



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Art. I.—*Sanctification.*

Sanctification is the maintenance and progression of a new life, imparted to the soul, by a direct agency of the Spirit of God, in regeneration or the new birth. Of the latter, Coleridge admirably says that "not the qualities of the soul merely, but the root of the qualities is transcreated. How else could it be a birth, a creation?"* By nature, or the first birth, we are not only destitute of every element of this Divine principle, every spiritual desire or aptitude, we also have within us a principle utterly, and to finite power invincibly antagonistic to it; a deadly, death-working energy, that reigns and rules with a sovereign sway throughout and over our entire nature. It is described by the apostle as a merciless tyrant that rouses himself and asserts his supremacy at the least symptom of resistance to his malignant sway. This is sin, original sin, knowing no infancy, adult in the new-born babe; as Augustine says, *Tantillus puer, tantus peccator;*† the spring-head and ever-flowing fountain of all wrong acts and words and thoughts and feelings; it is like the poison in the viper, which makes it

* Works, vol. v. p. 370, Shedd's edition.

† See South's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 430, Bohn's edition.

a viper the moment it comes into being. This is our native hereditary condition. By the omnipotent agency of the Third Person of the Godhead the believer receives that which, under his gracious and continuous superintendence, strikes a death-blow at the principle of sin, and communicates a power and a life by which he is "renewed in the spirit of his mind," and becomes joyously and intelligently conscious of God's infinite love, tenderness, and grace, as revealed in the Scriptures, accompanied with longings for the fellowship and enjoyment of God and desires after perfect conformity to his will, and a detestation of whatever either in heart or in conduct is contrary to absolute goodness and truth. In possession of this divinely begotten property, he discovers his true relations to God in creation and in redemption; he becomes an inhabitant of a new world, an inheritor of an inconceivable glory; he is a new creature; old things have passed away, behold all things have become new. This property it is the effect of sanctification to perpetuate, enlarge, and mature.

The influence of the sanctifying agency is deeper than consciousness; it is a secret insensible presence abiding in its subject, invisible by any introspection or intuition; it is the *hidden life of God* in the mysterious mechanism of our being. This is one of "those things of God which no one knoweth, but the Spirit of God."* Its existence is discoverable only in two ways; (1) by the testimony of God; the Spirit bearing witness to it in the word; and (2) by its effects or fruits. We cannot better describe it than by saying that it is a spiritual instinct,† a living impulse that "pervades the inmost recesses of the man,"‡ that possesses and vitalizes his soul throughout its every part and faculty, disposing and enabling him unto all goodness. It finds its analogy in that native instinct which is developed in the domestic relations by which a mother loves

* 1 Cor. ii. 11.

† Owen says, "It hath much more conformity unto a natural unchangeable *instinct* than unto any acquired *habit*." Works, vol. iii. p. 475, Goold's edition. John Howe also says, that that which is created in regeneration is "by the very nature of it *instincted* into a dependence on God." Works, vol. v. p. 13, London, 1822. Flavel calls it "a kind of supernatural *instinct*." Method of Grace, p. 108, Am. Tract Soc. ed.

‡ Canons of the Synod of Dort, ch. iii., art. 11.

her child, and a child its parent. It is the *filial impulse* drawn out towards God as our father; the *fraternal* towards Christ as our brother. Thus God reproves Israel by Malachi—"a son honoureth his father, and a servant his master; if I then be a father, where is mine honour? and if I be a master, where is my fear? saith the Lord of hosts."* And this is even more strikingly illustrated in those passages where God blames his apostate people for not knowing and obeying him, even as the brutes know and obey their owners: "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib; but Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider."† "Yea the stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times; and the turtle and the crane and the swallow observe the time of their coming; but my people know not the judgment of the Lord."‡

As this Divine principle is beyond our inspection, lying within us, beneath the subtle all-pervasive principle of evil, it is manifest that it is a thing not subject to our will, not under our control, not accessible directly to our thoughts. Believers are "created anew," "born again," vivified, raised from the grave of sin, and made partakers of the Divine nature, "the seed of God." God's law, which is the embodiment of absolute right and goodness, is put into their inward parts, and inscribed on the fleshly tables of their hearts. Christ has given them water which has become within them a well of water springing up unto everlasting life. "He that believeth on me," said Christ, "out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. This spake he of the Spirit which they that believe on him should receive."§ "But as thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, or how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, even so thou knowest not this work of God,"‖ this process of sanctifying power.

Hence again, of course, sanctification should not be regarded as a habit, a second nature, an acquired instinct resulting from repetition of acts. There may be very signal instances of "the form of godliness" thus produced. Indeed, the appearance of piety may be more marked, and in some sense more effective,

* Malachi i. 6. † Isaiah i. 3. ‡ Jeremiah viii. 7.
§ John vii. 38, 39. ‖ Ecclesiastes xi. 5.

than the reality: the beauty of holiness in a person truly sanctified is often greatly disfigured by reason of the uncompromising struggle with the world, the flesh, and the devil, in which he is engaged; but that habit of religion which results from repeated acts of piety, not originating in God, not being supernatural, however beautiful in appearance, is like "clouds without water;" its "root is as rottenness, and its blossom goeth up as the dust." In sanctification, a Divine habit, a nature increated by the Holy Spirit is truly the proximate cause of all real holiness of life. It inclines and strengthens the subject of it to the performance of whatever acts are congruous to it,—to obedience, and faith, and love, and every grace. It confirms and developes "the right spirit" which God creates in the believer.

In truth this work of God's Spirit in man necessarily antedates, and gives both existence and character to whatever of true goodness the believer may have or attain to. The tree is first made good, and then the fruit is good: without this sanctifying work, thus preceding and forming the ground of right action, we are not sufficient to do, say, or think anything acceptable to God. Therefore it is that primarily and fundamentally, it is not under our control. It is not ours to watch, manage, or direct. This sacred treasure, the purchase of the blood of Christ, is not entrusted directly to our guardianship and care. It is too precious a thing to be committed to the frail bark of the human will. The holiness with which God endowed Adam and the angels in their creation was intrinsically the same as that which is given to us in sanctification, but its maintenance, nay, the very continuance of its principle, was made dependent upon themselves, upon their own wills; not so with those who are new created in Christ: their wills, all their particular acts and exercises of holiness are made dependent on their primordial antecedent, sanctification: not, as we shall presently see, that they are mere machines herein, not that they have no agency or responsibility or duty in relation to it; but that God is first and sovereign, the primal cause and constant preserver of this "new heart," this "Divine nature," this principle of celestial spontaneity implanted by himself within them. He so upholds and energizes it that nothing is more

certain than that it will never perish; no power, whether their own or others, can destroy it or separate it from them. Nothing is more expressly or emphatically declared in Scripture than that this product of the Divine power, this "life of God in the soul of man," is in the special keeping and watch of the Holy Spirit. He evermore guards, cherishes, and renews it. By his quickening influence it is kept vital and active, sanctifying them in their spirit, soul, and body. Comparing our spiritualized nature to a vineyard, the prophet says, "I the Lord do keep it; I will water it every moment, lest any hurt it; I will keep it night and day."* Thus they are "kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation,"† and all things which pertain unto life and godliness are given them; they are strengthened more and more with all might by the Spirit in the inner man. The Bible can teach us nothing as certain, if it be not an absolute certainty that sanctification in its principle and essence is a work of God's free and sovereign grace, wrought and eventually perfected by the immediate and continued operation of the Holy Spirit.

There is another and most instructive aspect in which this subject is presented to us in Scripture: it is based upon the inter-relations of the several Persons of the Godhead with each other. It is unnecessary here to state what these relations precisely are.‡ It is the office work of the Third Person in the Godhead *to unite the believer to Christ.* In order to sanctification he must be joined unto the Lord, made one with Him, as the branch with the vine, the members with the body, the body with the head, the house with its foundations. The Holy Spirit does not accomplish the work of sanctification apart from Christ. The subject of this work must be "in" Christ, and Christ must be "in" him in a mysterious ineffable union, a union not only like those unions already named, but like that most wonderful of all unions, the union of the Persons of the adorable Trinity, "as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."§ It is in the execution dis-

* Isaiah xxvii. 3. † 1 Peter i. 5.

‡ The reader will find them succinctly set forth in the October No. of this *Review* for 1866—Art. II.—*The Trinity in Redemption.*

§ John xvii. 21.

tinctively of the Holy Spirit's office work that this transcendent union is effected. He creates, cements, and perpetuates it; making the believer and the Lord Jesus Christ most intimately, vitally, may we not say, divinely, one. We are taught in the Scriptures that this union is constituted in the mutual participation by Christ and the believer of the same eternal Spirit. The Holy Ghost is in Christ, his Spirit; the Holy Ghost is in the believer, his Spirit; and thus the Holy Ghost, the Third Person of the Godhead, the *vinculum Trinitatis*, is the vinculum, the bond of the mysterious union between Christ and the believer.

The *effect* of this union of the subject of sanctification with the Lord Jesus Christ, according to the Bible, is the communication and reception of the fulness of Christ. "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ, and of his fulness do we receive and grace for grace."* As Christ is the Head of the Church, so "from Him the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth according to the effectual working in the measure of every part maketh increase of the body."† "We are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones;"‡ "he that is joined unto the Lord is one Spirit."§ He is "our life," we are "dead," and He "liveth in us." Thus it is that our Lord communicates to us his life, image, grace and strength by the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; and God the Father, in the economy of grace, has put the Spirit under Christ, that Christ concurrently with the loving heart of the Spirit may impart, maintain, and perfect this new and Divine nature in his people.

In accomplishing this wondrous result, the Holy Ghost becomes (1) an *Indwelling* Spirit: that is to say, an abiding presence, a Personal resident, with reference to a revelation of Christ within us, a living, dwelling of Christ in us by faith. As in the old dispensation Christ dwelt in the temple by the Shekinah, so we, being inhabited by the Holy Spirit are consecrated as His spiritual temples in which Christ dwells and lives as at home. If any man have not thus the Spirit of Christ, he

* John i. 17, 16. † Eph. iv. 16. ‡ Eph. v. 30. § 1 Cor. vi. 17.

is none of His.* "Know ye not that ye are the temples of the Holy Spirit who dwelleth in you."† "The Spirit of Him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in you."‡ In this manner Christ Jesus the Lord is enshrined and enthroned in us by his Spirit, making us "all glorious within"§—and becoming unto us our Wisdom and Righteousness and Sanctification and Redemption. This Indwelling in its influence and effect is that Divine nature, that spiritual instinct of which we have spoken: by his Personal residence the Spirit becomes the immediate cause, pledge, and guarantee of its being, its continuance, and its final perfection.

For (2) the Holy Spirit does not *dwell* in believers only; He also *works* in them mightily and incessantly. He works all their good works; the springs of their goodness are in him. By his internal operations he enables and inclines them unto all right desires, thoughts, words, and actions. The renewed soul would apostatize and perish, even as did Adam and Eve and the angels, were it not that the Spirit sent by Christ to reside in us, actuated us in all our duties, struggles, and temptations. "He works in us to will and to do."‖ He makes and keeps us willing and active. He imparts strength so that we can do and suffer all things according to the will of God. Paul could say, "I love and serve and glorify God, yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me. I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." So he teaches us that holy living, in every case, is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. Believers are led, guided, moved "by the Spirit;" they walk and live and pray "in the Spirit." God the Spirit makes all grace abound towards them so that they always have a sufficiency in all things. This antecedent, fundamental, causative presence of the Holy Spirit, is, according to the Scripture, the secret of the beginning, progress, and end of the work of sanctification.

If this account of the elemental character and cause of sanctification is just, then may we apply to sanctification what the Psalmist says of the Divine omniscience, "such knowledge is too wonderful for me, it is high, I cannot attain to it."¶

* Romans viii. 9. † 1 Cor. iii. 16. ‡ Romans viii. 11.
§ Psalm xlv. 13. ‖ 2 Cor. ix. 8. ¶ Ps. cxxxix. 6.

The subject of it, as President Edwards says, has "a higher privilege than the blessed Virgin herself had in having the body of the Second Person of the Trinity conceived in her womb, by the power of the Highest overshadowing her: Luke xi. 27, 28; 'And it came to pass as he spake these things, a certain woman of the company lift up her voice and said unto him, Blessed is the womb that bare thee and the paps that thou hast sucked! But he said, Yea, rather blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it.'"*

A matter of great practical importance, to which reference has already been made, here requires a brief consideration. Such questions as the following will indicate it. Is sanctification, as it has now been described, in any proper sense within the power of the believer? Can a renewed person do any thing of himself to promote or retard it? Is it not so absolutely within the sphere of Divine sovereignty that we must leave the work exclusively to His will and pleasure? In reply, we remark, that if the distinction just made between the *Indwelling* and the *Inworking* of the Holy Spirit is correct, then it would appear that believers are under most solemn relations and responsibilities in respect to it. As to the former, before men become believers, they of course do only resist the Holy Ghost who offers to be their guest, yet even then, by occasion of this offer they are under the highest responsibility; and in not fulfilling it as they ought incur most fearful guilt. But the actual inhabitation of the human soul by the Eternal Spirit is of the purest sovereignty of Divine grace, the free electing love of God in fulfilment of the covenant of redemption, and until in fact effectual, is against the nonconcurrence of the will of its subject.

The operations or Inworking of the Indwelling Spirit on the other hand, while just as purely sovereign as his inhabitation, are generally put into relations to our own agency, in such a manner as to make us personally answerable for the increase or hinderance of our sanctification. If we are stones fashioned for incorporation into the spiritual temple by the plastic hand of grace, we are lively stones, rational spiritual agents. And

* Edwards' Works, New York ed. 1843. Vol. i. p. 557.

while every believer is absolutely secure against apostasy; while the seed, the life, the celestial instinct of holiness implanted in the advent of the Divine inhabitant, is incorruptible and ineradicable, there is a most intrinsic coincidence between our free, rational, and moral faculties, and the influences and operations of the Holy Spirit in our sanctification. In this respect the omnipotent energy of the Holy Spirit in imparting and maintaining holiness in the believer is distinguished from his miraculous and prophetic agency. There is no forced suspension or abrogation or violation of the laws and relations of our being, no interference with our freedom. While our consciousness cannot reach to the working of the Divine Spirit within us, it can and does recognize the *effects* of his presence and power: these now, as always, are instances of moral liberty. The soul is conscious of entire untrammelled freedom in all its spiritual preferences and acts. As we have seen it belongs to the nature of the work of the Spirit to impart a new *life* to the soul, new tastes and dispositions, a new ability and self-activity unto holiness; as the Synod of Dort says, the renewed will "is not only actuated and influenced by God, but in consequence of this influence becomes itself active."* While the origin of our holiness is Divine, once originated, it is *ours;* it is holiness in our souls, in our wills, in all our faculties, just as truly our own, as the instinct of the ox or the ass or the crane is theirs; just as truly as the instinct that makes and marks a mother is her own.† Now as holiness

* Canons of the Synod of Dort, ch. 3d. art. 12.

† This is that which chiefly distinguishes Sanctification from Justification. A distinction so broad and so marked, that its clear discernment will ever forbid and forestal the papal doctrine of subjective justification; a doctrine widely prevalent under various modifications in the Church of England, and fast gaining ground in this country through the Ritualistic and Realistic tendencies of worship and of philosophy. The Scriptures always regard the righteousness on the ground of which we are justificd as not our own, but that which is of faith, the rightcousness which is of God by faith. The obedience of Christ, which is his, and only his and never ours, is the basis of justification. The righteousness and true holiness which are created within us in regeneration and maintained and advanced in sanctification, are ours in the strictest sense. Nothing, no part of our being; body or soul, no faculty or power or disposition is more truly our own than is the spiritual life, the Divine nature imparted to us by the Holy Spirit.

by its essence is not a thing of force or physical necessity; and as we are still in the flesh weak and depraved, we may, under the force of unconscious habit or subtle temptation or remaining corruption, so act as to abridge more or less the inworking of the indwelling Spirit of Christ. In the language of the Bible, we may "limit," "resist," "grieve," "quench" his sacred influences, or, on the contrary, we may respond to and receive and cherish them. The fruit or effect of the inworking of the Spirit is love, joy, faith, etc.; unless we by freely acting out these motions of grace do love, rejoice, believe, we are without these gracious affections; we are not growing, we are declining in grace. The germinating seed of grace is not in a mummy, but in a vital spirit, in a rational nature, through the personal exercise of which they become in the most perfect sense its own and not anothers.

There are three factors that concur in actual sanctification. These are (*a*) the person sanctified, (*b*) the word of God, and (*c*) the Holy Spirit. So intimate and essential is this concurrence in the life of believers, that the result is indifferently ascribed to either or all of them. The Spirit is evermore the causal or prime agent, as such working all, effecting all, that is wrought. We need not repeat the quotations already made in confirmation of this. If anything is clear in the Bible it is that the Holy Spirit is the author and finisher of our sanctification.

The person sanctified is called upon to do what by the above statement the Holy Spirit alone can do;—"make you a new heart and a new spirit;"* "keep thy heart with all diligence;"† "strengthen the things that remain;"‡ "keep yourselves in the love of God;"§ "be ye filled with the Spirit;"‖ "grow in grace."¶

Not less explicit is Scripture as to the agency of the word; of this it is said, "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever;"** "the engrafted word, which is able to save your souls;"†† "the word of his grace, which is able to build you up,

* Ezek. xviii. 31. † Prov. iv. 23. ‡ Rev. iii. 2.
§ Jude 21. ‖ Eph. v. 18. ¶ 2 Peter iii. 18.
** 1 Peter i. 23. †† James i. 21.

and to give you an inheritance among all them that are sanctified."*

In the process of sanctification neither the believer nor the Holy Spirit acts independently of the word. The former believes, repents, loves, hopes, fears, prays through, and according to, the word. By and through the same word the Holy Spirit begets, renews, illumines, convinces, restrains, guides, sanctifies the believer. The responsible and happy activity of the saint is therefore in vital connection with the word; and at the same time he is entirely and constantly dependent upon the inward working of the Spirit, who uses the word as his instrument in producing holiness of heart and life. Hence the study of the Bible is indispensable in our sanctification. Through it all our progress in the Divine life is made. Without it any progress is impossible. The Saviour prays, "sanctify them through thy truth, thy word is truth."† The Bible must be seen and felt to be the very word of the true and living God, "in a furnace of earth purified seven times,"‡ and "magnified above all God's name."§

> It is the Book of God. What if I should
> Say God of Books?
> Let him that looks
> Askance at that expression, as too bold,
> His thoughts in silence smother,
> Till he shall find such another.—HERBERT.

Then and only then does it secure the sanctifying coöperation of the Holy Spirit when it is regarded as veritably Divine. Thus the apostle teaches—"for this cause thank we God without ceasing, because when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth the word of God which effectually worketh also in you that believe."‖ This efficient working is of course that of the Holy Spirit, for in themselves neither the will of the believer, nor the word of God can produce holiness in the soul. This is the peculiar prerogative of the Spirit.

But this word, the medium or instrument of sanctification, is

* Acts xx. 32. † John xvii. 17. ‡ Psalm xii. 6.
§ Psalm cxxxviii. 2. ‖ 1 Thess. ii. 13.

no bare letter, when it is used by the Spirit. It is itself spirit and life, a fire and a hammer, quick and powerful, an engrafted word able to save the soul. Let a renewed person receive the truth of God as verily that truth, adapted by its own nature to produce the fruits of holiness; its efficiency will now seem to be entirely within and of itself; and were it not for the positive testimony of God to the contrary, he would deem the coöperating, sealing, illuminating, renewing work of the Spirit not only unnecessary, but unreal. The supernatural *truths* and *statements* so received would be regarded as producing faith, the fontal grace, absolute trust in the revelations of the spiritual and eternal worlds; the commands and precepts would be thought to work obedience and submission and penitence, with their kindred graces; the *promises* would be looked upon as the source of hope, joy, consolation, strength, and gratitude; the *threatenings* and *cautions*, as producing awe, reverence, and watchfulness. Each and every declaration of God would be accounted as themselves fruitful of blessings to the believer sitting at the feet of Jesus and saying with Samuel, Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth. But this view of the independent efficacy of the word is, as we have remarked, contrary to the explicit testimony of God. The revealed facts concerning the nature and working of original sin in the believer, and the supreme place attributed to the Holy Spirit in sanctification render it an illogical as well as an unscriptural hypothesis.* The spirit and energy that are ascribed to the word are not of themselves competent to sanctify. On the contrary, unless the living word is accompanied with creative omnipotent power it serves only to blind and harden and condemn. Its practical value to the believer is to be estimated only in connection with this Divine agency. To separate the Holy Spirit from the word, is to make the latter a savour of death unto death. It is still armed with infinite authority. Not being the word of Moses or Paul, of David or John, of prophets or evangelists,

* A failure to recognize the distinction above indicated is the fault of such works as that of Jenkyn on "The Union of the Holy Spirit and the Church," and of all "moral suasion" theories in modern Divinity. In this connection, see Turretin, vol. ii. p. 463, et seq. Edinburgh ed. De vocatione et fide, Quæst. 4, sec. 23, or "Gratia per verbum" and "immediata gratia."

but of God, having as its author the faithful, the true, the infallible Witness, it is of course above all cavil, or question, or debate. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God."* "Holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."† Not merely *their* opinions, views, and feelings are communicated, but His, whose thoughts are not as man's thoughts, whose justice and whose mercy are past finding out. It is a word of infinite majesty to be scanned not by human logic, or learning, or intuition, but submitted to implicitly by the human will to be the supreme law of conscience and of life. It is thus a word of instant obligation, to be believed and acted upon at once. It is not amenable to the reasoning faculties of man, it commands his reason and his heart. The Holy Ghost evermore saith, "*To-day*, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts."‡ "*Now* is the accepted time; behold now is the day of salvation."§ From its very nature the word of the Bible admits of no delay as to the reception of what it teaches or obedience to its behests. Cavil, hesitation about acceptance and compliance with it, is presumptuous sin against its Author. Prompt, thorough, absolute acquiescence is our duty whenever we hear or read the word of God.

But we never resist the word alone; for the agency of the Spirit in using and applying the word is likewise immediate. The *duty* of the believer created by the word, and the *grace* of God enabling unto that duty go together. The Spirit convicts, enlightens, purifies, consoles, restrains, strengthens, as the case may be, just then, when the word received in simple faith comes into contact with the mind. No sooner does the Divine word touch the soul, whether through the ear or eye, or memory, than the exceeding greatness of the power of the Holy Ghost produces its legitimate effect. On this account, the word of God "never returns to him void, but accomplishes that which he pleases, and prospers in the thing whereto he sends it."‖ It always effectually worketh for good in them who receive it as the word of God. Being of Divine authority and of immediate obligation, and the blessed Spirit being both its author and its efficiency in the soul, unbelief, doubt, delay

* 2 Timothy iii. 16. † 2 Peter i. 21. ‡ Heb. iii. 7.
§ 2 Cor. vi. 2. ‖ Isaiah lv. 11.

are perilous to the last degree. And as we are wholly dependent upon the coöperation of the Spirit, as without him the word never quickens, or renews, or illuminates, or comforts, our relations to him are unspeakably tender, delicate, and solemn. His condescension to us in this matter being infinite, our faith and acceptance of him and his word should be simple and hearty and prompt. On this point of signal, essential moment, a few paragraphs from Pascal will not be inappropriate. "As to the mere passing topics of the day, it is doubtless quite enough to have once heard and retained them, but not so with spiritual truths. These must be impressed upon our minds by an internal and Divine influence, and not merely perfunctorily committed to the memory. We may indeed get by heart, and remember as easily, an epistle of Paul, as one of the books of Virgil; but the knowledge and the impression thus acquired are a mere effort of memory: while in order to enter into that sacred language, which is an unknown one to those not taught of heaven, we need the same grace which first opened the understanding to instruction, to preserve and retrace it continually in faithful and docile hearts. . . . . The perseverance of the faithful is only the result of a continual supply of grace; and not of such grace as when once imparted ever after subsists of itself; which shows us our perpetual dependence upon Divine mercy; for if that be once suspended, we are instantly reduced to inefficiency and barrenness. For grace once possessed is only to be retained by the acquisition of more. . . . . We should never indulge a disinclination for hearing or reading sacred things, however common and familiar they may be; for our memory as well as the instructions committed to it, are like a mere lifeless body without the vivifying influences of the Spirit. . . . . Thus a sermon of the most ordinary description will sometimes produce more effect upon those who receive its instructions in a teachable spirit, than the most eloquent discourse heard with the liveliest interest and delight. And we sometimes find that those who thus listen in a right mind, although ignorant and insensible before, will be touched with the mere hearing of the name of the Almighty, or by a few words that convey the threat of eternal punishment, although

these may be all that find admission into their darkened minds."*

In respect to this matter of the time or season of the sanctifying operations of the Holy Spirit, we submit a few thoughts in connection with the preaching and hearing of the word. Humble, docile, Mary-like *reading* of God's word, and careful David-like meditation on that word, furnish occasions for the working of the blessed Spirit, and we should properly magnify our duty therein. But it has "pleased God by the foolishness of *preaching* to save them that believe."† Faith and all the graces involved in faith come by hearing. The word, we are told, profits only when mixed with faith in them that hear it.‡ The official ministerial declaration of the word, is one of God's chief means of sanctifying and comforting his people. On the supposition that the preacher is a faithful ambassador of God, if the hearers receive his word with doubt and questioning, if they regard it as the word of the preacher, and not as it is in truth the word of God, if they sit as judges upon it and hesitate and delay to accept it, the Holy Spirit does not attend it with his sanctifying power. He is grieved and offended, and the result must be very different from a blessing. God's word must be heard as God's word in order to God's blessing. If we go to the house of God to be sanctified by his Holy Spirit, if we go to be wrought upon by the omnipotent Spirit in our deepest being, then we go not to hear a man speak, but what God the Lord may speak; we go to listen not to human eloquence or learning, but to the solemn voice of Him whose word called the world from nothing, and it came; to hear, not the preacher, but the word preached. The preacher, though he be a Paul or an Apollos, is only a minister, a servant of the people by whom they believe as the Lord gives to every man. All he does is to plant and to water: "so then neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase."§ How few professing Christians go to church for this supernatural purpose? If they went with the desire and expectation of being the subjects of the direct and

* The Miscellaneous Writings of Pascal, Faugère's ed. London, 1849. Pp. 16, 17.

† 1 Cor. i. 21. ‡ Heb. iv. 2. § 1 Cor. iii. 7.

most profound operations of the eternal Spirit, how much more frequently and earnestly would they attend upon the ministrations of the house of God? If, with David, the one thing that they desired of the Lord was to see and feel the beauty and power and glory of the Lord in his sanctuary, instead of being half-day Sabbath hearers and demanding short sermons and æsthetic appendages to the services, they would wish to dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of their life, and the gospel would come to them not in word only, but also in power and in the Holy Ghost and in much assurance.* That preaching which does not first of all commend itself to the Holy Spirit, that does not offer itself to Him as a prepared medium of Divine power to the souls of the hearers, though the preacher be unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice and can play well upon an instrument, is unprofitable, wicked preaching. The Holy Spirit sanctifies the people of God through the declaration of the testimony of God; therefore should the preacher come to them not with excellency of speech or wisdom; and his preaching should be not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, that their faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.† The less there is of the preacher the better. The counsel of Dr. Payson to a minister illustrates this; "Paint Jesus Christ upon your canvass, and then hold him up to the people; but so hold him up, that not even your little finger can be seen." God only is great in his own house. He is there by his Spirit to work this wondrous work of sanctification through the truth as it is in his written word; and hearers who do not crave and insist upon the real word of God from the ministry, fail to be sanctified through the ministry they attend on. Like the Bereans, they should themselves study the word in the Scriptures, that so they may receive and enjoy the peculiar benediction promised to the oral proclamation of that word. To be pleased, gratified, and satisfied, are very different things from being sanctified. It is not the preacher, but the word of God spoken by the preacher, through which the Spirit graciously operates. When that word

* Psalms xxvii. 4, xxiii. 6; 1 Thess. i. 5. † 1 Cor. ii. 1, 4, 5.

is faithfully and truly uttered, the opportunity of the Holy Spirit is furnished; and whether the preacher be a Jonah or a Paul, a Noah or a Peter, it depends not on him, but on the Holy Spirit, what use shall be made of the word he preaches.

Besides, as the word is a word of instant obligation, and as the Holy Spirit always recognizes his own authority and majesty by which that obligation is created, and exerts his power in connection with it, *when* preached, we may remark, that the *frequent* proclamation by the preacher, and the *frequent* hearing of that word by the people, is both a high privilege and a solemn duty.* What we have already quoted from Pascal bears strongly on this point; we add to it a few words from President Edwards: "It is objected that when sermons are heard so very often, one sermon tends to thrust out another, so that persons lose the benefit of all; they say, two or three sermons in a week are as much as they can remember and digest. Such objections against frequent preaching, if they are not from an enmity against religion, are from want of duly considering the way that sermons usually profit an auditory. The main benefit that is obtained by preaching, is by impression made upon the mind in the time of it, and not by any effect that arises afterwards by a remembrance of what was delivered. And though an after-remembrance of what was heard in a sermon is oftentimes very profitable; yet, for the most part that remembrance is from an impression the words made on the heart in the time of it; and the memory profits as it renews and increases that impression; and a frequent inculcating the more important things of religion in preaching, has no tendency to rase out such impressions, but to increase them and fix them deeper and deeper in the mind, as is found by experience. . . . . It seems to have been the practice of the apostles to preach every day in places where they went; yea, though sometimes they continued long in one place, Acts ii. 42 and 46,—xix. 8, 9, 10. They did not avoid preaching one day for fear they should thrust out of the

* The practice which obtains in some churches of requiring but one sermon of their pastor on the Sabbath, and substituting a prayer-meeting or a Sunday-school service in the place of the second sermon, has the support neither of Scripture nor of a sound philosophy.

minds of their hearers what they had delivered the day before; nor did Christians avoid going every day to hear, for fear of any such bad effect."*

From the views that have been presented, we readily infer that the *guarantee* of sanctification is the word of God heard and heartily believed; that its *measure* is according to the simplicity and child-likeness of faith; and that its *quality* is derived from the character and kind of the truths received. All the truths of the Bible believed and honoured in their due proportion will make the best balanced, most stable and efficient saint. How many dislike and avoid much of God's truth, and become one-sided, unequal, variable, questionable Christians in consequence?

It is also evident that our sanctification, though in its cause wholly a Divine work, is in a very high sense placed within our own power. The indwelling of the Spirit is constant and assured, but the operations and influences of that Spirit are in such connection with the will and wisdom of the believer and the word, that the believer is invested with a most sacred responsibility. It becomes a *duty* to be sanctified by the Holy Ghost. We sin against God, if, in the active intelligent use of God's word and in dependence on the promised Spirit, we are not dying more and more unto sin and living more and more unto righteousness. The Spirit inclines and enables us to believe and pray and love and struggle, and we may oppose and grieve him therein, or we may cherish and glorify him; and to him that *hath*, that uses and improves what he hath, to him shall be given more abundantly.

