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THE
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ART. I.—*The Bible its own Witness and Interpreter.*

A NEW philosophy, which has been frequently exposed on the pages of this Review, has invaded the Christian Church both in Britain and America, within the last thirty or forty years. Foremost among its ushers is Coleridge, whose views on the fundamental subjects of Inspiration, the Fall, and the Atonement, were so distorted by his philosophy, that by no alchemy of charity can we make them part or parcel of the Christian scheme. His philosophy was confessedly derived from Schelling.

Since Coleridge wrote and talked, this phase of metaphysical thought has been gradually extending itself through the domain of the Church. It is impossible to define the limits of its influence. It has, more than all other forces combined, created the "Broad Church" party of the Establishment of England, numbering about thirty-five hundred of its clergy,* and adorned with the names of such men as Arnold, Hare, Conybeare, Maurice, Jowett, Baden Powell, &c. It has effected an entrance into the Free Scotch Church; and while it has called

* Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1853, article on Church Parties.

*As Thomas Shannon, Jr.
Pastor, in Edinburgh Review*

forth the emphatic and able rebuke of Dr. Cunningham in his late inaugural, that rebuke only the more clearly shows how strong is the hold this mystical theology has already secured in that noble body of Christ's disciples. It has made rapid progress in this country. It holds not a few of the high places of the church in the land, and the rising ministry of no inconsiderable portion of the American church are taught to regard Schelling and Hegel as the "highest expounders" of philosophy.

It is difficult to describe, in a short compass, the varying forms which this new principle adopts. In attempting the Church of Christ, it has, of course, met with a great diversity of opposing forces, which only the steadfast, persistent working of many years can overcome. The applications of this philosophy are modified and coloured by early habits and prejudices, by the social influence of christianized communities and organizations, by a strong, though perhaps not very intelligent faith in God's word; and often no little skill is required to detect its presence, when it has really gained not only a foothold in the mental constitution of the individual, but the mastery over it. Thoroughly *a priori* and subjective, it has little to do with the external and phenomenal. It undervalues the objective, and magnifies the secret life, essence, and causes of things. Some of its watchwords are, "Spiritual Faith," "Spiritual Insight," "the Spiritual Sense," "the Reason," "the Practical Reason," "the Moral Reason," "the Transcendent Sphere of the Reason," "Intuitional Capacity." It talks much of "dynamics" in mind and in nature; of "development" and "self-evolution." It teaches that by "the one supreme principle of faith as the organ of all primitive or fundamental truth," the mind perceives or intuits absolute truth irrespective of the evidence on which it rests, "evidence and reasoning being little congenial to the spirit of faith"—indeed, it furnishes the evidence for truths that are supersensuous, even "the evidence of a direct intuition." If they are not evident in its light, nothing can make them so. It is "itself the substance and ground of its truth." Hence it teaches that the genus is as much "a substance, an actual being," as is the

individual;* that the genus Homo was alike the subject of the fall and of redemption. When God created Adam, he did not create a man, but "the Adám," an "idea which is not appreciable by the understanding, but only in the transcendent region of the Reason;" and Christ did not assume simply "a true body and a reasonable soul," but, as we have heard it expressed, "the archetypal idea that was defecated in Adam;" or, as Dr. Schaff and others say, he became not "a man, but man." This philosophy ascribes to the Church the theanthropic life of Christ, a *tertium quid*, no one can define, however clearly certain of the more gifted may intuitively perceive it; and to the race a generic sinfulness, which, in the Hegelian nomenclature, "becomes" the sin of the individual. It transmutes the sovereign work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification into the operation of an inward spiritual law or force, and identifies the enlightenment of believers by the same Divine Agent with the activities of "the reason," or "spiritual faith." It teaches that Christianity is "primarily a life, not a doctrine." It turns the earlier Mosaic narrative into an allegory or a myth, and applies its transforming processes to the miracles of the Bible, affirming that they are "a burden" which Christianity carries, not the foundation on which it rests; and that the doctrines of the Bible must establish its miracles, rather than these prove and authenticate the doctrines. The advocates of this philosophy quite generally accept the Scriptures as divine. Indeed, it is greatly for their interest to do so; for here is the theatre on which almost all its applications are made, and without which its sphere would be extremely limited. Being transcendental and mystical in its nature, it rejoices in the really transcendent utterances of these Divine oracles, and urges its claims upon the Christian church by the fact of its superior intuitive discernment of the

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* "If there is one dream of a godless philosophy to which, beyond all others, every moment of our consciousness gives the lie, it is that which subordinates the individual to the universal, the person to the species; which deifies kinds, and realizes classifications; which sees Being in generalization, and appearance in limitation; which regards the living and conscious man as a wave on the ocean of the unconscious Infinite; his life a momentary tossing to and fro on the shifting tide; his destiny to be swallowed up in the formless and boundless universe."—*Limits of Religious Thought*, pp. 105, 6. Am. ed.'

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mysteries of revelation. In keeping with this, however, the inspiration of the Bible is that of the *ideas*, not of the words; of the spirit, not of the letter; and hence the meaning of Scripture varies with the varying modes which the philosophy assumes; its more ineffable declarations being limited and apprehended by the intuitions of the Reason.

We do not affirm or suppose that any prominent individual church is described by these references to what we deem an essentially Infidel and Pantheistic Philosophy. Its poisonous taint has not yet so thoroughly diffused itself. Some good men, however, have been led captive by it, and adopted no small portion of the peculiarities of this scheme as now set forth. One cannot take fire into his bosom and not be burned. The adoption of this dynamic, realistic mode of thought in one application, speedily makes way for another; for no philosophy is more self-consistent and imperative in its claims. The logic is very simple that binds all Christianity in the same mystic chains, imparting a common character to the whole scheme, which gradually works death to every part. The love of the Bible as the pure and authoritative and self-interpreting word of God will not long abide in the same mind with this philosophy. Germany is a living witness to the truth of this remark, and instances are multiplying in this country which fully verify it. Christian men have tried and are trying to unite them. Though none more earnestly or more honestly than these repudiate the charge of rationalism, they are holden in its cords, notwithstanding their disclaimers, and it will lead them away more and more from the simplicity that is in Christ.

