THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW

FOR THE YEAR

1864.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D.D.

VOL. XXXVI.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY

PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET,

AND SUBSCRIPTIONS RECEIVED BY

R. CARTER & BROTHERS, New York; Rev. A. KENNEDY, London, C. W.;

Rev. WILLIAM ELDER, St. John, New Brunswick;

and TRÜBNER & CO., London.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXVI.

No. I.

No. II.

No. III.

No. IV.

THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1864.

No. I.

ART. I.—*The Union of Church and State in the Nicene Age, and its Effects upon Public Morals and Religion.* An Historical Essay.

THE name of Constantine the Great marks an important epoch in the history of Christianity. With him the church ceased to be a persecuted sect, and became the established religion of the Roman Empire. Since that time the church and the state, though frequently jarring, have remained united in Europe, either on the hierarchical basis, with the temporal power under the tutelage of the spiritual, or on the cæsaro-papal, with the spiritual power merged in the temporal; while in the United States of America, since the end of the eighteenth century, the two powers have stood peacefully but independently side by side. The church could now act upon the state, but so could the state act upon the church; and this mutual influence became a source of both profit and loss, blessing and curse, on either side.

The martyrs and confessors of the first three centuries, in their expectation of the impending end of the world, and their desire for the speedy return of the Lord, had never once thought of such a thing as the great and sudden change, which meets us at the beginning of this period, in the relation of the Roman state to the Christian church. Tertullian had even held the Christian profession to be irreconcilable with the office of a

Roman emperor.* Nevertheless the clergy and people very soon and very easily accommodated themselves to the new order of things, and recognised in it a reproduction of the theocratic constitution of the people of God under the ancient covenant. Save that the dissenting sects, who derived no benefit from this union, but were rather subject to persecution from the state and from the established catholicism, the Donatists for an especial instance, protested against the intermeddling of the temporal power with religious concerns.† The heathen, who now came over in a mass, had all along been accustomed to a union of politics with religion, of the imperial with the sacerdotal dignity. They could not imagine a state without some cultus, whatever might be its name. And as heathenism had outlived itself in the empire, and Judaism, by its national exclusiveness and its stationary character, was totally disqualified, Christianity must take the throne.

The change was as natural and inevitable as it was great. When Constantine planted the standard of the cross upon the forsaken temples of the gods, he but followed the irresistible current of history itself. Christianity had already, without a stroke of sword or of intrigue, achieved over the false religion the internal victory of spirit over matter, of truth over falsehood, of faith over superstition, of the worship of God over idolatry, of morality over corruption. Under a three hundred years' oppression it had preserved its irrepressible moral vigour, and abundantly earned its new social position. It could not possibly continue a despised sect, a homeless child of the wilderness, but, like its divine founder on the third day after his crucifixion, it must rise again; take the reins of the world into its hands, and, as an all-transforming principle, take state, science, and art to itself, to breathe into them a higher life, and consecrate them to the service of God. The church, of course,

* Apologeticus, c. 21: "Sed et Cæsares credidissent, si aut Cæsares non essent sæculo necessarii, aut si et Christiani potuissent esse Cæsares."

† Thus the bishop Donatus, of Carthage, in 347, rejected the imperial commissioners, Paulus and Macarius, with the exclamation: "Quid est imperatori cum ecclesia?" See Optatus Milev.: De schismate Donat. l. iii. c. 3. The Donatists, however, were the first to provoke the imperial intervention in their controversies, and would doubtless have spoken very differently had the decision turned in their favour.

continues to the end a servant, as Christ himself came not to be ministered unto, but to minister; and she must at all times suffer persecution, outwardly or inwardly, from the ungodly world. Yet is she also the bride of the Son of God, therefore of royal blood; and she is to make her purifying and sanctifying influence felt upon all orders of natural life, and all forms of human society. And from this influence the state of course is not excepted. Union with the state is no more necessarily a profanation of holy things, than union with science and art, which in fact themselves proceed from God and must subserve his glory.

On the other hand, the state, as a necessary and divine institution, for the protection of person and property, for the administration of law and justice, and for the promotion of earthly weal, could not possibly persist for ever in her hostility to Christianity, but must at least allow it a legal existence, and free play; and if she would attain a higher development, and better answer her moral ends than she could in union with idolatry, she must surrender herself to its influence. The kingdom of the Father, to which the state belongs, is not essentially incompatible with the church, the kingdom of the Son; rather does "the Father draw to the Son," and the Son leads back to the Father, till God become "all in all." Henceforth should kings again be nursing fathers and queens nursing mothers to the church,* and the prophecy begin to be fulfilled: "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever." †

The American separation of church and state, even if regarded as the best settlement of the true relation of the two, is not in the least inconsistent with this view. It is not a return to the pre-Constantinian basis, with its spirit of persecution, but rests upon the mutual reverential recognition and support of the two powers, and must be regarded as the continued result of that mighty revolution of the fourth century.

But the elevation of Christianity, as the religion of the state, presents also an opposite aspect to our contemplation. It

* Isa. xlix. 23. † Rev. xi. 15.

involves great risk of degeneracy to the church. The Roman state, with its laws, institutions, and usages, was still deeply rooted in heathenism, and could not be transformed by a magical stroke. The christianizing of the state amounted, therefore, in great measure, to a paganizing and secularizing of the church. The world overcame the church as much as the church overcame the world, and the temporal gain of Christianity was in many respects cancelled by spiritual loss. The mass of the Roman Empire was baptized only with water, not with the Spirit and fire of the gospel, and it smuggled heathen manners and practices into the sanctuary under a new name. The very combination of the cross with the military ensign, by Constantine, was a most doubtful omen, portending an unhappy mixture of the temporal and the spiritual powers; the kingdom, which is of the earth, and that which is from heaven. The settlement of the boundary between the two powers, which, with all their unity, remain as essentially distinct as body and soul, law and gospel, was itself a prolific source of errors and vehement strifes about jurisdiction, which stretch through all the middle ages, and still repeat themselves in these latest times, save where the amicable American separation has thus far forestalled collision.

Amidst all the bad consequences of the union of church and state, however, we must not forget, that the deeper spirit of the gospel has ever reacted against the evils and abuses of it, whether under an imperial pope or a papal emperor, and has preserved its divine power for the salvation of men under every form of constitution. Though standing and working in the world, and in many ways linked with it, yet is Christianity not of the world, but stands above it.

Nor must we think the degeneracy of the church began with her union with the state.* Corruption and apostacy cannot

* This view is now very prevalent in America. It was not formerly so. Jonathan Edwards, in his "History of Redemption," a practical and edifying survey of church history, as an unfolding of the plan of redemption, even saw in the accession of Constantine, a type of the future appearing of Christ in the clouds for the redemption of his people, and attributed to it the most beneficent results; to wit: (1.) "The Christian church was thereby wholly delivered from persecution. . . (2.) God now appeared to execute terrible judgments on their enemies. . . . (3.) Heathenism now was in a great measure abo-

attach to any one fact or personage, be he Constantine, or Gregory I., or Gregory VII. They are rooted in the natural heart of man. They revealed themselves, at least in the germ, even in the apostolic age, and are by no means avoided, as the condition of America proves, by the separation of the two powers. We have among ourselves almost all the errors and abuses of the old world, not collected indeed in any one communion, but distributed among our various denominations and sects. The history of the church presents, from the beginning, a twofold development of good and of evil; an incessant antagonism of light and darkness, truth and falsehood, the mystery of godliness and the mystery of iniquity, Christianity and Antichrist. According to the Lord's parables of the net, and of the tares among the wheat, we cannot expect a complete separation before the final judgment, though in a relative sense the history of the church is a progressive judgment of the church, as the history of the world is a judgment of the world.

I. RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CHURCH RESULTING FROM THIS ALLIANCE.

The conversion of Constantine, and the gradual establishment of Christianity as the religion of the state, had, first of all, the important effect of giving the church not only the usual rights of a legal corporation, which she possesses also in America, and

lished throughout the Roman Empire. . . . (4.) The Christian church was brought into a state of great peace and prosperity. . . . This revolution," he further says, p. 312, "was the greatest that had occurred since the flood. Satan, the prince of darkness, that king and god of the heathen world, was cast out. The roaring lion was conquered by the Lamb of God in the strongest dominion he ever had. This was a remarkable accomplishment of Jer. x. 11: 'The gods that have not made the heaven and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth and from under the heavens.'" This work, still much read in America and England, was written, to be sure, long before the separation of church and state in New England, viz., in 1739; (first printed in Edinburgh in 1774, twenty-six years after the author's death.) But the great difference of the judgment of this renowned Puritan divine from the prevailing American opinion of the present day, is an interesting proof that our view of history is very much determined by the ecclesiastical circumstances in which we live, and at the same time that the whole question of church and state is not at all essential in Christian theology and ethics. In America, all confessions, even the Roman Catholics, are satisfied with the separation, while in Europe it is the reverse.

here without distinction of confessions, but at the same time the peculiar privileges, which the heathen worship and priesthood had heretofore enjoyed. These rights and privileges she gradually secured, either by tacit concession or through special laws of the Christian emperors, as laid down in the collections of the Theodosian and Justinian codes. These were limited, however, as we must here at the outset observe, exclusively to the catholic or orthodox church.* The heretical and schismatic sects, without distinction, excepting the Arians, during their brief ascendancy under Arian emperors, were now worse off than they had been before, and were forbidden the free exercise of their worship, even under Constantine, upon pain of fines and confiscation, and from the time of Theodosius and Justinian, upon pain of death. Equal patronage of all Christian parties was totally foreign to the despotic uniformity system of the Byzantine emperors, and the ecclesiastical exclusiveness and absolutism of the popes. Nor can it be at all consistently carried out upon the state-church basis, for every concession to dissenters loosens the bond between the church and the state.

The immunities and privileges which were conferred upon the Catholic church in the Roman empire, from the time of Constantine, by imperial legislation, may be specified as follows:

1. *The exemption of the clergy from most public burdens.*

Among these were obligatory public services,† such as military duty, low manual labour, the bearing of costly honours, and, in a measure, taxes for the real estate of the church. This exemption,‡ which had been enjoyed, indeed, not by the

* So early as 326, Constantine promulgated the law, (Cod. Theodos. lib. xvi. lit. 5, l. 1:) "Privilegia, quae contemplatione religionis indulta sunt, *catholicae tantum legis observatoribus* prodesse opportet. Haereticos autem atque schismaticos non tantum ab his privilegiis alienos esse volumus, sed etiam diversis muneribus constringi et subjici." Yet he was lenient towards the Novatians, adding in the same year respecting them, (C. Theodos. xvi. 5, 2:) "Novatianos non adeo comperimus praedammatos, ut iis quae petiverunt, crederemus minime largienda. Itaque ecclesiae suae domos, et loca sepulcris, apta sine inquietudine eos firmiter possidere praecipimus." Comp. the eighth canon of the Council of Nice, which likewise deals with them indulgently.

† The munera publica, or λειτουργίαι, attaching in part to the person as a subject of the empire, in part to the possession of property, (munera patrimoniorum.)

‡ Immunitas, ἀλειτουργησία.

heathen priests alone, but at least partially by physicians also and rhetoricians, and the Jewish rulers of synagogues, was first granted by Constantine in the year 313 to the catholic clergy in Africa, and afterwards, in 319, extended throughout the empire. But this led many to press into the clerical office without inward call, to the prejudice of the state; and in 320 the emperor made a law prohibiting the wealthy * from entering the ministry, and limiting the increase of the clergy, on the singular ground, that "the rich should bear the burdens of the world, the poor be supported by the property of the church." Valentinian I. issued a similar law in 364. Under Valentinian II. and Theodosius I. the rich were admitted to the spiritual office on condition of assigning their property to others, who should fulfil the demands of the state in their stead. But these arbitrary laws were certainly not strictly observed.

Constantine also exempted the church from the land tax, but afterwards revoked this immunity; and his successors likewise were not uniform in this matter. Ambrose, though one of the strongest advocates of the rights of the church, accedes to the fact and the justice of the assessment of church lands;† but the hierarchy afterwards claimed for the church a divine right of exemption from all taxation.

2. *The enrichment and endowment of the church.*

Here again Constantine led the way. He not only restored (in 313) the buildings and estates which had been confiscated in the Diocletian persecution, but granted the church also the right to receive legacies, (321,) and himself made liberal contributions in money and grain to the support of the clergy, and the building of churches in Africa,‡ in the Holy Land, in Nico-

* The decuriones and curiales.

† "Si tributum petit Imperator,"—says he in the Orat. de basilicis non tradendis haereticis—"non negamus; agri ecclesiae solvunt tributum; solvimus quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et quae sunt Dei Deo; tributum Caesaris est; non negatur." Baronius, (ad ann. 387,) endeavours to prove that this tribute was meant by Ambrose merely as an act of love, not of duty!

‡ So early as 314 he caused to be paid to the bishop Caecilian of Carthage 3000 *folles* (τριστχιλίους φόλεις=£1800) from the public treasury of the province, for the catholic churches in Africa, Numidia, and Mauritania, promising further gifts for similar purposes. Euseb. H. E. X. 6, and Vit. Const. iv. 28.

media, Antioch, and Constantinople. Though this, be it remembered, can be no great merit in an absolute monarch, who is lord of the public treasury as he is of his private purse, and can afford to be generous at the expense of his subjects. He and his successors likewise gave to the church the heathen temples and their estates, and the public property of heretics; but these more frequently were confiscated to the civil treasury, or squandered on favourites. Wealthy subjects, some from pure piety, others from motives of interest, conveyed their property to the church, often to the prejudice of the just claims of their kindred. Bishops and monks not rarely used unworthy influences with widows and dying persons; though Augustine positively rejected every legacy which deprived a son of his rights. Valentinian I. found it necessary to oppose the legacy-hunting of the clergy, particularly in Rome, with a law of the year 370,* and Jerome acknowledges there was good reason for it.† The wealth of the church was converted mostly into real estate, or at least secured by it. And the church soon came to own the tenth part of all the landed property. This land, to be sure, had long been worthless or neglected, but under favourable conditions rose in value with uncommon rapidity. At the time of Chrysostom, towards the close of the fourth century, the church of Antioch was strong enough to maintain entirely, or in part, three thousand widows and consecrated virgins, besides many poor, sick, and strangers.‡ The metropolitan churches of Rome and Alexandria were the most wealthy. The various churches of Rome in the sixth century, besides enormous treasures in money, and gold and silver vases, owned many houses and lands not only in Italy and Sicily, but even in Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt.§ And when John, who bears the honourable distinction of the Alms-giver, for his unlimited liberality to the poor, became patriarch of Alexandria, (606,)

* In an edict to Damasus, bishop of Rome. Cod. Theod. xvi. 2, 20:—"Ecclesiastici . . . viduarum ac pupillarum domos non adeant," etc.

† Epist. 34, (al. 2,) ad Nepotianum, where he says of this law: "Nec de lege conqueror, sed doleo, cur meruerimus hanc legem;" and of the clergy of his time: "Ignominia omnium sacerdotum est, propriis studere divitiis," etc.

‡ Chrys. Hom. 66 in Matt. (vii., p. 658.)

§ Comp. the Epistles of Gregory the Great.

he found in the church treasury eight thousand pounds of gold, and himself received ten thousand, though he retained hardly an ordinary blanket for himself, and is said, on one occasion, to have fed seven thousand five hundred poor at once.*

The control of the ecclesiastical revenues vested in the bishops. The bishops distributed the funds according to the prevailing custom, into three or four parts: for themselves, for their clergy, for the current expenses of worship, and for the poor. They frequently exposed themselves to the suspicion of avarice and nepotism. The best of them, like Chrysostom and Augustine, were averse to this concernment with earthly property, since it often conflicted with their higher duties; and they preferred the poverty of earlier times, because the present abundant revenues diminished private beneficence.

And most certainly this opulence had two sides. It was a source both of profit and of loss to the church. According to the spirit of its proprietors and its controllers, it might be used for the furtherance of the kingdom of God, the building of churches, the support of the needy, and the founding of charitable institutions for the poor, the sick, for widows and orphans, for destitute strangers and aged persons,† or perverted to the fostering of indolence and luxury, and thus promote moral corruption and decay. This was felt by serious minds even in the palmy days of the external power of the hierarchy. Dante, believing Constantine to be the author of the pope's temporal sovereignty, on the ground of the fictitious donation to Sylvester, bitterly exclaimed:

> "Your gods ye make of silver and of gold;
> And wherein differ from idolaters,
> Save that their god is one—your's hundred-fold?
> Ah, Constantine! what evils caused to flow,
> Not thy conversion, but that plenteous dower,
> Thou on the first rich Father didst bestow!"‡

* See the Vita S. Joannis Eleemosynarii (the next to the last catholic patriarch of Alexandria) in the Acta Sanct. Bolland. ad 23 Jan.

† The πτωχοτροφεῖα, νοσοκομεῖα, ὀρφανοτροφεῖα, γηρακομεῖα, and ξενῶνες or ξενοδοχεῖα, as they were called; which all sprang from the church.

‡ Inferno, canto xix. v. 112—118, as translated by Wright, (with two slight alterations.) Milton, in his prose works, has translated this passage, as well

3. *The better support of the clergy*, was another advantage connected with the new position of Christianity in the Empire.

Hitherto the clergy had been entirely dependent on the voluntary contributions of the Christians, and the Christians were for the most part poor. Now they received a fixed income from the church funds, and from the imperial and municipal treasuries. To this was added the contribution of first-fruits and tithes, which, though not as yet legally enforced, arose as a voluntary custom at a very early period, and probably in churches of Jewish origin existed from the first, after the example of the Jewish law.* Where these means of support were not sufficient, the clergy turned to agriculture or some other occupation; and so late as the fifth century many synods recommended this means of subsistence, although the Apostolical Canons prohibited the engagement of the clergy in secular callings, under penalty of deposition.†

This improvement, also, in the external condition of the clergy, was attended with a proportional degeneracy in their moral character. It raised them above oppressive and distracting cares for livelihood; made them independent, and permitted them to devote their whole strength to the duties of their office; but it also favoured ease and luxury; allured a host of unworthy persons into the service of the church, and checked the exercise of free giving among the people. The better bishops, like Athanasius, the two Gregories, Basil, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Ambrose, Augustine, lived in ascetic simplicity, and used their revenues for the public good; while others indulged their vanity, their love of magnificence, and their voluptuousness.

as that of Ariosto, where he humourously places the donation of Constantine in the moon, among the things lost or abused on earth.

> "Ah, Constantine! of how much ill was cause,
> Not thy conversion, but those rich domains
> That the first wealthy pope received of thee."

Especially favoured was the *Basilias*, for sick and strangers in Caesarea, named after its founder, the bishop Basil the Great. Basil. Ep. 94., Gregor. Naz. Orat. 27 and 30.

* Lev. xxvii. 30—33; Num. xviii. 20—24; Deut. xiv. 22 sqq.; 2 Chron. xxxi. 4 sqq.

† Constit. Apost. lib. viii. cap. 47, can. 6, (p. 239, ed Ueltzen:) Ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος κοσμικὰς φροντίδας μὴ ἀναλαμβανέτω· εἰ δὲ μή, καθαιρείσθω.

The heathen historian Ammianus gives the country clergy in general the credit of simplicity, temperance, and virtue, while he represents the Roman hierarchy, greatly enriched by the gifts of matrons, as extreme in the luxury of their dress and their more than royal banquets;* and St. Jerome agrees with him.† The distinguished heathen prefect, Praetextatus, said to Pope Damasus, that for the price of the bishopric of Rome he himself might become a Christian at once. The bishops of Constantinople, according to the account of Gregory Nazianzen,‡ who himself held that see for a short time, were not behind their Roman colleagues in this extravagance, and vied with the most honourable functionaries of the state in pomp and sumptuous diet. The cathedrals of Constantinople and Carthage had hundreds of priests, deacons, deaconesses, subdeacons, prelectors, singers, and janitors.§

It is worthy of notice, that, as we have already intimated, the two greatest church fathers gave the preference in principle to the voluntary system in the support of the church and the ministry, which prevailed before the Nicene era, and which has been restored in modern times in the United States of America, and among the dissenters in England and the free churches of Scotland. Chrysostom no doubt perceived, that under existing circumstances the wants of the churches could not well be otherwise supplied, but he was decidedly averse to the accumulation of treasure by the church, and said to his hearers in Antioch: "The treasure of the church should be with you all, and it is only your hardness of heart that requires her to hold earthly property, and to deal in houses and lands. Ye are unfruitful in good works, and so the ministers of God must meddle in a thousand matters foreign to their office. In the days of the apostles people might likewise have given them houses and lands; why did they prefer to sell the houses and lands and give the proceeds? Because this was without doubt the better way. Your fathers would have preferred that you

* Lib. xxvii. c. 3. † Hieron. Ep. 34, (al. 2,) et passim. ‡ Orat. 32.

§ The cathedral of Constantinople fell under censure for the excessive number of its clergy and subordinate officers, so that Justinian reduced it to five hundred and twenty-five, of which probably more than half were useless. Comp. Inst. Novell. iii. c. 1—3.

should give alms of your incomes, but they feared that your avarice might leave the poor to hunger; hence the present order of things."* Augustine desired that his people in Hippo should take back the church property, and support the clergy and the poor by free gifts.†

4. We proceed to *the legal validity of the episcopal jurisdiction*, which likewise dates from the time of Constantine.

After the manner of the Jewish synagogues, and according to the exhortation of the apostle,‡ the Christians were accustomed from the beginning to settle their controversies before the church, rather than carry them before heathen tribunals; but down to the time of Constantine, the validity of the bishop's decision depended on the voluntary submission of both parties. Now this decision was invested with the force of law, and in spiritual matters no appeal could be taken from it to the civil court. Constantine himself, so early as 314, rejected such an appeal in the Donatist controversy, with the significant declaration: "The judgment of the priests must be regarded as the judgment of Christ himself."‖ Even a sentence of excommunication was final; and Justinian allowed appeal only to the metropolitan, not to the civil tribunal. Several councils, that of Chalcedon, for example, in 451, went so far as to threaten clergy, who should avoid the episcopal tribunal, or appeal from it to the civil, with deposition. Sometimes the bishops called in the help of the state, where the offender contemned the censure of the church. Justinian I. extended the episcopal jurisdiction also to the monasteries. Heraclius subsequently (628) referred even criminal causes among the clergy to the bishops, thus dismissing the clergy thenceforth entirely from the secular courts; though, of course, holding them liable

* Homil. 85 in Matt. (vii. 808 sq.) Hom. 21 in 1 Cor. vii. (x. 190.) Comp. also De sacerdot. l. iii. c. 16.

† Possidius, in Vita Aug. c. 23: "Alloquebatur plebem Dei, malle se ex collationibus plebis Dei vivere quam illarum possessionum curam vel gubernationem pati, et paratum se esse illis cedere, ut eo modo omnes Dei servi et ministri viverent."

‡ 1 Cor. vi. 1—6.

‖ "Sacerdotum judicium ita debet haberi, ut si ipse Dominus residens judicet." Optatus Milev.: De schism. Donat. f. 184.

for the physical penalty, when convicted of capital crime,* as the ecclesiastical jurisdiction ended with deposition and excommunication. Another privilege granted by Theodosius to the clergy, was, that they should not be compelled by torture to bear testimony before the civil tribunal.

This elevation of the power and influence of the bishops was a salutary check upon the jurisdiction of the state, and on the whole conduced to the interests of justice and humanity, though it also nourished hierarchical arrogance and entangled the bishops, to the prejudice of their higher functions, in all manner of secular suits in which they were frequently called into consultation. Chrysostom complains that "the arbitrator undergoes incalculable vexations, much labour, and more difficulties than the public judge. It is hard to discover the right, but harder not to violate it when discovered. Not labour and difficulty alone are connected with the office, but also no little danger."† Augustine, too, who could make better use of his time, felt this part of his official duty a burden, which nevertheless he bore for love to the church.‡ Others handed over these matters to a subordinate ecclesiastic, or even, like Silvanus, bishop of Troas, to a layman.‖

5. Another advantage resulting from the alliance of the church with the empire, was *the episcopal right of intercession.* The privilege of interceding with the secular power for criminals, prisoners, and unfortunates of every kind, had belonged to the heathen priests, and especially to the vestals, and now passed to the Christian ministry, above all to the bishops, and thenceforth became an essential function of their office. A church in Gaul, about the year 460, opposed the ordination

* Even Constantine, however, before the Council of Nice, had declared, that should he himself detect a bishop in the act of adultery, he would rather throw over him his imperial mantle, than bring scandal on the church by punishing a clergyman.

† De sacerd. l. iii. c. 18, at the beginning.

‡ In Psalm xxv. (vol. iv. 115,) and Epist. 213, where he complains, that before and after noon he was beset and distracted by the members of his church with temporal concerns, though they had promised to leave him undisturbed five days in the week, to finish some theological labours. Comp. Neander, iii. 291 sq. (ed. Torrey, ii. 139 sq.)

‖ Socrat. l. vii. c. 37.

of a monk to the bishopric, because, being unaccustomed to intercourse with secular magistrates, though he might intercede with the heavenly Judge for their souls, he could not with the earthly for their bodies. The bishops were regarded particularly as the guardians of widows and orphans, and the control of their property was entrusted to them. Justinian, in 529, assigned to them also a supervision of the prisons, which they were to visit on Wednesdays and Fridays, the days of Christ's passion.

The exercise of this right of intercession, one may well suppose, often obstructed the course of justice; but it also, in innumerable cases, especially in times of cruel, arbitrary despotism, protected the interests of innocence, humanity, and mercy. Sometimes by the powerful pleadings of bishops with governors and emperors whole provinces were rescued from oppressive taxation, and from the revenge of conquerors. Thus Flavian of Antioch, in 387, averted the wrath of Theodosius on occasion of a rebellion, journeying under the double burden of age and sickness even to Constantinople, to the emperor himself, and, with complete success, as an ambassador of their common Lord, reminding him of the words, "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you."*

6. With the right of intercession was closely connected *the right of asylum in churches.*

In former times many of the heathen temples and altars, with some exceptions, were held inviolable as places of refuge; and the Christian churches now inherited also this prerogative. The usage, with some precautions against abuse, was made law by Theodosius II., in 431, and the ill-treatment of an unarmed fugitive in any part of the church edifice, or even upon the consecrated ground, was threatened with the penalty of death.†

Thus slaves found sure refuge from the rage of their masters, debtors from the persecution of inexorable creditors, women and virgins from the approaches of profligates, the conquered from the sword of their enemies in the holy places, until the bishop by his powerful mediation could procure justice or

* Matt. vi. 14. † Cod. Theodos. ix. 43, 1—4. Comp. Socrat. vii. 33.

mercy. The beneficence of this law, which had its root not in superstition alone, but in the nobler sympathies of the people, comes most impressively to view amidst the ragings of the great migration and of the frequent intestine wars.*

7. The *legal sanction of the observance of Sunday*, and other festivals of the church, or the origin of the Christian *civil* Sabbath, as distinct from the Christian *religious* Sabbath, which was observed from the resurrection of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

The state, indeed, should not and cannot enforce the positive observance, but may undoubtedly, and should, prohibit the public disturbance and profanation of the Christian Sabbath, and protect the Christians in their right and duty of its proper observance. Constantine in 321 forbade the sitting of courts and all secular labour in towns, on "the venerable day of the sun," as he expresses himself, perhaps with reference at once to the sun-god Apollo, and to Christ, the true Sun of Righteousness; to his pagan and his Christian subjects. But he distinctly permitted the culture of farms and vineyards in the country, because frequently this could be attended to on no other day so well;† though one would suppose, that the hard-working peasantry were the very ones who most needed the day of rest. Soon afterwards, in June 321, he allowed the manumission of slaves on Sunday;‡ as this, being an act of benevolence, was different from ordinary business, and might be altogether appropriate to the day of resurrection and redemption. According to Eusebius, Constantine also prohibited

* "The rash violence of despotism," says even Gibbon, "was suspended by the mild interposition of the church; and the lives or fortunes of the most eminent subjects might be protected by the mediation of the bishop."

† This exception is entirely unnoticed by many church histories, but stands in the same law of 321 in the Cod. Justin. lib. iii. tit. 12; de feriis, l. 3: "Omnes judices, urbanaeque plebes, et cunctarum artium officia venerabili die Solis quiescant. Ruri tamen positi agrorum culturae libere licentesque inserviant: quoniam frequenter evenit, ut non aptius alio die frumenta sulcis, aut vineae scrobibus mandentur, ne occasione momenti pereat commoditas cœlesti provisione concessa." Such work was formerly permitted, too, on the pagan feast days; comp. Virgil. Georg. i. v. 268 sqq. Cato, De re rust. c. 2.

‡ Cod. Theodos. lib. ii. tit. 8. l. 1: "Emancipandi et manumittendi die festo cuncti licentiam habeant, et super his rebus actus non prohibeantur."

all military exercises on Sunday, and at the same time enjoined the observance of Friday, in memory of the death of Christ.*

Nay, he went so far, in well-meaning but mistaken zeal, as to require of his soldiers, even the pagan ones, the positive observance of Sunday, pronouncing at a given signal the following prayer, which they mechanically learned: "Thee alone we acknowledge as God; thee we confess as king; to thee we call as our helper; from thee we have received victories; through thee we have conquered enemies. Thee we thank for good received; from thee we hope for good to come. Thee we all most humbly beseech to keep our Constantine and his God-fearing sons through long life healthy and victorious."† Though this formula was held in a deistical generalness, yet the legal injunction of it lay clearly beyond the province of the civil power, trespassed on the rights of conscience, and unavoidably encouraged hypocrisy and empty formalism.

Later emperors declared the profanation of Sunday to be sacrilege, and prohibited also the collecting of taxes and private debts, (368 and 386) and even theatrical and circus performances on Sunday and the high festivals, (386 and 425.)‡ But this interdiction of public amusements, on which a council of Carthage (399 or 401) with reason insisted, was probably never rigidly enforced, and was repeatedly supplanted by the opposite practice.‖

* Eus. Vit. Const. iv. 18—20. Comp. Sozom. i. 8. In our times, military parades and theatrical exhibitions in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and other European cities are so frequent on no other day as on the Lord's day! In France political elections are usually held on the Sabbath!

† Eus. Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 20. The formulary was prescribed in the Latin language, as Eusebius says in c. 19. He is speaking of the whole army, (comp. c. 18,) and it may be presumed that many of the soldiers were heathen.

‡ The second law against opening theatres on Sundays and festivals (A. D. 425) in the Cod. Theodos. l. xv. tit. 7, l. 5, says expressly: "Omni theatrorum atque circensium voluptate per universas urbes . . . denegata, totae Christianorum ac fidelium mentes Dei cultibus occupentur."

‖ As Chrysostom, at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, often complains that the theatre is better attended than the church; so, down to this day, the same is true in almost all the large cities on the continent of Europe. Only in England and the United States, under the influence of Calvinism and Puritanism, are the theatres closed on Sunday.

II. INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON CIVIL LEGISLATION AND THE REFORM OF SOCIAL EVILS.

While in this way the state secured to the church the well-deserved rights of a legal corporation, the church exerted in turn a most beneficent influence on the state, liberating it by degrees from the power of heathen laws and customs, from the spirit of egotism, revenge, and retaliation, and extending its care beyond mere material prosperity to the higher moral interests of society. In the previous period we observed the contrast between Christian morality and heathen corruption in the Roman empire. We are now to see how the Christian morality gained public recognition, and began at least in some degree to rule the civil and political life.

As early as the second century, under the better heathen emperors, and evidently under the indirect, struggling, yet irresistible influence of the Christian spirit, legislation took a reformatory, humane turn, which was carried by the Christian emperors as far as it could be carried on the basis of the ancient Græco-Roman civilization. Now, above all, the principle of *justice* and *equity*, *humanity* and *love*, began to assert itself in the life of the state. For Christianity, with its doctrines of man's likeness to God, of the infinite value of personality, of the original unity of the human race, and of the common redemption through Christ, first brought the universal rights of man to bear* in opposition to the exclusive national spirit, the heartless selfishness, and the political absolutism of the old world, which harshly separated nations and classes, and respected man only as a citizen, while, at the same time, it denied the right of citizenship to the great mass of slaves, foreigners, and barbarians.

Christ himself began his reformation with the lowest orders of the people, with fishermen and tax-gatherers, with the poor, the lame, the blind, with demoniacs and sufferers of every kind, and raised them first to the sense of their dignity and their high destiny. So now the church wrought in the state, and through the state, for the elevation of the oppressed and the

* Comp. Lactantius: Inst. divin. l. v. c. 15.

needy, and of those classes which, under the reign of heathenism, were not reckoned at all in the body politic, but were heartlessly trodden under foot. The reformatory motion was thwarted, it is true, to a considerable extent, by popular custom, which is stronger than law, and by the structure of society in the Roman empire, which was still essentially heathen and doomed to dissolution. But reform was at least set in motion, and could not be turned back even by the overthrow of the empire; it propagated itself among the German tribes. And although even in Christian states the old social maladies are ever breaking forth from corrupt human nature, sometimes with the violence of revolution, Christianity is ever coming in to restrain, to purify, to heal, and to console, curbing the wild passions of tyrants and of populace, vindicating the persecuted, mitigating the horrors of war, and repressing incalculable vice in public and in private life among Christian people. The most cursory comparison of Christendom with the most civilized heathen and Mohammedan countries affords ample testimony of this.

Here again the reign of Constantine is a turning-point. Though an oriental despot, and but imperfectly possessed with the earnestness of Christian morality, he nevertheless enacted many laws, which distinctly breathe the spirit of Christian justice and humanity, as the abolition of the punishment of crucifixion, the prohibition of gladiatorial games and cruel rites, the discouragement of infanticide, and the encouragement of the emancipation of slaves. Eusebius says, he improved most of the old laws, or replaced them by new ones.* Henceforward we feel, beneath the toga of the Roman lawgiver, the warmth of a Christian heart. We perceive the influence of the evangelical preaching and exhortations of the father of monasticism out of the Egyptian desert to the rulers of the world, Constantine and his sons; that they should show justice and mercy to the poor, and remember the judgment to come.

* Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 26, where the most important laws of Constantine are recapitulated. Even the heathen Libanius (Basil. ii. p. 146,) concedes, that under Constantine and his sons legislation was much more favourable to the lower classes; though he accounts for this only by the personal clemency of the emperors.

Even Julian, with all his hatred of the Christians, could not entirely renounce the influence of his education, and of the reigning spirit of the age, but had to borrow from the church many of his measures for the reformation of heathenism. He recognised especially the duty of benevolence towards all men, charity to the poor, and clemency to prisoners; though this was contrary to the general sentiment, and though he proved himself anything but benevolent towards the Christians. But then the total failure of his philanthropic plans and measures shows, that the true love for man can thrive only in Christian soil. And it is remarkable that, with all this involuntary concession to Christianity, Julian himself passed not a single law "in line with the progress of natural rights and equity."*

His successors trod in the footsteps of Constantine, and to the end of the West Roman empire kept the civil legislation under the influence of the Christian spirit, though thus often occasioning conflicts with the still lingering heathen element, and sometimes temporary apostacy and reäction. We observe, also, in remarkable contradiction, that while the laws were milder in some respects, they were in others even more severe and bloody than ever before; a paradox to be explained, no doubt, in part by the despotic character of the Byzantine government, and in part by the disorders of the time.†

It now became necessary to collect the imperial ordinances‡ in a *codex* or *corpus juris*. Of the first two attempts of this kind, made in the middle of the fourth century, only some fragments remain.§ But we have the Codex Theodosianus,

* Troplong; *De l'influence du Christianisme sur le droit civil des Romains*, p. 127. Paris, 1843.

† Comp. de Rhoer, *Dissertationes de effectu relig. Christianne in jurisprudentiam Romanam*, p. 59 sqq. Groning. 1776. The origin of this increased severity of penal laws is, at all events, not to be sought in the church; for in the fourth and fifth centuries she was still rather averse to the death penalty. Comp. Ambros. Ep. 25 and 26 (al. 51 and 52), and Augustine, Ep. 153 ad Macedonium.

‡ Constitutiones or Leges. If answers to questions, they were called *Rescripta;* if spontaneous decrees, *Edicta.*

§ The *Codex Gregorianus* and *Codex Hermogenianus;* so called from the compilers, two private lawyers. They contained the rescripts and edicts of the heathen emperors from Hadrian to Constantine, and would facilitate a comparison of the heathen legislation with the Christian.

which Theodosius II. caused to be made by several jurists between the years 429 and 438. It contains the laws of the Christian emperors from Constantine down, adulterated with many heathen elements; and it was sanctioned by Valentinian III. for the western empire. A hundred years later, in the flourishing period of the Byzantine state-church despotism, Justinian I., who, by the way, cannot be acquitted of the reproach of capricious and fickle law-making, committed to a number of lawyers, under the direction of the renowned Tribonianus,* the great task of making a complete revised and digested collection of the Roman law from the time of Hadrian to his own reign; and thus arose, in the short period of seven years, (527—534,) through the combination of the best talent and the best facilities, the celebrated CODEX JUSTINIANEUS, which thenceforth became the universal law of the Roman empire, the sole text-book in the academies at Rome, Constantinople, and Berytus, and the basis of nearly all the legal relations of Christian Europe to this day.†

* Tribonianus, a native of Side in Paphlagonia, died 546, was an advocate and a poet, and rose, by his talents and the favor of Justinian, to be Quaestor, Consul, and at last Magister officiorum. Gibbon compares him, both for his comprehensive learning and administrative ability, and for his enormous avarice and venality, with Lord Bacon. But in one point these statesmen were very different: while Bacon was a decided Christian in his convictions, Tribonianus was accused of pagan proclivities and of atheism. In a popular tumult in Constantinople, the emperor was obliged to dismiss him, but found him indispensable, and soon restored him.

† The complete *Codex Justinianeus*, which has long outlasted the conquests of that Emperor, (as Napoleon's Code has outlasted his,) comprises properly three separate works: (1) The *Institutiones*, an elementary text-book of jurisprudence, of the year 533. (2.) The *Digesta* or *Pandectae* (πάνδεκται, complete repository,) an abstract of the spirit of the whole Roman jurisprudence, according to the decisions of the most distinguished jurists of the earlier times, composed in 530—533. (3) The *Codex* proper, first prepared in 528 and 529, but in 534 reconstructed, enlarged, and improved, and hence called *Codex repetitae praelectionis;* containing four thousand six hundred and forty-eight imperial ordinances, in seven hundred and sixty-five titles, in chronological order. To these is added, (4.) A later Appendix: *Novellae constitutiones* (νεαραὶ διατάξεις), or simply *Novellae* (a barbarism); that is, the New Code, or one hundred and sixty-eight decrees of Justinian subsequently collected, from the 1st of January 535, to his death in 565, mostly in Greek, or in both Greek and Latin. Excepting some of the novels of Justinian, the codex was composed in the Latin language, which Justinian and Trebonianus understood;

This body of Roman law* is an important source of our knowledge of the Christian life in its relations to the state, and its influence upon it. It is, to be sure, in great part, the legacy of pagan Rome, which was constitutionally endowed with legislative and administrative genius, and thereby, as it were, predestined to universal empire. But it received essential modification through the orientalizing change in the character of the empire, from the time of Constantine, through the infusion of various Germanic elements, through the influence of the law of Moses, and, in its best points, through the spirit of Christianity. The church it fully recognises as a legitimate institution, and of divine authority, and several of its laws were enacted at the direct instance of bishops. So the "Common Law," the unwritten traditional law of England and America, though descending from the Anglo-Saxon times, therefore, from heathen Germandom, has ripened under the influence of Christianity and the church, and betrays this influence even far more plainly than the Roman code.

The benign effect of Christianity on legislation in the Græco-Roman empire is especially noticeable in the following points:

1. In the treatment and elevation of *woman*. From the beginning Christianity laboured, primarily in the silent way of fact, for the elevation of the female sex from the degraded, slavish position, which it occupied in the heathen world;† and even in this period it produced such illustrious models of female virtue as Nonna, Anthusa, and Monica, who commanded the

but afterwards, as this tongue died out in the East, it was translated into Greek, and sanctioned in this form by the Emperor Phocas in 600. The emperor Basil, the Macedonian, in 876 caused a Greek abstract (τρίχωρον τῶν νόμων) to be prepared, which, under the name of the *Basilicae*, gradually supplanted the book of Justinian in the Byzantine empire. The Pandects have narrowly escaped destruction. Most of the editions and manuscripts of the west, (not all, as Gibbon says,) are taken from the Codex Florentinus, which was transcribed in the beginning of the seventh century, at Constantinople, and afterwards carried by the vicissitudes of war and trade to Amalfi, to Pisa, and in 1411 to Florence.

* Called *Corpus juris Romani* or *Corpus juris civilis*, in distinction from *Corpus juris canonici*, the Roman Catholic Church law, which is based chiefly on the canons of the ancient councils, as the civil law is upon the rescripts and edicts of the emperors.

† See Schaff's History of the Christian Church, during the first three centuries, § 91.

highest respect of the heathens themselves. The Christian emperors pursued this work, though the Roman legislation stops considerably short of the later Germanic in regard to the rights of woman. Constantine, in 321, granted to women the same right as men to control their property, except in the sale of their landed estates. At the same time, from regard to their modesty, he prohibited the summoning them in person before the public tribunal. Theodosius I., in 390, was the first to allow the mother a certain right of guardianship, which had formerly been entrusted exclusively to men. Theodosius II., in 439, interdicted, but unfortunately with little success, the scandalous trade of the *lenones*, who lived by the prostitution of women, and paid a considerable license tax to the state.* Woman received protection in various ways against the beastly passion of man. The rape of consecrated virgins and widows was made punishable, from the time of Constantine, with death.†

2. In the *matrimonial* legislation Constantine gave marriage its due freedom by abolishing the old Roman penalties against celibacy and childlessness.‡ On the other hand, marriage now came to be restricted under heavy penalties, by the introduction of the Old Testament prohibitions of marriage within certain degrees of consanguinity, which subsequently were arbitrarily extended even to the relation of cousin down to the third remove.§ Justinian forbade also the marriage between a god-parent and god-child, on the ground of spiritual kinship. And better than all, the dignity and sanctity of marriage were now protected by restrictions upon the boundless liberty of divorce, which had obtained from the time of Augustus, and had vastly hastened the decay of public morals. Still, the strict view of the fathers, who, following the word of Christ, recognised adultery alone as a sufficient ground of divorce, could not be carried out in the state.‖ The legislation of the

* Cod. Theod. lib. xv. tit. 8; de lenonibus.

† C. Theod. ix. 24; de raptu virginum et viduarum (probably nuns and deaconesses.)

‡ C. Theod. viii. 16, 1. Comp. Euseb. Vit. Const. iv. 26.

§ C. Theod. iii. 12; de incestis nuptiis.

‖ C. Theod. iii. 16; de repudiis. Hence Jerome, says in view of this, Ep.

emperors in this matter wavered between the licentiousness of Rome and the doctrine of the church. So late as the fifth century we hear a Christian author complain that men exchange wives as they would garments, and that the bridal chamber is exposed to sale like a shoe on the market. Justinian attempted to bring the public laws up to the wish of the church, but found himself compelled to relax them; and his successor allowed divorce even on the ground of mutual consent.*

Concubinage was forbidden from the time of Constantine, and adultery punished as one of the grossest crimes.† Yet here, also, pagan habit ever and anon reacted in practice, and even the law seems to have long tolerated the wild marriage, which rested only on mutual agreement, and was entered into without covenant, dowry, or ecclesiastical sanction.‡ Solemn-

30 (al. 84) ad Oceanum: "Aliae sunt leges Caesarum, aliae Christi; aliud Papinianus [the most celebrated Roman jurist, died A. D. 212,] aliud Paulus noster præcipit."

* Gibbon: "The dignity of marriage was restored by the Christians. . . . The Christian princes were the first who specified the just causes of a private divorce; their institutions, from Constantine to Justinian, appear to fluctuate between the custom of the empire and the wishes of the church, and the author of the Novels too frequently reforms the jurisprudence of the Code and the Pandects. . . . The successor of Justinian yielded to the prayers of his unhappy subjects, and restored the liberty of divorce by mutual consent."

† In a law of 326, it is called, "facinus atrocissimum, scelus immane." Cod. Theod. l. ix. tit. 7, l. 1 sq. And the definition of adultery, too, was now made broader. According to the old Roman law, the idea of adultery on the part of the man was limited properly to illicit intercourse with the *married* lady of a *free citizen*, and was thought punishable, not so much for its own sake, as for its encroachment on the rights of another husband. Hence Jerome says, l. c., of the heathen: "Apud illos viris impudicitiae frena laxantur, et solo stupro et adulterio condemnato passim per lupanaria et ancillulas libido permittitur; quasi culpam dignitas faciat, non voluntas. Apud nos quod non licet feminis, aeque non licet viris, et eadem servitus pari conditione censetur." Yet the law, even under the Christian emperors, still excepted carnal intercourse with a female slave from adultery. Thus the state here also stopped short of the church, and does to this day in countries where the institution of slavery exists.

‡ Even a council at Toledo, in 398, conceded so far on this point, as to decree, can. 17: "Si quis habens uxorem fidelis concubinam habeat, non communicet. Ceterum is, qui non habet uxorem et pro uxore concubinam habeat, a communione non repellatur, tantum ut unius mulieris aut uxoris aut concubinæ, ut ei placuerit, sit conjunctione contentus. Alias vero vivens abjiciatur donec desinat et per poenitentiam revertatur."

ization by the church was not required by the state as the condition of a legitimate marriage till the eighth century. Second marriage, also, and mixed marriages with heretics and heathens, continued to be allowed, notwithstanding the disapproval of the stricter church teachers; only marriage with Jews was prohibited, on account of their fanatical hatred of the Christians.*

3. The *power of fathers over their children*, which according to the old Roman law extended even to their freedom and life, had been restricted by Alexander Severus, under the influence of the monarchical spirit, which is unfavourable to private jurisdiction, and was still further limited under Constantine. This emperor declared the killing of a child by its father, which the Pompeian law left unpunished, to be one of the greatest crimes.† But the cruel and unnatural practice of exposing children and selling them into slavery continued for a long time, especially among the labouring and agricultural classes. Even the indirect measures of Valentinian and Theodosius I. could not eradicate the evil. Theodosius, in 391, commanded that children, which had been sold as slaves by their father from poverty, should be free, and that without indemnity to the purchasers; and Justinian, in 529, gave all exposed children, without exception, their freedom.‡

4. *The Institution of Slavery.*

The institution of slavery remained throughout the empire, and is recognised in the laws of Justinian as altogether legitimate.‖ The purchase and sale of slaves for from ten to seventy pieces of gold, according to their age, strength, and

* Cod. Theod. iii. 7, 2; C. Justin. i. 9, 6. A proposal of marriage to a nun was even punished with death, (ix. 25, 2.)

