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☞ The publisher of the *Biblical Repertory* takes the liberty to say, that out of Philadelphia and New York the subscribers are almost entirely ministers; and he thinks that in most churches there are ladies and gentlemen sufficiently intellectual to appreciate the themes discussed in its pages. If one could be found in each church, it would nearly double our subscribers. We would thank our ministers to try. P. W.

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ART. I.—*Remarks on the Ethical Philosophy of the Chinese.*

WIDELY as the Chinese have departed from the meagre outline of a religious system, left them by Confucius, they have generally adhered to his moral teachings. Developed by his followers, received by the suffrages of the whole people, and enforced by the sanctions of the "Three Religions," the principles which he inculcated may be said to have moulded the social life of one-third of the human family. These are no where to be found digested into a scientific form; but diffused through the mingled masses of physics and metaphysics which compose the *Sing-li Ta-tseuen*, or sparkling in the detached apophthegms of "The Sages"; happily for our convenience, we have them brought to a focus, in the chart, a translation of which is given below.

We shall confine ourselves to the task of explaining this important document, as the best method of exhibiting the system in its practical influence; though an independent view would afford freer scope for developing its principles.

This chart is anonymous; but the want of a name detracts nothing from its value. The author has no merit beyond the

idea of presenting the subject in a tabular view, and the pictorial taste with which he has executed the design. Of the ethical system so exhibited he originated nothing; and the popularity of his work is due mainly to the fact, that it is regarded as a faithful synopsis of the Confucian morals. In this view it is highly esteemed by the *Seen-sangs* of Ningpo, a city which ranks among the foremost in the Chinese empire in point of literary culture.

Note.—The half-illuminated sphere prefixed to the chart has scarcely more connection with its subject matter, than the royal coat-of-arms stamped on the title-page of some editions has with the contents of King James' Bible. It represents the mundane egg, or mass of chaotic matter, containing *Yin* and *Yang*, the seminal principles from whose action and reaction all things were evolved. *Woo-keih* produced *Tai-keih; Tai-keih* produced *Yin* and *Yang;* and these dual principles generated all things. This is the lucid cosmogony of the Chinese; and it adds little to its clearness to render the above terms, as they are usually translated by the "great extreme," the "male and female powers," &c.

The primitive signification of *Yang* and *Yin*, is *light* and *darkness*, a meaning exhibited in the shading of the diagram. *Tai-keih* may be rendered the Great Finite, and *Woo-keih*, the Indefinite or Infinite. We have then the following statement as the starting point of their philosophy and history.

The Infinite produced the Great Finite, and the Great Finite (the universe) evolved light and darkness. The passage, thus given, is equally rational and beautiful. It admits a creative power anterior to chaos, makes the production of light one of the earliest of creative acts, and, with at least poetical truth, ascribes the generation of all things to the action of light and darkness, or the succession of days and seasons. It is so far consonant with the Genesis of the Christian Scriptures; and may have originated in some indistinct tradition. Whether it was ever so understood, it is impossible to affirm; though it is certain that no such meaning is attached to it at the present day.

The dual principles of the Chinese, as explained by themselves, are not light and darkness; neither are they, like those of the ancient Persians, the antagonistic powers of good and evil. The creation and preservation of the universe are ascribed to them; and yet they are not regarded as deities, but as unconscious impersonal agents. Popularly they are understood, in a phallic sense, as the energies of the universal sexual system; and philosophically, as certain forces, positive and negative, to which, automatic and uncontrolled by any intelligence, are referable all the changes in the universe. They are the pillars of a materialistic atheism.

A CHART OF CHINESE ETHICS.

IN FOUR PARTS.

Part I.—CHART OF THE GREAT STUDY.

This contains the True Tradition of the Holy Sages. Whoever obtains this doctrine may live in prosperity and die in peace. I have accordingly condensed it into a chart, to be hung on the right of your easy chair, to aid your study of virtue, just as the ancients made use of inscriptions on their girdles and wash-basins.

Heaven having given existence to man, the doctrine of the  Great Study succeeded, and established order in society.

Restricted in its sphere, it produces the perfection of individual excellence—a Holy Sage.

His aim is,
PERSONAL VIRTUE.
The means to its attainment are—

- **1. Propriety of Conduct.**
  - Fidelity and Truth.
  - Suavity and Respect.
  - Dignity of Carriage.
  - Precision of Words and Actions.
- **2. Right Feeling.**
  - Avoiding Prejudice.
  - Restraining the Passions.
  - Cherishing Good Impulses.
  - Adhering to the Just mean.
- **3. Correctness of Purpose.**
  - Self-examination.
  - Scrutiny of Secret Motives.
  - Religious Reverence.
  - Fear of Self-deception.
- **4. Intelligence of Mind.**
  - Rejection of Error.
  - Comprehension of the Truth.
  - Quickness of Moral Perception.
  - Insight into Providence.
  - Study of the Laws of Nature.
  - Study of the Constitution of Man.
  - Study of the Records of History.

From the Son of Heaven down to the private man, every one must begin with the Cultivation of Personal Virtue.

With free scope for its exercise, it makes a Reformer of the World—a True King.

His aim is,
SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT.
The means to its attainment are—

- **1. The Discipline of the Family.**
  - Filial Piety.
  - Fraternal Love.
  - Conjugal Fidelity.
  - Care in Choice of Associates.
  - Strictness in Intercourse of the Sexes.
  - Attention to Established Rules.
  - Instruction to Children.
  - Caution against Partiality.
  - Harmony with Neighbours.
  - Regard for Frugality.
- **2. The Government of the Empire.**
  - Science of Government.
  - Power of Combination.
  - Reverence for Heaven and Ancestors.
  - Discrimination in Choice of Agents.
  - Love for the People.
  - Zeal for Education.
  - Strictness in Executing the Laws.
- **3. The Subjugation (*lit.* Pacification) of the World.**
  - Wisdom in Conducting War.
  - Righteousness in Rewards and Punishments.
  - Liberality in admitting the Expression of Sentiment.
  - Frugality in Expenditures.
  - Skill in Legislation.

The Great Study stops only at Perfection.

The Chart of the Great Study will acquaint you with the principles of virtue; but as the keeping of the heart is a matter of great difficulty, I accordingly subjoin this chart of it.

The Wisdom Heart is minute and subtle,
(*i. e.*, the germ of virtue is small and feeble.)

*

The Human Heart is in constant jeopardy,
(*i. e.*, beset with dangers, and prone to evil.)

Point of Divergence
between *Shun* and *Tseih* (*scil.* Cato and Nero.)

Influence of Primordial Harmony.

The Wisdom Heart.

1. Obeys Heaven.

(*a*) In Propriety of Conduct.

By { Regulating the External Actions, and Moderating the Internal Passions.

(*b*) In the Exercise of Charity.

By { Conquering the Malevolent Affections, and Governing the Desires and Aversions.

2. Restrains Self.

(*a*) In Subduing the Lusts.

By { Repressing Self-love, and Curbing Animal Appetite.

(*b*) In Guarding Solitude.

By { Not injuring one's body, soul, nature, or life; Not forgetting the reverential exercise of self-control.

He who pursues this course will daily rise in illumination, and finally become a saint or sage. Propitious stars will shine on him, and happiness attend his footsteps.

Influence of Gross Matter.

The Human Heart.

1. Indulges Self.

(*a*) In Habits of Indolence.

Leading to { Gluttony and Drunkenness. Idleness and Waste of Time.

(*b*) In Carnal Lusts.

Leading to { Shameless Excesses. Abominable Immoralities.

(*c*) In Avarice.

Leading to { Filthy Lucre. Violent Extortion.

2. Dismisses Conscience.

(*a*) In Yielding to Impulse.

For { Sensual Pleasure. Anger, Strife, &c.

(*b*) In Treachery.

Involving { Flattery and Deceit.

(*c*) In Hypocrisy.

Involving { Dissimulation and Falsehood.

He who follows this course, daily drifts into deeper corruption, and finally becomes a beast or monster. Evil stars glare on him, and calamity overtakes him.

* *Sing*, the Chinese character for *heart*.

The two roads of virtue and vice are clearly treated in the above chart, but as the virtues are not easy to practice, I add a chart of moral excellence.

Momentarily keep it in mind.

BENEVOLENCE.

Public Spirit.—Give all their dues, and let not self set up an opposing interest; but find your own good in the common weal.

Charity.—Do not to others what you would not have done to you.
Remember not old injuries, and treat men according to their several capacity.

Filial Piety.—Gratify the wishes of your parents, and worship your ancestors;
Carry out their purposes, and reflect honour on their name.

Mercy.—Treat all children with kindness, not your own only.
Pity the widow and fatherless, and give succour to brute animals

Magnanimity.—A great soul can bear an offence without resenting it.
He mingles with men on easy terms, and affects no superiority.
Kindness must be repaid, but not injury.
Rather suffer a wrong than do one.

Tremblingly hold it fast.

JUSTICE.

Manliness.—If you fail in anything, seek help in yourself.
Stand to your post, and let not vague desires draw you from it.

Fraternity.—Respect your elder, and be kind to your younger brothers.
Reverence age, and give precedence to years.

Courage.—When you see the right, do it; when you know your fault, correct it.
Neither truckle to the rich, nor disdain the poor.

Integrity.—Hold it fast, change not for custom.
Be content with simple fare, and when you see gain, ask, Is it just?

Modesty.—Let the men be continent, the women chaste.
Abhor evil, and fear falling.

WISDOM.

Knowledge of Man.—Detect false pretences, cleave to the virtuous, and avoid the vicious. Let not floating rumour move you to dislike a good man.

Knowledge of Nature.—Be erudite, inquisitive, thoughtful, discriminating. Investigating heaven and earth, the past and present.

Knowledge of Fate.—Practice virtue, take care of yourself, do your duty; and let good or ill fortune come as it may.

Use of the Eyes and Ears.—Keep the distant in clear view, and have an open ear for good counsel. Read no immoral books, hearken not to flattering words.

POLITENESS.

Respect—Proceeding from an inward feeling.
It manifests itself in apparel and demeanour.

Caution—Treasures the fruits of observation, hides the bad, and publishes the good.
It preserves conjugal harmony, and maintains decorum in the intercourse of the sexes.

Humility—When rich, feels poor; when full, feels empty.
Makes no boast of abilities, nor prides itself on place or reputation.

Deference—Declines much, and takes little;
And is only solicitous to find a lower place than others.

GOOD FAITH.

Simplicity.—In word and deed, in and out, one and the same.
In study or action, uniform from beginning to end.

Truth.—The words of the inner chambers should bear repeating in the palace.
Your private life should be such that heaven and earth might witness it.

Sincerity of Purpose.—Complete your engagements.
And be faithful in behalf of others.

Honesty of Intention.—So live that your heart will not condemn you, the people dislike you, your family shame you, or your friends reproach you.

The virtues may be copied from the chart of moral excellence, but lest vices should creep in unawares, I conclude with a formula for self-examination.

If guilty, correct your faults.

OFFENCES AGAINST BENEVOLENCE.

Cruelty.—Inflicting misery on family relatives,
And finding pleasure in giving pain to man or beast.
Envy.—Jealous of the advantages of others, obstructing their promotion.
Offended at the superiority of others, indulging in detraction.
Malice.—Playing wicked pranks, and forgetting favours.
Delighting to hear of others' faults, and taking pleasure in publishing them.
Selfishness.—Consulting its own interest, and
Seeking its own advantage.
Treachery.—Inveigling others into evil, and
Involving them in calamity for its own ends.
Petulance.—With spirit so contracted as not to endure an accidental touch.

If innocent, redouble your zeal in the pursuit of virtue.

OFFENCES AGAINST JUSTICE.

Cupidity.—Never satisfied, but always longing.
Indulging the senses, coveting fame, and pursuing gain.
Flattery.—With artificial smiles and simulated voice,
Playing the sycophant in hope of power.
Parsimony.—Neither succouring the needy, nor rewarding the deserving.
Concealing its wealth, and consorting with the poor.
Indecision.—Indolently procrastinating, and shifting with custom.
Drifting with the current, and bending before power.
Discontent.—Uneasy in its condition, and destitute of self-satisfaction.
In everything it murmurs against heaven, and finds fault with man.
Perversity.—Capricious in choices and aversions, not seeking the right.
Following inclination, and regarding neither good nor evil.

OFFENCES AGAINST WISDOM.

Depravity.—Neither inquiring right nor wrong,
Nor distinguishing good from evil.
Levity.—Leading to inconsiderate words and actions.
Shallowness.—Prying and meddlesome.
Mistaking slight praise or blame for glory or shame.
Interpreting slight favour or opposition as love or hatred.
Obstinacy.—Holding to its own opinions, and refusing to be convinced.
Narrowness.—Content with a humble circle of familiar thoughts, and
Unwilling to extend the view, or enlarge the sphere of knowledge.

OFFENCES AGAINST POLITENESS.

Pride.—Using wealth and power for self-magnification.
Employing talents and learning to eclipse others.
Arrogance.—Immodest in language, disrespectful to the aged.
Perverse in action, and heedless of advice.
Carelessness.—In affairs negligent of details,
In disposition harsh, in manners blunt.
Ostentation.—In all things tending to excess.
In general aiming to outshine others.

OFFENCES AGAINST GOOD FAITH.

Superficiality.—Without solid virtues, seeking an empty reputation.
Making a fair show, but hasty and insincere in friendship.
Insincerity.—With heart and life at variance,
Coveting the name of virtue.
Deceit.—In words false, in actions dishonest.
Intrigue.—Scheming, calculating,
Plotting and tergiversating.

Part I. is an epitome of the *Tahio*, the first of the four chief canonical books of the Chinese, and the most admired production of their great philosopher.*

Voluminous as an editor, piously embalming the relics of antiquity, Confucius occupies but a small space as an author; a slender compend of history, and this little tract of a few hundred words, being the only original works which emanated from his own pen. The latter, the title of which signifies the "Great Study," is prized so highly for the elegance of its style and the depth of its wisdom, that it may often be seen inscribed in letters of gold, and suspended as an ornamental tableau in the mansions of the rich. It treats of the Practice of Virtue and the Art of Government; and in the foregoing table these two subjects are arranged in parallel columns. In the first we have the lineaments of a perfect character, superscribed by the word *Sheng*, a "Holy Sage," the name which the Chinese give to their bright ideal. In the other, we have a catalogue of the social virtues as they spread in widening circles through the family, the neighbourhood, the state, and the world. These are ranged under *Wang*, the "Emperor," whose duty it is to cherish them in his subjects; the force of example being his chief instrument, and the cultivation of personal virtue his first obligation. The passage which is here analyzed, and which constitutes the foundation of the whole treatise, is the following:

"Those ancient princes who desired to promote the practice of virtue throughout the world, first took care to govern their own states. In order to govern their states, they first regulated their own families; in order to regulate their families, they first practised virtue in their own persons. In order to the practice of personal virtue, they first cultivated right feeling. In order to insure right feeling, they first had regard to the correctness of their purposes. In order to secure correctness of purpose, they extended their intelligence. This intelligence is to be obtained by inquiring into the nature of things."

* The doctrines of Confucius are well exhibited in an article by the Rev. J. K. Wight, in the *Princeton Review* for April, 1858.

This diminishing series is beautiful. However widely the branches may extend, the quality of their fruit is determined by the common root. Virtue in the state depends on virtue in the family, that of the family on that of the individual; and individual virtue depends not only on right feelings and proper motives; but as a last condition, on right knowledge. Nor is there anything in which Confucius more strikingly exhibits the clearness of his perceptions, than in indicating the direction in which this indispensable intelligence is to be sought, viz. in the nature of things—in understanding the relations which the individual sustains to society and the universe. The knowledge of these is truth, conformity to them is virtue; and moral obligations, Confucius appears, with Dr. Samuel Clarke, to have derived from a perception of these relations, and a sense of inherent fitness in the nature of things. Just at this point, we have a notable hiatus. The editor tells us, the chapter on the "Nature of things" is wanting; and Chinese scholars have never ceased to deplore its loss.

But whatever of value to the student of virtue it may have contained, it certainly did not contain the "beginning of wisdom." For skilfully as Confucius had woven the chain of human relationships, he failed to connect the last link with heaven—to point out the highest class of our relations. Not only, therefore, is one grand division of our duties a blank in his system, but it is destitute of that higher light, and those stronger motives, which are necessary to stimulate to the performance of the most familiar offices.

The young mandarin, who said to a member of one of our recent embassies, in answer to a question as to his object in life, that "he was desirous of performing all his duties to God and man"—was not speaking in the language of the Confucian school. He had discovered a new world in our moral relations which was unknown to the ancient philosopher.

The principal relations of the individual to society are copiously illustrated in this and the other classics. They are five—the *governmental*, *parental*, *conjugal*, *fraternal*, and that of *friendship*. The first is the comprehensive subject of the treatise; and in the second column of the chart, all the others are placed subordinate to it. Though not expressly

named, they are implied in the statement of the first four relative duties—*filial piety*, *fraternal love*, *conjugal fidelity*, and *choice of associates*. The last comprehends the principles which regulate general intercourse. Conjugal *fidelity*, in the sense of chastity, is made obligatory only on the female. *Fraternal* duty requires a rigid subordination, according to the gradation of age, which is aided by a peculiarity of language; each elder brother being called *'hiung*, and each younger, *te;* no common designation, like that of "brother," placing them on equal footing. This arrangement in the family, Confucius pronounces a discipline, in which respect is taught for superiors in civil life; and filial piety, he adds, is the sentiment which the son, who has imbibed it at home, will carry into the service of the prince.

Nothing in fact is more characteristic of Chinese society, than the scope given to filial piety. Intensified into a religious sentiment, by the worship which he renders to his ancestors, it leads the dutiful son to live and act in all situations with reference to his parents. He seeks reputation for the sake of reflecting honour upon them, and dreads disgrace chiefly through fear of bringing reproach on their name. An unkindness to a relative is a sin against them, in forgetting the ties of a common ancestry; and even a violation of the law derives its turpitude from exposing the parents of the offender to suffer with him, in person or in reputation.

It is thus analogous in the universality of its application to the incentive which the Christian derives from his relation to the "Father of spirits;" and if inferior in its efficacy, it is yet far more efficacious than any which a Pagan religion is capable of supplying. Its various bearings are beautifully traced by Confucius, in a discourse which constitutes one of the favourite text-books in the schools of China.

It is not the book that teaches it; but the art of governing thus founded on the practice of virtue, that is emphatically denominated the "Great Study," and this designation expressing, as it does, the judgment of one from whose authority there is no appeal, has contributed to give to Ethics a decided preponderance among the studies of the Chinese.

Other sciences, in their estimation, may be interesting as sources of intellectual diversion, or useful in a subordinate degree, as promotive of material prosperity; but this is *the science*, whose knowledge is wisdom, whose practice is virtue, and whose result is happiness. In the literary examinations, the grand object of which is the selection of men who are qualified for the service of the government, an acquaintance with subjects of this kind contributes more to official promotion than all other intellectual acquirements; and when the aspirant for honours has reached the summit of the scale, and become a member of the privy council, or Premier of the empire, he receives no higher appellation than that of *Ta-hio-sze*—a Doctor of the Great Study—an adept in the art of government.

The Chinese empire has never realized the Utopia of Confucius; but his maxims have influenced its policy to such an extent, that in the arrangements of the government a marked preference is given to moral over material interests. Indeed, it would be hard to overestimate the influence which has been exerted by this little schedule of political ethics, occupying, as it has, so prominent a place in the Chinese mind for four-and-twenty centuries—teaching the people to regard the empire as a vast family, and the emperor to rule by moral influence, making the goal of his ambition not the wealth, but the virtue of his subjects. But it is certain that the doctrines which it embodies have been largely efficient in rendering China what she is, the most ancient, and the most populous of existing nations.

Part II. is chiefly interesting for the views it presents of the condition of human nature. It is not, as its title would seem to indicate, a map of the moral faculties; but simply a delineation of the two ways which invite the footsteps of every human pilgrim. On the one hand are traced the virtues that conduct to happiness; and on the other, the vices that lead to misery. Over the former is written *Taou-sing*, "Wisdom heart," and over the latter, *Jin-sing*, "Human heart," as descriptive of the dispositions from which they respectively proceed.

These terms, with the two sentences of the chart in which they occur, originated in the *Shu-king*, one of the oldest of the

sacred books, and are there ascribed to the emperor *Shun*, who filled the throne about B. C. 2100. Quaint and ill-defined, they have been retained in use through this long period, as a simple expression for an obvious truth—recording as the result of a nation's experience, that "to err is human." They contain no nice distinction as to the extent to which our nature is infected with evil; but intimate that its general condition is such that the word *human* may fairly be placed in antithesis to wisdom and virtue.

Yet the prevailing view of human nature, maintained by Chinese ethical writers, is that of its radical goodness. Though less ancient than the other, this latter is by no means a modern opinion; and it is not a little remarkable that some of those questions which agitated the Christian church in the *fifth century*, were discussed in China nearly a thousand years before. They were not broached by Confucius. His genius was not inquisitive—he was rather an architect, seeking to construct a noble edifice, than a chemist, testing his materials by minute analysis; and, if none are philosophers but those who follow the clue of truth through the mazes of psychological and metaphysical speculation, then he has no right to the title;* but if one who loves wisdom, perceiving it by intuition, and recommending it with authority, be a philosopher, there are few on the roll of time who deserve a higher position.

The next age, however, was characterized by a spirit of investigation which was due to his influence only as the intellectual impulse which he communicated set it to thinking. The moral quality of human nature became a principal subject of discussion; and every position admitted by the subject was successively occupied by some leading mind. *Tsz-sze*, the grandson of the sage, advanced a theory which implied the goodness of human nature; but Mencius, his disciple, (B. C. 317,) was the first who distinctly enunciated the doctrine. *Kaoutsze*, one of his contemporaries, maintained that nature is destitute of any moral tendency, and wholly passive under the plastic hand of education. A discussion arose between them, a

* "Perhaps the subtile genius of Greece was in part withheld from indulging study in ethical controversy by the influence of Socrates, who was much more a teacher of virtue, than even a searcher after truth." *Sir J. Mackintosh.*

fragment of which preserved in the works of Mencius, will serve to exhibit their mode of disputation, as well as the position of the parties.

Nature, said *Kaoutsze*, is a stick of timber, and goodness is the wooden bowl, that is carved out of it.

The bowl, replied Mencius, is not a natural product of the timber; but the tree requires to be destroyed in order to produce it. Is it necessary to destroy man's nature in order to make him good?

Then, said *Kaoutsze*, varying his illustration, human nature may be compared to a stream of water. Open a sluice to the east, and it flows to the east; open one to the west, it flows to the westward. Equally indifferent is human nature with regard to good and evil.

Water, rejoined Mencius, is indifferent as to the east or the west; but has it no choice between up and down? Now human nature inclines to good, as water does to run downward; and the evil it does is the effect of interference, just as water may be forced to run up hill. Man, he repeats, with rhetoric slightly at variance with his philosophy, inclines to virtue, as water does to flow downward, or as the wild beast does to seek the forest.

A few years later, *Seuntsze*, an acute and powerful writer, took the ground that human nature is evil. The influence of education he extolled in even higher terms than Kaoutsze, maintaining that whatever good it produces, it achieves by a triumph over nature in obedience to the dictates of prudence:—that virtue is the slow result of teaching, and vice the spontaneous fruit of neglected nature.

Yang-tsze, about the commencement of the Christian era, endeavoured to combine these opposite views; each contained important truth, but neither of them the whole truth. While human nature possessed benevolent affections, and a conscience approving of good, it had also perverse desires, and a will that chose the evil. It was, therefore, both bad and good; and the character of each individual took its complexion, as virtuous or vicious, according to the class of qualities most cultivated.

In the great controversy, Mencius gained the day. The two authors last named were placed on the *Index Expurgatorius*

of the literary tribunal; and the advocate of human nature was promoted to the second place among the oracles of the empire, for having added a new doctrine, or developed a latent one in the Confucian system. This tenet is expressed in the first line of the *San-tsze-king*, an elementary book, which is committed to memory by every school-boy in China—*Jin che ts'u, sing peng shen*—"Man commences life with a virtuous nature." But notwithstanding this addition to the national creed, the ancient aphorism of *Shun* is still held in esteem; and a genuine Confucian, in drawing a genealogical tree of the vices, still places the root of evil in the *human* heart.

To remove this contradiction, *Chuhe*, the authorized expositor of the classics, devised a theory somewhat similar to Plato's account of the origin of evil. It evidently partakes of the three principal systems above referred to; professing, according to the first, to vindicate the original goodness of human nature, yet admitting, with another, that it contains some elements of evil—and thus virtually symbolizing with the third, which represents it as of a mixed character. "The bright principle of virtue," he says in his notes on the Ta-hio, "man derives from his heavenly origin; and his pure spirit, when undarkened, comprehends all truth, and is adequate to every occasion. But it is obstructed by the physical constitution, and beclouded by the animal (lit. *jin-yuh*, the *human*) desires, so that it becomes obscure."

The source of virtue, as indicated in the chart, is *Tai-ho*—"primordial harmony;" and vice is ascribed to the influence of *Wu-hing*—"gross matter." The moral character is determined by the prevailing influence, and mankind are accordingly divided into three classes, which are thus described in a popular formula:—Men of the first class are good without teaching; those of the second may be made good by teaching; and the last will continue bad in spite of teaching.

The received doctrine in relation to human nature does not oppose such a serious obstacle as might at first be imagined, to the reception of Christianity, though there is reason to fear that it may tinge the complexion of Christian theology. The candid and thoughtful will recognise in the Bible a complete view of a subject which their various theories had only presented in

detached fragments. In the state of primitive purity, it gives them a heaven-imparted nature in its original perfection; in the supremacy of conscience, it admits a fact on which they rely as the main support of their doctrine; in the corruption of nature, introduced by sin, it gives them a class of facts to which their consciousness abundantly testifies; and in its plan for the restoration of the moral ruin, it excites hope and satisfies reason.

The doctrine of human goodness, though supported by a partial view of facts, seems rather to have been suggested by views of expediency. Mencius denounced the tenets of Kaoutsze as pernicious to the cause of morality; and he no doubt considered that to convince men, that they are endowed with a virtuous nature, is the most effectual method of encouraging them to the practice of virtue. In the absence of revelation, there is nothing better. But, while faith in ourselves is a strong motive, faith in God is a stronger one; and, while the view that man is endowed with a noble nature, which he only needs to develope according to its own generous instincts, is sublime; there is yet one which is more sublime, viz., that while fallen man is striving for the recovery of his divine original, he must work with fear and trembling, because it is God that worketh in him.*

Part III., the Chart of Moral Excellence, (as I have called it, or more literally, of that which is to be *striven after* and *held to*,) presents us with goodness in all its forms known to the Chinese. It is chiefly remarkable for its grouping—the entire domain being divided into five families, each ranged under a parent virtue. The Greeks and Romans reckoned four cardinal virtues; but a difference in the mode of division, implies no incompleteness in the treatment of the subject. The Chinese do not, because they count only twelve hours in the day instead of twenty-four, pretermit any portion of time; neither when they number twenty-eight signs in the zodiac, instead of twelve, do they assign an undue length to the starry

* The writer acknowledges a suggestion or two on this branch of the subject from an able paper of the Rev. Griffith John, in the Journal of the North China branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for September, 1860, which, however, did not come to hand until this article had assumed its present form, and been read on a public occasion.

girdle of the heavens. The matter is altogether arbitrary; and Cicero makes four virtues cover the whole ground, which the Chinese moralist refers to five.

But while, in a formal treatise, definition and explanation may supply the defects of nomenclature or arrangement, the terms of a general class, like that of the cardinal virtues, are not without effect on the popular mind. In this respect, the Chinese have the advantage. Theirs are, *Jin*, *E*, *Che*, *Sin*, *Le*—Benevolence, Justice, Wisdom, Good-faith, Politeness.* Those of Plato and Tully are, Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance. In comparing these, Prudence and Wisdom may be taken as identical, though the former appears to be rather more circumscribed in its sphere, and tinged with the idea of self-interest. Temperance and Politeness, as explained in the respective systems, are also identical—the Latin term, however, contemplating man as an individual, and the Chinese regarding him as a member of society. The former, Cicero defines as *το πρεπον*, and a sense of propriety or love of order, is precisely the meaning which the Chinese give to the latter. In the European code, the prominence given to Fortitude is characteristic of a martial people, among whom, at an earlier period, it, under the name of *αρετη*, usurped the entire realm of virtue. In the progress of society, it was compelled to yield the throne to Justice, and accept the place of a vassal, both Greek and Latin moralists asserting that no degree of courage which is not exerted in a righteous cause, is worthy of a better appellation than that of audacity. They erred, therefore, in giving it the position of a cardinal virtue; and the Chinese have exhibited more discrimination by placing it in the retinue of Justice. They describe it by two words, *Chih* and *Yung*. Connected with the former, and explaining its idea, we read the precept, "When you fail, seek help in yourself; stand firm to your post, and let no vague desires draw you from it." Appended to the latter, we have the injunction—"When you see the right, do it; when you know a fault, correct it. Neither

* Though *politeness* is the common acceptation of the term, as expressing a regard for propriety and order in social intercourse; in Chinese ethics it has a wider and higher signification. It is precisely what Malebranche makes the basis of his moral system, and denominates "the love of universal order."

truckle to the rich, nor disdain the poor." What a noble conception of moral courage—of true fortitude!

Benevolence and good faith, which are quite subordinate in the heathen systems of the West, in that of China are each promoted to the leadership of a grand division. In fact, the whole tone of the Chinese morals, as exhibited in the names and order of their cardinal virtues, is quite consonant with the spirit of Christianity.* Benevolence leads the way in prompting to positive efforts for the good of others; justice follows, to regulate its actions, and restrain its antagonistic qualities; wisdom sheds her light over both; good faith imparts the stability necessary to success; politeness, or a sense of propriety, by bringing the whole conduct into harmony with the fitness of things, completes the radiant circle; and he whose character is adorned with all those qualities, may be safely pronounced *totus teres atque rotundus.*

The theory of moral sentiments early engaged the attention of Chinese philosophers, and particularly the inquiry as to the origin and nature of our benevolent affections. Some, like Locke and Paley, regarded them as wholly artificial—the work of education. Others, like Hobbes and Mandeville, represented them as spontaneous and natural; but still no more than varied phases of that one ubiquitous Proteus—self-love. Mencius, with Bishop Butler, views them as disinterested and original. To establish this, he resorts to his favourite mode of reasoning, and supposes the case of a spectator, moved by the misfortune of a child falling into a well. Hobbes would have described

* Cicero thus argues that there could be no occasion for the exercise of any virtue in a state of perfect blessedness, taking up the cardinal virtues *seriatim:*—"Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migraremus, in beatorum insulis, ut fabulæ ferunt, immortale ævum degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum judicia nulla fierent? aut *ipsis* etiam *virtutibus?* Nec enim *fortitudine* indigeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo; *nec justitia*, cum esset nihil quod appeteretur alieni; nec *temperantia*, quæ regeret eas quæ nullæ essent libidines; ne *prudentia* quidem egeremus, nullo proposito delectu bonorum et malorum. Una igitur essemus beati cognitione rerum et scientia."

He has failed to conceive, as Sir J. Mackintosh well suggests, that there would still be room for the exercise of love—of benevolence. The Chinese, educated to regard benevolence as the prime virtue of life, would naturally give it the first place in his ideal of the future state.

the pity of the beholder as the fruit of self-love acting through the imagination—the "fiction of future calamity to himself." Mencius says, his efforts to rescue the child would be incited, not by a desire to secure the friendship of his parents, nor the praise of his neighbours—nor even to relieve himself from the pain occasioned by the cries of the child—but by a spontaneous feeling which pities distress, and seeks to alleviate it. The man who thus vindicates our nature from the charge of selfishness in its best affections, sometimes expatiates on their social utility. He does so, however, only to repress utilitarianism of a more sordid type. When the Prince of Liang inquired, "what he had brought to enrich his kingdom?"—"Nothing," he replied, "but benevolence and justice;" and he then proceeded to show, with eloquent earnestness, how the pursuit of wealth would tend to anarchy, while that of virtue would insure happiness and peace. An earlier writer, *Meh-tsze*,* made the principle of benevolence the root of all the virtues; and in advocating the duty of *equal* and *universal love*, he seems to have anticipated the fundamental maxim of Jonathan Edwards, that virtue consists in *love* to *being*, as such; and in *proportion to the amount of being*. This led him to utter the noble sentiment, that he would "submit his body to be crushed to atoms, if by so doing he could benefit mankind."

The doctrine of Meh-tsze is rejected by the moralists of the established school as heretical, on the ground of its inconsistency with the exercise in due degree of the relative affections, such as filial piety, fraternal love, &c. They adopted a more cautious criterion of virtue—that of the moderate exercise of all the natural faculties. *Virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum*, is with them a familiar maxim. One of the "Four Books," the *Chung Yung*, is founded on it. But instead of treating the subject with the inductive accuracy with which it is elaborated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, the author kindles with the idea of absolute perfection, and indites a sublime rhapsody on the character of him who holds

* See an interesting paper on the writings of *Meh-tsze*, by the Rev. J. Edkins, in the Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, for May, 1859.

on his way, undeviating and unimpeded, between a two-fold phalanx of opposing vices.

Part IV. is the counterpart of the preceding, and is interesting mainly on account of the use for which it is designed. The whole chart is practical, and is intended, the author tells us, to be suspended in the chamber of the student as a constant monitor. The terms in which he states this, contain an allusion to a sentiment engraved by one of the ancient emperors on his wash-basin: "Let my heart be daily cleansed and renewed, and be kept clean and new for ever." This part of his work has for its special object to aid the reader in detecting the moral impurities that may have attached themselves to his character, and carrying forward a process of daily and constant improvement.

To some it may be a matter of surprise to find this exercise at all in vogue in a country where a divine religion has not imparted the highest degree of earnestness in the pursuit of virtue. The number who practise it is not large; but even in Pagan China, the thorny path of self-knowledge exhibits "here and there a traveller."

Tsang-fu-tsze, an eminent disciple of Confucius, and the Xenophon of his *Memorabilia*, thus describes his own practice. "I every day examine myself on three points. In exertions on behalf of others, have I been unfaithful? In intercourse with others have I been untrue? The instruction I have heard have I made my own?"

An example so revered could not remain without imitators. Whether any of them has surpassed the model, is doubtful; but his "three points" they have multiplied into the bristling array displayed in the chart, which they daily press into their bosoms, as some Papal ascetics did their jagged belts. Some of them, in order to secure greater fidelity in this unpleasant duty, are wont to perform it in the family temple, where they imagine their hearts laid bare to the view of their ancestors, and derive encouragement from their supposed approval. The practice is a beautiful one, but it indicates a want. It shows that human virtue is conscious of her weakness; and in climbing the roughest steeps, feels compelled to lean on the arm of religion.

In a few cases this impressive form of domestic piety may

prove efficacious; but the benefit is due to a figment of the imagination, similar to that which Epictetus recommends when he suggests that the student of virtue shall conceive himself to be living and acting in the presence of Socrates. If fancy is thus operative, how much more effectual must faith be—that faith which rises into knowledge, and makes one realize that he is acting under the eye of ever-present Deity!

It is one of the glories of Christianity that by diffusing this sentiment she has made virtue not an occasional visitor to our earth, but brought her down to dwell familiarly with men. What otherwise would have been only the severe discipline of a few philosophers, she has made the daily habit of myriads.* How many persons in how many lands now close each day of life by comparing every item of their conduct with a far more perfect "chart for self-examination" than our author has furnished.†

Next to the knowledge of right and wrong, Confucius placed "sincerity of purpose"‡ in pursuing the right, as an essential in the practice of virtue; but as he expressed only the vaguest notions of a Supreme Being, and enjoined for popular observance no higher form of religion than the worship of the ancestral manes, a sense of responsibility, and, by consequence, "sincerity of purpose," are sadly deficient among his disciples. Some of the more earnest on meeting with a religion which reveals to them a heart-searching God, a sin-atoning Saviour, a soul-sanctifying Spirit, and an immortality of bliss, have joyfully embraced it, confessing that they find therein motives and supports of which their own system is wholly destitute.

GENERAL INFERENCES.

On this sheet, (the chart above translated,) we have a projection of the national mind. It indicates the high grade in

* "Religion," says Sir J. Mackintosh, speaking of Plato, "had not then besides her own discoveries, brought down the most awful and the most beautiful forms of moral truth to the humblest station in human society."

† There are many evening hymns, in which the review of the day is beautifully and touchingly expressed, but in none perhaps better than in that of Gellert, commencing, "*Ein tag ist wieder hin.*"

‡ In the chart "Correctness of Purpose," the word *Ching* combines the ideas of "correctness" and "sincerity." No Chinese writer would speak of a person as "*ching*," in doing wrong.

the scale of civilization attained by the people among whom it originated, exhibiting all the elements of an elaborate socialism. Political ethics are skilfully connected with private morals; and the virtues and vices are marshalled in a vast array, which required an advanced state of society for their development.

The accuracy with which these various traits of character are noted, implies the same thing; and the correctness of the moral judgments here recorded, infers something more than culture—it discloses a grand fact of our nature, that whatever may be thought of innate ideas, it contains inherent principles which produce the same fruits in all climates.

These tables indicate at the same time that the Chinese have made less proficiency in the study of mind than in that of morals. This is evident from some confusion (more observable in the original than in the translation) of faculties, sentiments, and actions. The system is on the whole pretty well arranged; but there are errors and omissions enough to show that their ethics, like their physics, are merely the records of phenomena which they observe, *ab extra*, without investigating their causes and relations. While they expatiate on the virtues, they make but little inquiry into the nature of virtue: while insisting on various duties, they never discuss the ground of obligation; and while duties are copiously expounded, not a word is said on the subject of rights.

The combined influence of an idolatrous religion, and a despotic government, under which there can be no such motto as *Dieu et mon droit*, may account for this latter deficiency. But similar defects are traceable in so many directions, that we are compelled to seek their explanation in a subjective cause—in some peculiarity of the Chinese mind.

