THE

BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

PRINCETON REVIEW.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

OCTOBER, 1861.

PHILADELPHIA:
PUBLISHED BY
PETER WALKER, 821 CHESTNUT STREET.
AND SOLD BY
CROSBY, NICHOLS & CO., BOSTON; R. CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK;
WILLIAM S. & ALFRED MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA;
JOHN D. THORPE, CINCINNATI, OHIO;
AND TRÜBNER & CO. LONDON.

CONTENTS OF No. IV.

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VOL. XXXIII.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XXXIII.

No. I.

No. II.

No. III.

No. IV.

THE

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OCTOBER, 1861.

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ART. I.—*Rational Psychology; or, The Subjective Idea and Objective Law of All Intelligence.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. A New and Revised Edition. New York: Ivison, Phinney & Co. 1861.

WE avail ourselves of the appearance of a new edition of this work, to give it an examination correspondent to its own extraordinary claims, and the laudations of its admirers.

The author informs us that in this edition "some modifications have been made of particular parts, but not in the general method. This had been too comprehensively thought out to admit of any change." He also informs us that "It is given in this revised form from the conviction that its use is still needed to the same ends, and especially as a text or reference book in the higher philosophical instruction of our colleges." To the "complaint of obscurity from peculiarity of style and of terms," made against the first edition, the author replies that this "arises from the nature of the speculation, and nothing but more familiarity with this field of thinking can make any presentation by language to be perspicuous." He adds that, "To the familiar mind the work is not open to the criticism of obscurity, either from the style or the terminology." He

answers further, that "The vague reproaches in the charges of transcendentalism and German speculation need no other reply than the emphatic affirmation that whatever danger there may be in transcendentalism or Germanism, these are not to be overcome by any timid ignoring, or valorous denunciation of them. They are to be put down in no other manner than by fairly meeting, and fully refuting or correcting them in their own methods."

One might suppose, after the world has had so thorough an experience of transcendentalism or Germanism, and witnessed the natural ripening of its necessary fruits in Fitche, Schelling, and Hegel, that it might be lawful at length to apply the *label;* which label should be sufficient to characterize the same principles and method in any scheme in which they form the groundwork and substance; without the necessity of forever discussing the same principles over again, as often as they may appear anew. One might suppose this, but we will adopt no such method with the work in hand. Let us discuss its principles "in no other manner than by fairly meeting" them as though they had never been discussed or labelled before.

1. *The problem to be solved.*

"The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve," says Dr. Hickok, (p. 28,) "is this: How may the intellect know that which is out of, and at a distance from itself?"

This abstract question will be better comprehended by an example. I hold in my hand a cane. So it seems; but perhaps my senses deceive me. It may be an elephant. It may be a whale. It may be nothing. How do I know that it is really a *thing* outside of myself? If it be a thing, how do I know that it is a cane?

2. *State of the question.*

Many philosophers have held that we have no immediate consciousness of any outward thing, but only of our sensations; and surely, say they, our inward sensation is not a cane, a beam, or a horse. These must be wholly without, while consciousness reaches only to that which is within. How do we know that there is anything without? At most, say they, it is but some *representation* of the cane of which we are conscious; and how

do we know that the inward representation is like the outward object? Indeed, how can an internal sensation be *like* an outward beam or horse? A sensation has neither shape, extension, nor solidity. It cannot be *like* an outward object. How do we know that there is anything outward?

Berkeley concludes that we have no faculties that can give us certain knowledge of any outward thing; and that, so far as our knowledge is concerned, there is no world, save in our own ideas.

For the same reason Hume concludes that we cannot know the existence of mind. We are conscious only of fleeting thought; it is a gratuitous assumption to conclude that there is anything beyond. We cannot know that we have souls.

Here come the Matter-of-Fact men, the so-called Empirics. We do perceive outward things directly, say they. They come within our direct consciousness. We know them by experience.

O yes, say the Transcendentalists; all that is very well while we admit your assumption of an experience. But how do you know that such experience is possible? It assumes a direct knowledge, in consciousness, of things without. But such direct knowledge in consciousness reason sees to be impossible.

The Common-Sense philosophers come in here; and adduce, not the individual consciousness of one man, but the necessary and inevitable convictions of consciousness which all men have in common. These, they say, must be true, or the mental constitution of man is a lie, and neither truth nor knowledge is possible to him.

Dr. Hickok admits this common and inevitable conviction of consciousness in all mankind. He says, "It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive immediately the external objects themselves. Every man is convinced that it is the outer object, and not some representative of it, which he perceives. The knowledge that the object is out of myself, and other than myself, and thus a reality, and not subjective merely, is the testimony of common sense everywhere. All minds, that of philosophers as well as of common people, are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object." P. 42.

But is this necessary and universal testimony of consciousness in all men true? No: but utterly false, in the estimation of Dr. Hickok. He adds immediately, (p. 42,) "When the unexamined convictions of consciousness, as direct for the immediate perception of an outer world, are brought to the test of philosophical investigation—the demonstration comes out full, sound, and clear, that all such immediate knowledge is impossible. The very sensation through which the knowledge is given is wholly mental." "All that can be directly known is, that the mind has such sensations"—"but the reason attains the irrefragable conclusion that the sensation only, and not the object as external, can be immediately in the consciousness. A demonstration of reason thus concludes directly against the testimony of universal consciousness. And now where are we as intelligent beings? Consciousness contradicts reason; the reason belies consciousness"—"they openly and flatly contradict each other." "The nature of man as intelligent, stands out a self-contradiction." "All ground for knowledge in any way is self-annihilated. The truth of our intellectual nature is itself falsehood, and there remains nothing other than to doubt universally."

Such is the problem. Such are the difficulties in the way of its solution. Shall we, with the Common-Sense philosophers, hold to consciousness against all possible demonstrations of reason? Or, shall we, with Berkeley and Hume, hold to reason, and conclude against all consciousness and all common sense? We seem to be in a sad dilemma; if we hold our reason, we lose our common sense; if we hold our common sense, we lose our reason. Under any of the common methods of philosophy, Dr. Hickok regards the dispute between reason and consciousness as a "drawn battle," whose only result can be "nothing other than to doubt universally." The Critical Philosophy of Kant, which was designed to relieve this difficulty, Dr. Hickok regards as commencing "in a specious delusion," ending "in a stupendous dream," and as "consummated in Hegelianism," *i. e.* in completed Pantheism. What hope remains to save the thinking world from Pantheism or utter skepticism? Nothing; no system conceivable save that which Dr. Hickok brings us in Rational Psychology. But

3. *What is Rational Psychology? And how does it propose to solve the problem?*

Rational Psychology utterly refuses to begin with considering the facts of mind, and to learn from these how the mind operates, and what, and how, it knows. No; no science is possible in any such method. On all such methods, "The nature of man as intelligent, stands out as a self-contradiction," and "the truth of our intellectual nature is itself a falsehood." The Rational Psychology therefore begins by questioning all experience, all consciousness, and even calls into question the "full, sound, clear demonstrations" of reason herself. We know not yet that sense, or reason, or experience is possible. Beginning here, the Pure Reason, even before she knows the possibility of her own existence, beholds "An *Eternal Principle*," (p. 73,) as if before all worlds or minds were made. "The principle must be an ultimate truth, which in the insight of the reason is given as having in itself *necessity* and *universality*, and which consequently *is conditioned by no power, but must condition all power.* It is thus no *fact*, or thing *made*, but an *eternal* truth which in the reason *determines how things must be made.*" P. 71.

The reason, therefore, seeing, prior to all experience, how minds *must* be constituted, and how they *must* have knowledge of outward things, if ever they have such knowledge;—and seeing this by a "Principle" which God did not establish, neither can he evade or alter it; seeing it is "eternal," "necessary," "unmade"—and "consequently is not conditioned by power, but must condition all power;" and so must condition even the power of God;—the reason seeing this principle by her own insight, determines "THE SUBJECTIVE IDEA OF ALL INTELLIGENCE." If God makes an intelligent being he must make it after this plan. No other can be made. If God can deviate from this subjective idea in making intelligent beings, then, by the fundamental condition of the Rational Psychology, all Rational Psychology is impossible; for that eternal, necessary, and unmade principle, which conditions all power, need not be followed after all; and the Psychology may be wholly at fault.

Having determined *à priori* how minds *must* be constituted,

and how they *must* have intelligence; and that so certainly that God himself cannot make them otherwise; and having attained the necessary "subjective idea of all intelligence"—that it must subsist in the functions of sense, understanding, and reason; each of which functions *must* follow the plan of the Subjective Idea, or else be no intelligence at all;—having determined all this with absolute certainty, it might seem that a Rational Psychology is completed. No; it is but half done. We must now find, empirically, minds actually existing and working after the manner of this subjective idea. It should seem, then, this part of the work would be somewhat troublesome, since we must find what is sought in the use of that same consciousness whose inevitable witness in all men reason has demonstrated to be utter falsehood. No matter; minds must be empirically found so constituted, and so operating, in order to furnish the objective law of intelligence. The correspondence between the idea and the law gives science. We thus have a Rational Psychology; or the Subjective Idea and the Objective Law of All Intelligence.

All this must be done ere we can know that such a faculty as the reason exists, or is possible. Reason must first find sense and understanding, and establish their idea and law; then reason must find herself, by establishing her own idea and law. Until she has done this, we know not that there are any facts, or world, or understanding, or science, or reason, or anything. All must stand in abeyance until the reason is found and verified. If this search after the reason fails, then all has failed, and we know not anything. Such is the Rational Psychology. Such is the method by which she proposes to solve the problem.

4. *But here we too are authorized to assume an* à priori *position, and to inquire whether Dr. Hickok is Dr. Hickok, and his book a book.*

We may not trust our senses that a cane is a cane. But here comes a man with a book,——we beg pardon; if our senses cannot truly inform us of the cane, how can they truly inform us of a man and a book? By the very conditions of the Rational Psychology, we are not yet allowed to say, it

is a man. Here comes a *phenomenon*, with a phenomenal book. We beg pardon again;—the Rational Psychology demands proof that a phenomenon is a phenomenon, and not a hallucination, or modification of our own minds. But let us grant the phenomenon. Here comes a phenomenon with a phenomenal book, offering to prove, by a system of Rational Psychology, that a cane is a cane. The phenomenon, indeed, appears to our senses as Dr. Hickok; so does a cane appear a cane. But Dr. Hickok himself assures us, (if indeed the phenomenon be he,) that it is "mere dogmatism"—"to plant ourselves upon an assumption that a clear experience in consciousness is valid for itself, and is never to be questioned." Be it so; we will not dogmatize; we will be philosophical. Our consciousness may be utterly mistaken. We will not make the assumption which the phenomenal Dr. Hickok forbids. We find it quite as difficult to cognize a man and a book as to cognize a cane. We know not yet that an experience of either is possible. It may not be Dr. Hickok. It may not be even a phenomenon; for Dr. Hickok finds it necessary to give an Ontological Demonstration of the valid existence of the phenomenal. But we have granted the phenomenon; we may not grant any more. So far as we are able to determine at present, the phenomenon may not be Dr. Hickok. For aught that sense or consciousness can tell us, he may be a steamboat, the book an earthquake, and the argument a volcano. He may be Nichts, the German nothing. If it be Dr. Hickok, he requires us to receive him on the testimony of consciousness; while, if the inevitable witness of the consciousness of all mankind be not utter falsehood, the Rational Psychology is wholly unnecessary and without foundation. We cannot rationally believe it to be Dr. Hickok; he would not so belie his own philosophy. Reason and consciousness are doubly in contradiction here. What it is that seems to come to us with a seeming book and a seeming argument, we are, as yet, unable to determine. It ought to be anything else rather than Dr. Hickok. But whatever it be, we call upon it to stop. We shall make no dogmatical assumptions. Stop, Dr. Hickok; or stop, steamboat; or stop, Nichts. Prove to us that you are Dr. Hickok. Prove that you are even a phenomenon. If

we assume the validity of our consciousness in this matter, we must renounce your philosophy. If we receive your philosophy, we must renounce you. If we do really cognize you directly in consciousness, your book is false. If we do not, then we know not that it is a book. In either case, there is no earthly use that we can make of it; for either we cannot know that it is anything at all; or, if we can, the book is false and useless. If the phenomenon proves itself to be Dr. Hickok, then the same argument suffices to prove that a cane is a cane; and the book is quite unnecessary. Until it is proved, we are not authorized, by his own showing, to trust our senses or our consciousness so far as to regard it as anything at all; for if we may, then the philosophy is thereby proved both needless and untrue.

Here we might, in all propriety, end the matter. Dr. Hickok can, in no reason, expect us to begin with contradicting the fundamental principles of his philosophy, and with adopting practically the very assumptions of empiricism and of common sense which he condemns. Here we might end; yet let us keep on, in order to see whether, as in all other cases where truth is reached, all the lines of evidence from every quarter converge towards that one focus of truth.

5. *Is the human reason competent to give a reliable* à priori *Idea of All Intelligence?*

What is it that reason here undertakes to do? Leaving all facts and all experience behind, she undertakes to ascend to a position prior to all worlds, and to discern the limits of creative wisdom and power! God can devise no other plan or method of intelligence; he can execute no other! Human reason undertakes to give the *à priori* Idea of *All* Intelligence! She sees, by her own insight, the "eternal" and "unmade principle" which conditions the power of the Creator! The Rational Psychology professes to investigate *à priori* "the whole ground of *possibility* for bringing" a content in the sensibility "within the light of consciousness, and thereby making it to be a perceived phenomenon." Nay, the Psychology professes to have determined, "also, the possibility of all distinct qualities" that can be "matter for phenomena—given in sensation." Indeed! Was it necessary to a science of mind to

determine whether *things* can exist, as well as whether God can make *intelligences* that shall be able to know them? The Psychology professes, also, "to have determined the possibility of ordering sensation *in all the forms which matter for sensation may assume;*" and that "in these several *à priori* conclusions is involved the complete idea of *all* perception of phenomena in its *possibility.*"

Now this idea or plan must include all the plans, methods, and means, within the limits of Divine wisdom to devise, and of Infinite Power to execute. The Lord God must not be able to go beyond. If he can, then the "Subjective Idea of *All* Intelligence,"—and of course, a Rational Psychology—is impossible.

But so far is the human reason from being competent to give the idea of *All* Intelligence, that it is unable, even with all the aids of experience, to give the idea of any intelligence at all, in the sense here intended. It can never comprehend how the knowledge of outward things reaches the mind through any one of the few senses which the Creator has given us. All is to us inexplicable. What is true of outward objects, is true of all knowledge of things within. How we think; how we remember—no man can explain. No man could tell *à priori* that minds could be made so as to be able to remember anything. Tell us, Dr. Hickok, *how* are so many things laid up in the storehouse of memory? Tell us the *à priori* idea of constituting a mind so as to remember anything. How the knowledge of anything reaches the mind through any of our senses, no man can explain. No man could have been the counsellor of the Lord in these things, so as to have given him the *à priori* subjective idea of any intelligence. No man can explain or comprehend any act of intelligence. No man can comprehend how an actual cognition of anything is accomplished. We are lost amid the material enginery of sense; and can never tell how at last the connection is made between extended matter and unextended and immaterial mind. This has been the stumbling-block of philosophy ever since philosophy began. How, in the last analysis, it is possible for external material things, or the modifications of the material organs of sense, so to come into contact with the immaterial mind as to render the

knowledge of outward things possible, no man can tell. Is contact possible between the material and immaterial? If it is, does contact give knowledge? or, *how* does it give knowledge? No man can explain it. No man can conceive how anything can be done in the premises. Des Cartes and Malebranche thought contact impossible, and concluded, therefore, that man could have no faculty of knowing of himself, but must have knowledge by direct divine assistance. "We see all things in God," said Malebranche. "God has all their images, and being a spirit, he communicates the vision of these images to our spirits. No, said Leibnitz; it is indeed impossible that the material thing should come into contact with the immaterial. The best affection of the organ of sense, or of the brain, is still a material affection. The gulf between matter and mind is not passed. Sense, therefore, and outward objects, are not the causes of the mental affection or of the knowledge. But God has ordained a *pre-established harmony*, by which, when the body is affected, the mind is moved with corresponding affections; and, *vice versa*, the body with the mind. No, say others; the theory of those is better who, seeing the impracticability of any contact between mind and matter, supposed a *Plastic Medium*, not wholly mind, not wholly matter; but having the properties of each so that both may meet there in common." Others suppose that, as the outward object cannot travel through the organs of sense to meet the mind, the mind goes out to meet the object; but how it meets, and how it knows, even on these conditions, the theory cannot tell. Others suppose, not contact, but *influence*. But what *flows in*, or what that influence is, or how accomplished, or how it causes knowledge, the advocates of the theory are unable to explain. The sum of the whole is, that all is inexplicable. No man can give an *Idea* of any Intelligence at all.

Now, if Dr. Hickok could have reasoned out, *à priori*, the whole apparatus of our five senses, he could not even then have given us the idea of any intelligence. But our few senses may give us knowledge only of a few of the properties of material objects. An oyster may know external objects by properties which none of our senses enable us to discover. It is vain for

Dr. Hickok to tell us that "there must be a content in the sensory;" that is involved in the question of knowledge by means of sense. It is no explanation, nor advance of our knowledge at all. *What* content must be in the sensory? How shall knowledge reach the mind through *any* content in the sensory? The Rational Psychology, by omitting these inquiries, has not even comprehended what an Idea of Intelligence must be. It has not reached even the surface of true science touching the matter in question.

But now, instead of an oyster, or a man, take Voltaire's Micromegas from the Dog-star, with his thousand senses; or the inhabitant of Saturn with his seventy-two senses; each sense making its possessor cognizant of external things by means of properties and sensations to us unknown and inconceivable. *What* is the content in the sensory from each of these? *How* is the sensation accomplished? *How* does the sensation reach the mind? Unless Dr. Hickok can tell us all this; and tell us, also, whether more senses and properties are possible, and what, and how many, are possible, he is entirely incompetent to give the Subjective Idea of *all* Intelligence. A Psychology professing to do this, must necessarily be irrational.

6. *Instead of giving the Idea of all Intelligence, the Rational Psychology gives an Idea on which all Intelligence is impossible.*

Dr. Hickok declares it to be the full, sound, clear demonstration of reason, that all immediate knowledge in consciousness, of external things, is impossible. He maintains that consciousness in sense can never tell us "whence the sensation comes, nor reach its causality, nor attain an outer world." How then does our knowledge of an outer world come? The sum of Dr. Hickok's doctrine of perception is this: sensation is wholly mental, and gives no intimation of anything without. The understanding, of itself, never reaches to anything without. But a sensation being given, which has neither shape, colour, or anything resembling any material property,—the understanding, thereupon, takes this dumb, shapeless sensation, and forms an image of its outward cause. Then the understanding forms two judgments: first, that there is something without; secondly, that the image accurately resembles that outward

thing. Has the understanding ever known anything without? Never. The mind has no faculty for knowing anything without, save by the images which the understanding draws. Mental affections have no resemblance to outward things; the understanding has neither seen the outward thing, nor any resemblance of it, save in the image which she herself has drawn. How does the understanding know that her image is *like* the outward thing? It is plainly impossible to form a judgment of resemblance, unless one first knows the things between which resemblance holds. But this, the Psychology affirms, the understanding cannot know; she knows no outward thing, save through the images which are not given in sense, but which she herself has drawn. *It is, therefore, upon the system of the Rational Psychology, plainly impossible to know an outward object unless we know it before we know it.* But this is absurd and self-contradictory. The theory comes to a demonstrated absurdity. Instead of giving the Subjective Idea of All Intelligence, Dr. Hickok gives an Idea on which all knowledge is impossible.

7. *Whether the reason knows, as it is made to affirm, that all knowledge of outward things, as witnessed by the sense in consciousness, is impossible?*

The Psychology speaks of reason's "demonstration" as "full, sound, and clear," that all such direct knowledge of outward things is impossible. But the demonstration of the transcendental reason has no steps, no argument, no process. It is not a discursive faculty. What it sees, it sees by direct and immediate insight, or not at all. We need not therefore be troubled by the word "demonstration;" nor are we to look for reason's reasoning to find its full, clear, and sound demonstration. The alleged demonstration we shall find to be simply its dogma, which is certainly "full" enough; whether it be certainly sound and clear, we now call into question.

As reason cannot, in the last analysis of sense, explain the supposed contact between matter and mind, nor comprehend how such contact is possible; nor how, if it were possible, such contact should give knowledge;—as it is wholly unable to comprehend the manner or idea of any intelligence, but is wholly lost in trying to explain a sensation, as it is endeavouring to

explain the knowledge of an outward or distant object, it manifestly knows nothing on the subject; and is utterly incompetent to deny any such immediate knowledge in consciousness. A little further light might show the reason that what the common consciousness of all affirms, is most beautifully true. Reason's demonstration, therefore, is simply its dogma. It demonstrably knows nothing of that whereof it is made to affirm; and on the basis of that ignorant affirmation builds the supposed necessity for this system of Psychology. The certain testimony of the common consciousness is therefore wholly unimpaired, and the transcendental reason is convicted of rashness, presumption, ignorance, and utter error. Its denial is not Rational.

8. *The Idea of the Reason.*

In the view of the Rational Psychology, we know not yet that we have any faculty of reason, nor whether such a faculty is possible. We have not as yet an Idea of what it is, or what it must be. Not knowing that we have any reason, we must now set reason to form an Idea of what reason must be, and then to find itself as actually existing.

It will not do to learn by experience, and by observation of facts, what reason man has, and what it actually does. We know not yet that there are any facts, or that we have any power to observe them.

And now, by what process does the Rational Psychology propose to find such a faculty as the reason? We must first find the *à priori* Idea of the reason. We must seek a process and faculty of comprehending universal nature. This comprehension must include the question, How nature must begin, and how it must end? But this can be found only by first finding the Absolute as a compass for comprehending universal nature. Before we can find the reason, we must find the Absolute as an *à priori* position for the reason.* Our first work,

* See p. 40. "The whole problem of the reason, therefore, is seen to be in the determination of the Absolute. Nature can be comprehended by the reason in no other possible manner than as comprehended in the being of such an absolute; and the determination of this is the determination of an operation of comprehension. In the pure ideal of the absolute, we are to find our *à priori* position for overlooking nature, and thereby determining how its

then, is to find the Absolute. We must then, in order to comprehend nature in its beginning, be able to tell how God creates matter; by what eternal and unmade principles matter so created must grow into worlds; that man may be created, and what sort of being he will be; why and how he will sin, notwithstanding all that God may do to prevent it; then we must see *à priori* that God will become incarnate for man's redemption, and what will be the final consummation of the world. So shall we find at length what the faculty of reason must be. The faculty that shall be able to do all this, out of its own unaided resources, is the faculty of reason. The faculty that cannot do all this is no faculty of reason at all. Such is the reason in Idea.

But even so we have found the reason only as a "void conception." We must now find such an *actual* Absolute, who shall be found *actually* creating matter in the prescribed process, which matter shall *actually* grow into a world according to the "eternal and unmade principle" seen by the "insight" of the reason. We must find God *actually* becoming incarnate for man's redemption, and the world arriving at length to an *actual* consummation, such as appears necessary in reason's *à priori* comprehension. Having so established the "necessary process of comprehending nature by the supernatural, and so found the reason in Idea;" and having afterwards found all the actual facts in colligation by a Law in accordance with this Idea; we have at length found the faculty of reason. Our Psychology is completed. We can now solve the problem of a knowledge of outward things. Such is an outline of the process of finding the faculty of reason, as drawn out at length, and

comprehension is possible; and in this we shall have the entire function of a comprehending faculty"—"*even the faculty of the reason.*" Such will be the function of the reason "*in its Idea.*" P. 410. "So now, the mind's eye must as clearly apprehend the *supernatural spirit* in order to any demonstration, how alone universal nature can be comprehended in an author as its beginning, and a finisher as its consummating. In this only can we possess the compass for comprehending how nature, and nature's one time and space can begin and end. In this necessary process of comprehending nature by the supernatural, we shall attain the true function of the reason in its Idea. We must afterwards find actual facts in colligation by a Law, which is the exact correlative of this Idea, and in this we shall have a completed science of Rational Psychology." P. 396.

elaborated in the Rational Psychology. Let us follow the process.

9. "*The attainment of the Absolute as an* à priori *position for the reason.*"

Such is the caption of the section, p. 397. How shall we come to the proper conception of the Godhead? How shall we attain the knowledge of his existence? Dr. Hickok shows us, (p. 390,) that it is vain to begin the process in "subjective thought;" or to attempt "to reach the supernatural by beginning in *objective nature.*" P. 391. "The search for the supernatural" he affirms to be "just as endless and empty when we attempt the attainment through the indications of *adaptedness to ends.*" P. 393. "In an assumed *Theology*, we may flee from absurdities up the stream of adapting *causes;*" "the Canaan of the supernatural cannot be so entered." P. 395. It is only "when the reason as function is set to work in the light, and under the direction of *its own insight*, no antinomy arises, and the supernatural is fairly and intelligently attained." P. 395. All other methods "throw the mind on a tread-mill, which forces it to a perpetual and vain toil." P. 399.

Now, "the reason as faculty," must find the Absolute, not through "the things that are made," but by her own "insight;" and that, while it is altogether uncertain that such a faculty as reason either is or can be. She must first find the Absolute as an *à priori* position for finding herself. Till this is done, reason cannot be found.

And, now, farewell sense; farewell understanding; farewell worlds! None of you can help us in the transcendental flight which we are now to take on the wings of reason, to find whether reason is or can be. The time is gone by when "the invisible things of God"—"even his eternal power and Godhead"—were "clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." When we have already attained the Absolute, by comprehending the universe in him; then *afterwards* the heavens declare to us the glory of God, and his eternal power and Godhead are understood by the things that are made. But it is not in the method of Natural Theology, by beginning with "objective nature," that the "Canaan of the supernatural can

be entered." "We are thus forced, in this part of our work, to dispense with all use of the understanding, and can see that *if the supernatural may in any manner be attained, it must be in the use of the reason only.*" P. 400.

"We make abstraction then utterly of all that is phenomenal, and therefore dispense with all the functions of sense." "The phenomenal is gone"—"we then have the notional only." "We have thus nature in its substances and causes, and reciprocal influences, as things in themselves, and as they must be determined to exist by any intelligence who should know things directly in their essence, without any organs of sensibility." "Substance in its causality is, but no adhering or cohering qualities are." Pp. 40, 401.

Substance without qualities! Matter that is not material! Known in its essence as without extension, shape, or impenetrability! Why, what can it be, save the "Nothing," of which President Edwards in his youth said, "The sleeping rocks do dream of?" But, matter or no matter, this is the substance on which we are now to ascend to the supernatural and the Absolute.

10. *The process of ascending to the Absolute by the force which is most simple and primary, viz. "by the force of gravity."*

"We are not here concerned with the tracing of nature in its substance downward, as it must develope itself in an experience in the sense; and are only concerned in retracing its conception *upward* to a supernatural author." "We will then retain only the most simple, and that which is primary and present in all, viz. *the force of gravity.*" "Let there be the reason-conception of an everywhere present antagonistic force; and we shall have in this substance, with its causal laws of attraction, repulsion, inertia, impenetrability, motion by impulse, etc.; and thus, as it were, the frame-work or elementary rudiments of a nature of things, without regarding whatever distinguishable forces, and thus different substances and causes may be superinduced upon this." "We have in this all that is necessary for an *à priori* representation of a universal nature of things in *itself*, and not in phenomenal appearance." P. 403.

But why not begin with a real world, with all these laws, and forces, and substances, in actual existence. How is it any easier to find God through such an imagined—or reason-conception—world? If it is impossible to find God by beginning with "*objective nature*," as real existence, how is it possible to find him through just such a world conceived or imagined? But we forget. We know not yet that a real world is, or can be. We are to find the reason; and first to find God as a means of finding the reason; and to find the reason in order to find understanding and sense; and all these in order to find that we *can* find a real world! Therefore it is that "we here make abstraction utterly" of all that is phenomenal; and search for the reason "in the use of the reason only."

"We may, then, take any point in this primary space-filling force, and if it is not a centre, it will be tending to some centre of gravity." (Who knows? It is conceived of; and supposed, as "an everywhere present force." Who knows that each point of such a force will not tend equally everywhere?) "Such ultimate point we now assume in conception."—"In the comprehension of that one central point of antagonism we comprehend the universe of nature." P. 404.

And now to "comprehend the universe of nature," it is not enough to reach Omnipotence, and suffer the work of creation to be altogether veiled from our sight and comprehension; no, we must see *how* God can create matter, and how matter so created *must* grow into worlds in all their cosmical arrangements; not only without any wisdom or will of God to cause created matter so to arrange itself, but, if possible, even against his will; since we must see it by an "eternal and unmade principle, which conditions all power."

Now listen to reason, while on her search after herself, and in order to attain the Absolute as a stepping-stone to reach her own existence, she tells *à priori* the process of creating matter and worlds.

"Conceive of two congealed pencils, such that when their points are to be pressed together, the pressure shall equally liquefy both."—"Then will the liquefaction accumulate itself about the point of contact, and, if no disturbing force intervene, the fluid will perfectly ensphere itself about that point"—

"enlarging as the pressure continues and the liquefaction accumulates."—"In our supposition, for illustration, we have assumed pencils as sense-phenomena, but that purpose being answered, we would now retain the pencil points only in the mind's eye, as two pure activities in counteraction, and themselves doing what by the liquid pencils was indicated that the pressure was doing with the fluid; viz., ensphering itself about the point of counteragency. We would now make the mind's eye follow the force, and not now use the bodily eye." P. 405.

"An infinite agency at the centre can augment the sphere indefinitely at pleasure. So a primal space-filling force as a veritable substance may be."—"With a clear conception of such force, we can readily determine many things."—"The material universe must be spherical; must have its peripheral limit; must have its poles in the line of the antagonism working at the centre; must have repulsion from the centre as the cube of the radius of the sphere, and must have reaction towards the centre in each radius, and which will be attraction at the centre as the square of the radius"—"with many other cosmical principles, that in the Rational Cosmology has already been determined and correctly stated." P. 407.

And now we have the whole science of world-making,—all save the origination of the force at the centre. How to find that?

"With our clear conception of forces as substantial and dynamical, nature has already in her intrinsic being the lines that lead downward in cosmical beauty and order not only, but also lines which lead upward to a wholly supernatural Creator and Governor. The tracing of such lines upward may be as reverent as the tracing of them downward may be patient and careful, and the results may be as sure for the supernatural as for the natural." P. 409.

"*Who originates and perpetuates this central working*"—"the grand central counteragency" on which nature "reposes?" P. 410.

That is the question; find the author of this force, and find him personal, and we find the Absolute, through whom, as an *à priori* position, we are to find the reason; through which we

are to verify the sense and the understanding, and so complete a Rational Psychology.

Did our limits permit it, we should like here to follow Dr. Hickok through fifty pages, save one, (pp. 411 to 460,) in which he determines the Idea of Personality, and shows it to consist in "a pure *Spontaneity*, *Autonomy*, and *Liberty*," P. 60. It is not sufficient to determine the author of the force at the centre: we must also determine his character, and why he comes to put his simple acts in that counteraction, which makes a world. But how all this is to be determined from the simple acts in counteraction, or how a world actually made by such a process determines by the process alone the character and end of the author of the force, does not appear. Nor is it made to appear from anything save the *à priori* insight of that reason, which "makes an abstraction utterly" of all worlds, and all sense, and goes out into a vacant eternity in search after herself. Dr. Hickok has simply put himself under the necessity not only of telling how to create matter, but of telling *à priori* the necessary character and motive of the creator, and how to determine his personality, without the aid of facts or worlds, before he can find such a faculty as the reason; and the reason must be found before he can know that either facts or worlds have any existence. But waving all this, let us suppose such a Personal Absolute, and follow Dr. Hickok while he points out the method of creating matter, which, following its own "eternal and unmade principle," necessarily grows into a world.

"He may originate simple acts which, in their own simplicity, have no counteragency, and can therefore never be brought under any of the conditions of nature."

And now mark how the Absolute creates.

"From his own inner capacity of self-determination, he may designedly put simple acts in counteraction."—*He designedly puts simple acts in counteraction;* that is the process. "And at their point of counteragency a force begins."—"The perpetuated energizing in a counteraction is *creation in progress*" —"and *an impenetrable substance is made.*" P. 450. "The energizing of the absolute will" may continue the counteraction

till the impenetrable substance becomes as large as he wants it.* But doing this, whatever other forces he may add to modify the creation, each force by its own necessary law,—he cannot prevent the world from growing according to its own pre-determined and necessary cosmical principles. These "condition all power." If the Absolute puts his simple acts in counteraction, a world is made, and the Absolute cannot help it, nor alter its cosmical principles. While he continues the counteraction, just such a world must continue to grow. "The conditions for ensphering worlds, for centripetal and centrifugal forces, and the ratios of their action, both as to quantity and distance from the centre; their revolutions upon their axes and their orbits about their primaries; and the relative inclination of the planes of these orbits, and of the axes of each to their equatorial diameters; and, in short, the whole formal arrangements of the universe are given in the very points where the primordial forces have their genesis; as is also the whole science of nature in its original bipolar, chemical, crystalline, and animal forces." P. 452.

It used to be thought that the astronomical arrangements of the universe manifest in a wonderful manner the wisdom and knowledge of God. But Dr. Hickok has corrected this mistake; they manifest only the "unmade principle" which "conditions all power." Dr. Hickok could have told the Lord, that if he but put his acts in counteraction, just such a world would necessarily be made, and that the Lord had no room for choice or wisdom, save only on the question whether to put his act into counteraction. Very likely, also, Dr. Hickok, or

* "The energizing of the absolute will may fill so much of this whole space, and do this in so much of this one whole of time, as shall be directed by the archetypal rule of his artistic wisdom; and may give the modifications of distinguishable forces also, in accordance with such rule; and all for the end of his own spirit-worthiness." P. 450.

"Nature henceforth goes on in her development, according to the law of physical forces, and is perpetually a *natura naturans;* but at the central point of all counter-working, and in all the points of a superposition of distinguishable forces, a conditioning of nature is determined by the Absolute in his own liberty." He has no liberty to prevent the creation of "Impenetrable substance," or the growth of precisely such a cosmical world, if he once puts his acts in counteraction, and so continues them for a while. If he had such liberty, a Rational Psychology or Cosmology would be impossible.

some other man, may yet be able to tell what certain "other forces" being "superimposed," shall necessitate all the "animal forces," and all other superimposed forces that make up the present world and all its inhabitants; indeed, "the whole science of nature." Indeed, Dr. Hickok immediately continues: "An *à priori* philosophy *may long be detained* in this broad field, before it shall be competent to detect *all* these forces in their distinguishable rudiments; but their laws, and thus all their possible conditioned changes, have already been settled in their creation, and may be determined."

But it is time to inquire,

11. *What it is for a spirit to put his pure activities into counteraction; and how it is known that so they generate an impenetrable substance?*

What are these "pure acts" of a pure spirit? Do they tend, as in motion, from point to point within the extended being of a pure spirit? Are they anything different from the spirit itself in action? Do they bear any analogy to the activity of physical things? Is the activity like a physical activity? What is it to put them into counteraction? Is their counteraction a physical and forceful *impingement* or *pressure*, of one against the other? Does one part of the spirit physically *impinge* against another part? Or is the activity of the spirit an *entity* different from the spirit itself, which physically impinges against another activity? Or is it simply *thought* impinging forcefully against thought? and if so, is it a physical or a spiritual impingement? And can the latter produce a physical force? Can any one conceive of such a forceful counteragency without conceiving of a spirit with physical properties? Or let the counteragency be what it may, who knows that such spiritual counteragency will necessarily produce an "impenetrable substance?" Or if the reason sees that the pure activity of a spirit, meeting another pure activity of the same spirit, necessarily generates an impenetrable substance, which necessarily grows into a world, then why may not angels, or the disembodied spirits of men, also create matter and form worlds?*

* Dr. Hickok has considered this question, (p. 99,) of his Rational Cosmology. Man cannot "create matter," because he is himself incarnate, and

But now can Dr. Hickok, or any other man, tell, or conceive, what it is to make a spiritual act meet another spiritual act, so that each shall "hold the other in position?" Is it not obvious that whoever talks of such things, must use words without any meaning conceivable even to himself?*

12. *This system of Rational Psychology, necessarily, either deifies the human reason or else undeifies God.*

The reason is made to determine *à priori* how God *must*

can thus put forth no act that shall immediately meet another "act in counteraction, but his every act of energizing must first encounter forces in which he is incorporated. His activity meets forces and moves matter already created, but his activity cannot, *with nothing between*, meet *itself* in counteraction, and thus begin a new space counteraction."

It is here assumed that man can create matter well enough, if ever placed beyond the limits of a creation other than himself. *He* has power enough, but the circumstances hinder him. Very well; creation is finite; place him beyond its bounds, and the difficulty is removed. Then what shall hinder man, as a disembodied spirit, from creating a world? Dr. Hickok supposes that angels are competent, being pure spirits, "to make act meet act, and hold another act in position." "Yet their counteractivities could only be within their subjective spheres, and condition their own "conscious activities." "Thus neither man nor angel can be conceived as competent to create force that shall be objective, real, substantial, and impenetrable *to another agency*."—*Cosmology*, p. 99.

Very well. *Exceptio probat regulam;* remove men and angels beyond the limits of the present finite creation, and they shall be quite competent, according to Dr. Hickok's showing, to create worlds which shall be "real, substantial, and impenetrable" not to another agency, but *to themselves.*

* *E. g.* Had Dr. Hickok himself any comprehension of any possible meaning of such terms in the following scientific account of the process of creating matter, which he gives, p. 101 of his Rational Cosmology? "God puts his simple activity in counteragency. *He makes act meet and hold act;* and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and *holding itself in position* as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force *fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest;* and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertiæ*, or *a force actively holding itself still.*" Dr. Hickok adds to this a "Diremptive activity that works conversely to the antagonism, which"—"may for the present be apprehended as in unity, and the antagonism and diremption to be the one agency of the Absolute spirit, in one and the same limit of action: the antagonism working each way into the limit, and the diremption working each way out from the limit, and both making in their interaction *a compound material substance.*" "Any considerable extent of a space so filled, a cubic inch or a cubic mile, is a *Creation* of *matter palpable to the senses, impenetrable and substantial.*"

make worlds, if ever worlds are made. It is to determine this "By an *eternal principle.*" P. 73. "The principle must be an ultimate truth, which in the insight of the reason is given as having in itself *necessity* and universality, and which consequently is conditioned by no power, but must itself condition all power. It is thus no *fact*, or *thing made*, but an *eternal* truth which in the reason determines how things *must* be made." P. 71.

Now, there are two suppositions possible on this subject, and only two. The first is, that *God had some choice*, and exercised some *design* in forming the astronomical and cosmical arrangements of the universe. The second supposition is, that God *could not choose;* but that "eternal and unmade principle" was above him, which was "Conditioned by no power," but which "must itself condition all power."