✓ An alleged distinction between "the Understanding" and "the Reason," which Coleridge so elaborately attempts to establish, is the vicious root of no small part of the theological errors of our day. The Reason, with Coleridge and others, is the faculty of judging or discerning primary and necessary truths; the intuitive power of the mind which acts independently of the processes of the Understanding. That the human mind has such a power no one disputes; all reasoning and all faith presuppose and require it; but the Intuitional Philosophy assigns it a distinction and a sphere of its own arbitrary creation. The universal and necessary truths which are self-

evident and cognized as soon as stated, are vastly enlarged by this philosophy, and its "Reason," its "sense for the supernatural," claims to perceive immediately and intuitively, truths which in fact are at best knowable but in part, and this by inference or by testimony. Coleridge, and after him many others, identified that "Faith which is the gift of God," the "spiritual mind" in the regenerate, with their faculty of Reason; at the same time confounding the "natural" or "carnal" mind of the Scriptures with the "Understanding." Thus in his introductory sentence to his Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion, we read, "What the eldest Greek Philosophy entitled the Reason (*ΝΟΥΣ*) and ideas, the Philosophic Apostle names *the Spirit*, and *truths spiritually discerned*."* And again, on page 268, "Without or in contravention to the Reason—(that is, the *spiritual* mind of St. Paul, and, *the light that lighteth every man*, of St. John)—this Understanding (*φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, or carnal mind) becomes the sophistical principle, the wily tempter to evil by counterfeit good," &c. Perhaps, however, a better view of Coleridge's opinion may be taken from Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, page 564: "After showing that the idea of pure being is a real one, borne witness to by the clearest light of our inward nature, he (Coleridge) adds, 'By what name then canst thou call a truth so manifested? Is it not a Revelation? And the manifesting power, the source and the correlative of the idea thus manifested, is it not God?' How is it possible to show more clearly than this, the blending of our higher reason and intellectual sensibility in the one supreme principle of *faith*, as the organ of all primitive and fundamental truth?" And on the following page he says: "Reason, according to Coleridge, blends with the will: in other words, the faculty by which we gaze upon absolute truth, unites with that by which we are conscious of our own personality; and from hence originates a new insight into the secrets of man's destiny both in time and in eternity. 'Faith,' to use his own words, 'consists in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual will. By virtue of the latter, therefore, it must be an energy; and inasmuch as it relates to the whole man, it

* Prof. Shedd's edition of Coleridge's Works, vol. i. p. 199.

must be exerted in each and all of his constituents or incidents, faculties, and tendencies: it must be a total, not a partial—a continuous, not a desultory or occasional energy. And by virtue of the former (that is, Reason) faith must be a light—a form of knowing—a beholding of truth. In the incomparable words of the Evangelist, therefore, faith must be a light, originating in the Logos, or the substantive Reason, which is co-eternal and one with the holy will, and which light is at the same time the life of men.’”

The human mind thus endowed becomes truly a mighty power in Philosophy and Theology. According to the hitherto prevalent view, “the only principles which we are authorized to assume as intuitive, are universal and necessary truths; that is, truths which are universally admitted, and which necessitate belief as soon as presented. If we go beyond these narrow limits we enter on debatable and fallible ground, and others have as much right to deny as we have to affirm.” But now the deep mysteries proposed to our faith in the Bible are verities intuitively perceived, self-affirmed to this transcendent faculty of our nature. Surely if this is so, the entire Christian religion, as it has been held by the church, is undermined: the conclusion is very easily reached that an objective Revelation is not only incredible, but impossible. Miracles, and every other external proof by which we would authenticate the Bible truths must be judged by this intuitive faculty, and as they do not assert their own truth to it, must be discredited and disowned. Only such truths as are within the range of this supreme faculty can be known as truths to man, all others must be unrecognized as such. We are not therefore surprised when Dr. Hickok tells us, “that a Revelation from God can be addressed only to and received by this part of our being, and without it our Bibles were as well given to the brutes,” and accounts for the existence of certain paradoxes and contradictions, by ascribing it to what he alleges as a fact, that “the truths of the Infinite and of the Absolute have been kept from the Reason and degraded to the processes of the logical understanding,”* We need not indicate any further the tendencies of this vital element of the new Philosophy.

* Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1860, p. 89.

Now, does such a faculty as this belong to man? Have we, naturally or by cultivation, the power of spiritual insight into the supernatural and divine? Is there a "sense" for such objects, corresponding to that for objects in nature, by which the spiritual and divine revelations of the Bible are directly perceived to be true, they shining in their own light, and appealing with a self-evidencing power to the spiritual organ of vision in man? We speak not of that conviction, that unsailable persuasion of the truth of Bible revelations which arises upon "the witness" of the Holy Spirit, when, in sovereign wisdom, he imparts his enlightening grace to any of the elect; but of a normal power of spiritual vision which this philosophy asserts and signalizes as an endowment of our nature. Assuredly, human consciousness generally does not verify its existence; nor is there any evidence that the most cultured and gifted possess any such "autonomic" "divine" faculty. The present condition and the past history of mankind, so far from affirming, seem directly to deny its existence; for about nothing is there greater disagreement among men, than about these very truths that are claimed to be "*a priori*, and fundamental." The *ipse dixit* of certain philosophers do not prove either its actual presence in their own minds, or its latent presence in the rest of the race. Some have attempted to prove its existence by declaring that we cannot otherwise have any knowledge of divine and supernatural verities; that a revelation is possible only to this "supreme" faculty; that unless made to this, it might as well be made to the brutes; that "the things of the Infinite and of the Absolute," the mysteries of the spiritual world "are appreciable only in the transcendent sphere of the Reason;" that human language is inadequate to convey the ideas of these things; that they must be "seen" to be rightly or at all apprehended.* But these are

* Professor Shedd, in the introductory essay to his edition of Coleridge's works, remarking upon the prominence and supremacy assigned in Kant's system to the Moral or Practical Reason, says: "This is Reason in its highest and substantive form, and no decisions of any other faculty of the human soul have such absolute authority as those of this faculty. It stands over against the moral and spiritual world, precisely as the five senses stand over against the world of sense, and there is the same *immediateness* of knowledge in the one case as in the other. In the phrase of Jacobi, Reason, i. e.,

simply their own unproved assertions. If the only knowledge which we can have of things divine and supernatural is indeed that "clear and distinct" knowledge which the direct perception of the reason furnishes—knowledge which, however difficult it may be to express in language, is none the less, but rather the more, perfect on that account. We say, if this is the only knowledge we can have of such objects, and if *we really have it*, we should be indisposed to dispute the assertion of the existence of such a faculty. But the fact is, we neither have, nor is it possible for us to have, any such perfect knowledge of the things of God and the supernatural. Being finite and relative in our nature and existence, we cannot have other than finite and relative notions or conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute. There is knowledge that is too wonderful for us—so high that we cannot attain to it. Indeed, all our knowledge is imperfect, incomplete. Not only of things supernatural, but of the simplest objects of nature, must we say, "we know in part." *Omnia exeunt in mysterium.*