† A. D. 318; Valentinian did the same in 374. Cod. Theod. ix. tit. 14 and 15., Comp. the Pandects, lib. xlviii. tit. 8, l. ix.

‡ Cod. Theod. iii. 3, 1. Cod. Just. iv. 43, 1; viii. 52, 3. Gibbon says: "The Roman empire was stained with the blood of infants, till such murders were included, by Valentinian and his colleagues, in the letter and spirit of the Cornelian law. The lessons of jurisprudence and Christianity had been inefficient to eradicate this inhuman practice, till their gentle influence was fortified by the terrors of capital punishment."

‖ Instit. lib. i. tit. 5—8. Digest. l. i. tit. 5 and 6.

training, was a daily occurrence.* The number was not limited; many a master owning even two or three thousand slaves. The legal wall of partition, which separated them from free citizens and excluded them from the universal rights of man, was by no means broken down, and even the church taught only the moral and religious equality. Constantine issued rigid laws against intermarriage with slaves, all the offspring of which must be slaves; and against fugitive slaves, (A. D. 319 and 326,) who at that time in great multitudes plundered deserted provinces, or joined with hostile barbarians against the empire. But, on the other hand, he facilitated manumission, permitted it even on Sunday, and gave the clergy the right to emancipate their slaves simply by their own word, without the witnesses and ceremonies required in other cases.† By Theodosius and Justinian the liberation of slaves was still further encouraged. The latter emperor abolished the penalty of condemnation to servitude, and by giving to freed persons the rank and rights of citizens, he removed the stain which had formerly attached to that class.‡ The spirit of his laws favoured the gradual abolition of domestic slavery. In the Byzantine empire in general, the differences of rank in society were more equalized, though not so much on Christian principle as in the interest of despotic monarchy. Despotism and extreme democracy meet in predilection for universal equality and uniformity. Neither can suffer any overshadowing greatness, save the majesty of the prince or the will of the people. The one system knows none but slaves; the other, none but masters.

Nor was an entire abolition of slavery at that time at all demanded or desired even by the church. As in the previous

* The legal price, which, however, was generally under the market price, was thus established under Justinian, (Cod. l. vi. tit. xliii. l. 3): "Ten pieces of gold for an ordinary male or female slave under ten years; twenty, for slaves over ten; thirty, for such as understood a trade; fifty, for notaries and scribes; sixty, for physicians and midwives. Eunuchs ranged to seventy pieces.

† In two laws of 316 and 321. Corp. Jur. l. i. tit. 13, l. 1 and 2.

‡ Cod. Just. vii. 5, 6. Nov. 22, c. 8, (A. D. 536,) and Nov. 78 præf. 1, 2, (A. D. 539.)

period, she still thought it sufficient to insist on the kind Christian treatment of slaves, enjoining upon them obedience for the sake of the Lord, comforting them in their low condition with the thought of their higher moral freedom and equality, and by the religious education of the slaves making an inward preparation for the abolition of the institution. All hasty and violent measures met with decided disapproval. The council of Gangra threatens with the ban every one who, under pretext of religion, seduces slaves into contempt of their masters; and the council of Chalcedon, in its fourth canon, on pain of excommunication, forbids monasteries to harbour slaves without permission of the masters, lest Christianity be guilty of encouraging insubordination. The church fathers, so far as they enter this subject at all, seem to look upon slavery as at once a necessary evil and a divine instrument of discipline; tracing it to the curse on Ham and Canaan.* It is true, they favour emancipation in individual cases, as an act of Christian love on the part of the master, but not as a right on the part of the slave; and the well-known passage: "If thou mayest be made free, use it rather," they understand not as a challenge to slaves to take the first opportunity to gain their freedom, but on the contrary as a challenge to remain in their servitude, since they are at all events inwardly free in Christ, and their outward condition is of no account.†

Even St. Chrysostom, though of all the church fathers the nearest to the emancipation theory, and the most attentive to the question of slavery in general, does not rise materially above this view.‡ According to him mankind were originally created perfectly free and equal, without

* Gen. ix. 25: "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren."

† 1 Cor. vii. 21. The fathers supply, with μᾶλλον χρῆσαι, the word δουλεία (Chrysostom: μᾶλλον δούλευε); whereas nearly all modern interpreters (except De Wette and Meyer) follow Calvin and Grotius in supplying ἐλευθερία. Chrysostom, however, mentions this construction, and in another place (Serm. iv. in Genes., tom. v., p. 666) seems himself to favour it.

‡ The views of Chrysostom on slavery are presented in his Homilies on Genesis and on the Epistles of Paul, and are collected by Möhler in his beautiful article on the Abolition of Slavery (Vermischte Schriften, ii., p. 89 sqq.) Möhler says, that since the times of the apostle Paul no one has done a more valuable service to slaves, than St. Chrysostom. But he overrates his merit.

the addition of a slave. But by the fall man lost the power of self-government, and fell into a threefold bondage: the bondage of woman under man, of slave under master, of subject under ruler. These three relations he considers divine punishments and divine means of discipline. Thus slavery, as a divine arrangement occasioned by the fall, is at once relatively justified and in principle condemned. Now, since Christ has delivered us from evil and its consequences, slavery, according to Chrysostom, is in principle abolished in the church, yet only in the sense in which sin and death are abolished. Regenerate Christians are not slaves, but perfectly free men in Christ and brethren among themselves. The exclusive authority of the one and subjection of the other give place to mutual service in love. Consistently carried out, this view leads of course to emancipation. Chrysostom, it is true, does not carry it to that point, but he decidedly condemns all luxurious slaveholding, and thinks one or two servants enough for necessary help, while many patricians had hundreds and thousands. He advises the liberation of superfluous slaves, and the education of all, that in case they should be liberated, they may know how to take care of themselves. He is of opinion, that the first Christian community at Jerusalem, in connection with community of goods, emancipated all their slaves;* and thus he gives his hearers a hint to follow that example. But of an appeal to slaves to break their bonds, this father shows of course no trace; he rather, after apostolic precedent, exhorts them to conscientious and cheerful obedience for Christ's sake, as earnestly as he inculcates upon masters humanity and love. The same is true of Ambrose, Augustine, and Peter Chrisologus of Ravenna (458).

St. Augustine, the noblest representative of the Latin church, in his profound work on the "City of God," excludes slavery from the original idea of man and the final condition of society, and views it as an evil consequent upon sin, yet under divine

* Homil. xi. in Acta Apost. (tom. ix., p. 93;) οὐδέ γάρ τότε τοῦτο ἦν ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρους ἴσως ἐπέτρεπεν γίνεσθαι. The monk Nilus, a pupil of Chrysostom, went so far as to declare slaveholding inconsistent with true love to Christ, Ep. lib. i. ep. 142 (quoted by Neander in his chapter on Monasticism:) Οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιαι οἰκέτην ἔχειν τὸν φιλόχριστον, εἰδότα τὴν χάριν τὴν πάντας ἐλευθερώσασαν.

direction and control. For God, he says, created man reasonable, and lord only over the unreasonable, not over man. The burden of servitude was justly laid upon the sinner. Therefore the term servant is not found in the Scriptures till Noah used it as a curse upon his offending son. Thus it was guilt, and not nature, that deserved that name. The Latin word *servus* is supposed to be derived from *servare* [*servire* rather], or the preservation of the prisoners of war from death, which itself implies the desert of sin. For even in a just war there is sin on one side, and every victory humbles the conquered by divine judgment, either reforming their sins or punishing them. Daniel saw in the sins of the people the real cause of their captivity. Sin, therefore, is the mother of servitude, and first cause of man's subjection to man; yet this does not come to pass except by the judgment of God, with whom there is no injustice, and who knows how to adjust the various punishments to the merits of the offenders. . . . The apostle exhorts the servants to obey their masters and to serve them *ex animo*, with good will; to the end that, if they cannot be made free from their masters, they may make their servitude a freedom to themselves, by serving them not in deceitful fear, but in faithful love, until iniquity be overpassed, and all man's principality and power be annulled, and God be all in all.*

As might be expected, after the conversion of the emperors, and of the rich and noble families who owned most slaves, cases of emancipation became more frequent.† The biographer of St. Samson Xenodochus, a contemporary of Justinian, says of him: "His troop of slaves he would not keep, still less exercise over his fellow-servants a lordly authority; he preferred magnanimously to let them go free, and gave them enough for the necessaries of life."‡ Salvianus, a Gallic presbyter of the fifth century, says, that slaves were emancipated *daily*.§ On

* De Civit. Dei, lib. xix. c. 15.

† For earlier cases, at the close of the previous period, see Schaff's Hist. of the Christian Church, vol. i. § 89, at the end.

‡ Acta Sanct. Boll. Jun. tom. v., p. 267.—According to Palladius, Hist. c. 119, St. Melaniahad in concert with her husband Pinius manumitted as many as eight thousand slaves. Yet it is only the ancient Latin translation that has this almost incredible number.

§ Ad ecoles. cath. l. iii. § 7 (Galland. tom. x. p. 71): In usu quidem quo-

the other hand very much was done by the church to prevent the increase of slavery; especially in the way of redeeming prisoners, to which sometimes the gold and silver vessels of churches were applied. But we have no reliable statistics for comparing, even approximately, the proportion of the slaves to the free population at the close of the sixth century with the proportion in the former period.

We conclude then that the ancient catholic church of the Graeco-Roman empire, although naturally conservative, and decidedly opposed to all radical revolution and violent measures, nevertheless, in its inmost instincts and ultimate tendencies favoured universal freedom, and by raising the slave to a spiritual equality with the master and treating him uniformly as an immortal being, capable of the same virtues, blessings, and rewards, it placed the hateful institution of human bondage, then universally prevalent, in the way of gradual mitigation and ultimate extinction.

5. *The poor and unfortunate in general*, above all the *widows* and *orphans*, *prisoners* and *sick*, who were so terribly neglected in heathen times, now drew the attention of the imperial legislators. Constantine in 315 prohibited the branding of criminals on the forehead, that the "human countenance," as he said, "formed after the image of heavenly beauty, should not be defaced."* He provided against the inhuman maltreatment of prisoners before their trial.†

To deprive poor parents of all pretext for selling or exposing their children, he had them furnished with food and clothing, partly at his own expense and partly at that of the state.‡ He

tidiano est, ut servi, etsi non optimae, certe non infimae servitudinis, Romesia a dominis libertate donentur, in qua scilicet et proprietatem peculii capiunt et jus testamentarium consequuntur; ita ut et viventes, cui volunt, res suas tradant, et morientes donatione transcribant. Nec solum hoc, sed et illa, quae in servitute positi conquisierant, ex dominorum domo tollere non vetantur. From this passage it appears that many masters, with a view to set their slaves free, allowed them to earn something; which was not allowed by the Roman law.

* Cod. Theod. ix., 40, 1 and 2.

† Cod. Theod. ix., tit. 3, de custodia reorum. Comp. later similar laws of the year 409 in l. 7, and of 529 in the Cod. Justin. i. 4, 22.

‡ Comp. the two laws De alimentis quae inopes parentes, de publico petere debent, in the Cod. Theod. xi. 27, 1 and 2.

likewise endeavoured, particularly by a law of the year 331, to protect the poor against the venality and extortion of judges, advocates, and tax collectors, who drained the people by their exactions.* In the year 334 he ordered, that widows, orphans, the sick, and the poor, should not be compelled to appear before a tribunal outside their own province. Valentinian, in 365, exempted widows and orphans from the ignoble poll-tax.† In 364 he entrusted the bishops with the supervision of the poor. Honorius did the same in 409. Justinian, in 529, as we have before remarked, gave the bishops the oversight of the state prisons, which they were to visit on Wednesdays and Fridays, to bring home to the unfortunates the earnestness and comfort of religion. The same emperor issued laws against usury and inhuman severity in creditors, and secured benevolent and religious foundations, by strict laws, against alienation of their revenues from the original design of the founders. Several emperors and empresses took the church institutions for the poor and sick, for strangers, widows, and orphans, under their special patronage, exempted them from the usual taxes, and enriched or enlarged them from their private funds.‡ Yet in those days, as still in ours, the private beneficence of Christian love took the lead, and the state followed at a distance, rather with ratification and patronage, than with independent and original activity.§

6. And finally, one of the greatest and most beautiful victories of Christian humanity over heathen barbarism and cruelty, was the abolition of the *gladiatorial contests*, against which even

* Ib. tit. 7, l. 1: Cessent jam nunc rapaces officialium manus, cessent inquam! nam si moniti non cessaverint, gladiis praecidentur.

† The capitatio plebeia. Cod. Theod. xiii. 10, 1 and 4. Other laws in behalf of widows, Cod. Just. iii. 14, ix. 24.

‡ Cod. Theod xi. 16, xiii. 1. Cod. Just. i. 3, Nov. 131. Comp. here in general Chastel: The charity of the Primitive Churches, (transl. by Matile,) p. 281—293.

§ Comp. Chastel, l. c. p. 293: "It appears, then, as to charitable institutions, the part of the Christian emperors was much less to found themselves, than to recognise, to regulate, to guarantee, sometimes also to enrich with their private gifts, that which the church had founded. Everywhere the initiative had been taken by religious charity. Public charity only followed in the distance, and when it attempted to go ahead originally and alone, it soon found that it had strayed aside, and was constrained to withdraw."

the apologists in the second century had already raised the most earnest protest.*

These bloody shows, in which human beings, mostly criminals, prisoners of war, and barbarians, by hundreds and thousands killed one another, or were killed in fight with wild beasts, for the amusement of the spectators, were still in full favour at the beginning of the period before us. The pagan civilization here proves itself impotent. In its eyes the life of a barbarian is of no other use than to serve the cruel amusement of the Roman people, who wish quietly to behold with their own eyes, and enjoy at home the martial blood-shedding of their frontiers. Even the humane Symmachus gave an exhibition of this kind during his consulate (391), and was enraged that twenty-nine Saxon prisoners of war escaped this public shame by suicide.† While the Vestal virgins existed, it was their special prerogative to cheer on the combatants in the amphitheatre to the bloody work, and to give the signal for the deadly stroke.‡

The contagion of the thirst for blood, which these spectacles generated, is presented to us in a striking example by Augustine in his Confessions.§ His friend Alypius, afterwards bishop of Tragaste, was induced by some friends in 385, to visit the amphitheatre at Rome, and went, resolved to lock himself up against all impressions. "When they reached the spot," says Augustine, "and took their places on the hired seats, every thing already foamed with blood-thirsty delight. But Alypius, with closed eyes, forbade his soul to yield to this sin. O had he but stopped also his ears! For when, on the fall of a gladiator in the contest, the wild shout of the whole multitude fell upon him, overcome by curiosity, he opened his

* Comp. Schaff's *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. i. § 88.

† Symm. l. ii. Ep. 46, Comp. vii. 4.

‡ Prudentius Adv. Symmach. ii. 1095:

Virgo—consurgit ad ictus,
Et quotiens victor ferrum jugulo inserit, illa
Delicias ait esse suas, pectusque jacentis
Virgo modesta jubet, converso pollice, rumpi;
Ni lateat pars ulla animae vitalibus imis,
Altius impresso dum palpitat ense secutor.

§ Lib. vi. c. 8.

eyes, though prepared to despise and resist the sight. But he was smitten with a more grievous wound in the soul, than the combatant in the body, and fell more lamentably. . . . . For when he saw the blood, he imbibed at once the love of it, turned not away, fastened his eyes upon it, caught the spirit of rage and vengeance before he knew it, and, fascinated with the murderous game, became drunk with blood-thirsty joy. . . . He looked, shouted applause, burned, and carried with him thence the frenzy, by which he was drawn to go back, not only with those who had taken him there, but before them, and taking others with him."

Christianity finally succeeded in closing the amphitheatre. Constantine, who in his earlier reign himself did homage to the popular custom in this matter, and exposed a great multitude of conquered barbarians to death in the amphitheatre at Trier, for which he was highly commended by a heathen orator,* issued, in 325, the year of the great council of the church at Nice, the first prohibition of the bloody spectacles, "because they cannot be pleasing in a time of public peace."† But this edict, which is directed to the prefects of Phœnicia, had no permanent effect even in the East, except at Constantinople, which was never stained with the blood of gladiators. In Syria, and especially in the West, above all in Rome, the deeply rooted institution continued into the fifth century. Honorius (395—423), who at first considered it indestructible, abolished the gladiatorial shows about 404, and did so at the instance of the heroic self-denial of an eastern monk by the name of Telemachus, who journeyed to Rome expressly to protest against this inhuman barbarity, threw himself into the arena, separated the combatants, and then was torn to pieces by the populace, a martyr to humanity.‡ Yet this put a stop only to the bloody combats of men. Unbloody spectacles of every kind, even on the high festivals of the church, and amidst the invasions of

* Eumenii Panegyr. c. 12.

† Cod. Theod. xv., tit. 12, l. 1, de gladiatoribus: Cruenta spectacula in otio civili et domestica quiete non placent; qua propter omnino gladiatores esse prohibemus. Comp. Euseb. v. Const. iv. 25.

‡ So relates Theodoret: Hist. eccl. l. v., c. 26. For there is no law of Honorius extant on the subject. Yet after this time there is no mention of a gladiatorial contest between man and man.

the barbarians, as we see by the grievous complaints of a Chrysostom, an Augustine, and a Salvian, were as largely and as passionately attended as ever; and even fights with wild animals, in which human life was generally more or less sacrificed, continued,* and, to the scandal of the Christian name, are tolerated in Spain and South America to this day.

III. EVILS OF THE UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

We turn now to the dark side of the union of the church with the state; to the consideration of the disadvantages which grew out of their altered relation after the time of Constantine, and which continue to show themselves in the condition of the church in Europe to our own time.

These evil results may be summed up under the general designation of the *secularization of the church.* By taking in the whole population of the Roman empire, the church became, indeed, a church of the masses, a church of the people, but at the same time more or less a church of the world. Christianity became a matter of fashion. The number of hypocrites and formal professors rapidly increased;† strict discipline, zeal, self-sacrifice, and brotherly love proportionally ebbed away; and many heathen customs and usages, under altered names, crept into the worship of God and the life of the Christian people. The Roman state had grown up under the influence of idolatry, and was not to be magically transformed at a stroke. With the secularizing process, therefore, a paganizing tendency went hand in hand.

* In a law of Leo, of the year 469, (in the Cod. Justin. iii., tit. 12, l. 11), besides the *scena theatralis* and the *circense theatrum*, also *ferarum lacrymosa spectacula* are mentioned as existing. Salvian likewise, in the fifth century, (De gubern. Dei, l. vi., p. 51,) censures the delight of his contemporaries in such bloody combats of men with wild beasts. So late as the end of the seventh century, a prohibition from the Tullan council was called for in the East. In the West, Theodorick appears to have exchanged the beast-fights for military displays, whence proceeded the later tournaments. Yet these shows have never become entirely extinct, but remain in the bull-fights of southern Europe, especially in Spain.

† Thus Augustine, for example, Tract. in Joann. xxv., c. 10, laments that the church filled itself daily with those, who sought Jesus not for Jesus, but for earthly profit. Comp. the similar complaint of Eusebius, Vit. Const. l. iv. c. 54.

Yet the pure spirit of Christianity could by no means be polluted by this. On the contrary, it retained, even in the darkest days, its faithful and steadfast confessors, conquered new provinces from time to time, constantly reacted, both within the established church and outside of it, in the form of monasticism, against the secular and the pagan influences, and, in its very struggle with the prevailing corruption, produced such church fathers as Athanasius, Chrysostom, and Augustine, such exemplary Christian mothers as Nonna, Anthusa, and Monica, and such extraordinary saints of the desert as Anthony, Pachomius, and Benedict. New enemies and dangers called forth new duties and virtues, which could now unfold themselves on a larger stage, and therefore also on a grander scale. Besides, it must not be forgotten, that the tendency to secularization is by no means to be ascribed only to Constantine and the influence of the state, but to the deeper source of the corrupt heart of man, and did reveal itself, in fact, though within a much narrower compass, long before, under the heathen emperors, especially in the intervals of repose, when the earnestness and zeal of Christian life slumbered and gave scope to a worldly spirit.

The difference between the age after Constantine and the age before, consists, therefore, not at all in the cessation of true Christianity and the entrance of false, but in the preponderance of the one over the other. The field of the church was now much larger, but with much good soil, it included far more that was stony, barren, and overgrown with weeds. The line between church and world, between regenerate and unregenerate, between those who were Christians in name and those who were Christians in heart, was more or less obliterated, and in place of the former hostility between the two parties there came a fusion of them in the same outward communion of baptism and confession. This brought the conflict between light and darkness, truth and falsehood, Christ and antichrist, into the bosom of christendom itself.

1. The secularization of the church appeared most strikingly in the prevalence of *mammon-worship* and *luxury*, compared with the poverty and simplicity of the primitive Christians. The aristocracy of the later empire had a downright passion

for outward display and the sensual enjoyments of wealth, without the taste, the politeness, or the culture of true civilization. The gentlemen measured their fortune by the number of their marble palaces, baths, slaves, and gilded carriages; the ladies indulged in raiments of silk and gold, ornamented with secular or religious figures, and in heavy golden necklaces, bracelets and rings, and went to church in the same flaunting dress as to the theatre.* Chrysostom addresses a patrician of Antioch: "You count so and so many acres of land, ten or twenty palaces, as many baths, a thousand or two thousand slaves, carriages plated with silver and gold."† Gregory of Nazianzen, who presided for a time in the second œcumenical council of Constantinople in 381, gives us the following picture, evidently rhetorically coloured, yet drawn from life, of the luxury of the degenerate civilization of that period: "We repose in splendour on high and sumptuous cushions, upon the most exquisite covers, which one is almost afraid to touch, and are vexed if we but hear the voice of a moaning pauper; our chamber must breathe the odour of flowers, even rare flowers; our table must flow with the most fragrant and costly ointment, so that we become perfectly effeminate. Slaves must stand ready, richly adorned and in order, with waving, maiden-like hair, and faces shorn perfectly smooth, more adorned throughout than is good for lascivious eyes; some, to hold cups both delicately and firmly with the tips of their fingers, others, to fan fresh air upon the head. Our table must bend under the load of dishes, while all the kingdoms of nature, air, water, and earth, furnish copious contributions, and there must be almost no room for the artificial products of cook and baker. . . . The poor man is content with water; but we fill our goblets with wine to drunkenness, nay, immeasurably beyond it. We refuse one wine, another we pronounce excellent when well-flavoured, over a third we

* Ammianus Marcellinus gives the most graphic account of the extravagant and tasteless luxury of the Roman aristocracy in the fourth century, which Gibbon has admirably translated and explained in his 31st chapter.

† Homil. in Matt. 63, § 4, (tom. vii., p. 533,) comp. Hom. in 1 Cor. 21, § 6, and many other places in his sermons. Comp. Neander's Chrysostomus I., p. 10 sqq.

institute philosophical discussions; nay, we count it a pity if he does not, as a king, add to the domestic wine a foreign also."* Still more unfavourable are the pictures, which, a half-century later, the Gallic presbyter, Salvianus, draws of the general moral condition of the Christians in the Roman empire.†

It is true, these earnest protests against degeneracy themselves, as well the honour in which monasticism and ascetic contempt of the world were universally held, attest the existence of a better spirit. But the uncontrollable progress of avarice, prodigality, voluptuousness, theatre-going, intemperance, lewdness, in short, of all the heathen vices, which Christianity had come to eradicate, still carried the Roman empire and people with rapid strides towards dissolution, and gave it at last into the hands of the rude, but simple and morally nervous barbarians. When the Christians were awakened by the crashings of the falling empire, and anxiously asked why God permitted it, Salvian, the Jeremiah of his time, answered: "Think of your vileness and your crimes, and see whether you are worthy of the divine protection."‡ Nothing but the divine judgment of destruction upon this nominally Christian, but essentially heathen world, could open the way for the moral regeneration of society. There must be new, fresh nations, if the Christian civilization prepared in the old Roman empire was to take firm root and bear ripe fruit.

2. The unnatural confusion of Christianity with the world culminated in the *imperial court of Constantinople*, which, it is true, never violated moral decency so grossly as the court of a Nero or a Domitian, but in vain pomp and prodigality far outdid the courts of the better heathen emperors, and degenerated into complete oriental despotism. The household of Constantius, the son and successor of Constantine the Great, according to the description of Libanius,§ embraced no less than a thousand barbers, a thousand cup-bearers, a thousand cooks, and so many eunuchs, that they could be compared only to the insects

* Orat. xiv. Comp. Ullmann's monograph on Gregory, p. 6.

† Adv. avarit. and De gubern. Dei, passim. Comp. § 139, at the close.

‡ De gubern. Dei, l. iv. c. 12, p. 82.

§ Lib., Epitaph. Julian.

of a summer day. This boundless luxury was for a time suppressed by the pagan Julian, who delighted in stoical and cynical severity, and was fond of displaying it; but under his Christian successors the same prodigality returned; especially under Theodosius and his sons. These emperors, who prohibited idolatry upon pain of death, called their laws, edicts, and palaces "divine," bore themselves as gods upon earth, and, on the rare occasions when they showed themselves to the people, unfurled an incredible magnificence and empty splendour.

"When Arcadius"—to borrow a graphic description from a modern historian—"condescended to reveal to the public the majesty of the sovereign, he was preceded by a vast multitude of attendants, dukes, tribunes, civil and military officers, their horses glittering with golden ornaments, with shields of gold set with precious stones, and golden lances. They proclaimed the coming of the emperor, and commanded the ignoble crowd to clear the streets before him. The emperor stood or reclined on a gorgeous chariot, surrounded by his immediate attendants, distinguished by shields with golden bosses set round with golden eyes, and drawn by white mules with gilded trappings; the chariot was set with precious stones, and golden fans vibrated with the movement, and cooled the air. The multitude contemplated at a distance the snow-white cushions, the silken carpets, with dragons inwoven upon them in rich colours. Those who were fortunate enough to catch a glimpse of the emperor, beheld his ears loaded with golden rings, his arms with golden chains, his diadem set with gems of all hues, his purple robes, which, with the diadem, were reserved for the emperor, in all their sutures embroidered with precious stones. The wondering people, on their return to their homes, could talk of nothing but the splendour of the spectacle: the robes, the mules, the carpets, the size and splendour of the jewels. On his return to the palace, the emperor walked on gold; ships were employed with the express purpose of bringing gold dust from remote provinces, which was strewn by the officious care of a host of attendants, so that the emperor rarely set his foot on the bare pavement."*

* Milman: Hist. of Christianity, p. 440, (Amer. ed.) Comp. the sketch of

The Christianity of the Byzantine court lived in the atmosphere of intrigue, dissimulation, and flattery. Even the court divines and bishops could hardly escape the contamination, though their high office, with its sacred functions, was certainly a protecting wall around them. One of these bishops congratulated Constantine, at the celebration of the third decennium of his reign (the tricennalia), that he had been appointed by God ruler over all in this world, and would reign with the Son of God in the other! This blasphemous flattery was too much even for the vain emperor, and he exhorted the bishop rather to pray God, he might be worthy to be one of his servants in this world and the next.* Even the church historian and bishop Eusebius, who elsewhere knew well enough how to value the higher blessings, and lamented the indescribable hypocrisy of the sham Christianity around the emperor,† suffered himself to be so far blinded by the splendour of the imperial favour, as to see in a banquet, which Constantine gave in his palace to the bishops at the close of the council of Nice, in honour of his twenty years' reign (the vicennalia), an emblem of the glorious reign of Christ upon the earth!‡

And these were bishops, of whom many still bore in their body the marks of the Diocletian persecution! So rapidly had changed the spirit of the age. While, on the other hand, the well-known firmness of Ambrose with Theodosius, and the life of Chrysostom, afford delightful proof that there were not wanting, even in this age, bishops of Christian earnestness and courage to rebuke the sins of crowned heads.

3. *Intrusion of Politics into Religion.*

With the union of the church and the state begins the long and tedious history of their collisions and their mutual struggles for

the court of Arcadius, which Montfaucon, in a treatise in the last volume of his Opera Chrys., and Müller: De genio, moribus, et luxu ævi Theodosiani, Copenh. 1798, have drawn, chiefly from the works of Chrysostom.

* Euseb. Vit. Const. iv. 48.

† V. Const. iv. 54.

‡ V. Const. iii. 15, where Eusebius, at the close of this imperio-episcopal banquet, "which transcended all description," says: Χριστοῦ βασιλείας ἴδοιεν ἄν τις φαντασιοῦσθαι εἰκόνα, ὄναρ τ' εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕπαρ τὸ γινόμενον.

the mastery: the state seeking to subject the church to the empire, the church to subject the state to the hierarchy, and both full often transgressing the limits prescribed to their power in that word of the Lord, "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." From the time of Constantine, therefore, the history of the church and that of the world in Europe are so closely interwoven, that neither can be understood without the other. On the one hand the political rulers, as the highest members and the patrons of the church, claimed a right to a share in her government, and interfered in various ways in her external and internal affairs either to her profit or to her prejudice. On the other hand, the bishops and patriarchs, as the highest dignitaries and officers of the state religion, became involved in all sorts of secular matters, and in the intrigues of the Byzantine court. This mutual intermixture, on the whole, was of more injury than benefit to the church and to religion, and fettered her free and natural development.

Of a separation of religion and politics, of the spiritual power from the temporal, heathen antiquity knew nothing, because it regarded religion itself only from a natural point of view, and subjected it to the purposes of the all-ruling state, the highest known form of human society. The Egyptian kings, as Plutarch tells us, were at the same time priests, or were received into the priesthood at their election. In Greece the civil magistrate had supervision of the priests and sanctuaries.* In Rome, after the time of Numa, this supervision was intrusted to a senator, and afterwards united with the imperial office. All the emperors, from Augustus,† to Julian the Apostate, were

* This overseer was called *βασιλεὺς* of the *ἱερεῖς* and *ἱερά*.

† Augustus took the dignity of Pontifex Maximus after the death of Lepidus, A. U. 742, and thenceforth that office remained inherent in the imperial, though it was usually conferred by a decree of the senate. Formerly the pontifex maximus was elected by the people for life, could take no civil office, must never leave Italy, touch a corpse, or contract a second marriage; and he dwelt in the old king's house, the Regia. Augustus himself exercised the office despotically enough, though with great prudence. He nominated and increased at pleasure the members of the sacerdotal college, chose the vestal virgins, determined the authority of the vaticinia, purged the Sibylline books of apocryphal interpolations, continued the reform of the calendar begun by Cæsar, and changed the month Sextilis into Augustus, in his own honour, as Quintilis,

at the same time supreme pontiffs, (Pontifices Maximi,) the heads of the state religion, emperor-popes. As such they could not only perform all priestly functions, even to offering sacrifices, when superstition or policy prompted them to do so, but they also stood at the head of the highest sacerdotal college, (of fifteen or more Pontifices,) which in turn regulated and superintended the three lower classes of priests, (the Epulones, Quindecemviri, and Augures,) the temples and altars, the sacrifices, divinations, feasts, and ceremonies, the exposition of the Sybilline books, the calendar, in short, all public worship, and in part, even the affairs of marriage and inheritance.

Now it may easily be supposed, that the Christian emperors, who, down to Gratian, (about 380,) even retained the name and the insignia of the Pontifex Maximus, should claim the same oversight of the Christian religion established in the empire, which their predecessors had had of the heathen; only with this material difference, that they found here a stricter separation between the religious element and the political, the ecclesiastical, and the secular, and were obliged to bind themselves to the already existing doctrines, usages, and traditions of the church.

4. *The Emperor-Papacy and the Hierarchy.*

And this, in point of fact, took place first under Constantine, and developed under his successors, particularly under Justinian, into the system of the Byzantine imperial papacy,* or of the supremacy of the state over the church.

Constantine once said to the bishops at a banquet, that he also, as a Christian emperor, was a divinely appointed bishop,

the birth-month of Julius Cæsar, had before been re-baptized Julius. Comp. Charles Merivale: Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, vol. iii. p. 478 sqq. (Lond. 1851.)

* In England and Scotland the term *Erastianism* is used for this; but is less general, and not properly applicable at all to the Greek church. For the man who furnished the word, Thomas Erastus, a learned and able physician and professor of medicine in Heidelberg, (died at Basle, in Switzerland, 1583,) was an opponent not only of the independence of the church towards the state, but also of the church ban and of the presbyterial constitution and discipline, as advocated by Frederick III. of the Palatinate, and the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism, especially Olevianus, a pupil of Calvin. He was at last excommunicated for his views by the church council in Heidelberg.

a bishop over the external affairs of the church, while the internal affairs belonged to the bishops proper.* In this pregnant word he expressed the new posture of the civil sovereign towards the church in a characteristic though indefinite and equivocal way. He made there a distinction between two divinely authorized episcopates; one secular or imperial, corresponding with the old office of Pontifex Maximus, and extending over the whole Roman empire, therefore œcumenical or universal; the other spiritual or sacerdotal, divided among the different diocesan bishops, and appearing properly in its unity and totality only in a general council.

Accordingly, though not yet even baptized, he acted as the patron and universal temporal bishop of the church;† summoned the first œcumenical council for the settlement of the

* His words, which are to be taken neither in jest and pun, (as Neander supposes,) nor as mere compliment to the bishops, but in earnest, run thus, in Eusebius; Vita Const. l. iv. c. 24: Ὑμεῖς (the ἐπίσκοποι addressed) μὲν τῶν εἴσω τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθεσταμένος ἐπίσκοπος ἂν εἴην. All depends here on the interpretation of the antithesis τῶν εἴσω and τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐκκλησίας. (*a*) The explanation of Stroth and others takes the genitive as masculine, οἱ εἴσω denoting Christians, and οἱ ἐκτός heathens; so that Constantine ascribed to himself only a sort of episcopate *in partibus infidelium*. But this contradicts the connection; for Eusebius says immediately after, that he took a certain religious oversight over *all* his subjects, (τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἅπαντας ἐπεσκόπει, etc.,) and calls him also elsewhere a "universal bishop," (i. 44.) (*b*) Gieseler's interpretation is not much better, (§ 92, not. 20. Engl. ed. vol. i. p. 423): that οἱ ἐκτός denotes all his subjects, Christian as well as non-Christian, but only in their civil relations, so far as they are outside the church. This entirely blunts the antithesis with οἱ εἴσω, and puts into the emperor's mouth a mere common-place instead of a new idea; for no one doubted his *political* sovereignty. (*c*) The genitive is rather to be taken as neuter in both cases, and πραγμάτων to be supplied. This agrees with usage, (we find it in Polybius,) and gives a sense, which agrees with the view of Eusebius and with the whole practice of Constantine. There is, however, of course, another question: What is the proper distinction between τὰ εἴσω and τὰ ἐκτός, the *interna* and *externa* of the church, or, what is much the same, between the sacerdotal *jus in sacra* and the imperial *jus circa sacra*. This Constantine and his age certainly could not themselves exactly define, since the whole relation was at that time as yet new and undeveloped.

† Eusebius in fact calls him a divinely appointed universal bishop, οἷά τις κοινὸς ἐπίσκοπος ἐκ θεοῦ καθεσταμένος, συνέδρους τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ λειτουργῶν συνεκρότει. Vit. Const. i. 44. His son Constantius was fond of being called "bishop of bishops."

controversy respecting the divinity of Christ; instituted and deposed bishops; and occasionally even delivered sermons to the people; but on the other hand, with genuine tact, (though this was in his earlier period, A. D. 314,) kept aloof from the Donatist controversy, and referred to the episcopal tribunal as the highest and last resort in purely spiritual matters. In the exercise of his imperial right of supervision, he did not follow any clear insight and definite theory, so much as an instinctive impulse of control, a sense of politico-religious duty, and the requirements of the time. His word only raised, did not solve the question of the relation between the imperial and the sacerdotal episcopacy, and the extent of their respective jurisdictions in a Christian state.

This question became thenceforth the problem and the strife of history, both sacred and secular, ran through the whole mediaeval conflict between emperor and pope, between imperial and hierarchical episcopacy, and recurs in modified form in every Protestant established church.

In general, from this time forth, the prevailing view was, that God has divided all power between the priesthood and the kingdom (sacerdotium et imperium), giving internal or spiritual affairs, especially doctrine and worship, to the former, and external or temporal affairs, such as government and discipline, to the latter.* But internal and external here vitally inter-

* Justinian states the Byzantine theory thus, in the preface to the 6th Novel: Maxima quidem in hominibus sunt dona Dei a superna collata clementia *Sacerdotium* et *Imperium*, et illud quidem divinis ministrans, hoc autem humanis praesidens ac diligentiam exhibens, ex uno eodemque principio utraque procedentia humanam exornant vitam. But he then ascribes to the Imperium the supervision of the Sacerdotium, and maximam sollicitudinem circa vera Dei dogmata et circa Sacerdotum honestatem. Later Greek emperors, on the ground of their anointing, even claim a priestly character. Leo the Isaurian, for example, wrote to pope Gregory II. in 730: Βασιλεὺς καὶ ἱερεύς εἰμί (Mansi xii. 976). This, however, was contested even in the East, and the monk Maximus in 655 answered negatively the question put to him: Ergo non est omnis Christianus imperator etiam sacerdos? At first the emperor's throne stood side by side with the bishop's in the choir; but Ambrose gave the emperor a seat next to the choir. Yet, after the ancient custom, which the Concilium Quinisext, A. D. 692, in its 69th canon, expressly confirmed, the emperors might enter the choir of the church, and lay their oblations in person upon the altar;—a privilege, which was denied to all the laity, and which implied at least a half-priestly character in the emperor. Gibbon's statement needs correction accordingly,

penetrate and depend on each other, as soul and body, and frequent reciprocal encroachments and collisions are inevitable upon state-church ground. This becomes manifest in the period before us in many ways, especially in the East, where the Byzantine despotism had freer play than in the distant West.

The emperors after Constantine (as the popes after them) summoned the general councils, bore the necessary expenses, presided in the councils through commissions, gave to the decisions in doctrine and discipline the force of law for the whole Roman empire, and maintained them by their authority. The emperors nominated or confirmed the most influential metropolitans and patriarchs. They took part in all theological disputes, and thereby inflamed the passion of parties. They protected orthodoxy and punished heresy with the arm of power. Often, however, they took the heretical side, and banished orthodox bishops from their sees. Thus Arianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism, and Monophysitism successively found favour and protection at court. Even empresses meddled in the internal and external concerns of the church. Justina endeavoured with all her might to introduce Arianism in Milan, but met a successful opponent in bishop Ambrose. Eudoxia procured the deposition and banishment of the noble Chrysostom. Theodora, raised from the stage to the throne, ruled the emperor Justinian, and sought by every kind of intrigue to promote the victory of the Monophysite heresy. It is true, the doctrinal decisions proceeded properly from the councils, and could not have maintained themselves long without such sanction. But Basiliscus, Zeno, Justinian I., Heraclius, Constans II., and other emperors issued many purely ecclesiastical edicts and rescripts, without consulting the councils, or through the councils by their own influence upon them. Justinian opens his celebrated codex with the imperial creed on the trinity, and the imperial anathema against Nestorius, Eutyches, Apollinaris, on the basis certainly of the apostolic church and of the four œcumenical councils, but in the consciousness of absolute legislative

(ch. xx.): "The monarch, whose spiritual rank is less honourable than that of the meanest deacon, was seated below the rails of the sanctuary, and confounded with the rest of the faithful multitude."

and executive authority even over the faith and conscience of all his subjects.

The voice of the catholic church in this period conceded to the Christian emperors in general, with the duty of protecting and supporting the church, the right of supervision over its external affairs, but claimed for the clergy, particularly for the bishops, the right to govern her within, to fix her doctrine, to direct her worship. The new state of things was regarded as a restoration of the Mosaic and Davidic theocracy on Christian soil, and judged accordingly. But in respect to the extent and application of the emperor's power in the church, opinion was generally determined, consciously or unconsciously, by some special religious interest. Hence we find, that catholics and heretics, Athanasians and Arians, justified or condemned the interference of the emperor in the development of doctrine, the appointment and deposition of bishops, and the patronage and persecution of parties, according as they themselves were affected by them. The same Donatists, who first appealed to the imperial protection, when the decision went against them, denounced all intermeddling of the state with the church. There were bishops who justified even the most arbitrary excesses of the Byzantine despotism, in religion, by reference to Melchizedek and the pious kings of Israel, and yielded themselves willing tools of the court. But there were never wanting also fearless defenders of the rights of the church against the civil power. Maximus the confessor declared before his judges in Constantinople, that Melchizedek was a type of Christ alone, not of the emperor.

In general the hierarchy formed a powerful and wholesome check on the imperial papacy, and preserved the freedom and independence of the church towards the temporal power. That age had only the alternative of imperial or episcopal despotism; and of these the latter was the less hurtful and the more profitable, because it represented the higher intellectual and moral interests. Without the hierarchy, the church in the Roman empire and among the barbarians had been the football of civil and military despots. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance, that the church, at the time of her marriage with the state, had already grown so large and strong as to withstand

all material alteration by imperial caprice, and all effort to degrade her into a tool. The Apostolic Constitutions place the bishops even above all kings and magistrates.* Chrysostom says, that the first ministers of the state enjoyed no such honour as the ministers of the church. And in general the ministers of the church deserved their honour. Though there were prelates enough who abused their power to sordid ends, still there were men, like Athanasius, Basil, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Leo, the purest and most venerable characters, which meet us in the fourth and fifth centuries, far surpassing the contemporary emperors. It was the universal opinion, that the doctrines and institutions of the church, resting on divine revelation, are above all human power and will. The people looked, in blind faith and superstition, to the clergy as their guides in all matters of conscience, and even the emperors had to pay the bishops, as the fathers of the church, the greatest reverence; kiss their hands, beg their blessing, and submit to their admonition and discipline. In most cases the emperors were mere tools of parties in the church. Arbitrary laws, which were imposed upon the church from without, rarely survived their makers, and were condemned by history. For there is a divine authority above all thrones and kings and bishops, and a power of truth above all the machinations of falsehood and intrigue.

The western church, as a whole, preserved her independence far more than the eastern, partly through the great firmness of the Roman character, partly through the favour of political circumstances, and of remoteness from the influence and the intrigues of the Byzantine court. Here the hierarchical principle developed itself, from the time of Leo the Great even to the absolute papacy, which, however, after it fulfilled its mission for the world among the barbarian nations of the middle age, degenerated into an insufferable tyranny over conscience, and thus exposed itself to destruction. In the catholic system, the freedom and independence of the church involve the supremacy of an exclusive priesthood and papacy;

* Lib. ii., c. 11, where the bishop is reminded of his exalted position, ὡς θεοῦ τύπον ἔχων ἐν ἀνθρώποις τῶν πάντων ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων, ἱερέων, βασιλέων, ἀρχόντων, etc. Comp. c. 33 and 34.

in the Protestant, they can be realized only on the broader basis of the universal priesthood, in the self-government of the Christian people; though this is, as yet, in all Protestant established churches, more or less restricted by the power of the state.

5. *Restriction of Religious Freedom, and beginnings of Persecution of Heretics.*

An inevitable consequence of the union of church and state was restriction of religious freedom in faith and worship, and the civil punishment of departure from the doctrine and discipline of the established church.

The church, dominant and recognised by the state, gained, indeed, external freedom and authority, but in a measure at the expense of inward liberty and self-control. She came, as we have seen in the previous section, under the patronage and supervision of the head of the Christian state, especially in the Byzantine empire. In the first three centuries, the church, with all her external lowliness and oppression, enjoyed the greater liberty within, in the development of her doctrines and institutions, by reason of her entire separation from the state.

But the freedom of error and division was now still more restricted. In the ante-Nicene age heresy and schism were as much hated and abhorred, indeed, as afterwards, yet were met only in a moral way, by word and writing, and were punished with excommunication from the rights of the church. Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and even Lactantius were the first advocates of the principle of freedom of conscience, and maintained, against the heathen, that religion was essentially a matter of free will, and could be promoted only by instruction and persuasion, not by outward force.* All they say against the persecution of Christians by the heathen, applies in full to the persecution of heretics by the church. After the Nicene age all departures from the reigning state-church faith were not only abhorred and excommunicated as religious errors, but were treated also as crimes against the Christian state, and hence were punished with civil penalties; at first with deposi-

* Just. Mart. Apol. i., 2, 4, 12. Tertull. Apolog. 24, 28. Ad. Scapul. c. 2. Lactant. Instit. v., 19, 20. Epist. c. 54.

tion, banishment, confiscation, and after Theodosius, even with death.

This persecution of heretics was a natural consequence of the union of religious and civil duties and rights, the confusion of the civil and the ecclesiastical, the juridical and the moral, which came to pass in Constantine. It proceeded from the state and from the emperors, who in this respect showed themselves the successors of the Pontifices Maximi, with their relation to the church reversed. The church, indeed, steadfastly adhered to the principle, that, as such, she should employ only spiritual penalties, excommunication in extreme cases; as in fact Christ and the apostles expressly spurned and prohibited all carnal weapons, and would rather suffer and die than use violence. But, involved in the idea of Jewish theocracy and of a state church, she practically confounded in various ways the position of the law and that of the gospel, and in theory approved the application of forcible measures to heretics, and not rarely encouraged and urged the state to it; thus making herself at least indirectly responsible for the persecution. This is especially true of the Roman church in the times of her greatest power, in the middle age and down to the end of the sixteenth century; and by this course that church has made herself almost more offensive in the eyes of the world and of modern civilization, than by her peculiar doctrines and usages. The Protestant reformation dispelled the dream that Christianity was identical with a fixed organization, with the papacy, and gave a mighty shock thereby to the principle of ecclesiastical exclusiveness. Yet, properly speaking, it was not till the eighteenth century that a radical revolution of views was accomplished in regard to religious toleration; and the progress of toleration and free worship has gone hand in hand with the gradual loosening of the state-church basis, and with the clearer separation of civil and religious rights and of the temporal and spiritual power.