They have, for instance, no system of psychology, and the only rude attempt at the formation of one, consists in an enumeration of the organs of perception. These they express as *wu-kwan*, the "five senses." But what are they? The eyes, ears, nose, mouth; and not the skin, or nerves, but the heart—the sense of touch, which alone possesses the power of waking us from the Brama dream of a universe floating in our own brain, and convincing us of the objective reality of an external

world, being utterly ignored; to say nothing of the absurdity of classing the intellect (for so they intend the word) with those passive media of intelligence.

This elementary effort dates from the celebrated Mencius; and perhaps for that very reason the mind of the moderns has not advanced beyond it, as one of their pious emperors abdicated the throne rather than be guilty of reigning longer than his grandfather.

Another instance of philosophical classification equally ancient, equally authoritative, and equally absurd, is that of the Five Elements. They are given as *king*, *muh*, *shwuy*, *ho*, *tu*— i. e., metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. Now, not to force this into a disparaging contrast with the results of our recent science, which recognises nothing as an element but an ultimate form of matter, we may fairly compare it with the popular division of "four elements."

The principle of classification being the enumeration of the leading forms of inorganic matter which enter into the composition of organic bodies, the Chinese have violated it by introducing wood into the category; and they evince an obtuseness of observation utterly inconsistent with the possession of philosophic talent, in not perceiving the important part which atmospheric air performs in the formation of other bodies. The extent to which they adhere to the quintal enumeration or classification by "fives," illustrates, in a rather ludicrous manner, the same want of discrimination. Thus, while in mind they have the five senses, and, in matter, the five elements, in morals they reckon five virtues; in society, five relations; in astronomy, five planets; in ethnology, five races; in optics, five colours; in music, five notes; in the culinary art, five tastes; and, not to extend the catalogue, they divide the horizon into *five quarters*.

These instances evince a want of analytical power; and the deficiency is still farther displayed in the absence of any analysis of the sounds of their language, until they were brought acquainted with the alphabetical Sanscrit; the non-existence, to the present day, of any inquiry into the forms of speech, which might be called a grammar, or of any investigation of the processes of reasoning, corresponding with

our logic; and the fact, that while they have soared into the attenuated atmosphere of ontological speculation, they have left all the regions of physical and abstract science almost as trackless as the Arctic snows.

It would be superfluous to vindicate the Chinese from the charge of mental inferiority, in the presence of that immense social and political organization which has held together so many millions of people for so many thousands of years; and especially of arts, now dropping their golden fruits into the lap of our own civilization, whose roots can be traced to the soil of that ancient empire. But a strange defect must be admitted in the national mind. We think, however, that it is more in its development than in its constitution, and may be accounted for by the influence of education. If we include in that term all the influences that affect the mind, the first place is due to language; and a language whose primary idea is the representation of the objects of sense, and which is so imperfect a vehicle of abstract thought, that it is incapable of expressing, by single words, such ideas as space, quality, relation, &c., must have seriously obstructed the exercise of the intellect in that direction. A servile reverence for antiquity, which makes it sacrilege to alter the crude systems of the ancients, increased the difficulty; and the government brought it to the last degree of aggravation by admitting, in the public-service examinations, a very limited number of authors, with their expositors, to whose opinions conformity is encouraged by honours, and from whom dissent is punished by disgrace.

These fetters can only be stricken off by the hand of Christianity; and we are not extravagant in predicting that a stupendous intellectual revolution will attend its progress. Revealing an omnipresent God as Lord of the Conscience, it will add a new hemisphere to the world of morals; stimulating inquiry in the spirit of the precept, "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good," it will subvert the blind principle of deference; and perhaps its grandest achievement in the work of mental emancipation may be the superseding of the ancient ideographic language, by providing a medium better adapted to the purposes of a Christian civilization. It would only be a repetition of historic triumphs, if some of the vernacular dia-

lects, raised from the depths where they now lie in neglect, and shaped by the forces which heave them to the surface, should be made, under the influence of Christianity, to teem with the rich productions of a new literature, philosophy, and science.

Art. II.—*The Philosophy of the Absolute.*

The use of a theological nomenclature, viewed in a moral light, has an advantage balanced by a disadvantage. While it may be a relief to some minds, when reasoning about abstract deity, to have recourse to such terms as the Infinite, the Absolute, the First Cause, instead of those more devotional names of God, implying his personality and presence; yet there may be other minds inclined to lose rather than to foster reverence, by carelessly employing phraseology which, in many cases, if translated into common speech, would seem but little better than refined blasphemy. On the one hand, it is surely well that the dialect of worship should be kept distinct from the jargon of the schools; but on the other hand, there are "profane babblings to be shunned, as increasing unto more ungodliness."

We do not raise the question to discuss it, since necessity, convenience, and custom, have already placed it beyond discussion, but simply prefix it, as an introductory thought, to some reflections in which the reader can test for himself the good and evil of the current vocabulary.

The Philosophy of the Absolute, as ontology or speculative divinity is now termed, has been brought by the latest metaphysics to a curious issue. Two rival schools, founded in different nations, and headed by the most powerful thinkers of the age, are pitted against each other upon the question whether such a philosophy is possible. The German metaphysicians not only include it among the legitimate pursuits of

the human mind, but rank it at the very head of the sciences, as being their source, and embracing their whole content. The English metaphysicians, on the contrary, labour to prove it wholly illusive and futile, and insist upon limiting all rational research to the sphere of finite phenomena: while the French metaphysicians would seem to be more divided among themselves, both tendencies having been developed in an ultra form by the systems of Cousin and Comte. The Absolute Philosophy and the Positive Philosophy, or the Philosophy of the Infinite and the Philosophy of the Conditioned, as the opposite doctrines variously claim to be called, are in fact becoming the two poles of modern speculation, toward which, with different degrees of divergence, advanced thinkers in all lands are rallying. For so does thought from having been national grow to be catholic, and philosophy vindicate herself as the daughter of humanity.

What is more singular, the orthodox party cannot be said to have fairly committed itself to either extreme. In both schools the very same speculations are wielded for the defence and for the destruction of revealed theology. It is well known, for example, that the Hegelian philosophy of the Absolute became in the hands of one faction mere pantheistic infidelity, while another faction professed to find in it nothing less than a rational explanation of the most peculiar doctrines of Christianity. In like manner, the Hamiltonian philosophy of the Conditioned is taken by some late thinkers as the basis of a purely revealed divinity, while others are in haste to erect upon it, with the same logic, a mere scientific atheism. Between Marheineke and Strauss of the one school, or between Mansel and Spencer of the other, there are really more serious differences than between the schools themselves; so diversely has each master been interpreted by his disciples. We by no means infer from this that the whole controversy is harmless or useless, but rather take it to be illustrative of an axiom dominant through all the sciences—metaphysical as well as physical—that in each of them may be found antagonistic theories neither of which is wholly irreconcilable with Scripture, but which, by their own mutual collisions, are destined to issue in its support and illustration. There is indeed too much truth, as

well as error, involved in these formidable conflicts between the giant intellects of our time for the Christian theologian to think of either despising or disparaging them.

The whole subject, it is true, is both abstruse and hackneyed, and many, no doubt, have already retired from it as a mere labyrinth of wordy notions into which whoever enters only becomes the more bewildered the farther he wanders. We are not so rash as to think of attempting, at this late day, any original route over the trodden field; but it may be, that by taking a position somewhat above and beyond it we shall not only gain a fresher and more comprehensive view, but be able at length to connect and complete the researches of other explorers. In other words, could the whole question be sifted from the literature which has been accumulating around it, and all possible as well as actual opinions respecting it exhibited in some exhaustive synopsis, we should then have before us the materials for a final judgment.

Now it will be found that there are five, and only five, distinct questions which can logically be raised in reference to the Absolute: 1st. Is it conceivable? 2d. Is it credible? 3d. Is it cognizable? 4th. Is it revealable? 5th. Is it demonstrable? We name them in the order of their importance, and propose to pass briefly through the series, affirming each as the basis for affirming the next, until we reach the last, in which we hold that philosophy is destined to rest as the goal alike of reason and of faith.

The first problem relates to the conceivability of the Absolute. It is not whether the Absolute really exists, nor yet whether we conceive it as it really exists, but simply whether we can conceive it at all, in any form or to any extent. Is the Unconditioned an object of legitimate thought? Does the mind act illusively and impotently or sanely and vigorously when it strives to think of the Infinite?

This question, though really fundamental to both religion and philosophy, is sometimes held to be less important in the former than the latter. The orthodox wing of the Hamiltonians, while denying the conceivability of the Infinite, admit its credibility, and even maintain that it becomes an object of faith precisely because it cannot be an object of thought, or

that faith is complemental to thought in practically apprehending it. "By a wonderful revelation," says Hamilton, "we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." And Mansel, on the ground of the same distinction, endeavours to conserve the interests not merely of piety, but of polemics, by arguing that rationalism destroys itself in the very effort to think what cannot be thought, but must be simply believed. "We are compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being,—a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and finite. But the instant we attempt to analyze the ideas thus suggested to us, in the hope of attaining to an intelligible conception of them, we are on every side involved in inextricable confusion and contradiction."

If our present argument were only with this division of the school, it would be enough to object that the reasoning, even if sound, must defeat its avowed aim. Like some blunderbuss whose rebound is more destructive than its projectile, it would prove entirely too much for all parties. Instead of conserving a revealed theology by destroying rational theology, it would simply undermine both, and render philosophy and religion alike nugatory.

For what other effect could it have than to annihilate all faith, as well as thought, in respect to the Absolute. If the existence of an Infinite and Absolute Being is as inconceivable as that of a "circular parallelogram," it is surely quite as incredible. The incogitable cannot be other than also the incredible, since any mental object which contravenes the laws of thought must also contravene the laws of faith. He who dreams that he believes what he does not or cannot think, neither thinks nor believes at all, but only dreams. And when sane and waking men are found actually attempting to draw square circles or round squares, we may expect to find them believing in an Absolute their conception of which is a mere bundle of contradictories, or "fasciculus of negations, bound

together by the aid of language," but destined, like a torpedo, to explode at the touch of analysis in glaring absurdity.

It is no escape from this to distinguish the cogitable from the existible, and argue that "the impossible to thought" may still be "the possible in reality." We are not maintaining that our thought is a condition or criterion of existence, but simply that it is a condition or criterion of our faith as to what exists. The credible, if not bounded by the conceivable, is at least concentric therewith. If any choose to affirm that round squares or square circles are really possible in the sphere of objective existence, we insist that to us they are not credible, because not even conceivable; and, in like manner, that our faith must revolt with our thought from an Absolute which is apprehended as self-contradictory.

Neither will it avail to say that belief in the infinite is a spontaneous act of the mind into which thought commonly does not enter, or which is compulsory upon us in spite of any thinking to the contrary. We doubtless have some intuitive convictions which no sophistry can shake, as, for example, our faith in the existence of an external world; but none of them, when encogitated, will be found to involve a negation or destruction of thought. Otherwise, it would appear that we are subsisting upon plain absurdities with a nature divided against itself, or that we are constitutionally compelled to believe what, so soon as we think it, we are constitutionally compelled to disbelieve.

The whole argument, indeed, of the Hamiltonian divines simply destroys itself by reducing them to a choice of inconceivabilities; or rather, by developing, as an alternative, two other inconceivabilities, quite as revolting and absurd as the one they have alleged. We may retort, with their own favourite logic of contradictories, 1st. That it is inconceivable that we could believe what we cannot believe; and, 2d. That it is doubly inconceivable that God should be both the author and the object of such impossible belief.

We do not, however, here insist upon this refutation, as it would anticipate our second problem, and is, moreover, conclusive only against one wing of the school. By far the most consistent party are those who boldly accept the issue, to which they are driven by their own logic, of a thorough skepticism,

religious as well as philosophical, in respect to the Infinite, and a consequent restriction of faith, no less than thought, within the bounds of the finite. And it is only when the reasoning assumes such a portentous import that it merits examination.

It may be questioned, however, whether there ever has been a metaphysical controversy in which such brilliant dialectics have been displayed with no other effect than to leave truth worsted at the hands of logic. What unsophisticated mind imagines or spontaneously grants that its idea of the God it adores is a mere negation or absurdity? And yet, once admit the specious premises of these logicians, and reason is drawn from her moorings into an insiduous circle of thought which contracts as it proceeds, until, in spite of her recoil, she is engulfed amid the wildest contradictions. At one moment, it is maintained that our minds are finite, and therefore cannot conceive the Infinite; the next, that the Infinite, when analyzed, proves self-contradictory, and therefore cannot be conceived; and in fine, that these two propositions so corroborate each other as to force us into the dilemma of either believing the Infinite to be inconceivable or conceiving it to be unbelievable. We can escape the revolting conclusion only by strictly questioning each term and premise from which it is drawn.

If by the inconceivable* is meant what, while partially or vaguely included in thought, still transcends it, we may grant that the infinite, even as we must then maintain that the finite, is inconceivable. It should not be forgotten that the conceptive faculty is not the same in all minds or moods, and must vary with the matter or object upon which it is exercised. When that object is the Infinite, though the most capacious

* There are three distinct senses of the inconceivable: 1st. That of which we can have no notion whatever, which we cannot even attempt to think, but spontaneously pronounce unthinkable, or beyond the province of thought. 2d. That of which we can form only a self-contradictory notion, which we may attempt to think, but in the effort find to be destructive of thought. 3d. That of which we can form only a partial, yet still positive and consistent notion, which we may vigorously endeavour to think, but which will still baffle and overmaster thought, though tasked to its utmost capacity. It is only in this last sense that we admit the Infinite to be inconceivable. We do have some notion of an Absolute God, and a notion which, however meagre it be, is at least free from "contradictory opposites."

mind, in its most elevated mood, should strive to conceive it, and though the conception formed, as far as it goes, should be an energetic affirmation of thought, yet must it nevertheless fall short of the transcendent reality. But such, also, must be our conception of the finite. The material universe, for example, as far as already explored, involves magnitudes of time, space, and force, quite as overwhelming as the infinitudes of divine justice, goodness, and truth; or if there be any difference, the latter ideas are really more positive and vigorous, if not more complete and precise, than the former, owing to the fact that they have contrasts in our own personal consciousness by which they are thrown into relief as objects of distinct apperception, rather than of sensuous imagination.

So long, then, as the inconceivable is held to be merely what transcends thought in its legitimate exercise, there need be no argument; but when it is defined to be what actually contravenes thought, or what thought itself excludes by its own action as self-contradictory, and to it impossible, then a very different question is presented. While admitting that our conception of Deity is, and must ever be, only approximate, we must still insist that, besides being positive, it is perfectly congruous or consistent, and that the contradictions alleged to be involved in it are purely imaginary. This will appear, if we carefully sift the several notions of infinity, absoluteness, and causality into which that conception is analyzed by these thinkers, and which are pronounced by them to be irreconcileable.

Now, it is admitted even by Hamilton, that the Absolute and the Infinite are, from one point of view, though two distinct, yet consistent phases of the Unconditioned.* It is only when

* "The Unconditioned, in our use of language, denotes the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species. The term absolute is of a two-fold ambiguity corresponding to the double signification of the word in Latin: 1. *Absolutum* means what is *freed* or *loosed;* in which sense the Absolute will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c. In this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite. 2. *Absolutum* means *finished, perfected, completed;* in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total. In this acceptation—and it is that in which, for myself, I exclusively use it—the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite."—*Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 455, Appleton's ed.

the words are taken in their secondary and less obvious sense, that it is pretended they are conflictive. We may, however, not only choose for ourselves the primary definition as being more pertinent, but also object to the secondary as faulty, as, in fact, presenting merely "two opposite poles of the conditioned," rather than two distinct phases of the unconditioned. The "finished" and the "unfinishable"* plainly involve some material image, as the subject of which the *quasi* infinitude and absoluteness are to be predicated, and if admissible in our conception of the universe, must obviously be excluded from that of Deity. We cannot, indeed, even attempt so to conceive God, though we might either the world or man.

The contradiction which has been alleged disappears the moment we take the Absolute to mean what is absolved from any necessary relation to the finite, and the Infinite what, in comparison with the finite, is unlimited; the former being a difference in kind, and the latter in degree, between the human and the divine spirit or person. The two notions, so far from being oppugnant, will then be found complemental. In the supporting idea of personality as their ground and cement, they at once cohere and coalesce to form one conception. Our thought, though it might indeed be baffled and exhausted were it to pursue either of them apart, yet while endeavouring to unite them, it encounters no contradiction between them, and instead of withering up and collapsing amid blank negations, really finds itself grasping the most complete positives within its reach. The Absolute and the Infinite are, in fact, but divine attributes or properties which we contemplate in another Person, as the contrasts and correlates of our own human dependance and finitude; and the consistency of the two latter ideas is not more obvious in our consciousness of self than is the consistency of the two former in our conception of God. We simply apprehend ourselves as at once finite and dependent,

* "The Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecilities of the human mind, transmuted into properties of the nature of things—of two subjective negations converted into objective affirmations. We tire ourselves, either in adding to, or in taking from. Some, more reasonably, call the thing unfinishable—*infinite;* others, less rationally, call it finished—*absolute.*"—*Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 464.

and then, as opposed to this, affirm in thought the possibility of Another who is at once infinite and absolute. The two inconditionates, when thus defined, if they are partially inconceivable in the sense of surpassing thought, yet they are, at least, not utterly inconceivable in the sense of extinguishing thought; but are rather, when viewed apart, like asymptotical lines, which can neither meet nor clash, or, when viewed together, like concentric circles, whose very perfection precludes their conflict.

In like manner, it might be shown that the remaining notion of causality only adds to the consistency of the other two notions, when they are rightly adjusted one to another. Although an origination of the universe by an Infinite and Absolute Person, were it perversely conceived by us as necessary, might, indeed, seem to violate both his absoluteness and his infinitude, yet when it is conceived as wholly voluntary, it can only, in our view, conserve and manifest them both, ensuring not less the dependence of the creation than the independence of the Creator. In attributing personality to God, we include that volition from which we have our idea of causality, and associate with it, in contrast with our own conditioned will, his infinite energy and absolute purpose.

Thus the three ideas really demand and support each other; and so far from being mere "counter imbecilities of the human mind," are, in fact, the most consistent energies of which it is capable. We never think so positively, vigorously, and coherently, as when we steadily grasp and combine them in one conception; and of all conceptions that we can frame, there is none which so satisfies, while it exhausts, the capacity of thought. When contemplating an Infinite and Absolute Creator in relief from his finite and dependent creation, our ordinary consciousness is released and expanded to the utmost in the effort to apprehend the glorious object. As the mariner, sailing out from land into the shoreless ocean, we let go our hold upon the conditioned, and turn away to confidently affirm against it the unconditioned. It may then be said, not less philosophically than devotionally, that the soul is forsaking the things of time and sense to be wholly occupied with God, and,

like an eagle basking in the empyrean, becomes absorbed in the vision of ineffable glory.

It has now become apparent how the supposed contradictions have arisen. In part they are owing to a perverse habit of treating these divine attributes as mere abstractions, or predicating them of some vague notional substratum of the universe, or of the universe itself, rather than of a conscious spirit or person, distinct from the universe; and also, to a failure in distinguishing, in kind as well as degree, the divine person from the human. So long as we endeavour to conceive some dead substance, or blind force, or bare cause, matter, space, time, the universe, in short, aught but a personal God, as infinite and absolute, or so long as we endeavour to conceive a God who is infinite and yet not absolute, a mere *anima mundi*, or a self-developing world, we cannot but involve ourselves in absurdity, for the simple reason that we are vainly striving to merge the spiritual in the material, the unconditioned in the conditioned, the Creator in the created. But so soon as we admit the idea of a person or spirit in place of a mere substance, or cause, or vague being, and then add the further ideas of a personal independence in contrast with our personal dependence, and an infinite degree of all personal attributes in contrast with the finite degree in which we possess them; at once the whole group of else contradictory notions resolves itself into logical unity, and we have before us a conception, which, beyond all others possible to the human mind, will stand the test of analysis. The revealed Jehovah is, in fact, identified as the only rational Absolute, Infinite, and First Cause; and we can pronounce it not more sound in theology than in philosophy to conceive "a Spirit infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

Our conclusion, then, is, that while some modes of conceiving infinity, absoluteness, and causality, may be contradictory, and while all modes of conceiving them must be more or less defective, yet that conception in which they are brought together as attributes of a Divine Spirit or Person, is not only a positive and congruous effort of thought, but, when compared with others, is the most logical which the mind of man can grasp.

The *second* problem relates to the credibility of the Absolute. When we conceive it, do we conceive what actually exists? Does our subjective idea of the Infinite find support in any objective reality? Is the Unconditioned a mere magnificent abstraction, projected as the shadow of our own consciousness, or a glorious Person existing outside of our consciousness? Can we believe in such an Absolute and Infinite Spirit as we have conceived.

This question, although, like the first one, really fundamental to both philosophy and religion, is, unlike it, often held to be more important in the latter than in the former. The whole heterodox wing of the Kantians, while denying the credibility of the Absolute, maintain its cognizability, and even insist that it becomes an object of knowledge simply because it must cease to be an object of faith, or that our implicit faith in it as objective, expires through explicit knowledge of it as subjective. It was by means of this distinction that the most radical disciples of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, although professing some form of atheism or pantheism, still held to the Absolute as a necessary idea of philosophy, and even strove to erect a kind of mock theology on the ruins of practical religion by deifying nature or humanity.

It would be enough to reply to such irreligious philosophy, as to the irrational theology before noticed, that it must destroy itself on its own premises. The inconceivable and incredible cannot be other than also the incognizable, since whatsoever violates the laws of thought and of faith must at the same time violate the laws of knowledge. We can only know what we conceive and believe to exist; and if the Infinite can neither be conceived nor believed to exist in our finite self, or in finite nature around us, it can only be known, if known at all, as an extra-human and extra-mundane reality. When atheistic and pantheistic idealists are found actually treating the external world as part of their own personality, or their own personality as part of the external world, we may accept for valid knowledge their delusive apprehension of an absolute produced by human intelligence, or by the spontaneous development of the universe.

Without, however, pursuing this argument, we pass to the

more consistent Kantians, who would wholly annihilate the Absolute as an actual existence, retaining only the notion or conception itself, and so present the simple alternatives of idealism or realism in philosophy, and atheism or theism in religion.

To any but a thoroughly artificial mind such a question might, indeed, in its very statement, seem too revolting, as well as absurd, for serious discussion. How warped the intellect that would reduce the idea of God, that idea which, beyond all others, has operated upon mankind with the force of reality, to a mere abstraction or regulative notion! And how sophisticate the conscience that for the worship of such a Being would substitute mere enthusiastic love of nature, or proud apotheosis of self! And yet, for such a barren crown as this, a host of astute dialecticians have entered the speculative arena, and striven with pitiless logic, in the face of reason, instinct, and common sense. Foremost of these champions of the pure idealism came Fichte, annihilating all objective reality; then followed Schelling, annihilating all subjective reality; at length appeared Hegel, annihilating both as distinct realities, and retaining only their residual relations; and thus by turns the Absolute was gravely demonstrated to be everything or nothing, or a something which was either and yet neither, until it really seemed as if they were ready to prove it might be anything. We shall best rebut such "perverse disputings" by simply asserting against them the several grounds of that catholic realism which underlies alike all religions and philosophies.

In the first place, a firm basis for the credibility of the Absolute has been already laid in our doctrine of its conceivability. We do not mean that it is of necessity credible, simply because it is conceivable, but only that its conceivability is an indispensable condition of its credibility. It could not be believed if it could not be conceived. Belief in it involves no obvious or latent contradiction, but is rather a belief, to say the least, the contrary of which cannot be proved.

In the second place, it takes rank as an instinctive conviction or primary belief. Instead of resulting, like some convictions, from mere speculation, or reasoning, or education, it has

the marks of spontaneity, universality, and necessity. The moment the Infinite is conceived, it is instinctively apprehended to be objectively real. As in the very act of conceiving an external world all unsophisticated minds spontaneously attribute a reality to it from which they cannot escape, so in the very act of conceiving a god, they spontaneously attribute to it, not bare reality only, but personality, that form of reality suggested by their own consciousness, and the most substantial of which we can have any notion. It is only by some subtle logic that either of these primitive convictions ever becomes dissipated. The feeling of dependence upon an exterior and superior somewhat, which they call God, distinct alike from self and the world, is found in all mankind, and may be classed among the normal sentiments of the race.

In the third place, such belief, beyond all other instinctive convictions, proves to be indestructible and cumulative. The idol, or myth, or abstraction, in which it has expressed itself may be destroyed, but it will still survive, and, through some new and more consistent conception of the great Reality, feel after Him, if haply it may find Him. Even when it is brought reflectively into distinct consciousness and logically investigated, it not only asserts itself against all adverse reasoning, but admits of elucidation and ever-growing proof. Argument after argument may be accumulated to show that our spontaneous apprehension of God as a real existence is no illusion, until faith shall amount to assurance, and instinct be exalted into knowledge.

In short, philosophically speaking, the credibility of the Absolute, as of all objective reality, may be said to be in exact proportion to its conceivability. That we can no longer believe in the pagan or classic deities as the true and living God, is simply because we can no longer conceive them as such. And if our conception of an Infinite and Absolute Creator can be shown to be absurd or self-contradictory, then we must either wholly renounce our faith in such a being, or we must seek new support for our faith in some conception which we can affirm to be sound and consistent. We are, however, already trenching upon our next topic.

The *third* problem relates to the cognizability of the Abso-

lute. Does our subjective idea of the Infinite correspond to the objective reality? In so far as we conceive it, do we conceive it as it really exists? Must our cognition of deity be wholly illusory, like the vision of an object by a distorting eye or through a discoloured medium? or may it become clear and exact, as far as it extends, however limited? Can we know the God in whom we believe?

This question, too, we must insist, is equally momentous in both its religious and philosophical bearings. The attempt is indeed made, by both Kantians and Hamiltonians of the orthodox side, to distinguish between a speculative and regulative knowledge of the Absolute, or between its cognizability and its revealability, and while denying the former and retaining the latter, to erect the revealed theology on the ruins of all rational theology. It is argued by such thinkers that, as the Infinite God cannot be conceived, but must be simply believed, he is therefore of necessity, in accommodation to our faculties, revealed to us in a human form, and under gross finite images, and that this revelation, though sufficient to regulate our religious worship and practice, neither itself amounts to a true knowledge, nor can by any effort of reason be made to yield aught toward a science of the absolute.

But it may be said of such, as of all indirection, that it creates worse difficulties than it attempts to solve. We do not speak merely of the intellectual and moral duplicity which it would substitute for an unsophisticated faith in the inspired representations, but also of its fatal bearing upon inspiration itself. A God that could not be known, could not be revealed, for the simple reason that the revealing process from without involves the cognitive process from within, or is itself but the making known to, and through, the human intellect, what would else be unknown. Surely if, like the Samaritans, we "worship we know not what," or, like the Athenians, we worship only an "unknown God," then revelation has become to us either useless or worse than useless. Our ignorance, in so far as it is unconscious, is little better than heathen blindness; or, in so far as it is conscious, has nothing to boast over the classic idolatry. Let such "too superstitious" Christians receive as a rebuke what the Apostle to the Gentiles first

uttered as a gospel, "Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you," and learn anew that lesson of the great Teacher to those who had corrupted an existing Scripture: "We know what we worship: God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

The more consistent disciples of this school, however, instead of attempting such vain distinctions, maintain the Absolute to be wholly incognizable, either through reason or through revelation, for the purposes of philosophy or of piety, and, renouncing all efforts to apprehend or represent the unknown cause of the universe, follow out their logic to the extreme of a thorough nescience and neglect of the Godhead. In other words, while admitting the possible existence of the Infinite, they insist that it can neither be known nor worshipped, and that finite phenomena alone can become the object either of science or of practice.*

By far the most logical application of this doctrine, which the world has yet seen, or is likely to see, is to be found in the positive philosophy and religion of Comte. In that system the theory of the Unknowable is driven with remorseless rigour into the abyss of a scientific skepticism. Not only is the supposed Creator of the universe ignored as incognizable, but the whole existing conception of such a being is accounted for as in part a mere personification, and in part a mere hypothesis, which has grown out of the historical development of religion and science, and which originates in a primitive tendency of mankind to conceive external realities on the conditions or in the light of their own consciousness, under a human form, as animated with will or personality. Already this anthropomor-

* It was charged by Hamilton, that Kant "had slain the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the Absolute; and this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even to the present day." But it may now be charged upon Hamilton himself, that in his zeal to exorcise the spectre, he has but mangled the body of the Absolute, and left the remains of philosophy in the hands of infidels. Between the Hegelian universe of bare ideas and the Comtean universe of dead facts, there is, in sooth, as little to choose as between a ghost and a corpse. We shall escape both horrors only when the real and the ideal Absolute are combined in Jehovah, and science as well as religion has learned to recognise a living Creator, inhabiting and controlling his whole creation.

phic tendency has impelled them through the successive phases of fetischism, polytheism, and monotheism, and the myth of a Jehovah which still survives in the vulgar mind, will only have become obsolete when a perfected humanity, through science and art, shall have learned experimentally to realize its own ideal of power, wisdom, and goodness, instead of personifying and worshipping it as a Creator and Preserver of the universe, or identifying it with the unknown and unknowable Cause of phenomena.

If it had been intended, by this system, to ingeniously invert every axiom and instinct, it may be doubted whether the success could have been more complete. In what sound mind has the notion of a First Cause been thus resolved into a scientific fiction or devout self-personification? And how morbid must be that horror of blindly worshipping God in the form of man, which can only relieve itself by knowingly worshipping man in the form of God! And yet to compass these results, the whole field of knowledge has been laid under contribution, and the march of history toward them clothed with the precision of an inflexible law. The sciences, it is inductively shown, from their structure and development, are destined to destroy or ignore the very idea of Deity, and in its place to substitute that of humanity, as the only reality which can either be known or intelligently worshipped. Preposterous as may seem such conclusions, we cannot escape them unless we boldly seize and sift the premises from which they are deduced.

And if we should grant that the Absolute is incomprehensible, it would not follow that it is incognizable. Our knowledge of the Infinite, though it can never be exhaustive or complete, may still be real, as far as it extends. We are not reduced to the bare alternatives of omniscience or nescience. Although unable to know everything, we still may know something in respect to the reality we call God, and this knowledge, however limited, may be a positive advance beyond ignorance or error. If it is partial and liable to correction or corruption, so also is all other knowledge. The same reasoning, indeed, which would assail the former must assail the latter, and, if successful, would only envelope all external reality in harrowing uncertainty. We could not tell whether the veiled Isis,

before which we cowered, were spectre, fiend, or hollow nothingness; but would be full of

> "Blank misgivings of a creature
> Moving about in worlds not realized."

Let him believe who can, that the foundations of his consciousness are thus laid in delusion and imposture. We may grant that in one sense we must ever know the Infinite as still passing knowledge, but surely we need not on that account despise or renounce what knowledge we have.

Neither would it follow that the Absolute is incognizable if we should admit that our conception thereof is in some respects human, derived from our own personality, or howsoever derived, found analogous to that personality. We may fearlessly accept the imputation, and still insist that the Incomprehensible Reality behind all phenomena as their ground or cause, is actually what we conceive it to be, a Spirit, having, like us, spiritual attributes, but, unlike us, having them infinitely and absolutely. What if it be true that we are constitutionally impelled to apprehend and represent the Original Cause of phenomena as an intelligent Creator, and ourselves as his intelligent creatures? It is one thing to say that we have made to ourselves a god in the image of man, but quite another thing to say that we have ourselves been made in the image of God. On the latter supposition, theism becomes part of the natural realism of mankind, and, instead of being classed with outworn superstitions, may be taken as that true knowledge of the true God of which all pantheism, polytheism, and the grosser monotheism, are but counterfeits or approximates.

Thus defined and guarded, the cognizability of the Absolute may be maintained by several considerations:—

And, in the first place, still resuming and carrying forward our previous reasoning, we affirm it on the grounds of its conceivability and credibility. As all knowledge proceeds from the thought, through the faith of the thing apprehended, and so involves both thought and faith as its preliminary conditions, we have but to show, as has been done, that the Infinite may be conceived and believed, in order to show that it may also be known. In other words, the impossibility of such knowledge

cannot be proved without first proving the impossibility of such conception and belief, or without assuming a science of the possibilities lying beyond all conception and belief; in short, without assuming omniscience itself. He must have known God completely, who would prove that we cannot know him partially, or that, as far as we know him, we do not know him truly.

In the second place, such cognition has the certitude appertaining to other cognition. We may know God, at least as certainly as we know the world. We may know that we know him. As we cannot suppose that external realities in general are positively misrepresented to us in the process of our own intelligence, without thereby supposing that our whole nature is rooted in falsehood, still less can we suppose that the intimate and homogeneous reality of God is so misrepresented to us, since that would impugn the veracity of consciousness where its testimony is most direct, explicit, and valuable. In such knowledge we are in fact in immediate contact with an Infinite Spirit, from whom our finite spirits cannot escape, whithersoever they may flee; while in all ordinary knowledge we are cognizing existences indefinitely extended away from us in space and time, and presented to us under endless variety and vicissitude. Surely if directness, simplicity, and purity, in our apprehension of reality, be marks of true cognition, we may rely upon what we can know of God, however little it be. We say nothing as yet of the veracity of revelation as combined with the veracity of consciousness in affording a still farther and peculiar ground of certitude; nor of a subjective illumination as ensuring, in connection with that objective revelation, the ecstatic vision of the Absolute.

In the third place, such cognition imparts oneness and consistency to all other cognition. We cannot know the world as a whole, unless we know somewhat of God. An Infinite and Absolute Person, whose intelligent will is expressed through the laws of all phenomena as their first and final cause, is a fundamental and necessary idea of science, without which it would remain a mere mass of fragmentary knowledge, devoid of rational coherence and unity. As the universe, the totality of existence, acquires intelligibility, becomes a cosmos instead of a chaos, only when it is viewed as the creation of a Creator, so

the sciences can only be resolved into a system by means of theology. The law of their development is precisely the reverse of that maintained by the Comteans, as might be shown, both from their structure, and from their history.

In fine, the cognizability of the Absolute, like that of all other reality, is proportioned as well as conditioned by its conceivability and credibility. Only when we have lost all thought and faith can we also lose all knowledge of God. Though our conception of him must indeed be human, and our belief in him mainly spontaneous, yet both these are themselves a spiritual endowment and heritage, which may be either wasted or improved. They are, in fact, but the image of the Creator constitutionally impressed upon his creature. As the boundless cope is mirrored in a dew-drop, so does man reflect even deity in miniature; and according as he becomes conscious of that finite similitude, may he become cognizant of the Infinite Original. He may, indeed, have lost the likeness, and with it the knowledge of God in idolatrous superstition; he may even have obliterated them by sophistical philosophy or moral debasement; but he may also be "renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him."

Let us not, however, forestall our remaining discussion. We have maintained that a science of the infinite is as feasible as a science of the finite, and that, in fact, the former is indispensable to the latter. But there is this important difference between them:—Whereas, in our cognition of the external world, the subject is cognitive while the object is simply cognizable, yet in our cognition of God, both subject and object, the finite spirit and the Infinite Spirit, are interchangeably cogzable and cognitive.* In other words, our knowledge of the

* According to the strict absolutists, the finite spirit may even become identical with the Infinite Spirit, and theology be actually absorbed in psychology. According to the strict conditionists or positivists, the two are heterogeneous, and theology must therefore be isolated from psychology, and abandoned as a region of pure faith or mere conjecture. Between these extremes lies the true doctrine, that the finite spirit and the Infinite Spirit, although distinct and unequal, are nevertheless homogeneous and intercognitive, and consequently that psychology and theology are concentric, and ideally or *ultimately* coincident spheres of knowledge and faith, reason and revelation, science and omniscience.

Creator, in distinction from our knowledge of the creation, is such as one person may have of another person through a process of mutual intelligence or recognition. We sustain personal relations to an Absolute Mind, who is himself cognizant as well as cognizable, and whom, though "now we know only in part, we shall yet know even as also we are known."

This distinction brings us to the verge of the next general topic propounded, and by means of it we now emerge upon ground more open and familiar than that over which we have been groping.

Our *fourth* problem relates to the revealability of the Absolute. Can such a Spirit make himself known to us, as well as be known by us? May the Infinite Mind disclose itself to the finite mind? Must all our knowledge of deity be derived from our subjective reason? or may it be purged and extended by an objective revelation? Has "the unknown God" been made known?

In reference to this question, the attempt has been made to disjoin the sphere of philosophy from that of religion. One division of orthodox Hegelians, though nominally adhering to the revealed Jehovah, still pursued the rational Absolute independently, with more or less rigour, whithersoever their logic would take them, and some even maintained that the former is only to be retained as a kind of exoteric and mythical deity of the vulgar, while the latter alone is that pure reality discerned by the privileged circle of philosophers. It was with such subtle ambiguity that the most familiar dogmas of Christianity were held as philosophic formulas. The trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit, became travestied under the trilogy of the dialectic process; the incarnation was viewed as the reason embodied in all mankind, though best exemplified in the individual Christ; and the atonement as the reconciliation of this finite reason with the Infinite Reason.

Of this covert rationalism it is enough to say, that it is fatal to the interest it pretends to preserve, and all the more mischievous because of its orthodox disguise. In connection with such a thoroughly rational theology, there could not be any strictly revealed theology. If the God of Scripture is to be taken as a mere symbol, or witness, or harbinger of the God

of philosophy, all revelation, in any proper sense of the term, is undermined. For how could the revealable be at the same time the discoverable? or that which might have been positively concealed by the Infinite Mind be disclosed by the finite mind? "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" It was this impious attempt to prejudge, on grounds of mere reason, the content of revelation, which gave to Germany a piety "professing the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof," and multiplied in her ministry the "false apostles" of "another gospel, which is not another."

