dandy. Antiphanes states the characteristics by which one might infallibly know a philosopher of the Academy, to be—"his resplendent cloak, his elegant liver-coloured tunic, his jaunty felt hat, and his daintly-handled cane."§

"Hereafter," concludes Hermotimus, in the dialogue of Lucian which bears his name, "should I unwittingly happen upon a philosopher in the way, I shall turn aside and avoid him, even as I should a mad dog."‖ In another, by the unanimous wish of the gods, Zeus dooms the philosophers to "be rubbed up and ground down with their own dialectic."¶

* *Discussions*, App. ii. Logical; p. 639.

† Athenæus, *Deipnosoph.*, lib. 13; 92.

‡ Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.*, 30.

§ Athenæus, *Deipnosoph.*, lib. 12; 12 (544, f.)

‖ Lucian, *Hermot.* 86. Vol. i., p. 391 (1800.)

¶ Lucian, *Icaromenip.* 33. Vol. ii., p. 199. (Vid. *Vitar. Auct., et Piscat.*, passim.)

Cicero himself remarks, that "nothing can be said so absurd, as not to have been asserted by some of the philosophers."*

Varro, also, expresses the same sentiment in very similar words:

"No sick man dreams anything so monstrous as that some philosopher may not have affirmed it."†

Swedenborg, who doubtless knew whereof he affirmed, has said:

"The more any one is imbued with philosophy, the greater his blindness and darkness; these increase in proportion with the abundance of philosophy, as can be demonstrated by many examples."‡

Says the *Shepherd*, in the *Noctes Ambrosiana.*

"To please you, sir, I hae read lately—or, at least, tried to read—thae books, and lectures, and what not, on the Association of Ideas;—and yon explanations and theories of Tammas Broon's, and Mr. Dugald Stewart's, and Mr. Alison's, and the lave, seem at the time the volume's lyin' open afore you, rational aneuch,—sae that you canna help believin' that each o' them has flung down a great big bunch o' keys, wi' a clash on the table, that 'ill enable you to open a' the locks o' a' the doors o' the Temple o' Natur. But, dog on't! the verra first lock you try, the key 'll not fit! Or if it fits, you cannot get it to turn roun', though you chirt wi' your twa hands till you're baith black and red in the face, and desperate angry."§

Fontenelle thus notices some of the wise speculations of the ancient philosophers:

"Imagine all the sages at an opera—those Pythagorases, those Platos, those Aristotles, and all those people whose reputation makes now-a-days so much noise in our ears. Let us suppose that they are looking at the flight of Phaeton, whom the winds are carrying away; that they cannot discover the

* *De Divinat.* 2, 119.—In a note to the *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, (p. 28) Sir William Hamilton has attributed these exact words to Varro, in which Mr. Robert Turnbull follows him with unsuspecting faith, (*Introductory Essay*, p. xi.) Note that Sir William approves the sentiment.

† *Nonius Marcel.* 56, 15.

‡ *Adv. Isaiah*, (apud Wilkinson.)

§ *Noctes Am.*, vol. ii., (xxi.) p. 268, Edinburgh.

cords (by which he is moved); and that they do not know the arrangements behind the scenes. One of them would say: 'It is a secret virtue that carries off Phaeton.' Another, 'Phaeton is composed of certain numbers, which cause him to ascend.' Another, 'Phaeton has a certain affection for the top of the stage; he is not at his ease, when he is not there.' Another, 'Phaeton is not formed to fly, but he prefers to fly, than to leave the top of the stage empty.' And a hundred other absurdities which, I am astounded, have not destroyed the reputation of all antiquity."*

In one of his satirical romances, Voltaire introduces Micromégas, a titanic inhabitant of one of the planets of *Sirius*, who in a tour through the universe, with the Secretary of the Academy of Sciences in *Saturn*, finally reaches the earth. Meeting with several philosophers, they enter into conversation, and after the philosophers had replied with great promptness and unanimity to certain questions in astronomy:

"Micromégas said to them: 'Since you know so well what is exterior to you, doubtless you know still better what is within you. Tell me what is your soul, and how do you form your ideas.' The philosophers spoke all at once, as before; but they were all now of different opinions. The oldest cited Aristotle; one pronounced the name of Descartes; another, that of Mallebranche; another, that of Leibnitz; still another, that of Locke. An old peripatetic cried out with confidence: 'The soul is an entelechy and a reason by which it has the power of being what it is. This, Aristotle expressly declares, page 633 of the edition of the Louvre:

'*Εντελεχεῖα ἐστι*, etc.'

'I don't understand Greek very well,' said the giant. 'No more do I,' answered the philosophic mite. 'Why, then,' demanded the Sirian, 'do you cite a certain Aristotle in Greek?' 'Because,' replied the philosopher, 'it is very needful to quote what one does not comprehend at all, in a language of which one understands the least.'"†

* *Pluralité des Mondes*, Prem. Soir.

† *Micromégas*, c. vii. *Œuvres*, tom. viii., p. 79 (Paris.)—On the subject of quotation, we note that Dr. Brown cites an extract from this romance, in his

Lactantius shows that philosophy overthrows itself, by the following syllogism:

"If we cannot know anything, as Socrates taught, nor ought to believe anything (unless known) as Zeno declared, the whole of philosophy vanishes."*

So that philosophy is, as Bayle remarks, a veritable Penelope, who unravels at night what she has woven by day.

Dugald Stewart says:

"The prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes: first, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions. . . . It has unfortunately happened that these [the useful branches] have shared in that general discredit, into which the *other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen.*"†

Such is the confession of a philosopher, whose ability Sir William fully recognizes.

"After much debate," says Gulliver, "they [the Brobdingnag savans] concluded unanimously that I was only *relplum scalcath,* which is interpreted literally *lusus naturæ;* a determination exactly agreeable to the modern philosophy of Europe, whose professors disdaining the old evasion of occult causes, whereby the followers of Aristotle endeavoured in vain to disguise their ignorance, have invented this wonderful solution of all difficulties, to the unspeakable advancement of human knowledge."‡

If, as Pascal says,—whom our author calls "a miracle of

Philos. Lect. ix.—the translation being partially a mere paraphrase,—yet Sir William, it seems, has quoted the same from him (and with some of his accompanying remarks), totally without acknowledgment, (*Metaphysics*, Lect. viii.) Sir William has himself an injurious habit of free translation, by which many of his citations are materially affected.

* *Divin. Inst.* lib. iii., c. 4.

† *Philos. of Mind*, introd. pt. i.

‡ *Gulliver's Travels*, pt. ii., c. 3.

universal genius;" and Bayle, "one of the most sublime spirits among mankind,"—if "to make a jest of philosophy is truly to philosophize,"* the testimonies we have cited may meet a double purpose.

The second division of this special discussion regards the "*vehicle.*" It is surely the highest praise to say, that "mathematical language is precise and adequate and absolutely convertible with mathematical thought." Necessarily, it "can afford no example of those fallacies, which arise from the ambiguity of ordinary language." Mathematics have another mission; for we suppose no one would hold that the introduction of ambiguous language into mathematics would tend to increase, in any sense, the logical efficiency of the study. In this science, we are introduced to a new language; one, which is unsurpassed for capability of accurate and condensed expression of thought. It is a language which gains universal credence and suffers nothing from translation. "There is one book, at least, in the world, the propositions of which are recognized as truths by the minds of all countries and of all creeds. Hebrew, Confutzeean, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Christian, Mohammedan minds,—all believe the propositions of that volume of which Euclid was, at least, the editor."†

The third division concerns the "object-matter." Enough has already been indicated in this connection.

Our author, in the next place, charges the mathematics with inducing credulity and skepticism, because "the mathematician, exclusively engrossed with the deduction of inevitable conclusions, from data passively received," becomes insensible to moral evidence. Thus, by again implicitly denying to the study any exercise of the invention and by confounding the strained effect of an exclusive pursuit of the science, with the healthful tendencies of its proper cultivation, he arrives at the desired conclusions. Acknowledging that the effects of an exclusive study of any branch of knowledge are not a fair exponent of the educational tendencies developed in a judicious pursuit of it, nevertheless in a discussion upon mathematics as an exercise of the mind, he openly brings forward an argument,

* *Pensées*, pr. pt. x, 36.

† Halle, *Exact Philosophy*, bk. ii., c. i.

as of direct application, founded upon the distortion of intellect resulting from an "exclusive engrossment" in the study. The denunciations of the cloud of witnesses he cites to his support, are all directed, as these for the most part *very explicitly* avow, against the *exclusive* pursuit of the study. Pascal, for instance, speaks of "mathematicians, who are *mere* mathematicians, having their understanding correct only on notorious principles, &c.* So with nearly all his testimonies, which accordingly afford no argument against the *study;* not indeed, even an indirect one, for the *mere mathematician* is now hardly a possible being. Dugald Stewart, after speaking of the want of tendency in the *pure* mathematics to excite those moral sentiments, which are naturally aroused by the order and design pervading the universal frame, continues:

"It must be remembered, at the same time, that this inconvenience of mathematical studies is confined to those *who cultivate them exclusively;* and that when combined, as they now generally are, with a taste for physical science, they enlarge infinitely our views of the wisdom and power displayed in the universe. The very intimate connection, indeed, which, since the date of the Newtonian philosophy, has existed between the different branches of mathematical and physical knowledge, *renders such a character as that of the mere mathematician a very rare, and scarcely a possible occurrence;* and cannot fail to have contributed powerfully to correct the peculiarities likely to characterize an understanding conversant exclusively with the relations of figures and of abstract quantities."†

Metaphysics, if pursued exclusively, would infallibly produce effects upon the mind similar to those developed by an exclusive attention to the mathematics, though on another side and from a different direction. The tendencies of the two studies should be made to oppose and neutralize each other. Fontenelle says:

"The *spirit* of geometrical inquiry is not so exclusively attached to geometry, as to be incapable of being applied to other branches of knowledge. A work of morals, of politics, of criticism, or even of eloquence, will, if all other circum-

* *Pensées*, par. i., art. 10.

† *Philos. of Human Mind*, part iii., ch. i., sect. iii.

stances have been the same, be the more beautiful, for having come from the hand of a geometrician."*

In ancient and in modern times the atheistic tendency of metaphysical pursuits has been recognized. Cicero mentions it as a fact rendered probable by the popular belief, that "those who pay attention to philosophy, are atheists."† "He that sits down a philosopher," says Francis Quarles, "rises up an atheist."‡ Since Paul warned the Colossians not to be victimized through philosophy, many Christians have been properly shy of the philosophers. "The ancient fathers," says Bayle, "regarded the disputations of the philosophers as one of the greatest obstacles that the true faith could encounter in its progress;"‖ and, as his own opinion, asserts, that "the best use we can make of the study of philosophy is to learn that it is a *road of error*, and that we ought to seek another guide, namely the revealed Light."§ In the following extract from his chapter on "the Metaphysician," Dugald Stewart testifies to the sceptical inclination of metaphysical studies and their dangerous tendency to engross the attention exclusively, when once strongly arrested, which he considers, (wrongly we think,) peculiar to themselves:

"When the *mere metaphysician* is called on to exercise his faculties on other subjects, he cannot easily submit to the task of examining details, or of ascertaining facts; and is apt to seize on a few *data* as first principles, following them out *boldly* to their remotest consequences and afterwards employing his ingenuity to reconcile, by means of artificial refinements, his theoretical assumptions with the exceptions, which seem to contradict them. . . What farther contributes to limit his information, is the *insulated nature of his pursuits*. . . Of his appropriate studies alone, it is a distinguishing characteristic to engross to themselves that attention which they have once deeply engaged, and, by withdrawing the curiosity from the fields of observation, of experiment, and of research, to

* *Préface aux Eloges—Œuvres*, tom. v. p. 8, apud Dr. Brown.
† *De Invent.* lib. i., 29.
‡ *Enchiridion*, 4, 46.
‖ II. *Eclair. sur les Athées.*
§ *Dictionaire*, voce *Bunel*, note E.

shut up all the external channels of intellectual improvement. . . Metaphysical studies, when their effects are not powerfully controlled by the moral principles and feelings of our nature, have a tendency to encourage a disposition to *unlimited scepticism* on the most interesting and important subjects of philosophical inquiry."*

Such are the effects of an exclusive pursuit of pure philosophy, and no better are to be expected from confining the attention *solely* to matters of observation. Naturally in this case, there would be produced a habit of treating all subjects in an empirical manner,—a reliance solely upon appearances, and, as Pascal remarks, "an incapability of the patience to descend to the first principles of speculative matters;" † and "very little improvement," as Locke says, results from "all that crowd of particulars, that either pass through, or lodge themselves in the understanding." ‡

But, it may be asked, when these elements are combined into one harmonious and catholic philosophy, does not a study emerge which is superior to the *pure* mathematics as an exercise of mind? Our reply is, superior undoubtedly in some, but inferior also in other, respects. The *exclusive* pursuit, however, of the former would be equally hostile to the attainment of that varied activity of mind, which is the expression of its most perfect development, and especially prejudicial in its strong tendency to produce a devoted application to the speculative and metaphysical portions of the study, which constitute its principal and distinguishing elements. We have found these elements in no respect superior to the mathematics as a means of intellectual training, save and except in the paltry obstacles they present for conquest, by the use of the ordinary and ambiguous language. In philosophy, there is no element fitted to execute the peculiar work of mathematical study in a liberal education. These studies are the co-ordinates, not the substitutes, of each other. Necessarily, the *applied* mathematics constitute a study better

* *Philosophy*, vol. iii., pp. 185-6, Cambridge.
† *Pensées*, par. i., art. 10, p. 116, Paris.
‡ *Conduct of the Understanding*, § 13.

calculated than the *pure*, to supply that cultivation, upon which Sir William Hamilton founds the superiority of (observational) philosophy. We cannot, however, enter upon an exposition of this subject. Nor have we space to cite any of the testimonies to the glory and utility of the applied mathematics, which are found in literature from the days in which its earlier triumphs inspired the muse of Silius Italicus,* to the present time when, through the mathematical researches of a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Laplace, and their co-labourers, the harmonies of the universal frame and the very song of the morning stars have been interpreted to the admiring nations.

ART. III.—*Representative Responsibility, a Law of the Divine Procedure in Providence and Redemption.* By the Rev. HENRY WALLACE. Edinburgh, 1867.

THERE are few passages of Scripture more opposed to rationalism—"the wisdom of the world,"—than those which assert the apostasy and condemnation of the race, through the first sin of the first man. That this is a Biblical assertion, it is impossible to deny or doubt. Every believer in the Bible must accept the statement that the descendants of Adam, by ordinary generation, are "by nature the children of wrath," through the disobedience of their first parent in Eden. A variety of explanations of what all Christians hold on this subject has been given. There is, first, the Pelagian theory of imitation; secondly, that of inherited weaknesses and tendencies to evil, by which sinful action is made certain; thirdly, that of the transmission of a sinful nature, arising from the parental relation of Adam to the race; fourthly, that of the guilt or penal liability of the race to the consequences of Adam's sin by virtue of "federal headship," or a covenant which God made with him; finally, some teach that all explanations are valueless—that the ruin of man is the result

**Punicorum*, lib. xii., 341 sq.

of inscrutable appointment, a matter wholly inexplicable on any grounds of reason whatsoever. All these views of the constitution under which man was placed, have been earnestly maintained by friends of revelation, in order to remove or abate the natural repugnance which is aroused by the undeniable teaching of Scripture. Our direct aim in the interpretation of Scripture should be, not to vindicate God or satisfy man, but in a candid spirit to apply to it just principles of exegesis. Generally it will be found that, however repugnant Scripture may be to our instincts or feelings, it will so vindicate itself at the bar of reason, as at least to command our reverent submission. When by the help of nature, Providence, the Bible, and the Holy Spirit, the meaning of a Divine revelation is apprehended, the difficulties suggested by our reason are speedily overcome, or despoiled of their power to disturb a rational faith.*

That justice lies at the foundation of the arrangement or system of human existence, no believer in the moral government of God can doubt; and it is a fair presumption that justice in this case is not absolutely concealed from those upon whom it has operated so disastrously, and in whom God has planted an innate instinct for the just and the true, a moral sense, the primal bond of union between God and man. For, however injured and perverted that sense of justice in human souls may be, it certainly requires a solution of this revealed fact of the ruin of the race in Adam, in accordance with the self-evident principles of rectitude. Whether this is a proper, a righteous demand, is not now the question; we simply assert that with the revelations and intimations of the Bible on the subject, the mind craves a perception of the righteousness of the Divine appointment. If such a solution is not precluded by the terms of the revelation it may be diligently, if humbly sought for. The appeal of Abraham to God, Will not the Judge of all the earth do right? and the appeal of our Lord to the Jews, Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?

* A rational believer is one, (1) to whom the subject matter of his faith is expressed in intelligible language; and (2) who has good and sufficient reasons for what he believes.

suggest that an inquiry into the matter is not unreasonable; and all will admit that a statement of the case founded on universally recognized facts, and clear and manifold analogies, must be available in justifying the ways of God to men.

A large number of Calvinistic divines adopt the fourth of the above-named explanations, as involving fewer difficulties, and far more fully covering the declarations of God concerning the subject than any of the others. Indeed they regard it, not merely as a convenient theory by which to interpret the declarations of Scripture, but as an actual historic fact, the simple statement of truth by God himself.

Notwithstanding, however, the wide acceptance hitherto of this view, we think it is evident that the drift of thought in our times has been extensively in opposition to it. And the odium which exists against the doctrine in every form is directed against this statement of it with much skill and energy; and "the doctrine of 'the guilt of Adam's first sin,' that is, the liability to punishment of Adam's posterity, on the ground of his first sin, independently of their own actual sin, is regarded by many as so obviously unjust and unreasonable that it is only to be dismissed from thought on the bare announcement."*

Mr. Wallace confronts the repugnance to this view, arising from whatever cause it may, and aims to establish the position that it is wholly without ground, either in man's reason or in his sense of justice, and that the doctrine of the Fall, so extensively held by Calvinists since the Reformation, and indeed by the whole church whether Catholic or Protestant, is the only view which can be sustained either from reason or from revelation. This he does by giving a clear analysis of antecedent principles and facts which underlie the constitution of human existence and form the basis of the Divine administration in providence and redemption. Whatever there is of value in any and all the other theories is recognized, and Christian faith as well as Divine justice and sovereignty are fully honoured; and the question of the Adamic connection is remanded to the sphere of nature and of providence, where is found, as he maintains, a

* Rep. Resp., p. 70.

facile and sure interpretation of the declarations of Scripture on the subject.

In order the better to appreciate the scope and force of his work, let us first settle with some precision the Scripture revelations which give occasion for the argument.

The Bible everywhere assumes and asserts that all men are under the condemnation of God; that the sentence of his retributive justice rests upon them, in consequence of which they are, apart from his grace, irretrievably lost. Infinite grace, alone, can recover them from their helpless state. Such declarations as these warrant the statement: "He that believeth on Him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already. . . . the wrath of God abideth on him."* "Judgment unto condemnation has come upon all men."† "The whole world is guilty before God."‡ "By grace ye are saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God."§ To say that our condemnation is arbitrary, without reason or valid justification, were impious. Men are condemned by God for some reason, for some judicial reason, all-prevalent and all-sufficient. The nature of God is such as to assure us, beyond all peradventure, that "the curse causeless" does not come.

There is then something that justifies God; something that renders it just, if not a necessity, in God to pronounce sentence of condemnation upon each and every human being. This, as we are most explicitly taught in the Bible, is sin, *ἀνομία*, the transgression of God's law. Sin, without controversy, is the cause of the curse under which the whole race lies.

In examining the Scriptures on the subject, we find sin viewed in a threefold aspect. Confining ourselves now, to the Epistle to the Romans, we there note a most interesting and instructive statement of these three forms of sin. It is given with much detail, and in connection with it, the relations of Christ as our Redeemer to each respectively. In the first three chapters, we have a full and fearfully minute account of what is generally called *actual* sin, the actual transgression of the moral law. The catalogue of different forms of actual sin is long and exhaustive, covering both tables of the law, and applied alike to Gentiles and to Jews; and the apostle sums up

* John iii. 18, 36. † Rom. v. 18. ‡ Rom. iii. 19. § Eph. ii. 8.

his statements, by declaring that "the whole world is guilty before God," that is to say, obnoxious to Divine condemnation. Every mouth is stopped, all excuses are set aside, and every human being capable of transgression is a transgressor, and as such lies under the sentence of eternal justice. One cannot but remark the logical skill of the Apostle, in thus first convicting man universally of actual sin. Other sin, being of a very different character, and existing independently of the act, or the sinner's own will, would naturally be the subject of great incredulity and scepticism. Its existence and workings are known chiefly by the testimony of him against whom the whole world are in rebellion, and his declarations would be received with little favour, by those whom he had not already convicted and sentenced for their individual conduct. They are, therefore, silenced at the outset; and then the additional terrible revelations are made, and left to work in the thoughtful and repentant, according to their various circumstances and feelings.

In the fifth chapter, by way of revealing Christ in the character of the second Adam, sin, as acted by our first parent in Paradise, is announced as another ground and explanation of the universal condemnation of the race. Here the ruin of those who never personally and responsibly violated the law of God is asserted and accounted for, as resulting from the first sin of Adam. His eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree, is stated to have made or constituted all men sinners, and to have brought the whole world into penal relations to the law and government of God. Thus judgment unto condemnation has come upon all human beings by the one offence of one man. The race, so to speak, is outlawed by Adam's first sin, and its guilt (*reatus*) holds in its adamantine bonds every one of his posterity descending from him by ordinary generation.

In the sixth and seventh chapters we have a vivid description of what the Apostle calls, indwelling sin; a powerful principle of evil residing in the secret recesses of the soul, and underlying consciousness; a master power, that brings the soul, the whole man, into captivity to itself, and so is the proximate cause of all particular acts which are contrary to the Divine law. It is this, which our standards define as *original*

sin,* consisting in the want of original righteousness and the corruption of our whole nature, and which is often styled in the writings of divines, inbred or inherent sin, hereditary depravity, native corruption.

The apostle passes from this discussion to a statement which he deduces from his account of the remedies provided by Christ, for these several forms of sin; namely, that "there is therefore, now, *no* condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus!"† All occasions and reasons for condemnation are completely removed from those who are united to Christ by faith.

These three forms or kinds of sin are thus clearly distinguished by the Apostle, actual sin; Adam's first sin; and indwelling or original sin. And their distinct differences are still more clearly indicated by the corresponding revelation of the methods of deliverance from each. While salvation from sin, in every form, is through the virtue of the atonement, actual sins are offset by the pardon and acceptance of the believer on the basis of the righteousness of Christ; the sin of Adam is countervailed by the obedience of Christ as the second Adam; and original sin is remedied and removed by the renewing and sanctifying power of the Spirit of Christ.