But things which in their nature are incomprehensible are nevertheless so far within the range of our faculties as to be the proper objects of our intellectual conviction. We may

the Moral Reason, is the *sense* for the supernatural, and therefore we have in fact the same kind of evidence for the reality of spiritual objects that we have for that of objects of sense—the evidence of a sense—the evidence of a direct intuition." Again, speaking of "self-motion" as a development or movement in the spiritual world, unlike that of a movement in nature, he says: "The distinction itself, never more important than at this time when naturalism is so rife, cannot after all be taught in words, so well as it can be thought out. It is a matter of direct perception, if perceived at all, as must be the case with all *a priori* and fundamental positions. The contradiction which clings to the idea of *self-motion*, when we attempt to express it through the imperfect medium of language is merely verbal, and will weigh nothing with the mind that has once *seen* the distinction." A most convenient philosophy this, indeed, which defies criticism, and repels assaults upon its verbal statements of what it may deem "*a priori* and fundamental positions" in the sphere of the supernatural, by boldly affirming that these cannot be "well taught in words," but must be "thought out;" that its verbal contradictions are apparent, not real; that the intuitive perception or "seeing" of these sublime verities is far more reliable and certain than is the exactest "verbal" statement of them. Indeed, it would seem that "the words which the Holy Ghost speaketh," are by no means as excellent a medium of "the things of the Spirit" as is this spiritual sense, this faculty of direct perception.

know somewhat of that which passes knowledge. It cannot be said that we are *totally* ignorant of the Deity. Being "made after his similitude," we are ourselves possessed of certain elements in common with him. The ideas of spirit, of goodness, justice, wisdom, power, etc., are some of them primitive and fundamental, others are easily derived. These qualities are therefore already known to us. We readily ascribe them to our fellow-men. If, now, we seek to divest them of all imperfection, if we attempt to conceive of them as unlimited in degree, absolutely without defect, we have a basis in our minds for the thought of God, as a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. A God fully known, "directly perceived," would be no God to us. Our ignorance of his infinite nature, with our knowledge that his attributes are unlimited, furnishes a far better ground for an idea of God than any intuitive vision of his absolute and infinite being. So, too, we have some notion, positive or negative, or both, of personality. Being ourselves personal, the idea is not foreign to us. And when we are told that God is tri-personal, while we are unable to understand all that is meant, we understand enough to warrant and obligate faith, when the statement is authenticated as true.

The new Philosophy appears to ignore, to a large extent, one source of knowledge which mankind have ever esteemed of great importance. We have constitutionally a faculty, a power to believe truths or facts on extrinsic evidence. The knowledge thus derived may be as satisfactory as that which we have either by intuition or by induction. Our conviction is absolute that two halves make a whole; yet not more so than that produced by the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and equal to either is the conviction we have of the existence of the city of Paris derived from testimony of others. The modes of acquiring knowledge may be different, but the knowledge acquired may be perfectly satisfactory in each instance. Bishop Pearson has concisely and most admirably set forth this latter mode of knowing. After defining "belief in general to be an assent unto that which is credible, as credible," and explaining the

terms of this definition, he states the matter thus: "When any thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connection with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken up upon any real arguments or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet, notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by a manifestation, but attestation of the truth, and so moveth us to assent, not of itself, but by virtue of the testimony given unto it, this is said properly to be *credible*; and an assent unto this, upon such *credibility*, is in the proper notion *faith* or belief."* "Human faith is an assent unto anything credible merely upon the testimony of man." Divine faith is an assent unto anything credible upon the testimony of God. And when divinely attested truths, which may have been "held in unrighteousness," are by the Divine Spirit made to appear holy and just and good, when the merely intellectual acceptance of them becomes that of the whole man, then these truths shine with a beauty and glory more convincing to the mind, than is that of the existence of the sun produced by its shining. They realize and evidence themselves to us with a vividness and power equal to the intuitive perception of any necessary and universal truths.

But it must be remembered that the Bible with its revelation of supernatural verities is addressed to man in the first instance, not as thus enlightened by the Spirit, but as a rational and moral being, fallen, and blinded by sin to the *excellency* of divine things. This particular quality cannot be realized to the mind by any amount of external evidence, however abundant and unanswerable. Another agency must intervene to secure this result, to which, however, a conviction of the reality of the things revealed is an essential prerequisite; the Holy Spirit using the word of truth as the instrument of his renewing, enlightening, and sanctifying operations in the mind. Things must, in the order of nature if not of time, be true to us before they are either beautiful or good.

* On the Creed, Art. I.

To convince men, therefore, of the truth of supernatural announcements, and so to create the obligation of faith and obedience, they must be verified by signs and tokens that appeal "to them that believe not." Those signs and tokens must be distinctive and demonstrative; for the Scriptures demand faith in their highest mysteries on sternest penalties.

A great variety of evidences more or less conclusive, exist for receiving the Scriptures as the word of God:* and as a matter of fact, multitudes yield their assent to their claims on grounds sometimes of questionable sufficiency, so that their faith is easily shaken; yet the ultimate basis, the surest guaranty of faith in supernatural and superrational revelations, must be supernatural attestations. And we may add, that these attestations must to a large extent be so palpable and convincing, that if they are not in and of themselves *self-evidencing*, they are so in effect. In proportion as the things declared are beyond the reach of our natural faculties, should the *evidence* for their truth be within their apprehension.

The attempt to remove miraculous attestations from the sphere of "the Understanding" into that of "the Reason," is not only in accordance with the spirit of infidelity, but is a logical result of the intuitional philosophy. The effect of this is, in *the end*, to discredit the miracles themselves; but the *first* step is to subordinate the miracles to the truths they are held to accredit. We find in the writings of philosophers and theologians of this school such teachings as these: "The doctrine must prove the miracle, and not the miracle the doctrine;" "we believe the miracle for Christ's sake, rather than Christ for the miracle's sake.† Of course, if the truth of a super-

* Confession of Faith, chap. i. sec. 5.