Again, subjective sanctification is in no small degree *a fact to be believed*, rather than an experience of which we are conscious. Both the indwelling Presence and the powerful working of the Holy Spirit are alike beyond our inspection and recognition; so that the direct immediate discernment of the gracious work in its progress, is impossible: it is to be known only in a secondary form and manner; and this, as before remarked, is twofold, (*a*) by an observation of effects and fruits, and (*b*) by the testimony of God. As to the first, the

* Edwards' Works, New York ed., 1843, vol. iii. p. 342. See also Owen's Works, Goold's ed., vol. iii. p. 389.

saints are apt to judge of their holiness by their comforting experiences, their peace, and joy, and hope in the Saviour; but the Holy Spirit may act as a spirit of sanctification most, when he comforts least. Often the increase of the conviction of sin and hell desert, of self-diffidence and self abhorrence, are the most manifest tokens of grace; and these humbling experiences are not the most inspiring and pleasant, though probably they are the most profitable. Therefore on God's testimony saints are to believe that they are increasingly sanctified, even when they have many fears and misgivings; for every saint grows in holiness whether he sees and feels it or not. Two of the most noticeable cases of this named in the Bible are Heman and David. The experience of the former is recorded in the eighty-eighth Psalm, for the abounding comfort of broken-hearted desponding believers. That of the latter is thus beautifully narrated by Kitto. After his great sin in the matter of Bathsheba and Uriah, "David appears a much altered man. He is one who goes down to the grave mourning. His active history is past—henceforth he is passive merely. All that was high and firm and noble in his character goes out of view; and all that is weak and low and wayward comes out in strong relief. Of the infirmities of his temper and character, there may have been previous indications, but they were but dimly discernible through the splendor of his worthier qualities; now that splendor has waxed pale—the most fine gold has become dim, and the spots become broad and distinct. The balance of his character is broken. Still he is pious, but even his piety takes an altered aspect. It is no longer buoyant, exulting, triumphant, glad; it is repressed, humble, patient, contrite, suffering. His trust in the Lord is not less than it had been, and that trust sustains him, and still gives dignity to his character and sentiments. But even that trust is different. He is still a son—but he is no longer a Joseph, rejoicing in his father's love, and proud of the coat of many colours which that love has cast upon him; but rather a Reuben, pardoned, pitied, and forgiven, yet not unpunished by the father whose honour he has defiled. Alas for him! The bird which once rose to heights unattained before by mortal wing, filling the air with its joyful songs, now

lies with maimed wing upon the ground pouring forth its doleful cries to God."*

If the views that have been presented of the sovereignty and causative agency of the Spirit in sanctification and of our responsible dependence upon his operations are correct, the relations of art to worship are easily determined. We build our churches, provide for their services, and attend upon them not to be pleased or moved through any of our senses, or our æsthetic nature, but to be wrought upon by the direct and present power of the Holy Spirit; to be moulded, as clay in the hands of the potter, by his secret and subtle influence into the image of Christ. Whatever assists in bringing the soul of the believer, the word of God, and the Divine Spirit into most intimate conjunction should be earnestly sought; whatever tends to divert and separate the soul from this sacred union should be rejected and condemned. Whatever can be done, in the way of conveniences and adaptations, by which the body is so disposed as not to interfere with the Spirit, by which all things offensive to the eye or the ear are removed, or by which pure taste is violated, should be done; and whatever in architecture, painting, sculpture, or music, in decorations by flowers, curtains, etc., in the vestments of the minister, or the method of worship, attracts attention to itself, and so takes off the mind from God and his truth, should be sedulously avoided. The true object and end of all church arrangements should be to bring into vital relations the entire soul of man, the pure word of God, and the almighty Spirit of grace. The service of the sanctuary is spiritual. *Simplicity* should be the characteristic of whatever material is connected with it.

One other remark this discussion suggests. It has respect to ministers of the word. Sanctification as a work of God's Holy Spirit in God's elect through the word makes their office sacred beyond every other undertaken by man. They are appointed to furnish the materials through which this omnipotent efficiency is exerted. Those materials are the "all Scripture" which is given by inspiration of God. They must faithfully, fearlessly, in loyalty to the Holy Ghost, declare the whole

* Kitto's Daily Bible Illustrations, Carter's ed., vol. iii. p. 375.

counsel of God, not consulting the preferences, feelings, opinions, or prejudices of their hearers, but the feelings and wishes of the Divine Spirit. Alas for the souls of men, when the pews give tone and character to the pulpit; when the high, fearful, imperial declarations of the Bible do not find their clear, complete, emphatic echoes from the preacher. As none of the penmen of the sacred volume recorded their private personal views, but wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, so the ministry should speak as the oracles of God; not giving forth their *opinions* on any topic, but evermore profoundly mindful that they are called of God, consecrated by the anointing of the Holy One to the simple and sole function of reproducing the inspired word, and that as the commissioned ambassadors of God, his representatives in the stead of the Lord Jesus Christ, they are to render to God account of their ministry. Well has it been said,* that "their preaching should be abstracted from all the temporal and secular interests of men, and rigorously confined to human guilt and human redemption; upon its face, it should not seem even to recognize that man has any relations to this little ball of earth, but should take him off from the planet entirely, and contemplate him simply as a sinner in the presence of God;" as a renewed sinner, we may add, who through the word, preëminently the preached word of God, is to be called out from the world, and made separate, and then to be powerfully transformed and transfigured into the image of Him who is the brightness of the Father's glory, the express image of his Person.

* By Professor Shedd.

ART. II.—*A Plea for The Queen's English, Stray Notes on Speaking and Spelling.* By HENRY ALFORD, D. D., Dean of Canterbury. Alexander Strahan, Publisher. London and New York. 1866.

The Dean's English: A Criticism on the Dean of Canterbury's Essays on the Queen's English. By G. Washington Moon, Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. Alexander Strahan & Co., Publishers, 139 Grand Street, New York.

Good English; or Popular Errors in Language. By Edward S. Gould. New York: W. J. Widdleton, Publisher. 1867.

THE English language is spoken by nearly sixty millions of men, and "appears destined hereafter to prevail with a sway more extensive even than its present, over all the portions of the globe." Jacob Grimm, the highest authority in the Gothic languages, declares that "in wealth, wisdom, and strict economy, none of the living languages can vie with it," that it "possesses a veritable power of expression, such as, perhaps, never stood at the command of any other language of man." Its simple syntax, the small number of its grammatical forms, its nervous power, and its massive strength, point it out as a "world-language," which has already fulfilled the prophecy of its earlier days:

> "Who knows whither we may vent
> The treasure of our tongue? To what strange shores
> This gain of our best glory may be sent
> T' enrich unknowing nations with our stores?
> What worlds in the yet unformed Occident
> May come refined with accents that are ours?"*

A language of such richness and power, the vehicle of more free thought and earnest truth than any other living language, is worthy of our most diligent study. And yet it is only within a few years that the attention of scholars has been directed to the thorough investigation upon philosophical principles of that language, which, within four centuries from the time it ceased to be a mere jargon, produced the greatest poet of modern times. In fact the means for such a study did not

* Daniel, in *De Vere's Studies in English*, page 1.

exist until recently. But the publication of manuscripts and the republication of our early authors is gradually multiplying the facilities for such speculations, and increasing the number of persons devoted to them. Along with the more profound works which have been the result of this movement, a number of small volumes have recently appeared, some of which we propose to notice in the present article.

"A Plea for the Queen's English," or "Stray Notes on Speaking and Spelling," is a collection of papers originally delivered as lectures to the Church of England Young Men's Literary Association at Canterbury, by Dr. Alford, Dean of Canterbury. They were afterwards published in "Good Words," and now appear in a volume under the above title, but considerably modified in form. "The Dean's English" consists of a series of criticisms upon the Dean's Essays as they appeared in "Good Words." They were written by Mr. G. Washington Moon, F. R. S. L., who considered it his duty to expose the errors of the Dean, lest others should be injured by the example of "one of exalted position and reputed learning." The sharp controversy that ensued attracted public attention throughout the English literary world; and although both the disputants lost their temper, and notably the Dean, yet the discussion has been of much service. The verdict of the literary public in England upon nearly all the points in controversy has been in favour of the critic and against the Dean. Mr. Gould's work on "Good English" should be studied by every one who desires to avoid the popular errors in language which often escape the observation of educated men just because they are so common. The lecture upon Clerical Elocution, at the close of the volume, may be read with profit by ministers outside of the pale of the particular denomination for which it was intended.

We read the Dean's work very carefully and made our own criticisms as we read. Upon taking up Mr. Moon's little work we, of course, found that we had been anticipated in most of them, and were pleased to have the weight of his authority to sustain our judgment. There are, doubtless, many excellent things in "The Queen's English," to which we should do well to take heed; the style of the author, however, is not only

inelegant, but even inaccurate and slovenly. Mr. Moon quotes Schlegel's remark as a reason for his criticism of the Dean. "The care of the national language is at all times a sacred trust. Every man of education should make it the object of his unceasing concern to preserve his language pure." It is the duty of every educated person whose vernacular language it is, not only to keep the well of English undefiled so far as he himself is concerned, but also to prevent others from defiling the everflowing stream. We are surprised that the Dean's work should be employed as a text-book in some of our institutions of learning. It contains scores of errors, and surely the text-book should not only inculcate correct principles, but be an exemplification of them. If the Dean's book be employed for purposes of instruction, the Critic's work, which is almost faultless in point of style and rarely incorrect in its views, ought by all means to accompany it; bane and antidote should go together. In a subsequent part of this article we shall present proofs of the Dean's want of qualifications for the position he has assumed, beyond those of any person of ordinary scholarship and correct taste.

In illustrating the intimate connection between the mind and character of a nation and its language, he reveals more of the spirit of the partisan than the calmness of a judge, and shows his ignorance of some of the elements necessary to a fair decision. He reminds us of a distinguished Professor of the Sorbonne, who was greatly surprised when we assured him that English was spoken with more purity and propriety by the great mass of the people in the United States than by the corresponding class in England. His surprise was still greater when we informed him that the best Dictionaries of the language were by Americans. We quietly remarked to him that he had formed his opinion of the *American* language from "Uncle Tom's Cabin," then in the height of its popularity; and he acknowledged that this was the fact! We shall, however, permit our readers to judge for themselves. "Every important feature in a people's language is reflected in its character and history. Look, to take one familiar example, at the process of deterioration which our Queen's English has undergone at the hands of the Americans. Look at those phrases

which so amuse us in their speech and books; at their reckless exaggeration, and contempt for congruity; and then compare the character and history of the nation—its blunted sense of moral obligation and duty to man; its open disregard of conventional right where aggrandizement is to be obtained; and, I may now say, its reckless and fruitless maintenance of the most cruel and unprincipled war in the history of the world." In reading this paragraph an American involuntarily thinks of the Opium War in China and the extension of British rule in India. It also brings up anew the question of the English language in the United States, or rather in America.

It is a remarkable fact, and contrary to what we should have expected, that the further we trace a language back, the more divergent are its dialects, both in the form and in the sound of their words, and in their grammatical structure. As we descend the stream, the branches seem to unite, and we doubt not that the numerous dialects or patois that disfigure modern languages will eventually disappear, and that as the written languages of Germany, France, and Italy are now one, so each people will soon be of "one speech." Is it likely that as the dialects in England are becoming obsolete that the diversities of speech in England and America are either so great now or will hereafter attain such a character as to constitute two distinct dialects? We think not. Despite all the causes of alienations both in our earlier and in our later history the bonds of union between the two countries are growing stronger. The ocean between them does not divide but unites them more closely. They are Anglo-Saxon in their national traits, and their unity is manifest in the essential oneness of the language that exhibits the characteristics of their nationality. This language is a common inheritance, and the nations that speak it have a right to add to its stores. When a language ceases to grow it begins to decay. The English language has not yet reached this stage of its development, and so long as there is vitality in the American people they will contribute to its growth, and much of what originates here must be accepted upon the other side of the ocean as a legitimate outgrowth from the common stock. Even our English critics are beginning to confess the right of America to make contributions to the lan-

guage, and to acknowledge the lawful claims of these new words and phrases to a position in the tongue which is not the exclusive heritage of Englishmen. Considering the nature of language, the character of our people, and the constant infusion of "strange tongues," it is surprising that the language has not suffered greater changes at our hands than it exhibits at present. Englishmen exaggerate the changes, while many Americans either deny them or attempt to explain them, and retort by directing attention to the numerous errors in language prevalent in England. Dean Alford's book certainly shows that not a few solecisms, and these by no means trivial, are to be met with even amongst educated persons in England. The English language as spoken in America undoubtedly has some peculiarities, but to collect all the expressions to be found in American books or newspapers, or to be heard in the colloquial language of this country, that differs from the language of the best English authors, and to call these Americanisms, and to denounce us as corrupters of the English tongue, is manifestly unjust. The colloquial language of the two countries differs much more than the written language. We have common standards for the one, while in the other, the racy, idiomatic expressions have been lost by reason of our separation, and their places have frequently been supplied by the strong but inelegant expressions that may, too often, be designated as slang. Bartlett has gathered from all sources, but chiefly from the humorous writers of this country, many hundreds of words and phrases, which he styles Americanisms. Many of them, however, are really good English; and surely the slang expressions of this country no more represent the language of America than does the *argot* of some of the low characters of Eugene Sue's novels represent the language of the cultivated class of the French capital, or the "flash" language of London low life represent that of elegant society in the West End. Slang and even archaic modes of expression ought to be excluded from any just estimate of the "deterioration which the Queen's English has undergone at the hands of the Americans." And yet these, we think, constitute the great body of the corruptions which we are charged with having introduced.

It is undoubtedly true that the English language is spoken much more correctly by the mass of the people in America than by the corresponding class in England; but it is also true that the best educated people in England deviate less frequently from the standard of good English than do our best scholars in America. In other words, the educated class employ better English in their conversation, not in their writings, than the same class in America. Although dialects do not exist among us, and the language has achieved a remarkable degree of purity and uniformity, yet there are peculiarities that distinguish the different sections of the country. The nasal intonation of New England, the omission of the *h* after *w* in the Middle States, the drawl of the Southern, and the peculiar accent of the Western States, seem to us to mark unmistakably the inhabitants of the different parts of the land.

The Dutch have left only a few words in New York and New Jersey; while the Swedes have left no imprint upon the language. The Germans in Pennsylvania have not impaired the national speech, and the French of the Mississippi valley are destined to a complete absorption; while our immense Hibernian immigration has not even succeeded in obliterating the distinction between *shall* and *will*. In fact the English language in the days of Shakespeare resembled the Irish mode of pronunciation more nearly than does the language of the younger generation of the Irish in this country resemble that of their parents. The assimilating power of the English blood and the English language in this country is truly wonderful. Even "Carlyle" cannot obtain a footing here, and the "*me*" and the "*not-me*," "*stand-point*," &c., we hope will be ignominiously expelled. Only a few Spanish words were annexed with Texas and California, while the poor Indian has contributed only a few words, except geographical names. This, however, is a digression from our main subject.

While noticing the errors either of Dean Alford himself, or those to which he calls attention, it may be well to glance at some of the mistakes that are made even by well educated people among ourselves. In reference to spelling, the Dean is conservative, and desires to preserve those forms of words which recall their origin and etymology, where long usage does not

forbid a change. In the earlier periods of our language, the effort was to express the sounds of the words correctly, so that in many cases the forms do not profess to represent the etymology; each author seems to have written what was "right in his own eyes," or rather "in his own ears," and the printers, then as now, assumed to control the matter of orthography. The attempted reformation by Webster was, in most respects, a complete failure, and we are happy to observe that the last edition of his dictionary is not unlike the play of Hamlet, with the character of Hamlet left out; the notions of Webster have almost disappeared. The Dean, in ungrammatical English, condemns the practice of omitting the "*u*" in the termination "*our*." He hopes, with Archdeacon Hare, that the "abomination will be confined to the cards of the great vulgar, and to books printed in America." The last edition of his own poems contains the "abomination," but he defends himself by saying that the main part of the work was printed in America.

Recent investigation shows that spelling *honor*, *favor*, &c., without the "*u*" is not an Americanism, but actually prevailed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although sympathizing with the Dean in his view, we think it useless to attempt to stem the current. One word, we trust, will be kept sacred from this innovation. An Englishman once remarked, "We scarcely know our *Saviour* in your American language." "By removing a single letter from the holy word Saviour, you would shock the piety of millions," says Johnson in Lander. Let the word "*Saviour*" at least remain intact; we will yield the others without discussing the question of their derivation from Latin or French originals. We shall notice only one other point in orthography, and that for the purpose of generalizing what the Dean seems to confine to the words *attorney* and *money*. He states correctly that the mode of forming their plurals is simply by the addition of "*s*." The rule, we think, is perfectly definite as to words ending in "*y*"; where a vowel precedes the "*y*," add "*s*" to form the plural; where a consonant precedes it, change the "*y*" into *ies*. Thus, *turkey*, *turkeys;* but, *cherry*, *cherries*, &c.

The next subject he takes up is that of pronunciation. Any

one who has met Englishmen even casually, has been struck with the difference between their mode of pronunciation and that of Americans. The English *clip* their words, the Americans enunciate every syllable distinctly; the English articulate the consonants plainly; the Americans dwell upon the vowels. These differences are due to the influence of climate, and to the social habits of the people. There seems to be a difference in the structure of the vocal organs, and Mr. Marsh thinks that the contrast between English and American pronunciation is largely due to the fact that we are a nation of readers.

It is certain that we are more easily understood by foreigners, and that we acquire the pronunciation of foreign languages with greater facility. The French say that the English can rarely enunciate the French sounds correctly, while the Americans are next to the Russians and the Poles in the ease with which they acquire a command of the language. Whether this is merely the language of compliment or not, we are unable to say. Whatever may be our faults in pronunciation, we are free from that which the Dean pronounces the worst of all, the misuse of the aspirate, the exasperating "exhaspiration," as it has been termed. It is remarkable that the English are not the only people who have engaged in this war of extermination. Among the ancient Greeks and Romans the tendency of the vulgar was to omit the aspirate in the words to which it belongs, and the sound of "*h*" is no longer heard in the languages of Southern Europe. The best authorities deny this letter any power in French, save that of preventing the elision of the vowel of the article, or the *liaison*, in connection with the words beginning with the so-called aspirated "*h*." England then does not stand alone in this respect, and the history of the language proves that the error existed several centuries since.

We are familiar with the many amusing anecdotes that illustrate it, and know that it is almost impossible to correct the habit when once acquired. The Dean quotes from *Punch*, the story of the barber who assured a customer that the cholera was in the *hair*. "Then," said the gentleman, "you ought to be very careful what brushes you use." "Oh, sir," replied the barber, "I didn't mean the *air* of the *ed*, but the *hair* of the *hatmosphere*." In paragraph 55, the Dean says, "We still

sometimes, even in good society, hear '*ospital*,' '*erb*,' and '*umble*,'—all of them very offensive, but the last of them by far the worst, especially when heard from an officiating clergyman. The English Prayer-book has at once settled the pronunciation of this word for us, by causing us to give to God our '*humble* and *hearty* thanks' in the general thanksgiving. *Umble* and *hearty* few can pronounce without a pain in the throat; and '*umblanarty*' we certainly never were meant to say; *h*umble and *h*earty is the only pronunciation which will suit the alliterative style of the prayer, &c. . . . . It is difficult to believe that this pronunciation can long survive the satire of Dickens in David Copperfield: 'I am well aware that I am the umblest person going,' said Uriah Heep, modestly, 'let the other be who he may. My mother is likewise a very umble person. We live in a numble (an umble?) abôde, Master Copperfield, but have much to be thankful for. My father's calling was umble; he was a sexton.' " We have given the Dean the benefit of this ample quotation, and despite the support afforded him by Mr. Dickens, we think he mistakes in reference to the pronunciation of *humble*, and also of *herb*, while we coincide with his view as to *hospital*, although the almost universal practice of the Scotch and the Irish is against it. The unaspirated pronunciation of *humble* we think can easily be defended. On this point nearly every orthoepist is opposed to the Dean, and one of his critics justly remarks that, "*H* is a hearty letter, *u* is despondent," and that feeling and sentiment would rather dictate a pause after the word *humble* in the prayer, and a warm, cordial utterance of the word *hearty*, and the giving to each word its ordinary mode of pronunciation. Alliteration, upon which he relies so confidently, proves too much; for then we should aspirate the "*h*" in *honour* in the petition, "that we may *honour* and *humbly* obey her," *i. e.*, the Queen. Moreover, almost the first page of the Prayer-book, which settles (?) the question in his favour, contains the following: "That we may confess our sins with *an* humble, &c." The case is clearly against the Dean. The aspiration of the "*h*" in humble arises from two causes; in England, from a desire not to be thought vulgar, in this country from affectation.

Although we do not have the same trouble as the English in

reference to the "*h*," yet in the Middle States the words beginning with "*wh*" are very generally pronounced incorrectly. The same error prevails in England, although not to so great an extent. Thus no distinction is made between *when* and *wen*, *whet* and *wet*, *white* and *wight*, *wheel* and *weal*, *which* and *witch*, *whine* and *wine;* although the words contrast ludicrously enough when pronounced together. By recalling the fact that originally the "*h*" preceded the "*w*" in the orthography, as it still does in the correct pronunciation, the difficulty will be obviated. The words *shrine* and *shrink*, *shroud*, &c., are also erroneously pronounced without the "*h*." We are not noticing the faults of the vulgar and ignorant so much as those of educated persons. In the English House of Parliament and in good society in this country, one may hear such expressions as the "*lawr* of the land," the "*idear* of a God," "*Jehovahr*," "*peninsular*," &c., as if persons were unwilling or did not have sufficient energy to cut off the sound when they arrive at the end of a word. In the Southern States, on the contrary, the tendency is to omit the "*r*" at the end of words, *e. g.*, *doah* instead of *door*, although we believe that even in New York the final "*r*" is often transformed into "*h*."

Another fault, which the Dean says is most common in the midland counties in England, he styles "a very offensive vulgarism." It prevails quite extensively in our Northern States. It is the pronunciation of "*u*" like "*oo*"; calling "*student*" "*stoodent*"; "*new*" "*noo*"; "*duty*" "*dooty*," &c. We once heard a distinguished statesman speak of the *dooty* of the *individooal* to support the *constitootion*." "We must *edoocate*, we must *edoocate!*" exclaimed one of our most popular preachers and "platform" orators. "That it is very evident," quietly remarked a gentleman in the audience. Persons addicted to this mode of pronunciation should be consistent; but they are not. They may speak of *stoodents*, but they will never say there were only a *foo* present; they may talk of the *noo* church, but they never speak of the *poos* in it; they like to hear the *noos*, but are never *amoosed* by it. Let this error, from whatever cause it arises, be banished from cultivated society.

We may here notice a group of errors in reference to the

sound of "*o*"; these are *doos* for *does*, chiefly in Connecticut; *nŏthing* for *nothing* (*nŭthing*), throughout New England; *Lard* for *Lord* also in New England; *hoarse* and *moarning* for *horse* and *morning*, both in New Jersey; *pore* for *poor*, in the South. These may seem small things, and yet they indicate the finished and accurate scholar. The English pronounce the name of God very short, *Gŏd*, while the Americans prolong the "*o*" and pronounce the word as if written *Gawd*. The English may be correct, but it is too late for us to rectify the error, if it be one.

In France there is an Academy to preserve the language in its purity and propriety, in Germany the stage regulates the language to a considerable extent, while in England the usage of the learned professions and of Parliament is the ordinary standard of appeal. But in this country, at least outside of our great cities, the ministry exerts more influence upon the pronunciation of the language than any other class of society. It is of the utmost importance then, that they should be "ensamples to the flock" in language, as well as in conduct; and while seeking to amend the life, they should not corrupt the speech of the people. Ministers often pronounce incorrectly the proper names of Scripture. We coincide with the Dean in considering this fault as inexcusable, because a reference to the original at once decides the pronunciation. It would, however, be pure affectation to pronounce Alexandrīa, Philadelphīa, Samarīa, &c., because English usage differs from the original in the pronunciation of these names. It is unpardonable to hear a minister murdering the name of *Daniel* by pronouncing it in two syllables. It is certainly great cruelty *to knock out* its "*i*", especially as it is a *Cyclops*. *Pharaoh*, on the contrary, is a dissyllable. Some persons through a desire to avoid what they conceive to be a vulgarism pronounce the "*t*" in "*apostle*," "*epistle*," and "*often*." It is, however, silent, and this "licensed barbarism" is the only correct mode of pronouncing these words. The words "covetous" and "covetousness" are often mangled by inserting an "*i*" in pronouncing them "*covetious*" and "*covetiousness*", and to these we may add "*heinious*" and "*heiniousness*."

We may mention here, incidentally, that in the attempt to

correct this awful pronunciation the Dean's original paragraph was so ambiguously worded that Mr. Moon demonstrated mathematically that it was susceptible of 10,240 different readings. The Dean had the good sense to amend his sentence in the second edition, and we sincerely wish that he had more frequently heeded the advice of his critic.

The next topic discussed in his work is that of idioms. He defines an idiom to be "some saying, or some way of speaking, peculiar to some one language or family of languages, which can only be accounted for by the peculiar tendency, or habit of thought, of those who use it." We are careful in giving his definition, because the term is employed in a different sense. It is used strictly to denote the sum of the rules of construction, or that general syntax of the language which constitutes its peculiar character, and does not simply mean those forms of expression which cannot be explained by the ordinary rules either of general grammar or by those of the particular language in which the phrases occur.

Accepting, however, the Dean's definition of the term, we do not see how he can argue from an idiom in one language to that in another, or prove that because an idiom obtains in one language that it ought to prevail, or at least is not incorrect in another. Because attraction, direct or inverse, is constantly occurring in Greek, and gives unity to the sentence and beauty to the language, that is not a valid reason for its introduction into English. It is a peculiarity, an *idiom* of the Greek tongue. In reference to the neuter plural* with the singular verb in Greek, to which he alludes, we may remark that the rule was not absolute; when the individuals composing the mass were considered as *one body*, the verb was in the singular number, but when they were viewed otherwise, or possessed life, it was put in the plural. On the contrary, when an infinitive or a part of a sentence is the subject, the predicate adjective is usually in the plural, although the copula is singular. His mode of argument then seems to us to have but little weight in the cases in which he employs it. You may argue

* In certain instances when the subject was not neuter the verb might be singular, provided it preceded its subject, as in the French idiom, *Il y a des hommes.*

from the *general laws* of language, but certainly not from the *idioms* of one language to those of another, except of course in the case of dialects, or even languages having a common and a not very remote origin. This principle, which we think correct, is a sufficient and complete answer to his plea in favour of "*these kind*," and "*those kind*," expressions which even the Dean and those who side with him in his views would not employ in a polite circle or before a cultivated audience.

To notice all the matters which the Dean brings up would extend this article beyond due proportions. There is a point in reference to the so-called double comparative "*lesser*," in respect to which we think he is in error. He regards its use as "an idiomatic irregularity which we must be content to tolerate." We think that "*lesser*" is the original, and "*less*" is the intruder. Our translators did not merely "sanction the usage," but were perfectly correct when they wrote, "God made two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the *lesser* light to rule the night;" for *less* and *least* are both contractions of *leaser* (or *lesser*), and *leasest*, regular forms from the now obsolete *leas* or *less*, and the fuller form was the one employed by the best writers of that day. In fact the form *lesser* is always employed in the Bible when it qualifies a noun *following;* and Shakespeare we believe uses it oftener than he does the form *less*. The grammarians whom the Dean takes every occasion to denounce, and for whose rules he announces supreme contempt, do not stand in need of his commiseration so much as he imagines. Had he observed their precepts more generally he would not have been guilty of so many errors, and thus rendered himself liable to so much just criticism. The strict grammarian, who has studied his vernacular language, does not find it so difficult to give a satisfactory explanation of the "idiomatic expression" "*methinks*," as the Dean would lead us to believe. The impersonal use of the verb, which he considers so strange, was quite common in the Anglo-Saxon, although it now exists in English only in *methinks*, *meseems*, and *melists*. It was, doubtless, an imitation or rather a relic of the Latin. The Dean may be surprised to learn that *methinks*, in the opinion of some of the best grammarians, has no connection with the verb *to think*.

To think is the Anglo-Saxon *thencan=denken* in German, while *methinks* is derived from the Anglo-Saxon *thincan*, meaning *to seem*. *Methinks*, therefore, means *it seems to me*, the *me* corresponding to the dative in similar expressions in Latin and in Greek, *e. g.*, *mihi videtur*, μοι δοκεῖ; and it was even correct to say *videor mihi*, δοκῶ μοι, *i. e.*, *methinks*. *Methought* arose from the mistaken notion as to the origin of *methinks*.

In p. 145, he says the verb to "*progress*" is challenged as a modern (*sic*) Americanism. He quotes in favour of it a sentence from Shakespeare and another from Milton, and then acknowledges that the former is "hardly a case in point," and that in the latter "the use of the verb is not exactly that which is become common now." Why then quote them? Shakespeare accents the word on the first syllable, and it is not even certain that it is a verb in this instance, and in Milton it is not intransitive. We never use the word, although it will probably win its way in the end. We notice his condemnation of the use of the word *replace* (from the French *remplacer*, *i. e.*, *remplir la* place), to denote the very opposite of its real meaning, simply for the purpose of calling attention to the use of the word *retire* in a transitive sense, which has sprung up of late years in this country, and prevails very generally upon the stock exchange. It was employed in the days of Shakespeare but had become obsolete, and was re-introduced into the language by the brokers of New Orleans, who used it legitimately in French for withdrawing stock from the market. *Retirer* is *to withdraw*, and *to retire* in its transitive sense is, we believe, used exclusively of stocks.

There is so much in which we differ from the Dean that we are glad to find matters upon which we agree. We cordially unite with him in condemning the colloquial contractions, "*I ain't*," "*I warn't*," and worst of all, "*we ain't*." A mistake of the opposite kind is the resolution of the contraction "*I'd*" into "*I had*," instead of "*I would*," which is, of course, the correct expression. Lander represents Tooke as criticizing Johnson for his error upon this point. "T. Permit me first to ask whether we can say I *had hear?* J. You mean to say *heard*. T. No: I mean the words I *had hear*. J. Why ask

me so idle a question? T. Because I find in the eighth chapter of *Rasselas*, 'I *had* rather *hear* thee dispute.' The intervention of *rather* cannot make it more or less proper. J. Sir, you are right."

The character of the Dean's book, of course, causes our review of it to be rather discursive than systematic, but this may perhaps relieve what might otherwise be a monotonous discussion of dry grammatical questions. The Dean and some of his friends seem to think if they can find in a good author a form of expression violating the ordinary rules of grammar, that such a phrase is correct and must straightway be admitted into "the society of good English." It seems to us that all that such a discovery proves is, that a good writer has made a mistake, just as do ordinary men. Because Byron wrote, "Let *he* who made thee answer that," it does not follow that we are to use the nominative case of the pronoun with the imperative of the third person. All that it shows is that Byron was not correct in his grammar. This by way of preface to the next subject, which is an examination of the Dean's assertion that "*It is me*," "*It is him*," &c., are correct English. The Dean pleads custom in their favour. Custom is undoubtedly high authority. We are all familiar with the dictum of Horace,

> Si volet usus,
> Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi.

