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ART. I.—*History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe.* By the Rev. W. E. H. LECKEY, M. A. In two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866.

History of Rationalism; embracing a Survey of the Present State of Protestant Theology. By the Rev. JOHN F. HURST, A. M. With Appendix of Literature. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

Essays on the Supernatural in Christianity, with Special Reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tubingen School. By Rev. GEORGE P. FISHER, M. A., Professor of Church History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost; or, Reason and Revelation. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866.

THE simultaneous appearance of these and other important works, for and against Rationalism, from such various quarters —sceptical, Papal, and orthodox evangelical—only proves how profoundly the mind of all parties in Christendom is agitated on the subject. These several parties, of course, take very different views in regard to it. The sceptics laud Rationalism

as the chief instrument of human progress, enlightenment, and civilization, the great emancipator of the race from superstition, bigotry, persecution—all forms of religious barbarism and reptile delusion. Such is the scope of Mr. Leckey's very able but one-sided work, which, under another title, breathes very much the spirit of Buckle's *History of Civilization.* On the other hand, the evangelical and orthodox deem Rationalism, just in proportion to the degree and continuance of it, destructive of Christianity and all the beneficent fruits which it has showered upon our race, and which go so far to prove the divinity of its origin. Such is the drift of Hurst's *History of Rationalism*, a work of great value, notwithstanding some unworthy thrusts at Calvinism; while Professor Fisher rather fortifies the great defences of supernaturalism, and makes the blows of its assailants to recoil upon themselves. Archbishop Manning, on the other hand, agrees with evangelical Protestants in denouncing Rationalism as the deadly foe of religion. But he differs from them in maintaining that the Romish hierarchy or church is the only barrier and defence against it; and that rationalists are not only they who infringe upon the normal and paramount authority of the word of God, but those who question the infallibility of the Romish church, and of the Pope, its head. It is difficult then to exaggerate the importance of Rationalism, and of correct apprehensions of its real character, tendency, and influence.

What then is Rationalism? One answer to this question is, that it is the illegitimate exaltation of human reason in those matters of religion which are the subject of Divine revelation. This, though intrinsically a true, is nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, but a partial and relative definition of it. That which, in the view of some, is an illegitimate, in the view of others, is a legitimate use of reason in the premises. The orthodox and evangelical denounce, as subversive of the due authority of the word of God, what latitudinarians and liberals assert to be only the righteous prerogative of reason, and our only shield against bigotry and superstition. To define Rationalism, then, as the illegitimate elevation of reason in religion determines nothing, except for those who adopt the lawful standard in regard to its use. All parties claim that

they favour the right use of reason in matters of revelation. But they differ as to what constitutes such use of it.

There is, however, one view or definition of Rationalism in which all parties pretty nearly coincide. According to this, Rationalism is that mode or system of thinking in religion which makes human reason the supreme standard or authority therein. It admits of nothing on the authority of revelation which does not receive the sanction or endorsement of human reason, not merely on the ground of being revealed, but as judged by the standards of this faculty, in its natural state. This definition is accepted and given by rationalists themselves. So Wegscheider, in his *Institutiones Dogmaticæ*, as quoted by Hurst, says that Rationalism teaches "that the subject matter of every supposed supernatural revelation is to be examined according to the ideas regarding religion and morality, which we have formed in the mind by the help of reason. . . . Whosoever, therefore, despising that supremacy of human reason, maintains that the authority of a revelation, said to have been communicated to certain men in a supernatural manner, is such that it must be obeyed by all means, without any doubt, that man takes away and overturns from the foundation the true nature and dignity of man," &c., &c. Staudlin, as quoted by the same author, describes Rationalism as the opinion "that reason has the highest authority and right of decision in matters of faith and morality, so that an edifice of faith and morals built on this foundation shall be called Rationalism." Leckey says of Rationalism: "Its central conception is the elevation of conscience into the supreme authority as the religious organ. . . . It revolves around the ideal of Christianity, and represents its spirit without its dogmatic system and its supernatural narratives. From both of these it unhesitatingly recoils, while deriving all its strength and nourishment from Christian ethics." Vol. i., pp. 181—4.

If this is the account given of Rationalism by its friends, others will scarcely question its accuracy, so far as it goes. The ascription of such prerogatives to human reason, in regard to the authority and content of revelation, is surely Rationalism, whatever may be true of less than this. Professor Hahn says: "As to Rationalism, this word was used in the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries by those who considered reason as the source and norm of faith." Bretschneider says the rationalists "allow that revelation *may* contain much out of the power of reason to explain, but say that it should assert nothing contrary to reason, but rather what may be proved by it. . . . They only mean the accepting those doctrines which they like, and which seem to them reasonable. . . . In practice they reject the positive doctrines of Christianity, (I mean especially the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, the Mediation and Intercession of our Lord, Original Sin, and Justification by Faith,) because they allege that these doctrines are contrary to reason."

The sum of all these definitions or representations of Rationalism is that, in some form or degree, it makes reason the supreme authority in religion, and paramount to the word of God, when the two come into conflict. Of this there are various degrees, ranging from the absolute renunciation of the word of God, and even the possibility of a supernatural revelation, to the rationalistic explaining away from one or more Christian doctrines those elements which, however scriptural, are unwelcome to the feelings, or inexplicable to the reason of the unbeliever. But perhaps rationalists may be reduced to three radical classes.

1. Those who deny either that it is possible, or that it is reasonable, for God so far to interfere with and counterwork the uniform laws of nature, as to make a supernatural revelation, or to attest it infallibly by miracles. Of course, such rationalists are simply infidels. They may hold to a something, miscalled inspiration. But it is only the inspiration of genius, of Homer, Plato, Bacon, Kant, and other great masters of our race. It imparts no infallible certainty or authority.

2. The second grade of Rationalism is that which admits a revelation in the Bible authenticated by miracles, but so mixed with human additions, and modified by the moulds of human expression through which it comes to us, that it is left to human reason to determine what portions of it are the word of God, and how far they are so, and how far they are human. This really makes reason the supreme judge and arbiter in religion. For it will only admit that to be from God which

accords with the judgments of reason. In this class fall Socinians and Unitarians, *et id genus omne.*

A third class admit the Scriptures to be the word of God, and the supreme and sufficient rule of faith and practice. But they qualify this recognition with various rationalistic conditions or explanations. Many say that the Bible is inspired as to its thoughts, but not as to its words, which opens the door to endless license in rejecting or explaining away whatever in it is disliked. Many say that nothing can be revealed in it which is above or contrary to the dictates of reason, conscience, or their instinctive feelings. Consequently they explain away whatever seems contrary or inexplicable to their reason, or repugnant to their feelings. This is of every shade, from Socinianism, through Arianism, Sabellianism, Pelagianism, Arminianism, to some forms of metaphysical and rationalizing Calvinism. Some are rationalistic on some points of scriptural doctrine, who are wholly free from such a bias in other matters. Some rationalize the Trinity into Sabellianism or Semi-Arianism, who have no difficulty with the Incarnation, or other high scriptural mysteries. Some twist the Incarnation out of its scriptural proportions, who have no trouble with other points. Others still fall to eviscerating the scriptural and church doctrines of Original Sin, Inability, Regeneration, Atonement, because they cannot construe them in a manner satisfactory to their intellects or sensibilities. Such is Rationalism. It is the exaltation of Reason to supreme authority in matters of Religion, an authority paramount to and overbearing revelation, or forcing the interpretation thereof into conformity to itself, when the two are in collision. This process in regard to any or all the doctrines of revelation, is, as far as it goes, rationalistic. The question arises, how far this is a lawful or normal use of reason in the premises. If it is not, then the first definition of Rationalism, as the illegitimate use of human reason in religion, which we let go for the time, as uncertain, is validated by the second, which is recognized as just by all parties.

What then is the legitimate province of Reason with reference to the contents or averments of the word of God? To

this three generic answers are given, which, of course, are capable of manifold subdivisions.

The first is the rationalistic answer already presented, which gives human reason the prerogative of rejecting whatever declarations of Scripture do not accord with the natural feelings and judgments of the human mind.

The second is the Papal doctrine. According to this not only is Reason not permitted to exalt itself against Scripture, but it is not permitted to ascertain or judge what Scripture teaches. Its only function is to take the interpretations and decisions of the infallible church as to the mind of the Spirit written and unwritten, as these are declared by the Pope or by ecumenical councils. "All appeals to Scripture alone, or to Scripture and antiquity, whether by individuals or by local churches, are no more than appeals from the divine voice of the living church, and therefore essentially rationalistic."*

The third is the orthodox and evangelical view, which maintains the plenary inspiration, infallible truth, and supreme authority of the sacred Scriptures, while it assigns to reason simply the function of ascertaining and bowing to their teachings. This does not exclude efforts to reconcile these teachings with each other, with knowledge from other sources, and with right reason, and to put them into the most rigid scientific system; always however upon this condition, that the indubitable testimony of Scripture is true, however inexplicable, and whatever else may be false.

This we hold to be the true view—the only one which can logically escape Rationalism and infidelity on the one hand, and Romanism on the other; which, indeed, can make the Bible a real rule of faith or guide of life.

Nevertheless this view, although palpably and undeniably true, is not without difficulties in the details of its application. Questions and problems arise at every point which task our insight, patience, and candour for their solution. These will appear as we go on to point out the particular functions of reason in ascertaining the meaning of the Scriptures.

1. It is obvious that human reason, in order to believe the

* *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost,* by Archbishop Manning, p. 44.

truths of Scripture, must be able to discern their import. It is the eye which sees this light from heaven, these beams of the Sun of Righteousness. Without the bodily eye, the light of a thousand suns leaves us still in darkness. Without the eye of the soul, which is reason, it could not see the meaning of a Divine revelation speaking with all the clearness and self-evidence of axioms. But while there is a certain analogy between the outer and the inner eye, as the organs or receptivities respectively for taking in material and spiritual light, it is but partial. A difference soon appears. The eye of the body may open itself from a state of previous darkness upon all that the sun discloses of the material universe. It brings no contribution of light itself in order that it may be able to see the light of the sun and what it unveils. Not so with the eye of the soul as regards the light of revelation. In order to be capable of perceiving the ideas and truths therein set forth, it must itself be furnished with a certain stock of elementary ideas and truths, as the pre-condition thereof. How could the revelation of God's being, infinitude, truth, holiness, justice, goodness, be communicated to one who had no conception of the meaning of these things? How could the charge to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God, be received by one who had no conception of the meaning of these duties? How could the Scriptures so often reason with men, and summon them also to reason on these great matters, if they were void of all light, all ideas and truths of reason? Reason without any insight into such truths is no reason. It is at best but undeveloped, potential reason; not reason actualized. And it is only reason possessing the first ideas and truths of reason that is capable of being amplified and purified by revelation.

2. If a certain light of reason is requisite to receiving the light of revelation, the question arises, how far any revelation or interpretation of revelation can be received which is in conflict with the clear intuitions or evident deductions of reason: and how far we are authorized by forced interpretations to eliminate from Scripture its obvious meaning, if that meaning be opposed to our most confident judgments or earnest feelings. In answer to this it may be said generally, that revelation, while enlarging the sphere and correcting the errors of the

human understanding, incorporates into itself these first axioms of reason; or, in another view, engrafts its own teachings upon the truths thus already known to, and, indeed, themselves being constituent elements of, human reason. Revelation does not repudiate these, it does but enlarge, clarify, and perfect our understanding of them.

This is only saying that it does not destroy, it rather illuminates and perfects reason.

But, in thus instructing reason, two requisites are needed in reason itself, in order to be capable of such instruction. 1. That, as has been shown, it be capable of apprehending the matter taught, and 2, that it be capable of receiving or submitting to this teaching, in other words, that it be teachable. And in order to be teachable, it must recognize its own inferiority and insufficiency on all matters on which it is to be instructed by revelation. But how can this be, if reason sets itself up as judge of what alone is possible to be true, and therefore alone possible to be revealed even by infallible authority and omniscient wisdom. Plainly, so far as reason is invested with such prerogatives, revelation is irrelevant, solecistical and impossible. But how far is it so? In answer we say,

3. The only limits to the possibility or possible scope of a revelation from heaven, is that it cannot contradict known truths which have an incontestable certainty, whether from revelation itself, or the self-evident intuitions and axioms of reason, or the indubitable testimony of the senses. This is only saying that truth cannot contradict truth: that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time; that God cannot teach, and we cannot believe that the same thing is and is not at the same moment. Such is the principle, about which, fairly understood, there can be no difference of opinion. This is the *judicium contradictionis*, which the most orthodox divines have recognized as being the necessary prerogative of reason in determining the possible contents of revelation. And this is the only prerogative which they do concede to it. While there can be no difference of opinion as to this principle in itself considered, there is the widest diversity as regards its application. And this difference runs through the whole range

of opinion from the most reverent faith to the most destructive rationalism. A just application of the principle is safe and salutary. A false application of it is ruinous to the full extent to which it is carried. The false and destructive rationalistic application of this principle lies in finding contradictions where there are only mysteries, and in treating what are merely apparent contradictions as if they were real. This will be seen as we proceed to examine the several classes of cases involved.

But first a word as to the distinction between a contradiction and a mystery, which Rationalism is always endeavouring to confound; *i. e.*, by straining mysteries into contradictions.

Now we have seen what a contradiction is. It is at once affirming and denying the same predicate of the same subject. Its formula is, A is B, A is not B; or more grossly, A is, A is not.

A mystery, on the other hand, is what we can in some sense apprehend, but cannot comprehend. We may know that it is, but not how or why it is. But what is meant by this? Why, simply that we cannot explain its points of contact and modes of agreement with other related truths. Such is the Trinity, the Incarnation, the origin of evil, the omnipresence of God, the principle of life and growth. But this is wholly different from contradiction which asserts directly and immediately that what is, is not. That children cannot see why an iron anchor should sink, and an iron ship should swim, why a feather should rise and stone fall; why one picture seen through glass should display only one surface, while two seen in a stereoscope display depth as well as surface, is no evidence that they are not so. And in the things of God, what are we but children and less than children? Now one great enormity of Rationalism lies in its constant attempt to turn mysteries into contradictions.

4. Let us look at the application of these principles to the seeming or alleged contradictions of the Scriptures themselves. These are such as that God repents and does not repent, that he does not tempt any man, and yet did tempt Abraham, that he is not willing that any should perish, and yet does will that the rejecters of Christ shall go away into everlasting punish-

ment; that there is but one God, and yet there is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, each of whom is God; then in the sphere of soterology, that men are justified by faith alone, and that they are not justified by faith without works; that when they are weak they are strong; sorrowful yet always rejoicing. This catalogue of contradictions in sound but not in sense found in Scripture, might be indefinitely extended, but it is quite unnecessary. These amply suffice to illustrate our meaning.

Now many have made these and like seeming contradictions a ground of impeaching the inspiration and infallible authority of the Scriptures. They have said, writings so full of contradictions if not of other palpable errors, could not be from God. They must be myths or deliberate impostures. But we need not detain our readers to explain how all these several contradictions in sound are not contradictions in sense.

A much larger class make this false application of the principle of contradiction to particular doctrines in detail, without bringing it to bear against the Bible as a whole. Socinians bring these alleged contradictions of Scripture with itself, or with truths otherwise known, to batter down nearly every distinctive doctrine of the Christian system. Thus they say that God cannot be three and one, because it is a contradiction, to which, of course, the familiar answer is that the Godhead is one as to substance, three as to persons—a trinity or tri-*u*nity which involves no contradiction, however inexplicable the mystery. So of the Incarnation. It is said to be a contradiction that the same person should be both God and man; some hence arguing away his humanity, others his divinity, others still maintaining a hybrid theanthropic *tertium quid* neither human nor divine—all alike corrupting the great mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh, which, however inexplicable, is clearly set forth in Scripture, and is no contradiction, viz., that Christ is both God and man, two natures in one person forever.

So of faith and works; not merely Socinians, but, to some extent, Arminians, Romanists, and ritualists generally, say that what James says of the insufficiency of faith without works, and what the Scriptures uniformly teach of the absolute

necessity of good works and holy living to salvation, contradict the doctrine of exclusive justification by faith in the alone merits of Christ. Whereas, the meaning of Scripture nowhere teaches otherwise than that genuine faith in Christ alone justifies; it only teaches that if faith alone justifies, it is not such faith as is alone, or that a faith without works is dead, no real faith. Other doctrines, such as regeneration, atonement, original sin, are subjected to similar attacks, but we reserve the consideration of them, because they are more strenuously assailed from the side of alleged contradiction to the self-evident truths of reason. It is only necessary to say to all who admit the Divine inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, that all the alleged contradictions and discrepancies between different portions of the sacred volume disappear when they are duly understood, and in such wise, as in no manner to impair, but more fully to establish the complete credibility and authority of the whole and the parts. Its averments do not mutually subvert, but elucidate and confirm each other. And hence it follows,

5. That if there be apparent contradictions in Scripture which are not real, and which, however plausibly urged against catholic Christianity, are found to be wholly unsubstantial, then the same is quite as likely to be true of apparent contradictions between Scripture or scriptural doctrines and the most evident testimonies of sense or reason; in short of all our natural faculties intuitive and deductive. What witness against any truth's of revelation can be stronger than revelation itself? Yet we have found that such contradictions in word and sound exist in Scripture, which, when properly understood, are no real contradictions. Is not this then much more likely to prove true of any apparent contradiction between the clear, obvious, manifoldly repeated teachings of Scripture on any subject, and some obvious fact or maxim known through our natural intelligence? And if so, ought we not to be slow to conclude that the apparent contradiction is real, believing that in some way and time it must and will be so explained as to disappear; at all events, that there is a solution of the apparent contradiction which, though undiscoverable by us, is clear to the Omniscient mind? A strong example is furnished in the command to

Abraham to slay his son Isaac. Will our moral nature, either in its judgments or feelings, sanction the propriety and rectitude of that command, otherwise than as faith overrules their spontaneous impulses, and asserts that whatever God does is right, whether we can reconcile it with our standards and ideas of right or not? Yet will it do, will any one dare to expunge or contradict this part of the sacred history, because we know not how to explain it into harmony with our moral intuitions? It is true, and it is right, even if we cannot see *how* it is so by our reason, but only *that* it is so by our faith.

It is indeed true that a book which on the whole enjoins immoralities and fosters wickedness cannot be from God who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity; and the obvious scope of the revelations and requirements of the Bible is to promote that holiness which is one evidence of its divine origin. But this is perfectly consistent with the fact that we may not be able at once, or even in this life, to see all the ways of contact and conciliation between all points of that revealed truth which sanctifies, and other truths natural and revealed, moral and physical. The presumption, nay the certainty, that such revealed truth can be reconciled with all other truth, even if we do not know how, is strong enough to forbid its rejection. If we cannot reconcile the conflict with other truths, it may be that others can; it is certain that God can. To admit that men are at liberty to reject what scriptural doctrines they see not how to reconcile with other known truths, under the plea that they involve contradictions, would be most fatal to all faith. It would legitimate the most destructive scepticism and rationalism. This may easily be made apparent.

Thus, if we take the simple elementary doctrines of God's decrees and man's free-agency, they are both true and self-consistent, though multitudes have been unable to construe to themselves the way or even possibility of their agreement. Every man knows that he is free. And yet it is clearly taught that all his actions and all events are foreordained. Some see how such antecedent certainty no way conflicts with the freedom of action. But suppose any cannot see it. Are they therefore at liberty to reject, as so many Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians have done, the decrees of God in order to spare

man's free-agency, or, with fatalists and hyper-calvinists, to destroy free-agency in order to preserve decrees?

Then comes Original Sin. There is no possible aspect in which this can be viewed in which it does not involve mystery, or something difficult of reconciliation with some known truths; in this respect sharing the difficulties of the origin of evil, at once the most undeniable and inexplicable of all facts. But will it do for men to take the liberty of denying that the race fell in the fall of Adam, and in judgment for his sin while standing on probation for them? If many find it hard to see the equity of this scriptural account of our fallen state, do not manifold greater difficulties burden every other theory? So of native pollution and guilt; they have their difficulties. But are not the pangs and death suffered by our race from the first, unspeakably greater difficulties on the supposition of their freedom from sin? And how are they salvable in Christ, if they are not sinful and lost?

Again, there is the doctrine of Atonement, or of the expiation of sin through the sufferings and death of Christ in the sinner's room and stead. How many insist that this is contradictory to that primitive moral axiom that it cannot be right that the innocent should suffer the punishment of the guilty. Now we know the singular and unapproachable combination of circumstances that take this unique case beyond the reach of this axiom, such as the infinite worth, high prerogative, and sovereign consent of the adorable Sufferer. But suppose we did not see this, or were unable to comprehend its force, are we therefore at liberty to presume there is no solution of the difficulty, even in the Omniscient mind, and to follow the Socinians and Humanitarians in discarding this fundamental doctrine of Christianity, so manifoldly taught in the Bible as the only foundation of the sinner's hope, and of the religion of the Bible itself? Or are we at liberty, like some who stop short of this extreme, and retain the idea of some indirect and constructive substitution of Christ suffering for the merited punishment of the redeemed sinner, to say that these sufferings were not penal in lieu of our punishment, when the Scripture so manifoldly represents him as bearing our sins, the chastisement of our peace, and becoming sin, a curse, and a sacrifice for us?

Especially, if a closer and deeper examination will prove that the obvious meaning of Scripture is in truer accord with the profoundest intuitions and feelings of the human soul, when oppressed with a sense of sin, than any scheme of atonement which requires a more forced and non-natural exposition of the Scriptures?

Now let us pass to another great doctrine—Inability—viz., the doctrine so explicitly and variously taught in Scripture, asserted in the creeds and devotional literature of Christendom, affirmed by all Christians on their knees before God, that without Divine grace we are unable to keep the law, obey the gospel, and lead holy lives. It is said that this contradicts the intuitive maxim, that obligation cannot exceed our power; or that we cannot be obliged or rightly required to do or be what we have no power to do or be. Because of this apparent inconsistency, are we therefore at liberty to presume there can be no reconciliation between the two, or that we so fully apprehend the true and full meaning of these supposed contradictories, as to know that they must be really such, past all possibility of being harmonized, and that hence we must follow the Arminians, Pelagians, and so many in this country who disown these titles, in denying a real inability, and asserting some form of plenary ability? By no manner of means. Scripture and Christian experience in its favour are quite enough to prove that it must harmonize with all other truths, whether we can see how or not.

But a little closer examination will show us that a true understanding of the maxim that obligation is commensurate with ability, does not conflict with the scriptural doctrine of inability. For this inability is our sin; the strength and dominion of sinful lusts and passions. But surely sin cannot be excusable in proportion to its strength and mastery. Nor is it any part of the import of the axiom in question that we are under no obligation to put away sin, because it has dominion over us. The maxim in question only excuses from outward acts which we are physically powerless to perform, and from those inward acts and states for which we are disabled by other causes than our sin. The alleged contradiction, therefore, is wholly imaginary.

The same is true of a like plea for rejecting inability, on the ground of its apparent conflict with the popular axiom, that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, a maxim claimed to be at variance not only with inability, but with original sin, and divine regeneration. Hence large classes have in various degrees repudiated or pared down these doctrines. But this maxim properly understood, in its sense as well as its sound, does not contradict any or all of these great doctrines. When it is used by the people it is meant either with reference to outward acts, in which sense it is strictly true in the narrowest sense of the word *will*, as the mere power of volition; or the word *will* and its adjective voluntary are taken in the broad sense in which it was formerly used, for all the non-cognitive powers of the mind, together with the exercises and states thereof—*i. e.*, as embracing desires, feelings, and dispositions with regard to moral objects. In this sense also it is strictly true. In one or the other of the above senses is the maxim used when asserted as an axiom; and in neither of them does it conflict with the great doctrines which it is claimed to contradict.

Now suppose we admit the principle that we are at liberty to reject every doctrine fully set forth in Scripture because of some show of antagonism between it and what we count as self-evident principles, how readily will every cardinal doctrine of Christianity be swept away, not because of any real contradiction, but because of a seeming conflict arising from crude and undefined conceptions of them or either of them? The examples already adduced show how few landmarks of the Christian faith could stand before such hermeneutics.

One source of difficulty in this matter is the great doubt or uncertainty as to what are and what are not self-evident principles, and, when this is determined, what is a proper statement or exact expression of them. Plain as it might seem that self-evident principles are self-evidencing, and therefore past all dispute, it is no less certain that they have been the subjects of constant controversy among metaphysicians. Locke's assault on innate ideas was but an attempt to disprove the existence of supersensual intuitive truths, such as the first axioms in morals and metaphysics. Dr. Thomas Brown cau-

tions us against a tendency to the undue multiplication of first truths, beyond the very fewest which alone are such, observing that disputants are tempted to this, both from their indolence which inclines to the easy resort of self-affirmation when the labour of proof is needed, and from that partizan zeal which is inclined to exalt the dogmas of their own clique or clan to the dignity and authority of axioms and first truths: a propensity noticed by an old father, who tells us, *Unaquæque gens illud legem naturæ putat quod didicit.*

Hence the most eminent metaphysicians have come to devote great attention to elaborating the tests and criteria of intuitive truths. Hamilton gave some of his best efforts to this work. McCosh has recently published a volume on the "Intuitions of the Human Mind," of which valuable discussion on this subject constitutes a leading part. We cannot here go into this subject at any length. We will only state three criteria of intuitive truths which they have reached, viz., self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity, or universal acceptance; to which Hamilton adds simplicity or incomprehensibility, *i. e.*, the impossibility of being resolved into, or comprehended under aught that is more simple or ultimate. To develope this matter at large would require an independent article, indeed, many of them. Men are very apt to think that self-evident which is only very evident and dear to themselves. It is so evident to Unitarians and other latitudinarians, that they think and pronounce it self-evident, that for God to inflict on his sinless Son the sufferings due to penitent sinners, is the climax of absurdity. But quite the contrary is evident to the Christian world, who joyfully accept this glorious truth, in the belief of which

"The saints of all ages in harmony meet."

But not only does it require careful inquiry to determine what are these first truths and axioms, but also to fix the proper statement of them. It is generally, and justly, accepted as a first or self-evident truth that every event must have a cause. But a common and inadvertent mode of stating this truth was, that every *thing* (or being) must have a cause—a very different proposition, and leading to far different consequences. If every thing or being must have a cause, then God

must have a cause, or be created, which is Atheism. Like examples of the misapprehension, or misstatement, or misapplication of intuitive principles we have already seen, in reference to the equation of ability and responsibility, the punishment of the innocent instead of the guilty, the impossibility of three being one, etc.

While therefore the *judicium contradictionis* is a sound principle rightly applied, yet the perversion or misapplication of it runs into the most destructive Rationalism—1. even with respect to seeming contradictions between different portions of the language of Scripture; and 2. between these and the self-evident truths of reason which shine in their own light. And if this be so in these cases, much more must it be so in reference to any supposed contradiction between the obvious and didactic meaning of Scripture, and the conclusions reached by a course of reasoning physical or metaphysical, in which we are notoriously liable to err. It is far safer to presume there is some undetected flaw in our reasoning, than in the obvious meaning of the word of God, as shown in its literal and figurative statements, its implications, and the whole analogy of faith. Rationalism appears when mysteries are rejected either simply because they are mysteries, or because they are treated as contradictions when they are only inexplicable.

If all this be true of the points of contact between the obvious and repeated testimonies of Scripture, and whatever may seem in conflict with them, whether on its own pages, in the self-evident intuitions or the logical deductions of reason, in short, in the entire realms of theology, metaphysics, and psychology, what are we to say of similar apparent contradictions between the obvious meaning of scriptures and facts known, or conceived to be known, in regard to the material world, immediately by the senses, or mediately through the investigations, experiments, the inductive generalizations, and deductive reasonings of physical science?

The relations of physical science and religion are not without their share of perplexity. Many crude generalities have currency, which, if true in some sense, are not true in every sense, and for all purposes for which they are employed. It is truly said that the Bible does not aim or claim to teach physical

science. It is equally true that it teaches the facts out of which the science of theology is constructed, but does not in the strictest sense give the science, or scientific form of those facts. That is, it does not give the science in addition to the facts of theology. And it is further true that it does not teach falsehoods, whether in physics or metaphysics, whether in a scientific or unscientific form. Any facts taught by the infallible authority of God are facts, whether physical or psychological, whether they relate to stopping the sun in its course, walking on the sea, rending the rocks, raising the dead, or regenerating the soul. And these facts should be allowed and estimated at their real value by all truly scientific minds, as well as other facts discerned by our natural faculties.

It is often urged that the sacred writers speak of the sun's rising, as if herein they taught what science has disproved. But what is taught by this language? Just what is taught now by it, that the position of the sun relatively to the earth becomes elevated, but not which of the two bodies actually moves away from the other. No language is used in regard to the sun's rising in Scripture which is not just as freely used now, in full view of the sun being fixed, and the earth being in motion. In short, no language is used which is not, in its real significance, congruous with the ascertained facts of science. When we say that the shore recedes as the vessel we are in moves away from it, every one understands this merely as asserting that the distance between us and the shore increases, but not that the shore literally moves. The same principle applies to the sun's rising.

Now let us consider how some other alleged indisputable facts in the physical sphere are cited as contradictions of scriptural declarations or cardinal Christian doctrines. It has been said that the resurrection of the body which dies is impossible, because some of the materials of which it is composed go to form different human bodies as they are at death. Battle-fields are fertilized with human bodies, which thus form plants to become the food of other bodies. How then can the same bodies be raised again? This would be in point, if the identity of our own bodies now consisted in absolute continued sameness of all their particles. But it does not. They are

undergoing constant change of these, and change them entirely in seven years, without losing their identity.

Some scientists claim that the evidence of our race being composed of distinct species, is too strong to consist with the truth of the scriptural account of the descent of mankind from a single pair,—a fact which runs through the whole scriptural system of anthropology and soterology. Are we, therefore, to surrender the great doctrines of the unity of our race, its fall in the fall of the first Adam, and redemption by the second Adam? Is it possible that Agassiz, or any one else, can find any proofs about the origin of species subversive of this great truth? In point of fact, the most rigorous analysis of the criteria of species goes to indicate that our race constitute one species. But suppose it were otherwise,—that many things are as we should expect them to be, if mankind were several species. What then? Can they be decisive enough to overthrow the word of God? or to require its plain averments and implications to be frittered away?

We may pass all reference to the cosmogony of Genesis, and the discoveries of geology. It is enough that, conceding the utmost in regard to its facts, the Bible gives but a single detailed narrative on the genesis of the worlds, and that at most it only requires that day and night should have a breadth of signification which they often bear in Scripture and common speech, to effect a perfect conciliation between science and Scripture on this subject. But seriously, will it be pretended that evidence decisive enough has been obtained against any clear, repeated, manifoldly stated, and implied testimonies of Scripture, to require wrenching and violence of interpretation?

The whole department of miracles is within the domain of physics. That is to say, it has to do with the production of phenomena cognizable by the senses, and dependent on such cognition for their efficacy; and they are not in apparent harmony with the laws of nature, discovered by physical science. They involve the direct suspension, or interruption, or counteraction of those laws—*i. e.*, by whatever name we may choose to call it, such an intervention of special supernatural power as prevents their ordinary normal effects. Now it is the fashion of sceptical scientists, and scientific sceptics, to

assume the impossibility of any interruption of the laws of nature or of their uniform working. Many of them assume the a-priori impossibility of such supernatural interposition. Others assume that the uniformity of the laws of nature, past all possibility of interruption, in itself or its manifestations, by any special divine interposition, has been proved by the simple fact that we now find them to be invariable. This is one cardinal principle of Positivism, and of all who imbibe its spirit. It of course rules out all miracle, revelation, supernatural grace, to say nothing of special providence. It is therefore the doctrine of Atheists. But it is the doctrine of many who would resent the charge of Atheism, nay, of many who claim to be Christians. Whole treatises, most extended and elaborate, are now given to the public by such writers as Baden Powell, Leckey, and Draper; the key-note of which is, that society advances in proportion as it gets rid of belief in the supernatural. Says Draper, "is not momentary intervention altogether derogatory to the thorough and absolute sovereignty of God." "The process of attaining correct views of nature has been marked by a continual decline of the mysterious and supernatural." This is the whole drift of Leckey's book on Rationalism. These writers lump together the Christian miracles, supernatural grace, demonology, witchcraft, the lying wonders of impostors, praying for propitious weather and for health, in one category of preposterous delusion, which the growing knowledge of the invariability of nature's laws will dissipate.

Now here these sceptical scientists claim to have discovered a fact or law which is utterly contradictory to Christianity and all supernatural religion. What then? And are we to concede it? By no manner of means. The answer to it all is the existence of a Personal God, who can make and unmake; who can do his whole pleasure in establishing, continuing, or arresting any mode or law of nature's working, if adequate reasons therefor exist. To authenticate his own revelation, and redeem sinners, is a sufficient reason for such special interposition. It is only the lowest deep of stolid scepticism that is unable to see the resplendent proofs of a Personal God; of his power to interpose for the control and disposal of his own universe at his pleasure; of the fitness of such intervention for the salvation

of the lost; of his actual interposition as evinced in the self-evident divinity of his own word, and the incarnation and sacrifice of his own Son therein recorded. We confess that there is no class of writers and thinkers of whom we can think with less respect or even patience. We have just about as much respect for their claims to superior insight, because they are blind to the evidence and even possibility of a personal reigning God, of miracles, revelation, and redemption, as we should have for the pretence of a bat to see better than other animals because it cannot see daylight. The slave in the hut, with one glimpse of Christ, knows more and better than all this shallow and one-sided dogmatism. The least of Christ's little ones has an unspeakably greater breadth and depth of insight than is dreamt of in such philosophy.

What conclusions then do we reach respecting the oppositions of science, whether truly or falsely so called, to religion? That science is to be fettered in its search after truth, or that its indubitably established facts are not to be recognized by Christian believers, or that the word of Divine truth can contradict any truth certainly ascertained by sense, reason, science or philosophy? Not at all. Let science be untrammelled in its investigations, and go wherever evidence leads it. But then let it be candid enough to look at all the evidence, from every source, and weigh it impartially. Let it not shut out valid testimony by a-priori assertions of its incredibility. Let it take the evidence of testimony, as well as the senses. Suppose that some geologic inductions require that the Danube or the Nile, at their mouths, should have trended in one direction three thousand years ago, and reliable historical testimony and monuments prove that they trended in another; is this latter source of knowledge to be ignored or contemned? Suppose that any physicist judges from an examination of the fauna and flora of different zones, that our race sprung from different pairs and is made up of different species, is the evidence of its original unity derived from ethnology, comparative philology, and scriptural history, to be discarded? They are to be free to learn all about the sciences which their senses, aided by observation, experiment, and inductive reasoning, can tell them. They are bound equally to see that the Bible is the word of God, to

believe its testimonies, to weigh well their bearing on these subjects, and give them their due significance. And if two interpretations of some ascertained phenomena are possible, one consistent, the other inconsistent with the obvious meaning of the sacred word, they are bound a thousand times over to give the preference to the former. And they are bound to wait long and ponder well, and be sure of their facts, before they come to the conclusion to wrest Scripture from its natural meaning to a forced construction in accommodation to their views, lest they wrest it to their own destruction. Numerous scientists now tell us there is evidence not merely of the invariability of nature's laws, of the correlation of forces, and the conversion of matter from one form into another, but that matter is alike incapable of destruction or creation, and that all interruption of natural laws, all miracles and supernatural agencies, are impossible. Now this is in blank contradiction to the Scriptures, and even to the possibility of revelation. Are these scientists at liberty to fix their opinions on such subjects, ignoring the evidences of the divinity and infallibility of the Scriptures, and the proof these afford of the creation and destructibility of matter, and of supernatural intervention in the work of grace and salvation? Is not this like shutting our eyes to the sun, in order to clarify our vision and brighten our light? Like boasting of deeper and broader insight because we look at subjects with one eye, and that in the back of the head?

And now what constitutes a truly reliable and judicial habit of mind on these issues between, we do not say science, but some scientists, and the teachings of Scripture, the tenets of the Christian faith? Is it a state which ignores, or is blind, or indifferent to revelation, its evidences, averments, and cardinal truths? This cannot be. We might as well say it is requisite to a judicial condition of mind in metaphysics to ignore the primary intuitions of sense or reason, or in a disputed question of law to set aside or be indifferent to the first principles of jurisprudence. Such an attempt is absurd, irrational, impracticable. It is like putting out our eyes in order to see, discarding the first elements of reason in order to be rational, the most reliable sources of proof in order to an impartial judgment.

Neither are we to ignore any facts clearly proved by the testimony of our senses, of other reliable witnesses, of authentic history, or of clear deduction therefrom. These we are to weigh well in connection with all the assertions of Scripture. But we are not to conclude, in case of any apparent disagreement, that the inspired witnesses are of course mistaken, or probably so. We are to revise our evidence from natural sources, and see that there is no mistake, or reasonable possibility of mistake, either in the testimony so given, or our estimates of, and deductions from it. If finally it appears that somewhat is incontrovertibly established contrary to a more obvious and accepted interpretation of any portion of Scripture, then let this interpretation be revised, with all other evidence on the subject, and an adjustment or reconciliation sought consistent with all the evidence; but let it be propounded as only problematic and tentative, until due evidence fully confirms it. There is a true and a false prejudice on these and other subjects. We cannot, being Christians, scientists, or even rational beings, come to the fair investigation and adjudication of any subjects without such prejudgments, or prejudices, as are involved in our most intimate and well-founded beliefs or convictions as Christians, scientists, or rational beings. These may be of greater or less strength, according to the evidence on which they are founded; and may yield with greater or less difficulty according to the respective amounts of previous evidence for, and subsequent evidence against them. Such prejudice is involved in true candour and fairness. That prejudice which is without evidence, or against evidence, or which weds the soul to any consistency inconsistent with supreme fealty to truth, is alone to be condemned and abjured.