In the beginning of his reign Constantine proclaimed full freedom of religion (312), and in the main continued tolerably true to it; at all events he used no violent measures, as his successors did. This toleration, however, was not a matter of fixed principle with him, but merely of temporary policy;

a necessary consequence of the incipient separation of the Roman throne from idolatry, and the natural transition from the sole supremacy of the heathen religion to the same supremacy of the Christian. Intolerance directed itself first against heathenism; but as the false religion gradually died out of itself, and at any rate had no moral energy for martyrdom, there resulted no such bloody persecutions of idolatry under the Christian emperors, as there had been of Christianity under their heathen predecessors. Instead of Christianity, the intolerance of the civil power now took up Christian heretics, whom it recognised as such. Constantine, even in his day, limited the freedom and the privileges which he conferred to the catholic, that is, the prevailing orthodox episcopal church, and soon after the Council of Nice, by an edict of the year 326, expressly excluded heretics and schismatics from these privileges.* Accordingly he banished the leaders of Arianism, and ordered their writings to be burned; but afterwards, wavering in his views of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and persuaded over by some bishops and his sister, he recalled Arius and banished Athanasius. He himself was baptized shortly before his death by an Arian bishop. His son Constantius was a fanatical persecutor of idolatry and the Nicene orthodoxy, and endeavoured with all his might to establish Arianism alone in the empire. Hence the earnest protest of the orthodox bishops, Hosius, Athanasius, and Hilary, against this despotism and in favour of toleration;† which came, however, we have to remember, from parties who were themselves the sufferers under intolerance, and who did not regard the banishment of the Arians as unjust.

Under Julian the Apostate religious liberty was again proclaimed, but only as the beginning of return to the exclusive establishment of heathenism; the counterpart, therefore, of Constantine's toleration. After his early death, Arianism

* Cod. Theod. xvi. 5, 1: Privilegia, quae contemplatione religionis indulta sunt, catholicae tantum legis observatoribus prodesse opportet. Haereticos autem atque schismaticos non tantum ab his privilegiis alienos esse volumus, sed etiam diversis muneribus constringi et subjici.

† Comp. § 3, above.

again prevailed, at least in the East, and showed itself more intolerant and violent than the catholic orthodoxy.

At last Theodosius the Great, the first emperor who was baptized in the Nicene faith, put an end to the Arian interregnum, proclaimed the exclusive authority of the Nicene creed, and at the same time enacted the first rigid penalties not only against the pagan idolatry, the practice of which was thenceforth a capital crime in the empire, but also against all Christian heresies and sects. The ruling principle of his public life was the unity of the empire and of the orthodox church. Soon after his baptism, in 380, he issued, in connection with his weak co-emperors, Gratian and Valentinian II., to the inhabitants of Constantinople, then the chief seat of Arianism, the following edict: "We, the three emperors, will, that all our subjects steadfastly adhere to the religion which was taught by St. Peter to the Romans, which has been faithfully preserved by tradition, and which is now professed by the pontiff Damasus of Rome, and Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic holiness. According to the institution of the apostles and the doctrine of the gospel, let us believe in the one Godhead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, of equal majesty in the holy Trinity. We order, that the adherents of this faith be called *catholic Christians;* we brand all the senseless followers of other religions with the infamous name of *heretics*, and forbid their conventicles assuming the name of churches. Besides the condemnation of divine justice, they must expect the heavy penalties, which our authority, guided by heavenly wisdom, shall think proper to inflict."* In the course of fifteen years this emperor issued at least fifteen penal laws against heretics,† by which he gradually deprived them of all right to the exercise of their religion, excluded them from all civil offices, and threatened them with fines, confiscation, banishment, and in some cases, as the Manichæans, the Audians, and even the Quartodecimanians, with death.

* Cod. Theod. xvi. 1, 2: Baronius and even Godefroy call this edict, which in this case, to be sure, favored the true doctrine, but involves the absolute despotism of the emperor over faith, an "edictum aureum, pium et salutare."

† Comp. Cod. Theod. xvi., tit. v., leg. 6—33, and Godefroy's Commentary.

From Theodosius therefore, dates the state-church theory of persecution of heretics, and the embodiment of it in legislation. His primary design, it is true, was rather to terrify and convert, than to punish, the refractory subjects.*

From the theory, however, to the practice was a single step; and this step his rival and colleague, Maximus, took, when, at the instigation of the unworthy bishop Ithacius, he caused the Spanish bishop Priscillian, with six respectable adherents of his Manichæan-like sect (two presbyters, two deacons, the poet Latronian, and Euchrocia, a noble matron of Bordeaux,) to be tortured and beheaded with the sword at Trier in 385. This was the first shedding of the blood of heretics by a Christian prince for religious opinions. The bishops assembled at Trier (Treves), with the exception of Theognistus, approved this act.

But the better feeling of the Christian church shrunk from it with horror. The bishops Ambrose of Milan† and Martin of Tours‡ raised a memorable protest against it, and broke off all communion with Ithacius and the other bishops, who had approved the execution. Yet it should not be forgotten, that these bishops, at least Ambrose, were committed against the death penalty in general, and in other respects had no indulgence for heathens and heretics.§ The whole thing, too, was

* So Sozomen asserts, l. vii., c. 12.

† Epist. xxiv. ad Valentin. (tom. ii. p. 891.) He would have nothing to do with bishops, "qui aliquos, devios licet a fide, ad necem petebant."

‡ In Sulpic. Sever., Hist. Sacra, ii. 50: "Namque tum Martinus apud Treveros constitutus, non desinebat increpare Ithacium, ut ab accusatione desisteret, Maximum orare, ut sanguine infelicium abstineret: satis superque sufficere, ut episcopali sententia haeretici judicati ecclesiis pellerentur: novum esse et inauditum nefas, ut causam ecclesiae judex saeculi judicaret." Comp. Sulp. Sev. Dial. iii. c. 11—13, and his Vit. Mart. c. 20.

§ Hence Gibbon, ch xxvii., charges them, not quite groundlessly, with inconsistency: "It is with pleasure that we can observe the humane inconsistency of the most illustrious saints and bishops, Ambrose of Milan, and Martin of Tours, who, on this occasion, asserted the cause of toleration. They pitied the unhappy men, who had been executed at Treves; they refused to hold communion with their episcopal murderers; and if Martin deviated from that generous resolution, his motives were laudable, and his repentance was exemplary. The bishops of Tour and Milan pronounced, without hesitation, the eternal damnation of heretics; but they were surprised and shocked by the bloody image of their temporal death, and the honest feelings of nature resisted the artificial prejudices of theology."

irregularly done; on the one hand the bishops appeared as accusers in a criminal cause, and on the other a temporal judge admitted an appeal from the episcopal jurisdiction, and pronounced an opinion in a matter of faith. Subsequently the functions of the temporal and spiritual courts in the trial of heretics were more accurately distinguished.

The execution of the Priscillianists is the only instance of the *bloody* punishment of heretics in our period, as it is the first in the history of Christianity. But the propriety of violent measures against heresy was thenceforth vindicated even by the best fathers of the church. Chrysostom recommends, indeed, Christian love towards heretics and heathens, and declares against their execution, but approves the prohibition of their assemblies and the confiscation of their churches; and he acted accordingly against the Novatians and the Quartodecimanians, so that many considered his own subsequent misfortunes as condign punishment.* Jerome, appealing to Deut. xiii. 6—10, seems to justify even the penalty of death against religious errorists.† Augustine, who himself belonged for nine years to the Manichæan sect, and was wonderfully converted by the grace of God to the catholic church without the slightest pressure from without, held at first the truly evangelical view, that heretics and schismatics should not be violently dealt with, but won by instruction and conviction; but after the year 400 he turned and retracted this view, in consequence of his experience with the Donatists, whom he endeavoured in vain to convert by disputation and writing, while many submitted to violent punishment.‡ Henceforth he was led to advocate the persecution of heretics, partly by his doctrine of the Christian state, partly

* Hom. xxix. and xlvi. in Matt. Comp. Socrat. H. E. vi. 19. Elsewhere his principle was (in Phocam mart. et c. haer. tom. ii. p. 705): Ἐμοὶ ἔδος ἐστὶ δίκεσθαι καὶ μὴ δικάειν; that is, he himself would rather suffer injury than inflict injury.

† Epist. xxxvii. (al. liii.) ad Riparium adv. Vigilantium.

‡ Epist. 93 ad Vincent., § 17: Mea primitus sententia non erat, nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum, verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum, ratione vincendem, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos haereticos noveramus. Sed—he continues—haec opinio mea non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superabatur exemplis. Then he adduces his experience with the Donatists. Comp. Retract. ii. 5.

by the seditious excesses of the fanatical Circumcelliones, partly by the evident wholesome effect of temporal punishments, and partly by a false interpretation of the *cogite intrare*, in the parable of the great supper, Luke xiv. 23.* "It is, indeed, better," says he, "that men should be brought to serve God by instruction than by fear of punishment or by pain. But because the former means are better, the latter must not therefore be neglected. . . Many must often be brought back to their Lord, like wicked servants, by the rod of temporal suffering, before they attain the highest grade of religious development. . . . . The Lord himself orders, that the guests be first invited, then compelled, to his great supper."† This father thinks that if the state be denied the right to punish religious error, neither should she punish any other crime, like murder or adultery, since Paul, in Gal. v. 19, attributes divisions and sects to the same source in the flesh.‡ He charges his Donatist opponents with inconsistency in seeming to approve the emperors' prohibitions of idolatry, but condemning their persecution of Christian heretics. It is to the honour of Augustine's heart, indeed, that in actual cases he earnestly urged upon the magistrates clemency and humanity, and thus in practice remained true to his noble maxim: "Nothing conquers but truth; the victory of truth is love."§ But his theory, as Neander justly observes, "contains the germ of the whole system of spiritual despotism, intolerance, and persecution, even to the court of the Inquisition."‖ The great authority of his name was often afterwards made to justify cruelties, from which he himself would have shrunk with horror. Soon after him, Leo the Great, the first representative of consistent, exclusive, universal papacy, advocated even the penalty of death for heresy.¶

* The direction: "*Compel them to come in*," which has often since been abused in defence of coercive measures against heretics, must, of course, be interpreted in harmony with the whole spirit of the gospel, and is only a strong descriptive term in the parable to signify the fervent zeal in the conversion of the heathen, such as St. Paul manifested without ever resorting to physical coercion.

† Epist. 185 ad Bonifacium, § 21, § 24.

‡ C. Gaudent. Donat. i., § 20. C. epist. Parmen. i., § 16.

§ "Non vincit nisi veritas, victoria veritatis est caritas."

‖ Kirchengesch. iii., p. 427.—Torry's ed. ii., p. 217.

¶ Epist. xv. ad Turribium, where Leo mentions the execution of the Priscil-

Henceforth none but the persecuted parties from time to time protested against religious persecution; being made, by their sufferings, if not from principle, at least from policy and self-interest, the advocates of toleration. Thus the Donatist bishop, Petilian, in Africa, against whom Augustine wrote, rebukes his catholic opponents, (as formerly his countryman, Tertullian, had condemned the heathen persecutors of the Christians,) for using outward force in matters of conscience; appealing to Christ and the apostles, who never persecuted, but rather suffered and died. "Think you," says he, "to serve God by killing us with your own hand? Ye err, ye err, if ye, poor mortals, think this; God has not hangmen for priests. Christ teaches us to bear wrong, not to revenge it." The Donatist bishop, Gaudentius, says, "God appointed prophets and fishermen, not princes and soldiers, to spread the faith." Still we cannot forget, that Donatists were the first who appealed to the imperial tribunal in an ecclesiastical matter, and did not, till after that tribunal had decided against them, turn against the state-church system.

ART. II.—*An Introduction to the Old Testament, critical, historical, and theological*, containing a discussion of the most important questions belonging to the several books. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D. D., LL. D. 3 vols. 8vo., pp. 536, 492, and 492. 1862—3.

UPON the appearance of the tenth edition of Horne's Introduction, six years ago, we felt called upon to notice particularly the volume relating to the Old Testament, which was prepared by Dr. Davidson. At the conclusion of that notice we remarked: "The principles avowed or covertly insinuated in this volume will legitimately lead much further than the extent

lianists with evident approbation: "Etiam mundi principes ita hanc sacrilegam amentiam detestati sunt, ut auctorem ejus cum plerisque discipulis legum publicarum ense prosternerent."

to which they are actually pursued. There is no logical consistency in going so far as Dr. Davidson does, and stopping there." The volumes before us amply justify this language. Almost every page might be cited in evidence that the author has found his old position of compromise between orthodoxy and unbelief to be untenable, and has exchanged it for another more consistent with his radical principles.

It is not so much our present purpose to subject the merits or demerits of this treatise to examination, as to deduce from it a few illustrations of the processes and results of the "higher criticism," as practised by our author and the school to which he has addicted himself. In order to accomplish this in the most coherent and intelligible manner, we shall restrict ourselves to his discussion of a single book of Scripture. And with this view we have selected the prophecy of Isaiah, both from its intrinsic interest and from its affording a fair specimen of the whole.

In 1856 we were told that the entire book which bears the name of Isaiah was the genuine production of the prophet, not excepting the four historical chapters, xxxvi—xxxix., which, though not incorporated with his prophecies by himself, were extracted from another work written by him. Now we are informed, that out of the sixty-six chapters but twenty-three, together with a few scattered verses, have proceeded from Isaiah. At the former date, Dr. Davidson tells us in his preface, "he had not reached his present maturer views. He did what he could under the circumstances and with the knowledge he had at the time." "The circumstances in which he was placed," *i. e.*, as Professor of Biblical Literature in an Independent College, "were averse to the free expression of thought. A man under the trammels of a sect, in which religious liberty is but a name, is not favourably situated for the task of thoroughly investigating critical or theological subjects." "Harsh-minded theologians," he adds, "who have inherited a little system of infallible divinity out of which they may excommunicate their neighbours, will not understand such development." We are glad to be thus expressly excluded at the outset from a class, which our author so violently and repeatedly reprobates, for we fancy that we do understand his develop-

ment exactly, and, assuming his point of departure, we think it the most natural thing in the world.

We lay no stress upon his having previously attributed the first chapter "to the reign of Hezekiah," whereas he is now "inclined to refer it to the reign of Ahaz." And it is of slight consequence that adopting, as before, the hypothesis that the passage common to Isaiah, (ii. 2—4,) and to Micah (iv. 1—3,) was borrowed by both from an older prophet, he now retracts his former confident assertion, "that older prophet was not Joel," and thinks it a "probable" "conjecture that he was Joel." His change of mind in regard to the sixth chapter is more deserving of note, on account of the reason upon which it is professedly based, and which reveals the secret of more considerable and serious alterations yet to come. He had formerly said, "The sixth chapter is ascribed in the first verse to the year of Uzziah's death, and there is no reason with various critics for supposing it to have been written later. The most natural interpretation is that which refers it to the very commencement of the prophet's entrance upon office, as describing his original inauguration." Now he says, "It refers to the inauguration of the prophet, but was not composed at the time; for he could not then know that his addresses would only tend to aggravate the guilt of the people, because they would be treated with neglect. The experience of the prophet in his intercourse with his fellow-countrymen had made him acquainted with their stubborn unbelief; and the reflection of such experience appears in the composition. Hence we must assume an interval of time between his induction into office and the writing of the prophecy."

There is more involved in this language than might at first sight appear. It is not purely a question whether a given chapter was committed to writing a few years earlier or later; it concerns the integrity of the prophet and the possibility of prophetic prediction. If the reason given is valid against the writing of the vision in the year that king Uzziah died, it is equally so against its being received at that time. Isaiah's word is discredited, he is charged with declaring that a vision was granted him upon his inauguration to the prophetic office, which he could not possibly have had; and this when his origi-

nal auditors were still able to testify whether or no they had heard it from his lips at that early period. And the decisive argument is, "he could not then know" what had not yet taken place.

We do not here care to argue with the Doctor that even upon his own principles the honesty of the prophet might have been spared. Thus he admits, ii., p. 464, that "certain events in the immediate future are sometimes foretold with great confidence, so that the prophets must have been sure they would take place without doubt, in precise harmony with the announcement. Authentic oracles of this nature, though rare, (?) are an evidence that an influence superior to human sagacity pervaded the spirits of the prophets." Again we read, iii., p. 69: "The Old Testament seer never projected his vision into the far distant future, so as to be able to predict events there, or describe persons beforehand with infallible certainty. . . . The near, not the remote, was the limit of prophetic foretelling. This is now acknowledged by all who understand the genius of prophecy." The reception of the prophet's message by his countrymen, certainly belongs to the near and not to the remote future; and if he allows, as he says that he does, the possibility of a revelation which may disclose the former before it becomes apparent to the unaided human understanding, why may not this have been included within "the limit of prophetic foretelling?" Whence then his certainty that this could not have been known in advance of experience?

In fact even upon a lower theory of prophecy than this, the correctness of his conclusion might be disputed. Even if the prophets' "allusions to the future were the product of human wisdom," and their "experience" "enabled them to glance correctly into the future, because they drew from the past and present the proper materials for their survey," a view which he pronounces "untenable" and "defective in leaving out the divine element," ii., p. 464, why might not the past and present obduracy of the people have been such, that the prophet could confidently anticipate its continuance in the future?

Waiving all discussion of the point at issue, however, we simply wish two things to be distinctly observed as exhibited in the case before us, as well as in all that are to follow. First,

it is upon his own avowal fundamental to the higher criticism, as Dr. Davidson understands and practises it, that no prophecy can have been uttered prior, or none at least long prior to the event to which it relates. The dogma of the impossibility of prediction, in its strict and proper sense, is decisive of the date of every alleged prophecy, irrespective of all other considerations. Secondly, his confident and often-repeated assertions that there are in fact no real prophecies in the Old Testament, are wholly based upon a logical circle. Thus ii., p. 460: "Wherever definite predictions having special details occur, particularly in relation to times, it can be shown that they are supposititious, or that the whole prophecy is spurious." And p. 462: "In no place or prophecy can it be shown that the literal predicting of distant historical events is contained." Fix the date of each prophecy in detail, on the assumption that prediction is impossible, and the general conclusion will inevitably follow. He might in the same way have demonstrated any other principle, that he set out to prove, no matter what it was.

The next six chapters also exhibit traces of "development," which are here referred to, not so much from their inherent consequence, as from their betraying a general tendency. Chap. vii. retains the date formerly assigned to it in the invasion of Judah, during the reign of Ahaz, by the confederate kings of Ephraim and Syria. "The date of the piece is about 742, hardly later." Chaps. viii.—xii., from being "only about three-quarters of a year later," "though committed to writing some time after they were spoken, *when the prophetic announcements began to be confirmed*," have come to be distributed along from B. C. 741 to 722.

We have now seen how those prophecies are managed, whose accomplishment took place during the prophet's life. The critical dictum to which our author bows, is satisfied by shifting them to such times in his ministry that they shall appear to have been spoken, or at least recorded, after or near the events predicted. But when Isaiah utters predictions, the fulfilment of which was reserved to a future age, this method will no longer answer. Where it fails, however, two artifices yet remain: one in the domain of criticism, and the other in that

of interpretation. The former requires the summary and violent process of denying Isaiah's authorship either of the entire prophecy, or at least of its obnoxious portions. What unvarying tradition has ascribed to him, and what is rightfully his by all external evidence, as well as by the strongest internal considerations, is unhesitatingly pronounced spurious, and attributed to some nameless writer of such date as will satisfy the critical dictum. Where this is impossible, or only partially successful, the remaining resort is to empty the prophecy of its meaning, either distorting it by a forced exegesis, or in some way obscuring its correspondence with the event, and thus converting it into a vague expression of patriotic hopes, or of devout anticipations, which were never actually realized. False theories of inspiration cannot maintain themselves beside the facts which lie upon the very face of the Scriptures. The denial of prophetic foresight has as its inevitable concomitant a destructive criticism and an unfair interpretation.

Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It is the word of Him who knows the end from the beginning; and instead of being limited in its disclosures, as Dr. Davidson would have us believe, to "the immediate future," the most distant events may be revealed as readily and distinctly as those nearer at hand. They are alike known to God, and he can make them known to his servants to whatever extent he sees fit.

His revelations of the future are not, however, made indiscriminately nor at random. Just that is disclosed which is needed at the time for the instruction, warning, or guidance of the people of God. The purpose of God respecting Judah embraced especially two particulars lying beyond the lifetime of Isaiah, at different degrees of remoteness, with which it was important that the people should then be made acquainted. One belonged to his work of judgment, the other to his plan of grace. The first was the Babylonish captivity, involving calamities so unprecedented and distressing to the hearts of the pious, that they needed to be schooled in reference to it, and taught its meaning and issue. The second was the person and work of Messiah, with the blessed results which should

thence follow to them and to the world. Intervening or extraneous events were comparatively of small consequence to Isaiah's contemporaries. And, in fact, these still continued to be the great themes of prophecy until this heavy judgment had burst over Jerusalem. The burden of Jeremiah's instructions were the approaching exile and the coming Saviour. No foresight of the long succession of events which lay between was granted to him. It was not until the exile had actually begun, that a new vista was opened to Daniel, the interval to Messiah's advent measured, and the succession of worldly empires as well as the varying fortunes of the kingdom of God foreshown.

The judgment to be wrought by Babylon and upon it, accordingly occupies a prominent place among the predictions of Isaiah. Every thing relating to this subject, Dr. Davidson's critical dictum declares to be spurious; for how could this prophet know what would take place one or two centuries after his death? On the other hand, every thing Messianic is either converted into an indefinite rhapsody, or declared to have no reference to Christ at all.

Those who have never concerned themselves about critical questions, will accordingly have little difficulty in determining in advance what Dr. Davidson admits to be genuine, and what he rejects, by the simple criterion just afforded. If they ever mistake, it will be from a difference of judgment between him and them as to the question whether a knowledge of the Babylonish oppression is presupposed in a particular chapter or paragraph. That this is not only a sure test of the suspected chapters, but that it furnishes the real cause of their being suspected, will appear from an examination of them individually.

The burden of Babylon (ch. xiii. xiv.) belongs as a matter of course to the spurious chapters. "It did not proceed from Isaiah, but from a prophet living near the end of the Babylonian exile." In order to establish this conclusion, he tells us "Isaiah lived during the supremacy of the Assyrian, not the Chaldean empire. He could therefore refer to the future Chaldean one merely in its commencement. His historical standpoint could not be in it: nor, according to the analogy of prophecy, could he transfer his position at once into the distant

future, disregarding the political horizon of his own day. In making this statement, neither prophetic foresight nor inspiration is denied. The prophets did occasionally predict future events. They did not, however, cease to make their own time their starting point, out of which they surveyed the approaching future. Thus the charge made by Alexander and others against those who take our view of the nature of prophecy, resolves itself not into a denial of the possibility of prophetic inspiration, but a denial of their opinion respecting such inspiration. We do not reject the thing, but only their hypothesis, which is an arbitrary and an erroneous one."

No other reply to this seems to be necessary than that furnished by himself in 1856: "It has been assumed by many critics that xiii. 1, xiv. 23, proceeded from a much later writer than Isaiah, one living towards the termination of the Babylonian captivity. Their arguments, *if such they can be called*, in favour of this hypothesis, have been well refuted by Hävernick and Alexander: The chief cause which has led so many astray here is *the erroneous view of prophecy* they take. As long as prophetic foresight is limited to the gropings of human sagacity, without any supernatural element, such prophecies as the present will be totally misunderstood."

His other arguments, "if such they can be called," against the genuineness of these chapters, are in like manner proved futile out of his own mouth. Thus the allegation that "the tone and spirit of the prophecy are unlike Isaiah's," is met by the counter declaration, "When it is said that the spirit and views are foreign to Isaiah, the assertion is radically incorrect." "The style and diction are unlike those of Isaiah," is controverted by the express statement, "the style and diction are by no means dissimilar." He also formerly asserted, what he now denies, that "the ideas, images, and expressions in these chapters" are such as are found elsewhere in Isaiah, and are characteristic of him. His assertion, that "the unknown author has made use of several prophets later than Isaiah," is reversed by his previous assertion, based on the very same data, that the "using" was all the other way: "Later prophets have imitated and used the chapters under consideration." The only thing in his argument which is not anticipated by himself and contra-

dicted in express terms, is a list of words which he alleges to be of later origin than the time of Isaiah, but which is as unfortunate a selection as he could well have made. His first example, פְּצַח רִנָּה xiv. 7, is peculiar to Isaiah, occurring four times besides in his writings, and nowhere else. His second example, רִגְז xiv. 3, occurs five times in the ancient book of Job, while its verbal root occurs not only in other parts of Isaiah, which Dr. Davidson himself admits to be genuine, but even in the book of Genesis. שָׁגַח xiv. 16 is found only in Ps. xxxiii. 14, and in the Song of Solomon, both written long before the time of Isaiah. שָׁגַל xiii. 16 appears in Deut. xxviii. 30. פָּתַח occurs in the same sense, Gen. xxiv. 32, as in Isa. xiv. 17. שָׁעַר has the same meaning in Lev. xvii. 7, as in Isa. xiii. 21.

He even yet admits that "the authenticity of xiv. 24—27 is unquestionable;" this being so, the genuineness of the entire prophecy is established upon his own showing. For he tells us in his former work, "to separate the verses in question from the preceding prophecy," the very thing which he now does, "is quite arbitrary."

The next prophecy of Babylon's overthrow is contained in ch. xxi. 1—10: this, of course, shares the fate of its predecessor, and is declared not to belong to Isaiah himself, but to "an unknown author living towards the close of the Babylonian exile." Respecting this view he held the following language in 1856: "The considerations advanced respecting both pieces are the same, and *proceed on the same false view of the nature of biblical prophecy.* Their authenticity, however, is amply attested by the inscriptions which cannot be arbitrarily rejected; by the fact that several succeeding prophets, who appeared before the exile, present reminiscences and imitations of them; by genuine Isaiah-ideas and linguistic peculiarities." He here again reverses his own words almost sentence by sentence, and yet is so outraged by Dr. Alexander's ascribing the suspicion of spuriousness to the very source to which he had formerly traced it himself, "the fundamental principle of unbelief," that he hurls upon him the charge of "dogmatism, ignorance, and uncharitableness," "compensating for the absence of argument by railing." We can hardly refrain from saying

that Dr. Davidson affords the best possible illustration of his own words.

Chapter xxii., relating to Jerusalem, is admitted to be a genuine production of Isaiah, but then "the prophecy was not fulfilled." "The prophet merely uttered what he expected to happen." "Alexander has recourse to his not unusual hypothesis of a generic prediction, a picture of the conduct of the Jews in a certain conjuncture of affairs which happened more than once. This is a convenient subterfuge under the pressure of difficulties like the present." And yet in his previous work he not only admits the substantial fulfilment of the prediction, but in relation to the very next chapter affirms that view of prophecy which he here scouts as a "convenient subterfuge." He there says: "Hence there is reason for the view of Alexander, who regards the prophecy as generic, not specific, a panoramic picture of the downfall of Tyre from the beginning to the end of the destroying process, with particular allusion to the siege by Nebuchadnezzar."

Chap. xxiii. passes under the ban, because the Chaldeans are spoken of, ver. 13: "We dare not alter *Chaldeans;* else the difficulty could be obviated." He formerly said: "None of the arguments advanced against the Isaiah-authorship are sufficient to overthrow it."

Of ch. xxiv.—xxvii. he says: "The prophecy was not written by Isaiah, because the historical standpoint is in the Babylonian captivity." Yet every objection which he now adduces was formerly answered by himself in detail, and the prophecy declared to be "an authentic production of Isaiah."

The same thing is repeated in ch. xxxiv. xxxv.: though here, not satisfied with contradicting, sentence by sentence, what he had formerly written, he comes into collision with his existing theory. The writer of these chapters lived, as he has ascertained, "during the Babylonish captivity, probably about the middle of it." "We date the oracle about B. C. 555." He adds further, "It is not improbable that he was acquainted with ch. xl.—lxvi., though a different person from the author of those chapters." "The mind of the prophet before us was full of the ideas, and sometimes the diction of Isa. xl.—lxvi." This is said on p. 29. On turning to p. 45, we are informed

that ch. xl.—lxvi. were written from "B. C. 542 and onward till the eve of Babylon's conquest." Thus we have the ideas and diction of one composition reproduced in another several years before the first was written! Again, on p. 26, we are told that "the spirit of bitter hatred against the Edomites," and against "the heathen generally, argues a later period" than that of Isaiah. Whereas, on p. 39, one of the proofs that ch. xl.—lxvi. were written long subsequent to the time of this prophet is, that "the tone is tenderer, and more uniformly evangelical than that of Isaiah," and "the destruction of the Gentile nations is not dwelt upon with fierce rejoicings over it."

Chapters xl.—lxvi. are also pronounced spurious with as much confidence as a few years ago he declared them to be genuine. He adduces nothing on this subject, in the volumes before us, which he did not present in his former publication. But here again we meet with the singular phenomenon, that not only is his general conclusion respecting the genuineness of these chapters the opposite of what it was before, but he has changed sides in regard to the validity of each individual argument. Every thing is stringent now which was worthless then, and *vice versa*. Nothing can be plainer than that it is not the array of arguments from style and diction, etc., etc., which determine his mind. His conclusion is reached quite irrespective of any such considerations. As long as he admitted the possibility of the foresight of the distant future, the book of Isaiah was genuine. Now he holds that the prophet can see nothing beyond his own political horizon; and there is much in Isaiah which cannot be squared with this theory, unless the dissecting knife of criticism is applied.

That the whole strain of argumentation by which the endeavour has been made to set aside the genuineness of parts of this book, rests on the dogmatic basis of unbelief, no one saw more clearly, or stated mere strongly than Dr. Davidson himself. Thus, he says (Horne's Introd. II., p. 853): "Incorrect views of the nature of biblical prophecy lie at the basis of much that is here set forth. . . . The prophets were not confined to their own times. Their vision stretched beyond contemporary events and influences *into remote periods.*" And yet when Dr. Alexander says, in his commentary on Isaiah,

what is not only true by Dr. Davidson's former confession, but is demonstrably true, as we have shown, in his own case: "The fundamental principle of the higher critics is the impossibility of inspiration or prophetic foresight," he vents his spleen by denouncing this as an exhibition of *odium theologicum.*

After mangling the book in this manner, and converting it into "a collection of oracles belonging to different times, and proceeding from different prophets," it is not surprising that he complains of the absence of any principle of arrangement. Upon his theory it is indeed a singular jumble, and presents a phenomenon to which it might not be easy to find a parallel in literary history. We have here a book which was regarded as a standard authority from its first appearance, and was guarded with the most jealous care by a people who counted the very letters of their scriptures, in their anxiety to preserve them from error, and which yet has been interpolated and enlarged by spurious additions, without the slightest suspicion of the fact ever having been awakened. These spurious passages, moreover, compose the largest, most striking, and most important portion of the whole. And yet their several authors, though confessed to be prophets of rare genius and influence, and living by the hypothesis almost at the end of the exile, very near the time, therefore, when the canon was gathered and reduced to its permanent and final form, were wholly unknown to the collectors of the canon and to their contemporaries. And this, though there is not another instance of an anonymous prophecy in the Old Testament. The brief books of the minor prophets, such even as Obadiah and Nahum, though belonging to a former age, are preserved distinct, and referred each to its proper author. Yet not only were the names of these supposed writers lost, but their very existence was unknown to their own contemporaries; and their writings, in spite of their recent origin, were attributed to another, who lived two centuries before, and whose prophecies had been familiar from the time when they were first uttered. And these fresh additions to the volume of Isaiah's writings were not simply appended at the end, but inserted here and there at intervals, and so intermingled with the genuine portions that

nothing but the elaborate criticism of modern times could ever have separated them.

And what is yet more strange, there is nothing in the circumstances of the case to account for this remarkable literary error. There is no inherent similarity between these later passages and the writings of the prophet, with which they have been thus unaccountably confused, such as might have led to the mistake of attributing them to the same author. On the contrary, there is such a wide and palpable difference in subject, ideas, style, language, and general character, that modern critics distinguish them without difficulty, in the absence of all external evidence, and even in the face of it. Though, strangely enough, while the critics are unanimous in deciding that these passages are so unlike the genuine Isaiah that they cannot possibly be his, they cannot come to an agreement upon the question whether they agree with or differ from each other, and what number of distinct writers must therefore be assumed.

But what is perhaps most extraordinary of all, this odd jumble of the genuine and the spurious, this confused mixture of prophecies from various authors, belonging to different ages, forms a symmetrical whole. This heterogeneous mass of unconnected and discordant materials, thrown together without any system, presents nevertheless a most orderly arrangement. It is only to the merciless critic that there is any appearance of disorder. His violent sundering of what belongs together, obscures to him that consistent plan and method which pervades it. Admit this book to be what it claims, the record of one continuous prophetic ministry, and it unfolds regularly from first to last, and bears the stamp of consistent unity, completeness, and appositeness to the time and circumstances.

The prophets of the Old Testament whose writings are preserved to us, are grouped about the Assyrio-Babylonish judgment; the meaning of which it was their province as authentic interpreters of the will of God to explain, and the providential or gracious ends of which it was their mission to labour to secure. The several ministries of the different prophets derive their shape and character from the particular stage of this great disciplinary process at which they were raised up, and the par-

ticular aspect or portion of the divine plan which they were severally directed and enabled to present.

Isaiah witnessed the first flood of invasion by the Assyrians under Sennacherib, and his miraculous overthrow; this was an important crisis in his prophetic ministry. Another stroke of judgment preliminary to this, and standing in an intimate relation to it, was the invasion of Judah in the reign of Ahaz, by the combined forces of Syria and Ephraim; this formed another crisis in Isaiah's ministry, as it did likewise in the history of Judah. These two events, which mark the principal epochs in the prophet's life, and which are turning-points in the divine dealings with Judah, divide his ministry into three portions, and suggest a corresponding distribution of the book in which his ministry is recorded.

1. Chapters i.—vi., before the invasion by Syria and Ephraim.

2. Chapters vii.—xxxvii., between this and the Assyrian invasion.

3. Chapters xxxviii.—lxvi., after the Assyrian invasion.

Whether the chronological arrangement is strictly maintained throughout the book, as Hengstenberg has shown to be probable, or whether this is for special reasons departed from in some minor details, is a matter of small moment. The great periods of the prophet's ministry are undoubtedly preserved distinct, and succeed each other in their proper order. Each of these has a character of its own, determined by the particular exigencies of the time, and the spiritual necessities of the people. Each differs from the others in its general tone, in the scope of its revelations, and in its disclosures respecting the Messiah.

The first period belongs to the reigns of the pious Uzziah and Jotham. The prophet was called to confront a corrupt and wicked people, "drawing iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as it were with a cart-rope," v. 18; but yet who were outwardly prosperous; "their land is full of silver and gold, neither is there any end of their treasures; their land is also full of horses, neither is there any end of their chariots," ii. 7. And, as a consequence, they were carnally secure, and incredulous of the divine judgments. They said, v. 19, "Let him make speed and hasten his work, that we may see it; and let the counsel of

the Holy One of Israel draw nigh and come, that we may know it." This obduracy, which only grew more obdurate under the prophet's warning voice, it was the purpose of God to break by a succession of heavy judgments, vi. 9—13. Accordingly the prophet's ministry during this first period is one of denunciation and woe. He is perpetually pointing forward to the coming judgment, and exhibiting its necessity and certainty. The four prophecies of this period, chap. i.,* chap. ii.—iv., chap. v., and chap. vi., are so many arguments of the approaching doom, plied with growing distinctness and severity, until in the last the climax is reached in that sublime vision, in which the Lord of Hosts appears in awful majesty, to pronounce sentence in person, from his lofty throne in the temple, upon the transgressing people.

The prophecies of Isaiah in this period offer little that is cheering. He has no promises whatever for the proximate future, either of a positive or of a negative kind. He neither holds out the prospect of benefits to be directly communicated to Judah, nor gives them any assurance of the overthrow of their enemies, present or prospective, by whom they were then threatened, or from whom they were afterwards to suffer. The only blessings of which he speaks belong to the distant Messianic future. And these, so far from detracting from the severity of the threatened evils, tend rather to aggravate it; for it is only through the purgation of terrible judgments, which shall remove the dross of the people, and wash away their filth, that this blessed period can be reached.

Moreover these promises are not only limited to a far distant period, serving by contrast rather to enhance the intervening gloom, but the space devoted to them is comparatively brief. They occupy but a few verses, while there are whole chapters of denunciation. It is likewise to be observed that the Messi-

* The general plan of the book is unaffected by the question whether chap. i. is the earliest of Isaiah's prophecies, and appears in its proper chronological place, or whether it belongs to a later period, and is prefixed as a suitable introduction to the whole. It is therefore needless to enter upon this discussion here, which, so far as it is capable of being decided, depends upon the view to be taken of verses 5—9. Upon the former hypothesis they are predictive, upon the latter they are descriptive.

anic future is here merely spoken of in general terms. No mention is made of the person of the Messiah, except in an enigmatical phrase, descriptive of his divine and human nature: "the Branch of the Lord and the Fruit of the earth," iv. 2. And the blessings of this glorious period are presented, not so much in the way of a positive development of their proper character and fulness, as negatively by way of contrast with the existing character and condition of the people. Their present guilt and unfaithfulness should then be exchanged for a purity befitting the people of God, and corresponding with their true ideal; and the evils from which they suffered, or were shortly to suffer, should be removed or reversed. Jerusalem shall then be purged from her crimes, and be made holy, i. 25, etc., iv. 3, 4. The nations shall flow to her, not for hostility, but for instruction; they shall not give law to her, but she to them, ii. 2, 3. Wars, of which she and the world at large have had and shall still have such terrible experience, shall cease, ii. 4. Her degradation and losses shall be made up by the sublimity and beauty of "the Branch of the Lord and the Fruit of the earth," iv. 2. And God, who now resolved upon her humiliation, abandons her to her foes, or brings her foes upon her, shall then afford invincible protection and glory, iv. 5, 6.

The second portion of Isaiah's ministry extends from the invasion by Syria and Ephraim in the reign of Ahaz to the invasion by Assyria in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah. The vision of chap. vi. was seen "in the year that king Uzziah died." Whether this be understood to mean before or after Uzziah's death, it must be reckoned to the reign of Jotham, who administered the kingdom during the leprosy of his father, 2 Chron. xxvi. 21. Chap. vii. transports us at once to "the days of Ahaz, the son of Jotham, the son of Uzziah." Whether Isaiah received no divine communications during the remainder of the reign of Jotham, being like Ezekiel xxiv. 27, xxxiii. 22, dumb for a season as to the exercise of his office, or whether his prophecies, being substantially repetitions of those already uttered, presented nothing to be recorded for the permanent use of the church, we have no means of ascertaining. We only know of his ministry, as it is here reproduced. The King, the Lord of Hosts has himself pronounced sentence on

the people. God has spoken, and the prophet's voice is hushed. He adds nothing to this sublimely awful utterance, until the Lord himself breaks the impressive silence, speaking not by words but by deeds. The decree of desolation to be effected by successive strokes of judgment enters upon the first stage of its providential accomplishment, and the prophet is then directed to enter upon his work afresh.

One heavy woe has come; another and heavier was not far distant. The ministry of Isaiah now alternates between judgment and mercy. The themes upon which he dwells are speedy deliverance from the present distress, the necessity and certainty of yet severer suffering to subdue their unhumbled hearts, the miraculous overthrow of the future great oppressor, the fall of minor foes, and the blessed results to the covenant people and the world when the judgment shall have done its work. The person of the Messiah is now repeatedly brought to view in his kingly office as the secure pledge of his people's preservation and their deliverer from every oppressor and from every form of evil.

This section of the book, like the preceding, consists of four parts, viz.

1. Chapters vii.—xii., a prophecy or prophecies occasioned by the first act in the predicted drama of judgment, the invasion by Syria and Ephraim. Deliverance is promised from this, but a sorer calamity is threatened in the future.

2. Chapters xiii.—xxvii, the prophet's vision takes a wider scope, unfolding the purpose of God in these coming events with reference to the world at large. The same storm which impended over the covenant people in the invasion of the great Asiatic empire had a commission to perform in respect to heathen nations, and would burst over them likewise. The nations should be trodden down, the oppressor should be broken, but this temporary humiliation should prepare the way for an ultimate experience of the blessings of salvation.

3. Chapters xxviii.—xxxv, prophecies called forth by the near approach of the second act of judgment, the Assyrian invasion, whose miraculous defeat is promised.

4. Chapters xxxvi., xxxvii. record the invasion itself, the min-

istry of the prophet in that critical juncture, and the catastrophe which followed and by which this period was closed.

The first of these divisions contains a closely connected prophecy, or series of prophecies, which may be again divided into five parts, viz.

1. Chapter vii. details the circumstances of, and promises deliverance from, the existing invasion, but upon the presumptuous incredulity of the king threatens a severer one by Assyria.

2. Chapters viii. 1—ix. 7, both from this present and that future distress Immanuel is a pledge of protection to them who truly fear God.

3. Chapters ix. 8—x. 4, Ephraim, the foe of the present, shall perish.

4. Chapter x. 5—34, Assyria, the foe of the future, shall likewise perish.

5. Chapters xi., xii., the blessings of Immanuel's reign.

The three Messianic passages, which occur in the course of this prophecy and at its close, form a climax both in length and fulness. In the first, Immanuel, the virgin's child,* is a pledge of the deliverance from Syria and Ephraim. In the second, the child born, who is nevertheless the mighty God, the everlasting Father, and the Prince of peace, honours afflicted Galilee by his presence, gives joy to his suffering people, multiplies their diminished numbers, breaks the rod not only of Assyria but of every oppressor, and puts an end to war itself. In the third, he fills the world with the knowledge of the Lord, and restores the harmlessness of paradise; the Gentiles shall flock to the standard of the son of Jesse, and the dispersed outcasts of Israel be regathered from the four corners of the earth. In the present peril from Syria and Ephraim, and in the future and still greater one from Assyria, and after that peril and all others are surmounted, Immanuel is the star of hope, the sign

* Dr. Davidson admits, what it is impossible to deny, that the evangelist Matthew applies this prophecy to Christ. "But," he adds, "Matthew is not an infallible expounder of the prophecy, especially since he represents Jesus Christ to have been born of a virgin, and all the circumstances of his birth to have taken place in order that this very prediction might be fulfilled." "It is possible also that the first two chapters of Matthew may be unhistorical. Rothe believes so." So true is it that he who barters away his faith in the Old Testament must give up the New Testament likewise.

and pledge of safety. Ahaz need not fear the threatened overthrow of his royal house, though the foes leagued against him have already named his successor, (vii. 6,) for the virgin's son is yet to be born, and till then Judah and the house of David must be preserved. Assyria may fill the land of Immanuel with his armies, and flood it till the swelling waters reach the neck, viii. 8; and other enemies may combine against him only to be themselves broken in pieces, verse 9. Whatever miseries may be in store for the covenant people, and especially for the unfaithful portion of them, however many "may stumble and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken," the Wonderful, the Counsellor, shall yet sit upon the throne of David, of the increase of whose government and peace there shall be no end. The mighty Assyrian forest shall be hewn down, (x. 33, 34,) and the branch out of the roots of Jesse shall spring up. Every opposing power shall be removed out of the way, and the peaceful reign of the Son of David shall be universally established.

One function of the Assyrio-Babylonish empire has now been explained. It is to be a scourge divinely sent upon Judah. Is this the whole of its mission? Or is there any other work to be performed by it or upon it in the grand scheme of providence? The answer to this question is afforded by the next division of this section, (chapters xiii.—xxvii.) which sets the events already considered in their true relation to God's universal plan. This consists of a series of ten burdens or denunciatory prophecies, culminating in a judgment upon the whole world, and followed by the triumph of the Lord's people, whose foes have all been destroyed.

1. Chapters xiii. 1—xiv. 27, the burden of Babylon.
2. Chapter xiv. 28—32, the burden of Palestina, (Philistia.)
3. Chapters xv., xvi., the burden of Moab.
4. Chapters xvii., xviii., the burden of Damascus.
5. Chapters xix., xx., the burden of Egypt.
6. Chapter xxi. 1—10, the burden of the desert of the sea, (Babylon.)
7. Chapter xxi. 11, 12, the burden of Dumah, (Edom, Idumea.)
8. Chapter xxi. 13—17, the burden upon Arabia.

9. Chapter xxii, the burden of the valley of vision, (Jerusalem.)

10. Chapter xxiii., the burden of Tyre.

Chapter xxiv., the visitation upon the whole world.

Chapters xxv.—xxvii., the triumph of God's people.

Dr. Davidson argues from these prophecies against foreign nations, that the title (i. 1) which ascribes the entire book to Isaiah could only have been intended to embrace the antecedent chapters, which accordingly must have been published by themselves in the first instance, and which constitute the only part free from spurious additions. "The inscription does not suit the whole book, because it is said, 'which he saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem,' words inapplicable to chapters xiii.—xxiii. Hence it refers to an original collection of Isaiah's prophecies, to chapters i.—xii., and may have proceeded from the prophet himself." But why does he not on the same ground exclude the denunciations of Ephraim and of Assyria in chapters ix. and x. from the "original collection"? If the title is applicable to those chapters it is equally applicable to these burdens.

The predictions relating to foreign nations concerned Judah and Jerusalem as well. They were not intended for the benefit of the nations immediately affected. They were not even as a general rule made known to them. They were designed for the instruction, warning, or comfort of the chosen people. And that this is particularly the case here, appears from the intimate relation of these prophecies to the foregoing, as this has been already exhibited, seeing that they disclose the bearings which events of such special interest to Judah had upon the wider circle of the nations around, and upon the whole world. But further, the nations here named had been guilty of offences against the theocracy, and Judah was specially interested in knowing that these could not be perpetrated with impunity. That Arabia and Tyre form no exceptions to this statement, appears from 2 Chron. xxi. 16; Joel iii. 4; Amos i. 9. In six of the burdens, whence the inference may be extended to the remainder, the motive of the punishment is drawn from the attitude in which they stood to the chosen people. The humiliation of Egypt was in order to remove an object of idolatrous

trust, xx. 6. Babylon, xiv. 1, 2, 25; xxi. 10; Philistia, xiv. 32; Moab, xvi. 1—6, and Damascus, xvii. 14, are sentenced for the avenging of the cause of God's people, and their deliverance from oppression or vexatious treatment. It was surely a vision concerning Judah, when the prophet foresaw that Babylon would be laid low, that the captive people might be set free.

The structure of these burdens is remarkably symmetrical. If they be divided into two series of five each, the first series will exhibit a striking correspondence with the second in several particulars. The first burden of each series is directed against Babylon, which, although at that time but a dependent province, was destined to become the seat of empire. Isaiah had predicted, chapters i.—vi., the total desolation and exile of Judah, and had described the instruments of the judgment, v. 26—29, in general terms, indicative of their remoteness and the rapidity of their conquests, but had mentioned no name. This had in all probability not yet been revealed to him or to any contemporaneous prophet. In chapters vii.—xii. he showed that this would be effected neither by Syria nor by Assyria. It is here for the first time declared, xiv. 1, 2, as Micah iv. 10 also hints, that Babylon should be the real agent of Judah's downfall. Hence the prominence accorded to it, not only of being named first among these hostile nations, but of being the subject of two distinct burdens, the first in each series. The rest of the burdens are directed against nations subjugated by Assyria or Babylon, and found in that subjugation their partial or complete accomplishment. For these were in reality not so much two distinct empires, as one continuous empire with a simple change of the seat of authority, and they are here viewed together as fulfilling one common function, and experiencing a like overthrow. The aggregation of nations under a common head was substantially identical, only the dominant people was in the one case the Assyrians, in the other the Chaldeans. This ideal combination is further shown by the fact that the fall of Assyria is included in the burden of Babylon, xiv. 24, 25.