But the custom of whom do we accept as the standard? Of children? of the ignorant and uncultivated? Or does the voice even of the majority of those who are educated determine grammatical rules? Or is it the usage of the best writers and speakers? Really it seems almost childish to ask these questions. But the persistence of the Dean and his followers renders it necessary to go back to the very elements. "For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again which be the first principles." The laws of grammar are not the work of pedants and fools, as some would have us believe, but inductions rigorously made from the facts presented by an examination of the language. Because *c'est moi* is good French is no reason why "*it is me*" is good English, any more than because "*it is I*" is correct in English, therefore *c'est je* would be correct in French. If "*it is me*" is good English, then the French, in order to

correspond, ought not to be *c'est moi*, but *c'est me;* and we hence conclude that *me* is wrong in English as well as in French. The argument from the analogy of the French, to which he and Dr. Latham appeal, entirely fails. The Dean's statement that in Christ's words, "It is I, be not afraid," the use of the nominative is explained by the majesty of the speaker, and his purpose of reassuring the disciples, appears to us to be entirely refuted by other passages in the Scriptures. The sorrowing question of his disciples, "Lord, is it I?" and the interrogation even of the traitor, "Master, is it I?" show that the translators adopted the nominative form because it was correct, and not simply from some sentimental or metaphysical reason.

In this connection we may take up the question whether *than* does or does not govern the objective case. Because in a single anomalous instance, and that chiefly in poetry, it is used with the objective case is no more a proof that it is allowable in other instances than the fact that Dryden, contrary to his own habit in all other cases, and that of the other poets, says *con'template* instead of *contem'plate* is a proof that it is correct to accent the first syllable of this word instead of the second. The truth is, that leaving out this case, of which it may truly be said,

Grammatici certant, et adhuc sub judice lis est,

than does not govern a case. We may say "*than I*," or "*than me*," but these forms of expression are elliptical, and so far from meaning the same thing, as the Dean's rule would imply, they differ greatly in their signification. "He loves you better *than I*," *i. e.*, *than I* [*love you*]; but "he loves you better *than me*," means "he loves you better *than* [*he loves*] *me*." He is wiser *than me*, can never be correct.

In illustrating the correct mode of expression from the Scriptures it will be seen that the Dean's statement that solemnity or majesty is the reason why the nominative is used in the Bible in these cases, again vanishes before the test of fact. Christ says, "My Father is greater than I"; but Joseph also, when only a servant, says, "there is none greater in the house than I." A critic says, "when Solomon asked (Eccl. ii. 25), 'Who can eat more than I?' according to the Dean it ought

to have been, 'Who can eat more than me?' Perhaps this would suit the cannibal islands." The Dean is peculiarly unfortunate both in his quotations and in his appeals to Scripture. He declares (and in this opinion he is not alone,) that the pronoun "*its*" does not occur in the Bible, and Leviticus xxv. 5 is at once cited against him; he founds an argument in favour of his erroneous view as to the correct mode of placing an adverb upon an alleged expression in Scripture, and when it is referred to it is found to sustain the view of his adversary and to be diametrically opposed to his own. It is Numbers xii. 2, "And they said, Hath the Lord indeed spoken *only* by Moses?" *Only* is correctly placed, but not so in the judgment of the Dean, who had it "only spoken." He quotes from Milton,

> "Which when Beëlzebub perceived, *than whom*,
> Satan except, none higher sat."

But it has been well remarked he did not quote from the same author,

> "What matter where, if I be still the same,
> And what I should be, all but less *than he*."

We may also furnish a quotation or two from Shakespeare.

"Am I not an inch of fortune better than she?

"Well, if you were but an inch of fortune better than I, where would you choose it?"

The Dean says, "And thus every one of us would speak: 'than who' would be intolerable. And this seems to settle the question." By no means. A poet, whose latest work was highly commended in our last number, and who is also the Professor of Latin at Oxford, and should by reason both of his attainments and his position be an authority in the matter of language, thus writes:

> "Æneas was our king, than *who*
> The breath of being none e'er drew,
> More brave, more pious, or more true."

And again:

> "The son of Æolus, than *who*
> None ere more skilled the trumpet blew
> To animate the warrior crew,
> And martial fire relume."

Is it not probable that, as some one has suggested, "*than whom*" is only a traditional typographical error, which has become almost fixed in the language, like "*strain at*" instead of "*strain out*" a gnat in Scripture?

The most amusing thing, however, in connection with this subject is, that the Dean himself fell into the correct grammatical usage upon the very first page of his book, and that he might be consistent with his own views he changed the form of expression. Originally it stood "*than you or I*," and he afterwards changed it to "*any one of us.*" Of course the intervention of "*or*" does not affect the principle of construction. Appeal has been made to the construction of the comparative degree with the genitive in Greek and Latin, an idiom which we translate into English by "*than.*" But it is precisely in the construction in which the particle corresponding to "*than*" is *omitted* that we employ the oblique case. The particle "*as*" is used in the same manner as "*than*", and we can all recall the amusing mistakes made by our Teutonic friends who are constantly confounding these conjunctions. If the phrase "*than him*" be correct, then so is the phrase "*he is as good as her*"; and the next thing we shall see or hear is some unbreeched Highlander stalking across the English border, as of old, and insisting that he is perfectly correct in saying, "*her is as good as him.*" *Than him, than her, than them,* whatever other company they may keep, should be banished from the English of the Queen. It will not do to say that the Dean is pleading only for colloquial English, such as is heard at the fireside and in the family circle. For in paragraphs 124, 125, 126, he gives directions for punctuation, and in 380 and elsewhere he gives advice about style in writing, &c. Even were he advocating the claims of genuine colloquial English, surely that is no reason why ungrammatical or vulgar language should be suggested for our use. Of all places (the Dean would say "of all *other* places,") the fireside is that at which we should speak correctly. In the bosom of the family let no slang expressions, no vulgar colloquialisms, no solecisms, no incorrect pronunciations be heard by our children, or be permitted to issue from their lips without correction, and it will be as easy for them to speak with propriety as for them to act with

propriety. "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it."

In connection with this point we may allude to another error in the use of the pronouns, and one which is by no means uncommon. Persons recalling the impropriety of saying "*you and me*", when these pronouns constitute the subject of the verb, fall into the habit of placing "*you and I*" in the nominative when they should be in the objective in the expression "*between you and me*". So also "I thought it was *him*," instead of *he;* "I took it to be *he*", instead of *him.*

The Dean next discusses the confusion in the use of the tenses. But the discussion would not be a production of the Dean's if it did not contain some blunders in the very outset. He says, "The next point which *I notice shall be* the use of the auxiliaries "*shall*" and "*will*", &c. Here is a confusion of the present and the future upon which Mr. Moon severely comments. Elsewhere he says, "The first remark which I *have* to make *shall be* on the trick now *so* (*sic*) universal across the Atlantic." This confusion of tenses is constantly occurring and his critics call repeated attention to it. The distinction between *shall* and *will* as used with the different persons, seems to us very obvious and of considerable importance. We regret to observe that so high an authority as Mr. Marsh considers it as a grammatical subtlety of no logical value or significance whatever, and predicts that the verbal quibble will shortly disappear, while the distinction in meaning between the two words will be retained. He bases this prediction on the fact that the distinction between the two words as used with different personal pronouns is embarrassing, and that in Scotland and in many parts of this country the two words are confounded. We cannot see the force of this argument. Because children and uneducated persons do not speak correctly is no reason why we should imitate their erroneous example. The difficulty seems to be peculiar to the Celtic race, for Irishmen and Frenchmen also make as many blunders in this respect as Scotchmen.* Despite Mr. Marsh's prediction, we think that, "I *will* be drowned, nobody *shall* help me," is not likely to be uttered by

* The Lowlanders of Scotland are, of course, not Celts; but the error has probably crept in among them from their Highland neighbours.

any one who speaks English correctly and who does not contemplate suicide. We have neither time nor space to enter fully into this subject. Latham, ii. 410, quotes Wallis, who thus gives the principles that determine the use of *shall* and *will*, and also of *should* and *would:* "In primis personis *shall* simpliciter *prædicentis* est; *will*, quasi *promittentis* aut minantis.

In secundis et tertiis personis, *shall promittentis* est aut minantis: *will* simplicitur *prædicentis.*

Uram = *I shall burn*, Uremus = *We shall burn*,
Ures = *Thou wilt burn*, Uretis = *Ye will burn*,
Uret = *He will burn*, Urent = *They will burn*,

nempe, hoc futurum *prædico.*

I will burn, *We will burn*,
Thou shalt burn, *Ye shall burn*,
He shall burn, *They shall burn*,

nempe, hoc futurum *spondeo*, vel faxo ut sit.

Again—*would* et *should* illud indicant quod erat vel esset futurum: cum hoc tantum discrimine: *would* voluntatem innuit, seu agentis propensionem: *should* simpliciter *futuritionem.*"

Briefly; in the *first person*, *shall predicts*, and in the *second and third persons* it *promises* or *threatens*, while in the *first person*, *will promises* or *threatens*, and in the *second and third persons* it *predicts.*

One of the Dean's Scotch correspondents gives an amusing instance of the confusion of *shall* and *will.* A young men's Institute discussed the question, "Shall the material universe be destroyed?" His "correspondent supposes that the decision was in the negative: or that if it was in the affirmative, the society cannot have proceeded to carry its resolution into effect."

The subjunctive mode, the *pons asinorum* of all languages, receives notice, and the general rule is correctly laid down, that when matter of fact is concerned we should use the indicative; when matter of doubt, the subjunctive. As Latham substantially states it, if we can express the meaning of the sentence by inserting *as is the case* after the conditional particle, then we should use the *indicative* mood; but if *as may or may not be the case* will express the meaning correctly, then

we should use the *subjunctive* mood. We are met, however, by the broad fact that this rule has never been observed. In the earlier period of our language the tendency was to the use of the subjunctive, but at present the current sets in the opposite direction, and there is danger that the separate form of the subjunctive will entirely disappear.

We rather incline to the side of the purists in the whole controversy about forms of expression, but we are compelled to dissent, when under the pretence of accuracy we are really introducing a solecism and abandoning a good old English idiom. We refer to the use of the continuing present of the passive voice instead of the active form. While jotting down these notes we met with an excellent example of the present style of writing. It is an extract from an English paper quoted in the *New York Times*. "Great war preparations *are being made* at Mayence, the fortifications of which *are being extended* and repaired, while the arsenal *is being filled* with stores. Loads of needle-guns and ammunition *are being made* to the troops at Baden. In France I can detect no corresponding activity. It is true that the manufacture of the Chassepot rifle *is being carried* on, &c." Here we have the passive form *ad nauseam*, five or six times in eight lines; it might have been changed if only for the sake of variety. Whether the words in *ing* be verbal nouns, as is often really the case, or present participles, the idiomatic English form ought, as far as possible, to be retained. In old English we have, "the temple *was in building* or *a-building;*" "the book *is a-printing*," or simply, "the book *is printing*," and not "the book *is being printed*." The Dean contends for the truth in this instance, and those who oppose this view dare not be consistent and fully carry out their own view. Mr. Marsh, in his *Lectures on the English Language*, page 654, shows the absurdity of the proposed substitute by means of phrases constructed according to the notion of these reformers. "The subscription paper *is being missed*, but I know that a considerable sum *is being wanted* to make up the amount; the great Victoria bridge *has been being built* more than two years; when I reach London, the ship *will be being built;* if my orders had been followed, the coat *would have been being* made yesterday;

if the house *had been being built*, the mortar *would have been being mixed.*" It is unnecessary to refer to the classical or other languages to prove that active forms with a passive sense are constantly used.

The Dean is also correct, we think, when he condemns the expression "*to open up*," which is so often seen in the newspapers and is so frequently heard in the prayers of Presbyterian ministers. Much to our surprise Mr. Moon defends the expression, and quotes against the Dean three authors in "Good Words." Unfortunately "*to open up*" is a Scotticism, and the three authors quoted are "Scotch of the Scotch," viz., Guthrie, McLeod, and Caird, and therefore not very good witnesses as to the point in question. The Dean also condemns the use of "*different to*" for "*different from.*" This mistake is not common in America, but the very last English book into which we have looked (*Ecce Deus*,) contains it. Englishmen, however, do not make the mistake of saying, "*I differ with you*," when they mean "*I differ from you*," as may be read in every newspaper controversy, or heard in every animated discussion in this country. Neither do they say an event "*transpired in our midst*," when they wish to announce that something has "*occurred in the midst of us;*" and if they happen to be present at the occurrence of anything, they do not say "*we happened in*," or "we *come* as it *was transpiring.*"

In England professors *teach* their pupils, they do not *learn* them, although the Anglo-Saxon *læran* did originally mean *to teach*, and Shakespeare says,

"Sweet prince, you learn me noble thankfulness."

The distinction between the verbs *to teach* and *to learn* had not been so clearly defined as is the case at present. In this passage they are precisely synonymous:—"Unless you could *teach* me to forget a banished father, you must not *learn* me how to remember any extraordinary pleasure."

In England both *donate* and "donation visits" are unknown, the verbs *loan* and *jeopardize* are not employed, but that "vile vocable *talented*," as Coleridge calls it, is stealing into good society and attempting to introduce along with itself, *gifted*, *moneyed*, &c. The English use *grow* in a transitive sense, and

it is already found in our agricultural papers. Not long since we heard an Irishman speak of *labouring* the potatoes. Enough, however, upon these minor points: we add only, that "*once and again*" is correct, not "*time and again*," and that "*got*" is superfluous in the expression, "*I have got*"= *I possess.*

The Dean very justly condemns the use of the terms "party" and "individual" for "man," and yet he is charged by Mr. Moon with being himself guilty of the offence. In "business" circles in New York the term party is constantly employed where it is not desirable to name the person alluded to. The use of the term "*female*" to denote a woman he very justly censures. Applied to a woman, it would be considered, in France, an insult sufficient to provoke a duel. We once heard an Irish minister giving an account of a revival of religion in Ireland. He spoke repeatedly of the number of "*femmels*" who had been converted, and it was some time before we could discover that he meant *women*, who had been the subjects of the revival. "Thus, though some of the European rulers may be *females*, they may," &c., says the Dean, and his critic Mr. Moon condemns this expression in a manner almost too severe. In French and even in English the epithet is usually employed of animals, or simply of the distinction of sex in man, and the Dean should therefore have avoided the use of it. We join him most heartily in his protest against the present fashionable style of sensational writing. Our newspapers are doing much to enlighten us, but they are responsible for no small amount of the deterioration and corruption of the language. The *London Times* is almost an authority in England in the matter of good English, but while the editorials in some of our journals are admirable in point of style, yet many of our papers do not think it necessary to be even grammatical in the expression of their views. De Quincey, in one of his articles, gives an amusing account of the language of a landlady from whom he attempted to hire lodgings. Her speech was in the highest and most ornate style of the newspapers. A consummate master of English style and with a wealth of language that is truly astonishing, he could himself use long words, and he endured her talk for some time; but at length he grew nervous, and when she made use of the adverb *anteriorly* he could

endure no more, and in despair rushed from the house. The same writer states what is very true, that in the nursery is to be found the most idiomatic English, and that the correspondence of educated women contains some of the best specimens of the language.* This is true, perhaps, of all cultivated languages; even the style of Cicero owed much of its excellence to his association with some of the noblest ladies of Rome, while the purity of ancient Greek lingered longest among the women and children of Constantinople.

The English Bible has exerted upon the English language a greater influence than any other book that was ever written, and has contributed more to keep the language pure, and to prevent any divergence in speech from manifesting itself among the distant colonies of England, than all other causes combined. The Dean in his attacks upon the grammarians considers himself the special champion of the language of the Bible and of Shakespeare. He must have been unfortunate in the few grammarians whom he consulted, for we can recall but one who selects his instances of false syntax from the Bible. We condemn the practice, but we cannot agree with the Dean, who thinks that because an expression is found in the Bible it must therefore be correct English. This reminds us of the old controversy in reference to the Greek of the New Testament. One party contended that it was as pure and correct as that of the writers of Attic Greek, because they considered it derogatory to the Holy Spirit to suppose that any grammatical or other errors could occur; while the other party contended that it was utterly corrupt, abounding in Hebraisms, &c. The truth in this case, as in most others, is between the extreme views. It is the current Greek language of the day in which it was written, coloured by the Jewish minds through which the new Christian ideas were communicated to the world by the Holy Spirit. The errors in language did not affect the truth revealed, and they were just such as men in the position of the authors would be likely to make. So with the English

* "Would you desire," he says, "at this day to read our noble language in its native beauty, picturesque from idiomatic propriety, racy in its phraseology, delicate yet sinewy in its composition—steal the mail-bags, and break open all the letters in female handwriting."

version of the Bible. Its translators seem to have been almost inspired, and the English Bible will ever stand as the purest and best specimen of the speech of which it is an ornament and an example. As is the Greek of the New Testament so is the English of our Bible; each is admirable for its purpose, but it is not perfect. We think that a better translation can never be made; but this is not to say that there may not be a few inaccurate renderings of the original, or a few places in which the English may not be improved. We cannot refrain from quoting the eulogy of our English Bible by one who has given up the faith and the Bible of his ancestors. "Who will not say that the uncommon beauty and marvellous English of the Protestant Bible is not one of the great strongholds of heresy in this country? It lives on the ear, like a music that can never be forgotten, like the sound of church bells, which the convert hardly knows how he can forego. Its felicities often seem to be almost things rather than mere words. It is part of the national mind, and the anchor of national seriousness. . . . . The memory of the dead passes into it. The potent traditions of childhood are stereotyped in its verses. The power of all the griefs and trials of a man is hidden beneath its words. It is the representative of his best moments, and all that there has been about him of soft and gentle, and pure and penitent and good, speaks to him for ever out of his English Bible. . . . . It is his sacred thing, which doubt has never dimmed, and controversy never soiled. In the length and breadth of the land there is not a Protestant with one spark of religiousness about him, whose spiritual biography is not in his Saxon Bible."*

But we must hasten to finish this review of the Dean's peculiar views. We are surprised that, after noticing and correcting so many errors prevalent even amongst educated men, he should discourage the study of grammar and rhetoric, and refer men to "common sense, ordinary observation, and the prevailing usage of the English people," as good guides in the matter of writing English. In the earlier stages of education at least, men must receive most of their knowledge upon.

* Newman, quoted in Trench's "English Past and Present," p. 34.

authority, and it is only after they have made considerable progress in any branch of study that they can investigate and ascertain principles for themselves. Most men, moreover, do not enjoy the peculiar social and literary advantages which in the estimation of the Dean are better than treatises on grammar and rhetoric. Even Milton is not an authority in orthography, for his delicate ear sacrificed the spelling of words to his magnificent rhythm; while Shakespeare does not hesitate to violate the ordinary rules of orthoepy for the sake of the metre. Transcendent genius like theirs may be pardoned for such faults, but inferior men must not expect forgiveness when they commit similar errors. Because Milton sang:

> Adam the goodliest man of men since born
> His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve;

or because Thucydides calls the Peloponesian war *ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων*, we are not justified in using the superlative when the comparative is the correct form. Even with the Dean in our favour we should not be justified in speaking of Thucydides as the one writer of *all other* good Attic writers who is the most ungrammatical. Examples of similar mistakes can be found in all languages, and even in the best writers, but they are none the less mistakes. We know the meaning of the expression of Tacitus, *Ceterorum* Britannorum fugacissimi, but we should not imitate it.

Mr. Moon cites the authority of Dr. Campbell, Dr. Blair, Lord Kames, and Lindley Murray in favour of his own views and in opposition to those of the Dean. He replies, "I must freely acknowledge to Mr. Moon, that not one of the gentlemen whom he has named has ever been my guide, in whatever study of the English language I may have accomplished, or in what little I may have ventured to write in that language." The authors above-named are only the representatives of a class, and the Dean's statement in connection with other things shows that like too many educated men in England, and in this country also, he has never made his own language a study; and therefore his authority cannot be of great weight in any matter concerning English where there is much doubt. Some of his commentaries have been described, perhaps unjustly, as

rudis indigestaque moles; his Plea for the Queen's English exhibits proofs of his want of qualification for the office he has assumed. He discards the "so-called universal rules of English," and tells his young readers, "the less you know of them, the less you turn your words right or left to observe them, the better." Yet in deference to Mr. Moon's criticisms and in obedience to these rules he has changed nearly thirty passages.* We promised to give proofs of the Dean's errors in grammar and in rhetoric; we have not space to notice them at length. We had noted a considerable number, but must refer our readers to Mr. Gould, who gives a list of nearly sixty errors of greater or less importance.†

Every one who has had even a superficial acquaintance with our schools and colleges knows that scarcely any branch of education is more neglected than the study of our vernacular tongue. Young men can neither spell correctly nor write grammatically, and the deficiency is as great and the evil is as crying in this department as in the classical instruction of many of our schools and academies. It is taken for granted that men will know how to spell and to write their own language without any instruction. Not in America only is this the case, but in England also, where there are loud complaints about the neglect of the study of their own language and literature. Not only are degrees conferred upon men who cannot translate their diplomas; but Senior Wranglers, First Classmen, and others, go forth from the universities with the ability to write faultless Latin prose or perfect Greek Iambics, while they are unable to write even a letter in grammatical English. More attention is paid to the subject of English composition in the colleges of this country than in those of England, but it is impossible for them to remedy the deficiencies of the earlier stages of education. The thorough study of the classical languages need not interfere with attention to our own in the academy, and every college should have a Chair of the English Language and Literature.

Hear the conclusion of the whole matter. We should correct our own mistakes if we are to instruct others with authority;

* See The Dean's English, p. 126, sqq. † See Good English, p. 132, sqq.

we are not to be a law unto ourselves, rejecting those general laws of language which have been established for ages, and pleading the custom and usage of the unlettered many against the example and the practice of the cultivated few, but we are to accept those things as fixed, which the most diligent students of the language have discovered to be the normal and prevalent modes of expression. If any sneer at grammarians and their rules, a greater than the scoffers thus spoke: "Whoever in a state knows how to form wisely the manners of men and to rule them at home and in war by excellent institutes, him in the first place, above others, I should esteem worthy of all honour; but next to him the man who strives to establish in maxims and rules the method and habit of speaking and writing derived from a good age of the nation, and, as it were, to fortify the same round with a kind of wall, the daring to overleap which, a law, only short of that of Romulus, should be used to prevent."* Thus wrote John Milton.

ART. III.—*The Culture Demanded by Modern Life:* A series of Addresses and Arguments on the Claims of Scientific Education. By Professors TYNDALL, HENFREY, HUXLEY, PAGET, WHEWELL, FARADAY, LIEBIG, DRAPER, DE MORGAN: Drs. BARNARD, HODGSON, CARPENTER, HOOKER, ACKLAND, FORBES, HERBERT SPENCER, SIR JOHN HERSCHEL, SIR CHARLES LYELL, Dr. SEGUIN, Mr. MILL, etc. With an Introduction on Mental Discipline in Education, by E. L. YOUMANS. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1867.

Modern Inquiries, Classical, Professional, and Miscellaneous. By JACOB BIGELOW, M. D., late President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and late a Professor in Harvard University. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1867.

Classical and Scientific Studies, and the Great Schools of England. A Lecture read before the Society of Arts of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 6, 1865. By W. P. ATKINSON. With additions and an Appendix. Cambridge: Sever & Francis. 1865.

* The Dean's English, p. 100.

Classical Studies as a part of Academic Education. An Address delivered at Andover, February 7, 1866, before the Alumni of Phillips Academy, at the dedication of the new Academic Hall. By PHILIP H. SEARS. Boston: Press of Alfred Mudge & Son. 1866.

Inaugural Address delivered to the University of St. Andrews, February 1st, 1867. By JOHN STUART MILL, Rector of the University. Boston: Littell & Gay.

On some Defects in Public School Education. A Lecture delivered at the Royal Institution, on Friday, February 8th, 1867. With Notes and Appendices. By the Rev. F. W. FARRAR, M. A., F. R. S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Hon. Fellow of King's College, London; One of the Masters at Harrow School; Author of the "Origin of Language," "Chapters on Language," etc. Published by request. London: MacMillan & Co. 1867.

Classical Studies: Their True Position and Value in Education. By the Rev. JOSHUA JONES, M. A., Principal of King Williams College, Isle of Man; late Senior Mathematical, and Johnson Mathematical Scholar, Oxford. Extracted, by permission, from the Transactions of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool. London: Longman, Green, Reader & Dyer. Liverpool: A Holden. 1866.

THIS long series of publications, recently issued, is but a portion of those which the projects for radical innovation or revolution in the studies usually included in a course of liberal education have called forth. The contributions to this controversy, with which the press teems, evince the zeal and persistency of the reformers, who are confronted at all points by able and resolute defenders of the established course of liberal training, in its substantive and essential features, however they may accept modifications of its minor details. The importance and breadth of the subject, invest with high consequence the controversy now waged with such warmth and vigour in regard to it. Although, therefore, we have recently brought to the attention of our readers one phase of this great question, in an examination of the arguments of Drs. Woolsey and Hedge, respectively, for and against classical culture,* we make no apology for inviting their attention to further views upon dif-

* See Biblical Repertory, January, 1867, art. iii.

ferent sides of the subject, which are set forth with various power and skill in the volumes and pamphlets above mentioned. The massive volume of Prof. Youmans, plausible in its confident pretensions, and the vast weight of its alleged authorities; the far abler argument of Dr. Bigelow against the present prominence of classical study in liberal education; the still abler argument of J. S. Mill on the other side, and in behalf of a well-balanced, rounded culture, that have appeared since our former article, have given a progress, a public interest, and a many-sided character to the discussion, which we cannot properly overlook or ignore.

The first of these volumes, entitled the "Culture demanded by Modern Life," is a compilation of Essays, Lectures, and fragmentary extracts from various eminent scientists and educators, British and American, with introductory and concluding articles by the editor, Prof. Youmans. So far as the editor's own deliverances are concerned, they are bold even to audacity in the sweeping revolutions they propose. They go the full length of extirpating classical studies from liberal education, attenuating the mathematical course, and filling the vacuum with studies in physical science. He founds the chief argument for this revolution on Materialism, the advocacy of which forms the leading feature alike of his introductory and his concluding essays, even more than the educational innovations which he proposes to build upon it. It is quite aside of our present purpose to discuss Materialism. We discover nothing new in Prof. Youmans' arguments to establish this grovelling theory. He simply adduces some of the familiar facts which evince the powerful reciprocal influence of mind and body, and the special implication of the various forms of mental action with affections of the nervous and cerebral organisms. Some facts of this sort, which have long been among the commonplaces, not only of science, but of ordinary intelligence and information, he parades with all the emphasis and pomp of new discoveries. He complains, that, in the past, philosophers have studied the mind as if it were an entity distinct from the body, and hence have failed to reach any valuable results. He even tortures Sir William Hamilton's rhetorical extravaganza, when the latter quotes Lessing's famous avowal of a preference for

the search for truth above the possession of it, if he must have either alone exclusively of the other, into a confession of the advocates of the dualism of mind and body, that they "have actually denied the attainment of truth to be their object; declaring that the supreme aim of philosophy is nothing more than to serve as a means of intellectual gymnastics." "It is now established that the dependence of thought on organic conditions is so intimate and absolute that they can no longer be considered except as unity. Man as a problem of study is simply an organism of varied powers and activities; and the true office of scientific inquiry is to determine the mechanism, modes, and laws of its action."

"My purpose, on the present occasion, is to show that the doctrine which has prevailed in the past, and still prevails, is doomed to complete inversion; that the bodily organism, which was so long neglected as of no account, is in reality the first and fundamental thing to be considered; and that, in reaching a knowledge of mind and character through the study of the corporeal system, there has been laid the firm foundation of that Science of Human Nature, the completion of which will constitute the next and highest phase in the progress of man." Pp. 376, 377. Again, after reciting some facts illustrative of the limitations of intellectual power in the greatest minds, concerning which he alleges that "the old contrast between matter and mind led to the growth of an all-prevalent error;" he tells us:

"These phenomena find no explanation in the old hypothesis of mind as a vague spiritual entity; they throw us back immediately on the organism whose acknowledged limitations offer at once a solution of the mystery. These mental inaptitudes may be either organic deficiencies, or a result of concentrating cerebral agency in certain directions, and its consequent withdrawal from others. Thus viewed, every attainment involves the exercise of brain-power—each acquisition is a modification of the cerebral structure. All sensation of objects and words that we remember, all acquired aptitudes of movement; the associations of the perception of things with visible symbols, vocal actions and sounds, the connections of ideas with feelings and emotions, and the formation of intellectual

and moral habits, are all concomitants and consequents of the only kind of action of which the brain is capable—are all the products of organic nutrition; and the ratio and limit of acquisition, as well as the capacity for retention, are conditioned upon the completeness of the nutritive processes." P. 400.

The materialism of this is bald enough. We repeat that it is no part of our plan to discuss this doctrine now and here. The type of it which is now most rampant and blatant has been ushered in by the Positive Philosophy, and is readily espoused by divers physiological, medical reformers, and pseudo-psychologists. When occasion arises to deal with it directly, it will require to be made the chief, and not the incidental topic of an article. We have to do with it now, as it is made a basis of educational reform. The author educes from it some principles which he undertakes to apply to the support of his pet theories on this subject. On these we remark, that so far as they are true, they are not, in any important sense, new, and still less are they dependent on his materialism for proof and authority, either in themselves or their applications. Nor do they avail for the main purpose for which he uses them—the discontinuance of classical training and culture as a leading element of liberal education.

From the doctrine above stated, that "the rate and limit of acquisition, as well as the capacity for retention, are conditioned upon the completeness of the nutritive processes," he argues that there is such a limitation of mental power as must necessarily set limits to the amount of profitable, or even possible, study and intellectual acquirement: that "if we overburden the brain as in school-'cramming,' nutrition is imperfect, adhesion feeble, and acquisition quickly lost." Hence, as the number of studies must be limited in right education, he urges that those should be dropped, which can be omitted with least injury; and that these least valuable studies are the Latin and Greek languages, which, in his view, have small educating power, in comparison with the vast and increasing range of the physical sciences. Now we agree that it is both true and an important truth, that the mind is of limited capacity, and that, while it is good for it to be fully tasked, it is ill for it to be overburdened or crammed. But this is true, and known to be true, irrespec-

tive of all materialistic theories. And we still further concede and maintain that educational studies must not be encyclopediac, but made up of such a selection as will best develope and invigorate, instead of crushing, the mind. But all this does not prove that the ancient languages should be left out of the curriculum, or that physical sciences taken alone would be equally effective in informing and disciplining the intellect.

Another inference of Prof. Youmans, from the identity of mind and body which he maintains, is the needful alternation of rest and action, the equilibrium of the two being necessary to support the latter. This is brought in aid of the argument for curtailing or wholly eliminating classical studies. That the mind cannot bear uninterrupted continuous action, without ample and periodic intervals of rest, is undeniable. Although this is true of body also, it by no means follows that body and mind are one. And it determines nothing as to the place which the ancient classics should occupy in liberal training.