It is often said that we must meet sceptics, or sceptical scientists, on their own ground. If there is a sense in which this is true, there is certainly a sense in which it is false. If Christians are required to meet sceptics on their own ground, much more are the latter bound to meet Christians on their own ground. Whether and how far we ought to meet sceptics of any class on their own ground, depends entirely on how far that ground is tenable and gives either party a safe foothold

or resting-place. We are to meet them on ground of truth, not of falsehood: we are to abide by this truth and call on them to abide by it, by whatever evidence supported, whether natural or revealed. And whichever party refuses this issue does so at its peril. We will not meet sceptics or others on their own ground, in any sense which requires us to leave the rock and fortress of truth, and go down to be swamped in the ditches and quicksands of falsehood and delusion. When it is demanded of us that we meet any parties on such ground, we most respectfully but decidedly decline, and beg to be excused. If all that is meant by such language is that false science and philosophy ought to be met by true science and philosophy, we grant it. This is consistent with all that we have been maintaining; indeed is what we have been maintaining. But we mean by this simply that so far as scepticism brings false, or misapplies true, philosophy to assail Christian truth, we are called on, as far as practicable, to show the falsity or misapplication of the principle in question, from the scientific or rational stand-point. If the development theory, or the doctrine of the impossibility of supernatural intervention be urged on scientific grounds, let us endeavour to show them false on scientific grounds. But suppose that we fail to convince our sceptical adversary, either because he is too uncandid and bigoted to appreciate the evidence, or refuses to place himself upon any reasonable ground which will afford a premise in argument; or even because as yet it is out of our power to master the reasonings and allegations urged on the scientific side so as to be able to silence our adversaries; are we to confine ourselves to this ground which the sceptic has chosen for himself? are we to surrender to him on his own ground, instead of retaining our high vantage ground of faith in God and his word and its infallible testimonies, knowing that it must be true, and whatever is opposed to it must be false? If clearly shown false now by the light of heaven, we can well afford to wait until it is shown to be such by other light. This light of heaven the sceptic is bound to see and follow. If he refuses to come upon ground where he can see and follow it, if he hates the light, and refuses to come to the light, so much the worse for him. This is his condemnation, that light has come

into the world, and he has loved darkness rather than light. In this aspect we cannot consent to meet upon their own ground those who so darken their souls that for them the light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehendeth it not. Let God be true, but every man a liar.

Let us now briefly consider the function of reason in constructing the science of theology, or in harmonizing the truths of revelation with one another, and with related truths—in other words, the relation of philosophy to theology.

While many crude and inconsiderate views are constantly put forth on this subject, often with an air of incontestable authority, we think the main principles regarding it need only to be stated, to command the assent of Christian believers.

In regard to the matter of theology, so far as derived from revelation, the principle or ground of our acceptance of it must be the word of God, and not reason. We receive it because God affirms it; not because, aside of this testimony, it is evident either to sense or reason, or any mere faculty of natural intelligence. "Faith is the evidence (ελεγχος, persuasion) of things not seen." "We walk by faith and not by sight." In regard to the great facts of Christian theology, then, they are made known and proved to us by the word of God, not by any mere unaided natural faculty. Certainly this must be true of the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, of Original Sin, Divine Regeneration, Predestination, the Election and Conservation of the Saints, the Church and Sacraments, Judgment, Heaven, and Hell. The truth in regard to these great themes comes from the word of God, and no way from human reason, which can discover no more than our experienced need of them. So all true believers receive it, "not as the word of man, but (as it is in truth) the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe." 1 Thess. ii. 13. It may indeed happen that the human faculties, rightly used, can see things to be true which are asserted in the Scriptures. It may see the fallen and degraded state of our race, the unity of God, the fitness of retribution. But even these are none the less attested to us by revelation, although not entirely hidden from natural reason. In reality, however, the human intellect, in matters of religion, is so dimmed by sin that, aside of the light

of Scripture, and often even in defiance of that light, these truths are very feebly and inadequately seen. The heathen everywhere turn the plainest truths of God into a lie, and change the glory of the incorruptible God into an image of corruptible man. Even so essential a truth as immortality loses its evidence to the sin-darkened reason, until Jesus Christ brings life and immortality to light. When revelation reaffirms and restores these truths, which, though the natural inheritance of reason, have been squandered and lost through sin, reason is very apt to ignore its obligations to revelation for them, and to boast of its own sufficiency in regard to them. We can only see the extent of our obligations to revelation when we see that great mass of moral and religious truths which are the common property of christendom, and lost to heathendom. In the truest sense, therefore, for fallen man, revelation, not reason, is the source and norm of all these, as well as of the more distinctive Christian mysteries. The primary knowledge of these truths is not due to reason, science, or philosophy, but to revelation. Yet they are given us in Scripture, not in any scientific or systematized form, but only as individual facts. The sanctified human mind, however, by the necessity of its nature, and for most important purposes, is constrained to attempt the scientific arrangement and comprehension of these facts. In other words, it strives, from its very constitution, to discover the harmony of these with each other, and with other known truths. It seeks to reach apprehensions, statements, definitions of these and correlate truths, whereby such harmony will be attained, and all appearances of discrepancy or contradiction removed. Hence result formal statements, definitions, systems of theology, didactic and polemic. To this the human mind, regenerate and unregenerate, tends by its own inherent impulses. This is the strongest evidence that it has a mission from God to undertake this work. It has also an express commission from revelation itself to "compare spiritual things with spiritual," and to prophecy according to the proportion of faith. But comparison is the fundamental element in the process of reasoning and systematizing; and to go according to the proportion or analogy of faith, is to interpret Scripture by Scripture, truth by truth, one part in harmony with another,

and each with all. This process is indispensable, not only to answer the innate craving for logical consistency in the human intellect, but also to the exposition, maintenance, and defence of Christian truth, whether in teaching it to friends or parrying the assaults of adversaries. It is needless to show how a series of truths, concatenated not merely in an orderly arrangement, but in their relations of mutual interdependence, consistency, and unity, can be better taught, and more readily defended, than if left a mass of apparent unresolved antagonisms or contradictions, or of disjointed isolated facts, without any perceived principle of unity.

Not only so—not only does the Christian intellect strive so to discern and set forth the harmony of Christianity with itself and correlate truth, as to furnish no weapon which its adversaries may turn against it. The mind of the church further essays to wrest from its enemies the weapons of their own forging. It seeks to show that the objections urged are invalid—and this even on rational or philosophic grounds. It does not, indeed, found faith on anything short of the testimony of God, nor on its success in refuting the objections of adversaries from the rational or philosophic side. But it strives to show that, simply as rational arguments, they are either false, irrelevant, or inconclusive. To this extent, and in ways which have been already illustrated, the theologian and the Christian apologist meet adversaries on their own ground. And still further, in regard to truths which are alike affirmed by revelation and by reason, it endeavours to convince those who will not hear the former, by rational proofs. Thus to those who deny the sin and ruin of the race asserted in the Scriptures, it will endeavour to prove them by incontestable facts.

Hence in all ages, among all parties in the church, except mystics and heretics, there has been a constant effort to formulate and systematize the doctrines of the Bible in creeds and confessions.

And this is not only a necessary measure of defence against heresy, but also against mysticism, which heretics are so fond of making their shield. Mysticism is a distempered form of religion. It may be the result of good or evil tendencies,

according as it supervenes on what was previously below or above it. If it supervene upon dead formalism, supplanting it by a living, though somewhat distempered piety, it of course represents a salutary, because an upward tendency. If it come in the place of intelligent piety moulded by the doctrines of the Bible, with pretensions to supplant and improve upon that style of religion, it is, of course, morbid and pernicious. It is often made pretext for disparaging orthodoxy and intelligent evangelical piety. By mysticism is meant that idea of Christianity which founds it on feeling, or represents it as a life and not a doctrine, nor formed and bounded by a doctrine. Now it is true that Christian piety is a life, a life which includes feeling, but this life is inspired and guided by the truth as it is in Jesus, the doctrine which is according to godliness; this feeling is such as arises from the knowledge and belief of the everlasting gospel. Otherwise, whatever else it may be, it is not Christian piety. Mere feeling uninformed by Christian truth is not Christian feeling, and in proportion as it lacks the guidance and inspiration of such truth, it degenerates into fanaticism, superstition, or mere fleshly excitement, which soon sinks into absolute stupefaction and irreligion. Mysticism divorces religion from the intellect. But no religion can be genuine or scriptural which thus separates itself from knowledge. Christianity interpenetrates and exalts every part of our nature, especially the intellect or regal faculty, that which was designed to regulate feeling, which, if not thus regulated, must needs degenerate into mere irrational sensibility, irreligious, fanatical, or superstitious. This is eternal life to *know* God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Knowledge and piety can no more be separated than solidity and extension, life and breath.

But no reason is competent for this task which is not a Christian or regenerate reason—a reason purged of the blindness and darkness of sin, which, yielding to the supreme authority of the word of God, surrenders all preconceived opinions and predilections in conflict with it. This is the primary doctrine assumed by reason in all its legitimate efforts to systematize Christian doctrine, construct a science of Christian theology, and reconcile it with all related truths. No

philosophy can be an impartial judge between the great truths of Christianity and the "oppositions of science," which is uncertain or wavering, or indifferent in regard to those truths. We might as well prepare to judge impartially between the claims of the sun and of the earth to be the centre of the planetary system, by shutting out the light of the sun, as to qualify ourselves for an impartial judgment between the Scripture and oppositions to it, by closing our eyes to the light of the word. That mind, whether philosophic or theologic, alone is in a state of judicial candour regarding these questions, which has the candour to see and feel, at the very outset, that God is true though every man be a liar—that his word is the sure and supreme oracle.

> "This is the judge that ends the strife
> When wit and reason fail."

No mind can be in an impartial or judicial state in regard to truths of revelation and antagonistic errors, so long as it rejects or ignores Scripture, and God speaking therein as the supreme judge or arbiter of the controversy. This is the doctrine of Protestant orthodoxy as set forth by its divines and symbols. Says our own Confession of Faith:

"The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself. And therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.

"The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture." (Chap. I. 9–10.)

This brings us to the Papal Doctrine on this subject, to which we have already referred, that the infallible and only authorized interpreter of Scripture is the church, speaking through the pope, or ecumenical councils, or the perpetual and universal faith of all her members; that our simple duty is to accept the interpretations of Scripture and decisions of Christian doctrine given forth through these organs; and that all

private judgment as to its meaning is Rationalism. Such we have already seen to be the doctrine propounded by Archbishop Manning. We can go with him in the following statement, which we think contains all the truth reached in his argument: "Though there is no revealed pledge of infallibility to the saints as such, yet the consent of the saints is a high test of what is the mind and illumination of the Spirit of Truth." P. 97. Less than this we cannot concede to the doctrines accepted *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*, without coming near to a confession that revelation is a failure. While this is so, and genuine catholic doctrine carries a strong presumption of truth, which should have great weight in our interpretations of Scripture, still, the proper objective ground of faith is the testimony of God uttered in and through the Scriptures, and apprehended by the believer. Of course, this involves a judgment on his part as to what the Scripture thus utters and propounds to his faith. But, says the Romanist, this is incompetent and forbidden to him. He cannot and ought not to interpret Scripture for himself. He should take the interpretation and judgments of the infallible church—the decrees of popes and councils, without question or criticism. This is the only alternative to the supremacy of reason, *i. e.*, to Rationalism in matters of religion. Says Manning:

"There can be ultimately no intermediate between the Divine mind declaring itself through an organ of its own creation, or the human mind judging for itself upon the evidence and contents of revelation. There is or there is not a Divine perpetual Teacher in the midst of us. The human reason must be either the disciple or the critic of revelation." P. 85.

"The reason or private judgment of individuals exercised critically upon history, philosophy, theology, Scripture, and revelation, inasmuch as it is the most human, is also the most fallible and uncertain of all principles of faith, and cannot in truth be rightly described to be such. Yet this is ultimately all that remains to those who reject the infallibility of the living church." To all this the obvious answer is:

1. It disguises and misstates the real issue. It confounds judging what the Scriptures mean in view of a fair estimate of the force of language, laws of construction, and the circum-

stances in which they were written, and receiving that meaning, so obtained, as the truth of God, with sitting in judgment on the contents of revelation thus duly ascertained, in order to receive or reject them as they do or do not conform to human reason. The former is legitimate and necessary, and consistent with the absolute subjection of reason to Scripture, with taking the yoke and learning of Christ. The latter exalts reason above the authority of the word of God, and is Rationalism. To say, as Archbishop Manning does, that "reason must be either the disciple or critic of revelation," is to "palter in a double sense" of the word critic. One may be a critic of revelation so far as is necessary to ascertain its meaning, in order that he may be its disciple. This, so far from being inconsistent with discipleship, it is necessary to it. This is not being a critic in such a sense as to subordinate revelation in any manner to the behests of his own reason.

2. The Romish doctrine is plainly at direct variance with the Scriptures, which require us to search the Scriptures because they testify of Christ, and commend the Bereans for so doing, and for testing the preachers they heard thereby. So Timothy is commended for having known from childhood the Holy Scriptures, which are declared "able to make wise to salvation," and all of them to be "given by inspiration of God, and profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." 2 Tim. iii. 15—17. The summons is, "to the law and the testimony; if they speak not according to this word it is because there is no light in them."

3. We do not escape the necessity of judging, even if we are to take the interpretation of Scripture blindly from an infallible pope or church. It is just as necessary for the disciple to interpret and judge of the meaning of the utterances of pontiffs and councils as of the Scriptures themselves. The necessity of judgment on the part of the Christian is not superseded by the voice of the living teacher or infallible interpreter. Such a teacher can only say, "I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what I say." "He that is spiritual judgeth all things."

4. How shall men know the infallible church and pontiff,

and distinguish them from impostors claiming their prerogatives? Where can they find the marks or criteria of these infallible organs of the Divine mind and will? Is it said we find these marks in the Scriptures? Saying nothing of the old vicious circle of proving the church by the Scriptures, and the Scriptures by the church, it is enough that the Scriptures require us to try by scriptural standards the pretensions of all claiming to be heard as Christian teachers or oracles. We are charged to beware of false prophets, who come in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves, and to know them by their fruits. We are commanded to believe not every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they be of God. Those are commended who try them that say they are apostles and are not, and find them liars. Nay, we are charged to give no heed to wonder-workers who successfully simulate real miracles, if they attempt to use these lying wonders to seduce us from the religion of God and his word. Deut. xiii. 1—5. So far then from testing the Scriptures by infallible living teachers, we must test the claims of all teachers by the infallible Scriptures.

Finally, believers as such, and not any infallible pope or council for them, have the promise of Divine guidance in the saving apprehension of the truths essential to salvation. "If any man will do his will," says Christ, "he shall know of the doctrine whether it be from God, or whether I speak of myself." John vii. 17. "Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God." "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." Dr. Manning and other papal writers seek to evade the force of these and similar passages, by pressing into bold relief the great differences and controversies among those who call themselves Christians. How can these passages refer to private Christians, and how can they be divinely guided, if they are perpetually disputing and contradicting each other? To which the simple answer is; 1. These promises are made to real, not merely nominal or professing Christians. 2. They refer to "all things essential to salvation," not all matters of dispute in religion. 3. The controversies among real Christians are often more verbal than real, or relate to things which, if important,

are non-essential, to the outposts rather than the citadel of the Christian faith; to the speculative rather than the experimental side of Christianity. 4. The Papists are exposed to objections similar in kind, if not in degree. They do not pretend that the pope or the church is infallible in all things, or in things unimportant to salvation. They cannot deny that controversies have prevailed amongst their own divines and schools; they admit that it is only by degrees, and through the developments of successive controversies, that the pope and councils have been enabled accurately to articulate and formulate one doctrine after another. Their argument, therefore, from the controversies among Protestants, for the necessity of an infallible and oracular interpreter of Scriptures, proves too much. It recoils upon themselves with suicidal force. It brings us back to scripture for the interpretation of scripture, which we reach by comparing (*συγκρινοντες*) spiritual things with spiritual.

"God is his own interpreter,
And he will make it plain."

ART. II.—*Normal Schools, and other Institutions and Agencies for the Professional Education of Teachers.* By HENRY BARNARD, D. D. 2 vols., 8vo. Case, Tiffany & Co., Hartford.

THE term Normal School is an unfortunate misnomer, and its general adoption has led to much confusion of ideas. The word "Normal," from the Latin *norma*, a rule or pattern to work by, does not differ essentially from "Model." A Normal School, according to the meaning of the word, would be a pattern school, an institution which could be held up for imitation, to be copied by other schools of the same grade. But this meaning of the word is not what we mean by the thing. When we mean a school to be copied or imitated, we call it a Model School. Here the name and the thing agree. The name explains the thing. It is very different when we speak

of a Normal School. To the uninitiated, the term either conveys no meaning at all; or, if your hearer is a man of letters, it conveys to him an idea which you have at once to explain away. You have to tell him, in effect, that a Normal School is not a Normal School, and then that it is something else, which the word does not in the least describe.

What then do we mean by a Normal School? What is the thing which we have called by this unfortunate name?

A Normal School is a seminary for the professional education of teachers. It is an institution in which those who wish to become teachers learn how to do their work; in which they learn, not reading, but how to teach reading; not penmanship, but how to teach penmanship; not grammar, but how to teach grammar; not geography, but how to teach geography; not arithmetic, but how to teach arithmetic. The idea which lies at the basis of such an institute, is that knowing a thing, and knowing how to teach that thing to others, are distinguishable and very different facts. The knowledge of the subjects to be taught, may be gained at any school. In order to give to the Teachers' Seminary its full power and efficiency, it were greatly to be desired that the subjects themselves, as mere matters of knowledge, should be first learned elsewhere, before entering the Teachers' School. This latter would then have to do only with its own special function, that of showing its matriculants how to use these materials in the process of teaching. Unfortunately, we have not yet made such progress in popular education as to be able to separate these two functions to the extent that is desirable. Many of those who attend a Teachers' Seminary, come to it lamentably ignorant of the common branches of knowledge. They have consequently first to study these branches in the Normal School, as they would study them in any other school. That is, they have first to learn the facts as matters of knowledge, and then to study the art and science of teaching these facts to others. Instead of coming with their brick and mortar ready prepared, that they may be instructed in the use of the trowel and the plumb-line, they have to make their brick and mix their mortar after they enter the institution. This is undoubtedly a drawback and a misfortune. But it cannot be helped at present. All we can do

is to define clearly the true idea of the Teachers' School, and then to work towards it as fast and as far as we can.

A Normal School is essentially unlike any other school. It has been compared indeed to those professional schools which are for the study of law, divinity, medicine, mining, engineering, and so forth. The Normal School, it is true, is like these schools in one respect. It is established with reference to the wants of a particular profession. It is a professional school. But those schools have for their main object the communication of some particular branch of science. They teach law, divinity, medicine, mining, or engineering. They aim to make lawyers, divines, physicians, miners, engineers, not teachers of these branches. The Professor in the Law School aims, not to make Professors of law, but lawyers. The medical Professor aims, not to make medical lecturers, but practitioners. To render these institutions analogous to the Teachers' Seminary, their pupils should first study law, medicine, engineering, and so forth, and then sit at the feet of their Gamaliels to be initiated into the secrets of the Professorial chair, that they may in turn become Professors of those branches to classes of their own. Nor would such a plan, if it were possible, be altogether without its value. It surely needs no demonstration to prove, that in the highest departments, no less than in the lowest, something more than knowledge is needed in order to teach. An understanding of how to communicate one's knowledge, and practical skill in doing it, are as necessary in teaching theology, metaphysics, languages, infinitesimal analysis, or chemistry, as they are in teaching the alphabet. If there are bunglers, who know not how to go to work to teach a child its letters, or to open its young mind and heart to the reception of truth, whose school-rooms are places where the young mind and heart are in a state, either of perpetual torpor, or of perpetual nightmare, have these bunglers no analogues in the men of ponderous erudition that sometimes fill the Professor's chair? Have we no examples, in our highest seminaries of learning, of men very eminent in scientific attainments, who have not in themselves the first elements of a teacher? who impart to their students no quickening impulse? whose vast and towering knowledge may make them perhaps a grand feature in their College, attracting

to it all eyes, but whose intellectual treasures, for all the practical wants of the students, are of no more use, than are the swathed and buried mummies in the pyramid of Cheops!

A Teachers' Seminary, if it were complete, would include in its curriculum of study the entire cycle of human knowledge, so far as it is taught by schools. Our teachers of mathematics and of logic, of law and of medicine, need indeed a knowledge of the branches which they are to teach, and for this knowledge they do not need a Teachers' Seminary. But they need something more than this knowledge. Besides being men of erudition, they need to be teachers, no less than the humbler members of the profession, who have only to teach the alphabet and the multiplication table; and there is in all teaching, high or low, something that is common to them all—an art and a skill which is different from the mere knowledge of the subjects; which is not necessarily learned in learning the subjects; which requires special, superadded gifts, and distinct study and training. There is, according to our observation, as great a lack of this special skill in the higher seminaries of learning, as in the lower seminaries. Were it possible to have a Normal School, not which should undertake to teach the entire encyclopædia of the sciences, but which, limiting itself to its one main function of developing the art and mystery of communicating knowledge, should turn out College Professors, and even Divinity, Law, and Medical Professors,—men who were really skilful teachers,—it would work a change in those venerable institutions as marked and decisive as that which it is now effecting in the common schools. Of course, no such scheme is possible; certainly, none such is contemplated. But we are very sure we shall not be considered calumnious, when we express the conviction, that there are learned and eminent occupants of Professors' chairs, who might find great benefit in an occasional visit to a good Normal School, or even to the class-room of a teacher trained in a Normal School. We certainly have seen, in the very lowest department of the common school, a style of teaching, which, for a wise and intelligent comprehension of its object, and for its quickening power upon the intellect and conscience, would compare favourably with

the very best teaching we have ever seen in a College or University.

We come back, then, to the point from which we set out, namely, that a Normal School, or Teachers' Seminary, differs essentially from every other kind of school. It aims to give the knowledge and skill that are needed alike in all schools. To make the point a little plainer, let us restate, with what clearness we can, some of the elementary truths and facts which lie at the foundation of the whole subject. Though to many of our readers it may be going over a beaten track, it may not be so to all; and we all do well, even in regard to known and admitted truths, to bring them occasionally afresh to the mind.

As it has been already said, a man may know a thing perfectly, and yet not be able to teach it. Of course, a man cannot teach what he does not know. He must first have the knowledge. But the mere possession of knowledge does not make one a teacher, any more than the possession of powder and shot makes him a marksman, or the possession of a rod and line makes him an angler. The most learned men are often unfortunately the very men who have least capacity for communicating what they know. Nor is this incapacity confined to those versed in book knowledge. It is common to every class of men, and to every kind of knowledge. Let us give an example. The fact about to be stated, was communicated to us by a gentleman of eminent commercial standing in Philadelphia, now the President of one of its leading banks. The fact occurred in his own personal experience. He was, at the time of its occurrence, largely engaged in the cloth trade. His faculties of mind and body, and particularly his sense of touch, had been so trained in this business, that in going rapidly over an invoice of cloth, as his eye and hand passed in quick succession from piece to piece, in the most miscellaneous assortment, he could tell instantly the value of each, with a degree of precision, and a certainty of knowledge, hardly credible. A single glance of the eye, a single touch, transient as thought, gave the result. His own knowledge of the subject, in short, was perfect, and it was rapidly winning him a fortune. Yet when undertaking to explain to a younger and less expe-

rienced member of the craft whom he wished to befriend, by what process he arrived at his judgment, in other words, to teach what he knew, he found himself utterly at a loss. His thoughts had never run in that direction. "Oh!" said he, "you have only——to look at the cloth, and—and—to run your fingers over it,—thus. You will perceive at once the difference between one piece and another." It seems never to have occurred to him that another man's sensations and perceptions might in the same circumstances be quite different from his, and that in order to communicate his knowledge to one uninitiated, he must pause to analyse it; he must separate, classify, and name those several qualities of the cloth of which his senses took cognizance; he must then ascertain how far his interrogator perceived by his senses the same qualities which he himself did, and thus gradually get no common ground with him.

Let the receiving-teller of a bank be called upon to explain how it is that he knows at a glance a counterfeit bill from a genuine one, and in nine cases out of ten he will succeed no better than the cloth merchant did. Knowing and communicating what we know, doing and explaining what we do, are distinct, separable, and usually very different processes.

Similar illustrations might be drawn from artists, and from men of original genius in almost every profession, who can seldom give any intelligible account of how they achieve their results. The mental habits best suited for achievement are rarely those best suited for teaching. Marlborough, so celebrated for his military combinations, could never give any intelligible account of his plans. He had arrived at his conclusions with unerring certainty, but he was so little accustomed to observing his own mental processes, that he utterly failed in attempting to make them plain to others. He saw the points himself with perfect clearness, but he had no power to make others see them. To all objections to his plans, he could only say, "Silly, silly, that's silly." It was much the same with Oliver Cromwell. It is so with most men who are distinguished for action and achievement. Patrick Henry would doubtless have made but a third-rate teacher of elocution, and old Homer but an indifferent lecturer on the art of poetry.

To acquire knowledge ourselves, then, and to put others in possession of what we have acquired, are not only distinct intellectual processes, but they are quite unlike. In the former case, the faculties merely go out towards the objects to be known, as in the case of the cloth merchant passing his eye and finger over the bales of cloth. But in the case of one attempting to teach, several additional processes are needed, besides that of collecting knowledge. He must turn his thoughts inward, so as to arrange and classify properly the contents of his intellectual storehouse. He must then examine his own mind, his intellectual machinery, so as to understand exactly how the knowledge came in upon himself. He must lastly study the minds of his pupils, so as to know through what channels the knowledge may best reach them. The teacher may not always be aware that he does all these things, that is, he may not always have a theory of his own art. But the art itself he must have. He must first get the knowledge of the things to be taught; he must secondly study his knowledge; he must thirdly study himself; he must lastly study his pupil. He is a teacher at all only so far as he does at least these four things.

In a Normal School, as before said, the knowledge of the subject is presupposed. The object of the Normal School is, not so much to make arithmeticians and grammarians, for instance, as to make teachers of arithmetic and grammar. This teaching faculty is a thing by itself, and quite apart from the subject matter to be taught. It underlies every branch of knowledge, and every trade and profession. The theologian, the mathematician, the linguist, the learned professor, no less than the teacher of the primary school, or of the Sabbath-school, all need this supplementary knowledge and skill, in which consists the very essence of teaching. This knowledge of how to teach is not acquired by merely studying the subject to be taught. It is a study by itself. A man may read familiarly the *Mechanique Celeste*, and yet not know how to teach the multiplication table. He may read Arabic or Sanskrit, and not know how to teach a child the alphabet of his mother tongue. The Sabbath-school teacher may dip deep into biblical lore, he may ransack the commentaries, and may

become, as many Sabbath-school teachers are, truly learned in Bible knowledge, and yet be utterly incompetent to teach a class of children. He can no more hit the wandering attention, or make a lodgment of his knowledge in the minds of his youthful auditory, than the mere unskilled possessor of a fowling-piece can hit a bird upon the wing.

The art of teaching is the one indispensable qualification of the teacher. Without this, whatever else he may be, he is no teacher. How may this art be acquired? In the first place, many persons pick it up, just as they pick up a great many other arts and trades,—in a hap-hazard sort of way. They have some natural aptitude for it, and they grope their way along, by guess and by instinct, and through many failures, until they become good teachers, they hardly know how. To rescue the art from this condition of uncertainty and chance, is the object of the Normal School. In such a school, the main object of the pupil is to learn how to make others know what he himself knows. The whole current of his thoughts and studies is turned into this channel. Studying how to teach, with an experimental class to practise on, forms the constant topic of his meditations. It is surprising how rapidly, under such conditions, the faculty of teaching is developed; how fertile the mind becomes in devising practical expedients, when once the attention is roused and fixed upon the precise object to be attained, and the idea of what teaching really is, fairly has possession of the mind. In furtherance of this end, every well-ordered Normal School has, in connection with it, and as a part of its organization, a Model School, to serve the double purpose of a school of observation, and a school of practice. Thus, after these pupil-teachers are once thoroughly familiar with the branches to be taught, and after they have become acquainted with the theory of teaching, as a science, it is surprising how soon, with even a little of this practice-teaching, they acquire the art. If the faculty of teaching is in them at all, a very few experimental lessons, under the eye of an experienced teacher, will develope it. The fact of possessing within one's self the teaching gift, sometimes breaks upon the possessor himself with all the force of a surprising and most delightful discovery. The good teacher does not indeed stop

here. He goes on to improve in his art as long as he lives. But his greatest single achievement is when he takes the first step,—when he first learns to teach at all. The pupil of a Normal School gains there a start, an impulse which carries him forward the rest of his life. Thus a very little judicious experimental training redeems hundreds of candidates from utter and pitiful incompetency, and converts for them an awkward and painful drudgery into keen, hopeful, and productive labour.

But what is teaching? Unless our ideas on this point are clear and well defined, it is in vain to look for any satisfactory results. Teaching, then, in the first place, is not simply telling. A class may be told a thing twenty times over, and yet not know it. Talking to a class is not necessarily teaching. We have known many teachers, who were brimful of information, and were good talkers, and who discoursed to their classes with ready utterance a large part of the time allotted to instruction, yet an examination of their classes showed little advancement in knowledge.

There are several time-honoured metaphors on this subject, which need to be received with some grains of allowance, if we would get at an exact idea of what teaching is. Chiselling the rude marble into the finished statue, giving the impression of the seal upon the soft wax, pouring water into an empty vessel, —all these comparisons lack one essential element of likeness. The mind is indeed, in one sense, empty, and needs to be filled. It is yielding, and needs to be impressed. It is rude, and needs polishing. But it is not, like the marble, the wax, or the vessel, a passive recipient of external influences. It is itself a living power. It is acted upon only by stirring up its own activities. The operative upon mind, unlike the operative upon matter, must have the active, voluntary coöperation of that upon which he works. The teacher is doing his work, only so far as he gets work from the scholar. The very essence and root of the work are in the scholar, not in the teacher. No one, in fact, in an important sense, is taught at all, except so far as he is self-taught. The teacher may be useful, as an auxiliary, in causing this action on the part of the scholar. But the one, indisputable, vital thing, in all learning,

is in the scholar himself. The old Romans, in their word education, (*educere*, to draw out) seem to have come nearer to the true idea than any other people have done. The teacher is to draw out the resources of the pupil. Yet even this word comes short of the exact truth. The teacher must put in, as well as draw out. No process of mere pumping will draw out from a child's mind knowledge which is not there. All the power of the Socratic method, could it be applied by Socrates himself, would be unavailing to draw from a child's mind, by mere questioning, a knowledge, for instance, of chemical affinity, of the solar system, of the temperature of the Gulf Stream, of the doctrine of the resurrection.

What then is teaching? Teaching is causing any one to know. Now no one can be made to know a thing, but by the act of his own powers. His own senses, his own memory, his own powers of reason, perception, and judgment must be exercised. The function of the teacher is to bring about this exercise of the pupil's faculties. The means to do this are infinite in variety. They should be varied according to the wants and the character of the individual to be taught. One needs to be told a thing; he learns most readily by the ear. Another needs to use his eyes; he must see a thing, either in the book, or in nature. But neither eye nor ear, nor any other sense or faculty will avail to the acquisition of knowledge, unless the power of attention is cultivated. Attention, then, is the first act or power of the mind that must be roused. It is the very foundation of all progress in knowledge, and the means of awakening it constitute the first step in the educational art.

When by any means facts, positive knowledge, are once in possession of the mind, something must next be done to prevent their slipping away. You may tell a class the history of a certain event, or you may give them a description of a certain place, or person, or you may let them read it, and you may secure such a degree of attention, that at the time of the reading or the description, they shall have a fair, intelligible comprehension of what has been described or read. The facts are for the time actually in the possession of the mind. Now, if the mind was, according to the old notion, merely a vessel

to be filled, the process would be complete. But mind is not an empty vessel. It is a living essence, with powers and processes of its own. And experience shows us, that in the case of a class of undisciplined pupils, facts, even when fairly placed in the possession of the mind, often remain there about as long as the shadow of a passing cloud remains upon the landscape, and make about as much impression.

The teacher must seek then, not only to get knowledge into the mind, but to fix it there. In other words, the power of the memory must be strengthened. Teaching then, most truly, and in every stage of it, is a strictly coöperative process. You cannot cause any one to know, by merely pouring out stores of knowledge in his hearing, any more than you can make his body grow by spreading the contents of your market-basket at his feet. You must rouse his power of attention, that he may lay hold of, and receive, and make his own, the knowledge you offer him. You must awaken and strengthen the power of memory within him, that he may retain what he receives, and thus grow in knowledge, as the body by a like process grows in strength and muscle. In other words, learning, so far as the mind of the learner is concerned, is a growth; and teaching, so far as the teacher is concerned, is doing whatever is necessary to cause that growth.

Let us proceed a step farther in this matter. One of the ancients observes that a lamp loses none of its own light by allowing another lamp to be lit from it. He uses the illustration to enforce the duty of liberality in imparting our knowledge to others. Knowledge, he says, unlike other treasures, is not diminished by giving.

The illustration fails to express the whole truth. This imparting of knowledge to others, not only does not impoverish the donor, but it actually increases his riches. *Docendo discimus.* By teaching we learn. A man grows in knowledge by the very act of communicating it. The reason for this is obvious. In order to communicate to the mind of another a thought which is in our own mind, we must give to the thought definite shape and form. We must handle it and pack it up for safe conveyance. Thus the mere act of giving a thought expression in words, fixes it more deeply in our own minds.

Not only so, we can, in fact, very rarely be said to be in full possession of a thought ourselves, until by the tongue or the pen we have communicated it to somebody else. The expression of it, in some form, seems necessary to give it, even in our own minds, a definite shape and a lasting impression. A man who devotes himself to solitary reading and study, but never tries in any way to communicate his acquisitions to the world, or to enforce his opinions upon others, rarely becomes a learned man. A great many confused, dreamy ideas, no doubt, float through the brain of such a man. But he has little exact and reliable knowledge. The truth is, there is a sort of indolent, listless absorption of intellectual food, that tends to idiocy. We knew a person once, a gentleman of wealth and leisure, who having no taste for social intercourse, and no material wants to be supplied, which might have required the active exercise of his powers, gave himself up entirely to solitary reading, as a sort of luxurious self-indulgence. He shut himself up in his room, all day long, day after day, devouring one book after another, until he became almost idiotic by the process, and he finally died of softening of the brain. Had he been compelled to use his mental acquisitions in earning his bread, or had the love of Christ constrained him to use them in the instruction of the poor and the ignorant, he might have become not only a useful, but a learned man.

We see a beautiful illustration of this doctrine in the case of Sabbath-school teachers, and one reason why persons so engaged usually love their work, is the benefit which they find in it for themselves. We speak here, not of the spiritual, but of the intellectual benefit. By the process of teaching others, they are all the while learning. This advantage in their case is all the greater, because it advances them in a kind of knowledge in which, more than in any other kind of knowledge, men are wont to become passive and stationary. In ordinary worldly knowledge, our necessities make us active. The intercourse of business and of pleasure even, makes men keen. On these subjects we are all the while bandying thoughts to and fro, we are accustomed to give as well as take, and so we keep our intellectual armor bright, and our thoughts well defined. But in regard to growth in scriptural knowledge, we have a tendency

to be mere passive recipients, like the young man just referred to. Sabbath after Sabbath we hear good, instructive, orthodox discourses, but there is no active putting forth of our own powers in giving out what we thus take in, and so we never make it effectually our own. The absorbing process goes on, and yet we make no growth. The quiescent audience is a sort of exhausted receiver, into which the stream from the pulpit is perennially playing, but never making it full. Let a man go back and ask himself, what actual scriptural knowledge have I gained by the sermons of the last six months? What in fact do I retain in my mind, at this moment, of the sermons I heard only last Sabbath? So far as the hearing of sermons is concerned, the Sabbath-school teacher may perhaps be no better off than other hearers. But in regard to general growth in Biblical knowledge, he advances more rapidly than his fellow worshippers, because the exigencies of his class compel him to a state of mind the very opposite of this passive recipiency. He is obliged to be all the while, not only learning, but putting his acquisitions into definite shape for use, and the very act of using these acquisitions in teaching a class, fixes them in his own mind, and makes them more surely his own.

We have used this instance of the Sabbath-school teacher because it enforces an important hint already given, as to the mode of teaching. Some teachers, especially in Sabbath-schools, seem to be ambitious to do a great deal of talking. The measure of their success, in their own eyes, is their ability to keep up a continued stream of talk for the greater part of the hour. This is of course better than the embarrassing silence sometimes seen, where neither teacher nor scholar has anything to say. But at the best, it is only pouring into the exhausted receiver enacted over again. We can never be reminded too often, that there is no teaching except so far as there is active coöperation on the part of the learner. The mind receiving must reproduce and give back what it gets. This is the indispensable condition of making any knowledge really our own. The very best teaching we have ever seen, has been where the teacher said comparatively little. The teacher was of course brimful of the subject. He could give the needed information at exactly the right point, and in the right

quantity. But for every word given by the teacher, there were many words of answering reproduction on the part of the scholars. Youthful minds under such tutelage grow apace.

It is indeed a high and difficult achievement in the educational art, to get young persons thus to bring forth their thoughts freely for examination and correction. A pleasant countenance and a gentle manner, inviting and inspiring confidence, have something to do with the matter. But, whatever the means for accomplishing this end, the end itself is indispensable. The scholar's tongue must be unloosed, as well as the teacher's. The scholar's thoughts must be broached as well as the teacher's. Indeed, the statement needs very little qualification or abatement, that a scholar has learned nothing from us except what he has expressed to us again in words. The teacher who is accustomed to harangue his scholars with a continuous stream of words, no matter how full of weighty meaning his words may be, is yet deceiving himself, if he thinks that his scholars are materially benefitted by his intellectual activity, unless it is so guided as to awaken and exercise theirs. If, after a suitable period, he will honestly examine his scholars on the subjects, on which he has himself been so productive, he will find that he has been only pouring water into a seive. Teaching can never be this one-sided process. Of all the things we attempt, it is the one most essentially and necessarily a coöperative process. There must be the joint action of the teacher's mind and the scholar's mind. A teacher teaches at all, only so far as he causes this co-active energy of the pupil's mind.

It cannot be too often repeated, the measure of a teacher's success, is not what he himself does, but what he gets his scholars to do. In nothing is this more noticeable, than in the different modes of putting a question to a scholar. One teacher will put a question in such a manner as to find out exactly how much or how little of the subject the child knows, and thereby encourage careful preparation; to give the pupil an open door, if he really knows the subject, to express his knowledge in a way that will be a satisfaction and pleasure to him; to improve his power of expression, to cultivate his memory, to increase his knowledge, and to make it more thorough and definite.

Another teacher will put his questions so as to secure none of these ends, but on the contrary so as to induce a most lamentable degree of carelessness and inaccuracy. Let us illustrate this point, taking our example for greater convenience from a scriptural subject. Suppose it to be a lesson upon Christ's temptation, as recorded in the 4th chapter of Matthew. The dialogue between teacher and scholar may be supposed to proceed somewhat in this wise:

Teacher. Who was led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil?

Pupil. Jesus.

T. Yes. Now, when Jesus had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was afterward a—— what? How did he feel after that?

P. Hungry.

T. Yes, that is right. He was afterward "ahungered," how then?—the next scholar. Who then came to Jesus and said, if thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread?

(Scholar hesitates.)

T. The t——?

P. The tempter.

T. Yes, you are right. It was the tempter. Who do you think is meant by the tempter?—the devil?

P. Yes.

T. When a man has fasted, that is, has eaten nothing, for forty days and forty nights, and feels very hungry, would the suggestion of an easy mode of getting food be likely to be a strong temptation to him, or would it not?

P. It would.

T. Yes, you are right again. It would be a strong temptation to him.

We need not pursue this dialogue further. The reader will see at once how there may thus be the appearance of quite a brisk and fluent recitation, to which however the pupil contributes absolutely nothing. It requires nothing of him in the way of preparation, and only the most indolent and profitless use of his faculties while reciting. He could hardly answer amiss, unless he were an idiot, and yet he has the appearance,

and he is often flattered into the belief, of having given some evidence of knowledge and proficiency.