The second and third burdens of both series have relation to minor powers in the vicinity of Judah, the third in each case concluding with a declaration of the time when the fulfilment should take place, measured by "the years of an hireling," *i. e.*,

years accurately reckoned; an expression peculiar to these two passages. The fourth members of the two series have as their subjects the two branches of the covenant people; for though the first of these names Damascus in its title, it passes almost immediately, xvii. 3, to a denunciation of Ephraim or the ten tribes, who had allied themselves with Syria in the attack upon Judah. The fifth and last members of each series are directed against the two most prominent nations of that time, who were not under the domination of Assyria, viz., Egypt and Tyre. Here again dates are given; there is this difference, however, in the two cases, that the number of years designated in the first series, xx. 3, points to the entrance of the judgment, that in the second, xxiii. 15, 17, to its duration and the period of its removal. Possibly these numbers, found in burdens on either side of those directed to the two branches of the covenant people, may have been intended for them as well as for the particular nations to which they nominally belong. And if so, it is doubtless significant, that while the period of the coming of the judgment is fixed for Ephraim, but no prospect is held out of its removal, it is intimated that the duration of Jerusalem's judgment shall be but seventy years, xxiii. 15. At any rate, there would seem to be some relation between this seventy years of Tyre's humiliation by Babylon, and the same term of Jerusalem's humiliation by the same power, subsequently predicted in express terms by Jeremiah, xxv. 11, 12; xxix. 10.

A more remarkable correspondence in the burdens, with which each series closes, may be found, however, in the promises which they contain. The merchandise of Tyre shall be "holiness to the Lord," the very inscription worn by the high priest himself. Exod. xxviii. 38. And Egypt should be all that Israel had ever been, standing in the same relation to God, alike rendering him worship and service, and equally the recipient of his glorious salvation. Moreover the blessings here recited are not to be restricted exclusively to these individual nations, as though they were to be solitary instances of the Divine favour to the heathen, but they are rather to be regarded as examples and representatives of the whole, so that what is expressly granted to them belongs in like manner to all. This appears not only from their position at the end of each of the

two series, implying a relation to all of the foregoing, but also from the explicit though incidental mention of Assyria, xix. 23—25, and Ethiopia, xviii. 1, 7, as included within the circle of the divine mercy, which Jeremiah extends with equal explicitness to Moab, xlviii. 47, but especially from xxiv. 13—16, where it is predicted that God's praise shall ascend from the remotest parts of the earth, as a consequence of his universal judgments, the terms being strikingly conformed to the language used respecting Israel himself, xvii. 6.

The inflictions upon these several nations are also set forth, not as isolated facts, but as component parts of God's universal work of judgment, comprehending all the displays of his punitive justice, both in the course of the world's history, and in the catastrophe which is to mark its close. That this is the import of the burdens is suggested by their number ten, the symbol of completeness, which can no more be fortuitous than the seven denunciations with which the book of Amos opens. It is more explicitly shown by intimations both at the beginning and end of the series. The convulsions of nature which are to occur in the final judgment are in ch. xiii. 6—13, connected with the overthrow of Babylon as parts of a common subject, just as they are for the same reason linked with the destruction of Jerusalem in our Lord's discourse, Matt. xxiv. And the universal purport of these judgments is declared in express terms, ch. xiv. 26: "This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations." The burdens are also at their close expanded into a judgment upon the world at large, ch. xxiv., the terms of which are universal in their character, and should be interpreted with the utmost latitude both of time and place.

Then follows chs. xxv.—xxvii., the triumph of Judah redeemed from every foe, which both in length and fulness of meaning is an advance upon that which concludes the preceding division, and which celebrated the overthrow of Assyria.

This brief exhibition of the plan of this division, and the mutual correspondences of the several burdens, supplies us with a fresh test of Dr. Davidson's higher criticism. In spite of these clear evidences of a carefully considered structure, or

rather not seeming to suspect their existence, he deals with the burdens as though they were a congeries of disconnected and unrelated fragments, disposed without any principle of order, instead of a symmetrical series, no member of which can be sundered from the rest without a mutilation. He would have us believe that some of them were written by Isaiah, and the others, without any reference to the preceding, by a prophet or prophets a century and a half later, and that these were by some accident huddled together. Though here again he cannot escape his inveterate vice of self-contradiction. After carefully pruning from these prophecies every thing relating to Babylon, and pronouncing such passages manifestly spurious, he makes an admission on p. 47, which completely undoes his own work. He is endeavouring to discredit the genuineness of chs. xl.—lxvi., and in the course of his argument he says, "Former prophecies of Isaiah had come to pass; therefore those now uttered should be likewise verified. The older prophecies referred simply to the punishment of Babylon by a hero raised up and divinely commissioned, the new ones to its complete overthrow." Where are these former prophecies of Isaiah referring to the punishment of Babylon, unless in these very burdens, whose genuineness he impugns?

The lessons of this period have now been fully exhibited. But as the time for the Assyrian invasion approached, it was necessary to reiterate these words of warning and of consolation, that presumptuous sinners might be shaken out of their carnal security, and the pious comforted in the trial which was coming upon them. This is accordingly the aim of the next division, chs. xxviii.—xxxv. The denunciatory address, "Wo!" is characteristic of these chapters, as the denunciatory title "burden," of the preceding. After being five times directed against the covenant people, chs. xxviii. 1, xxix. 1, 15, xxx. 1, xxxi. 1, it is at length, ch. xxxiii. 1, turned against their foes. The prophet begins by predicting the overthrow of the kingdom of the ten tribes by the Assyrians, and the protection which would be vouchsafed to Judah. He then reproaches Judah for his sins, which would bring this same scourge upon himself, his breaches of God's law, the hypocrisy of his external services, his disregard of admonitions, his presumptuous contempt of

threatened judgments. These rebukes are blended together and repcated in various forms. And they are again and again interrupted by interjected promises of the sudden and complete overthrow which awaited the Assyrians, and the deliverance to be wrought for Judah, these promises expanding constantly in length and fulness until at length they are poured forth in an almost unbroken stream of mercy to Judah and judgment on his foes. Christ's coming and kingdom are from time to time wrought into this picture of the future good; and the full glories of that kingdom form, as in previous divisions of this section, the fitting termination of the whole. The hope of the Messiah is the brilliant background in every prophetic representation of the future. Inferior good things are set forth as types and earnests of the greater. And these are so intermingled, the one shading off gradually into the other, and the expressions used being often aptly descriptive of both, that it is frequently impossible to separate them.

This entire section of the book and of the prophet's ministry is wound up by that providential event to which much that preceded had reference. Chapters xxxvi., xxxvii. record the actual invasion by the Assyrians, the prophecy uttered by Isaiah at the time, and the signal miraculous deliverance granted in fulfilment of this and previous predictions. These, and the two historical chapters which follow, the Doctor tells us, p. 32, "were not composed as they are by Isaiah himself." The decisive reason is given as follows: "Some mythic and marvellous things would not have been written by Isaiah; but the plain facts as they occurred. Thus it is related in xxxvii. 36, that the angel of the Lord went forth and smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand, which were all found dead corpses early in the morning. Here the influence of tradition is visible in giving a particular form to natural events. Such definite prediction of future events as we find in xxxvii. 7, . . . xxxviii. 5, . . are contrary to the nature of prophetic foresight. They are too exact and precise to be predicted; and must therefore have been written after the things mentioned were known and past." This is another instance of the author's "development." When he wrote the second volume of Horne's Introduction he was of

the opinion that the narrative given almost in identical language in the second book of Kings was characterized by "historical fidelity and accuracy," p. 848.

The Doctor gives us a specimen of his characteristic looseness in argument in relation to these same chapters, on p. 61. He assumes that these chapters of Isaiah, and those corresponding to them in Kings, were both extracted, with certain verbal and other changes, from a genuine work of Isaiah, now lost, in which the acts of Uzziah and of Hezekiah were recorded. 2 Chron. xxvi. 22; xxxii. 32. Then arguing from this assumption, as if it were an ascertained fact, he thus triumphantly disposes of Isaiah's authorship of the book which now bears his name: "Is it likely that the prophet would revise his own composition in chapters xxxvi.—xxxix.? Will the believers in an infallible inspiration maintain this? Infallibility revising itself! The idea is absurd, for infallibility does not admit of degrees." But if infallibility does not, nonsense does, as the foregoing clearly evidences. There is nothing in the strictest view of inspiration to require that Isaiah, in repeating in a new connection and for a new purpose, what he had previously written with a different design, should adhere scrupulously to every word and letter which he had used before. The same inspiration which preserved him from error in the original draught, was competent to guide him in the copy, however freely it might be modified, whether in unimportant verbal changes, or in more serious alterations of form and character, to adapt it more precisely to its new position. No one surely need tremble either for the prophet's truthfulness or his authority, when he learns the real character and extent of the variations which occur in the two passages. They are such as "strange waters," 2 Kings xix. 24, for "water," Isaiah xxxvii. 25; "hearkened," 2 Kings xx. 13, "was glad," Isaiah xxxix. 2; "is it not if," 2 Kings xx. 19, "for," Isaiah xxxix. 18; also the omission in Isaiah of Hezekiah's message of submission to the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xviii. 14, and the insertion, Isaiah xxxviii. 9, etc., of Hezekiah's psalm of praise, which the account in Kings omits.

Two woes are now past; but a third is yet to come. The direful vision of chapter vi. demands a future accomplishment.

The obduracy there foreshown is not at an end, and its predicted train of consequences must follow. A desolation still more complete awaits the land; and the surviving remnant of the people must undergo another diminution. A better prince than Ahaz now sat upon the throne; and to the public deliverance just experienced was added the individual mercy of a restoration from mortal sickness. And yet when the people were once again tried in their monarch, Hezekiah showed that he had not escaped the taint of the prevailing corruption. His vainglorious exhibition of his treasures to the messengers of the king of Babylon led to the crushing announcement by the prophet, "Behold the days come that all that is in thine house, and that which thy fathers have laid up in store until this day, shall be carried to Babylon; nothing shall be left, saith the Lord."

This fearful prospect gives shape and character to what yet remains of the prophet's ministry. He no longer deals in words of terror, but in words of consolation. This section of the book is devoted to the work of comfort, which is no longer administered in limited passages or in solitary chapters joined with gloomy denunciations, but forms the great staple of all that follows. It was so terrible and unprecedented a disaster that the theocracy should be broken up, the atoning sacrifice abolished, the mediating priesthood deprived of its functions, God's dwelling-place reduced to ruins and his people carried away from the land which he had given them, to the heart of a powerful heathen empire, that the righteous were in danger of falling into utter despair and imagining that God had abandoned so unfaithful a people for ever. And this is doubtless one of the reasons why the comfort designed for those times is furnished not only by contemporary prophets, but by one belonging to a former age, just as subsequently Daniel was sent with consolations for the times of Antiochus Epiphanes. Judah needed to be thus prepared for it, and schooled with reference to it in advance. And it was important that when it actually came, they should recognise in it the hand of God, and look upon it not as an unforeseen and unexpected thing, but what had been revealed and provided for long beforehand. The prophet accordingly assures the people, that although this calamity

must come, it shall have an end. The oppressor shall be overthrown, the instrument for this purpose shall most certainly be raised up, as a pledge of which he is already designated and named, and Israel shall be restored, be blessed, and be a blessing.

In conformity with this prospective design of these closing chapters, they are not broken up into distinct discourses like the previous sections, but form one continuous and connected composition. They were not prepared to suit the varying circumstances of the present, and with reference to public delivery on separate occasions, but were adapted to a great necessity of the future, which naturally impressed upon them more uniformity of character. This, too, accounts largely for those differences of style, so far as they really exist, between this and preceding portions of the book, which the higher criticism has made the pretext of its unwarrantable conclusions. The uninterrupted treatment of a theme so animating and absorbing, lent its influence in producing those flowing sentences and fervid periods, by which this section of Isaiah is so eminently characterized.

This period of the prophet's ministry, like each of those which preceded it, has its own peculiar Messianic revelations. He does not now look forward merely to the period of the Messiah in general, as in chs. i.—vi., nor does he contemplate Messiah as a king, as in chs. vii.—xxxvii., but under an aspect more appropriate to his present theme, as a prophet and a sufferer, the antitype and head of his people. He is united with Israel in the commission to enlighten the world, and he will secure the accomplishment of it. And in the execution of this commission he is joined with them in a suffering which shall avail for the good of others, and shall issue in a glory which all that is glowing in human speech is summoned to describe.

The comfort, which the prophet is instructed to address to Judah in the prospect of these overwhelming calamities, is mainly drawn from the mission and destiny of the chosen people. This may accordingly be stated to be the general theme of these chapters. God had made choice of Israel that all families of mankind might be blessed in him. It was his mis-

sion to spread the true religion over the earth and to save the nations. This commission had never been and never would be revoked. The purpose of God made it infallibly certain that Israel would effect all that he had been raised up to do. No adverse circumstances must be suffered to cause discouragement or despondency. His own unfaithfulness should not baffle or frustrate God's designs. And the sufferings, which were to befall him on account of it, would further the accomplishment of his task instead of obstructing it, while they would be succeeded by the richest blessings for him and for the world.

The exhibition of the mission of the covenant people would be very incomplete, if it did not include the work of the Messiah, who was to be of them according to the flesh, and in whom all God's purposes of mercy were to meet their fulfilment. Israel was nothing without the Messiah. It was with reference to him that Israel was made the Lord's people; their whole history was a preparation for his coming; every thing about them pointed forward to him. He was the goal of their hopes; all their expectations centred in him. They waited anxiously for his appearing, and looked forward to it as the bright and blissful era in which every thing should reach its true ideal. From every present sorrow they were taught to turn for comfort to the happy future which he would inaugurate. The oppression of the heathen made them sigh for him who would break every yoke. He was to redeem Israel out of all his troubles, achieve his unperformed task, and fulfil his unaccomplished destiny. Zion should one day give law to the world; all men should worship the God of Israel; universal peace should be established, sin and woe be banished, and death itself destroyed; but it was in Messiah's days, and by him, that these results were to be effected. The Messiah was thus linked with every devout aspiration of those who were waiting for the consolation of Israel, and for the coming of the kingdom of God. And he was either explicitly or implicitly the centre or the background of every prophetic picture.

And yet notwithstanding all this, Dr. Davidson can say, on p. 35, that Isaiah could not "predict a far distant personal Messiah, consistently with the analogy of prophecy. Such leaps

into the future are unknown." And on page 69, "That the Messiah cannot be intended by the prophet, we argue, first, because it would be contrary to the nature of prophecy. The Old Testament seer never projected his vision into the far distant future so as to be able to predict events there, or describe persons beforehand with infallible certainty."

We had supposed it to be universally confessed, that if there was anything that the prophets did predict, it was the Messiah; and if there was anything consonant to the analogy of prophecy, it was such predictions. "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy" from first to last and at all times. If the Doctor had claimed that such predictions were fanatical, or that they were not really fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth, his position, however untenable, would at least have been intelligible. But to say that such predictions were not made, and that it is inconsistent with the analogy of prophecy to predict a far distant personal Messiah, evidences an ignorance or an assurance utterly unfathomable. And yet upon occasion he admits the existence of such prophecies, as on p. 81, where he allows that ix. 6, 7, is correctly referred to Messiah. But if Messiah is described in these last chapters of Isaiah, there is such a minuteness and exactness in the description as might overturn the Doctor's favourite view of the impossibility of predicting what lies remotely in the future. He is described "with infallible certainty," and hence a reference to him must be denied at all hazards and at every cost.

For the reasons already stated, the prophet in unfolding the mission of Israel includes under it all that was to be wrought by Israel's great descendant. This latter is in fact the ruling idea; the work of Messiah is really the main thing, and overshadows every thing else that Israel was to do for the glory of God and the salvation of man. This union between the church and her great Head is laid by the prophet at the basis of the comfort appropriate to the coming trial. It results from her connection with him, it is part of her likeness to him, that she is called to perform her work in the midst of shame and suffering, and to win her way through it to glory and honour. Messiah is identified with Israel in his work, his humiliation, and his glory. It is in view of this identification that the pro-

phet includes them both under one common name, "the servant of the LORD." This expression strictly denotes one whom the Lord employs to execute his will. It is accordingly applicable to any person whom God raises up to perform some important work, as Moses, Deut. xxxiv. 5; David, 1 Kings xi. 13; Nebuchadnezzar, Jer. xxv. 9. But in this connected prophecy it is appropriated to Israel as a people divinely chosen to accomplish the salvation of the world—to Israel, that is, not exclusive of the Messiah, but including him, inasmuch as he was to spring from this people, and was really and in the highest sense to accomplish the work, with the performance of which Israel was charged. The servant of the LORD, of whom Isaiah speaks, is, therefore, a complex person, embracing Christ the head, as well as his church, the body.

This explanation of the term, first propounded by Dr. Alexander, is not only recommended by its simplicity and naturalness, and by its ready applicability to all the passages in which it occurs, but by a number of scriptural analogies both in the Old and in the New Testament. Thus, "the seed of the woman," Gen. iii. 15, "the seed of Abraham," Gen. xxii. 18, "the son of David," 2 Sam. vii. 12—16, "the prophet," Deut. xviii. 18, ideal "man," Ps. viii., and the "righteous sufferer," in the typical Psalms, have both a collective and an individual sense. These several terms embrace the entire body of those whom they properly describe, including Christ, and indeed with predominant reference to him as the most important and prominent of all. So Israel embraces Christ by the law of natural descent, and Christ is linked with Israel by the eternal covenant of union, and by the vital power of his indwelling spirit.

The intimacy of the union subsisting between Christ and his people is abundantly set forth in the New Testament, both by literal statement and under the most expressive emblems. In fact, the name "Christ" is in one passage of the New Testament used with such latitude as to include the church of Christ along with Christ himself. 1 Cor. xii. 12, "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; *so also is Christ.*" The inspired authority of the New Testament may also be claimed

in favour of this interpretation, not only from its direct application of passages in Isaiah, which speak of "the servant of the *Lord*," both to Christ, in repeated instances, and to members of his church in at least two passages, Acts xiii. 47, comp. Isa. xlix. 6, and 2 Cor. vi. 2, comp. Isa. xlix. 8; but also by its use of the term *παῖς*, which is evidently the עֶבֶד יְהוָה of Isaiah, to denote both Israel, Luke i. 54, and Christ, Matt. xii. 18, Acts iii. 13. Jeremiah too, xi. 19, applies language to himself which Isaiah liii. 7, uses of "the servant of the Lord," showing that the people of God, as well as the Messiah, are to be included under that term.

Of this view of Dr. Alexander's, so strongly recommended by its appropriateness and the weighty considerations which may be urged in its favour, Dr. Davidson sneeringly says, p. 73, "The hypothesis is plausible. It is very convenient, too, because of its flexibility; for wherever the head does not suit, it is supposed to recede into the background, and the body to become prominent. Thus in xlix. 5, the idea of the head predominates over that of the body; whereas the reverse is the fact in xlii. 20, 21. Even so, however, the hypothesis cannot be carried out in practice, for the complexity of the person has occasionally to be laid aside, and either the head or body exclusively assumed. . . . In the fifty-third chapter, the body is entirely excluded. . . . The absurdity to which this interpretation leads, appears from the fact, that though the servant is a complex person, including Messiah and his church, things are predicated of Israel, or the body, totally adverse to the Head. They are even inconsistent with it. Thus we read in xlii. 19, 20, 'Who is blind, but my servant? or deaf, as my messenger that I sent? Who is blind as he that is perfect, and blind as the Lord's servant? Seeing many things, but thou observest not; opening the ears, but he heareth not.'"

This flippant and contemptuous rejection of the interpretation, which we have been considering, will by analogy prepare the reader for the statement that it was once accepted and defended by Dr. Davidson himself. Thus in his former treatise he says, p. 865, "Since the appellation before us is used in two ways, both in reference to one person, who is none other than Christ, and collectively of Israel; neither the one nor the

other can be adopted exclusively. Indeed the one does not necessarily exclude the other. The Messianic interpretation is consistent with the collective use of 'servant of Jehovah,' because the latter denotes Christ and his church, the head and the members of his spiritual body. . . . This interpretation, as Alexander justly remarks, 'agrees exactly with the mission both of the Redeemer and his people, as described in Scripture, and accounts for all the variations which embarrass the interpretation of the passages in question upon any more exclusive exegetical hypothesis.'"

The "absurdity," which Dr. Davidson now attempts to fasten upon this interpretation, will not be apt to impair its credit, so long as the usages of ordinary speech continue what they are. Precisely the same variety of application, which he ridicules, attaches to all general terms. They are constantly employed, not only where respect is had to every particular that they properly include, but also where the mass is regarded, and some individuals are left out of sight, or even where the mass is lost sight of, and one or more prominent particulars are alone regarded. And every intelligent reader or hearer instinctively makes the restriction, which the circumstances of the case demand. Thus, if we speak of the apostles as chosen by Christ, all are intended; if we speak of them as holy men, we predicate something of the body of the apostles, which is "totally adverse" to Judas, and "even inconsistent" with his character; if we speak of their writings, those who are included among the sacred penmen "become prominent," and the rest "recede into the background." So when we say that man is the creature of God, we refer to him as a complex being made up of soul and body; when we say that he is mortal or that he is immortal "the complexity" is laid aside," and either the soul or body exclusively referred to; when we speak of his appetites, both parts of his nature are affected, but the idea of the body predominates over that of the soul. We may properly speak of our being indebted to the Greeks for the Iliad and the Parthenon, though Homer wrote the one, and Callicrates built the other.

The third section of the book of Isaiah, chapters xxxviii.—lxvi., is like each of those which precede it, divisible into four

parts. The first, chapters xxxviii., xxxix., is introductory. It explains the occasion of the succeeding prophecy by detailing the circumstances that led to the prediction of the Babylonish captivity, which forms the starting point of all that follows. At the same time it links, as Isaiah is careful to do from first to last, the judgment with that blindness and obduracy, which in the gradually unfolding vision of chapter vi. was its predicted cause. Upon the entrance of the first in the train of woes the prophet was sent to Ahaz with a promise of speedy deliverance. The infatuated king, in this reflecting only too faithfully the heart of the people, preferred to rely upon Assyria for aid rather than upon God, and in so doing chose the Assyrian invasion, which was plainly set before him as the consequence of this fatal course. And it is not without a purpose, that the seemingly trivial, though not altogether casual circumstance is recorded, that the Assyrian general Rabshakeh, sent by Sennacherib against Jerusalem, stood and delivered his insolent speech, xxxvi. 2, "by the conduit of the upper pool in the highway of the fuller's field;" this is the very place, vii. 3, where Ahaz was met by the prophet, and where he exhibited his guilty unbelief. And then relief is scarcely experienced from this second disaster, before Hezekiah's vain display of his treasures takes the initiative in bringing on the third and worst calamity of all. The whole is thus concatenated together; and it is shown how each descending step to Judah's ruin is self-induced, flowing directly from his own acts of folly and of sin.

The prophet observes no strict method in the treatment of his theme in the last twenty-seven chapters, and no logical division is therefore possible. But a formal division is suggested by the recurrence of the same verse at the close of chapter xlviii. and chapter lvii.: "There is no peace, saith the Lord, to the wicked." This may be regarded as an emphatic termination of distinct paragraphs or sections, declaring that the wicked should be excluded from participation in the blessings therein announced. And the book ends, lxvi. 24, with the yet more awful declaration, that besides this negative exclusion, the wicked are reserved for the worm that dies not and the fire that is not quenched. Three portions are thus indicated of

nine chapters each, chapters xl.—xlviii., chapters xlix.—lvii., chapters lviii.—lxvi. These groups may be distinguished by the prominence given in each to a particular event of the future, without, however, their being in any case exclusively occupied with it. In the first, the leading theme is deliverance from the Babylonish exile; chapter xlv. may be regarded as the characteristic chapter of this division. Babylon and Cyrus, who are here so conspicuous, are nowhere named after these first nine chapters; the captivity and restoration from it being only the starting-point of this great prophecy, from which it rises to the contemplation of the entire future in reserve for the people of God. In the second division, the vicarious sufferings and consequent exaltation of the Messiah are introduced, chapter liii. being the characteristic chapter. In the third division, the future glory of the people of God is dwelt upon, the characteristic chapter being chapter lx.

Perhaps the suggestion of Hahn is not altogether fanciful, that this triple division is already shadowed forth in the triple comfort with which the prophecy begins. The prophet is instructed, xl. 2, to cry unto Jerusalem that her warfare, her definite period of toilsome service, is accomplished; that her iniquity is pardoned; that (not *for*, as in the common version) she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins; not double punishment, as if she had suffered twice as much as her sins deserved, or twice as much as the Lord had intended to inflict, but double blessings, notwithstanding all her sins, or even for all her sins; divine grace abounding even beyond her multiplied transgressions, and repaying her offences with mercies twice as great. In unfolding this triple comfort, the prophet may then be supposed to dwell successively upon those conjunctures in the future which would afford the most striking exemplifications of its several phases. The promise of an end to Zion's warfare is illustrated by pointing to the certain termination of the sore evil then impending, the Babylonish exile. The second comforting assurance of the pardon of their sins, finds its basis and pledge in the vicarious sufferings of the Redeemer. And the third word of comfort, the double blessings from the hand of the Lord, shall find its fulfilment in the triumph and glory which await the church.

The first impression which the book of Isaiah makes upon the ordinary reader, probably is, that the prophecies uttered by him are here put together without any special regard to their order or arrangement. The rapid and inadequate survey which we have now taken of it, will be sufficient, we trust, to show that this is a very superficial view. Underneath all this appearance of isolated and detached predictions there is a regular plan constantly pursued from first to last, and all the more striking, when discovered, from its not having been immediately obvious. This methodical arrangement, this careful selection of appropriate materials, and judicious distribution of them, is of itself an effectual bar to all those critical theories, which assume a jumble of unrelated prophecies, and account for it by the accidental confusion of the independent productions of various authors belonging to different ages. With Dr. Davidson's oft-paraded preference for German ideas and German modes of thought, it may be a fact of consequence in his esteem, that there are instances of German critics of no mean standing among their learned countrymen, who have professed themselves convinced of the integrity and genuineness of the whole book of Isaiah, by the single consideration of its structure and methodical arrangement.

We are willing at least here to rest the question, whether the Doctor was not nearer the truth when he said, "Isaiah greatly excels in all the graces of method, order, connection, and arrangement," (Horne's Int. ii., p. 868,) than he is now in saying, p. 61, "the present book of Isaiah is an aggregate of authentic and unauthentic pieces, accumulating by degrees to its present extent and disposition," and p. 4, "no definite, well-ordered plan can possibly be discovered."

ART. III.—*Memorial Sermon of the late Rev. James Hoge, D.D.* Preached October 4, 1863, by the REV. WM. C. ROBERTS. Columbus, Ohio, 1863.

TRUE religion is a matter of personal experience. The pious know by actual trial what it is to walk with God. They have felt in their hearts the power of religious emotion. If there are on earth any competent and credible witnesses respecting godliness, they are the real servants of Christ. Nor have they been backward to declare their estimate of God's service.

One says, "Thy loving-kindness is better than life." Another says, "A day in thy courts is better than a thousand. I had rather be a door-keeper in the house of my God than to dwell in the tents of wickedness." Another, "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee."

Paul said, "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord, for whom I have suffered the loss of all things." Polycarp said to the pro-consul, "Eighty and six years have I served Christ, and he hath never wronged me, and how can I blaspheme my King who hath saved me?"

Melanchthon's testimony was this: "I have often said, and I must take all occasions to repeat it, that a holy, heavenly life, spent in the service of God and in communion with him, is, without doubt, the most pleasant, comfortable life that any one can live in this world."

Similar to the above was the last testimony of Dr. Hoge. Not long before his death he said: "I am not alarmed at the prospect." "Oh, that blessed hope of which I spoke!" "I am still of the same mind, by the grace that is in Jesus Christ."

Like testimonies might be almost indefinitely cited. Some things respecting them may be noticed.

One is, that they are in substance the same in all ages, and under all circumstances. David and Asaph, under the old dispensation, speak just like Paul or Hoge under the new.

Another fact worthy of notice is, that they are all in one

direction. God's people are firmly and unanimously agreed in their estimate of the excellence of divine things.

So remarkably clear is the evidence in favour of the value of religion, especially in times of trial, that from the days of Balaam to this hour, many carnal men have said, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." The wicked themselves, in their honest hours, are persuaded that the righteous have a secret unknown to carnal men.

If these things are so, the righteous have chosen a good part. They are in fact the only wise men on earth. They are wise unto salvation. Rutherford well exclaims: "What is so needful as salvation? Fie upon this condemned and foolish world, that would give so little for salvation. Oh, if there were a free market of salvation on that day when the trumpet shall sound, how many buyers would be there! What are all the sinners in the world to that day when heaven and earth shall go up in a flame of fire, but a number of beguiled dreamers? Every one shall say of his hunting, and of his conquest, 'Behold, it was a dream.'"

We have been led to make these remarks here, becausc we have long noticed that old friends very often turn to the closing scenes of lifc, described in biography, before reading the earlier portions of the work. When we know how a man has lived, we naturally wish to know how he died. Besides, in ordinary cases, death is comparatively an honest hour. But if men even succeed in holding fast their delusions in that awful moment, the future world will take away all disguise, and truth and honour and the love of God will be found to be enduring, while every form of falsehood and deception will vanish for ever.

And if so great a difference between the saint and the sinner commonly appears on earth, how vast must be the difference in eternity! In this world we have hints of things, rather than full declarations. If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry? "If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses? and if in the land of peace, wherein thou trustedst, they wearied thee, then how wilt thou do in the swelling of Jordan?" Jer. xii. 5.

It is therefore a reasonable thing to believe the Bible.

Were it but probably God's word, a wise man would act upon it. If it is merely probable that one's house is on fire, he will rise and search his whole premises. If it is probable the thief will come on a given night, the good man of the house will watch. In the absence of certainty, wise men will be governed by probability. And when the evidence is so strong as it is in favour of the Christian religion, it is mere obstinacy to persevere in rejecting the Lord Jesus Christ. The Saviour himself teaches that the evidence is so strong in favour of his religion, that infidels in gospel lands shall in the last day receive a sentence in accordance with his written word: "He that rejecteth me and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him at the last day." John xii. 48. This judgment is just. This sentence is righteous. All men will one day confess as much.

Ever since it was announced that Dr. Hoge had departed this life on the 22d day of September, 1863, in the 80th year of his age, we have felt a desire to see some extended notice of his life and labours. Dr. Hoge was a historic person. The sermon noticed at the head of this article is very creditable to its author. It gives much pleasing information. The family of Dr. Hoge have also consented that a gentleman long intimate with him shall use some materials in his possession, for the purpose of bringing before the public some of the facts in his remarkable history. In this way we hope to preserve from oblivion some things that would otherwise be lost.

Dr. Hoge was one of the descendants of a man who lived and died in Scotland during the latter part of the reign of the Stuarts. His three sons emigrated to America during the latter half of the 17th century. The names of these men were Peter, Solomon, and William. Their names and the names of their descendants are spelled variously—Hoge, Hogue, Hoag, and Hogg. Peter settled in the neighbourhood of New York, and left a considerable family. His descendants are widely scattered. Solomon first resided in Pennsylvania, but afterwards removed to Loudon county, Virginia, married a member of the Society of Friends, and perhaps became a Friend himself. He was the progenitor of those numerous and respectable

people in the State of Ohio and elsewhere, who still bear his surname, and are Friends.

William Hoge, the great-grandfather of the Rev. Dr. James Hoge, settled in Pennsylvania, between Harrisburg and Carlisle. Here he resided until he was an old man. He then removed to the neighbourhood of Winchester, Virginia, where he died and was buried in the graveyard of either the Opequon or of the Cedar Creek church. William Hoge married Barbara Hume, a lady who, with her father's family, came over in the same ship with him. Although these Humes were of the same family with the historian of the same name, yet they were far removed from his wicked infidelity. They were zealous, and therefore persecuted, Covenanters. One of William Hoge's sons was named James. Early in life he settled at Cedar Creek, fourteen miles south-west of Winchester, Virginia. Here he lived to old age. Here he died and was buried. He was twice married; first to Martha Vance. By her he had several children. One of these, John, left home at the age of seventeen years, and was one of Washington's men at Braddock's defeat. He was taken prisoner; remained in Canada until the Revolutionary War broke out; then came to Massachusetts; entered the army, and continued in it till he was honourably discharged after peace. He lived in the South, and to a great age. James Hoge, an uncle of the subject of this notice, and a son of James, settled in Montgomery county, Virginia, in the part of it now forming Pulaski county. He lived to be considerably over eighty years of age, and left a large family—some sons and more daughters—one of whom was married to a Mr. Evans, and another to a Mr. Wilson; both men of note and worth.

The grandfather of Dr. James Hoge was married a second time, to Agnes Blackburn. She lived to be near eighty years old, and then died from an injury received in leaping from a horse after having ridden more than thirty miles that day. Her husband also died in consequence of a fall, when he was between eighty and ninety years old. Some account of this venerable man may be seen in Dr. Foote's Historical Sketches of Virginia, and in the Life of Dr. Archibald Alexander. By his second marriage he had three sons. The eldest was Edward, who lived and died on the same farm with his father,

leaving five children. The youngest was Solomon, who lived on the same farm for many years after his brother's death; but when about sixty years old he removed to Maury county, Tennessee. He lived in Tennessee upwards of fifteen years and then died, leaving two sons and two daughters.

The second son of James Hoge and Agnes Blackburn was Moses. Very early in life he was made a subject of renewing grace. At the age of nineteen years he began his studies for the ministry of the gospel. His first teacher was a Scotchman. He afterwards entered Liberty Hall, now Washington College, Va. Here he enjoyed rare advantages. Some of his schoolmates proved to be the brightest men of that day. But he enjoyed the teachings of that great master, the Rev. William Graham, of blessed memory. Here Moses Hoge also studied theology. He was licensed to preach the gospel, when he was about twenty-nine years old. About the year 1783, the Rev. Moses Hoge settled in Hardy county, Va., as pastor of a church near Moorfield. He was, about the same time, married to Elizabeth Poage, near Staunton, Va. Three or four years later, he removed to Shepherdstown, Berkely county, Va. Here he laboured with great diligence and faith, until 1806, when he was appointed President of Hampden Sydney College, in Prince Edward county, Va. Here he continued teaching and preaching until his death. In May, 1821, he was sent to Philadelphia as a member of the General Assembly, became ill, was most tenderly cared for both by physicians and the Christian family of the late Samuel Smith, Esq., whose hospitality he enjoyed, lingered till near the first of July, and then expired. He was buried in the graveyard of the Third Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia. A brief notice of him will not be unwelcome to our readers.

A memoir of him was partly prepared by one of his sons, but after passing through various hands it seems to have been lost; at least it has never been published. Not long after his death a volume of his sermons was printed, but they were not much circulated. The edition, owing to some cause, did not sell well. John Randolph pronounced him the most eloquent man he had ever heard. It is true that he and Randolph agreed in politics. It is also true that Randolph was under

very deep religious impressions during most of the time that he heard Dr. Hoge. Yet Dr. Hoge had some great disadvantages. His voice had considerable unpleasantness, arising from a nasal twang. So that it must be regarded as certain that he was a very remarkable man, to have won such commendation from his gifted countryman. Public sentiment everywhere gave Dr. Hoge a very high position.

Dr. Hoge often said that he could not remember the time when he did not love the Lord Jesus Christ. He was doubtless converted very early in life. This gave to his whole character a great charm. It was free from many of those faults and defects which arise from spending childhood and youth in vanity. Oh that early piety was the rule and not the exception.

There was a delightful tenderness in the character of Dr. Hoge's piety. It is said, and we believe correctly, that he seldom, if ever, slept at all on the night previous to the administration of the Lord's Supper, if he was expected to take part in the solemnities of that ordinance as preacher. He did not think it wrong to sleep, but he became so absorbed in meditating on the love and sufferings of the Saviour, that sleep departed from him.

We have seen an eminent Christian lady, who told us that some years before his death she heard him say that for twenty years he had not seriously doubted his interest in Christ. His assurance was strong.

Yet he was profoundly humble. On one occasion a high-tempered but good man disliked some views expressed by Dr. Hoge on the politics of those times. He lost his temper and said pettishly, "Dr. Hoge, you are nothing but a man after all, sir." Hoge wholly disarmed him by saying with unaffected modesty and sincerity, "Yes, sir, and a very erring and sinful man at best." One of his dying sayings was—"With the old English bishop I must say, 'Lord, forgive my sins of omission.'"

His income was often small, and his hospitality and kindness were unstinted. He took many poor young men into his family, and aided them in their whole course of preparation for the sacred office. In this way he did much good. One of these men was afterwards famous as a great preacher. We refer to James Robinson, who was a giant in strength, a great

sinner saved by grace, with an iron constitution, a very tender heart, and a voice of unusual sweetness and power. He traversed large regions of country, preaching with great zeal and success. We never saw him, but we knew his widow, and a very lovely son of his, who died soon after he began to preach, and who had been a communicant in the church from his childhood. Dr. Hoge's liberality and hospitality were not uncalled-for, and yet he was often in straits. But his confidence in God never failed, neither did his supplies. Many well-authenticated scraps of history concerning him in these matters have been given us by good people, and in particular by his late excellent widow. We will mention one. It was a cold Saturday morning, when Mrs. Hoge discovered that there was not wood enough to keep up the fires till Monday. She found she had no money, and went to her husband. He had no money. What was to be done? The wife wished to borrow, or use some extraordinary efforts. The Dr. said, "Our Heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of fire in such weather, and he will send us some. Let us trust in him." Not long after mid-day, a man was seen unloading wood, and presently he drove away, without saying anything to the family. This looked strange. The teamster was not a member of the church, nor even a stated hearer of Dr. Hoge's. Upon inquiry, it was found that the owner of the wagon had come to Shepherdstown with a load of wood, for which no one would offer him as much as he thought it worth, and he said, "None of you shall have it. I will give it to the minister up here."

Dr. Hoge left four sons, of whom three were preachers—James, John Blair, and Samuel Davies. The other became a physician, and still survives. Dr. Moses Hoge has three grandsons in the ministry. His son, John Blair Hoge was a man of great eloquence. He was settled in Richmond, Virginia, where a sweet fragrance is still connected with his memory. Samuel Davies Hoge died at Athens, Ohio, as Professor in the State university there. He seldom preached without having his face suffused with tears. His heart was very tender.

But few living men remember Dr. Moses Hoge. He was a fine scholar, a faithful man, a refined gentleman, a remarkable

Christian, an eloquent preacher, and an admirable teacher of theology.

The chief fields of labour of this eminent servant of Christ, were Hardy, Jefferson, and Berkeley counties, in Virginia, in early life, afterwards Hampden Sidney College, Virginia, and the churches in the counties of Charlotte, Prince Edward, and Cumberland. In all these he has left a name that is like precious ointment.

His first wife died while he was settled at Shepherdstown. His second marriage was to Mrs. Susan Hunt, whose maiden name was Watkins, of Charlotte county, Virginia.

One can hardly speak of this worthy man without being reminded of another, whose heart was knit to him in the tenderest love, who was associated with him in the government of the college, and who was allied to him by the intermarriage of their children. We refer to the Rev. Drury Lacy.

During the Revolutionary War a company of men were drilling and firing guns. One man loaded his musket very heavily, and, when they were about to fire, he asked the young lad Lacy to take his place, and fire his piece. They fired, and the gun burst, shivering Lacy's left hand. This act of cruelty gave a turn to his future life. His parents consented to his "going to learning," as it was then expressed. He learned well, was very ardent in his desire to be useful, and was always a favourite with his acquaintances. When he grew up, he had a silver hand put on his left arm. In riding, he attached the bridle reins to that as the bridle hand. He could easily remove this artificial hand, and put a fork in its place. In Virginia, clergymen were expected to carve the turkey on wedding occasions. Mr. Lacy performed that part of his duty with great skill. He had a very fine voice, so that he has, with ease, preached to thousands in the open air; he was sometimes spoken of as "the preacher with the silver fist and the silver voice."

Mr. Lacy, after he became a preacher, often had a private grammar-school on his own premises, and was, for a time, an officer of Hampden Sidney College. He was very useful as a letter writer. He wrote a beautiful hand, and there was a sweet savour of piety and of friendliness in all his private correspond-

ence. But, as a popular preacher, he excelled. His noble figure, his excellent voice, his good sense, his godly sincerity, and his melting tenderness, made him a great favourite with the masses of the people. Some of the old people still speak with enthusiasm of a sermon delivered in the open air to thousands on the words: "Where is the Lord God of Elijah?"

In 1809 he was Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church.

Two of his sons and four or five of his grandsons became ministers of the gospel, and are, we believe, still proclaiming the salvation their ancestor so delighted in preaching.

Like Dr. Hoge, Mr. Lacy died in Philadelphia. He came to that city for the purpose of having a surgical operation performed. He was taken into the family of that great and good man and merchant prince, the late Robert Ralston. He was most tenderly cared for. The operation was skilfully performed, and, for a time, it was confidently hoped he would soon be well. But God had determined otherwise. He began to sink, and in a few days closed his eyes on earth. About the same time his excellent wife died at the old homestead in Virginia. Neither of them knew that the other had left the world till they met around the throne of God in heaven.

We have in our possession a letter of Mr. Lacy written in 1802, which, if ever published, must surely be quite out of print now. It gives a pleasing account of the state of religion at that time in several places of the Old Dominion. We insert a part of it, in the hope that it will please our readers, and awaken in some of them a spirit of prayer for the return of such blessed scenes as are here described. He says: "You have already been informed of a meeting which took place last Christmas at Bedford Court House. Since that time greater harmony and brotherly love have been apparent among the different denominations. They frequently preach together, and seem much stirred up to promote the common cause of religion and the interest of the Redeemer's kingdom. But, as the proposed plan of union has not yet been discussed by the respective church judicatories, to which it was referred, it is impossible to say what will be the final result of that business. However, whether that be adopted or rejected, I am happy to

inform you that the attention to religion, which was excited at that meeting has continued to increase. It has spread upwards of twenty miles, and there have been pleasing prospects in more distant places, whenever the ministers have found an opportunity to preach from home. The Presbytery of Hanover, of which I am a member, met in that neighbourhood about the middle of April. Great numbers of people, considering the busy season of the year with planters and farmers, attended public worship four days successively. The congregation appeared very solemn and attentive, and the word preached was accompanied with considerable power. Numbers of the audience, during public worship, were frequently in tears, and sometimes the impression seemed almost general. It was delightful to observe with what spirit the people joined in singing the praises of God. This heavenly exercise they usually begin as soon as they meet. It continues sometimes an hour before public worship commences. They have committed a great number of suitable hymns and spiritual songs to memory, which they sing with so much solemnity and animation that it is peculiarly affecting. I was particular in inquiring what number had professed religion since the revival began, and, as nearly as I could learn, between eighty and a hundred had been brought to submit to the terms of the gospel and rejoice in Christ as the portion of their souls. I conversed with several who had been the subjects of the work, and their exercises appeared to me to have been entirely rational and consistent with the gospel plan. The views they had of the corruption of their hearts, as being opposed to God and holiness; their deep sense of being in a condemned state, and of their absolute need of Christ; also, the manner in which they were brought to submit to the sovereignty of God and to accept of salvation, through a crucified Redeemer, appeared clear and rational, and convinced me that it was the work of the Spirit of God on the soul. There have been a few instances of persons whose bodily powers have been overcome, but without being accompanied by any noise or confusion.

"A revival has also taken place in Albemarle county, eighty miles distant from Bedford, about the beginning of the present year. Mr. Robinson (the same mentioned above), who has

charge of two congregations in that county, was present at the meeting in Bedford, and had his affections greatly inflamed and his soul much comforted. On his return he felt much engaged, and had greater enlargements, both in praying and preaching, than usual. But God began the work before he had an opportunity to preach. A young man, about nineteen or twenty years of age, had accompanied Mr. Robinson to Bedford. This youth is the eldest son of a family of ten children, whose father is dead. His mother and three of his sisters were professors of religion, and esteemed pious; but, from the diffidence of females, the worship of God was not kept up in the family. It pleased God, while this young man was in Bedford, to strike him with very powerful convictions. On his way home, he formed the happy resolution of setting up the worship of God in his mother's house. He returned late in the evening, and, after giving the family a short account of the meeting, told them of the resolution he had formed, and called for the books in order to read and sing before prayer. The whole family burst into tears. His mother was almost overcome with excess of joy, and one of his sisters, in a transport, exclaimed: 'Glory to God; this is what I have been some years praying for.' Conviction seized the younger members of the family, and they now seem to be all engaged in walking together in the fear of the Lord and in obedience to his commands. The next Sabbath Mr. Robinson gave an account of what he had seen abroad, which greatly comforted the pious in his congregations, and encouraged them to be more importunate in prayer; and it pleased the God of grace and mercy, in a few weeks, to give them an evidence that he hears and answers prayer. A considerable number became deeply convinced of their sin and danger, and were brought to inquire what they should do to be saved. Since that time the work has been progressing, and religion appears in a very lively state. I was with Mr. Robinson in the beginning of April, and assisted him at a sacrament. I have hardly, in my life, been a witness of more solemn appearances. Numbers of the people were deeply affected, and wept abundantly during worship."

Oh that God's saving power might be again displayed in all the land in a like precious outpouring of his Spirit!

James Hoge, the son of Rev. Moses Hoge, D. D., was born at Moorfield, Virginia, in 1784. He was chiefly educated under his father's roof, though he was one year at an academy at Charlestown, Jefferson county, Virginia, and one year at Jefferson College, at Canonsburgh, Pennsylvania. He then taught for three or four years, part of the time as assistant, in an academy in Baltimore, Maryland, under the charge of Dr. James Priestley, afterwards President of Cumberland College, at Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Hoge was licensed to preach the gospel by the Presbytery of Lexington, in Virginia, April 17th, 1805, at the age of about twenty-one. He was ordained to the full work of the gospel ministry by the Presbytery of Washington (now Chillicothe), June 11th, 1808, at the town of Franklinton, Ohio. On the 18th of December, 1810, he was married to the amiable and excellent Miss Jane Woods, of Wheeling, Virginia. She was seven years his junior, but she had character enough even at the age of seventeen or eighteen to preside with dignity and wisdom in his family. By her he had eleven children, six of whom, four daughters and two sons, survive. His youngest son is now pastor of the Westminster Presbyterian Church, in Cleveland, Ohio. One of his daughters is married to the Rev. Dr. Nall of Alabama. Another (now dead) was married to the Rev. Mr. Hackett. Mrs. Hoge's death preceded that of her husband by a year or two.

