THE

PRINCETON REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1860.

No. IV.

ART. I.—*The Logical Relations of Religion and Natural Science.*

PHYSICAL science, at the present day, investigates phenomena simply as they are in themselves. This, if not positively atheistic, must be of dangerous tendency. Whatever deliberately omits God from the universe, is closely allied to that which denies him.

We cannot thoroughly investigate nature without asking for the origin and source of all things. Science undertakes to solve questions which compel either the acknowledgment of God, or the assertion of open atheism, or else a resort to that concealed atheism which quietly sets God aside without directly denying his existence. When, for example, a philosopher says that certain causes produced the present state of our earth, he is bound to answer the question, Did those causes arise from the will of an infinitely wise Creator? For, if the creating agency of Jehovah is admitted, we thus bring into scientific research an element which cannot be adequately comprehended except by an intellect equal to that of Deity. All physical theories must be exceedingly controlled and limited by the admission of such an element. That which to us seems impro-

bable and undesirable, may have been selected by God as by far the best at some former period of earth's existence. It is to avoid embarrassment from this source that physical science so frequently requires God (the unknown Infinite) to be excluded from her dominion. "The investigation of miracles can never be admitted into natural science."* But, if God created the universe miraculously, to omit the investigation of miracles is equivalent to abandoning the thorough knowledge of nature.

There is a tendency amongst physical philosophers to claim the right, as exclusive hierophants in the temple of nature, to dictate the interpretation of all phenomena. Woe to the rash mortal who touches the veil of Isis without their approbation. Whatever may be his other accomplishments, such a one is rejected with silence or contempt, should he venture on a region which belongs as rightfully to logic, history, and religion, as to natural science. But the most superficial are sometimes respectfully received, and, perhaps, have torches given to hold in the temple worship, if they deny, or seem never to have known, the Christian faith in Moses and the prophets. Even distinguished scientific attainment risks the forfeiture of its privileges when it would assign to the Bible a position similar to that of philosophy. De Luc was an eminent naturalist. Playfair was forced to admit that in his *Essai sur les Modifications de l'Atmosphère*, he "has succeeded where many men of genius had failed." In his tenth letter to De la Metherie, there is an attempt by De Luc to show, on scientific and *scriptural* principles, the condition of the earth before the appearance of the sun. Playfair, confessedly, never read this letter. Judging of it by its title, he says, "the absurdity of such an undertaking admits of no apology, and the smile which it might excite if addressed merely to the fancy, gives place to indignation when it assumes the air of philosophic investigation."† The

* Philips and Daubeny in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana, vol. 6, Mixed Sciences, page 797.

† Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory of the Earth, pp. 478—480, Note xxii. In a very recent work of science the writer introduces an argument from the Bible. In a note he says, "the author was advised to omit the fourteenth method—*because a reference should never be made in scientific works to the Bible.*"—*Studies of the Earth*, by S. E. Coues, Washington, D. C. 1860. Page 76.

ground of this bitter scorn is the idea of going "out of nature in search of knowledge." That is, permitting Scripture to have any place or authority in science. It would, however, be unjust to represent this as a specimen of the feelings of all men of science, or to group those men in an indiscriminate moral companionship. This would be like classing together the teachers of all religions. The Christian minister, the heathen priest, the North American medicine-man, have certainly some points of similitude, but many more of opposition. Thus, also, in the world of philosophy. It has teachers differing in moral character as much as the Christian pastor does from the Imaum or the Brahmin.

Very few scientific theories are essentially impious. They are made so by the spirit in which they are taught, rather than by their own intrinsic nature; but almost any one of them, if perverted, may become a dangerous antagonist to religion. Saints and martyrs might believe that skulls are vertebrated; they might innocently be further persuaded that the cavities and limbs of the body correspond with the cavities and jaws of the head. But all the demons of the Hartz would be less terrible than the grotesque atheism that Oken held in connection with the alleged vertebration of the deer's skull found by him on those mountains. Any old-fashioned Christian, beginning with the nebular hypothesis and resolving the fire-mist into chaos, might, if need be, proceed to the creation of the world in six ordinary days. But La Place gave to that hypothesis a significance which excludes Deity from the universe. In every community there are many who dislike religious restraint and the authority of God. The more ambitious amongst these wish to be gods themselves in their own small way; and they hope by means of science to gratify this desire. If nothing more is gained, they may at least escape from the Bible. It is easy to find plausible hypotheses concerning strata, fossil remains, Egyptian hieroglyphics, or the races of mankind, which are utterly at variance with the Scriptures. With little or no investigation, views are adopted which free the soul from all unpleasant belief in the Book which tells of the strait gate, the narrow way, and camels passing through a needle's eye.

We believe, and shall attempt to prove, that revealed religion, as understood by the church of Christ, is entitled to a high pre-eminence over the theories of science. Examining the principles which underlie all systems of natural philosophy, we find that physical science must ever be to a large degree uncertain. It depends upon the investigations of imperfect and fallible men. They, at the utmost, can obtain but a very small portion of the premises required to solve most of the problems of nature. Fresh discoveries of facts constantly modify or reverse theories resting on insufficient grounds. So far as natural science has any valid rules for progress, it derives them in part from principles which religion gives directly or indirectly; or else from principles which avail more for the establishment of religion than of philosophy. Whilst examining the logical basis of scientific systems, we shall inquire into the truth of that modern canon of philosophy which asserts that existing causes, acting at their present rates, have produced all that we find in nature. The logical strength of religion shall afterwards be contrasted with the imperfection of science. Christianity receives its essential truths directly and fully from God. He has constituted such a connection between himself and the spiritual church, that she, though not infallible, is the appropriate and safe interpreter of Scripture. Consequently no one can be a rational philosopher who does not at least treat with modest caution and respectful candour, those expositions of the Bible which are commonly received by the church. But, before proceeding to consider any of these points, we must notice a formidable difficulty which meets us at the outset.

Men of science have alleged that religious teachers, even great Protestant divines, have ignorantly opposed their views of Scripture to the advance of genuine science. The examples of this which they give, are taken from astronomy. Dr. Pye Smith and Hugh Miller tell us that Voetius, Heidegger, and Turrettine, denied the motion of the earth, and quoted the Bible against Copernicus. But those theologians did exactly what the philosophers demand. *They interpreted Scripture according to the science popular in their day and country.* Voetius relies on the authority of all "natural philosophers,"

"excepting one or two of the ancients" and the Copernicans. The Copernican system was rejected by all the Aristotelians, by Tycho Brahe, and by Lord Bacon, (*Adv. of Lear.* book iii. ch. iv. also *Novum Organon*, book ii. Aph. xxxvi.) The mistake of those great divines consisted in their permitting science to stamp its interpretation on the Bible; the traditionary error, thus made orthodox, survived even to the time of Turrettine.

Besides this, we must distinguish between the claims of mathematical astronomy, and those of other branches of science. Nothing else in natural philosophy is at all likely to secure a position of similar certainty. "Why has mathematical analysis been able to adapt itself with such admirable success to the most profound study of celestial phenomena? Because they are, in spite of popular appearances, much more simple than any others. The most complicated problem which they present, that of the modification produced in the motions of two bodies tending towards each other, by virtue of their gravitation, by the influence of a third body acting on both of them in the same manner, is much less complex than the most simple terrestrial problem." "The whole of organic physics, and probably also the most complicated parts of inorganic physics are necessarily inaccessible by their nature to our mathematical analysis."* It is unfair to argue the ultimate triumph of other physical theories because those of mathematical astronomy are now established.

We proceed to consider the principles which constitute the basis of physical science.

Since the time of Lord Bacon, the method of investigating nature by induction, has been critically and profoundly examined. It has thus been made more complete, accurate, and valuable. We may regard the following rules and principles as including so much of this method as belongs to the matters now under consideration.

1. Before a scientific theory can be established as certainly true, we must collect all the facts or phenomena which belong

* Philosophy of Mathematics, translated from the Cours de Philosophie Positive par M. Comte. By W. M. Gillespie. New York, 1851. Pages 34, 37.

to the right decision of the questions necessarily entering into that theory, or else we must have an equivalent for such a collection. These facts or phenomena, or their equivalent, must be thoroughly understood in all the relations essentially connected with the subject matter of the theory.

2. An actual, universal collection of such facts and phenomena is commonly impossible, except in geometric, or other mathematical researches. In respect to most of the questions of physical science, we can obtain only a portion of the facts and phenomena which belong essentially to the subject investigated. Those which we obtain cannot be the basis of a safe induction unless they represent, or imply, the other facts and phenomena which lie beyond the scope of actual knowledge, or unless they are such as exclude the possibility of the truth of any theory except that which we would establish. So far as this representative, or excluding character is doubtful, there must be corresponding doubt as to all theories which rest on these imperfect premises.

3. Sooner or later in our investigations we shall nced to form a supposition, or hypothesis, with which to collect scattered facts into one group. Whewell calls this the "Colligation of Facts." Borrowing a thought from Kepler, he regards the hypothesis as a string which ties up the sticks in one fagot.* But throughout this process, our aim should be, not to reconcile facts with our hypothesis, but rather to modify the hypothesis so that it may agree with the facts.

4. It is sometimes given by men of science as a test of true theories, that they shall lead to the discovery of some other truths hitherto unknown; as, for example, when Le Verrier discovered a new planet by reasoning from a previously established theory of the universe. But this rule must be taken with caution. Part of a theory may be true, and part false, and the true portion may lead to the discovery. The Hindoo astronomy, false as a theory, enables the Brahmins to foretell eclipses.

5. Powerful confirmation is given to a theory when we reach

* Kepler made nineteen wrong guesses as to the orbit of Mars, and pursued each to a demonstration of its falsehood, before he hit upon and proved the true theory that it is elliptical.

the same conclusion by independent trains of argument, arising from distant premises. But this of course depends for its value on the accuracy of each of these independent arguments. Before we thoroughly understand all the facts and conditions requisite for a just conclusion, it is very possible to make falsehoods seem to agree with and sustain each other.

6. So far as we fall short of absolute certainty that we know all the deciding facts or phenomena, and all their deciding relations, in the same proportion must our laws, theories, or hypotheses be uncertain. If, for aught that we know to the contrary, there lie outside of our knowledge innumerable unknown facts, which, if known, might seriously modify our conclusions, then all that we can attain is an hypothesis which may, or may not, be true.

But we have not yet reached the foundation principle of scientific progress. We have not come to the idea which justifies our advance from what we know to the truths which lie outside of the sphere of our present knowledge. Especially must we ascertain by what right some facts may be taken as representative of, or implying, others which are out of view. Perhaps we have seen a thousand instances of water heated above the boiling point. In each case it became vapour. But there have been, are, or may be, countless millions of instances of water thus heated of which we know nothing. How shall we reason from the known cases to the unknown, and feel certain that in all the water will be vaporized at boiling heat? By what right do we take comparatively, few facts as representing innumerable others which must for ever be unknown to us? Why are we not bound to make a perfect enumeration of all particulars before we frame a general law?

The great principle which underlies all physical theories and laws of nature is, that *the ordinary operation of nature is uniform.* Mill calls this "the fundamental principle or general axiom of induction." *Logic*, p. 184. Under similar conditions nature always acts in a similar manner. If Mars has an atmospheric condition like ours, a glass prism would refract sunlight there as here. From the unvarying course of known

phenomena we form the laws of refraction. We believe those laws to be universal, because the ordinary operation of nature is uniform. But we need to settle the authority of this foundation law itself. Why do we believe that under similar physical conditions nature will act uniformly?

If this law be an induction from our observation of nature, as Mill would have us believe, it is good for very little. No logical principle is better established, or more self-evidently correct, than this, that we must never state universally in the conclusion, any term which is not given universally in one of the premises. The course of nature, so far as we know it, is uniform; miracles and abnormal events excepted. But what we know is only an infinitesimal part of the entire course of nature, past, present, and future. Because an inappreciably small part is uniform, we cannot logically conclude from this, that the inconceivably greater whole is the same. Mere induction can never rightfully go a hair's-breadth beyond facts which we know, or which are included in others that are known.* One step beyond this runs into the logical error of drawing conclusions more extensive than the premises warrant. We reason in a circle when we attempt to prove this axiom of inductive philosophy by means of induction from known phenomena. The point to be proved is, that nature, under similar conditions, acts uniformly. We begin by asserting that observed phenomena pursue a uniform course. But before we can reason from this to the unspeakably greater number of phenomena unseen and unknown by us, we must, by some means, have a right to assume that those which have been observed, represent, in this respect, those which never have been observed. Here we come logically to a stand-still. Is there such uniformity in nature that we can be certain that the laws which govern the unknown are uniform and identical with those that govern what is known, so that we may reason from what we have seen to what we do not see? This is the very point to be decided. Until it is proved, we have no right to assume it. We cannot have a right to say that the known

* Playfair regards Bacon (*Nov. Org.* b. I. Aph. I.) as teaching that man cannot extend his knowledge "a hair's-breadth beyond his experience and observation of the present state of things."—*Illus. of Hut. Theo.*, &c., p. 19.

phenomena are representative, until we ascertain the uniformity of nature; and yet unless we can say that they are representative, we cannot reason from them so as to make out uniformity. Indeed, without this principle of the uniformity of nature, induction would be good for nothing, except to group ascertained facts under narrow generalizations. Induction, therefore, cannot prove this foundation axiom, which has to be added to the results of induction in order that it may extend beyond the limits of facts already known.

We admit that in order to form probable theories, and for practical purposes, empirical laws of nature, generalized from imperfect premises, may often satisfy us. In such cases, we must be content with the best we can get, and high probability is good enough. But when science asks any class of learned men to surrender or modify their beliefs, she is bound to show that she stands on logical ground, as good, at least, as theirs. If she requires the world to receive her theories as final truth, she is bound to prove by the most rigid logic, without a single flaw, the whole of her case from the first to the last.

Intelligent men who never inquired minutely into the foundation of their belief in the uniformity of universal nature, are apt to regard it as a sort of self-evident conclusion from the uniformity of so much as is seen by us. They may admit that it is impossible, in strict logic, to substantiate such a wide conclusion, from the narrow premises given by observation; but still there seems to be even a sort of necessity for our believing, as a universal rule, what we learn on a limited scale. If all that we know flows in one direction, it is claimed that, in the absence of contrary evidence, we have a right to say that all the rest is similar. If logic refuses to justify this conclusion, it will be amply borne out by instinct and common sense. Such has seemed to us to be the substance of the reasoning of some who contend for the principle, whilst admitting that severe logical proof is impossible.

But it is a striking truth that instinct and common sense never thus acted to aid philosophy, except where the Bible has been known. *We* receive the principle of the uniformity of nature almost as if it were self-evident. But it never was so

perceived by the ancient Greek philosophers as to avail for purposes of scientific progress.

What has been effected in philosophy without the Bible, may be learned from the fossil remains of human intellect obtained from Magna Grecia, Athens, and Alexandria; or the whole carcasses of it still to be found on the banks of the Ganges. From these we know that the heathen sages never taught accurately and adequately how science is to advance. That which prevented their progress was mainly their ignorance of the practical value and logical significance of this identical principle that we are considering. Other principles which appropriately belong to inductive investigation, are to be found sufficiently delineated in the writings of Aristotle.* But neither he nor any of his disciples, nor any other heathen philosopher, so understood that method as to use it for the advancement of human knowledge. In their hands induction was useless, because they did not unite with it the principle of the uniform action of nature under similar conditions. This is strikingly manifested in Plato's dialogue, called Meno, and by the remarks of Aristotle, made in connection with what is taught in that dialogue. The question is asked, How can we proceed from the known to what is now unknown? *We* can see, but *they* did not, that to assert the uniformity of nature is essential to an adequate reply. Meno presents this dilemma; if what we seek is known we need not search for it; if unknown, we shall not know what to search for. Plato makes Socrates reply that the soul is immortal (i. e. eternal.) It has inhabited all worlds and known all things. Scientific discovery is only an awakening of memory. Investigation of truth is but the calling our past knowledge out of obscurity. Aristotle refers to this question, and in his solution of it expresses the general idea of induction (*Post. Analyt.* book i. ch. 1.) But he gives nothing better than a mathematical illustration. First we conclude that triangles contain (angles equal to) two right angles. Thus having formed a general rule from known particulars, we assert concerning all triangles, even those the actual existence of

* Post. Analyt. book i. ch. 1 and 18. Topica, book i. ch. 12, book viii. ch. 8.

which is unknown, that they contain two right angles. But mathematics deal with fixed relations; and physical science with contingent, and partly unknown phenomena. Aristotle's answer, therefore, as he illustrates it, fails in respect to physics, as completely as that of Socrates or Plato. Nor does it appear that Aristotle and his followers ever surmounted the difficulty arising from an inability to collect all the particular phenomena connected with physical questions. (See *Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe, &c.* vol. ii. p. 73.) It is indeed well known to everybody, as a matter of fact, that neither the Aristotelians, nor the Platonists, nor any other heathen philosophic sect, had any available knowledge of the inductive method. And yet we find scattered through the works of Aristotle, an outline of that method, but it was useless for purposes of practical advance. Manifestly, not one of the Greek or Roman philosophers regarded the uniformity of nature as the true and sufficient basis for systems of science. Nor did the scientific world rise above their limits until the Scriptures had diffused through Christendom correct views of God as the Ruler of the universe.

The foundation axiom of inductive science, this law of the uniformity of nature, can be vindicated and established as a conclusion from what the Bible reveals concerning God. Let it be admitted that the universe is governed by a personal Deity, who has infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, and by one or two obvious logical steps we may deduce from this the doctrine of the ordinary uniformity of nature; and the Bible, wherever known, would irresistibly suggest this idea. Departures from uniformity are in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament attributed to the direct interposition of God, changing his regular course. The history in the first and second chapters of Genesis implies a uniform course of natural operations, as ordained by the Creator. In chap. viii. 22, we find the assertion, "While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold, and heat, and summer, and winter, and day, and night, shall not cease." This implies considerable uniformity as being certain in some important natural operations. The covenant with Noah in chapter ix. extends the application of this principle. Moses,

in the 90th Psalm, and the writer of the book of Job, distinctly teach that the universe is governed by laws which are to act until the purposes of God are accomplished. Solomon was the greatest physical philosopher of his day. (1 Kings iv. 30—34.) He formally asserts this principle: "The thing that hath been is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done." (Eccl. i. 9.) It is to be noticed that Solomon applies these words to natural, as well as moral, phenomena. The sun rising and setting, the circuit of the wind, rivers flowing to the sea, are given as examples of the application of this universal rule. The sacred writers, from David to the apostle John, in hundreds of passages, assert, at least by necessary implication, their belief in the ordinary uniformity of natural operations as being secured by the character of God. Various well known national peculiarities prevented the Jews, as a people, from making progress in natural science, notwithstanding their knowledge of its only safe foundation, which is the character of God. In this, as in many other matters, it was reserved for Christianity to make practical use of truths revealed under the ancient dispensation.

It is probable that, as a rule for practical use, we obtain this law of the uniformity of nature, partly as a consequence loosely drawn from our idea of God, and partly from a logically imperfect, but yet satisfactory, induction from visible nature. But, as a philosophical rule, it cannot be established except by reasonings logically deduced from what is taught in the Scriptures concerning the character and providential government of God.

The world of science appears to be indebted to the Church for that foundation axiom of induction which makes it possible for the philosopher to advance from the known to the unknown in nature.*

Not only does a belief in the existence of Jehovah thus

* Thomson, in his "Laws of Thought," part iv. sect. 119, fully recognizes the logical wrong of using induction to prove laws more extended than are the facts given in the premises. He, like Mill, would prove by induction the great canon of the uniformity of nature; but he confesses that thus "it partakes of the same formal defect that may be charged against other inductive results, viz. that its terms are wider than our experience can warrant." Again he

underlie all valid induction, but that truth needs to be kept in view as a polar star by those who would make safe progress in the knowledge of his creation. The history of science gives little encouragement to trust in even the physical philosophy of atheists. "The scientific speculations which produced an opposite tendency (i. e. opposite to belief in an intelligent Creator,) were generally those which, though they might deal familiarly with known physical truths, and conjecture boldly with regard to the unknown, did not add to the number of solid generalizations." (*Whewell's History of Inductive Science*, vol. iii. p. 515.) In this connection, Agassiz tells deep truths. Noticing the invisible thread which unwinds through the immense diversities of animated existence, he follows till it leads him to God; "Dieu personnel, auteur premier de toutes choses, regulateur du monde entier, dispensateur de tous les biens." This belief inclines and fits us to investigate truth for its own sake, and he expresses a conviction that if students of natural science would keep it in view, they would be more likely to make sure and rapid progress even in the special domain of the direct observation of nature. (*Recherches sur les Poissons Fossiles*, tome i., page 172, edition of Neufchatel, 5 vols. in 2.)

We now reach the margin of what has often been an enemy's country. From the days of Hutton until the present time, some of the most dangerous efforts of infidelity on the field of physical science have been made by means of a principle

says, "We draw a universal canon from an experience less than universal, and then employ it to justify us in drawing other universal truths from other particular experiences." By means of analysis and synthesis (Newton's method) he would establish laws of nature. But still he has to omit the almost infinite number of unknown cases which, if known, might reverse or modify the law. Much more satisfactory is Dr. W. D. Wilson in his Treatise on Logic. (Part II. chapter iii. section 5.) He represents a law of nature as an "indication of the Divine will and conception." "Therefore we expect all individuals in any class to conform to the essentials of that class, which essentials we are learning one after another by induction." This requires our belief that God ordinarily acts uniformly. In a note on page 312, Dr. Wilson quotes from Professor Agassiz, as follows: "To be understood well, the true relations of the system of nature ought to be considered *as an analysis of the thought expressed by the Creator.*" This, of course, would make the canon of uniformity arise from, and depend on, the character and will of God.

which needs careful examination. It is assumed that the law of the uniformity of nature, which we have been considering, implies that the causes and the rate of action, in natural operations, have always been such as are operating at present. Dispensing scientifically with supernatural causes or action, this principle easily becomes anti-scriptural, if not atheistic. Let it be admitted that natural causes never acted with more than their present energy and rapidity, and that none ever operated except such as are now in existence, and we may be forced to accept theories of the formation of our world utterly at variance with any fair interpretation of the Scriptures. Very inconsistently, some believers in the Bible have adopted this principle, but most commonly it has been a favourite stronghold for infidels and atheists. Hutton fairly exhibited its tendency, when he said, "In the economy of the world, I can find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end.*

The outside world looks at certain popular and dangerous systems, and wonders at the vastness and apparent strength of the structure. Researches, discoveries, astronomy, chemistry, botany, comparative anatomy, geology, mathematics, the history

* Quoted by Lyell, "Principles of Geology," Philadelphia, 1837, vol. i. page 71. Featherstonhaugh says that Hutton "presents the earth to us as a pure self-acting machine, operating eternal degradations and renewals." (*American Journal of Geology and Natural Science*, vol. i. page 254.) Such a belief assimilates naturally with the idea, "that all past changes on the globe had been brought about by the slow agency of existing causes." Playfair and Lyell felt, or affected to feel, displeasure at the charges of irreligion against their master. But neither can show that Hutton himself ever took pains to prevent the infidel effects of his views on the public mind. Lyell intimates his own belief that "the scheme of the universe may be infinite in *time* and space." (*Principles of Geology*, i. page 414.) If God is included in this universe, the words "may be" imply doubt of his eternity. If, as is more probable, the passage refers only to the physical universe, then the possibility of *it* being eternal and uncreated is asserted. But, with this conditional atheism in the first volume, in vol. ii. page 507, he represents it as a strange misconception to suppose that by "infinite in time and space," he meant anything more than "a minute and infinitesimal point in infinite space," and "a mere infinitesimal portion of eternity." How far we must accept as sincere the religious concessions of this writer, is made somewhat doubtful by his remark on page 75 of vol. i., that "we may feel regret, but must not blame" that "want of moral courage" which caused certain eminent scientific men to be "guilty of dissimulation" "out of deference to popular prejudices."

of the past and promises for the future; all are arrayed and combined in support of theories which sometimes are purposely so constructed as to conflict with the Bible.

But the keystone of the immense arch on which this temple of science rests is the principle that causes similar to those now in operation, and acting at their present rate, or substantially so, are to be regarded as having produced the former conditions of our earth. If this be false, the theories which rest on it, like the house built on the sand, fall with a great crash.

We deny the truth of this principle, and shall sustain this denial by showing, 1. That its advocates have failed to prove it, or even to state it in an available form. 2. That admitted natural facts are at variance with it. 3. That its most distinguished advocates have repeatedly been driven to abandon this principle.

1. The principle that the causes and rate of action in natural operations have always been such as are now in operation, has never been proved. It is not a self-evident truth; it rather contradicts the popular belief of mankind, if we may judge from the voice of nearly all religions and of all non-atheistic systems of philosophy. No one pretends that God has revealed it. Excluding self-evidence and revelation we have but one source left from whence this principle, if valid, can have come. It is logical reasoning, inductive or deductive. But we may safely challenge its advocates to state the accurate and well authenticated facts from which this principle can possibly be learned as a legitimate induction. In like manner we demand the well settled axioms of physical science from which we may derive it by deduction.

Its greatest advocate at the present day, Lyell, plainly showed that he did not know where to find logical proof for it, both when he wrote and when he suppressed the sentence recommending "an earnest and patient endeavour to reconcile the former indications of change with the evidence of gradual mutations now in progress."* Could he have ventured to assert as a clear result from safe premises the principle that

* Lyell's Prin. of Geology, book iv. chap. i., edit. of 1837. This attracted so much attention as violating the cardinal principles of induction by advising that we attempt to *prove*, rather than simply to *investigate*, an hypothesis, that

former changes arose from such "gradual mutations" as are "now in progress," (which is the foundation principle of all his system,) he assuredly would distinctly have laid down this vital truth, and would have stated its proof with something like clear and definite logical reasoning. Nor would he have silently changed its form into that of a suggestion to be inquired into, when it was assailed. He thus admitted that this corner-stone principle is, at the best, but a probability, the truth of which has yet to be investigated. Presently we shall see, that he and others of the most distinguished advocates of this idea abandon it whenever they are embarrassed by its operation. We may, therefore, well believe that it never yet has been proved to their own satisfaction.

We may also object to this idea its cloudy indistinctness. It is not well enough defined to be good for anything. No one can pretend to decide what *are* the causes now in existence; or what *is* their rate of action. Some natural operations greatly exceed in rapidity others of the same general nature. Is it certain that we have ascertained the limits of such variations? In the year 1759, the volcano of Jorullo, in Mexico, rose in a single night from the level ground to the height of 1600 feet. At this rate it would require but a few weeks to throw up mountain ranges greater than the Himalayas or the Andes. In 1783, the volcano of Skaptar Jokul, in Iceland, poured out two currents of lava, which, together, were equal to any continuous rock formation in England. In like manner we may take the more violent actings of wind, water, lightning, and other natural agencies. How shall we limit the rate of action of any natural agency whatever? If it be said that the *average* rate is to be taken, we may ask with Whewell, "Why must we insist upon it that man has been long enough an observer to obtain the average of forces which are changing through immeasurable time?"

Lyell expunged it after the fifth edition, and quietly placed it in book i. chap. xiii., as a recommendation to "an earnest and patient *inquiry*, how far geological appearances are reconcilable with the effect of changes now in progress." Whewell notices that even this, as Lyell brings it forward, is an unphilosophical "previous pleading" against the opposite doctrine. See note K. A. to book xviii. of Whewell's History of Inductive Science, vol. iii. p. 695. We may further regard this course of Sir Charles Lyell as a tacit but unequivocal confession of inability to maintain the great principle of his system.

2. Admitted natural facts are at variance with this principle. No physical truth is more familiar than that, in the beginning of many operations, there is great rapidity of action, which continues until equilibrium is produced, or the original causes are exhausted. Thus we find it in combustion, and in various chemical operations. But it is eminently probable that fire and chemical combination were largely concerned in the formation of our earth. Analogy would lead to the belief of a more vigorous action at first than now, when nature is probably in a state of comparative equilibrium. Geology is constrained to insist on a former very warm condition of our earth, if she would account for its condition by means of known causes. In like manner she is forced by this very principle to teach that formerly there was seven-fold more of carbonic acid in the atmosphere than now. But such a temperature, and an excess of carbonic acid gas, must have produced many results with a rapidity now unknown. If it were not so, then *this* would be a marvellous departure from the principle of uniformity in nature.

Still further: Geology has been constrained to accept creation. When entirely new types of life appear in any geologic era, they have to be accounted for by new creations. We may regard Professor Le Conte as expressing the conclusions of science on this subject when he says, "As far as the evidence of geology extends, *each species was introduced by the direct miraculous interference of a personal intelligence.*" (*Smithsonian Report*, 1857, p. 168. The italics are those of Prof. Le Conte.) But what are the conditions under which the creative power of God is exerted? Science is utterly unable to answer, for creation is a miracle, and therefore beyond her range. The original action of nature may have been, not only rapid, but even instantaneous.

3. The advocates of the principle in question, are frequently obliged to relinquish it. Of this we shall give a few striking examples.

Hutton's system depended on the principle "that all past changes on the globe had been brought about by the slow agency of existing causes." (*Lyell.*) Playfair is the acknowledged expositor and vindicator of this system. Kirwan

demanded the source of such heat as Hutton's igneous theory needs. According to Saussure's experiments, Hutton has to account for a degree of heat more than forty times as intense as the volcanic fire of Etna. Playfair goes to the hot stars and sun in search of this intense heat, but soon returns, apparently not satisfied. He then tells Kirwan that "friction is a source of heat unlimited, for what we know, in its extent, and so, perhaps, are other operations both chemical and mechanical." At last he says, "but if the only thing imputable to him (Dr. Hutton) is, that, being led by induction to admit the fusion of mineral substances in the bowels of the earth, he has assumed the existence of such heat as was sufficient for this fusion, though he is unable to assign the cause of it, I believe it will be found that his system only shares in an imperfection which is common to all physical theories, and which the utmost improvement of science will never completely remove. Thus then we are led, it must be allowed, into the region of hypothesis and conjecture, but by no means into that of chimeras." (*Illust. of Hut. Theory, &c.*, pp. 181—190.)

If all this is what is meant by "the slow agency of existing causes," the most violent believers in extraordinary catastrophes and convulsions need not hesitate to accept such a theory of uniform action. Nares might well say that no theory contains more extraordinary causes than Hutton's.

We have noticed already a striking case in which Sir Charles Lyell silently withdrew this principle from the place he had impliedly assigned to it amongst settled truths. In other instances we may find him directly abandoning it. Wishing to get rid of results deduced from the laws of compression of bodies below the surface of the earth, he says, "It is more than probable, however, that after a certain degree of condensation, the compressibility of bodies may be governed by laws altogether different from those which we can put to the test of experiment."* In this remarkable passage, it is conceded

* Principles of Geology, vol. i., p. 452 (book ii. chap. xviii.) By the laws of compression, as learned by actual experiment, water at a depth of three hundred and sixty-two miles should be as heavy as mercury. Steel should, at the earth's centre, be compressed to one-fourth of its bulk. This seems to conflict with La Place's estimate of the specific gravity of the earth as being only $5\frac{1}{2}$.

that, at a certain depth below the earth's surface, there may be laws of gravity differing from those we see in operation; or else that those laws will fail to act there as on the surface; or else that something, now unknown to us, will there act instead of gravity to decide the degree of the compression of bodies. This, if true, requires us to be very cautious in our attempts to decide, or conjecture the causes or the rate of action, of remote and unseen natural operations.

In another passage Lyell concedes that the former rapid and energetic action of natural agencies is in some important respects incapable of being made scientifically improbable. He says, "We are so unacquainted with the true sources of subterranean disturbances, that their former violence may in theory be multiplied indefinitely without its being possible to prove the same manifest contradiction and absurdity," i. e. the same "contradiction and absurdity" that he supposes there would be in the idea that torrents and moving waters once exerted an energy many thousand times greater than at present. (*Prin. of Geol.*, vol. i. 56, book i. chap. iii.)

We might add examples of a similar abandonment of this principle from Le Conte's Lectures on Coal; but it is unnecessary. He, inconsistently, contends for it, but repeatedly alleges facts which make it impossible. Such are the (alleged) early heat of the earth, the quantity of carbonic acid in the air, &c. He admits that "the most numerous class (of geologists) hold that the agencies of nature have decreased in energy from the earliest times until now." This is undoubtedly correct.

We have been the more thorough in examining the validity of this assumed principle, because it contains elements which are capable of becoming very pernicious. It is a poisonous weed which some have endeavoured to cultivate and expand into an upas-tree. The respectability of others who hold it with a better spirit should not make us lose sight of its tendencies to infidelity, and, perhaps, atheism.

There yet remain two elements of scientific progress so eminently important, and so imperfectly recognized in their true significance by most modern philosophers, that they require distinct notice. One of them is Adaptation of Means to an

END BY AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. Geoffroy St. Hillaire says, "I take care not to ascribe to God any intention," (i. e. in creating animals, &c.) He also says, "I know not an animal which has to play a part in nature."* But science cannot afford to cast away the belief that means are intentionally adapted to their ends by an intelligent First Cause. Sad havoc would ensue amongst geologic theories, for example, if we refuse to ascribe intelligent intentions to the Creator. All recent geologic theories depend essentially on a belief that the fossils found in different strata were once living plants, zoophytes, mollusca, fishes, or beasts. Time was when fossils were by some regarded as *lusus naturæ*. Voltaire contended for this when shells and fishes, found on inland mountains, were regarded as proofs of Noah's flood. But geology laughs to scorn those who believe that the stone shells, and skeletons, the coal calamites, and ferns, never were living animals or plants, but accidental forms; freaks of nature, like the calf with two heads. It is, however, impossible for the geologist to disprove this supposition except on the ground of a Creator, who intelligently adapts means to their ends. Let this be rejected, and, notwithstanding the contempt of science, the old idea of plastic nature, (e. g. a property which makes matter spontaneously assume different forms,) or the more modern idea of molecular attraction, producing such effects, will become as probable as any other supposition.

* "Je me garde de prêter au Dieu aucune intention." "Je ne connais point d'animal qui doive jouer un rôle dans la nature." (*Quoted by Whewell.*) St. Hillaire does not deny that God has intentions, but he demands that all arguments from them be excluded from science. Whewell gives a curious specimen of this naturalist's reasoning ability. St. Hillaire says, "I have read concerning fishes that because they live in a medium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculated so as to give them the power of progression under those circumstances. By this mode of reasoning you would say of a man who used crutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having a leg paralyzed or amputated." Here we have an eminent physical philosopher, the author of the European school of *Analogues*, incapable of distinguishing between the case of powers and faculties being adapted to the end they have to attain, and the case in which new instrumentalities are substituted when the original ones fail to attain the proposed end, or when they are entirely lost. St. Hillaire should deny that either the original leg, or the crutch, was made with an intention that it should be used for walking. This would be a parallel to his philosophy.

Argillo-calcareous matter has been formed by molecular attraction into the semblance of a human head and face, with a head-dress on; of a cat; of a broad-brimmed hat. (*Hitchcock's Elements of Geol.* p. 25.) Frost makes water crystallize on window panes so as to be like ferns, flowers, fishes, and what not. Stalactites are found in various shapes, and travertin is sometimes formed with extraordinary undulations and in laminated spheroids which cannot be traced with certainty to any known causes. Who shall set limits to the possible variety of forms in which the component parts of rocks may be aggregated? Why should not the ingredients of a fossil bone take that form as well without, as with, a living animal? Shall we say that nature always exhibits bones and shells as belonging to living animals? This is contradicted by the myriads of fossils themselves. No mortal eye is supposed ever to have seen a living animal in that fossil shell, or in any other of the same species, or even genus. On the seashore are countless millions of shells without animal life in them. On principles exclusively physical it would be impossible to prove that shells, bones, &c., may not exist apart from animal life, or that the carbonaceous matter of a coal-pit may not take the form of a tree as naturally as other carbonaceous matter does in a forest. Admit that both were formed by a wise and intelligent Being, who adapts means to their ends, and it becomes preeminently probable that the coal fossil was once a tree, and that the bones once constituted part of a living icthyosaurus or pterodactyle. Take away the agency of such a Being, and, for aught that appears, the bones came to be such by chance, or by occult laws of nature which sometimes create living animals and sometimes dried skeletons.

This great truth of Divine agency, which is so fundamental to science, has a significance far beyond that which most philosophers assign to it. Not only does it prove that fossils are a record of former vegetable and animal life, it sweeps onward through all the great doctrines of natural religion. It bears us to the edge of the open portal of the most holy place, the oracle of the sacred Scriptures. That God, who adapted so wondrously the plants and animals of geologic eras to each other; who gave fresh water to the animals of lacustrine and

fluviatile fossils, and salt water to the pelagic; who produced beauty, order, strength, convenience, by means of such violent and destructive agents as fire and water; who arranged the planets and the stars; the marvels of air, electricity, gravitation, and life; He, certainly, is not limited to what we have thus discovered. Waiting for further knowledge, we may once more recognize in science a great principle which admits of being applied far beyond the precincts of mere physical philosophy. It is the principle of HISTORICAL VERITY. When the astronomer or geologist gives instruction as to the present condition of the universe, he requires us to rely on human testimony in respect to whatever we have not seen for ourselves. Whenever science teaches that which in part, or entirely, belongs to the past, she requires us to rely on historical information. All existing physical scientific systems must perish if historic verity cannot be relied on. Cut off the geologist from reliance on written testimony, and how much will he be able to retain of his science? The larger portion of the leaves of the "Great Stone Book" has, after all, to be read from paper sheets. He who has learned the most of the "Testimony of the Rocks" has heard it chiefly from human witnesses.

But we need, in regard to this principle also, to see what follows from admitting it. If La Place had a right to receive as truth the testimony of Hipparchus about the position of the stars two thousand years ago, (and we do not for a moment doubt it,) then other people may have an equal, or superior, right to believe what very much better authenticated witnesses, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, tell of what they saw eighteen hundred years ago. Those records which, more completely than any others of equal antiquity, satisfy the demands of the rules of evidence, bring unequivocal miracles into the list of well authenticated phenomena. Let the miracle be what it may, we must at least take it as a vast and wonderful departure from the ordinary course of nature. Without reliance on historic verity, no theory of astronomy or geology can stand for a moment. But, if we are to rely on the truth of history, science must accept miracles, and also a high, undefined, possibility of any operation between what we commonly see of nature and miracle itself. The probability of such events is

limited only by our power to show that any alleged extraordinary operations are not likely to have been instituted by such a one as God.

In view of all the principles stated thus far, we may look at science in two very different aspects. 1. As simply human, physical, and irreligious. In this light we can have no guaranty for the value of its theories, and alleged laws of nature, except in comparatively few cases, most of which are mathematical. 2. As connected with, and subordinate to, religious truth—by which we mean the Bible. In this aspect we may rely on much that science teaches. It is a doctrine of the Scriptures (not of physical philosophy) that God desires to be glorified by his creatures perceiving his eternal power and Godhead from the creation and government of the material universe. This gives a force and security to the conclusions of cautious inductive philosophy which otherwise they never could have. From the Bible we may infer that God does not use his power, ordinarily or miraculously, to baffle and mislead our humble attempts to see him in his works. Of course, many of the conclusions of science must be true and reliable. Religion has produced an impression on the community which men insensibly connect with the meagre conclusions of mere philosophy. Even infidels, unconsciously perhaps to themselves, appeal to a state of popular feeling which never could have existed, if the community had not been pervaded by principles learned originally from the Scriptures.

Valuable service has been rendered to science by the Christian religion teaching so impressively the value of truth. The decisive stress laid by the Christian system on faith as the great instrument of salvation, is a demand for the subjection of the soul to the power of truth, and for the consequent avoidance of falsehood. It is difficult to estimate too highly the impulse thus communicated by the gospel to the minds of men. Truth is the light which marks the road to heaven; falsehood is the darkness which hangs over the path to hell. This could not be received as religious doctrine without producing an impression of the value of all kinds of truth. Science became vigorous when she breathed this pure atmosphere, diffused by the church of Christ. Truth, as such, has never

been rightly estimated, except where Christianity has prevailed.

But if God demands from us belief of his testimonies, this implies that he is a faithful and true witness. That which he testifies is not limited to his written word. The Scriptures themselves require us to believe in his works and his providence, as implying still further a witness of his character and will. No one can be acquainted with either the Old or New Testament without perceiving that visible nature is designed as a part of God's testimony to mankind. This is asserted so clearly and prominently that it neither could nor did escape the notice of those who read the sacred volume. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." "In Him we live and move and have our being." "The living God which made heaven and earth and the sea and all things that are therein—left not himself without witness, in that he did good and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." To these we may add many other similar passages; especially from the book of Psalms, of Job, and of Isaiah.

The veracity of God as a witness, whether in his works, or in his word, became a popular idea of Christianity, and, through the agency of the church, of nominal Christendom. No one acquainted with the ancient heathen writers needs to be informed that such was far from being their familiar idea of Deity. The poets, who formed the popular mind, do not hesitate to impute intentional deception to their gods. Doubtless some of the philosophers would, as an abstract doctrine, have admitted that veracity is an attribute of God. But neither they, nor the common people, looked upon nature as being designed to reveal a Creator who cannot lie.

It is taken for granted in the works of modern philosophers that men have, as it were, a *right* to discover truth when they use proper efforts. They admit the very limited power of science to search through nature, and also the logical wrong of drawing conclusions wider than the premises strictly warrant. Still it is felt that we are justified in assuming as absolutely

correct the universal laws formed from unvarying but infinitesimal experience. And, within certain limits, this is true. But it is only from the Bible that we can infer this right or learn the duty with which it is connected. Because it is morally fit for us to adore God as the Creator, he reveals himself to us in the visible universe. Our right to rely on careful and properly guarded scientific inductions depends on the confidence due to God who thus gives witness of himself. Infidel philosophy regards "nature" and scientific man as the deities to be relied on and glorified. In this, as in much else, she appropriates Christian truth to the service of falsehood, making such alterations as are essential to gain her end.

The Bible, especially the New Testament, is a book peculiarly well fitted to train the mind to accurate and systematic ratiocination. It shows by example how we are to combine scattered truths in general propositions, and also how we are to reason deductively from principles thus established. We may easily reduce to a strictly inductive form the scriptural arguments which terminate in the conclusion that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the Son of God. All that constitutes the substance of the inductive method is very obvious in the apostolical writings. Systematic theology is constructed so as clearly to exhibit that method. It takes religious facts instead of natural phenomena. From them it constructs a regular series of doctrines, just as the philosopher forms a system of science from facts obtained by investigating nature. Before Lord Bacon wrote, Melancthon, as a philosopher, and still more thoroughly, as a divine, had taught the principles of induction. If any one should take Melancthon's tract, entitled "A brief plan for the study of Divinity,"* and substituting natural phenomena instead of scriptural truths, should apply to the investigation of nature the method which it inculcates for the study of the Bible, such a one would be in the truest sense an inductive philosopher. It is a question worthy of examination how far the modern idea of induction arose from the mental discipline connected with the study of systematic writers on Bible doctrines. Certain it is that scriptural theologians,

* An abstract of this tract is given in the "History of the Church of Christ," published by the London Religious Tract Society, vol. vi. 449—452.

especially the inspired ones, gave to the world examples of the right kind of logic, long before either physical or metaphysical philosophers had just ideas in regard to the investigation of truth.

But even with the aid of religion, Natural Philosophy has not as much of certainty in its conclusions, as is generally supposed. Modern science has made wonderful progress. But this which is so much its pride is also its rebuke, when it offers theories as being finally and completely proved. No natural philosopher can ever feel secure that the next newspaper or scientific journal which he takes up, may not announce some experiment or discovery, which will overthrow much that now is regarded as firmly established. Every analogy of the past, and all the reason of the case, show that this is possible. The dying words of La Place were, "What we know is a small matter, what we do not know is immense." Sir John Herschell adopts the well known figure used by Newton. "Science, therefore, in relation to our faculties, still remains boundless and unexplored—we remain—standing on the shore of a wide ocean, from whose beach we may have culled some of those innumerable beautiful productions it casts up with lavish prodigality, but whose acquisition can be regarded as no diminution of the treasures that remain." We may add the following from the same distinguished writer: "There will occur a limit beyond which it is useless for merely human faculties to inquire; but where that limit is placed experience alone can teach us; and at least to assert that we have attained it, is now universally recognized as the sure criterion of dogmatism." If the unexplored fields of nature are thus unbounded, no one can foretell how great or how speedy may be the revolutions produced by new discoveries. Very instructive is the fact that one who writes on natural philosophy must be on his guard, lest he should become a laughing-stock, by believing what was accepted as sound science on many important points a century ago, or perhaps within half of that period. Philosophers who discovered the truth to-day, flout those who believe in the truth of last week, to be flouted in their turn a week hence. Few of the geologic or chemical theories of the eighteenth century continue to walk on all-fours. Many of them are already num-

bered with the respectable races of extinct mammalia; or the venerable but uncouth saurians of former eras. Fifty or a hundred years ago there were men whose authority was great in the world of science. But some of those stars are waning—Werner, Hutton, Playfair, with their cosmogonic theories; Bailly with his Preadamite Indian astronomical eras; the French *savans* with the zodiac of Dendera; the chemists before Lavoisier, with their phlogiston. And are not the atheistic physics of Oken; the analogues of St. Hillaire; the uniformitarian doctrines of Lyell; and the theory of different origins of men by Agassiz, inevitably tending to that Hades where so many once popular theories have already gone,

> "to join
> The innumerable caravan that moves
> To that mysterious realm where each shall take
> Its chamber, in the silent halls of death"?

