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

☞ The publisher of the *Biblical Repertory* takes the liberty to say, that out of Philadelphia and New York, the subscribers are almost entirely ministers; and he thinks that in most churches there are ladies and gentlemen sufficiently intellectual to appreciate the themes discussed in its pages. If one could be found in each church, it would nearly double our subscribers. We would thank our ministers to try. P. W.

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No. I.

Art. I.—*The Limits of Religious Thought*, examined in eight Lectures, delivered before the University of Oxford, in the year 1858, on the Bampton Foundation. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859.

This book assumes that Christianity is related to philosophy. We therefore propose to consider Christianity from a speculative point of view; and, in the course of the discussion, to show the import of Mr. Mansel's argument, and to determine its value in Christian evidences.

Philosophy culminates in theology. God is the ultimate problem to which all the lines of philosophical investigation conduct. It is, therefore, proper for philosophy to inquire, whether, from a speculative point of view, Christianity is entitled to the high pretension which it assumes, of being a revelation from God of transcendental truths pertaining to the respective characters of God and man, and from these characters explaining the government of the one, and disclosing the duties of the other.

It is obvious that if philosophy must, from the principles and the laws of human reason, pronounce, there is no God; or if it

must pronounce, from these principles and these laws, that man has no right of intelligence either to believe or disbelieve in a God, Christianity must, rationally, fall under the same adverse judgment. But if, on the other hand, it can be shown that, speculatively, atheism is impossible, and the understanding is thereby remitted to the evidences of natural theology, untrammelled by any *a priori* or speculative doubt, and that the great fact which Christianity assumes, that there is a God, stands on the rational ground of a conviction constrained by the most insuperable negative considerations, and by the most diverse positive evidence, Christianity thus becomes possible as a divine revelation, and is remitted to its proper evidences for proof of its high pretension.

It thus becomes manifest that the first requirement of a speculative proof of Christianity is, to show that there is a God to make such a revelation. And if the philosophical proofs of a God shall disclose him to human understanding, under the same special representations in which he is revealed in Christianity, this will be a cogent reason for the truth of Christianity. For if the most scientific thought will disclose an inference so complex in its premises in regard to the most difficult of questions, in just the same form and limits in which it is presented in a doctrine taught by unscientific thinkers, who profess that the doctrine was received from a higher intelligence than their own, or if the author, though illiterate, professes to be of higher intelligence than man, it is evidence of both the authority and truth of the doctrine. Christianity attempts no proof of the existence of a God; and, therefore, it only speaks of him, as if his existence were admitted. Christ came not as a philosopher, with reasons to authenticate his mission and his doctrine, but as more than a philosopher, with miracles suspending the laws of nature which philosophers can only learn so far as to obey them.

Criticisms of theology, both natural and revealed, correspond with the respective schemes of philosophy of which they are the polemic applications. Sensualism and Intellectualism, the philosophical opposites of each other, put forth their respective principles as tests by which the problem of God is to be solved, and also by which Christianity is to be criticised. The first,

at most, makes God a law or force; and the last strips him of all personality and all relations, and presents him in the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction—a mere pantheistic self-contradiction—a nothing. The first, as in the doctrine of Paulus, converts, by a sensualistic interpretation, the supernatural facts of Christianity into ordinary physical phenomena, misunderstood by an easy credulity. The glory of our Lord, which, on the night of his birth, shone around the shepherds of Jerusalem, was, according to Paulus, an *ignis fatuus*, or meteor; and the ascension of the Lord was nothing more than his sudden disappearance behind a cloud that accidently intervened between him and his disciples. The last, as in the doctrine of Straus, by a pantheistic interpretation, converts Christianity into a myth, a poetical fiction, representing religious ideas in the form of facts which were believed by the authors of the Gospels to have actually occurred. The ideas symbolized in the facts of the evangelical myths are, according to Straus, true as applied to humanity as a whole, but false as applied to the individual. But in the one-sided theories of the human mind, of Sensualism and Intellectualism, man's reason is put at war with itself. Both are true as a principle, but false as a theory. When Epicurus asserted that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that all else is imaginary; and when Plato proclaimed, that the senses are only sources of illusion, and that all reality is in intelligible objects which can be seen only by an intuition apart from sense, two theories hostile in their scopes and aims were ushered upon the battle-field of speculation, which have never yet come to terms of entire reconciliation. But as each theory is only a perverted truth, by which a part is substituted for the whole, each having a principle in the human mind for its basis, philosophers have endeavoured to reconcile the two principles in theories of mind embracing both. The most remarkable of these is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By a too architectural view of the human intelligence, Kant has so exhibited the human mind, as to make the principle on which Sensualism reposes a mere receptivity of illusions circumscribed and conditioned by conceptions that are also illusions; and the principle on which Intellectualism reposes, he makes an illusive regulator of the

other illusions. So that Kant has reconciled the antecedent hostile theories of Sensualism and Intellectualism, not by showing that there is no real hostility between the faculties of the human mind, when both principles on which they respectively repose are recognised, but by making human intelligence utterly mendacious. And worse than this, he makes the lower faculty find its highest function in striving to realize, as objectively true, the impossible illusions which are shadowed forth by the highest faculty, and which, though illusive, all the aspirations of man's intellectual and moral natures make him hope and believe to be true.

It is upon this false theory of human intelligence that Kant has built the most potent and subtle polemic against the speculative validity of theism, as a rational doctrine, which has ever been taught. But the force of his criticism depends, for the most part, upon the chasm which he erroneously represents as existing between the lower and the higher faculties of human intelligence, in the normal exercise of their respective functions; so that the higher, which is above all possible experience, can never derive any light from experience in proof of its ideas as having corresponding objects in being, but must ever wander lost in the midst of paradoxes which it is constrained to own as the legitimate products of its function, and which, at best, can only be systematized into insoluble antinomies or necesary conflicts of reason. On this scheme of human intelligence it is that Kant starts on the examination of the proofs of the existence of a supreme being, assuming, as his theory of the mind compelled him to do, that the notion of God is a mere necessary idea of the highest faculty of man, the objective validity of which it is impossible either to prove or disprove. However the aspirations of the human heart may offer up the incense of contrition and worship, after all, according to Kant, the object of adoration is, to speculative reason, only an idea hypostatized and personified by empirical credulity. What is worshipped as God is a mere regulative idea, to give scientific unity to the illusions of sense; its value being logical, not moral; scientific, not theological. But, yet, as speculation cannot, according to Kant, either affirm or deny the existence of a supreme being, it relegates the question to empirical proofs

which may elicit a belief, but not a cognition, for the idea lies out of the field of possible experience. Such is the rationale of Kant's transcendental criticism of theology, or the problem of God. And though he relegates the problem to empirical proofs, upon his scheme of the faculties of human thought, these proofs have no real validity. For, while he states the empirical or physico-theological proofs, with great force of logical combination, they are eviscerated of their cogency because of the entire separation, in his theory of human intelligence, of the sensuous intuition and its contents from pure reason and its ideas, of which God is one. Kant's theory of the human intelligence is so revolting to common sense, that even his own perverse ingenuity, at times, seems to be on the eve of discerning its sophistical character. In the following sentence he comes near to surrendering it as a blunder: "The reason (says Kant) does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience; and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical, though it must still be *in connection* with it. Transcendental ideas are properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned." Our highest thought, as this sentence nearly expresses, is a continuous thread, beginning in the intuitions of the external and internal senses, and is woven exclusively of the elements furnished by these primary faculties. There is no contribution of material by any higher faculty. There is a transcendental element in the primary intuitions—in experience—by which the mind rises necessarily towards the unconditioned, not as something *known*, but believed; being relatively implied in that which is known. This transcendental element is the relation, in human thought, of the conceivable to the inconceivable. For the conceivable in human knowledge is always bounded by the inconceivable, being always conceived in relation to it; and the mind, by a logical necessity, as well as by an intelligent craving, ever strives to comprehend the inconceivable or unconditioned. Therefore, though, in human thinking, the conceivable and the inconceivable are, logically, mutually exclusive of each other, yet, psychologically, they are mutually relative and intelligently filiated, and together make up that quantum of

human knowledge and belief which, according to the laws of intelligence, must have objective validity. This truth is realized in the fact, that it is impossible to conceive either an absolute least or an absolute greatest. There is always something beyond, which, though inconceivable, is necessarily believed to exist. Knowledge is, therefore, bounded by faith. Kant extinguished by his theory the transcendental ray in experience, and made the whole region beyond actual knowledge one of outer darkness. In his view of experience, speculation must ignore a God. But in our view of experience, the transcendental element or relation is a clew to conduct us through the labyrinth of negations, which meet us on all sides with their contradiction, to the goal where reason is necessitated by its own laws, as will presently be shown, to believe in a God, or else ignore its primary beliefs and nullify its rationality. And the argument founded on merely rational principles is supplemented and corroborated by the sense of moral obligation and the profound moral interests which a spirit, like man's, feels in the destiny which is foreshadowed by the reckonings of his reason. For our spiritual instincts are deliverances of intelligence, and have their proper objects of fruition in the universe.

Having exposed the sophistry of the objections offered by the Kantean philosophy against the validity of the argument for a God, we will proceed to examine the problem of God as it rests upon its intrinsic evidences. The clew to the solution of the problem is to be found in the doctrine of causation. The notion of cause is the clew by which the phenomena of the physical world are unravelled. Physical science does not transcend the horizon of natural causes, which are conceived as blindly operating forces inherent in matter. But as no natural cause is conceived as self-sufficient, but must be considered only as an effect of a cause, and thus, in an endless regress into infinity, the science of metaphysics emerges in human thinking, as an explanation of what lies beyond the horizon of natural causes. Two theories, to which all others may be reduced, after eliminating the irrelevant modifications, are given of the metaphysical notion of a cause. The one is that the notion is the result of an impotence to think an absolute beginning, and

therefore is purely negative, importing only a limitation of knowledge. The other and older and most generally received theory is, that the notion is the product of the consciousness of the exercise of force by our will upon our physical organization, and that this notion is transferred to all the changes in the physical world, as representative of their antecedent; the notion of cause being connected with the observed change, either by a law of association, according to some, or by a necessary law of thought, according to others. But neither the positive nor the negative theory is self-sufficient. Neither is an adequate explanation of the contingent in nature; and more especially does neither explain how effects or changes result in arrangements indicating design or final purpose. These arrangements, called final causes, are the one obtrusive manifestation characterizing universal nature; and the arrangements are not only perfect in mechanical skill and calculated with the nicest mathematical accuracy in weight and measure and forces, but the artistic finish and ornament is consummate in skill and beauty, each having no relation to a blind force, nor to any conceivable antecedent, except an intelligent creator of surpassing knowledge, taste, and power. And as an antecedent is necessarily thought, on either theory of causation, atheism, or disbelief in the existence of an intelligent artificer adequate to such work, is both a scientific and metaphysical impossibility. To suppose that the whole work is self-originated, is to ignore all intelligence, and thus to ignore the supposition itself, which is self-contradictory. Causation, in ultimate analysis, must be conceived as that which is self-determined; and when it is ascribed to physical nature, the inference is according to the analogy of man, and not according to the analogy of the world or physical nature; for cause must be conceived as originating in, if not identical with, intelligence and will. It is by this sort of inference that we determine the character or nature of our fellow-men. It is through our own image that we behold them. We are, by the laws of thought, necessitated to transfer to them our own forms of thought and our entire personality. By this same necessity, we are constrained to infer, from the data of self-consciousness, in connection with causation in the physical world, that God is; and that he is a

person, a conscious intelligence like ourselves, and not a mere law or force. We cannot stop short at a mere *deus ex machina*, which physical nature with its forces indicates as its fabricator, but we are constrained to add, to God's nature, those attributes which are indicated in the providence shown in the bounties of physical nature, with its rotation of seasons and their respective beneficences; and also, those moral attributes which are indicated in the sublime mystery of human conscience determining right and wrong, sin and righteous condemnation; and which utters its voice with undiminished authority, even when man is conscious, that a passion binds him as inexorably as fate, and that, while he feels that his only hope is heaven and his only help is prayer, yet his sin stifles his prayer and his hope, and makes him curse God, while he feels that God is long-suffering and slow to anger.

Feeling, and belief, and knowledge are distinguishable, but yet essentially and inseparably connected, elements of our intelligent nature. Therefore, in considering the grounds and proofs of God, we must estimate the force of each of these elements, in determining the existence and the character of God, as manifested in his relations to man and the world. We must not eliminate feeling and sentiment, and other anthropomorphic elements from ratiocination, as we do, in a mere inductive process of scientific inquiry, when seeking for an ultimate ground of science, where we must, as Bacon says, not draw our inferences *ex analogia hominis*, but *ex analogia universi*. But in the inquiry for a God, the inferences are legitimately *ex analogia hominis*, though founded on manifestations in the physical world. "Though man be not identical with the deity," says Hamilton, "still, he is created in the image of God. It is indeed only through analogy of the human with the divine, that we are percipient and recipient of the divinity." The personifying propensity, which induces man to personify external physical objects, must be taken into consideration in the evidences for a God; as it is a normal function of the mind, and indispensable to make up the complement of human faculties necessary to acquire the truths which pertain to human knowledge and human happiness. The Greeks personified the physical forces, and supposed that the course of nature was carried

on by direct supernatural personal agency. And when Socrates taught the doctrine of second causes, Aristophanes ridiculed the doctrine, in the comedy of "The Clouds," as blasphemous and atheistic, thereby showing the common opinion of the Greeks. It is by this function of the human mind that the personality of God is determined.

The logical cogency of the foregoing argument can be estimated, and its apodictic certainty demonstrated, by reference to the laws of thought by which the process is necessitated. For the synthetic and ampliative process of reason, by which inference from the data of consciousness is made upon analogy, is, logically, as cogent as the analytic and explicative process of reason, by which deduction is made from premises. The only difference is, that the mind is more liable to error by paralogism in the ampliative process than in the explicative; because, in the ampliative process, analogy has to be estimated, and may be misunderstood. But if the analogy be a valid one, the conclusion is determined with absolute certainty. For though logicians have not discovered that the ampliative process, as well as the explicative, is under the necessary laws of thought, analysis can demonstrate the fact. Because analogy, on which the ampliative process is founded, is only identity or sameness involved in diversity; and the ampliative process disentangles it from the diversity, and unifies it, by the law of identity, with the data of consciousness which suggested the analogy.* Therefore, from the notions of personality, and of intelligence and will, and of cause and design, given in human consciousness, we are constrained, by the law of identity, to affirm, from the indications of the physical world, that a personal intelligence, with a will and power like our own, has fabricated it, and exists as its governor. To deny this, is to deny what the law of identity constrains us to affirm, and therefore is self-contradictory. If the analogy be not mistaken, the inference is necessitated. And it is equally self-contradictory to deny the analogy.

The argument for a God, therefore, when tested by logical analysis, if we admit, as we are bound to do, the supreme

* See Progress of Philosophy, &c. By Samuel Tyler. Pp. 78, 79, 80, 215, 216, 217, 224, 225, 226, 227.

authority of the necessary laws of thought over the field of speculation, is found to be apodictically certain. God belongs to that class of truths which the laws of the understanding constrain us to believe, from the data derived from internal and external observation. It was by the laws of the understanding that Leverier was constrained to believe, from the data of observation, the existence of the planet Neptune, which afterwards became an object of intuition through the telescope. God, though believed in, by a like process of conviction, cannot become an object of direct knowledge, as will be explained in the sequel.

Admit, therefore, the reality of the external world, with its evidences of design, and atheism is speculatively impossible. Is, then, the sensible universe a mere illusion? This is a fitting inquiry for one who can say in his heart, There is no God. It is proper to show such an one, that the magnificent spectacle of order, beauty, and conformity to ends, called the world, as well as the grand glories, called the heavens, are not illusions of his own faculty, which he calls reason.

The universal doctrine of the ancient philosophy was adverse to natural realism, maintaining as it did, that we cannot perceive the external world immediately, but only by means of ideas; and therefore the ancient doctrine is called idealism. The philosophy of Bacon was a recoil against idealism. Observation of the external world, upon trust in the senses, was the one great precept of his philosophy—assuming that the external world is distinct from the mind, and is real; its whole aim is natural realism. Locke, in continuing the Baconian movement, inconsistently fell into the common error, traditionally received from the ancient philosophy, that we do not immediately perceive the external world, but something representative of it. By thus encumbering observation with a false hypothesis, repugnant to the validity of observation, Locke's philosophy was pregnant with covert absurdity. Therefore it was, that Hume, in the spirit of scepticism, accepted the doctrine of Locke, and exposed the absurdity which it involved. Hume, in fact, showed that philosophy is either altogether a delusion, or that the doctrine of Locke is erroneous or incomplete. Hume's doctrine was a scientific and

technical ignorance, aiming at the overthrow, especially, of a God as a valid philosophical belief. Philosophers were, therefore, constrained either to surrender philosophy as impossible, or else to ascend to higher principles for defence against sceptical reduction. Hume thus put philosophy into a dilemma, that forms a memorable crisis in the history of speculation. His Scepticism awoke the Sensualism of Britain, and the Intellectualism of Germany, from their respective dogmatic slumber, reposing, as each did, upon its own special principle, without any due acknowledgment of that of the other. It was manifest that the problems of philosophy must be considered in new aspects, and be subjected to a more searching analysis. As speculation had done, in all periods before, it took two opposite courses: British philosophy took the course which trusts more to the senses, and German philosophy took the course which relies more upon the ability of the intellect; hence we have designated the first Sensualism, and the last Intellectualism.

Reid, it was, who attempted to rescue British philosophy from the scepticism of Hume. He saw that Hume's reasoning proved, that the doctrine of representative perception involved, not only the denial of the existence of matter, but, by the fairest sequence, the denial of the substantiality of mind. He, therefore, strove to vindicate the unconditional veracity of consciousness, which testifies that we do immediately perceive the external world; and, by analysis of mental phenomena, he established the cardinal doctrine in metaphysics, *That what our nature compels us to believe as true and real, is true and real*, called the doctrine of common sense.

Kant, startled, like Reid, by the scepticism of Hume, strove to connect cause and effect, which Hume had shown, upon the doctrine of Sensualism, to be correlated only by succession in nature and by custom in thought. Kant makes causation the central problem of his philosophy, in accordance with his Intellectualism, which makes the notion of cause a mere regulative idea or logical principle unifying, into a scientific whole, the contents of sensuous intuition, and having no objective validity; while Reid made external perception the central problem of his philosophy, in accordance with Sensualism which reposes confidence in the senses as the accredited mes-

sengers of consciousness. But Kant decided the adverse destiny of his philosophy by his first step. He clung to the old idealism, that we do not immediately perceive external objects: but that what we illusively see, as the external world, is only a modification of our minds, and reality is only a necessary illusion. Having thus declared consciousness untrustworthy, his philosophy ended in making human intelligence self-contradictory in its normal exercise. And as, according to his philosophy, truth consists in the harmony of thought with thought, and not of thought with things, the spirit of his philosophy encouraged the most unexclusive doubt.

The doctrine of Kant, that the external world is a necessary illusion imposed on us by a treacherous reason, admitted, however, that there may be a reality corresponding to the necessary illusion. In this aspect, his philosophy is a hypothetical realism. But Fichte showed, by a rigorous logical analysis, that, at bottom, Kant's philosophy is absolute idealism denying any external world. Kant expressly taught, in accordance with the spirit of his philosophy, as we have seen, that the notion of God is only an idea with no objective validity possible to human reason.

The problem of reality and God, being thus decided in the negative by Kant, who had opened up the way of Intellectualism in refutation of Hume's scepticism, Schelling, proceeding in the same direction with Kant, claimed, for the mind of man, what Kant had demonstrated to be impossible, a faculty of intellectual intuition which is apart from sense, above consciousness, and released from the laws of the understanding, and which comprehends the absolute by becoming the absolute, and thus knows God by being God. By thus cutting the Gordean knot of metaphysics, Schelling thought that he had explained the knowledge of external reality and of God.

Hegel, the disciple of Schelling, next attempted to solve the problem of existence and of knowledge: and while ridiculing the intellectual intuition of his master as a poetical play of fancy, he claimed, that by sifting mental phenomena, men can rise to absolute knowledge, through a dialectical process which starts from the thesis, that being and nothing are the same; and that so far is contradiction, from being an insuperable

barrier to intellectual cognition, it is the chief instrument in laying the foundation of our higher knowledge, which, in fact, ends in the consummate paradox and ultimate truth, that contradictories are one and universal negativity is the essence of thought. And Oken, another disciple of Schelling, only a little less distinguished than Hegel, in the true spirit and principle of this philosophy, proclaimed, that God is nothing, and nothing is God; so impossible is it for human reason to deny the existence of God, that a philosophy, which outrages the conditions of thought and ends in universal negation, makes that negation God.

It was in this state of the problem of realism, that Sir William Hamilton took up the subject. He showed the intellectual realism of Schelling and his school to be a scheme of mere negation. And he proclaimed, in its stead, the doctrine of natural realism. "A mental operation (says Hamilton) is only what it is by relation to its object; the object at once determining its existence and specifying the character of its existence." This restoration of the objective to its legitimate position, in the dualism of thought and existence, from which Kant had displaced it, Hamilton based upon Reid's doctrine of common sense. Natural realism, while it recognises the relativity of thought, excludes that void relativity of Kant which makes philosophy a scheme of mere formal relations, just as entirely as it excludes the intellectual realism of Schelling and his school, which identifies the objective and the subjective in a unitarianism of thought and existence.

We are therefore remitted, by all the efforts of speculation to solve the problem of knowledge and existence, to the doctrine of natural realism, that there is a real external world, which we know immediately, reposing upon the principle, that what our nature constrains us to believe as true and real, is true and real. And all, or nearly all the intellectualists, after the self-love, which, in speculation, is apt to overcome the love of truth, had abated, have abandoned their ambitious doctrine of omniscience, and acknowledged the catholic confession of philosophy proposed by Bacon, that in order to enter the temple of science, we must become as little children, trusting to necessary beliefs. In this spirit we have examined the pro-

blem of God; and have, we submit, contrary to the doctrine of Kant, that theism is speculatively impossible, shown that atheism is not only speculatively impossible, but that we are, upon the empirical proofs, necessitated by the laws of thought to believe in a God.

But, though we have shown that we must believe in a personal God, of intelligence, will, and moral nature like our own, the question arises, is he omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect? as the proclivities of the human mind certainly urge men to assert. We cannot *know* that God is omniscient, or omnipotent, or morally perfect; for we have not, in our natures, any cognitive measure of these unlimited attributes. We can at most, therefore, only infer and believe that God possesses these transcendental attributes.

There is, however, as we have already shown, a philosophy which aspires to know God absolutely. That philosophy has proposed two modes for this knowledge. Schelling proposes an intellectual intuition free from all the conditions of sensuous intuition; and Hegel proposes a dialectical process free from the laws of thought. So unsatisfactory was the mode of each to the other, that while Hegel, as we have already said, calls the intellectual intuition a poetical play of fancy, Schelling calls the dialectical process a logical play with words. In fact, both modes of knowing are so absurd, ignoring, as each does, all the limitations of the human understanding, that it would have been a marvel in human error, if two such great thinkers had agreed in either mode. Each mode involves the doctrine of intellectual realism, and consummates its irrationality, as we have shown, in making God nothing, and nothing God. For, in fact, the absolute and infinite of this philosophy are subjective negations commuted into objective affirmations. But as thoroughly as all this has been exposed by Sir William Hamilton, there are respectable writers on metaphysics who still assert that man can know the infinite. Therefore it is, that we yield to the necessity of briefly considering the question.

If by knowledge we mean the immediate cognition of an object, then we can only know God by the intellectual intuition of Schelling. If we enlarge the notion of knowledge, so as to embrace whatever can be evolved in a dialectical process, then

we must have the dialectic of Hegel to know God. There is no other method of knowing God even conceivable by the most perverse ingenuity. To know God, therefore, we must follow either Schelling or Hegel. But if we admit, as we must, that consciousness is the prime condition of human intelligence, how can we cognize the infinite or absolute, when the fundamental law of consciousness is an antithesis of a subject thinking an object? Therefore, in the peculiar meaning of the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, the subject has to become the infinite or absolute object in order to know it; for otherwise the subject would not be embraced in the absolute or all, (the absolute and infinite mean the all, in this philosophy,) which would be a contradiction.

The words *absolute* and *infinite* express the inconceivable in two counter forms. The word *inconceivable* has a valid meaning, though it does not involve the conception of the object which it denotes, but negatives the possibility of such a conception. All negation involves affirmation, and we cannot predicate non-existence except by reference to existence; therefore, when we predicate infiniteness or inconceivability, it is always by reference to some finite or conceivable thing. Negative thinking is realized only under the condition of relativity and positive thinking. It expresses the limitation and impotency of the human understanding in a form that indicates an attempt and failure to conceive; and though it is objective in expression, and denotes negation, yet the negation implies subjective impotency and not objective impossibility. Room is therefore left for belief of the objective possibility of that which, in our failure to conceive it, we call the infinite. Knowledge is, therefore, not the whole contents of human intelligence; but faith is given to supplement, by its less certain, but not less valid conviction, the impotency of reason or understanding. The conception, called the infinite, is generated in an attempt to separate the conditions of finiteness—of relativity and non-contradiction—from a given object, that is, to conceive it absolutely; and the conscious failure leads to calling the object infinite or unfinishable in thought; and all that the conception embraces, in our attempt to think, from the finite to the absolute, is the indefinite, which we call the infinite. This

psychological genesis of the notion of the infinite, shows that belief in the infinite is not a mere instinct or feeling, but a necessitated conviction inseparably incident to the impotency of the understanding, being only a less certain conviction of reason. Though, therefore, the absolute nature of God is not directly manifested, and cannot be, to the reason of man, yet he is manifested under finite symbols and relations, which have a positive significance, and indicate, indirectly, that God is greater than the finite meaning of the symbols and relations; and the laws of our intelligence constrain us to believe, from what we know of him in his relations, in his incomprehensible majesty. In fact, we *know* that God is incomprehensible; for our consciousness testifies that nescience exercises an important function in our intelligent convictions in regard to the nature of God. This nescience of God is not atheism, but just the reverse; while the doctrine of absolute knowledge of God is atheism; for the philosophical conception, in which that pretended knowledge consists, is a mere negation, as we have shown. Though, therefore, final causes, together with our own personality, do not reveal the fulness of the Godhead to us, we are not on that account atheists, but theists, knowing in part, and believing more than we know; and hoping for the time when we shall know even as we are known.

There is no medium between apprehending an infinite being directly and analogically. That such being cannot be apprehended directly, we have shown. And that analogy debars absolute knowledge, is manifest. But so it be admitted, as it must, that all our intelligence of God is by analogy, it matters but little, practically, whether the mental conviction be called knowledge, belief, or faith.

Having, as we trust, shown that we are constrained, by the laws of thought, to believe, from the data of consciousness, in a personal God, who is incomprehensible; and thereby, having also established the doctrine, that we are compelled, by our intelligent nature, to believe a thing, though we may not be able to comprehend it, we are prepared to enter upon considerations which will conduct us to a position, from which we can take a speculative view of Christianity, as a supernatural revelation, from the God whose existence we have proved.

That man is a moral, and therefore accountable agent, and yet hemmed in by insurmountable impediments to free action, has always been more or less obvious to the common sense and the speculative reason of man. Hence human life has always been, to the mind of man, an insoluble paradox. The physical world so manifestly presents irresistible and irreversible courses of events, that their necessity, against all human power, has never been doubted. And when the courses of the moral world are scanned, the human mind is necessitated, by the laws of its intelligence, to predicate causation between the antecedents and consequents; and has never been able to construe, to consciousness, the difference between the forces of nature and the motives of a rational will, in determining necessary results, though they must be, and are, assumed as different in our practical convictions. So that, to the ancient Greek popular mind, both the physical and moral worlds seemed equally bound in fate. And yet sin seemed, to the pagan mind, a prime fact in the world, and punishment an inevitable retribution. It seemed to the Greeks as if there was an alliance and compact between the fates or powers of nature, and the furies or powers of conscience, to punish man for acts to which he is inexorably doomed, and for which, nevertheless, he could not but feel he was morally responsible. This terrible doctrine or belief, appears, in all its import, in the Greek drama, that living picture of Greek life. An inexorable fate seems to rule all the actions of the drama, to an inevitable destiny. Clytemnestra, who appears in so many dramas, by different poets, and is therefore a good example of the Greek conscience, does not, in her moral agonies, so much feel the remorse which results from conscious guilt, as the cruel torture of an inexorable fate. Though she had participated in the murder of her husband, the guilt of so foul a deed sat light upon her heart, even after she had reflected upon its turpitude; but she dreaded the furies as the scourges of fate. In Greek life, the pagan or heathen conscience attained its highest enlightenment; and the actors in the Greek drama reveal, in a striking manner, the various workings of the pagan conscience.

And the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, in regard to the great facts of the moral world, were

but little, if at all, more satisfactory than the common opinions of the people. These philosophers taught that matter is eternal, and that evil in the world is owing to the want of its perfect adaptability to good. Nature, they taught, always tends in its operations towards good, but owing to the imperfection of matter, which refuses to adjust itself to the form, it does not always, in its formations, attain to good. The soul, they taught, is the end and the essence of the body in all animals. In the souls of the inferior animals, the end of nature is not perfectly accomplished; neither is it in the souls of children. The human animal, and that the male, is the end and the centre of all earthly natures. All else beneath the moon is, as it were, an unsuccessful attempt to produce the male man.

Aristotle looked upon the reason of man as an element emigrated, from another sphere, into this sublunary portion of the universe. The moral life of man, therefore, he considered as an interpolation in nature—something distinct from the rest of the world. The end of his ethics is, to determine what is good for man politically, socially, and individually, in this life. Morality, in his system, is a relative mean between the opposite vices of excess and deficiency; and the rule of right is to be determined by the majority of instances. Virtue is a disposition towards good acquired by habit. Men who live rationally are, he thought, especially dear to the gods, and the peculiar objects of their providence; but that external and corporeal advantages are rather things of fortune, which, as they do not always fall to the share of the good and deserving, it is hard to say whether they are dispensed by the gods or not. Socrates maintained, and so did Plato, but not so exclusively, that virtue follows from knowledge, and that man only transgresses involuntarily.

The Greek mind, representing, as it did, the highest pagan or heathen enlightenment, was wholly unable to reconcile the moral phenomena of the course of natural providence with the judgments of their moral sense. The adversity of the good, the prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving the misery of the innocent, and even the existence of evil at all, whether physical or moral, perplexed their reason with insoluble paradoxes. The Greeks, amongst other opinions

in regard to the moral administration of the world, believed that Jupiter kept his lightnings to punish perjury; for physical punishment, because of moral delinquency, was a cardinal notion of the Grecks in regard to the course of nature. Aristophanes, in the comedy of "The Clouds," exposes the paradox which the belief involves; and thereby illustrates the moral perplexities which environed Greek opinion of the providential course of nature. Aristophanes is ridiculing the doctrine of second causes, as taking the administration of the world out of the hands of the gods, and presents Socrates as teaching the doctrine to Strepsiades, who held on to the popular opinion of the agency of the gods.

> "*Strep.* Let that pass,
> And tell me of the lightning, whose quick flash
> Burns us to cinders; that, at least, great Jove
> Keeps in reserve to launch at perjury?
>
> *Socr.* Dunce, dotard! were you born before the flood,
> To talk of perjury, whilst Simon breathes,
> Theorus and Cleonymus; whilst they,
> Thrice-perjured villains, brave the lightning's stroke,
> And gaze the heav'ns unscorcht? Would these escape?
> Why, man, Jove's random fires strike his own fane,
> Strike Sunium's guiltless top, strike the dumb oak,
> Who never yet broke faith, or falsely swore."

The perennial fact, in human judgment, that God's moral administration of this world has always seemed, to human reason, less perfect in justice than the moral standard which man sets up, in each age, as the criterion of moral conduct, seems conclusive, that the finite moral conceptions of man furnish no adequate type of the rule of God's conduct, whose ways are not as our ways, in his eternal administration over the life of man. And as man cannot obtain a conception of the infinite character of God, the Grecks and other pagans anthropomorphised the gods, and ascribed to them human passions, and a corresponding morality; and made fate, and not free will, the supreme condition of moral existence, whether of gods or men. The attempt to explain the moral providence manifested in the course of nature and human life, resulted, by the natural recoil from the failure to solve the problem, with the Greeks, in bringing down the goodness of the gods to the human standard.

The moral order and administration of the world seemed, to the Greeks, to rest rather on fate than on justice, on power than on right. And while the speculative reason of the pagan world, at best, but oscilated between fate and free will, its religious faith never rose above the enlightenment which rested its last hope for pardon of its shortcomings in this life, on the sacrifice of a cock to Æsculapius. A supreme God, as a moral governor of the world, was, at best, but an obscure sentiment in the back-ground of the opinions of philosophers; and an individual immortality of the human soul, little else than a craving of their minds. They felt that, with their intellectual and moral instincts, they would not perish in the grave, but would live beyond it, in intellectual contemplation, as an assembly of philosophers. The grand moral fact, in the life of the pagan world, was, that the reason of man required of him more than he felt able to perform.

Though European civilization was born of Asiatic, it had advanced so far beyond it in enlightenment, that Asiatic civilization seemed to have run its course in history, and to be only lingering in time to fulfil the condition of decay. The course of history, as if turning backwards, had carried European civilization into Asia, and the language of Greece had become in Asia a spoken tongue. European opinions had mingled with Asiatic, more in confusion than in conflict, creating rather doubt than enlightenment. At this crisis in human history, a person appeared at Jerusalem, who was born, in the humblest condition of life, in an obscure village of Judea, and proclaimed himself the light of the world, to show to man that way of life for which, under the sense of duty which is incradicable from his nature, man had been seeking in vain by the light of his reason. He professed to have come into the world in a supernatural way, being born of a virgin, to fulfil prophecies that had for centuries been made by men of his particular race and nation, who claimed to have the foreknowledge of God given to them for the special instruction of the Jews. Moses, the chief of these prophets, had written, as he claimed, under the eye of God, a history of the creation of the world, just in the order of formation in which it was made; and had narrated how only one man and one woman had been made by God in

his own image, to live in the world and to have dominion over it, and to people it with their children. He had stated, too, how this man and this woman had, of their free will, transgressed the commands of God, and thereby introduced sin and death into the world; and that it was one of God's ordinances that the sins of the parents were to be visited upon their children; and that thus it was that sin and death became the common heritage of the human family, all men having descended from the man and the woman who broke God's command. God had, according to this history, done the work of creation in six days, and rested on the seventh; and made it an example to man to labour six days, and to rest on the seventh for moral and religious improvement. So that, according to this history, the moral and religious government of the world rested on the two grand facts of creation, the work of six days and rest on the seventh, and the making one man and one woman the parents of the human family, and their transgression the cause of moral evil in the world.

Jesus Christ, as this man of Judea was called, at once recognised this account of creation and the fall of man into sin, as true, and declared that he had come into the world to fulfil the promise made by God, as told by the prophets, to deliver men from the woe that had been brought upon them by their first parents. He thus connected his work with the prime facts of the world. He so connected it with the origin of the physical universe and with the origin of man, in a moral filiation, as to be able to assume that it was part of the great scheme of administration which God had in his mind when he laid the foundations of the universe. The Mosaic history, which introduces the narrow Jewish polity, is thus made an introduction to universal history, with Christianity as the grand source of its moral life.

Moses, in his history of creation, gives, contrary to the universal doctrine of the pagan world, the only condition on which God can be thought to be omnipotent—*that matter is not eternal, but contingent;* and, therefore, it did not hamper God in his work of creation, as Plato and Aristotle taught, and thereby necessitate evil or imperfection. Neither did Moses, after the manner of philosophers, give any theoretical genesis of crea-

tion by formative forces of nature, but he merely narrated how the work was performed, in the order of its fabrication, by a personal God. And though Moses tells of God speaking to him face to face, as a man speaketh unto a friend; yet he also tells that God said to him, when he asked God to show him his glory, Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and live. This corresponds with the doctrine of God, which, as we have shown, speculative reason teaches. God can be manifested to man in finite relations, but not in his transcendent majesty.

Christ recognised as true the Mosaic representation of God, and offered no speculative solution of the great first cause. Neither did he, after the manner of philosophers, propound any theodicy or metaphysical theory of sin, but pointed to the Mosaic history, as giving the true account of the fall of man; and offered, not a speculative, but a practical solution of the dreadful mystery. That justice, which made even the pagan world, in its conscience, feel that punishment must follow sin, is recognised by him as inexorable, and sinless as he claimed to be, he offered up himself to its behests, as a vicarious sacrifice in the stead of sinning men. He told men that God, of his free grace and love, as a compassionate father, had sent him, his only begotten Son, who is sinless, to suffer for their sins, and thus to leave them as free from guilt as if they had not sinned, if they would only accept the gift of grace, and become as little children.

The theism of nature, as well as the theophanies of the Jewish dispensation, are consummated in Christ. While, in the genesis of the notion of God, the manifestations of nature are, as we have shown, of deep import, leaving atheism without excuse, still, of God as the moral governor of the world, our best notions are derived from Christianity; for the moral character of God is too much obscured in the paradoxes of good and evil presented in nature and human life, ever to have been adequately discerned by human reason, as pagan philosophy shows. Neither could the peculiar theophany of Father, Son, and Spirit, consummated by the teachings of Christ, be inferred from nature. This conception of the Godhead gives vitality to the mediatorial scheme of Christianity, and solves, in a prac-

tical way, the moral paradoxes of the world. Whom the pagans ignorantly worshipped, Christianity professes to make known.

Christianity is, as it claims to be, in moral scope commensurate with the history of the world; and is interwoven in it, in many ways, as a guiding, formative, and educational principle.

Through the writings of Moses, which it adopts as true, and connects itself with, Christianity furnishes a clew to universal history. The materials for universal history, which the conquests of Alexander had opened to the European mind, from oriental sources, needed some central point which would present the nations of men as only different members of one common family. The Jewish Scriptures, which profess to be a compendium of the earliest history of the world, furnished this central point, in presenting the families of men looking back to a past for a common origin, and forward to a future which determines them to a common destiny. In the beginning of the fourth century, after the appearance of Christ, Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, arranged the facts of the pagan history, from the beginning of the Assyrian empire down to his own time, synchronously, side by side with those of the Jewish. And the Alexandrian antiquaries at once adopted the Scripture narrative, as the centre round which to group all they could find recorded of the oriental empires. But there was no certain basis for a valid chronology. It was, therefore, impossible to determine the proper order in time of either transactions or persons, or whether persons, bearing different names in Jewish history and in pagan, were different, or the same persons under different names, and other like difficulties. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Joseph Scaliger took the Copernican astornomy as a basis for chronology. From this he showed on what principles the ancient epochs and chronological systems had been formed. By this means he bridged the gulph between the classical and biblical worlds. He saw that the history of the ancient world could only, if at all, be known as a whole. The only materials for ascertaining the facts of the extra-classical ancient world, were the statements which the chronologers of the empire had copied and transmitted to succeeding times, without knowing their

meaning. With the aid of the work of Eusebius, which he rescued from oblivion, Joseph Scaliger founded, upon the insight which the Copernican astronomy gave him into the chronology of ancient times, the basis of historical criticism which is fast unveiling the ancient pagan world to modern view, and proving by its success its own truth. The history of Moses and the astronomy of Copernicus are the two corner-stones on which historical criticism rests; the facts of the first, through the chronological clew furnished by the last, being rendered capable of being properly correlated with the facts of pagan ancient history; thereby giving us ancient history, both as to persons and transactions, as a whole distributed properly in time. The Jewish history, therefore, seems, by its relation to ancient pagan history, to have as strong evidence of its truth as the Copernican astronomy has of its truth in unravelling the chronological schemes of the pagan nations. They seem to be allied with each other, by that unity of truth which belongs to a consistent whole, whether that whole has the various complexity of a world, or is a more simple unity.

And Christianity, though originating at a period when a religion suited to all nations and peoples was thought by all to be impossible, and was opposed by Celsus on this ground, has fulfilled its high pretensions as a universal scheme of moral and religious culture, commensurate with the needs of men of all conditions and all times. It belongs to no one people, and to no one of the great geographical divisions of the historical life of the world. Though Asiatic in its origin, it has left Asiatic civilization behind it, and has become the prime formative moral influence in universal civilization. It rules all the relations of men, domestic, political, and international. By clothing itself, originally, in the Greek tongue, it has made all of Greek literature tributary to that broad culture, which the necessities of its polemics have introduced into the progress of learning. Its conflicts with error, necessarily, make it the chief exciting cause of learning and of speculative thought. That great Roman power, under whose imperial sway it originated in one of its obscure provinces, yielded to its influence; and the great body of civil law which that Roman power left, as its chief influence for good in modern civilization, owes its

wise adjustments of the reciprocal rights of social man, to the superior equities which Christianity taught. And the ameliorations of political government have been effected by the benevolent teachings of Christ. And that wider law of philanthropy, called international, of which pagan antiquity knew nothing, arose out of the broader doctrine of reciprocal right and duty, unbounded by race or nationality, which Christianity inaugurated. Even war has lost somewhat of its ferocity under the command to love our enemies. The deep insight into the fortunes of universal man, and the administrative forecast evinced, in conceiving and propounding a moral and religious scheme, which has proved so controlling for good, in general civilization, is altogether without parallel in history.