He also urges that the mind, being material, takes a permanent impression and acquires an enduring bent, from repeated exercises of any given kind,* and that hence, if we would exercise it most effectively for intellectual discipline and invigoration, it should be employed not upon the dead languages, but upon the living facts with which it has to do in the work of life. Now the power of habit, and of repeated exercises of any given kind in forming habits, is unquestioned and unquestionable. But this is wholly independent of materialism. And it settles nothing with regard to the comparative utility of classical studies in liberal education. If the mind is identical with the body, then the true way to study the mind is through the body, and psychology is best mastered through physiology. So Prof. Youmans confidently and strenuously maintains, "that the bodily organism which was so long neglected as of no account, is in reality the first and funda-

* "The basis of educability, and hence of mental discipline, is, therefore, to be sought in the properties of that nervous substance by which mind is manifested. That basis is the law that cerebral effects are strengthened and made lasting by repetition. When an impression is produced upon the brain, a change is produced, and an effect remains in the nerve-substance; if it be repeated, the change is deepened and the effect becomes more lasting." P. 15.

mental thing to be considered; and that in reaching a knowledge of mind and character through the study of the corporeal system, there has been laid the firm foundation of that Science of Human Nature, the completion of which will constitute the next and highest phase in the progress of man." P. 377. "Science now teaches that we know nothing of mental action, except through nervous action, without which there is neither thought, recollection, nor reason." P. 385. "Intellectual capacity is thus at bottom an affair of physical impressibility or nervous adhesiveness. Regard being had to the law that all nutritive operations involve repose, cohesion or completeness of association depends upon repetition." P. 15. "Corporeal agency in processes of thought has an aspect still more marked; the higher intellectual operations may take place, not only independent of the will, but also independent of consciousness itself. Consciousness and mind are far from being one and the same thing. . . All thoughts, feelings, and impressions, when disappearing from consciousness, leave behind them in the nerve-substance, their effects or residua, and in this they constitute what may be called latent or statical mind. They are brought into consciousness by the laws of association, and there is much probability that, in this unconscious state, they are still capable of acting and reacting, and of working out true intellectual results." Pp. 383, 4.

Of course, if the "statical" or permanent mind is a modification of the nerve-substance, which, underneath and independent of consciousness, is "capable of working out true intellectual results," then it follows that "the higher intellectual operations" cannot be ascertained or interpreted in the light of consciousness, which has no connection with them. The study of the mind, its processes, laws, and phenomena, is not therefore the study of consciousness, primarily and in chief. But it is mainly the study of nerve-structure and its modifications, and of physiological phenomena and laws. Also mental is but a form of physical education, and must be chiefly directed by physical or physiological laws.

In regard to all which, we maintain, that every mental act is an act of consciousness, and can only be known or studied as such. An unconscious mental act is absurd and inconceivable.

All acts of mind are acts either of knowing, feeling, desiring, or willing. And the very essence of knowing or thinking is consciousness of so knowing or thinking. Will it be pretended that there can be feeling without consciousness? As well may there be a sphere without roundness, or breathing without living. And the same may be said of desiring and willing. And if there were such acts of unconscious intelligence, feeling, or will, how could we ever know their nature, or in any wise interpret them? How, unless in having them, we know, are conscious, that we have them? Psychological study must therefore be primarily and fundamentally a study of consciousness. Aside of this, mere external, physiological examination of brain, nerves, cranium, spinal columns, etc., never could discover to us the first mental fact. All external inspection, therefore, outside of consciousness, must be subordinate and ancillary to this in psychological inquiries. They never can take a leading and dominant place. It is true that much light may be shed upon the workings and powers of the human mind by the study of the language, laws, history, literature of our race. And why? Because these are the exponents and records of the consciousness of our race. The study of these is but the study of the collective consciousness of mankind. It is true also, that when by the study of the phenomena of consciousness, we ascertain and classify the operations of the human soul, we may investigate conditions, physical or metaphysical, in which they take rise, or to which they give rise, or which they in any manner imply or presuppose.

If it appear, as it undeniably does, that any mental exercises become easier and stronger after successive repetitions, till what at first was burdensome effort acquires the facility and spontaneity of nature, and at length even a tyrannous mastery, then it is a just inference from this, that such repeated exercises of any given kind beget and leave behind them a permanent state of the soul, which constitutes an inward aptitude and facility therefor. But this proves neither materialism, nor that we can learn the phenomena and properties of mind otherwise than through consciousness. It is simply an implication of our conscious experience. So, if it be ascertained that given kinds or degrees of mental actions, whether normal or

morbid, are preceded, attended, or followed by certain conditions or phenomena of the body, whether outward or inward. These are important facts. They should be duly heeded, so far as they have anything to do with conserving or increasing intellectual health and vigour. But these states of the body are not states of the mind, and, taken by themselves, might be observed a life-time by the most accomplished physiologist or phrenologist, without discovering the first mental fact, law, or faculty. Such facts can only be known through consciousness. Any connected or related facts otherwise learned have only a subsidiary and derivative bearing on psychology. They shed no original light upon it. And, although such facts may prove a most intimate and sympathetic union between the mind and body; and that various parts or members of the body are of the nature of organs or instruments through which the mind acts or expresses itself, yet this by no means proves their identity. The union of mind and body is vital and mysterious, but it is without confusion or composition. Surely matter does not think or will. As some one has said, the ink in which a poem is printed is not that poem. So the telescope through which the eye looks is not the eye. And the eye through which the mind sees is not the mind.

It is not strange that they who deem the mind to be matter abjure metaphysics and think psychology best mastered by the study of physiology, should deem the study of the ancient languages useless. For language is but the exponent and record of human consciousness. The physiological psychologist will put but a low estimate on studies whose main merit is that they unfold the workings of the human soul, and train the powers of thought, by exercise upon the finest forms of human thinking, in ways, for which, as will soon appear, the modern languages afford no sufficient opportunity.

We have said all that space will permit of Prof. Youmans' contributions to this volume. They would have little importance of themselves, standing alone, even if amplified to a volume. They owe whatever weight they may have to the lectures, essays, and testimonies of higher men with which they are associated, and which, with slight exceptions, give no sanction to the views of the editor, in support of which they are,

not very honestly, paraded; views which, without such apparent sanction, and resting only on the name and reasonings of their author, are so extreme as to be suicidal. These eminent savants, philosophers, and educators give no countenance to materialism. With slight exceptions, they do not depreciate classical study. Many of them strongly commend it. They simply press the importance of certain scientific studies in education, both for the sake of the useful information, and the intellectual discipline they impart; or they advocate changes in the accepted method and time of classical study, and in that order of antecedence in the various branches usually pursued in a course of liberal education. These are all fair subjects for discussion. Good and not evil will result from an investigation of them conducted with candour and ability. Many of the views propounded by these authors in favour of such studies as Botany, Zoölogy, Physiology, etc., their influence on the Education of the Judgment; much also in the papers on the Development of Scientific Ideas, the Study of Economic Science, the Influence of Scientific Discovery on Education, command our hearty assent. They contain comparatively little which is objectionable. They are the fresh and vigorous productions of able men. The main point which they either establish or emphasize is, that scientific studies not only store the mind with useful knowledge, but are also valuable for their disciplinary efficacy in educating the powers of observation, comparison, judgment, and inductive reasoning, in the sphere of contingent matter. This may be granted, without conceding the comparative inutility of the ancient classics, or of the *literæ humaniores*—an idea which finds little countenance among those illustrious authors, although, along with materialism, it is made to stand in the fore-front of Professor Youmans' book, and in such a way as to convey the impression that these men are its chief authors, and the advocates of its leading principles. Indeed, the placards announcing the book, put up in front of bookstores which we have noticed, drop the name of Prof. Youmans altogether, and represent the distinguished men whose productions he has quoted as its authors. This is an artifice for giving to debasing and disorganizing

theories a surreptitious sanction of celebrated names, that does no credit to the author or his dogmas.

Leaving for the present this volume, the next on our list is that of Dr. Bigelow, already characterized in a short notice in our April number.

Classical and Scientific Studies and the Great Schools of England, by Prof. Atkinson of the Massachusetts School of Technology, is chiefly made up of extracts from the evidence collected in the Report of the Parliamentary Commission to investigate the condition of eight of the leading High Schools of England, including Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and Westminster, with a running comment upon them. It is decisive as an argument against the system of exclusive, extreme, and, in some respects, stolid training in the ancient classics current in the great schools of England. But it has little force against the curriculum of our American colleges. Attacks upon it, however annihilating, prove nothing against the classical course which enters into American liberal education. They decide nothing in regard to the questions now in controversy on this subject in this country. But it is in these expòsures of the extravagance of the great English schools, that the current objections to all training in the ancient classics find their chief plausibility.

The address of Mr. Sears at Phillips Academy is a hearty and judicious plea for that classical training, which that honoured institution has so signally promoted. It is in some respects a happy refutation of the allegations of Prof. Atkinson. And we hail it as a voice for genuine liberal culture from a region which, greatly as it has been distinguished for classical culture and elegant letters, has of late abounded in vehement attacks upon the study of Latin and Greek in our colleges.

The *Inaugural Address* of John Stuart Mill is by far the ablest of all the publications at the head of this article. The destructive philosophical heresies which he has taken up from the Positive Philosophy scarcely appear in sight, while the views of liberal education, and of the due place of the ancient languages, and the physical and metaphysical sciences therein, are profound, clear, well-poised, in short, every way admirable. We shall have occasion to recur to it.

The lecture of Mr. Farrar on "*Defects in Public School Education*," is very much occupied with a just exposure of the defects and extravagancies of the great English schools to which we have alluded. But it establishes nothing against a rational, balanced classical training, along with proportionate attention to other departments, such as has place in American colleges.

The tract by Principal Jones is a sound and judicious argument for giving the ancient classics a leading and fundamental, but not an exclusive or overbearing place in liberal education. He takes strong ground against the extreme course in the great English schools. He would give a due place to physical sciences and other studies. But he advocates assigning a pre-ëminent place to the ancient classics in a liberal education, with all the power of a penetrating, judicial, and comprehensive mind. This pamphlet ranks, in our judgment, next to that of Mill, in the series under review.

We will now reproduce, chiefly from the pamphlets of Messrs. Mill and Jones, some cogent arguments for a course of classical, mingled with other studies, not differing essentially from that established in our best American colleges. These strongly corroborate, by many additional considerations, the views we have presented to our readers in the article already referred to, and enforce them by arguments which have not been fairly answered. The principal and most plausible answer is, that, conceding the utmost weight to the mental discipline imparted by classical study, the information given by it concerning languages now dead, and the customs of an age which knew far less than our own, is comparatively useless, while the study of physical science is replete with the most useful knowledge, and at the same time has a disciplinary power not excelled by the ancient languages. It is claimed, in short, that scientific studies are not only the most utilitarian, but the most disciplinary. And it is especially insisted by Prof. Youmans, that the most useful and effective discipline is obtained by exercises of the mind directly upon the matters in which it is to be employed in life, and not upon subjects which are never afterward to occupy it, such as the dead languages; that this "vicarious discipline" is as absurd as if one should endeavour to discipline

himself for the work of a smith, a carpenter, or a mason, by swinging dumb-bells, or heaving ten-pins—an argument which, by proving too much, proves nothing; since, if it were sound, all education is faulty which is not immediately professional.

We freely accord to physical science a high place in liberal education, as a source both of useful knowledge and intellectual discipline. We would not lower its position or narrow its sphere in our colleges. But neither would we allow it to crowd out or overshadow the ancient languages, or to sink them from that regal position which makes them most of all the essential and characteristic element in liberal education. We are quite in favour of Scientific and Polytechnic schools, in which science and its applications hold the chief place, while all else is subordinate and ancillary, and the ancient languages are altogether ruled out. They are of great service to those who have not the time or means for a full course of liberal education, as also for those who, whether liberally educated or not, design to qualify themselves for engineering and other professions of applied science. What we insist on is, that there is no substitute for the ancient languages as an integral and leading part of a liberal education.

But, as preliminary to a brief discussion of this point, we wish to clear away somewhat of the confusion of ideas which is conspicuous among those who claim to be the special advocates of utilitarianism, and of utilitarian studies in education. By utility we understand that property or attribute of things whereby they are a means of some good beyond themselves. What is simply good *per se*, irrespective of its being a means to some other good, may be on this account supremely excellent, as virtue or moral goodness. Moral goodness is supremely good in itself, aside of its being a means to any good beyond itself, such as happiness. And therefore it is not to be gauged by any *merely* utilitarian standard. And yet it is a means of the highest possible good beyond itself—even the highest happiness of the rational creature. It therefore realizes all that of which the utilitarians are in quest, who reduce virtue to a *mere* means of happiness, thus debasing and destroying its very nature, whereby alone it can be instrumental of our highest happiness.

Now somewhat of this analysis applies to knowledge. It is a good, an eminent good in itself. It is so in proportion to its thoroughness and the elevation of the subjects to which it relates; and irrespective of its further uses, which are many and great, and vary with its nature. So also is mental discipline or culture, in proportion to its perfection. It is a good in itself, exalted in the ratio of its completeness, while it makes a keen polished instrument for the highest uses in working out exterior results. And, *ceteris paribus*, that mental discipline is best *per se*, and best in its utilities, which is most perfect. A low utilitarianism in education, therefore, as in morals, defeats itself. In opposing all mental attainment and discipline except what is acquired in professional study, or in science and its applications, (in all consistency, the utilitarians ought to limit education to the useful applications of science), they impair the instrument, which is needed, in utmost strength and sharpness, to achieve these practical utilities. And hence, we are prepared for the testimony given by the Professors in schools of Applied Science, that their liberally educated students, who have been well-trained in the classics of the college course are, as a class, far better scientific students than others not thus prepared. Another point deserves consideration here. It is in the search for truth as truth, and not in view of its utilitarian applications, that the discoveries of greatest ultimate utility, or capable of the most useful applications, have been achieved. To be imprisoned in our search for truth within the limits of its perceived utilitarian applications, is to be precluded from pursuing more than a minimum of the most useful truths. Even Prof. Tyndall, in his argument for the study of Physics, published in Prof. Youmans' volume, warns the utilitarian to "beware of attempting to substitute for that simple love with which the votary of science pursues his task, the calculations of what he is pleased to call utility. The scientific man must approach nature in his own way; for if you invade his freedom by your so-called practical considerations, it may be at the expense of those qualities on which his success as a discoverer depends. Let the self-styled practical man look to those from the fecundity of whose thought, he, and thousands like him, have sprung into existence. Were they

inspired in their first inquiries by the calculations of utility? Not one of them." An exclusive utilitarianism therefore in science and education, as in morals and religion, is self-destructive. Did those who made the original discoveries in electro-magnetism, which culminated in the electric telegraph, then have that telegraph in view? Let us eschew that narrow suicidal spirit, which, in its avidity for the golden eggs, kills the bird that lays them—in its eagerness for practical education removes that high symmetrical, independent culture, which alone invigorates and sharpens the mind for the noblest practical achievements.

In regard to the great inquiry before us, our first position is, that the thorough study of language, in some way, is essential to all high and thorough education. It is so, for the simple reason that language is the exponent of the mind, the vehicle of its thoughts, the expression and record of its conscious exercises, its achievements, conquests, and treasures. A knowledge of the workings, laws, products of the human mind, has its first foundations laid, therefore, in a mastery of the language that voices it. It is here that we have brought before us continually all the forms of thought, with its necessary logical relations and conditions; the products of abstraction and generalization in all common terms; judgments and reasonings of every kind, categorical, conditional, disjunctive, dilemmatic; with continual illustrations of every law and every fallacy of logic. Not only so, but language reflects every phase of the soul, and brings to view all the elements of psychology. And still further, in the modifications of verbs and nouns, the connections of clauses and sentences, not only are psychological phases manifestly reflected, but they articulate many metaphysical principles and distinctions. The force of the distinctions of tense and mood, of connective particles, and interdependent sentences, is largely metaphysical, as well as psychological. Moreover, the mastery of language by exact knowledge involves, within certain limits, exact knowledge of the things represented in this knowledge. It has been said that words are things. This is an exaggeration of the truth. In respect to a large class of objects, however, words are in such a sense things, that to know the former is to know the latter. To understand the

words, circle, triangle, acorn, maize, is, so far forth, to understand the things themselves. We understand the one only as we understand the other.

A due mastery of language, in its genius, spirit, laws, import, is therefore the best introduction to the knowledge of the soul, the immaterial, conscious spirit which articulates itself through this medium. In the merest utilitarian view is this knowledge useless, or of less than the highest utility? Is it not the knowledge of our higher being, and of the noblest essence this side heaven? Can such knowledge and the discipline it gives be underrated or degraded below the knowledge of the properties of matter, unless at the behest of the coarsest materialism? Can there be any higher discipline of the mind than to understand itself, its own powers, workings, aptitudes, as these are voiced in language? Can there be a better preparation for the study of physics and material nature, than a knowledge of the properties of the instrument by which we investigate them? Locke was first moved to those psychological investigations which issued in the immortal treatise on the Human Understanding, by the desire to see whether he could not get a clearer insight into some obscure and perplexing inquiries, by learning the exact powers, and limitations of the powers, of the mind, the instrument of investigation. This of course points to the need of direct studies in logic and mental philosophy in order to a good liberal education. But it indicates all the more certainly the preliminary necessity of thorough training in language as the grand manifestation of the soul. Besides, the mastery of language is requisite to that power of precise, elegant, forcible expression, which is the proper fruit and badge of liberal culture, and is one of the great endowments by which educated men facilitate and perfect their own thinking, and the effective communication of it to their fellow-men. But why may not all this be accomplished by the thorough study of our own tongue, the very instrument of expression we need to possess, without wasting precious years in the toilsome, and seemingly profitless study of the dead languages? In answer to this, it is readily granted that the study of our own language is, in its due place and time, an essential part of liberal education: that it is not without disciplinary power: that for those whose

opportunities at school are too short to admit of any important progress in classical studies, it is best to omit them altogether and attend only to the English language. But, after all these concessions, it is still true, that the study of our vernacular is no sufficient substitute for classical studies, in liberal and high education, because, in the words of Dr. Jones,

(1.) "To confine our language-studies to the vernacular is to narrow our range of thought and expression. 'In learning Greek and Latin as boys,' says Dr. Max Müller, (*Survey of Languages*, p. 2), 'we are learning more than a new language, we are acquiring an entirely novel system of thought. The mind has to receive a grammatical training, and to be broken, so to say, to modes of thought and speech unknown to us from our own language.'"

(2.) "Again it is very difficult to arrive at a correct insight into the nature of language, its laws, forms, and analogies, and in a general way to attain to any great power or exactness in the use even of our own language, without acquiring in addition to it some other one as well. For our mother tongue is so identified with our current modes of thought and expression, we use it with such facility, and with the exertion of so small an amount of reflection upon the meaning and force of the words and the structure of the sentences which we utter, that we fail to obtain from its study that knowledge of the principles of language and grammatical forms generally, and that force and accuracy in its own use, which we get from the acquisition of a language learnt only by prolonged and laborious effort. And this absence of effort in the use of the vernacular seriously impairs, in other respects as well as in this, the value of its study regarded as a mental discipline.

(3.) "Our own language would further appear to be inferior to the classical languages for the purposes of education for the following reason; it is singularly simple in the structure of its sentences and in the arrangement of its words, while they are most varied in the collocation of their words and most involved in the formation of their sentences; and hence, to arrive at the meaning of a passage in a classical author requires a much greater exertion of the reflective and analytical faculties, and

consequently involves a proportionately higher and more vigorous intellectual training.

(4.) "Again, the English language, beautiful and expressive as it is, is not as perfect in its grammatical structure and forms as the languages of Greece and Rome, and, accordingly, cannot afford so good a specimen for the language studies of the student as they do. For example, it conveys by a cumbersome array of little words what they convey by a change of inflection; and the abundant use of inflections in a language not only makes it more terse and forcible in itself, but also renders it possible to arrange words in sentences in such a way as to express ideas in the clearest and most striking manner; while a deficiency of inflections often renders it necessary, for the sake of making the meaning intelligible, to place the words so as to represent the ideas much less appropriately and forcibly. The inflection at once shows the proper position of a word as regards the sense, wherever it may happen to be placed in a sentence; and thus in Greek and Latin, each idea can be arranged according to its relative importance, and where its expression will be most striking to the mind, and we may add, most euphonious to the ear; whereas, in English, a certain fixed order of words and clauses must be for the most part observed, or the sentence would become mere unintelligible jargon.

(5.) "Nor must it be forgotten that the classical languages lie at the foundation, and enter largely into the structure of our own language. Many of our words are derived directly from them, and their meaning cannot be rightly appreciated without some classical attainments. 'If,' says the *Edinburgh Reviewer* (July, 1864), 'the knowledge of Greek and Latin among our upper classes were lost, it [our language] would become (as it unfortunately is to women, and to the mass of people already) a strange collection of inexpressive symbols.' It is not then perhaps too much to say that an acquaintance with Latin and Greek is almost indispensable for a precise and correct knowledge of our own language; at all events we may say, with her Majesty's Public School Commissioners, that the 'study of the classical languages is, or rather may be made, an instrument

of the highest value for the purpose' of acquiring 'a command of pure grammatical English.'—(*Report*, p. 33.)

(6.) "Lastly, it may be urged that some classical knowledge is of great value in helping the English student to acquire the humble but important accomplishment of correct spelling; because in the case of words of Greek or Latin origin, one possessed of this knowledge knows, from his acquaintance with the original languages, whence they are derived, how they ought to be spelt.

"For all these reasons we conclude that English is not to take the place of Latin and Greek in our education."

But if language must be studied in another tongue, in order to reap its full educating power, why not use for this purpose the modern continental languages, which have the prerogative of being easily acquired, of giving us access to the vast treasures of modern literature and science which they contain, and of being, particularly the French, as the Latin was before it, the great medium of commercial, social, political intercourse among the cultivated nations—advantages which confessedly do not belong to the dead languages of Greece and Rome? One answer to this is thus given by Mr. Mill, after urging the necessity of knowing French, and the importance of familiarity with German, to all well-instructed persons of this day. "But living languages are so much more easily acquired by intercourse with those who use them in daily life; a few months in the country itself, if properly employed, go so much farther than as many years of school lessons; that it is really waste of time for those to whom that easier mode is attainable, to labour at them with no help but that of books and masters; and it will in time be made attainable, through international schools and colleges, to many more than at present. Universities do enough to facilitate the study of modern languages, if they give a mastery over that ancient language which is the foundation of most of them, and the possession of which makes it easier to learn four or five of the continental languages, than it is to learn one of them without it." This view is confirmed by the highest living authority, Dr. Max Müller, who is quoted by Dr. Jones as saying: "In Latin we have the key to the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian. Any one who

desires to learn the modern Romance languages—Italian, Spanish, and French—will find that he actually has to spend less time if he learns Latin first, than if he had studied each of these modern dialects separately, and without this foreknowledge of their common parent." A doctrine to which even Prof. Youmans declares his adhesion, when, notwithstanding all his tirades against the ancient classics, he tells us: "The mastery of Latin reduces the labour of acquiring Italian, French, and Spanish, into which it largely enters." P. 18.

But while the most economical way of mastering the modern languages is through the previous mastery of the ancient classics, they cannot of themselves give that strong discipline and elegant culture which flow from classical studies, and belong to genuine liberal education. That they fall below the Latin and Greek classics in this respect appears from the following considerations, which we give in the words of Dr. Jones, while we should greatly prefer, if space permitted, to quote in full the richer, ampler, and stronger argument of Mr. Mill, with an occasional extract from which we may supplement and complete the former. Says Principal Jones:

(1.) "The very fact that modern languages can be so easily acquired, the very circumstance of their being living languages, and therefore capable of being learnt orally by a mere exercise of memory, without the laborious process by which alone a dead language can be mastered, makes them less suitable and efficient instruments of intellectual discipline; for intellectual development and culture are the results of intellectual effort; and, if you diminish the effort, you proportionally impede that development, and impair that culture.

(2.) "On the other hand, the fact that the classical are 'dead' languages, at the present time unused, and therefore unprogressive; that, consequently, we are able to study them in every stage of their progress, from a comparatively imperfect state to their highest point of perfection, and through their subsequent decline; that therefore there can be no difficulty in selecting from them the finest specimens of style, where the language is found in the greatest perfection (a matter most difficult of decision in the case of any living language, which is ever changing, whether improving or deteriorating, not being at

any given time ascertainable)—renders them more serviceable models for the study of language.

(3.) "Then, again, it must be borne in mind that Greek and Latin are in themselves more perfect languages, more logically accurate in the expression of ideas, with a more regular grammatical structure, and with grammatical details more easily traceable to general laws; and that, consequently, to adopt the conclusion of the *Quarterly Review* (July, 1864, p. 21), 'Latin,' to which we may add Greek in perhaps a greater degree, 'though not well taught and less well remembered, leaves behind it more knowledge of general grammar and etymology than the study of any modern language can convey.'

(4.) "To this we may add that they afford a standard of the principles of language and of grammar common to the whole civilized world. Now it is manifest that, in the study of philology, it is important that there should be some common basis of proceeding, and some standard of reference agreed upon by all. It would be plainly inconvenient that each nation should take for its standard its own or some other modern tongue, *e. g.*, that England should take French, Germany English, France German, or Italy any one of the three, or some other language; scholars could not thus compare their labours, and the variation in the point of view would probably produce hopeless discord as to the principles which are the ultimate object of research. Nor could it be expected that all modern nations would combine to elevate any one of their languages into the position of the one standard for them all. But Latin and Greek, being remote from national jealousies and the rivalries of modern life, standing out in the distant past the common heritage of all, to which all are equally entitled, and all are equally, or nearly so, indebted, form a ground of study open to every civilized man, from which the fundamental principles of all language can be educed, and upon which the philologists of every nation can work together and compare the results of their labours.

(5.) "And as they afford the most perfect specimens of language, so also they supply the finest literary models in poetry, history, and philosophy—models which have served as examples of thought and composition to all subsequent ages, and after

the fashion of which all modern literature has taken its form. And, in addition to this fact, observing also that classical, as compared with modern literature, which is practically speaking boundless in extent, affords a limited area for study, containing a few recognized models, upon which all can agree, whereas, to make a selection from modern authors for the same purpose is almost impossible,—we conclude that the literatures of Greece and Rome, no less than their languages, are more suitable for educational purposes than those of modern nations.

(6.) "Nor must this fact be forgotten. Modern literary productions abound in classical allusions, and in thoughts and sentiments either directly copied from the Greek and Latin classics, or framed on the model of similar passages in them. In evidence of this we may refer to the constant classical allusions in the speeches of our great statesmen—allusions which convey no meaning except to the classical scholar. And even in cases where this direct reference is not discernible, the classics have exercised so vast an influence on modern thought, and so many of our current ideas are traceable to that influence, that much of our modern literature cannot be thoroughly understood and appreciated without some classical knowledge.

(7.) "Another argument of considerable weight may be based on the circumstance that, in consequence of their remoteness from our own times, the classical authors are free from any reference to the controversies, religious, political, and social, which agitatate ourselves, and with which it is exceedingly undesirable to disturb the minds of the young before they are thoroughly competent to think for themselves, to discriminate between what is true and what is false, and to settle their own principles on the conviction of disciplined reason, and under the influence of sound and well-trained judgment.

(8.) "Further, it must be noted that the classical languages are, or at least the Latin is, as it were, the key to many of the most important modern languages, and that the acquisition of the former makes the acquisition, whenever necessary or desirable, of the latter a comparatively easy task—a fact the converse of which is by no means true.

(9.) "And, as a last argument—an argument, however, which is applicable only to our own times, and may ultimately cease

to be of any force—the classics have so long held possession of our leading seminaries of learning, that they, with mathematics, have secured a monopoly of the most highly trained and efficient masters, so that at present, and for some time to come, it would be difficult to procure a sufficient supply of competent masters of the modern languages.

"For all these reasons, we conclude that the modern languages, important as is the place which they ought to occupy in education, cannot be regarded as having the same educational value as those of Greece and Rome."

Says Mr. Mill: "The only languages, then, and the only literature to which I would allow a place in the ordinary curriculum, are those of the Greeks and Romans; and to these I would preserve the position in it which they at present occupy. That position is justified, by the great value, in education, of knowing some other cultivated language and literature than one's own, and by the peculiar value of those languages and literatures."

After showing with great cogency the importance of looking at things represented in other languages, in comparison with our own, in order to accurate knowledge; also of comparing ourselves, our views, methods, and achievements, with the standards presented by other nations and in other languages, Mr. Mill discourses in this wise:

"But if it be so useful, on this account, to know the language and literature of any other cultivated and civilized people, the most valuable of all to us, in this respect, are the language and literature of the ancients. No nations of modern and civilized Europe are so unlike one another, as the Greeks and Romans are unlike all of us; yet without being, as some remote Orientals are, so totally dissimilar, that the labour of a life is required to enable us to understand them. Were this the only gain to be derived from a knowledge of the ancients, it would already place the study of them in a high rank among enlightening and liberalizing pursuits. It is of no use saying we may know them through modern writings. We may know something of them in that way; which is much better than knowing nothing. But modern books do not teach us ancient thought; they teach some modern writer's notion of ancient

thought. Translations are scarcely better. When we want really to know what a person thinks or says, we seek it at first hand from himself." Mr. Mill proceeds to apply this principle to the study of ancient history, and to show that antiquity can only be truly known in the historians and authors through which it utters and portrays itself. "There is no portion of our knowledge which it is more useful to obtain at first hand—to go to the fountain head for—than our knowledge of history."

We cannot forbear to make another considerable extract, showing the incomparably superior educating power of the ancient over the modern languages. Keeping in view the extent to which their perfect grammatical inflections enable them to invert the order of thought, so that the student is under the necessity of tracing the meaning through a careful examination and comparison of the grammatical forms, inflections, syntactical relations, and other facts, the following passage is strongly to the point.

"Even as mere languages, no modern European language is so valuable a discipline to the intellect as those of Greece and Rome, on account of their regular and complicated structure. Consider for a moment what grammar is. It is the most elementary part of logic. It is the beginning of the analysis of the thinking process. The principles and rules of grammar are the means by which the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thought. The distinctions between the various parts of speech, between the cases of nouns, the moods and tenses of verbs, the functions of particles, are distinctions in thought, not merely in words. Single nouns and verbs express objects and events, many of which can be cognized by the senses, but the modes of putting nouns and verbs together, express the relations of objects and events, which can be cognized only by the intellect; and each different mode corresponds to a different relation. The structure of every sentence is a lesson in logic. The various rules of syntax oblige us to distinguish between the subject and predicate of a proposition, between the agent, the action, and the thing acted upon; to mark when an idea is intended to modify or qualify, or merely to unite with, some other idea; what asser-

tions are categorical, what only conditional; whether the intention is to express similarity or contrast, to make a plurality of assertions conjunctively or disjunctively; what portions of a sentence, though grammatically complete within themselves, are mere members or subordinate parts of the assertion made by the entire sentence. Such things form the subject-matter of universal grammar; and the languages which teach it best are those which have the most definite rules, and which provide distinct forms for the greatest number of distinctions in thought, so that if we fail to attend precisely and accurately to any of these, we cannot avoid committing a solecism in language. In these qualities the classical languages have an incomparable superiority over every modern language, and over all languages, dead and living, which have a literature worth being generally studied."