And hence we must regard as by far the most consistent rationalists those who avow hostility to evangelical truth, and boldly proffer their philosophical atheism or pantheism in place of the biblical theism. What was it, indeed, but the logical issue of pure rationalism which Christendom beheld when the whole historical as well as doctrinal system of Scripture was assailed by the criticism of Strauss, and its Jehovah exhibited as but a Hebrew Jove, its Jesus as but a Jewish Socrates, and even its gospel as only a Christian mythology? Malicious as the caricature seemed, yet it had at least the merit of candour, and exposed the seeming angel of light in the naked deformity of sin. Christianity is but betrayed with an Iscariot kiss by a philosophy which couches infidel sentiment in Scripture phrases and ancient formulas; but when the issue is boldly made between a god of reason and a god of revelation, then we know where and how to meet it.

And, in the first place, that the Absolute is revealable ensues upon our whole previous argument. If it could not be known, and known as a person or spirit, of course it could not be revealed; but since the Reality is both cognizable and cognitive, a positive and objective revelation is not impossible. Only upon the assumption that the unknown God is himself unknowing or unknowable, can it be argued that it is impossible either that he should be made known or should make himself known.

In the second place, there is in human reason a necessity for such a divine revelation. We do not mean that all rational theology is impossible or nugatory, but simply that it must be imperfect and erroneous until corrected and matured by

revealed theology. This may be proved: 1st. By the nature of those problems with which any theology, whether rational or revealed, must deal, but which mere reason itself cannot solve; such as the character, constitution, and policy of the Creator; the origin and object of the creation; and the relations and destiny of the creature. 2d. By the history of rational religion, which abounds in idol and mythical deities, in fabulous cosmogonies, and in the crudest notions of eternity. 3d. By the history of rational philosophy, which, whenever it has cast off the guidance of revelation, has groped into the darkness of atheism, pantheism, fatalism, scepticism, and nihilism.

In the third place, there is in human reason a capacity for such a divine revelation. All rational theology craves a revealed theology, as its legitimate sequel and complement. This may be proved: 1st. By the adaptation of the finite mind to an Infinite Mind, and its susceptibility to education through an objective revelation distinct from that made in nature and providence. 2d. By the universal reminiscence or presentiment of a revelation, which is expressed in all heathenism; and, 3d. By the germs or rudiments of such a revelation, in which all rational philosophy and religion abound.

In the fourth place, that divine revelation which has been given meets both the necessity and the capacity of human reason. This may be shown; 1st. From its form, which, having been progressive, scriptural, and miraculous, is suited to the rational constitution of mankind; 2d. From its contents, which not only elucidate and confirm whatsoever is sound in rational religion, but, in consistency therewith, contribute a complementary system of doctrine bringing a peculiar self-evidence of its own; and, 3d. From its effects, which have ever been to correct, stimulate, and mature all rational philosophy.

In a word, we may conclude that there can be no truly rational theology without a revealed theology as its counterpart and supplement. Until God makes himself known to us by some objective revelation, in some apocalypse more direct and personal than his mere creation and providence, our knowledge of him must remain partial and erroneous; while the actual

addition to that knowledge by means of such divine communication has ever only had the effect of imparting to it greater unity, precision, and completeness. The Jehovah of Holy Scripture is in fact that sole Reality whereof all mythical and ideal deities are but harbingers and witnesses. As in him the unknown God of heathenism is made known, and need no longer be ignorantly worshipped, so also in him may the highest abstractions of philosophy, the Infinite, the Absolute, the First Cause, find rational support and consistency, and become objects of adoration no less than of science.

Such is the act of the Infinite Mind in its recognition of the finite mind, an act of revelation; but if we now inquire what must be the correspondent act of the finite mind in its recognition of the Infinite Mind thus revealed, or how the two are related on the ground of such mutual intelligence, and intercommunication, we broach the next and last of the subjects to be considered.

Our *fifth* problem relates to the demonstrability of the Absolute. Can it be proved to be what it has been revealed to be? May the God of Scripture be identified with the God of reason or of nature? or are the two irreconcilable? Must our revealed knowledge ever remain singular and separate? or may it be logically combined with our rational knowledge? Are the evidences of revelation only, or are also its contents, a proper subject of philosophical inquiry?

In reference to this question, a remarkable attempt has lately been made to unite philosophy and religion upon a common ground of pure antilogy. The orthodox Hamiltonians, under the leadership of Mansel, maintain that both the revealed Jehovah and the rational Absolute, when logically investigated, are found to be equally self-contradictory, and, in fact, that the Reality which they suggest and prefigure can neither be revealed nor demonstrated, but can only be represented and believed. It is even argued by this writer that the main function of reason is to demonstrate the Godhead to be undemonstrable, and the only effect of revelation is to reveal it to be unrevealable. The so-called anthropomorphism and anthropopathy of Scripture are accepted as not peculiar to Christianity, but inherent in the very constitution of the human

mind; and the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, and the atonement, if viewed as matter of faith, are held as sufficiently accurate to guide our worship and practice, but if viewed as matter of science, are no better than a sort of didactic representation, or sacred epic, wherein the Father, Son, and Spirit appear as *dramatis personæ*, and perform the tragedy of Calvary on the scene of human history.

Of this refined dogmatism, what can we say, but that, like the covert rationalism before noticed, it jeopards the interest it would protect, and is only the more pernicious because of its pious intent? For if reason and revelation combined can yield us no real knowledge of God, or if it is the office of the latter to practise illusions which it is the office of the former to expose, in what respect are we better than the heathen or the skeptic? How much would there be to choose between such a dramatic Jehovah and the mythical Jupiter? Why not accept both as mere phases of a popular theology, which the learned are to outgrow and gracefully patronize? It is this specious effort to exalt reason by dragging revelation to its level, which has already, in many an orthodox communion, led to a mere "show of wisdom in will-worship and humility," and as it extends among the people, can have no other effect than to "corrupt their minds from the simplicity that is in Christ."

And hence we regard as by far the most consistent dogmatists, those who frankly admit their hostility to rational research, and intrepidly press their biblical creed in the face of all human science. We are only amused now at the sturdy dogmatism which once repudiated, on Scripture grounds, the rotundity and motion of the earth; but it was at least honest and consistent, and drew the lines sharply between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. That were but a sorry championship of Christianity which would desperately end the battle with infidelity by springing a mine of common absurdity under both combatants. But let the question simply be, whether the rational Absolute and the revealed Jehovah are reconcilable or irreconcilable, and then we can proceed intelligently.

And, in the first place, that the Absolute may be demonstrated we maintain on the ground that it has been revealed. If it had been actually concealed from us, it could not, of

course, be rationally investigated; but having been intelligibly disclosed to us, it may be brought within the purview of reason, to be either accepted or rejected, proved or disproved, held in opposition to other truths and facts, or established in consistency therewith.

In the second place, there is in divine revelation a necessity for such a human demonstration. We do not mean that reason is either prior or superior to revelation, but simply that, although inferior and supplementary, it is nevertheless indispensable. This will appear: 1st. From the origin of revelation as a direct emanation from the infinite reason of God; 2d. From the aim of revelation as a direct communication to the finite reason of man; 3d. From the purport of this communication as conveying new truth which must, sooner or later, in greater or less degree, be found rationally consistent with the old.

In the third place, there is in divine revelation a fitness for such a human demonstration. On examination it is found to be susceptible of rational investigation and vindication. This appears: 1st. From its actual evidences, which, unlike those of false revelations, satisfy the demands of reason; 2d. From its actual contents, which present problems upon which reason cannot but be exercised; 3d. From its actual structure, which, as a mere fragmentary composition of facts, truths, and principles, devolves upon reason the task of their logical organization into a system.

In the fourth place, such a human demonstration is already in progress. The reconciliation of revealed and rational knowledge is now going forward wherever the two are thrown into combination. It may be discerned, 1st. In all apologetic, exegetical, and systematic theology, which are respectively but so many attempts to demonstrate the evidences, import, and harmony of revelation; 2d. In all rational theology, which, whenever pursued independently, though reverently, has but served to develope and elucidate problems propounded by revelation; 3d. In all the other rational sciences, which, whether physical or metaphysical, by their own normal procession in human history, are but logically unfolding the attributes

of the revealed Jehovah, and demonstrating him to be the only rational Absolute.

In a word, we may conclude that as there can be no rational theology without a revealed theology, so there can be no revealed theology without a rational theology. The two complement and support each other, and are both normally and ultimately coincident. They, in fact, present the same Reality; the one under a theoretical, and the other under a practical aspect; the one as an object of science, and the other as an object of revelation; and neither could be disjoined without detriment to both. If, on the one hand, the rational Absolute can only be found in the revealed Jehovah, yet, on the other hand, the revealed Jehovah can only be demonstrated by means of the rational Absolute. Destroy reason, and there can be no revealed theology; destroy revelation, and there can be no rational theology; retain both as logically irreconcilable, and we must choose which theology to maintain against the other; but retain both as logically reconcilable, and then both theologies become like intersecting spheres which cannot but ultimately coincide, or like opposite members of an arc which must meet in a common support or mingle in a common ruin.

And the respective systems of sciences which are founded upon the two theologies must likewise stand or fall together. If, on the one hand, our physics and ethics are demonstrating the divine attributes, both natural and moral; yet, on the other hand, those divine attributes afford the only scientific basis of our physics and ethics. Moreover, while the rational division of the sciences, both physical and metaphysical, thus logically requires the support of the revealed theology; yet, at the same time, the revealed division of the same series of sciences as logically requires the support of a rational theology. The two branch divisions are not less the counterpart of each other than are the two radical factors of reason and revelation whence they have proceeded. Nor are they less vitally connected in their practical issues. Detached from the revealed Jehovah, the rational sciences, as they theoretically involve atheism or pantheism, must tend to irreligion or idolatry; detached from the rational Absolute, the revealed sciences, as they theoretically involve dogmatism and bigotry, must tend to

superstition and barbarism; but let the two be united and pursued together, and neither can fly into an extreme. We then have, in the ideal or ultimate reconciliation of rational with revealed science, the ideal or ultimate reconciliation of Christianity with civilization. Philosophy is married to religion, art to worship, and earth to heaven.

Thus what we have been taught respecting God in Scripture by our creed, we find proved (*i. e.* shown to be rational) in nature by our science. And whether we say, in philosophical phrase, that the Infinite Will (*causa causarum*) proceeds logically towards the Infinite Reason (*ratio rationum*) through those successive mechanical, chemical, organical, ethical, political, and religious forces in which it is rationally exerted throughout immensity and eternity; or whether we say, in theological phrase, that the "Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth," hath decreed, "according to the counsel of his will, for his own glory, whatsoever comes to pass;" or whether we say, in Scripture phrase, that Jehovah is "the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the beginning and the ending, which was, and which is, and which is to come, the Almighty;" in either case, we are but apprehending the same intelligible and adorable Reality.

Let heathen philosophy proclaim the Godhead unknown, and inscribe upon its fanes the fitting motto of such a deity,

> "I am all that was, and is, and shall be;
> Nor my veil, has it been withdrawn by mortal;"

but for the Christian philosopher to avow that "the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar,—'*To the unknown and unknowable God*,'"* is to forget that the times of such ignorance are now passed, that the veil of Isis has been rent, for all that will reverently gaze, and that only by ever knowing the ever knowable God do we have life eternal.

We have thus reached, as our general conclusion, a modified affirmative to the whole series of questions propounded. As

* Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 457.

we passed from one to the other we have striven for a firm foothold at each step by carefully avoiding the quagmire on either side. Considering the Absolute as an object of thought, we have admitted that our conception of it must be partial, while we have maintained that it may at least be consistent. Considering it as an object of faith, we have admitted that our belief in it is instinctive, while we have maintained that it involves no latent absurdity. Considering it as an object of knowledge, we have admitted that our cognition of it is imperfect, while we have maintained that it is nevertheless certain. Considering it as a reality to be revealed, we have admitted that a rational theology is possible, while we have maintained that a revealed theology is its indispensable complement. Considering it as a reality to be demonstrated, we have admitted that the revealed theology is necessary, while we have maintained that a rational theology is its indispensable supplement. And by means of such distinctions we have escaped the corresponding extremes of atheism and pantheism, skepticism and mysticism, nescience and omniscience, naturalism and paganism, rationalism and dogmatism; at the same time that we have combined into one connected argument the several truths thus sifted from each discussion. Were such an arrangement and treatment of these difficult questions more generally observed, we cannot but think that much of the controversy now waged about them would disappear.

It only remains to close our sketch with a remark or two, by way of review, survey, and prospect.

On reviewing the wide field we have traversed, we are impressed by the continuity, extent, and importance of modern philosophy. We find different thinkers, of different schools, in different nations, contributing without concert to a movement which, during the lapse of half a century, has grown and spread until it involves the most precious interests of civilization. At its origin, like a mountain rivulet which a pebble might so divide that it shall afterwards flood opposite valleys, the question presented seems almost too simple and harmless for grave discussion. Shall the Absolute be held as a subjective idea, or as an objective reality? Idealistic Germany has pursued the former; realistic England has

pursued the latter; while versatile France has seemed to vibrate from one to the other. And in the wake of each philosophical tendency have followed portentous systems of science, religion and politics, which, as simple monuments of speculative energy, have in no former age been surpassed.

On surveying the results now before us, we are impressed by the grave crisis which has been reached in human progress. There are, in the bosom of this age, two rival philosophies struggling for the mastery. In their extreme form, as fully matured in the systems of Hegel and Comte, they may be termed the Absolute Philosophy and the Positive Philosophy. The former penetrates behind phenomena in search of their essence and cause, and thence proceeds deductively, by mere logical process, to reconstruct the existing universe. The latter enters among phenomena in search of their laws, and there proceeds inductively, by mere empirical process, to investigate the existing universe. The one would take ontology as the basis of ætiology and nomology, and thereon erect the sciences into a system of philosophic omniscience; the other would take nomology as the basis of ætiology and ontology, and thereon erect the sciences into a system of philosophic nescience. While the one would bring philosophy to a premature completion, the other would abruptly leave it incomplete. If the pyramid might be taken as the symbol of the one, the obelisk would serve as the symbol of the other.

On turning now from our survey to the prospect, we cannot but be impressed by the need and imminency of some logical conciliation of these two philosophies. It would be folly to denounce either, because of the perilous extreme to which it has been carried. There must be valuable elements of truth in movements which have engrossed the most powerful minds of this century, and still involve the whole existing mass of knowledge. The true view to be taken of them is, manifestly, that both are legitimate within the limits which they impose upon each other. It is only when either process of reason, the intuitive or the discursive, the deductive or inductive, is pursued independently of the other, or of revelation, their common check and guide, that they become erroneous and pernicious. Let the science of the Absolute be pressed in defiance of the

laws of facts, and it cannot but be vague and visionary; let the science of the phenomenal be pressed in defiance of the causes of facts, and it cannot but be partial and schismatic: but let both be merged in the science of God, that only First and Final Cause of all the intermediate laws of facts, and while our knowledge of the Creator is acquiring precision and pertinence, our knowledge of the creation will be acquiring unity and completeness. In other words, the Absolute philosophy and the Positive philosophy logically converge toward an Ultimate philosophy, wherein the finite reason shall be reconciled with the Infinite Reason, and human science rendered perfectly coincident with Divine Omniscience.

ART. III.—*The History and Theory of Revolutions, as applied to the Present Southern Rebellion.*

THE present generation in this country have heretofore known revolutions only as matters of history, or as events occurring in some distant part of the world. We have read of them, heard of them with the hearing of the ear; but now a revolution, or an attempt at one, has become to us a present and most visibly real fact. The word has always had, for the public ear, a portentous and startling sound. We have been accustomed, and justly so, to connect with revolution the idea of civil war, as the world has known it hitherto, with all its atrocities and horrors; its wild, uncontrollable phrenzy, setting man against man, and community against community, with all the ungovernable fury of a tempest; its fratricidal hate and bloodshed; its unleashing all the worst passions of the human heart, which, in their wild and lawless revel, respect not the rights of man or the virtue of woman; its smoking and ruined cities, its pillaged towns, its deserted and untilled fields, and all its sanguinary paraphernalia of dungeons and scaffolds, guillotines and gibbets, armies and battle-fields. Perhaps we have generally derived our ideas from the French Revolution of 1792, which was a

familiar fact to our fathers in their younger days, and of which some fragments of the nameless horrors, and wild excesses, and almost incredible atrocities, were wont to be rehearsed in youthful ears round many a family hearthstone, and to be perused as amongst the earliest lessons in history.

And now *we* are in the midst of a revolution! *We*, in this republican America, in this lauded nineteenth century,—*we*, devoted to the arts of peace, engrossed in the pursuit of gain, covering the seas with our commerce, dragging forth the treasures from the mountains, chaining the continent together with our iron bands, tilling the broad acres of our wondrous and fruitful country,—*we*, in the midst of a revolution? It is even so! And have we before us the *possibility* of an experience such as other nations have tasted when overtaken by revolution? No man can say that we have not! When once the social structure moves upon its deep foundations, upheaved by the throes of civil convulsion, no prophet's ken can unerringly foretell where the movement will stop. All our predictions and confidences have failed us. In the very hour of our youthful and boastful self-glorification, when we were proclaiming on every hand our confidence in our republican experiment, and demonstrating its stability and permanence, we are called to go down into the very valley of the shadow of death, to have the thick mists settle upon our path, and the ground to quake and gape beneath us, and the very air to be filled with discordant voices of alarm and doubt, of malediction and terror.

It is well, then, that amid the fearful possibilities with which we are environed, we can look back, and calmly, in the light of history, study the general laws and workings of such national exigencies in the case of other nations. For history, whilst it never exactly repeats itself, is a perpetual prophecy of its own evolution. It is well that we can look back and see other nations, much weaker than our own, survive much worse disasters than ours, as yet, appears to be, and even flourish in the midst of them. It is well that we are permitted to observe how the turbulent and brutal passions of men, let loose like hell-hounds of havoc and lust by the tocsin of war, are allayed by the gentle wand of peace, and how in due time all the virtues,

and graces, and amenities of social life resume their accustomed channels. It is well for us that, amid our fears, we can look back and see, through the wildest surgings of national convulsion and deadly strife, the genius of freedom, both civil and religious, rising radiant and beautiful, like beams from the ocean spray. It is well that we can announce to ourselves, as a clear deduction of history, that no great vital interest of mankind, pertaining to Christianity or civilization, has ever been harmed by the ravages of war, or the heavings of civil commotion. The pole-star of human destiny shines always clear above the storm and tempest. God has provided, infallibly, that no local disturbances, as they seem to us, shall interfere with the essential facts or grand results of his moral government. To suppose otherwise, would be to suppose that creation was a freak, and providence a jumble of accidents.

Let us look, then, if possible, a little into this matter of Revolutions. Let us examine their facts, find out if possible their theory, and trace some leading outlines of their history—keeping in view always the special relations of our investigations to the case of our own civil troubles. And it is no affectation to say, that when a man ventures to attempt such a theme, at such a time as this, it behooves him to gather all his best thoughts about him; to weigh well the theories he presents, and the judgments he renders; and to point the eye of inquiry and hope to that only which will not finally deceive.

What, then, is Revolution? What is its definition? What its theory? What has been its history? When is it justifiable? When probably successful? These are questions which may indicate the general drift of inquiry which is before us.

And, first, as to the *definition.* Revolution may be defined to be a radical or organic change in the constitution of government, accomplished either peacefully or violently. Or it may be defined to be the successful resistance to established authority, by which a new form of authority is instituted and established. Or it may be defined to be the passing away of an old form, a worn-out institution, and the uprising of a new one, to enter on its career of development and history. In all these definitions, the fundamental conceptions are the same. They are those of destruction or decay, as preceding new-creation, or

new-formation of the dissevered elements. In the idea of revolution, the most prominent conception is that of overturning or overthrowing, by which society is, to a certain extent, resolved into its original elements, and made to take new shape and form new combinations. The idea is derived from the motion of a wheel, in which every particle is constantly returning to the point whence it started—suggesting the fact, that in the great movements of history, and the life of nations and civilizations, as in the astronomical universe, there is a constant tendency in all things to return, at least in the direction of the point of departure.

Revolution, to be proper and legitimate, and fulfil the part assigned to it in history, must be a movement against that which is old, worn-out, unnatural, unreasonable, or oppressive. When a government or an institution which may have met the wants of men in other ages or other circumstances, is no longer able to adapt itself to the changed circumstances and larger wants of another age, but has become, on the contrary, oppressive and burdensome, brooding, like a horrible nightmare, upon the rising energies and aspirations of a new-born era, then has the moment come for the great tongue of time to strike the hour of revolution, and suddenly armed men spring from the earth like the dragon's teeth of Cadmus, a shout of defiance and vengeance rends the air, and the new-born giant rushes on to his work of destruction.

Revolution must not be confounded with *rebellion* or *insurrection*. Rebellion, as the term indicates, is merely armed resistance to authority. Insurrection is merely a rising up against authority. Neither need necessarily lead to revolution; although they are often the first symptoms of its coming, the first stages of its progress. But rebellion or insurrection may be the result of caprice, of passion, of ambition, of jealousy, or of mere local causes, and they speedily perish. They may be like the mad tiltings of Quixotic knights against windmills and airy giants, in which they get only scars and bruises in return. But when rebellion is successful, and insurrection puts down the authority against which it rises up, then they attain to the dignity of revolution. Rebellion is often revolution begun, revolution is rebellion accomplished.

Having thus defined the term and the thing, it may aid us in examining the theory of revolutions. What is the philosophy of these great throbs in the life of every nation, these convulsive struggles and throes, which form so marked a feature in the life of every people who have attained a nationality since history began? And how comes it that the race does not seem to be outgrowing these portentous phenomena, even with the aids of the highest civilization and the purest Christianity? Whenever we find a fact so universal and perpetual as this, we may be sure that its cause lies deep, and its theory is bound up with the organic laws, and perhaps the very vitality, of the race.

Let us turn to nature, and study her lessons. Everywhere revolution—according to the fundamental conception of it as defined above—appears as an essential and healthful part of her vital processes. In all the universe, so far as man knows it, there is nothing at rest. Everything is in motion. As the gentle Cowper beautifully expresses it,

> "Constant rotation of the unwearied wheel
> That nature rides upon, maintains her health,
> Her beauty, her fertility; she dreads
> An instant's pause, and lives but while she moves."

All nature is a perpetual circulation of matter, and in this perpetual motion the leading factors are the antagonistic forces of life and death, growth and decay. Old forms fade, wither, die, dissolve, that new forms may start into life and beauty, only to fade, wither, die, dissolve again. The fruit ripens, decays, falls to the earth, and carries with it the vital seed, which, under favourable conditions, springs up a new, fruit-bearing tree. Life, death, birth, decay, beauty, deformity, growth, dissolution, are the alphabet with which nature makes up her wondrous story—the figures which move in her mysterious drama.

> "My heart is awed within me when I think
> Of the great miracle which still goes on
> In silence round me; the perpetual work
> Of thy creation finished, yet renewed
> For ever."

Nature, then, is full of revolutions. Revolution is the law of her life, the music of her mighty march. Spring, summer, autumn, winter, day, night, cold, heat, are each respectively a revolution on the other.

Now a law, analogous to this which thus pervades all nature, is, or seems to be, the law of national life. If we fail to see at once the accuracy or precision of its analogy, it is only because its cycles are so great, and its periods so long, that we can take but a few of them within the scope of our vision. It is only by a careful study of the whole history of national experience, that we arrive at the comprehensive generalization, that revolution is a perpetual agency in national development.

The educated mind of the age is becoming possessed of an ever-strengthening conviction that this universe, both material and moral—the universe of matter, and of men—is governed by laws, in a much wider as well as more minute sense than is ordinarily comprehended,—laws so steady and accurate that in a given period, amidst manifold variations, they will give us the same general average of cold and heat, of sunshine and cloud, of rain and drought,—laws so steady that in a given population, in ordinary circumstances, the same number of persons will die, the same number be born, the same number be married in a given period,—laws so steady, though obscure, that in the millions of births which occur annually, the proper numerical relation of the sexes is preserved,—laws so steady, though inscrutable, that in a given population, in ordinary circumstances, the same number of crimes will be committed, of each particular kind, the same number of punishments for the crimes will be suffered, and the same number of good deeds of virtue, benevolence, and charity, will be performed,—laws so steady, in short, that, in the same circumstances, masses of men will feel alike, and think alike, and act alike. The elements and laws of human nature, whilst exhibiting all the diversity of manifestation, within certain limits, which prevails in the physical world, are as steadfast and permanent in their essential characteristics as the laws of the material universe. Hence the perpetually recurring phenomena of history, that power, long wielded, begets oppression; oppression, long

endured, begets resentment and resistance; and resistance begets revolution. So long, then, as these things are so—so long as human nature remains unchanged in its essential features—must we regard revolutions as indispensable stadia in the path of national progress, indispensable factors in the problem of human destiny, indispensable evils, if we prefer to call them so, with which mankind must be afflicted—as indispensable as tempest and lightning, hail and snow, in the natural world.

It is one of the amiable weaknesses of many good people, to affect to think, in their horror of incidental evils and wickedness, that they could govern God Almighty's moral world better than he does himself—at least that they are competent to instruct him how to govern it better. We refer to the absurdities and impieties so frequent in prayer. We opine it is better to adapt ourselves to things as they are, or must be, or may become, and to believe that the mystic weaver who sits above the clouds understands from the beginning the texture and colour of the web he is weaving, though he may not always throw the shuttle just as we might desire.

The *theory* of revolutions then is, that with all their hideous and gory surroundings, they are the inevitable throes and pangs by which the old, the worn-out, the useless, the oppressive, are overthrown, and the new and hopeful introduced. They are always the symptoms of vitality seeking to assert itself—of life warring with death.

Revolution may be accomplished peacefully, without disturbance or violence; but this is not the ordinary law of its operation. It is the exception, not the rule, in national affairs. The old *may* pass away, and the new come in without jarring or discord, like the soft twilight of evening settling gently over the bed of the king of day; but the change is oftenest made with confused noise and garments rolled in blood. When the gigantic monarch of the forest has fulfilled its cycle of centuries; when its heart of oak has imperceptibly dropped away in decay, leaving but a thin, hollow shell to bear the weight of the limbs and trunk above, and to withstand the pressure of the storm, it is still possible that it may drop away piecemeal, one limb after another, until nothing be left but the

splintered and hollow trunk; but the much greater probability is, that at a certain point of its decay, on a stormy winter's night, the wings of the tempest will seize it in their sweep, and as the wild chorus howls among the branches, the ancient trunk will crackle and snap, and the huge hulk of the giant of centuries fall to the earth with a crash that startles from their coverts the denizens of the forest.

Before passing on to the history of revolutions, it may be well for us to give some attention to the question, When is revolution justifiable? When is a people justified in taking the assertion of their inalienable rights into their own hands in a revolutionary way? When may existing governments or institutions be justly overthrown, if need be, by force? It is manifest that this is a very serious question. It runs the dividing line between wicked rebellion and righteous revolution. It is, moreover, a very practical question, one which must be decided by almost every generation of men in one form or another. It is a question which has been often and much discussed. Philosophers, statesmen, lawgivers, kings, poets, orators, reformers, theologians, have all had occasion, with such ability as they may have had, to discuss it, for the benefit of themselves or others. Monarchs trembling upon their thrones, statesmen called to guide the helm of state amid stormy seas, philosophers in the seclusion of their studies, poets and orators firing the popular heart under the goading wrongs of centuries, reformers cleaving asunder the abuses of corrupt, disjointed times, and pious divines, earnest pastors of churches, having, in some measure, the care of the consciences as well as the souls of their flocks, have all, at times, by the necessities of their positions, been compelled to form for themselves a theory, and proclaim a doctrine, designed either to disprove entirely the right of revolution, or to assert it, and to define the limits within which it may be exercised.

If we accept the definition and theory of revolution which we have endeavoured to give, it is evident that the right of revolution does exist in every society. It is a latent ingredient in every political state, to be called forth by a necessity more or less stringent, according as the antecedents, and whole concatenation of circumstances, historic and ethnic, may require.

If this is not so, then despotism is the true theory of human government. If there is no right of revolution, then humanity is helplessly prostrate at the feet of any existing authority. If there is no such right, then any crowned Nero, or Caligula, or Philip II., may ride iron-shod over our liberties, may fetter our consciences, prescribe for us our religion, confiscate our property, make conscripts of our sons, and concubines of our daughters, and no murmur of injustice, or imprecation of wrath, must be heard. But this cannot be. Humanity was not made to be thus the plaything of despots. Readily as we admit the divine constitution of government, and admit even the divine sanction of kingly or monarchical government, for certain ends, and under certain limitations, we assert with equal readiness the divine origin of the rights of man. The one is a divine factor, which works over against and modifies the other. When one divine factor becomes untrue to its origin, another, equally divine, takes up the divine work of destroying it, and vindicating its own sacredness. In other words, when government, through human wickedness, becomes false to itself, and divorces itself from its own divinity, in whole or in part, then the divine afflatus blows the trumpet-blast of revolution. And thus history ever oscillates between the forces which play upon it on this side and on that.

But however men may theorize, they never fail to exercise the right of revolution when the necessity of the case demands it. Like the peace-principles of the Quakers, their anti-revolution speculations give way before the pressure of actual fact. The instincts of mankind are stronger than their doctrines. "Oppression maketh" even "a wise man mad." There is a point, even, at which the timid stag, hunted over mountain and valley, and finding the yelping pack coming closer and closer upon his failing steps, turns panting and furious at bay, and plunges his antlers into the nearest foe.* There is a right of revolution, then, which God never intended should be taken from men, until he brings in that more perfect constitution of human affairs, when there shall be nothing to hurt or destroy in all his holy mountain.

* Rev. George Frazer, General Assembly of 1861.

But admitting the right, we return to the query, When is its exercise justifiable? Perhaps no specific and definite answer can be given, suitable to all cases. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and, as a matter of fact, each case will decide itself in its own issue. But we may venture some general suggestions.

It is evident that as revolution is a last resort, an extreme measure, an ulterior remedy for the ills of the body politic, it ought not to be resorted to for light or trivial causes. The means must hold proper relation to the end. A man may take life in self-defence, and stand unimpeached of justice; but he cannot do so to avenge a slight indignity. Revolution can never be justified as a matter of caprice, or of mere party passion, or the ambitious schemings of demagogues, or the desire of mere local or sectional aggrandizement. There must be the endurance of actual wrongs—not merely the imagination of prospective wrongs—but the actual endurance of goading and painful wrong. A man cannot justly take the life of his neighbour under the apprehension that at some future time his own may be imperilled. And as an extreme measure, its proper place is after all others have failed. A last resort must not be a first resort. Every pacific measure must be tried, every peaceful remedy must be attempted and found unavailing, every possible effort must be patiently and perseveringly made to secure justice and right, and found futile, before an oppressed people can rightfully arise in their might, summoned by a call more potent than the bugle blast of Roderic, or the great iron tongue of the bell Roland in Ghent, to shake off the shackles of perverted authority, and overthrow the strongholds of abused power.

There is always a strong presumption in favour of established institutions—a strong presumption in favour of existing government. The fact that it is, is *prima facie* evidence, until the contrary is proved, that it ought to be. Although despotism, for instance, or monarchy, is always more or less of an usurpation—rests, first or last, upon usurpation—yet it becomes the means or occasion of government—it actualizes government—and the usurpation disappears as the history moves on,

and in manifold circumstances it may be best adapted to the wants of men. And in a rude and unprepared age, when men need to be under tutors and governors, the man would be justly branded as a wild enthusiast and madman, who should raise the standard of revolution, and rally men around the chimera of an ideal and impossible republicanism, based upon the abstract rights of man.

There is one general rule or formula which has been often referred to and quoted since our own civil troubles commenced, which is, perhaps, as just and comprehensive as any that can be found as a criterion of revolution. It is this;—*that the actual evils endured must be so great, that the evils of the revolution will be less: or that the ultimate good to be gained must be so great, that the aggravated evils of the revolution may be endured for the sake of it.* Before, however, entering upon this survey, we would remark that the question, when a revolution is profitable, is a matter of conscience, rather than of expediency. The great principle conservative of human rights and of the well-being of society, is, that we are bound to obey God rather than man. When any human law conflicts with the divine law, it ceases to bind the conscience. That divine law is revealed, not only in the Scriptures, but in the constitution of our nature. Whether the human does conflict with the divine law, is a question for the individual conscience. In cases of such conflict, it is our duty to refuse obedience, as did the apostles, but not necessarily actively to resist. Revolution, or the overthrow of established government, therefore, is not justifiable on caprice, or at the discretion of the people; nor on account of unwise or unequal legislation; nor simply for the object of benefiting the condition of the people. Rebellion, or the attempt to overthrow a legitimate authority by force of arms, is justifiable—1. Only when obedience to that government is disobedience to God. 2. When the evil admits of no other remedy. 3. When there is a fair prospect of success. False as is the principle that ability limits obligation in other spheres, in that of external action it is self-evidently true. A child is not bound to resist a ruffian about to commit murder. A strong man is bound. Whether the Scotch were right in resisting, by force of arms, the attempt of Charles II.

to impose prelacy upon them, or the English in opposing James II. in his efforts to introduce Popery, depended on the two questions—1. Whether the evil could be otherwise prevented; and 2. Whether they had the power to prevent it. If they could do it, they were bound to do it. It is doubtful whether anything more definite than this can be given, and with it we pass on to consider the history of revolutions, and to draw some contrasts between some of the great leading revolutions of modern times, and the present Southern rebellion in our own country.

History has been defined as "philosophy teaching by experience." In other words, the actual is always the best measure of the possible. And, indeed, for certain practical purposes, a thorough, intelligent study of history is worth more than all the metaphysical speculation that has accumulated since the days of Adam. History holds up the mirror to man's nature, and reveals to him, by the reality of what has been, the possibility of what may be, nay, of what must be; for the laws of human action, and the operation of human motive, are as inexorable as the laws of matter, and the forms and shapes of the future already lie dimly, yet definitely, outlined in the forms and shapes of the past. If, then, we are able to lay the phenomena of this Southern rebellion side by side with some of those great movements in the past which are appropriately styled revolutions; if we are able to compare their antecedents, their motives and causes, their general phenomena and general features, it may enable us, in some measure, to determine whether this civil trouble which is upon us is a revolution, or only a rebellion.

It will not be possible, in the limited space of a single article, to attempt a general history of revolutions. We might as well attempt a history of the world. Suffice it to say, that every great nation, both ancient and modern, without a single exception, so far as we know, has repeatedly felt the earthquake shocks of revolution. All have, at times, trembled to their very centres, and, in many instances, the whole fabric of government has gone down, as with a crash that startled the world, into dismemberment and chaos, and from amidst the

fragments a new form has arisen, to gird itself with youthful vigour and hope for the career of national greatness.

It will serve our purpose to select three or four prominent examples from comparatively modern history, with which to institute the comparison. These examples will be the revolution in the Netherlands in the latter half of the sixteenth century, which gave rise to the Dutch Republic; the French Revolution of 1792; the Cromwellian Revolution in England in 1649, and to these we will add the American Revolution of 1776. This Southern movement, by the magnitude it has assumed, and the claims it has put forth, must either take its rank along with these in the annals of the future, or sink, crushed and broken, into the oblivion in which lie the countless abortive rebellions and insurrections of which history has scarcely deigned to make chronicle.

We will endeavour to present some salient points of comparison and contrast.