We have seen that the experience of the pagan world was, that the reason of man required more of him, morally, than he felt himself able to perform. And this is the universal experience of men. Therefore, the moral faculty of man, which delivers, not theoretical, but practical judgments, is a mendacious faculty, on any scheme of morals and religion which does not embrace a vicarious element. Christianity makes, as we have seen, the vicarious principle the foundation of its scheme for reconciling sinning men to a just God. It therefore conforms to the moral constitution of man, and rescues his moral faculty from the paradox of commanding men to perform impossibilities—to lead a perfectly holy life. The moral command requires nothing less than perfect fulfilment. But the load of guilt is not lightened to man, because Christianity shows how he may be relieved of his burden; for the modern mind has, through the influence of Christianity in awakening the moral faculty to the evil of sin, come nearer to an adequate appreciation of human free agency and consequent responsibility. This is manifested, with extraordinary demonstration, in the drama of Shakspeare in contrast with the drama of the Greek poets. The remorse of Lady Macbeth, who is more conscious of her guilt than of a cruel destiny, in participating in the murder of her husband's guest, is in full contrast with the agonies of Clytemnestra, of whom we have spoken in illustration of the moral aspect of the Greek drama. Through the moral discriminations of human character, which Shakspeare

borrowed from Christianity, he has portrayed the deep things of the spirit of man, with a fearful reality that the Greek dramatists never even approached. The moral life of an era is more perfectly exhibited in the drama than in any other species of literature.

But Christianity professes to be, not only a supplement to the light of nature which is the common heritage of all men, but also of the peculiar light which had been given, as a special gift, to the Jews. In this double aspect of a special complement to the narrowest and most exclusive of dispensations, and a supplement and consummation of the one catholic dispensation destroying the line of separation between men, which Judaism had established, Christianity is exceedingly remarkable. That a doctrine of the broadest charity and the utmost catholicity should grow out of the root of the narrowest exclusiveness, seems, to speculative reason, impossible. For the Jewish dispensation, if only a human institution, must be considered as the perfection of bigotry, and could by no analogy evinced in the history of human opinion, give birth to Christianity, which destroys its bigotry, and becomes the consummate flower of its root, to yield fruit not for Jews only, but for all mankind. But admitting that both the Jewish and the Christian dispensations are of divine origin, and do not belong to the ordinary course of historical development, then the mind moves more freely in understanding Christianity as a phenomenon in the history of man. Even if Christ had been a Greek, with all the liberal culture of Greece, so far are his doctrines above those of the Socratic, or any other Greek school, in purity and catholicity of morals, that he would have been a marvel; and the purity and sublime manliness of his character, coming up to the requirements of his perfect doctrine and to the terrible demands of his dreadful struggles with evil, would have exalted him as far above the Greek pantheon, as the grandeur of his death is above that of Socrates. The fishermen, who became his disciples, are as far before Plato and Aristotle in their importance in history, as these philosophers are before the fishermen in human learning and in speculative genius. Plato and Aristotle founded their moral scheme on reason, which promised to philosophers the felicity

of intellectual contemplation in a future life. Christ founded his moral scheme on the affections, and made the dignity of life to depend on conduct, and promised to the ignorant as well as to the learned, the happiness of pure affections exercised on objects which impart peace and joy, not, however, in the darkness of ignorance, but amidst the light of intelligence.

As man is a moral being, knowing right and wrong, and yet prone to do wrong both from ignorance and an evil disposition, or an excess of passion, it is far more in accordance with speculative reason, to suppose that God would give him direct or supernatural instruction, than to leave him to the guidance of his own ignorance. The laws of physical nature, being bound in a necessity of undeviating antecedents and consequents, can be ascertained by human reason; and physical evil be thereby measurably avoided or prevented. But the moral code, except so far as it is founded on a narrow selfishness, never could, it seems to us, be discovered. The instincts of man would be taken by philosophers, as they were by Aristotle, as the affirmations of the moral rules for human conduct. But morality is, for the most part, a restraint upon these instincts, denying what they affirm; and in some instances deciding between opposite instincts; and, at best, in all cases determining, as Aristotle did, the rule of rectitude by the result of good or evil consequences in the majority of instances. Morals are therefore objective and not subjective in their origin. They are an external rule, both restraining the instincts and directing them to their proper objects. The mind, thus having before it, as objective laws, a moral code like the Jewish decalogue, obeys it until, from the experienced adaptation of its precepts to the moral nature of man, it becomes the subjective law of every sentiment, word, and deed. Much of the pagan morality is a traditional inheritance from primeval supernatural instruction, modified by the circumstances of human life.

If there has been no revelation, and there certainly has been none, unless Christianity be such, man is without an authoritative moral code. Morals, then, rest upon the diverse opinions of different ages and of different peoples. Its sanction is only human. And yet it is the moral element of man's nature which constitutes his true nobility, and his relation to

his Creator as the governor of the world. Take conscience from man, and he is, at once, only a higher order of brute. No responsibility, but that of fear of temporal loss, would attach to his conduct; and he need no longer perplex himself about a future state. For if man be not both a moral and religious being, conduct can have reference only to his physical welfare; and if he shall live in another state of existence, the violations of the laws of physiology will not extend their consequences beyond this life. Let man, if such be his nature, conform to the rules of hygiene, and he will enjoy all the felicity of which his constitution is capable. It is not possible for speculative reason to take this ignominious view of human nature.

From the foregoing considerations, according to every principle of rational conviction, we are shut in to the conclusion, that Christianity is a supernatural revelation; and that Christ was such an one as he represented himself to be.

We shall now enter upon considerations that will enable us to determine the relation of Christianity to human reason.

Christianity professes to be, not a product of human reason, but a revelation of truths that are above reason. It does not ignore the light of nature, but supplements it; and does not give to human reason greater powers, but, recognising its impotency and its limits, teaches a doctrine that is beyond the horizon of nature. Its voice is rather a whisper of consolation to that moral faculty, which sophistry, in all the long pilgrimage of pagan life, had not been able to pervert from its function of sovereignty over speculation on human duty, than a scheme of doctrines to satisfy human reason about the speculative difficulties which forced the great master of ancient philosophy to conjecture, that human reason is a wanderer in a strange region. Christ gave no solution of the moral paradoxes which result from the existence of evil in the world. He came to restore, reform, and regenerate, the moral kingdom of the world, by allying it more intimately with the kingdom of the future life. And in the prayer to the Father, which he gave as a model to his followers, the prime petition is, Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is done in heaven. The will of God, which is the supreme law, both in

heaven and on earth, he came to make known as the rule for the guidance of men. We can know nothing more holy than the will of God. To set up any other rule of right, and justice, and truth, is both rebellion and irrationality. Unconditional obedience to the declared will of God is our duty. In our relations to God our duties are absolute. They are imposed on us by a holy, omniscient, and omnipotent lawgiver, the stringency of whose decrees is not lessened by the opposition of either our wills or our reason. Rights and duties are not mutual correlatives in our relations to God. He has organized the world as it is according to his good pleasure; and has imposed a corresponding scheme of duties on man, which he must obey or suffer the penalty affixed to disobedience. Man cannot question the right of God to govern him, in his own way, without bringing down the absolute dominion of God to the level of the relative dominion of a human ruler. It was the duty of Abraham to obey God when he commanded him to slay his son Isaac. The freedom of man consists in doing the will of God. When Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, discusses the paradox of the providence of God and the free agency of man, he does not propound any metaphysical theory of sin justifying the ways of God to human reason; but, recognising the problem as insoluble, he rebukes the presumption of those who lay the fault of sin on God, the creator of sinning man, in these words, "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" Throughout all the discussions in this Epistle, of the great paradoxes of the moral world, the apostle, in no instance, attempts, in his explanations, to solve a problem which lies beyond the limits of human thought; but he teaches the doctrine, in all its stringency, however contrary it may be to human reason in its conceptions of justice on the part of God towards man. That a doctrine is a stumbling-block or foolishness to human reason, has no force, with the apostle, against the Divine teachings. And as Christianity does not view this life as a sunny scene of Epicurean pleasures, but as an awful drama, in which the eternal fate of the actors is determined by the manner in which they act their respective parts, the relation of this life to eternity presents a problem which keeps the mind always on

the border of speculation; and yet the apostles never betray an attempt, in their writings, to step over the limits of human thought. Mysteries are taught as mysteries, without any attempt at a rational criticism. And when a transcendental truth is enounced, it is done in a form wholly unspeculative; as, for example, Christ says, Before Abraham was, I am. Man must be humble in his ignorance, and obedient to the will of God. "It was (says Bacon) that ambitious and imperious appetite of moral science, judging of good and evil with the intent that man might revolt from God and govern himself, that was both the cause and means of the temptation, and gave occasion to the fall of man."

From the foregoing considerations, it is manifest, that in any attempt at a rational criticism of the positive articles of Christian doctrine, contradiction will emerge. Pierre Bayle, in the *Dictionaire Historique et Critique*, formulized some of the contradictions which manifest themselves in a rational criticism of the articles of Christian faith, thereby, as he supposed, showing the irrationality of Christian faith. The contradictions he was unable to solve; and he oscillated, in restless scepticism, between the contradictions. In the article David, he attempted to show, that the moral perfection, called holiness, of revelation, was repugnant to our rational notions of morality, by assuming that the character of David was holy, and that therefore his acts, which to the human sense of morality were evil, were exemplifications of a holy character. As the assumption by Bayle is false, his inference of oppugnancy between morality and holiness, as standards of conduct, is a sheer sophistry. By a more cunningly devised paralogism, he exhibits, in the article Pyrrho, the contradictions between the doctrines of revelation and those of human reason, in the dogma of the fall of man, with the moral evils that are its consequences. "We ought (says Bayle) to prevent evil when we can; therefore it is a crime if we do not when we can. Yet God does not prevent evil." Again, he says, "A person not in existence cannot be an accomplice in crime; yet original sin is a true doctrine." These difficulties, Bayle could not see, result from the constitution of the world admitting evil, and are not peculiar to Christianity. They only prove the

impossibility of a demonstrative theology. Christianity assumes this impossibility; and therefore it was, that Christ came into the world to make known the way of life to man. "Woe unto the world," said Christ, "because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come, but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh." This declaration recognises the inevitable existence of moral evil, but yet proclaims a woe against those who commit evil. Our not being able to understand why God does not prevent evil, neither invalidates Christianity, nor lessens the turpitude of sin. The declared will of God on moral subjects is the truth. And truth is the inevitable law of our thoughts, which we have no choice but to obey, by thinking it to be the truth. If Christianity is a divine revelation, we must believe its doctrines, whether repugnant to our reason or not; as repugnance to human reason, in transcendental truths, is because of the limits of human thought; and therefore, is no valid bar to faith in the supernatural, which Christianity claims to be.

These considerations bring us to the examination of the nature of that conviction, by which we believe in a revelation, called *faith*. The prime basis of all human intelligence is belief, called, plurally, primary beliefs. Knowledge, therefore, reposes on belief, and is only another name for belief when it is at its greatest certainty. Yet knowledge, in its turn, constrains to belief; and this secondary belief is sometimes, by writers, confounded with primary belief. What is meant by faith, is a secondary, and not a primary belief, and therefore it must be preceded by knowledge.

In the explication of faith, as thus defined, it is necessary to consider it in three relations; 1°. Its relation to knowledge; 2°. Its relation to reason; 3°. Its relation to its determining antecedents or objects.

1°. In its most limited meaning, knowledge is confined to self-consciousness and sensuous intuition. Any existence, therefore, beyond the limits of direct consciousness, can only be an object of belief, and not of knowledge in its most limited meaning. By this limitation of the meaning of knowledge, we cannot be said to know even the minds of our fellow-men, or that they have minds; for we are not directly conscious of

them, but only infer, by belief, and not by deduction, their minds, from analogy to what we experience in self-consciousness. If we limit knowledge to this narrowness, we cannot be said to know God. And if we extend the meaning of knowledge, so as to take in the next step or degree in intelligence, and say that we know the minds of our fellow-men through analogy to our own minds, still, as we have not the same degree of intelligence of God as we have of man, if we confine knowledge to this degree, we cannot be said to know God. And the Scriptures recognise this difference of degree in our intelligence of man and of God, in the remark, "He that loveth not his brother whom he has seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" As, therefore, we infer by belief the minds of our fellow-men, we must be said to infer by belief, and from a less cogent analogy, the mind of God, or rather God himself, for to our intelligence God is only mind or spirit. But we know the attributes of God. We learn them first in ourselves, and ascribe them, by analogy to ourselves, to God. But we cannot know them in their infinity; for it involves an obvious contradiction to say, that we know the unfinishable in thought, which is the meaning of the infinite in its relation to knowledge, as our genesis of the notion, given in a previous part of this inquiry, proves, whatever may be its meaning in relation to existence, whether the unconditionally unlimited, or the unconditionally limited. But still the attributes which we know in ourselves, we only infer, by belief, to be in God; and therefore cannot be said to know them in God as by direct cognition.

In the acts of our intelligence in reference to objects, the form of conviction, in reference to a conceivable object, is different from the form of conviction, in reference to an inconceivable object. The first, in all the different degrees of certainty which we have distinguished in the preceding paragraph, is usually called knowledge, and the last is usually called faith. The last has its root in the first; as the inconceivable has its root in the conceivable; for it would be illegitimate to posit an inconceivable that is not some known reality thought of as infinite, such as space, time, or God who is a personal reality thought of as infinite. Knowledge, therefore, constitutes the

root, and furnishes the ground of the limits of belief in God, or of religious faith. It is through or because of knowledge, as defined in this paragraph, without distinguishing the different degrees of conviction in regard to the conceivable which we marked in the preceding paragraph. We can believe in the infinite and absolute only through the finite and relative. The boundary between knowledge and faith is irremovable and insuperable. For if man presumes to *know* what he can only *believe*, he is, at once, doomed, by the laws of his intellectual constitution, to equivocate for ever between inexorable contradictions. But as soon as he humbles himself to the proper level of his intelligence, faith delivers him from the dilemma of contradiction, to the freedom of trusting to the teachings of Christ.

2°. But the relation of faith to reason is very different from its relation to knowledge. It presents the question, whether faith is a rational conviction or a mere blind passive feeling. In order to explicate faith in its relation to reason, we must consider three cases: 1°. I believe because it is consonant with reason; 2°. I believe although it is repugnant to reason; 3°. I believe because it is repugnant to reason.

In the first case, faith is so manifestly rational, that it needs no exposition to show it.

In the second case, reason makes a concession to faith. But as faith, as we have shown, is always founded on knowledge, there must be a foregone conviction to justify faith. In its weakness, faith, sometimes, because of something antagonistic to it in our reason, exclaims, "I believe, Lord help thou my unbelief."

In the third case, faith is put in entire antagonism to reason. Sceptics, in their attempts to invalidate faith in revelation, strive to show, that there is entire oppugnancy between faith and reason, as Bayle did. Revelation they say, must be believed not *although*, but *because*, it is in opposition to human reason. They exhibit, as the true formula of Christian faith, the extravagant purism uttered by Tertullian, in the *De Carne Christi*, when he said, "It is thoroughly credible *because* it is absurd"—"It is certain *because* it is impossible." While this paradox renounces all alliance with reason, and takes open opposition

to it, its very form shows, that, though it ignores reason, it allies itself with reason, and depends upon it for its own validity; as the logical illation, expressed by *because*, demonstrates. The formula is therefore self-destructive; and can have no existence in human thought, except as a form of words veiling an absurdity.

The purity of faith does not require the divorce of faith from reason, as the extravagance of Tertullian implies, but only the adjustment of the relation between them. Faith does not rest upon the impotence of reason, but exists as a form of conviction in the human mind, because man is not omniscient. It is rather because of the limitation than the impotency of human reason. A want of confidence in reason within its proper sphere is not necessary to the strength of faith. But, on the contrary, the more potent reason is within its own sphere, the more certain must faith be within its sphere. The notion, therefore, that faith rests upon the infirmity of reason, and is strong in proportion as the infirmity is greater, is a sheer sophistry. The only plausibility it has, and that is not so much as a shadow of truth, is derived from the thought, that revelation is believed because of our confidence in the person proclaiming it. The thought has been expressed by Bacon in these words: "The more the divine mystery is contrary to reason, the more it must be believed for the honour of God."

We must acknowledge the supreme authority of the laws of thought over all human speculation, controlling all acts of our intelligent nature, not only those of the understanding proper, but of faith also. It is by recognising the reality and universality of these laws, that faith is kept within its proper limits of rationality, and preserved from the paradox of Tertullian. For if the condition of noncontradiction is to be ignored in relation to the evidences of things not seen, and contradiction is to be no impediment to faith, then faith is the opposite of reason, and repugnance to reason is the criterion of credibility in divine things. And thus the *faith* of the philosophy of the conditioned, like the *reason* of the philosophy of the unconditioned, must repose upon the principle, that contradictories are one, and universal negativity, the essence of thought in divine things.

3°. Faith, in its third relation, must be considered in several aspects, in order to explicate it; because of the different determining antecedents, varied as they are by circumstances of diverse logical positions.

The conviction, by which we believe in the infinite from our knowledge of the finite, is metaphysical or philosophical faith. By it we believe in an infinite God, from our knowledge of the physico-theological combined with the psychico-theological proofs; as has been shown in the first part of this inquiry.

When revelation is considered as a scheme of transcendental truths, the relation of faith to it is not the same as to the transcendental in general as an abstraction. Our belief in revelation must, logically, rest upon our confidence in the person who makes it; whereas, in the metaphysical problem of belief in the transcendental as a generality, our faith is necessitated by the logical exigencies of thought. We must therefore, discriminate between the basis of faith in the metaphysical problem of the transcendental, and the basis of faith in the problem of God and of revelation. In the abstract metaphysical problem, which is entirely logical and subjective, faith is determined solely by the relation of the finite to the infinite in human thought. But the relation of faith to the problem of God is determined by all those questions which we have discussed; and its relation to revelation is determined by all the questions which enter into Christian evidences. Whatever is transcendental in Christianity, all its mysteries, are, logically, believed upon miracle. Just as a man believes, against his unscientific reason, in the doctrine, that the earth revolves around the sun, because of the prediction of eclipses and of comets by astronomers, betokening an accurate knowledge of the mechanism of the heavens; so men believe, against their reason, which they feel not to be a complete measure of truth, in all the incomprehensible things in revelation, because of miracles performed by Christ and the apostles betokening superhuman knowledge. It has been argued, that miracles are impossible to human reason, because of the necessity to recognise, in our thinking, the order and uniformity of nature; and that, therefore, revelation cannot rest upon it for proof. But the order or uniformity of nature is only an empirical

truth; and is not necessarily thought as an inevitable interpolation in our thinking about nature.* It is only a re-affirmation that the same is the same, determined by the guidance of the law of identity. The objection, therefore, that miracle is impossible, as a valid human belief, falls to the ground. Hume's doctrine that a miracle cannot be proved by any amount of testimony, has long since, because of its often exposed invalidity, ceased seriously to vex theology.

With most Christians, however, faith rests upon the internal evidences, as they are called, the satisfaction which they experience in Christianity for their spiritual needs. This faith, which is more practical than speculative, is rather an intelligent feeling, founded upon an experienced adaptation of the doctrines to the human heart, than a conviction determined by ratiocination from external evidences. The aspirations and the needs of the soul are not unintelligent instincts, mere cravings after impossibilities, mendacious wants without any possible object of fruition in the universe; but they are a part of our spiritual constitution, and are as veracious deliverances of our intelligent nature, as the deductions of our reason, of which they are the handmaid, and often the guide. Reason or intellect, and the sentiments, are both elements of our intelligent nature, and in their proper union and logical adjustment, guide to the higher truths of the moral world.

The diversities of way, by which men are led to the gospel, are according to their native peculiarities and their previous habits of life. These, it is not within the scope of this inquiry, to explicate.

There must be, either an unconditional recognition or rejection of revelation. Any middle ground is impossible. The only criticism to which it can be subjected, must be founded upon its own resources. One doctrine may be compared with another, or one statement of the same doctrine with other statements, in order to clear up obscurities of meaning. And discoveries in physical science may be used in explanation of any statement of physical facts, such as the periods of

* See Progress of Philosophy, &c., by Samuel Tyler, p. 80.

time denoted by the six days of creation. The truth, that the world was created in successive phases, and peopled by successive creations of vegetables and animals, each perfect in its kind at the moment of its creation, and finishing the whole work with the creation of one man and one woman as the representative parents of the human family to be born of them, is not affected, in its moral bearing, by the discovery, that the periods, called days, are not mere rotations of the earth on its axis in twenty-four hours, but indefinite periods of time. The important truth is, that the world was created by instalments, in successive periods of time; and that the successive periods should afford a type, for a rule of conduct to man of labour for six days, and rest on the seventh for moral and religious improvement. The moral and not the scientific relation of a physical fact, is the intrinsic one in the statements of Scripture. The Scriptures do not teach science.

The doctrine of the limits of religious thought which we have presented as true, is substantially that maintained by Mr. Mansel with such copious and apposite learning, such comprehensive thought, such dialectical vigour and subtlety, and such a pious spirit; though the course and aim of our argument is the reverse of his; ours being positive, and his negative. While we dissent from those critics who represent Mr. Mansel as making faith a mere feeling, only little else than the mute boundary of thought, still, both he and Sir William Hamilton push the doctrine of nescience further than we do. With all the acute discrimination of these two great thinkers, they both yield too much, it seems to us, to the Kantean distinction of *noumenon* and *phenomenon*. They, however, do not accept the subjective relativity of Kant, to the extent of making knowledge only a modification of mind, or a purely subjective product. They are both natural realists. The strong tendency of Mr. Mansel towards extreme subjectivism, is shown in his doctrine, that our conception of reality takes its rise in our minds through the intense consciousness of our real existence as persons. This one-sided doctrine cannot satisfy that dualism in thought, of subjective and objective reality, which is the basis of natural

realism. To thus make the notion of objective reality only the commutation of the subjective for the objective, as this doctrine seems to do, is at variance with any adequate doctrine of natural realism; and can only be maintained upon the Kantean doctrine of hypothetical realism, which must, in its ultimate logical reduction, end in absolute idealism. This extreme subjectivism and relativity taint Mr. Mansel's arguments more than his doctrine; his arguments being sometimes more negative than his doctrine seems to warrant. It was a negative purpose—to exhibit the limits of religious thought—that Mr. Mansel had; and it was next to impossible, in the argument at least, not to push the negation a little too far.*

Though our knowledge is limited and relative, still it is true and real as far as it goes; truth consisting in the correspondence between our thought and the real thing thought about; the apparent being real, though not absolute, but partial and relative. The distinction between knowing a thing, only as it appears, and not as it is in itself, involves, to some extent, the ascription, to the human mind, of that mendacity which only the Kantean distinction of *phenomenon* and *noumenon*, and between the understanding and the reason, can support; and is a deception arising from the necessary existence, in all human or limited thought, of a general and a particular element, of the inseparable union and co-operation of conception and perception in all concrete thinking; conception referring to sameness or matter, and perception refering to diversity or qualities. This subjective dualism in thought, of conception and perception, is necessary to the knowledge of the objective dualism in objects, of matter and qualities. Matter and qualities are necessarily thought as mutual relatives; and they are just as inseparable in nature, and as completely one in real existence, as conception and perception are inseparable and one in actual thinking. That objects are really such as we apprehend them, is the doctrine of natural realism. We know this, it seems to us, or we know

* For a fuller exhibition of the extreme length to which Mr. Mansel has carried this one-sided thinking, we refer our readers to our No. for October, 1860, Art. 4, *Reason and Faith.*—ED.

nothing. If we separate, in thought, matter and qualities, and endeavour to ascertain their mutual relations, we fail; and if we attempt to determine, in consciousness, the difference between them, we fail; for either, upon this last trial, will vanish as nothing, proving their inseparable unity, as an ultimate reality in nature, and an ultimate thought in consciousness. So, too, conception and perception are inseparable in their co-operation in actual thinking; each being impossible without the synchronous co-operation of the other. In human thought, there cannot be absolute unity; for the antithesis of consciousness is the highest and most perfect unity; and it is a dualism. The relativity of human thought necessitates this paradox of the one and the many, of identity and diversity, of matter and qualities; and limitation necessitates relativity.

From the limits of thought, Mr. Mansel determines, very justly, that philosophy has, within itself, no adequate criterion by which to test the validity or invalidity of the supernatural. It can, therefore, pronounce dogmatically neither for nor against a revelation. It can only prepare the way for the positive evidences of Christianity, by removing difficulties. This doctrine does not conflict with the argument, which we have presented in proof of Christianity as a divine revelation. Our argument is based on the relations of Christianity to the world and man.

We have, thus, given an outline of our views of the problem of God and Revelation; and we have exposed the futility of rationalism, while we have vindicated the rationality of faith.

Art. II.—*Mémoires sur la Vie de Messire Philippe de Mornay, Seigneur Duplessis, &c., par* Charlotte Arbalestre, *sa femme.* Treutzel, Paris, 1824.

The history of the Reformed Church of France is like an epic, for we may say of it that it had a beginning, a middle, and an end. From her origin during the reign of Francis I., until Henry IV. gained the throne, in common with her Dutch sister, she was a "church under the cross." From the publication to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, though she enjoyed only a sort of surly recognition by the state, as a "pretended reformed" church, her condition was comparatively peaceful and prosperous. From the Revocation to the Revolution, she aptly styled herself "the church in the desert." To all appearance she had ceased to exist in France, for nearly a century; her ministry and membership seemed to have been utterly exterminated, or, as her persecutors called it, "converted to the catholic faith." During the first two of the above-mentioned periods, she could show a roll of worthies not inferior to that of any other church in Christendom, presenting a splendid array of theologians, pulpit orators, scholars, authors, civilians noble in rank and station, but nobler still for their heroic deeds.

In the long list of historic names that adorn the annals of the French Reformed Church, not one is more truly illustrious than that of Philip de Mornay. Above all his contemporaries, he was a many-sided man, and yet every side of him exhibited rare excellence. He was a statesman, a diplomat, a general, a theologian, a scholar, an author, an humble Christian, a fearless confessor of the faith. In the camp, the cabinet, and the court, he was tempted to abandon the cause of truth, but from early manhood to his dying day, he stood firm as a rock, unmoved by the flatteries and the frowns of a monarch to whose service he had devoted his life and fortune—a monarch to whom he had been bound by common struggles, common sufferings, and a personal friendship of unusual intimacy, but who,

in an evil hour, meanly consented to assume the cloak of hypocrisy in order to win a crown.

The Romish party used to call De Mornay "*le Pape des Huguenots.*" As he never evinced and was never accused of a disposition to play the pope, in the sense of lording it over his co-religionists, this soubriquet of his enemies is a striking proof of the high position he held in the Reformed church, of his commanding influence, and of the large share he took in the movements of his times. Voltaire, whose judgment certainly could not have been biassed by religious prejudices, pronounced him, "le plus vertueux, et le plus grand homme" of the Protestant party.

> "Jamais l'air de la cour, et son souffle infecté,
> N'altéra de son cœur l'austère pureté."

Another eminent writer of later times declares that Philip de Mornay is beyond dispute, "un des beaux caractères de l'histoire moderne; appelé à jouer un des premiers rôles, à l'une des époques les plus mémorables de l'histoire de France, il allia un zèle ardent à une grande modération, et sut à la fois gagner l'amour des Protestants et l'estime de ses ennemis." This is high praise, yet we think that every candid reader of his life will agree that it is not more lofty than just.

About twenty years after the death of De Mornay, five stately tomes were published by the Elzevirs of Leyden, bearing the title of *Memoires de Philippe de Mornay.** The first volume contains a full narrative of the life and times of De Mornay, a part of which was written by his intimate friend Jean Laille, pastor at Charenton, and one of the greatest preachers of that age. In the remainder of the series, we have the correspondence, public and private, of De Mornay, besides numerous state papers from his pen, and we need hardly add, that they open to the historian a rich mine of information in regard to the most important transactions in church and state during the reigns of Henry III., Henry IV., and Louis XIII. Yet these plethoric tomes include only a portion of the material furnished by De Mornay's busy pen, to illustrate the stirring

* One of the volumes seems to have been printed in France, and two of them in Amsterdam, but the series is uniform in size.

times in which he lived. All the letters, and parts of letters, by which contemporary personages might have been compromised, were suppressed, viz. those to and from the Dukes de Rohan, and de la Tremouille, President Jeannin, Henry IV., Marie de Medici, Louis XIII., and many others high in rank or office. Two centuries after his death, an enterprising publisher of Paris (Treutzel) proposed to issue a complete collection of the letters of De Mornay, together with his commentary on the history of De Thou, written in an interleaved copy of that work. The plan embraced sixteen volumes, only twelve of which were published, extending to 1614, but though incomplete, they form an invaluable complement to the more widely known Memoirs of Sully. The first volume of this last series (1824) contains a Memoir of the life of Duplessis Mornay, written by his wife, Charlotte Arbalestre, "pour l'instruction de son fils," which for two centuries had slept in the dusty archives of the family in the old chateau de la Foret-sur-Sèvre. It is an exquisite piece of biography, and a noble monument of Madame de Mornay's intelligence and culture as a Christian woman, and of her affection as a Christian wife and mother. We wish we had room for some extracts from the admirable letter prefixed to it, in which she utters her maternal hopes and wishes to "mon fils."

Philippe de Mornay, baron de la Foret, seigneur Duplessis-Marly, conseiller du Roi, capitaine de cinquante hommes d'armes, gouverneur de Saumur, (such were his hereditary titles and offices,) was descended from one of the oldest noble houses of Normandy, and was born at la Foret-sur-Sèvre, 5th November, 1549. His father was a zealous Romanist, and two of his paternal uncles had good reason to adhere to mother church, as both of them were among her high dignitaries, one being Bishop of Nantes, the other, Abbé of Beauvais, besides having other rich benefices, all of which he intended his nephew ultimately to enjoy. Like so many other great and good men, De Mornay was, under God, indebted to his noble and pious mother for the training which enabled him to render his name illustrious. Though she did not openly identify herself with the Reformed party while her husband lived, she had long had a warm love for the pure gospel, and

at the risk of domestic strife, she early sought to instil the same feelings in the heart of her boy. M. de Mornay dying when Philip was about ten years old, his pious mother was left free to form her own church relations, and to carry out her own plan for the education of her son, with an openness and energy which in other circumstances she could not have ventured to employ. The good seed was planted in a genial soil. In his fifteenth year, De Mornay became a diligent student of the New Testament; he turned his back upon the seductive and splendid career open to him "in the church;" and he seems then to have heartily accepted the faith, to the defense and diffusion of which, all his powers were given with an unfaltering devotion, from dawning manhood to his dying day.

Those were troublous times in France, when nothing seemed easier than to kindle the flames of civil war. For many a century, to fight under some one's banner, had been, we might almost say, the normal life of most of those in whose veins flowed knightly and noble blood. No wonder, therefore, that the young De Mornay, when about eighteen, sought and received his mother's reluctant consent to his joining an older brother in the camp. But the Lord had other designs in regard to him. Kept at home for many months by a severe accident, he occupied the time in the cultivation of those literary tastes which were not less strong than his desire to take part in the stirring scenes of the camp and the campaign. The war was ended before he recovered his health, he therefore went abroad to complete his education by travel, in the course of which he visited Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, not as a mere sight-seer, but as an earnest student. At Geneva, Frankfort, Venice, and other cities, he stayed long enough to form many intimate friendships, to prosecute various branches of science, and to make himself master of the German and Italian languages.

De Mornay returned from Italy in September 1571, and spent the ensuing winter at Cologne, where he became involved in a theological debate with a learned Spaniard, which occasioned his publishing a small treatise in defence of the Protestant theory of the visible church. It was a hasty production, but it served as the basis of his *Traité de l'Eglise*, which

appeared six years afterwards, and was quickly translated into Latin, English, German, and Italian. At this very time the patriots and reformers of the Netherlands were in the midst of their tremendous struggle with Spain; the butcher Alva was at his bloody work, and the young De Mornay, during his residence at Cologne, was so near the battle ground, as to be almost if not actually a spectator of its dismal yet heroic scenes. His deepest sympathies were enlisted in behalf of the United Provinces, and their glorious leader, William of Orange, fighting as they were against fearful odds for the gospel and for freedom. He visited Flanders, and stayed there long enough to comprehend the merits of the Revolt of the Netherlands, and to see with his own eyes the horrible fruits of the ruthless bigotry of Rome. On his return to France, he drew up a Memoir on the state of the Netherlands, so admirable for its statement of facts, its cogent and eloquent reasonings, and its sagacious suggestions, that it excited the wonder of the venerable Coligny, elicited the warmest praise from Scaliger, and was deemed by De Thou worthy of being incorporated with his history of his own times. Yet its author was then only in his twenty-third year. His object was to induce the Hugonot princes to coöperate with William of Orange, but his plans were suddenly frustrated by the matchless perfidy of St. Bartholomew—that blackest day in the annals of France. De Mornay and his mother were in Paris when this "horrible tempest" burst upon the kingdom, and with great difficulty they reached the sheltering walls of his paternal castle of Buhy.

The Reformed Church never fully recovered from this blow, and while the escaped remnant of her membership was yet stunned by it, there would have been no cause for wonder if they had concluded that their contest with Rome was utterly hopeless. After a carnage which stupefied all Europe, (Rome excepted,) one would have supposed that all who had a spark of humanity would have made ready to fly from France as from a land given up to demons. In the words of an old chronicler, "la face de la France estoit horrible;" that of Flanders was nearly as bad; and in these circumstances, it is not surprising that De Mornay and his fellow Hugonots

resolved to remove to some distant region, where they would be safe from the crushing tyranny of Rome. Sweden, Ireland, and America, were each thought of, but as the violence of the storm abated, the scheme was dropped, and De Mornay, who had meanwhile gone to England to engage the good offices of Elizabeth for the "churches under the cross," at the urgent entreaties of his mother and other friends, returned to the land of his birth, to become one of the chief actors in the after scenes of that troubled period.

In January 1576, he was married to Charlotte Arbalestre, the youthful widow of M. de Fauquière. Like De Mornay, she was a zealous Protestant, and had also been in imminent peril at Paris during the Bartholomew massacre. For more than thirty years they were spared to each other, and her Memoirs, which unhappily she did not live to finish, abundantly prove that she was a wife every way worthy of such a husband. She was indeed one of the most illustrious "ladies of the Reformation." She died in 1606, after a long and painful illness, aggravated by the sad and sudden tidings of the loss of her only son, a young man of high promise, for whose instruction she had written her Memoirs of her husband's life. Sympathizing warmly with the heroic Hollanders in their struggle for freedom, he had joined the army of Maurice of Orange, and fell in the assault on Guildres, in his 26th year. De Mornay, who survived his wife nearly twenty years, never ceased to mourn her removal as the heaviest of earthly afflictions. When on her deathbed, with a rare unselfishness, she made him promise that he would not suffer his grief for her to interfere with his public duties. It was a promise easier to give than to keep. He soothed the sorrows of his heart by composing some sonnets to her memory, which display poetical abilities of a high order.

The marriage of De Mornay was almost exactly coincident in date with the formation of that memorable League, which involved France in a series of wars, (known in history as the Wars of the League,) that brought the kingdom to the verge of perdition, and which, with a few intervals, lasted from 1576 till 1596. The Romish priesthood and the Guises were the parties to it. The former, whose ferocious bigotry had been quickened

by the Bartholomew massacre, hoped to crush "heresy" utterly, and insisted that there could be only one religion in France consistently with the safety of the state. Accordingly the supremacy of the Catholic church was the ostensible object of the League; but the Guises, who were the prime movers in it, had another object, about which they were far more concerned; their ambitious eyes were fixed upon the crown. We may explain, in a few sentences, how they came to indulge in these lofty aspirations. No royal house in Europe had a fairer prospect of continuance in an unbroken line than had that of Valois at the death of Henry II. in 1559. He left four sons by his queen, Catherine de Medici—so long the real monarch of France. Two of these sons, viz. Francis II. and the infamous Charles IX., had in succession occupied the throne, but both of them had died young, and without lawful issue. Henry III. (the third son) had so little hope of wearing the crown of France that he accepted gladly the elective one of Poland, and when he left it, probably he never dreamed of again seeing his native land. On the death of Charles IX. he became king of France, and instantly returned thither to enjoy his good fortune; but he too was childless, and his only surviving brother, the duc d'Alençon, was unmarried, so that the early extinction of the house of Valois had become an almost certain event. In that case, the legal heir to the throne was Henry de Bourbon, the young king of Navarre, the political head and hope of the Hugonots. Catherine, failing her own issue, was quietly plotting to transfer the crown to her relatives of the house of Lorraine. The Guises, a younger branch of the same family, wanted it for themselves. The tender consciences of both were quite scandalized by the thought of its being worn by the heretic Henry of Navarre.

Such were the contingencies in view of which "the Holy League" was formed. Henry III., who had excited the contempt of Europe by the manner of his quitting Poland, was the most notorious and consummate Sybarite of that age. As Michelet says, "*Il y laissa le peu qu'il avait de viril; ce qu'il rapporta en France ne valait guère qu'on en parlât.*" It is absurd to suppose that such a creature could care who or what came after him. Like his brothers, he was the mere tool of his

mother; but by a sudden flash of sagacity, or a freak of fancy, he now proposed, to the intense disgust of Catherine and the Guises, to put himself at the head of the League. For a short time he acted in that capacity; but before two years had passed he discovered that the Guises had as little love for Henry de Valois as for Henry of Navarre, and that both they and the Romish priests were as ready—should the emergency arise demanding it—to thrust the one from the throne as to exclude the other. He therefore deemed it necessary to propitiate the Hugonots, which he did by the edict of Poictiers in 1578.

Such was the state of parties in France at the moment when De Mornay, with the dew of his youth fresh upon him, began his public career, in one of the most eventful periods in modern history. How thoroughly he comprehended the condition of France, the causes and the cure of the horrible disorders under which she groaned, is shown by a public paper, written by him in 1576. It is entitled "Remonstrance aux Estats de Blois pour la Paix, sous la personne d'un Catholique Romain," and in every point of view is a most masterly production; one so replete with political wisdom, so eloquent in expression, in a word, bearing so many marks of statesmanship and philosophy, that, if it had been written in English, it would have taken rank among the loftiest political classics of our language. Yet its author was a young man of twenty-five. He shows, in the first place, how essential peace was to all interests and all classes, from the king to the peasant—that "amid the clang of arms and the braying of trumpets the voice of good laws cannot be heard"—"that the poor labourer loses more in one day through the excesses of a rude soldiery, than he would pay in taxes and imposts during a whole year." We wish that our space allowed us to quote other passages in which he depicts the miseries of civil war, as they are so perfectly applicable to the circumstances of our own unhappy land.

He next proceeds to discuss the question, whether uniformity in religion was essential to the peace and prosperity of the kingdom. "Two religions—say many—cannot be allowed in France." "I wish, with all my heart, that there was but one religion, but since mere wishing will do nothing to the purpose, il faut vouloir ce qu'on peut, si on ne peut tout ce qu'on veut."

He then proceeds to demonstrate the falseness and the folly of this notion by an appeal to historic facts, and by a train of reasoning founded on the nature of religion, and the necessary results of intolerance, which is very remarkable, considering the author's years, and the age in which he lived. He writes, be it remembered, in the name of a Catholic, and his argument is directed to two classes, viz. to those who hold the above position in regard to "two religions"—*pour la conscience*, and to those who hold it *pour l'état;* in other words, to those who were actuated by a false zeal, and to those who were governed by a false prudence. "As for the first of these classes, I entreat them to distrust those passions and illusions by which they are induced to see things not as they are in truth. We have been accustomed to regard these people (heretics) as monsters, to hang them as if they were wild beasts. But they are men with the same nature and condition as our own. We have refused all fellowship with them. But they are Christians, who worship the same God that we do, trust in the same Christ, believe in the same Bible, children of the same Father, and heirs of the same inheritance. We have tried to persuade ourselves that they are not true Frenchman; but their language, their purposes, their love of country, their hatred of those enemies who have sought to invade and ruin it, and their notable services for the kingdom, abundantly demonstrate what sort of Frenchman they are. The sole difference between them and us is on this one point, viz. the many abuses which we, as well as they, confess to exist in our church. They, hopeless of reformation, have withdrawn from it, while we expecting a better state of things, with a good conscience abide in her communion. Both are seeking our salvation, both fear to offend God, both cleave to the same Christ. Suppose we are taking different roads, must we cut each others' throats? If a man is in error, enlighten him, but do not burn him; if he is infected, wash him, but do not drown him. . . . . . . Would you prefer that these people should become atheists rather than remain as they are? By intolerant laws you may make men atheists; but by so doing you bring them into a condition worse for *themselves*, since they then believe nothing; worse for *us*, since they fear nothing; worse for the *state*, since

those who have no God, can have no reverence for earthly rulers. . . . . . . I tell you, that you may make them hypocrites, but you cannot make them Catholics; you may convert them into infidels, but you cannot command their faith; and if you oblige them to be false to their God, you have destroyed their conscience, and have prepared them to act deceitfully in the whole business of life." We wish that the limits of our article would allow us to quote other parts of this eloquent argument for religious toleration.