Of these various forms of sin which concur in explaining and justifying the Divine condemnation of the race, the first in the order both of nature and of time, is the second named by the Apostle, the "one offence" of Adam. By this all men are made or constituted sinners; by this, judgment unto condemnation has come upon all men. Here is the beginning and foundation of all human sin and condemnation. This is that which makes indwelling and actual sin, certainties. It is the fontal iniquity. And the order in which these are named in our standards, is a recognition of the high place this sin holds

* Some have interpreted the answer to the eighteenth question of the Shorter Catechism as meaning that the three items, (*a*) the guilt of Adam's first sin, (*b*) the want of original righteousness, and (*c*) the corruption of his whole nature, together constitute "original sin." Those that do so, however, distinguish, or should distinguish between original sin *imputed*, which is the same as "the guilt of Adam's first sin," and original sin *inherent*, which embraces the second and third items of the answer. It is original sin *inherent* to which the Apostle refers in the chapters just cited.

† Rom. viii. 1.

in man's apostate condition; thus we have as an account of the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fall, 1st, the guilt of Adam's first sin; 2dly, the consequent want of original righteousness, and corruption of his whole nature; and 3dly, actual transgressions proceeding from this sinful condition.

There are some who practically ignore this first sin of Adam, in connection with man's destiny and duty. They teach that it is of little concern to us, to know how we became sinners, lost and condemned; it is enough to know that we are actual sinners and to seek to be saved from the manifold and fearful sins of which we are personally guilty. And even original sin inherent, which so corrupts and enslaves men, and is the fountain whence all actual transgressions proceed, is often regarded as a matter of minor importance. As it lies beneath our consciousness, and can be known only by Divine testimony and its actings in the heart and life, it is held, that we need not concern ourselves much about it. If we only attend to its fruits and watch its motions, we will have enough to occupy our thought and time. But with the revelations of God in our hands, an intelligent piety should not thus practically set aside his fearful declarations on this subject. How can we properly appreciate our Redeemer, unless we know how God regards, in all its aspects, that from which we are redeemed? If by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, surely, that which has wrought such infinite disaster to our kind, is not a matter to be lightly accounted of. Redemption reaches far beyond our actual sins. It accomplishes more for us, than our pardon and acceptance with God. To know the second Adam aright in his substitution and covenant relations to us, it is essential that we should know the first Adam in his covenant relations to God and to his posterity.

What now is the precise character of the connection between man's condemnation by God and the first sin of Adam? How does that sin operate to bring the Divine curse on the whole human family? There are in fact but two methods of reply which engage thoughtful and earnest minds in the Calvinistic portion of the church. On the one hand, the Adamic connection is attempted to be explained by what is usually termed "mediate imputation;" a view first made prominent by Pla-

ceus of the University of Saumur, in the earlier part of the seventeenth century. The relation of the first sin of Adam to his posterity is regarded as *indirect.* The penal consequences of that sin are not a direct or immediate condemnation of the race; but the union between Adam and the race was of such a nature, that upon his act the race became depraved, and the penalty of that sin is visited upon them as possessing a depraved nature, which, by reason of its opposition to the law of God, creates a righteous ground for such an infliction.

Those who hold this view do not agree among themselves in their expositions of it. There are some who teach that all men were in Adam "generically," as Levi was in the loins of Abraham when he paid tithes to Melchizedec a hundred years before he was born.* With these, Adam's act was their act as really and truly as it was his, and they are condemned for it precisely as he was.

Others teach that Adam by his disobedience forfeited the Divine Spirit and corrupted his own nature; and being the parent or natural head of the race, gave birth to a posterity in his own depraved image, under the working of the law of nature "that like begets or produces like." Thus Adam's first sin brought condemnation to himself and corruption or original sin to his posterity, and on account of this moral depravity, they are justly condemned.

We do not design to examine this view of the Adamic connection. We simply remark, that it does not seem to recognize the clear and broad distinction which we find in the Scriptures, and which, as we have seen, the Apostle Paul so plainly asserts, between the one offence of Adam as a distinct ground or cause of the condemnation of all men, and indwelling or original sin, as another and different cause of the Divine curse.

Old Calvinists have found in the Bible the assertion of another fact, termed "immediate imputation." We prefer to state just what this is, in the language of the late Principal Cunningham. "The doctrine which has been held upon this subject, by the great body of Calvinistic divines, is this, that in virtue of a federal headship or representative identity,

* Heb. vii. 9, 10.

established by God between Adam and all descending from him by ordinary generation, his first sin is imputed to them, or put down to their account; and they are regarded and treated by God as if they had all committed it in their own person, to the effect of their being subjected to its legal penal consequences,—so that, in this sense, they may be truly said to have sinned in him and fallen with him in his first transgression. Upon this theory, the direct and immediate imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity, or the holding them as involved in the guilt or *reatus* of that offence, is regarded as prior in the order of nature and causality to the transmission and universal prevalence among men of a depraved moral nature; and as being, to some extent, the cause or ground,—the *rationale* or explanation—of the fearful fact that man is morally what he is, a thoroughly ungodly and depraved being."*

The former view, when separated from philosophical explanations, refers the Adamic connection to absolute Divine sovereignty. It regards simply the fact of the universal depravity of the race in him. It makes no attempt to vindicate that fact as an exhibition of Divine justice. It affirms that it must be just, because an essentially just God has so ordered it, and makes its reception as a governmental arrangement a matter of pure faith beyond the pale of reason or observation. The strictly judicial and forensic style of statement in Rom. v. is, as it appears to us, overlooked, and no attempt is made therefrom to ascertain the rectitude of the Divine procedure.

If now it can be shown that the condemnation of the race, resulting from the first sin of Adam, is of the nature of a penal infliction, a proper punishment for a known actual transgression of the law of God, not only would the interpretation of the Scriptures on the subject be made simple and clear, but perfect relief would be afforded to our minds in the discovery that the Judge of all the earth has done right, has simply executed strict justice in the condemnation of man for the sin of Adam. And besides, it seems evident, that by finding—as

* The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, p. 374.

Mr. Wallace attempts we think most successfully to do—in the widely prevalent existence of Representative Responsibility, a ground on which to vindicate the ways of God to men in this matter, we transfer the argument from the sphere of revealed to that of natural religion, and thus obtain an advantage in apologetic Christianity over deists and almost all classes of oppugners of revelation, by meeting them on their own ground and contending against them with their own weapons.

It is a noticeable fact, moreover, that many Calvinists who deny immediate imputation in the Adamic connection, affirm it in that between Christ and believers. While refusing to admit that the race is condemned for the first sin of Adam, as their covenant or representative head, they firmly hold to the immediate imputation, on the one hand, of Christ's righteousness to believers, and on the other, of our sins to Christ. The rationale of this discrepancy, why the first is discredited and the latter allowed, is a very interesting inquiry. The careful reader of Mr. Wallace's book is made to understand the fallacy in the logic of these reasoners. He will see most clearly, that the same principle—a principle necessary to human existence—underlies the three facts, and must be applied alike to them all.

The peculiar value of this work consists in the place assigned to, and the use made of, certain facts, often referred to by defenders of this doctrine and allowed by all studious observers of human life. It is customary to consider the character of the Adamic relation chiefly a matter of biblical exegesis and interpretation. Mr. Wallace puts forth his whole strength in the elaboration and application of those principles and facts bearing on this subject which are admitted by all parties, and which may be discovered independently of Scripture. The service that he has thus rendered to the truth, we consider of very great value, and of signal importance in the present status of the Presbyterian church in this country."*

* In giving an account of this argument, we shall not, except in a few instances, burden our pages with quotation marks and references. The reader can readily determine what are and what are not extracts from the book. Though we largely quote his language, the task of exhibiting fairly

Mr. Wallace commences his argument by referring to a fact, not often noticed in discussions on the Adamic connection, viz., the comparative silence of the Bible on the subject. Considering, he says, the vast issues involved in this alleged arrangement, it may at first sight appear somewhat strange that there is so little positive direct teaching on the subject in the holy Scriptures. The only places in which he finds it expressly asserted are Rom. v. 12—21, and 1 Cor. xv. 21. He remarks —What is very evident as soon as attention is directed to it, that in these passages it is presented as a familiar and well-known truth, and in such a form as to preclude the necessity of any formal or laboured proof. Like the being of God, Adam's representative character is taken for granted throughout the Bible. So familiar a truth, so universally understood and allowed, is it assumed to be by the Apostle, that he employs it as a perfectly intelligible illustration of the representative character of Christ. He says, that the moral principles that underlies the fact is supposed to be universally accepted, so that when the Apostle would set forth the relation between Christ and elect sinners, he feels himself to possess a great argumentative advantage in affirming that although he proclaims a new fact, he introduces no new principle, that it is the very same which accounts for the transmission and prevalence of sin and death in the world, namely, the representative principle. The covenant relation between Adam and his posterity is not to be regarded therefore as an exceptional or singular case. It is singular as being the first, and as involving consequences more momentous and vaster in extent than any similar case. But the moral principle which underlies it is not singular, but familiar to man antecedent to revelation, and apart from its teaching. Whatever reproach, therefore, men have attached to the alleged fact of the sin of one man having been imputed to the whole race, as being unjust, and impossible to a just and good God, does not belong to Divine revela-

and fully Mr. Wallace's views, in so brief a compass as this article permits, is a difficult one. If we can induce others to read the book for themselves, we feel assured that they will be richly repaid, and many lines of thought, and objections to which we have not referred will be found dealt with in a frank, and, we think, satisfactory manner.

tion. Divine revelation finds the principle in the constitution of human nature, and in active operation in the moral government of God, and does not therefore present it as an authoritative dogma, but assumes its truth and uses it as an indisputable basis on which to found the great argument of righteousness by Christ. In treating, therefore, of this subject, he does not search for proofs of its truth in the word of God, but endeavours to discover where revelation found it, when it treated it as a truth lying within the observation of man.

We think this a very striking and interesting statement, and if it can be made good, the real character of the Adamic connection would appear to be settled. The nature of man's responsibility to God is of course involved in the question, and this again involves that of man's moral relation to God. The solution of the latter goes far towards the solution of the former.

On the subject of man's relation to God there are two hypotheses which seem to comprehend and exhaust the whole case. The two hypotheses are these: I. The direct and immediate relation of each individual to be maintained on his own proper personal responsibility. This supposes God to regard all men as distinct and separate units, each to give an account of himself to God. Or, II. That the race is regarded as a unity, an organic body, no one individual capable of any external relation apart from the whole—not capable of possessing or maintaining a relation to God otherwise than as being an integral part of the one body. This hypothesis implies that the responsibility of maintaining that relation to God is incompetent to any private member of the community, that it is the common and indivisible responsibility of all, and only capable of discharge by common or joint action.*

* It has been suggested to the writer that there is a third hypothesis which should have been considered by Mr. W., viz., that involved in the realistic notion of generic humanity. According to this theory the responsibility of the race is assigned, not to a single individual or to all the individuals of the species, but to that mysterious entity, called "man," the *genus homo*. When Adam sinned, the act was not that of a single person, but of the one human nature which existed in him, and which though undeveloped and undistributed, was a real vital and responsible existence, and by its act the apostacy

Having stated these hypotheses, he proceeds to try each of them by the test of natural reason and the sense of justice. In regard to the first, that of separate and distinct personal responsibility, the fundamental inquiry is: What provision has been made for its recognition and discharge in the constitution of man, and in the government of God. Of course, if no provision has been made by the Supreme Ruler to secure these ends, the hypothesis of the individual responsibility of each and all fails, and must be dismissed. Self-evidently the condition of a just responsibility for any action or course of action are these two. (1) A natural competency for its performance, and (2) sufficient liberty, that is freedom from compulsory restraint, to permit its performance. How are these conditions provided for in the constitution of man and in the government of God? As a matter of fact, human nature is so constituted that every member of the race, after the first pair, is born into the world in a state of helpless dependence, without any consciousness of moral relation, or moral power, or accountability. Here is palpably, a natural disability, rendering the discharge of moral obligations impossible, thus indicating that direct personal responsibility is not the law of the whole of man's personal existence, and does not exhaust the whole case of human obligation to God. That the infant is comprehended within a moral government, and in some way involved in its obligations, is proved by the fact that it is placed under the influence of moral order and privilege, and in custody of moral beings.

His next inquiry is, what provision is made under the government of God for that liberty of judgment and of action essential to a just accountability, when man's moral consciousness is at length awakened? Here he shows that man's first

was accomplished, and condemnation passed upon all men. We are aware that this theory has been held and taught by individuals of high standing in the American church, but we presume that as a theory accounting for the fall and condemnation of mankind it did not appear to Mr. Wallace to hold a place of sufficient importance to require his notice. There is a variety of hypotheses which have been proposed, besides those named and discussed by Mr. W., to account for the ruined condition of the race. They all doubtless seemed to him so far from meeting the conditions of the problem set forth in the Scriptures, as to be entirely unworthy of his regard. At any rate, if his affirmative argument in behalf of the second of the two he has considered is sustained, all others are excluded by the necessity of the case.

consciousness of moral relation and obligation is not towards God, but towards human beings. He feels himself under the authoritative control of others; he is subject to them; he is responsible to them. This limitation of his natural liberty is not only thus close, near lying to him, it is also ultimate. He sees none beyond it, nor above it, human or Divine. Whether he shall hear of a higher authority and relation, or when or under what aspects they shall be presented to him, is dependent upon those immediate authorities under which he is born and compelled to exist and grow. Natural reason and justice would lead us to expect that an immediate personal responsibility to God should rest upon the perception or consciousness of an immediate personal relation to God, just as an immediate personal relation to human authority rests upon the perception of an immediate personal relation to man. In the early period of conscious life no provision for this is made; every element of the Divine economy under which man was placed, upon which direct personal responsibility could be justly based, is absent.

Finally—the after progress of man's mental development when emerging from childhood, can hardly be regarded so free and independent as to qualify him for maintaining responsibility to God on his own responsibility. He must accept the conclusions of other minds, and act upon them before he is capable of forming any judgment of the grounds on which they are based. He is held so long in a state of tutelage that he is hardly left a chance to form an independent judgment. And when he reaches a period in which he wishes to act an independent part in the business of life, he finds himself borne along by a powerful public sentiment, providing him with ready-made opinions, determining for him the maxims of his life, his tastes, his habits, his politics, his religious professions, even. From these and such like considerations, Mr. Wallace concludes, that the arrangements of Providence in connection with the training of childhood and youth, and development into manhood, do not seem to have been designed and adapted to fit every man to maintain an immediate personal relation to God on his own responsibility.

In a subsequent part of the work he makes use of this argument with great effect. His illustrations and inferences are

admirable; but we must refer the reader to the volume itself for them.

In this way the first of the hypotheses referred to, is set aside. Such a solution of the question of man's moral relation and responsibility to God is wholly inadequate. The second, viz., that the race is a unity, whose relation to God was to be righteously maintained by a responsible representative, and that that representative was the ancestor of the race—is then considered, illustrated, and defended with great acumen and logical power. Without a taint of scholastic realism or nominalism, and with a remarkable independence of either the "dynamic" or "atomic" theories of modern philosophical speculation, he shows that the constitution of man is of an organic character, essentially "social," and that the providential arrangements and dealings of God in connection with the race are adapted to this kind of constitution and to no other. "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of all the earth." They have a common ancestry, and therefore natural relations to each other. Mankind, therefore, forms a natural unity, an organism. No man is an isolated unit. He cannot exist independently of others. His social relations are not voluntary, nor of arbitrary selection; they spring from the natural instincts of his native constitution. The natural unity suggests the possibility of a common relation, a common interest, common action, and if the moral element be superadded, a common responsibility. The final cause of a moral nature and of moral principles is manifestly the maintenance of moral relations. The consciousness of possessing a moral nature can only arise simultaneously with the perception of a moral relation. Our moral powers, like all our other powers, come into consciousness, stirred into action by their proper object. And the proper object, or in other words, the necessary condition of moral action, is a perceived relation to other moral beings. This perception of moral relation is found, in point of fact, to follow so closely upon the natural, that the child very early becomes aware of a controlling influence distinct from physical force and above it. There is a magisterial authority vested in the race, the power of self-government, insomuch that every man feels himself to be respon-

sible to mankind; and that every man has a claim upon his justice, and that he himself is entitled to justice from every man. Universal experience testifies to the organic relation of the members of the race. Every man feels that his acts, while personal to himself, are relative to others also. Their influence does not exhaust itself within his own individuality. It is transitive, passing over upon others, to an undefined extent for good or for evil. Even the whole genesis of his act is not to be found in himself. Its antecedent future and collateral relations are widely extended. The one single act comprehends within it the fruits of other minds, of other wills, of other responsibilities. After illustrating this position, Mr. Wallace very pertinently observes: "On the principle of a purely personal responsibility, might I not justly say, if I am to be responsible for my acts, let them then be exclusively my own, originated by my free and independent will, underived by any tradition from others, uninfluenced from without, by authority, by example, by custom, having no element in them which is not exclusively my own? And let not the acts of others affect me." We feel that no act of ours could be what it is, but for the antecedent and collateral acts of others, acts over which we had no control. We cannot resist the influence of the acts and sentiments of others. They are the common property of the race. We cannot isolate ourselves, on one course of thought. Thus, in this economy there is a natural provision made originally by God for the free and generous circulation of good through the channel of the "one blood," through all hearts for ever. Sin has taken possession of the same channel, and so secured the most perfect natural facility for transfusing itself as widely as the "one blood" flows. Man's constitution, natural and moral, is adapted to society, not to solitude. And in bestowing this constitution, it is evident that God has had regard, rather to the interdependence of the race, than to the independence of the individual. And it is also evident that God has adapted his moral government to this constitution of human nature, and that it proceeds upon the principle of ruling an organized unity, rather than separate and detached units. "He hath fashioned their hearts alike." Millions, therefore, can feel a common sentiment, obey a common impulse, acquire

a common character. Hence we have public opinion, national responsibility, national action, national character.

From this survey of the constitution of man and the government of God, he concludes, that the original design of God contemplated the race as a unity, with a common responsibility to himself—that his relation to mankind was to be maintained upon those grounds, and that therefore the personal responsibility of each individual to God was not primarily direct and immediate, no basis in nature or providence having been laid to render such a form of responsibility possible. The responsibility provided for was common and indivisible.

We have occupied more space than we intended in the statement of this portion of Mr. Wallace's argument; but as it is the corner-stone of his whole fabric, we shall be pardoned for allowing him thus freely to speak for himself.

His next inquiry relates to the provision made for the common action necessary to this joint responsibility to God. His position here is, that it is the universal experience of mankind, that joint regulated action by communities is possible only on the principle of representation. His demonstration and illustration of this are exceedingly clear and forcible. We can give only the briefest account of his line of argument. He remarks that in every organized association of men there are common obligations, not distributed in separate and independent portions among the several members, so that each might discharge his own share apart from the others; but, being common, are indivisible, and can only be discharged by such action as shall be regarded to be the action of the community. Joint action of all the members, and separate action, are equally impossible from the nature of the case; and yet the obligation to action is imperative and indispensable. The difficulty is solved by having recourse to the principle of representative responsibility. One becomes the official and responsible representative of the whole association, whatever it may be; and to him is transferred the common obligation to be discharged by him in the name and on the behalf of all. The minute division of the race into families is a perpetual illustration and evidence of the universality of the operation of this principle. The formal adoption of this principle of representative respon-

sibility is necessary to the coherence of every human association, civil, political, or religious. The representative is bound by his office to act for his constituency, and the constituency is bound by the acts of the representative, and in the interests of public justice must abide the consequences of those acts.

Moreover, this order of association acting by representation is not adopted by man arbitrarily, nor as one expedient among many which might with more or less success serve the same end. Nor is it adopted as a conclusion of deductive reason, nor as the result of experience. It is the sole expedient known to man by which the order of human association can be maintained, or by which the ends of human association can be attained. This arrangement, by which so much power is placed in the hands of *one* person, involves vast risks. Failure, disaster, may ensue from his lack either of ability or fidelity. Still the same expedient must be resorted to afresh, how often soever failure shall follow failure. The order of the Divine government admits no other; the constitution of human nature is adapted to no other. No other principle of order will serve the same purpose. It alone gives personality to the community, and renders possible the discharge of reciprocal obligation by related communities. Without it there could be neither legislation nor government among men.

The application of this to the relation of Adam to his posterity is thus stated at length. The reader cannot fail to perceive that the Adamic relation is simply the primary instance of this prevailing form of moral order.

Another fact connected with the economy of the race, of signal importance, is that the responsible representative is not self-chosen or self-appointed. The responsibility inheres in the community. No individual can take upon himself to act for the community. Such a person would not be recognized by them. A formal public appointment by legitimate authority is essential to create a responsible representative. Thus only can the community be identified with his official acts. Adam appointed by the sovereign Creator and Proprietor of the race is thus a legitimate and responsible representative of the race: and that his posterity should be involved in the consequences of his first act of transgression, in his fall and its necessary

results, is a necessary result of the established social order of Divine providence. The objection, therefore, that the race should suffer for the sin of the first man violates our sense of justice is entirely groundless, for by the principle of representative responsibility alone can true effect be given to our sense of public justice. That the members of a community should severally be able to repudiate the official or representative acts of its recognized head, whenever each chose to regard it for his private interest to do so, would be a violation of our sense of justice, and would render all organized association impossible. It would offend the reason of mankind, not less than the sense of right. So that if the head of the community is legitimately such, *i. e.*, not self-constituted, he is truly their *representative*, and we have all that is required in the case. The community are bound to and bound by their representative. And in the instance before us, we need go no farther in order to perceive the essential rectitude of the dealings of God with our race in the Adamic connection. Given the organic unity of the race, it would seem no other solution of the problem is either needful or possible.

By a variety of arguments, he proves that Adam was the representative of the race by the necessities of the constitution under which it exists. Recurring to the first of the two hypotheses he had named, he shows that Adam alone of all mankind was endowed with the personal qualities, and the personal liberty to which a direct *personal* responsibility could justly attach. He alone at the beginning of his life was placed in immediate conscious relation to God, and in a right relation to God consciously maintained is the eternal happiness of man placed. The economy of human nature and the economy of the Divine government rendered it impossible that any human being after Adam should possess the personal competency, or be placed in the condition necessary to a just exercise of personal responsibility. It could not be thought just that the infant newly born should be held responsible for its own well-being. And as all parents subsequent to Adam are at first infants, and subject to invincible disabilities in the way of *personal* responsibility, the original headship of the race must have devolved on Adam. The destiny of the race was, by the

Divine will, suspended upon the discharge of his own personal obligation to God, an obligation imperative upon him whether he had posterity or not. And thus the relations and character and endless future of man, were wrapped up in the personal responsibility of Adam. He was of necessity the only person who could act as man's representative before God. And he became, in fact, the civil and political, as well as moral head of the race; the true mediator, the prophet, priest, and king of all his posterity. But we need not pursue this argument further. The appointment of Adam as man's representative, vindicates itself from whatever point of view we regard it.