The opposite extreme from the method just exhibited, is that known as the topical method. It is the method pursued in the higher classes of schools, and among more advanced students. In the topical method, the teacher propounds a topic or subject, sometimes in the form of a question, but more commonly only by a title, a mere word or two, and then calls upon the pupil to give, in his own words, a full and connected narration or explanation of the subject, such as the teacher himself would give, if called upon to narrate or explain it. The subject already suggested, if propounded topically, would be somewhat in this wise:

The first temptation of Jesus.

Or, more fully: Narrate the circumstances of the first temptation of Jesus, and show wherein his virtue was particularly tried in that transaction.

The teacher, having propounded the subject clearly to the class, then waits patiently, maintaining silence himself, and requiring the members of the class to be silent and attentive, until the pupil interrogated is quite through, not hurrying him, not interrupting him, even with miscalled helps and hints, but leaving him to the free and independent action of his own faculties, in giving as full, connected, and complete an account of the matter as he can. When the pupil is quite through, the teacher then, but not before, makes any corrections or additional statements that may seem to be needed. In such an exercise as this, the pupil finds the absolute necessity of full and ample preparation; he has a powerful and healthy stimulus thus to prepare, in the intellectual satisfaction which one always feels in the successful discharge of any difficult task; and he acquires a habit of giving complete and accurate expression to his knowledge, by means of entire sentences, and without the help of "catch words," or leading-strings of any kind.

Some classes, of course, are not sufficiently advanced to carry out fully the method here explained. But there are many intermediate methods, founded on the same principle, and suited to children in every stage of advancement. Only let it be understood, whatever the stage, that the object of the

recitation is, not to show what the teacher can say or do, but to secure the right thing being said and done by the pupil.

To recur once more to the same subject, the temptation of Christ. For a very juvenile class, the questioning might proceed on this wise:

T. Where was Jesus led after his baptism?

P. He was led into the wilderness.

T. By whom was he led there?

P. He was led by the Spirit.

T. For what purpose was he led into the wilderness?

P. He was led into the wilderness to be tempted.

T. By whom was he to be tempted?

P. He was to be tempted by the devil.

T. What bodily want was made the means of his first temptation?

If the class is quite young, and this question seems too difficult, the teacher, instead of asking it, or after asking it and not getting a satisfactory answer, might say to his class, that Jesus was first tempted through the sense of hunger. He was very hungry, and the devil suggested to him an improper means of relieving himself from the inconvenience. He might then go on with some such questions as these:

T. What circumstance is mentioned as showing how very hungry he must have been?

P. He had fasted forty days and forty nights.

T. Mention any way in which *you* might be tempted to sin, if you were suffering from hunger?

The foregoing questions, it will be perceived, are very simple, being suited to scholars just advanced beyond the infant class. Yet no one of the questions, in its form, or terms, necessarily suggests the answer. No one of them can be answered by a mere "yes" or "no." No scholar, unacquainted with the subject, and with his book closed, can guess at the answer from the way in which the question is put. Not a question has been given, simple as they all are, which does not require at least some preparation, and which does not, to some extent, give exercise to the pupil's memory, his judgment, and his capacity for expression.

If the class is more advanced, the questions may be varied,

so as to task and exercise these faculties more seriously. For instance, the teacher of a class somewhat older might be imagined to begin the exercise thus:

T. After the baptism of Jesus, which closes the 3d chapter of Matthew, we have an account of several temptations to which he was exposed. Now, open your books at the 4th chapter, and see if you can find out how many verses are occupied with the narrative of these temptations, and at what verse each temptation begins.

The teacher then requires all the class to search in silence, and each one to get ready to answer, but lets no answer be given until all are prepared. When all have signified their readiness, some one is designated to give the answer.

The books being closed, the questioning begins:

T. Name the different places into which Jesus was taken to be tempted, and the verse in which each place is named.

P. It is said in the 1st verse that Jesus was led up into the wilderness; in the 5th verse, that he was taken up into the holy city, and set on a pinnacle of the temple; and in the 8th verse, that he was taken up into an exceedingly high mountain.

T. What was the condition of Jesus, when the devil proposed his first temptation?

P. He had been fasting forty days and forty nights, and he was very hungry.

We need not multiply these illustrations. We have not made them entirely in vain, if we have succeeded in producing in the mind of the reader the conviction of these two things; first, that it is a most important and difficult part of the teacher's art, to know how to ask a question; and secondly, that the true measure of the teacher's ability is, not so much what he himself is able to say to the scholars, as the fulness, the accuracy, and the completeness of the answers which he gets from them.

Before leaving this part of the subject, and that there may be no possible misunderstanding on these elementary points, it seems proper that we should here explain briefly the difference between teaching and training, two processes which practically run into each other a good deal, but which nevertheless ought

not to be confounded. Training implies more or less of practical application of what one has been taught. One may be taught, for instance, the exact forms of the letters used in writing, so as to know at once by the eye whether the letters are formed correctly or not. But only training and practice will make him a penman. Training refers more to the formation of habits. A child may be taught by reasoning the importance of punctuality in coming to school. But he is trained to the habit of punctuality only by actually coming to school in good time, day after day.

The human machine on which the teacher acts, is in its essential nature different from the material agencies operated on by other engineers. It is, as we have once and again said, a living power, with laws and processes of its own. Constant care, therefore, must be exercised, in the business of education, not to be misled by analogies drawn from the material world. The steam engine may go over its appointed task, day after day, the whole year round, and yet, at the end of the year, it will have no more tendency to go than before its first trip. Not so the boy. Going begets going. By doing a thing often, he acquires a facility, an inclination, a tendency, a habit of doing it. If a teacher or a parent succeeds in getting a child to do a thing once, it will be easier to get him to do it a second time, and still easier a third time.

A teacher who is wise, when he seeks to bring about any given change in a child, whether it be intellectual or moral, will not ordinarily attempt to produce the change all at once, and by main force. He will not rely upon extravagant promises on the one side, nor upon scolding, threats, and violence on the other. Solomon hits the idea exactly, when he speaks of "leading in the way of righteousness." We must take the young by the hand and lead them. When we have led them over the ground once, let us do it a second time, and then a third time, and so keep on until we shall have established with them a routine, which they will continue to follow of their own accord, when the guiding hand which first led them is withdrawn. *This is training.*

The theory of it is true, not only in regard to things to be done, which is generally admitted, but also in regard to things

to be known, which is often ignored if not denied. A boy, we will say, has a repugnance to the study of arithmetic. Perhaps he is particularly dull of comprehension on that subject. We shall not remove that repugnance by railing at him. We shall never make him admire it by expatiating on its beauties. It will not become clear to his comprehension by our pouring upon it all at once a sudden and overpowering blaze of light in the way of explanation. Such a process rather confounds him. Here again let us fall back upon the method of the great Teacher, "Line upon line, precept upon precept." We will first patiently conduct our boy through one of the simplest operations of arithmetic, say, a sum in addition. The next day we will conduct him again through the same process, or through another of the same sort. The steps will gradually become familiar to his mind, then easy, then clear. He learns first the practice of arithmetic, then the rules, then the relations of numbers, then the theory on which the rules and the practice are based, and finally, he hardly knows how, he becomes an arithmetician. He has been trained into a knowledge of the subject.

You wish to teach a young child how to find a word in a dictionary. You give at first, perhaps, a verbal description of the mystery of a dictionary. You will tell him that, in such a book, all the words are arranged according to the letters with which they begin; that all the words beginning with the letter A are in the first part of the book. Then those beginning with the letter B, then those beginning with C, and so on; you tell him that all the words beginning with one letter, covering some one or two hundred pages, are again re-arranged among themselves according to the second letter of each word, and then again still further re-arranged according to the third letter in each, and so on to the end. Arouse his utmost attention, and explain the process with the greatest clearness that words can give, and then set him to find a word. See how awkward will be his first attempt, how confused his ideas, how little he has really understood what you have told him. You must repeat your directions patiently, over and over, "line upon line"; you must take him by the hand day after day, and train him into a

knowledge of even so apparently simple a thing as finding a word in a dictionary.

While teaching and training are thus distinguishable in theory, in practice they are well nigh inseparable. At least, they never should be separated. Teaching has never done its perfect work, until, by training, the mind has learned to run in accustomed channels, until it sees what is true, and feels what is right, with the clearness, force, and promptitude, which come only from long-continued habit.

Supposing a man to know clearly what teaching is, and to have himself the gift, how endless are the modes by which it is to be exercised! How numerous are the methods of doing even that one function of the teacher's office, the hearing of recitations! Suppose we spend a few moments in considering two or three of these modes, by way of still farther illustrating the subject, and before drawing the general conclusion to which all these illustrations point.

The first that we shall name is called the concert method. This is practised chiefly in schools for very young children, especially for those who cannot read. There are many advantages in this method, some of which are not confined to infant classes. The timid, who are frightened by the sound of their own voices when attempting to recite alone, are thereby encouraged to speak out, and those who have had any experience with such children, know that this is no small, or easy, or unimportant achievement. Another benefit of the method is the pleasure it gives the children. The measured noise and motion connected with such concert exercises, are particularly attractive to young children. Moreover, one good teacher, by the use of this method, may greatly multiply his efficiency. He may teach simultaneously fifty or sixty, instead of teaching only five or six. But in estimating this advantage, one error is to be guarded against. Visitors often hear a large class of fifty or more go through an exercise of this kind, in which the scholars have been drilled to recite in concert, and if such persons have never been accustomed to investigate the fact, they often suppose that the answers given are the intelligent responses of all the members of the class. The truth is, however, in very many such cases, that only some half-dozen or so

really recite the answers from their own independent knowledge. These serve as leaders; the others, sheep-like, follow. Still by frequent repetition, even in this blind way, something gradually sticks to the memory, although the impression is always apt to be vague and undefined.

The method of reciting in concert is, in our opinion, chiefly useful in reciting rules and definitions, or other matters, where the very words are to be committed to memory. The impression of so large a body of sound upon the ear is very strong, and is a great help in the matter of mere verbal recollection. Children too are very sympathetic, and a really skilful teacher, by the concert method, can do a great deal in cultivating the emotional nature of a large class.

Young children, too, it should be remembered, like all other young animals, are by nature restless and fidgetty, and like to make a noise. It is possible, indeed, by a system of rigorous and harsh repression, to restrain this restlessness, and to keep these little ones for hours in such a state of decorous primness as not to molest weak nerves. But such a system of forced constraint is not natural to children, and is not a wise method of teaching. Let the youngsters make a noise; we had almost said, the more noise the better, so it be duly regulated. Let them exercise, not only their lungs, but their limbs, moving in concert, rising up, sitting down, turning round, marching, raising their hands, pointing to objects to which their attention is called, looking at objects which are shown to them. Movement and noise are the life of a child. They should be regulated indeed, but not repressed. To make a young child sit still and keep silence for any great length of time, is next door to murder. We verily believe it sometimes is murder. The health, and even the lives of these little ones, are sacrificed to a false theory of teaching. There is no occasion for torturing a child in order to teach him. God did not so mean it. Only let your teaching be in accordance with the wants of his young nature, and the schoolroom will be to him the most attractive spot of all the earth. Time and again have we seen the teacher of a primary school obliged at recess to compel her children to go out of doors, so much more pleasant did they find the schoolroom than the play-ground.

Quite the opposite extreme from the concert method, is that which, for convenience, may be called the individual method. In this method, the teacher examines one scholar alone upon the whole lesson, and then another, and so on, until the class is completed.

The only advantage claimed for this method is that the individual laggard cannot screen his deficiencies, as he can when reciting in concert. He cannot make believe to know the lesson by lazily joining in with the general current of voice when the answers are given. His own individual knowledge, or ignorance, stands out. This is clear, and so far it is an advantage. But ascertaining what a pupil knows of a lesson, is only one end, and that by no means the most important end of a recitation. This interview between the pupil and teacher, called a recitation, has many ends besides that of merely detecting how much of a subject the pupil knows. A far higher end is to make him know more,—to make perfect that knowledge which the most faithful preparation on the part of the pupil always leaves incomplete.

The disadvantages of the individual method are obvious. It is a great waste of time. If a teacher has a class of twenty, and an hour to hear them in, it gives him but three minutes for each pupil, supposing there are no interruptions. But we know there always are interruptions. In public schools the class oftener numbers forty than twenty, and the time for recitation is oftener half an hour than an hour. The teacher who pursues the individual method to its extreme, will rarely find himself in possession of more than one minute to each scholar. In so brief a time, very little can be ascertained as to what the scholar knows of the lesson, and still less can anything be done to increase that knowledge. Moreover, while the teacher is bestowing his small modicum of time upon one scholar, all the other members of the class are idle, or worse.

Teaching, of all kinds of labour, is that in which labour-saving and time-saving methods are of the greatest moment. The teacher who is wise, will aim so to conduct a recitation that, first, his whole time shall be given to every scholar; and secondly, the scholar's mind shall be exercised with every part of the lesson, and just as much when others are reciting, as

when it is his own time to recite. A teacher who can do this is teaching every scholar, all the time, just as much as if he had no scholar but that one.

Even this does not state the whole case. A scholar in such a class learns more in a given time, than he would if he were alone, and the teacher's entire time were given exclusively to him. The human mind is wonderfully quickened by sympathy. In a crowd each catches, in some mysterious manner, an impulse from his fellows. The influence of associated numbers, all engaged upon the same thought, is universally to rouse the mind to a higher exercise of its powers. A mind that is dull, lethargic, and heavy in its movements, when moving solitarily, often effects, when under a social and sympathetic impulse, achievements that are a wonder to itself.

The teacher, then, who knows how thus to make a unit of twenty or thirty pupils, really multiplies himself twenty or thirty-fold, besides giving to the whole class an increased momentum such as always belongs to an aggregated mass. We have seen a teacher instruct a class of forty in such a way, as, in the first place, to secure the subordinate end of ascertaining and registering with a sufficient degree of exactness how much each scholar knows of the lesson by his own preparation, and secondly, to secure, during the whole hour, the active exercise and coöperation of each individual mind, under the powerful stimulus of the social instinct, and of a keenly awakened attention. Such a teacher accomplishes more in one hour than the slave of the individual method can accomplish in forty hours. A scholar in such a class learns more in one hour than he would learn in forty hours, in a class of equal numbers taught on the other plan. Such teaching is labour-saving and time-saving, in their highest perfection, employed upon the noblest of ends.

But besides these questions of methods, there are other and higher questions, growing out of what may be called the philosophy of education. One of these relates to the observance of a proper order in the development of the mental faculties, and a mistake on this point leads often to a sad waste of time, even where it does not cause a mischievous perversion of ideas. Education may be defined to be the process

of developing in due order and proportion all the good and desirable parts of human nature. On this point all educators are substantially agreed. Another truth, to which there is a general theoretical assent, is that, in the order in which we develope the faculties, we should follow the leadings of nature, cultivating in childhood those faculties which seem most naturally to flourish in childish years, and reserving for maturer years the cultivation of those faculties which in the order of nature do not show much vigor until near the age of manhood, and which require for their full development a general ripening of all the other powers. The development of a human being is in some respects like that of a plant. There is one stage of growth suitable for the appearance and maturity of the leaf, another for the flower, a third for the fruit, and still a fourth for the perfected and ripened seed.

The analogy has of course many limitations. In the human plant, for instance, one class of faculties, after maturing, does not disappear in order to make place for another class, as the flower disappears before there can be fruit. Nor, again, is any class of faculties wanting altogether until the season for their development and maturity. The faculties all exist together, leaf, flower, fruit, and seed, at the same time, but each has its own best time for ripening.

While these principles have received the general assent of educators, there has been a wide divergence among them as to some of the practical applications. Which faculties do most naturally ripen early in life, and which late in life?

According to our own observation, the latest of the human powers in maturing, as it is the most consummate, is the Judgment. Next in the order of maturity, and next also in majesty and excellence, is the Reasoning power. Reason is minister to the judgment, furnishing to the latter materials for its action, as all the other powers, memory, fancy, imagination, and so forth, are ministers to reason, and supply it with its materials. The reasoning power lacks true vigor and muscle, the judgment is little to be relied on, until we approach manhood. Nature withholds from these faculties an earlier development, for the very reason, apparently, that they can ordinarily have but scanty materials for action until after the efflorescence of the

other faculties. The mind must first be well filled with knowledge, which the other faculties have gathered and stored, before reason and judgment can have full scope for action.

Going to the other end of the scale, we have as little doubt that the earliest of all the faculties to bud and blossom, is the Memory. Children not only commit to memory with ease, but they take actual pleasure in it. Tasks, under which the grown-up man recoils and reels, the child will assume with light heart, and execute without fatigue. Committing to memory, which is repulsive drudgery to the man, is the easiest of all tasks to the child. More than this. The things fixed in the memory of childhood are seldom forgotten. Things learned later in life, not only are learned with greater difficulty, but more rapidly disappear. We recall instantly and without effort, texts of Scripture, hymns, catechisms, rules of grammar and arithmetic, and scraps of poetry and of classic authors, with which we became familiar when boys. But it is a labour of Hercules to repeat by memory anything acquired since attaining the age of manhood. The Creator seems to have arranged an order in the natural development of the faculties for this very purpose, that in childhood and youth we may be chiefly occupied with the accumulation of materials in our intellectual storehouse. Now to reverse this process, to occupy the immature mind of childhood chiefly with the cultivation of faculties which are of later growth, and actually to put shackles and restraints upon the memory, nicknaming and ridiculing all memoriter exercises as parrot performances, is to ignore one of the primary facts of human nature. It is to be wiser than God.

Another faculty that shoots up into full growth in the very morning and spring-time of life, is Faith. We speak here, of course, not of religious belief, but of that faculty of the human mind which leads a child to believe instinctively whatever is told him. That we all do thus believe, until by slow and painful experience we learn to do otherwise, needs no demonstration. Everybody's experience attests the fact. It is equally plain that the existence and maturity of this faculty in early childhood is a most wise and beneficent provision of nature. How slow and tedious would be the first steps in knowledge, were the child born, as some teachers seem trying to make him,

a sceptic, that is, with a mind which refuses to receive anything as true, except what it has first proved by experience and reason! On the contrary, how much is the acquisition of knowledge expedited, during these years of helplessness and dependency, by this spontaneous, instinctive faith of childhood. The same infinite wisdom and love, which in the order of nature provide for the helpless infant a father and mother to care for it, provide also in the constitution of the infant's mind that instinctive principle or power of faith, which alone makes the father's and mother's love efficacious towards its intellectual growth and development. Of what use were parents or teachers, in instructing a child which required proof for every statement that father, mother, or teacher gives? How cruel to force the confiding young heart into premature scepticism, by compelling him to hunt up reasons for everything, when he has reasons, to him all-sufficient, in the fact that father, mother, or teacher told him so?

It may seem trifling to dwell so long upon these elementary points. Yet there are wide-spread plans of education which violate every principle here laid down. Educators and systems of education, enjoying the highest popularity, seem to have adopted the theory, at least they tacitly act upon the theory, that the first faculty of the mind to be developed is the Reasoning power. Indeed, they are not far from asserting that the whole business of education consists in the cultivation of this power, and they bend accordingly their main energies upon training young children to go through certain processes of reasoning, so called. They require a child to prove everything before receiving it as true, to reason out a rule for himself for every process in arithmetic or grammar, to demonstrate the multiplication table before daring to use it, or to commit it to memory, if indeed they do not forbid entirely its being committed to memory as too parrot-like and mechanical. To commit blindly to memory precious forms of truth, which the wise and good have hived for the use of the race, is poohed at as old fogyish. To receive as true anything which the child cannot fathom, and which he has not discovered or demonstrated for himself, is denounced as slavish. All authority in teaching, growing out of the age and the reputed wisdom of the teacher,

all faith and reverence in the learner, growing out of a sense of his ignorance and dependence, are discarded, and the frightened stripling is continually rapped on the knuckles, if he does not at every step show the truth of his allegations by what is called a course of reasoning. Children reason, of course. They should be encouraged and taught to reason. No teacher, who is wise, will neglect this part of a child's intellectual powers. But he will not consider this the season for its main, normal development. He will hold this subject for the present subordinate to many others. Moreover, the methods of reasoning, which he does adopt, will be of a peculiar kind, suited to the nature of childhood, the results being mainly intuitional, rather than the fruits of formal logic. To oblige a young child to go through a formal syllogistic statement in every step in elementary arithmetic, for instance, is simply absurd. It makes nothing plain to a child's mind which was not plain before. On the contrary, it often makes a muddle of what had been perfectly clear. What was in the clear sunlight of intuition, is now in a haze, through the intervening medium of logical terms and forms, through which he is obliged to look at it.

A primary teacher asks her class this question: "If I can buy 6 marbles with 1 penny, how many marbles can I buy with 5 pennies?" A bright boy who should promptly answer "30" would be sharply rebuked. Little eight-year old Solon on the next bench has been better trained than that. With stately and solemn enunciation he delivers himself of a performance somewhat of this sort. "If I can buy 6 marbles with 1 penny, how many marbles can I buy with 5 pennies? Answer—I can buy 5 times as many marbles with 5 pennies as I can buy with 1 penny. If, therefore, I can buy 6 marbles with 1 penny, I can buy 5 times as many marbles with 5 pennies; and 5 times 6 marbles are 30 marbles. Therefore, if I can buy 6 marbles with 1 penny, I can buy 30 marbles with 5 pennies."

And this is termed reasoning! And to train children, by forced and artificial processes, to go through such a rigmarole of words, is recommended as a means of cultivating their reasoning power and of improving their power of expression! It is not pretended that children by such a process become more expert in reckoning. On the contrary, their movements as

ready reckoners are rather retarded by it. Instead of learning to jump at once to the conclusion, lightning-like, by a sort of intuitional process, which is of the very essence of an expert accountant, they learn laboriously to stay their march by a cumbersome and confusing circumlocution of words. And the expenditure of time and toil needed to acquire these formulas of expression, which nine times out of ten are to those young minds the mere *dicta magistri*, is justified on the ground that the children, if not learning arithmetic, are learning to reason.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not advocate the disuse of explanations. Let teachers explain, let children give explanations. Let the rationale of the various processes through which the child goes, receive a certain amount of attention. But the extreme into which some are now going, in primary education, is that of giving too much time to explanation and to theory, and too little to practice. We reverse, too, the order of nature in this matter. What it now takes weeks and months to make clear to the immature understanding, is apprehended at a later day with ease and delight at the very first statement. There is a clear and consistent philosophy underlying this whole matter. It is simply this. In the healthy and natural order of development in educating a young mind, theory should follow practice, not precede it. Children learn the practice of arithmetic very young. They take to it naturally, and learn it easily, and become very rapidly expert practical accountants. But the science of arithmetic is quite another matter, and should not be forced upon them until a much later stage in their advancement.

To have a really correct apprehension of the principle of decimal notation, for instance, to understand that it is purely arbitrary, and that we might in the same way take any other number than ten as the base of a numerical scale,—that we might increase for instance by fives, or eights, or nines, or twelves, just as well as by tens—all this requires considerable maturity of intellect, and some subtlety of reasoning. Indeed we doubt whether many of the pretentious sciolists, who insist so much on young children giving the rationale of everything, have themselves ever yet made an ultimate analysis of the first step in arithmetical notation. Many of them would open their

eyes were you to tell them, for instance, that the number of figures on your two hands may be just as correctly expressed by the figures 11, 12, 13, 14, or 15, as by the figures 10,—a truism perfectly familiar to every one acquainted with the generalizations of higher arithmetic. Yet it is up-hill work to make the matter quite clear to a beginner. We may wisely therefore give our children at first an arbitrary rule for notation. We give them an equally arbitrary rule for addition. They accept these rules and work upon them, and learn thereby the practical operations of arithmetic. The theory will follow in due time. When perfectly familiar with the practice and the forms of arithmetic, and sufficiently mature in intellect, they awaken gradually and surely, and almost without an effort, to the beautiful logic which underlies the science.

How do we learn language in childhood? Is it not solely on authority and by example? A child who lives in a family where no language is used but that which is logically and grammatically correct, will learn to speak with logical and grammatical correctness long before it is able to give any account of the processes of its own mind in the matter, or indeed to understand those processes when explained by others. In other words, practice in language precedes theory. It should do so in other things. The parent who should take measures to prevent a child from speaking its mother tongue, except just so far and so fast as it could understand and explain the subtle logic which underlies all language, would be quite as wise as the teacher who refuses to let a child become expert in practical reckoning, until it can understand and explain at every step the rationale of the process,—who will not suffer a child to learn the multiplication table until it has mastered the metaphysics of the science of numbers, and can explain with the formalities of syllogism exactly how and why seven times nine make sixty-three.

These illustrations have carried us a little, perhaps, from our subject. But they seemed necessary to show that we are not beating the air. We have feared lest, in our very best schools, in the rebound from the exploded errors of the old system, we have unconsciously run into an error in the opposite extreme.

Our position on the particular point now under consideration,

may be summed up briefly, as follows: 1. In developing the faculties, we should follow the order of nature. 2. The faculties of memory and faith should be largely exercised and cultivated in childhood. 3. While the judgment and the reasoning faculty should be exercised during every stage of the intellectual development, the appropriate season for their main development and culture is near the close, rather than near the beginning, of an educational course. 4. The methods of reasoning used with children should be of a simple kind, dealing largely in direct intuitions, rather than formal and syllogistic. 5. It is a mistake to spend a large amount of time and effort in requiring young children formally to explain the rationale of their intellectual processes, and especially in requiring them to give such explanations before they have become by practice thoroughly familiar with the processes themselves.

We have thus endeavoured to set forth, in the first place, what a Normal School is, namely, a seminary for professional training in the art and science of teaching; and, secondly, to show, with some particularity and variety of illustration, what teaching is, in its very root and essence; and, to make the matter plainer, we have attempted to show the difference between teaching and training, and to explain some two or three out of very many different modes of teaching, and to discuss briefly one of the many points that are involved in the philosophy of education. Some distinct consideration of these subjects, which come up continually for discussion in a Normal School, seemed to be the very best line of argument for showing the necessity of such an institution. To appreciate the full force of this argument, it would be necessary, indeed, to consider the vast array of similar and connected subjects which beset the teacher's path, and which there is not time now even to enumerate. Let us merely name some few of these subjects.

The Monitorial method of teaching.

The Catechetical method.

The Explanatory method.

The Synthetical method.

The Analytical method.

Modes of securing in a large school all the while something for all the children to do.

Modes of teaching particular branches: as Spelling, Reading, Mental Arithmetic, Written Arithmetic, Grammar, Geography, Composition, Drawing, Penmanship, Vocal Music, &c.

School apparatus and means for visible illustration.

The development and cultivation of the faculties of observation, attention, memory, association, conception, imagination, &c.

Modes of inspiring scholars with enthusiasm in study, and of cultivating habits of self-reliance.

Topics and times for introducing oral instruction.

Teaching with and without books.

Object Teaching.

The formation of museums, and collections of plants, minerals, &c.

Exchange of specimens of penmanship, maps, drawings, minerals, &c., with other schools.

School examinations. Their object, and the different modes of conducting them.

School celebrations, festivals, and excursions.

The daily preparation which a teacher should make for school.

Circumstances which make a teacher happy in his work.

Requisites for success in teaching.

Causes of failure in teaching.

Course to be pursued in organizing a new school.

Course to be pursued in admitting new scholars.

Making an order of exercises.

Making a code of rules.

Keeping registers of attendance and progress.

Duties of the teacher to the parents and to school directors.

Opening and closing exercises of a school.

Moral and religious instruction and influences.

Modes of cultivating among children a love of truth, honesty, benevolence, and other virtues.

Modes of preventing lying, swearing, stealing, and other vices.

Modes of securing cleanliness of person, neatness of dress, courtesy of language, and gentleness of manners.

Modes of preserving the school-house and appurtenances from defacement.

Keeping the school-room in proper condition as to temperature and ventilation.

Length of school day.

Length and frequency of recess.

Games to be encouraged or discouraged at recess.

Modes of preventing tardiness.

Causes by which the health of children at school is promoted or injured.

Modes of establishing the teacher's authority.

Modes of securing the scholars' affections.

Mode of treating refractory children.

Modes of bringing forward dull, backward children.

Modes of preventing whispering.

The use of emulation.

Prizes and rewards.

But we pause. The mere enumeration of such a list, it seems to us, shows of itself, with overwhelming force, how urgent is the necessity that the teacher should have a time and an institution for considering them, and for obtaining in regard to them definite, well settled views. Some of these questions come up for practical decision every day of a teacher's life, and they are of too serious import to be left to the unpremeditated exigencies of the moment of execution. In a Normal School the novice hears these subjects discussed by teachers and professors of learning and experience, and he is made acquainted with the general usage of the most successful members of the profession. He enters upon his important and responsible work, not only fortified with safeguards against mistake, but furnished with a kind of knowledge which reduces to a minimum his chances of failure, and increases to almost a certainty his chances of success.

ART. III.—*Indische Alterthumskunde von Christian Lassen*, Vol. III. Geschichte des Handels und des Griechisch-Römischen Wissens von Indien u. s. w. 8vo. pp. 1200.

THE peninsula of India is by its position isolated from the rest of Asia. The broad rivers and lofty mountain chains, almost defying transit, by which it is bounded, are formidable obstacles to intercourse. Capable of supporting a vast population, and blessed with exuberant fertility and abundant material resources, it seemed complete within itself; there was no necessity, and there seemed to be no inducement to open communication with the outside world. It has hence developed a civilization peculiar to itself, which has been wholly shaped by internal and domestic causes; and it has entered but little into the broad current of general history.

Still, remarkable as this seclusion is, it has at no time been total. It has both influenced other lands, and been influenced by them to an extent which will well repay examination. Its precious wares have stimulated trade from the earliest periods to the present. Its fertile and salubrious plains have attracted invaders in ancient and in modern times. Its grand natural features, its strange productions, coupled with its mysterious history, and its hoary wonders, have awakened curiosity, and led to investigations, from which science has received some of its most powerful impulses. It has given birth to a religion which has propagated itself over more than half of Asia. Its extensive literature and subtle philosophy have left their traces on the thought of the world from its fables and romances to the speculations of the schools and the doctrines of the church. Its astronomical and mathematical learning, caught from western lands, received a development greatly beyond anything that antiquity or the middle age could boast elsewhere. It gave the world the arithmetical digits: and had its methods of calculation and their results been sooner known, they would have formed an era in western science and materially accelerated its advance. Its language revolutionized philology, or rather brought it into being; for as now understood it cannot be said to have existed before.

Our present design is not to discuss the entire subject of the relations of India with the rest of the world, but simply to trace those which existed between India and ancient Greece and Rome, so far as they can now be recognized, and to exhibit the influence reciprocally exerted by these two great systems of civilization so widely sundered at once in locality and in character. And in treating of these relations, those which may be called aboriginal shall at present be excluded from consideration, and only those which in contrast may be denominated historical will be taken into account. It is foreign to our purpose to inquire into the primitive connection between the races, that from which the Greeks and Romans were descended on the one hand, and the Arian race that peopled India on the other. Recent investigations into their physical structure, their language, usages, truths, and religious ideas, have developed much that is interesting upon this point. Such a connection has not only been established in the clearest manner, but the measure of its intimacy ascertained, not only as contrasted with tribes and nations, sprung from an entirely different stock, but as compared with other affiliated branches of the same primeval race, and some definite conclusions reached as to the grade of culture in the great Arian family before its various members successively separated themselves from it; and the range of ideas, or fund of traditions, possessed by this aboriginal ancestry, and transmitted to the whole multitude of their descendants.

Dismissing this whole class of questions, attractive as they are, we shall confine our attention to relations established in historical times, and which admit of being historically traced, such as subsisted between them after the races had become distinct, and they had become established as separate nationalities. Thus viewed, our subject spontaneously divides itself into three great periods:

1. That of indirect relations, extending to the time of Alexander the Great.

2. That in which the relations were chiefly military and diplomatic, embracing the reigns of Alexander and his successors.

3. That of commercial intercourse, dating from the extension

of the Roman empire into the east, and particularly from B. C. 31, when Egypt became a Roman province.

Before entering upon this discussion, however, it may be proper in a few words to specify the authorities from which the following materials have been chiefly derived: They are Lassen's *Indische Alterthumskunde*, in four thick octavos, a work of immense learning, in which everything relating to the early history and antiquities of India is elaborately, and, as nearly as may be, exhaustively discussed; Weber's *Indische Skizzen*, which contains four brief but exceedingly interesting and valuable articles relating to ancient India; Ritter's *Erdkunde*, vol. iv., in which there is an extended inquiry into the knowledge possessed of India in ancient times; and Humboldt's *Cosmos*, in which a distinguished place is assigned to the expeditions of Alexander in the development of the idea of the Cosmos, or the enlargement of men's views respecting the world, as one grand, consistent, and organized whole.

Agreeably to the division suggested above, the first period of Greek acquaintance with India is that in which there was no direct intercourse between the two countries. The only knowledge which the Greeks possessed of India or its products, before the time of Alexander, was the vague and uncertain information which reached them through the medium of other nations, especially the Phenicians and the Persians. The Egyptians are not included in this statement, for the reason that there is no conclusive evidence of their having established at this early period immediate communication with India. The expedition of Sesostris is too indefinite and legendary to build much upon it. The similarity of their institutions can be otherwise accounted for. It has been said that cotton coloured with indigo, mummies wrapped in Indian muslins, and pieces of Chinese porcelain, have been found in tombs of the 18th dynasty, which came to an end, B. C. 1476. But this is declared by Lepsius to be a mistake; and even if such articles had been found, they would not establish the existence of a direct trade, as they might have been brought overland.

The Phenicians in the time of Solomon traded with Tarshish, a port of southern Spain in the West, and Ophir in the East. The learned have long been divided in opinion whether the

latter is to be sought in India, or Arabia, or upon the eastern coast of Africa. Weber and Lassen give their suffrages in favour of India, and assign the following reasons: 1. This best suits the conditions of the narrative, 1 Kings ix. 9, 26–28; x. 11, 12. 2 Chron. viii. 17, 18; ix. 21. The vessels were made at Ezion-geber and Elath, and must have sailed out by the Red Sea. The voyage was a long one, occupying three years. The articles obtained were gold, silver, precious stones, sandal-wood, called almug, or algum trees, ivory, apes and peacocks. 2. The names of some of these articles have been explained from the Sanscrit; thus *apes* קוֹף, *κήπος*, Sans. *kapi*, and with more or less probability *peacocks*, תֻּכִּיִּים, Sans. *çikhin; algum trees*, Sans. *valgum;* ivory שֶׁנְהַבִּים, lit. tooth of elephants, Sans. *ibha*, an elephant; whence also the Latin *ebur*, and in Greek, with the Arabic article prefixed, *ελ-εφας*, or *ελεφ-αντ*,* may be equivalent to *aleph-hind*, ox of India. In either case the name of the animal bears testimony that it was first heard of from India, and through the medium of a Semitic people. 3. Ophir has, with considerable probability, been identified with Abhîra, mentioned both by native and Greek writers, which was located at the mouths of the Indus, where it would be convenient of access to the Phenicians, and well situated for interior trade, to which gold could be readily brought from the north, and sandal-wood from the south. A volume of native tales, the Panchatantra, perhaps alluding to the good bargains which the sharp-witted Phenicians were able to make with these simple-minded people, says, "Where there are no men of understanding in the land sea-born jewels are of no value; herdmen in the land of Abhîra (Ophir) sell gems radiant as the moon for three cowries." 4. To this may be added at least the partial testimony of tradition. Josephus refers it to the Golden Chersonesus which belongs to India. The LXX have *Σουφιρ* and *Σωφιρ*, which is the Coptic name of India. The Arabic translator several times substitutes India for Ophir.

The trade with Ophir must have been very ancient. It was

* Tamarind is similarly derived from *tamar-hind*, palm of India. The Romans who first saw the elephant in the army of Pyrrhus called it *Bos lucanus*, ox of Lucania.

known to Moses, who introduces the name Gen. x. 29. In Job xxii. 24, comp. xxviii. 16, it is used as a synonym of gold, its most valuable commodity. Other Indian products bearing their native names are spoken of in the books of Moses, as bdellium and lign aloes; and in the Song of Solomon *spikenard* נֵרְדְּ and *saffron* or *crocus* כַּרְכֹּם.

Another interesting fact in this connection is that the written character of India is of Semitic origin. The possibility of this was doubtfully suggested by Kopp in 1821, who endeavoured to establish a resemblance in the case of five letters. The first effective steps in this direction, however, were taken by James Prinsep, of Calcutta, who, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, for 1837 and 1838, first deciphered the letter upon the most ancient Sanscrit monuments. Subsequent monuments exhibit in regular series the successive changes by which it has been brought to its present form, and the several points of divergence of the various Asiatic alphabets which are based upon it. Prinsep's own conclusion was, "that the oldest Greek was nothing more than Sanscrit turned topsy-turvy." The conformity is so constant and so close as to demonstrate their common origin.

Now it is sufficiently plain that the Greeks did not derive their alphabet from India. Nor on the other hand could India have borrowed letters from Greece. For, 1. Alexander the Great found the art of writing in familiar use among the Hindoos. Strabo quotes Nearchos, one of the generals of Alexander, as saying that they wrote their letters on cotton cloth of close texture. The same thing is implied in what he says of their erecting mile-stones and guide-boards every ten stadia to indicate the distances and the turns of the road. Curtius also speaks of their writing on the inner bark of trees. 2. The oldest native monuments belong to the middle of the third century before Christ, and are therefore not long subsequent to the march of Alexander into the East. Upon these occurs the word meaning "to write," whose radical signification is not that of carving or engraving, but of anointing, and implies in its origin the use of a fluid ink. Inasmuch as there is no indication of letters having been coloured after they were carved in stone, this shows that writing was at that time not merely a

monumental art, but in current use on soft materials. The time when alphabetical writing was introduced into India cannot be accurately defined. It appears evident that the Vedas were at first unwritten, for the orthographic laws often require contractions which conflict with the metre. It has been made a question whether even the pratiçakhyasutras or Vedic grammars presuppose a written text.

However this may be, the only conclusion to which we can come is that the alphabets of Greece and of India must have been alike derived from a common source. And this can be no other than the Semitic; the additional sounds required in the Sanscrit being represented by varying the forms of already existing letters. The Phenicians or perhaps the Babylonians must have been their teachers.