On the former supposition, no created reason can ascend *à priori* to the necessary laws of the universe; for, by the supposition, they are neither necessary, unmade, nor eternal. They stand in no eternal necessity, but depend on the free choice, design, and wisdom of God; who may ordain and establish them as he pleases, in endless variety of choice. The reason, then, that can *à priori* discern these free thoughts and choices of Eternal Wisdom, must necessarily be Divine. It is God's Holy Spirit alone that "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of the Spirit of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." On this supposition, a Rational Psychology and a Rational Cosmology are both impossible. The conclusion is inevitable; either there is no Creator that is God, or a Rational Psychology that does not deify the human reason, is impossible.*

* "T. L.," in the *New York Times*, of June 2, 1860, has an article in which he strenuously affirms the divinity of the human reason. After arguing the point at length, and citing Scripture to sustain it, he says, "Let no outcry of Pantheism deter us from saying that man thus born of God has in him something above the natural,—the highest natural; in other words, that he has a true supernatural, a *true divine.* A false religionism might shrink from it as impiety; but why should we fear to say, that there must be in this image of God in man, and so in man himself, *the uncreated and eternal.*"

So, man as a rational being is "uncreated and eternal!" Why should he

Take now the second supposition, viz., that God is conditioned by eternal, unmade, necessary physical principles, which condition all power," and which consequently control the cosmical arrangements of his creation, if he creates; while he has neither option, power, or wisdom, other than simply to put his acts in counteraction, and take the necessary results. On this supposition, the reason that can discern *à priori* the necessary, unmade, physical principles of the universe, can indeed

not be able to see the "eternal and unmade principle," which conditions all power, and is itself conditioned by no power?" Why should not such a man be able to make Rational Psychologies and Cosmologies? For as "T. L." continues, "*He* is truly divine; he *has a supernatural being. He partakes of the immutable reason; he shares in the eternal light, he has a vision of the immortal ideas.*"

Speculations which begin with making man divine should seem to end at last in making God human. *The New Englander*, of November, 1860, has an article on the "*Divine Humanity of Christ;*" showing that God himself is human, and that Christ was human before he was incarnate,—eternally human. "There is in God something which is properly human." P. 860. "There is humanity in Deity, which is the original from which our own humanity is derived." P. 861. "The Theophanics—of God made in the Old Testament—indicate an essential humanity in the very being and nature of God." P. 862. "God appears as a man, not by the assumption of a foreign nature, but by the revelation of his own." The humanity in the person of Christ "rests upon, and supposes a prior truth, viz., the Divine Humanity as it exists in God"—"the manifestation of a hidden reality in the Divine Being, viz., the humanity of Deity." P. 863. Christ's humanity "is eternal and divine, a humanity existing from eternity," p. 874, and in this sense he "came unto his own." P. 863. "His humanity was not derived, like his body, from his human mother"—"it is from above, a *divine humanity*." P. 875. "A *divine man* has descended, and inserted himself into the race." "The eating and drinking of Jesus was not less divine than his raising Lazarus from the dead." P. 877. "God created man in his own image—kindred to God—of the *same kind* with him." "*Human reason*"—"is a ray from the Divine reason, and its light the *true light*, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." P. 858. So the *New Englander*.

Dr. Hickok, in his Cosmology, p. 41, regards "all theology" as "hopeless" by the philosophy of common sense, because "common sense is a *thing made*," and its primitive beliefs are "*things made;*" and "all *unmade principle*" is beyond her knowledge or conception. And, p. 131, "*Nature* includes the conception of an existence that has a *beginning*." "It is applicable to every *created* individual thing." And, p. 132, "That which *was not created*—has not a nature." "Of all *created* existence, we may say in general, *it is nature*." "Rational being"—"is thoroughly supernatural." P. 81. "Reason is not a *fact*, a something that has *been made*." What conclusion can be drawn from this, save that Dr. Hickok holds human reason to be "*unmade*," *uncreated*, and *without "beginning?*"

make a Rational Cosmology. It can tell *how* to create, and what creation *must be*, and so have whatever "position" this affords for making a Rational Psychology. If it can then see *à priori*, as well, the "necessary, eternal, and unmade principle" which must condition the Creator in making intelligent beings, then it can indeed make a Rational Psychology. The Creator has no choice, and can exercise no wisdom, save only whether, and how long, to put his acts in counteraction, and to supply forces. Unmade principles "condition all power," and determine the rest, whether God will or not. On this latter supposition the Creator is not God; nor could it with any propriety be said, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in *wisdom* hast thou made them all." Their designs, adaptations, forms, organizations, were not from him, nor was there any wisdom in the case; nor had the Creator any power to exercise wisdom in what has hitherto seemed to be the result of design, wisdom, knowledge, and skill. He had but one option—whether to put his acts in counteraction. Eternal laws which were above him determined all the rest. Were it not so, then a Rational Cosmology and a Rational Psychology must both be impossible; that is, the Rational Psychology necessarily either deifies the human reason or undeifies God.

13. *On the system of world-making on which the Rational Psychology attains the Absolute, there is no need of God, nor any room for him in the universe. For aught that man can see, this scheme can be fulfilled as well by chance as by design; nor is it necessary to suppose a creator who has any knowledge, or will, or who is even a spiritual existence.*

There is no room for the Only Living and True God in a universe made on this scheme. He could not exercise wisdom, taste, or goodness. Unmade principles conditioned all his power; he had only one choice and one function,—to put his acts in counteraction. Such a being is not God.

No conception of God can possibly originate in this scheme. He is unnecessary. The designs of order, harmony, adaptive intelligence, are none of his; nor do they lead to him; they lead only to the unmade, eternal, and necessary principle.

Pure acts, or *pure activity*, is supposed. But the conception

of these involves neither thought, nor knowledge, nor will,—nor anything save pure activity.

The only thing left us to account for is, how these pure acts can come into counteraction. No design or will is necessary for this. They must act somehow; they may as well come into counteraction as to act in any other way. Or, being constantly and necessarily active, these acts may *chance* to come in counteraction; and then a world is made quite as surely and as well, as though the counteraction were designed. If a world is not the necessary result, even upon such chance counteraction, then the "unmade principle" fails, and the Rational Psychology is, on its own showing, an impossibility.

Spirit is introduced into the scheme; but it is ascertained by none of the known properties or works of spirit. We have never known, or conceived, that it is a property of a spirit to produce an impenetrable substance by putting its own spiritual acts in counteraction. We never knew,—we cannot conceive,—that it is possible for a spirit to put its pure acts into counteraction. What is it? The *substance* of the spirit pressing against its substance with a physical forceful impingement? Impossible. Thought pressing physically against thought? Impossible! Moreover, if we suppose the pure act of a pure spirit—what is it? and what is the result, save the spirit itself in action? On this plan, the "impenetrable substance" which is made, is simply the creator impinging against himself; the pure spirit himself in action is himself the world he makes; and so we end in Pantheism. The scheme of world-making which the Psychology makes necessary to the finding of the faculty of the Absolute, and so to the finding of the faculty of reason, has no need of God, and no room for him. On that scheme the world may as well be made by chance as by design; and when made, it must, so far as reason can see by this scheme, be identical with its maker.*

* It is curious to compare Dr. Hickok's system of world-making with that of Schelling, and also with that of Coleridge. "We shall never," says Chalybaus, "succeed in contemplating nature with the eyes of Schelling, unless we first of all get rid of that usual mode of representation which perceives in all individual things but so many self-subsistent"—"substances. The interior of

But so far we have comprehended the world only in its *beginning*. "And now, that on the other side we may comprehend nature *in its consummation*, we have the same compass

things, their matter or substance as we call it, is no such substance at all, and has no such powers as are commonly imagined." "It consists intrinsically of such powers, or more correctly speaking, of such ACTIVITIES," as "*meeting each other* in the space that body occupies, *mutually support one another, enter a state of tension*, and so *produce the solid some thing, which appears to us as a body of matter.*" Here is Dr. Hickok's "pure activity in counteraction!" Schelling goes on. "Materiality is only the lowest style of the universal life of nature." Going on in a development of itself, and with "increasing energy, internal self-mobility and freedom, the matter so made by "pure activities" meeting each other, advances "under one and the same constant law, *from the most rigid existence of the stone or mineral*, up to *the play of thoughts in the human brain.*" It follows, "that in this general self-movement and activity of nature, *the law of the world, which when perceived and cognized by itself upon the highest state, is called the Reason*, will become cognizable and representable upon the lowest stages *as an unconscious and obscure instinct of nature.*" "Apart from this living impulse movement and activity, there is nothing material or real." "The very real and material itself *consists intrinsically in the play of these mutually determining activities.*"

Here with the "activities meeting each other," the same that Dr. Hickok supposes, and by which impenetrable substance is made, which grows into worlds,—out of this same counteraction of pure activities, Schelling sees not only stones, and minerals, and worlds, but thought, human brains, and reason itself. Stones, brains, thought, minerals, and reason, are all the same in essence, and all produced by the same law, when these two pure activities are put in counteraction! Why, here is the "genesis" not only of matter, but of mind! Here is the reason not only *found*, but we are told *how it is made*, while Dr. Hickok could tell only how to create matter and to make worlds!

Turn now to Coleridge on world-making, Vol. 3, p. 357, *Shedd's Ed.* "The transcendental philosopher says, Grant me nature *having two contrary forces*" —"and I will cause the world of intelligences to rise up before you "

"Now the transcendental philosophy demands first, that *two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature;* not in consequence of the accidental direction, but prior to all direction." "Secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite and indestructible." The problem then will be, "to discover the result or product of two such forces, as distinguishable from the result of those forces which are finite." "It will then remain for us to elevate the *thesis* from notional and actual, by contemplating intuitively this *one power* with its *two* inherent, indestructible, yet *counteracting forces*, and the results or generations to which *their interpenetration gives existence*, in the living principle, and in the process of self-consciousness, and at the same time will reveal to, and for, what purpose it is possible." "The *counteraction* of these two assumed forces does not depend upon their meeting from opposite directions; the power which acts in them is indestructible; it is therefore inexhaustibly rebuttant, and as *something must be the result*

of an all-embracing reason in the Absolute as Personality." P. 453. It is not enough to tell how the world must *begin;* but

14. *The reason which the Rational Psychology requires us to find, must be able to tell* à priori, *why God will create: that the world must be an Optimism; that such beings as man may be created; how sin may enter, and in spite of all that God may do to prevent it; that God will become incarnate to make a propitiation; and that the world's career will close with a universal chorus of Glory to God and the Lamb.*

The reason that cannot tell all this *à priori*, is no faculty of reason at all. Thus, pp. 453, 454, we must be able to determine what is the "grand end" for which God will create; and that "this grand end in all the works of God must be an Optimism in nature." We must see *à priori*, that "a moral world—a system of varied orders and ranks of persons in liberty," may be made, p. 457; that "somewhere the moral world will be brought in connection with the conditions of the physical world;" that "a race of beings compounded of the material, sentient, and moral, may be created, and thus that which is personal becomes incarnate, and the free is subjected to the colliding influence of the necessitated, and personal liberty is put in conflict with the conditioned force of nature." P. 458.

"Sin may enter by any prostitution of an ethical claim to a physical want, or by any assumption of the finite above its proportionate excellency, and become a soul-sin; but this must be somewhere below the Creator, and from creature-personality; inasmuch as no colliding want can reach the Absolute, and sin enter through him."—"Through any finite personality sin

of these two forces, both alike infinite, and both alike indestructible, and as rest, or neutralization cannot be the result, no other conception is possible, but that the product must be a *tertium quid*, a *finite generation*. Consequently this conception is necessary. Now this *tertium aliquid* can be no other than an interpenetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of the nature of both." P. 360. All this is in illustration of the naturalist spoken of by Des Cartes, who in imitation of Archimedes said, "Give me matter and motion, and I will construct you the universe." Coleridge, like Dr. Hickok, wants only "one power" with "*two counteracting forces*," and he can tell how to construct a universe.

may come in; and that it should come in somewhere, in any possible modification of a moral system, in its necessary subjection to a conditioned nature, may be a certainty to the omniscience of the Absolute, except in such interposition for prevention as would compromit the higher ultimate end in behalf of his own dignity." P. 458. "What he (God) may do, he will do to exclude sin; both in the use of sentient nature as a penalty, and when sin has entered, as a tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation." P. 458.

Now here the reason, in search after her own existence, has settled some of the deepest questions in Theology, which used to be thought matters for Divine Revelation alone. What sin is—"a prostitution of an ethical claim to a physical want;" what is the occasion of sin, the "subjection of the free to the colliding influence of the necessitated;" in which sin may not possibly be prevented "in any possible modification" of a "moral system in its necessary subjection to a conditioned nature." God will do what he may to prevent sin, and when it has entered, he "*will make use*" *of* "*sentient nature*" as a "*tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation.*"

Ah, then! Reason could have foretold God's mercy to sinners; and by what means he would bring them salvation! How much was Paul mistaken when he supposed it his mission to "make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God"—"the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit!" "Sentient nature—as a tabernacle for Divinity—to set forth a propitiation!" What is it that the reason here sees *à priori*, in her search after her own existence; and without seeing which she cannot comprehend universal nature, nor prove herself a faculty of reason? Why here are the great facts of Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement; all seen by the reason without the Bible, "and before man can ever know the Bible even as an existing, outward thing!" The same reason, in order to be reason, must comprehend *à priori* that the consummation of the world must be with "the full and eternal chorus"—of "Blessing, and honour, and

power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever." P. 459.

Why was Paul an apostle, "not of men, neither by man;"—Why was he not an apostle of The Reason! Why did he say of the gospel mystery, that it "is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by revelation of Jesus Christ"? Why had he not discernment to see that the deepest mysteries of revelation,—Trinity, Incarnation, Propitiation,—are all open to the *à priori* view of the transcendental reason!

For reason, in the scheme of the Rational Psychology, has no Bible for all this. She has made "abstraction utterly" of all sense; "the phenomenal is gone." Moreover, if she had a phenomenal Bible open before her, she could not yet acknowledge it as an existing *thing*, or even as a phenomenon; for the reason which is to demonstrate this is not yet found; though even while not found, she has made a "full, clear, sound demonstration" that the inevitable testimony of consciousness in all men is false. She is yet in search after herself, and if she fails to find the reason, then all other human faculties, and all their objects must remain in everlasting doubt.

Now a man who has a faculty of reason that can tell how to create matter, give the Subjective Idea of All Intelligence, explain how sin may come in by the colliding influence of the conditioned upon the free, see beforehand that the Absolute will use "sentient nature" as "a tabernacle for Divinity—to make a propitiation," and tell of the chorus at the consummation of the world:—a man who has such a faculty of reason as this,—what need has he of a Bible? Are there any deeper mysteries than these, for which Revelation should be necessary to such a man? And what a pity that a man with such a faculty of reason, should not also be endowed with lower faculties sufficient to enable him to know, even without a system of Rational Psychology, that a cane is a cane! Why cannot one endowed with such a reason, after furnishing the world with a Rational Psychology and a Rational Cosmology, furnish it also with a Rational Theology?*

* And to furnish the world with a Rational Theology is precisely what the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, of April, 1859, calls upon Dr. Hickok to do. After repre-

But let us not forget that we have not yet found the reason. We have only found that if there ever is a faculty of reason, such it must be. "We have determined the *à priori* possibility of such a comprehending operation"—"*But thus far, the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. We have not yet found such a comprehending faculty in actual being and operation.*"—"Our remaining task is that we take any facts which may present themselves in the whole field of a comprehending agency, and find whether they come at once within the actual colligation of this law of free personality." P. 462.

15. *We come, then, to the finding of an actual faculty of reason by the induction of facts.*

This is "our remaining task," "that we take any *facts* which may present themselves"—"First in the physical—system." P. 510.

Facts! In the physical system! On the system of the Rational Psychology we are not yet allowed to know that there are any facts, or any physical system. It is true, that reason has professed to verify sense and understanding, and has set forth Ontological Demonstrations of the validity of their object. But the reason itself is not yet found, and her Demonstrations go as yet for nothing. She alone as yet vouches for sense and understanding. It is therefore impossible for us, at present, to know that there are any facts, or anything physical. If reason now fails, sense fails, understanding fails, Ontological Demonstrations fail, the Rational Psychology fails, and goes, beyond redemption, to *Limbus Patrum*, or to the *Ivory Gate*, whence dreams and unrealities alone come forth to the upper world. And now, it is conceded, that reason cannot be found save by the help of *facts*. But *facts can never be found until after the finding of the reason!* If two burly men

senting his Rational Psychology and Cosmology as "the highest and most permanent type of American thinking," and predicting that, "if American philosophy is ever to have a history, the course of its stream, and the bulk of its waters, can appear in no other channel than the one which he has indicated," the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, of Andover, thus concludes: "It now remains for Dr. Hickok to give a THEOLOGY whose principles shall be as absolute as those which prevail in the works before us."

cannot help each other to raise themselves from the ground by lifting at each other's waistbands, then neither facts nor reason can ever be found! Here the *à priori* transcendental philosophy perpetrates an absolute *felo de se*. By her own admission, reason can be found only by the aid of facts, and facts can never be found without the aid of reason. One must be found first; while to find either first, the Psychology shows to be an impossibility. Reason fails; she can never be found. Sense fails; understanding fails; facts fail. Consciousness being a demonstrated falsifier, we know not anything without. By the same rule, we know not anything within. All ends in universal doubt;—we beg pardon,—it is not certain that doubt exists. All ends in simple Nihility. The German Ideal Pantheists left still an *Ego*, which they made both world and Creator; but the Rational Psychology of Dr. Hickok logically leaves not any thing. Facts, worlds, consciousness, thought, sense, understanding, reason,—it makes "an abstraction utterly" of all, leaving not a wreck behind.

Could the Psychology survive at this point, its destiny awaits it a little further on; for its "all-comprehending agency," the reason must comprehend universal nature in its "consummation;" and it must wait to prove its Idea by *facts*. Till it finds these, it cannot find the reason. But the final chorus of glory at the consummation of the world cannot be found as a fact without waiting till the period comes. The finding of the reason must therefore be adjourned till the end of the world. Sense, understanding, and physical facts must also wait. On the principles of the Rational Psychology, therefore, while the world stands it is impossible for man to know any thing.

16. *The principles of the Psychology destined it to this end from its very beginning.*

We fully admit that man is rational. He is able to discern in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and what can be yielded by no mere analysis of the object of sense. He can discern wisdom, thought, design, beneficence; and know spirit, not in its substance, nor as having properties in common with matter. In design he sees a designer—not contained in the thing designed,—a Creator "*understood*,"—not contained—yet "clearly seen" from the things that are made. We hold to

Natural Theology here, as the Bible does, though Natural Theology is so earnestly denied in the Rational Psychology, and by the transcendental philosophers. We have not space to argue these things here. Experience may show us that, so far as we can observe, two straight lines never *do* enclose a space; it is reason that tells us they never *can*. So far as we can observe in experience, nothing ever *does* begin without a cause. We see directly by reason that nothing ever *can* so begin. The child and the savage do not wait to learn by experience that the whole is ever equal to the sum of all its parts; they see intuitively by the reason that it *must* be so. It is vain to tell us that we can know nothing beyond mere *thought;* with thought we directly cognize the *thinker*. So in all language, the words *design*, *thought*, always involve a reference to the thinker and designer. There is a *direct beholding* through the proper faculty, just as there is in beholding objects of sense; an *intuition*. The same is true of our knowledge of outward things. It is immediate, direct, given in consciousness. We both *know*, or cognize; and *know that we know*, are conscious of knowing, or have knowledge in consciousness. Such direct beholding, or intuition, by the proper faculty in its normal state and action, is *knowledge*. It is primitive, simple, direct, absolute. We *know, and we know that we know.*

Now, no man can explain *how* we have knowledge through any faculty. No man can give any Subjective Idea of any Intelligence:—*i. e.* explain *how* it can be accomplished.

Nor can a direct beholding, or intuition, by any faculty *be proved;* for the simple reason that there is nothing more direct or certain by which any proof is possible. The very proof would need to be proved; and then the proof of the proof would need to be proved; and so on *ad infinitum;* and at each step by a medium of proof more direct and certain than the one which had gone before it; while nothing can be more direct or certain than the original intuition which was called into question.

Proving the intuitions of one human faculty by those of another faculty equally human, necessarily involves the same infinite series of absurdities. The faculty which proves the

other is itself in equal need of proof; and the proof stands in need of proof, and so on for ever.

Demonstration can never go beyond an intuitive truth, or direct beholding. The axiom can never be proved, nor does it stand in need of it. Demonstration consists in bringing any proposition, by a series of comparisons, each step of which is an intuition,—to rest at last on an intuitive truth. The geometrician who attempts to go beyond, launches on an ocean of doubt without a shore. So when one attempts to demonstrate the validity of the objects of our knowledge obtained in the normal use of the proper faculties, he attempts what is both absurd and impossible. Doubt here, and nothing remains but doubt for ever.

When, therefore, the Rational Psychology ventured to charge the witness of the sense in the common consciousness of all men as false; and, doubting all our faculties, undertook to give their *à priori* Idea, and to demonstrate the validity of the faculties and of their objects, it undertook what was both impossible and absurd; and what was destined to land its votary at last in universal skepticism, or in utter nihility. Dr. Hickok might have taken some other road; the end must necessarily have been the same. He has laboured with much ability, and with intense thought and industry, and has doubtless done the best which the principles and method of his Rational Psychology allow; but it has been as "Labour in the fire—for very vanity."

Art. II.—*American Nationality.*

We propose in this article to discuss the principle of American Nationality, as this has been developed from the first in conflict with State Sovereignty. Kindred subjects have never wanted attraction for thoughtful minds; and they have often been handled by our greatest statesmen; but the crisis of national history through which we are now passing, has poured upon them a new flood of light, and clothed them with an all-absorbing, even a religious interest. For these two ideas, nationality and state sovereignty, are now with arms in their hands, contending for mastery in the bosom of the American people. Having rejected all compromises, thrown away the pen, and silenced the voice of words, they have now appealed to the stern and final arbitrament of the sword.

The principle of nationality is a complex idea, which, at the outset, it is necessary to analyze.

1. Its first element is unity of race, which includes also unity of language. This might be inferred from the meaning of the word *nation*, the primary ground of which (*nascor*) is the idea of birth: and this inference would be sustained by the history of every nation of whose origin we have any account. But this unity of race and of language need not be absolute. All that is indispensable is, that there should be one predominant race, with a fulness and power of ethnic life, sufficient to absorb and assimilate the heterogeneous materials with which it may be associated. Thus it was that one Roman nation arose out of the numerous and hostile tribes of the Italian peninsula. This unity of race is what distinguishes a nation from an empire, which may embrace many nationalities under one government, as in the case of Russia, Austria, and Great Britain.

2. The second element of nationality is unity of country. This one race must inhabit one country, with its different sections bound together in mutual interdependence, by the physical conformation of the whole. This is essential to permanent national existence. Any considerable part of a nation's domain which is not in geographical union with the rest, tends

to political separation, as the American Colonies from Great Britain. And if for a time a people may be without a country, as were the Israelites in the wilderness, even in such a case it would seem that their national organization cannot be held together without the hope of some promised land. Also it enters into the idea of territorial unity that the national domain should not constitute an essential and dependent part of a larger country; otherwise it will tend to absorption in a broader nationality, as Scotland and Ireland have been absorbed by England.

3. The third element of nationality lies in the nature of the government. The individuals of this one race, inhabiting one country, must be organized under one supreme government. This may be absolute, or constitutionally limited, a government of the people, or of a few persons, or of one man; or, in fine, it may consist of all these elements mingled together; but in every case it must be one, and supreme, and it must extend to individuals or persons. It must be able to claim allegiance and support from, and to enforce obedience upon, all the individuals over whom it extends. If it be a popular government it must proceed from the people, not indirectly by delegation of any powers vested in other existing governments over them, but directly by their own action, from their common and original sovereignty. In other words, it must hold immediately from the people, not mediately from any compact of other governments which they may have previously invested with their sovereign powers.

4. The last element which it is necessary to mention here, is that of numbers and strength. This also is essential to permanent nationality. Without adequate numerical strength a people can maintain its national organization only whilst this continues to be defended, or at least tolerated by stronger nations. By this element nations are distinguished from petty states, and tribal associations.

Unity of race, of country, and of supreme government, over an adequate number of individuals or persons—these are the four principal elements which go to constitute the idea of nationality.

This idea, we now proceed to observe, it is the constant ten-

dency of civilization to realize in more and more perfect forms. Petty sovereignties and tribal associations belong to the nomad, hunter, and barbarous states of society. They are found among the Tartars of Eastern Asia, the American Indians, the South Sea Islanders, and the Negroes of Africa. Hence a declining civilization always tends to the breaking up of the nationalities into petty sovereignties, as in the Middle Ages. National organizations, on the contrary, are the fruits of civilization. They flourished among the more enlightened populations of the old world; they have grown with the growth, and strengthened with the strength of civilization in modern Europe and America. There is no lesson of history more clear and certain than that the life of civilization and the progress of humanity are inseparable from national organizations. And hence also a reviving civilization always manifests itself in a striving after national unity, in strenuous efforts to reconstruct the shattered nationality, as in Italy at the present time.

Obedient to this great law of social progress, the history of our own country exhibits a ceaseless striving, against almost insuperable difficulties, to realize in a more and more perfect form the idea of one nationality. The want of territorial unity between the American Colonies and the mother country was such as rendered it impossible that the former should be permanently held in subjection to the British crown by any political bond. Accordingly, the tendency to separation began to manifest itself at an early day in the pulsations of colonial life. This ultimately led, through what influences and events it is unnecessary to state, to the war of Independence. In entering upon this great struggle, two things lay before the Colonies, between which they were forced to choose. It was necessary for them to determine whether each should aim to achieve a separate independence, so that, if successful, there might come forth, at a birth, thirteen infant sovereignties; or whether they should all unite to constitute one great nation, which, like Pallas from the brain of Zeus, should spring into existence full grown and armed, to take her place among the mightiest powers of the world. In favour of the second alternative, there were several controlling reasons. 1. The territory of each colony was an interdependent part of a larger country, and essential to

a broader and higher geographical unity; whilst several of them, as Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Virginia, embraced within their territorial limits different sections of country which had no separate unity among themselves. 2. None of the Colonies was possessed of numerical strength to vindicate and maintain its own separate independence and nationality. 3. Both of these elements which were wanting to each, could be attained in fulness and perfection by their combining together. As one nation they would have complete geographical unity, either in possession or easily attainable, with numerical strength abundantly adequate to achieve their independence, and to maintain their common nationality. For these reasons, none of the Colonies dared to assert its own separate independence or sovereignty. It was as the United States they declared their independence, and put forth their first claim to a nationality separate from that of the mother country; nor even that as proceeding from the colonial or state governments, but through the action of a congress of delegates appointed by the people's conventions, and expressly "in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies;" that is to say, as one people and one nation.

This is a significant fact, the whole bearing of which upon the great controversy between the principle of nationality and that of state sovereignty, which followed, and which has now turned our peaceful country into two hostile camps, has not always been observed. For it has been generally conceded, injudiciously as we think, that previous to the adoption of our present Constitution, we were not properly one, but were many independent sovereignties: whereas, the truth is, that our first claim to separate nationality was an act of the united people, transcending entirely their state governments; and, consequently, the declaration of our independence must be regarded as the birth, not of many, but of one nation. Nor has our claim to nationality ever been recognized by Great Britain or other powers in any other form. No single state has ever been admitted into the family of nations.

From this it follows that the powers of sovereignty, originally reclaimed from the British crown by the united people of all the states, could not legitimately vest themselves in the sepa-

rate state governments. Without further action on the part of the people, these powers must legitimately vest in the revolutionary government, which was established under the Declaration; for that only could, as it did, represent the united people by whose authority the reclamation of sovereignty had been made. And this view is fully sustained by Mr. Madison in the express words, "The states never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty . . . . they are only political societies . . . the sovereign powers were always vested in Congress."

It is true, however, that this principle of one nationality, thus embodied in our Declaration of Independence, was not clearly and consciously before the mind of the country at the time that Declaration was made. The union which was thus constituted was generally understood to be chiefly for mutual defence, which left the question between one and many sovereignties to be finally determined by future contingencies. Neither was it plain even to the national men of that day, either how much, or what sort of union was necessary to constitute a national government. Clear and adequate conceptions of what they were dimly striving to realize could not come in a moment, could not be other than the growth of years of effort. Also the colonial, now the state governments, were first in the field, in full organization and activity, with already more than a century of growth and consolidation, and they were intensely jealous of each other.

From these causes it resulted that the state governments, seduced by the charms of separate independence and nationality, immediately *assumed* to exercise all those sovereign powers which had been reclaimed from the crown of Great Britain by an act of the people of all the states in union. And this assumption, although it was not so understood at the time, was, in its true character, a usurpation precisely analogous to that which has just been perpetrated by the politicians of the South; in which the whole procedure has been logically true to the origin and character of the idea by which it is governed. For here we see that state sovereignty on this continent had its birth in a palpable usurpation, which has never been formally sanctioned by the people of a single state, much less by the people of all the states, which would have been neces-

sary, after the Declaration, to legitimate it in any one of them.

Having in this manner possessed themselves of sovereign powers, the states proceeded, in the second year of the war, to delegate a portion of them to a confederate government, under the celebrated "Articles of Confederation," to which we must now turn our attention.

And here again we find the logic of usurpation ruling the whole procedure. For the states had no right, upon any theory of popular government, to form that confederation. Whatever sovereign powers they now possessed they claimed at least to hold from the people, whose acquiescence in what, as we have seen, was at first a usurpation, did give it an informal validity. No other claim would have been tolerated for a moment. But it is evident that no government, holding from the people, can have any right to alienate its sovereign powers in order to form another government. The powers which a government holds in trust from the people, it can have no right to resign into any other hands except those of the people themselves. The states had no more right to cede away the least of their sovereign powers, in order to form another government for the United States, than they had to abdicate the whole in favour of the British crown. The adoption of the Articles of Confederation by the states was an act of irresponsible power in the same line of procedure by which that power had been at first acquired, and of which the present usurpations in the South are the natural historical sequence.

But notwithstanding the necessity for union, and the pressure of the national principle, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, was so strong that the Articles of Confederation could not represent simply and purely the idea of state sovereignty, a very cursory examination of these Articles, in the light of contemporary discussions, reveals the fact that they recognize both of these hostile principles, mutually limiting, and, to a certain extent, neutralizing each other.

The principle of one nationality was represented by such particulars as the following. The government of the confederacy was one, extending over all the states, expressly designed to

be perpetual, and which made the citizens of each state citizens of all the states. It was empowered to coin and borrow money; to issue letters of marque and reprisal; to send and receive ambassadors; and to enter into treaties and alliances with foreign nations. It was clothed with exclusive authority to fix the standard of all weights and measures, to regulate the alloy and value of all coin, to decide all questions of prize and capture, all controversies among the states themselves, and all matters of peace and war. And these national powers were further strengthened by many express prohibitions laid upon the states. Without the consent and approbation of the Confederation, no state was allowed to maintain land or naval forces in time of peace, to engage in war unless actually invaded or imminently threatened, to commission military or naval officers, to issue letters of marque, to send or receive ambassadors, to enter into any treaty or alliance, either with foreign powers or with other states of the Confederacy; and all the states were solemnly bound to abide by its decisions, and to support its measures. In these provisions it seems impossible not to recognize a decided representation of the principle of one nationality, and by no means a feeble tentative towards the formation of a national government.

This attempt, however, was frustrated by the number and extent of the sovereign powers claimed as reserved to themselves by the states, and by them prohibited to the Confederacy; in which the principle of state sovereignty was represented as predominant. For the confederation claimed to be nothing more than a compact or league of perpetual amity between the states, each expressly assuming to be, in all respects, an independent and sovereign power. Each state maintained its own delegates in the confederate congress, and was represented in voting by a single voice; and each reserved exclusive authority over its foreign trade, to levy taxes, duties, and imposts, to claim allegiance and to enforce obedience from its own people, together with all other powers not *expressly* delegated to the Confederacy. The result of this was that the leading principle of the confederation was that of state sovereignty. The federal government was not so much a government as an agency. It was the creature and representative of the states in their cor-

porate and political character, not of the people. It had no power to raise a revenue for its own support, nor to enforce obedience to any of its measures, either upon the states or the people, nor to maintain the faith of its treaties or other national obligations, nor even of its own pecuniary credit. For all these purposes it had to rely exclusively upon the voluntary action of the state authorities, whose creature it was.

Thus it was that state usurpation sought to embody itself in a feeble substitute for a national government, and undertook to administer, upon the principle of state sovereignty, the national and common affairs of the country. The attempt demonstrated itself to be, and soon came to be universally recognized as an egregious blunder, and a disastrous failure. The history of the Confederation, during the twelve years beyond which it was not able to maintain itself, is the history of the utter prostration, throughout the whole country, of every public and private interest—of that which was, beyond all comparison, the most trying period of our national and social life.

For it was the extreme weakness of the confederate government, if such it could be called, more than anything else, which caused the war of independence to drag its slow length along through seven dreary years, and which, but for a providential concurrence of circumstances in Europe, must have prevented it from ever reaching any other than a disastrous conclusion. When, at last, peace was proclaimed, the confederate congress had dwindled down to a feeble junto of about twenty persons, which was so degraded and demoralized, that its decisions were hardly more respected than those of any voluntary and irresponsible association. The treaties which the Confederation had made with foreign powers it was forced to see violated, and treated with contempt by its own members; which brought upon it distrust from its friends, and scorn from its enemies, wherever it was known. It had no standing among the nations of the world, because it had no power to secure the faith of its national obligations. For want of a uniform system of duties and imposts, and by conflicting commercial regulations in the different states, the commerce of the whole country was prostrated, and well-nigh ruined. Private indebtedness was almost universal, and there was no business or industry to provide for

its liquidation. Bankruptcy and distress were the rule rather than the exception. The government was loaded with an enormous debt, and had no authority to provide for the payment of either principal or interest, whence its credit was paralysed. The currency of the country had hardly a nominal value. The states themselves were objects of jealous hostility to each other, especially from the claims of some of them to an almost indefinite extent of territory at the West, whilst others had no such pretensions. The mouth and lower waters of the Mississippi were controlled by Spain, who prohibited their navigation; and whilst the eastern states were urgent that her claims should be acknowledged for the sake of advantages to their commerce, the whole Western Valley, with its dependencies, was on the verge of separation from the East, in order to maintain, at all hazards, the right of way to the ocean on that father of floods. The internal peace of the country was threatened, and a civil war seemed inevitable, from the discontent of the officers of the Revolution, for whose sacrifices and necessities Congress, in open breach of the public faith, yet from sheer inability, had failed to make any compensation or provision. Nothing but the personal influence of General Washington over the officers themselves averted this calamity. In some of the states rebellion was already raising its horrid front, threatening the overthrow of all regular government, and the inauguration of universal anarchy. It is difficult for us to conceive of the panic which Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts spread throughout the country, and of the peril to which the whole fabric of society was exposed from organized bands of ten or fifteen thousand armed men, bent on cancelling, at the point of the bayonet, all public and private indebtedness, and excited to madness with the lust of plunder. Ah! what a picture of general gloom and distress, of patriot anguish and despair, is presented in the contemporary history of the confederate government! The sun of our national life and glory which, in the Declaration of Independence, had burst from the horizon in full-orbed splendour, was already obscured by the ominous clouds of state sovereignty, and seemed about to set for ever amid the nameless horrors of universal anarchy.

Such was our experience during that brief retrograde move-

ment in our civilization, which, perhaps, was the necessary result of severing our political connection with its centre and origin in the mother country, and during which the idea of state sovereignty was dominant over that of national unity. This trial of the principle of confederation was enough to satisfy the minds of Washington, Madison, Hamilton, Franklin, and of almost all the patriots and statesmen of that day, that the attempt to organize a government at all adequate to the national wants of the country, upon the principle of a compact or league between the states as sovereign, had utterly failed, and must for ever fail. A dreadful experience had now made it generally evident that in order to conserve the blessings for which the sacrifices of the war had been cheerfully borne, and even to save society from dissolution, an effort must be made to establish a government upon a different principle—a thoroughly national organization—which should be adequate to deal with the jealousies of the rival states, and with the vast interests of the western territories, to regulate upon a uniform system all our commercial and foreign relations, and to guaranty and maintain the faith of all our national obligations.

How great and urgent was the necessity for such a reconstruction, and how generally this was recognized and felt, may be inferred from the difficulties which the movement had to encounter, and which it overcame. For the states had now tasted the sweets of sovereign power; and their leading men had become accustomed to regard themselves as the heads of independent nations. These men must come down from their lofty position; and the states must renounce for ever their claims to separate nationalities. How hard this would be, may appear not only from the general principles of human nature, but especially from the efforts which the leaders of the southern rebellion are now making to recover this position, and from the stupendous risks and sacrifices of their states to reclaim these powers of sovereignty. And hitherto the states had been accustomed to the supreme control of their foreign trade. Each could protect its own industry by such duties and imposts as it might choose to levy; whence some of them possessed enormous advantages at the expense, and some were completely at the mercy of others—a necessary result of the geo-

graphical conformation and unity of the country. This state control of commerce must be surrendered; the difficulty of which may be inferred from the subsequent efforts of the eastern states to secure protection for their manufactures, and from those of Pennsylvania to carry through the Morill tariff restrictions, from which she hopes to become the great iron producer of this continent, and thereby to attain to almost boundless wealth, population, and grandeur.

But however great these obstacles to the formation of a national government, they were as nothing compared with that which arose from the claims of the larger states to almost boundless territory at the West. For, according to some of the colonial charters, the domain which they described, extended "from the Atlantic to the Southern sea;" that is to say, in the words of Launce, "as far as God had any ground." It was not without great opposition that the smaller states had been induced to unite even in a confederation with others of such vast territorial pretensions. New York, with great magnanimity, had ceded her claims to Congress, in order to effect even that imperfect union. In a closer, a national organization, the smaller states were afraid that they should become to the greater mere insignificant appendages; to which, therefore, there was no hope of obtaining their consent. Hence all these imperial domains must be alienated from the states to which they belonged, by the voluntary acts of the states themselves, before a national government could be organized.

Great hesitation and reluctance were naturally felt to submit to such sacrifices of dominion and power; but the necessity was so urgent that it overcame all opposition. Most of the other states now followed the example of New York, and ceded their territorial claims at the West to the Confederation. This act on the part of Virginia especially was one of heroic self-sacrifice on the altar of the purest patriotism, which must awaken astonishment in all future generations, and for ever command the admiration of mankind. For her territory included Kentucky, and most of that which is now Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. But Virginia of that day was the most national of all the states, and her public men were the

first on this continent. She was found equal to the great occasion; and the whole of this imperial domain became the property of the United States, by a grant of twenty lines, executed by Thomas Jefferson. Such was the patriotism of that "Mother of States and Statesmen"—honour to the illustrious dead!

This decisive measure not only removed the greatest obstacle out of the way of the formation of a national government, but it was in itself a vast stride towards the result at which it aimed. For previous to this the Confederacy had no power to acquire, or govern, or hold territorial dependencies by any tenure whatsoever. For these objects it had no authority in the Articles of Confederation. Yet this wide domain was ceded to, and accepted by, the United States, upon the express condition and guaranty that they should hold and govern it; should proceed to organize out of it new states, population being adequate, and should receive them into the Union on equal footing with the old. The effect of this, therefore, was to vest in the confederate government a new class of sovereign and national powers; which went into operation first in that celebrated act of Congress, since known to the world as "The Ordinance of '87."

This ordinance was, in the highest sense of the words, a national and sovereign act. For therein Congress asserts the right of eminent domain over all the territories thus acquired, with full power to dispose of the public lands for the benefit of the government, by which was laid the foundation of a vast national revenue; and undertakes to hold and govern these territorial dependencies, to establish over them all the departments, executive, legislative, and judicial, of a popular government; to appoint by its own authority the principal officers; and to organize and receive into the Union new states, without even consultation with the original thirteen parties to the federal compact. These, beyond all question, are great sovereign and national powers, which had no place in the Articles of Confederation. And hence a reconstruction of the government became indispensable to legitimate them and carry them into effect.