It was at this juncture, in 1576, that De Mornay visited Henry of Navarre, on the earnest invitation of the latter. The acquaintance then formed, quickly ripened into a friendship singularly intimate and tender, and which continued unbroken, until Henry took that step, so fatal to his own fame, to his family, and to France, of disowning Protestantism, and hypocritically pretending to have been converted to Romanism.

Henry had special need of just such a friend as De Mornay, for at no period in his career was the prospect of his wearing the crown of France more gloomy than now. By his cowardly profession of Romanism, at the bidding of Charles IX., during the massacre of Bartholomew, he had shaken the confidence of the Hugonots in his honesty, and without their united and hearty support, his cause was hopeless. By the same act he had awakened the suspicions, and chilled the sympathies of the Protestant princes. Young as De Mornay was, few men were so capable as he of repairing the mischief produced by his apostacy, at home and abroad. The firmness of *his* religious principles had been tested amid the bloody horrors of St. Bartholomew. He was of noble birth; he held the pen of a ready writer, and he could handle the sword like an accomplished soldier; in a word, he was equally at home in the cabinet and the camp. Catherine, Henry III., and the Duc d'Alençon, had already employed him in delicate and important missions, and he was known and honoured by many of the most distinguished personages in England, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany, for his writings and his personal virtues. He threw himself into the cause of Henry of Navarre, with a devotion so ardent and true, so unswerving and unselfish, that he richly earned the place in Henry's heart, which for many

a year he unquestionably held. To Philip De Mornay, more than to any other man—not excepting Sully—was Henry of Navarre indebted for the throne on which he sat as Henry IV. of France. But this first Bourbon paid his immense debt to De Mornay, just as the Bourbon family paid theirs to the party which won for them the crown of St. Louis—by shameless ingratitude and treachery.

As Henry was the first Bourbon who occupied the throne of France, a brief notice of the Bourbon family will not be out of place—a family, by the way, which succeeded in winning and wearing the crowns of France, Spain, and Naples—the first and last named of which they have lost for ever.

The Bourbons were descended from Robert Count de Clermont, the sixth and youngest son of St. Louis. By his marriage with Beatrice, heiress of John of Burgundy, and Agnes Lady of Bourbon, he acquired possessions which made him one of the most powerful feudatories of the kingdom. His eldest son Louis took the title of Duke of Bourbon, the name by which the family was subsequently known in the annals of France. In 1503 the two families of Bourbon and Montpensier were united in the person of Charles de Montpensier, whose son, the celebrated, or we should rather say, the notorious, Constable Bourbon, in an age crowded with great events—the disruption of the Papal power by Luther, and the efforts of Charles V. for universal empire—made himself heard and felt amidst the din and tumult of the world. The military talents of the Constable were of a high order, and they were devoted to the service of France until a real or imaginary insult led him to transfer them to Charles V., whom he helped to win the famous battle of Pavia, when Francis I. was taken prisoner. At the death of the "Great Constable," Charles Duke de Vendome became by marriage the head of the Bourbon family. His eldest son, Antony de Bourbon, married Jane, the daughter and heiress of Henry d'Albret, King of Navarre, a Hugonot, and a Calvinist; and their eldest son, Henry of Navarre, who was educated by his pious mother in the Reformed faith, ultimately became Henry IV. of France.

There are some striking points of resemblance between the history of the Bourbons and that of the Stuarts of Britain.

Both were indebted to Protestantism for their crowns; both were guilty of the basest treachery to the parties which had stood by them with unflinching loyalty in the dark and gloomy day; both came to a miserable end. When Mary Stuart was thrust from the throne she had disgraced, by crimes which had rendered her unworthy of respect as a woman or a queen, her son, James VI., then an infant in his cradle, might have been, and doubtless would have been, quickly disposed of, but for the steady loyalty of the Presbyterians of Scotland. True, his title was unquestioned, but if the Presbyterians had been indifferent, if they had not been as steadfast in their loyalty as they were in their religion, the Stuart might have been forced to give place to a Douglass or a Campbell. How those fared, who had kept ward and watch over the cradle of the infant monarch, when the infant had become a man, it is not necessary for us to tell. The title of the Bourbons to the crown of France was as clear and unquestionable as was that of the Stuarts to the crown of Scotland, yet their claims were resisted by a faction vast in numbers and resources, capable of mustering great armies, encouraged by the blessing of the Pope and the active sympathy of Spain, and if the Presbyterian Hugonots had not thrown themselves into the contest, as they did, with the most perfect union and unfaltering devotion to the cause of the young heir of the house, a Lorraine or a Guise might have wielded the sceptre and shaped the destinies of France. Certainly the only throne which a Bourbon in that case could ever have occupied, was that of the insignificant kingdom of Navarre. Henry, who owed so much to the Hugonots, did not, indeed, openly persecute them; he published an edict securing their religious liberties; but even during his own reign, its provisions were coldly observed, or practically annulled. On the eve of victory, after years of struggles and sufferings, he meanly became an apostate and a hypocrite to subserve his own selfish interests, leaving his faithful and heroic Hugonots to bear, as best they could, the brunt of Romish bigotry and partisan hatred, intensified by the bloody contests in which they had engaged for him. Both the Bourbon and the Stuart reaped what they sowed. They ruthlessly drove into exile the choicest spirits of France and Britain, men of whom their

kingdoms were not worthy, and in due time they were themselves forced to go forth crownless and homeless vagabonds, to wander over Europe. During successive generations, the Bourbons sowed with no stinted hand the seeds of revolution and anarchy, treachery, misery, blood, and at last they reaped a terrible harvest. As they had done to others, precisely so was it done to them. We are accustomed to call the darkest period of the French Revolution, from 1790 to 1795, "the Reign of Terror." Those four or five years were, to be sure, very dreadful, but not a whit more so than the long, long years from 1690 to 1780, not to mention Bartholomew of 1572, which exceeded far the most terrible days during "the Reign of Terror." If any one doubts the statement, let him read the story of the Dragonades, let him peruse Michelet's Louis XIV.

To return to De Mornay. We have stated that if there was one man to whose exertions more than to any other, Henry IV. was indebted for his elevation to the throne, that man was Philip de Mornay. Soon after their first interview, De Mornay went to England as the agent of Henry, and resided there in that capacity for two or three years. As his principal business at the English court was to disabuse Elizabeth of those prejudices against Henry, which his own conduct had excited—and a more suitable agent could not have been chosen than De Mornay, for whom the queen and her leading statesmen had a warm personal regard—he necessarily had a good deal of time upon his hands. He improved his leisure by a careful study of the Greek and Latin Fathers, with a view to the preparation of his work on the church, the composition of which occupied him six weeks. This, however, was only the first draught, which he submitted to the critical examination of the French pastors in London, and such other exiled ministers of the Reformed Church as he could get access to. It was published in 1578, was speedily translated into various languages, and from the numerous attempts to refute its facts and reasonings, we may infer that the Romish theologians regarded the book as one fitted to do their cause serious damage. One of those who undertook to prepare a reply, was the Baron de Meneville, a cousin of the author. The Romish clergy detailed to his assistance a Sorbonne doctor, named Corneille. The choice

of a helper was not fortunate, for instead of confuting he was converted by a perusal of the treatise, and soon after removing to Geneva he became a member of the Reformed church.

Within the limits of a single article, it is impossible to give in minute detail and historic order an account of all the missions upon which he was sent by the prince whom, if he served as a master, he loved as a friend. They extended to England, Scotland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany, and he discharged them with prompt and untiring devotion, though they exposed him to very great perils on the sea and on the land, in the city and the country. Twice, the vessel in which he sailed was captured; and more than once he was brought to death's door by a disease contracted in Antwerp at a time when the plague was raging there. Meanwhile his facile and eloquent pen was incessantly employed in the same cause. From their first acquaintance, Henry seems to have been sensible of De Mornay's rare abilities as an author, and before they parted, in 1576, he called them into requisition, to prepare a public manifesto, expository of the purposes, plans, and hopes of the Bearnois, for the information of France and other nations. At a later period, when Henry III., fully alive to the ambition of the Guises and the treachery of the priesthood, sought to combine his interests and forces with those of the King of Navarre, the task of persuading the Hugonot public to accede to the union with a monarch whom they had so much reason to abhor, was devolved upon De Mornay. In his hands the Hugonots well knew that their religious principles and civil interests were safe. Nor was his influence as a writer confined to his own sect. His unanswerable demonstration of the title of Henry of Navarre to the throne of France, and of the emptiness of the claims of the Guises, his Remonstrance to the Three Estates of France concerning the War of the League, and other pamphlets on the same subject, were circulated over the kingdom, they opened the eyes of the loyal Catholics to the real designs of the League, and prompted them to gather around the joint banner of the two Henrys. Of these political pamphlets, M. Lacretelle says: "l'éloquence y nait de la noblesse des sentiments; aujourd'hui même où de grands ecrivains ont épuré, embelli la langue française, aucun manifeste ne peut offrir des expres-

sions plus vives, plus énergiques." These, however, formed only an insignificant portion of the products of his pen. His public correspondence, *i. e.*, his letters to or for Henry, fill fifteen volumes.

When released from the duties of the cabinet, he was the "fidus Achates" of Henry in the camp, and though in this sphere his services were in a measure overshadowed by those of Sully, yet they were often invaluable. To the foresight and energy of De Mornay, much more than to his own valour, did Henry owe his signal victory at the memorable battle of Contras, 20th October, 1587. On the eve of that battle both the King of Navarre and his military council had resolved not to move in advance of the Duke de Joyeuse, who was at the head of a superior force of the enemy, on the ground that the day was too far gone. De Mornay alone was of opinion that the army should at once cross the river before Contras, and thus secure an advantageous position. He urged this movement so earnestly that Henry, who was an inveterate lover of pleasure, and had intended to spend the night with some of his courtesans, at last lost his temper. "Where, in that case, shall the army lodge?" asked the king, with a good deal of tartness. "Au piquet, en présence de l'ennemi, il n'est pas de meilleure place," replied the undaunted De Mornay. Astonished at this firmness, and perhaps ashamed of his own folly, Henry abandoned the gay party, and at once put his army in motion. If he had not done so, he would almost certainly, the next morning, have suffered a disastrous defeat.

On the 1st of August, 1589, Henry III. fell by the dagger of a priestly assassin, hired and trained for his bloody work by the agents of the League. Bad as he was, both as man and monarch, his death was a heavy blow to Henry of Navarre, and to the Hugonots of whom he was the recognised leader and protector. Though Henry III. lived long enough to declare Henry IV. his rightful successor, yet there was reason to fear that the loyal Romanists who had hitherto followed his standard, would now assume a position of armed neutrality, or would join the army of the League. The dying king strongly advised his successor to "become reconciled to the church," and thus terminate the war for the crown. But Henry was not

yet ready for such an act of baseness, nor, as the event proved, was his army, though composed of Romanists and Reformed, materially weakened in consequence of his firmness. He was now, *de lege*, Henry IV. of France and Navarre, but he was the monarch of a divided kingdom; a mighty League was in arms against him, insisting that his rights as a prince had been forfeited by his apostacy from the faith; while the capital of his dominions, rebellious Paris, refused to admit him within its gates unless he became an obedient son of the church. It was a juncture of affairs well fitted to call forth all those qualities which make the hero and the statesman. "Sire," said De Mornay to Henry, a short time before, "the eyes of France are upon you. God is preparing for you and for us great things." For a while Henry seemed equal to the emergency. To the Archbishop of Rouen, who had begged him to become a Romanist, he wrote: "You tell me that if I would make the nobility and the people my friends, I must change my religion. I am sure, my cousin, that the good people of all ranks would have occasion to believe that I was utterly devoid of all religion, if they saw me pass from one to another merely for worldly considerations. *Tell those people, from me, that religion is not a thing to be put on and off as a man would a shirt.*" In a letter to Walsingham, just before the death of Henry III., De Mornay describes the king of Navarre as "un prince beau, agreeable, adroit et douè de toutes parties requises pour attirer le cœur de la noblesse; en sa personne chacun remarque une vigeur de corps, une vivacitè d'esprit, une grandeur de courage presque incomparable. *C'est la matière dont se sont créés les plus grands princes.*"

The eyes of all France might well be fixed upon a man endowed with such princely qualities, and she had good reason to believe that, with such a monarch firmly seated on the throne, she would enter upon a new career of glory; that art, letters, commerce, religion, all her material and moral interests would flourish as they had never done before. True, there were difficulties to be overcome that might well appal a common man. But Henry was not a common man; Sully, De Mornay, Conde, his companions in arms, were not common men. He must cut his way with his sword to his capital and

his throne; he must crush the spirit of faction, and with a strong hand curb that ferocious bigotry against which the blood of so many thousands of martyred saints, and the sufferings of so many homeless exiles, cried for vengeance; he must compel Papist and Protestant, priest and preacher, to keep the peace, by securing to each the rights of conscience, and subjecting both to the rule and the penalties of just and equal laws. As De Mornay had demonstrated, factions and fanaticism were consuming the very vitals of France. Her grand necessity was religious liberty; and Henry was in a position to secure for her this priceless boon. He had an army ready to follow his white plume to any battle-field—an army whose valour was the product of that sort of piety which creates martyrs and confessors—an army not so numerous as that of the League, but composed of veterans resembling the Ironsides of Cromwell—soldiers whose backs no enemy had ever seen.

For five years after his accession to the crown, Henry struggled manfully with his foes. He fought many battles and gained as many victories. Slowly, indeed, but surely, he was advancing towards the goal. But at last he shows signs of weariness and weakness. He has vowed, with God's help, to redeem France from the bondage under which she has groaned for centuries; the work is half accomplished, but years of toil and self-denial may be required to complete it. If he will simply consent to assume the cloak of the hypocrite, and turn apostate, he can instantly exchange the hardships of the camp for the magnificence of the palace. Paris will open her gates; he can disband his army, as the League will be broken up. Accordingly there was an armistice between the Royalists and the League, and a talk of peace, based upon "the conversion" of the king. De Mornay, though he could not believe that Henry would take a step so dishonourable to himself, and so disastrous to France, used every effort to keep him right. "Never doubt,"—he wrote to the king—"that you will find men enough, full of courage, and resolved to seek the welfare of the kingdom—men, who under your leading will cause the Pope to see, *that it is as easy for us to make a Pope in France as it is for him to make a king.*" We have not space to describe the successive steps in Henry's so-called "conversion."

He tried to persuade himself and others that it was a political necessity, but it was a wretched farce from beginning to end. The trouble was, that while Henry undoubtedly had in himself the "stuff out of which great princes are made," his nobler qualities were vitiated by an intense sensuality,—a sensuality which, notwithstanding his kindly and generous temper, made him a thoroughly selfish man. Under the training of a pious mother, he became a Protestant in conviction and profession; but it is evident that his heart had never been touched by religion. He was a "lover of pleasure more than a lover of God." His licentiousness was notorious, and almost boundless; his amours, as the letters of De Mornay show us, were the standing scandal of the Hugonots, and some of them were attended by circumstances that were prëeminently shameful. This was the "dead fly" in the otherwise goodly "pot of ointment." It was an overmastering vice, and not a state necessity, which caused his "conversion." He is styled by a certain class of historians, *Henri Le Grand*, but on what ground is this title affixed to his name? Compared with the worthless creatures who had preceded him, or with those who succeeded him on the throne, we may, indeed, style him great. He had, in an eminent degree, the qualities which win men's hearts, but Charles II. of England was as largely endowed with the same genial generosity, the same good humour and ready wit. Henry had, and to a certain extent he unquestionably exhibited, commanding abilities, which rightly used would have made him the instrument of enduring good to his country and to Europe. But in what respects was France the better for his having reigned? He left her as he found her, the miserable victim of feudalism, faction, and fanaticism. How small does "Henri Le Grand" appear by the side of his contemporary, Elizabeth of England, and much more when we compare him with the Washington of the Netherlands,—that William of Orange, who, having wrested seven provinces from the iron heel of Spain, and the bloody sceptre of Rome, converted them into an asylum for religion, freedom, commerce, art, science, and who, at last, like himself, fell by an assassin's dagger!

The eyes of the devoted and long incredulous De Mornay were at length opened. The deed was done. Henry was

"converted." It was a dreadful blow to De Mornay as a Hugonot, a patriot, as an admiring friend and follower of his prince. But while such men as Sully allowed themselves to give a half-hearted approval of Henry's apostasy, De Mornay never swerved from the truth and the right; he was found nobly "faithful among the faithless," and casting aside all thought of personal consequences, with the lofty courage of a Christian, he at once uttered a kind, calm, respectful, but most pointed and emphatic protest against the fatal act. His letter to Henry on this occasion, is, in every point of view, an extraordinary production—one which only a great man, a patriotic, sagacious Christian statesman, could have written. While it breathes throughout the most ardent and reverential affection of the friend, and loyalty of the subject, it unfolds, with equal plainness and force, the disastrous folly and unmanly cowardice of Henry's apostasy. He was, as he well might be, profoundly moved by its perusal, yet, at the first interview after he had read it, De Mornay had no reason to suppose that he had given offence, since Henry showed the same confiding and gracious familiarity which had marked their intercourse for years, while the king laboured hard to convince him that there was no reason for his gloomy anticipations.

At the moment, Henry probably felt as he spoke. His affection for De Mornay, we doubt not, was as warm as it was when, in the exuberance of his joy at the escape of the latter from a murderous attempt upon his life, he had written to say, that prince as he was, he would gladly die to save one so deservedly dear to him. He evidently wished that their old relations should remain undisturbed. But this was, in the nature of things, impossible. There was a great gulf between them—the gulf that separates treachery from truth. After such a step as he had taken, Henry must have despised himself, and while confident in the loyalty, he must have known that he had for ever forfeited the respect of a man like De Mornay. As his subsequent conduct showed, he forgot De Mornay's untiring devotion to his cause, his vast sacrifices and toils during so many years, his immense services at home and abroad, but he never did forget or forgive that faithful letter already mentioned. Nor did he evince a much more

grateful remembrance of his obligations to the Hugonot party, to whose unwavering loyalty he was indebted for his crown. He issued, indeed, the Edict of Nantes, the proposed design of which was to secure the Reformed church of France the full enjoyment of her liberties; but some of its provisions were from the first a mere dead letter, and others were repeatedly violated in various parts of the kingdom. Henry was too much engrossed with pleasure, and too eager to convince the Papists, who all along suspected the sincerity of his conversion, that he was a good Catholic, to feel or to manifest much zeal in redressing the grievances of the Hugonots. Only two years after his apostasy, he showed how empty were those professions of unchanged affection which he had made to De Mornay, and how keenly he resented the honesty with which the latter had dealt with him in regard to his "conversion."

It came about in this way. De Mornay having withdrawn from the court to his government of Saumur, had occupied his leisure with the composition of his work on the Eucharist. (*De l'Institution, Usage et Doctrine du St Sacrement de l'Eucharistie en l'Eglise ancienne.*) It is divided into four books. In the first, he discusses the Romish dogma of the Mass, and proves that it has not the shadow of a foundation in Scripture, nor in apostolic practice. In the second, he treats of temples, altars, priests, and other things, and terms growing out of the idea of a sacrifice. In the third, he refutes the notion that the mass is a sacrifice, and conclusively shows that under the New Covenant there neither is nor can be any other sacrifice besides that offered by the Lord Jesus Christ upon the cross. The treatise, in short, is a complete and masterly manual on all the leading points in the Popish controversy—a storehouse of historic facts, patristic learning, and scriptural exposition, from which many a polemic of later times has largely borrowed. Such a work from the pen of such a man, could not fail to excite a great commotion among the Romanists. Henry, who was then seeking a divorce from his wife, Margaret de Valois, and hence wished to be on good terms with the Pope, of course looked upon De Mornay's volume as a most ill-timed publication. The Romish doctors, unable to deny its facts, or answer its arguments, were nevertheless

resolved, by fair means or foul, to bring the book into temporary if not permanent discredit.

Their plan of attack was based upon the probability, or rather the almost certainty, of finding some inaccuracies in a work containing such an immense number of quotations from the Fathers, and references to them. The trick was one which has been often repeated by Popish polemics. But on this occasion, a regular plot was laid to entrap De Mornay; a plot which, there is reason to believe, Henry had the unspeakable meanness to suggest to the priests, in carrying out which, at all events, he was their hearty and zealous coadjutor. We may be allowed to dwell upon the affair, as it is one of the most notable in the literary history of France. If De Perron, the tool of Henry and his priests, and the antagonist of De Mornay, had simply affirmed that the quotations and references of the latter were incorrect or irrelevant, De Mornay might have contented himself with replying, that even if there were five hundred cases of this sort, there still remained forty-five hundred about which there could be no question, and perhaps, as it was, he should have taken this position, and challenged his adversary to make good his assertion. But De Perron charged him with deliberate fraud, by pretending to quote passages which had no existence. Henry knew that De Mornay was utterly incapable of such a crime, yet he descended to the baseness of pretending to believe it. The accusation touched the noble Hugonot, who was the soul of honour, to the very quick, and he was thus prompted to assume the task which his enemies wished to put upon him. He undertook to vindicate his quotations and references, and accordingly sent a petition to Henry, by the hands of the Duc de Bouillon, asking his majesty to appoint a commission to examine his book. The king, of course, complied with the request, named the commissioners, appointed the time (April 2, 1600,) but fixed upon Fontainbleau as the place, instead of Paris, with the evident design of embarrassing De Mornay as much as possible, as in this rural palace, he could neither have access to books, nor could he be assisted in the laborious task of collation by the friends who would have gladly lent him their aid. His enemies would not even give him a list of

the passages which they charged him with mutilating; all that they engaged to do, was to present five hundred passages at the opening of the conference, with the promise that De Mornay should get fifty of them each day for examination. These conditions were, as Casaubon says, so "sane iniquæ," that De Mornay appealed to Henry, but without success, until the king began to fear that if he did not yield, the whole plot might fail.

We have not space for the details of the collation, but will simply describe the results in the words of De Thou, who, though a Romanist, was a man of honour. "Ex quo colloquio Perronius sibi visus est insignem de adversario triumphum deportasse, quòd *ex aliquot mille locis* in libris a Plesso allegatis, *decem* excerpsisset, ex quibus arbitri a rege constituti quædam parum ad rem facere judicârunt." A very small triumph truly, to find among several thousand quotations, exactly *ten*, which were adjudged to be not entirely "*ad rem*." Yet the priests shouted as lustily over it, as they might have done if De Mornay's argument had been refuted; and himself put to shame, while Henry, with an hypocrisy only equalled by that which marked his profession of Romanism, congratulated the bishops and the Papal nuncio on the happy issue of the affair.

De Mornay, certainly, had no reason to be ashamed of the result, yet the business nearly cost him his life. He had spent several days and nights, with hardly a moment's respite for rest or sleep, in a toilsome collation of the Fathers; his generous heart keenly felt the evident and gross partiality of the king; and he was, above all, tortured with anxiety lest the cause of truth should be, in some manner, compromised by his past mistakes or present mismanagement. He bore up as long as he could, but at length he was taken violently ill, so that they had to carry him from the conference-room to his bed. His physician at once informed the king that his life was seriously in danger, and that the colloquy must close. It is scarcely credible, but the fact is nevertheless beyond dispute, that, though De Mornay was brought to death's door, and for many weeks was confined to his chamber, the king, though in his immediate vicinity during the whole period of his illness, never once went near him. When the crisis of the disease was

long past, and De Mornay was nearly recovered, Henry had the effrontery, as we may well style it, to send a private secretary to convey to him the verbal assurance that he was still his friend. "Trust not in princes," were words which must have been often on De Mornay's lips. Such was the end of the "undying love" which Henry of Navarre had over and over again professed, and which he had good reason to feel for the man to whom he was under such vast obligations. And thus these ancient friends parted, perhaps expecting and wishing to meet no more. They, however, did meet again, but the old fellowship and the old affection were ended for ever. Their final interview occurred in June, 1607. The king, on this occasion, welcomed De Mornay with something like the kindness which marked their early intercourse, but the reason was, that he was again forced to avail himself of De Mornay's executive talent and practical wisdom in order to regulate the affairs of his little patrimonial kingdom of Navarre, which had been wholly neglected for years, and were now in the utmost confusion. This service performed, and having nothing to attach him to the court, De Mornay withdrew to his government of Saumur, and within a few years (in 1610) Henry fell beneath the assassin's knife, the victim of that very fanaticism which he had so weakly and vainly sought to propitiate, by casting truth and honour to the winds. How deeply De Mornay deplored the sad event, is evident from his letter to the magistrates of Saumur.*

What Henry IV. might have done for France and for her

* De Mornay's feelings are expressed in a letter to the Town Council of Saumur, dated 19th May, 1610. "Nous avons icy à vous prononcer une triste et une détestable nouvelle. Nostre Roy, le plus grand Roy que la Chrestienté ait porté depuis cinq cens ans, qui avait survescu tant d'adversités, de perils, de siéges, de battailes, d'assassinats mêmes attentés en sa personne, tombe enfin sous le coup d'un misérable, qui noircit en un moment tout cest Estat de dueil, noye tous les bons François de larmes." As his letter was addressed to Protestants and Romanists alike, he adds, "Qu'on ne parle plus entre nous de Hnguenot, ne de Papiste; ces mots sont défendus par nos Edits. Qu'en fussent aussi bien les animosités esteintes en nos cœurs. Quand il n'y aurait point d'Edit au monde, si nous Français, si nous aimons nostre patrie, si nos familles, si nous mesmes, ils doivent désormais estre effacés en nos âmes. Qui sera bon Français, me sera citoyen, me sera frere. Je vous conjure Mrs, de vous embrasser tous, de n'avoir qu'un cœur et une âme."

Reformed Church, if he had not come to an untimely end, in the meridian of his days, is, of course, simply matter for speculation. But if the question be this, viz. What *did* he do for France more than the Guises might and probably would have done for her, if they had won the crown? what did he do for the kingdom or the church, to justify the appellation of *Le Grand?* we are compelled to answer—Nothing. As we have already stated, Henry possessed some qualities which none of his Bourbon successors ever exhibited, qualities which have rendered his memory eminently popular in France. With talents of a high order he combined heroic courage, and a genial humour. He often manifested great generosity towards his enemies. He was kind hearted, and as he once said, he would have been glad if every peasant in the kingdom "had a chicken in his pot." But, after all, he showed himself a thorough Bourbon in his boundless sensuality, his quick forgetfulness of priceless services, his cold-hearted selfishness, his unblushing hypocrisy.

The political life of De Mornay, in one sense, may be said to have terminated when Henry IV. abjured the Reformed faith. He was still a public man, but, as we have seen, he no longer held the intimate and confidential relation to Henry which had subsisted up to that time. He was as firm in his loyalty as ever, but he was no longer the king's trusted friend and counsellor. On the death of the latter, he hastened to assure Mary de Medici, his widowed queen, that if he could in any way lighten the burdens thrown upon her by the sad event, his services were at her disposal—an offer of which Mary gladly and gratefully availed herself on several occasions. But, as we have said, he ceased to be a courtier—we use the word in its best sense, for in its bad sense he never was one—and the remaining years of his life were chiefly spent in watching over the interests of that Reformed church, to whose communion he had been bound from early manhood, by the deepest and strongest convictions, and for whose welfare he would cheerfully have laid down fortune and life. The Romanists, as we have before mentioned, were wont to call him "le Pape des Huguenots;" and certainly among the Reformed there was no man better fitted by intelligence, sagacity, calm wisdom, catho-

lic temper, and profound piety, to discharge the functions of such an office. But he does not appear to have had in any measure the spirit of Diotrephes. He used his utmost efforts, not without success, to preserve a good feeling between such Protestant grandees as De Bouillon, Sully, and others, and the national Synods, a task both delicate and difficult, as the former evinced a disposition to make themselves the political heads and lords of the church, and to use her as an instrument to accomplish their own personal or party purposes.

If seigneurs and synods had not been obliged to struggle incessantly with their common enemies, the king and the Pope, we think it probable that the Reformed church of France, like her sister church of Scotland, would have been forced to fight with her own professed supporters and friends, for her spiritual independence, or, to use the Scottish formula, "the crown rights of Christ." In the infancy of the Reformation in France, the influence of such great feudatories as Coligné, Conde, Bouillon, and Rohan, must have given a decided impulse to the movement, while by their feudal power they could, to a certain extent, restrain the ruthless bigotry of Rome. But when the Hugonots had become an organized party, when "the pretended reformed" religion was strong enough to muster armies, to fight battles, to demand from Valois and Bourbon securities of peace, we are inclined to believe that their connection with the Reformed church injured her quite as much as it benefitted her. She leaned too much upon these princes, and found them to be broken reeds. They at times betrayed her into measures well calculated to awaken the jealousy and to stimulate the bigotry of the king. Thus, in 1612, two years after Henry's death, one of these magnates, De Rohan, counting, perhaps, on the weakness of the Regent, Mary de Medici, undertook to enforce some feudal prerogatives of his, and thus came near rekindling the flames of civil war, under circumstances which must have made it utterly disastrous to the Hugonots. De Mornay's wisdom and energy, under God, saved the church and the kingdom from this great misfortune. Mary de Medici was very grateful to him, as she had reason to be, for this important service, and she expressed her gratitude not only in words, but by restoring to De Mor-

nay some offices of which he had been deprived, and the payment of pensions which had been suspended long before the death of Henry. Cardinal Perron, in spite of his prejudices as a Romanist, was so impressed by the real grandeur of De Mornay's character, as illustrated at this juncture and on other occasions, (which showed of what stuff men were made—occasions when it was easy to distinguish the large-hearted patriot from the narrow-minded and factious partizan,) that he was warm in his praise, and earnestly advised the queen-mother and her young son, Louis XIII., to insist upon his return to court, and to make him one of their most trusted counsellors.

We have too little space left us to notice other features of De Mornay's career with the fulness which they deserve. On the field of authorship he won a reputation no less brilliant than that which he gained in the cabinet and the camp. He was eminent alike as a theologian and a statesman, and as an author, he in no small measure added to the glory of the Reformed church of France in the most illustrious period of her history. He grappled with the great questions of that age, and handled them like a "master in Israel." He stood forth in the front rank of those heroic witnesses for the truth, who had thrown down the gauntlet to Rome, and had set themselves for the defence of a pure gospel, an unfettered conscience, and a living church; and he so demeaned himself in that position as to secure a European renown. He earned the fervent love and veneration of the French church, not only by the manifold and masterly productions of his pen, but also by the patronage he extended to her seats of learning, especially to the University of Saumur.* This Academy was founded by the National

* What Paul said of the Macedonian churches, (2 Cor. viii. 2,) may be applied to the Hugonots: "In a great fight of afflictions, the abundance of their joy and their deep poverty abounded unto the riches of their liberality" in the cause of education. In each one of the thirteen provinces of France, in 1607, they erected a college, or grammar-school, to prepare their youth for a university course. Two universities were established in 1596, and at a later period there were no less than six, sustained almost entirely by the Reformed church, viz. at Saumur, Montauban, Nismes, Montpellier, Sedan, and Die. By the Edict of Nantes, the government was bound to give a certain sum annually for their support, but the money was very irregularly paid. All branches of the Reformed church were zealous friends of sacred learning, but the poor and persecuted Hugonots on this excelled them all.

Synod in 1596, and the members of that body "entreated Monsieur le Gouverneur of that town to continue the hearty support which he had hitherto given to the scheme." During the first half of the seventeenth century, the University of Saumur had so high a reputation in France and beyond it, that most of the Protestant nations had representatives among its students. It included faculties of theology, philosophy, and belles lettres. The ancient, modern, and oriental languages were taught. There were two colleges "pour les humanités," one for Protestants, another for Romanists. In addition to all these means of education, there was an "academie d'equitation," in which the young men were trained in exercises that fitted them for the camp, if forced to go to the wars, and also to endure hardness as the soldiers of Christ. Among the professors at Saumur were some of the most famous scholars and theologians of that age, such men as Cappel, Cameron, Gomar, and in sundry instances the powerful influence of De Mornay was exerted to secure their services to the institution, in which he naturally felt a special concern, as Saumur was the seat of his government, and his place of residence.

Even at this early day the French church was disturbed by controversies growing out of the speculative tendencies of some of her leading divines. Piscator, in 1604, had broached opinions respecting the relation of our Lord's human nature to the law, which were deemed repugnant to the reformed faith. A few years later, Amyrant was taken to task for the way in which he had expressed himself on the extent of the atonement, and its relation to the decrees of God.* There was great danger of the Reformed becoming divided among themselves, a result pregnant with mischief to the good cause. De Mornay, therefore, directed all his efforts to the task of allaying the strife. Writing to one of the Synods, he says: "I shall not enter into the question, (Piscatorian.) We had better heal our old sores, rather than open new ones. We had better allow such matters to sleep, seeing that our adversaries are perpetually on the watch for our halting." He

* If our New England friends will study this portion of dogmatic history, we think they will discover that some of the distinctive features of their theology are not so new as they seem to imagine.

then warmly commends the conduct of the Reformed and the Lutherans in the Palatinate, who had declared that their difference in regard to the Eucharist should not hinder their fraternal union, as they were perfectly agreed about the thing, and only disputed about the mode, "de re constat, licet non de modo rei." Ten years afterward, (April 20, 1614,) the venerable statesman and saint wrote in a like strain, and for a similar purpose, to the National Synod, "de croire de moy, comme de celui qui n'a plus en ce monde que son épitaphe à faire, lequel avec la grace de Dieu ne démentira ny le style ny la teneur de ma vie." He goes to say, among other things, that pious people were expecting two results of this Synod, viz. that its authority would be exerted to suppress needless doctrinal debates, which disturb the peace of the church, and that all proper means would be adopted to heal the divisions which such debates had already produced. We may infer that his letters had a good effect, as he was chosen a member of a commission appointed by the Synod to deal with Du Moulin and Tilenus, who had fallen out on a point of theology, and to reconcile them, as happily they did.

A proper review of the numerous works of De Mornay, political and theological, would fill a long article. Our notice of them must be very brief. We have not space even to enumerate them all.

1. His *Discours de la Vie et de la Mort*, was published about 1576. It was composed at the request of Madame de Mornay, before their marriage, and while he was paying his addresses to her. Such a request, odd as it may seem to many, is not surprising, when it is remembered that both of them had been in the midst of the horrors of Bartholomew, and that they lived in times when Paul's words had a meaning and a force, which they have nearly lost in these days of peace, "let those who have wives be as though they had none." The aim of this work is wholly practical, and it is written in a style of glowing eloquence.

2. The *Traité de l'Eglise, où l'on traite des principales questions sur ce point en nostre temps*, was first published in London, in 1578, but was afterward enlarged, and passed through numerous editions between 1579—99. As before mentioned,

it was the means of converting the monk Corneille, who had been appointed to refute it.

3. The *Traité de la Vérité de la religion Chrétienne*, appeared in 1581. It is an admirable defence of religion, natural and revealed, "against atheists, Epicureans, Pagans, Mahometans, and other infidels." The work is one of his best, and displays vast erudition. Yet occasionally the author indulges in reasonings more fanciful than solid, as when he attempts to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by arguments drawn from natural reason, and to establish the fall of man by natural religion.

4. *De l'Institution, Usage, et Doctrine du sainct Sacrement de l'Eucharistie en l'Eglise ancienne, comment, quand, et par quels degrez la Messe c'est introduite en sa place, en IV livres*, was published in 1598.

5. *Le Mystère d'Iniquité, i. e. L'Histoire de la Papauté; par quels progrez elle est montée à ce comble, et quelles oppositions les gens de bien ont faict de temps en temps. Où aussi sont defendus les droicts des Empereurs, Rois, et Princes chrestiens, contre les assertions des cardinaux Bellarmin et Baronius*, is a goodly folio, and was first published at Saumur in 1611. The titles of the last two works, which we give in full, sufficiently explain their aim and character. The one on the Eucharist appeared just after the apostasy of Henry IV., the History of the Papacy appeared just after the death of Henry. Each of these works created a great sensation in France, and both of them were quickly translated into most of the languages of Europe. Together they form a vast storehouse of learning and logic, to which many a later writer on the Popish controversy has been glad to repair, that without the trouble of personal research, he might load himself with historic facts and patristic testimonies.

Besides these masterly contributions to polemic literature, he wrote a considerable number of volumes of a purely devotional cast. His political works were also numerous, and, as we have seen, were eminently serviceable to the cause of Henry IV. In 1571 he is said to have composed a work on *Law Ripuary*, *Salique*, and *Canon*, which was lost in the confusion caused by the Bartholomew massacre. His wife says

in her Memoirs of him, that he wrote a treatise on the Legitimate Power of Princes, and hence some have inferred, that De Mornay was the author of the anonymous volume *Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos.* Other anonymous volumes, which made considerable noise at the time of their appearance, are attributed to his prolific pen, particularly one on The Rule of Faith, and another on Councils. When we consider the long list of his acknowledged works, which would fill more than twenty quartos, and the vast reading which many of them evince, one would suppose that their author must have lived the life of a lonely and laborious scholar. Yet we know that he was one of the busiest of men in the camp and the cabinet, one of the chief actors in church and state during that stirring age.

Of the closing scene of his earthly career we have an exquisite memoir from the pen of Jean Daillé, who witnessed it. He had studied at Saumur, and for some years after his licensure he resided in the family of De Mornay as a sort of domestic chaplain, and as tutor of his young grandchildren. Not long before De Mornay's decease, Louis XIII. had taken the reins of state into his own hand, and gave signs of his purpose to imitate the policy which his unscrupulous minister and master, Cardinal Richelieu, afterwards carried out, viz. of wresting from the Hugonots, by force or fraud, all their "villes de sûreté," and thus rendering them dependent absolutely on the royal favour, and of breaking down the power of the great feudatories, Papist and Protestant, thus completely consolidating the monarchy. The gathering clouds excited extreme uneasiness in the minds of Hugonots of all classes, who, at the same time, felt that if any man could avert the tempest, it was De Mornay, the man to whom the young king, and his mother, and his father, owed so vast a debt of gratitude. They begged him to interpose on their behalf. Notwithstanding his bodily infirmities, he readily agreed to perform this last service for the cause to which his whole life had been devoted, and at once he began to prepare for his journey to Paris. But it was his Master's will that he should take another and grander journey —that to the "better country." His mission to Paris was arrested by what proved to be his last illness.

When, says Daillé, he found that the attack was more

serious than he had imagined, his first concern was to add a codicil to his will, and having thus arranged all his worldly affairs, he exclaimed, "Now I have nothing more to do but to die." During his sickness he gave so many express and clear testimonies to his faith and assurance, that we may say that in this brief space he confirmed by irrefragable evidences all that he had ever said or written concerning the truth of the Christian religion. We saw most distinctly, the gospel of the grace of God engraven by the Spirit on his heart; we saw him filled with content in circumstances which fill most men with terror. When the pastor of the congregation of which he was a member announced to him, somewhat bluntly, that his recovery was hopeless—"Is it so?" said he, "well, I am content." Not long afterwards he added, "I have a great account to render, I have received much and have profited little." The pastor rejoined, that during a long life he had happily and faithfully used his talents in the service of Christ and his church, De Mornay instantly exclaimed, "Say not I have done it—not I, but the grace of God in me." The pastor asked him, "Monsieur, do you attribute no merits to your works?" "Merits! merits!" replied De Mornay, "away with merits from me, and from every other man, be he who he may. No, I ask only for mercy, unmerited mercy." Then with a firm and grave voice he blessed his daughters and their husbands, praying them to maintain among themselves peace, "which," added he, "I bequeath to you." Then he pronounced his blessing upon their children present and absent, beseeching God to ratify it with his own holy benediction. The same was done to his nephew and niece, and to all his domestics. Lastly, and with deep solemnity, he gave a blessing to the pastor present, and to the church of Saumur, with which he was accustomed to worship, and in the spiritual welfare of which he had long taken the deepest interest. "During my life," said he, to the company in his chamber, "I have had no other aim but the glory of my God. Those who have known me, are well aware that if I had chosen other ends, it would have been easy for me to attain great riches and high honours. Pray to the Lord that he will dispose of me as he pleases. I am not disgusted with life, but I see before me one far better than the present.

I withdraw from life, but I do not fly from it." As his children and grandchildren, for the last time before he became insensible, gathered round his bed, he took the hands of each and pressed them to his lips and said, "I commend peace and fraternal love to you all, so that you may possess in peace the inheritance and the name I leave you." On the 11th of November, 1623, he calmly fell asleep.