We have thus given, as fully as our limits permit, the fundamental positions of Mr. Wallace in this volume. We are unwilling to rest the case upon our statement of it. The book itself is far more cogent than this condensation or epitome of it can possibly be. Any one that will read it, will see and feel how inadequate our presentation of it is. The great importance of the doctrine for which he so lucidly and earnestly contends, cannot be properly appreciated, till seen in connection with the high topics to which he applies it. His chapters upon original sin, the representative character of Christ, the priesthood of Christ, atonement, symbolic worship or ritualism, and the work and witness of the Spirit, furnish evidence of this great fact in human history, and indicate the wisdom of the remarks he makes (p. 114 etc.) upon the dangers to the cause of truth that arise from our habit of contemplating it in fragments, and not trying to obtain a general and comprehensive grasp of its unity and completeness.

We cannot yet dismiss this volume. There are two or three matters congruous to its immediate subject and flowing out of it, with which our author deals in a most satisfactory manner. We may but briefly refer to them.

There is no theoretic inconsistency between the idea of representative responsibility in the Divine economy and in the human constitution which he maintains, and that of personal responsibility, or the action of the individual conscience. It belongs to the nature of the system of representa-

tative responsibility was at first ordained, that though the appointed representative acts for the community, the members of that community, each and all of them, owe allegiance to their representative, indeed, but none the less to God. He does not cut them off from all obligations to God, but is the medium of their reverential service. Personal duty required compliance with the Divine order, with the whole civil and religious economy established under the supreme administration of Adam. Personal responsibility was necessary to maintain the internal coherence of the race as a unity, by maintaining the reciprocal obligation between parents and children, and for ruling the necessary subdivisions of the race for orderly and harmonious action in all interests, civil and religious.

Another point in this connection is, the manner in which the responsibility of mankind to God has been affected by the fall of Adam. This subject is frequently referred to by Mr. Wallace.* The substance of his view is as follows. It must be kept in mind, that the responsibility of the race to God was a corporate responsibility, the race being, by the Divine constitution, a moral unity with a common obligation. This common obligation still inheres in the race, even after its responsible representative has violated its law. The original representative economy ceased with the defection of Adam, no provision having been made for a succession of representatives. The race cannot raise up a new representative, and God has not appointed one to maintain that first economy. That economy ceases. But its original obligation to God being moral and righteous, still remains. The curse of its violation is entailed upon the race, legally and justly, by the failure of the representative. The guilt (*reatus*) is the guilt of the race, but the race has lost the power of associated action by the loss of its responsible representative, and therefore can take no action in relation to this guilt. The race no longer exists as an organized moral unity. That unity has been shattered. Anarchy has come with all its dividing and destructive forces, and the loss of harmony amongst mankind is a moral demonstration of estrangement from God. But rebellion does not terminate the

* Rep. Resp., pp. 34, 35, 106, 107, 139, &c.

relation between the righteous Sovereign and his subjects, although the relation is no longer one of reciprocal righteousness. His righteousness remaineth, although their's has ceased; and in vindication of public justice, he righteously exacts the penalty. And, in the interests of public justice amongst men, it is necessary to act upon the very same principle, not as a conventional arrangement, but as a moral necessity. The unfaithfulness of an official head of an association, abates no claim which any other party may have upon it; the individual members are responsible, even after the association has been resolved into its elements. This is the condition of the human race since the fall. No righteous claim of God has been abated by that event. The "condemnation has passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" in their representative. The claim never lapses, and never can lapse. It was originally just—it is just for ever. It can only be discharged by being satisfied. That satisfaction is the work of priesthood; it never can be made by the individual members of the human family.

There is in this work an aspect of the subject of human inability to right moral action, worthy of our careful consideration. We are accustomed to derive this doctrine, logically, from that of original sin, and to say, that men, by reason of the depraved condition of their moral powers, are indisposed, *disabled*, and made opposite to all good. And this is a truth, directly asserted in the sacred word, as well as one logically inferred from the above and other doctrines.

In the order of nature, the legal and penal consequences of Adam's first sin precede the moral and spiritual; and man is rendered helpless and impotent by the former, as truly as by the latter. There is, therefore, in man, not only a lack of will to do right, but a lack of opportunity. The first sin of Adam brought his constituents into a state of condemnation, as really as into a state of moral depravity. The curse entailed by the sin of their representative binds them in its adamantine chains. They are not merely subjects held to loyalty, but prisoners also, held for execution or Divine clemency, as the case may be. While the obligation to individual right action remains, and blame inheres in the subject for all wrong action, the person is disqualified by his legal status from fulfilling the obliga-

tions which arise from the original constitution of the human family, and which abide on the members of the race, notwithstanding the failure of their representative upon whom the discharge of the common duty devolved. He is a lost man. He has had his trial in his representative, and it is most disastrously ended. The state of amnesty graciously proclaimed, does not put men on a new trial; it simply renders possible the rescue of individuals through the intervention of the second Adam. Mr. Wallace thus expresses himself on this point: "When Adam was separated by a righteous judgment of God from his original relation, obedience [*i. e.*, the fulfilment of the obligations arising from that relation*] was no longer possible to him; for obedience [*i. e.*, such fulfilment] is impossible to the man who is undergoing punishment. Adam is driven into punishment, a discrowned monarch, in sin and shame. But his condemnation was that of the whole race, whose representative he was. His relation to God determined their's. Every child born after the sentence of Adam's expulsion from his original relation to God, is of legal and righteous necessity born under that sentence, because of his original relation to Adam, by whose act, under the original terms and conditions of his relation to God, he is legally bound. He comes into the world, not within the relation within which original righteousness exists and acts, but under the legal entail of Adam's first sin. There is no longer to man a relation of reciprocal obligation to God. This essential condition of original righteousness being lost, all other elements being dependent upon it, are of necessity wanting. Obedience, which is the righteousness of a subject, is in the nature of the case impossible [in specific respects originally obligatory] to one under sentence of condemnation. . . . Our relation to God, therefore, is that of Adam after the fall. Our state of condemnation is a derived state, derived from our responsible relation to Adam. It is a state acquired not by one personal act, but original to us as a race, whose moral state has been determined for us by the act of our representative head. The obligation to obedience still remains, but man is separated from the relation in which obedience is

* The words between brackets are inserted, in the absence of Mr. Wallace's context.

possible. The duties of citizenship belong to every citizen; but the criminal shut up in prison is cut off from the possibility of fulfilling the duties of his proper relation to the state. Until his relation as a citizen has been restored, the duties of citizenship are impossible to him. Man is without that relation to God, in which righteous obedience is possible; he is, therefore, without original righteousness.* In redemption, the redeemed person must not only experience a change of nature, but a change of relation. He must be "delivered from the law," as well as renewed in the spirit of his mind. The representative character of Christ and that of Adam are analogous. All "in Adam" sin and fall with him. All "in Christ" obey and stand with him. The status of the constituency is the status of the representative, for weal or for woe. This view of the apostacy has been greatly lost sight of during the reign of the "Modern Divinity." Under the influence of a subtle humanitarianism, which has largely possessed the ministry of our day and much abated "the offence of the cross," the stern and appalling fact of man's condition before God, his absolute ruin out of Christ, is but feebly recognized.

Perhaps there is no more popular and prevalent objection to the doctrine of Adam's representative responsibility, or the immediate imputation† of his first sin to his posterity, than

* *Rep. Resp.*, pp. 52, 53. The meaning of Mr. Wallace is very evident. The inability to which he refers is real and most calamitous, and by many altogether overlooked; but lest it should be inferred that this inability is of such a character as to destroy the obligation to universal and perfect morality, we have indicated what we conceive to be the limitations which should be made, and which are implied in our author's reasonings.

† There is no doubt, that misapprehensions and misrepresentations have made the word "imputation" obnoxious to many persons. This, however, arises from ignoring the scriptural sense of "impute." The guilt (*reatus*) of Adam's first sin, reckoned to the account of his posterity, his federal headship, his acting as a "common" or "public" person, his being our representative, and the immediate imputation of his sin to the race, are all forms of expression indicating one and the same truth. We have met with those who admit the representative character of Adam, and yet stoutly deny the direct imputation of his sin to his posterity. The latter form of statement seems to them, to have lurking in or about it, some terrible injustice, like that of "the transfer of moral character," while the former is confessedly a scriptural truth. We would not quarrel about words, though we remind the objector that "impute" has no such meaning in Scripture. Nothing more is meant by the

the undeniable patent fact. But it is said that they had no voice in his selection and appointment to the headship of the race. The utter unfitness of the race at any time or under any circumstances, to make a choice, is palpable: indeed the thing is a physical impossibility; and because Adam's alleged position was not held by the will and vote of his constituency, it is argued that he never held it.

The objection proves too much. In effect it denies the fact itself of representative responsibility as a principle of moral and political order in the Divine economy and in the constitution of man. It assumes that unless the constituency appoint their head, they are not bound by his acts—he is not their representative. This carries the matter too far. The instances are exceedingly rare and limited, of the appointment of a representative by the voice of all the parties represented. Indeed the principle of representative responsibility, where the constituency have no voice whatever in the selection of the official head, is so widely prevalent in human history, that we have often wondered at the strength of feeling with which it is assailed when applied to the Adamic connection. Universal suffrage in a nation, or a state, or a community, is a physical impossibility. Electors themselves act representatively, as well as personally, in their votes. All women, minors, and others, in various ways incapacitated for suffrage, are acted for by those who exercise the franchise. In hereditary monarchies, in cases where military power appoints a king or emperor, in armies where the government appoints the general-in-chief, and with all those who come into being during the term of service of a ruler, the obligation to be held by the acts of the existing representative, is an obligation of nature; it cannot be avoided except by revolution or rebellion. The agency of Divine providence in the economy of these and such like appointments, is too palpably evident to be controverted. But there are other instances, that vindicate our view of the Adamic relation, where the possibility of an election or voice

one mode of speech, than by the other. If it is conceded that Adam was a public person, acting as the covenant head of the race, all that the advocates of the immediate imputation of his sin contend for, is virtually conceded.

of any kind, on the part of the constituency is precluded, where the Divine appointment is an absolute necessity. There is scarcely any relation in the world in which the principle of representative responsibility is more signally instanced, than in that of the family; and yet, those represented, those most thoroughly involved in the acts of the parents, have no voice in their appointment. Their representatives were selected and assigned to their official place, by the order of Divine providence, before those for whom they act had existence. And so with the church. Its Head, the responsible substitute and sponsor of all its members, was "God's elect" before the church had a being. The second Adam was constituted the representative of the redeemed by no concurrence of theirs, however they may afterwards sanction it. Yet who, in either of the above instances, would be disposed to question, on the one hand, the representative character of the designated heads, or the validity of the tenure by which they hold their office and bind their constituents? When a social organization is the creation of God, it would seem eminently proper that he should select its responsible chief. The assignment of the first Adam to the headship of the race, was from the same All-wise source as that of the second Adam to the headship of the church. On this point Mr. Wallace remarks—"The unreasoning flippancy with which some object to their responsibility for the act of Adam, because they had no part in choosing him as their representative, shows singular want of thought and of discriminating observation of the settled order of God's providence. It is evident that when God himself directly institutes a social organization, he always appoints, either by special act, or by an invariable natural order, the ruling and representative head. By an invariable natural order he appoints the head of every family throughout all generations, because the family is his own immediate institution, and he has made it impossible that its head should be elective by man. His church is of his own institution, and he has appointed its representative head by his own sovereign act, his own Son, without the intervention of human election. The unity of the race is his own immediate institution, and he appointed Adam its ancestor to be its representative and federal head. And in this case also,

he rendered an elective appointment by man impossible, by the constitution which brought man into being in successive generations."*

ART. IV.—*The Old Roman World: the grandeur and failure of its Civilization.* By JOHN LORD, LL.D., New York, Scribner & Co.

IN a certain sense, the past is dead, in another, and most profoundly practical sense, it is still living. The past of history is the life of the present. Not to speak of what is recorded in books, our treasure-houses of wisdom, encouragement, and warning, without which we should be no better than barbarians, there is a silent and unrecognized inheritance of manners, customs, and improvements from age to age, whereby certain progress has been made, nobody knows how. Who first discovered that grain was suitable for food? Who first thought of grinding it, and making it into bread? Nobody knows. Yet that thought of some person, or persons, dead and forgotten, thousands of years ago, is living still in as practical a way as any discovery or invention of the present time. The thousand comforts, privileges, refinements of civilized life, are the growth, for the most part imperceptible and unrecorded, of successive generations. But imperceptible progress is carried forward chiefly on the current of that which is recorded. A people without letters must soon reach the limit of its capacity in improvement; and that will be at a very low standard. To well record and well understand the past, is to press forward the culture of the present. The current of life in civilization flows from the heart of the past. To recount in attractive manner and truly the achievements of other times is one of the most valuable services which a man can perform for his fellow men. If well done, such a work is, in the language of the old Greek historian, a possession for ever. The

* Rep. Resp., pp. 40, 41.

real experience of men, in the ordinary conditions of the life of man, must always be valuable instruction for men; and in circumstances extraordinary, its paucity or lack intensifies the sense of its value.

Every nation has its lesson to give. But especially fertile in instruction are those of the ancient Oriental group and the Greco-Roman, and most of all the latter. For the experiences of the earlier time passed through revision then, and took the forms in which we have received them. With the exception of what we have directly from the Hebrews, our indebtedness to the ancient Oriental world is almost wholly through the intervention of the Greeks and Romans; a fact which, admitted in a general way before, has been demonstrated by the results of recent antiquarian research.

The Greek and Roman constituted but one great period of civilization, which might be called the Ancient European. And its work was not so much invention, or introduction of things new, as the maturing and perfecting of what had been accepted from the preceding. The chief homes of primitive invention lay on the Nile, the Jordan, and on the seacoasts of Tyre and Sidon. But the maturity of the ancient world, the completest shapes of all that belonged to it, and the fullest development of the spirit they embodied, belong to the first grand period of European civilization. And so well did those gifted nations execute their work that they have left to their successors a clear field for new enterprise. Nothing remains to be done towards the completing or extension of Greek art, or of Greek philosophy or science, after the ancient methods; and Roman military discipline, Roman government, and Roman law, have filled up their measure to the brim. Their lessons remain to be learned and applied. The wisdom of the modern world is to accept them, not servilely, but with thorough understanding and appreciation, and to proceed from them and what they suggest, in the changed circumstances of human life and conditions of society, to new fields of inquiry, invention, and elaboration.

Men who consider the past as dead, would have every generation start from the beginning, throw away all the earnings of its predecessors, and take into view no experience save its

own; go out into the world without education, and pick it up in going along. They would waste life in labouring to do over again, what is already well done. They are masons who do their own blacksmithing; scribes who think their trade begins with paper making. A watchmaker who should impose upon himself the task of digging his own silver and copper out of the mine with his own hands, would produce few watches, and those not likely to be of a superior kind. Modern culture is a step forward beyond the ancient, which is possible only by accepting intelligently what the ancient has done. The experience of the old Roman world, and the fruit of its labours cannot be profitably neglected by the workmen of our day, constituting, as they do, the basis upon which our structure stands.

Dr. Lord's book possesses the merit of presenting within small compass, a view of the whole field, and justly from its Roman side, as being the one from which the tendencies were through the mediæval into the modern. The master-pieces of Greece rested in their own completeness. All that was properly Roman excellence had a view to the future, and ultimately passed under and through successive modifications. The Roman was also the master, his dominion the band, which inclosed and held the whole together as one. The greatest crisis in the world's history, whether for combination of the fruits of the past, or for influence upon succeeding times, was the commencement of the Roman empire. The government of the world, which had long before been taken out of the hands of patriarchal and theocratic monarchy, was then finally wrested from the decayed republics of Greece and Italy, and the unreliable adventurers who had followed Alexander, and reposed in one regularly constituted system, with an irresponsible sovereign at its head. The Roman Republic was not erased. It remained in all its forms, most of them in full force; but over and above all, there was constituted a permanent dictator. While his will was supreme, and counteracted the feverish excitement, which had latterly attended the rapid circulation of offices, the routine of government went on regularly in the broad and steady current of the old republican institutions. And whatever the vices and tyranny about the capital, the world in general experienced the change only in

greater regularity and peace, and in a more reliable court of appeal.

The great historical epoch extends from the first dictatorship of Cæsar until the death of Tiberius, when the imperial office was so firmly established that its continuance no longer depended upon the popularity of a man. It had by that latter date become a regular place in government, which was to be filled by somebody. That is the most important epoch in the world's history, so far as it has yet been evolved. Men of no common ability were concerned with its causes; but the causes, themselves the ripened growth of long preceding ages, conferred a special distinction upon the men. And among those who thus gathered in themselves the effects of the past to send them forth renovated as causes into the future, two stand conspicuous above all others. Both objects of admiration or astonishment in their time, neither was estimated, nor could be estimated then for fully what he was; for the very reason that they were both profound and far-reaching causes which it needed centuries to unfold.

Nineteen hundred years ago, Julius Cæsar fell beneath the daggers of assassins. The men who slew him were statesmen, and some of them well-meaning patriots; but they utterly failed to understand him, or the nature of the change through which their country was passing. It has taken these nineteen hundred years for us to apprehend, as we now do, that man's place in the Divine government of the nations. The old aristocratic republic of Rome was already gone. Nothing could restore it. Roman character had changed. The populace had become the stronger power, and viewed the senate and aristocracy as its enemies. And that populace, vicious and uneducated, was incapable of governing. By its own blind instincts it demanded a master; not a corporate body, not a senate, but a man, one to whom its love and enthusiasm could attach. The senate was no longer able to control that mass, and was becoming loose and discordant in itself. Rome stood in need of a ruler, who could unite in himself, if not to one another, the aims of the conflicting parties.

Julius Cæsar was born of the highest Patrician rank. His education and privileges were all that any Roman citizen could

possess. Early he perceived the change taking place in the relations between the noble and popular parties, and availed himself of the affinity which connected him with the latter. His aunt was the wife of the great Plebeian leader Marius, and, while yet a boy, he dissented from the faction in which he was born, to defend that of his uncle, yet without forfeiting a single privilege of his rank. Power under the former was limited by salutary constitutional checks, under the latter no check could limit what the people were able and disposed to confer. A man of noble rank might expect to rise successively to every office under the constitution, but only for the time and to the extent which the law appointed, and as any other of his rank might rise. A leader of the new Democracy, should it become superior, need be constrained by no such conditions. But while openly and frankly attaching himself to the Plebeian party, Cæsar never let himself down to its level. Patron of the lower ranks, he maintained the standing of highest splendour and repute in his own.

Passing through all the constitutional offices up to the consulship, in succession, he distinguished them all by acts to strengthen the Plebeian class and secure favour with it; and latterly, as he reached the highest places which regular routine had to give, addressed himself to the overthrow of the nobles. Above the consulship, higher steps of ambition could be taken only by war and civil broils, creating occasion for triumph or dictatorship. So far Cæsar had taken little part in war. Now it becomes necessary to his purpose, or fulfilment of his wishes. A brief and successful experiment in Spain assured him of his ability. He must on some new field eclipse the victories of Pompey in Spain, in the east, and at sea. The hitherto unconquered Gaul was assigned to him as proconsular province. None could have been more to his liking. Its conquest would unite Italy and Spain, and its conqueror, by the very process in which he became such, must have all three under his control. And to control Italy, was to control the world.

A brave resistance on the part of the Gauls lengthened out that war to nine years. But it furnished to Cæsar annual victories to be reported at Rome. And while giving his countrymen reason to be proud of his achievements, he by frequent

visits to the city prevented their forgetting his person. As no justifying plea for that war could ever be presented, so it was carried on with a recklessness of life, which had regard to nothing but success. Whole nations were slaughtered, and captured cities subjected to unrestrained rapine, or their population, man, woman, and child, slain by express order, not because the safety of Rome demanded it, nor because Cæsar took pleasure in blood, but because it suited his purpose.

At last the work was done. And the next was to perpetuate the reputation and power thus acquired. Another consulship would have been nothing in itself, as compared with what had already been accomplished; but it seemed to be a step indispensable to anything higher. The senate resisted the unconstitutional measures proposed to that end. Certain tribunes elected in his interest, thereupon quarrelled with the senate, and, as if their lives had been in danger, fled from the city, and took refuge in his camp. It fell in with his purpose admirably. Such a conflict of authorities will need higher authority than that of a consul to compose it. And, moreover, it is the sacred persons of tribunes, the representatives and leaders of the Plebs, that have been put in danger, and in them the rights of the democracy. In their defence Cæsar immediately marched his legions into his own country, and to war with the arms of the senate. Opportunity for reconciliation he neither sought nor permitted. It had then ceased to be possible. In three months his enemies were driven out of Italy. A few weeks more and they were subdued in Spain. He was then in condition to pursue the war to the eastward. In a little over two years from the day on which he crossed the Rubicon, he had, at the head of his own legions, defeated his enemies in every quarter, with a celerity positively unparalleled. More particularly, he marched on a track of unvarying victory from Spain and Italy into Greece, Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Pontus, Asia Minor, Africa, and Sicily, completing the conquest of all the nations around the Mediterranean sea, in two years and about four months, in the course of which he had visited Rome four times, keeping hold without relaxation upon the government, both domestic and foreign.

Within that brief time, for the succeeding war in Spain,

raised by the sons of Pompey, was only an insurrection, Cæsar transferred all the dominions of his country to himself. Within so short a time were the possessions of the republic changed into an empire. The splendor of Cæsar's triumph excelled everything of the kind that had gone before. But its real grandeur and import were judiciously concealed. While the trophies and captives from Egypt and Asia, and various barbarous nations, were ostentatiously displayed, no mention was made of Pharsalia, no trophy exhibited, which could recall the humiliation of a Roman. Under foreign names, Rome celebrated the triumph of her own conqueror, and revelled in festivities over the completion of her own defeat. The man who had subordinated her senate, and put an end for ever to the independence of her people, that senate and people now crowned with honours and exalted to the skies as a god. And although he fell a victim to the misguided zeal of a few patriots, the heir of his estates took his name and under it governed Rome as his successor. As long as the imperial succession continued it was by force of the same name and inheritance. And when the western empire was revived in Charlemagne, it was on the plea of reviving the rights and succession of Cæsar. The emperor of Austria, heir of the old German emperors, still holds his rank as inherited, through Charlemagne, from the Roman dictator, and still wears, as the talisman of power, the name of Cæsar. It was in the same spirit that the first Napoleon assumed imperial rank. Gaul, upon the conquest of which Cæsar founded the first empire, and on whose throne Charlemagne revived it, has not yet forgotten that importance, nor ceased to hanker after the honours, which her first connection with the Romanic world conferred.