In addition to all this, Mr. Mill maintains with great cogency, "that the superior value of the literature itself, for purposes of education, is still more marked and decisive. Even in the substantial value of the matter of which it is the vehicle, it is very far from having been superseded." In scientific knowledge the moderns of course surpass them, but not in "the treasure they (the ancients) accumulated of what may be called the wisdom of life; the rich store of experience of human nature and conduct which the acute and observing minds of those ages, aided in their observations by the greater simplicity of manners and life, consigned to their writings, and most of which retains all its value. The speeches in Thucydides; the Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics of Aristotle; the Dialogues of Plato; the Orations of Demosthenes; the Satires and especially the Epistles of Horace; all the writings of Tacitus; the great work of Quintilian, a repertory of the best thoughts of the ancient world on all subjects connected with education; and, in a less formal manner, all that is left to us of the ancient historians, orators, philosophers, and even dramatists, are replete with remarks and maxims of singular good sense and penetration, applicable both to political and private life; and the actual truths we find in them are even surpassed in value by the encouragement and help they give us in the pursuit of truth."

"In purely literary excellence—in perfection of form—the

preëminence of the ancients is not disputed. In every department which they attempted, and they attempted almost all, their composition, like their sculpture, has been to the greatest modern artists an example, to be looked up to with hopeless admiration, but of inappreciable value as a light on high, guiding their own endeavours. . . . . They show us at least what excellence is, and make us desire it, and strive to get as near to it as is within our reach. And this is the value to us of the ancient writers all the more emphatically, because their excellence does not admit of being copied or directly imitated. It does not consist in a trick which can be learned, but in the direct adaptation of means to ends. The secret of the style of the great Greek and Roman authors is, that it is the perfection of good sense. In the first place, they never use a word without a meaning, or which adds nothing to the meaning. They always (to begin with) had a meaning; they knew what they wanted to say; and their whole purpose was to say it with the highest degree of exactness and completeness, and bring it home to the mind with the greatest possible clearness and vividness. It never entered their thoughts to conceive of a piece of writing as beautiful in itself, abstractedly from what it had to express; its beauty must all be subservient to the most perfect expression of the sense. The *curiosa felicitas* which their critics ascribed in a preëminent degree to Horace, expresses the standard at which they all aimed. Their style is exactly described by Swift's definition: 'the right words in the right places.' . . . . These conditions being complied with, then indeed the intrinsic beauty of the means used was a source of additional effect, of which it behoved them to avail themselves, like rhythm and melody in versification. But these great writers knew that ornament for the sake of ornament, ornament which attracts attention to itself, and shines by its own beauties, only does so by calling off the mind from the main object, and thus not only interferes with the higher purpose of human discourse, which ought, and generally professes, to have some matter to communicate, apart from the mere excitement of the moment, but also spoils the perfection of the composition as a piece of fine art, by destroying the unity of the effect. This, then, is the first great lesson in composition to be learned from the classical

authors. The second is, not to be prolix. In a single paragraph Thucydides can give a clear and vivid representation of a battle, such as a reader who has once taken it into his mind can seldom forget." In the pressure of modern life, men who have anything to say, tend to prolixity, because they have not time enough to elaborate to the utmost brevity. "But they would do far worse than they do, if there had never been master-pieces, or if they had never known them. Early familiarity with the perfect, makes our most imperfect production far less bad than it otherwise would be. To have a high standard of excellence often makes the whole difference of rendering our work good when it would otherwise be mediocre."

The present position of the ancient classics in liberal education being thus vindicated, it remains that we look briefly at some of its other essential ingredients. Next to the languages, Latin and Greek, the Mathematics have had the preëminence among the branches of study conceded to lie at the foundation of a thorough liberal education, a place from which they will not easily or quickly be dislodged. They have an educational power for which there is no substitute. First, as they afford the calculus for the solution of problems involving number and quantity, which are indispensable in several leading departments of Physical Science, and essential to a due understanding of those sciences. This is an instrument, a tool, which every educated man should possess. But it is not so much for information as for discipline, that this study has value for the majority of students. It does a service for the reasoning powers which cannot otherwise be done. It not only trains the power of attention, close and continuous, to abstract and complex chains of thought, a power in which lies half the superiority of educated men; it accustoms the mind to reach certain truth by reasoning aright from right premises; it shows that this can be done and how it may be done; that it requires complete certainty and rigidly exact statement of the premises; the making sure of each succeeding step, in its order onward to the conclusion, which is thus indissolubly concatenated with the premises. It shows how vast bodies of truth can thus be established, and accustoms the student to the process of establishing them. It then trains him to make use of these

processes and results of reasoning as a prolific factor in the discovery of truth in physical science, the realms of actual being in Astronomy, Mechanics, Chemistry, and especially in Applied Science and the Arts. The conditions being once ascertained by observation and experiment which involve mathematical proportions, as the ratio of the resultant of two forces to their sum, of the force of gravity to the distance and mass of bodies, of the angles of incidence and reflection in the reflection of light, innumerable other conclusions can be certainly deduced by irrefragable mathematical reasoning.

But while mathematics exerts this high educating power upon the reasoning faculties, it needs to be supplemented by training in the ancient languages, in order to any adequate and balanced discipline of these faculties. The views which we have expressed in a former article on this point, are more than vindicated in the following quotation from Dr. Jones, which we make, barely remarking that we do not regard these studies as rivals or superiors, the one of the other, but as mutually supporting and complementary. Indeed, we should as soon think of asking whether animal or vegetable food were best for man, or whether he had better live on one to the exclusion of the other, as whether the reasoning powers were most strengthened by mathematical or classical studies, or by either exclusively of the other. Says Dr. Jones:

"Nor must we suppose that the mental discipline which mathematics effect can be accomplished through its instrumentality alone. Indeed, many have doubted whether mathematics is the best subject for training and developing the reason, and whether it is not inferior to the classics in this respect. For it has been urged against it, and with a great amount of force, that it is concerned only with number, quantity, and form, or the intuitions of time and space, and is thus limited to one sphere of existence, and therefore in no way applicable to the diversified phenomena of our intellectual life; and that, inasmuch as it is concerned with *necessary* matter, it incapacitates rather than trains the mind for dealing correctly with *contingent* matter, and so for forming accurate and sound conclusions in questions of common life, and of moral, political, philosophical, or religious truth, when abso-

lute certainty is unattainable, and probability, of greater or less degree of certainty, alone can be arrived at. But classical studies, they argue, while they are free from these defects as being engaged with *contingent* matter, and concerned with most of the problems which occupy the attention of the intellect, are yet a most effective means of cultivating the reason; for the accurate syntax and complex structure of the classical languages require on the part of the student a great exercise of the logical powers, to enable him to comprehend the purport of the language used; to determine which he has to trace out the connection between clause and clause, and sentence and sentence, to weigh conflicting probabilities as to the exact meaning of words and phrases, to apply rules and form conclusions; and all this involves direct processes of syllogistic reasoning, rapidly and almost intuitively gone through, but no less real and valid on that account." While it is thus clearly shown that the classics do for the reasoning powers, what mathematics cannot, we have shown above that the latter do a work in this behalf impossible to the former.

For reasons equally urgent, the Physical Sciences, in their great elements and outlines at least, have vindicated their claim to a place in liberal education beyond dispute; not indeed in derogation or exclusion of the classics, but concurrently with, and as supplementary to them. The study of them is enforced, in the first place, by the extent, variety, and importance of the information they afford in regard to the phenomena and laws of the Material Universe, of nature, and of man in his corporeal constitution, as well as of the affairs of practical life. Ignorance of the great outlines of these sciences is a disgrace to any educated man. Complete knowledge of any of them is impossible to any but experts and specialists therein. While all cultivated men may know something of the whole circle of sciences, seldom can any become masters of more than one or two. It is not the object of liberal education to make men lawyers, doctors, or clergymen, engineers, metallurgists, scientists, or even linguists in the higher sense; but to prepare them to enter with success upon the thorough mastery of any of these departments. At the same time, it is of the utmost moment that this broad, and symmetrical culture, giv-

ing insight into the leading features of all the great departments of physics, and metaphysics, thought and language, should precede professional or other special studies. Otherwise the liberal and learned professions will be filled with narrow and one-sided men. They will have keenness without breadth of vision; like the men who spend their lives in making the point of a needle; and if sharp like that minute instrument, like it also, in having but one eye and one point.

But if the Physical Sciences are essential for the information they give, they are none the less so for the peculiar discipline they afford. They, of course, train the powers of external observation, and of devising experiments for the ascertainment and verification of truth. They, no less than the languages, exercise the memory. They constantly exercise the student in classification and generalization. But still further, they bring the reasoning powers into play, in the due estimation of evidence, the detection of crucial tests, of uncertain criteria, of unproved hypotheses, and unwarrantable assumptions; in inductive reasoning from particular facts to general laws; in determining the conditions which warrant such universal conclusions from a few facts. In short, they accustom the mind to that sort of reasoning, with all its canons, cautions, and limitations, which has yielded such stupendous results in the realms of actual being; which enable us to foretell eclipses for centuries, with absolute accuracy and prophetic certainty; have harnessed the mighty but blind forces of nature into the service of man, and have given a progress to the civilized nations in half a century surpassing that of long preceding centuries. Many students have first had their powers of thought awakened, so as to think as they need to think in the actual world, by accomplished teachers of physical science. On all accounts, therefore, we assign them a high place in liberal education. Which of them shall be more prominently and largely taught, and which in mere rudimental outline, must of necessity vary in different institutions, according to their traditions and usages, and the power of the different professors to impress themselves or rather their departments on their pupils.

We should like to bring before our readers the whole of Mr. Mill's forcible passage on the value of the study of Logic in

educating the reasoning powers. But we want the room and must content ourselves with an extract.

"Of Logic I venture to say, even if limited to that of mere ratiocination, the theory of names, propositions, and the syllogism, that there is no part of intellectual education which is of greater value, or whose place can so ill be supplied by anything else. Its uses, it is true, are chiefly negative; its function is, not so much to teach us to go right, as to keep us from going wrong. But in the operations of the intellect it is so much easier to go wrong than right; it is so utterly impossible for the most vigorous mind to keep itself in the path but by maintaining a vigilant watch against all deviations, and noting all the by-ways by which it is possible to go astray—that the chief difference between one reasoner and another consists in their less or greater liability to be misled. Logic points out all the possible ways in which, starting from true premises, we may draw false conclusions. By its analysis of the reasoning process, and the forms it supplies for stating and setting forth our reasonings, it enables us to guard the points at which a fallacy is in danger of slipping in, or to lay our fingers upon the place where it has slipped in. When I consider how very simple the theory of reasoning is, and how short a time is sufficient for acquiring a thorough knowledge of its principles and rules, and even considerable expertness in applying them, I can find no excuse for omitting to study it on the part of any one who aspires to success in any intellectual pursuit. Logic is the great disperser of hazy and confused thinking; it clears up the fogs which hide from us our own ignorance, and make us believe that we understand a subject when we do not. . . . You will find abundance of people to tell you that logic is no help to thought, and that people cannot be taught to think by rules. Undoubtedly rules by themselves, without practice, go but a little way in teaching anything. But if the practice of thinking is not improved by rules, I venture to say it is the only difficult thing done by human beings that is not so. A man learns to saw wood principally by practice, but there are rules for doing it, grounded on the nature of the operation, and if he is not taught the rules, he will not saw well until he has discovered them for himself. . . . To those who think lightly of

the school logic, I say, take the trouble to learn it. You will easily do so in a few weeks, and you will see whether it is of no use to you in making your mind clear, and keeping you from stumbling in the dark over the most outrageous fallacies."

As we have shown that one great advantage of such careful study of language, as can only be ensured to young persons through the ancient classics, is the introduction which it gives to the knowledge of mind, or elementary Psychology and Logic, it may be added they perform a like service in behalf of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres. Nor does anything more require to be said in behalf of either of these great departments of *literæ humaniores*, which, on account both of the knowledge and the training they impart, have established for themselves an undisputed place in liberal education.

We had prepared some observations on the true way of meeting the claims made by the ever-widening area of science upon liberal education without crowding out the ancient classics: also in regard to the most advantageous age for beginning the study of Latin and other branches. But we rest here for want of space.

ART. IV.—*Preaching to Sinners.*

THERE is a question of no little importance to the mind of the preacher, which he proposes to himself in attempting the work of leading impenitent souls to Christ. This question is one that asks—How shall sinners be most easily convinced of their need? By what teaching shall they be most easily turned to Jesus, and converted from the power of Satan unto God?

It is understood and felt, that the conversion and the regeneration of the soul is through the grace of God. God ever asserts his own power in this blessed work. They who receive Christ, and to whom is given power to become the sons of God, are born not of the will of man, but of God. The *grace* of God, which bringeth salvation, must ever be remembered, and

insisted on, and preached. At the same time it is felt, that this grace of God does not work without instruments, as the very injunction to preach the gospel indicates. Through the instrumentalities of human argument and appeal do the powerful influences of grace work upon the soul. It has "pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." "How shall they hear without a preacher?" The people to whom have not come the messengers of the gospel are yet lying in the regions of the shadow of death. To them must be told the tidings of salvation ere light shall come upon them. This means is blessed by the Spirit of God unto the awakening and conversion of sinners. It is important, then, to know what the preacher shall preach, that he shall preach the truth and not falsehood. And not only is this important, but also that he shall preach the truth with skill, judgment, clearness, and point. He is working with God's tools. He must study to make himself a workman that needeth not to be ashamed. He is fighting with Divine weapons, and must study that he may please Him who has chosen him to be a soldier. Feeling his dependence for blessing and success upon the presence and coöperation of the Spirit, he will yet consider carefully and earnestly the method of his presentation of the truth.

His aim, as concerns the impenitent sinner, is, in one word, conversion. This is the grand result. But to this there is a previous stage. In order to the conversion of the soul there must be that soul's *conviction* concerning the nature and the application of the truth. Here is the especial work of the preacher. This is the first step. In speaking the word of God, his desire is to produce, by every means within his reach, such convictions in the mind of the hearer as shall seem most effectual towards salvation. But minds differing in habits of thought, in temperament, in disposition, are not all affected alike by one and the same view of the truth. An exposition of gospel teaching, which will to the soul of one man seem as a revelation of his own unspeakable sinfulness, may to another assume the glorious light of heavenly and attractive holiness. A truth which may goad one man nearly to the borders of despair, may to another seem as the loving tones of a Saviour's voice. The experience of every minister of the gospel will

testify to this, and also to a consequent oft-occurring carefulness and study as to what truths should by him be presented, in what most fitting way, to particular minds. In pulpit preparation, in pastoral labour, the minister is often conscious of studying the characteristics of his people, the special wants known to him, in order that he may, under the Spirit's blessing, bring just such medicine as shall effect a cure. If such and such convictions can be forced upon this soul, then he shall have large hope for its entering the kingdom.

And there is *one great and indispensable conviction*, without the production of which all the labour of the preacher will be in vain. Whatsoever may be the doctrine presented, the soul will not be led to the blessed Saviour until there is felt within it the conviction of which we speak. This is the conviction that *the salvation of the soul depends entirely upon the grace of God.* This may be said to include all the convictions of the soul felt in the application to it of the truths of salvation. To this, in fact, does every sinner come, who gives himself to Christ; to this in its substance, whether thoroughly comprehended in its length and breadth, or not, for the soul will not cast itself upon the mercies of the Lord, until the fact is felt that salvation is *given* to the sincere applicant. This may, then, be taken as the special aim of the preacher in opening to the sinner the truth of redemption, in order that immediately, if possible, the sinner may realize that he must in every way depend upon Divine grace. This shall be for the soul the stepping-stone, whence it may rise to the full experience of conversion's joys.

Of this conviction it may be said, in the first place, that it must be a *sincere conviction*, according to the evident meaning of the Scriptures. In other words, it is a conviction in the heart, and not a mere intellectual judgment; for a religion of the head only is no religion, and the command of God is not, "Give me thy mind," but "Give me thy heart." Preaching deals with the mind, and must deal with the mind by every possible and cogent argument, but only thus that it may touch the heart. A thought or truth, which has found its way into the heart, is one that in so doing has become a living reality for that heart. Formerly, as a mere judgment of the mind,

though established by reasoning, it had no substance for the affections, but now, enlisting these, it assumes at once a breathing form and a living energy. The man then looks upon the proven truth as something for himself, and having, as we may say, personal relations to his own well-being. We know well that this is a result not always, or ever, assured to human endeavour, but it is a result to be aimed at, and comes within the field of earnest study and impassioned appeal. The truth being spoken as a thing which *should* move the heart, the argument is such as seems most fitted to that end. The love of God, for instance, is reasoned upon and proved as an actual, ever-living, and powerful fact, but yet who knows anything of the love of God who has not felt it in his heart? And so the grace of God, whereon salvation shall depend, concerning which this heart-conviction is sought, is not only reasoned about as a reality made certain to the mind by the apostolic declaration, "By grace ye are saved," but is described as the attractive, soul-helping, mercy of God, which by its own power lifts the weakest and most degraded sinner out of the mire, and sets him on the Rock of his salvation.

In the second place, this conviction includes four elements, of which the first is that *the grace of God is a free giving.* In other words, what God bestows upon man in grace is a gift outright. There is nothing in it of reward, nothing of debt. Man does not in any way earn it. He only receives it as a free gift. It is not given in consideration for anything whatsoever in man, whether in his condition or in his action. It is not meant as a compensation for his misery, or for a premium upon faithfulness. It is an answer to prayer, but it is not the reward of prayer. It is conditioned on faith and repentance, but it is not their reward. In whatsoever way the idea of a free gift can be expressed, as separate from every thought of debt or of deserving, in such form may be described the grace of God, flowing from his sovereign good pleasure, as an act of favour upon the positively undeserving.

The second element here is, that *God's provision of a salvation and the means of it are thus entirely of grace.* Here we touch, on the one hand, the sin, the misery, and the death which are in the world, and, on the other hand, the mission of

Jesus Christ with its preceding types, its redeeming value, its divine teaching, and its work of the Holy Ghost. All the remedial measures for the evil which has laid hold upon humanity are shown to be of grace. While men may receive the reward of their labour in the death which is the wages of sin, the opposite condition of eternal life must ever be the gift of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord. It is God's salvation, prepared by him, wrought by his dear Son, and applied by his Spirit; and in this labour of love man's only part is to receive, to praise, to follow, and to love.

The third element in this conviction is that *the sinner's own share* in this salvation is a thing of grace. The sinner, beholding the grace which brought salvation to a world, needs also to see that, if his own soul share in that mercy, it must be through peculiar and especial grace to *him*. Redemption is not to be by him regarded as a fund of mercies originally founded by the grace of God, but to which, as thus founded, the sinner can now entitle himself by hard labour or strictness of life. Call it, if you will, a fund of gracious things, and then these shall be distributed by grace. God not only gave salvation to the world, but he also gives it to the soul. The sinner may look upon himself as standing entirely alone in the world, as though there was no other sinful soul under the heavens, as though all this wonderful work of Jesus Christ were done for his good alone, and thus perceive how entirely his salvation depends upon the Lord's grace. One would have a part in the redemption of Jesus. Let him understand that only as he receives it directly from the hand of grace shall he partake of the blessing. The sinner needs to be brought to a consciousness of his own position, hanging over the verge of the abyss, utterly helpless to save himself, dependent for deliverance, and for everything essential to deliverance, upon the grace of God.

The remaining element here is, that *this saving grace is freely offered unto men and promised unto him that seeks it.* The apprehension of this matter as already set forth, is not to appear as setting up a barrier over which no soul can cross, or to attempt the crossing of that which no soul may dare. These things *are* of grace, and for this reason—just because they are

of grace—they are the more to be hoped for and the more to be striven for. What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God did, in sending his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin. This was grace, and grace has therefore made possible that which otherwise had been for ever impossible, and thence hope should spring up in the bosom of man, and the way of attaining these things should appear. "Look unto me, all ye ends of the earth, and be ye saved," "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." "Whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely." Here is the God of all grace urging men to receive his grace, and promising life and salvation to the soul that truly seeks them in his appointed way. The conviction then concerning this saving grace of God is incomplete, if it sees only that these blessings are for God's hand to give. With such view only the soul might be overwhelmed, thinking that this salvation held of God were thus for ever beyond its reach. The sinner shall thus see how entirely he depends on grace, but he needs also to perceive how this dependence is of infinite advantage to himself. The complete conviction discerns, not only the hand of grace filled with every needed blessing, but that hand stretched out to bestow these blessings upon anxious and beseeching souls.

We may rightly include these things in this conviction concerning salvation as in every way dependent on the grace of God. These facts give to it its full meaning, as received and in a measure apprehended by every converted soul. The truth of grace, in order that it may excite the sinner, must thus reveal itself in his heart, as a free gift, given to the world, given to the individual soul, and not denied to sincere prayer. And this in its essential features, whether the mind is, or is not, able to define its parts, must work its way into the soul, before that soul will be found at the feet of Jesus. That Saviour must be seen as a gracious Saviour before the soul will cast itself upon him. If you desire to bring a sinner to Christ, you seek to put before him the nature of the Lord's free grace,—you speak to him of the blessed Christ waiting to receive him, calling to repentance, knocking at the door, and saying, "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy

laden, and I will give you rest." Other teaching is not sufficient without this. It may describe the terrors of the law for guilty sinners, but this will but drive the sinner to despair, or burden him in sin, unless upon this fearful picture there is allowed to shine the light of God's forgiving grace. It may paint the glories of heaven, and tell of all the joy and pleasure which there have an eternal dwelling, but this will only double the sinner's misery in view of that which seems for ever denied to him, or will cheat him with false hopes of gaining heaven by his own endeavour, unless there is shown the hand of grace held out to help every sinner in his heaven-ward climbing. A simple conviction of sin, even the deepest, is not enough, though it be one fraught with terrible forebodings and quivering with fear, without the knowledge of the grace of Christ. Fear may lead a soul to the extremity of anguish, and may compel him to wander here and there in search of help. He never trusts in anything that can save until he sees the Giver.

This, then, is a working conviction, a life-giving truth. Without it souls will not turn unto Christ. Having this, attended by the Spirit of God, they need no more to lead them. For this, it will be seen, necessarily suggests much that is not stated in its formal proposition. It presupposes all other truths connected with the soul's conversion. It simply speaks of the grace of God, but that grace touches, from its nature and in its statement, the lost condition of sinners and the Divine measures for their redemption. Having this manifold relation, it may be shown as flowing from, or connected with, any of the other doctrines which God has given for the warning, the teaching, and the encouragement of souls. It may, therefore, be taken as a prime object of desire to present the truth before the sinner, in such a manner that this conviction shall be most speedily and effectually wrought within him, that he shall realize that he is in very truth dependent upon his grace, so that grace must save him and not he himself. He is a sinful creature who must derive all help, all life, all holy emotion, all spiritual power, all salvation, from Christ, and from Christ alone. Whatever is taught to the sinner, let this be taught to him. Let him feel this. Let him feel his dependence, and let him therewith see Him upon whom he must depend. Lay

the sinner helpless at the foot of the cross, and teach him to look up.

It would seem to follow from these thoughts that the intention of all preaching to the sinner, looking to his conversion, should have this as its first aim, to lay this as the foundation of the saving work in the soul. This does not require a constant iteration of the word "grace," nor a perpetual recurrence to the statement of dependence thereon. It is not the unvarying teaching of one doctrine, but the drawing the practical lesson from every doctrine. It seeks the resultant of many forces. Urging the soul by every revealed doctrine, and every statement concerning its own condition and necessities, this preaching would so declare the many doctrines of the word, that the glory of grace may force its way into the sinner's heart. To what other end were these doctrines revealed to men, than for the glory of God in their salvation who receive them, and the condemnation of those who reject? How otherwise shall that glory be promoted, and souls be saved, or left without excuse, better than by this converging of all teaching upon the grace which bringeth salvation and applieth it unto men? If this can be brought out and shown plainly to the sinner, will he not by this be placed the nearer to an acceptance of God's mercy?

How this conviction shall be wrought in the handling of other doctrines may be briefly shown. Among the many teachings of the gospel there are a certain few which are ever and necessarily appealed to in this matter of the soul's conversion, having here a peculiar, though not their entire province. Foremost among these, and without which the others cannot be understood, is the doctrine concerning the nature of man's *sinfulness* and the extent of his *guilt*. This is to be taught in all its boldness. The deep depravity of the heart is to be declared. The stain of the first transgression; the corruption of nature; the turpitude of conduct; the ingratitude of life; the open rebellion against God's authority; the flouting of his grace; the deep damnation of which these are worthy; the complete impotence of the soul towards good; the utter ruin which sin has thus brought in and upon the soul; all these are to be taught to the sinner as the doctrine of the word, and as

the doctrine which experience will verify beyond a peradventure. These things are to be so taught to him, that the sinner shall feel himself to be, what he truly is, utterly unworthy of any good, and meriting God's wrath and curse for ever. By all means, let the sinner feel this. If it be possible, bring him to the verge of a dark pool, blacker than pitch, fetid with all corrupting exhalations, and then let him know for a certainty that this is his own God-forgetting and God-dishonouring heart. But do not leave him there. Make him not a lost soul wandering for ever in the darkness where no light dwells. Let him see the light. Let him see that his greatest sin has been against the light. Let him see the light still shining. Let the darkness urge him to the light. Having gotten him to this dreadful view of evil, preach grace to him for his own salvation. Here is the right subject for grace to help. He will never get out of his terrible condition, except grace lift him out. Therefore speak to him in that same hour of grace and Christ.

Again, as direction for a soul asking, "What shall I do to be saved?" we have the doctrine which declares that there must be within the soul "*repentance* towards God and *faith* in our Lord Jesus Christ." We can never insist too strongly upon this grand necessity. It is contrary even to the human idea of the fitness of things, that sin unrepented of, sin still loved, should be forgiven; or that a soul which refuses to trust in Christ should be saved by Christ. While man's nature is such as he possesses it, and while God's government is such as every teaching reveals it, there is an inherent impossibility that persistent impenitence and unbelief should be set aside as not worthy of condemnation. The conclusion of Paul, "So then we see they could not enter in because of unbelief," is not only a declaration of the Divine will in regard to the sinful Hebrews, but is the logical deduction of reason from the premises. While therefore the sinner is called to repentance and faith by the simple and plain statements of the Scripture, he is taught likewise, that these statements have their foundation in the nature of the sinner himself as a moral agent, and in the nature of God as a moral Governor; that this requirement is not a mere arbitrary decree, but sets forth the natural and necessary conditions without which salvation cannot be. The sinner

must repent. The sinner *must* believe. This is a breaking away from the dominion of sin and coming to the kingdom of God, together with a rejection of all self-righteousness and a placing all hope for life in the mercies and merits of Jesus Christ. But a sinner, learning thus the nature of this demand and the necessity of these things for salvation, is as far away as before, unless he come also in some way to the knowledge that these very things which are needed are *saving graces*. Veil this great fact and tell him only that he must be found with penitence and faith, as though for these he need look only to himself, and you will teach a hard lesson, and one which he cannot obey: you will put into his mouth the mournful cry, "Oh that I could repent! Oh that I could believe!" It is well for him to learn that cry, that his own weakness may be fully realized, but it is not well to leave him without the remedy. Let him see the grace which gives all graces, that his cry may then be, "Lord, turn my heart! Lord, help my unbelief!"

And so, again, when the sublime doctrine of the soul's *regeneration* is declared, with peculiar and yet greater force will the necessity of grace and the *gracious* character of grace appear. Before this necessity the sinner is placed as at the foot of an exceeding high and precipitous cliff, over which he cannot climb, and yet over which he *must* climb, if he shall ever reach the peaceful homes that are clustered at its summit. Here must at once appear to him the need of Divine work. As in the beginning the Spirit of God brooded over the face of the deep ere creation sprang to being, so must the soul be overshadowed by that Spirit before the generating to a new and better life shall appear within it. Let the sinner be staggered, as was Nicodemus, by the bold assertion, "Ye must be born again." Let all his hopes from self, or man, or worldly deeds, or earthly good, be utterly pulverized and given to the winds by the teaching, "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Verily, the sinner is thus as clay in the hands of the potter. Drive this home to his heart. Make him feel it as the uttermost necessity, out of the deepest sense of his own impotence. But then teach him the blessedness of it. Show him the message of joy that

there is in it. Tell him that this very thing is the gospel of grace, that this, which he cannot do, God can do for him, God is waiting to do for him, God is pleading to be allowed to do for him. Let him hear the voice of grace, saying, "Turn ye unto me—and I will take the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh."

Once more, the sinner is taught that there rests upon him a great *responsibility*, that he is responsible for the mire of his own soul. Duty, as pointing to the laying sin aside and following the commands of God—duty, as declaring the perfect purity of God's law by which he should live and by which he shall be judged—duty, as urging him to penitence and faith in Christ—this duty is at all times and in every way shown. He never can get away from its obligation. And yet this duty is a thing, which, all burdened by sin and chained by habit as he is, the sinner cannot fulfil. Essaying it, as many do, unaided by any help outside of himself, he fails utterly and miserably. Still obligation, not measured by present ability of sinners, remains; for the law is not responsible for the weakness which sin has made the heritage of man, neither is grace responsible for the loss of those who refuse to accept its power. The word remains, and man is still a moral agent, responsible for his choice and for his actions. But notwithstanding this presence of great obstacles and this burdening with undischarged obligation, the use of his free agency is not lost. Because the obligation *is* greater than his ability, simply because of this humbling fact, is there room for the operation of grace. Otherwise there were no need for its approach. But now there is room for it: and grace has come and offers to the sinner the help, the strength, the wisdom, which he lacks. Human agency shall thus find its field of action, of successful and heaven-bringing action, in the acceptance of the grace, and through grace the attempting and achieving duty. Through that shall the obligation be met, and the duty be done, and the sinner shall do it, and yet not he, but grace that dwelleth in him. So let the sinner understand that grace stands before him as a strength to be received of him. Let him understand that he, having on him the burden of great duty, yet oppressed with great weakness, responsible before God and his own conscience

for the performance of that duty, may do it, may be more than a conqueror, simply by taking the grace which Christ brings to his very touch. To this poor, weak, feeble sinner, speak of this sufficient grace. Describe it in such perfect form, such fulness of Divine means, such abundance of Divine power, such beauty and attractiveness of Divine love, that he cannot turn away, that he must take this grace to his own soul, and so have life. Make him know that the highest use of his own moral agency and the best following of true reason are found in that act wherein he casts himself, with all his sin and with all his weakness, at the feet of Jesus, to receive life from grace alone.

Thus may the grace of God be made to appear the concluding lesson of every doctrine which concerns the awakening and conversion of sinners, so that the conviction of its need and of the soul's dependence on it shall be the first result in the hearer. We have the gospel of the grace of God, and in every line of it you may read the distinct utterance of its mercy and love for sinners whelmed in a common ruin. It is not the law we preach alone, but grace. God, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, displays the soul-attracting charms of his grace, that by its power souls may be drawn to him and saved from the outer darkness. When he would overthrow the stiff-necked and rebellious, he casts the thunderbolts of his condemnation, but when he would win souls to his heaven and his love, he speaks in words of tenderest warning coupled with the language of earnest invitation. He tells of a love that is beyond all price, of a tender mercy that is over all his works. He sends his Son, and the cross is set up on Calvary, and

> "Sweeter sounds were never heard,
> Than Mercy utters from the cross."

