
No. 20.

THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW

FOR THE YEAR

1865.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

VOL. XXXVII.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY

PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET,

AND SUBSCRIPTIONS RECEIVED BY

R. CARTER & BROTHERS, New York; Rev. A. KENNEDY, London, C. W.,

Rev. WILLIAM ELDER, St. John, New Brunswick;

and TRÜBNER & CO., London.

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THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1865.

No. I.

ART. I.—*Are James the son of Alphæus and James the brother of the Lord identical?*

IN approaching, not without diffidence and hesitation, this difficult and interesting question, the author desires to occupy the position of an inquirer after truth, and not to speak *ex cathedra*. He proposes calmly, and without any *a priori* leaning to either side of the question, to consider the arguments, and sift the evidence produced on either side; and after due regard has been paid to the golden rule of all discussion, "*audiatur et altera pars*," to state the conclusion which his investigations have led him to reach.

The disentanglement of the question will probably be much facilitated by adhering to the literal nomenclature of the Greek, because doubtless much of the existing confusion is due to the departure from this rule.

The following table of all the persons bearing the name of Ἰάκωβος, mentioned in the New Testament, will be found convenient for reference:

1. Ἰακώβ, the father of Joseph, the husband of Mary the mother of Jesus. Matt. i. 15, 16.
2. Ἰάκωβος ὁ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου, Matt. iv. 21, x. 2, xvii. 1, xx. 20, 21, xxvi. 37; Mark iii. 17, v. 37; Luke v. 10, ix. 54;

Acts i. 13, xii. 2. In the last passage he is referred to as *Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰωάννου;* also in some of the other passages.

3. *Ἰάκωβος ὁ τοῦ Ἁλφαίου*, Matt. x. 3; Luke vi. 15; Mark iii. 18; Acts i. 13.
4. *Ἰάκωβος ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ Κυρίου*, Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3; Gal. i. 19.
5. *Ἰάκωβος*, the son of Mary, Matt. xxvii. 56; Luke xxiv. 10.
6. *Ἰάκωβος ὁ μικρὸς*, Mark xv. 40.
7. *Ἰάκωβος*, brother of Jude (*Ἰούδας ἀδελφὸς Ἰακώβου*), Jude i.
8. *Ἰάκωβος* (*Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου*), Luke vi. 16; Acts i. 13.
9. *Ἰάκωβος*, Acts xii. 17, xv. 13, xxi. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 7; Gal. ii. 9, 12.
10. *Ἰάκωβος Θεοῦ καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος*, James i. 1.

It is manifest that *Ἰακώβ*, the father of Joseph, could not be the brother of the Lord. It is equally manifest that Jacobus Zebedæi could not be the brother of the Lord.

Comparing Gal. i. 19 with Gal. ii. 9, 12, we find that Paul in the former passage refers to Jacobus, the brother of the Lord, and in the latter to a Jacobus simply, who seemed to be one of the pillars of the church. The question springs up, Are these two Jacobi identical? Their identity is generally affirmed. In that case, Nos. 4 and 9 of the above list denote the same person.

Nos. 4 and 7 may be identified, because Jacobus the brother of the Lord had a brother called Judas, Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3.

We have thus far dismissed from the list Nos. 1 and 2, and identified Nos. 4, 7 and 9. On the other hand, Nos. 3, 5 and 6 may be identified, if Mary was the wife of Alphæus (Clopas?).

The questions involved in some of these suppositions will come up as we proceed. For the present, assuming them to be tenable, we may sum up the result of the foregoing comparison, as follows:

No. 4=7,=9, *i. e.*, Jacobus the brother of the Lord is identical with Jacobus the brother of Jude, and with Jacobus simply.

No. 3=5 and 6; *i. e.*, Jacobus Alphæi is identical with Jacobus Mariæ and Jacobus the Little. The list has therefore been reduced to four persons bearing the name of Jacobus.

1. Jacobus (*Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου*) No. 8; but as nothing is known of him, beyond his having been the father of Judas the apostle, we may dismiss his name from the list; there remain therefore,

2. Jacobus, the brother of the Lord (No. 4=7,=9).

3. Jacobus Alphæi (No. 3=5,=6), and,

4. Jacobus, the servant of God and the Lord Jesus Christ, the author of the Epistle. This last may be shown to be identical with Jacobus the brother of the Lord, and this identification reduces the inquiry to the subject of investigation, viz., "Are Jacobus the brother of the Lord and Jacobus Alphæi identical or not?"

It is hardly necessary to discuss the question, whether our Lord could have had *full* brothers. Believing his Divine generation, we deny the *possibility* of his having had full brothers, and proceed at once to the inquiry: In what sense Jacobus Alphæi could have been called the brother of the Lord.

He may have been—1, the son of Joseph, the husband of Mary, by a former marriage; 2, the son of Joseph and the wife of his deceased brother (Alphæus or Clopas?), with whom he had formed a Levirate marriage; 3, the son of Alphæus and Mary, the sister of Mary the mother of Jesus.

On the first and second hypotheses, Jacobus Alphæus would have been at most the step-brother of Jesus, and that only by a free use of the term step-brother; on the third hypothesis, he was simply the cousin of Jesus, that is, his mother's sister's son.

As long as the inquiry is in what sense could Jacobus Alphæi be called the brother of the Lord, these three hypotheses appear to be exhaustive, unless we add to the complication a fourth hypothesis, which would make him the son of a brother of Mary the mother of Jesus, called Alphæus. But as that would make him simply the cousin of Jesus, and as Holy Scripture is silent concerning a brother of Mary the mother of Jesus, we may confine ourselves to the forementioned three hypotheses. If, however, the subject of inquiry is changed so

as to yield the question—in what sense could our Lord be said to have had *brothers*—the only remaining hypothesis is, that they were the children of Joseph and Mary, after the birth of Jesus, and consequently his uterine brothers.

After this preliminary statement of possible hypotheses, we now proceed to the consideration of the arguments by which the identity of Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord is thought to be proved.

I. ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM HOLY WRIT.

1. Jacobus Alphæi, the apostle, is mentioned in the lists of the apostles found in Matt. x. 2, Mark iii. 16, Luke vi. 14, and Acts i. 13. In Acts, (after the death of Jacobus Zebedæi, the apostle, also mentioned in said four lists of the apostles,) from chap. xii. 2, onwards, only *one* Jacobus is mentioned. This Jacobus must have been so distinguished and prominent an individual as to render it unnecessary for Luke to describe him by some further designation. Jacobus Zebedæi was dead, Jacobus Alphæi had already been mentioned in Acts i. 13; no new and third Jacobus had been introduced in the intervening chapters. It cannot surely be supposed that so careful a writer as Luke should have quietly dropped Jacobus Alphæi, and without any further notice have superseded Jacobus Alphæi the apostle, by another Jacobus, who was not an apostle. It must therefore be concluded that the person referred to as Jacobus, simply, in Acts xii. 2, 17, xv. 13, and xxi. 18, is Jacobus Alphæi. (So *Lange*, art. *Jacobus*, in Herzog's Real Encyclopædia: the same, Introd. to Comment. on James, in Bibelwerk; and *Meyrick*, art. *James*, in Smith's Dict. of the Bible; see also *Schaff*, Verhältniss des Jacobus, Bruders des Herrn zu Jacobus Alphæi, p. 29.)

On the other hand, it is evident that the Jacobus mentioned in Acts xii. 2, and onwards, is already sufficiently distinguished from Jacobus Alphæus, by being spoken of without any distinctive title. For if we turn to Gal. i. 19, we find that St. Paul, on his visit to Jerusalem, (mentioned in Acts ix. 26—30, that is, before the death of Jacobus Zebedæi,) states: "But other of the apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother." This Jacobus, the Lord's brother, so called at a

time when Jacobus Zebedæi was still alive, is therefore expressly distinguished from Jacobus Alphæi; and the inference lies near, that his appointment over the mother church at Jerusalem had taken place at the time of Paul's visit to Jerusalem (Acts ix. 26—30), and his prominent position would naturally account for his being referred to as Jacobus simply.

The circumstance that Jacobus Alphæi disappears from the record in the book of Acts, is anything but singular; that book contains mainly the record of the apostolical labours of St. Paul, and adverts to the acts of other apostles only incidentally. It is as silent about the acts of St. Matthew, St. Thomas, St. Bartholomew, and others, as it is about those of Jacobus Alphæi, whom tradition reports to have preached the gospel in Palestine and Egypt, and to have suffered martyrdom in the latter country (*Niceph.* H. E., 2, 40).

2. In Gal. i. 19, St. Paul says: "Ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων οὐκ εἶδον, εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου." And in chap. ii. 9, he describes a Jacobus as one of the three pillars of the church. Here Jacobus, the brother of the Lord, is expressly included in the number of the apostles; and as the lists of the apostles contained in the Gospels, and in Acts i. 13, specify only two apostles bearing the name of Jacobus, viz., Jacobus Zebedæi and Jacobus Alphæi, it follows that the Jacobus mentioned in Galatians as the brother of the Lord was Jacobus Alphæi; that is, the two are identical. Moreover, *Schneckenburger* (Annot. ad Ep. Jacobi, Stuttgart, 1832, p. 145) and *Steiger* (Evang. Kirchenzeitung, 1834, November and December Nos.) cite Acts ix. 27, 28, where we read that Barnabas took Paul to the *apostles* (ver. 27), and was with *them* (μετ' αὐτῶν, ver. 28). *One* of these apostles was Peter, and Gal. i. 19 shows that the *other* APOSTLE must have been Jacobus, the same Jacobus who was the brother of the Lord and an *apostle*, consequently, Jacobus Alphæi.

In reply, it may be contended:

(*a*) The εἰ μὴ in the citation (Gal. i. 19) does not *necessarily* qualify ἀποστόλων, for it may qualify the whole sentence, which would then read, "alium apostolum non vidi, sed vidi Jacobum," etc. (Cf. *Winer's* Grammar, p. 655.) A striking parallel passage is produced by *Theile* (Comm. in Ep. Jacobi, Lips.

1836, p. 36, note) who cites Rev. xxi. 27: "And there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie: but (εἰ μὴ) they which are written in the Lamb's book of life." Here εἰ μὴ is not exceptive, but adversative; and this adversative sense it may have in the passage under notice. But even admitting the *exceptive* sense of εἰ μὴ, it cannot establish the identity of Jacobus the brother of the Lord and Jacobus Alphæi; for,

(*b*) The word ἀποστόλων may be used in the wider sense, according to which it denotes not only the twelve, but also the helpers and companions of the apostles, that is, men of apostolical standing. In this wider sense, Paul and *Barnabas* are called apostles, in Acts xiv. 4, 14; and in the same sense, Peter and *Jacobus* may be referred to as apostles, in Gal. i. 19. *Neander* (Plant. of Christianity, Bohn's edition, p. 353, note) takes a similar view: "Paul had originally in his thoughts only a negative position; he had seen no other apostle at Jerusalem but Peter. But as it afterwards occurred to him, that he had seen at Jerusalem James the brother of the Lord, who, though no apostle, was held in apostolic estimation by the Judaizers; on this account he added, by way of limitation, a reference to James." If this larger sense of ἀποστόλων is supposed to conflict with the line of the apostle's defence, viz., that he had received his commission from God, and not from the twelve (*Meyrick* referring to *Thorndike*), we reply, that it is just the other way. For if Jacobus *was* an apostle, St. Paul, on his visit to Jerusalem, met *two* apostles, in the strict sense, that is, two of the twelve; but if *Jacobus* was *not* an apostle in the strict sense, Paul then conferred only with *Peter*, one of the twelve, and Jacobus, styled an apostle by courtesy; and his object being to show that he held his commission from God, and not from the twelve, his point is made stronger, if on that visit he saw only *one* of the twelve, than if he had seen two.

Lastly, if it is argued that Paul would hardly have ventured to put an apostolical man on a level with two of the twelve, and to affirm of the three, beginning with Jacobus, that they seemed to be pillars, we reply, that Jacobus the brother of the Lord who at that time was the head of the mother church at Jerusalem, and was universally honoured as a man of the very highest

distinction, might be described with great propriety as one of the pillars of the church; and although not one of the twelve, yet in virtue of his distinguished position—as the brother of the Lord, and as bishop of the church at Jerusalem—be named first in that noble triad of pillars.

3. The brothers of the Lord were: Jacobus, Joses, Simon and Judas, (Matt. xiii. 55, cf. Mark vi. 3.) The sons of another Mary, the same who is called in John xix. 25, the sister of the mother of Jesus and the (wife) of Clopas or Alphæus (?) were Jacobus and Joses, (Matt. xxvii. 56, Mark xv. 40, cf. also Mark xv. 47, xvi. 1.) Among the apostles we find Jacobus Alphæi, (Matt. x. 3, Acts i. 13); Simon, (Zelotes, the Canaanite, Matt. x. 3, Acts i. 13); Judas (Lebbæus, Thaddæus, Matt. x. 3, Judas Jacobi, Luke vi. 16, Acts i. 13.) Jacobus, Judas (Thaddæus) and Simon are enumerated among the apostles in Mark iii. 18; and the same names with the addition of Joses are given in the same order as those of the brothers of the Lord in Mark vi. 3, viz., Jacobus, Joses, Judas and Simon. Comparing Luke vi. 16, and Acts i. 13, with Jude 1, it appears that the Judas Jacobi of the first two passages expressly calls himself in the third passage, *ἀδελφὸς Ἰακώβου*; this makes Jacobus, Joses and Judas (the sons of Mary the sister of the mother of Jesus) brothers. Of Simon Zelotes, we have the testimony of Hegesippus, cited by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* I. 3, 32; I. 4, 22), that he was a son of Clopas, the Lord's uncle. Clopas and Alphæus being identical, Simon his son is therefore the brother of Jacobus, Joses and Judas. This striking recurrence of the same names renders it highly probable that their bearers are identical, that the four brothers of the Lord are really the sons of Mary, the sister of the mother of Jesus, or the sons of Alphæus, and that three of their number were apostles. See *Lange* on Matt. xiii. 53—58; Introduction to James, and article *Jacobus* in Herzog's R. E.; articles *Brothers of the Lord*, and *James* in *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible; *Winer*, R. W., articles *Jacobus* and *Jesus; Schaff*, p. 21, etc) On the opposite hypothesis, viz, that the brothers of the Lord and their namesakes are different, we have a most bewildering confusion of the same names, and (excepting the so-called

Helvidian hypothesis, according to which the brothers of the Lord were the children of Joseph and Mary the mother of Jesus), the highly improbable result that four pairs of first cousins had the same names.

The foregoing statement embodies the views of the majority of the advocates of the identity-hypothesis; there are, however, variations of it to which we intend to refer by and by. In reply we will endeavour to strike at the root of this supposed relationship, which rests on three assumptions, the first, that Maria-Clopa was the sister of Mary the mother of Jesus, (q. e. d.;) the second, that Clopas and Alphæus are identical, and that this Clopas-Alphæus was the husband of Maria, the sister of the mother of Jesus, (q. e. d.;) and the third, that Simon and Judas were the sons of Maria-Clopa, (q. e. d.,) as well as Jacobus and Simon. *Wieseler* and *Lange* after him deny that the mother of Jesus and Maria-Clopa were sisters, and although *Lange* is a staunch adherent of the identity-hypothesis, (his view will be stated in the sequel,) his adoption of *Wieseler's* construction of John xix. 25, cuts this Gordian knot most effectually, in removing the chief difficulty of this intricate question. The passage in question, (John xix. 25,) we now produce in the original. "*Εἱστήκεισαν δὲ παρὰ τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ, Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ, καὶ Μαρία ἡ Μαγδαληνή.*" In the E. V. it reads thus: "Now there stood by the cross of Jesus his mother, and his mother's sister, Mary the *wife* of Clopas, (*Cleophas* is manifestly a mistranslation,) and Mary Magdalene." That is, according to the punctuation in the E. V., three Marys were spectators of the crucifixion, viz., 1. Mary the mother of Jesus; 2. Mary the *wife* of Clopas; 3. Mary Magdalene. Now *Wieseler* proposes to separate the words *Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ* from the immediately preceding *ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ*, instead of taking them according to the common construction in opposition with them. This would give four persons instead of three, viz.: 1. Mary the mother of Jesus; 2. His mother's sister, (Salome, see below); 3. Mary the *wife* of Clopas, and, 4. Mary Magdalene. *Wieseler* gives the following reasons in support of his view, 1. The construction which separates *ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ*

from *Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ*, agrees better with the structure of the sentence, because definitions of the substantive, such as designations of title, dignity, etc., generally follow the substantive, and in this very sentence we have *Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ* and *Μαρία ἡ Μαγδαληνή;* cf. also xix. 38, xxi. 2; Mark xv. 40. The absence of *καί* proves nothing to the contrary (it *actually* occurs in the Peschito version which originated in the second century, and in the Æthiopic and Persic versions, and renders therefore the identity of this *ἀδελφή* and *Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ* impossible), as the apostle probably wanted to introduce those holy women in pairs, Mary the mother of Jesus and his mother's sister being one pair, and Mary the *wife* of Clopas and Mary Magdalene the other pair, the two sisters being thus distinguished from the two who were not sisters. Similar classifications by pairs are found in Luke vi. 14—16, and Matt. x. 2—4. 2. On the supposition that the wife of Alphæus was the sister of the mother of Jesus, we should have two *sisters* of the same name, which is almost without example. 3. Matt. xxvii. 56, Mark xv. 40, state that the mother of the sons of Zebedæus was present at the crucifixion. It is highly improbable that John enumerating the spectators of the crucifixion should have overlooked his own mother; but if he did mention her, she cannot be another than *ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς Ἰησοῦ* (which would certainly make the sons of Zebedæus first cousins of Jesus,) and this periphrastic mode of description would accord beautifully with John's indirect manner of referring to himself as "the disciple whom Jesus loved," or "who leaned on his breast."

With the exception of the second of *Wieseler's* reasons, we consider his argument not only tenable but conclusive. Applied to the subject in hand, it sets aside the assumption that Maria-Clopa was the sister of the mother of Jesus, and the entire edifice reared on that assumption falls likewise to the ground. Her sons (no matter whether she had two, three, or four,) would then cease to be related to Jesus; for even though she was what *Lange* declares her to have been, the wife of Alphæus-Clopas, the *brother* of Joseph, (the husband of Mary the mother of Jesus,) her sons were clearly not related to Jesus. Among all the arguments we have seen, there is, on the whole,

none which so completely demolishes the identity-hypothesis as this of *Wieseler*, which has the additional merit that it removes an apparent discrepancy in the Gospel account of the crucifixion, for while, according to the common interpretation of John xix. 25, there were present on that occasion, Mary the mother of Jesus, Maria-Clopa his mother's sister and Mary Magdalene, Matt. xxvii. 56, and Mark xv. 40, specify Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James and Joses, (*i. e.*, Maria-Clopa,) and the mother of the sons of Zebedæus (*i. e.*, Salome.) This discrepancy vanishes with the adoption of *Wieseler's* interpretation, while the relationship which it establishes between Jesus and the sons of Zebedæus, (Jacobus major and John,) not only involves no difficulties, but actually serves to elucidate many otherwise less intelligible incidents of the Gospel history.

But even apart from the (to us conclusive) interpretation of *Wieseler*, there are many grave and insuperable objections to the identity-hypothesis based on the assumption that Mary the mother of Jesus and Maria-Clopa were sisters, which we now proceed to consider. Supposing then, for argument's sake, that such a relation did exist, and that moreover Clopas and Alphæus are identical, and that his four sons were called Jacobus, Joses, Judas, and Simon, so that the sons of Alphæus-Clopas were on their mother's side the first cousins of Jesus, the question arises why are they called his *brethren* and not his cousins? If the lax use of the word *brother* in Scripture is offered in explanation, we reply, that all the passages cited from the Old Testament in support of this explanation, show that the context is "sufficient to clear up any possible confusion," and indeed, in the only two exceptional instances (not metaphorical,) viz., those in which Lot and Jacob are respectively called "brothers" of Abraham and Laban, the word is only extended so far as to mean "nephews;" and it must be remembered that even these exceptions are quoted from a single book, seventeen centuries earlier than the Gospels." (Art. *Brother* in *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible.) In the New Testament there is absolutely no parallel instance to the passages in question, for wherever the words "brother" or "brethren" are used in a wider sense, it is invariably in a

rhetorical or metaphorical connection. To affirm, therefore, that "brothers" signifies "cousins," or "relatives," is purely arbitrary, and an arbitrary dictum is no argument. The *constant* designation of Jacobus, Joses, Judas, and Simon, as the brethren of the Lord, however, is an *a priori* presumption that they *were* his brethren. Again, if these four brethren of Jesus were, as is contended, his cousins, viz., the sons of Maria-Clopa, how shall we account for their being invariably mentioned in connection with Mary the mother of Jesus, and not in connection with their own mother Maria-Clopa. The two passages in question are Matt. xiii. 55, and Mark vi. 3. The first reads thus: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary? and *his brethren* James, and Joses, and Simon, and Judas? And *his sisters* are they not all with us?" And here is the second: "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the *brother* of James, and Joses, and of Juda, and Simon? And are not *his sisters* here with us?" Maria-Clopa was not dead, for we have already seen that she was among the spectators of the crucifixion; why then is she not referred to? The persons who, in their astonishment at the wisdom and mighty works of Jesus asked these questions, were not strangers, but the townsmen and neighbours of Jesus and his mother, and their questions would lose all point if they used the words, "brethren" and "sisters" in the sense of "cousins" or "relatives." If Maria-Clopa (as *Lange* and many others conjecture) and her four sons lived with Mary the mother of Jesus, why is no mention made of her?

Again, if Maria-Clopa had four sons, why have we the names of two only, especially when it is remembered that the two whose names are suppressed were actually apostles. The two passages, in which her name occurs in connection with her sons, are Matt. xxvii. 56, and Mark xv. 40; in the former she is called "Mary the mother of James and Joses" (*Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Ἰακώβου καὶ Ἰωσῆ μήτηρ*), in the latter, "Mary the mother of James the less, and of Joses," (*Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Ἰακώβου τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ Ἰωσῆ μήτηρ*). Simon and Jude, her supposed other two sons, were apostles and distinguished by surnames from two other apostles of the same name. Judas (called Lebbæus-Thaddæus in Matthew, Thaddæus in Mark, Judas Jacobi in

Luke,) as distinguished from Judas Iscariot and Simon (called [erroneously in E. V.,] the Canaanite [ὁ *χανανίτης*, zealot, derived from Heb. קַנָּא Aram. קַנָּאָן] in Matt. and Mark, and Zelotes in Luke,) as distinguished from Simon Peter. If they were the sons of Maria-Clopa and surnames were necessary to distinguish them from other apostles of the same name, might we not justly expect such surnames to indicate, as in the case of Jacobus Alphæi (their conjectured brother), a reference to their descent?

In this connection we must not pass by another perplexing circumstance. If the supposed four sons of Maria-Clopa were identical with the brothers of the Lord and three of their number were according to the hypothesis apostles, in what sense are we to take those passages in which *brothers* (ἀδελφοί) of Jesus are introduced as distinguished from the apostles? Surely the only remaining Joses, of whom we know absolutely nothing but his name, would hardly be distinguished by the *pluralis excellentiæ*. But the perplexity is heightened by the fact that St. John the Evangelist expressly states that the brethren of Jesus did not believe in him at a time when Jacobus Alphæi had already been included among the twelve (John vii. 5, compared with John vi. 67, 70.) If Jacobus Alphæus was identical with Jacobus the brother of the Lord, then we have St. John's statement that he was an unbeliever. The same reasoning applies also to Judas and Simon, (the supposed brothers of Jacobus Alphæi and apostles as well as he.) As we shall examine this point more fully below, we need not stop to notice here either the lame replies or the subtle finessing to which the advocates of the identity-hypothesis have been driven to avoid the common sense conclusion.

Lastly, it is difficult to see the force of the argument that the identity-hypothesis must be correct, because it avoids a confusion of names and removes the improbability of four pairs of first cousins, having the same names, for even supposing that the brothers of the Lord were his cousins (which they were not), it is surely no uncommon occurrence, even in our own time, that the same names are found not only in different branches of a large family, the younger members being called after their common ancestry, but the same sets of Christian

names actually prevail in certain localities, and among certain religious denominations, so *e. g.*, nothing is more common than to hear persons say that this is one of our family names, this is a Puritan name, this is a Quaker name. The same peculiarity, if peculiarity it can be called, prevailed in Palestine, and hence we have in the New Testament, at least five contemporaries bearing the name of Jacobus, nine that of Simon, four that of Joseph. But the cousinship of the four brothers of the Lord is a mere assumption, and therefore this argument is altogether irrelevant; and we may here state that the name of the mother of Jesus was probably different from that of Maria-Clopa, so that much of the confusion created by the advocates of the identity-hypothesis will be removed.

Maria-Clopa is constantly called *Μαρία*, Matt. xxvii. 56, 61, xxviii. 1; Mark xv. 40, 47, xvi. 1; Luke xxiv. 10; John xix. 25; whereas, Mary the mother of Jesus is called *Μαρία*, Matt. i. 16, 18, ii. 11; Mark vi. 3; Luke i. 41; Acts i. 14; and *Μαριάμ*, Matt. i. 20, xiii. 55; Luke i. 27, 30, 34, 38, 39, 46, 56, ii. 5, 16, 19, 34. It is probable that *Μαρία* and *Μαριάμ* are two Greek forms of the Hebrew מִרְיָם, but it can hardly be accidental that the first form should invariably be used in the case of *all* the Marys mentioned in the Gospels besides Mary the mother of Jesus, and that the latter form should be applied exclusively to her. This distinction, it is true, may be used as an argument in favour of the hypothesis that Maria-Clopa was the sister of Mary the mother of Jesus, because in pronunciation the difference between *Μαρία* with the accent on the second syllable and an obscure or mute *α*, and *Μαριάμ* with the accent on the last syllable, would have been sufficiently marked to render it possible that the two names were borne by two sisters. The difference would certainly have been greater than that between the English Mary and Maria, as the names of two sisters, of which the author knows an instance in his own family connection. On the other hand, the distinction is equally pertinent to the hypothesis that Maria-Clopa and Mary the mother of Jesus were not sisters; but in either case the difference itself is worthy of notice.

4. Christ, nailed to the cross, commended his mother to the care of *St. John;* this is a strong point against the hypothesis

that he had *actual* brothers, for the comparison of John xix. 26, 27, with Luke xxiii. 49, shows that they were in all probability among the spectators of the crucifixion, (the passage in Luke states that, "*εἱστήκεισαν δὲ πάντες οἱ γνωστοὶ αὐτοῦ μακρόθεν*,") and it is unnatural to suppose that he passed over his own brothers, thus hurting not only their feelings, but those of his mother, and committed her to the care of the beloved disciple. This circumstance, therefore, renders it highly probable that the brothers of the Lord were his cousins.

But if they were his cousins, and the sons of his mother's sister (who was also present at the crucifixion, see John xix. 25), and formed part of the household of the mother of Jesus (all which is insisted upon by the advocates of the identity-hypothesis), why did he not commend her, say to Jacobus Alphæi, to Simon Zelotes, or to Judas-Thaddæus-Lebbæus, three of the alleged sons of Maria-Clopa, who were *apostles?* Was the preference he showed to John not equally slighting to them, and must it not have been galling in the extreme to them, that he actually removed his mother from their common dwelling to the house of John? The identity-hypothesis is therefore insufficient to clear this difficulty. But it vanishes on the following considerations: His brethren did not believe in him (John vii. 5), but his mother did; and although they became believers soon afterwards (Acts i. 14), their conversion was most probably the consequence of his resurrection (Matt. xxviii. 10), and they were still unbelieving at the time of the crucifixion. Would his unbelieving brothers have been congenial companions of the sorrow-stricken Mary? There may have been other reasons why John was the chosen protector of Mary, and not the brothers of Jesus. They appear to have been married (1 Cor. ix. 5.) On the other hand, John's whole soul was wrapped up in Jesus. He was his cousin (being the son of Salome, the sister of Mary his mother), and if, as we may suppose, Salome lived with John, where could a more delightful home have been provided for Mary, to whom the companionship of her sister Salome and her nephew John, both so devotedly and entirely attached to Jesus, must have proved the sweetest and most blessed consolation.

5. The general sentiment of the Christian church rejects the hypothesis that the brothers of Jesus were actually the sons of Joseph and Mary.

We are inquiring after truth, and truth is stronger than prejudice, false delicacy, and superstition. In the sequel, we will endeavour to account for the alleged general sentiment, which is sentiment altogether; for Scripture knows nothing of the *ἀειπαρθενία* of Mary the mother of Jesus. It enumerates the brothers of Jesus, and mentions his sisters; it calls Joseph the husband of Mary. The sentiment which rejects the hypothesis that the brothers and sisters of Jesus were actually the sons of Joseph and Mary, can hardly be called *general;* for those who held this *rejected* hypothesis were so numerous, even as early as the fourth century, that they had received a distinctive name, and were called by *Epiphanius* (Hær. 78), "Antidicomarianitæ." But as the whole question will come up hereafter, we reserve for the present the expression of our opinion, as well as the full statement of the hypothesis.

II. Arguments drawn from tradition for the identity-hypothesis.

1. The report of *Hegesippus*, a Jewish Christian author, who flourished about the middle of the second century, contained in Eusebius, who calls him an ecclesiastical historian of distinguished rank (Hist. Eccl. iv. 8.) It consists of two passages. The first is found in Hist. Eccl. ii. 23, the second in ibid. iv. 23. We supply them in full, using the translation given in *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible, article *James*, with the disputed passages in the original Greek.

"With the apostles, James, the brother of the Lord, succeeds to the charge of the church—that James who has been called Just, from the time of the Lord to our own days, for there were many of the name of James. [*Διαδέχεται δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου Ἰάκωβος, ὁ ὀνομασθεὶς ὑπὸ πάντων δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ κυρίου χρόνων μέχρι καὶ ἡμῶν. ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ Ἰάκωβοι ἐκαλοῦντο.*] He was holy from his mother's womb; he drank not wine or strong drink, nor did he eat animal food; a razor came not upon his head; he did not anoint himself with oil; he did not use the bath. He alone might go into the holy

place; for he wore no woollen clothes, but linen. And alone he used to go into the temple, and there he was commonly found upon his knees, praying for forgiveness for the people, so that his knees grew dry and thin (generally translated hard) like a camel's, from his constantly bending them in prayer, and entreating forgiveness for the people. On account, therefore, of his exceeding righteousness, he was called 'Just' and 'Oblias,' which means in Greek, 'the bulwark of the people,' and 'righteousness,' as the prophets declare of him. Some of the same sect, then, that I have mentioned, inquired of him, 'What is the door of Jesus?' and he said that this man was the Saviour, wherefore some believed that Jesus is the Christ. Now the forementioned sects did not believe in the resurrection, nor in the coming of one who shall recompense every man according to his works; but all who became believers, believed through James. When many therefore of the rulers believed, there was disturbance among the Jews, and Scribes, and Pharisees, saying, 'There is a risk that the whole people will expect Jesus to be the Christ.' They came together therefore to James, and said, 'We pray thee, stop the people, for they have gone astray after Jesus, as though he were the Christ. We pray thee to persuade all that come to the Passover concerning Jesus; for we all give heed to thee, for we and all the people testify to thee that thou art just, and acceptest not the person of man. Persuade the people, therefore, not to go astray about Jesus, for the whole people and all of us give heed to thee. Stand, therefore, on the gable of the temple, that thou mayest be visible, and that thy words may be heard by all the people; for all the tribes, and even the Gentiles are come together for the Passover.' Therefore, the forementioned Scribes and Pharisees placed James upon the gable of the temple, and cried out to him, and said, 'O just one, to whom we ought all to give heed, seeing that the people are going astray after Jesus who was crucified, tell us what is the door of Jesus?' And he answered with a loud voice, 'Why ask ye me about Jesus, the Son of Man? He sits in heaven, on the right hand of great power, and will come on the clouds of heaven.' And many were convinced and gave glory on the testimony of James, crying, Hosannah to the Son of David. Whereupon,

the same Scribes and Pharisees said to each other, 'We have done ill in bringing forward such a witness to Jesus; but let us go up and throw him down, that they may be terrified, and not believe on him.' And they cried out, saying, 'O! even the Just is gone astray.' And they fulfilled that which is written in Isaiah, 'Let us take away the just man, for he is displeasing to us; therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their deeds.' They went up therefore, and threw down the Just one, and said to one another, 'Let us stone James the Just:' and they began to stone him, for he was not killed by the fall; but he turned round, and knelt down, and cried, 'I beseech thee, Lord God Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.' And whilst they were stoning him, one of the priests of the sons of Rechab, a son of the Rechabites, to whom Jeremiah the prophet bears testimony, cried out and said, 'Stop! what are you about? The Just one is praying for you!' Then one of them, who was a fuller, took the club with which he pressed the clothes, and brought it down on the head of the Just one; and so he bore his witness. And they buried him on the spot by the temple, and the column still remains by the temple. This man was a true witness to Jews and Greeks, that Jesus is the Christ. And immediately Vespasian commenced the siege." Such is the more ample testimony of Hegesippus, in which he fully coincides with Clement. So admirable a man indeed was James, and so celebrated among all for his justice, that even the wiser part of the Jews were of opinion that this was the cause of the immediate siege of Jerusalem, which happened to them for no other reason than the crime against him. Josephus also has not hesitated to superadd his testimony in his works: "These things," says he, "happened to the Jews, to avenge James the Just, who was the brother of him that is called Christ, and whom the Jews had slain, notwithstanding his pre-eminent justice."

[With this must be compared the following account of his death, given by Josephus, (in whose writings, by the bye, no such passage as that quoted by Eusebius is now found,) Ant. xx. 9, 1: "Ananus thought he had now a proper opportunity. Festus was now dead, and Albinus was but upon the road; so he assembled the sanhedrim of judges, and brought before them

the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ, whose name was Jacobus, and some others; and when he had formed an accusation against them as breakers of the law, he delivered them to be stoned."]

The second passage from *Hegesippus* (Euseb. H. E. iv. 22) we cite in the original: "*Καὶ μετὰ τὸ μαρτυρῆσαι Ἰάκωβον τὸν δίκαιον, ὡς καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ λογῷ, πάλιν ὁ ἐκ Θείου αὐτοῦ Συμεὼν ὁ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος, ὃν προέθεντο πάντες, ὄντα ἀνεψιὸν τοῦ Κυρίου δεύτερον.* With this we must compare Euseb. iii. 32, where *Hegesippus* calls this Simeon "*ὁ ἐκ Θείου τοῦ κυρίου ὁ προειρημένος Συμεὼν υἱὸς Κλωπᾶ;*" and Euseb. iii. 11, *Hegesippus* is reported to have said that Clopas was the brother of Joseph, viz., "*τὸν γὰρ οὖν Κλοπᾶν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ ὑπάρχειν Ἡγήσιππος ἱστορεῖ.*"

The account of *Hegesippus* is produced in favour of the hypothesis that Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord are identical. Let us now examine the first of the last three passages, which the advocates of the identity-hypothesis render thus: "After Jacobus the Just had suffered martyrdom, as had the Lord also for the same cause, again Symeon the son of Clopas, the son of his uncle (viz., the Lord's uncle,) was appointed bishop, whom all preferred as the second cousin of the Lord." (So *Lange*, article *Jacobus* in Herzog's R. E., and in Introduction to James, p. 8.) But this rendering is forced and ungrammatical. *Neander* (Planting of Christianity, vol. I. p. 363,) and *Alford* (Prolegomena to James in Greek Test. vol. IV. part 1, p. 919, protest against *αὐτοῦ* being joined with *Κυρίου* and rightly argue that *Ἰάκωβον* is the principal subject in the first half of the sentence, and that therefore *αὐτοῦ*, according to grammatical usage, must refer to *Ἰάκωβον*. *Αὐτοῦ* applied to *Κυρίου* makes Symeon the brother of Jacobus. If Hegesippus thought that the two were brothers, he would hardly have used such roundabout language, but we should have expected the simple statement that they were brothers. On the hypothesis of Symeon being brother to Jacobus, *Alford* considers such a sentence simply unaccountable—*αὐτοῦ* applied to *Ἰάκωβον* makes Clopas the uncle of Jacobus and father of Symeon, that is, Jacobus the brother of the Lord and Symeon were first-cousins. But the passage, Euseb. iii. 32, expressly

asserts that Symeon was ὁ ἐκ θείου τοῦ Κυρίου. This does not set aside the construction we advocate, for it simply proves that Hegesippus loosely called Clopas our Lord's uncle, because Clopas and Joseph were brothers, (Euseb. iii. 11,) but Joseph was not the father of Jesus, and Clopas was not his uncle. The passage, Euseb. iii. 32, certainly presents a difficulty, and it is on that account sometimes suppressed. Still we cannot make up our mind to adopt a non-natural and ungrammatical construction of Euseb. iv. 22, and regard, therefore, Euseb. iii. 32, as a loose statement, which, for reasons we now proceed to state, does not affect the ground we have taken.

