THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

JULY, 1862.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY

PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET.

AND SOLD BY

CROSBY & NICHOLS, BOSTON; R. CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK;
WILLIAM S. & ALFRED MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA;
JOHN D. THORPE, CINCINNATI, OHIO;
AND TRÜBNER & CO. LONDON.

CONTENTS OF No. III.

JULY, 1862.

THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

JULY, 1862.

No. III.

ART. I.—*Rational Psychology; or the Subjective Idea and Objective Law of All Intelligence.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. A new and revised edition. New York: Ivison, Phinney & Co. 1861.

A System of Moral Science. By the same. Third edition. Same publishers.

Empirical Psychology; or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness. By the same. Third edition. Same publishers.

Rational Cosmology; or the Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By the same. A new edition, with revisions and Notes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1859.

[The object of the following article is to present a brief outline of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. It has been prepared by one of his personal friends, who is a decided advocate of his system. To this its value, to the readers of this journal, is largely due. They must be glad to receive, from an able and accomplished writer, a view of this philosophy which is not liable to the charge either of misapprehension or perversion. The article, therefore, is not to be regarded as presenting the estimate of the *Princeton Review* of Dr. Hickok's system, but the light in which it is viewed by its adherents.]

DR. HICKOK, though profoundly acquainted with German speculations, and constantly resorting to terms which they have made common, differs vitally from every German thinker, both as respects the starting-point and the termination of his philosophy. Though he is evidently in closer sympathy with Kant than with any other great leader of modern thought, yet the grand results of their thinking are diametrically opposite. It is the whole purpose of the *Rational Psychology* to establish what it is equally the aim of the *Critick of Pure Reason* to overthrow. With Kant, the being of a God, the freedom and immortality of the soul, and the substantial existence of an objective world, are all incapable of speculative proof. But we should not greatly err in saying, that the most noticeable feature in all Dr. Hickok's thinking, is the confidence with which he affirms, and the persistence with which he maintains, the doctrine exactly opposite to this. If, aside from the simple presentation of his philosophical views, there is one aim which has evidently controlled him in what he has written, it is to attain a foundation upon which philosophical scepticism may be utterly overthrown. Each of his works is penetrated by the deep conviction of its author, that such a position can be reached, and that the method he has adopted is the certain way to secure it. This fact gives us the point of view from which his philosophy should be contemplated, in order to a comprehensive acquaintance with its scope and meaning.

Scepticism, according to Dr. Hickok, is the necessary result of every system of thought which confines the work of the intellect to its judgments and inferences. These are, indeed, operations properly within its sphere, but if it can do nothing more, he argues, no judgment can ever be affirmed beyond a contradiction, nor the ground of any inference be established beyond a doubt. If, *e. g.*, the judgment: there is an external world, be denied by one who affirms that there is only a seeming phantasm, and that our belief in its reality is a dream, obviously the first judgment cannot escape this denial by a mere re-affirmation of itself, but only as it is grounded in another judgment, higher or more simple. Take then this higher judgment, *e. g.*, there is an external world, because we are so made that we must believe it, and immediately we meet

the sceptical inquiry, How do we know that we are not so made that we must believe a lie? To remove this doubt renders necessary a similar procedure as before. We may say, *e. g.*, the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator could not allow our only modes of judgment to be necessarily deceptive, but this only opens the way to graver doubts, and more numerous questions; *e. g.*, How do we know that there is a Creator? and what evidence have we that he is wise and kind? The same is true with every possible judgment. It is liable, at once, to some kind of doubt, and the attempt to remove this, by means of some higher judgment, instead of eradicating the scepticism, only gives it a stronger hold in a deeper soil. That this scepticism is inherent to all the processes of the merely judging or inferring intellect, Dr. Hickok finds evidence alike in the nature of the process itself, and in its actual exhibitions in the history of thought.

We may, undoubtedly, attempt to avoid this result, by affirming that we find ourselves in the possession of certain "common sense" convictions, back of which we cannot go, and upon which we may confidently rest our declarations, that there is a world, and there is a God. Moreover, the sceptic himself cannot doubt, that he also possesses these same convictions, or at least that they are the inalienable heritage of the great proportion of mankind. Why is not this enough? To this inquiry it might be a sufficient reply, that notwithstanding the force with which this testimony of "common sense" is affirmed, neither the position of the sceptic has been materially changed, in consequence, nor his progress essentially checked. But, beyond this, the sceptic declares, that the deductions of his logic contradict these convictions of his common sense, and that he must, at least, doubt which of the two to believe. Still further, he presses the more momentous inquiry: Why should we believe these convictions of common sense, for how do we know that they may guide us infallibly? and to this, in the field which he occupies in common with his opponents, there is no satisfactory reply. It is, of course, easy to say, that this query is impertinent or absurd, or that it is impossible to answer it, because, we are so made that we must believe these convictions—but the sceptic as easily replies: that this refusal

to answer only confirms his doubt, and that the reason assigned for the refusal, is only a begging of the very question in dispute.

It is to meet these difficulties, and to overthrow all scepticism in its last resort, that Dr. Hickok has laboured. His first inquiry is: whether there may not be some power in the intellect beyond its capacity for connecting things together, and deriving conclusions of one judgment from another. Have we any faculty by which we can see truth in a light so clear that we shall need nothing but its own shining to reveal its absolute ground and reason? Can the truth be made to stand out before us as self-affirmatory, and needing nothing but itself for its support? Having *believed* that the mountains sustain the heavens, and that Atlas sustains the mountains, may we *know* that the heavens sustain themselves and embrace the mountains?

Dr. Hickok answers these questions with an emphatic affirmative. In distinction from that faculty which can affirm one thing *because* of another, and which, in that it must *stand* something *under* every affirmation, is properly termed the *understanding*, he recognises, in the human intellect, a far loftier capacity, whose province is to behold the truth by an immediate insight, and in its absolute and self-affirming ground. This higher faculty, in that it, through the visible symbol, can *read* the truth, invisible to any eye of the sense or the understanding, is fitly named the *reason*.

This distinction between the reason and the understanding is fundamental in Dr. Hickok's thinking, but we shall make the gravest mistake in supposing that it means no more with him than that distinction, in similar terms, which is so prominent in the Critical Philosophy, and whose fallacy, as there recognised, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr. Hickok himself, have unanswerably exposed. With Kant, and with the, so called, German transcendental school, the reason is only a higher understanding. The two faculties differ only in name, not in reality. Both are essentially powers of judgment, which are so made that they attain their conclusions in a certain way,—the one directed by what Kant calls the *categories* of the understanding, and the other by what he terms the *ideas* of the pure reason. Neither of these has the capacity to look around or

through either itself or its objects. Neither can therefore lead to absolute knowledge. Nothing which the mind receives can be known, except as modified by its necessary method of receiving it, and this is equally true of both the reason and the understanding. The understanding *judges* that all its objects must come under the forms or categories of quantity, quality, relation, and mode—and the reason also *judges* that all its objects must be regulated by the form or idea of the absolute; but that these forms exist out of and independent of the mind which contains them, cannot be affirmed. That there is any quantity or quality, objective and real, the understanding cannot prove, and that there is any absolute outside of the mind which conceives it, the reason cannot know. Hence the distinction between the two faculties disappears, and the Critical Philosophy, as propounded by Kant, becomes justly liable to all the scepticism which has attended its development in the later German schools.

But it is a very different doctrine of the reason which Dr. Hickok maintains. In his view, this is a faculty which differs as truly in kind, and not merely in variety or degree, from all others, as that which is truly spiritual in man differs from the animal part of his nature. Spirit is, purely and primarily, with him, self-consciousness—*i. e.*, it belongs to the very being of spirit that it should know itself. In this self-knowledge there is involved an activity determining itself, and thus a self-direction—*i. e.*, spirit, in *knowing* itself, *has* itself, and is thus, essentially, a person. Moreover, in this self-knowledge, and the self-determination which it implies, there are disclosed two points of view from which the agency of spirit may be contemplated, and in which this agency becomes revealed as two distinct faculties of spirit, which may be named, respectively, reason and will. Reason is spirit, so far as it is self-knowing; and will is spirit, so far as it is self-directing. Spirit comprehends the two, and is, essentially, an activity which knows and determines, *i. e.*, directs itself.

In this conception of spirit, the reason becomes an original and broad capacity for knowledge. In knowing itself, it knows what reason is, and can thus detect reason whenever it passes before its eye. In its self-knowledge it has a standard by

which it can measure all things which can come within its apprehension, and determine whether they be reasonable or not. It can thus become the artistic critic, the philosopher, and the moral judge. All objects of beauty, truth, and goodness, become known to the reason, and give it joy and satisfaction only as they fit and fill those archetypal principles which are found within itself, and which it knows as it knows itself.

It is the original function of the reason, according to Dr. Hickok, to know not simply what is, but what must be. In knowing itself, it knows what is reasonable, and when this is clearly seen, its necessity is equally apparent. It is unreasonable, *e. g.*, that the world should exist without an author; and thus in "the things that are made," we clearly see the "eternal power and Godhead" of their Maker to be a necessary truth. It is unreasonable that this array of appearances, which the senses reveal, should be without a substantial ground; and thus we see in every phenomenon that its substance, and in every event that its cause must necessarily be. These are necessary truths, *i. e.*, not alone necessarily believed, but necessarily existent, because it would contradict reason were they otherwise. Moreover, in their necessity is also their universality. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, must be as true of all spaces as of any one space; and the same is as obvious of all truths which the reason affirms. Dr. Hickok thus terms it the *comprehending* faculty. It comprehends itself and the other faculties of the soul. It comprehends the phenomena and events of nature in their substances and causes, and these in their Author. By its own immediate insight, it knows eternal principles and necessary truths. But can it know anything other than the barest abstractions? and can its knowledge of these exclude all possibility of cavil or scepticism? These are, of course, fundamental inquiries, for the adequacy of the reason to its assigned work, either in philosophy or in life, depends upon them. It will at once be supposed, and not incorrectly, that Dr. Hickok affirms both these points.

In reference to the former, his doctrine is, that there is in fact nothing which we truly know, in which some contribution of the reason is not an essential element. The reason furnishes

an idea for every fact of knowledge, and only in the light of this idea can any fact be truly known. I may *believe*, *e. g.*, on the testimony of another, that the ratios of solid bodies are as the cubes of their homologous sides, and my confidence in the knowledge and truthfulness of him who affirms it, may be such, that my conviction of the truth will be as certain as if I had followed out the demonstration myself. But conviction of certainty is not knowledge, and I can only *know* this truth when I see its accord with those primitive ideas or axioms which are comprehended in the reason alone. To *believe* and to *know* may not differ at all in the certainty of their conviction, but the difference is entire in the ground on which this certainty rests. In the one case I rely upon something outside myself, and in the other, on what is disclosed within. And it is in this inner disclosure that the reason asserts itself, and that true science becomes attainable. Anything which contradicts its clear insight, can be no object of belief or knowledge. The reason immediately dismisses it as absurd, while anything which it sees to be in harmony with itself, it at once pronounces necessary and eternal. All mathematical truths become known as they are thus disclosed. The whole field of mathematics is thus a valid province for the reason's survey. Dr. Hickok reverts to this in all his treatises, and maintains, by repeated arguments and illustrations, that no mathematical knowledge is possible, to man, except through his possession of reason.

In like manner with the realm of beauty. Unless immediately beheld by the reason, it is never known. The beauty in the landscape cannot be in aught which the bodily eyes behold, for the ox sees this as truly as the man. Neither can it be in any reflection upon this, for the reflective judgment presupposes, in the mind, a standard to which it must refer for its correctness. There is an eye within which sees the beautiful, and knows it as such, only as its light blends with its own. Using the bodily organ as its instrument, the reason becomes thereby awakened to an ideal in itself, and a sentiment in the object of its contemplations which accords with this. And it pronounces the object beautiful, just in proportion to this accord. The whole field of art is thus the province of the reason. No æsthetic criticism could be, unless the reason had

its ideal of perfect beauty, by which it could measure every object of its contemplations.

In like manner with the entire domain of psychology. Neither the perceptions of the sense could be known as real, nor the reflections of the understanding as valid, save by the agency of the comprehending reason. Dr. Hickok's argument for this, though referred to in his other works, is fully unfolded in the first and second parts of the *Rational Psychology*. Briefly stated, in our own language, it is this: How can I know that the phenomena which I perceive, are not mere phantasms? Now, the very inquiry presupposes that there is a higher faculty which must decide the question; but, aside from this, that the mind determines the issue solely from its rational insight, is clear, from a simple statement of the process of perception. For, all the phenomena which we perceive, we must construct in form, *i. e.*, we must limit them in respect of their space, their time, or their degree of intensity. We cannot perceive anything unless it be *defined*. But this is not enough. The object must also be *discriminated*, or there is no perception, *i. e.*, we must not only mark out its boundaries, and see *how much*, but we must distinguish its peculiarity, and see *what* the object is, before we can perceive it. In other words, perception cannot be, unless there be a *quantity* and a *quality* to the object. Now there is something in the mind which can overlook the whole perceptive process, and determine that such and such things are essential to it. In other words, the mind has an *idea* of what perception must be, if it be at all. It not only *believes*, it *knows* that no perception by the senses would be possible, unless the mind could distinguish and define the object it perceived. We could never perceive a sound, unless, in the process of perception, this were *distinguished*, *e. g.*, from a colour, and also *defined*, *e. g.*, as dull or sharp, soft or loud, etc.

But how does this prove the *reality* of the phenomenon? Obviously, if the mind passes through this procedure, *i. e.*, if it finds itself distinguishing and defining quality and quantity, there is to it a real appearance or phenomenon. If the process of perception be real, so must its object be. But how do I know that the perceived object is separate from the perceiving

mind? Doubtless many objects which the mind perceives are its own subjective exercises, but it is equally clear that there are many separate from and independent of itself. For, if we notice carefully these objects, we shall see, that they divide themselves strictly into two classes, one of which is subject wholly to the mind's control, and the other not at all. Now this latter class, which come and go quite independent of the mind, and which it cannot change, either as to the time or the manner of their appearance, evidently have an agency, and thus a being of their own, separate from the mind which perceives them. They are as real as they are perceived, and they are as objective as they are real. The reality of an objective world is clearly beheld by that eye of the mind, within whose scope the whole perceiving process is performed. This eye is the reason, by whose presence alone the inquiry respecting the reality of an external world becomes suggested to us, and by whose insight alone it can be answered.

But is this external world anything but a range of phenomena? Has it a substantial existence? We can only perceive phenomena, can we know aught else? True, if there be a substance, it cannot be *perceived*. While it may have quantity and quality, these are only its properties, not it, and no work of perception can therefore reach it. But it would be most unreasonable to say that there can be quantity or quality without some ground for these. If no substance be *perceived*, it is necessarily *thought*. The operations of the reflective understanding would cease at once, unless there were some substance beneath every phenomenon, as the ground of its reality. No phenomena could be connected together, and no thought would be possible, without a valid substance for the one, and a real subject for the other. Without these, all experience becomes a nullity, for, the arising and vanishing of appearances, which come from naught and can be referred to naught, is not experience. There is a faculty in the mind which declares that unless there be something which cannot be perceived, then there is nothing which can be perceived. This faculty is the reason, and to it the mind assents with undoubting conviction. But beyond this, the same faculty sees, that an external substance is not only necessary in order to any connection of phe-

nomena, but in order to any communication of one man with another, respecting the phenomena of either. A man in a balloon, without compass or barometer, and in the midst of an impenetrable and constantly shifting cloud, has no means of determining his position, or the direction of his movements. This can only be fixed by its relation to something else which is also fixed. In like manner, the places and periods of any phenomena can only be determined, in their relations to each other, and to one whole of space and time, by their relation to something which is not phenomenal, and which, because it never appears, can give to every appearance a relative locality and duration. The reason sees that if we ever assign to one phenomenon a place and period in a whole of space and time, different from that of another phenomenon, and with determined relations to this, then there must be some permanent substance by which this may be effected. Our knowledge of substance is thus as clear as these determined relations are evident. There is, therefore, a substantial world, external to us, which the reason immediately beholds.

But can anything be known respecting such a world beyond its bare existence? The *Rational Cosmology* answers this question in the affirmative, and professes to give some of those eternal principles which the reason beholds in the universe around us. It is at least true, that some such principles are affirmed by every mind. No one doubts, *e. g.*, that matter, wherever it exists, must occupy space. This is no induction from our experience, for not only does our experience come in contact with too small a portion of the whole creation of matter to warrant such a universal conclusion, but, more than this, we know that there could not have been any experience, even, of matter, unless there were, separate from the matter, a space for it to occupy. It is a higher faculty than the sentient or reflective which affirms this, and this faculty is the reason. Again, we know that different matter cannot occupy the same space at the same time. To this all men assent, and yet the senses, at the most, can only testify that they never see this done, and the reflective understanding, at the farthest, can only apply this testimony to the whole of the *actual* experience—it cannot touch the possible. For aught

our senses, or deductions resting only on these, can tell us, there may be matter without space, and different matter at the same time in the same space. Yet we know this to be impossible, but how? Obviously, only through some higher faculty of knowledge, which may appropriately be termed the reason, and which, whether we call it by any other name, does give us these eternal principles, as the necessary laws for the very existence of matter. But why may not this faculty, which does thus much, do more? Is it absurd to seek, is it impossible to find, other principles also? Certainly, if there be a creation, God must have had some reason for this, which, as eternally within himself, must have directed all the processes of his creative hand. It would be as irreverent to affirm, as it is impossible to conceive, that God was controlled by no reason in the work of creation. It is equally the demand of a true philosophy and a scriptural faith, that there should be an eternally controlling reason or wisdom, which the Lord possessed, "in the beginning of his way, before his works of old." There must also as truly be a reason for every part of creation as for the whole, and which determined the Creator to make as he did every individual thing which he has made. And it is doubtless true that we are inquiring for this reason. The child does it. The man does it. The whole history of philosophy reveals only this inquiry as its guiding spring. Every man, even the most stolid, seeks a reason for the facts which he beholds around him. Attempts are made to answer the inquiry by making one fact rest upon another, or explaining the existence of one part of creation by the demands of another part. The stone falls, *e. g.*, because of gravity; or, the tides rise because of the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the question, sure to arise: Why and what is gravity? or: Why and how do the heavenly bodies work thus upon the earth? is not thus answered. Moreover, if we give it any heed, we shall notice that this answer is only another statement, in a more general form, of the very fact for which we sought an explanation. To say that gravity makes the stone to fall, and that gravity is the power which guides the tides and planets, is simply to declare that that which does one thing does something else also, but nothing is thus explained. Our search for know-

ledge is thus answered by enlarging the field of our ignorance. Or, if we still persist, and meet the reply: Gravity is only the expression of the Divine will in the control of matter,—or, the uniform way in which the Creator governs his work,—we are thus unavoidably reminded of the method of the ancient dramatists, who would introduce a deity (*ex machina*) upon the stage, merely to cut some knot in the drama which the ordinary personages could not untie. We admit that this resort was quite unworthy of the artist then, and we can hardly restrain the conviction, that it is no better befitting the philosopher now. The answer may, indeed, silence the inquiry, but the disposition reverently to propound it still remains, and is not, and cannot thus be stifled. When we seek a reason for a fact, we cannot be contented by another fact which must have its reason also. Is it not possible, therefore, that this disposition to seek for an ultimate reason, which the Creator has implanted so ineradicably within us, he intended us to use, in order that he might thereby conduct us to the satisfying object of our search?

The principles which Dr. Hickok, in the *Rational Cosmology*, affirms to be within the immediate insight of the reason, are very numerous, and nothing can exaggerate their importance if true. It is sufficient, for our present purpose, to take the first one which he lays down, and to give, in our own language, his thought and method of statement. This principle is, that *matter is force*, which Dr. Hickok declares to be immediately beheld by the reason, and as necessarily and unchangeably true, as that matter occupies space, &c. But when he affirms that this, and the other principles which he propounds, are immediately seen, he does not mean that every eye at once beholds them, without any efforts to render the vision steady and clear. They are immediately seen, just as all mathematical truths are, which, however, may require long and arduous processes before they can be brought within the mind's range of view. All Dr. Hickok's demonstrations in this book are that the reason sees these principles to be such, and that if thus seen, they need no farther proof, for they prove themselves. They stand revealed in their own light, and declare their truth with their own voice beyond a contradiction. Now, that the reason sees

matter to be force, may be revealed, first from the facts of our sensuous experience. For, what are these facts? What is it we experience? A certain body is visible, audible, &c.—what do we mean by this? Closely noted, it is that such a body has the power to affect our eye or ear in such a way. So also we say the body is hard, soft, fragrant, sapid; by which we can mean nothing other than that it has the power to affect us to the perception of these qualities. Thus of all the organs of sense. All that they can do, or reveal, is the presence of certain affections which certain bodies have produced; and thus all that we can derive, by *inference* from the senses, is, that the body which has caused the affection, *has* force. Force, therefore, is everything belonging to matter, of which we have any experience; and if we stood upon the basis of the so-called experimental philosophy, we should be obliged to say that we know nothing about matter, farther than its force. But we go beyond this, and declare that matter can be nothing but force; for to affirm otherwise, would be to contradict reason. Because, if we say that matter is an unknown somewhat, to which force is communicated, but from which it differs, do we not see that even the capability to receive such communication, or to retain it, is itself a force, and that thus we are driven to the contradiction of declaring that matter has force before it has force? Or, if we take the position that force must have some substance to support it, and in which it may inhere, we meet with the same difficulty in a different word; for what is involved in this substance or support, but the very idea which we seek to exclude? Could it be a substance, standing under (*substans*) and supporting anything without force? What else, therefore, have we to do with matter than as a force? This includes all to which our experience testifies, while it excludes everything but itself from the conception of matter. It is not possible for us either to know that matter is anything but force, or to conceive that it can be. It is thus directly seen, and may be unhesitatingly affirmed by the reason, as an eternal principle, that matter is force. But what is force? Dr. Hickok answers that it is action and reaction. This, he claims, will fill its whole conception. But if this be true, the origin of force, and mode of its origination, are at once revealed. For, whence can

action come but from spirit, to which activity purely and essentially belongs? Spirit, therefore, must be older than matter and its author. But not every spirit,—not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act react upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation. And now that our idea of creation involves exactly this process, is clearly seen. For, either creation is limited, or it is not. If we take the latter ground, we are both absurd and unchristian; for this is Pantheism, and we thus identify the Creator and the creature. But if we affirm the former position, what is this but declaring that the activity of the Creator restrained itself at the point where creation began, and that this self-imposed restraint is exactly what we mean by creation?

In all this view of its work, it is not implied that the human reason knows all things, nor that a reverential faith in God can ever cease to be its crowning glory. Because finite, it must be limited in its knowledge, and because it cannot comprehend infinity, it must rest on One who can. But the finite reason knows the eternal and unfailing ground for this demand of faith, in that it sees that it would be most unreasonable to have it otherwise. It knows God, not because it does or can comprehend him, but because the truth of his being is mirrored in its own being, *i. e.*, in its self-knowledge, it finds that which would be contradicted by the denial of God. Coincident with the absurdity of doubting its own being, would be the absurdity, if the finite reason should doubt the being of God. It knows him, not by the testimony of another, but by an intuition of its own. In Dr. Hickok's own language: "The conception of the non-being of the Absolute Reason, involves the absurdity of conceiving reason to be unreasonable."*

But this original knowledge of God, so clear, so direct, so impossible for the finite reason really to doubt, involves also a knowledge of many truths predicable of him. "He is manifestly a Person, having in himself the knowledge of all possible, and the self-determining will to execute all his own behests. To him there can be no beginning nor end, for there can be no

* Rational Cosmology, p. 86.

time when he was not; and to him there can be no bounds, for there can be no place where he is not. He is unsustained and uncaused, for there can be no substance which he does not hold, and no cause which he does not originate. He is absolved from all dependence upon, and determination, by any other being than himself. Here is no abstraction, but the positive affirmation of the I AM; he who has being and blessedness and exhaustless fulness in himself; even the being of whom it would be an everlasting absurdity to suppose that he was not, and was not blessed, and was not satisfied. Sense cannot *per*ceive him; discursive thought cannot *con*ceive him; only a spiritual discernment, the direct insight of reason, can behold him. All the attributes which our manner of conceiving apply to him, participate in this characteristic of absoluteness. His wisdom is absolved from all dependence upon outward conditions. He has within himself the reason-view of all things possible to be put in objective being, in the plans or ideal archetypes to which they must conform; and his regard to that which is worthy of his own acceptance, determines what of all that is possible shall also be actual. He is absolute liberty; for the one rule of that which is everlastingly worthy of himself, and securing his own dignity or glory, gives a repellancy and exclusion of all ends that might tyrannize and enslave. He is absolutely blessed; for in his constant holiness and steadfast purpose, fixed upon his own glory, there is no collision or disturbance, but the perpetual serenity of an unruffled flow of righteousness. He is absolute sovereign; for while the ultimate end of his own dignity is ever before him, and eternally directing all his agency, he, as supreme, has rightful authority and headship over all the beings that exist beside him, and may rightfully command in the ends of his glory, that they should serve him with unquestioning and constant devotion. He is, in fine, and as the most comprehensive form of expression, THE ABSOLUTE GOOD—good in himself as supremely excellent, without any reference to a farther end, and good as the source or supplier of all the good which any other beings possess and enjoy. He can be put to no use as a means to get something beyond himself; but as the end of all ends, all other things fulfil their measure in conspiring to present that to him which

is in honour of him. The highest seraph and the humblest saint honour themselves only in their devotion to his honour."*

However it may appear to others, Dr. Hickok evidently does not think it irreverent to speak of the Deity as controlled by principles. For principles, with him, are no *ab extra* chain stretched around the Divine Will, and guiding it perforce, or by the nature of things. But rather are they the eternal archetypes of everlasting truth, which dwell in him as their uncreated ground, and which control him, even as and because he controls himself. Dr. Hickok confidently maintains that we could never worship God, unless with the recognition that he is and must be eternally thus controlled. It is only, he claims, in the clear insight, which our reasons possess, of the truth that the Absolute One, the Supreme and Perfect Spirit, will ever act worthy of himself, controlled alone by the unchanging behests of his own eternal glory, that we can feel any obligation to reverence, or any incitement to adoration. "It is precisely in this light," says the *Rational Psychology*,† "and solely in this presence, that we wake to the consciousness of what reverence is, and know that we stand before an awful Majesty, where we must bow and adore. We may stand amid all the sublimities of that wonder-working *power* which is fashioning the material mechanism of the heavens and the earth, and we shall admire and praise in profound astonishment; we may look upon all the arrangements which, in the bounty of an ever-working *wisdom and kindness*, is diffusing sentient joy and gladness over millions of happy beings; and we may go with such as are competent to recognise their kind benefactor into his presence, and hear the ten thousand times ten thousand voices, in different ways proclaiming their *gladsome gratitude* as the sound of many waters, and we shall sympathize in their joys and praises with a rapturous delight; but it is only when I see all these standing in the presence of that absolute sovereignty and pure moral personality, who searches them all in the light of His own *dignity*, and judges them by the claims of His own *excellency*, and estimates their worth solely in reference to His *worthiness;* and when, also, I see that thus it

* Rational Cosmology, pp. 86, 87. † Pp. 436, 437.

behoved they should have been made, to be fit creatures of His ordering and accepting, and that He made them thus after the behest of His own uncreated reason, and in the light of His ethical truth and righteousness, and governs them, and holds them ever subordinate to His own moral glory and authority; it is in such a presence only, that I reverently cover my face, and fall prostrate, and cry from my inward spirit, 'Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, heaven and earth are full of thy glory.' 'Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power, for Thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.'" The spirit in which this passage is written pervades all the treatises of the author, many portions of which stir the soul as with an anthem, and awaken emotions which have no other so fitting expression as the exclamation of the Apostle: "For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things, to whom be glory for ever!"

The importance of the reason in Dr. Hickok's system is abundantly seen from the sketch we have given, and there needs little more for an accurate comprehension of his philosophic scheme. The functions of the reason are the architect of the whole. Both the basis and superstructure are laid and erected, solely in the light, and by the working of a direct rational insight. The *Rational Psychology* furnishes his statement of what this power is, and his proof that it is. This is therefore not only the first of his works in the order of their publication, but the first, also, in the order of their systematic arrangement. The doctrine of the reason, as expounded in the third part of this treatise, is only evolved and carried out to its legitimate applications in whatever else he has written. The *System of Moral Science* takes the rational rule of right as grounded in worthiness of spiritual approbation, and systematically applies this to the whole course of human conduct. The *Empirical Psychology* gathers the facts of the human mind as given in consciousness, and contemplates these in the light of that rational insight which detects their true and organic relations. The *Rational Cosmology* shows that the reason possesses ideas to which the universe conforms, and that no science of nature is possible unless the actual facts of the world around us are seen in living accord with the principles within.

The relations of this order of thought to philosophic scepticism remain to be noted, and may be comprehensively stated in a few words. The difference between the affirmations of the reason, which Dr. Hickok propounds, and the dicta of common sense, as declared by Reid and the Scottish school, is simply this: the "common sense" utters what it universally believes, but for which it knows no ground; the reason declares what it beholds and knows in its own ground. The principles which the reason sees, do not need anything other than themselves for their support. They do not need to be proved, therefore, but only to be shown. To demand a proof, would be the absurdity of requiring a reason for reason. Reason affirms, declares, supports itself. If, therefore, anything can be shown as revealed in the clear rational insight, this is sufficient, and we neither can gain, nor do we really ever seek any other ground than this. It is not simply because our powers are so weak that we cannot go beyond this; rather are they so lofty that they see in this the true ultimate, the self-supporting ground of all the rest. It is because we are reason, that we rest in what is reasonable, and it would be to deny that self-knowledge which is our crown and royalty, could we look for anything beyond. It is only necessary, therefore, that the sceptic see a truly rational principle, and his scepticism is, so far as this principle reaches, for ever overthrown. If Dr. Hickok's principles are true, and can be clearly shown as such, no farther scepticism is possible in philosophy. A mind deeply imbued with this order of thought, could be no more sceptical than it could be unthinking.

In every system of philosophy, the relation of the subjective mind to the objective world, has furnished a prominent theme of regard. How shall the two be brought into any such connection, that the thought of matter shall be true, and the knowledge of it real? Upon this question the attention of every great thinker has been so diligently exercised, that the different answers that have been given, may afford a desirable method of classifying the different systems which the history of philosophy reveals. All the forms of simple philosophical *Scepticism* centre in the doubt that any connection of mind and matter is possible. All philosophical *Mysticism* may be referred to the

conviction that while such a connection is both possible and actual, it is also inexplicable. But, while philosophers generally have neither doubted the fact of this connection nor failed to propound their methods of explaining it, it is quite obvious that every possible explanation must assume one of three general forms. I. Mind and matter are intrinsically alike, and there is thus no difficulty in their relation. But this intrinsic likeness is liable to a twofold appearance according as we view it in the resolving of mind into matter, or of matter into mind. In the one case there arises *Idealism*, which declares that matter is only mind degenerated, and in the other *Materialism*, which affirms that mind is only matter refined. II. Mind and matter are intrinsically diverse, and can be brought in contact only through a third somewhat. Here also we have a specific diversity of explanation. (1.) This bond of connection may be God, who brings the two together, (*a*) only by his almighty power, (*Descartes*); or, (*b*) by the intervention of his will in occasional causes, (*Geulincx*); or, (*c*) by spiritualizing the matter, so that we can see it in him, (*Malebranche*); or, (*d*) by a preëstablished harmony, (*Leibnitz*). (2) Mind and matter may be attributes of one infinite substance, (*Spinoza*). (3) They may be opposite poles of the Absolute, (*Schelling*). (4.) They are brought together by a superior principle, which unites them as matter and form, (*Aristotle*, *Kant*). III. Though intrinsically diverse, they have that in common by which they are related. On this ground stands *Plato* with his ideas, and here also, in a classification of philosophical systems, is Dr. Hickok's position. Spirit is, with him, essentially self-activity, with self-knowledge and self-determination; matter is essentially action and reaction, *i. e.*, force. Matter may thus be the product of spirit and cognizable by it. Such a conception removes the gulf, in other systems impassable, between the Creator and the creature, between the knowing mind and the material objects of its knowledge. But the two are not identified. The Creator is distinct from the creature, though He is in a true sense All in All, and all things live and move and have their being in Him. The mind is different from its objects, though its activity and their agency meet in the common point of the mind's knowledge.

ART. II.—*Remarks on the foregoing, and other recent Vindications of Dr. Hickok's Philosophy.*

THE preceding article, from one of the most distinguished supporters and representative expounders of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, we have cordially welcomed. We are glad to have, in a short compass, a clear exposition of that philosophy from an authorized source. It is something gained as the result of our strictures, that we have this system at length rendered to us in idiomatic and facile English, in a form, not only authentic, but as intelligible as the nature of the topics discussed allows. If it fails in its main object, this is not, in our judgment, so much the fault of the advocate, as of his cause. We think it confirms, instead of invalidating our past strictures.

This is not the only attempt to vindicate this philosophy, and parry the criticisms, more especially of this journal, upon it, which have been called forth more immediately by the review of the "New and Revised Edition of Dr. Hickok's Rational Psychology," published in our number for last October. That article, the present writer may be permitted to say, (as it came from another source, well known by all concerned, to be a distinguished divine in another branch of the church,) has been favoured with rare proofs of its extraordinary power. It is very seldom that any disquisition on abstruse philosophical questions commands such general attention from friend and foe, in our own and foreign countries. In this country, it not only received special attention in the usual notices which the religious weeklies give of the quarterlies, together with high encomiums from persons eminent in philosophy, to whom the author was wholly unknown, but it was read with keen interest and delight by a much larger number than usually give metaphysical articles a careful perusal. Beyond our own country, it was honoured with most laudatory notices, and was republished in Great Britain. But, beside all this, it broke the reticency which, so far as we know, Dr. Hickok has seen fit personally to preserve

in reference to previous criticisms. It brought forth operose rejoinders in the *American Theological Review*, one by Dr. Hickok himself in the April number, which had been preceded by one from his learned and accomplished coadjutor, Dr. Tayler Lewis, in the January number, and is now followed, in this journal, by the exposition already presented to our readers, from a hand which we have good reason to suppose Dr. Hickok would trust, as soon as any other, to discharge such an office. We refer to these unmistakeable proofs of the high power of that article, furnished as well by Dr. Hickok and his collaborators, as by manifold other demonstrations, for the purpose of showing that, whatever else he may see cause to do or not to do about it, he cannot afford to try to neutralize it by mere outbursts of irritation and contempt. Whatever he may accomplish in his search for the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence," or the necessary laws of world-building, he cannot afford such an attempt. To make it, is to confess that what is thus assailed cannot be refuted by argument. Whether Dr. Hickok has not placed himself in this predicament, we will shortly inquire. Meanwhile, we have a few words to offer in regard to the communication of our respected correspondent.

And first, we will premise some things, by way of clearing the *status questionis*, which are applicable in various degrees, not only to the article of our correspondent, but to those of Drs. Hickok and Lewis. The question is not, then, whether there are self-evident truths, above sense, which the mind has a faculty of seeing in their own light, intuitively, and without derivation by inference from any other truths. Nor is it, whether, especially in the mathematical, logical, and metaphysical, or what may be called in general the formal sciences, there are certain truths which are intuitively seen to be necessary, *i. e.*, such that their non-existence cannot be conceived without mental suicide. To deny them is to contradict reason and derationalize ourselves. It might be inferred from some parts of these rejoinders to our criticisms, that these truths were generally ignored or questioned, especially by the critics of Dr. Hickok's philosophy in this journal, and that Dr. Hickok had been called to the high office of reclaiming for them a due

acknowledgment and authority in philosophy. We need not say that all such implications, whether intentional or not, are quite gratuitous. Self-evident and necessary truths, together with the faculty for knowing them, are neither overlooked nor denied by philosophers in general, outside of the Sensuous and Positive sect, nor by this journal, nor especially, by the critics of Dr. Hickok in this journal. On the contrary, they are most strenuously affirmed in the principal notices of his works in our pages, as examination will abundantly show. There is no special philosophical mission for Dr. Hickok in this department. Whether he has not thrown all certainty of knowledge by our intuitions into doubt, is another and real question in this matter, on which we may have something to say; and, in reference to difficulties alleged in regard to which, his defenders will do well to say something, if they mean to escape the discredit of evading the true issues.

Nor is the question, what Dr. Hickok meant to do. That he intended and endeavoured to correct the obliquities of Kant, to establish a real external world, a valid ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology, may be well enough admitted. Certainly we have not denied it. Nor have we questioned his piety, nor the devoutness and sublimity of some of his religious and philosophico-religious meditations. But whether, in making his great attempt, he has not undermined what he sought to establish, and laid down principles logically subversive of all foundations, is another question. To that we have addressed ourselves. And to the difficulties expressed by some of the ablest thinkers on this point, his apologists will do well to address themselves. Dr. Hickok and his friends must not be too sensitive when we trace his system to pantheistic consequences. He does not hesitate to denounce modern philosophy, especially the prevalent religious philosophy, as "pantheistic."

Nor is the question, it is almost trivial to say, whether God acts according to perfect wisdom in the creation of the worlds, or whether rational beings can trace the signatures of his wisdom in his works. Those who read the vindications of Dr. Hickok's philosophy now under review, can judge whether there is not abundant occasion for this remark, and whether much is not advanced in some of them, as if he were especially commis-

sioned to maintain this truth, as being forgotten or impugned by his critics or others. The whole cosmical question raised by Dr. Hickok is a very different one. It is whether the mind of man can know *a priori*, not merely some necessary truths or laws, such as we have already indicated; but that the only possible way in which God can produce matter is by his own antagonistic activities; whether such activities in counteraction being once given, the human reason can see *a priori* that they *must* operate so as to produce all and singular the forms and properties of matter organic and inorganic, mechanical, chemical, vegetable, animal, which now exist; that hence, God was shut up (not by the moral necessity of acting wisely in freedom, but by a physical and fatalistic impossibility of acting in any other way, whatever his wisdom might dictate) to the single alternative of creating what he has, or as he has, or not creating at all. This is what the vindicators of Dr. Hickok's philosophy are called to defend; not that God acts wisely, and that we can see manifold traces of his wisdom, which who denies? And until some stronger defence of it appears than has yet come to light, we shall still reiterate our reprobation of such an attempt by mortal man; however able and ingenious, it is none the less perilous and presumptuous.

Turning now to the positive issues made by our correspondent, he says: "Scepticism, according to Dr. Hickok, is the necessary result of every system of thought which confines the work of the intellect to its judgments and inferences." "That this scepticism is inherent in all processes of the merely judging or inferring intellect, Dr. Hickok finds evidence in the nature of the process itself." This is extraordinary language. First, it apparently confounds judgment and inference, as if they were mental processes equivalent and co-extensive. It is true that every inference is a judgment; but it is not true that every judgment is an inference, which is a judgment derived from another judgment. Judgments then are of two kinds—intuitive, and inferential or discursive. But these two kinds of judgments include all possible cognitions, and grasp the *omne scibile*. Every mental affirmation is a judgment. How can anything be known except by a mental affirmation that it is, or that it is thus and so? If then scepticism is the "neces-

sary result" of intellectual operations in the form of judgments and inferences, where are we? Can we escape it? Can Dr. Hickok rescue us from it, even by the exercise of the almost divine prerogatives he ascribes to the reason? for can reason, or any other faculty, know aright with certainty, otherwise than by judgments, however intuitive, self-evident, and necessary those judgments may be? Is self-affirmation less a judgment than any other kind of affirmation?

