Released by Presbyterian Historical Society



33938



MI
P931

THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW

FOR THE YEAR

1863.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

VOL. XXXV.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY

PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET,

AND SOLD BY

R. CARTER & BROTHERS, New York; WM. S. & A. MARTIEN, Philad'a;

and TRÜBNER & CO., London.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXV.

No. I.

PAGE

ART. I.—Hopkins's Moral Science........ 1

ART. II.—The Liberties of the Gallican Church........ 20

ART. III.—The Scepticism of Science........ 43

ART. IV.—Training of the Children........ 76

ART. V.—Dr. Nicholas Murray........ 95

ART. VI.—The True Place of Man in Zoölogy........ 109

ART. VII.—The War........ 140

SHORT NOTICES........ 169

No. II.

ART. I.—The Manner of Preaching........ 177

ART. II.—The Life of Edward Irving........ 207

ART. III.—Recent Explorations in Africa........ 238

ART. IV.—The Fathers of Ross-shire........ 291

ART. V.—Mercer County Teachers' Institute........ 310

ART. VI.—The True Place of Man in Zoölogy........ 333

SHORT NOTICES........ 348

No. III.

Art. I.—The Inspired Theory of Prayer.......................... 353
Art. II.—Religious Instruction in the Army....................... 383
Art. III.—Faith, a Source of Knowledge.......................... 403
Art. IV.—The True Tone in Preaching, and the True Temper in Hearing.. 416
Art. V.—The General Assembly.................................. 439
Art. VI.—Date of the Books of Chronicles......................... 499
Art. VII.—Paul's Thorn in the Flesh.............................. 521
Short Notices.. 534

No. IV.

Art. I.—The Anglo-American Sabbath............................ 537
Art. II.—University Education.................................... 571
Art. III.—Witherspoon's Theology................................. 596
Art. IV.—Micah's Prophecy of Christ.............................. 610
Art. V.—The Children of the Covenant, and "their Part in the Lord" 622
Art. VI.—Miracles.. 643
Art. VII.—The Beautiful Things of Earth 656
Art. VIII.—Relation of the Church and State 679
Recent Explorations in Africa (*additional note*)..................... 694
Short Notices 697

THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1863.

No. I.

ART. I.—*Lectures on Moral Science.* Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., LL.D., President of Williams College; author of "Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862.

DR. HOPKINS first became known to us, and to that portion of the public with which we were then conversant, through an able article on Moral Science, published in one of our principal religious Quarterlies,* more than a quarter of a century ago. This article was of that marked character which at once drew attention to itself and its author, on the part of those interested in ethical, and ethico-theological discussions. In the circle of our acquaintance, it lifted the author, then young and previously unheard of, into decided prominence among the rising thinkers and guides of opinion on moral and religious questions. We well remember the light and inspiration we derived from it, as we were struggling through a chaos of youthful discussions on questions which then convulsed the

* We do not now certainly recollect which, nor have we at hand the means of ascertaining. Our impression is quite strong, however, that it was the *Biblical Repository*, then published at Andover, Massachusetts, and since merged in the *Bibliotheca Sacra.*

church, towards a stable foothold of truth, consistency, and faith. Especially do we recall with pleasure, the encouragement and aid it afforded us, in repelling the Epicurean and Utilitarian theories then so ingeniously and enthusiastically pressed upon us. In threading our "dim and perilous way," through the mazy sophistries of the astute advocates of these systems, to the doctrine that Right is a simple, original, and undefinable quality of virtuous action, which renders it obligatory and meritorious, and especially in contesting the authority of Paley—then the accepted text-book on Moral Philosophy in our American colleges—we not only hailed him as an ally, but still more, as one who promised to be a future guide.

The reasons why the distinguished author has since published little, if any thing, on these subjects, until the appearance of the present volume, he informs us, are mainly, his official labours, added to those involved in the publication of his volume on Christian Evidences, and some forty or fifty pamphlets. The force of these reasons, unfortunately, all conversant with such responsibilities can too well appreciate. It is to be regretted that he has been so long prevented from making those contributions to this queenly science, for which he has such high aptitudes. Owing to these avocations, he informs us that the course of Lectures contained in this volume have been delivered to successive classes substantially as they were first written in the year 1830; and that they received no revision until 1858. After a revision, which we judge amounts to a reconstruction, they were delivered before the Lowell Institute, in Boston, in the winter of 1861, and afterwards published. It was before the same Institute that the author delivered his Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, prior to their publication. If we are not mistaken, there is some foundation connected with this Institute for the support of frequent courses of Lectures on Apologetics and correlate topics. It is in connection with this delivery of these lectures in Boston, and their subsequent publication, that they have been recast, for the first time since their original preparation, in his early manhood, although they have been annually delivered to the successive college classes that have fallen under his instructions. This is the more significant, inasmuch as this

recasting has turned out to be no mere retouching to remove blemishes, strengthen weak points, and perfect his presentation of the same radical system, which his lectures had previously set forth. The alterations in them are so momentous and palpable, that he saw cause to commence this volume with an explanatory note to the graduates of Williams College, in which, besides other matters, he acknowledges this change of views in the following terms.

"When these Lectures were first written (in 1830,) the text-book here, and generally in our colleges, was Paley. Not agreeing with him, and failing fully to carry out the doctrine of ends, I adopted that of an ultimate right, as taught by Kant and Coleridge, making that the end. If, therefore, any of you still hold that view,—as doubtless many do,—it is not for me to say that you have not good authority for it, or to complain of you, if you object to that now taken.

"But whatever may be said of this central point, the Lectures have been much changed in other respects, and, as I hope, improved." P. 8.

It gives us pleasure to say, that this volume evinces a clear, profound, and independent thinker. It is equally free from transcendental platitudes, and from a grovelling sensism or positivism. His broad, calm, and judicial habit of mind saved him from that extravagance and recklessness of statement which so often distort and ruin a true doctrine by exaggeration, while it so tones down and qualifies any erroneous principles he advocates, as greatly to mitigate their evil influence. Still any important error in regard to the fundamental principles of morals must be of evil tendency, no matter how softened and guarded it may be.

Having premised this much, we observe, what we suppose our author would not dissent from, that "the doctrine of an ultimate right," or ultimate moral excellence,* as the proper

* This is not, as some imagine, setting up any mere abstraction as an object of affection and devotion. Like all attributes, it may be viewed in the abstract or concrete. It is as embodied in action and character that moral excellence enkindles love—and this supremely and ultimately as it is traced to its first original and norm in the immutable perfection of the Divine Nature, or as our author would prefer, and we do not object, to say, Character. From this it will

"end" of man, which he is bound to pursue, is not peculiar to Kant and Coleridge. For substance, and in some form, it is the doctrine of nearly all who do not accept directly or indirectly the Epicurean or Utilitarian theory of virtue, on the one hand, or found it in the mere will, irrespective of the moral perfection of God, on the other.

We observe, still further, that this is, as Dr. Hopkins justly indicates, the "central point" in a system of ethics. To this feature of his book, to the doctrine he has honoured with a life-long advocacy, and to what he has here substituted for it, he has, as we have seen, very properly invited special attention. What he has thus signalized shall receive our first attention. For ourselves, we hold and are satisfied with the doctrine that right and wrong are intrinsic qualities of moral actions; qualities which involve an immediate obligation to do or to avoid them, together with an intrinsic merit or demerit, a good or ill desert. Hence, that this right is the paramount "end" or object to be aimed at in action; that all other characteristics, consequences, and incidents of action are insignificant in comparison with this, and are to be subordinated, yea, if need be, sacrificed to it. This doctrine, that right or moral goodness is an intrinsic quality of virtuous action, creating an instant, imperative, and inevitable obligation to perform it, we understand the author to have maintained and taught through his whole public life up to a recent period. He has now espoused in its stead, the theory propounded in this volume. What is it? And what are its claims to supersede that, in lieu of which, it has been commended to public acceptance by whatever of argumentative ingenuity and tact the author can command? To these questions we now briefly address ourselves, and invite the attention of our readers.

Much that the author advances, with great earnestness and force, in connection with or in support of his peculiar view, we cordially accept, or do not care to controvert. It is just as consistent with the doctrine formerly held and now rejected by

easily follow that the will of God is the rule of right which we are bound to obey. But unless man had the original idea of right as that which he is bound to do, how could he be sensible that to obey the divine will is right and obligatory?

him, as with that which he now so ardently embraces in its stead. His whole doctrine of ends, in regard to which he says many things profound, beautiful, and true, is just as consistent with making intrinsic right or moral good, as enjoyment of whatever grade, the supreme and ultimate end of action. "Has man," says Dr. Hopkins, "again, an æsthetic, a rational, a moral, a religious nature? There is from the activity of each of these, a corresponding good. It is clear, then, that the whole good of man would arise from a combination in the highest possible degree of all these forms of good: also, that *the highest good would be from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object.*" P. 53. The italics are the author's. It is certainly true that the "highest good" of a man is moral rectitude, and this is "from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object"—Infinite Excellence. So all that our author says of the subordination of ends in the gradations of being; how each lower is conditional for the next higher, and appropriated by it, through the ascending series of mechanical, chemical, vegetable, animal, rational, and moral action, in which last all below culminate, is for the most part well said. It is, however, quite as appropriate to the scheme he has abandoned as to that which he has taken up.

The key to the author's new system is given in the following passage:

"If we suppose enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness, to be wholly withdrawn from the universe, we should feel, whatever form of activity there might be, that its value was gone. It would be a vast machine, producing nothing. But if we suppose the highest possible blessedness of God and of his universe secured, we are satisfied. It must surely be difficult to satisfy those who cannot find an adequate end and good in their own highest blessedness, and in the highest blessedness of God and his universe." P. 54. This is the final result of his reasonings in regard to the supreme end which men ought to seek. It is "enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness," of the subject himself, of God, and of the universe. Those who are not satisfied with such an end, it is broadly hinted, can be satisfied with nothing. This alone has "value." Whatever value other

objects possess, arises simply from their being a means to this. For otherwise, "we should feel . . . that its value was gone." And, on the next page, he tells us, "if there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing that ought to be either chosen or done." That is, from his previous account of value, nothing "ought to be either chosen or done" which is not a happiness or a means of happiness; and it is to be done or chosen only because it is so.

Having thus exhibited happiness as the end to be sought, in answer to the first of the three questions, "what ought to be done? why ought it to be done? and how ought it to be done?" he answers the second, "because of the intrinsic worth and excellency of that end." "Man and all moral beings are capable, as such, of a high and holy blessedness which can be compared with nothing else, . . . but has, in itself, an infinite worth."

So far as concerns the kind of enjoyment which is thus made to constitute the supreme end of moral action, and ground of its obligation, we may yet have something to say. How much is meant by this blessedness being "high and holy," taken in connection with other affirmations and negations of this treatise, remains to be estimated. The point now to be noted is, that enjoyment is made the exclusive end of virtuous action, and the ground of its obligation.

"Used as nouns," says Dr. Hopkins, "good expresses some form of enjoyment; right is defined to mean 'conformity to the perfect standard, rectitude, straightness,' that is, conduct adapted to attain the true end." Pp. 208, 209. "It is an objection to the system that makes right ultimate, that, as based on a mere abstraction, it furnishes no object to the affections, and moves us through its imperative by constraining and driving, rather than by attracting us. In our conception of a perfect being, the law is not known as an outward and constraining force, but there is a coincidence of inclination and of will by which perfect obedience becomes perfect freedom. Love is free and directly from a view of its object; but love is the fulfilling of the law." P. 224.

Whatever this may be worth as argument, there is no doubt that it is good as evidence of what the author now maintains

and what he repudiates. "Good" is defined to be, "some form of enjoyment." This is the "ultimate" end. Right is not "ultimate," but a means "adapted to attain the true end." In short, the only good is enjoyment, and right is such only as a means to it. As to the objection against "making right ultimate, that, as based on a mere abstraction, it furnishes no object to the affections," &c., it seems to us wholly gratuitous. Like all other qualities or predicables, it may be viewed in the abstract or concrete. The same is true of happiness or enjoyment. These are abstractions, and exist only as mental notions, except as they have actual and concrete existence in beings or persons that are happy and joyful. So of goodness or the good. Abstractly they represent a general notion. Concretely they are realized in good objects, actions, or persons. When Cousin treats of the "True, the Beautiful, and the Good," what are these but abstractions until realized concretely in true propositions, beautiful objects, good actions and persons? Now, will it be seriously alleged that rectitude in character and conduct, moral excellence in actions and persons, especially in saints, angels, and God, "furnishes no object to the affections" of a virtuous man, irrespective of, or over and above the happiness it may bring with or after itself? And really, is it to be assumed without proof, that such objects can move us only by "constraining and driving" us, or that, in obeying the law of right, considered as ultimate and supreme, "perfect obedience may not become perfect freedom?" It is an old and glorious formula, that "on the highest point of moral elevation, freedom and necessity coincide." May not the love of righteousness, like the love of knowledge, or beauty, or even happiness, be so perfect, that to pursue or conform to them shall be no way servile or constrained, but free and spontaneous?

It deserves remark here, that our author, in common with other advocates of this scheme, puts it in plausible contrast with the opposite, by the constant assumption that enjoyment is the only good. This is a continual source of confusion in his discussions. The real issue is, whether right is not in itself good, and not merely so, but whether it is not the ultimate and supreme good; in subordination to which enjoyment

and every good should be pursued; nay, must be pursued, if we would not utterly forfeit and make shipwreck of them. To assume, as this class of writers are so fond of doing, that happiness alone is good, is simply to beg the question. Thus our author says:

"The distinctions above made will enable us to account, in part, for the confusion there has been in our moral philosophy, and particularly for the prominence given to right, and *the* right, as distinguished from the good." P. 218. We know of none who thus make prominent the "right" in distinction from the "good"; but the highest class of ethical writers, according to our estimate, do broadly distinguish it from happiness, or enjoyment, making the former the substance which the latter follows as a shadow, the health of which the latter constitutes the buoyant sensations.

We think it has been sufficiently shown that the author adopts the Utilitarian in place of the Intrinsic theory of virtue. By Utilitarianism we understand that theory which denies that right actions are such intrinsically and as ultimate, or any further than as they are means to enjoyment—while this latter characteristic is what alone renders any actions right. The "enjoyment" required to be sought in this scheme is variously stated by different writers. It may be not merely our own, but that of others, or of the sentient, or of the moral universe. This may relieve the scheme of the grossness of Epicureanism. Still it is none the less Utilitarianism, making virtuous conduct not a good in itself, but a mere means to a good beyond itself, indeed to the only good—happiness. It does not alter the essential nature of it to say that the enjoyment is in the virtuous action itself. It is for those who advocate this scheme to show why, if enjoyment be the only good, it is not each one's concern to get as much of it, and as fast, as he can—*i. e.*, to make his own happiness his exclusive end. Is it replied, that he cannot secure his own highest happiness without seeking that of others? This alters not the principle. Even so, he will seek the happiness of others as a means to his own. This amounts simply to the celebrated definition of virtue given by Paley—"Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." "According

to which definition," says the late Dr. Archibald Alexander, very justly, "the good of mankind is the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue. If the question be asked, why we should seek the good of mankind, the answer is, from a regard to our everlasting happiness; and if the question be, why we should make the will of God the rule of our conduct, the answer must be the same; so that virtue is really resolved into a regard to our own happiness." *Alexander's Moral Science*, pp. 162–3.

We deeply regret our author's new position on this subject—and all the more, because the weight of his authority has heretofore been on the opposite side. We do not deem it necessary now to reiterate the arguments, which have been so abundantly arrayed against this doctrine on our pages. It is, however, requisite to any adequate critique on the volume in question, that some collateral points receive a passing notice.

There are many passages in this volume, as in all arguments we have ever seen in behalf of the fore-mentioned doctrine, that in sound, at least, if not in design, declare the contrary. The following is a specimen.

"Do we then say, to close this discussion in the terms with which we started,—do we say that the end for man is happiness? No. The good here, the highest good, is from the normal activity of the moral powers. As such, that activity is obedience to the law of God, however revealed. It is all that can be commanded or directly willed, or that can be approved or honoured. It is virtue; it is holiness. Do we then say that virtue or holiness is the end for man? No; for in this holiness there is a blessedness wholly distinctive and peculiar, higher, purer, nobler than any other; a blessedness like that of God himself, and as inseparable from holiness as light is from the sun. Not then, in happiness without holiness do we say is the true end for man, for without that the happiness would not be; not in holiness without happiness, for without that the holiness could not be and be holiness, any more than the sun could be the sun without its light. But we do say that the true end for man is HOLY HAPPINESS, that is, BLESSEDNESS." Pp. 195–6.

To most of this we say, amen, in our sense of the language

employed. So far as this and similar passages in the book appear to intimate a doctrine different from that which we have before elicited from its pages, we should rejoice to believe that they expressed the author's real theory, and that as to all seemingly contrary passages, he had been unfortunate in expressing, or we, in interpreting his meaning. We need hardly say how much such a solution of the case would delight us. But we are bound, if possible, to interpret every writer consistently with himself. And we must remember that, in this case, the doctrine of an "ultimate" right is professedly abandoned. Again, if by "virtue" and "holiness," in the above extract and other similar passages, be meant any thing distinguishable from the highest happiness and the means thereof; if by holiness be meant a distinct and superior quality or standard, to which all happiness must be subordinate and comformable in order to be lawful, then we have a clear denial of the author's cardinal principle, and an espousal of that which he has abandoned. But this he does not mean. The reason he offers for not placing man's end in happiness, is simply that without the holiness "the happiness would not be." The holiness is requisite, therefore, simply as an indispensable means to happiness. And this, we apprehend, is just the clew to the meaning of the entire passage, which is susceptible of this exegesis, and so harmonizes with itself and the residue of his work. It is true, saving the exceptions that arise from the abnormities of our present fallen state, that holiness is inseparable from blessedness, as the sun from its radiance, or the rose from its fragrance. It is none the less true that, though these several objects are inseparable, they are not identical. One is antecedent to and causative of the other. One is supreme, and the other subordinate. The rose does not come of the fragrance, nor the sun from its radiance, but *vice versa.* So holiness is not born of happiness, but happiness comes of holiness. The former is primary. The latter secondary and subordinate. It is of the gravest moment that these two be neither inverted nor confounded. The conception of happiness, or of the means thereto, even in the acts of free-agents, might be given without affording the first scintilla of an idea of virtue or moral goodness. This is simple, original, ultimate, indecomposable.

As is not unnatural, on this scheme, the author makes no note, that we observe, of the old ethical distinction between actions good, bad, and indifferent. This distinction, in our view, is fundamental. Without it, discussions in ethics and casuistry must run into inextricable mazes. According to this, one class of actions is intrinsically right or good, and, therefore, in their own nature, and for ever, obligatory. Such are the love and worship of God, truth, justice, and good-will towards men. What is intrinsically evil ought to be shunned, as profaneness, blasphemy, falsehood, extortion, fraud, injustice. Actions indifferent are so named, because they have in themselves no moral character. They are not *per se* either good or evil. They are to be performed or avoided, as, in given circumstances, they are judged to tend to good or evil. In itself it is indifferent what be a person's style of dress or equipage. But if he indulges in a style too expensive for his means, for the safety of his creditors, or for making prudent provision for. his family, or for the training of his children to due habits of industry and economy, such a course is clearly culpable. So a style that avoids these evils, and promotes the well-being in virtue and happiness of all affected by it, is clearly binding. Now, on the theory that happiness is the supreme end of virtuous choice, and that there is no intrinsic ultimate right, all other choices and actions become in themselves indifferent. They impose an obligation on us to do or shun them, only as they are seen to forward or hinder this great end. And, therefore, all actions, except this great "generic choice," fall within the domain of expediency, which is applicable solely to things in themselves adiaphorous. The language of Dr. Hopkins is coincident with this view. "If the end chosen be the true supreme end of man, then any means in themselves adapted to attain that end will be right. This is not the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, but implies the fact that this is such an end as can be obtained only by sanctified means." P. 235. Yes, and that these means are thus "sanctified" by being conducive to this end. It is this, so far as we can see, or nothing. On the previous page, he says, "Whatever is useful or expedient must be so, with reference to some end. Hence, utility and expediency always imply an end pre-

viously chosen. Here nothing will be chosen for its own sake, and all questions must respect the choice, not of ends, but of conditions and means." We take it that while virtuous and holy actions are means of final blessedness, yet that they are right and good in themselves, and ought to be chosen for their "own sake," whether any consequences to our own blessedness were supposed to flow therefrom or not.

Speaking of the choice of a profession by young men, the author says:

"The question here, it is often supposed, is to be determined by conscience; but, if the previous question, (the choice of a supreme end,) has been fully settled, conscience has, in strictness, nothing to do with it. The simple question will be, in the one case, how we can do the greatest amount of good, and in the other, how we can best subserve our own private ends." P. 218.

We do not suppose that the author would really have us to understand that conscience has no office to discharge in deciding on one's profession. This is not even a necessary deduction from his own theory, unless it be assumed to vacate the office of conscience altogether, which is far enough from being his view. Certainly, conscience enters into every responsible act of life, and eminently into the decision of all questions which determine life's sphere and occupation. The above language serves simply to illustrate how extremely artificial the author's theory is. So entirely is enjoyment of self and other beings the only good, the supreme end of moral action, that, in strictness, conscience is concerned only with the choice or rejection of this. All other actions are so purely indifferent in themselves, and so wholly dependent on their relation to this end for their moral quality, that "conscience has in strictness nothing to do with it."* Will not a system that leads to the use of such phraseology bear criticism and revision? Is not this attempt to reduce the whole sphere of conscience, to some single action, or kind of action, an excessive straining after a simplicity that is worse than useless?

* To the same effect the author says, page 211, "Conscience affirms obligation solely in view of the choice of ends, especially of the supreme end, *and not of means, except as they are conducive to that end.*"

We turn from all these attempts to analyze right, or moral quality, into the means of a good beyond itself, to a strong presentation of the true doctrine. We trust all appearances of another system are transient oscillations which will ultimately settle into this as a fixed view, not only for the past but the future. We think a large part of the reasonings and representations of this book are such as harmonize with the scheme which the author so long held. The new theory which he intermixes with them is like the clay mixed with the iron.

"Of the moral quality itself, which conscience presupposes, our notion is simple, as of colour or extension. We perceive it immediately as belonging to certain states of mind, as selfishness, envy, malignity, on the one hand, and benevolence, generosity, and kindness, on the other. Relations may be needed to evolve the acts, but it is from no perception of them. It is from no sense, but is an immediate knowledge, by the spirit, of the quality of its own states and acts. We know a moral act as moral, precisely as we know an intellectual act as intellectual. We know an intellectual act to be intellectual because it is an act of the intellect; and what an act of the intellect is, and that it is intellectual, every being having an intellect must know intuitively on the exercise of his intellect, and he could know it in no other way. It is in the same way that a moral act presupposes a moral constitution, and is known to have moral quality." P. 176. Still further:

"If it be still asked why a man ought to seek an end which has this intrinsic worth, the reply is, that this idea of obligation or *oughtness* is a simple idea, and, therefore, that we can only state the occasion in which it arises. Of its presence, in connection with the choice of this end, we can give no account, except that such is our constitution." P. 55.

There is to us more precious truth in these passages than in all the wire-drawn subtleties by which the author supports the theory we have been considering. This is none the less so, notwithstanding his endeavour to reconcile it with his theory, in the terms following: "He (man) ought to choose his own well-being rather than the contrary; but he ought to choose it, not simply because he ought, but because it *is* well-being. If there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing

that ought to be either chosen or done." If it be meant here that "well-being" is constituted by happiness as its only element, or that happiness is the only "valuable" thing—this we deny. There is, superior to this, moral good or right, involving "obligation or *oughtness*,"—simple in its nature, and requiring absolute subordination and conformity to itself as the condition, or rather the essence, of well-being. Does any one ask, why he ought to pursue his own well-being? It is all one to answer, because it is right, because he ought, to seek it. The question is settled when to pursue his well-being is seen to be right; for "ought" is but the correlative of right. What is right ought to be done. Right and ought are both simple and ultimate. If it be asked, why the pursuit of our well-being is right, the question is irrelevant. Right is a simple quality of such action, and seen intuitively, or not at all. If any one asks why it is right to tell the truth, to love goodness, to do justice, we cannot explain to him. In regard to simple moral actions, in themselves, good or bad,—if their moral quality is not self-evident, it cannot be made evident by any amount of arguing or explanation. The instances of difficulty and perplexity, as to what is right, either concern things indifferent in the sphere of expediency, or complex cases, in which the moral element is so complicated with extraneous adjuncts, that it is hard to disentangle it. It is clearly a duty, resting on its own evidence, for parents to seek the welfare of their children. But it might be a matter of great difficulty to determine, in some cases, whether their welfare would be best promoted by a liberal education or a trade. As to the ultimate source and standard of morality, the soundest ethicists and theologians find it in the immutable rectitude and perfection of the Divine Nature. They have objected to founding it in any fitness of things out of God, and thus over him. This militates against his supremacy. They have objected to founding it in *mere* will, even the will of God, because, as mere will, unguided by rectitude, it might make and unmake moral distinctions, turning good into evil, and evil into good. Both these perilous extremes are avoided, by founding it in the immutable goodness and perfection of the nature of God, to which his will freely and evermore conforms. Dr.

Hopkins objects to this, mainly, so far as we can see, in consequence of a rigid adherence to the German or Coleridgian definition of the words nature and supernatural. According to this, nature denotes whatever is necessitated in its action, by being subject to the law of physical cause and effect, and outside the sphere of freedom. The latter denotes whatever is brought to pass by will. Hence, he seems to detect something, in the attribution of a nature to God, inconsistent with his freedom. This appears to be implied in such language, as the following: "It may be, however, that the nature of God is nothing distinct from his personality, and that so he is wholly supernatural. It may be, that the terms nature and natural, used, as they commonly are, to denote something fixed, stated, uniform, and not made so by will, are without meaning when applied to God." P. 239. This definition and mode of contrasting nature and the supernatural is wholly arbitrary, and introduces, in ways which we cannot now stop to specify, utter confusion into all discussions on the great subject of supranaturalism. The nature of any being is that principle which leads it to develop and act, in some given way, rather than any other, and this, according to its kind; if a free, responsible being, in free action; if an involuntary agent, by a physical necessity. It is the nature of saints, angels, and God, to act freely, and, at the same time, righteously. There is, therefore, no reason for such a contrast of nature and character, and for the denial of any nature to God, as the following language imports. In the accepted sense of the word, nature, in this connection, is character. "What we need is, simply a person; and it is a mere abuse of language to convert that constitution of the divine Being, by which he is a person and capable of natural freedom, into a nature, the very idea of which excludes freedom. But if this be so, then, as in our search backwards for the origin of being, the ultimate fact is the *being* of God; so, in our search backwards for the origin of moral distinctions, we shall find, not any nature of things, not any nature of God, not any necessary and eternal principles, but simply the *character* of God." P. 240.

Not any nature of God, or necessary and eternal principles, we too, say, inconsistent with freedom; but such as give, what

Dr. Hopkins says of the character of God, "that moral certainty which accompanies the highest freedom."

While we thus see no cause for our author's repugnance to the more common orthodox phraseology on this subject, we are glad to record the conclusion of his reasoning thereon, which happily expresses our own view, and affords still further proof that his dissent from it is more verbal than substantial.

"If we accept what has now been said, it will follow, as moral distinctions have their origin in God as a person, as his character is the standard of goodness, and his will is the expression of his character, that his will, however made known, must be the ultimate rule of moral action; it must be that to which conscience will respond, not simply as will, but as the will of *God;* it was made to respond to his will, because that is the expression of his *character;* and his character, as combining benevolence and rectitude, is the perfection and standard of moral excellence.

"As we, then, find in the being of God the origin of all other beings, so that, without him there could be no other; so do we find in the character of God, and in his will as expressing that character, all that is ultimate in moral distinctions; and without that will and character, these distinctions could not be. Thus do all our speculations lead us to God, not merely as the foundation of being, but of excellence, and as the Head and Governor of the moral universe." P. 241.

All human wisdom is worse than folly, which does not culminate in lifting us to this primal source of light and truth, holiness and blessedness.

In his seventh Lecture the author gives an excellent analysis of personality, as a preparation for the analysis of conscience. It has been common to make intelligence and will the criterion and constitutive elements of personality. There is, of course, no personality where these are wanting. But the brutes have a species of intelligence and a will correspondent to it. It is requisite not only that there be intelligence, but intelligence of a peculiar order to constitute a person. There must be reason which the brutes have not, which gives us intuitive and supersensual truths. And, as our author well shows, there must not only be reason, but "moral reason." We might have an

organ for mathematical, metaphysical, and esthetic ideas and truths. These alone would not make us cognizant of moral truths, and therefore not persons. For what sort of a person is a being without a moral nature? Hence, the moral reason is requisite, which is the source of the primitive moral ideas and judgments. Without this sort of rationality there could be no conscience, no accountability, and so no personality. For what sort of a person is a being void of accountability? So, in the words of our author, "the three characteristics of a person are, that he is rational, free, moral. To me it seems that the moral ideas that are given by the reason, in the light of which we choose and act, through which, indeed, the will is a rational instead of a brute will, are quite as necessary to personality as the power of choosing and acting, and that both are indispensable." P. 164. If the "moral ideas" are thus given, are they not original and ultimate? What need, then, of that artificial analysis of them, as derivatives in some sort from happiness, for which some are so zealous?

Although Dr. Hopkins frequently seems to resolve character into "governing preference, or purpose," a favourite phrase of the late Dr. Taylor, yet, taken with the following explanations, it is relieved of most of the objectionable associations which past controversy has linked with it.

"That the above may not seem to be opposed to our consciousness, it may be well to state that in choosing a supreme end it is not necessary that we should know or choose it abstractly and formally, but simply that our individual and specific choices should involve it, and be instances under it. So it is that we know and act under the principle of causation, and so under mathematical axioms. . . . . In thus choosing a supreme end, if that end be the good of others, we reach the highest significance of the word love. This is an act *both of the affections and the will*, and carries every faculty and choice of the soul along with it. It lies back of specific choices and volitions, and determines character, springing from a synthesis of the rational sensibility and the will, it is the highest product of our highest powers—the consummate flower of our existence." P. 168.

A character springing not from will solely, but from the

"synthesis of the rational sensibility and will," implicated therefore with the cognitive and emotive faculties; and this so back of consciousness, that we do not "know or choose it abstractly and formally," "but simply that our specific choices should involve it," is a very close approximation to all that is involved in the scriptural representations of the character of man, by nature, and by regeneration. This involves the will, the affections, feelings, and understanding. And it further involves dispositions lying back of, and manifesting themselves in all specific conscious choices and desires.

The author is still more explicit, on one point at least, in the following passages.

"There are those who suppose that the affections and passions are drawn from us by a fixed law, as electricity flashes from one cloud to another, and that we are therefore not responsible for them. *But the voice of mankind is that men are responsible for their feelings through the whole range of the emotive nature, as well as for their actions.* . . . They judge that men can govern their passions, not only by restraining those external acts to which passion would excite them, but also by moderating and subduing the feeling itself. This is correct. Men are responsible not only for the feelings they have, but also for not having the feelings they lack; and yet no man can, by any direct act of the will, cause any one feeling, affection, or passion to exist." Pp. 147–8.

There is much precious truth here expressed, which underlies some vital doctrinal and experimental principles of the gospel. We have no time to point out its bearings in detail. They must be obvious to our readers. Nor is it any part of our concern to point out their harmony or discrepancy with what is elsewhere said in the way of denying moral character and responsibility to all the spontaneous exercises of the soul, and confining them exclusively to acts of the will. We rather join our testimony to his, that "this doctrine that we are responsible for the affections, and particularly for the natural affections, has special need of enforcement at the present time." Pp. 151–2.

While our author vindicates the doctrine of our responsibility for the feelings and affections, on the ground that they

are "controlled through the power of attention," *i. e.*, to such objects as will excite those which are right, and while this is largely true of some of them, it can be admitted, as we presume our author holds, only in a very qualified sense in regard to others. The unregenerate man cannot command holy feelings and affections into being, merely by fixing his attention on God and Christ. This, indeed, is necessary and salutary. But, unless God's Spirit takes the scales from the eyes, and the hardness from the heart, Christ will still be a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, having no form nor comeliness that they should desire him. We think all Christians have the witness of this in their own experience. We know that some theologians have maintained the contrary, in order to enforce a harmony between facts and their own theories of accountability. But they utter another theology on their knees. One of the most telling of the many pregnant evangelical passages of Coleridge, which form no insignificant counterpoise to the bald rationalism and transcendentalism in which he elsewhere abounds, is the following:

"Often have I heard it said by advocates for the Socinian scheme—True! we are all sinners; but even in the Old Testament God has promised Forgiveness on Repentance. One of the Fathers, (I forget which) supplies the retort—True! God has promised Pardon on Penitence; but where has he promised Penitence on Sin? He that repenteth shall be forgiven; but where is it said, he that sinneth shall repent? But Repentance, perhaps, the Repentance required in Scripture, *the Passing into a new mind*, into a new and contrary Principle of action, this METANOIA is in the Sinner's own power?—at his own liking? He has but to open his eyes to the Sin, and the Tears are at hand to wash it away! Verily, the exploded Tenet of *Transubstantiation* is scarcely at greater variance with the common sense and experience of mankind, or borders more closely on a contradiction in terms, than this volunteer *Transmentation*, this Self-change, as the easy means of Self-salvation."—*Aids to Reflection*, Burlington edition, pp. 82–3.

We should be glad to follow our author through many other points, in which he seldom fails to show ability and give valuable instruction. This is especially true of his practical reflec-

tions, which are interspersed with his reasonings, and of his closing lecture, in which he presents, with great felicity and force, the argument for the immateriality and immortality of the soul. We regret that the recent change in the author's view of the fundamental question in morals engrafted upon modes of thought induced by a life-long espousal of what we deem the true system, mars a work, in so many respects, of eminent merit.

Art. II.—*The Liberties of the Gallican Church.*

The eloquent apologist for the Papal Church, in his skilful delineation of the Variations of the Protestants, has made much of the contrast between the incongruous practice and conflicting doctrines held by the numerous branches of the Church of the Reformation, and the unity which, according to him, is the characteristic feature of the mother church. Uniform in its devotion to a single form of belief, and admitting only slight deviations in the prescribed ritual of even the most distant provinces, it is presented to our view as the embodiment of a universal religion, whose consistency is unerring demonstration that it possesses the very truth of Christianity. Other churches or sects pervert and distort particular doctrines, at the mere dictate of their caprice or unhealthy imagination; this alone is inflexible in its teachings, continuing, from age to age and in every land, to inculcate the same creed, and to enforce the same obedience. Whatever impression this lofty boast may make upon the ignorant, whose minds are easily dazzled with the contemplation of the pomp of this religion of the senses, it will be viewed with incredulity by every one who has made himself familiar with the history of the Papacy itself, and can consequently trace the gradual development of the system from its humble commencement. He will note the successive accretions which centuries have added to the doctrines of earlier ages. He will easily detect the introduction of new claims, put forth

at first with great care and only as incidental to the exercise of some long established and undisputed privilege, but presently announced to the world more boldly and vindicated by all the terrors of that mysterious power with which the Roman episcopate was invested. He will find the papal system to be neither the original form of Christianity, nor the product of the creative ability of a single person or age, but the aggregate of all the contributions of more than a decade of centuries,—not unlike some vast palace that has come down from remote antiquity, in which the Roman portal stands in strange juxtaposition with the light and airy fabric of some Saracen king, while minaret and Gothic belfry, massive pillar and chaste Corinthian column, are incorporated with strange neglect of symmetry and adaptation. And while the history of the Papacy itself exhibits anything rather than a confirmation of the vaunted unchanging character of the Roman church, the same result cannot fail to follow an investigation into the relations of the supreme pontiff with the separate countries in which his headship is more or less fully acknowledged. It will be found that the exorbitant assumptions of the Popes have met with no little opposition in almost every national church, and that both monarch and inferior clergy have manifested a determination to maintain their independence. The history of many lands is, in an ecclesiastical point of view, only a succession of struggles with Rome, carried on with varied fortunes, because sometimes abetted, at others opposed by interested princes. So far is the record of history from presenting unanimity among all Roman Catholics touching some of the most important points of faith and practice, that we find Bossuet himself, the champion of the immutability of the Roman Catholic faith, taking a decided stand in defiance of the pretensions of Innocent the Eleventh and his predecessors.

Of all the national churches, that of France was most distinguished for the resolute disposition with which the clergy asserted its rights in view of the encroachments of the papal court. Its privileges, founded upon the practice sanctioned by time-honoured usage, and ratified by kings and councils, were known as "the Gallican Liberties," famous for many ages as the fruitful source of embittered contention. The "Gallican"

party, embracing all that was noble and patriotic in the French clergy, desired to see these maintained unimpaired, for the honour and interest of the crown, the people, and the hierarchy itself. The "ultramontane" or Italian party, composed almost exclusively of those whom interest bound to the court of Rome or Avignon, advocated a complete sacrifice of all that was dear to the traditions of the French nation. It despised the freedom of its elections; it would place no checks upon the exercise of the pontifical prerogative in France. It maintained the despotic doctrine of the superiority of the Pope over the general council, and regarded the bull of major excommunication emanating from the pretended earthly vicar of God as the counterpart of the voice of the Almighty, before which every terrestrial power must abase itself. Between these two parties, or more accurately between the great body of the nation and the papacy, an almost unremitting war was waged. But the contest was by no means an equal one. On the one side it was carried on with craft and cunning, with frequent recourse to the weapons of a carnal warfare; and the treasures of the wealthiest court of Europe were lavishly expended in its prosecution. On the other side, the Gallican church was of necessity compelled to assume a strictly defensive attitude. Its measures must be moderated by the fear of occasioning scandal; its opposition must not be pushed to the point of becoming schismatical; its legislation must be made "with a reservation of the respect due unto the Holy See." And in view of these difficulties incident to their position, there is much in the course of the Gallican clergy which cannot fail to elicit our admiration for the intrepidity evinced.