It would indeed be more difficult to select those parts of natural science that are secure of life, than those that are likely to perish.

The analysis of scientific reasoning tends powerfully to produce scepticism in regard to much that is now esteemed by many to be settled truth, especially when that alleged truth seems to conflict with the far better proved truths of religion. But scepticism has so bad a character, that some may regard an attempt to repel scientific aggression by calling in such an ally, as being the same as though sheep should invoke the wolf to protect them against goats. We must therefore distinguish between religious and scientific scepticism.

There is no need to repeat the arguments which show that very much of scientific theory must be doubtful, because of the (to our view) infinite universe of facts which are beyond our reach and which may materially affect the conclusion. The powerful security of scriptural science consists in, and arises from, exactly the reverse in her case. She can, and does, include the Infinite in her premises; an Infinite *not* unknown, *quoad hoc*. Whether we look at those intuitive principles of right and wrong which underlie all religion, and which God himself gave to our souls; or at those internal and external testimonies by which the God of providence has authenticated the Bible as

his word; or at the direct communication between God and the hearts of Christians, by the Holy Ghost—far better established as fact than the greater part of the best proved phenomena of physics—in either of these cases we have the unequivocal testimony of God to the primary principles of religious truth. As rational beings we are frequently bound to call in question much that is very widely believed in as science. But this no more justifies religious scepticism than our right to doubt the accuracy of an engineer who has not surveyed the thousandth part of his field would justify our doubting the demonstrations of Euclid.

It is neither requisite nor practicable for us to exhibit in this article the force of the arguments in support of religious truth which we have just indicated. They may be found in many well-known, unanswered and unanswerable books. Works of the highest order of intellectual merit on moral science, on the evidences of Christianity, and in vindication of the reality of spiritual religion, may easily be procured. We are at liberty to refer for the proof of essential points to the writers who have thoroughly and professedly examined those particular subjects. It is thus that the geologist refers to the chemist, the anatomist, the botanist, in support of a large part of his positions. He justly requires all who doubt, to examine for themselves in the appropriate books. We have a right to do the same in regard to a matter of infinitely higher moment than any philosophy that human reason ever discovered or conceived of. We may justly complain, not now religiously, but philosophically, of those who profess to be teachers of their fellow-men in branches which require either a practical recognition or rejection of some parts of Christianity, and who set it all aside as if unworthy of notice. Not pretending to disprove the stupendous array of testimony and reasoning by which the Bible is shown to be the word of God, they pass it by in silence.

Amongst the Bible truths established by overwhelming evidence is the doctrine of the spiritual light and life of Christians. In all ages of the church there has been a class of persons distinguished from the rest of mankind by having received the wondrous gift of a supernatural spiritual illumination. To some degree, such light is possessed by every genuine member

of the church. If we admit this, can there be any rational doubt as to who are most likely to be sound interpreters of the Scriptures? Shall we learn the meaning of God's book from those who are in immediate communication with him, or from those whom he represents as having neither eyes, nor ears, nor heart, to appreciate his truth? We may admit that this illumination does not extend to mere science, even though scientific truth be mentioned in the Bible. But we have a right to regard it as belonging to all cases in which religious truth is complicated with physics. Whether the sun moves round the earth, or the earth round the sun; how many continents and what mountain ranges were above the surface of the ocean in Noah's day; are questions which seem to lie beyond the scope of those for the solution of which the aid of the Spirit of God is promised to believers. But questions which include the spiritual relations of the races of men to Adam or Christ, or which involve the connection between the sin of man and death, are of a very different nature. The church of Christ is not an infallible interpreter even on such points; at least not until she has sufficiently examined them with special prayer and waiting for Divine light; but very much less is any one else capable of deciding them authoritatively. Natural philosophers have no right to assume as certain any interpretation of Scripture which is not understood to be acceptable to those who fairly represent the light of the spiritual church. It is, however, to be remembered, that natural philosophers, who are themselves Christians, may frequently have peculiar advantages for the just interpretation of such parts of the Bible. But these pious philosophers are liable to err by mistaking the relative claims of religion and science. They may not always adequately remember how immeasurable is the superiority of a revelation from God, interpreted by "the children of light," who "have an unction from the Holy One and know all things," over the teachings of science, which, from beginning to end, have to be worked out by fallible human reason from very imperfectly known premises.

None who have taken the Bible as their guide have ever doubted this doctrine of the Divine illumination specially given to all true Christians. A mighty ocean of evidence flows down

through eighteen centuries, from all branches of the church, sustaining it as a catholic belief; "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." Tens of millions have experienced it for themselves. And we have our own eyes and ordinary reason by which to judge whether it is in the Bible. Rationalists, "liberal Christians," &c., who reject this doctrine, seldom have the effrontery to say that it is not taught by prophets and apostles. But if this stupendous advantage exists in the spiritual church, it is illogical and irrational to neglect or undervalue her opinion when science would investigate nature. Revelation and the true theory of nature are closely connected at so many points of contact that neither can be fully understood without the other. But revelation is older, better established, and more thoroughly investigated than natural science. By every title she may claim a superior place.

The ministers of Christ, if worthy of their office, are versed in the noblest of all sciences. Theology is such, not only in its subject matter, but also in the reasoning by which its great outlines are deduced from thoroughly proved first principles. But theologians need to be cautious when they would resist the aggressions of infidel natural philosophy. Such science is like a fortress built on soil where sappers and miners can easily work; but having walls too thickly compacted to be beaten down by direct battery. It is folly for one whose life is devoted to theological studies and pursuits to contend on their own field with those whose whole time and efforts are directed to natural science. An eminent philosopher, for example, alleges that a human skeleton has been found in a stratum a hundred thousand years old, or that the Falls of Niagara have been thirty thousand years receding from Queenstown to Goat Island. Nothing more than hardy assertion and a contemptuous allusion to investigations, which none but practical geologists can comprehend, is requisite to silence those who would argue against him directly. But the result may be very different if any one should analyze his arguments, and demand that he should produce all the conditions requisite for substantiating the conclusion. An ordinary pastor contending directly with a practical geologist about the age of certain strata, would probably make a poor figure. But if that pastor should insist

on the geologist proving that we are acquainted with the agencies formerly at work; and also that Nature then acted at the same rate as now, the philosopher might, peradventure, make a much worse figure.

It is a grievous, but very common, superstition, to believe that philosophers are, of course, accurate reasoners because they are profound mathematicians, or extensive examiners of nature. Even Sir Isaac Newton had but a limited comprehension of the logical principles of science, as Whewell shows with great force in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."* Men decidedly inferior to Newton are, of course, much more liable to be deficient. Industry in collecting facts, ingenuity and imagination, joined to the power of writing attractively, may invest a man with the popular character of a great physical philosopher. But these qualities do not imply so much as a moderate ability to reason with logical discrimination. The highest patricians in the world of science have no right to plead privilege against the writ of *quo warranto*. Philosophy, being merely human, must vindicate her entire claim at the bar of human reason. And, on the field of logic, others are fully as competent to judge as any natural philosophers that ever lived.

It is right to rebuke the dogmatism of science when it would exalt itself above revealed religion. An innumerable number of facts, essential to final theories, may for ever lie beyond the reach of investigation. Radical and rapid changes, arising from new discoveries, constantly occur in all the natural sciences. Logic refuses to sustain some of the most important conclusions of philosophy, until the physical is supplemented by religious principles derived from the Bible. Revealed religion, on the other hand, has its historical and logical proof much more complete than science. Besides this, it is directly authenticated by God to the heart of each true believer. Pride

* Part II., book xii., ch. xiii. The celebrated rule for *veræ causæ; i. e.* "we are not to admit other causes of natural things than such as are both true, and suffice for explaining their phenomena," is shown by Whewell to need serious modification, before it can have any real significance. All four of Newton's rules in the third book of the *Principia* are either too vague to have value, or else philosophically incorrect. Whewell's discussion of these rules is worthy of careful attention.

of intellect, and the aversion of sinful men to the holy commands of God may produce scorn, or anger, when science is reminded of its inferiority. Still it is true that there is no real wisdom except such as exists in subordination to the Bible, and in sympathy with that holy church which God himself has constituted the "Pillar and Ground of the Truth."

ART. II.—*The Higher Christian Life.* By the Rev. W. E. BOARDMAN. "That ye may be filled with all the fulness of God." Boston: Henry Hoyt. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1859.

THE importance so justly attached to the subject of Christian experience, in its various phases, and the deep personal interest which, in the very nature of things, it must always awaken in the mind of every true believer, cannot fail to render it in the future, as it has been in the past, one of the standing themes of religious inquiry and discussion. To a person who has known what it is to be under conviction of sin, to be brought to the point of self-renunciation and self-despair, to cast himself down in helpless trust upon the only Saviour of the guilty and perishing, to taste the joy of forgiveness, and to feel the power of a great hope springing up in his heart, there is, and there must be, in the history of others who have passed through a similar process, something of the same freshness and force of attraction which we find in a painting, or in a graphic description of scenes which were once familiar. The history in the one case, like the painting or the description in the other, is the reproduction of the past. It charms and takes us captive. We follow whither we are led, and at each successive step the objects, the associations, and the feelings of other days, become the vivid realities of the present.

A picture or a description of scenes which exist only in the imagination of the artist or the author, may possess elements of surpassing loveliness, and with all the power that taste and genius can impart, may appeal to the inward sense of beauty; but, if it be wanting in those features which suggest the asso-

ciations and experiences of the past, it will fail to move or even to reach that chord in the human heart which responds only to the touch of tender and sacred memories. The principle which explains the phenomena here referred to, is equally operative in determining the impressions produced upon the mind by the delineations of religious experience. A history of spiritual progress, which the writer has drawn rather from a peculiar theory of his own, than from the actual facts as they occur in the lives of Christians, which is more striking as a creation of skill and fancy, than as an accurate presentation of Scripture truth—may be read with interest as a theological curiosity, or as a brave attempt to revolutionize the settled convictions of the church, and introduce a new system of doctrine and biblical interpretation; but it can never receive the assent of an enlightened and disciplined understanding, or call forth the responsive sympathy of the heart. No power of logic can overthrow, in the Christian mind, the convictions which spring from the clear testimony of a profound consciousness in harmony with the teachings of God's word.

It is just here, as we think, that the volume entitled "The Higher Christian Life" is liable to objection. It was written, doubtless, with a commendable design, and contains many things that are worthy of serious consideration. But starting with a theory which is no less at variance with the general consciousness of Christians, than with the law of spiritual growth, as it is set forth in the sacred Scriptures, the author found himself obliged, almost from first to last, to distort the facts of individual history, and to contradict not only the sentiments of others, but those also which he evidently entertains himself. The attempt to construct a harmonious theory of Christian experience out of elements which not only have no affinity for each other, but which are mutually and absolutely antagonistic, is the true explanation, doubtless, of much of the incoherence and vagueness which are manifest on nearly every page. It would be impossible to point out in detail, within the limits of a brief review, all the inconsistencies of statement and reasoning, and all the errors in regard to matters of fact, into which the author, by a strange fatality, seems to have inadvertently fallen; but we may say—and it is thought the asser-

tion will be abundantly sustained by a candid examination—that not a single example, of all those employed to illustrate and establish his peculiar theory, can fairly be made to serve the purpose for which it is adduced. While every experimental Christian, of whatever name, will appreciate the motives and cordially sympathize with the ultimate design of the author, few, we apprehend, who read the book and weigh well its contents, will be disposed to accept its ruling theory, or assent to the validity of the arguments by which it is sought to be maintained.

Before we proceed to the examination of the theory itself, it is proposed to dwell for some moments upon a few matters of fact. In the preface to his volume the author calls our attention to one of his peculiar modes of expression, as follows:

"In the use of terms, the Bible principle—not the strict one—has been followed, 'second conversion,' for example. Of course it is not intended to convey the idea of a second regeneration, but that expressed by President Edwards in the term 'remarkable conversions,' which is the title of his account of several remarkable cases of higher life attained after conversion." P. vii.

The inquiry at once suggests itself on reading this paragraph, What Bible principle is it that the author follows in his use of the term "second conversion?" That he does not use the word "conversion" in the sense of regeneration, is rendered perfectly clear by his own disclaimer. What, then, precisely is the idea which it is here intended to express? Does it mean that movement of the soul toward God, which is the effect of regeneration, or in other words, the actual turning away from sinful habits and sinful acts, and the renewed surrender of the heart and life to Christ, which is characteristic of every one who has been born of the Spirit? If so, then we ask, Why *limit* us to a *second* conversion? Why not go on to a third, fourth, or fifth, to a five hundredth, or a five thousandth conversion? For, like Peter returning after the denial of his Master, every time a Christian repents and supplicates forgiveness, every time he returns from his backslidings and wanderings to Christ, the shepherd and bishop of his soul, then, in the proper sense of the term, and according to the Scripture

usage, he is converted. To single out a *second* conversion, therefore, and to lay special emphasis upon that, as a matter of great importance, and at the same time to pass in silence over every subsequent conversion, as if it were a matter of little or no importance, is equivalent to saying that a Christian should be very careful to repent and turn to God after his second sin of omission or of commission; but in regard to every subsequent sin, there is no particular occasion to insist upon repentance and amendment. The absurdity resulting from this sense of the author's favourite expression, precludes the possibility of supposing that it could have been thus employed. What he does mean by it, as we gather from his book, is simply this: That in the ordinary and normal progress of the Christian life, after regeneration has taken place, and after the soul has accepted Christ by faith as its Saviour from the condemnation and penalty of the law, there is a point at which it begins, for the first time, to believe in Christ for sanctification, and becomes conscious of a sudden transition into a new and higher state of experience. This is the "second conversion." In the first conversion, the soul does not embrace Christ as the complete and only Saviour. It looks to him only for justification and deliverance from penalty. In the second, it looks to him for everything, and it receives everything. It passes "out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of the Epistle to the Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth." It is "freed from the dead body of sin." It is "now linked by the three-fold cords of faith, hope, and love, to the living Saviour as its deliverer from present corruption, and from all the power of sin. The dead body is dropped. The living Jesus, sweet Jesus, precious Jesus, gracious Saviour, constant Friend, mighty Deliverer, has taken its place." P. 268.

Those who have not experienced this second conversion "have not yet learned that Jesus, through faith in his name, is the deliverer from the power of sin, as well as from its penalty." P. 266. They must suppose, therefore, that, having provided for the past, he leaves them in the future to take care of themselves. Like Paul, these poor half-way believers cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" They "sigh and groan in their bondage, as if there was no

deliverance this side the grave." P. 266. Of course there is deliverance, but they do not know it. "A moment's thought should make them see that they are not honouring the Bridegroom Deliverer (now, the bridegroom is Christ) when they point to this hopeless bondage; this struggling, sighing, groaning condition; this slavery to sin; this wedded state with a body of death as the bridegroom, (now, the bridegroom is the body of death) as the state and condition to which he (Christ) has introduced them. A poor bridegroom surely he must be, who holds his bride as a slave, sighing and groaning for liberty, and crying out, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death!'" P. 277, 8.

Those who experience the second conversion, though previously regenerated, then for the first time "really practically receive Jesus for sanctification by faith, as before he had been received as the sacrifice for sin." "This practical, experimental apprehension of Christ is instantaneous in every case, whether the instant can be marked or not." The soul then "leaves every other way, and trusts solely in Jesus." P. 55, 6. Up to that time it is implied, of course, that the soul had trusted partly in Jesus, and partly in something else. In this new experience, although the subject of it has already been regenerated, there is a "change of one principle of action for another." P. 58. What principle of action in a regenerate person is changed in this second conversion, we will not now stop to inquire. In regard to the "right and truth" of his doctrine, the author asks and answers the question: "Exactly what is attained in this experience? Christ. Christ in all his fulness. Christ as all in all. Christ objectively and subjectively received and trusted in." P. 58. "By faith the soul is now placed in the hands of Christ, as the clay in the hands of the potter." P. 59. It is quite evident that before this experience Christ is not attained.. Christ is not received in all his fulness. Christ is not accepted as all in all. Christ objectively and subjectively is not received and trusted in. The soul is not placed by faith in the hands of Christ, as the clay in the hands of the potter. And yet it has been regenerated and justified; yet the person is a believer and a disciple of Christ. This is strange, passing strange, to one who has derived his

ideas of experimental religion from the word of God. But we are told that this second conversion is "only the entrance, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification—not sanctification completed." P. 60. If by introducing the expression "fully and consciously," the author intended to remind us that the process of sanctification has been going on for years, it may be, but has only now for the first time attracted the notice and recognition of the mind, then we ask, why call that a second conversion which is only an intellectual discovery of something which has long existed, the mere opening of the mental eye upon a fact which had till then escaped its observation? And why not, for the same reason, call every subsequent addition to our knowledge of spiritual things, a third, fourth, or fifth conversion, and so on to the end? But if it is intended to express the idea that the soul now for the first time, absolutely, enters by the right principle upon the process of sanctification, then the question arises, How is it possible to conceive of a Christian who, after he has been regenerated and justified, and has received the principle of Divine life in his soul, continues for one, two, or three years, or for "a whole life time," p. 200, 211, without even entering upon the process of sanctification? For if he does not enter upon that process by the right principle, he does not enter upon it at all. The truth is, regeneration is itself the beginning of sanctification, and glorification is sanctification completed.

The author informs us, however, that this is a mistake; that they who have experienced the second conversion have learned that from the body of death, that is, from indwelling sin, "there is deliverance now here in this life through faith in Jesus." P. 266. They can unite with the apostle of the Gentiles in his memorable affirmation, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man;" but they have reached a height of spiritual attainment which renders it impossible for them to add, with him, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

In view of the sense in which the author employs the term "second conversion," the reader will no doubt concur with the

statement in the preface, that "the Bible principle" followed in the use of terms is "not the strict one." And he will probably be inclined to think that the statement would have been still more accurate, if the author had said that the principle which he followed was no Bible principle at all, either "strict" or loose.

The same remark might be made in regard to the precedent for the use of the term "second conversion," which the author professes to find in the writings of President Edwards. The statement that President Edwards wrote an "account of several remarkable cases of higher life attained after conversion," which bore the title of "Remarkable Conversions," is only one out of the many examples of carelessness and error in which the book abounds. No such account was ever written by President Edwards; at least it is not to be found in his works. He did indeed write what he called a "Narrative of Surprising Conversions," but there is no reference in the whole narrative, from first to last, to a solitary instance of a Christian, who, after he was regenerated, experienced a second conversion, or attained to a higher life, as they are understood and described by the author of the volume before us. Neither the name nor the thing is once alluded to.

The examples of Luther and D'Aubigné are also adduced by the author as illustrating in their Christian experience the practical workings of the doctrine he so earnestly maintains. He discovers in the history of each what he regards as unquestionable evidence of a second conversion. In regard to Luther, he asserts that during the interval between his first conversion and his visit to Rome, where he experienced a second conversion in the year 1510, "the truth that Jesus is all to the sinner, that in Jesus he has all if he takes him for all, he had not yet perceived. Christ a propitiation he accepted, but Christ a sanctification he rejected," p. 30; and that when the new light broke upon his mind at Rome, while ascending Pilate's staircase on his knees, then, "for the first time, he was freed from all false processes of salvation, and fully established in the true. Faith now, as the condition, and Jesus as the salvation, he saw was the whole." P. 31. Whatever else may be said of these assertions it cannot be denied, that they have the merit

at least of being explicit. But it is not a little remarkable that the very truth which Luther is here said to have rejected before his visit to Rome, and which he is said to have apprehended for the first time on the steps of Pilate's staircase, he is represented by D'Aubigné to have "received into his heart, as if God himself had placed it there," a full year before he set out on his journey. In the year 1509, while lecturing in the University of Wittemberg, on the Epistle to the Romans, he came to the seventeenth verse of the first chapter, where, says the Historian of the Reformation, "he read this passage from the prophet Habakkuk: 'The just shall live by faith.' This precept struck him. There is then for the just a life (not a mere justification or deliverance from penalty, but a life) different from that of other men: and this life is the gift of faith. This promise, which he received into his heart as if God himself had placed it there, unveils to him the mystery of the Christian life, and increases this life in him. Years after, in the midst of his numerous occupations, he imagined he still heard these words: 'The just shall live by faith.'" So also, we are told by the same high authority, in regard to the preaching of the Reformer before he went to Rome, that "the great seriousness that pervaded all Luther's sermons, and the joy with which the knowledge of the gospel had filled his heart, imparted to his eloquence an authority, a warmth, and an unction that his predecessors had not possessed." He knew nothing of this newly invented doctrine of one kind of faith for justification, and another kind for sanctification. "Faith in Christ," said Luther, all faith, any faith, that is scriptural and true, "takes away from you all trust in your own wisdom, righteousness, and strength. Then you learn to despise all those things which you see to be unavailing. Nothing remains but Jesus—Jesus only—Jesus abundantly sufficient for your soul. Hoping nothing from all created things, you have no dependence save on Christ, from whom you look for all, and whom you love above all." But perhaps the most remarkable fact connected with the point now before us, is that although our author represents Luther, while at Rome, to have been "for the first time freed from all false processes of salvation, and fully established in the true," and to have experienced the second conversion in which "the dead

body (of sin) is dropped," yet Luther himself, in a letter to George Spenlein, dated April 7, 1516, not less than five years after his return from Rome, declares, concerning the lingering tendency which he still discovered in his nature to seek for a personal righteousness and purity by his own good works, that "he was yet struggling unceasingly against it, and had not yet entirely triumphed over it." He has expressed the same sentiment in still clearer and stronger terms in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, first published in October, 1519. In commenting on the twentieth verse of the second chapter, he says to the young men to whom he was lecturing: "Ye are not infected with these pernicious errors, wherein I have been so nursled and so drowned even from my youth, that at the very hearing of the name of Christ my heart hath trembled and quaked for fear; for I was persuaded that he was a severe judge. Wherefore it is to me a double travail and trouble to correct and reform this evil: first to forget, to condemn, and to resist this old grounded error, that Christ is a lawgiver and a judge; for it always returneth and plucketh me back; then to plant in my heart a new and a true persuasion of Christ that he is a Justifier and a Saviour."

No comments of ours can add to the annihilating force with which these simple facts encounter the statements upon which our author rests the truth of his theory. That Luther was fettered in many respects by the prejudices of early education, which it was very difficult for him to throw off, is quite manifest from his own confessions quoted above; but, in regard to his view of Christ as the great central sun of the gospel system, the one and only source of spiritual light and life, the eye of his faith, when once fairly turned to behold him, was ever, from the hour of his first believing apprehension, as clear and keen as the eagle's. Isaac Taylor has truly said of him, that "he threw off the errors of the church, article by article, from the interior force of a spiritual vitality; or as a husk which the ripened fruit rejects. The false principles and corrupt usages in which he had been bred, and to which he had been most firmly attached, shaled away one by one from his mind, from his conduct, from his creed, as exuviæ which the energy of a genuine piety could no longer endure."

The same thing may be said of D'Aubigné. It required a hard struggle for him, even after his conversion, to break away entirely from the influence of his theological training. Although the new life had been implanted in his soul, and his faith had apprehended Christ as the only and all-sufficient Saviour, he yet found himself involved in difficulties when he attempted to adjust and harmonize the several doctrines of the gospel in a connected system, against which all his former education and convictions had been arrayed in uncompromising hostility. We are informed by a competent authority, that "the theological faculty in the Academy of Geneva, when Dr. Merle D'Aubigné was a student, was wholly Socinian in its character. Whatever were the shades of difference in regard to doctrine, which prevailed among its Professors, they all agreed in rejecting the proper Divinity of the Saviour and of the Holy Spirit; salvation through the expiatory death and intercession of the former, and regeneration and sanctification by the influences of the latter. With these cardinal doctrines of the gospel, others which are considered by all evangelical Christians to be fundamental in the system of their faith, were also renounced. It was under such instruction that Dr. Merle pursued his studies for the sacred ministry."* It is not to be wondered at that D'Aubigné, for a long time after his conversion, not only from sin, but also from doctrinal error, should frequently have found himself engaged "in a terrible struggle." When he called upon Kleuker, the Biblical Professor at Kiel, what was his object? Was it to be informed whether he should accept Christ by faith as his all in all, or in what way he could attain to a second conversion? Did his difficulties have respect to the essence of Christian experience, or to matters of detail in regard to the teachings of sacred Scripture? He has himself given us the answer in the narrative quoted by our author. He tells us that he called upon the Professor with the request that he would "elucidate several passages of Scripture;" that the Professor declined to "enter into any detailed solution of his difficulties," which he represented to be "difficulties of detail." But can a person who hesitates to receive Christ as his com-

* Dr. Baird, in a biographical sketch prefixed to a volume of D'Aubigné's miscellaneous writings, published in 1846.

plete and only Saviour, be said to be labouring under a mere "difficulty of detail?" This surely, if anything, is a difficulty of the most vital and tremendous importance. And as no one who is entitled to be called "an old champion of the word and an experienced Christian," would ever speak of such a difficulty, as Kleuker speaks of that of D'Aubigné, we must conclude that the difficulty in question was altogether different from what our author would lead us to suppose.

The very narrative of our author carries its own refutation with it; but if anything be required to render it more conclusive, it can easily be furnished in the words of D'Aubigné himself. In one of his discourses, entitled "Faith and Knowledge," he lays down the broad proposition that "it is impossible for a Christian, and by consequence, for a minister, to exist without the life of faith." If, then, at the time of the interview with Kleuker at Kiel he had not yet entered upon the life of faith—that faith in Christ by which the soul is sanctified, (Acts xxvi. 18,) that faith which is the victory that overcometh the world, (1 John v. 4)—so that he could say with the apostle, "The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me," (Gal. ii. 20,) then, according to his own declaration, it was impossible that he should have been a Christian. And we therefore conclude that either that was his first conversion, or else his difficulty did not relate to his entrance upon the life of faith and consequent sanctification. So, likewise, we find in another discourse, entitled "The Children of God," delivered at Geneva, in July, 1829, the following sentences which bear hard not only upon our author's statement in regard to this particular case, but also upon his whole theory: "Examine yourselves, to see if you truly possess the faith of which the Scripture speaks. You imagine that one can receive Christ and become a child of God by faith, without this faith producing any change in the heart. This is the third error that we would refute. . . . . It may happen in the world, if a good man adopts a wicked child, that this adoption, under the Divine blessing, may change the character of the child; but that which in human adoption may or may not occur, always takes place in the adoption of God. The child of God receives

not only the name, but also the nature of his Father. Every man, who is adopted of God, receives at the same time a new spirit, and becomes a new man. . . . . In proportion as you approach the great day in which you will be put in possession of your incorruptible inheritance, have more elevated, more holy thoughts, and become more desirous of heavenly things. One frequently sees a great heir, before the period of his majority arrives, think very little of what he is to become, and entertaining feelings very little in accordance with the grandeur of his future state. But as he increases in years, he becomes more grave, and acquires the consciousness of what he is. Children of God! heirs of eternity! the hour of your entire redemption draws nigher every day. 'The children of God,' said a faithful pastor of the fold of Christ, 'have three birth-days. They are born at first of a natural birth; they weep, but their parents rejoice. Afterwards, by conversion, they pass from a state of nature into the life of God; then they often weep bitterly, but the angels in heaven rejoice. Finally comes that which we call death, and this the primitive Christians regarded as the true birth of the children of God; there is still much weeping and grief, but when all is accomplished, the joys of eternal life begin, and there are no more tears for the children of God.'"

It is held, therefore, by D'Aubigné, that the great transformation, or the process of sanctification, begins at the very time of the Christian's adoption as the child of God, and that he passes out of "this struggling, sighing, groaning condition" —"out of the bondage of the seventh" chapter of Romans, and into the "entire redemption," the "full salvation" secured by Christ, only when he passes out of the world and into "the joys of eternal life."

But we are told by our author that the religious experience of Richard Baxter affords another remarkable case of "second conversion," "quite as distinct," says he, "as either Luther's or D'Aubigné's, both as to his final full apprehension of Christ as all in all, and as to his conversion years before." P. 40. We are willing to admit that this remark is entirely correct. The second conversion of Richard Baxter was "quite as distinct as either Luther's or D'Aubigné's." But how distinct

that was, we leave the reader to determine for himself. It is well known that Baxter, toward the end of his earthly course, wrote out a solemn review of his life, which is still included in his published works; and although at his second conversion, as our author would have us believe, he was "freed from the dead body of sin;" although "the dead body was dropped," and he "found his way out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth," we yet find him using, among the last and most impressive utterances of his life, the following language:

"In my younger years, my trouble for sin was more about my actual failings; but now I am much more troubled for inward defects, for want of the vital graces of the soul. My daily trouble is for my ignorance of God, weakness of belief, want of greater love to God, strangeness to him, and to the life to come, and for want of a greater willingness to die, and more longing to be with God in heaven. . . . Had I all the riches of the world, how gladly would I give them for a fuller knowledge, belief, and love of God and everlasting glory! These wants are the greatest burden of my life, and which make my life itself a burden."

Strange language this for a person who has already been "freed from the dead body of sin!" for one who has already been delivered from the "struggling, sighing, groaning condition!" for one who has already "found his way out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth!" If this was all his second conversion did for him, he might as well have stopped at the first.

There is only one other example of "second conversion" upon which we shall at present pause to remark. It is that of General Sir Henry Havelock. Of him also the author of "The Higher Christian Life" asserts that he was converted twice; once on board the ship "General Kyd," while outward bound for India, and again, the second time, in "Fort William" at Calcutta, the British Indian capital. After giving an account of his first and second conversion, the author adds:

"Now, Havelock would have been a distinguished soldier, and a decided Christian without doubt, even if he had not been met and blessed the second time as he was. But to understand

the philosophy of his unswerving dauntlessness in religion, and the deep solicitude he felt for the conversion of his soldiers, and of the heathen, to find the source of the steady brilliance of his light, we must look to the two scenes, the first on the 'General Kyd,' but not less to the second in 'Fort William,' and see how there the living union was formed first, and then more fully opened afterward by faith between him and his Saviour." P. 88.

We are here told that Havelock would undoubtedly have been "a decided Christian" even without a "second conversion;" that is, without "trusting solely in Jesus," (p. 56,) without receiving "Christ as all in all," (p. 58,) without "placing the soul in the hands of Christ as clay in the hands of the potter," (p. 59,) without "receiving Jesus by faith for sanctification," (p. 55,) without an experience which is "true as real, and as blessed as true, and as necessary as blessed," (p. 71.) He would have been "a decided Christian" without these! would he? Then, if he would, we can only say that the author's idea of "a decided Christian" is very different from ours. But we are told again, that although he would have been "a decided Christian" in the contingency supposed, yet we could not understand, could not account for, his solicitude for the conversion of soldiers and heathen, did we not take into consideration the fact of his second conversion. That is to say, if we should overlook his second conversion, we should find it impossible, or, at least, extremely difficult, to understand how he could be anxious for the salvation of others. Here, then, we have a man, who, although he does not trust solely in Christ as his only Saviour, is yet "a decided Christian;" and although he is "a decided Christian" he does not feel any particular solicitude for the conversion of sinners. Such "a decided Christian" surely bears very little resemblance to the apostle Paul. When Agrippa said to him, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian," he immediately replied, "I would to God, that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost and altogether such as I am, except these bonds!" It is our opinion in regard to all such "decided Christians," as those to whom our author refers, that the church ought to

pray, that as few of them might be permitted to exist as possible.

But of the many singular and astonishing statements in which this volume abounds, there are two yet remaining which we cannot forbear to quote. Lest we should be suspected of a design to awaken the prejudice of the reader by a mere caricature of the book before us, we shall allow the author to speak for himself. We frankly confess, that if we had been told in the language of a third person that any Protestant evangelical writer had published statements like those to which we refer, we should have had serious doubts in regard to the accuracy of his interpretation. In speaking of "the experimental apprehension of the principle of sanctification by faith as the privilege of all," the author expresses himself as follows:

"Why has the fact not had greater prominence in the past? Why have eighteen centuries been allowed to roll away before it is brought distinctly and prominently before the mind of the church?

"The answer is, that until now the time has never come for it. Now is the time. That it is no new thing, practically, is clear. . . . . And yet, until now, the time has never fully come to give it the prominence which now it is destined to take and to hold in the future history and progress of the kingdom of God in the world." Pp. 215, 216.

Now we ask, in regard to this statement, what system of Protestant Biblical Theology has ever been written, what Protestant evangelical church has ever adopted a confession, in which this very idea of sanctification by faith in Christ is not incorporated as one of its fundamental truths? To say nothing of a long catalogue of others, which might be mentioned, it is enough to remind the reader that in the Belgic Confession, the Confession of the Reformed Dutch Church, which was first published in the year 1563, and in the Westminster Confession, the doctrinal standard of the Presbyterian Church, which was drawn up in the year 1643, this identical principle is recorded with the transparency and splendour of a sunbeam. A man might as well lift up his head and inquire, Why have eighteen centuries been allowed to roll away before the sunlight is brought prominently before the public eye? We are rather

disposed to inquire, Where has this author been living? What was his business before he undertook to write a book?

The other statement to which we alluded, has reference to the doctrine of regeneration, or the new birth. And here also the author shall speak for himself. These are his words:

"It is only one hundred years since the great truth of the new birth, as a distinct experience, the privilege of all, began to receive its full power of application to the heart and life of the church." P. 216. "To the great central doctrine of justification by faith, revived before in the Reformation, the fact of the new birth, as an experience for all, was now (one hundred years ago) added to the faith of the church in the great awakening." P. 222.

How any one with a whole heaven of light streaming upon him in brightness above that of the noon-day sun, with every Protestant confession, every doctrinal symbol of the evangelical church from the Reformation down to this hour, proclaiming its clear and emphatic denial, could ever have put on record, in sober earnest, a statement like this, it surpasses our ability to conceive. If the great truth of the new birth was "added to the faith of the church" only a hundred years ago, what did Calvin mean, when, in the year 1559, he recorded this sentence? "As we have stated that complete salvation is found in the person of Christ, so, to make us partakers of it, he 'baptizes us with the Holy Spirit and with fire,' enlightening us into the faith of his gospel, regenerating us so that we become new creatures, and, purging us from profane impurities, consecrates us as holy temples to God." What did Ursinus mean, when, in the year 1570, he expressed this, as his undoubted conviction? "Man's conversion in this life is so necessary, that without it no one can obtain everlasting life in the world to come, according to what the Scriptures teach: 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.'" What did Arminius mean, when, in the year 1610, he laid down this proposition in regard to "the restoration of mankind?" "This restoration is the restitution, and the new or the second creation of sinful man, obnoxious through sin to death temporal and eternal, and to the dominion of sin." Again we inquire, Where has our author been living?

Where was he educated for the ministry, what books has he been accustomed to read, that he rises up three hundred years after the Reformation, when the doctrine of regeneration by the Holy Spirit took its place anew in the theological firmament, where it has ever since been blazing with the splendour of a constellation, and asserts, with the profoundest gravity, that the great truth of the new birth was "added to the faith of the church" only a hundred years ago? If anything can prove the correctness of the proverb, that "wonders will never cease," surely it must be this!

It can serve no useful purpose to occupy these pages, or to tax the patience of the reader with additional exhibitions of the error which characterizes this book in regard to almost, if not quite, all its pretended matters of fact. Enough has already been said to show that its statements indicate a most singular and unaccountable infirmity of apprehension. In concluding this part of the examination, therefore, we shall content ourselves with saying, what is scarcely a deviation from the strict sobriety of didactic utterance, that, taken as a whole, a book more completely destitute of all claim upon the reader's confidence, we do not at this moment remember ever to have read.

We pass on to the consideration of our author's peculiar theory. What that theory is, the reader may be reminded by referring back to the seventh page, and thence onward to the twelfth. It involves several important questions; for example: What is the law of spiritual growth? What are the principles laid down on this subject in the sacred Scriptures? Does a Christian have two distinct experiences which may be denominated conversions—just two and no more—or does he have but one? Is "the entrance, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification," postponed until after his "second conversion?" Is the transition into the new state of experience, subsequent to regeneration, generally sudden and striking? Does a Christian ever, in the present life, arrive at a point of spiritual attainment at which it may properly be said, that he is "freed from the dead body of sin," and delivered from a "struggling, sighing, groaning condition?" Of course, it is not intended to discuss these questions

separately. It is proposed merely to offer a few general observations which in a greater or less degree affect them all.

It might be objected to the theory of our author, that its practical tendency is adverse to the sound, intelligent, substantial piety of Scripture principle. But without dwelling at length on this phase of the subject, it will be sufficient to state briefly a few points of exception, and then proceed to what may, in some sense, be called the philosophy of Christian experience, including that peculiar experience which is here designated as "second conversion." The points of objection to the theory, on the ground of its practical influence are these. First, it has no foundation in the word of God. We are no where told that a Christian has one kind of faith (kind, not degree) for justification, and another kind for sanctification. Or, in other words, that he may have a true faith, when all the while, as our author says of Luther, he "accepts Christ as a propitiation, but rejects him as a sanctification." P. 30. On this principle a man may be justified, and, we suppose, go to heaven—for "whom he justified, them he also glorified;" (Rom. viii. 30) —while rejecting Christ in one of his most important offices as a Saviour. A more gross and revolting error could not well be conceived. But as all error in its proportion is detrimental to piety, and as Christians are said to be sanctified "through the truth," it follows that a theory which involves consequences like these must be anything but beneficial in its practical effects. We are far from saying that our author intended to teach this. It is only one of the absurdities which result from his theory. Second, while it does at some points invite Christians to higher degrees of attainment, it furnishes at others an excuse for them to continue as they are. It teaches that a man may be a decided Christian, as in the contingency supposed of General Havelock, for example, without experiencing a second conversion; or, in other words, without accepting Christ for all in all, without even "entering, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification," and without feeling any deep solicitude for the salvation of sinners. There are some professors of religion—whether they are possessors or not it is not for us to judge—who may possibly reason in this way: 'It is here said that a man may be

a decided Christian without yielding up all to Christ and looking for all in him, and without feeling any special anxiety for the conversion of others. True, if he wants to experience a high degree of spiritual peace and joy, he must be converted a second time. This is no doubt desirable and pleasant, but it is not indispensable, for the faith of justification will exempt him from penalty and render him a decided Christian, and that is enough for me. I shall not distress myself, therefore, in regard to anything further at present, especially as the claims of business require my undivided time and attention.' The idea involved in this inference the author would no doubt reject with abhorrence. But how he is to give any intelligible sense to much of the language of his book, and yet escape the inference, we confess our inability to perceive. Third, the theory in question has a tendency to divert the thoughts of Christians from the word of God, as the great immutable criterion of all true piety, and direct them to the changing moods and experiences of the mind. The inquiry of the author when looking for the evidence of Divine grace in the heart, is not so much, What say the Scriptures? and what are the indestructible principles, which, lodged in the soul, shine on for ever, like stars in the sky, with a brightness unchanged by the clouds and storms of the atmosphere below? as it is, How do you feel? Are you walking in light or in darkness? Are you in a "struggling, sighing, groaning condition," or are you "freed from the dead body of sin?" The religion which the book is most concerned about, is what is sometimes called the religion of sense. The appeal is characteristically away from principles to emotions. Of this kind of religion it was well said by good old Thomas Brooks, nearly two hundred years ago: "Those are the most excellent and heroic acts of faith that are most abstracted from sense and reason; he that suffers his reason to usurp over his faith, will never be an excellent Christian; he that goes to school to his own reason, hath a fool to his schoolmaster; and he that suffers his faith to be overruled by his reason, shall never want woe. Where reason is strongest, faith usually is weakest; but now the Lord, by forsaking his people for a time, makes them skilful in the life of faith, which is the choicest and sweetest life in this world." Fourth, the theory

of the book has a tendency to lower the standard of Christian piety. It is a sort of nondescript perfectionism. There is so much contradiction in it, that it is hard to tell precisely what it is. It will and it won't, it does and it don't. Now it is one thing, and now it is another. The general idea, however, seems to be that when a person has been converted a second time, he receives what is called "full salvation." He passes "out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth." "The dead body (of sin) is dropped." "Bondage is gone, freedom is come. Sighs give place to joys, fears to hopes." The happy subject of this experience has "learned that there is deliverance now here in this life, through faith in Jesus." All this is adapted to produce the impression that in this world there is nothing more to be looked for. The soul is constantly going up and down to heaven in a chariot of rosy exhalations, with clouds of perfume floating along its path. The idea of struggle and conflict is either kept out of sight or discouraged. And the effect, as any reflecting mind can easily perceive, is to make the person feel that now surely he needs nothing more. He has reached the goal. The end of the race is beneath his feet, and he looks abroad,

> "Where rears the terminating pillar high
> Its extra-mundane head."

He forgets that profound utterance of the Psalmist, "I have seen an end of all perfection: but thy commandment is exceeding broad." He forgets that he is called to be "perfect, even as his Father which is in heaven is perfect;" that it is only when Christ "shall appear," that his people "shall be like him;" and that "every man," no matter what his degree of attainment, "that hath this hope in him, purifieth—keeps on purifying—himself, even as he is pure." Thus the standard of Christian piety is lowered, and the aspirations of the soul are lowered in a corresponding degree to apprehend it.

It is almost superfluous to say that all this is utterly inconsistent with genuine growth in grace. The more a Christian is transformed into the image of Christ, the more he feels his own vileness, and the more he sees the need of transformation. And it is for this, among other reasons, that, so long as he is

"in this tabernacle, he groans, being burdened." That eminent master of Israel, Dr. John H. Livingston, for so many years Professor of Theology in the Seminary of the Reformed Dutch Church, has left on record these weighty words: "To grow in grace is to be emptied of all dependence upon ourselves, and practically to constitute the blessed Jesus our all in all. He must increase, but we must decrease. We take him for our all when first we believe; but what that fully implies, we do not, when first we believe, yet understand. To grow in grace is the unfolding of that mystery. It is experimentally to know that Christ is of God made unto us sanctification; that in the Lord we have not only righteousness, but in him also we have strength. It is to experience that when we are weak, then we are strong, and when we grow downward in humility, patience, and resignation, then we most effectually grow upwards in holiness. In this last particular, perhaps more than in any other, the saints are enabled to discern their growth in grace. They become in their own eyes, more vile, more empty and helpless, while the grace of Christ proves sufficient for them, and his strength is made perfect in their weakness."*

Thus much in regard to the practical influence of our author's theory. Let us now pass on to the remaining topic already referred to. The point from which we start is the clear and powerful declaration of the apostle Paul: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other." (Gal. v. 17.) The connection in which this passage is found requires but little explanation. The apostle had been exhorting the Galatian Christians to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ had made them free, and not to dishonour their profession by returning to the rites and usages enjoined by the ceremonial law. And then, having counselled them to avoid, as far as possible, all occasion for controversy among themselves, which generally arose from the infirmities of nature, and was but ill-adapted to promote the reign of fraternal concord and love, he urges them to walk, or to order their lives, according to the impulses of

* Two sermons on "Growth in Grace," delivered in the Collegiate Church, New York, in 1790.

the Divine Spirit, and so they would not gratify the wayward and forbidden propensities to which the unregenerate were accustomed to yield. With this, the passage stands in immediate connection. The apostle begins it with the particle "for," as if he had said, You have great need to walk in the Spirit, and thereby to subdue the rebellious lusts of the flesh. For the flesh strongly inclines men to act in opposition to the dictates of the Spirit; and these two forces, although they are frequently lodged in the same breast, are contrary and antagonistic the one to the other.

This seems to be the idea which the sacred writer intended to express. And it accords very fully with the universal experience of God's people in every country and in every age. The Christian has never yet lived, and so long as the sacred Scriptures continue to represent the Divine will in regard to the process of salvation, he never will live, whose heart either was not, or will not be, the theatre of a life-long struggle between the new principle of grace and the old principle of fallen nature. Our Saviour came into the world not only "to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law," and so render it true that "a man's foes should be they of his own household," but he came also to set a man at variance against himself—to introduce into his heart, into the very seat of life, and the very throne of self-government, a new principle to dispute the sovereignty of the old one that had reigned there from his birth. And the final issue of the conflict thus inaugurated, he intended to be, the supreme, and peaceful, and everlasting dominion of the new principle of Divine purity and love. True it is, that the contest will be a long one; that it will never terminate until every sinful instinct and passion shall be slain, and Christ shall reign triumphant in the closing experience of this mortal career. But the end is sure, the victory is certain. And then, the soldier who has endured hardness for the Master's sake, shall hear the beat of the soft peace-march that calls him home, where he shall

——"Walk up the heavenly street,
And ground his arms at Jesus' feet."