But let us attribute all this to some inexplicable confusion of ideas or terms which limits judgments to inferences. Let us assume that it is the object of the writer to maintain, as some passages would seem to imply, that we must have some faculty for judgments self-affirmed, and for grasping self-evident truths, which shine in their own light, without dependence on other truths for their proof. If so, we say again, this is nothing peculiar to Dr. Hickok, nor questioned nor ignored by his critics. But, what is of more moment, he subverts the authority of such self-evident, ultimate truths, in his very argument for their necessity. For, in reference to these ultimate convictions, which we are so made that we cannot but trust them, whether in relation to objects of, or above, sense, he treats it as a fair question on the part of the sceptic, "How do we know that we are not so made that we must believe a lie?"—as a question, moreover, that cannot be fairly answered, until Dr. Hickok leads us up to the faculty of reason, "whose province it is to behold the truth by an immediate insight, and in its absolute and self-affirming ground." But how does this help us? Is not the same question just as fair at this point, "How do we know that we are not so made as to believe a lie?" If the question is in place at all, it is in place here. The reason then must find some means of testing itself, as well as other faculties. It must be able to "look around and through itself and its objects," in order to test their reality and validity. And to do this, Dr. Hickok finds it necessary to master the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence." This is the explicative title of his *Rational Psychology*. To this it has been objected, that such an attempt must be abortive and suicidal. Reason, which tries all the other faculties, must be tried by itself, before it can be found and validated. It is its own

judge. Its affirmations are either valid or invalid, in themselves. If the former, it needs no testing. If the latter, it is an incompetent trier. The trier, it seems, needs trying. But he can only be tried by himself, and tried and tried, until he is tried out of being, certainly out of all authority. In short, if we are not permitted to know that our intuitions are trustworthy; if we must believe that it may be that "the root of our nature is a lie," and that consciousness "is a liar from the beginning," the foundations of all knowledge are subverted, and unmitigated scepticism is in the ascendant.

It is immaterial to us what terminology is employed to distinguish the Intuitive from the Discursive faculty. If any choose to follow the German distinction, to some extent naturalized among us, through the influence of Coleridge and others, by which Reason is appropriated exclusively to denote the Intuitive, and Understanding the Discursive power, we shall not take the trouble to contend with them. But whether Reason, in the language of our correspondent, "has a standard by which it can measure all things which come within its apprehension, and determine whether they be reasonable or not," (pp. 373–4) is another question. Here we have joined issue with Dr. Hickok. We hold that there is much that we can apprehend, but never can comprehend, *i. e.*, measure by the standard of our own reason, in the realms of Creation, Providence, and Redemption. Any other view is intolerably rationalistic, and hostile to faith, humility, and reverence. Still loftier exhibitions of the prerogative of Reason, crop out in the writings of Drs. Lewis and Hickok.

But it is, it is alleged, one of the great aims and achievements of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, to validate our cognition of an external world, left doubtful, it seems, until established by his *a priori* demonstrations through the reason. All that we can know by the senses, it appears, "is the presence of certain affections which certain bodies have produced; and thus all that we can derive by *inference* from the senses, is, that the body which caused the affection *has* force." This is, for substance, the account which all these writers give of the cognition of external objects through the senses. All that we know immediately, say they, is certain affections or impressions in

our own sensibility. But these are clearly subjective. All that we know of any objective reality is by inference from these subjective sensations. On this hypothesis, Dr. Hickok's *Rational Psychology* proceeds, asserting the necessity, and making the attempt, to compass, by *a priori* demonstrations, what the senses themselves can never reach—a real and certain outer world. This ignores or denies the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, so long emphasised by the soundest philosophers as true in itself, and vital to a valid doctrine of external perception, while it has been almost universally impugned or confounded by Sceptics, Idealists, and Materialists.

The Primary qualities are those which are inherent in body as space-filling substance, *i. e.*, as having extension and solidity. These are known immediately, especially by the touch and muscular energy, as objective and inherent in the body, and not as any mere subjective affections of our own organism. As has been unanswerably demonstrated, we have through these senses as decisive a conviction of an external non-ego as of an ego, and that the evidence for one is as strong as for the other. If consciousness is not to be trusted in the one case, neither is it in the other. The foundations of all knowledge and faith are subverted, and the blankest scepticism supervenes.

The Secondary qualities, on the other hand, into which this school resolve the Primary, are mere powers of producing conscious affections in our organism, occult in themselves, and unrealized until they interact with our organs, and evince their effects in the affections they thus produce. Of this sort are the odorous, sonorous, sapid, and, within certain limits, the visible qualities of bodies. The immediate knowledge thus given, (with a possible qualification in regard to sight,) is wholly subjective, limited to our own sensations. Consequently, if all the qualities of matter are secondary, it is impossible for us ever to gain a knowledge of it. Immediate knowledge of it is impossible; and by what conceivable process can we know it, unless immediately? Is it said that we can refer these subjective affections to it as their cause? But how is this possible, unless it be first known immediately, through its primary qualities? That we always, in our waking moments, do thus

immediately know external body, or substance having extension and solidity distinct from ourselves, is undeniable. The earth on which we stand, or the chair in which we sit, is ever known immediately and intuitively as a somewhat extended, solid, and other than ourselves. Knowing thus the existence of external objects by their primary qualities, we can attribute the secondary qualities to them by inference; because, whenever they are present, given "affections" are produced within us; *e. g.*, the sensation of sweetness on the presence of the rose, of a certain sound on the striking of a bell. But, unless bodies were first cognized immediately, by their primary qualities, they could never be known through the secondary—not even by any *a priori* demonstration, such as Dr. Hickok attempts. Such demonstration may show us the possibility that body may be—it never can prove that body is. Body can be known as existent only through the senses. If not proved to exist thus, then it cannot be proved to exist at all. How does our correspondent reach it? How does he show that we "know the perceived object is separate from the perceiving mind?" Our readers have doubtless noticed his answer on page 377. His criterion is that while many objects which the mind perceives are its own subjective exercises, those "which come and go quite independent of the mind, and which it cannot change, either as to the time or manner of their appearance, evidently have an agency, and thus a being of their own, separate from the mind which perceives them."

We are afraid that this criterion of externality, said to be furnished by the reason to make up for the incertitude and insufficiency of sense, will not stand. How is it with the aches and pains and pleasures, resulting from morbid or healthful conditions of the body, the alternate heat and cold induced by fever—the uncontrollable and immedicable anguish of the hypochondriac? Do not they, and much else which it is needless to specify, "come and go quite independently of the mind"? This mode of founding perception on the *a priori* demonstrations of the reason, after invalidating the certainty of it, in its own normal acts through its appropriate and God-given organs, is, and must be, a failure. It overthrows all certain evidence of an external world, and leaves the field

clear for idealism and scepticism—and this none the less, however contrary may have been the intent of the author.*

And this is all the more so, in view of the analysis of the inferences from our subjective affections as to their external causes, offered by Dr. Hickok's philosophy, to which we have before adverted. "All that we can derive, by *inference*, from the senses is, that the body which has caused the affection has force." "Matter can be nothing but force." We ask, first, on this theory, how do we know the existence of any "body" or "matter" whatsoever? We know or infer "force," it seems, operating somehow and from somewhere, upon us. But do we, or can we, know any particular body from which such force proceeds? How do we know that this force may not be the activity of some spirit? This question, however, is more than needless, when addressed to advocates of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. For the very core, the *punctum saliens* of this philosophy is, not only that matter is force and can be nothing else, that there can be no substance supporting and underlying this force, which is not itself force,† but this force is and must be the action of a spirit, even the Infinite and Eternal Spirit. Says our correspondent:

"But what is force? Dr. Hickok answers that it is action and re-action. This, he claims, will fill its whole conception. But if this be true, the origin of force, and mode of

* The following logical development into Nihilism of such germinant premises we copy from Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 129.

"The sum total is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition: that consist in the fact of the image of the images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images: nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up of only a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream."

† See page 381. We leave to others the task of reconciling this with what is said of substance on page 377.

its origination, are at once revealed. For whence can action come but from spirit, to which activity purely and essentially belongs. Spirit, therefore, must be older than matter and its author. But not every spirit—not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act re-act upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation." Pp. 381, 382.

This is precisely what we have charged upon Dr. Hickok's philosophy; that it really resolves matter into a mere act of God; and denies it to be an enduring product of such action, which is yet distinct from it: that it is thus, with regard to matter or the physical world, inevitably pantheistic. Moreover, we have said that we see no necessity for resolving matter into mere divine acts which is not equally urgent with reference to spirit. Thus absolute Pantheism emerges. The main premise of this argument is reaffirmed by our correspondent. We have seen no serious attempt to invalidate the reasoning and conclusion from it.

Dr. Hickok, according to our correspondent, argues the possibility of a connection between mind and matter, and so of a knowledge of the latter by the former, because spirit is essentially self-active, while matter is divine action and reaction, *i. e.*, force; and so can be the work (*i. e.*, act) of spirit. This explanation itself needs explaining. Is not the power of knowing at all an ultimate self-evident fact, so plain that nothing can be plainer by which to explain it? And does not this theory explain all matter into a mere act of spirit, *i. e.*, virtually spiritualize it? This attempt to explain how mind can know matter, is impracticable and absurd. Many of the old metaphysicians assumed the impossibility of an immediate knowledge of matter, because, as they said, the two were separated from each other by "the whole diameter of being." Hence they devised theories of mediate perception, through representative images, species, &c. to bridge over the chasm—all which logically issued in idealism. Dr. Hickok tries to overpass it, by resolving matter into an act of spirit, and therefore intelligible to spirit. But really, is it easier to explain how we can cognize an act of spirit, than solid and extended substance, which is other than a spiritual act? Is not either

sort of cognition ultimate and simple, and incapable of analysis or explication into simpler elements? And is it any desirable achievement in philosophy to attempt to solve the insoluble, and develope, in the solution, the germs of idealism and pantheism?

As to the claim, that no process is scientific which explains phenomena and facts by reference to broader facts, or laws of higher generality, that as yet have no explanation but the creative will of God; or which falls short of an ultimate explanation by necessary laws; this virtually takes out of the realm of philosophy everything but the formal sciences of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics—which *per se* give no content of actual existence; and except such portions of the material sciences as are found *empirically* to furnish any conditions to which mathematical, or logical, or metaphysical principles are applicable. It is to deny that inductive science proper is science. For our part, we deem that process scientific which refers facts and phenomena to laws, and laws of less to those of greater generality. If the only explanation of such laws be the creative will of Infinite Wisdom, whose ways are unsearchable, this does not destroy the scientific character of the process, however any may stigmatize it as introducing a "deity (*ex machina*)," or as "enlarging the field of our ignorance." This last is the least of our troubles. In one sense, this is the end of all true philosophy. Dr. Hickok and his philosophical friends will do well to "enlarge the field of their" acknowledged "ignorance" in matters too high, alike for us, for them, and for mortal man. No knowledge is more edifying than the knowledge of our own ignorance, or of the necessary limits of our knowledge. Quite enough of modern philosophical speculation has been too long in its sophomoric stage. "Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise." 1 Cor. iii. 18.

The Articles of Drs. Hickok and Lewis.

As has been already implied, many of the more significant points in these articles have been sufficiently ventilated in the preceding comments. They have, however, each some idiosyn-

cratic features, from which the contribution of our correspondent is happily exempt, and which demand a little notice. We will first summarily bring to view some leading doctrines of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, against which our review of his *Rational Psychology*, in our No. for October last, was directed. And, since the allegations and arguments of that article were sufficiently telling, to bring him and his coadjutor out in essays designed to parry them, we will very briefly indicate the way in which they have done the work essayed, and the conclusion to which we are thus inevitably driven.

Dr. Hickok begins with denying all immediate perceptions of outward things, and with denying the universal testimony of consciousness for such a perception. He holds that the mind is conscious only of its own sensations, which are wholly mental. "*The whole process*," he declares, "*is a thinking in judgments discursively, and not a perceiving of objects intuitively.*" (*Empirical Psychology*, p. 130.) We are conscious of a sensation; but sense cannot tell whence it comes, nor reach an outer world. The mind first *judges* that the sensation has an outward cause. Secondly, it *judges* that that cause is material. Thirdly, the mind forms an image of that outward cause, of which no form or resemblance has reached the mind from without. Fourthly, the mind judges that the mental image is *like* the outward object. But, plainly, a judgment of resemblance cannot be formed unless the mind first knows the object resembled. On Dr. Hickok's scheme, we can never know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it; which is impossible and absurd. He therefore gives an idea of All Intelligence in which all intelligence is impossible.

But while he denies all immediate perception of outward things, he fully admits that the denial is contrary to the necessary convictions of consciousness in all mankind. He maintains that the demonstration of reason is full, sound, and clear; that all such immediate knowledge of outward things in consciousness is impossible. "And now," he demands, "where are we, as intelligent beings? Consciousness contradicts reason; the reason belies consciousness"—"they openly and flatly contradict each other." "The nature of man as intelligent stands out a self-contradiction." "All ground for knowledge

in any way is self-annihilated. The truth of our intellectual nature is falsehood, and there remains nothing other than to doubt universally."

To this statement of the problem, and to Dr. Hickok's mode of solving it, we brought an array of objections, which wrought wide conviction, and Dr. Hickok has deemed himself called to answer in the *American Theological Review*.

And what does he respond? Of all the adverse reviews he affirms that "it is most pitifully and painfully manifest that their authors were utterly incompetent to enter into the method or the meaning of the works;" and their objections are "but sorry blunders of their own ignorance;" and especially that the review in our October number "manifests throughout that the writer of it has an entire want of discernment of the philosophical distinctions between the phenomena and things in themselves, the being and the becoming:" that it is "uninstructed criticism;" and then "the most lamentable part of the matter is, that very extensively the ductile minds of coming labourers are passing on to their responsible life-mission under the like negative instructions and positive perversions." Dr. Hickok affirms that "the speculation pursued in the *Psychology* is often misconceived," but "more often entirely beyond the apprehension" of the reviewer. He admits that the only practicable answer would be to point out the items in which the *Psychology* has been misunderstood or misrepresented; but for this he says "there is not sufficient inducement;" and he makes no attempt to specify a solitary particular in which his works have been misrepresented or misunderstood, nor does he attempt in any way to meet a solitary position or objection of the reviewer. Manifestly much disturbed, and feeling the necessity of some answer, he avoids all particulars, waives all specifications, and contents himself with general declarations of the ignorance and incompetence of the reviewer; who, he says, may suppose his mistakes "to be the fault of the work itself in its obscure thinking and expression, but surely," adds Dr. Hickok, "if it were too obscure for his apprehension, he was not bound to study it, nor to review it; certainly was not bound to review it till he had intelligently studied it." Has Dr. Hickok, then, attained such a position in the philosophical world, that he

may thus, *ex cathedra*, dispose of all arguments and objections against his philosophy, by simply alleging the ignorance and incompetence of those who make them, and that too, without deigning to specify a solitary point in which that error or incompetence appears? Are we to suppose that Dr. Hickok really fancies himself to have attained this high distinction and prerogative in philosophy, so that he may allege ignorance and perversions, by wholesale, with no attempt to specify the least particular? or is it more reasonable and more charitable to conclude that he was driven to assume this magisterial and supercilious attitude from the consciousness that no other reply could be given?

After giving an outline of the common history of ancient philosophy, Dr. Hickok earnestly maintains that all modern philosophy but his own, is Atheistic or Pantheistic; that even our theology, on the principles received from Edwards, denies all freedom and proper responsibility to man, and, in its philosophic principles, ignores and rejects the God which its faith blindly assumes; so that in future conflicts the victory must be with the followers of Compté, and not with our theology. This is truly a sad case, with nothing to relieve it but the philosophy of Dr. Hickok, which our theologians find it so hard to understand, and which, when they misconceive it, Dr. Hickok will not condescend to explain, nor to tell where the misunderstanding lies. This atheism and pantheism in principle, which, it is alleged, now underlie all our theology, Dr. Hickok says, "in the fullest meaning and closest application is the prevalent philosophy."* Without the aid of his

* The very slender pretext on which Dr. Hickok brings this charge against our current Christian philosophy is, that it defines freedom to be the power of doing "as the being pleases."—*Amer. Theol. Review* for April, p. 216. This, he contends, fetters liberty, or substitutes for it a causal necessity which is destructive of it. Without stopping to inquire how pertinent all this is to any issue that has been raised in this controversy, we ask, where it puts Dr. Hickok's system? Says our correspondent, "Dr. Hickok evidently does not think it irreverent to speak of the Deity as controlled by principles." "He is and *must* be eternally so controlled." Now he is thus controlled, agreeably, or contrary to, his own pleasure. There is no escape from this alternative, unless in an unconscious pantheistic absolute. If the former, then Dr. Hickok's system is in precisely the same plight as the prevalent Christian philosophy. He is, on his own showing, a Pantheist. On the latter hypothesis,

Rational Psychology, which the reviewer, "in his blindness," has been "holding up to misguided derision and reproach," and which constitutes "the very defences and support of" our "creed"—without adopting this very Rational Psychology, he holds that our adoption of this creed can be "*nothing but unreasoning credulity.*" Alas for the Christian world, that till Dr. Hickok arose, their belief in God and Christ, and in all the doctrines which constitute the "creed" of the Church, was "nothing but an unreasoning credulity!"

This blindness of the Christian world Dr. Hickok charges to the antinomy of using the logical understanding instead of the reason. Is it not possible that Dr. Hickok has mistaken the prevalent philosophy, and that other men have, and use the reason as well as himself? He has certainly mistaken and misrepresented our review of October last on this point. He says of the reviewer, "To him all objects are just what and just as the senses give to us, and all investigation of them can attain to nothing other than that which the logical faculty can make out of them."

Now why does Dr. Hickok use such language? He had the review before him, expressly and emphatically affirming the contrary, in these words: "We fully admit that man is rational. He is able to discern in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and what can be yielded by no mere analysis of the object of sense. He can discern wisdom, thought, beneficence; and know spirit, not in its substance, nor as having properties in common with matter. In design he sees a designer—not contained in the thing designed—a creator '*understood*'—not contained—yet 'clearly seen' from the things that are made."

Dr. Hickok may comfort himself in this matter; he has not only made this very strange mistake concerning his reviewer, but the prevalent philosophy, from the times of Reid, Buffier, Beattie, Edwards, and even before—the "prevalent philosophy"

it is still worse for him; for then God is controlled by principles of eternal necessity, against his own choice and pleasure. He is bound in chains of adamantine fate, or of a blind, insensate law of pantheistic development. This attempt, therefore, to divert attention from the crushing objections to his own philosophy, instead of answering them, is not only weak, it is suicidal.

of all Christendom, as well as of the mathematicians, has been entirely familiar with the intuitions of reason beyond those of sense.

But let us notice for a moment the reply of Professor Lewis. Dr. Hickok very properly questioned the reason itself, when he allowed reason to question sense and consciousness. He refused to *assume* the possibility of such a faculty as reason, but began by admitting "a drawn battle" between reason and consciousness, and then by inquiring "which, or whether either, be true." Professor Lewis begins with an entirely different sort of philosophy. He not only assumes that reason is infallible, but that it is not a human or created "faculty,"—is eternal, truly divine, bringing with it "*a priori* knowledge," "ideas that lie in the soul ready for use," and that "come with it from that supernatural and *pre-existent* sphere, in which the human spirit, so far as it is rational, had its supernal origin. Though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, it shares in the universal reason, and breathes the higher life of the eternal and uncreated world." By the "universal reason" he can mean, in this connection, none other than the eternal wisdom of God. If man's reason is thus *divine*, it shares in the Godhead. Professor Lewis adds, "To know God at all, implies a *divine* faculty." He speaks of "*divine* reason," and "*divine* thoughts" in man; and of our having lost or misused the "light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." What can this mean, unless that reason in man is the *Logos* which was incarnate in Christ, and by which every man possessed of reason, is, so far, God manifest in the flesh?*

The scheme of Professor Lewis, therefore, differs fundamentally from that of Dr. Hickok, in that while Dr. Hickok begins by doubting the existence and the possibility of reason, Professor Lewis not only assumes such a faculty, but assumes that it is eternal and truly divine, and comes furnished with *a priori* knowledge from its pre-existent sphere. If we admit the assumption of Professor Lewis, it does not follow that Dr.

* Dr. Hickok at times uses language on this subject scarcely less qualified. "Reason," he says, "can be conceived no otherwise than as a verity which fills eternity and immensity!"—*Rational Cosmology*, p. 85.

Hickok can establish the being and validity of a faculty of reason, and reach an outer world, when he has once removed from under him every ground and possibility of certain knowledge, by declaring the falsity of consciousness, and the doubtfulness, and perhaps the impossibility of reason itself.

What the doctrine of the Trinity can have to do with the question at issue, unless, perhaps, it may be to show that Dr. Hickok's *a priori* knowledge of the Incarnation and Redemption is valid, it is hard to tell. But Professor Lewis does not omit to give us his own views of the Trinity. He tells us that the only ground "on which a true Trinitarianism can be long maintained," is that which regards the Trinity as consisting in the Father and two of his attributes, "one the Wisdom, and another the Love of the Father." This is not the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Professor Lewis defends Idealism, cites an "old Gipsey" as a true philosopher, because he doubted the existence both of the world and of himself. But the defence of idealism is no defence of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. Dr. Hickok, so far from being an idealist, gives, or attempts to give, an ontological demonstration against idealism; while Professor Lewis not only lingers still in company with the "old Gipsey," but quotes Scripture to prove that the objects of sense are—not merely transient and changing—but that they have no real existence; while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore." If, therefore, Professor Lewis believes the Bible as he interprets it, then where is it?

Professor Lewis maintains with much warmth that Idealism has had pious advocates, as pious as the advocates of any opposite scheme. Be it so; that does not affect the question whether Dr. Hickok's scheme is rational and true, or whether it is self-destructive—and whether every scheme *must* not be self-destructive, which begins by doubting all our faculties, and by attempting to prove everything; thus requiring proof of the proof, and then proof of the proof of the proof, and so on for ever.

Professor Lewis denies that consciousness gives any testimony at all concerning an outer world: Dr. Hickok affirms that the testimony of consciousness in all men is for an imme-

diate knowledge in consciousness of an outer world, but that its testimony is false or unreliable.

Suppose the insinuations of Professor Lewis against the manner and motive of the reviewer were all true; suppose the reviewer had, "for a certain purpose," got "under the wing of Princeton," while his "vocabulary makes it easy to determine his theological origin;" suppose he really did believe, as Professor Lewis insinuates, in the "power of contrary choice;" suppose he had really set forth "a great deal of pious nonsense," and held, as Professor Lewis represents him, that "if God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy, instead of truth," (although the reviewer said nothing of the kind, nor anything from which anything of the kind could be gathered by any inference, however remote; but the representation of Professor Lewis is purely gratuitous, without the slightest foundation of any kind)—suppose the reviewer had held all this—would it have weighed at all on the questions at issue—whether Dr. Hickok's *Rational Psychology* really labours under the objections which are alleged, and which, if sustained, entirely invalidate the whole scheme? In every case Professor Lewis and Dr. Hickok evade the true issue. They make no attempt to meet or to invalidate the positions of the reviewer, nor to show that they are inconclusive. They had every inducement and every opportunity to show this; would they have utterly failed even to make the attempt, would they have confined themselves to other issues of their own making, and have dealt so profusely in insinuations and inuendoes, and resorted to allegations of ignorance and incompetence, had they not been conscious that their cause admitted no better defence?

How are the formidable allegations which roused Dr. Hickok and his friends from their silence, met by platitudes, however learned or lofty, on irrelevant issues, or by a volley of contemptuous and acrimonious epithets? Dr. Hickok, in his poorly concealed acerbity, denounces the review as "*argumentum ab ignorantia ad ignorantiam*," without doing the favour to point out and prove the instances of alleged ignorance. We can afford to be more liberal towards him, and enlighten him somewhat as to the nature of the ignorance displayed in his

vindication. It is, as we have shown, deformed throughout by that most fatal of fallacies, irrelevant conclusion,—IGNORATIO ELENCHI.

ART. III.—*Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Opera Omnia;* Tomis XI. comprehensa; a Theologis Lovaniensibus, Opera Manuscriptorum Codicum ab innumeris mendis expurgata, et eruditis ubique Censuris illustrata. Lugduni: Sumptibus Joannis Rudisson. Cum permissu Superiorum. MDCLXIV.

FROM the latter part of the third century to the former part of the fifth, there was a gradual but manifest decay of vital godliness. And although, during this period, God had tried his church both by judgments and mercies—first, in the terrible fires of the Diocletian persecution, and secondly, by the happy revolution under Constantine—still, the growing evil had not been effectually cured, or scarcely arrested. The declension continued and increased; dead forms and unprofitable disputes were substituted for piety and godliness; and it became painfully evident that true spiritual religion must ere long disappear, unless God should interpose by his Spirit, and revive his work. But at this critical juncture, God did graciously interpose, his work was revived, and spiritual religion again flourished, at least in one part of the Roman empire. The principal instrument in this precious awakening—the results of which continue even to our own times—was the celebrated Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. Let us pause for an hour, and consider the life, character, works, and end of this great and good man.*

Augustine, bishop of Hippo, (now Bona, in Northern Africa,) was born at Tagasta, a city of Numidia, A. D. 354. His father, Patricius, though nominally a catechumen, was no better than a heathen, until near the close of life. His mother,

* A brief sketch of the Life of Augustine was written soon after his death, by Possidonius, Bishop of Calama. A more extended biography was written by Cornelius Lancillatus Belga, an Augustinian eremite. Both these memoirs are contained in the first volume of the works before us.

Monica, was an eminently devoted Christian, and exerted a strong and saving influence over both her husband and her son. Of the course of life which she pursued with her husband, Augustine has informed us in his Confessions. "After her marriage with my father Patricius, she endeavoured to win him over to thy service, by the amiableness of her manners; and patiently bore the injuries of his unfaithfulness. His temper was passionate, but his spirit was benevolent. She knew how to bear with him when angry, by a perfect silence and composure; and when she saw him cool, would meekly expostulate with him. She bore him on her heart in continual and earnest prayer. At length, in the extremity of life, she gained her husband unto thee, and he died in the faith of Christ."

Patricius died in middle life, and left his son, at the age of seventeen, to the care of his mother. And most watchfully and faithfully did she care for him. Wherever he went, whether as a scholar or a teacher, she was sure to be near him; he was the object of much entreaty and of many prayers; and after a sore trial of some sixteen years from the death of his father, the blessing came. When she saw her son a decided Christian, she felt that the main object of her life was gained. She was now ready to depart, and in a few weeks she was summoned home. In all Christian antiquity, we have not a more eminent instance than is here presented of conjugal and maternal faithfulness. The great Augustine is to be classed with the large number of eminent Christians, who have owed, not their usefulness only, but their salvation, to the influence of a pious mother.

While Augustine was yet a child, he was dangerously ill, and through fear of death, implored that he might be baptized. His parents had hitherto neglected this duty, under the impression that, as sins committed after baptism were next to unpardonable, it was more prudent to delay. But now, when they saw their son apparently dying, they were in haste to have the ordinance administered. But his disorder taking a more favourable turn, his baptism, for the same reason, was again deferred. In his Confessions, Augustine refers to this circumstance, and expresses his opinion in regard to the then prevailing practice of delay. "Was the delay of my baptism for my

benefit? What is the cause that we hear every where such language as this: Let him do what he will, he is not yet baptized. How much better it had been for me, had I, in early life, been initiated into the fold of Christ?" By deferring baptism until late in life, under the impression that it washed away all previous sin, a license was given to the unbaptized to practise every kind of wickedness.

Although the parents of Augustine were in but moderate circumstances, they spared no expense in affording him the best means of education. The rudiments of grammar he studied at Tagasta; after which he was sent to school at Madaura, where he remained several years. He disliked Greek, and the exact sciences, but was fond of the poets, of literature, and oratory. At the age of sixteen he was taken from Madaura, and spent a year in idleness at Tagasta. Here, his lively, social disposition exposed him to many temptations, and he fell into some of the grosser forms of vice. At the age of seventeen, he was sent to Carthage to study rhetoric, where he remained two years. It was during his stay at Carthage that his father died.

At this period, he received benefit from the study of Cicero's Hortensius. It broke in upon his course of vicious indulgence, and inspired him with the love of wisdom. He felt that he was degrading himself, by living as a mere sensualist. He must rise above such base, grovelling practices, and become a philosopher, a wise man. Under this impression, he looked into the Holy Scriptures, but did not relish them, and was easily led into the mazes of Manicheism. The advocates of this error put forth the most lofty pretensions to wisdom, and claimed to be the greatest lovers of truth. "They were always talking," says Augustine, "of the truth, the truth, and yet formed the most absurd opinions of the works of nature, on which subjects the heathen philosophers far excelled them. They seduced me, partly by their subtle and captious questions as to the origin of evil, and partly by their blasphemies against the Old Testament saints."

At the age of nineteen, Augustine left Carthage and came to Tagasta, where he taught grammar and rhetoric, and frequented the courts. He remained here some five or six years. "All

this while," says he, "my mother was praying for me, being more solicitous on account of the death and ruin of my soul, than other parents are for the death of the body. About this time, she was favoured with a dream, by which she was much comforted. She appeared to herself to be standing on a plank, surrounded by dark waters, when a friendly looking person came to her, and asked her the cause of her afflictions. She told him that they were chiefly on my account; when he told her to be of good cheer, saying, Ere long your son will be standing on the same plank with you."

At the age of twenty-five, Augustine returned to Carthage, where he taught rhetoric with much applause for several years. It was during the latter part of his residence here, that he became disgusted with Manicheism; and the means which God employed to deliver him from the error, were very remarkable. A celebrated Manichee, by the name of Faustus, was coming to Carthage, who was expected to clear up all doubts, and do much for the advancement of the doctrine. "On his arrival," says Augustine, "I found him an agreeable speaker, who could deliver his fancies in a persuasive manner. But by this time I had learned that style and manner, however desirable, were no substitute for truth. On conversing with Faustus, he acknowledged his ignorance of all philosophy. Grammar alone, with some Ciceronian and classic furniture, made up his stock of knowledge, and supplied him with that copiousness and elegance of diction for which he was distinguished. My hope of discovering truth was now at an end. I remained still, by profession, a Manichee, because I despaired of succeeding better in any other way. That same Faustus, who had been the snare of death to so many, was the first, under God, to relax my fetters, though contrary to his own intention."

Augustine was now in his twenty-ninth year, and owing to some ill-treatment which he had received from his scholars, he resolved to exchange Carthage for Rome. The plan was disapproved of by his mother; but he contrived to steal away from her, and made his voyage into Italy. Arrived at Rome, he was attacked with fever, and brought near to death; but he recovered from it, through the influence chiefly, as he after-

wards thought, of his mother's prayers. He opened a school at Rome, and had many scholars; but as they refused to make him the compensation they had promised, he sent them away.

Just at this time, a request came to Rome for a teacher of rhetoric to be sent to Milan. Through the influence of his Manichean friends, Augustine was recommended, and repaired to that city—at that time the residence of the Emperor. The celebrated Ambrose was Bishop of Milan, and Augustine called on him. "He received me," says Augustine, "like a father; and I conceived an affection for him, not as a teacher of the truth, which I had no thought of discovering in the church, but as a kind and agreeable friend. I studiously attended his Lectures, but only to criticise his rhetoric, and see whether fame had done justice to him as an orator. As I had now despaired of finding my way to God, I concerned not myself about the sentiments of Ambrose, but only with his manner and language.

"Still, the ideas which I strove to neglect, forced themselves upon my mind, and I was gradually brought to listen to the bishop's doctrine. I found reason to rebuke myself for the hasty conclusions I had formed as to the perfectly indefensible claims of the law and the prophets. A number of difficulties which the Manichees had started in respect to them, found an easy solution in the expositions of Ambrose. The possibility of finding truth in the church of Christ was forced upon me, and I began to consider by what arguments I might convict Manicheism of falsehood."

It should have been enough to convince a thoughtful man, like Augustine, of the falsehood of Manicheism, that it exerted no favourable influence upon the character. He still lived, as he had done for years, in the practice of some of the grossest sins, and still fancied himself, as to his higher nature, perfectly pure; charging the entire blame of the evils he perpetrated upon a lower nature which sinned in him. His pride, he tells us, was highly gratified with this conception.

The difficulties which rose at this time in the mind of Augustine, and stood in the way of his conversion were the following:

1. The low estimation which he had been led to entertain of

the Old Testament, and of the characters of some of the holy men whose names are there celebrated.

2. The difficulty which he found in conceiving of God as a purely spiritual being. He often complains of this as an obstacle which he could not overcome. "When I thought of thee, my God, I conceived of thee as corporeal, though of the most exquisite subtilty. What was wholly immaterial appeared to me as nothing. Could I have formed an idea of a purely spiritual substance, the whole fabric of Manicheism had been overturned; but I could not." In one place, he tells us that he had been accustomed to think of God "as an immense lucid body, of which himself was a fragment."

3. His want of *intuitive certainty*, or *strict demonstration*, in regard to the reality of divine things. "My former mistakes and blamable rashness rendered me now exceedingly sceptical, and I wanted the fullest intuitive evidence. By faith, indeed, I might have been healed; but, having been treated by a bad physician, I now dreaded a good one. By simply believing, I could be cured; yet, through fear of believing false things, I was inclined to reject that which was true."

4. Another difficulty in the way of Augustine's conversion lay in the vexed question as to the origin of evil. The Manichees accounted for this on the supposition of two ruling principles in the universe, the good and the bad; and corresponding to these, two opposite natures in every human being. But, rejecting this supposition, and embracing the doctrine of one God, all holy and pure, how is evil to be accounted for? This question perplexed the mind of Augustine, as it did all the philosophers of ancient time.

5. Yet another difficulty in the way of his conversion, grew out of the views which he had been led to entertain of Christ. Like most of the Gnostics of the second century, he regarded Christ as a mere spectre, a phantom, having no real body of flesh and blood. "Thine only begotten Son appeared to me as the most lucid part of thyself, sent forth for our salvation. I concluded that such a nature could not be born of the Virgin Mary without partaking of human flesh, which I felt sure must pollute it. Hence arose my fantastic ideas of Jesus, so destruc-

tive of all piety. For how could a fantastic, phantom-like death, such as I believed Christ's to be, deliver my soul?"

Such were some of the doctrinal errors in which Augustine had been steeping himself for years, during his connection with the Manichees; and they now remained in his mind to trouble him. They rose up there like towers and bastions, to resist the entrance of gospel truth.

But these all gave way, one after another, under the faithful ministrations of Ambrose, and the more powerful teachings of the Holy Spirit, so that at length there remained but a single obstacle in the way of his entering the kingdom of Christ; and that was his long-indulged and easily besetting sin of unchastity. The manner in which he grappled with this, and overcame it, and thus entered the kingdom of heaven as it were by violence, must be given in his own words.

"In the agitation of my spirit, I retired into the garden, knowing how evil I was, but ignorant of the good thou hadst in store for me. With vehement indignation I rebuked my sinful spirit, because it would not give up itself to God. I found that I wanted a will. Still was I restrained, and thou wast urgent upon me with severe mercy. My old mistresses shook my vesture of flesh, and whispered, 'Are we to part? and forever? Canst thou then live without us?' On the other hand, appeared the chaste dignity of Continence: 'Canst thou not,' said she, 'perform what many of both sexes have performed, not in themselves indeed, but in the strength of the Lord? Cast thyself upon him; fear not; he will not suffer thee to fall.' Such was my internal controversy. When deep meditation had collected all my misery into the view of my heart, a great storm arose, producing a large shower of tears. To give it vent, I rose up hastily from my friend Alypius, who was sitting near. The sound of my voice was stifled with weeping, and he remained motionless in the same place. I prostrated myself under a fig-tree, and, with flowing tears, I spoke to this effect: How long, Lord, wilt thou be angry? forever? Remember not my old iniquities. How long shall I persist in saying, To-morrow? Why should not this hour put an end to my slavery? As I thus spake and wept in the bitterness of my soul, I seemed to hear a voice saying unto me: *Take up and*

read! take up and read! I took up the Epistles of Paul, which I had by me, and read the following passage, which first struck my eyes: 'Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof.' Nor did I choose to read anything more. Immediately, the struggle was ended, and my doubts were gone. I closed the book, and, with a tranquil countenance, gave it to my friend. With a serenity and composure suitable to his character, he went with me to my mother, who now triumphed in the abundant answers to her prayers. Thus didst thou turn her mourning into joy."

After his conversion, Augustine closed his school as soon as practicable, became a catechumen, and retired into the country, enjoying, with Alypius, the sedulous and affectionate care of his mother. He was baptised by Ambrose, at Easter, in the year 387, in the thirty-third year of his age.

Shortly after this, Augustine and his mother went to Rome, intending to return into their own country. While waiting at Ostia for a vessel to take them into Africa, this best of mothers fell sick and died. She had lived to see the desire of her heart accomplished in the conversion and baptism of her son. She was now ready to depart, and the summons came. She was buried at Ostia, where a small chapel still marks the place of her sepulture.

Having performed the last sad offices for his mother, according to her desire, in a land of strangers, (for she said: "No place is far from my God; and I do not fear that he will not find me in the resurrection,") Augustine pursued his voyage into Africa, where he lived in retirement, upon his own estate, at Tagasta, for almost three years. Yet he was not idle here, but spent the most of his time in studying the word of God, in meditation and prayer, and in directing inquirers, who flocked to him, in the way to heaven. At length, he was invited to Hippo by a person of quality, who wished to place himself under his instructions. Valerius was at this time bishop of Hippo; a man of great piety, but advanced in life, and scarcely able to preach to the people on account of his ignorance of their language.

At the urgent request of the congregation, Augustine was ordained a presbyter under Valerius, and was allowed to preach in presence of the bishop. Two years later, A. D. 393, he became colleague bishop with Valerius, and, on the death of the latter, took upon himself the sole care of the church. From this time forth, Hippo continued to be the scene of his pastoral labours, (for, in a higher sense, his field was the world,) until the day of his death.

One of the first things which Augustine attempted, after his ordination, was the establishment of what he called a convent, but what was more properly a theological school. Here many ministers, and not a few bishops, received their professional education. Some of these established schools on the same pattern, through which the theology and religion of Augustine were widely diffused. It is to this point that the order of Augustine monks trace their origin,—an order which continued to the time of the Reformation. Luther, both before and after his conversion, was an Augustinian friar. It was by means of his pupils, not less than by his own personal labours, that Augustine contributed to that general revival of evangelical religion which marked his age.

In addition to his labours as teacher and pastor, the pen of Augustine was almost continually occupied in explaining, enforcing, and defending God's holy truth. He wrote upon most of the great doctrines of the gospel. He also treated the subject *practically*, solving difficult questions, cases of conscience, and guiding earnest inquirers in the way to heaven. More than all, he was a *spiritual*, *experimental* teacher, who entered into the very essence of religion, as one who knew its reality and had felt its power. A considerable library of doctrinal, practical, and experimental theology might be gathered from the writings of Augustine.

At the same time, he felt that he was set for the *defence* of the gospel; and he engaged in frequent and earnest controversy with those who perverted and opposed it. Acquainted as he was with the pernicious principles and practices of the Manichees, he regarded himself as particularly called upon to deal with them,—to undeceive them, if possible, and lead them to the knowledge of the truth. Some of his earliest efforts, in

the way of controversy, were with his old friends and associates, the Manichees. He wrote also against the Jews, showing them, from their own Scriptures, that the Mosaic law was to be superseded by the gospel, and that, if they rejected it, the Gentiles were to come in and take their place. He encountered also the Arians, who, though comparatively suppressed in the Roman empire, were flourishing among the Goths and Vandals, and were threatening, in the approaching subversion of Rome, to subvert also the religion of Christ. He attacked the Priscillianists, the last remnant of the old Gnostic heresy, and also the errors of Montanus and of Origen.

The Donatist controversy was peculiarly African. It related not so much to the doctrines of religion, as to a question of ecclesiastical order and government. Had Cæcilian, or had he not, been rightfully ordained bishop of Carthage? The Donatists answered this question in the negative, and insisted that all who adhered to Cæcilian, and consented to be under his jurisdiction, had virtually shut themselves out from the privileges of the church. They had no authorized ministers, or gospel ordinances, and were to be regarded as heathen men and publicans. A question such as this, set forth and urged by serious, earnest men, might be expected to produce a great excitement in Africa; and so it did. It was impossible for Augustine to keep clear of the strife; nor did he attempt it. He wrote largely against the Donatists, and exerted all his influence to restore the better part of them to the fellowship of the church, and to suppress the remainder. He has been charged with aiming at their suppression by means of the civil power; and perhaps he did so. We shall not undertake to justify all that he may have said and written on the subject. But then it must be remembered that large bodies of professed Donatists were most outrageous disturbers of the peace. They wandered about with arms in their hands, plundering, distressing, and destroying all that opposed them. It was right that such men should feel the weight of the civil arm; and Augustine may well have used his influence with the government for their suppression.