From the Phenicians, who maintained an intercourse with India such as has now been described, the Greeks may doubtless at a very early period have become acquainted with some of the productions of India. But the name of the country was not known to them until they learned it from the Persians. Homer speaks of Ethiopians, or men of burnt countenances and dark skins, in both the extreme east and west. Those in the east have been conjectured to mean the Hindoos, as some things proper to them are by later writers attributed to Ethiopians, which might be explicable from this wide usage of the word. The *κασσίτερος* or *tin* of Homer is identical with the Sanscrit *kastîra*; though as tin was imported into India, and not exported from it, the word may have been carried thither in the Alexandrian period, as was probably the case likewise with the Sans. *kastûrî*, musk, from *καστόριον*. Many of the fables attributed to Æsop and others are found again in the writings of India. The oldest which has been identified is in Archilochus in the eighth century before Christ. In the opinion of Lassen these were indigenous in India: but Weber, who was originally of the same mind, after further investigation satisfied himself that they were in the majority of instances borrowed from the Greek.

The first knowledge of India properly so called came, however, to the west through the Persians. They had the advantage of being a kindred people and their language was closely allied to the Sanscrit, particularly in its old Vedic form.

Scylax, a Greek in the employ of Darius Hystaspes, led an expedition to the Indus and sailed down it to the ocean, of all which he wrote an account which is now lost; a brief narrative of it is however preserved by Herodotus. The cuneiform inscriptions of Darius make mention of the Gadâra and Hidu, dwellers on the Indus, as tributary to him. They are also spoken of as having served in the armies of Xerxes against Greece, which is the first time that the two nations were brought in any way in actual contact. In the armies of Darius Codomanus, the antagonist of Alexander the Great, there were few Indian auxiliaries, so that the Persian rule in that region would seem to have been less extended or powerful than formerly. He is said to have had fifteen war elephants, which is the first appearance of this formidable animal in history. It is worth while to observe the precise accordance of the statements of the sacred writers with these facts recorded by profane historians. The Ahasuerus of the book of Esther, who is the same with Xerxes, is said (i. 1,) to have reigned from India to Ethiopia over one hundred and twenty-seven provinces. The Darius of the book of Daniel, who is the Cyaxares of Xenophon, had (vi. 1,) but one hundred and twenty provinces. The empire was not so large and had not yet been extended into India.

Herodotus, whose knowledge was derived directly or indirectly from the Persians, speaks of India as lying at the farthest limit of the habitable world, beyond which lay an unknown and impassable desert: it was occupied by many different nations speaking distinct languages. His theory that the extremes of the world possessed the noblest productions, was doubtless based on what he knew of the animal and vegetable wonders of India and of Africa. He speaks of the Indus as the only river known to him beside the Nile, which contained crocodiles, referring of course to the alligators; of the bamboo and its uses, of trees bearing a wool superior to that of sheep and used for clothing, which is the earliest mention of cotton; of an abundance of gold brought down by streams, or dug out by an enormous species of ants nearly as large as foxes and as fleet as horses. It is impossible to conjecture from what this story could have arisen, though it is repeated by subsequent writers, one of whom avers that he had seen their stuffed skins. He also speaks of the

Brahmanical hermits as killing no living thing, and subsisting entirely on the spontaneous products of the earth, having no dwellings, and when sick receiving no attention but dying in solitude.

The most complete account of India that was given to the Greeks during this period, however, was by Ctesias, who was taken prisoner by the Persians, and on account of his skill in medicine was retained for seventeen years as physician at the court of Alexander Mnemon. Among other works written by him after his return to Greece, B. C. 398, was a treatise on India, of which we now possess some scattered fragments, together with a very imperfect abstract by the Byzantine patriarch Photius, in the middle of the 9th century. It is impossible to acquit Ctesias altogether of the charge of exaggeration and the love of the marvellous. Although the fabulous stories, on the ground of which his truthfulness has been impeached, it is now well ascertained, were not inventions of his own, but fictions popularly credited in India, many of which are still found in native writings, and which he reported as he had heard them. Here belong the races of one-eyed men; of one-footed men, who could nevertheless run with incredible swiftness; of men with ears reaching to their elbows, which they used as cloaks; of pigmies three feet high, with domestic animals to match; of macrobians who lived four hundred years, which is very moderate, for Indian writings attribute to them an age of from one to ten thousand years; of water in which nothing could swim, the same doubtless that was fabled to convert everything it touched to stone. It is not perhaps strange that he should have believed that elephants were used in war to pull down fortified walls, when he had seen them tear up palm trees by the roots; or that the reports of India's tropical heat should have been magnified into the statement that the sun appeared there to be ten times as large as in other lands, and that the surface of the sea was so hot that fish could not approach it. These exaggerations and fables were mingled with sober and reliable accounts of the country, its population, and productions. He described India as it was known and conceived by the Persians. One remarkable statement, which seems to imply some knowledge of electrical laws and the power of

metals as conductors, is that he had seen iron swords which had the property of dispelling clouds and lightning.

The era of direct intercourse between Greece and India was opened by the march of Alexander into the East. He entered the country in the spring of 327, and in the course of a year subdued a large portion of the Panjâb. Those native princes who submitted to his sway, he left undisturbed in their dominions and even enlarged their boundaries; while all who offered opposition were severely chastised. Cities were founded and garrisons stationed at important points with a view both to secure his conquests and to facilitate trade. His desire to extend his march to the Ganges was frustrated by the unwillingness of his troops to proceed farther. He consequently built a fleet of boats and sailed down the Indus to its mouth, whence Nearchos conducted the transports homeward by sea, while Alexander with the rest of the troops marched overland to Persia and Babylon, where he died June 11th, B. C. 323.

The political consequences of this conquest were neither deep nor lasting. The Indian provinces being left under their native governors were but loosely attached to the Macedonian empire. And even this shadow of Greek authority was resisted and thrown off by Sandrocottus or Chandragupta. Friendly relations were established between this prince and Seleucus Nicator, which continued through successive reigns, signalized and cemented by the exchange of ambassadors between the courts of Babylon and Palibothra. About B. C. 256, the satrap of Bactria revolted from the Seleucidæ and founded an independent line of Greco-Bactrian kings, whose sway was extended beyond the Indus and as far as Guzerat. This kingdom was subsequently divided and one part overturned by the Parthians; but the eastern or Indian portion continued to maintain itself until about B. C. 85, when it was swallowed up by the advance of the Indo-Scythians. The last relic of Greek government in India thus disappeared about 240 years after its sudden and brilliant beginning.

The indirect results of this conquest were more important. Its effect on the Greek mind was prodigious. Humboldt remarks that the march of Alexander deserves to be entitled a scientific expedition. The boundaries of the known world

received a vast enlargement. The Greeks were led over immense regions hitherto untravelled. They beheld nature in forms never before witnessed, the mighty Himalayas, the broad Indus, a new world of vegetation and of animal life. They were introduced to a civilization totally unlike their own, whose compact forms and hoary antiquity commanded their respect, while it stimulated their curiosity. Particularly the rigour of the ascetics, their strange manner of life, and their contempt of the world and of death kindled their reverence and put an end to the disdain with which they had hitherto looked down upon all barbarians.

Several of the generals of Alexander published such notes as they had made, upon their return. The range of their observation was, however, limited to the line of march. The brevity of their stay prevented any extended and careful investigations, even if these had comported with their soldierly tastes. And the portion of the country through which they passed was the least strict in its observance of the peculiar Brahmanical regulations. By far the most valuable treatise on India belonging to this period was from the pen of Megasthenes, who in the quality of ambassador at the court of Chandragupta had an opportunity of studying not only natural features and productions, but the interior life of the people, their castes, government, religion, manners, and history. Only fragments now remain of any of these works, although enough to give some indication of their character and to make us regret their loss.

This extended knowledge gave a new impetus to science. A multitude of facts was accumulated bearing on natural history. Geography was freed from the crude and fabulous notions previously entertained, and correct conceptions gained of the form and structure of the earth. How utterly vague and erroneous were the opinions which prevailed before, will appear from the fact that Alexander thought he might find the sources of the Nile in India.

The march of Alexander likewise left its impress in the region of Greek mythology and fiction. The worship of Bacchus appears to have begun in Thrace, and he received the name of Dionysos, or the god of Nysa, from a mountain of that name in that region. But as the Greeks extended their know-

ledge of foreign lands new Nysas were discovered or imagined and associated with this favourite deity, and the story of his victorious marches was more and more enlarged. Herodotus heard of a Nysa in Egypt. Euripides speaks of his having marched as far as Bactria. The companions of Alexander found a Nysa on their route, and were ever on the alert for evidences of Greek heroes preceding them. Discovering a people who clothed themselves in skins and branded their oxen and mules with the sign of a club, they set them down as descendants of Hercules. Another people, addicted to the culture of the vine, and whose kings indulged in festive processions with drums and cymbals, were supposed to have sprung from Dionysos. A sacred cave, near which they passed, was assumed to be the identical one in which Prometheus had been bound and from which Hercules had rescued him.

But Megasthenes gave a wider extension and more stability to these legends by interweaving them with the history of India. The only departure from native traditions, with which he appears to have been chargeable, arose from his prepossessions on this subject. He arbitrarily identified Hercules with the hero Krishna, in whom Vishnu the club-bearer became incarnate, though without materially altering the Indian legends respecting him. He seems to have found Dionysos in Siva, but what he says of him was chiefly an invention of his own, and grew out of the theory which he had brought with him from Greece of the progress of civilization and the primitive condition of mankind. And it may be added, that he is not the only writer who has undertaken to reconstruct history upon the basis of his own subjective theory.

In opposition to the Hindoo tradition that the most ancient condition of the race was the most perfect, and that all the affairs of state and of civil life were divinely regulated at the beginning, he represents the earliest inhabitants of the country as nomads, clothed in skins and subsisting on the spontaneous productions of the ground. But Dionysos, leading a host of Pans, Satyrs, and women, marched with drums and cymbals from one end of India to the other, subduing the entire land and teaching the people to plow and cultivate the soil, to worship the gods with processions and dances, and to practise the

arts of civilized life. He at length left India under the government of Spatemhas, or Svayambhuva, the Self-Existent, who was succeeded by his son Buddha, and so on from father to son in regular succession since.

This myth reached its final form in the Dionysiacs of Nonnos from Panopolis in Upper Egypt, an enormous epic still extant in 48 books. The part which relates to India seems to have no basis whatever in any native authorities, certainly not in the Mahabharata or Ramayana from which some have supposed it to be partly drawn. Many of the names of nations and rivers are fictitious, and those of cities and generals are derived from Greek. It is a confused medley of Greek and Asiatic legends transferred to new localities, and of adventures modelled after the experiences of Alexander in this region.

The exploits of Alexander also gave rise to numerous legends which spread throughout the east and have been perpetuated to the present day. Lassen remarks, "It has been the singular fortune of this most gifted monarch of antiquity to have his deeds sung by none but mediocre poets in his own country and in his native tongue, while among orientals and even occidentals whose ancestors stood in no relation to him, he has been celebrated in poems of high repute. In the west he was scarcely less renowned than Charlemagne and King Arthur. He has been, as it were, naturalized among the modern Persians, and incorporated in the history of their heroes by Nizâmi, one of their most distinguished poets in the best period of their literature. No less than ten Persian poets have employed themselves upon these legends. Finally, a story of his life stuffed with fables is a popular book and extensively read among the modern Greeks."

The accounts of India, which we owe to those who visited that country in the train of Alexander, or as ambassadors from the court of his successors, are interesting to us not only as revealing the new impulses communicated to the Greek mind from this remote quarter, but as exhibiting the conception formed of India and Indian institutions by the most cultivated nation of antiquity. They are further valuable in supplementing the knowledge we have of the country and its antiquities, and in supplying chasms in our other sources of information.

One most important service rendered by them in this respect is, that they furnish us a fixed point, which we have no other means of attaining, in Indian chronology, and which is available at once in its history, its language and its literature. We are made acquainted through Greek sources with a number of names of native princes. Many of these do not reappear in any domestic history which has yet been examined. Others are simply the names of nations or countries transferred to their rulers, or they are descriptive titles or epithets, or as in the case of Poros, the most formidable antagonist of Alexander, they are not individual but family names, and can no more be made available for the purpose of identification than Pharaoh or Ptolemy in Egypt, or Cæsar in Rome. But the leader of the revolt shortly after the death of Alexander, presents us with a name that is free from these objections. The Sandracottus of the Greeks is unquestionably the Chandragupta of native authorities. This gives us a fixed point from which all the others can be determined.

Still further, Chandragupta's grandson Açoka was the first king who interested himself specially in the spread of Buddhism within his own dominions and in foreign parts. Several inscriptions graven by him on pillars or hewn in the solid rock, have been discovered in various parts of the peninsula, at Delhi, Allahabad, Guzerat, in Orissa, in the vicinity of Peshâwar and in other places. They are in three different dialects, and contain edicts of substantially the same tenor, exhorting to mutual forbearance and toleration, and to planting trees, digging wells, erecting houses of entertainment and rest for travellers, and doing other things which would be for the public advantage; and they are enforced by the rewards attendant upon such meritorious deeds in this world and in the next. Their date is fixed with certainty by their containing the names of Antiochus, Ptolemy, Antigonus and Alexander. The language in which they are composed shows that the popular dialects were then already forming, from which the various local languages of India have since sprung. Data are here afforded for determining the extent to which this had then proceeded, and consequently of inferring the date of writings in which a corresponding state of the language may be observed.

The Greek rhetorician Dion Chrysostomus says that the poems of Homer were sung by the Indians in their own language, and that the sorrows of Priam, the lamentations of Andromache and Hecabe, and the valour of Achilles and Hector, were well known to them. As this is certainly not true in its literal sense, it can have no other meaning than that poems similar to those of Homer were in circulation. Now the Mahabharata, one of the great Indian epics, does contain passages which bear a general resemblance to those already referred to. It has been plausibly conjectured that this statement of Dion was derived from Megasthenes, who had a more intimate knowledge of Indian affairs than any other writer of antiquity and from whom alone such information could be expected. If this be so, it seems to make it clear that this great Indian epic was then already in existence. And at least a negative conclusion can be reached, regarding the time of the events which it celebrates, from another statement of Megasthenes, that Hercules lived 6,240 years before Chandragupta. Now as according to his belief Hercules was Krishna, whose deeds enter into the theme of this poem, it follows that the great war which it describes was at that time referred to a remote antiquity and could not have occurred, as some have conjectured, but a century before.

The effect upon India of these two centuries of contact was less considerable than that which we have seen to be exerted upon the Greeks. The reasons for this are obvious. The number of native Greeks settled in the country was inconsiderable, a large proportion of the garrisons being mercenaries from various Asiatic nations. Again, they scarcely penetrated into India proper, since they held merely Cabulistan and the Panjâb, districts which were regarded very much as Galilee was by the Jews, and for a similar reason. They were despised on account of their assimilation to foreign manners, and whatever was found in that quarter was hence regarded with suspicion. And further, the exclusive system of caste and a rigorous code of laws and observances laid great restrictions on influences coming from abroad.

Nevertheless such an influence can be traced to some extent. There are several passages in the native writings in which Greeks are spoken of or alluded to. A few words were introduced into

Sanscrit from the Greek, as *thatega* for *στρατηγός*, *dramma* for *δραχμή*, as at a later period dînâri for the Latin denarius. The art of coining money was first learned from the Greeks, and was subsequently maintained in slavish imitation of the models they had furnished. Wilson thinks that the Hindu drama is independent of the Greek; but Weber is of the opinion that the former may not improbably have originated in imitation of the Greek scenic exhibitions, since the oldest of them are later than this period of which we are now treating, and belong for the most part to Ozene in the west of the country, the part consequently which was most liable to be affected by Greek manners, and the stage-curtain is called *Yavanikâ*, i. e. Grecian.

The influence of Greek architecture is traceable in the northwest of India. The Hindus also derived from the Greeks their knowledge of the seven planets, the first allusion to which is found in seven points on the coins of the Indian satraps in Guzerat. Their employment to designate the days of the week, which was original in Egypt, and spread thence to other lands, belongs to the next period, a different division of time based on the light and the dark half of the month having prevailed previously.

This brings us to the third and last division of our subject, the period of commercial intercourse under the Roman empire. This trade was carried on over various routes. The least considerable portion coasted along the Persian Gulf, passed up the Euphrates and so overland to the Mediterranean. But as the mouth of the Euphrates was held by the hostile Parthians, the principal overland traffic was forced to pursue a more circuitous route farther to the east and north. The point of departure was Minnegara, the modern Ahmedpur on the Indus; thence it followed the great road still frequented through Cabulistan into Bactria. Here three roads diverged. One led across the Belurtag mountains to Central Asia, East Turkistan, the desert of Gobi, and Thibet, and was the avenue of trade with the seres inhabiting this region. A second took the direction of Herat and the Parthian capital, Hecatanpylon, thence to Ecbatana in Media and through the passes of Mount Zagros to Kalah on the Tigris, and into Asia Minor. The third passed down the Oxus to the Caspian Sea, where the goods were shipped across and

then forwarded to the Black Sea, and so brought down to the Mediterranean.

The disastrous defeat of Crassus by the Parthians, B. C. 53, and the frequent hostilities that followed in that quarter, greatly obstructed, if they did not absolutely prevent all traffic by way of the Euphrates. The route by the Oxus and the Caspian had been open since the death of Mithridates the Great, B. C. 63, but it was tedious and difficult. The reduction of Egypt to the condition of a Roman province, B. C. 30, opened the most direct as well as the most practicable route of all, viz., that by the Red Sea; the advantages of which were much increased by Hippalus' discovery of the S. W. monsoon. Alexandria now at length justified the expectations of its illustrious founder and speedily rose to great consequence, as the centre or entrepot of a trade which was constantly growing with the increasing wealth and luxury of Rome.

According to Strabo one hundred and twenty ships were engaged in the trade with India and the number was subsequently greatly increased. They left Egypt commonly about the middle of July. Thirty days brought them to the ports at the mouth of the Red Sea, whence they sailed in three different directions to Pattalene at the mouth of the Indus, to Barygaza on the Gulf of Cambay, which had the most considerable trade of all the Indian cities, or to Muziris, and other emporia in the southern part of the peninsula. In the latter half of December or the first of January, they set out on their return from the Malabar coast, that they might take advantage of the N. E. monsoon, thus completing their circuit within the year. Cohorts of archers accompanied them for their protection against the pirates which infested those seas.

Pliny states that the annual sum expended in the trade to India was never less than fifty million sesterces, or about two million dollars, and the wares thence obtained were valued at one hundred times that amount. The articles imported by the Romans were Indian iron, which was prized as of a superior quality, and a great variety of precious stones, including the diamond, the art of reducing which to dust for the purposes of the lapidary, Pliny thought to be one of the most wonderful results achieved by human ingenuity. The opal and pearl (*mar-*

garita,) betray their Indian origin by their Sanscrit names. To the above are to be added ebony, teak-wood, a species of oil, rice, sugar, several kinds of drugs, spices, as cloves, cinnamon, cassia, ginger, and pepper; the two last are Sanscrit names, pepper, also being entitled yavana-priya, *dear to the Greeks*, where Greek is used with the same latitude that Frank now is in the Levant; also colours, as indigo, a name which points to India, lac, and the vegetable cinnabar; perfumes, as myrrh, spikenard and aloe wood, ivory, tortoise shell, wool, seric skins, so called because obtained from Central Asia, though the species of animal is unknown, the celebrated myrrhine vases, the material of which was so costly that a piece only large enough to make three cups of a pint each, cost from $1500 to $3000. Lions, leopards, and panthers were brought for the circus, but not elephants, which were obtained from Mauritania. Roses also were imported for garlands and bouquets. And last, though not least in this enumeration of commodities, are cotton and silk.

The ambiguity of the terms employed by classic writers often makes it doubtful whether they are referring specifically to cotton, or to some other similar material. It can scarcely be questioned, however, that cotton garments, are intended by Herodotus, when he speaks of the Persians, as wearing σινδονες, a word which some derive from Sindh or the Indus, and others refer to a Semitic origin. The book of Esther (i. 6,) in describing the rich tapestry in the palace of the Persian monarch Ahasuerus or Xerxes, makes use of the Indian name כַּרְפַּס, which was subsequently borrowed by the Greeks and Romans. The cotton plant is spoken of on two small islands in the Persian Gulf; but it is doubtful whether it was cultivated in Upper Egypt as early as the time of Pliny. So that beyond question India was at that period the chief source of supply to the Roman world.

Seres and Serica, whence silk was brought, are not proper names of the people and the country, but designations given to them from their staple article of merchandise. They mean strictly silk-men and the silk-region, the words being traced back to *sir*, in Mongolian and the language of Corea, or with the final *r* omitted in Chinese, *sse* or *szu*, a silk-worm. The culture of silk was first introduced into the Byzantine empire

by Justinian in the fifth century, prior to which time India was the principal mart of the silk trade; the overland route to Central Asia being obstructed by frequent wars. From Aristotle it appears that he had no accurate knowledge of the silk-worm, and that few women at that time used silk, although cocoons (the word is Sanscrit) were even then brought to Greece. Under the Roman emperors the use of silk largely increased, although the knowledge of its origin did not keep pace with the employment of the material, for Virgil and Pliny both speak of it as combed from the leaves of trees. A pound of silk in the reign of Aurelian sold for a pound of gold.

The Roman merchants took to India in exchange for the wares thence obtained, copper, lead, tin, silver ware; coral, which is said to have been prized by the Hindus as pearls were by the Romans; stibium, which seems to have been preferred to the native articles employed from very early times in painting the eyelids; a few gems, incense, the edible Egyptian lotus, garments, girdles, and wine, notwithstanding the fact that all intoxicating drinks were forbidden by Hindu law. Their purchases, however, were chiefly paid for in gold and silver. Hence immense quantities of coin were annually carried into India, great numbers of which have been discovered in the most widely separated parts of that vast peninsula, in Cabulistan, the Mahratta territory, the Deccan, and Ceylon. These are of various ages, and by their varying numbers afford a ready indication of the times in which trade flourished most. Coins of the Roman republic have been found, but these must have been brought to India at a later time. Those of the Emperor Augustus and onward to the Antonines are most abundant, showing that the most flourishing period of this trade was from the beginning of the Christian era to the end of the second century. That the commerce continued to be prosecuted after the division of the Roman empire appears from the coins of Theodosios I., Marcianos, and Leon, discovered in Malabar.

The vast commercial enterprises of this period led to great frequency of intercourse. The Roman merchants gradually extended their trips farther and farther, not only to Ceylon, but along the eastern side of Hindostan. By Pliny's time they

must have reached the mouth of the Ganges, for he gives the measurement in Roman miles to that point from Perimula on the island of Manaar, near the northern extremity of Ceylon. And yet, although wonderfully well acquainted with the productions of Hindostan proper, he shows no knowledge of Farther India. The geographer Ptolemy, however, not only states the distance to the Ganges, but beyond it to Malacca or the Golden Chersonesus, and thence even to Kattigara or Canton: and mentions the name of Alexandros, who had reached that remote point. Instances are also given of those who had penetrated Serica to its capital. And a very interesting experience is recorded of Jambulus, son of a merchant, and himself a merchant, who paid a reluctant visit to the Indian Archipelago. While on a trading excursion through Arabia he was seized by robbers and carried with his companions to Ethiopia. He was there, with a single companion, put in an open boat provisioned for six months and sent to sea with directions to sail southward; the idea being that if they reached land in safety, Ethiopia would enjoy six hundred years of peace and prosperity, but if they put back or were driven back, they were subjected to the most frightful tortures, because of the calamities this would be sure to bring upon the country. After four months tossing about upon the sea, they reached the shore of an island where they remained seven years, at the termination of which they were sent to sea again and finally driven on the coast of India, whence he returned home and published an account of his travels. From his description of the island, its productions, among which was the sago-palm, and its inhabitants, who were divided into castes like the Hindus, and were governed by similar laws, it is plain that it was Bali, which, like the neighbouring Java and Madura, was at a very early period colonized from India. He speaks of their possessing an alphabet of twenty-eight letters divided into seven classes, which is substantially the Sanscrit alphabet, adapted perhaps to the peculiar sounds of the native language.

The frequency with which Hindostan was visited by traders from the west is farther shown by the copious lists of cities which Ptolemy was able to give. He reports fewer from Farther India for a double reason, both because being less civilized

it did not contain so many cities, and because being more rarely visited, these were less known. Another fact still more conclusive, is that several cities in both the Indian peninsulas and in Taprobane or Ceylon, bore Greek appellations, either originally imposed, or translations of the native names. These must have been factories, or places where considerable bodies of foreigners stationed themselves with more or less permanence for purposes of trade.

In this trade the Indian merchants also took an active part. That portion of it which extended beyond Hindostan to Farther India, the Indian Archipelago, and Canton, was almost exclusively conducted by them. They also participated in the trade to the westward. Settlements of Indian traders are known to have existed on the coasts of Arabia and Ethiopia, and on the island of Socotra or Dioscorides, whose name is perhaps Sanscrit. Many of them established themselves in Egypt, and they were emulous of a share of the trade between Alexandria and Western ports. They are particularly spoken of as visiting Lacedemonia.

Cornelius Nepos relates an incident, which can hardly be explained on any other hypothesis than their vigorous participation in the overland trade likewise. He says that when Metellus Celer was proconsul of Gaul, B. C. 60, some Indians were sent to him by the king of the Suevi, who had been engaged in trade but had been driven by storms and adverse winds completely out of their course. Now unless we suppose that they had entirely circumnavigated the continent of Africa, the only other alternative would seem to be that they were pursuing their avocation upon the route across the Caspian and Black Seas, and were driven by stress of weather to the northern shores of the latter, where they fell into the hands of the Suevi and were dealt with in the manner already mentioned.

The competition among the native princes for the trade with Rome, and their desire to obtain a full share of its benefits, may also be inferred from the repeated embassies sent from India to the Roman emperors, doubtless with this view. Thus we read of one from a king by the name of Poros, to the emperor Augustus; another from a king in Ceylon to Claudius;

a third from a king on the Malabar coast to Antoninus Pius, and a fourth was sent to the emperor Julian.

The effects of this increased intercourse upon the west, on one hand, and upon India on the other, are yet to be considered. No assimilation of Rome and India is to be expected. They were too remote, and too unlike, and the proportion of actual traders to the entire population of either country was too small for us to look for such a result.

It may be said, however, to have accelerated the fall of Rome, by tending to increase and pamper its luxury, by enormously enriching one class, the merchants, at the expense of the rest, and by the prodigious drain of the precious metals which, as has already been stated, it occasioned.

Its intellectual results were, however, of greater importance than its political consequences. The mind of the west received a powerful impulse on the one hand, from the vast additions now made to the knowledge previously possessed of the world and of natural phenomena, and on the other, from contact with the strange and striking forms of Hindoo thought and life. The personal observations of Alexander's generals, or the notes of subsequent merchants and travellers, furnished the data by which Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, Strabo, and Ptolemy, not only reached surprisingly accurate conclusions respecting these hitherto unvisited lands, but were greatly aided in working out the problem of the form and dimensions of the habitable earth and of the globe itself. They furnished the data likewise from which Pliny drew largely in composing his Natural History, that encyclopedia, as it has been well called, of the knowledge of the ancients. And even the errors, into which the ancient geographers were betrayed by these authorities, had an important connection with the greatest discovery of modern times. The imperfections in the mode of reckoning distance in marches and voyages made it impossible for the most careful to attain strict accuracy. But the itineraries, which were then the principal sources of information, did not even aim at the precision demanded by science. When the distance was extended to hundreds or thousands of miles, the margin of possible error became necessarily very great. In latitude, these errors were capable of at least partial correction by the statements made

respecting climate and productions, or the length of the longest day, or the direction of the shadow at noon, or the proportion between the shadow on the dial-plate, and the gnomon by which it was cast, whence the polar altitude might be readily calculated. But in computing the longitude no correction of this sort was possible for even the gravest errors, and the more remote the place the more considerable the error becomes. Thus Ptolemy gives the latitude of Cabul within 24 minutes of the truth, but the longitude which he assigns to it is 28 degrees in excess. At Madura the error of longitude is 30 degrees, and at Canton 46. The limit of the eastern continent was thus conceived to lie far beyond its actual position, and the task which Columbus proposed to accomplish by his western voyage was to that extent reduced.

Some of the doctrines of the Gnostics and the Neoplatonists were plainly borrowed from or modified by those of the Indian philosophy. This influence is apparent in the philosophical tenets of Plotinus, and Porphyry, as well as in the Gnostic ideas of emanation and the demiurgos, of the evil inherent in matter, the virtue of asceticism, obtaining direct communion with God by the mortification of the senses and profound meditation, and thus attaining to miraculous powers, the division of men into the three classes of *πνευματικοι*, *ψυχικοι* and *ὑλικοι*, etc.; while monachism, celibacy, the veneration of relics, bells, rosaries, the tonsure, and the like, betray a Buddhist origin.

On the other hand, the Hindus learned their astronomy from the west, and seem to have been subjected to some influences from the Christian church. Some peculiarities were introduced into the worship of Krishna, and some modifications made of the conceptions previously entertained of him, which seem to have been derived from the worship of Christ. There are also some strange approximations to the ideas of a personal supreme God, and the sovereign efficacy of faith in him, which seem as if they must have been borrowed from a Christian source.

ART. IV.—*An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy: Being a Defence of Fundamental Truth.* By JAMES McCOSH, LL.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1866.

DR. McCOSH has established a high rank for himself as a judicious, sound, and able writer on metaphysics and cognate questions relative to "fundamental truth." The freedom, sometimes amounting to diffuseness, of his style increases the popularity and influence of his philosophical writings. He seldom fails to detect the real issue between truth and error, and to do good service on the side of the former. Beyond any other considerable living author he has seized upon and exposed the false and dangerous theories propounded by the different philosophers and schools which exercise the greatest power over modern thought, and are working the direst havoc among the young thinkers of Europe and America. His great mission is, indeed, the "defence of fundamental truth" against assaults of sceptics, destructives, and the unintentional betrayals of mistaken friends. And nobly does he fulfil it. He shows that judicial mind in regard to philosophical questions which preserves its balance between contending parties, and rarely fails to seize and maintain the truth, sifting it clear of intermingled fallacies and sophisms. Among all the philosophical writers of the present time, none lays so firmly the foundations which underlie all truth, natural and revealed, and without which, all belief in substance, cause, or reality of any sort, must totter and fall.

It was therefore eminently fit that Dr. McCosh should bring to the test of a rigid examination the principles so industriously and ably propagated by one of the mightiest of modern destructive writers, John Stuart Mill. Such a work greatly needed to be done, and our author was the man to do it. This volume is important, not merely in reference to the views of Mr. Mill, but of the whole school of writers, past and present, British and continental, he so ably represents. Not only so. Mr. Mill's most significant and recent exposition of his views is presented in his review of Sir William Hamilton's Metaphysics. Thus Dr. McCosh in reviewing the former, continually deals

with the doctrines of the latter, the strongest representative of the contrary side, not to say extreme, in philosophy, which the century has produced in Britain. A searching examination of Mill's philosophical discussions becomes therefore really a survey of the two great currents of philosophical opinion in that country and our own at the present time. We invite the attention of our readers to a few of the salient points of our author's latest work.

1. The grand feature of Mill's system appears in his doctrine of sensations. To these he reduces all the operations of mind, and of course all that we know of mind or matter, or being. He says, "a feeling and a state of consciousness are, in the language of philosophy, equivalent expressions; everything is a feeling of which the mind is conscious; everything which it *feels*, or, in other words, which form a part of its own sentient existence." "Feeling, in the proper sense of the term, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought, are the subordinate species." The mind he analyzes into a mere "thread of consciousness," a "series of feelings which is conscious of itself as past and future." He says, "the belief I entertain that my mind exists, when it is not feeling, nor thinking, nor conscious of its own existence, resolves itself into a belief of a Permanent Possibility of these states." But these states or exercises have already, as we have seen, been resolved into feelings or sensations. In endless forms he teaches us that "matter may be defined a permanent possibility of sensations." Matter, mind, and all exercises of mind, in short, the universe, the *omne scibile*, are therefore resolved into sensations and possibilities of sensation. This is the only residuum of reality left to us by the alembic of Mr. Mill's philosophy. It involves the identity of Mind and Matter, and becomes indifferently Sensationalism, Materialism, Idealism, Nihilism, according to the standpoint from which it is viewed.

Thus, if we view sensation as an exercise or modification of mind, then all things are mere mental modifications or possibilities thereof. This is Idealism, or mere Egoism, or Infinite Subjectivity. But if sensation be an affection of matter, then all things are reducible to affections of matter or possibilities thereof, and Materialism ensues. And whether sensation be an

affection of mind or matter, in either case, it is the affection of a mere "possibility of sensation." To such heights of airy nothing does this pretentious philosophy soar. To such abysmal depths of utter Nihilism does it plunge. We look for substance and are mocked with shadows. This "new analytic" of ontology yields, for its grand climacteric, sensations as the sum and essence of all being.

But how does this prince of destructives account for other conscious exercises of consciousness besides mere sensation? What of Perception, Memory, Abstraction, Judgment, Reasoning, Imagination, Supersensual Intuition? Mr. Mill would analyze all these as well as the objects known by them into sensations, from which, by the aid of the principles of association, he would derive them. But how does he transform a sensation into what is wholly of another kind, into a remembrance, a judgment, a reasoning? How, in short, does he make it what it is not? *Ex nihilo nil fit.* Out of sensations, by no mode of derivation or combination, can aught but sensation be made. The attempt of the sensational, or as they prefer to call themselves, the psychological school, to construct all intellectual acts or cognitions, yea all being itself, out of sensations, is of a piece with the famous recipe for making stone-broth, viz., by putting with the stone the needed condiments of meats and vegetables. Dr. McCosh very aptly says:

"The main elements which he employs are sensations and associations of sensation. But he works up sensations of mind and body, of space and time, of personality and personal identity, of infinity and obligation to do good, which are not contained in the nature of sensations, and which could be imparted to them only by a new power superinduced, which power would require to have a place allotted to it in his system, and its laws enunciated, and its significance estimated. Again, it will be shown that Mr. Mill has made an unwarrantable use and application of the laws of association. These are the laws of the succession of our ideas, and nothing more. Give us two ideas, and place these two ideas together in the mind, and association will tend to bring them up once more in union. But it is not the office of association to give us the ideas, which must first be furnished to it. We shall see that Mr. Mill is for ever giving

to association a power which does not belong to it, of generating new ideas by an operation in which we see sensations go in, and a lofty idea coming out, solely by the idea being surreptitiously introduced, without any person being expected to notice it. The process carried on by this whole school of analysts is like that of the alchemists, who, when they put earth into the retort, never could get anything but earth, and could get gold only by introducing some substance containing gold. The philosopher's stone of this modern psychology is of the same character as that employed in mediæval physics. If we put in only sensations, as some do, we have never anything but sensations; and a 'dirt philosophy,' as it has been called, is the product. If we get gold, (as certainly Mr. Mill does at times), it is because it has been quietly introduced by the person who triumphantly exhibits it." P. 53.

Mr. Mill, however, attempts to summon to his relief the great Kantian doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which so subserves the cause of destructives, nihilists, and sceptics, whether materialistic or idealistic. The adoption of this and some affiliated principles from the subjective theories of Kant, by Hamilton and his followers, comes near neutralizing all the force of his incomparable defences of the realism of Reid—*i. e.*, of a real external world, a valid perception of external objects, a real dualism of mind and matter, soul and body. Hamilton's most eminent disciple, Mansel, has pushed this principle to results, in his *Limits of Religious Thought*, which are most portentous and annihilating, and undermine, in the very effort to confirm, the foundations of all faith or belief. The doctrine that all knowledge is relative to our knowing faculties is, within proper limits, obviously true and safe. It is true that we know nothing which is not so related to our knowing faculties as to be capable of cognition by them. It is also true that many properties of knowable objects, are not so related to our finite faculties, in their present state, as to be capable of being known by them. So far it is admitted that all knowledge is relative, but relative in such a sense as to be a true and trustworthy knowledge. But these writers, Kant, Hamilton, and at the opposite pole, Mill and the sceptical sensationalists, hold it to be relative in such a sense as to destroy

the purity and genuineness of our knowledge. They say, we do not know how much of what we discern in any object of cognition is contributed by the object cognized, and how much by the mind cognizing—*i. e.*, we know nothing at all about it. The case is thus briefly put by our author.

"Sir William (Hamilton) gives a third reason (of the relativity of knowledge), and here the error appears. '3d. Because the modes thus relative to our faculties, are presented to and known by the mind only, under modifications determined by these faculties themselves.' This doctrine is thoroughly Kantian in itself and in its logical consequences. It makes the mind look at things, but through a glass so cut and coloured that it gives a special shape and hue to every object. "Suppose (says Hamilton) that the total object of consciousness in perception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3—this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception." (*Metaph.* ii. p. 129.) This doctrine very much neutralizes that of natural realism, which Hamilton seems, after the manner of Reid, to be so strenuously defending. To suppose that in perception or cognition proper, we mix elements derived from our subjective stores, is to unsettle our whole convictions as to the reality of things; for if the mind adds three things, why not thirty things, why not three hundred, till we are landed in absolute idealism, or in the dreary flat into which those who could float in that empty space are sure in the end to fall, that is, absolute scepticism.

"By assuming this middle place between Reid and Kant, this last of the great Scottish metaphysicians has been exposed to the fire of the opposing camps of idealism and realism, and it will be impossible for the school to continue to hold the position of their master." Pp. 234—5.

The adamantine logic with which Hamilton has maintained a valid perception by the human mind of a real external world, will stand before such contradictories of it, if admitted to be legitimate, about as long as wooden ships before iron rams. One of these two contradictions in his system must displace the other. Of course, it is only fair in such destructive writers as Mill and Spencer, to use the weapons he forges for them in assail-

ing the really great and valuable defences he has elaborated in defence of fundamental truth.

One way in which these writers try to construct the whole universe of knowable things out of sensations and possibilities thereof, by association, is through the alleged relative character, or the relations, of these sensations. But the simple answer to all this is, that sensations can only yield sensations. If there be a knowledge of relations which is something more than these, such as causality, substance, likeness, difference, infinitude, then these involve new objects, elements, sources of knowledge beyond mere sensation. What this school makes the product of mere sensation is furtively interpolated from a higher source. It is the philosopher's stone turning sand into gold, when the gold is previously and otherwise furnished to it. Sensations will give us body, spirit, cause, substance, if these are only supplied from the higher faculties of the soul. As Dr. McCosh abundantly and ably shows all knowledge of relations supposes a previous knowledge of the things related.

This spurious doctrine of the relativity of knowledge is carried to its legitimate consequences by Grote in his exposition of Plato's philosophy, (art. *Theætetus.*) As quoted by our author, p. 245, he uses the following language, which clearly obliterates all intrinsic distinction between truth and error, making that alone true or false, which is so in the view of each individual.

"Object is implicated with, limited or measured by, Subject, a doctrine proclaiming the relativeness of all objects, perceived, conceived, known or felt, and the omnipresent involution of the perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, subject: the object varying with the subject. 'As things appear to me, so they are to me; as they appear to you, so they are to you.' This theory is just and important, if rightly understood and explained." "So far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and implication between subject and object, with actual multiplicity of distinct subjects—denying the reality either of absolute and separate subject, or of absolute and separate object—I think it true and instructive." "What is truth to one man, is not truth, and is often falsehood, to another; that which governs the mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is

treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere. Each man's belief, though in part determined by the same causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth; unless he expressly superadds the indication of some other persons believing in it."