There may be, in this statement of the Christian life, an aspect which the men of the world—the unconverted—and even some professors of religion, will regard as anything but inviting. But it cannot be helped. It is true, nevertheless, because it is the uniform statement of the Gospel. And whatever exemption from conflict we may appear to enjoy, or whatever unusual experience we may suppose ourselves to have undergone, if it be not clearly indicated and provided for in the infallible Word, the only standard of living Christianity, it is but the dream and delusion of an ungoverned fancy, that must yet be dispelled, as the mists of the soul's morning twilight before the rising sun of truth. The sacred Scriptures speak to us, on this subject, with no uncertain voice. Whatever occasion for doubt there may be elsewhere, here there is absolutely none. Every Christian, at every period of his life, when the principle of grace is in healthy exercise within him, finds "a law in his members warring against the law of his mind." Every Christian, from the youngest to the oldest, who has not fallen from his first love, or is not now in a backslidden condition, can trace through all the intervening years, from the time when, consciously to himself, he was born of the Spirit, down to the point at which he thus stops to reflect, the overwhelming evidence of the truth, that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other." The spiritual life is nursed into vigour by the rugged discipline of conflict. It is like the mountain oak, that springs up from the acorn only a frail and tender plant, but with increase, either slow or rapid, as the soil and the various influences around it may determine, and yet always with a proportioned and gradual progress, not by sudden and unnatural springs and starts, becomes massive and strong, by its exposure to the elements, and its wrestlings with the storm.

This is the true emblem of all healthy spiritual growth. It is, indeed, remarkable, that the even and steady advance of vegetable and animal life, step by step, toward its full development and maturity, is the favourite and standing symbol, by which the sacred writers, both of the Old Testament and the New, represent to us the progress of the Divine life in the soul. We find in their statements no provision for gaps or intervals

during which the onward movement is expected to halt and stand still, and then be followed by a sudden and violent spring, like that which occurs when the sinner is at once translated by the Holy Ghost into the kingdom of Christ. It is, on the contrary, gradual, even, proportioned, always going forward toward its ultimate point. Without multiplying quotations, a few out of many will suffice. God says to his people by the prophet Hosea: "I will be as the dew unto Israel; he shall grow as the lily, and cast forth his roots as Lebanon. They that dwell under his shadow shall return; they shall revive as the corn, and grow as the vine." So also he says by the prophet Malachi: "But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in his wings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves of the stall." The figure passes down from the prophets to Christ and his apostles. It pervades the New Testament. Our Saviour says, in regard to the tares and the wheat, in the parable: "Let both grow together until the harvest." To those who were in the infancy of their spiritual life, the apostle Peter says: "As new-born babes, desire the sincere milk of the word, that ye may grow thereby." And to all Christians, in all the various stages of their progress, he addresses the exhortation, "But grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

The idea thus expressed by the sacred writers, and repeated in almost innumerable forms, is fresh, and beautiful, and cheering. It is the scriptural idea, and the only scriptural idea, of Christian progress. A distinguished exegete and scholar, who is scarcely less distinguished as a poet, has expressed this idea in terms which are quite as remarkable for their poetic beauty, as, in the present application to Christians, they are substantial in their Scripture truth; so beautiful and so true, that the reader will not be disinclined to peruse them. In a poem, addressed to a little child on the day of his baptism, the writer says:

> "No harsh transitions Nature knows,
> No dreary spaces intervene;
> Her work in silence forward goes,
> And rather felt than seen:

For where the watcher, that with eye
  Turned eastward, yet could ever say,
When the faint glooming in the sky
  First lightened into day?
Or maiden, by an opening flower
  That many a summer morn has stood,
Could fix upon the very hour
  It ceased to be a bud?
The rainbow-colours mix and blend
  Each with the other, until none
Can tell where fainter hues had end,
  And deeper tints begun.
But only this much doth appear—
  That the pale hues are deeper grown;
The day has broken bright and clear;
  The bud is fully blown.
Dear child, and happy shalt thou be,
  If from this hour with just increase
All good things shall grow up in thee,
  By such unmarked degrees:
If there shall be no dreary space
  Between thy present self and past,
No dreary, miserable place
  With spectral shapes aghast:
But the full graces of thy prime
  Shall, in their weak beginnings, be
Lost in an unremembered time
  Of holy infancy."*

Now this, just this, as we have already seen, is the scriptural idea of religious growth. But the question may be asked, Are there not exceptions to this rule? Does it not sometimes happen that professing Christians, at certain points of their history, are conscious of a transition into a new state of experience which is so marked and sudden as to appear almost like a second conversion? We answer, Yes—it does undoubtedly happen; but never, in any case, where there has previously been a healthy spiritual growth. It is always the result of some antecedent disease or defect in the soul, just as the rapid increase of flesh and the sudden spring into new life and vigour, of which an invalid is conscious when recovering his bodily health, is the result of the previous disease and prostration which he has suffered. If, in the ordinary and natural condition of the body, a child, for example, should increase in size and strength in the

* Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Dean of Westminster.

same ratio in which he increases after a long period of sickness, it would justly be considered monstrous, and furnish a proper occasion for alarm. But as the law of spiritual growth—at least as it is given in the Bible—is precisely the same as the law of physical growth in the case of the "new-born babe," to which the apostle Peter refers—gradual, even, progressive—so, if these sudden and violent transitions should occur in the experience of a person, who, after his regeneration, had enjoyed an ordinary and healthy spirituality, then, according to all the rules of scriptural judgment we should pronounce that person to be, not a Bible Christian, but a spiritual anomaly, in one sense a spiritual monster. It is no more inconsistent with the law of physical growth for a healthy child to expand and swell out suddenly into the breadth and stature of opening manhood, than it is inconsistent with the law of spiritual growth for a healthy babe in Christ to expand and swell out suddenly into the breadth and stature of an opening manhood in Christian experience. The one is just as reasonable as the other, no more, no less. But the truth is, such a thing never happens in either case. We are reduced to this simple dilemma, either the idea is altogether erroneous, or else the Bible representation is not true. In all such cases, however, the Bible is to be preferred as a standard of judgment to any imaginary experiences of our own.

It is not denied that the sudden transitions referred to —or, as they have very injudiciously been styled, "second conversions," a name liable to great perversion and abuse—do sometimes occur. But judging from the uniform and consistent teachings of sacred Scripture, they are a simple impossibility, except as the result of at least one of five antecedent conditions. First, the absence of regeneration at the outset. Second, erroneous views of Scripture doctrine. Third, bodily weakness or disease producing mental languor and melancholy. Fourth, the temporary withdrawment of Divine light and comfort from the soul. Fifth, religious declension. From any of these, either singly or combined, these sudden transitions into a new experience may undoubtedly result. But in no case can they properly be styled, in the ordinary sense of language, a second conversion. In the first case, the change

is, simply, regeneration. In the second, it is the illumination of the mind and heart in regard to the teachings of Divine truth. In the third, it is the restoration either of the body or the mind to comparative health, and to consequent cheerfulness and vigour. In the fourth, it is the renewed communication of Divine light and comfort to the soul. In the fifth, it is the return of the backslider to Christ.

Now call these changes by what name you please, they are all the result of a previous defect, or an unhealthy condition, of the intellectual and spiritual nature. They no more form a part of the ordinary and normal growth of the principle of Divine grace in the soul, than the rapid and extraordinary increase of flesh and strength after long sickness forms a part of the ordinary and normal growth of a child. And to ascribe to a person superior attainments as a Christian, because he has experienced this sudden transition, is like ascribing to an invalid who is now convalescent, superior health and vigour because he has been sick. So far from being "the higher Christian life" it is the lower; it is, in fact, the lowest of all, just as the point at which a sick man begins to recover his health, is the point at which the principle of physical life is nearest to absolute extinction. So far from being the index of spiritual strength, it is the index of spiritual weakness. The person who has experienced it, has only begun his Christian life, or has but just recovered from a relapse which has retarded his progress. But the future is all before him. And he has reason to rejoice and be thankful in view of the happy work thus commenced, when he reflects that "He which hath begun a good work in us will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ."

There is, no doubt, a difference in the rapidity of spiritual growth in different Christians, just as there is a difference in the rapidity of physical growth in different plants, or in different children. In one case, it is greater, in another, it is less. But greater or less, as the case may be, it is, when normal and healthy, always symmetrical, proportioned, gradual, progressive. It is not simply the result of the increasing power of the Spirit, as opposed to the flesh. It is that increase itself. It is the grain of mustard seed sprouting, springing up, grow-

ing in girth and altitude, expanding itself into a great tree upon whose leafy branches the birds of heaven may come down and rest themselves, and sit, and sing. It is the little leaven diffusing its subtle but irresistible energy, extending the circle of its influence, permeating the whole mass, leavening the whole lump, assimilating every constituent particle to itself. These are the symbols of Christian growth. What these things are, in their proper relations, in the natural world, that the kingdom of God is, in the heart of man. Planted there by the Holy Ghost, an agency secured for poor, and guilty, and dying sinners, by the precious blood, and the surrendered life of Him who hung upon the tree, its vitality and increase are guarded and fostered by the same Power to which it owed its beginning. Its central object is Christ, radiating the life of purity and love, as the sun radiates the light. The manifestation and exercise of that life is the out-breathing of the soul after God, on the one hand, and the strenuous exertion of conflict with the powers of sin, on the other. Its aspect toward holiness and God, is loyalty and love. Its aspect toward sin and Satan, is war and battle. Its march, is onward. Its expansion is conquest, the trophies of victory wrested by the Holy Ghost from the Prince of Darkness.

In the heart of man—in your heart, reader, and mine, if we are now the people of God, or ever shall be—is this struggle to be maintained, is this triumph to be won. Hurled headlong from his throne by that act of the Divine Spirit which regenerates the heart, and emancipates the sinner into the glorious liberty of the new life, the great enemy of God and man is yet to be driven, step by step, beyond the limits of the dominion he has usurped. In this territory of the heart he marshals his forces, and there he awaits the conflict. The depraved instincts and passions, anger, wrath, malice, evil speaking, impurity, covetousness, the love of the world, self-sufficiency, "the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life," they are all on his side, and they present a formidable and threatening array. But, thanks to the compassion and self-sacrifice of the Friend of sinners, there is a power to meet them, and to dispute the victory with no unequal arm. It is the inexorable power of God's truth and Spirit; the power of a Saviour's suf-

ferings and a Saviour's blood. Their forces of light and love shall move on, step by step, and the enemy shall retire before them, until in death the last remnant of opposition shall be vanquished and expelled, and Christ, the King of Truth and Peace, shall reign with unquestioned sway.

This is the conflict. This is what we may expect. This is the result in which the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit will finally end. The result is glorious and cheering to contemplate. But we have not yet reached it. If we are Christians, indeed, then in our hearts the power of the flesh has been broken, but not yet entirely subdued. To his people, in the olden time, did God say, in regard to their enemies in the land of Canaan, "I will not drive them out from before thee in one year. By little and little I will drive them out from before thee, until thou be increased, and inherit the land." This is what he says to his people now. In the heart of every regenerate sinner, the good work has already commenced. Within the narrow compass of every believer's body, like the struggle between hostile soldiers contending within the walls of a fortress, the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit is now going on.

There is a passage in Brock's Life of General Havelock in regard to one of the most important events that occurred during the great Sepoy Rebellion in India, which is almost singular for the clearness and force with which it illustrates the conflict between grace and nature in the heart of man. In recording the history of the siege of Lucknow, the biographer informs us that early on the morning of the 16th of November, 1857, "Sir Colin (Campbell) began his march on the Sikunder Bagh, a strong square building, surrounded by a wall of solid masonry —as usual, loop-holed all around. It was evident the enemy was here in great force, and its possession would be hotly contested. A village on the opposite side of the road was also held by them. It was necessary to at once reduce the Sikunder Bagh, and drive the enemy from the village. The General saw that to effect this, artillery was wanted in a position that could not be reached without passing between a raking cross-fire from the village and the Sikunder Bagh, but in a moment two batteries were galloping their guns through a perfect stream of fire.

This done, a dazzling line of bayonets, closing around the loop-holed village, cleared it at a run. The brave soldiers swept across the ground without firing until they had faced the enemy, then the sharp gleams of fire, and the quick rattle, as of a single shot, and the bayonet in its terrible strength concluded the work.

"Meanwhile the artillery had been battering the walls of the Sikunder Bagh with little effect. At last a breach was made—a hole of two feet square, and then began a charge which for heroic daring has never been surpassed, and rarely equalled. The Sikhs and the Highlanders rushed to the wall and through that hole—for breach it could not be called; they flung themselves in upon the foe. The entrance once effected, woe to the mutineers! From the prison they had chosen there was no escape, except through barred windows high up in the building, and through the barricaded gate, which was within a few yards of the cannon's mouth. What passed within that house of horrors none who survive care to tell. Now and then a plumed bonnet and a tartan plaid were laid upon the grass without the blood-stained entrance. Beneath them lay a stalwart form whose eye will never more gladden the northern cottage from which the dead man came. Hour after hour passed in that awful struggle. Anxious men stood round this crater outside, wondering how the battle sped, and when it would be won.

"But the volcano within the thick walls still raged like a fiery furnace, and life was its costly fuel. Gradually the sphere of action widened as different parts of the building were carried and forced to admit fresh men; but not more than four hundred soldiers of our (Sir Colin's) army were at any moment inside, and, once in, there was no egress. The mutineers, whose numbers were at first overwhelming, struggled hard for life against the avenging column. At last the struggle closed; the work of death was done; the Sikunder Bagh was theirs; and as they looked on the piles of dead, men"—remembering the pitiless and savage butchery of helpless men and women, and dear little children at Cawnpore, and the glutting of that horrid well with the mangled bodies of the slain—"were constrained to say, 'Here is retribution for Cawnpore.'"

Such was the struggle within the walls of the Sikunder Bagh, and such its termination. Strong as were the rebels in hatred and number, they could not stand before the charge of Highland courage, and the Highland arm.

But there is another Sikunder Bagh. It is in the heart of man. And the rebels against God and his dear Son are there, strong in hatred and strong in number. "For the carnal mind," says the Word of Inspiration, "is enmity against God." It is a hard and rocky fortress. Its walls are granite, and its gates are barred. But there is a power in the sweet, and gentle, and loving Spirit of God, in its silent working, that is mightier far than all the shot ever belched in thunder from the cannon's mouth. Those walls shall be broken; those barricaded gates shall be carried by the forces of the Prince of Peace. And when the struggle is over, and the last sin is slain, the angels of heaven shall look upon the scene and say: Here is retribution for Calvary's blood.

If we are the disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ, our hearts are the theatre of many a conflict. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary, the one to the other; so that we cannot," as the apostle says, "do the things that we would." We have pledged our loyalty to our blessed Saviour, and our consecration to the same cause which he holds so dear; and now he calls upon us to be "workers together with him." We are to take our stand with Christ, with the Holy Spirit, with the word of Divine truth, and coöperating with the influences which they put forth, we are to maintain a life-long struggle with Satan, with the world, with the sinful propensities and passions which yet linger in our hearts. We need not expect, while on this side of heaven, any sudden elevation above the atmosphere of conflict and toil, any miraculous exemption from the necessity that lies upon us to endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ. If we do, then just so surely as God's word is truth, we shall find ourselves mistaken—sadly, wofully mistaken. The great issue is not to be settled in a day. It is not to be decided by a single stroke or battle. It is a long campaign. And the Captain of our Salvation says, "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life." In

reliance upon Him, in self-denial, in prayer, in watching, in the use of all appointed means, in sacrifices, in diligence, in labours, with patience and meekness and love, we are to persevere to the end. Many a time we shall be weary. Many a time we shall suffer humiliation. Many a time we shall go into our retirement with shame and pour out our confessions before God. Many a time our hearts shall ache, and the big tear shall steal unbidden down our cheeks. Do these things appal you? Do you shrink back from the encounter? Do you feel that you have no stomach for the fight? If you do, then you are not worthy to be Christ's disciple. No; we were not called to indolence and ease. We were called, like enlisted soldiers, to fight the battles of our King. Religion doubtless has its joys. But we are not always to be speaking of them, and never of the good fight of faith. We want to see the enemies of our peace, who, and what, and where, they are. We want to be reminded of the issue of this struggle in which we are now engaged. We want the truth of God's blessed word brought down upon our hearts to animate, and stir, and rouse our sleeping courage into life and action.

Amid the endurance and the labours of the present, direct your eye toward the future. This conflict will have an end. The victory shall be yours. You shall be more than a conqueror through the blood of Him who loved you. Your humiliation will be past. Your heart will cease to ache. Your tears will cease to flow. Heaven's unfolding gates, and the fellowship around the eternal throne, will be a recompense for all the sorrows of the way. Let this, then, be the lesson that we shall learn from this examination into Scripture truth—that we have a warfare to accomplish—that we are to maintain it to the end —that the victory shall be ours—that the fruits we shall reap from it shall be eternal rest, and eternal glory, at God's right hand.

In closing these observations there is a single suggestion upon which those who are living in impenitence and fancied security would do well to reflect. To all such we beg to offer the remark: Do not congratulate yourselves that you are exempt from the toils and trials of the conflict to which we have referred. Your exemption in that respect does not fur-

nish an occasion for rejoicing. But it does furnish an occasion for grief—grief to yourself, and grief to all who love you, and wish you well. If you do not bear the cross, you cannot wear the crown. If you do not engage in the battle, you cannot share in the fruits of the victory. If you are not on the side of Christ, he will regard you as on the side of his foes. "He that is not with me, is against me, and he that gathereth not with me, scattereth abroad." You know what the doom of all such will be. Remember it, and act in view of it, as wisdom and duty suggest. Do not suppose that you are in a condition of safety, because you sit down to enjoy the world in quietness and peace. There is such a thing as a treacherous repose; as a fatal exemption from struggle and pain. The sick man, who has long tossed upon his bed of anguish, may find a point in his experience, when all his sufferings appear to cease, and the power of his disease to be exhausted. His rest is undisturbed. All is quiet and still. But, alas! he little knows with what fearful activity the sappers and miners of death are performing their work in the dark. Mortification is there, subtle, silent, creeping up, with stealthy pace, toward the vital seat. Suddenly—when least expected—with the spring of the panther, and the grasp of the giant, it seizes his heart, and crushes out his life. Was that man safe because he had no pain, because all things appeared to be promising and fair? Ah, no! Better, a thousand-fold better, the keenness of anguish than that insidious rest, which is but the herald of approaching death. Better, a thousand-fold better, the most rugged conflict of the spiritual life, than that deceitful and transient repose, which is the precursor of torments that shall never end.

ART. III.—1. *The Leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia.* By H. B. 8vo. pp. 120. Philadelphia, 1859.

2. *An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address.* By HORACE BINNEY. 8vo. pp. 250. Philadelphia, 1859.

OF human fame, there is none more perishable than that of the lawyer. His greatest efforts in the lower Courts pass away with the moment, like things that perish in the using. And in the appellate Courts, the ablest and the most brilliant forensic arguments are preserved only in their skeletons, by the Reporters, shut up as in a mausoleum, where none ever enter except the lawyer, as a matter of business, searching for a precedent. Yet no class of men better deserve to be remembered than lawyers, even when only considered as upholding the causes of clients, with the full measure of their learning, their ingenuity, their physical strength, sometimes under the frown of power, the displeasure of the public, and often not only without pay, but at great personal loss. For all this is done avowedly to uphold justice; and without all this professional devotion, justice would be but the will and word of the dominant power holding the sceptre only to be abused. But lawyers deserve to be remembered for something more important than upholding the private interests of clients. To them is due the preservation and development of the law itself, which, like an unseen Providence, gives protection to the smallest right, and takes under its comprehensive vigilance all human interests, whether of individuals or of nations, on land or on sea, securing them to be adjusted according to rules of justice against the hand of the plunderer. It protects even the sanctuary of the church.

The Common Law of England is the great mother of American lawyers. From her bosom they imbibed that spirit of freedom which places law above power; from her strictly logical procedure, separating facts from law, rendered necessary by jury trial, they acquired the logical cast of mind and common sense so preëminently their characteristic. Many, too, of the leaders of the old American bar were educated at Westminster

Hall, and there acquired the habits of the English lawyer. When American institutions came to be established, the lawyers were everywhere the master-builders. They organized not only the judiciary, but also the legislative and executive departments of government. They were, from the nature of the case, the only competent architects of government. And wherever lawyers had the least influence, there the worst government was established, as in Pennsylvania, where Dr. Franklin had influence enough to have a legislature of one house established, which, however, because of its inadequacy, was soon abolished. All over this vast country, lawyers have built our institutions; and so far as the law is concerned have exclusively administered it as judges, attorneys, and counsellors; and even the legislation has been directed and controlled by lawyers. In fact, the lawyers have been the leaders of the nation. And if he who was at once the Secretary of Cromwell and author of Paradise Lost, spoke truth, when he said, "Peace has its triumphs no less renowned than war," then, the trophies won by lawyers on the great theatre of human action, deserve no less to be preserved in history than those of warriors.

Doubtless, views like these induced Mr. Binney, himself one of the greatest of lawyers, to rescue from oblivion the names of the leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia, behind whose example he grew up in those accomplishments with which he so long dignified his profession. Feeling lonesome, as one without professional comrades, when he looks at the Bar of the present day, he recurs to the Bar of the past for companionship, and presents to his professional brethren of this generation, portraits of the lawyers of the past as they stand mirrored in his memory. Mr. Binney feels that the times have changed, and that the Bar has changed with them. And like a parent, who feels that his mantle has not fallen on his sons, he suggests, rather than declares, that, in the mutation of things, the Bar of to-day has not fulfilled the hopes of its predecessors. And he wishes that examples of the old lawyers shall be presented to their successors in a portraiture more certain than the vague traditions of the Bar, to which his own professional character will soon be committed. Mr. Binney has done something far more important than rehearse, in a finished and animated style,

pleasant reminiscences of Lewis, of Tilghman, and of Ingersoll. It is well for lawyers of to-day to know the lawyers of the past, and profit by their example in learning and in general accomplishments. The Bar, we are pained to believe, has deteriorated, and more painful still, is deteriorating. The training with which law-students are now disciplined is but a sham, when compared with the hard mental gymnastics by which the old lawyers were invigorated and sharpened for the conflicts of the forum. And the modern digests, both of reports and of statutes, enable the lawyer in practice to cram himself for the occasion, without disciplining his faculties, as searching through the reasonings of cases and collating of statutes did in earlier times.

Another cause of change in the character of lawyers is the establishment of local courts, with their separate bars. Formerly there were courts of wide territorial original jurisdiction in the States, which brought all the lawyers together at the same bar for the trial of causes before the jury. The wider field for forensic ambition and rivalry furnished in these courts, stimulated lawyers to greater exertion. It is said, that when the old General Court of Maryland was established to give place to the local courts, Pinckney, the greatest of Maryland lawyers, said, "The glory of our bar is gone for ever!" Even the appellate courts do not now call the lawyers of the several inferior courts together. The increase of business in the appellate courts has made it necessary to divide the docket into sections suited to the convenience of each local court; so that the lawyers from the several courts do not now meet even in the appellate courts. Any wide fraternity of the Bar is thus rendered impossible.

The attempted law-reforms, too, have tended to lower the intellectual ability of the Bar. These pretended reforms have abolished the technical common law pleading, and substituted a loose and unscientific mode of statement, thereby begetting in lawyers loose and illogical habits of mind. The guiding idea in these reforms seem to be, that science is an obsolete thing, well for the old fogies of the past, but behind the practical enlightenment of this age of progress. Maryland has been wiser than her sister States in her law reforms. She simplified and rendered more scientific the old common law pleading, thereby

bringing it nearer to common sense and practical efficiency. The success of the simplified system was fully proved by more than three years' practice in all the courts of that State, without a single difficulty. The system was found fully adequate to all the exigencies of justice; while, as a logical discipline for the student, it was far better than even the old common law pleading. But commissioners, who had digested the statutes of the State which assume the existence of the old common law pleading, found themselves in the dilemma of either making their work conform to the simplified pleading, which they knew was their duty, or else so cutting up the simplified pleading as to enable them to let their work remain as it was, full of obsolete things. They chose the latter easier alternative, and the legislature, without knowing it, adopted their work; and the mutilated pleading now stands an appropriate chapter in a Digest, which puts lecturers on science, literature, morality, and religion, in the same category with stud-horses, jackasses, circus-riders, rope-dancers, and other such characters.* Whether the study of this code will influence the Maryland Bar for good, we, at least, have our doubts.

But a still more potent and fearful cause of the demoralization of the Bar, is the change in the tenure of the judicial office. The judiciary is no longer, as it was of old, independent by a life tenure in office; but is, upon theory, and avowedly, made dependent upon the popular will; and is re-eligible, so that the elective franchise is held in terror over the judges. The principle upon which our forefathers thought a pure and enlightened administration of justice dependent, is now repudiated. The administration of justice seems to be drifting towards Lynch law. The doctrine of a law, higher than decisions of courts, or enactments of legislatures, or even of constitions, is openly proclaimed. When this doctrine shall be the rule of judges, as it is of some legislators, the abomination of desolation, as woful as that spoken of by the prophet, will come, and that quickly.

There never has been a country where the judicial function was so important, and integrity so necessary to the judge, as

* See pp. 394, 395, vol. i. Maryland Code.

this. No other judiciary ever entertained questions of such magnitude; involving, as they often do, fundamental political rights that are hotly contested by infuriated national parties; and at other times, involving pecuniary interests of amounts astounding to those who only look at the common transactions of courts. The Dred Scot is a case of the first kind; and a case before the Supreme Court, at its last term, presenting the question, whether the rolling stock on railroads is liable to execution for the debts of the company, involving, as it did, millions of dollars, is one of the second kind. But a still more portentous class of cases in the Supreme Court, at the last term, were claims against the United States Government, involving millions of dollars' worth of land in California, founded on pretended grants from the Mexican government before the cession of California. These claims were attempted to be supported by forged public documents, forged public seals, and the perjured testimony of professional witnesses, and had been fraudulently sold, by those who got them up, for large sums of money to those who prosecuted them before the court. The claimants could, in the aggregate, have afforded to give millions of dollars in bribes to the judges. The court decided against the claims. Similar cases will, from time to time, come before the court, from newly acquired territory. Let the nation ponder these things! If our institutions are to be preserved, it must be done by the law administered through an enlightened and upright Bench and Bar. The Bench and the Bar must stand or fall together. They are mutually dependent. There is not an enlightened citizen who believes in the wisdom of an elective and re-eligible judiciary for a term of years; and yet, amidst universal condemnation, it is becoming a universal policy. "Our lawyers (says an eminent English judge) read with admiration, and consult with the greatest respect, the text-books of American lawyers, and the judgments of American judges; and our legal education and system of study have greatly profited by our emulation of that broader and more varied character which the peculiar circumstances of America necessarily tend to create." How long will this high and acceptable praise be merited, if the present progress of decadence in the legal profession be not arrested?

The change in the tenure of the judicial office is the effect of party politics. Adhesion to party had become the criterion by which the judges were appointed by the executives of the States; and, as a remedy for the evil, the judicial office was submitted to the vote of the people. Mr. Binney's first book has led us to these reflections; and here we appropriately take up the second, which is connected with the politics of the country.

In the state of dissevered sympathies, political, ecclesiastical, and social, presented at this time by the great community which in its aggregate relations constitutes the American people, the character of the father of the country is often invoked to mitigate, by its historical greatness and the national memories which cluster around it, the exacerbations of party strife. One of our most distinguished statesmen has, of late, traversed the country, delineating in a noble rhetoric, the intellectual and moral grandeur of Washington. And but a few weeks ago, a great British statesman, when installed as Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, in presenting from his own wide experience the precepts and examples best fitted to guide young men through the trying vicissitudes of life, especially pointed them to Washington, as the one great public man whose character was such that, in all time to come, the degree in which it shall be esteemed will constitute the measure of the civilization of the age. Of all the actors in the great spectacle of history, Washington is far the wisest and the most dignified; if it be wise to make all your ends those of your country's and of truth's; and if it be dignified to give up power at the earliest moment when your country can spare your services. When his sword had won the victories which made his country an independent nation, he delivered it back to the country as the instrument only of war and not of government. And when the sceptre of civil power was placed in his hands, he laid it down at the earliest period which patriotism would allow. Such was the moral greatness of Washington, that he felt that he could, without any show of vain-glory on retiring from the office of President of the United States, advise, in a farewell address, the people whom he had led to victory in war, and conducted to freedom in peace, upon the great principles of policy which

should guide them in the political career now begun in history, and initiated by himself. In the solicitude which he felt about this advice and warning to his countrymen, he called to his aid a friend, whom he had found wise and faithful in his whole public life. As nothing of importance in public affairs ever transpires without being more or less misrepresented, the formation of Washington's Farewell has been, by some, made a matter of reproach to Washington, and by others, to Hamilton, who was the adviser. It is to clear up this misrepresentation that Mr. Binney has written the book before us. And he has accomplished his purpose, and placed the question, once and for ever, on the foundation of truth, leaving Washington's wisdom unimpaired, and Hamilton's honour unsullied.

Ours is not a political journal; but it is within its scope to treat occasionally of the great principles upon which our institutions and social order repose. And because a spirit of disappointment may seem to darken the picture which we have presented, it must not be inferred that we despair of the Republic. No nation ever yet perished on the threshold of her history. Degenerate times have come to all nations, and must come to ours. But under the merciful providence of God, we have confidence in the fulfilment of a great end by our country.

We cannot close without expressing regret, that so masterly a writer as Mr. Binney should have given so much of his time to the labours of his profession, and not spared more to literature and mankind.

ART. IV.—*The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively considered.* By the Rev. JAMES MCCOSH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, author of "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Limits of Religious Thought Examined. In Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, in the year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. First American, from the third London edition. With the Notes translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The Province of Reason: A Criticism of the Bampton Lecture on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By JOHN YOUNG, LL.D., Edin., author of "The Christ of History," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Philosophy of the Infinite; with Special Reference to the Theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. By HENRY CALDERWOOD. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1854.

WE prefix the title "Reason and Faith" to this article, not because we propose to enter upon an exhaustive, or even formal, discussion of the subject, but because it is a prominent topic in all, and the chief subject treated in a part, of the books whose titles are given above, which we thus bring before our readers for comment and criticism. If it is the avowed and chief subject of two of these works, it is also largely and ably handled, either directly, or in the discussion of questions fundamental to the solution of it, in the other two. Not only does the question as to the general relation of Faith to Reason thus constitute the *commune vinculum* between these treatises, but more specifically, the discussion, to a greater or less extent, of this relation as affected by the philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned, and the various modes of speculating about the Infinite, the Absolute, the Eternal, and the Uncreated, that were initiated by Kant, and have made themselves felt as forces in shaping the current of philosophic and theologic speculation until now. They had, however, long ruled in Ger-

many before they were insinuated into the French mind through the fascinating lectures and publications of Cousin. Still more recently have they penetrated the Anglo-Saxon mind. But they have now become a formidable power in some of the high-places of Britain and America. As they wane in the country of their birth and early triumph, they wax in force and obtrusiveness in these countries of their later adoption. The problems and issues which this type of thinking raises, confront us on every hand. It impregnates very much of our current literature, philosophy, and divinity. The infection is in all grades of potency. We have simple and unmitigated Transcendentalism, the blankest Pantheism, theoretical and practical, running out, as in the school of Emerson, into the most shameless and articulate scheme of fatalistic licentiousness. We have transcendental mysticism and transcendental rationalism. We have decoctions of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in histories, essays, reviews, original and translated, native and imported. We have Rational Psychologies, Cosmologies, and Theologies, proving not merely how God has made, or even ought to make, but how he *must* make the universe, if he make it at all. We have theologies which identify God man and nature, and make Christ, or the Incarnation, the mere incoming of a theanthropic life into humanity, to bring it back to the depths of the Absolute Deity, of which it is the effluence—a life, according to some, permeating and recovering the entire race, or humanity as such—according to others, husbanded in the external and organic church, and distributed through the sacraments and other outward ceremonies, only to such as receive these ritualistic administrations at the hands of duty authorized hierophants. Others, again, show the bias which their thinking and writing have received from these sources, in their antagonism to this philosophy and its fruits. They are known chiefly as polemics against it, some assailing it with intelligence as to its nature, its truths, and its errors, while they attack the latter with well-chosen and well-directed weapons; others dashing at it blindly, and making havoc alike with friend and foe, truth and error.

We have blind giants, who appear to regard it as their mission to hurl bomb-shells somewhere, as a demonstration against

Transcendental heresies, whether these hit the foe, or fall and explode with destructive effect in their own or a friendly camp. Worst of all, some of the mightiest men who have undertaken to grapple with this Kantean philosophy and its monstrous progeny, and have flattered themselves and others that they have vanquished it, give unequivocal signs of being in a mournful degree mastered by it. They have caught somewhat of the distemper in the attempt to cure it. They seem, scarcely knowing it, to be striving to inoculate philosophy and theology with the virus, for the purpose of fortifying them against it; as will yet more fully appear.

Before proceeding to Mr. Mansel's great work, and the vigorous answer to it by Dr. Young, which will form the central topic of the observations we are about to offer, we wish briefly to characterize the treatise of Dr. McCosh. Some of its more particular statements relative to the great questions handled in Mr. Mansel's work, we hope to bring before our readers, when we come to the heart of our discussion.

Dr. McCosh has won high rank among the Christian philosophers of our day by the works he has already published. His treatise on "The Divine Government, Physical and Moral," introduced him most favourably and widely to the notice of cultivated and thinking men in both hemispheres. His next work on "Typical Forms," &c. was welcomed by a narrower circle, because more scientific and technical. At the same time it was recognized as a valuable contribution to apologetics, and a confirmation of the author's high rank as a thinker. We rate the present work above either of its predecessors, alike as regards the ability it manifests, the difficulty of the questions elucidated, and the importance of the solutions, direct and indirect, which he offers to some of the great issues which now enlist the mind of the church. His works have the merit of speaking to living questions and meeting an existing desideratum. They touch apologetic theology at that point in which, for the time being, the enemies of the gospel are most successful in perplexing and annoying its friends. They deal with it, as it is impugned, obscured, or endangered by the scientists, metaphysicians, rationalists, and mystics of our day—in short, by whatever constitutes the prevalent "philosophy falsely so

called." They repel not merely those who assail Christianity in name, and deny the divinity of the Scriptures, but those who, under the name and guise of Christians, virtually emasculate or annihilate it, for the purpose of bringing it into accord with the supposed demands of reason, spontaneous or reflective, scientific or philosophic. He has the merit of meeting the exact issue, of facing instead of shirking the difficult problems which are either intrinsic to philosophy, or which emerge in the attempt to conciliate it with religion. In short, Dr. McCosh's great specialty is metaphysics, including the metaphysics of physical science, and these especially as related to Christianity; and in our opinion he has cultivated it with signal success. We do not indeed class him with Hamilton, or even with Mansel, as to the order of his mind. We miss the gigantic intellectual energy, the immense learning, the mighty momentum of the former. But then we miss his vehement prejudices, his frequent one-sidedness, showing itself occasionally in the emphatic contradiction of what he had as emphatically affirmed,* and above all, his entanglement in that net-work of Kantean relativities, and antinomies, which he seemed, now to tear into shreds, and now to bind more tightly about him in the very effort to burst it—a giant brushing away these monstrous fictions, like so many puny reptiles, by the mere sporting or effortless play of his powers, and anon charmed, spell-bound and, in a sort, paralyzed by them. We miss also in McCosh the preëminent scholarly culture, the choice philosophic learning, the severely classic style, and the dialectic keenness of Mansel. But we are also glad to miss what is a heavy drawback to these high qualities—that enslavement to certain logical quibbles or fictions concerning the Absolute and Infinite, which figure so largely in the new philosophy of the conditioned, and which are treated by him as first truths that must be allowed to dominate over reason and faith, philosophy and theology.

But if less vigorous and brilliant than either the master or disciple, who, in spite of their faults, stand at the head of late writers on philosophy in the English tongue, he has merits

* See, for one instance, Hamilton's Lectures, pp, 223—256, in the first of which it is maintained that there is, in the second, that there cannot be, consciousness without memory.

which more than compensate for this sort of inferiority. There is a certain quick discernment of truth and error, good and evil; of the weak side of splendid and imposing philosophic systems; of the friendly or hostile bearing of metaphysical dogmas, or arguments upon scriptural and evangelical truth; a facile and felicitous exposure of the fallacies and sophistries which lend them plausibility; a ready perception, and happy setting forth of the harmony between the light of Nature and Revelation, and all this with reference to living issues, which impart great value to his writings, especially his latest work. If he does not rank among the foremost as a discoverer or originator of new opinions, he has few peers in power to detect and expose the chaff and the wheat, to separate, and help others to separate, the precious from the vile. Others may be more inventive, ingenious, and eloquent, as advocates. Dr. McCosh shows rather the qualities of a judge, whose "senses are exercised to discern between good and evil." Like the magnet cast into a heap of sand and iron-filings, it spontaneously picks up the true metal, and rejects the worthless dirt. It is this sound, sensible, judicial quality of mind that renders him a sober and safe thinker, and communicates to his works a healthy tone, and salutary influence. In this view, their wide popularity is both deserved and explained.

The very title of his book, although certainly not striking for euphony or terseness, discovers what is far better, the happy tact for discerning a work, that needed to be done, and appreciating its relative and intrinsic importance. "The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated," has long been a great desideratum with reference to some of the chief issues which agitate christendom. And yet, on a superficial glance, the very phrase savours of a solecism. For the very *differentia* of a truth known by intuition is, that it is not reached by induction, but *a priori*—i. e., known prior to, and independently of, such induction, which is an eminently discursive mental process, going from a long observation and comparison of individual instances, to the evolution of a general law. The idea of proving the illimitableness of space or time, the propositions of geometry, or that we ought to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, by

induction, or inductive generalization, is simply absurd. This is not what is meant by the inductive investigation of our intellectual intuitions. Induction is not here employed as another or rival method of knowing the same things which we know by intuition. It is not a cöordinate source of knowledge. It is rather a means of learning what our intuitions really are and what they actually contain, what precisely is the amount of their self-affirmations and immediate beholdings. Thus, that space is illimitable, that every event must have a cause, that justice ought to be done, that all qualities must belong to a substance—these are truths which are intuitively seen in their own light. They are not only not dependent for confirmation upon experience, but they are incapable of being proved by any amount of experience. For they affirm what is true, not only in, but beyond all actual experience; nay, all supposable or possible experience. They, of course, are not obtained by inductive observation and generalization, which have place only within the sphere of experience, and with reference to matters known exclusively by experience. *But then it is a matter of experience, a fact or phenomenon of our consciousness, that we have these intuitions which discern and affirm truths beyond experience, and a priori.* It is, therefore, a fair field of inductive inquiry, to ascertain what are the intuitions which manifest themselves in our conscious experience, how they arise, what are their circumstances and surroundings, what is their precise import, what are the criteria which test them, and whether the formulas which are commonly employed to express them, declare their content fully and exactly, neither more nor less. Thus the intuition of causality is sometimes enunciated in this wise: "everything must have a cause." But its true statement is, "every *event* must have a cause." The difference is vast—as great as that produced by the insertion or omission of a Greek letter in the Athanasian controversy. On the former statement, we require an infinite regress of causes without finding any First Cause. On the latter, a First Cause is inevitably postulated. Our intuition of the Infinite is that it is illimitable, and that the object of which infinitude is predicated, admits of no increase of degree. This is one thing. The dogma of the advocates of

the philosophy of the conditioned, developed from Kant's antinomies, that the infinite is that which includes in itself all actual and all possible existence; that therefore an infinite God is incompatible with finite or created beings; that creation is impossible, and pantheism the only possibility conceivable by the human intellect, is a very different thing. Men are exceedingly apt to take partial views of things, and unconsciously shut their eyes to whatever does not accord with their own likes and prejudices, and to exalt the tenets of their own clan, party or sect, or their own pet conceits and logical quibbles, to the dignity of intuitive truths, about which they are impatient of all doubt and controversy. *Unaquaeque gens id legem naturae putat quod didicit.* On the other hand, fierce partizans will often deny even intuitive truths which militate against their favourite dogmas. Besides all this, there are not wanting those who, pleading a *quasi*, if not real, sanction from Locke, deny all intuitive truths; assert that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, without any original ideas or first principles, potential or actual, and that its only resource for general truths is by induction from the facts of its outward and inward experience. For the elucidation of such questions, and the settlement of such controversies, the inductive investigation of our intuitions is indispensable. And to this work, Dr. McCosh has addressed himself with signal success.

A chief point which he emphasizes is the manner in which our intuitions first operate and display themselves. They always first perceive the truths they discern, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, as qualities of individual objects or actions. These are afterwards, having been observed in connection with a number of such individual things, generalized and formalized into abstract propositions or principles, whose truth the mind sees intuitively as soon as they are stated. That no two straight lines can enclose a space, that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same moment, that worship is right and blasphemy wicked, this and all else the like is first seen concretely in individual cases. The observation of these qualities in such instances suggests and induces the statement of the universal abstract principle, which is seen to be true as soon as stated, by its own self-evidencing light.

Space and time indeed are *sui generis*. Body perceived in space, and events in time, may first direct the attention of the mind to them. But when once turned towards them, it intuitively knows them to be boundless, and incapable of being conceived as non-existent. In this illimitable and necessary character, time and space of course are not first seen concretely in any object or event, but in their own immensity as the receptivities of all existence.

Dr. McCosh shows that there are three aspects in which these intuitions manifest themselves. First, they appear as regulative principles, whether they are distinctly apprehended by the mind swayed by them or not. Secondly, they are to be regarded as facts of consciousness in all mental phenomena which betray their presence. Thirdly, they are to be viewed as objective general truths, which represent what is involved in the concrete instances in which they appear, in an abstract and universal form, and which, as thus formalized, are intuitively seen to be true. These intuitions appear as regulative forces in the case of those who have never consciously recognized them, or who even deny them. The peasant who has never thought of free-agency, and the fatalist who denies it, both alike show that they are controlled by a conviction of it, in estimating their own responsibility and that of others. Others may have never presented to themselves the proposition, that moral good and evil are such intrinsically, and that there is an ineffaceable difference between them. They may be even Epicureans or Utilitarians in theory. But they will make it manifest that their moral judgments are often regulated, in spite of their theories, by the intuitive conviction that some acts are right and others wrong in their own nature. So in regard to idealists. Their conduct is regulated by the conviction that there are real external non-egoistic substances. The idealist clergyman, whose horse was stolen, was no wise comforted by being informed that he still possessed the idea of his horse.

Another point on which Dr. McCosh well and strenuously insists, is that the genuine intuitions of the mind apprehend realities, not mere fictions of the imagination, not a mere ideal colouring or shape which the mind throws out from itself. Thus, if we discern the quality of moral goodness, or moral

evil in actions, these are real objective qualities of those actions, not mere subjective shadows projected upon them from our minds—unless their action be morbid and abnormal. Space and time, the nexus of events with causes, and of qualities with substance, are objective realities, not mere subjective forms of thought. This principle we deem of the first importance, as it is maintained by our author, in regard to the intuition both of external objects through the senses, and of supersensual truths. It in reality closes the crevasse opened by Kant, through which Transcendentalism breaks out, levelling all embankments, burying common-sense, sound philosophy, and pure religion under its devastating flood—and which still, as we shall see, sends out its empoisoned currents to mingle with and vitiate Christian philosophy and theology. The beginning of all this sublimated folly of those who professing to be wise become fools, lies just here—in resolving objective truths and realities into mere subjective impressions or forms of thinking.

The criterion of these intuitive truths Dr. McCosh finds to be three—self-evidence, necessity, catholicity. Herein he substantially follows Hamilton, who also adds to these, simplicity and incomprehensibility. If a truth be compound and not simple, then it is not intuitive, but deduced from the conceptions or judgments of which it is compounded. And the same is true, if it be comprehensible, i. e. referrible to and explicable by other truths on which it is dependent. As to self-evidence, this criterion is self-evident. As to catholicity, that is, being confined to no nation, sect, or party, but showing themselves in all healthy and developed minds, this is an obvious characteristic of intuitive truth. As to necessity, this is of two kinds. 1. As denoting that, the contrary of which is inconceivable. 2. That which the mind cannot help regarding as self-evident as soon as presented to it, although the contrary is not inconceivable. Of the former sort of strict and literal necessity, the proposition that of two contradictories one must, and both cannot be true, is a specimen. Of the latter sort of relative necessity, the proposition that our normal consciousness is a true, and not a lying witness, and that its results are knowledge, and not imposture, is a specimen. It cannot be questioned that the foregoing are real and sufficient criteria of intuitive truths.

All this, and much more the like, is ably put, argued, and applied by our author to some of the great questions which hinge thereupon. Nor is it necessary that we say more by way of evincing what we have indicated as the sound and healthy character of the author's mind, especially as shown in this volume. Of course, he is not always equally forcible and felicitous. We find ourselves at times tried by a certain diffuse style and fragmentary method, where we look for a more compact and continuous evolution of the subject in hand. At first, in speaking of the will, he uses certain phrases which look like asserting the Pelagian theory of contrary choice. As we proceed, however, we find that he maintains a causation of the acts of will, only that this causation is not physical, but moral, and congruous with freedom of choice. This is the truth. It is all that most of those, whom the author seems to think himself opposing, claim. We observe at times a confused mode of statement in regard to necessary truths, as if they were dependent on induction for proof. At other times, however, he defines with great clearness and exactness the distinction between inductive and necessary truths. We now take leave of this important work, except as we may have occasion to quote from it, in dealing with Mr. Mansel, to whose great book on the "Limits of Religious Thought," we now turn.