But the most important of the controversies in which Augustine felt himself called upon to engage, was that with

Pelagius. The Pelagian controversy commenced at Carthage, about the year 412; but the public mind had been preparing for it for a long period. There had not been for centuries entire unanimity in the church on the important subjects of depravity and grace, the Eastern bishops holding these doctrines more loosely and indeterminately than the Western. Origen, in particular, whose influence in the East was very great, had leaned so strongly to the side of free-will, as almost to forget that, without the aids of omnipotent grace, the human will had been under the bondage of sin forever.

Pelagius was an inhabitant of Britain; but, as the ancient British church—that which existed before the Saxon invasion—received its teachers from the East, he seems to have been early indoctrinated in the oriental peculiarities. The natural temperament of Pelagius, and the course of life which he pursued, tended also to favour the views which he entertained. Instead of the turbulent, fiery spirit of Augustine, his natural disposition was mild and amiable: and, instead of mixing with the stormy world, and engaging in the fierce conflicts of life, he had been accustomed only to the retirement and the exercises of the cloister. Of course, he hardly knew, in his own experience, what it was to grapple with strong passion, or to feel the indomitable power of sin.

Of the particulars of the early life of Pelagius, we know but little. He never aspired to the clerical office, but was a monk and a layman to the day of his death. He visited the monasteries in different parts of the empire, previous to the disclosure of his heretical opinions, and was everywhere esteemed, not only for his intelligence, but for the excellence of his moral character. Such is the testimony which Augustine gives of him, and it is confirmed by a variety of other evidence. Accordingly, it was with great reluctance, and under the most solemn convictions of duty, that Augustine came into conflict with him.

As to the real sentiments of Pelagius, there has been little or no dispute. He held that the sin of Adam affected only himself. It exerted no direct injurious influence upon the natural state and character of his posterity. Men come into the world as innocent as Adam in Paradise,—as innocent as they

would have been, if he had never sinned. They are not only free from sin, but have no natural proneness or tendency to sin; so that the sin which is in the world may all be traced to bad examples, to injurious moral influences, to external temptations, and not to any inherent or inherited corruption. Pelagius held that perfection in the present life is no difficult or very uncommon attainment. Many persons have been perfect; and not a few, he said, have been more than perfect. They have done more than the moral law requires. This was particularly the case with the more rigid and abstemious of the monks, who voluntarily subjected themselves to great austerities and privations. Pelagius had much to say respecting our need of divine grace, and our obligations to God for bestowing it; but by divine grace, he understood only divine instructions, outward means and influences, and never a divine influence exerted directly upon the heart, exciting it to the exercise and practice of holiness.

How early Pelagius came to entertain opinions such as these, it is impossible now to ascertain. It is certain that he did not divulge them until late in life, and then not openly, but with the utmost precaution. It was his custom to start queries respecting the doctrines of the church, and these, not as having originated with himself, but with others.

Near the beginning of the fifth century, we find Pelagius at Rome, where he was engaged in writing a commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Among those who were here converted to his views, was a distinguished young advocate, by name Celestius. Celestius was much younger than Pelagius, and much more bold and decided in the expression of his opinions. He was a native of Ireland, and, ever after his acquaintance with Pelagius, was his devoted follower and friend.

When Rome was taken by the Goths, about the year 410, great numbers fled into Africa, and among the rest, Pelagius and Celestius. Augustine met them once or twice at Carthage; but nothing material passed between them. Pelagius soon retired from Africa, and passed through Egypt into Palestine, leaving Celestius at Carthage.

It was during the stay of Celestius at Carthage that the Pelagian controversy may be said to have commenced. Celes-

tius wished to become a presbyter in the church, and proposed himself as a candidate for ordination. As he laboured under some suspicion as to the soundness of his faith, he was brought before a synod at Carthage, and Paulinus, a deacon of the church at Milan, appeared as his accuser. Six heretical propositions were charged upon him, all growing out of the first and leading one, viz., that "the sin of Adam injured only himself, and not his posterity." The answers of Celestius were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was excluded from the fellowship of the church.

Meanwhile, Pelagius had arrived in Palestine, where the tone of feeling on these subjects was very different from that prevailing in North Africa, and where some of the leading ecclesiastics were not unwilling to receive him. There was one, however, with whom he could find no favour. This was the monk Jerome—a petulant, ill-natured man, but the most distinguished biblical scholar of his age. Jerome was now residing at Bethlehem, surrounded by pupils and flatterers of both sexes, and pursuing with diligence the study of the Bible. Defective as was his character in some respects, Jerome seems to have correctly apprehended the natural state and character of man, and his need of the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit in order to salvation. Of course, he could not endure the theology of Pelagius; and it was through his influence that the latter was brought before a synod at Jerusalem.

It would lead us too far from our subject to trace minutely the course of the Pelagian controversy for the next few months. In the synod at Jerusalem, as the fathers could agree upon nothing else, they concluded to refer the case to the arbitrament of Innocent, bishop of Rome. In a subsequent council, held at Diospolis, Pelagius was acquitted, and recognised as a faithful member of the church.

As, by the decision of the first council, the matter was to come before the bishop of Rome, both parties now undertook to justify themselves to him, and prepare his mind for a favourable issue. Three letters were addressed to him by the North African church, in which Augustine and his brethren accused Pelagius of maintaining free-will in a way that

excluded grace—at least in the proper, Christian sense of the term. In connection with these letters, they also sent to Innocent one of Pelagius's books, in which they had marked several passages for his consideration.

Pelagius and Celestius sought also to justify themselves to the Roman bishop. Pelagius wrote him a long letter, in which he defended himself against the charges of his adversaries. At the same time, he sent on a confession of faith, setting forth his orthodoxy, more especially on points not connected with the controversy.

Innocent received the communications from the North African church before the letter and creed of Pelagius reached him, and seems to have been sincerely inclined to the Augustinian views. But before a formal decision could be made, he was removed by death.

He was succeeded by Zosimus, whose doctrinal predilections were quite different from those of his predecessor. He favoured the Pelagians; and when his opinions came to be known, it was found that a strong party at Rome entertained the same views. It was under these favourable circumstances that Celestius himself arrived at Rome. He had several interviews with Zosimus, in which he endeavoured to persuade him that the matters in dispute touched no important point of doctrine; that they were questions of mere speculative controversy, relating to the propagation of sin, and the origin of souls, about which philosophers and Christians had always been allowed to differ. He insisted that both himself and Pelagius held firmly to the doctrines of free-will and grace, and that the differences of opinion concerning the nature of divine grace and the mode of its operation belonged only to the schools.

These explanations were enough to satisfy Zosimus. Accordingly, he wrote to the North African bishops, charging them with having decided the matter too hastily, and giving the most unequivocal testimony to the orthodoxy of Pelagius and Celestius. Of Pelagius's letter, he said: "How surprised and rejoiced were all the pious men who heard it! Scarcely could some of them refrain from tears, to find that one so thoroughly orthodox had been made the object of so much

suspicion. There was hardly a passage in the letter in which grace, or the divine assistance, was not mentioned." He sternly rebuked the African bishops for their too great zeal and officiousness in this matter, and entreated them, in the name and authority of the apostolic see, that they would restrain their curiosity, and submit their reason to the decision of the Bible and the church.

It will be readily supposed that Augustine and his brother bishops would not sit down very submissively under such a rebuke. They were conscious of understanding the matter much better than the new-made bishop of Rome; and the time had not come when his letters carried with them any special spiritual terrors. They returned him a respectful answer; but, without waiting for his more formal decision, they immediately summoned a council at Carthage, before which all the points in controversy were thoroughly examined, and Pelagianism was decidedly condemned. In their result, this council set forth the corruption of human nature through the sin of Adam; they exposed the shifts and evasions of the Pelagians in their use of the term grace; they represented grace as an inward communication of the divine life, from which alone all good actions spring. In opposition to those who said that grace only renders the performance of duty more easy, they quoted the express language of Christ, "Without me, ye can do nothing." At the same time, it is not unlikely that they interceded with the civil powers, to exert their authority in the case, and restore peace to the church. At any rate, from the year 418 and onwards, there appeared several imperial rescripts, couched in a style more theological than political, condemning Pelagius and his adherents.

Against such an influence, the infallible bishop of Rome could not long maintain his ground. He summoned Celestius to appear before him, and submit to another examination; but the heretic, foreseeing the result, hastily left the city. Upon this, Zosimus issued another letter, in which (in express contradiction of his former views) he pronounced the condemnation of Pelagius and Celestius. He adopted in full the decisions of the late Council of Carthage, and declared himself, on the doctrines of depravity and grace, to accord entirely with the

views of the North African church. By the authority of the Emperor, this letter of Zosimus was circulated through the whole Western church; and all bishops were required to give their assent to it. Those who refused (and there were some such) were driven from their churches and deposed.

We have said that Celestius fled from Rome, previous to the condemnation of his opinions by Zosimus. We next hear of him at Constantinople, where he was opposed by Atticus, the bishop, and was again condemned. Pelagius, who had remained all this while in Palestine, complained of the treatment he had received, and, by ambiguous statements and evasive answers, continued to impose upon those around him. It was under these circumstances that Augustine wrote his treatise "on Original Sin, and the Grace of Christ," which opened the eyes of many as to the real nature and importance of the subjects in dispute.

About the year 420, Celestius appeared again at Rome; but he was not allowed to remain. The probability is, that both he and Pelagius retired into Britain, and spent the remainder of their lives in obscurity. We hear little or nothing concerning either of them afterwards.

The Pelagian controversy, however, did not cease when its original promoters retired from the scene. It was carried on by the adherents of Pelagius, and more especially by Julian, the deposed bishop of Eclanum. He was a young man of much spirit and self-confidence, who had lost his office on account of his adherence to the Pelagian doctrines. He represented himself as the little David, who was to fight against the Goliath of Hippo; and he proposed to decide the contest by single combat, while the rest of the church should be at peace. But in reply to his boastings, Augustine asked: "Who promised you a single combat with me? Where, when, was the promise made? Who were present? Who the arbiters? Far be it from me to assume to myself, in the general church, what you are not ashamed to do among the Pelagians. I am one of the many, who refute your profane novelties as best we can."

Finding no encouragement in the West, Julian passed over to Constantinople and the East, hoping to ingratiate himself with Theodore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, Nestorius, and the

other distinguished ecclesiastics of Asia. But here again he was disappointed; for, though his views harmonized, in some points, with those of the individuals who have been named, in others there was a direct repugnance; and that same Council of Ephesus which condemned Nestorius, A. D. 431, condemned also the Pelagians. A doctrine which repudiated the fall of man, and set aside the necessity of sanctifying grace, could gain no favour in the church.

Still, there was a pretty large class of Christians in the Western church, who, as they could not accept the system of Pelagius on the one hand, so neither could they embrace the doctrines of Augustine on the other. They sought to compromise the matter, to split the difference, and between the two to construct a theory, which should be more nearly in accordance with the truth than either. Hence the origin of what has been called Semi-Pelagianism.

The principal advocate and supporter of this doctrine, in the ancient church, was John Cassian. He was a Scythian monk, who came from the country bordering on the Black Sea, and, after many travels in the East, settled at length at Marseilles, where he was the founder of a famous cloister. It is likely that his Eastern education had prepared him to disrelish the doctrine of Augustine, and he early appeared in the number of those who took exceptions to it. Still, he was unwilling to go the whole length of Pelagianism. He recognised the universal corruption of human nature, in consequence of the first transgression, and also the necessity of grace and of justification, but held that the bestowment of grace is always conditioned on the free self-determination of the human will. And yet, strange as it may seem, he taught that in some cases, though not in all, grace is *prevenient*. "The question," he says, "has been much discussed, whether free-will depends upon grace, or grace upon free-will; but this question does not admit of an answer which will apply to all cases. In some instances, the first incitements to goodness are from the grace of God; in others, they are from the will of the individual, which divine grace meets, supports, and strengthens, till renovation and recovery are secured." As examples of the first class, Cassian cites Matthew the publican, and Saul of Tarsus. As instances

of the last, he mentions Zaccheus and the thief on the cross, whose craving spirits, taking the kingdom of heaven by violence, anticipated the call of prevenient grace.

Thus taught Cassian, in the fifth century; and his doctrine found great acceptance with many of the Gallic monks and bishops. There were others, however, who clung to the entire system of Augustine, and who regarded the new explications as heretical and dangerous. Foremost among these, was Prosper, of Aquitaine, and Hilary, bishop of Arles. These men addressed a letter to Augustine, who was yet alive, informing him of the recent movement among the monks, and begging that he would again appear in defence of assailed and perverted truth.

In answer to this request, Augustine wrote his two books "on the Predestination of the Saints," and on "the Grace of Perseverance." In these works, which are characterized by great moderation, he gives Cassian and his followers credit for all the truth which their system contains; while at the same time he wonders that they should represent divine grace as in any cases depending on human merit. He reaffirms all that he had ever said as to the sovereignty of divine grace, and unconditional election, and shows that these doctrines—though liable, like all others, to be perverted and abused—were not to be ignored or kept back. With the necessary precautions and explanations, they should be proclaimed.

These works of Augustine, however able and convincing in themselves, seem to have had but little effect upon those for whose special benefit they were prepared. The Semi-Pelagians continued to teach and write as before; and Augustine, forbearing to prolong the controversy, suffered it to pass over into the hands of Prosper and Hilary.

At length a synod was held in the south of France—the very seat and focus of the Semi-Pelagian errors—in which these doctrines were formally condemned, and the system of Augustine, so far as relates to depravity and grace, was fully approved. This decision was reaffirmed by a subsequent council, and afterwards by the Roman bishop, Boniface II. The pontiff, in his letter, describes the followers of Cassian as "offshoots from Pelagianism, who refused to acknowledge grace

as the cause of faith, and considered that to be a work of corrupted nature, which could only be a work of Christ."

We have dwelt, it may be, too long on Augustine's controversy with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, and yet, possibly, not too long, when it is considered that this was no other than a struggle for spiritual, evangelical religion, against those who impugned it, and were labouring to subvert it. How much the world is indebted to the labours of Augustine in this protracted controversy, no human thought can estimate. It can be known only in the revelations of the final day.

From this point, however, we must proceed more cursorily in accomplishing what remains of the task before us. Of the particular *doctrines* of Augustine, little more need be said, as there never has been, nor can there be, any dispute respecting them. As we have seen already, he taught the natural and total corruption of man, connecting it with the first sin of Adam, and considering it as somehow propagated to the race. He taught the necessity and the efficacy of divine grace, not only to carry forward, but to *commence* the work of recovery in the depraved heart of man. There was nothing good in that heart naturally, and never would be, unless God by his grace interposed to excite it. Hence, predestination with him was not conditioned upon foreseen holiness, but was a predestination *to* holiness and consequent salvation—"predestined *to be* conformed to the image of his Son." Rom. viii. 29. Still, Augustine's predestination did not run into fatality, or lead to a denial of the responsible agency of man. "God can so influence men," he said, "that being awakened, drawn, touched, and enlightened, *they will follow*, without any resistance to the grace operating upon their will. God calls in a way which is so befitting, that the subject is drawn by him who calls, and yet follows with freedom."

It should be remarked, however, that Augustine did not come into the belief of the foregoing system of doctrines at once. He was led along, chiefly through the study of Paul's Epistles, and the teachings of the Holy Spirit, to the full discovery and adoption of the system of Paul, and to the earnest inculcation of it in all after life. For several years after his conversion, he held to the self-determining power of the will, and believed

that the influences of divine grace, without which none could be saved, "were conditioned on the subjective bent of the will." A little later, his views on the subject were modified, and he represents recovering grace as conditioned upon *faith*. "As man can perform nothing good before his renewal, so he can merit nothing. Grace precedes all desert. Still, there is nothing arbitrary on the part of God, when he gives to some, and withholds from others, that grace by which they obtain salvation; since men obtain this grace by faith, and faith is the work of man."

It is certain that a mind like Augustine's could not long rest in views such as these. He soon came to see and to say, that "the desert of faith does not precede God's mercy, but presupposes it; since faith itself is one of the gifts of grace." And thus he came to the conclusion—for he could come to no other—that the reason why God rescues some, rather than others, from that destruction into which all had plunged themselves, lies in the incomprehensible counsels of his own will. At the same time, he insists that "the justice of God cannot be impeached, although the exercise and range of it may surpass the measure of our knowledge. In the affairs of this world, he cannot be accused of injustice, who, according to his pleasure, remits the debts of one man, while he requires payment from another."

It happened to Augustine, as it has often done to other master-spirits of the times in which they live, that his disciples did not understand his peculiar doctrines so well as he did, and failed to exhibit them with the same caution and care. One of his dissertations having been circulated among the monks of Adrumentum, produced great excitement in the minds of these recluses. There were those among them who said, "Of what use are all doctrines and precepts? Human efforts can avail nothing. It is God that worketh in us to will and to do. Nor is it right to reproach or punish those who fall into error and commit sin; for it is not their fault that they act thus. Without grace, they cannot do otherwise; nor can they do aught to merit grace."

Augustine, having heard of these disturbances, addressed to the monks two books; in one of which he more fully unfolded

his doctrine concerning the relation of grace to free-will; while in the other, he more distinctly explained that doctrine in its practical bearings, and with reference to the consequences which had been drawn from it. Whether he succeeded in satisfying the monks, we cannot say. As much as this, however, is certain, that the views of Augustine, as they lay in his own mind, offered no obstruction to the exercise of free-will, and presented no hindrance or discouragement in the way of a faithful discharge of duty.

It is frequently said that Augustine was led to adopt his peculiar opinions on the subjects of predestination and grace, in consequence of his controversy with Pelagius. But the truth is, he was led into the controversy with Pelagius in consequence of his holding and revering these sentiments. He learned them, as we have before remarked, in the Bible and in his own conscious experience. He was taught them by the Holy Ghost; and it may be clearly shown that he came to the knowledge and profession of them at least ten years previous to the Pelagian controversy. This controversy commenced in the year 412; whereas Augustine had waded through all the preliminaries in the progress of his opinions, and become settled in his theological views as early as the year 397.

Of the works of Augustine we have spoken at some length already. They were first collected and published by Possidonius, bishop of Calama, a pupil of Augustine, the same who wrote his life. But the best editions, in later times, are those of Erasmus, of the Louvaine theologians, and of the Benedictines. The one before us is the Louvaine edition, published at Lyons, in eleven volumes folio, in 1664. The Benedictine edition has the same number of volumes, and (with some slight difference of arrangement) is much the same thing. It was first published at Paris and Antwerp, near the close of the seventeenth century, and again at Paris, in twenty-two half volumes, in 1836–9.

The first volume, in the Louvaine edition, contains Augustine's Retractions, his Confessions, and some eighteen other treatises, all written previous to his ordination, of which our space does not allow us to give so much as the titles.

The Retractions of Augustine are no other than a critique

upon his own writings. Some of his followers would scarcely admit that he could be in error; but he made no such pretensions himself. He rejoiced in the belief that he had made some *progress* in the truth, and was not ashamed to expose, near the close of life, what he regarded as his earlier errors.

The Confessions of Augustine—from which we have quoted freely in making out the foregoing sketch of his life—have been the most popular of all his works. They are at once an autobiography, a prayer, and in many parts almost a poem. In them, the writer sets forth, not so much his outward circumstances, as his internal experience, his inner life—his opinions, his feelings, his purposes, his prejudices, his errors, his temptations, and (without sparing himself at all) his sins; also the manner in which he was recovered from sin. The work is divided into thirteen books, the last three of which, however, have nothing to do with his personal history. The long popularity of this confessional, devotional narrative, sufficiently attests its character and its power. It has been translated into all the languages of Christendom, and by Catholics and Protestants is classed with the choicest memorials of piety. It meets a common want of humanity, and will be for ages to come, what it has been in ages past, a manual for the penitent, and a guide for the inquiring soul. It has been imitated by different writers, but never successfully.

The second volume of the works of Augustine contains his Letters—in all, two hundred and seventy—addressed to emperors and nobles, to doctors and bishops, to synods and councils, to missionaries, heretics, and humble inquirers in all parts of the world. Some of them are short, and of little value; but others are full treatises on important points of faith and discipline, drawn out to a very considerable length. In none of his writings does Augustine appear to better advantage than in his epistolary correspondence; for here his inmost heart speaks out, showing incontestably, not only his deep piety, but his charity, his clemency, his moderation, his guileless honesty, and his anxious concern for the advancement of Christ's kingdom, and the welfare of his fellow-men.

The third and fourth volumes of the works before us contain the Commentaries of Augustine, and his other writings upon

the Scriptures. Of these, the practical and devotional parts are the most valuable. As a critical interpreter, he can never sustain a high rank, and that for two reasons. In the first place, he was not deeply versed in the original languages of the Scriptures. And then he adopted, to some extent, the allegorical method of interpretation, which was as fashionable in his time, as it is unfashionable in ours.

The Editors have prefaced Augustine's writings on the Scriptures by his treatise *de Doctrina Christiana;* which means, not a work on Christian doctrine, but rather on Christian education. It consists of four books, the first three of which treat of the interpretation of Scripture, and the acquisition of scriptural knowledge; while the fourth relates to the art of preaching, or the communication of that knowledge to others. This fourth book was translated, not many years ago, by Mr. Oliver A. Taylor, then of Andover, and published in the *Biblical Repository.** It is a rare production, and is spoken of by Mr. Taylor as the only tract on Homiletics which had come down to us from the ancient church.

In the fifth volume of Augustine's works, we have his *Discourses*—more than seven hundred in all—which were taken down from his lips, and prepared for publication. They can hardly be called *sermons*, in the modern acceptation of the term. They are arguments, exhortations, impromptu addresses, which were delivered by him in religious meetings, and on other public occasions, varying in length from three minutes to an hour, and varying in subjects to suit the occasions which called them forth. In general, they are not studied performances, but adapted in style and manner to the popular ear.†

Augustine was one of those preachers whose power can never be estimated by their written discourses. We want to see the man and hear his voice, to witness the fascination of his manner and the flash of his eye. Who could form any adequate conception of Whitefield by the mere perusal of one of his printed sermons? That Augustine had great skill and power

* See Vol. iii., First Series, p. 560.

† An additional volume of sermons, before unpublished, was found at Monte Cassino, and published at Paris in 1842.

as a preacher, is evident from the effects which he occasionally produced. Two instances of this kind he has himself recorded.

There was a custom among the people of Cæsarea, in Mauritania, which had been carried to a monstrous pitch of cruelty. At a particular season of the year, citizens, neighbours, brothers, parents, and children, having formed themselves into parties, engaged for some days in battle with stones, each one killing whom he could. Augustine's object was to draw off the people from a spectacle in which they took very great delight. He has not given us his discourse on this occasion. He tells us, however, that he availed himself, so far as he was able, of the grand in eloquence, and not without some success. After he had addressed the people for a while in this way, they began to speak aloud, and to applaud him. He was too well acquainted, however, with the human heart, to suppose that he had effected anything substantial, so long as they amused themselves with giving him applause. He therefore proceeded in a different strain, and soon saw them melting into tears. He then concluded that a change had in reality taken place in them, and that the horrid custom, which had been handed down to them from their heathen state, would be abolished. "Nor was I," he adds, "disappointed; for it is now eight years since, and no attempt has yet been made to renew it."

As to the second instance mentioned, it seems that the African churches—and that at Hippo among the rest—had long been accustomed to celebrate the birthdays of certain saints, and in the end had so perverted them, that they were made occasions of feasting and drunkenness. And what made the matter more intolerable, these disgraceful celebrations were held in the churches. Augustine early determined to put an end to them, at least in his own church; and in a long letter to Alypius, he tells us how skilfully and faithfully he managed, and with what entire success. He had been for some time preparing his people for the change, by reading and expounding to them the most appropriate Scriptures. On the day preceding one of these celebrations, he told them plainly, if they dared to contemn the great things which had been spoken to them in the name of God, that God would surely visit their transgressions with a rod, and their iniquity with stripes, even

in the present life. "While I thus addressed them," says he, "and made my complaints, the Spirit of God seemed to impart to me courage and strength, according to the magnitude and danger of the enterprise. I did not move their tears by mine; but when I had done speaking, I confess that I was unable to refrain. Having thus wept together for a while, with a strong expectation of their amendment, I brought my address to a close."

On the following day, when they were accustomed to prepare for the disgraceful festivity, some were inclined to murmur and ask: "Why now? Our fathers, who lived before us, and were wont to engage in these festivities, were not they Christians?" To these men, and to all those who sympathized with them, Augustine replied: "Say not, *Why now*, but rather, *Even now*. Yes, *now*, after so long a time, break off this disgraceful practice, and honour the holy martyrs in a manner more appropriate and edifying." The practice, the preacher goes on to tell us, was effectually broken up.

The sixth volume of Augustine contains a large number of short practical treatises, which may be called his *miscellanies*. We have here his answers to eighty-three questions, philosophical, scriptural, theological, and practical. We have his Enchiridion, or manual of the Christian religion. We have his treatises on faith and works, on continency and matrimony, on virginity and widowhood, on lying, monkery, and patience, on demons and the dead—of which we can only mention the titles.

The seventh volume is entirely occupied by the most elaborate of all the works of Augustine, and that by which (next to his Confessions) he is most extensively known—*The City of God*. We regret that we shall not be able to give more than a brief notice of this remarkable production. The capture of Rome by the Goths, and the subsequent plunder and miseries of the imperial city, had opened the mouths of the Pagans to blaspheme the God of heaven, and to accuse Christianity as the cause of the ruin of the empire. "The gods are angry that their altars are forsaken; and therefore has this destruction come upon us." To obviate this objection was doubtless Augustine's primary object in preparing this great work. It consists of twenty-two books. The first book is defensive. It

takes up and answers the objection of the Pagans in due form. The next four books proceed on the offensive, carrying the war into the enemy's camp. Augustine here proves to the Pagans that while their religion prevailed, it was of no benefit to the human race, either socially, morally, or physically; that what of virtue or happiness remained to Rome under its bloody exactions, came rather in spite of it, than by its means. And as Paganism could do nothing for its votaries in temporal things, the author proceeds to show, in the next five books, that it could do even less in spiritual things; that as it was valueless in respect to the blessings of this life, it was worse than that in its bearing on the life to come.

The remaining twelve books have more of a theological character. Some of them seem almost prophetical. Augustine describes the *Civitatem Dei*, the kingdom of Christ, as a state older than that founded by Romulus, wider in its conquests, mightier in its power, firmer in its eternal foundations, and more majestic in its final triumphs. He carries forward the history of this kingdom, under both dispensations, from the beginning, to the time at which he wrote; and from that point, proceeds to point out its issues in the coming ages, and in eternity. He gives a description of the final judgment, and of the everlasting miseries of the wicked, and happiness of the righteous, in the future world. He closes with a delightful view of the glories awaiting the city of God, in this life, and for ever.

This work was one of great importance, not only in its immediate effects, but in the influence which it exerted through all the Middle Ages, and which it continues to exert to the present time. Since the revival of letters, it has been often published, and translated into most of the languages of Europe. In the language of another, "the rhythmic character of the work; the wave of imagination on which its narrative and its argument, its historic illustrations and its nice analogies, its sad review of follies, superstitions, and errors seem to be borne; the fervour of its piety, if not the glow of its prophecy; the changes of tone from the minor key of a funeral strain, to the triumphant vision of Christian victory—all justify us in classing it as among the greatest epics of the world. In the light

of subsequent history, it seems one long prediction of the triumphs of the cross."

The eighth, ninth, and tenth volumes of Augustine contain his controversial writings, of which so much has been said already. The ninth is wholly occupied with his publications against the Donatists, and the tenth with his more important works on the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian controversies. The eleventh volume is appropriately devoted to Appendices, Indices, and other helps, for the convenient consulting of the previous works.

In person, Augustine is represented as tall and slender, of a fair complexion, with a thoughtful countenance, and a full and brilliant eye. In the character of his mind, he united, in a high degree, the *intellectual* and the *emotional*—traits which are not often found conjoined in the same person. That he had an exuberant imagination, and an active, profound, and far-seeing intellect, no one conversant with his writings can doubt. And as little can it be doubted that he was a man of deep and earnest feeling. In his Confessions, particularly, his irrepressible emotions bubble up and boil over, all the way. It was these characteristics, combined with a devoted piety and an iron diligence, which made him the great reformer and pulpit orator of his age, and enabled him so to sound the gospel trump, that its echo has reverberated through all the intervening ages, to the present time.

As a man, Augustine was distinguished by simplicity of dress and manners, temperance in eating and drinking, and meekness and patience under sufferings and injuries. In some things, he showed a monkish self-denial, which was as congenial to his own age, as it is foreign to ours. Thus he was afraid to enjoy the pleasures of music; and was careful to have his food so prepared as to be distasteful to him, lest he should indulge himself too freely, and enjoy it too much. He was so careful not to speak evil of the absent, and not to encourage others in doing so, that he had the following distich engraven on his table:

> "Far from this table be the worthless guest
> Who wounds another's fame, though but in jest."

He was ever diligent in business. Not a moment of his time was wasted. Indeed, from the number and variety of his

works, it must have been so. He attended many councils, in which he ever took a leading part, and distinguished himself always in defence of sound doctrine, and the established order and discipline of the church. In introducing others into the ministry, he was careful to follow the directions of Christ, and to consult the wishes of those for whom pastors were to be provided. He was conscientiously attentive to the wants of the poor, and was prompt to relieve them, either from the revenues of the church, or the oblations of the charitable, which had been committed to his hands. He kept himself, says Possidonius, who knew him well, entirely disconnected from the world, owned neither house nor land, sat at the same table with his pupils and clergy, and improved the opportunity, not so much for sensual indulgence, as for religious instruction and improvement.

Augustine lived to see Northern Africa overrun, and his beloved Hippo besieged by the ruthless Vandals. In the prospect of approaching trials and sufferings, it was his daily prayer, either that God would deliver the city, or that he would give his servants grace to endure all that might be inflicted, or that he might himself be taken out of the world. In the last particular, and we hope in the two last, his prayer was heard. In the third month of the siege, which lasted fourteen months in all, Augustine was seized with a fever which terminated his life. He died, A. D. 429, in the seventy-sixth year of his age, and the fortieth of his ministry. During his last sickness, he had David's penitential Psalms inscribed on the wall, where he could see them constantly; and for several days before he expired, he desired to be left alone as much as possible, that he might give himself wholly to devotion. As he had neither lands nor money to bequeath, he left no will. He gave his library to the church.

Between Augustine and the Apostle Paul, there were some strong points of resemblance. Both had been virulent enemies of the gospel, in their younger days. Both had been arrested by omnipotent grace, had been deeply convinced of sin, and had been thoroughly renewed and changed. Both could say from the heart: "I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. Old things

have passed away with me, and all things have become spiritually new." They resembled each other in the character of their minds; and after conversion, both became the heralds and champions of the same system of doctrines—the doctrines of grace. It was Paul's vocation, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to combat the errors of his times, and lay down a platform of evangelical doctrine, which can never be destroyed. And in a time of general declension, when these doctrines had been obscured, and dead formalism was rising up to take their place, it was Augustine's vocation to combat the errors of *his* times, and bring back the doctrines of the great apostle to something like their original place and purity.

And it was from these joint wells of salvation that the Reformers of the sixteenth century drew living water. Luther and Calvin, with their co-labourers and coadjutors, had steeped themselves in the theology of Augustine and of Paul, and in their preaching and controversies, appealed to the former almost as frequently as to the latter. It is thus that Augustine holds a middle place between the Apostles and the Reformers. Augustine and the Reformers sustain the wires, over which the electric current of truth passes down from the apostles to the present time.

We would not be understood as ascribing a supernatural inspiration to Augustine, or as endorsing every expression or every sentiment which occurs in his voluminous works. Far from it. But we have no hesitation in saying, that probably no one man has lived since the days of Paul, the influence of whose writings upon the religious world has been so great, so enduring, and on the whole so happy, as those of the renowned Bishop of Hippo.

Art. IV.—*Examination of some Reasonings against the Unity of Mankind.*

In 1839 Dr. Morton published his "Crania Americana," a description of the skulls of American Indians. These skulls belonged to individuals of "more than forty Indian nations," extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the southern extremity of the continent to the northern polar circle. The most important ethnological conclusion which the author deduced from his comparisons was, that except the Esquimaux, all the aborigines of America, including the northern tribes, with the Mexicans, Brazilians, Peruvians, and others of the south, belonged to one race, or had been derived from one common stock. It is well to bear in mind this broad and momentous conclusion.

In 1844 appeared the "Crania Ægyptica," by the same author. In this work, from an examination of ancient and modern skulls of the eastern continent, he undertook to determine other races, totally distinct from the American, as also from each other.

The catalogue of skulls examined and compared in these works, amounting to 643 in number, was published in 1849; in it was given also an exhibition of their maximum, minimum, and mean capacity, in cubic inches, ascertained with great care.

A little earlier, Dr. Morton had published his "Distinctive Characteristics of the Aboriginal race of America."

These several works attracted great attention, and awakened a deep interest. For this there were two reasons, first, because they involved a vast amount of labour and study; secondly, because they contained a positive denial of the unity of the human race, and particularly of its having originated from one human pair. Dr. Morton's views upon this subject were fully exhibited in an "Essay on the Varieties of the Human Species," prefixed to the "Crania Americana," which fills ninety-

five pages of that great folio. The startling points of this "Essay" are reiterated in his other works, and maintained in his since published correspondence. Its title, viz., "Varieties of the Human Species," refers to Blumenbach's division of the human family into five groups, viz: 1, Caucasian; 2, Mongolian; 3, Malayan; 4, American; 5, Ethiopian; which was adopted by Dr. Morton, but in a different sense from that of the author. For whilst Blumenbach held all these groups to be *only varieties* of one race or species, Dr. Morton is careful to say: "I do not use it [race] to imply that all its divisions are derived from a single pair; on the contrary, I believe that they [the divisions] have originated from several, perhaps, even from many pairs; which were adapted, from the beginning, to the varied localities which they were designed to occupy." Also, he took special pains to repeat this statement; and to refer* to the pages of his works in which he had advocated it. Just before his death, May 1851, he wrote: "The doctrine of *the original diversity of mankind* unfolds itself to me more and more, with the distinctness of revelation." It is due, however, to the memory of Dr. Morton to state that he did not understand this view to be opposed to Scripture. For he says: "I find no difficulty with the text of Genesis;" and adds: "It (his conclusion) can be far more readily reconciled to the Mosaic annals, than some other points—astronomy, &c., for example." He also expressed his fears lest the hostility of clergymen "would lead to some controversy;" and says, that he "avoided coming into collision" with them. Add to this, that he died, as we are assured by one of his near relatives, without ever having avowed himself as having rejected the inspiration of the Bible, and we have satisfactory evidence that he would never have countenanced that use of his name and authority which has been made by some of his students and admirers, who have held up his works as a powerful attack upon the credibility of Divine revelation. For this reason, perhaps, it was that little alarm seemed to be awakened at the time; and, also, because the difficulty and abstruseness of Dr. Morton's investigations rendered them inaccessible and impracticable to all, except professed

* See Am. Jour. of Science, vol. iii. p. 40; 1847.

ethnologists, and a few students of wealth and leisure. But his conclusions have since come to be maintained by others, and on entirely different grounds. It would seem, therefore, that the time has come when there is required at least a brief examination of the reasonings through which they were reached by him, and have since been advocated by his followers: and, especially, on account of the bearing of the subject upon that great question which lies at the bottom of our present civil commotions. For it is quite certain that the new doctrines which would hold the black people in perpetual slavery to the whites, do rest at bottom upon a diversity of origin and species in the human race, however sincerely they may be advocated on other grounds, and by those who would be the last to admit any such diversity. The question of African slavery must ultimately resolve itself into one of natural history and ethnology.

There is, moreover, something very imposing in these works of Dr. Morton, which we propose now to examine. The nature of his investigations; the means he employed; the novelty and extent of his examinations and comparisons of the skulls of the dead; the testimony elicited from the "dry bones" of those whose memory had perished; and from whose living powers and activities no such indications had began to transpire—all is wonderful!

In order that this examination should be satisfactory, or even intelligible, the following table of results, derived from Dr. Morton's measurements and comparisons, must here be given. It exhibits under the five groups of Blumenbach—which Dr. Morton held to include as many, or more, original and independent races or species—sixteen families, and twenty-five varieties, of mankind; as, also, it exhibits the capacity in cubic inches, of the skulls of six hundred and twenty-three individuals, belonging to all these varieties. The table was first published in 1849, in the "Crania Americana;" but as here given, with very slight changes in the language only, to render it more perspicuous, it was corrected by himself from the results of ten years of his subsequent studies. Thus are accounted for, those differences between the numbers as now printed, and

those of the original table, which will be obvious to all who are acquainted only with his first work.

TABLE, showing the size of the brain in cubic inches, as obtained from the measurement of 623 crania of various races and families of man.

Groups.	Families.	Varieties.	Number of Skulls	Largest cub. in.	Smallest cub. in.	Mean cub. in.	Mean cub. in.
I. CAUCASIAN.							
MODERN.	1. Teutonic.	A. Germans,	18	114	70	90	92
		B. English,	5	105	91	96	
		C. Anglo-Amer.	7	97	82	90	
	2. Pelasgic.	A. Persians, B. Arminians, C. Circassians,	10	94	75	84	
	3. Celtic.	Native Irish,	6	97	78	87	
	4. Hindostani.	Bengalee,	32	91	67	80	
	5. Semitic.	Arabs,	3	98	84	89	
	6. Nilotic.	Fellahs,	17	96	66	80	
Ancient, from Catacombs.	7. Pelasgic.	Græco-Egyptians,	18	97	74	88	
	8. Nilotic.	Egyptians,	55	96	68	80	
II. MONGOLIAN.							
	9. Chinese.	Chinese,	6	91	70	82	
III. MALAY.							
	10. Malayan.	Malays,	20	97	68	86	85
	11. Polynesian.	Polynesians,	3	84	82	83	
IV. AMERICAN.							
	12. Toltecan.	A. Peruvians,	155	101	58	75	79
		B. Mexicans,	22	92	67	79	
	13. Barbarous Tribes.	C. Iroquois, D. Sinapè, E. Cherokees, F. Shoshones, &c.	161	104	70	84	
V. NEGRO.							
	14. African.	A. African born,	62	99	65	83	83
		B. Amer. born,	12	89	73	82	
	15. Hottentot.	Hottentot, &c.	3	83	68	75	
	16. Alforian.	Australians,	8	83	63	75	
5 Groups.	16 Families.	25 Varieties.	623	95.4	71.9	83.2	82.8

The classification of the preceding table may be illustrated by comparison with the determinations of other writers upon this subject. Thus, Linnæus and Buffon made five races or species; Malte-Brun, fifteen; Blumenbach, five varieties; Jaquinot, three species, derived from the three sons of Noah; St. Vincent, fifteen species; Luke Burke, twenty-eight intellectually distinct, and thirty-five physically distinct races; Desmoulins, sixteen species; Cuvier, three varieties; Agassiz, eight races, originating independently of each other in as many different centres, yet but one species; Lawrence, Pritchard, Bachman and Guyot, one species; Hunter, seven; Pickering, eleven varieties; Kant, four varieties, white, black, copper and olive;

other writers, three races, white, black, and red; Nott and Gliddon, "an indefinite number" of races having originated separately, of which, they think it probable, none has the primeval type, or form; and still another writer, quoted by Dr. Morton, has undertaken to establish at least two *sub-genera*. From these numerous and different divisions it is plain that no broad line of distinction between any of them can be drawn. For precisely in so far as they are different, they invalidate each other. The greater their number and differences, the less probable they are; and the less weight they have as arguments to shake the doctrine that there is but one species or stock of mankind. If science shall ever be capable of ascertaining more than one, it is evident from its present disagreement, that it has not yet effected it.