† Professor Baden Powell, of the University of Oxford, twenty years ago was a strong defender of the views contended for in this article; since his adoption of the new Philosophy he has become an equally earnest defender of an extreme rationalism in respect to Christianity. We need hardly remark that his present position is a logical sequence from his philosophy. In his recent work, "The Order of Nature, considered with reference to the Claims of Revelation," he gives forth such teaching as the following: "Spiritual faith transfers miracles to the region of spiritual contemplation and divine mystery;" "the acceptance of miracles is regarded purely as a matter of religious faith and spiritual apprehension." "Miracles are admitted as a part of the

natural doctrine is dependent upon the verdict of "the Reason," or "the spiritual insight," such external attestation as miracles afford is worthless; and, as Dr. Bushnell and others tell us, they are "burdens" which Christianity carries. The new philosophy is self-consistent in such assertions.

Miraculous manifestations occupy a large space in the Bible record. They are there for some distinct and important purpose; and that purpose, as we shall presently see, is avowedly that of attesting and authenticating the doctrines and duties inculcated by those that wrought them. No proof of their aptitude to this purpose is more striking or convincing than the fact, that throughout all ages, and in all parts of the world, they have been counterfeited with utmost care and study, both by devils and by wicked men, for the specific purpose of establishing claims to supernatural authority. On this account it is that the criteria, by which the true are distinguished from the counterfeit, are made a matter of so much importance in Christian evidences. We are abundantly forewarned that false prophets and false Christs should appear with their signs and lying wonders, so much resembling the manifestation of Divine power in supernatural works, that, if it were possible, they would deceive the very elect.

Among the tests by which "signs and wonders" are tried, is unquestionably *in many cases* that of the nature or tendency of the doctrine they enforce. Deut. xiii. 1—3, is decisive on this point. In the instance named it is very manifest that if a prophet or dreamer of dreams, produces apparently the most demonstrative evidence that it is the duty of men to deny the one only living and true God and become idolaters, the evidence is, *ipso facto*, worthless; the conduct prescribed proving that the sign or wonder was not from God. Any sign or wonder must be immediately discredited that goes to contravene the immutable principles of morality, or impugns any universal and necessary truths. God cannot contradict him-

gospel, not as the antecedent or preliminary proof of it." "The belief in miracles, whether in ancient or in modern times, has always been a point not of evidence addressed to the intellect, but of religious faith impressed on the spirit." A bold affirmation, indeed, to any one at all acquainted with the history of Christianity.

self in the nature he has given us. Even here however no little wisdom is requisite; for the number of self-evident truths is limited, and amidst the complications and relations of things we may be mistaken in regard to what is essential and necessary morality. God may require conduct that is *apparently* contradicted by the moral sense, but which is nevertheless both just and proper in the circumstances.

But granting that false miracles may be tested by the character of the doctrine they enforce, it by no means follows that true miracles are thus discriminated. We can in this way learn what is *not* from God, but not what *is*. When a doctrine or duty is announced which is strictly supernatural, it is manifest that such doctrine or duty stands wholly in the character of its authentication, whatever it may be, e. g. The Incarnation of the Second Person of the Godhead, or the resurrection of the dead, its verity is not deduced from its statement, but from something aside and independent of the statement. According to the Scriptures themselves, God's attestations of his truth, are such as no man can, without fearful guilt gainsay or resist. They ordinarily carry with them their own evidence and shine in their own light. They have all the power of first truths to the mind. Thus while the things declared are supernatural, the proofs of their verity are the most complete imaginable. The evidence is addressed to the senses, and in such circumstances as to preclude deception. Taking the Bible as a whole, the *number*, the *variety*, and the *manner of effecting its* miracles, are such as to carry irresistible force of evidence. But their principal characteristic is their self-demonstrativeness. While this varies in many cases, there are a large number in which the very highest form of this quality exists which put the Bible revelation as a whole beyond all rational question. The central miracle of our religion is, the Resurrection of Christ. It is explicitly affirmed that this fact was established by direct appeal to the senses of the Apostles and about five hundred others, and that the proof thus afforded was "infallible." The language of Luke is very distinct and instructive—"Apostles whom He had chosen; to whom also he showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things per-

taining to the kingdom of God.”* Here was the well-defined and unimpeachable evidence of the senses of sight and hearing, and we may add of touch, during this long period. If this does not settle the fact of the Resurrection, the assertion of it as a cardinal doctrine will not do it. And the Apostle in 1 Cor. xv. assumes that unless it can be proved by incontestable extrinsic evidence that Christ rose from the dead, then all the faith and hope and preaching of Christians are vain, and they of all men are most miserable. In like manner the divine mission and authority of Moses was authenticated by self-demonstrative miracles. He stood upon the shore of the Red Sea and lifted up his rod and stretched out his hand and divided the sea; the whole nation of Israel passed through the parted waters. The Egyptians followed. Arrived at the other side, Moses stretched out his hand again, and the waters returned, and covered the chariots and the horsemen and all the host of Pharaoh that came into the sea after them; there remained not so much as one of them. And Israel saw the Egyptians upon the sea shore. Surely here was a divine demonstration to the senses of three millions of people. Conceding the correctness of the record, we do not see how it is in the power of the human mind to evade its force. The effect was natural and legitimate: “And Israel saw that great work which the Lord did upon the Egyptians; and the people feared the Lord, and believed the Lord and his servant Moses.”†

This then is the specific end or purpose of miracles, to attest and confirm supernatural verities. “They stand on their own evidence and prove many doctrines otherwise uncertain, and confirm all.” They are appointed for this, and most effectually fulfil their appointed design. This is their natural and appropriate use, and nothing can take their place.

We design in the remainder of this article to show that this is the place they hold in God’s own view; and while we are aware of the danger of magnifying too greatly any one part of the complex whole of the evidence with which the Bible is authenticated, we feel that there is great truth in the remark of Mansel: “The crying evil of the present day in religious con-

* Acts i. 3.

† Exodus xiv.

troversy is the neglect or contempt of the external evidences of Christianity: the first step towards the establishment of a sound religious philosophy must consist in the restoration of those evidences to their true place in the theological system.”*

We shall not urge the claims of any other scheme of philosophy in order to nullify this German importation, whose tendencies and results we have briefly outlined. We believe that Christianity stands on other than “philosophical pillars,” and is what it is to the mind and conscience of those that receive it, on simple and palpable principles. Philosophy has no claim to be more than the servant of the Scriptures, and it ought to be a very humble self-diffident one. These must authoritatively judge and limit or silence philosophy as their divine wisdom may dictate. They are not at all beholden to it for their existence, for their power, for their principle, or rule of interpretation.