This book is designed as an antidote, primarily to Rationalism; secondarily and incidentally, to what he calls Dogmatism. These respectively he thus defines: "Theological dogmatism is thus an application of reason to the support and defence of pre-existing statements of Scripture. Rationalism, on the other hand, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the independent conclusions of the natural reason, and to be rejected where that adaptation cannot conveniently be made. By *Rationalism*, without intending to limit the name to any single school or period in theological controversy, I mean generally to designate that system whose final test of truth is placed in the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition, by whatever previous process these faculties may have been raised to their assumed dignity as arbitrators. The Rationalist, as

such, is not bound to maintain that a Divine revelation of religious truth is impossible, nor even to deny that it has been actually given." "And," adds Mr. Mansel, "he claims for himself and his age the privilege of accepting or rejecting any given revelation, wholly or in part, according as it does or does not satisfy the conditions of some higher criterion to be supplied by the human consciousness." Pp. 47, 48.

This is a good definition of Rationalism. And the author has well ascribed to it a tendency to diminish, dilute, and destroy all the distinctive doctrines, the very substance of Christianity. As to Dogmatism, which he farther explains as being an attempt to exhibit the unsystematized statements of Scripture, "as supported by reasonable grounds, and connected into a scientific whole," he claims that its perils are of an opposite kind. It tends to add human opinions to the body of revealed doctrine, and to weaken the authority of this doctrine by resting it on mere rational considerations, and substituting human for divine authority. As to this, we only observe, 1. That this is an unusual application of the word dogmatism, and fitted, if not designed, to cast gratuitous odium upon the systematic statement and defence of scriptural doctrine. 2. That it is the proud abuse and overstraining, not the use, of efforts to methodize and harmonize Christian doctrine that beget unscriptural additions to it. 3. That the effort to show that a doctrine or system is accordant with right reason, or not repugnant to it, at various points and in various aspects, is by no means inconsistent with founding it on Scripture. Nor does it lessen the authority of Scripture, when its statements are shown not to be repugnant to reason, or to have a response and witness in the conscience of men. It is only when the reason of men usurps the prerogative of the Infinite Mind, and denies that to be true which God affirms, or when it soars to meddle with things too high for it, utterly beyond its grasp, as in pronouncing against the possibility of the Trinity and Incarnation, that it becomes pernicious and destructive. This, however, if Dogmatism, is, in a far higher degree, Rationalism. Of this, more hereafter. These few provisional words have been said here, because we do not wish to encumber our progress by any further discussion of Dogmatism.

For these foes of Christianity, the one really portentous, the other, in its legitimate use, imaginary, the author thinks he has discovered a sovereign antidote, which it is the object of this volume to set forth. The principle which solves the whole difficulty, is thus stated and italicized, by himself: "*The primary and proper object of criticism is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its relation to Religion.*" P. 61. If it can thus be shown, that the human mind is wholly incompetent, in virtue of its own laws, to make the Infinite an object of thought without running itself into contradictions, then it follows that it is wholly incompetent to criticise a revelation from God upon matters pertaining to God. The Rationalist is caught in the entanglements which he weaves for the orthodox believer. "If it can be shown that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are both the same; that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and, from the nature of the case, must occur, the chief foundation of religious Rationalism is cut away from under it." P. 64. Our author then proceeds, in the second and third lectures, to demonstrate the necessary incapacity of the human mind to make the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite—i. e., God, (see pages 28, 29, foot-note,) an object of thought or knowledge. Of course, everything here depends on what is meant by thought and knowledge. If he means the full comprehension and perfect knowledge of God, of course none will dispute with him. But if he means a partial knowledge, yet a knowledge true, although partial, then all christendom will protest against it, except that superstitious antichrist which teaches that "ignorance is the mother of devotion." What he means, will appear more fully as we examine his proofs in support of his position. He says:

"There are three terms familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, Absolute, and as Infinite. By the *First Cause* is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being. By the Infi-

nite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that, than which a greater is inconceivable; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity.

"The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of an infinite number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded in a third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others. Even if it be granted, which is not the case, that such a partial infinite may without contradiction be conceived, still it will have a relative infinity only, and be altogether incompatible with the idea of the Absolute. The line limited in breadth, is thereby necessarily related to the space that limits it: the intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes, coëxists with others which are thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness. The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as Absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. 'What kind of an Absolute Being is that,' says Hegel, 'which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?' We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation; but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception required. That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible, modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. Indeed it is obvious that the entire distinction between the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an unrealized possibility is necessarily a relation and a limit. The scholastic saying, *Deus est actus purus*, ridiculed as it has been by modern critics, is in truth but the expression,

in technical language, of the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and later times.

"But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be mere appearance, and merges all real existence in the cause. The validity of this alternative will be examined presently.

"Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. . . .

"The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself. . . . . .

"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible." Pp. 75—79.

"The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from an original warp and woof:—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coëxistence of the infinite and the finite, and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infinite." Pp. 81, 82.

It was hardly necessary for the author to go on and demonstrate that Pantheism and Atheism afford no relief, but are capable of being easily run out into similar antilogies, and of shattering reason against itself in its very effort to apprehend them. Indeed, what is not capable of this treatment, if there be any substance or validity in this sort of logical legerdemain, which can be practised with equal facility upon any object, finite or infinite, and reel off an equal profusion of contradictions? But before examining these antilogies at length, which are but ramifications of Kant's famous antinomies,* we will

* Antinomies of Kant:

First Antinomy.

The world has a beginning in time, and is limited in regard to space.

The world has no beginning in time and no limits in space, but is in regard to both infinite.

Second Antinomy.

Every composite substance consists of simple parts, and all that exists must either be simple or composed of simple parts.

bring to the notice of our readers, Mr. Mansel's attempted demonstration of the source and the necessity of these contradictory conceptions of things, as lying in the very nature of consciousness and personality.

"That man can be conscious of the Infinite is thus a supposition, which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation, for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and *actually nothing;* (!!) for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must be conceived as *actually everything, and potentially nothing:* for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that, which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature, by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness.

"This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for, when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation—if, whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception regarded as finite—the *infinite*, from a human point of view, is merely a

No composite thing can consist of simple parts, and there cannot exist in the world any simple substance.

Third Antinomy.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world; to account for the phenomena we must have the causality of freedom.

There is no such thing as freedom, but every thing in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

Fourth Antinomy.

There exists in the world, or in connection with it, as a part or as the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being.

An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it, as the cause of the world.

name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." P. 94.

It was surely a work of supererogation for the author to tell us, on the next page, that consistency requires us to "refuse to attribute consciousness to God," if we attempt any conception of him, because consciousness implies "limitation and change;" and still further, that we cannot conceive of God except under some characteristics—i. e. distinction and limitation: and yet that if we attempt to set aside or ignore these limiting modifications, "the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;—pure being is pure nothing." A finite being or nothing! O thou Most High God! is this the dread position into which the minds thou hast given us are, in the phrase of this author, "cramped by their own laws, and bewildered by their own forms!" that they should be compelled to conceive of thee either as a limited being or as nothing!

Similar quiddities, shall we call them? are evolved by the author, from the fact that consciousness involves relation, while "the Absolute as such is independent of all relation"—therefore "we cannot conceive it as existing." Pp. 96, 97. Still further, from the fact that consciousness in human experience involves duration and succession, a tissue of like contradictions is woven. Pp. 98, 99.

Consciousness, moreover, involves Personality. So also do "the various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example. . . But Personality," says our author, "as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation . . . . a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness. . . Personality is also a limitation, for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other, and the several modes of thought are distinguished from each other by limitation likewise." Pp. 102, 103.

So the author strengthens, while he echoes, his great conclusion that the "*Absolute* and the *Infinite* are thus, like the *Inconceivable* and *Imperceptible*, names indicating not an object of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." P. 110. "It follows, indeed, that the infinite is beyond the reach of

man's arguments; but only as it is also beyond the reach of his feelings and volitions. We cannot indeed reason to the existence of an Infinite Cause from the presence of finite effects, nor contemplate the infinite in a finite mode of knowledge; but neither can we feel the infinite in the form of a finite affection, nor discern it as a law of finite action." P. 117. "The very conception of a moral nature is in itself the conception of a limit." P. 127. As to "a partial, but not a total knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute," we are told, of course, "the supposition refutes itself." P. 97.

If this series of dialectic feats tires the reader, this is not our fault. It is still more trying to the writer to transcribe, analyze, and refute them. Similar extracts might be multiplied at pleasure. We have thought proper to quote thus largely, in order to let the author speak for himself on the most fundamental point in his treatise—a question of intrinsic and acknowledged difficulty. We have thus before us the destructive portion of his theory. The constructive side will remain to be considered, when we have disposed of this. Those who are familiar with German transcendental modes of thought and expression, will recognize little that is new in these portentous demonstrations, which make it the prime function of human reason to commit suicide. The novelty lies in the use to which they are put by Mr. Mansel. He has undertaken to utilize modes of thinking heretofore employed in behalf of Pantheism or Atheism, and the demolition or corruption of Christianity in order to neutralize their own venom, and parry their own assaults upon our faith. He shows our supposed enemy to be our faithful and invincible ally. It is indeed true, according to Kant, Hegel, and their followers, that the mind of man cannot think of God as Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause, without running into all manner of contradictions and absurdities. But this need not alarm us. It proves not Pantheism or Atheism, but the utter incapacity of reason or philosophy to grasp religious truths at all, or exercise any critical judgment about them. Of course, all rationalistic or philosophic objections are undermined. For the very reason itself which makes them, is undermined, *quoad hoc*, and proved incapable of thought in the premises. This

is what is proved by the antilogies into which it runs, rather than the reality of those antilogies. Thus philosophy may at least evince its own futility. It is an engine which at least consumes its own smoke.

All this seems very good, only that it is too good. It is surely a good work to annihilate rationalism. But when this is done by quenching the light of reason as a faculty which can make the infinite God an object of thought, even when taught by his own Word and Spirit, (for the author's reasonings tend to all this, or they mean nothing,) we pause, and inquire if the boon proffered be not too great, and its cost too great?

"What is God? God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This we were taught in our infancy. No words are more familiar to the old and young, the learned and unlearned of our own and many other communions. No words more articulately or happily utter the common faith of christendom in the premises. And we say, without hestitation, that they convey more real and more salutary truth in regard to the High and Lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, than all the books ever written in the vein of the foregoing quotations. Do these words convey to the mind no ideas, or express no thoughts, or objects of possible thought? Or, what is worse, do they convey only notions bristling with stupendous contradictions and fatuous absurdities! Does the attribute of infinity intimate the blasphemy, that in order to be true of God, he must comprise in himself all finite beings, all possible existences and modes of existence, including sin,* which our author says follows by "unassailable reasoning," if we can have any thought of the Infinite at all? Is it endurable that Christians should be taught by a Christian teacher, that the absolute

* In his preface to this edition, Mr. Mansel notices the severe criticisms which have been justly brought against the passage here referred to. He endeavours to parry their face by offering the following analogous passage:

"Suppose that an author had written such a sentence as the following: 'A circular parallelogram must have its opposite sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference shall be equal to each. The conclusion is absurd; but the reasoning is unassailable, *supposing a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.*'"

"Would such a statement involve any formidable consequences either to

moral perfections of God imply limitations inconsistent with his Infinitude, and relations inconsistent with his Absoluteness? Are we to listen silently while men tell us, that if we attribute consciousness or personality to our God, these likewise involve limitations and relations inconsistent with his infinity and absoluteness, and that the only escape from this is found in denying all attributes to the Great Supreme, till beneath the lowest deep, we reach that lower still, that abysmal nihilism and Hegelian pantheism, in which "pure being is nothing"? Is all this, and much more like it, true of this admirable answer to the question, "What is God?" or is it not, in all points capable of being understood, in a sense not irrational nor self-contradictory, and, however inadequate or disproportioned to the object, yet true, edifying, and fitted to inspire with devout feeling? This question answers itself in the consciousness of the whole church of God.

The first sentence in the Bible is, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." We ask if this does not present what is a true object of thought and knowledge regarding God? Does it not set before us what illustrates and confirms, not what contradicts, the absolute and infinite perfection of his being? Do "unrealized potentialities" before, or additions to the sum of being through and after the work of creation, conflict in the least with any real conception of the Infinite and Absolute of which we are conscious? Is not creation itself rather an outgoing and evidence of infinite power?

But perhaps it is time to meet the question directly, Are cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, apprehensible or knowable by man, so as to be in any manner or degree objects of his thought? We answer, Yes. God is an object of apprehension and knowledge. This knowledge is partial, for the finite of

geometry or logic?" Perhaps not. But if the conception of a "circular parallelogram" be a fair parallel to our conception of an infinite God, we think it involves very "formidable consequences" to theology and religion. For as the first conception is an impossibility, so, by parity of reason, must the latter be. This the author maintains, as also that if such conception of God were possible, it would include evil as a part of it. This is quite "formidable" enough for us.

course cannot fully grasp the infinite. But as far as it goes, it is true knowledge. The definition of God already cited from the Catechism, sets forth attributes which we can apprehend, however imperfectly, and which are the foundation of our love, trust, and adoration of the Most High. If any of them were wanting, it would diminish so far forth our confidence and reverence. All feel that this would inevitably be so. But how could it be so, if each one of them, "infinite" among the rest, does not convey some intelligible idea to the mind? Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, denies even a "partial knowledge" of the Infinite. But though partial, it by no means follows that it is untrue, or unreliable. If so, then all knowledge is fallacious. We know nothing fully, from the dewdrop to the ocean, from the mote in the sunbeam to the stellar worlds, from our own bodies and souls, and their mysterious union, to the infinite God. But we know, or may know, all that is needful for us, TRULY. In proof of this we adduce:

1. The testimony of Consciousness. We are certainly conscious of some thoughts of God as a being of power, goodness, and wisdom; and of these as unlimited. Nor does the latter attribute, although but partially comprehensible by us, detract from; it enlarges and intensifies our idea of the former.

2. The testimony of Scripture. This certainly teaches— 1. That there are vast depths in the nature, plans, and ways of God which we cannot fathom. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" "Who by searching can find out God?" "How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out?" These representations surely strike down all Rationalism. They show the absurdity of our sitting in judgment on the procedures or declarations of Him whose judgments are a great deep. But they do not show that we can know nothing at all about him. On the contrary they show that we "know in part," partially, that we know parts of his ways, though so little a portion is heard of him. "Secret things belong to God, but the things that are revealed are for us and our children." In Rom. i. 20, it is clearly taught that the heathen are culpable for not knowing his eternal power and Godhead. Nay, the Scriptures make the knowledge of God indispensable to true religion and salvation. Christ teaches that "this is life eternal, to *know God* and

Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. (John xvii. 3.) Every one that loveth is born of God and *knoweth God.*" (1 John iv. 7.) He teaches that infidels and heathens worship "they know not what," an "unknown God;" that true worshippers know whom they worship, (John iv. 22,) and must worship him in spirit and in truth. How is this possible for those utterly ignorant of him, and incapable of making the Infinite an object of thought.

3. There is no true religion without faith in God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, substantially as they are revealed in the Scriptures. But how is faith possible in respect to that which is in no manner a possible subject of thought or apprehension? How can aught be brought within the sphere of faith, which cannot be brought within the sphere of cognition? Mr. Mansel employs his doctrine that God and the things of God cannot be objects of the mind's thought or knowledge, any more than a "circular parallelogram," to prove that these high matters must be handed over from Reason to Faith. There is a high sense in which this latter is true, as may yet more fully appear. But it is not the sense of our author. In this sense faith is an impossibility. It is so, from the utter absence of any apprehensible, credible, or definable object of belief, unless we take the old maxim of some extreme super-fidians, "it is certain because impossible." But downright contradictions, or contradictory affirmations or attributes cannot be objects of faith. We cannot believe in round squares or circular parallelograms.* The

* "Hamilton represents the notion of infinity as an 'impotency' of the mind, an impotency to conceive that space and time should have bounds. I am endeavouring to show in these paragraphs that there is more than this. Hamilton admits that we have a belief in the infinite. 'The sphere of our belief,' says he, 'is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and therefore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have indeed anxiously evinced both by reason and authority.' (*Metaph. App.* p. 684.) Handing us over in this way to belief, he has nowhere explained the psychological nature of this belief, or of belief in general. Must not a belief of a thing of which we have no conception be a belief in *zero!*" (*McCosh*, note, p. 218.)

This last interrogatory strikes us as quite unanswerable. It is quite noteworthy that such eminent philosophers as Hamilton and Mansel while proposing a psychological solution of these problems, and remanding so onerous a service to Faith; should nowhere have attempted, by a psychological analysis of its nature, to prove it capable of the labour they assign to it.

mind may believe that some apparent contradictions are not real, and that completer knowledge will dissipate them. This state of things may often occur with regard to God and divine verities. But it is wholly different from that contemplated in this volume. It is perfectly consistent with our KNOWING in whom we have believed, and that he is able to keep that which we commit to him. Nay,

4. We believe that he is "able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." We *know* that love which yet *passeth knowledge*. We comprehend in one sense, a height, and depth, and length, and breadth, which in another sense defy comprehension. We know God. We know his attributes. But we know his attributes and excellencies as unlimited by the bounds of our knowledge, or any other bounds—i. e., as infinite. But while God has thus all perfections in a degree surpassing our comprehension, yet we have some knowledge of what thus passes our knowledge. Have we no idea of what is meant by omnipotence, eternity, absolute and infinite wisdom and goodness? A standard method of defining the manner of our knowledge of God, is, that we obtain it by way of causality, by way of eminence, by way of negation. Our own consciousness of producing effects by our own volitions enables us to have some idea of the First and Omnipotent Cause making all things out of nothing. We have a consciousness of knowledge, of approving righteousness and condemning iniquity. We can have some idea then of consummate intellectual and moral excellence in the Most High. By negation is meant the removal of limits to any excellence or attribute of God. Do we not in this way attain a true though imperfect knowledge of God, and his adorable perfections? It is to no purpose to retort upon this, as is done by writers of the German school, that we thus form a conception of a magnified or infinite man, rather than of God. We have the testimony of God himself, that man was made in the image of God, and that this image consists in knowledge and righteousness. And can we not know God primarily from this similitude to him, and secondarily and still more fully by the infinite distance between him and us, between the Infinite and the finite? Dr. Young very forcibly calls attention to the

striking fact that Hamilton, notwithstanding his doctrine of the unthinkable character of the Infinite and Absolute, and of causality, still teaches that we ascend to the knowledge of God from the points of resemblance to him in our own souls. He says, as quoted by Dr. Young, "Though man be not identical with the Deity, still he is created in the image of God. It is indeed only through an analogy of the human with the Divine, that we are percipient and recipient of the Divinity." "Mind is the object, the only object, through which our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of God."* We are unable now to put our eyes on these passages in Hamilton. But language essentially equivalent to it will be found in the second of his *Lectures on Metaphysics.* And even Mr. Mansel says, pages 104, 105, "It is from this intense consciousness of our own real existence as persons, that the conception of reality takes its rise in our minds; it is *through that consciousness alone that we can raise ourselves to the faintest image of the supreme reality of God.*"

5. The mode of knowing God by negation, of which we have spoken, is something quite contrary to the negation of all thought—the mere mental impotency into which the school we are criticising resolve all our mental exercises in regard to cause, infinite, absolute, unconditioned. It is, viewed from another side, the greatest, the most positive affirmation the mind can make. It simply denies all limits, and in so doing affirms being, energies, excellencies, beyond all bounds imaginable, *ad infinitum.* Is this a mere negation of thought? When the mind affirms that space and time are illimitable, is this a mere negation of thought, or is it not the most positive and intense mental energizing?†

6. Nor does this involve the absurdity of conceiving the

* See *Province of Reason*, pp. 166, 167.

† A negative predicate, in form, is often the most positive in fact. When the subject is wholly undefined, except by a negative predicate, then this predicate becomes simply indefinite; it simply points out one thing that the subject is not, leaving it wholly uncertain what of all other things in the universe it is. Thus, if we say of any subject which is in itself wholly undefined, that it is not Washington, not a stone, not broad, we deny these attributes of it, but we point out nothing concerning it. But if we deny of any defined subject, qualities congruous with it, we may thus predicate the most

Infinite as comprehending in itself all possible, and all actual being. Dr. McCosh has forcibly demonstrated this in his chapter on our intuition of the Infinite. He says, "We can talk of space and time and God as being infinite. We can utter judgments about it, as that the infinite God is in every given place; there is no place of which we may not say, Surely the Lord is in this place. We can even reason about it; thus we can infer that this puny effort of man, set against the recorded will of God, shall surely be frustrated by his infinite power." P. 229. In a note he adds, "I decidedly demur to the statement of Mr. Mansel, 'that which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.' . . . I would rather agree with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel than any metaphysicians of the past or present age. But whether I agree with them or not, I must hold it to be quite possible to muse and reason about the attribute 'infinite,' as it is in fact conceived and believed in by the mind, without falling into the difficulties in which the German supporters of the absolute have involved themselves, and that we can think of God and write about God, as infinite, without being compelled by any logical necessity to look upon him as embracing all existence, or to reckon it impossible or inconceivable that he should create a world and living agents differing from himself. We cannot conceive that God's power should be increased, but we can conceive it exercised in creating beings possessed of power. We cannot conceive his goodness to be enlarged, but we can, without a contradiction, conceive him creating other beings also good. Nor can we by this conception be shut up to the conclusion that the creature-power or creature-excellence might be added to the Divine power and goodness, and thus make it greater. To all quibbles proceeding in this line, I say that,

positive properties. Thus, if we predicate of a man, that he is not wise, or good, or poor, or influential, or of water that is not pure, or of a stone that is not soft, we make the most positive affirmations respecting them. So, if we declare of an intelligent and moral being that his wisdom, goodness and power, are infinite, this is the most positive kind of thought. On this and related points, Mr. Calderwood offers some excellent observations. See *Philosophy of the Infinite*, chap. iii.

for aught I know, it may not be possible they should be added, or that if added, they should increase the Divine perfections; and no reply could be given, drawn either from intuition or experience, the only lights to which I can allow an appeal." (*McCosh on Intuitions*, pp. 228, 229.)

Finally, the whole alleged antagonism in our conceptions of the infinite and absolute is a groundless assumption, a pure fiction of philosophers; it is unknown to the normal consciousness and intuitions of the unperverted human mind. Who but the transcendentalists and those moulded by them, ever conceived that the absoluteness of God was invaded by the correlation and harmony of his own attributes, or by his relations to his creatures, or by any relations *ad intra* or *ad extra*, which do not imply a dependence on something without himself? Who ever imagined that consciousness and personality in God are inconsistent with his infinitude; or that it is impossible to conceive of space and time not only as absolutely limited but absolutely unlimited? On this subject we again refer to McCosh. Speaking of this antilogy as put by Hamilton, he says, "The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense in which the word 'conceive' is used. In the second of these counter-propositions the word is used in the sense of imaging, or representing in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions, the word 'conceive' is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. When thus explained, all appearance of contradiction disappears; indeed, all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions will vanish, if we but carefully inquire into the nature of the convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there is no contradiction. They stand thus: 'We cannot imagine space without bounds;' 'we cannot think that it has

bounds, or believe that it has no bounds.' The former may well be represented as a creature impotency; the latter is most assuredly a creature potency, is one of the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed, and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn." (*Mc Cosh*, p. 219.)

Having thus examined the destructive side of Mr. Mansel's system, in which he demolishes Rationalism by the attempt to establish the utter impotence of the human mind to attain any true speculative conception or knowledge of God, or to essay it even, without plunging into a chaos of contradictions, we now pass to consider the constructive side of the book—how it tries to reclaim to man that effective knowledge of God, without which religion is a nullity, and which it seemed to have taken away.

He first summons to his aid the great dogma of Kant, which, in various potencies, has streamed or been filtrated through the subsequent masters of Transcendentalism, until we find a portentous infusion of it in Hamilton and Mansel. We refer to the doctrine of what is technically called the "relativity of knowledge." It is in substance this. When the mind apprehends any object, whether material and by the senses, or immaterial and supersensual, it contributes from itself a part or the whole of the phenomenon—how much it is impossible to tell. Therefore, it is impossible to tell how much of what is perceived is subjective, and how much is objective, how much belongs to the object discerned, how much to the mind discerning. Therefore we have no knowledge of things *as they are in themselves*, but only as they exist in relation to our faculties. Whether, and how much of this mode of existence, as perceived by us, comes from the percipient mind or from the object, is wholly uncertain and unknowable. But what we appear to know may safely enough be taken for practical truth to regulate our own conduct with regard to it. If this be so in regard to all objects of thought and knowledge, much more is it so with regard to our knowledge of the Absolute and Infinite. Therefore, while we can have no knowledge of God as he is, yet we can have such apprehensions of him as may safely guide our practice. We can have, through the Scriptures, a safe regulative, although not a true speculative knowledge of him.

He says: "The object of which we are conscious is thus, to adopt the well-known language of the Kantian philosophy, a *phenomenon* not a *thing in itself* (called by Kant a *noumenon*): —a product resulting from the two-fold action of the thing apprehended, on the one side, and the faculties apprehending it, on the other. The perceiving subject alone, and the perceived object alone, are two unmeaning elements, which first acquire a significance in and by the act of their conjunction.*

"It is thus strictly in analogy with the method of God's Providence in the constitution of man's mental faculties, if we believe that in Religion also, he has given us truths which are designed to be regulative rather than speculative; intended not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but *how he wills that we should think of him* in our present finite state." Pp. 142, 143.

"To have sufficient grounds for believing in God is a very different thing from having sufficient grounds for reasoning about him. The religious sentiment, which compels men to believe in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of his existence, but not an exhibition of his nature. It proves *that* God is, and makes known some of his relations to us; but it does not prove what God is in his own Absolute Being. The natural senses, it may be, are diverted and coloured by the medium through which they pass to reach the intel-

* Hamilton puts the matter thus: "However great and infinite, and various, therefore, may be the universe and its contents—these are known to us, not as they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing them." (*Lec. on Meta.* p. 43.) "Whatever we know is not known as it is, but only as it seems to us to be: for it is of less importance that our knowledge should be limited than that it should be pure. . . . I see a book . . . let us suppose in the example I have taken, that the full or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made up of three several parts—of four contributed by the book —of four contributed by all that intervenes between the book and the organ— and of four contributed by the living organ itself.'

'I use this illustration to show that the phenomenon of the external object is not presented immediately to the mind, but is known by it only as modified through certain intermediate agencies." (What then, we ask, becomes of Hamilton's doctrine of immediate perception?) . . . "But this source of error is not limited to our perceptions; and we are liable to be deceived, not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowledge what is contributed by sense, but by not distinguishing what is contributed by the mind itself." (*Id.* pp. 102, 103.) If all this be so, what is left to us but utter incertitude and scepticism?

lect, and present to us, *not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us.* And this is manifestly the case with the religious consciousness, which can only represent the Infinite God under finite forms. But we are compelled to believe on the evidence of our senses that a material world exists, even while we listen to the arguments of the idealist, who reduces it to an idea or to non-entity; and we are compelled by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a personal God; though the reasonings of the Rationalist, logically followed out, may reduce us to Pantheism or Atheism." Pp. 128, 129.

"Religious ideas, in short, like all other objects of man's consciousness, are composed of two distinct elements—a Matter furnished from without, and a Form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." P. 158.

It does not appear to us that such a system can plant itself very widely or deeply in the soil of sturdy, old-fashioned English common-sense. Its clear statement is its refutation.

1. While it is, of course, true, that we know only what is in relation with our faculties; and while it is further true, that we may know but a portion of the properties of any object which may be known to other intelligences, still it must be maintained that our faculties, in their healthy and normal modes of operation, know truly. Otherwise they do not know at all. And if we know, we know that we know, for the former involves the latter. Of course, an uninstructed person knows little of a quartz crystal in comparison with a mineralogist; little of his own body, compared with the anatomist or physiologist. Still he knows the colour, the shape, the hardness of the former; he knows most of the exterior members, proportions, organs, hues, functions, and the interior vital sensations of the latter. He knows them truly, even if he have never studied them, or qualified himself to state them in an orderly manner. He knows them so far forth, as truly as the scientist, although he is ignorant of much lying beyond, which the latter knows. The dangerous point in this scheme of "relativity," is not that we know only what is in relation with our faculties, and that we know only in part,—but that we do not and cannot know truly, or, at least, be sure of knowing

truly. As Hamilton phrases it, "it is of less importance to us that our knowledge should be limited, than that it should be pure." "The Matter," says Mr. Mansel, "is furnished from without, and a form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." "Form" in the nomenclature of these philosophers means whatever is phenomenal in objects, the characteristics by which they are known. How do we know any Matter or substance sensuous or super-sensuous, except through its form or manifested properties? Be this as it may, according to all the forms of statement which we have quoted from Hamilton and Mansel, how is it possible to know in regard to any object, material or immaterial, what portion is contributed by the mind, and is subjective, what comes from the object, and has objective reality? It is clearly impossible. We are plunged into absolute uncertainty as to the reality of objects without us in the realms of both matter and spirit. If the mind contributes the form, why not the matter; if it creates the phenomenon, why not the *noumenon*; and what remains but the absolute subjectivity and infinite egoism into which Fichte so logically developed Kant's theory? At all events, the best that can be said of it, is that it lands us in utter uncertainty and scepticism. It destroys knowledge by destroying its certainty.

2. The reason why objects are apprehended by us as we apprehend them, is that they are such—such whether we know it or not. In order that a book may be known as a book, a tree as a tree, they must be such in themselves, whether we know them or not, and as the condition of our knowing them. Our minds do not give them their form or appearance. We could not perceive them as we do, unless they were as we perceive them. Our minds are dependent on the presence of these objects for their perception of them. But these objects are not dependent on our minds for their being and form. Space is no mere form of thought. It exists outside of and independent of any man's thinking, and as the condition of his thinking it. We know things thus, so far as we know them at all. It is witnessed by our deepest consciousness that objects are what they are, irrespective of our cognitions of them, and and in order to those cognitions. Any other system, as

O. A. Brownson says, in one of the finest passages he ever penned, ends in a "sublime system of transcendental nullism." And we must insist that it contradicts Hamilton's doctrine of the veracity of consciousness. It is a first principle with him that the absolute and universal veracity of consciousness is to be maintained; that if its testimony to the non-ego cannot be trusted, neither can its testimony to the ego; that the maxim applicable to all other witnesses holds with regard to this; *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus;* that on this hypothesis, "every system is equally true, or rather all are equally false; philosophy is impossible, for it has now no instrument by which truth can be discovered—no standard by which it is to be tried; the root of our nature is a lie." (*Metap.* p. 196.) This cannot be gainsaid. But it is utterly annihilating to the scheme, which makes these objects or properties, or phenomena, subjective or egoistical, which are apprehended in consciousness as objective realities external to the mind itself. Mr. Mansel makes a futile effort to parry this argument, by telling us, that the reality which the mind understands itself to cognize in consciousness, "is not identical with absolute existence unmodified by the laws of the percipient mind." P. 307. The mind holds itself to perceive objects and properties as they are, not as they are "modified" by its own "laws" or agency. Or rather it holds itself so constituted as to be veracious, not false, and under "laws" which lead it to know things as they are, not as they are modified by itself. He tells us, on the same page, that Kant's theory "amounts to no more than this: that we can see things only as our faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of other intelligences, embodied or spiritual." With all respect, we will ask if this is precisely the Kantian doctrine as he had before defined it? And whether it be or not, and whatever may be the superiority in the extent and mode of knowing in other intelligences, we submit whether it is not an intuitive conviction that all intelligences, so far as they know at all, know alike? One may know more and another less, one may know through the senses, the other by spiritual faculties alone; one by intuition,

the other discursively; but so far as they know at all, in reference to the same matter, they know not in contradiction of, but in harmony with each other. All intelligences who know at all in the premises, know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that blasphemy is wicked, that an oak tree is not an apple tree, that an elephant is not a man, and that black is not white. Any ideas not conformable to these representations, amount not to knowledge, but to ignorance. This does not mean that we never err through inattention, carelessness, passion, even in matters within our scope; nor that the sphere of our knowledge is broad; nor that our insight is more than insignificant in comparison with other intelligences. But it postulates that this insight, be it more or less, is insight, and that what we know, be it more or less, we know. Less than this, as it seems to us, cannot be maintained, without absolute scepticism and intellectual suicide. The whole issue is, after all, a very plain one, when we once brush away the dense fogs in which philosophy has shrouded it. It is merely, whether the minds with which our Creator has endowed us, are (so far as we know) so made, as to see, so far as they see at all, things, not as they are, but as they are not, not truth but error?

3. We are now prepared to estimate the value of the hypothesis that our knowledge of God is regulative merely, not speculative—intended, "not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but how he wills that we should think of him in our present state;"—"not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us." We fear this solution will not stand. The question is not whether we can know God completely; not whether we can see the mutual harmony and consistency of all that we do know concerning him; not whether we know in regard to God or creatures so infallibly that nothing remains for us to learn or correct; but the question is, whether our knowledge of God, in its best estate, *is real knowledge*, and gives us true or false conceptions of Him. It is not whether our "reason is satisfied," in the sense not only of knowing that things are, but comprehending *how;* not whether the scriptural representations concerning God are not sometimes

made in figurative language, not whether the propositions delivered to us are not regulative, or designed for the regulation of our faith and practice; but whether they are TRUE: whether what God "wills that we should believe" concerning himself is the TRUTH. This question we conceive is fundamental. We take it for an axiom, which no sophistry and no logical dexterity can shake, that we ought to believe and be governed by the truth, so far as it is within reach, and by nothing else: and especially, in regard to the things of God, by the realities of eternal truth, not by any representations prepared for effect, which disguise, distort, or in any manner give a false or erroneous version of these realities. We do not think this can be an open question till all the pillars of morality and religion are undermined. And "if the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?" But we are not left to our own reasoning or intuitions on this subject. God himself teaches us that by the truth we are "begotten," "made free," "sanctified." "But ye have an unction from the Holy One whereby ye know all things. I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth, *but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth.*" (1 John ii. 20, 21.) On the opposite theory, truth is no better than error, the search after it is irrational, and "the root of our nature is a lie." If this is the antidote to Rationalism, the remedy seems to us, if not worse than the disease, at least tainted with it. If there is any type of rationalism specially offensive to us, it is that which maintains that God does, or says, or requires things for regulative and practical purposes, which are variant from truth aud reality. This is that empoisoned stream which, issuing from German Transcendentalism, has flowed down through Schleiermacher, and from him through various diminutive channels in England and America. It has given us a Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, which are unrealities, mere modes of representation for the purpose of working the mind of the race in devout practice. It is abhorrent to every well-constituted mind. It leaves every one free to accept or reject, (as far as the truth of it is concerned,) as much or as little of the Bible as he pleases. We hardly understand how Mr. Mansel should have fallen into this view

after the pungent condemnation he has uttered in regard to an analogous view of prayer, as set forth by Kant.*

A corollary from the foregoing positions, which our author enounces, is that "the legitimate object of a rational criticism of revealed religion, is not to be found in the *contents* of that religion, but in its *evidences*." Pp. 204, 205. He seems, however, to be aware that the two cannot thus be separated and sharply contrasted. A most material part of the evidence is the contents of revelation. It is this in-evidence of divinity that has borne it to the hearts of God's people of every age and nation in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. It is because they hear a voice therein speaking as man never spake, and see a radiance of divinity not paralleled in the material creation or the light of nature, that they are conscious of vastly stronger evidence that the Bible is the word, than that the material world is the work of God.

It is not merely miracles in contrast to the "contents" of revelation, but these very contents, too, that attest its Divine origin. Mr. Mansel says, "The primary and direct inquiry which human reason is entitled to make concerning a professed revelation is—how far does it tend to promote or hinder the moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and indirect question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far it is compatible with the Infinite Goodness of God." P. 210. With all deference, this seems to us a *ὕστερον πρότερον*. It is because we see the impress of the "Infinite Goodness of God" upon the Scriptures, that we believe them "given by inspiration of God, and thus profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be per-

* "Let us hear then the philosopher's *rational* explanation, upon this assumption, of the duty of prayer. It is a mere superstitious delusion, he tells us, to consider prayer as service addressed to God, and as a means of obtaining his favour. The true purpose of the act is not to alter or affect in any way God's relation towards us; but only to quicken our own moral sentiments, by keeping alive within us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver. He, therefore, neither admits the duty unconditionally, nor rejects it entirely; but leaves it optional with men to adopt that or any other means, by which, in their own particular case, this moral end may be best promoted;—*as if any moral benefit could possibly accrue from the habitual exercise of an act of conscious self-deception.*" P. 56.

fect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17.) The first judgment of natural men, of a great majority of philosophers and thinkers destitute of spiritual illumination, has been, that the Christian method of salvation by grace tends to licentiousness—not "to promote but to hinder the moral discipline of man," by encouraging him "to continue in sin that grace may abound." It is only as man sees that the Infinite Goodness and Wisdom which manifest themselves in the Scriptures have provided this method of salvation; as its Divine efficacy to promote holy living is known to him by its fruits in the case of those who embrace it; and as he himself is effectually taught by the Holy Spirit; that he makes trial of its efficacy, and finds in blessed experience how, "being made free from sin, and become servants to God, we have our fruit unto holiness and the end everlasting life." Moreover, if miracles prove the doctrine, the doctrine also proves the miracle, at least negatively—insomuch that signs and wonders wrought in support of idolatry would thus be proved to be not from above, but beneath. (See Deut. xiii. 1—5.) Doctrine and miracle are both parts of one arch, and they are interdependent.

Nor does this enthrone man's reason over the Scriptures, or allow it to reduce their contents to its own measure and standard. On the contrary, there being clear evidence in the divinity of the contents of Scripture as well as from miracles, that it is the word of God, this enforces the submission of our reason to its teachings, whenever they surpass or confound it. It constrains us to take the yoke and learn of Christ,—to lay aside all rationalistic cavils and doubts, to take the Bible in its plain import without torturing it into accord with our preconceived views, and if we find what is incomprehensible, still to accept it; not doubting that there is a solution worthy of God, whether we are permitted to see it or not. So our faith will not stand in the wisdom of men but in the power of God. Indeed, what can seem more monstrous than that the deliverances of the Infinite Mind should be attenuated to the standard, and subjected to the revision of our short-sighted reason or common-sense? As well might we test the luminous capacity of the sun by our gas-lights.

And yet this revelation is delivered to rational beings, and

addressed to their reason. It supposes and requires the exercise of reason in ascertaining its evidences and import. It supposes an intelligent subject whose reason it employs, and at the same time purifies, enlarges, and perfects. Now there is a very limited range of subjects in regard to which we cannot doubt what is true, without a denegation of our rational nature. No amount of authority can convince us that two contradictories can be true, *i. e.*, that a thing may be, and may not be at the same time. If we know that we exist, we cannot believe the contrary. If we know that a body occupies space, we cannot believe that it does not occupy space. We cannot believe that things equal to the same thing are not equal to each other, or that a bit of bread on earth is the body of our Lord in heaven. So far forth, all competent divines have allowed a *judicium contradictionis*, in the interpretation of the word of God, *i. e.* that it must not be interpreted to teach contradictories, because contradictories can never both be true. Yet this principle is allowable only within very narrow limits. The contradiction must be immediate, unambiguous, undeniable,—not a matter of inference, or the result of inaccurate statements, or disputed definitions and representations of the points to which the alleged contradiction pertains. The in-evidence of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures, patent to the eye of faith and of unperverted or spiritually illuminated reason, will stop all that tampering with the plain averments of Scripture, which is known as Rationalism.

Our readers will agree with us that it is time to hasten to a close. Our specific object has been, not to treat with any minuteness of Mr. Mansel's book as a whole, but of that theory which constitutes its novelty and peculiarity, and which it is specially framed to commend to public acceptance. We do not wish to disparage the work in other respects. It has excellencies which have not been exaggerated by its warmest admirers. The notes in the appendix constitute a thesaurus of choice extracts from the great masters of the different schools of philosophy and theology, such as no mere philosophic pedant could have gathered. These alone are worth more than the cost of the volume. The Lectures themselves withal, abound

with observations at once just and profound in regard to the virus of Rationalism, whether it be intuitional, logical, or sentimental. Many things said in accordance with, and in support of the line of demarkation between Faith and Reason recognized by the church, are said with a precision, force, and beauty, such as cannot be found in writers of less scholarship, culture, and philosophic insight. These features of the work impart to it a high and permanent value. But these do not constitute the feature,—the differentia of the book. This consists in its new psychological method of annihilating Rationalism. Along with much that is true, it seems to us to contain a false and pestilent element, the exposure of which is important, just in proportion to the great power and plausibility with which it is presented and enforced.

We fully appreciate the triumphant exposure which these giant metaphysicians have made of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned: we mean that philosophy or theology, which from some postulate, true or false, in regard to the *primum ens*, undertakes to evolve the whole process of being, becoming, and knowing all forms of existence, God, man and nature, and all systems of philosophy and religion. From all such "intellectual intuitions," whether transcending or transcended by consciousness, and their correspondent monster systems of ontology and metaphysics, we pray to be delivered, and we devoutly hail our deliverers. But it sometimes happens, that physicians who combat malaria or contagion most effectively, themselves inhale the poison in a greater or less degree. And all the more so, if they employ the poison to counterwork itself. It is one thing to deny the competency of human reason to spin out a trustworthy system of theology from its innate and unregenerate intuitions; another, to maintain such incompetency of human reason on the ground that its normal intuitions, in their best and purest estate, with regard to the Infinite and Eternal, are a chaos of absurdities and contradictions, and that consequently the Infinite God cannot, even partially, be an object of thought. This, to be sure, undermines Rationalism. But it does more. And it does too much. It renders the possibility of faith itself even, problematical, to say no more. When we see Hamilton shattering to fragments the proud fabric of the

Philosophy of the Unconditioned, we rejoice. But when he tells us, that the Philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned "both agree that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy," this is more than we desiderate. It is too much alike for our Reason and our Faith.

A remarkable characteristic of the types of Rationalism originating with the modern transcendental and pantheistic philosophy, is that they attenuate and undermine the truth, by overstating it, and weaken faith by overdoing it. They accept Christian doctrine in a generous breadth, so far exceeding the reality, that it must be battered down to a thin film before it can expand to these vast dimensions. Of course, the pantheist can simulate and intensify the vocabulary of the highest orthodoxy in regard to the divine foreordination and in-working in Nature, Providence, and Grace; the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement. And in using such phrase he means so much more than the truth as to nullify it. We meet with those known as sceptics and rationalists, who astound us by the gracious announcement of their belief, not only in the inspiration of the Scripture writers, but of all, or of the more eminent Christians and sages of every age and nation—a volatile scheme, which now evaporates into the most super-sublimated mysticism, and now condenses into the most icy rationalism—but in either case destroys the proper divine inspiration and objective truth and authority of the Holy Scriptures. So we have those who impugn rationalism by invalidating reason to an extent inconsistent not only with rationalism, but with faith itself. We hear of the relentless adversaries of the doctrines of the church, all at once, not only retracting their opposition to creeds, but "ready to accept as many as are offered them" by virtue of a "chemistry of thought," which melts them all into each other, by melting them away to nothing. The principles of this "Broad Church" school we cannot sanction, even when advanced by men having no communion with it, and for the worthiest ends—as we understand to be true of Mr. Mansel.

Art. V.—*Napoleon III. and the Papacy.*

Among the remarkable events with which the agency of Napoleon III. is to be connected in the history of our age, we may record the termination of the temporal power of the Papacy. The event has not yet become a formal fact; but its probability is now so universally recognized, both in Protestant and Catholic Christendom, that we feel free to make this record of our views respecting it, as one of the events of the time. It is true that newspaper reports cannot be fully relied upon, till they are more variously confirmed than some which we shall here reason upon as true; but unless there is unaccountable error in the late rumours, we have Catholic testimony in favour of our assumption; having just now noticed the report that Cardinal Wiseman lately retired from a mortifying interview with the Pope, saying to his friend, "It is full time to bow to the hand of Providence, by which the downfall of the temporal power is visibly decreed."

It is now some fifteen hundred years since the Bishop of Rome began to claim supreme spiritual authority in the church, and to receive peculiar deference and veneration from a large number of his brethren. This gradual ascendency of the Roman diocesan over the prelates of other localities was partly, and perhaps mainly, the natural result of circumstances. Rome was an opulent, refined, and influential metropolis; a centre of learning, of commerce, and of almost unbounded political power. The position of the Church of Rome was commanding. The bishop there had superior means of knowledge on most matters of general interest to the church. His large revenue, sumptuous living, personal refinement and dignity, and his pomp of official display, challenged the reverence of the populace, and secured a marked respect for his presence and opinions in the councils of the church.

It was natural that under such circumstances the successive bishops of Rome should become ambitious of power; and should study the means of obtaining it; and the ignorance and rudeness of the people, and the want of learning and culture

among the inferior clergy, enabled the Roman prelates to use their power with great advantage to the church. Such a leading influence from Rome was easily established, and finally led to the erection of a supreme constitutional power and jurisdiction.