It may now be in place to attempt some appreciation of craniology, as a basis of classification of the varieties of the human race.

And, first, the uncertainty of the evidence it affords, is apparent from such considerations as the following. There is great variation in the forms of the heads in each division or variety of each family, as for example in those of the Germans, or English, or Anglo-Americans. There are but few dimensions which can be used as characters of the skull; whilst, in the varying forms, only the greater or less development of some of these can be considered; nor is there any fixed specimen for a standard of comparison. The *extremes* may be far apart, while the numerous *means* may have but a remote approximation, and may carry the subject to another division. We often see those from whose heads or skulls alone it cannot be ascertained whether they are English, or German, or Anglo-American. So also, it is admitted, that the Mongol and Malay groups are scarcely separable by any differences in their heads. Even practiced observers are at a loss to determine, from the differences in the skulls, to which of the five groups individuals may have belonged. The professed phrenologists afford frequent examples of the same uncertainty, when, from inspection of the slight differences in the so-called *organs*, they are so frequently led to assign very different characteristics to the same person. The high and prominent cheek bones of the American Indian

are often seen on the Anglo-American, of a dark complexion, though a pure Caucasian, while the two heads differ very little in their general form. And we often hear the remark with respect to an individual, that the form of his head would place him in another variety, if it were not for his colour, or hair, or known descent.

It was natural, therefore, for Cuvier to include the whole human race under three varieties, Caucasian, Mongolian, (embracing the Malayan and American,) and Ethiopian,—corresponding to the three prominent varieties of colour in man, white, red, and black. It should be noticed, however, that colour, though the most obvious distinction, is the least important characteristic. For we find in the Caucasian variety, all colours from white, through all shades of brown, to the black Jews of India. The American tribes have all colours less than white, to copper and dark brown. The shades of the Mongolians in Asia, and of the Ethiopians in Africa, are equally numerous and variable. Whence it is evident that the so-called arguments for the separate origin of the black variety, which have been adduced from its colour, will not bear examination.

Another element of uncertainty in Craniology, as left by Dr. Morton, and as it now stands, is the insufficiency of the number of skulls to sustain the vast generalizations which he draws from their comparison. It is true that for our own, and indeed for almost any country, his collection was enormous, and it received the highest commendations; but the actual value of its teachings is a very different thing; and it would naturally be over-estimated, as it must be conceded that it has been. The whole population of the globe classified in five groups, sixteen families, and twenty-five varieties, and these distinctly characterized from the outward form and capacity of the skulls of six hundred and twenty-three individuals—skulls, moreover, whose variations are confined within very narrow limits, and often approximating closely to each other! It is true, indeed, that the nationality of the skulls in Dr. Morton's collection, was chiefly known from other sources; and his divisions were not formed from the skulls, but were simply intended to be sustained and verified by his Craniology. But the weakness of the support is too obvious. The study must be pursued to a

far greater extent, and a far greater amount of knowledge from this source must be attained, and with more caution in generalizing, as will be evident presently, before anything more than a possible value can be ascribed to the results of Craniology.

Still another element of its uncertainty lies in the "proposition," which Dr. Morton lays down in his Correspondence in 1850—"That our species had its origin, not in one, but in several, or in many creations; and that these diverging from their primitive centres, met and amalgamated in the progress of time, and have thus given rise to those intermediate links of organization, which now connect the extremes together." What, and where are these "extremes"? what, and where are these "intermediate links"? Is the Caucasian group one extreme? Where is the proof that it has not been greatly modified by diverging from its "primitive centre," and by "amalgamation," and that it has not thus lost its "primordial form"? If so, which is certainly possible, then Craniology must give us an entirely false result. Who shall answer from Craniology, that the Semitic family of Israelites, Arabs, and others, is not the result of amalgamations, almost illimitable in extent, which have entirely transformed the primordial into a very different form? The ultimate triumph of Craniology may be anticipated with entire complacency from this point of view, to which Dr. Morton himself conducts us. For, if this process of amalgamation between groups of separate origin be a fact, then the forces are in active operation which, in time, must reduce all skulls to one form; so that, ultimately, they will prove that there is but one race. Now, whilst as yet the amalgamation is imperfect, this science goes to sustain the conclusion, that there were originally many races of independent origin; but when the amalgamation shall be perfected, it will prove that there never was but one! And this latter conclusion will then be quite as legitimate and certain as the former is now. This fact of amalgamation is also inconsistent with another notion of Dr. Morton's, which has since been sustained by the authority of great names, viz., that there is "an original adaptation of the several races to those varied circumstances of climate and locality, which, while congenial to the one, are destructive

to the other."* If this had ever been true, Craniology, after sufficient amalgamation has taken place, will show it to be true no longer, and will prove that there never was any necessity for such "original adaptations." Even now, man is a real cosmopolite, adapting himself, in the course of a few generations, to any new habitat, as is proved abundantly by the historical migrations of nations and races; nor will he be more cosmopolite then than he is now.

Yet another element of this uncertainty is the change which takes place in the form and capacity of the skull, under the influence of change of habitat, advancing civilization, and other causes. This is exhibited in the case of the negro imported into this country. The observation is not new, having been made by Dr. Bachman† of the descendants of those Africans who were originally imported into South Carolina, that "whilst we perceive no change, either in colour or hair, we are fully satisfied that even in the maritime country of Carolina, there is in form, in feature, and especially in skull, a very striking departure from the original type." Inasmuch as hundreds of these imported Africans, some of whom were *tattooed* in Africa, were accessible to Dr. Bachman, and his attainments in natural history, according to Dr. Morton himself, eminently qualified him for correct observations, we may feel assured that the native Africans present, as he says, "striking peculiarities when compared with the American-born negroes of unmixed blood, even when these are but three or four generations removed from their African forefathers." He adds also, with respect to at least one African skull in Dr. Morton's collection, labelled, "Negro, of whose history nothing is known," and which was before him while writing, that if it "is the true African type, then our negro race in the South unquestionably presents a most remarkable improvement in the skull." When compared with "more than fifty skulls of American-born negroes," the great improvement was palpable

* Amer. Jour. of Science, Vol. iii., p. 40. 1847.

† The Doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race, examined on the Principles of Science. By John Bachman, D. D., Prof. of Natural History in the College of Charleston, &c. 8vo. 1850. The second edition of this work is a great desideratum, and is earnestly expected.

in all but one. Dr. Morton's table, however, gives a different result, showing the mean capacity of the skulls of American-born negroes to be one cubic inch less than that of the native Africans—a result to be explained, no doubt, by the fact, that of the former, but twelve skulls were compared, and of the latter, sixty-two.

It should be observed here, that many authors affirm from their own more accurate knowledge of African tribes, that naturalists often give the general characteristics of the Ethiopian group as very different from what is the fact in many parts of Africa. Among these is Tiedeman, on the Natives of the High Lands of Africa, who says, "The figure of the African as commonly given, must find its prototype in the Mozambique and Guinea Negro." Hamilton, also, as adduced by Tiedeman, bears the same testimony; and Winterbottom, on the Negroes of the mountainous districts of Sierra Leone, represents them as very different in form from the usual caricatures of the African; and as approaching the "purest set of European features." Many other writers are quoted by Dr. Bachman to the same effect; and indeed any person may observe that many of the free blacks of the Northern States could hardly be recognised from these caricatures of their race which we find in books of Natural History. The same observation might be made also of the inhabitants of large districts at some distance from the equatorial regions of Africa.

In confirmation of these statements we adduce here the testimony of careful observers who have lived in Africa; one of them* being an intelligent and highly educated missionary, who has spent twenty-five years in the vicinity of Port Natal, about south latitude 29°, in the south-eastern part of the continent. He states that though the natives are an uncivilized, heathen, and degraded people, yet the heads and forms of the men, in general, compare favourably with those of the better and improved blacks of this country, and even with some of the white race. They are erect, their lower limbs well formed, colour varying from nearly black to the Indian brown, or brownish-red; their moral sense and feelings of right and wrong are

*The Rev. Daniel Lindley, D.D., of South Carolina.

full and active; and they are easily instructed in the common business of life. The women, being made the labourers for the men, and regarded as chattels or things, are early worn out, and become ugly, but yet are much beloved by their children. The common negro characterization and descriptions and figures of these people, he pronounces to be caricatures, wholly inapplicable to the millions of them. Such was his declaration after an examination of the figures (caricatures) in "The Types of Mankind," by Messrs. Nott and Gliddon. Too often ethnologists give the extreme of the form as characteristic of the higher or lower race, instead of the medium, which only can be typical, and accurately express that of the great body of the people.

Other and still more important elements of uncertainty in Dr. Morton's Craniology, will appear in a closer examination of his table from the capacities of the skulls being taken as an indication of the amount of mental power. The principle which he assumes is that of phrenology, of which in his views of mental science he was a strenuous advocate, viz., that intellectual power depends, when other things, as health, constitution, cultivation, age, size, &c., are equal, upon the volume of the brain. This part of his table is the result of great labour, and it honours the industry and perseverance of its author. He saw, too, and admitted its imperfections, in the very unequal number of skulls belonging to the different varieties; the wholly inadequate number in some, and especially in the most important divisions. The table at best can present only loose approximations, not reliable conclusions. Upon closer scrutiny it shows:

1. That the *greatest* capacity of the skulls ranges from 114 to 83 cubic inches; the *least*, from 91 to 63; and the *mean*, from 96 to 75—making a difference between the extremes greatest of 31, of the extremes least, 28, and of the means, 21. Now constant observation has long fixed upon the great difference in the size of heads, which is apparent in those of the same family and neighbourhood: and hence the proportional variations in the table may be, and probably are in most cases, due to such differences, and to the small number of skulls measured and compared.

2. The greatest capacity of skull in the native Africans, 99, is less than in only four of the twenty-five varieties, viz: Germans, English, Peruvians, and American Indians; and it is one greater than the greatest in the Semitic (Arabs); two greater than the greatest in the Anglo-Americans, Celts (Irish) and Malays; three greater than in the Nilotic races, both ancient and modern; and five greater than in the Persians, Arminians and Circassians. A still stronger result, however, is given by the measures of Tiedeman, as expressed in his own words, "that the cavity of the skull of the negro in general, is not smaller than that of the European and other human races."

3. Dr. Bachman has remarked on this table, that "the largest African skull is 99, and the largest Irish only 97. This proves, indeed, that a negro skull contained more brains than the largest Irish skull measured; but it does not prove that the negro possessed more sense. Probably he had a larger frame than the Irishman." Other things than size must have a great influence, though they cannot be estimated.

4. But the most significant result of this scrutiny is, that the numbers determine nothing as to the mental power, or for any other end of classification, of the different races, because *they overlap each other*, so as to present no definite limit. The higher numbers of the lower groups exceed the lower numbers of the higher groups. Of the German variety, *e. g.*, the greatest is 114, and the least 70. Now, of all the other varieties of all the five groups, the greatest measures exceed 70; and indeed more than half of the least measures either equal or exceed it. If, now, from the measures of the brain, the lower half of the Germans are held to be Germans, then the higher half of each of the other varieties, together with the lower half of most of them, must also be ranked as Germans, if their position is to be determined by the size of the brain. It is not possible to avoid this conclusion; the table itself is decisive. For the mean of the Germans is 90; their least measure is 70; and the least measures of ten of the other varieties range from 70 above 90, to 91; while the highest measures of the remaining varieties range above 70, *i. e.*, from 83 to 101; and of all but the Germans, from 83 to 105. Surely, the capacity of the skulls in the table shows a singular equality of brain.

It would seem that this must convince every one, as Dr. Bachman says, "of the utter futility of any attempt to divide the races of men into different species from the size of the brain."

There is still another source of uncertainty in the *material* employed in Dr. Morton's table. For the skull of the male is admitted to be larger than that of the female.* This difference is not considered in the table. It leaves us in utter ignorance of the proportion of males to females. If this had been given, it would have made a material difference in the estimate of the numbers and means. For, although it is taught by some craniologists that the upper part of the skull of the female is more round than that of the male, yet the general opinion is, that the one cannot be ascertained, or certainly distinguished from the other. This fact greatly diminishes the value of Dr. Morton's results. The smallest skull given by him is 63; and this is asserted to be the skull of a female Australian. It is obvious, moreover, that the skulls for such comparisons should be selected from those of mature age; although some come to maturity earlier than others.

It is also certain that the proportions of the table are not consistent with other facts. For example, in the Teutonic family, if we admit the correctness of the German extremes, 114 and 70, then in the English, the greatest, 105, is too small; or the least, 91, is much too large. The same is true, also, of the Anglo-Americans; for we know from the head of Daniel Webster, 122 cubic inches, and from others, that 97 is much too small for the greatest, and 82 is too large for the smallest extreme.

But if the table exhibited only reliable results in this respect, yet every observer must have seen numbers of men, with relatively small heads, yet with reasoning and business powers far

* The following table is derived from Tiedeman, by changing weight into numbers:

CAUCASIAN.—Male,	Greatest,	774.	Female,	Greatest,	397.
" "	Least,	327.	"	Least,	305.
Mean of 77 skulls,	. .	413.	Mean of 12 skulls,		353.
ETHIOPIAN.—Male,	Greatest,	543.	Female,	Greatest,	315.
"	Least,	316.	"	Least,	249.
Mean of 38 skulls,	. .	378.	Mean of 3 skulls,		292.

greater than many with larger heads. A smaller brain, with good health, good temperament, and adequate training, is more desirable than a larger, or much larger one, with the reverse of these advantages.

Nor should it escape our notice, that the Nilotic family of modern, and the Nilotic family of ancient Caucasians, exhibit in the table the same measures, and the same means, 80; and yet the ancient Egyptians wrought out those wonders which the more astonish both the learned and the unlearned, the more they become known, and which place their authors at a vast distance in mental power from the Fellahs, who are their modern representatives. Also, the greatest measure of these Nilotics is below that of the Celt, Arab, Malay, Peruvian, American (Indian,) and even of the native African.

It is not strange, therefore, that this craniological table of Dr. Morton should have proved unsatisfactory to other inquirers into the same subject, and even to his best friends. Thus Dr. J. C. Nott, one of his warmest admirers, as well as a vehement advocate of his principal conclusion with respect to the diversity of origin and species of the different groups, has expressed himself quite strongly upon this point. In his "Comparative Anatomy of Races," printed in the "Types of Mankind"*—a work published four years after Dr. Bachman had overthrown Dr. Morton's arguments, and designed by its authors to sustain the conclusions of their deceased friend—Dr. Nott, seeing the inevitable inferences from the table, which have been pointed out, says: "It (the table) is calculated to lead to grave error." (This error, no doubt, was, that the results were palpably opposed to the notion of diverse species in man.) He adds: "Like Tiedeman, he (Morton) has grouped together races which, between themselves, possess no affinity whatever; that present the most opposite cranial characters, and which are, doubtless, specifically distinct."

The pressure of this celebrated table upon Dr. Nott, especially in opposition to the conclusion which both he and its author wished to draw from it, was such, that he felt the necessity of trying to invalidate it. He thus criticizes the numbers

* Types of Mankind, or Ethnological Researches, based upon the Ancient Monuments, &c., &c., by J. C. Nott, M. D., and Geo. R. Gliddon: Phila., 1854.

in the Teutonic family: "The average, 90, is based on the measurement of but thirty skulls; whereas three hundred might not suffice to evolve a fair average of Germanic [but one of the three Teutonic varieties] cranial developments." Now if 300 skulls would not give a fair average of German heads, it follows that at least 3000 would be requisite for a fair average of all the modern Caucasian varieties; for the Chinese, including the whole Mongolian group, 100,000; for the Malays and American Indians, 30,000; and for the Africans as many more. Craniology then demands a labour which can hardly be said to have begun; and which will require many generations to finish it. And even if it were thus accomplished, it would determine little or nothing as to the mental power of the races, because it supplies only one of a great number of important elements, all of which are indispensable to the solution of the problems which it proposes. Thus the vast deductions from this ethnological table are blown away by its own friends as chaff before the tempest.

In another statement in the "Types of Mankind," Dr. Nott says: "With all his acuteness in craniology, it is clear that Dr. Morton felt himself to be much embarrassed in making this classification (in the table). He has several times modified it in his different published papers." He then proceeds to state that discoveries made in the five years following Dr. Morton's death would have led him to very different results. What these different results might have been is not stated. But whether the truth be on the side of the master or his disciple, and it cannot sustain both, their difference leaves us no ground of confidence in the conclusions of craniology for the determination of races, or of their intellectual powers.

Evidently enough there is nothing in all this to invalidate the conclusion of Humboldt (*Cosmos*) at the close of his argument, where he says: "In maintaining the unity of the human species, we reject, by necessary consequence, the depressing (cheerless) distinction (diversity) of superior and inferior races." Yet stronger is the testimony of Müller, the distinguished physiologist of Berlin, authority of the highest character. His words are: "Man is a species, created once, and divided into none of its varieties by specific differences. In fact, the origin

of the negro, and of his group, admits not of a rational doubt."

From the results of this examination thus far, we cannot but feel surprise at the persistency of Dr. Nott, in his repeated assertion of the original and untransitional character of numerous types, races, or species of mankind—for all these he holds to be the same thing—and especially, at least, of the four distinct types, white, red, yellow, and black, which appear, as he states,* upon the Egyptian monuments, at least fourteen centuries before the Christian era. Many of these monumental figures are presented by him; but they have little bearing upon the subject, even admitting their correctness, and the accuracy of the dates assigned to them. They show, indeed, the general phenomena of varieties in man—a point not doubted by naturalists—but they do not affect the subject of the unity of the race, so long as we are obliged to admit, on fixed evidence such numerous and great changes as we know to have occurred in the course of a few generations. Even if the monuments of Egypt do reach back to 3800 B. C., according to Lepsius, we have not yet reached the origin of the race; nor do these monuments certify to the separate origin of three or four species; so far as their testimony goes, we can be certain only of one primitive stock. Dr. Nott himself has virtually admitted this, and thus has annihilated himself, in the following definite statement of the uncertainty of Dr. Morton's Caucasian family itself. "It should also be borne in mind," he says, "that what we term Caucasian races, are not of one origin; they are, on the contrary, an amalgamation of an indefinite number of primitive stocks, of different instincts, temperaments, and mental and physical characters. Egyptians, Jews, Arabs, Teutons, Celts, Sclavonians, Pelasgians, Romans, Iberians, &c., &c., are all mingled in blood; and it is impossible to go back and unravel this heterogeneous mixture, and to say precisely what each type was." This "commingling of blood, through migrations, wars, captivities, and amalgamations," has, indeed, wrought wonders, according to this statement! External causes have then produced immense changes; and the characters of

* Types of Mankind, pp. 84—87.

the original types cannot be "*precisely*" stated, nor even be surmised. The whole Caucasian group ceases to belong to the "primordial," or to any original type. Indeed, Dr. Nott actually abandons the doctrine of Morton, with respect to the amalgamation of one species with another. For he says: "We hold that a variety which is permanent, and which resists, without change, all known external causes, must be regarded as a primitive species."* True, but where is there such a variety among men? And on this principle, how could it ever be ascertained? Who can prove that any given type now existing is not the result of amalgamation, or of some other, or all of the external causes mentioned by Dr. Nott? How can it be shown that these causes, together with climatic influences of every sort, have not produced even greater variations in one species than any differences that can be shown to exist?

Besides, if, according to Dr. Nott, the Caucasian group be a result of amalgamations of different species, this is doubtless true of the American group, the Esquimaux only excepted. Now, Dr. Nott holds, with Dr. Morton and most others, that all the aborigines of South and North America are of one stock. Yet their differences are as marked as those in the varieties of the Caucasian group; whence neither can they constitute one primordial form, but must have been derived from many original types, by amalgamation. Among the Indian tribes are found as great differences in the skulls, and in other characteristics (as Dr. Morton has shown, and Mr. Catlin, the painter of the Indians, has confirmed) as in those of the Caucasian group, or in any other. How then has it been ascertained so clearly that they are all of one stock? Dr. Nott, moreover, maintains that they are so peculiar that they cannot be changed and civilized, yet the Peruvians and Mexicans (of one and the same stock with all the rest, according to these gentlemen) were long ago, and undeniably half-civilized; and the Cherokees, in their settlement west of the Mississippi, have become an agricultural people in a single generation; all of which goes far to prove that the stock, in all its varieties, needed only the proper moulding influences, applied in the

* Types of Mankind, p. 75.

right and regular manner, to change it into the form of civilized life.

Dr. Nott also has committed a strange abuse of testimony in respect to the evidence of the early permanence of the tpyes found on the Egyptian monuments, which deserves special consideration here, and which we commend to his attention, and to that of all others who receive his unqualified assertions. We give it in the words of Dr. Gabell:* "It is, moreover," he says, "a significant fact, that, while the oldest monumental records extend back, according to Birch and Lepsius, to about 3800 B. C., *no negro delineation*, as admitted by the authors of the 'Types of mankind,' *is found earlier than the twenty-fourth century B. C.*" Just here, we are constrained to call attention to the apparently disingenuous way of recording this fact. So far from adverting to the interval of more than a thousand years between the date of the oldest negro delineation, and that of the earlier records, they speak of the former as "contemporary with the earliest Egyptians;" whereas it is seen that the monumental inscriptions, so far from demonstrating the contemporaneous origin of the black and white races, furnish a strong presumption against this doctrine. Accordingly, Bunsen and Lepsius, whom the authors of the "Types of Mankind" were constrained to accredit as the most eminent and reliable of living Egyptologists, are both earnest advocates of the specific unity, and of the common origin of the human races; and yet, in the teeth of this fact, Nott and Gliddon complacently ascribe the same opinions as expressed by Professor Owen, Count Gobineau, and others, to their ignorance of the "monumental history of man."

It is admitted, then, by the "Types of Mankind," in the "invaluable paper," as Dr. Nott styles it, of Mr. Birch to him, that "at the early period of the fourth and sixth Egyptian dynasties, no traces occur of Ethiopian (negro) relations" with Egypt; and that "there are no monuments to show that the

* The Testimony of Modern Science to the Unity of Mankind, &c. By J. L. Gabell, M. D., Professor of Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, in the University of Virginia. New York, 1859. This is a candid and powerful treatise on the subject, especially commended to all for its clear and conclusive argumentation. Nothing like it has been printed since Bachman's Unity of the Human Race.

Egyptians were then even acquainted with the black races." But in the twelfth dynasty, about 2400 B. C., some twelve or fourteen hundred years afterwards, distinct evidence exists of the black or negro race. Now, with respect to these admitted facts, Dr. Nott says: "We may hence infer that these Nigritian types were contemporary with the earliest Egyptians." This illustrates the logic of the "Types of Mankind," and its utter untrustworthiness in other respects—an admitted difference in time of 1200 or 1400 years makes facts contemporaneous!

Nor have we any reason to think that the Negroes would not have been represented on the monuments, if they had been known to the Egyptians. In that long interval, great changes may have taken place in the races of Ethiopia, such as are indicated by the change which has manifested itself in the black race in the United States, in the comparatively short space of three hundred years. Although Dr. Nott denies this, both in the blacks of this country and of Africa, yet it has often been remarked, and is beyond all doubt. Sir Charles Lyell speaks of it in his Tour through the United States, for geological purposes; as many other intelligent men have done.

Similar unfairness, and even misrepresentation, is found in the "Types of Mankind," where the authors, by strong commendations of Dr. Pickering,* seem to indicate that his views do not differ fundamentally, at least, from theirs—whereas the contrary is true. Dr. Pickering thinks it most probable that the American group was introduced into North America by the Mongols of Asia, at the northwest, and by the Malays, through the Polynesian Islands, on the southwest; also, that California might have been peopled from Japan—in direct opposition to the views of Morton, Nott, and Gliddon. Also, he makes *eleven* varieties of the human family, and holds them to be varieties of one species. He explicitly decides in favour of but one species, and of the unity of the race. Thus, to such names as Cuvier, Smith, Lawrence, Bunsen, Lepsius, Müller, Owen, Gobineau, Humboldt, Bachman, Pritchard, Guyot, and Gabell—

* The Races of Man, and their Geographical Distribution, by Charles Pickering, M. D., &c. New Edition. London, 1851.—Another admirable work, and its figures not caricatures.

all strenuous advocates of the specific unity of the race—is to be added that of Pickering, even though the "Types" has asserted that this doctrine is no longer believed by its former supporters.

We come now to examine the views of a man whose position in science is a very different one from that of either Dr. J. C. Nott or Mr. Gliddon. Greatly to the surprise of intelligent persons, Professor Agassiz appeared in the "Types of Mankind" as a coadjutor of its authors, in support of Dr. Morton's doctrine of the diverse origin of different races of men; but yet on very different grounds. Of course his aid was highly gratifying. His article in the "Types" is short and clear, however unsatisfactory. His well-known view is, that plants and animals—flora and fauna—have their own peculiar districts or provinces, where they originated; and that man, by his constitution and nature, is governed by the same law of origin and distribution. This doctrine was first advanced by him, as he states, in the "Revue Suisse," in 1845. He designates eight varieties of mankind, as having originated independently of each other, in eight distinct "natural provinces," or localities; of course from different pairs, or rather, as he supposes, in communities—each community in its peculiar fauna and flora. Yet he holds that all these different peoples, in and from these eight original centres, constitute only one species, because they all possess the same characteristics and endowments, or have the same physical structure and mental faculties. This statement is fundamental, and implies that the differences of these different peoples are only in degree, not in kind; consequently, that they all do truly belong to one species in natural history—in which fact lies the principle of the unity of mankind. Yet, strange to say, Professor Agassiz maintains, in the same paper, an amount of difference between some of them, that must, as will be made to appear, separate them into different species. This proposition was further illustrated by its author, three years later, in another work by the authors of the "Types of Mankind," in which, to set aside the evidences derived from unity of language, he is constrained to resort to an assumed analogy between articulate speech in man, and the inarticulate cries of birds; and at least to intimate that unity of speech is

no more proof of unity of race, than the fact that birds of the same species have the same inarticulate cries, is proof that they all descended from the same pair!

Now, in respect to the fauna and flora of different sections of the earth, the general views of Agassiz may be admitted, as that there are Arctic, Temperate, and Tropical faunas, somewhat different, too, in the same zones of different continents. No doubt, certain animals are limited to certain localities, and may be called the peculiar fauna of those localities. But it is also true, that other animals have a much wider range, and are found living and roaming through several of these limited faunas, as if they were not subject to any such law. Take, *e. g.*, the faunas of America, as designated by Agassiz; in each of which we find some animals which are unknown in the others; and, indeed, their subdivisions on either side of the equator have a few animals peculiar and confined to them. But if some of the animals have a range through many faunas, then man, endowed to make provision for himself far beyond the wants and capacities of mere instinct, *may possibly be qualified to live in and range through all the zoölogical provinces and different faunas*, and may be a real cosmopolite, as he is designated by Agassiz himself. If so, the argument for the separate origin and location of his eight varieties of man, fails. Dr. Bachman and others have urged this objection as irrefutable. Let us then consider the range of some well-known animals, as presented by standard authors.

The common wolf (*Canis lupus*) is found from Panama, through the United States, on both sides of the Rocky Mountains, over British and Russian America, to the Arctic Sea; and in Europe, over the countries north of the Mediterranean, to the Polar Sea; and in Asia, from the same northern limit, through China, Japan, Kamtschatka, Tartary, and Siberia; whence it passes over Behring's Straits into America. The ermine (*Mustela erminea*) inhabits America, Europe, and Asia, with the wolf; and Richardson extends it "to the most remote Arctic districts." The beaver (*Castor fiber*) is found from the most southern part of the United States, east and west of the Rocky Mountains, to the far North, and over all Northern Europe; though in France, Spain, Greece, &c., it is rare; and

in England and Wales, said to have become extinct. The otter has even a more extended range, south and north of the equator. The cougar (*Felis concolor*), panther, or catamount, "was once spread over the whole wide extent of the New World, from Canada to Patagonia;"* though now it is rare in the Northern States. The wolverine (*Gulo arcticus*) inhabits North America and Europe, from the Temperate to the Arctic fauna; and the authority in the note gives the opossum (*Didelphys Virginiana*) the range of Brazil, Guiana, Mexico, Florida, Virginia, and of the more northern temperate states. The skunk, (*Mephitis Americana*, Desm.) together with the muskrat and mink, has the wide range of all North America, and much of South America. The brown rat (*Mus decumanus*) is said to have come from Asia into Europe, and by commerce to have been introduced into America—the same pest in all climates.

Among fishes, the right whale, (*Balæna mysticetus*,) having its specific name from its *mustached* upper lip, abounds in the Arctic and Antarctic oceans, and ranges over much of the Atlantic and Pacific, even to tropical waters.

Many birds cannot be located in any one or two faunas of the Northern hemisphere, but, as the horned owl, (*Bubo Virginiana*,) have a home alike in North and South America, viz., in very different and widely separated "zoological provinces."

The lichen, (*Cenomyce rangiferina*,) or reindeer moss, because it is the food of that animal, which is one confined to the Arctic fauna, is spread over the north of both continents, is common on the mountains of the Northern States, and has been gathered on those of Virginia and North Carolina.

Further specification is unnecessary. But, if all the animals assigned to the Arctic and Temperate faunas in Europe and America, were enumerated, how few would be found confined to only one fauna of any very definite limits! If now the mere animals have so wide a range, that of man may be much more extensive. And what is there to prove that any particular group of men must have originated in one fauna, rather than in another, when, for aught that appears, they have the free range of them all? As Professor Agassiz had all these facts before him, and admitted them, the wonder is that he should

* A. A. Gould.

have maintained, on the ground of his distinct faunas and floras, a separate and corresponding origin for his several varieties of man.

Still more wonderful does this become, when we apply the doctrine to this continent, and to the American (Indian) group. For, according to Dr. Morton—and Professor Agassiz adopts his conclusion—this one group, derived from one stock, is spread over America, extending from the mean annual temperature of 32° Fah., or from N. lat. 66°, southwards through the Northern Temperate fauna, to the mean annual temperature of 74°, and thence through the tropical climate and fauna, into and through the Southern Temperate fauna, even to Cape Horn. This race or stock, therefore, has its home in the three great faunas of our continent, and occupies their whole ground, both in North and South America. This marvellous inconsistency of Professor Agassiz completely repudiates, for this continent, at least, his hypothesis of distinct races of men, as autochthons, in the distinct faunas of mere animal autochthons.

The wonder of all this is still further increased by Professor Agassiz's subdivision for mere animals of his principal faunas on each side of the equator, into twelve others, the limits of which it is not necessary to mention here. But if these twelve sub-faunas are what they are maintained to be, there should be *twelve races of men, autochthons, each in its particular fauna; but it is admitted, and even strenuously asserted, that there is but one over the whole continent.* Surely the hypothesis is run into the ground, by the author himself, too deep ever to be disinterred.

Professor Agassiz indeed remarks, that "this race is divided into an infinite number of small tribes, presenting more or less difference, one from another." But this does not even evade the difficulty. For if these "small tribes" are inconsistently regarded here and for the moment, as of separate origin, then there ought to have been an *infinite number* of faunas for the infinite number of tribes: but if, consistently with Dr. Morton's view, fully endorsed by Professor Agassiz in other connexions, they all belong to one stock or one creation, then there should have been but one fauna.

Further, the Esquimaux and Laplander are classed by

Agassiz separately from the American race, as derived from one stock, or, at least, from one creation, and as autochthons in the Arctic climate and fauna where they now live. But if it were admitted that the mere animals of this fauna are autochthons in it, and that the white bear, the polar fox, the reindeer, and others, were created with their adequate covering, surrounded with their ordinary food, and endowed with instincts for living as they now live, it would not follow that the human beings of those regions must follow the same law. On the contrary, judging from what we know of nature, if the man of that fauna was produced there, he must have been at first without the necessary clothing, dependent for it, and for his daily food, upon the animals of rivers and seas, without instruments for capturing them, or for making his garments, and destitute of those wonderful instincts by which the animals provide for their subsistence. Coming into life in such a state of helplessness, in such a climate, he must have perished; unless we suppose an amount of direct interposition, on the part of his Creator, such a series of miracles for his support and comfort through the first day, and certainly for the first months, even in the most favourable half of the year, as these gentlemen naturalists would be the last to admit. For, according to them, divine interposition into the immutable order of nature is inadmissible: and certainly the fixed law of destitution would, upon their hypothesis, have ensured the destruction of the human autochthons of the Arctic fauna.

The necessity for such interpositions passes away with the groundless notion that the Esquimaux originated in Arctic America. They, together with the whole American group, are regarded by Cuvier as offshoots of the Mongolian variety. In the present state of our knowledge, this is altogether the most probable view, not only of the Esquimaux, but also of the Laplanders, Samoyedes, and Kamschatkadales, all which belong to the Northern Arctic fauna of Agassiz. From Kamschatka, with no great difficulty, they might have crossed Behring's Straits, or they might have passed from the north-west of Europe to Greenland, and thence into Arctic America. Thus they would have found a home like that they left behind in Arctic Europe or Asia. But it seems best to comport with

the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, that man should have been originally placed in a warm, temperate climate, surrounded with ample means for his support; whence, as from a centre, his various families and races, as indicated by their affiliated languages have radiated over the whole earth. Hence, Dr. Pickering says: "Man, then, does not belong to the cold and variable climates; his original birth-place was in a region of perpetual summer, where the unprotected skin bears, without suffering, the slight fluctuations of temperature." This makes easy and natural the present location of all the peoples of the globe.

But before concluding our examination, it is necessary to advert to the relation of the monkey tribe to this subject, for the reason that our authors have endeavoured to show that the differences between the several species of the higher quadrumana, as also between these and man, are no greater, perhaps less, than the differences between the several groups or races of men; and this, not for the purpose of establishing any affinity between man and the ape, but in order to make it appear that the reasons for a specific distinction between them are no stronger, perhaps weaker, than those for a specific distinction between, and a separate origin for, the various races of men. In other words, if we decline to adopt their notion of distinct species in mankind, we shall not be allowed to insist upon any specific difference between man and the brute.

This interesting class of brutes, the anthropoid monkeys, evidently have a special attraction for the authors of the "Types of Mankind," and of the "Indigenous Races."* In

* Indigenous Races of the Earth, &c. By Nott & Gliddon. 1857. That portion of this work which the authors claim for themselves, is as illogical and unscientific as are their writings in the "Types of Mankind." The *Westminster Review*, which would have been favourable, if it had been possible, has examined and reported on it in strong terms of censure, because it denies, or does not recognise, what has been fully established by others. The *Review* rejects Dr. Nott's argument, in which he "tries to make it appear that 'each type of mankind,' like a species of plants or animals, has its appropriate climate or station." . . . "The latter portion of the work (Mr. Gliddon's) exhibits a total ignorance of what has been done in recent years, to disprove those notions of limitation of the area of species, which were current among a generation of naturalists now passing away." This is too hard on Agassiz!

the former work, Dr. Nott shows himself kindly disposed towards them, from the "fact of their near approach to the human family." He seems even to claim a closer affinity to them than is at all common. In the latter work is introduced an extended comparison between several species of the ape, and several varieties of man, accompanied by numerous figures of both, side by side; among which figures, those of man are, as usual, mere caricatures. The authors cannot conceal the strange pleasure which they experience in tracing and verifying resemblances between themselves and the orang-outang, chimpanzee, and gorilla. These, indeed, from their structure and organization, are placed by zoologists at the head of the brute creation. Their anatomy has been ascertained and published by Professor Owen, of England, Professor Wyman, of Cambridge, Mass., and by others; and their differences from man have been fully exhibited. Their nearest approach to humanity, according to Dr. Owen, is in the gorilla; in the chimpanzee, according to Dr. Wyman. Both authors agree in the great differences between them and man, and also that they are truly brute, and not human. It is not necessary to specify the points given by these distinguished comparative anatomists; but it is important to compare their general views with the remarkable assertions both of Professor Agassiz and Dr. Nott, in the "Types of Mankind." Thus, Agassiz asserts: "The chimpanzee and gorilla do not differ more, one from the other, than the Mandingo from the Guinea negro; they together do not differ more from the orang, than the Malay or white man differs from the negro."* Is not this to assert, in the strongest manner, distinct species in mankind? Now man, of all varieties, has the same kinds of bones, and the same number of each kind, in his skeleton; but, according to Drs. Owen and Wyman, these anthropoid monkeys differ in this particular of bones from each other, as well as from man; and accordingly, Professor Agassiz frankly exonerates those gentlemen from holding the opinion which he deduces from their analysis and dissection. Dr. Nott makes a similar statement to that above, as follows: "Nor can it be rationally affirmed, that the

* Types of Mankind, p. lxxv.

orang-outang and chimpanzee are more widely separated from certain African, or Oceanic negroes, than are the latter from the Teutonic and Pelasgic types."* Also he refers in the same place to Dr. Wyman, as having "placed this question in its true light." Yes, truly, Dr. Wyman has poured upon it a flood of light, as in the following passage: "The organization of the anthropoid quadrumana justifies the naturalist in placing them at the head of the brute creation; and in placing them in a position in which they, of all the animal series, shall be nearest to man. Any anatomist, however, who will take the trouble to compare the skeletons of the negro and orang, cannot fail to be struck, at the sight, with the wide gap which separates them. The difference in the cranium, the pelvis, and in the conformation of the upper extremities, between the negro and the Caucasian, sinks into insignificance when compared with the vast difference which exists in the conformation of the same parts, between the negro and the orang." Such is the language of the "very accomplished anatomist of Harvard University," as Dr. Nott correctly styles him, in which he is sustained by Dr. Owen himself. Now, it is almost too obvious for remark, that if Dr. Wyman has "placed this question in its true light," the above assertion by Dr. Nott is false, and that of Professor Agassiz is entirely incorrect. For the number and general structure of the bones in the anthropoid monkeys do undeniably differ from those of man; the former are not fitted for an upright position, as is the latter; and though their upper extremities are far longer in proportion, yet they go on all fours; and the arms of the gorilla are much shorter than those of the chimpanzee—differences between the animals themselves, and between them and man, which fully justify the strong statements of Dr. Wyman; and such as no one has ever offered to point out between any two races, or groups of men.

Dr. Owen concludes his examination with the following decisive propositions: "The unity of the human species is demonstrated by the constancy of those osteological and dental characters to which the attention is more particularly directed

* Types of Mankind, p. 457.

in the investigation of the corresponding characters of the higher quadrumana." . . . "Man is the sole species of his genus, the sole representative of his order, and subclass." . . . "Thus, I trust, has been furnished the confutation of the notion of the transformation of the ape into man."* †

These broad physiological differences between humanity and the brute, become absolutely impassable walls of separation, when we add to them the articulate language, and the moral and spiritual faculties of man. These endowments exalt him infinitely above the highest species of mere animals, and should

* On the Classification of the Mammalia, &c. Appendix B. On the Orang, Chimpanzee, and Gorilla. By Richard Owen, F. R. S. London, 1859.