Therefore let them echo and re-echo in the sinner's ears; let them seem the melodies of heaven sung in rapturous strains to golden harps, till the soul is charmed by the celestial music and subdued unto the grace of God and the cross of Christ.

The trouble with many souls is that they have not this conviction, nor anything like it. There is confusion in the mind.

A part of one truth is apprehended—a mere shred of another. They have an anxiety for salvation and they try to obtain it. They have a thought of their weakness and of their need of Divine help, while at the same time they expect to find saving influences in some work or exercise of their own. Grace seems to them as indeed a gift of God, a gift which has sent the Saviour, which will bring salvation at the end, will save from hell and lead to heaven, but it does not appear to them as a gift of God for the present weakness, and sinfulness, and miserable condition of their souls. It is not the grace which bringeth all things. They are casting about for something which shall assure to them the grace which they deem shall operate only in the future. And so, thus misapprehending the truth, they grope in the darkness, and are often content at last to give up all search in the unfounded and unscriptural hope, that at some time grace will find them and drag them into salvation and heaven, as the captive is bound by his pursuers. They need to know that grace has *already* found them; that here it is, all around and about them; that it is grace with which they have been striving; that grace speaks from the word and from the cross; that it calls by the conscience and the Spirit of God; that it brings good for present need, help for repentance and for faith, life for present living as well as life in the hour of death. They need to have this conviction wrought within them, so that at all times and in every way, for all spiritual good, for regeneration, for repentance, for faith, for all true service, they shall, and must, depend upon the grace of God, and upon that alone. They need to understand, that salvation is from God; that eternal life, begun here and continued hereafter, is of grace; root and branch, and flower and fruit, all are of grace, and grace of God. And then forced to the uttermost of self-renunciation and of self-abasement by this truth, they need to know that a sincere prayer is the key that unlocks for any soul the treasury of such transcendent blessing. Thus taught, the sinner will learn that grace is not a thing afar off, but a thing to be laid hold of here and now; that it is not a thing to be feebly hoped for, or to be feared, with despondent tremblings, but a blessing brought to the soul by the Giver of all good, so that

the sinner may come boldly to the throne of grace, to obtain mercy and find grace to help in every time of need.

Therefore, may we thus preach grace to the sinner, grace which for its other name has—Christ. We can strive to present to his mind and heart this vision of its nature. We may preach grace for all wants of human souls, to lead them from darkness to the light of God, to make their weakness strength, and to turn sinners unto the faithful following of Jesus Christ. Grace is given for this ministry, wherein we are ambassadors for Christ, praying of sinners in Christ's stead that they be reconciled to God. Preaching this gospel of reconciliation, we would bring forth the headstone thereof, with shoutings, crying, "Grace, grace unto it"; and before this power of the Lord Jesus Christ shall the great mountain become a plain, and souls that have groped in darkness shall behold a light shining "on the path which leads them to the Lamb."

Art. V.—*The British Churches under Cromwell.*

The Reformation in England was not permitted to reach the maturity it sought. Royal authority interposed and stopped its course by absolute prohibition. What the brief reign of Edward VI. effected, and not quite all that, alone was tolerated by Elizabeth. Some things the intervening reign of Mary had undone which her sister was not disposed to restore. The leading reformers who survived the Maryan persecution submitted, though many of them unwillingly, to the policy of Elizabeth, thereby accepting a reformation, which, as compared with that of the Continent and of Scotland, was but halfway. Some declined the Queen's authority in that matter, and together with those who unwillingly submitted, constituted a party of great weight in the Anglican church. A few of them separated from the establishment, but were of small moment in comparison with the number of them who remained in it. After the Roman Catholics had been excluded by the papal excommunication of Elizabeth, the state church contained just those

two parties whose aims were on the one hand to stop the reformation where it was, and on the other, to carry it forward to greater purity. Thus by the arbitrary interference of the great Queen there was constituted a strife in the bosom of the Anglican church which has raged there ever since. Throughout her own reign the spirit of difference increased in intensity. Prelatists, who in the beginning were so few that Parker, the primate, found some difficulty in obtaining proper persons to fill the episcopal places, became, in course of time, and under consistent royal patronage, more numerous and of stronger convictions; while the Puritans maintained their cause by diligent study of their Bibles, by intercourse with the reformers of the Continent and of Scotland, and by associations among themselves which the government did not always penetrate. Among them the Genevan translation of the Bible found special favour. In the time of James I. the Prelatic party retained the ascendency which it had secured under favour of Elizabeth. But his weak despotism both intensified and enfeebled it, by promoting its adoption of preposterous claims, while his harsh treatment of the Puritans prolonged for them the education of adversity. Then why did they not leave the established church? Because they loved it, and were not the less its members in that they desired its greater purity. They held that the advantage of the other party over them was due only to royal favour and acts of parliament. It was entirely consistent with their church-membership to agitate for a change in the laws, which according to their views had biased their church polity and fettered her spiritual progress. The few who had separated had thereby only withdrawn their support from the cause within the church, and brought greater hardships upon themselves; and what good they were to effect did not yet appear. The position of Puritanism within the English church was entirely and nobly consistent with its own aims.

Prelatists, again, as naturally supported the cause of absolute authority in the princes who sided with them, which tendency, the short-sighted policy of the Stuarts turned to the service of their own selfishness, and set aside every guarantee of English freedom. Were the Puritans who stood manfully by the constitutional rights of their countrymen to be regarded

as less true to their national church than that party which sought to ally it with despotism? After more than two generations of wretched misgovernment in that matter, Puritanism had made such progress that a Parliament could not be called without giving organization to its power. The King, at the head of the prelatic party, latterly shunned the conflict with it, and attempted to govern by his own will. But English customs and prescriptive law were not so completely suppressed as to allow of adequate revenue being collected in that way. The evils inflicted by tyranny recoiled upon itself; and when the King stood in need of an army to enforce his unconstitutional measures, he found himself constrained to call a Parliament to provide him with the means. It was certainly not very unnatural that the representatives of an oppressed people should withhold from the tyrant the means of further oppression. True, his immediate object, when the Long Parliament met, was to crush, not England, but the Church of Scotland; but in that Church of Scotland the Puritans recognized their own cause, and knew that every blow which should take effect upon it would damage themselves. In the quarrel which ensued between Charles and the Parliament, the two parties of the English church came to an open separation for the first time. In both Houses, among the lords temporal as well as among the representatives of the people, the Puritan element prevailed; in the latter by an overwhelming majority. Prelacy was abolished, and Presbyterianism, according to the views of the greater number of Puritans, established as the government of the English church, and the bishops excluded from the House of Lords. But the Puritans themselves consisted of two parties, Presbyterian and Independent. Until the Prelatists were overthrown both in battle and in debate, these two were practically one. The completeness of their success opened the way to their division. The Independents were most numerous in the army; the Presbyterians in Parliament. To the former belonged the force of the nation; to the latter the majority of its people. It was the purpose of Parliament, when the war was closed, to disband the army. But that, as its leaders well knew, would have been the humiliation of the Independent party, which, as

they believed, most consistently sustained the true cause of God.

The execution of the King was the work of the Independent party; and in order to put themselves in condition to effect it, they had to break with the Presbyterians in Parliament. After the death of the King the most important persons in the kingdom, by virtue of the places they occupied, were Lenthal, speaker of the House of Commons, and Fairfax, commander-in-chief of the army. But the former had his sphere only in the House. He was nothing out of it; and within it only what the rules of the House made him. And Fairfax, who all along had conceded so much to the superior gifts of his Lieutenant-General, was now disabled by the defeat of the Presbyterian party to which he belonged. The real leader, by the inevitable force of events, was Cromwell, who, although he had not been the first to dare the boldest steps, had consistently moved on at the head of his party, which now, and barely by support of his talents, was in the ascendant. Well for the world that such a man stood where he did at that juncture.

Much difficulty has been needlessly introduced into the character of Cromwell. After his death royalists obtained the public ear, and were sustained by imperious fashion in shaping the history for themselves. It did not suit their purpose to admit that he was truly a Christian, and without that admission his whole public life becomes an enigma. Everything having the colour of honesty about him was to be explained as hypocrisy. And in order to throw upon him the reproach of things which occurred in the natural order of human events, they impute to him a superhuman foreknowledge and laying of plans to promote his own ambition in them, with such skill in disguising, that nobody could ever detect them. Within more recent time research has turned back to the writers of the Commonwealth, and especially to the letters and speeches of Cromwell himself, and now set before us, divested of the false colouring and misrepresentations of royalists, he appears to have been a man of great simplicity and openness. In all his correspondence, not the first trace is to be found of the charlatan. On the contrary, the most indubitable marks of a man who lived near to God, shaken as he laments by the trials of his life, but ever

recurring to the merits of the Saviour. Not a letter from his hand, be it a note of affection to his wife or children, or a report of one of his victories to Parliament, fails to bear this testimony directly or indirectly. If some of his acts were neither wisest nor best, it is not more than incident to human nature; but that all in him which seemed to be Christian was the mere fruit of hypocrisy is inconceivable. They who have asserted it, have either not examined the facts, or been singularly blinded by prejudice. In its essential integrity the spirit of his letters was also that of his public life. The basis of his character was its profound religiousness. If not always uppermost, religion seemed to be always undermost in his thoughts. All things occurred to him in the light of their relations to God. And although tinctured, after the fashion of his day, with Old Testament severity, his religion was of that spirit which none ever learned save of the Lord Jesus Christ. With a university education, but without any pretensions to superior scholarship, his strong native powers readily appropriated the knowledge demanded by his duties; and he said of himself that he always did what was given him to do, to the best of his ability. Deep penetration into the motives of men, quick apprehension of the demands of the present, and great promptness and despatch in business, supplied to him the place of forethought. So readily did he adapt himself to emergency, and so abundant were his resources, that people were sometimes tempted to believe that he had laid a train to create the emergency, for which he seemed so well prepared: and could impute to nothing but hypocrisy his solemn averment to the contrary. But it was always so. His decision never wavered when the crisis came. Without a particle of the histrionic about him, the rapidity and daring of his intuitions sometimes affected himself like inspiration. It was to this that the most questionable as well as the greatest acts of his life were due. In the habit of daily prayer, and of taking special counsel with God in view of great duties, he was prone on rising from his knees, to take the idea which had strong hold of his mind as a voice from heaven: when he warmed in debate and new thoughts flashed before his mind, or in the sudden exigencies of battle, the idea of some brilliant and successful movement

darted before him, he knew not whence; he believed to be of God. But this belief, while it led him into some mistakes, gave a singular elevation and splendor to his genius. With the humility of a Christian, and more than ordinary simplicity of conversation and manner, he conceived of himself as a special instrument of God, under special Divine protection and destination to a certain end.

We are not aware of any verified fact of his public life inconsistent with these elements of his character. That masterly combination of practical judgment, energetic fidelity in duty, with quick and startling intuitions in times of difficulty, and that abiding feeling of supernatural guidance and communion with Deity, constituted such an aggregate of character as the world has seldom seen.

His insight in historical cause and effect was sagacious and far-reaching. No other man of his day has left any evidence to such breadth of statesmanship. He alone, among those concerned in it, seems to have apprehended the true historical importance of the revolution in which he was acting so important a part. It was greatly to the embarrassment of his plans and grief of his spirit, that he could not get men to coöperate with him on the level of his own views. How often did he urge—and often in vain—upon his council and Parliaments that their cause was not that of a party, but of the whole three kingdoms; and in and through them, of the whole Protestant world. "All the honest interests," said he before the Parliament of 1656, "yea, all the interests of the Protestants in Germany, Denmark, Helvetia, and the Cantons, and all the interests of Christendom, are the same as yours. If you succeed, if you succeed well and act well, and be convinced what is God's interest, and prosecute it, you will find that you act for a very great many who are God's own." Such was the spirit of his foreign policy, manifesting itself in protecting Protestants and putting a check upon the aggressions and cruelties of Rome in every direction. At home it was this liberality which procured him abuse from all sides, except from the few, who, like Milton, rightly understood him. He would not narrow himself down to be the champion of any party less comprehensive than the whole Protestant name. Prelacy he

restri ced only in as far as it adhered to the practices of Rome. Men of that day deemed it evidence of hypocrisy, that professing Christianity he did not exclusively defend the interests of one denomination; a charge which has been put into most definite form by one of his French biographers of our own time. "Cromwell's neutrality for forms of worship," writes Villemain, "compared with the fervour which he always affected, would of itself be enough to convict him of hypocrisy. In that fanatical age, faith was never distinct from intolerance, and if Cromwell had been sincere, he would have chosen the sect he preferred to follow."* Another such shallow and malignant remark it would be difficult to quote from any respectable historian touching any character which he must have studied. Cromwell viewed himself as raised up by God to be the defender of evangelical religion under every name, against heathenism in Rome and out of it; but especially in it. And when we consider the state of Europe at that epoch, the idea, far from being a craze of fanaticism, proves to have been one of the grandest conceptions of enlightened statesmanship.

On the Continent, the thirty years' war had just closed in the treaty of Westphalia, and Protestant nations for the first time had secured the recognition of their independence. But the Pope could sanction no treaty stipulations going to derogate from his ancient claims of authority, the vexation and wrath of the Catholics were extreme, and the violence of persecution intensified wherever they retained sway. It was then that the Jesuit order was most active and powerful, instinct with the purpose to exterminate Protestants, and recover by stratagem and oppression what had been lost in open war. Catholic princes supported them or submitted to become the executioners of their designs; and the whole was sustained by the wealth and political weight of Spain. Protestant states on the Continent were small as compared with the great Catholic powers. The alliance with France had carried them to success in the war. But France, though in policy arrayed against the house of Hapsburg, could not be relied upon to support the cause of Protestants. Within her own bounds they were subjected to

* Villemain's Cromwell, ii. 200.

many hardships. The alliance in which a terrible war had bound them being then dissolved, the Protestant states were exposed to the machinations of unscrupulous enemies. Some strong arm was needed in that emergency to secure respect for the conditions of the treaty.

The spirit and purpose of popery coincided with those of the great monarchies of which we have already made mention. Monarchical despotism had been defeated in England, but was not dead there. In France it had been checked in development by regencies and the necessity of alliance with the liberal cause in order to counteract the overbalancing weight of Spain, but was meanwhile slowly making progress to that degree of absolutism, which a few years after Cromwell's death it boldly assumed, when the King declared himself the state. Of this cause also the King of Spain was the principal champion, and his politics were those of his kinsman on the throne of the empire. What else was to be seen beyond those bounds? To the north, Russia, not yet a European power; to the east and south the Turks, then in all their pride of dominion. In the new world, the colonies of the great popish powers were strengthening themselves over the aboriginal inhabitants by measures the most diabolical. The Puritan settlements upon the northern coast were still but few and feeble.

Against such stupendous strongholds of wrong, what could a nation like Denmark or Sweden, or the disjointed states of northern Germany, or Cantons of Switzerland avail; or what could Holland, though then an arm of greater strength? And now, had the regal policy which ruled in the court of the Tudors and Stuarts, and reached its greatest audacity in that of Charles I. been suffered to continue, and add its influence, if not the strength of the British isles, to the side of despotism on the Continent, civil liberty, now distinctly assigned over to the Protestant states, must have gone down in the extinction designed for them.

The treaty of Westphalia would have been strangled in its infancy, but for certain wonderful providences, among which most conspicuous appeared the Commonwealth of England holding all the British isles, for the first time, bound together in one. And he who had so bound them in one and now stood

at their head, their representative to the world, well understood the import of the place he occupied in all these relations. No man elevated to such office ever estimated more justly its demands and responsibilities than Cromwell. The enemy of despotism in all forms, he was equally opposed to the radicalism of the levellers; and earnestly sought to establish the government of his country upon a regular constitutional basis. Repeatedly did he take measures to return the powers which he held to the hands of representatives of the people. The incapacity of their majorities defeated every such plan; and to save all from ruin, he had to resume the whole weight of the trust. The example which he wished to present to the world was that of a regularly constituted freedom. Not permitted so to do by the disorders of the time, it seems that he did the best which remained for him to do. Power had been put into his hands, to return it was impracticable then; but royalty had become synonymous with despotism, and he steadily refused its rank and title, preferring to be called the Protector of the English Commonwealth, in hope that the day might still come when the Protectorate might be laid down, or regulated to an ordinary office, and the commonwealth go on by force of its own constitution. Notwithstanding his anomalous position, he was on one side; kings on the other. However strongly tempted by the actual possession of power, and the offer of regal honours, he would not betray the cause of freedom, which might still emerge in its true colours in his or some other hands.

War, although a sphere in which he was invariably successful, Cromwell never pursued for either the gains or the glory to be obtained by it, not even for civil liberty alone. If he had any model before his mind, it was neither Cæsar nor Brutus, but Joshua, the captain of the armies of the Lord. The same motives which actuated his conduct in church and state, constituted the key to all his military career; that part of it which pertains to Ireland as distinctly as any other. He appeared in Ireland to put an end to an already long continued war; but he also commanded an army which viewed itself as the avenger of unspeakable barbarities practised upon their fellow Protestants. By two terrific blows he almost extinguished opposi-

tion. The rest of the campaign was little more than a triumphant march through the country. Everywhere non-resistants were spared. The men who had commenced hostilities, and conducted them, as long as unopposed by an adequate force, with the most atrocious brutalities upon multitudes of the unoffending, had provoked a retaliation, which, had their enemy been like themselves, would have been tenfold what they suffered. Cromwell's spirit was not cruelty. It was stern, unrelenting, but wise; and in the end proved to be, as we learn from himself at the time, it was intended to be, the most humane.

No other great general ever took less interest in war for its own sake. His object was always to have done with fighting as quick as possible, and to spare the effusion of blood. But he knew what was needed to that end; not only to cow the hearts of cowards, but what it takes to show brave men the unreasonableness of resisting. In a few months he subdued Ireland more completely than any of his predecessors had ever done, and with less blood than had often been shed in a futile insurrection.

In the neighbourhood of a man's strength lies the region of his weakness. Deeply impressed with the conviction that he was specially called by God to the execution of that work which in the order of events he found put into his hands, Cromwell neither felt free to decline the trust, nor questioned his own capacity or success in complying. In his eyes, it was not his own cause, but the cause of God which he served. No doubt seems to have ever subtracted from the energy of his purpose on that point. But although his clear practical sense precluded the dreamy weakness of fanaticism, it did not prevent him from sometimes taking his own cherished plans and earnest desires for the will of God. Ambition, excluded from his mind at every other avenue, entered by this, but without obtaining recognition. To some men ambition is a source of strength, when they fully admit it, and make the attainment of its ends their aim. Alexander and Napoleon openly professed ambition, and yielded all their energies in its promptings without reserve; and it answered the purpose of concentrating their efforts. To Cromwell it was weakness. For when he gave

way to it, in any instance, it was as a Christian gives way, half unawares, to a strong temptation. It divided for the time being his otherwise far loftier aim. The unprejudiced student of his public career will find facts which suggest the operation of ambition, but not one which can be imputed to that motive alone. Dealing fairly with the subject, he will discover that Cromwell's motive, as known to himself, was something very different. His assenting to the Parliamentary purge, his taking part in the execution of the King, and dissolution of the Long Parliament, have been considered as the most questionable of his public acts, and those into which ambition entered most largely. They were certainly to him the occasion of power, but the cause of weakness, throwing government into his hands, but alienating the body of the people from him, the latter a weakness which would have been fatal, but for the devotion of the army. And yet, even in those cases, he must be a superficial thinker, who does not perceive that there were motives at work with which ambition had little to do—overmastering necessities which make it difficult to conceive of how Cromwell could have taken any other course that would have turned out better. The charge of hypocrisy reiterated against him by royalist writers, but never established in a single instance, later and more critical investigation has finally exploded.

By advocates of the restoration he was persistently represented, or rather misrepresented, as Luther was by papists. Between the two men there is much resemblance in the main; the same was their gradual progress with the progress of events; the same their strong grasp of truth, often in defiance of the ordinary means of reaching it; the same their practical good sense and power in holding a check upon extreme radicalism, as well as in conducting vast and varied designs of reform, and the same self consecration to a special calling in the cause of God. But the piety of the Protector is more consistently reverential than that of the Reformer. Luther occasionally made unduly free with sacred language, Cromwell, never.

In that most valuable of all powers in a ruler, discrimination of character in selecting fit men for places of office and trust, Cromwell has never been surpassed. In this matter he suffered himself to be biased by no party, sect, or relationship. General

Ireton was his son-in-law. But Ireton rose side by side with himself, the nearest rival of his own power both in the army and in Parliament. General Fleetwood was also a son-in-law, but not until he had earned his rank and reputation, and the wars of the commonwealth on British soil were closed. A similar remark will apply to his brother-in-law, General Desborough, whose place in the army was independent of any relationship of affinity to the Protector. And when to these names we add those of Harrison, Lambert, Rainsborough, Monck, Goffe, Whalley, Ludlow, and others, we shall be ready to say that such a roll of officers in command of her forces England never saw before. At sea, the men whom he put or retained in office, did, with little exception, equal credit to his judgment. If Penn and Venables did not satisfy his own expectations of them, England has had no reason to complain. For they added to her dominion the valuable island of Jamaica. And the career of Blake surpasses in brilliant daring and success everything in naval history except that of Nelson. From these men he chose his confidential advisers, and added to them some of the wisest and most learned civilians of the age. The gifted Thurloe became his secretary of state, Milton his foreign, or Latin secretary, the learned Whitelocke commissioner of the exchequer, and Sir Matthew Hale, lord chief justice. And in the regulation of the universities and of the affairs of the church, his selection of leading men was no less judicious. Dr. John Owen he set over the university of Oxford, in which he also assigned the headship of colleges to Goodwin and Wilkins. In Cambridge, Cudworth, Arrowsmith, and Lightfoot owed their places to his patronage or appointment, as well as all others who distinguished those institutions in his time. For the benefit of the northern counties of England, he also erected and endowed a college in Durham, which, abandoned at the Restoration, has, like some other plans of his, been revived of later years. But it was for the purifying, regulating, and support of the church that his most anxious thoughts and most careful attentions were expended.

At the time of the King's death the state of the church in England was still unsettled. Episcopacy had been abolished by authority of Parliament. The Assembly at Westminster,

called to assist in church matters, had drawn up and recommended a Presbyterian system of doctrine, discipline, worship, and government; and the whole had been enacted by Parliament as the law of the land. Accordingly England and Wales had been divided ecclesiastically into provinces, and these again into classes, each of which contained a number of parishes, subject respectively to the authority of parochial, classical, and provincial assemblies: the first to meet once a week, the second once a month, the third twice a year, and, crowning the system, national assemblies were to meet as often as summoned by Parliament. But many difficulties had occurred in carrying out that order. A large number of the people clung to the ancient practice, as far as it was allowed, and did not understand, or did not like the new. Many of the ministers resisted it or imperfectly complied. Some deeming it an unscriptural radicalism, preferred in their hearts the Episcopal forms; others holding it to be not radical enough, demanded that the ultimate authority should be reposed in each congregation, and could take little interest in attending either classical or provincial councils; and others whose hearts were not profoundly engaged in religion, reluctated against the strictness of its discipline. Only in London, which was one of the ecclesiastical provinces, and in Lancashire, was it observed fully and consistently.

Presbyterians themselves further aggravated the evil by their own dissensions, and by an unnecessary urgency on the point of Divine right. Not content with the establishment of their church government, they insisted that the public and Parliament, by authoritative action, should recognize it as alone possessed of the Divine sanction, or as alone expressly and completely revealed under the gospel. Gratuitous offence was thereby given to many who would otherwise gladly have complied with it as consistent with Scripture.

In this excited transition state in the abolishing of the old system, and imperfect enforcing of the new, many congregations were greatly neglected, and improper persons either allowed to remain in pastoral charge of them, or introduced without sufficient scrutiny; and that not from neglect or carelessness, but from the nature of the circumstances.

Political complications increased the difficulty. Scotland and Geneva had furnished the Presbyterian model; and the Solemn League and Covenant with the former was much relied on for support. In the first instance, and for two or three years, it was a tower of strength. But in 1648 the Scotch also divided on the question of restoring the King, and the high royalist party obtaining the majority in their Parliament, sent an army into England to compel the English Parliament into their measures. Defeated by Cromwell, that invasion failed of its object; but was not without effect, reviving in the English breast the ancient dislike of Scotchmen, and alienating largely the adherents of the League and Covenant.

In the meanwhile subordinate sects had grown up or increased. Of these the strongest in learning and intellect, if not numbers, were the Independents. Not yet constituting a separate body or ecclesiastical connection, they were only variants or dissentients within the Presbyterian establishment. It was not until after the death of Cromwell that they came out with a confession of their own, which, after all, differed so little, except in government, from that of Westminster, that it soon fell into neglect. Other variations were created by the Baptists and Erastians, and the founders of the Society of Friends were beginning to attract public notice, and other differences of opinion were laying the foundations for sects which had yet taken no shape. All these, together with a greater number of repressed Episcopalians, were contained within the bosom of the newly established Presbyterian church, but not recognized as having any right to toleration. The greatest excitement of feeling, over all three kingdoms, intensified the tenacity with which conflicting opinions were adhered to and defended. Religion, politics, and local and national prejudices and interests heated and aggravated one another. English, Irish, Scotch, Welsh passions were excited to the utmost by designing leaders, and friends of the King arrayed in deadly animosity against his enemies. Well for the two nations most intimately connected that a real interest in religion, a practically working religion, entered so deeply into the heart of all their purposes, and swayed so much the conduct of their lives. Who shall be found equal to allay the public ferment, and reduce the dis-

cordant elements to harmony? Arduous would have been the task for a government unshaken in itself, and with all its machinery in full operation; what must it be to that fragment of the House of Commons, which has now assumed the burden alone? Nay, even to sustain itself would have been impracticable to that body, but for the coöperation of the army. And the strength of the army was that remarkable man who, without being its commander-in-chief, was morally and virtually the head of it.

The problem to be solved was new. At a time when monarchy was in the full blossom of its power and pride, and passive obedience to kings, as the anointed of the Lord, was the doctrine of the high and the burden of the low, the representatives of the people of England had resisted their monarch, brought him to trial before a court of commoners, and on the fundamental principles of justice had condemned him as a guilty man. The deed was not done secretly, nor timidly, but open, held up, as a lesson to the world, inviting examination and challenging its criticism. Men who took that unprecedented step must have felt well assured of the ground on which they stood. The laws which they contemplated were not the superficial and conventional. All such they obviously designed to subject to a thorough revision. The principles of the English constitution, and beneath them still, the eternal laws of right and wrong, alone did those men regard with veneration; and by the latter were even the practices of the constitution to be tried. In their eyes, the problem was one of radical revolution. This being admitted, it is not to the point to question them for non-conformity to prescriptive rule or mere statute law. They were now in the condition of lawgivers, empowered to abolish the old, and create new. If it were asked, who empowered them, the answer would readily be, the people of England, who had elected them to the places which they held, sustained them in the course they had pursued, and backed them with an army of their very best and bravest: and the doctrines by which they were guided, they drew from Scripture, and were always ready to defend thereby. True, the body of the nation had enjoyed no opportunity of publicly

approving or disapproving of their recent action, but they claimed to hold their commission from it.

On the abolition of the old government there was little difference of opinion among them; there was more as to what should be the form of the new. An executive was to be created. What shall it be? A committee? A presiding officer? Or shall Parliament itself be the executive of its own decrees? Shall the nobility be admitted to represent themselves as a separate interest? Then the judiciary, which, under the rule of the late King and his predecessor, had been deliberately and persistently corrupted, had to be revised theoretically and practically, and set up anew. The dissensions of political parties had to be kept in check; the recently established church had to be sustained and its organization carried forward, and the fiercely conflicting sects in its bosom, reconciled or kept in order. Preparations had to be made to encounter war from the side of Ireland and of Scotland, as well as the restless machinations of royalists within their own country, and backed by the navies of Holland. Never did greater dangers threaten the existence of a government than those which were now arrayed against that remnant of the English House of Commons. A sense of guilt would have succumbed. They, fully convinced that their cause was right, braced themselves to defend it. And their confidence was well-founded. For theirs was not a backward movement to take up an obsolete or decaying practice; but forward in the line of Christian development. They might mistake as to means, their own feet might not reach the goal, but their aim was true, and the direction that from which success must ultimately come.

The above questions were answered by declaring the government of England to be a free commonwealth. Its administration was to be committed to an executive council without a king; Parliament to consist of the representatives of the people, without a House of Lords; and three keepers of the new great seal were appointed from whom the judges were to receive their commissions. The executive was to consist of forty or thirty-eight persons, and to hold the reins of sovereignty for one year. And instead of the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, which were abolished, one was drawn up called the Engagement,

which obligated to be true and faithful to the government, as thus constituted.

That new oath was conceived in a "spirit of liberality hitherto unknown to English statesmen, and presented no bar to the occupation of office by religionists of all complexions and parties. It provided simply for the civil obedience of the subject, offering no violence to conscience, imposing no religious test, presenting no temptation to hypocrisy."*

Presbytery was declared to be the national church government in the three kingdoms and the principality of Wales; while liberal toleration was extended to all orderly Protestant sects. Romanists suffered many hardships, being excluded from offices in the service or gift of the government, but were not prevented from conducting their worship.

To support the church thus established it was resolved that the tithes should be continued as before, until some other maintenance equally good could be provided. The sequestered Bishop's lands were committed to trustees to be applied to the increase of poor livings in the church, and a similar disposition was made of other ecclesiastical revenues formerly payable to the crown. Provision was thereby made for the payment also of schoolmasters and professors in the universities. Moderate Episcopalians submitted to the new establishment, and many of their ministers served in it, as Puritans had formerly submitted to Episcopacy. But those who refused the Engagement, were thereby excluded. And to that class belonged also a great many Presbyterians, who had the best reason to be friendly to the Commonwealth. But they regarded it as a usurpation, and thought that the Engagement was inconsistent with their natural allegiance to the royal family, and with the Solemn League and Covenant, and that to tolerate the sectaries was to open the door to schism and all iniquity. Independents took the Engagement readily, because under it they were not to be molested for their religion; "and so did the King's old cavaliers, very few of them," as Baxter says, "being sick of the disease of a scrupulous conscience."

War threatened the young republic from the side of Scot-

* Choules's note to Neal, part iv. chap. i.

land; it was already raging in Ireland. To the latter country Cromwell was sent, and left England in July, 1649. He returned in May of the next year, to undertake the campaign against the Scotch, who had proclaimed Charles Stuart their king, invited him to their country and taken up arms in his cause. Cromwell entered Scotland in the latter part of July, 1650. Then followed the battle of Dunbar, the taking of Edinburgh, the coronation of Charles as King of Scotland, his march into England, and defeat at Worcester, September 3, 1651, and his escape to the Continent. This finished the civil wars of the Commonwealth. For the remnants of resistance were thenceforward hopeless, and endured only a short time. England, Scotland, and Ireland were now united by the strong bands of military force, and for the first time completely covered by the authority of one ruling power, and governed from London.