Evidently the monarchs of France had a strong motive to induce them to lend to the clergy the entire weight of their influence. The very aim of the papal court was to render itself supreme. It could attain this object scarcely more surely by the assertion of the superiority of the successor of St. Peter over the descendant of Charlemagne or Hugh Capet, than by the establishment of an "*imperium in imperio.*" For the destruction of the franchises of the chapters of cathedral churches and of the monasteries, abbeys and priories, and the assumption of the right to nominate bishops and abbots, and

to confer minor benefices, were to obtain undisputed control over the entire ecclesiastical body. It was the clearest dictate of prudence that the attempt should be repelled before it became too successful. And the kings of France and of every other part of Christendom found these prudential motives corroborated by others appealing more immediately to present interest. The papal treasury, under the guise of *annats*, claimed the entire income of the bishopric or other benefice for the first year after the appointment of the dignitary,—a species of first-fruits given by the incumbent to the most honourable ecclesiastic of Christendom. It seized upon the revenues of vacant offices, which the king specially affected. Every bull or brief needed to secure induction into office—and the number of these articles was almost unlimited—was procured at a heavy expense; and further sums were exacted for pronouncing a dispensation in behalf of those appointees, whom youth or some other canonical impediment incapacitated for the discharge of the requisite functions. Money flowed from every part of the land in never-ceasing streams, subjecting the kingdom to a perpetual drain. Much of it was diverted from the royal coffers, and its loss empoverished the crown as much as it did the nation. The interests of both ran parallel. Indeed, all the estates,—nobility, clergy, and commons,—possessed equal inducements with the king, to resist the increasing power of the popes. But we shall have occasion to see that the wiles of the popes were finally effectual in presenting to the selfish monarch, advantages that appeared to outweigh those which he derived from the ancient constitution; and a cardinal chancellor of France, to use the words of the Roman Catholic historian Mezeray, succeeded in "divorcing the interest of the king from the public good." *

It is not at all surprising that French historical writers have been wont to lavish upon their church, distinguished for so continuous a struggle in behalf of ecclesiastical rights, the warmest eulogies. "The Gallican church," says the celebrated abbé Claude Fleury, "has guarded itself better than all others from the relaxation of discipline introduced four or five hundred

* Abrégé chronologique de l'histoire de France, tom. iv. p. 584.

years since, and has resisted with greater force the undertakings of the court of Rome. Theology has been more purely taught in the University of Paris than in any other place. Even Italians came to study at it, and the principal resource of the church against the great schism of Avignon was found in this school. The kings of France, from the time of Clovis, have been Catholic Christians, and many of them extremely zealous for religion. Their power, the most ancient and stable of Christendom, has enabled them better to protect the church."* The principles which the Gallican church rejects are briefly these:—*First*, respecting secular affairs, that the temporal power is subordinate to the spiritual, in such a manner that kings are, at least indirectly, subject to the church in what pertains to their sovereignty, and can be deprived of it, when they render themselves unworthy; and, *Second*, that the source of all spiritual authority resides in the Pope, who receives it from God, bishops being merely his vicars; that all councils, even though œcumenical, derive their power solely from him; that he can decide infallibly on matters of faith; that he alone can make and dispense from ecclesiastical laws; that he can dispose absolutely of all church property; and that he can be judged by God alone.†

It is an extraordinary circumstance that the first decided step to repress the growing arrogance of the Papal See was taken by a monarch whose rare virtues were deemed worthy of canonization by the Roman church. Louis the Ninth, or Saint Louis, as subsequent ages have been content with much unanimity to style him, had viewed with no slight jealousy the threatening results of the papal usurpation, if allowed to advance unchecked by the states of Europe. The king was humiliated by the claim of superiority; his sovereignty was impaired by the levy of imposts within his dominions at the will of a foreign priest and prince. He foresaw that this, like many other usages, would take deep root, in spite of the vigorous opposition it already encountered, unless a public and

* Discours sur les libertés de l'Eglise Gallicane, par l'abbé Claude Fleury. Published in 1724.

† Fleury, republished in C. Leber, coll. de pièces relatifs à l'hist. de France, tom. 3, pp. 205–6.

authoritative declaration placed the rights of the French monarch and nation in their true light. For these reasons he saw fit, in 1268, to issue a solemn edict, which, as emanating from the unconstrained will of the king, took the name of the "*Pragmatic Sanction* of St. Louis." The preamble of this famous ordinance, upon whose authenticity doubts have been unjustly cast, declares its object to be the safe and tranquil state of the church of the realm, the advancement of divine worship, the salvation of the souls of Christ's faithful people, and the attainment of the favour and help of Almighty God. To his sole jurisdiction and protection had France ever been subject, and so did the king desire it to remain. The provisions of the Pragmatic were directed chiefly to securing the freedom of election and collation to benefices, and to the prohibition of the laying of imposts by the Pope upon ecclesiastical property in any portion of the royal dominions save by consent of the prince and the clergy.* In this brief document had been laid the foundations of the liberties of the Gallican church, not under the form of novel legislation, but of a summary of previous practice. As such, its place is important in the history of this question.

Political causes, not long after the death of Louis the Ninth, gave new strength to the opposition to papal arrogance, to which the kings of France were pledged. St. Louis's grandson, the resolute Philip the Fair, found fresh incitement in the extravagant conduct of the contemporary Pope, Boniface the Eighth. The bold ideas advanced by Hildebrand in the eleventh, and carried into execution by Innocent the Third in the thirteenth century, were wrought into the very texture of the soul of Boniface, and could not but manifest themselves in

* Preuves des Libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane, pt. ii. Ordonnances des Roys de France de la troisième race, tom. i., pp. 97–8. Section 5 sufficiently expresses the feelings of the pious king in reference to the insatiable covetousness of the Roman court: "Item, *exactiones et onera gravissima pecuniarum*, per curiam Romanam ecclesiæ regni nostri impositas vel imposita, *quibus regnum nostrum miserabiliter depauperatum extitit*, sive etiam imponendas, aut imponenda levari, aut colligi nullatenus volumus, nisi duntaxat pro rationabili, pia et urgentissima causa, inevitabili necessitate, et de spontaneo et expresso consensu nostro et ipsius ecclesiæ regni nostri." See also Sismondi, Histoire des Français, tom. vii., p. 104.

spite of the altered condition of mediæval society. Intolerant, headstrong, and despotic, he undertook to exercise a theocratic rule, and commanded contending monarchs to lay aside their arms, and submit their disputes to his arbitrament. To such summons Philip the Fair was little submissive. The crafty and unscrupulous prince, whose contempt for divine law was evinced in the shameless practice of injustice, whose coffers were filled indifferently by the confiscation of the rich spoils of the commanderies of the Templars, and by recklessly debasing the national currency, did not hesitate to engage in a contest with the most presumptuous of Popes. He appealed to the States-General of France, and all three orders repelled the insinuation that their country had ever stood to the Papacy in the relation of a fief. The disastrous example of the English John Lackland had found no imitator on the southern side of the Channel. The Pope was declared a heretic. Emissaries of Louis succeeded in seizing his person in his native city of Anagni, within the very bounds of the "patrimony of St. Peter." The rough usage to which he was subjected hastened the death of the aged Boniface, and his successors were less determined and more pliable.

After the short and unimportant reign of Benedict the Eleventh, who restored to the chapters and other ecclesiastical institutions the privilege of the election of their bishops, etc., of which they had been deprived by Boniface, the influence of the French members of the conclave elevated to the papal throne Clement the Fifth. Owing his dignity to the French monarch, he became a ready tool in his hands. From no ignominy did he shrink, but that of pronouncing a bull of condemnation against the memory of his obnoxious predecessor. The seat of the Papacy was removed to Avignon, and the sovereignty of the Comtat Venaissin, soon after acquired, did not shield the Pope from the pressure of the influence of the neighbouring king of France, in whose territories his scanty domain was imbedded. Against the interest of the Papacy, perhaps contrary to his own personal preference, Clement was compelled to become the instrument of Philip for reducing the power of the Templar knights, whose only crime was the accumulated wealth of its thousands of houses and

farms. No candid historian of the present day will give either king or pope credit for believing in the truth of the horrible accusations, under cover of which the conspirators strove to hide the enormity of the judicial murder of the grand-master, and many of the most distinguished members of the order. And the critic will not be inclined to judge too harshly the faith of those who saw an intimate connection between the appeal of de Molai from his earthly judges to an incorruptible tribunal, and the speedy death of his persecutors.

For seventy years, or during the so-called "Babylonian Captivity," the successors of Clement continued to reside at Avignon, too completely subject to the power of the French kings to resume their defiant tone, but scarcely less exacting than before of homage from other rulers. Indeed, the burden of the pecuniary extortions of the popes was rather augmented than diminished by the change from Rome to Avignon, and by the existence of rival popes, each requiring an equal sum to sustain his court, and yet being acknowledged as legitimate by only a part of Christendom. The methods of drawing tribute from all quarters of Europe were multiplied to an almost insupportable extent; and so effectual were they, that no pontiff, perhaps, ever left behind him more enormous treasure than one of the popes of Avignon, John the Twenty-second. Much of this revenue was derived from the wealthy provinces of France.

The "Schism" which followed the "Captivity,"—during which the generally acknowledged popes who had returned to Rome, were opposed by rivals at Avignon and elsewhere,—tended doubly to incline the monarchs of Europe to lend their influence to the attempt to set bounds to the ambition of the Papacy. For while the popes were shorn of a great part of their power and prestige, and thus became less formidable antagonists, their financial exactions were so intolerable as to furnish the strongest motives appealing to the self-interest of the monarchs. Hence the frequency with which the old demand for "a reformation in the head and the members" was heard from all parts of the western church. And hence, too, those memorable councils of Pisa, of Constance, and of Basle, which coming in rapid succession at the commencement of the

fifteenth century, must have seemed to awakened and thoughtful minds the inevitable precursors of a revolution so radical as to remove the thick veil of darkness enveloping the church of the Middle Ages. But the meagre and unsatisfactory results that flowed from them made it evident to all, that the promised day of renovation had not yet dawned. The history of these strange assemblages, important as it is in the discussion of the general relations of the Papacy to the individual churches of the west, cannot be examined here; and yet it is closely connected with one of the most remarkable events in the records of the Gallican church.

The council of Basle had not yet terminated its protracted sessions when Charles the Seventh summoned the clergy of France to meet him in solemn assembly. The times were troublous. The kingdom was rent with intestine division; a war was still raging, during whose continuance the victorious arms of the English had driven the king from his capital, and had deprived him of more than a half of his dominions. Nor was the work of restoring the power of the lawful monarch, so nobly begun by the wonderful interposition of the Maid of Orleans, nearly completed. Nothing daunted by the unsettled aspect of his affairs, Charles made his appearance in the national council, convened in the faithful city of Bourges, which, for some time, had served as his temporary capital. He was attended by the dauphin, and the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, the count of Maine and many other noblemen, as well as by a goodly train of doctors of civil and canon law. Awaiting his arrival were five archbishops, twenty-five bishops, and a host of abbots and deputies of universities and chapters of cathedral churches. In the presence of this august assembly, in which all that was most prominent in church and state was represented, gathered to deliberate on the spiritual concerns of the realm, Charles published, July 7th, 1438, an ordinance which has become celebrated under the name of the "Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges,"—by far the more important of the two documents of similar nature emanating from the French throne.

The Pragmatic Sanction, as this is often called, by way of eminence, is the Magna Charta of the liberties of the Gallican church. Founded upon the results of the discussions of the

council of Basle, it probably embodies all the reformatory measures which the hierarchy of France were desirous of effecting or willing to admit. How far these were from meeting the demands of the moral sense of the people, when once they were led to contrast the present condition of society with the precepts of the gospel, will be readily seen, when we say that the following comprise all the important provisions, with the exception of a few relating to ecclesiastical discipline and worship. The Pragmatic Sanction establishes the obligation of the Pope to convene a general council of the church every ten years. The decisions of the council of Basle are declared of perpetual force. Far from deriving its authority from the Holy See, the œcumenical council depends immediately upon Christ; and the pontiff, as all other Christians, is bound to render to its decisions due obedience. The right to appeal from the Pope to the future council,—a claim obnoxious in the last degree to the advocates of papal supremacy,—is clearly asserted. The Pope is announced to be unable to appoint to any of the high ecclesiastical dignities, save in a very few specified cases; in others the election belongs to the chapters. His pretensions to confer minor benefices are equally rejected. No abuse is more sharply rebuked and forbidden than that of *expectatives*,—a species of appointment in much favour with the papal court, whereby the Pope nominated a successor to ecclesiastical dignities during the lifetime of the incumbent, and in view of his decease. The Pragmatic limits the costly and troublesome appeals to Rome to cases of great importance, when the parties reside at a greater distance than four days' journey from that city. At the same time it prescribes that no person shall be vexed by means of such appeals, after having enjoyed actual possession of his rank for three years. Going beyond the bounds of the kingdom, it enters into the constitution of the "sacred college," and fixes the number of the cardinals at *twenty-four;* while it lays down the minimum age of the candidate for that dignity at thirty years. The exaction of the *annats*, or the first-fruits demanded by the Pope, is stigmatised as an act of simony. Priests living in concubinage are to be punished by the forfeiture of one-fourth of their annual income. Finally, the Pragmatic Sanction esta-

blishes the principle that an interdict cannot be made to include in its operation the innocent with the guilty.*

So thorough vindication of the rights of the Gallican church had never before been made. The Pragmatic Sanction laid the axe at the root of many formidable abuses; it restored the freedom of election to many ecclesiastical bodies; it relieved the kingdom of much of that burden of tribute which was gradually draining the kingdom of its wealth. Foreigners could no longer interfere with the operation of the laws, and weaken the authority of the crown by resisting the imposition of customary taxes. None were more indebted to the prudent provisions of the ordinance, than the clergy themselves, both secular and regular. They were no longer to be robbed of so large a fraction of their income, and their persons were not liable to be hurried out of the kingdom, on the most flimsy pretexts, to be tried at foreign tribunals, and perhaps consigned to dungeons or graves on the banks of the Tiber.

The council had not adjourned when the tidings of the transactions at Bourges reached the city of Basle. They excited the liveliest joy, and the fathers testified the extent of their approbation in a grateful letter addressed to the archbishop of Lyons. But their interest was surpassed in intensity by the commotion which the news created at Rome. Pope Eugenius the Third received the unpleasant announcement with extreme indignation. His pontificate, and the pontificates of his successors, were filled with fruitless attempts to secure the repeal of the ordinance. The threat was made to put France under an interdict; but it was answered by the counter-threat of the king's attorney, who proposed to make a practical application

* The Pragmatic Sanction is long and intricate, consisting chiefly of references to those portions of the canons of the council of Basle which it confirms. Summaries are given by *Sismondi*, (Hist. des Français, tom. xiii. p. 327, seq.,) by *W. G. Soldan* (Geschichte des Protestantismus in Frankreich bis zum Tode Karl's IX. tom. i. p. 40–1,) and others. The entire document may be seen in the *Ordonnances des Roys de France de la troisième race*, tom. xiii. pp. 267–291, and in the *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, tom. ix. pp. 3–47. Isambert thus defines the term *Pragmatic:* "Ou appelle *pragmatique* toute constitution donnée in connaissance de cause du consentement unanime de tous les grands, et consacrée par la volonté du prince. Le mot *pragma* signifie prononcé, sentencé, édit; il était en usage avant Saint-Louis."

of the instrument, by appealing from the Pope to a future general council. The pontiff, having too vivid a recollection of the perils to which papal pretensions had been subjected of late, feared to venture the hazardous step.

In Louis the Eleventh, Charles's son and immediate successor, the papal court found a more promising subject of influence. Animated with hatred against his father, and ready to disapprove whatever scheme had met with his father's support, Louis, while yet dauphin, had given the Pope's agents flattering assurances of his good intentions. On attaining the throne, he suffered the memory of his father to be treated with ignominy, when the Pope's nuncio pronounced over his corpse an absolution for the heinous offence of originating the Pragmatic Sanction. Louis went further. Unscrupulous in the means he employed to compass his ambitious designs, he lent too ready an ear to the suggestions of Italian emissaries; and finally consented to abolish the Pragmatic, on condition that the house of Anjou should receive the papal support in Naples. Contrary to the advice of his council, a royal declaration to this effect was published in 1461; it was received with exultation at Rome, but throughout France with universal displeasure. The parliaments, the supreme tribunals of law under the old monarchy, testified their disapproval openly. That of Toulouse registered the letters patent with a note indicating that this formality was observed "by the most express command of the king;" and the parliament of Paris, the most ancient, honourable, and powerful of them all, refusing to enter them upon its records, sent a deputation to the king to set forth the pernicious results to be expected from this proceeding. The university of Paris made bold to appeal to a general council. Meanwhile, it so happened that Louis, having discovered that there was no prospect of obtaining the advantages he had anticipated, was by no means reluctant to give up the project. He even re-enacted some of the clauses of the Pragmatic Sanction respecting "expectatives" and "provisions," three years after his formal revocation of the entire document.*

* The letter addressed by Louis the Eleventh to the Pope, annulling the Pragmatic Sanction, is given in the Ordonnances des Roys de France de la troisième race, tom. xv., pp. 193–4. The king therein stigmatizes the docu-

A few years later in the reign of the same king, (1467,) a second attempt was made to secure the complete abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction. The recent edict against "expectatives" was repealed, at the suggestion of the celebrated cardinal Balue. But the Parisian court of parliament, more firm than the king, refused to record the letters-patent. The attorney-general, Saint-Romain, was prominent in his opposition. Among the most powerful arguments adduced, was doubtless the exhibit of the result of a recent investigation, which demonstrated that during the three years in the pontificate of the late Pope Pius, while the Pragmatic had been virtually set aside, Rome had drawn from the kingdom not less than 240,000 crowns, as payment for bulls for abbeys and bishoprics which had become vacant within that space of time; 100,000 crowns more for priories and other benefices; and the enormous sum of 2,500,000 crowns for expectatives and dispensations. The cardinal was not slow in finding means to remove the bold Saint-Romain, who, it is said, was subsequently rewarded by the king; but his arguments had confirmed both parliament and university in their resistance, and neither body would yield. The fortunate discovery of the treachery of Cardinal Balue, made soon after, reconciled the king to a second abandonment of the scheme. The unhappy prelate met with deserved retribution, his people not saving him from being shut up in a large iron cage, a prison of his own invention. At length, yielding to the Pope's entreaties, the king so far relented as to release Balue, after eleven years' confinement, and suffered him to find his way to Rome. A concordat subsequently agreed upon between Louis and the Pope, fared no better than the preceding compacts. Parliament and university were de-

ment as schismatical and having risen in a time of sedition, and declares that at the Pope's bidding he rejects and radically abrogates it, pledging his word to over-ride all opposition. "Quod si forte obnitentur aliqui aut reclamabunt, nos *in verbo regio* pollicemur tuæ Beatitudini atque promittimus exequi facere tua mandata, omni appellationis aut oppositionis obstaculo prorsus excluso; eosque qui tibi contumaces fuerint, pro tuo jussu comprimemus et refrenabimus!" Louis was never more to be distrusted than when he bound himself by the most stringent promises. The remonstrances of the Parliament to the repeal, composed probably in 1464, or soon after, are also given in the Ordon. des Roys, t. xv., pp. 195–207.

cided, and Louis, as before, having no further advantage to gain by keeping his word, was as careless as was his wont in its fulfilment.

The Pragmatic Sanction was still observed as the law of the land. The highest courts, ignoring its repeal, insisted on conforming to it in their decisions, while the theologians of the Sorbonne taught it as the foundation of the ecclesiastical constitution of France. Yet as public confidence in its validity had been shaken, it was desirable to set all doubts aside by a formal re-enactment. This was proposed at the States-General held during the minority of Charles the Eighth, but notwithstanding the well-known opinion of all the orders, this reign passed without any decided action. It was reserved for Louis the Twelfth to take the desired step. In 1499 he published the Pragmatic Sanction anew, and ordered the exclusion from their offices of all who had obtained their appointment from Rome. In vain did Pope Julius the Second rave. In vain did he summon all upholders of the ordinance to appear before the fifth Lateran council. Death overtook him, it is even said, while about to fulminate a bull against Louis, and to transfer the title of "very Christian king" from the French sovereign to Henry the Eighth of England. The sturdy prince,—the "Father of his people,"—who had taken for his motto the device, "*Perdam Babylonis nomen*," made little account of his menaces.

On New-Year's day, 1515, the youthful duke of Angouleme, under the designation of Francis the First, ascended the French throne, from which the two daughters of Louis the Twelfth were excluded by the pretended Salic law, or more accurately by a precedent adopted several centuries before, to prevent the union of the English and French crowns upon the same head. He had, however, married the elder of the daughters of the deceased monarch, Madame Claude, whose deformity of body was compensated for by a gentle nature. Full of martial ardour, Francis at once entered upon the career of arms, and the victory of Marignano closed his first campaign. But that success was productive of more lasting results than the mere temporary possession of Milan. It led to a reconciliation with the Pope, and a solemn interview in the city

of Bologna. All that was magnificent and captivating to the senses in the ritual of the Mass, was employed by Leo the Tenth, that great patron of the arts, to dazzle the eyes of the young and imaginative prince. Never did pomp and ceremony more readily effect the object for which they were put forth. The way was paved for a convention, or Concordat, in which the rights of the Gallican church were to be sacrificed, and the spoils divided between pontiff and king.

Three cardinals were engaged in the elaboration of the details of the instrument, two on the pontifical, and one on the royal side. The last was the notorious cardinal Duprat, elevated by Francis to the high office of chancellor. The oath taken by that responsible functionary, when assuming the charge of the seals of state, contained a remarkable clause, binding him to refuse to affix them to any paper of an unjust or pernicious character, until having remonstrated with his master, he had cleared his own conscience of the guilt of the transaction. The delicate trust had been committed to unworthy hands. The churchman has been well described as a man "who observed no laws, skilled though he was in jurisprudence, but his own interest and the passions of his master." He died years after, execrated as the author of the venality introduced into every department of the government. The source from which the Concordat emanated, determined indifferently well the character which it might be expected to assume.

The pontifical court, realizing the strength of the opposition which its pretensions to decide in the affairs of the Gallican church created in the French people, had resolved to renounce a portion of its claims in favour of the king, in order to retain more securely the remainder. Under the pretext that the right of election vested in the chapters had been abused, partly by the choice of illiterate and improper persons, partly by the practice of partiality and simony, the selection for bishops and archbishops was removed from them, and given to the king. He was empowered to choose a doctor or licentiate of theology or law, not less than twenty-seven years of age, within six months after the see became vacant. The candidate was to be submitted to the Pope for approval, and if rejected, a second nomination was to be made by the king. Similar

regulations applied to the abbeys and monastic institutions in general. A few exceptions were made in favour of those patrons and bodies to whom special privileges had been granted. The issue of "expectatives" was prohibited, but no mention was made of the "annats," whence it of course followed that this rich source of gain to the papal treasury was to lie open, in spite of the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction to the contrary.*

Such were some of the chief features of the Concordat between Leo the Tenth and Francis the First. So violent was the change it introduced into the ecclesiastical relations of the land, that in the eyes of the French clergy it must seem to amount to little less than a complete revolution. After receiving the unqualified approval of the council of Lateran, in a session at which few but Italian prelates were present, the Concordat, engrossed on white damask, accompanied by a Revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction on cloth of gold, was forwarded to Francis, who had returned to his kingdom. Not ignorant of the discontent which the rumour of the transaction had engendered, the king first submitted the Concordat alone to a mixed assembly, composed of prelates and canons, of presidents and counsellors of parliament, doctors of the university, and other prominent personages. The dissatisfaction of those present found expression in the speech of Cardinal Boissy, who demanded that the clergy be consulted respecting a matter so vitally affecting their interests, suggesting the necessity of assembling for that purpose a national council. The king angrily retorted that the clergy must *obey*, or he would send their bishops to Rome to discuss with the Pope.

Failing in this informal attempt to obtain the consent of the most influential persons in his dominions, the king took measures to carry into execution that clause which enjoined the ratification of the Concordat by the parliaments. First, he dispatched letters-patent enjoining upon all judges to conform to its provisions. These were followed soon after by copies of the Revocation of the Pragmatic, and of the Concordat. But

* The text of the Concordat may be seen in the *Recueil gén. des anc. lois*, &c., tom. xii., pp. 75–97.

the parliament of Paris decided that so fundamental a change in the national customs required more mature consideration, and consequently deferred the registry. At this point properly began one of the most notable contests between the king of France and the judiciary of his dominions. Francis was impatient of delay or hesitancy in the execution of his commands. He possessed the most extravagant notions of the extent of the royal prerogative. In truth, there was nothing in the unwritten constitution or usages of the country to limit its exercise. The convocation of the States-General, the only body representing the people, had of late become an infrequent occurrence, for the kings were as reluctant to submit their actions to be canvassed by the delegates of the three orders, as were the popes to call a truly free general council of the church. They had deliberately assumed the perilous undertaking to reign without consulting the will of the nation; not imagining that they were thus incurring an undivided responsibility for which the world would sooner or later call them to an account. Of this absolutism, whose foundations had been laid before the time of which we speak, Francis was no less an embodiment than was Louis the Fourteenth; and those words,—"*L'état c'est moi*," were the true exponent of his feelings also, as many incidents of his life make manifest.

With the view of exercising a pressure on its deliberations, Francis now commissioned his uncle, the bastard of Savoy, to be present at the sittings of the parliament. Against this unprecedented breach of privilege, the parliament sent a deputation humbly to remonstrate. It was to no purpose. The irritated prince declared his determination to satisfy himself respecting the true disposition of the judges, and assured the delegates that he had firmly made up his mind to send the disobedient to the inferior parliaments of Bordeaux and Toulouse, and fill their places with "men of worth." "I am your king," was his constant remark, and this passed current with him for an all-sufficient argument. The counsellors were scarcely less resolute. Undoubtedly, the success that had attended their previous resistance to the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction, on at least three occasions in the reign of Louis the Eleventh, led them to hope for equal good fortune in the present instance.

By the presence of the bastard of Savoy they were apparently quite unmoved, although they had learned from Francis's own lips the object of his being there. They refuse to concede the enrolment; they declare that they must continue to observe the Pragmatic Sanction which was endorsed by a body representing the entire nation; they protest against suffering it to be annulled, and insist upon a convocation of the clergy, such as that which Charles the Seventh had assembled, as indispensable for the examination of the question.

Francis, who was sojourning at his castle of Amboise overlooking the Loire, indignantly sent word to the parliament to appoint deputies to convey to him the reasons of its refusal. But when they reached the castle-gate, an entire month was permitted to elapse before Francis would condescend to grant them admission. And when they gained admission, it was only to be treated with studied contempt. "There can be but one king in France," was the arrogant language of the young prince to the counsellors who had grown gray in the service of Charles the Eighth and the good king Louis. "You speak as if you were not my subjects, and as if I dared not try you and sentence you to lose your heads." And when the indignity of his speech awakened the spirited remonstrance of the judges, "I am king, I can dispose of my parliament at my pleasure," rejoined Francis, "begone, and return to Paris at break of day."

A formal command was now addressed to the parliament, and the bearer, la Trémouille, informed that body, as it listened to the king's message, that Francis had repeated to him more than ten times within a quarter of an hour, "that he would not for half his kingdom fail of his word to the Pope, and that if the parliament rebelled, he would find means to make it repent of its obstinacy." It was manifest that any further opposition from a court so constituted as to be completely dependent upon the will of the sovereign, was entirely useless. The parliament, from the circumstance that it was customary for the king to send to it all his general edicts, to be entered upon its records, and thus made known to all inferior courts and to the public, had long since assumed that the privilege belonged to it of refusing to enregister, claiming, that without the observance of

this formality no law could be carried into operation. In unimportant cases the crown had suffered, and occasionally connived at, this claim of a faithful and honoured tribunal. But the king always reserved the right of commanding the court to record his ordinances, either sending the mandate by a trusty servant, or proceeding thither and holding what was styled the "*lit de justice.*" Yet even when compelled to yield, the registry of the Concordat, at the suggestion of the crown officers, was accompanied by a declaration that it was made at the express command of the king many times reiterated; that the parliament disapproved of the revocation of the Pragmatic Sanction, and that in the adjudication of causes, it would continue to follow the law of Charles the Seventh, while appealing to the Pope under better advisement, and to a future council of the church. Thus the Concordat, initiated at Bologna in 1516, and signed at Rome, August 16th, 1516, was registered by the parliament of Paris *de expressissimo mandato regis* on the 22d of March, 1518.

Francis had not yet silenced all opposition. The rector of the university of Paris, not content with entering a formal remonstrance, ventured upon a more hazardous step. Making use of the prerogative long since conceded to the university, of exercising a censure over the press, he posted a notice, addressed to all publishers and printers, forbidding them to print the Concordat, on pain of the loss of their privileges. The dean and canons of the church of Paris also handed in their protest. But the preachers in several of the churches rivalled the rector in the audacity of their measures, for they began to declaim publicly against the ecclesiastical innovation. We are not surprised that the prince who could not even brook wholesome reproof, should have been enraged by proceedings which seemed to reflect upon his personal honour. He directed parliament to bring the offending clergymen to justice; but, strange to say, none could ever be found,—a circumstance which we must certainly attribute rather to the supineness of the judges than to any lack of witnesses. To the university Francis wrote in a haughty tone, threatening any of its doctors that dared to preach against the government, and by an edict from Amboise, on the succeeding month, he forbade the rector and

his associates from assembling for the discussion of political questions.

These were the closing scenes of the drama. The king had conquered, but not without meeting a spirited resistance from parliament, university, and clergy. If they had succumbed, it had only been before superior strength, and each of the bodies reserved to itself the right of treating the Concordat as a nullity, and the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438 as still the ecclesiastical constitution of the land. And this was not altogether an empty claim. Some of the provisions of the Concordat were never enforced, which was a solid advantage gained through the opposition; and the parliaments persisted in rendering judgment in cases coming before them, in accordance with the Pragmatic. As, for instance, when the bishop of Albi, chosen by the canons, was confirmed in his see, notwithstanding the pretensions of a nominee of the crown. Yet as a whole the Concordat was executed, and in 1532 it was extended to the monastic foundations, which had a clear right to elect, in order to gratify Francis, on the occasion of the marriage of his second son, the duke of Orleans, to Catharine de'Medici, niece of the reigning pontiff, Clement the Seventh. The anecdote is related, that in order to facilitate the execution of this new act of injustice, Cardinal Duprat ordered all ecclesiastical bodies to send him the documents attesting their right of election, and that on receiving them he threw them into the fire to destroy all memory of their claims. The story may be apocryphal; but it sufficiently reveals the estimate of the prelate's character made by his contemporaries and his immediate successors.

The Gallican church did not rest quiet under the loss of its highly-prized liberties. Under Francis the Second once and again their restoration was desired; and an edict partially restoring them was obtained, only to be virtually repealed by Charles the Ninth. So in the reign of his successor, Henry the Third, the voice of the three orders at the States-General of Blois (1576,) and of the clergy, three years later, was heard in remonstrance and entreaty. The latter unhesitatingly asserted that the Concordat had been a great detriment to the Pope as well as to the kings of France; for the day that wit-

nessed its introduction, also beheld the beginning of the heresy which had since attained such formidable dimensions. And in 1585, the clergy stated with equal assurance that Francis the First, upon his death-bed, had solemnly declared to his son that no sin weighed more heavily upon his conscience than his having deprived the churches and monasteries of their franchises. There can, we think, be no doubt that the Concordat assisted not a little the early progress of the Reformation in France. For it shook the confidence of many in the Romish church, and revealed the mercenary character of the dealings of the Papacy, as well as the frightful corruption which it fostered. On the other hand, by attracting to Paris so many of the higher ecclesiastics who were in search of preferment, it cleared the provinces of many of those who, from their position, would have been the most effective antagonists of the purer faith.

We pass over an entire century before reaching the famous declaration of the French clergy, made in an assembly at Paris, March 19th, 1682. Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, was its author, and it presented a resumé of the great principles advocated by the Gallican church. The first article asserts that the power given by God to St. Peter and his successors being in spiritual things only, kings are in temporal things subject to God alone, so that they cannot be deposed by any ecclesiastical power, nor their subjects freed from their allegiance. The second exalts the general councils above the Pope. The third maintains the customs and maxims revered by the kingdom and church of France as worthy of being inviolably sustained. The fourth and last supports the principle, that although the Pope has principal authority and his decisions are of universal application, yet his judgment may be corrected, if the consent of the church agree not with it. These were the four articles which Louis the Fourteenth by a special edict promulgated and directed to be made the subject of instruction in the theological schools. So obnoxious were they to the Pope that he seems to have been more indignant with Louis for endorsing them than pleased with him for his Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This circumstance seems to explain the anomalous

fact that whereas the massacre of St. Bartholomew's eve and the abjuration of Henry the Fourth were made the occasion for universal rejoicing at Rome, and the events were celebrated by commemorative medals, none seem to have been struck by the popes to celebrate the "piety" of the great Louis, unless we attribute to them a single medal of uncertain authorship, which seems quite to have escaped the notice of modern historians.

The Gallican church ceased to exist when the storms of the first French revolution overwhelmed the land. Restored by Napoleon the First, and protected by articles appended to a Concordat more liberal than that of Francis, it had lost its distinctive character. If Louis the Eighteenth attempted to reintroduce the old Concordat, that effort of despotism was defeated, not by the resistance of the clergy, but by that of the legislature. The past century has seen the entire denationalization of the French church. More pliant than in preceding ages, the Romish church in France has yielded to the inevitable tendency of the very system of which it forms a part, to make of the entire church only one consolidated despotic government, deriving its life and strength from Rome. The Gallican party now possesses but a handful of supporters among the higher clergy. Not that all jealousy has disappeared. That there is abundant evidence of dislike between the Italian and French clergymen, is known by all who are well acquainted with them personally. But recent commotions have demonstrated to the satisfaction of the vast majority of the French bishops, and even priests, that the only hope of long maintaining their ascendency, is found in linking their fortunes to those of the See of Rome, and in asserting its claims to universal obedience.

It is *fear* that has induced this change, unless we greatly mistake. But whatever be the cause, of the fact there can be no doubt. Whoever should venture to affirm the principles often enunciated by the defenders of the Gallican liberties would now be set down as a heretic. In 1482, the faculty of theology of Paris censured a Franciscan monk, Jean Angeli by name, who had said in public discourse: "Facultatem suam

habent dicti presbyteri (curati) ab episcopo duntaxat;" and gave its decision in these words: "Dicit Facultas quod propositio in se et quoad omnes reliquas partes et probationem partis ultimæ, in qua dicitur 'ab episcopo duntaxat,' est *scandalosa, in fide erronea, hierarchici ordinis destructiva*, etc." But what devout French catholic would dare to assert at this moment that the priest derives his authority from God directly, without the intervention of bishop or pontiff?

We have been looking at an interesting development of the spirit of independence in one of the national churches of the Roman communion. We have seen much to admire in its history. Its resistance of foreign intervention, its opposition to the introduction of the Inquisition, its defence of the persons of its clergy, whom the papal court would try in a foreign land —these and other features deserve our praise, even when we behold them associated with an intolerant spirit, and upheld by the most determined enemies of the "truth as it is in Jesus," and the most cruel persecutors of his martyrs. That spirit of independence is now a thing of the past, and its fall is an additional proof of the inflexible logic of the church of Rome, which leads inevitably to the suppression of all individuality of thought, and the merging of all interests in the will of the pretended vicegerent of Christ. Long and hard did the Gallican church labour to vindicate the maxim pithily expressed by the Abbé Fleury,* "The government of the church is, therefore, no despotic empire;" but history has demonstrated the falsity of its boast, so far as the Romish system is concerned. The liberty of private judgment, and the right of self-government, it was reserved for the Reformation to vindicate.

* Discours sur les libertés de l'Eglise gallicane, p. 252.

Art. III.—*The Scepticism of Science.*

It has come to be generally conceded among discerning men, that the great battles of Christianity henceforth are to be fought with the various forms of unbelief generated by scientific inquiry. And it has come to be boldly, and even boastfully declared, that the positive claims of Christianity, so far, at least, as they are founded upon the infallibility of Scripture, must now assuredly succumb under the last great assault, slowly but steadily, as with the tread of destiny, preparing against them. We can even hear, now and then, the hurrah, the shout, the *Io triumphe!* as if the victory were already in sight. Meantime, thoughtful men are preparing for the assault, watching calmly and confidently its progress and direction, and knowing full well that under it nothing will perish which has in it the breath of divinity.