As we have already remarked, one of the more prominent and wide reaching applications of this new Philosophy relates to the external evidences of Christianity. It is affirmed and held with persistent earnestness, that the peculiar verities of Christianity, if not discovered, are verified by the Practical or Moral Reason, the Intuitive faculty; and that the miracles of the Bible are both proved and interpreted by its doctrines and precepts, so that these latter are rather the tests of the miracles, than are the miracles the tests of the doctrines and precepts. Thus a wide and effectual door is opened for the entrance and prevalence of a system of interpretation covering the entire volume of inspiration which invests the finite, not to say the fallen, mind of man with a faculty of “Divine” discernment, and exalts this faculty to the seat of judgment upon the word of God.

Christianity is contained in a written document setting forth certain facts, doctrines, duties, etc. It is accompanied with a record of divine interpositions, which, as we shall show, are God’s authentications of these truths and duties. Now, aside from these miraculous interventions, we affirm that Christianity in nearly, if not quite all, its distinctive peculiarities, is not

* *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 207.

only not self-evident, but that it would be in the last degree presumptuous in us to receive and regard not a few of its distinguishing statements as true or rational: a special divine interposition is needed, we say not to require, but to justify our faith in them. Though they may be "*a priori* and fundamental positions," wholly in the sphere of the spiritual, still they are neither directly nor indirectly perceived to be true *a priori*, by the reason, or the moral sense, or the understanding, or any faculty of the mind. Apart from its testimonial miracles, the direct supernatural attestation of God himself, Christianity does not shine either in its own light or in that of the most gifted human spirit: unless we can see God's truth in God's light, we cannot see it all.

Lessons for inspection

The evidence of the divine origin and authority of the Scriptures is of different kinds, each having its own peculiar power. There is, in the first place, the internal evidence, which is in itself manifold. The Bible bears the impress of divinity. As the material universe, in its grandeur, immensity, harmony, and beauty, reveals itself as the work of an omniscient and almighty intelligence, so does the Bible in the grandeur of its truths, in its holiness, in its adaptation to the nature and wants of man, in its consistency and the logical relation of its parts as a gradually developed system, and, above all, in the unapproachable divine excellence of the character of the Son of God. It has the same evidence to the understanding and the heart, that the moral law has for the conscience. This moral evidence, as it may be called, is the main ground of faith to the mass of professing Christians. In the second place, we have the evidence of prophecy and miracles, which being indisputable manifestations of divine knowledge and power, are irrefragable proofs that the Bible is the word of God. In the third place, there is the demonstration of the Spirit, without which all other sources of evidence are of no avail so far as saving or sanctifying faith is concerned. This is the special ground of faith on the part of all true believers. When the Spirit of God convinces the soul of sin, it is impossible that it should not regard the law of God as divine; when he reveals the glory of the Redeemer as God manifest in the flesh, it is impossible that we should fail to see and believe him to be our

Lord and our God; when he unfolds to us the plan of salvation it is as impossible for us not to receive it as just what we need, as it would be for a man dying of thirst not to drink of an overflowing fountain. It is undoubtedly true that the Spirit of God does attend the truth with this kind of evidence. This is the direct and immediate testimony of God to the soul itself. It is no less true that this testimony of the Spirit is of the nature of a demonstration and revelation. It enables the soul to perceive the things of God to be true, so that faith is not merely reliance on testimony which is objective and extraneous, but includes an apprehension of the truth. It is to be still further remarked, that although this witness of the Spirit is confined in its direct influence to those doctrines which enter into our religious experience, yet it indirectly, although effectually, includes the whole Bible. (The man who is convinced of the divinity of the Son of God, cannot but be convinced of the divine origin of the book in which he is revealed, and which he sanctioned; which treats of him from beginning to end, and which he presents to us as his word. All this we cordially admit.) Our object is twofold; first, to vindicate the importance of prophecy and miracles as trustworthy, if not absolutely indispensable testimonials of a divine revelation; and secondly, to show that the Scriptures are not addressed to the intuitional faculty of the natural mind; that it is not the immediate apprehension of the reason which constitutes faith, but that the word of God is an objective revelation of truth, divinely authenticated by supernatural evidence, which gives it supreme authority over the reason and the conscience.

We cannot avoid referring to a very memorable sentence in Butler's Analogy, Part II. chap. 7. "In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be," he says, "several things of great weight, not reducible to the head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptance of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always joined with them."

We do not doubt, but most gratefully acknowledge that multitudes, as we have already intimated, even of those who

are not renewed by the Holy Spirit, are intellectually convinced of the truth of Christianity, who have never studied the Christian evidences. The reasons for their faith may not be very distinctly present to their minds; but from whatever source their conviction is immediately derived, the objective authentication of the Bible as divine is at the basis. The light which is thus cast upon those revelations imparts to them a radiance of their own in which they shine.

Let us clearly understand what we mean by Christianity. Of course, it is Bible truth as discriminated from natural religion. It is exclusively and distinctively Bible doctrines and Bible precepts. We intend those peculiar verities which mark and distinguish the Bible, separating it from all other books, and constituting Christianity a religion radically and for ever distinct from every other system of religious faith and practice known in human history. Among them we name the fall and spiritual ruin of the entire race of men in Adam, through one offence committed by him at the commencement of human history; by which offence judgment came upon all men unto condemnation, so that ever since this apostasy men are conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity, and are by nature the children of wrath; the mode of the divine existence, three distinct, eternal persons, subsisting in the one only living and true God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the gift of the Son by the Father to be a sacrifice for the sins of men; the advent of Christ to the world; his assumption of our nature in a true body and reasonable soul; his atoning death on Calvary, expiating human guilt, making reconciliation between an offended God and us, and bringing in an everlasting righteousness and complete salvation; the burial, resurrection, ascension, mediatorial reign, and intercession of the Incarnate God; the mission of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, in the fulfilment of which, by his own peculiar and sovereign influence, he convinces men of sin, leads the sinner to Christ, enlightens the understanding, rectifies the conscience, purifies the heart, and sanctifies the whole man through the instrumentality of the word of God; salvation through faith in Christ, in which regeneration, justification, adoption into God's family, sanctification, and final perfection, are secured; the

second advent of Christ; the resurrection of the dead; the universal judgment, and eternal retributions.