Thus arose, in due time, the Papacy, fully confirmed in ecclesiastical supremacy. And now this supremacy must be secured against the interference of the civil government. The seat of its power must not be ruled by a worldly sovereign. It must have revenues free from the control of secular authority. It seemed unavoidable, that the Pope should have a territory subject only to himself. In those times, when the church was not clearly distinguishable from the state, the ecclesiastical authority was liable to serious annoyance from the secular powers. The spiritual power must be independent of the civil. If the church be subject to a government administered on worldly principles, how can she administer her own affairs according to her spiritual nature and design? This necessity was inseparable from the times; from the character of the people, and that of the governments. The church must everywhere have sole and supreme jurisdiction, under Christ, of her spiritual affairs. She must understand and adopt for herself, the doctrine and the discipline given her from heaven, judge the qualification of her ministers and members, and choose the means of guarding her communion. Her decisions must be final with her members, and not be liable to be annulled or reversed by the temporal power. Not to insist on this, would be to deny the authority of her Head in herself. This is the great point contended for by the Free Church of Scotland; and the great prerogative so securely enjoyed by the church, and so happily placed beyond all controversy, in these United States of America.

The way to prevent the spiritual and temporal power from frequent and violent conflict was not then known. The jurisdictions of the two were not distinctly separated. The church had no resource but to assert her superiority to the state. This she claimed the right to do, by virtue of the supreme importance of the spiritual interests of men. Her standard writers held that "the church exercises the same sway over the state

that the soul does over the body; that it is the right and duty of the spiritual authority to curb the secular whenever the latter becomes prejudicial to religion." (See Bellarmine de Rom. Pontifice V. VI.) It was never the received doctrine of the church that the Pope had the power of regular civil legislation over princes; though Ranke asserts that Sextus V. cherished that opinion, and was displeased when any abandoned it. But it was the evident and justifiable aim of the church writers of the middle ages, to present the best speculative vindication possible at the time, of her right and her duty to secure herself in the free administration of her spiritual affairs.

But granting the entire propriety of the medieval endeavours of the church for temporal power, so far as to protect her own rights, we can still justify her only by her temporary exigency; and now that the exigency is past, the provision should be relinquished. Now, the only necessity for that sort of defence, is created by the Catholic church herself; by her pertinacious and perverse alliance with corruption, and her opposition to the true progress of the human race. When nations and governments have knowledge of Christianity, and respect for its claims, they will protect the church in her spiritual rights and duties. She safely trusts her defence to them. All the enlightened nations who have any experience of freedom, understand the relation of the church to the state; and in this country, as in others, it has been demonstrated that the church need not bear the sword to secure the effectual use of the keys. The fall of the temporal power is thus inevitable, and the facts we have mentioned are the historical conditions of its termination.

This event does not come from local and temporary causes merely. It follows a long and general preparation in the social progress of the world under the impulse of the Christian truth and life. Of this, the prominent human agency employed by Providence in the movement, is a remarkable illustration.

The part of Napoleon III. in these proceedings is prominent and significant. It is incidental to the influence he seems destined to exert in European affairs. We do not know enough of his religious history to pronounce upon his religious faith; but we think it very doubtful whether he entertains any con-

scientious preference for the Catholic church. We recollect no acts of his in favour of Catholicism, nor any practices of himself or his household, which signify more than a prudential and political deference for the faith of the great body of his subjects, whose religious sentiments he could not wisely offend. As for his military defence of the Pope, he foresaw good reason, in the important contingencies of Europe, for choosing rather to supply that defence himself, than to let Austria supply it; and while this supposition sufficiently explains the fact, it is not unworthy of the man. He receives a compliment for his deed—the title of "the true son of the church," which only shows the Pope can be grateful for past favours in the hope of favours to come. That Napoleon, therefore, in proposing to humble Austria, should not scruple to endanger the Pope, is not at all surprising. He is not open to the charge of inconsistency or treachery; for all see by this time, even those who saw not before, that the French arms in Rome did not represent Napoleon's conscience as a Catholic, but his policy as sovereign of France, and manager of Europe. We know not that he has ever professed a personal, conscientious interest in any of the religious matters he has been politically concerned with; whether in promoting spiritual reform in the Catholic church, or in weakening her in favour of Protestantism. But by his timely and effective intervention in Italian affairs, he became a prominent, providential agent in the present depression of Rome; and in every word of his to the Pontiff, he has shown that the important and disastrous result to the Papacy agreed with his expectation and design. Having enlarged Sardinia, till her exaltation attracted Romagna, and roused that part of the Papal dominions to revolt, he virtually required the Pope to forbear resistance; and the impotent shadow of falling power was able only to protest. The history of the final temporal depression of the Papal chair cannot be written without placing Napoleon III. foremost among the conscious agents of Divine Providence in the event.

This prominent agency of the French Emperor in these proceedings is very significant. In his mental habit there appears a settled consciousness of being an agent of the overruling power, and of all the political leaders known to history, there

was never one more alive to the providential significancy of passing events than he. The world is fully prepared to give him credit for remarkable sagacity; credit which he has earned by his uniform success in one of the boldest series of human undertakings. Whatever his pretensions or his experience in evangelical religion, (and of this we know nothing,) he is evidently willing enough to regard himself, and to be regarded, as an instrument or agent of Providence in accomplishing the destiny of France; and in this conceit resembles his illustrious predecessor. With this impression of himself, and with his extraordinary sagacity in human affairs, with his acknowledged ascendency in Europe, and even with all the selfish ambition which his bitterest revilers allege against him, his leading part in the passing events of Italy is richly suggestive.

All things were, in his view, so prepared for a great political change in northern Italy, which might work the interest of France, that he promptly resolves to encourage the movement, and set himself forward as its guide. While coveting glory from that field, he saw that the way to that glory lay through a contest in behalf of human freedom. He had cherished before a presentiment of some such opportunity; and had fortunately provided, by having kept an army for years in Rome, on pretence of protecting the Pope, that nothing should be done in that quarter by Austria, Sardinia, or Rome, without his intervention. When he set out upon his expedition, it was with the motto, as it were, upon his banners, "The Freedom of Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic;" and knowing, of course, that to displace the Austrian despotism must destroy the Papal, he betrays no misgiving nor hesitation, but moves steadily on through Solferino to Villafranca, with the destiny of the Papacy in his hand, yet with a courtesy, prudent and well-sustained, towards an office held sacred by so many of the rulers and people with whom he had to do. That amusing proposal of an Italian confederacy of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, under the presidency of Rome, naturally with the tacit understanding that the Emperor of France would continue dictatorial adviser, now appears more like a witty evasion, for the time, of the real design of the mover, than like an earnest suggestion for the permanent settlement of Italy. He evidently

looked for a long and sweeping progress of the change he had inaugurated—the coveted restoration to France of Savoy and Nice, and remoter results, not definitely foreseen, yet naturally probable, when questions can be raised about them which have been predetermined by management. And it is to be presumed that he as fully expected to annihilate the temporal power of the Papacy, as to overthrow the Austrian dominion in Italy. In a word, he saw those large populations, ripe for partial emancipation, and looking wishfully towards the constitutional kingdom of Sardinia, whose king looked wishfully towards France. There was a rising spirit of freedom. It was seen to be not a blind and transient impulse, but a movement of the rational instinct; and the circumstances were now such, that humanity there might be expected to take an advanced position, from which it would not recede. So sure was this sagacious observer of human affairs that the set time for the freedom of Italy had come. When he enjoined upon the Pope to institute substantial and reasonable reforms, it could not have been with the expectation that the requisition would be heeded; for the reforms must extend to matters on which his Holiness had announced his unfavourable determination, and which the whole spirit and tenor of the Papal government would repel. That government must, therefore, fall. "He that now letteth will let until he be taken out of the way." The man whose hand was upon the springs of that great movement had "principles which would not allow of armed intervention" to prevent the States of the Church from withdrawing from the temporal jurisdiction of Rome. And it was even among the earliest of his suggestions, that his Holiness contract his jurisdiction to the limits of the metropolis. As the cause of Italian liberty was now so plainly receiving the patronage of Providence, it was time for those who would secure the favour of Providence to pay a prudent respect to the demands of civil and religious liberty. Such was Napoleon's judgment of the times. With this conviction he allows the sword he has drawn for Italy to fall on the secular arm of the Papacy; and such a conviction in such a man, is a welcome sign of providential preparation for a permanent advance of Italy in the line of human progress.

The position and character of Napoleon gives this movement at Rome another point of significance. When he strikes for liberty as one of the ways to secure the ascendency of France in Europe, he strikes virtually for Protestantism. Now, a conscientious and devoted Protestant might honestly allow his zeal to mislead his judgment, and promptly and blindly hazard other great interests, without reasonable assurance of success to his favourite cause. Considering himself merely as the representative of Protestantism, he might act from special and local views which do not comprehend the general current of human affairs. But Napoleon, with no Protestant predilections, and with no design of promoting any religion, except as means to an end, undertakes an expedition at vast expense and political risk, to release millions of people from the social constraints incident to the domination of the Papacy. Without hesitation, and with sure execution, he lifts his sword against a tyranny thoroughly baptized into Romanism, and allows the blow to fall on the Papal throne itself, whose feeble incumbent he holds like an infant in his own arms. He gives this bold and forcible expression of his clear conviction that Protestant liberty is about to awake, and that France can make her interest out of the occasion; that there is no glory to be gained in maintaining the temporal power of the Pope; that the sun of Papal Rome is going down, and the noonday of Protestantism is near. This sagacious leader among the sovereigns of Europe, the glory-seeker of the world, a despot on his own throne, with no Protestant bonds upon him, like those which bind the British crown—incapable, as his enemies insist, of disinterested zeal for truth and right, and sure of grateful adoration from the Catholic world, for service he might render to the church of Rome—sees nothing to hope from propping up the tottering Papal power, and will not stake the prestige of his own name and the renown of France, in a campaign for Romanism and the Pope. He feels no political motive to do the Romish interest a service when he might. His hope is in a blow for liberty; such liberty as Romanism tends to destroy. This also shows how little, in his own view, he has to fear or to hope from Romanism in his own empire. He reads on the leaf of Providence now turned, the decree that the Roman Babylon is to fall; that it has no

longer a name nor a place among the agencies of advancing civilization; and that the spirit of Protestantism, under whatever form, as opposed to Popery, must take its place. This is a sign. The eye of Protestant hope may rest upon it. It is the rainbow of promise, set in the receding cloud of European despotism by the God of Protestant liberty; a sign that the flood of arbitrary power shall never destroy the nations again.

The principle by which we are estimating the passing events at Rome, would not allow a remainder of civil jurisdiction to the Pope, even within the walls of the metropolis itself. If the church no longer needs the sword in her own hands, to fulfil her destiny, then why should she cleave to a municipal authority in Rome? Why should the head of the Catholic church in Rome any more require a civil jurisdiction there, than a Protestant Episcopal Bishop in New York, or the Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in Philadelphia? If Catholicism now wants special laws for her protection, let her ask for them, as other institutions do, through the free and enlightened legislation of the state; and let her do in Rome as she must do in this country—convince the community that her influence is a great public benefit, that she is not living unto herself, but for the good of the state and of the world—and she will then command all that her real usefulness requires. The intelligence and free conscience of the civilized world are now a guaranty for the security of the church in her sacred immunities, far better than the sceptre of civil authority can be in her own hands; and as the only necessity for that power which ever existed has now passed away, it is not meet that she should leave the word of God, to serve in the secular field.

And must it not come to this? The people of Rome, as well as those of the Romagna, must naturally desire to be governed like the prosperous and progressive people around them. Especially will they repel the degradation of being left behind in a triumphant migration of their countrymen from Egypt towards a land of promise. Will they be content as an isolate, forsaken community, whose neighbours have left them for better associations? Will they respect and love a government detested and cast off by the mass of its former subjects, without dignity or influence, and cut off from healthy and improving intercourse

with the rest of the world? And why should so populous and renowned a city, with a situation central for social advantages, with facilities for commerce, with a history the most memorable, next to Jerusalem, of all the cities of the world, and with a name as venerable in the circles of literature and jurisprudence, as in the Christian church, be doomed, in an age of light and of surrounding advancement, to that ignominious bondage?

God has accomplished a great work in the world by the Catholic church. Despite of her manifold corruptions she was the depositary of precious truth. The doctrines of the Trinity, of God in Christ crucified, of salvation through his blood, of the Holy Ghost, of the forgiveness of sin, of the resurrection of the body, and of the life everlasting, are the light of the world. And these doctrines that church always professed. By the power of the truth thus maintained, thousands within the pale of the Romish communion were beyond doubt brought to the knowledge of God; and the light of the gospel was preserved from utter extinction. But her work is accomplished. Her form a pillar of salt between Sodom and Zoar. The Spirit of God goes out of her into other forms; while she, with her fanatical conceit of infallibility, forges chains of bondage, and yokes of galling captivity for her people out of the very truth which should make them free. Her vices, as an institution, are concentrated and immovable. She can never again be a form and an embodiment of Christianity for the world. She has nothing more to do in her present shape, but to linger with her lessening train, till her followers have walked by her flickering taper to the grave, and their children have become disciples in another Christian school.

What then should Romanism do? And what should this generation expect?

Popery, as such, should give up the ghost. We would not consign it to death as a punishment for having existed. Grant all that may be claimed for it as useful in its time. But its work is done, and done long ago. The Pope has done no good in any country for the last hundred years. And we cannot conceive a condition of things as likely to arise out of the present state of the church and the world, in which a Christian man, with the title of supreme and universal head of the church,

and residing in Rome or anywhere else, can do any real service even to the Catholic branch of the church. The Catholic communion may continue, and may be *the church*, even in her view of the matter. She may continue to claim apostolic grace in her sacrament of ordination, to the full satisfaction of the bishops and all others concerned; but the dogma of the primacy of St. Peter would fall, of course, with the Pope; and it is that late-born and unmitigated falsehood which has broken down the constitution of that church and consumed her life. And as the patrimony of St. Peter is the temporal power, and that is falling for ever, the holder of the patrimony may as well disappear; for what is the heir without the inheritance. The only necessity for his continuance lies in the fact that he exists, and there is no constitutional provision to abolish him. If once he were removed, and Catholic people were no longer plied with the devices of priestcraft, to keep alive in them a factitious reverence for his unseen person, there would be found, even in the present nature of Catholicism, no want or tendency that would reproduce him. It is impossible that the spirit of Catholic piety, if left to its natural course, should produce in an American Catholic the need of a Roman Pope, whom he never sees, and whom he never hears of, except as his Holiness is forced on his notice by the priest who uses the name and pretended dignity for his personal ends. The Catholicism of France makes virtually nothing of the Pope. The Gallican church denies, in form, his power over civil rulers, his infallibility, and the superiority of his decisions over those of councils. And this leaves nothing for the Pope that renders his office or authority of any practical value for the people. We would say then, in the plain, simple language of Presbyterianism, let the Pope, in view of the whole state of things, consider whether his usefulness in that capacity be not at an end; and, if so, let him take his dismission, and let his session, the college of cardinals, be dissolved. A body of men with talents and address to attain to such places, can, with the right spirit, be very useful in other offices, but in that they can do nothing. We do not speak thus because we think the voluntary resignation of the Pope or the dissolution of any portion of the hierarchy probable, or even possible, but we take this method of expressing what we think

of the present condition of the Papacy, and of the value of the office in determining the religious future of the world.

We incline to anticipate successive modifications of the Catholic system, by the continued and accelerated progress of change which has been inaugurated in the United States. The silent but growing disuse of dogmas and of practices which have become distasteful and unprofitable to the altered mental conditions has already gone much farther among the Catholics of the United States, and even among those of foreign birth, than is generally known. Some twenty years ago, we heard, in the leading Catholic congregation of one of our largest Atlantic cities, a discourse from a priest which took us quite by surprise. It was an exhortation concerning the duty of confession, and complained of great and growing neglect of this ordinance of the church, and remonstrated—"Why should the church have to mourn that one of her most binding ordinances should be so generally neglected by her members who are engaged in the business of the world, or have risen to the higher ranks of intelligence and culture?" And from statements as to the number of members in the charge, and the number who attended the confessional, it appeared that scarcely one in a hundred pretended to comply with the requisition of the church, by the habitual abuse of the confessional; that those who did confess, were mostly of the lowest class, or in extremity. This is the inevitable course of usages which do not agree with the advancing ideas of propriety, and which cannot adapt themselves to some rational sentiment of utility, even while fulfilling an acknowledged scriptural requirement. So it has already been with the Catholic church in this country, and so it will continue to be. The changes will naturally be the more rapid within the church as the usages become the more conformed to the religious sentiment prevailing in the age, and as the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant becomes less bitter and violent, while the transition of individuals and of communities from Romanism, will also be more free and frequent. Circumstances will also hasten the work. While the spirit of the two great divisions of christendom towards each other is conformed more and more to the gospel, the greater religious susceptibility of

Protestants will be communicated to the Catholics by the tendency to equilibrium, so long as Protestants continue in what we know to be their freer and higher communion of the Spirit.

The instinct of the awakened religious sentiment of Protestantism, leads to an immovable assurance of our improved condition in comparison with Romanism. That assurance may be freely and thankfully expressed without vaunting, and without vain, self-complacent and irritating taunts, or supercilious and repulsive exultation. And the true spirit of the Reformation will keep Protestants more and more on their guard in this respect, even in the height of triumph. And this assurance of which we speak has so many and such patent confirmations in the course of Providence and the progress of grace in the world, that the meek and grateful utterance of it, in all direct and indirect expressions compatible with the lowly mind of piety, must be a commendation of our cause to all earnest and candid seekers after truth. We are under temptation, indeed, from the bearings of all the social changes of the world in favour of the Protestant interest; but our imperfections are enough to employ the most diligent circumspection, to keep us alive to the admonitions of the Spirit, through Providence and Scripture, and to preclude all self-reliant and boastful indulgence.

But the progress of the world is like a demonstration in our favour. The changes are all in one direction. The progressive civilization of the world brings forward the Christian nations which have the most easy and free communion with the spirit of Protestantism, and throws back those most shut out from that spirit, and confined to that of the Romish church. Wherever the two systems are brought into direct conflict among people enjoying freedom of conscience and opinion, the gain is in favour of Protestantism. In mixed communities, where the two classes of people have free scope for mutual influence, the tendency is uniformly in the line of Protestant progress. Thus, in countries wholly Catholic the people are left by the church in ignorance; plainly showing that it is no part of the policy of that church, when left wholly to herself, to promote the universal diffusion of knowledge. This appears undeniable from the history of Catholic influence where it has not been disturbed, as in Mexico, Spain, Central and Southern Italy, and the South

of Ireland. But in this country, the Catholics are not behind in their zeal for education. They enter freely and at great expenditure of funds and labour into competition with the Protestant system of universal education; and though, for the most part, they take this course as the only condition of successful rivalry with the prevailing Protestantism, the effect is to change the entire Catholic policy in relation to mental culture, and by consequence, to modify, in important respects, the details of discipline and worship. The difference between the methods for public edification in the Catholic assemblies of this country and those of thoroughly Catholic countries, strikes all travellers who witness it. This invariable conformity shows that the tendency of the two bodies under mutual influence is in the Protestant line, and not in the Catholic. Thus also the withholding of the Scriptures from the laity, which is an undeniable and prominent feature of Romanism, in theory and practice, gradually disappears in this country, as in other countries increasingly Protestant, and the Scriptures, in the same form as used in public teaching, are distributed among the people. And the people are instructed in public on the presumption that the Bible is possessed and read in their families. We have ourselves heard in Catholic assemblies, whole discourses framed throughout on this presumption, and in this respect not differing at all from those of a Protestant pulpit. The cases we witnessed were those indeed of the most cultivated congregations of an enlightened city; and though not probably a sample for the whole Catholic population, prove nevertheless the tendency to conformity; which is our point. And what we have said of education, and of the popular use of the Bible, is equally true of other matters, which we should mention if time would permit.

It would therefore not be contrary to the course of Providence in analogous cases, if silent and half unconscious, and legally unauthorized modifications of Romanism should go on, and be immensely accelerated as the time draws nigh for all antichrists to be destroyed; and if, in process of time, the dissolving petrifaction of the ante-reformation Catholicism, in trying to recover some dim sense of her identity, should find that she was not. Thus England awoke, upon a time, to the

consciousness that she was not under arbitrary rule, but had a constitutional government, while her constitution was never written, but only grew, as a power, in the hearts of rulers and people. Thus old things pass away, in the most ordinary course of Providence and grace; not by a stream of formal repeals and abolitions, but by a constant shedding of the obsolete, and the silent descent of outgrown usages into desuetude.

As for the Papacy, it is outliving its time. Its spirit and power are gone. What is it? We speak not of the Catholic church as a whole, but of the Papacy, with its appendages, as an office of that church. What moral or religious influence has it with the people, for instance, of this country? What questions of any real moment, in doctrine or practice, has its infallibility to decide? Suppose the Catholic churches of the United States were severed from Rome, as the American Episcopal church is separated from its mother-church of England, having all merely legal matters adjusted to its separate state, and what would it lose? Of what moral or religious benefit would the Catholic Christians of this country be bereft?

With the fall of the temporal power of the Pope, will cease also, in a great measure, the acknowledgment of his spiritual influence. The early and continual endeavours of the Papacy after temporal powers, betrayed the conviction that, without the dignity of secular dominion, the universal headship of the church could be little more than a vain show. How much more must that conviction reveal itself in these times, when the people have become more enlightened, and capable of asking and weighing the reasons of things? And now that the secular dominion is coming to naught, it becomes more than a mere query for the curious, what the spiritual powers of the Papacy will hereafter in practice amount to. The revolting states of the church, as they pass under a government tinctured with Protestant liberty, will have more spiritual sympathy with progressive christendom than with Rome; and if Rome herself should join the progress, she would soon dissolve in the elements of freedom, like the morning mist in the light of advancing day. While the people are forsaking the Pope, and adopting another government of their own preference, they

take with them the great body of the clergy. The priests and bishops are as decided Catholics as ever, and may give their new government great trouble before they can learn to adjust themselves to their new conditions; but they must serve the people in their office. Their new king is an excommunicate, and their allegiance to him is a contempt of the spiritual power of the Pope, with which all pretences of submission in other things will be incompatible. The populous and influential state of the church which has already revolted, will feel little more regard for the spiritual power than it felt for the temporal. The Northern States of Italy, whose efforts for freedom were opposed by all his influence, can only hold him as a defeated enemy. The spiritual ministrations of an office which has been associated by the people with so odious a resistance to their welfare, must be of small account.

Indeed, the power and dignity of the Papacy are now so low, that no future changes in its government will be of any public concern. They can be nothing to the world, nothing to Europe; nothing in church, nor in state. The unhappy pontiff feels this, as he shows in his plaintive epistle to the sufferers in Syria. And a letter is now mentioned, but not yet come to hand, in which he is said to give up all as lost, and to declare his purpose to meet death in Rome rather than flee. He seems to expect no restoration; and it does not seem possible that any future changes of the world should replace him. The time has been when the Pope received the profoundest homage of princes; when he could compel them to wait at his gate, and to hold his stirrup, and could exact of them whatever might increase his power, and gratify his ambition. But he has now no powerful friend for his time of need. Sicily is lost to his interest, and other revolutions in Naples seem near. The only two powers of Europe confessedly Catholic, can do nothing for him. Austria, in her poverty, turmoil, and infirmity, can render him no aid. Spain, once the richest and greatest of the kingdoms of Europe, now lies in weakness and humiliation, needs help herself, and seems on the point of selling a portion of her independence for some mess of pottage from Napoleon. There is no help for his Holiness, and it does not yet appear how the affairs of Italy can be permanently

settled on any terms which will allow him to remain in Rome.

So complete is the prostration of that once mighty office. And it falls not by a tempest of foreign force, but by its own natural decay. Its root has died in the soil of humanity. It belonged to the childhood of the church, and is now put away as a childish thing. It belonged to a forming period of the Christian nations; and now as fast as the nations attain to manly intelligence and freedom, they cast off the Papacy. There never was on earth a temporary institution, not even the feudalism of Europe, or the divinely appointed system of Moses, that was more manifestly preliminary and provisional, intended to prepare the way for something better; none that has more evidently had its day, and become more thoroughly obsolete, than the institution of the Papacy. The fall is a sign of the steady and sure progress of the kingdom of Christ. So must also everything decline which belongs only to her training through the successive stages of her growth; everything which does not belong to her perfection as the body of Christ, and is not an organ and ornament of her glorious manhood.

The changes now in progress in the populations of Europe and Asia, to say nothing of other parts of the world, are more suggestive than any which the history of those countries has recorded before. Great events are taking place, and greater still are approaching. The Turkish empire seems virtually at an end; waiting only for the political system of Europe to digest and secrete the material. It has been already compelled, in its weakness, to tolerate Christian missionaries, until thousands of its Mohammedans have had their attention invited to the Holy Scriptures. We refer not to the Catholic Christians of Syria, who are now suffering so dreadfully from the barbarities of the Druses, but to those in Turkey, reached by the labours of Protestant missionaries. Millions in Italy are now accessible to Protestant influence, who never have been before. Even the Catholic portion of the church is leaving the Papacy behind, in many quarters, and pressing forward to that which is before. The kingdoms of the world are becoming the kingdom of Christ. They are everywhere preparing to protect his people in their privileges and their duties as Christians. They

thus become one kingdom, with Christ for its acknowledged head. All are learning to recognize and illustrate the universal brotherhood, and are expecting to see the human race return to the fellowship and union of a single family. Thus the kingdom of God will come, and his will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.

ART. VI.—*The recent Theory of the Eldership examined.*

THE ruling elder according to this theory is the *presbyter* of Scripture and of the Christian church in the early period of its history. It is the one fundamental order of which the preacher is a class—a functionary—who, by virtue of an additional gift, performs different duties, "but is by no means of a different order." There is, therefore, but one order of rulers in the church—deacons being only assistants or helps.

According to Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Thornwell this theory involves all that is essentially distinctive of Presbyterian government.* The issues are therefore of vital import. The theory is dogmatically "affirmed" to be sustained by arguments "clear, conclusive, and irresistible." (*Review*, p. 7.) "The Scriptures and our Standards both EXPRESSLY teach that the ruling elder is strictly and properly a presbyter, and therefore entitled to participate in all the acts—(*of necessity he would be*)—in which any presbyter, *as such*, can bear a part." (*Ib.* p. 57.) "The presbyter, as a title of office, means a ruler, and *nothing more* than a ruler." (*Ib.* p. 58.) This "is clear from the passage which proves *beyond the possibility of a doubt*, that presbyters and ministers of the word are not synonymous terms. That passage is 1 Tim. v. 17." (*Ib.* p. 61.) "From the account given of the meaning of this word it follows, that it is not

* See The Christian Pastor and Appendix, by Dr. Breckinridge, Baltimore, 1845, and The Elder Question, by Dr. Thornwell, in the Southern Presbyterian Review, June, 1848.

applicable to preachers as ministers of the word." (*Ib.* p. 66.) In support of these strong affirmations we are referred to the Old Testament, to the synagogue, to the plurality of elders in every church, and to the above text, and the subject is urged upon us by the solemn asseveration, that "these surely are not slight questions—they affect the very heart of our system—and in deciding them we settle the distinctive principles of our government." (*Ib.* p. 35.)

We will now proceed to examine in detail the grounds on which, scripturally and historically, this theory is based. With every possible effort to condense, and omitting much we might advance and have even written, we must task the patience of our readers. But as we can only oppose facts to authority, we may reasonably hope that all interested in the question of the true value of the ruling eldership will give to our argument a calm and dispassionate consideration. This is all we ask. To the law and testimony of God's word, and to our Presbyterian Standards is our confident appeal.

Meaning of the term Presbyter, i. e. πρεσβυτερος.

The fundamental position on which this theory is based is that the essence of the presbyter is rule, and that the fundamental meaning of the term presbyter is a ruler.

Let us then first inquire into the original meaning of the term *presbyter.*

Presbyter (πρεσβυτερος) does not primarily mean a ruler. It is the comparative degree of πρεσβυς, old, an old man, and means older, an older man, and has a superlative πρεσβυτατος, oldest, the oldest man. The word came to have the sense of reverend, or honoured, from the great respect paid in early ages to the aged and experienced, and especially to parents. The secondary meaning of the word, according to Passow, is an ambassador, and it is only in its third derivative sense it means, as it did at Sparta, a political title—a ruler. In this as well as in the other senses, it is found in some analogous form in almost every language, and very commonly in the Hebrew, and among the sacred race, whose history is preserved in the Old Testament Scriptures.

Precisely the same is the case with the Latin word *senior*—

the term, be it remembered, which was employed by the African Fathers, by Calvin, and Knox, by the Books of Discipline, and by the Waldenses. *Senior* is also the comparative degree of *senex*, old, and means older, and is generally applied to age, and to the respect and endearment associated with age, and not to office or rule. Senator and not senior is the Latin term for the members of the Roman Senate, whose position was not considered an office, but rather a dignity or rank like that of the *nobili* of Venice.

The Presbyters of the Old Testament—What?

This theory finds no support, therefore, from the primary and fundamental meaning of the terms *presbyter*, in Greek, and *senior*, in Latin. It is however affirmed, that the elders of the Old Testament, and of the ancient synagogue, were, *as this theory requires, of one order as rulers, of whom there were two classes*—one of rulers only, and one of rulers who were teachers also; and that these were not laymen, but ecclesiastics, who were both ordained, and ordainers by imposition of hands. Our Saviour and his apostles, it is said, found this theory of the eldership in practical operation, and transferred it to the Christian church. Let us then take up these positions.

On the real use and import of the term *elder*, and its Hebrew cognates, we regard the work of the now late and deeply lamented Dr. J. Addison Alexander on "The Primitive Offices of the Christian Church," to be exhaustive. He illustrates its use "from the very beginning of time, in all countries, under every variety of government, and under all changes in the form of government. It belongs, in short, to the phraseology of the patriarchal constitution of the earliest societies, and is employed in Scripture in application to the elders of Egypt, of Midian, of Moab, &c.; and not only to elders of countries, but also to local magistrates and judges." (P. 5, &c.) In all cases, these elders "were representatives of the people," and are frequently "taken for the people," and "for ALL the people." (P. 4, 5.) They were also the representatives of the people in civil and in sacred things. "The people therefore were originally and properly the chief depositaries of the governing power. They were convened and consulted on all important occasions, and without

their consent nothing could be lawfully done;" and hence, what the elders did was spoken of as done by the people.

But these elders among the Jews were not their established religious *teachers*. Enoch preached and prophesied of Christ. Noah was a preacher of righteousness. Such also were Abraham, Jacob, Job, Moses, and all the prophets, the spirit of whose prophecy was its testimony to Jesus. Those became "accredited agents and messengers," the immediate representatives of God, and mediators between God and man. But besides these, a particular order was set apart to be the teachers and priests of the people *with whom* the elders were *associated* in the government and discipline of the church. From the beginning to the end, therefore, the elders were lay representatives of the people, and under the theocracy were entirely distinct from the sacred order of teachers and preachers.

Preaching, therefore, was not "a new function superadded by our Saviour to the old office of elder," so as to constitute a subdivision under it. Teaching and preaching had always constituted a fundamental office in the church of God, and also in the synagogue. And it has ever been the doctrine of the Presbyterian church that in these ancient ministers of the word, the Christian ministry was represented and foretold, according to the typical nature of the ancient economy. That the priests and Levites in the Jewish church were entrusted with the public reading of the word, praying, preaching, teaching, blessing the people, &c., is affirmed by the Westminster Form of Government, which says, "The ministers of the gospel have as ample a charge and commission to dispense the word, as well as other ordinances, as the priests and Levites had under the law; see Isaiah lxvi. 21, and Matt. xxiii. 34, where our Saviour entitleth those whom he will send forth, by the same names of the teachers of old." Again, quoting Numb. vi. 23—26, with Rev. xiv. 5, and Isaiah lxvi. 21, it is said—"Where under the names of priests and Levites, to be continued under the gospel, are meant evangelical pastors." And again—"As there were in the Jewish church *elders of the people* who *joined with* the priests and Levites in the government of the church, so Christ also hath instituted government and *governors* to join with the

ministers," &c. (See *Form of Government* in Confession of Faith of Church of Scotland, pp. 388—391, Edinburgh edition.)

Preaching was not therefore, as Dr. Breckinridge affirms, "a new function manifested among the elders unknown to those of the Jews," but only an old function which, like the law of brotherly love, became a new commandment by the new authority, and motives, and sphere of Christ's kingdom. Nay, Dr. Breckinridge himself, in the same chapter, teaches that "the worship of the synagogues consisted in the reading and *expounding* of God's word, and in offering up prayers to him." (*Knowledge of God*, vol. ii. pp. 631 and 634.) It is also evident that the ministers of the New Testament are not the successors of the *elders* of the Old Testament, but of a separate and sacred order of preachers and expounders of God's will and word. Vitringa, in his learned work on the ancient synagogue proves at length that it had regularly ordained preachers.*

The Presbyters of the Synagogue.

The argument for this theory, founded on the supposed analogy of the Jewish Synagogue, though assumed by Dr. Breckinridge to be conclusive, will not, therefore, avail to its support. (See *Knowledge of God*, vol. ii. p. 621.) In the first place, while the synagogue *was*, in all probability, the model and basis of the first Christian churches, nevertheless to suppose that this was the case, not only in its *general* form and order, but in a slavish imitation, is, as Lytton well observes, (*On the Church*, p. 193,) "neither consistent with recorded facts nor with the spirit of the Christian dispensation." Secondly, it is impossible to ascertain *what was the polity* and order of the synagogue in our Saviour's time, or to harmonize the remaining statements of Rabbinical lore into any definite system. There is much confusion and contradiction, so that the most patient investigators into the originals—such as Maimonides, Buxtorf, Vitringa, Selden, Lightfoot, and Schœttgenius—contradict each other and themselves, and confess that much is a matter of the most doubtful disputation.*

* See Book III. chap. v. vi. and vii.

† See Dr. Miller on Eldership, pp. 35—48, and his frank admissions that his

Vitringa has shown that there was no one constant form of synagogue government, but that it differed according to circumstances and places, and that of these various modifications the one adopted for the government of the Apostolic church was a *Senatus plurium Doctorum qui quoddam Consistorium sive Presbyterium constituerunt.**

That the universal Jewish appellative term *elders* was given to some of their officers, sometimes to all, sometimes to a select number, may be admitted. But that *any* of these elders were invested with the clerical order is denied by Stillingfleet† and others, while that the term elder was given in any other than the *most general* sense to those who did not preside and preach, is denied by perhaps all the original authorities. Vitringa is of this opinion, and establishes, he thinks clearly, that the term rendered by *presbyter* was properly employed by the Hebrew writers to designate "those who composed the sacred consistory of doctors or teachers. This consisted always of a plurality of these learned doctors, but the exact number depended on the size of the place, the number of such doctors convenient, and other circumstances."‡ Selden corroborates this judgment by proving, as he thinks, that the powers of presbyters, within and without the Holy Land, were different, and that the former combined teaching and ruling, while the latter had power to teach, to bind, to loose, to prophesy only, and were *non in judicandi creati.* He also teaches that just as in every large city there were many synagogues, so also there were many Christian churches and presbyters.§ The sum of what is admitted, so far as we can gather it, may be briefly stated as follows:

1. The elders of the synagogue represented the people, and "were laymen of reputed wisdom and experience, who, in practical matters, might be expected to give sound advice." (*Dr. Killen's Ancient Church*, p. 252.) They formed "a lay coun-

authorities are against him, and at no agreement among themselves, pp. 45, 46; or Killen's Ancient Church, p. 252. Vitringa exposes the views of Lightfoot, Selden, Petitus *doctissimus*, Capellus, &c.

* See Book ii. Ch. xii., p. 592, &c.

† See Dr. Miller on Eldership, pp. 45, 46.

‡ See Vet. Synag. Book iii. Ch. i. and Ch. xviii. p. 874.

§ Selden de Synag. Vet. Ebræorum vol. ii., lib. ii., ch. vii. pp. 329, 325, 252, 319, 320, *et passim.*

cil." (*Id.* p. 232.) In this respect, therefore, the elders of the Synagogue were essentially different from those defined by this theory. According to Lightfoot they were "magistrates who judged in matters in contest arising within the Synagogue" and who "ruled in civil affairs." (*Quoted as authority by Dr. Killen*, pp. 233, 234.)

2. These elders of the synagogue were not ordained. Vitringa, after stating the difficulty of understanding clearly the views of even Maimonides, and differing in interpretation with Lightfoot, says: "Perhaps we may conclude this much, that while the affairs of the Hebrews flourished in Canaan, the presidents and ministers of the synagogue, who depended for their support upon the synagogue, were confirmed in their office by imposition of hands."* Lightfoot, speaking of their preachers, says: "None of these were admitted to his public employment of teaching and preaching, but he had ordination as a state call and commission to that office."† "And therefore," says Maimonides, "it was far from being a common use, *from being any use at all*, among the Jews, in their church, to let any mechanical or unordained man step up into the doctor's chair, or minister's pulpit, to read divinity publicly, or to preach in their synagogues, as impudency or folly would put them forward to do it; but they had a solemn state call . . . by a lawful ordination, by men themselves ordained. *Only these* rabbis, doctors, or bishops, were ordained."‡

3. The Hebrew word, translated *elders*, was given to these teachers, preachers, or presidents, only in conjunction with other titles, which made its restrictive official application apparent. These elders laboured in word and doctrine, and conducted the exercises of public worship, prayers, and exposition of the Scriptures. They were also called by the title, *ἀρχισυναγωγοι*. (Compare Luke vii. 8, and Mark v. 22, Acts xiii. 15.) One of these presided in turn, or according to arrangement. (Luke viii. 41, 49, Mark v. 22.) From this last passage, and Acts xiii. 15, and xviii. 8, 17, it appears that there was a plurality of these in one synagogue. Maimonides describes the bishop, or presiding officer of the synagogue, as

* De Vet. Synag., p. 837, 838. † Works, vol. v., p. 121, 122.

‡ See in Lightfoot, *ib.* Bernard Synag. of the Church, 85, 86, 169, 183.

"the presbyter, who laboured in word and doctrine." Neander says, "while all the officers of the synagogue were elders, those who presided were called, among other names, προεστωτες των αδελφων, that is, presidents over or of their brethren."* This president was also called chazan, angel, bishop of the congregation. "This person," says Lightfoot—"the public minister of the synagogue, who prayed publicly, preached, &c.—was called the angel of the church, and *chazan*, or bishop of the congregation; and certainly the signification of the word bishop (and presbyter,) or angel of the church, would have been determined with less noise, if recourse had been made to the upper fountains. . . . The service of the temple being abolished as being ceremonial, God transplanted the worship and public adoration of God used in the synagogue, which was moral, into the Christian church—to wit, the public ministry, public prayers, reading of God's word, preaching, &c. Hence the names of the ministers of the gospel were the very same—the angel of the church and the bishop (or presbyter,) *which belonged to the ministers* of the synagogue."†

In every particular, therefore, in which anything like agreement can be found, the synagogue theory of the eldership was in harmony with that of our church, and contrary to that now challenging its adoption. We find, therefore, that in the Westminster Assembly, Selden and Lightfoot, and out of it, Vitringa, and other Hebraists, were in opposition to it.

The Presbyter of the New Testament.

Let us then proceed to an investigation of the real presbyter of the New Testament, and the *usus loquendi* of the title.

With the termination of the civil theocratic commonwealth of the Jews, ceased also their ceremonial and typical economy, and it became necessary that around its permanent laws, rites, and religion, Christ, by his apostles, should re-organize a government and discipline adapted to the simplicity and spirituality of the church, as God's instrumentality for the conversion of the world. The very first act of Christ's public ministry was therefore the institution of the sacred order of

* Maim. De Sanh., chap. iv. Neander, Planting of Christ, vol. i., p. 177.

† Works, vol. ii., pp. 88, 89; and Bernard, chap. x.

the ministry, as his representatives, heralds, and ambassadors. This, also, was his last act upon earth, when in commissioning his church, he made the preaching of the gospel its fundamental business, and preachers its essential rulers; and when Christ ascended up on high, and gave gifts unto men, pastors and teachers—that is, the sacred order of the ministry in its two fold work of oversight or rule, and instruction—was the all comprehending permanent order which he instituted in his church. Around this order, to secure to it greater efficiency, more certain purity, and popular adaptation, there were gathered, from time to time, as occasion opened up the way for their institution, the order of BRETHREN, called also *governments*, and *rulers*, to represent and act for the people in conjunction with the order of ministers; and besides them, the order of deacons to act under, and in coöperation with both in the government and administration of the church.

It is, therefore, most assuredly to be expected that the order of the ministry, which is so fundamental, will be designated by titles and qualifications *peculiar* to itself. In this way alone can its divine institution, dignity, and usefulness be adequately set forth. And as the term presbyter is among other titles employed to represent the ministry and its qualifications, there is a most violent presumption against this theory which applies that term primarily, in its most official and distinctive meaning, to the same class of officers which are otherwise specially designated brethren, rulers, and governors.

The proper official meaning of the term presbyter in the New Testament, when not employed evidently in its derivative general sense, may be ascertained by considering its use in those passages which are the most clear and unambiguous. The conclusion arrived at by Dr. J. Addison Alexander, in his work on "The Primitive Officers of the Church," is the same as that reached by every other analyst of Scripture;—by Dr. Owen, and all modern Congregationalists; by Methodists and non-Episcopal denominations; and by a large body of Episcopalian writers and critics; namely—that "presbyters, as PRESBYTERS, possessed and exercised the highest powers now belonging to the ministry." (P. 29.) They preached; they administered the sacraments; they presided over and conducted all public

services. They ordained also other ministers and other officers. From a very thorough examination of the Council at Jerusalem, (Acts xv.;) the address of Paul to the presbyters at Ephesus, (Acts xxviii.;) the address of Peter, (1 Pet. v.;) and from the order of other churches mentioned in the New Testament, Dr. Alexander concludes—in opposition to the claims of prelates to be an order of ministers higher than presbyters—"that *the presbyterial office* was, as they admit, established in the primitive church, and was intended to be permanent; that it was clothed with the important powers of preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments; and that it is repeatedly spoken of in terms which, taken by themselves, would imply the possession of the highest powers belonging to the ministry . . . including those of discipline and ordination." (Pp. 66, 67.) "How could *they*," asks Dr. Alexander, speaking of the Ephesian presbyters as charged by the apostle, "comply, unless intrusted with the keys both of discipline and doctrine, with the power not of teaching merely, but of maintaining purity of doctrine by deciding controversies, trying heretics," &c. (p. 35.) "They were to act as shepherds, fulfil all a shepherd's duty—collecting, reclaiming, protecting, feeding—to do, in short, what our Saviour embodies in his full commission of the ministry, 'Feed my sheep, feed my lambs'—what the apostle Peter, who received that commission, delivered to the presbyters addressed by him, (1 Pet. v. 1—3;) and in both cases to do this, not as under-shepherds appointed by others who were over them and superior to them, but as commissioned, called, and qualified by the Holy Ghost. The terms, therefore, in which presbyters are spoken of in these standard passages for determining the *proper official* purport of the term—(which in its general meaning may, like its cognate term, bishop, have relation to œcumenical, civil, military, naval, judicial, or religious matters)*—are a "metaphorical description, *in its whole extent*, of the ministerial office as comprehending all that is essential to the continued existence of the church, and the attainment of the ends for which it was established." (*Alexander*, p. 33.)

The term presbyter, as thus expounded by inspired usage, is applied by both Paul and Peter, not to the presbyters of

* See Wordsworth's Greek Testament, on Acts xx. 28.

Ephesus alone, but to those at Miletus also, that is, to all included in that missionary field; and also to those in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Bithynia, and therefore to presbyters universally, everywhere.

The official meaning of the term presbyter is further determined by its application to themselves by the apostles. Peter calls himself a fellow-presbyter. John also styles himself a fellow-presbyter in the inscription of two epistles. The controversy at Antioch was referred to "the apostles and presbyters," (Acts xv. 2.) "It pleased the apostles and presbyters," (vs. 22.) "The apostles, and presbyters and brethren," (vs. 23.) "The apostles and presbyters." (Acts xvi. 4.) "The apostles and presbyters with the whole church," (xv. 4.) Now observe the conclusiveness of this usage. The ministerial commission was first given to the twelve and seventy,* and their ministerial duty is described by Christ as feeding his flock. Afterwards, when the ascended Saviour had given "pastors and teachers" to feed his flock, the term *presbyter*, which was endeared by immemorial use, as a term of dignity, reverence, and affection, was employed, and in connection with Christ's peculiar description of the office of his ministers—"feeding the flock of God"—and is appropriated by the apostles to themselves, and to all other ministers, as fellow-presbyters, and as those who feed the flock of God, over which the Holy Ghost has made them overseers. Add to this the universal appointment of presbyters in every church, even when no other officers are mentioned; their ordination by imposition of hands; their uniting in ordaining other ministers by imposition of hands; the reference to them as the only ministers, as when the apostle James directs any who are sick to send for the presbyters, and let them pray for them; and the very emphatic fact, that there is no other name besides presbyter (and the other terms used interchangeably with it,) for designating the fundamental and essential office of the ministry, nor any other delineation of its nature, functions, responsibilities, and authority.