The battle of the evidences has been fought over almost every field of human thought. As the eager and progressive mind of the race opened up one area after another of investigation and study, whether in the sphere of the logical reason or the practical intellect, in history, geography, philology, ethics, or psychology, their results were brought at once to bear, as criteria, upon the claims of Scripture. It was but natural that a book claiming to embody the highest knowledge, and to promote the highest welfare possible to men, and founding its claims upon a supernatural basis conceded to no other book, should be tested by every thing new in human discovery. And indeed, if its claims are well founded, it will not only endure, but rejoice in such a test. It must adjust itself, unquestionably, to every clear finding of the human mind. No two truths, or two facts, in God's universe, can be in hopeless and irreconcilable contradiction.

Thus far the test has been bravely and successfully borne. Amidst all the wondrous activity of the human mind, the shiftings of human opinion, the achievements of human invention, the wonders of human discovery, tho rise and fall of

dynasties of the intellect, and forms and institutions of society, and much else needless to mention, the religion of Christ and the divinity of Scripture have stood strong, steady, unimpaired, and so stand to-day, the civilized mind of the world being the judge. They have shrunk from no trial, and quailed before no foe. They have moved firmly on, sure and steady as the great flow of history itself, whilst much that once exalted itself against them has been left far behind amongst the *debris* which strews the high road of the world's life. The old Titanic foes of other ages are dead, without hope of resurrection. The old weapons, once wielded by sinewy arms, are rusty and dull. But now the scene changes, the conflict assumes a new phase, the battle draws to a different line, a new and powerful adjustment of the Christian evidences is required by the presence of a new and powerful test of their validity; and many are eagerly and fearfully wondering whether or not the old result of other conflicts will still be reached.

Manifestly the new factor in this great problem, the new power in the coming assault upon Christianity, is *science*, taken in its widest sense of all that is knowable, by the human intellect, of the universe of nature and of man—their properties, laws, antecedents, and results. It is not the scepticism of Celsus or Porphyry, nor of Voltaire or the French Encyclopædists, nor of Strauss and the German idealists, nor even of Gibbon and Hume—though the latter, in his Essays on Miracles, adumbrated one phase of the present contest—but the *scepticism of science*, that the church must prepare to meet —the scepticism (whether intentional or not) of Agassiz, and Morton, and Darwin—of the Statisticians and Mr. Buckle.

It is our purpose to suggest some reflections respecting the course and conduct of the "high debate" which is impending. It is not our purpose to exhaust the controversy ourselves, nor even so much as to enter fairly upon it, as to its merits, but rather to sketch or outline it as a coming fact, and to forecast, it may be, its necessary features and conditions. We shall endeavour to point out, if possible, the origin, nature, and tendencies of the scepticism of modern science, and to suggest some earnest words of counsel to our brethren respecting the

manner in which this new uprising of human opinion against the ancient bulwarks, is to be met and dealt with.

It is clear to any observer that the great palpable fact, pertaining to human inquiry in these latter days, is the progress of science. As a fact it can scarcely be overstated. The labours, achievements, successes of the devotees of the natural sciences, within living memory, have been vast and varied beyond description, and they portend results which as yet no human mind can fully measure. They have opened to us a universe, every where wondrous with motion and life. Instead of a universe of gross masses and inert forms, they have given us a universe vital and almost vocal in all its parts, and unveiled to us a complication and intricacy of laws, powers, and processes so grand and amazing, so perfectly adjusted, so nicely balanced, that we seem almost to be walking in the realms of a new existence. They have unveiled to us that wondrous alchemy of force which in its ever-shifting and Protean shapes and metamorphoses governs the whole course of material things, and which, itself indestructible, and incapable as a sum total of increase or diminution, raises the mind to the conception of that absolute perfection of adjustment, and exquisite prearranged harmony which pervade the universe,—a conception for many ages unattainable by the most exalted intellects. They have also unveiled, or are rapidly unveiling to us, the alchemy of higher spiritual, mental, and moral laws, which prevail in the human world, and which reveal to us the fact that the laws which govern men are as nicely adjusted, as inexorable in their flow, and as sure in their results upon large groups or masses of men, as are the laws which govern matter. Thus in the grand old words of Scripture is it seen that "He turneth the hearts of men as the rivers of waters are turned."

Science has indeed made man the "priest and interpreter of nature." It has enabled him to survey and map the starry heavens, to weigh and measure the sun, to throw his line over the planets, even to prophecy the presence of the unknown before its discovery, and to determine the path of the comet, as it comes up on its blazing wheels from the depths of space. It has enabled him, by means of its parallaxes and mathematical formulas, to rise to conceptions of the vastness in space, and

the stupendous grandeur of the material universe, wholly impossible without them. It has opened up to his critical gaze the earth beneath his feet, which the generations of men have trodden for six thousand years heedless of its hidden lessons, and enabled him to read in its rocky alphabet the record of a vastness in time as grand and stupendous as the vastness in space revealed by the telescope; and of successive creations and destructions far surpassing in volume the existing creation of our historical era, and of cycles of being, rude, indeed, and monstrous, compared with which our human epoch is as yet but as a watch of the night. It has put into his hands the microscope, and revealed to him a myriad-peopled world of life below him, stretching far down among the atoms, as his parallaxes stretch far up among the stars—a world of life from whose tiny organs, and delicate senses, and exquisite adaptations of sentient being, his mind rises to still higher conceptions of the divine skill and supreme order which prevail in this universe. By the patient study and careful comparison to which it incites him, it enables him to take the stony paw of some long-buried monster, never seen by human eyes, and, rent from the huge body to which it belonged, found solitary in its rocky bed, and to construct from it the form and features of the denizen of an ancient world. It has enabled him, through the science of chemistry, to analyse and determine the elementary structure of all material things, and thus incalculably to increase human power in the control and direction of nature, and add to the uses and comforts of man, and the wealth of civilization,—thus realizing the dream of the alchemists of the Middle Ages, by changing the baser metals of the earth into gold, not by a direct, but by an indirect process. It has enabled him to detect the presence of, and put under his control, the most subtle and powerful agents, for ever invisible to human eye, and impalpable to human touch. He has harnessed the lightning which flashed over the heads of the Chaldean shepherds, and around the summit of Olympus, suggestive only of dread and superstitious awe to the most cultivated people of the ancient world, and, though all unchanged in its nature since then, he has made it his swift and faithful messenger. It has enabled him, through its alliance with mechanical invention

and art, in the combined uses of coal, iron, and steam, to increase a thousand-fold his human power; to bind continents together in his iron bands, to whirl vast masses with arrowy speed over mountain and vale, to plow his huge leviathans through the yielding waves, and to enrich every shore with the multiplied commerce of the earth. It has enabled him even to modify and remove many of the ills that flesh is heir to, and to gradually add to the average of human life, thus realizing, proximately, that other dream of the alchemist when he searched for the elixir of life.

These are not rhetorical flourishes, but actual facts. Science has realized more than the wildest dream of poet, seer, or madman. Her works do follow her. The tangible evidences of her great conquests are around us everywhere. We do not, indeed, value these things beyond their proper nature and merits. It is true they are all chiefly material in their nature and uses. It is only one side of our nature that is elevated and beautified by them. We are not forgetful of the fact that there is another side of our nature, higher and nobler still, to which these can but feebly minister in any direct way, and in the most important respects not at all. But in their proper sphere, and valued for their proper uses, we hesitate not to say, that the achievements of science cannot be overstated.

Now with this exalted estimate of the claims of science before us, we approach the statement that science is impinging on the religious beliefs of the Christian public. We have already made the statement that such is the fact. We do not propose to illustrate the fact by a citation of instances, but we may briefly designate some of the forms in which the sceptical spirit manifests itself. It is seen under one form, in the promulgation of doctrines and scientific facts, (so claimed,) which in themselves strike at the root of some of the great cardinal doctrines of revelation, as, for instance, the doctrine of diversity of origin in the human race. It is seen under another form in the statement of inferences from certain scientific facts, which contravene the teachings of Scripture, as, for instance, that the undeviating uniformity of nature must preclude the idea of miracle. It is seen under another form in the prompt and emphatic rejection of all appeal or reference to the

authority of Scripture, as bearing upon scientific matters. It is seen again in the contemptuous thrusts, becoming in certain quarters rather common, at the antiquated notions, the absurd superstitions, and stupid traditions of religious people, which on examination are found to be the great cardinal beliefs, and grounds of belief, of the gospel. It is seen also in a wide-spread leavening of the popular mind with doubts, and misgivings, and uncertainties, derived, second hand, from scientific speculations. It is seen, finally, though somewhat rarely, in professed and laboured attacks upon the Scriptures and the Christian system, directed from a scientific standpoint. In general the scepticism of science is quiet, unobtrusive, indifferent to results, calm in attitude, and modest in utterance. It is, indeed, in most cases, not a direct interest, but a mere side issue.

It will enable us perhaps to understand the nature and origin of this scepticism, if we examine with care the *method* which prevails in the natural sciences, and which is indeed the true secret of their wonderful advancement. It has been named the *inductive method*, and is commonly and properly referred to Lord Bacon as its great apostle. Its opposite is the *deductive method*, which has prevailed in metaphysical and philosophical inquiries in all ages. Before proceeding farther we must endeavour to comprehend fully the distinction between these two methods, and to understand the operation of the former method in scientific studies, and its possible effects upon the findings of the latter. The inductive method is a reasoning from facts to principles; the deductive method is a reasoning from principles with a view to include facts. The inductive method gathers its data, and from them reasons to the general or original law; the deductive method assumes certain principles or axioms, and reasons from them to facts and conclusions. The inductive method is founded, either immediately or ultimately, on individual and specific experience; the deductive on admitted truths, intuitive perceptions, axioms, or traditional notions. In the former, experience precedes theory; in the latter, theory precedes experience. Induction is from particulars to generals, from the smaller to the greater, from the senses to the ideas; deduction is from generals to particulars,

from the greater to the smaller, from the ideas to the senses. By induction we rise from the concrete to the abstract; by deduction we descend from the abstract to the concrete. One is analytic, the other synthetic. The former is cautious, patient, indefatigable, wary, sceptical; the latter is bold, speculative, sometimes rash, and often credulous. Such are the two methods of inquiry which divide the world of thought.

Now it is true that these methods are never wholly divorced. They interweave and overlap, more or less, in every extended mental process. The inductive philosopher must use his ascertained principles, in many cases, for purposes of deduction, or his processes must stop, or be greatly impeded. Indeed, some of the grandest successes of modern science have been achieved just in this way. The philosopher, from his discovered law, has prophesied facts, and his prophecy has afterwards met fulfilment. And, on the other hand, the deductive philosopher, if he be not wholly visionary, must use more or less induction in the laying down of his fundamental principles, and must correct his conclusions by the touchstone of actual experience and fact. The two are married in eternal bonds, and when our mental processes shall have become perfect and our sciences mathematically accurate, it will be seen that they are supplementary of each other. Nevertheless, in certain branches of inquiry, especially in the present imperfect state of our knowledge, the one or the other method may necessarily predominate to such an extent as to justify the designation *inductive* or *deductive* as applied to the particular branch of science. Thus in the branches of science with which we are specially concerned in this article, the inductive method has been so manifestly predominant, that they have received, by common consent, the distinctive appellation, *the inductive sciences;* and it is indeed their great glory, and has been the great motive power of their progress. Careful collection of facts, patient examination of details, critical comparison of instances, rigid analysis of evidence, manifold collation of experiences, strict scrutiny of appearances, boundless multiplication of particulars, vigorous sifting of qualities and accidents, ruthless rejection of hasty or insufficient generalizations,—these, and much more akin to them, are what have guided and im-

pelled the magnificent career of the Baconian philosophy, and unveiled to the wondering gaze of man the mysteries of the material universe. These are what have whitened the seas with his commerce, started and swelled the busy hum of his manufactures, brought together the extremities of continents, and so mightily advanced the conquests of civilization. To these we owe the fame of Newton, and Kepler, and Cuvier, and Owen, and Black, and Boyle, and Davy, and Watt, and Brewster, and Lavoisier, and Agassiz, and Hugh Miller.

Now this method is clearly essential to the successful prosecution of the physical sciences. It is clearly impossible, as it seems to us, that they should make any progress without it. The mind has no *a priori* knowledge on these subjects. A child does not know that fire will burn until it has tried it, and a man devoid of the experience would know no better. Whatever may be claimed in behalf of original intuitions, innate ideas, axioms, perceptions, in other spheres of thought, it cannot be claimed for a moment that man has any intuitions, perceptions, or inborn ideas, respecting the elements, combinations, powers, and possibilities of the material universe. It is only when he stands over nature with hammer and crucible, with retort and pump, that he can wring her secrets from her. It is only when he watches, from the high hills of science, day after day and year after year, the recurrence of her great facts, that he can grasp and comprehend the great laws of her evolutions and developments. It is true that a powerfully intuitive mind may sometimes, from a very few data—perhaps from a single one—lead to the perception of the general law, and its statement becomes an epoch in science. And thus advances in knowledge are often made by the previous exercise of some boldness and license in guessing. But whilst this is true, it is also true that the guesses must be verified, or otherwise, by the patient toil of the inductive philosopher. Whilst minds quick and fertile in suggesting, give impulse to scientific pursuits, it is essential that minds of a different order should be careful and scrupulous in examining what is suggested; otherwise science could never be any thing more than an incoherent flight of fancies. All this is admirably illustrated in the case of Kepler, in whose intellectual character were combined in a remarkable

degree the swift flashing of intuition, and the slow toil of induction. His guesses, conjectures, theories, and hypotheses were legion,—some of them have made his name immortal, for they grasped the great laws of the solar system; whilst many of them, fanciful and puerile in the extreme, have perished with the other rubbish of human folly. But Kepler not only announced his guesses, he also examined them, and in many cases refuted them. With the most patient toil he gave himself to the work of these self-affirmations and self-refutations; and the candour and copiousness with which he has narrated them are not only curious and amusing, but afford an extremely instructive exhibition of the process of discovery.

That the inductive method is essential to the successful prosecution of the physical sciences, is seen, further, from the fact that they made no progress until it came to be adopted. Man's faculties of mind have been the same from the beginning. If he is claimed to have intuitions and innate ideas, these were possessed by the ancients as well as the moderns. And yet in every age and amongst all nations, the physical sciences were wholly unknown, save where the inductive method was cultivated;—and oftentimes the most crude and absurd notions were held by the learned. The thinkers of the Middle Ages, some of them of no mean stature, held opinions on physical subjects at which a school-boy now laughs. And it is indeed amazing for how many ages and generations of human history mankind remained ignorant of what now seems to us the most familiar and palpable facts; facts so near to man, which lie in such direct contact with his daily life, and are so constantly brought within the scope of his examination. Especially does it seem remarkable, that for six thousand years he should have remained ignorant of the structure and history of *the earth;* that on which he treads, from which he draws his daily life, on which he builds his habitation, and with which he mingles his mortal dust;—strange that the earth which has ever ravished his eye with her garments of beauty, should have so long locked up her profound and ancient lessons from his sight. But he had not found the *method* of gazing through her stony crust; she opens her ancient lore to no monarch in the realms of mere intellect; he must patiently study the key to

her mystic alphabet; this only the later generations of men have successfully done; hence the younger and more promising sisters of the sciences are those which treat of things nearest to man, whilst the oldest of all is that one which deals with the most distant bodies of the universe.

From the nature of the inductive process it will be seen at once that its manifest tendency is to originate and cultivate a *sceptical habit of mind.* The man whose business it is to gather, observe, and collate facts, for the purpose of discovering or verifying their general law, and ulterior sequences, must not be a man of easy belief. He must discriminate between the true and the false, between appearances and realities, between facts and the semblance of facts. He must not be deceived into accepting mere likeness for identity. He must not be satisfied with plausibilities instead of proof. He must scrutinize, and compare, and hesitate, and doubt; and this habit is strengthened in him as he gains his experience, by the fact that his most careful conclusions are often disturbed by subsequent and wider observations and experiments. He thus gradually and even insensibly grows into the habit of requiring an amount and degree of *evidence* not expected or required in other spheres of life or thought. He is in general sceptical of evidence, and properly so in the better sense of the term. For scepticism is not in itself a bad thing. Every thing depends on the character of the thing concerning which we are sceptical. To be sceptical of spiritual rappings, quack medicines, charms and omens, huge advertisements, sensation preachers, and humbugs in general, is not a bad thing. The scepticism of evidence which we are bound to commend in the scientific man, is the habit of withholding conviction until conviction is clearly demanded and enforced by the evidence itself. It is this habit of mind which makes the pathway of science steady and sure. But it is easy to see how it may operate disastrously upon a traditional faith when carried over into the sphere of man's religious life.

Faith, in the great majority of Christians, is not a matter of induction. Only in a very small number, comparatively, is it founded upon an inductive process at all, and that process, so far as it is inductive, is but partial and supplementary. The-

ology, as a science, is deductive. It begins with God, and, from his known or assumed attributes, reasons down to sequences and conclusions. The argumentation of the theological world is predominantly deductive. Only in certain branches, as, for instance, those pertaining to the nature of man and the genuineness and authenticity of the sacred Scriptures, is the inductive system brought into use. The great mass of religious beliefs, considered as intellections, are traditional, and so far as they are traditional they are not inductive. In the young they are always traditional, and must necessarily pass through a period of disturbance if they are subjected to the inductive process at all. Even that religious faith which springs from the inner wants of man's nature, or the work of the Holy Spirit upon it, enabling him by his proper spiritual organs to behold and realize the spiritual and eternal, is not a matter of induction. It is only when the concomitant grounds of that faith, or its external relations or affinities, so to speak, are subjected to the test of inductive analysis, that any disturbance can occur from such source. And, as already intimated, if the cycle of our knowledge were complete, and our mental processes perfect, there could be no disturbance; but the two systems would work into one another with perfect ease and harmony. As one has well said, perfect ignorance is quiet, and perfect knowledge is quiet; it is only the intermediate transition stage from the one to the other that is restless and stormy, anxious, uncertain, and sorrowful. It is evident at a glance, that where the rigid inductive system of the physical sciences is brought into contact with the deductive system, which prevails in theology and religious thought in general, their action must be more or less, and in the present state of our knowledge for the time being, mutually disturbing, and a sceptical habit of thought will appear in the former. It is true, there is a very large part of a man's religious faiths which can scarcely be touched by the inductive philosopher, for the reason that they stand above the sphere of his system. If induction cannot prove the being and attributes of God, neither can it disprove them. So of much else pertaining to a man's religious and emotional life. There is an entire phase of our nature, with its experiences and emotions, its perceptions and certain-

ties, which lies above and beyond the plane of the inductive reason. It is only, as we have said, certain concomitant grounds of faith which can be touched by the inductive analysis, for the reason that they lie within the plane of its action. To this class belong the sacred Scriptures, so far as their truthfulness in matters of fact is concerned, and consequently their full or plenary inspiration and infallibility in the evangelical sense. Science claims to be able to deal with certain statements of the Scriptures. It claims that the things stated, described, or taught, belonging purely to the domain of nature, and having left their own record in that domain, fall properly within its purview, and may be verified, or otherwise, by its own proper processes. And sceptical science, as we may call it for convenience, does not hesitate to pronounce that some of these statements, facts or doctrines, have been otherwise than verified.

Another important question arises at this stage of our examination into the origin and nature of the scepticism of science. It is this. What can be regarded by the scientific man as *authority* in matters of science?

Authority sways its sceptre in science as elsewhere. Indeed, science could scarcely exist, much less make progress, without it. Some things must be considered as settled. Science must have its fixed quantities as well as mathematics. In all matters of human inquiry a given amount of evidence must be considered as establishing a certainty which is practically absolute; and any such certainty becomes an authority, a fixed basis for further discoveries. Kepler's law of the relation between the mean distances of the planets from the sun, and the times of their revolutions, is such an authority, because it has been tested and verified by every proof possible to the human mind, and fulfils all the conditions of absolute certainty. Newton's law of gravity is such an authority, for similar reasons. The same may be said of Römer's discovery of the velocity of light, and of the laws of motion, refraction, heat, and electricity; and, indeed, of all the accepted and well-established laws on the assumption of which the experiments and investigations of the various sciences are conducted. Any thing may be regarded as an authority in science which

the scientific world has come to accept without question, and which is found to meet all the requirements of its ever widening analysis. It is true that some things may be so accepted for a time, which do not possess the attribute of absolute certainty. A wider sweep of induction, or a happy stumbling on a new fact or phenomenon, may reveal a higher law, and modify or remove the previously accepted fact or theory. But there is a limit to proof as there is a limit to the human mind, and when that limit is reached, the results must be accepted as to all intents and purposes absolute.

Again, where the things in question are not capable of mathematical proof, of course a mathematical certainty cannot be obtained. Still, authority may vest in an accumulated—almost infinite—preponderance of probabilities. Where all the induction points in one direction, and every newly-discovered fact only serves to confirm the conclusions from the former ones, the human mind will inevitably, in due time, acknowledge authority as vested there. The whole course of human life is determined by a calculation of probabilities; human interests are daily ventured upon it, and the human mind is facile in attributing certainty to that which is likely to occur. Hence, when science establishes her hypotheses by a multitude of facts, it is only to be expected that they will be believed.

Now it is held by some, and it has been put forth prominently by theologians in the high debate which science has evoked, that the statements of the Scriptures ought to be conclusive, and of the nature of authority, in matters of science. "If science does not agree with the Scriptures," says Professor Lewis, "so much the worse for science." It is held that the evidence on which the Scriptures are accepted by the Christian world, is stronger than any evidence of science can possibly be. And hence, that the clear statements of Scripture ought to be held sufficient against all opposing theories of science. And in attempting to strengthen this position, it is common to depreciate the evidences and investigations of science. Dr. Dick's comparison of a geologist to an insect on the back of an elephant speculating on the internal structure of the animal, is familiar to all theological students, and is still popular with some anti-geological polemics. But with all due respect for

our brethren who put forward this claim on behalf of the Scriptures, we beg leave to say, on behalf of the votaries of science, that they cannot possibly, *as scientific men*, accept *authority* under any such form. We have already said that the discoveries of science rest upon a basis peculiarly their own—a basis of actual experiment and observation—and nothing can claim authority in a scientific view which does not so rest. The inquiries and pursuits of science are conducted by a method of their own, and we have already shown that they could make no progress without that method; hence nothing can be accepted as scientific authority which is not evolved by that method. This seems to us so perfectly clear, that the mere statement of it should suffice. To suppose the opposite, would be to force upon one domain of inquiry and proof a wholly foreign and extraneous element of control—an element which could be accepted only by an entire abnegation of its own proper genius and life. Should science accept a statement of Scripture on a scientific matter as exhaustive and authoritative, prior to examination and verification in an inductive way, it would be so far forth no longer science at all. Hence, if in a congress of scientific men a member should quote a passage of Scripture as settling a mooted point of a strictly scientific nature, it would be regarded as entirely out of place. All this does not militate in the least against the Scriptures. Its force is the same, though all the statements of Scripture having a bearing on scientific matters be assumed to be correct. It is simply demanding the normal freedom of science—claiming for it that independence which it must have if it exist at all. And we are free to say, that if the Scriptures had been regarded by the Christian world as conclusive and exhaustive on subjects of science, science would have made very small progress. The influence of the Scriptures on the progress of science has not been direct, but indirect. It has been by the general expansion and stimulus it afforded the human mind, not by direct teachings on subjects of science. Had the Scriptures been so regarded, they would have held the same relation to science and scientific progress that the Koran holds, in Mohammedan history, to civil law and civil government. The gospel makes no pretensions to the character of a civil code,

consequently the profession of Christianity is consistent with any sort of jurisprudence, and any sort of political constitution, and consequently opens the door for unlimited progress and improvement in the forms of man's civil and national estate. But the Koran is held to be the eternal and all-sufficient expression of the Divine will on all points; it rules man's temporal as well as spiritual concerns; its sacred pages must therefore be received not only as the rule of faith and the law of morals, but also as a *corpus juris civilis*, rendering nugatory or superfluous the profane labours of a Justinian or an Alfred. To this day, the Koran, and the Koran alone, forms the groundwork of jurisprudence among all nations professing the faith of Islam. The consequence has been, that it has debarred its proselytes from all political and social progress. The human mind, in this great local sphere of its activity, has slept a sleep that has known no waking under its powerful spell. It has stereotyped the despotic forms and traditions of the East, and rendered more stationary and helpless its sluggish social life. Mohammedanism has never made one step in the direction of human freedom, and the recognition in a national way of the rights of man. So if the Scriptures had been held by the general mind of the world to be the eternal and authoritative expression of the Divine will on subjects of science, rendering superfluous or profane the labours of Galileo, Newton, La Place, and the modern geologists, we may safely say that science would scarcely have existed at all. It was so held by the inquisitors in the case of Galileo, with what possible results, had they been successful, it is now easy to see. It is no friendly deed to attempt to place the Scriptures in a false attitude to any department of human inquiry, and is sure to result, so far as successful, in disaster and regret.

"Non tali auxilio,
Nec defensoribus istis."

It is unreasonable to require science to conduct her inquiries in obedience to *a priori* decision of scientific facts. Admitting even the correctness of the decision, and anticipating that the ultimate researches of science will verify it, still it must be held highly derogatory, both to religion and science, to enforce it,

or attempt to do so. It would necessarily involve the destruction of the freedom of science, and, if carried into all the spheres in which timid religionists have taken exception to the findings of science, would involve the destruction of science itself. And the folly of any such attempt appears the more glaring, when we consider that if the judgment based upon the Scriptures be correct, as we believe it is, the ultimate finding of science cannot fail to accord with it; and thus the "handmaid of religion" will return from her journey of search to crown with her garlands the divinity of truth. On the other hand, if the judgment in question be not correct, no bolstering of it by *ex cathedra* deliverances, on the part of the church or religious teachers, can possibly save it from refutation at the hand of science. So that in any event the part of wisdom for us is to yield a free rein and an open course to the career of science, and not attempt to force the authority of the Scriptures upon it in a way which does violence to their whole genius and purport.

The Scriptures at one time were universally understood to teach that the earth is a plain, that it is immovable, and that the sun revolves around it. Had this interpretation of Scripture been made authoritative, it is obvious that all the grand discoveries, enlarging as they do immeasurably our conception of the magnitude of the universe, and the greatness of its Author, had been impossible.

Besides, it is obvious on the slightest reflection, that any such attempt to impose the authority of the Scriptures upon the labours of science, must greatly augment and intensify that scepticism which we have shown has begun to prevail extensively in the scientific world. The mind of the scientific man instinctively revolts against it. He keenly perceives and feels the incongruity and absurdity of requiring him to acknowledge authority under any such form; and in his disgust at the ill-timed zeal of the friends of religion, he may, illogically indeed, transfer his aversion to *the thing* which they would thus improperly thrust upon him. Besides, he may be led to suspect that such arbitrary procedure betrays a secret misgiving on the part of those perpetrating it—a craven fear lest their doctrines should be overthrown—a suspicion which, however erroneous it

might be, would not be likely to add to the strength of his own faith. Well has the sage and pious Whately remarked, "Those who avow their dread of the pursuit of knowledge of any kind, as likely to be injurious to the cause of religion, forget that the acknowledgment of such a feeling, or even the bare suspicion of its existence, does more harm to that cause than all the assaults of its adversaries. However sincere their own belief may in fact be, the impression will inevitably be excited that it is not so; that they secretly distrust the goodness of their cause, and are desirous, from some sinister motive, of keeping up a system of delusion by suppressing the free exercise of reason." These are words which it becomes those carefully to ponder, who are every now and then frightened out of their propriety by some new discovery of science. If all men would at all times fully and steadily realize that *truth is truth*, there would be no unseemly quarrel between Christians and the earnest students of science. But it may be said that it is not truth, but specious falsehood—science falsely so called—against which the Christian world contends. Very well; then it must be met not with the dicta of Scripture, but in another way, to which we shall revert before we conclude this article.

Another important consideration, in accounting for the scepticism of scientific men, remains to be noticed, namely, that the *evidence* of science, in the establishment of its several positions, is *cumulative.* It is an aggregation, or accumulation, which is constantly increasing, not only in bulk, but in density, as its previous imperfect findings are eliminated or corrected, and consequently is constantly increasing in *weight*—a process which may go on indefinitely in proportion as positive certainty is difficult of attainment. All this begets in men the habit of suspending judgment; in other words, of believing nothing as a finality until the preponderance of probabilities is so great that it may be regarded as equivalent to absolute certainty. So long as a process is inchoate and progressive, a trained and cautious mind is not positive and emphatic respecting it. His posture is one of scepticism; he is looking about him; he is vigilant and suspicious—a habit of mind which is just the opposite of the habit of faith, which is positive and emphatic. Hence, as scientific men are schooled, by their daily pursuits,

to attain to a positive certainty and an emphatic belief only as the goal of a long and tedious process, it occurs that they are slow in attaining the positive elements of Christian faith. This, were there no other obstacles to faith, of a personal nature, to be overcome, would beget no small amount of scepticism in the scientific world.*

Moreover, the general state of mind depends largely upon the *tendency* a line of evidence is taking. If a new discovery, or series of discoveries, seems to militate against the commonly received teaching of the Scriptures, the first effect is to produce uncertainty respecting that teaching, at least respecting the commonly received sense of it,—a distinction, however, which is not always readily made. Now if the progress of this series of discoveries, with its collateral inferences and consequences, be steadily and persistently in one direction; if every new fact only strengthens the previous facts; if every widening of the field of generalization only confirms the conclusions of former generalizations; if every modification, even of partial hypotheses, only carries the student to a higher platform of induction, and a more complete standpoint of theory; and if the unswerving tendency of this progress is adverse to a commonly received fact or doctrine of the Christian world, as derived from a given interpretation of the Scriptures, the only possible state of mind of a scientific man is one of increasing doubt concerning that fact or doctrine. Beyond a certain point, his scepticism must increase with the increase of evidence against the fact in question. The human mind is so constituted, that, save when blinded by passion or warped by prejudice, it must yield an involuntary consent to the force of evidence duly apprehended. And if the commonly received fact or doctrine be insisted on as an essential fact or doctrine, or if a prevalent interpretation of biblical statements be pressed as indispensable to the Scriptures as an inspired book, the result must be collision with the expounders and teachers of science, and aggravated scepticism on their part,—scepticism directed

* We do not deem it necessary to enlarge upon the personal obstacles to faith, referred to in the text, as we take it they are not specifically distinct in scientific men from what they are in other classes, and we know no reason why they should be more powerful in their action.

perhaps against the *interpretation*, which, to the opposite party, is identical with scepticism directed against the Book. And doubtless, in the heat of controversy, and under the chafings of a strife embittered by the rashness of those whose zeal exceeds their knowledge, many an otherwise devoutly inclined student of science is driven into positive unbelief of revelation as a supernatural fact.

Besides the causes above enumerated, there are others on which we have not time to enlarge. According to our observation, one of the most common sources of scepticism in scientific men is one-sided culture. They are often exclusively devoted to their own pursuits; sometimes to merely one branch of natural science; more frequently to natural science as distinguished from other departments of human knowledge. In forming their opinions or framing their theories, they have therefore only one class of facts before their minds. They are consequently exposed to the danger of adopting views which a wider scope of vision would have rendered impossible. Agassiz, for example, in proposing his theory of the different zones, having each its own *fauna* and *flora* originating within its limits, had before his mind only the facts of zoology and botany. These, he thought, might be better accounted for on that theory than on any other. It is at best a hypothesis, a guess. It is only one of many possible ways for accounting for the facts in question. Had that distinguished naturalist been also a linguist; had he paid even the slightest attention to the philosophy of language and to the relations between different tongues, he would have seen that innumerable facts stood in the way of his theory, and demonstrated it to be false. No man of general culture, no such man as either of the Humboldts, would have given Agassiz's theory a second thought.

It is only another illustration of the effects of one-sided culture, when men of science ignore or disregard the moral or religious considerations which legitimately bear on the decision of scientific questions. We have already admitted that matters of science are to be determined by the methods of science—that the facts of nature are to be ascertained by the investigation of nature. But when two theories are proposed for accounting for these facts, the one consistent with Scripture,

and the other opposed to it, or to its generally accepted interpretation, then the one-sided naturalist gives the authority of Scripture no weight in the choice between those theories. The irreligious naturalist prefers decidedly, and defends with zeal, the anti-scriptural theory, for the very reason that it is anti-scriptural. Both the indifferent and the irreligious man of science act irrationally. Viewing the matter coolly as a mere philosophical question, the moral considerations, in the case supposed, are entitled to controlling weight. The probabilities, so to speak, are infinitely (*i e.* indefinitely) in favour of the hypothesis which agrees with Scripture as against the theory which is opposed to the Bible. If one scientific hypothesis precludes the idea of final causes, or of a personal God, and another admits of both, is there no rational, philosophical ground for preferring the latter? If all truth must be consistent, then truths immutably established by moral evidence cannot give way or be given up to any amount of apparently contradictory evidence. This is demanding for religion no more than reason and the constitution of our nature force us to demand. It is no more than every man of science, of broad and healthful culture, will be ready to admit. Sometimes the facts of science seem to conflict with the facts of history. In such cases, is the man of science authorized to wave the historian off of the field, and tell him he must let science take its course? If history proves indisputably that three thousand years ago the sea-coast before Carthage, or at the mouth of the Nile, trended in a certain direction—if not only the testimony of ancient authors, but extant remains and monuments confirmed this fact, it surely would not do for the savan to set all this evidence aside, and assert the independence of science. He would only render himself ridiculous were he to insist that the question was purely a scientific one, to be determined by the laws of currents and deposits. It is unreasonable, therefore, when men of science assume entire independence in the formation of their theories, of facts, which rest on the laws of language, on the facts of history, or on the authority of a well-authenticated revelation. That all truth is consistent, is an axiom which works both ways. If it proves that revelation cannot contradict science, it no less assuredly proves that science

cannot contradict revelation. God cannot say one thing in his word, and another in his works. Of this we may be sure, therefore, while the believer is willing to allow the savan to take his own course, and to pursue his own methods, he may have a rational and unassailable conviction that whatever contradicts Scripture is false. His true humility is not in putting Scripture at the feet of science, but in keeping his mind open for light as to the true meaning of the word of God.

In assigning the causes above mentioned to account for the scepticism of men of science, we are not to be understood as intimating that there is more scepticism among scientific men than among other cultivated classes of society. It is more openly avowed, perhaps, because occasions for the avowal in their case more frequently occur. Much less are we to be understood as apologizing for infidelity. Scepticism is always irreligious. "If our gospel be hid," says the Holy Spirit, "it is hid to them that are lost." This is a truth which is neither to be denied nor forgotten.

How then, turning to the other aspects of the subject, is this scepticism of science to be met and dealt with? We ask the ear of our brethren and the church whilst we carefully and solemnly weigh the questions of our own duty, and the duty of the church. It is evident that the duty is critical and solemn, and the issue momentous. We feel it to be of vast importance that the church should place herself right and bear herself right, in word and action, in this great matter; and that she should not be committed to any detrimental course by the overpowering influence of narrow-minded bigotry, or ignorant zeal, or antiquated learning. We would fain see the church, in this ever-moving age, erect, eager and watchful; ever with eye and ear awake to the full import of the signal cry echoing from the mountain tops, "Watchman, what of the night?" and prepared, as she has ever been, to lead the van in every forward movement of the human mind.

It appears to us, in the first place, necessary to the proper posture of the church, that the largest liberty should be accorded to scientific men, to carry on the pursuits and investigations of their respective sciences according to their legitimate mode. The inductive method has won for itself too clear a title to

legitimacy as one of the sources of human knowledge, of human power and progress, to be restrained or curbed by any mere conventional authority, or any manufactured public sentiment. The church has no alternative but to allow it to push its inquiries in the regions of fact, order, and law, to their farthest possible results. And the more readily and cheerfully this is done the better. The mind of the age will defend the freedom of science no less promptly than it will defend the freedom of conscience itself. The civilized world is too far advanced in the whole order of ideas pertaining to human freedom, and the personal, social, and religious rights of man, to tolerate any infringement of his rights in the domain of scientific inquiry. And any spirit or temper on the part of the church tending to the suppression, by the mere force of authority derived from the Scriptures, or elsewhere, of the full liberty of scientific investigation and discussion, must so far forth place the church in a false position, and be resented by the mind of the age. We all see the monstrous folly perpetrated by the ignorant monks, who compelled a venerable philosopher to abjure the doctrine of the earth's motion, and we see with equal readiness the false posture in which the church was placed; but perhaps we do not so readily realize that in their circumstances and with their information, they were quite as excusable as many modern divines, who not only reject evidence as clear as Galileo possessed for the Copernican system, and pledge the Scriptures to a science as false as that held by the fathers of the Inquisition, but who are fain to hold up to odium, and cover with denunciation and obloquy, those who presume, as men of science, to teach otherwise.

Besides, the freedom which we would accord to science is the surest way to secure the correction of its own errors, and the attainment of clear and satisfactory results on any subject which lies within its legitimate domain; and beyond that domain it is not science at all, but mere speculation and conjecture. If an immature science has put forth hasty judgments, and announced wrong conclusions, and broached untenable theories, we may be sure that scientific men themselves will find it out. It will be convicted at its own tribunal. The error will be exposed by the indisputable teaching of fact; and the clouds

which may have begun to lower upon the horizon of faith will be dispersed by the same power that raised them. Unless we suppose that scientific men are specially leagued in conspiracy against the Scriptures, we must bid them God-speed, knowing that they will ultimately give us truth, and enlarge vastly, as they have already done, our conceptions of the wisdom and glory of God in the works of his hands.