† As we have seen, it was no part of the design of the authors of the "Types" to advocate the same origin, or unity of species, for man and the monkey. This belongs to the opposite pole of sceptical speculation in natural history; of which the latest form appears in a remarkable book, from a very high authority: "On the Origin of Species, &c.; by Charles Darwin, M. A., Fellow of the Royal, Geological, Linnæan, &c., Societies. 1860." The object of this interesting work is to prove that there is no such thing as permanence in the species of natural history; that all existing forms of animal life have been derived through natural generation, from one, or at most, a very few original creations. It carries, however, its own refutation in itself, in the author's frank admission of the difficulties of his theory, and in the stupendous absurdity of his conclusion. This is expressed as follows: "I believe that animals (*i. e.*, all animals) have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants (all) from an equal or lesser number." . . . "I should infer, from analogy, that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth, have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed." Cuvier has characterized, for all time, this whole branch of speculation, in the brief words: "There is no proof that all the differences which now distinguish organized beings are such as may have been produced by circumstances; all that has been advanced upon this subject is hypothetical." Since his day, however, these speculations, even of the greatest authorities within the legitimate sphere of the science, have become mutually self-destructive, to a degree which Cuvier never could have anticipated. Thus Morton and Agassiz find such differences between man and man, that the different races or groups never could have descended from a single pair; while Darwin finds so little difference between man and the animals, that he believes them all to be "descended from at most only four or five progenitors," and infers, "from analogy," that they are all "descended from some one primordial form." It is quite certain that such conflicting conclusions cannot endanger the received doctrines of the immutable permanency of species, and of the specific unity of the human race.

always place him in a division of zoology of which man would constitute the sole order, genus, and species. This classification has been adopted by two most distinguished zoologists, Ehrenburg, of Berlin, and Geoffroy St. Hilaire, of Paris. But it has not yet come to be generally received. The name of Cuvier, (whose classification is wholly dependent on the physical constitution, and wholly excludes the spiritual—treating man as a mere animal,) like the name of Linnæus in the previous age, seems to have held even Christian naturalists spell-bound. So long as he is followed in this particular, true progress in the descriptions and arrangement of the objects of natural history must be frustrated; because man must be classed in a rank far below that to which his creation and endowments would assign him; the image and likeness of God in him must be ignored by science; whilst it is evident that the right classification of man, must be vastly more essential to a sound zoology, than that of all the mere animals taken together. Man is the head of all the species of animals in virtue of his lower nature alone, which is one with theirs; but the head of the animal creation is MAN, in virtue only of his being endowed with a moral and spiritual nature, which is made in the image of God.

The due consideration of this moral and physical nature of man, might easily be made to refute all the speculation that has ever been advanced, from the analogy of the brute creation, in favour of a separate and independent origin for his several races or varieties. For the brute, from its nature and form, is, in a certain sense, attached to the soil; it is incapable of an upright position; it cannot vary or change its food; it has no power to adapt itself to new circumstances; it has no knowledge of distant countries; it is of one nature, and that is, "of the earth, earthy," destitute of reason, freedom, and morality. Hence there is a fitness that the mere animal should be, as it is, subject to laws that are merely physical; that it should be the slave of nature; and that each department of nature, distinguished in its climate and vegetable productions by peculiar adaptations, should have adapted aud at least partially confined to it peculiar forms of animal life. But man is the lord of nature, not its slave; and he finds his highest development in

asserting this control. His form is upright; he is endowed with a superior nature—with reason, freedom, morality, and immortality. Hence he is subject to other than physical laws; he can protect himself from the heat of the equator, and from the cold of the polar circles; he can vary his food according to the productions of each locality; the geometrical ratio of his natural increase makes it necessary that he should spread his tribes away from their native locality; and whilst any portion of the earth's surface remains unsubdued, he feels that his work is unfinished. Hence man justly claims a wider latitude and freer range over the earth than the brute can enjoy; and refuses to be confined within the faunas and floras of science, which are transcended by many species of the animals themselves.

If now, in conclusion, we look at the first chapter of Genesis merely as a philosophical theory of the beginning of things, the result merely of a wise man's reflections, after a wide examination of the phenomena of nature and of man, it is wonderful to see how free it is from all those difficulties which modern speculation have raised. There we behold the Creator preparing the world, its dry land and seas—covering the earth with vegetation for the future nourishment of man and beast. Then he causes the water to bring forth abundantly all its living things, both great and small, every fish of every fin, and "every fowl of every wing." After this he produces the beasts and all cattle, and all creeping things. The abundant creation of vegetable and animal life, not in single pairs, but in multitudes, seems to be implied in this account; and we know not what objection can lie against such an understanding of the words, which seems to be necessary, in order that there should be food both for the herbivorous and carnivorous species. The time might have been near the autumnal equinox. In all this the wise and learned author has given a theory of the creation of plants and mere animals, which, if derived from the study of nature, is at least such as modern natural history, even with its discoveries in geology, has only illustrated—which it has in no respect improved nor essentially modified. According to our present views, vegetable abundance must have preceded the creation of the animals, in order that these should be supplied

with food; and the order of succession in the animal creation, is the most natural. To the eye of science now, it is "all very good."

When this vast and perfect preparation had been made for man, the head and glory of the creation appears in the image of his Maker. Upon the animal nature in him is superinduced a free, rational, moral, and spiritual nature, to which there is no likeness in any other creature. With these unparalleled endowments, crowned with articulate speech, he is not made subject to nature, but "all things are put under him." He is placed above the limitations and local restraints of mere animal life, in virtue of his superior nature and lordship over the earth and all its creatures. Now Moses, observing further the obvious fact, that all known individuals of mankind were endowed with the same distinguishing qualities and faculties, and were all capable of inter-procreation in a geometrical ratio of increase, would naturally infer that they all originated from a single pair, and constituted one family and one brotherhood. What so natural, simple, rational. What so free from difficulty?

Far be it from us to endorse any such view of this oldest page of written knowledge. But if it were nothing more than this, we should not hesitate to accept it as by far the most probable account that has ever been given of the beginnings of things.

ART. V.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church met, according to appointment, in the First Presbyterian Church, Columbus, Ohio, May 15, 1862, and was opened with a sermon by John C. Backus, D. D., Moderator of the last Assembly, from Hebrews xii. 28. After the organization of the house, Charles C. Beatty, D. D., was elected Moderator, and the Rev. A. A. Hogue, of Kentucky, Temporary Clerk. Dr. Leyburn, of New Orleans, having resigned his office as Stated Clerk of the Assembly, A. T. McGill, D. D., of Princeton, N. J., was elected

to fill that office, and W. E. Schenck, D. D., of Philadelphia, was chosen Permanent Clerk in the place of Dr. McGill.

Revised Book of Discipline.

R. J. Breckinridge, D. D., Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Book of Discipline, reported that the Committee had several meetings, and had sent the book, as revised, to the several Presbyteries for their suggestions, and that a majority of the Committee had intrusted him to recommend that the subject be postponed to the next General Assembly. This recommendation was acceded to by the Assembly; and the matter was accordingly deferred. Dr. Beatty, the Moderator, was added to the Committee, in the place of the Rev. Prof. Peck, and Dr. Krebs, of New York, in the place of Rev. Dr. Thornwell. The Committee was instructed to meet on the 22d of July next, in the First Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh.

Place of Next Meeting.

Peoria, Illinois; Washington, D. C.; and Newark, N. J., were placed on nomination. Dr. Tustin made an eloquent and patriotic speech in favour of Washington; but the majority of the Assembly voted for Peoria, where the next Assembly is appointed to meet.

Board of Publication.

Dr. McPheeters presented the following report on this subject, which, after protracted debate, was adopted.

"Having carefully examined the Report of the Board, together with the Minutes of the Board and the Minutes of the Executive Committee, they recommend the approval of these Minutes as far as written, and would respectfully submit the following resolutions to the Assembly for its adoption:

1. *Resolved*, That this General Assembly continues to regard the Board of Publication as a most important and efficient agency of the church, in disseminating and defending divine truth, and approves of the wisdom, prudence, and energy with which the affairs of the Board have been conducted during the past year.

2. *Resolved*, That the Assembly is especially gratified to learn that the Board has entered with so much zeal and efficiency on the most important work of supplying the army and navy of the United States, and also prisoners of war, with suitable religious reading; and that, notwithstanding the troubles of the country, it has been enabled to employ so many colporteurs, who devote themselves to this new and exceedingly interesting field; and the Assembly, in view of the magnitude and urgency of this work, earnestly recommend the churches under its care to sustain the Board by liberal contributions to its colportage and distribution funds.

3. *Resolved*, That the Assembly is pleased to find that the Board is actively engaged in publishing books of suitable character for juvenile reading and Sabbath-school libraries; and that it be recommended to the Board, in view of the present exigencies of the church, to furnish a still cheaper edition of Sabbath-school books.

4. *Resolved*, That the Assembly renews its recommendation of the *Sabbath-school Visitor* to our congregations, as a most efficient aid in the work of Sabbath-school instruction.

Rev. Dr. McPheeters said that he had, with the Committee, bestowed every possible moment to the consideration of the Annual Report; and whilst there was much discussion, and full inquiry, the Report was cordially adopted, and the operations of the Board approved. They had been particularly and favourably impressed with the valuable work accomplished for the soldiers and seamen, by the Board; and the Committee was fully satisfied with the diligence, wisdom, and faithfulness of the Board, and the Executive Committee, in the management of this important arm of the church's service.

Rev. Dr. Schenck, Secretary of the Board, said, that as the Report of the Board had been distributed, he would not deem it necessary to go into any laboured exposition of the operations of the Board for the past year.

To all the Boards, this has been a year of great trial, on account of the troubles of the country. A large portion of the country which once coöperated with us, has ceased to do so; and many parts of the church, still accessible, have been so reduced in their means, that the income of the Board has not

equalled that of the last year. Although our receipts are in the aggregate smaller, yet from those churches that were accessible, there has been a very encouraging increase of contributions, so that we have great reason to thank God, and take courage, for he has vouchsafed success beyond the measure of our fears and hopes. Our colportage work has been restricted, as regards the extent of territory, and the number of colporteurs, but one hundred and fifty having been in their service. Of this number, a considerable proportion had been prevented from making reports, on account of the troubled state of the country, and, accordingly, the usual estimates of their labours, and their results, were not incorporated into our statistical reports. On account of circumstances growing out of the state of the country, our work has been more of a missionary character this year, and the amount of our sales, of course, diminished. This diminution, he had ascertained, upon inquiry, to be not quite so large as in other publishing houses, as, of course, in times of such agitation, there is a greater demand for the newspaper, and less for other kinds of reading. The missionary work is larger than ever before, especially in the interesting field opened before us by the vast army of our country. We have given away more volumes than ever, and have distributed three and a quarter millions of pages of tracts, to the soldiers and seamen, and prisoners of war.

We have stationed colporteurs in the cities through which our troops marched, and have placed in their hands the "Soldier's Pocket-Book," and others of our publications, adapted to the circumstances of the camp and the hospital. These books are greatly prized, as we have been well assured. They have been read, and in many cases committed to memory. These light and easily carried volumes are borne with them by the soldiers when on the march, and on picket and scout duty, and are a constant comfort to those who consult their pages. One of our colporteurs visited the army before the battle of Pittsburg Landing, and conversed and prayed with the soldiers, and distributed vast numbers of these books and tracts. We have also accomplished a great work in the hospitals, in which the sick and wounded, both of our own soldiers and the Confederate prisoners, are lying; and very many sick and wounded

men have been cheered and consoled by our colporteurs conversing and praying with them. None that have not witnessed this work can adequately appreciate its blessed effects among the prisoners, and on our sick and wounded; who, far away from their homes, are, by their very circumstances, predisposed to receive these attentions and these books. We have been delighted with the spirit with which they have received them; and in the many thousands to whom they have been offered, only two men were found unwilling to accept them. These books have been accompanied by the power of the Spirit of Christ. We have received assurances, from chaplains of the army and navy, that our volumes have oftentimes been blessed to the doing of good. If we could detail the reports of chaplains upon this subject, it could not but impress the Assembly and the churches. Amongst the regiments from which we have heard, large numbers have been received to the communion of the church, and many attribute their impressions to the religious books which they have read. The "Soldier's Pocket-Book" has been greatly blessed in this field, and the most encouraging results have followed. A little hospital card, printed on stiff pasteboard, has also been very useful. On one side is printed texts of Scripture invitation, and on the other the beautiful hymn, "Just as I am, without one plea."

He could not dwell upon this work as he would like to do. Our enterprise has chiefly been a gratuitous work—*i. e.*, we have not realized anything in the way of profits, as, under different circumstances, we might have done. We have not aimed at it in this field. Great want of funds has embarrassed us. We could have done vastly more, had we possessed means. Applications for supplies for the army have pressed upon us in great numbers, and with much urgency. He appealed earnestly for the active coöperation of the churches in this effort to bless the army, the navy, the country, the church, and the world.

In conclusion, Dr. Schenck earnestly requested the Assembly to appoint a committee to examine fully the plans and operations of the Board, and to report next year.

Dr. Sloan, Dr. Junkin, Mr. Waters, (ruling elder,) and others, spoke warmly in commendation of the wisdom and efficiency of the Board. Dr. Musgrave attributed to the Board a

disposition to prevent a thorough examination into its affairs, extravagance in the matter of salaries, &c. He wished to know what was the actual capital of the Board, how rapidly it is accumulating, and how it is employed, and why the accumulation of capital was not stopped, and the books reduced in price. If it shall be discovered that he and others are in error on this subject, he would rejoice. But they wished to be explicitly informed of the number of officers, and their salaries; whether economy is practised, and whether fair competition is admitted in the letting of printing, or whether certain parties are favoured with "fat jobs?" When a responsible firm in Philadelphia had offered to conduct the business of the Board upon terms by which $30,000 or $35,000 might have been saved to the church, it had been declined, and he wanted to know why? The church demanded cheaper Sabbath-school books, and he thought it practicable to meet the demand. The capital of the Board had increased till it was now a quarter of a million; the net profits, after all the expenses, is $10,000 a year. Is this to continue? Is there to be no limitation to this increase of capital? Is there to come no time when it will be enough? He proposed to rescind the resolution of 18—, directing the Board to add six per cent. to their capital. This would enable them to reduce the price of books. There ought to be some limitation. Must you add $10,000 a year for ever? He thought not. They have capital enough. He did not intend to enter into this discussion. All he asked was, that, in the language of the wise and dispassionate Van Rensselaer, the affairs of the Board should be looked into.

Dr. Schenck, Secretary of the Board, denied that there was any disposition to prevent investigation; that, on the contrary, year after year, the books and papers of the Executive Committee had been submitted for examination, and the fullest scrutiny had been invited. So far as we know, or are to judge, the church has full confidence in these representations. The overwhelming majorities by which, in former Assemblies, the Board has been sustained, is conclusive on this point. With regard to the specific objections abovementioned, Dr. Schenck said: It had been charged that our capital was too large, and that we keep back information in regard to it. A balance-

sheet was always present at the General Assembly, and subject to the inspection of the committee, and of any member. The capital of the Board is now about $237,000. This is invested in the house on Chestnut street, which accommodated this and another Board of the church—in the stock in trade—in stereotype plates of various works—in books scattered all over the country in the hands of colporteurs, &c. This distribution of our stock is necessary to our operations, and we cannot print new books without floating capital; and we only have a few thousand dollars, not more than is needful to increase our assortment of books from time to time. The stereotype plates *absorb capital*, are counted in summing it up, and yet are not very productive pecuniarily. We have been compelled to stereotype some books that have not a rapid sale. It is urged that we might reduce our profits and cheapen our books. There was an incoherency in this demand of the gentleman; for whilst he would have us reduce our profits, he would have us forego the contributions of the churches.

Dr. Musgrave had asked, what business-house would pay agents to sell books? We reply, there is no business-house that sends out agents to *give away* books to the poor and destitute as we do. The idea that this Board is to conduct its business entirely on the principles and plans of other business-houses, ignored the benevolent feature of the Board altogether; and unless the church was willing to annihilate the whole system of colportage, we must make allowance for the missionary phase of our operations. Is it not, then, a strange thing to ask, does any business firm pay agents to sell books? It ought to be remembered that these colporteurs are missionaries too—and the colporteur is not an agent to hasten from house to house, like any other pedler, to sell in the shortest possible time the greatest amount of books. If the plan of the objectors is insisted upon, and the General Assembly adopts it, we will obey; but it will revolutionize, necessarily, the whole colportage system as practised hitherto by our own Board and other societies. Ordinarily, it is expedient to give the colporteur a salary, so that he may feel that he is not a mere pedler, and that he has a work to do over and beyond the sale of books. If we are only to send the colporteurs to the rich and dense con-

gregations, the sparse populations would be left destitute, and without the gospel altogether. By this process, we could, perhaps, sell more books, and make more money; but what would become of the destitutions? Is the gospel only for the rich and dense population? Is it not also for the poor?

One other point. Dr. Musgrave said that a business-house had offered to assume the business of the Board on such terms as would save $30,000 or $35,000 to the Board. He (Dr. Schenck) had never heard of such an offer. No such proposition had ever been made to the Board, so far as he knew. The offer that was made was by a publisher of Philadelphia, who proposed to bring his own publication house into our house, place his books and ours on the same shelves, conduct our business on his own responsibility, allow the Board $4000 a year for our house, give us $10,000 for use of the plates of our publications, and publish such books as we might recommend. But when asked *at what prices* he would publish our volumes, and to guarantee as good books, (mechanically,) and at the same prices of ours, he said he would not—that no publisher in the country can afford to make books of the same style as cheap as ours. And he distinctly told us that he must fix his own prices, and that they would fix prices that would yield over *one hundred per cent.* higher profits than ours. This, and not what Dr. Musgrave represents, was his proposal. The Board unanimously decided that the offer was utterly impracticable. The Assembly will perceive a wide difference in the two representations; and they will see, that whilst the Board might save $30,000 expense to themselves, it would cost the churches and the people twice that amount annually, to purchase the books.

After further debate, the Rev. Dr. McPheeters offered the following resolutions, which were adopted, viz.

Resolved, 1. That in view of criticisms made in this and former General Assemblies, a committee of nine ministers and ruling elders, of which the Moderator of this General Assembly shall be chairman, be appointed to make a thorough examination of the affairs of the Board of Publication, and report to the next General Assembly.

2. That said committee shall meet in the city of Philadel-

phia, at the call of the chairman; and the Board is hereby directed to give free and full opportunity to the committee in carrying out the objects of its appointment, and any information the committee may desire to procure. And all persons from any part of the church shall have full opportunity, and are requested, either in person or by writing, to present to the committee any objections or doubts they may entertain in regard to the plans and operations of the Board.

3d. That the Board of Publication be directed to pay the travelling and other necessary expenses of the members of this committee, from its treasury.

In accordance with the above resolutions, the following gentlemen were appointed this committee of investigation, C. C. Beatty, D. D., S. B. McPheeters, D. D., L. H. Atwater, D. D., J. M. Lowrie, D. D., W. M. Paxton, D. D.; ruling elders, H. H. Leavitt, Esq., James Donaldson, Esq., C. Crosby, Esq., W. Whitely, Esq.

Board of Foreign Missions.

The Board express their deep sense of the goodness of God, as manifested during the past year, in sustaining their operations both at home and abroad.

1. At home, instead of ending the year with a heavy debt, as was seriously feared, the Board has been enabled, by the liberal gifts of the friends of this cause, to support the missions, in nearly all cases, in their usual vigour, to send out new labourers, to occupy new ground in some instances, and to close the year in a satisfactory condition. The Committee take great pleasure in making these statements, to the praise of the grace given to their Christian brethren in this year of trial. The gifts of the rich and of the poor have been cast into the treasury with willing hands, and have been the means of saving this cause from great embarrassment. The aggregate amount of the receipts is less than was acknowledged last year, owing partly to the sums received from legacies, and from the government on account of Indian schools, being less, and also to the withdrawal of contributions by churches in the so-called seceded states; but the amount received from the churches in other parts of the country, upon whose liberality the missions must now

depend, is in advance of the amount received from the same sources last year. The receipts were $176,939.47; the expenditures, $177.892.32; leaving a balance against the treasury of $952.85.

The indebtedness of the treasury to a few large donors is gratefully acknowledged, as well as the liberal gifts of the churches. It is mainly to the church collections that the missions should look for support, and the hope is earnestly expressed that these may be largely increased. This is necessary, in order to provide for the missions now in the field, and also to enable the Board to send out new labourers. A larger number than usual of these are under appointment as missionaries, if the Lord will; and their services are greatly needed in many places.

2. In the work abroad, the Committee give a full report of the state of the missions among the Indian Tribes; in South America, Western Africa, North India, Siam, China, and Japan; among the Chinese in California, the Jews, and some of the Roman Catholic countries of Europe. They lament the suspension of the missions among the Southwestern Indians, and the withdrawal of a large number of missionary labourers from their work, owing to the violence of lawless men. This was a great calamity to those half-christianized Indians. The missionary work was hindered, also, by civil war in New Granada; and the end of the year witnessed dark clouds in the horizon of the Ningpo mission in China, from the insurgents taking possession of that city. With these exceptions, the dealings of divine Providence with the people amongst whom the missions are established, have been such as to promote their success. The preaching of the gospel, the Christian instruction of the youth, the distribution of the sacred Scriptures—in short, the usual and ordinary means of grace, have been steadily and faithfully employed, by sixty-eight ministers of the gospel, aided by eighty-three teachers and other assistant missionaries, and by a growing body of native missionary labourers of various grades, of whom there are now eighty-two. In this brief abstract it is impossible to enter into minute statements, but it will serve to convey a general idea of the work in progress, when it is stated, that nearly five thousand heathen

youth are under daily Christian instruction and influence in the schools of the different missions; and also that additions of hopeful converts have been made to churches among the Chinese, Siamese, Hindus, Africans, and in South America, besides others not particularly reported. Some of these new members of the church are remarkable instances of the power of divine grace; two heathen women, one seventy and the other eighty years of age, were received into the church of Ningpo; the church in Siam received as a member a man, who may be one of its pillars, whose conversion was effected by the Spirit of God accompanying the study of the Scriptures, without his having ever seen or heard a missionary. On a general review of the missions, the Committee feel greatly encouraged by seeing what God has done with his servants, and how he has opened the door of faith to the gentiles.

The Report contains notices of the removal by death of two ordained missionaries, the wives of three, and several native church members in India and China. Their departure is sincerely lamented, but in every instance a good hope, through grace, supported them in their last hours. On the other hand, seventeen missionary labourers were sent out during the year to different missions, nine of whom were ordained ministers—three of these returning to their work. Several new assistants were obtained on the ground, from the ranks of native converts, which is regarded as a cause of thankfulness. The instructions given by one of these brethren to his own people on the coast of Africa, fifty miles from the missionary stations on Corisco, were the means of leading six hopeful converts into the church by baptism. Prayer should be offered especially that *native* missionary labourers may be sent into the harvest.

The Report concludes with reasons for thanksgiving, and a call to onward movement in the missionary work. This work remains. Multitudes are yet sitting in the shadow of death. Many more labourers could at once find employment in this harvest. Here is need of prayer; here is room for Christian liberality. The times passing over us call for fidelity to our blessed Lord and his cause in the world. But the church need not fear, her members being found in their lot, at the post of duty; rather they should look for times of refreshing from the

presence of the Lord, in the outpouring of his Spirit on all the missionary stations, even as at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost.

Dr. Lowrie, Secretary of the Board, was never more grateful to God than now, for his blessing, under the very great discouragements of the past year. He explained the cause of the apparent deficiency in the funds at the meeting of the last Assembly, as arising from the want of coöperation of southern brethren, the northern churches having made a small advance during the last year. They have used as great economy as possible, and have sent out every missionary who was ready to go. God, by his Holy Spirit, moved upon the hearts of his people to pray, and send forth many small streams of contributions, which have greatly aided the Board. We have received greater contributions from a few individuals, but cannot calculate upon them for the future, and it is not wise to rely upon such large private contributions. Besides, the income from ordinary sources is not equal to the current expenditure, and it will require an increase of $26,000 to meet the expenses of the year before us, not calculating upon the legacies.

This issue the Committee wish brought before this house for its sober, earnest judgment—whether to go forward and send out the new brethren or not; and it must be decided very soon. We feel stronger in faith, but the coming year will require extreme caution. There is no doubt of the ability of the church to do all, and more. If ministers would take this matter to heart, and present it, in all earnestness and affection, to their people, there would be a great advance in this matter. What means Providence bidding us go forward—the voice of our Saviour calling us to come, and the world waiting for us? India, China, Siam—all open. Conversions during the past year very encouraging. Brethren in the field say the work is growing on their hands, and they are calling for more men and means.

The Committee to whom this subject was referred, reported, through Dr. Stevenson, its Chairman, the following paper.

1. *Resolved*, That this Assembly, having learned from the Board's Report of the undiminished contributions of the churches, notwithstanding the pecuniary embarrassments of the

times, and of the blessing of God upon the labours of our missionaries in the foreign field, in the conversion of souls, and in the enlargement and strengthening of our mission stations, so that the work of this Board, in all its departments, is as encouraging as in any former period of its history, we do hereby record our devout gratitude to the great King and Head of the church for the merciful favour by which, in this time of general rebuke, he has evinced his approbation of our efforts to "preach the gospel to every creature."

2. *Resolved*, That we regard the proffer and acceptance of the services of thirteen young men, whom God has raised up in his providence, and influenced by his grace to undertake the work of missions at this trying crisis, as a significant fact, calling upon us, in the exercise of a more liberal benevolence, and a higher faith, to send forth these new labourers; in the confidence that his past mercies are but the earnest of larger favours, as the reward of increased exertions for the glory of his name.

3. *Resolved*, That in view of the greatly increased pecuniary liabilities of the Board involved in this new accession of labourers, we call upon all the members of our churches to carry this responsibility upon their hearts; upon all our pastors to present this call of divine Providence distinctly and pungently to the people; upon all our sessions to carry out such an efficient system of contribution as shall leave no tythe ungathered; and upon all our congregations to make united and continuous supplication to the great Lord of the harvest, that he will so bless the work and the workers, that we shall have reason to say, as each year of increased effort terminates, "we have trusted in the Lord and are not made ashamed."

4. *Resolved*, That in view of the present state of the world, and the encouragements by which Divine Providence is beckoning us onward in the prosecution of this great work, we express to the churches our increased sense of the importance of the claims of this Board upon their Christian liberality; as its field is the world, and its operations involve such multiform pecuniary expenditures, requiring, in addition to the outfit and salaries of the missionaries, large outlays for the support of schools, the building of houses, and the publication of the Bible, and other books and tracts, in a variety of foreign languages.

5. *Resolved*, that we heartily approve the effort of the Board to circulate the *Foreign Missionary* among the Sabbath-schools and families of our church; and that, under the strong conviction of the importance of training all our children and youth to feel a deep interest in the missionary work, we earnestly commend this subject to the attention of pastors, and parents, and Sabbath-school teachers, in the hope that they will make the inculcation of a true missionary spirit one of the principal features of their plans for Christian instruction and nurture.

6. *Resolved*, That this Assembly takes great pleasure in commending the wisdom and fidelity with which the affairs of the Board have been conducted, and our appreciation of the cheerfulness with which its executive officers have performed the increased labours of the present year.

7. *Resolved*, That the Report of the Board be approved, and referred to the Executive Committee for publication.

Interesting addresses were made by Dr. Stevenson, Mr. Morrison, missionary to India, and Dr. Junkin.

Board of Education.

Dr. John W. Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presented the following report:

The Committee to which was referred the Report of the Board of Education, having examined said Report, together with the minutes and accounts of the Board, submit the following statement and resolutions:

1. That the Board has been enabled to pay all the appropriations due to its beneficiaries during the year, though not without delay in some instances, nor without incurring debt.

2. That both the delay and the indebtedness incurred, arose from the failure of the churches generally to carry out efficiently the plan of systematic beneficence recommended by previous General Assemblies. Many of the churches contributed less than usual, and very many nothing to the Board of Education, during the year just closed. Hence, the Board was under the necessity of ending the fiscal year with a debt of something over $4000. A supplementary statement, however, shows that

this debt has recently been reduced to something less than $1000.

3. That a surprising fact is brought to light in the Board's Report, viz., that instead of too great an increase, as apprehended by some, there has been an actual decrease of the ministry, as compared with the membership of our church, of at least five per centum, within the last ten years.

4. That the Board of Education, in accordance with the direction of the last General Assembly, have furnished a sufficient number of copies for the use of this Assembly, of "A Proposed Draft of a Constitution for the General Assembly's Board of Education."

In view of these and other facts brought to light in the Report of this Board, the following resolutions are submitted:

1. *Resolved*, That the Assembly approve of the management of the important interests intrusted to the Board of Education, as evincing a highly commendable degree of efficiency, wisdom, and economy, under the trying exigencies of the year just closed; and that their Report be printed and circulated under their direction.

2. *Resolved*, That the Assembly has reason for thanksgiving to God, for the measure of blessing bestowed upon the work of the Board in all that portion of the church to which it has had access during the past year.

3. *Resolved*, That the Assembly deeply deplore the failure of so many of our churches to contribute anything to this Board during the year; and do earnestly repeat the injunction of the previous General Assemblies upon all their churches, to contribute to this, and also to the other Boards of the church, at least once a year.

4. *Resolved*, That the Presbyteries be renewedly and most solemnly enjoined to exercise increased care and caution in recommending candidates for the ministry to the care of the Board; and also to seek out such within their respective bounds as may be really worthy and may stand in need of aid, while preparing for the ministerial work.

5. *Resolved*, That, in the judgment of this Assembly, though the retrenchment of all unnecessary expenses is urgently required, it is inexpedient to reduce the amounts of the annual

appropriations to individual beneficiaries. The Assembly is of opinion, however, that much wholesome retrenchment might be effected by a more rigid application, on the part of Presbyteries, Instructors in Academies, Colleges and Theological Seminaries, of the excellent Rules of the Board respecting the qualifications of candidates. In some respects, such as further advancement in scholarship, a longer probation as to personal piety, and a higher grade of intellectual endowment, still more might properly and advantageously be required, for admission, by the Board. It is believed, however, that in the practical application of the rules of the Board, though the Board itself, so far as known to your Committee, is careful, faithful and resolute in the discharge of duty, there is, on the part of the Presbyteries, much laxness—much want of that scrupulous attention and faithful firmness which the nature of this important interest so imperatively demands; and all Presbyteries are hereby solemnly enjoined to give diligent attention to the discharge of their whole duty in this matter. Such a discharge of duty, it is also believed, would lead to the withdrawing of quite a number of candidates heretofore recommended by the Presbyteries to the care of the Board, and now receiving aid from the funds of the church, in some cases to the scandal of religion, and in many cases to the great prejudice of the education cause.

6. *Resolved*, That the Assembly rejoice in the measure of success afforded to the schools, academies and colleges, connected with our Sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods; and do again urge the solemn duty of securing the religious education of the children of the church, by establishing and adequately supporting suitable church institutions, within their respective bounds, as far as practicable.

7. *Resolved*, That the last Thursday of February next be observed throughout our bounds, as a day of earnest prayer for children and youth, especially the baptized children and youth of the church, and those collected in schools and colleges, with particular reference to an increased supply of labourers in the vineyard of the Lord; and that a collection be taken up on that day for the College Fund.

8. *Resolved*, That the proposed Draft of a Constitution, presented by the Board of Education to this General Assem-

bly, be committed to a Committee of three, to examine and report the same, with such modifications or suggestions as to them may seem proper, to the next General Assembly.

9. *Resolved*, That the Board of Education is hereby directed to meet for the transaction of such business as may claim their attention, on Friday, the 23d inst., at 5½ o'clock, P. M., in this Hall.

Dr. Scott said, that having been familiar with the working of our scheme of education, he could say that, if there were imperfections in the working of our system, the fault lay not with the Board, but with the Presbyteries, upon whom entirely devolved the business of seeing to it that no improper person was aided. The fact that some few cases of unworthy beneficiaries had received aid, was the most plausible objection to the Board; but it was one which the Board could not remedy, unless the Presbyteries were faithful in examining and supervising the progress and conduct of candidates; and it was on this account that the Committee had dwelt so much in the report upon this phase of the subject. After a few remarks explanatory of the report, the Doctor said he would yield the floor to the Secretary of the Board.

Dr. Chester, the Secretary of the Board, would occupy the Assembly but a few moments. He felt thankful for the report which the committee had submitted, and considered its suggestions eminently wise and well timed. He felt it difficult to decide whether trials or mercies most abounded in the history of our operations for the last year. They had had experience of both; but he was free to say that difficulties about funds were not the chief burdens upon the shoulders of the Board; but paying great attention to the character of our candidates, and endeavouring to inaugurate a more complete and healthful system of watchfulness. We began by procuring an order from the Assembly, urging this upon the Board and upon the Presbyteries, and all having the care of our candidates in any manner in their hands; and he was happy to assure the Assembly that very desirable results were already apparent. A new word has appeared in our office—"we recommend." We are resolved to solicit the closest watchfulness over our candidates. We have visited many schools, academies, colleges,

and seminaries, and have endeavoured to ascertain the exact *status* of our candidates for piety, diligence, success, and general character; and also to encourage them to aim high.

In regard to the oft-repeated difficulty of unworthy beneficiaries, it ought to be noted that "the falling star attracts the eye." It is the *few* unworthy ones that attract the notice of the public, whilst the *many* of an opposite character are unobserved. The failure of one young man will do more harm than the success of many will do good. But is it not hard that the many should be suspected on account of the few? Oh! that I could secure for those young men that are faithful, the sympathies of this Assembly, and of the churches. Many of them are orphans, having lost one or both parents. A large proportion of them are the sons of ministers—some the orphans of ministers of the gospel. A little group, sons of missionaries —some in the field and some in heaven—are found on our list; and we would the Assembly could know them, and we feel assured they would sympathize with them. Christ sympathized with candidates for the ministry. A large portion of his time was employed in caring for candidates for the ministry, and instructing them. He spoke most feelingly of the trials of candidates before their licensure, and of the lack of sympathy in their destiny after they left the Seminary. Spoke of the indifference which presbyteries and ministers often exhibited, whether these young men found fields of labour or not—deprecated this indifference, and invoked the sympathies, and prayers, and aid of the church in behalf of this cause. Although we cannot look forward to the coming year without some solicitude about the funds, yet if the Presbyteries will pay more attention to the character of the beneficiaries, and coöperate with us in thus restoring the confidence and the interest of the churches, abundant means will be provided, and the blessed work of providing a ministry will go on. Some have started the question, have we not too many ministers? But have we not more to do than to supply our own vacancies? Is not the world still before us? Are not the churches and missions to be multiplied? And are the unemployed, to any appreciable extent, the men whom this Board has brought forward? He thought candour and large views could only answer such ques-

tions in one way, and without further delay of the House, would leave the subject to them.

Dr. Marshall also advocated the cause of the Board. He bore testimony to the general good character of the beneficiaries, but admitted that mistakes were sometimes made. This, however, he maintained, was the fault not of the Board, but of the Presbyteries, who were not sufficiently careful in taking up candidates for the ministry. Dr. Maclise also urged this point with much force. Dr. Junkin narrated his long experience in connection with these educational operations, and referred to the urgency with which he had, from the beginning, insisted on the greatest care being exercised in this matter. He had always objected to the Board's taking up mere boys before their character was formed or their principles determined. Dr. Macdonald spoke on the same subject, with special emphasis. He introduced a resolution to the following effect, which was adopted by the Assembly:

Resolved, That the following be added to the "Rules and Regulations of the Board:

"Every person on a scholarship shall forward, or cause to be forwarded, annually, a report from his teacher or teachers, to the Presbytery under whose care he is, showing his standing for piety, talents, diligence, scholarship, prudence, economy, health, and general influence."

Board of Domestic Missions.

The order of the day was taken up.

Rev. Dr. Macdonald, from the Committee on the Board of Domestic Missions, made report. After reading the report, he called attention to some of the recommendations contained in it, especially those relating to the discontinuance of the Executive Committee at Louisville, and the Advisory Committee in California, and that relating to the increase of itinerants. He advocated, in a few earnest remarks, an increase of men and of energy in this branch of the church's work. He congratulated the Board that, amid such discouragements as the state of the country occasioned, they had not only maintained their position, but cancelled debt, and made progress. He reminded the Assembly that times of trial and public calamity had often

proved of advantage to the church, by refining away her dross, purifying her faith, and quickening her zeal, whilst it led to a more complete reliance upon God. He alluded to the trials of the non-conformists in the days of Richard Baxter; and quoted from that man of God, the declaration that they would little regret exclusion from the pulpits of the English establishment, if they could but have access to the heathen, and to destitute portions of the Christian world. Dr. Macdonald trusted that the trial of the present would be similarly blessed in the larger usefulness of this Board.

On the motion to adopt the Report,

Rev. Dr. Janeway, Secretary of the Board, said that he would not detain the Assembly with protracted remarks, as all the facts necessary to the information of the Assembly were contained in the Annual Report. The Assembly had great reason to be thankful to the great Head of the church, that at a time of great trial and embarrassment in the country, the Board had been able to meet all the demands of this cause, and also to cancel a large debt then existing. Last spring, the debt was $25,000; and on account of light receipts, it was increased to $28,000; but, by the increased liberality of the churches, the debt was paid, the cause sustained, all the missionaries that had reported had been paid, and were now in process of being paid. This was almost more than the Board had ventured, in the trying condition of the country, to hope for. It was probable that, on account of light receipts, there might be a small deficit in the months next ensuing; but they trusted that the church would sustain the cause, and he hoped that the missionaries who had borne with so much heroism, would still be patient, and that the present calamities being overpast, increased prosperity might attend the efforts of this Board. He thought that the church had arrived at a crisis in the history of her domestic missions, which would demand greatly increased operations to meet the wants of the country. The immigration will increase so soon as the war is over. A tide will set towards the yet unoccupied parts of the land, demanding to be accompanied or followed by the missionary. Such missions would, of course, be expensive, and would not for a long time be self-sustaining. The question then presses, Shall the church progress with the

prospective advance of population? He trusted she would, and that instead of $85,000, if the contributions increase, she will place at the disposal of this Board $150,000 for the promotion of this grand work. He believed that the church would come up to this work; and, as a means of bringing her up to it, he commended to the pastors and people the careful consideration of the Annual Report, and solicited their prayers and coöperation. Hoping that these suggestions would draw out remarks on this important subject from members of the Assembly, he left it in their hands without further remark on his part.

The Rev. Mr. Hale asked that the resolutions be read *seriatim;* which was done, and the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th, were adopted, and then the report was adopted as a whole, and is as follows:

The Committee to whom was referred the Annual Report of the Board of Missions, respectfully report that the Minutes of the Board, and of its Executive Committee, have not been put into their hands. They have carefully examined the Annual Report of the Board, and recommend to the General Assembly that,

1. It approve the Report, and direct the same to be published by the Board.

2. The Assembly gratefully acknowledge the signal tokens of divine goodness to the Board, in enabling it to pass with safety the trying changes of the past year; especially in enabling it to reduce its indebtedness, which in November last was $28,000, to less than $5000, and greatly to reduce the office expenses, whilst, at the same time, adding 121 new names to the list of missionaries in commission a year ago, and paying all the missionaries as far as they had reported, to the end of the fiscal year. Verily, God has granted to his people, in these troublous times, the heart to devise liberal things, and blessed be his holy name!

3. The Assembly also notice with gratitude to God, the spirit of self-denial on the part of our missionaries, enabling them to submit patiently to the inconveniences arising from delay in the payments due them, and to the reduction of their salaries.

4. That the Assembly bow humbly to the will of the great

Ruler of nations, in those calamities which he has permitted to visit the land, whereby missionary labour has been interrupted —missionaries, in some instances, driven from the field, and the work of years destroyed—and bewail the sins and unfaithfulness which have provoked them; but in the fear and strength of the Lord, we will go forward and endeavour to repair the waste places, and build up the walls which have been thrown down.

5. The Assembly take sincere pleasure in noticing the substantial aid which ladies of our churches have rendered to this cause, by articles of clothing furnished to missionary families. The aggregate value of these donations during the past year, was over $16,000, and was in addition to the salaries of the missionaries among whom they were distributed.

6. In view of the changes which have taken place in the field of the Executive Committee located at Louisville, as referred to in the Report, the Assembly hereby direct the discontinuance of said Committee, and further direct the discontinuance of Advisory Committees, wherever they exist, and the Board to conduct, throughout the entire field, its work hereafter as formerly, through the Presbyteries.

7. The Assembly solemnly call the attention of the church to the greatness of the work in which, by the command of the ascended Lord, she is engaged, and the increased proportions it is destined very soon to assume, by the return of prosperity to the nation, and the greater stability of our civil institutions, which we now, by the blessing of God, confidently expect—a work which, in addition to assisting young or feeble churches already established, is no less than to supply with the stated means of grace the teeming millions who are to fill up the continent. To accomplish this great work, the Board of Domestic Missions has been constituted, and this General Assembly would devoutly commend it to the prayers and patronage of all our people, and would especially invite the hearty coöperation of every pastor and session in providing the material aid which the exigencies of the cause demand.