The passage, Euseb. iv. 22, we render as follows: "After Jacobus the Just had suffered martyrdom, as had the Lord also for the same cause, next (πάλιν) the son of his (Jacobus's) uncle (*i. e.*,) Symeon the son of Clopas was appointed bishop, being the second cousin of the Lord;" (*i. e.*) the *reported* second of the cousins of the Lord, Alphæus-Clopas being brother of Joseph, the *reputed* father of Jesus, and the sons of Alphæus consequently the *reputed* cousins of Jesus. But as we do not consider Maria-Clopa to have been the sister of Mary the mother of Jesus, neither Joseph, nor Alphæus-Clopas, nor the sons of Alphæus, were really related to Jesus. The one was as loosely called his uncle as the others were called his cousins. It is evident that *Hegesippus*, with whom *Eusebius* appears to agree, calls Symeon δεύτερον ἀνεψιὸν τοῦ Κυρίου, because he was ὁ ἐκ θείου τοῦ Κυρίου (Euseb. iii. 32,) and because Clopas and Joseph were brothers, (Euseb. iii. 11,) that is, he traces the relationship through Joseph, the *reputed* father of Jesus. But even on the hypothesis that Maria-Clopa was the sister of Mary the mother of Jesus, (which we deny,) and that her sons were first-cousins of Jesus on his *mother's* side, and influenced by the statement in Euseb. iii. 32, connecting αὐτοῦ, not with Ἰάκωβον, but with the immediately preceding Κυρίος (as *Schaff* proposes), we are still constrained (with *Neander*, *Schaff*, and *Alford*), to refer δεύτερον, not to Jacobus, the brother of the Lord, but to Jacobus Alphæi, the first, *i. e.*, the eldest of the cousins of the Lord, which would make Symeon (the younger brother of Jacobus Alphæi), the second of the cousins of the Lord, who by reason of this relationship was chosen successor

of Jacobus the brother of the Lord in the bishopric of Jerusalem. Hence, on either supposition, (viz., Symeon being cousin of Jesus on his mother's side or on the side of his *reputed* father,) Hegesippus clearly supports the hypothesis which distinguishes Jacobus the brother of the Lord from Jacobus Alphæi.

But there are still other reasons against the identity-hypothesis. We must now turn to the first account of Hegesippus, which we have given in full above, and call attention to the opening sentence, which, for the sake of convenience, is here re-produced: *Διαδέχεται δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰάκωβος, ὁ ὀνομασθεὶς ὑπὸ πάντων δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Κυρίου χρόνων μέχρι καὶ ἡμῶν. ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ Ἰάκωβοι ἐκαλοῦντο.*

From this passage we deduce the following reasons against the identity-hypothesis: 1. *Μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων* is *with* the apostles, not *after* the apostles. *Jerome* takes the words under notice to be a mistake for *μετὰ τοὺς ἀποστόλους*, and renders: "Incepit ecclesiam Hierosolyma post apostolos frater domini Jacobus." *Stier* adopts the same ungrammatical rendering. *Lange* rejects the mistranslation of *Jerome*, and renders "*with* the apostles," but with his usual adroitness tries to make them actually favour the identity-hypothesis. He says: "He undertook the direction of the church conjointly with the apostles; *i. e.*, he became not bishop exclusively, but the co-operation from the nature of the case was reserved to the *other apostles*. As bishop, he is distinguished from the apostles, although he is an apostle; so Peter, as speaker, is distinguished from the apostles, although he belongs to them (Acts v. 29, *ὁ Πέτρος καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι*)." But surely the passage in Acts presents no analogy to the one under consideration. The case there is perfectly plain, the context requiring us to supply *λοιποί;* but here the *distinction* is manifest, whether *μετὰ* be rendered "with" or "after," and this *distinction* is further intimated by 2. *Πολλοὶ Ἰάκωβοι ἐκαλοῦντο* (*Lange* suppresses these words.) If *πολλοὶ* were called *Ἰάκωβοι*, there were more than two. *This* Jacobus was called *ὁ δίκαιος*, because there were many of that name; he is distinguished from the apostle Jacobus Zebedæi, who was dead, and from the apostle Jacobus who was

known as *ὁ τοῦ Ἀλφαίου* and *ὁ μικρός*. There were no other apostles bearing the name Jacobus. So *Ἰάκωβος ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου ὀνομασθεὶς ὑπὸ πάντων δίκαιος*—universally called the *Just*, must have been different from both. 3. *Hegesippus* recognizes the distinction; for while he expressly affirms that Jacobus the Just was *ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου*, he never describes Symeon, the brother of Jacobus Alphæi in that manner, but calls him *ἀνεψιός τοῦ κυρίου, ὁ ἐκ Θείου τοῦ κυρίου, ὁ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ*. Had he believed them to be identical, he certainly would not have distinguished them. This is rendered still more certain by the consideration that *Hegesippus*, in Euseb. iii. 20, speaks of the relatives of Christ as follows: "*Ἔτι δὲ περιῆσαν οἱ ἀπὸ γένους τοῦ κυρίου υἱωνοὶ Ἰούδα, τοῦ κατὰ σάρκα λεγομένου αὐτοῦ ἀδελφοῦ.*" With this statement of *Hegesippus*, Eusebius himself seems fully to agree in (H. E. iii. 19). Jacobus and Judas are mentioned as *brothers*, Symeon simply as cousin or a relative. With this agrees the following citation from the *Patres Apost.* (Clericus's new edition of Cotelier, vol. i. p. 382, produced by *Schaff*, p. 67:) "*Ἰούδας ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου μετὰ Ἰάκωβον, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφὸν, καὶ Συμεὼν, ἐξάδελφον τοῦ κυρίου . . . . ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ καθολικὴν ἐπιστολὴν, κ.τ.λ.*" We have therefore solid reasons for interpreting the testimony of *Hegesippus* in favour of the hypothesis which distinguishes Jacobus the brother of the Lord from Jacobus Alphæi.

The forementioned citation from Josephus also distinctly corroborates the assertion of Hegesippus, that Jacobus the Just was the brother of the Lord. But it is only proper to remark, that the words "brother of him who is called Christ," are judged by Le Clerc, Lardner, etc., to be spurious.

2. Next comes the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, preserved by Eusebius in Hist. Eccl. ii. 1. The full passage is as follows: *Κλήμης δὲ ἐν ἕκτῳ τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων γράφων ὧδε παρίστησι· "Πέτρον γάρ φησι καὶ Ἰακωβον καὶ Ἰωάννην μετὰ τὴν ἀνάληψιν τοῦ σωτῆρος, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὑπο τοῦ κυρίου προτετιμημένους, μὴ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι δόξης, ἀλλ' Ἰάκωβον, τὸν δίκαιον, ἐπίσκοπον Ἱεροσολύμων ἑλέσθαι. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἑβδόμῳ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔτι καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν." Ἰακώβῳ, τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ Ἰωάννῃ καὶ Πέτρῳ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν παρέδωκε τὴν γνῶσιν*

ὁ κύριος. Οὗτοι τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀποστόλοις παρέδωκαν. Οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι τοῖς ἑβδομήκοντα, ὧν εἷς ἦν καὶ Βαρνάβας. Δύο δὲ γεγόνασιν Ἰάκωβοι, εἷς ὁ δίκαιος, ὁ κατὰ τοῦ πτερυγίου βληθεὶς καὶ ὑπὸ κναφέως ξύλῳ πληγεὶς εἰς θάνατον, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ καρατομηθείς." *Αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ δικάιου καὶ ὁ Παῦλος μνημονεύει γράφων· ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων οὐκ εἶδον, εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου.* Gal. i. 19.

While the former part of this passage is anything but in favour of the identity-hypothesis, the latter part, in which Clement states *δύο δὲ γεγόνασιν Ἰάκωβοι*, seems to support it, for the *δύο Ἰάκωβοι* he mentions are clearly Jacobus the Just and Jacobus Zebedæi. But the testimony of Clement is after all of little weight, for he is notorious for historical inaccuracy—to wit, the following examples recorded in Euseb. i. 12: "Clement, in the fifth of his Hypotyposeis, in which he also mentions Cephas, of whom Paul also says, that he came to Antioch, and 'that he withstood him to his face,'—says, that one who had the same name with Peter the apostle, was one of the seventy." In the same chapter, he makes Thaddæus—one of the twelve—one of the seventy. A historian who can thus commit himself, is surely not entitled to much respect. In the same chapter of Eusebius, this self-same Clement says "that our Lord appeared to Jacobus," *εἷς δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν φερομένων τοῦ σωτῆρος μαθητῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἦν.* So that while in the former passage he says that there were two Jacobi, without saying that there were not more than two, (and the supposition of *Credner* and *Kern*, that Clement drew his information from Hegesippus, is by no means improbable—compare the words of Clement, from *ὁ κατὰ τοῦ πτερυγίου* to *εἰς θάνατον*, with the account of Hegesippus,) in the last mentioned citation he appears as a witness that Jacobus the Just was not merely a disciple, but one of the *brothers* of Christ.

3. Jerome (de vir. ill. c. 2,) cites the following passage from the Gospel according to the Hebrews: "Evangelium quoque, quod appellatur secundum Hebræos et a me nuper in græcum latinumque sermonem translatum est, quo et origenes sæpe utitur, post resurrectionem salvatoris refert: Dominus autem, quum dedisset sindonem servo sacerdotis, ivit ad Jacobum et apparuit ei. Juraverat enim Jacobus, se non comesurum panem

ab illa hora, qua biberat calicem domini, donec videret eum resurgentem a mortuis. Rursusque post paululum: Afferte, ait dominus, mensam et panem. Statimque additur: Tulit panem et benedixit, ac fregit et dedit *Jacobo Justo* et dixit ei: Frater mi, comede panem tuum, quia resurrexit filius hominis a dormientibus." It is here affirmed that Jacobus Justus was present at the institution of the Lord's Supper, while the Evangelists expressly declare that none but the twelve were present on that occasion, (Matt. xxvi. 20, Mark xiv. 17, etc., Luke xxii. 14.) Hence it is concluded that the author of the Gospel according to the Hebrews took Jacobus Justus to have been one of the twelve, and that consequently Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus Justus are identical. But the suggestion of *Herder* that the silence of the Evangelists does not prove that other persons were not present, is certainly noteworthy, and we are inclined to adopt the opinion of *Schaff*, that other intimate acquaintances of Christ, and Jacobus his brother among them, *were* present, because the other apocryphal gospels consider Jacobus the brother of the Lord to have been the son of Joseph by a former marriage, and consequently distinguish him from the apostles.

The identity of Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord, was also held by Theodoret (ad Gal. i. 19), Papias of Hierapolis, (see *Routh*, Reliq. Sacr. I. 16, 43, 230, Oxon. 1846), Chrysostom ad Gal. i. 19, and Hom. v. in Matt., through whom the hypothesis was diffused in the Greek Church, while Jerome and St. Augustine were instrumental in giving it currency in the Latin Church.

We have thus far examined the testimony from Scripture and tradition, produced in favour of the hypothesis that Jacobus the brother of the Lord and Jacobus Alphæi are identical, and reached the conclusion that it is not substantiated by either. In order to avoid confusion, and to free the text from embarrassing references to the advocates of different hypotheses, we have, as a rule, stated them in general terms, and now present a classified list of authors whose works may be consulted for more particular treatment of the question under discussion. We shall adopt the same plan with the other side of the question.

1. The *Levirate*-hypothesis, according to which Joseph and Clopas were brothers, (according to some brothers-in-law,) and

Clopas dying without issue, Joseph took his widow as his first wife, according to the Jewish custom, and that Jacobus and his brethren were the offspring of this marriage.

The principal advocate of this view is *Theophylact*, whose opinion is quoted by *Pott*, in Proleg. in Ep. Jac. p. 79: *Ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἀδελφὰς εἶχεν ὁ κύριος, τοὺς τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ παῖδας, οὓς ἔτεκεν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Κλωπᾶ γυναικός. Τοῦ γὰρ Κλωπὰ ἄπαιδος τελευτήσαντος, ὁ Ἰωσὴφ ἔλαβε κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπαιδοποίησεν ἐξ αὐτῆς παῖδας ἕξ, τέσσαρας ἄρρενας καὶ δύο θηλείας, τὴν Μαρίαν, ἡ ἐλέγετο τοῦ Κλωπᾶ θυγάτηρ κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὴν Σαλώμην.* See also *Lardner's* Credibility, p. 2, chap. 118, and Works, IV. 548, chap. 1, 163, Vol. V. 160.

2. The hypothesis that the brothers of Jesus were the sons of *Joseph* by a former wife, originated in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter, (*Origen* in Matt. xiii. 55, Op. tom. III. p. 462, E. ed. Delarue,) according to which Joseph married Mary when he was eighty years old, and the father of four sons and two daughters, (three according to Sophron. in *Lambec.* biblioth, Vindob. III. 54,) who were according to *Epiphanius* (Hæres. 78,) Jacobus, Joses, Symeon, Judas, Maria, and Salome, the children by his former wife Escha, (according to others the name of his first wife was Salome, who is said to have been related to the family of John the Baptist, *Nicoph.* H. E., 2, 3.) On the legend of Joseph's first marriage, see *Combefis* ad Amphiloch. p. 245; and on the children of that marriage, *Thilo*, Apocr. I., p. 362, sqq. *Jerome* rejects the whole story as 'deliramenta apocryphorum;' in Matt. xii. 46, contra Helvid. c. 7. This hypothesis has been adopted by *Thilo*, Apocr. I. 109, 208, 362, sqq.; *Grotius*, ad Jacob. i. 1; *Vorstius*, de heb. N. T. ed. Fischer, 71, sq.; *Paulus*, Comment. I. 613; *Bertholdt*, Einl. V. 656, etc., also by *Hilary* and *Ambrose*, *Victorinus; Taylor*, Op. V. p. 20, Lond. 1849, *Wilson*, Op. VI. p. 613, Oxf. 1859, *Cave*, Life of James, and others.

3. The hypothesis that Jacobus the brother of the Lord, and Jacobus Alphæi are identical, is held with several variations. Some of the most important have already been noticed, for others we must refer the reader to the works themselves. The following authors support this hypothesis. *Papias* of Hierapolis, see *Routh*, Reliq. Sacr. 1, 16, 43, 230, Oxon. 1846;

Clement of Alexandria (?) in Euseb. II. E. ii. 1; *St. Chrysostom*, on Gal. i. 19; *Lardner*, VI. 495, Lond. 1788; *Pearson*, Minor Works, I. 350, Oxf. 1844; and on the Creed, I. 308, II. 224, Oxf. 1833; *Thorndike*, 1, 5, Oxf. 1844; *Horne*, Introd. to H. S. IV. 427, Lond. 1834. *Natal. Alexand.*, hist. ecc. saec. 1, c. 8; *Baron.*, Annall. p. 21, 322; *Buddeus*, eccl. apost., p. 226, sq.; *Baumgarten*, Ausleg. d. Briefes Jac., p. 2; *Semler*, Paraphr. ep. Jacobi, p. 2, sq.; *Gabler*, de Jacobo Epist. eidem adscriptæ auctore, Altdorf. 1787, 4; *Eichhorn*, Einl. ins. N. T. III. 570; *Pott*, Proleg. in Ep. Jac., p. 84; *Hug*, Einl. II. 472, etc.; *Bertholt*, Einl. V. 2639, etc.; *Guerike*, Beiträge zur Einl. ins. N. T., p. 156, and Einleit. ins. N. T., p. 483, etc.; *Schneckenburger*, Annot. ad epist. Jacob., p. 141, sqq.; *Kern*, Tübinger Zeitsch. 1835, II. 111, etc.; *Meier*, Hall. Encycl. 2, s. XIV. 23, etc.; *Steiger*, Evang. K. T., 1834, No. 95, etc.; *Lange*, art. *Jacobus* in Herzog's R. E., also *Introd.* to Jacobus. (*Lange's* view may be called the adoption-theory. He makes Alphæus-Clopas the father of Symeon, the second bishop of Jerusalem, a brother of Joseph the husband of Mary the mother of Jesus, and Symeon a cousin of Jesus; Maria-Clopa was therefore Joseph's sister-in-law. Alphæus-Clopas he supposes to have died early, and Joseph to have taken his widow, with her sons, (the sons of Alphæus,) into his family, and to have become their foster-father; so that Joseph was *legally* their father, and the sons and daughters of Alphæus his *adopted* children. They would thus be considered as the brothers and sisters of Jesus. Lange tries in this way to steer clear of the Levirate-hypothesis. This expedient is certainly ingenious, but unfortunately purely conjectural.) *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible, art. *James*, and others.

We have now to consider the view according to which Jacobus the brother of the Lord and Jacobus Alphæi are *not* identical, but different persons.

I. Arguments drawn from Holy Writ.

After what has been said on the brothers of the Lord being the issue of Joseph by a former wife, or by the widow of his deceased brother, that on neither supposition they could be called his brothers, (because Joseph was not his father,) there

remains only the hypothesis that they were the sons of Joseph and Mary the mother of Jesus, and that consequently Jacobus the brother of the Lord is *not* identical with Jacobus Alphæi. The question, which of these two was the author of the General Epistle, or whether the authorship is to be referred to a third Jacobus, we hold for the present in abeyance.

1. The first intimations that Jesus was not the *only* child of Mary, are given in the following passages:

Matt. i. 25: "*Οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν αὐτὴν ἕως οὗ ἔτεκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον.*"

Luke ii. 7: "*Καὶ ἔτεκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον.*"

To an unbiassed mind, the conclusion drawn from the expressions *οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν αὐτὴν ἕως οὗ* and *πρωτότοκον*, that Joseph *did* know her afterwards, and that she had *other children*, must appear irresistible.

Much ingenuity has been employed to render this inference nugatory. It has been said that it was not the design of the Evangelists to say what took place after the event, but simply to affirm that Joseph knew her not before the birth of her first-born. But this is shirking the question. The Evangelists wrote the Gospels after the events they record had occurred. They are chroniclers of the past. And this is an important consideration. They say that until she had brought forth her first-born, he knew her not. Does this not imply that he did know her afterwards? It is contended that a negation before *ἕως* is not an affirmation after it, and that *ἕως οὗ* is here used like the Hebrew עַד אֲשֶׁר ,עַד בִּי to denote not only the time up to the limit, but also the time beyond it; and in support of this statement, early ecclesiastical writers, and many modern ones after them, have cited several passages from Holy Writ, in which the specific particles are used; these we now proceed to examine. In Gen. xxviii. 15, God said to Jacob: "I will be with thee, and will not leave thee *till* I have done that which I have spoken to thee of." Now, if this refers to the blessing promised to his seed, "that it should inherit the land of Canaan," God could not leave him afterward, because he was long before with God; or if it refers to God being with him going down to Padan-Aram, till he had brought him safe from thence, then the reason of that promise ceased after his return; or lastly

because the reason of the thing still remains, as when it is said of the sepulchre of Moses, "no man knoweth of it till this day." For the same reason, no man does, or without a revelation, will know of it for ever. Now these cases present no parallel to the case of Joseph; in the former the thing was impossible *per se*, whereas, in the latter, it was probable *per se*. Another passage adduced is 2 Sam. vi. 23, where it is said that "Michal had no child *till* the day of her death." Of course, she could not have one after her death. In Matt. xxviii. 20, our Lord promised, saying; "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world;" of course as long as the disciples continued teaching the nations to observe all things whatsoever he had commanded them, (see also Ps. cx. 1, 1 Sam. xv. 35, Job xxvii. 5, Is. xxii. 14, cf. *Pearson*, art. 3; *Whitby* on Matt. i. 25, and *Suicer*, Thes. ecc. s. v. ἕως 1, 1294. All these passages are as dissimilar as possible from the case under notice; they deal with impossibilities and cannot mislead any one; but here we have a probability, because Mary was his wife, and the reason why he should not know her before the birth of Jesus ceased after he was born. Even *St. Basil* felt constrained to admit that till she had brought forth her first-born, her virginity was necessary, that a virgin might conceive and bear a son, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἀπολυπραγμώτατον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ μυστηρίου καταλείψομεν, "but what she was afterward, let us leave undiscussed, as being of small concern to the mystery."

We neither hold that the negation before the event implies the affirmation after it, nor that the negation before the event implies the negation after it; but we do hold that it is impossible to lay down a general rule, because the circumstances must vary in each case as it occurs, and it is our province to determine the possibility, or to weigh the probability on the reverse in each case. The consideration of ἑῶς οὗ, for the reasons already stated, leads us to affirm that conjugal intercourse between Joseph and Mary, after the birth of Jesus, was probable. This probability becomes greater by the use of the word πρωτότοκος, "first-born." It is argued that this is a Hebraism, denoting, in the language of *Jerome* (adv. Helvid.), "is qui vulvam aperit et ante quem nullus est genitus, non quem frater post genitus subsequitur;" and that its proper

meaning must be gathered from Exod. xiii. 2: "Sanctify unto me all the first-born, whatsoever openeth the womb (כָּל־בְּכוֹר פֶּטֶר כָּל־רֶחֶם) among the children of Israel, both of man and of beast." This made every first-born, whether followed by any second-born or not, sanctified to the Lord, and therefore included all cases in which there was only one offspring. But this does not surely exclude the possibility of more offspring than one. And here we must lay stress on the fact, already mentioned, that the evangelists were chroniclers of the past; "they narrate the history as something that is finished," (*Winer*, R. W., p. 567, note); their calling Jesus the first-born son of Mary seems therefore to imply that they knew of children subsequently born to her, (see *Neander*, Life of Christ, p. 32, note). If they had intended to say that Jesus was Mary's only son, the word *μονογενής* would have answered their purpose better than the ambiguous *πρωτότοκος*. This consideration induced *Eunomius* to infer from Matt. i. 25, "*εἰ πρωτότοκος ὁ υἱός, οὐκέτι μονογενής*," and *Herder* (Op. p. 189) to ask: "If the reference were to any other person than Jesus, who would not be ashamed to waste another word on and against such clear testimony?" The conclusion of *Schaff* (p. 40) is therefore sound, that "it is more natural to take the expression *in the mouth of Matthew, and in connection with the passages of the brothers of Jesus*, in its proper sense, as indeed the *πρωτότοκος* in Rom. viii. 29; Col. i. 15, 18; Heb. i. 6, xi. 28, xii. 23; Rev. i. 5; although used in a different sense, refers nevertheless to something that is to follow."

Once more, if it is said that Joseph knew not Mary *before* she had brought forth her first-born son, because she had been overshadowed by the Holy Ghost, nor *afterwards*, for the same reason, (because he, being a just man, argued that she was consecrated to the Lord,) we reply, that the angel expressly said to Joseph, "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife (*τὴν γυναῖκα σου*)," Matt. i. 20, without any intimation that conjugal intercourse should not take place between them; and Joseph, being a just man, and tenacious of the Jewish rites, would deem it his duty to keep the law (Exod. xxi. 10, see *Selden*, de Uxor. lib. iii. 4, G.); that he lived with her at least twelve years, and that on the supposition that the negation before the

birth of Jesus continued after it, it is hard to understand why Mary was married at all. This difficulty was perceived at an early date, and gave rise to the silly tradition that Joseph was eighty years old when he married Mary—the object being to remove all possibility of her having had offspring by Joseph.

2. The presumption that the brothers of Jesus were the sons of Joseph and Mary is made stronger by the fact that they are called *brothers* by the Evangelists. They are *constantly* called *ἀδελφοί*, not *ἀνεψιοί* or *συγγενεῖς*. The last two words are actually used in the New Testament; and if the brothers of Jesus were not really his *ἀδελφοί*, but *ἀνεψιοί* or *συγγενεῖς*, we may reasonably expect that these less ambiguous terms would have been selected. Having already examined the objections against the literal sense of *ἀδελφός* in the former part of this article (see page 7), we may therefore in order to avoid repetition produce at once the passages containing the word *ἀδελφοί*, applied to Jesus.

John ii. 12: *Μετὰ τοῦτο κατέβη εἰς Καπερναοὺμ, αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ.* His *mother* and his *brothers* are here mentioned conjointly. Is there anything in the text to distinguish his mother from his brothers? If Mary was really his mother, what is here to intimate that the *ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ* were his *ἀνεψιοὶ* or *συγγενεῖς?* Here the *ἀδελφοὶ* are also expressly distinguished from the *μαθηταὶ;* the *ἀδελφοὶ* were not *μαθηταὶ.*

John vii. 3: *Εἶπον οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ· Μετάβηθι ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ ὕπαγε εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν, ἵνα καὶ οἱ μαθηταί σοῦ θεωρήσωσι τὰ ἔργα σοῦ ἃ ποιεῖς.* Verse 5: *Οὐδὲ γάρ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπίστευον εἰς αὐτόν.* Here again the disciples are distinguished from the brothers; and the reason is given, that his brothers did not believe in him. The *brothers* (whoever they were) *could not* therefore have belonged to the number of the twelve.

Matt. xii. 47—50 (cf. Mark iii. 31, and Luke viii. 19): *Εἶπε δέ τις αὐτῷ· Ἰδοὺ, ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοί σου ἔξω ἑστήκασι, ζητοῦντές σοι λαλῆσαι. Ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπε τῷ εἰπόντι αὐτῷ· Τίς ἐστιν ἡ μήτηρ μου; καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ἀδελφοί μου; καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ, εἶπεν· Ἰδοὺ, ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοί μου. Ὅστις γὰρ ἂν ποιήσῃ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ*

πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς, αὐτός μου ἀδελφὸς, καὶ ἀδελφὴ, καὶ μήτηρ ἐστίν.* The gist of this passage is manifestly the antithesis our Lord establishes between his real mother and brothers and his spiritual, ethical brothers, sisters, and mother. On any other supposition, such an antithesis is simply inconceivable and pointless. If Mary was his *real* mother, his brothers were his *real* brothers. There is nothing in the whole passage to warrant an essential distinction between *μήτηρ* and *ἀδελφὸς;* and the absurdity of such an essential distinction is well put by *Schaff* (p. 43), who proposes to translate *ἀδελφὸς* and *ἀδελφὴ*, by cousin and relative: "For whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, the same is my *cousin*, my *relative* and *mother*." This *reductio ad absurdum* alone ought to convince any unprejudiced believer in the *ἀειπαρθενία*.

Matt. xiii. 55, 56 (cf. Mark vi. 3, Luke iv. 22, John vi. 42). *Οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ τέκτονος υἱός; οὐχὶ ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ λέγεται Μαριὰμ, καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ Ἰάκωβος καὶ Ἰωσῆς καὶ Σίμων καὶ Ἰούδας; καὶ αἱ ἀδελφαὶ αὐτοῦ οὐχὶ πᾶσαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰσι; πόθεν οὖν τούτῳ ταῦτα πάντα;*

His countrymen expressed the utmost astonishment that the carpenter's son, with whose mother, brothers, and sisters they were well acquainted, should be so distinguished for wisdom and mighty works. To them he was simply the carpenter's son, Mary his mother the carpenter's wife, and his brothers and sisters the carpenter's children. Those simple people knew nothing of the extraordinary circumstances of his origin, or, if they did, they believed them not. They looked upon the family of Joseph as upon any other family, and saw in Jacobus, Joses, Simon, and Judas, and the sisters, actual brothers and sisters of Jesus. They were not kindly disposed toward Jesus, and saw in him an enthusiast, if not an impostor; they were therefore the last persons to use ambiguous language concerning him. The fact that his real brothers, sisters, and

* It is noteworthy that our Lord's reply is an incidental corroboration of the statement that he had brothers and *sisters*. His mother and brothers only are mentioned as being desirous to see him. He replies, most probably from habit, that all who do the will of his Father are to him brother, and *sister*, and mother.

mother were living among them, and well known to them, occasioned their surprise, and doubtless their anger. Had those brothers and sisters been cousins and relatives, the surprise would hardly be intelligible. We conclude therefore that here also the reference is to *real* brothers and sisters, and not to *ἀνεψιοί* and *συγγενεῖς*. Summing up all these arguments against the *ἀειπαρθενία*, any one of which is singly stronger than those produced by the advocates of that doctrine, and adding the circumstance noticed already (on page 7), that these brothers of Jesus are *always* in the company of Mary his mother, the conclusion is almost irresistible, that those four brothers and those sisters were the sons and daughters of Joseph and Mary, and consequently the *actual*, real brothers and sisters of Jesus.

But before we pass on, the fact must be noted, that three of the Evangelists agree in this enumeration of brothers and sisters, *after* Jesus had chosen the twelve. They are thus distinguished by name from the apostles and the *unbelieving* brothers of Jesus (we consider that *all* were unbelieving until after the resurrection), consequently could not be identical with any of the apostles whose names were the same as their own. Turning to Acts i. 13, we have distinct confirmation of the view taken; for St. Luke, after specifying the names of the eleven remaining apostles, including Jacobus Zebedæi and Jacobus Alphæi, continues thus: *Οὗτοι πάντες ἦσαν προσκαρτεροῦντες ὁμοθυμαδὸν τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ τῇ δεήσει, σὺν γυναιξὶ, καὶ Μαρίᾳ τῇ μητρὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, καὶ σὺν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς αὐτοῦ:* that is, he first names the apostles, and then specifies the mother and brothers of Jesus, which he would not and could not have done if the brothers of Jesus had been apostles. If it is contended that *some* of the brothers did not believe in him, while *others* did, because it is not expressly said that *all* the brothers of Jesus did not believe in him, we reply, that if this were so, the Evangelists would in all probability have said so; but their silence leads us to infer that none did believe in him before his resurrection. The analogy of faith compels us to draw this inference; for the opposite conclusion would deprive the passages we have already noticed, of their point. Our argument may not appear conclusive in every particular, but all the par-

ticulars taken together make it overwhelmingly so. But not to anticipate. The advocates of the identity are apt to cite the last passage in which the brothers of Jesus are mentioned, as the corner-stone of their theory. It is 1 Cor. ix. 5: ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Κηφᾶς. They say that Peter, who was an apostle, is here excluded from the apostolic band, and the brothers of the Lord being equally excluded, there is surely room for the presumption that some of them also were apostles; for if Paul did not hesitate to distinguish Peter from the apostles (without thereby destroying his apostolical standing), why should the Evangelists, distinguishing the brothers of the Lord, exclude them from the number of the apostles? We answer, first, that the parallel is not complete; in the case of Peter an isolated distinction is made for a particular purpose, in that of the brothers of the Lord it is constant. Second, any one consulting the context can readily perceive that Peter, so far from being excluded from the apostolic band, is rather singled out on account of his commanding position, and the esteem in which he was held by a strong party in the Corinthian church. St. Paul names first the other apostles, then the brothers of the Lord, and lastly κατ' ἐξοχήν, Peter, the high authority of the Petrine party at Corinth.

Examination, therefore, leads to the opposite result; that is, we have also in this passage a distinct line drawn between the apostles and the brothers of the Lord. Without a long recapitulation, we only wish to emphasize once more one of the strong points of our argument, which is and ever must remain a veritable rock of offence to those who take the opposite view. We have seen that St. Matthew specifies by name *all* the four brothers of the Lord, after he had enumerated the apostles (cf. Matt. xiii. 55 with x. 2—4). It will not do to impugn the chronology of Matthew (as *Schneckenburger* has done), for John and Mark's chronology fully accords with that of Matthew. The fact that three of the Evangelists (two of the Synoptics and St. John) agree in distinguishing the brothers of Jesus from the apostles, *after* these had been called, is very stubborn; but even this is less stubborn than John vii. 3, etc., above cited. *Alford* considers it the crowning difficulty in the

way of the identity-hypothesis; and *Schaff* affirms that it supplies the reason why it is *impossible* that the brothers of Jesus could have been *apostles*. For let us realize the exact situation of things. Our Lord had been in Galilee for some time; he had not gone to the passover at Jerusalem, and the great feast of tabernacles was near at hand. His *brothers* urge him to go into Judæa, "ἵνα καὶ οἱ μαθηταί σου θεωρήσωσι τὰ ἔργα σου, ἃ ποιεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν κρυπτῷ τι ποιεῖ καὶ ζητεῖ αὐτὸς ἐν παρρησίᾳ εἶναι· εἰ ταῦτα ποιεῖς, φανέρωσον σεαυτὸν τῷ κόσμῳ." The Evangelist informs us (ver. 1) that Jesus walked in Galilee, and would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill him. He had already told us in chap. vi. 66, that many of his disciples had deserted him, and in ver. 68, that the twelve, with the exception of Judas Iscariot, remained faithful. Now his brothers want him to go to Judæa for the alleged purpose that his disciples there might see his works; and they assign the reason of their advice in the words, that "no man doeth anything in secret, and yet *himself* seeketh to be known openly." What is the import of these words? Are they the language of friends, and expressive of their solicitude for his welfare? Hardly so; for the danger to which he was exposed in Judæa, and the desertion of many of his disciples, must have been known to his brothers; if they sought to promote his welfare, they would not have urged him to hasten to a region of peril; if they wanted him to be acknowledged by the great authorities at Jerusalem, why the doubt which they cast on his works, in the words, "*If* thou doest these things, show thyself to the world"? It is manifest that they had no faith in him, for St. John immediately adds, by way of accounting for their singular speech, "οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπίστευον εἰς αὐτόν." While we cannot consider their advice to have been friendly, we recoil from the idea that they tendered it (as some have thought) with malicious intent, that he might come to grief, and consider the whole speech to be simply ironical. They thought he would not go to the feast, because he feared the Jews, they therefore taunted him with the advice to go, and with the manifest contradiction between his obscure stay in Galilee and his pretensions to a greatness they discredited. This irony is particularly

brought out by the *αὐτός* and the *εἰ ταῦτα ποιεῖς*, etc., in ver. 4. Now is it possible that some of those who thus spoke to him were apostles? St. John surely cannot include among those who did not believe in him (chap. vii. 5) any of the twelve, whom he reports immediately before (chap. vi. 68, 69) to have declared through Simon Peter, their spokesman: "Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." The same result follows from a comparison of what our Lord said to his brothers with what he said to the disciples. The former he told (John vii. 7), "*οὐ δύναται ὁ κόσμος μισεῖν ὑμᾶς*," while he said to the latter (John xv. 18, 19), "*Εἰ ὁ κόσμος ὑμᾶς μισεῖ, γινώσκετε ὅτι ἐμὲ πρῶτων ὑμῶν μεμίσηκεν. Εἰ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἦτε, ὁ κόσμος ἂν τὸ ἴδιον ἐφίλει· ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἐστὲ, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐξελεξάμην ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, διὰ τοῦτο μισεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κόσμος.*" If any of the apostles had been his brothers, he would have affirmed of them in one place what he denied of them in another, and the whole account from John vi. 66—vii. 10, would be full of contradictions, and unintelligible. Sound reasoning compels us therefore to conclude that this passage imperatively excludes the brothers of Jesus from the number of the twelve.

The reasons produced against our view of this passage may be briefly noticed. *Pott* and others (see *Winer*, R. W., art. *Jacobus*, and *Smith*, Dict. of the Bible, art. *James*, also *Schaff*, p. 50, 51) urge that the Evangelist says, "*οἱ ἀδελφοί*," not "*πάντες οἱ ἀδελφοί*," and argue that some of them may have been believers, others disbelievers. But if three of the brothers (no matter who they were) were apostles, and consequently believers, then the *οἱ ἀδελφοί* must refer to the remaining Joses; or if Simon and Joses and the sisters were disbelieving, whence comes this information? The Evangelist simply says *οἱ ἀδελφοί*, and gives not the faintest intimation that he meant only part of their number. If it is said that the *ἀδελφοί* are the *cousins*, not the brothers of Jesus, it includes of course those of their number who were apostles, and this involves, if the force of *οὐκ ἐπίστευον* is not diluted, the distinction of the brothers from the apostles. This is done by *Olshausen* (Comm. ad loc.), who is however inconsistent, for he rejects on dogmatical prejudices

the hypothesis that our Lord had actual brothers. Most of those who cling to the opinion that the ἀδελφοί were the cousins of Jesus are driven to get over the difficulty by diluting the force of οὐκ ἐπίστευον. They represent the brothers to have had no "plena persuasio de dignitate Christi Messiana" (*Pott*), to have still clung to their own Messianic ideas, and to have hesitated to *confide* in Jesus as the Messiah (*Lange*). But while we are ready to admit that even the *faith* of the twelve was at that time far from complete, and that the brothers of Jesus were not inimically and absolutely unbelievers, we cannot convince ourselves that any diluting of οὐκ ἐπίστευον is sufficient to qualify the brothers to have belonged to the number of the twelve. A candid examination of the whole passage (John vi. 66—vii. 10) cannot lead to any other result.

It is also true that πιστεύειν is used by John in a sense which denotes a very low degree of faith (cf. John ii. 23, 24, xii. 42, 43); but how does this bear on the question under discussion? Does it justify the dilution of οὐκ ἐπίστευον? We think not, for if John actually extends the use of πιστεύειν to persons who believed in Jesus, but to whom Jesus did not commit himself (viz., in whom he had no confidence), and to the chief rulers, who because of the Pharisees did not confess him, because they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God, what must have been *their* state of mind, of whom the same Evangelist declares that *they did not believe* in Christ? To believe that these οὐκ πιστεύοντες may have been *apostles*, is to believe anything (see *Schaff*, p. 54, 55). Reason compels us therefore to maintain our view, that *none* of the brothers of the Lord could have been apostles, because they did not believe in Christ, while the apostles did believe in him, and that consequently Jacobus Alphæi the apostle is distinct from Jacobus the brother of the Lord.

3. In Acts i. 13, 14, the persons who continued with one accord in prayer and supplication are enumerated as follows: 1, the apostles (of course without Judas Iscariot); 2, the holy women; 3, Mary the mother of Jesus; 4, the brothers of Jesus. It follows from this enumeration, 1, that the brothers of Jesus were now converted; 2, that they were not apostles, for they are expressly distinguished from the apostles; and

that consequently Jacobus the *brother* of the Lord is distinct from Jacobus Alphæi the apostle.