While these preparations for a national organization were in

progress, the state legislatures were passing resolutions expressive of their inability to administer, by leagues and compacts among themselves, the national affairs of the country, and of the necessity that existed for a reconstruction of the government. These resolutions all set forth, either in substance or in express words, "that the Articles of Confederation had proved themselves to be inadequate to the great purposes for which they were designed," and recommended "that a convention of all the states be called, to perpetuate the benefits of the Federal Union by enlarging its powers." In response to a call from Virginia for a convention to provide for a uniform commercial system, delegates from five states came together at Annapolis; but instead of undertaking to accomplish the object for which they had met, they adopted a report, drawn by Alexander Hamilton, "that the existing commercial difficulties could not be adjusted under the federal compact, for the reason that such an adjustment required an extension of the powers of government in other directions; and that a general convention should be called to consider all the defects of the Articles of Confederation, and to devise such further measures as might appear to be necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union." This report was submitted to Congress, and to the states separately. Virginia and several others gave it their cordial approbation, and immediately appointed their delegates to the convention recommended. Congress hesitated for some time to adopt a measure which evidently looked to the organization of a new government to supersede its own authority; but under great pressure brought to bear upon it by the states themselves, especially by New York and Massachusetts, a resolution was ultimately passed, which recommended "that a general convention be called for the purpose of making such alterations in the Federal Constitution as should be adequate to the preservation of the Union, . . . and TO ESTABLISH IN THESE STATES A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT."

Upon this recommendation all the states which had not already acted, except Rhode Island, united in calling the convention, and appointed their delegates. These came together at Philadelphia. The convention embraced, probably, a greater

amount of talent and patriotism than any body that ever assembled on this continent, except always the signers of the Declaration of Independence. There was Washington; there were Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, the two Morrises, the two Pinckneys, Roger Sherman, John Rutledge, and Edmund Randolph. The body was found to be composed of two parties, a minority of state sovereignty men, still in favour of retaining the Articles of Confederation in an amended form, and a strong majority of national men, prepared to reject these Articles altogether, and to form a thoroughly national constitution. Everything passed through the convention was elaborately discussed in all its bearings upon this fundamental question; and the present Constitution of the United States was the result.

We come now to the analysis of this instrument with reference to three cardinal points. 1. What are the objects which the Constitution proposes to itself? 2. What are its powers for the realization of these objects? 3. From whom are these powers derived? The answers to these three questions will show to what extent it is the constitution of a national government.

1. The objects which the Constitution proposes to itself are stated in the preamble. They are these: "To form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." These certainly are all great national objects; and the "more perfect union" here proposed, cannot be understood as anything else but a national union, for the reasons that it was intended to supersede that of the Confederation, and to be an act of the people, not of the state governments.

2. The Constitution vests in the government of the United States the following sovereign and national powers: To establish and maintain a general postal organization, uniformity of weights and measures, to regulate the currency, and the value of all coins, and to punish counterfeiting: to establish and maintain a complete system of revenues for its own support and uses, by taxes, duties, imposts, excises, the borrowing of money, and the sale of the public lands; and thereby to guaranty the faith of all national pecuniary obligations: to

regulate and control all the foreign relations of the country, and to decide all questions of peace and war; specifically, to send and receive ambassadors, to pass uniform laws of naturalization, to regulate commerce, to define and punish felonies and piracies on the high seas, and all offences against international laws; to make treaties, form alliances, raise, maintain, and govern naval and military forces, declare and carry on war and make peace; to govern the territories, organize new states, and receive them into the Union on equal footing with the old, to secure to each state a republican form of government, to decide all controversies between the states, and to protect them all from invasion; to require of all state officers an oath or affirmation to support and maintain the Constitution, with all laws, treaties, and obligations made or contracted under its authority, as the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution and laws of any of the states to the contrary notwithstanding—a provision which not only makes the Constitution and laws of the United States an integral portion of the constitution and laws of every particular state, but which also exacts from the state officers allegiance to the United States *as paramount*, wherever the two authorities can come into conflict with each other. Under the Constitution, moreover, the government, by its judiciary, is the court of last resort to determine upon the constitutionality of all state laws and measures, whilst it is the sole judge of its own—a provision by which it is empowered to decide, without appeal, all controversies between itself and the several states. And, finally, the Constitution defines what is treason against the government, and empowers it to call out the whole militia of the country to execute by force of arms, if necessary, all the powers vested in itself, in any of its departments or officers.

On the other hand, the states are expressly prohibited from coining money, emitting bills of credit, laying any duties on exports or imports, granting letters of marque, and from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; as also, without the consent and approbation of the national government, from keeping troops or ships of war in time of peace, from engaging in war, unless actually invaded, or imminently threatened, and from entering into any compact or agreement with each other.

Such are the chief sovereign and national powers which are vested in the general government, and prohibited to the states separately, under the Constitution of the United States.

3. In the third place, by whom are these powers conferred upon the one government and prohibited to the others? From whom does this Constitution proceed? This is a question of fundamental importance.

Indeed, at the very first session of the Convention which drafted the Constitution, it was argued by the state sovereignty party, that inasmuch as the delegates had been appointed by the states to revise the Articles of Confederation, they had no authority to supersede these, nor even to propose a national constitution. To this argument the national men replied, that it was evidently a matter of no moment by whom a constitution should be drafted, even if it were by a private individual; the question upon which everything must turn was, by whom it should be adopted and ratified; and they proposed to submit all the results of their labours to the original sovereignty of the people themselves.

Accordingly, we find in this instrument no "Articles of Confederation between the states." Here are no states forming "a league of friendship with each other." Here no "state retains its sovereignty, freedom, or independence." Such expressions, which occur on almost every page of the Articles, have all and totally disappeared from the Constitution, which does not recognize state sovereignty, nor the agency of the states in its own formation in any capacity whatever, even by a distant allusion. This is the more significant, inasmuch as the Convention was composed of delegates appointed by the state governments, each claiming to be, in all respects, an independent and sovereign power. In place of all such state reservations, we have these solemn and majestic words, every one of which was carefully weighed and chosen with reference to this very controversy, WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, ... DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. And the force of these words palpably is, that in them the whole people represent themselves as ordaining a permanent government, not only for themselves as individuals, but also for their state governments

in union, and not the states, either in union or separately, forming a government for the people. Here we have the primal sovereignty in the act of embodying and organizing itself, and the people submitting to this organization themselves, their posterity, all their national interests, and even their state governments.

This preamble manifestly required that the Constitution should be adopted by the people in conventions appointed by their primary assemblies; and thus it was ratified in all the states. Notwithstanding, it has been the general custom to speak of this transaction as one in which the states ceded away, or delegated, certain of their sovereign powers to the government of the United States. And if this had been so, it might, perhaps, have constituted an inadequate basis for a national organization. But it is certain that the states did no such thing. We have seen, in the case of the Articles of Confederation, that they had no right to alienate from themselves the least of their powers of sovereignty, unless they should lay them down at the feet of the people themselves, from whom they were held in trust. And in this case, when the Constitution, completed and signed by the Convention, came before the state legislatures, it was apparent on the face of the instrument that they had no authority either to adopt or reject it. They could not speak for the people in this transaction, for the all-sufficient reason, that in it the people in union were speaking to them, ordaining and establishing over them a paramount authority. All that the state legislatures could do was just what they did, *i. e.*, submit the Constitution, as it came from the hands of its framers, to the people, to be passed upon by them in conventions appointed by their primary assemblies. In so doing, they declared that they were now ready and willing—a result of their twelve years' experience of their utter inability to administer the national affairs of the country by leagues and compacts among themselves—to lay down their sovereign powers, if required, at the feet of the people, from whom they were held in trust; and therein they called the people to pass upon this question, whether or not it was their will to withdraw these powers from their state governments, and to re-vest them in another and a national organization.

By ratifying the Constitution, as they did, the people answered this question in the affirmative; and thereby formally reclaimed the sovereign and national powers from their state governments, by which they had been originally usurped, and vested them for ever in a paramount government.

Such was the true nature of that celebrated transaction. And this is still further evinced by the careful wording of those Articles of the Constitution which treat of reserved rights and powers; in which some are declared to be retained *by* the people, and reserved, not *by*, but *to*, the states. Articles IX. and X. are as follows: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained *by* the people;" "The powers not delegated to the United States *by* the Constitution, nor prohibited *by* it *to* the states, are reserved *to* the states respectively, or to the people." *i. e.*, they were left where they were before. Hence, also, when the Constitution came before the people's conventions, it was admitted alike by its friends and enemies—and this was the chief ground upon which it was advocated by the one party and opposed by the other—that it did supersede the old confederation, together with the principle of state sovereignty, and did establish a "consolidated" national government.

The result of this analysis is, that the people of the United States, by ordaining and establishing our present Constitution in conventions appointed by their primary assemblies, and clothed with their original and common sovereignty, did withdraw, and prohibit for ever to their state governments, all the principal rights and powers of sovereignty, and did vest them in a national organization; which they ordained should bear the purse, and wield the sword, and be supreme in all its legitimate functions over both individuals and states. This supreme government, proceeding from the united people, acts immediately upon all the individuals or persons over whom it extends, to exact allegiance, and, if need be, to enforce submission and obedience, independently of, and even in opposition to, state intervention. Also, it acts immediately, and with paramount authority, upon the state governments, to exact allegiance, and, if need be, to enforce submission and obedience from them, in that it requires an oath of every state officer to

support and maintain itself; in that it is the court of last resort to decide upon all controversies between the several states, as also between the states and itself, and upon the constitutionality of all their laws and measures, whilst it is the sole judge of its own; and in that it pronounces and makes null and void everything in their constitutions and laws which is in contravention to its own.

In opposition to some of the foregoing views, it has been urged that in several of the ratifying conventions certain declaratory resolutions were also passed, to the effect "that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." The import of these resolutions has been much disputed in later times; but there was no such controversy when they were adopted; neither are the words at all ambiguous. For they distinctly declare the right of those from whom the powers of the Constitution are derived and held, to resume them again under certain circumstances. And who are these? The people of the several states? The people of each, or of any one state? Not at all; but the people of the United States. They are the grantors; they alone can revoke the grant. For the people of any one state had no power, even by a unanimous vote, to make the Constitution binding upon themselves. It required the joint action of the people of nine states out of the thirteen, almost three-fourths of the whole, to ordain and establish the Constitution over any one state. Surely this is conclusive as to the true sense of these declaratory resolutions. For if the people of any one state could not place the Constitution over themselves, as little can they absolve themselves from it. Nothing less than the authority by which it was ordained and established can release from its obligations.

The truth is, that in the act of adopting the Constitution the people were exercising the very right which these resolutions declare; that is to say, the right of reclaiming, in an orderly way, the powers delegated to their existing governments; and herein they assert their right to do this again for cause, and to resume the powers now delegated to their national

government; in other words, to alter, amend, and even to abolish the Constitution, for good and sufficient reasons. But this is a right which no one ever disputed. For it is self-evident that what the people, in the exercise of their inalienable, common sovereignty, did create, in the exercise of the same sovereignty they can uncreate. But it is the people of the United States, not the people of any separate state.

It is true, also, that in some of the ratifying conventions attempts were made to adopt the Constitution conditionally, with a reserved state power to secede, unless certain amendments should be inserted within a specified time. This battle had to be fought out in the convention of the people of New York, and in others. But in every case the adoption was ultimately made final and without conditions. Whilst this question was pending in New York, Madison wrote in reply to certain questions from Hamilton, the following words: "The reservation of a right to withdraw is a conditional ratification . . . it does not make New York a member of the new union, and consequently she could not be received on that plan. The Constitution requires an adoption *in toto*, and for ever. *It has been so adopted by the other States.*"

Thus it was that the people of this country superseded the Articles of Confederation by "a firm national government;" and therein repudiated for ever the principle of state sovereignty, of many petty nationalities, which, under state usurpation, they had tried and found wanting, and, according to the inevitable tendencies of a rising civilization, organized themselves into one great nation. And hence we have our national motto, E PLURIBUS UNUM.

In the adoption of the Constitution, the principle of one nationality in the American people assumed a new point of departure; and our nation entered upon that career of prosperity, power, and glory, which is without parallel in history. The new organization seemed to be the perfection of human wisdom; it worked with the most astonishing facility; its results were like magic. For now a confederate agency, illegitimate in its origin, and without power even to maintain the faith of its own treaties, had given place to a national government, resting immediately upon the original sovereignty of the

people, and which soon came to be universally recognized as fully competent to support and defend itself, to exact allegiance and enforce obedience, to assume and guaranty the faith of all national obligations, and as one of the first military and naval powers of the world. The currency and public debt, before of hardly nominal value, now rose to par and premium. Where private obligations had been almost worthless, and life almost without protection, now prevailed as perfect security for life and property as was ever known in any civilized country. Emigration rolled in upon us like the waves of the ocean. The destitute and oppressed of the old world here sought and found a secure asylum, and ample support. Here they were safe; here they were free; here they grew rich; here they were happy. The exhaustless wealth of the country was now rapidly developed. The sails of our commerce whitened every sea. The star-spangled banner was a type of freedom and power and glory in every quarter of the world. All the arts of peace revived and flourished, and bore their golden fruits of plenty, prosperity, and happiness. The anarchy and chaos of the confederacy disappeared, whilst order arose out of confusion, and light out of darkness, as when the Spirit of God sat brooding over the void and emptiness of the primal creation. The nations looked on with astonishment and wonder. They could not understand it; nor even yet are they able to comprehend the benign influence of such a national organization of the sovereign powers of a great and free people.

From the adoption of the Constitution, the principle of our nationality went on to develope and strengthen itself by the active and successful exercise of its own powers. The nation was fully occupied in governing its territories, extending its domain in order to perfect its geographical unity, adjusting boundaries, organizing and receiving new states into the Union, negotiating and ratifying treaties, regulating commerce, perfecting its military arrangements, building up a naval marine, elaborating its postal and revenue systems—in a word, in establishing justice, ensuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the general welfare, securing to the people and their posterity the blessings of liberty;

and thus in making it powerful and respected at home and abroad.

The limits of this article constrain us to pass over the attempt to revive the doctrine of state sovereignty against "the alien and sedition laws," except to say that in the suppression of the rebellion in Pennsylvania connected with them, the national principle was strenuously asserted, and fully sustained.

Also we must pass over one of the greatest national acts of this time, which was the acquisition by purchase from the French, of that vast territory which, with uncertain boundaries, was included between the Rocky Mountains and the Mississippi; the object of which was to secure for ever the control of the waters, but especially the mouth of that river, together with the Gulf of Mexico, and thereby to complete the territorial unity of the national domain.

But it is necessary to dwell a moment upon the events which led to the war of 1812, and those of the war itself, on account of their important bearing upon the development of the principle of our nationality.

For the continental system of Napoleon, which aimed to exclude English commerce from the ports of all Europe, and the counter measures of England, known as "the Orders in Council," inflicted a grievous injury upon the rights of neutral nations, and threatened the utter destruction of our commerce. In retaliation our government laid an embargo upon the exportation of every article from this country to France and England, and prohibited all intercourse. The effect of this extreme measure, the constitutionality of which has always been doubted, was to annihilate at a blow our rapidly rising commerce, then mostly confined to New England. In the words of Mr. Webster, "thousands of families, and hundreds of thousands of individuals were beggared by it." In the madness of this general ruin, some violent persons revived the idea of state sovereignty, and threatened secession; but no overt act in that direction was committed by any of the state governments. The embargo was soon taken off, and the prohibitory acts repealed. But while the excitement continued, it called forth the strongest expressions of condemnation in every other

part of the country, especially in the South, and most of all in Virginia. At a public dinner of the state electors of Mr. Madison to the presidency, and in presence of the governor and other distinguished guests, the following toast was drunk, with express reference to these sentiments in New England: "*The union of the states; the majority must govern;* IT IS TREASON TO SECEDE."

Also the war that followed was thought to be exceedingly burdensome and oppressive to the eastern states; several of which appointed delegates to meet in convention at Hartford, to devise measures of relief. That convention reported a number of amendments to the Constitution, more in the spirit of the old confederation than of the existing national government, and it advised that if these should not be adopted, nor peace concluded, another convention should be called, as was supposed—for the proposed convention never met—to take measures for the dissolution of the Union, and the establishing of a separate government. It does not appear, however, that any violent procedure was contemplated; notwithstanding this movement also was greeted with a burst of indignation throughout the whole country, and the members of "the Hartford Convention" were ever after spotted men.

These events seemed, at the time, to establish the national principle, so that it could never more be assailed; and the glorious naval victories of the war, together with the battle of New Orleans, with which it closed, kindled up such a glow of loyalty and patriotism in the national mind as seemed to consume the last remains of state sovereignty and pride.

From this time, in the peaceful and healthful exercise of all national powers by the government, nearly a generation passed away. The fathers of the Republic, the statesmen of the elder time, who, with

"The large utterance of the early gods,"

had silenced all opposition to the national principle, were fallen asleep, with thankful acknowledgments for the final establishment of "a firm national government." A new generation had risen up of men without experience of our past struggles for nationality. Among these Mr. Calhoun of South

Carolina, in opposition to governmental regulation of commerce, and in the interest of free-trade principles, undertook, in his celebrated nullification doctrines, to revive the long-buried idea that we were still a confederation of sovereign states, and not properly one nation. In the words of our own Motley, the historian, in one of his masterly condensations: "It was reserved to the subtle genius of this man, one of the most logical, brilliant, and persuasive orators that ever lived, to embody once more, in a set of sounding sophisms, and to exhibit as legitimate deductions from the Constitution, the main arguments which, in a former generation, had been unsuccessfully used to prevent its adoption." How this movement was put down by Daniel Webster in the Senate, and by Andrew Jackson at the head of the government and the army, need not be narrated here. It is enough to say, that here again the arguments for state sovereignty were put forth in all their strength, here again they were overthrown, and the principle of American nationality gained a new and signal triumph. Under the pressure of his defeat Mr. Calhoun himself publicly disavowed the most legitimate and significant consequences of his own theory. His words are: "No state has a right to do as it pleases in what concerns the whole. It is the plainest dictate of common sense, that what affects the whole should be regulated by the mutual consent of all, and not by the discretion of each. . . . . It is the duty of the Federal government promptly to suppress physical force as an element of change."

But notwithstanding this disclaimer, the nullification doctrines did contain the principle of the old confederation, inasmuch as they involved the right of each state to judge of its own grievances, and to secede from the Union at pleasure. This fatal germ did not perish even at the death of Mr. Calhoun. By his great personal influence and weight of character it had become the leading political idea of South Carolina, whence it has now spread over the other southern states, and has already begun to deluge our country in the best blood of her children. It remains only that we glance at some of the causes and pretexts through which it has led to this great, and, as we trust, final struggle for our nationality.

1. First among these, in the order of time, was the rankling memory in South Carolina of the defeat of her nullification enterprise. The humiliation of her greatest name in the Senate, the proclamation of the President, threatening to bring down upon her the whole military power of the nation—these were offences which never could be forgiven by her state pride. From that day onwards until her act of secession, she never ceased, according to the public avowals of her leading men, to cherish the hope and the purpose of breaking up the national Union, nor to labour, with an energy and success worthy of a better cause, to indoctrinate and inspire the whole south with her own ideas and purposes.

2. The second cause was the conduct of the abolitionists, who could see in our constitutional engagements to protect slavery where it existed by municipal law, nothing else but "a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell." Their ceaseless and scathing denunciations were, in the words of Mr. Benton, "carefully gathered up by those who were aiming to prepare the way for secession, and systematically imported into the South for fuel, as coal is imported for fuel into New York from the Pennsylvania mines." An incendiary press scattered these burning embers into every village and planter's home. The whole South was set on fire. And now the sincere and well disposed of the southern people naturally set themselves to defend and fortify the institution of slavery, thus attacked, and to form new theories for justification to themselves of what was inseparably interwoven with the whole structure of their social life. But what was still more to be deprecated, if possible, these abolition denunciations afforded a chosen string upon which unprincipled and wicked men could harp with the greatest effect in order to bring themselves into power. Able and conscientious men, who could not descend to this degradation, were generally driven from positions of trust and influence; and a class of third and fourth rate politicians, incapable of statesmanship, and utterly unprincipled, gained control of the destinies of the South.

3. The third cause was the institution of slavery itself. This being confined to one great section of the country, had always exerted a powerful influence to neutralize the geographical and

other elements of our national unity. Interwoven with all the fibres of social life, it caused the civilization of the South to take on a peculiar form, and one altogether hostile to the progress of the age. Being consistent only with a feeble civilization, it caused industry to languish, confined wealth and education to a few persons, in whom it nourished the pride and arrogance of a superior race, and prevented the increase of a free population. Hence the development of the unsurpassed natural resources of the South was slow, and her white population was almost stationary, in comparison with the gigantic and ever-increasing progress of the free states. Thus she was fast losing her preponderance in the national government. All this was intensely humiliating to her sectional pride; which did not allow her to explain it by its true cause, but constrained her to ascribe it to the influence of her union with the North. Slavery also had come to be condemned by the moral judgment of Christendom; whence, in order to fortify and maintain itself against the influence of public opinion, it naturally sought to sequester itself as much as possible from the rest of the world. Instinctively it felt that it could not live in communion with the social life of freedom.

4. But more powerful than all these causes together was the rise and growth of the cotton interest. This it was which gave such a pecuniary value to slave property as was never before imagined; which suggested the re-opening of the foreign slave trade—a step which was demanded not only by the cotton interest, but also as a logical justification of slavery itself. For whilst the foreign trade was regarded and treated as piracy, the domestic trade, and the institution itself, could never cease to be condemned by mankind. Cotton also was a natural monopoly of the Gulf states; and when it came to be their chief source of wealth, they naturally desired to hold it exclusively under their own control, untrammelled by a uniform commercial system which embraced other and rival interests. And it was cotton which was increasing the wealth and power of the southern states to such an extent that they could regard themselves, notwithstanding the difficulty of their theories of state sovereignty, as competent to a separate and independent national career. But cotton and slavery were exhausting to the

soil, and required, for their full development, an ever-extending area of new and fertile lands. This they could not hope to secure in union with the stronger free states, and in opposition to the rapidly strengthening sentiment of freedom, although the cotton belt was stretching away to the southwards, almost without limit, where the feebleness of the neighbouring populations invited them to conquest. As a separate and independent confederation, bound together by one great interest, nothing seemed to forbid them from re-opening the slave trade, and establishing a great cotton and slave empire around the Gulf of Mexico, which, controlling the mouth of the Mississippi, would make New Orleans the mart of the new continent, and would hold as tributaries not only the free states of the North and West, but all the manufacturing and commercial nations of the old world. For the realization of these magnificent designs, in themselves impossible as dreams, the leading politicians of the South laboured for twenty-five years to undermine the foundations, and to overthrow the structure of our national union.

5. There was still another cause, without which all these would have been comparatively powerless. This was a prodigious political corruption, the offspring of a bloated prosperity, which reigned over the whole country, upon whose wealth and resources it battened and revelled. Office and power had now come to be generally sought by the most corrupt machinations, for purposes of plunder. The astonishing, exhaustless wealth of the country enabled the swarms of officials to acquire vast riches; for which party organization was the indispensable means. Hence it followed that partizanship superseded patriotism; corrupt adherence to party ties and interests took the place of loyalty to the government. The great political parties became factions, and each came to stand to its partizans in the place of the nation. The national welfare was remorselessly sacrificed to the overthrow of the party in power, which, on the other hand, was prepared to aid and comfort treason sooner than surrender the spoils of office. The conduct of the late administration, in so far as it was not consciously labouring to overthrow the government, has given us one of the most wonderful instances of this ever afforded in

the history of any people. And when the present administration came into power, its opponents were so fettered by their party manacles, and so pledged to their political associates in the South, as to give them a confident assurance that the North itself was irreconcilably divided, and could not oppose—by force of arms at least—the dismemberment of the nation. The events of the past year, the utterances of the opposition press—with noble exceptions—but above all that master-stroke, the seizure of the telegraph, have revealed such grounds for the confidence of the South that there could be no forcible opposition to their designs, without which they could not have taken their first step in rebellion, as fully to explain those "bursts of laughter" with which the President's first call for troops was greeted in the Montgomery Convention.

Such are the chief causes which have led to the present revival of this doctrine of state sovereignty, and thereby to the terrible conflict in which we are now engaged for the life of our nation. In their combined influence they produced a singular effect upon the southern mind, which, it is hardly too much to say, amounted to a general hallucination. This now offers one of the most puzzling psychological problems in the history of human nature. Cotton and slavery seem to have proved themselves to be great transforming powers of the intellectual and moral nature of man. This great struggle could not be inaugurated before the minds of the southern politicians had been moulded into the complex type of cotton and slavery. In the light of these two ideas everything else was judged, and approved or condemned. They seemed to become the tests of truth and error, of good and evil. Whatever would promote the interest of cotton was good, and therefore good; whatever was opposed to it was evil, and therefore evil. Slavery was not only good as essential to cotton, but it was a good in itself; the highest result of civilization and Christianity; and it was the sublime mission of the South to propagate and perpetuate it. They had discovered "a great physical, moral, and philosophical truth," that one race of the common brotherhood of mankind was created to be the eternal bond-slave of another; and upon this truth, as their chief corner-stone, in defiance of the moral sentiments of the world, and in direct opposition to

twenty centuries of Christian progress, they would found the millennial civilization. Hence, slave-breeding for the market became the honourable employment of many of their first families. And they would re-open and legalize the foreign slave trade,* declared and treated as piracy by all civilized nations, who would not even dare to remonstrate. England and France, with populations intensely hostile to slavery, would support them with fleets and armies in establishing a vast slave empire, upon the supply of cotton from which the very existence of those nations would depend. And this great nation of ours, with a more intense vitality than any other in the world, and in the full exercise of all its gigantic powers, would be so paralyzed that it could not raise a finger in self-defence, but would expire at a blast from their nostrils, consent to die, and dissolve into its elemental particles without even a death struggle. And oh! what was it but a ghastly hallucination which could lead them to commit wholesale robbery, perjury, and treason, verily thinking that they were doing God service!

For a time, indeed, the providence of God seemed prearranged to favour them in the execution of the greatest political crime in the history of nations. They were in possession of the government, where, under their oaths to support and maintain the Constitution, they plotted and laboured, with sleepless industry, to overthrow it; and where, drawing their support from her bosom, they aimed to stab the heart of the nation. They placed their own creatures in almost every important office and command, in order that, when the time should come, they might, as they did, sieze its forts and arsenals, mints and custom-houses;—might plunder and disarm the nation, to arm and supply their state governments. They emptied its treasury, destroyed its credit, demoralized its army, and dispersed its navy over the world. They broke up the organization of their own political party in order that it might be defeated, and a pretext and preconcerted signal might be given them for secession in the election to the presidency of a man who, they had persuaded their constituents, was pledged

* We would by no means attribute any such design as this to the Christian people of the South.

to the overthrow of their cherished institution of slavery. And they remained at their posts in the government, still drawing its pay, in order, from their central position, to direct the secession movements, the moment Mr. Lincoln's election should be declared.

Immediately upon this preconcerted signal illuminations of rejoicing burst forth at the success of the plot, and the states began to move. South Carolina, still "badly eminent," was first to violate the sacred union of our fathers, and to lay her impious hands upon the integrity of the nation. State after state followed in quick succession. There was no pause. Star after star shot madly from its sphere, and plunged into the outer darkness of a hideous rebellion. The government, if not a unit in treason, was paralyzed. It could not even speak for the nation it represented. One word only it had to say—a word never to be forgotten by those to whom it came as the death-knell of hope—"The states have no right to secede, but nobody has any right to prevent them." Ah! those dreary months between the election and the inauguration! That day of darkness, rebuke, and blasphemy!—that night of horrors!—would it never come to an end! Perplexity was universal. The minds of all men were agitated with strange terrors. Many were seized with despair. It was difficult to breathe, as if the stricture of a serpent's coils were tightening upon our breasts. Was our national character a trick, a lie? Was our national life a bubble? Was our glorious national history a dream? Was the world's last hope of free institutions to be thus blasted for ever? No answer came—our sister nations the meanwhile looked on with amazement and shuddering.

But whilst hallucination with respect to the ends of life may supply temporary energy, and secure transient success, when it extends to the means of accomplishing these ends, it becomes madness. Such was the character it now assumed in the leaders of this rebellion. An insignificant fort in the harbour of Charleston had been left by mistake in charge of a man whom corruption could not reach. The name of Robert Anderson will go down to posterity as that of a man chosen of God for a high and holy purpose. Surrounded on all sides with the most formidable batteries, having but the feeblest garrison,

within two days of starvation, when every reason of state policy was against the attack, he was opened upon with a truly infernal fire, which, contrary to the usages of war, was not even suspended when the fort was in flames. The object of this was that the Southern Confederacy might be cemented with blood. But, wonderful providence! after a remorseless cannonade of thirty-six hours, no blood was shed. Fort Sumter fell by internal fires; and this was immediately followed by the declared intention to march on Washington, and by the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, intended to bring the commercial North, but especially the city of New York, on her knees at the feet of the South.

All of these measures were acts of madness which could not but have the contrary effect to that which was designed. And it is a matter of fervent thanksgiving to the God of nations, to have lived at a time when such a heart-cheering spectacle as that which followed could be witnessed. It is impossible to describe it—there is nothing like it in history. It will be transmitted from generation to generation among the cherished traditions of our nation, to the last ages of time.

For it would seem, that notwithstanding all that had taken place, the country was yet slumbering on the gains of peaceful industry, incredulous of change, and confident of security. But the guns of Fort Sumter were heard, through the telegraphic wires, with strange thrills, by every man and woman and child. The nation awoke, as in a moment, to the conviction that its liberties and its very existence were in peril. Twenty millions of a free people awoke, as the dead shall arise at the voice of the last trumpet, and stood up as one man in defence of their sacred nationality. Patriotism, which seemed to have died, now revived; it superseded the love of ease, of gain, of life; and the bond of national unity asserted its legitimate supremacy over the strongest affections of family and kindred. The mechanic left his workshop, the farmer his fields, the merchant his merchandize, the lawyer his causes, the physician his patients, the judge came down from the bench, the minister from the pulpit, and fathers and mothers recalled their sons from college and school and foreign travel, to fight, and if need be, to die for the nation. Money was poured out like

water; even the miser produced his hoarded gains. Partisan strife was hushed; party lines were obliterated; and political factions dissolved and melted into each other. Accursed be the hour when the attempt shall be made to renew them! Every man's duty was made plain; and every man's heart was in his duty. Great cities were turned into camps. States clamoured for the honour of supplying more troops than could be employed. The east and the west, the north and the middle states, poured forth their children by hundreds of thousands.

And now we began to hear the thunder of great armies on the march. The men of Massachusetts led the van. The men of New York followed. The men of Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey swept by. The men of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin, surged onwards like the waves of the sea. The men of New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and Connecticut, emulated the first in the field. Wherever the banner of freedom waved, there her sons were in arms. One rallying cry was in every mouth, "The City of Washington, the heart of the nation, is in peril, and must be defended." One spirit animated all hearts. It was the sentiment of loyalty; it was the sacred fire of patriotism; it was the instinct of a common nationality, now threatened with destruction.

Such were some of the incidents of that great national uprising which we of this generation have been permitted to behold. And when these astonishing movements began to pass before our eyes, ah! then we could breathe once more—then first our tears flowed. For patriotism was not dead; our nationality was not a fiction; our national history was not a romance; our national life was not a dream, nor a bubble.

The great struggle has now commenced. We cannot prophesy; but from the foregoing review of our past conflicts, we may anticipate with some degree of human probability what its result will be.

We have seen that this many-headed hydra of state sovereignty lay coiled around the cradle of our national birth. If it was not able to strangle the infant nationality, it will hardly be able to crush the giant, in the fulness of his strength, and in the maturity of all his powers. We may confidently hope that

the writhings and spasms, which it is now making, are its last. They are fierce and terrible, for it could not die an easy death. But it is not likely that they can last long; for we have reason to think that it is possessed of but a small portion of the strength and vitality which it seems to manifest. We know from the avowals of the leaders, from the utterances of such men as Alexander Stephens, and from the open facts of the case, that the southern states were precipitated into this rebellion by a few disappointed politicians, contrary to the sober judgment of a large majority of union and national men. These have been carried off their feet, for the present, by the flood of misrepresentation which has been poured out upon them, and by the whirlwind of passion which has swept over the South, or they are now silent from terror. There is but little money in the seceded states, and they are without credit in any market in the world. The war taxes, and the stringency of the blockade, must soon bring financial ruin upon them all. Dissensions have already arisen. It is impossible that they should remain united for any long time under the principle of state sovereignty, to which they have irrevocably committed their destinies. A defeat in the field will probably be followed by their speedy dissolution. When the evils which are inevitable come to be intolerable, and so soon as the Union men can reckon upon protection from the national government, they will not fail to be heard from again; a reaction may be expected to follow, the national sentiment to resume its power; and the traitorous state governments will be superseded by the facile and obvious method already adopted in Virginia and Missouri. Conquest or subjugation, therefore, the attempt to hold the southern people in the Union by force, is not even to be contemplated.

But whatever sacrifices may be necessary to defend and maintain our nationality, must be cheerfully borne. For this is not a war of our choosing; it has been madly and cruelly forced upon us. If the people of the South had referred their alleged grievances to a constitutional convention, and had come up from the ballot-box, saying: "This Union is no longer our free choice; it is oppressive to our interests, and offensive to our sentiments; we desire to be released, in an orderly manner, from our con-

stitutional engagements;" the nation would never have drawn the sword. Notwithstanding our unquestionable right to maintain the geographical unity of the national domain; notwithstanding the acquisition by purchase of Louisiana, and Florida, the payment of the Texan debt, and the immense sums expended in the fortification and defence of the southern states, we would have said, with infinite sorrow, as for the madness of brethren, "Go, in God's name; try your ideas; we foresee your prodigal history; but take the portion of goods that falleth to you, and set up for yourselves." But the conspirators knew too well that they could not trust the southern people to vote, in calmness and freedom, for the dismemberment of the nation. Precipitation, by the grossest usurpations, was therefore their only and avowed hope of success. They have sown the wind; it is the ordinance of God that they should reap the whirlwind. Robbery, perjury, and treason must be punished, if men would live upon the earth. No government or nation can continue to exist which bears the sword of God in vain for the punishment of such evil doers.

Compromise, in the present or any subsequent stage of this conflict, is impossible. For nothing that could be properly called by this name, would be accepted by the leaders of the rebellion, who hold all power in their hands, until they are beaten out of the field; and after that, nothing short of unconditional submission of the rebels could be accepted by the nation. How, indeed, can any compromise be made with men in arms against the government, without a fatal sacrifice of national sovereignty? And what benefit could result from such a procedure with men who have openly violated the most sacred oaths, and whom, therefore, no engagement could bind?

No; we are under the direst necessity to prosecute this war to its only legitimate conclusion—the suppression of the most groundless and cruel rebellion, and the punishment of the greatest political crime in the history of any people. For if we fail to do this, and yield to the southern demand of a constitutional right in the states to secede at pleasure, inevitably we ingraft the principle of secession, and establish it for ever in our Constitution. We admit as true what historically is utterly false, that we are a confederacy of sovereign states, and not a

nation; that we never had any right to assume national obligations; that our national character has been from the first a stupendous imposition upon the world; and that we are a race of impostors. We repudiate our dearest political birthright, that of American citizens; and tear down the work of our fathers, the noblest monument of statesmanship and patriotism the world has ever seen, or is ever like to see. We arrest the flood-tide of Christian civilization, and the ebb must immediately set in. We commence a retrograde movement, through petty sovereignties and tribal associations, which can never cease to be at war with each other, towards universal disintegration and anarchy; from which nothing can emerge but a military despotism to save society. We blight for ever the life of the Anglo-Saxon race on this continent, and the hope of free institutions throughout the world; and we dwarf the intellectual and moral faculties of our posterity: for a great nation is naturally mother to great minds and great characters; which require large national interests and ideas for their nourishment and development.

But whatever our sacrifices may be, they can hardly fail to bring with them a rich reward. For the agitations and trials of this day will bring forward a new class of men into public life, from which they have long been banished by political corruption. A dreadful experience will have taught us the inevitable consequences of excluding religion from politics, of the fierceness and bitterness of partisan strife, and of a demoralized public conscience. Slavery will no more predominate and rage in our national counsels; and surely it is not too much to expect that through this life and death struggle between slavery and freedom, the providence of God will open some way for the deliverance of the slave. The suppression of this rebellion will close up for ever the controversy between the two hostile principles of state sovereignty and American nationality; which will consign the one to the records of the many foiled attempts of barbarism to return upon the world, and open to the other a new career of development. It is our firm belief that in this conflict the eagle of American civilization is exercising and strengthening his wings for a nobler flight than he has ever before attempted.

Art. III.—1. *The Problem Solved;* or, *Sin not of God.* By Miles P. Squier, D. D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Beloit College. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1855.

2. *Reason and the Bible;* or, *The Truth of Religion.* By Miles P. Squier, D. D., Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, Beloit College. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861.

3. *The Hartford Ordination.* Letters of the Rev. Drs. Hawes, Spring, and Vermilye, and the Rev. Messrs. Childs and Parker; republished from the *New York Observer;* with Notes and a Review; to which is added a Statement of the Manchester Case. Second Edition. Hartford, Connecticut: Alexander Calhoun & Co. 1860.

4. *Sermon* by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, published in the *New York Independent*, of July 4th, 1861.

In presenting the foregoing works as exhibiting some of the advanced phases of Rationalism in the evangelical communions of our country, we have placed them in a logical, rather than a strict chronological order, although the two are mostly coincident. By this, we mean the order in which the principles advanced become premises for other principles which flow logically as conclusions from them. The first of these works is placed there, not for its recency, but merely as being in some degree exegetical of the second. The opinions and speculations which appear in these several works, however otherwise various, have a bond of unity in this, that they are more or less rationalistic, and relate primarily to sin, either in its origin, nature, punishment, or expiation.

Dr. Squier is in a state of exuberant and enviable satisfaction. He luxuriates in the sublime consciousness of having solved "the problem" of evil, which has confounded the great thinkers of christendom and heathendom through the ages; and of having looked through the "clouds and darkness" which have hitherto wrapt many of the Divine counsels and administrations in inscrutable mystery from the mightiest and devoutest minds. And since he appears quite unconscious that he is not

the inventor of his great solution, he intensifies the pleasures of comprehending the mysteries of God's providential government, by the higher ecstasies of original discovery,—"the rapturous eureka."

It is to be regretted that Dr. Squier should have thwarted his benevolent desire to make others share his delight in the premises, by an ostentatious swell and glitter of style, quite unaccountable in a writer of his age and antecedents. His passion for ambitious and inflated diction often betrays him into feebleness, obscurity, and magniloquent barbarisms. We do not often stop for mere word-criticism. That a writer merely offends our taste in these things is a small matter. But it is a duty which no loyal citizen of the realm of letters may rightfully evade, to arraign flagrant violations of the English language. What can justify such phrase as the following?—"Any strategic leanings to wrong, as a Divine expedient in the original and integral methods of the universe, is utter ungodlike and inconceivable." Why say "it will be resultant in retribution," for "it will result in retribution,"—a form of expression constantly recurring? What does he mean by telling us that no "good being can stand in any propositional relation to sin?" This use of the word "propositional" is as frequent as it is false to those who know the meaning of the word, and senscless to those who do not. "Sin is a mistake as well as a *mislead.*" "Sin will occur, if at all, in the *instep* of a moral economy." "Intelligence is a unity, and so is truth. The subject-personality and the subject-matter in the premises possess this generic quality, and indicate the strength of our position, that the study of man and of truth,—of him who thinks, and of that which is thought, and is the objective basis of it in the one universe which God has formed; gives direction and homogeneity to the results to which on reflection we come?" "In the first nestlings of 'the me' within us—in the first act or instance of consciousness, we get the validity of the Infinite,—the Absolute,—the Eternal—the Jehovah—and comprehend the necessary being of God." Quite an achievement for the "first nestlings of the me," which, whether they accomplish all this or not, have plainly launched the author on a philosophic sea whose abysmal depths and fatal under-currents he has yet

to learn. But, be this as it may, if we cannot have choice phrase without pedantic barbarisms, or something worse, by all means let us have common-place and even vulgar language, so that it be simple, clear, and unaffected. Many more passages might be selected from the author's two works, which show how they who rise on stilts to sublimity of expression are less than a step from the ridiculous. Dr. Squier asks, (*Problem Solved*, p. 158; our previous quotations are from his later volume): "May one be on both sides of a moral question, and be both proponent and repellant in the same moral issue?" Is this English, or is it—what? And what is meant by such ponderous verbiage as the following: "It is like a truncated cone mourning for its counterpart. It is a truth in its orphanage and without its parallelisms, and coincidences and reciprocations in all correlated truth, and in its solitude unintelligible, deceptive, objectless." *Id.* p. 224. What is meant by "the imperatives of right action in the soul as adjutant with Him in correcting and overcoming all that is wrong, and against it, and in the promotion of all that is right everywhere, and in accordance with His will." Surely Dr. Squier ought not to repel the readers whose sympathy he seeks with such jargon. It is too much to give us the stiff technics of Dr. Hickok without his depth, or the formidable verbosity of Dr. S. H. Cox, without his brilliancy. If we must have the contortions, let us also have the inspiration.