The preceptive code of Christianity (as such) is as peculiar and distinctive as is the doctrinal. It requires an unreserved and everlasting personal consecration and supreme love to the Lord Jesus Christ. It constitutes his word a supreme law to his disciples. Supreme love to him and regard to his glory are their constraining motives of conduct. They are required to renounce all their own righteousness as worthless, to accept his obedience in the place of their own, to live by his Holy Spirit, to be baptized into the name of the triune God, to celebrate the death of Christ in the sacrament of the supper, to seek to save the souls of men from the second death, to pray to God only in the name of Christ, to possess the virtues of self-denial, forgiveness of enemies, brotherly love, and endurance of wrong for Christ's sake.

This is Christianity. Its sphere is supernatural and super-rational. These several doctrines, these peculiar duties, as they are based upon and spring out of the doctrines, can neither be defined nor defended outside of the written word. "Reason," "Intuition," "Spiritual Faith," are blind and dumb before this oracle. God's testimony is the necessary ground and reason of faith in them. The notion that philosophy states the problems, and that faith solves them, which is held by the friends of this new system, is utterly baseless in fact and truth. Philosophy never dreamt of them, and knows nothing about them, except as they are declared in the Bible. These are matters of mere revelation, of inspired record, and can be received and credited only as stated in the written word of God, and because authenticated by him as true. Such a statement, made and attested by the Deity, is receivable by any sane human mind: yea, it must be received by all to whom it comes, on the alternative of making God a liar; and received just as are other truths or facts in nature or in providence, on reliable testimony. If we have God's testimony for any declaration, however incredible the fact or idea declared may be, we want nothing more, for God is Truth and knows all things, and cannot lie: if we have not this, nothing in man, no gift, no grace, no mystical transcendental faculty or property of the

mind can remedy the defect. To receive a statement on the divine attestation of its truth requires no intuitive perception of the essential harmony of that statement with reason. It is credited on the same principles and in the same way as are ordinary statements of facts or opinions, on the ground of the evidence which is furnished for their verity.

We say that the doctrines and precepts of the Bible, which constitute Christianity, can be accepted only on a special divine attestation. Let us take a single illustration. We meet with a Bible for the first time. We open it. Our eyes fall upon this sentence, "He that believeth (the gospel) and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Now it is clear that the mere existence of this sentence on paper does not prove the truth of what it declares. It is not axiomatic; it does not shine in its own light. It is not a self-evident truth that man's everlasting weal or woe is poised on faith, or the want of faith, in the words of Jesus of Nazareth. No mere man, however keen his perceptive faculties, however marvellous his intuitional power, can affirm or deny this statement. Its truth or falsehood is wholly dependent on the question, Does God declare this? and its verification must be a distinct, infallible, divine authentication of it: unless we have this, it has, it can have, no authority over us. An uneducated son of a carpenter, of truest morality, of sternest integrity, says this; must we believe it because he says it? We want evidence that he was competent thus to speak. The language is divine, or entitled to no credit. It involves on its face the divine prerogative of determining and settling our everlasting destiny. If God himself does not authenticate this declaration, we should not feel ourselves bound by it, though an angel was its author. Jesus must manifest himself to be a teacher sent from God. He must make it plain that the word which he speaks is the word of the Father which sent him.

We just now remarked, that there were not a few of the distinguishing statements of the Bible which it would be presumptuous for us to receive without a special divine attestation. Let us verify this remark before we proceed with our argument: we shall thus more fully appreciate the *necessity* for divine attestations of divine revelations, and the utter impo-

tency of the "spiritual sense," the "intuitive reason," in the mysteries of God. We shall better understand that in order to a right reception of the divine word, not high philosophy nor spiritual acumen are requisite, but the faith of a little child. "The first and most indispensable condition of piety is submission, blind, absolute, entire submission of the intellect, the life, the conscience, to God. This is blind, but not irrational. It is the submission of a sightless child to an all-seeing Father; of a feeble, beclouded intelligence, to the Infinite intelligence. It is not only reasonable, but indispensable, both as a safeguard from scepticism, and for the rational exercise of piety."

The doctrines that the one only living and true God subsists in three distinct and eternal persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and that the second of these persons became man, and was offered a sacrifice to Divine justice for our sins, are plainly stated in the Bible, and are God's own attested revelations. Now to hold these doctrines on any other ground than the divine statements of them, to assume to know anything more or other than God has been pleased to tell us; to pretend to reason out, or guess, or intuit these ineffable mysteries by any faculties our finite natures may possess, on the very face of the matter evinces a boldness and hardihood of spirit, a presumptuous intrusiveness into the arcana of the Infinite, compared with which the conduct of the Bethshemites in "looking into the ark of the Lord" was innocence itself. Again: The statement that God can be just, and yet justify and sanctify and give eternal life to the ungodly who believe in the crucified Nazarene, is one of pure revelation. To affirm it without a divine attestation, on the strength of a gift of "spiritual insight," or any thing else, would be unpardonable arrogance. Again: We read in the Bible that the infinite and holy God adopts guilty and vile men who believe in Christ into his family, loving them with the same kind of love wherewith he loves his only begotten Son, and changing them into his image from glory to glory. Now suppose a philosopher of highest acumen should declare this of the Most High? Even faith itself is often staggered at the inconceivable condescension herein displayed.

Take one or two instances of a practical character. To name them is sufficient. For Abraham to offer Isaac in a

bloody sacrifice to God at the suggestion of his "spiritual sense," or at the dictation of his "moral reason," would have been both impious and inhuman. Again: For Saul to have attacked the Amalekites, when they were at peace with him, and utterly to destroy them, slaying both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass, at the dictation of his "practical reason," in the strength of an "immediate perception" of his duty, would have been wantonly cruel and murderous; though to do these same things at the behest of the Almighty Ruler, was simple and righteous obedience, for which none can blame him.* Similar examples might be almost indefinitely multiplied. These suffice. Now to return.