How great that man was, in himself, in the work which he did, and in the effects which have proceeded from it, is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate. Certainly nothing equal to it has ever, in the political world, proceeded from the life of any other man; for mere extent of temporary conquest, like that of the Tartars or Saracens, is not to be compared with such enduring authority in and over the civilized world, at its highest seats of culture. Cyrus comes nearest to a fair comparison with Cæsar. But the influence of Cyrus almost en-

tirely ceased with the extinction of the line of great kings, which he founded. Alexander overran the old world, and sowed it with the seeds of Greek culture, but founded no empire. Upon a basis firmly constructed by centuries of Greek and Roman culture, giving strength and finish to the work of earlier antiquity, had Cæsar erected a sovereignty more solid and well-ordered than that of the great kings of Persia, with elements of permanence which never pertained to that of Alexander, while containing all, and more than all that went to form its civilization, and extending to the world of the future as their's had covered that of the past. Cæsar, for the first time, united under one hand the fortunes of Egypt, Syria, Phenicia, and Greece, with those of Italy, France, and Spain, and opened those channels whereby all that was best in the instructions of the east were carried out and communicated to the west. In him and in his surroundings, all that was greatest in the ancient world reached its utmost splendor. The best works of earlier time were still in their completeness, and for effect upon the future no other age of heathenism operated so powerfully as that present.

And yet, like every other man who has been great, Cæsar owed much to circumstances. Anywhere else than in Rome he could not have been what he was; at any previous period in the history of Rome, he could not have effected what he did. With the exception of Gaul, all the countries, which he united under his own hand, had already been reduced in whole or in part, and their national spirit broken by the arms of preceding Roman generals; and the defeat of the resisting party among his own countrymen was really the conquest of the whole. And the culture which adorned and gave such lustre to his empire was the growth of earlier times, or the continued operation of causes, in which he and the rule by him established had little to do. He had his place in the most important crisis of the ancient world, and his greatness appears most conspicuous in his clear discernment of that crisis, and of the steps which, at every point, were the most judicious for himself to take in view of it, and in the untiring rapidity of all his movements. Never did any man live a life of greater activity—cheerful, joyous, exhilarating activity. Entirely free from the

insolence of success, his mind always too much occupied with great projects for the future, to be puffed up with, or even to think much about the bygone, he won the hearts of the people by his courtesy, and easy affability of manner, while dazzling their imagination by the splendor of his accomplishments, and the grandeur of his exploits.

But stupendous as the work of Cæsar was, and far-reaching as its effects, it was entirely the fruit of ambition; nor is it to be supposed that he could foresee either the benefits or evils which followed, or the length of their duration. Although he contemplated still wider conquests, in comparison with which all that he had done was but a beginning; although he did much in science and letters, for which the thanks of the world are due, and although he was well disposed to exercise his power for good; still, there is the subtraction to be made that all he contemplated, as well as all he had done, was instigated supremely by a view to his own emolument and renown. For whatever good accrued, the world owed him gratitude only as an agency overruled by a higher power.

In the same epoch of time, but half a century further on, and in the first stage of the consolidated empire, Jesus Christ appeared. Born in a lineage descended from kings, but in such reduced circumstances, and in poverty so lowly, as to present the extremist contrast to the rank and wealth of Rome's great master, he never in all his life once aimed at bettering his condition in those respects, while unvaryingly he asserted his rank as a king. With great modesty and dignified gentleness of manner, he made claims of authority unprecedented. Instead of boasting his descent from king David, he announced himself, without pride or ostentation, but in the most cogent way, as David's Lord, and as the representative of Godhead among men. No wonder that the people of his time looked on with incredulous astonishment. He was, to their apprehension, a contradiction in himself. Some sneered at his pretensions as absurd, some charged them with disloyalty to Cæsar, while others regarded them as blasphemous. Some thought him an impostor, and others took him for a maniac, or the possessed of a devil. He himself admitted that they would have had reason for doubt, had he presented nothing but ver-

bal claims. But when he went on to give evidence of supernatural power, such as no mere man ever gave or could give, wonder, where it did not melt into conviction, gave way to hatred. Great was the prudence with which his astounding character and revelations were progressively unfolded, and yet the execution of his public work was very brief. In about three years and three months it was finished. He also was cut off by the wrath of men, who deemed themselves defending the old constitution of their nation. And when he said that his kingdom was not of this world, it only exasperated them to a charge of blasphemy. But to the end which he designed, his death, in just that way, was as important as his life, which would have been incomplete had it closed in the ordinary course of nature or by disease. Whatever free thought may think of Christ's doctrines, it will not, if intelligent of the history, deny that he has wrought upon the world effects with which there is nothing else of a religious and moral nature to be compared. For what is the vast jurisdiction of Buddhism, or Brahminism, over semibarbarous and unprogressive nations, when compared with moral and religious dominion over the greatest powers of the world, the leaders in the van of advancing civilization, the masters in science, in arts, in letters, and in active influence who either drag all other nations in their train, or leave them far behind in hopeless barbarism? And as to all the religions previously existing within the bounds of that civilization, his religion either absorbed their elements or expelled them. Those few years of the public life of Christ, believer in him and unbeliever alike must agree, have wielded a power unparalleled in the religious world.

Those two personages, Christ and Cæsar, at that juncture in the world's history, stand, in their respective relations, conspicuous above all others. The kingdom of the latter was entirely of this world, and made the greatest show in it, for a time. The kingdom of the former was not of this world, and yet, like the natural agencies of the heavens upon the earth, has wrought more profound and enduring effects than were ever produced by the hand of man. The kingdom of Cæsar was established by compulsion, sustained by overwhelming force, and inspired by ambition; that of Christ was introduced

by address to the gentler affections, in the exercise of wonderful power, but also in the poverty, suffering, and humiliation of its founder, and his ignominious death. When Cæsar fell, a triumphant national party and an invincible army kindled with indignation, and hastened to inflict vengeance upon his assassins; by the cross of the suffering Christ stood only a few disciples, most of them women. Even of his followers the greater number deserted him, or looked on from a distance. Upon the beginning of Cæsar's kingdom rested the splendour of worldly glory; upon that of Christ's the darkness of popular contempt. One was a kingdom of demonstrative forces; the power of the latter lay in causes unseen, and impenetrable to the public of that day. Both are still living, and working under their own and other names. The man who first introduced Roman laws, Roman culture, and Roman ideas into France, and opened their way into Germany and Britain, has communicated his life in a very practical manner to the now present. Legally and historically, both Napoleon III. and Francis Joseph are Cæsars and imperators. And the elements of his imperial erection, although the structure is now dismembered, are the fundamental supports of authority, in the inferior monarchies of their ethnic relationships. European law, though no longer Roman, is mainly of Roman origin and suggestion. The higher education reposes upon, and cannot wisely dispense with ancient classic lore. Art still enlightens her designs by the example of classic masterpieces. And all philosophy still, as it ever must, intrinsically, belongs to one or another head of the ancient.

Nothing outside of the course of revelation itself, did so much for Christianity as the Roman empire. It, for the first time, united the nations around the Mediterranean under one ruler, and made that sea the centre of the world's activity. What the Nile had been to Egypt, the seacoast to Israel and Phenicia, the Ægean to Greece, the whole Mediterranean became to the dominion of the Cæsars; and by the singleness and ability of their control of it, the navigation of its waters was, in the early days of Christianity, rendered as safe from foreign enemies or the depredations of pirates, as those of a private lake. Paul and the other apostles coasted about freely

and without interruption, where, before the time of Cæsar, they would have been exposed at every turn to plunder, maltreatment or death. Nations formerly separated from each other by diversity of languages, laws, and the prevalence of local wars, were now bound firmly together by one overruling system of law, the best ever established among heathen, defended against each other's violence and their own by the everywhere present arms of a master, who allowed freedom in all peaceable pursuits, not held to interfere with his government, and harmonized by common elements of education, and the use, in all public matters, of only two languages. In the time of the apostles whatever might be needed to reach the uneducated people in the country districts, a knowledge of Greek and Latin was enough to enable a man to preach to the understanding of a large public in all cities, from Antioch to Cadiz.

Facilities for travel and transport by land were also provided to an extent which had never existed before. Every military station was a centre of protection, and of industry in keeping up the freedom of communication with the capital. And Roman military roads, the most excellent and durable of all such structures, ramified out from Rome through the length and breadth of her dominion. The rapacity of local rulers, which, under the old senatorial government, it had been found impossible to restrain, received a salutary check from the sovereignty of one man, who, with the whole army at his command, knew it to be his interest to make the provinces satisfied with his administration. Education, though not superior to what it had been in some cities, among some classes before, was by far more generally diffused. Reading and writing had become comparatively common, and the productions of Greek and Latin authors were numerous, and to be found, more or less, in every province. Officers of the army, persons connected with the civil service, administration of justice, and pursuits of commerce, all contributed to the diffusion of letters and general intelligence. Books as well as preaching had access to a greater number of people than ever before. And if there was less stimulus to the production of great works, there was more peace and quiet for study. Never before could

the apostles, their fellow-labourers and followers, have travelled, with such facility as they did, through all the countries of Asia Minor, Macedonia, Thrace, Illyricum, Italy, Gaul, and Spain, without military escort, and, although not entirely without danger, without such interference as to defeat their purpose, finding in every city the same executor of the same laws, the same protector, the same common literature, the same languages of letters and of military and forensic business, and the fundamental principles of the same general culture.

These agencies Cæsar did not create, but he compacted the system of government to which they belonged, and under which they were extended to the west, and protected, as far as they were protected, until the dawn of the modern. In the ever-shifting conditions of society, changes have been introduced greatly modifying and diminishing that power; and as its fitness depends upon the relation in which it stands to the condition of society, it must wane with the process of time, until it ceases to be perceptible. From its own merits and the eminence of the nations over which it was established, and to which it has extended, conspicuous above all other monarchical systems, it is now not only broken apart, but in its sections beginning to dissolve, and to give place to governmental principles of a different kind.

The kingdom set up by Christ, on the other hand, has continued to increase until the present time, and so far from presenting signs of decay, is yearly becoming broader and more powerful. He who appeared as the poor peasant of Galilee, destitute of worldly goods, the meek and lowly man, who resisted no violence, who, on the only occasion when a sword was drawn in his defence, ordered it to be put up, proves to have been the only man, who in respect to the authority established by him is worthy to be mentioned on an equality with Cæsar. Such a fact is itself enough to enlist admiring attention. But it is far from being all that a view merely historical of the kingdom of Christ presents. That kingdom has transcended the boundaries of Cæsar's empire on every side, and established its conquests to greater extent than his, in continents to him unknown; and is now in still increasing strength

and activity, when his exists only in fragments. Taking its rise near the beginning of the imperial history, the kingdom of Christ immediately employed all the facilities then existing, and turned the great civil power to its greater purposes. Under obloquy and persecution, it made its way through the hearts and convictions of individual men and women to preponderating weight in society, and ere three hundred years had elapsed from the ignominious death of its founder, had conquered the imperial force of Cæsar, and set up its own candidate on his throne. In succeeding times, it clothed itself with the authority of empire, and when the civil government fell apart, still maintained its own organization, which it threw around the nations who invaded its jurisdiction, proving to be more powerful and more enduring than the greatest civil and military structure ever erected by man. What the Mediterranean sea was to the empire of Cæsar, the ocean has now become to that of Christ. Cæsar's empire exercised its power *over* men, that of Christ *in* men. The one was a coarse and violent movement, operating upon human motives from the outward; the other, a delicate pressure upon a spring of human action affecting the whole purpose of man's life for time and eternity. One secures allegiance by compelling the subject; the other makes him willing, and leads him in bonds of rejoicing, whole-hearted obedience.

The admiration which the people of Rome, and especially the soldiers, had for their successful general was enthusiastic, and in the case of some, went the length of encountering death for his sake. Christ, within his own mortal life, had but few staunch followers, and most of them in his last extremity denied or deserted him; yet such was the force of the convictions he implanted in them, that soon afterwards they were all ready to die for his sake. Armies of martyrs, in successive ages, have testified their devotion to him. Many as did die under the command of Cæsar, for the execution of his plans, it was only as incident to war. And now it is not likely that one man living would risk a tithe of his property to defend Cæsar's memory. But to millions the name of Christ is as dear as ever, and cherished above all earthly possessions and expectations. At this hour we dare not doubt that there are

multitudes, who, if need were, would lay down their lives for his cause.

Running counter to man's natural tendency to self-indulgence, and always resisted by its enemies with the bitterest animosity, the kingdom of Christ has made its way, not by compelling, but by changing the hearts of men, the external jurisdiction being not the aim, but merely a consequence of its spiritual work.

Of the two greatest personages in the most important epoch of the world's history, the humble peasant of Galilee proves to have been the greater. Comparing them only in view of external effects, and estimating them both as men, the founder of the empire must yield to the reputed son of the carpenter; victorious arms and iron legislation to the rule of love and faith, resting upon the person of Jesus of Nazareth. This cannot be set aside as a disputable dogma. It is history, simple fact, living before our eyes. Neither can its peculiar character be explained away by any analogies attempted to be set up between it and Buddhism, Brahminism, or any other heathen system; for reasons already mentioned, as well as for the higher reason, that heathen religions evince an inability to keep pace with the human mind where it enjoys facilities for development, and always become obsolete as intelligence increases; while the religion of Christ has not only unfolded greater power, as it has been more thoroughly studied, but has lifted up society and science and arts and letters, and government along with it, to a higher standard in a style of culture proper to itself. In all departments of intellectual effort, it is not merely that Christianity is the religion of the superior nations, but that the great moral feature of their superiority is Christian. And where the teaching of Christ is observed the most purely, the style of culture is the most beautiful and elevated. Often as brute force has been obtruded upon it as an ally, its only real progress has been made by the force of reasonable conviction taking hold of the gentler affections. For no heathen religion can this be pled. Nor is the case of Mohammedanism parallel. For its religious strength, as far as it goes, is due to the teaching of Christ. And in propa-

gating his system Mohammed constituted himself a Cæsar, on a narrower scale, and used the imperial argument of the sword. There is positively, in history, no case parallel to that of the kingdom of Christ; and nothing brings out its singularity, in this respect, more distinctly and forcibly than a comparison of its history with that of the greatest temporal power that the world has ever known. The progress of Christianity cannot be called miraculous, because it has proceeded by a regularly organized system of means, but is a wonderful and unparalleled work in the earth, more broadly and overwhelmingly expressive of supernatural power than was any miracle wrought by Jesus when upon earth.

Nor, viewed from this standpoint, is the success of Christianity in moulding or restraining the opinions of the civilized world the most extraordinary thing about it. To denounce all men as by nature vile sinners seems a very unlikely way of winning favour with them; to assure them that unless they give up all their most cherished likings, and become changed in the very spirit of their lives, they cannot be disciples of Christ, would seem to bar up the way to popularity of the cause. It is a kingdom which has not made progress by courting popular wishes. Its mystery of might is a superhuman manifestation of holiness, justice, and love to the world, and impressed upon the individual heart.

Cæsar showed no concern for the well-being of mankind. Men received his favour or his vengeance as they subserved or resisted his designs. To harass the people of Gaul, and to pamper the licentious tastes of the Roman populace were equally prompted by motives regardless of the welfare of others, and terminating in himself. Christ was tender of the interests and affections of men, and for them freely sacrificed his own. His purpose in establishing his kingdom was not to make himself greater, but to make men purer and happier. As compared with that of Cæsar, his motive was godlike. Cæsar operated on the principle of self-aggrandizement, Christ on that of self-denial. Cæsar employed force; Christ, love. The one compelled, the other attracts. And yet when Cæsar attempted to attract he appealed, without scruple, to all desires,

even the basest. He was ready to court all kinds of people, in the way that pleased them; and in so doing was not worse than other ambitious worldly men. Christ was most discriminating as to the way in which people were attracted to him. He required of his followers to deny themselves and to love him supremely. He never countenanced a mere admiration of his character and works; a hollow popularity he expressly rejected; and none who indulged in any vice could be retained as his disciple.

To outside observation there is something strangely contradictory in the inverse ratio of the results. Why is it that the finely discriminating Christ has had more and more devoted followers than the broadly popular Cæsar? Why is it that, in a gross sinful world, Christ's principle of heart-holiness has prevailed over Cæsar's easy, promiscuous indulgence; that Christ by self-denial has established a wider and more durable kingdom than Cæsar succeeded in erecting by the most successful ambition; and that Christ's kingdom, which is not of this world, has taken a stronger hold upon the world than that of Cæsar, which was altogether worldly? The dominion of Cæsar wrought a great change upon the relations of government, but only slightly and superficially affected the character of the individual; Christ's power begins with a radical change in the individual, and works outwardly to a corresponding change upon government and the face of society. Cæsar's work was external and mechanical; Christ's internal and vital. The one is like the builder of a masterly machine; the other like the operation of nature. There is a singular impression of Godhead made upon us, when we contemplate the historical Christ, from the human side, and in comparison with the greatest of men, unenlightened by his teaching.

The epoch of time, in which these personages appeared, was, from various other causes, greatly eminent in historical importance. It was that in which the best fruits of the ancient world were collected into that channel through which they have been transmitted to the modern. It has accordingly been selected as the central point for the work mentioned at the head of this article. Around and in relation to it, has Dr.

Lord disposed all the parts of his plan. Beginning with a rapid survey of the military history of Rome up to the establishment of the empire, he then presents a view of her material grandeur and glory at that epoch, the vastness and nature of her empire, the wonders of the city, art, literature, philosophy, and science in their previous history, as preparing them for the state in which they then were. He gives a similarly brief, but clear and interesting history of the Roman constitution and jurisprudence, and a picture of the internal condition of society under the empire. Thence he proceeds to record the causes of its decline, and the reasons why neither the conservative influences of Pagan civilization, nor the introduction of Christianity could arrest its decline. And the work closes with an excellent chapter on the legacy left by the early church to future generations. It is a well-proportioned book, not a treatise to sustain a philosophic theory, but a history, in the true and single spirit of history, and yet presenting the best logical effects of the philosophy which is always embodied in facts. Although there is compacted into its very moderate number of pages the substance of many learned volumes, it is in no sense a compend, but a genuine product of matured thinking, spirited and entertaining. Long familiarity with the subject in all its breadth and detail was needed to enable the author to communicate so much information so briefly, and yet with so light and easy a pen. Dr. Lord writes as a man deeply impressed with the grandeur and importance of his subject; yet that absorbing earnestness, though it sometimes leads him into unnecessary detail, never burdens his style, which is buoyant and elastic even where it carries the greatest weight. Although there is no lack of books on the history of Rome, yet one depicting her proper civilization concisely, yet fully in all its features, symmetrically, was really needed. And such, we believe, is the place filled by the work before us.

Art. V.— *Whitney on Language.*

The appearance of Prof. Whitney's "*Language and the Science of Language*" was briefly noticed in our number for January of the present year, both among the literary notices, (p. 150), and in the opening paragraphs of the article on "The English Language," (pp. 1—4.) The importance and value of the work entitle it to the emphatic welcome which it has already received from leading journals on both sides of the Atlantic. We read with pleasure, as well as hearty concurrence, the judgment of the *London Athenæum*, that these lectures "would do honour to any country." And the *Westminster Review* says: "If the Americans go on writing so many excellent treatises on philology we shall soon have to call the English the American language. The latest American writer on the subject is one of the best." We propose to indicate somewhat more fully than in our previous brief notices some of the elements of its great worth, and to direct attention, as we are reluctantly constrained to do, to some of its errors and defects.

From no American scholar would a contribution to this department of science and scientific literature be expected with more eagerness and confidence. As the accomplished Secretary of the American Oriental Society,—we had almost said its main stay,—as a contributor to the learned periodicals of England and Germany, as well as of his own country,—discussing on equal terms with Lepsius, Weber, and others of the foremost scholars of the Old World, profound problems of linguistic science, or the Hindu Asterisms,—a co-labourer with Roth, Böhtlingk, and other Sanscrit scholars of Europe in their most colossal undertakings,—Prof. Whitney has a recognized eminence in his department that entitles him to a hearing, and will secure a large and interested circle of readers for this, his first systematic and popular presentation of his views on this ever-attractive theme.

The volume before us has grown out of a course of lectures delivered in Washington by invitation of the Smithsonian Insti-

tution, in March 1864. The course, expanded to twice the original dimensions, was repeated before the Lowell Institute of Boston. The form of lectures is retained in the published volume, while each discussion has been expanded by further development and illustration, some of the lectures having been evidently again doubled. We recognize portions of some of the earlier lectures as having formed valuable and attractive contributions to recent volumes of the *North American Review*. So much of the author and the origin of his book, and the predispositions with which we approach the examination of a work greatly needed. For while volumes not a few have appeared in the English language on either side the ocean, discussing more or less fully the nature, the history, the philosophy of language, none has ever assumed to exhibit in any adequate and popular way the methods and results of the new science. We once attempted to use as a text-book Prof. Schele de Vere's "Comparative Philology," which in its intention comes nearer than any other American work to Prof. Whitney's treatise, but found it utterly inadequate. Prof. Max Müller's "Lectures on the Science of Language," which in the attractive reprint have reached no small circle of readers among us, with all their genius and learning, greatly lack clearness, simplicity, and method, and meet the wants neither of intelligent readers nor of our institutions of learning. No other works, generally accessible, make even so much pretence as these to exhibit the science of language. Not merely teachers and students of language, but many cultivated minds throughout society, have been waiting for the instruction and assistance to be afforded them by some friend, of profound, varied and extensive learning, who has thought clearly and well upon the historical questions and philosophical problems involved even in the simplest, humblest uses of our mother tongue. To all such we commend Prof. Whitney's volume as going far beyond any other work within our knowledge in the clearness and richness with which it presents the facts and principles of its science. As another valuable result from its intelligent and thoughtful use, we anticipate an improvement in the methods according to which languages will be studied and taught, not the classical tongues merely or mainly, but our own English and the other modern

languages, from which Prof. Whitney draws many of his freshest illustrations. The partisans of science will surely have less objection to the study of language and languages when so scientifically pursued.

A leaf is a little thing in nature; yet science, unfolding to us its structure, functions, and relations, and pointing us to the accumulated results of the leaf-work of the ages that are gone, constrains us to exclaim with new astonishment and delight, "This also cometh forth from the Lord of hosts, which is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working."

A word is a little thing. Yet how many inquiries does it suggest, and who can answer them all? The simple word "leaf"—what is it? It is not the simple group of signs upon this page upon which my eye may now be fixed. These are but an afterthought, an expedient employed to effect to a certain extent and under certain conditions the same result. The word "leaf" is the combination of sounds which these signs suggest; and it is this not as a chance grouping from among the myriads which human organs can produce, but as a combination which, for some reason, at some time, in some way, came to represent a certain mental conception,—and which has since been employed by a portion of the human family to convey that idea, and to describe or identify the corresponding object. And now from this little centre how many lines of curious and profitable inquiry diverge? Their results may not enable us to make the trips of the "Great Eastern" more lucrative, as investigation among dead leaves may do, yet these inquiries rightly pursued will not be without their large revenue of advantage to man and glory to God.