We pass briefly to consider the principles in the author's late work, only referring to the other as it may be explicatory of this. We notice them, not on account of any ability or novelty which characterize them, but on account of the boldness with which they are advanced, and the consequences to which they lead; which we propose to show are already developing themselves.

Dr. Squier undertakes to demonstrate the harmony of the doctrines of the Bible with the dictates of human reason: not merely that many of them accord with the natural judgments of the human mind, while it has the strongest reason for receiving all the residue upon the testimony of the infallible God; but that they are all in such a sense rational that the human mind can see the grounds of their truth, and why they

are certified to be true by the Omniscient God; that they contain nothing insoluble to human reason, or whose points of contact and conciliation with other known truths cannot be shown; that all doctrines of the Bible are to be explicated into conformity to these conditions; and that whatever cannot be shaped to this pattern must be rejected as impossible to be true, and therefore impossible to be taught in the word of God. But we will let our author speak for himself:

"Philosophy, then, embraces the sphere of religion, both natural and revealed. It shall descry in its principles what is possible in Divine revelation, and what is not. Solecism and absurdity cannot be in it. It will be on the basis of necessary truth, and be verified and justified by it. It will be the offspring of God, and commend itself to reason and common sense. It will be the God of nature and providence seen in the statements of an express revelation. It will be the further exhibition of the one God of the universe, and be a homogeneous manifestation. Its statements falling in with the terms of all necessary truth, reason will see and approve them. And thus philosophy has the same jurisdiction here as in the other works and manifestations of God. . . . she ascertains their economy, and justifies it to all truth and intelligence. The reason will take this prerogative, and it is deferred to and acknowledged in all exegesis of the word of God,—in all commendations of it, and all voluntary and responsible issues based upon it." *Reason and the Bible*, pp. 264, 265.

Again:

"Truth is not such by prescription. It may have an authoritative statement, as it has in the Bible, but this is only a *mode* of it and of its manifestation. It must be *truth*, or it could not be so *stated*. And this inherence of truth in the nature and fitness of things, and this reason for its authoritative statement which is found in its intrinsic verity and value, is what cultivated intellect demands—and is what society and the world *will* demand and *must* have. It is too what religion can and ought to give." *Id.* pp. 294, 295.

These are but the weaker tentative flights of our author. Before, however, introducing our readers to his loftier soarings, we have a suggestion or two to offer, with a view to a final dis-

posal of much of the irrelevant reasoning which constitutes the staple of the book, by indicating the real state of the question.

1. It is not claimed, as Dr. Squier seems to intimate in regard to his antagonists, that "solecism and absurdity" can be in the word and truth of God. But it is claimed that Dr. Squier's mind is not the ultimate infallible oracle which is authorized to pronounce that a "solecism and an absurdity" that has not been perceived to be such by the great mass of God's people, of all ages and countries. It is claimed still further, that we have no warrant to conclude any clear averment of the word of God absurd, because, in our apprehension it appears so. If it be clearly affirmed by the testimony of God, it is our duty to conclude that all supposed absurdities in it are due to our inadequate and short-sighted conception of it, and that they will disappear before a fuller comprehension of it, when that shall be vouchsafed, whether in this world or the next. Surely in these matters "the foolishness of God is wiser than man." "He will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent." Have not all the doctrines of grace been repudiated by vast numbers, on the ground of their alleged incongruity with reason, or, what is of the same force and effect, their feelings? Have those ceased to live who repeat the old cavil against gratuitous justification by the blood and righteousness of Christ, "shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" and insist that it tends to licentiousness? Have those ceased from the earth, who echo the questions in regard to the regeneration of the human soul by the Holy Ghost, even in the extreme dilution of the doctrine as put by the school to which Dr. Squier belongs, "How can these things be"? "Are they not at war with sense and reason"? Did our Saviour, therefore, explain them into accordance with Nicodemus's "reason and common sense"? And is the doctrine of spiritual regeneration to be surrendered at discretion, because it cannot be explained to harmonize with the thinking and feeling of some worms of the dust? What fearful maledictions have men as brilliant and fascinating as Channing and Bushnell hurled at the doctrine of vicarious atonement, in every conceivable view of it, which does not turn it into a "pious fraud," as revolting to all right

reason and feeling? As making the cross "the great central gallows of the universe," or as "involving in God the loss or confusion of all moral distinctions?" Is that which is the "wisdom of God and the power of God" to be forthwith renounced, at the call of such parties and the multitudes they represent?

The only case in which human reason is authorized to assert that a given doctrine cannot be taught in Scripture, is when it involves a contradiction, *i. e.*, asserts that a thing is, and is not, at the same moment; or, what is the same, asserts the contradictory of some truth *certainly* and *indisputably* known. It is, of course, impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same moment. But let the condition be observed. The contradictory of the supposed scriptural statement must be *certainly* and *indisputably* known. If it be at all in dispute, this condition fails. The application of this *judicium contradictionis*, which has been allowed by all standard theologians, is, however, subject to this limitation. The contradiction must not only be clear and indisputable, but, if the doctrine supposed to contain it be clearly asserted in Scripture, we must not forthwith reject it, or insist that it be interpreted or philosophized out of Scripture. It is more likely that we misconceive it, and that when we come duly to apprehend it, the contradiction will vanish. How many have been bewildered by what seemed to them contradictions in the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation—that three are one, and that two are one? How many Socinians have rejected these doctrines on the assurance that they contained obvious contradictions? But how clearly are these seeming contradictions eliminated, when it is seen that God is one substance in three Persons, and that Christ is one Person in two natures? We allude to these instances for the purpose of showing the extreme caution, with which any reverent mind will allow even seeming contradictions to overbear or rule out the obvious meaning of Scripture. What then is to be said of those who exclude all mysteries from Scripture, and refuse to accept any doctrine apparently taught there until they have rationalized all mystery out of it, and reduced it to the comprehension of reason and common sense?

2. According to Dr. Squier, reason has "jurisdiction" over "all exegesis of the word of God," to strain it into accord with its own decisions. This is the boldest and most unqualified rationalism. Even an "authoritative statement" by the All-wise God is not sufficient, unless the "reason" for it "in the nature and fitness of things" is shown to meet the "demand of cultivated intellects." It would not be easy to go further. Is this taking the yoke and learning of Christ? Is this becoming fools that we may be wise? Is this proper instruction to give to the natural man, who receiveth not, neither can receive the things of the Spirit? And can this nourish that faith which stands "not in the wisdom of men, but the power of God?"

3. The fact that the Bible teaches what commends itself to reason and common sense, which Dr. Squier labours through many weary chapters to show, is no proof that it does not also teach mysteries, even the great mystery of "godliness," which is in some aspects infinitely above the utmost stretch of comprehension by reason and common sense. Nor does the fact that all its truths harmonize with intrinsic reason, prove that they are now so set forth in the Scripture, as to be fully intelligible or explicable to the human reason in its present compass. Nor does the fact that God's methods of administration in nature, providence, and grace are mutually consistent with each other, because consistent with the One Supreme Reason, prove that this consistency, in all the methods and modes thereof, can now be explicated to the human understanding. We know, *a priori*, that harmony must exist between all God's procedures and administrations. But it does not follow that we can see the points of contact between many truths which we are compelled to admit. To insist on such a condition of the acceptance of truth, is really to undermine the possibility of faith, and erect in its place the fabric of unmitigated skepticism. It is to deny that we now know only in part, and assert that a finite mind can fully span the infinite. An iron ship will swim, and an iron anchor sink. Is this not to be believed, on the testimony of the senses, by children, or was it not to be believed by the world in its childhood, because they have not, or had not, found out the law of nature which explains

how these two facts are mutually consistent? Can a finite mind take in all those reasons and grounds of procedure that open themselves to the mind of God through eternity and immensity? And yet, unless this is so, all Dr. Squier's arguments to prove that God's procedures and manifestations in nature and revelation are reasonable and harmonious, are aside of the issue. And, in order to prove his point, he must show that we are never to walk by faith in contrast with sight; but that we see through everything which we are required to believe. From his unceasing and embittered assaults on a faith in any sense "blind and sightless," as well as from other evidence which we shall now adduce, we judge that Dr. Squier does not shrink from this abyss, but rather glories in leaping into it;—with all respect we must say, not knowing what he does.

He refers his readers to his chapters on the "Advantages of the Philosophic Method," and on "Moral Evil," as deserving of special consideration. In the former of these, we find a feeble and confused echo of Dr. Hickok, with an occasional dash from Cousin. He tells us:

"We gain the infallible ideas or first truths of reason. We seek the *rationale* of being, and comprehend the possible idea as well as objective law of knowledge and truth. *This is philosophy.* It takes cognizance of all, . . . and gains the *possible* as well as the actual of being. . . . . It regards all truth, and would give the law of it. It embraces the three categories of truth—the *finite*, the *infinite*, and the *relations* between them." Pp. 256, 257.

"Philosophy then *comprehends the law of the infinite*, and asserts the indispensable and necessary perfections of God, and finds itself verified in the oral statements of the revelation which he has given. Philosophy embraces the finite also, and analyzes its contents and characteristics. It gives the sphere of the finite, *and shows what it can and cannot contain.*" P. 259.

This is evidently Dr. Hickok's "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence," and of all being, even of that "law of the Infinite," which conditions his working, and determines all the possibilities of knowing and being, with an

attempt to adjust it to the key-note of Cousin's Philosophy. The whole culminates in the following grand climacteric:

"With the being and perfections of God, we infallibly get the principles of all necessary truth. From that central element radiate all the relations between the infinite and finite —between God and all else, and we have the economy of the physical and moral universe." Pp. 270, 271.

Somewhat of an achievement for creatures of yesterday who know nothing. The only comment we have to offer on such a pretension to penetrate the clouds and darkness which veil the Most High, shall be in words which the Holy Ghost teacheth.

"O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!

"For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?

"For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever, Amen." Rom. xi. 33—36.

No wonder that, after this, he signifies his amazement at the difficulties which "such men as Chalmers, and Barnes, and Stuart, and Hodge, in the present, not to refer to the scholars of past time," have encountered in interpreting Romans vii., and other passages. Such difficulties have no existence for one who flatters himself that he can "comprehend the possible idea and objective law of all knowledge and truth." An ignorant navigator sees no perils where the intelligent helmsman is on his guard against shoals and breakers, and

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread."

The great problem which Dr. Squier claims to have solved, is that of accounting for the existence of moral evil. In lieu of what he somewhere calls the "old view," as if his own were a new discovery or solution, he offers the familiar theory which has been debated by polemics of all generations, but in this age and country has been most prominently associated with the name of Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor. It was one of the two or three cardinal principles of what was known as "Taylorism," and which at length excited so general and decisive a repug-

nance to what was called New Divinity. This solution is, in brief, as follows: that moral agency involves a power of choice and contrary choice which may act either way "despite all opposing power;" that nothing can be sinful, or holy, or invested with moral quality, which is not the act, or the effect of the act of such a power; that, in consequence, the existence of moral agents and moral government, implies the possibility of their sinning, beyond the power of God to hinder it; that if moral agents choose to sin, and thus introduce moral evil into a moral kingdom, it is impossible to prevent it, without destroying their moral agency, and thus the very possibility of sin, holiness, and moral government. We have no space to quote, but we refer for proof that this is Dr. Squier's solution, specially to pages 325, 326, of the chapter on Moral Evil in his *Reason and the Bible*, and generally, to all that he has written on the subject. In reference to this whole matter, we simply observe:

1. That none of his writings throw any new light on the subject. It is simply amazing that one who has had so much to do with the church controversies of the last thirty years, should suppose that anything contained in either of these volumes entitles either of them to be called, in reference to this great mystery of the origin of evil, "The Problem Solved," or to be regarded as a discovery or new contribution to the solution of the problem.

2. He does not even appear to apprehend the difficulties of the question, or to notice many of the unanswerable objections that have so often been offered to his theory. This theory undermines the Divine decrees, and consequent foreknowledge, sovereignty, providence, election, the conservation of saints and angels in holiness and blessedness—in short, the stability of heaven itself. This liability of moral agents to sin, it is maintained, suppose what else you will, continues while moral agency continues. It may therefore subvert every plan, purpose, and arrangement of the Infinite God. It shadows with uncertainty every hope of salvation, and makes the pillars of heaven and the throne of God to tremble. It is in express contradiction to the word of God, which teaches that God doeth all things after the counsel of his own will, and that the hearts

of men are in his hands. It is contradicted by every prayer for renewing and sanctifying grace, for the conversion of others, for the spread of God's kingdom, and the gracious administration of his universal providence. In truth, this system logically divests God of his supremacy, which is virtually to ungod the universe and reduce it to helpless orphanage. The only guarantee that Dr. Squier can give us against such a catastrophe is, that "the unfallen universe will become too wise and confirmed in virtue for it, (sin,) and so get beyond the actual liability of it." We are afraid, if God's kingdom has no better security than this, it must reel to destruction. He tells us, "God did not decree the envy of Joseph's brethren, nor the malice and wickedness of the Jews" (when they crucified Christ.) "God no more purposed their agency in the matter, than they his. The event which was resultant of their wickedness, he turns to account, as he is wont to do in such contingencies,—the wickedness itself was in no sense of him."

This betrays a singular confusion of ideas, and is a direct contradiction of Scripture, which asserts, in regard to Joseph's brethren, that what they meant for evil "God MEANT for good;" and that the crucifiers of Christ did what God's "hand and counsel determined before should be done." "The wickedness was in no sense of Him," yet he chose not to prevent it, on account of the good he could educe from it. He MEANT it for good. How monstrous to pretend that events which, in themselves and their causes, lie at the very head-spring of the whole Divine administrations in the kingdoms of providence and grace, are in no sense purposed of God, or included in his plan! Let those consider this an escape from mystery who will; but it is an escape into absurdity and impiety. If such permission or non-prevention of sin is what Dr. Squier so strenuously protests against, as involving on the part of God what he calls a "strategic correlation to sin," so be it. Of course, this system limits all sin and holiness to acts ("a purpose," Dr. Squier somewhere says.) He expressly denies that it is any part of the office of the Holy Spirit to furnish a "supply of power" to lost and helpless man in securing "right affections and action in the soul." What, then, is his office? Or what statement could be in more direct contradiction to the

Bible, the creeds of Christendom, and the prayers of the people of God? We might multiply quotations indefinitely of like crudities, theologic, philosophic, and rationalistic. But we desist, and proceed to Mr. Childs's pamphlet, which reveals another stage of rationalistic progress, arising from the attempt to bring down all Christian doctrine to the level of each man's reason, common sense, feeling, or "sense of honour and right."

Mr. Childs's Pamphlet.

This production, which we are glad to see has reached a second edition, both on account of its ability and the great moment of the matters treated in it, gives us the main facts in regard to two recent ordinations and installations of pastors over two prominent Congregational churches in Connecticut—one the South Church in Hartford, of which the Rev. Dr. Walter Clark had for many years been pastor; the other the church in Manchester, a rural village in the vicinity of that city.

On the eleventh day of January, 1860, Mr. Edwin Pond Parker was ordained and installed pastor of the former of these churches. He was a graduate of Bangor Theological Seminary, and had been recommended as "sound in theology" by the Rev. Dr. Pond, Professor in that Institution. The ecclesiastical council by which he was installed was, according to Congregational usage, selected by the church, *pro re nata*, and expired with the occasion which gave it birth. It consisted, of course, of the pastors and delegates of such churches as the church in question was pleased to select for the emergency. It contained, however, some members of high position and of great weight of character and influence. Among them were the Rev. Dr. Vermilye, Professor of Theology in East Windsor Seminary, Rev. Dr. Harris, Professor of Theology in Bangor, and father-in-law of the candidate, the Rev. Dr. Samuel Spring, Trustee of East Windsor Theological Seminary, and the Rev. Dr. Hawes, Trustee of Yale College and Theological Seminary. The examination was public, and continued for some hours. What openly transpired there was the property of the public. To prevent all misapprehension, however, it is proper to say here, that Dr. Vermilye of East

Windsor, alone, of the whole council, voted against sustaining the examination of Mr. Parker.

The Rev. Thomas S. Childs, pastor of the Presbyterian church in Hartford, was present at this examination, and took careful notes of the hinge questions and answers. He soon sent a letter, giving a brief account of it, to a friend, who forwarded it to the *New York Observer* and one or two other journals for publication. What immediately follows will not be wholly new to that numerous class of our readers who are also readers of the *Observer*. In this letter it is declared that

"He rejected emphatically the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. He was not clear on the Trinity, doubted as to the use of the word *Person*, and stated that the unity of God meant one personality.

"All sin and holiness were affirmed by him to be voluntary. God has no holy nature. Man has no sinful nature. Every man has ability (in the sense of "adequate power") to fulfil the commands of God, even to sinless perfection in the present life.

"The gospel is not absolutely necessary to the salvation of adult heathen. Some are undoubtedly saved without it. God will give all men a fair chance, and Christ died with the same design for all. Hence if all men have not had a *fair chance* in this life, they will have it after death. The candidate stated openly, that he inclined to the belief that after death, and before the final judgment, there was a state (Hades) for all souls—where some who had died impenitent—some even who had rejected Christ in this life—would have a new offer of Christ and salvation, and the gift of the Holy Ghost, and be saved: so that if called to the death-bed of an impenitent sinner, and knowing that he had but a short definite time to live, he would not shut him up to faith in Christ within that time, or final ruin.

"These views were in direct conflict with the articles of the Church, to which every private member is required to give his assent. Yet they were not regarded by the council as a disqualification for the pastorship." P. 6.

To which the *Observer* appended the following testimony,

with the accompanying appropriate and indisputable comment. "It is in harmony with what we hear from various quarters. The fact that a respectable number of ministers in any part of the country would consent to induct such a teacher as this candidate into the ministry, to preach such another gospel as the above, is enough to fill with painful apprehension the mind of every Christian who believes the truths there denied to be essential to the integrity of the gospel of Christ."

This brought a prompt rejoinder into the columns of the *Observer*, over the signature of Drs. Hawes and Spring, in which they pronounced the letter of Mr. Childs a "succession of misrepresentations, exaggerations, suppressions, and falsities;" the *Observer's* "sources of information strangely corrupt;" Mr. Parker "maligned;" the ministers implicated "calumniated and aggrieved." "The wail of sorrow which arises from your correspondent at the imagined apostasies of Connecticut churches is so dolorously *soloistic* as to sound very ludicrously about here!" One of them, in a communication to the *Presbyterian Expositor*, declared Mr. Childs's representation "wholly at variance with the truth; that he either stolidly misapprehended, or wilfully misrepresented his (Mr. Parker's) views." How did they vindicate Mr. Parker's orthodoxy, and these severe accusations against Mr. Childs? Their main proofs appear to consist of quotations from a creed read by Mr. Parker to the council, touching the points in question. We prefer to let him speak for himself, where his defenders quote him in order to prove what they call his "manly and frank way of stating the truth." Say Messrs. Hawes and Spring:

"The first charge refers to 'Inspiration.' 'He denied emphatically the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures.' This implies that the candidate held such views as would invalidate the authority of Scripture. Hear his creed:

"'The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament * * * were written by men inspired of the Holy Ghost. They are a *unit* —a body—of which the various books are the members; each book has a polarity towards the cross of Christ; hence *all* this Scripture is inspired. It is the "word of God." While the Logos is the Revealer and the Revelation, the Holy Ghost is

the distinctive inspiring Power, enabling the sacred penman to give an adequate expression of the truth, whether revealed to them, naturally apprehended by them, or simply communicated through them.'

"Whether this implies verbal inspiration or not, it contains all that is necessary to make the Scriptures a complete and authoritative rule of faith."

As it is conceded on all hands that he denied verbal inspiration, Mr. Childs is fully vindicated on this head. And if any language can indicate the dreamy, unauthoritative pseudo-inspiration of modern mystico-transcendentalism, which leaves every one at liberty to accept as much or as little of the Bible as he pleases, it is surely done in the foregoing article of faith. What is "an adequate expression of the truth?" One in which all the words are written by Divine guidance? or one in which much of this language is to be explained away as an uninspired, and therefore unsatisfactory and unreliable statement of the mind of God?

The next article of his creed offered, is upon the Trinity, as follows:

"I believe in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. I believe in only one God. (Art. I.) Christ is the God-human, the humiliation of the eternal Logos. The *proof* of this doctrine is found only in the Bible. It is a *rational* doctrine; and was chiefly held in the apostolic and patriarchal church. I believe in the divinity of the Holy Ghost."

This does not disprove any statement of Mr. Childs. It is far enough from proving its author sound on the Trinity. It contains language which awakens a contrary apprehension. We should look for some of these phrases from an erratic or ignorant, not from an intelligent, orthodox divine. It is clearly and incontrovertibly proved that he did, in his examination, declare the unity of God to mean "one personality," which is no more than we should expect from the confessor of such a creed as the foregoing. Dr. Harris, his father-in-law, offers the following analysis of the subject, which only relieves Mr. Parker by betraying his own inexplicable confusion of mind in the premises. "What he said of the term *persons* was the statement, familiar, I had supposed to all theologians, that

the term *person* is not applied to the distinctions of the Trinity in the full ordinary sense; that God is not one person in the same sense in which he is three persons." We submit that this proves not only Mr. Parker, but Dr. Harris, "not clear on the trinity"; and as to the proper "use of the word person," Mr. Childs is fully sustained on this point.

In regard to ability, a holy and sinful nature, the salvation of the heathen, Mr. Childs is fully borne out in his statements by the following article of Mr. Parker's creed, and by Messrs. Hawes and Spring's comments on it, as follows:

"*Psychologically*, I believe holiness is the supreme choice of the mind, by which the person is devoted to the *universal*, rather than to his individual interests and good. I believe that *by nature*, men are sinners. That such is the corruption of the soul, that each person, obeying the influence of the depraved appetite and desires, will sin so soon as he comes to act consciously of the right and wrong. I do not believe that man is blameworthy, either for his nature or its hereditary corruption." Say Messrs. Hawes and Spring, "Who does believe so? or who can believe otherwise than this article expresses?* The next thing charged is this—'The gospel is not actually necessary to the salvation of adult heathen.' The candidate said no such thing. He explicitly stated, 'there is *no salvation* without Christ!' He believed that some heathen, as some other persons who have never heard of Christ, may be renewed and saved through him, or on account of what he has done: but '*all by Christ!*' This is no new doctrine, nor is it any heresy. Watts, Emmons, Dwight, and other theologians held it, and it is taught in several confessions of faith adopted by the Reformed Church—the Presbyterian Church, and others."†

* Their letter in the *Recorder* contains the following in addition: "As to what the letter charges, that the candidate holds that every man has ability in the sense of 'adequate power' to fulfil the commands of God"—let that speak for itself. It is accounted no deadly heresy, at least in this part of the country, to hold that man has power to do what God commands him to do; or, that he cannot be justly blamed or punished for not doing impossibilities."

† For a direct contradiction of this statement, see Larger Catechism, question 60: "They who having never heard the gospel, know not Jesus Christ, and believe not on him, cannot be saved, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, or the laws of that religion they profess."

This proves not that Mr. Parker is sound in regard to ability, original sin and righteousness, the salvation of the heathen, &c., but that his case is only one in a wide-spread and serious defection from the truth of God in relation to this class of subjects.

We come now to the crucial point. We call it so, not because enough of looseness and latitudinarianism has not already been shown, but because the discussions upon this case have chiefly centred upon this, as quite the most novel and startling of Mr. Parker's doctrinal outgivings. We refer to the future condition and opportunities of those who die in impenitence. In fact, this is the only point regarding which there has been any serious dispute as to the creed of the candidate. And this now appears to be placed beyond all doubt. Mr. Childs, corroborated by Dr. Vermilye, "as to all essential particulars," confirms his original charge by the following explicit testimony and cogent arguments.

"7. We now come to the 'crisis'*—Mr. Parker's views of the future state. And we shall meet the whole matter by a simple statement of facts which we stand ready to verify before any tribunal.

(1.) The germ of his views was *in his written creed.* Why did not Drs. Hawes and Spring ask us to 'hear his creed' on this point?

(2.) After an examination upon the subject which had gone on to weariness, with questions and cross questions, with explanations and counter explanations, the candidate did say frankly and explicitly, 'I wish to conceal nothing; *I will state my position upon this whole subject.* I INCLINE TO THE BELIEF that there is after death a state (Hades) for all souls, good and bad, where the good are happy, and where some who have died impenitent may have a chance of salvation,' &c. In reply to inquiries, he stated that he supposed this salvation would be in connection with the means of grace—the offer of Christ and the gift of the Holy Ghost.

(3.) He not only stated it; he argued it; feebly and doubt-

* This was the word used by Mr. Parker in his creed, to denote that point of time beyond the grave, up to which he was understood as entertaining hope for some who died impenitent.

fully indeed, but he argued it. He said he thought there were passages of Scripture which pointed to such a state, *e.g.*, 'Christ preached to the spirits in prison.'

(4.) He not only argued it, he called upon the Council to prove that the doctrine was not true. 'Will any one quote to me a scriptural proof against this view?'

(5.) When asked to reconcile his doctrine with the articles of the church over which he was about to be installed, and which articles affirm that men are to be judged 'according to the deeds done in the body,' he replied that he should not interpret the 'deeds done in the body,' as referring strictly to the present life.

(6.) He applied his theory, not merely to some who 'had never heard of Christ,' but to those who had heard and died unbelieving. Surely the gentlemen cannot have forgotten the case so solemnly put and so unequivocally answered: 'Suppose, sir, you were called to the death-bed of an impenitent man, and knew that he had but ten minutes to live; would you tell him that he must repent and believe in Christ within that time or be lost?"

(*Ans.*) "I would not." P. 17.

Drs. Hawes and Spring, in a reply designed to parry the foregoing evidence, and, if possible, defend Mr. Parker by inculpating Mr. Childs, though in a somewhat chastened tone, as compared with their original communication, say,

"We well remember, and the Council will remember, that Mr. Parker presented in defence of his possible theory, the supposition of a youth educated in all the ignorance and crime of the "Five Points," who had never heard of the way of salvation, and yet in whose moral sensibilities there might still remain some ground for the hope that if Christ were understandingly proposed to him he would accept the Saviour. Such an one he *would not* shut up conclusively to present faith in Christ or final perdition. We do not defend or approve his views. They are repulsive to our moral sense. We had rather leave such a case where the Scriptures have left it. The judge of all the earth will do right. We only state the facts as they can easily be recalled by every member of the Council."

The fact here stated, not the comments upon it, is also wit-

nessed by Dr. Harris, and Mr. Parker himself, in a communication deformed by some feeble and flippant thrusts at Messrs. Childs and Vermilye. Thus the original allegations of Mr. Childs in regard to the doctrinal aberrations displayed by this candidate are unanswerably sustained. It is with no pleasure that we find ourselves constrained to this conclusion. For the sake of evangelical truth and piety, it would be far more grateful to believe that Mr. Childs was bewildered by some misunderstanding or unaccountable hallucination.

We reserve the comments which these facts suggest, till we shall have brought before our readers a succinct account of the Manchester ordination, which quickly followed that in Hartford.

On May 31, 1860, a Council, called by invitation of the Congregational church in Manchester, Connecticut, for the purpose of ordaining and installing Mr. L. M. Dorman as pastor of that church, proceeded to examine him with reference thereto. The Council, of which the venerable Dr. Calhoun was a member, contained representatives of the two schools of New England Theology. They unanimously refused to procced to the ordination of the candidate, on account of the lax views, as disclosed by the examination, which he entertained "on inspiration, election, depravity, and, above all, probation after death."

Immediately the church invited another Council, which convened a week afterwards, and included only two ministers who were members of the first. One of these two ministers thus excepted, had signalized himself by the publication of an able defence of Dr. Bushnell, when his case was the subject of vehement controversy. In each Council it is understood that he voted against the candidate; and, as we have been informed, was quite surprised to find Dr. Hawes, who, in the former controversy was arrayed against him in behalf of orthodoxy, now arrayed against him in protecting a laxity of doctrine which he dared not sanction. For of this second Council, it is not surprising that Drs. Hawes, Spring, and Mr. Parker, after the part they had so recently enacted at Hartford, were leading members. The following reports of his examination were published soon afterwards, without question of their accuracy, as

is stated, from any quarter. In addition to these, another painfully significant statement was published, and, so far as we are advised, uncontradicted, in connection with the reports and discussions to which it gave rise.

"One of the correspondents of the *Recorder* states, that at the examination of Mr. Dorman, 'a member of the Manchester church expressed his concern at finding that certain young preachers hold that salvation will be offered to some who die impenitent.' 'A theological student' with whom he was conversing, '*assured him that most of his associates in professional study adopted that opinion.*' The correspondent asks with point, 'Is this one of the signs of the times?' "

Says one reporter in the Boston *Recorder:* "The Moderator and his associates were not a little troubled to ascertain what Mr. Dorman believed on some important points, and some of them were still more troubled by his explicit avowals on other points.

"On the question whether the gospel will be offered to any of the human race in the future world who die impenitent, the candidate was more reserved than when before the first Council, but there was no retraction or essential modification of the views then expressed. He admitted no connection between Adam's sin and the sin and ruin of his posterity, except what he was pleased to state thus:—'Adam set a very bad example.' The Bible was written only in part by inspiration of God. By *election* we are to understand simply, that God foresaw who would accept the gospel, and them he determined to save. He thought it probable, and after much questioning he was almost confident, that all true believers will persevere in holiness and be finally saved. On the doctrine of divine decrees the answers were so singular that Dr. Hawes referred the candidate to his license, which certified his assent to the creed of the Presbyterian church. But he declined giving his assent, at Manchester, to the doctrine in question as laid down in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. The Moderator then produced the creed of the church over which it was proposed to ordain him. He was understood to dissent positively from the Manchester Confession, also, respecting the decrees of God."

"Rev. Mr. Oviatt, who was certainly not unfriendly to Mr. Dorman or the Council, says:

" 'During the early part of the examination, Mr. Dorman appeared tolerably well; during the latter part, far otherwise. To many of the leading questions, his answers were very equivocal, certainly 'non-committal.' I remember distinctly the questions I put to him, and his answers thereto, almost word for word. I will give them in substance, and nearly verbatim, without the quotation marks. What is election? Answer.—I suppose God's choosing some. Why does God choose some? Answer.—I cannot tell. I sometimes lean to opinion that God chooses some for reasons best known to himself, and sometimes I lean to the opinion that God chooses whom he does, because he foresees that they will repent and believe in Christ; and and therefore he elects them. · I read the article in the 'Confession of Faith' of the church in Manchester, on election, and asked the candidate how he would expound it in a sermon, should his people request him to preach on this doctrine. Answer.—I don't know; I am studying the Bible to find out. With regard to probation, I asked him, do you or do you not believe that the probation of all men ends at death? Answer. —I cannot tell. God will give all men a fair chance. Faith in Christ is necessary to salvation. There may be some, I sometimes think, who, not having a sufficient knowledge of Christ in this world, will have an offer of pardon after death. I am not satisfied on this subject. About it I have my doubts. I don't know that any to whom I may ever preach in this land, will be among the number of those who have another chance after death. I asked, On what texts do you ground the belief of a probation *for any*, after death? Answer.—'All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.' &c.

" 'The license to preach, given to him by (I think) the Third Presbytery of New York, which specifies that he in his examination by that body assented to the 'Confession of Faith,' was read, when the Moderator asked him, Do you now believe as you did at the time this license was given to you? Answer.— I don't know but I do. Do you believe in the main, in the

Assembly's Catechism? Answer.—I don't know. I don't know much about the Catechism. With regard to the "Perseverance of the Saints," the candidate was equivocal, undetermined in his answers. All through the examination, the candidate was, in respect to many leading, fundamental doctrines, thus indefinite in his statements: seldom answering a question definitely, distinctly.

"'I was unwilling to ordain and install Mr. Dorman; to me, the way was not open thus to proceed for these reasons:— 1. I seriously thought Mr. Dorman unsound in *the faith*, in some essential particulars. 2. I thought he was too undetermined in his faith, was too full of doubts, leaned in too many different directions, to be set over the church in Manchester.'

"The examination lasted from three to four hours, and resulted in a vote, by a majority of four, to proceed to the ordination. On this majority were Dr. Hawes, Dr. Spring, and Mr. Parker." Pp. 61, 62.

Among the obvious comments which the foregoing facts suggest, the principal to which we briefly call attention are,

1. As to the extent and gravity of the doctrinal defection thus manifested. This may be estimated either with reference to the doctrines rejected, or the numbers who reject them. In regard to the former, it is clear that this young coterie of ministers and students for the ministry adopt all the common-places of the New-school Theology, and somewhat more. This addition consists in pushing the standard New-school objections to the "Five Points," towards some logical consequences which their abettors have hitherto disowned. Thus the objections against original sin, including hereditary guilt and pollution, and the imputation of Adam's sin, no longer stop with linking the fall of the race with the fall of Adam, by mere sovereign constitution. All special connection between the fall of Adam and that of his posterity is denied, and his influence upon his descendants is reduced to that of mere "example." Plenary ability is pressed to its necessary consequence, of undermining Election and Perseverance. The anthropopathic view of God's attitude towards sin, and his modes of dealing with sinful creatures, must necessarily sooner or later impinge upon the doctrine of the everlasting inevitable punishment of those

who die in unbelief. Those modes of thinking and feeling, which run athwart the doctrines of Original Sin and sinful Inability, in order to "give all men a fair chance," must, by parity of reason, demand a "probation hereafter" for those who have not been duly plied with the means of grace in this life. It has been shown a hundred times, that out of such principles, coupled with the conceded facts in nature and providence for premises, true logic will readily, and, in due time, surely, evolve Universalism, then Infidelity, and then Atheism. The denial of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures is itself, by necessary implication, the denial of all authoritative inspiration whatever. It leaves all free to pick and choose what portions and interpretations of Scripture they please, and to disown the residue. The startling peculiarity of the doctrinal manifestations among young ministers and theological students which we have presented to our readers is, that they give up even a nominal or pretended adhesion to doctrines heretofore confessed by the evangelical world, and show a positive affinity, heretofore unknown among those claiming to be orthodox, with the doctrinal license and negations of what is, in profession, "liberal christianity," in reality, baptized infidelity. And, in fact, this is one branch of the only alternative for what has been so long known as "New Divinity." It is not in itself a completed, self-poised, and self-sustaining system. The principles with which it impugns standard theology, if good for this, are good for a great deal more, as Dr. Squier's books abundantly show. They cannot be long operative among bodies of men without doing a vastly greater work of destruction than rounding off a few sharp points of "triangular theology." They will do the work which is going on among these young candidates for the ministry, and not only this, but much more. The other branch of the alternative is to renounce them. We rejoice also that this process has been going on in multitudes of men, both in New England and elsewhere. They see its logical contradiction to the most fundamental truths, and its experimental disagreement with their own Christian consciousness. But the system known as New Divinity cannot remain stationary. Its peculiarities must pass away, either by dying out, or by growing into far more pernicious and fatal

errors. In the New-school Presbyterian body, the former tendency has, as we rejoice to believe, for some time been most active and powerful—Dr. Squier's demonstrations to the contrary notwithstanding. Among Congregationalists, the two appear to be antagonizing, with an issue as yet uncertain.

As to the extent to which this liberalism has already leavened the Congregational mind, we have no great means of knowing beyond the information given in this pamphlet. We are credibly informed, however, that there have been several like cases. It is quite obvious that the endorsement given to these latitudinarian views, by both councils, was largely due to the exertions and influence of Drs. Hawes and Spring, especially the former. How far then are they to be regarded as representative men in such matters? Judging from their antecedents we should have said, eminently so,—at least, that what doctrines they would endorse, would be endorsed by a vast majority of Congregational ministers and churches. We hope it may be otherwise in the present case, and that their course is due to some of those unaccountable influences of private friendship or personal partiality for the candidates, or their friends, or the churches which had called them, or to some special idiosyncrasy and anomaly in their modes of thinking on these subjects, which, in rare instances, blind and pervert the judgments of the best and ablest men, so that they are not, *quoad hoc*, representative of those whom they usually represent. The fact that the council which installed Mr. Parker was swayed by these venerable men; embarrassed by the presence and tender urgency of the father-in-law of the candidate, himself a Professor of Theology; that the first council called to ordain Mr. Dorman unanimously rejected him; that the second, composed of men selected for the very purpose of surmounting the scruples which prevented the first from proceeding, under the earnest pleas of Messrs. Hawes, Spring, Parker, and their coadjutors, could be induced to give but a small majority for the ordination of the candidate, and that a large minority withdrew from all participation in the proceedings; that even those who had actively defended Dr. Bushnell opposed these candidates as unsound in the faith; induce us to hope that the manifestations under consideration are as yet

rather local, personal, and exceptional, than characteristic and normal in the Congregational body. Still, in any point of view, they are alarming. They betray tendencies which, unless successfully withstood, must prove absolutely destructive. We are glad that many among our Congregational brethren appreciate the services of Mr. Childs in his very faithful and candid presentation of the facts in the case, which arrested the attention and commanded the approbation of multitudes of the best people in the land, while it brought upon him the vehement censures of Messrs. Hawes and Spring. It is indeed ominous, that such men could have permitted themselves to insinuate that New England was unanimous in giving countenance to such liberalism, in the taunt, as turgid as groundless, that Mr. Childs in his complaints was "dolorously soloistic."

2. We call attention to but a single other point strikingly illustrated in the foregoing narrative—we mean the incompetency of Congregational councils to guard the truth as it is in Jesus, or to exclude such as impugn and deny it from the ministry. The case of Mr. Dorman, like innumerable others, shows that single Congregational churches can do whatever they choose, with rare exceptions. Whatever pastor they may choose, whatever doctrines or measures they may adopt, however contrary to the faith and practice of their own denomination or of Christendom, there is no regular, organic, restraining or corrective power from the church universal. It is, indeed, the custom to invite a council representing other churches, to sanction their choice of a pastor, and solemnly induct him into the sacred office; but they can pick the members of this council to suit their own purposes. And if the first body selected disappoints them, they can choose another, and still another, scouring the land till they can find parties who will serve their purposes. No body of Christians could long preserve its purity and integrity against such enginery. In every communion isolated persons can be hunted up, who, from weakness of intellect or will, under severe pressure, or from positive heretical pravity, will give sanction or tolerance to almost any scheme of doctrine when plausibly presented. Such a system of polity is, therefore, impotent for the main-

tenance of doctrine or order. It fails just where alone polity is of any use; where errors or scandals are to be kept out or purged out. So long as parties can pick their own judges, and if one tribunal fails them, construct another, more shrewdly selected for the very purpose of overbearing it, what authority can control them?