But we shall let Mr. Roberts speak:

"Without being personally handsome, Dr. Hoge possessed a noble appearance and native majesty that impressed every one that saw him. He was tall and perfectly erect until the day of his death."

There was a reason, not generally known, for Dr. Hoge's continuing to be so erect. The spinal column, for a considerable distance from the shoulders down, seemed to have become solid. More than a year ago we asked him if this was so. He said it was, and that he could not curve his spine if he would, except at one point. But we will hear Mr. Roberts again.

"There was something peculiar in his looks that attracted every one's attention, and when once observed, it was never forgotten. His great dignity forbade all levity and undue familiarity. This was mistaken by the young for that sternness of

character which tends to repel, but there was nothing more erroneous ever entertained concerning him. He was a man of strong affections and keen sensibilities. His countenance, in the company of his friends and relatives, always beamed with the warmth and kindness of his heart. He so unbent himself, at times, as to amuse his guests with his ready wit and playful repartee.

"No one could be freer than Dr. Hoge from that mean spirit of envy and jealousy which is the bane of so many of our public men. He never felt that a brother's elevation reduced him in the least, and hence never sought to bring him down that he might exalt himself. His ever-abiding principle was that God had a special place for every man, and endowed him with gifts to perform the duties of that place, and in that way, excluded all rational grounds for strife or unhallowed emulation. He was never heard to speak slightly of any worthy brother, or known to indulge in invidious insinuations about him for the sake of lessening his influence. But he laboured peaceably with brethren of different denominations, and wished them all God-speed in building up the Redeemer's kingdom.

"He was not only free from the spirit of envy and jealousy, but possessed of a *most equable temper*. No one ever saw him angry or perturbed in the least degree. He was always the same in sunshine and in storms, in safety and in danger. He remarked once to a friend, that he never experienced the sense of fear. This was partly owing to physical peculiarities, and partly to that perfect love which casteth out fear. He was always firm and decided, but neither rash nor reckless. This made him just the kind of man that was needed to labour on our frontiers, where the white population was weekly threatened with Indian massacres. When it became known once, that the red man was contemplating the speedy and utter destruction of Franklinton, a meeting of the citizens was called together to adopt some means of fortifying the place, and saving their lives. Dr. Hoge, then a young man, was made chairman of that meeting. 'The danger was imminent enough,' said Mr. Gardiner in a speech afterwards at a political meeting, 'to make the pale face of the young parson turn red;' but, instead of that, he calmly remarked that God was a shield and a buckler against

the arrows of the Indians, and the dagger of the assassin. These words were like oil poured upon the troubled waters: they calmed the frantic women, and inspired the weak-hearted men with courage.

"Such a spirit in many a man would have led him to all kinds of excesses, but it did not produce that effect upon Dr. Hoge. He was one of the most *prudent* men of his day. This was owing to his excellent judgment and profound sense. These, we are told, never failed him; but served as regulators to all his actions, and a balance-wheel to all his movements. He was never known to do an unwise thing. When looking back over a life of four-score years, he was able to say, that he could scarcely think of any thing that he ever did, that he would like to have undone. He gave the benefit of his good judgment to many others, who frequently resorted to him for counsel. It is no exaggeration to say, as you all know, that he was consulted on almost every thing from a common agricultural implement to the highest laws that regulate the State. On many matters, his word 'was the end of all strife.'

"With all this, he was *extremely modest and unassuming.* He made no display of his power, or parade about his learning; but, on the other hand, abominated all pomp and outward show. He would scarcely ever refer to himself, or mention any of his actions. He kept self always in abeyance, that the grace of God might be magnified, his favourite motto being, 'By the grace of God, I am what I am.' He was a living rebuke to the conceited and would-be great men that came in contact with him; and yet he never was obtrusive, in volunteering his criticisms, or urging upon any one his opinions.

"He was also an exceedingly frank or candid man in all his dealings. He never waited to be urged to do any thing, but consented, when asked, with unaffected simplicity, rarely found in any public man, or refused with great promptness, if he was unable to comply with the request. He never had a policy in any thing he ever did, but a great end to accomplish, for he always acted from Christian principles, and not from mere feelings or personal motives.

"These noble traits of character, as found in Dr. Hoge, were not due entirely to constitutional peculiarities, or early advan-

tages, but to the grace of God, and his close adherence to the revealed principles of the divine law. He was, by nature, 'of like passions with ourselves,' and the reason why he became so much more eminent as a man than many around him, is to be found 'in his diligence in business, fervency in spirit, serving the Lord.' This leads us to remark, that Dr. Hoge was an eminent Christian man. His piety was not of the negative kind, like that of so many in our day, but a life in the soul, a principle that regulated all his actions. His life was an embodiment of all the truths he so ably preached from year to year, and the result of hard labour and many struggles. No aspirant in the school of painting lived more constantly under the shades of Raphael or of Rubens, than he did under the mysterious shadow of the 'Holy, Harmless, Undefiled, and Separate from sinners.' No candidate for military glory ever drank deeper into the enthusiasm of a Cæsar or a Napoleon, than he did into the spirit of 'the great Captain of our salvation.' He strove hard to imitate him in all his imitable perfections.

"He did this, not simply by a careful and exegetic study of the Scriptures 'that testify of Him,' but by spending hours daily in reading them prayerfully and meditatively, so as to catch their hidden meaning and divine beauty. Thus he lived literally on the marrow and fatness of the gospel. Such a nourishment would naturally manifest itself in the growth of the inward man, and in the increasing strength of his religious principles. So plain and prominent were these, that the worldly and the fashionable, the careless and profane, would say sometimes, to make their assertions emphatic, that they were as true and correct as Dr. Hoge. Christians were often heard exclaiming, 'Let our death be the death of that venerable saint, and our latter end be like his.' One of the most eminent scientific men in our land said once, 'I am compelled to believe that there is truth and power in the Christian religion whenever I think of Dr. Hoge. Why, if all were like him, we would be in need of no civil laws, judges, policemen, jails, or penitentiaries.' I know that I am expressing your sentiments, my hearers, when I say, that the life of Dr. Hoge, more than that of any other man perhaps, was a living sermon to

you on your own duty; an incessant reproof to you of your negligence of it; and a perpetual monitor to you of your obligations to that God whom he so dearly loved and faithfully served. You could not look at him, in his old age and feeble health, wending his way to the house of prayer on dark and stormy nights, without feeling rebuked—nay, condemned.

"He was not only an exemplary Christian, but a loving husband and kind father. Four of his children were taken away in infancy to chasten his feelings, teach him submission to the Divine will, and qualify him to sympathize with the afflicted in his congregation. This accounts, in a great degree, I have no doubt, for that tender pathos which is said to have marked his words and prayers in the house of mourning. He was peculiarly tender on such occasions, and able to say to the bereaved, 'I am a man that has seen affliction.' But he was remarkably happy in his own family. I feel that I am now treading on the verge of sacred, if not forbidden ground. The presence of so many members of that favoured circle, remind me of my duty to be careful in speaking of family affairs. But as he was the same consistent Christian at home that he was abroad, I am relieved of much embarrassment, and encouraged to say, in general terms, that but few parents ever gained the respect and profound veneration of their children in the same degree that Dr. Hoge did. He was their friend, counsellor, and, I may add, their oracle. His will was the law of the family, his wishes the principles by which it was regulated, and his presence its light and joy. In his conduct towards his children, he combined, in the happiest manner, dignity of bearing, to command respect; decision of character, to secure obedience; justness of requisition, to insure confidence; and mildness of temper, to elicit the purest love. As few parents only have such traits of character, few only enjoy, in the same degree, the respect, the obedience, the confidence, and love of their children.

"Our late venerable father was a Christian scholar. . . He went through his studies under the vigilant and jealous eye of his distinguished father, who drilled him in them as no disinterested professor ever would. Thus, he learned well how to study to advantage, and how absolutely necessary it was to

carry on painful investigations afterwards, in order to enjoy any degree of success in his profession. Having come out to the wilderness as a missionary, he did not, like many others, give up all his studies, except those that were indispensable to his comfort in his field of labour. But he carried on his investigations just as carefully and extensively as if he had the most learned audience in the land. He had the name of 'devouring' every book of importance that came to the neighbourhood.

"He studied every subject thoroughly and profoundly; in other words, he completely mastered it. Only six weeks before he died, he gave me, without hesitation or mistake, a complete analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, stating what he regarded as its grand theme, and then dividing and subdividing it, giving the chapter and verse under each head. He went through the book of Acts in the same manner, pointing out at every step what he deemed erroneous in the leading commentaries on it. He was equally versed in the other books of the Bible. And he was not only versed in their analysis and exegesis, but in the antiquities of the Jews, and the oriental customs alluded to in so many passages. He was an excellent ecclesiastical historian; in fact, he taught that branch of study in the Theological Seminary which he was the means of starting at Cincinnati.

"He did not confine his studies to the sacred Scriptures, but familiarized himself with all the discoveries of science, and was particularly well read in astronomy, natural philosophy, and anatomy, as well as in the profounder researches of metaphysicians. He had acquired such an extensive knowledge of law and diplomacy, that he became a book of reference to many of the State legislators on all that pertained to the Constitution, respective relations and laws of the provinces before the Federal Union was formed. He seemed to have the history of that chaotic period perfectly clear in his mind, as well as the transaction of every convention that contemplated the independence of the provinces. He could explain the compromises, concessions, and adjustments made by the different States that originally formed our mighty Republic, with greater accuracy and facility than many of our gifted statesmen that made it a professional study. Indeed, one of the most eminent jurists in the

State said, in my hearing, that he believed him to be the best statesman in our commonwealth. As a token of their high appreciation of these rare attainments, the trustees of Miami University conferred their first title of Doctor of Divinity upon him in the year 1827.

"Soon after being licensed, he applied to the General Assembly for a commission to go out to Ohio as a missionary, which was granted him in the following terms: 'Resolved, that Mr. James Hoge be appointed missionary to the State of Ohio, and the parts adjacent thereto.' Thus he not only gave himself up to the self-denying work of the ministry, but applied for the most laborious and trying part of that work, even that which falls to the lot of a missionary. Being a son of one of the most distinguished scholars of the day, descending from an influential family, and possessing himself rare qualities of mind and heart, he might have easily found an inviting field of labour in one of the seaboard towns or cities. But he did not turn his attention in that direction. His soul yearned for the destitute and neglected on our frontiers; and accordingly he directed his steps towards the West. He arrived at Franklinton on the 19th of November, 1805, and held religious services the next day in the room occupied by the Supreme Court. He found the prospect of doing much good for the Master there rather gloomy, but he was not to be deterred. He laboured with great zeal for months, and as a result of this labour, a church was organized of thirteen members, on the 18th of February, 1806, Robert Culbertson and William Read being elected as its ruling elders; and Joseph Dixon, John Dill, Daniel Nelson, William Domigan, Joseph Hunter, and Lucas Sullivant, as its trustees. Thus commenced the new enterprise under the pastoral care of young Hoge, but alas! his health became so impaired that he was compelled to return to his native State early in the fall. Many would have made that a sufficient ground for abandoning the whole undertaking as being too full of danger and discouragements for him, but Mr. Hoge's conscience was not so easily set at rest. He determined to return, as soon as God, in his providence, saw fit to restore his health, and on the 25th of September, 1807, the church at Franklinton made out a call for three-fourths of his

time, and forwarded it to him. He soon returned to signify his acceptance of the same, and commence his labours.

"Not long after this, the settlement of Columbus commenced, and Mr. Hoge was solicited to preach occasionally this side of the river. He consented, and the First Presbyterian church was in time removed thither to a log cabin, rudely constructed, near the corner of Spring and Third streets. In a few years, it was removed to a house that was familiarly called by the Methodists of that day, the 'Old Trinity in Unity,' situated near the south-west corner of Town and Front streets. On the first Sunday in December of 1830, the first services were held in the basement of this building which we now occupy. He continued to minister here in holy things until the 28th of February, 1858, when a congregational meeting was called to accept the resignation of their venerable pastor. After making a few touching remarks, Dr. Hoge stated that his age and feeble health induced him to ask them to accept his resignation. They acceded to his request, but expressed, at the same time, their unfeigned regret at the circumstances that led to the necessity of severing the ties that had bound them so long together as pastor and people. Thus, you observe, he continued as pastor of the same people for over fifty years. The growth of the church, in the meanwhile, must have been rapid, from the fact that so many other churches went out of it. The nuclei that formed the Methodist Episcopal, the Protestant Episcopal, the Second Presbyterian, the Westminster, and partly the Congregational, and other churches, went out of it at different times, and yet left the old mother church, in many respects, the strongest of them all.

"All this is to be attributed to three causes, viz., the grace of God, the growth of population, and the abilities of the pastor. It is impossible to tell how abundantly God poured of his Spirit upon the people, during a pastorate of fifty years, and I have no data within reach to give you the rate of the increase of population, but I shall endeavour to give you some of the impressions I have received of Dr. Hoge as a preacher. He was very unlike his father and two brothers in this respect. His father was exceedingly eloquent, drawing crowds to hear him whenever he preached. His brother Samuel was blessed

with a rich imagination, and John Blair is said to have been like a meteor, bright, brilliant, and attractive. He consumed his vital energies, by excess of light and heat, long before he reached his prime. James never attracted the crowd, but gathered around him the learned and the elite, not by the brilliancy of his imagination, the charm of his eloquence, or beauty of his style, but by the profundity of his thoughts, soundness of his views, and strength of his logic. The Supreme Court that was in session at Franklinton adjourned, on one occasion, for the express purpose of going to hear young Hoge preach. After his removal to Columbus, the great majority of the church-going members of the State Legislature attended his preaching, it being very attractive to that class of men. His sermons were always rich in biblical and historical lore; they were logically arranged and well expressed. The range of his subjects, perhaps, was not quite as wide as that of many others less gifted than he, for he confined himself very closely to the great doctrines of grace, or the fundamental principles of the Christian religion. 'He determined to know nothing among his people, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.' He never became so animated in his preaching as when he was explaining the great plan of salvation through a Redeemer, or describing the glory of the Divine attributes; setting forth the doctrine of vicarious atonement, justification by faith, repentance and eternal life. These were evidently his favourite themes, though he did not neglect those that pertain more directly to morals and casuistry.

"Owing to the closeness of his reasoning and profundity of his thoughts, the careless hearer felt often that he was uninteresting. The different parts of his discourses were so connected with each other, that the full knowledge of the one was necessary to the due appreciation of the other. In addition to that, his sentences were considered by some too lengthy, and at times somewhat involved. This was not owing to a desire to appear profound, for he always aimed at the greatest simplicity of arrangement and expression, adopting usually the textual mode of dividing his subjects, and sometimes even the expository. Whatever might have been the method used, he was eminently scriptural. He never attempted to embellish his sermons by

any flowers of rhetoric, for the simple reason that he felt that he could not make them so effective, his aim being to reach the heart and conscience. His darts were never coloured with rainbow tints, but sharpened on the tables of the law, and dipped in the blood of the atonement, before they were hurled at the torpid conscience.

"I have been told, that Dr. Hoge was a revival preacher in his early days. By this you are not to understand that he indulged in horrid descriptions, or in vapid declamations, but that he was greatly blessed on such occasions. He was frequently called upon, many years ago, to take part in the exercises, during seasons of special awakening. His preaching at such times was exceedingly simple, but pointed and powerful. He seized the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, and applied it most effectually 'to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, joints and marrow.' He hurled at his hearers the old barbed arrows, that proved so effectual on the day of Pentecost in the hands of Peter, and in those of Paul at Macedonia, Corinth, and Greece.

"But he was never so happy, perhaps, in any of his pulpit efforts as on special occasions. This can be easily accounted for. Being naturally cool, and free from ambitious motives, he needed some extraneous force to call out all his powers. Those of you who heard his Thanksgiving sermons, his lectures on the Apocalypse, during the winters of 1835—36, or his discourses before the Synod and General Assembly, can readily indorse these sentiments. It is said that the sermon he preached from Eph. v. 25, 27, at the opening of the General Assembly at Philadelphia in 1833, was a masterly production; and yet the report is, that he had to call up the line of argument and every train of thought on his way thither, for he had inadvertently left his manuscript at home. The excitement connected with the occasion made him equal to the task. No less remarkable, in many respects, perhaps, was the hastily gotten up funeral discourse he delivered in the Ohio Senate Chamber over the mortal remains of the lamented Dr. Kane, on the 8th of March, 1857; and that on the signs of the times, when Europe was trembling beneath the tramp of war, will be long remembered.

"The vast and varied powers of Dr. Hoge were not confined to the individual church of which he was pastor, but were largely enjoyed by the whole denomination to which he belonged. He may be justly called the father of the Presbytery of Columbus, and even of the Synod of Ohio. He never appeared to better advantage than in our church courts: there he was a giant among his brethren. His personal influence, his practical wisdom, his extensive historical knowledge, his clear mind and logical powers told effectually whenever they were brought to bear on any subject. He did not say much, as a general thing, on any question, but when he rose it was usually done just before taking the vote to state some important fact, or mention some overlooked principle, that decided the case. He never argued for the sake of carrying his point, or showing his power, but because he conscientiously believed it to be his duty to do so. So great was his influence over the Synod, that a large number of its members, on an important occasion, tried to have the roll so called that Dr. Hoge's vote might be cast last, lest it should influence all that followed him; for they felt that it was impossible for many men to see differently from him on any subject.

"His power was felt also in the General Assembly. For many years, he was one of the most prominent men that attended its sessions, having acted as its Moderator in the year 1832, and served always on some of its important committees. A single incident will show you how faithfully he attended to such duties. When nominated, by a meeting held in his own church, as a member of some important committee, he declined the nomination for the want of time to attend to the business. Some one rose, and expressed his hope that Dr. Hoge would allow his name to remain, even if he could not be present at its meetings. He promptly replied, 'No, Sir; I have made it a principle never to be an irresponsible member of a responsible committee.' His faithful adherence to this principle made him a most valuable director or trustee of any institution. Dr. Spencer, of Brooklyn, himself one of the most useful and practical men in our church, said to a distinguished judge in our city, a little before he died, that Dr. Hoge was one of the most useful men that attended the meetings of the General

Assembly; and added, that he had more business tact and practical wisdom than almost any man he ever knew. During the stormy times and heated discussions that led to the great rupture of 1838, he was a peacemaker; but when the question of deciding between the two sides came, he cast his lot most decidedly with the Old-School side, and continued with it until the end of his days.

"It is proper to add, in this connection, that the efforts of Dr. Hoge were not bound by any ecclesiastical ties, but he was ever ready to lend a helping hand to every good cause, or united effort for the well-being of man. Unlike many of the fathers of his day, he was not so shackled by notions and prejudices that he could see nothing good in new and reformatory measures. His eye was so keen that he could see, at a glance, whether a cause had any merits in it or not; it never failed to discriminate between the vapid dreams of enthusiasts, and the wise measures of reformers. He taught the first Sabbath-school in this section of country. When he began, people thought that he was doing wrong, but he was satisfied that the Sabbath-school was not only a sinless institution, but the hope of our rapidly-growing country. He first gathered the little lambs of his flock into his own parlour, on the Lord's day, in order to instruct them in the great truths of the gospel, and soon succeeded in securing the aid of a good Methodist brother to carry on the work more profitably and extensively. Thus commenced that school into which you now send your children.

"Some years after this, he acted as the pioneer of the great temperance reform in our State. Seeing the heart-rending desolation and misery produced by the use of intoxicating liquors, he felt that it was his duty to see if no means, civil or ecclesiastical, could be adopted to stay them. He consulted the late venerable Governor Trimble, who was, at that time, a member of the State legislature, and a frequent guest at his own house, and found him ready to coöperate in any movement for that purpose. They, accordingly, drew up a series of resolutions on the subject, and obtained seventeen names of the most respectable citizens in the place, to their own. This was the first movement, as far as we know, towards a temperance reform in the State of Ohio.

"He acted, for many years, as a trustee in the two State Universities of Ohio, and cast his influence in favour of the present common-school system, which was first introduced in 1825.

"He was one of the warmest advocates of the Bible Society in the West, ever holding that it was the most honoured of all human institutions for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. He proved the sincerity of these views by giving for its use his time, his influence, and his means.

"In addition to all this, Dr. Hoge was a *thorough patriot*. He was not one of those who are clamorous for their country's well-being as long as it is to their pecuniary advantage to be so; nor one of those who are extremely loyal whilst their own views and peculiar notions are being carried out; but a true lover of his country in spirit and in truth, pouring out his prayers most fervently for its safety and integrity.

"Dr. Hoge was a philanthropist. . . . . He found two or three classes of men at home that claimed his attention and enlisted his warmest sympathies. These were the deaf, the dumb, and the blind. He learned, in some way, that these unfortunate creatures could be taught to read the word of God, and master the arts and sciences. Feeling very anxious that it should be tried in the State of Ohio, he applied to the most prominent members of the legislature for their influence to bring it about, but they could not be convinced that such a thing was within the bounds of possibility, and yet so great was their confidence in Dr. Hoge's judgment that they passed a bill authorizing him to try an experiment of that kind. He undertook the work; and, with his characteristic discrimination, selected a most excellent instructor. The thing proved an entire success, and the first report was made to the legislature of the State on the 8th of December, 1827. Hundreds, since that day, have had good reasons to thank God for such a boon.

"On the 11th day of March, 1836, the legislature of Ohio appointed Dr. Hoge, Judge Swayne, and Dr. Awl, as a committee to prepare a report respecting the possibility of ameliorating the condition of the blind. They investigated the matter with great diligence and care, prepared a report at Dr.

Hoge's house, and handed it in, in the month of December of the same year. It was accepted and adopted, and I am told that it forms the basis of every institution for the blind in our Western States.

"He was an efficient aid, as well as constant counsellor to the first projector of the Lunatic Asylum, watching daily the progress of the enterprise with the intensest interest. We might safely add, in this connection, that he manifested a special interest in all the charitable institutions of the State. In fact, it is not too much to say that the great majority of them have felt, in some form, the plastic power of his hand, or the moulding influence of his intellect.

"Our vast country, in all its varied interests, did not wholly absorb the mind and heart of Dr. Hoge. When that loud and doleful wail of the famishing in Ireland wafted across the broad Atlantic, some years since, its first notes reached his ears. They moved his heart to pity, and consequently to take an active part in a movement set on foot to send them immediate relief."

About a year ago, an article appeared in one of our weekly papers, headed "A Western Preacher." In it things were said, which unmistakably pointed to Dr. Hoge. In that piece the writer said,

"As early as 1814, this venerable man suggested to Dr. Speece, of Virginia, the plan of colonizing with their own consent the free people of colour in our land on the coast of Africa. Speece urged him to present his thoughts to the public, yet he declined. But his friend Speece, 'the man of giant body and giant mind,' did that year write and publish on the subject. This was two years before Dr. Finley and his coadjutors had their meeting in Washington to form the American Colonization Society."

When Dr. Hoge could not but see that he was pointed out in the article, he surmised the author, and wrote him a friendly letter, a copy of which is now before us. In that letter he makes this statement:

"In the month of February, 1814, I was on my journey from my father's residence in Virginia to my home in the West. On the way I called on the Rev. Conrad Speece, then

pastor of the Augusta church, near Staunton. We had much conversation, and among other things, on my having fixed my residence in a free State. I gave as one reason, my opposition to slavery. This produced some discussion of that institution, and, as usual in that day, Dr. Speece proposed the question, What should be done with the slaves if they were emancipated? I answered, Send them back to Africa, if they cannot be retained among us as free labourers. The proposal took hold on his mind, and he urged me to write and publish on the subject. This I declined, and requested him to examine the plan, and if he approved it, to write and have *his* views communicated to the public through some suitable medium. I was afterwards informed that Dr. Speece did write, and that his articles were published in a weekly paper printed in Richmond, Virginia, called, if I remember correctly, 'The Family Visitor.' I have not claimed the Plan of Colonization as my own, for I had previously read what was published by Dr. S. Hopkins, of Newport, Rhode Island, suggesting something of the same kind. This conversation with Dr. Speece occurred two years before I knew any thing of Dr. Robert Finley's agency in the matter."

As the article just referred to is not long, we insert most of the remaining paragraphs. Speaking of Dr. Hoge the writer says:

"Though aged, his heart is young. He loves children. He loves horses, and always keeps a good one. He thinks children ought always to have a dog to play with, not only because it furnishes them harmless amusement, but because they thus learn to observe the instincts of animals. It is said that as his own children were growing up, he had a little dog, that *would* go to church on the Lord's day. Although to some it seemed strange that a minister should oppose *any* one going to church, yet 'Fip' was often ordered to be tied or shut up on Sabbath morning. At length he grew so cunning, that when he heard the bells ring early in the morning, long before time for church, he would go out in the street, where they could not catch him, and after service had commenced 'Fip' would come in, ascend the pulpit steps and stand looking intently at his master, until at the end of a paragraph he would turn his head and look over

the congregation, as if to say, 'How do you like that? I think it is first-rate.'

"This venerable man has always been a great reader of newspapers and of penny papers, sometimes in small print. He often sat up late at night to read them by a single lamp.

"He has also through life done much of his studying at night, often sitting up for hours after others had retired to rest. This habit seems never to have injured either his sight or his health. Until of late, no amount of preaching seemed to produce even weariness. Through life, he has often preached three times on the Lord's day, yet was as fresh on Monday as on Saturday."

"Though naturally inclined to taciturnity, yet when he has had a good listener he has often sat up to a late hour, and poured forth a fund of rich thoughts. He has a great dislike to speaking of himself. He has no talent for uttering what Miss Edgeworth calls 'agreeable nonsense.' He is habitually exceedingly grave in his manners and appearance, yet he evidently loves to see others laugh at the right time, and has himself a keen perception of the ludicrous.

"In person, this venerable man is tall, without any tendency to obesity. He is as slender as when young. His complexion is swarthy. His attitude, both when sitting and standing, is very erect. His countenance is somewhat stern. His carriage is very dignified. No man could see him without perceiving at once that he was no changeling, but possessed great decision of character. His whole mien would repel undue familiarity. For most of his long life, his hair has been of a glossy jet black, but of late, time has been frosting it over.

"In preaching, this father is plain, simple, logical, scriptural and practical. He is brisk and lively, but seldom impassioned. He has been eminently useful.

"In deliberative bodies his power is great, because his wisdom is unusual. Public men often consult him. I have seen a venerable deliberative body impatient to come to a vote, when he would rise, shrug his shoulders, and begin to say some kind, weighty thing, until the house gave earnest heed for thirty or forty minutes, when he would sit down as unexpectedly as he rose. He never wearied a body with words after his ideas had been presented.

"I have heard from him wise and powerful addresses and sermons in our largest eastern cities; but he is as earnest and as eloquent in addressing twenty people in a little schoolhouse in the country as in addressing a thousand people in a populous city."

Dr. Hoge's life was not marked by very great variety. The history of one year was substantially the history of another. We will state an exception. In August 1845, he set out on a journey to his native State. The companion of his journey was a beloved child. He went as far as Lewisburg, Va., in his own vehicle. His object, probably, was again to see the country over which he had travelled forty years before. On the way, he pointed out old landmarks, which he recognised. His topical memory was good. He showed peculiar pleasure at discovering the identical bridle-path by which, near the beginning of this century, he had crossed one of the noble mountains—a path forsaken by the public, though still used by some of the mountaineers. In the valley of the great Kanawha, he met, at a late hour of the night, four eminent officers of the court on their way to Charleston. They were all his seniors, but had all been his pupils. The meeting was unexpected, and in the extreme joyous. Every day's journey produced increased exhilaration. How could it be otherwise? The scenery was magnificent. The climate was delightful. Everybody was kind. The whole appearance of the agricultural districts was vastly improved. Every day reminded him of Jacob's return after his long absence in Padan-aram. Near Lewisburg, he came to a spring, where he was once near dying. On his first return from the West, he was at that very spot seized with violent hemorrhage of the lungs; not knowing what to do, and being greatly exhausted, he drank of the water of the spring till he could drink no more. He was soon after discovered by a woman living in a cabin near the spring. She took him to her house, procured medical advice, and nursed him tenderly. It was thought by his physician that the copious draughts of water, probably, saved his life. In 1845, the cabin was still standing, though nearly in ruins. Its kind occupant was gone to eternity. But the memory of Dr. Hoge brought vividly back the whole scene. What recollections! what emotions! what gratitude!

what vows of entire consecration to Him, who had made that life his care. The day will declare all this.

In eastern Virginia, Dr. Hoge found his brother Thomas Hoge, M. D. He was living in Halifax county, on his plantation. As the carriage entered the spacious grounds, a gentleman was seen coming out of the doctor's office and walking across the lawn. It was twenty-seven years since the brothers had met. The carriage was stopped. Dr. James Hoge alighted. The brothers approached each other in silence. Not a word was spoken. They embraced each other for at least five minutes, each with his head on the other's shoulder. The scene reminds us of that scene in Genesis: "And Joseph fell upon his brother Benjamin's neck, and wept; and Benjamin wept upon his neck."

On this visit great numbers flocked to hear Dr. Hoge preach. Churches would not contain the people. The multitudes filled some of the noble groves. There the man of God pleaded with God for the lives of men's souls; and there he pleaded with men to be reconciled to God. His health was excellent. His preaching was powerful. God owned his labours. Among other good done, he had the pleasure of leading his only surviving brother to the cross of Christ. This was reward a thousand times over for all the fatigues of his long journey. When before he left the county he received his brother to the communion of the church, the scene was melting beyond description.

On the same visit he spent a few days with the widow of his father, a lady of much worth and dignity, who greatly enjoyed his society. On his way home he met the Synod of Virginia at Charlotteville, and was most cordially received. On Sabbath morning he preached with great power on the words, "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures."

In estimating the character and services of Dr. Hoge, we wish to be regarded as endorsing in the main the remarks of Mr. Roberts. Some things, indeed, we would have uttered with more strength of expression. We add some thoughts of our own, illustrated by some facts within our knowledge.

If asked how we account for his great usefulness, we of course ascribe it all to the distinguishing grace of God. No

man was more ready than Dr. Hoge to say, "What I am, I am by the grace of God." Yes, it was all rich, free, unmerited grace. But this grace, in making him a chosen vessel, was manifested in the ways and methods likely to produce such a character as his.

Thus his whole early history of hardship and exertion taught him self-reliance. He did not depend on others for what he ought to do for himself. He early saw that the world was busy about its own affairs, cold and selfish; and that even if disposed to help him, it was better to rely on his own exertions.

He was also a child of the covenant. We have spoken of the piety of his paternal ancestry. On his mother's side he had the same blessing. The connection between the prayers of God's people and the conversion and usefulness of their posterity is often hid from us; but in the next world we may see it in a manner that will surprise us. How many able ministers there are now on earth, who have been raised to their present position in answer to the prayers of ancestors who never saw them, no man can tell. We doubt not there are many.

Moreover, Dr. Hoge had a rich and increasing experience during the whole of his life. His early conflicts were followed by a wretched state of health, which made him look solemnly at eternal things. Then the death of four beloved children greatly softened his heart. These were followed by yet other trials and disappointments. John Owen says:

"Ordinarily, it is so in the holy, wise providence of God, that afflictions and troubles increase with age. It is so in an especial manner with ministers of the gospel; they have, many of them, a share in the lot of Peter, which our Lord Jesus Christ declared unto him, John xxi. 18. Besides those natural distempers and infirmities which accompany the decays of life, troubles of life, and in their affairs, do usually grow upon them when they look for nothing less, but were ready to say with Job, 'We shall die in our nest.' Job xix. 18. So was it with Jacob, after all his hard labour and travail to provide for his family, such things fell out in it in his old age as had almost broken his heart; and oft times both persecutions and public dangers do befall them at the same season. While the outward man is thus perishing, we need great supportment, that

we faint not. And this is only to be had in an experience of daily spiritual renovations in the inner man."

Dr. Hoge was no exception to this remark.

Dr. Hoge had a deep and abiding sense of his own utter want of sufficiency to do anything effectually for building up the church, except by the saving energies of the Holy Spirit. He held with another, who said:

"Could preachers declaim the rocks into wax, or hold the attention of the hills by their oratory; could their rhetoric shake the mountains into molehills, or rive the earth to its centre, the hardened heart of man would remain proof against the expostulation, unless he, whose prerogative it is to turn streams into blood, cut seas in sunder, shake the mountains, turn the flint to floods, drop the stars from their spheres and stop the sun in his course, put forth his omnipotent arm, and bow their perverse wills. Such is the desperate condition into which men have fallen by sin, that God must bleed to purchase life for them—the Holy One imputatively become a sinner to make them righteous; and, yet, they will be miserable for ever, unless the same Almighty hand make particular personal application of this infinite expense to their souls by immediate power."

Another secret of Dr. Hoge's success was his untiring industry. "If he was not making a draught of fishes, he was mending his nets." Who ever saw him sit down quietly to do nothing? He was, if not otherwise properly engaged, continually *reading*. He read constantly, not only theology, but history, philosophy and polite literature, etc. This habit was unbroken till he had gone far into his last sickness. Of course, his information was varied and extensive.

Dr. Hoge greatly extended his usefulness by his enlarged Christian hospitality. His house was open to all ministers of the gospel, and, indeed, it was for many years the resort of many of all classes. Of course, he was sometimes imposed on; but he bore this patiently. Nor did he lose his reward. Many pleasant scenes were witnessed by his family. Intelligent Christian gentlemen's visits refine, enliven, and bring down many blessings on a well-ordered household.

Another element of Dr. Hoge's power was his sincerity and

heartincss. Perhaps no man ever heard him accused of want of candor, or of earnestness in any profession of regard. He was not very demonstrative, and yet, he had an affectionate nature.

Dr. Hoge also abounded in secret prayer. Many a time have his children suddenly entered his study and found him on his knees; until at last it came to be their custom to knock or give some notice of their coming in. Even then very often it was evident he had just risen from his knees.

Dr. Hoge also well understood the meaning of the apostle when he said, "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life, that he may please him who hath chosen him to be a soldier." Upon reflection and deliberation he renounced wealth and its temptations. He had ample opportunities of accumulating a vast property. Indeed, he had in actual possession such an amount, that if he had husbanded it, as did many of his neighbours, he would have possessed a very large fortune. But he saw the danger, and made his escape. At one time he was offered on terms quite accordant with his means *thirty thousand* acres of fine land in Madison county; but he saw the effect it was likely to have on his ministerial character and usefulness, and declined the offer. He had some experience of the increasing cares attending a growing fortune, and although the scantiness of his salary, during a considerable part of his life, would have furnished a very plausible pretext to many to embark in secular pursuits, he determined to mind his calling, which was serving Christ in the gospel. His decision was wise. He did never regret it. Even here, he has left his children a better heritage than boundless wealth. "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches." Yet Dr. Hoge was independent in his old age. "He lacked no good comfort."

Dr. Hoge loved to preach. When some one was asked, What is Dr. Hoge doing these days? the answer was, "He is preaching away." He held with the apostles, that the two greatest things done on earth are preaching and praying. Acts vi. 4. If one did not wish Dr. Hoge to preach for him, it was safest not to ask him; for he seldom declined an invitation. Whitefield, who began to preach at twenty-four years of age

and died at fifty-six, had preached *eighteen thousand* times. We have no means of knowing how many times Dr. Hoge preached; but we do know, that for fifty-nine years he was abundant in labours. "There will be time enough to rest in the grave," said a laborious servant of Christ. Men can keep silence without licensure or ordination. Let those who hold a commission proclaim the glad tidings. Some have asked, Was Dr. Hoge eloquent? The answer to this question will depend on the definition we give of eloquence. One writer says, "Eloquence is animated simplicity of speech." In this sense Dr. Hoge was truly eloquent. Another says, "Eloquence is the art of persuasion." In this sense also he was eloquent. He often, even in his latter years, very powerfully moved large audiences. Or, if eloquence consists in a happy use of appropriate language, then Dr. Hoge was eloquent. For who ever wished to "lend him a word?" On communion occasions, Dr. Hoge, like his venerated father before him, was peculiarly tender and solemn. Yet never did he seek meretricious ornament; never was he highly imaginative; seldom did he thrill a whole audience by rare words uttered in clarion tones; perhaps at no time did men say, What an orator!

Dr. Hoge's reverence for sacred things was marked and lifelong. He never "wooed a smile, when he should win a soul." He was always fluent, never flippant.

And he made men feel "how awful goodness is." His presence hushed indecent levity. Yea more, it commanded profound respect. On one occasion he was called into court as a witness. The clerk was about to administer the usual oath. The counsel of the party who had not summoned him, said, "Mr. Clerk, you need not swear that witness." Without the oath the court permitted him to give his testimony, and it was decisive of the case.

Dr. Hoge was also a man of peace, and well did he know how to keep the unity of the Spirit. We have heard very harsh and ungracious things said to him, but we never knew him to give the bitter retort. When the great rupture in the Presbyterian church took place about twenty-five years ago, some of his church desired an organization in connection with our New-school brethren. These discontented persons, of

course, would talk, and some agitation was felt. Dr. Hoge knew what was going on. He called his session together. They sent for the persons who were causing dissension. They insisted on remaining in the church. He and his session insisted that they should bind themselves to live quietly, or at once take regular dismissions. The pastor and session prevailed. All were dismissed, and there was no further disturbance.

Hardly anything has struck us as more remarkable than the uniform agreement of men in estimating Dr. Hoge's character. Just as we were closing this article our eye lighted on an estimate of him in the *Cleveland Herald*. The editor says:

"Dr. Hoge was one of the remarkable men of the age. He was not only an Old-school Presbyterian, but an Old-school Christian gentleman. Tall, erect, active, and inured to the privations and hardships of pioneer life, he bore the weight of accumulating years with unusual vigour and strength, and did not shrink from the great work of his youth and manhood in old age. Modest, affable, benevolent, talented, and full of good sense, Dr Hoge held the even tenor of his way among the same people for nearly three-score years, baptizing their children, marrying the young, consoling the dying, burying their dead, each year binding closer the bonds of union."

ERRATUM—On page 100, *for* Hackett *read* Sackett.

ART. IV.—*Can God be known?*

THIS is a question which lies at the foundation of all religion. If God be to us an unknown God; if we know simply that he is, but not what he is, he cannot be to us the object of love or the ground of confidence. We cannot worship him or call upon him for help. Our Lord tells us that the knowledge of God is eternal life. How is it then that there are some among us, who say that God cannot be known?

There are, however, three answers given to the question which we purpose now to consider. The one is a distinct affirmative answer; another as distinctly negative; and the third

is a qualified affirmative. Among the ancient philosophers there were some who asserted that the nature of God could be as distinctly and as fully determined as any other object of knowledge. This opinion, however, was confined to a small class, until the rise of the modern speculative school of philosophers and philosophical theologians. With the disciples of this school, it is a primary principle, that what cannot be known cannot exist. And consequently that God is, only so far as he is known. To say, therefore, that God cannot be known, is to deny God, or, as Hegel says, it is the sin against the Holy Ghost. *Werke* xiv. p. 219. *Mansel*, p. 301.

How God is thus known in his own nature, these philosophers differ among themselves. Schelling says, it is by direct intuition of the higher reason. He assumes that there is in man a power which transcends the limits of ordinary consciousness, and by which the mind takes immediate cognizance of God.

Hegel and his followers say, it is by a process of thought; our thought of God is God. Our knowledge of God is God's knowing himself. We know of God all that God knows of himself. This knowledge is God's self-consciousness. *Werke* xii. p. 400. *Mansel*, p. 245. Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 10. Cousin finds this knowledge in the common consciousness of men. That consciousness includes the knowledge of the finite and infinite. We know the one as we know the other, and cannot know one without knowing both. "God in fact exists to us only so far as he is known." These philosophers all admit that the infinite can only be comprehended by the infinite, and, therefore, man to known God must be himself God. Reason in man, according to Cousin, does not belong to his individuality. It is impersonal, infinite, divine. What is personal to us is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and voluntary does not constitute an integrant part of our individuality. See Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 15. *Princeton Review* on Cousin's Philosophy, 1856.

This theory starts, as we have seen, with the idea of the absolute, which is defined to be that which exists in and of itself, and is independent of any necessary relation. From the absolute, which is the object of immediate knowledge, in one of the methods above mentioned, are determined the nature

of God. 2. His relation to the world; and, 3. What the world is. As to the nature of God, it follows from the nature of the absolute, that he is all things. "What kind of absolute Being is that," asks Hegel, "which does not contain all that is actual, even evil included." *Werke* xv. p. 275. *Mansel*, p. 77. It also follows from this idea that neither intelligence, will, or consciousness can be predicated of the absolute being as such. For all these imply limitation and relation. He is indifferent substance, which manifests itself, and comes into existence in the world. This determines his relation to the world. It is that of identity, so far as the world is the existence of God. It is coeternal with him. Creation is necessary as the self-evolution of God. And the world itself is merely phenomenal. It is the ever-changing mode of the divine existence. It has in itself no reality, except as the actual of the divine being is the real. Man has no individual subsistence, no personal immortality, no liberty, no accountability. Such is the doctrine of those who pretend to a knowledge of the infinite. In opposition to this doctrine, so monstrous and destructive, others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained that God is not knowable. We know that he is, but not what he is. This proposition has been understood in very different senses by those who use it. Plato has said, the search after God was difficult, and when found, his nature could not be declared. And Philo still more definitely asserts that the divine essence is without qualities and attributes; and as we can know nothing of any essence but by its distinguishing qualities, God in his own nature must be to us altogether unknowable.* So the devout Pascal, (*Pénsées*, partie ii., art. iii. 5.), says, "We know there is an infinite, and we are ignorant of its nature—we may well know that there is a God without knowing what he is." This is repeated continually by the Greek and Latin fathers, many of whom intended nothing more than that the infinite God is incomprehensible by his creatures. Others again in this declaration of the incapacity of man to know God, refer to the spiritual blindness occasioned by sin. And, therefore, while they deny that God can be known by the unregenerated, affirm that he is

* Strauss's Dogm. i. p. 527.

known by those to whom the Son has revealed him. The sense in which so many Christian fathers, philosophers, and theologians have pronounced that God cannot be known, is very different from the sense in which that proposition is asserted by Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and others of the same school. These distinguished writers had for their object the refutation of the monstrous system of modern pantheism which is founded in what is called a philosophy of the absolute, or, in the language of Hamilton, of the unconditioned. In opposition to the doctrine that we can know only the properties and phenomena of the world within and around us, and must from the limitation of our faculties be ignorant of the real essence which underlies these phenomena, the pantheistic or transcendental school of philosophy, assert that experience is unworthy the name of science, and that there can be no philosophy unless we can know things as they are, or can directly cognise the absolute (or unconditional), "As philosophy is the science of the unconditioned (*i. e.* the absolute and infinite), the unconditioned must be within the compass of science." Sir William Hamilton, p. 30. This assumption the philosophers just referred to have effectually proved to be unfounded. 1. By showing that the immediate knowledge of God, *i. e.*, of an absolute and infinite, is impossible. They have demonstrated that the immediate intuition of Schelling, which Hegel ridiculed, is a chimera; and that the dialectics of Hegel, which Schelling denounced, was a mere play of words, (see p. 31); and that Cousin's impersonal reason which enters into our consciousness, but not into our personality, is a gratuitous assumption. If these pretended methods of attaining an immediate knowledge of the infinite are unavailing, the knowledge itself must be unattainable. Existence is revealed to us only under specific modifications, and these are known only under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge. Things in themselves, matter, mind, God, all in short that is not finite, relative, phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our knowledge." Hamilton's *Discuss.* p. 23. 2. In the second place, this claim to the immediate cognition of the infinite is proved to be false, by the admission that none but the infinite can know the infinite. The assumption that man is infinite,

which this philosophy involves, shocks the reason and common consciousness of man, as well as outrages his religious and moral convictions. 3. In the third place, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel have abundantly shown that assuming the definitions of the absolute and infinite given by the transcendentalists, the most contradictory conclusions may be logically deduced from them. "There are three terms," says, Mr. Mansel, "familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of metaphysical theology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By *First Cause*, is meant that which produces all things, and of itself is produced by none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the *Infinite*, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attributes or mode of existence, which it had not from eternity." Accepting these definitions in the sense in which they are intended to be understood, it follows, first, that the absolute and infinite must amount to the sum of all reality. This, says Mr. Mansel, although rejected with indignation, as referring all evil to God, or making God to include all evil that is either real or possible, must be admitted as a necessary inference. "For that which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation." P. 76. Secondly, if the absolute and infinite be as above defined, it necessarily follows that they cannot be the object of knowledge—for to know is to limit; it is to define; it is to distinguish the object of knowledge from other objects. We cannot, for example, says Hamilton, conceive of an absolute whole, that is of a whole so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of a greater whole. Nor can we conceive of an infinite line, nor infinite space, nor infinite duration. We may as well think without thought, as to assign any limit beyond which there can

be no extension, no space, no duration. "Goad the imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of the finite." Hamilton, *Discuss.* 35. It follows, therefore, from the very nature of knowledge, that the absolute and infinite cannot be known. Thirdly, another no less necessary inference is, that as the infinite cannot be known, neither can it know. All knowledge or thought, say these philosophers, is limitation and difference. There is a difference between subject and object, between what knows and what is known. But in the absolute and infinite there can be no such difference, and therefore there can be no knowledge. Intelligence, therefore, whose essence is plurality, (*i. e.*, includes subject and object,) cannot be absolute, p. 39; nor the absolute intelligent. Fourth, it follows also from the nature of the absolute and infinite that it cannot be conscious; for consciousness involves a distinction between the self and not self. It is the knowledge of ourselves as different from what is not ourselves. "There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious." Even if only conscious of itself, there is the same distinction between subject and object; the self as subject, and a mode of the self as the object of consciousness. *Mansel*, p. 78, sec. 79. "The unanimous voice of philosophy," says Mansel, "in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter," p. 79. "Consciousness is the only form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change—the perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others," p. 95. The conception of an absolute and infinite consciousness, contradicts itself, p. 79. Fifth, it is no less clear that the absolute and infinite cannot be cause. Causation implies relation, the relation of efficiency to the effect. It implies also change, a change from inactivity to activity. It implies also succession, and succession implies existence in time, which cannot be predicated of the infinite and absolute. "A thing existing absolutely, (*i. e.*, not under relation,) and a thing existing absolutely as a cause," says Hamilton, *Discuss.* p. 40, "are contradictory." He quotes Schelling as saying, that he would deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who would think of defining its nature as *activity*. "But he who

would define the absolute by the notion of cause," adds Hamilton, "would deviate still more widely from its nature; inasmuch as the notion of a cause involves not only a determination to activity, but a determination to a particular kind of activity," p. 40. "The three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not," asks Mr. Mansel, "imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction as attributes of one and the same being? A cause cannot as such be absolute; the absolute cannot, as such, be cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the cause is the cause of the effect, and the effect is the effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." Sixth, according to the laws of our reason and consciousness there can be no duration without succession, but succession as implying change cannot be predicated of the absolute and infinite, and yet without succession there can be no thought or consciousness, and, therefore, to say that God is eternal, is to deny that he has either thought or consciousness. Seventh, "Benevolence, holiness, justice, wisdom," says Mansel, "can be conceived of us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any of his attributes, but the common subject of them all in one person. But personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and relation. To speak of an absolute and infinite person is simply to use language to which, however it may be true in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself." P. 103.