The word is a combination of articulate sounds. Looking then at what we may call its material or physical part, we are brought within the realm of natural history and natural philosophy. Anatomy, physiology, acoustics,—the whole phonetic system with the means of its development and its reception demand our attention. How widely in space and time is this particular phonetic system employed, and this particular combination of phonetic elements used for the expression of this one idea, and what is the nature of the determining forces? History, political and physical geography and ethnology must

lend us their aid before some of our natural and inevitable questions are answered. As we essay to pass within the form to the spiritual essence of the word, how shall we accomplish the transition? What is the connection between the signifier and the signified,—between the conception and the group of articulations that has come at some time, in some way, to be employed for its expression? How came the many millions that have used and are using this emblem of their thought, to its adoption? What brought any human being, the first who ever said "leaf" with the design of conveying our ordinary idea of a leaf, to the employment of this combination of sounds rather than some other? Vast multitudes of our race having evidently the same conception, and the same wish, impulse, and power to express it, employ very different combinations of sound. Whence this diversity? If we were to follow back the lines of descent by which these manifold terms have come to their present use, should we find them radii of a circle, leading plainly toward though we might not trace them to their common and primal centre? What approach, if any, can we make by these methods of investigation to a solution of the great problems connected with the beginnings of human history,—the time, the place,—the unity or diversity of our human origin? Or again, how came the word "leaf" or any of its equivalents whatsoever to be produced? What inward impulse, what outward necessity called human speech into being? What are the mutual relations of speech and thought, of speech and society?

These are among the questions that suggest themselves in quick succession to one who would know himself in one of the most characteristic and important powers and functions of his nature. My inquiries may not carry me back to the time when coal beds were formed of leaves, but I am well content to rest a little this side of that remote antiquity. Present and recent phenomena give me occupation enough, and I cannot think it altogether unprofitable.

Within this wide range of inquiry what are the proper bounds of the Science of Language? It is not philology, if either of the terms be defined with the precision characteristic of modern thought; not the philology illustrated by Godfrey

Hermann, whose object is literature,—nor the philology illustrated by Wolf, which includes speech, faith, art, and life under its searching survey, making the whole culture and civilization of a people, and not its literature alone, the object of study. (See Prof. G. Curtius' Inaugural at Leipsic, 1862, on "*Philologie und Sprachwissenschaft.*") Back of any literature, back of any culture lies the language of each people and the speech of the race. "Every language," says Curtius, "is fundamentally something transnational, and therefore not to be fully comprehended from the philologist's point of view." Much more inadequate, we would add, are the methods of philology to the comprehension and exhibition of those deeper facts which underlie all individual languages in the nature and developments of human speech. "The aim of linguistics," says Prof. Whitney, in the *North American Review*, (October, 1867, p. 522,) "is to comprehend language in the largest and most unrestricted sense,—the whole body of human speech, in all its manifestations and all its relations, in all its known varieties, with their history and the reasons of their discordance."

Thus to define the aims of the science of language is at the same time to set forth the grounds on which it is claimed that a new science has been within the last fifty years ushered into being. Were not the phenomena of human speech among the earliest that arrested the attention of thinking man? Have we not copious records of ancient speculations and debates in regard to the nature of language? From that day to this has not every school of philosophy that has laid claim to any completeness in its survey of the objects of knowledge, set forth its theories concerning the nature of words and the faculty of speech? With what fitness then, after the inquiry and controversy that have been matter of record for fifty times fifty years, is it claimed that the science of language is a growth of the present century? Some question whether the time has even yet come for conceding the name of a "science" to this department of human knowledge and inquiry,—whether the claim be not too ambitious, and to concede it premature. Its methods however are so far determined and its positive results so valuable within limits of easy definition, that we

apprehend no general denial of the claim. Without entering even in outline into the history and progress of linguistic research within the last fifty or sixty years, it may be enough for our present purpose to say that the progress of Sanscrit studies and of investigations in Comparative Philology has put even abstract inquiry into the nature of human language upon an entirely new basis. Large classes of facts of vital importance are now for the first time accessible, and inductions are now possible and justifiable that two generations ago would have been utterly impossible. Theories that before might plead at least plausibility, are now in many cases wholly repudiated, and on the other hand strong presumptions established at many points where certainties are still in the future. Here again there are those who question whether there has not been undue prominence given to Sanscrit studies both in Comparative Philology and linguistic science. In an article in the *North American Review* for October, 1867, Prof. Whitney defends his science with great keenness and spirit against such attacks from Profs. Key of London and Oppert of Paris.

Studies in language have been and are pursued with very various prepossessions and presumptions, and of course with a corresponding diversity of method. Here again, as in regard to the nature of his science, we make Prof. Whitney the interpreter of his own position. In the *North American Review* for January, 1867, he speaks as follows, (see pp. 31, 32): "Linguistic science, not less than some of the physical sciences, has had its triple course of development, as formulated in the philosophy of Comte, and each of these stages is more or less distinctly recognizable in the views of some of its present votaries. The 'theological' stage is represented by the once prevailing opinion that language is a divine creation, elaborated in all its parts by the Deity, and miraculously placed in men's possession; parallel with which, moreover, though so unlike in many aspects, is the doctrine, seriously put forward by some scientists, that speech is a direct product of the physical constitution of its speakers, a kind of secretion of organs provided for that purpose, and that its varieties represent differences of animal organization. Both these alike cut off all possibility of

a science of language.* The 'metaphysical' stage is seen in a personification of language itself as an independent existence, an organism, and of its laws and processes as actual powers literally working themselves out, governing the material in which they are exhibited, and producing effects after the manner of gravity, cohesion, chemical affinity, and the other forces which are active in the changes of matter. The final or 'positive' stage is entered upon when linguistic scholars are minded to keep themselves strictly upon the basis of fact and legitimate induction, to avoid the acceptance of figures as realities, to see clearly and describe definitely, and not to cover up ignorance and obscurity of thought with sounding and philosophical phraseology."

Of course Prof. Whitney is thus "minded"; he plants himself upon this platform. The work before us we regard as in most respects an admirable specimen of a scientific treatise aiming to popularize the results of learning. We find here great breadth, variety, and richness of resources, great skill in the combination and presentation of facts, usually great caution in induction of principles, great clearness and precision of statement (with an occasional excess in abstractness), copiousness of illustration, with the enlivening infusion now and then of keen criticisms and refreshing pleasantries. Such qualities cannot fail to widen and deepen the public interest in the studies which the book advocates and represents, and will gain many adherents for the views which it sets forth. We apprehend, however, that this "positive" stage will not be found to be "final." We are confident that there are important truths concerning language that are sought, and in some measure already reached, by the "psychological" school, of which Steinthal is perhaps the ablest representative, which must yet be brought into more perfect combination with the results of empirical study. Many of the imperfections of Humboldt's view are already in good degree removed by Steinthal and others, who are correcting, extending, and sup-

* Is there then no science of anything that has a supernatural origin? Let us understand one another. If that only is science which denies God both the right to act, and the right to tell of what he has done, the world may yet wish itself well rid of it.

plementing the wonderfully stimulating and yet perplexing and often inconsistent utterances of that great master of linguistic science. We regret that we must add that this work of Prof. Whitney affords likewise a specimen in some particulars of the ordinary and necessary working of that hyper-scientific spirit which loves to regard itself as having reached "the final and *positive* stage" in any department of investigation. Herbert Spencer, in his work on Education, (pp. 91, 92), pronounces true science "essentially religious" among other reasons "inasmuch as it generates a profound respect for, and an implicit faith in, those uniform laws which underlie all things. By accumulated experiences the man of science acquires a thorough belief in the unchanging relations of phenomena—in the invariable connection of cause and consequence—in the necessity of good or evil results." We fear that Prof. Whitney has become too "religious" after this type. When he reaches points in his inquiry at which side-lights and lights from above fall upon his subject, he seems wholly ignorant that such is the fact, or to hold that the most incidental recognition of the fact would be out of place in a "scientific" treatise. We shall illustrate this point when we come to the doctrine of the book, express or implied, concerning the unity of the race and the antiquity of man.

One other preliminary inquiry demands a moment's attention before we proceed to our examination in detail. The science of language—what, where is its place in the circle of the sciences? The answer to this question will, of course, conform to the view one entertains of the nature of language. Prof. Max Müller (see Lecture I. 1st series) defining physical science as dealing with the works of God, while historical science deals with the works of man,—and finding (p. 37), that "nothing new has ever been added to the substance of language, that all its changes have been changes of form, that no new root or radical has ever been invented by later generations, as little as one single element has ever been added to the material world in which we live,"—and in view of the further fact that the proper treatment of the science accords with that of the inductive sciences, passing through its empirical, classificatory, and theoretical days, pronounces his science physical. Further,

in reply to an objection, he says, (p. 47), "Art, science, philosophy, and religion, all have a history; language or any other production of nature, admits only of growth." Once more (p. 77) he says: "If that modification which takes place in time by continually new combinations of given elements, which withdraws itself from the control of free agents, and can in the end be recognized as the result of natural agencies, may be called a growth; and if, so defined, we may apply it to the growth of the crust of the earth; the same word in the same sense will be applicable to language, and will justify us in removing the science of language from the pale of the historical to that of the physical sciences." Accordingly Müller shapes his remaining lectures (iii—ix) so as to conform to the standards of the inductive sciences, presenting in due order and proportion the three stages that are normal for a physical science.

In opposition to this whole conception of language and its proper treatment, Prof. Whitney in his second lecture (and with some variety both of argument and illustration in an article in the *North American Review*, for October, 1865), maintains that language is of historical growth, and its study a moral science whose methods are historical.

We cannot present or comment upon Prof. Whitney's view without advancing from the inquiry where the science of language belongs among the sciences, to the more specific question, What is language,—the object of this science?

Humboldt, to whom the science of language owes so much, defines language as "the effort of the spirit continually repeating itself to make articulate sound capable of the expression of thought." (*Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues u. s. w.*,—Vol. 6 of his collected works,—p. 42.) Heyse, whose *System der Sprachwissenschaft* is so remarkable for its clear, distinct, concise and philosophical presentation of his subject, defines language (p. 35) as "the utterance (or objectively, the form of the utterance) of the thinking spirit in articulated sounds." A very compact definition of Schleicher's (*Zur vergleichenden Sprachengeschichte*, p. 6) makes language "the vocally articulated expression of spiritual life." We have multiplied and varied these definitions coming from different linguistic schools to emphasize the idea that language

is the expression of thought in articulate sound,—thought its spiritual, articulate sound its formal part,—articulate sound the container, thought the contents,—articulate sound as it were the body, thought the soul,—and these brought into this relation in every actual occurrence of speech by the conscious activity of the thinking spirit seeking expression for its thought. Of course there are various auxiliary and supplementary contrivances that may be called language,—written language, pictorial or alphabetic—the sign-language of deaf mutes or of those cast away in a strange land,—and other such things; but as the word *language* etymologically testifies of the *tongue* as a chief organ in its production, so a true theory makes articulated sound the vehicle for the conveyance of thought in language, properly so called.

Here we plunge at once into the midst of a group of the most subtle and abstruse problems involved in language. Intimately as the subject is connected with our own personal life and experience, and partly because the connection is with life, the most mysterious of all the terrestrial objects of our investigation, opinions have been very various and sharply conflicting. Then there are several distinct lines of inquiry to be pursued which are not always carefully discriminated.

What are the relations of speech to our humanity, to nationality, to our individual and our social life? We may ask a series of questions with regard to speech as a faculty or function of humanity,—and when the same series in whole or in part recurs with respect to the languages that have been and are used by the races and nations of men, may reach a very different series of answers. Few writers have thought their way through this labyrinth so as to be clear and self-consistent,—and few who quote them have thought their way through so as to quote others correctly. Therefore many a writer on language may find himself quoted in support of views that he never held, and in opposition to those to the maintenance of which he devotes his life. And there is no subject in which array of names and citations is less conclusive. Words too are very differently used by different schools, and at the best convey only single aspects of the thought or truth which they symbolize.

Is language voluntary or involuntary? If the question be asked with reference to speech as a function or faculty of our humanity, language is instinctive and involuntary. If it be asked, why we speak at all, it is not because we choose to speak instead of never speaking. Speech is one of the distinctive and characteristic endowments of our nature, without which we should not be what we are. But in every individual instance of speech since the creation of the world man has spoken voluntarily, (we mean of course in those conditions in which he is master of himself.) He had a thought to express. He had an end, he had a means, and he consciously and intentionally employed the means for the end.

Yet those who would agree without hesitation in these answers to the question, whether speech is voluntary or involuntary, divide at once into conflicting parties when the same question is put with reference to any given form of human speech, or every actual form that language has ever assumed.

Humboldt, and a host of writers on language, differing widely in their philosophy but agreeing in their result, maintain that language is not voluntary in the forms in which it appears. Humboldt, for example, (as above, p. 5), says, "language is no product, but an involuntary emanation of the spirit," and again, (p. 35), "it cannot be strictly taught, but only waked up in the soul;" and again, (p. 10), "the production of language is an inward necessity of humanity, not merely an outward necessity for the maintenance of social intercourse, but one lying in the very nature of humanity, indispensable to the development of its spiritual powers, and to the gaining a view of the world to which man can attain only by bringing his thoughts to clearness and definiteness through common thinking with others." In the passage last quoted there are important hints in regard to the reflex influence of language upon thought that are well worthy of consideration. Other writers, some Hegelians and some the bitterest opponents of Hegelianism, reach and state in their several ways the same substantial conclusion that language is "an involuntary emanation of the spirit," or something tantamount to that as contrasted with all products of the human will. We have seen above why Müller classes the science of language with

the physical sciences. In an entirely different quarter theologians by processes of exegesis have reached similar conclusions. Baumgarten (in his *Theologischer Commentar zum Pentateuch*, i. 46), commenting on Gen. ii. 19, 20, argues that language is "the involuntary necessary utterance of thought," because "when Adam gave names to all animals no other human being existed to whom he spoke,"—so that language in its first use was certainly not a means of intercommunication.

The "psychological" school holds that speech exists both for the individual and for society. Language is defined by Steinthal as "the most general, altogether peculiar means of spiritual perception, and its activity consists in the consolidation (*Verdichtung*) of thought; it is not only (according to Humboldt) mediatrix between the outer material world and our inner spiritual nature; it is this only because it at the same time by its mediation unites clear consciousness with all the knowledges that lie in the depths of the soul, and so is a mediatrix within the soul itself." Another writer in the same interest (Boltz, *Die Sprache und ihr Leben*, Leipsic, 1868,) says, (p. 15): Speaking is therefore now defined "sensation (*Empfindung*) and thought, *i. e.*, the rendering possible and furthering perception, comprehension and intelligible communication (*Wahrnehmung, Verständniss und Verständigung*) in regard both to the known and to the unknown by means of language." Why this process is called language through all these stages these writers fail to satisfy us. They insist that the common element is the feeling which seizes upon the unshapen, unformed material of thought within the mind, and moulds it into conceptions which become the first objects of consciousness,—which same feeling lays hold upon vocal utterances, before void of signification, and moulds them into forms appropriate and adapted to the expression of the idea. The identity of this feeling requires a little more proof. And we want a more perfect definition of the "*innere Sprachform*" upon which they so insist. Yet the theories of this school do certainly give expression to a deep conviction of the permanence and vitality of language that is not found in the old doctrines of the conventionalists.

Another large class of writers hold that language exists not

for the individual but for society. They reject every emanation theory. They reject the Hegelian doctrine that thought must present itself to itself in an exterior and cognizable form, which form is language, before it can become real, conscious thought. And so with every other doctrine which identifies speech with thought or makes them logically inseparable. These writers vary in the terms they use and the philosophical systems out of which their theories of language spring. They agree in making language truly a human product, distinctively voluntary in its origin. Human speech, not the faculty, not the power, but in the form which it assumes in the world, is a human invention, discovery or institution; its forms are conventional. This philosophy of language has been assailed by ridicule as well as argument. Ludicrous pictures have been drawn of the conclave of primitive savans deliberating speechless as to the nature and forms of their future speech. The *odium theologicum* has been invoked to put its ban upon a doctrine that ascribes to man so vast a power, so lofty an office. The theory stands however, as we think, much stronger now, than at any former time, as its positions are more considerately taken, its terms better defined, and its correspondence more clearly indicated with all that we know empirically of the development of human language. We can nowhere watch the creative process in language, but so far as experience can be summoned as a witness its testimony seems to bear wholly in favour of the conventional theory, with reference to all of language that lies under historical observation.

Prof. Whitney,—and it is time that we should indicate more explicitly his position regarding the questions at which we have been glancing,—warmly advocates this doctrine, that language is an "institution." In his second lecture (p. 35) he says: "Language has in fact no existence save in the minds and mouths of those who use it; it is made up of separate articulated signs of thought, each of which is attached by a mental association to the idea it represents, is uttered by voluntary effort, and has its value and currency only by the agreement of speakers and hearers. It is in their power, subject to their will; as it is kept up, so is it modified and altered, so may it be abandoned, by their joint and consenting action, and in no

other way whatever." In regard to the much abused term "convention," he expresses himself thus in the *North American Review*, (Oct. 1865, p. 467): "that one man proposes, and that his comrade, his family, his locality or his country accepts, and that the proposed sign or modification of a sign is understood and passes current, is language as far as it is accepted and no farther,—this is linguistic convention, the convention which makes and changes language, from its primitive inception down to the very latest steps of its history." This is all very well until we come to apply these reasonings to the origin of human speech.

We confess that we are at a loss how to reconcile with Müller's earnest reasonings and remonstrances against this "conventional" theory of language, some utterances of his in which he seems to go far beyond all convention. In his letter to Bunsen on the Turanian family of languages (Bunsen's *Outlines of the Philosophy of Universal History*, i. 475, 478), he says: "On all these languages (the Arian) there is one common stamp—a stamp of definite individuality—inexplicable if viewed as a product of nature, and intelligible only as the work of one creative genius"; and again, "it is possible that the Semitic and Arian languages also passed through a stage of mechanical crystallization, or uncontrolled conglomeration of grammatical elements; but they left it and entered into a new phase of growth and decay, and that through the agency of one creative genius grasping the floating elements of speech and preventing by his fiat their further atomical concretion." (The same idea is emphatically repeated in vol. ii. p. 17.) Here is not joint voluntary action determining the form of language, but "one creative genius"!

Prof. Whitney, starting on *terra firma*, not with *a priori* reasonings, with an admirable naturalness of method begins with the simple inquiry, why we individually speak as we do? Not because our "mother tongue" is "waked up" in us, but because we are taught it. The speech of a community or of a nation is made up of the average or aggregate of the individual languages of men who have severally come into possession of their languages in the same simple way. The wish and the necessity that we be mutually intelligible, holds us to the use

of the language used by our fellows. This is surely far more comprehensible than Humboldt's idea, (pp. 35, 40), that "languages are creations of nations, and yet self-creations of individuals, inasmuch as they can be created only in every several man, in him however in such a way that every one presupposes the understanding of all, and all meet this expectation." "Language is, as it were, the external manifestation of the spirit of the people; their language is their spirit, and their spirit their language; we can never think of them as identical enough." There is a mystery about this individualized national spirit within which individual spirits do the work, they creating, it controlling.

An inquiry into the nature of the forces which produce the changes in language that are ever in progress with more than the restlessness of the tides, points us to the same seat of power. Those who use any given language are in perpetual convention in regard to these changes, and among every people characterized by intellectual life a few generations are sufficient to work such changes as to make a glossary indispensable, if one would know what his forefathers said and meant. This transmutation, which is all of creation that comes within the view of history, affects both forms and significations. And as the successive phases or the co-existing dialects of each language are thus produced, why not by a like divergence within broader limits of time and space, yet still under the same controlling power, the manifold and diverse languages of earth?

While maintaining strenuously this general view of the nature of language, Prof. Whitney recognizes various analogies existing between language and "growth" and "organisms" and such other things not voluntary, as language has by different schools been held to be. Thus he teaches (p. 50) "that what the linguistic student seeks in language is not what men have voluntarily or intentionally placed there. * * * Each single part is conscious and intentional; the whole is instinctive and natural. The unity and symmetry of the system is the unconscious product of the efforts of the human mind, grappling with the facts of the world without and the world within itself, and recording each separate result in speech."

One other theory demands brief notice before we pass to other topics. Agreeing with the conventional theory in regard to the way in which men in all historical generations have received their speech, each from his fellows and predecessors, it makes language at the beginning a Divine creation, and so stands upon ground of its own, both in regard to the nature and the origin of language. There are two forms of this theory,—one making language a Divine creation simultaneous with the creation of man, the other a gift bestowed subsequently to the origin of our race. With some this theory seems to be a refuge from the perplexities involved in the problems of human speech,—with some a devout impulse to extend as far as may be the prerogatives and activities of the Creator. The former class seem to blind themselves to the greater difficulties of the solution which they adopt,—the latter surely detract quite as much from the honours of the Creator of man as they would confer upon the Divine author of language. The former class should teach us how words are created and communicated antecedently to and independently of ideas and experiences, and how so created, they are made signs available for thought and the communication of thought. And the latter class should beware lest by over-frequent recourse to miracle, by finding on all sides the "*nodus vindice dignus*," they disparage the merits of creation in its very masterpiece.

The emphatic and weighty objection of Cousin to this theory is often quoted. "The institution of language by the Deity removes the difficulty but does not solve it; the revealed signs would be for us no signs at all, but things which it would be forthwith necessary to elevate to the rank of signs by attaching to them certain significations." Was the first human mind created full of conceptions of which these divinely created words were to be the signs,—or did man develope the conceptions naturally, and afterward mate them with the already existent words? In every man since the first, the conceptions which language has to set forth have been the result of mental processes of his own; of whose mental processes were the first conceptions of the first man the result? If not of his own, what would they be to his mind, but strange, foreign, and unintelligible? Ideas without thinking,—or ideas and language

as products of different minds, we confess appear to us beyond the reach of miracle. Jacob Grimm sums up his discussion of the two forms of the theory which ascribes to language a Divine origin in this way: "An innate language would have made men beasts, a revealed language would have assumed them gods." The former theory, as he argues, obliterates the distinction between human speech and inarticulate animal cries; the latter, in supposing man capable of comprehending such a revelation does away with its necessity. Very few men of science now deem this theory either necessary or defensible. In Dwight's *Comparative Philology*, (i. 164—177), we find this philosophy of language still defended. One argument, the exegetical, deserves an allusion. We have seen Gen. ii. 19—20 employed by Baumgarten to prove that language exists for the individual and not primarily for society. Mr. Dwight's interpretation leads him to this result (p. 171): "As God looked upon his works at the end of each of the great days of creation to see that they were all very good; so, in the record here furnished he seems to call upon Adam to use the speech which he had taught him; as if looking on to enjoy the pleasing result of his contriving skill." The author appears to take a professional view of the matter; Adam's recitation hour had come, and it is now to be ascertained whether he had learned his lesson! And if we were looking for that which would afford gratification to the Divine mind, man's correct use of a language previously taught him appears to us a far inferior object of delight, as compared with some more productive use of the powers which the great Creator had bestowed.