Messrs. Hawes and Spring and their coadjutors endeavour to break the force of Mr. Childs's disclosures by alleging that he sees with Presbyterian, and, therefore, prejudiced eyes, predisposed to detect and exaggerate faults and errors among Congregationalists. His dissatisfaction with these doctrines is accounted for by his looking from a "Presbyterian standpoint." We think this a reflection upon our Congregational brethren, which the facts do not justify, and which, if coming from a Presbyterian source, would justly offend them. Is it indeed so, that Congregationalists see nothing wrong in such doctrinal manifestations as those brought under review? The votes at Manchester, and the course of the *Puritan Recorder*, to go no further, evince the contrary. It betrays a conviction of the weakness of their cause, thus to raise an irrelevant issue, whereby sectarian prejudice may be invoked to overshadow and veil from view doctrinal derelictions. But since this issue has been raised by them, not by Presbyterians, it is proper to remark, that Presbyterian polity affords channels unknown to Congregationalism, through which the vigour and soundness of the whole church can operate for the removal of corruptions and disorders in particular localities. This was so obvious in the early history of the Connecticut churches, that they framed the Saybrook Platform for the express purpose of introducing the Presbyterian element of *fixed* ecclesiastical tribunals, which they called Consociations, whose judgments were final and conclusive upon all parties, with the intent of obviating the ecclesiastical confusion and anarchy which had become ascendant more than a century and a half ago. This Presbyterian element was so conspicuous in this constitution, that, until a very recent period, the Congregationalists of Connecticut were commonly called, and called themselves Presbyterians. By degrees, however, one Consociation after another abdicated its prerogative of ordaining, installing, and dismissing pastors,

acting in judicial cases, and on "all occasions ecclesiastical," with conclusive authority. The result is, that these bodies, with occasional exceptions, have become mere organizations which keep up a traditional annual meeting, and pay some attention to the state of religion, missions, and charitable contributions within their bounds. All ecclesiastical business proper is remanded to the transient picked councils from whom it was originally taken. All ecclesiastical authority beyond that of single congregations is thus at an end. Hence the events now transpiring. Even Dr. Hawes said in a sermon preached in Boston within a few years, before the Congregational Board of Publication, that Congregationalism had two great wants, "a common creed and a better organization." He urged the necessity of this reform in order to keep its "hold of the conservative and thoughtful," and avoid falling into the hands of "the rash and radical." This opinion is eminently just, and could hardly have had a stronger confirmation than in those late events in which he has performed so important a part. How great and deplorable is the change in this regard, within the present century, during most of which Dr. Hawes has held a commanding position and influence, not only in his own vicinity, but in all Connecticut and New England, is well shown by Mr. Childs in the following passage, which is, in other ways, interesting and instructive.

"It does seem to us time we were done with the miserable attempts to forestall the defence of truth and the exposure of error, by the perpetual cry of 'Presbyterianism.' The simple fact is, the *professed* doctrines of Congregationalism and Presbyterianism are identical. The doctrines now held and taught in the Old-school Presbyterian Church are neither more nor less than the precise doctrines of the New England standards and the New England fathers. To denounce and ridicule these doctrines is to denounce and ridicule the original faith of New England. To overthrow these is to overthrow the foundations of the New England churches. Let us understand, then, what those men are doing who appeal to the churches by the outcry of 'Presbyterianism' and 'Princetonism.' Let us understand that under this cover the battle is waged against the

bulwarks of our faith—against the foundations of the true New England theology and of the word of God.

"It deserves to be said that our fathers had none of this jealousy of Presbyterianism. They were neither afraid nor ashamed of the name. The writer has before him two volumes of 'Sermons by Nathan Strong; Pastor of the North PRESBYTERIAN Church in Hartford, Conn.,' printed in 1798–1800. Dr. Strong, as we have said, was the immediate predecessor of Dr. Hawes. In 1799 the *Hartford North Association* of ministers, composed of such men as Drs. Strong and Flint of Hartford, and Dr. Perkins of West Hartford, made the following declaration of their principles:

"'This Association give information to all whom it may concern, that the constitution of the churches in the State of Connecticut, founded on the common usages, and the Confession of Faith, Heads of Agreement, and articles of Church Discipline, adopted at the earliest period of the settlement of the State, *is not Congregational, but contains the essentials of the government of the Church of Scotland, or* [*the*] *Presbyterian Church in America;* particularly as it gives a decisive power to ecclesiastical councils; and a consociation, consisting of ministers and messengers, or a lay representation from the churches, is possessed of substantially the same authority as Presbytery. The judgments, decisions, and censures in our churches and in the Presbyterian are mutually deemed valid. *The churches, therefore, in Connecticut at large, and in our district in particular, are not now, and never were, from the earliest period of our settlement, Congregational churches,* according to the ideas and forms of church order contained in the Book of Discipline, called the Cambridge Platform. There are, however, scattered over the State, perhaps ten or twelve churches, (*unconsociated,*) which are properly called Congregational, agreeably to the rules of Church Discipline, in the book above mentioned. Sometimes, indeed, the associated churches of Connecticut are loosely and vaguely, though improperly, termed Congregational. While our churches in the State at large are, in the most essential and important respects, the same as the Presbyterian, still in minute and unimportant points of church order and discipline,

both we and the Presbyterian Church in America acknowledge a difference.'

"According to this testimony, the true and proper form of the Connecticut churches is *Presbyterian*, and not Congregational. And can any man doubt where Drs. Strong and Perkins would have stood at such a time as this? Would they have opposed sound Presbyterianism for the sake of unsound Congregationalism?" P. 58.

Is there any reasonable probability that either of these ordinations could have been consummated, if this ancient Consociation and those adjacent to it had retained their original and appropriate functions?

We are far from saying that any ecclesiastical constitution whatever, administered by imperfect men, will be a sure and unfailing safeguard against the intrusion of error and disorder. We are far from saying that the best and purest forms of church polity may not sometimes, through ignorance, passion, and partisanship, be perverted so as to work oppression and injustice. But if this be a sufficient argument against them, it is an argument against all church government and order, and in favour of unmitigated confusion and anarchy in the sphere of religion. Certainly it will not be pretended that no such evils occur in the exercise of government by single congregations, which may, if they choose, and often do in fact, prevent any effective appeal from their oppressive acts. Yet will it be pretended that, notwithstanding such drawbacks, discipline of this kind is not better than utter ecclesiastical anarchy and licentiousness? It is one thing that errors and disorders creep in, notwithstanding the best provisions for preventing them, which sometimes fail, though ordinarily sufficient for the purpose. It is quite another, that all barriers are prostrated, and the door is purposely opened to invite whatever inroads upon truth and order any may choose to make. In the latter case the friends of the gospel find themselves helpless against the inrushing floods of error, and put at every disadvantage in contending for the faith once delivered to the saints. Crimes will sometimes be committed under the most perfect governments, and in the best ordered communities. Will it be said, therefore, that good government is useless, that no government

is better, or that because it does not repress all crime, it does not nevertheless repress so much, that, without it, earth would be one vast Pandemonium?

Rev. H. W. Beecher's Sermon on Justification.

Since the foregoing was written, the last of the productions placed at the head of this article has been given to the world. The rationalistic views of sin and punishment already brought to the notice of our readers must, by unrelenting consequence, press upon expiation, atonement, and redemption. If sin has not that intrinsic demerit which renders it, whether in the inhabitants of Christian or heathen lands, deserving of eternal punishment; if sinful dispositions as well as acts are not justly obnoxious to condemnation and penalty; if it is harsh and cruel, or contrary to "honour and right" in God to visit pains and penalties which would be unbecoming in a high-souled man, or tender-hearted human parent, in like circumstances, then not only must the doctrine of punishment crumble away under the shock of such antagonistic principles; but expiation and atonement, by the substitution of the sufferings and sacrifice of another in the sinner's stead, must also fall before them. Our readers scarcely need to be informed of the development of such consequences, and the utter rejection of the doctrine of vicarious atonement by Dr. Bushnell some years since, in his *God in Christ*. We wish to make a record of a still more flagrant repudiation of the whole method of justification through the atonement of Christ, in the sermon by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, circulated among multitudes of admiring readers in the columns of the *Independent*. The following extracts speak for themselves.

"And this is the root idea of justification before God. There is a heart-power in God, which, when it falls upon the soul, acts just as benefaction does between man and man; between parent and child; between benefactor and orphan. That which you see of the nature of noble qualities in the ten thousand relations of life in fragments and in imperfect operation, has its full glorious form in the soul of God; and the heart of God is so pure, so gracious, so sweet, so beneficent, that when there is nothing to prevent it from giving a heart-stroke to a sinful

soul, it melts the wickedness in that soul and overcomes it with superlative power, and redeems it.

"A man's justification, then, takes its origin, as we think of it, in his unworthiness, in his sinfulness, in his guilt, and in his danger; and he comes before God as a sinner. Then God looks upon him with saving compassion. Not on account of any arrangement that he has made, not on account of any expedient that he has set up, not on account of any settlement or plan that he has fixed, but on account of what he is, he looks upon a sinful man and says, 'I so love you that I accept you just as if you were not sinful.' This is illustrated by one of the simplest things in the world. A mother, when her child does wrong, says, 'My darling child, will you do so any more?' and tears are the child's answer, and she clasps him to her bosom without another word, and the matter is all settled. There is the mother's heart an atoning sacrifice for the child. Theologians have put forth the absurd notion that God has made a plan of salvation. As half a dozen men sometimes take up a poor debtor's affairs, and look at them, and put their heads together, and fix them, and then say to the man, 'Well, we think we have made a satisfactory adjustment of your affairs;' so theologians talk as if there was a kind of conference between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and as if after talking the matter over they concluded that they would help men out of their trouble, and made an arrangement for that purpose. They thus turn heaven into a counting-room and make God's everlasting love to be like a mere business committee; and so belittle the whole thing. They seem to think that God arranged with the Son, and that the Son agreed to suffer for the world, with the understanding that when he had suffered enough, mankind should be loved of God, and should be pardoned and helped by him. But what set the Father to begin this work of saving men at all, if he could not love them till after the Son had suffered for them? If that was the case, how came there to be any arrangement made? Where did it start? Or, did the Son love the world first, and tell the Father that he wished that he would redeem it? Is not the whole of this talk about a plan of salvation a mess of sheer ignorance, not to say nonsense?"

Again: "But at last there arises a sense of God's nature as loving, pitying, sympathizing, and healing. The heart of God is the world's hospital; and men that have been striving to get well by medicating themselves, becoming no better, but rather growing worse, at last gain this conception of God as one whose nature it is to accept men, not on account of any arrangement or plan that he has made, but for the purpose of healing him. When a man lays his case at the feet of his Master and says, 'Lord, I am a sinner come to be healed of sin,' with grace and benignity his Lord and Master says, 'Thee I accept. Thou art my child, I forgive the sins thou hast committed in the past, and accept thee for guidance, and education, and salvation in the future.'"

If ranker Socinianism than this can be found in the works of Socinius; or if a more complete repudiation of the scriptural and church doctrine of justification can be found in all the productions of Massachusetts Unitarians, we have yet to see it. If anything could be more offensive than the rejection of this article *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*, it is the light and flippant style in which it is assailed and disowned. We are glad that it did not pass without calling forth vigorous protests from leading Congregational journals, not only against the sermon, but against the *Independent*, for circulating such poison among its vast company of readers, without the slightest antidote in the way of editorial criticism or comment. These at length roused the *Independent* from its ominous silence. We are exceedingly sorry that along with some refutation of Mr. Beecher's outgivings, it offers a trifling and flimsy apology for them, and for its own course in publishing them, which deprive that refutation of its principal value as a testimony or protest against these dangerous and fatal sentiments. It says,

"The views of Mr. Beecher in the sermon here cited are condemned by several religious journals as a dangerous heresy, and *The Independent* is censured for giving them publicity. We confess that we were somewhat surprised when we came to read the sermon, which we did not happen to do until we saw the criticisms of our contemporaries upon it. But *The Inde-*

pendent is too well known as an advocate of New England Orthodoxy to be obliged to publish a disclaimer against whatever rhetorical license Mr. Beecher may take with phases of doctrine which he deems obnoxious. We do not believe that he had a thought of assailing the substance of the *doctrine* of justification by faith; but with an overflowing sense of the love of God, and a feeling that somehow that love is straitened by the theories of Princeton Repertories and Boston Reviews, he went off into a rhetorical *excursus* against that class of theologians, and not being versed in the technics of theological warfare, he made the mistake of firing upon the colours of his own regiment. His loyal heart will bring him back in due time, and it will hardly be worth while to court-martial him!"

We have too much respect for the perspicacity of this writer to suppose for one moment that he does not know that such a palliation as this is scarcely better than the thing thus extenuated. "Rhetorical license," or bewildered hostility to the *Princeton Repertory* and the *Boston Review*, will never excuse Mr. Beecher, or an angel from heaven, for preaching another gospel, and for giving such aid and comfort as the sermon in question offers to the enemies of the cross of Christ; or others for circulating it, and shielding it from merited condemnation, under the assumed *imprimatur* of being "advocates of New England Orthodoxy." When this sneering attack on the plan of salvation is retracted as broadly as it is proclaimed, then can we accept some such palliation as "rhetorical license," or a mental eclipse and hallucination regarding "Princeton Repertories,"—never before. We insist first of all on that which also we have received, "how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures." Nor ought the bold and obtrusive renunciation of this corner-stone of Christianity from the pulpit and the press, nor the flippant and trifling defence or palliation of such a course, by widely circulated Christian journals to pass without awakening notes of just alarm and righteous reprobation. This indeed is no uncertain sound. We do not mean that it shall be. It however falls short of the severity of censure expressed in some Congregational journals

that have hitherto been closely affiliated with the *Independent.** The extent and earnestness of this protest encourages the hope that the character of rationalism has now made itself sufficiently palpable to rouse an effective reaction against it; and that "as Jannes and Jambres, ... they shall proceed no farther, for their folly shall be manifest unto all men, as theirs also was." 2 Tim. iii. 8, 9.

* The following from the *Congregational Herald*, of Chicago, we reprint from the *New York Observer*, of July 25.

"We grieve to see such loose theology circulated in the columns of the *Independent*, and that its editors may know how those feel who have always sympathized with its views and have delighted to aid its progress, we conclude with an extract from a private letter of a well-known, influential, and progressive minister in the West, who will pardon this unexpected use of his words, as we withhold his name:

July 10, 1861.

DEAR BROTHER:—How do you like the discovery annonnced in the last *Independent*, that God never had any "plan of salvation," and that the "atonement of Christ is simply a manifestation of divine love which melts the sinner, and reconciles him to God"? Is the moral government of God a myth, and the idea that a propitiation was needful to render pardon consistent with justice, an obsolete superstition that came down from the darker ages? Is H. W. Beecher as much of a Unitarian as his last published sermon would indicate? What are we to do? Are the editors of the *Independent* themselves on the high road to Unitarianism? They declare indeed, occasionally, that they have no responsibility for the sentiments of the correspondents, &c. But they have, and they cannot escape it. The world will hold them to an accountability. They are as much responsible for Beecher's sentiments as they are for Cheever's. But when Cheever takes some ground on "Congregational Order" which they think unsound, they come out with a protest as long as one of Gov. Wise's letters. But Beecher may ridicule orthodoxy once a month the year round, and pitch into the doctrines which we preach, and on which we rest our salvation, and not an editorial pen has one word of reply or rebuke. Are we being sold ont to the devil by that paper? Are our denomination going to follow meekly and admiringly wherever Beecher chooses to lead us, and never utter one protest because it is Beecher? I am exceedingly distressed in view of the developments of that man's sermons. Some of them I esteem as superexcellent, and some of them are about on a par with Fowler and Greeley, in respect to theology. The last one would do for Gerrit Smith or Beriah Green. What shall we do? What do your editorial corps think of the matter? Has the *Herald* no duty to do? I have taken the *Independent* a long time, have recommended it, and aided to some extent its circulation. May God forgive me. All the religion that it now brings to its readers is in the sermon, and that is such religion as our denomination did not formerly relish. Do give me some light."

ART. IV.—*A Practical View of Infant Baptism.*

IT has been shown in a former article that the children of believing parents are to be received into the visible church by baptism. They are holy, *i. e.*, consecrated to God, not merely by the formal act of the parent, consecrating them to him, but also by his covenant with his people, in which he incorporates them into his visible kingdom, with a view to their training for his spiritual and eternal kingdom; just as, in all human governments, the children, by virtue of their connection with their parents, are incorporated into the state, and are under its laws, with a view to full citizenship when they have the proper qualifications. God's visible kingdom, by its original and unaltered constitution, is such an organization, embracing believers and their seed within its pale. In consequence of this Divine incorporation, the seal of the covenant was applied to them in the days of Abraham, and has been ever since, under both dispensations.

Without repeating the arguments formerly presented, our design at present is to exhibit more fully the practical bearings of this important subject. We are not utilitarians. In the system of theology and philosophy which we hold, utility is neither the *foundation* nor the *measure* of virtue. And yet we are persuaded that in all the great arrangements of providence and of grace, duty and utility lie in the same direction. "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." It is proper for us to consider its advantages. Only thus can the wisdom and goodness of the divine economy be made apparent to our minds. This we shall endeavour to do on the present occasion, by bringing into view, as distinctly as possible, all the parties to this transaction, with their mutual relations, pledges, engagements, and obligations. It will thus be seen, we trust, that in every aspect the ordinance is eminently salutary as well as scriptural.

In the view we take of it, the parties to this transaction are four—the parents, the church, the child, or children, on the

one hand; and the triune God on the other. These all are intimately and deeply concerned. The first three, though separate from each other, yet all stand on one side, allied parties, as it were, while God is the sole party on the other; having an individual relation to each of them in particular, and also a grand relation to the three united in covenant with himself, in this one business. While dwelling upon each of the parties, it will not be practicable to leave the others entirely out of view, as their relations are so very intimate; yet as far as possible attention will be given exclusively to each in succession, and in the order just named. The church ought to understand what is meant by this solemn ordinance in all its bearings.

I. The parents are the first, and, at the time at least, the most deeply interested party to this transaction. To them it has associations and bearings which are incalculably important. (*a*) Their right to bring the child is dependent on a moral qualification within themselves, viz. their faith. "The *unbelieving* husband is sanctified by the *believing* wife . . . . else were your children unclean, but now are they holy." The very act, therefore, of baptism, if it be performed in an intelligent manner, suggests the inquiry, Am I a child of God? Have I that faith which secures the "holy" child?—the child whom God incorporates into his visible kingdom? If not, what do I here? Without faith it is impossible to please God. At the very outset, therefore, he is thrown upon the work of self-examination, and is led to a renewed self-consecration. In this spirit the offering is made with the earnest and confiding hope that the God of providence and grace will accept the lamb. (*b*) In the next place, the faith and resolutions of the parent touching the child, are eminently scriptural and salutary. It is by nature impure. It belongs to a fallen race. It must be born again by the power of the Holy Ghost. It is therefore given to him for purification. Deeply imbued with a sense of its depravity, the faithful parent solemnly promises to watch and guide his offspring with the tenderest care. He will cultivate his own mind and heart, that he may do justice to the child. He will order his own conduct and conversation with a view to moulding its character properly. He will govern with

prayerful consideration and solicitude, withholding whatever may be injurious, and giving whatever its highest interests may demand. Often his own deficiencies will be matter of deep penitence and humiliation before the Lord; and the resolution of renewed fidelity will be formed. Here there is a guaranty of no small value that the child will grow up under influences of a hallowed nature. (*c*) The faith of the parent touching the child's relations to God are eminently important. It belongs to him—is only lent to us for a heavenly training. The Most High has an interest in it, watches over it, marks parental faithfulness or unfaithfulness, sympathizes with parental anxieties, and will crown the efforts of parental love with his blessing. This again is an invaluable impression made by this ordinance in the early life of our children, and kept alive either by the recollection of what we have done, or witnessing the same thing as done by others. These loved ones are not mine. They belong to God. Jesus claims them for his own. Out of love to them, and in sympathy with the parental yearnings and Christian faith which he has planted in my heart, he will aid in the work committed to my hands. He will touch my heart, to wake it up to fidelity—will touch their hearts when and as I cannot touch them—will hear my prayer; water the seed sown, make my work successful, so that with the children he has given me I shall be gathered to heaven at last. Such a faith as this is valuable beyond expression. It is fostered by the ordinance of baptism, without which it is not commonly found. (*d*) And then again the faith of the parent touching the church is of great value as set forth in this ordinance. She is the foster-mother of himself, and his fond recollections of his own hallowed training are kept alive. What he has received by divine grace through the church leads him to expect the same blessings for his offspring. The children thus incorporated into her, are to be trained for her welfare and according to her laws. He will avail himself of all her facilities, study her peace, and labour for her prosperity. His children will be kept within her pale, taken with him to the house of God, taught to sing the songs of Zion, and to look upon her with filial regard. Thus his own heart is comforted, the church has in him, and prospectively in his family, just the

spirit which her welfare demands, and the children secure that example and those influences which are adapted to fit them both for earth and for heaven. An institution which thus comes to the help of anxious parents, binds up their minds to a high sense of obligation in all these respects, and, at the same time, animates them with such principles and hopes, cannot be overestimated. The effect it must have on the parents, and through them on the rising generation and on the prosperity of Zion, are incalculable. As a permanent institution of the church it was intended no doubt to excite and encourage parents in the most important work ever entrusted to human hands, and to secure for the young the utmost possible care and the best possible influences in the moulding period of their lives. In this view alone, enough is seen to vindicate the divine wisdom and goodness in appointing the ordinance. Would that it were understood and appreciated in all its bearings by the party under consideration. It speaks in emphatic language as an expression of faith; and it pledges them most solemnly to the child, to God, and to his church. Are these pledges redeemed, gentle reader? Do your children, in your example and counsels, enjoy the benefit of such a training? Does the Searcher of hearts witness your fidelity, as he looks down on your family? Does the church, of which you are a member, see that you are dealing with Christ's lambs, as you have promised, as they require, and as she has a right to expect at your hands? Search and see; and the Lord grant you grace to be faithful!

II. The next party named in connection with this ordinance is the church—the particular church with which the parents are connected, and then the entire flock of Christ. Her interest and responsibility are scarcely inferior to that of the parents. Her relations are as manifold, and almost as solemn —pertaining to the child, to the parents, and to God. . . . As to the child, in this public and solemn manner, through her appointed agents, she receives it into Christ's visible kingdom, pledges to it and to him her prayers, counsels, sympathies, aid, and oversight. The baptized are not foreigners, but adopted children, in whom she has the deepest concern, and upon whom she promises that all the benefits she can confer shall be cheerfully and faithfully bestowed. She will see that parents dis-

charge their duties and aid them in the same. The ordinances of the gospel must be afforded to her lambs. The healthful influences of a scriptural education and training must be provided. In conjunction with parents, she will pray and labour for the young, that they may be led on to maturity, to intelligence, to respectability, to piety, to usefulness, and to heaven. To this end every possible provision for good and safeguard against danger will be made. Surely, this is no inconsiderable blessing to the rising generation, who find here a double guaranty that their culture shall not be neglected.

As to the parents, the church in this ordinance pledges them her sympathy and assistance in their arduous work. She will combine her faith and importunity with theirs in pleading God's covenant promise. Her influence and example shall be added to theirs in enforcing the teachings of Scripture. Her ministers shall unfold the sacred oracles in the pulpit; enforcing the lessons of the nursery. They shall visit the little ones at home, and in the Sabbath-school, to interest and instruct them in the great truths pertaining to God and to themselves, to time and to eternity. To the humble earnest parent, such coöperation is encouraging and comforting in the highest degree. His own faith is weak, his efforts feeble, his resources limited, his short-comings innumerable; but here is the whole company of the faithful, appointed of God to help him in his work. Most of them, having children of their own, know how to sympathize with him in his trials. Their faith and prayers accompany and inspire his own. The body of the faithful seems like one great association for mutual assistance in training the young aright. Each individual parent is strengthened by the thought, and she herself is blessed in her heavenly work.

And as to God, to whom the church is related in this transaction, the posture in which it places her is equally important. She takes under her oversight the lambs of his flock. Her faith takes hold of the divine covenant—"I will be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee." Here her hope lies. She lives and is strengthened in this faith as she brings her sons and daughters to the God of Abraham. Here they are. Help us to believe! Show thyself a covenant-keeping

God! There she hangs, having anchor-hold on Jehovah. Tear her from this, and where can she rest? How can she hope to live and flourish, if not in and through her own offspring? This has always been the line of her perpetuation—the main channel of her progress. Where will she look, if this be removed? Even those who reject this covenant relation and its seal, yet look to the same source for growth and continuance, *i. e.*, to their offspring, but without a tithe of the confidence and comfort granted to those who lay hold on God as this ordinance teaches. Theirs is but a trembling hope, existing in spite of an unfriendly theory, while ours is a confidence begotten by the truth.

In this aspect then of our subject, the church as a party, pledging herself to the child, the parents, and to God, we contend that no little importance attaches to infant baptism. It involves and promotes the good of all concerned. Children and parents are blessed by it; while her own interests and the glory of God are promoted. This has always been the view taken by our beloved Zion. Hence her attention to the young. They stand in a peculiar relation to her and she to them. In secular education, therefore, and especially in moral training, she has been unremitting. Her schools, colleges, and seminaries, in all of which religion must be taught and exemplified, are her testimonials in this matter; and the intelligence, stability, sobriety, and moral worth of her children, are at once the fruit, the evidence, and the reward of her fidelity. The Lord has greatly blessed her in her youth, and the world may be challenged to show another such army of cadets as she can produce. This is said, we trust, in a spirit of thankfulness, not of boasting. To him be all the glory.

Let it inspire us, however, to continued and more vigorous efforts. We have not reached the full measure of duty or of success in this respect. Much remains to be done. A vast improvement may be made. Indeed it may well be doubted whether our church, as a whole, has yet come to anything like a realizing apprehension of her relations and duties in this matter; and of the mighty power of this lever, by which she may do so much to elevate mankind. In most of our congregations, when children are presented for baptism, the trans-

action is regarded as mainly one between the parents and God. The church does not feel herself a responsible party, bound to the parents, the children, and to God, in this solemn ordinance. She excuses herself from her high responsibilities, in the weakness of her faith. To her sinful shortcoming, no doubt it is principally due, that the institution is not more highly and generally esteemed. If it were made what it was designed and is adapted to be, it could not fail to be appreciated by an admiring world. They would see its suitableness to the very constitution of society, as well as the prosperity of the church. But more of this in another connection.

III. We come in the next place to the children themselves, the subjects of this ordinance, as a third most deeply interested party. For them especially, *i. e.*, for their good, this ceremony was appointed. In order that we may guard against error here, and exhibit as fully as possible the whole truth on this point, several important questions may be introduced for consideration. (*a*) In the first place, is it a regenerating ordinance? So much has been said in modern times about baptismal regeneration, that it cannot be out of place to notice the doctrine in this connection. We would notice it with candour; and are therefore constrained to say at the outset, that the doctrine, as held by its advocates, is not commonly understood. They do not attribute to the water itself any regenerating power. Forms of expression may perhaps sometimes have been employed which seem to imply this; but that this is the common idea of its advocates we do not believe. They are too sober-minded and sensible, to suppose that a spiritual change is wrought by the mere power of an external application. The most extravagant language used by the fathers, implies something added to, or conveyed through the visible element, which does not belong to it inherently. Thus Chrysostom says, "Plain or bare water worketh not in us; but when it hath received the grace of the Holy Spirit, it washeth away our sins." St. Cyril says, "As water thoroughly heated with fire, burneth as well as the fire, so the waters that wash the body of him that is baptized, are changed into divine power by the working of the Holy Ghost."

Not the water itself, therefore, but some mysterious power

conveyed *to* it and then *through* it, works the change in the estimation of these writers. This we believe is the nearest approach to the doctrine of regeneration by water. There probably are some who hold substantially this view at the present time. They consider the ordinance itself mysteriously effective of a spiritual change; but of these, we are persuaded, there cannot be many. Like the Romish dogma of transubstantiation, it contradicts reason, sense, and Scripture, so glaringly, that few can believe it unless blinded by ignorance, prejudice, or fanaticism. We will not stop, therefore, to refute it.

The most common and plausible view of baptismal regeneration is, not that there is any mysterious power given to the water, or possessed by the administrator; but that God has so bound himself by covenant with his church and people, that whenever and wherever this ordinance is properly administered, he changes the heart of the subject by his Holy Spirit. This is certainly a far more rational form of belief than the other; and if it could only be substantiated from Scripture, might well command our cordial reception. But here is the difficulty. The Scriptures do not teach it. Neither promise nor declaration can be found in the word of God authorizing us to believe that a change of heart is then produced. Nor do facts support this theory. Some indeed may be born again from that hour, or even before, for aught we know, but in the vast majority of cases, subsequent life shows most plainly that regeneration did not take place at baptism. The belief that it did, is palpably false, and must be injurious as an article of faith—injurious because untrue, and because the tendency is to beget a superstitious confidence in a mere ceremony, to bring reproach on the church of Christ, and to make both parents and children less careful as to training, and less sensible of their dependence on Divine grace. It is calculated thus to defeat all the ends which this ordinance, rightly understood, is adapted to foster; and must therefore be rejected, as it ever has been in the scriptural judgment of the mass of God's people.

And yet, it is more than questionable whether, in the rejection of this unsupported theory, we do not, on the other

hand, expect too little in connection with this ordinance and the training which it involves. Our faith, it is to be feared, is as much too weak as theirs is too strong. They believe too much, we too little. It is to us a formal and public consecration of our children to God—an expression of our faith in his covenant promise, and an emblematic representation of their need of purification, and of the nature of the Spirit's work. We administer the ordinance in this firm and intelligible conviction; and yet, after it is done, instead of rising to the proper conception and comfort of the deed, we practically regard our children as the children of the devil still. Now we are persuaded that the faith which ought to exist would enable us to say, These children belong to God—have been given to him in reliance on his covenant promise on my part, and are accepted by him, in accordance with his own engagement. The seal of his covenant has been applied to them. We are training them, not for the world, but for his glory; and such is our confidence in him, that while we cannot and could not presume to limit him as to time, place, or manner of their conversion, yet we firmly believe in the reality of his covenant, and that after using them for his glory here, he will bring them into his heavenly kingdom at last.

Such a faith, with the intelligent zeal and faithful training which it inspires, would not often be disappointed. The God of the fathers, in accordance with it, will be the God of our children. We fail to make the most of our covenant privileges if we do not come up to some such height of Christian confidence. Let not the people of God be frightened by extravagance or error on one hand, to throw away what legitimately belongs to them on the other. Baptism does not regenerate—is not always accompanied or followed by regeneration. We cannot dictate to God when, or on whom, this sovereign gracious change shall be wrought. He has tied himself to no ceremonial observances, nor has he limited himself to any succession of consecrated hands through which his grace shall flow. Nevertheless, obedience to his will and faith in his promise is not a vain thing. Giving our offspring to him, we believe in his faithfulness who hath promised. In this spirit we pray, wait, look, hope, for the manifestation of a renewed life. Nor

shall his people be disappointed. It will appear in due time, though when the change was wrought no one may be able to say. The wind bloweth where it listeth—but it will blow upon these dry bones sooner or later, and they shall live. We have in the covenant promise of God to his people and to their seed almost a tangible rock on which to stand.

(*b*) But if baptism neither regenerates, nor is uniformly accompanied by regeneration, what does it accomplish? This question has been anticipated in part, but deserves a more specific notice. Would that the young themselves might understand and consider the answer to be given! Our formal reply is four-fold. It brings the child into connection with the visible church, puts it under the care of God's people, and binds it to walk according to the tenor of her teaching. It brings the church into visible connection with the child. She adopts it into her family, and assumes a solemn obligation to watch over it, and by every possible influence to help it forward to usefulness and to heaven. It brings the parents into public covenant with God, with his church, and with the lambs of his flock, binding them by the strongest conceivable inducements to watch their developments and labour for their salvation. It brings Jehovah into covenant with his people and his church, according to which he engages to be their God and the God of their seed after them. These are its direct practical bearings, so far as the children are concerned. It is the nearest thing that can be done towards bringing them directly to Christ, to be taken into his arms and blessed. It is the strongest, warmest effort of parental love and faith, to bring them into heaven itself. They are brought into the kingdom here, that they may grow up under its laws, familiar with its doctrines and usages, acknowledging its head, advancing its interests, and finally may be transplanted into the enclosure on high.

Have the young themselves no interest or responsibility in all this? Though at the time of their consecration they may be unconscious agents, yet it is to them an all-important fact that they have been given to God. Believing parents could not, would not, dared not do less than consecrate them to him. They are therefore members of his church—minors, indeed,

but members as truly as they are members of the state. The Lord himself has made them such by his covenant with his people. They cannot dissolve this connection, nor shake off the responsibility which it involves. The eye of God is fixed upon them with parental tenderness. He expects them under this hallowed nurture to act a worthy part. If they are disposed to do right, they are hereby furnished with every facility. If they are inclined to go astray, he hereby throws every possible hinderance in their pathway to ruin; and furnishes every influence to turn and draw them from destruction. If they will perish, therefore, they must break over the enclosures which God himself has placed around them, and consequently must go down to ruin with a fearfully aggravated load of guilt resting upon them. Would that they understood their position, and would act the part of wisdom! As they grow up in the commonwealth of the redeemed, let them yield to its laws a wholesome obedience. Thus shall they enjoy its highest favours, and bestow upon the world the truest benefits.

(*c*) One other important question in connection with this party remains to be noticed. What shall be done with those who, on coming to mature age, disregard their obligations and refuse to acknowledge Christ? This is usually considered one of the most embarrassing points connected with this whole subject. We would not shrink from looking at it fairly. Here is the sad fact, staring us in the face every day, that multitudes whom we consider as belonging to the church are habitually trampling under their feet the laws of Christ. What shall be done with them? Shall they be held liable to judicial prosecution; to be arraigned, tried, condemned, and cut off from the church? So the logic of our system is sometimes thought to require. Shall they be continued in their places and exempted from censures? This is thought to be forbidden by consistency. To our view, all practical embarrassment on this point vanishes when we remember the nature of their membership. They are not members in full, but only as minors are of the state, or children of the family—under law, entitled to protection and culture, but deprived of certain privileges until they are qualified to enjoy them in an intelligent and profitable manner. This is by no means an anomalous or unreasonable

position. The analogy with the position of children in the family or the state is complete, and the mode of treatment very much the same. The faithful parent is very slow to banish even an ungrateful, undutiful child from his house. He forbears, reasons, remonstrates, pleads, leaving it still under the privileges and influences of home. In this treatment there is far more hope of reformation than there would be in a course of severe justice. After the same manner should the church deal with her wayward children. Though they grow up, refusing to acknowledge the Lord, no practical evil, but much hope of good results from retaining them under her influence. This is her ordinary course in regard to full members who may have fallen under sin. She suspends them from certain privileges, still holding them however to be members in a modified sense, and then waits, watches, instructs, pleads, and prays, that they may be restored to a sense of duty. Much more should the same course be pursued with her baptized members. Let her ministers visit, instruct, exhort them. Let the church show her deep interest in their behalf. By every possible means let the impression be made, that by covenant of God with their parents and with his church, they stand in a most peculiar and solemn position. Bring to bear on their minds all the invitations and incentives of the gospel. Hold up the mirror of truth before them every day. Let them see their advantages, their ingratitude, their aggravated guilt in sinning against God in such circumstances. Let them see the tender love of Jesus, whose blood they trample under their feet. Show them the faith, love, and zeal of God's people in their behalf. All this may be done not only without embarrassment from our theory, but is eminently facilitated by it. Properly understood it leads directly and necessarily to just this treatment, which the highest good of the rising generation demands. By taking hold of it we have a wonderful vantage ground from which to deal with them. If properly impressed, the vast majority of them will be led in due time to acknowledge Christ, and take their places in his church.

And here, at the risk of an apparent digression, we cannot refrain from inquiring, Why is it that so many of our children grow up within the pale of the church without embracing the

Saviour? As a practical question, the mind both of ministers and parents is often anxiously directed to this inquiry. Several explanatory answers may be given. One is, that we fail to take clear and strong hold of the covenant of God with us and with them, under which we believe them to stand. We neither realize it ourselves, nor press it properly on their minds. God's precious covenant, on which we profess to rest, dwindles into a mere ceremonial observance. Hence the measure of good which this ordinance was designed to convey is not secured. Our unbelief is the cause of failure. God does not work for us as he would for believing Israel; for without faith it is impossible to please him. We do not work for our children as we would with a realizing faith, for the motive power is gone when this is wanting. They do not yield to gospel influences as they would if we were full of the spirit of Abraham. This is one explanation.

Another is, that our practical training of them, consequent upon this want of a realizing faith, is highly defective. We ask the attention of the reader to this point. After consecrating them to God, in reliance upon his covenant, we still take it for granted that they are not his—that they are to grow up in sin, the children of the adversary, until some future and definite time, when they may be brought under conviction for sin, and led to embrace the Saviour. Hence they grow up, not looking to God as their Father, to Jesus as their Redeemer, to the Spirit of holiness as their sanctifier, and to the church as their home; but with a feeling that they are aliens, and God an enemy. In other words, we put them outside of the kingdom by our treatment, while yet we hold them to be in it according to our theory. We constantly assume that their first actions and emotions of a moral nature will be evil and only evil, instead of believing that by Divine grace, and in the faithfulness of the Most High to his own engagements, they will have true spiritual exercises from childhood. Hence, as they come to years of maturity, they stand aloof, waiting, as it were, for God to enlist them—waiting to *get religion*, as the phrase goes, instead of feeling that they belong to God, and are to love and serve him from the beginning.

To our apprehension there is a practical error here, of great

perniciousness. Having given our children to God, in accordance with his appointment, we ought not to feel or to act as though it were a nullity. To our faith, the presumption should be that they are the Lord's, and that as they come to maturity they will develope a life of piety. Instead of waiting, therefore, for a period of definite conviction and conversion, we should rather look for, and endeavour to call out, from the commencement of moral action, the emotions and exercises of the renewed heart. Teach them to hate sin, to think and speak of God as a Father, and of Christ as a Saviour. Let them be taught to say, We love the Lord, we love and trust in Jesus, we love his people, we love the church with all her doctrines and ordinances, we hate sin in all its forms, and are determined, by God's help, that we will not be its slaves. And let us expect that, as they come to years of deliberate action, their life will correspond to this teaching. Is this too much to expect of our covenant God? Is this presumption? Is this less pleasing to God than a spirit of unbelief, which nullifies his word? We think not. It may be a strong faith is required for such a course, but it is a legitimate faith, well pleasing to God, comforting to ourselves, and most blessed in its bearing upon our children. If we can but exercise it, by his help, vast numbers of our children will be sanctified from the womb, and will indeed grow up "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord," and will stand like olive plants around our table and our dwelling.

This is evidently the course of things contemplated by our church. "Children born within the pale of the visible church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the church; and are to be taught to read and repeat the Catechism, the Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And, when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have a sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's supper." (*Directory for Worship*, chap. ix. sec. 1.) This is the true view of their position, and indicates the proper mode of dealing with them.

They are the Lord's, unless they show by their conduct that they reject his covenant. Let us, therefore, cultivate a stronger faith, and adopt a corresponding treatment. We are persuaded that much harm is done to the young and to the church by the common failure of Christian parents in this respect. Adult conversions among her own children are not so much what the church ought to look for, as sanctification from early life. This corresponds both with the nature of the covenant and with the nature of spiritual life, which is a gradual development. As a matter of fact, we are persuaded that many of those who make a profession of religion at a particular time, have been born again, and growing under Divine influences long before. The life is only more clearly manifested to themselves and others about the time of their professed conversion. It has existed perhaps from childhood—the unseen fruit of this covenant, of which baptism is the seal.