Parliament now began to contemplate its own dissolution, which was appointed to take place on the fourth of November, 1654. The interval was to be employed in confirming the new institutions, and settling the qualifications of its successor. But many other matters, and especially the maritime war with the Dutch, imperatively demanded a large share of attention, and dissatisfaction arising both among the people and in the army, Parliament, long before the arrival of the day by itself appointed, was brought to a premature end. Cromwell, who, since the resignation of Fairfax, had been commander-in-chief of the army, was all this time, by force of his character and office, the principal man of the nation; and upon him, by a sort of intuitive consent, had all parties concentrated the responsibilities of government.

The Commonwealth was in a prosperous condition, and rising in European importance; but its domestic opponents were many. Taxes were heavy, public dissatisfaction great, and many were the appeals to the military officers to interfere. Members of Parliament had not escaped corruption from their extraordinary success. They were accused of applying to their own use an undue proportion of the revenue. And while appropriating to themselves the fruits of victory they proposed to disband, or transfer to the fleet, the soldiers who had won

them, without providing for the large arrears of pay which were then due. A petition was presented by the officers of the army for a reform of the law, for carrying forward the purification of the church, for removal of scandalous and incompetent persons from offices of state, and especially for a real representative Parliament. Month after month were these topics agitated without any conclusion being reached. A serious quarrel thereupon arose between the Parliament and the army, in the midst of which word was brought to Cromwell that the former were discussing a resolution to dissolve at an earlier date than had previously been determined, and so to prescribe the constitution of a new Parliament, as to retain themselves in it, and constitute themselves electors of it, thereby designing to perpetuate their existing policy. The Lord-General immediately took a file of infantry, and proceeding to the Parliament house, turned the members out of doors. That act, accomplished by a scene not less grotesque than it was momentous, although hardly to be defended even upon revolutionary principles, was highly popular in its time. The soldiers approved it. It was in defence of their cause. The royalists were glad of it. It was the overthrow of their old enemy. And Presbyterians did not regret the removal of rulers who had despised the Solemn League and Covenant.

Cromwell, with his council of officers, now took upon themselves to convoke a new Parliament. One hundred and forty persons were selected from the wisest and most consistent Christians of their respective districts, some of them men of historical eminence; but after a brief session, in which little was done, they resigned their powers to the hands of the Lord-General and dissolved. The country thus again left without a government, what was to be done? Four days afterwards, December 16, 1653, the officers of the army, the mayor and aldermen of London, and the commissioners of the Great Seal, caused to be read publicly an *instrument* which they had drawn up, creating Cromwell "Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland," with a council which should not exceed twenty-one, nor be less than thirteen, granting to them the rights of sovereignty, and the power to make laws during the intervals of Parliament, and stipulating that a

Parliament should be called every three years, the first to assemble on the third of the following September. On the same occasion, on which the "Instrument" was read, Cromwell was solemnly inducted into office. And this act of a few was, three years and a half later, confirmed and repeated in a manner still more impressive by the second Protectoral Parliament, as the representatives, and in the name of, the people of England.

In this new state of the revolution Presbyterianism continued to maintain its place as the established church, the laws in relation to it, as such, "were not to be suspended, altered, abrogated, or repealed," while the doctrine of toleration was more clearly defined and more fully stated. The following paragraphs are the 36th, 37th, and 38th articles of the "Instrument."

"That none shall be compelled to conform to the public religion by penalties or otherwise; but that endeavours be used to win them by sound doctrine, and the example of a good conversation.

"That such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ, though differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship, or discipline publicly held forth, shall not be restrained from, but shall be protected in the profession of their faith and exercise of their religion, so as they abuse not this liberty to the civil injury of others, and to the actual disturbance of the public peace on their parts: provided this liberty be not extended to popery or prelacy, or to such as, under a profession of Christ, hold forth and practice licentiousness.

"That all laws, statutes, ordinances, and clauses in any law, statute, or ordinance, to the contrary of the aforesaid liberty, shall be esteemed null and void."

The exception made to the prejudice of Episcopalians was more in law than in practice, and more because they were royalists than for their religion. Although not enjoying legal toleration, their assemblies were connived at; and all their clergy who refrained from taking active part in royalist plots were indulged in the exercise of their ministry, and preached publicly in the churches, both in London and in the country. It is fully admitted by Bishop Kennet, (Neal, ii. 136,) "that

the Protector was for liberty, and the utmost latitude to all parties, so far as consisted with the peace and safety of his person and government." (Neal, ii. 158.) Mr. Baxter, a strong Presbyterian adversary of Cromwell, also testifies "that all men were suffered to live quietly, and enjoy their properties under his government: that he removed the terrors and prejudices which hindered the success of the gospel, especially considering that godliness had countenance and reputation as well as liberty, whereas before, if it did not appear in all the fetters and formalities of the times, it was the way to common shame and ruin. It is well known that the Presbyterians did not approve of the usurpation, but when they saw that Cromwell's design was to do good in the main, and encourage religion, as far as his cause would admit, they acquiesced."

Various causes conspired to render it impossible, at that time, to grant free toleration to Romanists. For they were not only dissenters in religion, but enemies to the whole Protestant connection, the subjects of a foreign prince ready to accept every occasion of hostilities. Cromwell would suffer no man to be molested for his religious belief, as long as he contained himself within the proper sphere of religion. But he would not allow the clergy of any denomination to turn their meetings into means of organizing resistance to the national government: and wherever such a disposition showed itself it was immediately suppressed. Although an Independent, he sustained and defended the Presbyterian establishment.

Even before the dissolution of the little Parliament, he had been engaged in devising measures for giving more effect to the organization of the church; and for purifying it from incompetent or otherwise improper ministers. His first step towards that end was taken on the twentieth of March, 1654, in the appointment of a commission for the trial of public preachers. It consisted of nine laymen and twenty-nine clergymen, selected from the Presbyterians, Independents, and Baptists, with special view to their prudence, sagacity, and sound Christian experience. By those Triers, as they were called, "any person pretending to hold a church living, or levy tithes, or clergy dues in England," was first to be tried and approved.

A second step in the process, taken in the following August,

consisted in appointing local commissioners of both clergy and laymen, from fifteen to thirty in each county of England, whose duty it was "to inquire into 'scandalous, ignorant, insufficient,' and otherwise deleterious ministers of the gospel," and to be a tribunal for judging and ejecting them. Persons thus ejected, if married, were to be allowed a small pension. In the selection of the triers Cromwell did not seem to care whether they were his political supporters or opponents, provided only they had the proper intellectual and spiritual qualifications. It was a singular plan, but wrought well, and received the approval of some good men who were no friends to its author. "Because this assembly of Triers," says Baxter, "is most heavily accused and reproached by some men, I shall speak the truth of them, and suppose my word will be taken, because most of them took me for one of their boldest adversaries: the truth is, though some few over-rigid and over-busy Independents among them were too severe against all that were Arminians, and too particular in inquiring after evidences of sanctification in those whom they examined, and somewhat too lax in admitting of unlearned and erroneous men, that favoured antinomianism, and anabaptism; yet, to give them their due, they did abundance of good to the church. They saved many a congregation from ignorant, ungodly, drunken teachers, that sort of men who intend no more in the ministry than to read a sermon on Sunday, and all the rest of the week go with the people to the ale-house, and harden them in sin: and that sort of ministers who either preached against a holy life, or preached as men that were never acquainted with it; these they usually rejected, and in their stead admitted of any that were able, serious preachers, and lived a godly life, of what tolerable opinion soever they were; so that though many of them were a little partial for the Independents, separatists, fifth monarchy men, and anabaptists, and against the Prelatists and Arminians, yet so great was the benefit above the hurt which they brought to the church, that many thousands of souls blessed God for the faithful ministers whom they let in, and grieved when the Prelatists afterwards cast them out again."

The Triers were concerned only with the established church, and the ministers whom they rejected were not thereby deprived

of religious liberty; they were only denied the privileges of the national ministry. The commission continued to sit at Whitehall until the year 1659, after which it was discontinued.

Still further to distribute the force of government over the country, and secure the regular working of minor appointments in both church and state, the Protector, in the year 1655, divided England into ten districts, placing in each, with the title of Major-General, a man most carefully chosen, of real wisdom, fearing God, and of unimpeachable integrity. These officers were invested with a universal superintendence, civil, military, and ecclesiastical. They were to take care that the taxes were collected, to inquire after the private assemblies of suspected persons, and such as frequented taverns and gaming houses, and after scandalous and unlearned ministers and schoolmasters, and to aid the commission in ejecting them. And they were ordered to enlist a body of reserves, at half pay, who might be called together upon any sudden emergency. There was no appeal from the Major-General, except to the Protector himself. This also was an extraordinary device, and might have proved oppressively despotic, but that it was honestly meant for good, and conducted by wise and good men; and, like that of the Triers, wrought well. Of the Major-Generals, Cromwell said, in his speech to the Parliament of 1656, "They have been effectual for the preservation of peace," and in reference to the plan, "it hath been more effectual towards the discountenancing of vice and settling religion, than anything done these fifty years: I will abide by it, notwithstanding the envy and slander of foolish men." But as the state of the country became more satisfactory, he reduced the power of the Major-Generals, and finally, when he thought them no longer needed, suppressed them.

In Scotland there was almost perfect harmony in sustaining the Presbyterian church, which by accepting the works of the Westminster Assembly in 1647, and adopting the Directory for the election of ministers, in 1649 completed its form and organization. The people were also well agreed on the subject of royalty, and upon the death of Charles I. proclaimed his son Charles their king. But what had one time had been their bond of union, now proved to be a cause of dissension. The

national covenant was turned into a religious test; and subscription made indispensable to the holding of any place in the service of the country. Covenanters moreover divided among themselves. When their young king arrived among them, one party insisted upon his subscribing immediately, in order to secure the political effect; another, perceiving the laxity of his character, urged that he ought not to subscribe until, after carefully reflecting, he might be able to do so religiously. Charles preferred to subscribe at once; and thereby convinced the more earnest thinkers of his insincerity. During the war, which ensued with Cromwell, Parliament passed certain resolutions repealing those acts which had confined all public offices to the hands of Covenanters. Against these resolutions the stricter party protested. And the quarrel between Resolutioners and Protesters marred the peace of the church and involved it in civil broils. The General Assembly, which met in July 1652, was so agitated by these causes that it broke up, and its acts were never recorded. Cromwell deemed it best that the scene should not be repeated; and when in July of the next year the ministers came together again, an officer of the army appeared among them and inquired by whose authority they met, that of Charles or of the Protector? The question was pertinent. Because the General Assembly of the church of Scotland meets by authority of the crown. As those delegates could show no such authority, they were escorted by a body of soldiers a mile out of town, and directed to return to their respective homes. General Assembly was suspended during the rest of the Protectorate. It was the only violence used by Cromwell towards the Church of Scotland. In nothing else did it suffer interruption. Synods and Presbyteries continued to meet as formerly; and although Resolutioners persisted in praying for the King, no force was applied to prevent them.

As in England, so in Scotland, means were taken by Cromwell to protect the interests of true religion. Mr. Patrick Gillespie and some others of the stricter party received a commission empowering them to settle the affairs of the church and secure its purity. The spiritual profit soon became obvious. A degree of civil peace prevailed, "beyond what had almost ever before been experienced." A quiet, but pervasive revival

of religion, filled up the rest of the Protectorate in Scotland. "I verily believe," says Kirkton, "there were more souls converted to Christ in that short period of time than in any season since the Reformation, though of triple its duration."

Soon after the death of the King, a commission was appointed to regulate the affairs of the church in South Wales, and another in North Wales. The spiritual destitution of the Principality was great. Constant and godly ministers were few and much persecuted. The greater number either did not live in their parishes, or were incompetent, scandalous, and negligent of their cures. Vigorous measures were taken by the commissioners to remove the evils. But so many persons were concerned in them, that they met with much resistance and misrepresentation. As it was difficult to find a sufficient number of pious and learned ministers able to preach in the Welsh language, itinerant preachers, six for each county, were appointed to supply the deficiency, until the number equal to the parishes could be filled up. In the poverty of many of the parishes, the commissioners encountered another embarrassment, which the brief duration of the Protectorate did not give them time to entirely overcome.

Ireland was geographically divided among the great religious parties, the Presbyterians being principally residents of Ulster, the Episcopalians of the eastern side of the island, and the Romanists of all the rest. Although the last were by far the most numerous, yet Episcopacy had from the Reformation been the established religion. It ceased to be such under the action of the Long Parliament in January, 1643. The Solemn League and Covenant extended also to Ireland, and was gladly accepted by the Presbyterians there. The terrors of the Popish rebellion had constrained Protestants of every name to make common cause. Wiser had it been for them had they done so more consistently. A fearful array of cruelties were accumulated in those years for the soldiers of Cromwell to avenge upon the Romanist Irish. Presbyterians and Episcopalians alike were almost entirely swept from the North, and greatly thinned in the East. Cromwell compelled the Catholics to submission, confined them to one part of the island, and filled the land taken from them with a more orderly and

industrious population. In the new prosperity which succeeded, the church participated. Settlers from Scotland replanted Presbytery in the north, and from England recruited Episcopacy and Independency on the east and south. The rule of the Protector extended toleration to all. Presbyterians being few could reap little advantage from the position of their church as the establishment of the consolidated Commonwealth. But under the Lieutenancy of Major-General Fleetwood, and still more of Henry Cromwell, the long-harassed country enjoyed an interval of wise and benign government, "when the churches had rest throughout all the land, and increased in number daily." It was then that Presbyterianism first assumed its proper form in the province of Ulster, and had great prosperity until the reign of oppression opened again with the restoration of the monarchy.

In New England, the colonists were allowed to establish congregationalism, as the government of their choice. A scheme was also projected for carrying the gospel to the North American Indians, which the death of the Protector prevented from going into operation.

It was the purpose of Cromwell to constitute the British church the centre of a confederation of all the Protestant churches of Europe. His plan, according to Bishop Burnet, was matured, and contemplated common defence against Rome, propagation of the gospel, and the employment of secretaries to hold "correspondence everywhere, to acquaint themselves with the state of religion all over the world, that so all good designs for the welfare of the whole, and of the several parts, might by their means be protected and encouraged." Though this was also defeated by his death, his administration put England into such a relation to the Protestant churches of the Continent as she did not again assume until the reign of William III. In this, as in many other respects, the Revolution was the true successor of the Commonwealth, less earnest and daring, but more cautious and expedient.

In all previous English history religion and politics had been so intimately intermingled as to be practically inseparable. Cromwell was the first to set the example of discriminating truly between them. Attempts to compel all into one form of

profession and worship had resulted in dividing the church and creating deadly animosities. Under the free toleration of the Commonwealth all sects lived together peacefully. The lesson, poorly learned by the party which came next into power, was not forgotten by sounder thinkers; and when, upon the downfall of the Stuart kings, the government was remodeled, Cromwell's doctrine of toleration was incorporated into the constitution; and although the church was still connected with the state, the separation between religion and politics, as far as then practicable, was also revived.

The Commonwealth passed away, and its work for a whole generation seemed to be utterly undone; but its leading doctrines are those which are appointed not to die, its efforts were in the line of Christian progress, and even its errors have proved of most salutary warning to succeeding reformers. It was the generative epoch of that religious freedom which revived at the revolution, and operating to the present day in the British churches, has found a more congenial and fuller development on this side of the Atlantic.

ART. VI.—*Bibliotheca Sacra and Biblical Repository for July* 1863*; Art. III. Doctrines of the New-School Presbyterian Church.* By Rev. GEORGE DUFFIELD, D. D., Detroit, Michigan.

THE Plan of Union proposed by the Joint-Committee requires that the Confession of Faith be adopted in "its fair historical sense, as it is accepted by the two bodies." We know what its "fair historical sense" is, both in itself, and as it is accepted in the Old-school body. But its "historical sense" as accepted by the New-school body is equally to be legalized; and clearly to this extent, that no minister or office-bearer who holds it, in that sense, can be molested in, or refused admission to, the united body, without breach of covenant. It is therefore a chief test in regard to the merits of this proposed Plan of Union, if we can ascertain what the "fair historical sense" of these standards, as accepted by the New-school body, has been,

and is. On this subject we are able to refer to authority of the highest kind, which ought immediately to be laid before our church.

The *Bibliotheca Sacra* has, for some years, been publishing a series of articles from men in the different Christian denominations, selected with special reference to their known qualifications for the work, giving an account of the doctrine and polity of the several churches to which they respectively belong. This was done in order to obtain a presentation of the faith and practice of these several communions, as understood and acknowledged by their own members. The Rev. George Duffield, D. D., of Detroit, Michigan, was procured to do this service for the New-school Presbyterian body. Probably, in view of his antecedents, and present position, his known ability, his participation in the controversies which led to the disruption, and his intimate acquaintance with the growth and spirit of this church of his love, no truer witness, or better expounder of its doctrine and spirit could be found. That he more or less misconceives, and so misrepresents or caricatures, Old-school principles, is no argument to the contrary. For this is the genius of New Divinity, inherent in the system. His article is nearly eighty pages long, thoroughly elaborated, and spares no pains to set forth the theology of our New-school brethren to the utmost advantage. It appeared in the No. for July, 1863, and had in view the movement, then initiated, looking towards reunion, and was shaped, as he assures us, with the "hope in doing so, not only to subserve the general cause and interest of theological science, but to promote the reciprocities and courtesies of Christian confidence and fraternal fellowship;" and that "it can be shown that there is in reality no radical difference between Old and New-school Presbyterians," thus furthering "a much desired reunion." What then has he to say of the doctrinal and ecclesiastical views of New-school Presbyterians in this attempted Irenicum?

I. OF THE ACTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF 1837.

These expurgated the Congregational element from our organization, of which Judge Gibson, in the final adjudication of the case, in the civil courts, said, that "the two were as immiscible as oil and water." Dr. Duffield says of these procedures, "They

were in violation of the Constitution, revolutionary in tendency and design, and, establishing a new basis, consummated a plan of secession for the Old-school, from those who maintained the union and government of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America," etc., p. 567. This will do for a first step towards "promoting the reciprocities and courtesies of Christian confidence and fraternal fellowship." Are things ripe for organic reunion with those who, to pave the way for it, think, and feel, and speak thus?

II. Imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity.

Says Dr. Duffield, "The disobedience of Adam was his crime, and rendered him obnoxious to death, its ordained punishment. According to the theological theory of the Old-school, that crime was imputed to his posterity, and being so imputed involved them in his guilt, and rendered them obnoxious to the same punishment, that is death. . . New-school Presbyterians dispense with this and every other theory by which to explain the moral relationship of Adam and his posterity. They receive it as a fact divinely revealed. Preferring the language of common sense to theological technicalities, they are contented to say that, as the result or in consequence of Adam's transgression, his posterity became mortal and morally corrupt." This is precisely what Pelagians say. Thus they utterly reject imputation, as mere groundless human "theory." They prefer what they call "the language of common sense" to the clear "historic sense" of our standards, and the equally clear teachings of Rom. v. 12—21.

The words "physical," "nature," "constitutional," figure so largely in Dr. Duffield's representations of Old-school theology respecting sin and grace, and serve so fully to mystify the whole subject, that it is difficult to present in full force his repudiation of Old Calvinism, without quoting passages in which these words occur. Nor will the emphasis of these appear, unless something is said to clear up the confusion which Taylorites and New Divinity men have, with considerable adroitness and success, contrived to throw about these terms. Dr. Duffield uses them just as Dr. N. W. Taylor was wont to use them. In repudiating hereditary sinfulness, inborn depravity, a principle of sin anterior to, and causative of, sinful acts,

as taught in our Confession, and held by Old-school Presbyterians, they stigmatize it as a doctrine of *physical* depravity, inherent in our *constitution*, *faculties*, *nature*, *as created by God*. And they denounce the correlate doctrine logically flowing from this, and taught in the Bible and our standards, viz., that regeneration is the removal of this corrupt principle, and the implantation of a new principle of life and holiness, as "physical" regeneration, a change in the constitutional faculties, &c.; also as being wrought by the exercise of God's mere "physical" omnipotence. Of this evidence enough will appear as we proceed.

Now, for our present purpose, it is sufficient to observe, that the word "nature," φύσις, and, perhaps, in a less degree, the word "constitution," as related to these subjects, is used in a threefold sense. First, for human nature unfallen as it came from the hands of God in the creation of our first parents. Secondly, for that nature as fallen and morally corrupted in the fall of our first parents. Thirdly, for those essential faculties and properties which belong to man as such, whether fallen or unfallen, in the absence of which he is no longer man. Now when our Confession and Old-school divines speak of "corrupted nature," or "principle," and use other like phrases, they mean it not in the first or third, but the second of these meanings. And they hold that there is such a sinful vitiosity of nature derived from the fall of the first man to all descending from him by ordinary generation; which nothing but the Almighty power of God can remove in regeneration. Herein they follow the Scriptures, which declare that we are "by nature, φύσει, children of wrath;" meaning thereby not our original nature as made upright by God, nor yet the essence of human nature as it exists in man fallen and unfallen: but nature as corrupted by the fall, and dead in sin. Since the English word "physical" is a derivative from the Greek φύσις, so the older Calvinistic divines have applied it to our original moral depravity, or inborn sinful dispositions, to indicate that they are by nature, φύσει, and not merely acquired, nor mere acts. In like manner, they used the word with reference to regeneration, to signify that it is a change of this nature, φύσις, lying back of acts, whereby we are children of wrath;

and hence they sometimes even speak of a "physical" operation of the Holy Spirit in regeneration; meaning thereby that the change is no mere act of the sinner produced by moral persuasion through the presentation of the truth, even such objective presentation of it as may be made by the Holy Ghost; but a change of the moral nature, φύσις, or disposition of the soul, lying back of acts and causative of them. This is especially a frequent use of language with Owen, whom Dr. Duffield is fond of quoting. Since the word "physical" has come to be used chiefly in the sense of material or corporeal, Calvinistic divines have dropped its use to avoid ambiguity, and substituted such words as "direct" and "immediate."

New-school divines, however, have been constantly in the habit of objecting to the old Calvinistic view of original sin and regeneration as "physical," often in a way which shows that they understand it, or wish to understand it, in these connections to be synonymous with material or essential; that they mean to charge upon the Old-school the doctrines of depravity and regeneration of the soul's essence, and of an exercise of omnipotence in regeneration which changes that essence; indeed that the Old-school divines make sin a part of the very constitution, *i. e.*, of the original substance or essential nature of the soul as such. The following passage from Dr. Duffield is an illustration of this, while it sufficiently evinces his own and the New-school repudiation of the doctrine of original sin, as held among us and set forth in our standards.

"New-school Presbyterians thought that their Old-school brethren, in setting forth their views of original sin, regarded as the corruption of our moral nature, believed, and by their language and illustrations implied, that man's natural depravity, as a moral and accountable creature, is something, if not physical, so inwrought or involved in his constitutional nature as to be transmitted like *any other corporeal faculty or quality, lege procreationis*, by 'ordinary generation.' Although this was denied, yet their language and modes of illustration led unavoidably to the inference, that moral corruption was believed by them to be some psychical peculiarity, property, or cause—something *in the very constitution of the soul or mind* —determining by necessity of nature, to sin, and therefore

itself sinful. This view New-school Presbyterians could not reconcile with the fact, as affirmed by the Confession of Faith, that God is not the author of sin, nor with the nature of God's moral government, the freedom of the human will, and the accountability of the moral creature.

"The Old-school Presbyterians, on the other hand, charged their brethren who dissented from their theological ideas as to the nature of moral corruption, with denying that 'Adam's posterity inherit from him a depraved nature,' and also 'that there is any such thing as 'a corrupted nature,' distinct from voluntary acts. The ground of controversy here lies in a *terra incognita. New-school Presbyterians care not to explore it.*" Pp. 587, 588.

"If Old-school Presbyterians do not believe that the agency of the Spirit in regeneration is physical, like that of his physical omnipotence in creation, they have failed to make themselves understood. We confess ourselves utterly unable to get any other idea from such language as this: 'the formal efficiency of the Spirit, indeed, in the putting forth the exceeding greatness of his power in our quickening, is no otherwise to be comprehended by us than any other creating act of Divine power.'* Dr. Rice, the exponent of Old-school views, insists upon there being 'a moral nature or disposition, distinct and anterior to its acts,' produced, of course, by a *new creation*, 'so that the regenerated man is, in his moral character, as really a new creature as he would be in his physical character, if the natural powers of his mind were radically changed.'" Pp. 605, 606.

Thus it is avowed that New-school Presbyterians regard our doctrine of native and hereditary sinfulness, as, "if not physical, inwrought or involved in his *constitutional* nature, transmitted like any *other corporeal faculty or quality*," so reducing it to the genus of "corporeal faculties or qualities," and making it a part of man's original and essential nature. They ignore, and "do not care to" know anything about depraved nature inherited from Adam, or distinct from voluntary acts. To say that this is *terra incognita* to them, is to say that they disbelieve it, and do not hold it. Moreover it shows that their meaning of the word "physical" when they

* Owen on the Spirit, book iii., chap. i. p. 225.

use it in such connections, and their interpretation of it as used by Owen and some old divines, is equivalent either to "corporeal," or else to something in the original constitution, and essential nature of man as created by God. And further, they clearly maintain that the removal of this innate sinful principle or disposition in regeneration by the direct agency of the Holy Spirit, is a "physical" work of "physical omnipotence," in their sense of the word physical; and, in short, is what they wholly disown and repudiate. This will yet more fully appear. Whatever else may be true of this view, it is at war with old Calvinism, Old-school Presbyterian doctrine, and the Confession of Faith.

Let the reader bear in mind all this, whenever in our succeeding quotations from Dr. Duffield's article, they find opposition to the Old-school theology, or rather to the plain doctrines of our Confession, masking itself under such words and phrases as "physical," "constitution," "nature of man," etc. It is simply and purely the style of the Taylorism and New Divinity of thirty years ago at the time of the disruption.*

III. Original Sin.

In addition to the passages adduced in the preceding preliminary explanation, Dr. Duffield quotes with approval the deliverance of the New-school Synod of Michigan, after much circumlocution, gathering up their meaning in the following summation of doctrine on this subject. "We mean, what our standards affirm, that in all we inherit from Adam there is no provision made for our holiness and salvation; but, on the contrary, it is morally certain we shall sin." P. 587. So much for the positive side of the "historic sense" of what, in the New-school view, "our standards affirm." They affirm all this and a great deal more. This of itself does not amount to the doctrine of original sin. It rises but little, if any, above Pelagianism.

Again negatively, Dr. Duffield tells us: "New-school Presbyterians concede that, both by omission and commission, it is natural to fallen man to sin. But when required by their Old-school Presbyterian brethren, as does Dr. Rice, to adopt his

* See this evinced in *Princeton Essays*, First Series, Articles XIII—XVI.

metaphysical theology and technicalities, and, with 'Dr. Owen and the old Calvinists, to speak of original or indwelling sin (moral corruption) as a *principle* or SOMETHING which has *the efficiency of cause*, and which exists in men *anterior to any acts performed by them*,' he demurs." "He prefers instead of the vague terms, 'principle' or 'SOMETHING,' (?) to designate supreme selfishness, distinguishable from instinctive self-love, as the primary originating cause or source of all developments of moral corruption. He can trace the voluntary acts and exercises, of which he predicates sin, to the demands and control, or impulse, of a generic, governing purpose." P. 590. "When Old-school theologians will show—what thus far they have failed to do—*how sin* exists *in* a moral creature anterior to, and separate or distinguishable from, any or all volitions or voluntary exercises of intelligence and will, or actings of the passions and affections, then may they, with greater show of theological acumen, as well as aid to Christian charity, accuse their New-school brethren with denying what, by such ill-defined and vague theological technicalities, they either do or design to teach about innate corruption, inherent depravity, a corrupted moral nature, a deep-rooted principle of depravity, and the like." P. 591. If this is not a denial of original sin as set forth in our Confession of Faith, and in all the great Christian symbols, Latin, Greek, Lutheran, Reformed, then it is hard to find words amounting to such a denial. It is confessedly counter to the "historic sense" in which the old Calvinists and Old-school Presbyterians have held it. It is purely and simply the theory of Dr. N. W. Taylor, or Taylorism, which resolves all original sin into a generic, governing purpose, formed at the beginning of moral agency. The italics and capitals in the above quotations are Dr. Duffield's.

IV. REGENERATION.

Dr. Duffield quotes the following from Dr. Owen, and appends the subjoined comment. "If," says he (Owen), "there be not an impotency in us by nature unto all acts of spiritual life, like that which is in a dead man unto the acts of life natural; if there be not an *alike* power of God required unto our deliverance from that condition, and the working in us a principle of spiritual obedience, as is required unto the raising

of him that is dead, they may as well say that the Scripture speaks not truly as that it speaks metaphorically. We see not how any other idea could have been intended by such language, than that the *same sort* of *physical omnipotence* which gives vitality to material organisms, is both real and necessary in imparting spiritual life to the sinner in regeneration. This is the theology of Old-school Presbyterians on the subject, *who talk of implanting and infusing into the soul a principle of spiritual life. But that the New-school Presbyterian accounts philosophic theory, and a very fallacious one also.*" P. 575. So we have supposed in regard to many of them, and that it is no calumny to say so. What if old Calvinists and Old-school Presbyterians do hold that regeneration is a new creation, or implantation of a principle of spiritual life, requiring an exercise of Divine omnipotence, even as any other creation? Is not this clearly and manifoldly taught in Scripture? Yea, that it involves "the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead?"

Again, says Dr. Duffield: "Dr. Owen says explicitly, 'There is a real *physical* work of the Spirit on the souls of men in their regeneration. There is not only a *moral*, but a *physical* immediate operation of the Spirit, by his power and grace, or his powerful grace, upon the minds or souls of men in their regeneration.'* Accordingly he understood and used the phrases, 'new creature,' 'new creation,' 'created anew,' in their strict, literal sense, and not either metaphorically or analogically, to denote resemblance in a moral point of view. He attributed it to the same omnipotence which is exerted in every part of the material creation. Hence, to deny the reality and necessity of the intervention of this Divine omnipotence in regeneration, he accounted a fatal heresy. So, too, averred Old-school Presbyterians." P. 593.