What then is the result of the whole matter? It is that reason and the laws and necessities of human thought, lead us into a labyrinth of contradictions. If there be an absolute and infinite Being, he must be the sum of all existence, evil as well as good, possible as well as actual; if admitted to exist, such a being cannot be an object of knowledge, for we know and can know only the finite; and as the infinite cannot be known, neither can it know. It can neither be self-conscious, nor a cause, nor a person, nor the subject of any moral attributes. What is the inference from all this? The first inference drawn by Sir William Hamilton from these premises, is that a

philosophy of the Absolute is a sheer impossibility. It cannot be known "any more than a greyhound can outstrip his shadow, or the eagle soar higher than the atmosphere." The human mind can think only under the limitations which confine its knowledge to the phenomenal and finite. Consequently, the whole modern transcendental philosophy is a baseless fabric. In this conclusion we may well acquiesce, and feel deep gratitude to the man whose unequalled learning and matchless power have been employed in unmasking the pretensions of this stupendous system of pantheistic atheism, whose highest results are the deification of man and the deification of evil.

But unfortunately Hamilton does not stop here. He infers that all that is said of the Absolute by the transcendentalists is true of God. That is, that so far as human faculties are concerned he is not an object of knowledge; that if we conceive of him as absolute and infinite, we cannot conceive of him as cause, as intelligent, as conscious, as a person, or possessed of any attributes. He is pure nothing—the simple negation of all thought. "A God understood," he says, "would be no God at all. To think that God is as we can think him to be, is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar—'Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ—To the known and unknowable God." *Discuss.* p. 22. Nevertheless he admits, and Mr. Mansel admits, that we are forced to think of God as absolute and infinite, to believe that he is such, and also that he is a person, self-conscious, the first cause of all things, benevolent, wise, holy and just. They admit that he is declared to be all this in the Scriptures, to the authority of which they bow. How are these things to be reconciled? How can our reason lead us inevitably to the conclusion that the absolute is unconscious, without intelligence, will, activity, or moral perfections, when the constitution of our nature, and the word of God, declare the very reverse? To meet this difficulty, they have recourse to two principles. First, that this contradiction is merely in our own minds, or arises from the limitations of human thought. It determines nothing as to what the absolute, or God, is in himself. And, second, that the Bible is not intended to teach us what God really is, but what he chooses that we should think

him to be. As to the former of these principles, Mr. Mansel says, "It is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. . . . . It proves that there are limits to man's power of thought; and it proves nothing more." P. 106. On the second principle, that our knowledge of God is mere *regulative*, he says, we must be "content with those regulative ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect—which tell, not what God is in himself, but how he wills that we should think of him." P. 132. "Though this kind of knowledge is," says Hampden, (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 54, quoted by Mr. Mansel, p. 303,) "abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel and how to act towards God—for it is the language we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice—it is altogether inadequate in point of science." Regulative knowledge, therefore, is that which is designed to regulate or determine our character and practice. It need not be true, much less adequate or complete. All that is necessary is, that it should be trustworthy, *i. e.*, such as we can safely act upon. As our senses, it is said, give us only relative, and not absolute knowledge, telling us what things appear to us to be, not what they really are, so the revelation which God has made of himself in our moral nature and in his word, reveals him as he appears to be, as he wills that we should regard him, but not at all as he really is. But as we can safely trust to our senses, and act as though the knowledge which they give us is real and not merely regulative; so we can safely act on the assumption that God is what he declares himself to be, whether he really is in his own nature what we think he is or not. All that the Bible and our own nature reveals of God we are to believe—that is, regard as trustworthy—although we must remain in profound and absolute ignorance whether

these revelations are true, that is, answer to objective reality or not.

This whole theory which teaches that God cannot be known, appears to us self-contradictory and destructive.

1. In the first place, it cannot even be stated, without involving a denial of doctrine in the very terms in which it is presented. For example, Mr. Mansel says, after Sir William Hamilton, that we cannot know whether God is a person or not. We must think of him as a person, and feel toward him as such, but this is only a *regulative* revelation, designed to control our thoughts, feelings, and conduct. But what is regulative truth, but truth designed to accomplish a given end? And what is design, but the intelligent adaptation of means to an end? And what is intelligent adaptation of means but a personal act? Unless, therefore, God be in reality a person, there can be no regulative truth. Mr. Mansel says, we do not know what God is in himself, "but how he wills that we should think of him." Here will is attributed to God, and the personal pronouns, He and Him, are used, and must be used, in the very statement of the doctrine. That is, it must be assumed and asserted that He is a person in the very assertion of the principle that our knowledge is regulative and not real.

2. This theory contradicts itself, in that it both affirms and denies the veracity of consciousness, and the authority of our intuitive convictions. Thus it admits that our consciousness teaches absolute truth when it declares the real existence of the objects of sense. We know they are; but we do not know that they are what we take them to be. Consciousness, however, teaches the one as well and as clearly as the other. If Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel are right in repudiating the authority of consciousness when it teaches us that things are what they appear to be, why may not Spinoza repudiate its authority when it teaches that the external is real? Again, Mr. Mansel says, consciousness teaches us not only that we are, but what we are, and its testimony as to both parts must be received with implicit confidence as the foundation of all science, religion, and morals. "I think, *therefore*, I am," or rather, as M. Bartholemiss, *Histoire des doctrines religions*, i. p. 23, (quoted by Mansel, p. 288), renders the *ergo*, *c'est à dire*, "that is to say, I who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am

the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation to personality, all that we know of that which seems to exist." P. 105. Consciousness gives us the knowledge of *substance*. We are a substantive existence, p. 288. "Kant," he says, "unquestionably went too far in asserting that things in themselves *are not* as they appear to our faculties; the utmost that his premises could warrant him in asserting is, that we cannot tell whether they are so or not. And even this degree of scepticism, though tenable as far as external objects are concerned, cannot legitimately be extended to the personal self. I exist, as I am conscious of existing; and conscious self is the *Ding an sich*, the standard by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived." P. 291. That is to say, when we see a tree, we are authorized to conclude there is something seen—but not what that something is—that is, a real subsistence in a given form, with given properties and attributes. All we know is, there is something, but whether a substance, a force, an idea in our own mind, or a mode of God's existence, we cannot tell. But when we are conscious not of a sense-perception—but of our own thoughts and feelings, then it is not merely an unknown something of which thought and feeling are phenomena, which is assumed, but really a substance, the existing self. This seems to us a contradiction, as it affirms in one sentence what is denied in the next. Consciousness no more directly apprehends the substance self, than it does the substance tree. And if in the perception of a tree, we cannot infer (or rather assume as given in) the phenomena what the something is that we perceive; neither are we authorized to infer, or to assume, the substance self, to account for the phenomena of thought and feeling. As many men deny the one as deny the other. The application of this principle to the case of our knowledge of God is obvious. As we know, says Mansel, that sensible objects are, but not what they are, so we know God is, but not what he is. But as we do know that a tree is not merely an unknown something, but a tree; as we know that we are an intelligent feeling acting substance—and not merely that the

phenomena of thought and feeling exist, so we know not only that God is, but what he is. We know from our consciousness what a spirit is, as Mr. Mansel admits. And therefore, when it is revealed in consciousness, as he also admits, that we stand in relation to God as to another spirit, on whom we are dependent and to whom we are accountable, it is thereby revealed in consciousness or in the laws of our nature, not only that God is, but that he is a spirit. And this obscure revelation given within, which so many men in their blindness misread or neglect, is authenticated by the express declaration of Him who is truth itself. God is a spirit. It is not true, therefore, that God is unknown and unknowable, and the theory which leads to that conclusion is not only false, but, as we have endeavoured to show, self-contradictory.

3. This is not the worst. This theory involves not only at one time the admission, and at another the denial, of the veracity of consciousness; it causes scepticism beyond the limits assigned to it in other departments of knowledge. Mr. Mansel says that Kant is wrong in asserting that the objects of sense *are not* what they appear to our faculties; we simply do not know what they are. They may be what we take them to be, or they may not. But Sir William Hamilton says it is blasphemy to think that God is as we can think him to be. He and Mr. Mansel both say the absolute cannot be a cause, the infinite cannot be a person. "A thing—an object—an attribute—a person—or any other term to signify one of many possible objects of consciousness, is by that very relation necessarily declared to be finite." P. 107. That is, if we think of God as a person distinct from other persons, ourselves for example, it is impossible to think of him as infinite. He is thereby necessarily declared to be finite. This theory, therefore, does not merely teach that we do not know what God is, but that we do know that he is what we think him to be; he is not cause, intelligent, conscious, or person. If he is absolute and infinite, it is said, he cannot be any of these.

4. But these distinguished writers are devout Theists. They believe in an absolute, infinite, personal God. They say the existence of such a being is a matter of faith. We may believe what we cannot know, and, it seems, what we know is self-

contradictory. On this doctrine, that we may and must believe what the reason pronounces to be impossible, we would remark, in the first place, that it supposes a conflict between the constitutional elements of our being inconsistent with rationality. The reason of a man is the man himself; so is his conscience; and so are his other faculties. It is the one substantive self that thinks, feels, and wills. To assume, therefore, that by necessity we should think one way and feel another; that the laws of our reason should declare that to be true which our conscience or senses declare to be false, is to destroy our rationality. In the second place, it destroys the foundation of all knowledge. The ultimate ground of knowledge is confidence in the veracity of God. How do we know that consciousness is not a delusion or a lie? How do we know that the laws of belief impressed upon our nature, and which we are forced to obey, are not all false? If laws of our reason necessitate the belief of what is not true, or necessarily lead to false conclusions, why may not the senses, and conscience, and consciousness itself, be equally fallacious? We do not see what Hamilton or Mr. Mansel can have to say to the Pantheist who pronounces the finite to be a show and delusion. All foundation of confidence is gone, if we once admit that God has so constituted our nature that it cannot be trusted; that reason, conscience, or the senses, acting according to the laws he has given them, lead us into contradictions and absurdities. It does not avail to say that this evil arises from men attempting to transcend the limits which God has assigned to the human mind. It is conceded that there are such limits, and that they are very narrow, and that all beyond them is for us darkness and chaos. But it is not a question about what is beyond these limits, but as to what are the legitimate results of human thinking. These philosophers say that the right use of reason leads inevitably and of necessity to the conclusion that the absolute and infinite is not a cause, intelligent, or a person. But this conclusion is admitted to be false, and it therefore follows that God has made it necessary for us to believe what is not true. To say that the difficulty arises from the fact that the absolute is not an object of knowledge, and hence it is that we of necessity err when we attempt to reason about it, is

equivalent to saying that because sound is not an object of vision, the right use of our eyes necessarily leads to a false theory of acoustics. If a man assumes that the incomprehensible can be comprehended, his reasoning will no doubt be vicious and his conclusions false. But this is only saying that false premises and false reasoning lead to false conclusions. But according to Hamilton and Mansel, right premises and correct reasoning lead to false conclusions; which is a very different thing, and a direct impeachment of the Author of our rational nature, and destructive of the foundation of all knowledge. In the third place, the principle that reason may legitimately pronounce absurd that which nevertheless we are bound to believe, renders faith itself impossible. If our reason, acting according to the laws which God hath given us, teaches that the infinite cannot be a person, then it is impossible that we should believe in his personality. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between the incomprehensible and the impossible. We may not be able to understand how the infinite can be a person; but this is very different from seeing that the two ideas are incompatible, so that an infinite person is an impossibility. We may be utterly unable to understand the law of gravitation, or how matter can attract matter in proportion to its quantity and the square of the distance between one portion and another, but this is very different from seeing that such attraction is impossible. As faith is the inward affirmation of the mind that a thing is true, and impossibility or contradiction is an affirmation or perception that it is not and cannot be true, it is evident that faith cannot coexist in the mind with the conviction that its object is an impossibility. If, therefore, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are right in saying that the absolute and infinite cannot be cause, intelligent, conscious, or a person; if reason, as they say, pronounces these ideas contradictory, then faith in them becomes an impossibility, or, if possible, it would be irrational and irreligious. Just as all Protestants pronounce the faith of the Catholic, that the consecrated wine is blood, both irrational and irreligious. It supposes God to require us to believe what the constitution of the nature which he has given us declares to be false. The theory under consideration reduces, therefore,

Theism to a level with transubstantiation; a doctrine which cannot be believed without renouncing our rationality and our allegiance to God. It concedes every thing to the transcendentalists. For while it demonstrates that their conclusions are false, it admits the validity of their premises; and from these premises, either their conclusions or absolute scepticism must follow. This objection that Hamilton's doctrine renders faith impossible is not met by the remark of Mansel, that the contradictions referred to are only in our own minds. So is faith in our own minds. We cannot believe what is contradictory to us. Other and higher intelligences, to whom these things are not contradictions, may believe them. But no rational being can believe what to him is a contradiction.

5. Sir William Hamilton's doctrine that God is unknown and unknowable, not only as we have endeavoured to show, involves self-contradictions, or is inconsistent with itself; it not only denies the veracity of consciousness, and leads to absolute scepticism by destroying the foundation of both knowledge and faith; but, as a farther objection, it is, as it seems to us, illogical. It is a specimen of false reasoning. He starts with a certain definition of the absolute and infinite; from that definition he deduces by a strict process of reasoning, a mass of contradictions. The legitimate conclusion from this fact is, that the premises are wrong; that he has assumed something as belonging to the absolute which does not really belong to it. But instead of admitting any error in his definition, he asserts that the absolute is entirely unknowable. This is certainly a *non-sequitur*. If a man chooses to define the human soul as an idea, or as a mode of God's existence, instead of an individual self-conscious substance, and from that definition draws any number of contradictory conclusions, that does not prove that the soul is absolutely unknowable. It only proves that the definition is wrong. So when Hamilton and Mansel draw from the definition of the absolute and infinite as given by the transcendentalists, what the former calls a whole fasciculus of contradictions, the conclusion is decisive as against the transcendentalists and their definitions, but altogether illegitimate as against those who repudiate the premises as well as the conclusions. Hamilton and Mansel, however, admit the premises,

and therefore are reduced to the alternative of absolute scepticism, or a blind, irrational and impossible faith. What right have these philosophers to define the absolute as that which existing by and in itself, and without necessary relation to any other being, in such a sense as to deny any possible relation whatever. If the idea of the absolute exclude the idea of relation—then the absolute must be absolutely all that is, whether potential or actual, whether good or evil. Then, also, it cannot sustain the relation of cause to effect, or of subject to object. Then, as these philosophers teach, it cannot be intelligent, conscious, or a person. But suppose we define the absolute to be the self-existent, having no necessary relation to any thing out of itself, then none of these conclusions follow. If the self-existing being is a spirit, then it has and must have power, intelligence, and will; the distinctions and relations involved in activity and intelligence are not inconsistent with its nature. What right again have they to define the infinite so as necessarily to exclude the finite. If, say they, the infinite does not include the finite, then it can be greater than it is, and therefore not infinite. But, if the infinite implies the negative of only such limitations as is inconsistent with perfection, then these absurdities do not follow. If, as Hamilton and Mansel, after the transcendentalists, say, that all thought is limitation, then such limitation is an excellence. An infinite that is intelligent is surely higher than an infinite that is unintelligent. There is nothing, therefore, in the idea of the absolute or the infinite, legitimately understood, which is inconsistent with the absolute and infinite God, that is, God considered as self-existing and of infinite perfection, being the cause of all things out of himself; a self-conscious, intelligent person, holy, just, and good. The contradictions said to be involved in this idea, all flow from arbitrary definitions, the incorrectness of which is demonstrated by the absurdities to which they lead.

6. Another fallacy in the argument of Hamilton and Mansel, to prove that God cannot be known, is found in their use of the word *to know*. If all knowledge be limitation, not only in the subject but in the object, if we must limit God's power in order to know it; if we limit omniscience in order to

have any knowledge of it; then, of course, the infinite cannot be known. And this is the sense in which Hamilton uses the word. He often, indeed almost habitually, interchanges the words to conceive and to know, the conceivable and the knowable. What, therefore, we cannot conceive of, we cannot know. But in the ordinary sense of the word, and in that sense in which Hamilton and Mansel, at least, often use it, *to conceive* is to form an image of. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 24,) "implies imagination. To have a conception of a horse," he adds, "we must be able to combine the attributes constituting the definition of the animal *into a representative image.*" "Conception," is also defined by Taylor in his *Elements of Thought*, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word all must admit that the infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole, or of an infinite part, or of an infinite God. And it is well we cannot, for that would be mental idolatry. No wonder that Hamilton says it is blasphemy to think God is what we can think him to be, if by thinking or knowing him, we must of necessity limit or make a mental image of him. A second sense in which these writers use the word *to know*, is that of comprehending, understanding. To know the absolute, in this sense of the word, is to have such a comprehension of its nature, as to be able, *a priori*, to determine all about it; to decide what is and what is not consistent with the idea. It is so to understand what it is, as to make it the foundation of all science. The incomprehensible, the inconceivable, and unknowable, are in the philosophy of Hamilton, and in the reasoning of Mr. Mansel, convertible terms. They are, however, all clearly and easily distinguishable. The incomprehensive may be knowable, but it cannot be conceived of, or reduced to a mental image. It is, therefore, far from following that because God is incomprehensible and inconceivable he cannot be known.

"Knowledge," says Archbishop Whately, (*Logic*, book iv. chap. ii., and *e* note), implies three things: "1st, firm belief; 2d, of what is true; 3d, and on sufficient grounds." This

may not be an accurate statement, as it does not sufficiently discriminate between knowledge and faith. The difference lies in the ground of the firm persuasion which is common to both. The ground of knowledge, is sense, consciousness or deduction. In faith it is adequate testimony, or authority. But this does not concern the present subject. If knowledge be the firm belief of what is true, on sufficient and appropriate grounds, then all the arguments of Hamilton and Mansel to prove that God cannot be known fall to the ground.

7. If our knowledge of God be merely regulative; if God be not in reality what the Scriptures declare him to be; if the design of the revelation he has made of himself in the constitution of our nature, in the external world, in his word, and in Christ, is not to teach us what God is, but simply to regulate our feelings and conduct, then it is deceptive and powerless. This theory not only assumes that God may be altogether different from what we think him to be, but it is certain that he is not what we think, or can think him to be. We think he is a person, that he thinks, and feels, and acts. Although we are bound to believe this, it is nevertheless a delusion. It not only may be a mistake, but it certainly is a mere form of subjective knowledge, to which the reality does not correspond. Mr. Mansel indeed says, that the objects of our sense-perception may be what they appear to us to be, and so God may be what we think he is. But then, he also teaches that this assumption induces endless contradictions and absurdities. If that is so, it cannot be true and cannot be believed. And Sir William Hamilton says, that it is blasphemy to assert that he is what we can think him to be. He is unknown and unknowable. And Mr. Mansel says, "the infinite cannot be an object of thought at all," p. 194. Then, of course, to us he does not exist. What is not and cannot be thought has no reality for us. What is said about the infinite, that is about God, cannot be any thing more for us than imagination, delusions, and fanciful representations. We can imagine the whole universe to be peopled with intelligent agents, fairies, or gods and goddesses, and this imagination may have a regulative power, as it doubtless had over those who adopt these fancies. But it is all a delusion. In like manner, we may have the notion of an absolute

and infinite being who is the first cause of all things, a person who thinks, feels, and acts, who takes cognizance of human conduct, and judges men according to their works. And this notion or imagination may have great power over those who believe it. But according to this philosophy it is not true. It is only the form under which an unknown truth is presented to our minds. All we certainly know is, that our thoughts do not represent the reality. God treats men as some parents educate their children, by fictions and fairy tales. It should be remembered, however, that the power of regulative truth depends on the belief that it is true. If a mother tells her child that there is no Christkind or Santa Claus, the giver of Christmas presents—that she is the real giver, of course, the power of the delusion of a supernatural giver is gone. Or, to take a more elevated illustration, if a philosopher had convinced the Greeks that there was no Neptune, or death-dealing Apollo, to be propitiated, the regulative power of the belief in those deities would be lost. In like manner, if Sir William and Mr. Mansel can convince the world that God is not what we think him to be, the power of the thought—that is, the power of the doctrine of theism—will be gone. What we call God may be a mere unconscious force, or a moral order of the universe, or an idea with no objective reality at all. The principle which these philosophers apply to the doctrine of God must, if sound, be appliable to all the doctrines of religion, natural and revealed. If what is taught concerning God is merely regulative, then what is taught of sin and atonement, and Christ, and heaven and hell, must be merely regulative. Then, the whole system of truth, the external universe, the world of mind and thought, is one vast illusion, a phantasmagoria, having semblance but not reality. We do not forget that Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are devout men, that they write not against the truth, but in its defence. They believe in God, and in the doctrines of his word. It is not against them or their beliefs that these remarks are directed, but against their philosophy. The conclusions to which their principles, as it seems to us, inevitably lead to the overthrow not only of theism, but of all rational faith in the doctrines of religion.

We have endeavoured to show, 1. That the principles of this

philosophy are self-contradictory. 2. That they involve at once the assertion and denial of the veracity of consciousness. 3. That they destroy the foundation of all knowledge, which is confidence in God that he has not so constituted our nature as to force us to believe what is not true. 4. That they destroy the possibility of faith, as they require us to believe what our reason declares to be impossible. 5. That the system is illogical, as it adopts principles which necessarily lead to false conclusions; and instead of renouncing the premises, it falsely concludes that God, or the Infinite, cannot be known; whereas the only thing the argument proves is that the *a priori* ideas of the Absolute and Infinite on which the system is founded are incorrect. 6. That the whole doctrine of regulative truth, adopted to save us from absolute scepticism, is itself delusive and destructive. And 7. That the system itself is founded on an arbitrary and false notion of the nature of knowledge.

We come now to state in what sense, according to the Scriptures and the common faith of the church, God can and may be known. 1. It is admitted that God is inconceivable in the same sense that infinite space, infinite duration, or any form of infinitude is inconceivable. That is, it is conceded, that we cannot form a conception or representative image of an absolute and infinite being. The same, however, is true of many other objects of knowledge. We know that substance is, but we can form no conception of what it is. Neither can we form any representative image of the soul, or of any thing that is not at once finite and material.

2. It is admitted that God is incomprehensible. To comprehend is to know fully. It is to know all that is to be known of its object by any intelligence, even by the highest. Such knowledge is impossible in a creature, either of itself or any thing out of itself. It includes, *a*. The knowledge of the essence as well as the attributes of its objects. *b*. A knowledge not of some, but of all its properties. *c*. Of the relation in which these attributes stand to each other and to the substance to which they belong. *d*. Of the relation in which the object of knowledge stands to all other things. Such knowledge of God can belong to no one but to God himself. We do not know his essence, we do not know all his attributes. He

may have, and doubtless has, many perfections of which we have no idea. Neither can we comprehend his relation to things out of himself. That is, of the infinite to the finite. But the same may be said of every thing else, even of our own souls. We do not know its essence; we do not know all its capacities. We have only an imperfect knowledge of those powers which are called into exercise in the present life. The soul doubtless has faculties of which we at present have no knowledge whatever, but which will be developed in a future state of existence. These, and other limitations of our knowledge of ourselves, however, are not incompatible with definite and certain knowledge of our nature and capacities to a certain extent. And as this knowledge is real, and not merely regulative, as we are sure that we really are what we are conscious of being, so, in like manner, our knowledge of God is real, and not merely regulative. He really is what we take him to be, so far as our views are determined by the revelation which he has made of himself.

3. It is also conceded that our knowledge of God is not only imperfect in the sense that there is much that is true concerning him which we do not know at all; but also that our knowledge of what is revealed concerning him is merely partial and inadequate. We know that God knows; but there is much relating to his mode of knowing, as well as to the extent of his knowledge and of its relation to its objects, of which we are ignorant. We know that he acts, but we do not know how he acts, or the relation which his activity bears to time, or to the things out of himself. We know that he feels, that he loves, pities, is merciful and gracious, that he hates sin. We know that these representations convey real truth, *i. e.*, they answer to what is objectively true in God, and are not merely modes in which we express our subjective convictions. The emotional element of the divine nature is covered with an obscurity as great, but no greater, than that which rests over his knowledge, thoughts, and purposes. Here again our ignorance, or rather the limitations of our knowledge, in relation to God, finds a parallel in our ignorance of ourselves. We know that we perceive, think, feel, reason, and act, but how, we do not know. It is perfectly inscrutable to us how the mind, which is

immaterial, takes cognizance of what is material; or how matter can act on spirit; or how the mind can act on the body. These are facts of consciousness which are as incomprehensible to us as the modes in which God acts on his creatures. But as partial knowledge of the facts of consciousness is not inconsistent with the reality and correctness of that knowledge as far as it goes, so our partial knowledge of God is not incompatible with the reality or correctness of our knowledge of him. Mr. Mansel's argument against the claim of partial knowledge of God, is a remarkable specimen of that play on words with which the most distinguished men often delude themselves and confound their readers. "To have a partial knowledge of an object," he says, "is to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part of the infinite which is supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, it presents the same difficulties as before, (*i. e.*, it cannot be known.) If it is finite, the point in question is conceded, and our consciousness is allowed to be limited to finite objects." *Limit.* p. 98. It might as well be said that we can have no partial and yet definite knowledge of duration, unless we can comprehend eternity, nor of space, unless we can comprehend infinite space, or of knowledge, unless we understand omniscience, or of power, unless we are conscious of omnipotence. There is such a thing as partial knowledge, even of the infinite, as our knowledge of the finite is in all directions partial. "We know in part," says the apostle, a much higher authority than any philosopher.

The limitations, therefore, which belong to our nature as finite beings, do not impose on us any such ignorance of God as that which belongs to irrational creatures or to idiots, to whom the name and attributes of God have no meaning; nor yet the ignorance under which the blind labour with regard to colour. The blind have nothing in their experience or consciousness which answers to that word, and they can attach to it no definite idea. They know there is something which other men call colour, but what it is they cannot tell. This is a form of ignorance which the theory under consideration would ascribe to men in reference to God, but which the human consciousness instinctively rejects. Nor again are we ignorant of

God in any such sense as we are, or should be, if a geometrical figure were proposed to us in its elements, which we could demonstrate was a square, and with equal certainty prove it to be a circle. This again is a form of ignorance which this theory attributes to man in relation to God. By one process we can prove he is a person, and by another that he cannot be a personal being; that he is a cause, and that he cannot be a cause; that he is intelligent, and that he cannot be intelligent; that he is holy, just, and good, and that he cannot possess moral attributes.

In opposition to all this, the Scriptures declare and the whole church believes, that God is a proper object of knowledge; that while we cannot conceive of him in infinitude, nor comprehend his nature, his perfections, nor his relation to his creatures, yet our partial knowledge is correct knowledge; that he really is what he declares himself to be—a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent, infinite, eternal and immutable in his being and attributes. By knowledge is meant, not full comprehension of its object, but a firm belief of what is true on appropriate grounds addressed to our reason. That such belief is of the nature of knowledge, Sir William Hamilton himself admits. The primary truths revealed in the constitution of our nature, and vouched for by the common consciousness of men, he calls primary cognitions or beliefs. We know that we ourselves are, and that we are intelligent, personal subsistences; we know that the external world exists, and that the primary qualities of matter really belong to it. These things are matters of knowledge. We are commonly and correctly said to know whatever is given in consciousness, or that can be fairly deduced from these primary truths or intuitions. It is in this sense we know God. We know that he is, and that he is what we know him to be. We have in the constitution of our nature the knowledge of what a spirit is, and, therefore, we know what God is, when our Lord declares he is a spirit. We know what knowledge, power, will, and moral excellence are, and therefore we know what is meant when these attributes and perfections are ascribed to God. As he is infinite in being and perfection, we necessarily remove all imperfection or limitation from these attributes, as they belong to God. But this does not destroy their nature. Knowledge does not cease to be knowledge,

because it is omniscience; nor does power cease to be power, because it is omnipotence. If men frame to themselves such a notion of the infinite that an infinite being must include all other beings; or such a notion of knowledge that an infinite mind cannot know; or such an idea of the absolute, that an absolute being cannot act, this only proves that their notions of the infinite and absolute are wrong, and not that the infinite being cannot be known. We form our notion, or idea, of God, therefore, by attributing to him the perfections of our own nature without limitation, and in an infinite degree. And in so doing we attain a definite and correct knowledge of what God is; while we admit there is in him infinitely more than we know anything about; and while we are duly sensible that our ideas or apprehensions of what we do know are partial and inadequate, we are, nevertheless, assured that our knowledge within its limits is true knowledge; it answers to what God really is.

The ground, or reason, why we are authorized to ascribe to God the perfections of our own nature, is that we are his children. He is the Father of spirits; we are of the same generic nature with him; we were created in his image; we are, therefore, like him, and he is like us. This is the fundamental principle of all religion. This is the principle urged by the Apostle in his address to the Athenians. Inasmuch as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the godhead is like to gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art, or man's device. On the same ground we ought not to think of him as the unconscious ground of being, or as a mere abstraction, or a name for the order of the universe, nor as the unknown and unknowable, but as a Father—whose image we bear, and of whose nature we partake. This, in the proper sense of the term, is anthropomorphism, a word much abused, and sometimes employed in a bad sense, to express the doctrine that God is altogether such an one as ourselves, a being of like limitations and passions. But in the sense above explained, it expresses the doctrine of the church in all ages, and of the great mass of mankind. Jacobi (von den göttlichen Dingen, *Werke* iii. p. 418, 422,) well says, "We confess accordingly, to an anthropomorphism inseparable from the conviction that man bears the image of God; and maintain that besides this anthro-

pomorphism, which has always been called Theism, is nothing but atheism or fetichism."

To this it was of old objected, as it has been by sceptics of every class in modern times, that other creatures, as for example, the beaver or reindeer, if possessed of religious feelings, would also conceive of the Deity with the limitations of its own personality. This is only saying that if irrational creatures were rational, they too would bear the image of God, and, of necessity, conceive of him as rational. That this method of framing our ideas of God is trustworthy, or that God really is what we are led to think him to be, is proved: 1. Because it is the law of our nature. That all men do thus think of God is admitted. Even in the lowest form of fetichism, the life of the worshipper is assumed to belong to the object of worship. The power dreaded is reverenced, and is assumed to be possessed of a life like our own. So under all the forms of polytheism which have prevailed in the world, the gods of the people have been intelligent, personal agents. It is only in the schools of philosophy that we find a different mode of conceiving of the godhead. They have substituted the abstract for the concrete—*τὸ ὄν* for *ὁ ὤν*, *τὸ θεῖον* for *ὁ θεός*, *τὸ ἀγαθόν* for *ὁ ἀγαθός*. It is here as with regard to the knowledge of the external world. The mass of mankind believe that they have immediate knowledge of the objects of perception, that they see and feel the things themselves. It is the philosophers who contradict this universal and necessary belief, and say that it is not the things themselves that we perceive, but certain ideas, species, or images of the things. Now as the philosophers are wrong here, and the people right, so in the mode of conceiving of God, the people are right and the philosophers wrong. In other words, the conviction that God is what he has revealed himself to be, rests on the same foundation as our conviction that the external world is what we take it to be. The ground of assurance in both cases is the veracity of consciousness, or the trustworthiness of the laws of belief impressed upon the constitution of our nature. "Invincibility of belief," according to Sir William Hamilton himself, "is convertible with truth of belief." *Wight.* edit. p. 233. "That which is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be, truly IS." P. 226. This

principle he makes the foundation of all philosophy and of all knowledge. No man has more nobly or more ably vindicated this great truth. "Consciousness," he says, "once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional scepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy, but only rational result. Any conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human nature. Our personality, our immateriality, our moral liberty, have no longer an argument for their defence. Man is the dream of a shadow; God is the dream of that dream. The only question, therefore, is, Are we invincibly led to think of God as possessing the attributes of our rational nature—as an intelligent personal being, infinite in being and perfection? This is not denied. "Fools," exclaimed Mansel, against the transcendentalists, "to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human portrait of God." P. 57. True, he denies the correctness of that portrait, or at least asserts that we cannot tell whether it is correct or not. But that is not now the question. He admits that we are forced by the constitution of our nature thus to conceive of God; and by the fundamental principles of his own and of Hamilton's philosophy, what we are forced to believe is true. It is true, therefore, that God is what we thus think him to be.

2. In the second place, all men are conscious of accountability to a being superior to themselves, who knows what they are, and what they do, and who has the will and purpose to reward or punish men according to their works. The God, therefore, who is revealed to us in our moral nature, is one who knows, and wills, and acts: who approves and disapproves; that is, he is revealed as a person, an intelligent, voluntary agent, possessing moral attributes. Now, this revelation of God must be assumed to be conformed to the truth. God must be what he thus declares himself to be, or our whole nature is a lie. All this Mr. Mansel admits. He admits that a sense of dependence on a superior power is a "fact of the inner consciousness;" that this superior power is "not an inexorable fate or immutable law, but a being having, at least so far, the attributes of personality, that he can show favour or severity to

those dependent on him, and be regarded by them with the feeling of hope, and fear, and reverence, and gratitude." P. 120. No man, however, is, or can be, grateful to the sun, or to the atmosphere, or to force, or law. Gratitude is the tribute of acknowledgment of a person to a person. Again, the same author admits that "The moral reason, or will, or conscience of man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority, save as implanted in him by some higher spiritual being, as a law emanating from a lawgiver." P. 121. "We are thus compelled," he adds, "by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral (and of course of a personal) Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity." P. 122. Both in a sense of dependence and consciousness of moral obligation, he says, "We are compelled to regard ourselves as persons related to a person." P. 130. Our argument from these facts is, that if our moral nature compels us to believe that God is a person, then he is a person; and therefore, we arrive at a true knowledge of God by ascribing to him the perfections of our own nature.

3. The argument from our religious, as distinguished from our moral, consciousness, is essentially the same. Morality is not all of religion. Men must worship as well as obey. The one is as much a law and necessity of their nature as the other. To worship (in the religious sense of the word,) is to adore. It is to ascribe infinite perfection to its object; it is to address to that object acknowledgments for the blessings we enjoy; it is to seek their continuance or increase; it is to confess, and praise, and pray. Can we worship the law of gravity, or unconscious power, or mere order of the universe? Our whole religious nature, which demands an object of supreme reverence, love, and confidence, demands a personal God—a God clothed with the attributes of a nature like our own, who can hear our confessions, praises and prayers, and who can supply all our wants, and fill all our capacities for good. Thus again, it appears that unless our whole nature is a contradiction and a falsehood, we arrive at true knowledge of God, when we attribute to him the perfections of our own nature. Mr. Mansel admits that our nature does demand a personal and moral

Deity; but he says, "The only human conception of personality is that of limitation. The very conception of a moral nature is itself the conception of a limit; for morality is the compliance with law; and a law, whether imposed from within or from without, can only be conceived to operate by limiting the range of possible actions." P. 127. Therefore, God is not a person after all, neither can he have a moral nature. We must, he tells us, (in a passage already quoted,) "renounce all knowledge of the absolute, and be content with those *regulative* ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient to guide our practice, but do not satisfy our intellect; which tell us not what God is in himself, but what he wills that we should think of him." That is, we must not rely on our instinctive beliefs; we must not regard as true what God has rendered it necessary for us to believe. This is the subversion of all philosophy as well as of all religion. And why? Why is this contradiction between reason and conscience, between our rational and our religious nature, assumed to exist? Simply, because these philosophers choose to define personality and morality in a way which forbids them being predicated of an infinite being. Both, they say, imply limitation, and therefore the infinite cannot be either personal or moral. But we deny that either imply any limitation inconsistent with absolute perfection, or which is not necessary to it. We do not limit God when we say he cannot be irrational as well as rational, unconscious as well as conscious, the finite as well as the infinite, evil as well as good. The only limitation admitted is the negation of imperfection. Sense is not limited, when we say it is not also nonsense, or spirit when we say it is not also matter; or light when we say it is not also darkness, nor space when we say it is not also time. We do not, therefore, limit the Infinite when we exalt him in our conceptions from the unconscious to the conscious, from the unintelligent to the intelligent, from an impersonal something, to the infinitely perfect, personal Jehovah.

4. If we are not justified in referring to God the attributes of our own rational and moral nature, then we have no God. The only alternative is between anthropomorphism, in this sense of the term, and atheism. For an unknown God; a God of whose nature and of whose relation to us we know nothing, to

us is nothing. And, as an historical fact, those who reject this method of forming an idea of God, who deny that we are to refer to him the perfections of our own nature, have become atheists. They take spirit, and strip from it consciousness, intelligence, will, and moral attributes; and the residue, which is blank nothing, they call God. Hamilton and Mansel take refuge from this dreadful conclusion in faith. They admit that reason leads to the denial of all these attributes to the Infinite and Absolute, but they say that faith protests against this conclusion. But this protest of faith is unavailing, unless it can be shown that it is well founded; that the conclusions against which she protests are fallacious. When Kant proved that there is no rational evidence of the existence of God, and fell back from the speculative to the practical reason, (*i. e.*, from reason to blind faith,) his successors universally gave up faith in a personal God entirely. It is admitted that we can form no idea of God unless we think of him as possessing the attributes of our own nature, and therefore, if this procedure lead us to false apprehensions, and be repudiated as invalid, we are left in total darkness, without God and without hope. Mr. Mansel acknowledges that "anthropomorphism is the indispensable condition of all human theology." P. 241. He quotes Kant, (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 282,) as saying, "We may confidently challenge all natural theology to name a single distinctive attribute of the Deity, whether denoting intelligence or will, which, apart from anthropomorphism, is anything more than a mere word, to which the slightest notion can be attached, which serves to extend our theoretical knowledge." Unfortunately, however, these writers, while they admit that this is the only possible method in which we can know God, deny that we thereby attain any true knowledge. It does not teach us what he is, but simply what we are forced (against reason) to think He is.

5. A fifth argument on this subject is, that the works of God manifest the attributes of a nature like our own. It is a legitimate principle that we must refer to the cause whatever attributes are required to account for the effects which that cause produces. If the effects manifest intelligence, wisdom, power, and moral excellence, these qualities or properties

must belong to the cause. As, therefore, the works of God are a revelation of all these attributes on the most stupendous scale, we are under a rational necessity to ascribe them to the cause of the Universe. This is only saying that the revelation made of the nature of God in the external world, authenticates the revelation of himself which he has made in the constitution of our own being. In other words, it proves that the image of himself, which he has enstamped on our nature, is a true likeness.

6. The Scriptures declare God to be just what we are led to believe he is, when we refer to him in an infinite degree, the perfections of our own nature. We are self-conscious; so is God. We are spirit; so is God. We are voluntary agents; so is God. We have a moral nature, miserably defaced indeed; God has moral excellence in absolute perfection. We are persons; so is God. All this the Scriptures declare to be true. The great primal revelation of God is as the "I Am," the personal God. All the names and titles given to God in the Scriptures, all the attributes ascribed to him, and all the works attributed to him, are revelations of his nature. He is the Elohim; the Mighty One; the Holy One; the Omnipresent Spirit. He knows all things. He is the Maker; the Preserver; the Governor of all things. He is our Father; the Hearer of Prayer; the Giver of all good. He feeds the young ravens; He clothes the flowers of the field; He is love. He so loved the world that he spared not his own Son, but freely gave him for us all. He is merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth. He is a help in every time of need; a refuge; a high tower; and an exceeding great reward. The relations in which we are represented as standing to him are such as we can sustain only to a person. We are bound to fear, worship, love, trust, and obey him. He is our Ruler, our Father, with whom we can have communion. His favour is our life; his loving-kindness is better than life. This sublime exhibition of God in his own nature and in his relation to us, is not a delusion. It is not mere regulative truth, or it would be a mockery. It makes God known to us as he really is. We know God, although no creature can understand the Almighty unto perfection.

7. Finally, God has revealed himself to us in the person of his Son. No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him. Jesus Christ is the true God. The revelation which he made of himself while on earth, was the manifestation of God in the flesh. He and the Father are one. The words of Christ were the words of God. The works of Christ were the works of God. The love, mercy, tenderness, and forgiving grace, as well as the holiness, severity, and power manifested by Christ, were manifestations of the nature of God. We see, therefore, as with our eyes what God is. We know that, although infinite and absolute, he can think, act, and will; that He can love and hate; that He can hear prayer and forgive sin; that we can have fellowship with him as one person can commune with another. Philosophy must vail her face and seal her lips in the presence of God thus manifest in the flesh, and not pretend to declare that he is not, or is not known to be, what he has just revealed himself as being. As this doctrine concerning the nature of God, as the object of certain and true knowledge, lies at the foundation of all religion, it was necessary to devote the more time to its explanation and vindication.

ART. V.—*A History of Christian Doctrine.* By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

THE title of this work, coupled with the author's reputation, will awaken large expectations in all who take an interest in the scientific unfolding of Christian doctrine. These expectations will not be disappointed, in the case of those who love the distinctive truths of Christianity, and who study these volumes sufficiently to understand their significance and power. In our judgment, no production of greater moment has been given to the public for a long time. It will, beyond doubt, attract great attention, and exercise a commanding and permanent influence in shaping opinion, in regard to those highest Christian doc-

trines which have ever staggered the reason, humbled the pride, and rebuked the corruption of fallen man—which constitute the offence of the cross, and leave not the flesh whereof to glory. And we are happy to say that, in support of nearly all those high Christian doctrines which have suffered most violent and persistent assaults from heretics, latitudinarians, rationalists, infidels, heathens, and atheists, but which still keep their grasp on the faith of the church, these volumes render efficient and signal service. We say this with none the less emphasis and cordiality, although we shall be constrained to differ with the accomplished and respected author, on an occasional point.

There is a great advantage in the study of doctrines and creeds by the light of history. The maxim of Bolingbroke, now become proverbial, that "history is philosophy teaching by example," has a pregnant import in regard to church history. For not only can the doctrines of Christianity be illustrated and interpreted by Christian history, but, so far as the scientific statement and exposition of them is concerned, they are evolved by history. That is, while, for substance and implicitly, they were held by the church from the first; yet it was only as they came in conflict with heretical and rationalistic opposers, that they were developed into those exact and self-consistent forms of statement, which parry the ingenious assaults of adversaries. The great Christian doctrines, and more especially the symbols which articulate them, will be best understood in the light of the heretical assaults by which they were impugned, and to guard against which, they were expressly shaped and phrased. It is notorious that the creed-formulas in which the mind of the church finally settled, were reached in successive eras—in regard to different doctrines, as they were successively impugned, and by such antagonism developed into greater clearness and fulness. Says Dr. Shedd, "The endeavour to defend Christianity very often elicits a more profoundly philosophic statement of it. The defence of the doctrine of the Trinity against Sabellian and Arian objections, resulted in a deeper view of the subject than had heretofore prevailed. The subtle objections, and dangerous half-truths of the Tridentine divines, were the occasion of a more accurate statement of the doctrine

of justification by faith without works, than is to be found in the ancient church. Indeed, a clear, coherent, and fundamental presentation is one of the strongest arguments. Power of statement is power of argument. It precludes misrepresentations. It corrects misstatements. Hence, we find that the Defences of Christianity embody a great amount of philosophical expansion of Scripture doctrine; so that the history of Apologies is oftentimes, to a great extent, the history of the influence of philosophy upon Christianity." Vol. i. p. 31.

The author gives a fine illustration of what we have been saying, while he sets forth his own method, which is mainly that of "Special Dogmatic History," or the history of individual doctrines. We should be glad to quote, but have room only to refer the reader to pages 33, 34, of vol. i.

In these volumes the author precedes his history of individual Christian doctrines, by the history of Apologetics, and of philosophy in its relation to and influence upon Christian doctrines. He follows it with a history of Symbols, which concludes his work; the body of which is occupied with the analysis of the historical development of particular doctrines.

As the several forumlas of doctrine are best understood in the light of their historical genesis in guarding the truth against opposing errors, so that historian is best qualified to understand and explain this historical evolution, who, *ceteris paribus*, has had most personal experience of the antagonistic relations between these truths and their correspondent errors. He will best appreciate the doctrine of atonement and justification as exhibited in the Symbols of the Reformation, who has lived amidst and been called to combat the contrary errors; and all the more so, if in his own personal experience and thinking, he has been led to work his way out of such errors into the clear light of the glorious gospel of the blessed God. Dr. Shedd, with eminent scholarship, with the studies demanded in the chair of ecclesiastical history, which he filled many years with such honour to himself and advantage to the church, with a mind apt by nature and early training for metaphysical and dogmatic insight and discrimination, with a keen relish for doctrinal discussion, and the most solemn earnestness in his convictions of the importance of doctrinal truth—with these

and other qualifications for his task—combines that to which we have just referred. He has lived in a region which boasts of great improvements in the church theology he vindicates and loves. We find no trace of the so-called New England Theology in his book; and so far as this theology boasts peculiarities, the counter-points of catholic doctrine are boldly and sharply set forth by him. We know little of the relation of these matters to his personal experience, beyond what may be indicated by the foregoing facts, and by his intense earnestness.