We are aware that very excellent men look askance at every suggestion of a human origin for language, as though to entertain the idea were in itself a quasi scepticism. It is abundantly assumed that the Scriptures tolerate no such idea. To our view however the Scriptures not only tolerate it, but by the plainest and most necessary implication teach it. The first mention of human speech in the Bible is quite incidental. It occurs among the steps taken preparatory to the creation of woman (although of course with no reference to any peculiar needs, tastes, or tendencies of Eve and her daughters). All the nobler part of the animal kingdom is brought before Adam,

incidentally to see how he would name them, but primarily to show him that a help meet for him was not yet created. This is, so far as we know, the all but universal interpretation of this passage, as might be shown by the amplest citations. No hint of anything but Adam's naming the animals, and naming them under circumstances implying a comprehension underlying and determining the name. And if this passage fails so completely to support the cause in whose support it is so often adduced, we know not what substitute can be found. What Prof. Whitney has to say upon this theory may be found on pp. 399—403. (For fuller arguments on the same side see, *e. g.* Farrar's *Origin of Language*, pp. 20—31, *Chapters on Language*, pp. 1—12, Charma, *Essai sur le Langage*, pp. 126—130 and notes.)

Dismissing now this subject of the nature of language, let us direct our attention to some of those processes of linguistic growth, through the study of which some of the vital principles of the science of language are reached. This discussion, with the classification of languages, to which it leads, occupies more than two-thirds of Prof. Whitney's volume. We have no space, nor is it necessary to enter into a detailed exhibition of the way in which comparison is made now between different historical stages of some one language, and then between this language and others known historically or from interior evidence to be cognate to it, and then again between this group and others alien in origin and structure. Suffice it to say, that these comparisons made year by year with increasing caution and discrimination, are also made with growing confidence, and are more prolific in interesting, reliable, and valuable results. The constant change which is revealed to us by the most superficial inspection of any living language at two or three different periods, is the first significant fact that strikes us. Its real meaning and method (if it has any) are matters for later inquiry. According to the phraseology of one of the schools, but with an import recognized and admitted by nearly all the others, this incessant change is "the life process of a language." Empirically how far and in what direction can we trace it, and what are the legitimate deductions in regard to the periods that lie beyond our immediate scrutiny?

In every living language whose course we have the means of tracing, and in each according to the degree in which it is living, the change is in the direction and of the nature of external decay. This tendency lays hold not merely upon the formative parts of words, the prefixes and suffixes, mutilating and destroying them; it intrudes into the most radical syllables, so confusing and obscuring the original as in many cases to defy direct recognition. "Culture," says Diefenbach, in his vigorous way, (*Origines Europæ*, p. 30), "is anything but conservative! It rather attacks its very finest organ, language, worst of all, and degrades the significant phonetic image originating in natural necessity into a mere conventional label." "This is precisely the great and attractive thing," says Curtius, (*Philologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 21), "in the history of language, that the external decay produces new life,—that the spirit employs for its ends the weakening of the material, and only then unfolds its pinions most freely when the phonetic substance of words has subtilized itself to a more delicate web." The fact of this prevalent formal decay in cultivated languages we need not stay to establish or illustrate. Let modern English be compared with Anglo-Saxon, the Romance languages with the Latin, any modern tongue of the Indo-European family with such older languages as the Greek and Sanscrit. Nor need we demonstrate the connection of this tendency with culture. It is not modern degeneracy, either a physical feebleness that shrinks from the expenditure of breath upon vowels so broad and full, or syllables so numerous,—nor is it a mental weariness that throws out an imperfect suggestion of an idea in place of the highly elaborated pictures of two or three thousand years ago. It is rather a wise and necessary economy both of productive and of graphic power. It is a dispensing with that which in its time and place was both beautiful and useful, so soon as it becomes an incumbrance. It is the mind's girding itself up for more rapid progress and more effective work. The mind is more thoroughly master of its material and is no longer mastered by it. Here is in appearance, but only in appearance, a returning toward the meagreness and nakedness now illustrated in the world's least developed languages.

But when we speak of "returning" we are insensibly anticipating the next inquiry. We follow back the path along which we have remarked so clearly both the fact of decay in linguistic forms, and the nature of that decay. We reverse the analytic process. When we reach the most fully organized and amplest forms of the languages that we have been inspecting, have we reached their primitive stage? So some have argued, maintaining that the original condition was precisely this—of most exuberant fulness in form, most balanced and symmetrical proportion, most minute and perfect pictorial power. We might be tempted to this conclusion if we were to disregard the nature of the earlier exuberance. If that fulness of form and roundness in development found its analogy in the many members of an organic body, each member ministering to life while incapable of an independent life, we might imagine something more highly and delicately organized than Greek and Sanscrit to have been the speech of the first forefathers of our race. But some of the earliest stages of our inquiry reveal the fact that many of these enveloping syllables are not simply like the slips which we take from plants in our conservatories to root and grow up into an independent and productive life. They had a strong and independent life of their own before they were themselves taken up and made accessory to the more perfect manifestation of other more substantial and essential ideas. They were, not all, but to a very large extent, words before they became mere syllables, auxiliary to the inflection of some stronger word. Not merely by judicious nurture could they be made words; they were words. If this be so, there must have been a synthetic process back of the analytic process, which is not simply one of our expedients in studying language but a method of nature herself. It is not the whole truth that our anatomy of language results in many forms that bear a striking resemblance to others that exist independently. For hundreds of years nature, we mean the human mind working naturally, has been pursuing in general this analytic method. And as the devout geologist, taking in hand a piece of conglomerate or flint imbedded in chalk, which, admitting that the materials might have come in this combination from the Creator's hand, nevertheless believes

the combination a mediate rather than immediate work of God, so the linguist reasons that these elements which he finds combined in the words of many languages came together after a previous separate existence. Agreeing heartily with Prof. Whitney in this view, we are almost ready to protest against the undue and dogmatic vehemence with which he presses his reasoning. (Pp. 253, 254.)

What then are our conclusions in regard to the primitive condition of human speech? The general division of the languages of earth into three classes, the inflectional, the agglutinative or amalgamating, and the monosyllabic, is retained by Prof. Whitney as sufficiently full and accurate. Are these consecutive stages in the development of human speech, or coexistent and independent types of language? If the inflectional languages, the most perfect in their articulation, point us back to a monosyllabic nucleus as marking their primitive stage,—and if the structure of the agglutinative languages is so much looser that on a simple shaking of no great violence they fall asunder, there seems to be only one answer warranted. These various types of language, though we are not yet able and may never be able to trace the whole process in any one section of the path of development, though difficult and perplexing questions remain to be answered, are consecutive in logical and natural order, although in time and space coexistent. We ask without answering some of the questions that suggest themselves in the face of this theory of human speech,—questions, some of which are at times put as though the simplest asking of them was a triumphant refutation of the theory,—while others of them are the mere proposing in an interrogative form of difficulties to be cleared up. Has man, whose historical work in language has everywhere seemed to be that of mutilation and disorganization, ever shown the constructive and creative power which this theory demands? Again, these groups of languages lie well defined and in classification widely separated one from another; if the theory were true, should we not find the intermediate spaces filled with languages here just emerging from one state, there just preparing for transition into another? Again, languages are classed by grammatical structure mainly; "the principle of a language

will never change; it is the very essence of the language;" these groups are distinct in principle; how then is the transition brought about? Once more, is the theory consonant with what we otherwise know of the growth of humanity and its institutions? What view does it give us of the beginnings of human society? These and other kindred questions we must dismiss with the asking. To one other we must attend for a moment; what length of time is required by this theory for the existence of the human race upon the earth?

Most writers on language are cautious in the matter of computation. We have recently found one marked exception. Dr. Boltz in his *Sprache und ihr Leben*, (p. 71), makes these estimates. Both Arian and Semitic history and tradition put various peoples of these families into their historical position earlier than the year 2000 B. C. Assuming a thousand years for the previous migratory period we have their oldest languages existing in their present form at least 5000 years. At the beginning of this period the languages already show signs of decay. We must therefore assume a prehistorical period of equal length as intervening between the culmination of their perfection and the state in which we find them at the dawn of documentary history. At least an equal period was requisite for the development of that perfection which they attained as inflecting languages. The preceding stages of agglutination with its successive phases of formation, development, and decay, must have demanded 20,000 years more. Allowing only ten thousand years for the monosyllabic stage, we have as the minimum period some 50,000 years,—a period "more imperceptible and transitory than the tick of a pendulum within the narrow bounds of human life—a breath, a wink of the eye of the body of nature, that lives for unnumbered, innumerable æons!"

Prof. Whitney, we need not say, indulges in no such folly as this wild play with figures. We confess however that we are disappointed with the way in which he leaves this part of his subject. On pages 277, 287, 377, 382, there are statements more or less specific of the conclusions which he thinks warranted by the present state of linguistic science. On the last mentioned page, after some allusions to changes wrought by geological science in the views formerly universal in regard to

the method and order of creation, to the tone of which we must take exception, Prof. Whitney proceeds as follows: "In like manner has it been supposed that the first introduction of man into the midst of the prepared creation was distant but six or seven thousand years from our day, and we have hoped to be able to read the record of so brief a career, even back to its beginning; but science is accumulating at present so rapidly, and from so many quarters, proofs that the time must be greatly lengthened out, and even perhaps many times multiplied, that this new modification of a prevailing view seems likely to win as general acceptance as the other has done." Has this really "been supposed?" Has the supposition any better warrant than the thousands of suppositions that are continually made in the course of human speculation? When it is the word of God in its most direct and obvious interpretation that has led to the supposition that these were the limits of human existence on the earth, we claim from Christian men of science a slight recognition of the fact that it is between the Scriptures and their science that an adjustment is to be made. They may leave it to theologians to reconstruct Biblical chronology, but they should not leave it perfectly possible to confound them with that class of infidel scientists who enjoy nothing so much as to exaggerate the ignorances and errors of past religious faith. No infidel could have more completely ignored the Scriptures as having anything to say bearing however indirectly upon the antiquity of man upon the earth. We had not expected Prof. Whitney to do the theologian's work, but we had expected a little hint somewhere that it is only a readjustment of Biblical chronology that will be requisite when science is less wise in her own conceit, and more wise in fact than she now sometimes appears. We are not objecting to Prof. Whitney's conclusions that the human race may have been somewhat longer upon the earth than was formerly supposed; we agree with him in setting aside as invalid the arguments drawn from the rapidity with which the English and the Romance languages, *e. g.*, have been developed,—for these are comparatively slight changes upon one common plane, and within narrow bounds; but we do object to his utterly ignoring all other evidence upon the

subject than that which lies in the line of his science, and a few others historical and physical. This style of dealing with such subjects is too "positive" for our taste, and for our reason and conscience likewise.

Returning a few steps to the conclusion now commanding quite general assent among linguists, that the primitive type of human speech is monosyllabic, we encounter a new series of inquiries in regard to the nature of these primitive roots. Of what were they significant? How did they become significant at all? What class of ideas did they represent, and in what probable order was the range of their application widened? Were they wholly conventional, or had they a necessary intrinsic meaning, or if neither of these, what was the connection between the thought and the word?

As we have seen, Prof. Whitney holds the "conventional" theory in regard to the nature of language. He explains the changeable meaning as well as the changeable form of words, (p. 102) by the fact "that there is no internal and necessary connection between a word and the idea suggested by it, that no tie save a mental association binds the two together." But is it not philosophical to admit that explanations perfectly valid when we have only the continuance of an existence to account for, fail utterly when we come to deal with origins? Methods adequate to the propagation of being, only mock us when we resort to them for the primary creation. It has been well said, "there is this enormous difference between our speaking and that of the first man, that with him the inner and outer form of speech (*sprachform*) corresponded; our designations are with few exceptions arbitrary." Prof. Whitney fails to do justice to this vast difference of condition between the first and all subsequent speakers. Children sometimes curiously illustrate to us the most profound and subtle principles in the philosophy of language. A little boy in the family of a friend had often heard sung, "We're going home to die no more." In his mind the phrase "die no more" became associated with some conspicuous and familiar object about his father's house; it happened to be a weathercock upon a neighbour's barn, one of the most noticeable objects under his daily observation. This was his "die-no-more," to which he was

in the habit of going home, and the name answered every purpose; it was to him a pertinent and adequate designation of its object. When we go back to the primitive stage of language, is there no more vital connection between the sound and the sense? Bunsen holds (as above, ii. 80, 81) that "every sound had originally a meaning, and every unity of sounds (every syllable) answers to a unity of object in the outward world for the world of mind." Shall this be our theory, or going to the other extreme, shall we hold that at no stage, developed or radical, does the word stand in any other relation to the idea than that of the algebraic symbol to the object which it may be chosen to represent? Or is there more tenable ground between the two extremes?

In Lecture vii. the author exhibits the results reached by a scientific examination of the Indo-European language with reference to the nature and import of their roots. This department of linguistic science is best developed, and Wedgwood is fully justified in his criticism upon Müller's claim, that we must wait for an equally thorough scrutiny of the other families of human languages before constructing our theories. "We cannot suppose," he says, (*On the Origin of Language*, p. 15), "that the Creator would provide one scheme for the origination of language among the Aryan nations, another for the Semitic or the Turanian, etc." Prof. Whitney adopts and defends the division of Indo-European roots into demonstrative or pronominal, which are subjective and serve merely to mark relation,—and predicative or verbal roots, which are "of objective import, designating the properties and activities inherent in natural objects—and prevailingly those that are of a sensible phenomenal character." (P. 259.) Each of these, he adds, with reference to their form, "represents its own meaning in nakedness, in an indeterminate condition from which it is equally ready to take on the semblance of verb or of noun." Again, in further definition of his view, he says, (pp. 260, 261), "that the first traceable linguistic entities are not names of concrete objects, but designate actions, motions, phenomenal conditions, is a truth resting on authority that overrides all preconceived theories and subjective opinions." He does not hold that we have reached or can reach empiri-

cally the actual beginnings of human speech, but that these results positively reached "represent to us the incipient stage of speech."

In Lecture xi. Prof. Whitney treats briefly of the more abstract question "what class of ideas should have first found incorporation in speech?" And he holds that a true view of the nature of language justifies, if it would not have suggested *a priori* the doctrine of roots which the historical method of inquiry has established. Not confining ourselves to his order or method, let us glance a moment at this, which is one of the most subtle inquiries anywhere suggested by our general theme.

Were names originally specific and individual designations, or general and widely applicable? Great names in philosophy can be cited in support of each of these views. Let us consider that names are not designed to be, nor are they capable of being fully descriptive of the corresponding objects. Even if a name as an actual existence were the counterpart of its object, its *alter ego*, it could not embody the fulness of the qualities of that object. To define with completeness and precision many a simple object would require a paragraph, a chapter, a volume. Words do not find their analogy in plaster casts or in paintings. They aim simply at securing an adequate identification of the conception for the purposes of thought and communication. For neither of these purposes is it essential that the name should be anything more than suggestive of its object. For the purpose of communication it is enough if the object be really and clearly called up in the mind of the person addressed. And though we refuse to hold, as some would have us, that language is thought, or that language is essential to thought, we admit that language greatly facilitates thought, and is indispensable to many of its best processes and most valuable results. Here again it is by no means essential that the name contain symbols of all the qualities of its object. Nor again need naming wait for our full comprehension of the object to be named. Research constantly reveals new qualities in objects that may have received their name ages ago, and in the depths of comparative ignorance. If the name identifies and suggests the object, however imperfectly comprehended

by either party, it is enough. Objects will then be fitly and adequately described by the suggestion of a part, possibly and usually of a single one of the qualities belonging to it. And mere weariness would soon compel the abandonment of names that should undertake much more than this.

But what quality shall have the right of fixing the appellation? Those objects are rare which have qualities so exclusively their own that the same name could not be applied to others. Most names, apart from some limitation imposed by human consent or otherwise, might be applied to a considerable number of objects. According to the mental constitution, or the relations of the namegiver, different qualities would be conspicuous, so as to be naturally chosen for the identification of the object. According to the preponderance of reason or of imagination, for example, or according to some experience of the individual in connection with the object, the designating quality which shall be accounted worthy to supply the name will vary. We should expect then to find a great variety of designations at first, and in fact we find great numbers of roots cast out in later languages as superfluous. "There are 2000 roots in Sanscrit," says Benloew, (*Aperçu general*, etc., p. 22), "we reach the figure of 600 only in Gothic, 250 suffice the modern German tongue to form its 80,000 words." To illustrate the variety of designations found for the same object let us glance at some of the Sanscrit names for the elephant, not all monosyllabic or simple, be it observed.) The examples are taken from Boltz (as above, p. 107); the "hand-possessing" animal,—the "toothed,"—the "thrust-toothed" or "tusked,"—the "two tusked,"—the "great-toothed,"—the "pounder,"—the "roarer,"—the "forest roarer,"—the "mailed,"—the "twice drinking,"—the "mountain born,"—the "vagabond,"—the "vagrant-born,"—the "splendid."

To what were names first applied? Our acquaintance is primarily with individual objects. These would naturally first call for names. Experience enlarges the number of objects known to us, but also prompts in many ways to classification, and reveals the evils of an undue multiplication of terms. Generalization and abstraction in their fuller developments require time and imply some intellectual progress. Neverthe-

less name-giving from the first, by an absolute necessity requires the abstraction of some distinctive quality, and its appropriation to the purposes of speech. And unless there are to be as many languages as there are talking men, there must be some limitation through human convention. If we are to avoid the cruditics of the old conventional theory, implying a conference and agreement among men antecedent to the application of names, the name-giving must depend upon or be controlled by some principle, which, if it would not have secured in advance concert of action, so that by common consent, or something less voluntary, the same quality should be selected, will at least ensure the ready acceptance of some one as the prevailing designation. The revelation of names would afford an easy relief, and to this explanation some resort. The development of names by some organic involuntary action of the mind would afford relief, and this is the theory of others. But rejecting this quasi-physical theory also, we find that notwithstanding the original possession by men of common impulses and equal rights in this matter, there are not as many systems as there are name-givers. The necessity of a mutual understanding has been the mighty regulator. And of the names that have come down to us from a far distant past there are many that cannot be primitive. Time and experience would be requisite to the ascertaining of the very facts which the names now symbolize. To take a familiar example, the moon, the "measurer," cannot have been so denominated until a somewhat prolonged observation had shown what use might be made of its courses. This is by no means one of the first qualities that would arrest the attention of primæval man. There must have been a sifting process, after the results of the word-creating power were in considerable numbers before the minds of men. And multitudes of influences, many of them too delicate for our calculation, would come in to determine the final decision. Some tongues have retained many synonyms, others have stripped themselves of all such superfluities, apparently intending that there should be a real difference between the approximating appellations of the same thing.

With reference to the inquiry how terms were found for the designation of the qualities that were judged sufficiently significant to become the basis of names, we can only say that Prof. Whitney, concurring with Farrar, Wedgwood, and others of the best recent writers, traces them largely to onomatopœia, and to primitive interjections, both greatly widened in the range of their applicability, by metaphorical transfer from the domain of one sense to that of another, and from one department of thought to another. Fuller discussion and illustration may be found in Farrar and Wedgwood than in Prof. Whitney's volume.

But we must pass over many interesting topics, the characteristics of different languages and families and types of languages,—the relative advantages of various methods of classification,—the mutual relations of language and thought, language and race, language and culture, to say a few closing words on the relations of our subject to the unity of the race. Prof. Whitney devotes a portion of his tenth lecture to this discussion, and thus sums up his result, (p. 394.) "If the tribes of men are of different parentage, their language could not be expected to be more unlike than they in fact are; while, on the other hand, if all mankind are of one blood, their tongues need not be more alike than we actually find them to be. The evidence of language can never guide us to any positive conclusion respecting the specific unity or diversity of human races." Cardinal Wiseman in his second lecture argues more hopefully in regard to the positive corroboration by linguistic science of the doctrine of human unity, and quotes at length from some of the authorities that stood highest in the opening decades of this century. Dr. Duns of Edinburgh, in the concluding chapter of his "*Science and Christian Thought*" takes a similar view, and adduces in its support quotations from Humboldt, Müller, Bunsen, and Hincks. We confess that we are more disposed to take Prof. Whitney's view, and do not anticipate from this department of science proof of human unity. Arguments drawn from the diversities of human speech against the doctrine we expect to find more abundantly refuted as science makes progress. But we are more and more inclined

to think that there are some things even in nature which we must not expect to find science demonstrating or materially confirming. They must be received on God's own revealed testimony, and he who is not content with this kind of evidence will not believe them.

Here again, where Prof. Whitney is reasoning within the bounds of his science, we greatly admire his clearness and his caution. But when, in one of the opening paragraphs of the next lecture, he gives a résumé of his preceding argument, he quite needlessly lays himself open to a different judgment. He says, (p. 397), "Happily, the question is one of little practical consequence; the brotherhood of men, the obligation of mutual justice and mutual kindness, rests upon the possession of a common nature and a common destiny, not upon the tie of fleshly relationship." How this "common nature and common destiny" are to be established in disregard of the revealed fact that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth," is not quite clear to us. Nor do we feel any great assurance that these obligations would be recognized either in theory or practice even as much as they are now. But we are quite sure that the "fleshly relationship," which the Scriptures assert, stands in vital connection with the moral condition of our race. The problem of one Adam's fall is quite enough for us in itself and its consequences. And "happily" for our deliverance we are not invited to trust in a Saviour who assumed the nature of some one among several sinning and ruined races coexisting upon earth, but in one who stands thus related by a simple single bond, to every human being that needs his salvation. And "happily" our faith rests on foundations more positive and abiding than any human science, historical or physical.

Art. VI.—*Spectral Appearances; their Causes and Laws.*

The state of public opinion in regard to spectral appearances and supernatural manifestations has varied considerably at different periods. At the beginning of the last century, almost everybody, in this country and in Europe, believed in them. Elves, and fairies, and ghosts, were of common occurrence. Witches were dreaded and persecuted everywhere.

Then a long period elapsed, in which the sentiment of the public went to the other extreme. Ghosts and witches were laughed at, the very existence of evil spirits was denied, and we were all in danger of becoming Sadducees.

But now, the former times seem to have returned upon us. Spectral appearances are multiplied, the whole atmosphere is full of spirits; they swarm around us like bees; they infest our houses, break our furniture, tear our clothes, and rap and rattle their mysteries in our ears, much to the annoyance of sober, well-minded people. Their revelations are even sold at a price. The present, therefore, seems to be a favourable moment in which to give the subject a deliberate consideration; and, to prevent misapprehension, we commence the discussion with stating, in a few particulars, our own belief.

We believe, then, that there is a spiritual world, or world of spirits, which may be near to us,—nearer than most people are wont to imagine. We believe that there are, in that world, spirits of a higher order than ourselves, holy and unholy, angels and devils, both of whom are permitted to have access to us, and to exert an influence upon our minds. Holy angels are ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be "heirs of salvation"; while infernal spirits are represented as roaming the earth, going up and down in it, seeking whom they may devour. We believe that man has a soul distinct from the body, which survives the body, and which, in the moment of dissolution, passes into the world of spirits, where it retains a conscious, active existence, and is happy or miserable, according as its character is good or bad. We

believe that the world of which we speak, though not material, is yet a *substantial* world. Spirit is a substance, not less than matter, though of a very different nature. Spirit exerts more influence upon matter than matter upon spirit, in this world, and in every other where they exist together.