First, and chiefly, as to the provocation or evils endured, which excited to armed resistance to authority. Let history remove the mask of delusion under which our Southern brethren have so hastily rushed to arms. If they have thought themselves aggrieved, let them consider what others have borne before venturing into the abyss into which they have so recklessly plunged. In the case of the Netherland Revolution, the story of wrongs, long and patiently borne, is one of the most heart-rending and monstrous which has been left us in all the annals of time. On the abdication of Charles I., his son Philip II. succeeded to the crown of Spain. Few characters in history present all the worst features of the despot in so intense a form. Besides the crown of Spain, he inherited a hereditary sovereignty in the Netherlands as Duke or Count of Holland and Flanders; a sovereignty, however, limited and defined by constitutions, and charters, and privileges, granted and confirmed to the Provinces long before, and making the government as strictly a constitutional monarchy as is that of England at this day. During his first visit to the Netherlands, a summer was spent in festivities; the opulent cities of that great hive of industry vieing with each other in the magnificent banquets, and cavalcades, and ceremonies, by which he

exchanged oaths of mutual fidelity with them all. He swore unreservedly to support and maintain inviolate all the constitutions, and charters, and privileges, which had been confirmed to them by his predecessors, and by which his sovereignty was limited and his government regulated. And now, monstrous and difficult of belief as it may seem, we are forced to the conviction that all this was mere dissimulation and sham. From that very moment the whole policy of his government, backed by the power of Spanish armies, was to trample upon all these constitutions, and charters, and privileges, to treat them as nullities, to punish as a traitor any one who dared insist on their sacredness, and to erect over the doomed Provinces an authority dependent on nothing, limited by nothing, defined by nothing but his own personal, absolute, despotic will. To accomplish this purpose, deception and dissimulation were resorted to which seem scarcely human. With fair promises, and specious protestations and blandishments, he lulled the suspicious and restless victims of his tyranny, whilst his private correspondence shows that his deliberate purpose was to bind upon their limbs more firmly the fetters of political and ecclesiastical slavery. State papers and despatches were sent to his regents to be published as instructions from the throne, when the same courier carried private messages to the same officials instructing them to do just the reverse. Netherland noblemen were invited to Spain on missions of confidence, and kept there under strict surveillance, and in due time poisoned or assassinated, and messages of condolence sent to their friends, informing them that they had died peacefully and trustfully believing that God had mercy on their souls. The Counts of Egmont and Horn, two leading Netherland nobles, were invited to Brussels to share the hospitality of the newly-arrived Duke of Alva. The revelry of a merry banquet lasted late in the hours of the night, after which the two nobles were invited to a private interview with the Duke. Scarcely had they entered his room when they were arrested and sent to close confinement, and shortly afterwards publicly beheaded in the horsemarket. Troops of foreign soldiery overran the country, and overlooking every important city was a powerful citadel erected, to overawe the turbulent populace. All this

was done with deliberate purpose, and prior to all provocation, except that which arose, at the several steps, from protests and complaints against the violations of ancient rights. He levied upon them taxes and imposts the most arbitrary and monstrous, and he punished, with all the exquisite arts of torture, all deviations from the established religion. The Inquisitors whom he sent amongst them assumed a license, and practised a scrutiny and cruelty in the discovery and punishment of heresy, most frightful to think of. And yet the Netherlanders scarcely thought of revolution! Some local scenes of turbulence and resistance occurred, but it was not until every right had been trampled in the dust, every feeling of honour and patriotism outraged, every hope of relief by constitutional methods dissipated, that the sagacious and heroic William of Orange was able to organize a combined and effectual resistance. And even that had to be done under the fiction of making war, as Philip's stadtholder, upon Philip's governors, for the vindication of the ancient laws. And when a down-trodden and insulted people did at last thus arise, and not pray, but demand a recognition of their ancient charters, he answered them by a visitation of the most horrible cruelties which the imagination can conceive. He sacked their cities, he devastated their fields, his brutal soldiery butchered their old men and children by thousands, and ravished their women by hundreds in the churches and market-places. By a sweeping decree he condemned the whole population of the Netherlands to death, every man, woman, and child, with some few exceptions, which were named; so that his officials could hang up, without question or form of trial, any one whom they suspected of having an aspiration of liberty in his breast. Here, then, was an occasion for revolution. Nay, all history would have sanctioned a revolution in the Netherlands long before it occurred. When laws which protected the citizen against arbitrary imprisonment, and guarantied him a trial in his own province,* which forbade the appointment of foreigners to high office, which secured the property of the citizen from taxation except by the representative body, which forbade the inter-

* Motley.

meddling of the sovereign with the conscience of the subject in religious matters,—when such laws had been subverted by Blood Tribunals, whose drowsy judges sentenced thousands to the scaffold and the stake without a hearing,—when excommunication, confiscation, banishment, hanging, beheading, burning, were practised to such enormous extent, and with such terrible monotony, that the executioner's sword came to be looked upon as the only symbol of justice,—when cruelties too monstrous for description, too vast to be believed by a mind not familiar with the outrages practised by the soldiers of Spain and Italy, were daily enacted,—then, surely, if ever, might the shrill voice of humanity shriek out from amid her blood and tears, and call upon her mail-clad warriors to avenge her wrongs. And we would say, in a word, by way of application, that if our brethren in the Southern states had endured a tithe, nay, a hundredth part, of the wrongs which the patient Dutch of the sixteenth century had inflicted upon them, they would be *justified* in this rebellion.

Let us look now at the second great example named, the French Revolution of 1792. This is spoken of distinctively as *the* French Revolution, because of the magnitude of its results, and the terrific interest of its attendant circumstances, although there have been several revolutions and changes of dynasties in France within living memory. It is common for many persons to think and speak of the French Revolution only as a volcanic outburst of infidelity and bloodshed. They think of it only as a Reign of Terror, in which such demons of impiety and cruelty as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, rode triumphant upon the wave. In looking at the excesses to which the movement ran, they lose sight of the central current of the movement itself. The rebound is always in proportion to the pressure in the opposite direction, and if the French Revolution ran into lamentable and disastrous excesses, it was mainly because the freedom which it inaugurated was rescued from the thraldom of such an intolerable oppression, its excesses assisted also by the mercurial temperament of the French people. But the Reign of Terror was not the French Revolution. The French Revolution was a tremendous and overwhelming revolt against the combined tyranny of a feudal nobility, a dissolute court and

clergy, and an absolute sovereign, each forging a separate chain by which to bind and oppress the mass of the nation The feudal system of the Middle Ages, which was a good thing in its time, a good thing in times when every individual man needed a protector, and was fain to attach himself to some powerful chieftain who was able to secure him in his rights of person and property, and for which protection he was willing to render service of labour or arms—this feudal system reached its culmination in France, and in the eighteenth century had become the embodiment of insupportable abuses. The feudal lords, who owned most of the soil, were as about one to two hundred and fifty of the population; and yet so absolute and minute, so detailed and specific were their exclusive rights, that the two hundred and fifty, or the greater part of them, were little better than the slaves of the one. To cite a single and apparently trivial instance—and we cite it as a representative instance—they possessed the exclusive right to keep pigeons, and it was their privilege to let them loose upon the fields in sowing time, and the toiling peasant dared not raise a finger in resistance or protest. As owners of the soil, they absorbed nearly the whole productive wealth of the nation, leaving the peasant and artisan scarcely the necessaries of life. This vast income they expended in show, and in profligate and dissolute ways, and yet refused to contribute their just proportion to the expenses of government, causing the taxes to fall with inconceivable severity upon the already oppressed labouring and other classes. They obstinately resisted all reforms, and clung with ferocious tenacity to their hereditary privileges. Add to this the equal tyranny of an absolute sovereign, whose prodigal and dissolute court, whose expensive wars, and whose wasteful squandering of the public money upon favourites and parasites only added to the heavy burdens already entailed by the feudal nobility; and add, also, the officious and intermeddling presence everywhere of a thoroughly debased and mercenary, yet powerful clergy, oppressing the conscience as well as the estate, and we have an abundant occasion, if history can furnish one, for a thorough and radical revolution.

From beneath this incubus of ages, the enlightened mind of

the eighteenth century in France sprang with a tremendous rebound, and the world shook with the concussion. Out of the chaos emerged, amid blood and fire, and the wild shouts of a freed and almost frantic people, first a brief and delusive republicanism, afterwards a healthier and better form of constitutional monarchy. Its odious features and its so-called failure notwithstanding, France owes an incalculable debt to her great revolution. At the time of the revolution, all the privileged classes combined—and there were numerous grades of them—constituted but one-thirtieth of the population; the other twenty-nine thirtieths, composed of peasants, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, scholars, philosophers, men of science, lawyers, physicians, were what was called the Third Estate, in other words, the *people*, who then possessed neither rights nor privileges as citizens, but who have been a power in history ever since.

And we would say here again, briefly, by way of application, that if the Southern states of this Union had been oppressed with burdens and disabilities half as heavy and odious as those laid upon the unprivileged Third Estate of France before the revolution, they would be *justified* in this rebellion.

We pass now to the third historical example named, the revolution in England under Cromwell.

This had for its basis two fundamental ideas, viz., resistance to the encroachments of the royal prerogative, and the assertion of the rights of conscience. During the two previous reigns of James I. and Charles I., the most strenuous and persevering efforts had been made to extend the royal prerogative, so that even the Magna Charta of King John, the sheet-anchor of constitutional liberty under monarchical government, was in danger of being superseded, or its effect seriously thwarted. And the religious persecution had also been most stringent, showing the determined purpose on the part of the sovereign to crush the religious sentiment of the nation into the Procrustean form of an established hierarchy. Against this double usurpation, joined with a most flagrant deterioration of the public morals, the spirit of liberty and the awakened conscience of the nation revolted, and the whole fabric of monarchy went down, for a time, before the psalm-singing legions of the great

Oliver. And though the change was but temporary, and England soon returned to the flesh-pots of her kingly Egypt, yet the effects of it are most marked and salutary to this day, not only in English history, but in the history of religious liberty throughout the world. "Freedom to worship God" was its watchword, and its legacy to our own time.

And we will add here, too, that if the rights of conscience had been trampled upon in the South, if there had been an attempt to establish a religious inquisition, or a censorship in the worship of God, and all other means of redress had failed, they would have been *justified* in revolution.

We will glance now at our fourth and last historical example, the American Revolution of 1776.

An attempt has been made by the Southern leaders and newspapers, to claim the advantage of this great example, which is a matter of common history and common pride with us all. They say to us, that if the colonies could justly assert their independence of the mother country, then "we can with equal justice claim and assert our independence of you." But let us observe that the cases are by no means similar in their essential features. In the first place, there is no parallel in the character or nature of the two cases. The American revolution was not a revolution in the sense in which the Southern rebellion is necessarily a revolution, if it attain to that dignity at all. It was no organic disruption of society, no radical disintegration of the framework of government. It was a mere separation of certain governmental dependencies from a distant sovereignty, with which, though largely affiliated in origin and language, they had scarcely anything in common in respect to governmental polity and tendencies. The colonies were no incorporated, functional members of the British government, and their severance left that government whole and sound in all its parts. Not so with our Southern states. They are part and parcel of the organic whole of the nation. They were, to a large extent, agents and actors in all the functions of government. In fact, they had the lion's share, both in the honours and emoluments of office, since the formation of the government. They are separated from us by no natural boundary. We are visibly bound together by those grand

physical features of the continent, which are more potent than compacts and constitutions, and which declare unmistakeably the organic oneness of our national life. Between the waters which leap from the frozen fissures of the Rocky Mountains, and those which spread their calm bosom to the tropical sun of the Gulf of Mexico, there stretches a continuous, unbroken relationship, by virtue of a great law of nature, which can only be interrupted by the destruction of the great Father of Waters himself. So the natural oneness, the organic wholeness of our national existence, can only be destroyed by the violation of the great manifest laws of our being. Hence the revolution which our Southern patriots, as they call themselves, would justify by the example of that of our fathers, is a far more radical and destructive revolution, and ought to be sanctioned by more potent and manifest causes and provocations. But in this respect, also, the example fails them. The colonies revolted against grievances more tangible and real than those which the heated passions or base designs of partisans and demagogues have used to inflame the deluded people of the South. They were subjected to an unnatural and oppressive system of taxation—unnatural and oppressive because forced upon them entirely from without, and for purposes in which they had little interest. They were subjected to taxation without representation, whilst our Southern revolutionists have had, to some extent, representation without taxation. They were denied trial by jury on their own soil for certain offences. They were made to bear the burden of large standing armies for foreign purposes. They were cramped and harassed in their whole internal policy by the domineering interference of a distant and selfish sovereignty. They rebelled, not from caprice, or passion, or ambition, but from necessity. And we hesitate not to say, that if our Southern brethren could put forth a Declaration of Independence which would stand the scrutiny of fact, such as was put forth on the 4th of July, 1776, they would be *justified* in this rebellion.

But, instead of all this, what have we? What have been their grievances? Have they been hanged and burned, drawn and quartered, like the patient Netherlanders? Have their ancient constitutions, charters, and privileges, been trampled in

the dust? Instead of this, they have been continually strengthened by new guaranties, and conciliatory propositions were thrown into the very jaws of the revolt. Have they been held under hard taskmasters, and bound to unrequited toil, like the Third Estate of France before the Revolution? Have they been persecuted for conscience' sake, like the Puritans of the reign of James I.? Have they been oppressed and goaded by unthinking tyranny, like the American colonists? Instead of all this, or any of it, what have been the facts? They have been nursed and fondled by the nation. They have shared the choicest of her gifts. They have given shape and form to her general policy. They have had the most extraordinary concessions made to them. So long and patiently did the North yield to their ever-enlarging demands, that they themselves instinctively scorned us as dough-faces. The general government has always been specially and paternally tender of their welfare, and even of their prejudices. Many of the leading measures of governmental policy in years past have been taken specially in their interest. They have been nourished and cherished into greatness, and wealth, and prosperity, all of which they have hazarded in the vortex of revolution, lured by a chimera of no tangible outline or actual form!

We confess that they have not been free from grievances, as viewed from their own peculiar stand-point; not grievances, however, growing out of the public policy or acts of the government, but rather out of the opinions and temper of the people of the North. The chief of these grievances has arisen from what all Americans in former years supposed to be one of their inalienable rights, viz., freedom of speech and freedom of discussion. We can readily imagine how goading it must have been to a Southern slaveholder, who had fully possessed himself with the idea, not only of the rightfulness and beneficence of slavery, but of its vast superiority to every other system as a basis for civilized society, to hear it discussed and questioned in the North, to hear it denounced, in the language of Wesley, as the "sum of all villanies," to see its enormities exposed in the vivid light of fiction, to see its workings held up in the cold, calm glare of statistics, to hear its merits in a moral view tested in the crucible of the universal conscience, in

short, to have it thought about, and talked about, and written about, badgered and beaten hither and thither with the remorseless battledores of logic or no-logic, by those who, in his view, had nothing to do with it—all this, we say, we can readily imagine to have been excessively annoying. But is this, or anything like it, to justify revolution? Then, indeed, must human society be bound with ropes of sand. Are we to put the moral sense of all Christendom under the ban because it is against us? Rather should this lead us to question the infallibility of our own conclusions. Is this the sort of wrong, long and patiently borne, which demands that society shall return to chaos and reorganization? Assuredly not, or society is a fiction, and history a myth. Our Southern brethren have never been oppressed, or grieved, or wronged, in any such sense as has fired the hearts and nerved the arms of revolutionists in days of yore. What shall we say then? What does history say, speaking to us by example, her voice pealing through the long and gory ages of the past? Her utterance is this, if we have interpreted it aright, that, judged by all the past, tested by all the criteria of great and successful revolutions in other lands, measured by the motives and provocations which have goaded men in other years to deeds of violence and bloodshed, this Southern rebellion is the *most causeless revolution* ever attempted in the annals of time! It is, in fact, a revolution, not against oppression, not against injustice, not against civil or religious disability, but a revolution against the census and against the ballot-box. It is a convulsive grasp after waning and departing power.

If we turn now to the second member of our definitive limitation of the justifiableness of revolution, viz., that "the ultimate good to be gained must be so great that the aggravated evils of the revolution may be endured for the sake of it"—we will find that the present rebellion must suffer in the comparison with either of the four great revolutions we have indicated. They all had a purpose, an object, an ultimate good, toward the achievement of which they tended and struggled, and the realization of which was worth any amount of privation and suffering within the limits of human endurance. They were all manifestly moved by those great world ideas which work them-

selves out into great and permanent results in the history of mankind. The Netherlands Revolution was a contest in the interest of civil and religious liberty throughout all Christendom—in the interest, in other words, of Protestantism, which was then engaged in a life and death struggle for its own existence. In that little, amphibious corner of the north of Europe, the genius of human freedom stood at bay, and defied the power of absolutism in church and state, and its victory in the strife rescued European civilization from the clutch of despotism, and the human conscience from the thraldom of priestly usurpation. The Reformation was there on trial for a history or a grave. There can be no doubt that a different result would have been followed by the subjugation of England, the arrest and ruin of the Reformation in Germany, and thus all Europe, and perhaps America too, would have been at the feet of two monster powers, the empire of Spain and the Papal throne. In such a cause, even such scenes as the sack of Haarlem or the siege of Leyden can be endured, nay, must be endured, if humanity is true to its own exigencies.

The French Revolution was a contest in which the essential rights of man were involved as against unrelenting oppression. Any one who makes himself at all familiar with the condition of France before the Revolution, must see at once that the time had fully come for a thorough and radical reorganization of the whole framework of society. The old, effete, and burdensome institutions of a former era were tottering to their fall, or pressing like an incubus upon the awakened energies of a great people. There was no ordinary possibility that the old order of things could continue, unless the whole nation sank into torpor and death; or that it could be changed, save by the sweeping charge of the hurricane. Events are stronger than men; and when an unseen power from beneath impels the movement, men ride but as straws upon the wave. Whenever a revolution is impelled by the quickening pulse of new-born national life, then no sacrifice is too great, no endurance too severe, to purchase the boon of success.

The Cromwellian Revolution had for its object the conservation of the constitutional rights of the realm, the purification of the social and political fabric, and the defence of the rights

of conscience. Its ultimate good, for which it plunged the English nation into revolution, has been sufficiently attested by its influence upon Anglo-Saxon history and morals everywhere, and upon the subsequent history of the British monarchy. No price is too dear to pay for that which mankind cannot afford to lose.

The American Revolution was the realization of the dream of a great nationality—or rather the necessary and irresistible outbirth, sooner or later, of an instinctive feeling of nationality. The most superficial survey of the continent, the most meagre comprehension of the true extent of their possible possessions, and the field for empire opened before them, must have begotten in the advance minds of the time the first feeble pulsations of national life, the first rising aspirations after social autonomy. And these pulsations and aspirations must have been perpetually strengthened by every new discovery of the vast possibilities before them, and the incapacity of the old order to meet the requirements of the case. It seems hardly within the ordinary range of conjecture to suppose that the proper and natural development of this continent could have been reached as a mere dependency of the British crown, or as the fragmentary dependencies of several European sovereignties. And as the vast possibilities of their country's future would glimmer faintly, even, before the vision of the patriots of the Revolution, they might well count no cost too dear, no sacrifice too great, to bestow such an inheritance upon their children.

But what, now, of this Southern Confederacy? What ultimate good do they propose as an offset to the aggravated evils of revolution? What great world idea moves them to do, and dare, and suffer? Perhaps some of their ambitious leaders have had their dreams of empire, too. Perhaps visions of expansion, and conquest, and illimitable grandeur, have floated before their waking hours. Perhaps they have been bold enough, in their speculative flights, to project for themselves a nationality, based distinctively upon slavery, which would astonish the world by its successful working and practical results. It is a bold idea, certainly, but whether it be a living thought-birth of the genius of history, or an *ignis fatuus*, luring to ruin, time alone will determine. Doubtless at this moment, to

the moral perceptions of the vast majority of Christendom, it seems more like the dream of a maniac. But is this the ultimate good they propose? We think it is. It appears, with more or less distinctness, in the published speeches of their leading men. It is seen in some of the features of their Constitution itself. Instead of one great nationality, unique, compact, yet multiform in its minor features, truly *e pluribus unum*, combining the restless energy and world-conquering power of the sons of the frosty North, and the fervid imagination and generous impulses of the children of the sunny South; yielding the corn of the broad prairies, and the cotton and sugar of the warm sea isles and savannahs; sweeping on in one great, broad stream of social grandeur; chiming in the ear of history like a full diapason, in which all the tones, from deepest bass to lightest alto, are heard—instead of this, they propose to give us two great nationalities, each one-sided and narrow in its features, each at fault for want of the complement of the other, perhaps each watching with jealous and hostile eye every movement of the other; or, worse still, if their theory of government be consistently held, they propose to give us a dozen or more petty sovereignties, discordant and jarring, and doing their best to devour one another. This is the *ultima thule* of secession. This is the final end to which they look to justify the horrors of revolution. For this, is it, that they have pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honour? So it would seem.

What, then, is the special and particular significance of this Southern rebellion? What leading idea lies at the root of it? Into what formula may we compress its essential, central meaning? By what definition may we limit and distinguish it, so as to embody its heart and core, its real purpose and final aim? We answer this: It is the struggle of *a false civilization for supremacy*, or at least independence.

All high civilization rests upon labour as its natural and essential basis. There must be a broad and permanent basis of toil, on which to rear its lofty and graceful proportions. Labour is the true measure of value; hence labour is the parent of wealth. The earth must be made to yield her increase, her mineral resources must be dragged forth from their

rocky beds, and the myriad sons of labour must change, modify, refine, and convert to the uses of man, the agricultural and mineral products of the earth, or mankind can never rise above the condition of roaming shepherd tribes or savage hunters. Now, while all agree in these general premises, the distinction between the Northern and Southern conception of civilization is this—that in the North we believe this labour ought to be voluntary and free, incited by the hope of reward, stimulated by the lure of gain, made steady and reliable by the hope of personal independence and of constantly rising to a more desirable elevation in the social scale. This the Northern mind believes to be the true theory of the highest civilization; to be most consonant with the universal kinship and ultimate perfectibility of the human race, or any part thereof; and to be most nearly allied to the conceptions of the founders of this great republic of the setting sun. Whilst, on the other hand, the ruling sentiment of the South is, that this labour ought to be a matter of property; that it ought to be owned, like the soil or the mines, and that it ought to pertain to a distinct and separate class, working under compulsion, and for ever bound to that estate of toil—at least unable to rise above it by any provision of the system itself. This is their conception of the true relation between labour and capital, between labour and civilization. And it may be readily conceded that, in certain contingencies and relations of races, this theory may be accepted as a provisional arrangement. We are no such advocates of the abstract rights of man as to suppose that those rights may not at times be held in abeyance, by necessity or expediency. And we think the fact is indisputable that, until recently, the great majority of Christian people in the South held to this view of the case, *i. e.*, that slavery was a provisional arrangement, and not a finality; in other words, they held to the theory of expediency, or the "toleration theory," as opposed to the "sin theory" on the one hand, and the "Divine right theory" on the other, according to the classification of Dr. Frederick B. Ross. And we think the fact equally clear, that this has been the position of the Presbyterian church from the beginning—a position from which the advocates of the "sin theory" on the one hand, and the advocates of the "Divine

right theory" on the other, in vain attempted to drive or seduce her. And had the mind of the whole country been content to repose in this position, had the storms of fanaticism not howled from the North, nor an equally fatal madness pervaded the South, this trouble, humanly speaking, would not have occurred either in church or state. Had the mind of the whole country rested in the doctrine of the fathers, that slavery was a provisional arrangement, a local or municipal institution, to be continued, modified, or removed, as circumstances indicated, by those who were responsible for it, the North would have been ever ready, as we believe the great mass of its people have ever been, to concede to the South, under the Constitution, all that pertains to their peculiar institution, and the Southern people would not have been changed into fanatical slavery propagandists. But it is manifest that the doctrine of expediency, or the toleration theory, has been steadily, and of late rapidly, giving way in the South, supplanted by a type of thought more affirmative and positive in the interest of slavery —a type of thought which accepts it, not as a provisional arrangement, but as a finality, the divinely ordained relation between labour and capital, and the permanent basis of the highest civilization.

Now we will readily admit, that if the doctrine of the unity of the race could be dispensed with; if the proper humanity of the labouring class in the South could be set aside, this Southern theory of the relation between labour and civilization might be readily acquiesced in by the whole world. But how it can be held consistently with the doctrine of oneness of blood and of origin between the races, we cannot imagine; and we will venture to predict, that if this Southern rebellion is successful, the doctrine of diversity of origin will be ably urged, from Southern sources, upon the attention of mankind, before the close of the century.

This theory, then, of the relation of ownership between labour and capital, has given type to Southern sentiment, Southern policy, and Southern civilization. And the political leaders, warned by the ever-widening disparity revealed by each returning census, have been making a bold push to secure the supremacy of this theory, as the controlling policy of the

government. No other rational interpretation can be given of the efforts at legislation of certain Southern leaders, aided by their Northern abettors, during the last ten years. And when the great and populous North—great and populous, because of its free labour and wider civilization—demurred, and in fact at length flatly refused, and by virtue of its superior ability to vote, placed a man in the presidential chair, as the representative of a different policy, then the tocsin of revolution, under the specious plea of secession, was sounded, and the great body of the South, much against the judgment and will of a large mass of her people, was at length whirled into the abyss. Such then, as we believe, is the true, distinctive character of this movement. Stripped of all its accessories, it is the struggle of a false civilization for supremacy; and failing of that, for independence.

Many other topics of this prolific subject might claim attention. We might go on to speak of the probabilities or improbabilities of the success of this revolution, and of the manner in which it has been initiated and conducted. We might speak of the pretended right of secession, as of necessity the disintegration of all government, and hence so utterly fallacious as a governmental theory, that no government could possibly embody it as a radical part of its organization. We might speak further of the effect this great crisis may have upon the future structure and policy of the government, and show that whether it terminate one way or the other, it must beget organic changes in our political fabric. We might speak also of the effects which the war may have upon us as a people, and show by the analogies of history, that great wars are not always of necessity great calamities upon a people; that by a merciful arrangement of Providence, the people, except in the immediate scene of conflict, go on sowing and reaping, eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, as though nothing of the kind were occurring. God has provided that the great framework of society shall stand unharmed amid these local tumults, just as the universal frame of nature stands intact when earthquakes rock and tempests blow. But we must forego these topics.

There is but one other belonging to this general class of

topics, to which we shall revert. It is, that this civil commotion is not to be the ruin of our American civilization, nor the death of the Saxon race on this continent, nor the wreck of the hopes of mankind, so widely centered upon this great experiment of popular government. Our civilization is too young to be blasted, our nation too young to die. What the precise issue of our present troubles will be, no one can tell. What the specific solution of the great national problem forced upon us will be, no prophet can foresee. But that there is a solution awaiting us—a solution in the interest of civilization, and of Christian, human progress—no one, we think, can doubt. Shall we believe that the Saxon race, with its wondrous vitality, its adamantine vigour, its unbroken energy, its power to overcome obstacles, to surmount difficulties, to adapt itself to circumstances, to solve questions of the practical intellect, and to make a virtue of any necessity which may be forced upon it? Shall we believe that this Saxon race, at the present stage of its development, in the fulness and exuberance of its bounding life, is about to commit suicide? Shall we believe that this youthful nationality is about to be wrecked for ever? That would be to belie all history. No man who believes that history has a meaning can entertain such a conception for a moment. Not more surely do the arranging of the letters of the alphabet, by intelligence, indicate certain words and thoughts, than does the alphabet of the Divine Providence, arranging itself now for three hundred years—yea, perhaps we may say truthfully, for eighteen hundred years—indicate another issue than that for our national problem and our Christian civilization. A predestined purpose will infallibly guaranty the means thereto. To the Christian who has the eye of his faith fixed upon the shining portals of the heavenly city, there is a firm and sure pathway of stone, even through the midst of the Slough of Despond. So the man who sees in the elements and antecedents of our national existence a purpose worthy of history, worthy of God, and essential to mankind, will believe that a solution of our present troubles is awaiting us, even though it should come to us from beyond the stars! Though our good ship of state may have got among the breakers, yea, though roaring Scylla may be heard upon

the one hand, and devouring Charybdis may yawn upon the other, yet so great is our confidence in the strength of the helm, and in the skill and purpose of the *Divine* steersman, that we believe it will plow safely through the surging foam, and yet ride the tranquil bosom of the wave, like a thing of life!

And we may further briefly express our own unfaltering conviction, that the only pathway of safety and existence for us now, is that of vigorous and deadly warfare. The malignant virus of a causeless and wicked rebellion cannot be purged from the body politic by mild sedatives. It needs blood-letting. In the language of an eminent Southern leader, "the argument is ended, we now stand to our arms," and we will not lay them down until the sword has fulfilled its mission, and wanton armed resistance to constituted authority be driven from the land. When that is done, we may hope to see a reconstruction, if not a restoration. "When wild war's deadly blast is blown," we may hope to hail again the return of "the piping times of peace," when, according to rare old Ben Johnson, "every man can stand under the eaves of his own hat, and sing his own song." And let us hope that we will emerge from this conflict chastened and sobered, made wiser and better, more charitable and appreciative of each other; prepared to bury old feuds and extinguish old animosities, and to turn joyfully to the grander and more genial conquests which have distinguished us hitherto—the triumphs of the arts of peace—"the winter of our discontent made glorious summer, and all the clouds that lowered upon our house in the deep bosom of the ocean buried."

A word, in conclusion, as to our foreign relations. It has been manifest from the beginning, that one of the great perils growing out of this rebellion was the danger of our becoming embroiled with some of the other nations of the earth. That peril, as an ever-existing fact, is becoming every day more apparent. We are gratified, however, to observe a strong disposition on the part of the government, to avoid a hostile entanglement with foreign nations, by every means in its power, consistent with the preservation of national honour. In the progress of this struggle, a thousand complications and

unforeseen casualties must arise, which will demand the wisest statesmanship, and the utmost self-control, to carry us safely through, without offence to foreign powers. It is not our purpose to speculate upon the probabilities or improbabilities of a war with England, or any other foreign power, or to conjecture the course and ultimate result of such a war, or to endeavour to forecast the wide-spread complications to which it might give rise, both on this continent and in Europe. This is not our province. Suffice to say, that if it does occur, it will probably make history enough to occupy the pens of several generations.

It is our purpose, rather, to say that there is one thing which we should assuredly be taught by the menace with which England preceded and accompanied her negotiations with us on the point so recently in dispute,* and that is, that we should henceforth make ourselves more powerful, both by sea and by land. It is manifest that the millennium is not yet upon us. We are still in the "state militant." A few years ago, our popular orations and much of our literature was rife with "the peace-tendencies of the present age." But the dream has fled. The nation that beats its swords into ploughshares before the time, will have to forge new ones, or be dashed to pieces. There is no advantage in deluding ourselves with impracticable theories. Peace congresses, Quaker principles, and millenarian preaching may be studied as auspicious harbingers of a promised future, but for present use they are not to be accounted of. It is clear that the old governing principle of all the ancient world, viz., *force*, still holds largely in human history. To be able to enjoy peace, we must be able to make war, and have the world so understand it. There are some questions in the entangled relations of national affairs, which cannot be settled, as mankind stand now, save by the stern arbitrament of the sword. Hence we should put our military organization on a basis to contend with any in the world. We should increase, vastly and permanently, the defences of the country, and greatly extend the facilities for the military education of our people. If the millions of dollars

* The seizure of Mason and Slidell.

which we have spent in the last twenty-five years in foreign purchases to gratify the luxurious tastes and minister to the vanity of our people, had been spent upon the defences of the country, England would not have preceded her official correspondence with us by brandishing her mailed fist in our face.

We are not unmindful of the danger of large standing armies; but we should not alarm ourselves by parallels which are destitute of force. A large standing army in the hands and under the pay of a selfish despot is one thing; a standing army which is part of a great people is another thing. Our military organization should form an integral part of our people, and with the powerful popular tendencies which have become ingrain to us, working irresistibly towards the realization and maintenance of republican institutions, we can see nothing alarming in a standing army of sufficient magnitude to secure order at home and respect abroad.

Especially does it behoove us, as speedily as possible, to create and maintain a powerful navy. The main strength of most great nations lies upon the sea. Ever since the discovery of the mariner's compass, the great maritime nations have ruled the destinies of the world. When Venice, in her palmy days, led the commerce of the world, it was essential to her that she should be great at sea as a naval power. When Spain was the first power in Europe—when she held Asia, Africa, America, and the half of Europe in her giant grasp, it was because she was mistress of the sea, and her commerce and her treasure-ships poured into her lap the gems of the Indies and the gold of Peru. When her great Armada threatened England in 1588, the poetry and literature of the time abounded in metaphor, describing old ocean as groaning under the cumbrous weight. When the Dutch Republic, with her small, dyke-bound territory, made herself respected as a power in the ends of the earth, it was because her amphibious sons were at home upon the vasty deep. The bold Admiral who tied a broom to his mast-head, was a representative man. England has held her rank amongst the nations mainly by the power of her navy; and France, though confessedly the first power in Europe in military operations on land, is scarcely

inferior in her naval strength. We should henceforth determine to surpass them all. A nation possessing more sea-coast than any other in the world—whose shores are washed for thousands of miles by two great oceans on opposite sides—a nation whose commerce is whitening every sea, and is destined to extend into every inlet and harbour of the habitable globe—a nation possessing harbours on whose broad bosoms all the argosies of Venice could ride in safety—such a nation ought to possess a navy inferior to none other in the civilized world. In fact, the mind of the country cannot but stand appalled at the utterly defenceless condition in which we have been, as against attack by any of the great maritime powers of Europe.

Such are some of the lessons which this rebellion and its attendant circumstances should teach us. It was doubtless necessary for us to learn these lessons. It was assuredly better we should learn them now than later in our history, and perhaps the particular method taken to teach us is, on the whole, the cheapest and best. And when we shall have learned them, and acted on them practically, we shall stand firm, calm, self-poised, in the simple majesty of power beneficent to bless, yet terrible to strike, guaranteeing rational liberty to the subject at home, yet enforcing the claims of constituted authority; compelling, by the unanswerable arguments of rifled cannon and iron-bound ships, an honourable recognition and respect abroad; and, having got beyond the excesses, and foibles, and boastful delusions of our youth, we shall settle down to the proper work, and the enduring triumphs of our national manhood.

ART. IV.—*The Doctrine of Providence practically considered.*

WHEN we look abroad upon creation, and contemplate the extent of the universe, we are soon lost in the immensity of the scene, and our mind returns from the excursion with a painful sense of our own littleness. Such a range of matter, such a display of being, so many grades of intelligence, so many revolving worlds present themselves to our view, that we are amazed and bewildered. To shut out the idea of a First Cause is impossible. To exclude the notion of an end to be accomplished, is irrational. To admit an end and exclude a plan, is equally contrary to reason. And to conceive of a plan, and no superintending power to carry it into execution, is not less unreasonable than either of the suppositions previously stated.

The doctrine of Providence is, therefore, a dictate of natural religion. The belief of it, in some form and degree, has always accompanied the belief of a God. The heathen attributed the abundance of their harvests, their success in war, deliverance from shipwreck, recovery from sickness, the prosperity of trade, and such like advantages, to the favour of their idol deities. To teach them their error, not in acknowledging a Providence, but in giving its praise to idols, an impressive lesson was exhibited in the metropolis of the East. The potentate who filled the throne at Babylon, and whose sceptre controlled the greater part of western Asia, was miraculously thrust out from human society, bereft of his faculties, degraded to a place among the brutes, and then as miraculously restored to reason and the converse of men. All this, the inspired penman tells us, was to the end that he might know that "the heavens do rule."

A lesson thus taught must convey weighty truth. Let us give it our most solemn attention.

"The Lord reigneth." To reign, includes two ideas, viz., to ordain law, and to enforce it. He who merely issues laws, but has no power to enforce them, legislates, but does not reign. On the other hand, he who merely executes laws, but has no

power to make them, is as far from reigning as the first. In our country, there is properly no reigning power, because one department of the government makes the laws, and another executes them. But in Asia, where the Bible was written, the legislative and executive powers were commonly united in one sovereign prince; and there the regal authority was, so far, an image of the divine.

The doctrine of the Bible, then, is this: Jehovah, the self-existent God, has ordained a law, according to which the affairs of the universe are to proceed, and he is constantly and efficiently employed in carrying that law into effect. A sublime truth! How wide it reaches! How deep it draws! To follow it through all the departments of being, would require an angel's wing. To search all the depths which it contains, would demand more than an angel's intellect.

In saying that Jehovah has established a law for the government of the universe, we are not to be understood as employing that term in the narrow sense in which it is commonly applied, *i. e.*, as denoting a rule of action prescribed to moral agents merely, and in the obedience of which the will is concerned. We use the word in a sense far more general and extended, viz., as comprehending all being, rational and irrational; descending to matter itself, and governing all its modifications; holding, in its mighty grasp, heaven and hell; going back to the eternity which preceded the birth of the world, and reaching forward into the eternity which shall follow its dissolution.

The existence of such a law as this, which is no other than that eternal purpose which was in the Divine mind, when God called the world out of nothing, is every way agreeable to sound reason. For it is surely inconceivable, that a Being all-wise and almighty should have produced such a result as this universe, and not have previously determined what it was to be, what end it should answer, and by what agencies it should attain the end proposed.

But we are not left here to reason's dubious ray. The Bible speaks: "Known unto God are all his works, from the foundation of the world." That settles the first point, that God had determined what the universe of creatures was to be. "The Lord hath made all things for himself." That settles the

second point, as to the end to be attained—his own glory. "He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." That settles the third point, as to his appointment of the agencies through which that end was to be pursued. That these agencies are pre-determined, and the results fixed, follows directly and inevitably from prophecy. "The Lord declareth the end from the beginning; he calleth things that are not, as though they were." Thus does the Bible confirm, in every particular, the deduction of reason.

But the moment we admit the existence of such a purpose, we must also admit its certain fulfilment. For there can be but two reasons to prevent it—defect of wisdom, or defect of power in him who formed the purpose. But either of these suppositions, if true, would strip God of his perfections. A God who, wisely purposing, lacks the power to execute his plans, or who, having power to execute, lacks the wisdom to devise, does not reign; and a God who does not reign, is not worthy of our worship.

Some who are unwilling to oppose a truth so plainly revealed, but are equally unwilling to submit to its application, seek to relieve themselves by a distinction. They admit a general, but deny a particular Providence. They would persuade us that, in regulating a system of being, consisting of an inconceivable number of parts, God rules the whole, but does not rule any of the parts! He rules all, and yet rules none! A clumsy and self-contradictory device to remove God farther from us; to set him on high behind a cloud, instead of bringing him, as the Psalmist does, "round about our path and our lying down."

The reader already perceives the object aimed at in this paper. It is to explain and vindicate the doctrine of Providence, as taught in holy writ. A scriptural elucidation of this deep theme will best meet, and most successfully refute, the various objections urged against it; since, however formidable they may appear at first view, they all derive whatever strength they have from a misconception of the doctrine which they oppose. When the truth itself is rightly apprehended, these objections, either wholly or in great part, lose their force.

1. In governing the universe, the Lord, the great King,

uses the interposition of subordinate agents, all in action, but all acting under his immediate control. That is to say, he does, constantly and infallibly, what every great and wise earthly monarch desires and endeavours to do, but for the most part without success; namely, arrange his empire in a complete system of subordination, beginning from himself, so that, throughout his dominions, his will is done everywhere, in the minutest and least important, as well as in the greatest and most important thing which is the subject of his government. We saw this attempted, half a century ago, on the other side of the Atlantic, and with a success which filled all men with admiration at the transcendent powers of a mind which seemed everywhere present and everywhere active. But if this, when partially effected by a wicked prince, through wicked means, and for a wicked end, could command our admiration, and enforce the tribute of respect, can we withhold a sentiment of adoring wonder and awe from Him who does the same thing on an infinitely broader scale, and without the slightest failure in a single particular, and who is, at the same time, a righteous Ruler? He whom the Bible presents to us as sovereign and universal King, is seated upon no throne of iniquity. No plunder enriches his treasury. No murders and burnings, no bribes and treasons, no tears and curses established his power. Truth is the girdle of his loins. All his ways are equity. His throne is the seat of judgment for all worlds. His provinces are the realms of universal nature. His armies are the hosts of heaven. His engines are the elements and the seasons. His tribute flows from all being. His infinite mind pervades, directs, controls, animates, and actuates every part of his dominions. His hand can reach, in a moment, the least or the greatest, the nearest or the most distant, of all his dependencies.