Our conclusion is not invalidated by the introduction of Judas Jacobi; for, 1. He was an apostle, and therefore could not be identical with Judas the brother of the Lord, because the brothers of Jesus are here distinguished from the apostles. 2. *Ἰούδας Ἰάκωβου* cannot have been the brother of *Ἰάκωβος* the brother of the Lord, for St. Luke mentions him by this designation among the twelve, when they were chosen by Christ (Luke vi. 16); for it has already been shown that the brothers of Jesus were disbelievers before his resurrection. 3. The ellipsis in *Ἰούδας Ἰάκωβου* therefore cannot be supplied by the unusual "brother," but the analogy of almost universal usage compels us to supply it by the usual "son," (it is so supplied in every other case of the apostolic catalogues,) and "to follow the Peshito and Arabic versions, the Benedictine editor of Chrysostom, Hom. 32 in Matt. x. 2, the translation of Luther and nearly all the most eminent critical authorities, and render the words 'Judas the *son* of Jacobus,' *i. e.*, either Jacobus Alphæi, with whom he is coupled in Matt. x. 3, or some otherwise unknown person." (See *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible, art. *Jude*). 4. Judas the brother of the Lord was therefore most probably "Judas the brother of Jacobus" (*i. e.*, of Jacobus the brother of the Lord), and author of the Epistle of Jude (Jude 1).

4. Acts xii. 17, and onwards, a Jacobus is mentioned without any further designation. This Jacobus we consider to be Jacobus the brother of the Lord, for the following reasons: 1. This Jacobus, as head of the Jerusalem church, appears to occupy in Acts precisely the position which Paul assigns in Gal. i. 19, to Jacobus the brother of the Lord. 2. He cannot be Jacobus Alphæi, because St. Luke, as has been shown in the preceding section, distinguishes *all* the apostles from the brothers of the Lord. After enumerating the apostles, he says, "*οὗτοι πάντες ἦσαν . . . . καὶ σὺν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς αὐτοῦ*," Acts i. 14. 3. He cannot be Jacobus Zebedæi, because Herod had killed him with the sword. Acts xii. 1, 2.

If it be objected that it is impossible to imagine Jacobus Alphæi to have vanished from the stage, we answer, that the

author of Acts drops other apostles as well. We look in vain for any record of Matthew, Thomas, Philip, Jude, Bartholomew, Andrew, Simon, and Matthias. St. Luke's main design was to give an account of the life and acts of Paul; his silence about other apostles is therefore by no means surprising.

If it be objected that Luke, who is generally so very accurate, would hardly have introduced a third Jacobus without giving some account of his antecedents or origin, we reply, that the self-same Luke introduces in the same manner Philip; and the fact that he adverts to Jacobus without any further designation, when he was in the habit of describing the two apostles of that name by some qualifying addition, argues in favour of our hypothesis. He means that Jacobus, who in virtue of his prominent position required no further designation, because he was universally known as *the* Jacobus, the head of the Jerusalem church, and the brother of the Lord.

5. The Epistles of Paul contain five references to a Jacobus, 1 Cor. ix. 5, xv. 7; Gal. i. 19, ii. 9, 12, 13. This Jacobus we believe to be the brother of the Lord, because, 1, in Gal. i. 19, Paul distinctly affirms that he met at Jerusalem "*Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου*;" 2, he distinguishes in 1 Cor. ix. 5, the apostles from the brothers of the Lord; 3, therefore it is improbable that he would confound Jacobus the brother of the Lord with another Jacobus; 4, Paul speaks of this Jacobus as of a man well known to his readers, and this points unmistakably to Jacobus the brother of the Lord, the celebrated head of the Jerusalem church; 5, this view is sustained by the explicit testimony of early Christian authors, as we shall see by and by.

The hypothesis, according to which Paul is made to refer now to one Jacobus and then to another, is altogether conjectural and arbitrary; it is therefore not necessary to discuss the merits of the objections which, on the strength of those conjectures, are advanced against our view. But we may here add, that we render Gal. i. 19, *ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων οὐκ εἶδον, εἰ μὴ Ἰάκωβον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου;* "another of the apostles saw I not, but *I saw* Jacobus, the brother of the Lord." That is, we adopt the view of *Fritzsche*, *Clemen*, *Credner*, *Neander*, *Herder*, *Hess*, and *Alford*, that *εἰ μὴ* qualifies the

whole clause, and not ἕτερον only, and hold that Jacobus the brother of the Lord was not an apostle. In the same sense we take 1 Cor. xv. 7, ἔπειτα ὤφθη Ἰακώβῳ, εἶτα τοῖς ἀποστόλοις πᾶσιν, which we render "afterwards he was seen by Jacobus; then by all the apostles;" that is, Jacobus is distinguished from the apostles. This view appears to us on the whole more consistent and less confusing than the explanation that Paul included Jacobus among the apostles, but not among the twelve, because he considered him entitled to that appellation in virtue of his eminent position as Bishop of Jerusalem. We have already shown that the word "apostle" is used in this lax sense, but for the reasons given, we prefer the view we advocate.

6. The author of the Catholic Epistle describes himself as "Ἰάκωβος Θεοῦ καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος." He could not have been Jacobus Zebedæi, because at the time of his execution (Acts xii. 2), which took place only seven years after the martyrdom of Stephen, the state of the church, the number of Jewish Christians in the dispersion, and the doctrines discussed in the Epistle, point to a later date.

It is improbable that Jacobus Alphæi was the author of this Epistle, because he was an apostle, and would have introduced himself by the designation "Apostle," rather than the more vague "a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ." This circumstance alone, however, would not be decisive, for Paul does not invariably call himself an apostle in his Epistles, (Phil. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1; Philemon 1), and John describes himself simply as πρεσβύτερος, but considering that the author of the Epistle of Jude calls himself the brother of Jacobus, (Jude 1.) and not an apostle, that he appears to exclude himself from the number of the apostles in v. 17, that this Judas is, by general consent, regarded to have been the brother of Jacobus, the celebrated head of the Jerusalem church, that the contents of the Epistle of Jacobus point unmistakably to Jacobus the brother of the Lord, as its author, we are constrained to conclude that Jacobus the brother of the Lord and not Jacobus Alphæi the apostle, wrote this Epistle.

To sum up, the hypothesis which distinguishes Jacobus Alphæi the apostle, from Jacobus the brother of the Lord,

rests upon the following argument drawn from Holy Scripture.

1. The force of ἕως οὗ ἔτεκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον renders it highly probable that Joseph and Mary were the parents of sons and daughters younger than Jesus.

2. This probability is strengthened by the fact that the Evangelists mention brothers and sisters of Jesus.

3. That these brothers of Jesus could not have been apostles, because they remained disbelievers during the lifetime of Jesus, and that even after their conversion, they are still distinguished from the apostles.

4. That the Jacobus referred to in Acts xii. 17, and onwards, cannot have been any other than Jacobus the brother of the Lord.

5. That Paul in his Epistles makes mention of Jacobus the brother of the Lord, and distinguishes the brothers of the Lord from the apostles.

6. That the author of the Epistle General appears to have been Jacobus the brother of the Lord.

To this argument drawn from Holy Scripture, we must still add the testimony of early tradition.

II. Arguments drawn from *Holy Writ against* the identity of Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord.

We have already seen in the former part of this article, that the testimony of Hegesippus is decidedly in favour of the hypothesis which distinguishes Jacobus Alphæi from Jacobus the brother of the Lord, and that the questionable passage in Josephus, (Ant. xx. 9,) corroborates that view. In addition to these we have still to notice the following testimony: 1. In the second epistle of Pseudo-*Ignatius* ad Johannem (Patres apost. ed. Coteler; edited by Clericus, Antwerp, 1698, Vol. 2, p. 127,) we read as follows: "Si licitum est mihi apud te, ad Hierosolymæ partes volo ascendere et videre fideles sanctos, qui ibi sunt, præcipue Mariam matrem Jesu, quam dicunt universis admirandam et cunctis desiderabilem. Quem enim non delectet, videre eam et alloqui, quæ verum Deum de se peperit, si nostrae sit fidei et religionis amicus? Similiter et illum venerabilem Jacobum, qui cognominatur Justus? quem referunt Christo Jesu simillimum facie, vita et modo conversa-

tionis, ac ejusdem uteri frater esset gemellus. Quem dicunt, si videro, video et ipsum Jesum secundum omnia corporis lineamenta." The last clause we cite in English. "Likewise, also, that venerable Jacobus, surnamed the Just? who is reported to be very much like Christ Jesus in countenance, in his life and manner of conversation, as if he were his twin-brother, whom, if I shall have seen, they say that I see Jesus himself according to all the features of the body."

2. The passage in the pseudo-*Clementine* Homilies, Hom. xi. 35 (*Patr. Apost.* ut supra I., p. 700), makes Peter speak thus: "*Ὁ ἀποστείλας ἡμᾶς Κύριος ἡμῶν καὶ προφήτης ὑφηγήσατο ἡμῖν, ὡς ὁ πονηρὸς τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας διαλεχθεὶς αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν δυνηθεὶς πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπηκόων ἐπηγγέλλετο πρὸς ἀπάτην ἀποστόλους πέμψαι. Διὸ πρὸ πάντων μέμνησθε ἀποστόλου ἢ διδάσκαλον ἢ προφήτην, μὴ πρότερον ἀντιβάλλοντα αὐτοῦ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰακώβῳ, τῷ λεχθέντι ἀδελφῷ τοῦ Κυρίου μου, καὶ πεπιστευμένῳ ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν Ἑβραίων διέπειν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ μετὰ μαρτύρων προσεληλυθότι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.*" The *τῷ λεχθέντι ἀδελφῷ τοῦ Κυρίου μου* does not denote any doubt, as *Credner* supposes, but simply states the current report that he was considered the brother of the Lord, although he was so only on the mother's side; he was called brother, although in reality he was only the Lord's half-brother.

The *Recognitiones Divi Clementis*, belonging to the second century, contain the following passages. Lib. i., c. 43 (*Patr. Apost.* ut supra I., p. 497): "Et ecclesia Domini in Hierusalem constituta copiosissime multiplicata crescebat, per Jacobum, qui a Domino ordinatus est in Episcopum, rectissimis dispensationibus gubernata." Ibid. c. 44: "Quum autem nos duodecim apostoli ad diem Paschæ cum ingenti multitudine convenissemus, ingressi ecclesiam fratrum unusquisque nostrum, Jacobo interrogante, quæ a nobis per loco singula gesta sint, audiente populo, breviter exponimus." In c. 68, Jacobus is called "Episcoporum et sacerdotum princeps;" cf. c. 69, 70, 73. (In the Epistola ad Jacobum, ed. *Patr. Apost.* ut supra I., p. 602, Peter addresses Jacobus as follows: "*Πέτρος Ἰακώβῳ, τῷ κυρίῳ, καὶ ἐπισκόπῳ τῆς ἁγίας ἐκκλησίας, κ.τ.λ.*;" and Clement, in Epist. ad Jacobum, ibid. I., p. 605, "*Κλήμης Ἰακώβῳ, τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ ἐπισκόπων ἐπισκόπῳ, κ.τ.λ.*" This is the more

remarkable, because Peter is called in the same Epistle, c. i., "ὁ τῶν ἀποστόλων πρῶτος." Thus while Peter is declared to be the *first* of the apostles, Jacobus is set over all the apostles as the bishop of bishops). In lib. i. c. 35 (*Patr. Apost.* I., p. 544), Propter quod observate cautius, ut nulli doctorum credatis, nisi qui Jacobi, fratris Domini, ex Hierusalem detulerit testimonium cet.

To these already very distinct and explicit testimonies against the identity of Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord, we have still to add the following extracts from the *Constitutiones Sanctorum Apostolorum*, etc., which, like the Homilies and Recognitions, are also ascribed to Clement of Rome, although they are one and all undoubtedly spurious. Still the testimony of the Constitutions is of the greatest importance, because the first six books originated in the third century, in Syria, in the very region which was most influenced by the church of Jerusalem, and where the memory of Jacobus was held peculiarly sacred. It is also to be remembered that in Syria the Epistle of Jacobus was first received into the Canon of the New Testament. But let us hear the Constitutions, lib. ii., c. 55: ". . . . δὶ ἡμῶν τῶν δώδεκα καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἐκλογῆς σκεύους Παύλου· ἡμεῖς οὖν, οἱ καταξιωθέντες εἶναι μάρτυρες τῆς παρουσίας αὐτοῦ, σὺν Ἰακώβῳ τῷ τοῦ Κυρίου ἀδελφῷ καὶ ἑτέροις ἑβδομήκοντα δύο μαθηταῖς καὶ ἑπτὰ διακόνοις αὐτοῦ ἐκ στόματος τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἠκούσαμεν, κ.τ.λ. This passage clearly distinguishes Jacobus from the twelve, and classes him among the seventy-two disciples. (*Cotelier* has here the following note (I., p. 259, note 23): "Ita solet Jacobum, fratrem Domini, episcopum primum Hierosolymorum, ex albo apostolorum expungere ac tres Jacobos enumerare, duos apostolos, Zebedæi filium, et filium Alphæi prætereaque hunc Hierosolymitanum. *Quam sententiam Æthiopes*, a quibus constitutionum codex pro sacro habetur, *in missa sua amplectuntur, consentientibus tum Syris, tum a tempore multo Græcis.* Contra Latini duos in officio ecclesiastico agnoscunt dumtaxat Jacobos, utrumque apostolum, nempe Zebedæi illum fratrem Joannis et hunc Alphæi prognatum, qui sit etiam frater Domini ac episcopus sanctæ civitatis." Here we may further add the note of *Bovius* in *Gruter's* edition of *Clem. Rom.*, p. 333: "Noli

mirari Jacobum fratrem Domini extra duodecim app. numeratum, fuit enim hæc constans non modo *Clementis*, sed etiam *Eusebii*, *Epiphanii*, *Ambrosii* atque *aliorum* sententia, cui non obstat, quod in Ep. ad Gal. Paulus eum apostolum nominat et columnam, quam ampliori vocabulo dicti sint apostoli alii, qui præter duodecim ad propagandam evang. missi, apostolatus munere fungebantur, quemadmodum dicimus *S. Martialem* apostolum Galliarum fuisse cet.") In lib. vi. c. 12, we read, "*ἡμεῖς οἱ δώδεκα συνελθόντες εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ . . . ἐπεσκεπτόμεθα ἅμα Ἰακώβῳ, τῷ τοῦ Κυρίου ἀδελφῷ, τί γένηται.* Here the twelve are distinguished from Jacobus. In lib. vi. c. 13, there are enumerated first, *οἱ κηρύξαντες τὴν καθολικὴν διδασκαλίαν*, as follows: "*Πέτρος καὶ Ἀνδρέας, Ἰάκωβος καὶ Ἰωάννης, υἱοὶ Ζεβεδαίου, Φίλιππος καὶ Βαρθολομαῖος, Θωμᾶς καὶ Ματθαῖος, Ἰάκωβος Ἁλφαίου καὶ Λεββαῖος, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θαδδαῖος, καὶ Σίμων ὁ Κανανίτης, καὶ Ματθίας, ὁ ἀντὶ Ἰούδα καταψηφισθεὶς ἡμῖν;*" and then, "*Ἰάκωβός τε, ὁ τοῦ Κυρίου ἀδελφὸς καὶ Ἱεροσολύμων ἐπίσκοπος, καὶ Παῦλος, ὁ τῶν ἐθνῶν διδάσκαλος, τὸ σκεῦος τῆς ἐκλογῆς.*" Here Jacobus, the brother of the Lord and bishop of Jerusalem, is clearly distinguished from the twelve. Again, lib. vii. c. 46 (p. 382): "*Ἰάκωβος ὁ τοῦ Κυρίου ἀδελφὸς, Συμεὼν ὁ τοῦ Κλεόπα καὶ Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου,*" are mentioned as the first three bishops of Jerusalem; lib. viii. c. 35 (p. 416): "*Κἀγὼ Ἰάκωβος ἀδελφὸς μὲν κατὰ σάρκα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, δοῦλος δὲ ὡς Θεοῦ μονογενοῦς, ἐπίσκοτος δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων Ἱεροσολύμων χειροτονηθείς, κ.τ.λ.*" And lastly, lib. viii. c. 46 (p. 422): "*Ὑπὸ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς οἱ δεκατρεῖς ἀπόστολοι* (sc. *κατεστάθημεν*) *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐγὼ Ἰάκωβος καὶ ἐγὼ Κλήμης καὶ σὺν ἡμῖν ἕτεροι.*" Paul is here the thirteenth apostle, while Jacobus is distinguished from the apostles.

The perusal of this striking testimony, coming as it does from the very region which was immediately affected by the labours of the bishop of Jerusalem, can yield but one conviction, viz., that at the time these Constitutions were written it was the prevalent opinion among the Christians in Syria that Jacobus the brother of the Lord and bishop of Jerusalem was neither an apostle nor identical with Jacobus Alphæi.

3. *Tertullian* is a staunch advocate of the hypothesis according to which Jesus had uterine brothers; he says, *de carne*

Christi, c. 7. "Quoties de nativitate contenditur, omnes, qui respuunt eam ut præjudicantem de carnis in Christo veritate, ipsum Deum volunt negare esse natum, quod dixerit: Quæ mihi mater et qui fratres? Audiat igitur et Appelles, quid jam responsum sit a nobis Marcioni . . . . . Primo quidem, *numquam quisquam adnunciasset illi, matrem et fratres ejus foris stare, qui non certus esset, et habere illum matrem et fratres cet.*" And *de monogam*, c. 8, "Christum quidem virgo enixa est, semel nuptura post partum."

4. *Eusebius* enumerates fourteen apostles, Paul and Jacobus the brother of the Lord being added to the twelve, although he distinguishes the latter from Jacobus Alphæi. He says in his Commentary on Isa. xvii. 5: "Δέκα καὶ τέσσαρας ποιήσει τοὺς πάντας (ἀποστόλους), ὧν δώδεκα μὲν τοὺς πρώτους ἀποστόλους εἴποις ἂν εἶναι, οὐκ ἐλάττω δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν Παῦλον, καὶ αὐτὸν κλητὸν ἀπόστολον, καὶ τὸν Ἰάκωβον γεγονέναι, τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου, ὃς πρῶτος ἐπίσκοπος τῆς Ἱεροσολύμων ἐκκλησίας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καταστῆναι τοῦ σωτῆρος μνημονεύεται." Cf. H. E. vii. 19: Ἰακώβου . . . . τοῦ πρώτου τῆς Ἱεροσολύμων ἐκκλησίας τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν πρὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὑποδεξαμένου, ὃν καὶ ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ χρηματίσαι οἱ θεῖοι λόγοι περιέχουσιν. Also H. E. i. 12, where adverting to the persons by whom Christ was seen after his resurrection, he says concerning Jacobus: "Εἷς δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν φερομένων τοῦ σωτῆρος μαθητῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἦν." The sense in which he uses the last clause, is evident from H. E. ii. 1: "Τότε δὴ καὶ Ἰάκωβον, τὸν τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον ἀδελφὸν ὅτι δὴ καὶ οὗτος τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ ὠνόμαστο παῖς, τοῦ δὲ Χριστοῦ πατὴρ ὁ Ἰωσήφ," (another reading is, "οὗτος υἱὸς ἦν τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ, τοῦ νομιζομένου οἱονεὶ πατρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ,") "ᾧ μνηστευθεῖσα ἡ παρθένος, πρὶν ἢ συνελθεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἤὑρετο (εὑρέθη) ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου, ὡς ἡ ἱερὰ τῶν εὐαγγελίων διδάσκει γραφή. Τοῦτον δὴ οὖν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἰάκωβον, ὃν καὶ δίκαιον ἐπίκλην οἱ πάλαι δι' ἀρετῆς ἐκάλουν προτερήματα, πρῶτον ἱστοροῦσι τῆς ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἐκκλησίας τὸν τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς ἐγχειρισθῆναι θρόνον." From these extracts it is abundantly manifest that Eusebius considered Jacobus to be the actual son of Joseph, and the word λεγόμενος is used by him, not because he had any doubt on the subject, but because he wanted to correct the opinion

that Joseph was the actual father of Jesus. The passages, i. 12, iii. 11, 32, should be interpreted according to the foregoing extracts, which furnish explicitly the opinion of Eusebius.

Jerome, the staunch advocate of the ever-virginity of Mary, makes mention of several ancient but otherwise unknown authors who maintained that the brothers of the Lord were the sons of Joseph and Mary. *Hilary* also represents the advocates of the latter view as very numerous, and says, "sed *plures* irreligiosi et a spirituali doctrina admodum alieni occasionem ex eo occupant turpiter de Maria opinandi, quod dictum sit: "Priusquam convenirent, inventa est utero habens," et illud: "Noli timere accipere Mariam, conjugem tuam," et illud: "Non cognovit eam, donec peperit." (Op. ed. Oberthür 3, 317.) *Eunomius* the Arian, the so-called *Antidicomarianitæ*, *Helvidius* and his followers who were called Helvidiani, *Jovinianus* and *Photius* were also on the side of those who held that the brothers of the Lord were the sons of Joseph and Mary. For particulars see *Suicer*, Thesaurus eccl. s. v. *Μαρία*, vol. 2, p. 305, etc.; *Petavius*, Theol. dogm. de incarnatione. 14, 3; and *Walch*, Ketzerhistor. vol. 3. p. 577, etc.

Here we may also mention the modern advocates of this view; *Hammond* (partly), Paraphr. prolegg. ad ep. Jac. p. 499, etc. *Rich. Simon.* Hist. crit. du Texte du N. T. ch. 17. *Herder*, Briefe Zweener Brüder Jesu in unserm Kanon, Lemgo, 1775. Sämmtliche Werke zur Religion und Theologie, Tübingen, 1806, vol. 8, p. 185, etc. *Kleuker*, Anef. Untersuchung der Gründe für die Aechtheit und Glaubwürdigkeit der schriftlichen Urkunden des Christenthums, part 2, section 2. *Morus* (not decidedly). *Niemeyer*, Charact. der Bibel, part I. p. 395, etc., ed. 1830. *Hess*, Lebensgesch. Jesu, vol. I. p. 223, 8th edition; cf. his History of the Apostles, 3d ed. II. 309. *Zaccaria*, Dissert. de tribus Jacobis, in his Dissert. ad hist. atque antiquit. eccles. pertinentt. 1781, vol. I. *Clausen*, Introd. in Ep. Jacobi, p. 8, etc. *Stier*, die Brüder Jesu, in Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständniss im Ganzen und im Einzelnen. Erste Sammlung, 1824, p. 404, etc. *C. F. A. Fritzsche*, Evang. Matth., 1826, p. 481, (Mihi quidem non ad opinionem solum, sed *plane ad veritatem* persuasum est,

Jacobum, Cleophæ filium, et Jacobum, Christi fratrem, *diversos* fuisse homines.) *Clemen*, the brothers of Jesus, in *Winer's* Magazine for Scientific Theology, vol. I., part 3, 1829, p. 329, etc. *Rückert* on Gal. i. 19, p. 50. *Billroth* on 1 Cor. ix. 5. *De Wette*, in his Manual on the several passages. *Maycrhoff*, Introd. to the Petrine Writings, 1835, p. 43, etc. *Credner*, Introd. to the N. T., vol. I. 2, p. 571, etc. *Tholuck* on John ii. 12, p. 84, 5th ed. (vacillating). *Jachmann*, Comm. on the Catholic Epistles, 1838, p. 26, etc. *Kern*, the Epistle of Jacobus, etc., 1838, p. 26, etc., (he afterwards changed his view.) *Hase*, Leben Jesu, p. 53, 3d ed. *Wieseler*, Theol. Stud. und Krit, 1840, part 3, p. 648, etc. *Neander*, History of the Planting, etc., 3d ed. vol. 2, p. 478, etc. *Schaff*, das Verhältniss des Jacobus, Bruders des Herrn zu Jacobus Alphæi, etc. Berlin, 1843. *Winer*, Real Wörterbuch, art. Jacobus and Jesus. *Fronmüller*, Brief Judä (in *Lange's* Bibelwerk,) Introduction. *Oosterzee* on Luke in *Lange's* Bibelwerk. *Riggenbach*, Leben Jesu. *Alford*, Greek Test. Proleg. to James. *Smith's* Dict. of the Bible, articles, Brothers of the Lord, and Judas the Lord's brother.

This is an appropriate place to acknowledge the great obligation under which we are, to our esteemed friend, the Rev. Dr. Schaff, whose work on this subject, as catalogued above, is by far the most thorough with which we are acquainted. For many of the references to books which we could not procure, and for not a few of the quotations from early Christian authors, we are indebted to him. He is a strong advocate of the view, which distinguishes Jacobus Alphæi from Jacobus the brother of the Lord, but is inclined to respect the theory according to which the brothers of the Lord were not the children of Joseph and Mary, but the children of Joseph and a former wife. On the last point we are at issue with him, but take occasion to refer our readers to the recently published volume of Dr. Schaff's translation of *Lange's* Commentary on Matthew, where his view is briefly stated in a note, also to his History of the Apostolic Church, p. 378, note.

We have thus far examined both sides of the question. Our inquiry has been, what is the truth in this at first sight bewildering conflict of opinions; and we have no hesitation in

stating that Scripture and early tradition testify that the brothers of Jesus were neither his step-brothers, (*i. e.*, the sons of Joseph by a former marriage,) nor his cousins, (*i. e.*, the sons of Maria-Clopa [Alphæi], the supposed sister of Mary the mother of Jesus), but *veritably* the sons of Joseph and Mary; but before we review that part of the question which constrains us to reach this conclusion, we will briefly notice the origin and rise of the erroneous view which insists upon the identity of Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord.

It is historically certain that the earliest and most prevalent view saw in the brothers of Jesus simply the sons of Joseph and Mary. The first opposition seems to have come from the Gnostic Docetæ, who held that Christ, during his earthly life, had not a real or natural, but only an apparent or phantom-like body; it was consequently their interest either to deny that Christ had real brothers, or to maintain that his so-called brothers were the sons of Joseph by a former wife (see *Tertull.* de carne Christi, c. 1, de monogam, c. 8, ut supra). The extravagant encomium passed upon the sanctity of celibacy by the growing asceticism of the Church of the 4th century, soon saw and venerated in Mary the mother of God (*θεοτόκος*), the ideal of celibacy. This excessive veneration of Mary gave rise to a violent opposition, of which *Helvidius*, a Roman layman, apparently without a regular theological education, and *Bonosus*, a bishop, probably of Sardica in Illyria, were the leaders. The former maintained that the New Testament represented the brothers of Jesus as the later born sons of Mary, and quoted the authority of *Tertullian* and *Victorinus* of Octavio in support of his opinion, which he affirmed did nowise infringe on the honour of Mary; he was thus led to attack also the exaggerated opinion of the unmarried state, and quoted the examples of the patriarchs, who had maintained a pious life in wedlock, while on the other hand he referred to the examples of virgins, who had by no means lived up to their calling. (*Neander*, Ch. Hist., vol. 3, p. 483.) He was bitterly and violently opposed by *Jerome*, who calls him an illiterate rustic, and maintains that Joseph was not the real husband, but only the custodian of Mary. "Tu dicis Mariam virginem non permansisse, ego mihi plus vindico, etiam ipsum Joseph virginem fuisse per

Mariam, ut ex virginali conjugio virgo filius nasceretur. Si enim in virum sanctum fornicatio non cadit, et aliam eum uxorem habuisse, non scribitur, Mariæ autem quam putas est habuisse, custos potius fuit, quam maritus: relinquitur, virginem eum mansisse cum Maria, qui pater Domini meruit appellari." (*Jerome* adv. Helvid.) The veneration of Mary, which among the Collyridians (a small sect of women who came from Thrace and had settled down in Arabia) had already degenerated into idolatrous worship, but was universally condemned by the Church, did not become general until after the council of Nice, in 431, which sanctioned the title *θεοτόκος*. From that period the cultus of Mary grew apace, and as it grew the most extravagant opinions of her sanctity, virginity, efficacious intercession, etc., rose into prominence and gradually removed her from the level of a mortal woman to the exalted position of queen of heaven. It is doubtless to the influence of monkish asceticism and the rise of Mariolatry that we must ascribe the opinion that the brothers of the Lord were either his so-called step-brothers or his cousins. It was no doubt difficult to overcome the earliest and most generally diffused opinion that they were the sons of Joseph and Mary, and hence we find that the apocryphal gospels, Origen, and others, gave currency to the myth that they were the sons of Joseph by a former marriage; but this hypothesis, as we have seen, was already rejected by Jerome as a *deliramentum apocryphorum*. The Levirate-hypothesis, advocated by Theophylact, never found many adherents, the most natural, and, as we believe, the true view was in conflict with the growing unscriptural and irrational veneration of Mary, and the equally unscriptural, irrational, and extravagant merits ascribed to the unmarried state, there was nothing left, therefore, than the bottomless and purely conjectural hypothesis that they were simply the sons of his mother's sister. But whereas the church is no longer tyrannized by the innovations of Rome, whereas the sentiment of Epiphanius on the cultus of Mary: ("The whole thing is foolish and strange, and is a device and deceit of the devil. Let Mary be in honour. Let the Lord be worshipped. Let no one worship Mary,") is undoubtedly the sentiment of the pure sections of the Church of the 19th century, whereas the hallucination of the fabled sanctity of the un-

married state does not fetter the mind of the church; whereas the question of the perpetual virginity falls confessedly within the limits of religious inquiry; and whereas we investigate our subject free from any dogmatical prejudice on purely exegetical and historical ground, we not only see no reason why the true view should be suffered to remain in the background, but consider it a manifest injury to the cause of truth and religion to suppress it. This true view we believe to have proved to be that the brothers of Jesus were *veritably* the sons of Joseph and Mary, and that consequently Jacobus Alphæi and Jacobus the brother of the Lord are *not identical.*

The principles of sound exegesis and due regard to historical evidence compel us to reach this conclusion. Let us cast a brief glance at the component elements of our argument. We have shown that the cousin-hypothesis is purely conjectural; that the step-brother hypothesis (according to which the brothers of the Lord were the sons of Joseph by a former marriage,) is idle imagination and legendary; that the Levirate-hypothesis has no historical or exegetical foundation whatever; that the plain statements of Scripture, uninfluenced by dogmatical prejudice, and on the principles of sound exegesis and grammar, render it well-nigh certain that the brothers of the Lord were the sons of Joseph and Mary; that early tradition and the notices of the earliest and most reliable ecclesiastical authors coincide with that opinion, and it is on these grounds that we cannot but consider that opinion to be the truth.

Here we might stop, but we should hardly have completed our appointed task; for we shall still further strengthen our position that Jacobus Alphæi is different from Jacobus the brother of the Lord, by showing that the contents of the Catholic Epistle sustain our view, that its author was Jacobus the brother of the Lord, the celebrated head of the Jerusalem Church, and known by the surname "the Just." We propose therefore to conclude this essay by a rapid review of the life of Jacobus the brother of the Lord, by showing how remarkably his character and mind are stamped upon the Epistle included in the New Testament Canon.

The earliest notices in the Gospels introduce him in company with his mother, Mary the mother of Jesus, and because he is

always named first, we infer that he was her first-born after Jesus. With this inference seems to agree the statement of Hegesippus, that he was holy from his mother's womb, that is, she consecrated him to the service of God according to the well-known precept of the law, whereby, in memory of the Exodus, the first-born was devoted to God, for Jacobus was the first-born of her marriage with Joseph. Such a consecration involved a quasi-priestly character, for we learn from Jewish authorities that the law entitled the first-born to discharge priestly functions in the family, (Misch. Sebach. xiv. 4, *Onkel.* ad Ex. xxvi. 5. Targum hieros. xlix. 3. *Othon*, Lex. rabb., p. 548, sq. *Vitringa*, observ. sacr. ii. 2, 3. *Rosenmüller* ad Ex. xix. 22.) The influences which surrounded him, and under which he grew up, were those of a pious Jewish household. Joseph was a just man, (Matt. i. 19,) and Mary was a pattern of humility and faith, (Luke i. 38). All that pertained to the faithful performance of the law, and to the practical exhibition of Old Testament piety, was doubtless characteristic of the holy family. Messianic hopes also lived in its members, and although the presence of the spotless and holy Jesus among them would lead us to expect that his brothers according to the flesh would have stood by and clung to him with enthusiastic attachment, yet we know from the evangelic record that, misled and deceived by the expectation of an earthly Messianic kingdom, with all the paraphernalia of outward and material greatness and triumph, they persisted steadfastly in an attitude of unbelief towards Jesus, an unbelief which remained unbroken and unchanged until after the resurrection, when the brothers of Jesus are enumerated for the first time among the followers of Jesus. It is difficult with these facts before us to determine the precise opinion Jacobus and his brothers entertained concerning Jesus; that it was not altogether favourable, stands to reason; that they saw in him an enthusiast, is highly probable; and that they were staggered at his sayings as inconsistent with his conduct, is matter of history (see John vii.). In Jacobus, therefore, we can only see the rigid type of Old Testament legal piety, in virtue of which he was known by his contemporaries as the Just. It is probable, from the notice contained in 1 Cor. ix. 5, that he was a married man, but in all other

respects he was a rigid and ascetic follower after righteousness. We cannot of course take the account of Hegesippus as gospel, but after deducting much that is evidently fantastical and overwrought, he draws, doubtless, a true portrait of Jacobus. The crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus were the means of his conversion; the wonderful phenomena attending the former, probably began to remove the veil of Mosaic and Rabbinical prejudice from his spiritual eye, and if we may credit the notice in the Gospel according to the Hebrews, that he had made a vow not to eat bread until Christ should have risen from the dead, the crisis of his conversion would seem to have begun with the crucifixion. The fact that St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 7) states that Jacobus was favoured with a particular appearance of the risen Saviour, seems to give colour to the notice of the apocryphal gospel. But it is certain that Jacobus is first enumerated among the followers of Jesus after the Resurrection, (Acts i. 14); the probability therefore is very strong, that the vision of the risen Saviour marks the date of his conversion to the faith. From that moment he seems to have thrown all the ardour and earnestness of his nature into the prosecution of the great work which he probably regarded in the light of a legacy bequeathed to him by that now glorified elder brother, in whom he had so persistently refused to believe in the days of his incarnation. Jerusalem, heretofore the centre of the ministry of Jesus, became thenceforth the chosen sphere of Jacobus. Round him, the Lord's own brother, now converted to the faith, the Christians would naturally gather, and he, the zealous advocate of the law, the very impersonation of legal Judaism, who had earned for himself the epithet "Oblias," righteousness and bulwark of the people, was above all men best fitted to act as a guide to Christianity to his Jewish brethren. By common consent he appears to have speedily risen to great eminence. At the miraculous deliverance of Peter from prison, it is to Jacobus that the liberated apostle desires the good tiding to be borne. (If we place this event with *Alford*, about A. D. 44, *i. e.*, during the lifetime of Jacobus Zebedæi, we have an additional argument in favour of distinguishing Jacobus the brother of the Lord from Jacobus Alphæi.) After that time, we meet him simply as Jacobus, the head of the Jerusalem church. At the

Apostolic convention, it is he whose opinion ruled the assembly, (Acts xv.) On Paul's visit to Jerusalem it is to Jacobus that he was officially introduced, (Acts xxi. 18.) He appears throughout as the chief man at Jerusalem; and the record of his sayings and doings in Acts is in singular agreement with the account which has been handed down by tradition, and we cannot fail to recognize in him the mediator between the liberal sentiments of the Gentile Christians and the national customs of the Jewish Christians. Thanks to his counsel of moderation, the Apostolic convention issued the famous decree relating to the *indispensable* conditions on which Gentiles could be admitted to Christian fellowship. On the other hand, the advice he gave to Paul with four others, to take the Nazarite vow, shows his disposition to go to the utmost extent in order to conciliate the feelings of the Jews. Besides the incidental references to his prominent position at Jerusalem, in Galatians, Scripture is silent concerning his after-history. For the account of his character and martyrdom, as supplied by tradition, we refer to the earlier portion of this article, where the respective passages are given in full.