But it may be said that it is not against true science, but false science, our wrath is kindled—against ignorant pretenders, sciolists, and vain boasters. Very well; give a fair field, and they will be foiled at their own weapons. Real attainment will put to shame pretension, and genuine discovery will silence empty boasting. The church, as the custodian of the Scriptures, if she believes in their inspiration and consequent truthfulness, has nothing to fear, but everything to expect, from the most extended researches and the most complete generalization of science.

It has been well said by Hugh Miller, that questions in arithmetic must be settled arithmetically; questions in geography, geographically; questions in astronomy, astronomically; and questions in geology, geologically. None of them can be settled *biblically*, apart from an induction of facts. From this it follows, in the second place, not only that the church should concede to science the largest possible liberty in her own sphere, but that she should cultivate, through her ministry, a thorough knowledge of those branches of science which have a relation to Christian faith. She should thus master for herself a practical understanding of the elements of the problem with which she is called to deal, and a correct comprehension of the danger, if there be any, to which she is exposed. This would seem to be the obvious path of safety. An enemy who brings against us new and formidable weapons, must be met by weapons equal or superior. A contest against iron-clad ships can be sustained successfully only by iron-clad ships, or something better. If it be held important that the ministry possess a creditable acquaintance with human learning, and science generally, even if not connected directly with the matter of their work, much more ought it to be held important, now that they possess at least a good general acquaintance with those branches of science

which bear directly on their own teachings, and which may be permeating with painful doubts the minds of their hearers. This would at least shield them from exposing themselves, and damaging the cause they serve, by weak and rash arguments and ignorant declamation. There are few things more detrimental to even a good cause than to have it supported by weak arguments. The mind is only too prone to attribute that to the cause itself which belongs solely to the arguments. On the other hand, there is nothing more advantageous to an opponent than the exposure of gross ignorance, in his antagonist, of the true state of the question. We have heard from the pulpit, blunders as to the true posture and progress of science, for which there could be no apology in an educated man; and we could conceive with what infinite scorn a somewhat sceptical savan would have listened from his pew, and what damage his exposure of the ignorance would have done could it have been made to the congregation. Against this the ministry should guard themselves, by a careful acquaintance with the actual state of progress of those sciences which bear more or less directly on revelation.

But the church has a right to expect more than this of her commissioned teachers. There are among them many who have special adaptations of mind to scientific pursuits. These ought to be assiduously cultivated. They ought to be held to be special gifts of God in this age. The great scientifico-religious problem now pending between revelation and science, can never reach a clear and permanent solution until it comes to be fully comprehended and mastered, on its scientific side, by the religious mind of the age; and the religious mind of the age can only thus master it through the instrumentality of those who are the appointed teachers of religious and theological truth. Hence we conceive it to be the obvious duty of those who have special gifts and inclinations in this direction, to improve their gifts, and follow their inclinations as the leadings of Providence, in order that, standing above and comprehending the tendencies and requirements of both the theological and scientific interest, they may point out to the former the true path of safety and triumph. There is in the religious world a complete stairway of thought. No where else is the influence

of commanding minds more powerfully felt; and unless the commanding minds of it, now and henceforth, are able to seize and appropriate the scientific elements of the problem in question, and give to the world below them clear and sufficient utterances, the result must be an increasing and alarming scepticism.

To this end, may we not hope that the time is not far distant when theological education will be more carefully and systematically guarded on its scientific side? When it will be considered at least quite as important to furnish students with weapons to contend with living foes, as to arm them against antagonists who have been dead a thousand years? Surely it is quite as important to assist them to the comprehension of controversies which are shaking the living mind of the time, as to school them in the love of controversies of which only the dry bones are left to dangle in the wind. We are no advocates of hasty and sudden changes in the curriculum of theological culture, nor do we undervalue the learning and wisdom of the past, but we think the obvious phenomena and needs of the time ought not to be overlooked. It too often happens that a young man comes forth equipped for his work, richly furnished with the book-culture, the apologetics, and polemics of the past, but when called to deal with the living questions of the time, flounders sadly; when called to move in sympathy with the thinking, feeling mind of the time, finds himself in a strange and bewildering atmosphere; and when called to satisfy the wants, and relieve the difficulties of inquiring minds around him, is imbecile or indifferent. We have ourselves seen painful instances of this, and could not but mournfully wonder to what this thing would grow.

The church should learn her duty from her history. In every attack which has been made upon Christianity by hostile human learning, from the days of the apostles to the days of Dr. Strauss, the assailing party have been thwarted and vanquished by the church seizing and mastering the weapons of attack. The sons of the church have become learned in the learning of their adversaries, and have not only sustained the attack, but have succeeded in bringing from every newly opened field of inquiry something to strengthen the citadel of their

faith. The church has never gained anything by despising her foes, or ignoring the issues they have started; and that branch of the church, once the spiritual mistress of the world, whose policy has been of this type—who, pluming herself upon her infallibility, turned upon her heel when any presumed to question her teachings—stands this day a petrifaction and a warning to all who would attempt to fetter human thought, or despise the outgoings of human inquiry. The church cannot afford to despise or ignore science. She cannot cast from her contemptuously the issues which science presents at the bar of the world's judgment. She must take up these issues, she must aim to mould and direct them in her own interests, she must learn all that science has to teach, she must become a student herself in the great school of fact, phenomena, and law: she must listen to all the various cadences of the voices of creation, in order to know whether any of them are out of harmony with what she believes to be the voice of Deity in his word, and in order to assure and show to the world that the harmony is perfect. Let her sons be equal to their calling and she will not belie her history. However firm and eternal the foundation on which she rests, God has ordained that the price of her safety is eternal vigilance.

A third obvious duty of the educated mind of the church is to avoid ill-natured and unbecoming abuse of science and scientific men. It would seem at first sight as if such a caveat as this were scarcely necessary, but facts too plainly show its necessity. We do not propose to illustrate by personal instances; but we are safe in saying that a careful analysis of the controversial literature called forth in the theological world, by the revelations and impugnings of science, will reveal no little acrimony and ill-nature—not a little narrow bigotry, small jealousy, coarse and even scurrilous abuse, and altogether unbecoming behaviour in general. To call a man an ass or an ignoramus, is not the best way to answer his arguments. Especially when facts and the interpretation of facts are in the debate, is such controversial heat unbecoming. Facts are cold things and stubborn things, and cannot be set aside by high words or haughty sneers. We may be sure that science cannot be turned aside from her steady and onward course by any such

bravado, and while nothing can be more distasteful to scientific men, or more foreign to their habits of mind, it will not in the least move them. Let Christian men, by all means, take up and discuss the issues which science makes, in the same calm, dignified, and self-composed spirit in which they are offered. Let them indeed contend earnestly for the faith, let them bring the heaviest batteries of argument to bear against the hostile attacks of science, let them expose unsparingly all possible errors, crudities, rash statements, and hasty generalizations of scientific men; but let them do it with the amiable calmness of men conscious of the final strength of the cause they are defending, and not with the unseemly heat which usually betrays an uneasy misgiving of ultimate consequences. Let them avoid bandying epithets, or indulging in personal asperities, or pretending to depreciate the attainments of men who by long and patient labour have gained a name of honour among their peers. Even Hugh Miller, with all his wonderful powers, has not wholly escaped such treatment at the hands of certain journalists and others in this country. No other result can follow such a course but damage to the cause pursuing it. Let the church remember that the scepticism with which she has to contend is not a frivolous, shallow, or flippant affair—it is not the holiday tilting of novices and sciolists—it is not the prepense outbreaking depravity of base and wicked men—it is a grave and serious matter-of-fact affair; it has often the spirit of an anxious inquirer; and in all circumstances has a right to claim the amenities due to an honourable foe.

A fourth hint we would suggest to our brethren who are in the habit of defending the Scriptures, by tongue or pen, against the scepticism of science, is to avoid hazarding the whole doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, and consequently the whole Christian religion, upon any given *interpretation* of a particular passage, or passages. We have in our mind's eye some notable examples of this, which we might adduce, did we not desire to avoid personal allusions in this article. We might cite instances of men of position and character in the church, boldly suspending (or attempting to do it) the veracity of the entire Scriptures, and the whole Christian system, upon their understanding or interpretation of a given text,—perhaps the

apparent and commonly received interpretation. The process is very summary; the argument, if argument it may be called, is briefly this. "If this be not true, then the Scriptures are convicted of falsehood, the doctrine of their inspiration falls to the ground, for God cannot lie; if the Scriptures are not inspired, Jesus Christ was an impostor, his redemption is a myth, salvation a delusion, immortality a dream, and the whole system of Christian faith a mockery and sham." Now it strikes us that this is hanging too great a weight of precious things upon one hook. It is risking all the treasure in one ship. It was surely not the intention of the Author of the Scriptures thus to hang their whole authority on the apparent meaning of any one passage, or he would not have embodied in them many things dark, mysterious, emblematical and "hard to be understood," to the gradual comprehension of which the mind of the church slowly comes in the course of ages. It is no disparagement of Scripture, and breeds no conflict with the doctrine of its inspiration and infallibility, to say, that it contains many things of which the deepest and truest meaning is not the obvious meaning; that their final meaning is difficult of attainment, and needs the aid not only of history, but also of the development of thought and the labours of the mind in other spheres, to its full elucidation. Thus, we think it may be said with propriety, that the developments and discoveries of science are as necessary to the ultimate interpretation of certain portions of the Scriptures, as the events of history are necessary to the full understanding of prophecy.

The history of exegesis exhibits many tortuous windings in the course of ages; the path of particular passages resembles the course of certain rivers on the map, flowing now east, now west, and then apparently returning to the point of starting. But withal the river reaches its destination; and so do the Scriptures still stand, unbroken in their symmetry, unimpaired in their integrity, fresh as ever in their life and power. Infallibility of the Scriptures is one thing, interpretation is another. Let our brethren fully understand this.

In the fifth place, let the apologists of the Scriptures and of the Christian system carefully avoid forcing them to do violence to the laws of the human reason, or to the inevitable

sequences of evidence, or to the instinct of the human mind. No more disastrous service could be rendered to Christianity by its professed friends than to attempt to array it against the human mind itself, in the legitimate exercise of its powers,—those very powers by which the evidences of the Christian system can possibly be apprehended. It is most clearly and flagrantly suicidal. Two considerable classes of men, within the last two hundred years, have been labouring, though with opposite intentions, to the same result. The one class consists of the Humes, the Voltaires, the Bayles, the Bolingbrokes of a former age, and the Holyoakes, the Martineaus, the Secularists and Westminster Reviews of later times, who have wrought with all the fire of genius and the force of the most trained and skilful logic, to show that the facts and doctrines of the Bible traverse those great fixed laws which regulate human belief, and that Christianity is an abnormal and transient excrescence upon the life of the world. The other class consists of those ill-starred defenders of the faith, who with perhaps the best intentions, but with a zeal that far outruns their knowledge, would set the teachings of revelation against the legitimate deductions of science, and insist that the latter shall succumb to the former; would compel a faith which tramples upon and crushes the exercise of the reason in profane matters, and violates both the instincts of our natures and the order of our general belief. It is to be hoped this latter class is fast passing away, though some noted specimens of it still remain. A hundred years hence they will be regarded with as much wonder as the novice in geology regards the fossil saurians and cetacea of the ancient world. Let us take an instance. As an escape from the difficulties which science has forced upon the traditional faith of the church, it has been gravely asserted that the fossil appearances in the rocks of the earth were not the remains of living creatures at all, but only *appearances*, freaks of nature, or rather the direct works of the Almighty. "For aught that appears in the bowels of the earth," said the London Record, some years ago, "the world might have been called into existence yesterday." "The very day when the ocean dashed its first waves on the shore," says Chateaubriand, "it bathed, let us not doubt, rocks already worn by the break-

ers, and beaches strewn with the wrecks of shells." We have ourselves, within the last ten years, heard a respectable minister avow his belief that the organic remains of the earth were created as we find them. We have not space nor patience to argue this point. We would simply ask—If a man does not believe that a fossil fish was once a living fish, and is logically consistent, what else can he believe? And if he does believe any thing else, *how* does he believe it? Does he believe that the mounds and buried cities of the West are the remains of an ancient race which once dwelt on this continent, or the remains of any race at all, and if so, *how* does he believe it? Does he believe that the skeletons occasionally exhumed in the neighbourhood of ancient burying grounds were once living men, and if so, *how* does he believe it? We opine such a man can only avoid being a universal sceptic by an inconsistency as glaring as his scepticism is absurd. Any such attempts to force the Scriptures to traverse the fixed laws of human belief, can only result, if successful, in unmitigated disaster. And the same order of thought, if carried into any other department of religious truth, must be equally deleterious. Christianity is indeed in a large and important sense a specialty, but it is not a specialty in such a sense as to stand in violent antagonism to the whole normal order of the moral and intellectual worlds. It has its mysteries and doctrines for faith, which transcend reason, but it does no violence to reason in its own sphere. Says the acute Bishop Berkeley, "Nothing dark, incomprehensible, mysterious, or unaccountable is the *ground* or *motive*, *principle* or *foundation*, *proof* or *reason* of our faith, though it may be the *object* of it."

The liability is great in some minds thus to set the Bible and Christianity against the laws of evidence and belief in other spheres. It is one of the misfortunes of the church, and one of the vantage-grounds of infidelity. In the practical contest at the bar of public sentiment, the advantage is immensely on the side of those who plead for the inviolability of the laws and instincts of the human mind, and the supremacy of facts. Furthermore, facts and evidence are sure to assert themselves triumphantly in the lapse of time, and to control finally the course of public opinion. This they do by their own native force,

as irresistibly as the channel controls the course of the stream. Take again, as an instance, the doctrine of the globular form of the earth. It is not only important as one of the first steps in astronomy, but is one of the finest examples of the triumph of evidence, being among the first of those convictions, directly opposed to the first conclusions and apparent evidence of the senses, which astronomy irresistibly proves. To make men believe that up and down are different directions in different places; that the sea, which seems so level, is, in fact, convex; that the earth, which seems to rest on a solid foundation, is, in fact, not supported at all;—are great triumphs, both of the power of discovering and the power of convincing. And had this conviction failed to force itself, on the evidence, into general acceptance and recognition, it could only have so occurred through the utter and hopeless imbecility of the general mind of the race. And yet, as bearing on the present progress and claims of science, we must not forget that at a date comparatively modern, the doctrine of the antipodes, or the existence of inhabitants of the earth who stand on the opposite side of it, with their feet turned towards ours, was considered both monstrous and heretical. Let us believe that the Bible and the religion thereof, are bound to the life of the world as the bark is to the tree, which does not crack and burst with the inward expansion, but expands and spreads, and covers and protects it at every point. If this be so, no labours of science can do aught to harm them.

In the sixth and last place, let the Christian world and the Christian ministry stand firm and steady, holding by the old paths and the traditionary faiths until the irresistible force of proof demands a modification. We are no advocates for rash and hasty changes of opinion. The genius of science herself deprecates them. All changes of public sentiment, to be healthful, ought to be slow. An established belief has a claim to acceptance until the contrary is proved. The *onus probandi* now in all cases lies with science. Never before was the motto of more importance than it is now in the Christian world—"*festina lente!*" A disposition on the part of the ministry to snatch up every novelty of science, and hasten to adjust their biblical faith to its apparent demands, thus holding their faith

as a mere weathercock, to be turned about by every wind of doctrine, would not only be disastrous in the extreme, but imbecile and foolish to the last degree. No matter how specious the recently announced conclusions of science may be —nay, we go farther, and say, no matter how true they may be, still, an indecent haste to adopt them, and modify interpretation to suit them, is to be deprecated. All new truth must bide its time. And besides, time is the great test of the true and the false. Science, when she comes as a revolutionizer of old opinions, must submit to the same severity of ordeal, and the same patient trial, which prevail in her own methods. If she is to beget changes in religious opinion, they ought to proceed slowly, silently, almost imperceptibly, like the formative processes of nature, which add new shape, beauty, and completeness to the old without destroying it, not like the rush of the hurricane, which spreads ruin and desolation in its path—which casts down but builds nothing up. In this view we value highly the strong conservative elements of the Anglo-Saxon mind—the vast power of resistance which it presents to novelties in doctrine. It is the sheet-anchor of its safety, in a restless, energizing, progressive age. Especially in our own Presbyterian body do we value these conservative elements, properly modified, as we believe they are, by the propulsive forces of the age. It is a sign that the forces which direct her progress are in healthful play. The increased activity of the vital forces under excitement is pleasant for a time, but as a continuous state would be ruinous. It is true that individual cases of dogged and senseless resistance to the clearly established claims of scientific truth may be numerous, and painful to consider, and if these should preponderate too greatly, their influence would be disastrous in placing the church in that false posture which we have deprecated in a former part of this article. They would then indicate the opposite extreme of atrophy and stagnation. But we regard them rather as the necessary drag-weights in an age of progress. The chief remedy for too rapid motion is friction, and this use they serve. Thus, though it has its minor disadvantages, and occasionally presents phenomena which are not a little annoying, we ought to rejoice that, in our own communion, there is

at least a sufficiently ponderous make-weight embedded in the masses of the uneducated mind of the church, and that even the educated classes are not wholly free from it. Let us hope that our church will thereby come gradually but surely to the perception of the true harmony of science and revelation, and not sink into the listlessness of dead orthodoxy, on the one hand, or rush into the excesses of rationalism on the other. Better that the perfect harmony of the two should be deferred a hundred years, than that it should be forced upon the religious mind of the world before it had grown to the apprehension of it. Thus, while we insist upon the largest liberty being conceded to science, and would urge upon the church the pursuit of scientific studies, and would deprecate the controlling preponderance of an order of thought which would benumb the vigorous intellectual life of the church, and pledge her to a false science, we would heartily disavow the desire to see the *vis inertia* of the church suddenly removed, and see her run with itching ears after every new teacher. Let her "*prove all things*," and "*hold fast that which is good.*"

Finally, we avow our unhesitating conviction that the apprehended danger to the religious interests of mankind from the discoveries of science, is *not real.* We cannot understand how any one who holds the essential doctrines of Christianity as realities, can apprehend any such danger. To say that no permanent damage can accrue to *truth*, seems to us almost to partake of the nature of an axiom. Science and religion may each one shine with a new and peculiar beauty in each other's light; they cannot obscure or destroy one another. And whilst jarring and discord may reign for a time among those who are struggling through the twilight of that intermediate state between ignorance and perfect knowledge, they will come, in the end, to see eye to eye; and meantime the divine faith of the world will move steadily and surely on, unharmed by the feverish strife—"*saevis tranquillus in undis.*"

ART. IV.—*Training of the Children.*

FROM the date of the Abrahamic covenant—the first separate constitution of the church—the children of God's people have held a conspicuous place in the provisions of the plan of grace. "I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." Gen. xvii. 7. Such were the terms of the covenant in its original form; and in no subsequent development or rehearsal of it are the children overlooked. On Sinai its provisions were detailed in the ten commandments. "The Lord our God," says Moses, "made a covenant with us in Horeb, . . . saying, I am the Lord thy God, ... thou shalt have none other gods before me. . . . Six days thou shalt labour and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God, in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter. . . Honour thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee, that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." Deut. v. 2—16. Again, in the land of Moab, the covenant was renewed. "Ye stand this day, all of you, before the Lord your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water, that thou shouldest enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day." Deut. xxix. 10—12.

So, when the Son of God appeared, he left no equivocal testimony as to the rights of the children to recognition and place in the gospel church. "Suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Matt. xix. 14; Mark x. 13; Luke xviii. 15. The significance of this saying, and its importance in the gospel constitution, is marked by its record by three of the evangelists. So, too,

when the commission was renewed to Peter by the risen Saviour, and his apostasy forgiven, his profession of love is answered first by the injunction to care for the children of the church, as being the lambs of Christ. "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me more than these? He saith unto him, Yea, Lord, thou knowest that I love thee. He saith unto him, Feed my lambs." John xxi. 15.

Nor was Peter unmindful of the charge thus given him. On the day of Pentecost, he to whom were given the keys to open the door of the gospel church, to the house of Israel first, and then to the gentile world, testifies to his hearers that the blessings of the old covenant, in all their fulness, both to parents and children, were transferred to the New Testament church. "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Acts ii. 38, 39. "Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed." Acts iii. 25.

So Paul, the great apostle of the gentiles, assures them that even where one parent is unbelieving, this grace of the covenant is sealed to the child by virtue of the faith of the believing parent. "The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband; else were your children unclean; but now are they holy." 1 Cor. vii. 14. And, as has been well remarked,* Paul, in writing to the churches, and addressing special instructions to each class of members, designates the children as included among them, and entitled, as Christians, to distinct recognition and peculiar privileges, and subject to corresponding responsibilities.

Proportionate to the position thus assigned to the children of God's people, is the emphasis attached to their nurture and training in the school of Christ. The divine recognition and assurance that Abraham would be faithful in this respect was fundamental to the covenant with him. "I know him," says

* *Home and Foreign Record*, December, 1862.

God, "that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him." Gen. xviii. 19. With this view it is, that the passover, the principal sacrament of the church of Israel, which is perpetuated in the Lord's supper, is expressly stated to have been instituted, among other purposes, with distinct reference to the instruction of the little ones. "And it shall come to pass, when your children shall say unto you, What mean ye by this service? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians and delivered our houses." Exod. xii. 26, 27.

Israel was very earnestly urged to fidelity in the instruction of the children in the knowledge of God. "These words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand, and they shall be as frontlets between thine eyes. And thou shalt write them upon the posts of thy house, and on thy gates. . . . And when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, What mean the testimonies, and the statutes, and the judgments, which the Lord our God hath commanded you? Then thou shalt say unto thy son, We were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt; and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand: and the Lord showed signs and wonders, great and sore, upon Egypt, upon Pharaoh, and upon all his household, before our eyes; and he brought us out from thence, that he might bring us in, to give us the land which he sware unto our fathers. And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, as it is at this day. And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do all these commandments before the Lord our God, as he hath commanded us." Deut. vi. 6—25. "Take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes have seen, and lest they depart from thy heart all the days of thy

life; but teach them thy sons, and thy sons' sons, specially the day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb, when the Lord said unto me, Gather me the people together, and I will make them hear my words, that they may learn to fear me all the days that they shall live upon the earth, and that they may teach their children." Deut. iv. 9, 10. The fidelity of a Lois and Eunice, and the instructed piety of a Timothy, are illustrations of the method and results of this family culture in divine things. "From a child, thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus." 2 Tim. iii. 15. "The unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice; and I am persuaded that in thee also." 2 Tim. i. 5.

The duty of the Christian parent is stated in a word by Paul. "Ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath; but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." Eph. vi. 4. And the Christian pastor's function in the same relation is proclaimed by the Son of God, when, having triumphed over death and the curse, and awaiting his ascension and enthronement in glory, he laid upon Peter, as pledges of the love he professed, the two commandments—"Feed my lambs. Feed my sheep."

From all this, it is evident that no parent can stand approved before God, who fails to labour with untiring industry to fill the young minds which are committed to his charge with the truths of the word of God, and imbue them with the controlling energy of the doctrines and principles therein contained, and that no pastor can be accounted faithful who is negligent of the nurture of the lambs of his flock in heavenly knowledge.

It does not enter into our present purpose to trace the influence of these facts and principles upon the organization and policy of the primitive church, and the various branches of the church of the Reformation. That it was profound and all-pervading is too well known to require demonstration. The signal importance which our own church has ever attached to the training of her children is evinced by the great emphasis with which she has spoken of it in her constitutional standards and other public testimonies. The Westminster Assembly not only provided

with great labour and care the Larger and Shorter Catechisms for the assistance of parents and pastors in this duty, but in other ways expressed their sense of its importance and anxiety for its faithful performance. In the Directory for Baptism, provision is made for the solemn and public admonition and instruction of parents on the subject. Under the head of "The Sanctification of the Lord's Day," it is urged, "That what time is vacant, between or after the solemn meeting of the congregation in public, be spent in reading; meditation; repetition of sermons, especially by calling their families to an account of what they have heard; and catechising of them; holy conferences; prayers for a blessing upon the public ordinances; singing of psalms; visiting the sick; relieving the poor, and such like duties of piety, charity, and mercy; accounting the Sabbath a delight."

It is well known to all who are familiar with the history of the Westminster Assembly, that its deliberations were embarrassed, and the work which it performed restricted by the interpositions and instructions of parliament. In consequence it did not frame a directory for secret and family religion. The deficiency was supplied by the Scotch General Assembly, in 1647, whilst the Westminster divines were still in nominal session. The Assembly, at that time, in adopting the Westminster formularies, added a chapter, which was immediately adopted by the Presbyterians of England, and incorporated in all the editions of the Westminster standards, under the title of "Directions of the General Assembly, concerning secret and private worship, and mutual edification; for cherishing piety, for maintaining unity, and avoiding schism and division."

In this chapter, it is stated, that "The ordinary duties comprehended under the exercise of piety, which should be in families, when they are convened to that effect, are these: First, Prayer and Praises, performed with a special reference, as well to the public condition of the kirk of God in this kingdom, as to the present case of the family, and every member thereof. Next, Reading of the Scriptures, with Catechising in a plain way, that the understandings of the simpler may be the better enabled to profit under the public ordinances, and they made more capable to understand the Scriptures when they

are read; together with godly Conferences tending to the edification of all the members in the most holy faith; as also, Admonition and Rebuke, upon just reasons, from those who have authority in the family."

It is also urged that "on the Lord's-day, after every one of the family apart, and the whole family together, have sought the Lord, in whose hands the preparation of men's hearts is, to fit them for the public worship, and to bless to them the public ordinances, the master of the family ought to take care that all within his charge repair to the public worship, that he and they may join with the rest of the congregation; and the public worship being finished, after prayer, he should take an account of what they have heard; and thereafter, to spend the rest of the time which they may spare, in catechising, and in spiritual conferences upon the word of God. Or else, going apart, they ought to apply themselves to reading, meditation, and secret prayer, that they may confirm and increase their communion with God; that so the profit which they found in the public ordinances may be cherished and promoved, and they more edified unto eternal life."*

In fact, the entire formularies of the Westminster Assembly were designed and employed by the Presbyterians of England and Scotland as a manual of family instruction, and the earlier editions, from that of 1657 down, contain by way of preface, not only the "Directions" above cited, which were also inserted in the body of the work, with the Directory, but also two distinct treatises on family religion and catechising, addressed "To the Christian Reader, especially Heads of Families." The first of these is signed by forty-four such names as Henry Wilkinson, D. D., Thomas Goodwin, Matthew Pool, William Bates, and Ralph Venning. The other is from the pen of Thomas Manton. The former of these is so precisely to the present purpose that we cannot forbear the employment of its eminent authority. After an urgent appeal to heads of families, as to the duty which they owe to themselves, with respect to divine knowledge, the writers proceed:

"Our second advice concerns the heads of families, in respect

* "Directions," &c., appended to the Westminster Directory.

of their families; whatever hath been said already, though it concerns every private Christian that hath a soul to look after, yet upon a double account it concerns parents and masters, as having themselves and others to look after. Some there are, who, because of their ignorance, cannot, others, because of their sluggishness, will not mind this duty. To the former we propound the method of Joshua, who first began with himself, and then is careful of his family. To the latter we shall only hint, what a dreadful meeting those parents and masters must have at that great day, with their children and servants, when all that were under their inspection, shall not only accuse them, but charge their eternal miscarrying upon their score.

"Never did any age of the church enjoy such choice helps as this of ours. Every age of the gospel hath had its Creeds, Confessions, Catechisms, and such breviaries and models of divinity as have been singularly useful. . . . Concerning the particular excellency of these ensuing treatises, we judge it unneedful to mention those eminent testimonies which have been given them from persons of known worth in respect to their judgments, learning, and integrity, both at home and abroad; because themselves speak so much their own praise. Gold stands not in need of varnish, nor diamonds of painting. Give us leave only to tell you that we cannot but account it an eminent mercy to enjoy such helps as these are. It is ordinary in these days for men to speak evil of things they know not; but if any are possessed with mean thoughts of these treatises, we shall only give the same counsel to them that Philip gives Nathaniel, 'Come and see.' It is no small advantage the reader now hath, by the addition of Scriptures at large, whereby with little pains he may more profit, because with every truth he may behold its scripture foundation. And, indeed, considering what a Babel of opinions, what a strange confusion of tongues there is this day, among them who profess they speak the language of Canaan, there is no intelligent person but will conclude that advice of the prophet especially suited to such an age as this—Isa. viii. 20, 'To the law, and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.'

"If the reverend and learned composers of these ensuing

treatises were willing to take the pains of annexing Scripture proofs to every truth, that the faith of people might not be built upon the dictates of men, but the authority of God, so some considerable pains hath now been further taken in transcribing those Scriptures, partly to prevent that grand inconvenience which all former impressions, except the Latin, have abounded with, to the great perplexing and disheartening of the reader—the misquotation of Scripture; the meanest reader being able, by having the words at large, to rectify whatever mistake may be in the printer in citing the particular place—partly to prevent the trouble of turning to every proof, (which could not but be very great,) partly to help the memories of such who are willing to take the pains of turning to every proof, but are unable to retain what they read; and partly that this may serve as a Bible common place; the several passages of Scripture which are scattered up and down in the word, being, in this book, reduced to their proper head, and thereby giving light each to other. The advantages, you see, in this design, are many and great. The way to spiritual knowledge is hereby made more easy, and the ignorance of this age more inexcusable.

"If, therefore, there be any spark in you of love to God, be not content that any of yours should be ignorant of him whom you so much admire, or any haters of him whom you so much love. If there be any compassion to the souls of them who are under your care—if any regard of your being found faithful in the day of Christ—if any respect to future generations—labour to sow these seeds of knowledge which may grow up in after times. That you may be faithful herein, is the earnest prayer of Henry Wilkinson, D. D.," &c.

With eminent adaptation to the present times, Manton, in his prefatory address, urges that "parents have so used their children to be unruly, that ministers have to deal but with too few but the unruly. And it is for want of this laying the foundation well at first, that professors themselves are so ignorant as most are, and that so many, especially of the younger sort, do swallow down almost any error that is offered them, and follow any sect of dividers that will entice them, so it be but done with earnestness and plausibility. For alas! though by the grace

of God their hearts may be changed in an hour, whenever they understand but the essentials of the faith, yet their understandings must have time and diligence to furnish them with such knowledge as must establish them, and fortify them against deceits. Upon these, and many the like considerations, we should entreat all Christian families to take more pains in this necessary work, and to get better acquainted with the substance of Christianity. And to that end—taking along some moving treatises to awake the heart—I know not what work should be fitter for their use, than that compiled by the Assembly at Westminster—a synod of as godly, judicious divines—notwithstanding all the bitter words which they have received from discontented and self-conceited men—I verily think, as ever England saw. Though they had the unhappiness to be employed in calamitous times, when the *noise* of wars did stop men's ears, and the *licentiousness* of wars did set every wanton tongue and pen at liberty to reproach them, and the *prosecution* and *event* of those wars did exasperate partial, discontented men, to dishonour themselves by seeking to dishonour them. I dare say, if in the days of old, when councils were in power and account, they had had but such a council of *bishops* as this of *presbyters* was, the fame of it for learning and holiness, and all ministerial abilities, would, with very great honour, have been transmitted to posterity.

"I do therefore desire that all masters of families would first study well this work themselves, and then teach it their children and servants, according to their several capacities. And, if they once understand these grounds of religion, they will be able to read other books more understandingly, and hear sermons more profitably, and confer more judiciously, and hold fast the doctrine of Christ more firmly than ever you are like to do by any other course. First, let them read and learn the Shorter Catechism, and next the Larger, and lastly read the Confession of Faith."

In the revision of the formularies of Westminster by the fathers of our church in this country, provision was expressly made for securing due attention to the proper training and instruction of the lambs of the flock. In the Directory for Baptism, the minister is instructed "to exhort the parents to

the careful performance of their duty, requiring that they teach the child to read the word of God, that they instruct it in the principles of our holy religion, as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, an excellent summary of which we have in the Confession of Faith of this church, and in the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly, which are to be recommended to them, *as adopted by this church, for their direction and assistance in the discharge of this important duty;* that they pray with and for it; that they set an example of piety and godliness before it, and endeavour, by all the means of God's appointment, to bring up their child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."*

So, in the "Directory for Secret and Family Worship," it is stated that "family worship, which ought to be performed in every family, ordinarily, morning and evening, consists in prayer, reading the Scriptures, and singing praises.

"The head of the family, who is to lead in this service, ought to be careful that all the members of his household duly attend, and that none withdraw themselves unnecessarily from any part of family worship, and that all refrain from their common business while the Scriptures are read, and gravely attend to the same, no less than when prayer or praise is offered up.

"Let the heads of families be careful to instruct their children and servants in the principles of religion. Every proper opportunity ought to be embraced for such instruction. But we are of opinion that the Sabbath evenings, after public worship, should be sacredly preserved for this purpose. Therefore we highly disapprove of paying unnecessary private visits on the Lord's day, admitting strangers into the families, except when necessity or charity requires it; or any other practices, whatever plausible pretences may be offered in their favour, if they interfere with the above important and necessary duty."†

Further, it is declared that "children, born within the pale of the visible church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the church, and are to be taught to read, and repeat the Catechism, the Apostles'

* Directory for Worship, ch. vii. § 4. † Directory, ch. xv. §§ 3—5.

Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And, when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's supper."*

Thus it appears that the system of order of our church contemplates the dedication of its children to God in baptism, and their nurture—as expectants of the higher privileges of the church—in the knowledge and love of God, in the family and the church, by instructing them to read the word of God, and pray daily in secret, and by the constant observance of family worship, morning and evening, including prayer, singing praise, reading of the Scriptures, and catechetical exposition of the portions read; and on the Sabbath,—after attendance on public worship,—by a stated examination of the children upon the sermon of the day, and upon the Catechisms of our church, with reading of the Scriptures, and instruction and exhortation thereon. With these hallowed exercises, they aim to associate the necessary discipline of the family, which would thus be sanctified and commended to God's blessing. They further contemplate, and in the baptismal covenant provide for the distinctive training of the children of the covenant as a peculiar people, holy to God, and not common with the children of the ungodly, but enjoying relations with God of peculiar intimacy, invested with most precious privileges, and bound under peculiar and proportionate responsibilities.

This system, if faithfully executed in its details in the family and the public congregation, is certainly adapted to produce the most happy results in the intelligence and early piety of the children of God's people. In one respect, however, the Westminster plan, especially in its application to this country, is fundamentally defective. Originally framed with reference to the parochial system of England and Scotland, and having in view exclusively the condition and wants of a population all of which maintained a nominal connection with the church, it

* Directory, ch. ix. § 1.

failed entirely to provide in any adequate manner for the evangelization of the children of the openly ungodly, and the gathering and training in the knowledge and fear of God of the multitude of youth in this land whose parents have no connection with the church of God, and use no means for the spiritual welfare of their little ones. Nor in the revision and adaptation of the Westminster standards to our church in this country, was any attempt even made to remedy the defect. It is, in fact, a curious illustration of the controlling influence of traditional theories and systems, that the fathers of our church, in revising the formularies of Westminster, ventured so little to deviate from the provisions of a plan originally designed and adapted to a state of things so different from that existing here. After having planted the foundations of Presbyterianism in America upon the doctrine that the church is a missionary society, whose office it is to carry the gospel to those who have it not—after having organized the first Presbytery avowedly for this purpose, and upon this conception,* and pursued the work of missions laboriously and successfully for more than eighty years—the fathers, in their revision of the standards, only so far recognised their own practical position and the true theory of the church, in this respect, as to provide for the ordination of evangelists for the missionary field. Otherwise, the provisions of our constitution pre-suppose settled churches, a thoroughly evangelized community, and organizations in all respects normal and complete. And whilst the condition and wants of the baptized children in the bosom of the church are fully recognised and provided for in the complete and adequate arrangements already noticed, no provision whatever is made for the pressing claims of that large class of the youth of our country who are born out of the pale of the church, and alien to the privileges of the covenant.

Here it is, that the Sabbath-school, originating in a casual providence, furnishes the instrumentality essential to the completeness of the whole system, and provides the desideratum for the gathering and training of those youth who otherwise must perish for lack of knowledge. But whilst this institution has

* Assembly's Digest, revised edition, p. 321.

vindicated for itself a place among the indispensable means of grace, and, as such, has been adopted by our own church in common with all others, and cherished among her most valued instrumentalities—the mode of its origination and introduction has been the unnecessary occasion of serious inconveniences and embarrassments, which demand earnest attention, and for which the remedy would seem to be obvious.

When modifications in the means of grace, so important and far-reaching as those incident to the introduction of the Sabbath-school, were proposed and adopted, it would seem evident that the highest learning, wisdom, and prudence of the church should have been called into official requisition, in a careful revision of the constitution, for the purpose of ascertaining to what extent changes were requisite, and how they could be so effected as best to preserve all the advantages of the old system, and to incorporate with them the improvements of the new. In such a revision, means could have been taken to preserve that portion of the Sabbath which had been already consecrated to household instruction by the parent, for that fundamental service; provision made for employing the talents of the laity in the evangelical labours of the Sabbath-school; such a course of instruction provided as should have sustained the proper discrimination between the children of the covenant and others; the respective relations of pastors and parents, sessions and congregations, to the new institution, and the duties and responsibilities of its officers and teachers to them severally, ascertained and defined; and all the instrumentalities of the church, and parts of the system, new and old, adjusted to a mutual adaptation and harmony.