This destroys all objective truth and standards of truth—all foundations. If the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?

Dr. McCosh thus very felicitously exhibits Mill as being in different aspects, at once a resurgent Hume and Fichte.

"It is not needful to maintain that Mr. Mill is in every respect like either the great Scottish sceptic or the great German idealist, any more than to assert that these two are like each other. Mr. Mill is not so original a thinker as Hume, nor does he, like him, profess scepticism. He does not possess the speculative genius of Fichte, and he defends his system in a much more sober manner. But it can be shown that his philosophy comes very nearly to the positions taken up by Hume, when Hume is properly understood; and in maintaining that mind is a series of feelings aware of itself, and that matter is a possibility of sensations, he has reached conclusions quite as visionary as those of Fichte. As Hume brought out fully the results lying in the philosophy of Berkeley—as one of the offshoots of the philosophy of Locke, and as Fichte carried to their logical consequences certain of the fundamental principles of Kant, so Mr. Mill, and we may add, Mr. Herbert Spencer, are pursuing to their proper issues the doctrine floating in nearly all our later metaphysics, that we can know nothing of the nature of things." Pp. 231—2.

Dr. McCosh offers many judicious and valuable criticisms on Mill's logic, which show a just appreciation of its defects and its excellencies. Its faults arise chiefly from those great metaphysical, pyschological, and ontological errors which characterize his entire system. Formal logic he misconceives and underrates. As he makes experience the source of all our knowledge, and this experience consists solely in sensations, of course he denies all those self-evident axioms, those intuitive, a priori,

and necessary truths, which form the original premises for all reasoning, and are quite as essential to it as extension to figure, or light to colour. As he derives even axioms and first truths from inductive generalization, so it is in his treatment of induction, that the main power and value of his logic consist. And in pointing out the tests of the validity of universal inductive conclusions from particular instances, his logic is altogether peerless and invaluable. Our author also in this connection presents what we deem, on the whole, a just view of Hamilton's great advances at the opposite pole of logical science, *i. e.*, in formal logic. He awards deserved commendation to some of these innovations, while he repudiates others among the more extreme of them, as at least useless or worse than useless. Among these may be classed the quantification of negative predicates as particulars.

The radical principles of Mr. Mill's philosophy already brought to view of course make him a utilitarian in ethics, and a fatalist, if not rather an atheist, in divinity. Few writers could bring greater ingenuity to the support of these debasing schemes; still, when he comes to account for the idea and feeling of obligation expressed by the word "ought," as arising out of the mere conception of virtue as a means of happiness, it is the old paralogism over, of transmuting stones into gold, provided the gold be furnished beforehand. All attempts to define virtue as a compound or derivative from something more original or simple, or better than itself, presupposes virtue itself in the definition, or in the original elements out of which it is alleged to be compounded. It is in full consonance with his whole system, that Mill should tell us, "we venture to think that a religion may exist without a belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an instructive and profitable object of contemplation." This needs no comment.

There are some points which we think admit of a more exact and clear analysis than that presented by our author in this and other works in which he has done such signal service to the cause of truth. We refer especially to some of his remarks in regard to *à priori* and necessary truth, and the relations of our knowledge of it to proofs from inductive generalization.

These, however, are too slight to be dwelt upon in our limited space, and constitute no serious drawback from the great value of the book. We close with the following summation by our author of this new philosophy.

"What have we left us according to this new philosophy? We have sensations; we have a series of feelings aware of itself, and permanent, or rather prolonged; and we have an association of sensations, and perceived resemblances, and possibilities of sensations. The sensations, and associations of sensation, generate ideas and beliefs, which do not, however, either in themselves or their mode of formation, guarantee any reality. We have an idea of an external material world; but Mr. Mill does not affirm that there is such a world, for there are laws of the series of feelings which would produce the idea, whether the thing existed or not; and our belief in it may be overcome—just as our natural belief in the sun rising is made to give way before the scientific conviction that it is the earth that moves. He thinks he is able by a process of inference to reach the existence of other beings besides ourselves. But the logic of the process is very doubtful. I believe that neither Mr. Mill nor any other has been able to show how, from sensations, individual or associated, we could ever legitimately infer the existence of anything beyond. What he claims to have found is after all only other 'series of feelings.'" Pp. 272—3.

The wide acceptance of this and other forms of philosophic scepticism is among the ominous symptoms of the day, and summons to a vigorous and united array against it, all who would contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints.

Art. V.—*The General Assembly.*

The General Assembly of 1866 was in many respects a remarkable body. It was numerously attended, two hundred and fifty-one members being present the first day. It embraced many men of distinguished ability. It came together at a time when the public mind, in the church and state, was deeply agitated. The questions presented for discussion included topics in which the whole community took the liveliest interest, and the conclusions arrived at are likely to have a very great and perhaps lasting influence on the character and destiny of the Presbyterian church.

As so much of the time of the Assembly was taken up with the case of the Louisville Presbytery, and so much of the debates had reference to documents which do not appear on the minutes, it is necessary, in order to understand the measures, and to account for the animus of the Assembly, to advert to some things which occurred prior to the meeting of that body.

"*Declaration and Testimony.*"

The action of the Assembly of 1865, having given offence to many ministers and elders, especially in the border states, the Presbytery of Louisville adopted and issued a "Declaration and Testimony," to which they solicited the adherence of those in all parts of the church who agreed with them in opinion. This document, making twenty-seven octavo pages, is much too long, notwithstanding its historical importance, to be inserted in this journal. It testifies against fourteen errors in doctrine and practice as to which it charges the General Assembly with having departed from "the faith and practice" enjoined by the Head of the church. It testifies, 1st, against "the assumption of the courts of the church, of the right to decide questions of state policy." 2d. "Against the doctrine that the church as such owes allegiance to human rulers or governments." 3d. Against the perversion of Christ's direction to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and the Apostle's command to be subject to the higher powers. 4th. Against "the action of the Assembly on the subject of slavery and

emancipation in 1864, and confirmed in 1865." 5th. Against "the unjust and scandalous contradiction of their own recorded testimony and well-known facts, in regard to the labours of the Presbyterian church and ministry, for the christianizing of the slaves of the South, and the preaching to them of the gospel of Christ." 6th. Against "the doctrine widely taught in the church, and even countenanced by the Assembly, that the acts and deliverances of the courts of Christ's commonwealth may properly be based upon, and shaped in accordance with the ordinances and laws of state legislatures, the orders and proclamations of military chieftains, and even the results of popular votes given at elections." 7th. "Against the doctrine that the will of God, as to the duty of the church and of his people, is to be learned from particular providential events, and that the teachings of the Scriptures are to be interpreted by these providences." 8th. "Against the sanction which has been given both directly and indirectly, to the usurpation by the secular and military powers of authority in and over the worship and government of the church."

In support of this charge they refer, among other things, to "the endorsement in word and act of such usurpation as perfectly right by the Seminaries at Princeton and Danville, as witness the doctrine laid down by the Princeton Professor of Theology, and the doctrine and practice of the Danville Professor in the same department." 9th. "Against the alliance which has been virtually formed, by the church with the state, by which the state has been encouraged, and even invited to use the church as an instrument for giving effect to its various schemes of a political character." 10th. "Against that persecution which has been carried on for these five years past, and with increasing malignity toward all those who have steadfastly refused to sanction or acquiesce in these departures of the church from the foundations of truth and righteousness." 11th. "Against the wide-spread and destructive perversion of the ministry and the province of church courts." 12th. "Against the action of the Assembly in reference to the churches in the seceded and border states, and against the basing of that action upon an assertion of what the Assembly had the clearest evidence was not true." 13th. "Against the act of

the Assembly by which the Board of Missions, *i. e.*, (the Executive Committee at Philadelphia or its Corresponding Secretary) were constituted a court of final and superior jurisdiction,—&c." 14th. Against all and every movement in the church, however cautiously or plausibly veiled, which looks to a union of the state with the church, or a subordination of the one to the other, or the interference of either with the jurisdiction of the other.

Reasons for this Testimony.

Against each and all these errors in doctrine and practice we testify:

1st. Because they are contrary to the word of God, and subversive of its inspiration and supreme authority as the only infallible rule of faith and practice.

2d. Because they are contrary to the doctrine of the Presbyterian church as taught in her catechisms, confessions, and constitution.

3d. Because they tend to obliterate all the lines of separation between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, &c.

4th. Because they brought the ministry and the ordinances of religion and the authority of the church into public disrepute.

5th. Because they tend to keep up strife and alienation among brethren of a common faith, and thus delay the pacification of the country.

6th. Because they are schismatical. "Those who invent new doctrines, who teach for doctrines the commandments of men, who bring in damnable heresies, are, by the word of God, adjudged as schismatics. It is not those who withdraw from such corruptors of the gospel that are chargeable with the sin of schism; but those who by their false teaching and scandalous practice render it necessary for the faithful to separate themselves in order to preserve their garments undefiled."

In the conclusion of this section they say: "We declare our deliberate purpose, trusting in God, who can save by a few as well as by many, to use our best endeavours to bring back the church of our fathers to her ancient purity and integrity, upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, and under the

banner of our only King, Priest, and Prophet, the Lord Jesus Christ. In this endeavour we pledge ourselves to assist and coöperate with each other; and by the grace of God we will never abandon the effort, no matter what sacrifices it may require us to make, until we shall either have succeeded in reforming the church and restoring her tarnished glory; or, failing in this, necessity shall be laid upon us, in obedience to the apostolic command, to withdraw from those who have departed from the truth. Compelled to this course, we will go bearing with us the true Presbyterian church, with her doctrines, order, worship, and freedom, as they have been given her by her divine Head, and transmitted from generation to generation by the hands of saints, and confessors, and martyrs."

Action Proposed.

1. "That we refuse to give our support to ministers, elders, agents, editors, teachers, or to those who are in any other capacity engaged in religious instruction or effort, who hold the preceding or similar heresies.

2. "That we refuse to take any part in the discussion or decision by any ecclesiastical court, of those questions touching the policy and measures which do properly pertain to the civil commonwealth.

3. "That we will recognize no authority in the decision of questions of Christian doctrine or morals, or concerning the rights of the church or the duties of its members, other than the written word of God.

4. "That we will not take any oath prescribed by civil or military authority, as a qualification for sitting in a church court, or for worshipping God, or for preaching the gospel, or exercising any of the functions of the ministry. Nor will we sit in any judicatory thus constituted.

5. "That we will extend our sympathy and aid, as we may have opportunity, to all who in any way are subjected to ecclesiastical censure or civil disabilities or penalties, for their adherence to the principles we maintain, and the repudiation of the errors, in doctrine and practice, against which we bear this our testimony.

6. "That we will not sustain, or execute, or in any manner

assist in the execution of the orders passed at the last two Assemblies on the subject of slavery and loyalty; and with reference to the conducting of missions in the Southern states; and with regard to the ministers, members, and churches in the seceded and border states.

7. "That we will withhold our contributions from the Boards of the church (with the exception of the Board of Foreign Missions) and from the Theological Seminaries, until these institutions are rescued from the hands of those who are perverting them to the teaching and promulgation of principles subversive of the system they were founded and organized to uphold and disseminate. And we will appropriate the moneys thus withheld, in aid of those instrumentalities which may be employed for maintaining and defending the principles affirmed in this Declaration, against the errors herein rejected; and in assisting the impoverished ministers and churches anywhere throughout the country, who agree with us in these essential doctrines, in restoring and building up their congregations and houses of worship.

8. "We recommend that all Ministers, Elders, Church Sessions, Presbyteries and Synods who approve of this Declaration and Testimony, give their public adherence thereto in such manner as they shall prefer, and communicate their names, and when a church court, a copy of their adhering act.

9. "That inasmuch as our only hope of improvement and reformation in the affairs of our church depends upon the interposition of Him, who is King in Zion, that we will unceasingly and importunately supplicate a Throne of Grace, for the return of that purity and peace, the absence of which we now sorrowfully deplore.

10. "We do earnestly recommend that on the day of , A. D. 1865, a convention be held in the city of , composed of all such ministers and ruling elders as may concur in the views and sentiments of this testimony, to deliberate and consult on the present state of our church; and to adopt such further measures as may seem best suited to restore her prostrated standards, and vindicate the pure and peaceful religion of Jesus from the reproach which has been brought upon it, through the faithlessness and apostacy of its ministers and professors.

"And now, brethren, our whole heart is laid open to you, and to the world. If a majority of our church are against us (as we have too much reason to apprehend it is), they will, we suppose, in the end, either see the infatuation of their course, and retrace their steps, or they will, at last, attempt to cut us off. If the former, we shall bless the God of Jacob; if the latter, we desire to stand ready for the sake of Christ, and in support of the Testimony, now made, to endure whatever suffering may be required of us by our Lord. We have here frankly, openly, and candidly, laid before our erring brethren the course we are, by the grace of God, irrevocably determined to pursue. It is our steadfast aim to reform the church, or to testify against its errors and defections until testimony will be no longer heard. And we commit the issue to Him who is over all, God blessed forever. Amen."

This document, in the pamphlet form, now before us, is signed by forty-one ministers and seventy-eight elders. Its publication produced a general feeling of apprehension. The severity of its language, its sweeping assertions, its charges of defection and heresy against the supreme judiciary of the church, its condemnation of principles and practices coeval with our organization, and its avowed schismatical object, offended the judgment and conscience of the great body of our members, ministers, and elders. It was, perhaps, an exaggerated apprehension of the strength of the party represented by the "Declaration and Testimony," which led to the call for a convention of ministers and elders who approved of the acts of the Assembly, and desired to sustain them, to meet at the same time and place as the Assembly itself. The abstract right of the people to meet together to express their own convictions, and to endeavour to mould the opinions of others, cannot be questioned. It is pushing this right, however, to a very dangerous extreme, for a convention to be called to sit side by side with a constitutional assembly, whether in the church or state, with the avowed or obvious purpose of influencing its action. Such a course can be justified only in times of the greatest emergency, when the appointed means of governing the church or state are deemed unworthy of confidence. In the present case, as the event shows, no such emergency existed.

The fact that this convention was attended by over a hundred members, shows, however, that no little apprehension was felt as to the effect which the "Declaration and Testimony" was likely to produce.

We fully sympathize in the disapprobation of the spirit, principles, and proposed mode of action set forth in that document, which has been so generally expressed. It is founded, from first to last, upon an erroneous theory of the office and prerogatives of the church; a theory which was advanced for a purpose, and was never acted upon by any branch of the church from the beginning. It assumes the church to be so spiritual in its nature and functions that it cannot recommend objects of benevolence, such as colonization, or temperance societies, nor testify against such glaring sins as the African slave-trade. It forbids all injunctions to Christians to be faithful, as citizens, to the Government under which they live. It is, among other things, against the acts of the Assembly, passed during the late war, declaring the duty of loyalty and obedience to the civil authorities, that the signers of this document testify. If this doctrine were to prevail, a seal would be set on the lips of the church, and she would be forbidden to testify against many sins, and to enjoin many duties which lie properly within her sphere. In consequence of this contracted view of the prerogative of the church, the Declaration refuses all regard not only to such acts and deliverances of the Assembly as may really transcend the limits of the constitution, but to many which are perfectly legitimate. The gravest objection, perhaps, to the document, is its openly schismatical character. Individual signers of the Declaration have, indeed, denied any intention to separate from the church. However true this may be of them, personally, there can be no doubt as to the meaning and design of the document itself. Its signers say: "We will not abandon the effort until we shall either have succeeded in reforming the church and restoring her tarnished glory, or, failing in this, necessity shall be laid upon us, in obedience to the apostolic command, to withdraw from those who have departed from the truth." It is not exclusion, but a voluntary withdrawing, in obedience to an apostolic injunction, that is here spoken of.

When the Synod of Kentucky met, Dr. R. J. Breckinridge

moved that those members of that body who have issued and signed this Declaration and Testimony should not be allowed to take their seats as members. This motion was lost; whereupon Dr. Breckinridge complained, and appealed to the General Assembly. It was under these circumstances the Assembly met. It was the Declaration and Testimony, and its consequences, which occupied most of the time of the House during its whole meeting, and which has so profoundly agitated the church and threatens still more serious evils.

Organization of the House.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America met, according to adjournment, in the Second Presbyterian Church, St. Louis, Missouri, on Thursday, the 17th day of May, 1866, at eleven o'clock A. M., and was opened with a sermon by the Rev. John C. Lowrie, D.D., Moderator of the last Assembly, from Acts i. 8: "But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth."

The Moderator announced that the first business in order was the election of Moderator, and the Assembly proceeded to such election.

Rev. R. W. Allen nominated Rev. P. D. Gurley, D.D., of the Presbytery of the Potomac.

Rev. Dr. Krebs nominated Rev. R. L. Stanton, D.D., of the Presbytery of Chillicothe.

Rev. Dr. Brookes nominated Rev. S. R. Wilson, D.D., of the Presbytery of Louisville.

On motion of Rev. Dr. W. L. Breckinridge, it was

Resolved, That in all elections by this body, a majority of the votes cast be necessary to an election.

The roll was called, and Rev. R. L. Stanton, D.D., was then elected Moderator, having received 158 votes, to 75 cast for Rev. Dr. Gurley, and 18 for Rev. Dr. Wilson.

The Moderator appointed Rev. Dr. Krebs a committee to inform Rev. Dr. Stanton of his election, and conduct him to the chair.

Upon taking the chair, Dr. Stanton briefly addressed the Assembly as follows:

Fathers and Brethren: I need scarcely say that I am deeply sensible of the honour conferred upon me by being called to preside over your deliberations. This honour brings with it responsibilities and labours of no ordinary character. While thankful for this mark of your confidence, I shall endeavour to bring to the discharge of the duties of the chair an honest effort to advance the wishes of those whose servant only I am. A consciousness of my inability fully to meet the demands of the position you have given me, prompts me to throw myself upon your generous indulgence, and to ask your assistance in every proper way; while it is essential, in order that the business of the Assembly may be properly conducted, that we should unitedly seek the guidance of that wisdom which is from above. It has been said by many that this would be one of the most important General Assemblies of our church. There may be some truth in the estimate thus put upon what may prove to be the result of our deliberations. Vital questions, affecting the integrity of this Assembly and the purity and peace of the church at large, will claim from you a prompt and decisive solution. That rebellious defiance of lawful authority, which has racked this nation to its foundations during four years of war, still rages within the precincts where it was born—the church of God. To meet it promptly, courageously, in the fear of God, and with the aid of his grace, is your manifest duty, as well as directly to deal with those who openly deride your most solemn injunctions. To settle all these questions upon principles so clearly right that they shall command the confidence of the church and give it rest, and at the same time advance the Saviour's glory, should be the object of our labours. Then those who have gone out from us upon vain and wicked pretexts may be left to their own chosen way, and if any still remain to revile, they may know the cost of setting at defiance the authority which Christ has given to his church. The bare mention of these things shows how greatly we need a wisdom from above. Let us seek that wisdom and grace which God hath promised, and may he give success to the right!

The Moderator then announced that nominations for Temporary Clerk were in order.

Rev. M. J. Hickok, D.D., Rev. Everard Kempshall, and Rev. J. B. Davis, were nominated.

Upon calling the roll the Rev. Dr. Hickok was elected Temporary Clerk.

Exclusion of the Commissioners of the Louisville Presbytery.

It is understood to have been the programme of the convention to allow the whole matter concerning the Louisville Presbytery and the Declaration and Testimony to abide the issue of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge. This would have brought up the merits of the case, given all parties a fair hearing, and secured a regular judicial decision, against which there could be no appeal. This wise course was prevented by the introduction, on the first day of the session, by Dr. D. V. McLean, of the following paper, which threw everything into confusion:

WHEREAS, It is understood that the Presbytery of Louisville has openly defied the General Assembly, and refuses to submit to its orders, in a pamphlet adopted by it, of which the following is a specimen: "We will not sustain or execute, or in any manner assist in the execution of the orders passed at the last two Assemblies on the subject of loyalty or slavery, and which refer to the conducting of missions in the southern states, and with regard to ministers, members, or churches in the seceded or border states;" and

WHEREAS, Said Presbytery has commissioned and sent to this Assembly at least one Commissioner, who, if the orders of the last Assembly had been faithfully executed by said Presbytery, there is the strongest reason to believe, would have been suspended from the functions of the gospel ministry; therefore,

Resolved, That until the Assembly shall have examined and decided upon the conduct of said Presbytery, the Commissioners therefrom shall not be entitled to seats in this body.

Rev. Dr. W. L. Breckinridge moved to lay this paper on the table, on which motion

Rev. John Crozier called for the ayes and nays, which were ordered.

Ruling elder S. Galloway moved that the Assembly do now adjourn, which was lost.

The question was then taken on the motion to lay Dr. McLean's paper on the table, which was lost by 212 noes to 31 ayes.

Before taking a vote on Dr. McLean's paper the Assembly adjourned. The next day—

Rev. Dr. D. V. McLean briefly stated the purport of the paper offered by him yesterday in relation to Louisville Presbytery. He contended that the Assembly was, legally and properly, the judge of the qualifications of its members, and without entering into any defence of the principles of the paper, he moved the previous question on its adoption. After some time spent in raising and discussing points of order, the paper was adopted, under a call for the ayes and noes, by a vote of 201 ayes to 50 noes, and three excused from voting.

Rev. H. J. Van Dyke, D. D., Rev. A. P. Forman, Rev. J. T. Smith, D. D., and others gave notice of their intention to offer a protest against this action of the Assembly, and to ask that the same might be spread upon the minutes.

Rev. Dr. D. V. McLean then offered the following:

Resolved, That a Committee of seven—four ministers and three ruling elders—be appointed to examine into the facts connected with the alleged acts and proceedings of the Louisville Presbytery, and ascertain whether it is entitled to a representation in this General Assembly, and to recommend what action, if any, this Assembly should take in regard to said Presbytery.

Rev. Dr. West moved to lay this resolution on the table.

The motion was lost.

Rev. D. J. Waller moved to amend Dr. McLean's resolution by adding the following: "And that the case of Rev. T. A. Bracken, a commissioner from West Lexington Presbytery, and alleged to be at the same time a member of Lafayette Presbytery, and a pastor of a church within its bounds, be referred to the same Committee."

Rev. Dr. J. H. Brookes, of St. Louis Presbytery, offered the following additional amendment:—"And that the Committee be also instructed to inquire into the truth of certain rumours, charging other members of this body with the same offence for which the Presbytery of Louisville has been arraigned before

the Assembly, and report what action should be taken in the premises."

Dr. Brookes very naturally and honourably desired the action of the Assembly to be directed against all those who were in the same category. As he and others had signed the Declaration and Testimony, he insisted they were as much responsible as the Louisville Presbytery, by which it had been adopted, and therefore if the members of that Presbytery were to be censured, he and other signers of the document should be included in the same condemnation. To this, however, the Assembly did not, at least in the first instance, agree, but confined its attention to the Presbytery and its commissioners.

Dr. Van Dyke, Dr. Anderson, Mr. Forman, and Mr. Bracken, spoke in favour of the proposed amendment. They insisted that it would be partial and unjust to deal exclusively with the Louisville Presbytery, while so many others held, and had avowed, substantially the same sentiments. Mr. Forman said that Dr. Hodge in the protest presented to the Assembly of 1861, and Dr. R. J. Breckinridge in the Synod of Kentucky, had pronounced the action of the Assembly unconstitutional and unscriptural. Dr. Anderson said the Synod of Missouri by a vote of three to one had adopted the main points involved in the Declaration and Testimony. Mr. Bracken said that the Synod of Kentucky without a dissenting voice had adopted the paper of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge condemning the action of the Assembly of 1861. Subsequently the action of the Synods of New Jersey and Philadelphia declaring that the certain deliverances and injunctions, in the form of rules of procedure adopted by the Assembly of 1865, were not binding on the churches, until they had been sanctioned by the Presbyteries, were cited as putting those Synods on the same ground with the signers of the Declaration and Testimony.

We presume that Dr. Hodge and Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, to say nothing of the venerable Synods referred to, are perfectly willing to bear the responsibility of their own declarations. It tends however to nothing but confusion and misrepresentation to confound things essentially different. There is as much difference between the protest to the Assembly of 1861, and the action of the Synod of Kentucky on the one hand, and the

Declaration and Testimony on the other, as there is between Dr. R. J. Breckinridge and Dr. Stuart Robinson. These gentlemen are very pronounced in their antagonism, and cannot easily be put into the same class, nor can the documents of which they were severally the authors or advocates. All that the protest against the Spring resolutions of 1861 said was, that it was not the province of the General Assembly to interpret the constitution of the United States, and to decide whether the allegiance of the citizen is primarily due to his own state or to the Union. This is the precise ground taken by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge and the Synod of Kentucky. In his paper adopted by that body, it is said, "In the judgment of a large majority of the Assembly (of 1861), and of multitudes in the church, the subject-matter of the action, in the premises, being purely political, was incompetent to a spiritual court. Undoubtedly it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require or advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments—in the manner and under the circumstances which existed; and still further, it was neither wise nor discreet for the Assembly of the whole church to disregard, in its action, the difficulties and dangers which render it absolutely impossible for large portions of the church to obey its order, without being liable to the highest penalties. . . . . The Synod contents itself with this expression of its grave disapprobation of this action of the Assembly—which the Synod judges to be repugnant to the word of God, as that word is interpreted in our Confession of Faith."—The Synod thus expressly endorses the minority of the Assembly of 1861 in their protest, and adopts identically the same principle. If therefore, their protest, contains, as has been asserted, the seeds of all the heresy and treason which have since been propagated in the church, Dr. R. J. Breckinridge's paper contains the same seeds transplanted from the open air into a steaming hot-bed. The truth, however, is, that neither paper contains either heresy or treason. They simply assert a principle which, *in thesi* at least, no man can deny. In perfect consistency with their former action, the signers of the protest of 1861, and the members of the Synod of Kentucky, united in Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies,

in the strongest appeals and exhortations to the people of the non-seceding states, to be loyal to the national government and zealous in its support. But it is against such appeals and exhortations the Declaration and Testimony formally testifies, and condemns them as evidence of the departure of the church from the faith and practice prescribed by the word of God and its own standards. In this matter, therefore, there is a great gulf between the two parties.

In the second place, all that the Synods of New Jersey, Philadelphia, and virtually those of Baltimore and Kentucky, did in reference to the action of the Assembly of 1865, was to declare that in their judgment no mere deliverance of the Assembly (not sitting in its judicial capacity) is binding on the conscience of the people; nor can it be obligatory on the lower courts to require of applicants for ministerial or Christian communion to approve of such deliverances. This is all that this journal had asserted on this subject. This again is a point about which there can be no difference of opinion. There may be difference in words, and in practice. The principle may be violated, and those may be denounced who maintain it, but it cannot be denied. It is written, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." If Paul required the Galatians to pronounce an apostle or an angel from heaven anathema, if he preached another gospel (and whether it was another, they were the judges), surely we cannot be required to submit to the declarations and ordinances of any body of men on earth, if we judge them to be contrary to the Scriptures. No deliverance of the Assembly therefore can be imposed as binding on the people or upon inferior judicatories, which either transcends the limits of church power, or is contrary to the constitution, or in contravention of the word of God. This is a principle, which, as we have said, does not admit of dispute. Dr. Thomas, in his speech before the late Assembly, said, that the Assembly had made deliverances which he deemed to be contrary to the Scriptures. It is of course out of the question that he could either adopt those deliverances himself, or impose them upon others. Dr. West in the Assembly of 1865, said, that if the Assembly should order the northern Presbyteries and sessions to disci-

pline those of their number who had aided, encouraged, or abetted the late rebellion, "there is not a church in New York which would not snap its fingers at such action," of course Dr. West cannot, with the least self-respect, or with the slightest regard to the good opinion of honest men, attempt to enforce obedience to such action on his brethren.

Had the Declaration and Testimony confined itself to testifying in behalf of the principle in question, and confined the application of it to proper limits, there would have been no ground of complaint. But it refuses to recognize the authority of acts which are fully in accordance with the constitution and the Scriptures, and denounces as heretical doctrines which the Presbyterian church has ever recognized as true and sound. It testifies against all deliverances during the late war, exhorting the people to loyalty and the support of the government. It denies that the church, as such, owes allegiance to any human government. Its authors, in their recent address, condemn the Assembly for making patriotism a Christian virtue (as though honesty, although a natural duty, was not also a matter of Christian obligation); they accuse that venerable body of "asserting the bold Erastian heresy, that the revealed will of the Lord Jesus Christ is the supreme law of the land, directly in the face of the Scriptures, as interpreted by the symbols of the Scottish Reformation, and the fathers of the Westminster Assembly." This heresy, so called, has been propounded by high judicial authority in our civil courts. It is nothing more than the assertion of a truth which all Christians admit, viz., that the will of Christ binds all men to whom it is revealed in all their circumstances and relations. It is one thing, therefore, to protest against acts which transcend the constitution, and another to pronounce nugatory or heretical acts and declarations which are perfectly scriptural and constitutional.

In the third place. Many wise and worthy men were convinced that Congress had not the constitutional right to establish a national bank, or to conduct internal improvements. They openly avowed this conviction. They endeavoured to demonstrate its unsoundness, and to induce others to agree with them. In all this they were exercising the clear right of freemen. But if they had gone further, and not only denounced

Congress as apostate, but avowed their determination to break up the Union, to separate themselves from the central government, and to proclaim themselves the true United States, unless the majority would adopt their peculiar views, their conduct would have deserved and received universal reprobation. In like manner there are many in the church, whole Synods and Presbyteries, who believe that the General Assembly, in certain acts, transcended the limits of the constitution. This opinion they avowed and endeavoured to sustain. But they neither desired, purposed, nor organized any factious opposition or combined resistance, much less any separation or schism. The signers of the Declaration and Testimony, however, not satisfied with protesting against the acts in question, extended, most unreasonably, their denunciations and criminations, and put themselves in the position of schismatics by avowing the purpose of separation, and adopting the incipient measures for the execution of that purpose. Nothing, therefore, can be more unreasonable than the attempt to identify with them the Synods of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Baltimore, and Kentucky, or such men as Dr. Breckinridge, Dr. Hodge, Dr. Thomas, and Dr. West. The gulf between the two classes is wide and deep.

Dr. Thomas spoke against the amendments and in favour of the resolution for the appointment of a committee. His speech was characterized by the skill he always manifests in popular address. He endeavoured to draw a distinction between the Presbytery of Louisville and individual signers of the Declaration and Protest. The one was an organized body, directly amenable to the Assembly; the other might claim that they were exercising their personal right of protest or dissent. This distinction does not appear to us to be sound. If the adoption of the Declaration disqualified the Presbytery to send Commissioners, it disqualified its signers to sit as members. This the Assembly itself ultimately admitted, and by special vote permitted those of its members who had adopted the obnoxious document to retain their seats.

Dr. Thomas, after the conclusion of his speech, moved the previous question, which motion prevailed. The amendments were thus cut off, and the vote on the main question was decided

in favour of adopting the resolution for the appointment of a committee.

The Commissioners of the Presbytery excluded from their seats by the action of the Assembly presented the following paper, viz.

To the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, now in session in St. Louis.

The undersigned, Commissioners from the Presbytery of Louisville, deem it both respectful to the Assembly, and demanded by the interests of truth and righteousness, to lay before the body, through you, in this formal and official manner, for record on the minutes, their views and purposes in regard to the resolution passed yesterday, under operation of the previous question, to this effect:

"That, WHEREAS the Presbytery of Louisville have 'openly defied the Assembly,' and declared publicly their intention not to enforce the orders of the two last Assemblies on slavery and loyalty, &c., and have, in act, disregarded them in sending a Commissioner here, who, by a faithful execution of those acts, would probably have been suspended from the functions of his office; therefore,

"*Resolved*, That until the Assembly shall have examined and decided upon the conduct of said Presbytery, the Commissioners shall not be entitled to seats in this body."

We respectfully suggest, not indeed as vital to the case, but as illustrating simply the evil of such action, under the operation of the previous question, cutting off all explanation, that both the premises of the Assembly's resolution contain grave mistakes of facts. The Presbytery of Louisville have indeed published a Declaration and Testimony against the acts of the five preceding Assemblies, in which many ministers and elders outside the Presbytery, formally, and many more in spirit and act, have concurred. But the Presbytery of Louisville have not "openly defied the Assembly," as might have been seen by reference to the whole tenor of the paper, from which a single passage is quoted. Nor have the Presbytery sent any Commissioner here, who, even under the act of 1865, in relation to ministers who have gone into the Confederacy, or fled or been banished into foreign countries, could have been suspended from

the ministry. Since the only one of their Commissioners who has been absent from the country during the past three years, was neither in the Confederacy, nor fled, nor was banished; but, being absent on a vacation tour, by arrangements made months before, at the inauguration of an unlimited military power under the control of his bitter ecclesiastical enemies, prolonged that absence, with the advice and concurrence of the church session and of prudent friends of all parties.

Aside, however, from these mistakes of fact in the premises, a far more important matter, in our judgment, is the dangerous error in principle involved in such action, even were the facts as charged. On this view of the case, we beg leave, with all respect and deference, to suggest:

1. It will be manifest, on due reflection, and would have been shown, but for the call for the previous question, that the assumption of the right to take such action under the general power of any deliberative body to judge of the qualifications of its own members, arises from a failure to see the want of analogy between the case of the General Assembly and that of legislative and other similar bodies in the secular sphere. The right to appoint Commissioners to the General Assembly, and to judge of the qualifications of those Commissioners, is inherent in the Presbyteries, whose members are a constituent part of the Assembly itself; nor can they be divested of that right save by sentence of deposition from office as Presbyters, reached through the forms so carefully prescribed in the constitution. The claim of any particular Assembly to judge of the qualifications of its own members must be limited in the nature of the case to the question whether the credentials are in accordance with the provisions of the book. But in fact the Assembly in this instance does not pretend to be passing judgment upon the qualifications of its own members at all, but upon the constituency which sent them. This is manifest, not only from the terms of the action, but also from the fact that one of the Commissioners excluded was no party to the "Declaration and Testimony;" neither could he be possibly objected to on the score of disqualification or a defective commission.

2. This, therefore, makes manifest what was confessed on the floor of the Assembly by some who voted for this resolution,

that the action was *in its nature judicial*, and it is therefore, in effect, a judicial sentence, pronounced and executed, not only in disregard of all the provisions for a fair trial so carefully ordained in our constitution, but, under the operation of the previous question, excluding the parties charged from a word of explanation, defence, or protest.

3. And it adds to the aggravation of the wrong done in this action; that, even had the Assembly the right thus to act, and were its action according to the forms of law and the sentence given after a fair hearing, it is a sentence of disgrace, as if inflicted for crime committed, whereas what was done by the Presbytery could at most be regarded as only the mistaken exercise of the right of protest against what was conceived to be an act of usurpation by the Assembly.

4. A further aggravation of this wrong is the manifest partiality evinced, in thus singling out for condemnation the Presbytery of Louisville, while, notoriously, a large number, if not a majority of the churches in all parts of the country, but also several Presbyteries represented in the Assembly, have *done* precisely the thing which the Louisville Presbytery is condemned for asserting its purpose to do.

5. But a still more important and dangerous principle involved in this action, is, that it takes away from minorities, and even individual members of the body, all those safeguards provided for their protection against the violence and partisan feeling of a casual majority of members in all times of excitement and passion. The principle of this action, if admitted, would inevitably and speedily change the Assembly from an *ecclesia*, organized, restrained and governed by the well established laws of Christ's house, into a mere ecclesiastical gathering under the unlimited control of the majority of members, "the most part knowing not wherefore they have come together."

6. It but evinces more clearly and aggravates the wrong done in this case, that the Assembly resolves not absolutely and finally to exclude us, but only to exclude us until the Assembly "*shall have examined and decided.*" The right to examine and decide under such a resolution; the right to exclude us, even for an hour, pending such examination; the right to exclude us after such examination is had, and the right absolutely and

finally to exclude us, are all equally groundless. The injury inflicted upon the good name of the Presbytery among the churches from a temporary exclusion, as though *probably* guilty of high crime, is *scarcely less* than the injury from a sentence of final exclusion. Besides, even though it was consistent with our proper self-respect, and with the honour of the Presbytery for us to await the result of the Assembly's inquisition, thereby recognizing the Assembly's right thus "to examine and decide," we are cut off, by the sentence of exclusion, from the exercise of any right of defence. All of which makes it still more palpably manifest that the action of the Assembly is, in effect, the pronouncing and executing of sentence, and afterward proceeding "to examine and decide."

With profound respect for the Assembly as the highest court of the church, and with unfeigned sorrow that we are constrained, in fidelity to our trust, thus to speak, we feel it our duty to say to the Assembly, that—Regarding this action as of the nature of a judgment upon the Presbytery and its Commissioners, and this judgment a sentence of exclusion without trial or a hearing in any form in explanation or defence; regarding this action as not only unjust, injurious, and cruel, but as subversive of the foundations of all justice, destructive of the constitution of the church, and revolutionary in its nature; regarding it as setting a precedent for the exercise of a partizan power in the courts of Christ's kingdom, which leaves all the rights and immunities of His people at the mercy of any faction that may casually be in the ascendancy—we should be untrue to the Presbytery whose commission we bear, faithless to the cause of truth and Christian freedom, false to our Lord and King, should we silently acquiesce in such procedure, or in any way recognize its legality. We must regard this action in its effect, so far as relates to us as Commissioners, and to this present Assembly, as final in the case.

With these views and convictions, there is but one course left open to us, viz., To take our appeal at once upon the issue, as it has been made for us and forced upon us, from this General Assembly to the Presbytery of Louisville in particular, in so far as it concerns ourselves and that body, and to the *whole church* in so far as it is an issue involving the great

principles of her constitution, and, indeed, her continued existence as a free Christian commonwealth in the enjoyment of the franchises and immunities conferred upon her by her adorable Head.

We therefore respectfully inform the Assembly that we shall not attend further upon its sessions.

STUART ROBINSON,
SAM'L R. WILSON,
MARK HARDIN,
C. A. WICKLIFFE.

St. Louis, Mo., May 19, 1866.

Dr. Boardman then offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the paper just received from the Commissioners from the Presbytery of Louisville be referred to the special committee having charge of that matter, and that said committee be instructed to report, with the least practicable delay, as to the expediency of re-admitting said Commissioners to their seats, till the case be disposed of.

This resolution Dr. Boardman supported in an able, earnest, and eloquent speech. He insisted that as these Commissioners were regularly appointed and presented themselves with credentials approved by our own committees, and thereupon enrolled, they had as good a right to sit, deliberate, and vote, as any other members of the House. To deprive them of this right was an act of great injustice, transcending the legitimate authority of the Assembly. There were no definite charges, merely "alleged acts," for which no defence or explanation was admitted. Such a course of action endangered the standing of every member of the Assembly, as any man was liable to be condemned unheard. It could not fail to arouse public sentiment against the Assembly, as well as to produce dissatisfaction and alienation in the church, and thus lead to serious evils. These and other ideas were expanded and pressed by the speaker with great clearness and force.