The contents of the Epistle of Jacobus are in admirable keeping with what we know of the character of the man. It is rather moral and practical than dogmatical. It aims at the exhibition of the unity of Christianity and the Mosaic law. It is the nearest parallel to the Sermon on the Mount which we have in the New Testament. It is mainly addressed to Jewish Christians, whose characteristic was the lack of living faith, the falling asunder of knowledge and action, of head and heart. (See *Alford* Proleg. and *Wiesinger*, Einleitung.) In the language of *Herder*, the epistle is a living proof of the authorship of Jacobus the brother of the Lord. "If," says he, "there should exist a writing, fully such as we ought to expect it from this Jacobus, with the impress of his character, name, office and life; just, cold, severe, virtuous, zealous, and yet replete with gentle moderation, matured wisdom, honest and well considered advice, and faithful sympathy with the trials and failings of his brethren; a writing at once Jewish and Christian, and exhibiting the union of both religions in one common centre of liberty and virtue; such a writing would not contain many references

to Jesus, but where it did refer to him, it would introduce him with profound reverence, not so much as a man as the Lord, the Founder of faith and of the royal law of love and liberty; it would contain, especially, caution against faults, whose burden had most oppressed this Jacobus, such as hardness, striving with God, discord and envy as obstacles to the truth; it would preach nothing more than quiet wisdom, genuine deeds, endurance, well-tried patience, faithful modesty and submission; it would enforce all this in a manner impossible both to Jacobus Zebedæi and to Jacobus Alphæi, both to a publican and a fisherman, learnedly, abruptly and rich in figures and philosophical maxims, full of exclamation and acuteness, almost poetical; in grammatical expression replete with peculiarity, excellent selection, brevity and abrupt Jewish Greek euphony. The author would not call himself an apostle (which he was not), but the servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ, which he was (for the modest man would not have called himself a brother of the Exalted One, which he was not), and the whole writing would breathe the spirit of the forementioned brother, the rigid but righteousness-loving Pharisee or Essene, the honest sage, the abstemious Nazarite, (consecrated to God), the man constant in prayer, of distinction and influence, the shadow of whose arrival was enough to inspire order, calmness and equanimity without respect of person, *vir pietate gravis*, even to the shadows of his prejudices and favouritisms, Jacobus, the former brother of the Lord. Attributed to any other, the Epistle would be inexplicable from beginning to end; ascribed to him, intelligible in every turn, every word, every syllable. Look now at the Epistle of Jacobus in our Canon. It belongs no more to the son of Zebedæus or to that of Alphæus than these two were the brothers of Judas, which the Epistle of Judas manifestly affirms of our Jacobus. Attributed to them, confusion ensues, (*fällt alles vom Himmel*,) and we have a *non possum dicere quare*. "What a noble man speaks in this Epistle! Profound, never-ceasing profound patience under suffering! Nobility in poverty! Joy in sorrow! Simplicity, firm and steadfast confidence in prayer! To no condition he is more hostile than to that of unbelief, to desponding, ruinous subtlety of reasoning, to double-mindedness. How he is drawn

up to God! He speaks of the power, even the miraculous power of prayer, as most certain and infallible, heartily, experimentally with definite cases and illustrations ready at hand—surely like a man full of the Holy Spirit, a prayerful man, a disciple of Jesus. How familiar he is with wisdom, with the origin of true and false wisdom in the mind of man! how he tames the tongue under the appearance of good, the tongue the murderer through lusts and desires—the silent saint! the Nazarite! the disciple of heavenly wisdom! How he insists upon works, works! not upon words, not upon faith, but upon spontaneous works, perfect, noble works, according to the royal law of the spirit—the freeman—the purified Pharisee or Essene, the Christian!" To this admirable sketch we have nothing to add than to refer our readers to the Epistle itself.

Art. II.—*A Plea and a Plan for Presbyterian Unity.*

"That they may be one."—John xvii. 11.

The chosen people of God are a *united* people, they have one Lord, one faith, one baptism. There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. They who love the Lord Jesus Christ, and are united to Him by a true and living faith, together constitute the Bride—the Lamb's wife. Here on earth

"Their fears, their hopes, their aims are one,"

and they desire and expect to be congregated at last as brethren, in the house of their common Father. What more natural, and desirable, and proper, then, than that there should be the closest possible *external* as well as mystical union, binding them to each other in love, and labour, and enjoyment, now and here, and for ever.

And yet this one church of God—this one household of faith—as it exists in this world, is cut up into many sects, and parties, and larger or smaller coteries, which, more or less severely, hold aloof from each other, and wrap themselves each in its own mantle of exclusiveness. From this state of things

it follows, with the inevitable conclusiveness of a mathematical corollary, that there must arise jealousies, and rivalries, very unbecoming to the body of Christ, and very obstructive to the prosperity of his cause. And yet they all pray "thy kingdom come," and profess that their one great work upon the earth, which absorbs their most earnest zeal, and engrosses their chiefest anxieties, is to carry forward the work of the Lord to its final and glorious completion.

Now, it certainly is a most important question whether we, the whole church of God, are not thus hindered in the fulfilment of our divine vocation by unnecessary clogs. If we are, we are manifestly sinning against the grace of God, and walking unworthy of our sonship every day and every hour that we voluntarily continue to wear such fetters.

To us, and we think to all men who give it serious consideration, it appears very evident that these divisions among Christians are a sore evil under the sun, and a great sin resting upon those who are in any way responsible for their continuance. But if any thoughtful Christians do not so understand it, we hope to make our views plainer, incidentally, in the further discussion of our subject.

We are ready to confess that to some extent there are at present insuperable difficulties in the way of a reformation in this matter. On account of the imperfections of understanding, and the weakness and depravity of intellect, which still characterize us all, Christians are found to differ widely in their interpretations of important doctrines of grace. So long as this is the case, it is undoubtedly best that those who think alike should stand together. A peaceful and kindly separation, with mutual God-speeds, is certainly preferable to a continual discord in an external union. Though a wall of separation, even in such a case, is an evil, it is the lesser evil of the only two alternatives. And even where the honest difference of conviction is in a matter not of doctrine but of government, so long as it is an honest, conscientious, God-fearing difference, involving efficiency in the service of God on either side, we say let separation continue in all brotherly-kindness and charity.

But where creed and government are identical, or so nearly so that all interested acknowledge that the divergencies are of

no considerable importance, why should there not be an external and visible union? In such a case, with what arguments shall we palliate our schism, (or, if that word be too strong, our denominationalism,) to ourselves, or excuse it before a mocking world, or answer for it before a jealous God?

There are several separate denominations now in the church which agree in a Calvinistic faith, and a Presbyterian form of government—(We can at present count nine or ten entirely separate and distinct *sects* in these United States, which are all professedly Calvinistic Presbyterians,)—Why should not all, or the most of these be ONE, not only in doctrine and order, not only in love and in spirit, but in external organization?

Our purpose is to give some reasons why they *should* be one. And in doing so we will take a cursory view only of the inferior, yet perhaps, most easily appreciated motives to union, and consider it as a *matter of policy.*

We have said that the one great work of the church in this world is to carry forward the work of the Lord to its final and glorious completion. The church is the custodian of God's revealed will, and the instrument in his hands for the spread of his gospel, and the enfoldment of his elect.

Now, how can she, or rather, how can the orthodox Presbyterian church in these United States, best fulfil the holy office? We say, *by acting unitedly, as one body.* So, and *only* so, can she put forth the strength which the Lord has given her in the Lord's service.

Let us look for arguments for the support of this proposition.

First, to the ordinary work of the church here at home, in the preaching of the gospel, and the furnishing of the ordinances of God's house and the means of grace to those for whom they are given. In the fulfilment of this work, the church continually finds herself hampered by the lack of adequate means. The harvest is plenteous, the field is wide, and the work is urgent, but the executive departments of our various Presbyterian denominations complain that they have not men enough to preach the gospel, nor money enough for the adequate support of those they have, nor the means to build churches for poor and destitute communities.

Now, what are the facts? All over our land there are ham-

lets, and villages, and towns, in which may be found from two to half a dozen *different Calvinistic Presbyterian denominations* struggling for a foothold, and each seeking to establish its church. In many cases there are means enough expended to build *and pay for* one commodious and substantial church, Presbyterian element enough in the community to form a good and self-supporting congregation, and room only for the labours of one faithful and devoted pastor. Instead of this, there are two or four pastors, devoted to utter discouragement and slow starvation; two or four churches overwhelmed with debt; and two or four *congregations* of each a handful of people, who, by the force of circumstances, are learning a gospel of bigotry, envy, and jealousy. Besides these, there are two or four Boards of Domestic Missions, watching anxiously from a distance, overburdened with cares, and calling earnestly upon their several denominations for help to sustain the church of Christ in that place, which cannot sustain itself because it is infinitessimally subdivided.

Nor is this the case only in country villages and small towns. In our large cities also you will find, for instance, an Old-School Presbyterian church on one block, and a Scotch church on the next, and a Reformed Dutch church on the third, all struggling for existence, all heavily in debt, and all groaning on the verge of extinction, or retaining the breath of life by factitious and questionable expedients. And yet they all are built in honour of, and for the service of the same Saviour, teach the same doctrines, are pledged to the same form of sound words, and maintain the same identical order in God's house. One church, one pastor, and one congregation is all that there is room for on the ground where they are all attempting to stand. And this, while the voice of the Master is still ringing through the courts of Zion, to say, "go ye into all the world," and while the church is still complaining for want of men and means! All this time the destitute and the perishing from every side are calling aloud to the church with an exceeding great and bitter cry, "come over and help us;" but the only answer seems to be, "wait until we have crowded our brethren out of this place, and perhaps they will then come to you."

Are these several denominations primarily churches of Christ,

or primarily rivals of each other? They evidently are both, but which is their first and highest vocation? Is there no field for them except the field which somebody else is likely to occupy?

Is this the harmony and unity of the body of Christ? Brethren, can we see these things, and then dare to lift our hands to our Master, while we continue with divided counsels?

Secondly, let us look at the *Educational* interests of the church. And here let us say, first, that we would not touch the time-hallowed institutions of learning, the venerable colleges and seminaries which our fathers have handed down to us, with unhallowed hands, or with untimely zeal for reform in number and position. Yet is it not true that essentially Presbyterian Colleges, and even Theological Seminaries, stand very, *very* close together in some sections of our land, while other wide tracts of our immense domain are left without any adequate provision for the liberal or the systematic theological education of the youth of our churches? Only a few days ago the writer of this article received a pressing appeal for aid in establishing a new college, with the plea that, if it were not accomplished, our young men would be absorbed by other Presbyterian colleges already existing in that region, and so diverted from our church. Denominationally considered, it was a valid and powerful plea, but, as between different sects holding the same identical faith and order, can *any* denominational plea be valid in the court of conscience, before God? When we consider the amount of money needed for the adequate endowment of any college worthy of the name, the peculiar and rare talents required in its professors, and the fact that, when once established and properly officered, it can accommodate five hundred students just as well as fifty, does it not appear a shameful and sinful waste of material to establish new colleges or seminaries where they are only needed for the support of pure and simple sectarianism? The means and resources of the church for the education of the masses and the theological training of her neophytes, constitute one of the talents with which she is intrusted by the Master; how can she dare to squander it upon her unlovely and inexcusable lust of selfishness? The Presbyterian church, considered as a whole, is not so densely popu-

lated, or at least not so fruitful in candidates for a liberal, and especially theological education, but that each one of her colleges, if properly endowed and cared for, might accommodate a district swept by a radius of from fifty to a hundred miles, while within that compass may, in many instances, be found two or three starveling institutions, each one filling the ears of the church with a lamentable wail of inadequate support. So the institutions of learning, like the churches, in too many instances, crowd each other in a miserable struggle for existence, when, if it were not for their worse than useless rivalry, they might be so regulated and distributed as to secure their comfort and multiply their usefulness an hundredfold. We say again, we are not advocating interference from any quarter with colleges or seminaries already founded and endowed, but we do urge the external union of those churches which are already so thoroughly one in heart and object, in order that they may, among other good ends, stop the inconsistency, and the waste, and the shame, and the sin of establishing any more institutions of the kind where no more are needed; and that they may combine to establish them wherever there is a fair prospect of usefulness for them.

Thirdly, let us look at the *Printing and Publishing* operations of the church. We are not prepared to say how many distinct denominational Presbyterian Boards or Committees of Publication are now in operation. We know of four, and our impression is that the remaining Presbyterian denominations are doing nothing at all, as churches, in the way of issuing religious publications, probably for want of an accumulated capital with which to begin. Now, if the sole, or the main object of denominational arrangements for publication were the issue of books for sale in the ordinary way of trade, we would say, let the church wash her hands of the whole business at once. She has quite too many real responsibilities to undertake to do that which secular business firms would gladly do, and could do better than she.

But we suppose that the real objects of publication under denominational supervision, are these.

First, to furnish approved, unobjectionable, evangelical reading matter to the public, under the imprimatur of the church,

or, in other words, to fulfil her commission to preach the gospel to every creature by means of the printed page as well as the spoken word. *Secondly*, to protect valuable standard works from the excisions and revisions of those who would occupy the field with emasculated editions, by furnishing them herself in their entirety. *Thirdly*, to publish such works as she deems of important value to the church and the world, but which are not likely to pay as a business speculation, and consequently, would not otherwise be published. *Fourthly*, to furnish approved religious reading at a cheaper rate than it can be furnished by business enterprise, and consequently give it a wider circulation; and *fifthly*, to furnish the gospel in books and tracts *gratuitously* to the poor, or the indifferent.

Now, could not all of these objects be subserved at a considerable saving of expense, and consequently with a corresponding increase of power of extension in the work, by such a combination of capital, and such a reduction of machinery, as would naturally result from a union of those who are now separately trying to do one and the same thing? We may well leave the question confidently, to be answered by the common sense and instinctive business tact of all candid thinkers. What right have we, as the servants of Christ, to throw away any portion of the strength or the means which he has given us for his service, in an unnecessary division and isolation? This question we may well leave to the consciences of all sincere and earnest Christians. We will say nothing here of the advantage which such a General Publication Board of the One United Presbyterian church would gain in the increased respect and confidence of all the churches, and in readier access to the world at large. The advantages would be many, and the subject is so suggestive that we will simply leave it to the reader.

Fourthly, let us look at the *Missionary* operations of the church. All the various Presbyterian denominations claim to be missionary churches, that is, churches devoted to the work of spreading the gospel until the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the whole earth. This is the one great legitimate object and commission of the Church Universal, and where the disposition and effort to fulfil it are not found, we miss one of the

essential characteristics of the true church of Christ. While Presbyterians, then, do not claim to be endowed with a missionary spirit *par excellence*, they do claim their share in the great work, and send their representatives far and near, with ever-increasing anxiety and effort to multiply their influence and power in spreading the gospel of our Lord and Saviour.

But oh, how much power is lost in this work by divisions and collisions. We have already spoken of the baneful influence of sectarianism (as distinguishing those who are of one faith and one order) in our home field. In how many instances half a dozen of us stand gleaning in a one-acre lot, while the whole world is white unto the harvest. We say, confidently, that there is strength and effort enough put forth by Presbyterians, in the work of Domestic Missions, to accomplish more than twice as much as we are now doing, if there only were unity of counsel and harmony of action.

The same truth applies, though perhaps in a less marked degree, to the work of Foreign Missions. Cases have not been wanting where two different Presbyterian denominations have attempted, nay, are still attempting, to occupy one station, and build up two separate missions in the same field. Now, we believe it is true that ministers of different evangelical denominations are drawn much nearer to each other in sympathy and fellowship, when they come together in a heathen land, than they are here at home, and for very evident reasons. They often are personally disposed to stand together with one mind, and with an entire identification of interests, in contending with the embattled hosts of Paganism, and carrying forward the banner of the cross. But then they and their work are subject to the supervision of the respective ecclesiastical bodies to which they belong here at home; and if there be no unity of counsel here, what can there eventually be but confusion, collision, and disaster there?

And any collision of missions in heathen lands must give a shock to the cause, of which we can have but little conception here—a shock which must degrade the gospel in the eyes of mocking idolaters, and put back the shadow on the dial which marks the early day with them for many and many a degree.

So long, then, as the church at home is to have any super-

vision over her missionaries abroad, the various denominations must either, with set purpose, keep their missionaries as far apart as possible, (and what a spectacle would that be for angels and men,) or they must themselves come together and be ONE.

You may say that this argument applies to *all* the evangelical denominations. Well, if it does, and if Unity is practicable only for those who are of one faith and one order, then, in the fear of God and the name of our Master Jesus, at least let the various Presbyterian denominations *unite and be one*, and give glory to Him who hath called us with his holy calling.

And here let us pause in the enumeration of the reasons for an external union of all Calvinistic Presbyterians. We said that we would give superficial reasons, and consider the question as a matter of policy. We have done so, briefly and superficially to a fault many will say, and yet we ask, have we not given reasons enough—enough to make us blush with shame for our sectarianism, to pray for forgiveness for the past, and to seek a reformation for all time to come?

But many will say, "it is doubtless desirable—we knew that before—but it is impossible. We must wait for the millennium, when these crooked things will, in all probability, at last be made straight; at present there are insuperable difficulties and objections."

Let us, then, consider such objections as present themselves, and see whether they are absolutely insurmountable.

It will not be necessary to investigate any difficulties arising from diversities in regard to faith unto salvation, for we have been speaking from the first only of those denominations which agree in the faith, and in that didactic system expounding it which is known as the Calvinistic. Nor will we have to deal with any cardinal principles of church government, for we are speaking of those who are confessedly Presbyterian.

It is therefore apparent already that whatever difficulties there may be, must be minor difficulties, such as no Christian would or could allow to stand in the way of his recognition of and fellowship with other Christians, as members of the same spiritual household of faith with himself, and partakers with him of the covenant promises. In other words, such objections

as do arise must be urged simply and solely as *matters of policy*. Our discussion is simplified, therefore, to a mere array of reasons for the policy of divers Presbyterian denominations, over against the reasons already specified for the policy of *Union*.

The *first* objection to external Presbyterian unity which we shall specify is that, in such a case, we *should lose the traditions of the fathers*. The Presbyterian church has never been a unit in external organization since the days of the apostles, and the immediately succeeding age of the Christian church. From the throes of the Reformation the Presbyterian church came forth one in faith, and spirit, and object, but naturally and necessarily divided in external organization by national and geographical limits. There were the Presbyterian churches of Scotland, of Holland, of France, of Switzerland, of the German Electorates, &c. All of these were limited in their external and formal organization by the bounds of their several nationalities. In being transplanted to the New World by immigration, these distinctions of nationality were naturally, and, because of difference of language and divergence of settlements, almost necessarily preserved. Hence, we soon had here at least three principal denominations of Presbyterians who were one in faith and order, the Dutch, the Scotch, and the German. Each of these, as was natural, clung fondly to Old World memories, and even for a time to ecclesiastical connection with the mother churches. Each had some peculiarity of usage, which, while it served to bind them to their respective churches, also helped to keep them strangers to their brethren of other descent. So they continued to grow here, side by side, and acknowledging oneness of purpose, yet looking at each other always somewhat askance. Each had glorious histories in the records of the troublous past, and honoured their noble fathers by the sacred preservation of every peculiarity which had been known to belong to them, even when, by the changing of time and circumstances, they had long become cumbersome and useless. And who shall blame them? There is something more than a vain glory in looking back through the vista of history to the days of old John Knox, and remembering how my fathers, and the fathers of my brethren with whom I bow now in the house of God, stood together with him and those

who came after him, to bear witness for Jesus, in those days when it meant something to be a Christian, and to seal their testimony if need were with their blood. Or, otherwise descended, it is something more than a dark page in history to me, those dreadful days of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, when I remember that my fathers were then and for ever driven from their homes and their native land, and went out destitute, afflicted, tormented, not knowing whither they went. Or, if my fathers were of those who welcomed and received those fugitives on the dykes of hospitable Holland, and taught the world the first practical lesson of religious liberty when they opened their homes and their hearts to outcasts of whom the world was not worthy, then who shall point the finger of scorn at me for clinging to those whose fathers came with mine from that dyke-begirded land, and feeling most at home when I bow to worship with them in our good old ancestral church?

We say there is something more than sentiment in all this, something which takes very strong hold of our natures, and cannot be shaken off without a conscience trembling with the guilt of sacrilege.

And yet it is but a broken reed if it stands in the way of the Lord's work. We would indeed be ignoble sons of our sturdily godly sires if we could not, or would not, sacrifice all these holy associations, if need be, for our Saviour's sake, and for the welfare of his cause. Shame to him who would plead them in bar of Christian union, or let them stand for a moment to obstruct the path of Christian duty! Yet we hope to show a way of Presbyterian unity which shall avoid the least disturbance to root, or branch, or tenderest shoot of these plants of filial piety.

Farther divisions have arisen in the Presbyterian church from local and temporary matters of dispute, or from adverse counsels in matters of policy, some of which have been imported from the seat of their origin and outside the limits of their logical application, but maintained through custom, and obstinacy, and old soreness, and others of which have arisen here, and within the memory of the present generation, but which, in the good providence of God, are already fast dying out with the circum-

stances which gave them birth. Still these various divisions are maintained, in some cases even to the extremes of exclusiveness, and the only reason which we can imagine for such maintenance is *lest the traditions of the fathers should be forgotten.* Now, we had glorious, noble fathers, it is true, and filial piety rightly demands that we should remember their good deeds and reverence their memories, but, in the name of common sense, why should we remember and perpetuate their mistakes, and the follies which their remaining depravities perpetrated? Or, admitting that my fathers were right and yours were wrong in the dispute which separated them, is that any reason why I should hold myself aloof from you now, when there is no practical matter of dispute between us, their descendants? It does seem, as it is often charged, that Presbyterians inherit obstinacy in the line of natural generation above almost any other people, but it is surely high time that we begin to show by our conduct before a gainsaying world that the grace of God can overcome hereditary depravity.

The *second* objection to Presbyterian unity is that *it would involve the sacrifice of such customs and usages* as are peculiar to each separate denomination now, approved by judgment, and endeared by use. And here we refer not to trivial matters, but to such as are really important, but confessedly not essential. For instance, some of our Presbyterian denominations are strictly liturgical, while others abhor liturgies; some of them use a great variety of religious poetry and rhyme in their choral services, while others will sing only the Psalms of David; some of them continue their elders in active service for life, while others statedly relieve their elders by rotation in the discharge of the active duties of the office; some of them have delegated, where others have conventional church courts, and many other such like divergencies there are, characterizing the several distinct denominations.

Now, we might say that none of these things are of sufficient importance to counter-balance the advantages of Unity—that if the Master demanded the unconditional sacrifice of them all for the greater prosperity of his cause, he would not ask too much. But we know how fondly, how inseparably the heart comes to cling to the accustomed order of God's house, and how almost

impossible it is to feel at home where old familiarities are missed, and perhaps scouted. Moreover, we must remember that some of these peculiarities are really matters of conscience, adopted and maintained from a sense of duty and in the fear of God. We feel therefore that it would be almost hopeless, before the millennium, to ask that these should all be brought and thrown into a common crucible, to come out some general uniformity to be imposed upon all. But we hope to suggest a plan of union which would not involve the sacrifice of the least of all of them. If such can be found, all objections from this source happily vanish.

The *third* objection to Presbyterian unity is that *it would involve the loss of identity.* The smaller denominations will say "we shall be swallowed into a great Presbyterian maw, and lost to ourselves, to history, and to the world, like some little rill which is never mentioned, distinguished, or thought of again, after it has mingled with the great river." And the larger denominations might object that after they have succeeded in winning a high place, and carving a great name and a great record, it would be a fearful loss to them to be confounded into a general mass with those who have never risen to half of their achievements.

These objections would have a semblance of validity if we were working for ourselves; if the grand object were the aggrandizement of our individual denominations. But for us, who claim to be only the servants of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; for us, who, when anything has been accomplished by our instrumentality, devoutly sing, "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but to thy name give glory, for thy mercy and for thy truth's sake;" for us, whose highest and only legitimate end is gained when glory results to God in the highest; for *us* to object to union in our Master's service, because it gives us less opportunity for distinction—let it never be named again among us, as becometh saints. Faugh! There is a smell of the pit about the objection which pollutes our whole discussion.

"But," says the objector again, "there is a practical evil in this loss of identity. There are extensive funds and possessions which are almost essential to the carrying forward of our

work, which were given and are secured for the exclusive use of particular individual Presbyterian denominations. In case of a general Presbyterian union, these funds, endowments, and possessions must be given up, and lost to the church and the cause."

We are afraid to venture a conjecture as to how much this objection ought to weigh in the balance against the proposed union. But the plan which we are about to suggest avoids it entirely, and leaves every dollar, and every dollar's worth of such endowments in the undisturbed possession of those who hold them now.

The *fourth* objection, and the last we can think or have heard of, is that while a union and a unity would be very nice, and very desirable, and a great increase of efficiency, and all that, the different Presbyterian denominations, after all, *wont unite*. It would be a good thing to be done, but *they wont do it*. What can be done with such an objection? It is the concluding and conclusive argument of opposers who pride themselves upon being intensely practical people. What can we say against it?

We can say that *we have faith in God*, who, step by step, carries forward his own work in his own way, and himself prostrates every barrier before the chariot-wheels of his glory. If it be his will to honour the Presbyterian church by multiplying her efficiency in his service, through the means of unity in her counsels and efforts, then he will assuredly bring it to pass. We are predestinarians, and believe in irresistible grace.

We can say that *we have faith in the piety and sincerity of Presbyterian Christians;* that we believe that they only need to see clearly the path of duty, and that then they will immediately gird up their loins, with a prayer to God for strength, and go forward in it, though it be straight over high walls of prejudice and deep moats of depraved obstinacy. Presbyterians do not mean to be backward in doing the Lord's will and promoting their Saviour's glory, even if it should require strenuous exertion and mortifying humiliation.

And here we take leave of objections, and proceed to a rough sketch of a plan of union. And let us say in the beginning, that we shall not presume to indicate anything more than an outline, which, if adopted in its essential features, might be

readily and satisfactorily filled up and perfected by the joint wisdom of the several denominations interested.

And *first*, as to the *doctrinal* basis of union. We believe that most, if not all, of the Presbyterian denominations in our land already subscribe, *ex animo*, either to the Westminster Confession and the Assembly's Catechism, or to the Heidelberg Catechism and the Confession of Faith of the Synod of Dort, and have adopted one or the other of these as their doctrinal standard. We believe also, that it is universally conceded that these two systems of doctrine are identical in all essential particulars.

We suggest, therefore, that these, or either of them, separately or conjointly, according to the choice of each individual denomination, shall be the recognized doctrinal basis of the Presbyterian union. And further, we suggest that if there should be verbal objections to these, or either of them, on the part of any, or if an individual denomination should prefer some other Calvinistic confession, those so objecting or preferring should be received into the union upon the basis of their preferred confession, whenever it shall be considered tantamount, by the others joining in the union, to the basis already indicated.

The object, so far as this point is concerned, is to associate and unite all those who are already one in the faith, as to the distinctive doctrines of grace and the doctrines and use of the holy sacraments. This simple object being kept in view, we think there could be no practical difficulty in determining the doctrinal standard.

Secondly, in regard to the details of government, customs, usages, &c., we would leave everything just as it is. Each denomination should maintain, as it now does, its ecclesiastical assemblies and church courts; should retain its supreme authority over its existing colleges and theological seminaries, and should hold possession of its endowments and all vested funds, with unrestricted right to apply them according to their original design. Each denomination should continue to regulate its own order of worship without interference, and have the right to decide finally upon all applications for individual or ministerial communion. Each denomination should retain its dis-

tinctive name and title at its own pleasure, and so much of its own constitution as relates to its internal affairs, and does not conflict with the terms of union.

Thirdly, we would erect a Synodical Assembly, composed of an equal number of delegates from each of the constituent denominations, which should have a supreme federal authority in all matters which should be submitted to it according to the Constitution of Union. The Boards or Committees of Domestic and Foreign Missions, of Education, of Publication, of Church Building, &c., (composed also of members from each of the constituent denominations,) should be directly responsible to this Synodical Assembly, and subject to its authority. These Boards, directed by just and equable constitutions, would be able to prevent all clashing of denominational interests, and direct the whole force of the United Presbyterian Church where it may be most effectual in the service of our Master, Jesus. So should we no longer present to the world the spectacle of divided and distracted partizans, as often hindering as helping each other in the common cause: but we should move forth as one mighty phalanx in the service of our King and Captain, Jesus.

We will attempt no further details of our plan, leaving that for the discussion and arrangement of wisdom and talent.

We have given utterance to these suggestions under a deep sense of responsibility to the Master and Lord, whose greater glory is our only object and end, and with a long-felt conviction that the Presbyterian church is falling far short of her mission, and wasting much of her strength, by reason of divided counsels.

It seems to us that the several Presbyterian denominations are now very much in the position of the original American colonies—friendly indeed toward each other, in the main, yet suffering liability to weakness, and jealousies, and conflicting interests, for want of a federal union, and needing only that to become a mighty power in the world.

The Presbyterian church claims to be eminently republican in its form of government. Can she not learn a lesson in this matter from the children of this world, who are in their generation wiser than the children of light? Our sessions or consisto-

ries, our presbyteries or classes, our particular and general assemblies or synods—these correspond to the graduated steps of government and authority in the individual States. If a federal congress over all gave unity and strength to our nation, and caused symmetry and power to spring out of political chaos, why should not a similar arrangement do as much, with the blessing of God, for the Presbyterian (*i. e.*, republican) church of Christ?

Here we leave our suggestions to the consideration of those who love our Lord and his cause.

Art. III.—*The Nature and Ends of Prayer.*

In its own nature, that exercise which is commonly designated by the comprehensive name of *prayer*, is the highest privilege to which a creature can aspire, or of which creatures can conceive. The angels stand before the throne of Jehovah in veiled adoration and praise; and wait in listening readiness to obey his mandates of goodness and kindness, of mercy or of wrath. But we have no reason to imagine that they are admitted to enter into converse with God—to engage with him in a confidential interchange of thought, sentiment, and affection. Not to them, but to man it peculiarly belongs to enjoy the communion and fellowship of the Father of lights, his Son Jesus Christ, and the Spirit of holiness. 1 John i. 3; 2 Cor. xiii. 14.

The stated form in which this fellowship finds expression and exercise is prayer, which is defined in our Catechism to be "an offering of our desires unto God, for things agreeable to his will, in the name of Christ, with confession of our sins, and thankful acknowledgment of his mercies." More largely, the word is used to comprehend not only our petitions, confessions, and thanksgivings, but also those praises of God's majesty and glory, which nearness of access to his presence always suggests. It is in this wider sense that we shall now view it.

When we come to analyze, and examine in detail, the particulars involved in prayer, they at once present themselves in aspects perplexing, and apparently absurd and contradictory to the carnal mind, and the true significance of which is not always fully appreciated by the child of God, even though familiar with the closet.

It is a telling to God of our necessities and wants—all which he knows already; so that it cannot be designed to instruct or inform him.

It is a pressing him with arguments drawn from our interests and concerns, therein comprehending our most trivial, as well as our greatest affairs—"in *everything* by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, letting our requests be made known unto God." Phil. iv. 6. But all these, the greatest as well as the least, are utterly insignificant, as compared with his greatness, and the vast affairs of his kingdom; so that it cannot be designed to influence him, by virtue of the weight and importance of the matters involved.

It is a pleading with Him as to the orderings of his providence. And yet the design cannot be to induce any change in his plans, any modification of his purpose for the future; for, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." Acts xv. 18. And "he is in one mind, and who can turn him?" Job xxiii. 13.

We are enjoined to be importunate and persevering; and yet this cannot be with any expectation to weary the infinite and almighty One to acquiescence in our wishes.

Where two or three agree touching anything which they ask, they have special assurances of hearing and answer; and even in the solitary closet, the union and fellowship in prayer of all saints is to be recognized and employed in the argument and appeal, "Our Father." Yet this cannot be because the combined strength of many, or all mortals, is more adequate to overcome and mould the purpose and will of God into harmony with our wishes.

In acceptable prayer is included a confession of our sins. And the assurance is given, that "he that covereth his sins shall not prosper: but whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall have mercy." Prov. xxviii. 13. And yet, manifestly,

confession makes no compensation for sin; nor does it give any information to the justice of God, in order to its satisfaction, since the books of remembrance already contain full record of all.

This exercise involves thanksgiving and praise to God; and yet it is manifest that neither do our thanks compensate for God's goodness, nor our praises exalt his essential majesty or increase his blessedness.

To what purpose then is prayer? What is the object accomplished in the fulfilment of this duty and embrace of this privilege? In one word,—*Prayer is an act of communion with God, so ordered as to provide very special and powerful incentives to indulgence thercin, in the varied and unspeakable blessings which are bestowed upon us through the channel of this exercise.*

Man, in his creation, was designed and endowed to be, in a very peculiar and exalted sense, the friend and fellow of God. Of this, a remarkable testimony is given by the Son, the Wisdom of God, in the book of Proverbs, viii. 29—32. "When he gave to the sea his decree, that the water should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth; then was I by him, as one brought up with him; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth; and my delights were with the sons of men. Now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children." To this end it was that man was originally endowed with the image and likeness of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness; a knowledge consisting not merely in intellectual apprehension of the truth respecting God's attributes and perfections; but in a competence for, and enjoyment of, personal acquaintance and converse with God; and a righteousness and holiness involving the outgoings of love and trust toward God, his attributes and his law, as revealed to the understanding in his works, his words, and the communings and teachings of his Spirit.

The fall was an apostasy from that divine fellowship to which man was thus ordained, in his creation; an apostasy which was signalized by actual bodily flight from the presence of God, and the vain attempt to hide from him, among the trees of the

garden. Henceforth, men "did not like to retain God in their knowledge." For this reason they have "changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." Rom. i. 28, 23. Henceforth, "the wicked,"—a name too truly including by nature the entire race—"the wicked, through the pride of his countenance will not seek after God; God is not in all his thoughts." Psal. x. 4. To such a pass of alienation has he come, that the apostate affections give form to the atheist's creed, and the fool says, in his heart, "There is no God." Psal. xiv. 1. Thus, the withdrawal from personal converse and communion with God, and loss of that knowledge of him which flows from such intercourse of the heart, has resulted in a corresponding perversion of the understanding, and departure from all just and true conceptions respecting God and our relations to him. The result is, that darkness has covered the world, and gross darkness the people; that darkness the reverse of which is "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God."

From man's alienation from God results a correspondent enmity against his fellow-men. The one law of love, which alike bound man to his Maker and to his fellows, had the principle of all its activities in the attractive power of the Divine perfections; and that power being lost, love lost its control, and men became "hateful and hating one another," by virtue of being "haters of God."

With regard to the condition of man, as thus lost alike to divine and human fellowship and love, it was that Christ came to restore us to the blessed communion of God, and charity to each other. He came to declare the Father by that testimony of his Word which dispels the intellectual darkness of the world respecting God; and to bring men to the Father by the illuminating and sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit, taking the things of Christ—all that the Father hath—and showing them unto us; drawing the heart out after God in ardour of love, and zealous obedience; and coming—the Father and Son, by the Spirit—and dwelling in the heart as abiding guests. John xiv. 21—26.

It is in view of these things, that our Saviour, having un-

folded to his disciples, at the table of the Supper, the nature and results of the union and communion of believers with the Father and Son, in a discourse recorded in the Gospel of John, (xiv—xvi.), afterwards, in a most wonderful prayer on the same theme, defines the nature of salvation, in those remarkable words, "And this is life eternal, that they might *know* thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." John xvii. 3. Of that last discourse and prayer, thus reported to us by the beloved disciple, John the divine, the impress may be traced in every line of his General Epistle, in which he expatiates upon this same theme—"That," says he, "which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ. And these things write we unto you, that our joy may be full. This then is the message which we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth; but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." 1 John i. 3—7. Of this union and fellowship of believers with God and each other, thus testified by John, he reports yet more striking expressions from the prayer of Jesus. "Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are." (ver. 11.) "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me." John xvii. 21—23. Thus does our Saviour intimate his own person to be at once a singular exemplar—"as thou Father art in me, and I in thee," and the means, "I in them," of the union and communion of God and his people. In the person of Christ, an actual personal unity is established between the second person of the Trinity and the child of Mary; between the Son of God and the Son of man.

And through him in whom God and man are thus united, and through him alone, can man ever again recover the fellowship of God. "No man cometh unto the Father but by me." John xiv. 6. Thus does God, by the very person which he has given to his Son, signalize his own wonderful design to exalt, honour and bless man above every other creature, by admitting him to his own communion and friendship, making him a son and heir; and thus placing him in a position of dignity and privilege far above that which Adam by transgression lost.

The Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of the intimacy thus implied, alike as, dwelling in Christ the Head and believers the members, he engrafts them into him; and as, in them, he abides as the Spirit of adoption, and of grace and supplications. As the Spirit of the Son, he excites in us feelings of filial love and confidence, and induces us to adopt the cry, "Abba, Father;" bearing witness with our spirits that we are children of God. And as the Spirit of grace and supplications he "helpeth our infirmities," "making intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered."

But, even in the children of God, the flesh, lusting against the Spirit, indisposes them to the intimacy and fellowship thus implied; so incongruous as it is to their native attitude of apostasy and alienation. Not only so, but the blindness and darkness induced by the fall disqualify them natively for communings with God upon such themes as are the proper and ultimate subjects of such communion; the great things of his grace and glory, since a common sphere of knowledge is essential to intercommunion of intellect or affection.

It is in view of these aspects of our lost and helpless condition that God has graciously appointed the ordinance of prayer, or supplication for needed mercies and blessings; the first and lowest degree of divine communion, and stepping-stone to all the rest; to thanksgiving, to praise and adoration. In this exercise, Jehovah bows his infinite intelligence to the narrow capacity of the feeblest Christian, by accepting, as the subject of converse, the most trivial concern of self which occupies the thoughts and arouses the emotions of that Christian's heart. He uses it as the means to constrain the alien nature, and attract the child of grace into his presence and converse,

by pressing him with the burden of necessities and wants, relief from which is held out to him, to be obtained at the throne of grace in answer to prayer. Thus, by the divine wisdom and goodness, the lowest and narrowest principle of our nature, selfishness, is made auxiliary to the highest ends of our sanctification and God's glory; as, by appeal to it, we are persuaded to draw near unto God and stand waiting and looking to his mercy-seat.