Such, however, was not the course adopted. The Sabbath-school originated outside the church, in the Christian zeal and benevolence of Robert Raikes. Walking in the suburbs of Gloucester, he was struck with concern at the wretched appearance of a group of children in the street. "Alas, sir," said a woman of the neighbourhood, to whom he spoke, "could you take a view of this part of the town on a Sunday, you would be shocked indeed, for then the street is filled with multitudes of these wretches, who, released on that day from employment, spend their time in noise and riot, playing at chuck, and

cursing and swearing in a manner so horrid as to convey to any serious mind an idea of hell rather than any other place." This conversation suggested to Raikes the idea that "it would at least be a harmless attempt, if it would be productive of no good, should some little plan be formed to check this deplorable profanation of the Sabbath.

"Having found four persons who had been accustomed to instruct children in reading, I engaged to pay the sum they required for receiving and instructing such children as I should send to them every Sunday. The children were to come soon after ten in the morning, and stay till twelve. They were then to go home and return at one; and, after reading a lesson, they were to be conducted to church. After church, they were to be employed in repeating the catechism, till half-past five, and then to be dismissed, with an injunction to go home without making a noise; and by no means to play in the street. This was the general outline of the regulation."

Such was the original constitution of the Sabbath-school, consisting of classes which assembled, each at the room of their teacher, and spent the most of the day in receiving instruction, for which pecuniary compensation was paid by the author of the plan. Early modified to its present form, it was introduced into our church under the impulses of private benevolence and zeal, at a time when the prevalent influence of the voluntary system tended to disparage the importance of ecclesiastical constitutions and their dependent arrangements. And it was not given to our fathers to appreciate, by anticipation, the importance of the revolution involved, and the greatness of the results to follow, from the first effort to gather a few outcast children from the streets, and teach them to read and understand the word of God. So far, therefore, as the highest authorities and constitutional arrangements of our church are concerned, the Sabbath-school was left originally, and still continues, dependent mainly upon its own spontaneous growth and development, and the more or less powerful influences of surrounding circumstances and instrumentalities, for the form of its constitution and the sphere and mode of its operations. No adequate or effectual measures have been used by the church, as a body, to secure a symmetrical development of the institution,

or to guard against the maladjustments between it and the other means of grace. Such inadvertence and neglect could not but result in evils of greater or less magnitude. Whilst the church cherished this institution, and cheered on its labourers, and, forgetful that the arrangements of her system already provided for the entire occupancy of the sacred time, made no adjustment in that respect—the consequences were inevitable detriment to other interests, and neglect of duties attaching to them, which were superseded to make room for this.

Originating in a noble zeal for the spiritual welfare of the children of unbelievers, for whom no previous provision had been made, and not at first intended to embrace the children of the covenant—for whom abundant means were already furnished—it is no wonder that the Sabbath-school should have failed, in its arrangements, to recognise the line of discrimination between them, and to adjust its system to the conditions of that discrimination. Finding no other time so convenient for its purposes as that which had already been appropriated to family instruction, it has generally occupied that time; and being too commonly left by the officers of the church to its own control, it has been a natural result, that, in some cases, the institution thus neglected has been disposed to deny the rightful authority of the pastors and elders over its constitution and management.

The excellencies of the system are its own, and they are priceless. Its evils are, almost without exception, traceable to the neglect herein indicated—the failure of the church to enter into a deliberate re-adjustment of her system to the exigencies here involved. Some of the unhappy consequences are patent to the most casual observation. Such family instruction as our standards contemplate—especially the Sabbath afternoon exercise of examination on the morning sermon, and catechising—is scarcely known, if it at all survives, in our church. Our youth are too generally remitted even by pious parents to the Sabbath-school for the greater part of the systematic Sabbath instruction. In it the Scriptures are, in many instances, studied by means of question books, constructed upon the principle of inculcating nothing but what is called "common" Christianity. The distinction between the baptized and the unbaptized is sel-

dom recognised, and the distinctive necessities of each are therefore overlooked. The books of the library not unfrequently convey little or no religious instruction; yet serve, at home, to fill up the hours of the day which are not already occupied in church or school, and thus help to relieve parents of the sense of responsibility and duty. The parent, bishop of the house, by these concurrent causes induced to surrender those most eminent and responsible duties of his office, which are peculiar to the Sabbath, is the more ready to esteem lightly and omit the daily duties of family religion. Baptismal vows are forgotten. Baptismal privilege is disesteemed; and should the distinction which our standards draw between the baptized and others, be clearly indicated by the pastor in their admission to the table of the Lord, it would be witnessed, in many instances, with surprise, and, in some, with displeasure.

Not only has a change taken place with respect to parental fidelity, but one equally great is sometimes witnessed in the fulfilment of the duties of the pastor's office. Formerly his responsibility with respect to the lambs of the flock was divided with none but the parents; and their instructions had constant reference to preparation for pastoral catechisings. No other religious studies interrupted those which he directed, and no other public services came in competition with his appointments. An undivided responsibility, and freedom of action, were arguments effectual to the cultivation of a proportionate fidelity. Now, his arrangements and plans are often of necessity modified, and in a measure subordinate to the operations of the Sabbath-school; whilst his relations to it are undefined, and seldom understood, and his rightful authority in it often disregarded or denied. The tendency hence arising is to relax the sense of responsibility, and induce the partial or entire neglect of a class of duties the most important, thus become difficult and perplexing, and sometimes almost impossible.

Another evil of no little magnitude, which is occasionally realized in connection with the present system, consists in the fact that the time of active Christians is so occupied with public duties as to preclude the possibility of due attention to those of a more private nature in the family and the closet. Not unfrequently two sittings of the Sabbath-school are had. These,

together with two public services with the congregation, so occupy the time, that after due attention to bodily wants, little or no space remains for private meditation and prayer, and for family conference and instruction. The food of the word remains, therefore, undigested; the soul fails of proper nourishment, and the growth of the man of God, though it may seem rapid, is deficient in symmetry and robustness; and when the day of temptation comes, he is found unprepared to detect and overcome the seductions of error, and subtler arts of Satan.

An unhappy effect of the causes here indicated, is realized in the heavy drain which in some places our church experiences through the withdrawal of our youth to other communions. The intimacy of the bond which unites them to the church, its officers and ordinances, is relaxed. The relations and responsibilities implied in the baptismal seal are not appreciated. The undistinctive doctrines of a common Christianity coincide with the other causes, and our youth often grow up to maturity, and go forth to the battle of life, unconscious of any peculiar tie binding them to the church of their fathers, with no adequate appreciation of its doctrines, nor knowledge of the scriptural basis of its system of order. They are therefore ready, under the influence of accident or convenience, to abandon its fold for another.

Again, the undefined relation of the Sabbath-school to the authority of the pastor and session is another occasion of serious evils. However readily it is, in general, admitted in theory, that in the family the parent, and in the congregation the pastor, is the divinely appointed instructor of the children, and that any other religious instructions provided by the church must be auxiliary and subordinate to those of the pastor; and however distinctly the authority of the elders, as governors of the church, may be acknowledged; and although the General Assembly has expressly declared that "these schools should always be under the direction of the pastor and session,"* it commonly happens that the schools are left by these officers to a practical independence, which readily induces

* Digest, revised edition, p. 185.

a disposition to claim it as an original right, and occasionally introduces distraction and division in the congregation.

Such are some of the consequences of the anomalous attitude of our church, in which the Sabbath-school is cherished as an invaluable means of grace, a principal part of the Sabbath surrendered to it, and the religious instruction of our children mainly entrusted to its charge; and yet is it unrecognised in our standards, and left by the teachers and governors of the church almost entirely to its own control; resulting frequently in the conflict of its arrangements with the provisions of the constitution concerning the fundamental duties of family religion, as relating to the Sabbath.

The General Assembly has not failed to recognise and warn the churches against most of the evils here indicated. Thus, in the Narrative of 1834, the Assembly says: "But few of the Presbyteries have reported specifically on the subject of the treatment of the baptized children of the church. This fact is both painful and alarming. The institution of Sabbath-schools is doubtless one of the most important means of moral influence which God is employing to destroy the works of the devil, and subject the family of man to the obedience and authority of Christ. But is it not to be feared that family instruction, and the instruction of the baptized children of the church, as persons holding relations and lying under responsibilities which do not appertain to unbaptized children, have given place, to a considerable extent, to the exercises of the Sabbath-school; or have been wholly abandoned? The attention of the ministers and elders of our churches is invited to this subject; that a course of instruction may be instituted for our baptized children, appropriate to the nature of that relation which they hold, by divine covenant arrangement, to the visible kingdom of Christ."*

Reiterated warnings, such as these, have entirely failed to produce any apparent effect in arresting the evils specified. Nor can the isolated efforts of individual pastors accomplish the end in view. In some happy cases they may be able to secure the most cordial concurrence and coöperation

* Digest, p. 183.

of all the parties involved, and obtain the most desirable results. But even these will be modified by the influence of the surrounding atmosphere, and in many cases any attempt on the part of pastor and session to interpose with the control of the Sabbath-school would create odium, and elicit open hostility. And we are persuaded that the remedy will not be found in anything short of a careful revision of our Directory, and readjustment of its provisions to the condition of things involved in the use of the Sabbath-school; and the concurrent action of the whole church thus stimulated, directed, and harmonized. Measures short of this may perhaps palliate the inconveniences, but nothing less will effect a radical cure.

Under this conviction, the Synod of New Jersey, at its recent sessions, unanimously adopted the report of a committee appointed at the previous meeting, recommending that an overture be addressed to the General Assembly, urging upon that body a revision of the Directory for Worship, with a view to the following points:

"1st. To reclaim the Sabbath afternoon or evening expressly for family instruction, and enforce the duty upon parents.

"2d. To give a distinct constitutional recognition to the Sabbath-school, as a cherished instrumentality of the church, for the nurture of her own youth and the evangelization of others; and to provide that the time appropriated be ample, as esteeming this to be a cardinal means of grace.

"3d. To restrict its assemblies, in all ordinary cases, to one part of the day, so as to avoid trenching upon the time appropriated to the paramount duties of parents.

"4th. To secure to the pastor, unequivocally, as the divinely appointed teacher of the lambs of the flock, the prerogative, and hold him to the responsibility of presidency over the school, with provision for a vice-president or superintendent, to serve in the absence of the pastor.

"5th. To recognise the church session as invested with authority and responsible for the details of the organization, the appointment and removal of teachers, and the whole government of the school.

"6th. To provide for such a system of distinctive instruction

as will secure to our youth a thorough training, not only in the doctrines of grace, but in the principles of order which the Scriptures set forth, and keep continually before their minds the burden of baptismal obligations, and the value of covenant privileges, as sealed to the children of God's people."

It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of the questions involved in the points here enumerated; and the time that has elapsed since the introduction of the Sabbath-school, and the experience enjoyed under its instrumentality, would seem to have been enough for a full appreciation of that institution, in its relations to the other agencies of the church, and ought to qualify for a judicious revision and readjustment of her constitution and practice, in view of the exigencies of the entire sphere of her labours, and all the interests which are committed to her trust.

ART. V.—*Memoirs of the* REV. NICHOLAS MURRAY, D. D., (*Kirwan.*) By SAMUEL IRENÆUS PRIME, D. D. New York: Harper & Brothers.

THERE is, perhaps, no department of literature in which greater or more numerous mistakes have been committed than in Biography. The cause of this has been, that gratitude, or affection, or possibly self-interest, has been allowed to usurp the place of sober judgment, and thus deliver itself of an effort to embalm mediocrity; or else a really deserving subject, has, from the operation of the same spirit, been so georgeously or extravagantly dressed up, that the identity of the portrait with the original could scarcely be recognised. To say nothing of the numerous books designed to perpetuate characters whose mission on earth has been only for evil, it may safely be asserted, that if all which are of mere negative tendency, or which emblazen gifts or graces that nobody ever saw in the persons commemorated—thus performing a work of creation rather than of faithful description—if all these were to be put out of the way, not only would there be a vast reduction of many of our libraries, but a very perceptible thinning out of not a few of

our bookstores. This, however, is only admitting that biography shares the fate of all other good things, and that, while it is fitted to accomplish great good, by preserving the remembrance of eminent talent, or virtue, or usefulness, or all of these blended, it is liable to be perverted, belittled, or turned into an instrument of positive and even great evil.

It is hardly necessary to say that these remarks have been suggested to us in connection with this memoir of Dr. Murray, only in the way of contrast; for we have rarely taken up a book that is more strikingly illustrative of the real value of biography than this. Dr. Murray was anything but an everyday character—the qualities both of his mind and of his heart were marked by a degree of individuality that would effectually prevent his ever being confounded with anybody else; while there was a vigour and elevation pertaining to both his intellectual and moral faculties, which were felt not only as an attractive influence, but as a positive power. And then his life was so manifestly directed and controlled by a wonder-working Providence—the sober realities of his history, while at first view they seem to take on the air of romance, when they come to be scrutinized by the eye of faith and reverence, are seen to have been marvellously shaped and stamped by the divine wisdom and goodness. Both his life and character then formed a most fitting subject for the biographer; and public expectation would have been sadly disappointed if no extended memoir of him had appeared. In accordance with an earnest wish expressed by many of his friends, shortly after his lamented death, it was determined that a memoir of him should be prepared; and to no hands could it have been more appropriately committed than to those by which it was undertaken. Dr. Prime had been in relations of fraternal intimacy with Dr. Murray for many years, and from his very frequent intercourse with him, especially as a contributor to the *New York Observer*, had the best opportunity of forming an accurate estimate of his character. Besides, everybody knows that he is one of our most graceful and attractive writers; or if there are any who have not found it out until now, this volume surely will make the revelation to them. It was a grand subject for his skill, and taste, and we may add, genial sympathies, to work upon; and

we are sure that those who expected most are not disappointed in the result. We fully accord with the public verdict, so far as it has already been made known, that this is one of the most instructive and interesting pieces of biography which we have met with for a long time, from either side of the water.

The first thing we meet, on opening this volume, is an engraved portrait of our departed friend, which almost startles us by its well-nigh matchless fidelity to the original. Those to whom his face is most familiar will find it difficult to criticise any thing in respect either to the features or the expression. The intelligence, the kindliness, the firmness, the good humour, are all there. Truly, it is one of our manifold blessings that, by a process that takes but a few moments, and costs but a few pennies, we may have secured to us a life-like image of not only those friends from whom we are temporarily separated on earth, but those whom we can hope to meet no more till we go to mingle with them in other scenes.

Of the life of Dr. Murray, which the Memoir presents with great fidelity, and in much more detail than we should have thought possible, we can give but the merest outline He was born at Ballynaskea, in the county of Westmeath, Ireland, December 25, 1802. His parents were both Roman Catholics. His father was a man of some consideration in the neighbourhood in which he lived, but he died when this son was only three years of age. When he (the son) was about twelve, he was apprenticed as a merchant's clerk in a store in Grannard, near Edgeworthstown, where he remained three years, but he was so badly treated by his employer that, at the end of that time, he ran away, and returned to his mother's house. In spite of his mother's importunity to the contrary, he resolutely refused to return to his clerkship, and having made an arrangement with his brother, which secured to him the necessary means of crossing the Atlantic, he embarked for America. Up to this period, he had been buried in the deepest darkness of Romanism. His education, at least so far as the elementary branches were concerned, had not been specially neglected; but of the true religion he knew nothing; and though he conformed to the Romish rites, and in the main accepted his hereditary prejudices as having the authority of a Divine revelation, his mind

was too essentially reflective, not to be occasionally oppressed with difficulties which he knew not how to solve.

He arrived in New York, in July, 1818, nearly pennyless, and was of course cast entirely on his own resources. Wandering about the streets of that city in quest of something to do, his attention was directed to the printing establishment of the Harpers, which, though not as great then as it has become since, was already a highly enterprising and prosperous concern. Here he became engaged as a clerk; and here now commenced a friendship between himself and his employers, which proved a source of mutual satisfaction and benefit through a long succession of years. His mind, naturally active, was quickened by the new light into which it was brought; but, instead of accepting that light and turning it to good account, its first effort was to leap from the darkness of Romanism into that of infidelity. He quickly felt, however, that he was not on firm ground yet; and God's wise and gracious providence soon brought him in contact with influences that put both his intellect and his heart to moving in the right direction. He was led, as he would have said, *accidentally*, to hear a sermon from Dr. Mason; and so deeply was he impressed with the force and majesty of the effort, that he went again and again; and at no distant period he saw the infidel fabric which he had reared for himself, in ruins at his feet. About this time he was brought into intimate relations with some of the Methodist brethren in New York, from whom he received important encouragement and aid; and at one time it seemed not improbable that he might become a member of that communion. Circumstances, however, subsequently pointed him in another direction; and when his mind had become sufficiently enlightened, and his confidence in the genuineness of his own Christian experience sufficiently strong to warrant it, he made a public profession of his faith by becoming a member of Dr. Spring's church.

As he very soon, in his intercourse with his Christian friends, developed much more than ordinary talents, and withal an earnest desire to consecrate himself to God in the ministry of reconciliation, some benevolent individuals quickly originated a plan for gratifying his desire, and securing him to the sacred office. In accordance with this plan, he went first, through the

offerings of a considerate charity, to Amherst Academy, where he remained prosecuting his studies, preparatory to entering college, for about nine months; and then, in the autumn of 1822, he entered the Freshman Class in Williams College. Throughout his whole college course he had a high reputation in respect to both scholarship and deportment; and he graduated with high honour in the year 1826.

Immediately after leaving college, he became an agent of the American Tract Society, and laboured for a few weeks in its behalf very successfully in Washington county, New York. He then entered the Theological Seminary at Princeton; but, at the end of the year, in order to relieve himself of pecuniary embarrassments, took another agency under the Tract Society at Philadelphia, where he established a branch society, and finally accepted an invitation to become its secretary. Here he continued eighteen months, and then returned to Princeton and resumed his place in his class, having kept along with them in their studies during his absence. He was licensed to preach, by the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in April, 1829.

After preaching for a short time, with much acceptance, at Morristown, New Jersey, he went, in the capacity of a domestic missionary, to Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania, and very soon received and accepted a call to become pastor of the church in that place. Here he was ordained and installed in November following, and was not only highly acceptable in his ministrations among his own people, but was greatly respected and honoured throughout the whole region. When the church in Elizabethtown became vacant, by the removal of Dr. McDowell to Philadelphia, their attention was immediately directed to Dr. Murray, as a suitable person to become his successor; and he, having accepted their unanimous call, was installed as their pastor, in July, 1833.

Here Dr. Murray found his last field of labour; for though he was called to at least half a dozen of the most prominent churches in the land, besides being invited to two theological professorships, and several other positions of great responsibility and usefulness in the church, he was never willing to break the tie that bound him to this congregation. But his field of labour was far from being comprised within the limits of his

pastoral charge—indeed, his field was literally the world. His earnest devotion to his Master's work, in connection with his high executive talent, made it easy for him to respond to the numerous claims of the church for his services, in almost every department of benevolent effort; and he seemed as much at home in each, as if his training had been exclusively in reference to it. To the several Boards of the church especially he lent an unremitting and powerful influence; while towards the Princeton Theological Seminary he manifested not only the watchful fidelity of a constituted guardian, but the gratitude and affection of a devoted son. He kept steadily at his work until the revelation was suddenly made to him that his work was done. Almost before his nearest neighbours were aware that he was not in his full health, the startling intelligence went abroad that his connection with all earthly scenes and interests had closed. He died on Monday evening, the 4th of February, 1861, and his funeral was attended by an immense throng—all of whom seemed like mourners—on the Friday following.

Dr. Murray made two visits to Europe,—the first in 1851, the second in 1860. It was an event of no small interest in his life to return to his native land, after an absence of more than forty years, especially considering the varied experience of which, in the meantime, he had been the subject, and the wonderful transition he had made from the bigotted Romish boy, going to seek his fortune, to one of the most influential and honoured Protestant clergymen of his day. When he reached his birth-place and the home of his early years, he was well nigh overwhelmed by comparing what he saw with what he remembered—a few who had been his youthful companions remained, but both they and he had changed so much as to have got beyond the point of mutual recognition, and they gazed at each other in vain to discover the least mark of identity. The shadows of Romanism hung just as dark and heavy around the endeared spot as ever; and though he was not disposed, during his brief visit, to assail needlessly the prejudices of his friends, especially as he could not remain to reason the matter out with them, yet neither could he refrain from letting fall a note of solemn admonition upon the ear of his two brothers, the only surviving members of his father's family; and in order to give

the greater impressiveness to what he said, he took the opportunity to speak to them while the three were standing together beside the graves of their parents. On both these transatlantic visits he made the acquaintance of many eminent men, and attracted great attention by his frequent appearance on public occasions in connection with what had previously been known of his history. He was deeply interested, both on the Continent and in Ireland, in watching the operations of that religious system under whose blighting influence he had received his early training; and everything that he saw only served to make him more grateful for the deliverance he had experienced, and more earnest to do his part in dissipating the wide-spread delusion.

Dr. Murray's outward appearance and manners were but a faithful reflection of the intellectual and moral qualities which formed his noble character. With a strongly built and robust frame, he combined a countenance expressive of high intelligence, of great decision, of imperturbable good nature, of exhaustless humour. His manners, though simple and unstudied, were gentlemanly, and there was a bland and genial air about him, that, of itself, would have rendered him an attraction in any circle. He had enough of the Irish accent to have his nationality recognised any where, but not enough to be regarded by anybody as an imperfection in his speaking. Into whatever company he might be thrown, he was almost sure to be recognised as a leading spirit; and yet there was nothing in his manner in the least degree assuming or dictatorial. He had a rich vein of native wit, and was not slow either to give or take a joke; but his wit was usually a bright and genial sunshine—very rarely the depositary of anything that could rive or blast. Though he was one of the busiest of men, no one was more ready than he to welcome his friends, and no one more able than he to render them contented and happy.

Dr. Murray's intellect was clear, vigorous, discriminating, and in the highest degree practical. It was not metaphysical, either in its tastes or its habits, but it found its element rather in the region of common sense, and amidst the sober realities of life. While he was a diligent student, and kept himself thoroughly informed in respect to passing events, he was a

great lover of method, and all his various duties seemed to be reduced to a rigid system. First on the list of his duties for the week was his preparation for the Sabbath; and before Monday had passed, his sermon (for he wrote but one sermon a week) was so far advanced as to be beyond all peril of failure. There were always the evidences upon his study-table that he did not rest in the judgment of commentators in respect to the true meaning of his text; for there was the Bible in its original languages, which, without claiming to be an eminent Greek or Hebrew scholar, he freely and constantly consulted.

Dr. Murray's power in the pulpit was the result of a combination of qualities and influences. First of all, he carried thither beaten oil—his sermons, instead of being only an apology for sermons—the product of mere scraps of time, and got up from sheer necessity, were evidently the result of continuous and earnest thought; and the elaboration bestowed upon them, instead of making them profound philosophical disquisitions, made them as clear as the light and as pungent as barbed arrows. For nothing were they more distinguished than the union of brevity with strength; there was a certain sententious air about them, which, while it arrested and enchained the attention, would sometimes make a mighty deposit of truth in the mind, which it would not be easy to dislodge. Then his appearance in the pulpit was eminently commanding; with great dignity and solemnity he had great force and animation; and no one who heard him could doubt that he felt that he was dealing in momentous realities. Sometimes, indeed, though very rarely, a sentence would drop from him that would cause a general smile to pervade his audience, owing to the strong natural proclivities of his own mind in that direction; but it was evidently unintentional on his part, and the effect upon his hearers was only momentary. All the discourses that we have heard from him would lead us to concur in the judgment we have heard expressed by some of the most intelligent of his stated hearers, that few men, of any period, wield the sword of the Spirit with greater skill or power than did Dr. Murray.

But if the pulpit, as was said of old Herbert, was

Dr. Murray's throne, in the sense of its having been the place where he put forth the greatest power, there was no position pertaining to his ministry in which it did not seem easy for him to wield the appropriate influence. In the pastoral relation particularly, he was a model of prudence, watchfulness, tenderness, and fidelity. He regarded his whole flock with an affection scarcely less than parental; and he was always upon the look-out for opportunities to do them good. There was no office of kindness that he was not ready to undertake even for the humblest of them. As he was eminently qualified to be their spiritual guide—to counsel them in their difficulties, and comfort them in their sorrows, and help them in their duties, so his familiar acquaintance with many of the forms of worldly business often rendered him a very competent adviser in respect to their temporal concerns; and hence nothing was more common for him, after praying at the bedside of one of the dying members of his congregation, than to be put in requisition for the writing of his will. This remarkable facility at worldly business, while it never acted as a temptation to him to forget any of the duties of his high vocation, was really an important auxiliary to his usefulness in his relations to his people.

While Dr. Murray fulfilled with scrupulous fidelity and promptness the duties which he owed to his immediate charge, he was always ready to respond to the more public claims that were made upon him, in connection not only with his own denomination, but with the church at large. In all meetings of the Presbytery, the Synod, or the General Assembly, he was, by common consent, recognised as one of the controlling spirits. In debate he was logical, clear, self-possessed, and not lacking in due respect for his opponents, however widely or earnestly he might dissent from them, though nobody could ensure them against an occasional avalanche of extemporaneous wit that would point back to the Erin Isle. His views of the public interests of the church were enlightened, sober, comprehensive; and to the promotion of these interests his whole ministry was carefully and diligently directed. But while he was, from conviction and from association, thoroughly a Presbyterian, he had a warm side for every true follower of Christ—he

was at home among all evangelical denominations; and even those who were not evangelical, he treated with kindness and respect, while they, in turn, felt the attraction of his warm and generous spirit. The day of his funeral was a day of general mourning at Elizabeth; and from the universal demonstrations of grief, extending even to the Roman Catholics, one might have supposed that the whole population had been sitting under his ministry.

We must not omit to say, that Dr. Murray acquired an honourable distinction as a writer. While in college, he accustomed himself to use his pen, not as a matter of duty only, but of pleasure; and he was an occasional contributor to one or more of the newspapers in that region. He began, at an early period in his ministry, to publish occasional sermons, but the first thing from his pen, which especially drew public attention toward him, was his first series of Letters to Archbishop Hughes, concerning which there was a general expression not only of decided approval but of strong admiration, while yet their authorship remained a secret. These Letters, as well as those which succeeded them, though addressed to a dignitary of the Romish church, only contemplated him as the representative of Romanism, and were really designed to bring the light of truth in contact with as many of the members of the Romish communion as they might reach. No man could have written on that subject under greater advantages than Dr. Murray; for while he was perfectly familiar with the whole ground, and testified from out of the depths of a bitter experience, he knew by what avenues the deluded votaries of the system could be most successfully approached; and the lucid and sententious deliverances of his pen, already referred to, were fitted to lodge themselves in the mind, both as a light and as a power. His Letters to the Archbishop—some or all of them—have found their way not only into most European countries, but into the heart of Asia, and are read in some four or five different languages. They are characterized by a force of argument, an amplitude of illustration, an earnestness of appeal, and often by a scathing sarcasm, that give them a decided prominence among standard works on the Romish controversy. If Dr. Murray's mission was more in one direction of public usefulness

than another, probably it was like that of Paul,—doing good to his brethren still sitting in the darkness from which he had escaped; and the immense circulation which his books on this subject have already gained, would seem to be a pledge that they have as yet only begun to accomplish the work to which they are destined. But he did not limit himself to this particular field, but wrote several other works, of great practical interest, upon every page of which the characteristics of his own peculiar mind are unmistakably impressed. His book on "Preachers and Preaching," published not long before his death, is full of common sense and deep wisdom, and is admirably fitted to minister both to the dignity and the efficiency of the pulpit. It would be well if every student of theology, and every young minister in the land—to say nothing of those who are older—would read and inwardly digest this work, until they have become thoroughly familiar with its teachings, and fully imbued with its spirit.

It is scarcely necessary to add, after what we have already said of the kindliness and warmth of Dr. Murray's affections, that he never appeared to greater advantage than in the privacy of his own house. In the relations of husband and father, there was a beautiful blending of love and dignity, to render him one of the most admirable models we have ever known; and his friends who used to have the privilege of visiting him, always reckoned the days spent under his roof as among the brightest of the year. He had a just appreciation of character, and did not admit persons to his confidence with undue haste; but when he had once recognised one as a friend, it was no easy matter to dislodge that person from his heart, and there was hardly any sacrifice which he was not ready to make for the promotion of his happiness or usefulness.

From the mere glance which we have taken of Dr. Murray's life and character, as they are both so admirably portrayed in the Memoir, and, we may add, as we knew him in the intimacy of an endeared friendship, it is manifest that his career was marked by extraordinary activity and usefulness. Some men, while they are very good at some one thing, and perhaps know how to ride a hobby at tremendous speed, are good for nothing else. Not so Dr. Murray. When he stood in the pulpit

delivering God's message; or when he was ministering to the sick or the sorrowful, or performing any of his more private pastoral duties; or when he was giving direction or impulse to the movements of some ecclesiastical body; or when he was nerving his intellect and his heart for a desperate encounter with the man of sin—in any one of these cases you might have supposed that he had planted himself on the spot where, of all others, he was most at home; and yet, at the bidding of circumstances, he could occupy any other of those departments of duty with the same graceful facility, and the same decided and desirable results. With this remarkable power of adaptation, and an industry that rarely has a parallel, both controlled by strong religious sensibilities and a deep feeling of obligation to the Master whom he was pledged to serve, it is not strange that the accumulated results of his not very protracted life exhibit an amount of service rendered to both God and man, which it is rarely the privilege of the church to record in respect to any of her ministers.

We can only hint at two or three of the most obvious lessons which have occurred to us, as we have passed over the pages of this remarkable book. First of all, every one, surely, who has ever learned to reverence or recognise God's hand, must trace it in the whole course of Dr. Murray's extraordinary life. Who would have conjectured that his being born of Roman Catholic parents, and educated to a belief of the absurd doctrines, and an observance of the equally absurd rites, of the Romish church; that the cruel treatment of the man to whom he was apprenticed, leading him unceremoniously to quit his service, and his coming a forlorn and nearly penniless boy to this country, in spite even of the earnest remonstrances of his own mother—who would have believed that this was to form an essential part of the preparation for the high stand he was to take, and the important part he was to perform in our American church? Had it not been for his early experience of the cold horrors of Romanism, he never could have wielded such a pen of fire in exposing them; and had it not been for the unkind and almost savage bearing of that Grannard merchant, there is no reason to believe that he might not have lived and died in as deep darkness as either of his brothers. Surely God worked

in a mysterious way to make out of material that seemed to promise so little that noble minister of the gospel, whose name has become as a household word almost all over Protestant Christendom. Shall not such facts as this lead us to trust our God as well in the darkness as in the sunshine, and to wait patiently and reverently for the mysteries of his providence to develope their own explanation?

Another lesson which this volume most impressively teaches, is the vast importance of that form of the charity of the church which looks after the education of her indigent and promising sons. There was Nicholas Murray, with great natural gifts, with a warm and generous heart, and withal struggling into the kingdom of heaven, and yet doing his daily task, like any other hireling boy, at that great printing establishment of the Harpers; and even though, along with his regenerate nature, there might come aspirations for higher usefulness, yet with them would naturally be associated the thought that he was a stranger in a strange land, and that he might well afford to be satisfied if he could earn his daily bread. But as God's gracious providence would have it, he fell in with some of the benevolent men in Dr. Spring's church, who, being struck with his intellectual superiority as well as his decided demonstrations of Christian principle and feeling, offered themselves to him as auxiliaries if he would study for the ministry. We cannot say, indeed, what might have been accomplished by his own sanctified energies both of mind and heart, if no aid from without had been proffered to him; but there is no doubt as to the fact that these excellent men not only gave him the first impulse towards an education with reference to the ministry, but furnished the first facilities towards the carrying out of this object. He never forgot the debt of gratitude he owed them while he lived; and now that the beneficiary and the benefactors have met on a nobler field, where they can trace the results of that first movement in favour of his education by a brighter light, can we doubt that, in view of this experience, their hearts are knit together more closely, and drawn forth in offerings of more intense thankfulness to their common Father?

And why should not this example stimulate a multitude of others to go and do likewise? Young men in indigent circum-

stances, but of pious aspirations and great capabilities for usefulness, are scattered everywhere; and all that is needed in order to render them, perhaps, even pillars in the church of God, is for the hand of Christian charity to be stretched out for their encouragement and help! Is not this an object worthy of deeper consideration, of more liberal offerings, than the church has yet bestowed upon it? Especially, shall not those public institutions which contemplate exclusively this object find increased favour in the eyes of our rich men, who, in consecrating themselves, have also consecrated all that they possess unto the Lord? Is it too much to hope that one effect of the circulation of the Memoir of Dr. Murray will be that many gifted and excellent young men will have a way opened for them to enter the ministry, who otherwise would have lived and died, perhaps, in the drudgery of some humble secular vocation.

And, finally, what an example is Dr. Murray to all young men, and to all ministers of the gospel, of vigorous and self-denying effort! The same heroic resolution, the same unfailing diligence, the same fearlessness of difficulties and obstacles which marked both his earlier and his later developments, if associated with the same high tone of spiritual feeling which he exemplified, would throw success and triumph into the path of any young man; and to the minister of the gospel, of powers even greatly inferior to those which he possessed, they would be a pledge for extensive usefulness and an honoured name. Let those who read this book, and learn what it is possible for one man to do, then settle the question with themselves whether they are labouring for God and the church up to the full measure of their ability.

We cannot take leave of this work without thanking the author for having so gracefully and tenderly embalmed the memory of his friend and ours, and at the same time conferred so great and permanent a favour upon the whole church. When scores and hundreds of memoirs—even of those which have had their brief day of being talked about and admired—shall be numbered with the things that have been, we confidently predict that this will be holding on its way with posterity, and performing its great work with undiminished power.

ART. VI.—*Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of America*, by LOUIS AGASSIZ. First Monograph in Three Parts. I. Essay on Classification, &c. Vol. I. 4to. Boston, 1857.

THE "Essay on Classification" in Professor Agassiz's "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of America," is a very remarkable treatise, in a very remarkable work, for our own, or for any country. The prospectus was for ten volumes, on as many important, though not the best known, parts of American zoölogy, with full descriptions, and most ample illustrations, from the embryo to the perfect animal, at twelve dollars the volume. The first four of these have been issued, and have fully satisfied the high anticipations of the patrons of this great enterprise; to provide for the expense of which at least eight hundred subscribers were necessary on reasonable calculations of the work to be done; but so high did the author stand in scientific estimation, and so generous were his views of what the character of the work and its illustrations should be, that it is said the list of subscribers exceeded twenty-five hundred, more than thrice the number anticipated—a patronage of more than princely munificence. All this was without any special effort. The support of the enterprise, therefore, may be considered certain, even though a considerable falling off from the subscription list should take place; and the distinguished author, with his fair prospect of life and health, may be reasonably expected to complete the work, the value of which he will richly enhance by the number and excellence of the illustrations which this noble patronage will enable him to furnish. Of the volumes already published, the first two contain, besides the Essay, the North American Testudinata, or Turtles, with thirty-seven splendid plates; the next two present the Acalephs, with forty-six plates; and the four taken together constitute the most gratifying earnest of those which are to follow. All true lovers of Natural History must rejoice in the progress and the promise.

Of such a work the appropriate introduction should be the richest and most complete essay on Classification. This was

the more necessary on account of the different views held by naturalists on this subject:—and to many who assume as the basis of their systems, the material organs, or what is commonly called the natural or physical organization, this Essay will be held to be transcendent. At least, in all but some of the minor subdivisions, it will doubtless be placed at the head of their systems. But apart from the admiration it will elicit from practical zoölogists, and other admirers of nature exhibited in scientific detail, and illustrated by art, this Essay will excite a special interest in all who love to trace the operations of the Divine Mind in the works of his creation. Under this aspect, however, it presents not only the most extraordinary excellencies, but also very grave defects; some of which, in both kinds, we propose to exhibit here, in order that the true, and only consistent place of man in Zoölogy may be made to appear.

I. *The Excellencies.*

1. All must agree with Professor Agassiz, that sufficient progress has now been made in the knowledge of animal life to form a correct system of arrangement. Passing from the first imperfect classification, in the *Systema Naturæ* of Linnæus in 1735, to its great improvement in 1761, and thence to its final revision by its author in 1766, we come to the system of Cuvier, which is a great advance beyond all that had preceded it. In all the subsequent "Anatomical Systems," from that of Cuvier to that of Leuckart in 1848, of *eight* of which Agassiz gives the details with remarks, the departure from the views of Cuvier seems to have been inconsiderable, except in that of Ehrenburg in 1836. Of prominent "Philosophical Systems" of Zoölogy of the German School, *three* are specially detailed and reported on in this Essay. Next to these are given the "Embryological Systems," *four* of which are finely commented on, as in the preceding cases. This short statement with respect to *fifteen* systems—and these are not all—must convince us that enough has been, or ought to have been done by zoölogists to enable a competent author to propound a system truthful and complete, at least in all the fundamental divisions. These, in their most general form, must be obvious and accessible to all observers. Accordingly we find that some zoölogists, in each

of the three modes of investigation, *i. e.* anatomical, philosophical, and embryological, do agree with each other in certain respects, on the four primary divisions of the animal kingdom, as given by Cuvier; or, as Prof. Agassiz writes, on "the natural primitive relations of animal life," viz. vertebrates, articulates, molluscs, and radiates. And if this classification were confined to animals below man, it would call forth no opposition. There is, however, a classification more fundamental and broad,* which was made by Ehrenburg in 1836, and also by St. Hilaire in 1856; but this is barely referred to in the Essay.