2. In governing his creatures, the Creator acts upon them according to their several natures. And who so capable of this, as he who is himself the Author of those various natures? Who so able to accomplish it, as he who assigned to each its powers, and tempered and combined them in each according to his own good pleasure? When any part of his plan calls for strength, he uses the strong. When any part requires wisdom,

he uses the wise. When the material world is to bear its part, he applies its stores according to their nature. Does his anger burn? "He springs his mine, and desolates a nation at a blast." The lightnings rush through the sky. Thunders echo round the heavens. The ocean bursts its bounds. The east wind dashes navies against the rocky shore, or strews the beach with ruin. Conflagration rages in the city. The volcano pours its tide of fiery desolation over the plain. The mountains fall and crush their inhabitants. Do love and pity stir his nature? The south wind gently blows. The warm shower descends. The sun sheds down his genial beams. The land floats in harvest, and the presses burst out with new wine.

It is this administration of providence through subordinate agencies, that hides the divine efficiency from our view. That what is deadly should kill, that what is nourishing should support, that what is fierce should devour, that what is heavy should fall, and what is light should rise, is all in course, and betrays not the latent God. But this mode of administration is sometimes forsaken. There are cases where the vail is rent. What shall we say if iron swim? if the shadow go backward? if fire cease to consume? if mire heal the eyes? if a word restore the paralytic? if the grave itself yield up its dead? Is not the present God uncovered now? Can we acknowledge miracles, and yet deny a particular providence? Or can we refuse miracles, and keep the Bible? We put the question to the candour, to the conscience, to the reason, to the common sense of every reader.

3. Since God governs his creatures according to their several natures, his government does not destroy their liberty. It is natural to moral beings to have the faculty of choice. Whenever such a being acts at all, he *must* act freely. We are conscious of our own freedom. It is a reason we every day give for what we do, that "we choose to do so." When we speak of necessity in reference to moral things, we mean nothing more than the power of some motive, which actuates our choice. Thus, when a poor man says that he *must* labour, he means no more than this—that a view of the consequences of omitting to labour acts so upon his mind, that he chooses to labour rather than incur them.

This freedom is necessary to our responsibility, and is in no wise inconsistent with the corruption of the will. The will of a sinner is perfectly free as it respects force from God, or from any creature. It is in bondage only to its own corruption; and here the slavery is so complete, that, in its natural state, sinful motives act upon it with controlling power, and holy motives with little or no force. Such a being God governs without destroying his liberty. To deny this is, in effect, to maintain that God cannot govern a moral being; and, as a great part of his creatures are of this description, it is neither more nor less than to dethrone God. Did God destroy the liberty of the Assyrian king, when he used him to chastise rebellious Israel? Not at all; but, according to express divine testimony, it was in Sennacherib's "heart to destroy and to cut off nations not a few." The conqueror acted freely, pursuing, like other conquerors, the bent of his own ambition. Yet God governed him. He used him, (as himself declares,) as "a rod," as "an axe," and as "a saw." He made his own ambitious and wicked promptings subservient to the chastisement of a "hypocritical nation." But did this destroy his liberty and consequent responsibility? By no means. Hear again what God says: "Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon Mount Zion, and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks." The fruit of his "stout heart and high looks"—his courage and his pride—here referred to, was his war upon Israel, which God permitted in punishment of his people; and yet, for waging that very war, God here declares his purpose to punish Sennacherib. That is, God would chastise his own chastising rod. This shows that the Assyrian king, though used as an instrument by the divine hand, was, nevertheless, free and responsible. It shows that he was actuated, in all he did, by the ordinary ambitious and self-aggrandizing motives of military conquerors.

4. As God rules the creatures according to their natures, so, in ruling sinful creatures, he rules them as possessed of sinful propensities, and influenced by them. It is the nature of a wicked man to do wickedly, as much as it is the nature of

fire to burn, or of a lion to devour. But God rules equally over them all—the man, the fire, and the lion.

Here we must govern both our words and our thoughts with cautious reverence. Two extremes are to be avoided. The one is, making the creature independent of God; the other is, making God the author of sin. An independent creature is a contradiction in terms. Every creature is, by the very necessities of its being, essentially dependent, not only for the endowment and measure of its faculties, but for the continuance and exercise of every one of them. On the other hand, God is not, and cannot be, in any manner or degree, the author of sin. An independent creature, as we have said, is a self-contradiction; but a sinful God (the words may well make us tremble) is, of all contradictions, the most contradictory. Yet such our God must be, if he is the author of sin.

Truth rejects both extremes. It holds the creature in dependence on God, but, at the same time, it holds him responsible for the use which he makes of his powers. His being is not independent, his actions are not independent, but his sinfulness is. His powers are God's; his sin is his own.

5. The reign of God does not destroy or impair the connection of cause and effect. On the contrary, that connection is God's own appointment, and owes both its existence and its continuance to him. It is the very means he uses in accomplishing his designs. Why does poison produce death? Because, first, God, in his plan, determined that it should; and because, secondly, in the execution of that plan, he causes it to do so. Hence we perceive that the contingency of second causes may have its place, without interrupting the execution of God's plan in the least. An event may be contingent as it respects ourselves and all other creatures, which is, nevertheless, immutably settled in the divine counsels. For example, the death of a man in danger of being poisoned may be contingent in its own nature—dependent, by a fixed relation, on his taking the poison; and yet it may be an event perfectly settled and determined by God. It may be truly said of such a man, that, if he swallows the poison, he will die; if he does not, he will live. Thus, to human knowledge and foresight, his death is a contingency; while, in the Divine foreknowledge and pre-determina-

tion, it is far otherwise. So Christ declares that, if his miracles had been done in Sodom, Sodom would have repented, and thereby escaped destruction. In like manner, Paul declared that his own and his companions' escape from shipwreck could not take place, unless the sailors remained on board the vessel; yet God himself had revealed to Paul that they should escape. Here, again, we see that what is a contingency in respect to men, may be a fixed purpose in the mind of God; and we see, further, that the Scripture distinctly so represents the matter. It is in directing these contingencies that the providence of God is often displayed—as in the cases of Joseph and Moses, for example—in the most illustrious manner, to the comfort of his saints, and the glory of his own name.

Thus have we accomplished, as far as it lay in our power to accomplish, the object with which we started—to unfold, illustrate, and justify the ways of God to man in his administration of providence. Two questions arise here, which are often urged, in vehement tone and with a triumphant air, as unanswerable objections to the doctrine which it has been our endeavour to explain and vindicate: 1. How can God govern a moral being, in the manner claimed, without destroying his liberty? 2. If God governs the universe, how shall we account for the origin of evil? Let us bestow a moment's attention on these two interrogatories.

The first is, how does God, to the extent alleged, govern a moral being so as to preserve his liberty? To this we have a very short reply—"We do not know." The Bible reveals facts, not modes. The Bible tells us that God does govern such a creature. Our own reason tells us that he must govern him. But how he governs him, is not a question to be put to an angel. "Who knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man that is in him?" In like manner none knoweth the things of God, save the Spirit of God, and "he to whom the Spirit will reveal them." This he reveals not; and will any dare attempt to break into the breast of the Almighty, and rifle that eternal bosom of its secrets? Nay, child of yesterday, thou mayest worship at his foot; thou mayest bow before his throne; thou mayest touch the hem of his garment;

but to catechise Jehovah, to arraign, or even to question, his sovereignty, is not thy prerogative.

The second question is like unto the first: If God governs the universe, how shall we account for the origin of evil? To this question we answer as before—"We do not know." Far be it from us, far be it from any creature, to attempt the satisfying of such an inquiry. The Bible, instead of answering, rebukes it: "Thou wilt say, then, why doth he yet find fault, for who hath resisted his will? Nay, but, O man! who art thou that repliest against God?" There the Holy Ghost has left it; and who shall break, or wish to break, the silence of the All-wise?

But on this difficulty we remark, that it is not confined to any revelation which the Scripture gives of God or of his government. If you burn the Bible, the difficulty will remain just where it was and as it was. Evil is before our eyes, and there is a God. Let the caviller escape from the difficulty if he can. These two facts block up his way. One or other of them he must remove. Evil he cannot. It only remains that he turn atheist, and remove God. Then, indeed, he has avoided one difficulty, but he has leaped into ten thousand.

The truth we have been considering is full of comfort to all who believe. Christian reader, the Lord reigneth, and that is enough. Roll all your cares upon him. It is for you he reigns. The clouds of this sojourn shall dissipate at last, and you shall have such a view of providence as shall fill you with wonder, ravish you with joy, and employ you for ever in gratitude and praise. "The Lord reigneth," shall be your anthem in glory; let it be your song in the house of your pilgrimage.

The doctrine set forth in this paper conveys a solemn warning to all who reject Christ. Unconverted reader, the Lord reigneth; a pledge to you, so remaining, of certain ruin. In refusing Jesus, you have thrown off shield and buckler, and now you must try who shall prevail. You say his law is hard and impossible; he says it is holy, just, and good. You say its breach is a trifle; he says its breach deserves hell. You say you need no Saviour; he says that without one you shall perish. This great question is soon to be put at issue. If God reigns, and you continue incorrigible, he reigns to your undoing.

The exposition and vindication of the doctrine of providence, which we have attempted in the present paper, contains instruction for all, whether saints or sinners. The lesson it conveys to every human being is: Be satisfied to remain within your proper sphere. Seek not to know what your Maker has concealed. Repress that pride of intellect which refuses the attitude of the angels who tremble and adore, and which aims to bring God down from his throne, and subject him to the process of its lordly scrutiny. Remember that you are finite, not infinite; that you are a man, and not a divinity. But if you refuse the lesson, go on. Make war with heaven. Assail the towers of God's strength, and scale, if you can, the rock of his abode. Those brazen towers, which stood the brunt of hell, dread not the feeble artillery of human cavil. That everlasting Rock, at whose foot break the waves of time, and whose towering height o'erlooks eternity, shall stand secure, and awe the universe with its strength, when you and your memorial shall have perished in the folly of self-destruction.

Art. V.—*Bilderdijk.*

[Continued from p. 132.]

The disinterested efforts of De Vries to secure for Bilderdijk a post of usefulness that might afford a comfortable subsistence to himself and family, and thus remove out of his way the obstacles to his return, laid the foundation of an indissoluble friendship. In the poetical works of the latter, we find several pieces addressed to the former, which evince how highly the poet appreciated these kind exertions in his behalf, and the high esteem in which he held this generous friend. The letters* of Bilderdijk, too, are said to attest his fervent gratitude

* The correspondence of Bilderdijk was collected and published in 1836–7, in five octavo volumes, under the editorial supervision of Da Costa, aided by his highly gifted friend, Willem de Clercq, and by the publisher, Willem

and sincere attachment to De Vries.* If Bilderdijk cherished so warm an affection, and entertained so high a regard for this dear friend, the affection of De Vries for him was equally cordial, and his esteem equally high. He speaks of his intercourse with the immortal poet as opening to him an inexhaustible fountain of pure and rational enjoyment; and bears the most decisive testimony to the intrinsic excellence of his character, and the cordiality which he had ever evinced towards him.

In the Amsterdam Division of the Batavian Society of Philology and Poetry, it was proposed, in 1805, to offer inducements to Bilderdijk, then residing in Brunswick, to deliver lectures before them on the Dutch Language, Eloquence, and Poetry. This proposition originated with De Vries and M. C. van Hall, an eminent jurist, poet, and orator, who, however much he differed from Bilderdijk, ever admired him as a poet. The obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of this plan were such as to induce the Society to abandon it. It resulted, however, in a generous present, made by certain of his countrymen, chiefly members of this Division, as a contribution towards defraying his expenses in returning to his native land. It was presented to him early in 1807, with an accompanying letter from De Vries. Men of every rank, and of every shade of political sentiment, manifested an interest in the welfare of the returned exile, and would gladly have seen some plan consummated which would secure to him an honourable support in the performance of literary labour, provided this could be done without giving him an official position. Among those who gave practical demonstration of their interest, was R. J. Schimmelpenninck, Pensionary of Holland, and former friend of Bilderdijk. His generosity touched the heart of his unfortunate friend, and elicited a poetic acknowledgment of his kind-

Meeschert, who was also a highly esteemed friend of the editor. We regret that these letters are not in our possession, as they doubtless contain much that might serve to impart additional interest to this article.

* Jeronimo de Vries was a numismatologist, poet, and amateur. He is author of a treatise on the improvement and decline of Dutch poetry during the eighteenth century, as compared with earlier periods. This constitutes the third and fourth volume of the works of the Batavian Society of Philology and Poetry.

ness, and a beautiful tribute to his intellectual greatness and moral worth. It was committed to paper, but was not communicated to him until another change in political affairs had divested the noble statesman of his high dignity, and elevated the injured poet to the zenith of his honour and fame. It was then transmitted to him with a beautiful addition, expressive of the poet's undiminished affection and esteem, which were not based on external circumstances.

As no certain prospect of permanent support opened to his view in his own country, he determined to accept a professorship in Kazan, which had been tendered him in 1805. To this determination he had reluctantly come, and a kind Providence interposed to relieve him from the necessity of carrying out his purpose. The Society of Literature felt it incumbent on them to pay their respects to their new sovereign. Most of the members offered reasons why they should be exonerated. Four remained, who could assign no other reason than want of inclination, and on them the duty accordingly devolved. Among these was Bilderdijk, who, to his surprise, found himself well known at the royal palace. Before the formal reception of the deputation, Bilderdijk, without knowing him, had a conversation with the king, and expressed his views with his usual candour. His frankness made a favourable impression on the mind of his Majesty, and drew from him the remark: "Il est franc comme on doit l'être."

Having won the confidence of the king, and being admitted to intimacy with him, the poet now received many marks of royal favour. He became the king's instructor in the Dutch language; and to facilitate the performance of his duty, an apartment in the palace was offered him. When the Netherlands Institute was founded, Bilderdijk must constitute one of its ornaments. Not only was he allowed a liberal annual income, but residences and country-seats were placed at his disposal. When the poet felt constrained to decline a royal favour, the indulgent reply was: "I meant it well; but live where and as you please; I am contented, if you are." At another time: "Be careful for nothing, only labour for the glory of your country."

This prince seems to have possessed sufficient magnanimity

to enable him to appreciate the convictions and feelings of those who felt themselves indissolubly bound to the House of Orange. Such he gathered around him, and sought to attach to his person. He identified himself with the nation, and laboured to promote, not only its material prosperity, but also its advancement in the arts, sciences, and polite literature. While thus overcoming the prejudices that existed against him at the commencement of his reign, and securing the affection and esteem of the nation, as also its lasting gratitude, he received from Bilderdijk no encouragement to hope that his kindness would ever cause the nation to forget its obligations to the illustrious house now deprived of its rights. Sincerely as the poet was attached to the person of Louis Bonaparte, highly as he appreciated his noble efforts to promote the national welfare and prosperity, grateful as he felt for the numerous favours conferred on himself, and faithful as he was in the performance of present duty, he did not, in his intercourse with him, conceal his sincere conviction that the crown rightfully belonged to another, nor his expectation of one day seeing it restored to its rightful possessor.

Enjoying the royal favour, he now received from different quarters marks of respect. Some of these, had they been shown him when an exile in a foreign land, would have been peculiarly grateful to his feelings, as evidences of being still held in remembrance and esteem.

It was to him a source of peculiar pleasure and heartfelt satisfaction, to see again some of his old and tried friends; such as Rev. J. W. Bussingh, at whose house he was permitted, with his wife and children, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of his birth, soon after his return to Holland; and his early friend and benefactor, Dr. Verschuur, who died a few months after, and whom he commemorated in an elegy, breathing the liveliest gratitude, and expressive of the highest esteem; and P. J. Uylenbroek, a bookseller and poet of Amsterdam, and one of his earliest and dearest literary friends, who died in 1808, and whom Bilderdijk commemorated in a beautiful elegy, abounding in tender and touching allusions to the past, and pervaded by a spirit of most devoted friendship.

During this period, some of the most distinguished scientific

and literary men in Leyden, at the Hague, and in Amsterdam, were numbered among his warm friends and admirers; such as Jeronimo de Vries, of whom mention has been made, and his excellent brother, Abraham de Vries, a distinguished Baptist minister in Haarlem, who vindicated its claim to be regarded as the place where the art of printing was first invented;—Jeronimo de Bosch, a celebrated Latin poet and a distinguished philologist and antiquary, who died in 1811, at the age of seventy-one, and whom Bilderdijk honoured as a man of poetic genius, a patron of learning and arts, a protector of oppressed virtue, and a lover of justice, liberty, country, and humanity; Herman Bosscha, a distinguished Latin poet, and professor of History in Amsterdam, author, also, of several prose works, chiefly historical, some in Latin and others in Dutch, and who died in 1819, aged sixty-four:—Meinard Tydeman,* professor of jurisprudence, successively in Harderwijk, Utrecht, and Leyden, who died in 1825, at the advanced age of eighty-four, and whom Bilderdijk honoured as a man of vast learning, indefatigable industry, and eminent piety;—J. Hinlópen, president of the Second Class of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Sciences, Literature, and Fine Arts, who died in 1808, and whom he commemorated in an elegy replete with beautiful and elevated Christian sentiment;—and S. J. Brugmans, professor of Natural History, Medicine, Chemistry, and Astronomy, in the University of Leyden, author of several Latin works, who died in 1819, aged fifty-six, and whom Bilderdijk regarded as greater than either of the celebrated men, Boerhaave or Albinus.

From Dupré, secretary of the king, Bilderdijk received, October 2d, 1806, a polite note, in which he acknowledges the favour of several of the poet's works, received through Professor Brugmans, and suggests the propriety and desirableness of an Ode to Napoleon from his gifted pen, assuring him that he should esteem it an honour to put such a production into French verse. This suggestion, or rather solicitation, Bilderdijk

* In Bilderdijk's poetical works we find several beautiful pieces, addressed to this worthy man. Much as Bilderdijk honoured him for his prodigious learning, he honoured him still more for his sincere and devoted friendship, and his high Christian character.

regarded as a challenge to Dutch poetry, which he could not well decline. On the 14th of the same month, a copy of a Pindaric ode to Napoleon, accompanied by a very polite note, was transmitted to Dupré. Before its publication, it was submitted to the critical inspection of the celebrated Van der Palm.

It is a brilliant production, attesting the lofty genius, characteristic independence, and heroic courage of the poet. It takes at the outset the high position that it is the poet who confers immortality on the hero. It then portrays the poet required to celebrate the praises of the great military hero, who was the admiration, as well as terror, of the civilized world. In lofty strains, but not in the spirit of servile adulation, the poet next celebrates the exploits of Napoleon, whom he regards as the great instrument, in the hand of God, for the infliction of the divine judgments on the nations, and for the introduction of a universal monarchy,* which he confidently anticipates as the consummation of earth's blessedness. From this bright vision of the future, the poet turns to the mighty conqueror, and boldly demands of him, whether he to whom the world was paying its homage, were worthy of his song; and proceeds to say, that if the happiness of mankind were his grand design—if he could feel happy in subserving the divine plan for its realization, and if his actions betrayed no other ambition, then he might also receive his homage.

The sagacity of the distinguished critic to whom the ode was submitted, could not fail to perceive how offensive to the pride of Napoleon must be its closing strophe, and how perilous its publication might prove to the poet. It was returned to its author for alteration, who sent another as a substitute, but even this the prudent censor could not allow to pass. The Ode was accordingly given to the public without either, but preceded by a short preface from the pen of the critic, to apprise the reader of the poet's stand-point.

From this brilliant Ode, we must now turn our attention to "De Ziekte der Geleerden,"† a didactic poem, which may be justly regarded as one of his masterpieces. Whilst mourning

* It may be necessary to apprise our readers that Bilderdijk, in common with Da Costa, firmly believed in the personal reign of Christ on earth.

† Sickness of the Learned.

the loss of a dear child, the tenth that he had consigned to an untimely grave, and weighed down under the burden of bodily pains and infirmities, the sad consequences of overtasking his brain, and feeling that the tide of life was fast ebbing away, he conceived the design of writing a didactive poem, exhibiting the nature, symptoms, and effects of a disease under which he was then labouring, and designed to warn literary men of the dangers to which they were exposed, and to inculcate on them the importance of a proper regard to their bodily health. In the performance of this task he sought and found consolation for his bleeding heart, and cherished the hope that it might afford comfort to others who were similarly afflicted.

It was intended as a grateful offering to the University of Leyden, but it was suggested to him that it might afford more general pleasure and profit, and, in accordance with this friendly suggestion, two songs were actually read before the Leyden Division of the Society of Arts and Sciences, when a fearful calamity by fire befel the city of Leyden, laying a large part of it in ruins, and involving the loss of life of thousands of its citizens, among whom were some of its brightest ornaments. Deeply affected by this sad catastrophe, and having neither silver nor gold to bestow for the relief of the sufferers, he obeyed the impulses of his generous nature, by placing the manuscript of this poem in the hands of the Minister of the Interior* for the benefit of those who were suffering from this terrible calamity. It was published by subscription, and,

* The calamity occurred on the night of January 12th, 1807, and five days after, the manuscript, accompanied by the following note, was placed in the hands of the Minister of Internal Affairs.

"*A son Excellence le Ministre de l'Interieur.*

"Monsieur—Le désastre de la ville de Leyde me touche au delà de toute expression. A peine rentré dans mes foyers, accablé par l'infortune, et n'ayant presque quoique ce soit que je puisse appeler mien, je ne saurois cependant rester spectateur indifférent des efforts généreux de tout ce qu'il y a d'âmes compatissantes dans la patrie. Permettez donc, Monsieur! qu'au lieu d'or et d'argent, je dépose en vos mains un poème en six chants que je viens de terminer, que j'ai dédié à l'université de Leyde, et dont j'abandonne le produit pour le soulagement de cette ville malheureuse.

"J'ai l'honneur, etc.,

(signed) "Bilderdijk.

"*La Haye*, 17 *Janvier*, 1807."

though from the nature of its theme, only a limited circulation could be expected, the nett proceeds amounted to fourteen hundred florins; a generous gift, certainly, for a poor man. The influence of this noble example was not lost upon others.

When this work first made its appearance, it was received with general favour. All who were capable of appreciating the theme and his treatment of it, were delighted with it. Among its enthusiastic admirers may be mentioned J. H. van der Palm, who was regarded by his cotemporaries, not only as the first pulpit orator of Holland, but as the purest prose writer in the Dutch language. We have read it with great satisfaction. The subject is treated with masterly ability. The author evinces his profound acquaintance with the human system, with the laws of health, with diseases in general, with the nature and symptoms of this in particular, and with the best means of recovering and preserving health. The poem is an admirable and practical demonstration of the beauty, strength, flexibility, melodiousness, and riches of the Dutch language. The work, from beginning to end, bears testimony to the genuine and preëminent poetic talent of its author.

Familiar as Bilderdijk was with the best dramatic poetry of ancient and modern times, he seems to have been but little disposed to exercise his own poetic talent in this direction. In his youth and early manhood he gave to the public his imitations of the two masterpieces of Sophocles. Subsequently, he so expressed himself in a poetic epistle to his friend, Jeronimo de Vries, as to discourage his friends in entertaining the hope of ever seeing a tragedy from his pen. A sudden impulse was, however, given to his mind, the result of which was his tragedy of "Florence the Fifth," which was followed by his "William of Holland," and that by his "Kormak." At the request of the king, he also gave a poetic translation of Corneille's "Cinna." Great as may be the merits of these tragedies, it is not claimed for their author, unless by blind admirers, that he attained the same eminence in this as in the other departments of poetry.

Friends were not wanting who desired to see an epic poem from the pen of Bilderdijk. He was not left unapprised of their wishes. For a time he turned a deaf ear to their friendly

suggestions. But in 1809, under the influence of a fresh poetic inspiration, a theme was selected, a plan formed, and the work actually commenced. In fourteen days the first song was completed. Three more were soon added. A few months more might have sufficed to complete the work; but greatly to the regret of his friends, a sad reverse of fortune, both personal and national, occurred whilst he was engaged on the fifth song, which not only temporarily interrupted the prosecution of the work, but proved the occasion of its final abandonment. Its subject is the destruction of the first world. So far as completed, it is regarded by competent judges as surpassing everything produced in modern times in this, the highest department of poetry.

Before we conclude our notice of these masterpieces of Bilderdijk, we wish to give our readers an opportunity of listening to one whose eminent poetic talent, delicate and correct taste, sound, discriminating, and independent judgment, and acquaintance with the best ancient and modern poetic productions, entitle him to be heard with deference: "Tried by these principles, the poetry of Bilderdijk will, I think, bear the test. To the eminent manner in which it bears testimony to the mastery of its author over his instrument, we shall purposely return in developing following propositions. But who that is in any degree acquainted with the poetry of Bilderdijk, needs to be reminded how his exquisite, his lively, his distinct feeling for truth in every domain; for beauty in all its forms, for the *naïve* as well as for the sublime—and no less for the beauty of the small than for that of the great—glitters on every page of his numerous works? Hence that poetic conception, and that no less poetic presentation and working of the most diverging subjects, from the domain of the visible creation, of history, of revelation, of science, of philosophy, of the knowledge of men, of the theory of the beautiful itself. . . . . .

"And with what strength, with what riches of imagination, is this poetic sensibility combined; imagination always led, directed, and if need be, bridled by this sensibility; but also thus making its excursions on the four winds, ascending into all heavens, and diving into all depths, in order everywhere, and from every quarter, to bring and to draw, to unite and to

separate, to combine and to contrast, to discover and to create what serves its purpose; yea, to spread the fairest flowers over the driest subjects, and to shed the clearest light on the most profound. To the strength, the boldness, the enterprise of this extraordinary imagination, Holland had been well-nigh indebted for an epic poem, which, by the grandeur of its plan and its magnificent execution, let the excellent portion we possess of it witness, would probably have left behind it all that the more modern times have delivered in this highest of all the poetic departments. To the riches of this imagination, sustained by a treasure of knowledge, and joined to matchless accuracy, is to be ascribed that Bilderdijk, in the philosophic didactic poem, for there also he is always visible, shows himself no less a poet than in the Pindaric ode, and that the Sickness of the Learned, truly no attractive subject, everything considered, must be regarded as his masterpiece, as a piece in which poetry has achieved one of its fairest triumphs.

. . . . .

"The ideal beauty of architecture is unity, order, and proportion, with richness and fulness; and it may be said that this also is the peculiar beauty of Bilderdijk's poetry. To what else is to be ascribed that powerful impression, which the whole of one of his larger poems makes and leaves, when read from beginning to end?

"The poems of other poets seem often written for the sake of single beautiful lines or passages, which are not to be forgotten, and on which rests the permanent fame of these pieces and of those who composed them. But with Bilderdijk the beautiful lines and passages are concealed in the general beauty, and this is remembered, and this alone. Reading his poems, we feel as under the arches of one of those grand edifices in which all is beautiful, but the beauty of each part is subservient and subordinate to the beauty of the whole. Everything is in its place; everything has its measure; all seems to be of one piece. Nowhere chink or gap. Nothing superfluous. Everything necessary. Everything to its purpose. No statue without niche; no niche without statue. No lack of ornaments, save of the ambitious. Everywhere the hand, everywhere the impress, everywhere the spirit of a master. Such is the Sick-

ness of the Learned, such are the Animals, such is the Spirit-world, such the Art of Poetry, such True Happiness, such the Three Sister Arts. Such was Elius. Such are the five songs of the Destruction of the First World; such would the whole have been, had the completion of that master-piece been permitted to elevate his fame to the highest point, and in the most magnificent way illustrate his remark: 'It is unity which is always beautiful, but it is unity astonishing by its richness and fulness which is sublime.'"*

The four years of royal favour enjoyed by Bilderdijk, and in which he attained the zenith of his poetic fame, though in many respects happy, were not exempt from trial. To the loss of children, bodily indisposition, and occasional fits of sickness, and frequent change of residence, were added the vexatious annoyances of those who desired through him to secure royal favours.

In 1809, his duties as member and President of the Royal Institute required his removal to Amsterdam, where, in the spring of the following year, a sore trial awaited him, arising from pecuniary embarrassment. It might be supposed that, at the close of four years, in which he stood high in the royal favour, was the recipient of munificent gifts, and received an annual income finally augmented to six thousand florins, he might be in comfortable circumstances, unembarrassed by pecuniary liabilities which could not be readily met. But the unwonted prosperity enjoyed by him during this period, contributed not a little to involve him in this very embarrassment. Generous to a fault, it is supposed that he often relieved from his own purse those who desired him to present their grievances or requests to the king, rather than be constantly employed in so unpleasant a business. Though a model of order and neatness in the management of his affairs, strictly conscientious, in many respects very economical, and keeping a strict account of his expenditures, yet his benefactions often exceeded his ability, and he did not possess sufficient practical knowledge of men and things to secure him from the frauds and impositions

* Verpoozingen op Letterkundig Gebied, door Nicolaas Beets. Te Haarlem. bl. 265, 267, 272, 273.

of those who were willing to take advantage of his integrity and generosity.

To the sensitive spirit of Bilderdijk this was an exceedingly sore trial, though its severity was greatly mitigated by the tenderness and courage of his devoted wife, to whom he was most tenderly attached, and who was a woman of great refinement, high mental culture, exemplary piety, and distinguished as a poetess.*

This temporal calamity, coincident with that of his country in the loss of its nationality by incorporation into the French empire, proved the occasion of great spiritual distress. The light of the divine countenance seemed to be withdrawn. The powers of darkness were permitted to assail him. The fiery darts of the wicked one pierced his soul. He was led to ask, Hath God forsaken me? and to cry, in the expressive language of David, "all thy waves and thy billows are gone over me." He sometimes feared that he might be left to yield to the horrid suggestion of the great adversary. But he was not suffered to fall a prey to the great tempter. The God in whom he confided rebuked the tempter, allayed the tempest, dispelled the darkness, and imparted light and peace to his soul. It was a fiery trial through which he passed, but he came forth as gold from the furnace.

For several years he was in straitened circumstances, and often in a condition of extreme destitution. At such times striking interpositions of Providence to relieve his necessities were not wanting. In the performance of various kinds of literary labour he endeavoured to earn a livelihood. His duties as member and president of the Royal Institute were faithfully discharged, though, as it would seem, without any pecuniary compensation. From 1814 to 1817 he performed the duties of secretary to said Society, which yielded him some remuneration. In these trying circumstances his rich poetic

* This was his second wife. Her name was Katharina Wilhelmina Schweickhardt. She was to him all that his heart could desire. For thirty years they were permitted to share each other's joys and sorrows. A complete edition of her poetical works has been recently issued in three volumes, uniform with those of her husband in fifteen duodecimo volumes, of about five hundred pages each.

vein continued to flow freely. Of the poetic productions of this period we must not fail to mention his Spirit-world, his Marriage, his Epistle of Nero to Posterity, and his celebrated Farewell.

This noble production, composed when he thought himself on the borders of the grave, was delivered, January 10th, 1811, in the Amsterdam Division of the Holland Society of Sciences and Arts, to a select audience, and is said to have made an indescribable impression on the whole assembly, but especially on the poets who were present. In it he takes a retrospective view of his poetic career, describes the condition of Dutch poetry when he entered the lists, mentions Lady de Lannoy as the only one whom he regarded as a worthy competitor; in a beautiful strain reviews his own poetic course, and makes honourable mention of Helmers, Klijn, Vereul, Kinker, Tollens, Loots, Van Lennep, and Schenk, who had all arisen since he began his poetic career. He then pours forth a tender and beautiful lament over his country's fall, and finally, in a most beautiful conclusion, composed in trochaic measure, he captivates and transports his hearers or readers, as he predicts the restoration of his country, after having glanced at its fall, which he had also foretold.

Passing over various things of interest to us, and which, perhaps, would not be devoid of general interest, we must now give some account of the manner in which Da Costa, then a youth of fifteen, under the direction of a gracious Providence, was first led to an acquaintance with Bilderdijk, whose instrumentality was blessed not only to his conversion from Judaism to Christianity, but also to the spiritual illumination of his mind, and the renovation of his heart.

There existed at this time in Amsterdam a Society of Dutch Jews, composed of men of literary tastes and cultivated minds, who were anxious to avail themselves of all the means within their reach to promote their acquaintance with general history and literature, but especially with the history and literature of the Netherlands. This desire was stimulated by the removal, in 1795, of the restrictions which had previously debarred them from official stations. To promote the object which they had in view, they determined to extend the membership of their

Society beyond the limits of their own religious faith, and to confer the honour of membership on Christian men distinguished for their literary attainments. Among the first on whom this honour was conferred was Bilderdijk, J. H. van Swinden, a distinguished professor of mathematics and natural philosophy, and author of various scientific works, and J. Wilmet, a distinguished orientalist. In the discharge of the duties growing out of this new relationship Bilderdijk was conscientiously faithful. He also exerted a happy influence on these Israelites, in confirming their faith in their own Scriptures, against the skepticism of the age.

Isaac da Costa, though not a member of this Society, was related to one of its members, from whom he was at the time receiving instruction in Hebrew. To his instructor he presented one of the earliest productions of his Dutch muse. It was laid by him before Bilderdijk, who was gratified by discovering in it marks of poetic genius. This paved the way to a personal acquaintance. Da Costa, though but a lad, and at the time too much filled with admiration of the classic poetry of antiquity, and of the modern poetry of other lands, to appreciate Dutch poetry in general, or that of Bilderdijk in particular, felt a deep interest in this eminent man. His indignation had been excited by the unworthy manner in which he had been treated; his admiration had been drawn forth by the spectacle of a man who dared to stand alone in the dignified consciousness of his superiority to his opponents; and a presentiment had been awakened in his breast, that he should obtain from him a solution of the momentous problems that perplexed his youthful mind. The prevailing skepticism of the age, in which even the Jews participated, had distilled its poison in his tender breast, and he found it exceedingly difficult to maintain his faith in God and immortality, against the fierce assaults of Voltaire and other skeptical writers. His mind was long in doubt and perplexity as to whether God had actually revealed himself to man, and if so, whether such revelation had been made to his Jewish ancestors. Through the efforts of a learned professor, who instructed him in general history, he had become confirmed in his convictions on these important points. Though his belief in the divine origin of the Old Testament was now

confirmed, yet he entertained no idea of a New Testament; and he still stood at an immeasurable distance from the acknowledgment of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, promised of God, and predicted by the ancient prophets. His innate dread of even touching the writings of the apostles and witnesses of Jesus, long continued to operate, and served to prevent the entrance of gospel light into his mind.

Such was his state of mind when he was conducted by his friend and instructor to the humble dwelling of Bilderdijk, to have his first interview with a man for whom he entertained so profound a regard. This interview made an ineffaceable impression on his memory. For nearly three hours these learned men continued their conversation, Bilderdijk occasionally directing his to the lad who had come to make his acquaintance. On leaving, he received an invitation to repeat his visit. Of this he gladly and frequently availed himself. By the advice of an eminent jurist in Leyden, his worthy father secured for him the privilege of receiving from Bilderdijk a regular course of instruction, preparatory to his entering the law department of the university. Hence he daily resorted to the house of his teacher, with whom his intercourse became constant and intimate. Many opportunities occurred for conversation on various topics pertaining to law, language, poetry, history, and philosophy. His principal study, however, was Roman Law, specifically the exposition and application of the Pandects.

Bilderdijk studiously refrained from all attempts to proselyte his young friend and pupil, contenting himself with manifesting on suitable occasions, his respect for the law of Moses, and with endeavouring to inspire him with similar respect; encouraging his expectation of a Messiah coming in glory, yet not concealing his own belief in a suffering Messiah. As the standpoint from which his instructor was accustomed to view all subjects, was the manifestation of the Son of God in human nature, these conversations were pervaded with a spiritual element of vital truth, and were a virtual preaching of Christ.

In 1817, Bilderdijk removed to Leyden, whither his pupil had gone a few months before. Here the grateful pupil enjoyed the high satisfaction of making some of his dearest and

most intimate university friends acquainted with his beloved instructor, and of associating them with him as disciples of this great master. Among these was A. Capadose, a student in the medical department, a Jew of Portuguese descent, a relative, and an intimate friend from their earliest years. Of the high privilege enjoyed by these young men, Dr. Capadose thus speaks: "A savant of the University of Leyden, the celebrated Bilderdijk, a man of extraordinary genius, a distinguished poet, an excellent historian, a profound philosopher, and, above all, a true disciple of Christ, assembled around him at that time a few studious young men. My friend, who had long known him, and I, were among the number of his auditors. He honoured us with peculiar affection; and his conversations contributed not a little, under God, to direct my mind to serious contemplation. Though he never spoke to me of Christianity before my conversion, he nevertheless exercised a great and salutary influence over my heart. The vivacity and fervor of his soul, the nobleness of his sentiments, the force of his logic, the depth and extent of his knowledge, joined to an ardent desire of being useful to youth, all concurred to enrapture us. But no love of a spiritual religion had yet entered my heart."

In 1818, Da Costa and Capadose, having completed their course and taken their degrees, returned to Amsterdam, their native city, to enter, the one on the practice of law, and the other on that of medicine. They still kept up their intimacy, and, after a time, they began to meet together regularly for the purpose of reading the Scriptures, including the New Testament, and of communicating to each other their doubts and difficulties. This practice was continued for some time, and with a constantly deepening interest. At length, in October, 1820, whilst engaged in reading the sacred oracles, the veil was removed from their minds, and Jesus of Nazareth, the crucified on Calvary, stood revealed to their spiritual vision as the Messiah, whose sufferings had been so vividly depicted by the prophet Isaiah. With profound adoration they prostrated themselves at his feet, and acknowledged him as their Lord and their God.