He who could have relieved his people at once and for ever from every form of trouble and from every experience of want, on the contrary, leaves them to a continual wrestling with tribulation and sorrow; assuring them at the outset of their course, "In this world ye shall have tribulation;" and verifying to them that declaration, to life's close. And whilst he holds in his power abundant supply for all wants and deliverance or consolation from all troubles, his hand is restrained and his blessings withheld. The wants could as easily have been satisfied, out of infinite fulness, at once, and without prayer; yet has he suspended his succors upon the condition, "Ask, and it shall be given you." Why is this? Because God delights in our unhappiness? or, because he stands upon the dignity of being asked, before he will bestow? Nay, verily. But, thus, our necessities are made the means of compelling us to turn away from the world, to the presence of God, and to engage in converse with him. We draw near before him, and tell the story of our burdened hearts, and pour out our sorrows in his ear. We ask deliverance, and it is received. We seek supplies, and they are granted. Thus arises the occasion and the emotion of thanksgivings poured forth from grateful hearts. As thus we frequent the Divine presence, and, as petitioners, grow familiar there, all the Divine perfections are gradually discovered to our view. His infinite power, his boundless goodness, his unspeakable condescension, his fathomless love, his universal providence, his spotless holiness and perfect justice, unfold themselves to our wondering view, inspiring us with admiring joy, and impelling us to acts of grateful praise and reverent adoration.

Nor, in all this, is the believer alone, in giving expression to his desires and feelings, his prayers and praises. That gracious

One who has brought him thus nigh, in order to teach him to converse with God, delights to respond to these utterances, which his own Spirit gives, in testimonies of reciprocal love and grace, in disclosures to the soul of his own hidden beauties and glories, and in promises suited to each several case. The Spirit taking the things of Christ, and showing them to the believer, selects from the promises and testimonies of God such as are appropriate to each particular case, and seals them as God's own special testimony to that soul. Thus is a mutual communion and fellowship with the Father and his Son established; that communion which, perfected and perpetuated in heaven, is the source of all its joys, and the highest of all its honours.

In this view we have the key to all the phenomena of prayer. What matters it, that in thus bringing our wants before God, we do not instruct him; since already he knows them all! It is sufficient, that the theme is one upon which we can talk intelligently, and that upon it we may be persuaded to commune with God. What cares the loving parent, how trite or trivial the topic upon which his child addresses him, so long as it inspires the stammering efforts of the young prattler, and gives occasion for the interchange of thought and affection between parent and child. How common upon parents' lips, the expression, "Ask me, ask me pretty, and you shall have it." So, a gracious God, delighting to hear the faltering accents of filial love and confidence addressing his fatherly ear, says to his children, "Ask, and it shall be given you."

So too, with respect to our interests being too insignificant to deserve the notice of God. True, none of our affairs are of a dignity which may, on that score, claim his attention. But the one consideration which controls the case, is, the degree in which the subject is important and interesting to us. No matter how trivial the subject may be, in itself, if it sustains such relations to us as to render it of moment to our welfare and happiness; if it have a power to arouse our intellectual faculties and stir our affections, and to direct them toward God, in communications of confidence and in expectation and hope; in it are fulfilled the best designs of prayer, and the child of God may with confidence bring it to the notice of the Father's ear. And, undoubtedly, it is through a too common failure of just

and practical conceptions on this point, that prayer is to so large an extent a mere futile and barren exercise of the intellect and the imagination. In entering upon that exercise, we too little consult our own conscious necessities, and the real wishes and longings of our own hearts; but seek rather to find themes and a style sufficiently dignified for the ear of God. Than such orations—however high the sentiments, however lofty the theme or worthy the phrases—one cry of earnest desire gushing importunately toward God's throne, from a trusting heart, however rude the speech or trivial the subject, has infinitely more of true dignity, and assured acceptance with God. Let no child of faith imagine that anything can interest or concern him, respecting which the Father's ear is not ready to listen, and the Father's love does not invite him to speak.

Again, the Divine purpose in enjoining on us importunity and perseverance in prayer, is manifest in the light of the principles above stated. The answer is not delayed because of reluctance, and the object of importunity is not to weary out the Divine will. But the design of God, in this feature of his dealings, is to keep us in attendance at the mercy-seat, that we may grow familiar there, and that we may acquire the habit, not merely of occasional coming into the Divine presence and communication with the Father of spirits; but of a continuous waiting before him, with reverent confidence pleading and expostulating with him respecting the delaying kindness; watching his countenance for the tokens of gracious hearing and answer, and thus acquiring and enjoying a growing privilege and freedom of communion with the hearer of prayer.

So too of united prayer. In it the complete and triumphant power of Christ's salvation is doubly displayed, in the restored fellowship of the redeemed with God, and with each other. As the apostasy of man from God involved therein alienation from his fellow-men, so the plan of redemption not only provided for reëstablished communion with God, but for renewed fellowship among men. These two results of his salvation the Redeemer very emphatically identifies together, and sets forth as the evidence and pledge to the world of his own mission and the Father's love to the redeemed. "The glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are

one; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me." John xvii. 22, 23. Of this communion of believers with each other and fellowship with God, union and agreement in prayer is the most signal evidence and expression; as therein is exhibited not only harmony, fellowship and union of affection and sentiment with each other, but as that harmony has respect to search after and communion with Him, from whom they are, by nature, so utterly estranged.

Not only so, but this united approach to the throne of grace is a most powerful means of cherishing and invigorating the unity of the Spirit, of which it is so emphatic an expression. Coming together into the presence of one God and Father of all, through one Lord Jesus Christ the Saviour of all, by the one Spirit of holiness and grace—confessing the same sins, lamenting the same infirmities, realizing the same necessities, pressing the same requests, and cherishing the same expectations and hopes—they are induced thus to appreciate the reality of the tie by which they are one, to cherish the intimacy proper to that unity, and to draw toward each other in the bonds of mutual tenderness, and exercises of mutual kindness and sympathy. Thus are they knit together in love and communion with each other and with God; and to this intent is it that united prayer is designed.

As this agreement of believers in prayer is the highest demonstration of restored fellowship in both these directions, so it is the best evidence of the presence and agency within them of the Spirit of God, by whose power alone such unity of sentiment, such desire after God, and concurrent approach to him could ever be induced. Thus is united prayer assured of acceptance and answer, by a double argument; on the one hand, as the Divine faithfulness is pledged in this way to reward the union which thus so remarkably exhibits and accomplishes the triumph of his grace; and, on the other, as that Spirit by whom it is wrought is he who helpeth our infirmities in prayer, and maketh intercession for us according to the will of God, inditing petitions which God's will that dictates them will answer.

Another of the circumstances of prayer which finds its solution in the cherishing of divine communion, is the fact that all the promises of answer are addressed to faith: "Whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, *believing*, ye shall receive." Matt. xxi. 22. "What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, *believe* that ye receive them, and ye shall have them." Mark xi. 24. "If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. But let him *ask in faith*, nothing wavering: for he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, driven with the wind and tossed. For let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord." James i. 5—7. "The *prayer of faith* shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him." James v. 15. The essential ground of faith is testimony; and that class of testimonies upon which, in effectual prayer, faith lays hold, is the promises, not merely as they stand recorded in the word, nor as they may be appealed to by the imagination, but as the Spirit selects them and brings them home to the heart with applying power, taking the things of Christ and shewing them unto us. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him, and he will show them his covenant." Psal. xxv. 14. And it is in such intercommunications as these, in which the soul's pleas are met by secret testimonies to the heart of the Divine presence and love, and pledges of blessings according to the need, that the true communion of the closet consists. He who prays without faith, babbles in God's presence, without listening for the answer. He has failed to reflect that to such as will hear, God is always ready to speak; that, to those who ask, he is ever ready to respond. He goes away unblessed, and shall receive no good thing of God, because he has declined communion, not even listening to the promises which God was ready to utter. He has attempted to convert the banqueting-house of love into a mere almshouse of beggars.

Believing prayer, then, implies, not only an exhibition of our pleas before the throne of God, but a heartfelt sense of God's presence, in so doing; and, predicated thereupon, a looking and waiting, not merely to receive the blessing sought, but to hear the voice of God responding to us; an acceptance of the com-

munications thus received, in a spirit of trustful confidence; and a consequent patient waiting until the desired mercy is obtained. "I waited patiently for the Lord," says the Psalmist, "and he inclined unto me and heard my cry. He brought me up also out of an horrible pit, out of the miry clay, and set my feet upon a rock, and established my goings." Psal. xl. 1, 2. But since faith is not of ourselves, but the gift of God, a fruit of the Spirit, and the other exercises which accompany it in prayer are of like origin, the necessity of the aid of that blessed agent, in order to a right performance of this duty, is apparent. Hence that testimony of Paul, "The Spirit also helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God." Rom. viii. 26, 27. Thus the efficacy of prayer is at last dependent upon the presence and guidance of that Spirit of God and of Christ whose communion and fellowship is the enjoyment of every believer.

Here, it is necessary to present an additional consideration, which must enter into any just understanding of those promises which have respect to effectual prayer, the prayer of faith. It is, that, in this exercise, we seldom so yield ourselves to the leadings of the Spirit as to constitute him the sole author of the affections realized and the petitions presented at the throne of grace. Usually, our own carnal understandings, imaginations, and feelings interpose to such a degree as to modify essentially the whole character of the exercise, and leave it very partially under the control of the Spirit. Sometimes, no doubt, it occurs that we neither seek nor receive any assistance whatever from the Spirit, as to the frame-work and formal matter of our petitions, and yet enjoy a measure of his presence and influence, inducing emotions and exciting groanings which are unuttered, but heard before the throne, while our speeches, though never so eloquent, are altogether empty and vain. But, inasmuch as we know not what we should pray for as we ought; inasmuch as the Spirit only knoweth the will of God, and can therefore make intercession according thereto; inasmuch as he only can

truly impart and interpret to the soul the divine promises which respond to such intercessions, and create faith in those promises; it is manifest that true faith, to which the assurances of answer are given, can only characterize any petition in so far as, whether in matter or spirit, it is dictated by the Holy Ghost. In so far as it is of him it accords with God's will, and the answer is sure. In so far as it is of ourselves it must be devoid of true faith.

How entirely in harmony with this whole conception of prayer is the requirement that our supplications be in the name of Christ, it is scarcely necessary to show. On this point, nothing could be more appropriate than the very language in which Jesus directs us thus to use his name: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you. Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full. These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs; but the time cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but I shall show you plainly of the Father. At that day ye shall ask in my name: and I say not unto you, that I will pray the Father for you: for the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came out from God. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again, I leave the world, and go to the Father." John xvi. 23—28. In fact, a coming into God's presence, in the name of him who is God's own fellow, is of itself a claim to fellowship with him—a claim which, as Jesus here testifies, is most acceptable to God, since it announces our love to him who is the Father's first beloved, and who came out from him.

Proportionate to the nature of prayer, as here exhibited, are its rewards. First among these is the reception of the blessings which are sought at the hand of God. "Whatsoever ye shall ask believing, ye shall receive." "If ye ask anything in my name, I will do it." Whenever a penitent sinner comes to the mercy-seat, and in the name of Christ, with true faith, presents his petition, and with patient perseverance presses his suit and awaits the blessing, the promise may seem to be delayed, but it will come, and will not tarry. It is, indeed, sometimes attempted to explain away the express and specific language of

the many promises on this subject, which have been already exemplified in this discussion; and to interpret them as implying no more than the assurance that the believing suppliant shall be blessed, in some way or other, though perhaps not in the particular which he desires and expects. It is, no doubt, often true, that while the heart, moved by the Spirit, is yearning after one thing, the lips, guided by the carnal will, are pleading for something altogether different. The manner of this phenomenon of grace we have already noticed, and indicated that the extent to which the petition is dictated by the Spirit, and, therefore, embraced by a true faith, is that which the promise comprehends. That, to this full extent, it is sure to the believer, results, not only from the express and unambiguous language of the promises, but from several other considerations which are equally clear and conclusive.

It results from the nature and objects of prayer. Its design being to bring us into the Divine presence, in order to intercommunion there—the full intent is never accomplished until the suppliant, persuaded by the Spirit to come to the throne of grace, and inspired by him with such desires as will be acceptable there—has presented his plea, received a response from the mouth of God, and accepted it with believing joy. If the communion have been real, the faith thus induced rests on the truth of God; and to suppose that to fail were blasphemous. Further, the design of suspending God's mercies upon the condition of prayer, being to persuade our alien nature to come nigh to God, under the impulse of favours expected in answer to our requests—it is evident that unless we may expect the very favour, the desire for which has brought us there, the whole argument and encouragement utterly fails.

To the same conclusion, is the fact that believing prayer is dictated by the Spirit. It can neither be imagined that he is ignorant of the will of God, nor that he will delude the subjects of his guidance by persuading them to expect what God will not grant.

The history of the Son of God, when on earth, in his dealings with those who sought his grace, confirms the view here taken. He is "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever;" and is not only the very image of the Father, but

is now enthroned by the Father as Head over all things, Lord of providence, and administrator of the Father's kingdom, so that from his immediate hand are we to look for the answers to prayer and the supply of our wants. But when he was upon earth, in the days of his flesh, he never failed to grant to one believing suppliant the petition which he asked. Then, as now, he required faith in the applicant, as a condition of his favour. Then, as now, he sometimes delayed an answer, in order to try and strengthen faith and perseverance. But no suppliant who came in faith went away disappointed. Always they received, not only the better blessings of saving grace, but also the specific favour for which they sought his presence. And so must it be now, as then, with him who changes not.

Here, let it not be supposed that the prayer of faith, which is thus so assured of acceptance, has in its nature anything occult or mysterious, or so difficult as to be necessarily of rare attainment, and beyond the ordinary reach of common Christians. In so far as any prayer is acceptable with God, it is of this nature; and in so far as any child of God seeks and cherishes and yields to the guidance of the Spirit in the closet, will he grow in grace and effectual prayer. To no petition does God listen with more favour than to that which asks for the Holy Spirit. "If a son shall ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone? or if he ask a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent? or if he shall ask an egg, will he offer him a scorpion? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?" Luke xi. 11—13. And never is that blessed Spirit more congenially engaged, than when leading the children of God into the Father's presence, and teaching them how there to plead with boldness and efficacy, for all things whatsoever they need. He, then, that would be effectual in prayer, let him watch in the closet against his own wisdom and self-confidence, and strive continually to commit himself to the guidance of the Comforter.

Need we say that these views give no just occasion to a carnal enthusiasm? Not those who, out of their own heads, frame their petitions, and, out of their own hearts, believe that they shall

have what they ask—not they shall receive any good thing of God. Such may become blind enthusiasts, deceiving and being deceived. But this snare is to be avoided, not by denying or disparaging the grace of God, but by a constant jealousy of self, making sure that the grace of God is in us, and abiding steadfastly in that grace.

The immediate design and effect of the communings to which the closet invites us, is the cultivation within us of the Divine knowledge and love. Whilst by means of minor blessings we are enticed into the presence-chamber, and are brought into communion with the Father of spirits, it is in order to bestow upon us better things—to reveal to us the perfections of Jehovah. Each act of approach, on our part, is predicated upon knowledge already attained, and is met by further communications of knowledge, as every word of God thus received conveys its own peculiar revelation to the soul, thus fulfilling the request, in which every child of grace joins with Moses—impelled thereto, as was he, by partial visions already enjoyed: "I beseech thee, show me thy glory."

Two results, in succession, follow from this. In the higher contemplations thus set before them, and the lofty communings which are associated therewith, the disciples of Christ attain to a superiority over all earth's cares and troubles, and acquire that peace of God which passeth all understanding, filling their hearts and minds through Jesus Christ, and a hope immovable and full of glory. And going on from strength to strength, they are gradually sanctified and fitted for heaven. Of this result, whilst the Holy Spirit is the efficient agent, the communion and vision of God are the immediate cause. "We love him because he first loved us." Each testimony of Divine love received by the soul, elicits emotions of responsive love. Each vision of God's holiness and glory inspires admiration of those perfections, and abhorrence of our own depravity and vileness, and so induces conformity to the Divine likeness. Thus the radiance of God's perfections is enstamped upon the soul, and his people "with open face beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord" (2 Cor. iii. 18), until, by earth's communings, gradually educated for heaven, they

at length, perfected in holiness, are translated to glory, there to see as they are seen, and to know, even as also they are known—the wailing plaints and prayers of earth giving place to the joyous and adoring songs of the skies; and its distant and interrupted vision and fellowship exchanged for a home in the bosom of God.

We close with some suggestions for guidance in prayer, deduced from the general principles here presented.

1. In engaging in prayer, the mind should be occupied and controlled by a clearly defined desire and expectation of enjoying a mutual communion with God. The object is not, from a distance, to address the throne, but to draw near, and enter sensibly into the Divine presence; and whilst presenting our petitions and uttering our confessions, thanks, and praises, in each to look for, expect, and await a Divine response, imparted at once by the Comforter, on the Father's behalf. To this intent it is well that, at times, our own utterances should be entirely suspended, and the mind, unemployed in conceiving and uttering speech, be left entirely free to hear: "Commune with thine own heart, and be still." And, in such exercises, let it not be supposed that nothing is gained, because no more may be realized than a solemn awe in God's presence. Not only is that of itself an experience of the highest value, to be assiduously cherished, but it is furthermore undoubtedly true, that to the soul thus adoring before God's throne, the Holy Spirit, which helpeth our infirmities by intercessions and groanings that cannot be uttered, may and does bestow communications of grace to the spirit, whilst the understanding is unfruitful. Compare Rom. viii. 26, with 1 Cor. xiv. 14, and throughout the chapter.

2. It was not casually that, in instructing the disciples how to pray, the first words which our Saviour taught them to utter were the fraternal, filial cry, "Our Father"—recognizing in those two words the brotherhood of all saints, the sympathy of all the members in the one body, their common interest at the throne of grace, the paternal love and tenderness of God, and the filial confidence and fellowship thereby induced. Such are the feelings which Jesus designed to inculcate by the direction—"After this manner pray ye." Such the feelings which

should be diligently cherished and brought into exercise in all our approaches to the mercy-seat. If our Father, then may we come with confidence and boldness; then may we be assured that not only will he hear, but respond and bless.

3. The same general principles apply to the use of the name of Christ. Whilst some doubtless use that name as a mere form adapted to round off the closing period, and others as a sort of word of incantation, invested with some secret mystic power, and whilst the children of God too often seem to view it in no higher light than as a plea of justice satisfied for sin; a glance at the language of our Saviour on the subject, will evince that it has a much higher design. "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask anything in my name I will do it." John xiv. 13, 14. "Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full. . . . And I say not that I will pray the Father for you; for the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came out from God." John xvi. 24—27. The name of Christ is the plea of love. It involves indeed a claim of justice satisfied, but to the Son, himself, upon the throne, it urges the Father's glory, "that the Father may be glorified in the Son," as well as the Son's own love to his redeemed. And to the Father, it is the plea of our love to his dear Son. Thus, its spirit and purpose is love; and its design is not a mere formal utterance of the name at the close of prayer, but faith and love to him, and to the Father in him, pervading it all. As we come, with the cry, our Father, the first words we utter, so should we come with the faith in Christ, and consequent union with him, which that cry implies. He who calls us to the fellowship of heaven, thus, in the God-man, reveals the way.

4. In order to the freest and highest enjoyment of the privilege of the mercy-seat, it is necessary that our views and wishes be in all respects conformed to those of God. To this end, the word of God is to be studied, with the constant object of moulding our thoughts and affections in accordance therewith; and in all our thoughts and meditations it should be our endeavour to strive to view things, not from the low and grovelling

stand-point of our carnal aims and interests, but from that of the Divine honour and glory, and the vast dimensions of God's kingdom, and the depth and wisdom of his counsels.

5. That importunity and perseverance to which a gracious answer is pledged, does not consist in an occasional and impetuous urging of our plea at the mercy-seat, but in a calm, earnest, and persistent pressing of it, with humble consciousness and confession of unworthiness, filial confidence in God's infinite grace and love, and a confiding expectation of the blessing, looking and patiently waiting for it. The design of our being invited to exercise perseverance, being to induce us to keep near the mercy-seat, so as to learn the faithfulness and love of God, and to engage in communion with him, it is evident that he who most fully and heartily enters thus into the spirit of the exercise will soonest receive his request; whilst an occasional and impatient cry—since it implies unsubmissiveness under God's hand, distrust of his goodness and truth, and therefore ignorance of his true character, by reason of estrangement from his presence—precludes the blessing, the bestowal of which in such circumstances would be an encouragement to continuance in such a state of distance and ignorance.

6. Above all else, as being the means essential to all, is the aid of the Spirit to be sought, and his guidance followed with implicit acquiescence. How often do we grieve that agent of Divine grace, when present, and offering his aid, by listening to the suggestions of our own grovelling understandings and dictates of our carnal wills, rather than give heed to his invitations, which are calling us to the banquetting-house under the banner of perfect love. Would we offer acceptable petitions? They must be dictated by "the Spirit of grace and supplications." Would we conform them to the will and purpose of God? It is the Spirit that "maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God." Would we therein experience the highest joys, and antepasts of heaven itself? They are found in "the communion of the Holy Ghost." The secret mystery of prayer, therefore, is to watch and set our sails so as to catch the softest breathing of the Spirit, and guide our bark thereby to the bosom of infinite Love;—a secret, this, which none but he himself can teach. But "if ye being parents

know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him." Ask, then, and it shall be given you.

How wonderful the condescension, grace, and wisdom of our God, who employs such means and uses such assiduities to win us back from our apostasy from him, and persuade us to return to the communings of his heart and the bosom of his love; making his eternal Son, in his two natures, the exemplar and bond of union, and the way, and his Spirit the guide, into his presence, the inspirer of our utterances there, and interpreter to us of the Father's words of grace, accepting our low concerns as the theme of converse; and, with all the treasures of infinite power and goodness, adequate to every want and more than heart can conceive, held forth in his hands, suspends the bestowal of all on the one condition that we will talk with and believe in him as our Friend! Ask, believe, persevere, and ye shall receive.

ART. IV.—*Pennsylvania Archives*, Vol. 4. 1853.
A Chapter from "*The Monongahela of Old*," &c., by the HON. JAMES VEECH, Pittsburgh, Pa. 1857.

ONE hundred years ago, this last autumn, Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon commenced to run from East to West the parallel of latitude which forms the Southern boundary of Pennsylvania, and still bears their names, with so much celebrity. No line of demarcation, drawn by human survey, was ever so remarkable, in the geographical divisions of our globe. It is perfectly artificial. Neither desert, nor mountain, nor water, the three diversities of boundary which nature gives to States, can be found to guide or help its continuity; not even a circle of the sphere that geography would draw, without fractions, in one of its regular measures from the equator; and yet no other limit on earth was ever so conspicuous, in the

course of a single century, for the delineation it makes in the history of man. The opposite tendencies, the moral contrasts, the political antagonisms, the convulsions, and bloody strife, which have been marshalled along this viewless track of the surveyors' chain, have made it a "breach wide as the sea;" marked and deepened, as if the continent had yawned along its way, and left a gulph, as memorable and desolate as that which lies "in the vale of Siddim."

Almost a century of confusion and strife had preceded the running of this line. The royal Stuarts of Great Britain, doomed, alike in their pleasure and their spite, to entail trouble from their hands, had granted originally the whole territory, it divides. In 1606, James I. gave eleven degrees of latitude on the Atlantic, reaching from 34° to 45° N. to two incorporated companies; one called the Plymouth, and the other the London Company. From 38° to 41° the territory was to be considered common ground betwixt them, only that latitude 40° N. was understood to be the limit more precisely between North and South. The whole territory had had the common name of Virginia, in honour of Queen Elizabeth's virginity, and was now to be called North Virginia, and South Virginia. But soon afterwards, in 1614, the northern was called by Captain John Smith, or rather Prince Charles, at his suggestion, New England; and the southern only retained the name Virginia. The jealous and inconstant monarch, however, instigated by Gondemar, the Spanish ambassador at his court, and disgusted with the spirit of popular freedom, already alive and bounding in those wastes, revoked these charters in less than twenty years after they were granted, and left the vast domain to be parcelled anew, by despotic sons and successors.

Captain John Smith was the original surveyor of the coast; the first to make a map of English America; by which the authorities in England were guided, for half a century, in the distribution of grants and charters. This great adventurer, while founding the colony at Jamestown, would often leave it, even in critical circumstances, for the strange pleasure of exploring and mapping the wild borders of bays and rivers, as well as the ocean. The whole Chesapeake Bay was traced by him, with wonderful accuracy; and so was the coast of New

England, subsequently, from the Penobscot to Cape Cod. It is not the least marvel in his romantic life, that, without an education, and with such a passion for extremities of peril, in fighting or governing men, he could be so patient and exact in topographical observation. Most of his rude charts have been substantially verified, by the best results of modern science and art. The greatest blunder, and the only serious one, made in his mapping, was the misplacement of latitude 40°, which seems to have been always the dividing line between North and South, in the original schemes of high contracting parties, at Hampton Court and Whitehall. We shall soon see what confusion followed from this error; and how much the destiny of States depended on the eye and chain of that original surveyor.

While the Stuarts, with characteristic whimsy and arrogance, were busy creating and dissolving land corporations, giving and taking again the territories of a hemisphere, Holland became mistress of the seas; and Englishmen who coveted renown upon the ocean went over to man her fleets, and guide her discoveries. Sir Henry Hudson was one of these. In the service of the Dutch East India Company, he made his third voyage in search of the north-west passage; the two first adventures having been made in the interest of England. But his crew this time, accustomed to traverse latitudes of the south, could not bear the cold, and constrained him to sail backwards along the English-American coast, as far as the Chesapeake Bay, where he had the maps of Captain Smith to direct him. His own object, however, being discovery, the charts in his hand were used only to show him a starting point on the wonderful coast; and he turned northward again, entering first the Delaware Bay. This was in the year 1609. It was a year later that Lord Delaware, Governor of Virginia, made his entrance, and gave to the bay and river his name. It ought to have been called Hudson Bay and Hudson River. But the Dutch mariners thought its shores were too much like the Netherlands, low and flat. They were intent on finding territories new to them, in every aspect; and they turned out again for the north, without having even landed on the shores which they were the first of Europeans to see. Coasting along the sands of New Jersey, they soon turned round to anchor

within Sandy Hook. Here Hudson and his crew were delighted with the forests and slopes of the Nevesink Hills. He passed the Narrows, touched on Manhattan Island, ascended the river, carefully sounding it beyond the Highlands, and in a boat went on beyond the site of Albany.

But Hudson was not the first to discover this bay and river. Almost a century before him *John Venazzani*, exploring for France, and sent out on the errand by Francis I., had entered the same channel; and only the battle of Pavia, in which the French monarch lost everything, even his personal liberty, hindered that Florentine adventurer from returning, with French colonization, and his own name, for the magnificent bay and river he was the first to explore. The Delaware and the Hudson were each named in honour of the second explorer. But in consequence of the incident now related of that original expedition to the New World, from their own Texel, entering the Delaware first, and the Hudson second, the Dutch themselves called the one South River, and the other North River.

They determined to hold both. Immediately, on the return of Hudson, the Dutch West India Company decided to avail themselves of his discoveries for the advantage of trade; and while John Smith was actually tracing the shores of New England above them, they took possession of Manhattan Island, and founded New Amsterdam; from which, with wonderful convenience they could enrich Old Amsterdam, at once with the spoils of Spanish commerce and the furs of North American trapping. Their agents eagerly ascended the North River to New France, and planted posts of traffic from Staten Island to Canada, and from the Connecticut river to the Delaware. At Gloucester Point, a little below Philadelphia, on the New Jersey side, they had their outpost and principal fortress, called Fort Nassau. But it was not till 1629 that they regularly attempted to establish themselves as cultivators of the American soil. For this purpose they went as far south as they could, without intruding on the colony at Jamestown. Nearly opposite the southern extremity of New Jersey, where one of their own admirals, Cornelius May, had divided his name between the two capes at the entrance of Delaware Bay, they purchased from the natives, by the agency of Godyn, a tract

of land, extending on the western shore of this bay, from the headland on Fenwick's Island, which was called Cape Henlopen, at first, more than thirty miles. In 1631, De Vries brought over from Texel, in Holland, his colony of thirty persons, with cattle and implements of husbandry, established them near the present Lewes, Delaware, remained with them a year, and left them, at his return to Holland, happy and prosperous, far beyond any other beginning, at Roanoke, Jamestown, Manhattan, or Plymouth. The next year he came back, anticipating hospitable welcome, and the first fruits of wheat, tobacco, and furs, which were to reward the corporation at home for its enterprise. It was the Swaanendael, which the whole island of Texel talked of for two years, giving the colony this name, and fondly hoping that this daughter would soon excel the mother, and spread their industry, and especially their Protestant faith, far and wide on the great continent they now held, with a good footing in its genial and exuberant latitudes. But, to his grief and horror, he found only charred remains of huts, and scattered bones of adults and children. They had all been massacred by the neighbouring savages. Yet, from the ashes of this handful, which Holland cast upon the wilderness, the sly dexterity of a Quaker, half a century afterwards, managed to extract a commonwealth.

The Swedes, meanwhile, came on about the year 1638, to land nearly at the same spot, and purchase of the same treacherous natives, the whole coast, from the smouldering Swaanendael, up to the falls of the South river at Trenton. They were the first of Europeans to dwell on the soil of Pennsylvania, and a little below Philadelphia is the spot of their Tinicum, where Prinz, their governor, fixed the capital of New Sweden. The Dutch would not acknowledge this neighbour. Even the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus could not be suffered to begin a dominion on their claim in the wilds of America. Fort Casimir was built at New Castle, to resist the occupancy of Sweden; and after various conflicts, and owing mainly to the rapid degeneracy of Sweden under the government of her apostate queen, Christina, the Dutch entirely triumphed; and humanely incorporated the Swedes and Finns, already numerously settled, under their own jurisdiction. Although this

adverse occupancy of Swedish rule lasted only seventeen years, and was overthrown by the Hollanders themselves, we shall see how it availed also to carve a State out of Maryland, and mingle in the complications, out of which issued the celebrated line of division, that now shapes, on the south, the Keystone of our American arch.

Our subject, indeed, is but a line; and that is "length without breadth." Yet so many factors are concerned with the beginning of this line, that we are compelled to make, out of colonial cairns, the broadest base, perhaps, that ever sustained the adjustment of a territorial line. The main parties of the ultimate dispute are now to appear.

George Calvert, descended from an ancient family of Flanders, a native of England, educated at Oxford, early brought to the court as a secretary of Cecil, and ingratiated as a favourite of king James, who successively knighted him, made him a Secretary of State, and elevated him to an Irish peerage, with the title of Lord Baltimore, was probably the most popular and sagacious man in England, on the side of cavalier aristocracy and kingly prerogative. He seems to have set his heart early on colonization in America; and for the same reason that Robinson and Brewster longed to lead the Pilgrims hither, to obtain the unmolested establishment of his religious faith. But he was a Roman Catholic. The current tradition has it, that he was a convert to Popery, through disgust at the dissensions among Protestants, with which England was tossed at the time. So the Papists themselves have uniformly affirmed; and historians have generally believed them. But facts outweigh assertions. Three years at least before he is said to have resigned his offices at court, because he had become a Catholic, he obtained a charter for Newfoundland, with the express design of preparing there an asylum for the poor and persecuted Papists, with whom avowedly he was to cast in his own lot. And we know, that James always leaned with indulgence towards native and adhering Catholics, while he treated with vehement antipathy such as changed their faith to either side. Changeling himself, he would not allow others to change, in any other way than to forsake Presbyterianism. Besides, Calvert never showed the intolerant zeal of a convert; but

always the moderate and fair spoken temper of one whose religious convictions are cautious and apologetic, with life-long habit. As soon as he found it would be no offence to his sovereign, he openly professed to be what James had known him to be; and then, because the laws of the realm required it, he retired from office, to become a baron in Ireland, and a feudatory of princely domain in America.

He first attempted to colonize Newfoundland, and expended his fortune largely in settling Catholic citizens, and building baronial accommodations for himself. But finding the climate too severe, he determined to seek a settlement farther south; and having been himself a member of the Old Virginia London or South Company, he concluded to sail for Old Point Comfort; which was considered the central point of the Virginia coast. While the Swedes were entering the Delaware in 1629, Calvert and his fleet of Roman Catholic adventurers entered the Chesapeake, and became delighted with its genial clime, luxuriant forests, noble rivers, and beautiful birds. The sight of the oriole, it is said, captivated him beyond measure, and determined him to make that region his own. He first applied to the colony at Jamestown for a community of possession and privilege with them. But they required the oath of supremacy, by which the King, and not the Pope, was to be acknowledged head of the church, and this he refused. Knowing however, that the old charters of Virginia had been revoked, and that any prescription could easily be voided by a Stuart on the throne, he returned to England, to get from the monarch, whose headship he spurned in the wilderness, the grant of domain in this coveted country.

Charles I. was now king, and married to Henrietta Maria, daughter of Henry IV. of France. An avowed Roman Catholic was no unwelcome suitor at his court. And it was easy to excite his jealousy, and hasten his liberality, by representing how much the Swedes and the Dutch were aiming to occupy these lands, and how much a prior and actual occupation would prejudice the claims of England, according to the law of nations.

In 1632, Charles granted unto his "trusty and well beloved subject, Cecilius Calvert," now Lord Baltimore, all that George his father asked for, and had described in a charter drawn up

by his own hand: though he died, before it could pass under the seals of state. The territory granted was to begin at a line across the mouth of the Potomac supposed to be latitude 38°, "unto that part of Delaware Bay, on the north, which lieth under the fortieth degree of north latitude, where New England terminates; and all that tract of land from the aforesaid Bay of Delaware, in a right line, by the degree aforesaid to the true meridian of the first fountain of the river Potomac, and from thence tending towards the south to the further bank of said river, and following the west and south side of it to a certain place, &c., to the beginning." *Crescentia* was the name which George Calvert had intended for the territory; but Cecilius readily accepted what the ambitious Henrietta Maria proposed, and it was named in honour of herself, *Maryland.*

Lord Baltimore did not know, that already the Dutch had broken the soil in cultivation, on the frontlet of this inheritance, and he allowed the preamble to recite, that all the region granted him was "*hactenus terra inculta.*" It was in February 1634, that the Pilgrims of Maryland reached Point Comfort; and in March following, that the sacrifice of the mass was offered, and the appropriate ceremonies of seizin were performed, in the bosom of Maryland. For some reason, Lord Baltimore did not emigrate himself, but committed the colonization to his brother Leonard. This settlement was of slow growth. Their ideas were intensely feudal, at war with the civil and social as well as religious heart of the home from which they expected support and accession. Puritan power advanced in Great Britain. The royal grantor himself was beheaded in fifteen years after that livery of seizin. Clayborne of Virginia, who was there before them, in the island of Kent, resisted their claims and defied their power. Cromwell and the Commonwealth, a terror to kingdoms of Popery in Europe, was of course a terror to this handful of papists in English America. Pressed by the Puritan ascendancy in England, and the cavalier dislike in Virginia, Lord Baltimore was in no condition to ascertain the limits of his claim, and still less to contend on its borders. A struggle for its existence was all he could maintain. And so it continued till the restoration of Charles II., in 1660; five years after Gov. Stuyvesant,

by conquering the Swedes, had vindicated the occupation of Holland, from the original Swaanendael to the falls of the Delaware. Then, it was too late to claim the western margin of Delaware as "terra inculta."

But England had always ignored the rights of New Netherlands. Even her offcast pilgrims in New England regarded with envious challenge the spread of Dutch civilization, Calvinistic and republican as it was, in this wilderness. They crowded them out of the Connecticut valley, and almost entirely off the lands of Long Island. And when a charter was obtained for Connecticut, no recognition was inserted of this noble Christian people beside them. It called for territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. Charles II., soon after his accession, was painted in Holland, with a strumpet hanging on each arm, and courtiers behind him picking his pockets. The caricature was transported to London. And this creation of the Batavian *Punch*, more than all the rival glories of her commerce and religion, stirred him to hatred of Holland. For once he was warlike, in the midst of debauchery, and the mean persecution of his own people. He struck Holland, first in New Guinea, and next in New Netherlands. He gave over the latter to his brother, the Duke of York, to conquer and hold; which was easily done by reason of intestine division. New Amsterdam became New York; and Niewer Amstel became New Castle. All the demesne rights of the Dutch passed into the hands of this victor; and the Catholic Baltimores might now expect the utmost facility, in spreading their charter as they pleased, under the disposal of this bigoted papist. Who could have thought, that anything, thrown up in the heavings of the Commonwealth, and especially anything fanatical, and still more especially, anything fanatically round—round-head or round-coat—could come between York and Baltimore now, or between Baltimore and his Delaware coast? But the Duke of York, with all his faults, was warmly attached to the friends of his youth. Admiral Penn had been his tutor in naval affairs, of which he was passionately fond; and as his captain commander, in serving under him had won the only credit that ever made him popular in England.