8. The Assembly earnestly recommend the appointment of a greater number of itinerating missionaries for new and sparsely settled regions, to explore and advise as to the most favourable

localities for permanent congregations, and also recommend the Presbyteries to take measures for establishing and sustaining an itinerancy for the feebler missionary churches, and more destitute portions within their bounds.

9. The Assembly enjoins it upon the Board hereafter to regard the order of a former Assembly, to send up its Minutes for examination.

Church Extension.

The Report of the Board of Church Extension was read by the Chairman, Rev. Mr. Conover, thus:

The Committee on Church Extension submit the following report:

Resolved, 1. That the Assembly approve of the careful manner in which the records of the Board have been kept by the Secretary.

Resolved, 2. That the Report be approved and published, together with the Rules of the Board, and Instructions to Churches needing aid.

Resolved, 3. That while the severe trials of the country have greatly retarded the work of church-building, yet the church has great reason for thanks to God, that in the midst of these trials, fifty-five churches have been aided by the Board during the year in completing their sanctuaries.

Resolved, 4. That the Assembly highly approve of the economy exhibited by the Board in the management of the fund entrusted to their care.

Resolved, 5. That the Assembly approve of the suspension of the work on the "Children's Church" for the present.

Resolved, 6. That the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly be directed to alter all the blank reports for statistics in the Appendix to the Minutes of the Assembly, so as to transfer the item of "*Contingent and Commissioners' Fund*" from the column of "*Church Extension*" to that of "*Congregational.*"

Resolved, 7. That all our ministers, and sessions of vacant churches, be earnestly requested to present this cause to their respective churches for their contributions annually, and, as far

as practicable, on the *first Sabbath of July*, the day designated by the Assembly of 1861.

Resolved, 8. That all churches needing aid for building houses of worship, and all churches and individuals contributing funds for this purpose, are hereby earnestly requested to make this Board the agency of their favours and benefactions.

Mr. Conover said he had but a remark or two to make in regard to this report. He spoke in reference to the column of statistics mentioned in the report, and showed why the change recommended should be made. He showed how many of our churches contributed nothing to this Board, and clearly demonstrated the importance of giving it a liberal support. All ought to do something; rich as well as poor churches ought alike to have the cause urged upon them by their pastors. The poor churches often give as much, according to their means, as the richer ones. Pastors are often to blame for not presenting this cause to their people. If they would, the Board's funds would be thereby greatly augmented. Rills make and fill oceans. Let all do something, and much more would be done than is done.

Rev. Mr. Coe, the Secretary of the Board, said, in view of the fact of the able remarks of the Chairman, and also as the Report was printed, brief, and distributed among the members of this Assembly, many remarks from him would be unnecessary. He spoke eloquently, and with great emphasis on the subject of parsonages, showing their importance. The matter had not been sufficiently considered, by either the pastors or the churches in our connection. He rejoiced that Mr. J. M. Wilson, in his work of Presbyterian statistics, had done much to arouse the churches on the subject of preparing suitable parsonages for their ministers. It was a sad fact, that more than five hundred of our churches were without edifices, and one-fourth of our churches must be in part supported by the other three-fourths, or go out of existence. Let the strong help the weak—the rich aid in sustaining the poor. "The poor we have with us always." Never was there a year when applications for aid were so pressing and numerous. These are troublous times. O, that we might be enabled by the people of

God, to cheer those churches that look for help to the Board! It pains us to turn any away. Let us plant and water, and God will give the increase.

Dr. Chester wished to state a fact in support of the Report. He said that within six miles of where he lived, there was a Quaker lady who took such an interest in Presbyterianism as to give the funds to erect a small edifice. This he cited, to stimulate us to greater activity and liberality in building churches and *manses*, in destitute places, for the advancement of the glorious kingdom of Christ. This Board is the youngest of the church's children. Let us not forget it. It is worthy. He loved the Board and its Secretary, whose path he often crossed in his peregrinations through the churches, and was happy to say that the zeal and labours of the brother were worthy of all commendation.

Dr. Halsey, Mr. Bishop, and Dr. Junkin united in urging the special claims of this Board on the support of the churches.

Theological Seminaries.

The Committee on Theological Seminaries submit the following report, viz.

They have had before them the Annual Reports of the Trustees and Directors of the Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey; of the Western Seminary, at Allegheny, Pennsylvania; of the Seminary at Danville, Kentucky; and of the North-West Seminary, at Chicago, Illinois, and have carefully examined the same. A brief summary of their contents is as follows:

1. *The Seminary at Princeton.*—The corps of Professors is full, and the number of students one hundred and seventy, of whom forty-one have completed the usual course of study, and one has deceased. Six or seven of the Senior Class have offered themselves for the foreign missionary work, and an unusually large proportion of the other classes contemplate the same destination.

While the instruction of the Seminary has been satisfactory and gratifying in its results, the Trustees report no less prosperity in its financial department. The financial year closed with a balance in favour of the Seminary, of $4352.67. In addition to this, they state that at the late Semi-centennial

celebration, Messrs. Robert L. and Alexander Stuart, of New York, presented the munificent donation to the funds of $50,000.

2. *The Western Seminary at Allegheny.*—The corps of Professors is full, and the number of students one hundred and fifty-eight, of whom thirty-three have completed the regular course of study; two have deceased; five or more have devoted themselves to the work of foreign missions. The proficiency of the classes has been gratifying. The Trustees report that notwithstanding the pressure of the times, they have been able to make a slight progress. The permanent funds have been increased, and the salaries of the Professors have been promptly paid. Among donations to the library, it deserves to be noted, that the handsome gift of four hundred and sixty-four volumes has been made by the Rev. Dr. C. C. Beatty.

3. *The Seminary at Danville.*—The number of students has been greatly diminished by the fact of civil war in the vicinity of the Institution. The number in attendance was reduced to eleven. The instructions of the Seminary, however, were not interrupted for a day. Six students have completed the regular course of study. There is a vacancy in the corps of Professors, Dr. Smith having finally declined the chair of Pastoral Theology and Church Government. As there are funds enough to support all the Professors, there is no reason why this vacancy should be left unfilled. The Directors leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the Assembly.

This suggestion derives additional force from the infirm health of some of the Professors. The funds have been rising in value since the last report, although the income continues still to be seriously affected by the failure of dividends; and a serious falling off is apprehended during the coming year. A fire-proof library building, a lecture-room, and rooms for the accommodation of twenty or thirty students have been completed, and will be ready for use in September.

4. *The Seminary of the Northwest at Chicago.*—The number of students has been eleven, of whom three have completed the full course of study. The proficiency of the various classes is described as commendable. There are two chairs vacant in the Theological Faculty, in consequence of the declinature of Dr.

Krebs as Dr. Rice's successor, and the lamented decease of Dr. Scott. Professors Lord and Halsey have supplied the deficiency by extra labours, and the Rev. J. D. Pering has been employed as teacher of Hebrew. Such is the embarrassed condition of the finances, we are sorry to have to add, that the salaries of the present Professors themselves are reduced, notwithstanding increased duties; and the Directors do not deem it expedient to ask the Assembly to fill these vacancies for the present year. The Committee feel impelled to add, that the affairs of this Seminary are in a delicate and critical situation, and that probably the Directors are the persons best qualified to manage them successfully, as being intimately acquainted with all the circumstances.

Since the last meeting of the Assembly, we have the painful duty of recording the death of Professor Scott, of the Seminary of the Northwest; and among the Directors of the Western Seminary, of Drs. Allan D. Campbell and Henry G. Comingo; and among the Trustees of Princeton Seminary, James Neilson, Esq. Dr. Campbell was a Trustee, as well as a Director, of the Western Seminary.

The Committee recommend to the Assembly the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. That the Annual Reports be printed in the Appendix, as usual.

Resolved, 2. That we gratefully acknowledge the tokens of favour with which Divine Providence has been pleased to regard the various Seminaries of the church, and particularly that we thankfully record the prosperity and success which the oldest of our Seminaries has enjoyed during the first half century of its existence, just closed—a like career of prosperity we ardently desire for all our Seminaries.

Resolved, 3. That this Assembly express their grateful acknowledgment of the munificent donation of $50,000, by Messrs. R. L. and A. Stuart, of New York, to the funds of Princeton Seminary; to Dr. Beatty, for his donation of books to the Western Seminary, and also to other donors.

Resolved, 4. That the Assembly deeply deplore the loss which the church has sustained in the decease of those steadfast friends of the Seminaries, and useful servants of Christ,

Professor Scott, Dr. Campbell, Dr. Comingo, and Colonel James Neilson.

Resolved, 5. That the Assembly proceed to choose a Professor to fill the vacant chair of Pastoral Theology and Church Government in the Seminary at Danville, Kentucky.

Resolved, 6. That in accordance with the wishes of the Directors of the Seminary of the Northwest, at Chicago, no steps be taken at present to fill the vacancies in that institution.

Agreeably to the fifth of the above resolutions, the Assembly, on a subsequent day, elected the Rev. R. L. Stanton, D. D., Professor of Pastoral Theology and Church Government, in the Seminary at Danville.

Report on Disabled Ministers' Fund.

Rev. Dr. Musgrave moved that the Rev. Dr. Jones be now permitted to present the Report of the Board of Trustees on the subject of the Disabled Ministers' Fund. Adopted; and the

Rev. Joseph H. Jones, D. D., proceeded to read the Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly upon this very interesting and important Fund. The Report showed that whilst, on account of the war, and the consequent derangement of business, the field from which collections were made was narrowed, yet the aggregate of collections was greater. It stated that six ministers who had been assisted have died; and it detailed the very happy results of the year's labours in sustaining disabled, aged, and sick ministers, and the widows and orphans of ministers. It was a clear, touching, and impressive *resumé* of this department of the church's charity, giving (anonymously, of course,) many affecting incidents connected with the disbursement of this fund.

This Report was referred to a Committee, who, through Judge Leavitt, their Chairman, submitted the following report, viz.

The Committee to whom was referred the Report of the Trustees appointed in relation to Disabled Ministers, and the Destitute Widows and Children of Deceased Ministers, recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. That the able and interesting Report of the

Trustees, charged with the supervision of this subject, presented to the present General Assembly, is earnestly commended to the attention of the pastors and people of our churches.

Resolved, 2. That while the Assembly rejoices in the progress and increasing success, during the past year, of this noble enterprise, it learns, with profound regret, that in a large proportion of the churches no contributions have been made in furtherance of its beneficent objects.

Resolved, 3. That this Assembly earnestly recommends that annual collections be made in all the churches, and reported, as required by the previous action of the Assembly.

Resolved, 4. That the Report presented to this Assembly by the Committee of the Trustees, and their Chairman and Secretary, be adopted, and published in the Appendix to the Minutes, and that extra copies be printed by the Board of Publication for the use of the sessions of the churches; and that it be recommended to our pastors and stated supplies to read it to their congregations, on or before the day when collections are to be made for this object.

Resolved, 5. That with a view to an increase of funds, for the purpose referred to, special and liberal individual donations, and testamentary bequests, be solicited from all parts of the churches. And if at any time the funds received from all sources shall exceed the amount appropriated by the Trustees in any year, the surplus shall be permanently invested by the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly, the interest on which shall be used only in aid of disabled ministers, and needy widows and children of deceased ministers.

Resolved, 6. That it be recommended to Presbyteries and Synods having funds or property, given or provided to aid disabled ministers, and the families of disabled ministers needing aid, to transfer the same to the General Assembly for this purpose, in cases where the terms of the grant or donation will permit such transfer.

Resolved, 7. That the Assembly has learned and highly appreciates the praiseworthy and successful labours of the Chairman of the Committee and Secretary of the Fund, and cordially commending him to the sympathy and coöperation

of the pastors and churches, express the earnest desire that he may continue thus to serve the church in a field in which he has been so eminently useful, and thus far *without any charge on the funds contributed by the churches.*

Resolved, 8. That it be enjoined on Presbyteries to appoint one of their number to take especial charge of this subject within their bounds, and see that these resolutions are observed, or to adopt such other measures as the Presbyteries may deem most efficient to secure the end in view.

Judge Leavitt made some excellent remarks in favour of this report. He was rejoiced to learn that the contributions to this fund had more than doubled during the last year. Still, only comparatively few of the churches have given anything. He thought there could be no difference of opinion on any part of the report, excepting on that proposing the establishment of a vested fund for disabled ministers and their needy families. The Jewish law made special provision for the support of the priesthood. So ought we.

Judge Linn regarded the subject contained in this report as one of the most important that can, or is likely to come, before the General Assembly. It is one on which he had thought much. He had been chairman of a committee on this subject when the Assembly met in Philadelphia. This gave him an opportunity of becoming acquainted with some facts not generally known by the brethren. A surplus fund, arising from contributions, legacies, &c., ought to be raised for the support of disabled ministers, and the widows and children of such as are deceased. We are behind the church in England and Scotland on this subject. The church there has such a fund, and it goes not only to the support of disabled ministers, but to ministers' widows and their needy offspring. This is as it should be. He had never heard but one objection urged against a vested fund —that of its being an improper inducement to young men to enter the ministry. But there is no validity in it. He was confident of this. Ministers were not well enough supported. He spoke from sad experience. He was the son of a minister, and therefore spoke knowingly on this subject. No one ought to have any more delicacy to ask for assistance from a vested

fund in the church, than to ask for a legacy left him by a deceased friend. Anxiety about debt takes up half the working brains of a young man exercised by it. No man can labour successfully and pleasantly when he is solicitous about his domestic concerns. We want a vested fund of $400,000. This may seem large, but what is it among so many? Four hundred thousand dollars we want, and $400,000 *we will have*, if God gives me grace to carry out the plans we have in view. He knew of legacies ready to be contributed to this fund, if this Assembly would order its creation. Give the people an opportunity, and you will be astonished how soon this fund will become great. He spoke touchingly of the condition of old ministers, unable longer to labour for Christ. This subject commends itself to our consciences. He had a word to say to the ruling elders of the church. It belongs to *them* to carry out the measure contemplated. There is a delicacy in the matter that prevents ministers from presenting and pressing this thing on the attention of the people. There is no indelicacy for laymen to do it. O Christian brethren in the eldership, let us try and live so as to receive at last that commendation from the whole ministry, "*I was hungry*, and ye gave me meat." He answered the argument against vested funds in regard to the difficulty of secure investment. Any fund can be safely invested. Investments in government stocks are now peculiarly safe. They will be as permanent as the government itself, and if it goes down, all moneys and stocks sink with it. Does endowment cripple energy? Not always. Some have a groundless fear of endowments. Such do not understand it. Endowments might not work well in missions, but all the objections that lie against endowment there, has no force against the matter before the House.

The fifth and sixth resolutions being under discussion, Dr. J. C. Lowrie moved that the remaining resolutions be laid on the table, and this whole subject referred to a committee of three ruling elders, to report to the next General Assembly.

After passing the seventh resolution, the motion was agreed to; and Judges Linn and Leavitt, Mr. C. F. Maurice, and Dr. J. H. Jones were appointed that committee.

Systematic Benevolence.

The Rev. S. S. Sheddan, Chairman of the Committee on Systematic Benevolence, submitted the following report:

The Committee on Systematic Benevolence, in making their report, feel straitened because so little data has been furnished. From the one hundred Presbyteries represented on this floor, only twenty-three have given in reports, and some of these not showing the facts desired by the Assembly.

Should we make these reports the basis, and then aggregate the contributions to all the Boards, it will be found that about one-half obeyed the injunction. This ratio only holds in the aggregate. The Boards of Domestic and Foreign Missions have received the largest attention. In a few Presbyteries every church responded to the call. In the reports before us these Boards have received, in the average, from about two-thirds of the church. Without pretending to fractional accuracy, it may be said that the Boards of Education and Publication have been remembered by about half of the churches reported; the Church Extension not rising above one-third; and of the churches who are enjoying a working ministry, not one-fourth have given to the ministry disabled by long service or overtasked effort.

From the tone of the reports made by the Secretaries of the Boards to the Assembly, as well as from the statistics furnished us, we feel there is some advance in systematic effort. It was at least gratifying that, in these times of business prostration, the Boards, generally, close the year with little or no indebtedness. The very stringency of the times has helped to systematize, and has called out some churches, as a well-timed reserve, that, through remissness, had been held back.

From the little the Presbyteries have told us, and from the Reports of the Boards, and in view of the times, we are quickened in our belief, "as thy day is, so shall thy strength be."

Your Committee feel that our Boards are entering upon a year that will, more than the past, call upon the churches for system in effort and sacrifice, and will hear of no plea for delinquency. It is true that Systematic Benevolence is not a Board—has no secretary, nor trustees, but holds the place of the nursing mother of all the Boards. Through impulsive

benevolence they may live for a time, but for their continuance, their health and growth, there must be system.

Each individual church may place her own estimate upon the relative importance and claims of the Boards, but all should remember that they are so kindred, and their co-existence such a unity, that none can well be neglected. They are not all the eye, but they are parts of the body. Your Committee, feeling that the church is beginning to awake more to the analogy of works, as well as faith, would, in the name of the Assembly, urge her to this system of beneficence.

The Boards, entering upon the year more by faith than by sight, appeal to the whole church—give us a place in your almsgiving. The Assembly has said to the Boards, Go forward —educate your young men, build your churches, help the weak, print your Bibles, books, and tracts, and scatter them.

And the Assembly would again press upon the church to sacredly regard her own agencies for good. Have a chart embracing every Board of the church, and give according to your ability. Adopt, if you can, the simultaneous effort recommended by the Assembly; if not, choose your own time and way, but let none fail of doing something for each Board. This is urged by the day in which we live, and not only so, but, especially in trying times, it is essential for her spiritual health that the church keep active her outgoing sympathies. It is true that the low fountain may not give out as that which is full, but without motion it will sooner become impure. Would the church, in trying times, be true to the demands from without, and true to her own spiritual purity, peace, and prosperity, she must have her charitable outgoings.

Pressed by the times, urged by the enlarged wants and efforts of the Boards, and exhorted by a care of her own spiritual health; therefore,

Resolved, 1. That the Assembly urge upon all the churches, that, according to the General Assembly's plan of simultaneous effort, or by a plan adapted to their situation, they would every year give a place and a time to all the Boards.

Resolved, 2. That while the Assembly record gratitude to God, that he so enabled us to meet the more pressing wants of the last year, we feel that the providences of God bid us

enlarge our efforts, and bring out more energy to speed these agencies of the church.

Resolved, 3. That the General Assembly would solemnly throw it upon the Presbyteries, the pastors, the elders, and churches, to see to it that systematic benevolence be perfected, and that no church so dishonour herself and her religion as to have no name or place in the beneficence that marks God's children, and which he has ordained as an instrumentality in building up his kingdom.

This report gave rise to some debate, but was finally adopted in the form in which it was presented by the Committee.

Union of the Old and New School Assemblies and Foreign Correspondence.

The Committee of Bills and Overtures reported that they had several communications from the Presbyteries of Ogdensburg, California, Madison, and Oxford, asking the Assembly to take steps for a reunion with the New School. The Committee recommended, in substance, that it is inexpedient at this time to enter upon this matter, and that it be deferred to the next General Assembly, with the promise that the Assembly will then give a kind and candid consideration to any proposition which may be presented. Dr. Christian moved to strike out the latter part of the resolution proposed by the Committee. Dr. Musgrave, Dr. Junkin, Mr. Comfort (elder), advocated the amendment, which was carried by a vote of 128 to 80. The minute adopted was simply in this form: "In the judgment of the Assembly it is inexpedient at this time to take any definite action with reference to a reunion of the Old and New School Presbyterian churches." We are rejoiced at this disposition of the matter, as we are persuaded that the peace and purity of the church would suffer by any attempt to unite the two bodies.

Dr. Tustin, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Correspondence, submitted the following report, viz.

Whereas, It is eminently proper, in whatever aspect the subject is viewed, that harmony and good will should prevail among all the members of the great Presbyterian family;

And whereas, It is understood that the General Assembly of

the Presbyterian church (New School) now in session at Cincinnati, Ohio, is entertaining the question of sending a corresponding delegate to this body; therefore,

Resolved, That in anticipation of this fraternal spirit, this Assembly do hereby appoint the Rev. Robert Davidson, D. D., to represent this General Assembly in the General Assembly now in session at Cincinnati, in the hope that this correspondence may be alike pleasant and profitable to all parties concerned.

Resolved, That it is expedient to appoint a delegate to the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, with a view of securing an annual interchange of delegates between these bodies, and the Rev. Elisha P. Swift, D. D., be and he hereby is appointed to represent this Assembly in the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, now in session in the city of Pittsburg, with a view of accomplishing this object.

Dr. Breckinridge thought that this matter had not been properly introduced, and the report was recommitted, with the names of Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Musgrave added to the committee. On a subsequent day, the recommendation to appoint delegates to the two Assemblies named in the report was unanimously adopted.

Presbyterian Almanac.

Dr. Marshall moved that Joseph M. Wilson, of Philadelphia, be allowed to present the claims of the "Presbyterian Historical Almanac" to the Assembly. Granted.

Mr. Wilson began by thanking the Assembly for the distinguished permission just given. The "Almanac" was a volume of *facts*, and not of *opinions*. It was therefore a safe work; and its reliability has been fully sustained. It contained the acts and deliverances of all the Presbyterian bodies throughout the world, with reports of their various objects of benevolence, the biographies of deceased ministers, and histories of Presbyterian churches. It was established to supply a want felt by all intelligent Presbyterians. He was prompted to begin the work on account of the great want of information upon the subject of Presbyterianism in its wide and comprehensive character. The statistics were arranged according to the most

approved rules of statisticians. In addition to the proceedings of the different bodies, he has introduced histories of the various Boards and Committees—the volume for 1862 containing a history of the Board of Education, which was very valuable—so much so, that the Board has published a portion of it in the *Home and Foreign Record.*

He proceeded to explain the nature of the work, of its utility, its comprehensiveness, and reliability, and also mentioned the additions he intended to introduce into the forthcoming volume; that is, the volume for 1863, viz., a full and complete history of Princeton Theological Seminary. This history will give all the proceedings of the Assembly organizing the Seminary, a full account of the Scholarships, its library, a list of the Alumni, alphabetically and statistically arranged; biographies of its deceased Professors, with sketches of the living ones; the proceedings of the late Semi-Centenary celebration, including the oration of Dr. Sprague; and, to make the matter complete, the illustration of this one portion of the work will be finely engraved portraits of the deceased Professors, viz., Rev. Drs. A. Alexander, J. Addison Alexander, Samuel Miller, J. W. Alexander, and John Breckinridge; also of the present Professors, namely, Rev. Drs. Charles Hodge, McGill, Green, C. W. Hodge, and Moffat, and also that of the Semi-Centenary orator, Dr. Sprague. This statement will give some idea of its value.

The volume for 1862 contains the memoirs of one hundred and twenty-six Presbyterian ministers who have died during the year. He had used all diligence in collecting facts concerning them. He spoke of the collections of the Presbyterian Historical Society, and the attention which is being drawn to these matters; and from the stores in their possession, he was preparing, and expected to begin the publication, as an Appendix to his Almanac, of a Presbyterian Biographical Dictionary, giving a sketch of every Presbyterian minister who has laboured and died in the United States and British Provinces.

He also referred to his *manse scheme*, the opening article of which is found in the volume for 1862, containing a full account of the present state of the church in reference to the subject of manses. He announced it as his purpose to continue this

subject from year to year, until a comfortable manse should be the home of every Presbyterian minister. He also showed the propriety of making use of the word *manse*, rather than parsonage, as indicating the true idea, viz., permanence—a *permanent abode* for a Presbyterian minister. He pressed this matter strongly and eloquently upon the attention of the ministers and ruling elders, and concluded with an appeal for their aid and coöperation in extending the circulation of the "Almanac" among the people.

He was followed by ruling elder Crosby, who offered the following preamble and resolutions:

Whereas, The "Presbyterian Historical Almanac" is a volume containing the annual operations of every branch of the Presbyterian church throughout the world, with biographies of deceased Presbyterian ministers, and historical sketches of Presbyterian churches; and as a wide dissemination of such information will produce a beneficial influence in the church; therefore,

Resolved, 1. That the "Presbyterian Historical Almanac," prepared and published by Joseph M. Wilson of Philadelphia, be earnestly recommended to the members of the churches under our care.

Resolved, 2. That the colporteurs of the Board of Publication be allowed the privilege of supplying said Almanac to such as may order it.

These resolutions were adopted unanimously.

Colonization Society.

Dr. Junkin offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the American Colonization Society and all others having in view the accomplishment of the same benevolent object, viz., the removal of free people of color from this country, with their own consent, and their settlement as citizens of Liberia in the land of their fathers' sepulchres, or elsewhere, be and they are hereby commended to the liberal support of our members throughout our churches.

The resolution was adopted.

Dr. Breckinridge's Memorial.

The present state of the country, the dreadful civil war

which is now desolating so large a part of our land, has of necessity agitated the community with conflicting feelings and opinions. There is not only the great antagonism between the rebellious and the loyal states, but among those who still profess allegiance to the general government there is great diversity of sentiment. This difference is partly one of principle or opinion, and partly of mere feeling. There are no doubt in the Border and Northern states some who are, in the true sense of the word, secessionists. That is, they hold the Calhoun theory of our Constitution, and maintain that any and every state has the right to withdraw from the Union at pleasure, and that the allegiance of the citizen is due primarily to his state, and only through the state to the United States. So long therefore as his state remains in the Union he is bound by the Federal Constitution; if it secedes, he owes no more allegiance to the Federal government than he does to the crown of Great Britain. This is a theory which, although no doubt, in many instances, honestly entertained, was nevertheless devised to justify separation long determined upon in the minds of its authors. It is so unreasonable and suicidal that it had few sincere advocates even at the South, until its adoption became a necessity. Many, however, who have never adopted the theory of secession are anti-coercionists. They deny the right of the general government to make war upon a state, and therefore condemn the present war. They maintain that the only redress is an appeal to a national convention, when one or more states choose to separate themselves from the Union. Others again, from disposition, or from social or political relations, prefer the South to the North; their sympathies are with the rebels, they wish them success, not because they approve of their theories, but because they like them. There are men born and educated at the North, of whom this is true. They exult over defeat of the federal armies, and rejoice at every success which the rebels achieve. This seems to us incredible baseness, but it is nevertheless true. Others, again, are in a state of mind which they themselves cannot understand. All they know is, that they prefer separation to war. They would rejoice at the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, if peace could be thereby restored. We have also

men among us who throw all the blame of the present state of the country on the North. They do not pretend to justify the South, but they say that the provocation came from the North, and that the responsibility for the war lies on the Federal government. In opposition to all these disaffected classes, Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, came out in full and earnest support of the Union and Federal government. His eminent talents, his age, station and social position, gave great weight to his speeches and writings. In the divided state of opinion and feeling in Kentucky, the loyalty of such a man went far towards deciding the action of the state. As was to be expected, his course provoked warm opposition. Some of his brethren in the ministry regarded him as using his influence as a preacher and theological professor for the support of his political opinions. The Rev. Messrs. Hoyt and Robinson, of Louisville, Kentucky, had published in the newspapers some articles which Dr. Breckinridge regarded as reflecting on his character so seriously, that he felt authorized, as an appointee of the General Assembly, to bring the matter before that body. He accordingly presented a memorial, stating the facts of the case as they lay in his mind, and tendered his resignation as professor of theology in the Seminary at Danville. Dr. Stuart Robinson, who was also a member of the Assembly, presented a counter statement. These papers were referred to a committee, consisting of Judge Leavitt, Dr. Marshall, Dr. Macdonald, H. K. Clarke, M. W. Staples, A. B. Belknap, and James McDougall. Judge Leavitt subsequently submitted a report in behalf of a majority of this committee, and Messrs. Staples and Macdonald presented a minority report. After some discussion, the following minute was unanimously adopted, to the great satisfaction of the whole house, viz.

1. *Resolved*, That in so far as these papers (*i. e.*, the papers submitted by Drs. Breckinridge and Robinson,) involve the personal relations or controversies of the parties named, the Assembly can take no cognizance of them, unless in a judicial proceeding, prosecuted in the mode prescribed by the constitution of the Church; and as to these, the Assembly, therefore, express no opinion.

2. *Resolved*, That as the office of Professor in our Theologi-

cal Seminaries is held under the authority and by the appointment of the General Assembly, it is competent for that body, at the request of any one holding that position, or on their own motion, to inquire into his acceptability and usefulness in that office.

3. *Resolved*, That in the judgment of the Assembly, no facts have come to their knowledge which impair their confidence in Dr. Breckinridge as Professor in Danville Seminary.

4. *Resolved*, That the Assembly do not concede, that in accepting a Professor's chair in the Seminary, Dr. Breckinridge did necessarily yield the right of expressing freely his views in relation to matters of great national concernment; and that, in their judgment, his bold and patriotic stand in reference to the great conflict now in progress, entitles him to the gratitude of the church and the country.

5. *Resolved*, That in view of the whole case, the Assembly decline to accept his resignation.

State of the Church and of the Country.

The subject which occupied more of the time of the Assembly than any other, and which excited the greatest attention and interest, was the paper introduced by Dr. Breckinridge on the State of the Country. The debate on that subject was continued through several days. Various substitutes and amendments were offered, but the Assembly voted them all down, and adopted as its own the document prepared by Dr. Breckinridge, by an overwhelming majority. It was matter of general gratulation and gratitude, not only that so great unanimity prevailed as to all the important principles concerned, but that such a kind, serious, and Christian spirit marked the whole discussion. Almost all the speakers who opposed the adoption of the paper as unwise, avowed themselves the advocates of its principles.

The paper, as adopted by the Assembly, is as follows, viz.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America, now in session at Columbus, in the state of Ohio:—Considering the unhappy condition of the country in the midst of a bloody civil war, and of the church agitated everywhere, divided in sentiment in many places, and openly assailed by schism in a large section of

it; considering, also, the duty which this chief tribunal, met in the name and by the authority of the glorified Saviour of sinners, who is also the Sovereign Ruler of all things, owes to him our Head and Lord, and to his flock committed to our charge, and to the people whom we are commissioned to evangelize, and to the civil authorities who exist by his appointment, do hereby, in this Deliverance, give utterance to our solemn convictions and our deliberate judgment, touching the matters herein set forth, that they may serve for the guidance of all over whom the Lord Christ has given us any office of instruction, or any power of government.

I. Peace is amongst the very highest temporal blessings of the church, as well as of all mankind; and public order is one of the first necessities of the spiritual, as well as the civil commonwealth. Peace has been wickedly superseded by war, in its worst form, throughout the whole land; and public order has been wickedly superseded by rebellion, anarchy, and violence, in the whole Southern portion of the Union. All this has been brought to pass, in a disloyal and traitorous attempt to overthrow the national government by military force, and to divide the nation contrary to the wishes of the immense majority of the people of the nation, and without satisfactory evidence that the majority of the people in whom the local sovereignty resided, even in the states which revolted, ever authorized any such proceeding, or ever approved the fraud and violence by which this horrible treason has achieved whatever success it has had. This whole treason, rebellion, anarchy, fraud, and violence, is utterly contrary to the dictates of natural religion and morality, and is plainly condemned by the revealed will of God. It is the clear and solemn duty of the national government to preserve, at whatever cost, the national Union and Constitution, to maintain the laws in their supremacy, to crush force by force, and to restore the reign of public order and peace to the entire nation, by whatever lawful means that are necessary thereunto. And it is the bounden duty of the people who compose this great nation, each one in his several place and degree, to uphold the federal government, and every state government, and all persons in authority, whether civil

or military, in all their lawful and proper acts, unto the end herein before set forth.

II. The church of Christ has no authority from him to make rebellion, or to counsel treason, or to favour anarchy, in any case whatever. On the contrary, every follower of Christ has the personal liberty bestowed on him by Christ, to submit, for the sake of Christ, according to his own conscientious sense of duty, to whatever government, however bad, under which his lot may be cast. But while patient suffering for Christ's sake can never be sinful, treason, rebellion, and anarchy may be sinful—most generally, perhaps, are sinful; and probably are always and necessarily sinful in all free countries, where the power to change the government by voting, in the place of force, which exists as a common right constitutionally secured to the people, who are sovereign. If, in any case, treason, rebellion, and anarchy can possibly be sinful, they are so in the case now desolating large portions of this nation, and laying waste great numbers of Christian congregations, and fatally obstructing every good word and work in those regions. To the Christian people scattered throughout those unfortunate regions, and who have been left of God to have any hand in bringing on these terrible calamities, we earnestly address words of exhortation and rebuke, as unto brethren who have sinned exceedingly, and whom God calls to repentance, by fearful judgments. To those in like circumstances who are not chargeable with the sins which have brought such calamities upon the land, but who have chosen, in the exercise of their Christian liberty, to stand in their lot, and suffer, we address words of affectionate sympathy, praying God to bring them off conquerors. To those in like circumstances who have taken their lives in their hands, and risked all for their country, and for conscience' sake, we say, we love such with all our heart, and bless God such witnesses were found in the time of thick darkness. We fear, and we record it with great grief, that the church of God, and the Christian people, to a great extent, and throughout all the revolted states, have done many things that ought not to have been done, and have left undone much that ought to have been done, in this time of trial, rebuke, and blasphemy; but concerning the wide schism which is reported to have occurred in many

Southern Synods, this Assembly will take no action at this time. It declares, however, its fixed purpose, under all possible circumstances, to labour for the extension and the permanent maintenance of the church under its care, in every part of the United States. Schism, so far as it may exist, we hope to see healed. If that cannot be, it will be disregarded.

III. We record our gratitude to God for the prevailing unity of sentiment, and general internal peace, which have characterized the church in the states that have not revolted, embracing a great majority of the ministers, congregations, and people under our care. It may still be called, with emphasis, a loyal, orthodox, and pious church; and all its acts and works indicate its right to a title so noble. Let it strive for divine grace to maintain that good report. In some respects the interests of the church of God are very different from those of all civil institutions. Whatever may befall this, or any other nation, the church of Christ must abide on earth, triumphant even over the gates of hell. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that the church should guard itself from internal alienations and divisions, founded upon questions and interests that are external as to her, and which ought not, by their necessary workings, to cause her fate to depend on the fate of things less important and less enduring than herself. Disturbers of the church ought not to be allowed—especially disturbers of the church in states that never revolted, or that have been cleared of armed rebels—disturbers who, under many false pretexts, may promote discontent, disloyalty, and general alienation, tending to the unsettling of ministers, to local schisms, and to manifold trouble. Let a spirit of quietness, of mutual forbearance, and of ready obedience to authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, illustrate the loyalty, the orthodoxy, and the piety of the church. It is more especially to ministers of the gospel, and, amongst them, particularly to any whose first impressions had been, on any account, favourable to the terrible military revolution which has been attempted, and which God's providence has hitherto so signally rebuked, that these decisive considerations ought to be addressed. And in the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus, we earnestly exhort all who love

God, or fear his wrath, to turn a deaf ear to all counsels and suggestions that tend towards a reaction favourable to disloyalty, schism, or disturbance either in the church or in the country. There is hardly any thing more inexcusable, connected with the frightful conspiracy against which we testify, than the conduct of those office-bearers and members of the church who, although citizens of loyal states, and subject to the control of loyal Presbyteries and Synods, have been faithless to all authority, human and divine, to which they owed subjection. Nor should any to whom this Deliverance may come, fail to bear in mind that it is not only their outward conduct concerning which they ought to take heed, but it is also, and especially their heart, their temper, and their motives in the sight of God, and towards the free and beneficent civil government which he has blessed us withal, and toward the spiritual commonwealth to which they are subject in the Lord. In all these respects, we must all give account to God in the great day. And it is in view of our own dread responsibility to the Judge of quick and dead, that we now make this Deliverance.

Judge Gamble, of Missouri, proposed the following substitute, or amendment.

Resolved, That in view of past deliverances of the highest tribunal of the church, on the subject involved in the paper just read, it is deemed by this General Assembly, with the highest respect for the venerable minister from whom the paper comes, and a deep sense of the great value of the services he has rendered to the church and the country, inexpedient to take further action on the subject at present.

He urged the adoption of this resolution as a peace measure. He feared that the churches in his state would be rent asunder and destroyed, if this discussion should be continued, and Dr. Breckinridge's paper should be adopted. Dr. Macdonald seconded the resolution of Judge Gamble, as indicating the wisest course to be pursued under the circumstances. Dr. McPheeters, of St. Louis, denied the right of any ecclesiastical body to call into question his political opinions on any subject. He had tried to avoid all political discussions. He earnestly repudiated the charge of disloyalty which had been made against the pastors in St. Louis. Rev. Mr. McKee, of Ken-

tucky, is said, by those who heard him, to have made a truly eloquent, earnest, and patriotic speech on the occasion. He deprecated the adoption of Dr. Breckinridge's paper as most unwise. He was sure it would be disastrous in its effects on the churches in Kentucky. If anything could be done towards the preservation of this government by passing this paper, then let it pass, though the heavens fall. But it can do no good to the loyal, and only alienate the more the disaffected. "It is easy for you in the Northern states," he said, "to pass these deliverances; but to us it is distress, division, ruin, death. O! do regard our circumstances! Bind not such burdens on us, which we who love our country and our God are not able to bear. If you say nothing, our people will be peaceful and comparatively happy; but, if you agitate this subject, our churches will oppose the *principle* involved in these annual political deliverances. . . He intended to remain loyal to his country, to his church, and to his God. What will you gain? You will lose the Synods of Missouri and Kentucky, and others, by passing this paper. Beware what you do! *You* gain nothing; *we* lose much by the passage of this document." The Rev. N. Williams referred to the action of the Synod of Kentucky, condemning Dr. Spring's resolutions, passed by the last Assembly. He argued, that if the Synod was right, this paper of Dr. Breckinridge's must be wrong, as the one is directly opposed to the other. He argued that there was no need of this paper to prove our loyalty, and that it was inexpedient to adopt it. The Rev. A. P. Forman, of Missouri, made a protracted and forcible argument on the subject. He urged, 1. That the church, as such, ought not to utter anything as true or obligatory which is not contained in the Bible. The paper under discussion, in his view, violated that principle, as it declared it to be the duty of the national government to preserve, at whatever cost, the national Union and Constitution. This, he said, we may believe as citizens; but where has Christ taught it? 2. He would regard the adoption of the paper as an improper yielding to popular clamour. 3. The good of the people, the peaceful union of the nation after the war, would be promoted by our abstaining from any such deliverance. 4. The passage of this paper would certainly do much harm in the

border slave states. Rev. Dr. George Junkin spoke earnestly and at length, on the other side. He said, the assumption that the Confederacy is a government, is the fallacy which lies at the foundation of the false logic exhibited by the opponents of Dr. Breckinridge's paper. He argued to show that it was no government, either *de jure* or *de facto*. A government was an ordinance of God; but this Confederacy had a very different origin. Is Jeff. Davis, he asked, a magistrate to be obeyed as an officer of Jesus Christ? It had been called an unlawful government; but Dr. Junkin contended that an illegitimate government was no government at all. He admitted, indeed, that a rebellion might be successful, and that when it had put down all opposition, it might be acknowledged as a government *de facto*. But that was not the case in this instance. The Southern Confederacy was no more a government than the insurgents in Pennsylvania, during the Whiskey Insurrection, were a government. The Rev. R. A. Johnston, of Kentucky, regretted the introduction of such a paper; but, since it had been introduced, he deemed it his duty to vote for it. Dr. Marshall took much the same ground. He would have been satisfied if this paper had not been introduced; but we cannot now refuse to pass it. It was highly respectable and purely patriotic. He did not believe it would wound any truly loyal man in the border states. Rev. Mr. McMillan followed on the same side. He had heard no real arguments on the other side, only appeals for sympathy, and warnings of the evils to be anticipated from the adoption of Dr. Breckinridge's paper. It would offend only *fence-men*. He argued that this was distinct from all former utterances of this body. Dr. Spring's resolutions were political—this paper is not; and therefore the objections urged against the former, do not bear against the latter. He did not see how anything so Christian in spirit, and loyal in sentiment, could offend any one. At this stage of the discussion, Judge Gamble's resolution was laid on the table, and the debate continued on Dr. Breckinridge's paper.