The office of the presbyters was to watch over all the inter-

* That their commission was the same as that of the twelve, see Luke x. 1, 10, 17; Matt. x. 17; and Mark vi. 7—14.

ests of the church, to instruct the ignorant, (1 Tim. iii. 2,) to exhort the faithful, to confute the gainsayers, (Titus i. 9.) to warn the unruly, to comfort the feeble-minded, to support the weak, to be patient toward all, (1 Thess. v. 14,) to "feed the church of God, which he had purchased with his own blood." They are to speak to us the word of God, and watch for souls. (Heb. xiii. 7, 17.) They are ἡγουμενοι, leaders, guides, captains, such as have precedence. They are the ἀγγελοι, the angels, messengers, apostles, or missionaries of God. They are διδασκαλοι, doctors, or masters in doctrine. They are to "attend on teaching, to be instant in preaching, to labour, (*be occupied in it as their business*,) in the word and doctrine." They are shepherds, watchmen, messengers, and ambassadors of God. They are to be patterns to the flock; to lead and go before them, as a captain before his troops; as a shepherd before his flock; as a guide before the traveller; and as such they are to be followed. They are to give attendance to reading; to give themselves wholly to these things; to be instant in season and out of season; and to be supported so as to be able to give themselves to the word of God and to prayer, that their profiting may appear unto all. (1 Cor. ix. 7—14; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 1 Tim. v. 17.)

The conclusion therefore is, that the familiar and much-loved term, *presbyter*, has been selected under the teaching of the Holy Ghost, as one of the permanent and peculiar titles of the ministry of the gospel, and the one which is most expressive of dignity, veneration, and authority; and that it is not employed in its official sense, as this theory teaches, to designate a general order of office-bearers, of which ministers are *only a class*.

The Presbyters in the Synod of Jerusalem—Acts, chap. xv.

But it is urged against this conclusion, that there are several passages in which the term *presbyter* must be understood to include representatives of the people, as well as ministers. Of these, one of the most important is the use made of it in the account given in Acts, chap. xv., of the model Synod, held in the model church of Jerusalem, to determine certain questions of doctrine and order. "Certain men," "certain others also," besides Paul and Barnabas, were sent to consult with the apos-

tles and presbyters, who "came together to consider of this matter." Now admitting all that Presbyterian writers have ever said on the conclusiveness of this proof of the Divine warrant of government by presbyteries and synods, the question arises, Who composed the body? Was it composed of apostles only, so far as a right to deliberate, and decide, and give judgment was concerned, as Romanists affirm; or of apostles and and presbyters, as Prelatists teach; or of apostles, presbyters, and members of the church at large, as Congregationalists affirm; or of apostles, presbyters, and representatives of the people, as Presbyterians maintain? This question depends very much on the genuineness and meaning of the terms "certain men," "certain others also," "the brethren," by which the words "church" and "the whole church," are restricted; and by whose concurrent voice the matter was decided, and the decree promulgated.

Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Killen both attach great importance to this Synod. The former however makes nothing of these terms, and the parties they represent. They are in the record, but they are not in his book. He ignores them altogether, and assumes that as *presbyters* included both teaching and ruling elders, these were merely "lookers on in Venice." Dr. Killen, however, found them lying across the track of this theory of the ruling and teaching presbyters; and designating, IN ADDITION to apostles, teaching presbyters, and ruling presbyters, "certain others also," called THE BRETHREN. They must therefore be put out of the way, since in them there is an evident reference to "representatives of the people," who were different and distinct from "the presbyters." He calls, therefore, to his aid every one who can lend a hand towards clearing the track. Congregationalists take hold, and at once identify "the brethren" with "the whole church," or "the whole assembly present." (See *Ancient Church*, p. 84.) But as this would not help the cause, Prelatists and Romanists are set to work; and it is decided that they only intimate that the decision "met the universal approval of the meeting;" or "they were gifted members;" or what settles the question, the true reading, as "now recognized by the highest critical authorities, and sustained by the whole narrative," is, "the apostles and pres-

byters—brethren," and therefore, "the apostles and elders, brethren were the only individuals officially concerned in this important transaction." (P. 85.)

Now what are we to understand by all this? Plainly this, that in order to coerce Presbyterians at least, to admit the appellative meaning of the term *presbyter*, as including teaching and ruling presbyters, in this narrative,—to secure, we say, this theory, Congregationalists, Prelatists, Romanists, and latitudinarian critics, are to be employed to nullify the clearest possible delineation of representatives of the churches, sitting, deliberating, and deciding, in this model ecclesiastical court. But the labour is all lost.

For, 1. The omission of "the brethren" in one verse does not expunge it from *ten* other passages in this chapter, nor the other expressions which are clearly expressive of special delegated office. 2. The reading in our authorized text is not abandoned, but maintained, by the best critics and the weightiest authorities. "The reading of some old manuscripts," says Baumgarten, and he is sustained by Dr. Alexander, and many more, "must, on closer examination, appear to be an intentional alteration which had its source in the prejudice that in these discussions and decrees none but the apostles were concerned."* 3. Romanists will lead to still further expurgation, and exclude, according to the reading attributed to Clement, both the words "presbyters and brethren."† 4. But let us adopt the reading of Dr. Killen, and it only follows that "presbyters" were co-equal and co-ordinate with apostles, and were therefore ministers and not "a mixed multitude" of different classes, and of whom some only ruled. 5. Dr. Killen, however, repudiates his own interpretation and reading. He calls these brethren "deputies commissioned to consult." "The conclusion," he says, "met the universal approval of the meeting, *including the deputies on both sides.*" "The apostles and elders, *with the whole church*, send *chosen* men of their

* Apost. Hist. vol. ii., p. 33. Alexander on Acts ii. 89. See also Griesbach, Bloomfield, Wordsworth, Tischendorf, Schaaf, Calvin, &c. It is sustained by Ebz., E. G., and H., and by the great body of the Cursive MSS., and by the Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic versions, and as Dr. Alexander says "commonly."

† See Baumgarten, as above.

own company." He alludes to the "certain *other deputies*," and to "*a distracted constituency appointing commissioners*," to "the deputies on both sides," including "Syrian deputies commissioned to consult." (Pp. 84, 85.) Dr. Killen, in reviewing this council from another stand-point, (p. 620) again declares, "A few years afterwards the *representatives of several Christian communities* assembled in the holy city and ordained decrees."

We have here, therefore, a very remarkable proof that the word "presbyter" in the New Testament was the official designation of ministers, and that other terms are employed to distinguish "the representatives of the people" as a separate order of officers. The term "the brethren" is certainly used in a special as well as in a general sense. It is embodied in the record of their decree, and in the introductory address of the decree itself, in marked separation from apostles and presbyters. It is found also in similar distinction from the people in many salutatory passages.* The *bishops* in Acts xx. 28, and presbyters in v. 17, are included under the title *brethren* in v. 32. An official representative sense must also be given to this term in Acts xviii. 23—27; Acts xvi. 2. Compare Acts xiv. 23; 1 Tim. iv. 14. That the term *brethren* is used as a title of distinction as well as a common Christian appellative, is maintained by many.† It is also employed to denote a colleague in office.‡ Bloomfield concurs with Mosheim and Kuinoel in thinking that these brethren "were select persons from the laity, of most knowledge, influence, and credit, perhaps *delegated* from the whole body." (*Crit. Digest*, Acts xv. 6.) Neander considers these brethren as representing all, and acting in their name. (*Hist.* vol. i., p. 205.) Bishop Hinds regards them as "other official persons met as the plenipotentiaries, each of his own body, who may be called the whole church, because appointed to represent it." (*Hist. of Rise and*

* See 2 Cor. i. 1; 1 Thess. iii. 2; Heb. xiii. 23; Phil. i. 20; 2 Cor. ii. 13 and viii. 18, 22, 23, and xii. 18, and ix. 35; Gal. i. 2; 1 Cor. i. 1; Phil. ii. 25, and i. 14; Eph. vi. 21; 1 Pet. v. 12; 2 Pet. iii. 15; Rev. xix. 10. Compare xxii. 9.

† Vorstius in Phil. Sacr. cap. iii. 166, determines the meaning, in some cases, to be dignissimus quem adeas. See also Suicer Thesaurus *in verbo*.

‡ Robinson's Greek Lexicon *in verbo*.

Progress of Christ., pp. 145, 146.) This was also the opinion of Bishop Jewel, Whitaker, and other Episcopalians, and of Bishop White, who, on this ground, urged and secured the popular lay representation in the Episcopal Conventions in this country. Wordsworth (*Greek Test.* in loco,) says, we have in this Council the model of all succeeding ones, and for the presence "of the laity assisting at the deliberations, and giving force to the decree of the council." (*Ib.* v. 2.) Many of our own writers take this view of the council, such as Professor Jamieson, Blondel, Bucer.* In v. 22, these *brethren* are called *leading men*, that is, leaders, *governors*, or rulers, and in v. 7, &c. "*the whole* church or multitude, because," as Dr. Wordsworth says, "the presence of all is continually assumed in cases where the assembly is open to and representative of all."

Pastors and Teachers. Eph. iv.—*What?*

Let us then pass on to the consideration of another passage, in which these theorists endeavour to find support for the common application of the same names to ruling and teaching presbyters, by dividing the "pastors and teachers," in Eph. iv. 8—11, so as to correspond with the ruling and teaching elders *it* seeks in 1 Tim. v. 17. These two words, however, have been given to Christ's under shepherds ever since he had a flock to tend, or wandering sheep to be sought for amid the mountain wastes of sin and sorrow. But according to this theory, "pastor" means ruling elder, and "*teacher*"—what does it mean? According to this theory it only sometimes refers to the minister, but not less officially, as both Dr. Killen and Dr. Adger teach, to the ruling elder, whose function it is to teach, and to be apt to teach, and from house to house. The "pastors and *teachers*" given by the ascended Saviour have, however, been generally regarded as denoting the very form of metaphor under which Christ commissioned and designated his first ministers, who call themselves and their successors presbyters; under which Paul gave his final charge to the presbyters at Miletus; under which Peter charges these same and all other presbyters; and under which Christ, the great exemplar

* Jamieson's Cyprianus Isotemus, 542, 13. Blondel in do. 542.

of all his ministers, is represented as the shepherd, or *pastor*, and bishop or *teacher*. Ruling and preaching are also associated in all those passages in which, by almost universal consent, the ministry is spoken of—"Remember them that have *the rule* over you, who have *spoken* unto you the word of God," &c. (Heb. xiii. 7, 17.) "Aptness to teach," as well as capacity to rule, is made an essential characteristic of a presbyter-bishop, (1 Tim. iii. 2;) and again in Tit. i. 9, where it is required of a bishop that he "hold fast the faithful words as he had been taught, that he may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers"—passages which, until this theory arose, no one had ever dreamed of applying to any but to presbyters and bishops, as ministers. "The Constitution and Discipline" of Dr. Killen's own church under section 4, treats of "bishops, presbyters, pastors, teachers, ministers, commonly called clergy," and after quoting as proof-texts all the above passages, including Eph. iv. 11, (*pastors* and *teachers*,) as referring to the ministerial office, with its two-fold functions of ruling and teaching, it concludes by saying, "Every regularly appointed teacher, pastor, or minister, was an apostolic presbyter, and every presbyter labouring in word and doctrine (*and it never applies the title of presbyter to any other*) was the apostolical bishop or overseer." (Pp. 5, 6.)

But even where these terms have been divided, they have been considered as representing different but not distinct officers—the one a preacher and pastor, and the other a doctor, professor, or systematic instructor. "None of these distinctions, however," says Dr. Eadie, "can be sustained scripturally and historically. We agree with those who hold that one office is described by the two terms." "The one office is honoured appropriately with two appellations. It comprised government and instruction." "Such pastors and guides rule as well as feed the flock, for keeping or tending is essential to the successful feeding." (*Commentary* in loco, p. 288, &c.) "The absence of the article before teachers proves," says Dr. Hodge, "that the apostle intended to designate the same persons as at once pastors and teachers." He quotes Augustine and Jerome, and adds: "In this interpretation, modern commentators,

almost without exception, concur." (*Comment* on pp. 226, 227.) "These officers," says Schaff, "are undoubtedly the same with those elsewhere in the New Testament, commonly called presbyters, and fewer times bishops, whose business is expressly declared to be the feeding and oversight of the flock." (*Apost. Church*, p. 522.)

Neander, who originated this theory and interpretation of "pastors and teachers," admits that at the time of the Pastoral Epistles, presbyters, on account of heresies and heretics, were required to be able to teach. "The gift of teaching, and the order of teachers are then spoken of as constituting an entirely distinct function and order." (*History of Church*, vol. i. p. 260.) The passage in Titus i. 9, he thinks, "certainly implies that the bishop must possess the gift of teaching," or "the ordinary and regular office of teaching." (Pp. 258, 267.) But when he assumes *a very late date* for these epistles, he relies upon "an extremely doubtful hypothesis of a second imprisonment of the author at Rome."* "The conclusion, therefore, is that the presbyters or bishops of the apostolic period were the regular teachers and pastors, preachers, and leaders of the congregations;"† and it is very pleasant to find Dr. Killen concurring in our views when he interprets from another stand-point. Thus, on page 260, after showing that the churches of all Asia, (see pp. 258, 259,) were included in Paul's farewell charge, (Acts xx.) and in Peter's solemn appeal, (1 Peter v. 1—5,) to the presbyters of so many provinces, Dr. Killen declares that the metaphorical illustration and "the designations are identical." The exhortation of Peter in verse 5, "*is obviously addressed to ministers.* This command can be acted upon *only by ministers* who are confederates, and hold the same ecclesiastical status." He would therefore on this occasion render the words thus: "Likewise ye younger (presbyters) submit yourselves unto the elder, and ALL to ONE ANOTHER." "I have," he adds, "supposed *presbyters* (his own italics) to be understood as the apostle is speaking to *them* in all the preceding part of the chapter."‡

* Schaff, Apost. Church, pp. 531, 328—347. † Ibid.

‡ Ancient Church, page 260. The reconciliation of this with pp. 232 and 258, we cannot of course be responsible for.

Vitringa discusses at length the meaning of the terms pastor and teacher. "One thing," he says, "is certain, and *admitted by all*, that Paul by pastors designates the ordinary presidents (*Præfectos*) of the church, those I say, which are otherwise called presbyters and bishops." This he illustrates by the synonymous use of these titles, and by Ignatius, and by a multitude of passages from the Jewish writings, and among them from Philo and the Zohar, to prove that every part of the office of the doctor of the synagogue is attributed to pastors; whence we conclude that pastors (פרנסים *Parnasim*) formerly signified learned and pious men, who were devoted to the work of making prayers and exhortations to the people, and expounding the Holy Scriptures. They were not, therefore, as Lightfoot supposed, the deacons, but "those rulers of the synagogue who were at the same time doctors, eminent for learning and piety."* In Vitringa's day, the term pastor was admitted to mean docere, monere, sacramenta administrare, et omni potestate a Christo ministris suis concessa, gregem gubernare. Vitringa could therefore triumphantly ask "whether any one could *seriously* dare to assert and defend the application of these titles of pastor and bishop to lay presbyters, (Presbyteris laicis.)" Since his day confidence has considerably increased, but perhaps, if the authority for it is traced up, it may terminate in an elephant resting upon nothing.

The argument from the plurality of Presbyters.

We are thus led to notice another, and indeed the most relied upon of all the grounds on which this theory is based. This is the admitted fact, that in general a plurality of presbyters is spoken of as existing in one and the same place, and sometimes even in one and the same church. On this subject we have already said enough to undermine its apparent strength by calling to mind the missionary character of the apostolic and primitive churches, and the relation of these many presbyters to the whole field of their united labours. Like all the other premises from which this theory draws its conclusions, this argument is at once prelatic and congregational, and is employed by both parties for the overthrow of

* De Syn. Vet. Lib. iii. part I. chap. ii. pp. 621, 627, et passim.

Presbyterians. As employed by prelatists, it may be found discussed and most ably refuted by Clarkson, in his very learned works on Diocesan churches and Primitive Episcopacy, and by others.

Mr. Guthrie, whose recent work on the eldership we noticed as an intended manual for the Independent Morrisonian churches, carries out *the admitted premises of all these theorists* in this manner. It is granted that when the New Testament speaks of a plurality of presbyters and bishops in every particular church, they allude to the two classes of the one order of rulers, called indiscriminately presbyters, since we could not imagine a plurality of preachers in any one infant church. All arguments, therefore, founded upon such a plurality of preachers for a presbytery, are baseless, and "a territorial church or a national church is a purely human institution—a hissing shibboleth sounds in their very names." (P. 2.) On page 15, Mr. Guthrie boldly avers that the largest cities mentioned in the New Testament—and he names "such large metropolitan centres as Jerusalem, Antioch, and Rome—had but one church." "The principle that harmonizes and explains the whole is, that while all elders in the apostolic churches were rulers, only some were teachers." (P. 80, &c.) Now this is precisely the argument of every one of the writers we have examined. Mr. McKerrow, for instance, occupies a whole chapter in proving that the order of "presbyters" existed in the apostolic churches, and then, in another chapter, offers two proofs that these presbyters were of two kinds—ruling and teaching: first, their plurality; and second, 1 Tim. v. 17. But the first we perceive leads to Congregationalism, and the second is an assumption which is disproved by the established usage of the New Testament, and, as we will show, by inherent critical difficulties. Both Vitringa and Selden make it evident that there were many synagogues in one place, and also a plurality of presbyters in one synagogue, varying in number with circumstances.* The whole analogy of the synagogue usage, and the missionary character of the apostolic churches, concur in rendering the uniform ancient Presbyterian interpretation the only true and satisfactory one. This is well expressed by Thorndike,

* Vitringa, Lib. III., chap. xviii., p. 874.

who says there were anciently "presbyters in every church," and "presbyters in every city;" "not meaning one in a place, but presbyteries, that is, colleges, bodies, companies of presbyters, with common advice to order the *churches* planted in those cities." The character of these churches must, from the nature of things, have been the same as every such church in heathen lands now. In Shanghai, for instance, there are "six missionary churches, and many smaller preaching-places afford facilities for inquirers. This is felt to be the case by the younger missionaries, in such a degree that most of them are anxious to go out into 'the regions beyond;' leaving to those who first broke ground here the task of training up, and building up in the faith, those who in the course of Providence are attaching themselves to the army of the Lord, and are requiring to be more perfectly instructed in the way of life."

In exact accordance with what is thus taking place in heathen lands—and such as constituted the field of apostolic and primitive Christianity—we find everywhere the presbyters acting as a combined, organized body; we find household churches (ἐκκλησίαι κατ' οἶκον) frequently mentioned and greeted;* and we have found the apostolical epistles addressed, not to any one of these, but to the whole body of Christians in and around Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, &c., as all together forming *one body or church.*†

The conclusion, that because there were generally a plurality of presbyters in every apostolical mission church, therefore the majority of them were not preachers, and must have been ruling elders, is a triple *non sequitur*, 1. in assuming any other meaning for *presbyter* than minister; 2. in confining all to one congregation and locality; 3. in arguing from a *forming* to a *fixed* condition of the church. No such officers as ruling elders were then known under the title of presbyters. Many congregations were united under the care of one mission church, and economy, comfort, and efficiency would not only justify but require the association of several ministers together. A plu-

* Rom. xvi. 4, 5, 14, 15; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2.

† 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1; 1 Cor. i. 2, v. 1 sq.; 2 Cor. i. 1, 23, ii. 1 sq.; Col. iv. 16. This Neander, in both his works, recognizes, and Baur. See Schaff, 526, 527.

rality of presbyters in one mission church no more proves that this term referred to ruling elders as well as ministers, than the same fact does at Shanghai, Ceylon, and elsewhere. Nay, Dr. Owen himself teaches, that there may be many ministers as well as *one*, even in a single congregation, and the Presbyterian Standards of the Reformers, of Geneva, of Westminster, and of the Scottish, and all affiliated churches to this day, provide for such a plurality. This theory is, therefore, built on the sand—upon baseless assumptions—upon a loose interpretation of an equivocal term—upon an inconclusive argument, which understands the term *presbyter* in one sense in its premises, and another in its conclusion.

The Presbyter of the Fathers and Reformers.

The conclusion, therefore, remains, that in the usage of the New Testament the term presbyter—and its collateral terms bishop, pastor, &c.—mean the same office that they do now, and refer exclusively, in a strict official sense, to the order of ministers. This is true also of the apostolical and primitive Fathers, and, as we have seen, of the Reformers, and of all Presbyterian Standards. The assertion that because among the mission churches of the early Fathers, and the growing corporations of later and corrupt churches, a plurality of presbyters is spoken of, therefore they must have been in greater part ruling elders, is simply preposterous. The language of these Fathers, and the condition of their churches, are precisely analogous to those of the New Testament writers and churches. Presbyters and bishops are their ministers, and are one and the same order, until by degrees (*paulatim*, as Jerome says,) the bishop was regarded as a higher, and the presbyter a second or lower order, and deacons a third order of MINISTERS. This fact of the original identity—as the one and only order of ministers—of presbyters and bishops, is the corner-stone of the historical argument for the scriptural, apostolical, and primitive polity of Presbyterianism. Render the term presbyter equivocal and appellative, and the argument falls to the ground. But if there is anything historically true, it is that the terms presbyter and bishop have come down to us as the invariable and untransferable titles of the ministry.

According to Augusti and other archæologists, the term presbyter was usually retained in ecclesiastical writings, or if translated into Latin it was rendered by *sacerdos*, pastor, and the like."* The Saxons used the word *preostre*, and afterwards, by contraction, *prester*. The High and Low Dutch have it in the word *priester*. The French say *prestre;* the Italians, *prete*, and the Spaniard, *presbytero*. The translation of the word into English occasioned much controversy. In the English translation of 1562 the word priest was employed to translate presbyter.† Hooker justifies this rendering as being liable to no mistake, but as it had been so long perverted he was willing to drop it.‡ Beza and Erasmus retained the word presbyter. Our translators, being all prelatists, and acting for King James, after he had become such, found it necessary to conceal much of the argument in favour of presbytery by adopting the ambiguous word *elder*. But having been introduced, it has come to be used by Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, &c. for their ministers as distinguished from the laity or brethren, and from officers called deacons, stewards, &c. "*There is, therefore, no dispute,*" says Riddle, "*that the term presbyter continued to denote those ministers to whom the New Testament gives indifferently the title of presbyter or bishop.*"§ Suicer, in his Thesaurus of the Fathers, sustains this statement, and though in favour of the distinction of ruling and teaching elders, gives no attempted example of it earlier than Bullinger and Illyricus among the Reformers.‖ Bentley, therefore, to sustain prelacy, invented the theory that in the next generation after the apostles all Christendom agreed to use the term *bishops* for prelates *as* successors of the apostles, and leave presbyter to denote ordinary ministers under them.¶ But the identity of presbyters and bishops was openly acknowledged in remarkable testimonies by the most learned of the Fathers—Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theo-

* Riddle's Antiquities of the Christian Church based on Augusti, &c., p. 232.

† See Fulke's Defence of the English Translation, 1583, p. 250. Parker Society ed.

‡ Ecclesiastical Polity.

§ Riddle, ibid, p. 57.

‖ Tom. I., Πρεσβύτερος.

¶ See in Wordsworth's Greek Testament, on Acts xx. 28.

doret, &c.—even after the Romish prelatical system had become completely established.* This is the standing and irrefragable argument of Presbyterians against Prelacy. It was the sledge-hammer of the Reformers, and is the substance of Dr. Killen's able work, and of his skilful application of the late discovered statue of Hippolytus and his Philosophumena, and of the Catacombs of Rome, and of the insoluble riddle of the early prelatical succession at Rome and elsewhere.† "The pastor, (presbyter) and not the prelate," says Calderwood, one of the earliest Scottish champions of presbytery, "is the minister whom the apostles did approve. Such were Linus, Clemens, Cletus, Anacletus, fellow-presbyters at Rome at *one time.*"

It is perfectly preposterous to question a position now universally admitted by Prelatists themselves. Dr. Barr and Rothe agree therefore in the opinion that "both the presbyter and bishop were originally the same in their sphere with the later bishops;"‡ and a most valuable part of Dr. Killen's work—and it enters into every Presbyterian argument§—is his elucidation of the process by which the moderator, or as he calls him in one place, "the chief *pastor!*" "became permanent, and was called by eminence the bishop."‖ Gieseler and Guericke elaborate the same argument.¶

It is of some weight to mention that such critically accurate and candid writers as Archbishop Whately and Bishop Hinds use the term *elder* interchangeably with minister, and give authority for the exclusive application of the original word presbyter to ministers.**

We have prepared an analysis of the evidence presented from the Fathers to prove that by presbyters they must have under-

* See Gieseler, Rothe, l. c., 207—217. Schaff, p. 524, &c.

† Ancient Church, pp. 344, 348, 350, &c., and 331 *et passim.*

‡ See Olshausen on Timothy, Introd., p. 174. Edinb. ed.

§ See, for instance, Hill's Lectures, vol. ii., on Episcopal and Presbyterian Controversy.

‖ See pp. 556, 578, 579, 580, 584, 585, 619, &c.

¶ Gieseler, vol. i. p. 108, 109.

** Whatcley's Lessons on the Worship of God, Lesson v. § 11, 12, &c. Hinds' History of the Rise and Progress of Christianity, last ed. 1 vol. pp. 231, 232, 233, who quotes several early Fathers.

stood ruling elders, which, however, we must omit. Separate from such quotations, the proofs founded upon plurality of presbyters, and upon the existence of *other persons* called *seniores plebis, seniors of the people*—(not ruling elders nor *presbyters*, but *seniores*)*—and there is not a particle of proof that the PRESBYTERS of the Fathers were, in any case, any other than ministers authorized to preach and administer ordinances. "*Nothing*," says Vitringa, "*is more certain, nothing in all ancient history is more determined*," than that presbyters "were part of the clergy, like the bishops, or, if you please, like the ministers of the word of our time, having power to administer sacraments, baptize, anoint, preside at the Lord's Supper, distribute the elements, bless the people," &c., "and that in the oriental churches presbyters were preachers equally with bishops, is a fact beyond dispute."† By an examination of evidence analogous to that of the statue of Hippolytus, Rothe has concluded that the *seniores plebis* were civil magistrates. At any rate they were laymen, (plebis) representatives of the people, not even called presbyters, but enumerated after, and in addition to them, and were confined to the North African churches.‡

1 *Timothy* v. 17, *examined.*

We have now examined every ground upon which this theory attempts to establish the claim of ruling elders to be the presbyters of Scripture except one. We have seen that in the New Testament the term presbyter refers to ministers of the word "able to teach others also," and to commit their office, by ordination, to faithful men in perpetuated succession.

We are now, therefore, prepared to take up the consideration of the only passage in which apparent authority has ever been found for the theory which makes presbyters one order of rulers with two classes, that is, 1 Tim. v. 17. As translated by Alford, the words are, "Let the presbyters, (*πρεσβυτεροι*) who have well-presided, (over their portion of the church's

* That these *seniores* were not church officers at all is the opinion of Vitringa. See Vitringa at length at p. 511, &c. He is of opinion that a reference to them does the cause of ruling elders more harm than good.

† See page 489, 511. ‡ Ibid.

work) be held worthy of double honour, especially those that labour in the word and teaching."

There is, it will be evident, nothing here to *suggest* any other distinction than that of work or occupation among officers holding the same offices, and members of the same order. Prelacy and Popery have eagerly sought to establish a distinction of order (or class,) in order to create a divine right for an order of rulers who, while authorized to preach, are chiefly commissioned to exercise the power of jurisdiction. *A distinction* in this passage makes, therefore, for Prelacy and Popery, and hence many authorities from among Prelatists can be quoted for the distinction. By an equivocal, indeterminate meaning of the word presbyter, they hope to destroy our argument for the one order of co-equal ministers. But even if such a meaning and such a distinction are admitted, what is gained for the theory that makes *ruling* the one fundamental order and *preaching* a class under it? Nothing but contradiction in the very words of the passage itself. For they plainly reverse that order and subordinate ruling to teaching. And so do Calvin and the other Fathers of the Presbyterian church. Let us hear old Ayton,* and to understand fully his language, let it be borne in mind that when lay elders or governors were agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly, the Independents and Erastians in Parliament succeeded in destroying the whole system by securing the right of appeal from ecclesiastical to civil courts, and the presence of four elders in each ecclesiastical court to one minister.† Ayton, like other defenders of Presbyterianism of that period, urges that as licensing probationers, ordination of ministers, suspension, deposition, excommunication, and the like . . . nearly and particularly concern the ministerial office," "it is reasonable that in concluding any acts of jurisdiction or government in the church, it ought to be by plurality of ministers. The pastoral office is a SUPERIOR ORDER to that of mere ruling elders."

This passage, therefore, on any interpretation, can never be sufficient to authorize the theory which makes ruling elders and

* Primitive Constitution of the Church, &c.

† See Reid's Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Vol. 2, pp. 33, 34.

not ministers the one fundamental order, neither does it warrant any other meaning of "presbyter" than what we have found to be the *uses loquendi* of the New Testament, and of the Presbyterian and all other churches, in all ages. Presbyter in this passage means just what we have seen it means in every other passage—the minister to whom rule *and* authority, presidency over the churches, *and* labouring in word and doctrine, were assigned as his peculiar functions. Presumptively this is and must be its meaning, unless it can be proved that it is not. We are not called upon to prove that it is, nor to give any satisfactory and unobjectionable interpretation. This must be given by those putting on the word presbyter here a meaning not found elsewhere, and by no means necessary here. There are a number of explanations which have been given of the passage, as having exclusive reference to the ministerial office, while no adequate reason can justify the foundation upon it of two indivisible, indeterminate, unequal, and fundamentally distinct classes of presbyters—*one* to *rule* ONLY and one to do what? To labour in word and doctrine *only?* This would be the *contrast*, and the necessary contrast, *if there is, as is alleged, a division into two classes.* But this is not the theory which the words are made to sustain, nay, to originate and authenticate. That theory makes the two classes to be, one that rules well, or ruling elders, and one that does this, *and while doing this* labours in word and doctrine. The text repudiates any such division. It implies no division, but affirms that while all presbyters that act well their parts as rulers in the church are worthy of double honour, they are especially so if they labour hard and faithfully in what is their chief end and business, under the commission of Christ—in the preaching of the gospel —labouring in word and doctrine. There is here no distinction in order or class, but only in the department in which efficient labour is most to be commended, and to discharge which the ministry is to be supported, and ministers enabled to give their whole time, and study, and labour, to pastoral duty.

The Provincial Synod of London say: "They (ministers) are called *such as rule well;* not in any civil way, as state officers, but such as labour (rule well) in word and doctrine." This is,

after all, the force of the passage. Double honour—that is ample support—and being esteemed highly in love for their works' sake, are *not to be given*, except where the well-ruling of the presbyter (who is officially both ruler and teacher) is shown in his labours in the word and doctrine. Preaching and teaching—teaching while preaching—earnestly and zealously applying the word and doctrine to the flock publicly, and from house to house—this is the "rule well" that is to be honoured and supported. In other words, ruling is in order to preaching, and not preaching in order to ruling. Authority and rule—the keys—are given to impart efficiency to preaching, and to render it the power of God unto salvation—the intermediate causative agency between the two final ends of the church of God, "the perfecting of the saints," and "the edifying (or completing) the body of Christ." Mean what it may, therefore, this text must mean the exaltation of "the ministry of reconciliation," and not ruling; and mean what it will, it *cannot* mean what this theory of a two-fold presbyterate teaches, and requires it to declare; since, if it does divide it, it will be into those that rule *only*, and those that labour in doctrine *only*. There is no alternative. If they who are required to labour well in word and doctrine, are also required to "rule well," then are they one and the same, in office, in authority, in qualification, in function, and in rights, however differing in personal gifts or in official devotedness. If, on the other hand, the "rule well" and the "labour in word and doctrine" are distinct, then they are distinguished here as those that only "rule well," and those who *do not rule*, but labour only in word and doctrine. But that helps this theory as little as the Presbyterian view, and is contrary to what is elsewhere established as true of presbyters, and to the whole context, which refers only to one order of presbyters, and that—as Calvin and all other interpreters admit—the order of the ministry.

The emphasis in this passage, according to the Greek language, is: 1. On the word *presbyters*, which is the subject of the proposition. 2. On προεστωτες καλως, who *do well* what is implied in acting as a *proestos*, that is, one who presides. 3. On κοπιωντες ἐν λογῳ,* &c.; *they* who "*labour* in word and doctrine."

* See Taylor's Emphatic New Testament. London. 1854.

"The meaning of the term *presbyters*, we have established to be *ministers*. By προεστως is literally expressed one set over, at the head of, as the president or the mayor of a city." (*Plato* and *Polyb.*, in Liddell and Scott.) By "*who labour*," is literally expressed, who are beaten out, wearied, and faint with their zealous ministerial labours.* What is predicated of presbyters, therefore, is, that they preside and moderate in all church assemblings, and are engaged in imparting instruction. And what is declared of presbyters who preside and administer *well*, and *labour zealously* in preaching and teaching, is, that they deserve double honour. In this verse, the term *presbyter* is therefore determined to mean that officer who is both a *labourer* in word and doctrine, *and* a *proestos*—a leader, president, administrator of ordinances, steward of mysteries, and ruler, having the keys of the kingdom.

A clear exposition of the indubitable official use of the term προεστωτες translated "*rule*," will of itself determine the untenableness of the theory that applies it to ruling elders, and not to ministers. The term has been already shown to be a correlative term with presbyter, expressive of the same persons and offices. The *proestos* in 1 Thess. v. 12, had pastoral care of souls, closely laboured among them, and admonished them as an ensample to the flock of which he was the shepherd. Justin Martyr uses the word *proestos* six times for the minister who presided in public worship, preached, prayed, gave thanks, and blessed the people. Irenæus speaks of "presbyters who are elated with pride at their exaltation to the *chief seats*." Firmilian speaks of "the church where presbyters *presided*, in whom is vested the power of baptizing and imposition of hands." Hilary says, "A presbyter is he who is distinguished with *the first seat*." Ambrose says, "by the angels of the Apocalypse, we are to understand the *rectors* or *proestotes*." Epiphanius says, "Aerius, having become a . . . . presbyter in Alexandria, *presided over* a church (προιστατο) called Baucolis." Tertullian calls the presbyter the "*summus sacerdos qui est episcopus*." (See Killen, pp. 531, 563.) Hermas speaks of "the bishops, that is, the *presidents* of the churches." (Ibid.) Dr. Killen calls Polycarp "the apostolic presbyter,"

* See Emphatic New Testament, by Taylor, *in loco*. Bagster. London.

"the presiding minister of the church." (Pp. 557, 558.) "We have shown," (says Dr. Killen, p. 560,) "that in various cities . . . . . the senior presbyter continued to be *president* (*proestos*) until about the close of the second century." The name of presiding presbyter (προεστως πρεσβυτερος) continued, he says, "to be given to the Roman bishop until at least the close of the second century." (Pp. 332, 333.) But we must stop, for we might fill pages of proof from Dr. Killen alone.* The term *proestos* limits and restrains the *possibly indefinite* meaning of *presbyter* to its strict official and ministerial one, and renders any other interpretation impossible.

But the emphatic and qualifying term, καλως, translated *well*, increases the impropriety of such a reference, since it declares that the distinction affirmed is not in office, nor even in function, but in their perfect or imperfect discharge. Judicious presiding required no ordinary ability and wisdom. In all assemblies, the regularity or irregularity of their proceedings depends much on the wisdom and prudence with which they are conducted; and in the infant state of the church, when confusion and disorder did prevail, and made specific instruction necessary, and when enemies were ever ready to take advantage of anything which could be converted into calumnious charges, the security, as well as prosperity of the churches depended essentially upon the judicious, as well as winning manner of their presiding ministers.† But, while all this is true, yet the earnest and edifying presentation of the truth as it is in Jesus, well and laboriously prepared, and affectionately conveyed from house to house, as well as from the pulpit—this was the throne and sceptre of the ministry, the shepherd's crook, by which souls were won and watched for Christ, and therefore the apostle adds the word "*especially*," (μαλιστα) to carry on the emphasis of the word "*well*," (καλως,) and thus by one of the most general and commonly used terms expresses this thought—that is to say, if they also "labour in," or diligently and faithfully hold forth the word of life. The term μαλιστα does not divide things that

* See pp. 506, 516—518, 576, 580, 584, 560, 564, 575, 576, 578, 319, 508.

† See Bloomfield and Benson in do. Crit. Digest, in loco.

are essentially different, but only marks a difference between things essentially alike. It is the remotest possible from scientific classifying phraseology.

It points here to some specified peculiarity of a portion of the same class by which they are distinguished from the rest, and not—*as this theory requires*—to *two* distinct classes. Neither does this theory allow "labouring in word and doctrine" to be peculiar to either class, but makes it common to both; and, undoubtedly, there is nothing in these words to imply public authoritative preaching any more than in others which this theory applies to ruling elders, such as "apt to teach," which is made a necessary qualification for ALL elders in this same epistle, in conjunction with "ruling well"—both being required as proofs of any person being qualified for the difficult task of governing the church of God.* All that is here described is therefore of one class, and of every one of that class—which must be the ministry.

But the class referred to is further determined to be the ministry, by the words "*double honour,*" (τιμης,) to which the word *especially*, and the subsequent word *labour*, are relative, and of which they give the reason. "Let the presbyters that rule or govern their flocks well be counted worthy of double honour, especially (μαλιστα,) that is, if they also," says Benson—"and that chiefly and because or in respect of their labour in word and doctrine," says Mede.† That this word refers to an ample and honourable support, is made very nearly certain by the connection. "From the consideration of the relief of the poor the apostle proceeds to the support of the clergy," says Bloomfield; and in confirmation he proceeds to give proof in v. 18. "To be thought worthy" means "the obtaining that of which one is thought worthy." Theophylact and Chrysostom interpret it "a liberal stipend." "And in this," says Bloomfield, "most of the recent commentators are agreed."‡ "The use of the term τιμη for stipend," he adds,

* See Litton on Church of God, p. 391.

† Mede's Works, vol. i., book i., disc. 19, p. 92. See also Litton on the Church, pp. 391, 392.

‡ Critical Digest. He refers to Wolf's Sch'l Lex., Heinrics, Whitby, and "many eminent moderns."

"may well be considered among the delicacies of Greek phraseology and of the apostle." "From the general tenor of examples, as well as from the context, *it is evident*," says Alford, "that not merely honour, but recompense, is here in question." Grotius refers the allusion to the double portion of the first born. The passage is given by the later Helvetic Confession as proof of the "stipend due to ministers—all things that be necessary for themselves and families." Calvin does not oppose Chrysostom's interpretation, and adds afterwards, "Paul enjoins that support shall be provided chiefly for pastors who are employed in teaching." In his Institutes, also, Calvin says, "The apostle here refers not only to the reverence due to them, (i. e. pastors,) but to the recompense to which their services are entitled."*

Doddridge interprets the words an "honourable maintenance, according to what they need, given in a liberal and respectful manner." Adam Clarke says, "Almost *every critic* allows that τιμη here means reward, stipend."† Wordsworth (*Greek Testament*) interprets by "double pay," and refers to Mede, Barrow, and others. On the analogous passage in 1 Thess. v. 13, "esteem them very highly in love, for their work's sake," Bloomfield remarks, "which of course includes providing for their honourable maintenance." (*Critical Digest.*) And Koppe on this text remarks that the words "plainly signify, provide him with sustenance."

But let us turn to the other term here employed, which combines to fix its meaning, and that is "*labour* (κοπιωντες) in word and doctrine." "This is a very general term," says Bloomfield, (*Crit. Dig. on* 1 *Thess.* v. 12) "to denote labouring for the promulgation of the gospel;" and Mosheim thinks that this kind of ministerial labour is made prominent, because especially necessary at that time.‡ The word evidently implies that the ministry is their *labour*—their daily, regular, and

* Book ii., chap. viii. § 35.

† He dwells upon the thought, and again fully on verse 18.

‡ Comment on the Affairs of Christians, vol i. See Rom. xvi. 6, 12; 1 Cor. xii; 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 10; xvi. 16; Gal. iv. 11; Phil. ii. 16; Col. i. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 10; v. 17. See also Limborch Theol. lib. vii., cap. iv., § 10.

exclusive occupation, so much so, that in order to give themselves wholly to it they must be supported.

We thus perceive that by the established use of the term presbyter; by the general tenor of the passage; by the context; by the force of its several terms; this passage must be interpreted as applying only to ministers, and that the *invariable* application of it to such by ancient interpreters, and by the very general consent of modern commentators, renders this interpretation certain, and most assuredly overthrows the theory which BUILDS upon IT a twofold order of ruling and teaching presbyters.*

Finally, on this passage let it be noted, that the Westminster Assembly, which perfected the Form of Government which is constitutionally that of all Presbyterian churches except our own and the Continental, rejected this text as a proof text for ruling elders, but employed it to prove that the minister had a ruling power in the church as minister, and that while there *ought* to be in every church one both to rule and labour in word and doctrine, "the precedence is due to ministers."†

1 *Thessalonians* v. 12.

This conclusion, however, will be still further strengthened by referring to the very analogous passage in 1 Thess. v. 12, 13, "And we beseech you, brethren, to know them who labour among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you; and to esteem them very highly in love, for their works' sake." In making this the text for his discourse before a convention of ruling elders on the nature of their office,‡ Dr. Thornwell said, "Commentators are universally agreed, that the rulers of the church are the persons to whom the apostle here refers." Now, this is true. But the rulers to whom these commentators refer it are ministers, and ministers only. We have been able to find no diversity among all within our reach, except one, who is of no permanent authority, referred to by Poole in his

* Poole in his Crit. Sacra, scarcely alludes to such an interpretation, and in his Annotations, after enumerating several interpretations (not including this) declines giving an opinion.

† See in Gillespie's Notes in his Works, vol. ii. pp. 4, 20, 58, 64.

‡ Held in Charleston in January, 1860. See Report of, in the Courier.

Synopsis. Their unanimity is wonderful and decisive. Dr. Thornwell's statement is equivocal. The middle term (*ruler*) in the syllogism—necessary to include ruling elders within the affirmation—must be employed in different senses in the two premises. This text does refer to rulers, and ruling elders are rulers. But it does not follow that it refers to ruling elders, since ministers are rulers in a very different sense from ruling elders. *They are rulers of ruling elders*, and before, and independently of them, by the very nature of their office, call, qualifications, and authority given to them *directly* by Christ, through the Holy Ghost and his word, and *mediately* by his appointed church court. They are brought into relation to the *people* only when licensed or ordained by that court to preach; and to any particular church, only when called to become, by mutual covenant, their pastor. "Ruling elders," however, "are *properly the representatives of the people, and chosen by* THEM for the purpose of exercising *government* and *discipline* in CONJUNCTION WITH pastors or ministers." Now, it is exclusively to pastors or ministers commentators universally refer this passage, and since it is closely analogous to 1 Tim. v. 17, the whole weight of their authority is in favour of the same interpretation of that passage. Calvin has a comment on this passage of nearly three octavo pages, and refers it exclusively to "pious teachers," "good ministers," "ministers who faithfully *preside*," "pastors," "teachers," "true pastors, that *by teaching govern* properly and faithfully," *fidèles ministres de la parole*, "whom the Spirit of God honours with the distinction of *presidency*." This *presidency* denotes "spiritual government . . . in the name and by the commandment of Christ . . . *presiding in the Lord*. Unquestionably that any one may be ranked among lawful pastors, it is necessary he should show he PRESIDES IN THE LORD . . . and what else is this but that by pure doctrine he puts Christ in his own seat," &c.

Dr. Owen, who is only second as authority to Calvin, with these theorists, on Heb. iii. 3—6, where ministers are declared by him to be partakers of the honour and glory of Christ as the great builder of the church, and therefore to be highly

esteemed, quotes in proof this passage. (*Exposition*, vol. vii. p. 563.)

We need not do more than refer to all the authorities in *Poole's Synopsis*, and to the full and argumentative exposition in his *Annotations*, to Matthew Henry, to Scott, as edited, with additional comments, by Dr. Symington, (Glasgow, 1858, vol. iii. 4to;) to the very full and able note of Guyse; to Burkitt and Clarke; to Gill, in a very extended note; to Doddridge, Barnes, and others. Alford refers the passage to presbyters or ministers as the rulers of the church, and all the terms to the same office.

Chrysostom and Theophylact, are explicit in giving the same application of the words. "If," says the latter, "you honour those who *preside* over you in temporal affairs, how much more should you respect those who do it in spiritual things—who regenerate you in baptism, pray for you," &c. See in Valpy, who expresses his views through them. (*Greek Testament*, with Notes.)

Grotius and Benson both refer the passage to "religious teachers," to whom respect, honour, and comfortable maintenance are due.* Wordsworth attaches importance to this passage, as proving, in this earliest period and church, the organization and regular support of the Christian ministry since "we have here a body of men labouring and *presiding*, and admonishing the rest—in a word, a body of clergymen, settled and established." (*Greek Testament*, with Notes.) So also speaks Bloomfield. (*Synops. Critic.*) "Ministers," adds Doddridge "*by virtue of their office*, may be said to preside over Christian assemblies." "This," says Litton, (*on the Church* p. 134,) "is an ultimate and essential idea in the office of a minister or preacher, and hence even the apostles and seventy were a body of persons authorized by Christ to *preside over* and conduct the affairs of his kingdom."