Such was the peaceful end of the great and good Duplessis Mornay—one of the purest spirits and brightest ornaments of his times. "You will search in vain," says La Vassor, "history, ancient or modern, for a character superior to his. Equally at home in science and the affairs of the world, he defended religion, discussed the most thorny questions of theology, he sustained the Reformed churches by his prudence, he gave good counsel to ministers of state and to princes, and even kings listened to him with respect."

Art. III.—*The Human Body as related to Sanctification.*

The relation of the human body to the moral and spiritual condition of its occupant, is very undefined to most minds, sometimes for want of thorough attention to the subject, and sometimes from the inherent difficulty of finding the principles which adjust and determine all questions pertaining to it. At the same time, it is a question of high interest, and, as the frequent references to it in Scripture prove, the due understanding of it is important, and the sober study of it profitable.

We think an examination of the various shades of doctrine, of knowledge, and of ignorance on this subject, which have place in Christendom, will disclose the three types of opinion which obtain in reference to nearly every point of speculative and practical divinity—we mean the ritualistic, the rationalistic, and, midway between these extremes, the evangelical. According to the former, religion consists preëminently in "bodily exercise" of some sort; either in public

corporeal rites and sensuous ceremonies, which, as outwardly performed, confer saving benefits by an *opus operatum* efficacy, or in volunteer private bodily austerities, penances, and mortifications. The rationalists, on the other hand, incline, in various degrees, proportioned to the intensity of their rationalism, to exclude the body, with its conditions and activities, from the sphere of morality and religion. According to them, holiness and corruption are wholly aside of it. They are as irrelative and impossible to it, as to blocks and stones, trees and flowers, fruits and birds. Some go the length of denying, ignoring, or explaining away the resurrection, without which our faith is vain, and Christianity a delusion.* This, however, is not common. But otherwise to estrange the body from all relation to religion, as being alike incapable of participating in the sin or sanctity of the person, is exceedingly common with those even who do not avow it. Less than this would be inconsistent on the part of that large class of theologians who deny to the intellect, the feelings, the desires, and affections,—everything but the mere faculty of volition,—all participation in the depravity resulting from the fall, and, of course, in the holiness imparted by the Holy Spirit in our recovery from it.

Like all extremes, however, the foregoing sometimes meet. Ritualism and rationalism sometimes embrace each other in the common heresy, that body and matter are essentially evil, and the cause of all sin; hence, that perfection can be attained only by the ascetic and self-torturing purification of the body, according to monkish ritualism, or by the final and eternal release of the soul from its imprisonment in the body. This is Christianity filtrated through Platonism. Moreover, some of the late transcendental forms of rationalism, which make Christ a mere manifestation of God to men, and the incarnation only the entrance of God, or of a new divine life-power, into humanity and history, maintain that this divine human life is enclosed in the church, and communicated or actualized to men through her ministry and ritual. Thus we have a ritualized rationalism and a rationalized ritualism; of both which counter-types of *cultus* and speculation the Mercersburg school

* 1 Cor. xv. 13—19.

in our own country, on the one hand, and the new Oxford, Broad Church School in England, on the other, are conspicuous concrete examples.

Indeed, all forms of rationalism, which have a tincture of pantheistic thinking, either as born of, or begetting it, or which in any way confound and vacate the essential dualism of body and spirit, tend to condense into ritualism, unless they first evaporate into utter scepticism. In whatever way this be done, the identification of body and spirit makes the exercises of the one exercises of the other. So "bodily exercise," a sensuous ceremonial, sacerdotal manipulations, affect the spirit *per se* by an *opus operatum* efficacy, because body and spirit are one, and the exercises of either are exercises of both.

The impugners of this dualism between body and spirit in man, are reducible to three principal classes. First, the materialists, who hold that the soul is the product of the body, its "blossom and fragrance." So such materialists as Condillac and Helvetius maintained that thought was but "transformed sensation," however sublimed and etherialized it might be. Opposite to this view, which makes the soul an "efflorescence of the body," is the ideal theory, which makes the body a product, a development of the soul, or a frame-work built by it for a temporary habitation—the chrysalis in which it envelopes itself preparatory to emerging into its perfect state. This idealizes the body. A third theory may be called the transcendental, because it is logically allied with modern transcendental thinking, in connection with which it is chiefly found. It does not directly materialize the spirit, or spiritualize the body, but makes them both products of one principle, properties of one substance, which is neither the one nor the other exclusively, but developes both separately and simultaneously. "It would be erring," says an advocate of this theory, "to say that man consists of two essentially different substances—of earth and soul; but he is *soul only*, and cannot be anything else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in the *life* of the body, and internally in the life of the mind. Two-fold in its development, it is one in its origin, and the centre of this union is one personality. . . . . We admit, therefore, of a difference between soul and body, but one that proceeds from,

and terminates in, a union."* It is very obvious that, if body and spirit are but one substance, the exercises of the one are the exercises of the other. Ritualism is the logical result.

While this sort of rationalism meets, and ossifies itself into ritualism, which exaggerates the position and office of the body in sanctification, another species, to which we have already adverted, goes to the opposite extreme. It inclines unduly to attenuate the relation of the body to religion and irreligion, sin and grace, the fall and redemption; indeed, to rule out not only the body, but all the powers, states, and exercises of the soul, except the volitional, from the sphere of morality and responsibility—from all share in corruption by the fall, and sanctification by the Spirit. The truth is, all parts of our nature, though in degrees varying in proportion to the intimacy of their connection with the rational and voluntary self, the inmost seat and centre of responsibility, partake of its corruption and sanctity. That which is in vital union with the person, and is so pervaded by our personality that whatever befalls that befalls the person, is liable to be implicated with, or to sustain intimate and important relations to the moral states of that person. These relations are, indeed, subordinate, not paramount. Still they are none the less real and important.

In this view Scripture and sound philosophy coincide, not only with each other, but with our Confession of Faith, which declares: "This sanctification is throughout the whole man, yet imperfect in this life; there abideth still some remnants of corruption in every part, whence ariseth a continual and irreconcileable war, the flesh lusting against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." In proof and explanation of this article, its framers quote 1 Thess. v. 23: "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly: and *I pray God* your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."† The apostle's prayer obviously calls for a complete sanctification. This completeness, too, has reference to the several parts or elements of our nature, rather than to perfect sinlessness on earth. Such per-

* Rauch's Psychology, pp. 185, 186.

† See Confession of Faith, Chap. xiii. Art. 2.

fection in holiness as is implied in the sanctification of all the elements of our nature, and in possessing some measure, at least, of all the Christian graces, is required in the word of God, and has ever been recognised by the church, as of the essence of Christian piety.

Here, however, various questions arise. What precisely is meant by soul and spirit? How do they differ from each other? In what sense can the body be the subject of sin, or holiness, or sanctification? It is to this last that we shall now direct our especial consideration. We will first, however, say a word, in the hope of clearing the perplexities which are sometimes quite annoying, in regard to the former.

We can discover no better analysis of the ascending grades of being, than that given by the soundest philosophers, physical and metaphysical, which accords so well with the language and meaning of Scripture, the doctrine of the church, and the unperverted judgment of mankind. We have, 1. Inorganic matter, endued only with mechanical and chemical energies—*υλη*—as stones. 2. Organic matter endued with a power to unfold, according to a certain law, from a germ within, by taking and assimilating matter from without—*υλη* or *σωμα* + *φυσίς* = plants. 3. Matter having not only organization, but consciousness or sensibility—*σωμα* + *φυσiς* + *ψυχη* = animals. 4. Matter having not only organization and sensation, but all this conjoined with reason, or a rational spirit superinduced upon it—*σωμα* + *φυσìς* + *ψυχη* + *πνευμα* = men, moral and accountable. 5. Pure spirit unembodied, as in God, who is a spirit, and the spirits of the just made perfect, prior to the resurrection. So plants are distinguished from lifeless things by the *φυσìς;* animals from plants by the *ψυχη;* and men from animals by the *πνευμα.*

While the *φυσίς* is not a substance separate from the bodies to which it belongs, but an energy, principle, or law working in and shaping those bodies after a certain method; the *ψυχη* and *πνευμα* form a substance distinct from the *σωμα*, but brought into mysterious and vital union with it, in order to bear imperial sway over it; yet separable, and from death to the resurrection actually separated from it, as then disorganized and dissolved; the spirit meanwhile living, awaiting its reorganiza-

tion and reunion at the Lord's second advent. And this, we apprehend, not only because in the custody of the Lord, but because being simple, without parts, and therefore incapable of dissolution, it, in the words of the poet,

"Cannot but by annihilating die."

It is by virtue of this *πνευμα, νους, λογος*, imbreathed into man when he "became a living soul," that he is made in the image of God, and, although he has defaced it, capable of being renewed therein in "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness," Eph. iv. 2, 3, 4; Col. iii. 10; and by this withal, that he is for ever distinguished from the brutes, as a rational, moral, accountable, and progressive being. With due allowance for poetic freedom of expression, and a consequent avoidance of a too literal interpretation of certain phrases, as if higher grades of being were developed from the lower, *propriis viribus*, the substance of the foregoing analysis of the ascending orders of existence is exquisitely given in some lines of the sublimest of poets, who, like so many others, had

"A vision and a faculty divine,"

for philosophy as well as poetry; some of whose highest poetic flights are but sublimated metaphysics, and whose finest prose is but magnificent poetic reasoning. He puts the following address into the mouth of the angel, "winged hierarch," whom he represents as in converse with our first parents.

"O Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Endued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and, in things that live, of life:
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,
As nearer to him placed, or nearer tending,
Each in their several active spheres assigned,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportioned to each kind. So from the root
Springs lighter the great stalk, from thence the leaves
More aery, last the bright consummate flower
Spirits odorous breathes: flowers and their fruit,
Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed,
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,

> To intellectual; give both life and sense,
> Fancy and understanding; whence the soul
> Reason receives, and reason is her being,
> Discursive, or intuitive; discourse
> Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours,
> Differing but in degree, of kind the same."*

The foregoing distinctions will help to indicate what is meant by body, *σωμα;* the soul, *ψυχη;* the spirit, *πνευμα*, in 1 Thess. v. 23, to which we have already adverted. A slight comparison of scriptural passages will show, we think, that while *ψυχη* and *πνευμα* are each sometimes used for the whole interior conscious principle, of which they severally constitute a part, yet that the general usage of Scripture makes the former the principle of animal life and consciousness, including the animal appetites and desires, while the latter indicates the rational spirit, which is not only above all the powers of brutes, but imparts somewhat of its own dignity and rationality to the lower sensations, perceptions, and desires of the *ψυχη*, with which it inter-works, and is, in our present earthly state, interfused. Calvin interprets the *πνευμα* and *ψυχη*, as denoting respectively, reason and will, including under will, according to the old terminology, desires, affections, &c.† This, however, differs less from our exegesis in sound than in fact. For the principles of animal consciousness, sensibility and intelligence, scarcely go beyond feeling, appetite, and action, and such instinctive insight as is requisite to guide, however blindly, their action within the sphere assigned them. The intelligence of the brute is but a faint element in his consciousness, and is wholly secondary to, and comparatively lost in its feelings, impulses, and determinations to action. Superinduce upon this that reason whereby we are capable of knowing God

* Milton—Paradise Lost, Book V., vs. 469—490.

† "Notanda est autem hæc hominis partitio: nam aliquando homo simpliciter corpore et anima constare dicitur, ac tunc anima spiritum immortalem significat, qui in corpore habitat tanquam in domicilio. Quoniam autem duæ præcipuæ sunt animæ facultates, intellectus et voluntas, Scriptura interdum distincte hæc duo ponere solet, quum exprimere vult animæ vim ac naturam: sed tunc anima pro sede affectuum capitur, ut sit pars spiritui opposita. Ergo quum hic audimus nomen *spiritus*, sciamus notari rationem, vel intelligentiam: sicut *animæ* nomine designatur voluntas et omnes affectus." *Calvin's Commentary* on 1 Thess. v. 23.

and righteousness, and this brute feeling and willing are transformed into rational and responsible exercises.

In the prayer that we may be wholly sanctified, body, soul, and spirit, as it may be assumed that soul and spirit together mean the whole of that interior principle which is not body, so it may be assumed that they differ from each other according to their distinctive meanings elsewhere in Scripture. What are these? In Acts xx. 10, *ψυχη*, it is translated life. "His life (*ψυχη*) is in him." Matthew vi. 25, "Take no thought for your life." "Your life (*ψυχη*) is more than meat." Hence it is used to denote that sentient or conscious principle which animals possess in distinction from plants, and which men possess in common with brutes;—in short, that intelligence and sensibility, those perceptions, instincts, desires, which belong to animals, and which pertain to our animal, as distinguished from our spiritual nature. It thus denotes the seat of the lower or corporeal "senses, desires, affections, appetites, passions."* In this narrow and inferior sense it is used when contradistinguished from spirit, as in the passage already quoted; and when the apostle speaks of the word of God as "piercing to the dividing asunder of the soul and spirit," Heb. iv. 3. The sense now indicated is quite marked and palpable in 1 Cor. ii. 14, where the adjective *ψυχικος* is translated "natural." "The *natural* man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." This clearly means a man ruled by his lower propensities, including his animal appetites and passions. It is essentially of like import with "flesh," "fleshly," and "carnal," in Rom. viii. In this meaning, soul is used when distinguished from spirit, in the manner we have specified.

Spirit means that rational element, superinduced upon the animal nature, which distinguishes man from brutes. It is the peculiarly spiritual, the immortal part. Added to, penetrating, informing, ruling the lower sentient principle of the mere animal nature, it raises the whole to the dignity of manhood—a grade a little lower than the angels—as rational, moral, and

* Robinson's Lexicon of the New Testament, Article Ψυχη.

accountable. Thus, then, do we understand this triple division of humanity into body, soul, and spirit. *Body*, meaning our material organism; *soul*, our lower perceptions, propensities, and desires; *spirit*, the rational, accountable, and immortal nature.

It is still further to be noted, that, as soul and spirit, *ψυχη* and *πνευμα*, denote respectively, the one the lower, the other the higher element in our immaterial, conscious nature, so each is often used alone to denote our entire incorporeal being,—the rational, sensitive, and voluntary nature, higher and lower. Thus, "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul," (*ψυχη*)? "Or what shall he give in exchange for his soul," (*ψυχη*)? Matt. xvi. 26. "Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. x. 28. And in this now popular sense of the word soul, shall we use the word when not contrasted with spirit in what follows.

In like manner, spirit (*πνευμα*) is often used to denote the whole interior conscious nature. As when we read of "glorifying God in our body and spirit," (*πνευμα*). 1 Cor. vi. 20. In such cases, spirit, like soul in the instances just cited, means the whole incorporeal, sentient, conscious nature.

When the apostle, therefore, prays that the "whole spirit, soul, and body, may be preserved blameless," it is a circumlocution to denote our whole being; or it is explicative of the previous petition, that the God of peace would sanctify us WHOLLY.

The question now arises, in what sense can the body be sanctified, or be preserved blameless, or in any manner be the subject of blamelessness or sanctity, and of the contrary? How the rational, self-active, voluntary spirit, *πνευμα*, should be so, requires no explanation. It results from its very nature. In its very constitution it is moral, and must be either holy or unholy, good or evil. How the lower desires and propensities which are proper to the *ψυχη*, or soul, the sentient animal principle, and belong to man in common with animals, should acquire this character, is not difficult to be seen. For, although in mere animals that are void of any moral sense, or rational free will, these, and all other parts and faculties, must be void of moral responsibility, it is otherwise in man. In him they

are coupled with his higher nature; with free-will, conscience, and rationality; with the πνευμα, or spirit, which interpenetrates and vitalizes them with its own dignity and responsibility. Thus appetite, and its indulgence in animals, are wholly void of moral quality and responsibility, because they are wholly out of relation to conscience and rational will. There is no morality in the eating, drinking, or other instinctive indulgence of the brute. But in man temperance is an indispensable virtue, and intemperance is among the most degrading and culpable sins. The government of these appetites is remanded to the conscience, will, judgment—the whole rational and moral nature. Not only so, but it is in the due regulation of these and other animal desires, that the moral element in our constitution makes its power and supremacy felt. To eat, and drink, and move in any manner, though originally indifferent, according to circumstances, becomes a moral or an immoral act. For those who own fealty to Christ, these and all else that is subject in any degree to the will and conscience, become religious works—acts of worship. Whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, we must do all to the glory of God.

This being so, we see how sanctification, as a gracious state, disposition, or habit, may possess the lower propensities, appetites, and passions, as well as the higher. Temperance, not merely in the gratification, but as to the force and impetuosity of the lower appetites and desires, may become a habit, and this not only as the effect of constant practice, but through the inworking of the Holy Ghost. So of all fleshly lusts which war against the soul, whether these have their seat in the body, *i. e.*, the flesh, literally so called, or in the lower principles of our spiritual nature, when they usurp the ascendancy over the higher; as when the love of self, of kindred, of human praise, or of wealth, rise to a vehemence that overmasters the love of God. These all need, and are susceptible of sanctification.

We are now prepared to see how the same principle extends still further, even to the body itself. The body is so implicated with the spirit, as its abode, its instrument, and its organ, that their states reciprocally affect each other. The states of the body act upon the spirit, and the states of the spirit act upon the body. The highest and most salutary

moral state of the soul depends upon, and requires the fullest concurrence in the activities of the body; so that to be sanctified wholly, in the highest sense, requires that the whole man, "body, soul, and spirit, be preserved blameless." As the body is the servant, the organ, the expression, the articulation of the soul, its medium of communication with the outer world, so it is obvious that the facility of the soul in holy exercises will be greatly modified by the state of the body. It may not only greatly help or hinder the soul's sanctification, but it is, in a qualified and derivative sense at least, capable of sanctification itself.

This is contrary to the Platonic idea, which has from the beginning percolated more or less through the practical, if not the theoretical, theology of portions of the church, and which reached its culmination in Manicheism, Gnosticism, and Neo-Platonism, viz. that matter is essentially evil; that the depravation of the human soul is due to its union to the body, and will cease on the dissolution of that union. Hence Platonism treated the body as the degrading and corrupting prison of the soul, into which it had sunk from a pre-existent state of purity, and from which it must emerge in order to regain that purity. The essence of all spiritual and holy culture, accordingly, lay in sublime and serene contemplation of supersensual truth, which should lift the soul above the murky and polluting vapours of the sensible and material, to the clear upper region of pure spirit. The body was the great source of corruption. Emancipation from the body was the grand means and consummation of spiritual regeneration.

This element of Platonism, the loftiest and purest form of ancient philosophy, which almost simulated or foretokened Christianity itself, made itself felt, of course, in some schools of Christian theology, which it contributed to mould and develope. It received some plausible support from those numerous passages of Scripture which use the words "flesh," "fleshly," "carnal" "body," (*σαρξ* and *σωμα*,) to designate the corrupt principle in fallen man. This is a false inference, arising from a mistaken conception of the ground for such use of these terms. Such terms as *flesh*, &c., are employed to denote the principle of depravity, not on the ground that the body or mat-

ter is essentially evil. The contrary is evinced by the consideration: 1. That matter and the human body are original creations of God. Whatever he hath made is pronounced good, very good. 2. The Divine Word became flesh. In that body which was prepared for him he now abides, and will abide through eternity. This for ever contradicts the doctrine that the body is inherently evil, or the source of evil. 3. When these bodies shall be raised in glory at the last day, Christ shall change them that they shall be "like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself." This could not be, if body were essentially evil, or the source of evil. 4. The body serves innumerable uses, and is the organ of some of the best and holiest activities of the soul. 5. The reason why depravity is designated by the terms "flesh," "carnal," &c., is not that the body, or its appetites, or the animal nature and desires, are essentially evil, but that when not controlled by those higher spiritual principles of love to God and righteousness, which ought to control them, they are sinful; the whole man thus becomes sinful; that general disorder and lawlessness supervene which constitute the sinfulness of our nature. It is not that the lower principles are in themselves evil, but evil when out of place, dominating over and bearing down the higher.

This, however, is not peculiar to the bodily appetites and propensities. It is true of all the lower propensities and longings of our nature, whether corporeal, animal, or spiritual. In place, they are good. Out of place, or, at least, overruling those principles which ought to govern them, they are evil. The love of human approbation is good in its place. Exalted above the love of righteousness, by which it ought to be controlled, it is evil. So the word "natural," as we have already seen in the sentence, "the natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit," is translated from the adjective of the word usually translated soul, and means the man under the dominion of unholy appetites and desires. So the apostle speaks of those dead in trespasses and sins as "fulfilling the desires of the flesh and the mind." The "desires of the mind," when irregular or exorbitant, are just as much, therefore, and, because of their superior power, more the

seat and source of depravity, than the "lusts of the flesh," strictly so called. This phraseology of Scripture, then, which employs the term "flesh" to denote depravity, in no manner proves matter or the body to be evil, or the prime source of evil; or, in its normal state, otherwise than good, and promotive of goodness in the soul to which it is united. But there can be no doubt that the theology and discipline of the early and medieval church were deeply tinged with the contrary idea; sometimes transmitted from the Platonic philosophy, sometimes suggested, and always strengthened, by the interpretation of the Scriptures which we have just combatted. This is seen in the bodily austerities, penances, flagellations, and macerations, which formed so large a part of the *cultus* of the Romish church. They were designed not merely as penances, or inflictions in punishment and satisfaction for sin, thus usurping the office of Him who was "bruised for our iniquities;" they were designed to reduce and subdue the body, as the grand seat and source of sin. Phraseology sometimes current among Protestants looks the same way. We often hear the body spoken of as the great incubus and prison of the spirit, which enthrals it under the bondage of corruption, as if the perfection and glory of the soul required its perpetual separation from the body; as if its encasement in its clayey tabernacle were the great clog to goodness and purity. It is indeed true that the soul is not made perfect in holiness, till death separates it from the body as now corrupted by sin. It is no less true, that the spirit does not reach the fulness of joy and the perfection of glory, till it is reunited to that body risen and glorified; so that our flesh rests in hope, and the spirit, even if among the just made perfect, "waits for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." We well remember that the language we were accustomed to hear on the subject in childhood, in sermons and elsewhere, left the impression, doubtless undesigned, that the spirit could become sinless and glorious only by separation from the body; and it was only in later years, notwithstanding our early drill in the Assembly's Catechism, that the doctrine of the resurrection dawned upon us with all the freshness and power of a new truth. It was not so much rejected, as forgotten and ignored, in the teachings to which we refer. All such

ideas, wherever propagated, are contrary to the plain truth of Scripture.

If the body is not, then, intrinsically evil, how, and in what sense, can it become the subject of that sanctity and blamelessness which the apostle implores for it?

1. The body is sometimes spoken of by the sacred writers as comprising the whole sentient animal nature which possesses and actuates it; and this again considered as including the lower desires and principles, even of the spirit, in a condition of excess; in insubordination to the higher; thus engendering that disorder and lawlessness, which, as already explained, constitute the depravity of our nature, so often by the sacred writers denominated "flesh." So Paul says: "For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the BODY, ye shall live." Rom. viii. 13.

Indeed, as the body is the seat of the animal appetites, which in excess and lawlessness become sinful and domineering lusts; run into the brutal vices of intemperance and lawlessness; or, failing of this, constitute an impetuous and overpowering force, which overbears higher principles of our moral and spiritual nature; and impels us to exalt self, the body, and the world, above God, righteousness and the spirit; its conditions are deeply implicated with our moral and spiritual state. It may be in a state favourable to the violence and tyranny of these lusts, or to their normal and duly regulated action. It is susceptible of an influence from that Holy Spirit, which quickens our mortal bodies and makes them his temple. This can render the appetites and the feelings, together with the desires and thoughts implicated with them, temperate and lawful. In the absence of this influence, in our present fallen state, they all degenerate into those fleshly lusts which war against the soul. In close connection with all this, it is to be observed,

2. That there is the most intimate inter-dependence between the body and the mind, both soul and spirit. Such is their mysterious union, that all the workings of the mind, in this present state, are in and through, and dependent upon the body, through the brain, the nerves, the senses, and the members. It is a familiar fact, that, in our present state, the activities of mind and the energies of consciousness manifest

themselves in and through the agency of the brain and nerves, and are conditioned by them; that hence the intellect and sensibility are respectively styled the head and the heart, in popular and scriptural phrase; and that the word of God speaks of the whole head as being sick, and the whole heart faint. The senses are the gateways of communication between the soul and the eternal world. It is only through them that we know anything whatever of outward and material objects. It is, moreover, only as we become acquainted with external objects, that our minds are first roused to the recognition of spiritual and supersensible truths, which they imply or suggest. The range of knowledge and thought, as we can readily see, would be exceedingly narrow, dry, and lifeless, were we bereft of the organs of sense. On the other hand, how greatly are our moral feelings, judgments, and purposes, affected by the impressions made by external objects! What a new world has been opened to us on these subjects by the sciences of Ethnology and Physical Geography!* And how much depends upon our manner of beholding or knowing such objects! Are we not warned against the "lust of the eye," which feeds on vain ostentation, or polluting spectacles, as ranking with the "lust of the flesh and the pride of life"? Are not the wicked characterized as "having eyes full of adultery"? Is it not through the taste, that intemperance and gluttony come to tyrannize over soul and body? Is not the drunkard's fiery appetite a depravation of the body and soul? And through the senses, generally, does not sensuality enter and enslave the man?

There is the gift of articulate speech which voices and perfects man's spiritual and rational nature, while at the same time it reacts upon that nature. If, "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh;" if speech is to the soul what radiance is to the sun, its outbeaming and expression; it returns upon, it brightens or tarnishes, it purifies or corrupts its own source. As it is with the motions of all the faculties, physical, moral, and intellectual, which develope and strengthen, or debilitate and pervert, the powers which thus go forth in exercise, so is it eminently with speech. It is a stream

* See especially Professor Guyot's *Earth and Man.*

which returns upon the fountain whence it issues, to cleanse or defile it. There can be no doubt that profaneness of speech tends to beget impiety; that envious, malicious, revengeful, infuriate words on the tongue, kindle, and feed, and fan, like passions in the soul. So Paul charges us: "Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil speaking, be put away from you, with all malice," (Eph. iv. 31,) as if such speech and dispositions were mutually auxiliary. So, in evidence of the utter depravity of our race, Paul, echoing the Old Testament writers, declares: "Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness." Rom. iii. 13, 14. James tells us, "The tongue is a fire, a world of iniquity; so is the tongue among our members that it defileth the whole body, and setteth on fire the course of nature; and it is set on fire of hell." James iii. 6. How true, vivid, and terrible! There can be no doubt, that in this gift of speech, which is a chief organ and crown of our higher being, there are habits which interact with the profoundest habitudes of our moral and spiritual nature—habits instinct with pollution or purity—which not only betoken, but deepen our holiness or vileness; which are therefore proper subjects of sanctification; which, in short, need to be rectified by the Holy Spirit, as he actuates all our parts and faculties with a divine life. So we are charged to "let our speech be with grace, seasoned with salt;" to "let no corrupt communication proceed out of our mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace to the hearers," Eph. iv. 29; "neither filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not becoming, but rather giving of thanks." Eph. v. 4. So, "if any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain." James i. 26. To guard the tongue, train it to right and holy habits of speech, through divine grace, is among the foremost Christian duties and attainments.

3. The same principle holds, in an inferior degree, in regard to all the members of the body, as well as those which are specially organs of the mind. If not immediate organs, they all are instruments of the soul in fulfilling its behests, either in

the service of Christ or of sin. We are accordingly charged by the apostle, not only generally, that we should "let not sin reign in our mortal bodies, that we should obey it in the lusts thereof;" but Paul adds in particular: "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God." Rom. vi. 12, 13. And here it is unquestionable, that there may be an aptitude and facility, natural, acquired, or infused by the Holy Spirit, for either right or wrong, holy or wicked activity, on the part of the members of the body, as well as the faculties of the mind. There are the motions of sin, the law of sin in the *members*, (including, to be sure, all that is so often denoted by the flesh, but, nevertheless, not excluding special respect to the members themselves,) warring against the law of the mind. Rom. vii. 23. So, of the wicked, it is declared, that "their feet are swift to shed blood. Destruction and misery are in their ways." Rom. iii. 15, 16. Their "hands are defiled with blood, and their fingers with iniquity." Isa. lix. 3. The force of evil habits is felt in begetting aptitudes and tendencies to evil, to whatever part of our nature they pertain. The force of good habits is manifested in the contrary facilities. We see it in the aptitudes and dexterities acquired by the different members and muscles in the various mechanical arts, and especially in the marvellous fingering of musical instruments—a dexterity so commonly attained by persevering practice. Well has it been said by an illustrious physicist, "the fingers in this case think—the brain is projected into them." Says a writer on Political Economy,* "It is a well known physical truth, that the exercise of a muscle increases its volume and strength. An operation which was difficult at first, becomes easy by frequent repetition—that which at the beginning could only be done slowly, comes by dint of frequent practice to be done with rapidity—that which required close mental attention to do it with accuracy, is done at length without any conscious watchfulness, and with a precision that rivals the action of machinery. Delicacy of touch,

* E. Peshine Smith.

as well as rapidity of movement, are susceptible of indefinite cultivation. In some manufacturing operations, children repeat a hundred times in a minute, and for hours in succession, motions involving the action of several muscles."

The work of sanctification is complete when all the members become prompt, expert, faithful servants of righteousness; when they are always quick and strong to fulfil the behests of the spirit within. This work will go forward as sanctification goes forward; and will only be perfected in the glorified body, united to the glorified spirit in heaven. Here the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak—and this as the effect of habits of wickedness, native and acquired—motions of sin in its members bringing forth fruit unto death.

4. Conformably to the views already presented, divines have often observed that distempers of body have much to do with distempers of the soul. We know how much sanity of mind is dependent upon sanity of body, insomuch that the first treatment for mental alienation is bodily medication. As sin is a species of madness, we find here a nexus between the condition of the body and the sanctification of the soul. We know how certain kinds of depression of health depress the spirit. They promote melancholy, dejection, unbelief, despair. All these are hurtful, sometimes fatal, distempers, which war against, damage, and sometimes destroy the soul. In such circumstances, it is difficult to rise to the peace and joy of believing. The bones wax old, and tears are daily and nightly food, while the spirit is thus in the horrible pit and the miry clay. It must grow weaker till it is able to plant itself on Christ, and apply to itself the healing and cheering medicaments of the great physician. Other conditions of body favour buoyancy, firmness, energy of soul. They help to brace us up, so that we stagger not at the promise, but are strong in the faith, giving glory to God. They help us to joy in God through the atonement, and the joy of the Lord is our strength. They conduce to that peace, firmness, stability, courage, fortitude, which enter so largely into the highest type of Christian excellence. Judicious experimental counsellors, have been wont to counsel the desponding not to mistake dyspeptic or nervous prostration for spiritual apostasy, or divine aban-

donment. And there are few pastors of long experience who have not seen the most obstinate religious melancholy vanish along with morbid conditions of the body.

This subject speaks its own importance. Too many are in the habit of regarding the noble human frame as so much animated matter, which is almost as indifferent in regard to our moral and spiritual states as mere animals, plants, or stones. They will, indeed, recognise the value of health for its own sake. They recognise the duty of keeping the appetites in subjection, so far as to shun intemperance and licentiousness: but they forget that it is the abode, the organ, the expression and outbeaming of the immortal soul. They forget that every exercise of the conscious soul, in our present state, is in and through states of the body, which at once affect, and are affected by it; that in consequence of its mysterious union to the rational and immortal spirit, it is implicated in its actings, its character, and borrows somewhat of its dignity and its glory; that hence it participates in, and promotes the sanctity or pollution of the soul; that hence its sanctification, along with our whole nature, is to be sought for, in the use of due means, and the avoidance of all hindrances on our part, and through the inworking of the Holy Spirit on the part of God, that it may be "a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work." Many forget that mysterious union and interpenetration of body and spirit, by which, although different in substance and nature, they constitute one person, for ever inseparable, except for a short period between death and the resurrection; both partaking in the fall and depravation of our nature, and requiring to be restored by the new-creation of God, to newness of life, according to the working of that mighty power which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead. So we are required to "yield up our bodies (doubtless as representative of our entire persons) as living sacrifices, holy and acceptable unto God, which is our reasonable service." And in reference to the body specially, says Paul, "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection, lest that, by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway." 1 Cor. ix. 27. "Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ?" 1 Cor. vi. 15.

"What, know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." 1 Cor. vi. 19, 20. "If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy." 1 Cor. iii. 17.

Among the practical relations of this subject, we think it worth while briefly to call the attention of our readers to the following, as we conclude this article.

1. The proper treatment of certain forms of religious melancholy is closely connected with the foregoing discussion, and has already been suggested by it. We do not propose to treat this matter in any fulness: but there is no phase of religious experience, and no condition of soul, which more hopelessly baffles young ministers and private Christians, who have not been trained to meet it by some special teaching or experience. It is evident that religious despondency may arise from, and be aggravated by, various causes. It often arises from allowed sin, neglect of duty, declining spirituality, backsliding, and presumption. Of course, so far as despondency springs from such causes, the only remedy is a corresponding repentance. The appropriate spiritual treatment is obvious. But there are cases of terrible religious depression, either amounting or approximating to despair, obstinate, invincible to all spiritual counsel and religious discipline, which confound the inexperienced pastor when first brought in contact with them. These phenomena sometimes appear in those who have only been known as most exemplary and devout Christians. Some are haunted with blasphemous thoughts. Others feel that they have been abandoned by God, or committed the unpardonable sin, or passed their day of grace, or they torture the most harmless and cheering indications into grounds of despair. They "refuse to be comforted" by any ray of hope. In such cases the cause is often purely physical, some acrid bodily distemper which oppresses the brain, prostrates and irritates the nerves, and poisons all the organs of thought and sensibility. The ancients evinced their profound appreciation of the mysterious influence of man's physiological upon his psychological condition, when they named this fearful malady melan-choly or *black*

bile. So it is the habit of the old experimental divines, like Baxter and Edwards, to speak of melancholy as a bodily affection. Much in a similar strain may be found in that quaint and pedantic, yet amusing and instructive work, the *Anatomy of Melancholy.* It is hard to improve upon the diagnosis of this disease, and the hints as to the proper remedy, contained in the following extract from Baxter's *Saint's Rest*, chap. viii. sect. 10.

"Another ordinary nurse of doubtings and discomfort, is the prevailing of melancholy in the body, whereby the brain is continually troubled and darkened, the fancy hindered, and reason perverted, by the distempering of its instruments, and the soul is still clad in mourning weeds. It is no more wonder for a conscientious man that is overcome with melancholy, to doubt, and fear, and despair, than it is for a sick man to groan, or a child to cry when he is beaten. This is the case with most that I have known lie long in doubting and distress of spirit. With some, their melancholy being raised by crosses or distemper of body, or some other occasion, doth afterwards bring in trouble of conscience as its companion. With others, trouble of mind is their first trouble, which, long hanging on them, at last doth bring the body also into a melancholy habit: and their trouble increaseth melancholy, and melancholy again increaseth trouble, and so round. This is a most sad and pitiful state. For as the disease of body is chronical and obstinate, and physic doth seldom succeed where it hath far prevailed; so without the physician, the labours of the divine are usually in vain. You may silence them, but you cannot comfort them; you may make them confess that they have some grace, and yet cannot bring them to the comfortable conclusions. Or if you convince them of some work of the Spirit upon their souls, and a little at present abate their sadness, yet as soon as they are gone home, and look again upon their souls through this perturbing humour, all your convincing arguments are forgotten, and they are as far from comfort as ever they were. All the good thoughts of their state which you can possibly help them to, are seldom above a day or two old. As a man that looks through a black, or blue, or red glass, doth think things which he sees to be of the same colour;

and if you would persuade him to the contrary he will not believe you, but wonder that you should offer to persuade him against his eye-sight;—so a melancholy man sees all things in a sad and fearful plight, because his reason looketh on them through his black humour, with which his brain is darkened and distempered. And as a man's eyes which can see all things about him, yet cannot see any imperfection in themselves; so it is almost impossible to make many of these men to know that they are melancholy. But as those who are troubled with the ephialtes* do cry out of some body that lieth heavy upon them, when the disease is in their own blood and humours; so these poor men cry out of sin and the wrath of God, when the main cause is in this bodily distemper. The chief part of the cure of these men must be upon the body, because there is the chief part of the disease."

There can be no doubt of the general truth of the foregoing quaint but graphic portraiture, or of the wisdom which advises a resort to medical counsel and treatment in a large proportion of this class of cases. With regard to those instances in which a troubled conscience and desponding spirit have preyed upon the body until it is infested with this melancholic distemper, which again reacts upon the soul, to aggravate its despondency, till body and spirit are mutually pressing each other to hopeless anguish and prostration—in such cases, it sometimes happens that no bodily or spiritual medication will suffice, without an effectual diversion of the mind from the particular topic which induces such morbid action of soul and body. This diversion of the mind is sometimes as indispensable as a change of scene, air, and diet, for obstinate chronic maladies. Such treatment is especially applicable to those blasphemous suggestions of Satan, which we have sometimes seen exorcised by depletion, and again by recovery from other bodily ailments. The following counsels, in regard to such cases by President Edwards, himself, like Baxter, no stranger to religious despondency arising from a depression of bodily health and spirits, are eminently sound and judicious. We find them in his letter to Mr. Gillespie, of Scotland, in answer to some inquiries put

* Night-mare.

by the latter in regard to certain points raised in the treatise on the *Religious Affections.*

"Satan is to be resisted in a very different manner in different kinds of onsets. When persons are harassed with those strange, horrid injections, that melancholic persons are often subject to, he is to be resisted in a very different manner, from what is proper in case of violent temptation to gratify some worldly lust. In the former case, I should by no means advise a person to resist the devil by entering the lists with him, and vehemently engaging their mind in an earnest dispute and violent struggle with the grand adversary, but rather by diverting the mind from his frightful suggestions, by going on steadfastly and diligently in the ordinary course of duty, without allowing themselves time and leisure to attend to the devil's sophistry, or viewing his frightful representations, committing themselves to God by prayer in this way, without anxiety about what had been suggested. That is the best way of resisting the devil, that crosses his design most; and he more effectually disappoints him in such cases, that treats him with neglect, than he that attends so much to him as to engage in a direct conflict, and goes about to try his strength and skill with him in a violent dispute or combat. The latter course rather gives him advantage, than anything else. It is what he would; if he can get persons thus engaged in a violent struggle, he gains a great point. He knows that melancholic persons are not fit for it. By this he gains that point of diverting and taking off the person from the ordinary course of duty, which is one great thing he aims at; and by this, having gained the person's attention to what he says, he has opportunity to use all his craft and subtlety, and by this struggle he raises melancholic vapours to a greater degree, and further weakens the person's mind, and gets him faster and faster in his snares, deeper and deeper in the mire. He increases the person's anxiety of mind, which is the very thing by which mainly he fulfils all his purposes with such persons."

The late Dr. Hope, of the College of New Jersey, published an instructive article on this subject in the July number of this Journal for the year 1844. He brought to the subject a thorough theological and medical training, a deep christian as well

as ministerial and missionary experience, together with a highly reflective and philosophical cast of mind—qualifications rarely found in combination. The article is rich in the examples it furnishes of cures of religious melancholy effected by hygienic and medical treatment, such as bleeding, tartar emetic, exercise, and diet, sometimes prescribed by himself, combined with a judicious spiritual regimen. But we have nowhere met with any actual case which so fully and profitably illustrates many of the views and suggestions we have presented, as the following, which has the advantage of being given from his own personal and professional knowledge. He says:

"We give as a type of one sort of these cases, to which perhaps no other may exactly conform, and yet which illustrates the essential elements of many others, the case of a young lady whom we have long and intimately known. Of a temperament highly nervous and sanguine, she embarked very young, with all her ardour, in the gay pleasures of fashionable life. A single season convinced her fully of their emptiness and folly. She was soon after brought under the influence of pungent preaching, and convinced of sin. The struggle was sharp and long; but the result was, that she gave herself, with all her heart, to a course of rigid religious duties. Above all, she seemed to live in an atmosphere of prayer. Her faith in the truth and promises of God, was without the shadow of a cloud. And yet she had not the pure enjoyment which she supposed to be the necessary fruit of real piety. She did not, therefore, look upon herself, as a child of God; and her consequent anxiety wore upon her spirit, and secretly undermined her health. At length, one day, as she rose from prayer, the thought struck her like a thunder-bolt, 'what if there is no God after all.' She repelled the thought with horror, and went her way. But the shock had struck from her hand 'the shield of faith,' and all her efforts were unable to grasp it again. From henceforth she found herself exposed to a constant shower of darts, fiery and poisoned, and she could not resist them. They stuck fast in her vitals, and drank up her spirits. The poison thus injected into the heart of her religious experience soon spread, and blighted the whole. She never knew a moment's peace, when her thoughts were upon her

once favourite, and still engrossing subject. She called herself an infidel, and applied to herself the dreadful threatenings and doom of the unbeliever. And yet it was evident she was not, in any sense, an unbeliever. She was one of the most devout and consistent persons we ever knew. She was conscientious even to scrupulosity. She was a most devoted and faithful Sunday-school teacher, and God blessed her labours to the conversion of nearly all her scholars. She rejoiced to hear of persons becoming Christians, and would often say, with despair in her tones, how she envied them. When any of her acquaintances died without giving good evidence of piety, she became excited, and, as she expressed it, was ready to scream aloud. She gave every possible evidence that she had not, in reality, a shadow of a doubt about the truth of revelation. And yet no one ever dreamed that her difficulties were connected with disease of any sort; for her mind was remarkably clear and active. The advice of pious friends and ministers, therefore, based upon the supposition that her case was one of spiritual darkness, or satanic temptation, was to persevere in prayer—to struggle on more earnestly, and God would give her light after he had tried her faith and patience and love. But the more she prayed and struggled the worse she grew. She would come from her closet, exhausted with the fearful conflict, and looking ready to sink into utter despair. The Sabbath was always the worst day of the week; and the labour and exhaustion of teaching aggravated her symptoms.