The Rev. Dr. McPheeters, of St. Louis, was the next speaker. He said his original purpose was to be silent, and to satisfy himself with protesting against any action of the Assembly on this subject. He had yielded to the wishes of others in

now taking the floor. He objected to the paper on higher grounds than those of expediency. The Assembly could not pass it without violating the constitution of the church. Synods and councils are forbidden to handle civil affairs, except in the way of petition, or of advice for the satisfaction of conscience. This paper is not a petition; and we have not been called upon for advice on the matters of which it treats. He proceeded to show that the document before the house did "handle civil affairs," when it declared it to be the duty of the government to preserve, at whatever cost, the national Union and Constitution. His second ground of objection was, that the paper assumed that the church of Christ, as such, owes allegiance to civil government. This doctrine was formally announced last year, and it is implied in the paper now under consideration. Dr. McPheeters contended that the church owed allegiance only to the Lord Jesus Christ, whose kingdom is not of this world. He objected to the paper also on the ground that it went far too sharply into the merits of the questions which now divide the people, and the degree of guilt on the one side or the other. He concluded by saying, that should this paper pass he would still abide in his lot. So long as he was not called upon to say anything which he believed to be wrong, or hindered from doing or saying what he thought to be right, he expected to remain true to all his duties to the church.

Dr. J. C. Backus, of Baltimore, did not rise to discuss the principles involved in the paper of Dr. Breckinridge. He claimed to know something of the condition of the churches in the border states. For twenty-five years he had been pastor of one of those churches. The Presbytery of Baltimore contributed as much to some of our Boards, as the whole Synod of Philadelphia. Maryland is a slave state; Baltimore has, indeed, only three thousand slaves, out of a population of twenty-six thousand coloured persons, yet we are closely allied to the South by this institution. Our business and social relations with that portion of our country are varied and intimate. At this moment it is claimed that five thousand Marylanders, of whom three thousand are from Baltimore, are in the Southern army. I minister weekly, he said, to the families of three prominent commanders in the Southern navy. From one-third to

two-thirds of the members of our congregations sympathize with the South. This is not strange. It is according to the ordinary working of human nature. These people are among our best and most exemplary Christians. They are sensitive on the subject of the interference of the church, with the political relations of their friends. They do not hold that the church has nothing to do with politics; they admit all the Confession teaches as to duty of fidelity to civil government. But they urge that church and state have different spheres, and that the one ought not to intrude into the sphere of the other. And as many of our duties are mixed, both civil and religious, the church ought to interfere only as to what is moral. Besides this, it cannot be denied, that there are some in the border states who favour a separation from the General Assembly, and the creation of an independent Synod. Under these circumstances it is unwise in this Assembly to give utterance to sentiments adapted to irritate and alienate. We all believe that the adoption of this paper will hazard the peace and unity of our churches. When a country is torn, we need bandages to hold together the pieces until they are knit. What better bandages could you have than united churches? The real question before the House is this, "Is it so necessary to pass this, or any similar paper, that it ought to be passed, at the risk of distracting and dividing all the churches in the border states—of casting them off for years, if not for ever, and of losing all their influence in restoring the whole church on the re-union of the country?" It is said there is no danger of this result. The great majority of those who represent the border states on this floor, think there is danger. It was said last year that there was no danger of the church being divided by the action then contemplated. But that action has driven off nearly one-third of our churches. Dr. Backus thought that by omitting a part of Dr. Breckinridge's paper, and appending to it the twenty-third chapter of the Confession of Faith, a document could be framed which would meet the views of all parts of the house. He accordingly presented such a paper, including more than one-half of that proposed by Dr. Breckinridge.

Dr. Breckinridge remarked that he would address himself to the exposition of the doctrine in this behalf. I would say,

however, that I have observed that every speech on this subject, even to that of my friend Dr. Backus, involved either a direct or covert attack upon me. This is always the temper of faction; and faction is always exacting—grant it a little, and it will at once demand more. Some say they are sorry for me, that I should have been so unfortunate as to introduce this paper here! Now, I will agree to do this—I will even "compromise" with them; and I make them this proposition—that I will take unto and upon myself all the blame that may attach on this account before men, if, when we have all gone up above, they will not claim the glory of it there! (Laughter.) Every speech giving utterances from a disloyal bosom seems to signify that it would be no harm, by silence, to disgrace the church; and yet deem any plain and unequivocal allusion to the difficulty as exceedingly harmful. One very hot day, a West India lady directed her servant to take some ice, and some *liquor*, and some water, and some lemon, and mix them for her to drink. "And, if you please, mistress," said the servant, "shall I put in a little nutmeg?" "Begone, you beast!" screamed the mistress; "*do you think I would drink punch!*" (A laugh.) So, now, when I would put in the "nutmeg," and make the question unequivocal, the brethren manifest abhorrence of the whole matter. (Continued merriment.)

Dr. Breckinridge pursued his remarks, to show that the apprehension as to the effects of this action are unfounded. He also alluded to the doctrine in relation to the "fusion of religion and politics," of which some had spoken, claiming that this is not a political paper, even in the remotest sense. It was, as Dr. McPheeters had called it, a solemnly religious paper. It is the solemn duty of every Christian man to sustain the government in its efforts at securing peace; and I say to you, brethren, that if you do not support the law and the government, you are, as men, forsworn and perfidious. To refuse this is perfidy and perjury; and to avoid these, I call one of the duties of religion; and 'tis that they call "politics!" You, my brethren, are this day making history. You are not simply acting for Kentucky and Maryland; you are acting for all of Christ's church; and in so doing, you are making history that will last as long as the church lasts. There never was, in my

conviction, in all the profane history of the church of the living God, a crisis more pregnant with the events of the future, than is this in which you are now called upon to act. Then, let me beseech and enjoin you, in the name of God, of his Christ, and of his church, to act as you would answer at the "great" day.

The floor was then given to Dr. Stuart Robinson, who yielded it, after speaking a few minutes, for adjournment.

Dr. Robinson said he did not care to discuss the question on the grounds of expediency, and therefore had not said a word on Judge Gamble's paper. As the Assembly was weary and impatient, he would confine himself to a simple outline of his argument. He summed up his objections to the paper in these four particulars. First, it is *doctrinally erroneous* and dangerous in principle. Secondly, even if it were sound in doctrine, its spirit, in idea and language, is too hard and severe for a solemn utterance of this sort. Thirdly, even if its doctrine and spirit were unobjectionable, its style of utterance is too vague, indistinct, and liable to misconstruction, for a deliverance binding the conscience of God's people. Fourthly, even if its doctrine, its spirit, and style, were all unexceptionable, the adoption of such a paper, in the circumstances, is contrary to the clearest and highest Christian expediency.

The first head was the one principally elaborated. In the discussion of that point, he laid down four propositions as fundamental to Presbyterianism. 1. Wherever the gospel is established, there are two distinct and complete governments over men, the temporal and spiritual. 2. The rule of conduct of the state is the light of nature; the rule of the spiritual government is the word of God only. 3. The agencies in the civil government are such as reason, good sense, and circumstances may dictate. The only agencies to be employed in the spiritual government are such as Christ has appointed. 4. Those agencies of the church are to be used for the work of the church only, and not to promote any secular end. He argued to show that the paper under discussion contravened these principles. It did decide, in the name of the church, and by the authority of Christ, purely civil or political questions. The other heads of his argument were successively, though briefly illustrated. Apart from the objections already men-

lie against Dr. Breckinridge's paper. That paper does indeed, as explicitly as the Spring resolutions, declare it to be the duty of all Presbyterians represented in the Assembly, to sustain the general government. But this is true under any theory of the Constitution. Even according to the Calhoun doctrine, the people owe allegiance to the federal government, unless the states to which they belong secede. All the states represented in the Assembly are non-secession states, and therefore all the people in them owe allegiance to the general government. Those in Kentucky, Missouri, or Maryland, who take up arms against the general government, are traitors, and would be so pronounced at the bar of John C. Calhoun. And those in those states who are in heart disloyal, are traitors in heart. There is, therefore, no assumption of civil jurisdiction in this adoption of Dr. Breckinridge's paper. It is a simple application of one of the laws of God to a plain case. Loyalty is a duty which all Presbyterians represented in the last Assembly owe to the general government, on any possible interpretation of the American Constitution. It was, therefore, perfectly competent to that Assembly to enjoin on them the performance of that duty with all their heart and strength.

Dr. Breckinridge was charged with inconsistency, in that he had introduced into the Synod of Kentucky, a paper unanimously adopted by that body, expressing "grave disapprobation" of the action of the Assembly of 1861, in passing Dr. Spring's resolutions, those resolutions being, in judgment of the Synod, repugnant to "the word of God." And yet he presented a paper to the Assembly of 1862, taking the same ground as those resolutions took. If the views expressed above are correct, there is no inconsistency in the case. The Assembly of 1861, representing the South as well as the North, did decide a grave political question. The Assembly of 1862, representing only the loyal states, decided no such question, but simply enjoined a duty which binds all for whom the Assembly acted, no matter how that political question may be decided.

It was urged as a further proof that Dr. Breckinridge's paper trespassed on the domain of politics, that it declared it to be the duty of the general government to maintain the integrity of the Union, and to resist force by force. Where does the

Bible teach that? it was triumphantly asked. The Bible, in teaching the general truth that governments are ordained of God, that resistance to them is resistance to the ordinance of God, and that the magistrate is armed with the sword—that is, with legitimate authority to enforce such obedience—does teach all that the paper in question asserts. It matters not whether the Calhoun doctrine is true or not; the duty of the government remains the same. First, because it is the prerogative of the government to decide whether that theory is true or not. It must decide it. The President of the United States swears to support the Constitution. He, and every other department of the government, must decide whether that Constitution is in force in South Carolina or not. And if they decide that it is, they are bound to enforce it. We do not decide the case for them. We recognise their right to decide it; and we assert that it is their duty to act in accordance with a decision which we believe to be correct. But, secondly, it is to be considered that the duty of the government to suppress this wicked rebellion, does not depend on the question whether or not the states have the right to secede. Secession is one thing, and war against the country is another thing. Admitting, for the sake of argument, the suicidal theory of the Secessionists, it does not follow that South Carolina had a right to fire on the flag of the Union, to bombard a national fortress, to seize the national arms; or that little Florida had a right to take forcible possession of Pensacola and Key West; or Louisiana to appropriate the mouths of the Mississippi. The whole country had a joint and equal right to hold and to use all these national forts and channels of commerce. Admitting that the legs of a man have a right to secede from his body, it does not follow that they have a right to put a ligature round his aorta or his windpipe. The seceding states, in appealing to the sword, instead of to a national convention, made war not only a duty, but a necessity.

Again, Dr. McPheeters, whom to know is to love, objected that Dr. Breckinridge's paper implied that the church, as such, owes allegiance to the state, whereas, he asserted, it owes allegiance to the Lord Jesus Christ alone. The sense in which this is true, has no relevancy to the case in hand. The

church is subject to Christ alone in determining all questions of doctrine, organization, worship, and discipline. But by the church, it is to be remembered, is commonly and properly understood the people of God. The word *church* is only a collective term for God's people. It will not be said that the people of God do not owe allegiance to the state. That is just what they, as Christians, do owe, and that is all the paper adopted by the Assembly asserts or implies. "A loyal Presbytery" is only a Presbytery composed of loyal presbyters, and not a Presbytery which makes the state the arbiter of doctrine and morals.

2. But while it is to be admitted that there are no objections founded on principle against the adoption of Dr. Breckinridge's paper, the expediency of its introduction and passage is still an open question. Several of the brethren spoke disparagingly, and it seems to us, unadvisedly, about expediency. It is of literally unspeakable importance that words should be used in a definite and fixed sense. *Expedient* is a scriptural word, and expediency is a divinely sanctioned rule of action. The doctrine that nothing is right or wrong in itself, but only in virtue of its effects—that the end sanctifies the means—expediency in that sense is simply atheistic and abominable. But while there are some things immutably right or wrong in their own nature, there are others which are indifferent, and with regard to them expediency (*i. e.*, wisdom and benevolence,) is our only guide. Eating meat sacrificed to idols was lawful. No law of God forbade it to Christians. But in Paul's age it was inexpedient, and he therefore declared that he would not eat such meat while the world stands. The Assembly might have a perfect right to entertain such a paper as the one in question, and yet the wisdom of its introduction and adoption be open to serious doubt. For ourselves, we believe that the wisest, most dignified, benevolent, and Christian course for the Assembly, would have been entire silence on the disturbed state of the country. The Presbyterians of the North did not need to have their loyalty or patriotism either excited or proclaimed. The general government was not suffering from the want of the moral support of the great body of Christians. There never was

a time when all classes of the people were so united, nor a subject on which that union was more cordial and determined. As there was no imperative necessity for the adoption of such a paper, the fact that men so eminent for goodness, wisdom, experience, and position, as Judge Gamble, Dr. Backus, Dr. Dixon, Dr. McPheeters, Rev. Mr. McKee, and others, from the border states, expressed their firm conviction that its adoption would injure the cause of Christ and his church in those states, satisfies us that its introduction was unwise. Had the question, whether the principles and sentiments of Dr. Breckinridge's paper are sound and right, been submitted to the Assembly, we presume that not more than two or three of its members would have voted *no*. Had the members given their judgment as to whether it was wise that such a paper should be introduced, from all we can learn, we presume the majority would have opposed its introduction. When the question was, whether, having been introduced and debated, it was better to adopt than to reject it, two hundred and six, as we have seen, were for its adoption, and only twenty for its rejection. We trust that the evils anticipated by our border states brethren may not be realized. The time is rapidly coming when even in those states neutrality will be impossible, and when all must be openly either against the government, or for it.

3. It is important that the great points of national interest on which the North, and especially northern Christians, and most especially northern Presbyterians, are a unit, should be distinctly and constantly before the public mind. Those points are, First, that the doctrine of secession is a political heresy, inconsistent with the nature and origin of our national compact, and incompatible with its existence. Second, that admitting the right of secession, the course of the seceding states, in seizing the public property, and commencing hostilities against the national government, rendered war on the part of that government not only just, but obligatory and necessary. Third, that the real, and, it may be said, the avowed object of the war, on the part of the seceding states, is the overthrow of our national Union for the sake of the security, perpetuity, and extension of African slavery; and that the avowed and legiti-

mate object of the war on our part, is the restoration and preservation of our national Union in all its integrity—the prerogatives of the federal government, and the rights of the several states, being alike secured and perpetuated. This has been formally and authoritatively declared to be the object of the war, by unanimous votes of Congress, and by the proclamations of the President. Fourth, it is the duty of all citizens, and especially of all Christians, to sustain and encourage the federal government, in the prosecution of this war, to the utmost of their ability, and at any cost. This duty is not dependent on the private opinion of the individual citizen as to the wisdom of the administration, or of the relative amount of guilt belonging to the North and South, in bringing upon us our present calamities. A man may even think it was wrong on the part of the government to resist, by an appeal to arms, the open hostilities commenced by South Carolina. Nevertheless, as the question of peace and war is, by the Constitution of the country, (which *jure divino*, binds the conscience of every American citizen,) belongs to the Congress of the United States, every citizen is bound to submit to the decision of that body. Many good men disapproved of the war of 1812 against Great Britain; more disapproved of the late war against Mexico; but for any American citizen to afford aid or comfort to Great Britain or Mexico, in the prosecution of those wars, would have been both morally and politically treason; and to have in heart sympathized with them, and wished them success, would have been treason at the bar of conscience. We say this in reference to our border state brethren; for elsewhere in the loyal states, there is not one man in a thousand whose reason and heart are not in favour of the war. But its wisdom, we repeat, is not the essential point. It is a war of our country for a legitimate object; and therefore we are bound to sustain it. If a man sees his father struggling for life with a murderous assailant, and he either aids that assailant, or wishes him success, he is none the less a parricide, although he may think his father began the quarrel. Fifth, as the object of the war, on the part of the Confederate states, is the overthrow of the national Union for the perpetuity of slavery, so there is, we presume, but one mind at the North, that if the overthrow of

slavery is necessary to the preservation of the Union, slavery ought to be, must be, and inevitably will be overthrown. There is no such necessity other than that which arises out of the pertinacity of the South. If the South insist on their present course, and especially if they succeed in securing the intervention of foreign enemies, of English abolitionists, and French liberals, to aid in this attempt to destroy our nationality for the sake of slavery and its products, then it becomes a question of life and death, and all will be done that God will permit and enable twenty millions of freemen to do, to preserve their national existence and the freedom of future generations. We are not the advocates of the immediate and universal emancipation of the slaves. We believe such emancipation would be a dreadful calamity to the blacks, as well as to the whites. We have ever been, and still are the consistent advocates of such a system of moral, intellectual, and social culture of the blacks, as would render their transition from slavery to freedom as certain and as healthful as the transition of man from childhood to manhood. Nevertheless, we believe the South may render emancipation indispensable and inevitable. If forced to choose between the preservation of slavery and the preservation of the Union, the heart of the nation will not hesitate a moment. On all the points above mentioned, we believe there is the most cordial unanimity of sentiment among all the members of our church, some few of our brethren in the border states excepted. This being the case, it would be most unwise to allow diversity of judgment as to particular measures, or the propriety of a particular set of resolutions to disturb either the peace of the church, or the cordiality of the support rendered to the national government.

4. The only other remark which we feel moved to make in connection with this whole subject is, the special importance in times like these, of holding fast to well-established and well-considered principles. Most men are controlled by their feelings. Their opinions are only the expression of their likes and dislikes. What they hate, they condemn; what they like, they approve, without any reference to reason or the law of God. Thousands in this country, from the experience of the evils brought on the nation by slavery, have become abolitionists,

although abolitionism may be, and has been demonstrated, (and has been all but unanimously pronounced by the Old-school Presbyterian Church,) to be contrary to the word of God, so that practically and virtually a man must either give up abolitionism or give up the Bible. It matters not how good he may appear to be, or how orthodox he may profess himself to be, the man who refuses to submit his judgment as to what is true and right, to the authority of the word of God, or who labours to pervert the obvious meaning of that word to justify his judgments, is governed by the spirit of infidelity. The real question between faith and unbelief in the Bible is, whether the word of God or our own understanding shall decide for us what is true and right. By abolitionism is meant, the doctrine that slaveholding is in itself sinful, and that immediate and universal emancipation is, for that reason, a moral duty. This is the well-established meaning of the word in this country, from which no one is justified in departing. Taking the word in this sense, we assert that abolitionism is contrary to the word of God, and contrary to the faith and practice of our church, and of the church universal. It would, therefore, be a great evil, if, because slavery and slaveholders have brought such fearful calamities on our country, we should renounce our own faith and the faith of our fathers, and turn abolitionists. Let us adhere to the truth and to our recorded testimony, and not be driven about either by our own passions or by the passions of the people. It is the first duty of the church to teach the truth, whether agreeable or disagreeable, whether popular or unpopular, and to be governed in deciding what truth is only by the authority of Him whose word is truth.

Another principle which it is especially necessary that we should preserve in its integrity is the authority and prerogative of the church. It is the doctrine of the Scriptures and of the Presbyterian Church, that the kingdom of Christ is not of this world; that it is not subject as to faith, worship, or discipline, to the authority of the state; and that it has no right to interfere with the state, or give ecclesiastical judgment in matters pertaining to state policy. It is no less, however, the doctrine of the Scriptures, that the church is God's witness on earth, and has the right to bear testimony against all error in doctrine

and all sin in practice, whether in magistrate or people. The clear principle of discrimination between what the church may, and what it may not do, is this. Any question which is to be decided by the teachings of the word of God, the church may, and when the occasion calls for it, is bound to decide, and to urge or enforce that decision by her spiritual authority. All questions, which are to be decided by any other standard, lie beyond her jurisdiction. In opposition to these plain principles, there are some among us, who assert that the church is so purely spiritual, it cannot pronounce judgment, or in any way rightfully interfere, either in the pulpit or church courts, in reference to any political question. What was meant by this theory is determined beyond doubt or denial by the illustrations employed by its advocates, and especially by its author. The church, it was said, is so spiritual that she cannot recommend the colonization society, and cannot condemn the slave trade. But are not these matters, the right or wrong of which may be determined by the word of God? Is there nothing in the Bible which teaches that it is right to send Christianized and civilized Africans, with their own consent, to the land of their fathers, to introduce among its pagan inhabitants the light of the gospel and blessings of civilization? Is there nothing in the Bible which prove man-stealing and devastating wars for the sake of procuring slaves to be diabolically wicked? And is it not the very object for which the church was founded, that she should teach God's truth, and apply it to all the concerns and emergencies of life, for instruction, exhortation, and consolation? She has nothing to do with politics as politics, with questions of banks and tariffs, with regard to which the rule of decision is human laws or secular interests. But with all that pertains to faith and holy living, it is her prerogative and duty to hold forth the word of life. On the other hand, however, it cannot be denied that zeal for a good cause, or the fervour of patriotic feeling, has led, and may again lead, the church to forget the limits set to her authority as a teacher or judge. She cannot decide whether the Salic law is in force in Spain; whether the expulsion of the Stuarts from the throne of England was lawful; whether the American Constitution recognizes the right of a state to secede from the Union; or whether

Louis Napoleon was lawfully elected emperor of the French. These are all political questions, to be decided, not by the law of God, but by historical facts and human laws. Of course, questions of duty which depend on the solution of these political questions, are all without the sphere of the church's authority. The church could not discipline a Jacobite who conscientiously believed that the Pretender had a right to the throne of England; nor can we excommunicate such a man as Leighton Wilson, who believes that his first duty as a citizen is to the state of South Carolina. As in these times of agitation, we are in so much danger of forsaking the only sure and infallible rule of faith and practice, and of giving ourselves up to the control of passion, instead of principle, it becomes us to be the more thoughtful, humble, and prayerful.

ART. VI.—*Slavery and the Slave Trade.*

IN May, 1607, the first permanent English settlement in the western hemisphere was made at Jamestown, in Virginia. At the end of twelve years, the population numbered but six hundred souls, mostly males. It was then strengthened by the addition, in one year, (1619,) of twelve hundred and sixty-one colonists, including ninety unmarried females, "young and uncorrupt," who were selected and sent over, to supply wives for the fathers of "the Old Dominion."

The next year witnessed an accession of a different kind to the strength and population of the rising colony. A Dutch vessel, from the African coast, appeared in the river, and sold to the colonists twenty "Guinea negroes," the pioneers of those millions of that race, which have aided to swell the population of the United States, and to subdue its wilds. They were landed in August, 1620; and it is a coincidence worthy of notice, that the first cotton grown on the continent was planted on James river the next year, and constituted a part of the earliest crop cultivated in America by their labour.

Thus early introduced, the institution of slavery soon struck its roots firmly into the soil, and, gradually following in the path of colonization, became domesticated throughout the continent.

The manner of the entrance of slavery, thus, in the earliest forming period of the colonial history, accounts for the fact that its introduction was, with slight exceptions, accomplished silently and almost unobserved, alike unsanctioned and unchallenged by legal authority. "There is not," says Bancroft, "in all the colonial legislation of America, one single law which recognises the rightfulness of slavery in the abstract."* There is not one that assumes to authorize, or establish and give legal validity to the enslaving of the negroes. In a few instances, their introduction and bondage was met, at the outset, with warm and active opposition in the colonies. But, generally, the subject seems at first to have been passed in silence, and wherever any measure was adopted by the colonial authorities having a tendency to impede or prohibit the trade in negroes, it was promptly set aside by the royal veto, which was employed with the most watchful jealousy in defence of this cherished institution. And it was not until entrance had thus been secured, and domicil acquired by the system—until after it had gained some degree of maturity and strength in the colonies—that the statutes begin to take cognizance of, and make regulations respecting it, as already existing. Nor was it until the colonies had passed the first stage of early helplessness—until they had acquired such a measure of maturity and growth as developed a distinctive colonial sentiment, and gave birth among them to views of policy independent of those which were cherished in England, and patronized by the crown, —that a course of legislation began to be pursued having systematic reference to the purpose of restraining the slave-trade, and excluding the institution of slavery from their territories.

During a century and a half, from the first settlement of the American colonies until their independence, the African slave trade constituted by far the most important branch of British commerce, the nursery of her maritime power, and foundation

* History of the United States, vol. iii., p. 409.

of that gigantic system of empire which has since been reared by her sons.

The pioneer of English enterprise in this direction was Sir Thomas Wyndham, who visited the African coast in 1551 and 1552, and returned with one hundred and fifty pounds' weight of gold-dust. An expedition was thereupon fitted out by a London company, consisting of two ships, and one hundred and forty men, under the command of Wyndham, with whom was associated Pinteado, a Portuguese, well acquainted with the trade, which had been carried on by the Portuguese for nearly a century and a half. But the imperious and headstrong course of Wyndham resulted in the sickness and death of himself, Pinteado, and one hundred of the crew. The forty survivors were compelled to abandon and sink one of the ships, and return to England. The company immediately organized a yet larger expedition of three ships, under the charge of Captain John Lok. After a prosperous voyage, he returned to England, freighted with thirty-six butts of Guinea pepper, two hundred and fifty elephants' teeth, four hundred pounds of gold-dust, and "certain black slaves"—the first brought into England by British vessels. These latter, however, do not seem to have been recognised as included in the proper objects of the voyage, but as incidental to the more legitimate commerce which supplied the principal part of the cargo.

To Sir John Hawkins belongs the infamous distinction of having fitted out the first English vessel for the trade in slaves. Having learned that negroes were in demand in Hispaniola, he sailed, in 1562, with three ships for the African coast, secured three hundred slaves, and conveyed them to Hispaniola. The Spanish regulations for the colonies were designed to confer the monopoly of slave supply upon the kindred Portuguese. But Sir John managed to evade all obstacles, and to smuggle his cargo into a profitable market. "The rich returns of sugar, ginger, and pearls, attracted the notice of Queen Elizabeth; and when a new expedition was prepared, she was induced, not only to protect, but to share in the traffic. In the accounts which Hawkins himself gives of one of his expeditions, he relates that he set fire to a city of which the huts were covered with dry palm leaves, and, out of eight thousand inhabitants,

succeeded in seizing two hundred and fifty."* Such were the exploits which were honoured with knighthood at the fair hand of the virgin Queen, and with commission as treasurer of the British navy. On his second expedition, Hawkins sailed in a Queen's ship, the *Jesus*, (!) accompanied by three other vessels.

The atrocious trade thus originated, with the patronage and coöperation of royalty, soon acquired a national importance, and became a central pillar of British commercial prosperity and greatness. In 1631, Charles I. chartered a company, the first organized for the slave trade. In 1672, this company was merged in another, erected upon a charter granted by James II. under the name of The Royal African Company.

The British slave trade was at first restricted to a clandestine supply of Spanish America. But no sooner were British colonies planted in the new world, than they were recognised as presenting the prospect of a secure and permanent market for the African traders; and hence every attempt by the colonies to impose any restrictions upon the traffic was regarded with corresponding jealousy, and met by the frowns of the home government. In 1655, the acquisition of Jamaica secured to Britain the monopoly of that market for slaves, and in 1713, by the Assiento with Spain, Queen Anne acquired an exclusive right to supply the Spanish dominions with negroes. The title, and one or two short extracts, will exhibit the nature of this transaction.

"The Assiento [or Compact] adjusted between their Britannick and Catholic Majesties, for the English Company's obliging itself to supply the Spanish West Indies with black slaves, for the term of thirty years, to commence on the first of May, of this present year, 1713, and to end on the like day in the year 1743.

The King.

"Whereas, the Assiento agreed on with the Royal Guinea Company settled in France, for the introducing of negro slaves into the Indies is determined, and the queen of Great Britain

* Bancroft's History, vol. i., p. 173.

being desirous of coming into this commerce, and, in her name, the English Company," &c.

"Her Britannick Majesty does offer and undertake, for persons whom she shall appoint, that they shall charge and oblige themselves with bringing into the West Indies of America belonging to his Catholic Majesty, in the space of the said thirty years, one hundred and forty-four thousand negroes, of both sexes and all ages, at the rate of four thousand eight hundred negroes in each of the said thirty years."*

So runs the treaty. Four thousand per annum of these negroes were subject to a duty of thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents each, payable into the Spanish treasury. The remaining eight hundred were admitted free, and upon any negroes imported above the number required by these terms, a duty of sixteen dollars and sixty-six cents was agreed upon.

Thus it became the boast of Queen Anne to her assembled parliament, that from the reluctant weakness and fears of Spain, she had obtained the privilege of being her sole slave factor. At this time the crown of Portugal was possessed by the king of Spain, who had fallen heir to all the possessions of that monarchy, in Europe, Africa, and America. So that by the Assiento, England, besides her own possessions, became the exclusive slave merchant for the West Indies and Mexico, for Caraccas and Brazil, for Chili and Peru—in short, for all Spanish and Portuguese America. In the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico, no ship but those of England might engage in the merchandize of men. Such were the profits anticipated from this traffic, that Queen Anne reserved a quarter of the stock for herself, and Philip V. of Spain, took a like share; whilst the remaining half was given to the South Sea Company, which had recently been organized for clandestine trade with Spanish America. The energies of this company were now united with those of the Royal African Company, to pour a supply of slaves into the Spanish, Portuguese, and English colonies.

In addition to the enormous stake thus vested by Great

* Almon's Collection of Treaties. London, 1772. Vol. i., p. 83.

Britain in the slave trade, there were other considerations which assisted to determine that government to stock her colonial possessions to the full with Africans. They would constitute an element of weakness, tending to hold the colonies the more easily subject to the authority of Britain. Their presence would tend to discourage manufactures, and thus secure a monopoly of that class of productions to the English people. "Were it possible," says a British political pamphleteer, in 1745, "for white men to answer the end of negroes in planting, our colonies would interfere with the manufactures of these kingdoms. In such case, indeed, we might have just reason to dread the prosperity of our colonies; but while we can supply them abundantly with negroes, we need be under no such apprehensions." "Negro labour will keep our British colonies in a due subserviency to the interest of their mother country; for, while our plantations depend only on planting by negroes, our colonies can never prove injurious to British manufactures, never become independent of their kingdom."* This consideration was as well appreciated in America; and was recognized as an argument against the trade, and a reason for becoming independent of a government thus avowedly hostile to the welfare of America, and to the development of her resources and power.

When the attention of the colonies first began to turn toward the moral character of the African slave trade, and its influence upon American growth and prosperity, the subject was embarrassed by its relation to the condition of two other classes of bondmen, who had existed in most of the colonies from the earliest period of their history. From the first settlement of Jamestown, there were among the colonists persons who had been sent over at the expense of the Virginia Company, or conveyed by the ship-captains, upon condition that they should reimburse the expense of their passage by a term of service. The servants of the Company were allowed one month per annum of their time, three acres of land for cultivation, and

* "The African Slave Trade, the great Pillar and Support of the British Plantation Trade in America;" in Bancroft, vol. iii., p. 415.

two bushels of corn from the public store. The remaining eleven months belonged to the Company. The number of these bondmen was never large, and they soon entirely disappeared. Those who were sold by the shipmasters, in payment of passage-money, were more numerous, and were longer an element of the colonial system. The demand was great, and created in England a regular system for supply. Men who were nicknamed "spirits"—that is, kidnappers—made it a business to delude idlers into embarkation for America, as a land of spontaneous abundance and luxurious idleness. Their victims they sold to the shipmasters, by whom, upon arrival in America, they were resold, singly or in lots, to the highest bidder. "In 1672, the average price in the colonies, where five years of service was due, was about ten pounds, while a negro was worth twenty or twenty-five pounds."* But little regard, however, was paid to the demands of justice, or the terms of sale, as favouring the unhappy "redemptioner." Men, the expense of whose transportation did not exceed eight or ten pounds, were sometimes sold for forty, fifty, and sixty pounds, and required to render a proportionate service, which was equivalent to perpetual bondage. Ultimately, a class of men arose in America, who were popularly known as "soul-drivers." By them, the redemptioners were purchased from the emigrant ships, in lots of fifty or more, and driven about the country, in coffles, for sale. In Pennsylvania, "the last of the ignominious set disappeared about the year 1785."† This class of bondmen was swollen by royal contributions of prisoners taken in the civil wars, and victims of religious persecution. Thus Cromwell rid himself of the encumbrance of royalist prisoners taken at Dunbar, Worcester, and in Penruddoc's conspiracy. So Charles II. and James II. disposed of many of the Covenanters of Scotland, and the followers of Monmouth, who escaped Jeffries's bloody assizes. The profits of their sale were the subject of scramble among the needy courtiers and royal favourites. The malice of James dictated a letter to the governor of Virginia, directing him to recommend the passage of a law by the Assem-

* Bancroft, vol. i., p. 175.

† Day's Pennsylvania Historical Collections, p. 209.

bly, for preventing these prisoners from redeeming themselves, by money or otherwise, until the expiration of ten years at least. The Assembly, however, refused to be thus made the instrument of royal vengeance.

The other class of bondmen in America consisted of Indian prisoners of war. Recognizing the law of Moses, as in its civil and municipal provisions still binding on the people of God; or, at least, as a perfectly safe and suitable model of government, the Puritan settlers of New England supposed themselves to find in it abundant warrant for reducing to slavery the "heathen round about them," when forced into hostilities with them. Many of the captive warriors were sold to the West Indies; whilst numbers, especially of the women and children, were retained in slavery at home, and were ultimately absorbed into the negro population.

The first American slave-trader was fitted out in Boston in 1645, by Thomas Keyser and James Smith, the latter a member of the church in Boston. They returned from Africa with a cargo of slaves, some of whom were disposed of to the colonists of Massachusetts. But the public indignation was aroused against the authors of this enterprise. The broad distinction between the enslaving of domestic enemies—with respect to whom, in many instances, that was the alternative to their otherwise necessary destruction—and the gratuitous capture and enslaving of a foreign people, by whom nothing had been done to justify the violence, was clearly seen and recognized. Keyser and Smith were arrested and imprisoned. The negroes who had been sold were reclaimed, and the entire cargo reshipped for Africa, and conveyed to their homes at the public expense; the representatives in General Court, after conference with the elders of the church, and with their sanction, setting forth an earnest testimony against the crime of manstealing as a heinous offence, "expressly contrary to the law of God and the law of the country."*

About the same time, a law was enacted by the General Court of Massachusetts, which prohibited the buying and selling of slaves, except those taken in lawful war, or reduced

* Winthrop, vol. ii. pp. 243–5, 379–80.

to servitude for their crimes, by a judicial sentence; and these were declared to be entitled to all the privileges allowed by the law of Moses.*

Soon after, the Assembly of Rhode Island passed the following act:

"At a General Court held at Warwick, the 18th of May, 1652.

"Whereas, there is a common course practised among Englishmen to buy negroes to that end they may have them for service or slaves for ever—for the preventing of such practices among us, *Let it be ordained*, That no black mankind or white being shall be forced by covenant, bond, or otherwise, to serve any man or his assignees longer than ten years, or until they come to be twenty-four years of age, if they be taken in under fourteen—from the time of their coming within the liberties of this colony; at the end or term of ten years to set them free, as the manner is with the English servants. And that man that will not let them go free, or shall sell them away elsewhere, to that end they may be enslaved to others a longer time, he or they shall forfeit to the colony forty pounds."

Whilst Massachusetts thus arrayed herself against the African trade, and Rhode Island denounced slavery itself, the Old Dominion identified herself with the same cause. A duty of five per cent. was early imposed on the importation of slaves. To avoid the jealousy of the African interest in Great Britain, this duty was made payable by the buyer. In this form, it with difficulty gained the assent of the crown. Royal requisitions for aids from the colonial treasury, furnished pretexts for increasing this impost from time to time, until it amounted to twenty per cent. The sequel is told by Brougham. "In Virginia, a duty on the importation of negroes had been imposed, amounting to a prohibition. The Assembly, induced by a temporary peculiarity of circumstances, repealed this law, by a bill which received the immediate sanction of the crown. But never afterwards could the royal assent be obtained to a renewal of the duty."† In 1662, an act was passed, which was so shaped

* Belknap's New Hampshire.

† Brougham's Colonial Policy, Book ii.

as to evade the watchfulness of the African traders, and yet put some restriction on the growth of slavery. It provided that "no Englishman, trader, or other," who should bring any Indians as servants, and assign them over to any other, should sell them as slaves, nor for any other time than English of like age could serve by act of Assembly."

In 1703, the opposition of Massachusetts to the increasing trade was indicated by an act, imposing a duty of four pounds sterling on every negro brought into the colony. On the 7th of June, 1712—the very year of the Assiento treaty—Pennsylvania adopted "an act to prevent the importation of negroes and Indians into this province," embodying similar provisions. These restrictions, however, were immediately set aside by the royal authority.

The British policy on the subject was now mature, and the slave trade interest stood paramount in the councils of the nation. In 1695, it was declared by act of Parliament, that "the trade is highly beneficial and advantageous to the kingdom and colonies." In 1708, it was asserted, by a committee of the House of Commons, that "the trade is important, and ought to be free." Again, in 1711, report was made to the House that the trade should be increased, in order to supply the plantations with negroes "at reasonable rates." In 1712, Queen Anne, in the speech from the throne, congratulated Parliament upon the monopoly of the trade secured by the Assiento. In 1729, an appropriation was made by Parliament, at the recommendation of George II., for putting in order the African forts for protection of the trade. The Royal African Company having become bankrupt, and surrendered its charter, in 1749, a new company was organized, and a charter granted, but with none of the exclusive privileges previously enjoyed. Every obstacle to private enterprise in this direction was removed, and the trade thrown open to the freest competition of British subjects, to the exclusion of all others; because, says the statute, "the slave trade is very advantageous to Great Britain." "The British senate," writes Horace Walpole, in February, 1750, "have this fortnight been pondering methods to make more effectual that horrid traffic of selling negroes. It

has appeared to us that six-and-forty thousand of these wretches are sold every year to our plantations alone."*

Equally unequivocal and decided was the policy of the royal government as exercised in the American colonies. "The eighteenth century was, as it were, ushered in by the royal instruction of Queen Anne (1702) to the governor of New York and New Jersey, 'to give due encouragement to merchants, and in particular to the Royal African Company of England.' That a similar instruction was given generally, is evident from the apology of Spotswood for the small importations of slaves into Virginia. In that commonwealth the planters beheld with dismay the increase of negroes. A tax checks their importation; and, in 1726, Hugh Drysdale, the deputy-governor, announces to the House, that 'the interfering interest of the African Company has obtained the repeal of that law.'"†

Georgia was planted, in 1733, by Oglethorpe and his associates, as an asylum for the impoverished of England and the persecuted Protestants of the continent, and a barrier on the frontier between the adjacent colonies and the hostile Spaniards and Indians. For all these reasons, and because of the moral character of slavery, the Trustees determined to exclude it. But the resistance of a feeble corporation, against the interests of the slavers, and the settled policy of the British government, was in vain. The history is given by Oglethorpe in a few words:—"My friends and I settled the colony of Georgia, and by charter were established Trustees to make laws. We determined not to suffer slavery there. But the slave merchants and their adherents occasioned not only much trouble, but at last got the government to favour them. We would not suffer slavery, which is against the gospel, as well as the fundamental law of England, to be authorized under our authority. We refused, as Trustees, to make a law permitting such a horrid crime. The government, finding the Trustees resolved firmly not to concur with what they believed unjust, took away the charter."

Duties were imposed upon the importation of slaves by New

* See Bancroft, vol. iii., p. 414. † Ibid. p. 415.