2. The general views of Prof. Agassiz on the real object of classification, are worthy of philosophy and of the truth. He maintains the existence in animals of departments, *i. e.* of "branch, class, order, family, genus and species, by which we express the results of our investigations into the relations of the animal kingdom." Naturalists generally have admitted the real existence of species, and sometimes of genera; but they have too often considered even genera, as well as the superior divisions, to be the result of human contrivance or as a matter of indifference; whilst these ought to be neither. With respect to such arrangements, Agassiz asks: "Are these divisions artificial or natural? Are they the devices of the human mind to classify and arrange our knowledge in such a manner as to bring it more readily within our grasp, and facilitate further investigations, or have they been instituted by the Divine intelligence as the categories of his mode of thinking?" In a note he adds: "A system may be natural, that is, may agree in every respect with the facts of nature, and yet not be considered by its author [or by others,] as the manifestation of the thoughts of a Creator; but merely as the expression of a fact existing in nature, no matter how." This is a just exhibition of the perverse thoughts of a host of naturalists, with which the admirable, and truthful, and exalting views of the author of this essay are in striking contrast. For by most naturalists, no respect has been paid to that original and grand idea of Plato, of a primordial plan or

* This more fundamental distinction was made, also, by Aristotle, as has just been pointed out to the writer, as he concludes this article, by a distinguished Greek scholar. It, with the grounds upon which it rests, will be introduced in the proper place, both for its antiquity and wise discrimination.

conception in the mind of the Divine architect, according to which all things were formed and have their operations carried on. From ignorance or design their systems have originated in very different conceptions. This is illustrated in the Linnæan system of botany, *artificial* in its general structure, and yet *natural* in that it presents a host of facts accordant with nature. Such also, in part, is the so-called "Natural Method," which superseded that of Linnæus, and such, to a considerable extent, was his early zoölogy. The system of Cuvier shows the least possible respect to the development of a Divine plan.

In opposing all artificial classification, Agassiz maintains the obvious and all-important, but often forgotten principle, that the order of the system is to be "inherent in the objects themselves," so that in truth the arrangement shall be "but translations into human language of the thoughts of the Creator." Throughout the Essay the distinguished author often adverts to the design or plan in nature as proof of one intelligent and wise Creator. Speaking to this purpose, he says: "If there is any truth in the belief that man is made in the image of God, it is surely not amiss for the philosopher to endeavour, by the study of his own mental operations, to approximate the workings of the Divine Reason, learning from the nature of his own mind better to understand the infinite intellect from which it is derived." And surely the *perfect* system of zoölogy must contain and exhibit the Divine plan, both for the instruction and elevation of the sincere student of nature, and for spiritual communion with the Father of spirits in the glorious temple of his works.

Another thought, as admirable as it is just and worthy of a scientific naturalist and a true philosopher, is the following: "I cannot," says our author, "overlook nor disregard here the close connection there is between the facts ascertained by scientific investigations, and the discussions now carried on respecting the origin of organized beings; and though I know those who hold it very unscientific to believe that thinking is not something inherent in matter, and that there is an essential difference between inorganic and living and thinking beings, I shall not be prevented by any such pretensions of a false philosophy from expressing my conviction that as long as it cannot be shown that matter and physical forces do actually reason, I shall consider

any manifestation of thought as evidence of a thinking being as the author of such thought, and shall look upon an intelligent and intelligible connection between the parts of nature as direct proof of the existence of a thinking God, as certainly as man exhibits the power of thinking when he recognises their natural relations." In a note in this connection, also, he makes the significant admission, that to the minds of many naturalists, "the name of God appears out of place in a scientific work, as if the knowledge of secondary agencies constituted alone a worthy subject of their investigations, and as if nature could teach nothing about its author." Must not intelligent man be under a *moral obligation* in the study of the works of nature, to recognise and honour their infinite and benevolent Creator and Ruler?

3. Professor Agassiz explains the reason for the course thus pursued by many naturalists in the following way, viz. that they "are no doubt prevented from expressing their conviction that the world was called into existence and is regulated by an intelligent God, either by the fear of being supposed to share clerical or sectarian [theological] prejudices; or because it may be dangerous for them to discuss freely such questions, without acknowledging at the same time the obligation of taking the Old Testament as the standard by which the validity of their results is to be measured." Is this an adequate and satisfactory reason for not "expressing their conviction" of the origin and government of the world? Another explanation is stated thus: "There are physicists who might be shocked at the idea of being considered materialists, who are yet prone to believe that when they have recognised the laws which regulate the physical world, and acknowledged that these laws were established by the Deity, they have explained every thing, even when they have considered only the phenomena of the inorganic world, as if the world contained no living beings; and [or] as if these living beings exhibited nothing that differed from the inorganic world."

Further, in our author's view, it is not enough to see only the "adaptation of means to ends," and the "connection of organs and functions," in the things and creatures of earth, in order to trace the Divine plan so industriously ignored by those

naturalists who are here alluded to. For, as he states, "we find organs without functions, as, for instance, the teeth of the whale, which never cut through the gum, the breast [of the male] in all the class of mammalia; these and similar organs are preserved in obedience to a certain uniformity of fundamental structure, true to the original formula of that division of animal life, even when not essential to its mode of existence. The organ remains, not for the performance of a function, but with reference to a plan." This he beautifully illustrates, also, by the "unity of structure of the limbs of pinnated animals, in which the fingers are never moved, with those which enjoy the most perfect articulations and freedom of motion." To these may be added the "blind fish" of the Kentucky Mammoth Cave, in which Dr. Weyman discovered the "rudiments of eyes, left them as a remembrance" of the general type of fishes, with respect to this organ of vision. If so, "the blind crawfish and the blind insects" of that cave probably have rudimentary eyes; and inasmuch as these crawfish have the optic nerve, may it not be that their eyes are so delicate as to afford them the vision necessary for their location?

4. Professor Agassiz is perfectly explicit on the question of "equivocal generation," and on the errors in the explanation of phenomena which are more or less remotely connected with that idea. Of a certain class of physicists he says: "Mistaking for a causal relation the intellectual connection observable between serial phenomena, they are unable to perceive any difference between disorder, and the free, independent, and self-possessed action of a superior mind, and call mysticism even a passing allusion to the existence of an immaterial principle in animals, which they themselves acknowledge in man." "It is further of itself plain," he adds in a note, "that the laws which may explain the phenomena of the material world, in contradistinction from the organic, cannot be considered as accounting for the existence of living beings, even though these may have a material body, unless it be actually shown that the action of these laws implies, by their very nature, the production of such beings. Thus far Crosse's experiments are the only ones offered as proving such a result. I do not know what physicists may think about them now; but I know that there

is scarcely a zoölogist who doubts that they only exhibited a mistake." It is gratifying to find Prof. Agassiz so explicit upon these experiments of Mr. Crosse, whom he himself introduced to the public.*

5. Prof. Agassiz is decidedly opposed to the notion so common, and yet so baseless, of accounting for the works of nature by the operation of physical laws, or inherent forces, or co-existing powers. When the zoölogist sees and understands something of the Divine plan, according to which creation has been moulded and produced, he can no longer tolerate the "desolate theory which refers all to the laws of matter, as accounting for all the wonders of the universe, and leaves us with no God but the monotonous, unvarying action of physical forces, binding all things to their inevitable destiny." This is implied, indeed, in previous quotations, but here the question is argued at length. "It is the object of the following paragraphs," he says, "to show that there are neither agents nor laws in nature known to physicists, under the influence and by the action of which, these [organized] beings could have originated; that, on the contrary, the very nature of these beings, and their relations to one another and to the world in which they live, exhibit thought, and can, therefore, be referred only to the immediate action of a thinking being, even though the manner in which they were called into existence remains for the present a mystery." The whole argument is too long for insertion here; but it may be safely stated

* These experiments were made in 1837, and are now hardly remembered. Mr. Crosse found that in the operation of the galvanic current upon the silicate of potash, some little eggs and insects appeared in the solution; which were figured by him to show their (the insects') form, head, body, legs, and bristles. Numbers of these insects were examined in England and France; and their place was ascertained under the genus Acarus, or mite; in which, and even in their species, the French naturalists agreed with the English, although they had no belief in this new and philosophical mode of creation. Yet it seemed to some that the electrical current had developed the work of creation, and produced organs of life, for the insects lived and moved. What a triumph of science! But short was the exultation; for in other careful experiments, which excluded external interference, the insects failed to crawl into life. Mr. Crosse himself finally supposed that the eggs, and perhaps some insects, had fallen into the silicate material, and had thus been developed in the common method. See American Journal of Science, vol. xxxii., July 1837, and vol. xxxv., January 1839.

that it is triumphantly sustained; and the conclusion is certainly in accordance with right reason, and with the general understanding of the teachings of infinite Wisdom. For we may well ask, in the words of our author, "What evidence there is in the present state of our knowledge, that at any time these *physical agents have produced anything they no longer do produce;* and what probability there is that they *may ever have produced any organized being?*"

6. Prof. Agassiz adopts the conclusions of geologists, drawn from their discoveries of the remains of animal life in the fossiliferous rocks—from the oldest to the newest of this vast amount of rocks on or near the earth's surface—that *various forms* of animal life are found together; that they all belong to the four great and commonly received divisions of the mere animals; and that there is good reason to believe we have the knowledge of the "earliest types of the animal kingdom," which have existed on our globe. "We find," he says, "everywhere below this oldest set of fossiliferous beds, other stratified rocks, in which no trace of organized beings can be found." Thus both zoölogy and geology carry us back to the period when *organized bodies began to exist*—a great fact in the history of our earth—even to the "lowest deposits formed since the existence of organized beings upon earth." To say that the fossils might have been formed from older beings, or that Plutonian, or other action, may have obliterated all trace of such remains where they once existed, is to depart from the true ground of science, viz. *facts*, and to rest on mere supposition.

7. Finally, to mention no other particulars, Prof. Agassiz is a firm defender of the permanence of species; which, in this day of perverse speculation in natural history, is a high honour. The theories of specific changes in plants and animals, maintained by Lamarck and Darwin, as well as by others, have shaken many naturalists, if they have not overwhelmed them with doubts. Not so with Agassiz; in illustration of which only a few references need be given. Thus, he says: "Between two successive geological periods, then, changes have taken place among animals and plants. But none of those primordial forms of life, which naturalists call species, are known to have changed during any of these periods." . . . "Geology shows that at different

periods there have existed different species; but no transition from those of a preceding into those of a following epoch has ever been noticed any where." . . . . "The Egyptian monuments," and the "most careful comparison" of the animals found on them, with "living specimens of the same species" in Egypt, show "that there is not a shadow of a difference between them for a period of five thousand years;" also, that "many of the so-called varieties, which are supposed to be the product of time, are as old as any of the animals that have been known to man." It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the same animals, as the horse, ox, elephant, lion, tiger, bear, sheep, &c., have been known to man from time immemorial. This "permanence of the specific differences which characterize every organism," no doubt depends upon the immaterial principle, or the peculiar living force of each organized being.

To illustrate the permanence of some species, Professor Agassiz gives his calculations of the time during which the coral insect has been at work in forming the coral reefs of Florida; this he estimates at eight thousand years for each of the four reefs. But there are other suppositions equally plausible, viz., that these reefs have all been growing at the same time in water of suitable depth, and then have been raised by some upheaving power, of which geology has abundance in the earth ready for use; or that their growth was more rapid in their early formation than in recent times, since they have come to be examined. Thus the age of these reefs might be reduced far below that here assigned to them, and even brought within the compass of six thousand years.

These and other excellencies of this Essay will receive the fullest commendation. They exalt the distinguished author as a wise man, even more highly than he is exalted as a most accomplished zoölogist by the scientific part of the work.

But even the wisest may fail in some things—"to err is human"—and we must now, though unwillingly, undertake to point out some of the errors or defects of that *system* of zoölogy to which Professor Agassiz has committed himself, and of those arguments for its support and defence into which it has led him in this Essay.

II. *The Errors or Defects.*

The grand error of the Essay is involved in the principle thus stated: "To me it appears indisputable that this order and arrangement [viz., that of the four great divisions in the system of zoölogy by Cuvier,] are based upon the natural, primitive relations of animal life." Under the phrase "animal life," he means to include all that he understands to belong to human life. In this he makes himself clearly understood; for in discussing, in the first section, the "Fundamental Relations of Animals," he shows that the "leading features of a natural zoölogical system are all founded in nature;" and this "natural . . system" he finds in that of Cuvier, in which man is classified as a mere animal. Besides this, he condemns the separation of man from the mere animals in the zoölogical systems of Ehrenburg and St. Hilaire, as in the following words: "I cannot, therefore, agree with those who would disconnect mankind from the animal kingdom, and establish a distinct kingdom for man alone;" and elsewhere—"I must object to the admission of a distinct kingdom for man alone." This is explicit; and the idea is fully carried out in the reasonings and illustrations yet to be considered.

Here it is to be observed that there are two principles upon which this classification of man with the mere animals may undertake to defend and maintain itself. The first of these is, to deny to the rational and moral powers any place or influence, as a characteristic of beings, to determine their position in classification or arrangement; the second is, to assert a rational and moral nature in all, at least in all the higher animals; and consequently to deny that this nature is any distinctive characteristic of humanity. To the latter of these views Agassiz seems to incline, although the arguments he advances in defence of his system do not all harmonize with this supposition; whilst most of those naturalists with whom he agrees in adopting Cuvier's system, seem to incline to the former view.

Yet are there no grounds for this exclusion of the reason and moral nature, as a distinctive character in classification, but the strongest arguments against it. For the intellectual

and moral powers are a part of nature, and of our nature, as much as our senses, or bodies, or skeletons, or any part of our physical structures. The spirit or soul of man is the work of the Creator no less than his body, and is the most important element in the system of nature. No system can be true and complete, according to nature, which leaves out this element. It is as natural for man to discern between right and wrong, and to feel approbation for what he sees to be right, with condemnation for the wrong; in other words, to experience the operations of the conscience, or moral sense, as it is for a dog to bark, or for a lion to roar, without any moral feelings. With this sense of the words *nature* and *natural*, no exception can be taken to the statement that "the leading features of a natural zoölogical system are all founded in nature." But in the sense in which they would be taken by most of Cuvier's followers, as exclusive of the most significant and exalted characteristics of humanity, the statement is a grievous falsifying of the primitive facts of nature. For certainly the conscience is a primitive fact of man's nature, which is not formed by language, study, or habit, and which, thanks to the Father of truth, no system can ever annihilate.

Meanwhile, it is fully admitted that man has an animal nature, and should be treated of as subject to its laws, wherever he is not elevated above them by those superior traits of which no trace is found in the brute. He is no less a vertebrate, a mammifer, an air-respiring and a warm-blooded animal, than he is exalted immeasurably above the whole sphere of animal life by his articulate language, and by his rational, moral, and religious nature. But upon what principle of science is his place in zoölogy made to depend upon the lower characteristics of his nature, to the entire exclusion of all those in virtue of which man is man? Is it not self-evident that in a truly scientific method and classification, the more significant and exalted characteristics of his nature, in which he is distinguished from the mere animals, would be of greater weight in determining his true place, than his less significant and lower traits in which he is identified with the brute?

Struck with this, one would think, most obvious truth, two distinguished naturalists have separated man from the mere

animals in their systems of zoölogy. In that of Ehrenburg there are only two great divisions, viz.

First Cycle, Nations, Mankind—One distinct Class.

Second Cycle, Mere Animals.*

These divisions depend on other differences than those of Cuvier, but no less palpable. They need not be detailed here. It is obvious that Ehrenburg based his system of zoölogy on the "natural, primitive relations of organized beings," and that the order in these fundamental divisions is "inherent in the objects themselves." Ample authority is this one name of Ehrenburg.

In the system of St. Hilaire,† organized bodies are classed in three great fundamental divisions, called kingdoms, viz. 1. Vegetable. 2. Animal. 3. Human. The first has vegetative life, the functions embraced under *nutrition* and *reproduction*. In the second, *animal life*, exhibited in *sensibility* and *mobility*, is added to vegetative life. In the third kingdom, containing man alone, *moral life* is added to vegetative and animal life. "The plant *lives;* the animal *lives and feels;* man *lives and feels and thinks.*" In the *feeling* of the animals are comprehended their passions, instincts, and whatever mental operations belong to their nature and condition. So also, the *thinking* of man comprehends all the faculties, functions, and exercises of his *moral* nature.

Here, again, it is evident that this system, which depends upon the structure and organization for the very different *vital* powers, is based on the "natural, primitive relations" of organized beings, and that the order is "inherent in the objects themselves."

It is obvious, also, that while Cuvier formed his four departments or branches of animated nature on the ground that there are four "distinct plans of structure," his system is not so elementary in its higher groups, as that of St. Hilaire, whose three organic kingdoms are designated by three different vital functions. But admitting this quadriform structure, though it is controverted by some zoölogists, where is the evidence that

* See Agassiz's Essay, p. 200.

† Histoire Nat. Generale des Regnes Organique, par I. Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Paris, 8vo. 1856.

it is the character which unfolds the Divine plan in the case? Surely we must conceive of the Creator's plan as best interpreted by those traits and characteristics of his creatures which are of the highest importance, and which most fully evince his greatness and goodness. Which, then, of these different systems, it may be asked, the more ennobles man, and gives the higher glory to his Creator—that which makes man's place in zoölogy to depend exclusively upon his physical structure, or that which takes into consideration, also, as a distinguishing character, his moral life—that which teaches us to think of man only as a vertebrate with the other vertebrates, or that which directs our thoughts to his moral and religious faculties, which raise him far above the mere animals, assimilate him to the angels, and constitute that "image of God" in which he was created? The fundamental principle of the latter, to say the least, is no less scientific than that of the former, whilst it reveals in a far more striking manner the glory of the Infinite Intellect.

This view is confirmed by consideration of the great and radical difference which exists between man and the mere animals. The highest class of these, *i. e.* the mammals—and we need not refer to any others—have the five senses, by which they receive impressions from external nature and have distinct perceptions of objects; they have the common appetites, desires, and emotions, which, as they are gratified or not, are the sources of enjoyment or suffering; they like and dislike, choose and refuse, compare and reason,* at least to some extent; they are conscious of their feelings, desires, and knowledge, and evidently remember with great accuracy, distinctness, and tenacity; they are subject to various passions, have strong attachment to their kind, and take great care of their young; they associate and contrive for

* The following instance, similar to many others which have been published, is given here on authority that, if known, would command unhesitating belief. A gentleman saw a crow fly up from the ground with something in its beak, which it dropped from a height of 100 or 150 feet above the earth. This was repeated several times. Attracted by the sight, the gentleman rode rapidly to the spot, and found that it was a land-tortoise which the crow had been carrying up and dropping. Its shell was already fractured, and the meat was laid bare. The crow, by his reasoning and experiment, had procured for himself a delicious feast, which he was left to enjoy.

their own support, defence, and protection, and for the construction of their nests, burrows, houses, and the like; they have an unerring instinct by which they are prompted and guided, without instruction or experience, to the most important and wonderful operations and results, for their support and the continuation of their species; they have a mode of communication, a sort of language, corresponding to emotional sounds or interjections, and capable of conveying information from one to another, yet entirely distinct from the articulate and conventional languages of mankind; some of them are susceptible of instruction, so as to understand many of those sounds and signs which human beings alone are capable of making, and so as to perform many acts of which, without instruction from man, they are totally incapable; in fine, they manifest the phenomena of will, and often great strength of purpose or decision.

Now as any or all of these exercises or acts in man are held to be the manifestations of mind, so they must be regarded as proofs of a similar power in the brute. It is wholly unscientific to explain the same series of phenomena in man and the mere animals by different hypotheses. This power, call it mind, or soul, or understanding, they share with man. It belongs to the animal constitution in each, and, as far as this animal mind goes, it seems to be an inseparable attendant of sensation and voluntary motion. For what could sensation effect without knowledge; and what benefit can we conceive of as resulting from voluntary motion without intellectual motives, ends, objects?

It is true, however, that in the mere animals this mind partakes more of the nature of feeling than of thinking; and it is wholly employed upon the objects of sense. It is the universal practice of man to speak of the *feelings of animals.* In the power of instinct they greatly excel man; from which we should anticipate as great inferiority in their intellectual or reasoning faculties. Philosophers, however, have not been able to agree altogether in what the inferiority of animals to man consists, although they have commonly recognised it as essential rather than accidental or circumstantial. Mr. Locke placed it in the want of the "power of abstracting." The "having of general ideas" he called "an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to;" they "have not the faculty of abstract-

ing, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs."* This great and essential inferiority of the brute to man, involves another equally important, viz., the want and total incapacity of articulate and conventional language. Thus, says Max Müller:† "the one great barrier between the brute and man is *language*. Man speaks, but no brute has ever uttered a word." The adaptation of man to society, to established laws and civil government, for which the highest of mere animals have no power or faculty, is another distinguishing characteristic. Still another grand difference is presented by Prof. Agassiz himself: "If," he says, "there is anything which places man above all other beings in nature, it is precisely the circumstance that he possesses those noble attributes, without which, in their most exalted excellence and perfection, not one of these general traits of relationship, so characteristic of the great types of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, can be understood, or even perceived. How, then, could these relations have been devised without similar powers?" [*i. e.* similar powers in the Creator.] Is not this difference enough to place man in a class by himself, viz. his having faculties to the conception of which the highest brute does not and cannot attain?

The above differences are confined to the sentient and intellectual faculties, between which in man and in the brute there is certainly a broad distinction, however much their operations, within certain limits, may resemble each other. The range of the intellectual powers is very different also in different animals of the highest and lowest classes; but in the highest it is vastly inferior to that of ordinary men, even in the lowest savage state. The reasoning process is very limited; no abstraction, or apprehension of general principles, or demonstrative reasoning, seems to be attained, or attainable; most of the great ends of their being seem to be secured by instinct; and how near soever the reasoning process in animals may approach to that in man, the wide separation is still palpable. The same is true of the voluntary powers.

* Essay on the Human Understanding, book ii. ch. 11, sec. 10.

† Müller's Lectures on the Science of Language, pp. 354, 8vo. New York: 1862.

But all these differences taken together are as nothing compared with that which is manifested in the fact that man is endowed with *a moral nature, a perception of right and wrong, and a feeling of moral obligation*, of which not the least trace appears in the highest of mere animals. This moral power—this feeling of moral obligation—cannot be confounded with sensation, intellect, or volition, nor with all of these taken together. For the moral sense, or the sense of moral obligation, respects a different class of things, either objects or relations, and has an entirely different quality and nature, as is apparent in the works that have been written on morals and religion as compared with those on the understanding or reason, on rhetoric or logic, and also in the common convictions of intelligent and thoughtful men. Yet the language of Prof. Agassiz, and of some others, seems to imply a disregard of the true moral element of human nature, and to exclude such as are truly moral sentiments, by exhibiting a merely intellectual affinity or likeness in man to the Divine excellence. It is strange—it is wonderful—that this moral sense, this feeling of moral obligation to God and man, has not always been taken as the palpable and distinctive character, property, or power, separating man from the mere animals! Probably the failure to discriminate precisely between the moral and intellectual faculties has been at the bottom of the prevalent objection to the existence of a mind, or an immaterial principle in the brute.

It is upon these clearly ascertained and essential characteristics, which do not appear in the brute, especially upon that of the moral nature, that we claim for man a place in zoölogy distinct from that of mere animals. For it seems evident from what has been said, that the true classification of organized bodies must be substantially that of St. Hilaire, which distinguishes them into three separate kingdoms, each of which, as we have seen, is determined and defined by a peculiar and an essential characteristic, inherent in the constitution of its subjects. The characteristic of the first kingdom is vegetative life; of the second, animal life, superinduced upon the vegetative; of the third, moral life, superinduced upon the animal. Thus the first stands as the

foundation; the second includes the first, and rises above it; the third includes the second and first, and crowns all. The vegetative life, including nutrition and reproduction, has not one property of the peculiar animal life, of which the characteristics are sensibility (including all the operations of the animal intellect) and voluntary motion; nor has the mere animal one property of the distinctively human or moral life, the characteristics of which include the capacity of the knowledge of abstract and moral truths, and the feeling of moral obligation and responsibility. Hence the life of man is elevated immeasurably above the sphere of that of any, even the highest, of the mere animals.

It is gratifying to know that this classification of organized bodies is no discovery of modern times, inasmuch as it is substantially that of Aristotle himself, who may not improperly be styled the founder of Natural History. In his Ethics, in order to determine the highest good of man, and the means of obtaining it, he found it indispensable to ascertain first the true and distinguishing characteristic of human nature. Accordingly he recognises the general properties of organized bodies in the plant, the animal, and man, and asks: "What would be the proper peculiarity of man?" He answers to this effect: "Life seems to be common to him with the plants." . . . . "We are then to set aside the life of nutrition and growth." . . . "Next to this follows a certain sentient life, [*i. e.* the life of sensation, perception, affection, and understanding,] and this man has in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal." . . . "There remains now a certain practical [acting] life of a being who possesses reason."* By *reason* here, as elsewhere in the writings of Aristotle, is plainly intended, not that understanding which belongs to animal life, but that power of intellect by which man is distinguished from the brute, viz., that by which moral obligation is acknowledged and felt, and duty is performed.

Strange indeed would it be in the arrangements of infinite wisdom, if the proper characteristic of man had not been discoverable until nearly six thousand years of his history had

* Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, B. i. cap. 6; B. ii. cap. 3; and B. iii., on the Soul.

passed away; and then only by anatomical investigations accessible but to a very few. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, to mention no others, clearly apprehended and set forth the distinguishing characteristics of the mere animal nature, and exhibited the great peculiarity of man as elevated far away from the sphere of brute life. By the method of common sense, *i. e.*, by analyzing the characteristics of organized beings, they seized without effort, and held with the utmost firmness, the distinguishing character of man.

Hence it is plain that every system of zoölogy which does not recognise this distinction is false, its foundation is a falsehood, and instead of revealing, it hides the plan of the Creator, which it ought to disclose.

Moreover, it is evident that only upon this arrangement, which confounds man with the mere animals, is it possible for Prof. Agassiz to maintain his doctrine of eight or more independent creations of man in eight or more distinct provinces or faunas. For his principal arguments are derived from the animal nature of man, and from the analogy of the human to the brute creation. Just in proportion to the amount of difference ascertained between man and the animals, is that analogy weakened, and the conclusion invalidated. Hence the unanswerable objection to those distinct provinces for man is, and must ever be, that his higher physical, his far more exalted intellectual, and his transcendent moral powers, place him at an immeasurable remove from the highest of mere animals, elevate him far above the laws which may confine them to particular locations, and enable him to be, as he is found, truly and properly, a cosmopolite.

Recurring now to the statement, that animals feel, think, compare, judge, and have various affections and passions, which seem to imply an immaterial principle in them, it is to be observed that this, in virtue of the broad differences already pointed out, does in no sense make them human; nor does it imply the immortality of their thinking principle. The question so often asked, What becomes at death of the mind of the brute? may be safely answered by another, in the words of an ancient wise man, "Who knoweth the spirit of a man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward

into the earth?" The spirit of man aspires to immortality; that of the beast gives no such indication; it may wholly perish with the body; and for aught that appears, it may be far better for the animal itself that this should be so; while its place may be filled with an equal, or a better form of life. Besides, the fact that the carnivorous species have a place in the Divine plan, is a striking exhibition of the low estimate which should be formed of the life and mind of animals. Indeed, it is conceded that the existence of species which require animal food, as of man, for example, is a proof of the Divine benevolence. With what repugnance would the slaughter of animals for food, and even for sacrifice, and their destruction generally, be viewed, if it were believed that in any or every such case, a life or mind of moral endowments were consigned to dissolution with the body. It is the moral nature of man which gives him his priceless estimation, and assures to him immortality.

For wherever the intellectual and moral natures are brought together in the unity of one and the same consciousness, moral obligation at once arises, the creature becomes subject to a higher law—the moral law of the Creator; and while we know of no reason for the continued existence of mere thought or intellect, especially in its lower forms, we do know of an imperative reason for the continued existence of the *moral* creature, until the whole object of moral law shall be accomplished, and the creature shall have responded to all the obligations of its moral nature and relations. If the minds of animals be supposed to survive their bodies, it must be for reasons not implied in their mere existence, and without the least evidence in nature that such is the fact. The moral nature of man, on the contrary, involves his immortality, with which are inseparably bound up all his wisest, purest, and highest aspirations.

With these views we are prepared to understand correctly those exhibitions made by mere animals, which are thus described by Prof. Agassiz: "When animals fight with one another, when they associate for a common purpose, when they warn one another in danger, when they come to the rescue of one another, when they display pain or joy, they manifest

impulses of the same kind as are considered among the moral attributes of man.'' But these indications are the mere workings of their animal constitution, involving so much knowledge and such passions as are essential to their self-defence and preservation. To call these "moral'' feelings is a perversion of language, unless it be intended to designate the workings of the animal *mind*, as distinguished from the operations of the material body; and then it would seem that *mental* would have been a better word. Even if they are of a *similar* kind to those of the animal nature of man, no one attributes to them guilt or merit, right or wrong, praise or blame, because no one has discovered in the mere animals the least evidence of a moral sense, or of moral obligation. They are mere animal impulses. But man is always held responsible for these feelings, because he is confessedly endowed with a moral nature, by which he discerns between right and wrong, is sensible to moral obligation, and is capable of controlling his passions and actions in conformity with the wise and benevolent moral laws of God.

But since the above operations belong to the natures of man and beast alike, let it be granted that, in the words of Professor Agassiz, there is not "a difference in kind between them,'' in so far as they are *animal operations*, does it follow that the highest endowments of man are also to be found in the brute? Agassiz seems to maintain this, where he says, "The gradations of the moral faculties among the higher animals and man are, moreover, so imperceptible, that to deny to the first a certain sense of responsibility and consciousness, [conscience,] would certainly be an exaggeration of the difference between animals and men.'' That the animal has consciousness in the sense that it is aware of its own sensations, feelings, volitions, desires, memories, and impulses, must be admitted by all; but that even the highest of mere animals has any sense of moral responsibility or conscientiousness, or acting of conscience, or feeling of right and wrong, has never yet been discovered. This is something which is seen to belong not to the brute, but exclusively to man. The one is thence held to be a *man*, and the other a *brute*.

Now this assumption—for it is no more—of "impulses of the

same kind" in man and the brute, is the sandy foundation upon which this classification of man with the mere animals is built. No mighty storm and wind, it would seem, can be required to overthrow it. But let man be separated from the brute in a class by himself—a change easily effected—and the whole fabric of this zoölogical system is built upon a rock; its firmness, symmetry, and beauty, challenge the admiration of every beholder. God smiles upon it.

The doctrine maintained by Agassiz, "of the existence in every animal of an immaterial principle similar to that which, by its excellence and superior endowments, places man so much above animals," is to be received not without due qualification. For the force of the words "*similar to*," is that of *the same as*, or, according to the previous statement, "of *the same kind.*" Of this no proof is offered but that already quoted; and none whatever can be produced. Man's superiority does not consist merely in a higher degree of powers the same in kind with those of the brute, but in powers entirely distinct and diverse in kind from every thing yet discovered in the mere animal; of which powers "the roof and crown" is the moral sense, the religious principle. This is the distinction marked in that well known definition, *Man is a religious animal.*

A statement before published by Professor Agassiz is amplified in this Essay, showing us his fixed opinion on the subject, in the following words: "A close study of the dog might satisfy every one of the similarity of his [the dog's] impulses with [to] those of man, and that those impulses are regulated in a manner which discloses psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man . . . and though all these faculties do not make a philosopher of him, [the dog,] they certainly place him in that respect upon a level with a considerable proportion of poor humanity." This, probably, is the most extravagant assertion ever made by a philosopher, with respect to the exalted powers of mere animals, even those of the dog! Has the distinguished author truly considered the force of this language, and estimated the results involved in it? Let us consider these for a moment. For if this assertion be true, and the common attributes of humanity be maintained, the dog is moved by the same sense of rectitude as man; is actuated by

the same sense of honour and uprightness, has the same discernment between right and wrong, is the subject, like man, of moral law, may properly be required to worship and revere his Creator, and must be the subject of rewards and punishments under the Divine government; and, further, is possessed of the same inalienable rights as man, viz., those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." All this, and much more, results inevitably, upon the supposition above stated, from the doctrine that the dog is endowed with "psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man." Now, if this be truth, of course it is all right. But, palpably to all men but such as these philosophers, it is not true. For whatever be the instincts and intellect of the dog, with all the teaching and training ever given him, the moral sense, the feeling of right and wrong has never been developed—the dog has no such faculty or power. But if, on the other hand, the dog be held, as he is by Professor Agassiz, to be the same animal, of the same characters, as known and described from all antiquity, then it follows, from the assertion that his "psychical faculties [are] in every respect of the same kind as those of man," that man is degraded from his high position, as the moral image and likeness of his Maker, to a level of kind, though not of degree, with the mere animals, and even with the dog. This last is the fair understanding of Agassiz's words, in this place; as it is one legitimate consequence of that classification in zoölogy which ranks man with the brute. But there is no truth, there is nothing of the Divine idea, nothing of the thought of the Creator, in all this: for whilst the moral sense remains in man, the lowest "of poor humanity" will continue to be possessed of psychical faculties *differing in kind* from, and immeasurably exalted above, those of the dog.

Another illustration of Professor Agassiz's views upon this subject, merits special attention. "Who," he says, "can watch the sunfish (*Pomotis vulgaris*) hovering over its eggs, and protecting them for weeks, or the catfish (*Pimelodus catus*) move about with its young, like a hen with her brood, without being satisfied that the feeling which prompts them to these acts is of the same kind as that which attaches the cow to her suckling, or the child to its mother?" [the mother to her child?]

. . . "Who is the investigator, who, having once recognised such a similarity between certain faculties of man, and those of the higher animals, can feel prepared in the present state of our knowledge, to trace the limits where this community of nature ceases? And, yet, to ascertain the character of all these faculties, there is but one road, the study of the habits of animals, and a comparison between them and the earlier stages of developement of man. I confess, I could not say in what the mental faculties of a child differ from those of a young chimpanzee."

Now it may readily be admitted that in the above instances the *animal feelings* of the parents for their offspring are similar, even the same, in their nature, except so far as they may be modified by the peculiar form of animal life in each. But in the mere animals those feelings are wholly instinctive; and does it follow that the human mother can have no other than instinctive animal feelings, nor any additional affections for her offspring? Is she not endowed with a moral nature and feelings, which are unknown to the brute? Is she prohibited by any law of her nature from the exercise of these in her affection for her child? Surely, the human mother, from her nature, has feelings for her child, which are peculiar to her, and which do not at all show themselves in the *storgè* of the brute. And this is in accordance with the judgment of mankind. For if the cow neglects her calf, and it dies, the matter rests there—she is not blamed or punished. But if the human mother neglects, or voluntarily injures her child in any way, so that it perishes, how great is her guilt, and how justly does she suffer the penalty of her crime! Whence now comes that penal law or statute which she has violated, but from the common sense and common consent of all mankind, that her relation to her child is different in kind from that of the brute to its young? And the profoundest reflections of the greatest, wisest, and best of men, vindicate and sustain this spontaneous judgment of humanity—they affirm that it is right to punish the woman, and that it would be wrong to punish the cow. The true and sufficient reason for this difference is, that all men believe and know that man is made in the image of God, while the brute is not.