"The only treatment which was successful, in this case, would by many have been rejected with horror. She was advised to give up the struggle which she had maintained so unequally, and which would only have resulted in disastrous consequences—to think as little as possible on the subject—to spend less time in devotional exercises, and allow her mind to gather its scattered strength by relaxation. The form of prayer advised was short and audible, and such as took for granted what she had been struggling to convince herself of. Incessant pains were taken to present the character of God in a simple, affectionate, parental light, when anything led to the subject. The simplicity of faith, and the certainty of salvation, were occasionally flashed across her mind, when it was in a suitable

frame. The only two evidences of piety which her state of mind rendered available, were kept prominent as the basis of new feelings and hopes, viz., her love to the people of God, and the pain she felt in the absence of divine favour, and the longing for its return. These were untouched by the dismal monster that had preyed upon her hopes.

"By a judicious perseverance in a course like this, accompanied with well directed hygienic measures, suitable recreation, exercise, and diet, for improving the general health, and especially the tone of the nervous system, the mental energies will often, in such cases, react; and new views of truth, and new hopes will then spring up in the mind."

2. The bearing of the considerations that have been presented on the Christian sacraments, is worthy of consideration. It is quite clear that these, as signs which symbolize the blessings of redemption, and seals which ratify the promises stipulating them, are so shaped as to enlist the bodily senses in the service of the spirit. They are not only, in the language of an old father, "the word made visible;" in them the word is also tangible, besides being presented to the taste as well as the eye. Through these great inlets to the soul, are the blessings of salvation set forth and promised in the word, signified and sealed to us. So God graciously condescends to enlist all the lower, as well as higher cognitive and sensitive powers, in apprehending, appreciating, and appropriating the gifts of his grace, and the benefits flowing from faith in Christ. Touch, taste, sight, and hearing, are thus marshalled in this holy service. Under the old dispensation, in which, from the more inexplicit and inchoate unfolding of the spiritual elements of salvation, the sensuous forms of representation had a greater predominance, the remaining sense of smell was also enlisted in burnt-offerings and incense. There is a large class who undervalue, and fail duly to improve, if they do not utterly neglect, the sacraments and other outward means of grace, because they cannot see their rationale, or comprehend their utility. This plea is, of course, sufficiently answered by the fact that these are God's ordinances, and that the due observance of them ensures his blessing, because he has covenanted to bestow it. This proves such observance to be needful for us; to be required because of

its adaptation to our spiritual welfare; and that none can refuse it without suffering spiritual loss or ruin. Nevertheless, it assists our faith and intelligence, and consequent improvement in observing those ordinances, if we see something of their special reasons and uses. When we know that they are not mere sovereign, and, to us, meaningless rites; that they are adapted to our sensitive and cognitive nature; that they so exhibit the blessings of grace as to enlist the senses in appreciating and appropriating these blessings; that they are to the verbal promises withal, what seals are to written instruments, solemn ratifications, fitted to reassure our faith, so prone to "stagger" at their amplitude and freeness; that they not only appeal to the senses, which are organs of external perception, but still further to the vaguer yet cheering inward senses of exhilaration, nutrition, and invigoration, in assisting our appreciation of the Saviour's body and blood; we are surely all the better prepared to "discern the Lord's body" in the supper, and "put on Christ," with the "answer of a good conscience," in baptism.

3. This subject sheds light on all matters affecting the outward attitudes, arrangements, order, and other sensuous manifestations in connection with divine worship. The intimate connection and powerful interaction of the body and the soul, which has been set forth, render all such matters significant and important. It is the undoubted tendency of every feeling of the soul, when in vivid exercise, to externalize itself in its own appropriate bodily manifestation. It is obvious and familiar in the case of love, pity, tenderness, anger, malice, revenge, rage, shame, joy, sorrow, and the like, that they have their appropriate outward expression, not only in words, but in the countenance, the motions, and attitudes of the body. It is no less undeniable, that these outward expressions react to strengthen the feelings of which they are the out-beamings. And the want of them, contrariwise, tends to deaden the feelings of which they are the normal exponents. The stifling of all outward manifestations of joy and sorrow, anger and kindness, tends to extinguish them; as what stifles the outburst of flames, in due time extinguishes the fire. Those feelings must

press themselves upward and outward, which root themselves inward and downward.

This being so, there can be no doubt that reverential attitudes in prayer, private and public, have an important connection with reverential and devotional feeling. We speak not now of exceptional cases, in which physical infirmity or exhaustion disable any from assuming a devotional posture without a degree of pain that would conflict with devotional feeling. The principle that mercy should prevail over sacrifice, will by no means justify the aspect and attitude of a very large proportion of our Protestant, evangelical, but non-liturgical Christian assemblies, in public prayer. In some a few, in some more, in some none standing, others inclining the head, a larger number sitting, staring, or gazing, or lounging—what can be more unseemly than such a spectacle as this, during prayer, presented by such numbers of Christian congregations? The only devotional attitudes known to Scripture or the church are kneeling, standing, and prostration. There can be little doubt that he who needlessly refuses to adopt one of these attitudes in prayer, suffers loss in his own spiritual feelings, and in the sight of God. Since public prayer is a social act, and is designed to bring into salutary action the social element in our nature, there is a power in the assumption of a uniform devotional attitude by the great congregation, of all upon each, and of each upon all. It is a high power for good. Who has not felt it? It is not merely as he kneels or stands himself, but as the whole assembly kneels or stands with him, that he feels kindled and inspired by this great sympathetic devotional manifestation in the entire assembly. It is doubtless a joyful act of praise and adoration to sing the Christian doxology alone. How much more with the assembly of the saints? And how vastly more, if this whole assembly rise to sing it in token of adoring reverence, and united praise? What are all exquisite artistic musical performances by hired quartettes, or other vicarious choirs, in comparison with this swelling, multitudinous voice of praise to the Triune God? And is not this remnant of uniform attitude, together with that in receiving the benediction, the most impressive of all our solemnities? On the other hand, are not the irregular, heterogeneous atti-

tudes, the listless, vacant, indolent appearance of so many of our congregations in prayer, enough to infuse a chill into devotion, and to impair the impressiveness of public worship upon children and unbelieving adults? Is it not bringing confusion into the church instead of "doing all things decently and in order? Is it worshipping God in the *beauty* of holiness? Can we have this disorder in our public worship, and offer, without misgiving, the holy challenge:

> "Let strangers walk around
> The city where we dwell,
> Compass and view the holy ground,
> And mark the building well;
>
> "The orders of Thy house,
> The worship of Thy court,
> The cheerful songs, the solemn vows;
> And make a fair report.
>
> "How decent and how wise!
> How glorious to behold!
> Beyond the pomp that charms the eyes,
> And rites adorned with gold."

We confess that it is easier to indicate this great evil, as we conceive it to be, than to prescribe a remedy. We have attempted more than once to work a reform in our own sphere, and always with one result. For a time, after presenting the arguments in behalf of a uniform reverential posture, the congregation would generally rise in prayer. But as soon as the freshness of the plea began to fade from memory, the indolent habit of sitting would reassert its mastery, first in one, then in another, until, in three or four months, the assembly would subside into its former attitudes. This of itself is one illustration of the tyranny of habit over the body in its actings as the organ of the soul, and thus over the soul itself; consequently of the importance of training the body to right habits as the servant and organ of the spirit. Despairing of relief in this way, many congregations, in order to secure uniformity at least, have adopted the rule of sitting in prayer with a reverential inclination of the head, and of rising in singing. This, however, has proved a failure. Old habits soon show their gravitating force. All, indeed, sit in prayer; only a portion,

however, bow the head. The rest sit in vacant and undevout indolence. After a while, more than half the congregation will decline rising in singing, through the same *vis inertiæ*. And in its best estate, a sitting posture is far from being that which is most congenial to, or expressive of worship.

We know not the origin or history of this decline from the former wholesome practice of standing in prayer, in Presbyterian and Congregational churches, so far as the country generally is concerned. We only know that in the region of which we had personal knowledge, it was an inheritance bequeathed by what were called the New Measures of thirty years ago. A new measure preacher from Western New York was procured to conduct a protracted meeting, in churches in which the practice of standing in prayer had been almost universal. During these meetings he directed the congregation to sit and bow their heads in prayer. They complied. With rarest exceptions, the people never resumed their former practice of standing. Although they, with the preacher in question, long since renounced all the peculiar measures in question, they retained the habit which he introduced, and which indolence, supported by growing fashion, favoured. Whatever its origin, there is no doubt of its prevalence everywhere, to a very injurious, though in different congregations, very various degree. And while we are not now prepared to suggest a remedy, we think the devising of one well worthy to enlist the mind of the church.

The same principle applies, *mutatis mutandis*, in reference to some lesser matters, at which we can barely hint. It is undoubtedly easy to overdo, in minute prescriptions as to clerical costume, manners, &c. Any important truth may be rendered ridiculous by being driven to extremes. It is also true that official costumes, so made as to be the insignia of a sacerdotal or hierarchical caste, or of ritualistic incantations, are offensive to our taste; and scarcely less so, any feeble aping of it by those who disown such a caste. Yet we do not think it to edification for a minister to be arrayed in the garb, or assume the manners of a coxcomb, a fop, a sloven, or a jockey, whether genteel or vulgar. Nor is it otherwise than to edification, if there be not only entire congruity between the outward

aspect and the sacred office, but somewhat in the former that suggests the latter.

Similar observations may be made in regard to church architecture. It is certainly desirable that church edifices should have a form and aspect which harmonize with and suggest their divine uses. They should not appear, within or without, like theatres or public saloons. On the other hand, if this ecclesiastical aspect is purchased at the sacrifice of all accommodations for the comfortable and intelligent worship of God, and for the preaching and hearing of his word; if it is obtained by a height of ceilings, a length of audience room, a forest of pillars, stories of arches, and a "dim religious light," which hinder alike the comfortable, intelligent, and edifying conduct of divine service, we say, give us buildings of the most secular appearance in preference, for the use of the people of God in worship and hearing the word. Let us never sacrifice the chief end to a subordinate end. There is, however, no need of either extreme. Churches may be, should be, and often are, so planned with respect to light, form, ornamentation, and needful fixtures, as to serve in the highest degree all the purposes of public prayer and preaching, while they have a decided churchly aspect which separates them heaven-wide from the opera-house, the saloon, or the town-hall, and tends to awake hallowed associations consonant with their sacred uses. This is the normal standard, at which all in charge of such matters should ever aim.

4. These principles serve to illustrate the ordinance of fasting, and to explain, in some degree, its grounds and uses. The same principles apply here as to the sacraments. If it is divinely appointed, and has the promise of God's blessing on its due observance, this is enough, whether we can understand the intrinsic reasons of its utility or not. It must be beneficial to the soul. But, according to the representations of Scripture and the custom of the church, fasting, whether public or private, is connected with occasions demanding special humiliation and penitence, either for personal or social sins. And it is a principal duty in connection with it, to "afflict our souls," in view of our sin. Now, fasting facilitates this inward exercise and discipline through that wondrous implication of the states

of the body with the states of the soul, which we have been considering. We know that it is the instinct of men to manifest anl promote good cheer and hilarity, by feasting as its natural expression and symbol. Hence public thanksgivings usually associate with themselves bountiful and delicious repasts. The same is true of that day which most of Christendom recognises and celebrates as the joyful anniversary of the Saviour's birth. On the other hand, it is certain that sadness of soul depresses the appetite, and indisposes the subject of it to take food. And reciprocally, abstinence from food, by depressing the vital energies, also dejects the spirit in such mysterious sympathy with them. Thus it is in a better condition to discern, and feel, and bewail the aggravation of sins, whether its own or others, private or public. So they look to Him whom they have pierced, and mourn. But no language can depict this so graphically as has been done by the pen of inspiration. Says the Psalmist, "Fools, because of their transgression, and their iniquities, are afflicted. Their soul abhorreth all manner of meat; and they draw near unto the gates of death. Then they cry unto the Lord in their trouble, and he saveth them out of their distresses." Ps. cvii. 17—19. "Therefore also now, saith the Lord, Turn ye even to me with all your heart, and with fasting, and with weeping, and with mourning: and rend your heart, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil. Who knoweth if he will return and repent, and leave a blessing behind him; even a meat-offering and a drink-offering unto the Lord your God?" Joel ii. 12—14.

This great ordinance for spiritual discipline and culture, so signalized in the Old Testament, is recognised and continued in the New. It is not, indeed, commanded to be observed on any certain days. Christ rather left it to the judgment, candour, and fidelity of public authorities, civil and ecclesiastical, and of private persons, to decide when prevailing iniquities, or threatened calamities, or private spiritual declension require their observance. It is unquestionably of great moment to avoid that superstitious reliance on the external observance of fast and feast days which corrupts and enslaves the more prominent

ritualistic churches. But it is no less unquestionable, that the practice of fasting has fallen into an unwholesome desuetude in our evangelical churches, especially as concerns its observance by private Christians. While no laws can be prescribed on this subject, as to times and seasons, the most saintly men have been exceedingly apt to have frequent and regular seasons of religious fasting. There is little doubt of the edifying efficacy of this means of grace, duly employed. And as little doubt that, if we would successfully practice, we must form the habit of it, *i. e.*, acquire aptitude and readiness for it by frequent and somewhat regular repetition. Otherwise the contrary natural habitude will be likely to assert its natural mastery. And hence, in spite of the best resolutions, most Christians gravitate into the ordinary neglect of this important means of spiritual growth, of recovery from lapses, and advancement in holiness.

Indeed, the habitual and punctual performance of many religious acts is to be recommended for the sake of the habits of devotion thus nourished. The security for the daily performance of devotional duties, personal and family; for the weekly performance of duties appropriate to the Sabbath; for the proper attendance on the weekly lecture and prayer-meeting, lies in forming the habit, by the timely and regular attendance on all these services whose times are fixed, and by fixing regular and convenient seasons for those private duties which it is left to us to time, in which they may be regularly performed. In this, that concurrence of the body with the spirit is required, which we have seen is so largely involved in all religious discipline, cultus, and experience. Those habits of the body which lead to the regular outward performance of these services, are of great moment. Many things, says Paley, the shrewdest of utilitarian moralists, are "to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit," and he pronounces it a "rule of considerable importance." This is eminently true of those outward habits, which, indeed, do not constitute religion, but are essential either to its being, or its thrift and vigour. Outward services, of course, do not alone suffice. Mere "bodily exercise profiteth little." "He is not a Jew that is one outwardly" only. Neither can one be an

inward Christian, whose religion does not externalize itself in fit manifestation. Moreover, many inward exercises, for reasons already shown, require a certain bodily coöperation. Good outward habits in regard to religious services are the frame-work in which genuine inward exercises are protected, nourished, supported; without which they fail of due development, and wither, and die. They are the shell which encases and guards the seed, the germ, the interior vital principle. They are not, indeed, that principle, or any substitute for it; but they are essential to its sustenance and growth. Thus, though the form of family prayer, Sabbath observance, and church-going may be maintained, there may be but the "form without the power of godliness." But the power of godliness cannot long survive the loss of these outward forms. Nor will these outward forms be duly and permanently observed, unless they have the support of habit. Men whose habits are wrong in these respects, often make good resolutions. But unless these resolutions are supported by correspondent habits, nothing but the "exceeding greatness of God's power" can prevent their being transient in duration, feeble in authority, and spasmodic in the efforts they incite.

ART. IV.—*De Mensch en de Dichter Willem Bilderdijk*, eene bijdrage tot de kennis van Zijn Leven, Karakter, en Schriften, door MR. IS. DA COSTA. Haarlem: A. C. Kruseman. 1859.

THIS work is, we believe, the last that came from the pen of the lamented Da Costa. It bears the impress of his original, peculiar, and highly cultivated mind. Ascribing not only his conversion from Judaism to Christianity, but also his spiritual change to the instrumentality of Bilderdijk; greatly indebted to him for his early intellectual training, and for the development and culture of his own poetic talent; enjoying from his early youth a large share in the affections and confidence of this illustrious man, and admitted to the greatest intimacy

with him; himself a poet of a high order, and familiarly acquainted with the productions of the best poets of ancient and modern times, in the languages in which they were written; a jurist by profession, and distinguished for his literary, scientific, and theological attainments; he was well qualified to appreciate the merits, and to do justice to the memory, of one of the most extraordinary men that have ever appeared in the world of letters: a man distinguished as a mathematician, geologist, tactician, architect, and painter; eminent as a jurist, philosopher, and historian; and occupying the first rank as a linguist and poet.

Willem Bilderdijk was born in Amsterdam, September 7th, 1756. His father, Isaac Bilderdijk, was a respectable physician of that city. He was a man of medium height, of a vigorous bodily frame, of dark complexion, with dark eyes and heavy eyebrows, and wearing an expression of gravity on his countenance, that partook somewhat of a Spanish character. He was a man of integrity and honour, inflexible, imbued with a martial spirit, and endowed with an indomitable courage. Warmly attached to the house of Orange, firm in his political convictions, vehement in his feelings, and fearless in the expression of them, he gave great offence to the opposite political party, by the severity with which he, both in prose and verse, castigated them for the abuses of power with which they were chargeable. Experiencing, in consequence of the displeasure thus incurred, a diminution of practice, he finally withdrew entirely from the public exercise of his profession. He was honoured by the Princess Regent with a public trust, which he held to old age. Numerous and perplexing as were the duties and cares of his new position, he still kept himself informed of whatever was taking place in the department of medicine, and also devoted a portion of his time to the poetic muse. His political sonnets, but especially his tragedies, gave him a certain degree of celebrity as a poet. He was a good Latin scholar, but was only imperfectly acquainted with the Greek. He does not seem to have possessed, in any high degree, a taste for the beautiful, or to have manifested any special fondness for drawing, painting, and architecture, in which his son became so great a proficient.

His mother's name was Sibilla Duyzendaalders. She was allied to several of the patrician families in Amsterdam, and was descended from the mediæval nobility of the Netherlands, In how great a degree her eminent son may have been indebted to her for some of those mental endowments in which his father seemed to be deficient, does not appear. She was a woman of great excellence of character, distinguished for order and neatness, but possessing, in common with her worthy husband, an excitable temperament.

Peculiar and affecting were the circumstances of the childhood and youth of Willem Bilderdijk, and extraordinary were the developments of his mind during this period. When he was in his fifth year, a neighbour's child with whom he was talking, wantonly or sportively jumped on his left foot, and inflicted a serious and permanent injury on the osseous membrane of his great toe. The injury was at first disregarded, but was soon followed by the most distressing consequences. Powerful means were for years employed, but these only aggravating, instead of alleviating his sufferings, were at length wholly abandoned. Under a milder treatment, his pains became more tolerable, but a perfect cure was not effected until he had attained his twenty-seventh year, after the annihilation of the injured bone by an extremely slow process, followed by a contraction of the parts, causing a deformity of the foot. From the time that he met with this great misfortune till he had reached his eighteenth year, he was confined to the house, much of the time to his room, and a part of it to his bed. During the early part of this solitary period, he derived amusement, instruction, and comfort, from the constant perusal of Cats, the nation's favourite poet, whom he had even in his fourth year read with interest and delight. Confined to his room, left much of the time alone, with his injured foot resting on a cushion, and unable to change the position of his swollen limb, he was led to reflect on the power of motion possessed by the body and its members, and on the manner in which they were acted upon by the mind. He was soon fully satisfied, that the influence of the mind and body must be reciprocal. His inquisitive mind, thus set at work in this direction, pursued its metaphysical inquiries, and constructed for itself a philo-

sophical system, comprising the essential principles of psychology, logic, mathematics, and physics. Mathematics were now viewed by him in a new light, and his early proficiency in this science was such as to excite astonishment. With the *Jus Naturæ* of Wolf and of Pufendorf he now made himself acquainted. The perusal of the work of Wolf, with the annotations of Lusac, first inspired him with respect for the science of law, which he had previously heard traduced as mere chicanery. From this time his mind inclined to the legal profession as the object of his choice.

When but six or seven years old, he was a beautiful penman. He early acquired a taste for drawing, and desired to enjoy the instructions of a master; but his father, who, it seems, had not the least conception of art, denied his request, deeming it sufficient to furnish him with pictures to copy. His unaided efforts were unsuccessful, and proved an injury to his hand and eye. Subsequently, through the kindness of a portrait painter, he was furnished with the Outlines of S. le Clerc, from which he acquired the principles of the art. Years after, he was permitted to take lessons from Drecht, whom he represents as a man of genius, and from whom he obtained clearer ideas of the beautiful. Henceforth beauty and the fine arts became to him a study and a necessity; and architecture, which, in his view, combined all æsthetic and mathematical pleasures, ever remained his favourite study. His attention was also directed to tactics and fortification, his proficiency in which, commended him, at a later period of his life, to the notice and favour of the Duke of Brunswick.

The military profession would in all probability have been his actual choice, had he not been disqualified for it by the sad misfortune of which mention has been made. In one of his poetic pieces, written in advanced life, and entitled, "Herinnering aan mijne kindsheid,"* he represents himself, previous to that event, in a sequestered spot, musing on his present condition and future prospects, and surveying human life, to discover, if possible, some worthy end for which to live, and some profession to which he might feel an inward drawing. The

* Reminiscence of my childhood.

military profession was even then the only one to which his heart inclined, and the bent of his mind was ever in that direction. But his ideas of it embodied all that was noble and praiseworthy.

The only worthy end of life, which he could discover, as his pensive mind surveyed himself and the world around him, he found in God alone; supreme devotion to whom, seemed to him the chief good. The being, perfections, and ways of God, early engaged his serious attention. His spirit instinctively soared upward. He ever felt himself a stranger in this world, and from his earliest childhood he sighed for another and better land. During the memorable years of his seclusion from the world, he cherished an almost impatient desire for death. And this feeling remained habitual with him through his long and weary pilgrimage.

To satisfy his thirst for knowledge, and to afford him amusement in his solitary hours, books of every variety and description from his father's library, were indiscriminately put into his hands. These he read with great avidity, and, at first, with implicit confidence, but finding them from time to time in error, he early imbibed a distrust of books, and formed the habit of thinking and judging for himself. He was at length more judiciously supplied with books, by Dr. Verschuur, his father's colleague, and a friend of the family, who manifested a deep interest in the youthful sufferer, appreciated his character and talents, and encouraged him in his despondency. His kindness was ever held in grateful remembrance.

After long importunity, he obtained his father's permission to study Latin. He was soon able to read Horace with comparative ease. The expressiveness of the Latin language, and the various shades of meaning possessed by its words and phrases, particularly engaged his attention. Hence he was led to investigate his own language, to enable him to render the sentiments of his favourite poet into Dutch verse. This induced him also to give special attention to the Dutch poets. He now made almost incredible exertions to obtain a perfect mastery over his mother-tongue, and an unlimited power of versification. These efforts were made with no expectation of ever appearing as a poet himself, as he was not yet conscious

of his own poetic powers, but to enable him to appreciate better the nicest beauties of poetry, and to comprehend more thoroughly the finest workings and susceptibilities of the human soul. He had, it is true, at the very early age of four years, written an original composition in verse, which, subsequently polished, is still preserved, and is included in the recent and complete edition of his poetical works. When twelve years old, he had also composed a few verses, which he concealed, but which were afterwards brought to light, and placed, without his knowledge, in the Vaderlandsche Letterœfeningen. This was done, it was said, for his encouragement, but it had a contrary effect on his mind. These productions had not, it seems, revealed to him his own poetic genius. Hence, when the Hague Society, in consequence of its appreciation of these latter verses, desired to receive him as a pupil, he in all sincerity declined the honour, feeling that he was not destined to be a poet. In 1773, the new poetic version of the Psalms made its appearance, and awakened new feelings in his breast; and its influence on him, combined with the impression before made on his mind by the perusal of Antonides, and the Lyrics of Willem van Haren, served to convince him of the possession of a power, whose presence he had previously denied or questioned.

His introduction to the public, in 1774, as an original poet, was brilliant and flattering. The Leyden Society—Kunst wordt door arbeid verkregen*—had proposed as the subject of a prize poem, Den Invloed der Dichtkunst op het Staatsbestuur.† This was regarded by his father and others as a very unpoetic theme; but his own mind became interested in it, and the result was, the effusion of a lyric, which he committed to paper; and on reading it over, he was sufficiently pleased with it to send it in. This he did with no expectation of its receiving the prize, but with the hope that it might elicit some expression of the judges of award as to its merits. Hence he did not insert his name in the accompanying billet. To his surprise, the gold medal was awarded it. Great was the astonishment in his father's family, when, after the announcement of

* Skill is acquired by practice.

† The Influence of Poetry on Politics.

the decision, he laid claim to its authorship, and produced from his desk the rough draft. This triumph was at first very encouraging to him, but on learning that there was but one competitor, he attached but little value to his success. The next year, however, a more brilliant triumph awaited him. The theme was, "Liefde tot het Vaderland."* He sent in a poem in Alexandrine verse, which received the gold medal; and a lyric, which received the second silver medal, the first being awarded to Lady de Lannoy. His reputation as a poet was now established. He was thus brought into personal acquaintance and epistolary correspondence with this gifted woman, for whom he had previously entertained a high esteem. The poet Feith participated, for several years, in this correspondence and friendship. In Bilderdijk's celebrated Farewell, delivered January 10th, 1811, in the Amsterdam Division of the Holland Society of Sciences and Arts, after making honourable mention of cotemporary poets, he casts a retrospective look on this period, and pays a beautiful tribute to her memory in the following lines:

> "Gij, gij-alleen, Lannoy, gij echte Dichteres,
> Wier tombe, omwemeld van Bataafsche lijkcypres,
> Ik-zelf met eigen hand uw lijkasch heb geschonken,
> Verdiende in 't perk der eer eens Dichtershart te outfonken;
> Gij waart me een zegepraal, mij dierbaar, mijner waard!
> Neen, Hollands Dichtrcnoogst was tot dees tijd gespaard. "

He now applied himself to the study of languages, both ancient and modern, which, with the exception of the French and Latin, in which he received some instruction from his father, he acquired without the aid of teachers, and without even the assistance of dictionaries. He read works in the different languages, without preparation, and acquired the ability to understand them by constant reading, comparison, and reflection. The object he had in view, in the study of languages, was to get a deeper insight into the operations of the human mind. With the same object he pursued the study of the sciences, and of history; and to this end were directed all his studies, observations, and reflections. In 1779,

* Love to the Fatherland, or Patriotism.

at the age of twenty-three, he gave to the public, in his imitation of the King Œdipus of Sophocles, the first specimen of his imitations of the ancient poets. The poetic talent with which the work was executed, and the profound knowledge of the Greek language, arts, and antiquities, exhibited in the accompanying notes, and also in a letter published in 1780, brought him into personal acquaintance and intercourse with such men as Petrus Fontein, Daniel van Alphen and L. van Santen of Leyden, through the latter of whom he also became acquainted with the celebrated Lodewijk Casper Valckenaar. Whilst thus prosecuting his studies, he was actively engaged in assisting his father in the duties of his office; and, among other things, he kept his accounts, which he did with great accuracy and elegance. He could not, however, be induced to comply with his father's wishes, who desired him to follow the same occupation with himself; but he selected, as his calling for life, the profession of law.

At the age of twenty-four he repaired to Leyden for the purpose of studying law. He was now in the vigour of early manhood, possessing a strong and finely developed bodily frame, and a mind of the highest order, uncommonly developed and matured, and enriched with stores of varied learning. He was refined, genial, and possessed of brilliant conversational powers: these, however, did not always appear to full advantage, owing to a certain diffidence in social intercourse, which, whether arising from a conscious inability to do justice to his own conceptions, or resulting from the secluded life which he led in childhood and youth, or whether it were the effect of both these causes combined, was to him a source of indescribable annoyance, and it was only by the greatest exertions that he was enabled to overcome it. This characteristic may to some appear incompatible with the independence of mind, and freedom from fear, for which he was so distinguished. Yet examples are not wanting of men in whom these seemingly opposite traits have been found united. He was also characterized by great vehemence of feeling and expression, which detracted from his many amiable qualities, and was to him a fruitful source of unhappiness in life, causing him many a bitter experience, and costing him many a painful struggle for

its subjugation: yet this natural vehemence of character was also of important service; impelling him to great exertions, to noble achievements, to heroic sacrifices.

His reputation as a poet and linguist had preceded him to this celebrated seat of learning, where he was received with corresponding marks of distinction. At the receptions, given by the professors and other distinguished literary men, he was cordially welcomed. The variety and extent of his knowledge, his fascinating conversation, and the distinction which he had already attained, gathered around him a large circle of friends and admirers, composed of students from the different departments in the University, and chiefly, too, of those whose political sentiments were opposed to his own. Among these were J. H. van der Palm, and Johan Valckenaar, son of the eminent Greek professor, L. C. Valckenaar. With the former of these he formed relations of the greatest intimacy and of the most ardent friendship; but delightful and profitable as was their intercourse during this happy period, they subsequently experienced an unhappy estrangement from each other, though the great orator and the incomparable poet mutually retained their high esteem of each other's eminent gifts. But the intimate friendship subsisting at this time between Bilderdijk and Valckenaar, resisting the influence of conflicting political and religious sentiments, and withstanding the shock of political revolutions, was maintained through all the vicissitudes of an eventful life, till terminated by the death of the latter in 1821.

Though relaxing his mind by social intercourse, and gratifying his appetite for varied knowledge, by attending to different branches of learning, he did not forget the great object that had brought him to Leyden. With natural law, as we have seen, he had a previous acquaintance. He now made himself acquainted with civil, canon, and feudal law. The amount of legal knowledge which he acquired during the two years that he spent in the law department of the University, is said to have been almost incredible. But his application to study was intense and well-nigh unremitting. His studies were often protracted throughout the night. The injury thus inflicted on his constitution, though not so sensibly felt at the time, owing to

the elasticity of his system, nature seems to have avenged in later years, by dooming him to sleepless nights. On the 19th of October, 1782, after defending one hundred and five theses, drawn from the various departments of jurisprudence, he received the degree of Doctor of Laws.

During this period of intense application to study, his poetic vein did not cease to flow. The current of poetic thought and feeling, flowing in a rapid and full tide, ran, however, as was not unnatural at his time of life, in an erotic channel. His effusions, partly original, and partly imitations of Anacreon, Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, and Horace, bore testimony to the luxuriance of his imagination, and to his skill in transferring the beauties of the ancient poets; but they were not wholly free from what is offensive to delicacy and purity. They were given to the public in two separate collections; the first in 1781, entitled "Mijne Verlustiging;"* the second in 1785, entitled "Bloemtjens."†

Having taken his degree, he removed to the Hague, where he commenced the practice of law. He devoted himself with characteristic ardour to his profession, in which he soon gained a high reputation, and secured an extensive practice. His devotion to his calling is thus forcibly expressed by himself:

> "Ik zwoer met hart en ziel aan dees mijn roeping trouw.
> Om haar verduurde ik leed en arbeid, zweet, en kou';
> Om haar doorwaakte ik nacht aan nachten, en verzaakte,
> Wat andren d' arbeid zoet, het leven dierbaar maakte,
> Kleefde aan mijn schrijfdisch vast, en at mijn tweebak droog,
> En dronk mijn slappe thee, gelukkig in mijn oog.
> Waar voor? voor d'armen wees, den lijdende en verdrukte,
> D' onnoozle wien mijn moed uit band en kerker rukte."

In 1784 he entered into the marriage relation with Rebecca Catharina Woesthoven, by whose beauty he had been captivated, and in whom he fondly hoped to find a mind congenial with his own; but in this he was disappointed, as she was incapable of appreciating his poetic talent, or of sympathizing with him in his enthusiastic devotion to poetry. Tenderly as they may have loved each other, and high as may have been their mutual esteem, this want of congeniality prevented the full

* My delight, or recreation. † Flowerets.

realization of connubial bliss which, from childhood up, he had fondly and confidently anticipated from the matrimonial relation.

From 1781 to 1787, those who were attached to the house of Orange, and who gave free expression to their views and feelings, were subjected to various annoyances; many, whose words were followed by corresponding acts, were even subjected to criminal processes at law. Of these not a few, attracted by his well known attachment to the same political party, his profound legal knowledge, and his determined courage, naturally sought in him a protector from injustice and oppression. On one occasion, when called to defend two female clients before the Court of Sheriffs, augmented in this instance by a commission from the States, the hall of justice was filled with armed men, who gave unmistakeable evidence of their hostility to the advocate. Unintimidated by these hostile demonstrations, he reminded the court, that his situation resembled in some respects that of Cicero, when engaged in the defence of Milo, but that he, unlike the great Roman orator, feared nothing, and that he should, by no consideration of whatever kind, be deterred from the faithful performance of his duty. Before proceeding to the defence, he demanded the necessary freedom and silence. The result was, that he carried his cause so far triumphantly as to secure either the acquittal of his clients, or their discharge, on the payment of a trifling fine. On retiring from the hall, he received a slight wound in the side from a bayonet.

During his residence at the Hague, Bilderdijk, from want of inclination, or from aversion, seldom appeared in public at the court of the Stadtholder, Prince William V., though he was admitted to great intimacy with the prince, enjoyed his confidence, was consulted by him on matters of great moment, and was regarded as eminently qualified to conduct important negotiations. He formed a favourable estimate of the literary attainments and intellectual endowments of the prince, though not blind to his want of decision and energy, in which he found an insuperable obstacle to the adoption of such measures as in the judgment of the prince himself could alone save the nation, as well as the house of Orange. What Bilderdijk

seems to have desired was this: that the prince instead of remaining Stadtholder William V., invested with insufficient authority to maintain his own honour, or the interests of the nation, should, by a bold *coup d'etat*, become Count William VII., invested with an authority adequate to the maintenance of his own dignity, and the peace, order, and welfare of his subjects. In the adoption and successful carrying out of such a measure, he saw the only effectual means of securing the nation from foreign domination and oppression, and from the disastrous effects of internal dissensions.

In 1787 he was charged by the Prince with a delicate and difficult commission to the Duke of Brunswick, in executing which, his ability and tact as a negotiator, and his knowledge and skill as a strategist, were especially called into requisition. The revolution was effected, and the authority of the Prince restored. The Advocate at the Hague might now have easily secured for himself some high official station, in consideration of the signal services which he had rendered the Prince and the now dominant party. Disapproving any retaliatory measures, and unwilling to make any efforts in favour of himself, he was permitted, greatly to his own satisfaction, to remain in the faithful discharge of his professional duties. He now manifested the same readiness to defend the injured and oppressed of the defeated party, as he had previously done in reference to those who suffered for their manifested attachment to the house of Orange. In pursuing this course he rendered himself obnoxious to some of his political friends; but this consideration could not induce him to deviate from a line of conduct dictated alike by feelings of humanity and by a sense of justice, though he clearly foresaw that no favour would be extended to him, should the political party to which his injured clients belonged regain its former ascendancy.

During the thirteen years of arduous professional labour which he spent at the Hague, his poetic genius was industriously at work, sending forth one production after another, and that, too, of widely different character. Yet numerous, diversified, and mature as were these poetic productions, they can only be regarded as the first fruits of an exceedingly abundant harvest. To this period are to be referred his poetic transla-

tions, or imitations of Ossian. certain Hymns of Callimachus, Odes of Horace, Death of Edipus according to Sophocles, Solomon's Ecclesiastes, and the Consolation of Philosophy according to Boëtius; also his Heroic Epistles in the strain or Ovid, his Idyls of Theocritus, and numerous lyrics, tales, and fables, some original, and others derived from foreign literature.

The department of romance, for which he had a particular fondness, was assiduously cultivated by him during his whole poetic career. His Elius, consisting of seven songs, is a wholly original poem, the scene of which is laid a thousand years ago, on the banks of the Rhine. Its hero is Elius, whom the poet claims as one of his ancestors, and the story is one of thrilling interest. It is a highly finished composition, of surpassing beauty as a whole, and abounding in beauties of detail, among which are several admirable descriptions. Not to speak of his Roosjen, a free imitation of Burger, and of his Yrwin en Vreedebag, founded on a Lapland romance; his Urzijn en Valentijn, wrought from mediæval legends; and his Ahacha, the scene of which is laid in Guinea, are beautiful specimens of this kind of poetry.

In the midst of all these labours, we find him gathering materials for a Dutch dictionary of a comprehensive character. The rich materials which he had collected for the purpose, were, however, in great part lost, in consequence of his hasty departure from the Hague, and his residence in foreign lands; such as were not, were either incorporated into later philological writings, or into his annotations on various collections of his poetical works.

Such was the course of political affairs, after the restoration of the Stadtholder, that he no longer felt able to identify himself with either of the great political parties. With his independence of character and his high valuation of personal freedom, he was too strenuous an advocate for popular rights to become identified with the aristocratic party; on the other hand, his determined and freely expressed opposition to the French ideas of liberty, which he regarded as essentially revolutionary, and his leanings towards monarchism, rendered him unacceptable to the so-called patriot party. He was no absolutist, nor necessarily a monarchist; yet he was in favour of

having the supreme power vested in one man, whether denominated king, stadtholder, or doge, was to him a matter of comparative indifference, provided his power were such as to enable him to restrain the aristocracy from their encroachments, and sufficiently guarded to prevent the infraction of popular rights.

The withdrawal of the prince from the Hague in 1795; the occupation of the country by the French, who were, on their arrival, welcomed by the patriot party as friends, but in whom they soon found oppressors; the abrogation of the constitution, which had existed for six centuries; and the establishment of a new government by the French, in conjunction with the patriots; were events that portended evil to the Advocate at the Hague, whose well-known political sentiments rendered him obnoxious to those in power, and whose independence and integrity would prevent him from sacrificing his conscientious and enlightened convictions on the altar of his secular interests.

The new Assembly, styled "Provisional Representatives of the People of Holland," required all who held offices, which it was customary to assume with an oath, to take a new oath. The formulary prescribing this oath, contained and asserted a political principle which Bilderdijk could not admit; and the oath itself was in direct conflict with the one that he had previously taken, of fidelity to the States of Holland and West-friesland, and to the House of Orange. To take this oath, in its prescribed form, was with him a moral impossibility. Should he refuse or neglect to take it, he must desist from the public exercise of his profession. Dependent as he was for his temporal support on his profession, and unaccustomed to earn a livelihood in any other way, the thought of relinquishing a profession, which, with all its arduous duties, was dear to him, was fraught with trial to his mind. Yet he at first determined to do this; and as he felt himself, with his debilitated system, and in his present state of mind, incapacitated for vigorous mental exertion, he resolved to seek a subsistence by inventing, drawing, and, if need be, etching vignettes and other plates; and also by translating from the ancient and modern languages interesting and valuable works in the various departments of science and art.

Upon further reflection, however, he abandoned this design, and determined to present a memorial to the government, stating the reasons why he could not take the oath in the form prescribed, and praying to be allowed the privilege of continuing in the public discharge of his official duties, on taking an oath of acquiesence, with the promise of civil obedience and submission. He accordingly prepared a memorial, in which he clearly and forcibly stated his objections to the oath, denying their right to exact such an oath, and maintaining that the exaction was in conflict with their own professed principles. It was written in an earnest tone, and couched in respectful and courtly phrase.

The Assembly, on hearing the memorial read, professed great indignation, and immediately passed a resolution requiring him to leave the Hague within twenty-four hours, and the Province within eight days. This was a new and unexpected issue. He had previously contemplated the possibility of imprisonment, criminal process, or even death on the scaffold; but the idea of banishment from his native land, on so short a notice, and with the refusal of passports, had not entered his mind. In his circumstances he preferred imprisonment or death to exile. The Fiscal Advocate, a personal friend of Bilderdijk, was appointed to notify him of the resolution of the Assembly. He inquired of his informant whether he were to regard the decree as a *consilium abeundi*, with which he might refuse compliance without criminality; or whether he must regard it as an act of political authority, disobedience to which would be rebellion. The reply that he must regard it in the latter sense, left no room for doubt as to the nature of the decree.