The superiority of the author's method of historico-doctrinal analysis to the methods which have generally been in vogue, is evident. Most historians of doctrine have also mingled with it all other matters pertaining to the progress, organization, and vicissitudes of the church. They have followed the order of time in their treatment of the whole. They have treated continuously of doctrine only so far as it characterized the period under review, and then have left it to record all else belonging to the history of the church during that period. Of course, this gives only a fragmentary and confused view of the unfolding of any particular doctrine. Others, who are historians of doctrine only, conduct the thread of their narrative according to centuries or periods, rather than by the course of particular doctrines as they are severally evolved into creed-formulas in successive ages. They treat of *all* the doctrines as they are connected with each period, before they pass on to the next period. This method is measurably exposed to the same objections as the last-mentioned. The treatment of each doctrine is necessarily a series of fragments, separated from each other by the accompanying matter interposed in regard to other doctrines. No clear and complete view is presented of the progress and vicissitudes of any one doctrine, until it reached a form of statement with which the mind of the church, as a whole, has been permanently satisfied. By far the most thorough and satisfactory method is that adopted by the author, of treating each doctrine by itself, tracing its development through successive controversies with antagonistic heresies, until it reached its fixed form, which parried the thrusts of adversaries, and satisfied the theological mind, as being an adequate summation of scriptural doctrine.

We have spoken of the "development" of Christian doctrine. Development is a favourite idea of our author. It is in this light that he contemplates all history, especially church history, and the history of Christian doctrine. He is, however, careful to repudiate the modern German pantheistic doctrine of development, in all its forms. Development has no relation to the Infinite and Absolute, who is evermore perfect, and is, therefore, *ex vi termini*, incapable of development. He is not, like the Absolute of the pantheists, a mere "potentiality," to be developed in man and nature. Development, according to Dr. Shedd, pertains only to created things, which are capable of imperfection and immaturity. Creation mostly produces germs which are ceaselessly evolving into actuality what is potentially enfolded in them. But inasmuch as God is good, and creates only that which is good, how are sin and evil evolved from what he creates? The answer is, that sin is not the creation of God, but of the free will of man. Thus was interpolated an alien and abnormal germ into humanity, which is in constant development, and bringing forth fruit unto death. To counterpoise and neutralize this pernicious development of sin, God has introduced a supernatural force among men, which is continually working itself out in the redemption and salvation of men from sin and the curse. These germinant forces, however, do not, as we understand our author, evolve themselves in any such changeless or fatalistic uniformity as to preclude God's providential government of the world, or his sovereignty in the administration of grace.

So far as doctrinal development is concerned, Dr. Shedd carefully guards against the idea of adding to the teachings of Scripture. The sum and substance of all Christian doctrine is to be found in the sacred volume. But to gather up its manifold representations into one whole, which shall set forth all, and contradict nothing, that is essential in these representations, is often the work of ages, consummated only after long and dire conflicts with opposing heresies. This is the only doctrinal development for which our author contends.

Dr. Shedd begins by tracing the mutual relations of philosophy and Christianity. He shows that it is vain to ignore this relation; that men will philosophize and inquire what truths

are witnessed by the light of nature, by consciousness, sense, and reason; and that this philosophy must ever tend to an accordance with their religious convictions, since truth cannot contradict truth, and the human mind cannot be brought to accept contradictions. Hence philosophy will either control or be controlled by men's acceptance and interpretations of Scripture. The course of Christian doctrine will depend largely upon the type of philosophy dominant for the time being, and the degree and manner in which they interpenetrate each other.

The author assigns to the systems of Plato and Aristotle a paramount influence and ascendency in the apostolic and all subsequent periods marked by decided doctrinal development. And they have been antiquated only by systems that have sprung from them by lineal derivation, so far as the latter have exerted any formative influence on the modes of stating, defending, and explaining catholic doctrine. Of course, Dr. Shedd does not allow to philosophy any authority in matters of Christian doctrine that is original, paramount, decisive, or coordinate with revelation. When Scripture and philosophy conflict, of course the latter is convicted of error by infallible authority, and must yield. But as Scripture must be interpreted in accordance with known and indisputable truth—as a true philosophy supports, and a false philosophy antagonizes with all other truth, natural and revealed—it follows logically, as it has been found historically, that a certain class of philosophical principles have generally prevailed in connection with a sound theology. We do not go quite the length of our author in regarding Platonism as forming the base of this Christian, or as Turrettin calls it, "regenerate philosophy." Its supersensual and spiritual element gives it a more friendly relation to Christianity than Epicureanism, while, nevertheless, this element is overstrained so as to make body intrinsically evil, and the great source of evil. Probably Plato's realism is the important matter with Dr. Shedd, as furnishing that philosophic solution of the race sinning in Adam's sin, which he evidently has fixed upon as the church view, and true view, of that subject. There is no doubt that something like this was at times apparently advanced by Augustin, and entered con-

siderably into orthodox anthropology, until the advance of the Protestant reformation, which had for its special doctrinal mission, to unfold and formulate the doctrines of sin and grace, particularly as regards their origin, and their responsible, legal, and judicial relations.

We think the author rather fully estimates the influence of Locke over English and American theology, until a recent period. That influence was undeniably felt, not for good, but for evil. But we quite disagree with him in regarding the Scotch school as in any sense retaining the system of Locke, and counteracting its virus by a loose interpretation. On the contrary, as represented by Reid, its founder, this school is in direct and avowed opposition to Locke's sensuous system.

We are glad to observe the just and discriminating view which the author gives of Mysticism, in both its potencies, as related to extreme speculative subtlety, to orthodoxy, and to practical piety, especially on pages 79, 80.

Dr. Shedd, of course, attributes to Aristotle the predominant influence during the mediæval scholastic period, in which dialectic subtleties so largely anatomatized the great living ideas and truths of morals and religion till they perished, and gave place to the legion of cadaverous entities and quiddities brought forth in their place. During this period, according to Dr. Shedd, the prevailing philosophy had Aristotelianism for its base, with some infusion of Platonism, and was Aristotelo-Platonism. During the healthier periods which preceded and followed the scholastic era, it was Platonism with a tincture from Aristotle, Platonico-Aristotelianism—idealism systematized and regulated by logical order and precision, and dialectic forms filled with the content of Platonic ideas. This is Dr. Shedd's ideal, if we may not say of Christian philosophy, at least, of a philosophy favourable to Christianity. And undoubtedly it is more so than the exclusive and overbearing predominance of either of these systems. The virtue of metaphysical and ethical distinctions in shaping the construction of formulas, so as to express the various elements of Christian doctrine, clear of contradictions, and invulnerable to the shafts of adversaries, is happily illustrated by our author, in the instance of the *Symbolum cuicumque*, ascribed, and probably with justice, to

Athanasius. We barely refer the reader to volume i. pp. 72, 73.

The author's estimate of German philosophy, theology, and especially of Schleiermacher, have importance and interest for various reasons. After saying that pantheism destroys the foundations, not merely of revealed religion, but of all religion, by affirming that God is the only substance, and the only Being, and that all that has been, is, and ever shall be, is his self-evolution and manifestation, he proceeds thus:

"On looking at the scientific theology of Germany, during the present century, we find it modified by both of these two great philosophical tendencies. The two systems of theism and pantheism have been conflicting in this highly speculative country, with an energy and intensity unequalled in the history of philosophy; so that the theological mind of Germany exhibits a remarkable diversity of opinions and tendencies. Even in the anti-rationalistic or spiritual school, this same opposition between the historical Theism and Spinozism is to be seen. The theology of Schleiermacher, which has exerted a great influence upon classes that disagree with it—upon the Rationalist on the one hand, and the Supernaturalist on the other, and upon all the intermediates between these—is characterized by a singular heterogeneity of elements. Its founder was a diligent student of Plato, and an equally diligent student of Spinoza. Hence, while we find in this system, a glowing and devout temper that is favourable to a living theism, and a vital Christianity, we also find *principles* that are subversive not merely of revealed but of natural religion. In fact, this system presents, in one respect, the most remarkable phenomenon in the whole history of theology and philosophy—the phenomenon of a system mainly pantheistic, instrumental at a particular crisis in the history of a national mind, in turning its attention to the more distinctively spiritual and evangelical doctrines of Christianity. Having served this purpose, however, its work is done, and it cannot, as the course of thinking now going on in Germany itself plainly indicates, continue to satisfy the wants of the theological mind, but must either be adopted in all its logical consequences, and thereby become the destruction of evangelical religion, or else be rejected and left behind, in that further

progress towards, and arrival at New-Testament Christianity, which it was instrumental, by a logical inconsistency however, in initiating.

"The final judgment, consequently, in respect to the real worth and influence of the philosophic movement of the German mind, must be held in reserve, until the final issue appears. The estimate which the future historian will form of it, will be determined according as the German Church of the future shall draw nearer to the symbols of the Reformation, or shall recede further from them." Vol. i. pp. 98—100.

Passing on to theology proper, we can barely refer to the author's ingenious defence of Anselm's ontological argument for the being of a God. We cannot see our way clear from the mere idea of a perfect and necessary being to his actual existence. We require other evidence, which is so abundant and overpowering both within and without us, that only the "fool hath said in his heart, there is no God."

With regard to the attributes of God, we find that our author is profound and discriminating. He justly observes, what we think must soon attract increasing attention, as undeniably and deplorably true in the first eight centuries: "Phraseology was, however, sometimes employed by orthodox teachers themselves, that would be pantheistic if employed by an acknowledged pantheist." P. 225. We will add that such phraseology did not cease with the expiration of that period. It abounds in later writers, such as Aquinas and the scholastic theologians. Not being among the disputed points of the Reformation, some of it was taken up inconsiderately by many reformed divines, and was not entirely eliminated from the lucid, precise, and profound works of Turrettin. In the lights and shades thrown upon this subject from revelation and the dark background of modern pantheism, we are satisfied that some phrases which have passed current with many standard theologians, will require to be revised, and either amended or expurgated. Dr. Shedd well observes:

"As theological science advanced, however, it was perceived that the essence of the Deity cannot safely be contemplated apart from his attributes. The essence is *in* the attributes, and the attributes *in* the essence, and consequently Christian

science must seize both ideas at once, and hold them both together. This led to the examination and exhibition of the Divine attributes, as *real* and *eternal* characteristics of the Deity.

"We cannot follow out the development of thought upon the Divine attributes; for this would require their being taken up one by one, and their history exhibited through the various periods. A single remark, only, can be made at this point. In proportion as the attributes have been discussed in connection with the essence of the Deity, has the doctrine of God been kept clear from pantheistic conceptions. In proportion, on the contrary, as speculation has been engaged with the essence of the Godhead, to the neglect or non-recognition of the attributes in which this essence manifests itself, has it become pantheistic. It is impossible for the human mind to know the Deity abstractly from his attributes. It may posit, i. e., set down on paper, an unknown ground of being, like the unknown x in algebra, of which nothing can be predicated, and may suppose that this is knowing the absolute Deity. But there is no such dark predicateless ground; there is no such Gnostic abyss. The Divine nature is in and with the attributes, and hence the attributes are as deep and absolute as the nature." Vol. i. pp. 240—1.

On the subject of the Trinity, the author finds no trace of the Christian doctrine in pagan writers, and utterly repudiates the Socinian pretence of its being borrowed from Plato. He also maintains the doctrine of the Nicene creed, in all its fulness, including the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit, and shows, beyond a peradventure, that it has been so uniformly the doctrine of the post-Nicene church, that the exceptions, outside of Unitarians and within the pale of the church, are too slight to deserve serious notice. For proof of this we deem it unnecessary to do more than to refer the reader to his very extended and thorough historical review of this subject. In regard to the opposition which the doctrine of eternal generation has encountered in New England, he barely remarks, in a foot-note, which we give below.*

* This foot-note is as follows, on p. 383. "The Nicene trinitarianism came with the English and Continental colonists into the American churches. The

While Dr. Shedd ably vindicates the thorough church doctrine of the Trinity without qualification, there are one or two solutions or explications, which he either propounds or appears to approve, that call for a word of criticism. We think the following has some look of explaining the oneness of substance in the three persons of the Godhead by the realistic theory, and shows that the want of precision in the use of certain terms, so common even in standard writers on this subject, has not been wholly avoided by the rigidly logical and metaphysical mind of Dr. Shedd.

"The Father and Son are of one and the same uncreated and infinite essence, even as the human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence. The participation in the same identical nature or essence, or, in the Nicene phrase, the consubstantiality (*ὁμοούσιον*), places the first and second persons in the Godhead in the same class or grade of being. Both are equally divine, because they share equally in the *substance* of deity; as, in the sphere of the finite, both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity. The category of substance determines the grade of being. That which is of a divine substance is divine; and that which is of a human substance is human. And the mere relationship in each case—the mere being a father, and the mere being a son—

Episcopalian church adopts it, in adopting the Thirty-nine Articles. The Presbyterian church receives it in the Westminster Confession; as did also the early Congregational churches. The churches of New England, represented in the Synod at Boston in 1680, made their statement in the following phraseology: 'In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and Son.' (Boston Confession, chap. ii.) An earnest defender of the Nicene doctrine of 'eternal generation,' is Samuel Hopkins, (Works, i. 293 sq.,) the leader of one of the later New England schools. The elder Edwards is also supposed to have left in manuscript reflections upon the doctrine of the trinity, in the line of the Nicene trinitarianism. During the present century, some opposition to the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship has shown itself in a few New England writers. The opposition, however, is founded upon an inadequate dogmatico-historical knowledge—the Origenistic theory of eternal generation, as revived in England in the last century by Samuel Clarke, being mistaken for the historical doctrine of Athanasius, and the Nicene theologians."

does not in the least affect the grade or *species* of being to which each belongs. The human son is as truly a *man* as is the human father; and the Divine Son is as truly God as is the Divine Father. "We men," says Athanasius, "consisting of a body and a soul, are all *μίας φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, of one nature or essence; but we are many persons." Again, when his Anomoean opponent compares the Father, Son, and Spirit, to a bishop, presbyter, and deacon, Athanasius directs his attention to the fact that these latter have all the same nature, being each of them man."* Vol. i. pp. 342–3.

There are two or three terms that play an important part in this controversy, and in that respecting realism, whose ambiguity causes great confusion, unless understood and guarded against. The first of these is the word "same," which strictly denotes numerical identity or oneness, but is often used in the sense of similar. Thus we say, one man is of the same nature or substance with another, meaning that he is of similar nature, &c. Two houses are built of the same *i. e.* similar materials. This ambiguity sometimes extends to the word "identical," which is of stricter import than "same." This equivocal import of these terms would enable them to take in not only the *ὁμοούσιον* of the Athanasian creed, but the *ὁμοιούσιον* which it rejected, because the latter would let in Arianism, and not only that, but Tritheism. Then again, "essence" has its original metaphysical sense of substance or being, and its logical meaning of the essential marks (genus and specific difference) of a species. In the former sense, unity of essence means unity of substance. In the latter, it means those similar marks in a plurality of substances, which make them of one species or kind; as animality and rationality are the essence of manhood, or of the species man; four sides with the opposites parallel the essence of a parallelogram. Now, it is only in the second meaning of the word essence that "the

*Our Author says in a foot-note: "It should be added to this illustration of Athanasius, that the *whole* Natureor Essence is in the divine Person; but the human person is only a *part* of the common human nature. Generation in the Godhead admits no abscission or division of substance; but generation in the instance of the creature implies separation or division of essence. A human person is an individualized *portion* of humanity."

human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence," *i. e.* they have similar marks which constitute the logical essence of humanity, but are different beings. But it is very clear that this is no proper or safe illustration of "consubstantiality" in the persons of the godhead; for thus they would become not only three persons, but three beings. And when he illustrates this consubstantiality by the statement that "both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity;" this can be true only in a loose and unusual sense of the word *substance*, as equivalent to logical essence as above defined, in which case it would be obnoxious to the criticisms already made. Or, if substance be used in its strict and proper meaning, then it can be true only on the supposition that manhood is one numerical substance, by participation in which individuals become men. This is realism. If true, undoubtedly it would solve all difficulties in regard to the oneness of substance in the three persons of the godhead. If all human persons are one substance, much more are the Divine hypostases. But it is to be considered first, whether the realistic theory does not involve more difficulties than it removes—a question on which we may yet have somewhat to offer—and next, whether, if the consubstantiality of the divine persons be only such as subsists between men, the Trinity be not cleared of all that mystery which, from the first, friends and foes have agreed in attributing to it, and does not amount to tritheism.

We do not forget that our author, in the foot-note we have quoted, attempts the distinction between the unity of substance in the divine and human persons, that the former partake of the whole, the latter of a part of it. But if realism be true, every man is permeated by the one substance of humanity, which being one, can suffer no "abscission." If it be false, there is no one numerical substance common to all men, either partially or wholly.

We do not place strong reliance on the author's evolution of a Trinity, through the self-consciousness of the Deity, as giving us three eternal personal distinctions, or supposita in a subject-*ego*, an object-*ego*—and the union of the two—although he is far from being novel or singular in this view.

While we have noted these slight questionable points, they are as nothing compared with the great service which Dr. Shedd renders to the trinitarian cause, by his masterly analysis of the history of the doctrine, and the ability with which, on the whole, he maintains the church doctrine.

In his Christology, Dr. Shedd states clearly, and defends ably, the scriptural doctrine which the history of the church has only served to develope and confirm. He introduces his chapter on this subject with the following passage, which fully defines the true doctrine and its antagonistic heresies, while he goes on to show how, as the latter successively infested the church, they were exorcised, until the scriptural view of the Incarnation became the permanent catholic doctrine.

"Four factors are necessary in order to the complete conception of Christ's Person: 1. True and proper deity; 2. True and proper humanity; 3. The union of deity and humanity in one Person; 4. The distinction of deity from humanity, in the one Person, so that there be no mixture of natures. If either of these is wanting, the dogmatic statement is an erroneous one. The heresies which originated in the Ancient Church took their rise, in the failure to combine all these elements in the doctrinal statement. Some one or more of these integral parts of the subject were adopted, while the others were rejected. The classification of the ancient errors in Christology will, therefore, very naturally follow the above enumeration." Vol. i. 392.

Although the author treats Anthropology next in order, and not without support of logic as well as usage, still Christology naturally links itself to Soteriology. And it will best suit our convenience, to say what little we have to offer upon his treatment of Soteriology first. There is little need of comment here, as his views on this whole subject are, with hardly a qualification, those of the Reformed symbols. If he varies anywhere, it is in not assigning the obedience, as distinguished from the sufferings of Christ, its due prominence in our justification.

The following in regard to the nature of the atonement, and the tardy evolution of the explicit definition of it in creed-formulas, is highly satisfactory, and all the more so from one

whose theological life and training have been in New England. The italics are the author's.

"Taking the term atonement in its technical signification, to denote *the satisfaction of Divine justice for the sin of man, by the substituted penal sufferings of the Son of God*, we shall find a slower scientific unfolding of this great cardinal doctrine than of any other of the principal truths of Christianity. Our investigations in this branch of inquiry will disclose the fact, that while the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology received a considerably full development during the Patristic and Scholastic periods, it was reserved for the Protestant church, and the Modern theological mind, to bring the doctrines of Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion." Vol. ii. p. 205.

The Arminian, which is also the modern New England and New-school theory, and resolves the divine justice into benevolence, so making the atonement really a mere satisfaction of benevolence, is disposed of as follows.

"According to these positions, the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted penalty, but a substitute *for* a penalty. A substituted penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute *for* a penalty, may be of inferior worth, as when a partial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by the method of acceptilation; or, as if the finite sacrifice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted by the will of God an offset for human transgression. And the term 'satisfaction,' also, is wrested from its proper signification, in that the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of *benevolence*. 'Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigour and exactitude of divine justice, but the just and *compassionate* will of God,'—a use of language as solecistical as that which should speak of smelling a sound." Vol. ii. pp. 373—4.

Two more extracts from our author's exceedingly valuable historical survey of this doctrine, one on justification, and another on the extent of the atonement, must suffice.

"The 'justification of the *ungodly*,' of which St. Paul speaks —*i. e.*, the judicial acquittal from condemnation of a soul that is still polluted with indwelling sin, and will be more or less until it leaves the body—cannot of course be founded upon

any degree of holiness that has been wrought within it by the Holy Spirit. It must rest altogether upon an outward and finished work, namely, the atoning suffering of the Son of God. This *declarative* act of God, whereby, on the ground of the objective satisfaction made to law by the Redeemer, he forgives the past, must be carefully distinguished from the subjective transforming work of God in the soul, whereby he secures its holiness in the future." Vol. ii. pp. 256, 257.

The remaining extract occurs in his analysis of the controversy between the Arminians and the Synod of Dort, relative to the extent of the atonement. The author does not expressly declare which view he adopts. But the manner in which he puts the arguments of the respective parties shows unmistakably the drift of his own convictions.

"The Arminians held that the atonement of Christ is intended for all men alike, and indiscriminately. As matter of fact, however, it saves only a part of mankind. The reason why the atonement does not save all men alike and indiscriminately, lies in the fact that the will of the finally lost sinner defeats the divine intention. There is no such degree of grace as is irresistible to the sinful will. The effectual application of the atonement, therefore, depends ultimately upon the decision of the sinner's will, and this decision in the case of the lost defeats the divine purpose. In opposition to this view, the Dort Synod held that the atonement, though sufficient in value for the salvation of all men, was intended only for those to whom it is effectually applied, viz., the elect. The Holy Spirit possesses a power that is irresistible, in the sense that it can subdue the obstinacy of any human will, however opposed to God. Hence, the application of the atonement depends ultimately, not upon the sinner's decision, but the divine determination to exert special grace. There is, therefore, no defeat of the divine intention, and the atonement saves all for whom it was intended." Vol. ii. 496, 497.

Dr. Shedd treats of regeneration under the head of Anthropology.

In regard to regeneration, our author thoroughly repudiates all theories which militate against its being exclusively the work of the Holy Ghost. Contrary choice, synergism, all

grades of ability in man for self-regeneration, or any part thereof, find no favour with him. And he writes with an earnestness and clearness which betray an experimental, not less than a speculative ground. We will not detain the reader with further remark on this subject, but refer him to the work itself. We shall confine ourselves in the residue of this article to the author's speculative and historical analysis of the doctrine of Original Sin.

On the subject of original sin, native corruption, and inability, as on other subjects, Dr. Shedd's opinions appear more in the manner in which he portrays historical controversies than in his own express avowals. It is inevitable that a writer should be able and willing to put doctrines which he believes, and the arguments for them in a stronger light than the contrary. He believes, and therefore he speaks. He is likely to apprehend his own doctrine and the reasons of it more fully than its rejecters, and the opposite side more imperfectly than those who embrace it. In this way, the reader feels no doubt with which set of opinions Dr. Shedd is in sympathy, or to which of them he would be glad to win assent. According to this criterion, Dr. Shedd takes the highest ground with regard to the native inherent corruption, and spiritual impotency of man. He also maintains that the race fell in the first sin of the first man; that this sin sustains a real causative relation to the corruption of the race, because it was the sin of the race, in such a sense that the race is justly condemned, and abandoned to the bondage of a sinful nature, as a natural and penal consequence. All this abundantly appears not only in these volumes, but in other publications of the author. It is further to be said, that he holds the inherent native sinfulness and impotency of man, not only on speculative grounds, but in the interest of a deeper religious experience than consists with Pelagian and Arminian theories. Moreover, all his theories in regard to the manner of the fall of our race in Adam, by virtue of that kind of race-unity which he maintains, and we are about to discuss, are held in the hope of conciliating with philosophy the testimonies of Scripture and religious experience in regard to the depth, sinfulness, and obduracy of our inherent native dispositions.

The chief question of moment between him and us relates to the kind of union, in virtue of which Adam's sin was accounted and treated as the sin of the race. We hold that we sinned in Adam, as he was our federal head and representative, and acted in our "room and stead;" that his act was therefore ours representatively; that thus it was imputed to us, and is the ground of our original guilt, and condemnation, and abandonment by God to that loss of communion with him, whence came the loss of original righteousness, and the corruption of our whole nature, whereby "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good," and whence "do proceed all actual transgressions." The theory of "race-unity" by which the author explains our participation in Adam's sin, is the realistic, or that the manhood common to Adam and his descendants is one substance, so that when he sinned the race sinned. At least, this is exhibited as the theory of those defenders of original sin who are signalized and made prominent, and which is itself presented in its utmost strength, in this work. The other system, which is not only ours, but that of the leading Reformed, Puritan, and Calvinistic divines and creeds, since the theological mind of the Reformation fully developed the judicial relations of sin and redemption, is scarcely exhibited; indeed, we should judge, very imperfectly apprehended by the author. The theory presented in the strongest and most favourable light in this work, will be seen in the extracts we shall make from his sketches of the anthropology of Augustin and Anselm, which, in view of the following at the conclusion of his sketch of the latter, may not unjustly be taken as a fair exponent of the author's theories on the subject.

"The harmony of Anselm's doctrine of original sin with that of Augustin is apparent. Had the anthropology of the mediaeval church been shaped by the profound contemplations of Anselm, instead of the superficial speculations of Lombard—had the archbishop of the then unknown and insignificant see of Canterbury been accepted by the Latin church as its leader and thinker, instead of the Master of Sentences—the history of the Western church would have been that of a gradual purification and progress, instead of a gradual corruption and decline." Vol. ii. pp. 138, 139.

Augustin's theory is thus stated, vol. ii. pp. 77 et seq.

"These passages, which might be multiplied indefinitely, are sufficient to indicate Augustin's theory of generic existence, generic transgression, and generic condemnation. The substance of this theory was afterwards expressed in the scholastic dictum, 'natura corrumpit personam,'—human *nature* apostatizes, and the consequences appear in the human *individual.* In the order of nature, man*kind* exists before the generations of mankind; the *nature* is prior to the individuals produced out of it. But this human nature, it must be carefully noticed, possesses all the attributes of the human indivdual; for the individual is only a portion and specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities. Hence, according to Augustine, generic or original sin is truly and properly sin, because it is moral agency. . . . . .

"The Manichaean theory that sin is a substance created, and infused into man by creative power, Augustin refuted and combatted with all the more energy, because he had at one time been entangled in it. Hence, he was careful to teach that original sin itself, as well as the actual transgressions that proceed from it, is moral agency. But in order to agency there must be an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent—*i. e.*, to the human *nature* in distinction from the human *person*, or individual. Hence the stress which he laid upon the act of transgression in Adam. At this point in the history of man, he could find a common agent, and a common agency; and only at this point. Ever after, there are only portions or individualizations of the nature, in the series of generations. This one common agent yields him the one common agency which he is seeking. In this manner, original sin is voluntary agency, as really as actual sin is—the difference between the two being only formal. Both are equally the product of human will; but original sin is the product of human will as yet unindividualized in Adam, while actual sin is the product of human will as individualized in his posterity."

Anselm's Realism is thus described by Dr. Shedd: "In

Anselm's theory, the species is an entity as truly as the individual. For him, the universal has *objective* existence, and is not a mere name for the collective aggregate of particulars. The human 'nature' is prior to the individuals that are produced from it, and is as substantially existent as they are. For the individuals are only the nature *distributed;* they are the 'species' metamorphosed into persons. The 'nature,' therefore, is not the collective aggregation of individuals; for in this case the nature is not an entity,—it is only the name given to the aggregation of particular individuals, and the only entity is the individual. On the contrary (according to the theory of Realism), the nature is a primary entity, having real existence, which is metamorphosed by distribution into a multitude of individual persons." P. 117.

The quotation which follows, with much more equally pronounced, shows the application of this realistic doctrine by Anselm to the explication of original sin.

"That only is imputed to all men which *all* men have committed; and the only sin which *all* men have committed is that one sin which they committed when they were all '*ille unus homo*,' one human nature, in the first human pair.

"Thus, in Anselm's anthropology, as in Augustin's, everything starts from the *original unity of the human race.* If this idea is not conceded, the whole doctrine of original and transmitted sin, as Anselm constructs it, falls to the ground. Original sin is original agency; but original agency supposes an original agent; and this original agent is the whole human nature undistributed and unindividualized, in distinction from this or that individualized part of it. Original sin, coming into existence by the single primitive act of apostasy, is then transmitted along with the nature, from generation to generation—the generation being so many individualizations of the common humanity. The first pair of individuals are created, and contain the substance of the entire race, both upon the spiritual and the physical side. All the posterity, as individualizations, are propagated, not created. Herein consists the possibility of a transmission of sin from the first human pair, to the whole posterity, and also of a transmission of holiness." P. 120.

The theory thus clearly and undeniably found in Anselm, (but not without question as to interpretation, to be acknowledged as the mature and steadfast doctrine of Augustin,) Dr. Shedd considers to be characteristic of the Protestant anthropology. He says,

"The Reformers constructed their doctrines of sin and regeneration after the same general manner with Augustin and Anselm; so that the somewhat minute account which we have given of the Augustinian and Anselmic anthropologies renders a detailed representation of the Protestant anthropology unnecessary." P. 152.

On this we think proper to say just here; 1. Although Augustin firmly maintained such a union of Adam and his posterity in reference to the first sin, that they so sinned in him as justly to suffer the punishment of his sin, yet he was far from having developed into clearness, consistency, and stability his view of the nature of this union, whether it were federal and representative, or a realistic and numerical oneness. Thus Turrettin at once interprets Augustin, and gives his own view as to the natural oneness of our race, and whether it is such that realism or federal representation explains the manner of our sinning in Adam. "Ut Adamus esset persona publica et repræsentativa, non necesse fuit, ut munus illud a nobis ipsi demandaretur, ut tam nostro quam suo nomine ageret; sufficit intercessisse justissimam Dei ordinationem secundum quam voluit Adamum esse stirpem et Caput totius Generis humani, qui ideo non sibi tantum, sed et suis bona acciperet, vel amitteret; unde omnes dicuntur fuisse unus homo. 'Quicunque,' inquit August. ep. 106, 'ex illo uno multi in seipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno, unus homo erant,' unitate *non specifica, vel numerica*, sed partim *unitate originis*, quia omnes ex uno sunt sanguine, partim *unitate repræsentationis*, quia unus omnium personam repræsentabat, ex ordine Dei." *Loc.* ix. Quæst. 9.

2. It follows that nothing can be inferred from the frequent reference in the Reformation theologians and symbols to Adam's being the root and natural head of his posterity, or to their being seminally in his loins, and other like phraseology, against their holding to representation and denying realism in the premises. We see that this is done by Turrettin, in the

same paragraph in which he expressly denies the numerical or realistic, and asserts the representative oneness of Adam and his descendants. And this often occurs in other writers and creeds that avow precisely the same principles. This remark applies especially to the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, composed by Turrettin, Heidegger, and others, in opposition to Joshua Placæus's theory of mediate imputation, and quoted by Dr. Shedd on pages 158, 159, which we will soon notice more particularly. 3. It is proper to add, that like Augustin, some of the Reformation divines, especially before the Protestant theological mind had worked out their theology to its full development, have a wavering, indeterminate style of expression, which simply shows that they had not very fully examined and settled the kind of oneness with Adam which was the ground of the imputation of his sin; and that nothing conclusive on this point can be inferred from their statements. Conspicuous among these was Calvin.

We are bound to add, that Dr. Shedd evinces a less satisfactory acquaintance with the Reformed doctrine of representation in Adam, and consequent imputation of his sin, and the terms related thereto, than is usual with him on historico-theological points. Thus he translates *culpa* and *reatus* in the *Formula Concordiæ*, the first "guilt," and the second "crime." We will now look at his analysis of the Formula Consensus Helvetici, which he justly says, in regard to sin and grace, contains "statements that are more exhaustive and scientific than that of any of the other creeds drawn up by the Reformed or Calvinistic theologians," as well as the "most clear and specific;" also at his analysis of the system of Placæus, which this Formula was framed especially to repel.

Dr. Shedd says, "the imputation of the effects of Adam's apostacy, Placæus denominated 'mediate;' while the imputation of the apostatizing act itself, or of the cause of these effects, he called 'immediate.'" P. 159. As we understand it, it is agreed on all hands that the imputation of the effects of Adam's sin, *i. e.*, of inherent and actual sin in his descendants to the subjects of it, is immediate. How can it be otherwise? The question, as stated by Placæus himself in the passage quoted from him by Dr. Shedd immediately below the fore-

going is, whether the imputation of Adam's sin is immediate, or mediate; *i. e.*, antecedently and without regard to personal hereditary sin; or "mediately, *i. e.*, through the medium of hereditary inward corruption;" in other words, whether, in consequence of such corruption, we are regarded as either virtually sanctioning, or being equally criminal as if we had personally committed, Adam's sin; and so, on this ground, or through this medium, it is mediately imputed to us. Immediate imputation Placæus rejects; mediate, he maintains.

"In opposition to this theory of 'mediate' imputation," says Dr. Shedd, "the Formula Consensus makes the following statements," a part of which only we have room to quote:

"'As God entered into a covenant of works with Adam, not only for himself, but also with the whole human race in him as its head and root, so that the posterity who were to be born of him would inherit the same integrity with which he was created, provided he should continue in it; so Adam by his sad fall sinned not for himself only, but for the whole human race who were to be born 'of blood and the will of the flesh,' and lost the blessings promised in the covenant. We are of opinion, therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity by the secret and just judgment of God. For the apostle testifies that 'in Adam all have sinned,' 'by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners,' and 'in Adam all die.' . . . . Thus it appears, that original sin, by a strict discrimination, is two-fold, and consists of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression and the inherent hereditary corruption consequent upon this. For this reason, we are unable to assent to the view of those who deny that Adam represented his posterity by the ordinance of God, and, consequently, deny that his sin is *immediately* imputed to them, and who, under the notion of a 'mediate' and consequent imputation, not only do away with the imputation of the first sin, but also expose the doctrine of innate and hereditary corruption itself to grave peril."

The following is a part of Dr. Shedd's comment on this, which seems clear enough of itself.

"According to this statement of Turrettin and Heidegger, mediate imputation must rest upon immediate; and *both* impu-

tations must be asserted.* They did not consider it conformable to justice, to impute an effect without imputing the cause. The posterity could not properly be regarded as guilty for their inward corruption of heart and will, unless they were guilty for that primal Adamic act of apostacy which produced this corruption. . . . . The Adamic sin itself must, therefore, be imputable to the posterity, in order to legitimate the imputation of its consequences. And, furthermore, this act, they imply, must be imputed upon *real* and not nominal grounds. The imputation of Adam's sin must not be a 'gratuitous' imputation, for this would yield only a 'gratuitous' condemnation. Righteousness may be imputed when there is no righteousness; but sin cannot be imputed when there is no sin. 'David describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God *imputeth righteousness* without works: saying, Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven*, and whose *sins are covered.* Blessed is the man to whom the Lord *will not impute sin.*' Rom. iv. 6—8. The imputation of righteousness when there is no inherent and real righteousness, according to this explanation of St. Paul, is simply the forgiveness of iniquity, or the non-imputation of sin. It is a gratuitous imputation, and a gratuitous justification. But when Placæus proposed to carry the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, such as holds true of Christ's righteousness, over to Adam's sin, and proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit upon the part of the posterity, in the same manner that the righteousness of Christ is imputed without any real and inherent merit upon the part of the elect, Turrettin and Heidegger opposed him. The doctrine of a gratuitous justification is intelligible and rational; but the doctrine of a gratuitous damnation is unintelligible and absurd. Hence the Formula Consensus taught that 'man previous to the commission of any single or 'actual' transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth, ... first, on account of the

* The author has the following also in a foot-note:

"Turrettin also asserts both imputations in his Institutes, upon two grounds, viz., the *natural* union between Adam and his posterity, and the *political* or *forensic* union whereby he is 'the representative of the whole human race.'"

transgression and disobedience *which he committed in the loins of Adam.*' The posterity must be really, and not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may be 'immediately' and justly charged with a common guilt." Pp. 159—163.

Here it is to be noted again, that Dr. Shedd carries the idea that two imputations are in question, that of the "cause" and the "effect" of Adam's sin, (which, agreeably to his theory, he always calls the "Adamic sin,") and the inherent hereditary corruption of his descendants resulting from it. Now we have known of no dispute about the latter, unless as against Pelagianizing controvertists, certainly not among reformed theologians. The only question about the imputation of sin to men, respects Adam's sin; whether it is to be imputed at all; and if so, whether that imputation is mediate or immediate. The latter was the only question among the reformed theologians. There can be no doubt on which side this was settled by their most authoritative creeds, especially when interpreted by the writings of their framers and recognised expositors and defenders. We know not why Turrettin is said to have maintained two imputations. Certainly he held that on the ground of his being the natural as well as federal head of the race, Adam's sin was, representatively, the sin of the race, and therefore imputed to them immediately. This is the only imputation in question between Turrettin and Placæus—the only imputation arising either from his natural or forensic headship, and supported alike by both, or more especially by the latter as having its reason in the former. It cannot be that Dr. Shedd, as his language in one place implies, means that Turrettin teaches a mediate and immediate imputation, which some have claimed to be proved by a mistranslation of the following passage, that expressly denies it: "Illi cum quibus hic agimus, vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt; Nos vero cum Orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentem." *Loc.* ix. Quæst. 9. Some have strangely construed this as if *utrumque* referred to both mediate and immediate imputation, which are mutual contradictories, whereas it plainly refers to what follows, for the purpose of explaining, viz., both that imputation is true, and

that it is immediate. A like misconstruction appears when the author says that "Placæus proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit on the part of the posterity." This, as we understand it, is the exact opposite of Placæus's doctrine, which was that Adam's sin was imputed in view and in consequence of inherent corruption and demerit as the antecedent and meritorious ground. He represents Turrettin as opposing this doctrine, which he attributes to Placæus; whereas the former held, as we have seen, that the sin and guilt of Adam were imputed immediately, and antecedently to such inherent corruption, and constituted the judicial ground of abandonment to such corruption. And it is thus imputed, because it is treated as the sin of the race on trial in the person of its first representative.

When Dr. Shedd represents Turrettin as holding that the imputation of Adam's sin is "upon *real* not nominal grounds;" that it is not "gratuitous;" that "the posterity must be really, not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may immediately and justly be charged with a common guilt;" if he means to imply that this great theologian held that they were so in Adam as to participate in his sin literally, or in a realistic sense, or otherwise than representatively; or that such a representation in him was not a reasonable and just ground of its imputation to them, we think the contrary has been abundantly shown. We hold that such a relation to Adam affords a ground of imputation which is neither unreal, unjust, gratuitous, nor fictitious.

We object to the realistic solution of the fall of our race in Adam, because, 1. We object to the doctrine of Realism itself, on general grounds. This doctrine we understand to be, that the unity of a class, species, or genus, consists not merely in the similarity of the objects composing it, whereby they are generalized and denoted by a common term, but in a numerical oneness of substance pervading them—so that the abstract terms denoting conceptions of what is common to the class, or, in other phrase, denoting universals, denote not only such conceptions, but real universal entities that are numerically single. So manhood, humanity, animality, denote severally one substance pervading respectively all men, or all animals, and

making them such. This not only destroys individual substances, and subverts all personal identity and responsibility, but, in its last analysis, logically terminates in one substance in the universe. For all lower classes may ultimately be generalized into one, the *summum genus*, *i. e.* being, which comprehends all things. Now, if the unity of a class consists in their being one substance, then all things are but one substance in manifold manifestations. What this amounts to, we need not say, except that it is what Dr. Shedd abhors, *ab imo pectore*.

2. If what Adam did the race did, because all men are, by virtue of a common manhood, one substance with him, then this applies not only to his first sin, but to all his subsequent sins, by necessary and inevitable consequence. Not only so, but the acts of all other parents become the acts of their descendants. In fact, the acts of each and every man become the acts of all men. Our readers have seen that Dr. Shedd tries to parry this inference by putting a difference between the first man, the first pair, and all their descendants. But so far as the present point is concerned it is unavailing. If Adam's posterity participated literally in his sin, because his act was the act of the entity manhood common to him and them, the same effect follows every act of every man by virtue of this same community of substance. This confounds and vacates personal identity and responsibility.

3. We object to this solution of the relation of Adam's sin to the sin of the race, because it reacts upon the relation of Christ's righteousness to our justification, in consequence of the parallel drawn by Scripture between the two, Rom. v. 15—19. If then the way in which Adam's sin avails to our condemnation be, that we literally committed it, or that it is ours inherently and personally, then the way in which the righteousness of Christ becomes ours is that, by a community of nature, it is ours personally and inherently. Thus subjective righteousness or personal holiness becomes the ground of justification. Such, in our view, are the logical and historical tendencies of this realistic solution of original sin, which make us afraid of it, and lead us to cling to that upon which the Reformers ultimately settled, and which appears in the federal, representative, and public character assigned to Adam in their sym-

bols, and more fully in their great theologieal treatises, to explain the sin and fall of the race in him.

Yet, if one ean bear the realistie philosophy, it must be eonfessed that it has its charms as a solvent of many of the difficulties connected with the doctrine of original sin. It enables one to adopt, in their utmost literality of meaning, all phrases of Scripture in regard to the fall of the race in Adam; and in like manner the strongest language of our Confession and Catechisms, if we except the federal and representative office aseribed to him. But surely none can say with greater sincerity than the realistie Calvinist, "All sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression." And they only, who have had a similar experience, can appreciate the attitude of mind of persons, who, like Dr. Shedd, have lived and moved and had their being in a region where original sin is widely decried, and the imputation of Adam's sin seldom spoken of, but as the climax of all absurdities. Those who have a Presbyterian training cannot understand the difficulty experienced by such persons in digesting the doctrine of imputation. When they come to those profounder scriptural and experimental views which radicate sin deeper and earlier than any conscious acts, by which character is formed in our present state, and look for a theory which will serve as a scientific frame for such views, the realistic hypothesis is extremely alluring. It seems to solve all difficulties, to conform, *quoad hoc*, to the language of Scripture and the creeds, to have the traditional dignity and authority given it by the adhesion of some of the greatest heathen philosophers and Christian divines—and withal to be arrayed in the united charms of mysticism and philosophy. We speak what we do know, and testify what we have seen in the conflicts of personal experience. But it must be remembered, that nearly all that we have said of the attractions of Realism, on this account, might be said of Pantheism. That too, on some of the most high and difficult doctrines, can adopt *ex animo* the literal statements of the Scripture and the creeds. But it can adopt and does include a great deal more, utterly inconsistent with other portions of Scripture and the creeds. Similar in its degree is the objection to Realism in the various departments of theology.

Here we close our examination of this high work, on the whole, so creditable to the author's learning, piety, and doctrinal insight. It is because of our sense of its great excellence, and probable influence, and because it generally takes so high ground in behalf of thorough orthodoxy, that we have felt constrained to indicate what we deem its chief error. This error, indeed, pertains rather to the circumference than the centre of Christian doctrine. It is embraced by the author all the more earnestly, because he regards it as a powerful means of holding fast that centre—of keeping true to what is so fundamental in the Christian system as the doctrine of Original Sin, and its correlates, Divine Redemption and Regeneration. We reject it, as untrue in itself, and as fraught with contrary tendencies. Notwithstanding this drawback, the work is, as a whole, among the strongest promoters of high-toned orthodoxy, which has been of late given to the public. In its grand exhibition of standard scriptural and historical theology, it will shed great light upon some boastful but narrow provincial schemes that vainly aspire to supplant that theology.

SHORT NOTICES.

A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life; with a complete Bibliography of the subject. By William Rounseville Alger. Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 628 Chestnut street. 1864. Pp. 913.

This is a most elaborate work. It undertakes to present the views of all nations, ancient and modern, and of all creeds, concerning the state of the soul in a future world. The barbaric notions of uncivilized tribes, the Druidic, Scandinavian, Etruscan, Egyptian, Brahmanic and Buddhist, the Persian, Hebrew, Rabbinical, Greek, Roman and Mohammedan, doctrines are all passed in review. Then come up for consideration the teachings of the New Testament on this subject, and a protracted history of the doctrine in different ages of the church, with dissertations or additional discussions on future punishment, methods of salvation, recognition of friends in a future life, &c. This meagre statement of the contents of this volume show that it is without a rival for comprehensiveness of plan, and for laborious research in its execution. Mr. Alger's own doctrinal stand-point appears very far below that occupied by the great body of evangelical Christians, and his work is to be taken as a repository, and not as an authority. The most remarkable feature of this volume is the Index, prepared by Mr. Ezra Abbot, on the "Literature of the Doctrine of a Future State." This Index contains a classified catalogue of more than four thousand works, with the names of the authors, the time when they lived, and the editions of their writings. This catalogue alone would be well worth the price charged for the volume.

The Life and Times of John Huss; or, The Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century. By E. H. Gillett. In two volumes. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Square. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 632, and 651.

The Reformers before the Reformation; the men who comparatively alone, and without the support of princes and people, protested against the corruptions of the church, in doctrine, discipline, and morals, whose reward was the stake, have not had that place in history to which they are entitled. There is a debt of gratitude to them which remains unpaid. Mr. Gillett

has done a good work in devoting so much talent and labour to one interesting field of historical research, with the view of diffusing a knowledge of one of the most remarkable men, and one of the most important movements in ecclesiastical history. There have been to our view few more valuable contributions to our religious literature than these two volumes during the present century. The author of this work takes rank with Sparks, Bancroft, Irving, Prescott, Hopkins, and others, who have done so much to exalt the reputation of our country in the world of letters by their historical productions. The work is printed in the elegant style for which the Boston publishers are distinguished.

Geographical Studies. By the late Professor Carl Ritter, of Berlin. Translated from the original German, by William Leonhard Gage. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 356.

This volume contains a sketch of Ritter's life, an account of his geographical labours, and a series of his essays on important subjects connected with the science of comparative geography. Ritter stood for years the acknowledged head of this department. To this his long and honoured life was almost exclusively devoted. To the students of philosophical geography, who desire to ascertain the laws which have determined the conformation of the earth's surface, this volume will be peculiarly welcome. This is a department of knowledge which our own Professor Guyot is doing so much to render familiar to the American public; and in which the labours of the lamented Dr. Robinson, so far as relates to the geography of the Holy Land, secured for him a reputation second to that of no living author.

George Morton and his Sister. By Catherine M. Trowbridge. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1864. Pp. 258.

This is the history of a neglected street wanderer, redeemed and elevated by well-directed efforts of Sunday-School teachers and friends. It is written in a lively and interesting style, and bids fair to take a high place in the class of works to which it belongs.

Family Sermons. By Horatius Bonar, D. D., Kelso. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 464.

These are short sermons, fifty-two in number, designed to illustrate the glorious gospel in some of its manifold aspects, by one of the most popular living writers of Scotland.

The Witness Papers. The Headship of Christ, and the Rights of the Christian People, a Collection of Essays, Historical and Descriptive Sketches, and Personal Portraitures, with the author's celebrated Letter to Lord Brougham. By Hugh Miller. Edited, with a Preface, by Peter Bayne, A. M. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 502.

The *Edinburgh Witness* was for many years under the editorial management of Hugh Miller. Those accustomed to peruse the weekly issues of that paper, probably derived a higher idea of the varied attainments and of the mental power of the editor, than that produced by even his most celebrated works. Theology, ecclesiastical law, finance, general literature, physical science, seemed equally familiar to him. On all these topics he wrote with a simplicity, clearness, power, and beauty, which was a constant source of amazement and admiration to his numerous readers. We are glad that some of his remarkable contributions to the *Witness* have been collected in this volume. For ourselves, however, we can say that we have sometimes been as much impressed by the power of the man, as exhibited in an article of some four or five lines, as in his more elaborate productions. Hugh Miller belonged to the highest class of men, and everything he wrote is worthy of preservation.