It needs, therefore, no uncommon power or daring in the "investigator" who attempts "to trace the limit where this community of nature [in man and the animals] ceases." Ordinary talents and acquisitions are abundantly competent. No difficult or abstruse investigations are required. Embryology has not given, and cannot give any light on this subject; the subtle analysis of the lowest and most obscure animals helps not this case; the correctness of the orders in the highest division of mere animals, *i. e.*, the mammals, avails nothing here; but the knowledge of the powers, endowments,* and habits of men and the higher animals, is what is necessary for this investigation; and this knowledge is accessible to all. In order to be qualified to investigate this subject, one need not be an expert naturalist, in the technical sense of the word. The first and great divisions of organic bodies, vegetable, animal, and human, are already given—they are palpable to sense on presentation of fully developed specimens of each. No extensive examination, or wide comparison, is necessary to ascertain the difference between mental and moral characteristics. Indeed all the facts urged by Prof. Agassiz against separating man from the mere animals, are manifest to all intelligent observers, and many of them have been a thousand times remarked; they have, moreover, been considered pertinent and strong, but they are not incapable of satisfactory explanation; and they become less and less important as the examination of the human and animal powers becomes more full and particular. He 'confesses, indeed, that he cannot say in what the mental faculties of a child differ from those of a young chimpanzee;' but if he means, that the two are too young to *exhibit* any difference, he only asserts that he cannot distinguish because the differences are not yet developed, which may be easily believed; and if he means, they do not exhibit any difference in their mental

* At the late meeting of the British Association, the President of the zoölogical section, Prof. Huxley, after the reading of a paper by Dr. Owen on the brain of man and that of the gorilla, said that this was not the way to distinguish man from the monkeys; that such discussions were futile; and gave his opinion that the difference between man and the animals was to be found, not in the toes nor in the brain, but in the "moral and intellectual" characters or powers. The value of this, from so great and distinguished an anatomist, can hardly be over-estimated.

faculties because there is none, let that be distinctly understood, with all the consequences which must flow from the doctrine; but we can discover no reason why that assertion should be restricted to the young, since, if it be true of them, it must be true also of the old. Evidently, the true method requires the examination and comparison of the faculties of a mature man and a mature chimpanzee. A knowledge of the "earlier stages of developement" of either man or the animal, or both, is of no value for the determination of the differences between them. And when mature specimens are examined and compared, even the somatic characters of the two are found to be so diverse that they are placed in different divisions; whilst in the qualities of their minds they are so different, that the one has human or moral life, and the other is entirely destitute of every such manifestation. Their young inherit their distinctive properties, and are sure to develope or manifest them in due time, according to a law of nature settled and fixed from their creation. A creature may be too young to manifest its specific characters; as it may not be possible to determine from the egg what shall be hatched from it; and as the embryo may be too little advanced to exhibit the characters of its class or order; but what does all this amount to, whilst we are able to predict with perfect certainty that the offspring of a man will prove nothing else but human, and that of a chimpanzee nothing else but an ugly chimpanzee? There is no uncertainty here, although the argument for classing man with the animals, which Prof. Agassiz founds upon the fact that the faculties of the young of both are undistinguishable, has no force whatever upon any other supposition. And whilst he concedes and maintains that, according to the immutable laws of nature, the elements and forces in a child will not be developed into a monkey, nor those of a young monkey into a child, it is difficult even to conceive of any rational object for which he makes the statement that whilst they remain undeveloped, the faculties of the one cannot be distinguished from those of the other.

We are now prepared for the positive statement that "this community of nature [between man and the animal] ceases" *where the powers cease to be the same.* Between the vegetable and the animal is the community of vegetative life or power;

and this community of nature ceases where the animal life begins. In like manner, between the animal and man is the community of vegetative and animal life; and this community of nature ceases where the moral life begins, which belongs exclusively to man. The fixed and unchangeable limit between man and the animal is just as easily and clearly traceable as that between the animal and the vegetable.

The structure of the higher monkeys places them, in this particular, in the next rank to man, but even in this respect they are entirely distinct from him, as has been shown by Professors Owen and Weyman, the very highest authorities, and by others. In intellect they are probably inferior to the lion and elephant, perhaps to other animals; and being absolutely destitute of moral powers, they are placed at an immeasurable distance from man.

The protest which has been made by many philosophers, and naturalists too, against the classification of Cuvier, and the wide difference "between man and the monkeys," which that protest maintains, has not arisen, as Agassiz intimates, from the ignorance of the Greeks "of the existence of the orang outang and chimpanzee." Many of those who have protested, and do still protest, against it, have known little or nothing of the ignorance or knowledge of the Greeks upon this subject. They founded this distinction on those characters which *man is known to possess, and which the brute is known not to possess.* The discovery of the orang outang, the chimpanzee, and the gorilla, has not diminished the difference in the least. If Aristotle had been as well acquainted with them as are the modern naturalists, he would have discovered in them no more semblance of that moral power which he gives as the distinctive character of man, than he discovered in other animals. Agassiz himself finds his chosen example of what he pleases to call moral faculties, not in the monkey, but in the dog; and the dog was as well known to Aristotle as it is to Professor Agassiz. It is the modern naturalists alone, with no new facts which bear upon the point, who profess to find so little difference between man and the brute—a view utterly repudiated by Aristotle. Even Linnæus forgot, or disregarded, or never knew, the distinction given by the great heathen phi-

losopher and naturalist, when, as quoted by Agassiz, he (Linnæus) said in 1746: "Nullum characterem adhuc eruere potui, unde homo a simia internoscatur." True, he afterwards made the discovery of structural differences, so as to place man in the first order, and the monkeys in the second order of his corrected zoölogy in 1761; but neither Linnæus, nor Cuvier, nor Agassiz, has made the distinction so clearly presented by Aristotle in the grand moral peculiarity of man; by which he separated him from all the animals in a class by himself. This, indeed, is not a mere nominal classification, but one based upon the distinctive characters of organized beings.

The protest is stronger, made by more and louder voices now than ever before. Indeed, there is reason for another protest from the great body of naturalists against such views as Professor Agassiz has here presented, as being unfounded in history, and unsupported by any facts or fair considerations; whilst, if there were any need of it, we would cordially sustain his "protest against the bigotry spreading in some quarters, [where?] which would press upon science doctrines not immediately flowing from scientific premises." For we maintain that the classification here advocated is strictly "scientific," inasmuch as it is founded upon palpable facts and well-known principles of the highest consequence in science and morals. If there is bigotry in asserting and urging upon naturalists and philosophers, the moral faculties or powers, as distinctively and exclusively characteristic of man, it is the bigotry of Aristotle, and others among the wisest of the heathen. Repelling, therefore, with our author, every influence "which would press upon science doctrines not immediately flowing from scientific premises," we maintain that if there is any truth in natural history established by scientific examinations, carried on through the whole historic period, it is this, that *no brute has "psychical faculties in every respect of the same kind as those of man;"* and that no dog, no learned pig, no orang, chimpanzee, or gorilla, is, in this respect, "on a level" with any real specimen of true, though "poor humanity."

Prof. Agassiz undertakes to support this doctrine of intimate relationship between men and animals, by an argument derived from a supposed analogy between the inarticulate cries

of different species of the same family of animals, and the various languages of the human race. This part of the Essay is very remarkable as exhibiting views of language which must astonish the comparative philologists, to whom we leave it; for we cannot examine it here, and we abstain from attempting to characterize it by any descriptive terms.

He shows also that the psychological characteristics of man and of the animals possess a high interest, inasmuch as mind and soul have a value superior to that of matter, even in its most highly organized forms. To this we fully subscribe; yet we can hardly accept in its full extent the following assertion: "The natural history of animals is by no means completed after the somatic side of their nature has been fully investigated; they, too, have a psychological individuality, which, though less fully studied, is nevertheless the connecting link between them and man." Now, we have seen that the community of nature between man and the brute is that of vegetative and animal life, the latter including the animal mind or understanding, with its passions and instincts: also, the animals are linked to man by their organized structure. But their "psychological individuality" is totally destitute of the moral element, which is the predominating characteristic of the "psychological individuality" of man. So far, then, is it from being true that this is "the connecting link between them and man," that it is precisely in their psychological characters that the animals are most distinctly and broadly separated from man.

From this point of view we are enabled to appreciate other statements of our author, in which he anticipates a new paradise for us in our future life, as follows: "Most of the arguments of philosophy in favour of the immortality of man, apply equally to the permanency of this principle in other living beings." How little of truth there is in this we have seen in the fact that the moral and religious endowments, the grand reason for immortality, apart from which all other reasons together have little or no force, are confined to man alone of all the creatures of earth. But Professor Agassiz continues: "May I not add, that a future life, in which man should be deprived of that great source of enjoyment, and intellectual and moral

improvement, which result from the contemplation of the harmonies of an organic world, would involve a lamentable loss; and may we not look to a spiritual concert of the combined worlds, and all their inhabitants, in presence of their Creator, as the highest conception of paradise?" Many will admit the possibility of this; but most of those who do, will exclaim, Is this the paradise of God? Has this world stood so long, and displayed such a multitude of wonderful operations for thousands of years, to have the same "harmonies of an organic world" repeated on a grander scale? Is it not more probable that these earthly wonders will have answered their object, and come to an end, and that they will be followed by higher wonders of knowledge, more glorious displays of moral excellence, and more transcendent works of the infinite Creator? But are such speculations scientific? And if philosophy must indulge in them, how much does she need for her guidance, to hear that voice behind the veil, which assures us that all things there will be light, and peace, and love—not painful research and seeking, but full and eternal enjoyment.

Before closing this article, it is necessary to recur, for a moment, to a statement by Professor Agassiz, which has been already noticed, "of the close connection there is between the facts ascertained by scientific investigations, and the discussions now carried on respecting the origin of organized beings." To this he adds: "According to some they originated spontaneously by the immediate agency of physical forces, and have become successively more and more diversified by changes produced gradually upon them by these same forces. Others believe that there exist laws in nature which were established by the Deity in the beginning, to the action of which the origin of organized beings may be ascribed; while, according to others, they owe their existence to the immediate intervention of an intelligent Creator." Of these different views, the first two, as already explained, our author shows to be insupportable, and philosophically absurd, from the evidence of thought and design, and from the fitness of organized beings for relations to, and benevolent association with each other, which cannot be found in unthinking forces, nor in laws ever inoperative apart from mind; and he adopts the third view, that they must

be derived from an intelligent and infinite Creator. How these organized beings *began to be*, there are no facts in nature to show; from this source, only possible and more or less probable hypotheses are, or ever can be, accessible to man. The common opinion is, that the vegetable kingdom, by a Divine fiat, was evolved in full maturity of plant and fruit, or seed, already fitted for the wants of the animal kingdom; which was next created by a similar fiat, in all its multitude and specific diversity, and consequently surrounded with the necessary provision for the support of its life: in fine, that man was the crowning work of the infinite Creator, and was formed in the perfection of his powers, with articulate language as readily flowing from his lips, and with as much facility of spontaneous action in all his members, as is the case now with a mature man. This certainly was the philosophical view of Moses, not to plead here his claims to inspiration, which have never been invalidated—a view for its rational probability, as we think, never yet paralleled. But Professor Agassiz believes that organized beings were "created as eggs"; and that the "conditions necessary for their growth must have been provided for"; also that these "conditions must have been conformable to those in which the living representatives of the types first produced now reproduce themselves." The method here indicated is conceivable and not absurd, as we think, because infinite wisdom and power can be limited only by absolute impossibilities. But when we consider these conditions of the fertilized eggs in which the first types "now reproduce themselves," and what an amount of continued care and attention and contrivance must have been necessary, although no special good seems to result from the long and slow process, how much more simple, grand, and divine appears the other procedure, viz., that all the types were at first created in the *full maturity of their frame and powers!* But in either mode of creation, as well observed by Agassiz, "the transmutation theory furnishes no explanation of their existence," viz., in reference to causation, because organization must have existed before transmutation could have begun.

Finally, it should be observed, that the four distinct plans of organization in the zoölogical system of Cuvier, adopted by Agassiz, break up that "unity of composition," for which St.

Hilaire, the father, contended, which has since been sustained by the son, and which we might expect to be prominent in any arrangement which claims to be an expression of the Divine thought. For it is not enough, as clearly shown in this Essay, that a system should present the facts of nature in their relations, and thus exhibit the harmony that reigns in the works of the Creator. All this is done by the system of Cuvier in the plastic hand of our author. But any system, which is truly the expression of the Divine mind, must assign to every creature its true rank, according to the characteristics and powers of its nature. Especially is it necessary that to the noblest creature should be assigned a distinct and the highest place in the classification. Thus, if Agassiz had followed St. Hilaire, or Ehrenburg, or even Aristotle, instead of Cuvier, he would have ranked man in an independent and separate division, and placing all the mere animals as consistently, he would have presented the Divine plan in that true "unity of composition" by which the works of infinite wisdom are ever characterized. For whether we consider articulate language, the power of apprehending and reasoning upon abstract and necessary truth, and upon the relations and affinities of the organic kingdoms—or the moral power, the sense of right and wrong and of religious obligation, in virtue of which man alone is made in the image of God—whether we consider any one, or all of these together, as characteristic of man, he is thereby dissevered from, and immeasurably exalted above the mere animals, (in the highest of which not one of these traits appears,) and by the thought and mind of God he is appointed to stand at the head of the creation, in a division and a rank by himself. Zoölogy is thus brought into harmony with the Divine plan. Science is perfected. God is honoured.

But Professor Agassiz has committed himself to the classification of Cuvier, which ranks man as an animal, and nothing more; and it is in defence of this system that he is led into that systematic disparagement of every thing distinctively human, and unto that extravagant exaltation of the faculties and powers of the brute, which we have signalized in this paper. This is the explanation of what, in such a man, were otherwise inexplicable—the system required it at his hands. What the

tendency of this system must ever be whilst it continues to be held is here revealed in the most striking manner, viz., to degrade man. But it is comforting to know that discovery and science are moving in the right direction to ensure its overthrow. If, indeed, man is nothing more than an animal, and has no traits differing in kind from those of the monkey, the elephant, the ox, the lion, the dog, then, and not otherwise, this system may stand. But if it is no less untrue, than it is repulsive to common sense and to the human heart, that men and brutes have psychical faculties and powers in every respect the same in kind—yea, if man is man—the system must fall; and reason and conscience will come to fill their proper place in determining the classifications of zoölogy. God speed the day!

Art. VII.—*The War.*

The war which is now desolating our country bids fair to be an epoch-making event. It will probably modify essentially our political and social institutions. Should Europe become involved in the struggle, it can hardly fail to produce changes in that part of the world equally important. Should European nations be wise enough to abstain from intervention, the disturbances in the course of trade, and the radical changes therewith connected, may produce results which no human sagacity can now foresee. The interests involved in this struggle are therefore so momentous that the eyes of the civilized world are anxiously watching its progress. None but the frivolous can in this matter be indifferent or neutral. Men must take sides, and they must speak out. Silence is impossible. The feelings of the community do, and must, find expression at the family altar, from the pulpit, the forum, and the press, both secular and religious. The cobweb theories by which some among us attempted to muzzle the church, speaking through her ministers, her religious journals, and ecclesiastical courts, have been

swept away. The authors of those theories were among the first to discard them. This war touches the conscience in too many points to render silence on the part of religious men either allowable or possible. There never was a time when the public conscience was more disturbed, or when it was more necessary that moral principles in their bearing on national conduct should be clearly presented. In the first place, the great principle that the moral law, the will of God however revealed, binds nations as well as individuals, needs to be so exhibited and enforced as to secure its practical recognition. It cannot be denied that it is too frequently ignored. Not only public men in their actions, but the people in their judgments, proceed on the assumption that expediency is the only rule to guide the conduct of nations. The point in each case to be decided, is the wisdom, not the morality, of a given measure. How it will affect this or that interest is carefully considered, and the decision is suspended on this calculation of probabilities. Whether it be consistent or inconsistent with the law of God, is not taken into consideration. Of course, in extreme cases, ignoring the morality of actions is impossible. No nation can openly advocate murder, treachery, or theft. Nevertheless it is true, to a lamentable extent, that public measures are adopted and estimated, as a general thing, by the rule of expediency, to the disregard or neglect of the law of God. Indeed, according to a scheme of ethics which for many years has been taught extensively in Europe and America, there is no higher principle of action than expediency. Right and wrong are words without specific meaning. That is right which promotes our own happiness, say some, or the happiness of the community, as others say; and that is wrong which has an opposite tendency. Apart from the degrading character of this theory, it is obvious that the decision of the question, what the operation of a given measure will be, is often one which the widest range of experience and the greatest sagacity are unable to answer, whereas its moral character a child may determine with certainty and in a moment. Expediency, so far as all moral questions are concerned, is not only a wrong rule of action, but one which can lead neither to certainty nor unanimity of judgment. It will be a great national benefit, if the

people of this country should be roused by the trials through which we are now passing, to turn their minds to God, to recognise their dependence upon him, and their obligation to make his will their rule of action as a nation. If this war should burn into the national consciousness the conviction that what is wrong never can be expedient, we shall not have suffered in vain.

In the second place, What is the moral or religious aspect under which this war is to be regarded? Are the sufferings under which we, as a nation, are now labouring, divine judgments—the manifestation of God's displeasure on account of our national sins? This is the popular view of the subject. We constantly hear the exhortation addressed to the people to confess their sins before God, to humble themselves under his rod, and to put away those evils which have called down upon us the Divine wrath. The principle is often avowed that suffering, whether in individuals or in nations, and especially in the latter, is always punitive. We have heard in high places the declaration, that whenever we see calamity overtake any man, we may conclude that it was for some sin known or unknown. Nations, as such, having no immortality, must find in this world the period of retribution, and therefore, especially with regard to them, it is said, we may safely infer that national suffering is a proof and punishment of national sins. This disposition to look upon calamities as evidences of the Divine displeasure, it must be confessed, is very natural. It has revealed itself in every form, from the days of Job to the present time. When the barbarous people of Melita saw a viper fasten on the hand of Paul, they said, "No doubt this man is a murderer." This disposition to administer justice, is only one expression of that spirit of self-righteousness which belongs to our fallen nature. If men expect acceptance with God on the ground of their goodness, they expect suffering on account of their sins. The legal spirit attributes prosperity to the Divine favour, and adversity to the Divine wrath. It was our common fallen nature, and not any thing peculiar to Christ's disciples, which prompted the question, "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?" This disposition to look on suffering as always punitive is not only natural, but, we are told, has the

support of Scripture. Long lists of passages are quoted, threatening the wrath of God on nations and individuals for their sins. The Bible is full of promises of prosperity to the good, and of denunciations of evil to the wicked. The righteous "shall be a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper. The ungodly are not so; but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away." From such representations it has been inferred that good and evil are in this world distributed on the principles of justice. The Bible itself, however, tells us that if we speak thus, we should offend against the generation of God's children. We are not to interpret providence on the assumption that this is the state of retribution; we are not to regard Lazarus, at the gate of the rich man, as accursed of God, and Dives as his favourite. What the Scriptures plainly teach on this subject is, 1. That so far as rational creatures are concerned, where there is no sin, personal or imputed, there is no suffering. 2. That no man, no community of men, no society, church, or nation, ever suffered in this life as much as their sins deserve. And, consequently, no individual or nation can ever justly complain of the dispensations of Divine providence as unmerited inflictions. 3. But thirdly, it is no less clearly taught, that the distribution of good and evil in this world to individuals, churches, or nations, is not determined by the principles of justice, but according to the wise and benevolent sovereignty of God. He puts up one, and puts down another of the princes of the earth; he exalts one nation and humbles another; he gives one man prosperity and another adversity, not according to their several deserts, but according to his own good pleasure. Sometimes, nay often, his dispensations towards individuals and nations are punitive. He often makes suffering so directly the consequent of transgression, that their causal and judicial relation can be questioned neither by the offender nor by spectators. It is not more evident that death by the hand of the executioner, is the punishment of murder under the government of man, than that disease and poverty are the punishment of drunkenness under the government of God. That suffering may be punitive, is however no evidence that it

always is so. Because loss of health is the punishment of excess, it does not follow that every case of sickness is an expression of the wrath of God. As with individuals, so with churches and nations. God has various ends to accomplish by the trials which he calls upon them to endure. Sometimes, as we just said, he means to punish them for their sins; sometimes he designs to try their faith and patience, and to make them examples to others; sometimes he intends to develope their character, to call forth their powers, to fit them for higher degrees of usefulness; and sometimes, as our Lord said, the end of their sufferings is, "that the works of God should be made manifest in them." This was the grand design of all Paul's sufferings; and therefore he rejoiced in his infirmities, in order that the power of Christ might rest upon him. Such being the case, it is obviously most unscriptural, and often the manifestation of a pharisaical and censorious spirit, when men regard calamities, whether of individuals or of nations, as necessarily Divine judgments, and manifestations of his wrath. This is not only a fundamentally erroneous view of the Divine government as administered in this world, but it betrays an inordinate estimate of mere temporal prosperity. Happiness, abundance of the good things of this life, health, riches, and honours, are not the highest gifts of God. Poverty, suffering, the necessity of labour, disappointment and reproach, are often the greatest blessings, and evidence of God's especial favour. How strange would the Beatitudes sound if accommodated to this new theory, Blessed are ye rich, Blessed are ye that are prosperous and honoured among men! How is it that our Lord says, Blessed are they that mourn; Blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you? Who are they of whom God says, "The world was not worthy," but those who wandered about, being destitute, afflicted, tormented? Good people sometimes err in this matter from confusion of mind. They feel the burden of their sins; they are oppressed with a sense of guilt; they know that nothing which they or others can be called upon to suffer in this life, can exceed their ill-deserts; and hence they assume that to deny that suffering in themselves, or in the community to which they belong, is punitive, and evidence of God's displeasure for their sins, is equivalent

to denying that they are guilty in the sight of God. This is a strange mistake. Paul regarded himself as the chief of sinners, but he gloried and rejoiced in his afflictions, not as evidences of God's wrath, but as tokens of his love, and the means of manifesting the power of Christ. The martyrs, one and all, were sinful men, and deserved "the wrath and curse of God, both in this life and in that which is to come," but who would dare to say that their sufferings on the rack or at the stake were in punishment of their sins. The apostle called upon believers to count it all joy when they fell into diverse temptations or trials; and the early Christians all considered it an honour to suffer for Christ's sake. Nothing can be more contrary to Scripture, more opposed to history and fact, or more repugnant to right feeling than this doctrine, that the distribution of good and evil in this world is determined by the principles of distributive justice.

It is often said, indeed, that providence may not be judicial so far as individuals are concerned, but as nations do not exist in the future world, they must be punished for their national sins in this life. It is, however, no more true of nations than it is of churches, that they have no organic, denominational existence in the world to come. Are we therefore to infer that the persecutions of the early church, the massacre of the Waldenses, the butchery of St. Bartholemew's day, the dragonnades of France, were all vials of Divine wrath poured out upon his church? The truth is, that God deals with nations as he does with individuals. He acts as a sovereign, sometimes he punishes them for their sins; sometimes he allows them to prosper in their iniquities; sometimes he spares them for centuries, and then brings on one generation the retribution due for the blood shed from the foundation of the world. Quite as often, however, he disciplines and educates them by suffering, as he does his own children, and purifies them as by fire, not in wrath, but in mercy. There is no more reason for regarding a nation struggling for truth and righteousness, as accursed of God, than for regarding the afflictions of God's elect as evidence of his displeasure. The monstrous doctrine of Carlyle, and of the modern philosophy, that the Weltgeschichte is the Weltgericht; that history is judicial; that the strong are always

right; that those who succeed ought to succeed; that we must always take sides against the afflicted and down-trodden, is simply diabolical. It would make us the partisans of the kingdom of Satan from the beginning until now. No man really believes this. No American regards the trials of our revolutionary war, as Divine judgments for the sins of the people; no patriot looks upon the blood shed at Bunker Hill, Princeton, or Yorktown, as drawn by the scourge of the Almighty. Neither does any enlightened man of this generation look upon the civil war in England as a judgment of God against the nation. It was its salvation. To the perfidious Stuarts and their abettors, it may have been punitive, but to the people it was the price and means of their Protestant and national life. So in our case, we, as a nation, have sins enough to justify our destruction. So had Paul and all the martyrs. This war, for what we know, may be a punishment for those sins. But no man has a right to assume this, much less has he the right to press that assumption on the consciences of others. It may be, as other wars and other trials, individual and national, have been, a mark of God's favour; the discipline by which he is educating the nation for a higher career of usefulness in his service. It may be his means of awakening the consciousness of our unity as a nation, of arousing the spirit of patriotism, and of patient endurance. It may be the necessary process of developement of our national life, and be all meant in mercy and not in wrath. This at least is an elevated and healthful view of the subject. At any rate, we are not to take for granted that God is against us. We are not to assume, even should the rebellion be successful, that God approves of the cause of the Confederates; that he favours the perpetuity and extension of slavery; or that he condemns the efforts of the government and of the nation to preserve our national life and institutions. There is need for caution against this pharisaical and censorious spirit. We can hardly take up a religious journal, or enter a religious meeting, without being struck with some of its manifestations. If the works of some public improvement are carried away by a flood, it is because the proprietors violate the Sabbath. If a village is burnt, it is because the inhabitants were wicked; if a man falls dead, it is because he was a blas-

phemer. Do not these things happen to the just and unjust? Are we entitled to gather up our skirts lest they should be defiled by the touch of poverty or suffering? Do not the Scriptures and all experience teach us, that God is a sovereign, that the orderings of his providence are not determined by justice, but by mysterious wisdom for the accomplishment of higher ends than mere punishment or reward? We are in his hands, and we are to learn his will and our duty, not from the adverse or prosperous dispensations of providence, but from his holy word.

A third point about which the public conscience is exercised, is the nature and extent of the allegiance which we owe to the government. It is admitted on all hands that government is a Divine institution; that obedience to the higher powers is a moral duty; and that disloyalty is not only a civil crime, but a sin in the sight of God. It is, and must be, further admitted, that the government to which our allegiance is due, is the national government at Washington, of which Abraham Lincoln is the constitutional head. Even those who hold to the doctrine of secession, must admit that the citizens of those States which have not seceded are conscience-bound to be loyal to the United States. But what is loyalty? As disloyalty is a crime, we have no right to change the meaning of the word. No man has a right to say of another, "he is not loyal in my sense of the word," any more than he has a right to say, he is a thief or murderer in his sense of those terms. Words have a sense of their own, determined by usage, which no man is at liberty to alter. It is important, therefore, that we should have a distinct idea of what loyalty is, and what is, and what is not, inconsistent with it. Unfortunately this, as so many other words, has more than one legitimate meaning, so that a man may be loyal in one sense, and disloyal in another. Neither of these senses, however, can be arbitrarily determined. They must be ascertained and fixed by authority. In the strict meaning of the word, loyalty is the allegiance and service which the law requires of a citizen to his country, or of a subject to his sovereign. This meaning of the term is determined by its etymology, as well as its usage. As it is derived from the French word signifying law, it is properly that service

which the law demands. Loyalty, however, is also a sentiment. It expresses a state of mind. It is fidelity of love. Thus Cowper says: "We, too, are friends to loyalty; we *love* the king who loves the law," &c. As human laws respect overt acts, it is evident that a man may be loyal in the legal sense of the term—in that sense which entitles him to all the rights and privileges of a loyal citizen—who has no real affection for the government under which he lives. We suppose every one has heard, even before this war began, a preference expressed for other forms of government than our own; and not unfrequently, an ostentatious disavowal of all patriotic feeling. Whatever may be thought of those who utter such sentiments, they are not amenable to the law of the land for disloyalty. Besides those who are heart and soul devoted to their country, not only obedient to its laws and true to their allegiance, but zealous for the success of the government in its present struggle for national existence, constituting, as we doubt not such persons do, the great mass of the people of the North, there are among us three other classes of men. First, those who are strictly and conscientiously loyal in the legal sense of the word. They scrupulously perform all the duties which the law exacts at their hands, and abstain from everything which tends to afford aid or comfort to the rebels. Nevertheless, they disapprove of the war. They think it unauthorized or unwise. They prefer that the matters in dispute should be peacefully adjusted, or, failing in such attempts, that the Union should be dissolved by mutual consent. A second class go still further; while keeping within the limits of the law, they nevertheless cordially sympathize with the South, they are glad whenever the rebels are successful, and cast down when victory attends the federal arms. They, however, keep these feelings to themselves, or utter them only in the privacy of their own households. We do not see how the law can take cognizance of either of these classes. If they do not transgress law, they cannot be legally molested on account either of their opinions or their feelings. There is, however, still a third class, consisting of those who are not wise or self-possessed enough to abstain from the expression of their feelings. They openly exult when the federal armies are defeated, and publicly express their satisfaction when the rebels

are successful. What the law would say to such persons we do not pretend to know. Liberty of speech is a very sacred right, and should not be lightly invaded. Many of the best men in England openly sided, so far as the expressing of feeling was concerned, with the American colonies during the Revolutionary war, and were unmolested. More recently, the liberals in parliament and elsewhere, did not hesitate to denounce the war against Napoleon, and to rejoice in every success of the French over the allied forces. If such liberty was afforded in monarchical England, it may be allowed in republican America. Still it is very hard to bear. To hear men, enjoying the protection of the government, and, in many cases, seeking its offices and emoluments, openly rejoicing in its discomfiture, taking sides in feeling and in words with its enemies, even when through prudence or cowardice they abstain from any illegal action, is a trial to the patience of patriotic men, to which they ought not to be subjected. Such persons should at least be marked and avoided. All political support or encouragement should be withheld from them. They may be allowed to enjoy the protection of the law, which they take care not to transgress, but they have no right to complain, if nothing more than what the law demands be conceded to them. Whatever may be legally withheld, may be rightfully withheld from those who in heart, if not in act, are the enemies of the country. It is better to err on the right side, and to allow too much, rather than too little liberty. We should bear with great evils rather than violate any of those principles of law and order, which lie at the foundation of all society. This distinction between loyalty as a legal duty, and loyalty as a sentiment, ought not to be overlooked. For the former we are responsible to the authorities of the land; for the latter we are not. And doubtless much injustice has been done from confounding these two things. Men have not only been denounced as disloyal, but treated as such, who have not offended against the law, though their opinions and feelings may not have been on the side of their country. That many friends of the Union at the South have been despoiled of their property, imprisoned or hung, for the mere expression of their feelings, is no reason why we should violate the law or the principles of justice.

The South has done much in this war, which, if done at the North, would fill the world with indignation. Nevertheless let us be just. Let us not attempt to make men amenable to the civil authorities for their opinions or their feelings. For their words they may be held responsible. It is by words information is given to the enemy. It is by words that soldiers are induced to desert, or men dissuaded from enlisting, or from paying taxes. It is for the law to determine when a man, in the exercise of his liberty of speech, exposes himself to judicial process. Our great anxiety is that our country should do right; that those in authority should not transgress the law of God, or violate the principles of justice, in this the time of our probation.

Fourthly, a still more momentous subject which concerns the public conscience, is the object of the war. It is very possible that a change as to this matter, may consciously or unconsciously be effected in the minds of the people or of our rulers. When the war began there was no diversity of opinion on the subject. By the unanimous vote of Congress, by the official, and often repeated declarations of the President, and of the heads of departments, and of commanding generals, the sole object of the war was proclaimed to be the preservation of the Union and of the Constitution. Any desire or purpose to alter that Constitution, or to impair the rights of the several States, was openly and solemnly repudiated. So far as we know there has been no official or authoritative renunciation of this object as the only legitimate end of the war. The President has recently declared this to be the object at which he still aims. The abolition of slavery, when spoken of at all in this connection, was only adverted to as a means to an end. If the Constitution and Union could not be preserved without the abolition of slavery, then slavery should, if possible, be abolished. To this sentiment, we believe, the heart and conscience of the country fully responded. It can, however, hardly be questioned, that what was spoken of as a means, is by a large party at home and abroad, now regarded as the legitimate end. The abolitionists, to a great extent, are for the war as a means of putting an end to African slavery; as a means for the restoration of the Union, they would be opposed to it. The same is true,

to a great extent, with the philanthropists of Europe. Even Count Gasparin, the most enlightened of our friends abroad, evidently contemplates the emancipation of the slave as the object which gives elevation, grandeur, and interest to the conflict in which we are now engaged.

This is a very serious matter. If the abolition of slavery be made, either really or avowedly, the object of the war, we believe we shall utterly fail. If the perservation of the Union and the Constitution be sincerely adhered to as the only legitimate end of the war, we believe we shall not only be successful in the conflict, but that the abolition of slavery will follow in a natural and healthful manner. We regard it, therefore, as the duty of every man to enter his protest against any departure from the object for which the country so enthusiastically took up arms. To substitute for that object the abolition of slavery, would, in our judgment, be disastrous, 1. Because it would be morally wrong. It may be conceded that the system of slavery, as it exists in this country, is a great moral evil; that it is a burden and curse to the whole nation; that it is a great source of power to those in arms against the nation. It is, however, not enough that our object should be in itself good, and its attainment eminently desirable, to justify a war. False religion is a great moral evil; its prevalence is the one great curse of the world; the prosperity of our own and of every other country would be immeasurably promoted by its suppression. Would this justify a crusade against idolatry and superstition? So also despotism is a grievous yoke on the neck of the nations. Its prevalence abroad is a great evil to us. The fellow-feeling between political and domestic despots, between the privileged classes and slaveholders, is the secret of a great part of the hatred to the North and sympathy with the South, which prevails in Europe, and which have been one of the principal causes of the continuance of this war. But this would not justify our government in making war against England and France. We cannot rightfully sacrifice thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of money, because aristocrats hate us, and wish evil to our institutions. Nothing can be a legitimate object of a war but something which a nation has not only a right to attain, but which also it is bound to secure. The sup-

pression of false religion; the destruction of feudal institutions abroad; the abolition of slavery in Asia or Africa, does not fulfil either of these conditions. These are not objects for which our government was instituted, nor is it responsible for them. But the security of its own territories; the protection of the lives and property of its citizens; the preservation of its own national existence, with all the prerogatives therewith connected, are the very ends for which civil governments are instituted, and for which they are responsible. These are ends which they are bound to secure, and these, therefore, alone are the legitimate objects of war. Other things may be benevolent, useful, desirable, but they are to be attained in some other way. War is a tremendous evil. It is no slight matter for parents to give up their children to death. The government which calls for this great sacrifice must make out a case of necessity. There must be a moral obligation on a people to make war, or the war itself is a crime. Now it cannot be asserted that the abolition of slavery, however desirable in itself, is one of the ends for which our national government was instituted. We are not bound to abolish slavery by war, as we should be bound to resist invasion, or as we are bound to suppress rebellion by force of arms. England had the power, as mistress of the seas, to suppress the slave trade, by making it a ground for war. But she was not bound to put an end to that horrid traffic in that way, and to have done so would have been an outrage on the rights of nations, and therefore a violation of the moral law. If our government, therefore, has neither the right nor the obligation to abolish slavery within the limits of the States, which is undeniable, and never has been denied, then to make such abolition the end of the war, is a plain and palpable violation of the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, and of the law of God. We do not say that the emancipation of the slaves may not be a legitimate means for the prosecution of the war. But the difference between its being a means and an end, is as great as the difference between blowing up a man's house as a means of arresting of a conflagration, and getting up a conflagration for the sake of blowing up his house. Plain as this is, and essential, in the moral aspect of the case, as this distinction is, we do not expect to

see it regarded. If men hate and disapprove of any thing, they seldom are scrupulous as to the means of getting rid of it. The plains and hills of every European nation are red with the blood shed in obedience to this spirit. The end sanctifies the means, is the motto of fanaticism as well as of Jesuitism. Christianity was hateful to the heathen, Protestantism was hateful to the Papists, and therefore all means, rapine and murder included, were lawful in their eyes for their suppression. In like manner slavery is hateful to the men of this generation, and therefore they are prone to make its extirpation the great end of the war. We have, however, in the sight of God, no more right to do this, than we have to make war for the suppression of false religion, or despotism, or any other great evil which prevails in the world.

2. The substitution of the abolition of slavery for the preservation of the Union, as either the real or avowed object of the war, besides being morally wrong, because transcending the powers of the government, would also be in the highest degree inexpedient. If there be any one condition of success, in the deadly struggle in which we are now engaged, more essential than any other, it is the cordial union of the people in the loyal States. That this great war should be conducted to a safe conclusion as a party measure, is simply impossible. Neither the Republicans nor Democrats can command the resources of the nation. Much less can those resources be called out and directed by a mere fragment of either of those great parties. Unity of purpose and of effort on the part of the North and of the border States, is therefore essential. It is self-evident that this union and coöperation can be secured only by the adoption of a truly national, as distinguished from a party, policy. The object of the war must be something in which the whole country can with a good conscience coöperate, and for which the whole people are willing to exert their utmost energies. Stated in these general terms, these principles can hardly be questioned. If, then, it can be shown that the whole country, the people now loyal to the government, cannot, and will not unite, in making the abolition of slavery the object of the war, then it must be admitted that any such change in the purpose of the government must be fatal to our

success. It, however, is not a matter which needs to be proved, that the whole people cannot be brought to sustain the war as a means of emancipating the slaves. No party has ventured publicly to announce any such purpose. Nay, the President has, within a few weeks past, disclaimed it. The most influential of the Republican papers (the *New York Times*) in a recent issue made the same disclaimer. The democratic party, which prevailed in so many of the late elections, is known to be hostile to any such measure; and the large body of voters, who are not party men, but vote as their conscience directs,—the conservative men of the country as they are called—are no less opposed to any such policy. It must, therefore, be suicidal, if not treacherous, for any man or any set of men, to insist on the government taking ground on which the people cannot and will not stand. If there be not wisdom and right feeling enough to secure a national policy, that is, the policy of adhering truly and avowedly to the restoration of the Union as the only legitimate object of the war, then we believe success is hopeless, and the sooner the war is brought to an end the better it will be for all concerned. We are not arguing against the abolition of slavery, any more than we are arguing for the continuance of false religion, or of despotism. We are only arguing that these are not legitimate objects of the war. Having undertaken the war for a purpose which the government and the people heartily approved, and for the attainment of which they felt bound to make every sacrifice, to substitute any other object, be it the acquisition of new territory; the consolidation of the government; the subjugation of one part of the country to another; the abolition of slavery; or any thing else, is palpably wrong and must be disastrous. The policy of States must be guided first by the law of God, and next by a regard to the convictions, feelings, and interests of the people. The men who control that policy at any one time may have their own private opinions as to what would be right and wise, but they must, as statesmen, act for the people, and give effect to their well ascertained desires. It is the public, and not the private conscience and judgment which are to govern the country, and therefore no extreme measure, no measure sanctioned only by a small part of the thinking public, can

be wisely adopted. In the *Pittsburgh Banner* for December 27, 1862, there is a very judicious editorial article bearing on this point, which we should be glad to transfer to our pages. "The people," says the editor, "must be united. A platform, broad enough for all loyal people to stand upon, must be adopted. The radicals cannot carry their principles through. It is utter folly in them to think so. They have not the numbers. The people will not go with them. And the Republicans cannot, as a party, so wage the battle as to triumph. They have the reins of government but only half the people, a power far too weak. Neither could the Democrats, on party principles, succeed. . . . There must be union; and to have union we must adopt broad, noble, national principles."