Dr. Hornblower took substantially the same view. He urged with clearness and ability the objections to the peremptory action which had been adopted. 1. That the exclusion of the Commissioners of the Presbytery of Louisville was unprecedented. 2. That it was for an act in which the Synod of

New Jersey (of which the mover of the resolution excluding the said Commissioners was a member), had concurred. This action of the Synod, although adopted late in the evening, was sanctioned after the matter had been well considered by a committee, and when the Synod was as full as usual. 3. That the mover framed the resolution without conference, made a speech in its support, and then moved the previous question. This he considered a very objectionable proceeding. 4. That there is often an impatience at the forms of justice. Men are satisfied if substantial justice is done, without regard to the means by which it is accomplished. This is a great evil. He disapproved of the conduct of the Louisville Presbytery, and thought it deserved censure, but at the same time held, that the exclusion of its Commisioners, in the manner by which it was effected, was unconstitutional.

The Hon. Isaac D. Jones also argued in favour of Dr. Boardman's resolution. He insisted that the Commissioners of the Louisville Presbytery were entitled to their seats, because they had been regularly appointed. 2. Because the right of a body to judge of the qualifications of its own members is a right regulated by law which determines the mode of its exercise. 3. It must be exercised before the members are admitted to their seats, and not after they have been regularly enrolled. 4. He reviewed the analogies which had been sought in justification of the action of the Assembly, derived from the acts of legislative bodies and civil courts. A court may indeed punish summarily for contempt. But it must be contempt of itself, and committed in its presence. In the case of the Louisville Presbytery, the contempt complained of, if committed, which he questioned, was against former Assemblies, not against the body then in session. No man ever heard of a court punishing a contempt committed against its predecessors. Mr. Giddings, when expelled for a contempt of the House of Representatives, when re-elected was freely admitted by its successor. 5. Mr. Jones further argued that the Louisville Presbytery had done nothing more than many of those on the other side had done with regard to the fugitive slave law. That law had been pronounced unconstitutional, condemned as cruel and unjust, and its execution in various ways impeded.

In this debate the Hon. S. Galloway followed Dr. Boardman, and made the principal speech against the adoption of his resolution. He defended the action of the Assembly in the exclusion of the Louisville Commissioners, which it was the object of Dr. Boardman's resolution to reverse, 1st, on the ground of the inherent power of the Assembly and the binding force of its decisions. On this point he quoted freely from the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in our celebrated Church Case. In his judgment Chief Justice Gibson said: "The decisions of every council, to which parties refer a matter for adjudication, is binding, though it be a mere informal reference to a neighbour. The decisions of the General Assembly, or any other of these general councils, is as binding on all the churches and congregations within its jurisdiction, in spiritual affairs, as the decision of a state tribunal in civil affairs. All are bound to submit to such decisions." He cited also the following passage from Mr. Hubbell, one of the counsel in the Church Case, as containing a sound exposition of our constitution: "From the decision of this great council there is no appeal; and when the General Assembly declares a doctrine heretical, it must no longer be heard in a Presbyterian church. Its maintainers must either conform to this decision or go elsewhere, and form new associations; of which they may, at their pleasure, make what are heresies, when compared with our standards. This decision of the General Assembly is the decision of the majority of that Assembly, and hence it results, (however harsh it may seem,) that the construction which the majority put upon the standards is orthodoxy, and that of the minority is heresy. This power is necessary to and inherent in every church establishment, or it ceases to be a church, call it what you please. This decision may be given either in the process of a judicial trial, and be the sentence upon an individual heretic, or it may be an abstract declaration of the Assembly, or 'bearing of testimony' against heretical doctrines. In whatever form this declaration of the Assembly may be given against a particular opinion, that opinion is heresy, and must be abandoned by the faithful. The malcontents have no alternative but submission or secession."

He argued at length to show that the decisions of the Assembly are final and binding, that we are bound to obey them. This is the doctrine of the church, he said, as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. He read as follows: "The whole power of the Presbyterian Church is concentrated in the General Assembly. Notwithstanding that supreme judicatory of the church has entrusted the exercise of this power, in many cases, to the inferior church judicatories, the Synods, Presbyteries, and church sessions, yet as the General Assembly exercises an appellate jurisdiction over all these inferior judicatories, and is the tribunal of dernier resort, the whole power of those judicatories concentrates in the General Assembly as the primeval fountain of ecclesiastical power. It exercises the same power over the decisions of the inferior judicatories that the Supreme Court in this state exercises over the decisions of the inferior courts. And you cannot arraign the Supreme Court, on an accusation of abusing its power, by reviewing the proceedings of an inferior court; whilst it would undoubtedly be an abuse of power, should the inferior refuse to allow an appeal to be taken from their judgment."

2d. He appealed to the action of the Assembly in 1837–8, in cutting off Synods and Presbyteries without a hearing. 3d. To the action of state legislatures and courts. 4th. The Presbytery was under process by the appeal of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge. It was under process from the day notice was given of that appeal. The question simply is, whether the Commissioners from that Presbytery shall be allowed to sit and deliberate until that appeal is issued. We say they shall not, because of their reproachful and rebellious language against the supreme court of the Presbyterian Church.

Finally, on the motion of Mr. H. K. Clarke, Dr. Boardman's resolution was divided. The first part, viz., "That the memorial of Dr. S. Robinson, and others, be referred to the committee of seven appointed to make inquiry in the matter of the Presbytery of Louisville," was adopted. The remainder was laid upon the table.

Rev. Dr. Van Dyke presented and read the following protest, signed by himself and sixteen others, against the action of the Assembly in excluding the Commissioners of the Louisville

Presbytery from the Assembly without hearing them, and pending an investigation into the conduct of that Presbytery.

PROTEST.

We, the undersigned, respectfully protest against what we deem to be the mischievous and erroneous judgment of the General Assembly, in suspending the Commissioners from the Presbytery of Louisville from the exercise of their rights and privileges as members of this body, for the following reasons:

1. By this act the Assembly has violated the fundamental principles of its own organization, and vitiated its own integrity as the highest judicatory of the Presbyterian Church. It is declared in chapter xii. of the *Form of Government*, that the General Assembly "shall represent in one body *all* the particular churches of this denomination;" and again, the General Assembly "shall consist of an equal delegation of bishops and elders from each Presbytery." It cannot be denied that at the time their representatives were excluded from the Assembly, the churches composing the Presbytery of Louisville were, and still are, an integral part of the Presbyterian Church. And yet the Assembly, by a simple resolution, adopted under the operation of the previous question, without debate, excluded these churches from all participation in its proceedings at a time when the business under consideration was of vital importance to the said churches. For such a course of action there is no warrant in the constitution, and no precedent in the history of the church. The attempt to justify it by the usage of legislative and other political assemblies, is, in the judgment of the undersigned, utterly futile; because, in the first place, there is no proper analogy between legislative bodies or other secular assemblies, acting under rules of human invention, and the court of Jesus Christ, organized under, and bound by the laws of Christ, as expounded in its own written constitution; and because, secondly, if such an analogy did exist, it has been violated in this case in the following essential particulars: 1. By the action of its own Committee on Commissions, and by the formal adoption of their report, the Assembly had already decided that the Commissioners from the Presbytery of Louisville were entitled to their seats. 2. In legislative and other

secular assemblies, when the right of members to the seats they have obtained is contested, they are always allowed to retain their places in the body, and to participate in its proceedings until the case is fully decided.

2. By this act the Assembly has virtually pronounced a judicial condemnation upon the Presbytery of Louisville without observing any of the forms of trial so carefully prescribed by the constitution, and so essential to the due administration of justice. And, in the opinion of the undersigned, this proceeding is rendered the more irregular and unjust in view of the fact that, by the operation of the previous question on the adoption of the resolution excluding them, the Commissioners were denied a hearing before the Assembly, either in their own behalf, or in the behalf of the Presbytery they represent. And this disregard of judicial forms is further aggravated by the fact, that in the resolution excluding the Commissioners from their seats, the Assembly endorsed unsustained public rumours against the ministerial character and standing of one of the said Commissioners, and made these rumours, thus endorsed, without any judicial proof, a ground of condemnation against the Presbytery.

3. The facts alleged against the Presbytery of Louisville do not involve any heresy or crime, nor justify the exclusion of the churches comprising said Presbytery from the fellowship of the church of Christ. Inasmuch as "all synods or councils since the days of the apostles"—being composed of uninspired and fallible men—"may err, and many have erred," the right to publicly discuss, dispute, and protest against the deliverances of such synods and councils belongs to every other ecclesiastical body, and to every, even the humblest, member of the church. This right has been exercised from the foundation of the church till the present time, and has never been disputed except by the Church of Rome. Moreover, the deliverances and orders of the General Assemblies, against which the Presbytery of Louisville have protested, and which they have refused to obey, not having been transmitted to the Presbyteries for their approbation, (according to the requisition of the *Form of Government*, chap. xii., sec. 6,) are not "established as constitutional rules;" neither are they "obligatory upon the churches." To exclude the churches of the Presbytery of Louisville from representa-

tion in this body for refusing to do that which, according to express provisions of the constitution, was not obligatory on them, is, in the judgment of the undersigned, an unwarranted and alarming usurpation of power.

For the foregoing and other reasons, in the name of Jesus Christ, by virtue of the right secured to them in the constitution, and in the discharge of their covenant obligations to study the purity and peace of the church, the undersigned do solemnly protest against this whole proceeding, as being unconstitutional and revolutionary, as calculated to bring the lawful authority of this Assembly into contempt, to enkindle strife and produce alienation, and to defeat the end for which the Assembly was originally organized, viz., that it might "constitute the bond of union, peace, correspondence, and mutual confidence among all our churches."

Henry J. Van Dyke,	Glass Marshall,
R. K. Smoot,	James H. Brookes,
J. L. Yantis,	John M. Travis,
A. P. Forman,	Thomas A. Bracken,
L. P. Bowen,	J. W. Pryor,
R. L. McAfee,	Geo. W. Buchanan,
Isaac D. Jones,	J. T. Hendrick,
G. C. Swallow,	P. Thompson,
S. J. P. Anderson,	W. M. Ferguson.

On motion of Rev. Dr. West, it was

Resolved, That the protest be admitted to record, and that a special committee be appointed to answer it.

To this protest the following answer was on a subsequent day returned:

The paper upon which the Assembly acted in the exclusion of the Commissioners of the Louisville Presbytery from their seats in this body until their case should be decided, indicates sufficiently the true ground of that action. It is no other than the constitutional right of the General Assembly to protect its own dignity, and vindicate its own authority, as the supreme tribunal of the church, in view of open insult to that dignity, and open defiance to that authority, by an inferior court, subject to its jurisdiction.

1. The argument of the protestants that the Assembly has, by this action, violated the fundamental law of its organization

in this respect, that no Assembly can be constitutionally valid unless *all* the particular churches and Presbyteries under its care are actually represented in the body, is an utter misinterpretation of the constitution, and the assertion of a principle that would vitiate the validity of nearly every meeting of the Assembly, and render the organization of any Assembly almost an impossibility. So conspicuous a fallacy as that of confounding the fundamental law and right of representation with the actual presence of the whole company of the representatives themselves, needs only the statement of the fallacy in order to furnish its refutation, not to mention the various clauses of the fundamental law which evince its glaring absurdity. (*Form of Government*, chap. xii.)

2. In reply to the protestants' assertion that there is no warrant in the constitution, no precedent in the history of the church, and no sufficient analogy for such exclusion, to be found in any secular assemblies whatever, the Assembly simply utters the counter assertion. The protestants, moreover, err greatly in supposing that the Assembly is organized by any "formal adoption" of the report of the Committee on Commissions, or that the *ex officio* organization of the Assembly by the clerks of the house, as the ministerial officers of the Assembly, renders impossible any subsequent action of the Assembly in reference either to the Commissioners themselves, or to the Presbyteries, which are the electors of these Commissioners. The power of the Assembly to determine claims of membership in its body, involves the power to decide whether the electors have, by any act, or acts, so far disqualified themselves as, *pro tempore*, to forfeit their right of representation in the supreme tribunal of the church. *McElroy's Report of the Presbyterian Church Case*, 1839, p. 171; *Assembly's Digest*, revised ed., p. 726, § 126.

3. The protestants, moreover, utterly misrepresent the action of the Assembly in the exclusion of the Commissioners of the Louisville Presbytery, by denouncing it as a "judicial condemnation" of the Presbytery without a regular trial. So far from this being the case, the truth is, that the action of the Assembly was only the suspension of the functions of the Commissioners, interdicting their participation in the deliberations of this body until their case should be decided, in the consideration of which case the Commissioners were not only allowed, but particularly invited, by formal vote, to appear, discuss the

case, and defend the action of their Presbytery to the fullest extent. The allegation that the Assembly decided the case of the Commissioners of the Louisville Presbytery merely upon public rumours, without proof, is entirely untrue.

4. It is unnecessary to enter upon any detailed denial of the protestation that the Louisville Presbytery has done nothing that can, by any possibility, justify the Assembly in the suspension of the privileges of the Commissioners. The Presbytery, according to its own "Declaration and Testimony" is in admitted, open, and persistent defiance of the authority of the Assembly, by its lifting up a standard of revolt in the church, and by its call upon all Presbyterians to send in "adhering acts," and thus engage in rebellious, heretical, and schismatical conduct, and so the Assembly has judged. In reference also to the doctrine that no decrees and determinations of the General Assembly are of binding force upon the inferior judicatories, unless previously submitted to the Presbyteries, and approved by a majority of the same, the Assembly declares that this is simply a violent wresting of chap. xii. sec. 6, *Form of Government*, from its historical connection and design, and in opposition not only to the usage of the church in past days, but also to the careful decision of the whole matter, as it emerged in the early controversies of the church. (*Digest*, p. 49, 50.)

5. As to the right of protest by any individual or court in the Presbyterian Church, the Assembly fully recognizes the same. But it is utterly unendurable, as it is utterly unconstitutional, to prostitute or pervert the right of dissent and respectful protest to the ends intended by the Louisville Presbytery, to wit, to open rebellion against the authority of this body, to the propagation of a vast brood of fatal heresies, to bitter misrepresentation of the acts of the Assembly, and to the organization of conspiracies against the very existence of the church itself.

6. The declaration of the protestants that, by the Assembly's action, the churches under the care of the Louisville Presbytery have been excluded "from the fellowship of the church of Christ," is illegitimate, illogical, and gratuitous. There is not a particle of evidence to justify the implication that the Assembly deals with the churches under its care, in precisely the same way in which it has dealt with the Louisville Presbytery. Should every minister of the Presbytery be not only suspended

from his ecclesiastical functions, but deposed from the gospel ministry, the churches of the Presbytery would still remain in connection with and under the care of the Assembly, until, by their own act of insubordination, they had rendered themselves obnoxious to the censures, and judicial or legislative discipline of this supreme tribunal, and thereby been lawfully excluded from our connection, or had voluntarily withdrawn themselves to go elsewhere.

N. WEST,
W. T. FINDLEY,
F. T. BROWN.

Thus ended the discussions referring to the exclusion of the Commissioners of the Presbytery of Louisville. The whole subject, however, was resumed and occupied a large share of the remaining sessions of the Assembly, being brought up again in the report of the committee of seven, so often referred to.

Report on the Presbytery of Louisville.

That report is so long that we cannot insert it at length. It is drawn up with marked ability, and presents the case against the Louisville Presbytery in the strongest light. We do not think that any speech or document on that side of the question presents so plausible an argument in defence of the proposed action of the Assembly.

It states that three subjects had been committed to their consideration. 1. To examine and report the acts and proceedings of the Presbytery of Louisville. 2. To inquire whether the said Presbytery, in view of the action referred to, is entitled to a seat in this Assembly. 3. To recommend what action, if any, the General Assembly should take in the premises.

Under the first head, the committee give an analysis of the Declaration and Testimony. Under the second they urge that the Commissioners of the Presbytery should be debarred from sitting in the Assembly, because it was discretionary to suspend from the privilege of a seat in a judicatory the parties who were under process. The Presbytery was under process from the time the Assembly appointed a committee to examine into the action. Under the third head, the committee recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

Be it Resolved by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America:

First. That the Presbytery of Louisville be, and hereby is, dissolved; and that the custody of its records, papers, and other property be transferred as hereinafter ordered.

Second. That a new Presbytery be and is hereby constituted, to be known by the same name, occupy the same territory, and have watch and care of the same churches; said Presbytery to be composed of the following ministers, (together with so many elders as may appear,) viz., Rev. D. T. Stuart, W. W. Hill, S. Williams, W. C. Matthews, R. Valentine, B. H. McCown, J. H. Dinsmore, H. C. Sachse, T. A. Hoyt, J. L. McKee, J. P. McMillan, J. McCrae, H. T. Morton, J. C. Young, or so many of them, whether ministers or ruling elders, as shall, before their organization, subscribe the following formula, viz., "I do hereby profess my disapproval of the Declaration and Testimony adopted by the late Presbytery of Louisville, and my obedience in the Lord to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States," which formula, together with the subscribers' names, shall be subsequently entered upon these records. The said Presbytery shall meet in the Chestnut street church, in the city of Louisville, Kentucky, on the 20th day of June, 1866, at the hour of eleven o'clock A. M., and shall be opened with a sermon by the Rev. J. P. McMillan, or in his absence, the oldest minister present, who shall preside until a Moderator is chosen.

Third. That so many ministers belonging to the late Presbytery of Louisville as are not herein named, are hereby directed to apply for admission to the Presbytery now constituted, as soon after its organization as practicable, and they shall be received only on condition of acknowledging before the Presbytery their error in adopting or signing the Declaration and Testimony, and of subscribing the aforesaid formula on its records. If at the expiration of two months from the organization of the new Presbytery, these ministers shall not have made such application, or shall not have been received, their pastoral relations, so far as any may exist with the churches under our care, shall thenceforth be *ipso facto* dissolved.

Fourth. That the licentiates and candidates under the care of the dissolved Presbytery are hereby transferred to that now

constituted, and the Stated Clerk of the late Presbytery is hereby directed to place the records and other papers of the said Presbytery in the hands of the Stated Clerk of the Presbytery now constituted, as soon as such clerk shall be chosen.

Fifth. That this General Assembly, in thus dealing with a recusant and rebellious Presbytery, by virtue of the plenary authority existing in it for "suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations," has no intention or disposition to disturb the existing relation of churches, ruling elders, or private members, but rather to protect them in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges in the church of their choice, against men who would seduce them into an abandonment of the heritage of their fathers.

The committee recommend the adoption of the following order: That on the hearing of the matters presented by this report, the Commissioners to this Assembly from the Presbytery of Louisville be heard to the rules of order which govern this House. This recommendation was adopted, and the Rev. Dr. Brookes was requested to inform the Commissioners of the action of the Assembly. To this communication the following answer was received:

The undersigned, Commissioners from the Presbytery of Louisville, who happen not yet to have left the city—overlooking, in the spirit of Christian forbearance, the insult and seeming mockery of the Presbytery and themselves, in a proposition to appear and be heard before a court which has already condemned them unheard—in response to the resolution of this afternoon, transmitted to them by the Permanent Clerk of the General Assembly, most respectfully refer the Assembly to their letter of May 19th, as containing very obvious and sufficient reasons why they could not, without further special instructions from their Presbytery, appear before the present Assembly in any capacity.

SAMUEL R. WILSON,
STUART ROBINSON,
C. A. WICKLIFFE,
by James H. Brookes.

St. Louis, Mo., May 24th, 1866.

The debate on the above report of the Committee of seven was protracted and earnest. As the same principles were in-

volved, the discussion took much the same course as that which concerned the exclusion of the Commissioners of the Presbytery of Louisville. The first speaker was Dr. Thomas, who delivered a much more argumentative speech than the one on the former question. He contended, 1st. That the Louisville Presbytery was properly before the Assembly by the power of review and control. 2d. It is not necessary in order that the superior judicatory should exercise this right of review that the records should be before the House. It is enough that the irregularity to be corrected should be notorious. 3d. He appealed to former acts of the Assembly providing for the exclusion of delegates from offending Presbyteries, according to the rule in chap. v, section 9, of the *Book of Discipline*. 4th. He proved also that the Assembly had on other occasions passed over Synods, and acted immediately on Presbyteries. 5th. As the Assembly had the right to act in the way proposed, the occasion not only justified it, but demanded it.

H. K. Clarke, Esq., of Detroit, made a powerful speech in support of the report. In his introductory remarks he called attention to the fact that the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in our church courts were not distributed as in the state and national governments. They all vest in one and the same body. This of necessity creates a great difference as to the modes of procedure. After this and other preliminary observations he proceeded to discuss the following points: 1. Has the Assembly the power assumed in the report under consideration? He referred, in support of an affirmative answer to this question, to explicit statements of the *Form of Government*, in chaps. viii. and xii. In the exercise of this power the Assembly may adopt any mode of procedure in itself just, if it sees fit, provided no particular mode is prescribed in the constitution. No such mode is prescribed as to the conduct of process against a Presbytery. Hence the mode proposed in the report is perfectly legitimate. His second proposition was, that abundant ground was afforded in the action of the Presbytery of Louisville to call for the interference of the Assembly. That Presbytery deliberately refused to obey the injunctions of the Assembly of 1865, especially as to the reception of ministers and members who had participated in the rebellion. He argued

with great force to show that the rebellion was a great crime; that those who favoured and joined it were guilty of a civil, moral, and ecclesiastical offence; and that Presbyterian ministers and church members had been foremost in exciting and fostering this criminal revolt. He referred, in support of this last point, particularly to the action of the Synod of South Carolina, and to the sermon of Dr. Palmer, which had exerted so great an influence on the public mind at the South. The Presbytery had not only refused to obey the injunctions of the Assembly, but had avowed the purpose of creating a schism in the church, unless their opinions were adopted, and had taken measures to carry that purpose into effect.

Dr. West argued with ability and warmth on the same side, and with special reference to the speech of Dr. Van Dyke. He urged the adoption of the report for the following reasons.

(1.) Because the deliverances of the Assembly as to slavery and the rebellion are in accordance with God's word.

(2.) These injunctions are a duty, if the doctrines upon which they are based are true. We first give doctrine, and then enforce the precept. That is the rule in all our preaching. See the four preliminary principles in the *Form of Government*, where it is clearly laid down that truth and duty are inseparable.

(3.) The injunctions being true, remain until they are repealed, or the end for which they were given is accomplished.

(4.) The church is bound to state and enforce the truth on all subject to her care. There is no political element involved in this doctrine.

(5.) Because of the very end of government there must always be some final, ultimate tribunal, whose decrees are to be obeyed, unless contrary to the word of God.

(6.) Because the deliverances of the Assembly are in accordance with our standards; they are to be received and submitted to, as a power vested in the church for her good, and the good of her members. This power is not a self-originated, but a divinely delegated power—the power of Christ himself. The decrees of the Council of Jerusalem were not submitted to the Presbyteries; but they were binding then, and they are binding now. "But," says the objector, "those men were

apostles." I answer, that the apostleship was not a source of power, else there had been no need of a council.

(7.) Because our ordination vows bind us to submit to the General Assembly. We all understand this.

(8.) Upon the whole theory upon which the Presbyterian Church rests—its four grand principles, popularity, parity, &c.

(9.) From the principles laid down in the contest of 1838. All the questions involved here were settled then. How did that controversy terminate? It established the principle that the Assembly had legislative, executive, and judicial powers. This is the grand principle that runs all through that controversy.

He was particularly explicit as to the power of the Assembly in the premises. "We have no need," he said, "to wait for an express grant of power; for the relation of Presbyteries to the Assembly is not, by any means, the same as that of states to the general government. The power here is of God. The Assembly need not give a reason for its action, for it has all power. The question here is, Who is to be obeyed?—the Presbytery of Louisville, or the General Assembly? One or the other must give way. Our authority must be dragged down in disgrace, or punishment must be inflicted on the rebellious."

In an early part of this article, we adverted to the fact that Dr. West, in the Assembly of 1865 intimated in a very pointed manner, that if the injunction as to those who favoured the rebellion should be applied to the abettors of the rebellion at the North, it would not be obeyed. We had not then seen his speech, and therefore give here what he said on that point, as we find his remarks reported in the *Presbyterian.*

"It is alleged, again, that the Assembly refused to impose the same terms of admission upon men in the North, and men coming from the South. In reply to this I say, that the injunctions of the last Assembly were, that when application was made for admission, inquiries should be made as to the conduct of the applicant in the rebellion. An independent resolution was proposed, directing church sessions to take the same action, and make the same inquiries respecting their members. This,

as we all know, was voted down. The injunction made by the Assembly was left to be acted upon on *application.*"

We do not see that this touches one point. The question is. Have not our sessions and Presbyterics from God, and under our constitution, the right to judge of the qualifications of ministers and church members, subject of course to their responsibility in the exercise of that right, to the review of the higher judicatories? If the General Assembly has no right to say to the sessions, beforehand, whom they shall receive, and whom they shall reject, how can it have the right to say the same thing to the Presbyteries. And if abetting the rebellion be so great a crime as to call for the rejection of an applicant for admission, why does it not call for the expulsion of those already within our pale? If the injunctions of the Assembly be binding as to the southern applicants, it would have been equally binding as to the far more guilty northern abettors of the rebellion. And if the disobedience to the one injunction be a failure of allegiance to the church; then the contemptuous refusal to obey the other is a still greater offence against its authority. This is the light, as it seems to us, in which this matter will strike most minds.

Dr. William L. Breckinridge made the first speech in opposition to the report. The spirit which this gentleman brought into the debate may be inferred from the following paragraph:

"I have been taken to task a number of times since I had the privilege of addressing this body on this subject, by persons of various shades of opinion, and especially by those whom I would, without disrespect, call the holders of extreme opinions on this subject. I have been taken very gravely to task for the kindness of feeling I expressed towards my brethren on all sides; the effect of which, in my mind, is to convince me more and more that I am right. One finds very serious fault with me for speaking a single kind and loving word towards my brother Thomas, whom I have known longer probably than the person who rebuked me has lived; and another finds fault with me for speaking a kind or charitable word towards my dear brethren of the Declaration and Testimony wing, many of whom I have known for a long time. I am not in sympathy with either of these parties, but I thank God I can love them all as my

brethren, and when I am rebuked for expressing kindness of feeling towards them on both sides, I thank the Lord and take courage, because it convinces me more and more perfectly that the middle ground is the true ground."

The great object of his speech was to prove that the General Assembly had not the constitutional power to do what the committee recommended. It could not disregard the Synod, and reach over its head, and, of its own motion, either organize or dissolve a Presbytery. This he argued, 1. From the words of the constitution. In the chapter granting powers to the Assembly, there is not one word said of Presbyteries, except as they were the constituencies of the Assembly. 2. From the absence of any sustained decisions in support of such power. 3. From the evil consequences which would flow from its concession. If the Assembly can act directly on the Presbyteries, it may on the sessions, and on the individual members, and do anything that is "doable," having in itself all the power of the churches. From the reference made to this speech by subsequent speakers, it seems, not only on account of the character of the man, and spirit which he manifested, but by the force of the argument, to have made a strong impression upon the House.

Dr. Humphrey moved to strike out the resolutions reported by the committee, and insert the following:

Be it Resolved, as follows:

The "Declaration and Testimony" adopted and published by the Presbytery of Louisville is, in the terms, spirit, and intent thereof, derogatory to the just authority of the General Assembly, hostile to the institutions of this church, destructive to the peace of our people, and fruitful in schismatical contentions and disputations.

Wherefore this General Assembly expresses its grave disapprobation of the proceedings of the Presbytery, as unbecoming in a lower judicatory of the church.

The Assembly also enjoins upon the Presbytery to forbear whatever tends to further disturbances and agitations; to support the institutions of the church, and especially to take such order at its stated meeting as will show that it does not intend to defy the authority of the General Assembly, or to disparage the institutions of the church.

Furthermore, the Assembly does hereby require the Presbytery of Louisville to appear by its Commissioners before the next General Assembly, on the second day of its session, to show what it has done, or failed to do in these premises, and the next Assembly is requested to take up and issue this business.

Furthermore, the Assembly directs the other Presbyteries to confer with those ministers under their care, who have signed the "Declaration and Testimony," and to urge those brethren to disavow the intention of setting the authority of the General Assembly at defiance. These Presbyteries are also directed to report hereon in writing to the next Assembly. All this to the end that the whole church may have quietness and repose.

Notwithstanding the limited space at our command, we venture to insert the speech of *Dr. Humphrey*, in support of his substitute, at length as reported in the *Presbyterian*.

Mr. Moderator, allow me, in the first place, to speak of this question, not as it effects many of my brethren here; but as it affects the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky. While a large majority of you will return to undisturbed and pleasant fields of labour, and be allowed to prosecute your work in peace, we of the Synod of Kentucky will, if this paper is adopted, return, not to the ordinary and peaceful business of the ambassadors of Christ; but to scenes of strife and controversy, and to agitated and divided churches. We are thrust into the midst of a controversy in churches, among which some of us have gone forth for twenty years sowing the good seed of the kingdom, with God's blessing upon our labours. Therefore bear with us while we present our views as to the effect of the measure proposed by this report. And let me say just here, that whatever may be your action, some of us will bow in due and respectful deference, and go home to do what we can to repair the desolations around us. If it were the purpose of the Assembly to exact strict *justice*—if no *mercy* were to be exercised—undoubtedly it might be well to pass the paper before us. But if it is our purpose to exercise mercy, tempered with judgment, this is not the paper. I sympathize fully with the sentiment expressed by a previous speaker, and thank God that he *is* a God of mercy.

This is my only ground for hope; and it is in this spirit that I have drawn the paper I have just presented.

Let me now call the attention of the Assembly to some points wherein this amendment differs from the report of the committee. And, in the first place, let me say that, as respects the Declaration and Testimony, and the judgment we form of it, there is no essential difference between this paper and that of the committee. Stronger terms are used by the committee, it is true; but the opinion expressed is substantially the same. There are in Kentucky three parties; first, the signers and supporters of the Declaration and Testimony; second, the "middle men," as they are called; and third the party representing the majority of this Assembly. We, who are known as "middle men," agree with the latter in their opinion of that pamphlet. So far as the church is concerned, we agree that whatever there is in it that is new, is not true; and that what is true, is not new. As to secular and spiritual affairs, we believe that things secular belong to the state; and things spiritual, to the church; but we hold also, that in the rebellion great moral questions were involved, and we thank God for the deliverances of the Assembly during the last few years. While I have not agreed to some of the great points in those deliverances, and have thought them not strictly in accordance with the principles by which such matters should be settled, I have stood by the church, and I expect to do so in the future, for I believe the great body of its testimony is deduced from the word of God. As to the *spirit* of the Declaration and Testimony, I suppose, therefore that we are in entire accordance with this body. Sir, until I read it, I did not know how rich the English language was in terms of objurgation—they dance through the whole document to the tune of Dixie. I agree with the Assembly that the *spirit* of this document must be rebuked. But when I come to compare the two modes proposed for this purpose, I find that the one proposed by the committee is *partial.* It is to be brought to bear in all its terrible power upon the heads of a few brethren in the Presbytery of Louisville, while there are others who confess themselves guilty of the same offence. Is there any good reason why the whole power of the Assembly should fall upon a few, while others are allowed to

escape? There is undoubtedly a difference between the Presbytery of Louisville and others, and this amendment provides for that difference. It proposes to deal differently with different offenders—to *deal* with all, but with a difference in our final judgment.

When the life, the liberty, or the ecclesiastical relations of the people of God are at stake, judicial forms are of vast importance. This amendment preserves the form of judicial process. I have been pained to hear it asserted here that it is unnecessary to regard the *form* so long as we observe the *spirit* of the law. Why, Moderator, forms but embody the spirit. You cannot trample down the form without trampling upon the spirit. We must stand by the *form* if we would preserve the *spirit* of justice. The plan proposed by the committee is anomalous and unprecedented. What analogy, I ask, is there between the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia and the Presbytery of Louisville? The former was established without constitutional authority, and for the propagation of error. It was dissolved because it never had a legal existence. The latter was established in 1813, and from that day has stood on the firm foundations of the church. Did any one ever hear of a Presbytery dissolved, and its members turned out of the church in the manner in which it is proposed to dispose of the Presbytery of Louisville? The ecclesiastical position of every minister in the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia was carefully cared and provided for, while here a Presbytery is dissolved, and no provision is made to preserve the ecclesiastical position of its members. Our fathers in 1837 were remarkably careful to administer matters according to the constitution of the church, and they ceased their citation only because the dissolution of the Plan of Union made it unnecessary. Did you ever know of a body of men turned out of the church—and that, too, without a hearing? Festus said it was not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he who is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him. Shall we be less just than they? All through our Book citation is the rule—aye, *two* citations—for proceeding against offenders; and I undertake to say you cannot proceed to this measure till you have

given these brethren a fair chance; and that they may have that, this amendment proposes to cite them to appear before the next Assembly.

Again. The process recommended by the committee is *too summary.* It does not afford to these brethren that *locus penitentiæ*—that place for repentance—which is guarantied to the worst criminals. Hence I plead for more time. Give them one year more. If they bring forth fruit, well; if not, then cut them down. We propose by this amendment to put this case on such a footing that a judicial trial and investigation can be had hereafter. I have quite agreed with my venerable colleague (Dr. R. J. Breckinridge) that a judicial trial was the best way to settle this important matter, and we came here expecting it, under his appeal. Here is a legal tribunal; here are the parties; here are the judges, who have come, expecting to hear and consider the matter; here is the venerable Nestor, whose breast has so long been bared to the enemies of his church and of his God; here are the papers; here are all things necessary for a full and impartial investigation. We expected this course to be pursued. We came ready to submit to your decisions, whatever they might be, and to go back to Kentucky and stand by the church, though we went back under your censure, and marked with tokens of your disapprobation. That plan has failed, and we now propose to cite these brethren before the next Assembly, and to settle this great case, not upon the banks of the turbid Mississippi, but beside the clear and beautiful waters of the Ohio.

Again. The scheme proposed by the committee is simply one of *church power.* It is a *brutem fulmen* in every aspect. It says to these men, "We have concentrated in our hands *all* the power which Christ has given to his church. We have you in our hands, and will hold you there, and in the exercise of this concentrated power." The amendment proposes that our proceedings shall be in the legitimate exercise of the power of all the bodies among which the power of the church is distributed. We urge a trial. We urge that the question may come up by a reference to the Synod of Kentucky. I believe that Synod would issue the matter in accordance with truth and righteousness, and I do not object to the insertion of such an injunction.

This Declaration and Testimony was only issued in September last. Give us time to deal with these brethren, and see if they will not retrace their steps. We are greatly agitated and disturbed all over Kentucky, and we ask this General Assembly now to step in and relieve us. If you will send this case back to us, we will do the very best we can with it. I beg of you to consider all these things, and act accordingly.

I now approach a point upon which I speak with diffidence and reluctance. Though I have lived there for twenty years, I am not a Kentuckian by birth, and I can say here what I would not say before a Kentucky Presbytery. I tell you these Kentuckians are a great people. Kentucky has been the cradle of Presbyterianism for all these western and south-western states. She has had a bloody and troubled history, and a troubled experience in religious matters. First came the Cumberland schism, then the New-light controversy, and then the New-school agitation and division. Our cause has triumphed there in three trying conflicts. We are now in the midst of a fourth, and, by God's blessing and your assistance, we will meet it successfully. But do not lay upon us burdens which we cannot bear. Kentucky has always had an able and godly ministry—men of ardent zeal and untiring labour—yet to-day the Presbyterian Church within her bounds numbers but ten thousand communicants. Kentucky Presbyterianism has emptied itself all over Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Tennessee, and been a fountain of light and salvation all over this land. Yet, few as we are in numbers, we have done some things for Christ and for his church. We have established two noble institutions. Danville College and Danville Seminary stand to-day as monuments of the piety and liberality of Kentucky Presbyterianism. Of our one hundred and fifty churches, but one-third are self-sustaining. If you drive a ploughshare through these churches, what can be the result but to ruin all this work of years, and spread division and desolation through all our bounds? Now, unless it is absolutely necessary, lay not on us this severe affliction. Spare us one year more to go back to our brethren of the Declaration and Testimony, and beseech them to cease from this work of strife. Let our Kentucky church alone one year more, I entreat you. Then, if you *must* cut it down, well.

We will submit, and, though with bleeding hearts, we will go home and labour to repair our desolations. You who are pastors, we entreat you to come to us as pastors. We call upon you who are young men, to come to us in the name and spirit of the Master, and labour with us for the strengthening and establishment of his glorious kingdom. We call upon you to come and preach the gospel. But spare us this blow—*spare us this blow.* Do not destroy forever our hopes of a united church.

We learn from the papers that the delivery of this speech drew tears from many of the audience. Elder H. K. Clarke Esq., said, "It almost persuaded him to be—on Dr. Humphrey's side." Had the Dr's substitute been adopted, we believe that it would have been as oil on troubled waters, and ultimately satisfied all parts of the church, except perhaps the most extreme of the Declaration and Testimony men. It has been ordered otherwise. God, for his own wise purposes, seems to have ordained a further period of agitation and trial for the church, for its good and his own glory.

Dr. Van Dyke spoke at length against the report of the committee. Few members of the Assembly, on either side of the House, were listened to with greater respect by all parties. His moderation and manliness, as well as the clearness and fervor of his arguments, produced a strong impression whenever he addressed the Assembly. His speech has been published in a separate form, as well as reported in the papers. We can give only a bare synopsis of its principal points. 1. He laid down what he claimed to be the true principles of loyalty in the church and state. He had been loyal in both relations. He had no intention of separating himself from the church of his fathers. 2. He denied that the signers of the Declaration and Testimony had any design to divide the church. 3. He reviewed the action of the late Assemblies, particularly that of 1864, to show that it was political in its character and bearing. 4. He maintained that the decrees of the Assembly of 1865 were unconstitutional, and therefore not binding on anybody. The Assembly had only delegated powers, and cannot make terms of communion without transmitting them to the Presbyteries for their approval. 4. The proposed action was partial.

"Why this discrimination," he asked, "between ministers of different sections? There are ministers in all the Presbyteries,—and I am one of them—who will not obey them. The Synod of New Jersey and other judicatories have formally protested against them. 5. "The execution of these orders is impossible. Not a Synod nor a Presbytery in the North has tried to enforce them. I abominated," he said, "the effort to enforce on men who are *down*, and who owned themselves 'whipped,' orders which I do not dare to enforce on my own members."