We believe that the spirits of the other world, both angelic and human, have in some instances made themselves visible to men. Apparitions from that world have actually occurred; and of course such things are to be regarded as possible. Angels often appeared to holy, inspired men and women, as recorded in the Scriptures; and Moses and Elias appeared to the wondering disciples on the mount of transfiguration. We furthermore believe that mortals of our race have, in some instances, had intercourse with the other world, and have received revelations from it, not only by direct communication, but in trances, visions, and dreams. Thus, while Peter was praying, he "fell into a trance," and it was revealed to him that the gospel was to be preached to the Gentiles. The prophet Daniel received most of his revelations in visions and dreams.

We make these preliminary statements for the purpose of showing that we are not Sadducees. We receive, with undoubting assurance, all that the Scriptures in their plain and obvious meaning assert, with regard to the subject now under consideration; at the same time, we believe that a vast many persons have pretended to receive revelations, in trances and visions, which were really no revelations, but the working of their own disordered fancies or nerves; and that more, perhaps, have heard noises, and seen sights, and encountered ghosts and goblins, which had no reality out of themselves. They were either absolute impositions, or optical, fanciful, spectral illusions.

We are justified in this belief by many considerations,—more than we have now time to offer. We will state, however, a single fact. Some of the most celebrated ghost-seers have often witnessed the ghosts of *the living*—the ghosts of persons before they were dead. We could mention fifty cases of this kind, as well attested as any ghost-stories whatever. Yea more; in some instances persons have seen their *own*

ghosts, while they were themselves in the body, and actually looking on. Goethe once saw his own ghost. He was riding on horseback in a narrow path, when he saw himself on another horse, and in another dress, coming to meet him. As the figure approached him, it disappeared. Dr. Kerner tells of a Catholic priest who, coming home late one evening,—whether drunk or sober, he does not say,—saw a light in his bed chamber. He went up to it, and whom should he find there but himself, sitting in his own arm-chair. The ghost rose up as he entered, passed by him, and went away. Now what shall we say to these things? Were they, or were they not, spectral illusions? How could the spirits of living men present themselves *out* of the body, while they were actually *in* the body? Can the same spirit be, not only in two places, but in two very different conditions, at the same time?

But not to dwell upon this point here, we undertake to affirm, and are safe in affirming, that most of the sights and sounds which have claimed to come from the other world *had no such origin*, and that most of those who have pretended to them were either deluded themselves, or were wickedly aiming to impose upon others.

In what follows, we shall not attempt to account for all the variety of apparitions which are alleged to have been witnessed, or for the countless stories of them which have been put in circulation. Such a labour would be as fruitless as it would be endless. But we shall hope to furnish an explanation of *many* of these appearances—of different classes of them,—and to lay down principles on which others may, in like manner, be accounted for.

We remark then, first of all, that many of the current stories of ghosts and goblins and other spiritual manifestations, are *base impositions*, got up for mischievous or selfish purposes. In proof of this we might quote hundreds of instances, but must content ourselves with two or three.

The first we shall mention is the apparition of Mrs. Veal, published in all the later editions of *Drelincourt on Death*. The story is this: Mrs. Veal and Mrs. Bargrave had long been intimate Christian friends; but being separated to a distance from each other, they had not met for several years.

One day, about noon, Mrs. Burgrave heard a knocking at her door, and upon opening it, who should be there but Mrs. Veal. She came in, sat down, and talked with her friend upon various subjects; and among the rest, of Mr. Drelincourt's book on death, which she highly praised. After she had gone out to call upon another friend, Mrs. Burgrave learned, to her utter astonishment, that Mrs. Veal had died the previous day. It was her apparition, therefore, which she had seen. The story was soon noised abroad, and produced, as may be supposed, a great sensation. It was shortly after reduced to writing, and was published in all the subsequent editions of *Drelincourt on Death,*—which work the ghost had taken due care to praise.

Such is the story, apparently well attested, and inserted within the cover of a very good book; and we now proceed to the explanation, which we are able to give on the highest authority. An English bookseller, more than a hundred years ago, had published an edition of "*Drelincourt on Death,*" which he could not sell. Unwilling to meet the loss with which he was threatened, he applied to the celebrated Daniel Defoe, the author of *Robinson Crusoe,* to help him out of the difficulty. Defoe got up the story of Mrs. Veal's ghost, and advised that it be inserted as an introduction to the work in question. The plan took admirably; the edition was soon gone; and more than twenty editions have since been sold, all containing the story of Mrs. Veal's ghost.

The celebrated Stockwell ghost had its origin in a pure *love of mischief,* and was very like to some of the spiritual manifestations of the present day. The occurrences which we are about to relate took place in the village of Stockwell, near London, in the year 1772. There resided in this village a Mrs. Golding, an elderly lady, who had a house-servant whose name was Anne Robinson. All at once, Mrs. Golding's plates, dishes, china, glass-ware, and small moveables of every kind, seemed to be animated, changed their places, flew about the room, and were broken to pieces of course. The good lady was greatly alarmed, knew not what to think of it, and called in her neighbours, who were as much affrighted as herself. Meanwhile Anne Robinson was remarkably composed, and endea-

voured to comfort her mistress, assuring her that, as such things could not be helped, they should be borne with patience. After bearing the disturbance and loss for a considerable time, Mrs. G. and her maid retreated to the house of a friend. But here the same occurrences continued, until her host refused any longer to shelter a woman who was so strangely and unaccountably persecuted. Mrs. G. was now persuaded to dismiss her maid; and from this time the strange appearances ceased. Many years after, Anne Robinson confessed that she was herself the cause of all the disturbance. She had fixed long horse-hairs to some articles of crockery, and placed wires under others, by which she could throw them down without touching them. Others she dashed about by a slight of hand, in a way not to be noticed by spectators. She loosened the strings by which some things were suspended, so that they fell on the slightest motion. She succeeded so well with her mischievous pranks, that she pursued them further than she at first intended. Such, in brief, is the solution of the whole mystery which, under the name of the Stockwell ghost, frightened many persons almost to frenzy.

Very similar, in some of its aspects, was the affair at Woodstock, England, which took place at the time of the revolution in 1649. At Woodstock was one of the residences of the late king; and the Long Parliament sent down a commission to search it, and strip it of all the trappings of royalty. The commissioners arrived at the palace in the month of October, and entered resolutely upon their work; but they soon encountered obstacles the most strange and unaccountable, and which seemed to come from the other world. Their bed-chambers were infested with dogs, which came and went as no earthly dogs ever could do. Billets of wood flew through the house; trenchers were hurled at their heads; tables and chairs were shuffled about; while the feet of their couches were suddenly lifted up, and then dropped with great violence. Spectres made their appearance in different shapes, and, in one instance, the candlestick was kicked over by the devil himself, as was manifest from his cloven foot. Other and worse tricks were practised upon the astonished commissioners, who, believing that all the fiends in hell were let loose upon them, retreated

from Woodstock, without accomplishing the object for which they were sent. After the restoration, the whole matter was discovered to have been a trick of one of their own party. The commissioners had taken with them, as clerk, one Joseph Collins, commonly called funny Joe, who was a concealed royalist, and had formerly resided in the palace at Woodstock. He knew all the trapdoors and private passages, and, availing himself of the aid of the servants, he contrived, without being suspected, to play off all sorts of tricks upon his puzzled and affrighted masters.

Ghosts, imposed by tricksters upon unsuspecting persons, have been common in all ages. So late as the year 1830, a ghost made its appearance in the fields and groves at Waltham, Mass., nearly every night. It was robed in white, appeared and disappeared suddenly, and no one could tell whence it came, or whither it went. Thousands of persons flocked together from Boston and the neighbouring towns to witness the marvel, and satisfy themselves as to its reality. The general opinion was, that the apparition was no mortal being, but a spirit from the other world. But after a time the bubble burst. His ghostship was surrounded and captured, and safely lodged in the county jail.

But spectral appearances and manifestations are not all tricks. They sometimes have a less guilty origin,—one involving, perhaps, no guilt at all. We proceed to notice several classes of this description.

Some of them are the result of unknown or unobserved *natural causes*, and may be as satisfactorily explained as any of the phenomena of nature. A remarkable instance of this class is the spectre of the Brocken. The Brocken is the name of one of the highest peaks of the Hartz mountains in the kingdom of Hanover. The spectre has been often witnessed; but we will give the account of a Mr. Hane, who saw it in 1797. He was on the mountain very early in the morning, when the air was surcharged with vapor, though not sufficiently dense to obscure the beams of the rising sun. Looking off towards the southwest, in a direction opposite to the sun, he saw in the air, at a great distance, a human figure, directly facing him, and of monstrous size. The outline was perfectly distinct, and

the spectacle appalling. It might have been taken for a Titan, or rather for Jupiter himself. At this instant,—the wind blowing a gale,—Mr. Hane raised his hand to his head to secure his hat. He was astonished to find that the spectre did the same; and whatever motions he afterwards made, the spectre was sure to mimic him. At length he came to the very natural conclusion that the sky was, for the time, "a molten looking glass," in which he was beholding the image of himself.

Owing to the same cause, the images of vessels are often descried at sea, sometimes erect, and sometimes inverted, long before the hulk is visible. While the ship itself is too far away to be seen above the horizon, the approach is heralded by its image in the vapory sky. An instance of this kind occurred at New Haven, greatly to the affright of the early settlers, in the year 1647. A severe thunder-storm from the northwest had just passed over the place, and was settling away in the southwestern horizon, when suddenly there appeared on the cloud the figure of a ship, with sails set, apparently approaching the harbour. It was visible for half an hour, in which time it seemed to encounter the storm, and to be totally dismantled and wrecked. It was regarded at the time as a miraculous occurrence, and as such was reported by Cotton Mather.* But the cause of it is now well understood. The people, just at this time, were expecting a vessel from England, which never arrived. It was undoubtedly wrecked in the storm, and its image was reflected on the cloud.

Sir Walter Scott tells the story of an apparition, which is to be referred to the same cause—*the reflection of light.* A father and daughter resided in a house which stood back of a dissenting chapel in England. One evening, as the young lady was looking out at her window, enjoying the twilight, she was surprised to see a gleamy figure, as of some aerial being, hovering against the arched window in the end of the chapel. And while her attention was fixed upon it, the figure bent gracefully towards her more than once, and then disappeared. The girl, in her fright, went directly to her father, who promised to watch for the spectre the following night. He sat accord-

* Magnalia, vol. i. p. 77.

ingly, in his daughter's chamber, with her by his side. Twilight came, and nothing appeared; but as the gray light faded into darkness, the same female figure was seen hovering on the chapel window, with the same bowing and stooping as on the evening before. "And what do you think now?" said the daughter to her astonished father. "Anything," replied he, "rather than that which we see is supernatural." A little search soon discovered the cause of the appearance on the windows. An old woman, who had rented the garden beneath, was accustomed to go out at night to gather her cabbages. The lantern which she carried threw up the reflection of her form on the chapel window. As she stooped down to gather her cabbages, her image seemed to bend forward;—and that was the whole account of the matter.

The ancient black art, or the art of raising devils, undoubtedly belonged to the same class. It was practised by means of pictures and mirrors, arranged somewhat as in a magic lantern. Mr. Roscoe, in his life of Cellini, gives an account of an experiment which that gentleman once had with an Italian conjurer. The scene of the adventure was the amphitheatre of the Coliseum at Rome. The conjurer, having described his circle, and confined the spectators within it, commenced his horrid incantations, enjoining, meanwhile, that those within the circle should burn smoking perfumes on a fire which he had kindled there. As soon as the smoke began to rise, the devils began to appear; and they continued to multiply, assuming the most terrific and menacing attitudes, until the air was filled with them, and the whole company was most thoroughly frightened. Some of them well-nigh lost their senses, expecting nothing but instant destruction. The scene lasted until the incense was all consumed, when the devils and the smoke disappeared together. "There can be no doubt," says Dr. Brewster, "that these frightful appearances were no other than optical phantoms, produced by one or more concave mirrors or lenses. The images of the devils were formed from pictures in the air, directly over the fire, where not one of them could be seen, until the smoke began to rise and create a ground for them. They were then reflected to the eyes of the spectators, and danced about in all imaginable forms. But as soon as the smoke ceased, they were no longer visible."

A very different class of spectral appearances may also be accounted for on natural principles. We refer to those phosphoric lights, vulgarly called corpse-candles, which are sometimes seen in church-yards, and over newly covered graves. The following instances are cited by Baron Reichenbach, who has made some singular experiments on the subject. He tells us of a young clergyman, by the name of Billing, who discovered a concealed grave, by a lambent flame which he saw floating over it in the night. Reichenbach persuaded a young lady, whose nervous sensibility was peculiarly exquisite, to go with him to a neighbouring church-yard, in a very dark night. She soon saw on one of the graves, what seemed like a delicate, breathing flame. She saw the same thing, only fainter, on an older grave. In the cemetery near Vienna, to which she was afterwards taken, where burials are occurring daily, she saw many similar lights. They were the most vivid on the newest graves, and in some instances peered up to the height of two or three feet. They were not visible to every one, but she declared that they were distinctly so to her. Admitting the truth of these statements, there is no difficulty in accounting for them on natural principles. A buried corpse is the subject of many and rapid chemical changes. Here is putrefaction, fermentation, decomposition, gasification, and a general play of chemical affinities; and it is not incredible that a phosphoric vapor may sometimes ascend, which, in a dark night, and to eyes of a quick and sensitive perception, may produce appearances such as have been described. And if this be admitted, we have a solution, on purely natural principles, of most of the spectres and goblins with which burial places have been thought to be haunted.

Other mysterious manifestations may be, and probably are, the result of *occult* natural causes. That there are powers in nature beyond what have ever, as yet, been investigated, no modest man will presume to deny. And that some of these powers or forces,—call them electricity, magnetism, or what you will,—do occasionally show themselves in the facts of biology, mesmerism, pathetism, and the like, is highly probable. And the present indications are, that all which is mysterious about the spiritual writings and rappings—all that

does not resolve itself into mere trick—is to be accounted for in this way.

It is an admitted fact that the answers received from the rapping-board coincide generally, if not always, with the wishes of the medium, or of some one present in consultation with him. We know a very respectable man who discovered that he was a medium, and who occasionally experimented upon himself. Upon being questioned as to the result of his experiments, he said: "If the answers are from the spirits, they must be very silly spirits; for they always answer as I wish to have them; that is, if I have any wish about it." Another medium assures us that he can get any answer he pleases, by only fixing his mind strongly upon it at the time.

On the possibly *electric* character of these manifestations, we are happy to introduce the testimony of Dr. T., a highly respectable physician of Massachusetts, whose article on the subject may be found in a late number of the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal.* Dr. T. discovered, accidentally, that he was a medium, and he proceeded to make experiments upon himself. The manifestation in his case was, not by rapping, but by writing,—a much more intelligible mode of communicating with the world. On taking his pen, and holding himself in a particular attitude, and proposing mentally some question to be answered, his pen would begin to oscillate in his fingers, and very soon would write out an answer, without any conscious effort of his own. He tried the experiment many times, and always with the same result. And what is particularly to be noticed is, the pen would always write an answer *which accorded with his own opinions or wishes.* Dr. T. inquired, among other things, about the different forms of religion. "I asked," says he, "what is the best religion; at the same time fixing my mind sternly on the word, *Protestant.* My hand immediately wrote, *Protestant.* Under the same influence, my hand wrote, *Methodist, Baptist, Congregationalist,* and I believe one or two others. While in this state, I felt a sensation like that of a light galvanic current passing through me. Sometimes it appeared to be a steady thrill; and then it would be intermittent, resembling slight shocks of electricity."

After numerous experiments, Dr. T. came to the conclusion,

that the strange appearances of which he was the subject were not tricks of his own, neither did they come from the spirit-world, but were the result of what he calls "detached, vital electricity." When this conclusion had been formed in his own mind, it occurred to him that he would put it to the test of the spirits themselves. "Accordingly, I asked them," says he, "Is this the work of departed spirits? They answered; No. I asked if it was the work of the devil? Again the answer was, No. I asked if it was the effect of detached vitalized electricity. The answer was, Yes." So the spirits confirmed the conclusion to which the Doctor had himself come; as they did, in fact, all his conclusions. Although Dr. T. rejects the idea that the answers which he received came from the other world, he adds, "A present impression that the writings are the work of spirits *tends greatly to the perfection of the experiment;* since it better concentrates the mind on the subject, and more strongly excites the nervous system."

We have the testimony of another medium, of the same purport with that of Dr. T. Mr. B. F. C., who had long been a believer and an operator in the spirit-rappings, states that his mind is now entirely changed. This change has been brought about, he says, "by a deep and earnest study of the nature, powers, and application of electricity, and of the susceptibility of the mind to electrical and psychological changes." "These things," he tells us, "will produce the same mysterious and startling phenomena which have been produced throughout the country, and attributed to the operations of departed spirits."

We have now considered a class of spectral appearances which may be regarded as the product of *natural causes*,—some of them known causes, others more occult. There is nothing spiritual or supernatural about these phenomena, more than there is in the attraction of gravitation or the load-stone.

We proceed to notice another class, which are the result of *disease*. In some diseases, as delirium tremens, the sufferer always sees spectres. They are as real to the sense, and as tormenting to the soul, as though they were objective realities. So in ephialtes or night-mare, a feeling of oppression and suffo-

cation comes over us, and some intruding spectre is conjured up, as the cause.

But other diseases operate more remarkably in the same way. Dr. Gregory, of Edinburgh, had a patient who was subject to fits. They came upon him daily, about an hour after dinner, and were introduced, as he expressed it, in the following manner: "The door of my chamber seems to me to fly open, and in comes an old hag, with a frowning, fiery countenance, who rushes upon me, says something in an angry tone, and then strikes me a severe blow with her staff. I fall from my chair in a swoon, which lasts for a little while, and then I recover." The doctor tarried with his patient through one of these paroxysms, saw him fall, and witnessed all that was visible. He prescribed for him, as for epilepsy; but with what success he does not say.

The same physician tells of another patient, a lawyer, who wasted away and finally died of a nervous disease, during which he was continually haunted with spectres. The ghost first took the appearance of an old black cat, which continually followed him, but about which he cared very little. Next, he was attended by a gentleman usher, in full court-dress, with his bag, and sword, and chapeau-bras, who would seem to glide by him, and run up stairs before him, as if to announce him in the drawing-room. After a while, the phantom of the gentleman usher gave place to one of a more terrific character. It was no other than a dry skeleton, the very image of death. Whether he lay down at night, or sat up by day, the skeleton was continually before him, grinning and rattling its bones in his face. He knew it was a phantom—knew it had no reality; and yet he could not rid himself of it, and under the impression of it he died.

Spectral appearances are often produced by *medicine*, more especially by opium, and other narcotics. The horrid visions of the English opium-eater, as recorded by De Quincy in his *Confessions*, were all of this class. The famous *witch-potion* of other times, under the influence of which the poor deluded subject swooned away, and went in vision to her hellish frolics and festivals, was undoubtedly some potent narcotic.

Dr. Gregory relates an instance of the effect of opium in his

own case. He had been across the water to visit a lady who was in the last stages of consumption. On his return, he took a dose of laudanum for the purpose of preventing sea-sickness. As he lay on his couch in the cabin, the figure of the sick lady appeared before him, so distinctly that her actual presence could not have been more vivid. He was quite awake, and fully sensible that it was a phantom produced by opium; still he was unable, by any effort, to banish the vision.

Dr. Abercrombie had a patient who was suffering from a painful local disease, requiring the use of large opiates. Often, after taking his medicine, he had visions of *dramatic scenes and characters.* The *dramatis personæ* passed before him with all the vividness of a theatrical representation. He heard their conversation and their speeches, some of which were in rhyme. He was wide awake, and knew that what he saw had no reality; and yet there it was before his eyes, and he could not be rid of it.

Spectral illusions not unfrequently result from an abnormal condition of the *organs of sight.* It is possible for these organs to be in such a state that they are affected *without* their appropriate objects precisely as they should be with them; and then, of course, they seem to see things which do not exist, and to be struck with appearances which have no reality. Illusions from this cause are very numerous. Dr. Abercrombie tells us of an aged friend, whose general health was good, but who, for a dozen years together, had daily spectral visitations. "They in general present," he says, "human countenances; the head and upper parts of the body are distinctly defined; while the lower parts are, for the most part, lost in a cloud." The figures are various, but he recognizes the same countenances appearing from time to time, particularly that of an old woman, with a peculiarly arch and playful expression, who seems just ready to speak to him. These figures appear before him at all times of the day. He sees them equally well with his eyes shut or open, in full day-light or in darkness. They are generally of a pleasant character, and instead of dreading them, they have become rather a source of amusement. The old gentleman has found, as might be expected, that any addi-

tion to his usual quantity of wine increases their number, and renders them more brisk and lively.

The same distinguished physician speaks of another aged man, who seldom sits down at his own table without seeing a large party preparing to sit down with him, dressed in wigs and powder, as was the fashion a hundred years ago. Dr. Dewar speaks of a lady who never walks out, without seeing a little old woman, with a red cloak and a crutch, who seems to be hobbling along before her. This lady is subject to no such illusions within doors.

Sir David Brewster gives us a still more remarkable account of a Mrs. A., who was subject to optical illusions for a course of years. She often saw her husband with her, when she knew he was absent; and saw other absent friends among both the living and the dead. One evening as Mrs. A. was about retiring for the night, she saw before her, in a large easy chair, the deceased sister of her husband. The sister was dressed as usual, with great neatness, but in a gown which Mrs. A. had never seen her wear. Mrs. A. tried to speak to her, but got no answer, and in about three minutes the figure disappeared. Several months after, Mrs. A. awoke her husband in the night, and told him that she had just seen his deceased mother drawing aside the bed-curtains, and looking in upon them. Shortly after, when sitting in her drawing-room, Mrs. A. saw the figure of another deceased person moving towards her from the other side of the room. It approached the fire-place and sat down in a chair. Mrs. A. rose from her seat, walked up to it, and commenced sitting down in the same chair. Nor did the spectre disappear, until she actually took possession of the seat.

This whole account of Mrs. A. is abundantly attested, and her's were to all appearance *ghosts*,—as much so as any of which we read. And yet every one of them was an *optical illusion*, and was understood to be so, by the subject of them, at the time.

Spectral appearances often present themselves in a state of *partial, abnormal sleep*. There is a kind of sleep which can hardly be distinguished from full wakefulness, in which persons see visions and encounter spectres, which are mistaken for

realities. Such, undoubtedly, was Constantine's vision of the cross in the heavens, which is supposed to have been the means of his conversion. Such, too, was the vision of Col. Gardiner, as recorded by Doddridge in his life. Col. Gardiner was at this time a vicious young man, who, though apparently very happy, was in reality very miserable. Sitting alone in his room one evening, waiting the coming of a guilty associate, he commenced reading a religious book which his pious mother had given him. As he read on, suddenly there appeared before him the figure of the Saviour on the cross. He saw him with perfect distinctness, and was a witness of his agonies. The sight affected him most deeply, and resulted in an entire change of heart and life. The question now is, what was Col. Gardiner's state at this time, and what did he see? He seemed to himself to be wide awake, and could never be convinced that he did not actually see the Saviour on the cross. And yet it is not at all likely that he did see him; for the truth is, that the Saviour on the cross was not there. He had been taken down from the cross, and had gone into heaven, long before. The state of Col. Gardiner was undoubtedly one of partial sleep, and what he saw was a *vision* of the Saviour.