William Penn is the next and last original factor, to be carefully scanned before we begin the running of our line. All history hardly furnishes a greater puzzle than the analysis of his character. Born of a Dutch mother, to whom he owed the traits which made him so renowned for virtue, and the mediation that often saved him from the wrath of his own father, he yet regarded every thing Dutch with aversion, to the end of his days. Converted to Quakerism when a boy at Oxford, he was expelled from college for tearing off the gowns from his fellow-students, which he doffed and hated as relics of superstition; and yet, in a little time afterwards, he was conformed to the fashions of Paris itself, and returned to England so modish in costume and port as to be called "a fine gentleman," even by Pepys, the courtly diarist of Charles II. Now a student of theology at Saumur, and sitting fondly at the feet of Moses Amyraut, the great Calvinistic doctor; and not long afterwards a prisoner in the Tower, for assailing as a "sandy foundation," the doctrine of the Trinity, the satisfaction of Christ, and the imputation of his merits in the justification of men. Again so fanatical a Quaker as to be turned out of doors by his own father, for refusing to take off his hat in the presence of the admiral, the Duke of York, and even King Charles himself; and yet that same father, at the same time, could send him to Ireland, with full confidence that he would manage a large estate there with tact and pliancy, and the highest degree of good common sense. Now a street preacher in London, so turbulent and heedless of statutes as to be fined and imprisoned with common vagabonds in Newgate; and anon, so high in favour at the court of James II., that noblemen were his clients, and so expert in guiding the conscience of that monarch that he was taken for a Jesuit in disguise, and had to rebut the charge by writing a book. So modest a man at one time, that he offered the secretary who made out his proprietary patent, twenty guineas, if he would not prefix "Penn" to "Sylvania," in giving name to the grant; and yet at another time so anxious to be restored to the government of the colony, from which he had been deposed for the malversation and corruption of his agents, that he would set the kingdom in commotion, and employ every influence, Locke and Tillotson, with the

Duke of Buckingham, to secure a reinstatement in the coveted honour. A treaty-maker, so illustrious for integrity that his covenants with the Indian became a proverb of unchangeable faith, "the only treaty never sworn to and never broken;" yet, as we shall now see, a border litigant, so bent without scruple on getting a "back port" for Pennsylvania on the Chesapeake, that all vested rights and parchments to the contrary, with the great seal of state upon them, were treated as nullities.

In consideration of services rendered by his father, Admiral Penn, he petitioned in 1680, for a grant of lands in America; where only, north of Virginia, he knew they remained yet to be granted—west of the Delaware and north of Maryland. He drafted the charter for himself with his own hand, and had Calvert's before him for a model, and, therefore, knew the boundaries of Maryland. Never did passive importunity obtain a richer prize. Never did a man's religious faith more perfectly coincide with his worldly fortune. He well knew that he could obtain nothing in that court, without the utmost conciliation and concession; and in Penn these gentle graces were never known to be dull or napping.

He had to meet the agents of Lord Baltimore and the Duke of York, before the Lords of Trade and Plantations. He had petitioned for five degrees of latitude, leaving it carefully undefined whether these degrees were to be invisible and indivisible lines through and touching his boundaries, or belts of 69½ statute miles, every one of them; that is, whether he meant a breadth of 278, or 347½ statute miles. He was now present to watch, not to urge, much less contend for his petition. Baltimore objected, that he had received only two degrees, from 38° to 40°. "Mr. Penn," said the President of the Board, "will not *three* degrees serve your turn?" "I submit," answered Penn, "both the *what* and the *how* to the honourable Board." It was then agreed that he also should have what Calvert obtained, two belts; and the *three* degrees mentioned should be inclusive only, between the first and the third of these indivisible lines. That is, he should have from the northern verge of 40° to the southern verge of 43° degrees, considering the degrees as 69½ statute miles broad. Longitude

seems to have been thrown in by the Board, very much as Penn happened to name it. His original petition seems evidently to have designed a square territory, five degrees each way; but it came from the Board of Plantations a parallelogram five in length only, with which the meek petitioner seemed perfectly content; but which he and his descendants were always intent on widening.

As for the Duke of York, his commissioner was careful only to reserve all that was valuable in the Swedo-Dutch acquisition, he had made by conquest, on the Delaware. First, he insisted that Penn's boundary should not come nearer than twenty miles of New Castle. The Lords of Trade, however, guided by the map of Captain John Smith, alleged that if the southern boundary of the proposed grant should be pushed up so far, it would leave a narrow and unappropriated strip between this line and latitude 40°, at which the territory of Maryland was bounded. It was therefore agreed, that it should begin twelve miles from New Castle, on a circle, the radius of which measured from this point would be sure to cut the line of 40°; and keep the possessions of York, northward and westward, safe from the intrusion of this new grant. After nine months of scrutinizing care and scruple, by not only this Board of Plantations, but the Bishop of London also, and Lord Chief Justice North, to see that no "undue liberties," to use their own expression, such as had been granted to Massachusetts and Maryland, should pass to this petitioner, the charter was issued on the 4th of March, 1681, under all the seals of state. The whole description of metes and bounds is precisely in these words, viz., "All that tract or part of land in America, with the islands therein contained, as the same is bounded on the east by Delaware River, from twelve miles northward of New Castle town, unto the three-and-fortieth degree of north latitude, if said river doth extend so far northward; but if not, then by a meridian line from the head of said river to said forty-third degree. The said land to extend westward five degrees of longitude, to be computed from said eastern bounds. And the said lands to be bounded on the north by the *beginning* of the three-and-fortieth degree of northern latitude, and on the south by a circle drawn at twelve miles distance from New

Castle northward and westward unto the beginning of the fortieth degree of northern latitude, and then by a straight line westward to the limits of longitude above mentioned."

The first and main question to be decided, in pursuance of this grant, as between Baltimore and Penn, was, where is line 40° north, at which Maryland was to end and Pennsylvania to begin. According to Smith's map, which the authorities had followed implicitly, the transit of this line across the Delaware was fixed a little below New Castle; and they were all sure, that the radius of twelve miles from that town would touch it, before the circumference could turn visibly from west to east. The southern boundary of Maryland had been correctly fixed at Watkin's Point, and Baltimore must measure up northward two belts to this line of 40°.

Markham, the kinsman and zealous partizan of Penn, landed with the first emigrant party of Quakers at Upland, now Chester; and according to his instructions made it one of his first concerns to confer with Lord Baltimore, on the interesting question of boundary. In the spring of 1682, the parties met, a careful astronomical observation was made, and to the astonishment of all concerned, this line of 40° was up far beyond the reach of that radius from New Castle, above Upland, above the mouth of the Schuylkill; a line, which, passing exactly over Bedford, Pennsylvania, and almost touching Lancaster, would put Chambersburgh, Gettysburgh, York, and Philadelphia itself into Maryland! Markham was confounded, and Lord Baltimore thanked the stars and the Virgin, for this heavenly extension of his charter.

Soon as the waves and the winds could waft him to London, Markham hastened to tell the proprietor what astronomy had done to his border, in spite of Captain Smith's authority. Penn's equanimity was greatly disturbed. Some of his partizans at court urged him to claim the whole belt, whose northern line was 40°—thus, beginning at 39°, which would have thrown the site of Baltimore City far up into Pennsylvania—absurdly overlooking even his own charter, which compelled that radius of twelve miles from New Castle to touch the southern line of his domain. But the proprietor himself, more astute, if not more generous, hit upon another expedient. The Duke of York was his friend. Those Dela-

ware dependencies which had been wrested from the Dutch were vested in him, by royal grant, and the right of conquest. And these, extending from the head of Fenwick's beach to the mouth of Christiana Creek, would give to Penn all he wanted—outlet to the ocean, free from ice, not only by the Delaware Bay, but, as he supposed, by the Chesapeake also. Money, importunity, and intrigue, as well as friendship secured from the Duke this coveted possession; and by two deeds, in August of 1682, all that Holland and Sweden and England herself had done, to carve out of Calvert's "hactenus terra inculta" grant, was now firmly vested in the founder of Philadelphia.

Thus, forehanded with charters and assignments, William Penn made his first visit to America, with twenty-six sail of colonists, landing in the autumn of 1682. After taking livery of seizin, and receiving the homage of 3000 people, already planted in the "lower counties," as this recent acquisition was called, and paying due respect to the Duke's governor at New York, he sought an interview with Charles, Lord Baltimore. Historians say, it was "friendly, but formal." Of course, it would be *friendly*, on the part of one who has been so renowned for benevolence and philanthropy, and who had just brought some twenty-six ship-loads of friends to settle brotherly love in savage America. But no friend, intent on removing the landmarks of his neighbour, could have brought a more ungracious lot of disclosures, for the information of a competitor.

He began by informing Lord Baltimore, that 60 miles instead of 69½ was to be the breadth of geographical degrees for Maryland. And next, that the Delaware coast had not been *terra inculta* in 1632, when his grandfather, George Calvert, had obtained his patent; that the Christian people of Holland had subdued the shore, first from the wilderness, and then from the Swedes, and that all this culture and habitation had passed over to the Duke of York, by whose grace the whole possession had in due form been conveyed to him, William Penn. Lord Baltimore, starting with "anger, and bewildered by these unexpected meshes, which the Quaker had woven, exclaimed, "I stand on my patent!" Subsequently, in another interview, held at New Castle, Penn proposed to give up the literal advantage his charter he had got from the blun-

dering of Captain Smith, and allow the breadth of Maryland to touch on 40°, provided, Baltimore would sell to him, at "a gentlemanly price," a sweep of acres around the head of Chesapeake Bay. But his lordship replied, he would do so, if Penn would throw in the "three lower counties," all that is now the State of Delaware, into the bargain. "This," said Penn, "he knew I would not do—I did not prize the thing I desired at such a rate."

Here negotiations ended for half a century. Lord Baltimore determined to hold at all hazard the claim of his fathers. At once he made forcible entry on the territories of Penn, and appealed to the king at St. James'. Pending the trial of his cause, Charles II. died, and the Duke of York ascended the throne. Of course, the cause of William Penn, being virtually that of James II. himself, would be decided against Baltimore. The Lords of Trade and Plantations, to whom the matter had had been referred, would not however touch the difficult problem of line 40°; but only decided the question about the peninsula, between the Delaware and the Chesapeake, in which alone his Majesty was personally involved. They ordered this to be divided—all of it, between Cape Henlopen and 40° by a right line, into two equal parts; "the eastern half to go to his Majesty," (and of course to Penn), and the western half to Lord Baltimore, as comprised in his charter. Thus the State of Delaware began, and the art and influence of William Penn reared a commonwealth from the ashes of Swaanendael, at the expense of Catholic Maryland.

The Greek painters, we are told, represented their Nemesis as a virgin goddess, looking on in thoughtful attitude, with a bridle in the one hand, and a sword or scourge in the other. All his renown for meekness, and equity, and benevolence, could not screen the owner of both Delaware and Pennsylvania from a visible retribution. Before the decision in his favour could be enforced, the Revolution rolled Penn out of court; and even an order of Queen Anne, as late as 1708, proved ineffectual to separate his territories from the jurisdiction of Maryland. Harassed by debt, with mortgages to remorseless money-lenders, compelling him to sell the half of all to the Queen, and, at the same time, persecuted, both for his faith and his fondness

for the Stuarts, he died in 1718; bequeathing contention to his heirs, among themselves, as well as vast incumbrances, and unsettled boundaries, to his magnificent demesne.

Passing over many incidents of romantic interest, which resulted from the spirit of angry border feud, we come to the year 1732; when Richard Penn, the youngest of the three sons, became of age. The title of Baltimore had also descended another generation, and now vested in Charles Calvert, the second of that name, and great-grandson of the original proprietor. Both parties were now alike out of court. A Protestant succession on the throne was not be won easily in favour of the Catholic Calverts: and a Hanoverian House remembered not the Penns, whose political partialities might still be sighing for the exiled Pretender. Besides the colonial peace was greatly disturbed. The notorious Colonel Cresap, squatting on the banks of the Susquehanna, had armed desperate men, and furious women also, to resist the Penns in the bosom of their own commonwealth. A little below where Wrightsville now stands, opposite Columbia, he kept a ferry and built a fort, and filled it with "border ruffians," who stigmatized the colonists of Penn with the name of "quaking cowards," while these, in turn, called the Marylanders, many of whom were transported convicts, "hominy gentry." Arrested at length on the charge of murder, and brought by the sheriff of Lancaster to the prison in Philadelphia, Cresap exclaimed, as he entered the city with an air of taunting defiance—"This is a pretty Maryland town."

Wearied on both sides with troubles like these, and obtaining at length an accurate map of all the localities, the parties entered into a memorable compromise on the 10th of May in that year, 1732; which adopted the order in council of 1685, dividing the peninsula into two equal parts; and superseded all reference to line 40°, substituting, for the true observation, fixed and familiar landmarks, already mentioned in the charter, settling, as far as could be done without actual survey, the boundaries as they are at this day.

On the margin of this agreement was drawn a map of the work, with directions how to pursue it. They were to begin at New Castle, and run the radius of twelve miles from that point,

northward and westward. Then to go down to Cape Henlopen, "which lieth south of Cape Cornelius," and from its ocean point, to measure a due west line to Chesapeake Bay; find the middle point of that line, and plant a corner there. From said middle point run a line northward, up the peninsula, so as to be a tangent line to the periphery of the circle, at or near its western verge, and mark the tangent point. From said tangent point, to run a line due north, until it comes to a point fifteen English statute miles south of the latitude of the most southern part of the city of Philadelphia. From that fifteen-mile point, run a line due west, across the Susquehanna, &c., to the utmost longitude of Pennsylvania.

The patience and persistence of the Penns always triumphed, over the hasty and turbulent spirit of the Baltimores; and what they called compromise invariably proved to be every jot and tittle of their own claim. This compromise, found out very soon by Lord Baltimore to be all on one side, began at every step of the practical adjustment to be evaded. Commissioners to run the line met and parted, in fruitless contention. Baltimore's representatives insisted that the circle which we now see at the head of Delaware State, should stretch its periphery, instead of its radius, to the southernmost line of Pennsylvania; and again, that the Cape Henlopen, from which Delaware was to be measured on the south, should be the upper one, opposite Cape May, called Cape Cornelius then, instead of Fenwick's beach or island; and that the east and west line from which the north line to divide the peninsula would start, should run from the Atlantic to a channel bounding Taylor's Island, instead of the Chesapeake itself, and run upon the ground instead of horizontal admeasurement, so as to narrow the Delaware counties. On every one of these pretences, the court of Chancery in England had to decide; and always decided in favour of the Penns. Baltimore in a rage threw up his charter, and asked George II. to give him a confirmation of what a king had given in 1632. This was refused; and the king in council had to dictate an arbitrary line, until the surveys could be completed; which was reluctantly accepted.

At length, after another tissue of troubles, arising out of this expedient also, the high litigant parties, in another generation,

did, on the 4th of July, 1760, enter into that agreement which remains ratified and acknowledged, without disturbance, to this day. And a more remarkable document, it is said by eminent lawyers, is not to be found among all the great models of old English conveyancing; remarkable for length, consisting of thirty-four pages closely printed octavo; and also for legal precision, and perspicuity; putting at rest for ever the most vexing question, according to Lord Hardwicke, that ever engaged the Councils and Chanceries of England.

The only remaining trouble was the execution of the surveys. Seven commissioners for each proprietary, three of whom should be a quorum to act, began the work in November 1760; but had to begin with the north and south dividing line on the peninsula, between Delaware and Maryland, in order to have a tangent for that circle of twelve miles radius about New Castle; on which tangent line, at a distance of fifteen miles from Cedar Street in Philadelphia, the great western line was to begin. Delaware, indeed, being also as much the property of the Penns as Pennsylvania itself; and called, as we have seen, "the three lower counties," New Castle, Kent, and Sussex; while Philadelphia, Bucks and Chester, the whole of Pennsylvania, were called "the three upper counties." But that one line, the western boundary of Delaware, took the joint Commissioners of the survey three years to locate, run, and mark. Tired with this long delay, and fearing that still another generation would pass before the important line of latitude could be traced, the proprietors about London decided to supersede American surveyors altogether, and send Mason and Dixon, astronomers of rising fame at London. They had been at the Cape of Good Hope together, to make observations of an eclipse of the sun. And it was resolved to constitute them a joint commission for this important business. And they represented well the composition of two tempers, that, after the jarring of three generations, joined their hands in final reconciliation. Mason represented the Quaker element, and Dixon the Chevalier. The former was "cool, deliberate, painstaking, never in a hurry," the latter was "active, impatient, and nervous" in temperament. Yet both worked on in harmony to the end of their task. They began it late in the fall of 1763;

and spent the remainder of that year and much of the next, in preparatory observations and work, which had been done already by the slow American surveyors. And these they were compelled to verify. With all their advantage of science and experience, and the most perfect instruments which art could furnish—a four feet zenith sector, among others, brought with them from London, they confessed that the rude sightings and chainings of their predecessors were so exact, that they could not make the tangent line pass one inch eastward or westward. In 1764, they began to run west from their celebrated corner, and traced their line to the Susquehanna, a parallel of 39° 43′ 32″, instead of the round simplicity of 40° as evidently intended at the original granting. Next year, 1765, they began to lay open vistas in the forests, which had never yet been explored by civilization, and now their main work needed the fortitude of American, more than the skill of London surveyors. But for the four brothers McClean, soon after distinguished in the provincial history of Pennsylvania, the privations and dangers of the survey would have been too much for Mason and Dixon. Nearly two years transpired before they reached the Allegheny mountain. The line had measured only 160 miles, when the Indians interfered, to forbid the axe and the chain; until a grand convocation of the "Six Nations," procured at a great expense by the Governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland, gave them leave to proceed. Nearly a whole year more was consumed in this negotiation. In 1767, the western limit of Maryland—"the meridian of the first fountain of the Potomac" was reached. Why they went on as a joint commission beyond this point, cannot be well ascertained. But the Penns, who always had their own way, were eager to measure out five degrees of longitude; and the company went on at the expense of Maryland as well as Pennsylvania. At the crossing of Braddock's Road, however, the savage warriors, who had been at hand ever since they descended into the valley of the Ohio, became sullen and reserved. The Mohawk chief, who had been a consenting agent for the Six Nations, left them suddenly and silently. The Shawnese and Delawares made terrific demonstrations. And at length, as soon as their line touched the old Catawba war path, peremptory

commands from the savage chiefs compelled them to desist. There the line had to stop for fifteen years. Mason and Dixon did not finish it. They returned to mark in a permanent manner what they had measured, setting up every mile a stone, with M. on the one side, and P. on the other; and every five miles, a stone brought from England, with the proprietary coats of arms engraved on each side. They made their final report to the proprietaries on the 9th of November, 1768, five years after they had arrived in Philadelphia to begin their work.

The work was well done. But, after all, it remained to be perfected by American surveyors. In 1849, the three States which meet together at the celebrated bend in the Northwestern corner of Delaware, employed Colonel James D. Graham, of the United States Corps of Topographical Engineers, to retrace the lines, especially of that notch and circle, so much the concern of little Delaware; and replace the missing monuments of Mason and Dixon. The great corner-stone, from which their parallel began, had been made a chimney-piece by a neighbouring farmer, and a post of wood put into its place. The radius of twelve miles which keeps Pennsylvania and Maryland at arm's length from Newcastle, was found two feet and four inches too short, but on the periphery and the tangent line some of the miles were found to be too long by a few feet. And these minute corrections deprived a legislator of his seat, turned over the old Christiana church to another commonwealth, and obliged Maryland to yield one acre and three quarters of territory to Delaware.

It would be a history of greater interest to pursue the line, from the war path of the Indians to the southwest corner of Pennsylvania, as it was run between Pennsylvania and Virginia when they became sovereign States; and to record how marvellously again the meek persistency of Quaker claims triumphed over the cavalier and choleric demands of the Old Dominion; how the rich wool-growing hills of Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, and Greene counties in Pennsylvania, were identified at the first with Virginia law and custom, its early settlers preferring these to the government of the Penns; and how even the "Whiskey Insurrection" originated very much from this feeling, and hostility to the federal excise law,

because it resembled so much an odious measure of the kind which had claimed their submission from the authority of the Penns. It would be also an interesting history to go round about the whole territory of that magnificent parallelogram, and see how Pennsylvania got the "Erie triangle," as it was called, by holding on to her north boundary the beginning of latitude 43°, notwithstanding that widening on the south of nineteen miles, taken from Maryland by virtue of John Smith's blunder in the map. She was chartered originally for two degrees only, inclusive, but won, as we have seen, by artifice and perseverance a strip besides which comes within a mile of cutting Maryland in twain. Still more, we might glean a triumph of the same kind over Yankee push and aggression, in the memorable defeat of the Connecticut claim to the valley of of the Wyoming, awarded by arbitrators sitting at Trenton in 1782.

Never did the Keystone fail to hold successfully at last everything adhering to her sides, as well as inhering in her bosom: and may we not well construe this geographical tenacity, as an augury of hope, that she will hold the whole arch, that is her own to bind, by a charter infinitely fairer than the parchment by which Maryland was cleft, on the line of Mason and Dixon?

And although we cannot justify the greed and finesse of the Penns, in the light of impartial history, and have glanced already at some of the retributions with which they were punished, we may well rejoice that the nineteen miles of her southern border, in the providence of God, fell to Pennsylvania, and not to Maryland; and consequently escaped the blight and curse of American slavery, ever since that woe began to tell upon the industry and morals of the people. Look at that border during the whole period of the dispute between the Penns and the Baltimores. It was the most illuminated strip of land on the whole continent of America.

It included all Philadelphia, the chief city of North America then, and for half a century afterwards. It included the great school district of American Presbyterianism—the New London and New Londonderry, or Fagg's Manor, the Pequea, and the Nottingham schools—all of them so renowned for the Blairs,

the Smiths, the Allisons, Finley, Davies, Ewing, and many others who founded and adorned our church in the century that is past; not to speak of James Smith, James Ross, Hugh H. Breckinridge, John Rowan, Thomas McKean, Hugh Williamson, David Ramsey, Robert Fulton, and a host of others, men of the first magnitude among statesmen, historians, and inventors, who sprung of Scotch-Irish parentage, were formed for greatness in the schools of this conterminous ground; which had, of right and royal intent, originally belonged to Maryland. Who can estimate the different influence upon the destiny of this nation if that narrow strip of nineteen miles had been ridden from that day to this, by the arrogance of slave-power! It is not too much to say, perhaps, that if William Penn had not obtained by the mistake of a rude survey, and his own pertinacious will to make the most of it, a slice from the charter of Calvert, this American Union had not have been arched at all, or had tumbled to ruins, in the hour that Missouri knocked for admission as a sovereign State. The population which spread from east to west, along the parallel surveyed by Mason and Dixon, has been the most adhesive element in our whole Republic. Until recently it was mainly Scotch-Irish. As it passed over the Kittatinny or Cumberland valley, it was almost an unmingled element of this kind for a hundred years. That beautiful garden valley of the United States, from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to Lexington, Virginia, was thrown across the great dividing line, to be filled with a massive band of steel, in order to continue, what the Allegheny itself could not hold together for a day, diverse civilizations in one harmonious brotherhood. Another clasp of the kind fastened the western extremities of Pennsylvania and Virginia together.

But, alas! these bands of steel are now broken to pieces; and in proportion to the tenacity with which it held the Union together, is the repulsion with which the same element refuses to be welded again. The last link that was broken will be the last one to yield, in the pressure which would join us in a reconstruction. Border Presbyterianism, of such a type, once divided, will come far behind political compromises, and other forms of ecclesiastical reunions, to join hands, with anything like the original earnest. Their feuds have always been of dif-

ficult and slow reconciliation. It may be well, therefore, that an element of such stern love and hatred has been passing away from that border line, for a whole generation; that the descendants of German immigration, from the Palatinate and elsewhere, have been gradually superseding the Scotch-Irish people, who would have met the rebel raiders, as their fathers met the murderous Indians, in the gaps of their mountains, when the government of Penn would give then no protection, with a rifle and a rock, for every man, woman, and child, in defence of their homes. Their successors, of a different spirit, for the most part quiet, passive, money-loving, can be moulded far more easily in forms of reconstruction. Thus, what we have often mourned over, along that line, the decadence of old Presbyterian churches and schools, may prove to be a national blessing in the good providence of God. Removed from the fissure into which it would have fallen by the quarrel, as an element of stubborn disintegration, the seed of that sturdy race, and that mighty faith, has gone to make the corners of the land flourish on every side, until the receding latitudes, north and south, shall become worthy of each other again, and seek to be tied again in constitutional bonds which cannot be easily broken.

And then, again, Maryland is free, and West Virginia is free. The slave line is pushed down to their feet. The conspicuity of Mason and Dixon's line goes out, in the radiance that sheds an equal light of liberty on each side of this ancient boundary; and thus let it be obliterated; let its main demarcation, for which it has been distinguished so long in the memory of this generation, sink from the sight of man, a fossil, harder to be found than the armorial carvings, long since buried or carried away, with which the London surveyors were so proud to mark every five miles of their progress.

by Charles Hodge

Art. V.—*Nature of Man.*

The Scriptures teach that God formed the body of man out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה, *a living soul.* According to this account, man consists of two distinct principles, a body and soul; the one material, the other immaterial; the one corporeal, the other spiritual. It is involved in this statement, first, that the soul of man is a substance; and secondly, that it is a substance distinct from the body. So that in the constitution of man two distinct substances are included.

The idea of substance is one of the primary truths of the reason. It is given in the consciousness of every man, and is therefore a part of the universal faith of men. We are conscious of our thoughts, feelings, and volition. We know that these exercises or phenomena are constantly changing, but that there is something of which these *phenomena* are the exercises and manifestation. That something is the self which remains unchanged, is the same identical something, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. The soul is therefore, not a mere series of acts, nor is it a form of the life of God, nor is it a mere unsubstantial force, but a real subsistence. Whatever acts *is*, and what *is*, is an entity. A nonentity is nothing, and nothing can neither have power nor produce effects. The soul of man, therefore, is an essence, or entity, or substance, the abiding subject of its varying states and exercises. The second point just mentioned is no less plain. As we can know nothing of substance but from its phenomena, and as we are forced by a law of our nature to believe in the existence of a substance of which the phenomena are the manifestation, so by an equally stringent necessity we are forced to believe, that where the phenomena are not only different, but incompatible, there the substances are also different. As therefore, the phenomena or properties of matter are essentially different from those of mind, we are forced to conclude that matter and mind are two distinct substances; that the soul is not material nor the body spiritual. "To identify matter with mind," says Cousin, "or mind with matter, it is necessary to pretend that sensation,

thought, volition, are reducible, in the last analysis, to solidity, extension, figure, divisibility, &c.; or, that solidity, extension, figure, &c., are reducible to sensation, thought, will." (*Elements of Psychology*, Henry's translation, p. 370.) It may be said, therefore, despite of materialists and idealists, that it is intuitively certain that matter and mind are two distinct substances. And such has been the faith of the great body of mankind. This view of the nature of man which is presented in the original account of his creation, is sustained by the constant representations of the Bible. The Scriptures do not formally teach any system of psychology; but there are certain truths, relating both to our physical and mental constitution, which they constantly assume. They assume, as we have seen, that the soul is a substance; that it is a substance distinct from the body, and there are two, and not more than two essential elements in the constitution of man. This is evident, 1st, from the distinction everywhere made between soul and body. Thus, in the original account of the creation, a clear distinction is made between the body as formed from the dust of the earth, and the soul as the principle of life, which was breathed into it from God. And in Gen. iii. 19, it is said, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." As it was only the body that was formed out of the dust, it is only the body that is to return to dust. In Eccles. xii. 7, it is said, "Then the dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." Isaiah x. 18: "Shall consume both soul and body." Daniel says, vii. 15, "I was grieved in my spirit in my body." Our Lord, Matt. vi. 25, commands his disciples to "take no thought for the body;" and again, "Fear not them that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but fear him which is able to destroy soul and body in hell." Matt. x. 28. Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. The body and soul are set forth as distinct substances, and the two together as constituting the whole man. 2d, There is a second class of passages equally decisive as to this point. It consists of those in which the body is represented as a garment which is to be laid aside; a tabernacle or house in which the soul dwells, which it may leave, and return to. Paul, on a certain occasion, did not know

whether he was in the body, or out of the body. Peter says he thought it meet as long as he was in this tabernacle to put his brethren in remembrance of the truth, "knowing," as he adds, "that I must shortly put off this my tabernacle." Paul in 2 Cor. v. 1, says, "If our house of this tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building of God." In the same connection he speaks of being unclothed, and clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven; and of being absent from the body, and present with the Lord, knowing that while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. To the Philippians (i. 23, 24,) he says, "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." 3. It is the common belief of mankind, the clearly revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the church universal, that the soul can, and does exist, and act after death. If this is so, then the body and soul are two distinct substances. The former may be disorganized, reduced to dust, dispersed, or even annihilated, and the latter retain its conscious life and activity. This doctrine was taught in the Old Testament, where the dead are represented as dwelling in Sheol, whence they occasionally reappeared, as Samuel did to Saul. Our Lord says, that as God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, his declaring himself to be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, proves that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are now alive. Moses and Elijah conversed with Christ on the Mount. To the dying thief our Lord said, "This day shalt *thou*," (that in which his personality resided,) "be with me in paradise." Paul, as we have just seen, desired to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord. He knew that his conscious personal existence was to be continued after the dissolution of his body. It is unnecessary to dwell on this point, as the continued existence of the soul in full consciousness and activity, out of the body, and in the interval between death and the resurrection, is not denied by any Christian church. But if this be so, it clearly proves that the soul and body are two distinct substances, so that the former can exist independent of the other.

Man, then, according to the Scriptures, is a created spirit in vital union with a material organized body. As to the relation

between these two constituents of our nature, it is admitted to be mysterious. That is, it is incomprehensible. We do not know how the body acts on the mind, or how the mind acts on the body. These facts are plain: 1. That the union is a vital union, in such a sense as that the soul is the source of life to the body. When the soul leaves the body, the latter ceases to live. It loses its sensibility and activity, and becomes at once subject to the chemical laws which govern unorganized matter, and by their operation is soon reduced to dust, undistinguishable from the earth whence it was originally taken. 2. It is a fact of consciousness, that certain states of the body produce certain corresponding states of the mind. The mind takes cognizance of the impressions made by external objects on the organs of sense. The mind sees, the mind hears, the mind feels, not directly or immediately, (at least in our present and normal state), but through or by means of the appropriate organs of the body. It is also a matter of daily experience, that a healthful condition of the body is necessary to a healthful state of the mind; that certain diseases, or disorders of the one, produce derangement in the operations of the other. Emotions of the mind also affect the body. Shame suffuses the cheek, joy causes the heart to beat, and the eyes to shine. A blow on the head renders the mind unconscious, *i. e.*, it renders the brain unfit to be the organ of its activity; and a diseased condition of the brain may cause irregular action in the mind, as in lunacy. All this is incomprehensible, but it is undeniable. 3. It is also a fact of consciousness, that while certain operations of the body are independent of the conscious voluntary action of the mind, as the processes of respiration, digestion, secretion, assimilation, &c., there are certain actions dependent on the will. We can will to move, and we can exert a greater or less degree of muscular force. It is better to admit these simple facts of consciousness and experience, and to confess that while they prove an intimate and vital union between the mind and body, they do not enable us to comprehend the nature of that union, than to have recourse to arbitrary and fanciful theories which deny these facts, because we cannot explain them. This is done by the advocates of the doctrine of occasional causes which denies any action of the

mind on the body, or of the body on the mind, but refers all to the immediate agency of God. A certain state of the mind is the occasion on which God produces a certain act of the body; and a certain impression made on the body, is the occasion on which he produces a certain impression on the mind. Leibnitz's doctrine of a preëstablished harmony is equally unsatisfactory. He also denied that one substance can act upon another of a different kind; that matter can act on mind or mind on matter. He proposed to account for the admitted correspondence between the varying states of the one and those of the other, upon the assumption of a prearrangement God had preordained that the mind should have the perception of a tree, whenever the tree was presented to the eye, and that the arm should move whenever the mind had a volition to move. He denied there is any causal relation between those two series of events. This is one of the vagaries of genius; a vain attempt to explain the inexplicable.

The scriptural doctrine of the nature of man as a created spirit in vital union with an organized body, consisting therefore of two, and only two distinct elements or substances, matter and mind, is one of great importance. It is intimately connected with some of the most important doctrines of the Bible; with the constitution of the person of Christ, and consequently with the nature of his redeeming work, and of his relation to the children of men, with the doctrine of the fall, original sin, and of regeneration; and with the doctrines of a future state, and of the resurrection. It is because of this connection, and not because of its interest as a question of psychology, that the true idea of man demands the careful investigation of the theologian.

The doctrine above stated, as the doctrine of the Scriptures and the church, is properly designated as realistic dualism. That is, it asserts the existence of two distinct *res*, entities, or substances; the one extended, tangible, and divisible, the object of the senses; the other, unextended, and indivisible, the thinking, feeling, willing subject in man. This doctrine stands opposed, 1st, to materialism and idealism, which, although antagonistic systems in other respects, agree in denying any dualism of substance. The one makes the mind a function of the body,

while according to the other the body is a form of the mind. But according to the Scriptures and all sacred philosophy, neither is the body, as Delitzsch (*Biblische Psychologie*, p. 64) says, a precipitate of the mind, nor is the mind a sublimate of matter. 2. The scriptural doctrine of man is of course opposed to the old heathen doctrine, which represents him as the form in which nature, *der Naturgeist*, the *anima mundi*, comes to self-consciousness, and to the wider pantheistic doctrine, according to which men are the highest manifestations of the one universal principle of being and life; and to the doctrine which represents man as the union of the impersonal, universal reason, or λόγος, with a living corporeal organization. According to this view, man consists of the body, (σῶμα), soul ψυχή) and λόγος, or the impersonal reason. This is very nearly the Apollinarian doctrine as to the constitution of Christ's person applied to all mankind. 3d. It is of more consequence to remark that the scriptural doctrine is opposed to Trichotomy, or the doctrine that man consists of three distinct substances, body, soul, and spirit; σῶμα, ψυχή, and πνεῦμα; *corpus*, *anima*, and *animus*. This view of the nature of man is of the more importance to the theologian, not only because it has been held to a greater or less extent in the church, but also because it has greatly influenced the form in which other doctrines have been presented, and because it has some semblance of support from the Scriptures themselves. The doctrine has been held in different forms. The simplest, most intelligible, and the one most commonly adopted is, that the body is the material part of our constitution, the soul or ψυχή is the principle of animal life, and the mind, πνεῦμα, the principle of our rational and immortal life. When a plant dies, its material organization is dissolved, and the principle of vegetable life, which it contained, disappears. When a brute dies, its body returns to dust, and the ψυχή, or principle of animal life, by which it was animated passes away. When a man dies, his body returns to the earth, his ψυχή ceases to exist, his πνεῦμα alone remains until reunited with the body at the resurrection. To the πνεῦμα, which is peculiar to man, belong reason, will, and conscience; to the ψυχή, which we have in common with the brutes, belong understanding, feeling, and sensibility; or the power of sense-

perceptions. (See August Hahn's *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*, p. 324.) According to another view of the subject, the soul is neither the body nor the mind, nor is it a distinct subsistence, but it is the resultant of the union of the πνεῦμα and σῶμα. (See Göschel in Herzog's *Real-Encyklopadie*, art. *Seele*), or according to Delitzsch, (*Biblische Psychologie*, 64), there is a dualism of being in man, but a trichotomy of substance. He distinguishes between being and substance, and maintains that spirit and soul (πνεῦμα and ψυχή) are not *verschiedene Wesen*, but *verschiedene Substanzen*. He says that the נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה mentioned in the history of the creation, is not the *compositum*, resulting from the union of the spirit and body, so that the two constituted man when he became a living creature composed of mind and body; but it is a *tertium quid*, a third substance, which belongs to the constitution of his nature. But secondly, this third principle, he says, does not pertain to the body; it is not the higher attribute or function of the body, but it pertains to the spirit and is produced by it. It sustains the same relation to it that breath does to the body, or effulgence does to light. He says the ψυχή (*soul*) is the ἀπαύγασμα of the πνεῦμα, and the bond of its union with the body.