Dr. Boardman made a long and able argument on the same side of the question. 1. He expressed decided disapprobation of the Declaration and Testimony. He regarded it as urging sound Scripture principles to an undue extent. He did not believe that there were five men in that Assembly who do not believe a large part of the principles laid down in that paper. He contended therefore, that as its signers were not heretical, as they were devoted ministers of the gospel, they did not deserve the severe treatment now proposed. 2. He urged that the Assembly have not acted with such severity towards other offenders. He read extracts from the *Danville Review* condemning the action of the Assembly as "unchristian and unjust." 3. He argued to show that the decrees of 1865 were unconstitutional. "You require," he said, "of every minister from the South who presents himself for admission, that he holds to the opinions of the four last Assemblies on the subject of slavery; and this too, when your own Assembly has said it is wrong to make slaveholding a term of communion." 4. He depicted at length the evil consequences which may be expected to flow from the proposed action.

Dr. Brookes, from his high standing as a man and as a minister, and his distinguished ability as a public speaker, secured an attentive hearing from the house, and was sustained by the sympathy of a crowded audience in the galleries. He said he stood alone. Even those who were most opposed to the action of the majority joined in the condemnation of the Declaration and Testimony. As he had signed that document, and, although not its author, had been principally instrumental in its production, he was the more bound to speak in its

defence. He regarded the Declaration and Testimony as a simple protest, and he does not appear to have assumed its defence in any other light. His first position was, that there was good and sufficient reason for protesting against the acts of the five preceding Assemblies. In support of this position, he cited the testimony of Dr. Hodge and others, who had protested against the action of the Assembly of 1861; and then that of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, Dr. W. C. Matthews, Dr. R. W. Landis, and Dr. Humphrey, who had joined in the condemnation of that action in terms as severe as those used in the Declaration and Testimony. 2. He reviewed the acts of subsequent Assemblies, passing slightly over those of 1862 and 1863, and dwelling at length on the action of the Assembly of 1864, in reference to slavery. That action was, as he maintained, in direct contradiction to the carefully considered deliverance of the Assembly of 1845, and to the word of God. In 1845 the Assembly declared that slaveholding was not in itself sinful, nor was the renunciation of that relation a condition of membership in the church of Christ. The Assembly of 1864 declares it to be "guilt" and "sin." It instructs the Board of Domestic Missions to refuse its aid to all missionaries and ministers who do not adhere to the declaration of that Assembly, touching loyalty and slavery. The Assembly of 1865 reduced the principles of the former Assemblies to practice, by enjoining on the lower judicatories to require of applicants for admission, the adoption of those principles. This, he said, necessitated a struggle unless "the liberty of God's children, and the crown rights of Jesus Christ as King of Zion were to be tamely and basely surrendered."

His second position, viz., the right of any member of the church to protest, not being called in question, was not enlarged upon. The third point of his argument was, that the spirit and form of the protest contained in the Declaration and Testimony were justified by the necessities of the case. He asserted that the committee who had that document under consideration had failed to produce anything really disrespectful to the Assembly. He instituted an extended comparison between the spirit and language of the Declaration and Testimony and those of protests uttered on other occasions. Under this head he referred to the

paper prepared by Dr. W. L. Breckinridge, and adopted by the Presbytery of Translyvania, declaring certain acts of the Assembly of 1865 unconstitutional, unwise, inexpedient, and nugatory. He cited still stronger language from the records of the Presbyteries of Ebenezer, of Sangamon, (Ill.) and Lewes, (Md.) He dwelt on the action of the Synod of Kentucky, in the fall of 1865, sustained by the vote of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, which declared "the acts of last General Assembly, (1865), on overtures No. 6 and 7, and the fourth resolution on the Report of the Board of Domestic Missions, in the judgment of the Synod, unwise, as tending to destroy the peace and harmony of the church, and in some of their provisions unconstitutional and unscriptural." Dr. Brookes then adverted to earlier facts in our history. He cited the action of the Presbytery of Chillicothe, which declared they could hold no communion with any ecclesiastical body which tolerated the sin of slaveholding, or its justification, under its jurisdiction. He quoted from the *Christian Monthly Magazine*, for Sept. 1845, edited by the Rev. Dr. Thomas, an extremely severe denunciation of the Assembly of that year, for its deliverance on slavery. He thus endeavoured to show that there was nothing in the Declaration and Testimony to call for special censure from the General Assembly.

Besides the substitute for the Report of the Committee presented by Dr. Humphrey, printed above, *Dr. Boardman* offered the following paper:

The attention of the General Assembly has been called to a pamphlet entitled 'A Declaration and Testimony,' purporting to have been adopted by the Presbytery of Louisville, on the 2d day of Sept. 1865. This pamphlet contains various statements, which, if taken in their literal import, we regard as disrespectful to the General Assembly, pregnant with schism, and adapted to foster a spirit of insubordination throughout our bounds. The Assembly is unwilling to believe that the Presbytery of Louisville designed to place itself in an attitude of rebellion against the just authority which Christ has established in his church, or that it will deliberately sanction the use of words and phrases which seem to set at defiance the higher judicatories of the church. Willing to give the members of that Pres-

bytery time for reflection, the Assembly contents itself, for the present, with admonishing them of their grievous error, and directing them to review their whole procedure in this matter, and to make a full report of their action in the premises to the Synod of Kentucky, at its next stated session, and also to the next General Assembly.

The Synod of Kentucky is instructed to take such order in the case as may, in their judgment, best conduce to the purity and harmony of the church, and the interests of true religion. And since this case has manifestly excited much feeling, and threatens to disturb still further the peace of our communion, we exhort all concerned to cultivate a spirit of forbearance and conciliation, to merge all private and personal aims in a paramount devotion to the interests of truth and righteousness, and humbly invoke for themselves and the churches with which they are connected the healing, reviving, and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit.

Preferred by

H. A. Boardman, R. J. Clark,
R. W. Allen, Joseph T. Smith,
J. S. McClellan, J. E. Spilman,
D. C. Brown, Charles A. Marshall,
John H. Clarke, William T. Adams,
Justus T. Umsted, William M. Grimes,
I. F. Vanarsdale.

H. Day, Esq., of New York, offered the following substitute for the paper of Dr. Gurley, subsequently adopted by the House:

Whereas, This General Assembly has had brought to its notice a certain paper called a "Declaration and Testimony," which, it is alleged, was adopted by the Louisville Presbytery, Sept. 2, 1865, and which imports to be signed by ministers and ruling elders belonging to other Presbyteries; and, whereas, in the judgment of this General Assembly, the said paper is a most flagrant and unwarranted attack on the dignity and authority of the General Assembly, derogatory to its character, tending to bring odium and disrepute on the highest judicatory of the church, and to increase agitation and alienation in the bosom of the church, schismatical in effect, contumacious in

spirit, and unjust and untrue in its statements; now, therefore this General Assembly, in defence of its authority, in the exercise of its high prerogative to suppress schismatical contentions and disputations, reproving, warning, and bearing testimony against error in doctrine and immorality in practice, and in the fulfilment of its sacred duty to secure union, peace, and mutual confidence of all our churches, does *Resolve*,

1. That this General Assembly considers the alleged action of the Louisville Presbytery, and of the ministers and ruling elders who have signed, published, and disseminated the said paper called the "Declaration and Testimony," as worthy of the gravest censure of this body, and as an offence against the authority, peace, and harmony of the church, and as a sin against the Lord Jesus Christ, the great Head of the Church.

2. That the Synod of Kentucky is hereby required, at its next meeting, to proceed in an orderly manner to try the Louisville Presbytery for the said alleged offence of adopting, publishing, and disseminating, the said "Declaration and Testimony," and that the Synod by its records, at the next General Assembly, do show what it has done in the premises.

3. That this Assembly does hereby require and enjoin on the said Louisville Presbytery, to reconsider its action in adopting said "Declaration and Testimony," to cease from disseminating the same, and from all agitations and contentions which tend to disturb the peace and harmony of the church, and to submit to the lawful authority of the church of Christ, as exercised by the General Assembly, and that the Presbytery by its Commissioners report its action in the premises to the next General Assembly.

4. That each and all the Presbyteries with whom any of the subscribers to said Declaration and Testimony are connected, are hereby required, at their next meeting, to proceed against such subscribers, and try them for said alleged acts, in signing and giving publicity to said document, and if it is found that they have been guilty of offence in so doing, that each of said Presbyteries, respectively, do censure their conduct, and require such members to confess their error, and to cease from their agitations; and such Presbyteries are hereby required, by their Commissioners, to appear at the next General Assembly, and

report their action in the premises, and while such persons are under process, as aforesaid, to suspend their privilege of deliberating and voting as members, until the process is finally issued; and it is further ordered, that the members of said Presbyteries, who have not subscribed said "Declaration and Testimony," shall have the authority of such Presbyteries respectively, shall exercise their proper functions, and shall have charge of the Presbyterial Records and all property.

Mr. Day's motion was laid upon the table.

Under a subsequent resolution of the Assembly, it was signed by the following persons, as expressing their views, and being the one for which they would have voted had it come before the Assembly:

Henry Day, A. Gosman, S. G. Law, E. D. Yeomans, E. B. Raffensperger, W. T. Cushing, D. V. Smock, D. M. Halliday, John Dickson, John M. Krebs, William H. Hornblower, S. D. Chamberlin, J. R. Ralph, John L. Nevius, H. L. Vannuys.

Dr. Gurley's paper, which was presented as a substitute for the resolution recommended by the Committee, was adopted by the vote, *yeas*, 196; *nays*, 37. *Declined to vote*, J. H. Brookes, 1. The paper is as follows:

1. *Resolved*, That this General Assembly does hereby condemn the Declaration and Testimony, as a slander against the church, schismatical in its character and aims, and its adoption by any of our church courts as an act of rebellion against the authority of the General Assembly.

2. *Resolved*, That the whole subject contemplated in this report, including the report itself, be referred to the next General Assembly.

3. *Resolved*, That the signers of the "Declaration and Testimony," and the members of the Presbytery of Louisville who voted to adopt that paper, be summoned, and they are hereby summoned, to appear before the next General Assembly, to answer for what they have done in this matter, and that until their case is decided, they shall not be permitted to sit as members of any church court higher than the Session.

4. *Resolved*, That if any Presbytery shall disregard this action of the General Assembly, and at any meeting shall enroll, as entitled to a seat or seats in the body, one or more of

the persons designated in the preceding resolution and summoned to appear before the next General Assembly, then that Presbytery shall *ipso facto* be dissolved, and its ministers and elders who adhere to this action of the Assembly, are hereby authorized and directed, in such cases, to take charge of the Presbyterial Records, to retain the name, and exercise all the authority and functions of the original Presbytery, until the next meeting of the General Assembly.

5. *Resolved*, That Synods, at their next stated meetings, in making up their rolls, shall be guided and governed by this action of the General Assembly.

In support of this paper, Dr. Gurley read the following reasons for adopting it, which were ordered by the Assembly to be inserted with it in the *Minutes*.

1. Because it condemns in strong, yet just and appropriate terms, the Declaration and Testimony, pronouncing it "a slander against the church, schismatical in its character and aims," which it manifestly is.

2. Because it declares the adoption of the Declaration and Testimony by any of our church courts, to be an act of rebellion against the authority of the General Assembly; which it manifestly is.

3. Because it summons the signers of this Declaration and the members of the Presbytery of Louisville who voted for its adoption, to appear and answer for their conduct before the General Assembly, the body against whom they have offended, and the only body which, in the present circumstances of the church, can properly and without embarrassment consider and adjudicate the case.

4. Because it summons them to appear before the *next* Assembly, thus giving them ample time for reflection, for repentance, and for making up their reply.

5. Because, in the meantime, it forbids their sitting in any church court higher than the Session—an abridgment of privilege which we are bound to make in fidelity to our erring brethren and to the peace of the church.

6. Because it saves us from even the appearance of taking action in this case which is too summary and severe. Though we might lawfully dissolve the Presbytery of Louisville at this

time, no such great or perilous exigency has arrived as makes such an extraordinary proceeding necessary—nor is it expedient. It is better for the Assembly, better for the church, and better for all the interests in any way concerned in this case, that justice should be secured and administered *in the ordinary way and by the ordinary methods.*

7. I urge the adoption of this substitute, because it provides that in case any Presbytery shall disregard this action of the Assembly, and permit the signers of the Declaration and Testimony or those who voted to approve it, to sit in the body as members, that act of rebellion, according to an authoritative declaration of the Assembly, dissolves the Presbytery, and causes its powers to pass at once into the hands of those who respect the highest court of the church, and are willing to submit to its authority.

8. Finally, in answer to the objection, that the General Assembly has no right to pass beyond the lower courts and deal with individuals, I would say, our *Form of Government* expressly gives to the General Assembly the power "of suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations;" and this clearly implies the power of dealing directly with the persons or parties who are engaged in such contentions and disputations.

Dr. Monfort moved that it be the sense of the Assembly that the above paper take effect at the close of the sessions of this Assembly, and that the signers of the "Declaration and Testimony" continue until then to occupy their seats.

This paper of Dr. Gurley has some obvious advantages over that proposed by Dr. D. V. McLean. It avoids immediate and peremptory action; it gives time for those implicated to consider and determine upon the course which they will pursue; and it secured the votes of some who doubted the authority of the Assembly to act at once and without citation or warning, on a Presbytery, without regard to the Synod to which it belonged. On the other hand, it goes quite as far as the report of the committee, as to the power which it assumes to belong to the General Assembly; it is equally severe in the penalty attached to adherence to the Declaration and Testimony; and it reaches over the whole church, instead of being confined to the single Presbytery of Louisville. The Presbytery of Baltimore, we

understand, has one member, a young gentleman from Canada or Nova Scotia, who signed the Declaration and Testimony. If the Presbytery should allow him to take his seat, it would be *ipso facto* dissolved. The Assembly thus proposes to visit scruples as to the constitutionality of one of its injunctions and a simple act of disobedience, with a penalty as severe as it could inflict for the open denial of Christ and rejection of his gospel. We do not question the right of the Assembly to pass such an order. We speak only of the severity of the penalty. We think that the Presbyteries ought to submit to this order, however severe they may consider it. For ourselves, we should, on the whole, have preferred, of the two papers, the resolutions of the Committee.

In the winding up of the Assembly there were several papers of importance adopted.

First: The following addition to the Pastoral Letter, proposed by Dr. Krebs.

In regard to the deliverances of the last and five preceding Assemblies, as well as this, and especially the requisitions to examine applicants from the South touching their views of slavery and rebellion, the Assembly would observe, that although the war is over, secession effectively quashed, and slavery abolished,—yet in view of the spirit of these dead issues which, it must be admitted, still survives rampant and rebellious, perhaps more virulently in the religious form than elsewhere, it was necessary to guard the church from being disturbed by this element, which has asserted itself so rebelliously, and continues to be so vehemently proclaimed, and therefore to require satisfactory evidence of the practical repudiation of these heresies.

Nor does the Assembly deem it needless to observe, that while manifestly the views put forth by these deliverances, and the views which it was proposed to elicit from applicants for admission to our churches and presbyteries, have regard only to those more recent opinions concerning the system of Southern slavery, out of which secession and the war for its perpetuation and extension grew, the Assembly considers that there is no contradiction between these latest expressions of the Assembly, needed by a new state of the case, and the whole current of consistent deliverances on the subject of slavery which the church has

from the beginning and all along uttered—especially from 1818 to 1846.

The Assembly in these things has desired to impose no new terms of communion; it has but pointed out the appropriate treatment of the rebellious and disobedient; and, in the language of no less an authority than the illustrious Calvin, it did but make "a genuine and simple application of the *lex Dei* to the times and manners for which it was designed." In this special application it has only, in the still further language of the great Reformer, "guarded against offences which are most expressly forbidden by the Lord," without, "taking away one *punctum* of Christian liberty." *Instit.*, lib. iv., cap. x., sec iv. 21, 22.

And in regard to our deliverances on these subjects, the Assembly here contents itself, as sufficient, with declaring that it has but exercised the constitutional right and duty of the Assembly, which has been constantly exercised from the time of the fathers who made the constitution of our church, to utter its sentiments, warnings, and exhortations, on all points and questions, which, while we are properly restrained from invading the jurisdiction of civil tribunals, do nevertheless belong to that class of things which we may handle, viz., those moral and religious questions, which, although they may even embrace points in which *politics*, whether in their larger or lesser sense, are involved, because they relate to civil and political affairs, are also questions of *religious* duty, and cannot be thrown out of the religious jurisdiction.

Second: Dr. Gurley offered the following addition, which was also adopted:

It having come to the knowledge of this body that some of the ministers under our care are not able to subscribe to the recent testimonies of the General Assembly on the subjects of loyalty and freedom, and that some who have not signed or formally approved the Declaration and Testimony, do nevertheless hesitate to comply with the requirements of the last Assembly touching the reception of members from the South, known or supposed to have been in sympathy with the rebellion; therefore,

Resolved, That while we would treat such ministers with

kindness and forbcarance, and would by no means interfcre with the full and free discussion on their part of the testimonics and requirements referred to, we deem it a solemn duty, which we owe to them and to the church, to guard them against giving countenance in any way to declarations and movements which are defiant of the Assembly's authority, and schismatical in their tendency and aim, and we do earnestly exhort them in the namc and for the sake of our common Lord and Master, to study and pursue the things which make for peace.

Third: Dr. *W. E. Schenck* offered the following paper:

Whereas, There is reason to believe that among the ministers and members of the Presbytcrian Church in the South, there are many who disapproved of the late rebellion against the Government of the United States and of the separation of those churches from this body, and who did not of their own free will and consent lend their aid or countenance thereto, but bowed, bcfore what they believed to be an irresistible necessity; therefore

Resolved, That this Assembly, without expressing any opinion in regard to the propriety of the course adopted by such persons, will still cherish a kindly and fraternal regard for them, and whenever any of them shall desire to return to their former connection with us, they will receivc a cordial welcomc.

And in regard to those who have voluntarily aided and countenanced the said rebellion and separation, this Assembly disclaims all vindictive feelings, and all disposition to exercise an undue severity, and reiteratcs its rcadiness to receive them back whenever they shall have complied with the conditions laid down by the last General Assembly on page 563 of its printcd *Minutes*.

After discussion, the previous question was called for and sustained, when the main question was put, and the paper was adopted.

Fourth: A paper offered by Dr. *J. T. Smith*, was, on motion, taken from the tablc and adopted. It is as follows:

Whereas, The churches in that portion of our country lately in rebellion, whose names appear upon our roll, havc not been rcpresented in this Assembly, and still remain in a state of separation from us; *and whereas*, the measures adopted by this Assembly, if not carried out by the lower courts in a spirit of

great meekness and forbearance, may result in perpetuating and embittering divisions already existing, and extending them over portions of our church, now at peace; therefore,

Resolved, 1. That this Assembly greatly deplores the continued separation between ourselves and our Southern brethren, so long united in the bonds of Christian love and ecclesiastical fellowship, and expresses the earnest desire that the way may be soon opened for a reunion on the basis of our common standards, and on terms consistent with truth and righteousness.

Resolved, 2. That the lower courts who may be called upon to execute the measures of this Assembly, be enjoined to proceed therein with great meekness and forbearance, and in a spirit of kindness and conciliation, to the end that strifes and divisions be not multiplied and inflamed, and extended still more widely, and that the discipline of Christ's house may prove for edification and not for destruction.

The matter of a report from Dr. West, on the Sunday milk traffic, committed to him by the last General Assembly, was referred to the next Assembly.

Fifth: Dr. Lowrie, from the Committee on Overtures, presented a report in answer to the memorial of the Convention from which the following paragraph is an extract:

"As the General Assembly, at its present session, has considered substantially the matters embraced in said memorial, and expressed by its action its judgment, it is deemed unnecessary to suggest any additional measure for rebuking the spirit of rebellion against the authority of our highest court in a few sections of our church. The dissatisfaction and discontent consequent upon the deliverances of the Assembly of 1865 are abating with increased knowledge of the design and purport of those decisions, and it is confidently believed that maturer reflection will produce a fuller acquiescence in the authority of the church. It is alike the past and present purpose of our church, to preserve within its fold all who sincerely and earnestly love its order and doctrines, and to fan into life and energy every lingering spark of genuine attachment to our faith and order which may exist in those portions of our country where the spirit and unrelenting power of the rebellion drove many true and loyal Presbyterians into a hostile atti-

tude towards the church and country. With this enlarged and Christian view, it is appropriate to declare, that whilst the testimonies and authority of our church are to be obeyed, the fullest Christian liberty of opinion is tolerated and protected, and no enforcement of the deliverances of our church is expected or demanded—except that which will debar from our communion and church courts all those who refuse to submit to the 'powers that be,' and remain in wilful antagonism to the manifestations of God's providence, and the authoritative decisions of our church."

Every attentive reader of the minutes and reported debates of the last Assembly must be aware that in all that concerns the action of the Assembly in regard to the Presbytery of Louisville and its Commissioners, there are three distinct points for consideration. First, had the Assembly the constitutional right to exclude these Commissioners from a seat in the Assembly until their case was decided; and had it the right to dissolve that Presbytery as was proposed by the Committee; or to dissolve other Presbyteries on the contingency provided for in the paper of Dr. Gurley, which was finally adopted? The second question is, assuming that the Assembly had the right to do what it did, was there any sufficient reason for its action? Did the Presbytery of Louisville merit exclusion from the Assembly? The third question relates to the manner in which these things were done. There may be a right and wrong, a kind or unkind, a fair or unfair way of doing what in itself is just and proper.

The first of these questions alone has any permanent importance. It is comparatively a small matter that a court should inflict an unduly severe penalty; or that the judge should be harsh and overbearing in his spirit and manner, provided he has the law on his side. It was not the hardship to Dred Scott, as a man, or any want of courtesy on the part of the Supreme Court, that caused its decision in that case to shake the country like an earthquake. It was that the decision itself was in conflict with the long-cherished and settled convictions of the people as to what was the true law of the land. As to the first of the three questions proposed for consideration, it may

be remarked that there are three different theories as to the nature of our Presbyterian system; all of which were advanced on the floor of the late Assembly, and each of which controlled the opinions and votes of those who adopted it.

The first is derived very much (as it seems to us) from an assumed analogy between the constitution of the United States and that of the church. In our national and state governments, the constitution is a grant of powers. Congress has no power which is not specified in the constitution; all others are expressly reserved to the states or to the people. In like manner, as many assume, the Presbyteries are the source of power in the church. The Assembly has no power not expressly granted by the Presbyteries in the constitution. And hence the demand was so frequently and earnestly made for a reference to chapter and section, where the power to exclude Commissioners, or to act immediately on a Presbytery, was granted.

The second theory goes to the opposite extreme. It assumes that the Assembly is the source of power to the other courts. Having all church-power in itself, it has delegated a certain portion of its fulness to Synods, Presbyteries, and Sessions. This was the doctrine for which the authority of Chief Justice Gibson, and of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was quoted, especially by Hon. Mr. Galloway. A much higher authority might have been derived from the Church of Scotland.

The third view is that which, we presume, is held by the great body of Presbyterians. It assumes, 1. That all church power is derived from Christ and conveyed in his word, and by his Spirit. 2. That this power belongs to the whole church, not to the clergy to the exclusion of the people, nor to the people to the exclusion of the clergy. 3. That it inheres in the church, as the body of Christ, and, by his appointment, is to be exercised through certain office-bearers, who act as its representatives and organs. 4. These office-bearers are selected, qualified, and called by the Holy Spirit. 5. It is the function of the church to authenticate this call of the Spirit, and to certify it as its judgment, to the people. This is done in ordination. 6. The office-bearers of a church, therefore, are that church, *i. e.*, they are authorized and empowered, in the name and behalf of the church to exercise all the power which Christ has given

it for edification. Hence the session of an individual church is authorized to do whatever an individual church may do, in the reception of members, in the exercise of discipline, and in the instruction and spiritual nurture of the people. So the Presbytery is vested with the power of the church within its limits. It is the representative, organ, and agent of the collective body of Christ's people included within its ecclesiastical limits. The same is true of Synods, Assemblies, or other general councils. These church courts in no case derive their powers from the constitution. They possessed them before the constitution was framed, and would continue to possess them although it was entirely abolished. A number of Christians organizing themselves into a church, and electing church officers, would of course have the power which Christ has given to his church; the power to judge of the qualifications of candidates for admission to Christian ordinances; to exercise discipline, and to provide for the edification of the people. The Presbytery has, in like manner, independently of any written or human constitution, all the power which Christ has given to a Presbytery,—the right to ordain, the right to suspend and depose from the sacred ministry; and the right to exercise all the functions of a church within its own limits. The constitution is only a treaty, or a set of stipulations, as to how these several church courts shall exercise the powers which they derive from Christ. The Presbytery, for example, has the right to ordain, but it has agreed with other Presbyteries not to ordain any candidate who has not received a classical education. That is, as the Scriptures require that a minister must be apt to teach, the Presbyteries have bound themselves to regard a liberal education as one evidence that the candidate possesses that qualification. Again, the Bible requires that a minister should be sound in the faith, able to resist gainsayers; the Presbyteries have agreed to make the sincere adoption of the system of doctrine taught in the Westminster Confession a test of such soundness. The constitution therefore, instead of being a grant of powers, is a limitation of them, so far as their exercise is concerned. It ties the hands of all the church courts, and prevents their doing many things which otherwise they would have a perfect right to do. All this is reasonable and just. It is necessary to

secure harmony, peace, and purity. If one Presbytery assumed one standard of ability to teach, or soundness in the faith, and another another; the utmost confusion and conflict would be produced. Besides, a minister ordained by one Presbytery becomes a minister of the whole church, and exercises in the higher courts a jurisdiction over the whole body. The whole body, therefore, has an interest in his being suitably qualified, and a right to a voice in securing that end.

According to this theory every church court has within its limits all church power. The power of presbyters is given to presbyters, inheres in them, and is not delegated to them. It can be exercised by them, whenever they are properly associated and organized for the exercise of their functions. A commander-in-chief of an army can command a regiment or a company. In cases of emergency he does assume such command. It is only on rare occasions that this is either expedient or possible. He has too much to do, to allow of his taking into his own hands the duties of his subordinates. In the state, the care of children is properly left to their own parents. But in the case of orphans, or when the parents are untrustworthy, the courts interfere, and the children become wards in chancery. The court performs toward them the duty of parents. Our General Assembly has examined a minister on his knowledge of experimental religion, and his qualifications for the sacred office, and received him as a minister of the Presbyterian Church, in good standing. Of course the cases are extremely rare in which the higher courts are justified in assuming the functions of the lower bodies, but, so far as the power to do so is concerned, we do not see how it can be questioned. If three presbyters have from God the right to ordain or depose, why should not three hundred have the same power? Our church in the early period of its history uniformly acted on this principle. When the original Presbytery passed into a Synod, the Synod continued to exercise presbyterial powers, in appointing commissions to license, to ordain, to visit churches, and to adjust difficulties.

Such being the nature of the power of our church courts, it is necessary to consider its limitations. The power of all our courts is limited in three ways: First, it extends only to things

ecclesiastical, to the exclusion of secular affairs. Secondly, it is limited by the constitution. Thirdly, it is limited by the word of God.

1. The church has authority only in matters pertaining to religion. It is organized and endowed by her Head with certain prerogatives in order to secure the propagation and preservation of the gospel, the purity and edification of the body of Christ. If Congress should pass laws to regulate the religion of the country, they would be a dead letter. If church courts transcend their limits, and undertake to decide questions pertaining to the state and its civil tribunals, their decisions have no binding force. The church cannot regulate the tariff, or establish banks, or make all her members democrats or republicans, or interpret the constitution of the Union or of the States. Should it at any time attempt to legislate on these subjects, the people would regard their action with the same feeling they would the acts of Congress assuming to regulate the faith of the church. As to this point there can be no difference of opinion.

2. In the second place, it is equally plain that an unconstitutional law is void *ab initio*. It is no law. It is not obligatory on any person or upon any organization. If a man refuses to obey a law of Congress or of the States, which the courts pronounce unconstitutional, he is held harmless. His disobedience is justified. This is an important safeguard in church and state. As our constitution establishes certain fixed principles and rules, and limits the authority of all our courts, even the highest, any enactment or requisition inconsistent with its prescriptions, may be, and should be, disregarded. There is not a Presbytery in the land which would give heed to any Assembly which should forbid them to ordain a candidate unless he had passed through a full three-years course in some Theological Seminary. The constitution also prescribes the terms of Christian and ministerial communion, and these can only be altered by altering the constitution. This is the principle which is enunciated in our Book, when it says, that no constitutional or standing rule shall be considered binding, until it has been remitted to the Presbyteries and received their sanction. That is, the General Assembly cannot alter the constitution, or give binding force to anything inconsistent with it. This is perfectly consistent with the recognition of

the authority of the Assembly to "law down rules," within the limits of the constitution. The laws of Congress bind the people, if constitutional; so the acts of the Assembly are binding under the same conditions.

3. The third limitation is that imposed by the word of God. That anything contrary to the Scriptures can bind the conscience of any man, or be rightfully imposed upon him as a rule of faith or practice, no Protestant will for a moment admit. If all the ecclesiastical bodies in the world should pronounce that true, which God declares to be false; or that right, which He pronounces to be wrong, their declarations would not have the weight of a feather. No law of man can make that sin which is no sin, or that virtue which is not virtue. Should the Assembly decree that eating meat, drinking wine, using tobacco, or holding slaves, is sinful and a bar to Christian communion, if the word of God teaches the contrary, its decrees would bind his people no more than the decrees of Congress enjoining the worship of images or the adoration of the host. Here again, beyond question, we are on common ground.

Another great principle of our common Protestant Presbyterianism is the right of private judgment. It was said on the floor of the Assembly, in the warmth of debate, that the deliverances, acts, or injunctions, of that body, are to be assumed to be within the sphere of church-power, to be constitutional, and consistent with the word of God, and obeyed as such, until by competent authority the contrary is officially declared. This is the denial of the first principles of Christian liberty, whether civil or religious. Every man has not only the right to judge for himself on all these points, but is bound by his allegiance to God to claim and exercise it. The Bible teaches, and all Protestants believe, that the Spirit is promised and given as a teacher, not exclusively to the clergy but to all the people of God. Therefore, every Christian is bound to search the Scriptures, and to judge for himself whether the things decreed or commanded are consistent with that standard. Thus the early Christians acted when they refused to obey the constituted authorities of the Jewish church. Thus afterwards, although the Bible enjoined upon them to be obedient to the powers that be; yet, when the Roman magistrates re-

quired them to burn incense to idols, they resisted unto death. There had been no Reformation, had not God taught and enabled his people to assert this right of private judgment. Episcopacy would have been established in Scotland, and despotism in England, had not our Presbyterian and Puritan ancestors been men enough to claim and exercise the right to think for themselves, and to obey God rather than man. This right is recognized in the state. No man is bound to obey an unconstitutional law. If he errs in his judgment, and pronounces that to be unconstitutional, which is in fact legitimate, he must bear the penalty of disobedience. And so it is in the church. If an individual, or Presbytery, refuses to obey an injunction of the Assembly, from the conscientious conviction that it is contrary to the constitution or the word of God, he or it may be arraigned for disobedience, and condemned or justified according to the judgment of a competent court; for one Assembly is not bound by the decision of its predecessors; and may, therefore, justify disobedience to any of their injunctions, which it deems erroneous. On this right of private judgment we must all be agreed. Dr. Thomas and other leaders of the majority in the late Assembly repeatedly and expressly stated that former Assemblies had frequently made deliverances which they deemed to be contrary to the word of God. Of course they did not, and could not adopt them; nor could they require others to approve them, without demanding that men should approve what they believed God condemned. The deliverances of the Assembly, therefore, by common consent, bind the people and lower courts only when they are consistent with the constitution and the Scriptures, and of that consistency every man may and must judge, as he has to render an account to God.

Such, as we believe, are the principles in which nine-tenths of our ministers and members will concur. It follows from these principles that the General Assembly, unless expressly prohibited by the constitution, can exercise, when the emergency demands it, its power to correct abuses or evils, immediately in any part of the church. It has the right, on its responsibility to God, to refuse seats to delegates, or to dissolve any of the lower courts, if the safety or well being of the church

requires it. This follows from the scriptural principle of representation. Under the Old Testament, by the appointment of God, the elders of a tribe were the tribe; and the elders of the congregation were the congregation, and could act as such. Under the New Testament dispensation, the elders of the church, in council assembled, are the church. The elders of a particular church are that church, and the delegated elders of the whole church are the whole church, and are clothed with all church power, under the important limitations above specified.

In the second place, the right in question, and specially to exclude delegates, flows from the very nature of the Assembly as a court of Christ. It is a body of men duly appointed, consisting of those who recognize the Headship of Christ, the infallible authority of His word, and the Presbyterian system of doctrine and order. If any men present themselves as Commissioners, who openly and avowedly declare them no Christians, or no Presbyterians, it is plain that the Assembly should be bound to reject them. The avowal may be so explicit and public, made *viva voce* or over their written signatures, as to preclude the need of examination or proof. If any Presbytery should make an official declaration of Socinianism, and that declaration be signed by its Commissioners, published to the world, and circulated through the Assembly, we presume no one would deny that that body would be bound to say to those Commissioners, "you do not belong to the class of persons of whom, according to the Scriptures and the constitution of the church, this court is to be constituted." If there be any doubt as to the facts, those ought to be cleared up. But if the facts are beyond question, then the right and duty of the Assembly is immediate and imperative. It is said that it is contrary to natural justice that any man should be condemned unheard. But, in the first place, in the case supposed there is properly no condemnation, at least in the judicial sense of the term. The effect of the exclusion is not to depose, or even to suspend the parties from their office as ministers or elders, but simply, as it were, to arrest them and to remit them to the proper tribunal for trial. In the second place, a man cannot be said to be condemned without a hearing, who is condemned,

(or rather arrested), out of his own mouth, for his own declaration made *in præsenti.*

In the third place, this right is analogous to the right of expulsion. If a man should rise in the Assembly and blaspheme, he may immediately be expelled. There would be no need of a trial or an examination. And fourthly, this right of peremptory and immediate action is the right of self-preservation, which belongs to all bodies and associations. It is exercised by all legislative assemblies. Congress may rightfully exclude any avowed traitor from taking his seat in the council of the nation. Every judge has the right to protect the sanctuary of justice by immediately committing to prison any one who violates its dignity. General Sheridan, in the last battles before Richmond, deprived General Warren of his command on the field, and sent him to the rear. This was a tremendous punishment inflicted without a hearing. It may have been an act of cruelty or injustice, but the right thus to act cannot be questioned. General Washington did the same thing in the case of General Lee in the battle of Monmouth.

These remarks are all applicable to the case of dissolving a Presbytery. Should any such body make a declaration of Socinianism, or avow themselves to be infidels, the Assembly would not be bound to leave the people six months under the instruction and government of such open apostates. It would be its duty, in virtue of its charge of all the churches, immediately to dissolve the body, and deprive its members of all ecclesiastical power.

The views here expressed of the inherent power of our church courts, and especially of the General Assembly, were presented and defended at length in the pages of this *Review* for July, 1838, pp. 464—490. It was then shown: 1. That our church, from the first, adopted the standards of the Church of Scotland, both as to faith and form of government. 2. That in Scotland, so far from the Assembly being the creature of the Presbyteries and deriving its powers from them, it existed before the Presbyteries, and governed the church for years before any Presbytery was organized. It was the Assembly that formed first the Synods, and then the Presbyteries. 3. That the General Assembly in Scotland had from the begin-

ning acted as the governing body of the whole church, exercising, whenever it saw fit, original jurisdiction; acting directly on the Presbyteries, and individual ministers, citing, trying, condemning or acquitting them, as it deemed right; transferring pastors from one parish to another without the intervention of any of the lower courts; and, in short, exercising a general and immediate jurisdiction over the whole church. On this head we quoted from *Hill's Institutes*, the highest modern authority on the discipline and government of the Scottish Church, the following passage. After stating that the powers of the General Assembly are judicial, legislative, and executive, Dr. Hill says: "In the exercise of these powers, the General Assembly often issues peremptory mandates, summoning individuals and inferior courts to appear at its bar. It sends precise orders to particular judicatories, directing, assisting, or restraining them in the exercise of their functions, and its superintending, controlling authority, maintains soundness of doctrine, checks irregularity, and enforces general laws throughout all districts of the church." 4. That our *Confession of Faith* itself teaches, chap. xxxi. 2, that, "It belongeth to Synods and Councils, ministerially, to determine controversies of faith, and cases of conscience; to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and government of his church," &c. And that "the decrees and determinations of such councils, if consonant to the word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission, not only for their agreement with the word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereunto in his word." It is here taught not only what the power of church courts is, but also that it is from God, and not conferred by men. 5. Pages of that article of our *Review* are filled with citations from our records to show that the original Synod of Philadelphia, the United Synods of New York and Philadelphia, and the General Assembly, have uniformly acted as courts of original jurisdiction; acting immediately on individuals, sessions, and Presbyteries, and that the Assembly has ever assumed that it had the power to correct abuses, by the immediate exercise of its authority, when necessity required, in any part of the church. We cannot, therefore,

agree with those who denied the right of the General Assembly to exclude the Commissioners of the Presbytery of Louisville, or to dissolve the Presbytery itself. It is to be remembered, however, that the effect of dissolving a Presbytery, is not, as some of the speakers seemed to suppose, to suspend or to depose its members. It merely dissolves the bond which unites them as a church court. They might be attached to other Presbyteries, or disposed of as the Assembly saw fit.

We are aware that in answer to a protest of the New-school party, against the abrogation of the Plan of Union between Presbyterians and Congregationalists, the writers of that answer take different ground from that assumed above. They say: "1. The constitution of the Presbyterian Church, like that of our National Union, is a constitution of specific powers, granted by the Presbyteries, the fountains of power, to the Synods and General Assembly. 2. No powers not specifically granted can lawfully be inferred and assumed by the General Assembly, but only such as are indispensably necessary to carry into effect those specifically granted." On this it may be remarked: 1. That every one is aware that the Assembly is in the habit of appointing one or more persons to answer protests, who present their own particular views. It would be unfair to hold the Assembly responsible for the soundness of every argument which they may see fit to use. 2. The theory, the opposite to that assumed in this answer, was the basis of the whole action of the Assemblies of 1837 and 1838, and was constantly avowed in the debates. 3. Admitting that the Assembly of 1837 did commit itself to this false theory, that would have little weight against the uniform teaching and action of the Presbyterian Church, both in Scotland and in this country, in all periods of its history.

If it be acknowledged that the Assembly had the right to do what it did, the second question to be considered, is, was there any adequate ground for the exclusion of the Commissioners from the Louisville Presbytery, or for ordering the dissolution of every Presbytery who should admit any of the signers of the Declaration and Testimony. On this question every man has a right to his own opinion. For ourselves we think there was no adequate reason for such action. 1. Because the penalty

was unduly severe. It is among the heaviest within the power of the Assembly to inflict, and, therefore, should be reserved for extreme cases. 2. There was no important object to be gained. The church would not have been endangered in any of its important interests by the adoption of a milder course. 3. The Assembly itself virtually admitted that signing the Declaration and Testimony was not a sufficient reason for exclusion from our church courts. It allowed those who had signed it, and who openly avowed in the presence of the Assembly, their continued adhesion to it, to retain their seats to the end of the sessions. Yet it ordered that any Presbytery who should admit one of those signers, should be *ipso facto* dissolved for doing what the Assembly itself had done. 4. This action instead of tending to allay strife and division in the Border States, had a directly opposite tendency, and therefore was so earnestly deprecated by some of the wisest and best men of the church. 5. It places, or would place, if carried out, many ministers and churches in anomalous position, and put in jeopardy important interests. The dissolution of a Presbytery, as before remarked, does not suspend or depose its ministers, or separate them from the Presbyterian Church, or vacate their pulpits. Without further action it only throws all things into confusion.