In September, 1822, they repaired to Leyden, the scene of so many tender recollections, to make a public profession of

their faith in Christ. They were cordially welcomed by their highly-revered instructor and his accomplished wife, who both participated in the celestial joy with which their hearts overflowed. On the 20th of October they were received by baptism into the bosom of the Christian church. Their lives have been filled with labours in the cause of Christ, their writings have been greatly blessed to the edification of Christians, and their personal influence, writings, and labours, have been blessed to not a few of their Jewish brethren. They have long occupied a foremost rank in the church of Holland as zealous defenders and promotors of orthodox sentiments and evangelical piety. The former now rests from his labours. To have been instrumental in the conversion of two such young men, belonging to the once beloved but long rejected people of God, might well be a source of unspeakable joy and consolation to this eminent, but sorely-tried and afflicted servant of God.

From 1817 to 1827, Bilderdijk resided in Leyden, a place dearer to him than all others. During this period of ten years he gave to the public numerous poetic productions of diversified character. Of these our limits forbid us to speak.

From 1820 to 1825 he sent forth eight volumes in prose, entitled Philological and Poetical Diversities and New Philological and Poetical Diversities. These were, in great part, treatises and contributions from his pen, dating back to the time of his presidency of the Second Class of the Royal Institute. In 1826 appeared his Grammar of the Dutch Language. Another work on the Gender of Dutch Nouns, of a very high character, proceeded from his pen during this same period. Of these works we shall allow Professor Siegenbeek, one of the highest authorities in his day on philological subjects, to express his opinion. After expressing his entire acquiescence in the judgment of Professor Ypeij, that the Dictionary of Weiland is to the student of the Dutch language invaluable and indispensable, he adds: "The same can be said, with no less right, of the very remarkable treatise on the genders of the nouns in the Dutch language of the eminent poet and philologist, W. Bilderdijk, which first appeared in 1804, and subsequently in 1818, with Appendices and augmented Annotations, and to which the writer, four years later, added an alphabetical list of

the Dutch Nouns, with their genders, established on positive principles of philology, in two volumes. In this treatise a light, in all respects new and brilliant, is spread not merely over the subject of the genders, but at the same time over the whole composition of the language, and the right derivation of the words; and this light is still further augmented, in many places, by the alphabetical list of the genders. Also his Philological and Poetical Diversities, and New Philological and Poetical Diversities, contain very much that is new and original, the further development of which is anxiously looked for by all in a complete grammar of the language."

He also edited new editions of the poetical works of Hooft, Huygens, and Antonides van der Goes, adding illustrative notes. He, moreover, translated into Dutch various works from the English, French, and German. Among these were Chalmers' work on the Evidence and Authority of the Christian Revelation, and six sermons of Merle d'Aubigné. A volume of Essays, relating to Psychology, Ethics, and Jurisprudence, was also given by him to his countrymen. This work was violently assailed by Kinker, a distinguished jurist and philosopher, who adopted the system of Kant, and was a disbeliever in Christianity. To all these labours we must add his polemic work, completed just before leaving Amsterdam for Leyden, entitled, "A Protestant to his Fellow-Protestants." It was directed against the attempts made to effect a return of the Dutch church into the bosom of the Roman church.

During this period he also gave a regular course of lectures on the History of the Netherlands to successive classes of university students, who desired to hear on this and kindred topics, the views of a man so eminently versed in this department, and so independent in his judgment. Besides Da Costa and Capadose, already mentioned, were Willem van Hogendorp, belonging to one of the noblest families of Holland, who to great nobility of character added high personal accomplishments of mind and body; his brother, Dirk van Hogendorp, a man of great excellence of moral character, and a decided Christian, leaving behind him as such, an unblemished reputation. These were sons of the distinguished Count Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, who acted so conspicuous a part in

liberating his country from the oppressive rule of Napoleon. Not to speak of N. Carbasius, J. T. Bodel Nyenhuis, A. Brugmans, P. J. Elout, Rau (van Gameren), Baron van Wassenaer van Catwijk, who all attended his first course of lectures, we must mention G. Groen van Prinsterer, an illustrious statesman, a distinguished historian, and the accomplished editor of the Archives, or unpublished correspondence of the Orange-Nassau family, to which our own distinguished historian so often refers in his Rise of the Dutch Republic. Groen van Prinsterer has been a decided friend and advocate of sound doctrine and evangelical piety in the church of Holland, standing at the head of the evangelical party, and coöperating with such men as Count Dirk van Hogendorp, Gevers, Capadose, Da Costa, Elout, Singendonck, and Van der Kemp, in resisting the inroads of Rationalism.

These lectures, as delivered to his pupils, were interspersed and enlivened by numerous extemporaneous remarks, and were listened to with deep interest, and even admiration, by his youthful auditors. They were designed to rectify the mistakes into which Wagenaar, the great historian of Holland, and others, had fallen, from prejudice, party spirit, or an inadequate acquaintance with the feudal system. That much has been accomplished in this direction, is admitted even by those who have assailed the work. These lectures were subsequently published in fourteen octavo volumes, under the editorial supervision of H. W. Tydeman, an eminent jurist and a distinguished Professor of Law in the University of Leyden, who has added much to their value by his numerous explanatory and illustrative notes and observations.

The ten years, from 1817 to 1827, which Bilderdijk spent in Leyden, may be regarded as the most peaceful and happy of his life. Though not wholly exempt from trials, he enjoyed a high degree of domestic happiness, and was surrounded by a circle of choice young men, who listened with eagerness and delight to his instructions, and cherished for him a sincere affection, as well as a profound regard. His circle of intimate friends, though not large, was of such a character as to contribute to his spiritual as well as intellectual enjoyment. For the most part, he enjoyed inward peace and serenity of mind,

and was enabled to acquiesce in the will and allotments of his heavenly Father, and to confide in his love and faithfulness.

Most of his sacred poetry was written during this period. It possesses a very high degree of poetic merit, and some of the pieces are exquisitely beautiful, and worthy of his best days; but it commends itself to the heart of the Christian by far higher qualities. It is decidedly evangelical in sentiment, and its tone is eminently spiritual. It clearly evinces how fully its author had entered into the varied experiences of David, and other men of God, as recorded in the Scriptures.

In 1825, the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the University of Leyden was celebrated, in which he cordially and actively participated, and which was to him as an ever-grateful alumnus of this venerated alma mater, a high satisfaction. During the same summer another high pleasure awaited him, in the unexpected visit and providential detention of the poet Southey. A few years before, Southey's Rodrigo the Goth had been commended to the attention of Mrs. Bilderdijk, who was so much pleased with it, as to undertake its translation into Dutch verse. It was completed in 1824, and dedicated to the author of the original, to whom it was sent, after publication, by Bilderdijk, with an elegant Latin epistle from his pen. This gave rise to an epistolary correspondence. In the summer of 1825, the poet laureate of England visited Holland, and was naturally attracted toward the celebrated seat of learning, where these new poetic friends resided. Here he was detained far beyond his original intention, by an accidental injury to one of his limbs, and yielded to the urgent solicitations of these generous friends to make their house his home during the remainder of his stay. Every attention which the skill and ingenuity of Mrs. Bilderdijk, aided by her English recollections, could suggest, was lavished upon him. This kindness was suitably acknowledged in his letters to his family and friends; and his admiration of the man, whose hospitality he had enjoyed, was thus expressed to his friend Cunningham:

> "And who is Bilderdijk? methinks thou sayest
> A ready question; yet which, trust me, Allan,
> Would not be asked, had not the curse that came
> From Babel, clipt the wings of poetry.

Napoleon asked him once, with cold fixed look,
'Art thou then in the world of letters known?'
And meeting his imperial look with eye
As little wont to turn away before
The face of man, the Hollander replied,
'At least I have done that whereby I have
There to be known deserved.'
A man he is
Who hath received upon his constant breast
The sharpest arrows of adversity.
Whom not the clamours of the multitude,
Demanding, in their madness and their might,
Iniquitous things, could shake in his firm mind;
Nor the strong hand of instant tyranny
From the straight path of duty turn aside;
But who, in public troubles, in the wreck
Of his own fortunes, in proscription, exile,
Want, obloquy, ingrate neglect, and what
Of yet severer trials Providence
Sometimes inflicteth, chastening whom it loves,
In all, through all, and over all, hath borne
An equal heart; as resolute toward
The world, as humbly and religiously
Beneath his heavenly Father's rod resigned.
Right-minded, happy-minded, righteous man!
True lover of his country and his kind:
In knowledge and in inexhaustive stores
Of native genius rich: philosopher,
Poet, and sage. The language of a state
Inferior in illustrious deeds to none,
But circumscribed by narrow bounds,
Hath pent within its sphere a name, with which
Europe should else have rung from side to side.
Such, Allan, is the Hollander to whom
Esteem and admiration have attached
My soul, not less than pre-consent of mind
And gratitude for benefits, when being
A stranger, sick, and in a foreign land,
He took me, like a brother, to his house,
And ministered to me, and made the weeks,
Which had been wearisome and careful else,
So pleasurable, that in my calendar
There are no whiter days."

Our limits do not permit us to speak of the productions, both in prose and verse, that proceeded from his pen subsequently to his removal from Leyden in 1828. Nor can we do more with reference to the arts and sciences so successfully

cultivated by him, than merely to say that a high place is awarded him as an artist and scientist by those who are competent to sit in judgment on such matters. As a philologist, we shall simply adduce respecting him the testimony of a man not chargeable with partiality for him. Professor Hamaker, whose competency to pronounce a verdict in the case is indisputable, says, in his University Lectures on the utility and importance of a grammatical comparison of the Greek, the Latin, and the German dialects, with the Sanscrit: "That, in spite of fanciful errors and singularities, he has done inconceivably much for Etymology, yea, that his Treatise on the Genders and his Explanatory Gender-list give reason to believe, that, could he have availed himself of all the helps which the present moment offers, little would have escaped him that is now found by others; yea, that he would have seen further than most of the German scholars who now occupy themselves with this department, and that, though his inventiveness is not free from unnaturalness, he would however have shunned most of the rocks on which these otherwise highly meritorious men have fallen."

The merits of Bilderdijk, with respect to the language and literature of Holland, are very great. This is admitted even by those not most friendly to him. Not only did he render most important services by his philological writings, but he has, in his own poetical writings, exhibited the beauty, strength, flexibility, melodiousness, copiousness, in a word, all the capabilities of the language, beyond any previous, cotemporaneous, or subsequent writer of which his country can boast. What Hooft and Vondel, those two great masters, did in the seventeenth century for the Dutch language, that, and far more, Bilderdijk has done in the nineteenth century.

"But instead of pursuing the inquiry, what service Bilderdijk may have rendered to the various sciences and arts cultivated by him, let us rather fix our attention on the benefits accruing from those stores of knowledge to himself, that is, to his poetry. For, next to life's highest purposes, his poetry was certainly the centre and object of all his strivings, of all his studies and pursuits. And it is to that general, profound, and extended knowledge of Bilderdijk, that we are indebted for the clearness,

profoundness, definiteness, exquisiteness, regularity, excellence, I may say, blended with the great sublimity and brilliancy of his poetry—poetry equally at home, whether it respects subjects or terms, in the observatory of the astronomer as on the vessel of the mariner,—by the intricate construction of a sluice, as by the operations of the spinning-wheel or the loom,—in the secrets of the vegetable kingdom, as in the power, operations, and experiences of the body, whether in a healthy or morbid state,—equally familiar with the speculations of Philosophy and with the systems of Christianity,—equally skilled in the subtilties of the logic of law, as in the combinations of military tactics and strategy,—as in the available means for a richly constructed versification in every measure and tone."

In 1828 Bilderdijk removed to Haarlem. Here a few choice friends welcomed him. To his literary labours during this closing period of his life we have already adverted. Here he was called to sustain an irreparable loss in the death of his estimable wife, to whom he was so tenderly attached, and who had so greatly alleviated his trials, and ministered so much to the purest enjoyments of his life. While yet in Leyden she had a severe fit of sickness, which left her for years in a pining condition, from which she was for a short time recovered, but only to succumb to the severity of another attack. This discipline of her heavenly Father served to raise her to a still higher degree of spirituality of mind, for which she had been previously noted. She entered into the joy of her Lord, April 16, 1830.

From the shock caused by this severe stroke, Bilderdijk never recovered. It closed his poetic career. Only half lines were afterwards found, bearing testimony to fruitless attempts. Again and again, it would seem, he attempted to write an elegy on his departed wife. This life had no longer any attractions for him. Only one son remained to him, a youth of eighteen. This was to him a care and concern, which he was enabled to commit to his gracious Redeemer, but did not operate in the way of begetting a desire to remain any longer in a world of sin and sorrow, from which he had ever longed to take his flight. The Bible and Cats, as in the days of his childhood, constituted his principal reading. The visits of

spiritual friends, who ministered consolation to him on gospel grounds, were ever welcome. All comfort offered him in view of death, not drawn from the Scriptures and from the cross of Christ, was distasteful to him, and was positively rejected. To the inquiry, made by an aged Christian friend, who came from Amsterdam to visit him in his last illness, whether his faith in God and Jesus Christ remained firm and steadfast to the end, he gave an emphatic affirmative response—the last, it is thought, that he uttered with full consciousness. On the 18th December, 1831, in his seventy-sixth year, after a short illness, he peacefully and gently breathed his last. Thus closed his long, laborious, and eventful life. His remains were deposited, on the 22d, beneath the great church in Haarlem, beside those of his beloved companion, in the vault of one of the pastors, both of whom were his sincere and faithful friends.

We shall not attempt in this article any further delineation of the character of this great man, nor estimate of his works, or of the services which he rendered to the cause of letters, science, and religion, but shall afford our readers the pleasure of listening to the gifted Willem de Clercq, since gone to his reward, who was a personal friend and admirer of Bilderdijk: "Where much existed to praise and to admire, there could not be wanting, also, the depravity which is found, on this polluted earth, in connection with all that is great and sublime. Have we caused the light to appear, the shadow is also there; it is there for our instruction, that we should also here acknowledge, that in his gifts God must be glorified, not man, who, in connection with all his acquired excellencies, ever continues to exhibit the primitive lineament of sin, which he brought with him into this world. . . . . If, then, his poetry affords proof of what the grace of God accomplished for him, it exhibits likewise proofs of the apostacy and sin, as all nature, which we admire, and which yet preaches to us the humiliating truth, that we are dust. And yet, notwithstanding this acknowledgment, we take leave of our poet with the assurance that he rests from his labour, and that He who came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance, will also confess him, by whom he, though in weakness, was confessed with steadfast

courage, and in the midst of many trials. The praise of cotemporaries is of short duration; the applause of posterity uncertain; the laurel wreath of the poet fades; but he that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life."

Art. VI.—*Principles of Political Economy, with some of their applications to Social Philosophy.* By John Stuart Mill. In two volumes. Boston: Charles C. Little, and James Brown.

We preface this article with the title of this great production, not because we design to review it, or to avow our acceptance of its doctrines. From some of them we dissent. We refer to it in this way, because we are indebted to its profound and masterly discussions relative to money and credit, for the suggestion of some important facts and reasonings, in the analysis of these subjects, to which we now introduce our readers.

In proportion as men emerge out of a state of pure barbarism, and make any approaches towards civilization, they spontaneously adopt what is known as "division of labour." That is, instead of attempting to produce all the various commodities they need, each by his own labour, they severally devote themselves to the production of some single, or at most, few articles. Of these, each produces a larger quantity than he needs for his own use, and in some way seeks to exchange the residue for other desired articles, of which others, in his own or other countries, have produced a surplus, which, in its turn, for like reasons, seeks a reciprocal exchange. This process of division of labour goes forward in increasingly minute subdivisions, as civilization advances, until, to form the point of a pin, or the eye of a needle, becomes the exclusive occupation of a life. In this way, of course, the skill and efficiency of labour are immensely increased, and its products multiplied beyond calculation. Out of this plenty and variety of products, so immensely surpassing the few necessaries for bare subsist-

ence, which the savage is able to fabricate and collect in his hut, arise the wealth, power, comfort, luxury, elegance, and refinement, that distinguish civilized nations.

Out of all this division of labour, and in proportion to its extent, arises the necessity of exchanging its products. So trade and commerce are commensurate with the productiveness of human labour, and the advance of civilization. But it is demonstrable, both from the nature of the case, and from history, that this exchange can take place only in a very limited and inconvenient way, without that medium of exchange, which, whether able to define it or not, every child understands, under the name of money. Simple barter is an awkward and cumbrous operation, and involves so many difficulties, that, left to it alone, exchange, and consequently division of labour, with all its benefits, would speedily be arrested. The simplest example will show this. A tailor desires some nails to repair his house, or a hat for his head. How can he make garments that shall be of the precise value of these or other articles he needs? Or if he could, how rarely would he find a person having nails or hats to sell, who would want exactly such garments? As each may readily see for himself, this example is a type of all others.

Hence the rudest nations, who have advanced a step beyond a pure state of nature, have found the necessity of some medium of exchange. Various substances more or less precious have been adopted for this purpose, in the ruder stages of society; but, in proportion to the advance of civilization and intelligence, the nations, with a unanimity scarcely paralleled on any other subject, have recognised the two substances known as gold and silver, or the precious metals, as alone suitable to fulfil this function. The reasons for this, which may be called the universal judgment of our race, are urgent enough to explain it. And yet, when men differ so largely on other subjects, affording no greater room for reasonable debate, this remarkable unanimity of the commercial world on this momentous subject, may be ascribed, in part, to a higher than earthly guidance. For, so far as exchange and commerce among nations are important, they are immensely facilitated by a uniform medium of exchange, and measure of exchange-

able value. That substances suitable for such a medium exist, and have so evinced themselves to the mind of the race as to secure a practically universal adoption, is a special manifestation of the divine goodness. Only one step further on the part of man, is necessary to secure the full consummation and benefit of this uniformity in the substances they recognise as money. This is a uniform standard of coinage and nomenclature of coins among all nations. Whenever national pride and isolation so far melt away before the cosmopolitan forces of commerce and Christianity, as to furnish international coins and currency uniform for the whole world, this will greatly lubricate the machinery of trade, and remove much of the friction which still impedes exchanges between the nations.

The reasons why the precious metals constitute the fittest material for a medium of exchange, and measure of relative value, are, First, their great value in proportion to their bulk and weight. Value, in the sense of political economists here intended, implies two things; first, that it be what men deem really important and desirable to possess. Whatever labour anything may have cost, even that spent upon the Great Eastern or the Atlantic cable, to the amount of millions, the product is of no value, except as it is something important and desirable to men. Secondly, that which has value, in our present sense, must also cost labour to acquire it. The amount and difficulty of this labour are the precise measure of the value of its products. Thus pure air and water are in the utmost degree important and desirable to men. Yet they have no value, *i. e.*, economic or exchangeable value, where it costs no labour to obtain them. In cities, where pure water is obtained by costly aqueducts, and on ship-board, where it costs labour to place and keep it, it has its price, and a proportionate exchangeable value. Two elements then enter into exchangeable value—intrinsic utility and desirableness, together with the necessity of labour in order to production or acquisition. These properties combine remarkably in the precious metals, and this, in connection with the most diminutive weight and bulk. Aside from their use as money, they have ever been coveted by men for purposes of art, ornament, comfort, and luxury; and as symbols of social dignity, rank, and power.

This intrinsic utility and desirableness form an indispensable requisite, else they would have no exchangeable value. Bits of marble, shaped and polished in the form of coin, at whatever cost, would not serve for money, because they are of insignificant worth or use to men for any other purpose. Or if they were of use, but were as free to all without labour as the air we breathe, they would not serve for money. It is, moreover, requisite that this value be compressed within small weight and bulk, in order to fulfil another requisite in the medium of exchange, which is, 2. Portability. This requisite is so obviously necessary as to need no elucidation. A substance having the weight and bulk of iron, in a given value, would be impracticable as an ordinary medium of exchange, where civilization has developed any considerable progress in manufactures and commerce. 3. Divisibility into small equal quantities, and their multiples, without considerable labour or loss. In this way the amounts required for exchange may be varied indefinitely, as circumstances require. They may be easily and exactly computed, and the values of all other commodities readily reckoned and denominated in the amount of coin for which they will exchange. This requisite rules out precious stones, which have some of the other most essential properties of money. 4. Durability is another essential property in the substances used for money. That which would easily wear, or waste, or decay, or tarnish, would speedily sink in worth and desirableness, and would thus fail to be a uniform standard of value. This is one of the most important characteristics of money, and belongs eminently to the precious metals. 5. As closely connected with, and necessary to the last, something like uniformity in the actual or relative cost of production, *i. e.*, labour requisite to obtain them, from age to age, is necessary to their uniformity of value. This has been a remarkable property of the precious metals. The two chief exceptions have been the great increase and cheapening of the production of silver, especially consequent on the discovery and working of the Mexican and South American mines; and of gold, after the late discoveries of it in California and Australia. We do not, however, consider that this materially altered their relative, if it did their actual cost of production. By this we

mean, that, although the labour requisite to the production of the precious metals was thus lessened, the labour employed in the production of other things, through improved skill, tools, and machinery, had become proportionally efficient. If gold and silver became more abundant and cheap, other products became more abundant and cheap. A dollar in gold will to-day probably exchange for more of the necessaries and comforts of life than fifty years ago. The reverse may be true of some things, but not of the totality of things required in comfortable and wholesome living. We well remember the period, less than forty years since, when, after the expense of raising and curing flax, and working it into thread by the domestic spinning-wheel, more was paid for the simple weaving than the average price of cotton cloth for the same uses, during the last ten years. The precious metals, therefore, possess, as no other known substance does, that last great requisite of a circulating medium, viz., a relative uniformity in the cost of their production.

In order to render them most perfectly available for purposes of exchange, governments have found it necessary to coin them into pieces of a given weight and purity, authenticated by their names, or by equivalent tokens enstamped upon them. This not only saves the trouble of weighing by the parties in each instance of exchange, which, in ordinary small transactions, would be nearly impracticable; it also guards against frauds in the purity and fineness of the metal, and against most of those minute parings from the quantity, which Jews now so often practise upon our smaller coins. In short, government coinage is absolutely necessary, in order to put the precious metals into forms convenient for use in exchange, and duly protected against counterfeits and other frauds.

Thus prepared, the precious metals are money, and will exchange for their value in *any* out of all the purchasable commodities in market, which its holder may desire. We say they will exchange for their value, neither more nor less. We mean that this is their normal operation. So far as, through abnormal causes yet to be specified, they deviate from this standard, they have a constant counter-tendency to gravitate back towards it. By value here, we mean the labour requisite

to their production or procurement at the place and time of exchange. And the principle we maintain is, that at such time and place, the law of exchange, to which they conform, or always tend to conform, is, that they will command as much of other saleable products as then and there can be attained with the same amount of labour. Of course, in making out this balance of labour, not mere physical exertion is meant. Those adjuncts, of skill which is often, of machinery which is always, the fruit of labour, of agreeableness and security, for which men are always ready to give an equivalent in labour, are to be counted. This being so, the tendency of money, as of all other things, is to exchange for its equivalent, or what costs its equivalent, of labour. This is susceptible of demonstration *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Whenever the precious metals will exchange generally for what costs more labour, risk, &c., in the production than themselves, then the tendency of labour will be to resort to mining, importing, and coining them, till the equilibrium is restored, and these employments are no more remunerative than others. On the other hand, if gold will not procure in exchange for itself what costs equal labour in production, then the tendency will be, *ceteris paribus*, to leave the mining, importation, and coining of it for other occupations, until they lose their relative superiority. This law is not only deducible from the principles of human nature; it is proved by actual history, and all deviations from it are due to exceptional and transient causes, which are easily explained.

Hence it is clear that, as to value, money is subject to the same laws as all other commodities. Its peculiarity is this. It will command its own value in *any* of all purchasable articles its owner desires. Herein it differs from all other commodities. The holders of these, who wish to exchange them for other commodities, can seldom do it immediately. Those who have the articles they wish to obtain, rarely want what they have to offer. Others, however, who have different commodities, may want them. Hence these several articles will not immediately exchange for what their holders desire. But money will always exchange for, and command, whatever of all articles seeking exchange or sale its holder desires. And, on the other hand, all articles will exchange for so much of money

as, at the time of exchange, will procure their equivalent value in other articles. Therefore the different denominations and amounts of money have been aptly likened to so many tickets, entitling their holder to an equivalent amount of all purchasable articles in the market. Herein chiefly does it surpass, in its exchangeable power, other kinds of property.

This brings to view the true sense in which money is a measure of value. Absolutely considered, it is just as much a measure of the value of other things, as they are of it and of each other. And the value of all alike at any given time, special exceptions being disregarded, is measured by the amount of labour, estimated by its quality not less than its quantity, then requisite to produce them. If a dollar measures the value of a yard of cloth, no less does this yard of cloth measure the value of a dollar. But, in a relative sense, money is the measure of the value of other things. It is the common measure in which the values of all other things are computed, in order to determine their value relatively to each other, and the respective amounts in which each will exchange for each. A farmer wishes to sell wheat, and buy sugar. The rates at which they shall exchange for each other are estimated by their respective values in money. If ten pounds of sugar exchange for one bushel of wheat, and the latter be estimated at one dollar per bushel, the former will be reckoned as worth ten cents a pound. In this sense, and no other, is money specially a measure of value.

Hence we see why it is that the property of men is estimated in money, and that men are pronounced worth so much money. It means that they have accumulations of some sort of property, which will procure in exchange for itself that amount of money, or other articles which are exchangeable for, and whose value is represented by, such amount of money. But the phrase is often used, and indeed the word *money* is often used, as if it were the only real property, and other possessions had value only in proportion to their convertibility into money. But then it must not be forgotten, that this very convertibility is owing to their antecedent value. This quality is reciprocal. If they are valuable because they command money, money is valuable only because it will command them, and worthless so far as it

is incapable of commanding them. The reason why *money* is so often used as if it were the generic term for all property, is found in the peculiarities already specified: 1. That it has the prerogative of commanding its own value in all commodities seeking sale. 2. That it is, in the sense already explained, the measure of the value of all other kinds of property, and is therefore the standard by which it is estimated, and the symbol by which it is expressed. Hence, as being the representative of property, and the means of commanding whatever other commodities we desire, "money answereth all things."

We have said, that the normal exchangeable value of money is as much of other commodities, as at the time costs an equal amount of labour, direct and indirect, quantity and quality included, to produce them. So far as it deviates from this law, through any disturbing causes, it has a constant tendency to return to it. The principal disturbing causes are a derangement of the equilibrium between supply and demand. If money, through any special cause, be scarce, and unusually difficult to obtain, while at the same time there is a production of carriages beyond the wants of the people for use, causing a glut of them in the market, of course money will command carriages, whose production cost more labour than itself. This may sometimes happen in regard to the relation between money and the great bulk of the commodities in market. It always happens in commercial panics, and generally in domestic and foreign wars. All articles of sale then go at low prices. On the other hand, the reverse state of things may exist; money may be very plenty, or what is equivalent, it may be easily obtained, while other commodities are either scarce in fact, or made so by being, in consequence of the very abundance of money, held for higher prices. Then money, for a time, exchanges for less than the cost of its production in other articles. This usually occurs with regard to more or less commodities and forms of property, in times of inflated credit and extravagant speculation. Then prices rule high. This was true of nearly all commodities, but especially of lands and building sites, as the prime object of the speculative mania in the grand commercial bubble, which preceded and burst in the financial panic of 1837. It was not until the year 1842, that

the country touched the bottom of this financial abyss, and began to rise from its depression to the subsequent unparalleled career of prosperity. Then, again, the increased production of the precious metals at the mines, along with a proportionate expansion of credit, may produce an undue inflation of prices, in some or all articles, which is sure to find its reaction towards, and for a while below the normal standard—as the immense production of gold in California and Australia stimulated trade, credit, and consequent speculation, especially in worthless railroad securities and their adjuncts, until the whole "baseless fabric" culminated and fell in the financial crash of 1857.

The amount of precious metals required to discharge the functions of exchange, supposing no substitutes for them in use, and laying out of account all exceptional transient disturbing influences, is determined by the fundamental principle already laid down, which is indeed the fontal principle from which every other doctrine pertaining to this whole subject flows. It is determined by the equality of values between money and what it exchanges for. To this they mutually tend, by a law as irresistible as gravitation. So much of the precious metals, if they are the only medium of exchange, will be requisite, as is needed to sustain this balance. And to this amount, in every country, it must evermore tend. For when the precious metals exchange for more than their equivalent, labour will be attracted to mining them; and when they exchange for less, it will be withdrawn from mining until the equilibrium is restored. But the amount in question does not therefore necessarily bear a fixed ratio to the amount of property in existence, within the limits of its circulation. This is sometimes supposed, but erroneously. And it has been supposed, also, to be a demonstrable deduction from this, that as money increases in quantity in any region in which the amount of property remains the same, prices must rise, and as it diminishes, they must fall. Many plausible arguments, claiming to be demonstrative, have been deduced from these supposed premises, against the emission of paper money by banks and governments, as if, by such issue, they could largely and permanently raise or depress prices, make and unmake commercial panics, together with the business and fortunes of

individuals and communities. How far, and under what conditions, this is so, will soon come into discussion. What we wish now to emphasize is this: that it depends entirely on circumstances whether the increase or diminution of the amount of money in a community raises or lowers prices. These circumstances are: 1. The extent to which the property of a community is undergoing the process of exchange. In a purely agricultural community, or a non-commercial town or city, or when trade is stagnant, very little property, comparatively, changes hands. Of course, if there be little exchange, there is needed but little of the medium of exchange. Most of the money actually in such places lies inactive and useless in hoards. Hence, 2. When property is undergoing rapid exchange, the amount of money requisite to effect such exchanges will, *ceteris paribus*, be inversely as the rapidity of its circulation. Take a given thousand dollars. If it be hoarded in a miser's chest, it discharges no service as a medium of exchange, and is, to all useful purposes, or as to effect upon prices, as though it were not. Now, suppose another thousand dollars. It is paid by one to another, who in turn pays it to another, in liquidation of debts, or in purchase of goods. But the last person who obtains it chooses to hoard it, or to keep it on hand for a time to provide for a maturing debt, or to await a more favourable opportunity of investment; until this money is again put in circulation, it is as if it were not, to all who have occasion to use money in exchange. They must seek another thousand in its place. Thus two thousand are needed, when, with a more active circulation, one would have sufficed. Suppose now, as often happens at the first of January, that the same money, passing from hand to hand, discharges twenty debts in succession, in the course of two or three days. The volume of money, therefore, required to be in circulation at any given time, in order to maintain the equilibrium already mentioned, to which it ever tends, is in the direct ratio, not of the absolute amount of property, but of the amount of property bought and sold, and inversely as the rapidity of its circulation. The volume of water required to propel a given machinery, is inversely as the swiftness of its current. This is on the hypothesis of a purely metallic currency, and of the

absence of those substitutes for it furnished by various forms of credit. The effect of these will now fall to be considered.

Employment of different forms of Credit as Substitutes for Money.

It is quite obvious that, if property changes hands, not by the actual payment of money, but by the promise to pay it, or on the faith that it will be paid at a future time, this credit so far forth is in lieu of money, and discharges its office as a medium of exchange. So far as such credit serves to effect exchanges without the use of money, so far it lessens the amount of money requisite to effect them. It is no less true, that as civilization, wealth, manufactures, and commerce advance, they involve conditions which extend among men mutual confidence in each other's pecuniary solvency and honesty. So far as such confidence exists, it will lead to sales on credit. Those who have commodities which they wish to sell, and who can forego immediate payment, will sell on credit when they can thus sell more readily and advantageously than for cash at the moment. The buyer in turn may also sell upon credit, and this process may go on through several successive sales before any money is passed, or it may be some months before the last buyer pays, and the money passes back from him through the intermediate sellers to the first; or no money whatever may pass. It often happens that real estate is sold for a note which it is mortgaged to secure, and that it is resold, again and again, carrying with each sale the original mortgage, which may be assumed and carried for an indefinite period by the last purchaser. So far as that portion of the price represented by the mortgage is concerned, no money at all is employed in consummating the successive exchanges. In periods of land speculation, sales and transfers of land, to almost fabulous amounts, are effected without the use of a dollar of money. And this is so, to a large extent, when a speculative mania seizes the public, leading to vast transactions in any given commodity or species of property. In quiet times, when mercantile confidence possesses the public mind, this occurs very largely in transactions not speculative. Credit, in this its simplest, spontaneous form, thus far supplies the place, and largely performs the functions of money. What thus supplies

the place and performs the functions of money, will, when inflated and superabundant, produce the most important phenomena caused by a glut of money in the market. It will, within the sphere of its operation, raise prices precisely as would be done by an equal supply of money seeking investment in the same way. This is shown in nearly all cases of speculative excitement and inflation. The land speculations in this country which so raised the bubble that burst in 1837, and those in the West, which helped to swell that which burst twenty years later, were carried on, to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars, by notes of hand and mortgages. The amount of money used was merely nominal. But these purchases on credit were of the same effect in raising prices as equal purchases with money would have been. This credit came into market as a purchasing power seeking land, and offering the promise of large sums for it, in the expectation that other purchasers would soon appear, offering for it the promise of still larger sums, until at length the bubble burst, from the attempt of some of the parties to realize in cash what had existed only in notes or mortgages. When, after such a process of inflation, produced by successive purchasers buying on credit in the expectation of selling at an advance, until this "kiting" process lifts up the price out of sight of its original starting-point, an apprehension arises of a reactionary decline, then a general desire to realize these promises in cash spreads, the bubble speedily breaks, and the ideal fortunes, which had been speculated into being, vanish in an hour. We wish to signalize this matter. All the phenomena of a commercial crisis or panic, as has been so ably shown by J. Stuart Mill, may be produced by the expansion of simple credit, without any of those forms of it which constitute paper-money, properly so called. Many writers, and indeed vast numbers of people, suppose that all financial inflations and explosions are due to paper-money exclusively, and would be prevented by the abolition or stringent restriction of it. No greater fallacy could be entertained. This is but one, and a subordinate one, too, among the many agencies to which this class of phenomena are due. If there were no paper-money in existence, they would appear with nearly the same frequency and severity as now.

The inflation is produced not chiefly by the particular form of credit embodied in paper-money, but by that pure and simple credit which no legislation on the subject of paper-currency can prevent, and which accomplishes all the essentials of a speculative inflation, before bank-bills, or any other kind of money, are used in connection with it. These are sometimes brought in, as the writer just referred to has well shown, to sustain the inflation a while longer. They may sometimes intensify it a little by prolonging its last stages.

It is, nevertheless, exceedingly doubtful whether they accomplish very much which would not be accomplished without them. Of this, however, more when we come to speak directly of paper-money. It is the desire to obtain the actual cash, in place of the promises of it, which were previously trusted—a desire which grows in extent and urgency as it begins to be seen that the amount of promises current in the community vastly exceeds the ability to pay—that first creates a demand for money greatly beyond the actual supply. Hence stringency, with threatening panic in the money market. Very soon the most solvent, and even wealthy men, who have pecuniary liabilities to meet, become anxious to obtain money in advance of the maturity of their debts, so as to be prepared for every possible emergency. Those to whom money is due, although they can, and in ordinary times would, extend their accommodations in the form of new loans, become timid and distrustful. They know not who is going to stand or fall. They desire to realize what is due them, and dare not trust it out again. Thus it is practically withdrawn from the money market; thus the stringency is increased by the very efforts to escape. They draw the fatal net tighter about them in the very effort to relax it. The panic grows by what it feeds on. Everybody comes to distrust everybody. The strongest houses are suddenly unable to collect their dues, and, therefore, to meet their obligations. The result is a commercial crash, and wide-spread bankruptcy. All these phenomena, it will be observed, may occur, and often have occurred, where paper-money has no existence.

2. Another form in which credit becomes a substitute for money, performing all the functions of exchange in its stead,

is that of bills of exchange. To illustrate this, let us suppose that A., a merchant in New York, has sold to B., a merchant in Chicago, goods to the amount of one thousand dollars; and further, that C., a grain-dealer in Chicago, has sold to D., a trader in New York, wheat of like value. The simple process which would be adopted to liquidate these transactions, without the aid of the commercial contrivance in question, would be as follows: B. would carry a thousand dollars to New York to pay A., and D. would transport a like amount from New York to Chicago to reimburse C. But this labour and risk of transmission is saved by a very simple process. As C., in Chicago, has a thousand dollars due him in New York, while B., in the same city, owes a thousand dollars in New York, the latter purchases of the former his credit in the great metropolis, and transfers it to his creditor for a like amount in that city. Thus the foregoing transactions liquidate each other, without the transmission of a dollar in cash between the two cities. Of course, this may happen with regard to all the products and merchandize interchanged between the two cities. The only money necessary to be transmitted will be what is requisite to balance an occasional excess in the amount sold by one city over what it buys of the other.

Thus far, however, the saving is not in the absolute amount of money employed, but in the cost and risk of its conveyance between distant places. But, in all places between which any considerable commerce is carried on, the work of effecting these exchanges is regularly organized. It becomes a regular department of banking, and banking-houses are established for the special purpose of executing it, by buying and selling bills of exchange—*i. e.*, bills authorizing the holder to whom they are issued, or to whose order he encloses them, to collect either at sight, or within a short specified time, the amount named upon them, of some responsible party in the distant city with which commerce is maintained. Now, what takes place on a smaller scale between the smaller and larger cities of any given country, will go on between that country and foreign countries with which it interchanges commodities. As there is one great centre, in each country, of monetary exchanges, where all unsettled balances ultimately converge for liquidation—as New

York for this country, and Paris for France—so there is one great centre where all the previously unsettled exchanges of the commercial world ultimately centre for the liquidation of balances. This is London. Now, bills of exchange on known and guaranteed houses or banks of high repute for solvency and strength, readily pass, by endorsement, from hand to hand, because it is known they will command the money according to the terms of their face. And if they are on the great centres of exchange, as bills in this country drawn on New York or London, the money is often more valuable at the place where the bill gives command of it, than in the place where it is drawn and held. Thus, a bill in Chicago on New York, or in New York on London, for one thousand dollars, is usually worth that sum, and frequently as much more as will equal the cost and risk of transporting specie to that amount. This being so, these bills of exchange often pass from hand to hand, by endorsement, and freely circulate as money. Not only is this so where they arise out of the legitimate transactions of business; they are sometimes drawn for the very purpose of supplying the place of money, where there is no real exchange of commodities on which they are based; no debts due from or to the place or parties on which they are drawn, which they are the means of cancelling. They are drawn simply because the drawer wants money, or its equivalent, for his own use, or to loan to others. These will perform the function of money, under the circumstances, with more advantage and less cost to himself than any other device; hence he fabricates them and puts them in circulation. In highly commercial places, such bills often largely perform the functions of a circulating medium.