We do not argue against making the abolition of slavery the object of the war, on general grounds; on the tremendous social revolution involved in the immediate emancipation of four millions of slaves, the great majority of whom are in the lowest state of civilization, or on the wide-spread misery consequent on the loss of the recognised right of property in the labour of such a multitude of men. The President in his recent annual message dwells at length on these evils in favour of his plan of gradual emancipation. We are content to rest the matter on the two grounds already mentioned, viz., that the United States have no more right to go to war for the abolition of slavery than for the correction of any other great social evil at home or abroad; and that the country cannot be expected to unite in the support of a war for any such purpose. We must keep right, and we must keep united, or we must be defeated.

Fifthly, another moral question, of scarcely less importance, concerns the means or measures which are adopted for carrying on the war. The aphorism that all things are lawful in war, is not only unchristian, but inhuman. It was rejected by the heathen and adopted only by savages. And yet we frequently hear the doctrine advanced, that the end of war is to inflict injury on your enemies, and the more injury you inflict the sooner and the more effectually will the war be brought to an end. We have heard men justify the burning of cities and laying waste the country by fire and sword. This, indeed, is often the language of passion rather than of deliberate convic-

tion. Nevertheless, there is great reason to fear that many of the people, and some even in places of authority, have very little scruple as to the morality of the means to be adopted in the suppression of this rebellion. The end sanctifies the means, is practically the creed of many who would not dare to adopt it in its abstract form. We may, however, safely assume that no Christian man can advocate the principle, that every means of injury against enemies may be rightfully adopted. The apostle says of those who teach that we may do evil that good may come, that their damnation is just. That is the judgment of God, and his judgments cannot be disregarded with impunity. It follows, therefore, that if the Union can be preserved only on the condition of the commission of sin, it must be allowed to perish. If one word of blasphemy against the Saviour of men could give us peace, that word should never be spoken. Better far that the whole land should be buried in the depths of the sea. About this there can be no dispute. As little can it be doubted that it is a sin, a violation of the law of God, for our government to disregard any of the established laws and usages of modern warfare in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. Better let the rebels succeed, than offend God, by reverting to the cruel and wicked usages of former ages, or of savage nations. It is one of the recognised rules of modern warfare, that prisoners of war should be humanely treated, and the lives of non-combatants be regarded as sacred. Of course any violation of this rule would be morally wrong. It would not justify a departure from this principle that our enemies disregard it. We fear that the records of southern prisons will prove that, in numerous instances, federal prisoners of war have been subjected to the greatest hardships and indignities, and sometimes shot on the slightest provocation. We must disbelieve not only the testimony of loyal men, but the statements of the southern journals themselves, if hundreds of men, guilty of no other crime than fidelity to the country, expressed no otherwise than by words, have not suffered death. No such case, to our knowledge, has ever occurred at the North. Prisoners have not only been kindly treated, but non-combatants, however open in their avowals of hostility to the Union, have escaped injury from unauthorized persons. In the compara-

tively few cases in which they have been deprived of their liberty, it has been by the officers of the law, and in obedience to the command of the constituted authorities.

Again, it is one of the humane regulations of modern warfare that private property is entitled to protection. Robbery or marauding, on the part of soldiers, is punishable with death. The evils of war are great enough without adding to them the right of unlimited spoliation. The track of armies, whether friendly or hostile, can hardly fail to be marked with desolation. Necessity, which knows no law, subjects the resources of the country through which an army passes, to a greater or less degree to its support. Men and horses must be fed, and it is often impossible that sufficient food or forage can be transported to meet necessary demands. Private property, therefore, must be used; but it is to be used only when necessary, and, when taken from persons not in active opposition to the government, the proprietors are entitled to a fair compensation. What we hold, however, to be immoral and demoralizing, is the doctrine that the private property of non-combatants is a lawful prize in war. Indiscriminate plunder, or wholesale confiscation, confiscation of the property of classes of men, without judicial decision in each case affirming the lawfulness of the forfeiture, we believe to be contrary to the law of God and the usages of civilized society. It is easy to assert the doctrine that a state of war supersedes all civil rights, when we are the gainers. But we become clear-sighted to its injustice, when it operates against ourselves. Here, again, we think that the federal authorities are entitled to great commendation. Southern property in northern hands, or when vested at the North, has not been confiscated; southern debts have not been sequestrated to the use of the federal government. The congress of the Confederate States, on the other hand, has made it unlawful for southern debtors to liquidate the claims of northern creditors. Hundreds of millions of dollars due by the law of God and by the recognised principles of honesty, have been, and still are, withheld from loyal men, who have thereby been ruined. This violation of the great principles of moral obligation by our enemies, will not justify a similar course on our part. What we are anxious should be impressed on the public

conscience, and on the minds of our rulers, civil and military, is, that the rights of property are sacred—that they cannot be violated except in cases of absolute necessity, or in punishment of offences judicially authenticated. We are aware that exception is perhaps unavoidably made to this rule, when towns or cities are not only defended, but turned into fortresses, which must be taken by assault. When a citizen's house is transformed into a fort, from which shots are fired, it loses its character and forfeits its right to protection.

Once more, the usages of war and the consciences of Christian people, condemn as morally wrong all unusual and cruel methods of conducting hostilities, such as poisoning streams, wells, or food, or letting loose hordes of savages, or stirring up servile insurrections. We do not say that it would be wrong to employ the Indians or negroes in our military service, any more than it is wrong for the English to employ the Sepoys of India. When so employed, however, Christian principle and common humanity require that they should be under military discipline, and restrained by all the rules of war. If the great powers of Europe were justifiable, which no man doubts, in interfering to arrest the indiscriminate massacre of the Greeks by the Turks, we may be sure that we should arouse against us the indignation of the Christian world, if we should resort to the instigation of servile war, as a means of suppressing the rebellion. Better far that we should be defeated, and the country divided, than that its unity should be preserved by any such revolting means. If a strong man is bound to arrest the hand of a ruffian about to murder a child, Christendom would be bound to interfere and put an end to a war conducted on any such principles. We have no fear, however, that any thing so horrible as servile insurrections would ever be resorted to, or tolerated by the American government. We should not have even adverted to the subject, had we not been told, (what our own ears never heard,) that men and women, professing to be Christians, have been so demoralized, or demented by passion, as to maintain that it would be just to visit the South with the fate of the Canaanites. We know no parallel to this, but some of the ravings of the southern press, in which resort to poison, fire, and the poinard of the assassin,

has been advocated as lawful in such a war as this. God forbid that such persons should be, or be regarded, as fair representatives either of the North or of the South. If we cannot succeed by right means, we can never succeed at all.

Another question on which the public conscience is sorely tried, and on which good men are much divided in opinion, relates to the limits of the power of the executive. Has the President of the United States the right to suspend the privilege of *habeas corpus*, to order the arrest and imprisonment of private citizens, without due process of law, or to subject them to trial for offences not specified in the laws, by the military authorities? Has he the right to abolish slavery either in the States or Territories? Nothing connected with the war has so disturbed the public mind as the principles involved in these questions. Nothing has called forth such opposition and bitter denunciations against the administration, as the exercise of the right to deal in this summary and arbitrary manner with the liberty and property of private citizens; and nothing threatens so much danger for the future. It is on these points division at the North is most to be apprehended. Already direct collision between the state governments and the national executive is looming up before us. It is not the number, the resources, or the persistency of our enemies, that is to be apprehended, so much as radical division and alienation among the loyal men of the North. This, therefore, is a subject of transcendent importance. It is one also of great difficulty. When the highest legal authorities in the land are found arrayed on opposite sides, it is folly for either party to assume that the matter is plain and simple. It is still greater folly to make the view taken of these questions the test of loyalty or devotion to the cause of the country. Men equally patriotic, and zealous for the support of the government and for the suppression of the rebellion, are found on both sides of these questions. We have no idea of discussing these subjects in their legal or political aspects. The whole object of this article is to endeavour to show the bearing of the moral law on these great questions of national interest, and to assist ourselves and our readers to determine the path of duty. With

this view we propose, in very few words, to state how this matter presents itself to our minds.

1. In the first place, it is conceded that the President of the United States, in his capacity of civil magistrate, and in ordinary times, has no authority under the Constitution, and consequently no authority at all, to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, or to arrest and imprison any citizen without due process of law, or to emancipate a single slave. On this point there does not seem to be any difference of opinion. The proclamation of the President is issued in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. The emancipation of the slaves is declared to be "a war measure." Its justification is rested not on general principles of justice and humanity. It is not because slavery is a moral wrong, but simply because emancipation of southern slaves is assumed to be a necessary means for the successful prosecution of the war, that the decree for their emancipation is defended. This is avowed by the President himself, and therefore the operation of the proclamation is confined to States and parts of States in actual rebellion. If emancipation was proclaimed as a matter of justice to the slave, it must of course be general in its operation.

2. It may also be conceded that the war power of the President is not only derived from the Constitution, but limited by that instrument. In declaring that the President shall be the commander-in-chief of the army, the Constitution invests him with all the prerogatives, which, according to the laws of nations and the usages of war, are attached to that office. We see no reason to dissent from the dictum of Judge Curtis, that the President "possesses and exercises these powers, not in spite of the Constitution and laws of the United States, or in derogation from their authority, but in virtue thereof, and in strict subordination thereto." This is the President's own view of the subject. He closes his recent proclamation with the solemn words, "Upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God."

3. The only question is, How far does the war power of the

President extend? To this we answer, So far as the preservation of the country demands, and no farther. He has the right to do whatever is not in itself sinful, which is necessary to protect the government and Constitution, which he has sworn to support. The law of self-preservation is the same in nature in its application to individuals and to states, or organized communities. Any man is justifiable in setting at naught the rights of property, to preserve his own life or those of his family. Who would venture to arraign a man for theft, who, in order to save himself or children from drowning, should take a boat which did not belong to him. Nay, the right to life yields to that of self-preservation. It is justifiable homicide to kill a man in self-defence. The same principle applies to organized communities. They, too, have the right of self-preservation, and they must have organs through which that right can be exercised. In times of emergency the common council of a city, for example, cannot be called together. The mayor must act, and because he must act, he has the right to act. If a great fire occurs, he may arrest its progress by blowing up any buildings, no matter how valuable or venerable. It would be vain to quote the Bill of Rights about the inviolability of property, or to produce the municipal charter to prove that blowing up houses was not one of the functions of the mayor. All such pleas are felt to be nugatory in the presence of the instinct of self-preservation. So, too, when pestilence has revealed itself in a particular part of a city, its inhabitants are removed, its places of business are closed, and all access to it is debarred. What would it avail to protest against such measures on the ground that a man's house is his castle, or that he has a right to carry on his business where he pleases? In all these cases, the necessity must be real, and not imaginary or fictitious; and the means employed must not transcend the immediate exigency. If a man kills another on the plea of self-defence, when he is in no real danger, he is guilty of manslaughter; and if his plea of self-defence is feigned, and the homicide is committed with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder. So, also, to justify the destruction of private property to arrest a conflagration, the necessity must be real and apparent, and the destruction must not be carried beyond what

the exigency demands. These principles evidently apply to military affairs. A commanding general has the right to seize private property, to arrest suspected persons, and to do whatever is not morally wrong, which the necessity of the service requires. He may proclaim martial law, which suspends the common and statute laws, and puts in their place the arbitrary will of the general in command. This is admitted. It is done in every war. It has been enforced during the present war by the rebels as well as by the loyal generals. It is on this ground of self-preservation, of immediate and urgent necessity, that we think that the right of the President to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, is to be defended. It has been said that Congress alone, as a legislative body, has the right to suspend the operation of the law of the land in so vital a matter. To this we answer, first, that then the constitutional provision for the suspension of the writ in question would be nugatory. Before Congress could be called together to act, irreparable evil might be done. And secondly, this is contrary to all analogy. A man whose life is in imminent danger is not required to go to a magistrate to get permission to kill his assailant; neither is it necessary for the mayor of a town to call together the common council to give him authority to destroy private property to arrest a raging fire. No less unreasonable is it to assert, that the President of the United States must obtain permission of Congress to arrest and imprison enemies of the country in times of emergency. Judge Curtis admits that this right does exist. He says, "In time of war, a military commander-in-chief, or one of his subordinates, must possess and exercise powers both over the persons and property of citizens which do not exist in time of peace." Again, "In the time of war without any special legislation, not the commander-in-chief only, but every commander of an expedition, or of a military post, is lawfully empowered by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to do whatever is necessary and is sanctioned by the laws of war, to accomplish the lawful objects of his command." Martial law, according to Judge Curtis, goes even further than this. "It is," he says, "the will of a military commander operating without any restraint, save his judgment, upon the lives, upon the persons, upon the entire social and

individual condition of all over whom this law extends." Such is the absolute power which martial law vests in a commanding general. Such is the power which he is often called upon to exercise. When shut up in a besieged city, he is, and must be, master of all its resources; and when, as was the case with General Butler in New Orleans, he is in a captured city filled with a hostile population and discordant elements of every kind, it would be suicidal for him to submit to the trammels of ordinary law. He is, and ever must be, bound by the great principles of morals, but he must, at the same time, be clothed with all the powers which the exigencies of his position demand. Judge Curtis, however, as we understand him, insists first, that this military power of the President, or of his subordinates, must be confined to the present. It cannot be exerted to determine the future relations either of persons or property; and secondly, that it must be confined to the sphere of actual military operations. The former of these limitations has nothing to do with the propriety of arbitrary arrests, as they are called. It is on the second ground, as we understand, that the objection to such arrests is founded. We presume it would not be charged as a fault against General Banks, if he should arrest individuals who, in the streets of New Orleans, were haranguing the people against the government, or exhorting them to cheer for the rebel authorities. It is because the President has ordered the arrest of suspicious persons outside of the field of military operations, and within the limits of loyal States, that he has been so severely censured and denounced. We cannot see the reason for this limitation. We understand well enough that a subordinate general must confine the exercise of his power to the immediate sphere of his command. A general commanding one department has no more authority to exercise his military power in another department, than the President can exercise such authority in Canada. But the authority of the President extends over the whole United States. What he can lawfully do in one place, he can lawfully do in another. This extraordinary war power, springing "from present pressing emergencies," says Judge Curtis, "is limited by them." Then it exists wherever and whenever those emergencies arise. There is no justification for the

exercise of such power, but necessity; and the necessity is a justification wherever it exists. It seems strange to us, that a man may be lawfully arrested and imprisoned, in one place, because he is dangerous to the country, and be exempt from all harm in another place, where he may be ten-fold more dangerous. The President of the United States, in times of rebellion and invasion, may, on pressing emergencies, do any where whatever any commanding general may do within the sphere of his authority. Neither the one nor the other can rightfully do any thing but what the law of self-preservation demands. A power which arises out of necessity is limited only by that necessity.

There may be just cause of complaint in some cases, on the ground that these summary arrests were made when no necessity called for them; that men truly loyal, or whose disloyalty was a mere matter of feeling, have been unjustly imprisoned. Admitting this to be true, it does not touch the principle. If the right to arrest dangerous persons be admitted, each case of its exercise must be judged on its own merits. Much is said about the dangerous character of this power. It is said to put in peril the most sacred rights of the citizen, and the Constitution itself. All power is liable to abuse, and its exercise should be jealously watched. We have, however, as little fear of any serious danger to the liberty of the people from the power in question, as we have of indiscriminate manslaughter, or the general blowing up of houses, because homicide and the destruction of private property are justified in cases of emergency. Much of our fear on this subject is traditionary. It is a correct maxim, that the depositaries of power should be sedulously watched. "The price of liberty is perpetual vigilance." Formerly, kings and nobles were the depositaries of power, and it was obligatory on the people to be constantly on their guard, and to resist the first indication of encroachment on their rights. English history, which is our own history, is a record of this struggle of the people against their rulers. This we have been instructed to regard as the spirit of liberty. We have received it as part of the great inheritance bequeathed to us by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. We are not duly mindful, however, of the entire change of our position. The maxim still

holds good, that the depositaries of power are to be jealously watched, but in this country all power vests in the people, and not in our ephemeral rulers. The danger to liberty is from the masses, and from State pride and assumption, not from the federal government. This De Tocqueville discovered years ago. "So far," says he, "is the federal government from acquiring strength, and from threatening the sovereignty of the States, as it grows older, that I maintain it to be growing weaker and weaker, and that the sovereignty of the Union alone is in danger." This stupendous and wicked rebellion, with which we are now struggling for our national life, is the outbreak of popular and State feeling against the authority of the Union. It is not the power of the national government, it is the license of the people and the patronage of the government we have to fear. If every post-master, and every other officer of the government below the members of the cabinet, could hold their positions on the good behaviour tenure, it would do more to purify and strengthen our institutions than any new restrictions on the power of the President. Our reasons for not sympathizing with the alarm manifested on account of "the arbitrary arrests," besides the one just intimated, are that this power of the President can be exercised only in times of rebellion or invasion; that it is limited to cases of necessity; and that the agents of the government are responsible for their acts, in obedience to the commands of the central government. If a man kills another on the plea of self-defence, he is bound to make out that the homicide was necessary to his safety. If the authorities arrest and imprison a man as dangerous to the government, they must be prepared to show that such arrest was an act of necessity, that the public safety demanded it. If it can be proved to be wanton or malicious, those who make the arrest will be held to account. We repeat our conviction, that our danger is not from the despotic power of the President. When men are rushing with their engines to extinguish a conflagration, there will always be those to cry out against them for breaking the curbstones or barking the trees; but after all, the real danger is from the fire, and not from the injury done the public thoroughfares.

In like manner, our present danger is from the rebellion, and not from the irregular exercise of national authority.

The above principles apply to the emancipation of slaves. If the President, as commander-in-chief, or his subordinates, may, in time of war, and in case of pressing necessity, appropriate the property of the enemies of the country, why not their property in slaves? They claim slaves as property; they have a recognised and legal title to their labour; on the proceeds of that labour they live; by it they are enabled to carry on this war for the overthrow of the government. There seems to be no reason why this peculiar kind of property should be exempt from the operation of the laws of war. If the rebels confiscate or sequestrate, without any pretence of military necessity, not only hundreds of millions of mercantile debts due to northern men, but the immense amount owned by them in southern banks and railroads, they at least should not complain of the application of strictly war principles to themselves. As, however, this emancipation of the slaves is declared to be a war measure, founded on "military necessity," it must, as before said, be limited by that necessity, and by the nature of the President's authority as commander-in-chief. Both of these limitations are essential. The President has no authority to liberate a single slave, except on the ground of military necessity. If that necessity exists, the right exists, and to the extent and no further, that the exigency demands. This is conceded. Men may differ as to what "military necessity," in this matter, at the present moment does require, but they must admit that nothing can be rightfully done which the present emergency does not demand. The right to emancipate slaves cannot extend beyond the military necessity for such emancipation. This we understand to be the President's doctrine. The other limitation is no less important. The President's power to emancipate is a military power. It belongs to him as the head of the army. But the authority of a general is executive, and not legislative. He cannot make laws to be permanently binding. He acts for the present, and for pressing emergencies. The President does not pretend to be a dictator. He does not assume the right to enact new laws, or to overturn the institutions of the country. He speaks in his

character of military officer, and assumes to do only what lies legitimately within his military authority. He may, as commander-in-chief, issue an order to his subordinates in the navy and army to regard and treat as freemen all the slaves within their respective commands, or who may seek refuge within their lines. What is more than this, must be legally void, and practically inoperative. The President's authority, at the present time, is no more regarded in South Carolina than that of the governor of New Jersey. Until that State is occupied by our armies, a proclamation of emancipation from the former can have no more effect than one issued by the latter. What its moral effect may be is another question. We are not to deceive ourselves in this matter. There is something so grand in this idea of three millions of slaves raised in one day, and by a stroke of a pen, to the dignity of freemen, in the vastness of the social change thus effected, and in the world-wide consequences of such a measure, that it is almost impossible to avoid being carried away by feeling, and uttering shouts of exultation. Many will not, and many cannot, stop to consider whether the edict itself is, in its literal import, and in its prospective operation, of any real authority, above what has just been indicated. The approbation accorded to it, is an approbation of slave emancipation, and not a judgment as to the legality of the measure, in the sense in which they understand it. Were the President to issue a proclamation, as "a war measure," suppressing the Protestant religion in this country, Te Deums would resound through the Vatican; or should he ordain the closing of every Catholic church in the land, doubtless many Protestants would be loud in their applause. In both cases, joy over the result would render men indifferent as to the means by which it was effected. This would be very natural, but not very wise. We have no idea that one intelligent man in ten, or the President himself, believes that he can legally ordain the permanent abolition of slavery throughout the United States. His proclamation can only operate as instructions to his subordinates to regard and treat all slaves who come within their power as freemen. This is a vast deal, and may produce a radical change in the state of the country. With this, con-

scientious men, loyal to the Constitution, ought to be contented. The right, in the long run, is always the most effective.

In view of the present state of the country, it is certainly imperative on all good men to unite in the support of the government; to render those in authority all the aid they need to carry on this struggle to a successful issue; cheerfully to submit to the burdens and sacrifices which the war imposes; and to render prompt and hearty obedience to all the lawful commands of the powers that be. This duty does not depend on the opinion which men may form of the wisdom or efficiency of the national administration. Whether the weakest or the wisest government the country ever had, the duty of submission and devotion is still the same. The threats of revolutionary or factious opposition, which have at times been made, are in the highest degree criminal. Our only safety is in fidelity to the Constitution and to our constitutional rulers.

Another great duty, which presses on all loyal citizens, is not to despond. The work which we have undertaken is a great work. To sustain the Constitution and Union against an organized rebellion of the people of eleven States, and the divided allegiance of several others, is a herculean task. It must be expected to demand great effort and great sacrifices. The difficulties which we have to encounter are tenfold greater than those which the rebels have to encounter. They are on their own ground, in the midst of their own resources. We have to operate at a distance from ours. General Rosecrans's base of supplies is Louisville, two hundred miles in his rear. General Grant must draw all his resources from Columbus, at a still greater distance. To guard effectually such long lines of communication, is almost impossible. If General Lee's army were in central New York, with loyal Pennsylvania in his rear, what would become of him? How would he keep up his communication? It is wise to look the difficulties of our position calmly in the face, so that we may not be cast down at unavoidable disasters. There is no sufficient cause for discouragement, if we can only be united and persevering. Confident in the justice of the national cause, assured that God is on our side, we are bound not to despond. We should remember that we are acting for generations to come; that the fate of the

country, and, in large measure of Christendom, hangs on the issue of this conflict. The question, as it seems to us, to be determined, is, Whether North America is to be the abode of liberty and constitutional order, or converted, through the greater part of its extent, into a vast empire, in which the blacks shall be slaves, and all, except slave-holders, miserable serfs. We do not say that success will certainly attend the right. The wrong in this world, which for a time is the kingdom of Satan, often triumphs. But we do say, that it is a thousand-fold better to be defeated with the right, than to be triumphant with the wrong.

SHORT NOTICES.

Sectional Controversy, &c. By William Chauncey Fowler, LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1862.

THIS thin octavo was written by Professor Fowler, of Amherst College, Massachusetts, a native of New England, and a descendant of the Puritans. It purports to trace historically, and to illustrate by numerous citations from original documents, the progress of the political controversy between the North and South, which has at last culminated in civil war. It is written in the interest of the South. It espouses the extreme doctrines of Mr. Calhoun, which southern statesmen themselves repudiated, until forced to adopt them in justification of the present rebellion. Professor Fowler belongs to that class of persons of all others most to be commisserated, "northern men with southern principles." Such men forfeit the respect of the North and are despised by the South. The latter word is not too strong. We have never heard words more bitterly contemptuous than those uttered by southern men against this class of persons. In this depth, however, there is a lower deep. Some northern men not only adopt southern principles, but give in to the southern assumptions. Men of the South say that this war is a war of races, a conflict between Normans and Saxons, between a ruling and a servile race. This claim, as a matter of history, is not only unfounded, but,

considering the real facts connected with the original peopling of the South, absurd. It is a claim incident to a certain form of civilization, as we see in the Turks and the Chinese, to whom all other men are dogs. Professor Fowler, if we understand him, recognises the justice of this claim of the South to superiority of race. All we have to say is, that we do not admire his taste. He should, at least, congratulate himself on the law-abiding character of northern men. Had he written such a book, (a book altogether in favour of the North,) at the South, if not hung, he would assuredly be imprisoned for life. A race born to rule, does not brook contradiction from those born to serve.

Manual of Geology: treating of the principles of the Science, with special reference to American Geological History, for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools of Science. By James D. Dana, M. A., LL.D., Silliman Professor of Geology and Natural History in Yale College; author of "A System of Mineralogy," of Reports of Wilkes's Exploring Expedition on Geology, on Zoophytes, and on Crustacea, etc. Illustrated by a Chart of the World, and over one thousand figures, mostly from American sources. Philadelphia: published by Theodore Bliss & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1863. Pp. 798.

This is an American book in a peculiar sense, not only in its author, but its subject. It is geology in its application to North America, "which stands as a simple, isolated specimen of a continent, and the laws of progress have been undisturbed by the conflicting movements of other lands." The author has, therefore, "written out American geology by itself, as a continuous history." To do this, however, required that all the principles of the science should be fully developed, for American geology is only the illustration and confirmation of those principles by the geological facts of this continent. This volume is, therefore, a complete manual of the science. It is adapted both to literary and scientific students, the more minute details necessary only for the latter, being printed in small type. The size of the work, the elegance and number of its illustrations, the skill with which its complicated details are arranged, the fulness of knowledge, and the mastery over that knowledge which it exhibits, all combine to make this volume an honour to American science.

John Rogers: The Compiler of the first authorized English Bible; the Pioneer of the English Reformation: and its first Martyr. Embracing a Genealogical Account of his Family, Biographical Sketches of some of his principal Descendants, his own writings, &c. By Joseph Lemuel Chester. London: Longman, Green, Longman & Brothers. 1861. Pp. 452.

The author of this book, believing himself to be one of the descendants of the proto-English martyr, was led to undertake

an exhaustive research into the history of the family. This research led to the conviction that justice had never been done to a name familiar to all speakers of the English language, and venerated by all English Protestants. He was, therefore, induced not only to present and compile a family record, but a biography of the man, and a vindication of his claim to a high place among the great and faithful men of his generation. The volume has, therefore, a two-fold interest, one for the martyr's own descendants, and another for the religious public in general.

The Canon of the Holy Scriptures examined in the Light of History. By Professor L. Gaussen, of Geneva, Switzerland, author of "Theopneusty," &c. Translated from the French, and abridged. By Edward N. Kirk, D. D. Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. Pp. 464.

The author presents the evidence of the canonical authority of the Scriptures under two forms or methods. He discusses the question, in the first place, as a matter of history, just as he would argue the authenticity and genuineness of the works of any ancient writer. He then, in the second place, exhibits the higher evidence of the Divine authority of the Bible, from the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit, working by and with the truth in our hearts; so that our faith does not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. Professor Gaussen is already so extensively and favourably known as the author of an excellent work on Inspiration, published twenty years ago, that this new contribution to the vindication of the sacred volume is sure of a cordial welcome. It strikes us as being more thorough and learned than his earlier work.

Letters of Rev. John Smith, a Presbyterian Minister, to his brother, the Rev. Peter Smith, a Methodist Preacher. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1862. Pp. 188.

This volume contains eighty-four letters. They are short, pointed, and adapted to the popular mind. All the leading doctrines on which Augustinians and Arminians differ are successively brought into view. We believe these letters were originally published in one of our religious journals, and on account of the general acceptance accorded to them, subsequently collected into a volume.

Lyra Cœlestis. Hymns on Heaven. Selected by A. C. Thompson, D. D., author of "The Better Land," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. Pp. 382.

Many of the pieces in this volume are not easily accessible to the majority of readers. No intentional alterations have

been made, except omissions and change of titles. Besides the hymns originally English, there will be found translations from the Syriac, Latin, Russian, German, French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. This extract from the preface of this volume will give our readers an idea of its character. To the lovers of devotional poetry it will prove a welcome present.

Health, and its Friends and its Foes. By R. D. Mussey, M. D., LL.D., Late Professor of Anatomy and Surgery at Dartmouth College, &c., &c. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York, Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1862. Pp. 368.

The long experience of the writer of this volume entitle his suggestions to respectful consideration. The topics of clothing, alcohol, tobacco, diet, and regimen, are brought under review. Much wisdom may doubtless be gathered from his pages; but his favourite idea is, that an exclusively vegetable diet is sufficient for man, and more conducive to health and vigour than any other. In this he has against him the organic formation of the human body, the general judgment of mankind, and the express authority of the Bible. In Genesis, God says to the representatives of our race, "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things." In Deuteronomy, he says to the chosen people, "Thou mayest eat flesh in all thy gates, whatsoever thy soul desires, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God, which he hath given thee." And the apostle mentions as one sign of the apostacy, the command "to abstain from meats."

Liberia's Offering: being Addresses, Sermons, &c. By Rev. Edward W. Blyden. New York; John A. Gray, corner of Frankfort and Jacob streets. 1862. Pp. 167.

This volume possesses peculiar interest. The author is a coloured man, a native of St. Thomas, one of the Danish West India islands. Under the auspices of the Rev. John P. Knox, formerly of St. Thomas, now pastor of the Presbyterian church, Newtown, Long Island, he came to this country, and thence went to Liberia, and became a pupil of the Alexander High School. After the completion of his course as a student, he became first the assistant of the Rev. D. A. Wilson, principal of the school, and then Professor of the Greek and Latin languages. In 1861 he was appointed by our government a commissioner to act in its behalf in promoting the interests of the African race. The discoveries in this volume prove him to be a cultivated and able man, and affords cheering evidence of the capacity for education and usefulness of our coloured brethren.

Praying and Working: Being some account of what men can do when in earnest. By the Rev. William Fleming Stevenson, Dublin. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863.

This highly readable and evangelical book is made up of biographical sketches of four eminently devout and zealous Christians, in different churches on the continent. It is designed to illustrate the efficacy, not of earnest working alone, or earnest praying alone, but of both united. It belongs to the class of books that command many readers, and bestir sluggish souls to wholesome zeal and prayerful activity.

The Last Day of our Lord's Passion. By the Rev. William Hanna, LL.D., author of the Life of Dr. Chalmers. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863.

Although new books are now few, owing to the high price of paper, and other causes, yet, if the present instalment from the Messrs. Carter be fair specimens, the contraction in quantity is quite compensated by the excellence of the quality—as occurs in so many things, that quantity and quality are in a reciprocal inverse ratio. This volume seizes every circumstance connected with our Lord's last day on earth, and with rare combination of spiritual insight, tact, and unction, makes it profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness. The chapter on the "Physical Cause of the Death of Christ" presents Dr. Stroud's theory, free from that minute anatomy which, presented by some advocates of this view, gives it a revolting aspect, and commends it to favour by many cogent considerations. Altogether, this volume, by Dr. Chalmer's son-in-law and biographer, has a Christian and literary savour, which will win for it thousands of the best class of readers.

Parish Papers. By Norman McLeod, D. D., one of her Majesty's chaplains for Scotland, author of "Wee Davie," "The Gold Thread," etc. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863.

These productions of this rising preacher and author go far to account for his celebrity. They are made up, we judge, of his parish sermons, adapted to the press. In our view, they contain, in a very high degree, the elements and characteristics of genuine gospel preaching. We find here the great truths of the gospel presented boldly and clearly, on the authority of God, illustrated and corroborated from the realms of nature and providence, didactically and experimentally; never left as dry and jejune propositions, but brought to bear with the utmost solemnity and tenderness on the heart, the conscience, and the life.

The Sympathy of Christ with Man: its Teaching, and its Consolation. By Octavius Winslow, D. D., author of "The Precious Things of God," etc. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1863.

The characteristics of Dr. Winslow as a religious writer are too familiar to the public to need specifying in detail. His doctrinal truth and richness, mingled with extraordinary unction, of course, abound, when he treats in any way of Christ; and all the more so as he dwells upon his various manifestations of sympathy with his people.

Vesper. By Madame the Countess de Gasparin. Translated from the third French edition by Mary L. Booth. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1863.

The imaginative brilliancy and fertility of the Countess de Gasparin, joined with the thoroughly Christian character of her works, have already won for her a high rank as a Christian authoress. These traits appear conspicuous in the present volume, and are employed on topics fitted to interest even a wider circle of readers than her "Near and Heavenly Horizons."

SERMONS,

OCCASIONED BY THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

The Federal Judiciary. A Thanksgiving Discourse. By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1862.

In the latitude usually taken by our ministers on days of Public Thanksgiving, and accorded them by Christian public sentiment, Dr. Boardman has happily selected as the theme of his discourse, the "Federal Judiciary." He has treated it with that breadth and justness of view which he is apt to bring to subjects of this nature. We suspect, withal, that the whole subject is comparatively unknown or overlooked by the mass of the present generation. As Dr. Boardman reviews the agency of the United States Supreme Court in defining and facilitating the working of the federal Constitution; the formidable issues between the General and State Governments, which it decided; the broad patriotism, incorruptible integrity, and consummate juridical endowments of Chief Justice Marshall, whom he justly ranks second only to Washington, in his services to the government, during its formative period, he is rendering a precious service to a generation that has grown up since John Marshall was laid in his grave—a "generation that knew not Joseph." We cordially endorse all Dr. Boardman's objections to the short official terms, and direct popular elections, with which the later

politics of many States have compromised the independence, dignity, and sometimes, we fear, the integrity of the bench.

The Nation's Gratitude and Hope; A Sermon preached in the First Presbyterian Church, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 27, 1862. By Rev. William M. Paxton, D. D., Pastor. Pittsburgh: W. G. Johnston & Co. 1862.

Dr. Paxton, in common with most of those whose discourses are noticed below, enters on the good work of reviving the hearts of our people amidst strong tendencies to undue depression, in consequence of military inaction or disaster. He shows with great force and eloquence, abundant causes of thankfulness, not only for temporal and spiritual benefits innumerable, still left to us, but for the military success, which, on the whole, has been achieved. We think such views specially important just now. As to what Dr. Paxton and others say of the President's proclamation, we will not add to what we have previously said on this subject.

The Mission of Calamity; A Thanksgiving Sermon preached in the First Methodist Episcopal Church, Scranton, Pennsylvania, Nov. 27, 1862. By M. J. Hickok, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Scranton. Published by request. New York: John F. Trow. 1862.

After the dark portraiture, drawn by Dr. Hickok's graphic pen, of our national afflictions, he proceeds to inquire in what light they are to be interpreted. Are they judgments in wrath, designed for our ruin, in righteous retribution? Or are they, more probably, for the truest good of ourselves and others? The author advocates the latter alternative with great cogency of argument, and edifying aptness of application.

Light in Darkness. A Discourse delivered in the First Reformed Dutch Church, Stapleton, Long Island, on Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 27, 1862. By Thomas S. Skinner, Jr. 1862.

This is a clear and vivid presentation of substantially the same view as that given in the discourse last noticed. It takes a thoroughly Christian view of our national affairs, and of our duties appertaining thereto. Without underrating our own grounds of difficulty and discouragement, it finds "light in darkness," and cheers us on to victorious conflict with the rebellion.

Our Present Position. A Thanksgiving Discourse delivered before the North Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, November 27, 1862. By the Pastor, Rev. L. H. Christian, D. D. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien.

Dr. Christian, while he makes it manifest that he distrusts the wisdom of some important measures of the government,

also presents in a strong light the progress which has been made in subduing the rebellion, the many interpositions of Providence in our behalf, at home and abroad; and instead of finding room for despondency, presents abundant and irresistible reasons why we should thank God and take courage. His rebuke of the haste and impatience of the people for immediate results, which have cost us such terrible disasters, are well put, and we hope will not be unheeded.

The Union and the War. A Sermon preached November 27, 1862. By William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Associate Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church of the City of New York. New York: Charles Scribner. 1862.

Dr. Shedd, in his own classic and vigorous style, shows the necessity of our National Union, the consequent iniquity of the rebellion for its overthrow, and the consequent righteousness of the war for its maintenance, together with the necessity of prosecuting it to a successful issue. These points are set forth, of course, with the author's wonted perspicuity and force; and Dr. Shedd insists earnestly and ably, that the object of the war is solely the maintenance of the Union and Constitution. As to making the abolition of slavery its prime object, he shows clearly that the government has no right to do so, however desirable such a consummation may be, or however righteous a retribution it may be for the attempt to overthrow this government and erect one of which "slavery is the corner-stone" on its ruins. He not only quotes the famous Crittenden declaration on the subject, unanimously voted by Congress at the outbreak of the war, but the following language from the Inaugural of President Lincoln: "I have no purpose, directly nor indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so," &c. This attitude, at once loyal and conservative, always right, is now specially opportune. On one point, indeed, we are not sure that we can go all lengths with Dr. Shedd. He says, by way of stripping the rebellion of all apology, "the Southern States of the American Union needed only to bide their time, to enjoy fully their constitutional and vested rights," (p. 25.) What are the "constitutional and vested rights" which, at the time of their first secession, were denied them? We do not know.