To leave the place of his abode within twenty-four hours, and the land of his nativity within eight days; to tear himself away from those who were dearer to him than life itself, was a trial, the severity of which we can more readily imagine than adequately describe. After the Fiscal Advocate who had announced to him the decision of the Assembly had left, as he was sitting in the solitude of his study, pondering the past and the future, his eye, glancing over the open Bible that lay before him, rested on the consolatory declaration of the apostle, "There

hath no temptation taken you, but such as is common to man: but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will, with the temptation, also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it." Confidence in God was his support, and his only support, under the pressure of a trial that might otherwise have overwhelmed him. To the various emotions of his soul in these trying moments, he gave a free expression in his Uitboezeming,* penned in Hamburg, on his way to England. The poet, dejected in mind, directs his eyes upward, and entreats the Searcher of hearts to regard him in his deep distress, acknowledging that his sufferings, however great, could not entitle him to be heard, yet expressing his faith in God, as a refuge to those who are in trouble. After breathing the spirit of submission to the Divine will, in view of the trials that might be appointed him, he thus expresses his confidence in God:

"Ik buig het hoofd in zielbetrouwen,
En hoe uw slaande hand mij grieft,
Ik kan het als een gunst aanschouwen,
En voel dat Gij mij teder lieft.

Dan ô genadig God en Vader,
Gij, die mij dit betrouwen schenkt,
Bevestig het mij na en nader,
En trek mij waar uw hand mij wenkt!

Helaas! er vallen oogenblikken,
Die duistrer zijn dan 's Afgronds nacht!
Die ook eens Christens moed verschrikken,
Terwijl hij op uw redding wacht."

He then proceeds to give a vivid description of the hardships which he might be called to endure in his exile, yet the prospect of these he could bear with composure, and this cup of sorrow he could drink without murmuring; but to part with the objects of his dearest affection, filled his soul with the keenest anguish:

"Dit al valt hard, mijn God, voorzeker,
Voor zielen nog gehecht aan 't vleesch;
Maar echter, 'k nam dien wrangen beker
Blijmoedig op, en zonder vrees:

* Unbosoming, or utterance.

> Doch, God van heil en zaligheden,
> Gij ziet het waar mijn hart om beeft!
> De panden van U afgebeden,
> En waar geheel dat hart in leeft . . . !"

The whole piece, which not only reveals the state of his mind in the prospect of a dark and uncertain future, but also discloses the hidden grief of his heart in the years of his outward prosperity, is one of touching tenderness, and breathes a spirit of penitence, submission, and confidence in the love and faithfulness of his heavenly Father.

Having left the Hague, he tarried with his friends in Groningen, though urged by the authorities of the place to depart, until he could obtain passports, which were at first refused by the government, but were finally granted through the intervention of Macdonald, the French general in command. The decree of banishment was registered March 24th, 1795, but through the withholding of the necessary permission to set foot on foreign soil, a month or more elapsed before he actually went into exile.

Before his departure, he entrusted to a friend, for publication, his poetic translation of an Arabic tragedy, one of the most celebrated productions of the renowned Ibn Doreid, who flourished in the ninth century. The translation was made in the interim between the revolution and the announcement of the decree of banishment.

To England, whither William V. had previously gone, he first directed his course. At Hampton Court he had an interview with the prince, and he subsequently, during their stay in England, exchanged calls with his Highness. Opportunity was soon afforded him to give instructions in ancient and modern languages, in drawing, and in various branches of learning. A nobleman, to whom he had offered himself as an instructor in drawing, requested him to produce his portfolio, and exhibit to him some specimens of his skill as an artist; this he declined to do; but, taking his crayon, he produced on the spot such a specimen of his skill as astonished the nobleman, and enraptured an Italian portrait painter, who was present. Many and varied were the scenes through which he passed, and the events

that befell him during the two years that he spent in the metropolis of England.

In the summer of 1797, at the suggestion of the Prince, who also went thither, he repaired to Brunswick. Here he was welcomed by the Duke, who gave him a brilliant reception, and granted him an annuity. The amount of labour which he performed here, as an instructor, is almost incredible; and had he been a good financier, at even moderate charges, he must have realized a very handsome income from such abundant labours. He was daily employed in communicating instruction: giving lessons or lectures on rhetoric, metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, and geography; on drawing, painting, architecture, dioptrics, and anatomy; on natural, political, and civil law; history, Greek and Roman antiquities, many ancient and modern languages, and literature in general: these instructions, too, were often given without the aid of a manual, and chiefly in foreign languages. In addition to all this, he also instructed the Marquis de Rivière in fortification.

In the midst of this unwearied activity, and in circumstances comparatively comfortable, though an exile from the land of his birth, he made the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. It will not, we trust, be uninteresting to our readers to listen to the remarks of his biographer on the characteristics of the two centuries, and the distinctive differences between the poet, viewed as belonging to the one or the other of these periods:

"Thus the nineteenth century, subsequently so boldly developed, had dawned upon the chief poet of the Netherlands in the land of his exile. The line which separates the last hour of one century from the first of the one that immediately succeeds it, may be imaginary—not imaginary, but real, is the characteristic distinction between the entire course, and nature, and physiognomy of the eighteenth century, sultry, sluggish, wearied, and, as it were, impregnated with inflammable matter; and the nineteenth, airy, and volatile, and mobile, advancing with gigantic strides, or on eagle's wings. Every man, whoever he may be, even he who, by virtue of duty or calling, is obliged to be, in many respects, an opposer of the spirit of his time, is, and remains, in another respect, a child of his time,

participating, with or without his will or self-consciousness, not only in the concussions and experiences, but also in the phenomena and developments of the period in which he lives, especially when that period is as extraordinary as was the one in which the career of Bilderdijk found its place. Between the Bilderdijk of the eighteenth and the Bilderdijk of the nineteenth century, with the same outlines, there is undeniably a great and real distinction, especially as to internal growth, development, and activity.

"With the opening of this century, both the poet and his poetic powers enter upon an entirely fresh and new period of life. We see his mighty genius, after and with this transition, as by a violent concussion, released from many a band and fetter, which, in the poetry of his youth, and even of his early manhood, too often produced a sort of restraint by his otherwise lofty classic flight.

"The more or less stiff, or rather harsh form, peculiar to the eighteenth century, in life as in poetry—the more or less antique stateliness, reminding us of the time and court of Louis the Fourteenth, which at a later period still distinguished the prose, but especially the social life of our poet—henceforth and at once disappear from his poetry. As didactic, as lyric, as epic poet, as original writer, or no less original translator, he now for the first raised on high, in their full strength and breadth, those eagle's wings, which hitherto he had, perhaps, only shown or expanded for trial."

Intimately connected with this fuller development of his poetic powers, and the bursting asunder of the fetters that may have previously embarrassed his lofty genius in its upward flight, was the marked inward change which he experienced during the period of his exile. From the evidences before us, we do not feel justified in expressing it as our conviction, that the principle of spiritual life was now for the first imparted to his soul; but certain it is, that if previously communicated, it had lain comparatively dormant, and that it now burst forth into new life and vigour. From early childhood he regarded the great Author of his being as the source of true happiness, cherished a profound veneration for his glorious character, felt a conviction of his entire dependence on him, and confided in

his universal, beneficent, and all-powerful providence. The benign influence exerted on his tender mind by the writings of Cats, he gratefully acknowledges in a beautiful tribute, which, in the near prospect of death, and as a last duty of life, he paid to the memory of this venerated man. From it we venture to quote a few lines bearing on the point in hand:

> "Nu leidde me uwe hand, in zoete mijmeringen,
> Tot Hem, in wien ik mij en 't wezen aller dingen,
> Vond afgeteekened: bron en oorsprong van 't bestaan,
> In alles uitgedrukt, in alles na te gaan!
> Nu leerde ik, teder kind van nog geen derdhalf jaren,
> Met volle toeverzicht op Hem-alleen te staren;
> Aan Hem-alleen mijn lot te hechten; al mijn hoop
> Te stellen in Zijn zorg: en heel mijn aardsche loop
> Scheen me in 't vooruitzigt, hoe met ramp op ramp doorweven,
> Een vaste en zekere koers op d' Oceaan van 't leven,
> Van wisselbaren wind noch wankelend geval
> Afhanklijk, maar bepaald door 't groot eenvormig Al."

With all the scriptural knowledge which he early possessed, positive Christianity was to him, in childhood and youth, involved to some extent in doubt and uncertainty. By the study of the sacred oracles, and not by the perusal of human writings, his doubts were in due time removed. His views of objective truth had already, in early manhood, become distinct and settled. So far as parental instruction and influence were concerned, he might have been a Socinian; but deriving his views of truth directly from the word of God, they were in conformity with the system of truth taught in the formularies of the Reformed churches. Even in his earlier poetic productions, his orthodoxy was discernible. Whilst pursuing the study of law in the University, he was chided by literary and scientific men of distinction, with whom he had intercourse, and who appreciated his talents, for allowing his orthodoxy to appear in his writings, as it might prove offensive to some who held different sentiments. But neither then nor subsequently did this consideration deter him from a free expression of his religious views, when duty demanded, or the occasion elicited such expression.

With clear speculative views of revealed truth, and with some experience of its purifying and elevating influence, and of

its sustaining power, he was not yet fully initiated into the mystery of that spiritual life which consists essentially in communion with God, and is maintained by the Holy Spirit, keeping the soul in the habitual exercise of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. He could not fully adopt the language of the apostle: "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." The clearer and fuller revelation to him of Christ, in the power of his cross, to bring the soul into communion with God, to purify the heart, to elevate the affections, to comfort in the deepest sorrow, and to sustain under the pressure of the heaviest trials, was reserved for a period in which his heart imperatively demanded a consolation which all the resources of his genius and learning could not afford.

It is worthy of notice, as evincing the sovereignty and efficacy of Divine grace, that this spiritual change occurred in this man of genius, at a time when men of learning were generally repudiating the Bible as a Divine revelation, and exalting human reason above the word of God. On his arrival in Brunswick, to his great surprise, he found himself numbered among the so-called illuminati of the age, and as such he was honoured with a flattering reception; but the independence of his mind, and the integrity of his heart, would not permit him to occupy a false position, however advantageous it might be to his worldly prospects. A frank avowal of his sentiments was accordingly made, though it involved a sacrifice of secular interest. To hear from the lips of a man of profound, varied, and extensive learning, a declaration of his belief in the Bible as a revelation from God, so astonished these enlightened men, that they could not at first credit his sincerity in making it, but when this could no longer be doubted, they questioned the soundness of his judgment. Differing so widely in his views on matters of infinite moment from the literati of Germany, it is not surprising that he did not, to any great extent, cultivate their acquaintance. Among his most intimate friends, while in Brunswick, were Eberhard August Willem von Zimmermann and André de Luc: the former, for many years a distinguished professor of Physics in the Collegium Carolinum in Brunswick,

was at this time privy counsellor to the Duke; the latter, a Genevan by birth, was distinguished for his scientific investigations, and was the author of several religious works in French, one or more of which Bilderdijk highly prized.

The rich and varied fruits produced by his poetic genius during his exile, were successively given to his countrymen through the press of his native land. During this period several volumes of poetic miscellanies were published, comprising lyrics and idyls, romances, fables, tales, erotics, and elegies. Among these his Graaf Floris* de Vierde stands preëminent; and in this department no subsequent effort of his genius produced anything superior to it. It is exquisitely beautiful, and shows throughout the hand of a master.

In 1805, whilst still in Brunswick, he completed his poetic translation of Ossian's Fingal, of whose genuineness he was fully persuaded. The military knowledge and skill which its author evinces, were to his mind a sufficient proof of its genuineness, as, in his judgment, later poets have, in their descriptions of battles, shown themselves lamentably ignorant of military affairs.

In 1803, he gave to the public his Buitenleven; a poetic translation or imitation of the French work of the Abbé Delille: "L'Homme des Champs, ou les Georgiques Françoises." To this work his attention was directed by certain Dutch ladies of his acquaintance, residing in Brunswick, who were captivated by this poem, which had just made its appearance, and was enjoying a very high degree of popularity. On examination of it, he found the French exceedingly good, which in his judgment was a rarity in those days; the versification smooth and euphonious, and many things very happily expressed. Though he regarded the work as defective, even essentially wanting in the higher properties of true poetry, yet he found sufficient poetic life in it to kindle his own; and hence for the gratification of these female friends, who were ladies of refinement and high mental culture, he translated portions of it, in his leisure moments, into Dutch verse. Yielding to their de-

* Count Florence the Fourth of Holland, slain by the Count of Clermont, in a sudden fit of jealousy, and in violation of the rights of hospitality.

sires and to the solicitation of a bookseller in Amsterdam, who had announced a Dutch translation of it, he finally completed his translation of the whole work. It was very happily executed, and was greatly admired for the felicity with which the ideas of the French writer were transfused into pure, idiomatic, and elegant Dutch; for its picturesque language and vivacious style; and for its poetic fire, in which, as well as in the poetic nature of its language, it was thought superior to the original. M. Siegenbeek, professor of Dutch literature in the University of Leyden, in one of his prize essays, appeals to this translation of Bilderdijk, comparing portions of it with the original, in confirmation of his position, that for poetic purposes the Dutch language has a decided superiority to the French, which in picturesque, vivacious, and animated expression of poetic ideas, is poor and defective, compared with the Dutch.

In presenting this French poem to his countrymen in a Dutch dress, Bilderdijk was careful not to endorse sentiments which he did not approve. Besides the liberty that he allowed himself in translating, he added notes, in which he distinctly and freely expressed his own views. One of the more extended of these, we feel disposed to place before our readers, as exhibiting the enlightened views he entertained, and the unshaken confidence he maintained in the Divine origin of the Scriptures, and the confirmation which they would ultimately receive from science itself, at a time when scientific investigation and discoveries, so far as made, were specially directed to the overthrow of Christianity, and when the faith of so many yielded to the insidious assaults of infidelity. It should be borne in mind that it was written nearly sixty years ago, when the influences by which he was surrounded, were almost wholly adverse to Christianity. It is on the need of Christendom, an expression that occurs in the poem. "Never was this need greater or more urgent. Let us be upright: who is there, since everything is filled with objections against the Divine revelation, consisting partly, it is true, in bare perversions, irrational suppositions, and impudent assertions, but partly also founded on pretended natural and experimental truths and results of mathematical calculations, which contradict the historical portion

of our dogmas, on which more depends than is commonly supposed; who (I say) is there, that as he hears this advanced on all occasions, and sees it everywhere asserted in writings or accepted and taken for granted as if it had long been proved, does not sometimes begin to doubt, whether that which constitutes the foundation of the Christian system, be indeed so true, and of that Divine origin, as it was yet inculcated on us in our childhood? Certainly, there is no one that reads or mingles in society, who is not more or less in this case; and no subjection, resting on human grounds, no faith built on human investigation, can be proof against such a conviction as these objections seem to carry with them. Which of them meanwhile is in condition to investigate the truth of those pretended natural principles, and to examine the correctness or incorrectness of the consequences derived from them? And must not all examination, too, be unsatisfactory, as long as the very things to which the appeal is made, are not fully brought to view? How necessary then, how indispensable for our time, how desirable for every Christian, must be a work, in which this is done, and of the accuracy, fidelity, uprightness, and perfect knowledge of whose author we may be as well assured as we are of the inaccuracy, defective knowledge, blinding, and seductive desire of novelty of a Buffon* and his adherents!

"When I follow the course of ecclesiastical history, a branch of learning which, were it more generally attended to, would prevent much misapprehension, much confusion, and much uneasiness, and would also prevent many new opinions from taking root. I see the attacks of the heathen philosophers, those of the heretics and the superstitious, always tend to the diffusion of a new or greater light, which has rendered truths, that are objects of faith, more acceptable and convincing to the understanding. The very same thing I behold in the present general uprising of natural philosphers against Christianity. It will, it can, only serve to cause what would never have occurred without them, mute nature to bear its testimony in favour of the Divine Word, which will fill the atheist with shame, the Christian with courage and confidence. Yes, I

* In another note, Bilderdijk gives Buffon the credit to which he thinks him entitled.

dare promise myself still more: it is to you, my countrymen, it is to Christians, that I speak, and I care for the laugh of others just as little as for all persecution: I foresee that a time will come, in which a greater and deeper insight into nature, in the mode of formation, propagation, multiplication, and dissolution, will give us an after-insight into truths which we now apprehend only by faith, and which we are accustomed to regard as conflicting with reason. But God, who requires of us faith, and to whom we, according to all revealed and truly philosophic principles, cannot be brought back but by a submissive faith, will, we may hope, come to the aid of our weakness, by making the grounds of our faith more agreeable and convincing to our understanding, in proportion as we need this to maintain our position; but the intelligent insight into those truths of which I speak, must necessarily be reserved for a point of time in which our return shall be effected by faith. And this consciousness must restrain every one of us, when we suppose ourselves able to demonstrate something of those truths, from relying on his demonstrations, from an ostentatious exhibition of them, or from giving them unseasonable publicity, even with the best designs. Let us always remember the Saviour's words: 'Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.'

"These are my views of the present necessity, the necessity of Christendom in our age. But I submit the question, whether a faith founded on such or any other rational demonstration, can pass for true and saving faith, or not? Whether with the intellect to exhibit God and his way in redemption, or to feel with the heart, characterizes the Christian? I submit this, I say, though I trust, that no true Christian can hesitate, where this is the question to be decided. But however it be, though the convincing refutation of objections cannot make the sincere inquirer, who feels that he is not one, a Christian, it will make him wish to become a Christian, and this desire, too, will be of God. Above all, it will confirm the Christian in his faith, hope, and confidence, and encourage the wavering to seek, with so much the more earnestness and fervency, from God in Christ the only sufficient support."

During his residence in Brunswick, he also translated Pope's Essay on Man, allowing himself the liberty of making Pope think and write as, in his judgment, Pope should have thought and written, in accordance with the system that he embraced. His deviations from the original, gave occasion for accompanying notes, in which he treats of the history of the poem, the low views entertained of it at first, whilst its authorship was unknown, the great change in public sentiment respecting it, after its author became known, and the causes that had operated to raise it so high in public esteem. He freely expressed his views respecting the author, his design in writing it, and the spirit by which he was actuated, the plan of the work, and its execution. He expresses his surprise that English critics should ever have exalted it to the rank of a didactic poem, and expected to find in it a corresponding dignity of style. For the conception and execution of a didactic poem, designed to exhibit a philosophical system, Pope was, in his estimation, qualified neither by the compass of his intellect, nor by the possession of the requisite knowledge of men and morals. The system which the work contained, derived, as he thinks, from Bolingbroke, who desired to render his strange mixture of fatalism and Spinozism more acceptable to the public, by employing the verses of Pope as the vehicle of its communication, was never fully understood by Pope himself: hence he can more readily forgive his inconsistencies and contradictions, resulting, as they did, from the attempt to incorporate his own imperfect views of Christianity into the ill-comprehended system of Bolingbroke. The critical acumen, delicate taste, sound judgment, keen irony, and varied learning which these notes display, together with the profound philosophic views they contain, render them deeply interesting and eminently worthy of regard. His honest attempt to convert the blind admiration with which Pope was at that time regarded in Holland, as well as in Germany, into a just appreciation of his merits, gave great umbrage to some of Pope's admirers.

Before his return to his fatherland, two highly important volumes of miscellaneous poetry, including a few essays in prose, were in readiness for the press, and were given to the

public in 1806, under the title, "Nieuwe Mengelingen."* Among the more important and brilliant of these, were, in the department of romance, his humorous Robbert de Vries, and his deeply affecting Assennede. In the historical department, bordering on the epic, were his Achilles in Scyros, according to Statius, his Lucretia, according to Ovid, and the wholly original Slot van Damiate.† Several odes contained in the same volume with the above, must also be included among the more brilliant productions comprised in this collection. The other volume is of a decidedly religious character. Its more prominent and beautiful pieces are the Saviour's ascension, the deity of Christ, Europe, the apostles in the night of the Saviour's betrayal, and an address to the Jews. The prose essays are on vicarious satisfaction, original sin, the immortality of the soul, and on a general and particular providence.

During this period of indefatigable labour, he also gave to the public his treatise on the Genders of Nouns, the first of his philological works. Professor Siegenbeek, in the preface to one of his own philological treatises, speaks of it in high terms, and expresses his regret that it had not appeared in time to allow him the opportunity of availing himself of the light it imparts, for the settlement of certain disputed points. He places him in the first rank as a philologist.

During the same period, a learned treatise on Roman Law, written in Latin, proceeded from his untiring pen. It appeared in 1805, dedicated to his benefactor, the Duke of Brunswick, and bearing the title, "Gulielmi a Teisterbant (dict. Bilderdijk) JCt. Observationum et Emendationum Liber Unus." It was highly esteemed by eminent jurists, both in Holland and Germany. A second and much larger edition of the work was issued in 1819, and in 1820 it was followed by a "Liber Alter," dedicated to Valckenaar. From a letter written to his instructors in law, Pestel and Van der Keessel, it appears that he beguiled many a tedious hour, by night and by day, over the *Corpus Juris*,‡ during his exile.

* New Miscellanies.

† Castle of Damiate.

‡ "Accedebat, unicum mihi librum esse, (quem domo in exilium extuleram,)

Incessant mental labour, domestic cares and anxieties, sore bereavements, and sharp inward conflicts, subjected him, whilst in Brunswick, to several fits of sickness; the last of these proved a very lingering illness, which threatened a fatal termination. For the recovery of his health he finally deemed his removal from Brunswick absolutely necessary. Various causes, too, had been for some time operating to diminish his income, and such was the political and social state of the country as to preclude the hope of gaining there a permanent subsistence. But whither should he go? His desire to return to his fatherland was indeed strong, but there were formidable obstacles in the way. Negotiations, too, were at this time pending, relative to a professorship in Moscow. Thither he would probably have gone,* had not Providence unexpectedly interposed to effect his return to his native land.

In the spring of 1805, an unknown reviewer of his "Miscellanies" opened a correspondence with him, relative to his return to his beloved country. This generous man found various obstacles placed in his way by those who were unfriendly to Bilderdijk, which made it necessary for him to propose many questions in regard to the history of his past life. To these inquiries the exile returned unambiguous, decisive, and as it proved, satisfactory replies. This noble-minded Hollander, who sympathized with his illustrious countryman in his misfortunes, was no other than Jeronimo de Vries, a man of taste and classic culture, capable of appreciating such a man as Bilderdijk; and who, satisfied with the replies he had received, now made efforts to secure for him a professorship in the department of jurisprudence at Franeker. These generous efforts were, however, frustrated by opposition to Bilderdijk, resulting

Corpus Juris Civilis, cujus dum lectione insomnes noctes ipsumque vitae tædium fallerem, non potui non in varia loca incidere quæ dubiis, conjecturis, observationibus, ansam darent." This also informs us what gave rise to the above-mentioned work.

* To this he alludes in a letter subsequently written to Louis, king of Holland, from which we make an extract: "Obligé de fuir cette patrie, dont les malheurs et les pertes me touchoient bien plus encore que l'ingratitude dont j'étois la victime, accablé de chagrin et de misère, je succombois à la rigueur de mon sort, et j'allois m'ensevelir dans un climat éloigué, lorsqu'un regard de votre Majesté a changé mon destin."

partly from misapprehension of his character and sentiments, and partly from a real diversity or contrariety of political sentiments. Though the wishes of De Vries, in which Bilderdijk participated, were not realized, yet the efforts of the former in this matter, had their influence in determining the latter to return to the land of his nativity.

In the spring of 1806, after an absence of eleven years, two of which had been spent in England, and the remaining nine in Germany, Bilderdijk was permitted to set foot once more on the soil of a country in whose welfare he had cherished the liveliest interest, by whose misfortunes he had been most deeply grieved, and to which he still felt most ardently attached, despite the unkind treatment which he had experienced. From a heart overflowing with joy and sorrow, he poured forth the following touching lines as a salutation to his native soil:

"'k Heb dan met mijn strammen voet,
Eindlijk uit d' outstuimen vloed,
Hollands vasten wal betreden!
'k Heb mijn kromgesloofde leden
Op zijn bodem uitgestrekt;
'k Heb hem met mijn lijf bedekt;
'k Heb hem met mijn arm omvademd;
'k Heb zijn lucht weêr ingeademd;
'k Heb zijn hemel weêrgezien,
God geprezen op mijn kniên,
Al de doorgestane smarte
Weggebannen uit mijn harte,
En het graf van mijn geslacht
Dit mijn rif te rug gebracht!—

'k Heb dit, en, genadig God!
Hier voleinde ik thands mijn lot!
Laat, na zoo veeljarig sterven,
Mij dat einde thands verwerven!
Dit, ô God, is al mijn hoop
Na zoo wreed een levensloop!"

(To be continued.)

Art. V.—*Are there too many Ministers?*

Until recently this question would have sounded strangely in the ears of Presbyterians. We have been accustomed to regard increase in the number of ministers as the evidence and index of the favour of God. To ask whether we had too many ministers, was regarded as equivalent to asking whether we had too many converts, too many revivals, too much of a missionary spirit, too much benevolence, too much zeal for Christ's glory, or too much devotion to his service. Were we and our fathers wrong in this view of the matter? Since when has the harvest ceased to be great, and the labourers few? When and how has our Lord recalled his command, "Pray ye the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest"? We hardly know how to enter on the discussion of this subject; and yet we are told that there is an urgent necessity for it. We are assured, that not only among men of the world, not only among those who are habitually disposed to take low views of everything, or who stand aloof from all benevolent efforts, but among many of the best men of the church and the best friends of our Boards, the impression is gaining ground, and often finds utterance, that we have too many ministers—that the supply is greater than the demand. It is very obvious that if this is true—if the supply of ministers is greater than we need—then it is the duty of the church to lessen the supply—to cease all efforts to increase the number of the preachers of the gospel. And it is no less obvious, that just in proportion as this conviction, whether well or ill-founded, spreads among the churches, will all effort to increase the number of ministers cease. It is very clear, therefore, that this is a vital subject, affecting the life of the church and her cherished institutions.

We have said that the assertion that we have too many ministers, once sounded as strangely as the declaration that we had too many Christians, or too much piety. Whether the state of mind which led to regarding these things as equivalent,

was right or scriptural, or whether the present impression which is said to be gaining prevalence in the church, that the number of our ministers is in fact too great, is reasonable and right, depends on the view taken of the nature and office of the church. If the church is a voluntary society in the sense in which the state is, or in which the army or navy within the state are, then the question whether its members or its officers are too many or too few, is a question of fact to be determined by prudential considerations. The citizens of a country may easily increase beyond the limits of comfortable support or profitable employment. The state would then be called upon to take measures to prevent such increase, and by emigration or otherwise, to remedy the evil. Still more frequently does it happen, that applicants for service in the army or navy are more numerous than the exigencies of the country demand. Then it becomes the duty of the authorities to stop all recruiting, and to refuse to make any new appointments. Now if men are disposed to regard the church in the light of a civil institution, it is to be dealt with on the same principles. If its converts become inconveniently numerous, we must stop preaching; or, if too many candidates for the ministry present themselves, we must refuse to receive them. This, however, is not the view which Presbyterians have been in the habit of taking of the church. And it is because the complaint that we have too many ministers, betrays the influence (secret it may be) of this low theory over the minds and feelings of our brethren, that it has given rise to so much painful surprise.

In the Scriptures, in our own standards, and in the inmost convictions of God's people, the church is the body of Christ, filled and animated by his Spirit. Every man by his regeneration becomes united to that body as a living member. Every member has its place and its office, determined not by its own will, not by human appointment, but by the Spirit of God. To one he gives one gift, to another another, dividing to each one severally as he wills. "We, being many," says the apostle, "are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another. Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, whether prophesy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith; or ministry, let us wait on our

ministering: or he that teacheth, on teaching; or he that exhorteth, on exhortation." If this be the true view of the matter, then the complaint that we have too many ministers, terminates, not on the church, but on the Holy Spirit. The church has nothing to do with it. It is not her office to call men into the ministry. She can only sit in judgment on the question, whether the candidate is really called of God. She puts him upon trial; she examines into his experience, into his qualifications or gifts. If satisfied, she pronounces her judgment to that effect, and thenceforth, until the contrary is made manifest, those whom the church approves as called by the Spirit, are to be so regarded and treated. Those who complain that we have too many ministers, know not what they do. They can escape the guilt of charging the Spirit with distributing his gifts unwisely or too profusely, only by denying that there is any divine call to the ministry. But this they cannot do without denying the plain doctrine of God's word, and the faith of our own, and of every other Christian church. The candidate is expressly asked in the ordination service of the Episcopal church, and impliedly in the inducting ceremonies and services of our own and of all other churches, "Do you believe that you are called of God to take upon you this office?" If the candidate believes that he is thus called, if the church is satisfied that he is neither a hypocrite nor a self-deceiver; if he gives every scriptural evidence of being the subject of this divine call, what shall we do? Shall we refuse to recognise it? Shall we say that we have ministers enough? Shall we decline to aid those thus called in preparing for the work to which God has called them, or in sustaining them in their labours? No one would dare consciously to take this ground. And yet this is the very ground taken by those who complain that we have too many ministers. To divest this complaint of its irreligious character, it must be directed not against the number, but against the character of our ministers. The only rational ground of complaint is, that the church introduces into the ministry men who are not called of God. This may well be; nay, it is impossible but that in some cases it must be; just as it is impossible but that offences must come. The church is not infallible in her judgment, and is not always

faithful in the exercise of her prerogative of judging. It is here, as in the admission of men to the full communion of the church. When a man is called of God into the kingdom of Christ, he has the right to come to the Lord's table, and it is the duty of the church to receive him. But it is not her duty to receive all who profess to be thus called, or who sincerely believe in their own vocation. It is the duty of the church to see that they have the qualifications for church-fellowship laid down in the word of God. In like manner, if any man is called by the Spirit to the work of the ministry, it is his right and duty to preach the gospel, and it is the duty of the church to aid him in preparing for his work, and to sustain him when he enters upon it. But it is not every one who professes or believes that he is called to be a minister, who is really called of God. And therefore it is the duty of the church carefully and faithfully to examine into the matter; to put him through a protracted trial, and be fully satisfied that he gives all the evidence of a divine vocation which she is authorized to demand. When she has done this, her responsibility ceases. Whether they be few or many whom God thus calls, she must joyfully receive, sustain, and encourage them, assured that if God calls men into his service he will find work for them to do.

The complaint, however, as we understand, is not that our presbyteries have become of late more remiss than formerly, in the discharge of their important and responsible duty in this matter, nor that the character of our ministers and candidates has deteriorated, giving evidence that the church is, so to speak, in advance of God's Spirit, receiving more candidates for the ministry than the Spirit calls to that work. Of any such charge we hear no intimation, and we believe that there is no ground for it. It must of course be admitted, that as unworthy members are received to the fellowship of the church, so unworthy men are sometimes admitted to the ministry. This is an evil against which no human foresight or fidelity can effectually guard. But we presume that no intelligent person will venture to assert, that the character of our church membership, or of our ministers and candidates, is lower now than it was twenty or thirty years ago. So far from this being the case, we believe that on an average the character of both of

our membership and ministry is higher now than it ever was. So far at least as we have the opportunity or ability to judge, we can confidently say, that the candidates for the ministry are now, and for some years past have been, of higher promise as to their spirit, piety, and general qualifications, than at any former period. We cannot see, therefore, that the complaint that we have too many ministers can be seriously entertained by any who believe that the Spirit of God, and not presbyteries, is the author of the call to the sacred office. It is our duty to hail the increase in the number of those whom the Spirit thus calls, with the same grateful joy with which we would hail any other manifestation of the Spirit's presence.

It may be said, however, that this is all theory, that there is no reasoning against facts, and the fact is that we have more good ministers and good candidates than we need, or than can find profitable employment. If this be so, it is something which never happened before since the world began. The clearest possible evidence should be demanded, to satisfy any Christian man that the Holy Spirit calls more men to the ministry than there is any necessity for. What is the evidence relied upon to sustain this extraordinary assertion? So far as we have heard, the evidence consists of two particulars; first, that many of our candidates after licensure are unable to find suitable fields of labour; and second, that when a vacancy occurs in any self-sustaining church, there is always a crowd of applicants for the situation. The former of these allegations is easily disposed of. The fact assumed is not true to any extent justifying the allegation. The graduates of our theological seminaries are generally settled in the ministry, or profitably employed in the service of the church, within a few months after leaving their respective institutions. It was publicly asserted months ago that every student who left the Western Seminary at Allegheny last spring, was already a settled pastor; and of the sixty recent graduates of Princeton, we are informed, that there are not ten who remain unemployed, excepting such as are still pursuing their studies or preparing for the foreign field. If, however, the graduates of our seminaries did remain unsettled to a much greater extent than is actually the case, this would not prove that the Spirit calls too

many men into the ministry. This is the very last hypothesis to which we ought to resort to explain the fact. It may arise from the peculiar and transient state of the country; from the want of proper guidance, or the deficiency of energy, or tact, or of popular talents on the part of the candidates. It is far from being true that the best and most useful men are the soonest settled. Showy, superficial gifts, often secure attention when those of higher value remain for a while unnoticed. But suppose it should be admitted that five or ten per cent. of our candidates for the ministry are failures; that that proportion of their number are either unworthy, or deceived as to their call; may not the same be said of our church members? Must we then close our churches? Must we refuse to send into the harvest ninety men, really called of God, because ten men join them who are not called? No enlightened Christian conscience could justify such a course. We must do the best we can to sift the tares from the wheat, but let us not throw away the wheat; let us not refuse to receive those whom God really calls, for fear we shall receive some whom he has not called. We are bound to receive the former, and to do what we can to avoid receiving the latter. The rest belongs to God.

The great argument, however, relied upon to prove that we have too many ministers, is that there are on our list some three hundred without charge, and that whenever any vacancy occurs in a self-supporting congregation there is a crowd of applicants for the post. Of these three hundred ministers without charge, we are not told how many are disqualified by age or infirmity for active duty; how many are voluntarily engaged in other pursuits; how many have mistaken their calling and have not the gift of preaching. If proper deductions were made from this class, the number would probably be greatly reduced. We do not believe there are one hundred Presbyterian ministers, qualified and willing to preach the gospel, who are unemployed. That there are numerous applicants for every desirable vacant church is indeed true. But this only proves that there are comparatively few congregations in this region able or willing to give a minister an adequate support. There might be only a dozen such congregations in the State of Pennsylvania, and yet a million of her population be destitute of the means of

grace. Would this prove that thirteen ministers were too many for Pennsylvania? Does the fact that there is not one self-supporting church in all Africa prove that its teeming thousands need no missionaries? According to the moral statistics from great cities, not one-half of the people are supplied with the stated ministrations of the gospel. Every unemployed minister in our church could find abundant employment in any one of these great centres of our population. If from one-fourth to one-half of the people of every state in this Union are not living without the stated ministration of the gospel, then our statistics are greatly at fault, and then is our country far better off in this respect than most other Christian nations. According to the most reliable information furnished to the public, there are some six millions of people in the United States who are under no pastoral care. We are commanded to preach the gospel to every one of those millions. Their blood will be required at our hands if we fail to do it. Yet we are told that we have too many ministers! Common sense and common honesty, it is said, forbid the increase of the number of preachers. The churches are exhorted to refuse to sustain any more candidates, to stop the supplies of our Board of Education, and to turn our theological seminaries into manufactories and arsenals. We have nothing to say to this. Giving is a matter of free will. The church has no right to constrain its members to contribute to any particular object. Each man must exercise his own judgment and his own choice. To his own Master he stands or falls. God does not beg any man to give. He only permits it. The Bible leaves every one perfectly sovereign in the disposition of his money. He may spend it wisely and liberally for the glory of God, or he may keep it all and carry it with him to the judgment, and say, Here, Lord, is thy talent. His fellow-men have no right to prescribe or to control in this matter. The churches, therefore, need have no fear of being pestered, much less disciplined, into giving to any cause which their reason and conscience do not approve. It is, however, a duty to disabuse the minds of the brethren, and not permit them to be deceived, or to deceive themselves as to what the true interests of the Saviour's kingdom demands.

Even if we confine our attention to our own denomination, the want of ministers is deplorably great. According to the Minutes of the Assembly of 1861, the number of our churches exceeds that of our ministers by nine hundred and seventeen. Deducting, on the one hand, from the number of congregations, those who are united under one minister, and on the other, from the whole number of ministers reported, those who are disabled, or engaged in other departments of labour at home or abroad, we have still such a deficiency, "that if every available minister in our church were settled in a pastoral charge, there would remain from eight hundred to one thousand churches for which there would not be a single minister." We make this statement, in full confidence of its correctness, from data furnished from the office of one of our Boards in Philadelphia. This, however, is not all: we learn from the same source, that although the last decade has been the most active and successful in the operations of the Board of Education, yet, so far from keeping up the supply of ministers, we have fewer preachers now, in proportion to our membership, than we had ten years ago! One-half of our minsters now in the service of the church have been aided by the Board of Education, whose operations it is proposed to suspend. What would have been our position as a church had the views now advanced been acted upon in 1851? Would we now exhibit the condition of one of the most efficient and honoured ecclesiastical bodies on the face of the earth, or one of the most inefficient and dishonoured? This question admits of but one answer; and it requires no spirit of prophecy to predict what will be our condition ten years hence, if these new views are to control our action. Should God withdraw from our young men his Spirit, so that few or none should be called to the ministry, or from the churches the gift of Christian liberality in their support, we have little reason to hope for other manifestations of his presence. Where the Spirit dwells, he dwells in the plenitude and harmony of his gifts. If he gives a man faith, he gives him repentance; if he gives a church zeal and spirituality, he will give to her children the grace to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ.

There is another consideration which cannot be overlooked.

The average number of deaths among our ministers can be hardly less than fifty annually. In 1855 it was forty-eight; in the years 1856 and '57 it was forty-six. To this must be added the number annually rendered unfit for active service by old age or sickness. These causes cannot deduct annually less than sixty ministers from the number of our working clergy. For the last ten years, the average number of graduates from our two largest and oldest seminaries, Princeton and Allegheny, has hardly amounted to that number; those seminaries, therefore, can barely supply the yearly loss of ministerial strength, leaving it to the other institutions to make provision for the demands of a population which nearly doubles itself every twenty years.

Hitherto we have not raised our eyes from the ground. We have been looking at our feet, and at what lies immediately around them. The commission of Christ to our church is not, Preach the gospel to the thirty millions of Americans, but to every creature under heaven. Preach the gospel to the thousand millions of your dying fellow-men, and, lo, I am with you always; with you, to endue your sons with the gifts of preaching, and you with the grace to aid and sustain them. To this we answer, Stay thy hand, O Lord, we have already more preachers than we know what to do with. What! more than enough for the thirty millions of your countrymen, and for the thousand millions of your fellow-sinners! Then, stand aside; I will give my gifts to those who are not so easily satisfied. May God in mercy preserve our church from such reprobation!

The brethren who complain that we have too many ministers, have their eye on a real and portentous evil of our system; but they fatally mistake as to its cause. It is not that we have too many ministers, but that inadequate means are provided for their support. This they acknowledge by contradicting themselves. They tell us, and tell us truly, that there are heathen enough in our cities to give full employment to every minister without charge in our church—and yet they say we have more than we need! That is, the cities would absorb our whole supply, and leave all the other abounding desolations of the land unsupplied. By their own showing, therefore, we

have not a tenth part of the number of ministers we need; what we lack is, adequate means of supporting them. The reason why so many applicants are found for the vacant pulpits of self-sustaining churches, is not that we have too many ministers, but that it is so hard for them to find means of supporting themselves and their families. This support they are entitled to by the laws of justice and by the express ordinance of Christ. Read the apostle's argument and revelations on this subject in 1 Cor. ix. "Who goeth to war on his own charges?" he asks; "who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" Is this merely a human usage?—does not the law recognise the same principle even in its application to brutes, when it says, "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"? What human and divine law thus recognise as right, has its foundation in simple justice; "for if we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?" Under the old dispensation, by divine command, they who ministered about holy things, lived of the things of the temple; "even so," he adds, "hath the Lord ordained that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel." On this point there can be no dispute. If, therefore, there are well qualified ministers unemployed, it must be either because they are unwilling to labour, which is neither asserted nor believed, or because they have not the means of support. If the latter, whose fault is it? Can the church complain that we have too many ministers, when there are thousands and millions of our fellow-men perishing for lack of knowledge, if she fails in providing the means of sustaining them in the field? Here is the difficulty; and it is inherent in our system. We almost tremble while we write the sentence—but does not truth demand that it should be written?—The Presbyterian church is not a church for preaching the gospel to the poor. She has precluded herself from that high vocation by adopting the principle that the support of the minister must be derived from the people to whom he preaches. If, therefore, the people are too few, too sparse, too poor, to sustain a minister, or too ignorant or wicked to appreciate the gospel, they must go without it. We have attempted to ob-

viate this evil by aiding feeble congregations through the Board of Domestic Missions, and great good has been thus accomplished. But, 1st, this leaves the principle untouched. It is the object of the Board to aid, in the main, those churches which promise to become self-supporting. People living where congregations cannot be formed, or who fail to reach the self-sustaining standard, are either not reached, or are sooner or later dropped. 2d. The scale on which the limited resources of our Board force its officers to dispense their contributions, is far below the reasonable and righteous demands of the ministry. The families of our home missionaries are kept but little above the starvation point; therefore it is, that while the field is white for the harvest, ministers with families dependent upon them hesitate to enter into the harvest. If the church will not support them, how can they go? Do we refuse to send missionaries to the heathen until the heathen are willing and able to support them? If not, why should we refuse to sustain those whom we send to our own people?