The foregoing analysis of the operation of bills of exchange, supposes that money is required, sooner or later, to pass to the banker who issues them, from the party who procures them for circulation, or from some of his representatives to whom he has passed them. This, however, is far from being necessary, and, in fact, occurs only to a very limited extent. They are mostly paid for by the third and largest substitute for money in the form of credit—we mean bank checks. In all places where business is active enough to generate bills of exchange, it also

generates private or public banks of deposit, if not of issue; usually all these. We therefore notice,

3. The use of credit in the form of bank-checks as substitutes for money. One of the convenient devices of civilization is, that the ready money, which all persons in comfortable circumstances, whether for business or living, try to keep at command, may be deposited for safety as well as convenience, with a bank or banker, having ample vaults for its secure custody, and ample means to ensure his ordinary ability to return it when called for. His compensation for this trouble is the use of the money until so called for. Most persons near a bank, having occasion to use any considerable amount of money, are wont to avail themselves of this privilege. The consequence is, that the bank or banks accumulate deposits, varying in amount in proportion to the resources and business of the place where they exist. Often, as in New York city, these deposits in banks largely exceed the amount of their capital. Their managers soon learn how much of these deposits they can safely loan out, and how much they must keep on hand in specie reserves, or funds immediately convertible into specie, in order to meet all demands to which they are ever liable, unless in exceptional emergencies. The portion of the deposits loaned gives the banker his compensation for his trouble, and is a principal source of the profits of banking, in banks not of issue, or of issues merely nominal—such as the great banks of the city of New York. Now this money so deposited is drawn upon by bank-checks; and in active commercial communities, nearly all payments of any considerable amount are made in such checks. The payments made in actual money are mostly those which are too small to justify the trouble of drawing a check. Most of the money used, therefore, performs very much the office of small change. Now the checks so given by the payer are usually deposited by the payee in bank. They are drawn from the balance standing to the credit of the former, and added to that due the latter. The same process goes on with the checks of the latter in payment of his debts; and this may be extended through an indefinite series of debtors and creditors. Here is no actual passing of money. Pieces of paper do the work. They could not do it, however, except through the

faith of their takers, that they are, if desired, immediately convertible into money, and therefore serve every purpose of money. It is obvious, that if all these checks are drawn on and adjusted by one bank, the operation of them would be simply to alter the respective balances due the different depositors, according to the amount taken from and added to each respectively.

The case is not essentially different where there is any number of banks, one of which receives on deposit checks drawn on others, and *vice versa*. Then these banks make daily or less frequent settlements with each other, by exchanging checks and other mutual claims, so that they are severally presented to the respective banks against which they are drawn. The balances due from one bank to another, as the result of these settlements, are paid in cash; and this cash, used in liquidation of inter-bank balances, will be all that is really employed in these transactions, which are often of vast amount. In London, New York, and other principal cities, this is now done through a clearing-house, in which such settlements between all the banks of a given place are daily effected, the balances being paid in cash. In New York city, exchanges are daily made between the banks to the amount of from twelve to twenty millions of dollars. The balances are usually liquidated with two or three hundred thousand dollars of gold—almost the only purpose for which, in quiet times, gold is used as money, except to liquidate occasional balances which accumulate against the city, in favour of foreign countries or other commercial centres in our own. Nor does the full extent to which this substitute for the precious metals may supplant their use yet appear. For the banks of all other cities, except the great metropolis, usually pay their balances by drafts, bills, or checks on that city, where the exchanges of the country are ultimately balanced, as also the balances between this country and foreign nations. Here, therefore, the largest specie reserves of the country tend to accumulate. In the bank vaults of the great metropolis the specie reserves of country banks are largely kept, ready to be drawn upon at pleasure. The balances which they owe other banks are really paid in their checks or drafts on these depo-

sits in New York. Thus we see how small a sum of actual gold, in ordinary times, is required to effect the great exchanges of the country, after checks have done their work. And these checks are forms of credit given by their takers to those who draw them, and to the banks on which they are drawn.

We have not, however, as yet reached the full extent to which checks can go as a medium of exchange. They are not only substitutes for money. They may become powerful instruments for inflating and vitiating the currency, as far as this can be done while specie payments are maintained, and in preparing, so far as any convertible substitute for specie can do, for the suspension of specie payments. In order to accomplish this, suppose that all the banks in the city of New York, after having loaned all their legitimate funds, discount to borrowers ten per cent. additional to all their previous loans, and that this discount is not at once paid to the borrower in money, but remains in the form of a deposit in the bank by him, against which he can draw his checks. These checks will find their way into this, or other banks, which will return them to the original bank against which they are drawn, for payment. But this payment will be met by similar checks on other banks, of a similar kind, which have, in like manner, come into the possession of the former bank. So the credits of these various institutions thus loaned out, furnish each other a reciprocal support, until prices having been inflated, stimulate foreign importations to an excess which requires a large amount of specie above our other exports to balance them. Then, but not till then, or the occurrence from other causes of a drain of specie for export, will this bubble burst, from the necessity of turning these paper credits into hard cash. That this sort of inflation by discounts and checks often goes forward in quiet times, is undeniable. Indeed, it is the only way whereby the banks of New York city, which constitute the controlling banking interest of the country, can promote any factitious inflation of currency and prices; for their circulation rarely equals half the specie in the vaults. The day before the two last bank suspensions it was far less than the specie they had on hand. Thus we have another evidence how small a part of

financial inflations and explosions is necessarily due to mere bank-bills, or would be cured by what some suppose to be a sovereign preventive—their suppression, or at least limitation in quantity to the amount of specie kept for their redemption. These checks performing the functions of money are forms of credit always in a threefold way—that is to say, 1. The taker of the check trusts the drawer; 2. The deposit in bank against which the check is drawn, is so much entrusted to that institution; 3. In the case of deposits which are the proceeds of discounts made by the bank to the depositor and drawer, there has been this antecedent credit given to him by the bank.

While checks and bills of exchange are thus made substitutes for money in all the great transactions of commerce, there are certain offices of money which they cannot fulfil. As they rest upon the combined credit of the drawer or endorser, and the bank on which they are drawn, they are of course unavailable for payments where these parties are unknown, or, if known, are distrusted. They are also unavailable for payments by those who keep no bank accounts, a class, however, now comparatively small among those in convenient proximity to banking-houses, who handle considerable sums of money. These nearly all make and receive payments by checks. Still, a large amount of payments remain which cannot be met by checks. Not only so, the innumerable small payments which all have occasion to make, require money, as the trouble of writing checks for such amounts would overbalance all the convenience resulting from them. But, even for such payments, a contrivance has been found and generally adopted, which serves to substitute paper credits for coin, even in small payments, except the fractional parts of the great unit of currency—as the dollar in this country, and the pound-sterling in Great Britain—which are provided for by silver change. This brings to view

The 4th form of credit employed as a substitute for coin, or money proper. This is paper-money, or bank-bills. These are promises to pay the bearer, on presentation at the bank-counter, amounts convenient for the use of those among whom they circulate. They are engraved in a style which renders counterfeiting difficult, and which shows them to be issues of

the institutions by whom they purport to be issued. These institutions, being known to be incorporated by public authority, and to possess large means, are trusted, by those in their vicinity to whom their bills are offered, as being able to redeem their promises. The confidence that these promises are immediately convertible into coin for the amount of their face, leads nearly all willingly to accept them in its place. For other reasons they are preferred to coin, such as their greater facility of carriage and concealment. Wherever bank-bills, issued by institutions in good credit, are freely issued, they almost wholly banish from circulation all specie not of a smaller denomination than themselves. This circulation of course, if left to itself, will mostly centre about the neighbourhood of the institutions issuing them. It will not largely enter or remain in regions where the institutions issuing them are unknown, or if they are so distant as to render their convertibility into specie difficult. The exceptions to this are the issues of banks having a national character and authority, and which provide for the redemption of their issues at the points where specie is needed for the liquidation of domestic or foreign balances. Of this character are the bills of the Bank of England, as were those of the old United States Bank. The former have, and the latter had, a free national circulation. The common principle which secures the acceptance of these notes in place of specie, is the conviction that they are convertible into gold at the pleasure of the holder, while they are more convenient for use. On the other hand, the inducement on the part of banks to issue them, is that, while they cost but a trifle, they yield the same interest, when loaned, as actual specie. The whole cost is that of the paper and engraving, together with the small amount of unproductive specie in vault, which experience, as in the case of deposits and checks, shows to be ample for the redemption of such bills as will be ordinarily presented for payment. Not only so, if a bill is lost by its holder, he suffers no more than if he lost so much coin, while the bank gains the full amount of the bill.

There is also an absolute gain to the world of all the gold and silver thus released from service as a medium of exchange. All this amount of the precious metals, or the labour which

would be requisite to procure them, is thus liberated, to be employed in enlarging the comforts and luxuries, the intellectual, moral, and spiritual advancement of men. Besides this, the loss arising from the abrasion of coin, and other modes of its destruction, when in actual use, is avoided. The world has so much more of its wealth available, as is thus set free from the service of commerce. Adam Smith's felicitous illustration of this is not yet stale. He compares it to some inexpensive device, by which an air-path for common travel is substituted for roads on terra firma, thus liberating, for agricultural and other purposes promotive of human wealth, the soil now appropriated for travel. In a reverse way, the streets of our great cities not only accommodate travel, but they are honey-combed beneath, and the caverns thus made are utilized for purposes of trade and manufacture.

Of course, the temptation to multiply paper issues, which yield all the profits of coin, to an indefinite extent, is very great. Cupidity will press it to all possible lengths. But to this possibility there are natural limits, which are often still further confirmed by legislative restrictions. The natural limit is immediate convertibility into specie. It is this property which gives the engraved paper of banks the character of money, and renders it more valuable than any other engraved paper. Now bank-bills, deposits, and checks upon deposits, are kept permanently convertible, only by being limited very nearly in quantity to the amount of the precious metals they displace. If they greatly exceed this in the combined elements of quantity and briskness of circulation, an inflation of currency ensues, which proportionally inflates prices above the average standard in the world. This attracts increased imports of foreign goods, which will always seek the highest prices. Hence will arise an excess of imports over exports, which requires to be balanced with money. This money, when sent to foreign nations, must be real money—the precious metals. Consequently, the bills and deposits of banks must be converted into cash by drawing upon the bank reserves for foreign exportation. This increase of money in foreign countries makes money plenty, and raises prices there, while the country drained has its money diminished and prices reduced. This reverses the movement

of trade. Exports are resumed, and the precious metals flow back, until the equilibrium is restored. This process is always going on. Prudent bankers usually try to anticipate any unusual drain of specie. They usually strive to avoid it, and to use due precautions, so far as they are able, to ward it off. Hence they strive to keep their liabilities, whether for deposits or issues, so adjusted to their specie reserves that they can be prepared for any ordinary or probable contingency. If they see a prospect of a considerable demand for specie for foreign or domestic use, they contract their loans and discounts, which can only be made by increasing their own liabilities, in bills and deposits, or by diminishing their specie funds. The former they strive to diminish, the latter to increase, in view of any impending pressure upon their resources of coin. This tends to reduce the volume of money in the form of bank bills and deposits substantially to the specie standard, *i. e.*, to the amount of specie which would be in use if such substitutes for money were unknown. To this standard it unalterably tends, by a law as inexorable as gravitation, and, amid all variations, it continually oscillates around this as its true norm. Bank bills may contribute, along with other forms of credit, to those inflations which issue in financial explosions. They are, however, as we have seen, but one, and that a secondary form of that *expansion of credit* which results in these catastrophes, and is their generic cause. They may prolong and aggravate an expansion produced by other forms of credit, on account of their greater facility of passing from hand to hand as money. On the other hand, they are among the first instruments for bringing it to an end by precipitating a panic. Being in the hands of all classes of persons, poor as well as rich, no sooner does any suspicion or apprehension seize the public mind of the possible or probable stoppage of specie payments by any bank, than the poor and ignorant who have these bills in their possession, hurry to the bank counters to insist on their conversion into specie. Thus the "run" upon the banks is fairly inaugurated by the holders of small bills, when their depositors would never have molested them, had not the panic already gone so far that the question is no longer, whether the bank shall sus-

pend the payment of specie, but who shall get what specie it has for their bills and deposits?

We are thus introduced to the consideration of an inconvertible paper currency, its causes and effects. In whatever form, and to whatever extent credit supplies the place of money, the sudden shrinkage or cessation of that credit must produce a wide-spread inability to meet pecuniary engagements. Where book-credits, notes of hand, bills of exchange, checks, and bank-bills, have paid a hundred dollars of indebtedness, or been the medium of exchanging a hundred dollars' worth of commodities, for every two dollars of the precious metals employed for such purposes, then the extinction of a large part of this credit, in any or all of its forms, of course creates a demand for a proportionate amount of specie to fill the vacuum. This, however, under the very prevalence of the credit which has rendered it for the time needless, will have largely gone out of the country, or have been consumed in the arts. Even the modicum that remains in bank-vaults, if drawn out in a panic, is not put into circulation, but locked up in private hoards. Suspension is inevitable when universal distrust has supplanted credit, the great substitute for money, and there is no money to take its place. This must in due time act upon the banks, the great repositories of circulative capital, the representatives and instruments of mercantile credit—given by them to borrowers, and to them by bill-holders and depositors. For so soon as the banks, from any cause, withhold a considerable share of their customary accommodations, in the way of loans to the mercantile community, their customers find increasing difficulty in meeting their obligations to the banks, the amount of circulating medium being proportionally restricted. Thus there is a continual action and reaction, until the failures of merchants first weaken the banks, and then produce a distrust of them, which cannot go far without producing a panic, a "run," a suspension of specie payments, in which all other suspensions tend to culminate.

In short, credit is a state of mind, a belief. Mercantile credit is either a belief in the ability of the party to whom it is extended, to fulfil the obligations into which he enters, or the power of the latter to procure the entrusting of property to

himself, on the ground of this faith. Involving a state of mind, it is subject to all those causes of fluctuation which influence the minds and control the beliefs of men. It is therefore as sensitive and volatile as the subtle causes which sway human belief. It is often affected by ignorance, error, and misapprehension. And in regard to the subject in hand, it has this peculiarity—not only that it propagates itself by that sympathetic and epidemic excitement which so largely sways communities of men, but intelligent persons, who see no ground of distrust, are compelled in their actions to follow the lead of the ignorant, who are seized with an unreasoning panic, and thus swell the current, which, having opened a crevasse, deepens and widens it, until it has spread devastation far and near. For, suppose a merchant has perfect confidence in the full solvency of the bank or merchant whom he has trusted, if they could be left unmolested by a groundless panic, and in their ample resources for ultimate solvency in any event; but suppose, at the same time, that he sees them assailed by such a panic, and that, in consequence, they will for a time be unable to meet their engagements; suppose further, that he has obligations maturing which can only be met by his deposits in bank, or by the funds he has loaned to others, and that they, in consequence of the panic, are in danger of immediate inability, however ample their ultimate ability, to meet their dues;—in such circumstances he will be disposed to convert his bank deposits and bills into specie, and to refuse to re-loan to his solvent debtors, what in ordinary times he would not hesitate to trust to them, in order to make sure of the means of meeting his own immediate obligations.

Thus the intelligent and solvent men of society are often drawn, in spite of themselves, into the vortex of a groundless panic, which they cannot prevent, but whose destructive effects upon their own credit they try to parry. And when large numbers are engaged in such an effort to protect themselves, they do but tighten around the whole the toils which each one for himself is trying to escape. *Vice versâ*, intelligent men are often constrained to credit those whom they know to be unworthy of credit, because they know that others will trust them for a time, although they must, in due time, prove bankrupt.

If the public generally will take the bills of an institution which he believes will prove unsound, he will take them for immediate use, because all can use them as money; or he may trust a man for a week, whom he knows to be unsound, because he believes he will not stop payment short of three months.

The remedy for the evils resulting from the impossible attempt suddenly to convert all the credits of the community, first into bankable funds, and then into specie, will vary according to the causes which induce it. So far as it arises from the fear of sound and solvent firms that they shall be unable to provide funds to meet their engagements, and their consequent precautionary efforts to procure them, (and the most serious difficulties of every commercial crisis arise from this source,) the remedy is found in such measures as will dissipate that fear. So long as solvent and prudent men are freed from all alarm, or cause of alarm, little evil and much good arise from destroying the credit of those rash and insolvent traders who are not entitled to credit, and urging them into open bankruptcy. This terminates their power for mischief by stopping the inflation of baseless credit, and the increase of the victims of their fraudulent operations. It is of the greatest moment that this result be reached without one of those financial panics known as a "commercial crisis," which, by destroying all, or nearly all credit, whelms sound and unsound traders or debtors in a common ruin. The evils of such a catastrophe, financial, industrial, social, and moral, are incalculable. How, then, may it be averted?

So far as it arises from the collapse of unduly inflated credit, acting like so much increase and subsequent annihilation of money, to inflate and then depress prices, of course whatever can be done in advance to prevent such inflation, so far serves to ward off the pernicious effects both of it and its sudden contraction. So far as imprudent advances by bankers and banks of the credit which they possess in the community, whether in the form of deposits or bills of circulation, tend to prolong or aggravate the inflation and its consequences, they should be withheld. This is usually done by the sounder class of bankers and money-lenders.

In this way, they may do something to check the continu-

ance and promote the stoppage of overtrading. But, as has been shown by the ablest financial writers, they cannot do very much at this stage. As has already been made to appear, the bubble is really inflated by the operation of credit as a purchasing power. So long as men are willing to sell on credit, an extensive demand for an article by buyers on credit whom they are willing to trust, operates as effectually to raise prices as if they came severally with the specie, or with bank bills convertible into specie, in their hands. Now, nothing is more notorious than that men of exceedingly small means, or even of no means, often do succeed in making purchases on credit of prodigious amounts. This is especially so in a speculative state, when from any cause, even from the prevalence of speculation itself, it is expected that given commodities will reach higher prices. This expectation creates a wide demand, and the increased demand raises the price. The speculator, who is known by some purchase to have got the advantage of this rise of price, thus gains increased credit. With this he purchases more at an advance, in expectation of a still higher advance. A point is at length reached, when the conviction rapidly gains ground that the price has culminated, and must soon fall. This causes a rapid and often precipitate fall, down to, and for a time greatly below, the normal standard. Repeated instances have occurred in times of land and railway speculation, within our personal knowledge, of men worth a mere trifle, or nothing, becoming purchasers of these things to the amount of hundreds of thousands of dollars, without the use of a dollar in specie, bank-bills, deposits, or loans, except as they are trusted by the seller. Credit, in the simple form of book-credit, or promissory notes, has done the whole work. It is mostly when this aerial fabric begins to totter from the commencing fall of prices, always more sudden and precipitate than the previous rise, that the loan market is applied to for means to enable them to hold the article, and avoid the ruinous decline incident to a forced sale of it in a collapsing market. Here, if any where, bank credits in the form of bills or deposits, come into play, in propping up the staggering structure so as to delay, but rarely to prevent, its fall. Doubtless, such delay is evil. The sooner the fall of the "baseless fabric," the

better. The final desolation is increased the longer it is delayed. In consequence of the difficulties between Britain and China in 1839, a great advance in the price of teas was anticipated, and several retail dealers in London began to speculate on the prospect, until prices advanced more than one hundred per cent. Instead of the expected stoppage of importations of this luxury, however, unlooked for supplies came in from various quarters, and prices at once began to reel downwards. Of course many of these speculators failed. "Among these one was mentioned, who, having a capital not exceeding £1200, which was locked up in his business, had contrived to buy four thousand chests, value above £80,000, the loss upon which was about £16,000."

"The other example which I have to give, is that of the operation on the corn-market between 1838 and 1842. There was an instance of a person, who, when he entered on his extensive speculations, was, as it appeared by the subsequent examination of his affairs, possessed of a capital not exceeding £5000, but being successful in the outset, and favoured by circumstances in the progress of his operations, he contrived to make purchases to such an extent, that when he stopped payment, his engagements were found to amount to between £500,000 and £600,000. Other instances might be cited of parties without any capital at all, who, by dint of mere credit, were enabled, while the aspects of the market favoured their views, to make purchases to a very great extent. And be it observed that these speculations, involving enormous purchases on little or no capital, were carried on in 1839 and 1840, when the money-market was in its most contracted state; or when, according to modern phraseology, there was the greatest scarcity of money."*

These are but samples of thousands of instances showing the purchasing power of credit in its simplest form, and its efficacy in inflating prices and producing other attendant and consequent phenomena, without the intervention of any money, paper or metallic, or of other bank substitutes therefor; and that, while bank substitutes for money in the form of bills or checks as the avails of bank loans, may for a time perpetuate,

* See Mill's Political Economy, vol. ii. p. 65.

they rarely originate the inflation. They are a stronger kind of credit rushing in to fill, for a time, the vacuum arising from the annihilation of the weaker. Still, undue expansions of bank credits, in whatever form, should be avoided; that so far forth they may mitigate catastrophes which they cannot, to any considerable extent, prevent.

The condition thus produced, in which great numbers of solvent merchants and traders apprehend difficulty in meeting their obligations, and accelerate and aggravate the general ruin by the extraordinary measures which each adopts to protect himself, is frequently the result of other causes than inflated credit and over-trading. It is liable to arise from any causes which induce a large and unusual exportation of the precious metals, unless the vacuum thus produced can be filled by the substitution of some form of credit in its place. As specie is withdrawn from the banks to foreign countries, or to distant parts of their own country, they begin to diminish their loans, and the obligations thence resulting, lest with their diminishing specie reserves they should be unable to meet these obligations as fast as they will return upon them. This growing scarcity of money and credit, renders all sound and prudent houses more anxious to increase their supply of the former in order to preserve the latter, in the worst contingency which such circumstances foreshadow. Thus the very causes which lessen the supply of the loan-market increase the demands upon it. This increasing stringency increases distrust, and renders more inaccessible even the diminished resources upon which demands are thus suddenly increased. This pressure tends to increase until it degenerates into a panic, and threatens the diminished reserves of specie, not only to meet the legitimate wants of commerce, which might be borne, but the demands from bill-holders and depositors, who fear that this is the only expedient for securing themselves against loss. The sequel is as inevitable as familiar.

Among the causes which may induce a sudden and unusual export of the precious metals, besides an undue inflation of credit, may be mentioned—1. A disposition to invest in tempting securities, adventures, or enterprises abroad. The rapid movement of English capital to this country for investment, in

periods of high speculative excitement, has, in one instance, if not more, caused an exportation of the precious metals to this country which brought the commercial community of Great Britain to a "crisis." This not only occurred in 1839, in consequence of their implication in American securities and adventures, but to quite a large extent after their immense investments in American railways, which culminated in 1857. A sudden withdrawal of these investments produces a like effect in the country so depleted. 2. A failure of crops may occasion a necessity for large and unusual imports of food or of raw manufacturing materials, which must be paid for in coin; or, in an agricultural country like our own, may lessen the usual exports of produce which pay for our imports, and thus leave an adverse balance to be liquidated by an export of gold and silver. Or the failure of crops abroad which a country is accustomed to import for food or manufacture, may so raise the price as to require extraordinary payments abroad to procure the requisite supply. Thus the failure of the food-crops in Great Britain in the years 1846—7, and the blight on the cotton crop in this country at the same time, caused a drain of the precious metals from that country which produced a financial stringency, that would have forced a suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England, had not that catastrophe been averted by a very simple device, which sets at defiance some very plausible and popular theories of currency. So short crops in this country, leading, in 1836, to the actual importation of European cereals, were not without their influence in aggravating the commercial crises of 1837 and 1857. A third cause of the unwonted efflux of precious metals from a country, may be large foreign expenditures by the government for military or other purposes. This efflux of bullion from Great Britain during the long Napoleonic wars necessitated the suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England, and for some time afterwards. The financial derangement caused by the war of 1812 in this country, produced a like result. And although the present civil war has not, as yet, led to any expenditures abroad which have not been chiefly, if not fully, met by our exports, yet the sudden displacement of the specie of the bank-vaults of the great commercial centres,

by government loans from these banks, made in specie, and disbursed through its immense expenditures in distant parts of the country, put these metallic resources, for a time, so far beyond their reach, as to render the temporary suspension of specie payments the only alternative to great financial stringency and commercial distress.

This suggests the answer to the question, What is the antidote to the evils of that prostration of credit, whether produced by a violent reaction to overtrading, or by other causes, such as have been specified, which puts sound and prudent traders in fear of being unable to meet their engagements, and leads or tends to all the deplorable consequences, as already set forth, of such a wide-spread apprehension? The answer is plain. This evil and its consequences can be removed only by removing its cause. Its cause is the excessive and crushing contraction of credit. Let that undue contraction be removed. Let the banks or bankers who control the loan market, either of money or its credit substitutes, boldly resolve and proclaim that those who deserve credit shall have credit, and that really solvent houses shall receive their ordinary accommodations in the form of bank-bills or credits upon which they can draw checks. This of itself, if seasonably adopted, will generally at once relieve, and soon totally remove, the "pressure." It will kill the rising panic. It will restore sound commercial transactions to their wonted channels, and loose the "deadlock" which holds the resources of the people as unavailable and moveless as if in the clutch of death. This is the only, generally it is the sure, way of averting the catastrophe they seek to escape by an opposite course—the suspension of specie payments—an event seldom consummated among solvent and prudent banks, except by the aid of such a panic as this course dispels. At all events, this event is sure to come of any course which suffers large numbers of sound and prudent merchants to stop payment. And it comes with great aggravations, as compared with any temporary suspension following the other course. For the injury produced by the breaking down of large bodies of sound merchants is incalculable to themselves, the banks, and the people, alike in a financial, social, and moral point of view. This function of banks and bankers in

averting financial explosions, or mitigating their worst evils, as they inevitably arise from time to time, has, until recently, been overlooked, not only by the sounder political economists and legislators, but by bankers themselves. But a very few facts, of comparatively recent occurrence in the intensely commercial countries which most largely substitute convertible paper credits for coin, as a medium of exchange, will at once illustrate and verify the induction.

Those familiar with these subjects know that the present charter of the Bank of England was framed with great care for the purpose of affording the convenience and profit of a paper-currency, and, at the same time, preventing the evils of its undue inflation. It is, therefore, allowed at all times to issue, on certain conditions, £17,000,000 or $80,000,000, upon an equal amount of government stocks, it having been found by experience that something like this amount of a paper-currency, in which all the nation perfectly confides, will keep afloat at all times, in addition to the issues of local banks, without returning upon the bank for redemption. A similar amount of specie, in the absence of these or equivalent notes, would doubtless always be in circulation. In order to prevent the expansion of paper-currency beyond the amount of specie that would be current, if the former were unknown, the bank was permitted to issue no further notes of circulation, except on the deposit of gold to an equal amount. And it was required to issue notes to the amount of gold so deposited, to all who should demand them. When these bills were returned for redemption in gold, which would only occur in case of a demand of bullion for export, the bank was forbidden to reissue them, except in return for an equal deposit of gold. This part of the circulation of the bank was in no manner left to its own option. It must equal and vary with the amount of specie deposited. This system, of course, averts whatever inflation is produced by an excessive issue of bank-notes. But its working is evil in that state of things, when, through exportation of the precious metals, serious stringency seizes the money market, solvent traders become anxious, and a panic is impending. Consequently, when the extraordinary drain of specie from the bank for corn and cotton in 1847, proportion-

ably contracted the bank-note circulation, money became so scarce as to appal the strongest houses, and induce all the premonitory symptoms of a panic and a suspension of specie payments. How was all this averted? Simply by an Order in Council suspending the prohibition to issue notes, in excess of the specie deposited for this purpose. This produced confidence in solvent houses that the supply of money would be equal to their necessities. This arrested the panic, and prevented that suspension of specie payments which was otherwise imminent and inevitable. A similar suspension of this restriction, or the assurance that it would be ordered if needful, (we are uncertain which, was attended with similar benefits in 1857—8.

In the financial crisis of 1857 in this country, the New York banks, afraid of the constitutional penalty of forfeiture of charter for the non-payment of specie, made the avoidance of this their chief concern, whatever might become of their customers, including the solvent merchants, whom they had been accustomed to aid with loans. The consequence was, that great numbers of the most substantial houses staggered or fell. The most reliable means of raising money failed. Exchange on London, in ordinary times as easily converted into specie as bank-bills, could not be negotiated at any price, (thus proving that there was no need of draining the banks of specie, and of consequent financial stricture and panic to liquidate foreign indebtedness,) credit was nearly annihilated; a rayless gloom, which has had no parallel in any of the shocks given to public and private credit by our civil convulsions and enormous military expenditures, settled upon all financial circles and agencies, till Wall Street, the monetary heart of the country, stood for days petrified with hopeless bewilderment and horror, blindly awaiting those coming events which, to the eye of all competent observers, then "cast their shadows before."

At length, the more intelligent depositors of the banks, seeing no end to this dead-lock but by the stoppage of specie payments, presented demands for coin large enough to compel suspension. This thunder-burst cleared the lowering financial skies, and purified the murky atmosphere. It was like the vernal thaws which unlock our rivers and canals, and revive

our internal commerce though these great arteries, after its long hybernation. Solvent dealers were at once furnished with needful credits. The panic ceased. The specie withdrawn from the banks almost immediately returned to them, and in a short time it was doubled. In a few months they had more than double any reserve they had known for years. Almost immediately after the suspension, the difference between specie and bills in the market was merely nominal. The result showed that the only necessity for suspension lay in a panic created by the unwise restrictions of the banks—a course adopted by them because they themselves were first so far seized by the panic as to refuse credit to those worthy of credit. What then could they expect but that the same measure should be meted unto themselves in return, and bring them down among the mercantile wrecks they had created, and which made the very atmosphere about them "thick with the dust of fallen fortunes"? Had they resolved to do, a month before their enforced stoppage of specie payments, what they then refused to do for fear of that catastrophe, but what they freely did as soon as it occurred, this calamity would itself in all probability have been averted. Even if it had not, its evil effects would have been vastly mitigated. The simple measure which the exigency demanded, was the extending to sound borrowers, who, if thus sustained, would ultimately prove solvent, their wonted accommodations. Such a course, though requiring some courage, is the only safe and prudent one in such an emergency. It cannot possibly lead to any worse consequences than the opposite. The chances are a hundred to one, that it will work results immeasurably better, and either wholly avert what is known as a "financial revulsion," or greatly mitigate its evils.

This was beautifully proved and illustrated in the next important commercial disturbance in this country, in the winter and spring of 1861, caused by the secession developments in the South. The Southern banks suspended specie payments almost as soon as these movements were initiated. The insurgent leaders predicted an immediate "commercial crisis," culminating in bank suspensions, and general bankruptcy at the North. Judging from the past, the grounds for this augury

were not slight. The almost entire stoppage of Southern payments to Northern merchants and manufacturers, for which these events furnished either the necessity or the convenient pretext, together with the cessation of Southern purchases, occasioned an immediate loss of probably not less than a hundred millions to the dealers with Northern banks; and this loss, to a great extent, comprising the very means on which they relied to meet their bank indebtedness. This, of course, was enough to cause a great, and threaten a greater, financial upheaving. The usual premonitory symptoms of a "commercial crisis," "bank-run," stoppage of specie payments, and driving solvent firms into bankruptcy, began to appear. What course then did the New York bank managers pursue? They saw that there was no demand for specie for exportation, but that the drift of it from all quarters was towards the great metropolis. They learned wisdom from the past. Instead of each bank endeavouring for itself, as in 1857, by enforcing immediate payment of their dues, and refusing to re-loan the funds so received, to stem the panic inevitably begotten by such a course, they agreed to sustain each other, and all solvent dealers with them. The commencing panic was quieted. None but those whose losses had made them actually insolvent, were suffered to go down. Confidence was established among those who deserved confidence. Specie, so far from being drained away from the bank-vaults, rapidly accumulated in them; and, owing to the large European balance in our favour, in consequence of our immense exportations of corn, and small imports of goods, rose to the unprecedented maximum of fifty millions—and this in the midst of the prodigious expenditures initiated by our civil war! And yet, had the policy of 1857 been followed, it would probably have issued in a similar commercial explosion and devastation.

Early last winter the immense expenditures of the government in distant parts of the country, sustained by loans from the metropolitan banks, rapidly scattered their unprecedented accumulations of specie, the only currency which the government was then authorized to employ in receipts or disbursements. To perform this vast increase of government business with coin, required an amount of it beyond precedent in the

channels of business. This drain, however, might possibly have been long borne, had it not been for the effects of the *Trent* imbroglio, and other ominous foreshadowings of hostile European intervention. The nearly universal belief in Britain and France that war with this country was imminent, started a rapid withdrawal of European capital invested here, which also began to reduce the bank reserves. This threatened to continue. The prospect of such interminable complications and conflicts, added to our present struggle, moreover, weakened the credit of the government, alarmed capitalists, and strengthened the general apprehension that the suspension of specie payments could not long be delayed. This growing conviction itself hastened and rendered certain its own realization. The only question was, whether to anticipate it before all specie was drained from the banks, to return foreign capital invested here when we could least afford to spare it, and to form useless private hoards, and before oppressing the mercantile community with a financial stricture; or whether they should bear up till the last extremity, and then succumb to the irresistible pressure, with all the foregoing train of calamities. They adopted the former alternative, wisely and well too, for themselves and the country. The other course, adding all the evils of a commercial panic to the financial and other difficulties of the government, in that darkest hour just preceding the recent series of brilliant victories that have reassured the national heart, would have added another crushing weight to burdens already well nigh insupportable. The difference between paper-money and specie has been slight, except during a transient speculation in the latter, which has fortunately proved disastrous to the speculators. The flow of bullion into the bank vaults has returned, and they have already about twice the amount on which they sustained uninterrupted specie payments for a decade prior to the crisis of 1857.

Although there is every indication that specie payments might again be resumed and maintained, yet such a war as is now upon us gives rise to so many unlooked-for financial anomalies, that it will probably be safer to prolong the suspension during its continuance, keeping the difference between paper and metallic currency slight, than to open the door for

panics in the various disturbances that may yet arise. But the true standard is gold and silver. The true paper money is that which is immediately convertible into them. Inconvertibility is a serious evil in itself considered; yet an evil sometimes to be temporarily borne, for the avoidance of still greater and more intolerable evils. Still, specie is evermore the standard, as appears from the fact, that an inconvertible paper currency is counted in the denominations of specie. To this standard it should ever tend and approximate; if sound, it will have an inevitable *nisus* towards it; and any necessary deviation from it should be as slight and transient as possible.

The true function of those then, who have the power to loan their credit, so that, in the form of bank-notes or checks, it shall perform the functions of money, is, we conceive, 1. During a period of buoyant and expanding credit to avoid inflating it, by refusing facilities for speculation, financial "kiting," or for aiding "bold operators" and unsound adventurers; and by keeping an ample supply of coin in proportion to their liabilities. 2. When credit is so collapsed as to produce or threaten distress to prudent and solvent dealers, at once to extend to these their accustomed aid, and stand or fall with them. This latter course will, in most cases, prevent the further development of a commercial panic, and avert the suspension of specie payments. It will avert it, if anything can avert it. If such suspension follows, it will not be in consequence, but in spite of this preventive measure. It will be because nothing could prevent it. But its evils will be greatly mitigated, as has been shown. The effect of indefinite persistence in the attempt to reduce all means of immediate payment to hard specie, after credit substitutes have so long supplied its place in the ratio of fifty to one, and this when even specie itself has by panic been abstracted from the channels and centres of commerce, either to foreign countries, or to inaccessible private hoards, would ruin nearly every person who owed anything, however ample his resources. For property could be turned into coin to pay these debts only at ruinous rates. Suppose such an incubus as pressed down our commercial cities for a month prior to the suspension of the New York banks in

1857 to last a year, and what business or estate encumbered with debt could survive it?

This view is further confirmed by the fact, which has hitherto eluded the notice of all but a few of the profoundest writers on this subject, viz., that this is the only way in which the operation of paper substitutes for coin can be made to correspond to that of a purely metallic currency. That such paper substitutes will ever cease to exist, in some form, in highly civilized and commercial countries that have once enjoyed their use, it is vain to suppose. Undoubtedly the maximum of benefits and the minimum of evils result from their substitution for the precious metals, when they as nearly as possible correspond, in their operations and effects, to the more costly and inconvenient currencies they supplant. What then, in the circumstances we have been considering, is the working of a currency wholly metallic, as shown *a priori* from the nature of the case, and *a posteriori* from experience?

In ordinary times there will be, 1. The coin in actual circulation for the purpose of effecting the actual exchange of commodities. 2. The hoards of specie constantly accumulating in private hoards in the following ways: First, to provide that reserve for the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of living and demands of business, which prudent managers like to keep. Secondly, in those larger amounts which capitalists are fond of accumulating to await opportunities of favourable investment. Thirdly, in that hoarding of silver and gold as the only known means of safely husbanding money which occurs to some extent in all countries; but, on a very large scale, in countries destitute of banks for savings and deposits, and especially in those despotic or ill-governed countries, where private concealment of money is its only protection from private or governmental robbery. In France and the continental countries, where the banking system is but partially organized, the aggregate of such hoards is immense. In the former country, it has been estimated that the quantity of coin in private hoards amounts to some hundreds of millions of dollars—no small proportion of which is among the peasantry, who are far enough from being thought to possess considerable reserved funds. Analogous to this are the private accumula-

tions of coin over the continent. Suppose now that any extraordinary contingency arises, calling for an unusual exportation of the precious metals. How is it met? By withdrawing the coin in ordinary circulation, and producing the inconvenient and oppressive stringency thence arising? No. The unusual demand for money raises the rate of interest enough to tempt out of the hoards what the emergency requires. Thus the foreign export of specie is met, without any sensible diminution of the circulating medium, or any other inconvenience than a temporary rise in the rate of interest, and a decrease of those reserves which a little prudence and economy will readily replenish. In this way, unusual demands for coin for export, occasioned by wars or other disturbances, have often been met on the continent. Witness the great popular loan for the Crimean war, so successfully raised by the French emperor.