Let any man come to us claiming to deliver a message from God, the very fact that he is a man, not only gives us the right, but makes it our duty to require evidence that God has given him such a message. He must show his credentials, and those credentials must be supernatural, since the message which he declares is so. Accordingly, we demand evidence that his message is divine. He refers us to our "Practical Reason," telling us that a spiritual insight into the nature of his message will prove its truth; that the subject belongs to the domain of the spiritual, and can be known only by the "spiritual sense." It is a matter of "direct perception, if perceived at all." We reply, that we are not conscious of any such intuitive faculty; his message does not appear to us self-evidently true; we must have objective and external proof, demonstrative and infallible, because our best faculties are finite and fallible, utterly unreliable in things supernatural and super-rational. He still insists that we have such powers of spiritual insight, and if we will not exercise this divine faculty, we must remain in ignorance of the mind of God and of our duty. This method of ascertaining divine and spiritual truths, of testing and substantiating the doctrines of Christianity, is simply preposterous. In any really serious case, no human being would rely upon it. And yet the new philosophy does put forth pretensions akin to this. Not to speak of Schelling and Hegel, of Newman and Parker, who philoso-

* See Butler's Analogy, Book II. chap. iii. near the close.

phized distinctive Christianity into Pantheism or mysticism, utterly out of the reach of that class by whom the Christian religion is principally received,* it has, as we have seen, votaries among men whom we must regard as friends of evangelical religion—men who attribute a percipient faculty to the human mind, a power of “insight into the transcendent sphere of the Reason,” which, if it really exists, renders superfluous or of secondary value any distinct extraordinary attestations from God, other than that furnished by this marvellous power of spiritual intuition. No; we must have special divine evidence for all divine doctrines or precepts that command our faith and obedience. And the same principle that makes it our duty to require demonstrative evidence for the divinity of the word declared, makes it our duty to believe implicitly, and obey promptly that word when thus attested. In this case, not merely the nature of the doctrine, but the character of the evidence is to determine the truth of the statement announced. And when conclusive evidence is furnished, when the divine word is divinely authenticated, “it is to be received,” as Lord Bolingbroke, one of the most gifted and accomplished of English deists, says, “with the most profound reverence, with the most entire submission, with the most unfeigned thanksgiving. Reason has exercised her whole prerogative then, and delivers us over to faith. To believe before, or to doubt after this attestation, is alike unreasonable.”

Christianity, with its superhuman and superfinite revelations concerning God and Christ, and the way of salvation, and the future state, must have the unmistakable seal and witness of God for its truth. It can be properly believed only when and as thus authenticated. For the Book which contains Christianity was confessedly written by finite men, and their utterances on these high and mysterious themes, to be valid and authoritative, must be owned and proved to be from God himself.

The method of proof which God has chosen, and which is so perfect and commanding as to make the Bible its own evidence is, as has already been observed, that of miracle; the special

* 1 Corinthians i. 26—29.

and extraordinary interposition of the Deity in works of knowledge and of power. Let us briefly describe this method.

True prophecy, the perfect foresight and authentic announcement of future, distant, purely contingent events, necessarily involves omniscience, infinite intelligence. God only can thus foresee and foretell the secrets of futurity. This proposition is too plain to need proof or illustration. The Bible is replete with prophetic declarations of events near and remote, simple and complex, most unexpected, pertaining to persons not then in existence, to events which were to occur during the progress of years, even of ages; prophecies, which those who first attempted to oppose Christianity by argument, endeavoured to show, were written after the events; but they were even more staggered by the fact, that the Old Testament Scriptures must have been in being hundreds of years before Christ, from the indisputable existence of the Septuagint version, so that many of the most signal fulfilments of prophecy could not be explained on any such supposition.

Now the strength, the convincing power of the evidence of prophecy consists in this, that connected with these divine predictions, so blended and interwoven that they cannot be separated from them, are those very doctrines and precepts which constitute the pith and core of the Christian religion. Witness as an illustration the 53d chapter of Isaiah. We find there a declaration of the humiliation, rejection, substitution, atoning sacrifice, death, burial, and intercession of the Lord Jesus Christ: also the depravity of men and the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son. Omniscience uttered the prophecy. Omniscience revealed the doctrines. Both proceeded from the same divine oracle. If one is received the other must be also. They are too closely united ever to be put asunder. And so throughout the Scripture. The "Thus saith the Lord" cleaves alike to the word of doctrine and of duty, and to that of prophecy. To reject the prophecy is logically impossible. To reject the doctrine or the duty it enforces, is wilful disobedience to the Omniscient God. So that until any one can deliberately deny the wondrous prophecies of the Bible, he is shut up to the reception of the doctrines

and precepts, the warnings and threatenings, that are embodied in it.

And so in regard to miracles. A true miracle is the work of Omnipotence. The Bible is full of the records of the most positive, indubitable, miraculous events. These miracles were, or they were not, performed. If it can be proved that the book which is so full of divine revelations in connection with divine prophecies, is equally full of sham miracles; if it can be proved that Omniscience has joined with imposture and absurdity, with myths and fables of events that never occurred, and allowed that book in whole or in part to be the guide of His church for nearly four thousand years, then a fact will be established more wonderful than are all the miracles recorded in it. Admitting the prophecies of the book, even if there were no other evidence for the reality of the miracles, it would be most irrational, undevout, and hasty, to discredit those miracles. Once admit that the finger of an Omniscient God has traced its infallible lines throughout these pages, and that mind must be sadly perverted that is ready to deny the evidences which loom up all over those same pages, that an Omnipotent God is also seen in the mighty deeds, the super-human achievements there recorded. A real miracle is proof absolute of Divinity; and if miracle and teaching are blended and interwoven, even as are prophecy and teaching, if the power of God and the doctrine of God are manifested at the same time, as any reader of the Bible cannot fail to perceive they are, then the attempt to dissever them must be a vain one. They stand or fall together. Both must be accepted, or both must be rejected. We cannot allow the miracle and deny the doctrine; we cannot allow the doctrine and deny the miracle. If we admit, e. g., that Christ had power to heal the paralytic by a word, we must also confess that he had power on earth to forgive sins.

Beyond question, the testimony of prophecy and miracle to the divine origin of Christianity is decisive. If the Bible rests upon Omniscience and Omnipotence thus manifested, then it is God's word beyond reasonable debate. God deals with us in this matter as rational beings. There is no truth of revelation to the acceptance or obedience of which he summons us,

except on sufficient and infallible evidence. For the existence of no object in nature, for the occurrence of no event in history, is the evidence more intrinsically clear and commanding than for the super-rational verities of the Christian religion. And though some men refuse to believe on the evidence God has furnished, it is not because of insufficiency in that evidence, but because, as Pascal has said, "of the supernatural hardness of their hearts." The evidence is demonstrative, and just what the human mind requires.