Some, however, besides these theorists, have found a diversity of rulers here spoken of, but of what kind? Ruling elders? No! Some, like Mosheim, say *if* the order of presbyters is to be divided, there are *three* kinds of *teachers* spoken of; and Bloomfield, Reeves, Barrow, and others, find

* Εἶδναι has this meaning in Gen. xxxix. 6.

here a chief bishop, or prelate ruling over his two inferior orders of clergy, so that while these were *pastores gregis* (*pastors of the flock*) he was *pastor pastorum et gregis*, (pastor of both pastors and flock,) as Charles I. was fond of saying. In every way, therefore, this passage is limited to ministers, who are, as all writers admit, (προεστωτες) *presiding rulers*, and hence this passage strengthens the similarly striking general concurrence in the interpretation of 1 Tim. v. 17.

Our Historical Name.

There is one other assumption in this theory, of which we desired to present a full historical refutation. It is, as stated by Dr. Adger, that "the distinction between bishops or elders who teach and rule, and bishops or elders who rule *only* . . . . gives us our name of the Presbyterian church—the church that holds to government by elders, *the essence* of whose office *is ruling and not teaching.*" (See *South. Presbyterian Review*, p. 167, 1859.)

Now this is contrary to fact, since elders are found in the Methodist, Lutheran, and—historically and constitutionally—in Congregational, Baptist, Independent, and, as Owen declares, in some form and name *in every church in the world.*

This is also contrary to history. The name of Presbytery was given to our system by Beza, perhaps a century before the name of "ruling elders" was commonly given to these representatives of the people; before the distinction referred to was definitively made; while as yet the church had not either the wish nor the power to make the office a purely spiritual or permanent one; while the office was denominated by various names in different churches and countries; before the office was uniformly or universally adopted, or made obligatory; and, finally, before even the courts of the churches were generally called presbyteries. These positions might all be fully sustained.

Presbytery, in its generic and historical meaning, is that system of polity of which the highest, the fundamental, and the absolutely essential officer is the *presbyter*, as opposed to prelate on the one hand, and to the people on the other. It is the presbyter who gives coherence, resistance, and attraction to

the whole body, combining in one organization the laity and the clergy; repelling the arrogancy of prelatic despotism; and attracting and attaching to it, the body of the people, by associating with it in co-equal government their chosen representatives, both for disciplinary and distributive rule—for the management both of its spiritual and temporal affairs.

The presbyter as opposed by, and opposed to, the prelate, and then again to the *plebs* or mass of the people, was to the Reformers the first point of assault and repulse, around which the battle of liberty was fought; the scriptural and impregnable fortress into which they ran, and the armoury from which they drew the sword of the Spirit to pierce even to the dividing asunder all the unscriptural despotism and dogmas of prelates, and to secure for the Lord's people his own priesthood, commissioned and sanctified by one Spirit, their long alienated birthright and inheritance in Israel. Let any one read the history of the Reformation at Zurich, at Geneva, at Wittemberg, at Edinburgh, everywhere; and he will see that the presbyter, as God's divinely instituted minister in opposition to unauthorized prelates, and to uncalled, unsent, visionary, or fanatical lay preachers, was the head and front of all their contendings, the fore-front of the hottest battle. Read the Scottish Confession, the Books of Discipline, the Book of Common Order, the Confessions of every Church, the Solemn League and Covenant, the Acts of the Scottish Assembly for the first fifty, yea, hundred years; let him read the "Pastor and Prelate" of Calderwood and other early apologetical vindications, and he will have no doubt that we wear the honoured name of Presbyterian in testimony to this cardinal office of presbyter with its all-embracing authority and relations.

Horror of Popery everywhere led to an almost equal horror of Prelacy; and in England, Scotland, and Ireland led to the Solemn League and Covenant to seek its complete extermination, and caused the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty. Down with prelacy and up with presbytery was the shout of a reformed and liberated church, especially among the Reformed, who rejected the different orders of ministers which even Luther was willing to tolerate, and who gloried in the name which at once pointed out their specific differ-

ence and seminal principle. And the long series of fearful persecutions endured at the hands of both Popery and Prelacy has imbued the minds of all Scotch and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians with a cherished ancestral love of the simple presbyter and their own appointed representatives and elders.

The Reformers, says Principal Hill, "*laid the foundation of Presbyterian church government on this principle, that all ministers are equal in rank and power.*"*

But to all this it is objected, that this attaches to our name as a church nothing that is peculiar to it. But were it so, a denominational name very rarely, if ever, expresses what is peculiar, but rather what is prominent. In its original and undivided condition, the doctrine of the presbyter was peculiar to Presbytery, and was carried as a fundamental basis, by every separating body, into their distinctive organizations. Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, are therefore to this extent Presbyterians, and have received names indicative of their points of difference. And, in truth, it could easily be shown that the doctrines of the unity of the church as catholic, and the principle of representation, are embodied more or less fully in the creeds of other churches besides the Presbyterian.† As a generic church, in contrast to Popery and Prelacy, the presbyter is the essential characteristic of Presbytery. The Presbyterian church is, therefore, a historic rather than a denominational title. It is generic, and not specific. It is founded upon the doctrine of the presbyter, and not of the ruling elder.

Before leaving this point, let us press the considerations, that this theory would actually sectarianize our holy catholic church, diminish her sun into a satellite, and thus obscure her glory. Our founders and fathers—Paul being witness—abjured any name that would narrow the one foundation, or substitute man and his measures for Christ and his glorious gospel. Enter not, O my soul, into their counsels, who would restrict that name

* See his whole exposition in his View, as above, and p. 43, &c., 8vo edit.; and his Lecture on Presbytery and Episcopacy, in his Lectures on Divinity. Paul Henry suggests this reason, (Life of Calvin, vol. i. p. 398,) on the whole argument, to which we could only allude.

† See the Platform of the Congregationalists, issued by their Board, 1855.

which has waved in bannered and exultant triumph amid the smoke and flame of many a battle, and in the hands of many a dying martyr, to the shibboleth of any party! Let it remain, as it was intended to be, a platform so simple, catholic, and broad, that all who believe in one generic order of divinely commissioned ministers—and this will include not only non-Episcopal, but many also among Episcopal communions—and also in holding forth to perishing sinners the pure gospel of the grace of God, may cordially work and strive together in furthering the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, in the unity of the Spirit and the bonds of peace.

The Destructive Tendencies of this Theory.

We have thus applied the axe to both root and branch of this new theory, growing, under such powerful and combined stimulus, to a portentous influence. None are abler advocates, or more ardent lovers of the doctrines, order, and polity of the Presbyterian church, than many of its defenders; nor would any abjure more solemnly than they, the dangerous consequences which, if generally adopted, it would logically entail. This theory, however, we do regard as, in its logical consequences, destructive to Presbyterianism—to the ministry, to one fundamental historical proof of Christianity, to the eldership, and to the deaconship—and in its controversy, needlessly provocative of division and debate among brethren, who love one another and the honoured mother of us all.

1. This theory is, *logically*, *destructive to the argument for Presbyterianism*, by making—just as prelatists wish us to do—our middle term equivocal, and our conclusion sophistical. The argument for Presbyterian polity against Popery, Prelacy, and Erastian "Popularity," (as Owen and others were wont to call a purely democratic polity,) is this: The twelve apostles, and the seventy others, commissioned by Christ to proclaim the gospel of the kingdom, must have permanent successors—according to the commission, promise, and ascension gift of Christ—as the teachers and rulers of the church, "always, unto the end of the world." But the only permanent successors of the apostles, as teachers and rulers in the church, are PRESBYTERS; (*otherwise called*, synonymously, *bishops*,

leaders, presidents, pastors and teachers, angels, ambassadors, heralds, &c.) Therefore, *presbyters* are the only permanent ministerial successors of the apostles.

This argument, around which all the research and reasoning of the many champions of presbytery are gathered, requires two points to be established. It is necessary first to prove that all these terms are used for one office and order—that is, for the PRESBYTER; and secondly, that the term *presbyter* refers unequivocally to *ministers.* For when prelatists are compelled to admit the overwhelming demonstration of this fact, they save themselves by appealing to "the miserable sophistry of names." "*Presbuteros*—i. e., *presbyter*," argued Dr. Mason's prelatical opponents, "signifies *an elder man*, whence *alderman.* By this new species of logic, it might be proved that the apostles were aldermen, and aldermen apostles." (*Mason's Works*, vol. ii. p. 40.) This is a standing Romish argument. "To translate *presbyter* by *elder*," say they, "is as wise and reasonable as if a man should translate *major Londini, greater* of London, and not *mayor;* and *Universitas Oxoniensis* the *generality*, and not the *University* of Oxford.*

Now, in his unanswerable and triumphant argument, Dr. Mason establishes the position that "the officers of the church are distributed, *without a single exception*, into the two general classes of presbyters or bishops, and deacons;" that these must mean something *official* and *appropriate*, and *fixed;* that they are *particular*, and not *general*, since it is impossible to believe that such an immense society should "be destitute of names by which the officers might be correctly known, so that when an official term is mentioned, no ingenuity could guess whether an officer inspired or uninspired, ordinary or extraordinary, highest or lowest, in the church was intended." He proceeds to show from Acts xv. that apostles and presbyters are *specific* terms of office, and from the regular ordination of presbyters in every city, and qualifications given in particular instructions, that these are not *general* terms of office, from which a prelate as well as a presbyter might be

* See in Fulke's Defence, pp. 267, 268.

inferred, but "were as distinctive, and were annexed to certain officers with as much regularity and exactness as any official terms can be at this day;" and that "the allegation of the hierarchy [*and our theorists*] that the term presbyter is an indefinite term, *signifying merely a ruler* without reference to his station [*as a minister*], is altogether false, and the objection, [*and the distinction into two classes, officially distinct,*] founded upon this allegation, is altogether frivolous." Pp. 48, 40.) In pursuing his opponent, who prosecutes his argument from "the promiscuous use of the terms presbyter and bishop in the sacred writings," Dr. Mason shows that "his conclusion is vain, because the premises are false," in overlooking "the distinction between the *absolute* and relative use of terms." "The sum is that the terms apostle, bishop, presbyter, and deacon, designate *with precision* officers known and established in the apostolic church." (Pp. 60, 48.) To admit, therefore, that the term presbyter designates two classes of officers, the one clerical and the other *lay*, (as Dr. Mason calls elders, vol. i. p. 191,) is therefore to destroy the whole argument on which Presbyterianism rests.* "Presbyterianism," says Dr. Baird, "is so called (and is what it is called) because it is governed by presbyters, and not by prelates." (*Religion in America*, Art. *Presbyterianism.*)

2. *But, secondly, this theory is, by the same argument, shown to be destructive to the ministry, as a distinct order and office in the church.* That it is both, the Provincial Assembly of London prove, in their unanswerable work on the Divine right of the gospel ministry,† by many arguments, one of which is, "From the *peculiar* names or titles whereby they are distinguished from other saints. "If God hath given peculiar names and titles . . . then this office is by Divine institution. For as the judgment of God is, so are the denominations which God giveth to things, *according to truth.* Surely the only wise

* We cannot, as we would have wished, enforce this argument from Dr. Killen's Ancient Church. Compare pp. 550, 551, 552, 553, 562, 563, 568—585, Hill's View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, pp. 19—28, &c. Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul, vol. i. p. 434. Schaff's Apost. Church, p. 525, and every writer from Blondel to Dr. Miller, Shimeall, Coleman, &c.

† See Jus Divinum Ministerii Evangelici, pp. 1—202.

God will not distinguish where he himself hath made no difference. But God hath given *peculiar* names and titles to ministers, such as: 1. pastors, (Eph. iv. 11; 1 Peter v. 2;) 2. teachers, (1 Cor. xii. 28; Gal. vi. 6;) 3. rule well, (1 Tim. v. 17;) 4. presidents, (Heb. xiii. 17, 24;) 5. superintendents and overseers of the flock, (1 Peter v. 2; Acts xx. 18; 1 Peter iv. 15,)" &c. Other arguments are drawn from the peculiar gifts and qualifications enjoined—the peculiar duties required of them, and towards them; the particular promises made to them; and many more.

Dr. Owen says, "Four things are required unto the constitution of a divine office, 1. An especial trust. 2. An especial mission or commission. 3. An especial name. 4. An especial work." (*Works*, iv. 355.) He repeats these proofs of a divinely instituted office, and gives twelve arguments to sustain the divine institution and authority of the ministry, including those above-mentioned, and all the texts usually given and involved in this discussion. (1 Pet. v. 2, &c.; Acts xx. 28; Eph. iv. 11, 12, 13; 1 Cor. xii. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 1—7; Tit. i. 5—9; Rev. ii. 1—5; Heb. xiii. 7, 17; 1 Tim. v. 17; and also all the names and titles in question; such as pastor or shepherd, bishop, elder (*presbyter*,) ruler, including "pastoral feeding, teaching, and ruling," &c. "On this office and the discharge of it, Christ," says he, "hath laid the whole weight of *the order, rule, and edification of his church*, in his name and by virtue of his authority." (Vol. xvi. 47—54.) In vol. ix. on Eph. 4, 8,* he proves the ministry to be the gift of Christ, "the *office*, and the persons to discharge that office." Gifts, says he, (*even the charisma of teaching*) "make no man a minister; but all the world cannot make a minister without gifts." He shows that the power in the church to call a minister consists in an absolute compliance with the command of Christ. "No church can make a man *formally* a minister that Christ hath not made so *materially*." "The way whereby the church doth call or constitute any person unto this OFFICE thus appointed, is by giving themselves up unto him in the Lord." (Pp. 431—436.)

This theory, therefore, annihilates the divine right, institution, and independence of the ministry. It deprives it of any

* He here assumes that pastor and teacher refer to the same office.

peculiar name or title, "ordained, defined, and limited by God himself."* Every name is converted into an appellative, and made to refer to the ministry only as one of two classes, or rather, the *function* or work of a portion of one class; and to refer primarily to the ruling elder. Every qualification is, in like manner, appropriated to the ruling elder, with every function, promise, responsibility, and required obedience, love, and honour. THE ministry is not among Christ's gifts, for ruling elders are "pastors and teachers," and are to be "apt to teach." It takes away all precision from official names, office, and work. They are neither ordained, limited, nor defined. The ministry is only "a new function, a gift added to a ruling elder and making him a teaching elder." But gifts, we have seen, without a direct authoritative mission to a divinely instituted OFFICE, "ordained, defined, and limited," cannot make any man a minister.†

On this theory, any man who believes himself to be gifted and called, is an authorized minister. Why not? if he can get people to believe as he does. This theory led to some thirty sects, with self-ordained lay preachers, at the time of the Westminster Assembly; and to all the melancholy evils during the great awakening so loudly deplored by Tennent and Edwards.‡ This theory has led the Virginia pastor and reviewer logically and practically to the same conclusion. The large body of Campbellites act upon this theory. "A Christian," they say, "is by profession a preacher of truth and righteousness, both by precept and example. He may of right preach, baptize, and dispense the supper, as well as pray for all men, when circumstances demand it." (*Chris. Sys.* p. 85.) Mr. Fall says: "We do not 'deny a gospel ministry,' as you charge; but we do deny *the exclusive claims* of any body of men, distinct from the body of the people to the sole right of teaching the people, of preaching the gospel, and of administering ordinances. We consider this the quintessence of Popery."§ (P. 42.)

* This is Dr. Breckinridge's proof of a divinely instituted office. (Vol. ii. p. 652.) And "every thing has a divine authority or no authority, at all." (Ibid, p. 542.)

† See Jus. Div. Min. Evang., pp. 67, 115.

‡ See Neal's Puritans and Hodge's Constitutional History, vol. ii. 99, 100.

§ Dr. Rice's Expositor, vol. ii. p. 191.

The Plymouth Brethren in England, and in their extended churches and members over the world, are distinguished by this rejection of a distinctive office of ministry, and have only general officers to rule, who may, any or all, preach. Now, as Dr. Thornwell observes, "extreme cases prove principles," and if we would avoid a similar *result* we must crush the serpent in the egg.*

This *theory*—not its advocates—is certainly Romish in that it makes ruling and the ruler paramount, and preaching and the preacher subordinate; since it makes the ruler fundamental and first, and the ministry only a new function or gift attached to it.

This theory is also suicidal. The *distinction* between the *potestas ordinis*, (*i. e.* "the power of teaching and administering the mysteries," which belongs to the minister or teaching elder, and the *potestas regiminis*, (*i. e.* power of rule or government,) is, says Dr. Breckinridge, "*fundamental;* and the *difference* in the exercise of the two powers is also *fundamental*, (pp. 641, 642,) *which distinction must exist also in those who hold the power, or else* ALL of them MUST hold BOTH forms of church power, and the inherent distinction in the nature of the power be liable to constant disregard." Now, the argument of Dr. Mason carries these premises with irresistible force to the conclusion, that there must be distinct and different names by which the holders of these powers, so *fundamentally* and inherently distinct, may be correctly known. To think otherwise is to attribute to God what never has happened in the affairs of men from father Adam down to the present A. D. 1860, and what is inconsistent with the nature and use of human language.†

And finally, on this point, by destroying the independence of the ministry, and making ministers representatives of the people, and dependent upon them, this theory destroys the balance of power inherent in the senatorial character of the ministry, and reduces our polity either to an oligarchy or a democracy, which even Dr. Owen repudiates.

* Southern Presbyterian Review, 1859, p. 619.

† See Works, vol. ii., pp. 44, 45, &c.

3. Before passing to the bearing of this theory on the eldership, we would press upon our readers its disastrous effect in seriously undermining an argument for the truth of Christianity, which may be regarded as a key-stone in the arch, or a corner-stone in the building. An order of ministers, known as presbyters and bishops, has always existed, from the times of the apostles continuously to this day.

"Now," as Archbishop Whateley puts the argument, "if a century ago, or ten centuries ago, or at any other time, a number of men had arisen, claiming to be the immediate successors (as above described) of persons holding this office, when, in fact, *no such order of men had ever been heard of*, such a silly pretension would have been immediately exposed and derided. There must always, therefore, have existed such an order of men, from the time of those apostles, who professed to be eye-witnesses of the resurrection, and to work sensible public miracles in proof of their divine commission. And consequently, the Christian ministry is a standing *monument* to attest the *public proclamation* of those miraculous events at the very time when they are said to have occurred. Now at that time there must have been great numbers of persons able and willing to expose the imposture, had there been any.

"And you are to observe, that this argument for the truth of the sacred history is quite independent of any particular *mode* of appointing Christian ministers. If, for instance, these had been always elected by the people, and had at once entered on their office, without any ordination by other ministers, still, if they were but appointed (in whatever mode) as immediate successors of persons holding the same office, the argument is the same. That mode, indeed, of admitting men into the ministry, which was practised by the apostles, has in fact been retained in all ages of Christianity. But the argument we have been now considering is quite independent of this. It turns entirely on the mere fact of the *constant existence* of a certain order of men."

Now if it is true—as this theory, in its various forms, teaches—that the terms *presbyter* and *bishop*, by which this order of ministers is known to have always existed, and to have perpetuated itself, "are not applicable," as Dr. Thornwell

explicitly concludes, "to preachers as ministers of the word;" and if, as he also declares, "it is clear, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that presbyters and ministers of the word are not synonymous terms," (see *Southern Presbyterian Review*, 1848, pp. 61, 66)—then the whole argument falls to the ground. For that such a succession of ruling elders, as distinct from ministers, can be clearly made out, is denied not only by infidels and by nine-tenths of the Christian world, but also, as we shall see, by a weighty number of the most learned Presbyterians.

4. *This theory destroys also, and for many of the same reasons, the ruling eldership.* It founds the office upon an equivocal term—upon an English rendering of the words (*καλως προεστωτες*) *the wise or judicious presidents*—upon a *very partially* supported interpretation of one single text, in contrariety to the universal criticism of all other denominations—to the positive decision of the Westminster Assembly, and to its form of government, which is the received standard of all Presbyterian churches but the American. An office and a name based on such a foundation, must rest upon shifting sand amid ever-wasting tides.

Besides, either the ruling elder alone, or the minister alone, must be understood by presbyter and be designated in its qualifications, call, gifts, offices, and obligations; and it is very certain the Christian world will never dethrone her ministry to enthrone the eldership over her demolished empire.

But further. Legitimate interpretation, of which Calvin and Owen are examples, almost necessitates the honourable support and exclusive occupation of the presbyters in 1 Tim. v. 17, and 1 Thess. v. 12, 13, and is presumptive proof that they cannot be ruling elders.*

Again. By clothing the eldership with all the names, and requiring for it all the qualifications, and imposing upon it all the duties, and fearful responsibilities, and laborious devotion attached in Scripture to presbyters, we render it impossible for any honest conscientious man to assume the office;

* Dr. King, on the eldership, allows that "it must be admitted that the word translated *honour* does sometimes allude to pay or wages, and that the allusions which follow do seem to favour this interpretation. Dr. Wardlaw argues from it as incontrovertible. See in do. 37, 35.

since, if fit and prepared for such an eldership, he is of course fit and prepared for, and must feel impelled to desire the office of a minister.

Now, Dr. King acknowledges that the great difficulty of getting elders "would be rendered insuperable by attaching preaching to the office," and surely all the qualifications required for a bishop must include this under "aptness to teach," and the many other forms in which teaching, instructing, and admonishing are made their duty.

Dr. Thornwell, in the discourse referred to, said that we may err in raising the standard of qualifications for the eldership too high, and that good common sense, prudence, ardent piety, and active zeal, were all that the office required. But if ruling elders are the presbyters and bishops of Scripture, they must possess ALL their required qualifications, and perform ALL their duties, and be EVERY ONE of them *apt* to teach, trained, skilled, and officially devoted to teaching. This, and nothing short of this, is on this theory demanded, under the solemn sanction of a vow, and a "woe unto them," if faithless. "There prevails amongst us," says Dr. Adger, (p. 177, do.,) "too low a conception of what the office is, and what it involves. The ruling elder is not a mere assistant of the minister. He is a high spiritual officer in Christ's house. He is a shepherd of the blood-bought flock. He rules in Emanuel's kingdom. He is a judge in the courts of the Lord. Sitting in that court he has committed to him the keys of the kingdom of heaven—and as he binds or looses on earth, it is bound or loosed in heaven!"

Let our elders think of this. If *presbyters*, they must be all this, or else rashly assume an office for which they may have neither the call, the qualifications, nor the desire. And then, by this theory, the elder ceases to be a layman, or properly a representative of the people. Not being a layman, he is of course a clergyman, "for he is not," says Dr. Breckinridge, "*by any means a different order*,"* and as "the government of the church is exclusively in the hands of elders," (do. p. 632,) it follows that the government of the church is a clerical oligarchy. For it is not the existence of a sacred order o

* Dr. Breckinridge, vol. ii. p. 641.

ministry, called and commissioned by Christ, and as independent of the laity as is a Senate in relation to a House of Representatives, that constitutes a hierarchy or priestcraft. No, but it is the exclusion of the *laity* and of the representatives of the laity, as a separate and independent house of lay delegates that makes a despotic priestcraft, a prelacy. And such a prelacy is logically created by this theory, which must land us either in Dr. Owen's abhorred "popularity," (i. e. *democracy*,) or in a clerical oligarchy of "ONE ORDER." The principle of representation is destroyed, and with it our glorious free representative and conservative commonwealth, of which we may say in the language of Milton, "it is the divinest, noblest, safest, and freest commonwealth that can be established among men."

Nay, by this theory, the very *existence* of ruling elders at any time, or anywhere, either in apostolic or subsequent times, is seriously endangered. The evidence for a divinely instituted *presbyter*, that is not by office and ordination qualified to preach and administer sacraments, &c., has been called in question on critical and historical grounds by many of our own ablest judges, and best friends. Dr. Miller admits that many of his brethren rejected it. Principal Hill regards the evidence for it as very slender. (View, as before.) Dr. Wilson of Philadelphia searched in vain to find such mute presbyters during the first three centuries. Professor Jamieson of Scotland, one of the ablest and most learned champions of presbytery, after having published in favour of such presbyters, publicly renounced it.* He quotes Blondel as of the same opinion, and many Presbyterians. The Westminster Assembly rejected the *name* ruling elder, which had been even voted upon, &c.,† 1 Tim. v. 17, as a proof-text for any such presbyter. Baxter says this was the prevalent opinion among Presbyterians in his day.‡ It was also, as we have seen, among the French Presbyterian churches, and those of the Remonstrants. Mr. Boyce, in his very able work on the Ancient Episcopacy, (p. 208,) affirms (and quotes Blondel as believing) that "the primitive presbyters were all ordained to

* Sum of the Episcopal Controversy, p. 87. Cyprianus Isotimus, p. 541.

† See in Gillespie's Notes.

‡ Orme's Life of, pp. 74, 77, and on Episcopacy.

the sacred office of the ministry." Gieseler rejects the distinction made by this theory. Mosheim does the same. Dr. Coleman and Riddle, in their "Antiquities of the Christian Church," founded upon Augusti and others, declare against this theory. Selden and Lightfoot, the greatest Hebraists of modern times, were against it in the Westminster Assembly. Vitringa, to whom all our knowledge of the synagogue is now chiefly referred, expresses himself in the most unqualified manner. "I am not," he says, "opposed to lay elders, but contrariwise greatly like them. I will not, however, offend against the brotherhood, of which I form a part, if I openly declare that I am able to find no such elders in the apostolical church of the first age; none such in the church of the age following; none in the *writings* of the apostles, or in the records of the age following, as far as they have been examined by me or others. This opinion, in which I have long been fully confirmed, I consider it no fault freely to divulge, though contrary to that of others, and which no other reason or presumption than the force of truth has compelled me to embrace. And can any one then dare," he adds, "seriously to assert and to defend the position that to these *lay elders* the name of *bishop*, or the name of *pastor*, can be appropriated? And if no one can so dare, then the question is settled concerning them, since no other presbyters (or elders) are acknowledged or constituted in the church of the Apostles, except those who are at the same time pastors and bishops," &c.* Professor Jamieson, as referred to above, uses similar language: "I can't find," says he, "during the first three centuries express mention of these seniors or ruling elders; for I freely pass from (i. e. *abandon*) some words of Tertullian and Origen, which I elsewhere mentioned as containing them, and so also from what I said of the Ignatian *presbyters* being ruling or non-preaching elders."† The very learned non-conformist writer, Clarkson, of whom Baxter says he was a man of "extraordinary worth for solid judgment and acquaintance with the Fathers," &c., coincides in this judgment, and so do many others.‡

* De Vet. Synag. p. 484.

† Jamieson's Cyprianus Isotimus, p. 544.

‡ Primitive Episcop. pp. 92, 100, 104, 105. See others referred to in Bib. Repert. 1843, p. 327.

Finally, Rothe, the most learned living antiquarian of Germany, has found, upon elaborate investigation, that the supposed *ruling presbyters* of the North African churches, the *seniores plebis*—Tertullian, Augustine, and Hilary, were, without doubt, *laymen distinguished from, and set over against the clergy, and no other than the civil magistrates within the parish or congregation—nobilissimi.* (See p. 237. Schaff also takes a similar view, *Apost. Church*, 239.) Dr. Killen ignores this remarkable discovery.

Is it then, we ask, expedient to rest the office of ruling elders upon a text and a distinction so plainly repudiated by our greatest authorities and acknowledged standards, and by claiming that they are and must be *presbyters*, imperil their Divine warrant, and weaken their authority and influence?

This theory, therefore, by attempting to make the *ruling elder* the *presbyter*, and destroying his true glory and dignity as the representative of the Christian body under Christ, for the election of their own officers, endangers their very existence itself.

But to all this it is replied that the view we have presented of the ruling elder as "properly the representative of the people," "and not properly the presbyter of Scripture, as Dr. Thornwell announced to the last General Assembly, destroys the office altogether." But how? Does it not ascribe to it scriptural titles and functions, scriptural exemplifications, and actual exercise? And do not these secure for it a divine right, divine appointment and institution, under the immediate sanction and authority of Christ, the only King and Head of the church? We do not say that it is, as Dr. Thornwell does when he represents in order to refute our views, (*South. Pres. Review*, 1848, p. 51,) "the creature of the people, possessed of no other powers but those they have chosen to entrust to it." The appointment of officers as representatives of the people in the "discipline and distribution" of the church, is by Christ's institution and authority as much and as truly as that there shall be particular churches regularly organized whom they represent, and "in whose name they act." (*Form of Gov.* chap. i. § 3.) These are not contradictories. They are both

true, both by divine right, both made authoritative by the power, and regulated by the word of Christ. "It is the true doctrine of the Scriptures," we agree with Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Owen, whom he quotes, (See do., p. 52,) "that all church power *in actu primo*, or fundamentally, is in the church itself, *in actu secundo* or its exercise in them that are especially called thereunto," and we again cordially unite with both (do., p. 531,) in the statement, "while, therefore, all church power, which is nothing but a right to perform church duties in obedience to the commands of Christ, and according unto his mind, is originally given unto the church essentially considered, yet, *in all regularly organized churches*, it has evidently "a double exercise—1. The call or choosing of officers; 2. In their voluntary acting with them, and under them in all duties of rule." Our standards, and our Reformers, and all Presbyterian Confessions maintain both facts. In opposition to Erastianism, they teach "that Christ hath appointed officers not only to preach, &c., but to exercise discipline for," &c. And in opposition to Romanists and Prelatists, they teach "that it is incumbent upon these officers, AND UPON THE WHOLE CHURCH IN WHOSE NAME THEY ACT, to censure or cast out the erroneous or scandalous." (*Form of Gov.* chap. i. § 3, quoted as above, p. 52.) In many ways our congregations exercise this power. The first act of "The Congregation" in Scotland, was to organize and elect officers, though they had as yet no minister. And Gillespie in one of his later works, and while establishing the above doctrine, vindicates and shows the consistency of an opinion formerly avowed, "that nothing should be done without the concurrence of the people or congregation."

Dr. Thornwell may, therefore, pronounce his suppositious theory, "without hesitation, absolutely false;" but our view he cannot, without self-contradiction, charge with destroying the eldership. When, however, he affirms that consistency requires "to abolish the office as a human contrivance, and a useless appendage to the church," when "the arguments for its divine appointment drawn from the natural meaning of the title, the *acknowledged* (?) constitution of the Jewish Synagogue, and the plurality of elders, confessedly ordained in the apostolic

churches are rejected; and when he declares it to be "idle to tell us that Paul speaks of GOVERNMENTS, and using the abstract for the concrete, means governors themselves," although on the next page (p. 59,) he quotes our Form of Government (chap. v. book 1.) where the very passage and term, *governments*, is quoted in proof of ruling elders, we may well ask which theory tends to the destruction of the office.*

But in the fifth and last place, this theory is logically destructive to the Deaconship. It ignores its existence as an office instituted by Christ, for the assistance of the elders and ministers, in the full and proper administration of his church. "Government," it is said, "is *exclusively* in the hands of *elders*," and "deacons *have no power* of regimen or order." What, then, we ask, are they? God hath set them in his church as ordinary and permanent office-bearers. Their creation, name, qualifications, election, ordination, and personal names, even, are handed down to us. They have existed, without disputation, and with special honour put upon such as discharge the office well, always, everywhere, until the theory in question led practically to the absorption of them in the office of ruling elder, as is declared to have been the case in Scotland by Principal Hill, and in Ireland by the Book of Discipline, and in the United States by Dr. Wilson and Dr. Miller.†

Now, deacons were required to be men full of Christian zeal, faith, wisdom, prudence, and exemplary piety, sound, and well instructed in the truth, holding the ministering of the faith in a pure conscience. Stephen was full of the Holy Ghost and power, and he immediately began to speak for Jesus; "and they were not able to resist the wisdom and the Spirit by which he spake." Another of them, Philip, was so gifted as to be afterwards an "evangelist." From their connection with the

* If it is asked, as it may well be, what is the great practical benefit sought by this theory, the answer is, the right of ruling elders to impose hands in ordination, "a *potentiality*," which has never yet been developed into exercise under the constitutional authority of any Presbyterian church in the world, and as Dr. Miller's learned correspondent assured him, certainly not in the Church of Scotland.

† Miller on Ruling Elders, pp. 237, 238, 242. Dr. Wilson Princ. Gov., and Hill's View of the Church of Scotland.

agapai, or love-feasts, (Acts vi. 2,) and the general care of the poor, they are believed to have had the supervision of, and to have assisted in the daily administration of the Lord's Supper, and other services of the church, (Acts ii. 42.) And it is accordingly declared, that they who use this office well, "purchase to themselves a good degree, and great boldness in the faith which is in Christ Jesus." (1 Tim. iii. 9—13.) Taken from among the people; chosen entirely by them; intimately acquainted with all their wants—they are admirably qualified to assist the pastor and elders with counsel and coöperation, in everything common to their mutual interests, and to their special department of general temporal and charitable ministration, and to constitute a bond of living union between them and the people.

The most ancient authorities of the purest and primitive age, undoubtedly represent them as assisting ministers in their religious services and other official duties. "They whom we call deacons," says Justin Martyn, "distributed the consecrated bread and wine and water to each one that is present." The same service is enjoined in "The Apostolical Constitutions." They had general oversight of the assembly during religious worship, and distributed the alms. In the church of Scotland, whose *first* formal act of organization was the appointment of elders and deacons, the minister breaks the bread and distributes the cup, "all the while the elders *and deacons*, in a competent number, and in a grave and reverend manner, do attend about the table, to see . . . that all who are admitted may have the bread and wine,"* &c.

"Deacons are not only to distribute the charity of the church to the poor, but ought also to visit them at their own houses, counsel them, pray with them, and otherwise assist them." So speaks Mr. Lorimer. And in the Irish Church Discipline it is said, "they should *exhort* the poor to be rich in faith, and to become heirs of the kingdom of God." (P. 7.)

The deacon, therefore, is not only an ecclesiastical and spiritual officer, like elders, but "he is," as Mr. Lorimer remarks,

* Compend. of Laws, vol. i., p. 306. Pardovan, Book II., § 20, tit. iv.

"to a certain extent a *ruler*, . . . ruling their own family well, being one of the tests by which he is to be proved."* "To them," says our Form of Government, "may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the church." What our standards say deacons *may properly* do, their First and Second Book of Discipline make positively their duty: "Their office and power is to receive and distribute the whole ecclesiastical goods unto them to whom they are appointed, . . . that the patrimony of the kirk be not converted to men's private use, nor wrongfully." Under this patrimony is drawn out whatever pertains to property held, rents, bequests, collections, and income generally; and the support of ministers, teachers, schools, churches, manses, &c. The office of deacon is, in short, the treasury department and municipal or home government of the church, and as important and honourable in its sphere as the legislative and executive functions; and when *properly* officered and invested with its rightful authority, it evidently holds in its hands the efficiency and prosperity of each particular church.

Deacons, therefore, have always been considered as united in the general polity of the church, and as having rule—within their sphere, and under the authority and direction of the pastor and elders—exercised in a common council. "We believe," says the Belgic Confession, Art. 30, "the true church ought to be *ruled* with that spiritual polity which God hath taught us in his word, to wit, that there be pastors to preach the word purely, elders *and deacons* to constitute the ecclesiastical senate." The Book of Common Order, drawn up by Knox, in Geneva, approved by Calvin, and established in Scotland, and by the Puritans, who endeavoured to have it made the polity of England, treats, in chap. v., of "the weekly assembly of ministers, elders, and *deacons*."† In the First Book of Discipline, chap. x., § 11, the office of deacon is described as above, and it is said, "they may also assist in judgment with ministers and elders, and may be admitted to read in the assembly, if they be required and be able thereto." This Book also pro-

* On the Office of Deacon, pp. 59, 70.

† This Book was usually prefixed to the Psalms in Metre, in Scotland.

vides, that if the minister was of light conversation, the elders *and deacons* should admonish him."

In the first Book of Discipline, chap. viii. § 6, it is provided that "if any extraordinary sums are to be delivered, then must the ministers, elders, and deacons consult whether," &c. The second Book of Discipline divides the whole polity of the church into doctrine, discipline, and distribution, with its threefold officers—pastors, elders, and deacons—who are "to be called and elected as the rest of the spiritual officers;" and as their duties are to be performed at the discretion, and by the appointment of pastor and elders, "for this cause, and not for regimen, *they are to be present at the ordinary meetings of the eldership.*" Guthrie of Stirling, in his Treatise of the Ruling Elders and Deacons, 1699,* says: "It is also true that the deacons may assist in judgment with the minister and elders, and be helping to them in those things that concern the oversight of the congregations, by information and advice." "Deacons are not to count light of this employment, or any others to esteem lightly of them .... but as one of those holy and honourable employments which the wisdom of God thought fit to appoint." In 1705, the General Assembly declared: "The kirk session, being the lowest judicatory in every parish, consists of one minister or two, and a competent number of ruling elders, *and the deacons of that parish are to be present, and have a decisive vote, only* (*however*) in matters belonging to their own office."† The Form of Government of the Westminster Assembly in the chapter "of the officers of a particular congregation," enumerates "one at least to labour in the word and doctrine, AND TO RULE," "others to *join* in government;" and "others to take special care of the poor;" and adds: "*These officers* are to meet *together* at convenient and set times for the well ordering of the affairs of that congregation, each according to his office." "As to the members that con-

* Published by order of the general meeting of the ministers and elders of the church.

† See in Edward Irving's Standards of the Church of Scotland, Appendix, p. 154.

stitute parochial sessions," says old Ayton,* "they are ministers of the word, ruling elders, *and deacons.*" And "serving tables," he interprets (p. 624,) as including "care and inspection of the poor, and the distribution of the elements at the sacrament of the Lord's Supper." Our own standards place deacons among the necessary officers in a fully organized church, as given by Christ, and shows their estimate of their status as rulers *quoad hoc*, by appointing in one and the same chapter one and the same mode of election and ordination, for *ruling elders and deacons*, thus making them authoritatively coördinate or joint officers in the church. The representative principle in our polity requires and implies some primary court lower than the session or coördinate with it, in which pastor, elders, and deacons, may meet and deliberate on all matters of common jurisdiction, and in which the deacons may exhibit their records, and have them reviewed, and receive the common and co-equal judgment of all present for their direction; and this is found, and we think in a perfect form, in the deacon's court, as now established and in use in the Free Church of Scotland in this country,† in the constitution and practice of the Reformed Dutch church, and to some partial extent in our own church. This theory, therefore, which ignores and repudiates the deaconship as a branch of the polity of the church, is evidently in contrariety to the representative character, the balance of power, the division of power, and the whole historical constitution of the Presbyterian church throughout the world.

And now, in closing, let us say that, of course, we exempt these theorists from any sympathy with the logical results of their theory. God forbid we should so malign them. Rather would we exalt them. And we would hope that, with their abilities and their knowledge of the theory and practice of government, they may carry out the principle of representation to the perfect system of treating of our principles in accordance with the uniform established character of the Presbyterian system, so that without division or diversion, we may

* Original Constitution of the Church. Edinburgh, 1730, p. 619.

† Digest of Rules of Procedure of the Free Church of Scotland. Edinburgh, 1856, chap. i.

all walk by the same rule and mind the same things, and strive together in love for the furtherance of the gospel, and the glory of our beautiful Zion.

We owe our readers an apology for occupying so many of our pages with the discussion of the Elder question. When our distinguished correspondent proposed sending us a communication on that subject, we expected one article of ordinary length. The materials however at his command, and the range which he proposed for himself, have led to the production of three articles much beyond the ordinary size. This is more than we thought desirable; but having once begun, it was hardly courteous to cut the matter short. The first article, by some mistake, was printed without our having seen it. The last article we could not read on account of the state of the manuscript. It is published on the responsibility of the writer. The editor of a Review can be held to answer only for the general character and bearing of articles not written by himself. In the present case, we understood from Dr. Smyth that his purpose was to oppose the new doctrine, that ministers and ruling elders are one in office. In this opposition we cordially agree with him. As to the manner in which he conducts the discussion, and as to his arguments in detail, he alone is responsible. We regret the introduction of Dr. Miller's name at all into the discussion, which we consider unnecessary, and which is painful to our feelings. This would not have happened, had it not been for the mistake which prevented our seeing the first article before it appeared in print. We do not doubt that the papers prepared by our learned friend with so much labour, although more numerous and more extended than we expected or desired, will prove of permanent value, not only on account of their ability, but for the amount of important matter which they contain. Editor.

SHORT NOTICES.

Outlines of Theology. By A. Alexander Hodge, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Fredericksburgh, Virginia. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. 8vo. pp. 522.

For some years after the present Professor of Didactic Theology in the Seminary of Princeton entered on the duties of his office, he pursued the following method of instruction: A subject was assigned to the class a week beforehand, on which the students were expected to read the ordinary text-books, and any other works within their reach. An examination was then held on that particular subject, the examination being attended by remarks and explanations on the part of the Professor. At its conclusion, a list of some twenty or thirty questions was given out, to which the students were expected to write the answers for themselves. The questions were always prepared for the occasion, and therefore were never precisely the same in any two successive years. These written answers differed according to the ability, diligence, or taste of the student. Some wrote only a few lines, in reply to any one question. Others made the preparation of those answers the main part of their work during this portion of their theological course. Those who adopted this method, left the institution with a system of theology of their own composition, the materials for which were derived from the books which they read, from their own examination of the Scriptures, and from the ideas suggested in the class-room. The books thus prepared are very different from those of later date, which consist of notes, more or less full, taken from the lectures which the Professor of Theology afterwards thought it advisable to deliver. The writer of this book, being a member of the Seminary while the method of instruction above-mentioned was continued, devoted himself in great measure to the preparation of his answers to the written questions given to his class. The book which he thus prepared is the substratum of the present work. All the answers, however, have been rewritten, with the advantage of his thirteen years of study and experience. Several new chapters, as those on the Evidences and on the Canon, have been introduced. The questions themselves have been modified, multiplied or divided, to suit his particular purpose. While, therefore, the general plan and cast of the work is due to his Seminary course, the

substance of it is his own. That is, the mind with which the reader is brought into contact is his, and not his teacher's. The latter, in reading this book, is conscious of contact with a mind exterior to his own, and differing from it in its modes of thought and expression. This is all the originality which a work, which aspires to nothing more than to be an outline of a received system of theology, can, or ought to have.

The work seems to us to meet a desideratum, and to be well adapted to be useful. Its advantages are, 1. That it is comprehensive. It goes over the whole ground usually embraced in systems of divinity. 2. It is orthodox. This is meant in no invidious or controversial sense; it simply means that the book presents the doctrines of the Reformed church, as those doctrines are set forth in recognized symbols and standards. 3. The several points are clearly presented, and the answers are precise, and concisely expressed. 4. The difference between the Reformed or Augustinian faith and the views adopted by other classes of theologians, are clearly though briefly presented. While, therefore, this book will not satisfy the thorough student, by elaborate and exhaustive discussions, it will be found, as we hope, eminently suggestive, and a convenient digest of religious truth.

A Rejoinder to the Princeton Review, upon the Elohim Revealed; touching the Doctrine of Imputation and kindred topics. By Samuel J. Baird. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1860. pp. 40.

Dr. Baird attributes the unfavourable character of our review of his late work to personal feeling. He says that we endeavoured "by the mere force of scornful denunciation, to trample opposition in the dust, and annihilate at once author and book." He attributes to us "admirable ingenuity" in avoiding giving any hint that the peculiar teachings of the reviewer are called in question in the book. "The design of the review," he says, "is manifestly to startle discussion into silence, stigmatize the doctrines which the reviewer opposes, and enforce unquestioning acquiescence in his peculiar opinions." If this is so, then it was not only very wicked but very foolish. Of himself, he says, that he was "impelled to the publication of my [his] treatise by a sense of imperative obligation—it was written under an impressive apprehension of the responsibility involved; and with the anxious endeavour to meet that responsibility in a spirit of Christian charity and fraternal courtesy—speaking what seemed to me to be truth, irrespective of persons, but speaking the truth in love." The meaning of this in plain English is, that, *quoad hoc*, Dr. Baird is very good, and his

reviewer very wicked. He wrote with elevated aims and in an humble Christian spirit; we, with a low, selfish object, and with a proud and malicious temper. Although the heart is deceitful above all things, we hope that Dr. Baird has been more successful in interpreting his own consciousness than in divining ours. We give him credit for sincerity when he says he wrote his book with the elevated sentiments to which he lays claim, will he do us justice when we say our review was written, as far as we understand ourselves, from a sincere regard to the truth of God, and with no unkind feeling toward him? If he is unwilling to believe our word, will he at least admit the evidence of fact? We had known for years that Dr. Baird differed from us on certain theological points; we knew that that difference was brought out in his book, and that he had honoured us with no little opposition; yet, notwithstanding, the notice which we wrote and published of his book is the most eulogistic we have yet seen in print. To every candid man this is positive proof that we were prepared not only to do him full justice, but were predisposed, from the very fact of his opposition to us, to go to the extreme limits of truth in commendation. When, on further inspection, we found that his book was designed to overthrow doctrines which, as we believe, are clearly revealed in the word of God, which underlie our Confession of Faith, and which enter deeply into religious experience, it was natural and proper that it should be reviewed with earnestness and feeling. And when, moreover, we found that the objections against these doctrines were, as we regard them, very weak, and such as had been presented a thousand times before, it was impossible not to make it apparent that we so regarded them. If there was anything wrong in the manner of doing this, we are sincerely sorry for it, and would gladly make any amends in our power. But we cannot alter our convictions at will. We still think that Dr. Baird's book is an assault upon some of the most important doctrines of the Bible, and we still regard the arguments which he urges as weak, and we still think that his objections arise, in a great measure, from want of discrimination. This is perfectly consistent with the belief of his sincerity and with the admission, freely and fully made in the review, that his work evinces ability, learning, activity of mind, and diligence, and that "his volume will prove eminently suggestive, and take a high rank in the theological literature of the country." Is not this enough?