York, in 1753; by Pennsylvania, in 1762; and by New Jersey, in 1769. The result may be inferred from the instructions communicated to Governor Wentworth, of New Hampshire, June 30, 1761—instructions which indicate, at once, the royal recognition of the anti-slavery sentiments which prevailed in the colonial legislation, and the deliberate and determined opposition of the crown to any restriction of the trade. "You are not to give your assent to, or pass any law"—so reads the paper—"imposing duties on negroes imported into New Hampshire."* The Assembly of South Carolina, in 1760, passed an act forbidding the importation of slaves. The act was immediately annulled by the royal veto; the governor reprimanded for having sanctioned such a bill; the other colonial governors warned, by a circular letter, against similar offences; and the trade so effectually plied as to drive out or subdue all opposition in that colony; so that, when independence was achieved, South Carolina was found ready to demand the continuance of the traffic, which formerly she had so earnestly deprecated.

In 1772—that year so memorable for the Somerset decision in England—the Virginia Assembly petitioned the king on the subject of the trade. "We are encouraged," say they, "to look up to the throne and implore your majesty's paternal assistance in averting a calamity of a most alarming nature. The importation of slaves into the colonies from the coast of Africa, hath long been considered as a trade of great inhumanity, and under its present encouragement, we have too much reason to fear, will endanger the very existence of your majesty's American dominions. We are sensible that some of your majesty's subjects in Great Britain may reap emolument from this sort of traffic; but when we consider that it greatly retards the settlement of the colonies with useful inhabitants, and may in time have the most destructive influence, we presume to hope that the interest of a few will be disregarded when placed in competition with the security and happiness of such numbers of your majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects.

"Deeply impressed with these sentiments, we most hum-

* Gordon's American Revolution, vol. i., letter 2.

bly beseech your majesty to remove all those restraints on your majesty's governors of this colony which inhibit their assenting to such laws as might check so very pernicious a commerce."

Neither the force of this appeal, nor the influence of English philanthropists whose services were enlisted, was of any avail. "I myself," says Granville Sharpe, "was desired, by a letter from America, to inquire for an answer to this extraordinary Virginia petition. I waited on the Secretary of State, and was informed by himself that the petition was received; but that he apprehended no answer would be given."*

Finally, amid the agitation of the dawning revolution, the Assembly of Massachusetts, in 1774, passed a bill entitled, "An act to prevent the importation of negroes and others as slaves into this province." It imposed a duty on such importations. Governor Hutchinson immediately rejected the bill, and prorogued the Assembly. He afterwards stated to a deputation of blacks, that his course was dictated by the royal instructions. A similar statement was made by his successor, General Gage.

Whilst the colonial legislatures were thus restrained by the royal authority, the courts of Massachusetts erected their testimony to the principles of liberty and humanity. The royal charter declared all persons born or residing in that province to be free as the king's subjects residing in Great Britain. Several negro slaves, taking advantage of this declaration, sued for freedom and wages, on the ground that, by the laws of England, no man may be deprived of liberty, but by the judgment of his peers; that the provincial laws on slavery merely treated it as an existing evil, which they aimed to mitigate, but did not authorize or sanction; and that even though the parents were supposed to have been lawfully enslaved, no such condition should descend to their offspring. The first trial took place in 1770, two years before the Somerset case in England. The cause was decided in favour of the negroes. Other suits were entered with similar issues. Soon, however,

* Tucker's Blackstone.

the results of the war swept away the authority of the British crown, and with it the occasion of such judicial proceedings.

Thus, from the very dawn of their existence, until their separation from Great Britain, did the American colonies maintain an unwearied, though unavailing struggle with the crown, on the question of slavery. Thus, through all the years of British supremacy in America, was the power of king and parliament exercised, and the wealth of the nation employed, to rob Africa of her sons, and force the institution of slavery on the colonies. Not even when, by the Somerset decision, she had assumed the proud boast, that English soil could not bear the tread of a slave, nor for thirty-six years thereafter, did Britain relax her exertions to that effect, or abandon the policy on which they were based. Nor in all this was she inconsistent with herself, or untrue to the principles which rule her to this day. Slavery, as she and the colonies alike understood, is detrimental to manufactures. And hence, on the one hand, by filling the colonies with negroes, she guarded her own manufactures from competition there; whilst, on the other, by the prohibition of slavery in England, she protected them at home from the contact of its withering influence. Nor did she depart from this policy when she abandoned the slave trade, and decreed the emancipation of her colonial slaves. Having filled her colonies with negroes, of whose competition in manufactures she could have no fear, by the abandonment of the trade, and West India emancipation, she sought, as her statesmen avowed, and her philanthropists complained, to open, among her freed men, a market for her manufactures, which slaves could never supply, and to create a similar market in Africa, which the slave trade must utterly preclude.

It is estimated by Bandinel, a competent authority, that the Royal African Company alone, between the years 1713 and 1733, transported some fifteen thousand negroes annually, or three hundred thousand in all, of whom, about one-half were distributed to the Spanish, and the rest to the English colonies. He estimates the average number exported annually, between

the years 1733 and 1753, at twenty thousand, making four hundred thousand more.* Bancroft makes an estimate of the whole number taken by the Companies and by private traders. "From 1680 to 1700, the English took from Africa about three hundred thousand negroes; or, about fifteen thousand a year. The number, during the continuance of the Assiento, may have averaged not far from thirty thousand."† The Assiento was terminated by war, in 1739, after a continuance of twenty-six years; so that, according to this calculation, the number of negroes taken from Africa, and distributed to the American islands and continent, during its operation, was about seven hundred and eighty thousand! Raynal estimates the aggregate number of slaves taken from Africa, by all Europe, prior to the American war, at nine millions! Others have set it down at much higher figures. The estimate given by Bancroft is the lowest made by any competent investigator. He asserts England to have transported at least half of the entire number, and states her share in the traffic to have amounted to nearly three millions, besides more than a quarter of a million thrown into the Atlantic on the voyage from Africa! As the result of all, when the American colonies separated from the mother country, they found themselves the involuntary guardians of half a million African slaves. Such were the results of a century and a half of British dominion in this land; such the chief legacy, the only important product of the power and resources of England, as applied to the affairs of the colonies—a legacy of five hundred thousand ignorant and vicious barbarians, thrust into the bosom of a Christian republic, there to exert a corresponding influence—a heritage of slavery, intruded to mar the fair proportions of the institutions of the free—a fountain of dissension, anarchy, and disunion—a blight and a curse.

The commencement of the war of Independence was the introduction of a new era on the subject of slavery. In 1774, Congress adopted—among its first measures, as an article of

* Western Africa, by Rev. J. L. Wilson, D. D., late missionary in Africa—p. 63.

† Bancroft, vol. iii., p. 411.

the non-importation agreement—a mutual pledge to abstain from and discountenance the slave trade, and all those who should continue to pursue it. When the original draft of the Declaration of Independence was laid before Congress, it employed the following language in relation to the royal patronage of that traffic. "He has waged war against human nature itself; violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty, in the persons of a distant people who never offended him; captivating and carrying them into slavery, in another hemisphere, or, to incur a miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where *men* should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce." This paragraph was erased, not because it deviated from historic truth, or failed to express the sentiments of the great majority of Congress, and the vast proportion of the American people; but for the purpose of securing perfect unanimity in support of the propriety, as well as the truth, of every utterance contained in a document of such peculiar character and importance.

The decree of independence was a signal for the inception of an anti-slavery policy in a majority of the states. The district of Vermont had been under the jurisdiction of New York, and with it subject to the pro-slavery policy of Great Britain, although there were but a few individual slaves in the territory. On the second of July, 1777, a convention met to frame a state constitution. In this document, the doctrine of liberty was emphatically enunciated. At a shortly subsequent period it was declared by the legislature, that "by the constitution of this state, all the subjects of this commonwealth, of whatever colour, are equally entitled to the inestimable blessings of freedom, unless they have forfeited the same by the commission of some crime; and the idea of slavery is expressly and totally exploded from our free government." And it was enacted, that if any person should attempt to seize or hold "any subject of this state" as a slave, he shall, upon convic-

tion, forfeit and pay to such subject one hundred pounds, and pay the costs of suit.*

An act of gradual emancipation was adopted by the Assembly of Pennsylvania on the first of March, 1780, in the preamble to which it is stated, that "we esteem it a peculiar blessing granted to us, that we are enabled this day to add one more step to universal civilization, by removing, as much as possible, the sorrows of those who have lived in undeserved bondage, and from which, by the assumed authority of the kings of Great Britain, no effectual relief could be obtained." The act provides that "all servitude for life, or slavery of children, in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all children born within this state, from and after the passing of this act as aforesaid, shall be, and hereby is, utterly taken away, extinguished, and for ever abolished."

One day later, Massachusetts adopted a constitution and bill of rights which soon effected the extinction of slavery. "It was fully abolished in this commonwealth, in the year 1783, by decisions of the courts of justice, and by the interpretation placed on the declaration of equality in the bill of rights."† Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, adopted abolition enactments in 1784, New York in 1799, and New Jersey in 1804. In Massachusetts the emancipation was immediate and entire. The act of Connecticut provided, that, of those born after its passage, none should be held in servitude "longer than until they arrive at the age of twenty-five." The Rhode Island law was similar to that of Pennsylvania. That of New York, as passed in 1799, emancipated all born subsequent to the passage thereof, the males at twenty-eight years of age and the females at twenty-five. In 1817, a new law was adopted, declaring all born thereafter free at twenty-one, and those born before July 4, 1799, free after July 4, 1827. The law of New Jersey declared all those born subsequent to July 4, 1804, free, the males at twenty-five and the females at twenty-one.

The results of these measures will be seen at a glance in the

* Twenty-sixth Ann. Rep. Vermont Col. Soc., in *African Repository*, 1846, pp. 105, 106.

† Mr. Everett, in Message to Massachusetts Legislature, January 5, 1836.

following table of the number of slaves reported in the successive decades of the census.

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.	1850.	1860.
Pennsylvania	3,727	1,706	795	211	*386	64		
Vermont	17							
Connecticut	2,759	951	310	97	17	5		
New Hampshire	158	8						
Rhode Island	962	381	103	48	25	17		
New York	21,324	20,343	15,017	10,088	75	4		
New Jersey	11,423	12,422	10,851	7,657	2,254	674	236	
Total	40,370	35,811	27,076	18,101	2,757	764	236	

Our space will not permit, nor is it necessary here to trace the history of the ordinance of 1787, by which the Northwest was declared exempt from the entrance of slavery.

The constitutional provision that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight," did not preclude, but implied, the right of the states severally to prohibit the importation of slaves. It did not forbid the confirming of such state prohibition by additional penalties imposed by Congress; nor did it deprive that body of the right to exclude the traffic from the territories. In each of these modes, therefore, was the seal of reprobation set upon the trade. By Virginia, it was, in 1778, prohibited, under penalty of death; and by the northern states, generally, that part of the non-importation agreement of 1774, which for ever prohibited the slave trade, was observed and enforced by enactments of various degrees of severity. In Congress, a law was adopted, in 1794, (approved March 22,) imposing heavy penalties upon citizens who should engage in the trade for the supply of foreign countries. In 1798, the importation of slaves from abroad into the Mississippi territory was prohibited, (April 7,) under penalty of three hundred dollars for each imported slave, and their emancipation. A like provision, adopted March 26,

* Upon an investigation by the Senate of Pennsylvania, it was found that this enumeration included the freeborn minor children of slaves. Hence an apparent increase within the preceding decennial period.

1804, exeluded from the newly purchased Louisiana territory, all slaves from whatever quarter, which had been imported into the United States, subsequent to May 1, 1798, and prohibited the bringing of any slaves whatever into the territory, for sale. In 1803, February 28, an act was passed, requiring the custom-house officers to conform strictly to any state regulations for the exclusion of negroes; and imposing penalties on masters of vessels and others violating such laws. On the second of March, 1807, it was enacted, that from and after January 1, 1808—the earliest day at which, under the Constitution, the prohibition could take effect—"it shall not be lawful to import or bring into the United States, or the territories thereof, from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of said negro, mulatto, or person of colour, as a slave, or to be held to service or labour," under pain of confiscation of the vessel; a fine of twenty thousand dollars each, against the parties engaged, their aiders and abettors; and other penalties.

On the 25th of the same month, a similar law was enacted by the British parliament, prohibiting the importation of slaves into the British colonies after the first of March, 1808.

In perfect harmony with the preceding, has been the entire subsequent action of the government of the United States. In the treaty of Ghent, the tenth article initiated negotiations on the subject with the foreign powers. It provides that, "whereas, the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and whereas, both his majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object."

The moral sentiment of the American people, sustained by the severity of the laws, had now put a total stop to the importation of slaves into this country. There were still, however, those found, to whom the profits of the foreign trade were paramount to the authority of the laws. It was, therefore, enacted, on the 15th of May, 1820, that all who continued in that trade be held guilty of piracy, and punished with death.

To give full effect to this enactment, the House of Representatives, on the 28th of February, 1823, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-one to nine, "*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to enter upon, and prosecute, from time to time, such negotiations with the several maritime powers of Europe and America, as he may deem expedient for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation as piracy, under the law of nations, by the consent of the civilized world."

The British ministry had already, in 1818, proposed to the government of the United States the grant of a mutual right of search, as the only effectual means of suppression. But, after the experience already had of the significance of such a right, and having just terminated a war waged against the aggressions which were committed under pretence of it, but one answer could be returned. The proposal was declined. It was now renewed by the British minister at Washington, Mr. Canning. In again declining to acquiesce in the proposed plan, Mr. Adams stated in a letter to Mr. Canning, June 24, 1823, three principles involved, "to neither of which the government of the United States felt itself at liberty to accede. The *first* was the mutual concession of the right of search and capture, in time of peace, over merchant vessels, on the coast of Africa. The *second* was the exercise of that right even over vessels under convoy of the public officers of their own nation; and the *third* was the trial of the captured vessels by mixed commissions in colonial settlements, under no subordination to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country to which the party brought before them for trial should belong."

He states that he is directed by the President to propose the adoption by Great Britain of the principle of the act of May 15, 1820, declaring the slave trade to be piracy, "and to offer a mutual stipulation to annex the penalties of piracy to the offence of participating in the slave trade, by the citizens or subjects of the respective parties." "To this measure, none of the objections which have been urged against the extension of the right of search appear to be applicable. Piracy being an offence against the human race, has its well-known incidents of capture and punishment by death, by the people and tribunals

of every country. By making this trade piratical, it is the nature of the crime which draws after it the necessary consequences of capture and punishment."*

In a communication of the same date, June 24, 1823, addressed to Mr. Rush, United States minister to the court of St. James, the negotiation was transferred to him, with a project of a treaty, of which Mr. Adams says: "The draft of a convention is herewith enclosed, which—if the British government should agree to treat upon this subject, on the basis of a legislative prohibition of the slave trade by both parties, under the penalties of piracy—you are authorized to propose and conclude. These articles, however, are not offered to the exclusion of others which may be proposed on the part of the British government; nor is any one of them, excepting the first, to be insisted on as indispensable, if others equally adapted to answer their purposes, should be proposed. It is only from the consideration of the crime in the character of piracy, that we can admit the visitation of our merchant vessels, by foreign officers, for any purpose whatever; and, in that case, only under the effective responsibility of the officer for the act of visitation itself, and for everything done under it."†

The first article of the project declared, that "the two high contracting powers having each, separately, by its own laws, subjected their subjects and citizens, who may be convicted of carrying on the illicit traffic in slaves on the coast of Africa, to the penalties of piracy, do hereby agree to use their influence, respectively, with the other maritime and civilized nations of the world, to the end that the said African slave trade may be recognised, and declared to be piracy, under the law of nations."

As the result of these negotiations, the British government agreed to declare the trade piratical; and, on that basis, a convention was entered into, by the plenipotentiaries, for its suppression, by making the law of piracy, as applied to that traffic, under the statutes of the two governments, reciprocally operative on the vessels and subjects or citizens of each other.

* Adams's letters of March 31 and June 24, 1823, communicated March 19, 1824, in answer to a call of the House of Representatives.

† Ibid.

For the purpose specified, the right was conceded to commissioned officers of the respective navies, who should be furnished with instructions for executing the laws against the slave trade, of "visiting, capturing, and delivering over for trial, the merchant vessels of the other, engaged in the traffic of slaves."

This convention was ratified by the Senate, with an amendment restricting its provisions to "commanders and commissioned officers duly authorized, under the regulations and instructions of their respective governments, to cruise on the coasts of Africa and of the West Indies, for the suppression of the slave trade." The coast of America was excepted from the concessions of the treaty. "The exception of the coast of America from the seas upon which the mutual power of capturing the vessels under the flag of either party may be exercised, had reference, in the views of the Senate, doubtless, to the coast of the United States. On no part of that coast, unless in the Gulf of Mexico, is there any probability that slave-trading vessels will ever be found."* The United States had too recently experienced the aggressions of the British navy, exercised under pretence of the right of search, to expose herself, by treaty, to the unrestricted exercise of that right on the line of her coast, under the pretext of suppressing the trade where a slaver was never seen. Another consideration may have had weight with the Senate. By the local and restricted application of the provisions of the treaty, it was rendered impossible that the concessions therein made should ever be drawn to support a general claim of the right of search under the law of nations.

That the caution of the Senate was well-founded, we have recent demonstration. It is but four years since, the vexations and obstructions to American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, arising from the assumption of the right of search by British cruisers, upon professed suspicion of slave-trading, seriously threatened the peace of the two countries, and led to a peremptory correspondence, in which the English government was at length brought formally to renounce any claim to visit or

* Adams's despatch to Mr. Rush, in Appendix to Gales and Seaton's Register of Debates; eighteenth Congress, second session, p. 23.

the whole superior to that of any other negro population in the world, that of Liberia only excepted.

The proper attitude of the general government is not, and in practice it has never been, that of a mere passive indifference on the subject of slavery. It is bound, indeed, not only to avoid all encroachments on the prerogatives of the states with reference to the subject, but to respect the delicacy and difficulty of the questions to them, which are connected with it. But, in perfect consistency with these obligations, its position, normally, historically, and in the Constitution itself, is in moral opposition to slavery, and to every attempt to increase it, and in sympathy with every movement which originates in enlarged wisdom and justice, and tends to the enfranchisement of the slave.

SHORT NOTICES.

Sermons by Jabez Bunting, D. D. Vol. I. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1862.

This large octavo, of nearly five hundred full and compact pages, appears to be the first of we know not how many; the residue of which are yet to appear. The author, Dr. Bunting, was among the foremost of the Wesleyan preachers of England. The public will be glad to have access to these specimens of his preaching. So far as we have been able to observe, his sermons are characterized by devout and evangelical sentiment, with an occasional tinge of methodistical peculiarities; by great simplicity and force of thought and diction; by fervour and earnestness, which infuse an impassioned glow into his arguments and appeals; in short, by several elements of "power in the pulpit," which account for his high rank and influence as a preacher.

The Testimony of Christ to Christianity. By Peter Bayne, A. M., author of "The Christian Life," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862.

Mr. Bayne has already acquired distinction as a writer on topics of religion and literature, in his "Christian Life," and "Essays on Biography and Criticism." His characteristic traits as a writer appear in the present volume, which presents a refutation of the sceptical objections of Hume and others to the reality, and the convictive weight of miracles, while it exhibits the positive argument in their favour, and in behalf of the divine inspiration and authority of the Book, of which they are the God-sent vouchers. The novel feature of the argument is, as its title indicates, the manner in which he arrays the testimony of Christ in support of his own miracles, showing this testimony to be conclusive from the character of the witness, and proving the divine excellence of the witness from the internal evidence of his recorded words and deeds. Of course, the originality lies rather in the manner of putting these things, than in the substance of the things themselves. And here we find that freshness of thought, style, and imagery, which have already won for him a high place among living authors. We know not how far a rigid scrutiny might detect questionable propositions. It strikes us, however, that the following for-

mal definition of a miracle (p. 47) does not clearly distinguish it from the supernatural workings of the Holy Ghost in the human soul. "A miracle is an occasional display of divine power, independently of those sequences of natural law through which God commonly acts."

The "I Wills" of Christ: being Thoughts upon some of the Passages in which the words "I will" are used by the Lord Jesus Christ. By Rev. Philip Bennett Power, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Worthing; author of the "I Wills" of the Psalms, &c., &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

It is very obvious that this quaint title, while redolent of piety, hardly presents any ground of logical unity, further than as all Christian topics are connected by that holy bond which makes them "one in Christ." The topics strung together on this thread, are the "I Wills" of Invitation, Reception, Healing, Confession, Service, Comfort, Disposal, Subjection, Glorification. These are treated in the form of discourses from utterances of Christ which contain the phrase "I Will;" some of which are among the most pregnant and emphatic in the whole Bible. Evangelical truth and unction pervade the whole volume, which presents the subjects discussed in a manner fitted to instruct, persuade, and edify. It is rendered the more widely interesting and readable by the copious biographical illustrations from the lives of eminent saints with which it is enriched.

The Parable of the Ten Virgins, in Six Discourses, and a Sermon on the Judgeship of the Saints. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., author of "Last Times," &c. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1862.

Dr. Seiss is beginning to let his light shine in frequent and prolific authorship. He addresses himself especially to exegesis, and expository discourses, doctrinal and practical. The present, like his previous works, is not without light and power. It is especially designed to signalize and vindicate one form of what is commonly known as the Second Advent doctrine, or, that the conversion of the world is to follow and be caused by, instead of preceding Christ's second advent to our earth. This, too, on this scheme, is to abide for ever, as the eternal habitation of the King of kings, and his redeemed people, who shall reign with him as kings and priests unto God for ever and ever. Of course, we cannot here argue this doctrine, so frequently advanced by some of our present religious writers. Dr. Seiss maintains that the foolish virgins are not unregenerate formalists, but immature, or weak, undeveloped Christians. To render this view at all plausible, requires considerable special pleading—at least in our judgment.

The Life of Arthur Vandeleur, Major Royal Artillery. By the author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars," "English Hearts and English Hands." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

The Biography of Captain Vicars was read with great avidity by the Christian people of this country and Great Britain. It illustrated the possibility, the actual workings, and special characteristics of earnest piety in military life; in peace and in war; in the dull monotony of martial drill, and the terrific excitement of the battle-field. The present is a book of the same general type. Such works are at all times valuable, as showing the power of true Christian zeal in the most difficult circumstances, while they add to the intrinsic force of divine truth, the fascination of martial narrative. In the present military occupation of the young men of our country, and the absorption of the public mind in things of this nature, such books are especially attractive and profitable.

Lessons in Life; a Series of Familiar Essays. By Timothy Titcomb, author of "Letters to the Young," &c. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861.

It is only necessary to read two or three of these essays, which is all that we have as yet been able to do, to be satisfied that the author, Dr. Holland, of Springfield, Massachusetts, is a writer of rare insight and power. His fresh and racy thoughts, his pure, vigorous, and brilliant style, his vigorous exposure of shams, conventionalities, and popular delusions, must make him a favourite with the intelligent and cultivated—indeed, with sensible people generally.

The Little Brown Bible. By E. L. Llewellyn, author of "Mary Humphrey," &c. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This story of an orphan, left with a little brown Bible for his inheritance, is well adapted to interest children and youth, and to illustrate the power of the Holy Scriptures to "make wise unto salvation."

The Christian Physician; or, Reasons why a Physician should be a Follower of Christ. By Wolcott Richards, M. D. Published by the American Tract Society.

After disproving the alleged skeptical tendency of medical studies and pursuits, this judicious little volume proceeds to point out some of the more salient reasons why a physician stands in peculiar need of personal religion, alike on account of the spiritual interests of his patients; his own peace in life, death, and through eternity; and in order to meet with the highest success in the various exigencies of medical practice.

The Catholic Doctrine of a Trinity proved by above a Hundred short and clear Arguments, expressed in the terms of the Holy Scriptures, compared after a manner entirely new. By Rev. William Jones, M. A., F. R. S., Rector of Nayland, Suffolk, England, A. D. 1750 to 1800. Printed by the American Tract Society.

It is only necessary to say that this terse little work fulfils the promise of its title-page; that it really gives the "Catholic," and not some other doctrine of the Trinity; and that it brings to its support, and in refutation of objections against it, copious and irrefragable Scripture proofs, appositely and effectively put; in order to indicate its great value, not only to Christians generally, but to ministers and candidates for the ministry.

The Christian Sabbath; its History, Authority, Duties, Benefits, and Civil Relations; A Series of Discourses. By the Rev. N. L. Rice, D. D., the Rev. William J. Hoge, D. D., the Rev. Harvey D. Ganse, the Rev. William Adams, D. D., the Rev. Alexander H. Vinton, D. D. With a Sketch of the Sabbath Reform, by the Secretary of the New York Sabbath Committee. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

The efforts of the Sabbath Committee, in New York, to promote the better observance, and abate the profanation of the sacred day, have been eminently judicious and successful. The above-mentioned discourses were preached at the instance of this Committee, last winter, to crowded houses, and are now given to the public through the press, in order to enlarge and perpetuate their usefulness. It is only necessary to look at the list of authors and topics, to be assured of their great value and wide circulation.

Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church, with an *Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History*. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D. D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. From the Second London edition, revised. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1862. Pp. 542.

This reprint is from the already famous Riverside press, Cambridge, Mass., whose productions fall little, if any, short of those of London. Professor Stanley has made good use of his time since he entered on his duties at Oxford, in the spring of 1857. The Introduction to this volume consists of three of his early lectures, and this History of the Eastern church is a series of lectures subsequently delivered. He has in preparation a History of the Jewish church, and in contemplation a History of the Church of England. The department of ecclesiastical history has of late years been so laboriously cultivated by German scholars, that it came to be regarded almost as their peculium. It is a matter of sincere gratulation, that English, French, and American authors are entering on this same field.

Almost all German historians write either under the dominion of some philosophical system, or to establish some peculiar hypothesis. It is well to have the same subjects presented as seen through a different, if not a clearer medium. We commend this important work of Professor Stanley to the attention of our readers.

The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States. By John Codman Hurd, Counsellor-at Law. In Two Volumes. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1862. Vol. I., pp. 617. Vol. II., 800.

We cannot pretend to do more than call attention to this elaborate and exhaustive work. It would require weeks of study to be qualified to express an enlightened judgment of these volumes, even if we had the requisite knowledge and ability. No one, however, can read the author's preface without being convinced that he is a man of high intelligence and of large views. Nor can the slightest inspection of the contents of these volumes fail to satisfy the reader that they are a great storehouse of valuable information. We know of no work in the language on the subject of slavery, which can enter into competition with this. Although the topics here presented are more frequently matters of discussion between politicians and moralists, than in courts of justice, this work, the author tells us, is properly a "law book." "It is intended to present statements of law only, without the introduction of any considerations of the effects of such law on the moral and religious, the social or political interests of the nation, or of the several states."

The Reformers; and the Theology of the Reformation. By the late William Cunningham, D. D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edited by his Literary Executors. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. 1862. Pp. 616.

This volume is made up mainly of articles contributed by Dr. Cunningham to the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, supplemented and illustrated from his manuscripts in the hands of his literary executors. They form a connected view of the historical position of the leading minds of the Reformation. These articles produced a profound impression at the time of their original publication, and have received the highest encomiums from D'Aubigné. They constitute a system of historical and polemical divinity, and are a noble monument to the memory of their distinguished author.

John Albert Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament: pointing out from the natural force of the Words, the simplicity, depth, harmony, and saving power of its divine thoughts. A new translation. By Charlton T. Lewis, M. A., and Marvin R. Vincent, M. A., Professors in Troy University. Vol. II. Philadelphia: Perkinpine & Higgins, No. 56 North Fourth street. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1862. Pp. 980.

The reputation of Bengel's Gnomon is established and universally known. All that can be said in reference to any new form in which the work appears, must have reference to the accuracy of the exhibition of the author's text or meaning, and the convenience for consultation. We have here a new translation by competent scholars, and the whole work comprised in two volumes not too cumbrous. In a former number we expressed our favourable judgment of this edition, when the first volume was published.

The Religions before Christ: being an Introduction to the History of the First Three Centuries of the Church. By Edmond de Pressensé, Pastor of the French Evangelical Church, Paris. Translated by L. Corkran. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton & Co. 1862. Pp. 268.

Four volumes of M. de Pressensé's work on the early Church have already appeared. The design of the work is to show the forces with which Christianity had at first to contend, and to develope the idea expressed by St. Paul at Athens, viz., that the heathen were seeking an unknown god. Paganism itself was a work of preparation for the gospel, as it was the outworking of the instinctive desire after God, which belongs even to our fallen nature.

Two Centuries in the History of the Presbyterian Church, Jamaica, Long Island: the oldest existing Church of the Presbyterian name in America. By James M. Macdonald, D. D. With an Appendix, containing discourses delivered, and an account of the services held, in commemoration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the founding of said Church, on the 7th, 8th, and 9th days of January, 1862. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1862. Pp. 329.

Dr. Macdonald has rendered a real service to the church in the preparation of this volume, which has evidently cost him much labour and research. The evidence which he adduces that the church at Jamaica, Long Island, was from its organization a Presbyterian church, seems to us conclusive. It follows that it is the oldest Presbyterian church in the United States of which we have any record. Jamaica was settled in 1656, under a grant from the Dutch authorities. A Dutch minister preached there in 1661. Most of the people came from Hempstead, where the Rev. Richard Denton, a Presbyterian minister, was settled; in 1700, the town, by a unanimous vote, decided that Mr. Hubbard should be ordained their pas-

tor, after the *Presbyterian way;* in 1710, Rev. George McNish, one of the original members of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, became the minister of the church, which retained its connection with that body. This is only a small part of the evidence presented by Dr. Macdonald in favour of the Presbyterian origin of this church, and of its claim to priority in the list of our congregations. The whole volume is replete with important and interesting information, and we cordially recommend it to all concerned in the history of Presbyterianism in this country.

An Exposition of the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Hebrews. By the late John Brown, D. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology to the United Presbyterian Church, and Senior Pastor of the United Presbyterian Congregation, Broughton Place, Edinburgh. Edited by David Smith, D. D., Biggar. Vol. I. and Vol. II. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1862.

These volumes combine the characteristics of a commentary and of lectures. It is not a simple exposition of the text that the author aims at, but the exhibition of the doctrines taught, and their practical application. Dr. Brown's other expository writings are widely and favourably known. The editor informs the public that these volumes are the last of his writings of this class to be committed to the press.

Christ, the Life of the World. Biblical Studies on the Eleventh to the Twenty-first Chapter of St. John's Gospel. By Rudolph Besser, D. D. Translated from the German, by M. G. Huxtable. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin, John Robertson. 1862. Pp. 484.

The peculiarities of Lutheran theology are deeply impressed in this volume, especially in the exposition of the third and sixth chapters of St. John. It is, however, no less distinguished by its learning and its earnest spirit of devotion.

The Princeton Semi-Centennial Jubilee. A Discourse addressed to the Alumni of the Princeton Theological Seminary, April 30, 1862, on the occasion of the Completion of its first half Century. By William B. Sprague, D. D. With an Appendix, containing notices of the other Commemorative Exercises. Albany: Steam Press of Van Benthuysen. 1862. Pp. 72.

Every Alumnus of Princeton Theological Seminary is a debtor to Dr. Sprague for this appropriate and excellent discourse. It fulfilled the expectations of a large and intelligent audience, prepared to desire much on such an occasion, from such a man. We believe the celebration of the Semi-Centennial Anniversary of the Princeton Seminary was a real blessing,

religiously speaking, to all who were present. It was a day of sincere thanksgiving and abounding brotherly love.

Introduction to the Study of the Gospels. With Historical and Explanatory Notes. By Brooke Foss Westcott, M. A., formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; author of a "History of the New Testament Canon," &c. With an Introduction, by Horatio B. Hackett, D. D., Professor in Newtown Theological Institution; author of "A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles," "Illustrations of Scripture," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1862. Pp. 476.

Mr. Westcott has attained a high rank among Biblical scholars by his work on the Canon of the New Testament, and by his contributions to Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. This Introduction to the Study of the Gospels is his latest work, and has been received in England with great favour. It may be confidently commended to the reader as a very valuable accession to our biblical literature.

The Closer Walk, or the Believer's Sanctification. By Henry Darling, D.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1862. Pp. 226.

The design of this work is to incline believers to a closer and more habitual communion with God, and to show them how such fellowship is to be attained. It defines what sanctification is, points out clearly its difference from justification and regeneration; shows that it is necessarily progressive, depends on our vital union with Christ, and is carried on by the Holy Spirit, exciting, guiding, and aiding the activities of the soul in its constant struggle after holiness. We sincerely hope that the pious wish of the author to benefit his fellow Christians may be abundantly answered. We believe it is adapted to be extensively useful.

Lectures on the Science of Language. Delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in April, May, and June, 1861. By Max Muller, M. A., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford; Corresponding Member of the Imperial Institute of France. From the second London edition, revised. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1862. Pp. 416.

Another production of the River-side press, worthy of the elegant form in which it is presented. The science of language is comparatively of recent origin. It concerns equally the philosopher, the historian, and theologian. It is the surest guide in all ethnographical investigations. Had some distinguished naturalists been something more than naturalists—had they not been one-sided in their culture—they would have seen that the results of comparative philology prove many of their theories as to the varieties of the human family, to be untenable,

because in opposition to undeniable facts. The author is not extravagant in saying, "that the discoveries in this newly-opened mine of scientific inquiry were not inferior, whether in novelty or importance, to the most brilliant discoveries of our age." The whole subject is briefly treated in this volume by the hand of a master. It is one of the most interesting and valuable books of the day.

Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia—Rev. ii., iii. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D., Dean of Westminster. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. Published by arrangement with the author. 1861. Pp. 312.

Few portions of the word of God have greater or more peculiar attractions than the Epistles to the Seven Churches. They are beset with difficulties; they present many problems hard to solve. They exhibit the Lord Jesus Christ under new titles, and in new relations to his church; they therefore call for much study, as well as for devout perusal. The reader will be thankful for the aid of such an accomplished guide as Dr. Trench in the examination of these epistles, to whose interpretation he has devoted much time and labour.

The Hand of God with the Black Race. A Discourse delivered before the Pennsylvania Colonization Society. By Rev. Alexander T. McGill, D. D, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. 1862.

This is an eloquent plea for the colonization of the black race to a land that is their own. The arguments showing the inadequacy of any other means of emancipating these people from social and political degradation, with all its dire consequences, are strongly and vividly put. This subject is acquiring new interest in view of the perplexing problems which our present civil war is rapidly raising, in regard to the disposal and destiny of the increasing number of Africans whose fetters it strikes loose. The discourse of Dr. McGill is well fitted to correct the errors of extremists on either side, whether abolition or pro-slavery.

Quit you like Men; be Strong. An Address delivered before the American Whig and Cliosophic Societies of the College of New Jersey, June 25, 1861. By William C. Cattell, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1861.

Those who have the ear of educated men, young and old, at our great academic festivals, enjoy high opportunities to do good. If they embrace the occasion to advocate lofty and ennobling principles, while they denounce and expose the spurious doctrines to which the educated mind of the time is prone,

they may render high service to the cause of truth and righteousness. This is medicating the streams of public opinion at their fountains. In this address before the literary societies of the College of New Jersey, Mr. Cattell avails himself of his opportunity to denounce utilitarian and epicurean ethics, to inculcate a lofty and self-sacrificing virtue on the basis of pure Christianity, and to kindle in the breasts of his auditors generous sentiments and lofty aspirations. Nor does he present dull abstractions, nor pour upon his subject only a dry light; he enlivens his discourse with the sparkle of wit and humour, of copious and apposite illustration.

"AN INVALUABLE BOOK."

FLEMING'S VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY.

A VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL;

WITH QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS.

By WILLIAM FLEMING, D. D.,

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

From the second revised and enlarged London edition, with Introduction, Chronology of the History of Philosophy brought down to 1860, Bibliographical and Analytical Index, Synthetical Tables, and other additions, by

CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D. D.,

Translator of "Tholuck on the Gospel of John."

687 PAGES. LARGE 12mo. CLOTH, $1.75.

☞ The Publishers respectfully invite the special attention of College Professors and Students to this great work, and to the opinions of eminent men, as given in the following selection from many commendatory notices received.

From Rev. LYMAN H. ATWATER, D. D., Professor of Mental Philosophy, College of New Jersey, Princeton.

"I know of no work that so well answers the purposes of a *vade mecum* for the English or American student of Philosophy, whether in the more elementary or advanced stages of study. As a Thesaurus of the dicta of the great masters of Philosophy in the English, and to some extent in other tongues, on cardinal points, it is invaluable. Midway between a dictionary and encyclopedia, it is precisely what is wanted, not only by all students of philosophy, but by all men of letters and liberal culture."

From the Hon. THEO. FRELINGHUYSEN, President of Rutger's College, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

"A very valuable help to the student, and the main work is enriched by the Chronological Table and Bibliographical Index, &c. It deserves a large patronage. Scholars will prize it, and all who would grow in useful knowledge would find that the cost paid would be well expended."

From Rev. THOMAS C. UPHAM, D. D., Professor of Mental Philosophy in Bowdoin College, Maine.

"I regard it as a highly valuable work. It exhibits abundant evidence, not only of the learning which is requisite in such an undertaking, but of intellectual ability and good judgment. Every student of Mental and Moral Philosophy will find an advantage in possessing it, and if he has not a large library, and great opportunity for reading, and the comparison of books and systems, such a work becomes quite indispensable to him."

From Rev. HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

"The additions of the American editor increase, very materially, the value and usefulness of the work. Every student of Philosophy will find it needful to have a volume which presents, in a clear, concise, and convenient manner, the definitions and statements of the most eminent thinkers, upon all the leading terms pertaining to the human mind, its operations and ideas."

From Rev. W. LORD, D. D., Professor of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History in North-Western Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

"It is indeed an admirable compend of philosophical terms and definitions, which, when once possessed, will be felt to be, not only a convenience, but a necessity."

From Rev. E. V. GERHART, D. D., President and Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa.

"Upon examination, I find it to be a very valuable help to the student of Philosophy, combining extensive research and accurate scholarship, with clearness and force of diction. As a book of reference, it is superior to any work in the English language."

From LORIN ANDREWS, LL.D., Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio.

"I have examined with care and interest 'Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy,' and I have no hesitation in pronouncing it a most valuable aid to teacher and pupil. I do not see how any one interested in the study of Philosophy can afford to do without this almost indispensable work."

SMITH, ENGLISH & Co., Publishers,
No. 23 North Sixth street, Philadelphia.

TERMS FOR 1862.

THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW is published quarterly, in January, April, July and October, at THREE DOLLARS PER ANNUM.

1. Subscribers for one copy, who remit THREE DOLLARS *in advance*, to the office of publication, will be entitled to payment of postage on all numbers issued after the receipt of the money.

2. Subscribers who remit FIVE DOLLARS *in advance*, to the office of publication, will be entitled to one copy for two years, postage paid.

3. Six or more persons uniting in a club, and remitting *in one sum* to the office of publication at the rate of TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS each, will be entitled to payment of postage on the numbers issued after the receipt of the money. Payment at club-rate will not be received from a less number than six subscribers in one association. If payment is delayed by members of a club until after the expiration of the year, the full price of THREE DOLLARS will invariably be charged.

4. Theological Students, Missionaries, Young Men's Christian Associations, &c., are furnished with the Review, at TWO DOLLARS per year; or $2.25 by mail, postage paid.

5. All arrearages are charged at THREE DOLLARS per year.

The above are the only terms upon which the Review is furnished to subscribers in the United States or British possessions.

Bills of all solvent banks in the United States or British Provinces received in payment, and may be sent by mail at the risk of the publisher; but those who send are requested to keep a memorandum of the contents and date of their letter till they receive a receipt. Those who act as agents, or remit in large amounts, are requested to procure a check or draft. Subscribers in Canada may send their orders and money to the Rev. A. KENNEDY, London, Canada West; and those in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, to the Rev. WM. ELDER, A. M., St. Stephen, New Brunswick.

PETER WALKER,
821 *Chestnut Street, Philadelphia.*

☞ It is a standing rule of the Office to send the Repertory to all subscribers who have not given notice of discontinuance by the first day of January. And even when due notice is given, the work will not be discontinued, till all arrearages are paid, unless at the option of the Publisher.

☞ NOTICES *of Removal or of Discontinuance must be sent direct to the office of publication,* 821 *Chestnut st., Philadelphia.*