In opposition to all the forms of trichotomy, or the doctrine of a threefold substance in the constitution of man, it may be remarked: 1. That it is opposed to the account of the creation of man, as given in Gen. ii. 7. According to that account, God formed man out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה, *i. e.*, a being (אֲשֶׁר בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה) in whom is a living soul. There is in this account no intimation of anything more than the material body formed of the earth, and the living principle derived from God. 2. This doctrine (trichotomy) is opposed to the uniform usage of Scripture. So far from the נֶפֶשׁ (ψυχή, *anima*, or soul) being distinguished from the רוּחַ (πνεῦμα, *animus*, or mind), as either originally different, or as derived from it, these words all assignate one and the same thing. They are interchanged: the one is substituted for the other; and all that is or can be predicated of the one may be predicated of the other. The Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ and the Greek ψυχή mean breath, life, the living principle, that in which life and the whole of the subject spoken

of resides. The same is also true of רוּחַ and πνεῦμα; they also mean breath, life, and living principle. The Scriptures therefore speak of the נֶפֶשׁ or ψυχή, not only as that which lives, or is the principle of life to the body, but as that which thinks and feels, which may be saved or lost, which survives the body, and is immortal. The soul is the man himself, that in which his identity and personality reside. It is the *Ego*. Higher than the soul there is nothing in man. Therefore it is so so often used as a synonyme for self. Every soul is every man; my soul is me; his soul is him. What shall a man give in exchange for his soul? It is the soul that sins. Lev. iv. 2. It is the soul that loves God; for we are commanded to love God, ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς. Hope is said to be the anchor of the soul, and the word of God is able to save the soul. The end of our faith is said to be (1 Peter i. 9) the salvation of our souls; and John (Rev. vi. 6, 9, xx. 4) saw in heaven the souls of them that were slain for the word of God. From all this it is evident that the word ψυχή, or soul, does not designate the mere animal part of our nature, nor is it a substance different from the πνεῦμα, or spirit. 3. A third remark on this subject is, that all the words above mentioned, נֶפֶשׁ, רוּחַ and נְשָׁמָה in Hebrew, ψυχή and πνεῦμα in Greek, and soul and spirit in English, are used in Scripture indiscriminately of men and of irrational animals. If the Bible ascribed only a ψυχή to brutes, and both ψυχή and πνεῦμα to man, there would be some ground for assuming that the two are essentially distinct. But such is not the case. The living principle in the brute is called both נֶפֶשׁ and רוּחַ, ψυχή and πνεῦμα. That principle in the brute creation is irrational and mortal, in man it is rational and immortal. "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beasts that goeth downward to the earth?" Eccles. iii. 21. The soul of the brute is the immaterial principle which constitutes its life, and which is endowed with sensibility, and that measure of intelligence which experience shows the lower animals possess. The soul of man is a created spirit of a higher order, which has not only the attributes of sensibility, memory, and instinct, but the higher powers which pertain to our intellectual, moral, and religious life. In the brutes, it is not one substance that feels, and another that remembers;

so it is not one substance in man that is the subject of sensations, and another substance which has intuitions of necessary truths, and which is endowed with conscience and the knowledge of God. Philosophers speak of world-consciousness, or the immediate cognizance which we have of what is without us; of self-consciousness, or the knowledge of what is within us; and God-consciousness, or our knowledge and sense of God. These all belong to one and the same immaterial, rational substance. 4. It is fair to appeal to the testimony of consciousness on this subject. We are conscious of our bodies, and we are conscious of our souls, *i. e.*, of the exercises and states of each; but no man is conscious of the ψυχή as distinct from the πνεῦμα, of the soul as different from the spirit. In other words, consciousness reveals the existence of two substances in the constitution of our nature, but it does not reveal the existence of three substances, and therefore the existence of more than two cannot rationally be assumed. 5. The passages of Scripture which are cited as favouring the opposite doctrine may all be explained in consistency with the current representations of Scripture on the subject. When Paul says to the Thessalonians, "I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless until the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," (1 Thess. v. 23), he only uses a periphrasis for the whole man. As when in Luke i. 47, the virgin says, "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour," soul and spirit do not mean different things. And when we are commanded, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind," (Luke x. 27,) we have not an enumeration of so many distinct substances. Nor do we distinguish between the mind and heart as distinct entities when we pray that both may be enlightened and sanctified. We mean simply the soul in all its aspects, or faculties. Again, when in Heb. iv. 12, the apostle says the word of God pierces so as to penetrate soul and spirit, and the joints and marrow, he does not assume that soul and spirit are different substances. The joints and marrow are not different substances. They are both material; they are different forms of the same substance; and so soul and spirit are one and the same substance, under

different aspects or relations. We can say that the word of God reaches not only to the feelings, but also to the conscience, without assuming that the heart and conscience are distinct entities. Much less is any such distinction implied in Philip. i. 27, "Stand fast in one spirit (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι), with one mind (μιᾷ ψυχῇ)." There is more difficulty in explaining 1 Cor. xv. 44. The apostle there distinguishes between the σῶμα ψυχικόν, and the σῶμα πνευματικόν, the former is that in which the ψυχή is the animating principle, and the latter that in which the πνεῦμα is the principle of life. The one we have here, the other we are to have hereafter. This seems to imply that the ψυχή exists in this life, but is not to exist hereafter, and therefore that the two are separable and distinct. In this explanation we might acquiesce, if it did not contradict the general representations of Scripture. We are, therefore, constrained to seek another explanation which will harmonize this passage with other portions of the word of God. The meaning of the apostle is plain. We have now gross, perishable, dishonourable, and unsightly bodies. Hereafter we are to have glorious bodies adapted to a higher state of existence. The only question is, why does he call the one psychical, and the other pneumatic? Because the word ψυχή, although often used for the soul as rational and immortal, is also used for the lower form of life which belongs to irrational animals. Our future bodies are not to be adapted to those principles of our nature, which we have in common with the brutes; to those which are peculiar to us as men, created in the image of God. The same individual human soul has certain susceptibilities and powers which adapt it to the present state of existence and to the earthly house in which it now dwells. It has animal appetites and necessities. It hungers and thirsts. It needs sleep and rest. But the same soul has higher powers. The earthly body is suited to its earthly state; its heavenly body to its heavenly state. There are not two substances ψυχή and πνεῦμα, but one and the same substance with different susceptibilities and powers. In this same connection, Paul says, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Yet our bodies are to inherit that kingdom, and our bodies are flesh and blood. The same material substances, now constituted as flesh and blood, is

to be so changed as to be like Christ's glorious body. As this representation does not prove a substantial difference between the body which now is, and that which is to be hereafter, so neither does what the apostle says of the *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, and the *σῶμα πνεματικόν*, prove that the *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* are different substances.

This doctrine of a threefold constitution of man, being adopted by Plato, was introduced partially into the early church, but soon came to be regarded as dangerous if not heretical. Its being held by the Gnostics that the *πνεῦμα* in man was a part of the Divine essence, and incapable of sin; and by the Appolinarians that Christ had only a human *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*, but not a human *πνεῦμα*, the church rejected the doctrine that the *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* were distinct substances, in which those heresies were founded. In later times the Semi-pelagians taught that the soul and body, but not the spirit in man, were the subjects of original sin. All Protestants, Lutheran and Reformed, were therefore the more zealous in maintaining that the soul and spirit, *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, are one and the same substance or essence. And this, as before remarked, has been the common doctrine of the church.

4. There is still another view of the nature of man, which from its extensive and long-continued influence demands consideration. According to this view, man is defined to be the manifestation of the general principle of humanity in union with a given corporeal organization. This view has been held in various forms, which cannot here be severally discussed. It is only the theory in its more general features, or in the form in which it has been commonly presented, that our limits permit us to examine. It necessarily assumes that humanity, human nature as a general principle, or form of life, exists antecedently (either chronologically or logically) to individual men. "In the order of nature," says Dr. Shedd, "mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the nature is prior to the individuals produced out of it." Vol. ii. p. 77. It exists also independently, and outside of them. As magnetism is a force in nature existing antecedently, independently, and outside of any and all individual magnets; and as electricity exists independently of the Leyden jars in which it may be collected, or

through which it is manifested as present; as galvanism exists independently of any and all galvanic batteries, so humanity exists antecedently to individual men and independently of them. As an individual magnet is a given piece of soft iron in which the magnetic force is present and active, and as a Leyden jar is simply a coated jar in which electricity is present, so an individual man is a given corporeal organization in which humanity as a general life, or force, is present. To the question, What is human nature, or humanity generically considered? there are different answers given. 1. It is said to be a *res*, an essence, a substance, a real objective existence. It is something which exists in time and space. This is the common mode of statement. The controversy between Realists and Nominalists, in its original and genuine form, turned upon this point. The question, which for ages occupied to so great an extent the attention of all philosophers, was, What are universals? What are genera and species? What are general terms? Are they mere words; or, are they thoughts, or conceptions existing in the mind? Or are the things expressed by general terms real objective existences? Do individuals only exist; so that species and genus are only classes of individuals of the same kind; or are individuals only the revelations, or individualizations of a general substance which is the species or genus? According to the early and genuine Realists, and according to the modern speculative philosophers, the species or genus is first, independent of and external to the individual. The individual is only "a subsequent *modus existendi;* the first and antecedent mode (in the case of man) being the generic humanity, of which this subsequent serial mode is only another aspect or manifestation," (Dr. Shedd's *Essays*, p. 259,)* precisely as magnetism is antecedent to the magnet. The magnet is only an individual piece of iron, in and through which generic magnetism is manifested. Thus the Realist says, *Etsi rationalitas non esset in aliquo, in naturâ remanaret.* (See Cousin's *Abelard*, p. 167.) Cousin quotes the complaint of Anselm against Roscelin and other Nominalists, *de ne pas comprendre comment plusieurs hommes ne sont qu'un seul et même homme,* "*nondum intelligit quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus*

* Also his "History of Christian Doctrine," ii. p. 117.

homo. The doctrine of his *Monologium* and *Proslogium*, and *Dialogues de veritate*, Cousin says is, *que non seulment il y a des individus humains, mais qu'il y a en autre le genre humain, l'humanité, qui est une, comme il admettait qu'il y a un temps absoler que les durées particulières manifest sans le constituer, une vérité une et subsistante par elle-même, un type absoler du bien, que tous les biens particulières supposent et réfléchissent plus ou moins imparfaitement.* P. 146. He quotes Abelard as stating the doctrine which he opposed in the following words: Homo quædam species est, res una essentialiter, cui adveniunt formæ quædam et efficiunt Socratem; illam eamdem essentialiter eodem modo informant formam facientes Platonem et cætera individua hominis, nec aliquid est in Socrate, præter illas formas informantes illam materiam ad faciendum Socratem, quin illud idem eodem tempore in Platone informatum sit formis Platonis. Et hoc intelligunt de singulis speciebus ad individua et de generibus ad species. P. 167. According to one theory, *les individus seuls existent et constituent l'essence des choses:* according to the other, *l'essence des individus est dans le genre auquel ils se rapportent, en tant qu' individus ils ne sont que des accidents.* P. 171.

All this is sufficiently plain. That which constitutes the species or genus is a real objective existence. A substance one and the same, numerically as well as specifically. This one general substance exists in every individual belonging to the species, and constitutes their essence. That which is peculiar to the individual and distinguishes it from other individuals of the same species, is purely accidental. This one substance of humanity, which is revealed or manifested in all men, and which constitutes them men, "possesses all the attributes of the human individual; for the individual is only a portion or specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities." (Shedd, ii. p. 78.) "Agency," however, "supposes an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, as it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent, *i. e.*, to the human nature in distinction from the human person or individual." P. 80.

What God created, therefore, was not an individual man, but the species *homo*, or generic humanity—an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence. Individual men are the manifestations of this substance, numerically and specifically one and the same, in connection with their several corporeal organizations. Their souls are not individual essences, but one common essence revealed, and acting in many separate organisms.

2. This answer to the question proposed above,—What is human nature generically considered?—which makes it an essence or substance common to all the individuals of the race, is the most common and the most intelligible. Scientific men adopt a somewhat different phraseology. Instead of substances they speak of forces. Nature is defined to be the sum of the forces operating in the external world. Oxygen is a force; magnetism, electricity, &c., are forces. A species is "a specific amount or condition of concentered force, defined in the act or law of creation." (Dana, *American Journal of Science*, 1857, p. 305.) Humanity, or human nature is the sum of the forces which constitute man what he is. The unity of the race consists in the fact that their forces are numerically as well as specifically the same in all the individuals of which it is composed. 3. The German theologians, particularly those of the school of Schleiermacher, use the terms life, law, organic law. Human nature is a generic life, *i. e.*, a form of life manifested in a multitude of individuals of the same kind. In the individual it is not distinct or different from what is in the genus. It is the same organic law. A single oak may produce ten thousand other oaks: but the whole forest is as much an inward organic unity as any single tree.

There may be convenient formulas to prevent the necessity of circumventions, and to express a class of facts. But they do not convey any definite idea beyond the facts themselves. To say that a whole forest of oaks have the same generic life, that they are as truly one as any individual tree is one, means simply that the nature is the same in all, and that all have been derived from a common source. And to say that mankind are a unit because they have the same generic life, and are all descended from a common parent, either means nothing more

than that all men are of the same species, *i. e.*, that humanity is specifically the same in all mankind, or it means all that is intended by those who teach that genera and species are substances of which the individual is the mere *modus existendi*. As agency implies an agent, so force, which is the manifestation of power, supposes some thing, a subject or substance, in which that power resides. Nothing, a nonentity, can have no power and manifest no force. Force, of necessity, supposes a substance, of which it is the manifestation. If, therefore, the forces are numerically the same, the substance must be numerically the same. And, consequently, if humanity be a given amount and kind of concentered force, numerically and not merely specifically the same in all men, then are men *ὁμοούσιοι*, partakers of one and the same identical essence. The same remarks apply to the term life. Life is a predicable, not an essence. It supposes a subject of which it is predicable. There can be no life unless something lives. It is not a thing by itself. If, therefore, the generic life of man means anything more than the same kind of life, it must mean that that which lives in all men is identically the same numerical substance.

According to the common doctrine, the soul of every man is an individual subsistence, of the same kind, but not of the same numerical substance as the souls of his fellow-men, so that men are *ὅμοι*, but not *ὁμοούσιοι*. In support of this view, and in opposition to the doctrine that "all men are one man;" or that human nature is numerically one and the same essence of which individual men are the modes of manifestation, it may be remarked, 1. That the latter doctrine is an arbitrary hypothesis. It is a simple assumption founded on what is possible. It is possible that the doctrine in question may be true. So in itself it is possible that there should be an *anima mundi*, a principle of life immanent in the world, of which all living organisms are the different manifestations; so that all vegetables, all animals, and man himself, are but different forms of one and the same numerical living substance, just as the multitudinous waves of the sea, in all their infinite diversity of size, shape, and hue, are but the heavings of one and the same vast ocean. In like manner it is possible that all the forms of life should be only the various manifestations of the life of God.

This is not only possible, but it is such a simple and grand idea, that it has fascinated the minds of men in all ages, so that the prevailing hypothesis of philosophers as to the constitution of the universe has been, and still is, pantheistic. Nevertheless, pantheism is demonstrably false, because it contradicts the intuitive convictions of our moral and religious nature. It is not enough, therefore, that a theory be possible or conceivable; it must have the support of positive proof.

2. Such proof the doctrine under consideration does not find in the Bible. It is simply a hypothesis on which certain facts of Scripture may be explained. All men are alike; they have the same faculties, the same instincts and passions, they are all born in sin. These and many other similar facts admit of an easy explanation in the assumption that humanity is numerically one and the same substance of which individuals are only so many different manifestations; just as a thousand different magnets reveal the magnetic force which is the same in all, and therefore all magnets are alike. But as the facts referred to may be explained on divers other assumptions, they afford no proof of this particular theory. It is not pretended that the Bible directly teaches the doctrine in question. Nor does it teach anything which necessitates its adoption. On the contrary, it teaches much that is utterly irreconcilable with it.

3. The hypothesis under consideration derives no support from consciousness. We are conscious of our own existence. We are (in one sense) conscious of the existence of other men. But we are not conscious of a community of essence in ourselves and all other men. So far from this being the common interpretation which men put on their consciousness, it is diametrically opposed to it. Every man believes his soul to be a distinct, individual substance, as much as he believed his body to be distinct and separate from every other human body. Such is the common judgment of men. And nothing short of the direct assertion of the Bible, or arguments which amount to absolute demonstration, can rationally be admitted to invalidate that judgment. It is inconceivable that anything concerning the constitution of our nature, and so momentous in its consequences, should be true, which does not in some way reveal itself in the common consciousness of men. There is

nothing more characteristic of the Scriptures, and few things which more clearly proves their Divine origin, than that it takes for granted, and authenticates all the facts of consciousness. It declares us to be what we are revealed to ourselves as being in the very constitution and present condition of our nature. It recognizes the soul as rational, free, and responsible. It assumes that it is distinct from the body. All this we know from consciousness. But we do not know that the essence or substance of our soul is numerically the same as the substance of the souls of all men. If the Bible teaches any such doctrine, it teaches something outside of the teachings of consciousness, and something to which those teachings, in the judgment of the vast majority of men, even the most enlightened, are directly opposed.

4. But the Scriptures not only do not teach the doctrine in question, they teach what is inconsistent with it. We have already seen that it is a clearly revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the church universal, that the soul continues to exist after death, as a self-conscious, individual person. This fact is inconsistent with the theory in question. A given plant is a material organization, animated by the general principle of vegetable life. If the plant is destroyed, the principle of vegetable life no longer exists as to that plant. It may exist in other plants; but that particular plant ceased to exist when the material organization was dissolved. Magnetism still continues to exist as a force in nature, but any particular magnet ceases to be when it is melted, or volatilized. In like manner, if a man is a manifestation of a generic life, or of humanity as an essence common to all men, then, when his body dies, the man ceases to exist. Humanity continues to be, but the individual man no longer exists. This is a difficulty which some of the advocates of this theory endeavour to avoid by giving up what is essential to their own doctrine. Its genuine and consistent advocates admit it in its full force. The anti-christian part of them, acknowledge that their doctrine is inconsistent with the personal immortality of man. The race, they say, is immortal, but not the individual man. The same conclusion is admitted by those who hold the analogous pantheistic or naturalistic doctrines. If a man is only

the *modus existendi*, a form in which a common substance or life reveals itself, it matters not whether that substance be humanity, nature, or God, when the form, the material organism is destroyed, the man as a man ceases to exist. Those advocates of the doctrine who cling to Christianity, while they admit the difficulty, endeavour to get over it in different ways. Schleiermacher admits that all philosophy is against the doctrine of the personal existence of man in a future state. His whole system leads to the denial of it. But he says the Christian must admit it on the authority of Christ. Olshausen in his *Commentary* on the New Testament says, when explaining 1 Cor. xv. 19, 20, and vers. 42—44, that the Bible knows nothing of the immortality of the soul. That he pronounces to be a heathen idea and form of expression. A soul without a body loses its individuality. It ceases to be a person, and of course self-consciousness and all that is connected with it. As however the Scriptures teach that men are to exist hereafter, he says, their bodies must also continue to exist, and the only existence of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection, which he admits, is in connection (*i. e.*, in vital union) with the disintegrated particles of the body in the grave, or scattered to the ends of the earth. This is a conclusion to which his doctrine legitimately leads, and which he is sufficiently candid to admit. Dr. Nevin, a disciple of Schleiermacher, has to grapple with the same difficulty. His book, entitled *The Mystical Presence*, is the clearest and ablest exposition of the theology of Schleiermacher, which has appeared in our language, unless Morell's *Philosophy of Religion* be its equal. He denies (p. 171) all dualism between the soul and body. They are "one life." The one cannot exist without the other. He admits that what the Bible teaches of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection, is a difficulty "which it is not easy, at present, to solve." He does not really attempt to solve it. He only says, the difficulty is "not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory, but to bring it into harmony with itself." This is no solution. It is a virtual admission that he cannot reconcile the Bible with his psychological theory. The doctrine that man is a *modus existendi* of a generic humanity, or the manifestation of the

general principle of humanity, in connection with a given corporeal organization, is inconsistent with the scriptural doctrine of the separate existence of the soul, and therefore must be false.

5. This doctrine is inconsistent with the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. It necessitates the conclusion that the Father, Son, and Spirit, are no more one God than Peter, James, and John are one man. The persons of the Trinity are one God, because the Godhead is one essence; but if humanity be one essence, numerically the same in all men, then all men are one man, in the same sense that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one God. This is a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is clearly taught in Scripture, and universally believed in the church, that the Persons of the Trinity are one God in an infinitely higher sense than that in which all men are one man. The theory, therefore, which leads to the opposite conclusion, must be false. It cannot be true that all mankind are one essence, substance, or organic life, existing or manifesting itself in a multitude of individual persons. This is a difficulty so obvious and so fatal that it could not fail to arrest the attention of Realists of all ages and of every class. The great point of dispute in the Council of Nice between the Arians and orthodox was, whether the persons of the Trinity are *ὅμοι*, or *ὁμοούσιοι*, of a like, or of the same essence? If *ὁμοούσιοι*, it was on both sides admitted that they are one God; because, the same in substance, they are equal in power and glory. Now it is expressly asserted that all men are not *ὅμοι*, but *ὁμοούσιοι*, and therefore, by parity of reasoning, they must constitute one man in the same sense as there is one God, and all be equal in every attribute of their nature. (See Shedd's *Hist.* vol. i., p. 120). Of course it is admitted that there is a legitimate sense of the word, in which all men may be said to be *ὁμοούσιοι*, when by *ὁμός*, *same*, is meant similar, or of a like kind. In this sense the Greeks said that the bodies of men and other animals were consubstantial, as all were made of flesh; and that the angels, demons, and human souls, as spiritual beings, are also said to be *ὁμοούσιοι*. But this is not the sense in which the word is used by Realists when speaking either of the persons of the Trinity, or of men. In both cases the word

same means numerical oneness; men are of the same numerical essence in the same sense in which the Father, Son, and Spirit are the same in substance. The difference between the two cases, it is said, does not relate to identity of essence, which is the same in both, but in this, that "the whole nature or essence is in the Divine person; but the human person is only a part of the common human nature. Generation in the Godhead admits no abscission or division of substance; but generation in the instance of the creature implies separation or division of essence. A human person is an individualized portion of humanity. (Shedd, i. 343). It must, however, be remembered that humanity is declared to be a spiritual substance. It is the same in nature with what is called the soul, an individualized portion of human nature, possessing consciousness, reason, and will. But if spiritual, it is indivisible. Divisibility is one of the primary properties of matter. Whatever is divisible is material. If, therefore, humanity as a generic substance admits of "abscission and division," it must be material. A part of reason, a part of consciousness, a part of will, are contradictory or unintelligible forms of expression. If humanity is the same essence as the soul, it no more admits of division than the soul. One part of a soul cannot be holy and another unholy; one part saved and the other eternally lost. The objection to the theory under consideration, that it makes the relation between individual men identical with that between the Persons of the Trinity, remains therefore in full force. It is not met by the answer just referred to, which answer supposes mind to be extended and divisible.

6. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the doctrine in question, with what the Scriptures teach of the person and work of Christ. According to the Bible, the Son of God became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul. According to the Realistic doctrine, he did not assume a reasonable soul, but generic humanity. What is this but the whole of humanity, of which, according to the advocates of this doctrine individual men are the portions. Human nature as a generic life, humanity as a substance, and a whole substance, was taken into personal union with the Son of God, and the *Logos* became incarnate in the race. This is certainly not the

Scripture doctrine. The Son of God became a man; not all men. He assumed an individual, rational soul, and not the general principle of humanity. Besides this, it is the doctrine of those who adopt this theory, that humanity sinned and fell in Adam. The rational, moral, voluntary substance called human nature is, or at least was an agent. The sin of Adam was the sin not of an individual, but of the generic substance humanity, which by that sin became the subject both of guilt and depravity. By reason of this sin of human nature, the theory is, that all individual men in their successive generations, in whom this nature is revealed, or in whom, as they express it, it is individualized, come into the world in a state of guilt and pollution. We do not now refer to the numerous and serious difficulties connected with this theory as a method of accounting for original sin. We speak of it only in its relation to Christ's person. If human nature, as a generic life, a substance of which all men partake, became both guilty and polluted by the apostasy; and that generic humanity, as distinguished from a newly created and holy rational soul, was assumed by the Son of God, how can we avoid the conclusion that Christ was in his human nature personally guilty and sinful? This is a legitimate consequence of this theory. And this consequence being not only false, but blasphemous, the theory itself must be false. As the principle that humanity is one substance, and all men are ὁμοούσιοι in the sense of partaking of the same numerical essence, involves consequences destructive of the scriptural doctrines of the Trinity, and of the person of Christ, so it might easily be shown that it overthrows the common faith of the Protestant churches, on the doctrines of justification, regeneration, the sacraments, and the church. It is enough for our present purpose to remark that as an historical fact, the consistent and thorough-going advocates of this doctrine do teach an entirely different method of salvation. Many men adopt a principle, and do not carry it out to its legitimate consequences. But others more logical, or more reckless, do not hesitate to embrace all its results. In the works of Morell and of Dr. Nevins, above referred to, the theological student may find a fearless pressing of the genuine

principle of Realism to the utter overthrow of the Protestant, and it may be added, of the Christian faith.

7. Other objections to this theory may be more appropriately considered, when we come to speak of the several doctrines to which it is applied. It is sufficient in the conclusion of the present discussion to say that which is true of the genus *homo*, is assumed to be true of all genera and species in the animal and vegetable worlds. The individual in all cases is assumed to be only the manifestation, or *modus existendi* of the generic substance. Thus there is a bovine, an equine, feline substance having an objective existence of which all oxen, all horses, and all animals of the cat-race, are the manifestation. And so all species, whether of plants or animals. This is almost inconceivable. Compared to this theory, the assumption of a *Naturgeist*, or *anima mundi*, or of one universal substance, is simplicity itself. That such a theory should be assumed and made the foundation, or rather the controlling principle of all Christian doctrines, is most unreasonable and dangerous. This realistic doctrine, until recently, has been as much exploded as the eternal ideas of Plato or forms of Aristotle.

There is however another form of this doctrine, which it is necessary to mention. The doctrine that genera and species are real substances existing prior to individuals and independent of them, is the old, genuine and most intelligible form of Realism. It was expressed in the schools by saying that *Universalia* are *ante rem*. The other form of the doctrine asserts that the *Universalia* are *in re*. That is, that the Universals exist only in the individuals; and that the individuals alone are real. "L'identité des individus," says Cousin, p. 162, in his exposition of this form of the doctrine, "d'un même genre ne vient pas de leur essence même, car cette essence est différente en chacun d'eux, mais de certains elements qui se retrouvent dans tous ces individus sans aucune difference, *indifferentér*. Cette nouvelle théorie diffère de la première en ce que les universeaux ne sont plus l'essence de l'être, la substance même des choses; mais elle s'en rapproche en ce que les universeaux existent réellement, et qu'existant dans plusieurs individus sans difference, ils forment leur identité et par là leur genre." Again, on p. 168, he says, "Le principe

de la nouvelle theorie est que l'essence de chaque chose est leur individualité, que les individus seuls existent, et qu'il n'y a point en dehors des individus d'essence appellées les universeaux, les espèces et les genres; mais que l'individu lui-même contient tant cela, selon les divers points de vue sans lequels on le considére." (See the exposition by Abélard himself, quoted on p. 170.) Thus Socrates as an individual man has his own essence, which with its peculiarities makes him Socrates. Neglecting those peculiarities, and considering him as rational and mortal, then you have the idea of species; neglecting rationality and mortality, and considering him as an animal, you have an idea of the genus; neglecting all these forms (relictis omnibus formis), we have only the idea of substance. According to this view "les espèces et genres, les plus élevés comme les plus inférieurs, sont les individus eux-mêmes, considérès sous divers points de vue." P. 183. This according to the plain sense of the terms amounts to the common doctrines. Individuals alone exist. Certain individuals have some distinguishing properties, or attributes in common. They constitute a particular species. These and other individuals of different species have other properties common to them all, and they constitute a genus, and so in regard to orders and classes, until we get to the category of *being*, which includes all. But if all beings are assumed to be one substance; which substance with certain added qualities or accidents constitute a class, with certain other additions, an order, with still further modifications, a genus, a species, an individual, then we have the old theory back again, only extended so as to have a pantheistic aspect.

Some scientific men, instead of defining species as a group of individuals having certain characteristics in common, say, with Professor Dana, as stated above, that it "corresponds to a specific amount or condition of concentered force, defined in the act or law of creation;" or with Dr. Martin, that it is "a primordial organic form;" or with Agassiz, that it is an original immaterial principle which determines the form or characteristics of the individuals constituting a distinct group. These are only different modes of accounting for the fact that all the individuals of a given species have certain characteristics or funda-

mental qualities in common. To such statements there is no objection. But when it is assumed that these original primordial forms, as in the case of humanity, for example, are by the law of propagation transmitted from generation to generation, so as to constitute all the individuals of the species essentially one, that is, one in essence or substance, so that the act of the first individual of the species (of Adam for example) being the act of the substance numerically the same, in all the members of that species, is the act of each individual member, then something essentially new is added to the above given scientific definition of species, and we return to the original and genuine form of Realism, in its most offensive features. It would be easy to show: 1st. That generation, or the law of propagation, both in plants and animals, is absolutely inscrutable; as much so as the nature of matter, mind, or life, in themselves considered. We can no more tell what generation is, than what matter is, or what mind is. 2d. That it is therefore unreasonable and dangerous to make a given theory as to the nature of generation, or the law of propagation, the basis for the explanation of Christian doctrines. 3d. That whatever may be the secret and inscrutable process of propagation, it does not involve the transmission of the same numerical essence, so that a progenitor and his descendants have one and the same substance. This assumption is liable to all the objections already urged against the original form of the realistic doctrine. It is, moreover, destitute of all evidence, either from experience or analogy. There is no conceivable sense in which all the oaks now on the earth are identical as to their substance with the oaks originally created. And there is no conceivable sense in which we and all mankind are identically the same substance with Adam. If a thousand candles are successively lighted from one candle, they do not thereby become one candle. There is not a communication of the substance of the first to the second, and of the second to the others in their order, so as to make it in any sense true, that the substance of the first is numerically the same with that of all the others. The simple fact is, that by the laws of matter ordained by God, the state in which a lighted candle is, produces certain changes or movements in the constituent elements of the wick of another candle, when the two

are brought into contact, which movements induce other movements in the constituent particles of the surrounding atmosphere, which are connected with the evolution of light and heat. But there is no communication of substance involved in the process. An acorn which falls off an oak to-day, is composed not of the same particles of matter from which the original acorn was formed, but of matter of the same kind, and arranged in the same way. It may be said to be imbued with chemical and vital forces of the same kind with the original acorn, but not with numerically the same forces. So of all plants and animals. We are of the same nature with Adam, in the same sense all animals of one species are the same. The sameness does not consist in numerical identity of essence, or of vital forces, nor of reason or will, but in the sameness of kind, and community of origin.

Art. VI.— *What's the use of breathing?*

The use of breathing! Some will say—Why, breathe—of course we must breathe—we cannot live without breathing. It might as well be asked, What's the use of living? While it is very plain that this is no answer to the question, it is equally plain that the inquiry is a legitimate and proper one, and that an answer ought to lie within the range of our attainments.

Respiration among animals is a universal function. No animal lives that does not constantly continue to breathe from the beginning to the end of life. In man, all the mammalia, and birds, and for the most part, in reptiles, this function is performed by lungs, by alternate inhalation and exhalation, by introducing air within the body so as to bring it in close proximity to the blood, and then expelling it again. In fishes and lower aquatic animals, like crabs and lobsters; among articulates, clams and oysters; among mollusks, and most radiates, the breathing is performed by gills. The blood in this case is carried out to the surface, so as to meet the air held in solution

in the water in which they live. In still other animals, as insects, a system of interior, open, ramifying tubes, carries air to all parts of the body. Thus respiration continually goes on in all animals. In man seventeen inspirations per minute, from the first gasp of new-born infancy till the closing scene in death. No interruption; no sleep for the function of respiration; day and night it continues; no weariness of respiratory muscles; nine millions of inspirations, and as many expirations per year. Other systems tire and take repose, but no sleep or rest or sense of weariness in the muscles of respiration for threescore years and ten.

Now, if this were to introduce nourishment into the body, one could understand it. Action consumes the body. The body wastes away by living, and food is needed to restore it; but what possible good can come from incessantly blowing in and blowing out again only air. That is not food, or in any sense nourishment.

If a man is well, one would suppose the appropriate advice would be, eat good food and keep well; and if feeble, exhausted, sick, eat nourishing food and be restored; but such is not the popular prescription. Each one deems himself competent to prescribe, and all alike direct, if well, you must get out in the open air or you will be sick, and if sick, you will never get strong and well till you breathe the fresh air. Still air is not food. It is not drink. You breathe in air and breathe air out again; you inhale and exhale mere gas, tasteless, colourless, odourless, and apparently substanceless and useless. What, then, is the use of all this?

Of the three essentials to life, moreover, without which life cannot go on, food, water, and air, such are the providential arrangements of this world that the supply of the latter is the least precarious. Air is furnished to us the most freely, with the least labour or expense. Moreover, it is that one of the three necessaries of life, without the free supply of which death soonest comes. For food to nourish and replenish the body, for drink by which the waste of evaporation and exercion is restored and the blood kept liquid, we wait hours, days if need be, but if deprived of air for three and a half or four minutes only, death is inevitable. Indeed, so great is the care that

this function shall not fail us, that we live submerged in the very midst of a great amospheric ocean. Nor has our Omniscient Organizer been content with this incessant external application of air to our bodies, but, as before alluded to, has organized us for its equally incessant internal application. Alike, through care and negligence, through attention and inattention, through wakefulness and sleep, through labour and repose, bathed externally in air and permeated internally by air, and this not optional, but compelled to live in it, and equally impelled to breathe it; for no man can voluntarily stop breathing if he will. The desire for breath overpowers, controls, and subjugates the most determined will. A man may resolve to do almost anything else and do it, but to resolve to stop breathing is about the most futile of volitions.

Now a function so universal, so imperative, so constant, so guarded on all sides against a moment's interruption, and the object of which, moreover, is so obscure, must have an object, and as students of nature we ought not to rest till we understand something of its object and uses. What then is the use of breathing?

It is probably impossible to answer this question satisfactorily without including a partial view of certain other functions; and first, a word about nutrition. The body is nourished through the introduction of food, and the food of every animal is organic matter. No animal, however insignificant, lives on mineral matter. That which is food must have previously passed through and been prepared by an organized being, and that being always a plant. We eat animal food, to be sure, but the beef must have previously eaten grass and grain. Popularly, food is vegetable or animal, and these are esteemed very different. Science is not content with such a subdivision. That which is food must have been produced by a growing plant; not that all organic matter produced by plants is food. Strychnine is not food, but food is of vegetable origin only; and whether it has first undergone physical change by passing through an animal or not, chemically it is what the plant made it. It is starch, or sugar, or oily matter, without nitrogen—non-nitrogenized food, on the one hand; or albuminous matter,

gluten, &c., containing nitrogen as prepared by plants, cereals, and other grains; or this, changed in physical properties but not in composition, when it becomes the muscle of beef, fibrin, that is, nitrogenized food, on the other. And observe, in reference to both these classes of food, all food of all animals contains a superabundance of carbon, unoxidized carbon; and as carbon is combustible, all food will burn, if thrown on the fire.

If O represents an atom or equivalent of oxygen, H one of hydrogen, C one of carbon, and N one of nitrogen, then H O will mean water, C O_2 carbonic acid, N H_3 ammonia, $C_2 H_4 N_2 O_2$ urea; and the principal ingredients of food will stand thus:

Non-nitrogenized food.	Sugar, . . .	$C_{12} H_{11} O_{11}$
	Starch, . . .	$C_{12} H_{10} O_{10}$
	Oil, . . .	$C_{11} H_{10} O$?
Nitrogenized food.*	Veg. albumen, Veg. fibrin (gluten), Animal flesh,	$C_{48} H_{36} N_6 O_{14}$

Non-nitrogenized food contains only just enough, or less than enough oxygen to convert all its hydrogen into water, and the nitrogenized always less than enough; so that the affinity of the carbon and part of the hydrogen of food can never be satisfied by the supply of oxygen it contains.

Food thus originated by the vegetable kingdom, crushed and softened in the mouth, liquefied in the stomach and intestines, then absorbed and circulated as blood, is deposited and vivified in the tissues as cells, very minute, excessively numerous, and arranged in numbers, constituents, and forms, so as to constitute living organs; but through all this change of form, and function, and vitalization, observe the composition remains. The oil, the starch, the sugar of the plant, continue to be hydro-carbon compounds, still containing unoxidized carbon; and the albumen and fibrin of the cereal, whether it has first

* The reader who is critical in chemical matters will immediately detect the incompleteness of these formulæ, and at the same time will notice that the solid oxides of S, P, &c , which are washed out of the system by water, need not complicate a discussion of the elimination of the gaseous products of the oxidation of the above elements.

become beef or not, is albumen and fibrin still, nitrogenized matter, still containing unoxidized carbon.

Now in order to sustain life, we need and eat about thirty-six ounces, say two-and-a-quarter pounds of such food every day, a mixture being requisite to health; and this two-and-a-quarter pounds is every day used within the body, much of it converted into living cells, vivified muscular, nervous, and fatty or other tissue, and yet the curious fact is true that we are not gaining in weight. Four to six ounces are discharged as excrement, a little more, dissolved in water, escapes in the urine, some through the skin; and yet we take in thirty-six ounces of solid food, provide thus for the exit of a limited portion of it only, and still do not gain in weight, often not an ounce for years together. It may be said that there is a constant waste, and in this way it disappears; but one must define to himself what he means by this. Let us not be cheated by mere words. If he mean that it disappears by becoming nothing, the explanation must be ruled out by the answer, that matter is never destroyed. We can no more make nothing out of something, than we can make something out of nothing. The explanation is however possible; for while the millions of cells constructed daily from the food we eat, the vital principle being the artificer, are born, and enter upon their brief career of life; other millions having accomplished the end for which they lived, die and disappear. But how do they disappear? you say. Certainly, that is the very question. We put into the body two-and-a-quarter pounds of solid food every day; how do we get it out again?

Now let us get back to breathing. We inhale a large quantity of air every day and exhale about an equal bulk, but then it is greatly changed. We inhale a mixture of nitrogen and oxygen, of which one-fifth is free oxygen, (the nitrogen does not concern us now.) In expired air, a considerable part of this oxygen is replaced by carbonic acid and water. The inhaled oxygen is transferred by the blood to the dying hydrocarbon cells, unites with them, and returns as carbonic acid ($C\ O_2$) and water ($H\ O$) to be exhaled. Inspired air has five or six ten thousandths, expired five or six hundredths of $C\ O_2$.