If these views be correct, how important is the period of childhood in a Christian family—how wonderful the wisdom and goodness of God in putting the plastic mind of the young under influences so well calculated to mould it; and how responsible, yea, how God-like, the work of every parent and the work of the church! Here truly is the hope of the world. If the church will but wake up to the great truth that she is the school of Christ, in which the world is to be educated through the natural and simple way of training up her children in the way they should go, a glorious day of prosperity will soon dawn upon her. But if she undervalue this training, and attempt to reach her proper end in some other way, let nothing but disappointment be expected. The Lord will show that his appointed agency cannot be harmlessly neglected.

IV. The only remaining party mentioned in connection with this ordinance, is Jehovah himself, the triune God. We have seen the relations and duties of the other parties, and throughout the discussion have taken for granted that God has intimate relations to each. But let us with reverence and delight look at them more specifically. Here, in fact, is the foundation of the whole matter. If it be not true that God is a party, the whole transaction is unmeaning and useless. We have nothing, if we cannot take hold of him as engaging, in a

most kindly, condescending manner, to perform his part of the covenant. It is pleasant and profitable, therefore, to consider him as related to the parents, to the children, and to his church in this transaction. To the first of these he says expressly, "The promise is to you and to your children." "I will be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee." This is equivalent to saying, What I am to you I will be to them. As I have chosen you, called you, loved you, accepted and blessed you, so will I do to them. What a comfort this to the anxious parent! His heart swells with heavenly emotions as he says, like David, "Who am I, O Lord God? and what is my house, that thou hast brought me hitherto? And this was yet a small thing in thy sight, O Lord God; but thou hast spoken also of thy servant's house for a great while to come." This hope is the legitimate resting-place of every pious parent. We are the seed of Abraham and heirs of the promises, which are yea and amen in Christ Jesus. "Cast not away, therefore, your confidence, which hath great recompense of reward."

Not only to the parents, however, but to the children also, the Lord stands peculiarly related. They are his, in a different sense from all others, even before they have reached years of maturity. "Now are they holy;" *i. e.*, consecrated to him by his own act of incorporation. By his engagement they shall have a place in his vineyard, the culture of his ordinances, the restraints of his law, the incentives of his truth, the movings of his Spirit, the watchfulness of his ministers, the repeated calls of his gospel, the open door of access to him at all times, and the increased readiness to bless for the parents' sake. Over them the Great Shepherd will spread his sheltering hands, and into them infuse his Spirit. They are not like the children of the heathen and the stranger. Some of their advantages may indeed be enjoyed by others who dwell around them, but it is only incidentally as it were; while for them the very design of the economy which he has adopted was to provide these blessings. His regard for them, and his fidelity to his covenant, are manifested in that he has actually secured them for the children of the faithful. Let them remember the obligations under which they are brought by this beneficent arrangement.

To the church also, he looks in the same condescending manner. She lives by his grace. She is dear to him as the apple of his eye. He provides for her peace and perpetuity, and for the welfare of all her families in the arrangement under consideration. The natural yearnings of her heart draw her towards her offspring. She is permitted to cherish and follow out these yearnings to their fullest scope. As in the domestic circle, her children are in a great degree her charge. In her efforts to take hold of Jehovah's promise, and to train them up for his glory, the Lord will smile upon her. He gave her the covenant with its seal, and all that the ordinance comprehends for her encouragement. In observing its conditions, she has blessed work, by which she is enlarged, perpetuated, and comforted, while the children in her families are trained for usefulness and for heaven. Surely the value of these engagements cannot be over-estimated. The Lord is faithful; and having bound himself thus to the three parties before mentioned, the parents, the children, and the church, he will fulfil all he has spoken. He is pleased with the confidence they all may repose in him, and will show that it is not misplaced.

Enough has now been said, we trust, to show the practical bearing and value of this ordinance. In every aspect it is incalculably beneficial. Christian parents are incited, animated, encouraged, and comforted in their arduous work. The church, through this channel, is abundantly blessed. Through it she has hold upon her families, her members and her lambs on the one hand, and on her God on the other. She holds them, and holds to him, while by his divine Spirit he preserves and sanctifies through his grace. The children, too, have every possible influence that may tend to good, with every possible safeguard against evil. All the great ends and interests of the individual, the family, the church, the state, and the world, are promoted by it. God's glory and man's good are unitedly secured. Instead, therefore, of undervaluing this ordinance, which seems to have been the tendency in modern times, we ought to appreciate it more highly. It opens up to us a most deeply interesting view of the divine economy through the church, and should direct both our faith and our efforts in accordance with the declaration, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it."

ART. V.—*Leven en Karakter van Johannes Henricus van der Palm*, Geschetst door NICOLAAS BEETS. Te Leiden, bij D. du Mortier en Zoon.

THE name of J. H. van der Palm, though comparatively unknown in this country, has a high European reputation. A man who laid the educational, moral, and religious interests of Holland under such great and lasting obligations, and to whom the world is chiefly indebted for the present improved school system; who for thirty years stood at the head of the literati of his country, and was universally regarded as its first pulpit orator; the author of numerous literary and theological productions, possessing the highest interest and value, which are destined to descend to remote posterity, and to confer on him an immortality of fame; richly deserves to be better known to American scholars.

Dr. Beets, the author of this biographical sketch, is an accomplished scholar, a distinguished poet, an eloquent preacher, and a popular writer. He is a grandson, by marriage, of Van der Palm, was numbered among his favourite pupils, and enjoyed rare opportunities of becoming intimately acquainted with the subject of his memoir. Though the intimate relations subsisting between him in his youth and Van der Palm in his old age, might be supposed to have prepossessed his mind in favour of the illustrious man whose life and character he portrays, yet he seldom, if ever, betrays a disposition to conceal his faults, or to overrate his talents, attainments, and labours. The work is written in good style, is replete with elevated sentiment, abounds in beautiful and masterly delineations of character, and as a whole reflects great credit on the taste, judgment, and scholarship of its author.

Johannes H. van der Palm was born in Rotterdam, July 17, 1763. His father was a virtuous, intelligent, and genial man, a good linguist, and endowed with a respectable share of poetic talent. He conducted successfully a very respectable Dutch and French boarding-school, first in Rotterdam, and afterwards at Delfshaven. His eminent son always spoke of

him with evident satisfaction, and delighted to exhibit him as a model instructor. His mother was a woman of noble birth, domestic in her habits, and distinguished for her piety. He was also blessed with a remarkably pious grandmother, whose memory he fondly cherished, who taught him to read well before he had attained the age of three years. She imbued his mind with a knowledge of sacred history, and taught him many spiritual songs.

At the early age of ten years, he was transferred from his father's to the Erasmian school in Rotterdam, where for five years he pursued his studies with great diligence and success, securing, in an eminent degree, the good-will and affection of his schoolmates, though outstripping them in their studies, and always carrying off the first prizes. Whilst attending this school, he still enjoyed the society and supervision of his vigilant and beloved father, who was now located in Delfshaven. He was also favoured with the society of several literary men, friends of his father, who interested themselves in his welfare, and exerted a happy influence on his youthful mind. Having completed his course in the Erasmian school, he repaired, at the early age of fifteen, to the University of Leyden, where he was received with high honour, and began his course on the 16th of September, 1778, by listening to the celebrated Valckenaar on the Acts of the Apostles.

This famous University was at this time in a very flourishing condition. Its bi-centenary had been celebrated with great pomp but three years before his matriculation. This had communicated to it a fresh impulse. Its professorial chairs in all the departments were filled by the most celebrated men. The concourse of youth from various parts of the Netherlands was unprecedentedly large; and of these very many were destined to become eminent in every branch of learning, and to be, in their respective spheres, ornaments to church and state. In addition to these, not a few resorted to it from England.

Van der Palm soon attracted the notice of his professors, who quickly perceived in him those extraordinary mental endowments, combined with high moral and social qualities, which were destined to raise him to great eminence in his subsequent career. Whilst enjoying, in a very high degree, the

confidence and esteem of all his professors, he was admitted to special intimacy by the celebrated orientalist H. A. Schultens, who imbued him with his own enthusiastic fondness for oriental studies. This great and amiable man manifested a deep interest in his welfare, received him daily at his house, and cherished him with paternal tenderness; and when, after five years of instruction and intercourse, he was obliged to part with this beloved pupil, his eye followed him in his course, his heart glowed with affection for him, and up to his death he continued to give him proofs of unabated interest in his welfare. The kindness thus lavished by this great man on this noble youth, met with a cordial and worthy response.

The modest deportment, the amiable spirit, the agreeable manners, and the genial disposition of Van der Palm, won the hearts of his fellow-students: while his talents and attainments commanded their respect and admiration. With many of them he formed relations of intimate and abiding friendship. Schimmelpenninck, Brugmans, Nieuwland, and Bilderdijk, were numbered among his intimate friends. To the last named he was devotedly attached, but the intimate friendship subsisting between them was destined to be in after life painfully interrupted.

The characteristic differences between these two highly gifted men, and which tended to produce this unhappy result, are so well pointed out by the biographer, that we cannot forbear to transcribe the passage, for the gratification of our readers. "They saw each other almost daily. Bilderdijk was several years older, and Van der Palm gladly allowed himself to be instructed by him out of the vast fund of general knowledge which even then he already possessed. These two young men, who were destined to introduce and to preside over an entirely new era in Dutch prose and poetry, heard each other, exercised each other, loved each other, felt that they were worthy of each other. They seemed destined to enter upon the path of fame with clasped hands, and to walk together to the end. It would have been a beautiful incident in the history of our national literature. But they who were well acquainted with both, might even then have perceived that they were not sufficiently adapted to each other to maintain a

permanent friendship: the difference in their disposition, character, and efforts was too great. This difference did not, indeed, interrupt their good understanding during the period of speculative student life, but would necessarily give rise to collisions in practical life. Van der Palm sedate, moderate, gentle, equanimous, prudent almost to reserve; Bilderdijk impulsive in the extreme, energetic, capricious, courageous even to excess. Van der Palm modest, loving and revering his fellow-men, not always free from the suspicion of being influenced by the fear of man; Bilderdijk haughty, positive, and struggling with a sombre misanthropy. Van der Palm pliable, sometimes bordering on weakness; Bilderdijk steadfast, not without headiness. In the scientific, Van der Palm investigating, Bilderdijk discovering; Van der Palm applying, Bilderdijk speculating; Van der Palm accurate and regular, Bilderdijk inconstant, undertaking everything simultaneously, and paradoxical; Van der Palm renovating the old, Bilderdijk here pursuing the new, there obtruding without qualification the old; Van der Palm pleading for his opinion; Bilderdijk contending for his. Add to this, the distinction of political party, and the difference in providential allotments. Van der Palm blessed with health, prosperity, domestic happiness; loved, honoured, flattered, ascending from step to step without contradiction of any: Bilderdijk sickly, unhappy in his marriage,* in his offspring,† vexed on every side, misapprehended, necessitous, grieved by one disappointment after another. These things necessarily separated those who were so inwardly united; separated them despite the esteem which they cherished for each other's gifts and greatness, which induced them, after an intervening coolness or actual breach, to extend to each other the hand of reconciliation, which, alas! could not be of long continuance. To these causes must be ascribed their inability to forgive each other's infirmities. Public sentiment, which had throughout shown itself partial to Van der Palm, seemed, in the closing period of their lives, disposed to restore to Bilderdijk the share in its favours which it had so long withheld; the Society of Literature united their names, by confer-

* His first marriage. † Most of his children died young.

ring on them an honour in which no one else might participate; but their hearts were estranged from each other, and nothing but death could unite them. Van der Palm continued to speak to the last with great respect of Bilderdijk's excellent gifts, testifying that he esteemed him far above himself, and that he freely forgave him all the injury he had done him."

In addition to those already mentioned, Henricus van Roijen, Jacobus Kantelaar, Cornelis Fransen van Eck, Jacobus van Heusden, Johannes Stolk, Thomas Hoog, and Ewaldus Kist were his most intimate friends. Of his ardent attachment to Kist, and the delightful intercourse which they enjoyed with each other during their University course, the limits of this article forbid us to speak.

Whilst at the University, Van der Palm was fond of all the sports in which young men usually engage, delighted in social intercourse, and was the centre and life of a circle of choice young men, who met weekly for mutual improvement. The amount of study and reading performed by Van der Palm during his six years at the University was very great. Oriental languages and literature were his favourite study, and to the ancient and modern authors on these subjects he devoted special attention. He extended his acquaintance with the Greek and Roman classics; and in French, German, and English literature his reading was varied and extensive. While pursuing his theological course, he began his critical work on Ecclesiastes, written in Latin, which he completed near the close of the year 1783, and publicly defended, January 31, 1784, in presence of a large assembly, under the presidency of Schultens. His public defence came off with great *eclat*. The work itself elicited high encomiums from the professors, and established his reputation as an orientalist both at home and abroad.* When the time arrived for him to furnish proof of his pulpit talents, he acquitted himself in such a manner as to excite general admiration, to secure the approbation of his professors, and to awaken high expectations of his future

* Ruhnkenius denominates it a "præclarum libellum, in quo omnes qui de his rebus judicare possunt, et ingenium auctoris et eruditionem admirantur;" the theological faculty, "Complura non ingenii modo sed etiam eruditionis documenta continens;" Schultens, "doctum specimen."

eminence as a pulpit orator. His noble form, his dignified bearing, his melodious voice, and his graceful and appropriate gestures, added to the beauty of his style, the simplicity and power with which he presented his subject, and the appropriate and edifying manner in which he treated it, captivated his hearers. He completed his course in January, 1784, and received from such men as Valckenaar, Ruhnkenius, Van de Wijnpersse, and Schultens, as also from the theological faculty, the most honourable testimonials, in which they bear their united and decided testimony to his eminent natural endowments, the zeal and diligence with which he had prosecuted his studies, his great proficiency in them, and the modest and consistent deportment that had added lustre to his other excellencies.

In consequence of his youth, he could not be located in the province of Holland, and hence he was obliged to seek a settlement elsewhere. On the 13th of December, 1784, he was unanimously chosen to be the pastor of the church in Maartensdijk, a village about four or five miles distant from Utrecht. He accepted the invitation of this church, and was installed March 28, 1785. He was married, November 14, 1786, to Miss Alida Bussingh, daughter of his old friend, the Delfshaven minister. She was a young woman of great beauty and amiability, with whom he was permitted to enjoy forty-nine years of great domestic happiness. His preaching at Maartensdijk was exceedingly popular, attracting many from Utrecht, especially students of the University. Owing to the political troubles of the country, and the invasion of the Prussians, he suddenly withdrew from Maartensdijk in September, 1787, much to the surprise and regret of his people and friends, whose persuasions, seconded by those of the classis, to induce him to return, proved unavailing.

After remaining for some time in a state of uncertainty and irresolution, he opened a correspondence with his beloved friend and revered instructor, Schultens, in consequence of whose recommendation he made an arrangement with Lord Johan Adriaan van de Perre, first nobleman of Zealand, who having retired from public life, was at that time residing as a private citizen in Middelburg. This eminently pious nobleman,

filled with zeal for the diffusion of knowledge among all classes, had founded an institution, bearing the name of the Middelburg Museum, in which a regular course of lectures was to be delivered, especially designed to enlighten and elevate the lower classes of society. Until provision could be made in some other way to remunerate the superintendent of the Museum for his services, Lord van de Perre agreed, could a suitable person be found, to allow him yearly a thousand florins and a house free, requiring in return, that, besides assisting him in the prosecution of his scientific investigations, he should perform the duties of a private chaplain to himself and family. In the spring of 1788, Van der Palm, accompanied by his wife, repaired to Middelburg, where he found a house in readiness for him, adjoining the mansion of Van de Perre. In this worthy nobleman he found an agreeable companion, a warm friend, and a generous benefactor. Pleasantly and rapidly did the time glide away, whilst traversing in company with this enlightened man the various fields of science; and from these excursions into the domain of science, the young theologian returned laden with fruit with which to adorn and enrich the future productions of his pen. His attention, however, was principally devoted to his favourite studies. Various books of Scripture were regularly and critically investigated. To this he was naturally led by the duty devolving on him of daily expounding a portion of the Scriptures as a part of the devotional exercises of the family. The performance of this duty greatly contributed to his practical acquaintance with the requisites to a popular exposition of the Bible. The fruits of these studies were in part given to the world as early as 1791. The pure and exalted pleasures enjoyed by him in the society of this virtuous nobleman, were of short continuance. Van de Perre, his friend and benefactor, died April 8, 1790. He ever cherished a grateful recollection of the many acts of kindness which he had received at the hands of his generous patron, and of the happiness which he had enjoyed in his domestic circle; and he nobly repaid this debt of gratitude by raising in one of his masterly orations an enduring monument to the memory of his noble benefactor. At the urgent solicitation of the dowager he consented to remain at his post, and in doing so he believed

he was discharging a sacred obligation. In August, 1791, he was called to the pastorate of the church of Vlissengen. This invitation he felt bound to decline, though urged to its acceptance by his friends as well as by the congregation. It was greatly to the regret* of his friends that a man so abundantly qualified for extensive usefulness, should consent to move in a sphere so circumscribed. His reply to the church of Vlissingen breathes a spirit of ardent devotion to his Master's cause, and clearly evinces that he was actuated by pure and noble motives in declining their flattering invitation, for which he tenders them his warmest thanks. Firmly persuaded that he had been directed by a special providence to his present post, and that it was his sacred duty to remain at it, he continued in the faithful discharge of its duties, till the death of Lady van de Perre, which occurred August 14, 1794.

Belonging to the so-called patriotic party, whose principles he had early imbibed, and borne away by the current of political events, he placed himself with two of his friends, men of ability and integrity, early in the year 1795, at the head of a revolutionary movement in Middelburg. Their object was to direct and control a movement which could no longer be resisted, and to prevent the excesses that might otherwise attend it. In this they were completely successful. The revolution was effected without bloodshed or violence. He was one of the twenty-five new members of government that were appointed. After discharging for a year the duties of this office with great ability and integrity, and rendering important services to the city of Middelburg and the province of Zealand, he retired from it uncontaminated, bearing with him the esteem, if not the favour, of the opposing party.

Having declined the professorship, tendered him early in 1796, at Lingen, he was soon after appointed professor of

* Professor Boers of the theological faculty in Leyden, thus expresses his regret: "Very deeply has it affected me that he (Van der Palm) by a concurrence of circumstances has been laid under the necessity of discontinuing his ministry—a man, who by his extensive learning, sound judgment, delicate taste, excellent preaching gifts, attachment to the doctrines of our church, and especially by his peaceable disposition and genuine piety, is so eminently fitted to be useful in the promotion of the kingdom of Jesus Christ."

Oriental Languages and Antiquities in the University of Leyden. This appointment he accepted with his characteristic modesty, and was inducted into office June 11, 1796, with a discourse *de Litteris Hebraicis exornandis.* The rectorate of the University, conferred on him two years after, he resigned Feb. 8, 1799, with a discourse *de Mohammede religionis Islamiticæ et imperii Saracenici conditore.* (This oration was so admirably written and so impressively delivered as to produce a profound sensation among his auditors.)

In April, 1799, he was appointed by the executive government of the Batavian Republic, Minister of National Education. With the approbation of the curators of the University, who were highly gratified by the selection that had been made, and on condition of being permitted to resume at any time his professorship, he accepted the appointment. While many approved the choice of the executive government, and rejoiced in his acceptance of the office, others regretted it, either fearing that he might not prove perfectly adapted to this new position, or that the good which he might accomplish in it, would not counterbalance the loss that the church and the University would sustain by his removal from Leyden. Devoted as he was to oriental studies, he however regarded the cause of primary education as of superior importance.* His sense of the importance of this post, and his fear that it might fall into wholly incompetent hands, were the principal motives that constrained him to accept it; and in the discharge of its duties his versatility of talent, his quickness of perception, his comprehensiveness of mind, and his adroitness and dexterity in the management of affairs were strikingly exhibited. It soon became apparent at the Hague that the accomplished scholar and divine was also a statesman. The condition in which he found the schools, was truly deplorable, and is vividly

* On this point we are permitted to hear him speak for himself in a letter to the celebrated orientalist, Silvestre de Sacy, with whom he corresponded. "In illa enim institutionis parte emendanda, quam elementarem vocant, primam operam collocandam putavi, siquidem emolumenta publice et privatim inde speranda, et reliqua rei litterariæ commoda, et magnorum cum exhaustæ reipublicæ tenuitate parum congruentium moliminum gloriam longe mihi viderentur superare."

portrayed by him in an address, delivered in 1801, in which he also touchingly alludes to the discouragements and trials which he experienced in the prosecution of his work, and the almost insuperable obstacles that lay in the way to the attainment of his object. By his genius and perseverance, with the coöperation of those whose interest he enlisted in the good cause, he succeeded, with the divine blessing on his indefatigable efforts, in effecting an entire reformation of the schools, and in laying the foundation of that system of primary instruction, which excited the admiration of Europe, and elicited high encomiums from such men as Cuvier and Cousin. According to Van Kampen, a distinguished historian, "the improved school system was the last gift of the Dutch republic to the world." Important improvements were also effected by him in medical practice, especially in the rural districts. Explicitly charged in his commission to take measures for the introduction of a uniform spelling of the Dutch language, he held consultations relative to this matter with other distinguished philologists; and the result of his consultations and efforts was, in the matter of grammar, the work of Weiland, which received the sanction of government, and in that of orthography, the treatise of Siegenbeek, which also received the same sanction, and has been ever since regarded by the nation as their code of spelling, though certain philologists, dissenting from some of his conclusions, have felt themselves in such cases at liberty to disobey its authority. These are a few of the many obligations under which this great man laid his country during the five or six years that he served it in essentially the same capacity, though under different titles, owing to the various changes that the government underwent during this period. While zealously labouring to promote the educational interests of his country, he did not wholly neglect the oriental muses. Evidence of this was afforded by the publication in 1805 of his Translation and Exposition of the Prophet Isaiah. Several orations were also delivered during this period, which were subsequently given to the public.

Laden with tokens of regard from Schimmelpenninck, then Pensionary of Holland, and enjoying the sweet satisfaction of an approving conscience as to the purity of his motives, and

the fidelity with which he had served his country, he left the Hague in 1806, and returned to Leyden, to enter upon a career of almost unexampled usefulness and honour. This event was hailed with joy and approbation by the nation, which had so reluctantly witnessed his retirement from Leyden as to be incapable of fully appreciating, at the time, the important services which he was rendering his country. The views entertained by the nation of his conduct in relinquishing his professorship to enter upon what is called his political career, and the demonstrations of joy with which his return to his more appropriate sphere of labour was greeted,* are clearly and frankly presented in an able and interesting letter subsequently written by him to Louis Bonaparte, king of Holland, in which he positively declines a royal appointment, which he could not accept without again abandoning his professorship; and he urges, as a further consideration by which to reconcile the king to his refusal, that the general disfavour with which his acceptance of the office would be regarded, would, by counter-

* We should, for various reasons, be happy to lay this letter entire before our readers, but as we cannot do that, we feel constrained to subjoin the following extract: "Quand j'abandonnois, il y a neuf ans, ma place de Professeur, avec des vues, que je croyois pures et louables, uniquement pour être utile à l'Instruction publique, et pour prévenir, que ce département ne fut confié à quelque tête chaude, portée à la désorganisation, cela n'a pu empêcher, que cette démarche ne fut hautement désaprouvée par ceux même, qui ne me vouloient que du bien. Quand, dans ma qualité d'Agent d'Education Nationale, et après la suppression de ce ministère comme Membre du Conseil de l'Intérieur, j'ai employé le peu de talens, que je possédois, à traiter les affaires exactement, avec regularité et promptitude; quand j'ai taché de ne donner à personne un juste sujet de se plaindre, et de rendre à chaqu'un les services, qui dépendoient de moi; quand j'ai donné l'existence à des etablissemens, qui ont été jugés dignes, d'être conservés sous le règne de V. M.: tout le monde pourtant n'a cessé de se recrier d' une unanime, que je n'étois pas à ma place, et que tout ce que je pouvois faire de mieux dans uue carrière politique, ne sauroit ni égaler les services, que les Lettres et la Religion avoient droit d'attendre de moi, ni effacer le scandale, d'avoir trahi des interêts et des devoirs sacrés.

"D'un autre coté, Sire! après que je n'ai plus, été employé en politque, et que j'ai repris mes fonctions de professeur; surtout après que j'ai temoigné par des faits, que je n'avois pas quitté pour toujours la chaire ecclesiastique; rien ne peut être comparé à l'approbation génerale, même aux applaudissemens universels, qui me sont prodigués de toute part, comme on les prodigueroit à quelqu'un qu'on voit revenir d'un long égarement."

acting his efforts for the public good, tend to defeat the very object which the king hoped to attain by his appointment. His refusal was not misinterpreted by his sovereign, who soon after constituted him knight, and, after the death of Rau, orator of the Order of Union; and to this appointment are due two excellent orations, in which he portrays the characters and embalms the memories of several worthy patriots.

We need offer our readers no apology for allowing the biographer himself to introduce Van der Palm to their acquaintance, on his second return to Leyden. "Thus, amid various vicissitudes, forty-three years of his life had passed away. From the quiet village, where, as shepherd of souls, he was charged with the highest interests of an humble country congregation, we have seen his sphere of action limited to a single honourable family. Proceeding thence, we have seen him, in some respects uncalled, taking his place among the regents of his country, whence science recalled him to fill a professor's chair. Not long, however, is he permitted thus to maintain her interests. His country places him at the head of the department to which is entrusted the care of its educational interests. In all this he is actuated, less by a becoming ambition than by an ardent desire to be useful to his country. On the improvement of primary instruction we see his attention constantly fixed. Hitherto it has seemed to be the great task of this son of an instructor. In all these different spheres, his oratorical powers are brilliantly displayed. In all these various ways Providence exercises his gifts and powers, and combines them so as to form that perfect whole, which must place him at the head of all scholars, as more than a scholar: as a sage; who is not only acquainted with books, but with men, understanding human nature in all its phases; practically acquainted with the affairs of life, and who, having pondered the great problems of human existence, has formed his own conclusions respecting them. As such he returns, in the vigour of manhood, to the temple of science, and from that moment opens that period of long continued fame and honour, which it pleased Providence to permit him and his country to enjoy."

On his return to the University, Van der Palm found the

chair which he had previously occupied in possession of Professor Rau, who had assumed its duties, in addition to those of Professor of Sacred Poetry and Eloquence. Conceding to Rau the department of Oriental Languages and Antiquities, he assumed that of Sacred Poetry and Eloquence, and entered on its duties September 20, 1806, with a discourse *De oratore sacro litterarum divinarum interprete.* In this oration were embodied the principles, which he subsequently expanded, illustrated, and enforced, in his lectures. Appointed, in 1807, University preacher, he exemplified in the pulpit the principles he inculcated in the lecture-room. His preaching produced a great sensation in Leyden, and attracted a large concourse of hearers. As a preacher, he is thus portrayed by his biographer: "In his delivery, everything combined to captivate the hearer, and cause him, as it were, to hang on the orator's lips. Van der Palm ascended the pulpit with dignity, with no affectation, and with a most simple expression of benignity on his countenance. He placed himself very much at his ease in the pulpit, with no hurriedness, with no ado in adjusting himself, without anything in the least repulsive. His tall and erect frame, and the beautiful lineaments of his countenance, irresistibly inspired his hearers with awe. He had neither the high forehead nor the sparkling eye which are wont to contribute so much to the power of eloquence; but his was of such a nature that an amiable countenance and a gentle look befitted it. With him everything was in harmony. His voice was not heavy, not deep; but inconceivably flexible, euphonious, musical, and so clear and audible that even in the largest and worst constructed churches no word was anywhere lost. Yet he made no great exertion to make himself heard, but spoke in a rather gentle tone, yet with clear and forcible distinction of the sounds, and without obscuring a word, or even the termination of a word. He possessed, in the highest degree, the faculty, with the first and gentlest use of his voice, to command silence in the largest assemblies. His pronunciation of our language was most agreeable, and in all respects exemplary. The distinction between the long and short vowels, and all the modifications which they undergo in enunciation, not to be represented by writing, were with him audible and entirely

natural. . . . . He read his sermon, but without difficulty, after having studied it well and written it distinctly. In his gestures he was extremely simple and moderate. The theatrical was with him absolutely excluded. It sometimes seemed to his hearers that nothing extraordinary was to be perceived in his delivery; yet it was at the same time inimitable, and just for that very reason inimitable, because art was entirely concealed, and nothing seemed to be done for effect; nor was there any appearance of making an effort, because all that pertained to it formed a perfect and proportionate whole. It was of such a nature as to be able to maintain itself long in the general esteem, which it actually enjoyed to his old age. His last sermon he delivered March 13, 1836, in the Highland church, still entirely in his peculiar way, and understood by all. The pleasantness, softness, and melodiousness of his voice were preserved even to the close of his life." High as may seem to us the praise here awarded to his delivery, we have reason to regard it as not excessive. The universal admiration it excited and secured for fifty years, affords the highest presumptive evidence of its uncommon excellence.

His sermons were given to the public in small volumes, rapidly succeeding each other, and were read and re-read with universal delight and approbation. Some of these volumes, though succeeding each other so rapidly, passed through several editions; and after his death, an ample subscription was secured for a uniform edition of all his sermons, in sixteen octavo volumes, which was soon followed by another of duodecimo size. As it is not our purpose to discuss at this time the merits of these sermons, we shall content ourselves with simply remarking, that they may be justly regarded as models of sacred eloquence.

Towards the close of the year 1817, he was again called to fill the chair of Oriental Languages and Antiquities, vacated by the death of Rau, to whose memory he paid an eloquent tribute, in an oration delivered the same year before the Order of Union. To his oriental studies he now devoted himself with renewed zeal. His lectures in this department were principally on Hebrew grammar, Hebrew antiquities, and the philologico-critical investigation of the Old Testament, in which he greatly

excelled. So interesting and attractive were these lectures, in which he exhibited the beauties of the Hebrew Scriptures, and which afforded ample scope for the exercise of his rare gifts, that when he was in his prime, they drew large audiences of admiring listeners. Selecting chiefly the most beautiful Psalms, the Song of Songs, choice passages from Job, or sublime portions of the prophets, he first subjected the whole passage to a review, designed chiefly to determine its æsthetic value, placing it in such a light that his hearers could readily perceive its beauties, and catch the spirit of the inspired writer; he then proceeded to its grammatical and philologico-critical analysis, often citing passages from the Greek and Latin poets, or certain lines from Bilderdijk, with a view to elucidate the forms of expression, or to exhibit more clearly its beauties. Expressing himself in pure and flowing Latin with perspicuity, ease, and simplicity, and communicating his instructions in the most agreeable manner, he rendered even the drier and less inviting parts of the course interesting and attractive. By the urbanity of his manners, the courtesy with which he ever treated an audience of students, and the geniality of his disposition, prompting him to relax the tension of their minds by an occasional and well-timed anecdote, he imparted to the lecture-room an air of cheerfulness and sociability, and exerted on his pupils an attractive influence that was irresistible.

Out of the lecture-room he ever manifested a friendly interest in the welfare of his pupils, speaking to them a word of encouragement or commendation, and to such as needed it, rendering pecuniary assistance. Those who showed themselves specially worthy of his regard, he gradually admitted to greater intimacy; and if they bore the test of better acquaintance, they were finally regarded as members of his family.

In 1818, 1819, he again filled the office of rector of the University, but not enjoying the position, owing to the revival of certain disputes among the students, which occasioned him much annoyance; and feeling oppressed by its cares in connection with his other numerous engagements, he resigned it with a discourse *de Imperatore Ali Abu-Talebi filio, Saracenorum principum maximo.*

Near the close of 1819, he met with a severe loss in the

death of his only surviving son, Hendrick Albert Schultens, named after the illustrious man, to whom he felt himself so greatly indebted, and for whose memory he cherished the highest veneration. This amiable youth, the joy of his father's heart, endeared to his parents by the simplicity of his character and the purity of his morals, had attained his eighteenth year; and devoted to letters and theology, had already distinguished himself among the pupils that listened to his father's instructions. He was seized with a violent nervous fever, which reached its fatal termination on the ninth day. During its progress, and as its dangerous symptoms increased, the deeply afflicted father was greatly agitated and distressed; and as at last death came upon the object of his fond affections, unable to endure the sight, he was constrained to retire from the painful scene. But no sooner had death accomplished his work, than the bereaved father, tranquil and serene, returned to the couch of his departed son, and kneeling beside it, uttered the words of Job: "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord." This was unquestionably the severest trial of his life, but it most clearly revealed the strength of his inward piety, and the greatness of his soul. Comforted with the assurance that his dear child, washed in the Saviour's blood, had found admission into the kingdom of God, submissive to the divine will, and fervently grateful for his remaining mercies, which he felt to be peculiarly great, he consigned his mortal remains to their last resting place in Katwijk-down. Strengthened from on high, he soon resumed his labours, and presently the ninth volume of his Bible for Youth made its appearance, in the preface to which he paid a fitting tribute to the memory of his son.

During the period of Van der Palm's professorship, the fruits of his labours were not exclusively enjoyed by the students and the University circle, but were also given to the public in rich profusion. Comprehending the true end of life, and sincerely desiring to attain it, he was not contented to secure merely the admiration of the learned world by devoting himself wholly to its benefit and gratification; but he earnestly desired to promote the general good, for which he was so eminently fitted, as well as by his previous training as by the

harmonious combination of his rare natural endowments. His zeal for Hebrew learning, his devotion to the Greek and Roman classics, his attention to other modern languages, had not caused him to neglect his mother tongue, but bestowing on it the attention it deserved, he had made himself a perfect master of this rich and beautiful language, able so to employ it as to impart to it new charms. The positions which he had previously occupied had afforded him the best opportunities for becoming practically acquainted with the wants and the taste of the nation. Thus qualified by nature and education, he devoted himself to the great and noble work of securing the allegiance of his countrymen to their God, and their attachment to the sacred Scriptures, whose divine authority was at that time covertly and openly assailed; and of improving the morals of the nation by an attractive exhibition of the perfect code of morals contained in the sacred volume. Such were his noble aims, and it pleased a benignant Providence to crown his efforts with the most abundant success.

Besides his sermons, of which mention has been made, his first gift to the public was his Solomon. The Proverbs of the king so famed for his wisdom, had long engaged his attention. To their elucidation he had brought his varied and extensive learning, and his practical acquaintance with the affairs of life. The results of these labours were now communicated to the world in the form of weekly essays, in which the practical application of these proverbs was combined with their æsthetic and exegetical contemplation. Three hundred and nineteen essays, extending from the beginning of the tenth chapter to the seventeenth verse of the twenty-second, were successively sent forth, and were read with the greatest delight, securing general favour and approbation.

Ever cherishing a lively interest in the welfare of the young, to whose improvement he had often directed his efforts, he began in 1811 his Commentary on the Bible, designed for the benefit of youth, which, comprised in twenty-four volumes, he completed in the course of twenty-three years. This work, beyond all his others, has been a general favourite with old and young, passing almost constantly through the press, and still retaining its popularity.

In 1816 appeared his Historical and Rhetorical Memorial of the Restoration of the Netherlands, to which the committee of award had unanimously accorded the first rank. This production of his pen, regarded as the masterpiece of Dutch prose, was elicited by Admiral Van Kinsbergen, who, influenced by an ardent zeal for the honour of his country, had in 1815 publicly invited the orators, poets, and painters of Holland, each in their way, to immortalize this event for the benefit of posterity. The desired article was to be conceived in the spirit of the ancients, especially in that of Sallust, and its tendency must be to fraternize, not to revive the old factions. The article of Van der Palm, regarded as fully meeting these conditions, and as exhibiting him in all his greatness as a prose writer, was greatly admired for its portraitures of Van Kemper and Van Hogendorp, two of the principal actors in that event, and especially for its delineation of the character of Napoleon.

In 1818, at the age of fifty-five, he commenced his translation of the Bible, which is regarded as the most gigantic undertaking of his life. He had, however, been for many years engaged in making preparations for it. It was not designed to supersede the authorized version, but rather to accompany it, especially for family use. His views as to the necessity of revising the version in common use, and the principles on which it should be conducted, seem to us so judicious, that they could hardly fail to commend themselves to candid and reflecting men. The work was published by subscription, and received the most honourable as well as the most ample patronage. It was completed in seven years. His notes on the translation appeared from 1831—1835.

In the midst of labours that excite our astonishment, Van der Palm still found time to extend in an irreprehensible manner his fame as a secular orator. The National Oration, delivered in 1799 by order of the government, had so completely established his reputation, that he was henceforth regarded by the nation as its orator par excellence. Subsequently on every great occasion he must be the orator of the day. In view of celebrating the tri-centenary of the art of printing, he alone was suggested as the speaker, though to secure a poem worthy of the occasion, it was thought necessary to appeal to

emulation. When, in 1824, the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Leyden's deliverance was celebrated, his eloquence must enhance the interest of the occasion. In 1820, the sad but pleasant duty devolved on him of honouring the memory of the gifted Borger, once his pupil, afterwards standing beside him as a theological professor, and second only to himself as a pulpit orator, though closing his brilliant career at the early age of thirty-five. Of him was required in 1824 to commemorate the virtues of the noble Van Kemper, who, in conjunction with Count Van Hogendorp, acted the most conspicuous part in freeing his country from the oppressive rule of Napoleon.

As member of the various literary, scientific, and art societies throughout the land, it often devolved on him to appear on their platforms, and from this duty he never excused himself on the ground of his numerous engagements. On such occasions we find him at one time discoursing on the true nature of eloquence, and at another descanting on the eloquence of Cicero; now commending a useful mediocrity of talent, then insisting on the necessity of self-knowledge to the artist; now pointing out certain requisites to simplicity of style, then reprimanding a neglect of the rules of art; now expatiating on the influence and value of the external, then selecting for his theme unity and diversity; now indicating and defining the limits of self-love, then inculcating the duty of general benevolence; now dwelling on the importance of a sound judgment, and then estimating the value to be attached to the judgment of posterity: and on all these occasions affording evidence of the delicacy of his taste, and exhibiting his characteristic wisdom, moderation, and benevolence.

Bereaved in 1835 of his beloved consort, and in 1836 of a highly gifted and beloved daughter, who had solaced him in his bereavement, and succumbing under the pressure of these heavy trials, he resigned his office of University preacher, as too onerous for him, but still continued his lectures, diminished by the coöperation of Professor Hamaker, until 1838, when he was wholly relieved by Professor Rutgers. Thus terminated his labours for the benefit of the University.

After relinquishing his public duties, he still prosecuted his literary labour, completing in 1838 his treatment of the first

nine chapters of the Book of Proverbs; and in 1839 he applied himself to the remaining portion, but succeeded in completing only two essays, subsequently given to the public, and bearing testimony to the clearness of his intellect at that late period of his life. His study had long been his delightful retreat. To it he continued to resort as long as his bodily strength permitted, though he could only employ himself in reading, and finally could not do even that to his satisfaction.

It was allotted to Van der Palm to receive from his cotemporaries a degree of honour correspondent to his great merits. As an orator, he enjoyed with all the highest reputation. Personally acquainted with the most honourable in the land, and condescending to the humblest, he everywhere met a cordial reception. All classes, from the humblest citizen to Count Van Hogendorp, delighted to do him honour. Poets, from the least to the greatest, sung his praises. Among the learned, by whom he was surrounded, he stood preëminent. None disputed his superiority. None envied it. All felt honoured by it. All rejoiced in it. All loved him. All revered him. He was the great luminary, towards which they were attracted, and around which they revolved. Men in every department of knowledge, both in the Universities and throughout the land, paid homage to his genius and learning, highly valued his judgment, and solicited his criticisms on their works. Almost every society in the land, literary, scientific, or art, honoured him with its membership. The Netherlands Literary Society in 1830 awarded him a gold medal, as one of the two men who, during the past half century, had laid Dutch literature under the greatest obligations, having eminently enriched it with their productions. His fame was not confined to his own country. His first contribution to theological literature, the production of his youth, and given to the world in Latin, had introduced him to the favourable notice of European scholars. With Silvestre de Sacy he held a learned correspondence. Many scholars abroad, among whom were Professor Bernstein of Breslau and Rey of Paris, sent him regularly copies of their works. In 1822 he was made *Associé Correspondant de la Societé Asiatique à Paris.* Literary strangers continued to honour him with their visits even to old age.