Are there two kinds of Divine omnipotence? If not, then whatever is wrought by Divine power, in the realms of matter or spirit, nature or grace, must be wrought by the one Divine omnipotence which never differs from itself, although it may

* Owen on the Spirit, book iii. chap. v.

differ in its modes and results of operation, according to the subject upon which, and end for which it works. This, taken with what we shall soon quote from the next page, excludes omnipotence, as such, from the work of regeneration. But meanwhile it is proper to say that when, in the passage above cited, Owen asserts "not only a moral, but a physical immediate operation of the Spirit" in regeneration; by the former he means moral suasion through the objective presentation of gospel truths and motives by the Spirit; by the latter he means simply the implantation of a new principle of holiness, over and above all mere suasory influence, by the immediate exertion of almighty power. This appears abundantly in all the preceding part of the chapter from which Dr. Duffield quotes. Owen had been laying down this in such language as the following: "First, the work of the Spirit of God in the regeneration of sinners, or the quickening of them who are dead in trespasses and sins, or in their first saving conversion to God, doth not consist in *moral suasion* only." Again: "we say that the whole work, or the *whole of the work* of the Holy Ghost in our *conversion* doth not consist herein; but there is a real physical work whereby he infuseth a gracious principle of *spiritual life* into all that are effectually converted and really regenerated. . . . . There is a real physical work of the Spirit on the soul of men in regeneration. That all he doth, consisteth not in this *moral suasion*, the ensuing reasons do efficiently evince. First, if the Holy Spirit worketh not otherwise on men in their regeneration or conversion, but by proposing unto them and urging upon them *reasons*, *arguments*, and *motives* to that purpose; then after his whole work, and notwithstanding it, the will of man remains absolutely indifferent . . . . for the *whole* of this work consists in proposing objects unto the will. . . . . Secondly, this *moral persuasion*, however advanced and improved, and supposed to be effectual, yet it confers no new *real supernatural strength* unto the soul. For whereas it worketh, yea, the Spirit or grace of God therein and thereby, by reasons, motives, arguments, and objective considerations, and no otherwise, it is able only to draw out the strength that we have," etc.

Our view of Dr. Owen's meaning, in the passages quoted and condemned by Dr. Duffield, is thus confirmed beyond a

peradventure by the whole context, which was evidently before him, and could not pardonably be misunderstood. And Dr. Duffield thus plainly evinces his aversion to the doctrine, that in regeneration, over and above all mere Divine moral suasion, "the Holy Ghost infuseth a gracious principle of spiritual life." And this all the more decisively in the following language, on page 594, next succeeding our last quotation from him.

"The life of the soul of the moral creature man, beginning in or with regeneration by the power of God, was referred [by Dr. Owen and others] to the implanting in the mind, heart, or soul a new principle, as the proximate and efficient cause of holy sensibilities and spiritual actions constituting the life of the new creature, of the sinner born again. This 'principle of holiness' created by the physical omnipotence of God, according to this theory of regeneration, when implanted in the mind and heart, formed the life of the soul, just as the soul itself was believed to be the life of the body. *New-school Presbyterians cannot understand this life-theory of regeneration*, as we take the liberty to call it, according as Old-school Presbyterians employ it for illustration, *in any other light than as intended to teach that the very same sort of physical omnipotence by which God raises a dead body to life, is exerted and requisite to infuse spiritual life into the dead sinner by the work of regeneration.*" Pp. 594, 595. What then? Is not this just what the Scriptures teach and our standards teach, unless another sense be twisted out of them by forced interpretations? We surely need no further evidence that, on the great subject of regeneration, Old and New-school doctrines are poles apart. The foregoing quotations from Owen will also shed light on Dr. Duffield's deliverances upon the next topic. It deserves notice too, in this connection, that, in concluding his remarks on this subject, Dr. Duffield refers in terms of commendation to Dr. Taylor's celebrated review of "Spring on the Means of Regeneration," and without any word of dissent or qualification. This, more than any other single production, brings out the grand peculiarities of the system known as Taylorism, which deviates from old Calvinism in precisely the same direction as Pelagius diverged from Augustin. Beyond any other publication of its author or his coadjutors, it served to arouse and

organize that opposition to the system among Congregationalists and Presbyterians, which gave birth to East Windsor (now Hartford) Theological Seminary, and culminated in the disruption of the Presbyterian church.

V. THE NATURE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT'S AGENCY.

In regard to this there are at bottom but two views. These are negations of each other. The Calvinistic and scriptural view is, that in regeneration a change is wrought in the soul by the direct and immediate agency of the Spirit, back of and beyond any mere acts of the sinner, by no *mere* agency of truth and motive—a change which certainly and infallibly causes a willing and hearty obedience of faith to all scriptural truth and motive. This change therefore may be wrought in infants, sanctified from the womb, leading them freely to embrace Christ, when their reason is sufficiently developed to be capable of knowing him. In an adult this change of state *may be* wrought, by Him who worketh where, when, and how he will, in the oblivious prostration of extreme sickness, as well as in the fullest conscious activity; so that, while life lasts, there is no exigency in which we may not properly pray for the interposition of that almighty grace in behalf of perishing sinners, which is able, even out of the stones, to raise up children unto Abraham. This, however, is not to the exclusion of a suasory influence through the truth in the case of adults not bereft of reason and capable of understanding such truth. Such agency also is employed by the Holy Ghost, in the view of old Calvinists; so that in this sense he begets and sanctifies by the truth. This sufficiently appears in the extracts already made from Owen, in this respect *instar omnium*. But what is also maintained is, that, over and above and beyond all this, all influence of mere truth and moral suasion, divine or human, there is a renovation of the soul, by the direct, immediate, irresistible agency of the Spirit of God, making it "a new creature," without which it will not and cannot, with which it will certainly, freely, and joyfully yield to such divine truth and persuasion. Such agency of the Spirit, Pelagians and others maintain to be inconsistent with moral agency in the subject of it. Dr. Owen and old Calvinists maintain that it not only consists with moral agency, but frees moral agents from their bondage to sin. Says

Owen in the chapter so much quoted by Dr. Duffield, "The power which the Holy Ghost puts forth in our regeneration, is such in its acting or exercise, as our minds, wills, and affections are suited to be wrought upon, and to be affected by it, according to their natures and natural operations. . . . He doth not act in them any otherwise than they themselves are meet to be moved, and move, to be acted and act according to their own nature, power, and ability. . . He offers no violence or compulsion to the will."

So, in language still more explicit and felicitous, our *Confession of Faith*, chap. x. 1, 2, represents the Spirit in Effectual Calling, as "enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man; *who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.*"

The other view denies any agency of the Spirit otherwise than in the presentation of truth and motive with a suasory power beyond that of man, even as God is mightier than man. But however powerful, it is still in the way of moral suasion, and only by the vivid and powerful presentation of the truth, which it is the prerogative of the sinner's will to yield to or resist, and which many do effectually resist.

The only possible medium between these two views is the synergistic theory, according to which man coöperates with God in regeneration. This is in reality only a form of the moral suasion theory, such coöperation of the sinner being wholly inconceivable and irrelative on any other hypothesis. Now, of these views, it has already been made evident enough that Dr. Duffield and the New-school Presbyterians represented by him, reject the first. But if there be any doubt, the following extracts will dispel it.

"They [the more astute Old-school Presbyterians] talk of a

'*direct*,' '*immediate*' agency of the Spirit in the work of regeneration . . . saying, 'we are far, however, from denying that in regeneration the Holy Spirit operates *in connection with the truth*.'* How in connection? Whether by mere juxtaposition, or as 'over, above, and beyond the truth'—favourite phrases with some—or, plainly and frankly, by means of the truth? To answer this question would not be so embarrassing as it is to the Old-school Presbyterian, if he did not believe the agency of the Spirit to be other than *through*, i. e., *by means* of the truth." Pp. 600, 601. He then proceeds to contrast New-school Presbyterians with them in this respect. The embarrassment here attributed to Old-school Presbyterians is the merest fiction of our New-school brethren. It exists only in their own imaginations. The former have no difficulty in recognizing an influence of the Spirit with and through the truth, which must yet be inefficacious upon a soul not quickened and renewed, and made willing in the day of God's power, by a divine inworking "over, and above, and beyond" the truth, as already explained—such as the above exhibition of New-school Presbyterian theology disowns.

But again, says Dr. Duffield, "The agency of the Spirit is not physical, not literally creative, but in perfect consistency with man's free moral agency, as a rational, accountable creature, held rightfully under obligations of obedience to the law of God. It is such as in its nature may be and often is resisted." This shows, 1. That in the writer's view a literally creative is the same as a "physical" work of God in the soul, in his meaning of that word, and therefore to be denied. 2. That, in his view, such a creative work is inconsistent with moral agency and obligations of obedience to God's law, and therefore to be denied. 3. That in his view the agency of the Spirit in regeneration is such as may be and often is effectually resisted. Hence, 4. a logical result of this is, that regeneration must really be the work of that human will whose prerogative it is to render unavailing or efficacious the whole agency of the Holy Spirit in the case. This harmonizes with the theory that regeneration is the act of the sinner's will forming a new governing purpose, the cardinal doctrine in Dr. Taylor's

* Dr. Rice.

review of "Spring on the Means of Regeneration," the article mentioned with approval by Dr. Duffield.

Moreover, Dr. Duffield condemns the sinner's looking "for an agency of the Spirit to save him, lying back of and beyond the sphere of his own conscious exercise of faith in Christ," as dangerous. P. 603. As we have already seen, he objects, and represents New-school Presbyterians as objecting to the statements of Dr. Rice, that there is, in regeneration, "a moral nature or disposition, distinct and anterior to its acts," produced of course by a new creation, "so that the regenerated man is in his moral character, as really a new creature as he would be in his physical character, if the natural powers of his mind were radically changed," as implying that "the agency of the Spirit in regeneration is physical, like that of his physical omnipotence in creation." P. 605. It is thus clearly proved that Dr. Duffield, for himself and New-school Presbyterians, in manifold ways repudiates the first of the forementioned views of the manner of the Spirit's agency held by the old Calvinists and asserted in our Confession. What remains to them but the second, towards which, in the passages already quoted, so strong a leaning has appeared in various expressions and implications? But does he make any direct statement or avowal, as to whether he regards the influence of the Spirit suasory only, consisting in a Divine vividness and efficiency in the presentation of truth?

Says Dr. Duffield: "The New-school Presbyterian believes that the moral suasion of the Spirit of God—although the phrase is seldom used by him—which, it cannot be denied, he has exerted by the truths revealed in the Bible, and enforced by exhortations, remonstrances, appeals, motives, and considerations of varied character therein contained, is just as much more mighty, *as God employs them* in applying them to men's minds, hearts, and consciences, and gives them force and efficiency, than anything man can do by *his* moral suasion, as the omnipotence of God exceeds the power of man. In so doing he is far from admitting, and utterly denies, what is charged upon him by Old-school Presbyterians, that the Spirit's agency, in the regeneration or conversion of the sinner, is merely *objective*, consisting only in the presentation of truth

before the mind—first, by originally inspiring the Scriptures, and second, by the preaching of the gospel." P. 606.

For the due interpretation of this, let it be considered: 1. How utterly the direct and immediate agency of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration, together with the infusion of any new principle or state back of the sinner's acts, has been repudiated in previous extracts, as being something "physical," or the product of "physical omnipotence." 2. That the only form of the Spirit's agency positively asserted and defined, is the "moral suasion of the Spirit of God." 3. That in repelling, as unjust, the charge that they hold the "Spirit's agency" to "consist only in the presentation of truth before the mind," he explicates this statement by what follows as meaning "a presentation of truth before the mind, *first, by originally inspiring the Scriptures, and second, by the preaching of the gospel.*" This caveat, therefore, is perfectly consistent with holding that the whole agency of the Spirit in regeneration is that of Divine moral suasion, the only doctrine consistent with his other utterances on this subject.

VI. ATONEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION.

Says Dr. Duffield: "The Old-school Presbyterian insists upon using the *ipsissima verba* of the Confession and Catechisms, when they speak of the righteousness of Christ being 'imputed by faith.' The New-school Presbyterian is not tenacious about this technical term of theology, but prefers to express the idea intended to be conveyed by it in the plain language of common sense." P. 617. "They prefer to regard and speak of the atonement of Christ, his obedience and death, by which he satisfied the justice of God for our sins, as the great expedient and governmental procedure adopted by the great God of heaven and earth in his character of chief executive, the governor of the universe, in order to magnify his law and make it honourable, rather than as a juridical plea to obtain a sentence in court for discharging an accused party on trial." P. 619. "The questions, how Christ's sufferings and *death* atone for sin, and how his obedience avails unto justification through faith, as they do—the philosophy of the way of salvation—receive from them different answers and explanations, according to their views of the nature of justice, and their theories of government. . . . They are not essential to Christianity." P. 621.

Suppose one should hold that they avail for this purpose, simply as instructive, symbolical, or in the way of martyrdom. What then? Again, says Dr. Duffield: "As in human governments punishment is sometimes commuted, as banishment or solitary confinement for death, or release from imprisonment by the payment of a pecuniary fine, so in the government of God, his justice, it is contended, admits of commutation, and is satisfied as fully if the penalty be inflicted on a surety or substitute for the transgressor as upon the transgressor himself. The sufferings and death of Christ are accounted, according to this view of justice, by Old-school Presbyterians, to be the penalty of the law for sin, inflicted on him as having stood 'in the room and stead' of his elect. . . . . The Old-school Presbyterian's idea of the substitution of Christ is, that his person is commuted for the persons of the elect, and therefore his sufferings and death were the very same punishment in penalty, in law, which might have been exacted personally from them in their eternal sufferings and death. To deny this, they account a denial of the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings and death, and of their real expiatory value."

"The New-school Presbyterian does not so understand it. It is contrary to the very nature of distributive justice—which has reference to personal character and conduct—to punish innocence and protect crime. No legal fiction can ever make it possible to transfer the personal properties of guilty sinners to the innocent Son of God, so that he should assume their character and become guilty and merit their punishment. The substitution of Christ and his vicarious sufferings and death he does not believe to have been a procedure either of commutative or distributive justice. He suffered and died, 'the just for the unjust,' not according to law. . . . . Hence there arises a difference between Old and New-school Presbyterians as to the applicability and extent of the atonement; the former limiting it to the persons of the elect, as the ransom paid specifically for each one, and designed for them only." Pp. 623, 624. He confesses on the next page, however, that the Old-school theologians "affirmed the infinite sufficiency of the atonement of Christ, in itself, for the whole world, if God should see fit to apply it." Again, "New-school Presbyterians believe that the

atonement of Christ may be much more satisfactorily explained by regarding it in the light of that sort of justice appropriate to, and required in, a public governor. This is called public justice, having relation to the public interests, the general good. . . . All sanitary regulations and abatement of nuisances and measures for general improvement must be traced for their sanction, to the obligations of public justice. Its exercise has no direct reference to law, and its obligations are those of high, ennobling morality, enforced by the demands of benevolence, and the dictates of virtue." P. 626. This is clearly the governmental theory of atonement. It denies that Christ's sufferings are properly penal and *in this sense* vicarious. It makes them an expedient of mere sovereign benevolence, like the abatement of a nuisance, or tearing down private buildings to stop a fire. They have no direct relation to law or distributive justice, *i. e.*, justice proper. They are designed indefinitely for all or any. Not only so, but Dr. Duffield falsely represents the Old-school view as making its adherents, "embarrassed in preaching the free and universal offers of salvation by God to sinners of mankind without exception." Just as much as, and no more than, the doctrine of election. Are our New-school brethren "embarrassed" in making a universal offer by this? Or do they hold it in some qualified sense only? Let us see.

VII. PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

Says Dr. Duffield: The New-school Presbyterian "prefers neither to assert nor deny," "that as friction is incident to matter, so is sin to a moral system, and that therefore while God would not absolutely prevent it altogether, he seeks, like a skilful machinist, to limit and restrain it, and overrule it for the greatest good. . . . . If the Old-school Presbyterian affirms that God's foreknowledge is founded on his purpose, the New-school Presbyterian replies that the absolutely certain futurition of any event is not essential to its being apprehended by Omniscience." P. 631. Surely this is equivalent to the famous dictum of Dr. Taylor, that "no one can prove that God could prevent all sin in a moral system." It implies also that events can be known from eternity, as about to come to pass in the future, of which in eternity there was no certainty of their coming to pass. That can be known then as certain which is

not certain. For how could events in time be made certain in the eternity past, otherwise than by their futurition through the purpose of God that they should come to pass?

In regard to election he says: "Believing that God foreknew all of the human race who, in the progressive development of his plan of redemption through Christ, could be led to faith and repentance by the Holy Spirit, the New-school Presbyterian avers that he affirms nothing at variance with the sacred Scriptures and the standards of his church, when he says, that the Divine decree of election embraces all whom God foresaw that he could, by the blood and Spirit of Christ, in the providential development of his plan, bring to faith and repentance. The Apostle Peter affirms believers to be 'elect according to the foreknowledge of the Father.' Elect, says the New-school Presbyterian, expanding this thought, not because God foreknew that this one and the other left to themselves would believe; but because, according to the mystery of the Divine Omniscience, he foreknew whom he could, by the truth and Spirit of Christ, bring to faith and repentance." Pp. 632, 633.

The foregoing account of the New-school doctrine of election is simply the Taylorite doctrine on that subject. Divested of circumlocution, it amounts simply to this: God elects to salvation those whom he foresees, by the utmost power of his Spirit, word, and other agencies, he shall be able to induce to believe and obey. If this is anything higher than the Arminian doctrine of election upon foreseen faith and good works, we do not see it. It must be a distinction without a difference. His representations of the Old-school view involves the usual misconceptions of Arminians and Pelagians. He says, "Old-school Presbyterians are apt to adopt a more summary process by which to explain the mystery of election, affirming the choice of God to be wholly arbitrary, a simple absolute exercise of sovereign will, without any reason whatever except its designed arbitrariness." Because they deny that it is founded on faith, holiness, good works, or any other condition foreseen in the creature, does it therefore follow that it is without any reason whatever in God's all-wise counsels? Old-school Presbyterians, like the Scriptures and our Confession, pronounce election sovereign relatively to its objects. But when have they ever

pronounced it without reasons within the Divine mind, or solely "for the sake of its designed arbitrariness"?

Dr. Duffield claims that Dr. John Witherspoon has done more than any other man, "in giving form and character, not to say originating, New-school views of truth." The stupendous error of this statement was fully exposed in this journal, Oct. 1863, Art. III.

Such is the testimony given by one of the most competent and trusted leaders of the New-school church, as to the doctrines characteristic of that body. It was given with the utmost care, and under circumstances of the highest responsibility. It speaks for itself, and needs little comment. It shows most fully the "fair historic sense" of our standards as understood by the New-school body, and that in fundamental doctrine it is in diametric opposition to their "fair historic sense" among ourselves and in Christendom. We rejoice to know that the New-school church contains many honoured exceptions, whose theology differs slightly, if at all, from our own. We should most cordially welcome all such to our communion, by that regular door which is open to all who agree with us. But Dr. Duffield has put it beyond all doubt, that the doctrinal scheme known as "New Divinity," which was the main cause of the disruption of our church, and the protection of which was a chief end of the New-school secession, prevails, though we trust it does not predominate, in that body now. At all events he shows one "historical sense" of our standards which the basis of union now proposed requires us to tolerate without let or hindrance other than by free discussion.

Nor does the Doctrinal Protest of the New-school in the Assembly of 1837, readopted by the Auburn Convention, and reproduced by Dr. Duffield with approval in his Article, prove anything to the contrary. For first, it is drawn with a sort of controversial skill and diplomatic adroitness which evade many of the chief issues without appearing to do so. And secondly, the question is not merely what they hold, but what they require as a condition of ministerial and official standing. It proves nothing therefore either way.

And now the question arises, what means the loud and bitter clamor uttered and echoed by leading New-school ministers and

journals, and to some extent even reëchoed among ourselves, against those as calumniators of their New-school brethren, who have offered as a reason against the projected scheme of reunion, that the foregoing scheme of doctrine has place among them, and must be tolerated in the united body, if union on the proposed basis is consummated? Who are the calumniators, and who is calumniated in this matter?

The question before us is a very simple one. Shall we give the foregoing theology sketched by Dr. Duffield equal liberty, privilege, and authority in our church with that of our Catechisms and Confessions? Shall we fill our pulpits and church courts with its proclaimers and defenders? Shall we subject our theological seminaries to their control, and admit them to our vacant theological chairs? Shall we submit the books of our Publication Board to such an *Index Expurgatorius* as this theology would require? Shall we bring back the intolerable strifes which preceded and caused the disruption? Shall we, in short, surrender unconditionally? For ourselves we say No, and in this we believe we speak the deliberate mind of our church.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Law of Creeds in Scotland. A Treatise on the Legal Relation of Churches in Scotland established and not established, to their Doctrinal Confessions. By Alexander Taylor Innes, M. A., Solicitor before the Supreme Court of Scotland, and Member of the Faculty of Procurators of Glasgow. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1867. 8vo. Pp. 493.

This is an able, elaborate, timely, and valuable work. It consists of two parts. The first is devoted to an historical exhibition of the relation of the law to the Creed of the Established Church in Scotland; and the second to the bearing of the legislative power on the Non-established Churches with their creeds. To each chapter is added "An Appendix—of Statutes, Acts of Assembly, Articles of Faith, Legal Decisions, Judges' Speeches, and illustrative documents generally," together with an Index of Subjects, of Statutes, and of Cases.

All questions relating to the relation between the Church and State, the power of ecclesiastical courts, the tenure of religious trusts, &c., come up for discussion and historical illustration. The volume is a storehouse of facts and legal opinions. It thus has a special interest for all Presbyterians, and indeed for all religious bodies in this country as well as in Scotland: the present condition of our ecclesiastical affairs, which promises to bring up the principles of religious trusts, and of church property generally, makes such a work specially important.

The Resurrection of Jesus Christ; with an Examination of the Speculations of Strauss in his New Life of Jesus; and an Introductory View of the present position of Theological Inquiry in reference to the existence of God and the miraculous evidence of Christianity. By the late Robert Macpherson, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Aberdeen. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1867. 8vo.

The latter portion of the book was prepared for publication a few days only before the author's death. This volume is his last contribution to the cause of truth and sound doctrine. It begins with a lecture on the Spirit of Theological Inquiry. This is followed by discussions on the Existence of God, on Atheism, on the Evidence of Divine Revelation, on Miracles. These are introductory to the examination of the evidence of the resurrection of Christ and a refutation of the objections which have been urged against this central fact of the Christian faith. This brief statement of the contents and design of the work of Dr. Macpherson will satisfy the reader of its importance, and of its adaptation to the necessities of theological students of the present day.

The College, The Market, and The Court; or, Woman's relations to Education, Labour, and Law. By Caroline H. Dall, author of "Historical Sketches," "Sunshine," "The Life of Dr. Zakrzewska," &c. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1867. Pp. 498.

The design of this work is to prove the right of women to all the advantages enjoyed by men for the attainment of knowledge and the cultivation of the mind, and the consequent right to employ their acquirements and talents in all the departments of life, and to enjoy all the social and political privileges accorded to persons of the other sex. The book is written in a clear and pleasant style, and is replete with illustrations and historical notices. It is to most persons a matter of regret to see ladies of so much ability as the writer of this volume, employing their time and talents in attempting the impossible. The laws of nature cannot be altered. God has adapted all creatures to their respective spheres. All attempts to fit them

for a different sphere than the one assigned, not only inevitably fail, but ruin the subjects on which the experiment is tried. It would be a cruel folly to attempt to make a gazelle do the work of a dray-horse. If the experience of six thousand years proves anything, it proves that God has given to women a mental, physical, and emotional constitution, which fits them for a sphere, it may be a higher and a happier one, but nevertheless a different one from that in which men were designed to move. If this be so, then the laws of nature, as ordained by God, must be altered before women can be made to do the work of men, without the loss of all their attractiveness as women, and endless social confusion.

The Story of Doom and other Poems. By Jean Ingelow. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1867. Pp. 290.

"Except Mrs. Browning, Jean Ingelow is first among women whom the world calls poets." This judgment of the *Independent* is substantially ratified by the English press.

Questions on Bible Doctrine, for the Closet, the Family, and Bible Classes. By Rev. James B. Ramsey, D. D., pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Lynchburgh, Virginia. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1867. 16mo., pp. 210.

The plan and execution of this little volume are alike excellent. On all the leading doctrines of the Scripture pertinent questions are asked and references given to passages of the Bible, whence the answer may be inferred. A family or class carried through this book, committing the proof passages, would be well and intelligently instructed in the whole system of evangelical doctrine.

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Vol. I. No. I. St. Louis: E. P. Gray. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard & Co. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

Judging from the first number of this Journal, which bears evidence of considerable speculative acumen, and knowledge of philosophy, it is to be an organ of German Transcendentalism, of the Hegelian type. We of course can neither sanction its principles, nor wish it success.

God's Word Written: The Doctrine of the Inspiration of the Holy Scripture Explained and Enforced. By the Rev. Edward Garbett, M. A., author of "Religion in Daily Life," Incumbent of Christ Church, Surbiton: Boyle Lecturer for 1861, 1862, and 1863; Select Preacher to the University of Oxford in 1862 and 1863. American Tract Society, New York. W. W. Smith, Princeton.

A clear and conclusive argument for the plenary, verbal inspiration of the word of God.

Christocracy; or, Essays on the Coming and Kingdom of Christ. With answers to the principal objections of Post-millenarians. By John T. Demarest, and William R. Gordon, ministers of the gospel in the Reformed Dutch Church. New York: A. Lloyd, No. 115 Nassau Street. 1867.

This volume comprises a series of articles on Eschatology, published a few years ago by Drs. Demarest and Gordon in "The Christian Intelligencer." The articles have been somewhat enlarged and modified, and as now issued each is accompanied with a reply to alleged objections. The different points involved in the Millenarian controversy are discussed with considerable ability and scholarship. The writers are honest, earnest, and thoroughly familiar with both the scriptural and historical argument in favour of Pre-millenianism. Their familiarity with the writings of Mr. D. N. Lord—whom they hold in high esteem—occasionally betrays them into an imitation of his style of dealing with an opponent. They "cannot conceal their fears" that Dr. McClellan "was not exactly honest." They are "amazed" that Dr. Fairbairn should "support an opinion absolutely at variance with common sense." McCullagh's Exposition of Isaiah lxv. 17, is "ridiculous." They raise the question whether Drs. Hatfield and Shedd "can be so self-conceited as to think, &c."

Should some one who has the leisure and the ability for the work prepare and publish a satisfactory reply to the numerous volumes that within the last few years have been issued from the press in defence of the theory of the Pre-millennial Advent, he would render the church an important and much needed service.

The Theology of the Greek Poets. By W. S. Tyler, Williston Professor of Greek in Amherst College. Pp. 365. Boston: Draper & Halliday. 1867.

This valuable volume is made up of six essays, published at different times in various theological reviews. The title of the book is fairly descriptive of the subjects of the last four essays, two of which, on "The Homeric doctrine of the gods," and "The Homeric doctrine of Sin," were published in the *American Theological Review*, and the other two on "The Theology of Æschylus," and "The Theology of Sophocles," in the *Bibliotheca Sacra.* To these are prefixed an essay entitled, "The Head of the Church head over all things," which appeared in 1838 in the *Biblical Repository;* and one on "The Homeric Question," taken from the *Bibliotheca Sacra.*

The collection is an interesting and valuable contribution to Natural Theology. The opening essay, written nearly twenty years before the others, will have the widest circle of readers,

and will be pronounced an unusually fresh, vigorous, compact, and comprehensive discussion of the general value of the argument from analogy, with very rich and apposite illustrations. The argument on the Homeric question is a strong defence of the authenticity and substantial integrity of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. We have supposed that in England and in this country there was all but universal assent to the correctness of this award. Mr. Grote has stood almost alone as a dissentient. We observe, however, that Mr. Parry, the editor of Homer in the *Bibliotheca Classica*, takes strong ground, in the preface to a new school edition which has just appeared, against the high antiquity of our "Homer." On philological and archæological grounds he insists that the present Iliad and Odyssey cannot be older that the time of Herodotus.

"Grammatici certant et adhuc sub judice lis est."

The other articles in our volume present the results of prolonged and thorough studies, both in the original authors, and in all the illustrative works in which Germany and England have been so productive. It is certainly an important service to Natural Theology to exhibit so fully and minutely the doctrine of the three most truly representative and influential of the Greek poets on the great question of religion. We have no space to exhibit results. The author reveals himself everywhere as an experienced and accomplished teacher, as well as a thorough scholar. While accumulating he has well trained himself to communicate.

The English of Shakespeare; illustrated in a Philological Commentary on his Julius Cæsar. By George L. Craik, Queen's College, Belfast. Edited from the third revised London edition, by W. J. Rolfe. 12mo. Pp. 386. Boston: Crosby & Ainsworth. 1867.

We welcome all such works as this, whether reprinted or original, as important contributions both to literature and philology. For this volume we know Shakespeare better, and also our mother tongue. Prof. Craik's works have been favourably known in previous reprints, and this volume will add to his reputation. The American editor has made considerable and important additions to the illustrative material of the work. The book will make its way into many homes where Shakespeare is loved, and into many of our literary institutions where English is really studied.

My Little Library. Sixty-four Stories, bound in sixteen volumes, each thirty-two pages. Price $1.50. American Tract Society, New York. W. W. Smith, Princeton.

The Lord's Supper. A Manual, or a Scriptural and Devotional Guide to the Table of the Lord. By the Rev. David Smith, Biggar, Scotland, author of "Memoir of John Brown," and "The Devotional Psalter." American Tract Society, New York. W. W. Smith, Princeton.

A sound and instructive manual on the subject—well-fitted to assist pious souls in a right participation of the Holy Feast; also to "fence" out the careless and presumptuous. But we question whether the work is equally well-suited for doubting and timid Christians.

Coming Wonders expected between 1867 *and* 1875. Explaining the future Literal Fulfilment of the Seals, Trumpets, Vials, and other Prophecies of Revelation and Daniel, within the Final Seven Years; commencing with a Napoleonic-Judaic Septennial Covenant for the National Restoration of the Jews; subsequent extensive Revivals of Religion; the First-fruits Ascension of 144,000 translated Christians; the Latter-day Wars, Famines, Pestilences, and Earthquakes; Fiery Ordeal of Britain and America; the Great Tribulation and Antichristian Persecution for three and a half years—the Slaughter of the Witnesses—the Second Ascension of Innumerable Christians—the Closing Conflict at Armageddon—the Personal Reign of Christ on Earth for a thousand years. With quotations from the treatises of Archbishop Cyprian, George Duke of Manchester, Lord Congleton, Honourable Gerard Noel, Revs. Dr. Alexander McLeod, Dr. Hales, Dr. Gill, Dr. Grabe, Dr. Roos, Dr. Seiss, and Revs. Thomas Scott, Hollis Read, E. Nangle, R. Skeen, J. G. Gregory, R. A. Purdon, R. Govett, R. Polwhele, Tilson Marsh, C. J. Goodhart, J. G. Zippel, B. W. Newton, C. Beale, D. N. Lord, Colonel Rowlandson, Major Trevilian, Major Bolton, &c. With eighteen full-page illustrations. First American Edition. By the Rev. M. Baxter, author of "The Coming Battle," and "Louis Napoleon." Philadelphia: James S. Claxton, successor to Wm. S. & Alfred Martien, 1214 Chestnut street. 1867.

We presume our readers need no more information about this work than this pondrous title-page affords.

Helena's Household. A Tale of Rome in the First Century. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 8vo. Pp. 422.

The Word; The House of Israel. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York. 12mo. Pp. 504.

A Sequel to Ministering Children. By Maria Louisa Charlesworth. 12mo. Pp. 428.

These books designed for the young are all valuable in matter, and attractive in style and appearance. The name of the publisher which is common to them all, is a sufficient guarantee of the solid value of any work to which it is attached. In the case of the third book, the name of the author, and the eminent success of the previous work to which this comes as a sequel, is an additional recommendation of the highest kind.