Our system, which requires the minister to rely for his support on the people to whom he preaches, has had the following inevitable results:—1. In our cities we have no churches to which the poor can freely go, and feel themselves at home. No doubt, in many of our city congregations there are places in the galleries, in which the poor may find seats free of charge, but, as a general thing, the churches are private property. They belong to those who build them, or who purchase or rent the pews after they are built. They are intended and adapted for the cultivated and thriving classes of the community. There may be exceptions to this remark, but we are speaking of a general fact. The mass of the poor in our cities are excluded from our churches. The Presbyterian church is practically, in such places, the church for the upper classes (we do not mean the worldly and the fashionable) of society. 2. In large districts of the country—as in the pines of New Jersey, for example—where the people are poor and widely dispersed, we can have no churches. So far as we are concerned, such districts are left entirely deserted. 3. Hundreds of our best and most laborious ministers, settled over new or feeble congregations, are subjected to the greatest privations and trials;

often unable to provide for the support of their families, or the education of their children. 4. Many such ministers, unable to sustain themselves, are constrained to engage in secular pursuits, and to devote more or less of their time to making money; others give up in despair, resign their charges, and wait and look for some vacant church able to support them—hence the number of applications for every such vacancy. 5. Our present system interferes with the progress and efficiency of the church. It can go only where there are people who are rich and good enough to support the gospel for themselves. On this plan, it is almost impossible that we should adequately fulfil our duty to preach the gospel to every creature.

On the other hand, the system which secures an adequate support of the minister, independent of the people whom he immediately serves, has the precisely opposite effects. 1. The churches are common property. They do not belong to individuals who build or rent them. They belong to the people. The high and low, the rich and poor, have a common and equal right to them, as they have to the common highway. They resort to the one with the same freedom with which they walk on the other. The consequence is, that there are few or no class churches, none from which, by force of circumstances, the poor are excluded. Any one who has visited Europe must have been struck with this fact. Not only in Catholic, but also in Protestant countries, the places of worship are seen crowded with a promiscuous throng—the peasant, the student, the professor, the merchant, the noble, unite in one worshipping assembly. This is a right of which the poor avail themselves freely, and the gospel, or at least the benefits of public worship, are as open to them as to any class in the community. 2. Ministers can be sent and sustained among people unwilling or unable to support a religious teacher for themselves. 3. It is rare where this system prevails to see ministers engaged in any secular pursuits.

In countries where the church and state are united, the support of the clergy is provided for, in some cases, as in England and Scotland, by a system of tithes, in others, by endowments, in others by stipends from the government, and in others, as for-

merly in New England, by a tax on property for the support of public worship, just as the free-schools are now supported. Where the church is independent of the state, and acts on the voluntary principle, one plan is adopted by the Free Church of Scotland, another by the Methodists, both here and in Europe. The question now under consideration, is not how this should be done in our case, but rather the importance of, in some way, accomplishing the object. As long since as July 1847, this subject was discussed in the pages of this journal. The two principles insisted upon are, first, that every minister devoted exclusively to his work is entitled to a competent support; and, secondly, that the obligation to provide that support does not rest exclusively on the people to whom he ministers, but upon the church at large. As to the way in which duty can be best discharged, opinions may differ. The main point, however, is to secure the general and cordial recognition of the duty itself. In some of our cities it may be expedient to erect churches and provide an endowment for the pastor, or secure his support by outside contributions. In others, it may be wise to have district missionaries sustained as are ministers in our seamen's chapels. But, as it seems to us, the most feasible plan is simply to enlarge the resources of the Board of Domestic Missions, so as to enable them to give an adequate support to those aided by its funds. To accomplish this, the plan adopted by the Free Church of Scotland might be found as available here as it has proved there.

The proposition to provide an adequate support for the clergy, independent of their congregations, righteous and scriptural as it appears to us, met with strenuous opposition, not only on the ground of the expense which it would involve, but on the assumption, that if ministers are secure of a support independent of their people, they will neglect their work. To this we answer, 1. That it supposes that ministers have no higher motive of action than the desire to get money out of their people. If the love of money governs the ministry of our church, they are a very silly set of men. There is not one in ten of them who could not secure that object in some other way more effectually than by preaching the gospel. 2. It is not found that the teachers of our free academies and schools,

whose salaries are not dependent on the favour of the parents of their pupils, neglect their work. These teachers are not constrained by higher motives than ministers, nor are they held to a stricter responsibility. 3. Our foreign missionaries have a support independent of the people among whom they labour. And yet, as a body, they are as faithful, diligent, and successful, to say the least, as any other equal number of our clergy. 4. This is no new plan, it has been acted on for centuries. Whatever may be said of the orthodoxy or spirituality of the stipendiary clergy of Prussia, for example, they are as hard-working a class of men as any to be found in this country. They not only conduct public worship on Sundays and festivals, but they must attend to the sick, and to the burial of the dead, and devote certain hours every week to the religious instruction of the young in the public schools. Every child in Prussia, male or female, passes through a course of religious training by the clergy, and you cannot find a barefooted boy in the streets of Berlin, who cannot read and write, and give an intelligible account of the historical facts of the Bible, and, if approaching the age of fourteen, who cannot repeat the creed, the Lord's prayer, and Luther's catechism. These results imply an amount of faithful and systematic labour, which the plan of making the clergy dependent on their own people has never yet secured.

We are not concerned about the way, if only the end be secured. Let the church remember that her field is the world, that she is bound gratefully to receive, and, if need be, to educate, every young man whom the Holy Spirit mercifully calls to preach the gospel, and then to sustain him in that great work. Let those who feel for unemployed ministers not raise the standard of rebellion against God, nor reject the proffered gifts of the Spirit, nor strive to impede the progress of the church, but devote their energy to enable her to carry into effect the ordinance of Christ, that they who preach the gospel shall live by the gospel. Then, should we have too many ministers, the proper remedy will be the deposition of those who refuse to work, and not arresting the increase of faithful labourers.

ART. VI.—*England and America.*

No two nations are bound together by so many bonds of sympathy and interest as England and America. England is our mother. That one word is a volume. We might ponder long on its meaning without exhausting its fulness. During the colonial period of our history, ninety-nine hundredths of our population came from Great Britain. And since the establishment of our national independence, the accessions to our numbers from other sources have been in a great measure absorbed and assimilated. Immigrants from the continent of Europe have produced no perceptible difference in our language, laws, or institutions. England has transmitted to us her Anglo-Saxon life. We are bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. The English oak has been transplanted to this country and filled the land. What we are, is but the normal development of English life under new conditions. Whether the way in which her children grow up and reveal themselves in lands other than her own, be in accordance with her taste and judgment or not, they are none the less her children. She is bound to us and we are bound to her by the closest ties of consanguinity. With community of blood is connected community in language, literature, modes of thought, laws, institutions, and religion. We are the two great Protestant powers of the world, doing more than all other nations combined, for what we both regard as the best interests of man and the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. This bond of a common faith is even stronger than that of lineage. That those who profess allegiance to the same Lord, who have a common faith and hope, should be enemies, is a greater violence to their normal relationship than contention among brothers. Neither can injure the other, without thereby injuring the cause of Christ. The two nations thus closely united by the bonds of common parentage, of a common intellectual, political, and religious life, have their material interests so involved, that the pros-

perity or adversity of the one is inevitably shared by the other.

We feel free to say, that America has always felt and acted as became her intimate relationship to England. Even in the same family, when widely extended, there will be occasional misunderstandings and collisions, while the family bond remains unbroken; so there have been doubtless on our part many hard feelings and unkind utterances and acts towards our mother country. Nevertheless the national feeling in America, the heart of our people, as a people, has been loyal to our race. We have had a pride in the glories of England as the glories of our own ancestors. We have had respect for the intelligence, the courage, the truthfulness, and honour which belong to the character of Englishmen. We have ever felt that they and we belong to the same household of faith, and that both *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα* they are our nearest relations on earth. England has never passed through an hour of trial without the sympathy and prayers of the American people. In the long wars which arose out of the French revolution, notwithstanding the still unallayed passions of our war for independence, and our national gratitude to France, and our natural sympathy with a people goaded to madness by centuries of oppression, yet the mass of intelligent and Christian Americans were in heart on the side of England. The same is true as to the Crimean war. And during the terrible rebellion in India, prayer ascended from every American church and every family altar in behalf of our brethren in the faith. When the Prince of Wales recently visited the United States, his journey through the country, although intended to be private, was a protracted ovation. "Welcome to the son of Victoria," was the favourite legend for arches and gateways. There could not be a more unmistakeable evidence of the national feeling than was thus afforded. And now, in the midst of angry excitement, when news reaches our land that England's model mother and queen has suffered the greatest earthly bereavement, the American journals are filled with eulogiums on the character of the late Prince Consort, and with expressions of condolence with the British sovereign and people. We claim, therefore, that the national feeling in America

towards England has always been healthful and right, in harmony with the intimate relationship of the two nations. We have classes of people inimical to Great Britain, and papers, generally edited by Englishmen, or by other foreigners imbued with an anti-Anglican feeling, but the facts to which we have referred, and many others of like import, which might be adduced, prove that as a people we have been loyal to our ancestry and to our race.

Our time of trial has now come. We are engaged in a struggle for our national life, for law, order, and liberty. A rebellion, designed to overthrow our government, for the avowed purpose "of conserving, perpetuating, and extending the system of domestic slavery," has contrived to enlist in its support nearly a third part of the people and resources of the United States. With this rebellion we are now engaged in a deadly conflict. Constitutional, anti-slavery England throws the whole weight of her sympathy in favour of this unrighteous proslavery rebellion. This is an event so unexpected, so contrary to what we had a right to anticipate, that it is only by slow degrees American Christians have yielded to the conviction that such is really the fact. To overwhelming evidence they have at last been forced reluctantly and sorrowfully to submit. We were not surprised that the aristocratic class in England took part against us. The failure of republicanism, as they erroneously regarded it, was in itself to them a matter of gratulation; and the sentiment candidly expressed in public by Sir Lytton Bulwer, was natural, if not honourable. He said that the balance of power between nations required the dissolution of the American Union; that this country under one government, threatened to overshadow Europe and disturb the political equilibrium. Neither were we surprised that the cotton manufacturers took sides with the cotton producers. Human nature is too often blinded and perverted by self-interest to make any new manifestation of its weakness a matter of surprise. The privileged class and the cotton spinners, however, do not constitute England. We had faith in the heart of the people, and especially in the Christian principle of the middle classes. We confidently believed that the mass of the controlling population of Great Britain would prove faithful to their professions, and

true to the great interests of justice and humanity. In this we have been mistaken. The general tone of the public press, the utterances of representative men, and the action of the government and of its officials, are the only indexes of national sentiment to which foreigners have access. We shall rejoice to find that all these deceive us, but their concurrent indications force us to the conclusion, that England has in this great struggle taken the side of lawlessness, of slavery, and of violence, from selfish and dishonourable motives. This is a conclusion to which we have come with much the same reluctance that we should admit the dishonour of a gray-headed father. But how can we resist it?

We know the character of this rebellion. We know that it is unprovoked, that it is made simply in the interests of slavery. We know that it has been brought about by the long-continued machinations of able, but unprincipled men; that it has been consummated by acts of the grossest fraud, treachery, and spoliation. We know that it is directed to the overthrow of a just, equal, and beneficent government, and that, in all human probability, its success must be attended by the greatest evils for generations to come. It may be said that our English brethren do not know or believe all this; that they take a very different view of the subject; that they persuade themselves that slavery has nothing to do with this conflict; that it is a mere contention for power, or a struggle between a tariff and anti-tariff party. But why do they so regard it? Romanists refuse to recognise in the German Reformation any religious movement. Luther, Calvin, Latimer, and Cranmer, according to them, were wicked men, governed in their resistance to the church of Rome by the basest motives. They are probably sincere in this conviction, but to Protestants they are not the less inexcusable for taking good for evil, or for siding with the evil against the good. It is for the state of mind which leads to the dominant judgment of the English people in favour of an unjustifiable pro-slavery rebellion, that the Christian world must hold them accountable.

That the prevailing feeling and judgment in England are in favour of this rebellion, is to us painfully evident. The

prompt recognition of the Southern Confederacy as belligerents, entitled to be treated in all respects as equal with the constituted and acknowledged government of the United States, was itself a most unfriendly act. That Confederacy has no recognised existence at home or abroad as a *de facto* government, and yet all its acts are practically respected as much as they could be if their separate nationality had been formally admitted. Their letters of marque are regarded as valid. This involves the recognition of those who issue them as a legitimate power, foreign to that of the United States, on whose commerce they are authorized to prey. England professes perfect neutrality, to sit apart and regard this as a struggle between equals. Of this we should not much complain, if that government were really neutral. But her neutrality is very equivocal. Facilities of all kinds are granted to the Southern privateers, which are denied to our national vessels. The laws of neutrality are pushed to one extreme in their favour, and to the opposite to our disadvantage. Southern privateers are allowed to coal and refit in British ports, when our ships are forbidden by colonial governors even to take on board coal deposited by our own government. English vessels, filled with arms and other contrabands of war, are allowed to enter the harbours in the English West India Islands, transship their cargoes, receive pilots, and every other aid from British consuls, to evade the blockade of our Southern ports. An American ship is burned within sight of an English harbour by a Southern privateer; her crew carried into that harbour as prisoners of war; the privateer allowed to repair damages, increase her armament, and get ready for further depredations. The Queen's proclamation forbids English ships carrying despatches, arms, military stores, or materials, or any other article or articles, considered and deemed to be contraband of war, according to law or modern usage of nations, for the use or service of either of the contending parties; and threatens with her displeasure in case they disregard her commands. Nevertheless British officials knowingly receive the ambassadors of our revolted States, pay them, as such, the greatest deference and attention; secure for them, with their despatches, a passage on board of a British steamer, without

let or censure. In these and many other ways have the government of England, and those in authority under it, unmistakeably manifested their sympathy with the Southern rebellion. Every one knows how powerful is this moral support. The kind feeling and good wishes of England for Italy, during her recent struggle for nationality, despite the neutrality of the government, was a potent influence in deciding the conflict in her favour.

Governments, however, are of necessity cautious in their acts and utterances. The popular feeling is much more readily and clearly manifested in the public press than by official conduct. There can be no denying the fact, that the English press, metropolitan, provincial, and colonial, with few exceptions, has from the beginning been openly and cordially in favour of the rebellion. Its habitual tone has been that of disparagement, ridicule, or contempt towards the United States. Every disaster has been magnified and made matter of exultation. Every success has been depreciated; the stupendous efforts of a nation to meet an emergency such as has seldom in the history of the world taxed the energies of a people, have been ignored. When General McClellan, in August last, assumed command on the Potomac, he found the army almost disorganized by the expiration of the term of service of the troops which had been enlisted for three months. Since that time six hundred and fifty thousand men have been mustered into service, have been armed, uniformed, formed into regiments, brigades, and divisions. Not less than a thousand cannon have been provided and prepared for the field; a military line of operation from the Potomac to Kansas, of fifteen hundred miles, equivalent to a line from Madrid to Moscow, has been occupied. An immense naval armament, for the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi river, has been created, and twenty-four thousand sailors called into service. No man in modern time, except Napoleon in the famous hundred days, has accomplished a greater work than General McClellan: and the departments of the army and navy of no nation has ever shown more energy and wise efficiency than has been exhibited under our government. Is there nothing in this to secure the respect of foreign nations? It would at least shield us from contemptuous abuse,

were it not for a deep and violent feeling of hostility. We should not so entirely give up our confidence in the honour and rectitude of England towards America, if this unfriendly spirit were confined to the secular press. The last hope of justice or kind feeling died within us, when we found that leading religious papers of Great Britain were equally hostile. Dr. Campbell (in the organ of the English Congregationalists) tells us that we are fighting for an abstraction, and that we are engaged in a hopeless struggle to subjugate the South. The *Edinburgh Witness*, the organ of the Free Church of Scotland, a body to which we are bound by the most intimate ties of brotherhood, publishes and endorses slanders so atrocious as to be incredible by any mind from which God had not withdrawn the spirit of justice. These slanders are directed principally against our President, a man held in respect and affection by this whole nation. He may not be a man of polished manners or dignified presence. Englishmen, however, know better than most men, that the body is not the man. They know not only that the highest attributes may belong to a mind encased in an uncouth form, but that the blood of kings and nobles may flow through limbs of huge proportions. They have seen burly dukes, whom no stranger could distinguish either by form or carriage from a boniface. We do not claim for Mr. Lincoln the graces which a dancing-master can bestow. But we do regard him as a man of mind, of unimpeachable integrity, of unbending firmness, of kind and gentle feelings, and of genuine simplicity of character, (the true apostolic *εἰλικρίνεια*) which promise to secure him a place in the hearts of his countrymen, second to that occupied by no president since the days of Washington. To hold up such a man as a monster, in a paper professing to be religious and to represent a great ecclesiastical organization, is a national insult and injury.

Nothing, however, so clearly demonstrates the hostile feeling of England towards this country, as the effect produced by the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board of a British merchant steamer. The whole country burst forth in one cry of indignation. The demand for instant redress was imperious and insulting. All negotiation or diplomacy was to be repudiated. Nothing but the immediate restoration of the rebel

ambassadors, and an apology for the insufferable outrage and insult to the English flag. was to be thought of for a moment. The government sent out its imperative demand. Preparations were instantly made for war on the largest scale. All exportation of arms or warlike munitions of any kind to America, was forbidden by proclamation. Troops were ostentatiously ordered to Canada. A large naval force was collected on our coast. The press, liberal and tory, vied with each other in violence. Secession flags were exhibited in the theatre, and paraded through the streets of London. At no former period in the history of England does there appear to have been such unanimity and violence of feeling. Even the excellent Earl Shaftesbury excuses himself from appearing at a meeting appointed to pray for peace, for fear it should be inferred that the supplicants to the Prince of Peace to keep two kindred nations from shedding each other's blood, did not sympathize with the government in its hostility. What was the occasion of this violent manifestation of enmity? Simply that we had done to England what she many hundreds of times had done to us. We had stopped a British merchant vessel on the high seas, and taken from her four native born American citizens. England has always claimed the right to take her subjects wherever they could be found. This she did not assert as a belligerent right, but as her prerogative at all times, whether of war or peace. She had formally refused to renounce that right, even when our government, after the commencement of the war of 1812, tendered her peace, if she would simply agree to forbear to exercise it. Viewed, therefore, simply in the light of claiming our own citizens, however inconsistent in this view of the matter with our own principles, England had no right to complain. But this is not the proper light in which the arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell is to be regarded. They were not taken simply as citizens owing allegiance to this country, but as enemies, bearing commissions and carrying despatches from an organized body arrayed in arms against this country. The steamer Trent had violated the laws of nations, and the proclamation of the British Queen, in becoming the carrier of those gentlemen on a mission hostile to the United States. No English lawyer has ventured to

assert that she was not justly liable to seizure and forfeiture. The only error charged by the law officers of the crown, is that Captain Wilkes, by whom the seizure was made, did not take the vessel into port, and have the forfeiture judicially decided. In this, it is admitted, he erred. He violated a principle which our government has ever asserted. We always protested against the justice of permitting any subaltern to adjudicate on the spot, on the nationality and allegiance of men found on board of American ships.

As to this whole matter, the points of agreement and disagreement between us and England are, 1. She claims the right of searching neutral vessels in time of peace. This we deny. 2. Both parties admit the right of search in the time of war. That is, they admit that when one nation is at war with another, no neutral power is entitled to aid either party; and that when there is reason to suspect that a neutral vessel is engaged in such hostile act, she is liable to search and seizure. 3. It is also agreed that carrying for an enemy any person or thing contraband of war is an act of hostility. 4. That not only military officers, soldiers, sailors, and munitions of war, but also despatches are contraband; and, according to Sir William Scott, and to reason and justice, civil officers on a hostile mission are to be included in the list. 5. It is conceded that the captain of the Trent did receive and engage to transport to England, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, knowing them to be ambassadors and bearers of despatches, in direct violation of national law, and of the Queen's proclamation, and, therefore, that his vessel was justly liable not only to search, but to confiscation. 6. That Captain Wilkes erred in not bringing the Trent into port for judicial decision. This last is the only ground for complaint that England has in the case. And this complaint, though valid in itself, she had no right to make, because she had so often taken sailors from our ships without adjudication, and in other instances had assumed the right of this peremptory action. After the battle of Waterloo, it was taken for granted that Napoleon would endeavour to make his escape to America. The English Admiralty, therefore, issued orders to the British cruisers to search every American vessel they should encounter, and to

take the person of Napoleon into custody wherever found. The American ship Virginia, sailing from a port in France at that time, was thus overhauled and searched throughout, with the avowed purpose of taking their enemy from under the protection of the American flag. Whatever, therefore, may be thought of the principle, no candid man can refuse to admit, that England was fairly estopped by her antecedents from making Captain Wilkes's mistake a ground of complaint. But even if she has arrived at the conclusion that she formerly did wrong, and has formed the purpose to be more tender of the rights of neutrals in the future, the error of the American captain was too small to account for subsequent events. His offence was not that he fired a shot before the bows of the Trent; nor that the Trent was innocent of any violation of neutrality; but simply that Captain Wilkes, from the most disinterested and benevolent motives, abstained from taking his prize into port. This, and this only, as charged by the law officers of England, was the head and front of his offending. Did this throw a great nation into a frenzy of indignation? Was it for this a Christian people seized their arms, and shouted to a kindred people, "To your knees, or die!"? The cause is altogether disproportioned to the effect. When an engineer raises the valve of an overcharged boiler, the opening of the valve is not the cause of the violent outrush of steam. It is but the occasion. It is not less evident that the affair of the Trent was not the cause, but the occasion, of the outbreak of wrath which shook all England. Had there been no pent up spirit of enmity, that affair had been as little regarded as the lifting the valve of an empty boiler.

We deeply regret the conduct of England towards this country in this the time of our national trial, because it must produce permanent alienation; alienation arising from a sense of a grievous injury unrighteously inflicted, and alienation arising from a loss of confidence in the honour and sincerity of the English people. That the most vehement abolitionists should take part heart and hand with a rebellion, the object of which is to perpetuate and extend slavery, is an offence which no ignorance, real or pretended, can explain or justify. It shocks the moral sense of the world. England stands before the

nations as a people willing and anxious to sacrifice their conscience to their interests and jealousies. We do not write this under the impulse of hostile feelings to England, much less from any desire to increase the sense of wrong and the consequent resentment which are now so strongly felt by all Americans. We have some readers in Great Britain. It is for them we write. We wish to convince them that they have done, and are doing us a grievous wrong, and that they have given the whole weight of their influence to an evil cause. They have joined the wrong against the right. They have come out as the great upholders and patrons of the perpetuity and extension of slavery. It is with a view of producing this conviction, that in the foregoing pages we presented the evidence that England, of course with many and honourable exceptions, does sympathize with this southern rebellion, and we proceed now, in few words, to show that in so doing they sympathize with evil, with an unrighteous effort to establish a government whose cornerstone is domestic slavery.

It would be difficult, should we fill a volume, to present a tithe of the evidence on this subject. In the course of a few pages, however, enough may be said to produce conviction in every impartial mind. In the first place, it should create some misgiving that England stands alone in this matter. The other governments of Europe, more or less decidedly manifest their sympathy with the United States in this great struggle. There are interested classes in France, and elsewhere, who take the opposite side. But, as a general remark, what we have said is true. We dread nothing, except from England. Especially do Christians on the continent of Europe appreciate the true cause of this conflict, and give us their hearty sympathy. When the President of the United States appointed a national fast, we received the gratifying assurance that they would, and afterwards that they did, unite with us in the observance of that solemnity. When the Evangelical Alliance met, during the past summer, at Geneva, that body adopted a series of resolutions expressing the warmest interest in our behalf. Count Gasparin, the noble representative of the mind and heart of the friends of Christ in Europe, published, so early as last spring, when this rebellion had scarcely raised its

hydra head, a book which seemed to glow with the holy fire of inspiration. It filled American Christians with wonder and delight that God had given to his children abroad such just and elevated views of this great crisis in the world's history. This rebellion is a world event. On its suppression or success depends far more than the fate of this one nation. Count Gasparin wrote, just after the Cotton States had formed their Confederacy, and while Virginia and the other border states were trembling in the balance. Even then, however, he took in the true nature and vast proportions of the coming struggle. "Never," he says, "was a more obstinate and more colossal strife commenced on earth." That he understood the nature of the rebellion, is abundantly evident. "It is one thing," he says, "to hold slaves; it is another to be founded expressly to serve the cause of slavery upon earth; this is a new fact in the history of mankind. If a Southern Confederacy should ever take rank among nations, it will represent slavery, and nothing else. I am wrong; it will also represent the African slave trade, and the fillibustering system. In any case, the Southern Confederacy will be so far identified with slavery, with its progress, with the measures designed to propagate it here below, that a chain and whip seem to be the only devices to be embroidered on its flag." P. 125. "One cannot, with impunity, give full scope to his imagination, and, in the year of our Lord, 1861, set to work to contrive the plan of a confederacy designed to protect and propagate slavery. These things will be avenged sooner or later. Ah! if the South know how it is that it should not succeed, if it comprehended that the North has been hitherto its great, its only guarantee!" P. 148. The anticipations entertained by the authors of this great rebellion, he thus depicts. "Nothing could be more imposing, in fact, if they had the least chance of success. The fifteen Southern States, already immense, joined to Mexico, Cuba, and Central America, what a power this would be! And doubtless this power would not stop at the Isthmus of Panama: it would be no more difficult to reëstablish slavery in Bolivia, on the equator, and in Peru, than in Mexico. Thus the patriarchal institution would advance to rejoin Brazil, and the dismayed eye would not find a single free spot upon which to rest between Delaware Bay

and the banks of the Uraguay. Furthermore, this colossal negro jail would be stocked by a no less colossal slave-trade; baracoons would be refilled in Africa, slave expeditions would be organized on a scale hitherto unknown, and whole squadrons of slave-ships (those 'floating hells,') would transport their cargoes under the Southern colours, proudly unfurled; patriotic indignation would be aroused at the mere name of the right of search, and the whole world would be challenged to defend the liberty of the seas."

The author is not unaware that the Southern leaders have repudiated the idea of reëstablishing the African slave-trade. As to that point, however, he says: "Each one feels instinctively that no part of the plan can be separated from the whole; that it must be great to be respected; that to people this vast extent with slaves, the African slave-trade is indispensable; of course they took care not to avow all this at the first moment; it was necessary, in the beginning, to delude others, and perhaps themselves; it was necessary to obtain recognition. On this account the prudent politicians, who have just drawn up the programme of the South, have been careful to record in it the prohibition of the African slave-trade, and the disavowal of the plans of conquest. But this does not prevent the necessities of the position from becoming known by and by. True programmes, adapted to the position of affairs, are not changed from day to day. I defy the slave States, provided their confederation succeeds in existing, to do otherwise than seek to extend towards the south; hemmed in on all sides by liberty, incessantly provoked by the impossibility of preventing the flight of their negroes, they will fall on those of their neighbours who are the least capable of resisting, and whose territories are most to their convenience. This fact is obvious, as it is also obvious that they will have recourse to the African slave-trade to people their new possessions. It is in vain to deny it, on account of Europe or of the border States; the necessities will subsist, and sooner or later they will be obeyed. If the border States persist in deluding themselves on this point, and fancy that they will always keep the monopoly of this infamous supply of negroes, sold at enor-

mous prices, this concerns them. In any case, the illusion will finally become dispelled." P. 121—3.

Taking such just and comprehensive views of the nature and designs of the new confederacy, Count Gasparin, as a philanthropist and a Christian, gives his hearty support to the United States. He fully appreciates the justice and greatness of their cause, as well as its difficulties and dangers. "I have not sought," he says, "to recount events, but to attempt a study, which I believe to be useful to us, and which may also not be useless to the United States. We owe them the support of our sympathy. It is more important than people imagine, to let them hear words of encouragement from us at this decisive moment." "The American people are now striving to rise. Enterprise as difficult as glorious. Whatever may be the issue of the first conflict, just about to be decided, this will be only the first conflict. There will be many others; the uprising of a great people is not the work of a day." "In wishing the final triumph of the North, we wish the salvation of the North and of the South, their common greatness, and their lasting prosperity." He shows, moreover, that he has soul enough to appreciate the character of the man, whom English and Scotch journalists, secular and religious, would hold up to execration. "If," says Count Gasparin, "you wish to know what the presidency of Mr. Lincoln will be in the end, see in what manner and under what auspices it was inaugurated; listen to the words that fell from the lips of the new president as he quitted his native town. 'The task which devolves upon me is greater, perhaps, than that which has devolved on any other man since the days of Washington. I hope that you, my friends, will all pray that I may receive that assistance from on high, without which I cannot succeed, but with which, success is certain.' 'Yes, yes; we will pray for you!' Such was the response of the inhabitants of Springfield, who weeping, and with uncovered heads, witnessed the departure of their fellow-citizen. What a *debut* for a government! Have there been many inaugurations here below of such thrilling solemnity? Do uniforms and plumes, the roar of cannon, triumphal arches, and vague appeals to Providence, equal these simple words: 'Pray for me!' 'We

will pray for you!' Ah! courage, Lincoln! the friends of freedom and of America are with you. Courage! you hold in your hands the destinies of a great principle, and a great people. Courage! you have to resist your friends, and to face your foes; it is the fate of all who seek to do good on earth. Courage! you will have need of it to-morrow, in a year, to the end; you will have need of it in peace and in war; you will have need of it to avert the compromise in peace or war of that noble progress which it is your charge to accomplish, more than in conquest of slavery. Courage! your *rôle*, as you have said, may be inferior to no other, not even to that of Washington; to raise up the United States will not be less glorious than to have founded them." We thank God for these noble words.

The French Christian philanthropist, in entering so intelligently into the true character of our present struggle, seems to have been prescient of danger to this holy cause from England. To her he says: "Let England beware! it were better for her to lose Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar, than the glorious position which her struggle against slavery and the slave-trade has secured her in the esteem of nations. Even in our age of armed frigates and rifled cannon, the chief of all powers, thank God, is moral power. Woe to the nation that disregards it, and consents to immolate its principles to its interests! From the beginning of the present conflict, the enemies of England, and they are numerous, have predicted that the cause of cotton will weigh heavier in her scales than the cause of justice and liberty. They are preparing to judge her by her conduct in the American crisis. Once more, let her beware!"

That European Christians, free from perverting influences, take this just and elevated view of our national conflict, ought of itself to lead Christians in England to doubt the righteousness of their hostility to a cause which appears so worthy of support to God's people elsewhere. But, in the second place, that the rebellion with which we are now contending is made in the interests of slavery, is apparent from the fact that only the slave states take part in it, and that hostility to the general government is in exact proportion to the predominance of slavery within their own borders. The slave states are divided

into classes, differing from each other in their productions, in the character of the people, as well as in climate. In those producing cotton, rice, and sugar, the number of slaves is far greater in proportion to the whites than in those further north. It was in the Gulf, or cotton region, that secession had its origin. Those states separated from the Union and formed a confederacy before any of the other class joined in the revolt. It was long doubtful whether any of the farming slave states would take part with the extreme South. There was an overwhelming majority against secession and in favour of the Union, in North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware, and Maryland. Of these states, the four last named remain in the Union, and are contributing their quota of men and money to uphold the federal cause. In the three former, (Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee,) the sympathizers with the South were able to carry their states into the Southern Confederacy; not, however, on the issue of secession, but in opposition to coercion. When the cotton states separated from the Union, Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, assured them that he did not contemplate waging war against them, or employing the forces of the United States to coerce them into submission. He simply avowed that, in obedience to his oath to support the Constitution, he should take measures to collect the duties on foreign importations, and assert the right of the Union to the possession and safe-keeping of the public property. In this posture things remained in abeyance until the bombardment of Fort Sumter. This was regarded as an act of open hostility. The President immediately issued his proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers, not to make war on the South, but to carry into effect the purposes avowed in his inaugural address. This was denounced by the South as coercion. The *esprit de corps* which pervades the slave states, was so roused as to carry the three states already mentioned over to the confederacy. The simple fact, therefore, that this rebellion is confined to the slave states, and that it had its origin in those states in which the slave interest is altogether predominant, and that only a minority of the border states have been induced to join it, is decisive evidence of its being made in the interests of slavery.

Thirdly, the whole history of the country and of the present controversy, precludes all doubt on this subject. There are in the United States not far from four millions of slaves. There are about three hundred and fifty thousand slave owners, who, with their families, make about two millions of persons directly interested in this kind of property. To these slave owners a very large proportion of the land, especially in the cotton states, belongs. The annual product of this vast amount of slave labour, in cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco, is to be counted by hundreds of millions. The slave interest, therefore, viewed in its material aspect, is immense. The influence belonging to such a number of persons, and to such an amount of property, must be exceedingly great. Slave property, moreover, is, from its nature, peculiarly sensitive. It is felt to be precarious. There is the danger of insurrections, of escape, of interference from hostile influence. It therefore requires to be specially guarded. Stringent laws are made for its security. Everything which tends to render the slaves discontented, is resisted as a deadly evil. The discussion of the lawfulness or of the evils of slavery becomes a real danger; and those known to be adverse to the institution are regarded as enemies. It is further evident that these slave owners, having peculiar interests and being under peculiar influences, form a distinct and intimately associated class. It is said that the hay-crop in this country exceeds in value the cotton crop. But the hay growers do not form a distinct class in society; neither do manufacturers, nor merchants, in the same sense or to the same extent, as do the slave owners. The latter, therefore, act together in any great political movement. Their property being thus peculiar, and the rightfulness of their tenure, and especially the wisdom and justice of perpetuating the institution being a matter vehemently doubted and debated, it has become an axiom with them that slave owners are never safe in any community unless they have the controlling power. This is true, provided the community have the legal right, as well as the power, to legislate on the subject.

Slavery has been abolished in the dependencies of France and England, because the slaveholders were the minority. It has in like manner disappeared from all the states of this

Union, where non-slaveholders were in the ascendency. Under the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits all interference by the general government in the municipal affairs of the several states, slavery was secure. But this, many of the Southern planters were slow to believe. They were afraid to trust to the guaranties of the Constitution, and therefore, as long at least as thirty years ago, it was said by representative men, that as soon as the South ceased to control the Union, it must set up for itself. For the last twenty years, disunion has been on this ground openly advocated, and skilful and persistent efforts have been constantly made to bring the public mind at the South to this conclusion. The South, up to the election of Mr. Lincoln, has controlled the Union. Of this there is no doubt, and it is often boastfully asserted as proof of the inherent superiority of the South to the North. Although less than a third of the free population of the country, and possessing less than a third of its wealth, it has had eleven presidents out of sixteen; seventeen judges of the Supreme Court out of twenty-eight; fourteen attorney-generals out of nineteen; sixty-one presidents of the Senate out of seventy-seven; twenty-one speakers of the House of Representatives out of thirty-three; eighty foreign ministers out of one hundred and thirty-four. The like disparity runs throughout all the officers of the general government. Nothing can more clearly evince the dominance of the slave power in the councils of the nation. Our foreign and domestic policy has been in like subjection to Southern influence. There is nothing surprising or abnormal in this. The slaveholders, although a minority, have always held the balance of power. Of two contending candidates, he was sure to succeed who could secure the Southern vote. Everything, therefore, was promised and given to obtain that support. Besides this, the slave power has not only been thus the arbiter in all struggles for place or influence, but it has always threatened disunion, if it was not satisfied in its demands. Disunion and its consequences have ever been regarded as the most dire of national calamities. To avoid it, the North were willing to submit to everything. To this day, Northern men would have gladly allowed the South to have every president, two-thirds of all offices of trust and power, to

control our commercial relations at her pleasure, and to have her own way in everything, rather than risk the destruction of our national unity and life.

The South has always been treated as a spoilt child, to which the other members of the family gave up for the sake of peace. It was not until her demands touched the conscience of the North, that a stop was put to concession. If she loved slavery, she might take what measures she saw fit to cherish and perpetuate it. But when she demanded, as the condition of her continuance in the Union, that the nation, as a nation, should love it, should legalize and extend it; that every foot of the territory of the United States, so long as it remained under the control of the general government, should be slave territory; that the area of slavery should advance whenever and wherever the nation enlarged its boundaries, then the reason, heart, and conscience of the North said, No!—you may hold slaves, if you please, but you shall not make slaveholders of us. This was the cause of disunion. It was the determination of the South to convert all the territories (as distinguished from the states) into slave territory, and to require the enactment of slave laws by the general government, that led to the refusal of the North to make further concessions to the slave power.

Our English friends may not at once understand this. A few words may render it intelligible. From the foundation of our government until a very recent period, slavery was admitted by the North and the South, as by all other nations, to be a municipal institution, depending for its existence upon the *lex loci.* This principle has been recognised by numerous decisions, as well of the federal as of the state courts, and by those of the slave states as frequently as by those of the free states. From this principle it follows, that if a master takes his slave into a free state, to England, Canada, New York, Pennsylvania, or anywhere else where slavery is not by law established, he loses all legal control over him. The slave thereby becomes free. It follows, also, or rather it is included in what has been said, that if the United States possessed or acquired territory in which slavery did not already exist, slaveholders, although free to take any species of property which other men may take into such territories, could have no

security therein for their slave property. It was also held by all parties, that the general government, having sole legislative control over the territories not yet formed into states, had the right to establish or to prohibit therein slavery at their discretion. This power Congress exercised on repeated occasions, with the concurrence and coöperation of the Southern senators and representatives. As the operation of this principle was likely to exclude slavery from the new territories, and prevent slaveholders from having, as they regarded it, an equal interest in the common property of the nation, various expedients were adopted to satisfy their demands. In 1820 it was enacted, in the famous Missouri Compromise, that slavery should be for ever prohibited north of latitude 36° 30′, and not prohibited south of that line. This law was passed by Southern votes and influences. Next the principle was adopted, that the people living in any territory might establish or prohibit slavery, as they saw fit, but that Congress should not interfere one way or the other. This is what, in Western phraseology, was called the doctrine of "squatter sovereignty." This also, for a while, secured the earnest support of the majority of Southern statesmen. Soon, however, it was found that this would not answer their purpose. Northern emigrants to the unoccupied lands of the West, were likely greatly to outnumber those from the South; if, therefore, it were to be left to the inhabitants of the territories to determine their destiny, they would in most instances inevitably become free. This led to the adoption of the principle, that neither Congress nor the territorial legislatures had the right to prohibit slavery in any of the territories of the United States; that Southern planters had the right to carry their slaves wherever Northern farmers could lawfully take their horses; and that as Congress enacted laws for the protection of all other kinds of property in the territories, it was bound to pass laws for the like security of property in slaves. As this converts all the territories of the United States into slaveholding communities, and devolves on the general government the duty of establishing slavery wherever the Constitution bears sway outside of the established free states, and assumes that whenever new territory shall be acquired, whether by purchase or conquest, whether North or

South, it shall be instanter transformed into slave territory, by the mere action of the Constitution, it proved to be more than the yielding North could bear. Mr. Lincoln was elected on a platform which repudiated this new doctrine, and asserted what had been the faith of the founders of our government, and of all our illustrious statesmen, viz. that slavery has no right to exist where the *lex loci* does not expressly create or recognise it. His election was the signal for revolt. It was held to decide the question that the North would not grant the South her new discovered right of carrying slavery wherever the Constitution of the United States was in force. Although the illustrious Henry Clay had long since declared, that no power on earth should ever force him to vote for the introduction of slavery into any territory where it did not previously exist; and although even Jefferson Davis, now president of the new confederacy, had himself, as senator, voted for the prohibition of slavery by Congress, yet as an occasion for disunion was all that was desired, Mr. Lincoln's election was hailed with public rejoicing in Charleston, and steps were immediately taken to carry into effect the long-cherished plans of disunion. It is thus apparent that the preservation and extension of slavery is the sole object of this rebellion, so far as it dares to be avowed.