It is proverbially hard for us "to see ourselves as others see us," and we suspect that the animus of this rejoinder appears to the reader very different from what it does to Dr. Baird him-

self. Why is it directed solely against the *Princeton Repertory?* The tone of our article, we admit, is different from Dr. Thornwell's. For this the reason is obvious. Dr. Thornwell looked at the questions in dispute from a philosophical point of view, we from a theological. His article is a discussion of realism, ours an examination of our true relation to Adam and to Christ. We looked at the matter as Dr. Baird himself does. He says, "The whole question relates to doctrines which are fundamental to the gospel scheme." Exactly so. We regarded it as a question of life or death. We believe a man may hold the theory of Dr. Baird's book in his head, and be a Christian; but we do not believe that any Christian holds it in his heart. If the sinner has no other ground of confidence than what this book authorizes him to assume, we know not how he can be saved. Viewing the matter in this light, we could not help writing earnestly. For the philosophy of the book, apart from its theology, we care very little. Although there is the characteristic difference between the two reviews just stated, they both come to the same conclusion. Dr. Thornwell says of Dr. Baird's philosophy, that it substitutes "absurdity for obscurity," and of his theology, that it upsets our whole system. We submit, therefore, that if Dr. Baird's object were to vindicate either his philosophy or his theology, the *Southern Review* was as much entitled to his attention as the *Princeton Repertory.*

The special object of the Rejoinder seems to be to convict us of heresy as to the doctrines of imputation, original sin, and justification. The author speaks much of our "peculiar views" on those points, which he denounces as unscriptural and heretical. His principal proofs of our heresy are derived from our Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. That commentary was published in 1835, twenty-five years ago. We were then young and self-distrustful, and therefore availed ourselves of the paternal kindness of Dr. Archibald Alexander, who read every word of the manuscript before it went to press. With his sanction it was published; at least twenty thousand copies of the work have been circulated in this country, and it has been reprinted in Great Britain, translated and printed in France. We have heard of its being spoken of disparagingly enough in other aspects, but we never heard its orthodoxy called into question by any man except Dr. Baird. As to that one point it has received the sanction of Old-school Presbyterians in every way that such a volume could be endorsed. From this it follows, either that Presbyterians do not understand their own doctrines, or that Dr. Baird is mistaken. If they have sanc-

tioned what he condemns, one or the other must be wrong. We think that Dr. Baird has provoked this controversy against great odds. It is not one man *versus* another, but it is Dr. Baird *versus* the great body of his brethren.

Let us look for a moment at these several points—imputation, original sin, and justification. A real causal relation between the sin of Adam and the apostasy of the race, being admitted, there are but three methods of explaining it. 1. That which we hold to be the common doctrine of the church, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed, viz. that in virtue of the union between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the judicial ground of their condemnation, and as the penalty threatened against sin was death, that condemnation involved the loss of original righteousness and the corruption of our whole nature, so that all who are descended from Adam, by ordinary generation, are born in a state of spiritual death. 2. The doctrine of mediate imputation, viz. that as the sin of Adam involved a corruption of his moral nature, that nature in its corrupted state is inherited by his posterity, and is the ground of their condemnation. They are not condemned for Adam's sin, but for the inherent depravity inherited from him. 3. The doctrine that in virtue of the identity of nature between Adam and his race, his sin was truly and properly their sin. Being the act of their nature, it was their act, for which they are responsible on the same ground that they are chargeable with any personal transgression. It was an act of voluntary self-apostasy from God on their part as truly as on the part of Adam. Dr. Baird adopts this last theory. This would be a harmless matter were it not for the reasons assigned for it, and the consequences drawn from it. If any man can attach any idea to the words that he sinned by an act of self-determination thousands of years before he existed, he may be allowed to say so. We cannot help agreeing with Dr. Thornwell in saying that this is substituting absurdity for obscurity. Still there is no sin in absurdity. But the case is very different when we are told we must believe this doctrine, because otherwise God would be unjust; or, when it is asserted, in support of this theory, that the judgments of God must be founded on the personal merits or demerits of those whom they affect; that it is a denial of his moral nature, and even atheistic, to say that he can pronounce the just unjust, or, the unjust just; that the only legitimate ground of judgment are character and works; and when still further it is asserted, that community in a propagated nature involves all those to whom that nature belongs in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor. Then we say the whole gospel is destroyed,

and every scriptural ground of salvation of sinners is renounced. It is admitted among all the Lutherans and Reformed, at least, that so far as imputation is concerned, it is the same in nature and its essential foundation, in the case of the imputation of Adam's sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to the believer. We do not understand Dr. Baird to deny this. But if the above-mentioned principles are true, if, as he says, God must judge every one according to his real subjective character and his conduct, then it not only follows that if condemned for Adam's sin, we must be personally criminal for that offence, but also that Christ was personally criminal and polluted if his sufferings were penal, and that the righteousness which is the ground of justification must be our own inherent moral or spiritual excellence. It must be from our own subjective character, however, that they be induced or derived. This is the fatal matter. If the sinner is referred to what is in himself as the ground of his confidence before God, he is sunk into despair. No man can be saved who, whatever be his theory, does not trust for pardon and acceptance on what is out of himself—on what Christ has done for him, as distinguished from what he has wrought in him. In opposition to the teachings of Dr. Baird, explicit or implied, we hold, in common with our own standards and the faith of the Reformation, that Adam's sin as the sin of our head and representative, was the ground of the condemnation of his race, and inherent personal corruption its penal consequence; that our sins and not Christ's own personal criminality (God pardon the words) was the ground of the penal character of his sufferings; and that his righteousness, and not our own personal, subjective righteousness is the ground of our justification. This is our heresy so far as imputation is concerned.

As to original sin, in the sense of inherent hereditary corruption, there are the following theories: 1. That it is not properly of the nature of sin, but simply a proclivity to sin. 2. That it is truly of the nature of sin and guilt, but that it does not consist in the corruption of the substance of the soul, nor in the positive infusion of any corrupt principle; and that it is the state of a rational and moral being, which is consequent on judicial abandonment and the withholding of the Spirit of God. This we hold to be the common faith of Christians. 3. That the same numerical substance which became corrupt in Adam, is propagated to us, so that the substance of the soul is morally depraved. Conformity of the substance of the soul to the law of God, says Dr. Baird, is holiness; the reverse is sin. Our heresy on this point, according to Dr.

Baird, consists in our denying that the substance of the soul is corrupted, and in making original sin the result of the withholding of the Spirit of God. If so, he argues, it is mere defect; it can involve no criminality, and there must be a time, "however brief," between the withdrawal of the Spirit and the rise of corruption, in which the soul has no moral character. If a man should say that darkness is not a substance, not something black diffused through space, but the absence of light, would he be a heretic in natural philosophy? Is it a scientific heresy to say that cold is the absence of caloric, death the absence of life? Must there be an interval, however brief, between one of these states and the other? When Dr. Baird blows out the candle in his chamber, is there much of an interval between light and darkness? If God judicially withholds spiritual life from apostate men, they are dead. They come into being in darkness and death. We do not think Dr. Baird has much ground for the charge of heresy on this point.

As to justification—the man who holds the principle that *all* God's judgments are founded on the inherent moral state of their objects; that the only criterion is merit or crime; that "every intelligent creature shall be dealt with according to his works;" that "the sinner only can be punished;" who applies this principle to our relation to Adam, and declares that we cannot bear the penalty of his sin unless we "are morally chargeable with it," and really committed it; and who further declares that our justification in Christ is analogous to our condemnation in Adam—does thereby teach that the ground of our justification is our inherent moral character. This doctrine, if we can understand English, is as explicitly taught by Dr. Baird as it was ever taught by any theologian of the Romish church. After arguing at length to prove that we must be morally criminal in Adam's sin, in order to be justly liable to its penalty, that his sin is a proper ground of self-condemnation and remorse, he says: "We are guilty in Adam in a way similar to that in which we are justified in Christ, with only this difference: that in the former case the relation is native and intrinsic, and therefore involves us in the crime and condemnation by an immediate judgment proper to us; in the other, the relation is supernatural and by free gift, and therefore the sentence of justification is by grace," p. 438. That is, the sin and righteousness are alike inherent; they constitute moral character; the one is the ground of remorse, the other of complacency; the only difference is, that the sin is by nature, the righteousness by grace. This might have been copied out of Bellarmine. It is the precise doctrine of the Romish church. Agreeably to

this view of the matter, Dr. Baird goes on to say, in support of the doctrine that we should cherish complacency in the righteousness by which we are justified, that "there are two selves in the believer, the old man and the new. The one is the nature received from Adam, ... the other is the new nature received from Christ." The one is the ground of remorse, and the other of complacency. The righteousness of Christ is thus confounded with the new nature received from him. He adds: "The proper exercises of the soul are indicated by the fact of our real and substantial communion in the nature that sinned, and in that which wrought the righteousness, in which we are justified. That this implies and requires complacency in that which by grace we are, it will hardly be necessary to prove." "The child of God," he says, "may not cherish self-complacency; if by that phrase is meant, a confidence in the flesh. But it is not only his privilege, but his duty, to cherish a complacence in that which by grace he is," p. 449. According to all this, the ground of condemnation is the old nature derived from Adam, and the ground of our justification is the new nature received from Christ. We should feel remorse for the one, and complacency for the other, as they constitute our moral character. Dr. Baird, of course, teaches at times the old doctrine. He teaches both doctrines—the one, in obedience to his theory; the other, in obedience to the Bible, his early training, and, as we doubt not, to his religious experience. Because we maintain that the ground of our justification is neither anything done by us, nor wrought in us, no inherent righteousness which constitutes our moral character, and is the ground of complacency, he says we ignore the mystical union in connection with justification entirely; that is, because we do not admit that the indwelling of the Spirit, and the new nature received from Christ, constitute our justifying righteousness, the two have no relation to each other. He might as well say, that because we deny that faith is the ground of justification, we deny that it has anything to do with it. The ground of justification is our union with Christ, or rather, our union with Christ is the ground of that imputation of his righteousness for which we are justified. And that union is threefold: 1. The eternal federal union arising from the gift of God of a people to his Son, whom he represents, and for whom he obeyed and suffered; 2. The inward mystical union arising from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost; and, 3. The union by faith. Now, in virtue of the eternal federal union, and in accordance with the conditions of the covenant of redemption, God in his own good time sends his Spirit into the hearts of his people,

calls forth the exercise of faith (if they be adults,) imputes to them the righteousness of Christ, adopts them into his family, and works in them to will and to do according to his own good pleasure. No man therefore is justified, who is not a living member of Christ's body; but his spiritual life is neither his justifying righteousness, nor the ground of his title to the righteousness of Christ. The great mystery of redemption is, that the innocent may suffer punishment in place of the guilty; and that the guilty may be pronounced righteous on the ground of a righteousness which is not inherently their own. We understand Dr. Baird to deny this; and we regard his book as designed to establish the contrary doctrine. We therefore raised against it our solemn protest. To that protest we are bound to adhere.

The New Englander for August, 1860. Art. X.

The title of this article from our contemporary is "The Princeton Review on Dr. Taylor and the Edwardean Theology." The articles brought under review in it are chiefly that on Dr. Taylor's Moral Government, being the third in our issue for July, 1859, and incidentally that on Edwards and the New Divinity, which was the first in our issue for October, 1858. The writer, at the threshold, informs his readers that he was moved to "great impatience" on reading the former of these articles, in which Dr. Taylor's system was authentically exhibited and proved from his own statements. This information was hardly necessary for those who read his article. It bears throughout the most palpable marks of great mental perturbation, which even the lapse of a year seems to have aggravated. We are sincerely sorry that the writer has allowed his wounded feelings to master him and goad him into such "impatience." This is not only *malum in se*, but *malum prohibitum*, in the light not only of Scripture and conscience, but of the writer's utilitarian tests of an evil affection, as stated by himself, p. 757: "That the affection is a means of evil to its object will not be questioned; that it is also uncomfortable to the person indulging it will also be granted; it is an uncomfortable affection, evil in itself." We hope the author or authors will take it as evidence of our Christian friendship, when we counsel them, as we earnestly do, hereafter, under this and other like trials, to "let patience have her perfect work." They will certainly feel better, and think better, and write better, and be every way the better for it. "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a

city." In particular, if they duly curb their feelings, they will not allow themselves to be urged by their "impatience" to overwhelm "even a Princeton Reviewer" with obloquy, to utter directly contradictory and self-annihilating calumnies within the compass of one article of even forty-seven toilsome pages. They will not on one page, under the affectation of charity, pretend that we maintain and oppose what we do in order to gain popularity; and in another that our doctrines are so unpalatable that our ministers dare not preach them. They will not, for the purpose of heaping contrary kinds of odium upon us, say on one page, that "we write like a philosopher," and on another signify that we write like blundering "sciolists." In attempting to refute an article like that on Edwards and the New Divinity, they will try to establish the contradictory of some position or positions of the paper they combat. To contend that Edwards philosophized, and the New Divinity men also philosophized about religion, is not contending for the contradictory of our main position, which was, that the New Divinity men are not, as they and friends often contend, the true successors or heirs either to his philosophy or theology. This is but one out of many irrelevant arguments which form the staple of the review—we mean irrelevant, as regards refuting the articles of which it professes to be a refutation. All arguments to prove that self-love is one proper motive of human action, even if genuine, disprove no position of ours. All quotations from Edwards, or Knox, or Fichte, in favour of this position, or in favour of certain exceptionable and eccentric theories on this subject, prove nothing against us, although they may bewilder the readers of the *New Englander* as to the real issue, and what we have written about it. The word-practice on pp. 754, 755, wherein the writer argues that, according to our statement, "moral goodness is defined to be conformity to moral goodness," is about as keen as it would be to say, when straightness is represented to "mean not only conformity to a standard, but as often the very standard, idea, or law to which we must conform in order to be straight;" according to this, *straightness* is conformity to *straightness*. Is this writer, whose exuberant airs of philosophic superiority are only matched by his contemptuous depreciation of the philosophic insight of his adversaries, ignorant that the same quality, idea, or conception may be spoken of now in the abstract, now in the concrete, now in idea, standard, rule, or law, now in the actual experience or realization of it? If not, we commend to his attention the rudimental school-books on Logic and Philosophy. If he does, why

what then? As to our allegation, that Dr. Taylor's system resolves right into the means of the greatest happiness, and this to the sentient universe, quantitatively considered, the reviewer says all manner of hard things about it. But he does not disprove it. He does not show the insufficiency of our quotations from Dr. Taylor's treatise on Moral Government to prove it. Nor can he show such insufficiency. See pp. 499—506, inclusive, of our review of this work. He does not even attempt it. Indeed, he is at pains to signify, again and again, that he will not undertake to defend all the language of Dr. Taylor on this subject. And in no part of his article does the reviewer give more hopeful signs of regaining his patience and self-possession than in this discreet wariness. As to our statement that Dr. Taylor was "propounding principles confessedly at war with the doctrines of all branches of the church," which the writer indignantly denies, he cannot and does not invalidate the proof, *inter alia*, quoted by us, (pp. 518, 519,) wherein Dr. Taylor, unlike this special pleader for him, manfully, not to say exultingly, avows it. As to the moulding influences which we mentioned as having contributed to develope and favourably explain Dr. Taylor's peculiarities, but which our reviewer captiously denies or questions, we believe them real. We believe they furnish a clue to the most favourable construction of his system. We know this to have been the opinion of many competent judges. But we have no interest in urging them, if they are offensive to the special friends or advocates of him or his system.

As to all the material points in our articles, which the writer has impugned, we refer our readers to those articles for the proof—proof, despite all that has yet been done, ample and intact—of our positions. As to the irrelevant arguments, the gratuitous aspersions, expressed or implied, by insinuation or inuendo, open and covert, positive and negative, against Old-school theology, the Presbyterian church, Princeton, "the Princeton Reviewers," and "a Princeton Reviewer," we leave them where we find them. If the writer can afford to utter them, we cannot afford to answer them. They are the "cheap defence" of what admits of no better defence. When these writers *prove* that we have "injuriously misinterpreted" and misrepresented Dr. Taylor, or any other person, we shall esteem it not only a duty, but a pleasure to make the requisite corrections. Until they do this, we shall justly regard captious, or irrelevant, or reproachful criticism, as corroborating the substantial truth of our strictures and allegations.

An Essay on the Pastoral Duties of Ruling Elders. By E. T. Baird, D. D. Read before the Presbytery of Tombeckbee, Mississippi, and ordered to be published, April 7, 1860.

Our Southern brethren seem to be taking special interest in the Elder question. Synodical sermons have been preached and published; Presbyterial essays have been disseminated; the *Southern Presbyterian Review* has had several important articles on the subject; the papers of Virginia and North Carolina have taken more or less part in the discussion; almost everything in our own pages on this subject is, as has been extensively made known, from a Southern source, and was designed to meet the counter views circulated in the Southern churches. So far as we know, there has been no special attention awakened at the North to this question, and no diversity of opinion avowed. What is the cause of the fact just mentioned, we do not know; the fact itself, however, is apparent. The *Central Presbyterian* recently remarked, with great truth, (speaking, we presume, with special reference to the South,) that a decided change had taken place in the mind of the church of late years, on matters of church government. Formerly very liberal views prevailed on that subject, it being assumed that scarcely anything was prescribed authoritatively as to church organization, in the Scriptures; whereas the tendency now is to assert a special divine warrant for everything. The Hoges, Alexanders, Rices, Baxters, and Speeces of the former generation, would certainly be astonished at the principles now avowed by those who claim to be the only true representatives of American Presbyterianism. This reaction is going, as we think, to an unhealthy extreme. It is unreasonable, unscriptural, and opposed to the historical character of our church. American Presbyterians have ever been distinguished by their zeal for doctrines, and their catholic liberality as to questions of form. They have contented themselves with acting on the defensive, as against Prelatists and Independents, and with asserting the scriptural character of their distinctive principles. Since the organization of our church, there has scarcely been a word of controversy among Presbyterians about the principles of Presbyterianism. Our internal contests have been about doctrine. Now, as we are all of one mind in doctrine, we are trying to fall out about forms. Men are beginning to denounce their brethren who agree with them in everything pertaining to the authority, rights, and functions of ruling elders, because they differ from them as to the method of proof. Appeal is made to the headship of Christ; his authority is invoked; his honour is said to be at stake, when the fact is,

nothing but the private opinions of this or that man, as to what our blessed Lord has enjoined, is at all involved. We fear that it will not be for the best interest of our church, should we begin to follow the example of High-church Episcopalians, and make matters of external organization of equal importance with the truths of the gospel. If we make them equal, all history shows that the latter will soon be regarded as subordinate.

These remarks have no reference to the Essay, the title of which is given above. This pamphlet contains a clear, forcible, and calm exhibition of the nature of the office of ruling elders, and of their peculiar duties. It is written in a dignified, Christian spirit; didactic rather than polemic in its tone and manner. With nine-tenths of what Dr. Baird here says, all his brethren would cordially agree. There are some principles, however, laid down in this pamphlet, which we are satisfied are utterly inconsistent with our system. For an example, the author says: "The power of jurisdiction, which is a joint power, and comprehends everything which church courts may do, but which ministers and elders, by virtue of office, may not do. Hence the exercise of discipline, in all its grades, all declarative and administrative legislation, including the ordering the work of ordination and the authoritative designation of the candidate, and all executive authority necessary to the exercise of other powers, taking in the whole system of evangelization, appertain to the power of jurisdiction." Then a minister cannot organize a church, he cannot ordain elders, he cannot baptize adults and gather them into a church relation, where no church organization previously existed. We cannot send out missionaries; we can only send church courts. If any one does not see that this is inconsistent with Scripture, with our Book, with the practice of the church, and even with the inward law of its life, we must despair of convincing him. Again, Dr. Baird explicitly says, that "there are two offices," that of the minister and that of the elder, p. 1. The ruling elder and minister are not the same in office. But on p. 7, he says, that "in the primitive church there was no distinction between teaching and ruling elders, so far as the office itself was concerned." This is saying, in express terms, that in the primitive church there was no such *office* as that of ruling elder. This is precisely what the enemies of Presbyterianism have said from the beginning; and this is the inevitable consequence of the new doctrine of the eldership. It destroys the office. By making the offices the same, the distinction between them is of course obliterated, and the ruling elder, *as an officer*, is pronounced an interloper in the church of God. No man can read the current productions of the press

on this subject, without being convinced that the greatest confusion of mind prevails respecting it. There are almost as many theories as there are writers. We are well persuaded that little more than a definition of terms is requisite to bring the mass of our brethren to a cordial agreement on the topics now in debate.

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edited by the Rev. Henry L. Mansel, B. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. In 2 volumes. Vol. II. Logic. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. 8vo. pp. 715.

These Lectures form the concluding portion of the Biennial Course on Metaphysics and Logic, which was commenced by Sir William Hamilton on his election to the professorial chair in 1836, and repeated, with but slight alterations, till his decease in 1856. Although chiefly composed during the session in which they were first delivered, (1837—8,) yet as they continued to be delivered by their illustrious author up to the time of his death, they are to be considered as expressing his abiding views and convictions. "The author," we are told, "largely availed himself of the labours of previous writers." "To the works of the German logicians of the present century, particularly to those of Krug and Esser, these lectures," say the editors, "are under special obligations." The American readers, therefore, have, in the two volumes now published, abundant materials for a competent understanding of the outlines at least of Sir William Hamilton's philosophical system.

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England. Collected and edited by James Spedding, M. A. of Trinity College, Cambridge; Robert Leslie Ellis, M.A. late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Douglas Denon Heath, M. A., Barrister at Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Volume XI., being Vol. I. of the Literary and Professional Works. Boston: Published by Brown & Taggart. 1860. Pp. 461.

There are few epoch-making men, whether in philosophy or civil affairs in the history of the world. Beyond controversy Bacon was one of this small number. His works, therefore, belong to no one age. They are part of the permanent inheritance of the intellectual world. Every student of philosophy must examine them for himself. It is, therefore, a great service rendered to philosophy and literature to prepare a trustworthy edition of the writings of such a man, and to place them within the reach of all who desire to possess them. The editors of the present collection of Lord Bacon's works have every

facility for the successful execution of their task. The specimen volume now published contains several historical essays, the largest and most important of which is the History of the Reign of King Henry VIII. It is equal in the style of printing to the standard productions of the London press, and is an honour to the enterprise and taste of the American publishers.

Commentary on Ecclesiastes, with other Treatises. By E. W. Hengstenberg, D. D., Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated from the German, by D. W. Simon. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 488.

This volume, besides the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, contains Prolegomena to the Song of Solomon, The Book of Job, The Prophet Isaiah, The Sacrifices of the Holy Scripture, The Jews and the Christian Church. As Hengstenberg's character for learning, ability, and piety is almost as well known in this country as it is Germany, we need only inform our readers that another volume from his pen is now accessible, in the English language, and at a moderate price.

Occasional Productions, Political, Diplomatic, and Miscellaneous. By the late Richard Rush. Edited by his Executors. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1860. Pp. 535.

Few American statesmen spent so large a portion of their lives in the public service, or filled so many important offices. He was Attorney General of the United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Minister to France, and Minister to England. All these positions he honourably filled. His remarkable amiability of temper and courtesy of manners made him universally acceptable. His writings do not pretend to be profound dissertations; they are pleasing memorials of men and things, and afford an insight into the social and political life of England and France from a perfectly reliable source.

Love and Penalty; or, Eternal Punishment consistent with the Fatherhood of God. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., Pastor of the Tabernacle Church. New York: Sheldon & Co, 115 Nassau street. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 358.

Dr. Thompson, in the ordinary course of his pastoral labours, delivered a series of Sabbath evening discourses on the subject indicated by the title of this volume. At the request of many of his hearers they were prepared for the press and published. The form of personal address is happily retained, imparting to the lectures the life of oral discourse. The subject is difficult and important. It is treated with skill and force, and the volume is one peculiarly adapted to meet objections which are often secretly cherished when not openly avowed.

The Reformed Pastor: Showing the Nature of the Pastoral Work, especially in Private Instruction and Catechizing. Prepared for a day of Humiliation kept at Worcester, December 4, 1665. By Richard Baxter. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 560.

The late Rev. J. Angell James, toward the close of a ministry of fifty-four years, said: "I have made, next to the Bible, Baxter's Reformed Pastor my rule as regards the object of the ministry. It were well if that volume were often read by all our pastors—a study which I now earnestly recommend to them." The Messrs. Carter have added to the numerous obligations of the Christian public to that enterprising firm, in presenting a new and handsome edition of this work of long established reputation to the numerous pastors of our country.

The Year of Grace: A History of the Revival in Ireland, A. D. 1859. By the Rev. William Gibson, Professor of Christian Ethics in Queen's College, Belfast. With an Introduction, by Baron Stow, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 464.

An authentic narrative of one of the most remarkable revivals of modern times is of permanent value. Such a narrative is found in this volume, prepared by a man of eminence and wisdom, living in the midst of the scenes which he describes, and furnished with all facilities for obtaining accurate information.

Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., LL.D., Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford. First American, from the second English edition, corrected and enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 291.

The design of this work is to exhibit the relation between Psychology and Logic. It pre-supposes a knowledge therefore of both. Dr. Mansel is a man of great skill and culture. He is an eclectic in Philosophy, standing midway between the Scottish and German schools, and endeavouring to combine what he conceives to be the excellencies of both.

Prophetic Office of Christ, as related to Verbal Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. By Eleazar Lord. New York: Anson D. Randolph, No. 683 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 154.

Mr. Lord continues his indefatigable labours in vindication of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. While disagreeing with him in many of the principles on which he rests the defence of the great doctrine in question, we heartily agree with him in his estimate of its truth and importance.

An Exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes. By the Rev. Charles Bridges, M. A., Rector of Hinton Martell, Dorset. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 389.

Mr. Bridges is the author of several well-known and highly esteemed practical works. This volume is of the same general character. The author is indeed a scholar and a student; he is conversant with the discussions as to the authorship, authority, and exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes, which have been carried on in different ages of the church, but his main object is the edification of the believing readers of the word of God.

A Brief Treatise on the Canon and Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures: For the Special Benefit of Junior Theological Students, but intended also for Private Christians in General. By Alex. McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 336.

The first edition of this valuable manual was published many years ago. It has, however, been long out of print. The present edition is greatly enlarged, and proportionably increased in value. It bears the impress of the clear, sharp mind of the author, and is far more readable than most books on such subjects.

The Book and its Story: A Narrative for the Young. By L. N. R., Author of the "Missing Link." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1861. Pp. 463.

This is a history of the Bible from the first dawn of revelation, with an account of its translation and circulation down to the present time. This is a great subject, and one of universal interest. We commend the volume as containing a great amount of valuable information nowhere else to be found in so compact and accessible a form.

Commentary on the Song of Solomon. By George Burrowes, D. D. Second edition, revised. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 454.

We expressed some years ago, when the first edition of this work was published, a high opinion of its value as a spiritual exposition of this peculiar and difficult portion of the word of God.

My Saviour; or, Devout Meditations in Prose and Verse, on the Names and Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ. By Rev. John East, A. M., Rector of Croscombe, Somerset, England. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 252.

Peace in Believing; exemplified in the Memoirs of Mrs. Ann East. Written by her husband, Rev. John East, A. M., author of "My Saviour." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 270.

These are two beautiful little volumes, replete with truth and pious feeling.

Science in Theology. Sermons preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, before the University. By Adam S. Farrar, M. A., F. G. S., F. R. A. S., Michel Fellow of Queen's College, &c. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 250.

In theology there are two factors; the truths of God as objectively revealed in the word of God, and the diverse forms of human thought. The former is immutable, the latter is variable. It is one of the most interesting and improving vocations of the student of theology to investigate the relation of these two elements to each other in the different ages of the church, and to see how the undying truths of God have asserted their supremacy and permanence amidst the ever-changing systems of philosophy and the constantly advancing discoveries of science. These elements are ever more or less in conflict, and happy is the man who adheres throughout to the truth as objectively revealed, while philosophy and science adjust themselves to the immutable as best they may. The book before us is intended "to bring some of the discoveries and methods of the physical and moral sciences to bear upon theoretic questions of theology." This design is carried out with a full knowledge of the recent forms of philosophy, as well as of modern science, but with a prevalent tendency to explain the truths of religion in conformity with science. Doctrine is the plastic element, science the controlling one in the author's hands. Such at least is the impression which we derive from a slight inspection of his work.

History of the Christian Church to the Reformation. From the German of Professor Kurtz. With Emendations and Additions, by the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D., author of the "History of the Jewish Nation." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. Pp. 526.

The same. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

The Edinburgh translation was made from the third, the American from the fourth edition of the original work. This is Kurtz's "Text Book of Ecclesiastical History," not his Manual, which is much more extensive. This edition, prepared by Dr. Bomberger, is founded on the Edinburgh translation; but as the latter avowedly altered the original, and omitted the strictly Lutheran portions of the work, Dr. Bomberger has restored such passages and corrected the alterations. This is all fair. Dr. Kurtz is a thorough Lutheran, and impresses his doctrines on every thing he writes. But he is a devout Christian, and therefore his works are, in a religious point of view, immeasurably superior to the current productions of the German press; while in learning and skill they belong to the first class of German books.

Illustrations of Scripture; suggested by a Tour through the Holy Land. By Horatio B. Hackett, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institution. New and revised edition. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 354.

The journey of Professor Hackett was made in 1852; the first edition of this work was published in 1855. The present edition is in several respects improved. The design of the work is not to give a connected view of the geography of the Holy Land, but to illustrate particular passages of Scripture from the topography of the places referred to. It is an interesting and invaluable work.

The True Path; or, The Young Man invited to the Saviour. By the Rev. Joseph M. Atkinson, Raleigh, N. C. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 300.

This volume contains a series of Lectures on a number of related topics, addressed to young men, and designed for the instruction and guidance specially of those who have enjoyed a liberal education. To that class, from the author's style of thought and mode of writing, they are specially adapted. There is in these lectures abundant evidence of culture, of extensive reading, as well as the higher attributes of soundness in doctrine and enlightened zeal. We commend the volume to the young as one which may be of essential service in meeting their difficulties and controlling their decisions.

Early Methodism within the Bounds of the Old Genesee Conference, from 1788 *to* 1828. By George Peck, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. 1860. Pp. 512.

This volume contains an account of the most interesting events, and of the most noted personages in the history of Methodism in Central New York and Northern Pennsylvania, during a period of forty years.

Sketch Books; or, Miscellaneous Anecdotes illustrating a variety of Topics proper to the Pulpit and Platform. By William C. Smith, of the New York Conference. New York, Carlton and Porter. 1860. Pp. 350.

Those public speakers who have the disposition and skill to avail themselves of anecdotes as a means of excitement or impression, will find this volume a useful book of reference.

How to Enjoy Life; or, Physical and Mental Hygiene. By William M. Cornell, M. D. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. Cincinnati: Rickey, Mallory & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1860. Pp. 360.

A popular, rather than a scientific work, replete however, with sound principles and wise counsels, which it would be of unspeakable service to literary men especially, if they would

ponder and practice. It is a work which theological students and ministers would do well to read.

A General View of the Rise, Progress, and Corruptions of Christianity. By the Most Reverend Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, with a sketch of the life of the author, and a catalogue of his writings. New York: William Gowans. 1860. Pp. 288.

Archbishop Whately was one of the writers engaged to prepare introductory essays for the new edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, now in the course of publication. This treatise is one of those essays. It has not before been printed in a book. The subject and the reputation of the author will secure for it a hearty welcome from the Christian public.

The Bible in Schools. Argument of Richard H. Dana, Jr. Esq. and the opinion of the Supreme Court of Maine, &c. Approved by the Committee of Publication. Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath-school Society. Depository, No. 13 Cornhill. Pp. 59.

A Roman Catholic child was excluded from a district school in Maine, because her father refused to permit her to read the Scriptures in the common English version. For this exclusion the father brought suit for damages, as he was a tax-payer. This pamphlet contains an exhibition of the grounds on which the court sustained the action of the school authorities and non-suited the plaintiff.

The Difficulties of Arminian Methodism; A Series of Letters addressed to Bishop Simpson, of Pittsburgh. By William Annan, author of "Letters on Psalmody." Fourth edition, re-written and enlarged. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 336.

As this work has been many years before the public, it has an established reputation. It has received the stamp of general approbation, and we rejoice that so useful a volume is again sent forth in an improved form. Those of our brethren who are called to contend with the constant misrepresentations of the opponents of the Augustinian system of doctrines, will find this work a very valuable aid.

A Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Revised with important additions. Boston: Swan, Brewer & Tileston. Cleveland: Ingham & Bragg. 1860. 8vo. pp. 608.

This dictionary is substantially a combination of "the Comprehensive Dictionary," and "A Pronouncing, Explanatory, and Synonymous Dictionary of the English Language," previously published by Dr. Worcester. It contains a vast amount of valuable matter in a very condensed form. Besides a full vocabulary of well authorized English words, it comprises numerous technical, obsolete, and provincial words, which need explanation. In all doubtful cases as to pronunciation, the authorities for the different modes in use are given. Besides the usual list of Greek, Latin, and Scriptural proper names,

the appendix contains a list of Christian names of men and women, with their signification; pronunciation of modern geographical names, of distinguished men of modern times; a collection of words, phrases, and quotations from the Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish languages; principal deities, heroes, &c., in Greek and Roman fabulous history, &c., &c. It is evident therefore, that it would be difficult to find so much valuable matter of the kind in any other similar work.

Moral Philosophy; Including Theoretical and Practical Ethics. By Joseph Haven, D. D., Professor in the Chicago Theological Seminary, and lately Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. For sale by McGenniss & Smith, Princeton, New Jersey.

We reviewed favourably Dr. Haven's work on Mental Philosophy a year since. His volume on Moral Philosophy, although it has been before the public for a twelve-month, has only just come into our hands. From the slight inspection which we have been able to give it, we do not think that it will take the same stand with the previous work by the same writer. It is however, compendious, instructive, and well written.

The Philosophy of Natural History. By John Ware, M. D. Prepared on the plan, and retaining portions, of the work of William Smellie, Member of the Antiquarian and Royal Societies of Edinburgh. Boston: Brown & Taggart. 1860. Pp. 448.

The book of Smellie was published about seventy years ago; in 1824 Dr. Ware prepared an edition for the use of schools. In the present edition the original plan has been adhered to, but extensive alterations have been made, and most of the chapters have been prepared anew.

British Novelists and their Styles; Being a critical sketch of the history of British prose fiction. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature, University College, London; author of "the Life of Milton and his Times." Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 312.

The substance of this volume was delivered in a course of lectures in Edinburgh. The subject is one of interest to literary men, and it is treated by a man of established reputation.

A Greek Grammar, for Schools and Colleges. By James Hadley, Professor in Yale College.

We have been highly gratified by the inspection of this work. It meets a real want. Recent analysis of the Greek language has put our old Grammars out of date, while the best of the new have hitherto lacked simplicity and clearness in the statement of general principles. Excellent as treatises for a scholar

to read, they are bewildering to a beginner, who seeks to commit them to memory. Professor Hadley's book is addressed admirably to this emergency. A grammatical thesaurus it does not pretend to be. We have works of that kind with whose merits this does not come into competition. But for the purpose of instruction in schools and colleges, it is decidedly an improvement upon anything of the kind hitherto published in our language. We remark especially its admirable arrangement of the verb, at once so clear in itself, and true to the principles of Greek philology; and, in its syntax, the brevity and precision with which the heads of sections are enunciated, whereby the bearing of the whole will be readily perceived and easily apprehended by the memory. We may be permitted to add, that the execution of the whole is marked by the modesty of genuine scholarship.

A Sketch of the Life and Character of Rev. Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D. By Rev. S. W. S. Dutton, D. D.

Dr. Dutton differs from most of the eulogists of Dr. Taylor, in the candor and frankness with which he states his distinctive doctrines and traits of character, while he falls behind none in fervent admiration of the man and his system, taken as a whole. He evidently regards Dr. Taylor as the theologian of the age, and as having made permanent and momentous improvements in the science of theology. He speaks of the doctrine of an enslaved or disabled will, and especially of the theory of "moral inability," prevalent in New England when Dr. Taylor appeared, as an "imposition, a sacred sham, enacted in hundreds of pulpits every Sabbath." He says that Dr. Taylor displaced this by "the true doctrine of free-will—of the will as a power able to control its own states, not enslaved by them." While Dr. Dutton glories in this part, and in the general scope of Dr. Taylor's theology, and is far enough from a just appreciation of the views of dissentients, he has the candour to admit the deficiencies of his ethical scheme. He says: "We expect that in future improvement in philosophy and theology, (for such improvement is not ended,) there will be a general acknowledgment that the idea of right cannot be wholly resolved into the idea of expediency or utility; and that the sense of right and duty is as real and *ultimate* ground of appeal or motive in the mind as the desire of happiness." This amelioration cannot be needful for the great mass of the Christian church, who have always repudiated the epicurean and utilitarian schemes. Dr. Dutton regards "the greatest mistake of his (Dr. Taylor's) life" to have been, "the spending no small part of his precious time in proving himself orthodox according to human standards.

He was thus under strong temptations to make out a case of full accordance with standard theologians more plausible than sound." This is well stated. We are sorry to see that, unlike Dr. Dutton, some of this great man's present defenders inherit the same infirmity. He also says, it must be acknowledged that "he did not always justly estimate the intellectual merits of those who differed from him," and was apt to believe that such difference arose from "some weakness or deficiency in minds that did not see and acknowledge" the truth of his positions and reasonings.

Of course, our estimate of the value of Dr. Taylor's theories differs *toto cœlo* from Dr. Dutton's; but we do not see any material difference between us, as to what the salient points in his system actually were. We think his eulogy of this remarkable man all the more effective, because it is not only sincere and unaffected, but so free from disguise or equivocation. In the long run, Dr. Taylor and his system will be estimated for what they were, not for what they were not. No special pleading can prevent this. The sooner all parties recognize divergence from standard theologians, the better. All efforts to the contrary will prove awkward; or, whenever plausible, "more plausible than sound," if we may adopt Dr. Dutton's phrase in the premises.

The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical; with Quotations and References for the Use of Students. By William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. From the second revised and enlarged London edition. With an Introduction, Chronology of the History of Philosophy brought down to 1860, Bibliographical Index, Synthetical Tables, and other additions. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Translator of Tholuck on the Gospel of John. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860.

In our issue for January, 1860, we used the following language in regard to the London edition of Professor Fleming's work, from which the foregoing is reprinted: "The great value of such a work as this title-page describes must be evident to all intelligent men. It is well executed. The technical terms of philosophy are not only defined, but the definitions are sustained and illustrated by copious quotations from the best authors in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy generally. It must, therefore, be useful not only to students of philosophy, but to all scholars and cultivated men. We call the attention of our publishing houses to it. We do not doubt that by republishing it they would serve their own interests as well as the cause of philosophy." Whether in obedience to this suggestion or not, the work has, we are glad to see, been put by our enterprising Philadelphia publishers within reach of American students. Not only so. It has been greatly enlarged

and improved by the additions of Dr. Krauth. He has added a short glossary of German philosophic words which are coming into frequent use, but are not as yet fairly naturalized. His synthetical table of the departments of philosophy, together with his bibliographical index, and chronological outline, will greatly aid investigations into the origin, history, schools, systems, authors, and books relative to philosophy. Such a work has long been a desideratum for British and American students of philosophy, and scholars generally. It is midway between a mere word dictionary and an encyclopædia of philosophy. In philosophy preëminently, the study of words is the study of things. To master this "vocabulary" is to do much towards mastering the great philosophic questions indicated by the terms it explains. The quotations from the highest philosophical authorities, which show the use of terms by the great masters, also show their opinions on the questions implicated with these terms, or point us to the sources whence their opinions may be learned. Aside from its uses for students of philosophy, what cultivated or thinking man would not be relieved at times if he could at once find the meaning of such terms as Realism, Nominalism, Conceptualism, Idealism, Sensism, Sensorium, etc. etc.? That there should be occasional errors or imperfections in such a work, is a matter of course. They are much fewer, however, than were to have been expected. The book is a rich treasury of precious things, and must find its way to all important libraries. Now that Professor Fleming is an expert in this sort of labour, we join Dr. Krauth in expressing the desire that he will be encouraged to carry out the project of which he has given a conditional promise in his Preface to his second edition, of expanding the plan of the present work into a Cyclopædial Dictionary of Philosophy, thus "rendering to philosophy among ourselves, a service similar to what has been rendered to philosophy in France, by the publication of the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques.*" It should be mentioned, as an additional proof of the value of the work, that the author enjoyed the assistance of Morell and McCosh in its preparation.

Ethica. An Outline of Moral Science for Students and Reflecting Men. By John H. Stinson. New York: Published by A. B. Kitson. 1860.

This little hand-volume evinces earnest thinking, and maintains many wholesome principles. It is far, however, from being complete, or in all respects free from error. The author would write far better with wider reading and study of authors, and broader culture, not only in ethics, but in the kindred departments of metaphysics and theology. He would thus raise

himself above a certain crudeness of thought and expression which deforms the present work. At the same time, it is creditable to him, and a pleasant token of profound interest in a science which adjoins, and at various points interlaces with, the *scientia scientiarum*—Christian Theology.

Our First Duty; a Missionary Sermon, preached by appointment before the Synod of New Jersey, at Morristown, New Jersey; repeated in the First Presbyterian Church, Scranton, Pennsylvania; and published at their request. By M. J. Hickok, pastor of the church. New York: John F. Trow, printer. 1860.

A Plea for Home Missions, of unusual power, rising quite above the stereotyped style of preaching on such themes. It abounds in rich, fresh, forcible thought, and glowing appeals. It is one of those sermons which will interest the reader as well as the hearer—a quality by no means common in pulpit discourses.

An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought. A Treatise on Pure and Applied Logic. By William Thompson, D. D., Provost of Queen's College, Oxford. From the fourth London edition. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

This is one of the fruits of the quickened interest in the study of Logic in Britain, which was largely due, in the first instance, to the publication of Whately's celebrated treatise, but has been vastly increased by the fresh contributions to the science, the masterly discussions, and the inspiring personal instructions and influence of Sir William Hamilton—a name destined to be quite as illustrious in connection with logic as with any branch of metaphysical philosophy. Dr. Thompson has dedicated this work to Hamilton, and received important aid from him in preparing it. He has incorporated the doctrines of his great master in his treatise, so far as they command his approbation. Yet the work is by no means servile, or a mere echo of the great philosopher. It bears on every page the imprint of independent, vigorous thinking, of scholarly attainment, and refined culture. In short, it is, in every respect, a masterly treatise, much in advance of any thing else on the subject in our language, unless it be the forthcoming Lectures of Hamilton, which we have not seen. The topics are admirably distributed, and treated in brief chapters, quite convenient for students and teachers. In simplicity and ease of style, as well as other qualities which adapt it to the ready apprehension of young students, and others not familiarized to the ponderous phrase and formidable technology introduced into philosophy by Kant, it is quite superior to those publications of Hamilton which we have thus far seen.

Of the smaller works sent to us we can only give the titles:

Home Jewels; or, Maggie Ella Colton and her Brothers. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 100.

Rosalie's Lessons. By Mrs. Sarah S. T. Wallace. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 132.

The Lost Children; or, Henry and his Torch. By the author of the "Widow's Sixpence." Pp. 82.

Ella Graham; or, Great Effects from Small Causes. By Abbie Eldridge. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 138.

Elsie Lee; or, Impatience Cured. By Mary Grey. Presbyterian Board Publication. Pp. 83.

Holidays; and the Reasons why they are Observed. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 106.

Nursery Tales for her Little Friends. By Cousin Martha. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 76.

Mary Humphreys; or, Light Shining in a Dark Place. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 108.

The Ulster Revival; or, Address to Sabbath Scholars. By the Rev. Robert Knox, A. M., Belfast. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 55.

Ellen; or, Submission in Affliction. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 36.

Am I a Christian? and how can I know it? Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 179.

Little Annie's First Thoughts about God. By Nelly Graham. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 87.

Emily Grey, the Orphan; and her Kind Aunt. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 153.

Twyman Hogue; or, Early Piety Illustrated. A Biographical Sketch, by W. W. Hill, D. D. With an Introduction, by L. W. Green, D. D., President of Centre College. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 186.

Light in the Valley; or, the Life and Letters of Mrs. Hannah Bocking. By Miss M. Anneslie. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. Pp. 176.

The Dragon, that Old Serpent the Devil, and Satan, whose head must be bruised in the Coming Contest among the Nations. By G. B. Stacey. Richmond, Va.: W. Hargrave White, publisher. Pp. 184.

Haste to the Rescue; or, Work while it is Day. By Mrs. Charles W. With Preface, by the author of "English Hearts and English Hands." American Tract Society, 115 Nassau street, New York. Pp. 324.

Katie Seymour; or, How to make Others Happy. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 231.

A Cluster of Fruits from the Tree of Heavenly Wisdom. Compiled for the Board of Publication, by Annie Brooks. Pp. 285.

The Bar of Iron; and the Conclusion of the Matter. A True Story. By the Rev. Charles B. Tayler, M. A., Rector of Otley. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 147.

Hannah Lee; or, Rest for the Weary. By the author of "Isabel; or Influence," "Margaret Craven," &c. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 211.