All the honours conferred on him, all the respect shown him, all the encomiums elicited by his brilliant efforts, could not impair his lovely simplicity of character, or divest him of his characteristic modesty and humility, which rendered intercourse with him so delightful. He had profoundly studied the life and character of Him who was meek and lowly in heart, and having drunk deeply into his spirit, he succeeded, with the assistance of Divine grace, on which he implicitly relied, in reproducing in his own life no faint resemblance of the virtues which adorned the Saviour's character. Mild, yet firm, dignified, yet affable and condescending, honouring the virtues of all, respecting the rights of all, ministering to the pleasure of all, Van der Palm was the life and centre of the social circle, directing, without apparent effort, the current of thought and feeling, restraining from levity, rebuking the spirit of calumny and detraction, and diffusing the spirit of benevolence throughout the whole circle. The lovely traits of character which he exhibited in the social circle, shone forth with even greater lustre in the privacy of domestic life. There he was seen in all the amiability of his character. He was the devoted husband, the tender father, the kind master. With his own spirit he imbued his whole family. Order, peace, love, and harmony prevailed. Hence happiness was there a constant guest. As his house was the abode of joy, it had a charm for every visitor, and was the seat of an oriental hospitality.

It pleased the Sovereign Disposer of all events to grant to Van der Palm a long life of uninterrupted health and prosperity. He was not, indeed, exempt from all trial. He doubtless had, in common with all, his daily trials; but these must have been greatly lightened by the composure and serenity of mind which he constantly enjoyed. He had sorer trials, too, caused by the death of several of his children, and of his beloved companion. These had tried his faith and patience, which had risen triumphant over them. Now his bodily health and comfort are to be impaired. Now, unattended by the lovely and pious woman, whose companionship he has enjoyed for nearly fifty years of his earthly pilgrimage, he is to engage in a fearful conflict with excruciating bodily pain and suffering, which are destined to be of several months' continuance. The

resources of medical science and skill are all tried, but in vain. No relief can be afforded, much less can a cure be effected. Wearisome days and nights are experienced. His faith and patience are sorely tried, but do not fail. He still retains his confidence in God. He still relies for acceptance with him solely on the merits of the Lord Jesus Christ, rejoicing in him as his righteousness, and rejecting all consolation drawn from the retrospect of a well-spent life. He emphatically bears his dying testimony to the great truths of the gospel which he has preached during his life. Having endured with patience the sufferings appointed him by infinite wisdom and love, he finishes his course with joy, and departs in peace.

Van der Palm died September 8, 1840, in the seventy-eighth year of his age. During his long-continued sufferings, his mind remained clear and vigorous. His death was preceded by a violent fever, respecting which, when it first arose, he remarked, "This will be my last conflict." During his sickness he had intimated to his physician his willingness, should he desire it, to have his body subjected to a post-mortem examination. With the consent of the family, this was accordingly done by Professor Broers. The investigation confirmed the opinion previously entertained by his attending physician. The aorta, where it leaves the heart, was found in a state of osseous induration, and the right heart was expanded and softened. His remains, attended by a large concourse of friends and admirers of various ranks and ages, were conveyed to Katwijk-down, where they were interred to await the resurrection of the just. Appropriate addresses were delivered at the grave: with an extract or two from which, we shall complete our sketch of this great and amiable man.

The first is from Professor Van Hengel: "And Van der Palm too must die! Already we stand here by his coffin, whilst the sad tidings are spreading far and wide through the provinces of our country, and great and small, learned and unlearned, are lamenting his death! We have lost a man, such as but seldom appears in the world; great as a University professor, great as a Bible expositor, great as an orator, and at the same time amiable as a man, humble and modest as a minister of Christ. What he was before God, was testified to

the last by those days, and weeks, and months of trial, into which he was brought, that he might become more closely united to heaven. . . . . You feel the unspeakableness of the loss which the church, the country, which you have sustained. But you fervently rejoice, that what we see before us are only the material remains, enclosed in a narrow casement of wood. Himself we follow in imagination into those regions whence we hear it proclaimed to us, 'Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord!' Thither his works follow him, however small and insignificant they were in his own eyes. And to the world from which he has departed, he will continue to speak, as long as a posterity exist that appreciate such a gift of Providence."

From the Rev. J. Dermont: ". . . . . His image is vividly before us in all that he performed and achieved that was good, and beautiful, and great, in his unsurpassed merits, in his imperishable fame; but only to mention these on the holy place, where greatness and fame disappear;—only to think of his great name, though that will be immortal—of his public life and works, though the fruits of these shall be reaped by remote posterity;—from simply doing this he would himself prohibit us, could he still address us, who set us an example of humble modesty, and departed as the humble servant of his Lord. . . . . His voice comes as for the last time to us, saying, 'Remember how I have preached him (Jesus) as the precious Redeemer, the mighty Prince of life; how I have glorified him in death as the source of all grace: he is faithful: his reward is in his hand: I have entered into the joy of my Lord!' . . . ."

ART. VI.—*Social Statics: The Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the first of them developed.* By HERBERT SPENCER. London: John Chapman. 1851. Pp. 476. 8vo.

THERE is so much resemblance between the doctrines of this work, and those contained in Mr. Dove's book on the Elements of Political Science, that nearly all that was said in a former number of our *Review* (Jan., 1860, Art. I.) in reference to the latter work and its method, is entirely applicable to this one. Of course, we do not intend to repeat what was there said. But we find in this book a few errors, not noticed in that article, which we regard as of fundamental importance in political philosophy, and which we think it may be profitable for us now to discuss, in the form of a partial review of the present work.

Our author's first principle, or, as it is called in the title of the book, first *condition* of human happiness, is that—*Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man;* and his whole book is professedly devoted to prove and develope this principle. He thinks he has stated this proposition with all the certainty and exactness of thought and language that belongs to mathematical axioms, and that he has proved it by a perfectly definite and scientific demonstration, (though axioms are not usually proved); and he has attempted to develope out of it, in a systematic form, a portion of a system of perfectly definite and scientific political truth; but it seems to us that in all this he has failed, and necessarily failed.

Regarded scientifically, his argument is without form and void, having no steady method, and using deductive and inductive processes, and aprioral, psychological, and historical premises, without any defined discrimination. Very much that he has said is well said and well thought; but the constructive power of the author, in the use of these materials, is radically defective, and his whole system seems to us arbitrary, and therefore lifeless. Indeed we cannot avoid the impression that

he has proceeded in the construction of it by gathering together a few dry bones of defunct utopias and manufacturing a few others, and by making of these, hardly a skeleton, but rather a sort of frame, which he has attempted to fill up by attaching to it a series of political essays prepared previously and for no such purpose. We are quite content, however, that any reader of the book shall come to the conclusion that, if our mental vision had been more acute, our impression of the book would have been different in this respect.

The author gives us several times, in somewhat different language, a summary of his argument in support of his first principle; and we may state it thus:—God wills the happiness of man, therefore he has a *right* to be happy. But, as he cannot have complete felicity without having *all* his faculties exercised in the ratio of their several developments, therefore it is his *duty* so to exercise them. And, as he cannot do so without being free, therefore he has a *right* to be free. But "this sphere of existence into which we are thrown not affording room for the unrestrained activity of all, and yet all possessing, in virtue of their constitutions, similar claims to such unrestrained activity, there is no course but to apportion out the unavoidable restraint equally," and therefore every man's liberty must be restrained by the "like liberty of every other man." P. 77.

Our *italics* must be taken as an indication of some of the points in the above demonstration that are open to criticism, for we shall not stop to discuss them. Of the conclusion, limiting the freedom of each for the freedom of others, we must say now that, so far as that ground of limitation operates, it is a limitation of man's happiness; because it limits his inherent natural tendency to perfectly free activity by a mere external necessity; and that, if this is the only ground of that limitation, then man would be more happy as a solitary animal than in society. And even if we add to his argument that man has need of society, and therefore is under the necessity of limiting his freedom, we do not remove the objection; for the limitation is still a purely outward necessity or outer law restraining his free activity and natural tendencies, and therefore interfering with his happiness. We are not clear that this whole happiness

argument would not apply as well to horses and hares, to buzzards and butterflies, as to men. Let the reader try it. Moreover, this argument establishes no *duty* to regard the rights of others, but only the *expediency* of doing so, if we desire to be happy. It is a fatal defect of the argument that it takes no notice of those inherent tendencies of our spiritual nature that, when properly developed, incline us to respect the rights and to sympathize with the wants of others, and thus give us an inner law which makes us feel this is a duty, and even a pleasant duty, enlarging our capacities and increasing our happiness. We shall have more to say of this hereafter.

It is from this *first principle* that he professes to deduce all the rest of his system, so far as he has developed it; though he falls into many discussions which, though not unprofitable, are yet irrelevant and embarrassing to such a deductive process. From it he concludes that no man can have any just title to land; that all existing titles are founded in fraud; that men and women, parents and children, adults and infants, are perfectly equal in all their rights of every kind; that "each is free to exercise the same authority in legislation as his fellows," page 217; that the rights of a child are "co-extensive with those of the adult," p. 172; that a state or civil society is merely a conventional association; that government is "simply an agent employed in common by a number of individuals to secure to them certain advantages," p. 206, and can coerce no one, p. 254; that any one may secede from the state at his pleasure, though living within its boundaries, p. 250; and other doctrines to which we need not refer.

That our readers may not be unduly surprised at these conclusions, we hasten to say that the government, state, and condition of society, to which they theoretically and scientifically belong, is an ideal one, a Utopia, and that the author is a utopist. Every boy, perhaps, of any considerable degree of education, is something of a utopist; and when he arrives at greater maturity of thought, part of his amusement sometimes is to recall fragments of his utopian dreams and political schemes and to laugh at them; without, however, condemning that tendency to form ideals out of which they arose, or even the act of forming them, for these are part of the ordinary

process of mental growth. It is as natural for the mind to theorize as it is for a bird to fly, and though the first efforts of both are naturally awkward, yet those efforts are necessary to all subsequent skill and success.

The moral and political scheme which the author attempts to sketch is the perfect form of organization of a society of perfect men. He comes down a little from this standard occasionally, as when he calls morality "a code of rules proper for the guidance of humanity in its highest *conceivable* perfection." P. 27. Conceivable by whom? By man, of course; and as the Hottentot, the Laplander, and the Englishman, Mr. Spencer, Dr. Pusey, and Dr. Whately, and indeed every man, would form different conceptions of the perfect state, of course the fundamental standard of morality is infinitely variable, and the only one Mr. Spencer can furnish us is one that can fit only himself. But, according to his general thought, his politics and morals are for men who are absolutely perfect. P. 38.

The author admits that such a system ignores "all vicious conditions, defects, and incapacities" of humanity. P. 56. This view of the essential elements of the system confines it to a very small province, and if the author had adhered to this thought, his labour would have been immensely reduced. Strike out of a system of social science all notice of the vices, defects, incapacities, weaknesses, ignorance, selfishness, and mistakes of men; and we get clear of all debate about crimes and punishments, of all colleges and academies, of hospitals and poor-houses, of courts and prisons, of all disputes about debts, and titles, trespasses and slanders, because perfection admits of none of these matters. It excludes also all envy, malice, avarice, oppression, tyranny, and civil and parental authority; and, of course, it leaves no room for sympathy, gratitude, mutual dependence, respect, reverence, hope, faith, and moral and intellectual aspiration and idealism; for where all are perfect, where there are no vices, defects, or incapacities, all these would be excluded. Then even God himself ceases to be an object of man's regard, and is of no more use to him than he is to the ant and the bee; for humanity, when its spiritual growth is complete, will still need God's upholding

power, but, so far as we can see, can have no further aspiration for divine ideals.

It is therefore quite incompatible with the author's system that he should consider the rights of children; for childhood necessarily implies defects and incapacities with reference to his standard. He ought not to have treated of childhood at all, and then he would not have said that the rights of a child are "co-extensive with those of the adult," while its desires, tendencies, and capacities are all different. Perhaps he means to compensate for this impossibility by another; that the *duties* of a child are co-extensive with those of an adult. His system requires this, and he says: "Unable as the imperfect man (a babe, for instance, we say,) may be to fulfil the perfect law, there is no other law for him." P. 38. And yet a babe has no moral, or intellectual, or physical capacity, to comprehend, violate, or fulfil any duty; though it has the germ principles in it, a moral nature in embryo, which are as certain as its growth to bring it into actual connection with the law of duty.

But the author enables us to get clear of this apparent inconsistency, by telling us that his system "implies an ideal society," p. 38, and "an ideal arrangement of circumstances calculated to secure" the greatest happiness. P. 5. His system, therefore, is not designed for the world as it is, nor for actual existing men or babes, but for ideal ones. How the world, and men, and babes are to arrive at this ideal state, he will, no doubt, tell us, when he comes to treat "of the forces by which society is advanced towards perfection," p. 409, in his promised work on Social Dynamics. We venture to think that, if he had written that work first, as he ought to have done, we never should have been favoured with such a one as this.

But now we must know that his world, and men, and children are only ideal ones, having no vices, defects, or incapacities, and that, in his Social Statics, he speaks not at all of any of us or of our world. If, therefore, he speaks in accordance with his system, when he declares all men, and women, and children equal in all rights, he does not mean that the Greenlander is entitled to have orange groves, and the Brazilian reindeer, or that the fool is equal to the philosopher. He

does not mean that a child is entitled to be king, or president, or commander-in-chief; or a shoeblack, professor of astronomy; or a rag-woman, chief justice. He does not mean that a wild Pawnee is entitled to a splendid mansion and gardens, and cultivated fields, while he has no more fitness for them than a pig has for a parlour. He says expressly, that "the course of civilization could not possibly have been other than it has been," p. 409; and, therefore, it cannot now be other than it is, and all its growth has been legitimate; and yet he puzzles us by oft-repeated and unsparing condemnations of both past and present laws and institutions.

If he really means his ideal system to declare the true law for ideal men, then he does not mean that it shall apply to us in our actual state. He could not mean that the law of life and conduct of the caterpillar is the very law that governs it when developed into a butterfly. He could not mean that the laws established for the guidance of the thin-skinned grub-worm are the very laws that it has when it takes its highest state as a winged and mail-coated beetle, and that its grub-worm life is a constant transgression of the true law of its nature. All the *principles* out of which grow the *laws* of the beetle and of the butterfly, do undoubtedly exist in the grub-worm and in the caterpillar, and even in the egg; but it is only with the development of their highest state that these principles become, or can become, actual laws of their conduct. The acorn and its first tender sprout contain all the principles of the mature oak; but their *law* is not the same, for it is only the mature tree that bears seed, or is fit for ship-timber. The principles of the best possible apple-tree are all in the germ of the wild crab-tree; yet this can bear nothing but crab-apples, and the actual law of its being requires that it should do so; and it cannot become subject to the ideal law of the orchardist until after it has undergone a long course of preliminary training.

But we cannot thus set aside the theory of the author as not intended to have any application to society in its present imperfect state. He does intend that it shall now be applied as fast as he can succeed in developing it and bringing it to the attention of the public. He thinks that human legislation is capable of a perfectly definite and perfectly adapted code of

laws, which will never stand in need of change; as definite at least as those of the bee and the ant, which are themselves perfect as soon as they pass out of their larval state. He thinks himself justified in this assumption by the analogy of mathematics, though that science has nothing to do with motives and feelings, and moral and social qualities; and none of these are ever estimated by weight and measure, multiplication and division, squaring and cubing. He is himself forced to his doctrine of equal rights, partly because actual inequalities are incapable of measurement, p. 120; and thus he admits that this equality is arbitrary, because it disregards the inherent facts of the case, and proceeds only according to the capacity of the theorist.

He thinks himself further justified, in insisting upon his perfect and definite code of laws, from the analogy of the science of physiology. P. 58. But here again his analogy fails him utterly: for, though physiology does, as far as possible, enunciate the laws of vitality of physical man in his normal state, yet it derives them from actual subjects, and not from an *ideal* one. And that would be a very poor physiology that would give only the vital laws of some supposed perfect subject, some gymnast or acrobat, and leave out all notice of generation, growth, youth, maturity, senility, and decay, of the peculiarities of races, and of the differences arising from differences of temperament, of nutriment, of habits and of climate. An ideal law for ideal men under ideal circumstances can be no law at all. It is nothing applied to nothing. He says that social science, "in common with all other sciences, assumes perfection in the elements with which it deals." P. 56. But what science does so? None. All of them treat their subjects as they find them, and the systematized knowledge of them, as they actually are and as they act, constitutes the science of them. He is no philosopher at all, but a mere algebraist in morals, who excludes actual men in their actual relations from his theorems, and deals only in theorems of abstract thought.

The author's fondness for perfect certainty leads him to think that all events, moral and physical, "are wrought out in a certain inevitable way by unchanging forces." P. 40. Yet this is very near nonsense; for an unchanging force is no force

at all. Every new combination of elements brings a change of forces. Every new event indicates a change of them. All growth in matter and in mind does so. We have and can have no right to assert even that the germs of all forces are already existing in creation; for it is in connection with its Creator, and may be ever receiving new influences from him. All forces and the germs of them are in nature and *its relations*, and it must ever stand in relation to God. We know that material nature is in relation with spiritual—man; and spiritual with spiritual—man with man, and that each modifies the forces of the other. And we have faith that *all* nature is in relation with God, and must be modified by its connection with him. Even a new planet brought into relation with our system would change its forces; one planet passing near another does so. And how can it be supposed that nature and man can be in relation with the Great Cause, without being affected by the relation. Even God himself represents himself as being affected by his relation to his creatures; as watching over them, sympathizing with them, punishing, restraining, guiding, protecting, and encouraging them, and attracting them towards himself. He careth even for the sparrow and the lily. The very grain that seems to take its time in the long summers near the tropics, hastens its growth and maturation in the short northern summers. Why? We can only answer: God careth for it and for the beings it is to nourish, and speeds its forces. We cannot dispense with the First Cause, even if we should discover some intervening or second one.

On the same ground he objects to common sense as a standard of social laws, because "it would be absurd to measure with a variable standard." Yet, for the judgments of imperfect men, and so far as men are entitled to judge their fellows, it has never been deemed absurd. The practical minds of lawyers and judges have always deemed "certainty to a common intent" all that was really necessary. Common sense is our common standard in relation to food, clothing, style, houses, language, intelligence, law, prices, contracts, and general intercourse, and it has answered reasonably well. Certainly it is variable, because society is variable; but only in long periods. It is always but an approximation to exact-

ness of rule. And surely this is all that is allowed to men. Some scope must be left to human freedom and variety. No man is allowed such perfect judgment as to be an infallible judge of human actions. No man is allowed to free himself from the common sense of society, else he would cease to be social. No man is allowed to get so far in advance of society as to be free from its imperfections, else he could not understand it. He may go somewhat in advance, and then his duty is to help society to advance.

The author exhibits another and similar misapprehension of the very nature of some of the essential processes of all science, in the frequent demands which he makes for exact language and perfectly precise definitions. He must have perfectly definite laws; exact ratios of rights, duties, capacities, and exact standards of them; precise definitions even of such terms as maintenance, education, and good citizen; exact ethical rules, and exact conclusions; and he declares, of all propositions and terms that will not bear this test, that, "bubble-like, they will bear a cursory glance, but disappear in the grasp of one who tries to lay hold of them." P. 314. And he had before said, that when the terms of a rule are not universally accepted in the same sense, it "will be liable to such various constructions as to lose all claim to the title of a rule." P. 3.

Now there is apparent in all this the utter confusion of the ideal and the actual, that exists in the author's mind, and that pervades his whole work. One may arbitrarily construct the most exact definitions of ideal rights and duties and capacities, and then proceed to deduce from them, with perfect accuracy of thought, a whole system of rules, and yet he will only have regulated and developed his ideas within that special field of his labour, and will not have demonstrated a single rule for the guidance of actual men. From our own ideas of lines and numbers we may build up a system of mathematics, without learning, thereby, anything of the actual world or of the use of mathematics in it. We cannot, from our cosmological ideas, declare the true construction and rules of the actual cosmos. Experience alone can be our guide in this. And we cannot go beyond experience in such matters, except so far as faith enables us to do so; and therefore, even with our present know-

ledge of our fallen nature, we cannot construct a legislation for our perfectly regenerated nature, any more than we could construct a world out of chaos. And yet, with no better or more real materials, the author does expect to construct "a purely synthetic morality, proof against all criticism," on account of its indefiniteness. P. 28. Well, be it so; still his system would not prove itself to have any application to existing society. The laws of cosmos are not the laws of chaos, though its germ principles may all be involved therein. There is, in the elements of chaos, a fitness for orderly relations, when favouring circumstances arise; but, as chaos, it must have the *laws* of chaos, tending to cosmos. And moral chaos must have its appropriate laws. If it is destined to become moral cosmos, it must have tendencies and laws for improvement, and when perfection is attained it must have laws appropriate to the perfect state.

When the subject of any science is actual beings and things, and their relations and modes of action and interaction, no definitions are at all relevant except definitions of those very elements of the subject to be treated of, or rather definitions of our conceptions of them. Our conceptions are not formed arbitrarily, or by construction, from mere thinking; but are the natural result of the connection of our mind with the matter conceived of. Our conception is our knowledge of that matter, and it must depend, for its definiteness, accuracy, and sufficiency, on our intelligence and qualifications as observers. Our definitions cannot be more true to the actual fact or being or thing than our conceptions of them are; for our definitions are the expression of our conceptions, and these are necessarily indefinite in relation to immense classes of objects of thought, partly because of our ignorance and partly because of the very nature of the objects themselves. So long as conceptions are indefinite, the terms used to express them must be so, and so must the definition of these terms.

Why then should the author complain of the indefiniteness of terms, which, in all his instances, depends on the nature of things and on the degree of our intelligence? How can definite terms be found, or even exist, so long as the very notions which they are intended to explain to others are necessarily

indefinite? No words expressive of the perceptions of sense can have a perfectly defined meaning, for the senses of all do not act alike; even those of the same person vary. The senses require for their expression such words as smooth, sweet, fragrant, purple, loud, hard, all indefinite, merely approximate, giving general character and no exact notions. No language could be invented that would give all their shades of difference, objective or subjective, and no language that would attempt it could be understood by many in the same sense.

And take words expressive of moral judgments; good, happy, just, right, humane, generous, noble, sublime, free, vulgar, refined; all are indefinite in fact and in thought. Their contents, as conceptions, are necessarily as variable as the judgment of varying men, children and adults, ignorant and learned, vicious and virtuous, vulgar and refined persons. Words are for common use, and therefore they must be inexact because common notions are so. Even the word *true*, as expressive of the exactness of a description of a fact or thing, expresses only approximate or general exactness. A statement may be true, though abounding in words of indefinite meaning. Common usage is the law of language, and it cannot be more fixed than that is, nor more exact, and it cannot go beyond our knowledge. We have no language for unknown institutions and relations and duties, and can have none. And so long as our conceptions are growing, our language must be indefinite, and we must put up with inexact conceptions, as the common stock, until all or most men become perfect.

It is quite plain that the author misunderstands entirely the functions of a definition. He admits that the word "happiness, is for the present capable only of a generic, and not of a specific definition," and yet he takes it as the very foundation-stone of his structure, though he rejects such words as maintenance and education, and others not now remembered, as unworthy a place in a scientific discussion, because they also are generic, and, therefore, indefinite. Why, they are all generic words, and, therefore, capable of generic definitions, and not at all of specific ones. They must change their nature first. Vanity is a specific form of happiness, and many men enjoy more than a common share of happiness by keeping up

that form. *Angle* is a generic word, but our conception of it is clear enough to draw one, and to demonstrate that all the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. We know well enough for general purposes what a tree is, though we might not be sure that it properly includes a rose-bush as well as an oak.

Our conceptions are often very clear, even when we cannot define them; for we cannot afford to spend our life in constructing and forgetting the definitions of all the adjectives, nouns, and verbs of the language, and often the demand of them is a mere ruse of sophistry. Neither a conception nor the definition of it is indefinite, because an indefinite number and variety of subjects is included in it. It is definite, if it definitely indicates all the properties that are common to them all, and distinguish them from other subjects. Definition is not description, and that would not be a true definition of a general conception that would give it all the definiteness of individuation. In its very nature, a conception or its definition is the ideal *frame* in which an indefinite number of subjects may, consecutively or contemporaneously, be fitly placed; and therefore all general terms are, so far, indeterminate. A definition must leave to all growing things their growing character, and thus all institutions and conceptions may be defined, with common certainty, though they are continually changing. When they change in essential features, the terms expressive of them may remain, but the definition is changed. A dwelling-house may easily be defined, though, in its structure, there is infinite variety. In savage life, it is a mere physical resort and shelter for man. In civilized life, it is a physical, social, and moral shelter; a shelter from the weather, from the irruptions of animals, and from the intrusion and observation of man. It improves and changes as man himself does, and thus becomes an index of character and civilization. As a *home*, it is a shelter and a nursery of the special affections and customs, and reserved ideas, and moral dignity of the family.

The aspirations of the human mind, that incline all men to form ideals of perfection and exactness, are perfectly natural tendencies; they are essential elements of a growing spiritual being, and we have no fault to find with them; but we cannot

avoid the impression that there is much selfishness in that pertinacity that leads us to invade the common order of society, by insisting that our ideals are the true models for all social conduct and institutions. The perfection of naturally growing beings consists in the perfection of growing, rather than in the exactness and order of completed growth. All growth is change, and all growing things are continually changing. Every growing thing is developed differently from every other one; no two plants, or trees, or animals are exactly alike, though of the very same species; the difference is often very great. In man, the difference is especially great, because, perhaps, the principles inherent in him are more numerous and more expansive than in vegetable and in mere animal nature.

We may impose our aprioral and ideal law, with a very high degree of exactness, on a machine which we ourselves plan and construct, because its very purpose is to express that law. But even then our law must submit to the modifications which are required by the nature of the materials, which we did not create; by the natural variations of the propelling power; and by the changes of weather, atmosphere, and other circumstances in which our machine is placed. On the other hand, we can impose no aprioral or ideal law on the constructions of other men, or on the things and beings which God has created. The best we can do is to study their nature and their actual operations, and by this means discover the actual law which is already in them, or becoming developed in them.

These ideals are quite individual in their character, and have much to do in marking individuality; for the ideals of one man are different from those of every other man, according to the differences of purpose, pursuit, disposition, and spiritual development from which they start. They are hardly *laws* in the life of the individual himself who cherishes them, but rather *goals* in advance of his actual progress. He has proposed them as laws to himself, but has not yet succeeded in so far subduing his older system of law, his former habits, his "carnal mind," as to be able to instal his ideal law with supreme authority in its stead; the old law in his members still wars against the law in his mind, and brings him into captivity. When at last the ideal prevails, and becomes the actual, practi-

cal, realized law of his conduct, it ceases to be ideal, and new ideals arise in its stead, and present new goals and new prizes in the spiritual race. When these ideals are purified and directed by an abiding and proper faith in a supremely good and sympathizing God, then they always help us on in our spiritual progress. Very often, however, they are purely chimerical in their character, and never can be realized; yet if they be, as they ought to be, confined to the improvement of the individual himself, even in their failure they may bring gain in some other direction. We ought not to attempt to impose our ideals as law on society. When they have passed the proper tests, they will be entitled to take their place among the elements of sound education, and then, in proper time, they will become parts of the common faith of society, and have their due influence in improving its customs and legislation.

Without denying that the due exercise of our faculties is an essential element of happiness, we cannot avoid thinking that *the process of development* of the principles and faculties of our nature, physical, intellectual, moral, and religious, is an element quite as essential and obvious, and much more influential. We can account for the omission of this consideration by the author, only on the ground that he considers human perfection as consisting in a completed growth, and not in a perfect process of growing. So we have understood him before, and this omission tends to confirm our thought; yet this theory is so strange that we have endeavoured to discover that our first impressions were erroneous. We are not mistaken. His theory is that the normal state of man, the state at which he is to arrive in the present life, is a state of completed perfection, when all moral, intellectual, and physical growth will have ceased for men, women and children; and he, in his Social Statics, undertakes to legislate for this state, and reserves, for his coming work on Social Dynamics, his legislation on the process of advancing towards perfection.

To us this seems amazing presumption. He has not himself arrived at perfection, in his sense of the word; and therefore he can have no experience of what that state is, or of the legislation that belongs to it. How does he prove that to be our

normal state? He assumes it. How does he prove the legislation proper for it? By history? No; for history can, as yet, tell us nothing of it, for no human experience has reached so far. By psychology? By a careful, accurate, and thorough analysis of all the principles, tendencies, and faculties of our nature, and by a demonstration of the exact points at which they all necessarily terminate? No; all the psychological investigations in the work are extremely meagre, slovenly, and unscientific; and we venture to affirm that he gives us nothing like a demonstration of any one of the important principles of his book. All that is really well said consists of those parts of his work wherein he does not depart from the common sentiments and opinions of society, and were it not for these his book could find no readers.

And if he had adhered strictly to his plan of giving a system of rules for the perfected state of humanity, derived simply from his own ideals, we might dismiss him after a very short discussion. But he does not do so. He evidently intends to apply his system to man as he now is. He does everywhere apply it, and is quite lavish in his condemnation of society for coming short of his standard. He wants his system adopted now, without any regard to the degree of social preparation for it. He thinks the adoption of his system would itself be the completion of social growth; though all history shows that such arbitrary experiments on the growth and organization of society can be productive of nothing but confusion and disaster.

Let rationalism have full and free play in mathematics and general logic, for they deal only with pure intellect and its productions. But in morals, politics, and religion, rationalism begets mere philosophism, not philosophy. It is quite irrational, because it sets aside all our natural sentiments, the elements of the mind that give interest, activity, and energy to the intellect and the will, and which are therefore essential elements of our reason. And because our sentiments are so inseparably connected with our intellect, and are infinitely various in their degrees of energy in different individuals and under different circumstances, it is utterly impossible to invent an exact system of laws of moral conduct that

can apply to all men alike. The great *principles* of benevolence, truth, purity, justice, and order, are eternally true and binding, just because they are founded on essential elements of our nature, as God has created us, on our sentiments and our intellect, and therefore on our whole reason. But the special *laws* and definitions of duty and degrees of duty, of every age and degree of culture and capacity, of every period of civilization, of every variation of the condition of society and of the world, is quite impossible, and even manifestly absurd. Such legislation would be a denial of all human freedom.

However accurately analysis may measure, and logic direct, our pure intellect, they can give us no exact standard by which we are to measure out our sentiments. Like the intellect, they are continually growing, developing, rising, if properly cultivated, as is manifest in the case of love, growing from that of a child for its mother, to love of family, kindred, clan, country, and all humanity; and in the case of the sentiment of beauty, growing from mere love of colours, toys, animals, persons, up to the heights of artistic, intellectual, and moral ideals of beauty; and in the case of the love of truth, from its simplest elements up to the heights of science, and even unto the mysteries of the infinite. Mere rationalism can never define a single stage in the development of any element of human reason, much less of reason itself, and, therefore, cannot declare its legislation, and has no authority to prescribe it.

A principal end of man is physical, moral, and intellectual growth, as is manifest from facts and from the very nature of his faculties; and this involves growing laws, growing rights, growing duties, for duty depends on capacity. "To whom much is given, of him shall much be required." Performance of duty, in the exercise, training, and education of our sentiments, as well as of our intellect, brings increase of capacity, and therewith increase of duty; and thus gradually the highest duties may come within the province of our capacity. God has implanted in our nature the germs of all the faculties and sentiments that can ever be developed in us, and therefore the germs of all those duties themselves; but the duties themselves can never become actual, except with the fact of development and

according to it, and no law can otherwise prescribe them. To dictate rules of duty, regardless of our natural sentiments, is to quench the very aspirations of the soul that make duty and improvement possible, and to suppress the very warmth that gives activity and growth to these spiritual germs. To require that man should act under the guidance of intellect alone, without sentiment, is to require an impossibility. No man ever does or ever can do so. None act on mere principle in all that they do. Most men act on mere sentiment in a great portion of their conduct; and often it is sound sentiment alone that checks their resolves, and saves them from the perversions of mere intellect. In fact, it is sentiment that guides all our actions in childhood, and gives us all our early experience which constitutes the very materials of reasoning afterwards.

And it is not rationalism or pure intellect, that unites men together or with God, but rather the correlation of sentiments. It is no arbitrary law that holds the earth in its orbit, nor the attraction of the sun alone; but the mutual attraction of the sun and the earth. To be attraction at all, it must be mutual. And the affinity that combines particles into gold, or air, or water, must be mutual affinity. Seeing is the result, not of the mere capacity of the eye, but of the mutual action of the eye and some coloured object. Hearing is the mutual action of the ear and sound; and taste is the mutual action of the tongue and something savory.

And so it is in spiritual matters. God wills that man shall love him; but this is no arbitrary law, and could not be, without changing the very character both of man and of love. God has implanted in our very nature the tendencies which do themselves declare this law, when they are brought into mutuality of relation with him. Faith and trust in him, as a supremely good and sympathizing Being, is the capacity that brings him within the reach of our sentiments. Then love recognized begets love. "We love him because he first loved us." Faith in a God who is merely First Cause would satisfy only the intellect, and result in mere pantheism, which gives no God at all. Faith in a God who has no sympathy for us, would disappoint the highest sentiments he has bestowed upon us. Such is the faith of

devils, they "believe and tremble"; and so do bandits before civil authority.

Every sentiment is conditioned on some object, act, quality, or sentiment, perceived or presumed, that is calculated to raise it. Wrongs done, and felt as such, excite resentment. Sublimity perceived excites admiration; music, joy; kindness, gratitude; mystery, wonder; and wisdom, reverence. All the truly spiritual or purely intellectual sentiments are such as arise from purely intellectual perceptions or conceptions, as those of order, wisdom, goodness, and justice, exciting sentiments of admiration, reverence, love, and trust. A horse can have none of these, and therefore none of the aspirations which they impart to the soul and which give to it all its native growth.

The common bond of humanity is love, a sentiment which admits of indefinite degrees of intensity, from that of a mother for her child to that sometimes scarcely discernible affinity or attraction which human beings in general have for each other. And enmity, admitting of similar degrees, is the dividing, disuniting, disintegrating force of society. Sentiment alone produces union of spiritual natures, and a contrary sentiment produces disunion. Without love, union among men could not manifest even its first and feeblest results, and our experience could furnish to our reason nothing to reason about in relation to it. Everywhere in society, sympathy and antipathy are continually and naturally arising, and though reason may always restrain and guide these sentiments, it can never suppress them. Among equals, love and hate tend mutually to beget each other. The sentiment which power feels for the enmity of weakness, is blame, disdain, contempt, or scorn. That of weakness towards the enmity of power, is fear, ill-will, spite, malignity, ferocity. Power foiled in its purposes by weakness, feels anger, resentment, rage. Of course, we are not attempting to express, with exactness, all these shades of feeling, for no language or thought is capable of doing it. These sentiments do not come from the will, but underlie it and give it all its force. Nor do they proceed from the intellect, but are essential elements of its experience and wisdom.

On the other hand, the sentiment of power towards loving

weakness, is forbearance, tenderness, compassion, sympathy, mercy; and the sentiment with which weakness naturally regards sympathizing power, is deference, honour, veneration, reverence. Guilty weakness shows its recognition of offended power, by the sentiments of fear, awe, or dread. No doubt the sentiments of men do not always appear to operate in this order; and often it is difficult to perceive any order in the form or degree of their manifestations. This is the result of defective training. Like a neglected garden, all the seeds and roots of sentiments grow up without any intelligent control, and become entangled together, and interfere with each other. Or, like a family of spoiled children, one is strong, proud, and tyrannical, and domineers over the others; another is weak, dependent, and slavish; another capricious, fretful, and complaining; or perhaps all are subjected to an ignorant and overbearing intellect, that prunes where it ought to train, and suppresses where it ought to encourage and develope. Like husband and wife, intellect and sentiment are necessary to each other, and helpmates to each other; and by harmoniously and constantly assisting each other, they grow more and more in sympathy, symmetry, and power. What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

Love or sympathy is the natural spiritual bond of the union of power and weakness, and all united produce graciousness and authority on the one hand, and reverence and subordination on the other. Natural authority, therefore, means power and sympathy properly recognized by weakness and love, however feeble this love may be. A man of great comparative power, and who sympathizes with society in its social purposes, is a natural authority in society, and receives from it the natural testimonial of authority—reverence—measured out to him according to the need which society feels that it has, and according to its faith in his ability to supply that need. It is the same tribute of reverence, differing only in degree, that we all render to God, when we recognize him as a God of infinite power and goodness. It is the same that the faith of heathens demands for their gods, or the images of them, except when the power of their gods is represented as maleficent, and then mere fear and dread is the natural tribute. It is the same that

has been rendered to good sovereigns in all past ages, and that is still rendered to them by the spontaneous sentiment of those who know them only in history. It is the same that well-trained children render to their parents, when their minds become sufficiently developed to discover the moral and intellectual superiority that guides and protects them. Sometimes family training is so defective that this reverence is never developed in the child, and in the full-grown man we recognize only disrespectful rudeness.

It is the natural spiritual tribute that thoughtful inferiority always renders, in some degree, to superiority in every department of life: soldiers to their general; disciples to their teacher; people to their preacher; patients to their physician; and even employers to the artists and mechanics employed by them, especially where the principles of the art are above their comprehension. Every man of science and skill in his art or profession is an authority in it, and, therefore, naturally entitled to the deference of others in all matters relating to it, and this is freely conceded to him by all men of generous thoughtfulness. And yet our author thinks, and often declares, that all reverence for authority is mere superstition. He ranks it among the "deciduous sentiments," and "larval appendages" of the mind, which are to fall away or be absorbed as we arrive at his normal state of perfect society; as the caterpillar dispenses with its hairy skin, and the tadpole with its tail, when they come to their complete development as frog and butterfly. We need not stop to discuss this matter with him. We may do it by the way.

No doubt this natural reverence for authority is often unduly developed, so as to appear oppressive to the other sentiments and faculties of the soul, but this is to be expected. All the sentiments and faculties are liable to this disproportionateness in their development, and some of them much more so than this reverence. In no man are all alike developed. Every pursuit of life requires a somewhat different development of character or of sentiments and faculties. Savage and civilized associations, orderly and disorderly times, require very different characters, and very great degrees of difference. The development that may rule in quiet times, may be totally incompetent

for times of social conflicts. In the very nature of things, the laws that are prepared for the regulation of the mere common order or disorder of society, cannot suit in times of great social disturbance; for these bring with them new developments of sentiment, new social aims, a new social character, to which the old laws do not apply. The reverence and devotion that rallies the clan around its chief on every sound of danger, may be disproportioned to the other sentiments and faculties, considered in themselves, and yet not at all so, when considered with reference to attending circumstances.

Our selfishness is perhaps strong enough to save society from any very dangerous or permanent errors in the way of excessive deference for authority; and it seems probable that we need no other safeguard in that direction, at least not as against civil authority. Our selfishness is very apt to show itself in continual censures of established authority, and then our credulity induces us to attach ourselves to any leaders who will help to gratify this propensity, ignorant though they may be, and though they may be leading us into the deadly swamps of anarchy. But complaining of such matters does not tend to cure them. So long as and so far as we are ignorant, we will be credulous, and will yield, more or less, to such usurped authority. More reverence for our own instituted authority would save us from many of the evils which continually afflict society.