It may be true, and doubtless is true, as the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, who for a long time nobly resisted the movement, that the chief instigators of this revolt were actuated by disappointed ambition, but this does not affect the character of the rebellion as a whole. Its avowed object, that which was presented in order to arouse and secure the coöperation of the slave states, was the security and extension of slavery. In the ordinance of secession passed by South Carolina, the only reason presented to justify her, in the sight of heaven and earth, for breaking up the Union of these States, is that slavery was endangered. It complains that for twenty-five years a system of agitation had been in operation against slavery, that at last it had secured the aid of the common government in the election of "a man to the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery;" and that the South was to be excluded from the

common territory. It was for slavery, and for nothing else, South Carolina seceded. The speech of Mr. Stephens, after his election to the vice-presidency of the new Confederacy, gives the fullest and most explicit exposition of the design and principles of the confederates. "The new constitution has put at rest for ever," he says, "all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery, as it exists among us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this as 'the rock on which the old Union would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact." After referring to the fact that Jefferson, and other statesmen of that day, believed not "the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically," he goes on to say, "Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the idea of a government built upon it, when the storm came and the wind blew, it fell. Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth." Anti-slavery men, he says, are fanatics, because they assume "that the negro is equal, and hence is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man. If the premises were correct, their conclusions would be logical and just; but their premises being wrong, their whole argument fails." We cannot stop to remark on this as a spemen of logic. Because, as now found in the South, the negro is not equal to the white man, therefore he must be doomed to perpetual slavery, is the argument. But unless he is so inferior as to be for ever incapable of freedom, he cannot justly be permanently enslaved. Two things are falsely assumed against the negro; first, that his inferiority is so great that his normal condition in relation to a white man is that of a slave; and that

his inferiority is inherent and unalterable. The logic of the Turk is as sound as that of Mr. Stephens; women are inferior to men, therefore they should for ever be slaves. We are not, however, to be turned aside to show the atrocity of the principle on which the new Confederacy is founded. Our object is simply to show what that principle is, by Southern statesmen, avowed to be. It is not for us, says Mr. Stephens, to question God's ordinances. He has made one race inferior to another. "Our Confederacy," he tells the world, "is founded upon principles in strict conformity with these laws. This stone, which was rejected by the first builders, is become the chief stone of the corner in our new edifice." This is the edifice which anti-slavery England is aiding to raise, and for the sake of which she seems willing to shed rivers of blood. Surely God must have given her up to delusion.

To Americans, it is no more necessary to prove that this Southern rebellion is made in the interest of slavery, than it is to prove that charcoal is black. We are writing, however, for those whose interest it is to deny it; who must deny it, to shield themselves from self-contempt and self-reprobation. This denial, however, being made in face of facts patent to the whole world, can avail them little. If it saves them, for the moment, from self-condemnation, it cannot save them from the condemnation of the world. We shall advert to only one other source of proof on this subject. The nature of a disease may often be determined by the nature of the remedies. So the character of the struggle which now rends our unhappy country, can be learned from the means proposed, first to prevent, and afterwards to arrest it. These means had reference to one object from first to last; and that object was to satisfy the demands of the South in relation to slavery. This collision has been long foreseen, or at least apprehended. The framers of our Constitution thought they gave every reasonable security to the South, by providing, first, that while in all other states population was to be the basis of representation, in the South three-fifths of the slaves, although held as property, should be represented. This rule gives the South nineteen or twenty more representatives in Congress than it would be entitled to on the basis of its white population. Secondly, by withholding all

authority from the federal government to interfere with slavery in any form within the limits of the several states; and, thirdly, by the provision for the rendition of fugitives from serviee.

There is another feature of our Constitution, which, although not intended for the exclusive benefit of the South, has worked very mueh in its favour. The Senate of the United States is composed of two senators from each state, without regard to its extent of territory, to its population, or its wealth. The slave states, although having but little more than one-third of the white population of the country, had thirty senators, and the free states thirty-two. These are the eonstitutional provisions for the security of slavery; but they did not satisfy the South. The slaveholders, through their representative men, urged that it was not enough that the general government had not the right to abolish slavery, but the seeurity of that institution required that it should not have the power to do it. To secure this end, it was urged that whenever a free state was admitted to the Union, it should be balanced by the admission of a new slave state; so that in the Senate, at least, the equality should be preserved. Another plan, first proposed by Mr. Calhoun, and urged last winter by Senator Hunter, of Virginia, was to alter the Constitution, so as to provide for the election of two presidents, one from the slave and the other from the free states, whose joint signatures should be requisite to the validity of any aet of Congress. The exorbitaney of these demands is not perceived, if we have in our mind the whole South as territorially a moiety of the Union. We must remember that these demands had for their object to secure for three hundred and fifty thousand slave-owners, and their immediate dependents, equal power to the residue of the thirty millions of our people. Southern writers say, that in all these controversies, a Southerner is a slaveholder. This is his distinctive characteristic. And, of eourse, if a man is not a slaveholder, he is not a Southerner, and is not to be so regarded, no matter where he lives. In point of fact, the non-slaveholding whites of the South, although outnumbering the slaveholders three or four times over, are never taken into account. Their interests, and even their existence, are ignored.

After the secession movement had actually begun, all the efforts to arrest its progress had exclusive reference to slavery. First, the resolution was unanimously adopted by Congress, declaring that the general government had no right to interfere with slavery within the several states. The president and every department of the government gave every assurance that all the guaranties of the Constitution should be faithfully observed. Secondly, Senator Crittenden proposed that slavery should be for ever prohibited in the territories north of latitude 36° 30′, and legally established in all territories now possessed, or to be hereafter acquired by the United States, south of that latitude. Thirdly, what is called the border state proposition, was, that slavery should be prohibited north of 36° 30′, and not prohibited south of that line; its establishment or non-establishment being left for future decision. Fourthly, Mr. Adams, now our minister at the court of St. James, introduced a bill proposing to erect all our territory into separate states, with or without slavery. Those territories which had already admitted slavery, would constitute slave states; and those which had not, would constitute free states. It is not our object to discuss the merits of either of these plans, but simply to call attention to the fact, that they all had reference to slavery. That was the only subject in controversy. It is therefore undeniable, that the perpetuity and extension of slavery was the object of the rebellion, which these compromises were designed to prevent or to arrest.

Having thus proved that this is a pro-slavery rebellion, we propose to show, in few words, that it is altogether unjustifiable, and that it has been consummated by the grossest acts of treachery and spoliation. The leaders of the enterprise, indeed, assumed the ground that no justification is necessary. The several states, they say, entered the Union at their own free will, and are at liberty to leave it when they please. It is enough to say in reference to this view of our federal Constitution, that it was universally rejected, north and south, until within the last twenty or thirty years; and since that period it has been advocated only by a set of extreme political theorists. It is intrinsically absurd. Who can believe that a government would give fifteen millions of dollars for Louisiana,

ten millions for Texas, five millions for Florida, if those states would within a week declare themselves out of the Union? Well does Count Gasparin say—"Never yet existed on earth a federal compact conceived in this wise—The states which form a part of this league will remain in it only till it pleases them to leave it. Such, notwithstanding, is the formula on which the Southern theorists make a stand. Among the anarchical doctrines that our age has seen hatched (and they are numerous,) this seems to me worthy of occupying the place of honour. This right of separation is simply the *liberum veto*, resuscitated for the benefit of federal institutions. As in the horseback Diets of Poland, a single opposing vote could put a stop to everything, so that it only remained to vote by sabre-strokes, so confederations, recognising the right of separation, would have no other resort than brute force; for no great nation can allow itself to be killed without defending itself." (P. 108.)

The leaders of this movement, of course, advance certain reasons to vindicate the exercise of their assumed right to break up this government. They say that the compact has been violated; that fugitive slaves have not been restored, agreeably to the provisions of the Constitution; and that the Constitution itself was virtually annulled by the election of Mr. Lincoln. The complaint about the non-rendition of fugitive slaves is a mere pretext. The cotton, or Gulf states, are so far removed from the Northern frontiers that they suffered little or nothing from that source. Besides, the general government has ever been faithful to the constitutional compact in this regard. Congress not only enacted a stringent fugitive slave law, but every department of the government, judicial and executive, was strenuous in carrying it into effect. The Hon. Mr. Douglas once said in his place in the Senate, that for one fugitive slave liberated by illegal action at the North, he could adduce the case of ten northern freemen outraged at the South. As to the abrogation of the Constitution by the election of Mr. Lincoln, it can only mean, that the interpretation of the Constitution given by the extreme South was repudiated by those who voted for that gentleman. But when it is remembered that no sentiment has been uttered by

Mr. Lincoln, as President, which he does not hold in common with Washington, Jefferson, and other founders of our Constitution, it is obvious that this plea is almost devoid of meaning. It is plain that the South has no oppression to complain of. She has always had more than her due share in the representation, and in the executive authority of the country. No act of Congress, of any political importance, has ever been passed without the concurrence of Southern men. The South has prospered—has increased in population, wealth, and power, under the beneficent operation of the national government. Slaveholders have rebelled, not on account of the past, but for the sake of the future. To realize their scheme of a vast empire founded on slavery, they have not hesitated to endeavour to overthrow a government which they had sworn to support, and involve the nation in all the horrors of a civil war.

This rebellion, thus without any just provocation, was inaugurated by treachery and spoliation. Members of the cabinet, of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives, under their official oaths to support the Constitution of the country, and while receiving its pay, were plotting its overthrow. Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, in an address to the people at Richmond, stated that General Scott, as early as September 1860, presented to the administration of Mr. Buchanan a programme for the arming and garrisoning the Southern forts, which, if carried out, would have rendered secession impossible. It was his boast, his claim to Southern gratitude, that he had prevented the adoption of that plan. The Southern forts, therefore, were designedly left unarmed and unoccupied, in order that they might fall an easy prey to the seceding states. Immense quantities of arms, and other munitions of war, were transferred to the South, in order that it might be prepared for rebellion. All such munitions, and the arsenals, mints, and other public property, were seized and appropriated, even in many cases before the acts of secession were passed. Officers in the navy and army, high in rank, threw up their commissions, and, wherever possible, surrendered the troops under their command, and the public property at their control, to the rebel authorities. Mercantile debts, to the amount of three hundred millions of dol-

lars, owed by Southern to Northern merchants, have been cancelled; all stocks of the several seceding states held by men faithful to the Union have been forfeited. Such is the character of the rebellion which England, and, as it would seem, the English people, are disposed to aid by every means in their power.

Englishmen tell us that this is a struggle for power; that the North is endeavouring to subjugate the South; or that, at the best, we are fighting for an abstraction. It is plain, however, from the preceding statement, that we are fighting for our national existence; that the avowed object of the war, that is, formally and authoritatively by Congress and the President, is simply to uphold the Constitution in its integrity, and in its legitimate authority. In the accomplishment of this object, not only our national honour, our name and place among the nations of the earth, the free and normal development of our institutions, but the most important material interests of the country are at stake. It is almost physically impossible that this country should be divided. The mouths of the Mississippi must be in the possession of the millions who dwell upon its banks. To secure that object the nation gladly paid fifteen millions of dollars, and it cannot now be relinquished. In order to secure the port of Pensacola, and the harbour at Key West, five millions were paid for Florida, and nearly a hundred millions expended in her Indian wars, and for the navy yards and fortifications. It is impossible that the nation should give up these points, essential to the security of its commerce. In short, it might as well be said that England would be fighting for an abstraction, should she refuse to submit without a struggle to the secession of Scotland and Ireland from the British crown, and their erection into independent and hostile governments.

But, it is said, admitting the war to be a righteous one, it is nevertheless hopeless. Disunion is a fact accomplished. The North can never conquer the South. Eleven millions of people, we are told by English Christians, can never be subjugated. That may be very true. But, in the first place, there are not eleven millions to be subjugated. And, in the second place, subjugation is not the object aimed at. Eleven

millions is the whole number of the population of the fifteen slave states. From this are to be deducted, first, four million five hundred thousand slaves, and free coloured people; and, secondly, two million five hundred thousand white population of the border states, which have not joined the rebellion. This reduces the number of our antagonists to something like five millions instead of eleven. Still further reduction is to be made on account of the vast numbers of Union-men scattered through the Confederate States. The great mistake, however, of these English writers, is the assumption that the object of the general government is the subjugation of the four or five millions of people. It is not subjugation, but the deliverance of the seceding states themselves from the domination of a tyrannical minority. When the Independents under Cromwell overthrew the British monarchy, the mass of the people were quiescent, and submitted to the authority of the Protector. The English people were not subjugated when the appearance of General Monk's army emboldened them to throw off the bonds of the new government, and to return to their allegiance to the house of Stuart. Neither will the South be subjugated, when the advance of the Federal armies enable the people to emancipate themselves from the dominion of the slaveholders, and to resume their wonted place in the American Union.

It is a great error to assume that the white population of the South is either homogeneous or unanimous. There is, indeed, a very great difference between the different slave states. No one would think of comparing the civilization, or condition of society, in Virginia, with that which exists in the Southwest—especially in Texas and Arkansas. The cotton states are the only real seceding states. In them, the population is divided into three classes: first, the slaveholders; secondly, the poor whites; and thirdly, the free whites inhabiting the mountainous districts, where there is little or nothing of slave labour, and where free labour is not considered a disgrace. These are true freemen of the mountaineer type. It is the slaveholders, who are a small minority of the population, by whom, and for whose sake this rebellion has been made. Not even all of this class approved of the measure. Many of them regarded it as insane and suicidal. Alexander

H. Stephens, the most honoured statesman of the South, long and strenuously resisted it. We have heard from the lips of men born and educated at the South, and owning large numbers of slaves, the severest condemnation of secession and disunion. The Southern papers contained lamentations and threats directed against the *rich*, as a class, for holding back from the rebellion, through fear of losing their money. As a body, however, there is no doubt that the slaveholders in the cotton states earnestly desire independence. As to the numerous class called "poor whites," they are poor in every respect; poor in property, in education, and in influence. Mr. William Gregg, in an address delivered before the South Carolina Institute, in 1851, estimated the number of white people in that state "who ought to work, and who do not, or who are so employed as to be wholly unproductive to the state, at one hundred and twenty thousand." These people, he says, are "wholly neglected, and are suffered to while away an existence but one step in advance of the Indian of the forest." There are not much more than three hundred thousand white people in South Carolina, and of these, we are told, that nearly one-half are in a state of ignorance, want, and barbarism, little above that of savages! Does any other civilized state in Christendom exhibit such a condition of its people! This is proud South Carolina! These poor whites, nevertheless, are great advocates of slavery. They are free, and therefore they are above the negro. It is their only distinction. They can easily be roused, therefore, to oppose what they are told is abolitionism, and to support a pro-slavery government. Nevertheless, they are, and are felt to be, a dangerous class. When evil comes, when fears are entertained of servile insurrections, and these poor whites are called upon to patrol the country, to keep guard over their own cabins as well as over the mansions of the planters, then they ask themselves the question—why they should thus watch, and thus tremble for their own lives and those of their families, to uphold a system which makes the few rich and the many poor. This we have heard from men who were born and passed their whole lives at the South. It is not, however, a matter to be wondered at, that the slaveowners, as a class, have supreme control, and have been able

for the time to enlist the whole resources of the country in their support. This unanimity is, however, merely superficial. In no one of the cotton states did the leaders venture to submit the question of secession to a popular vote. They dreaded the opposition of the non-slaveholding majorities. It is on those majorities the government rely for the restoration of the Union. It is not subjugation, but emancipation of the people from a selfish and tyrannical minority, this great war is intended to accomplish.

Should the prediction, however, of our English kinsmen be accomplished; should this Union be dismembered, and the Southern Confederacy, whose corner-stone is slavery, establish its independence, what will be the result? Nothing but Omniscience can answer that question. But what is the dream which the leaders in this rebellion hope to realize? It is the establishment of an empire, in which capital shall own labour; in which one race shall have all wealth and power, and the other shall be slaves—not for a time, or during a transition state, but permanently, as the best organization of society. This state of civilization, involving of necessity the barbarism, ignorance, degradation, and misery of the majority of the people, is not only to be perpetuated, but indefinitely extended. For this end, this glorious Union—founded by God, as all good people hoped and believed, to be the home of the free, the refuge of the oppressed, the instrument in his hand for the dissemination of Christianity and civil liberty throughout the world—is to be overturned.

We earnestly pray that England may be saved from the guilt of favouring such a cause. Sure we are, that if she, or any other foreign nation, should openly take part with this rebellion, it will excite the millions of the North to ungovernable frenzy, and produce a scene of desolation, over which men and angels may well weep.

SHORT NOTICES.

Some of the Mistakes of Educated Men. The Biennial Address before the Phrenakosmian Society of Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa. By John S. Hart, LL.D.

Among college anniversary addresses we have rarely met with one so full of valuable practical remarks, on the subject of which it treats, as this. It is clearly the fruit of long observation and experience in the department of life to which it pertains. With hardly an attempt at that literary ornamentation, which forms the principal feature of the greater number of such productions, and yet with a peculiar grace and felicity of style, it presents a series of considerations of the most vital interest to literary and professional men. Recognising work as the only effector of all that genius as well as learning can conceive, it proposes for its subject the means of retaining both body and mind in working condition; and the mistakes of educated men mentioned are such as go to impair the capacity of the body to subserve the purposes of the mind, which cramp, embarrass, or dissipate the energies of the mind itself, or interfere with the facility or effect of effort. The subject is familiar, the remarks in themselves far from recondite; they will be accepted as just and valuable, and perfectly natural, and yet not one in a hundred ever thought them into such a practical shape. As was proper to the occasion on which they were uttered, they are framed to correct the mistaken notions of young men, yet coming from the heart of mature experience, they have profitable suggestions for all. "We talk a great deal about genius. What we say, is no doubt all very fine. But, much as it may seem to you to be letting the subject down, depend upon it, you will not go far astray practically, if you define genius to be an extraordinary capacity for labour. I know well enough that such a definition does not exhaust the idea. But I have taken some pains to investigate the problem of the productions of genius, and the nearer in any given case I have been able to get at the very interior essence of things, the more have I been satisfied that no world-wide greatness was ever achieved, except where there has been a prodigious capacity for work. Genius, at least that kind which

achieves greatness, is not fitful. It has an iron will, as well as an eagle eye." "Now it is obvious that in order to any such career, the body must have adequate powers of endurance. Long continued mental labour, especially where the feelings are enlisted, makes fearful drafts upon the bodily frame." "My first advice, then, to young men pursuing or completing a course of liberal studies, is, take care of your bodily health. Without this your intellectual attainments will be shorn of more than half their value. I dwell upon this point, and emphasize it, because on every side of me, in professional life, and especially in the clerical profession, I see so many helpless, hopeless wrecks. Verily, there is some grievous mistake among us in this matter."

"I do not propose to tell how this strong physical health is to be secured. All I wish is to call your attention to the subject." "Let me, however, say this much. We must live more in the open air than we do. We must warm our blood less by closed rooms and air-tight stoves, and more by oxygen breathed upon the beautiful hill sides. We must spend more time in innocent outdoor amusements." "When a professional man is exhausted by intellectual labour, it is not in a dismal, solitary walk to recuperate him. Better let him pull off his coat, and join the young folks on the green in some kind of honest game." "Do not misunderstand me. I am not for turning life into a holiday. My views of life are serious, almost severe. But, for the stern realities of duty, we all need, and none more than those who do brain work, the recuperation which comes from active amusement in the free open air."

As one of the effects of this fine bodily health in connection with mental culture, he remarks upon the greater capacity of the senses, that in their healthy action, and in the service of a well disciplined intellect, they collect more valuable material for thinking. "The man who has learned drawing or painting, sees more than other men do. The man who has studied music, hears more. The cultivation of the eye, the ear, the hand, and of the other bodily organs and senses, multiplies in an ever increasing ratio the occupations and capabilities of the mind."

In a similar manner the author discourses of methods going to fortify and facilitate the exertions of literary men, under heads referring to comfort and facility in work; to persistence in occupation; to methods of maintaining freshness and variety of thought, and suggestions concerning the application of culture in letters and in society.

Without pretending to any superior wisdom on these important topics, the author treats of them in a plain and sensible manner, calculated to arrest attention, and guide observation to useful practical results. We recommend the discourse to the consideration of those to whose interests it is addressed.

Historical Lectures on the Life of our Lord Jesus Christ; being the Hulsean for the year 1859. With Notes, critical, historical, and explanatory. By C. J. Ellicott, B. D., Prof. of Divinity, King's College, London; late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; author of Critical and Grammatical Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1862. Pp. 382.

An able book by an able man. It deals with the facts rather than with doctrines or truths of the gospel history. It designs to harmonize, synchronize, and to illustrate those facts. It is also apologetic in its character, being designed to vindicate the historical verity of the Evangelists. It is, therefore, a very seasonable and valuable book.

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England. Collected and Edited by James Spedding, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge; Robert Leslie Ellis, M. A , late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Douglas Denon Heath, Barrister at Law; late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Vol. II. Boston: Published by Brown & Taggart. 1861.

This is a new volume of the elegant, convenient edition of Lord Bacon's Works, now in the course of publication by Messrs. Brown & Taggart, of Boston. We have repeatedly called the attention of our readers to this important enterprise.

History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By J. A. Dorner, Professor of Theology in the University of Göttingen. Division Second. From the end of the fourth century to the present time. Vol. I. Translated by the Rev. D. W. Simon, Manchester. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. 1861. Pp. 456.

This is volume tenth of the third series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Dorner's History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ is by far the most extended and thorough which has ever been published. It is a work of immense labour and research; written with an apparent spirit of fidelity, but nevertheless coloured, more or less, from beginning to end, by the peculiar philosophic opinions of the writer. It is a work to be studied and used, but not to be implicitly followed as a guide.

Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew. Specially designed and adapted for the use of Ministers and Students. From the German of J. P. Lange, D. D., Professor in the University of Bonn. By the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. 462. 1861.

This is volume ninth of Clark's third series. Professor Lange belongs to the orthodox or evangelical class of German theologians. He is a man of genius, learning, and piety. Although adhering to what all Protestants regard as the fundamental doctrines of the gospel, he allows himself much latitude in speculation. His work will be found one of great interest to American readers, from the very fact that it differs so much in its modes of thought and representation from those of writers with whom they are most familiar.

The Puritans; or, the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, during the reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Vol. III. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, No. 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1861. Pp. 675.

We have already noticed the first and second volumes of this extended and valuable work. We now simply announce its completion, with a hope, at a future day, of giving it a more extended review.

The Book of Psalms, in Hebrew and English, arranged in Parallelism. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1862. Pp. 194.

The Hebrew text in this book is that of Hahn. The arrangement in verse, or parallelism, is that of Rosenmüller. The English is the common version. The Hebrew and English are so arranged that the corresponding members stand opposite each other. It will be seen at once that this is a very convenient and useful work. It will greatly facilitate the habitual reading of the Hebrew Psalter by theological students and ministers.

Journal of Prison Discipline.

The closing number of the sixteenth volume of this valuable Quarterly periodical, (the only one in the country, we believe, devoted to this branch of public economy,) is before us. Among its contents we find a seasonable article on the importance of sustaining and executing the law; another on the idiosyncracies of criminals; a third on public executions; and a fourth on a late law of Pennsylvania abridging sentences in certain cases. Added to which are several important and interesting notices on various topics connected with the administration of prisons. The subscription price is one dollar. E. C. & J. Biddle, Philadelphia, are the publishers.

Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Boston: Published by the Board. Missionary House, No. 33 Pemberton Square. 1861.

The issuing of an historical volume in connection with the semi-centennial jubilee of the oldest and largest of our missionary organizations, as a permanent memorial of the great events connected with its origin and growth, is so appropriate, that without it the celebration of that grand and solemn festivity would hardly have been complete. Of course, no person so competent for the work could be found as the accomplished and venerable senior Secretary, Dr. Rufus Anderson, whose official connection with the Board, running back over a period of nearly forty years, gives him unequalled knowledge of the history of an Institution which has so long enjoyed the benefit of his admirable counsels and services. The duty of preparing the volume was, accordingly, with great unanimity, assigned to him. As might be expected, he has given us a "Memorial Volume," worthy of himself, the subject, and the occasion. It consists of three parts:—I. An account of the jubilee meeting held in Boston, October 2, 1860; together with the historical discourse then delivered by Dr. Mark Hopkins, President of the Board, which is itself, of course, a treasure. II. The history of the Board, with brief sketches of its eminent founders, in which we detect the touches of Dr. Sprague's graphic pencil, delineating such among our own former worthies, as Green, Miller, and Richards, in illustrious companionship with the Dwights and Appletons of New England. The powers and functions of the Board; its civil and ecclesiastical relations; its attitude toward its patrons, its missions, and missionaries; with the gradual growth of Ecclesiastical Boards in some of the churches which once were connected with it, are clearly set forth. The American Board is, in its constitution, unlike any organization for evangelical service with which we are acquainted. It is not voluntary, in the sense that any one, by payment of money, or any other voluntary procedure, can make himself a member of it. Neither is it ecclesiastical. It is a close, self-perpetuating corporation, like the Boards of Trustees of our older Colleges. III. Memorials of the Missions, of Missionaries; their achievements, evangelical and literary; of the principles pertaining to the conduct and sustentation of Missions, developed by time and experience, form the third part of this interesting and instructive volume, the great value of which must have been already made apparent to our readers. Indeed, it furnishes rich, suggestive materials for a full article, in review of which we have now neither time nor space to avail ourselves. We ought not

to omit notice of the excellent typographical dress in which the volume appears, at the low price of one dollar.

Essays and Discourses, Practical and Historical. By Cortlandt Van Rensselaer, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Of that brilliant constellation of eminent men, intimately related to Princeton, and suddenly extinguished in the meridian of life, usefulness, and fame—we refer to the two brothers Alexander, Hope, Van Rensselaer, and Murray—Dr. Van Rensselaer was second to none in that tireless and systematic industry, which, coupled with his well-balanced and vigorous mind, and his preëminent goodness, made him a great man. Considering his worldly advantages of lineage, rank, and wealth, we have often admired that unselfish and unsparing industry in the service of the church, to which he became a martyr. The monuments of his efficient and self-sacrificing zeal are found in the institutions whose present stability and vigour owe so much to his exertions, and in those able productions of his pen (seldom idle) whereby "he, being dead, yet speaketh." The more important of these are gathered in this volume, which, though posthumous, has the advantage of having been revised by the author before his death, with a view to publication. Many of these productions are not new to Presbyterians, who will welcome their appearance in their present form. We are glad that they are given to the world by the publishing Board of the church, which, under God, owes so much to his efficient and devoted labours.

Autobiography of William Neill, D. D., with a Selection from his Sermons. By the Rev. J. H. Jones, D. D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1861.

Dr. Neill belonged to an earlier generation of those intimately related to Princeton, who were also chief pillars and ornaments in the church. The cotemporary and friend of the elder Alexander, Miller, and Carnahan, he outlived them all, and scarcely any of his venerable co-labourers survives him. He was a sound, intelligent, experimental divine; an instructive, earnest, and edifying preacher; a man of much practical wisdom, purity, and firmness of purpose; his counsels were of great value and weight in our church courts, boards, and educational institutions. Such a man deserves the appropriate memorial furnished by this volume. The autobiography is attractive, and the sermons are clear, solid, and judicious expositions of divine truth.

Self-sacrifice, or the Pioneers of Fuegia. Compiled for the Board of Publication. By Sarah A. Myers. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This narrative of the vicissitudes of the eventful lives of these martyrs to missionary zeal has the fascination, not of a fictitious tale, but of that truth which is "stranger than fiction." It does not merely entertain the reader. Besides the valuable information it gives in regard to Patagonia and her barbarous inhabitants, it is fitted to fan the flame of Christian and missionary zeal.

Christ, the Light of the World: Biblical Studies on the first Ten Chapters of St. John's Gospel. By Rudolph Besser, D. D. Translated from the German, by M. G. Huxtable. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1861.

Another addition to that series of translations from leading evangelical German authors, for which the public is so greatly indebted to the house of Messrs. Clark. The exposition and comments appear to proceed from a mind at once scholarly and devout. They are marked by discrimination, spirituality, and unction. The author, however, is intensely Lutheran, and presents the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation, and sacramental grace, without mitigation. Thus in commenting on John iii. 5, he says:

"The *birth* to life in the kingdom of God, as well as the *nourishment* of this new life, are each of them a sacramental mystery; the former takes place in the sacrament of holy baptism, the latter in the sacrament of the altar." P. 126. Again: "And we do well, when approaching the Holy Table, to ponder in our hearts the words: 'Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life.' For the *same* flesh and the *same* blood of which the Lord here speaks as being the meat and drink of life, do we surely eat and drink with and under the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper." P. 298.

This sacramentarianism is the only drawback which we have noticed in the very cursory inspection we have been able to make of the book.

The Gorilla; being a Sketch of its History, Anatomy, General Appearance, and Habits. By Leonard J. Sanford, M. D.

While Mr. Du Chaillu, the African traveller, whose name is identified with the Gorilla, has given to the public an instructive and entertaining account of his own observations of this wonderful animal, he has left ample room for the learned and scientific contribution to our knowledge of the subject here published. The historical traces and the anatomical analysis of this huge anthropoid, given us by Dr. Sanford, are highly

creditable to his scholarly and scientific diligence and insight. A wide and inviting field of inquiry opens up in regard to the whole genus of apes. A sharp discrimination of the points of resemblance and difference between anthropoids and men, would not be without its uses, even in psychological and ethical science. One thing, however, ought not to be overlooked. Those species of each lower grade of being which present the closest approximations to, and mimicry of, the next higher, are not its noblest specimens. The sensitive plant is less noble than the oak or the cactus; the monkey, than the lion or the eagle.

SERMONS FOR THE TIMES.

The "things which are not:" God's Chosen Instruments for advancing His Kingdom. A Sermon preached at Cleveland, Ohio, October 1, 1861, before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, at their Fifty second Annual Meeting. By Richard S. Storrs, Jr., D. D., of Brooklyn, N. Y. New York: John A. Gray. 1861.

Glorifying God in the Fires. A Discourse delivered in the Second Presbyterian Church, Albany, November 28, 1861, the day of the Annual Thanksgiving in the State of New York: By William B. Sprague, D. D. Published by request of the young men of the congregation. Albany: C. Van Benthuysen. 1861.

Establishment in National Righteousness, and Present Causes for Thanksgiving. A Sermon, preached in the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., by the Rev. N. West, Jr., pastor, November 28, 1861. New York: John F. Trow. 1861.

Our Country and the Church. By N. L. Rice, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861.

Thanksgiving in War. A Sermon, preached in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, on the 28th day of November, 1861. By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: C. Sherman & Son. 1861.

These discourses have a common bond of unity, which our readers will readily infer from their titles, and the occasions of their delivery, at least with regard to all, except the first, by Dr. Storrs. Rich, however, as his sermon is in regard to other matters pertaining to the spread and triumph of Christ's kingdom, he could not refrain from devoting a portion of it to that great theme which now kindles every loyal heart—the great struggle into which our government has been plunged for the preservation of our national life. He finds here a great and cheering illustration of the principle, which he emblazons with a gorgeous exuberance of imagery and diction rarely equalled, viz. that God employs "things that are not," *i. e.*, forces as

yet unrecognised and undeveloped, to bring to nought the "things that are," *i. e.*, that have risen to actual and acknowledged power.

Dr. Sprague's discourse exhibits the fervour of intelligent and elevated Christian patriotism, in connection with the present crisis. In presenting the causes of devout gratitude furnished by our existing national trials, he quickens the interest inspired by his just and appropriate views, by an impassioned glow of feeling, and that exquisite *naïveté*, which lends a charm to all his compositions.

Mr. West has produced a discourse of marked ability. In the depth and scholarly character of its discussions, the clearness and earnestness with which it sets forth the relations of morality and Christianity to the state, and in the collation of weighty authorities to support his positions, it takes high rank among the recent contributions to our patriotic and Christian literature.

Dr. Rice's pamphlet consists of the substance of two discourses preached to his people on the Sabbath preceding the late national fast. Of course, his object being to dispose his hearers to humiliation, he is led to signalize a different class of topics—the sins of the nation, especially such as stand in immediate connection with the terrible judgments of God now visited upon it. This is done with that perspicuity and force, of which Dr. Rice is so eminent a master. The views presented in the first discourse appear to us as just as they are ably set forth, and likely to command the sympathy of intelligent and devout Christians. The second enters upon more debateable ground, and maintains it with that power and skill which the author never fails to bring to the support of his principles. On a careful inspection of the discourse, we are of opinion that what is true in so many cases, is true here. The author differs from the great body of his brethren, not so much in fundamental principles, as in certain applications of them. Few, we presume, would dissent from the following doctrines:

"The duty of the church to the state is embraced in the following three particulars, viz.

"1st. It is the duty of the church, through her ministers, to teach those great principles of God's word by which civil rulers are bound to govern their official conduct. God is King of kings; and his law is supreme over rulers. Read Deut. xvii. 14—20.

"2d. The church owes it to the state to teach the people 'to be subject to the powers that be,' within the limits God

himself has fixed; and to explain to them, out of God's word, the duties of citizens. Rom. xiii. 7; 1 Pet. ii. 17.

"3d. The church owes it to the state to pray for it, for all civil rulers, that they may fear God, understand and discharge their duty; and for the country, that the blessing of God may rest upon it." Pp. 60, 61.

Again. "There have, indeed, been cases of civil conflicts, and there may be cases again, in which ministers and churches may and should take sides; because they directly involve moral principles. Suppose, for example, a party should deny the obligation to obey civil authorities, and attempt to overthrow all government. Or suppose a party should attempt, for their own ends, to revolutionize a government already established, and which confessedly is constitutionally administered. Or suppose a party to attempt to deprive a portion of the people of the rights of conscience. Or there may be wars of conquest or of plunder. In all such cases, the violation of the law of God is clear; and the ministers of Christ must condemn the wickedness." Pp. 69, 70.

So far there is no question. We find that Dr. Rice's meaning, in some passages pertaining to the application of these principles to the present war, has been differently construed by different persons. We do not ourselves, however, perceive any ambiguity in his statements and reasonings. However this may be, we have only to refer to the uniform course of this journal, to show that we regard this contest as so "directly involving moral principles," that it is the right and duty of ministers, in their public prayers and preaching, on suitable occasions, to manifest their desire for the success of our government in its present struggle against armed insurrection; that it is none the less so, although many good men in the South are, for the time, so blinded that they "verily think they ought" to sustain this insurrection, and even imagine they are thus "doing God service;" that the war ought to be prosecuted from Christian principle and feeling, if at all; and that the effect of such elements in the contest, must be, not to aggravate, but to mitigate its violence and obstinacy; not to increase, but to lessen the obstacles to an honourable peace.

We had just written the foregoing, when the Thanksgiving sermon of Dr. Boardman reached us. It is quite up to the level of any of those already noticed, in its high-toned loyalty, its intelligent and conservative Christian patriotism, and the power with which it inculcates timely and momentous truths.

It says some things which we do not remember to have seen so well said elsewhere. *Inter alia;* "that several millions of people should conspire to overthrow a government like this, was a phenomenon as much without historical precedent, as it was without justice or decency. The country and the world could not but stand amazed at the revolting spectacle. But bad as the case is, it might have been worse. It is clearly an instance of virulent *moral insanity*, spreading itself like an epidemic over a vast region of territory. Having acquired such a momentum, it is nearly as great a marvel that it should stop where it did, as that it should have broken out at all."

After an eloquent refutation of the pretext of some British journalists, that we are "fighting for an idea," a mere abstraction, which it is wicked to go to war about—a pretext too shallow to be respectable, if not to be honest—followed by an invidious recital of some other irreparable evils consequent on national disintegration, he gives as the climax, "that it would entail perpetual war upon our posterity. For what power short of Omnipotence could prevent this, with two rival confederacies inflamed with hereditary animosities, having an imaginary line of several hundred miles in length as a coterminous boundary . . . . .? It is this consideration which, beyond any other, reconciles many of the wisest and best of our countrymen to the war. Appalling as it is, they are convinced that it is the only alternative to something far worse—a long succession of fierce and bloody wars among those who are to come after us. They feel, as patriots and as Christians, that it would be a crime of the deepest dye to transmit such a legacy to posterity; and sooner than consent to it, they will make any sacrifices, submit to any hardships, and face any dangers."

Thus we see that in the judgment of our most judicious and conservative ministers, this conflict so directly involves moral principles, that the pulpit is bound to make itself felt against a rebellion, which, if successful, promises to inaugurate endless war and carnage.

The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton; Collected, Arranged, and Abridged, for the use of Colleges and Private Students. By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College, Cambridge. Lever & Francis. 1861.

The metaphysical works of Hamilton, as they have been given to the public, along with their immense ability and learning, have presented very serious drawbacks to the student.

They have been published in three ponderous volumes—the Notes and supplementary dissertations in his edition of Reid; the articles first published in the *Edinburgh Review*, and afterwards collected into the volume of "Discussions on Literature and Philosophy;" and the "Lectures on Metaphysics"—to say nothing of his equally huge volume on Logic. While to procure all these volumes is a heavy, and, to most persons interested in such studies, an impossible expense, the metaphysics of the author are so presented in fragmentary passages—now in this volume, now in that—and so intermingled and overlaid with quotations and references to authors, which only reveal the author's prodigious learning by impeding the progress of the young student, that his philosophical teachings must have remained a *terra incognita* to great numbers, without some such process of sifting, condensation, and collation, as Professor Bowen has performed in the present volume. Here, in half the space, and at half the price, of either of these three formidable volumes which we have mentioned, we have the substance of his philosophy, in his own words, and in a connected form. Professor Bowen has taken the "Lectures on Metaphysics" as his general basis. From these he has omitted useless repetitions, redundancies, and displays of erudition, while he has incorporated, in Hamilton's own words, such passages from his other works as would serve to supplement them, and give as complete a view of his opinions on each subject, as is of moment to any but those who make philosophical study a profession or a specialty. The importance of this work for the mass of students will be best appreciated by those who have done most in the study of this wonderful author. As a text-book for Colleges, to be used in the class-room, this volume, however, has serious defects, analogous to those of the original "Lectures." 1. The subjects are treated in great disproportion. We do not finish Sense-Perception till we reach page 395, in a volume of 563 pages. Comparatively little is said of Constructive Imagination, the Discursive Faculties generally, and of various metaphysical questions which ought not to be ignored in a liberal education. 2. Hamilton's style is too formidable for juvenile beginners in philosophy, unless they have an efficient preliminary drill in some elementary philosophical course, or are under a teacher of unusual skill and power. The average of college students, who do not make philosophy their specialty, will be liable to be discouraged and repelled. But for the private use of students of philosophy, we think the volume an important addition to their resources for successful study.

Introduction to the Pentateuch: an Inquiry, critical and doctrinal, into the genuineness, authority, and design of the Mosaic writings. By the Rev. Donald Macdonald, M. A., author of "Creation and the Fall." 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. 480 and 484.

These valuable and interesting volumes deserve a more extended and careful notice than we are able at present to bestow upon them. As the title correctly indicates, the discussion embraces all the more important questions connected with the Pentateuch. Beginning with an analysis of each of the books of Moses, the writer proceeds to an examination of their literary unity, their antiquity, authorship, and credibility. While himself a staunch defender of sound views, he exhibits a familiarity with the history of the controversy which has been waged in relation to these subjects, presenting with clearness the different phases which it has assumed, and ably disposing in succession of the whole variety of conflicting opinions which the modern race of unbelievers, whether critics, naturalists, historians, or philosophers, have suggested or maintained regarding them. He then passes to an extended investigation of the contents of the Mosaic writings, with the view of exhibiting their nature, and the ends to be answered by them, as a part of divine revelation. He here unfolds and defends from aspersion and misrepresentations, the exhibition therein made of the character of God, the condition and prospects of man, the plan of redemption, and the promised Redeemer; and finally, dwells upon the work of the Pentateuch in the training of Israel, and the preparation for the New Testament. While we have observed some peculiarities of opinion on individual points, to which we are not prepared to subscribe, we have no hesitation in commending this work, which is written from a thoroughly evangelical point of view, as the ablest and most satisfactory treatise upon the Pentateuch which has hitherto proceeded from the pen of any writer in our language.

Alice Rosedale, or the Power of a consistent Christian Life. By Mrs. Caroline L. Blake. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. No. 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 186.

Johnny Wright. The Boy who Tried to do Right. By the author of Little Bob True, &c. Presbyterian Board. Pp. 300.

Madeleine, or the Lost Bracelet. By the author of Little Flora, &c. Presbyterian Board. Pp. 100.

Emma Allen, or the Lord's Prayer in Daily Life. By A. R. B. Presbyterian Board. Pp. 162.

Walking with God, or Practical Christian Life. By James B. Rankin. Presbyterian Board. Pp. 252.

Mary Reed. By the author of George Miller and his Mother. Presbyterian Board. Pp. 324.

Meditations and Hymns. By X. Protestant Episcopal Book Society, Philadelphia, 1224 Chestnut Street. Pp. 184.

Kitty King. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. Pp. 80.

A Wonderful Deliverance; or, The Passover Explained. American Tract Society. Pp. 20.

Historical Tales for Young Protestants. American Tract Society. Pp. 223.

The Engine and its Motto. American Tract Society.

The Hebrew Captive. American Tract Society.

Life in Ceylon. American Tract Society.

Grandfather's Birth-Day. American Tract Society. Pp. 32.

The Promised One, as Revealed in the Old Testament. American Tract Society. Pp. 63.

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