Now it is a familiar fact, that in countries having a thoroughly organized and convertible paper-currency system, the ready money which people keep, exists, for the most part, either in the form of bank-notes, or bank-deposits; and that the great hoards of coin are in the bank-vaults—in the supplies which all prudent bankers keep to meet all ordinary and extraordinary demands upon them, short of those caused by the panic of a financial revulsion. If, therefore, in such countries, unusual demands arise for coin to export, or for domestic transfers of it equivalent to foreign export, such as arise in some civil wars; and if the resulting movement be analogous to that under an exclusive metallic currency; then free drafts for the emergency will be made upon the reserved hoards of specie in the banks, *without interfering with the ordinary volume of currency in circulation;* i. e., *without seriously lessening the ordinary means of payment in the community in the form of bank credits, deposits, notes, and checks.**

We thus detect the secret of the disastrous failures of so many of the attempts at currency regulation by the civil power in this country and in Britain, to remedy the evils and accomplish the good for which they were intended. The evils they hoped to avert were the inflation of currency, prices, and

* See Mill, vol. ii., p. 209, *et seq.*

vicious speculative trading, with their consequent evils of ultimate severe contraction and collapse of currency, prices, reasonable credit, and all the disastrous phenomena of a "commercial revulsion." They have sought to accomplish this by trying to bring a paper currency to conform in its workings, as nearly as possible, to the course of a currency exclusively metallic. For this purpose they have sought to prevent the speculative and baseless expansion of credit, with its destructive reactionary effects, by trying to restrict the issues of paper money to what they suppose to be the specie standard, as to volume. This is all good for prosperous times. As far as it goes, it tends in some degree to lessen the inflation of speculative credit. For reasons already shown, however, it does this only very partially, because credit has so many forms, and so many means of expansion, which are sure, at times, to operate and urge the money market towards a reactionary crisis, without the intervention of bank-notes. This is one great fact that has been overlooked by nearly all regulators of the currency, and has therefore been a fruitful source of disappointment as to the result of those schemes.

But while these schemes have proved comparatively unavailing to prevent speculative expansion, many of them have proved extremely efficacious in aggravating all the horrors which result from the bursting of speculative bubbles, or from that large export of specie sometimes rendered necessary by other providential causes. For, in such an emergency, they compress the volume of currency, as we have already seen, vastly below the normal standard which would be at command for legitimate uses, under an exclusively metallic currency. For, instead of *allowing the hoards of specie to meet this demand, without seriously reducing the amount of money in circulation*, they are nearly all so shaped as to require that in proportion as the specie reserves are reduced, either the amount of their circulating notes, or of these and their deposits, all their liabilities, shall be reduced proportionately; *i. e.*, so much available resources for money payments shall be withdrawn from the support of sound business and solvent dealers. In the present charter of the Bank of England, for every pound sterling withdrawn from its vaults, a pound is also withdrawn

from circulation. But this operates with vastly greater severity where the proportion of specie to liabilities required to be kept on hand, is in the proportion of one to three, four, five, or ten, as often happens under our American financial legislation. Supposing, as it is fair to do, that in quiet times this requisition is barely complied with, then, when there is a drain of their specie from any cause, for every dollar of coin drawn out, they are obliged to abstract ten dollars of available substitutes for money from the use of the public. Such a sudden tightening of financial cords no people can long endure. They will either snap from their own tension, or be rent by the writhings of their victims. The public will obtain relief by enforcing a speedy suspension of specie payments, if not otherwise. And in the face of such a pressure, all legislative and even constitutional prohibitions, making, as in the case of New York state, the penalty of a stoppage of specie payments by banks to be an immediate loss of their charters, are nullities. They are well adapted to the case of individual banks which fail in quiet times, when bank-notes and deposits generally are convertible into specie, because then such failure proves actual insolvency. But their enforcement in times of universal suspension of specie payments from panic, would be intolerable, and would ruin nearly all solvent persons who had survived the wreck. Hence the courts of New York found ways of expounding the constitutional prohibitions and penalties on this subject, after the suspension of 1857, so as to make them apply only to the former class, of occasional banks stopping the payment of coin in ordinary times, which constitutes a fair presumption of bankruptcy. Even the enforced securing of bill-holders has in more than one instance frustrated itself, aggravated panics, and issued in ruin to the banks and loss to their creditors. The banks in some of the Western states had, in compliance with laws requiring them to secure their circulation by state stocks deposited with the government, made large investments in the Southern state stocks for this purpose. When secession showed its head, in addition to all other financial disturbance caused by it, these stocks depreciated something like one-half. This at once caused distrust of the banks owning them, and of the bills secured by them, and produced prodigious loss and

embarrassment on all sides. A somewhat similar history attended a large proportion of the early free banks with secured currency in the state of New York. This evil that state has largely remedied by requiring the deposit of the stocks of New York state, or of the United States. But not a few of them have suffered loss from the unlooked for depreciation of government securities, caused by the unparalleled expenditure which no human mind could have foreseen. When, however, our present commotions are settled, the immense amount of United States securities afloat will probably afford an ample basis for well-secured currency throughout the land. And to the free use of such a currency without abatement, in order to prevent or ease the excessive contraction of credit after its extravagant inflation, or to alleviate the inconvenience arising from the unusual export of bullion, there is no valid objection. But if securities for circulation in the way of public stocks are exacted, they should be as solid and indestructible as our national existence and faith. It is impossible to foresee what may occur to depreciate or destroy any feebler securities, no less to the injury of banks than their creditors. Nothing, however, is a substitute for the judicious and faithful management of these institutions, which shall curtail their operations to the support of none but sound business in speculative periods, and expand them enough to support all such business in times financially critical. It greatly contributes to such management of them, if they are required to make frequent publication of their condition and operations, and if they are annually inspected by a competent and faithful committee of visitors from the state. These simple precautions have, for a long time, secured an administration of the New England banks advantageous to their stockholders, borrowers, depositors, and bill-holders. Of late years, it is rare that the public have lost by them. They were the last to suspend specie payments in 1857, and their issues, with those of East Jersey, are at the lowest discount (merely nominal) which country bank-notes bear in New York city; it ranges at from one to two and a half mills in the dollar.

If a paper currency, however, is unavoidable, it is impossible to reach its full benefits unless we have that which bears a

national imprint and credit. The bills of local institutions, however good, have only a local credit and currency which are either legitimate or enduring. A thousand advantages arise from having at command paper money which is equally current and available in every part of the country. The recent act of Congress directing the emission of $150,000,000 of United States treasury notes is the first step in this direction. We do not believe this step will be retraced, unless the system is abused by a further excessive emission of this currency, so great will prove to be its practical benefits. The measure has two principal aspects, in regard to each of which we will say a few words in concluding this article, which has greatly outrun our first intention. These aspects are its relation to currency and to the credit of the government.

As a currency measure, it supplies what in this country has long been a desideratum—paper money having a national credit and circulation. The convenience of this in ordinary times is too obvious to need proof. Its superior portability, security, and ease of concealment, as compared with coin, for those who have occasion to travel to distant parts of the country, or to make payments where banks and banking offices are as yet unorganized, although great, are among the least of the advantages. For transmitting payments of moderate amount by mail it will be an invaluable convenience, saving the cost of drafts, and answering every purpose in the countless cases in which drafts are unavailable or inconvenient. As it will be almost the only money passing between the commercial centres and extremities of the nation, most of the loss now sustained by the discount in our great cities on the bills of distant banks will be avoided. As this currency will be available everywhere, it will especially fill the channels of circulation where there is now a want of a sound bank currency. It will rapidly reduce the circulation of the spurious issues of unsound banks, by which our people have suffered so often and so much.

It is unfortunate that the introduction of such a currency should occur at a time when the universal suspension of specie payments renders it a necessity that it should be for a time inconvertible. But this very circumstance made the necessity

for its immediate adoption only the more imperious. The suspension of specie payments, along with the immense war expenditures to be provided for by loans, renders paper which is for the present inconvertible, the only currency which is accessible to the government.

The only alternative for the government was to use its own notes, or those of local banks. How could these avail in the payment of its half million of soldiers, placed in distant parts of the country, where the banks making these issues are unknown and void of credit? For the payment of soldiers and other army expenses, no paper currency would serve but that of the government, or its equivalent. As to specie, although the government might at all times provide enough of it for its ordinary disbursements, it would be impossible, until new accumulations of it are gathered in the loan-markets of the country, to provide enough for its present extraordinary payments. The immense productive energies now devoted to the war, are ordinarily occupied in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. The payments required to sustain them are not made with coin, but with its credit substitutes. Is the accessible coin of the country now so much more abundant, that an ample supply of it can be commanded for the same amount of payments made by the government? This no considerate person can maintain. There has been some accumulation of specie in payment for our extraordinary exports of corn. But it is neither available or adequate for this purpose, while it is needed for other uses, which we are just about to indicate.

But this currency is not only a convenient instrument for the people and the government, in making payments, and distributing their resources as necessity requires; it is a great addition to the credit and resources of the government, and of the people also, whose interests are bound up in ways innumerable with the financial strength of the government.

All paper money in circulation, as well as common bank-deposits, are loans without interest to the institutions issuing them, or the parties against whom they are held. Whoever holds a bank-note for ten dollars, holds the promise of that bank to pay him ten dollars in coin, on demand. As long as he does not demand it, or keeps the bill, he in reality loans the bank

that sum, without interest. Any bank or banker that keeps bills to the amount of one hundred thousand dollars in circulation, enjoys a gratuitous loan to that extent from the public. Is there any good reason why the public itself should not reap the profit of some part of this, its own gratuitous loan, by giving it to the government—especially when it is thus provided with a currency of superior, and, in our own country, universal credit, and from which there is little or no liability to loss? And did not this virtual loan, or rather the anticipation of it—for it is not yet to any extent issued—afford suitable and vast financial relief to the government, in that darkest hour just preceding our recent brilliant victories, when foreign intervention in behalf of an attempted slave-empire, added its fearful weight to the heavy incubus already upon us?

But its beneficent effects were not confined to the mere raising of a loan of a hundred millions from the people, without interest, at a time when its securities were greatly depressed. It prevented a still greater and ruinous depression of those securities, which, had a hundred millions more of them been thrust upon the market six weeks ago, in its then temper, would have forced them down so low as to verify the European prediction, that the United States must give up the contest, from financial exhaustion. This measure, however, bridged over the chasm which lay between the crisis of despondency and the revival of financial and political confidence, by the recent brilliant series of victories. But had government securities sunk as low as would otherwise have been inevitable, it is impossible to calculate the fearful political and military consequences, or the all-pervading financial embarrassment which must have ensued. For all financial interests are now implicated with the fate of these securities.

Besides, had it much longer remained uncertain whether the government contractors would be paid, their embarrassment would have ramified itself indefinitely through the countless interests directly and indirectly involved with them. The non-payment of the creditors of the government would have necessitated the non-payment of their creditors, and so of others in turn in an indefinite series. As so large a portion of the business of the country is occupied in the service of the govern-

ment, this would have reached all the channels of trade, production, finance, from the families of soldiers to the largest banks. The distress of every kind thus produced would have been incalculable, and not the least in those few bank parlours where the most strenuous endeavours were, doubtless with the best intentions, made to discredit and defeat this issue. It would have caused another stricture of credit, already contracted to the utmost endurable point, if it had not precipitated a full "commercial crisis," when the country was by no means able to bear it.

A fourth advantage of this measure, having to do with its relations both to currency and public credit, lies in its furnishing a proper medium for the payment of government taxes, and the purchase of government stocks. For reasons already shown, coin in sufficient quantities for this purpose is out of reach. The only other resource is the inconvertible paper of local banks, unknown beyond their vicinage, and sometimes of dubious credit even there. This medium of exchange, coming to the creditors of the government, ultimately reaches the capitalists who have loaned to producers the means of trusting the government. These capitalists will naturally desire to re-invest the means thus returned to them; and in what will they so naturally place it as the stocks of the government paying an annual specie income of six per cent? Into such a stock these notes are at all times convertible at par. As they thus return to the government, they will be returned again to the people in its disbursements. This will be an immense aid to the government, in reaching and attracting to its service those resources of the people which it needs for the prompt and efficient suppression of anarchy and insurrection.

A final advantage of this measure is, that it will liberate some of the surplus and inert hoards of gold in the country, to procure in foreign countries those articles, whether for ordinary consumption or the conduct of the war, which we cannot otherwise obtain, while our energies are so severely tasked in this stupendous struggle. To this extent we can command the aid of other countries at points where we most need it. And in this matter it is undeniable, 1. That we had an ample supply of coin for the ordinary wants of commerce before the

secession of the Gulf States. 2. A very great addition has since been made to our stock by the usual arrivals from California, and the importations from Europe in payment for our cereals. 3. But a small part of this surplus has as yet been exported, and a large residuum can therefore be spared as well as not. 4. As has already been shown, in times of great emergency, the natural course for nations and individuals is to draw freely upon those reserves which they have made to meet contingencies, and which after the exigency is past, they will speedily replenish by diligence and economy. This is the course of things in countries where the currency is exclusively metallic. In this country the deficit is speedily replaced by the products of our California mines. In all these ways does the measure in question strengthen the credit of the nation, and render its resources more available.

In the absence of the convertible element in this currency, however, its beneficent effects would be seriously jeopardized if it were to be largely increased beyond the present issue. While paper-money is convertible into specie, it cannot be permanently increased very much beyond the amount of coin that would circulate in its place, if the currency were exclusively metallic. This result is ensured by the irreversible laws of trade. An inconvertible paper-currency cannot go very much beyond the same standard, without producing serious derangement. So long as it approximates it, its effects are very nearly the same as if a similar amount of specie or convertible paper performed the same functions in exchanging a like amount of commodities. Experience alone will determine how much of government paper-money will circulate without serious depreciation, and proportionate inflation of prices. No absolute and unchangeable amount can be fixed upon. For it will vary with the amount of other currency in circulation, with the amount of exchanges of property going on, the rapidity of its circulation, and the extent to which bank-checks can supply its place. At present, the suspension of specie payments removing gold from circulation, the large amount of payments to our army and navy requiring to be made in money alone, the great shrinkage in the bank issues, especially at the West, probably open an ample field for the

present issues. But there are two chief criteria of the due amount of an inconvertible currency. First, the premium on specie. If this is slight, it shows that the expansion of the currency is inappreciable. Yet even this is, in the presence of disturbing causes, at times, an imperfect criterion. During the long stoppage of specie payments in Great Britain on account of the wars growing out of the French Revolution, specie was at a premium of from five to thirty per cent. But it has been established by competent investigation, that this arose, not in any considerable degree from the inflation of currency beyond its ordinary volume, but from the extraordinary demand for the precious metals to supply the vast military chests on the continent, which gave them a temporary abnormal value. The premium for gold here, as we now write, is between one and two per cent., which shows our currency to be far from any vicious inflation. Yet speculators, a short time ago, bid it up to nearly five per cent., in expectation of a great profit from the sudden excess and rapid depreciation of inconvertible paper. There was no real foundation for such a difference between bullion and notes, as the result has shown. A second test of the excess or deficiency of an inconvertible paper-currency, as compared with the normal standard, is the grade of prices, not of any single article, but of commodities and properties generally. If these are unduly high, they prove an excess of circulating medium. If otherwise, they disprove it. Tried by this test, the rate at which the property and products of the country sell, we are far enough from any inflation of currency.

Still another indication on this subject is found in the amount which the Bank of England (whose notes, for all practical purposes, are equivalent to government issues made a legal tender,) is able at all times to keep in circulation, without the slightest danger of return for redemption, in addition to the issues of all other banks in the kingdom. Says Mr. E. Littell, of Boston, "The total amount of notes never falls below one hundred millions of dollars, but is often above that *low water* mark." It might undoubtedly easily be carried further, but for certain restrictions in the charter itself. But, in that compact and intensely commercial country, checks do a vastly

greater work than in our more sparsely populated land. Is it extravagant then to suppose that one hundred and fifty millions will easily circulate in this country, without any hazardous inflation of our currency?

This process, however, cannot be repeated, so as seriously to swell the volume of currency beyond its normal amount when convertible, without the most disastrous consequences. Mere bits of paper, multiplied indefinitely, no matter how secured, or what stamp of government authority or legal tender they bear, become cheap in proportion to their amount, and if multiplied indefinitely, become indefinitely worthless as currency. This is proved *a priori* and *a posteriori*. All attempts at forcing the illimitable circulation of paper at the par of its face, by whatever penalties, have failed. The old continental paper-currency, and the French assignats, are memorable examples; Confederate currency bids fair to be another. The evils of such a depreciation in the measure of value, to both government and people, are beyond estimation.

It is to be regretted, that the exigency required that our temporarily inconvertible government issues should be made a legal tender. This was an overbearing necessity, arising from the persistent determination of some parties to make them unbankable, and therefore unavailable. Such discredit would have paralyzed their beneficent influence. In the same manner, a "run" upon the banks which assailed this currency has more than once compelled them to stop specie payments. The normal principle thus yielded to an overbearing necessity; so their "run" upon the issues of the government compelled it to legitimate a certain amount of inconvertible paper. This no more involves an indefinite increase of such currency, in one instance, than in the other; discretion and integrity are the only safeguards in either case.

SHORT NOTICES.

The Coming Crisis of the World; or the Great Battle and the Golden Age. The signs of the times indicating the approach of the great crisis, and the duty of the Church. By the Rev. Hollis Read. Columbus, Ohio. 1861. 12mo. pp. 345.

The current history of the world is the unfolding of God's plans regarding the human race. The mighty forces developed in human society, however irregular their action, however diverse or conflicting in spirit, are agencies which he employs, and they conspire to accomplish his sovereign will. The real significance of the period in which we live, and the value and meaning of the events occurring amongst ourselves, or in other parts of the world, can only be apprehended by viewing them in their religious bearings, and viewing them together. No event affecting individual welfare, national developement, or social progress, is productive merely of temporal or secular results. It must stand in some way related to the establishment of Christ's kingdom; and the final and proper estimate can only be put upon it from that point of view. And such events can never be isolated or unconnected facts. To be judged aright, they must be seen to be parts of an all-comprehending scheme, which had its remote beginnings in the past, and whose perfected results are to be accomplished in the future. This is the key-note of the book before us. Its clear and comprehensive survey of the present and the recent past, is deeply interesting and instructive. The author shows himself to be a careful observer and a sagacious expounder of the works of God, exhibiting with graphic earnestness the unmistakeable and rapid progress which the world is making toward the promised millennial glory, and indicating with no uncertain finger the gathering preparations, and the darkly muttering premonitions of that fearful conflict between righteousness and unrighteousness, which we are taught to expect prior to that blissful era.

Our commendation of the book is quite independent of the peculiar views which the author entertains respecting the prophecies yet unfulfilled. Whether he is right or wrong in his prognostications of the imminence, the locality, or the character of the great battle of Armageddon, or in his belief of the

purification of this earth by the final fires, to be the everlasting habitation of the redeemed; whether his interpretation of the apocalyptic trumpets and vials, and his computations of apocalyptic numbers, are correct or incorrect, no one, we think, can rise from the perusal of the volume without being profited, stimulated, and instructed. The vigour of the book is, no doubt, partly due to the confident vaticinations which it contains respecting the proximate future: from some of these many will dissent. In fact, the writer occasionally dissents from himself. The predicted drying up of the great river Euphrates is, on pp. 117 and 249, explained to mean "the extinction of the Turkish power and the Mohammedan religion:" whereas we are told, pp. 38 and 47, that it means not "the extinction of the Turkish empire and Mohammedanism," but the "severance of church and state." On p. 44, the man of sin is popery, whereas a subsequent chapter is occupied with proving that the man of sin is not popery, but modern infidelity. According to p. 50, Christ is to appear personally on the Mount of Olives, in the last great battle preceding the millennium, but shall not then continue to reign personally on the earth; and inasmuch as the writer (p. 8) does not accept the views of those who place the resurrection and final judgment before the millennium, we are left to infer that two personal advents are still to be looked for. On p. 146, he supposes that Christ's coming before the millennium will not be personal; so that we are not surprised to hear him say, on p. 275, that he is not sure whether the Lord's feet shall stand on the Mount of Olives, in a literal or a figurative sense. On p. 18, there is an argument to show that the millennium cannot denote a thousand literal years, but must be an indefinitely long period; yet, on p. 338, a computation is based on the assumption that a thousand literal years are intended.

In addition to these inadvertencies, or slips of memory, we find the author not always consistent with himself in his methods of interpretation. The thousand years' reign, as we have just seen, is in one place computed literally, and in another regarded as a definite for an indefinite number; but the other apocalyptic periods are estimated by neither of these methods, it being uniformly assumed that a day is put for a year. When Zechariah says that all nations shall be gathered to Jerusalem to battle, this determines the locality of the coming conflict to be in the Holy Land, in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem (p. 273;) but when Isaiah says that the Lord hath a sacrifice in Bozrah, and a great slaughter in the land of Idumea, Idumea denotes the enemies of Zion, or the true

church; and Bozrah is a type of modern Rome, (p. 257.) The cleaving asunder of the Mount of Olives, and the conversion of the land south of Jerusalem into a plain, denotes physical changes to be brought about by supernatural agencies (pp. 276, 281;) but the living waters which shall flow from Jerusalem to the two seas, though spoken of in the same chapter, and discussed in the same connection, are a symbol of a moral transformation. The feast of tabernacles is to be perpetuated (p. 285.) The writer does not inform us whether he supposes that the entire Jewish ritual, of which it formed a part, is to be restored, and whether the temple is to be rebuilt upon its ancient site, as a like interpretation of the closing chapters of Ezekiel would compel us to believe. Nor does he tell us how this restoration of the ancient ceremonial, the going up of all nations to Jerusalem to worship, and the superior privileges accorded to the Jewish nation are consistent with the teachings of the New Testament as to the abolition of the typical ritual, the central seat of divine worship, and the distinction between Jews and Gentiles. It does appear to be a strange assumption, that the descendants of those Israelites who were Israelites indeed, who embraced Christ at his coming, and became blended with the Christian church, thereby losing their distinctive nationality, shall not have an equal share in the promises made to their forefathers with those who disowned and rejected Jesus, and have persisted in this criminal rejection for eighteen hundred years. A conclusion so extraordinary would seem to require for its justification some explicit testimony from the word of God, that while those of the covenant people who embraced Messiah at his coming were put upon a level with believing gentiles, those who refused and despised him then shall ultimately be exalted far above their brethren. We are sorry to find that in his zeal to prove that this earth shall be the eternal abode of the redeemed, our author depreciates, as he does, (p. 338) the past results of the atonement. All the saved of past generations, added to the true followers of the Redeemer now living, would, in his opinion, not exceed "three-fourths the present population of the globe." What, then, has become of those who have died in infancy, embracing so large a proportion of the human race from the beginning?

While, however, we cannot accept all our author's expositions of prophecy, and while we suppose that he will himself, upon a careful review of what he has written, find some things to correct, or at least to modify and harmonize, we cheerfully bear testimony to the Christian warmth and earnestness of this volume, and to the excellence and value of its spirit, and of much that it contains.

The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural. By the Rev. James McCosh, LL.D., author of "The Method of the Divine Government." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1862. Pp. 369.

Few writers of the present century have made so strong an impression on the public mind as Dr. McCosh; any new work therefore from his pen is sure of attracting and rewarding general attention. This essay is the first part of a larger work contemplated by the author on "The Method of the Divine Government, Supernatural and Spiritual." The publication of this portion in advance, is due to a desire to contribute something to counteract the rationalistic tendency of the "Essays and Reviews," which have recently excited so much alarm in England. When a writer produces a decided effect, he has powers; if he has a wide reputation, he must deserve it. We do not doubt, therefore, the superiority of Dr. McCosh as a philosophical writer. We must confess, however, that to us he is prolix and obscure. There is a lack of the power of discrimination and analysis. We doubt whether any of his readers can get from this work any clear idea of what is natural and what supernatural. "Nature," he says, "includes substances, with their powers and properties. These substances have the power of acting according to their properties. This system of objects and agencies is the cosmos, which we call nature, and the events produced by these agencies we call natural." This is true and important, so far as it goes. But how are we to reconcile it with the language found on p. 83, where we are told that God not only upholds all substance, but is "the power in all force," "the actor in all action," and "the mover in all motion," "living in all life"? If this is so, then substances have no powers, and produce no effects. They are not agents or agencies, as he elsewhere calls them." If God is the "actor in all action," then he is the author of all our acts, good and bad. Whatever Dr. McCosh may mean by this language, and he doubtless means something consistent with Theism, it is nevertheless the language of Pantheism. The Pantheist does say, and can say nothing more than Dr. McCosh says. It is one thing to say that the soul controls the body, and operates in it and with it, and another that all the properties of the body are properties of the soul, or the manifestations of its activity! So it is one thing to say that God is everywhere present in nature, and controls all its operations, and a very different thing to say he is the power in all force, and the agent of all acts, which we take to be the meaning of "actor in all action."

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac, and Annual Remembrancer of the Church, for 1862. By Joseph M. Wilson. Volume IV. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1862. Pp. 415.

This Almanac of Mr. Wilson's has steadily increased in value since he first began the work. It contains the statistics of all Presbyterian bodies throughout the world. It gives a detailed account of their organization, of their operations, and of their progress. It furnishes biographical notices of all ministers who have died during the preceding year, and a great amount of other valuable information. It is a work of very great labour and expense, and entitles the author and publisher to a liberal and cordial support from every branch of the Presbyterian church. This Almanac must retain its value as a convenient book of reference. It is not merely a record of the past, or an annual survey, but it is a storehouse of statistical facts and information. The illustrations are of a much higher grade than formerly, and such as would adorn the pages of any periodical. The portraits of the late venerable Dr. Herron, of Dr. Colin Smith, Moderator of the Church of Scotland; of Dr. Robson, of Glasgow; and of our own Drs. Backus and Murray, particularly attracted our attention. We sincerely wish Mr. Wilson success in his laborious enterprise.

The Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude preached and explained, by Martin Luther. Wittemberg, 1823—4. Translated, with Preface and Notes, by E. H. Gillett. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. Pp. 336.

It is not every man who has the good fortune to present something new from the pen of Luther. These lectures, it appears, were found among a number of pamphlets in the Union Theological Seminary, in the original edition, as issued during the lifetime of the great Reformer. As they had never been translated into English, Mr. Gillett determined to perform that service, for which the church is very much his debtor. No mere account can ever give us the same vivid impression of a man's character that is derived from hearing or perusing his own living words. And there is more life in Luther's words, than in those of any other uninspired man, so far as we know.

Text-Book of Church History. By Dr. John Henry Kurtz, Professor of Theology in the University of Dorpat. Vol. II., from the Reformation to the present time. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston; Smith, English & Co. 1862. Pp. 454.

The present volume completes "Kurtz's Text-Book of Church History." It has been translated directly from the original, by Dr. Bomberger, of Philadelphia. Its excellencies

are its conciseness, comprehensiveness, and lucid arrangement. Dr. Kurtz has an established reputation as a church historian of the first rank, as a devout Christian, and as a decided and zealous Lutheran. Evidences of the justice of his claim to all these characteristics are abundant in this volume. This history, however, is very much like a Chinese map—China is every thing—all the rest of the globe is outlying islands. Germany in this volume takes the place of China.

A Commentary on Ecclesiastes. By Moses Stuart, late Professor in the Theological Seminary at Andover. Edited and Revised by R. D. C. Robbins, Professor in Middlebury College. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: John Wiley. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1862. Pp. 346.

The more difficult a book the more numerous the commentaries. It is not the importance of the solution, but the intricacy of the question which tempts investigation. Ecclesiastes, one of the least intrinsically valuable of the sacred writings, has had more labour devoted to its elucidation than any other portion of the Old Testament of like extent. Professor Stuart's book was written more than ten years ago. Since that time several other elaborate expositions have appeared. This volume will find approving readers among the numerous friends and admirers of its lamented author, whose characteristics as a writer, and especially as an expositor, it clearly exhibits. More than one-third of the work is devoted to the Introduction, in which the nature, the design, the authorship, &c. of the book are discussed.

The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism, considered in its different Denominational Forms and its Relation to British and American Protestantism. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. Vol. III. From the death of Wesley to the Centenary Jubilee of Methodism. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. London: Alexander Heylin, 28 Paternoster Row. Pp. 524.

The religious movement of which this work gives the narrative is one of the most important in the history of the church. It has found in Dr. Stevens a competent historian. The two former volumes of this elaborate work are complete in themselves, giving the fullest and most satisfactory history of Wesley and his times which has yet appeared. Those volumes can be procured as one work, presenting a view of Methodism as founded and administered by Wesley and Whitefield. This third volume gives the history of the development of Methodism as a great missionary and church institution. The value and interest of this work are not confined to the Methodists. All Christians are concerned in the history of a movement whose

effects have been so extended and so permanent. It would be a great error on the part of statesmen and men of the world to assume that they can learn nothing from works of this kind. Whatever affects the character of the people, the state of society, the progress of knowledge and religions, is for them, as well as for the religious public, of the highest importance.

A Dictionary of English Etymology. By Hensleigh Wedgwood, M. A., late Fellow of Christ College, Cambridge. With Notes and Additions, by Hon. George P. Marsh. Vol. I. (A. D.) Imperial octavo. Price, brown cloth $3.00. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Pp. 247.

"This volume may well claim a place among the best books of our language. To the student of etymology it is invaluable; to the casual reader it will unfold new pleasures. The original work of Wedgwood has been subjected to the acute mind of Marsh, the peer of etymologists, rendering it as a whole unsurpassed by any former work on the subject.

"The whole work will probably be completed in two more volumes, uniform with this. The mechanical execution of this work has received unusual care and study. The printing is by Houghton, of the "Riverside Press," on laid paper, delicately tinted, from long-primer types; the notes of Mr. Marsh being in the same type as the body of the page, but distinguished by brackets and the initial M. The size is the English imperial octavo, and the three volumes, when completed, can be bound into one, without making too bulky a volume."

The slightest inspection of this elegant volume justifies us in endorsing the foregoing notice, given by the enterprising publishers of this work. It is an honour both to the learning and the arts of the country. We cordially recommend it to our readers, and hope it may have complete success.

A Commentary, Critical and Grammatical, on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. With a revised translation. By Charles J. Ellicott, B. D., Professor of Divinity, King's College, London, and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: John Wiley. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1862. Pp. 190.

It is only recently that English scholars have turned their attention to the exegesis of the New Testament. True to their national training, it is as Grecians, as experts in grammatical interpretation, rather than as theologians or philosophers, that they have distinguished themselves in this new field. Mr. Ellicott is one of the best commentators of this class. His previous work on the Epistle to the Galatians established his reputation as a learned and skilful critic, which the present volume will serve to extend and confirm.

Elijah, a Sacred Drama, and other Poems. By the Rev. Robert Davidson, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1860.

Of Dr. Davidson's merit as a scholar, writer, and preacher, we have had ample proofs. We have also known him as a man of taste and culture. We were not, however, aware of his pretensions as a poet. This volume, beautifully printed on cream-coloured paper, satisfies us that, in addition to other accomplishments, he has, in no mean degree,

"The vision and the faculty divine,"

which is distinctive of poetical genius. The following apostrophe to water is a fair specimen:

"Beautiful water: best gift of the sky;
Cool to the touch, and clear to the eye;
Hidden deep in the shaded well,
Bubbling up from the mossy dell.

Beautiful in the rocky grot,
Where the heats of noontide enter not;
In the dewy pearls that sprinkle the lea,
In the shimmering lake, and the dimpling sea.

Beautiful in the rainbow bright,
Woven of mists and threads of light;
Beautiful in the vernal shower,
Greening the leaf, and tinting the flower.

Beautiful in the sandy waste,
The Eye of the Desert, with palm-trees graced;
With frantic joy the caravans cry,
Beautiful water! best gift of the sky."

P. 49.

We think the rendering of the *Dies Iræ* (p. 148) highly creditable for its combination of literal accuracy and metrical power. The following is a sample:

"Mors stupebit et natura,
Quum resurget creatura,
Judicanti responsura."

Rendered thus:

"Death and nature it surprises,
When from dust the creature rises,
Summoned to the great assizes."

Meditations and Hymns. By "X." Protestant Episcopal Book Society, Philadelphia.

While this little volume, neatly printed and bound, is not marked by any eminent lyrical or poetical power, still, its pious thoughts and musings are set in verse which renders them pleasing and attractive. Its devout and evangelical sentiments cannot fail to edify its readers.

The Near and the Heavenly Horizons. By Madam De Gasparin. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

This is an extraordinary product of female authorship. There is not only vivacity and sparkle of thought, imagery, and diction, together with the evangelical truth and unction, which we might expect to find in the writings of a French lady eminent for genius and piety; but we also find a depth, and insight, a mastery of the great doctrinal and philosophico-religious questions of the day, which are seldom shown by any but the most robust and cultivated intellects. The chapters entitled "the Hegelian," and "Personal Identity," are illustrations of what we mean. The whole is rich with Christian sentiment, and aglow with devout feeling. We observe, in the last chapters, that she belongs to the Second Advent school. Notwithstanding any questions on this or other subjects, we think the high encomiums passed upon it by the British journals are well supported by its actual merits.

God's Way of Peace: A Book for the Anxious. By Horatius Bonar, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

Although books of high value for the guidance of religious inquirers are not wanting, yet the field is still open. The cases to be met are so manifold, that a great variety of works is needed, in order to afford due light to all. We have recently found the want, in dealing with anxious souls, of just such a work as this of Dr. Bonar. For the most part, the topics are handled not only with truth, but with judgment and tact.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. By Horatius Bonar, D. D., Kelso. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

The first series of hymns by this author found great favour with the Christian public. Some of its pieces have already been appropriated by the church, and incorporated into her standard hymnology. This "Second Series" is very much in the vein of its predecessor.

The Pathway of Promise; or, Words of Comfort to the Christian Pilgrim. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

A devotional treatise, well fitted to assist spiritual meditations, and to promote Christian knowledge, fervour, and peace. It is compact and portable, suitable for a *vade-mecum.*

Sunsets on the Hebrew Mountains. By the Rev. J. R. Macduff, D. D., New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

The title of this volume does not suggest its subject. "Sunsets" are here used as emblematical of death, the going down of the light of life. They are represented as occurring on the "Hebrew mountains," because it is the scriptural patriarchs and prophets who lived and died there whose deaths are made the theme of description and comment. The whole closes with the "great sunset," the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. The volume betrays the characteristics which have achieved for the author, in his numerous works, a success equal to his fecundity.

Life Work; or, the Link and the Rivet. By L. N. R., author of the "Missing Link," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1862.

The "Missing Link," which we noticed in its original appearance, was designed to set forth the place which Christian women ought to occupy in ministries for the relief and evangelization of the poor. It has already done a great work. It has led great numbers of pious females to engage privately, and through extended organizations, in furthering this holy work. This volume, by the same author, is designed to forward the same great object, more especially by giving some account of what has already been accomplished by this means. These narratives will be read with avidity and profit.

Life among the Chinese; with Characteristic Sketches and Incidents of Missionary Operations and Prospects in China. By the Rev. R. T. Maclay, M. A., thirteen years missionary to China from the Methodist Episcopal Church. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1861.

The title of this volume reveals the substance and character of its contents. These are arranged and presented in an interesting manner, and constitute a valuable addition to our means of knowledge concerning that vast and strange people, the Chinese, both in their intrinsic qualities, and as furnishing a field for missionary enterprise.

The Exiles of Madeira. By the Rev. W. M. Blackburn. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

The history of Bible reading in Madeira, of the success attending it, and of the persecution and expulsion of those engaged in this heavenly work, is among the most stirring in the annals of modern missions. We are glad that our Board of Publication have published this well-prepared volume, giving a compact and animated account of these significant events.

The Curse of Canaan rightly Interpreted, and kindred Topics. Three Lectures, delivered in the Reformed Dutch Church, Easton, Pa., January and February, 1862. By the Pastor, the Rev. Cornelius H. Edgar. New York: Baker & Godwin, Printers. 1862.

The object of these Lectures is to refute the monstrous principle, that, by a special curse, a large portion of the human race is doomed to perpetual bondage; that hence slavery is the normal state of human society, and requisite to its highest development. The author brings to the execution of his purpose considerable learning, logic, and occasional sallies of wit. There is no question, that the present insane insurrection in support of the idea combated in these discourses, will prove perfectly suicidal, and array destructive forces, which otherwise had remained dormant, against the very institution it seeks to uplift to this superlative elevation.

Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate; or, Hints on the Application of Logic. By G. J. Holyoake. With an Essay on Sacred Eloquence, by Henry Rogers. Revised by the Rev. L. D. Burrows. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1861.

This book is largely a compilation, which, though fragmentary, and of various merit, offers many valuable suggestions to the discriminating student.

Poems, with Autobiographic and other Notes. (Illustrated by Darley, Hoppin, and others.) By T. H. Stockton, Chaplain to Congress. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1862.

We have not been able to examine this volume enough to characterize it.

Messrs. Trübner & Co. are proposing to publish the principal works of the late Horace H. Wilson, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford. These are to be issued in five divisions. The first division, embracing two octavo volumes, is to contain his various essays on the religion of the Hindus; the second division, also two volumes, his essays on Hindu literature; the third division, five volumes, his translations from the Sanskrit; the fourth, in two volumes, essays relating to the history and topography of India; the fifth, one volume, upon Hindu inscriptions and numismatics. Four volumes are to be issued every year, at a cost of 10s. 6d. each, until the entire series is complete. Professor Wilson's translation of the Rig-veda is now in the course of publication, in six volumes, as a distinct series.

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