This then is what goes on. Plants absorb carbonic acid, water, and a little ammonia, and through the influence of plant life, or the vegetable vital principle, always, however, requiring in addition sunlight, or that chemical ray which accompanies the sunbeam, they are able to construct living vegetable tissue—organized matter. They deoxidize water and carbonic acid, deliver the oxygen into the atmosphere, and detain the deoxidized hydro-carbon as vegetable tissue, the proper and only food for animals; while animals, having consumed as food these organic compounds formed by plants, reoxidize them by the process of respiration, degrading tissues back to mineral matter, and delivering them again to the atmosphere as carbonic acid and water. Thus, in order ourselves to live, we steadily destroy organic matter, and while millions of cells begin in us to live to-day, as many millions die, and their carcasses are removed from the interior of the body by the simple act of breathing. If breathing stops, death ensues, because, if for no other reason, the putrid carcasses of dead and dying cells poison us. Thus inhaled oxygen, while it prematurely attacks and kills the cells of which our bodies are made up, immediately removes the carcasses of those dead, and respiration becomes the scavenger of the body to remove the debris of matter which has lived through its brief career, performed its part in the world of vitality, and dead, is thus swept away into the great ocean of the atmosphere whence it originally came. Thus then it happens that without two-and-a-quarter pounds of solid food each day we cannot live, and with two-and-a-quarter pounds introduced every day, we must immediately die, unless an equal amount of effete dead and dying organs are every day removed.

This two-and-a-quarter pounds of organic solid matter, daily introduced, is a very varying mixture of the nitrogenized and non-nitrogenized articles of food. Both are necessary to the continuance of life, but the proportions of the mixture may vary much with the varying circumstances of life. Always however, food contains less oxygen than is sufficient to convert its carbon and hydrogen into carbonic acid and water, and expressed in free carbon, not less than seven or eight ounces must be expelled from the lungs every twenty-four hours.

Often it is asked how frequently during life the body changes. Popularly it is believed to be renewed every seven years; hence that vaccination runs out, and certain diseases are liable to recur at such interval. In the light of what has been said, it is easy to see that an amount of matter equal to the weight of the body is introduced, used, dies and escapes in as many days as two-and-a-quarter is contained in the number of pounds the body weighs; that is, through a man of one hundred and fifty pounds, there flows his entire weight of solid food every sixty-six days. But the entire composition of the body is not changed in quite so brief a period as this, for a part of the food we eat is used in us without ever actually becoming living tissue at all. Moreover, the rapidity of change varies very much in different tissues; for while muscles, brain, and nerves change their constituents with extreme rapidity, bones, cartilage, &c., may be years in being replaced by new material.

This then is the use of breathing. We must eat two-and-a-quarter pounds of organizable matter every day or we die. The same amount having lived its brief career within us, dies, and must be carried out of the system every day or we immediately die. Breathing results in the oxidation and elimination of this effete material. The inhaled oxygen aids in killing and destroying tissue, and then immediately removes it from the body. We are constantly living, constantly dying. We cannot live without dying, because motion involves death and destruction of tissue, and the two-and-a-quarter pounds of matter cannot die within us, and we yet live, without the incessant purifying process of respiration. It is not a nourishing, a vivifying, a building up, an organizing and life-giving function, but a killing, a destroying, a disintegrating, a reducing process. Plants make organic matter, animals, through respiration, consume it.

A second point is worthy of our attention. No fact in science is better established, than that whenever carbon unites with oxygen to form carbonic acid, heat is evolved. This may or may not be attended by light also. If the carbon of the vegetable kingdom, a plant or a tree, be rapidly burned in a stove, heat and light are both emitted. If the same plant lie exposed to the air without ignition, it slowly disappears, it rots

we say, its carbon is oxidized, and it becomes carbonic acid, and in so doing evolves just as much heat as if burned rapidly in the stove, but occupying months or years, the evolved heat is diffused through the atmosphere and is unnoticed. Heat is always generated when carbon becomes carbonic acid. But carbon is constantly becoming carbonic acid in our bodies, through the process of breathing. Does that develope heat? Does breathing not only kill us, but burn us up while we live? Are we furnaces in which combustion is constantly going on? Well, the evidence is that we live in a medium whose temperature is 60°, in winter often 0°, and somehow our bodies continue at the temperature of 98°. We are radiating heat constantly to other objects, and yet we remain 40°, 80°, 100°, hotter than they. A stove may do that, but only while combustion continues. If its carbon ceases to be oxidized, it cools. Nay, if well supplied with carbonaceous food, and with free respiration to burn it, we remain at 98°, when everything around us is frozen. Kane was comfortable with his body at 98°, when the air around him was nearly or quite —98°, the air or other surrounding bodies 180° or 190° colder than he. What a rapid radiation from his person must have occurred, notwithstanding the impediment that furs could offer; and whence this development of heat, but from the furnace within him, the oxidation of his own tissues by breathing. And this throws light upon what is obscure about food. Observe we live upon two kinds of food. Only one of these can furnish material for the construction of our bodies. Our organs are built up of nitrogenized food only, of albumen, fibrin, the gluten of wheat and other grains; while sugar, starch, and fatty matters can never make muscle, brain, or other tissues. These tissues must have nitrogen, while they contain none. They are more largely consumed by us than the former, digested and circulate as part of the blood, and in the capillaries are burned with the oxygen of respiration to sustain our animal heat, when our tissues are consumed too slowly to keep us warm; and if too much of this highly carbonaceous food is taken, that is, more than is needed for immediate combustion, it is stored as fat, a fuel for combustion at some future time. Hence the philosophy of fattening animals is easily understood. Food is of two kinds, tissue-

making and heat-making. If the ox is to be worked, that is, to consume his muscles in dragging the cart or the plough, grain and other nitrogenized food must be furnished to supply his muscular waste; but if he is to be fattened, he must be fed on starch, and oily matters, hay, potatoes, turnips, and corn or flax-seed meal, which are converted into fat, and he must be kept still in the stall, so as not to hurry respiration, and thus consume his stored fat, and kept warm, so as not to need a hurried respiration to keep up his normal temperature.

So too we see why the indolent, inert, inhabitant of the tropic, breathing slowly, and a rarefied air, may sprawl in the shade, and live on fruits which are little else than flavoured water. He needs but little fuel, and but a languid respiration, because the medium in which he lives is nearly 98°; and if compelled to work, and to increase his breathing and his combustion, his temperature is moderated by a copious gush of perspiration, thus carrying off his superabundant heat in a latent state, in vapour. Fatty food is his abomination, while the Arctic inhabitant freezes without it, and asks no choicer meal than blubber, with tallow-candles for dessert. Even when the supply of food-fuel is arrested, respiratory combustion still goes on.

The melancholy doom of the shipwrecked man is sad in the extreme. If he cannot float, if he be submerged, he cannot breathe; he dies for want of oxygen, he is poisoned by retained carbonic acid. We say he is drowned. But if he float and breathe, oxidation goes on, and heat is developed, but not sufficient to prevent the gradual reduction of the temperature of his body in a medium which conducts away heat so well as sea-water. In a few hours, notwithstanding his internal combustion, he is benumbed, then cooled below the temperature compatible with life (about 80°), he dies. But if he be of the favoured few who gain the life-boat, what then? Breathing still goes on, oxidation of his body by degrees; first his fat is attacked, stored among his organs for this very purpose. It burns away for several days; it keeps him warm, and saves his muscles from attack; he becomes lean. This gone, the oxygen of breathing attacks his muscular system, the nitrogenized constituents of his body; he fails in strength, because his muscles

soften and are consumed. Mere skin and bone is his appearance, scarcely strength to move a finger is his condition. Then the oxygen of respiration invades, attacks, and steadily consumes his nervous system, his brain; delirium, perfect exhaustion and death soon ensue. Starvation we call this. The body has been consumed, burned up, converted into carbonic acid and water, just as surely as if it had been in successive pieces thrown into the fire, and just as much heat liberated. A mere skeleton is left, and that nearly all incombustible. If food could have been reached, life would have been spared; but the fuel exhausted, the fire goes out. Cellular death and combustion go on for days, to preserve the life of the body; but the cell fuel exhausted, respiratory combustion ceases, and somatic death is the immediate and inevitable result.

The identity of the body is thus easily understood. Living implies death. If the body lives, it can only be at the expense of the incessant death of its component cells. Identity of form and features may persist for years, but not identity of substance. Appearance may be constant, but the substance of a man is not the same for any two consecutive moments. A steady stream flows through him, of food, water, and oxygen, not less than a ton and a half per year. Man's body is like a gas flame; it seems the same this moment as the last; it is a ceaseless onward flow of combustion, but neither is the combustible nor the supporter of combustion identical now with that of any former moment.

It appears then that two important purposes are served by the function of respiration. It serves to purify the body, to eliminate from it the effete, dead, and dying portions which otherwise would collect, circulate, and poison it; and at the same time, in the act of removal, produces new and inoffensive compounds, and generates the animal heat necessary to continued life.

But while respiration destroys and consumes organic matter and developes heat, it must not be supposed that no other end is accomplished by breathing. If we stop at this point, the uses of breathing are but imperfectly found and stated. A steam-engine consumes organic matter and developes heat, but remember heat is an energy, a phase of mechanical power, an

embodiment of work, and just as the chief office of the combustion of the fuel of the engine is not to keep the engineer warm, but to do work, so the combustion of the animal body, while it keeps us warm enough, generates that *power* by which the body is enabled to perform its part in the work of life; by which it carries about and executes the mandates of the soul. Let no man suppose that he is the creator of the power he is able to exert, any more than that he is the creator of the matter of which his body is composed. His power lies dormant, latent in the structure of his unburned body, and is only liberated when his combustible tissues are burned. As well suppose that the will of the engineer is the source of the power of the locomotive, as that the will, the mind, or the vital force of the man, is the source of his power to do mechanical work. Heat is an equivalent of, and is convertible into mechanical power; and combustion, that is, oxidation of fuel, is the source of our artificial heat. Fuel then is our great reservoir of manageable power, and is the same whether it be our enormous deposits of coal, our contemporaneous vegetation, or the bodies of animals, and oxidation in either case immediately yields us the mechanical work. Nor does it matter much whether our vegetation be oxidized under the engine boiler, and thus do work; or be eaten by the ox and then oxidized as muscle in him, and thus do work; or his muscle yet unoxidized be eaten as beef by us, and then, as man-muscle, oxidized in us by breathing, and thus do work; or, carried still further as lifeless animal-muscle and fat, be burned under the engine boiler, still combustion is the means, and heat, or its equivalent power, the end attained. Whenever or wherever a hydro-carbon compound is oxidized, there heat or mechanical energy, or both, are eliminated, and may be applied and used by man; and it is by power so generated in us that we are able to pick ourselves up and carry our bodies about, or execute any of those muscular movements by which the business of the world is carried on. The reasons are abundant for the conviction that our bodies can perform no act, produce no motion, exert no force, without the oxidation and death of muscular fibre, and this is the direct result of breathing. It is interesting fully to apprehend the thought that in this world I not only can perform no

bodily labour, but I can convey no thought to you, without the death and destruction, that is the combustion, through respiration, of some portion of my muscular system. If I speak, or write, or gesture, or nod, or smile, or frown, it is all the same. No idea can be conveyed by me to you without the contraction and accompanying death and oxidation of some muscular fibre; and it is highly probable that on your part, your mind can receive no impression made by me without a corresponding oxidation of some portion of your nervous structure. Muscle and nerve constitute, in this world, the only bridge over which thought can travel between one mind and another, and a part of the bridge must be destroyed every time a thought passes over.

It is easy now to understand the need of two kinds of food. The fibrin and albumen of meat and the gluten of the cereals are the tissue-producing food, and respiratory combustion of these is mainly the source of our ability to do work; while the starch, sugar, and oil of vegetables, and the fat of animals are the calefacient constituents of our bodies, and by their respiratory combustion they mainly contribute to the production of our animal heat.

Thus then the answer to our quere lies before us. While a whole catalogue of other functions, in both plants and animals, conspire to build up the embodiment of that splendid conception, an animated being, respiration is ever busy tearing the structure down again, and removing the rubbish, destroying organized matter, killing us while we live, and enabling us to live while we are continually, piece by piece, dying. Moreover, through its influence we are kept at a comfortable temperature, not only here and now, but enabled to resist the fiercest arctic cold ever found on earth; and lastly, through breathing only are we able to produce those motions and generate that immense power of animals and men, without which both would be more helpless than new-born babes.

How far respiration contributes to preserve a uniform composition of the atmosphere; how far to furnish food for plants; how far it is related to our own choice of food and clothing; how far to the ventilation of our dwellings and churches; how far it is instrumental in enabling us to produce those sounds,

which, modulated into language and vocal music, contribute so largely to our free communion with each other, and to aid us in our approaches to Him who planned the whole, he can know who chooses to press further the inquiry, and seek yet a fuller answer to the question—What's the use of breathing?

SHORT NOTICES.

Philosophy as Absolute Science, founded in the Universal Laws of Being, and including Ontology, Theology, and Psychology, made one as Spirit, Soul, and Body. By E. L. and A. L. Frothingham. Vol. I. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., 245 Washington street. 1864. Pp. 453, 8vo.

This is another Philosophy of the Absolute. That is, another attempt of man to become God. The assumption that man can so comprehend the universal laws of being, as to determine the nature of Absolute and Phenomenal being, and to show the relationship which exists between them, is an assumption of omniscience. It is one thing to proceed from phenomena to causes; or to receive on authority what transcends the sphere of experience, and the powers of induction, and quite another thing to determine *à priori* the laws of being so as to comprehend what God is, what the universe is and must be, and to reduce all being and all phenomena to science, including, unifying, and explaining all things. This attempt has rarely been made except by those who hold that man is God in the highest form of his existence. Mr. Frothingham however maintains that such a science is not only possible, but absolutely necessary. Knowledge less than this is necessarily chaotic, fragmentary, and inconsistent. All philosophies, therefore, whether sensuous or psychological, founded on the facts of natural consciousness, must, he thinks, be false. "Philosophy," says Mr. Frothingham, "is thus confined to a knowledge of phenomenal appearances and relationships, which are discordant, deceptive, and the opposite of what they seem; so that neither truth nor consistency is possible for it." Everything must be known in order to know anything.

Our author's not only think such absolute science is attainable, but that although others have hitherto failed in their attempts to realize it, they have succeeded. Such a science of course admits of only one method. It must be attained by intuition. But according to the common faith of men intuitive truths are the common property of all men. What is intuitively true is of necessity and universally recognized as true. One man may indeed have intuitions of truth which others have not; but when such truths are stated they must be

seen to be true by all capable of understanding the terms in which they are conveyed. When such a mathematical genius as Newton sees at a glance the propositions of Euclid to be true, it is not so much by intuition as by an inconceivably rapid discursive process. The range of intuitive truths therefore is of necessity for man very limited. They cannot by possibility take in the universal laws of being. This Mr. Frothingham seems to admit with regard to ordinary men. He assumes that there are an external, a natural, and a spiritual consciousness. The last is of slow and difficult development. It is only those who have attained that exalted state who are capable either of seeing or receiving these spiritual truths. This being the case, a philosophy founded on the intuitions of the spiritual consciousness can have no authority or power for any but the chosen few who have attained the full development of their nature. What is intuitive cannot be proved. It can only be affirmed. Mr. Frothingham rests what he considers the rightful claims of his philosophy to universal recognition, on the assumption that the three departments of Ontology, Theology, and Psychology, which have hitherto been discordant and antagonistic, are here represented in perfect unity and harmony. It is not enough however that a theory accounts for facts to prove its truth. One man may construct a theory of two independent, eternal causes, the one good the other evil, to explain the complex phenomena of the universe in which good and evil are so strongly mingled. Another may adopt the theory of one principle in various stages of development to explain these same phenomena. Another may receive the doctrine of the Bible, of an infinitely perfect personal God, the Creator of all things, and a universe including free moral agents, left at liberty to determine their own destiny as to good or evil. Viewed as mere theories either of these may be carried out by an ingenious mind so as to account for much of what falls within the range of our knowledge. The choice between them does not rest exclusively upon the fact that the one more than the other gives a rational explanation of things as they are. There are other sources of evidence by which the question may be decided. But if we adopt the test which Mr. Frothingham proposes, it would be a miracle, if his or any other *à priori* theory of absolute and phenomenal being and of their relation, should meet and solve every problem of fact or experience. These systems of *à priori* philosophy have hitherto proved as soap-bubbles which float safely in the ambient atmosphere in great symmetry and beauty, but the moment they touch any solid

matter, they vanish and leave only a drop of water to indicate their having existed. That solid matter against which these philosophical bubbles are sure fatally to impinge, are the doctrines of the Bible, the facts of consciousness, and the facts of experience. It is vain for philosophers to hope to persuade men to believe what the laws or the necessities of their nature pronounce to be false. The mind may be drugged into unconsciousness or insanity for a season, but it is certain to revert to its normal allegiance to the laws of belief impressed upon its nature. We must believe the well-authenticated testimony of our senses, the dictates of consciousness; we must believe that we are free, that we are accountable to a personal God, that we are sinners, and, if we have the Scriptures and the teachings of the Spirit, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Saviour of the world. Any system which impinges against these or similar established facts or truths, must vanish into thin air.

We cannot close this short notice of a remarkable work, which, although out of our sphere, we recognize as a product of great labour and talent, without expressing our admiration of the style in which as to typography and binding it is got up. It is one of the most beautiful volumes we have seen from the American press.

Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Book of Genesis. From the Creation to the Covenant. By Melancthon W. Jacobus. 1865. 12mo., pp. 304.

Few books of the Bible, if any, impose a severer task upon a commentator who aims at thoroughness than Genesis. This does not arise from any obscurity of its language, which is perspicuous and simple to the last degree, encumbered by no philological difficulties of any moment, and free from those perplexing puzzles which are encountered in the Prophets and the Psalms. The magnitude of the task lies chiefly in the three following particulars:

First, the contents of the book must be harmonized with the results of scientific research. Revealed truth and the truths of nature cannot conflict, and yet it is not always easy to make their consistency appear. In recording the origin of all things, though this is done with a religious and not a scientific aim, Genesis comes in contact with numerous points of scientific inquiry, which are of great magnitude, and have awakened an extensive interest, such as the time and manner of the formation of this globe, and of the entire material universe, the unity, antiquity, and primeval habitation of the human race, the unity and origin of language, the universality of the deluge, and the affinities of ancient nations. These present broad fields

of inquiry. No small amount of time and labour are needed to traverse them, even in the most cursory and superficial manner. But he who would vindicate the accuracy and Divine authority of the book of God, with other than unskilful hands, must qualify himself to speak with confidence and decision upon the points at issue, and have a clear understanding of the facts and arguments which bear upon them.

Next to the scientific, come the critical questions. A destructive criticism has aimed its attacks with special virulence against the Pentateuch and against the Gospels, which, form the foundation, respectively of the Old and the New Testament. A vast amount of ingenuity and learning has been expended upon the Pentateuch, and upon Genesis in particular, with the view of showing that it bears internal evidence of not being the production of Moses nor of any other single writer, but that it is made up of distinct compositions by different authors, which were not put together until after the Mosaic age. A multitude of hypotheses and conjectures upon this subject have been held and abandoned, but the general theory is so far from being exploded, that fresh changes are rung upon it still, and even such men as Delitzsch and Kurtz, who commonly appear as champions of sound opinions, have been partially enlisted in its support, while among ourselves forms of opinion are every now and then paraded as new and wonderful discoveries, which have long since been universally cast aside as untenable in the land of their origin. The humble believer may not be disturbed in his faith by speculations of this sort. But it is incumbent on him who would complete the defence of this portion of the sacred volume, to demonstrate their baselessness and their incompatibility with the character of the book upon which they are professedly founded.

These are, however, but the outposts; the proper work of exposition yet remains. This requires the unfolding of the plan of the book of Genesis, its particular value and position in the general scheme of the Scriptures, and the meaning of each separate portion of the book in itself, and in its relation to the design of the whole. In expounding the Old Testament, and especially this which is the earliest portion of it, it is necessary to apprehend distinctly the spirit of the former dispensation, without on the one hand transferring to it ideas and modes of thought which belong only to later times, or on the other overlooking the seeds and germs of truths to be subsequently unfolded, which abound everywhere, in order that its meaning for contemporary generations may be exhibited, as well as the bearing of the whole upon that for which the Old Testament

was designed as a preparation. There is here abundant work for a clear and vigorous mind, joined with a pious and devout heart.

In the volume before us, embracing the first seventeen chapters of Genesis, Prof. Jacobus presents us with the first-fruits of his Old Testament studies. He has the advantage of many years spent in Biblical instruction, and also of experience as a commentator, as the well-known author of the popular Notes on the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles. Abundant quotations, particularly on the scientific and critical questions discussed, communicate the views of leading authorities to those who have not the leisure or opportunity to examine their writings for themselves. This volume, which abounds in striking and valuable suggestions, fully sustains the previous reputation of its author, and will doubtless attain a wide circulation.

The Bible translated into Arabic. By Dr. Eli Smith and Dr. Van Dyck.

The new translation of the Bible into Arabic, begun by Dr. Eli Smith sixteen years ago, and left unfinished at the time of his death, has at length been completed by Dr. Van Dyck. Of the importance of this work, and the thoroughness with which it has been executed, there can be but one opinion. The members of the Syrian Mission, in a formal communication to the American Bible Society, unanimously bear the following testimony: "The names of the translators are ample guarantees to all linguists conversant with the facts of the case, that both with respect to conformity to the original tongues and in rendering into Arabic, as faithful and as excellent a translation has been secured as could be expected in any language. Besides these translators, chosen from their own number, the Mission has employed the best native talent that could be found in the country to make the translation elegant as well as faithful, that it should conform to the native style of expression, and to the highest standards of literary taste. A still further guarantee to the fidelity of the translation, and one which applies also to its unsectarian character, is that each sheet of the translation before being finally printed was submitted to the careful scrutiny of all the members of the Mission; to interested native scholars of all sects; to other American missionaries besides themselves; to English, German, Scotch, and Irish missionaries of different religious denominations and in different parts of the empire, (these proof-sheets being about thirty in number); that criticism has been freely invited and courted, has been offered and duly weighed, and from all these quarters have come warm and unqualified expressions of appro-

bation and confidence. So far as we are informed, the missionaries of all denominations and nationalities, where the Arabic language is used, now circulate this translation, and only this, just as far as it has been published, and as fast as they can obtain it. The British and Foreign Bible Society, after an examination of the work by scholars in England, rejecting all other translations and their own previous issues, are now printing this, as far as they have permission from the American Bible Society." By the spring of 1865 the New Testament will have gone through eleven editions, the Pentateuch through three editions, the Psalms through three editions, and the whole Bible through two editions. Of the twenty-four thousand copies of the New Testament already printed in different forms, but eight thousand eight hundred and sixty copies now remain on hand. An edition of three thousand copies of the Pentateuch and the Epistle to the Hebrews is exhausted. At the urgent request of the Syrian Mission, the American Bible Society has resolved to stereotype this work in different forms adapted for general circulation. This will be done under the immediate superintendence of Dr. Van Dyck, the surviving translator. The cost of the plates alone will be twenty-five thousand dollars; and the printing of the several editions will cost many thousands more. But the Scriptures will thus be rendered permanently accessible in a satisfactory translation to one hundred and twenty millions of people.

Weak Lungs, and How to Make them Strong; or, Diseases of the Organs of the Chest, with their Home Treatment by the Movement Cure. By Dio Lewis, M. D., Proprietor of Essex Street Gymnasium, Boston: Professor of Physical Culture in the Boston Normal Institute: author of the new Gymnastics for Men, Women, and Children; and Physician-in-Chief of the Boston Movement Cure for Consumptive Invalids. Profusely Illustrated. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1864.

The title of this book will have a great attraction for vast numbers—an immense proportion of all deaths in this country (some say one-third of the whole) arising from some form of pulmonary disease. The great principle maintained in this book, with manifold proofs, illustrations, and applications, is, first, that prevention is far better and easier than cure; and secondly, that, whether for prevention or cure, hygienic methods and appliances are greatly preferable to drugs. This theory is corroborated in the author's view, by the intimate connection between tubercular phthisis and imperfect digestion. Hence he dwells largely on the necessity of wholesome air, food, clothing, temperature, exercise, bathing, gymnastics, &c., with copious directions for realizing them. The

instructions and suggestions in this behalf, with which the book abounds, we are quite confident might be heeded by thousands with advantage, who are now on their way to a premature grave. This is perfectly consistent with an occasional extravagance of statement in regard to diet and gymnastics. The author holds that consumption is very much due to indigestion, and indigestion, in this country at least, to over-eating; and no doubt justly. It is to be expected, therefore, that he should go full far in his precepts of abstemiousness. He takes strong ground against the fashionable remedy for consumption and indigestion, for which so many are always ready to enter the ranks of consumptives and dyspeptics—consisting of a luxurious table and liberal potations of whisky and brandy. Still he terminates his discussion on this point with the sensible conclusion, that "all who have been starved into consumption must be feasted; all who have been feasted into it must be starved. And yet, for the surfeited class, the plain diet contains ten times as much nutriment which they can assimilate, as the old stimulating one." The phrase, "Movement Cure," hardly does justice to the author, as having a quackish aspect, which does not belong to what he denotes by it, viz., a system or series of gymnastic exercises, adapted to universal practice, as well at home as in public gymnasia, and designed to invigorate consumptives, dyspeptics, and invalids. We have gone quite as far as is proper for a non-professional opinion on such a book; but only as far as we have found ourselves supported by the best professional authority.

Choice and Service. Baccalaureate Sermon, delivered at Williamstown, Mass., July 31, 1864. By Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of Williams College. Published by request of the Class. Boston: T. R. Marvin & Son. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1864.

Dr. Hopkins is one of the few men who is capable of interesting a public assembly, of educated men even, with a profound metaphysical discussion. That he has accomplished this in the brilliant discourse before us, is among the many proofs of high rhetorical as well as metaphysical power. The great principle maintained in the discourse is, that in addition to the three classes of mental phenomena commonly recognized—"thinking, feeling, willing, in reality there are four—thinking, feeling, *choosing*, willing." The distinctive doctrine advanced, therefore is, that choice is neither a form of volition nor feeling, nor of any "synthesis" of the two, but an independent and coördinate fourth faculty of the mind. He further maintains that this "choice, and not volition, is the primary seat of freedom." "It is the personality." "It must determine cha-

racter." "Choice is primary, volition secondary; choice is directly free, volition indirectly; choice respects persons, objects, ends—volition acts; choice is not executive—volition is. Choice has the common relation of source to both willing and loving, *volition is not a source at all.*"

As choice is thus made the centre of personality, freedom, and responsibility, to the exclusion of will, so is it to the exclusion of desire. "The sphere of nature has for its characteristics uniformity and necessity, but here (in choice) is freedom, ... desire is necessary." Pp. 8, 9. Among the instances of such desire, he mentions hungering and thirsting for righteousness.

These novel and cardinal principles of this discourse have a wide and momentous application. As such they merit a more searching examination than is practicable in our short notices of new publications. It may be that hereafter we may see cause to give it, or at all events the questions involved, such a thorough discussion. For the present, we will only say, we do not think the author's positions will endure such an ordeal. No *usus loquendi* will justify them. When the saints ejaculate, "there is none upon earth that I *desire* besides thee." "One thing have I *desired* that *will* I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." "My soul thirsteth for God." "As for me and my house we *will* serve the Lord." When Christ says to the Jews, "ye *will* not come to me that ye may have life," we ask, does not moral quality of the strongest kind attach to the exercises of mind here described? Do they not involve the higher elements of freedom and responsibility? And are they not appropriately described by the terms "desire" and "will?"

A Treatise on Logic, or the Laws of Pure Thought. Comprising both Aristotelian and Hamiltonian Analyses of Logical Forms, and some chapters on Applied Logic. By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. Cambridge: Sever & Francis, Booksellers to the University. 1864.

This is an able treatise by one who is obviously master of his subject. Those who fully comprehend what the author here teaches, will have a very competent understanding of the science of Logic, not only as it was elaborated by Aristotle and his followers, but as it has since been developed from a higher stand-point by Kant and his successors; and especially as it has been enlarged and purified by Hamilton and such collaborators as Bayne, Thompson and others.

While we hesitate not to commend this book to the attention of scholars, and all who are on any ground interested in the

science of Logic, we deem it proper to observe, that few will study it to advantage who have not already been somewhat drilled in a more rudimentary treatise for beginners, or who do not find an adequate substitute for this in an instructor of rare efficiency. An elementary work on Logic, framed upon the present acknowledged conception of it, as the science of the laws of thought, well adapted to the wants of beginners in high-schools and colleges, is still a desideratum.

Reflected Light. Illustrations of the Redeemer's Faithfulness in the Happy Death-bed Experience of Christians. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1865.

The character of this book is well given in its title-page. It will be a sufficient guarantee of its interest and value, if we apprize our readers that the power of Christianity is illustrated in sketches of the dying experience of such eminent Christians as Lady Huntingdon, Doddridge, Hervey, Romaine, Venn, Bedell, Chalmers, the Mores, Judsons, Haldanes, and numerous others.

God's Way of Holiness. By Horatius Bonar, D. D., Author of "God's Way of Peace," "Hymns of Faith and Hope," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1865.

This volume gives what it purports to do, "God's way of Holiness," in broad contrast to every way of man's devising. It shows the true support and spring of holiness to be in free and full justification by the cross of Christ, which, to the eye of unbelief, is an incentive to sin and licentiousness. The author appears fully to understand the gospel method of deliverance from the power, through deliverance from the curse of sin, arising from the redemption of Christ applied by the Holy Ghost, and received by faith. Like all his writings, this work is clear, instructive, evangelical, and quite aglow with fervour and unction.

The Dawn of Heaven; or the Principles of the Heavenly Life applied to the Earthly. By the late Joseph A. Collier of Kingston, N. Y., with a brief Biographical Sketch of the Author. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1865.

The early decease of this gifted and beloved minister was greatly lamented. It is fit that his friends and the Christian public should have some permanent memorial of his ability and worth. Although he had previously distinguished himself as a contributor to Christian literature, by two prize essays, one an essay on Peace, published by the American Tract Society, the other on "the Christian Home, or Religion in the Family," published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication, the public will be glad to have this posthumous volume which is so worthy

of his pen. The holiness of heaven as applied to religion on earth is set forth with vividness, beauty, and evangelical fervour. From the biographical sketch we learn that he was pious from youth and even childhood. His life is a happy illustration of the tendency of early piety and covenant training to give a consistent and symmetrical development to Christian character.

Tales and Sketches of Christian Life, in different Lands and Ages. By the Author of "The Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1865.

The Martyrs of Spain and the Liberators of Holland. By the Author of "The Schönberg-Cotta Family. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1865.

Diary of Mrs. Kitty Trevylyan: A Story of the Times of Whitefield and the Wesleys. By the Author of "The Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family," "The Early Dawn," &c., with a Preface by the Author for the American edition. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1864.

The foregoing works by the unknown author of the celebrated "Schönberg-Cotta Family," which has won such wide and deserved favour with the Christian reading public, are upon different subjects, but in a similar vein. The passion for reading tales, whether of truth or fiction, which so largely controls the young, will find gratification in these volumes, in connection with those great themes and events relating to Christianity and the church, which do not debase, but elevate and purify the mind.

Bible Lessons on Palestine. By the Rev. William P. Breed, D. D. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This little volume is made up of a series of questions and answers in relation to the principal recorded facts of Scripture as they stand related to the places of chief importance in the Holy Land, and is adapted to Sabbath-school instruction. The advantages of using this thread of association for instructing the young in the facts of Scripture are obvious.

The Church of Christ: Its Constitution and Order. A Manual for the Instruction of Families, Sabbath-schools, and Bible Classes. By the Rev. Samuel J. Baird, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Such a Manual as this, for teaching Presbyterian Church polity, if properly executed, will supply a great want. The strong testimonials from representative men in every branch of the Presbyterian Church, in favour of this volume, including Drs. McGill, Boardman, H. B. Smith, Cooper, Wylie, Berg, Stevenson, Bomberger, furnish a strong presumption in its favour. With their judgment, our own impressions, derived

from a very cursory survey of the volume, correspond; while, of course, we do not undertake to be sponsors for every statement it contains. We see no reason to dissent from Dr. McGill, when he says, "I earnestly commend this volume to the churches."

The Cedar Christian; and other Practical Papers and Personal Sketches. By Theodore L. Cuyler, Pastor of the Lafayette Avenue Church, Brooklyn. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1864.

This is mainly a collection of Mr. Cuyler's contributions to the *Evangelist* and *Independent*. Most of our readers have seen specimens of them. The many who have found pleasure and profit in these racy and sprightly papers will doubtless be glad to find them exchanging their fugitive for a permanent form, by being collected into this neat and readable volume. Some are mainly literary. A larger proportion, however, are not only religious, but earnest and stirring.

Egypt's Princes. A Narrative of Missionary Labour in the Valley of the Nile. By the Rev. Gulian Lansing, Missionary of the United Presbyterian Church in Egypt. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1865.

The records of missionary labour, involving as they do, not only the incidents and fruits of this labour, but the customs, manners, and geography of the countries where it is employed, have become a distinct and important branch both of Christian and of general literature. No transient travellers can understand a people as well as those who live amongst them, and are devoted to their moral and spiritual improvement. The publications of missionaries not only reveal the moral condition and religious systems of the nations; they shed light on some of the most difficult questions in geography, ethnology, language, history, and philosophy.

This volume is interesting, not only as a narrative of missionary life and labour, to which Christians are always alive, but also for the knowledge it gives of Egypt, which is of interest to the general reader; and more especially to that increasing class of antiquarians, scholars, and investigators, who are prosecuting studies in regard to Egypt, with enthusiasm, and have marked off this as a distinct field of systematic study, under the title of *Egyptology*.

Life Lessons in the School of Christian Duty. By the Author of "The Life and Times of John Huss." New York: Anson F. Randolph, 770 Broadway. 1864. Pp. 407.

"The aim of this volume is practical throughout. It is designed to conduct the mind of the reader onward from a state of religious indifference to a sober contemplation of the objects and duties of life, and to urge them upon the heart and conscience."

Truth in Love. Sermons by the late Josiah D. Smith, D. D., Pastor of the Westminster Church, Columbus, Ohio. With a Biographical Preface by the Rev. James M. Platt, and an Introduction by M. W. Jacobus, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 320.

Dr. Smith was born in Western Pennsylvania in 1815, and died in Columbus, Ohio, on the 29th of May, 1863, in the forty-eighth year of his age. In January, 1851, he was installed in Columbus as co-pastor of the late venerable Dr. James Hoge. His reputation as a minister and the attractive features of his character as a man, secured for him the warm attachment of his people, and rendered his death in the prime of life a calamity to the whole church to whose service he was zealously devoted. This volume is a fit monument to his memory.

Woodcliff. By Harriet B. McKeever. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. Pp. 464. 1865.

"The hero of this story is a Scotch boy, taken from the humbler walks of life. . . . . By his moral and intellectual worth, sustained by unfaltering trust in God, he rises, step by step, until he attains a commanding position among his fellow-men."

Addresses at the Inauguration of the Rev. A. A. Hodge, D. D., as Professor of Didactic, Polemic, and Historical Theology in the Western Theological Seminary. Published by the Board of Directors.

Dr. Hodge seems to have entered auspiciously on the duties of the important position to which he was assigned by the last General Assembly. The charge delivered by the Rev. James M. Platt, at the inauguration, is well written, and replete with sound views and principles. The address delivered by the new Professor is clear and comprehensive.

Addresses at the Inauguration of William C. Cattell, D. D., as President of Lafayette College. Easton, Penn., July 26, 1864. Published by order of the Board of Trustees.

The introductory address by the Hon. James Pollock, President of the Board of Trustees, is what might be expected from so practised a speaker. Dr. Cattell's Inaugural Discourse occupies much the larger portion of the pamphlet before us. It is in every aspect an excellent address. The College has entered on a new and very promising career, since the election of Dr. Cattell as its President, whose activity and efficiency have already been productive of the best results. The distinguishing feature which it seems the design of the officers and friends of Lafayette to impress upon that Institution, is a larger measure of Christian instruction. No one can doubt that in a Christian

country every educated man should be taught the facts and doctrines of his religion. These are to be learned authoritatively only from the Bible. The Bible therefore should somewhere and somehow be introduced as a subject of study in the course of education. It cannot safely be left to the family, nor exclusively to the pulpit. In Protestant Germany, in the lower and higher schools, there is a "Religionstunde," as regular as the hour for languages and mathematics. It is a difficult practical question how, in this country, the object referred to can be best accomplished. If neglected in the primary schools, it should be attended to in the college. We sincerely hope that the plan proposed in the College at Easton may be so wisely ordered and executed as to prove not only successful but exemplary.

Healing and Salvation for our Country from God alone. A Sermon preached in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, on Thanksgiving Day, November 24, 1864, by Henry A. Boardman, D. D.

This is an excellent, patriotic and loyal discourse, full of religious feeling and of wise counsels. "It is of the Divine mercy," says Dr. Boardman, "that this rebellion has not attained its end in the overthrown of our government; and that our people have with such unanimity come forward to the maintenance of our Constitution and Union. We must refer to his hand all the successes with which he has been pleased to crown our army and navy; and all the progress that has been made in suppressing this most criminal revolt. We may be thankful that any slave States have become free; and should any method of universal emancipation be devised, which like that adopted in our own and other northern States, shall not involve the destruction of either the black or white race, but conduce to the amelioration and happiness of both; we shall have very great cause for gratitude to God." In these sentiments we are persuaded the great body of the loyal people of this country will cordially concur.

Sketches of Eloquent Preachers. By J. B. Waterbury, D.D. American Tract Society. Pp. 256.

As this small volume contains notices of twenty preachers, American and English, with one or two French, and Luther from the Germans, ending with the Apostle Paul, the reader will not expect an extended exhibition of the characteristic qualities of any one man. The author has, however, succeeded in giving information interesting to the general reader, of men with whose names the Christian public has long been familiar.