Sir Walter Scott tells a story of a shipmaster, one of whose crew had been murdered at Lisbon. Shortly after, his mate insisted that the ghost of the murdered man haunted the vessel, appeared to him every night, and (as he expressed it) "worries my soul out." The captain resolved to watch the movements of the mate, and see what his story amounted to. Accordingly, after the mate had turned in and slept a while, the captain saw him start up with a wild look, light a candle, and proceed to the cook-room of the vessel. Here he sat down with his eyes open, staring as if at some frightful object. At length he arose, took a can of water, put some salt into it, and commenced sprinkling the vessel. When this was done, he seemed relieved, returned to his hammock, and slept soundly. The next morning he came forward with his usual story about the ghost, but said that he had laid him, by sprinkling the vessel with holy water. The captain then told him what he had seen, convinced him that it was all a dream, and in this way banished the spectre from the ship.

Here, it will be perceived, was a case of genuine somnambulism, and the ghost which haunted the sleeper in this state was a true representative of the thousand and one ghosts which have been witnessed under the like circumstances. They are all of them no better than dreams, and should be so regarded by sensible people. "He that hath a dream, let him tell a dream."

Among the causes of spectral illusions, the most prolific, undoubtedly, is a *heated, excited imagination.* The imagination may be excited in various ways,—by remorse of conscience, by fear, by intense grief, by prolonged expectation, and sometimes by sympathy; but when excited in a high degree, the subject is very likely to see sights, and hear sounds, and mistake the conjuration of his own wild fancy for objective realities.

Distress of conscience,—a painful, terrible sense of guilt,—frequently leads persons to see spectres. How often have seducers and murderers been haunted by the ghosts of their victims, till they could no longer endure life, and have put an end to their own existence. The captain of a slave-ship took a particular dislike to one of his men, Bill Jones, and on some slight affront shot him down with a blunderbuss. And as though this was not enough, he cut him up and boiled him in the slave kettle, where they prepared food for the negroes. But the captain's conscience, seared as it must have been, was never easy after this. He appeared distressed, pined away, and fancied that the ghost of Bill Jones was constantly pursuing him. At length, when the ship was under full sail, and in sight of his crew, he threw himself overboard. When he rose for the last time, he lifted up his hands and cried with a horrid oath: "Bill Jones is with me here!" At that instant he sank, and was seen no more.

Intense *grief* and *sorrow* under bereavements have the same effect as remorse. The following example of this kind is mentioned by Dr. Hibbert. "A gentleman was told of the sudden death of a dear friend, and was deeply affected by it. After supper, he walked out by himself in a court behind his house. The sky was clear, the night serene, and no light was falling upon the court from any of the windows. When he

had proceeded a short distance, the figure of his friend appeared distinctly before him, at the opposite corner of the court. The gentleman was startled at first, but soon recovered himself, and walked briskly up to the place where the spectre stood. As he approached it, it vanished away, not by sinking into the earth, but by seeming to melt insensibly into air."

A similar example is related in the *London Christian Observer* for October, 1829. "A gentleman, who was most happy in his family, lost his wife suddenly, and under very painful circumstances. A few weeks after her death, while travelling on horseback in the night, and thinking over his sorrows, suddenly the form of his deceased wife appeared before him, at a little distance. He stopped his horse, and looked at it for a moment, when it vanished away. Only a few days afterwards, while sitting in his parlor in the evening, and reading by lamp-light, the door seemed to him to open, and the form of his deceased partner stood again before him. In a short time, it disappeared.

Extreme *terror*, as well as grief, has the effect of exciting the imagination, and creating spectral illusions. When persons are affrighted on account of ghosts, or are placed in situations to awaken fear, they are very likely to encounter the objects of their dread. The fancy can create spectres from nothing; or it can dress up whatever chances to come in its way, and make a ghost of it, and then shudder at its own creation. Dr. Hibbert tells us of a whole ship's company that were thrown into the utmost consternation, by the apparition of the cook, who had died a few years before. He was distinctly seen walking on the water, in advance of the ship, with a peculiar gait by which he was distinguished when alive, from having one of his legs shorter than the other. On nearing the image, and closely examining it, it was found to be only a piece of floating wreck bobbing up and down upon the surface of the waves.

In certain forms of *insanity*, the imagination is intensely excited; in which case spectres are of very common occurrence. There is probably not an insane hospital in the land in which there are not ghost-seers; some having habitual intercourse with them, and others seeing them only at inter-

vals. In the asylum at Worcester, only a few years ago, there was a person who "saw angels and cherubs at his window every night, and held conversation with them. They told him, among other things, that Tuesday is the proper Sabbath, and he observed that day, instead of Sunday."

The seeing of spectres is much promoted by the *expectation* of seeing them. Let a person go by a church-yard, or into a haunted house, in the confident expectation of seeing ghosts, and he will be very likely to meet them. Dr. Ferriar tells us of a traveller in the highlands of Scotland, "who was put into a room which was reported to be haunted by the spirit of a man who had there committed suicide. In the night, he awoke from a frightful dream, and found himself sitting up in bed with his pistol in his right hand. On looking round by moonlight, he discovered a corpse, dressed in white, standing up against the wall, close by the window. The features and grave-clothes were seen distinctly. On recovering from his first affright, so as to be able to scrutinize the phantom more closely, it was found to be produced by the moonbeams shining askance through the window." The same writer speaks of two travellers who were compelled to sleep in a haunted room, in separate beds. "One of them awoke in the night, and saw very distinctly a skeleton hanging from the head of his friend's bed. He got up instantly to investigate the matter, and found the appearance to be produced by the moon-beams falling upon the bed-curtains, which had been thrown back on account of the heat of the room."

Another cause which tends mightily to produce strange appearances, and to give them currency, is *sympathy*. An amusing illustration of this occurred in London, some years ago. In front of the Northumberland house, in the Strand, crouches a huge bronze lion. A man stood before it one morning in great affright, affirming that he had seen it wag its tail. Soon a great multitude crowded around him, blockading the entire street, while from one and another the cry went up, "He moves his tail! It wags again"! Hundreds went away honestly affirming that they had seen the bronze lion of Percy wag its tail.

The power of sympathy in this matter is often illustrated in

the religious world. In religious meetings, where it is common for persons to shriek out, to fall down and have trances and visions, and especially where such things are encouraged, they are always multiplied. They are multiplied, often, to the great annoyance of sober worshippers.

But we have dwelt long enough, perhaps too long, on the more prominent *causes* of spectral appearances. It remains that we say something as to the *laws* to which such appearances are subject.

Those of them which are the result of mere imposition are subject to no laws, aside from the artifice and cunning of the persons concerned in them. Those which are brought about by natural causes will be subject, like other events, to nature's laws. But we are to speak more particularly of those illusions which are in their nature *subjective*, and which do not fall under either of the above classes. Are these mere random phantasies, the sport of caprice and chance? Or is there some method observable in them? Are they, to some extent, subject to law? We hold the latter opinion, and shall proceed to illustrate it by examples.

The spectres and visions which a person sees, the trances and ecstacies into which he falls, the revelations which are made to him, have a manifest connection with *the state of his own mind at the time;* with his particular *habits of thought and feeling;* with his *opinions, studies, and pursuits.* Indeed, they may be said to *grow out* of his mental states and habits, as much as his dreams do; and instead of increasing his stock of real knowledge, or producing any marked change of character, they but confirm him in what he was before. Such, as we understand it, is *the law;* and examples to illustrate it are almost without number.

The revelations of the spiritual rappers and writers come, obviously, under this law. "If these answers come from the spirits," says a medium before quoted, "they must be very silly spirits; for they always answer just as I wish to have them." Another medium says: "I can get any answer I please, by only fixing my mind strongly upon it at the time."

The trances and visions of certain classes of religionists come under the same law. They conform, in general, to the

habits of thought, of opinion, of feeling, which are indulged in at the time. Thus the heathen have their trances, in which they see things in the other world, in accordance with the traditions and mythologies which they have learned in this. And the same may be said of different classes of Christians. The Catholic sees the blessed virgin in her glory, and hears the supplications which are offered to her by the saints. The Millerites used to have visions of angels, who always told them of the approaching end of the world, to be accomplished in 1843. When children have visions of heaven, they commonly see their deceased relatives there. Whom else should they see, since of others they have little knowledge? Dr. Passevant mentions a peasant boy, who, after a short illness, apparently died. His body was cold and stiff, and his eyes closed. He however revived, complaining bitterly that he had been called back to life. He had been in a delightful place, where he had seen his mother, his little brother, and other deceased relatives.

Mary Matthews, a pious, nervous old lady, was the intimate friend aud parishioner of the late Mr. Fletcher, of Madeley. When her pastor died, she was a deep mourner, and for a long time could think of little else in heaven, probably, besides the Lord Jesus and Mr. Fletcher. At length, she had a vision of heaven; and whom did she see there? Let us hear her own account of it: "The first thing I saw was the Lord Jesus sitting on a throne. There was a beautiful crown upon his head, and all around him was glory. Turning my eyes a little, I saw close to my Saviour my dear minister, Mr. Fletcher; I looked on him a long time, and saw every feature with its old likeness. He then turned his eyes on me, and held out his hand to me, just as he used to. I seemed to have lost my old, weak, shaking body. I felt as if I could fly to the world's end light as air."

The celebrated William Tennent once had a trance, and continued in it for several days, until his friends were about to bury him, as one dead. He seemed to himself to go to heaven; and what was the kind of heaven which he saw? The account is too long to be inserted here. Suffice it to say that it was just such a heaven as an ardent, devoted, orthodox young minister might be expected to see, if he saw any; not differing materi-

ally, we presume, from the truth; though we ground our presumption not at all on what he saw, but on the fact that his account agrees substantially with the Bible.

There was a time when most of the nations of Europe were infested by a class of invisible beings called *elves* and *fairies*. And nothing was more common, at that period, than the appearance of these mischievous spirits, carrying out their freaks, their processions, and their pastimes. And not only so, the fairies of different countries varied in point of appearance and character, precisely according to the notions of the people. The Scandinavian queen of the fairies was of gigantic stature —a perfect Amazon, who rode on the storm, and marshalled her rambling hosts under her grim banner; while queen Mab, of the Celtic tribe, was a little imp—the very opposite in all particulars. What has become of these elves and fairies? Why do they not appear as often, and perpetrate as much mischief now, as in former times, except that the people have outgrown them, and no longer believe in their existence?

Ghosts, too, are subject to the same law which applies to trances and visions, to elves and fairies. Why is it that English and American ghosts almost always appear in white; while Italian ghosts are robed in black, and are often encumbered with a chain? Why is it that Roman Catholic ghosts so often come back from their unquiet resting places to entreat the prayers and masses of the living; while Protestant ghosts seldom ask for prayers, having been instructed in the way of the Lord more perfectly?

The ghosts which a person sees have sometimes a manifest connection with his *business*. Thus Nicolai, a German bookseller, was a man of much business, whose nerves at length became disordered, and he saw spectres. And how does he describe their appearance? "They seemed to be moving," he says, "as in a market-place, where all were eager to press through the crowd. At times, they seemed to be transacting business with each other." Dr. A. tells of a trader, who had a quarrel with a drunken soldier, had received a wound in his head, and had passed through other exciting scenes. The consequence was that he began to see apparitions. And what did he see? His shop was thronged with noisy, imaginary custo-

mers, pressing around him, who were so very like to those in the flesh, that he could hardly distinguish the one from the other.

More than twenty years ago, Prof. Hitchcock of Amherst College had a fever, which did not deprive him of reason, but it subjected him to numberless optical illusions. We do not recollect that he saw spectres; but he saw almost everything else. And what is specially to be noted, the scenes, the appearances, the objects which he saw, were most signally coincident with his previous studies, theories, habits, and pursuits. They obviously grew right out of them, as any one may perceive by examining the account.*

Swedenborg lays down the law of ghost-seeing precisely as we have done, the only difference being that he regards the spectres as having a real existence, while we regard them as illusions. "The spirits which attend a man," he says, "are such as are *in agreement with his affections and thoughts.* Hence, should he openly converse with them, they would only *confirm him in his existing state of mind,* and add their testimony to the truth of all his falses, and the good of all his evils." Never did Swedenborg utter a more important truth than this. He states the law of spectres and apparitions with entire accuracy; and what is specially to be noted, *his own spectres conform to this law.* As Mr. Emerson says: "His interlocutors all Swedenborgize."

A part of the ghosts of Swedenborg were of a *philosophical* cast; and the philosophy which they taught was *his* philosophy, the same which he had elaborated before his intercourse with the other world commenced. This is admitted by one of his followers. Mr. Clissold says: "Swedenborg's visions grew out of his philosophy. His philosophy led to them."†

Others of his spectral visitants had a *theological* turn; and the theology which they taught was just that which had occupied his own thoughts for years. He early rejected the doctrines of the Trinity, and of justification by faith, and had frequent disputes with the Swedish clergy respecting them. We

* See the *New Englander* for April, 1845.

† See Clissold's Letter, p. 202.

find his angels rejecting the same, and arguing against them as stoutly as he. His doctrine of correspondences Swedenborg received from the other world, but not until his own thoughts and studies had led him to adopt and advocate it. He had prepared his "Hieroglyphical Key to Representatives and Correspondences," some considerable time before his intercourse with the spiritual world commenced.

In the early part of his life, Swedenborg was sorely, incurably disappointed in love. He could resign the beautiful daughter of Polhelm, but he could not forget her. Her image seems to have haunted him as long as he lived. He thought a great deal, undoubtedly, of conjugal love—of its sweetness and happiness when unalloyed, and when it was mutually gratified. He could conceive of no heaven, no enjoyment, to be compared with this, accordingly, his angels are many of them *desperate lovers*. With them, conjugial* love is the love of all loves, and the delight of all delights. They can think and talk of little else, but the sweetness, the blessedness of conjugial love.

One of the most remarkable ghost-seers of modern times was the Seeress of Prevorst. A memoir of her has been published by Dr. Kerner, her physician, at whose house she spent the latter part of her life. She was naturally nervous and superstitious, and these infirmities of her nature were all heightened by the manner of her education. She was nurtured, so to speak, in the midst of spectres, and was often affected almost to madness by the terrific character of her dreams. Her first ghosts were such as an ignorant peasant girl might be expected to see;—an old knight, who told her that he was miserable in the other world; that he had murdered his brother; and that there was something concealed in a certain vault, the discovery of which would afford him relief;—an old-looking monk, with a wrinkled face, who also confessed himself a murderer;—a tall-looking female, with a child in her arms, who came to the Seeress for advice. After the Seeress had begun to attract notice, and was introduced into better society, and more especially after she came to reside with Dr. Kerner, her spirits were of a better character. They became more learned, used better language,

* Not *conjugal*; that is too hard a word.

and began to dabble with philosophy and theology. In short, they improved just in proportion as she did, and adapted themselves most remarkably to her altered circumstances.

But we will not pursue this discussion farther. It will be seen that spectral appearances are not altogether of a random character; that they are, in general, subject to law; that they stand connected with, and grow out of, the particular state and character of the individual, at the time. We would not say that every ghost-story in circulation can be reduced to this law, more than that all our dreams can, yet we conceive that the one is quite as much subject to law as the other.

We close this discussion, as we commenced it, with affirming our unshaken belief in the existence of a spirit-world, which may be very near to us, and into which all who depart this life immediately enter. We believe that other life to be a place, not of shadows, but of substantial realities; not of gloomy repose and indolence, but of glowing consciousness, and of intense mental activity and sensibility; a place of happiness or misery, of joy or sorrow, according as the character is good or bad. We believe all this, not because rappers and mesmerisers have taught it, or failed to teach it, but because reason indicates it, and the word of God declares it. Yes, the *word of God declares it,* and that is enough. We believe, as we have before said, that spirits from the other world have actually appeared to men, and for aught we know may appear again. But if they do, they will come,—as they always have come,—on some fitting occasion, and for some important purpose; not to engage in small talk, and reveal secrets, and gratify an idle curiosity, but on some errand worthy of the occasion, and of God.

And here is a remarkable difference between the apparitions and resurrections recorded in the Scriptures, and those which are said to occur in modern times. The former made no disclosures respecting that world from which they had come. They had seen and heard many things; but what they had seen it was not lawful for man to utter, and the words which they had heard were unspeakable words. The latter, on the contrary, practise no reserve. They tell you all about the

world of spirits. They go into the minutest particulars,—sometimes into the most disgusting details,—and publish (as one expresses it), "a penny magazine of the spiritual world."

Let us hear, then, the conclusion of the whole matter. The Bible, and the Bible alone, is a safe guide in respect to the things of the other world. God has told us in his word all that we need know respecting that world. He has told us all that he intends we ever shall know, until we get there. And what he has told us, we have on his own infallible authority. It is to be depended on. It is the word of a Being who cannot lie. Let us then study his holy word, believe it, love it, and live according to it. Let us prepare for that world on which we are so soon to enter, and not be vainly attempting to pry into its secrets, or be running after those who can know no more about it than we do ourselves.

SHORT NOTICES.

Ante-Nicene Library: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A. D. 325. Edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts, D. D. and James Donaldson, LL.D. Vol. V. Irenæus, Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1868. Pp. 480.

The same. Vol. VI. Hippolytus, Bishop of Rome, Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1868. Pp. 508.

Messrs. T. & T. Clark are among the most enterprising publishers of the day. Besides numerous separate works they have published in their Foreign Theological Library, which has reached its fourth series, some sixty or eighty volumes of the most valuable German theological works. Their Ante-Nicene Library has reached its sixth volume. The titles of the last two of the series are given above. So much intrinsic importance, historical, theological, religious, and ecclesiastical, attaches to the writings of the early Fathers, that this attempt to bring these writings within the reach of every reader of English is worthy of approbation and support. The volumes are elegantly printed.

Theological Index. References to the Principal Works in every Department of Religious Literature: embracing nearly seventy thousand citations alphabetically arranged under two thousand heads. By Howard Malcom, D. D., LL.D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. London: Trübner & Co., 60 Paternoster Row. 1868. Large 8vo., pp. 487.

"Scire ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars eruditionis est." This motto selected by Dr. Malcom contains an important truth, and is the best recommendation of his volume, the design of which is to teach students where the knowledge they at any time specially want, is to be found. The references are in a great measure confined to English and Latin writers. To have included the numerous German authors under the two thousand heads, would have swelled the volume unduly, without, perhaps, a proportionate increase of its practical value. This work has cost the author years of hard labour, and we are confident it will be found to meet a want very extensively felt by theological students and ministers. We cordially commend it to their attention.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, with Explanatory Notes: to which are added a Condensed View of the Priesthood of Christ, and a Translation of the Epistle, prepared for this work. By Henry J. Ripley, late Professor in Newton Theological Institution, author of "Notes on the Gospels," "Acts of the Apostles," &c., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard & Co. 1868. Pp. 203.

Prof. Ripley is favourably known as an annotator on the Scriptures by his former works. This volume, on one of the most important portions of the New Testament, is perhaps of more special interest. The notes are judicious, and bring out the sense and course of the thought clearly and correctly. It is well adapted to Sunday-school and Bible classes.

Short Studies for Sunday-school Teachers. By Charles S. Robinson, D.D., pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. New York: Wynkoop & Sherwood, 18 Beekman street. 1868. Pp. 247.

This is a collection of brief, familiar, Sunday afternoon discourses. They have the refinement, the variety and originality, and the elevated religious feeling which those who know him would expect in the productions of their author. The writer says of them, "Perhaps they may prompt some one who is weary, may encourage some one who is tired; perhaps they will be suggestive to superintendents in preparing for public services; perhaps they will prove acceptable gifts for older teachers to present to younger." We doubt not the volume will serve not only these, but other and higher useful purposes.

The Far East; or, Letters from Egypt, Palestine, and other Lands of the Orient. Illustrated with Engravings, Maps, &c. By N. C. Burt, D. D., author of "Hours with the Gospels." Cincinnati: R. W. Carroll & Co. 1868. Pp. 396.

The ground passed over by Dr. Burt has been often traversed by other travellers, and often described, sometimes in one aspect and sometimes in another. Each new report, however, when coming from an intelligent and cultivated writer, is sure to have its own peculiar value, and to find its own circle of readers. There is no valid objection, therefore, to the multiplication of such books of travel; and Dr. Burt has done well in contributing his part to the knowledge and interest which all classes of people, and especially all Christians, desire and cherish in reference to the scenes of Scripture history.

A Suggestive Commentary on St. Luke: with Critical and Homiletical Notes. By Rev. W. H. Van Doren. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 443 and 445 Broadway. 1868. Vol. I., pp. 520. Vol. II., pp. 558.

This work has been highly and very generally commended in the literary journals of England. It certainly evinces thought, labour, and learning; but the plan strikes us as un-

natural and repulsive. The idea of being concise and suggestive is run into the ground. Every line begins with a capital letter. Every line consists (as a rule) of a sentence. Each is distinct and unconnected. The effect is very much like that produced by reading a dictionary. If any book written in this way proves to be generally acceptable, it will be a proof that its intrinsic worth countervails the greatest possible disadvantage of method.

Ecce Ecclesia: An Essay showing the Essential Identity of the Church in all Ages. New York: Blelock & Co. 1868. Pp. 576.

Ecce Homo, published anonymously, was a sensational success. Hence the imitations, *Ecce Deus, Ecce Deus Homo,* and now *Ecce Ecclesia.* We suspect these works form, as might be expected, a descending series, in originality and force. The wide expectations excited by the title, "Ecce Ecclesia," are indeed repressed by the explanatory equivalent; "An Essay showing the essential identity of the Church in all ages." But such being the limited object of the book, the author had no right to give it a designation which awakens far higher expectations. That the Church has been the same in all ages is the common faith of Protestants, and we do not see that the writer of this volume has thrown any additional light on the subject. He seems to be labouring under an erroneous impression of what Protestants generally believe on this subject.

History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. By the Rev. W. M. Hetherington, author of the "History of the Church of Scotland." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1868.

The value of this standard work is well known and generally conceded. It is the most convenient, and, for ordinary laymen and ministers, available history of an Assembly, and the symbols it framed, of which no Presbyterian, or Calvinist, or lover of church history can willingly remain ignorant.

The Weaver Boy who became a Missionary: being the story of the Life and Labours of David Livingstone. By H. G. Adams. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1868.

This is an account of the career of Dr. Livingstone, compiled mainly from his own publications. The large numbers interested in the life and exploits of this world-renowned explorer, and devoted missionary, who cannot afford the means to procure, or the time to read the original sources of this work, will doubtless be glad to find in it a condensed and continuous narrative of a life alike heroic and romantic.