Certainly we cannot escape from any of our social evils by casting away all reverence for authority. We could not do this by a mere act of our will; but such a result may be attained or approximated by a long course of bad training. And then, what have we in the place of reverence for authority? Self-conceit, self-worship. We need not say that this too may exist in an excessive and superstitious degree; and that it can be no better guide of social life, and of life in society, than the common authority and the common sense or general intelligence of the country.

But, as this rejection of all reverence for authority is a fundamental principle of ordinary rationalism, it is worth our while to consider a little further what it involves. In doing so, we shall avoid all theological discussion, and consider only how

man is bound to treat and judge his fellows. In his relations with God, we judge him not; "to his own master he standeth or falleth." We need not be particular whether we express the duty by one or other of the terms, reverence, respect, trust, faith, submission, subjection, or obedience; all are used to express the same thought, or different shades of it. Faith or trust involves the perception of good qualities, and the reverence or respect that spontaneously attends such perception; and, on the other hand, reverence often means to express both the sentiment and its antecedent perception, and we may find it convenient to use these terms as convertible.

The fact of authority, as the ruling element of society, has existed always and everywhere. It has shown itself always in the family, the clan, the tribe, the state, and in every form of human society. It exists in the very facts of right and of duty, and is the spiritual force that causes rights to be respected and duties to be observed. It is seen in the social influence of deceased sages, and of leading men in war, politics, science, and arts, and in the actual authority of inherited opinions, customs, and institutions, as well as those of contemporaneous or recent legislation. It is a spontaneous product of all human nature, wherever human sentiment is not crushed out by an overbearing rationalism; which is never entirely possible. It is, therefore, the will of God that men should be subject to social authority; and he has testified this will by placing the proximate ground or cause of human authority in our very nature. Its elements in human nature are natural inequalities, dependence on each other, inferiority and superiority, and the perception of them, the feeling of the need of order, faith in each other, respect, reverence, instinctive imitation, admiration of great qualities, and faith in higher ideas and principles than those we have already attained.

And so he has done with other parts of his creation. He requires matter to gravitate, combine, and take form, seeds to grow, plants and trees to bear fruit, and animals to multiply; yet it is not simply because of his will that all these do so, but also because of the active principles which he has created in them, fitting and inclining them to do so under proper circumstances. "All things are double." In all creation there is a

yoking or gearing together and interlacing of correlative principles and tendencies in order to produce action and interaction. Attraction, affinity, and growth, are results of correlative, mutuating, interceding tendencies; all essential to the operation, and contributing to its efficiency. And so it is in spiritual things. Sentiment, thought, opinions, habits, customs, purposes, are perpetually and naturally circulating and interfusing, so as to make society and social organization and social authority perfectly natural products of the development of the germs of human character. Let us notice some of these.

The common sense of society, its common customs, common language, common opinions of propriety, of decency in dress and behaviour, and of general morality; all these are a real, most necessary, and most imperious authority among men. And yet few men feel that they are oppressive to individual development, and there is no body of law that is so little rationalistic in its origin and development, while it is all more or less rational, because it is of spiritual growth. None but born idiots refuse to participate in these common properties of society, and they only from incapacity, and not from any voluntary rejection of social authority. The authority comes from the very nature of man and of society, and its rejection is impossible. Yet it may be so far weakened by rationalistic teachings as to bring about a dissolution of an existing social organization, and require its reconstruction; and for this the principle of social authority will still be found remaining in man.

The purpose of language, in all the world, is the same; it is everywhere uttered by similar vocal organs; has necessarily the same parts of speech, the same distinctions of gender, number, time, relation; and, in short, is the same in its fundamental principles, and in the spontaneity of its origin and development, so far as any living language is concerned; and yet the customs of language differ more widely than any other customs, as between different races and nations, and even between different tribes of the same race and country. And yet every language is valid, as the general custom of the people who use it, contains for them the valid and authoritative laws of expression of all thought, to which all must conform who

would profit by the advantages of social intercourse. All the people receive it, and not one of them can give any account of its origin, or justify, on rationalistic principles, his reception of it. He may see that it has always been growing, as the people have advanced from savage life to a state of high civilization, and as their pursuits, possessions, customs, morality, and intelligence have changed, and that thus it has been continually adapted to express the common and special thoughts of the people. But he does not think of proving the legitimacy of the origin of any portion of the language, in order to justify himself in the use of it. For us, at least, the authority of society, or common usage, is a sufficient justification; and he would be regarded as a fool, and would be one, who would invent a language for himself. The fact of inheritance is proof of rightful authority.

All the customs of men are subject to this variety and continued change, and yet they are all a real authority in society. Let any one study, even cursorily, the customs of dress, of the forms of dwellings, of courtesy, of agriculture, of cooking, of furniture, of the different social callings in the arts, trades, commerce, and learned professions; and he will find them all invested with authority more or less imperious in its influence; and though they are all founded on permanent principles in human nature and in the world around us, yet they are all continually changing their forms and giving rise to new laws in all the relations of life.

Conservatism and officialism are prone to fall into the error of supposing that the laws to which our experience has already led us, are the only true laws for us for all time to come. Radicalism, with its aprioral deductive process of legislation, is prone to reject experience altogether, and to pronounce invalid all laws and customs which it cannot logically deduce from its highest rational principles. But the fact of spiritual growth, as a necessary element of human nature, involves the growth and change of all its customs, and gives an aprioral principle that condemns both such conservatism and such radicalism. It is this—The natural law of naturally changing and developing being must itself be naturally changing. This principle seems to us to be one of axiomatic clearness and certainty; and

any one can illustrate it for himself by a little observation of the laws of vegetable, animal, and human nature. What we have already said will aid in this illustration. It admits of and requires permanence of fundamental principles, and allows great variety in their development and application; "diversities of gifts, but the same spirit, differences of administration and of operations, but the same God who worketh all in all."

Our respect for the customs and institutions of society is perfectly natural, and though it becomes enlightened and somewhat changed by reflection and sound teaching, it is only the perversions of selfishness and of rationalism that can seriously impair it. The child naturally adopts the language and other customs of its parents; and grown people naturally adopt the customs of others around them; and it is only thus that we can profit by the experience of others. Our faith in the customs of society saves us from the necessity of re-trying the experience of others, and aids in bringing social action into harmony and consistency. Without faith in the example of others we could derive but little advantage from their experience, and every individual would have to limit himself chiefly to the share of wisdom imparted by his own experience.

But the world has not made progress in this way. All our first opinions, customs, and rules of action, are received simply by faith in parents, friends, and the society in which we move. We do not will to receive them, but they come to us spontaneously. It is a simple inhaling of the spiritual atmosphere in and by which we live, and it becomes part of ourselves even long before we take knowledge of its existence. We receive and practice these opinions until they become a part of our life and character, and give us all the real intelligence and power we have. We have no other ability to reason than that which they have given us, and have nothing to reason from or about except our experience of them. To reject them all, as the products of a superstitious faith, would be to cast ourselves on the world as helpless as new-born babes, and to find that we can have no other kind of start for our spiritual life. It is this faith in beings and ideas that are above us, which furnishes us the strongest impulse to improvement, and which continually elevates our standard of duty and chides us for falling short of

it. It sets no value on completed acquisitions, except as means of making further ones. Its look is ever onward; forgetting things behind, it reaches and presses forward. Its view is not strong enough to see perfection itself, else it would overlook all the intermediate stages of progress, and leave us to flounder through them, or in them, in hopeless struggles. But it advances by gradation, "from faith to faith," and thus continually uses our defective experience as means of preparing continually new foundations for our further progress.

It is only after our spontaneous experience has developed our reasoning faculties, and supplied the materials of thought, that we are capable of discussing the fact and the principle of social authority, and of at all understanding and appreciating that degree of reverence for it that is needed for its maintenance. Then everybody perceives that organization and authority are essential forms of society; but we do not so readily discover that these forms must vary according to the varying intellectual and moral development of men; and therefore we do not discover the principle that must guide and control these varieties.

And yet we are strongly impressed with the belief that this principle was divinely expressed long ago, in a very simple form: "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant; and whosoever shall exalt *himself* shall be abased." To our mind this seems a clear declaration of the principle that all social organization, and authority, and functionaries, must be adapted to the condition of the people; must be competent to express and execute their general and permanent will, and thus be the servants of the whole; that rulers and subjects must be adapted to each other; that no man has any moral right to a position to which he is not adapted, and that no sanction of popular election can save him from the disgrace of unfitness, or the people from the consequences of their unwise choice. The principle is illustrated in the Mosaic legislation, the wisdom of which consisted in its adaptation to a particular people in their state of moral and religious progress, and not in its universal and eternal fitness. It is illustrated in another form, in almost all royal inauguration oaths, binding the king to rule according to the laws and customs of the country, and mean-

ing thereby, that legislation must always be adapted to the condition and general opinions of the people, and not to the will of the legislator.

And this is a thoroughly philosophical principle. No man acts, or can act, on any other principles than those which he has received by faith or intelligence, or both, and which together constitute his character. And so it is with a people. Their character consists of their settled customs and opinions, and social organization is for the purpose of giving form, and force, and harmony to these in all social action. There is a true gradation of individual, species, and genus of opinions, customs and habits, as there is relative to vegetables and animals. The settled opinions of a man constitute the individual conscience, and direct his actions. The settled common opinions of a state constitute a species, the conscience of the state, and direct its actions. The settled common opinions of associated states constitute a genus, the conscience of the associated states, and direct their actions. It is the respect of each for the province of the others, that will prevent self-hood and sociality from encroaching on each other; and it suggests two very important political axioms:

For individual action, the individual conscience, including respect for society; and for state action, the state conscience, including respect for individuals.

And for international and interstate relations, this one:

For each state's action, its own conscience, including respect for other states; and for the interaction of related states, the common conscience of them all, including respect for each.

Our own sad experience ought to have already convinced us that, when the law of mutual respect is violated, written constitutions, as bonds of union, give way "as a thread of tow touched by the fire." If we could learn to study our *duties* more, and to brood less over our *rights*, we should never forget our respect for others, and should improve faster, and quite securely.

It is the misunderstanding of the relative rights of the individual conscience and the public conscience that leads to most of the dissensions and oppressions that afflict humanity. Every one can point to many proselyting and bigoted fanatics, politi-

cal and religious, who are illustrations of this remark, and history abounds with familiar instances of it. It was by disregarding this distinction, and setting up his own conscience above that of society for social action, that Philip II. set aside his oath of office, and persecuted his Dutch provinces, in order to impose upon them absolute power and his own religion, until they asserted their independence. By similar conduct, Charles I. lost his crown and his head. The same error led Charles II. to a like perjury, and to a persecution of the people of Scotland for a quarter of a century, in order to enforce a change of their civil and religious institutions. Thus, too, James II. violated his coronation oath, and attempted to force his systems of politics and religion upon his people, and thereby lost his crown. In these cases, it was the conscience of the king that was arrayed against the conscience of society, and it failed because it was too narrow, and knew not how to respect the conscience of the people. The rule of England over Ireland has been an effort to control the conscience of one people by that of another people, and it has been a continual misrule. The abortive effort of England to control America, and Spain, Mexico, was of the same character, the conscience of one people attempting to guide the actions of another.

Let us not be understood as meaning that the mere common opinions of society are sufficient for the statesman or jurist. Far from it. The common sense of society indicates sufficiently clear the rights of its several members in a general way, and the offences that it regards as punishable, and the general character of punishments; but the forms of administering the public will in these regards require a very special degree of skill and training; just as common sense indicates the general character of a house, while it needs a skillful architect to build it.

The common sense of society is a real, and necessarily a most imperative authority in social affairs. It can act on no other, and no *man* at best can condemn its action when thus directed, however he may wish its judgment to be improved. This does not exclude social faith in great men, and the great national achievements thus performed, for then its faith is an element of its common sense. It is quite as definite

as a system of rules as any that we can hope for in human affairs, and it always improves as we ourselves improve. It is the very rule that we unhesitatingly adopt in relation to language; and we think that we have very express inspired authority in its favour—"whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing." Our generalizations of common sense will require continual and very gradual modifications according to the progress of society, yet this never prevents such an approximate definition of it now as is necessary to constitute it an adequate present standard of social action.

If we have any correct conception of what human nature is, then all the principles of human activity are *within* man, in every man; and all the specific and definite rules or laws of human conduct are derived from these principles according to man's development and to the circumstances in which he is placed. And all these derivative laws must also be *in* him, before he can act upon them. Yet it is not necessary that he should have worked them out for himself; it is sufficient that he receive them as correct. To act upon them without this, is to be subject to laws imposed from without, and therefore to mere compulsion. The principle of faith or reverence is the very principle that enables him to receive higher rules of conduct than he is able fully to comprehend and appreciate, and that constrains him to believe that it is his duty to receive and act upon them; and it is only by thus receiving them that he can learn their adaptation to his nature. "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

It is sadly true that there are very many persons who seem to have very little of this faith and reverence, who perceive nothing above them, no superior moral excellence, no superior ability, nothing venerable in long-tried institutions, nothing respectable in customs that can prove their ancestry through an hundred generations, nothing that is worth their aspiration except the figments of their own fancy. This is deplorable moral degradation. It is utter and debasing selfishness. Such men grow only downwards in the moral scale. If they have ever grown upward at all, it was only by faith in and reverence

for higher beings and ideas; and by their subsequent rejection of them, their growth is stopped, and their fall is begun.

A little reflection makes it quite apparent that this rationalistic irreverence in political affairs, has been greatly promoted by the doctrine that all true government is matter of social compact. This arises from mistaking what was intended only as an analogy for a fact. There is an analogy between social institutions and contracts, but no identity. The analogy consists in the fact that all political institutions ought to be so adapted to the character and purposes of the people as to express their common opinions and receive their general assent. They differ from contracts in this essential particular, that no man can refuse subjection to them on the ground that he did not contract. The common sense of society does certainly, and even necessarily, demand that it shall find itself truly expressed in social institutions, and that is the only mode of securing the *common* consent. But it does not require *universal* consent to them, as is necessary in the case of contracts, where each is personally a consenting party, if a party at all. Social institutions and obligations do indeed often take the form, or nearly the form, of contracts, as in the case of treaties, constitutions, official and testimonial oaths; but these are forms not of creating, but of defining or solemnly recognizing pre-existing and ascertained duties, so that their performance may be more secure. They come from acknowledged duty, not the duty from them. People are not united into one people by contracts and constitutions; but when God has joined them together, they frame their constitutions according to the best of their skill, so as to secure a firm organization and harmonious interaction.

Men who have not time to think carefully on the great subjects of politics are prone to mistake analogy for identity, and to suppose that social institutions are mere matters of contract. Then they very naturally bring them down to the mere level of contracts, in which each tries to make the best bargain he can for himself. Then all deference to authority, all reverence for the past, all respect for the common sense of society are banished. All political discussions become questions of private *rights*, rather than of social *duties*. Then public func-

tionaries are selected, not because of their competency for their public duties and of their earnestness to perform them well, but because of their readiness to advance the partisan and the private interests of those who are most active in selecting them. Then the most solemn of popular acts, public elections, become mere strategic evolutions of hostile parties with masked batteries, skilful manœuvres, crafty artifices, and deceiving tricks, in order to insure success. This is a conversion of the means of peace and harmony into instruments of war and discord, and it must always tend strongly towards dissolution and anarchy. It must produce a frightful degradation of elections and of politics, unless God in his mercy save us by directing us to some efficient remedy.

Radicalism or political rationalism is the general form of a great variety of political discussions that disturb and derange the natural process of development of the social organism. Forgetting that all spiritual and social growth starts from the lowest elements of knowledge, and rises by faith and reverence, and by slow degrees upwards to the highest generalizations or principles of science, it endeavours to *start* from such principles, often very badly ascertained and defined, and out of these to construct, by mere deduction, a whole system of social science. Of course it neglects the whole process of growth, with all its faith, its reverence, its spiritual strivings, its necessary imperfections, its many failures, and the very charity which all these beget, and cruelly condemns all that will not bear to be measured by its standard, though they may have in them the promise of much better results than any it can offer. It can have no reverence, for its look is always downward, as its process is; and it can have no upward growth, for its faith is only in itself. It must reject all reverence in order to open the way to its reception, and it does reject it: such is its notorious character.

And suppose such philosophism should succeed in expelling all reverence and faith out of certain classes of society, what will they have in their stead? Servility or self-sufficiency. The former is a spiritual disease, bred only from contact with demagogues now-a-days, and not from civil authority, and we need not discuss it. The latter, when belonging to ignorance, is

usually called impudence. And can it supply the place of faith and reverence? It may frown down and trample on those who are weaker or less swaggering than itself. It may bark loud enough to drown the voice of the most enlightened wisdom. It may howl down good and honest public servants, whose very honesty has prevented them from studying how to defend themselves from its assaults. But its victories are never enduring. "Its hand is against every man, and every man's hand *will be* against it." Respect for society and its true interests and true forms of progress furnishes the only ground of enduring influence over it. Faith and reverence alone secure spiritual growth. Their look is always upward. Faith, hope, charity, "these abide." May they abide with us for ever!

SHORT NOTICES.

Ce qu'il faut à la France. Etude Historique, par Rosseeuw St. Hilaire.

This "Historical Study," by one of the Christian thinkers of France, is well worth perusal. It is a suggestive outline of French Christianity, distinguished in five periods, with the salient points and characters of each. M. St. Hilaire sketches the different phases of the national faith with great clearness, and in an earnest and Christian spirit seeks to guide his countrymen to a conclusion of "what France needs." The resistless logic of events is left to impress the conviction that it is not Popery, for this is shown to have been thoroughly tried, and proved unequal to the moral exigency of the nation; for in France we have the freest and most national development of any branch of the Popish church. It was even called "Gallican," with something of independence. There, if anywhere, might it have produced the fruits of the gospel in a Christian nationality, since it had crushed out its antagonist, the Reformation, and possessed the field to itself. If it were possible for Roman Catholicism to have reformed without injuring its integrity, this might have taken place in France, above any other part of Latin Christendom. But the result shows that, even in France, this could not be. The Catholic church proved itself incapable of Port Royal, and repudiated its Saint-Cyrans, and Arnaulds, and Pascals. M. St. Hilaire is very happy in his description of that remarkable movement, and does justice to those men who, with truest devotedness to Rome, yet sought to exalt the Saviour. Their very excellence only makes more striking the profound aversion of Popery to reform; and we are prepared for the quick, but natural succession of incapacities which ripen apace, and finally deliver the nation over to the Encyclopedists, and "*La France sans Dieu.*" With deepest feeling of Christian patriotism, and yet great delicacy, M. St. Hilaire urges his countrymen to gather up the lessons of their history, and seek the answer to France's need in the gospel itself.

We recommend most heartily this work of M. St. Hilaire, already favourably known as a writer. He is a trained observer, and looks with Christian insight into the forces at work in society. His delineations of the personages who come in review are very graphic, and he subjects to a fearless but just

discrimination the men who so long gave an infidel direction to the literature of France. M. St. Hilaire belongs to that noble band of men contending for truth, and looking hopefully to their country's regeneration. Surely they demand full sympathy from us, whose theology owes its crystalline clearness and definiteness to their illustrious countryman, the great French reformer.

Justification. A Sermon preached before the Hartford North Association, and the North Congregational church of Enfield, Connecticut, Monday, September 2, 1861. By Thomas S. Childs, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Hartford, Connecticut. Hartford: Calhoun Printing Company. 1861.

We are glad that Mr. Childs does not tire in his labours to explain and vindicate the truth in quarters where it has fallen into discredit, quite as much from persistent misrepresentation, and consequent misunderstanding, as from any real aversion to it. He appears to possess the happy gift of stating the controverted doctrines of the gospel clearly, stripping them of all the odious disguises imposed upon them by their adversaries, defining the issue precisely, and arguing it dispassionately but conclusively. He first rules his own spirit, and is then all the better prepared to overcome those of the contrary part. We cannot doubt that his temperate and judicious presentations of evangelical truth will do much to further its acceptance in the region where God has cast his lot, and where so much has been done, with various success, to educate the people into a misapprehension and disrelish of some cardinal gospel truths; which, although asserted in the public creeds of New England, as well as other portions of Christendom, have long been represented by a numerous class of writers (who, if they know no better, are inexcusable for such ignorance) as inventions or peculiarities of Princeton.

On no subject has this sort of misrepresentation been more obstinate and extravagant than on imputation, and its correlate central doctrine of Christianity—justification by the imputed righteousness of Christ. Most New England divines have so long been accustomed to regard imputation as involving a transfer of moral character, that they almost "refuse to be comforted" with the undeniable proofs that in the Scripture the word "impute" always means "reckon to the account of." This whole subject is clearly and ably discussed by Mr. Childs in this discourse, wherein it is proved, beyond a peradventure, that sinners are justified solely through the righteousness of Christ, imputed to them and received by faith. Vulgar misrepresentations and misconceptions in the premises are kindly

and thoroughly exposed. We observe that the sermon was preached before the Hartford North Association, as well as the North Church in Enfield, whether by invitation of one or of both these bodies does not appear. It was published by request of the above-named church. We are glad to see, however, a letter in the appendix, from Dr. Thompson, Moderator of the Association, and Professor in East Windsor Theological Seminary, in which he most earnestly commends the discourse, and expresses a desire for its wide circulation. He says: "It was gratifying to me to hear the members of the body express their concurrence in your views of justification; the dissent intimated by some of them having reference to certain terms employed, not to the sentiments taught. To me the sermon did not seem liable to objection on account of its phraseology."

Dr. Thompson brings to view a curious and striking fact in regard to the first and second editions of the late Professor Stuart's Commentary on Romans. In the first edition, "in expounding the fourth chapter, third verse, he classifies the texts containing the word rendered impute, and in the first are cited six or eight in which the word means—'to reckon to one what he actually possesses,' . . . . '*i. e.*, to treat him as actually possessing,' &c. In the second class is a reference to more numerous illustrations of the meaning—'to impute something to one which does not actually belong to him; to treat him as possessing what he does not actually possess.' In this division very appositely occurs first, Lev. xvii. 4. On opening the second edition of the Commentary, 1835, at the same place, one finds that this classification of texts has been abandoned, and the citations are given under the general remark that—'the word usually means, to reckon to one what he actually possesses, or to impute that to him which actually belongs to him, *i. e.*, to treat him,' &c. Among the proof-texts is the famous Lev. xvii. 4. The author does not intimate that a careful review of the question had changed his judgment—indeed no reason is given for this marked discrepancy between the two editions, a discrepancy which makes a body of witnesses testify to one thing in 1832, and to its opposite in 1835."

It is high time to discuss these topics with double earnestness, when we find the names of the most popular preachers, even in evangelical communions, published, not only as denying that justification depends on any plan of salvation, but also as responsible for such effusions as the following.

"Being clothed with another's righteousness. Oh, woe is

you, if this sweet thought shall not preach of father and mother to you. I am clothed with my mother's righteousness to this hour, although she died when I was yet an infant. . . . . By the feeling which I have had a thousand times in temptation, that she beheld me, that she restrained me, that her heart was yet with me, sorrowing and rejoicing as I sorrowed and rejoiced—by these fragments of experience, I know what it is to be clothed in another's righteousness. . . . To be clothed with God's righteousness, according to my understanding, is this:—A generous nature, with the spirit of love, looking upon the love of God, feels, 'He surrounds me, he stimulates me; I am clothed with his goodness rather than upheld by my own.'"

We do not give the name with which this ebullition of antichristian sentimentalism is associated in the public prints which have been circulating it. We hope there is some mistake. But the propagation of such ideas calls for the louder utterance of the truth as it is in Jesus.

A History of the Modes of Christian Baptism, from Holy Scripture, the Councils Ecumenical and Provincial, the Fathers, the Schoolmen, and the Rubrics of the whole Church, east and west, in illustration and vindication of the Rubrics of the Church of England since the Reformation, and those of the American church. By Rev. James Chrystal, A. M., a Presbyter of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blackiston, 1861. Pp. 324.

This work announces itself as "an apology for the belief of the early church, that Christ enjoined trine immersion." So far as the Scriptures are concerned, the proof of this point is, in our judgment, an entire failure. As to the opinions and practice of the church, the author proves what no one denies, that diversity as to the mode of baptism early prevailed, and that among the wisest, the best, and most authoritative of the Fathers, the rational and scriptural doctrine was distinctly announced, that the mode in which water is applied in baptism, whether by immersion, affusion, or sprinkling, is not essential to the significance or validity of the sacrament. The class of writers to which the author, we presume, belongs, regards church usage as authoritative. And this class, so far as they are consistent and understand their own theory, maintain that the concurrence of the bishops of any one age on matters of doctrine or practice, is the rule of faith and practice to the church of that age. As, therefore, it is undeniable that the bishops of the Latin and Anglican churches have for centuries concurred in the administration of baptism by affusion, or sprinkling, we think he is fairly estopped as a loyal presbyter

of the "American church" from now mooting the question. It is one of those small matters about which the church can afford to be at rest.

Letters of John Calvin, compiled from the original Manuscripts, and edited with Historical Notes. By Dr. Jules Bonnet. Vol. IV. Translated from the Latin and French languages by Marcus Robert Gilchrist. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. 8vo. pp. 467.

This volume contains the letters of Calvin written during the years 1559 to 1564, inclusive. Also his last will and testament, his farewell address to the seigneurs of Geneva, and his farewell address to the ministers of that city. To these are added, in an Appendix, several important letters belonging to an early period. A valuable Index of the whole work closes the volume. Our Board has rendered an important service to the whole church, in all its denominations, in giving to the public this reliable historical portraiture, not only of one of the leading minds of the Reformation period, but of that period itself. No history subsequently written can ever convey so clear an idea of any period as the contemporaneous, private, and confidential writings of its leading men.

The Life and Letters of John Angell James: including an Unfinished Autobiography. Edited by R. W. Dale, M. A., his colleague and successor. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1861. 8vo. pp. 633.

This is a very interesting and instructive history of one of the popular preachers and most copious writers of the present century. Many of his works are as familiar to American as to British readers, and his reputation as an eminently good and useful man is confined to no one land. He is, however, specially known and revered as a pastor and preacher. His long-continued and successful labours as a Christian minister render his memory precious to thousands who enjoyed his faithful ministrations. "To the last," we are told, "he wrote his sermons very fully, though, except on occasions of unusual importance, he never used his manuscript in the pulpit. When his popularity as a preacher was at its height he preached *memoriter*, and, I think," says the narrator, "that even in his later years he generally delivered many passages nearly as he had written them. Few could speak better when altogether unprepared, but he escaped the ruin into which a fatal fluency has betrayed many a clever but indolent man, by conscientious and painstaking preparation for ordinary as well as extraordinary services." The American edition of this memoir

contains a very spirited, life-like engraved likeness of its subject, by the distinguished artist A. R. Ritchie, of New York.

The Justice of our National Cause, and the Momentous Issues for our Nation, the Church, and the World, which are involved in the results of the present Civil War. A Sermon, preached in the Central Presbyterian Church, Buffalo, on Thursday, September 26th, a National Fast Day. By John C. Lord, D. D.

Dr. Lord was extensively known as one of the most "conservative" ministers of our church; that is, as one of the most zealous opponents of abolitionism, and one of the most determined advocates of Southern rights and principles. He is only one instance, among thousands, of a thorough change, not perhaps of opinions, but of position. The men most opposed to the anti-slavery agitation at the North are now most prominent in their opposition to the pro-slavery rebellion at the South. The whole status of the question has been changed. Since Southern politicians have thrown off their allegiance to the Union and Constitution which they had sworn to support, and have, by false representations and by appeals to popular passion, goaded the majority of the people in some of the States to open rebellion, the reason, the conscience, and the religion of the North, have united in denouncing this rebellion (in the language of the Hon. Reverdy Johnson of Baltimore) as the most wicked and insane known in modern history. The distinction of parties is forgotten in this great question of national life or death. Those at the North and West who dissent from this judgment, who stand aloof from this great national movement, are utterly insignificant in number and weight of character. The all but universal conviction is, that there can now be but two parties, patriots and traitors, those for their country and those against it. This upheaving of nationality, this universal rising of the people in favour of their institutions and government, has the force of an irresistible torrent. It is not wonderful, therefore, that it should threaten to carry individuals, and even bodies of men, beyond the bounds of wisdom and justice. In our humble judgment, it did carry the venerable Assembly of our church, at its recent sessions, beyond the limits of its constitutional authority. It demanded that the Assembly should decide a question which it had no more right to decide than the title to a contested estate. The members of the Assembly might have a strong conviction that the title of right vested in one party, and that the other was sinning against honour and justice in disputing his claim; yet no one would pretend that the Assembly, in virtue of its prerogative to rebuke all sin, could decide the legal question of ownership.

So they had the strongest conviction that the allegiance of American citizens is due to the Constitution of the United States, anything in the laws or acts of a particular State to the contrary notwithstanding. But whether this theory of our political union is correct or not, it is not the prerogative of a church court to decide. Yet the Assembly was driven by the patriotic spirit which was aroused within and around them, to decide that question for all under its spiritual jurisdiction. There is a like danger now; we fear that the people may be driven to forget the true and legitimate object of the war in which we are engaged. It is a defensive, not an aggressive war. It is a war for preservation, not for subjugation or change. God has given our rulers the wisdom and grace to announce to the world that it is a war not for the overthrow of the constitution, not for the abolition of slavery, nor the abrogation of the constitutional rights of the separate States, but for the defence of the government and for the integrity of the institutions which we are all pledged to support. Dr. Lord's sermon is one among many similar indications, that some of our most conservative men, men who have prided themselves as being the special friends of the South, are in danger of making this an anti-slavery war, a war to subvert and not to support the constitution. This, we think, is greatly to be deprecated as both unjust and impolitic. We have no right to abolish slavery except as an act of confiscation of the property of rebels, or as an act of imperative necessity for self-preservation. Of such necessity for an act which would probably lead to the unutterable horrors of servile insurrections, which would consolidate the South and divide the North; and which would involve the negroes in imminent danger of extermination, there is at present no such prospect as to justify the serious proposal of any such measure. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Let the future take care of itself. Slavery is undoubtedly doomed in the border States which take part in the rebellion. It cannot exist in the rear of the armies of the Union; not because of any act of emancipation, but because of the inevitable insecurity of property in slaves under such circumstances. It is of the last importance that the country should be right, and that it should be united. It is united at the North and West as one man, as to the right and necessity of suppressing rebellion and sustaining the union, constitution, and government of the country, and thousands in the South earnestly pray for our success. Beyond this, we have no common ground to stand upon.

The Gospel Ministry, in a Series of Letters from a Father to his Sons. By William S. White, D. D., Lexington, Virginia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 204.

These are real letters, the outgoings of the heart of a father to his own sons. This gives them a savour of sincerity and truth which fictitious addresses could hardly possess. All who know the respected author will confidently expect to find them fraught with wisdom, and imbued with the spirit of true Christian piety. In this expectation they will not be disappointed. It is painful to think that the writer of these letters, so lately one of the most revered ministers of our church, no longer acknowledges this relationship. We are conscious of no change of feeling towards him. The bonds of Christian fellowship and love are as strong as ever. The disruption of external ties, whether political or ecclesiastical, cannot dissolve the bonds of spiritual union. Nevertheless, such disruption is a sore affliction and a great evil. Where the hearts of Christians still yearn for their wonted communion, we may hope that God, in his own time and way, will bring them again together as one body.

Henry Burney; or, A Talk about Angels. By Mrs. C. A. Bradshaw. Presbyterian Board.

Heavenly Watchwords; or, Promises and Countersigns. By L. B. J. Presbyterian Board.

Memoir of Captain M. M. Hammond, Rifle Brigade, who fell in the Siege of Sebastopol, at the age of thirty-one. Abridged. American Tract Society.

A Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B. By the Rev. William Brock. Abridged. American Tract Society.

Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars. Abridged. American Tract Society.

Amie and her Brothers; or, Love and Labour. By the author of "The Blue Flag," &c. American Tract Society.

Emily and Uncle Hans. By the same author. American Tract Society.

Sketches for the Young. By Joseph Belcher, D. D. American Tract Society.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

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GERMANY.

F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Psalter. Vol. II. Ps. 90—150. 8vo. pp. 530. The Appendix contains a series of essays relating to the book of Psalms, in general by Delitzsch himself, and a discussion of the Hebrew poetic accentuation and other Masoretic matters, by S. Baer, the author of a Hebrew treatise on the same subject, called Thorath Emeth.

S. Baer, Liber Psalmorum Hebraicus. 8vo. pp. 34. In this edition the text has been critically revised by the aid of the Masora, the early Jewish grammarians, manuscripts, and printed editions; and the author claims for it, particularly in the points and accents, an accuracy greater than has been attained before.

E. von Ortenberg, Contributions to the textual criticism of the Psalms. 8vo. pp. 30.

G. Volck, The Last Song of Moses, Deut. 32. 8vo. pp. 46.

J. Popper, The biblical account of the Tabernacle. A contribution to the history of the composition and preparation of the Pentateuch. 8vo. pp. 256.

J. C. Hoff, The Mosaic Offerings in their symbolical and typical import. 8vo. pp. 44. Third edition.

A. von Schlüsser, Introduction to the Books of Kings. 8vo. pp. 254.

A. Tholuck, The Prophets and their Prophecies. An Apologetical and Hermeneutical Study. 8vo. pp. 206. This is a general discussion of all that relates to the prophetic order, the nature of their inspiration, and the character of their predictions. It is eminently worthy of perusal, though in seeking to give a candid appreciation of the arguments of the adversaries of prophetic inspiration, he seems to us sometimes to yield more than candor requires. The popularity of the treatise was such, that a second edition was demanded in three months.

G. Baur, History of Old Testament Prophecy. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 420. The author, already known from his commentary upon the prophet Amos, discusses in this volume the

preliminary stage of Old Testament prophecy, or that which preceded the rise of those prophets, in the strict and official sense of the term, whose writings have been preserved to us. His theological standpoint unfortunately unfits him for a satisfactory treatment of his theme.

E. Boehl, The Prophecy of Isaiah, chapters 24—27, elucidated by a Commentary. 8vo. pp. 53.

A. Knobel, The Prophet Isaiah explained. 8vo. pp. 471. This is the third edition of a work originally published in 1843, and is one of the series of commentaries belonging to the "Condensed Exegetical Manual to the Old Testament," prepared in concert by Hitzig, Bertheau, Thenius, and others, and which is not yet finished. The collaborators are all liable to the charge of unusual extravagance of criticism, as well as a common disbelief in the reality of Divine inspiration; though their productions are valuable as exhibiting a summary view of the principal interpretations, and furnishing occasionally good exegetical suggestions.

D. Zündel, Critical Investigations into the date of the Book of Daniel. 8vo. pp. 272.

A. Köhler, The Post-Exilic Prophets. 8vo. Of this work two parts have been published, viz. the Prophecies of Haggai, pp. 118, and the Prophecies of Zechariah, chapters 1—8, pp. 250.

M. Breiteneicher, Nineveh and Nahum, with the results of the latest explorations. 8vo. pp. 120.

O. Wolff, The Book of Judith defended and explained as a historical document, with investigations into the duration and extent of the Assyrian power in Asia and Egypt, the Hyksos, the original seats of the Chaldees, and their connection with the Scythians, Phut, Lud, Elam, etc., etc. 8vo. pp. 196.

A. Dillman's edition of the Ethiopic Old Testament, whose publication was suspended for lack of funds, upon the appearance of the first volume in 1853, has been resumed again. The second volume is to contain Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, and Esther. Of this the first part has been issued, containing pp. 96 of Ethiopic text, and pp. 59 of critical annotations, exhibiting the various readings, and the departures from the text, of Holmes's edition of the Septuagint. The Ethiopic letter used is much smaller than that employed in the preceding volume, and each page, in conformity with the fashion in Ethiopic manuscripts, consists of a double column.

Libri Veteris Testamenti Apocryphi Syriace e recognitione P. de Lagarde. 8vo. pp. xxxix and 273.

The Babylonish Talmud is publishing in Warsaw in the

original Hebrew, in twenty volumes folio. The seventh volume has appeared, pp. 510, and contains the treatise Y'bhamoth or Levirate marriages, which is the first treatise in the third general division of the Talmud.

Mischna, cum Commentariis recentiorum. Vol. III. 4to. pp. 324.

E. A. Schultz, The doctrine of the Old Testament respecting the Immortality of Man. 8vo. pp. 66. In Latin.

H. Schultz, Things presupposed in the Christian doctrine of Immortality. 8vo. pp. 248. The author tells us in his preface, that he has projected a volume upon the Christian doctrine of immortality, to which this may be considered as preliminary. He has, therefore, excluded from it the teachings of the New Testament respecting eternal life in Christ, the person of Christ in its relation to death and the final judgment. It contains merely what Christianity presupposes of the nature of man, his relation to immortality, the relation of sin to death, and of life to redemption, upon which Christ, the author of this redemption, has built his peculiar promises.

F. Kleinschmidt, The Typological Citations of the four Evangelists explained. 8vo. pp. 55.

C. E. Luthardt, On the Composition of the Gospel of Matthew. 4to. pp. 29. In Latin.

E. W. Hengstenberg, The Gospel of St. John explained. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 420. This volume embraces the first six chapters; a second is to complete the work.

A second edition of Hengstenberg on the Revelation is announced, in six numbers; the first has appeared.

Lange on Mark, and Osterzee on Luke, forming parts of Lange's theological and homiletical Bibelwerk, have already reached a second edition.

Pauli epistola ad Romanos cum rabbinico commentario. 8vo. pp. 136. Pauli epistola ad Hebræos cum rabbinico commentario. 8vo. pp. 110. In the Hebrew language.

A. Maier, Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo. pp. 406.

K. Wieseler, An investigation touching the Epistle to the Hebrews, especially its author and its readers. First half. 8vo. pp. xxii. and 69.

T. Schott, the First Epistle of Peter explained. 8vo. pp. 360.

A. Christiani, Exhibition of the Contents of the Apocalypse. 8vo. pp. 150.

J. Koestlin, On the character of the Miracles wrought by Christ and his primitive disciples. 8vo. pp. 70. In Latin.

T. Keim, The human development of Jesus Christ. 8vo. pp. 44.

F. G. Lisco, Introduction to the Bible. 8vo. pp. 248.

Guide to the Bible, an introduction to the Holy Scriptures, issued by the Calw Publishing Union. 12mo. pp. 216.

Bible Atlas, to accompany Bunsen's Bibelwerk; 10 maps, with 3 pages of letter-press. 8vo.

A. Ewald, Annual of Biblical Science, 1860–1. 8vo. pp. 308. This is the eleventh number of this annual, in which the author reviews, from his own peculiar stand-point, the recent publications relating to Biblical studies.

J. H. Elrard, Faith in the Holy Scriptures and the Results of Natural Science. 8vo. pp. 87. This is a reprint of a series of letters first published in the Neue Reformirte Kirchenzeitung, in 1855–7. They aim, in a manner often striking and novel, to point out the accordance between the facts of astronomy and geology and the truths of the Bible.

Corpus hæreseologicum. Vols. II. and III. Epiphanii episcopi Constantiensis, panaria eorumque anacephalæosis, ed. F. Ochler. 8vo. pp. 731 and 458.

Epiphanii episcopi Constantiæ Opera, ed. G. Dindorf. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 588.

Clementis Romani Recognitiones Syriace, ed P. de Lagarde. 8vo. pp. 167.

F. Hipler, Dionysius the Areopagite. Investigations into the genuineness and credibility of the writings extant under this name. 8vo. pp. 139.

H. Voigt, The Doctrine of Athanasius of Alexandria, or the tenets of the Church in the fourth century based upon the biblical doctrine of the Logos. 8vo. pp. 346.

F. C. Baur, The Christian Church of the Middle Ages in the main features of its development. 8vo. pp. 558. A posthumous work.

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