These reasons however afford no justification of disobedience to the orders of the Assembly. A law is binding although severe or unwise. So the orders of the Assembly are binding, unless they transcend the sphere of church power, or are contrary to the constitution, or to the word of God.

As to the third question, which concerns the mode adopted to secure the ends aimed at, we believe, from all we can learn, there is little difference of opinion. The leaders of the majority themselves deprecated the action of Dr. McLean, which, for some reason they felt constrained to adopt. That a member should rise in his place, propose the exclusion of the members of a Presbytery, make a speech in favour of his motion, and then move the previous question, and thus prevent any other member from stating his objections to the motion, or his reasons for preferring a different course, was certainly a most extraordinary proceeding. And then the motion to refer the case of

the Presbytery of Louisville to a committee of the House, thus taking it out of the hands of the judicial committee, where it already was on the appeal of Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, was irregular and unnecessary. It prevented the matter from coming up in the way which had been designed, and which would have secured a fair hearing of all parties, and a calm judicial decision.

In looking back over the proceedings of the Assembly, there is much for which the church should be thankful, and much which promises great good in the future.

In the first place, the Assembly recognized the right of protest and of free discussion, as belonging not only to its own members, but to all the members and ministers of the church. This was declared to be the birthright of Presbyterians. It was called a sacred right, with which the Assembly disclaimed all intention of interfering. The right of protest, as it has always been exercised, includes the right of dissenting from the deliverances and judgments of church courts, on the ground of their being unwise, unjust, unconstitutional, or unscriptural. It includes the right to make all proper efforts of proving the correctness of the grounds of objection, and to bring their brethren to agree with them.

Secondly: The Assembly recognized the principle that adhesion to its deliverances and judgment cannot be made a condition of Christian or ministerial communion. It would be a contradiction to allow of protest against a deliverance, and then demand approbation of it as a condition of membership in the church or ministry. Should the Assembly declare that the holding of slaves is not a sin, or a bar to Christian communion, and allow Dr. Thomas and others to protest against such declaration as unscriptural, could it then require him to approve and act upon it on pain of exclusion from the church? The judicial decisions of the Assembly are of course final, and must be submitted to, until the penalty be removed by a subsequent Assembly. Its orders and injunctions are to be respected in all cases, and obeyed, unless believed to be contrary to the constitution and the word of God. If an individual be arraigned for such disobedience, and the church courts, including the Assembly, censure him for the offence, he would have meekly to submit to

the infliction, (as the Quakers do for refusing to obey the military laws), or leave the church. It is plain that the Assembly recognized these principles when it adopted the papers proposed by Dr. Gurley and Dr. J. C. Lowrie. The former expressly recognized the right of those who are not able to subscribe to the testimonies of the Assembly of 1865, or to carry out its injunctions, to remain undisturbed in the church, provided they do not engage in movements defiant of the Assembly, and which lead to schism. The other paper does substantially the same thing. The Assembly has always acted on this principle in case of conscientious dissent from its testimonies, or failure to obey its injunctions. The abolitionists who openly repudiated the deliverance of the Assembly of 1845, and refused to act upon it in the exercise of discipline, were left to enjoy their constitutional liberty. That is, the Assembly avows its purpose of acting on the common sense principle adopted by every constitutional government. The state allows the people to think and say what they please about its laws, and to disobey them for conscience' sake, provided they do not disturb the public peace, and quietly submit to the penalty of disobedience, when judged to be without sufficient cause.

Thirdly: The doctrine taught by this Assembly respecting schism, is the scriptural doctrine on that subject, as it has ever been held in our church. Schism is separation from the church without adequate cause. It is a breach of Christian fellowship and subjection, enjoined by Christ on his people. This has ever been regarded as a great sin. No man is justifiable in thus breaking up the unity of the church, unless he is required to profess or to do something which the Bible condemns as false or wrong; or unless he is prohibited from professing or doing what the Bible commands. We, as Presbyterians, are required to profess and teach nothing but what is contained in our doctrinal standards, and we are required to do nothing but to conform to the form of government and discipline which we have voluntarily adopted. It would be a sad thing if the Union of the United States should be dissolved because Congress should enact an unjust tariff, or an unconstitutional bank-law, and it would be equally grievous if the church were to be rent asunder every time the General Assembly should, in the

judgment of a portion of its members, err in their testimony or injunctions.

Fourth: This Assembly teaches the scriptural doctrine concerning slavery. It distinctly asserts that slaveholding is not a sin or a bar to Christian communion. This it does in two ways: First, by declaring that the recent testimonies on this subject are not to be understood in any sense inconsistent with the former deliverances of the church. But, in 1845, the scriptural doctrine on this subject was not only distinctly stated, but elaborately sustained. The Assembly declares that it still adheres to that deliverance, and virtually reiterates it. Secondly, by saying that the errors intended to be denounced, the renunciation of which was insisted upon, were, 1. That slavery is a divine institution, "in the same category with marriage and civil government," (and therefore to be perpetuated and extended)—and, 2. That it is the mission of the church to conserve the institution. These declarations of the Assembly are contained in the paper offered by Dr. Krebs and in the Pastoral Letter.

Fifth: The Assembly takes scriptural and liberal ground on the subject of Christian union. It declares that it is desirous of retaining, or receiving into the church, all who sincerely adopt our standards of doctrine and government, who adhere to the testimony of the church, as just explained by the Assembly, and are willing to submit to its legitimate authority, that is, who are not schismatical in their spirit and measures. These principles are, in the paper presented by Dr. J. T. Smith, specially applied to the Southern churches. With regard to whom the Assembly says that it "greatly deplores the continued separation between ourselves and our Southern brethren, so long united in the bonds of Christian love and ecclesiastical fellowship; and expresses the earnest desire that the way may be soon opened for a reunion on the basis of our common standards, and on terms consistent with truth and righteousness."

In view of these declarations, it is the obvious duty of every minister and member of our church to labour to allay all further alienation and strife. We have here a platform, broad, scriptural, and just, on which the whole church, north, south, east, and west, may unite.

The two General Assemblies meeting at the same time in St. Louis, gave occasion to friendly intercourse between the two bodies. Messages of kind greeting were interchanged, and they united in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. All this met, and will meet, with general approbation, as tending to the promotion of Christian fellowship. Rev. Dr. Nelson appeared in our Assembly, and made a conciliatory and eloquent address. In his reply, Dr. Stanton, as Moderator, reciprocated the assurances of brotherly regard, and expressed himself as decidedly in favour of a closer union between the two bodies. He was understood to intimate that the principal causes of separation had been pro-slavery tendencies on the part of the Old-school, and laxness in matters of order on the part of the New-school. We are not sure that this was the meaning of the Moderator, although he was so understood by many of his hearers.

There cannot be a greater historical error, nor a more injurious imputation on the Old-school Church, than to insinuate that a zeal or tenderness about slavery was the motive which guided its action in 1837 and 1838. There is not a word about slavery in the Act and Testimony, nor in the proceedings of her convention, which sat in 1837 alongside of the Assembly; nor in any of the official documents on either side relating to the separation, nor in the debates which occupied the time of the House. To suppose that such men as Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, the early and faithful advocate of emancipation in Kentucky; the venerable Dr. Elliot of Pittsburgh; the late Dr. Green of Philadelphia, one of the authors of the testimony against slavery, adopted in 1818, and the whole Old-school body, especially the whole Synod of Pittsburgh, then regarded as the backbone of the church; to suppose, we say, that such men, while professing zeal for doctrine and order, were really influenced by a desire to protect slavery, is to suppose them to be hypocritical and dishonest—a set of false-pretenders. We have no idea that Dr. Stanton intended any such imputation, although his speech, unfortunately, is adapted to give some countenance to this slander, which has been frequently uttered by the more reckless among the enemies of our church. The avowed and real causes of separation were: 1. That while the Old-school insisted

on the cordial adoption of the system of doctrine taught in our standard, as the condition of ministerial communion; the New-school maintained that all that was required was the adoption of "the fundamental doctrines of religion." On this ground it was notorious that they freely received and ordained, as ministers, men who denied many of the distinctive principles of our system; that is, the principles which distinguish the doctrine of the Reformed Church from Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Arminianism. 2. The other cause of separation was, that the New-school received Congregational churches and ministers into organic union with our body; allowing men who had never adopted our standards, and who refused to adopt them, to sit in all our church courts and administer the discipline and government of the church. If these causes still exist, then the union of the two bodies would involve, on our part, an utter dereliction of principle. It would be a surrender at discretion. It would be an acknowledgment that we had been either false or misguided in all that was done, in effecting the deliverance of the church; or it would evince that we ourselves had apostatized from the faith of our fathers, and were willing to sacrifice our faith for unworthy ends. It would also be a grievous breach of trust, and would forfeit morally, if not legally, our title to the endowments of all our institutions. These endowments were given to a body holding the distinctive principles of the Old-school, and because it held them. In many cases, and those involving the largest benefactions, the money was given to the Old-school body as such, and is forfeited if it loses its distinctive character.

If the causes above specified have ceased to exist, then, there is no valid objection to the union of the two Assemblies. We believe, however, that they exist now in all their original force. The principle of lax interpretation of the Confession of Faith has of late years been all but officially avowed by the New-school. This was done in the *History of the Presbyterian Church*, recently set forth by their Publication Committee. The organ of their church in Philadelphia, says, if the union takes place, it must be on the principles of "*liberal* Presbyterianism." We know what liberal Christianity means, and it is not hard to understand what is meant by "liberal Presby-

terianism." It is no less notorious that the New-school has never taken official action against union with Congregationalists. There are Presbyteries in their connection with scarcely a single Presbyterian church within their limits. While, therefore, we believe that there are many sound Presbyterians in the New-school body, with whom we should rejoice to be united, we are persuaded that the great body, at least of the older members of our church, would regard an organic union of the two Assemblies as a great calamity, and as a great sin against our own principles. The principal danger on this subject arises from the fact that the separation between the Old and New-school occurred nearly thirty years ago; and consequently, a great part of our younger brethren are ignorant of its causes and necessity, and are, therefore, not prepared to estimate the gravity of the interests at stake.

This subject was brought before the Assembly in several overtures, which were referred to the appropriate committee, who reported the following resolutions, which were adopted:

Resolved, 1. This Assembly expresses its fraternal affection for the other branch of the Presbyterian Church, and its earnest desire for re-union at the earliest time consistent with agreement in doctrine, order, and polity, on the basis of a common standard and the prevalence of mutual confidence and love, which are so necessary to a happy union and to the permanent peace and prosperity of the united church.

Resolved, 2. That it be recommended to all churches and church courts, and to all ministers, ruling elders, and communicants, to cherish fraternal feelings, to cultivate Christian intercourse in the worship of God and in the promotion of the cause of Christ, and to avoid all needless controversies and contentions.

Resolved, 3. That a committee of nine (9) ministers and six (6) ruling elders be appointed, provided that a similar committee be appointed by the other Assembly now in session in this city, for the purpose of conferring in regard to the desirableness and practicability of re-union; and if, after conference and inquiry, such decision shall seem to be desirable and practicable, to suggest suitable measures for its accomplishment, and report to the next General Assembly.

The following committee was appointed by the Moderator:

Ministers.

J. M. Krebs, D. D., Synod of New York.
C. C. Beatty, D. D., Synod of Wheeling.
J. T. Backus, D. D., Synod of Albany.
P. D. Gurley, D. D., Synod of Baltimore.
J. G. Monfort, D. D., Synod of Cincinnati.
W. D. Howard, D. D., Synod of Pittsburgh.
W. E. Schenck, D. D., Synod of Philadelphia.
Villeroy D. Reed, D. D., Synod of New Jersey.
F. T. Brown, D. D., Synod of Chicago.

Elders.

James M. Ray, Synod of Northern Indiana.
Robert McKnight, Synod of Allegheny.
Sam'l Galloway, Synod of Ohio.
H. K. Clarke, Synod of Sandusky.
Geo. P. Strong, Synod of Missouri.
Prof. Ormond Beatty, Synod of Kentucky.

The Hymnal.

The committee to whom had been assigned the preparation of a new Hymn Book, notwithstanding the amount of adverse criticism they have encountered, succeeded in getting their work sanctioned, and authorized to be used in the churches. It has, however, been referred to an enlarged committee, to be modified and increased in size. While it is impossible, in matters of taste, to please everybody, we gather from what has been of late written on the subject, that there are certain points in which there is a general agreement: 1. We should have but one book,—the use of two or more is inconvenient, awkward, and expensive. 2. Whatever may be said on general principles, it is a historical fact, not to be ignored, that the Presbyterian Church, in Great Britain and America, is addicted to the worship of God in the use of the Psalms of the Old Testament. Their omission from a book designed for general use does violence to all our traditions and to the spirit of our church. There should be at least one metrical version of every Psalm. 3. It is to be remembered that singing in the sanctuary

is an act of worship. Didactic, exhortatory, or sentimental prayers are admitted to be offensive and unedifying. Hymns of like character are equally objectionable in public worship. 4. Hymns for children are as much out of place for a book designed for the sanctuary, as nursery prayers in a liturgy. 5. The mutilation or alteration of hymns should be avoided. The pastor can select the portions of a hymn he desires to be sung. It is commonly unnecessary thus to change an author's productions. Such changes are almost always for the worse; and often do violence to the cherished associations of the people, who are attached to the hymns in the form with which they are familiar. The thanks of the church are due to the committee for the labour, taste, and talent, exercised in the production of the new book. We hope they may be able so to modify it as to give general, if not universal, satisfaction.

SHORT NOTICES.

Presbyterian Historical Almanac and Annual Remembrancer of the Church, for 1865. By Joseph M. Wilson. Vol. VII. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. Pp. 406.

This work has an established reputation. It is a condensed record of matters of interest to the whole body of Presbyterians. It will be found of great practical value; a storehouse of information to ministers and people.

Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Fourth Series. Vol. VII. *Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Gospel of St. John.* Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1865, pp. 541.

This Foreign Theological Library, of the Messrs. Clark, renders accessible to English readers almost all the important evangelical modern works of Germany. In this country the successive volumes can generally be procured of Messrs. Smith & English, of Philadelphia. This Commentary of Dr. Hengstenberg, on the Gospel of St. John, although probably not equal to some of his other works, is full of valuable information and fertile suggestions.

Commentary on Joshua, Judges, and Ruth. By C. F. Keil, D.D., and F. Delitzsch, D.D., pp. 494.

This is another volume from the same press, and belonging to the same series. It is the production of two of the most eminent living scholars and divines of Germany. Although a complete work in itself, it forms part of a commentary on the Old Testament, which these distinguished men have in the course of preparation.

An Exposition of the First Epistle of John. By James Morgan, D.D. Belfast, Author of the "Scriptural Testimony to the Holy Spirit." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1866, pp. 528.

Dr. Morgan has been for thirty-seven years pastor of one church in Belfast, Ireland. He tells us he has prepared this Exposition of the Epistle of John, the principal topic of which is "brotherly love," as a memorial of the peace and harmony which has so long prevailed among his people. The work consists of a course of lectures exegetical, doctrinal, and practical, on the whole epistle. It is distinguished by soundness, piety, and excellent judgment, and will doubtless prove acceptable and useful to a large class of readers.

Commentary on the Gospels of Luke and John. By Rev. Dr. Wheden, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Carlton & Porter. Pp. 422.

It is a matter of gratulation that so many distinguished men, of all denominations, are turning their attention to the preparation of commentaries on the Holy Scriptures. This volume forms part of a work, now in progress, designed to embrace all the books of the New Testament, and ultimately those also of the Old Testament. It is written in a clear, terse, and forcible style. There is very little waste of words. The expositions are concise, to the point, and evangelical and edifying. It bids fair to be a very valuable work.

Prophecy viewed in respect to its Distinctive Nature, Special Function, and Proper Interpretation. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow; Author of "Typology of Scripture," "Ezekiel and the Book of his Prophecy." New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry Street. 1866. Pp. 524.

Prophecy is now exposed to two principal perverting influences. The spirit of Rationalism strives to disprove or explain away its supernatural character, and Literalism to interpret it so as to favour the introduction of Judaism, both by weakening or destroying the argument from prophecy, in proof of the Messiahship of Jesus of Nazareth, and by representing the future of Christ's kingdom as little more than the realization of the Jewish idea on that subject. The book of Dr. Fairbairn will be received with great interest. The importance and the difficulty of the subject, the high character of the author, and the special adaptation of his work to the state of the times, must secure for it a general and cordial welcome.

Giant Cities of Bashan; and Syria's Holy Places. By Rev. J. L. Porter, A. M., author of "Five Years in Damascus," &c. New York: T. Nelson & Sons, 137 Grand Street. 1866. Pp. 377.

Bashan, which fell to the portion of the half-tribe of Manasseh, has been less frequently explored than most other of the countries belonging to the ancient Jews. In many of its features, it is, perhaps, more remarkable than any of them. This book, not merely of travel, but of description and research, presents to the general reader a very instructive and important account of its characteristics and antiquities.

The Emphatic Diaglott: Containing the Original Text of the New Testament, with an interlineary word for word English Translation; a New Emphatic Version, based on the Interlineary Translation, &c. By Benjamin Wilson. New York: Fowler & Wells, 389 Broadway. 1865.

The title page of this book is too long and minute for transcription. The book evinces a good deal of labour, being fur-

nished with various readings, references to parallel passages, and occasional critical or illustrative remarks. We cannot see the advantage of the interlinear translation, unless it be to give the English reader some idea of the Greek idiom. As a help to the student of Greek it can be of little importance. Every attempt, however, to induce people to study the Scriptures, especially in the form in which they came from the sacred writers, is to be regarded as a good work.

Life of Emanuel Swedenborg; together with a brief Synopsis of his Writings, both Philosophical and Theological. By William White. With an Introduction by B. F. Barrett. First American Edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866. Pp. 270.

Swedenborg has been called by his friends, "the most unknown," and "the best abused man in the world." If thus unknown, it must be because he is incomprehensible, for more lives and memoirs of the man, and expositions of his doctrine, have been published within the last five and twenty, or thirty years, than have been devoted to any other celebrity. This small, well-printed, and compact volume, may assist the public in gaining some knowledge of a very remarkable man, and of a system of doctrine which still evinces great vitality.

The Living Forces of the Universe. The Temple and the Worshippers. Know and Govern Thyself. By George W. Thompson. Philadelphia: Howard Challen. 1866. Pp. 358.

"Well knowing," says the author, "the tendency to degradation in vulgar, rude, animalistic, and human imaginates, and in a language which corresponds with and embodies them, and conscious of the necessities of pure ideas and of the proper dignity and exaltation which should accompany them, the latter have been adopted, and rather than lower these to the standard of a life which need all elements of purification and elevation, a Glossary of a few words not current among general readers, is added, with the hope that the work will be more widely useful and acceptable."

With all the help of the Glossary, we have to confess that we soon became lost in a fog of misty verbiage, to which even "vulgar, rude, animalistic, and human imaginates," if we could understand precisely what they are, might be preferable. By no effort of "intusception," or "discriminate injection of self into the object of cognition," could we comprehend the work, and we have therefore been obliged to abandon it as thoroughly "objectio-facient, *i. e.*, set over in independent or quasi independent entity."

It is the first duty of a writer on philosophical subjects to study clearness and simplicity in his language, and never to coin

a new word, when an old one will serve his purpose. The author by disregarding this obvious rule, has exposed himself not merely to misapprehension, but to ridicule, and to more perhaps than is deserved; for the evident seriousness and earnestness with which he writes, and the vigour and freshness of his conceptions, are worthy of a better style. Should the proposed continuation of the work have but the common merit of being intelligible, we will then be able to discuss its claims to be considered as a new philosophy with a new method, and whether its tendency will be for good or evil.

Life of Benjamin Silliman, M. D., LL.D., late Professor of Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Geology, in Yale College, chiefly from his Manuscript Reminiscences, Diaries, and Correspondence. By George P. Fisher, Professor in Yale College. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1866.

Professor Silliman was beyond all question one of the high men of his age and country. Few of his American contemporaries were so widely and favourably known, not only in the scientific world, but wherever elegant letters, brilliant oratory, with manhood, Christian excellence, graceful manners, social amenity, the dignity, courtesy, and courage of the true gentleman, united in rarest symmetry, are appreciated. His majestic form and radiant countenance not only made him, to the eye of the stranger, *facile princeps* in almost any group of men, however eminent, but they rendered his very presence a power and inspiration in all circles and assemblies, private and public, collegiate, scientific, social, and Christian. He was not, indeed, remarkable for original discovery, or for logical method. But his brilliant rhetoric, his intellectual quickness, activity, and perseverance; his enterprise and tact, his unfailing benevolence and suavity, enabled him to surpass all others in introducing modern science to the country, and exalting it in public estimation. Rarely has science, in any of its branches, enjoyed the advantage of such successful experiments, rich illustration, and fascinating eloquence. To have established the *Journal of Science*, and edited it with success until it was passed over to the able editorship of his son and son-in-law, under which it continues to flourish in the forty-eighth year of its existence, is an achievement possible only to an extraordinary man.

Professor Silliman, owing to the associations of birth, nurture, marriage, foreign travel, scientific and professional eminence, high position in Yale College, and as the organ of communication between scientific men and the public, through the pages of his journal, along with the personal qualities before mentioned, added to an extraordinary love and facility for letter-

writing, and the full continuance of his intellectual powers to the day of his death, at the age of eighty-five, had a prodigious extent and variety of significant correspondence on great subjects with great men, including many of the most illustrious of the present century in both hemispheres. He was withal wont to make and keep memoranda of all important events. Of these materials the two copious volumes before us are chiefly made up. They have been selected and put together with great good judgment and taste, by Prof. Fisher, whose comments and suggestions are exceedingly just and apposite. Altogether, few biographies have so much to charm and instruct, or are so thoroughly readable and permanently valuable. It would be easy to fill up an article with tempting extracts. We must, however, restrict ourselves to a few, and first of those which reflect his religious principles and Christian feelings.

Verging towards four-score years, he thus writes to a sceptical friend:

"*My Dear* ——: I cannot desert my Saviour—Him who spoke as never man spake, while he knew what was in man; who has paid my debt while I was bankrupt; and who sustained in my stead the penalties of a violated law. I cannot desert him, and repose my confidence in the visions of so-called mediums." Vol. ii. p. 254.

On retiring from the active labours of his professorship, at the ripe age of seventy-five years, he thus uttered his feelings:

"For myself, in the evening of my life, may I be every day ready to die, trusting in thy mercy through the Redeemer of men, and if power and opportunity to be useful are still continued to me, may I have a disposition as well as ability, to honour Thee and to benefit my fellow-men. For my salvation I depend entirely upon the Redeemer. In the sight of God I have no merits of my own, and feel deeply that, if I am saved, it will be of grace and not of works. I have none to offer that are worthy of Thine acceptance." Vol. ii. p. 235.

Writing to Dr. John Griscom, in 1851, he says: "There is no safety in any reliance except our Saviour. As we go on in life, he becomes more and more precious to us. He has paid our debt, and sustained the penalty of the law for us, and salvation through Him is a gift as free as it is all-sufficient and indispensable." P. 11.

Such delightful Christian outbreathings might be quoted almost indefinitely. But we hasten to quote from a generous and appreciative estimate of Professor Silliman by Professor Joseph Henry, (one of a vast number of celebrated men whose writings or sayings appear in these volumes,) a passage which

will explain to our readers some of the difficulties, and some of the defects of periodical journals, in a way which none can appreciate but those who conduct them.

"In reply to some remarks on an article of less scientific merit than the general standard of the journal, Professor Silliman once said to me, 'Could you see what I reject, and the amount of correspondence which such rejection involves, you would not be surprised that I occasionally suffer an article to appear not strictly in accordance with my own views. I try, however, to express disagreeable truths in language as little offensive as possible; to encourage beginners, and to elicit observations of natural phenomena, even from those who make no pretensions to science.'" P. 333.

We are glad of the opportunity to put in permanent record on our pages a deserved tribute to one whose early death alone prevented his attaining both a living and posthumous celebrity second to none of our great scientists—as also to his son, who so worthily bears his name, as the honoured head of the Institution which his father adorned. Professor Silliman made the following notes of what he styles a "Brief Residence at Princeton." Vol. i. pp. 109-10.

"At this celebrated seat of learning, an eminent gentleman, Dr. John Maclean, resided, as professor of chemistry, &c. I early attained an introduction to him by correspondence, and he favoured me with a list of books for the promotion of my studies. Among these were Chaptal's, Lavoisier's and Fourcroy's Chemistry, Scheele's Essays, Bergman's Works, Kirwan's Mineralogy, &c. I also passed a few days with Dr. Maclean in my different transits to and from Philadelphia, and obtained from him a general insight into my future occupation; inspected his library and apparatus, and obtained his advice regarding many things. Dr. Maclean was a man of brilliant mind, with all the acumen of his native Scotland; and a sprinkling of wit gave variety to his conversation. I regard him as my earliest master of chemistry, and Princeton as my first starting point in that pursuit; although I had not an opportunity to attend any lectures there. Mrs. Maclean was a lovely woman, and made my visits at the house very pleasant to me. She was a sister of Commodore Bainbridge, afterwards signalized by the capture of the British frigate *Java*, in the war of 1812–15. Mrs. Maclean gave me an introduction to the family of Commodore Bainbridge, in Philadelphia, in which I was an occasional visitor. Dr. Maclean, the President of Princeton College, at this time and for some years

past, is the worthy son of Professor Maclean, and does honour to his father and the institution over which he ably presides."

History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By John Anthony Froude, M. A., late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Vols. V., VI. New York: Charles Scribner & Company. 1866.

We have noticed with high appreciation the previous volumes of this great work as they have successively appeared. We know of no author who sheds so much light on English history, civil and ecclesiastical, as connected with the Protestant Reformation. The author's religious sympathies are not very certainly indicated. He is no Papist. How far he goes with evangelical Protestanism, in his personal convictions, sometimes appears questionable. But whatever they may be, they do not often swerve his mind from its severely impartial and judicial attitude. He brings much to light that was before unknown concerning this great historical era. He presents it in a clear, chaste, and graphic style. He strings together the sober facts of history in a narrative so vivid, and with descriptions so picturesque, as to enchain the reader with all the charms of a novel. His account of the trial, sentence, recantation, and death of Cranmer affords a fine specimen of all this. We cannot forbear noticing the admirable appearance, including the typography of the Riverside press, in which Scribner presents this and so many of his publications.

A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with Special Reference to Ministers and Students. By John Peter Lange, D. D., in connection with a number of eminent European Divines. Translated from the German, and edited with additions original and selected, by Philip Schaff, D. D., in connection with American Divines of various Evangelical Denominations. Vol. II., of the New Testament, containing the Gospel according to Mark, and the Gospel according to Luke. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

The great work of which the second volume is here presented to the public was described at length in an extended article in this journal in connection with the publication of the first volume.* To this we must refer our readers for a competent analysis of its contents and character. Its high value for the purposes indicated in the title-page is undeniable. The large sale of the first volume shows the high appreciation of it by our American divines and scholars. The few blemishes of German origin found in it, do not compare with its great and peerless excellence. These will be largely guarded against by the American editors and translators. It is no slight pledge of

*See *Princeton Review*, Oct. 1864, Art. IV.

this, that Dr. Shedd has superintended the translation and revision of Mark's Gospel, while Drs. Schaff and Starbuck have had the revision of that by Luke, which is the work of a very sound Dutch divine and scholar, Dr. Oosterzee, of Utrecht.

Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church, Part II., from Samuel to the Captivity. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D. D., Dean of Westminster. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866. [*Published by arrangement with the author.*]

In this large and solid volume the publisher treats us to another specimen of the luxurious Riverside typography. The learning, raciness, vigour and clearness which characterize all of Dean Stanley's productions are conspicuous in this. The work is profoundly instructive and entertaining to all lovers of sacred history, and students of the Old Testament. We detect occasional outcroppings of the author's Broad-church latitudinarian proclivities. The work, however, is not mainly doctrinal, and its doctrinal deflections do not destroy its value as history, or interest as a narrative.

Library of Old English Divines, under the editorial supervision of William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York.

Sermons Preached upon Several Occasions, by Robert South, D. D., Prebendary of Westminster, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. In Five Volumes. Volume I. New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. 1866. W. W. Smith, agent in Princeton.

We wish all success to this great undertaking of these enterprising publishers. The old English divines, such as Leighton, Hooker, Barrow, Bunyan, Charnock, Jeremy Taylor, Cudworth, and many others the like, whose works it is designed to give to the public in this series, would add much to the resources, to the wealth of didactic, esthetic, devotional and homiletical matter in our theological and ministerial libraries. They would aid greatly to enrich not only the minds of clergymen, but of thinking and cultivated men generally. The editorial supervision of Dr. Shedd is a pledge that the selection will be judiciously made.

The sermons of South, with which the series is here introduced to us, do not need to be critically characterized by us. The robustness, originality, and clearness of his thought, uttered in a style of extraordinary density, force, and vivacity, have made him a classic among preachers, whose sermons it must be ever profitable for young ministers to study. In saying this, we intend not to be sponsors for his doctrines or his spirit. In the former he was sometimes lax or erratic. In the latter, his bitterness was often too caustic to consist with Chris-

tian charity. But this aside, his sermons still remain among the first models of pulpit eloquence, of flashing wit, and contain the very marrow and pith of thought. We trust that the response of the public to the beginning of this great series, in the beautiful type of the Riverside press, will encourage the publishers to continue and complete it.

The Shadow of Christianity in the Genesis of the Christian State. A Treatise for the Times. By the Author of "Apocatastasis." New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. W. W. Smith, agent in Princeton.

A noble topic is here treated by some one who has evidently thought much upon it, and who betrays no little capacity and preparation for his task. The book abounds with many original and just observations in reference to the church, state, sociology, and political economy. It also abounds in extreme and one-sided views. His idea of the proper materials and organization of the church and the state cannot be realized before the millennium. Even then, the author's definition of the church as "a self-organizing, self-legislating, self-governing, free DEMOCRACY," will be out of place.

Remarks on Dr. Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice." By Rev. W. W. Andrews. Hartford: Press of Case, Lockwood & Co. 1866.

This considerable pamphlet is prefaced with the following *imprimatur:*

"The following paper, prepared for the Hartford Fourth Association, and read before it, is now published at its request, and according to the unanimous desire of a large number of other clergymen who were present at its meeting.

C. E. STOWE, *Moderator.*"

The paper in question is able and clear. It shows a large knowledge of scripture and church theology. It thoroughly repudiates Dr. Bushnell's theories, and exposes their fallacy. But we have thought it worth while to produce the endorsement given to the disquisition, because it so explicitly asserts certain views of the atonement, which it has been so much a fashion in parts of New England to stigmatize as absurd and obsolete. He says that Christ "by dying in the common nature of man, and as bearing the guilt of all men's sins, made a true atonement." P. 63. "Then was justice satisfied, because the righteous sentence had been executed upon the offending race in its sinless Head." P. 54. Speaking of the faith of those who believe the Trinity and Incarnation, he says, "there have been diversities of opinion as to the explanation of the fact, but none as to the fact itself, that forgiveness comes to man *in virtue of*

Christ's dying under a penal curse for sin." Much more of similar import might be quoted. He also argues that *δικαιόω* means "to declare just in a forensic sense, *to absolve judicially.*" Pp. 60–1. Again:

"The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity makes subordination with equality to be found amongst the Persons of the Godhead, who exist from eternity as the Father, absolute and underived; as the Son, the eternally begotten of the Father; and as the Spirit, eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son. There is no inferiority in these Divine relationships." P. 41.

These orthodox views are mixed with and warped by the realistic theory of the unity of our race, according to which Christ became consubstantial with it, so that his acts are their acts, and his redemption universal. This, however, does not affect the orthodoxy of the view presented as to the *nature* of the atonement.

Records from the Life of S. V. S. Wilder. Published by the American Tract Society. W. W. Smith, agent in Princeton.

This is a record of the life and deeds of one of the most eminent of our American Christian merchants. He resided many years in Paris, in the prosecution of his business, omitting no opportunity to spread evangelical religion in that metropolis, and elsewhere in France. He became opulent in early life. He consecrated his talents and resources to his Divine Master, whom he served efficiently in every sphere of life. He was for a long period President of the American Tract Society, which now publishes this memoir in honour of his memory. This whole biography shows him to have been an uncommon man. It is excellent reading for young men. They who can read it without catching some high inspirations toward all that is good and Christian and man-worthy, must be either above further improvement or below it.

The Women of Methodism: Its three Foundresses, Susanna West, the Countess of Huntingdon, and Barbara Beck, with Sketches of their Female Associates and Successors in the Early History of the Denomination. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. A Centenary Offering to the Women of American Methodism, from the American Methodist Ladies' Centenary Association. New York: Carlton & Porter, 1866.

The fitness and interest of such a work, well executed, at the present time, are obvious, and Dr. Stevens has in various productions proved himself an adept in Methodist biography and historiography. He is quite faithful in noting the thorough Calvinism of the Countess of Huntingdon. But he classes her and her circle with Methodists, on account of their association with Whitefield. There is perhaps some ground for this, although the term Methodist, in this country, now imports not

only an adherent of Methodistic polity, but of Arminianism in doctrine. But this application of the term is overdone when those Presbyterians and Congregationalists in this country, who favoured Whitefield, are styled Methodists. Our attention was recently called to the fact that, in a late History of Methodism, (we believe by Dr. Stevens), Princeton College was said to have been founded by the Methodists! The only ground for such a statement is the mere fact that its founders belonged to that class of Presbyterian ministers who countenanced Whitefield's preaching.

The Young Lady of Pleasure.
Green Pastures for Christ's Little Ones.
Basil on Honesty and Industry.
Bertha Allston, or the Good Step-Mother.

These excellent books for children and youth, are published by the American Tract Society, New York, and for sale by Mr. Wm. W. Smith, Agent, Princeton.

In Trust; or Dr. Bertrand's Household. By Amanda M. Douglass. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1866.

Natural History. A Manual of Zoölogy, for Schools, Colleges, and the General Reader. By Sanborn Tenney, A. M., author of Geology, etc., Professor of Natural History in Vassar College. Illustrated with over Five Hundred Engravings. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1866.

So far as our knowledge goes of the existing books on this subject, that before us supplies a desideratum. We know of nothing so conveniently adapted, and withal so attractive, for those seeking elementary knowledge of Zoölogy.

Temperance Recollections. Labours, Defeats, Triumphs. An Autobiography. By John Marsh, D. D., Secretary of the First Three National Temperance Conventions, and thirty years Corresponding Secretary and Editor of the *American Temperance Union.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1866.

The friends of temperance will thank the venerable author for this contribution to the history of the great Reformation wrought on this subject within the last forty years. No other man could have written this book. Though nearly an octogenarian, he still holds the pen of a ready and vivacious writer. His eye is not dimmed, nor his natural force abated. Every important measure, and every important person connected with the progress of this cause, are here brought to view. We do not, of course, coincide with all the exegetical or ethical opinions of the veteran author in regard to all drinks capable of producing inebriation. This, however, does not hinder our high appreciation of his volume, as an interesting and valuable contribution to one of the most blessed reformations of modern times.

Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Volumen Quintum. Epistolæ Pauli et Catholicæ fere integræ ex libro Porphyrii Episcopi palimpsesto sæculi octavi vel noni, nuper ex oriente aleato, rara textus antiquitate insigni, eruit atque edidit A. F. C. Tischendorf. 1865. 4to. Pp. xxiii and 364.

In 1862 Tischendorf went to St. Petersburgh, to deliver up to the custody of the Czar, the famous Sinaitic Codex, which he had discovered and published. While there, he formed the acquaintance of Archimandrite (now Bishop) Porphyry Uspenski, and was shown the Greek manuscripts gathered by him in his journeys to the East. Among these there was one which he saw at the first glance to be a palimpsest, and which Porphyry had also recognized as such, but without knowing what it contained, or suspecting that it possessed any other than a palæographical value. Tischendorf's practised eye discerned enough in a brief examination to satisfy him that an uncial manuscript of the New Testament, in whole or in part, lay hid beneath the more modern writing. A few days after he was allowed to have it in his own rooms and apply chemicals to a couple of pages, with the view of restoring the faded letters. This was so successfully done, that Porphyry exclaimed in rapture, "See Lazarus risen from the tomb!" The result was an agreement that Tischendorf should take the precious treasure to Leipsic for a year, that he might master its contents. He found the task more difficult than he imagined, and more time was consumed upon it than he at first thought would be required. He succeeded, however, in reading the whole of it, with very trifling exceptions, in the course of eighteen months.

The manuscript consists of 325 small octavo pages. The more recent writing in literæ minusculæ is an elegant copy of the work of Euthalius, deacon of Alexandria, on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of Paul, first published by Zaccagni in 1698, together with the complete text of these books. The excellence of the latter leads to the conclusion that it too was drawn from the work of Euthalius, and extracts from it will be printed in the next volume of the *Monumenta*. The date, as gathered from a subscription at the close, is A. D. 1301.

It is a fortunate circumstance that in putting old manuscripts to a new use the original form was retained; even the length of the lines and the number of them on a page being conformed to those which had been erased. Consequently none of the old text is cut away; only the notes on the upper margin indicating the feast-days have suffered occasionally. By a careful examination of the original numbering of the sheets, Tischendorf succeeded in restoring them to their primitive order. It appears that the old uncial manuscript contained, 1. The Acts of the

Apostles; 2. The Catholic Epistles; 3. The Epistles of Paul; 4. The Martyrdom of Peter and Paul; and finally the Apocalypse. Three leaves of the first sheet are missing, so that the extant text begins with Acts ii. 9; the last fifteen verses of the book of Revelation are also wanting. Three leaves are also missing in the catholic epistles, and nine in the epistles of Paul. All that remains is legible, with the exception of a very few verses and occasional words and letters. The inscriptions and subscriptions to the Epistles not being written with ink but with some other material, which the chemicals failed to restore, have been but partially recovered. From the character of the writing, the peculiarities of the orthography, the punctuation, abbreviations, and the use of accents and breathings, Tischendorf assigns it to the eighth or ninth century. And the correspondence of the text in general with the oldest and best authorities leads him to assign to it a very high value. It adds to its interest and worth, that uncial manuscripts of the book of Revelation are comparatively rare.

This volume contains a reprint in the uncial character of the Catholic Epistles and the Epistles of Paul, one page of *fac simile* being added at the end. The Acts of the Apostles and the Revelation are reserved for another volume.

ERRATA.

Page 487, line 17, *for* them *read* themselves.
19, *for* should *read* would.