"*I Will*," being the determinations of the Man of God, as found in some of the "I wills" of the Psalms. By the Rev. Philip Bennett Power, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Worthing; author of the "I wills" of Christ. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863. Pp. 404.

Fourteen thousand copies of this devotional book has been sold in England, which is sufficient evidence of its power. It is a fruitful topic. "I will not be afraid of ten thousands of people." "I will lay me down in peace." "I will fear no evil." "I will not trust in my bow." "I will call upon the Lord." "I will trust in thee." "I will abide in thy tabernacle for ever." The reader may see from this selection of mottoes, how rich a field of instruction and consolation is opened in this volume.

The Desert Pathway. By the Rev. William Robertson, of Hamilton, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863. Pp. 404.

"This book," says its author, "pretends to nought but a few simple thoughts written down in an interval of retirement, during which it has pleased God to withdraw the writer into a path of silence and trial." Books written under such circumstances are apt to be genuine productions of the heart, and reach the hearts of those similarly tried.

The Jewish Tabernacle and its Furniture in their Typical Teachings. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., Rector of the Church of the Epiphany. Philadelphia. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 393.

This is a very attractive volume, as well on account of its subject, as the method in which the author's plan is carried out, and the appropriate beauty of its illustrations. The main idea of the book is, that "the tabernacle was designed of God, not only to foreshadow the gospel before it came, but also to illustrate it after it had come." For this typical character not only of the old economy in general, but of the ordering of the tabernacle and its service, we have the divine authority of the apostle in his epistle to the Hebrews. It is, therefore, important that this source of instruction should not be neglected, due care being taken that we do not substitute our own fancies for divine intimations.

Claude, the Colporteur. By the author of "Mary Powell." New York: Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 316.

The scene of this interesting volume is laid in Switzerland, and brings into view the peasant life of that country.

The Risen Redeemer. The Gospel History from the Resurrection to the day of Pentecost. By F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Translated from the German, by John T. Betts. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 298.

Dr. Krummacher tells us that the object of this work is not merely devotional, but also apologetic. It is not only an exposition for spiritual edification of a portion of the evangelical history, but an answer to the objections of recent sceptical writers. It was published in Germany under the title of "The Easter Manual," and forms, with the writer's two preceding works on the Advent, and Passion of Christ, a trilogy for these ecclesiastical epochs.

Able to Save; or Encouragements to Patient Waiting. By the author of "The Pathway of Promise." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1864. Pp. 280.

This is another book written under the pressure of affliction, by a devout spirit, and designed to administer comfort to the weary.

Memoir of the Rev. Erskine J. Hawes, Pastor of the Congregational church, Plymouth, Connecticut. By his Mother. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 275.

"A mother's love, perhaps a mother's partiality, has prepared, and now gives to the public, this memoir of a beloved son." These touching words open every heart to receive this

tribute of maternal affection to a son well worthy of her love. The public have not forgotten the sad accident by which the subject of this memoir was cut off in the prime of his life and usefulness. His venerable father, the Rev. Joel Hawes, D. D., of Hartford, has been called to severe suffering in the loss of his children, but he has the great consolation of knowing that the memoir of one at least of the number, Mrs. Mary E. Lennep, has been, since her death, a means of extensive usefulness, and this life of his lamented son, will no doubt be also similarly blessed.

An Essay on the Improvement of Time. By John Foster, author of "Essay on Decision of Character." Edited by J. E. Ryland, M. A. With a Preface, by John Sheppard. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1864. Pp. 264.

As John Foster holds rank with the most distinguished English Essayists, the public will welcome this new edition of an essay which, although not published until after his death, is worthy of a place among his most elaborate productions.

The Great Stone-Book of Nature. By David Thomas Ansted, M. A., F. R. S., F. G. S., &c., late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, &c. Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 628 Chestnut street. 1863. Pp. 335.

The Stone-Book is the science of geology. "There is but one way," the author says, "in which geology can be understood, and that is, by a thorough familiarity with what is going on now both in the animate and inanimate kingdom of nature." This is the idea on which this book is constructed. It is a popular, instructive, and interesting exhibition of an important department of knowledge.

Milton's Paradise Lost. New York: Frank H. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1863. Pp. 331.

A very handsome and passable edition of a standard work.

Hymns and Tunes for the Army and Navy, published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. Pp. 128.

Little Pilgrims. American Tract Society. Pp. 55.

Katy Seymour; or, How to make Others Happy. American Tract Society. Pp. 152.

Hannah's Path. By the author of the "Blue Flag," &c. American Tract Society. Pp. 118.

Harry, the Whaler. By the author of "Harry, the Sailor-boy," &c., from the Religious Tract Society, London. Published by the American Tract Society. Pp. 138.

Buster and Baby Jim. By the author of the "Blue Flag." American Tract Society. Pp. 107.

A Compendious History of English Literature and the English Language from the Norman Conquest, with Numerous Specimens. By George L. Craik, LL.D., Professor of History and of English Literature in Queen's College, Belfast. In two vols. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

These massive volumes constitute a thesaurus of information in regard to the development and shaping of our mother tongue, and the growth of English authorship, which will be invaluable to philologists, and men of letters, taste, and culture. The number of authors described and cited; the wide and varied field over which the work ranges; the changes in the vocabulary, grammatical structure; the literary, scientific, and esthetic capabilities of the language, which are here exhibited; the learning, skill, and judgment, displayed by the author, make it a repository so rich and instructive as to deserve a place in all well-furnished libraries.

An Outline of the Elements of the English Language, for the Use of Students. By N. G. Clark, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in Union College. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

Professor Clark has here condensed within a small volume much of the matter which Professor Craik has presented more fully and minutely in his two heavy octavos. It is in a form and at a price within the reach of multitudes of young students, to whom the latter is inaccessible and useless. We do not mean that it is any mere compend or condensation of Professor Craik's work. It is entirely independent, and so far as we have noticed, may have been written without any knowledge of Professor Craik's book. It is quite adapted to the wants of the class for whom it is intended, both in its analysis of the gradual progress and development of our language, and in its quotations and critical comments upon leading authors. No process is more educating than the study of the history of words and their connotative import, and of genial, appreciative, but discriminating comment upon the English classics.

The Heidelberg Catechism, in German, Latin, and English; with an Historical Introduction. Prepared and published by the direction of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America. Tri-centenary edition. New York: Charles Scribner. Chambersburg, Pa.: M. Kieffer & Co. 1863.

This celebrated symbol will be sought with interest and avidity, not only by the German Reformed Church, and by theologians outside of it, but by all who take an interest in the doctrinal development which during the past twenty years has been going forward in that communion in this country. The three languages in which it is issued, the ability and care with

which it is edited by such scholars as Drs. Schaff, Gerhart, and Nevin, acting by the appointment of the church itself, all tend to give it authority and value. Nearly half the volume is occupied by the "Historical Introduction." This is prepared with the scholarly care and theological insight, but not without the constant ingenious effort to give it an extreme sacramentarian bias, and to compare it with our own and other similar symbols, to the disadvantage of the latter, which we might expect from its authors.

We wish to signalize the excellent typography and paper of this and most of Mr. Scribner's publications. It lessens the labour and heightens the pleasure of reading works full one-half, when they are printed like this and Dr. Shedd's new work, not to speak of others. We should rejoice to see a copy of our own standards in similar style.

Sermons Preached before his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, during his Tour in the East in the Spring of 1862, *with Notices of some of the Localities visited.* By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, Honorary Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, Deputy Clerk of the Closet, Honorary Chaplain to the Prince of Wales. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863. Published by arrangement with the Author.

We are glad to observe, that as Dr. Trench has been promoted to the bishopric made vacant by the death of Archbishop Whately, so Dr. Stanley has been promoted to the deanery made vacant by this removal of Dr. Trench. This is a well-merited recognition of the distinguished contributions he has already made to letters and religion. His originality, freshness, sound judgment, classic simplicity, and elegance of style, appear in the sermons and descriptions of this volume, which possesses a high literary as well as religious interest and value. Those preachers who have never mastered the art of writing short sermons worth hearing, would do well to study this volume. In it there is much curious information, of value to the philologist, the exegete, the antiquary, and the common reader of the Bible.

My Father's House; or, the Heaven of the Bible. A Book of Consolation. By James M. MacDonald, D.D., Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton, New Jersey. Fourth edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

We have been accustomed to rank the contents of this book, both as we heard them originally delivered from the pulpit, and as they are now embodied in this neat volume, among the author's happiest efforts. It well deserves, and we doubt not

will continue to receive, the favour already bestowed upon it by those who mourn in Zion, or who love to foretaste heaven on earth.

The Federalist. A Collection of Essays written in favour of the New Constitution, as agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. Reprinted from the Original Text. With an Historical Introduction and Notes. By Henry B. Dawson. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

These celebrated state-papers have long been out of print, and comparatively unknown to our younger lawyers and politicians. Until a recent period, few thought themselves qualified to enter political life, or to aspire to a place in the national councils, who were not familiar with these masterly discussions on our national constitution, which exerted so powerful an influence in promoting its acceptance and ratification by the people, especially the people of New York, among whom a powerful party threatened to prevent the adoption of this beneficent instrument by that great State. These papers were written mostly by Hamilton, largely by Madison, and a few of them by John Jay. These, in connection with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, rendered by John Marshall, form the ablest and most decisive construction of this great national charter. We are glad to find them again in print. We do not doubt that, in this crisis of our national existence, when the mind of the nation is stirred to its depths in regard to the most elementary principles relative to national and state, legislative, executive, judicial, and military authority and prerogative, these expositions of our ablest statesmen, concerned in framing and defending it, will be sought and examined with avidity. The historical introduction and notes are valuable additions to the volume.

My Farm of Edgewood; a Country Book. By the author of "Reveries of a Bachelor." Eighth edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

The author, who has given to the public many entertaining books of fiction, here employs his graphic pen upon the various incidents connected with life upon a farm to which he has retired. The lights and shades sketched in his vivid style, are both instructive and entertaining in the inside view they give of fancy and real farming.

Music of the Bible; or, Explanatory Notes upon those Passages in the Sacred Scriptures which relate to Music. Including a Brief View of Hebrew Poetry. By Enoch Hutchinson. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1864.

This large volume is devoted to a single point of scriptural investigation, which is not treated at length in any accessible

volume known to us. The author makes searching inquiry into the portions of Scripture that touch, even in the most casual way, upon music, or musical instruments. Many interesting pictorial illustrations of the rude musical instruments mentioned in Scripture are given. The poetry of the sacred writers is also made the subject of interesting and profitable discussion. The work, as a whole, is characterized by judgment, learning, and piety.

The Mercy-Seat; or, Thoughts on Prayer. By Augustus C. Thompson, D. D., author of "The Holy Land," "Morning Hours at Patmos," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863.

A very thorough, evangelical, devout, and beautiful treatise on the great subject of communion with God. It is cast in a highly readable form. The author finds many of his best illustrations and examples in the great devotional compositions of the church. He abounds in sparkling imagery and choice anecdote, which lend to his successive chapters the charm of story, eloquence, and poetry. His fondness for figure and metaphor in rare instances outruns the limits of our own judgment and taste; as when, likening prayer to the telegraph, he speaks of "God's immediate presence" as the "Trinity Bay of the universe." P. 33.

Christianity the Religion of Nature. Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. By A. P. Peabody, D. D., LL. D., Preacher to the University, and Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1864.

This work is an earnest defence of Christianity from the author's standpoint. This is considerably higher than has been common among the Unitarians or liberal Christians of Massachusetts. He is clear and strong in support of a supernatural, authoritative revelation attested by miracles. These are momentous truths. They are supported by Dr. Peabody with eminent ability, great force of argument, affluence of illustration, exquisite and enchanting beauty of style. Undoubtedly the book will be useful to many minds that are perplexed and wavering on these subjects.

But we are sorry to say that the work is marred by one serious and radical defect, which is partly foreshadowed in its title. We discover no recognition of the fall of man and of Christianity as a remedial provision for recovery from this lapse. So far as we have observed, in an examination of necessity cursory, the natural religion which he reasons out *a priori*, and which he contends is identical with Christianity, is a reli-

gion which does not require the vicarious penal sufferings of the God-man, or an inward new creation of the corrupt soul by the Holy Ghost. Hence, we find no higher attributes and offices ascribed to Christ than the "image," or "representative" of God, and the "faultless model" and "exemplar" of man. Pp. 164, 175. With this the work harmonizes in correlative subjects, and in it we have the key to the defects which mar the forementioned excellencies.

A Treatise on Regeneration. By E. C. Wines, D.D. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia, 1863.

The cardinal doctrine of regeneration is handled by the author, in this little volume, in a manner worthy of him and of the subject. The orthodox view is set forth, in all its parts, with great clearness and force, with ample and apposite scriptural proofs, with just psychological and metaphysical distinctions, with edifying practical applications, and in a style at once pure and attractive.

Views From Nature. Published by the American Tract Society.

One of the very best books for children and youth.

Kelly Nash, or I Didn't Think. By the author of "Blue Flag."

Amy's New Home; with the Blot of Ink, and the Picture Clock.

The Little Sea-Bird. By the author of "Mackerel Will," &c.

Gospel Workers; or a Plea for doing Good, for Everybody. By Rev. J. Cross.

The foregoing are neat little volumes published by the American Tract Society. The first three, of various merit, for children, the last designed and fitted to promote Christian activity.

Motives to the Missionary Work. A Sermon before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at their meeting in Rochester, N. Y., October 6, 1863. By Elisha L. Cleaveland, D.D., Pastor of the Third Congregational Church, New Haven, Ct. Boston: T. R. Marvin & Son. 1863.

This is a model sermon for a great occasion, connected with the evangelization of the world. It is a clear and eloquent presentation of evangelical truth—far more appropriate and edifying than the splendid platitudes, remote from Christ and him crucified, which sometimes steal into such places.

Chronicles of the Schönbergh-Cotta Family. By two of themselves. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1864. Pp. 552.

The scene of this work is laid before and during the Reformation. It is an exceedingly interesting exhibition of the state of feeling and opinion among the Romanists at that period, and of the effect of the new doctrine taught by Luther.

Die Altpersischen Keilinschriften im Grundtexte mit Uebersetzung. Grammatik und Glossar, von Fr. Spiegel. 8vo. pp. 223.

This convenient and complete little manual sums up the results of the investigations of the last sixty years in regard to the Persian arrow-head inscriptions. The whole of these, so far as they have been copied by Europeans, are here given, both in their original text transcribed in Roman letters, and in a German translation. The longest and most important is the great Belùstân inscription, where Darius recorded upon the perpendicular face of the mountain rock, three hundred feet above the plain, his title to the throne, the extent of his empire, and the leading events of his reign. Next to this in length and consequence is another from the same monarch at Naksh-i-Rustam, engraved in a like inaccessible position. The rest are of smaller compass and of less intrinsic worth, though by no means devoid of interest and value, representing as they do, seven of the Persian monarchs, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes Ochus.

The inscriptions themselves are followed by critical and explanatory notes, together with a grammar of the language represented in the inscriptions, and a glossary of all the words which they contained. A concise but satisfactory history is also given of the deciphering of these inscriptions, and the successive steps by which it was accomplished, from the first fortunate conjecture of Grotefend in 1802. The name of the author, who is well known from other valuable contributions to our knowledge of ancient Iranic literature, is a sufficient guarantee of the ability with which his work is executed.

One very interesting fact connected with the Persian arrow-head letter, which may be of importance in tracing the history and development of writing, is that it is an alphabetic character formed upon the basis of syllabic characters previously existing. There are several systems of writing, which are classed under the generic name of the arrow-head character, because they all consist of the same elements, the wedge and angle, variously modified and combined. These are used in writing different languages, and some of them are exceedingly complicated. That in which the ancient Persian language is written appears to be the most recent, as well as the simplest of them. All the rest are syllabic, this alone is alphabetic, really and truly so, though still retaining traces of its syllabic origin. Thus there are three forms for *d* and three for *m*, corresponding to the three vowels *a*, *i*, or *u*, by which they may be followed. The explanation of this doubtless is, that *da*, *di*, and *du* were originally represented by separate charac-

ters denoting the consonant with its accompanying vowel. When these were subsequently used to represent the consonant alone, and a distinct sign was introduced for the vowel, that form of the consonant was naturally selected to accompany a particular vowel which had formerly included it in itself. If this method had been consistently followed out, it would have required three forms for every consonant. Some of these were, however, dropped as superfluous. Thus, besides the two letters already named which have three forms, *k*, *g*, *t*, *n*, and *r*, have two forms, one employed before the vowels *a* and *i*, and the other before *u*; *v* has two forms, one before *a* and *u*, and the other before *u*; *j* has distinct forms before *a* and *i*, but does not occur before *u*. The other letters have but one form before all three of the vowels. But here, as in Sanscrit, a consonant unaccompanied by another vowel is regarded as involving in itself the short vowel *a*.

Einleitung in das Babylonisch-Hebräische Punktation-System, nebst einer Grammatik der Hebräischen Zahlwörter von Abraham ben Ezra, aus Handschriften herausgegeben und Commentirt von S. Pinsker. 8vo. pp. xlix. (in German,) and 192 (in Hebrew.)

The Historical and Antiquarian Society of Odessa received from a Karaite hacham in 1839 the present of a number of old Hebrew manuscripts, mostly Bibles and synagogue rolls. Among these were several, which were distinguished by a system of signs for the vowels and accents quite different from those in ordinary use. One is a Codex of the latter prophets, written upon two hundred and twenty-five folio leaves of good parchment. Each page has two columns, between which and on the margins are glosses like those of the Masora. This was described, and a fac-simile of the book of Habakkuk published by Dr. Primer in 1845. Besides this, there are fifteen fragments, making in all seventy-seven quarto leaves of a Pentateuch on cotton paper, accompanied with the corresponding Haphtaroth, or synagogue lessons from the prophets. Each verse of the Pentateuch is followed by the Chaldee translation of Onkelos, and each verse of the Haphtaroth by that of Jonathan. There are also twelve fragments, containing forty quarto leaves of another Pentateuch, on cotton paper, with the Haphtaroth and Targums.

In these manuscripts all the vowels with the exception of Shurek are written above the letters. The vowel Seghol is wanting, its place being supplied, according to circumstances, by Pattahh, Hhirik, or Tsere. Hhirik and Tsere preserve their accustomed forms in their altered position, Hholem has two dots vertically placed instead of one, and the other vowels

have undergone a considerable change of figure. Singularly enough, the sign for Kamets (*ā*) and Kamets Hhatuph (*ŏ*) is identical, as in the ordinary punctuation. Every vowel but Hholem and Shurek appears in three forms, which are determined by the character of the syllable and the position of the accent. In simple syllables, and in all syllables whether simple or not, which receive either the principal or the secondary accent, the vowel has its proper uncompounded sign. Methegh is not written in these manuscripts, though they thus attest the reality of the tone which it indicates. In unaccented compound syllables, as well as where a compound Sh'va would be expected, a horizontal stroke is drawn beneath the vowel sign. Before a doubled letter a like stroke is drawn above the vowel sign. This stroke unconnected with a vowel is used both for Raphe and Sh'va; its combination with a vowel sign bears an analogy to the compound Sh'vas in the current Hebrew orthography. The sign for Daghesh, both forte and lene, is the ordinary one. Pattahh furtive is not recognized.

The accentual system is somewhat simpler than that in common use. There are but eighteen accents, twelve disjunctives and six conjunctives, the former being invariably written over the tone syllable, and the latter beneath it. There are no postpositives or prepositives as in the ordinary punctuation.

This is called the Assyrio-Babylonish system of punctuation, because it is supposed to have prevailed among the Jews in Assyria and Babylonia, in distinction from that previously known, and which is attributed to the Masorites at Tiberias or in Palestine. Many interesting questions here arise, which cannot as yet be said to have found a satisfactory solution. Was one of these systems of writing the vowels and accents derived directly from the other? If so, which is entitled to claim the priority? Or were both alike descended from some simpler system which they have developed differently? There is too much similarity between them to admit of their being regarded as wholly independent in origin; and at the same time the diversity in principle and method is too great to have been simply fortuitous. Perhaps the further investigation of this subject may yet shed a welcome light upon that great mystery of Hebrew criticism, the introduction of the vowel signs, and exhibit to us the steps by which their present nicety and complication was attained, as well as the certainty of the basis on which they rest.

This little volume contains a fac-simile of the closing verses of Malachi, with the subscription by the copyist, and reproduces the text of various passages with its peculiar system of

signs, viz., 2 Kings i. 6, the Ten Commandments from Deut. v., Isaiah xxxix., Jer. i., Ezekiel xxvi. xxvii., Mic. iv. The grammar of the Hebrew numerals, by Abraham ben Ezra, which is added to it, occupies with Pinsker's Comments, sixty pages of the Hebrew portion of the book.

It may be added here, that there is a manuscript of the K'thubhim, formerly in Heidelberg now in Rome, which is described in the following terms: Vocalium puncta, quæ in Hebraicis infra poni solent, superposita, et quidem quinque præcipua. No careful examination of this Codex has been instituted, so far as is known: so that it is impossible to say whether it represents the same system of punctuation as the Odessan manuscripts or not.

—

The Board of Publication have recently made several valuable additions to their Sabbath-School Library, all of which are attractive in appearance, well printed, and beautifully illustrated. The following have been sent to us for notice.

Little Pearls from the Ocean of Divine Truth. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 35 and 40 cents.

Rays of Light from the Sun of Righteousness. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 45 and 50 cents.

The Sunbeam, and other Stories. 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The above works are selections of stories, some of which have appeared in the columns of our religious newspapers. They are of unequal merit; but all of them interesting and instructive, and not unworthy of preservation in their book form.

Jenny, the Crochet-Worker; or, the Path of Truth. By the late Sarah M. Fry, author of "The Lost Key," "The Young Hop-pickers," &c., &c. 18mo. pp. 130. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This is the story of a young pious girl, who was tempted by a fellow-servant to assent to a falsehood, which brought upon her disgrace and much unhappiness. The lessons taught flow naturally from the story, which is told with much simplicity and beauty.

Kate Stanley; or, the Power of Perseverance. By Abby Eldredge, author of "Ella Graham." 18mo. pp. 200. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This little volume is full of exciting incidents, which will doubtless make it a favourite with youthful readers; but there is an out-cropping of juvenility in the construction of the work, which prevents us from giving it our entire approval.

Little Annie's First Bible Lessons. 18mo. pp. 175. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This is a series of instructive conversations between a mother and her daughter upon some of the narratives contained in the book of Genesis.

Rebella; or, the Shining Way. By Nellie Graham, author of "Little Annie's First Bible Lessons." 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The subjection of the rebellious heart to the Saviour, and the introduction into it of holy desires and affections are here depicted allegorically, as a journey in the Shining Way from the Carnal City to the City of Light. It shows no little temerity to follow in the wake of the Great Dreamer, but the author has probably succeeded in all that she purposed, and produced a book which will interest and instruct children. The allegory is constructed with good taste and judgment.

Nina Grey, a Christmas Story of 1861. 18mo. pp. 164. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The Christmas story of 1861 will find only a wider need of its circulation in 1864, among the bereaved families of our country.

Bessie Grey; or, the Value of Little Labours. 18mo. pp. 128. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The story of "Bessie Grey" illustrates some of the ways in which little children can do good. Few boys or girls will read it without being made better by it.

Blind Annie Lorimer. By the author of "George Miller and his Mother," &c. 18mo. pp. 200. Price 35 and 40 cents.

Annie Lorimer, a blind girl, in an institution for the instruction of the blind, receives the truth into her heart in love, and returns to her family near the Adirondack Mountains, where her humble labours are much blessed in her own family, and in that wild neighbourhood. There is a life-like vivacity in some of the sketches, which leaves little doubt that they are copied from nature. The book is evidently the production of a person of well-cultivated mind, and will delight and instruct its readers.

Alice Barlow; or, Principle is Everything. A country village history. 18mo. pp. 280. Price 40 and 45 cents.

Alice Barlow was the child of irreligious parents, who received into her mind the seeds of Christian principle in a Sabbath-school, and amid the many trials and temptations incident to a life of poverty and labour, continued steadfast in her principles, and in a remarkable degree unswayed by selfish considerations.

It contains many graphic pictures of English village life, and is, we believe, a re-publication from the London Tract Society's catalogue.

Lessons in Flying, for our Home Birds. By the Rev. William P. Breed, author of "The Book of Books." 18mo. pp. 164. Price 25 and 30 cents.

The author of this little book has a rare and most happy faculty of putting his thoughts into a graphic form attractive to children. We have no doubt that this book will deeply impress some truths upon the minds of those who read it.

Try; Better Do it, than Wish it Done. By the author of "Annandale," "Clouds and Sunshine," "Cares and Comforts," &c. 18mo. pp. 244. Price 40 and 45 cents.

The heroine of this book suffered from "a want of self-reliance, and a tendency to be easily discouraged," but as she "passed Mr. Locke's, he was leaning on the fence, talking with some strange gentleman in a gig, and just as I came up, the stranger said, 'Try; better do it, than wish it done;' and it seemed to answer my thoughts so exactly that I almost supposed for an instant that he was speaking to me." This sentence she adopted as her motto, and in the book we have her application of it in various exciting circumstances. The work is well written, and will interest and instruct its readers.

The Wonderful Stone: or, the Curse turned into Blessing. 18mo. pp. 284. Price 40 and 45 cents.

An excellent book for young readers, abounding in admirable lessons, true to nature, and deeply interesting. It is the narrative of a lad reduced from affluence to poverty, by adversity led to seek the Saviour, and by the application of Scriptural principles in his life and labours doing much good, and raising himself again to comparative affluence.

The Three Homes; or, Three Ways of Spending the Sabbath By Nellie Graham, author of "Diamonds Reset," "Little Annie's First Thoughts," &c. 18mo. pp. 216. Price 35 and 40 cents.

The book is designed and well adapted to impress upon youthful minds the unspeakable importance of a proper observance of God's holy Sabbath, and to show that he will bless those who honour him by honouring his day.

Grace Abbott; or, The Sunday Tea-Party. 18mo. pp. 144. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This work is intended for a younger class of readers than the above, and, like it, inculcates the duty of keeping the Sabbath-

day holy, and in a very touching and pleasing way depicts the early life of a little girl who was led and enabled by God's Spirit to do so, in spite of great temptations and obstacles thrown across her path.

Walter and Alice; or, the Mother's Prayer Answered. By Abby Eldredge, author of "Kate Stanley." 18mo. pp. 179. Price 35 and 40 cents.

This little volume illustrates the power of prayer. The prayer of a mother, who died in early childhood, is blest to the conversion of her son, after he has run a long course of wilfulness and sin, and he is brought, by the grace of God, back to Christ and duty.

Poor Nicholas; or, The Man in the Blue Coat. By Mrs. Sarah A. Myers. 18mo. pp. 316. Price 45 and 50 cents.

This is the history of a little boy and his pious mother, residing at Munich, in Bavaria, who passed through severe trials and straits, and were ultimately befriended by the good king Maximilian Joseph. In the book there are many interesting pictures of German life, and the object of the whole is to inculcate reliance upon the promises of God, and the certainty that he will not disappoint the faith of those who put their trust in him.

The Railroad Boy. By the author of "Poor Nicholas," &c. 18mo. pp. 180. Price 35 and 40 cents.

The scene of this story is laid in Prussia. Like "Poor Nicholas," by the same author, its leading incidents have been actual occurrences there. It is the history of a poor boy who loved God and trusted in the Saviour, and was brought through many trials into the ministry of the gospel. It will well repay a perusal.

Mattie's Story; or, The Blessing of the Pure in Heart. 18mo. pp. 116. Price 25 and 30 cents.

This is the real life of a young disciple. Its aim is to depict her religious experience, tracing her first approach to the Saviour, and her growth in grace and usefulness, until transferred to glory.

We respectfully acknowledge the receipt of many Sermons and Addresses, of which our limits forbid a specific notice.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

—

GERMANY.

Sifra, Commentary on Leviticus, belonging to the beginning of the third century, with the explanations of R. Abraham ben David and Maseret Ha-Talmud, by J. H. Weiss. (In Hebrew.) Folio, pp. 230.

C. F. Keil, Biblical Commentary on the Prophetico-historical Books of the Old Testament. Vol. I. Joshua, Judges and Ruth. 8vo. pp. 382. This is a part of the Commentary upon the Old Testament to be prepared in concert by Keil and Delitzsch. The former, who is well known as an able and judicious expositor and critic, has now published three volumes of the series, the first two embracing the Pentateuch. The first volume by Delitzsch will be on Isaiah.

P. F. Keerl, The Unity of the Primeval History of the Bible, (Gen. i.—iii.) and the agreement of the narrative of the Creation with the natural relations of the earth pointed out with reference to the views of Dr. Delitzsch, Dr. Hölemann, and Dr. Keil. 8vo. pp. 218.

A. Kamphausen, The Psalms translated and provided with explanatory remarks. 8vo. pp. 288. Reprinted from Bunsen's Bible-work.

F. Hitzig, The Psalms translated and explained. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 312. To be completed in two volumes. A third edition has also appeared of his Commentary on the Minor Prophets. 8vo. pp. 413.

P. de Lagarde, Remarks upon the Greek version of Proverbs. 8vo. pp. 96.

J. Diedrich, The prophets Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, briefly explained for attentive Bible-readers. 8vo. pp. 188.

A. Köhler, The Post-Exilic Prophets. Part 3. The Prophecies of Zechariah, chap. ix—xiv. 8vo. pp. 312. The preceding chapters of Zechariah and Haggai are discussed in the first two parts.

G. K. Mayer, The Messianic Prophecies Explained. Vol. II. Part 1. The Messianic Prophecies of Jeremiah. 8vo. pp. 133. The first volume contains the Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah.

E. Gerlach, The Prophecies of the Old Testament in the

writings of Flavius Josephus, and his alleged Testimony respecting Christ. 8vo. pp. 120.

A second edition of Hävernich's Lectures on the Theology of the Old Testament has appeared, with remarks and additions by Dr. H. Schultz. 8vo. pp. 285.

A. Hilgenfeld, The Prophets Ezra and Daniel, and the latest Treatises respecting them. 8vo. pp. 102. A discussion of the apocryphal book of 2d (or 4th) Esdras, principally in opposition to the views expressed by Volkmar in his Introduction to the Apocrypha; and an attempt to invalidate the evidences of the genuineness of the canonical book of Daniel; especially as presented by Zündel in his Critical Investigations respecting the date of its composition.

H. Ewald, The Fourth Book of Ezra in respect to its Age, its Arabic Versions, and a recent Restoration. 4to. pp. 100.

E. Meier, The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament translated and explained. Part 2. The Prophetical Books. 8vo. pp. 376. One of the wildest and most destructive of critics.

G. A. Freytag, The Symphony of the Gospels. A putting together of the geniune portions of the four gospels in a new translation, with scientific explanations. An Appendix containing the second chapter of the Acts and the Revelation in their original form. 8vo. pp. 290. Belongs to the same category with the preceding.

C. Tischendorf, Synopsis Evangelica. Editio II. emendata. 8vo. pp. lx. and 184.

P. Schegg, (Rom. Cath.) The Gospel according to Luke. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 644. This is the fifth volume in a series by the same author, entitled, The Holy Gospels Translated and Explained.

Jos. Grimm, The Unity of the Gospel of Luke. 8vo. pp. 204.

L. Klofutar, Commentarius in Evangelium St. Joannis. 8vo. pp. 326.

W. Bäumlein, Commentary on the Gospel of John. 8vo. pp. 196.

G. Böttger, The Testimonies of Flavius Josephus respecting John the Baptist, Jesus Christ, and James the Brother of the Lord. 8vo. pp. 32.

A. Bisping, Exegetical Handbook to the Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles. Vol. I. Matthew. 8vo. pp. 576. A second edition of his Handbook to the Epistles of Paul, is in course of publication.

K. Kluge, The Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo. pp. 220.

A. Messmer, (Rom. Cath.) Explanation of the Epistle of James. 8vo. pp. 85.

F. Steinfass, The Second Epistle of St. Peter. 8vo. pp. 101.

K. H. Neizsäcker, Criticism of the Epistle of Barnabas, from the Codex Sinaiticus. 4to. pp. 50.

J. C. K. von Hofmann, The Holy Scriptures of the New Testament connectedly investigated. The first part contains an introductory discussion of Gal. i. 11—ii. 14, and a Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians. The first division of the second part (8vo. pp. 242,) is occupied with a Commentary upon the Epistle to the Galatians.

The Illustrations of the Biblia Pauperum in a MS. of the 14th Century, preserved in the Convent of St. Florian. Published by A. Camesina. Explained by G. Heider. With thirty-four lithographed plates. 4to. pp. 20.

G. J. B. Güntner, Introductio in Sacros Novi Testamenti libros historico-critica et apologetica. 2 vols. 8vo.

J. Schwetz, Theologia Dogmatica Catholica. Vol. I. Editio 4to, emendatior. 8vo. pp. 451.

J. Schwetz, Compendium Theologiæ Dogmaticæ. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 272.

J. Amberger, Pastoral Theology. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 1334.

M. Benger, Pastoral Theology. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 1047.

F. A. Philippi, The Doctrine of Election and of the Person and Work of Christ. 2d half. 8vo. pp. 356.

J. Klein, De Jansenismi Origine, Doctrina, Historia. Pars I. 8vo. pp. 143.

J. Wiclif, Tractatus de Officio Pastorali. 8vo. pp. 48. Published for the first time from the manuscript recently found at Vienna.

P. Neumayr, (Rom. Cath.) The Origin of the Human Soul, Transmission of Original Sin, and our Justification through Christ. 8vo. pp. 58.

Corpus Reformatorum. Vols. XXIX. Series Altera. J. Calvini Opera, quæ supersunt omnia. Vol. I. 4to. pp. lix. and 1152. Cum Calvini effigie.

M. Schneckenburger, Lectures upon the Doctrinal Systems of the Minor Protestant Sects. 8vo. pp. 251. Published from the author's manuscripts after his death.

H. Denzinger, Ritus Orientalium, Coptorum, Syrorum, et Armenorum in administrandis Sacramentis. Collected from the Assemani, Renaudotius, Trombellius, and other authentic sources, with prolegomena and critical and exegetical notes, with the concurrence of several theologians and orientalists. To consist of two volumes. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 500.

A. Tholuck's Works. Vol. I. The Doctrine of Sin and of a Mediator. 8th edition. 8vo. pp. 176.

C. J. Hefele, History of Councils. Vol. V. 8vo. pp. 1071.

G. von Zezschwitz, The Catechisms of the Waldenses and of the Bohemian Brethren, as evidences of their mutual doctrinal interchange. Critical edition of the text, with investigation in ecclesiastical and literary history. 8vo. pp. 270.

F. Uhlemann, Chronological Tables of Church History from the first Century of the Christian Era to the Religious Peace of Augsburg. 8vo. pp. 42.

F. C. Baur, History of the Christian Church. Vol. IV. 8vo. pp. 707. From the Reformation to the close of the 18th Century. Published after the author's death. One more volume is yet to be issued.

A. Hug, Antioch and the Insurrection, A. D. 387. 4to. pp. 30.

H. Hübsch, The Ancient Christian Churches, and the influence of the early Christian style of architecture on the church-building of all later periods. Folio, with plates. Ten numbers have appeared.

A. Tappehorn, Life of St. Ausgar, the Apostle of Denmark and Sweden, and the History of the Spread of Christianity in the Scandinavian North. 8vo. pp. 290.

M. V. von Fereal, Mysteries of the Inquisition and of other secret societies of Spain, with historical remarks and explanations, by M. Cuendas. 8vo. pp. 584.

A. Geiger, Sadducees and Pharisees. 8vo. pp. 48. The learned Rabbi maintains that the Sadducees were the aristocratic party, consisting of the old and noble families, especially of the priestly order, who attached themselves to the ancient and famous family of the Sons of Zadok, and to whom, in the time of Christ, the party of the Herodians were added; while the Pharisees were the popular party. The Karaites were descended from the former, the Rabbinical Jews from the latter.

Baer's new edition of Buxtorf's Hebrew Concordance is now complete.

Zunz, The Hebrew Manuscripts in Italy, an admonitory call of justice and of science. 8vo. pp. 20.

A second edition has appeared of Fürst's Hebrew and Chaldee Dictionary. And of Winer's Chaldee Reading Book, edited by Fürst. Also, the third and last part of Fürst's Bibliotheca Judaica, or Bibliographical Handbook of all publications by Jews, or relating to Jews and Judaism. 8vo. pp. civ. and 664.

A. Dillmann, Lexicon Linguæ Aethiopicæ. Pars II. 4to. pp. 689—1168.

Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon. Pars prior. 4to. pp. 1104. Edited by M. Schmidt.

P. J. Junker, Contributions to the Chronology and History of Antiquity, especially in the Israelitish and Egyptian relations. 8vo. pp. 94.

J. B. de Rossi, Christian Inscriptions of the City of Rome, older than the Seventh Century. Vol. I. Folio, pp. clxvi. and 619.

T. Mommsen, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. Vol. I. To the death of C. Cæsar. Folio, pp. 649.

H. Steinthal, History of the Science of Language among the Greeks and Romans, with special reference to Logic. 8vo. pp. 712.

P. Pervanoghi, The Gravestones of the Ancient Greeks, specially investigated from the remains of the same preserved in Athens. 8vo. pp. 93.

K. B. Stark, Niobe and the Niobidæ in their literary, artistic and mythological significance. 8vo. pp. 464.

F. Lübker, Contributions to the Theology and Ethics of Euripides. 4to. pp. 54.

J. J. Bachooen, The Bear in the Religions of Antiquity. 4to. pp. 46.

E. Gerhard, Etruscan Mirrors. 8vo. pp. 347.

De locis sanctis quæ perambulavit Antoninus Martyr circa A. D. 570, ed. T. Tobler. 8vo. pp. 129.

F. Windischmann, Zorastrian Studies, Treatises on the Mythology and Legendary History of ancient Iran. Published after the death of the author, by F. Spiegel. 8vo. pp. 324.

Avesta, the Sacred Writings of the Parsees, translated from the original, with constant reference to tradition, by F. Spiegel. Vol. III. Khorda-avesta. 8vo. pp. 275.

R. Lepsius, The Original Zend Alphabet. 4to. pp. 91.

M. Schultze, Handbook of the Persian Language, Grammar, Chrestomathy, and Glossary. 8vo. pp. 123.

O. Bohllingk, Hindoo Proverbs, Sanscrit and German. Part I. 8vo. pp. 334.

H. Brugsch, Journey of the Prussian Embassy to Persia in 1860 and 1861. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 418 and 516.

H. Brugsch, Collection of Egyptian Monuments, drawn upon the spot. 4to. pp. 120. With 107 lithograph plates. Intended to be an explanatory supplement to the author's History of Egypt.

H. Brugsch, Account of a Medical Treatise, dating from the fourteenth century before our era, and contained in a hieratic papyrus of the Royal Museum at Berlin. 4to. pp. 20.

The first number of the Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprachund Alterthums-kunde, edited by H. Brugsch, appeared on the first of July last, and is to be issued semi-annually.

S. Reinisch, The Grave-stole of the Priest Ptah-Emwa, with an interlinear version and commentary. 8vo. pp. 15.

E. Schlagintweit, Buddhism in Thibet, illustrated by literary documents and objects of religious worship. With an account of the Buddhist systems preceding it in India. 8vo. pp. 403, with a folio atlas of twenty plates, and twenty tables of native print. In English.

H., A., and R. Schlagintweit, Results of a Scientific Mission to India and High Asia, undertaken between the years 1854 and 1858, by order of the Court of Directors of the honourable East India Company. Vol. III. 4to. pp. 293. In English.

H. Barth, Collection of Vocabularies of Central African Languages. 4to. pp. 334.

J. H. Platte, The Religion and Worship of the Ancient Chinese. 4to. pp. 243. With 24 lithograph plates.

L. Krehl, The Religion of the Pre-Islamitic Arabs. 8vo. pp. 92.

F. K. Meyer, The still living Celtic Populations, Languages, and Literatures, in their history and significance. 8vo. pp. 51.

K. Weinhold, Grammar of the German Dialects. Vol. I. Alemannic Grammar. 8vo. pp. 477.

J. Kelle, Comparative Grammar of the Germanic Languages. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 512.

Library of Anglo-Saxon Poetry, with critical texts and a complete glossary, by C. W. M. Grein. Vol. IV. Part I. 8vo. pp. 304.

A. F. Pott, Anti-Kaulen, a Mythical Representation of the origin of nations and languages. With reviews of two linguistic treatises, by H. Ewald. 8vo. pp. 298. This treatise is mainly in reply to Kaulen's discussion of the Confusion of Languages at Babel, Gen. xi. 1—9, published two years since.

R. Rolle de Hampole, The Prick of Conscience. A Northumbrian poem, copied and edited from manuscripts in the library of the British Museum, with an introduction, notes, and glossarial index of R. Morris.

R. von Raumer, Collected Linguistic Writings. 8vo. pp. 539.

C. Nitzsch. The Evangelical Movement in Italy, described after a residence of several years in Italy. 8vo. pp. 125.

Niclas Meldeman's Panoramic View of the City of Vienna during the siege by the Turks in the year 1529. Imitated by Albert Camesina. With an explanatory preface by K. Weiss. Folio, pp. 41, and a wood-cut of six folio leaves. The original was made by a Nuremberg painter from a view taken from the top of St. Stephen's tower during the siege. It presents an

accurate picture of the siege, the position of the besieging camps, the defences of the besieged, and the condition of the City of Vienna at the time, and is a valuable historical document. Only three copies are now known to be in existence. The fac-simile is accompanied by Niclas Meldeman's own account and explanation of the wood-cut, and two narratives of eye-witnesses, one of whom was within and the other without the walls of the city. Two ancient views of the City of Vienna are added in fac-simile, one the oldest that is known to be in existence, dating from 1489, and the other from the year 1566, representing the entry of Maximilian II. in 1563.

FRANCE.

E. Arnaud, Commentary on the New Testament. Vol. I. Matthew, Mark, and Luke. 12mo.

G. d'Eichthal, The Gospels. Part I. Vols. I. and II. Critical examination and comparison of the first three Gospels. 8vo.

A. Gratry, Commentary on the Gospel according to Matthew. 8vo.

Abbé Vidal, St. Paul, his life and works. 2 vols. 8vo.

Hennebon, History of Biblical Revelation. 2 vols. 8vo.

M. Nicolas, Critical Studies on the Bible. 8vo.

Renan's infidel Life of Jesus has called forth a large number of replies.

E. Reuss, History of the Canon. 8vo.

P. Past, Study on the Song of Songs, followed by a translation. 12mo.

A. Tollemer, Beginnings of Catholic Charity, or the state of misery and relief among Christians during the first centuries of the church. 8vo.

H. de Triqueti, Statement of the works of Protestant Charity in France. 12mo.

J. H. Merle d'Aubigné, History of the Reformation in Europe at the time of Calvin. Vols. I. and II. Geneva and France. 8vo.

Jacquinet, The Preachers of the 17th Century before Bossuet. 8vo.

H. Guys, The Theogony of the Druses, or a Summary of their religious system. Arabic text, with a translation, explanatory notes, and critical observations. 8vo.

A. Gilliot, The Religions of the East compared. 8vo.

Emile Burnouf, Essay on the Veda, or Studies on the Religious Literature and Social Constitution of India from primitive times to the Brahmanical period. 8vo.

Garcin de Tassy, Mantic-Uttair, or the Language of Birds, a poem of religious philosophy, translated from the Persian. 8vo.

M. Bréal, Fragments of Zend Criticism, the geography of the Avesta. 8vo.

Oppert, Honover, the creative word of Zoroaster. 8vo.

Oppert, The Assyrian Inscriptions of the Sargonidæ and the Fasti of Nineveh. 8vo. Also, The Fasti of Sargon. Folio.

J. Menant, Assyrian Inscriptions of Hamenourabi, king of Babylon in the 16th Century B. C. Translated and published with a Commentary. 8vo.

A. Pictet, Indo-European Origins, or the primitive Aryas. Vol. II. 8vo.

Rougé, Historical Inscription of king Pianchi-Meriamoum. 8vo.

Chabas, Researches on the Egyptian name of Thebes. 8vo.

Mounicou, Japanese Mythology. 8vo.

S. Julien, Chinese Dialogues. 8vo. The Book of the Thousand Words, the oldest elementary book of the Chinese. 8vo. The Two Cousins, a Chinese Romance. 8vo.

A. Christianowitsch, Historical Sketch of Arabic Music in ancient times, with representations of instruments, and forty melodies. Folio.

L. Beuloew, The Shemites at Ilium, or the Truth respecting the Trojan War. 8vo. Some Characteristics of the Primitive Language. 8vo.

Inscriptions collected at Delphi, and published for the first time under the auspices of M. Rouland, by C. Wescher and P. Foucart. 8vo.

T. Desdevizes du Dezert, Ancient Geography of Macedonia, 8vo.

C. Levêque, The Physics of Aristotle and Contemporary Science. 8vo.

P. Deschamps, Biographical Essay on M. T. Cicero. 8vo.

L. Vaffier, History of Statuary, its origin, developments, and fall, among the different nations of antiquity. 12mo.

Carro, Journey to the Celts, followed by a notice of the Celtic Monuments. 8vo. Memoirs on the Primitive Monuments called Celtic. 8vo.

A. Bertani, An Essay toward the deciphering of some Etruscan Monuments. No. 1. 4to.

L. Lacaille, Knowledge of Madagascar. 8vo.

T. Juste, The Low Countries in the 16th Century. 8vo.

A. Foucher de Careil, Descartes and the Princess Palatine,

or the influence of Cartesianism on the women of the 17th Century. 8vo. Leibnitz, Descartes, and Spinoza. 8vo.

Kerwyn de Lettenhove, The first book of the Chronicles of John Froissart. Vol. I. 8vo.

A. Trognon, History of France. Part I. France in the Middle Ages, from 481 to 1483. Vols. I. and II. 8vo.

J. Michelet, History of France. Vol. XV. 8vo.

E. Baret, History of Spanish Literature, from its origin to our days. 8vo.

A new series of about sixty volumes is to be added to the Patrologiæ Cursus Completus, embracing all the writers from Photius to the Council of Florence in 1439.

E. G. Rey, Historical and Topographical Study on the Tribe of Judah. 4to.