Instead, however, of arguing this from the nature of the case, or from analogy, we propose to show from the Bible itself that the human mind instinctively and rightfully demands just this sort of evidence for supernatural revelations, and that God has most freely recognized and met this demand. Our references and quotations, though by no means exhaustive, will be quite numerous, not more so, however, we think, than the importance of the subject at the present time requires. We wish to signalize the divine testimony on the necessity of a special supernatural authentication of revealed truth, and therefore freely tax the patience of our readers.

We find then, throughout the Bible, that when men claimed to speak from God, those to whom they spake had, or demanded, evidence of their authority thus to speak, and that ordinarily miracles constituted that evidence.

When God told Moses to go to the children of Israel and call them out of Egypt in his name, Moses answered and said, "But, behold, they will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice; for they will say, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee!" The force of this suggestion was admitted; and God in order to authenticate his word by Moses and silence this objection, said unto him, "What is that in thine hand? And he said, A rod. And he said, Cast it on the ground, and he cast it on the ground, and it became a serpent; and the Lord said unto Moses, Put forth thine hand and take it by the tail, and he put forth his hand and caught it, and it became a rod in his hand; that they may believe, that the Lord God of their fathers hath appeared unto thee." *Exod. iv. 1—5.* Upon which Bishop Pearson admirably remarks, "They who saw in his *hand* God's omnipotency, could not suspect in his

tongue God's veracity; insomuch that when Aaron became to Moses instead of a mouth, and Moses to Aaron instead of God, Aaron spake all the words which the Lord had spoken unto Moses, and did the signs in the sight of the people, and the people believed."*

When Moses and Aaron went in unto Pharaoh and said, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go—it was right and rational, a thing to be anticipated, that Pharaoh should say, "Show a miracle for you"†—i. e. give me your credentials; what proof can you furnish that the Almighty speaks as you avow? When God by the prophet Elijah had restored to life the dead son of the woman of Zarephath, that was a necessary conclusion she drew, "now by this I know that thou art a man of God, and that the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth."‡ As was also that of the people of Israel upon the result of the trial of the prophets of Baal by the same prophet—"and when all the people saw it, they fell on their faces; and they said, The Lord, He is the God; the Lord, He is the God."|| God, wishing to produce conviction on the mind of Ahaz, said to him, "Ask thou a sign of the Lord thy God; ask it either in the depth, or in the height above." Ahaz only evinced his unbelief and sin when he replied, "I will not ask, neither will I tempt the Lord."§ When the prophet Isaiah promised to Hezekiah from God that his life should be prolonged fifteen years, his unattested word was insufficient, and he said, "This shall be a sign unto thee from the Lord, that the Lord will do this thing that he hath spoken, Behold, I will bring again the shadow of the degrees which is gone down in the sun-dial of Ahaz, ten degrees backwards. So the sun returned ten degrees, by which degrees it had gone down."¶

Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be the Son of God, and to speak with authority in God's name. And when the Jews demanded evidence of so high a claim, saying unto him, "What sign showest thou, that we may see and believe thee? What dost thou work?" so far from refusing to meet their demand, he habitually referred them to his miracles as verifica-

* Pearson on the Creed, Art. 1. † Exod. vii. 9. ‡ 1 Kings xvii. 24.
 || 1 Kings xviii. 39. § Isaiah vii. 11, 12. ¶ Isaiah xxxviii. 5—8.

tions of his words. Miracles throughout the evangelical record are made one great ground of conviction. These were the manifestations of his "glory" and of his "grace." That was a most rational conclusion of Nicodemus: "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him."* Equally wise was the word of the man who was born blind: "Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing."† So the prophetic power which Christ exhibited to the woman of Samaria attested the divinity of his mission: "Come and see a man which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ? For which reason many of the Samaritans believed on him."‡ And at the Passover in Jerusalem, "many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did."§ And he himself demanded faith in his word because of the miraculous character of his works. "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. There is another that beareth witness of me. . . . The *works* which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me."|| "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto thee, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the *works*"—*i. e.* which verify the truth of my words. "Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me, or else believe me for the very works' sake."¶ "If I do not the *works* of my Father, *believe me not*. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in him."** "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, *they had not had sin*; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father."†† And the beloved disciple testifies: "Many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written, that ye might believe that

* John iii. 1.

† John ix. 32, 33.

‡ John iv. 29, 39.

§ John ii. 23.

|| John v. 31, 32 and 36, also, x. 25.

¶ John xiv. 10, 11.

** John x. 37, 38.

†† John xv. 24.

Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through his name.”* To verify and establish more abundantly his divine mission and authority, the Lord Jesus gave the power of working miracles in his name to his disciples; for, when he had said unto them, “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, he that believeth not, shall be damned . . . they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following.”† And so it was throughout the apostolic history. Divine *works* went with divine words, authenticating and establishing them. Thus it is said of Philip’s preaching at Samaria: “The people with one accord gave heed unto those things which Philip spake, hearing, *and seeing the miracles* that he did.”‡ Paul declares, “that Christ had wrought by him to make the Gentiles obedient by *word and deed*, through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God.”§ “Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs and wonders and mighty deeds.”|| As also, speaking of salvation by Christ, he says: “which at first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness both with signs and wonders and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will.”¶ Wherefore Peter spake unanswerable truth when he said: “Ye men of Israel hear these words, Jesus of Nazareth, a man proved to be from God among you by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by him in the midst of you as ye yourselves also know.”** Truly was Jesus “declared to be the Son of God with power.”

This, then, is the position which the Bible itself holds in regard to the authentication of a divine revelation. It makes prophecy and miracles its seals. It refers to those manifestations of Omniscience and Omnipotence as the undeniable evidence that it is of God. It never appeals to the intuitive perceptions of the mind as the ground of our faith. It is only

* John xx. 30. 31.

† Mark xvi. 15, 16, and 20.

‡ Acts viii. 6.

§ Rom. xv. 18.

|| 2 Cor. xii. 12.

¶ Heb. ii. 3, 4.

** Acts ii. 22.

and always the testimony of God, that testimony which is given by outward works of divine power, and by the inward demonstrations of the Spirit. To confound this witnessing of the Spirit with and by the truth on the heart and conscience, with the intuitions of reason, is to obliterate the distinction between the natural and supernatural, between Rationalism and Christianity.

The spiritual experience of the Christian, his joy, and peace, and hope, and invincible persuasion of the truth of the promises, are all limited or enlarged by the authenticated word. The outward revelation attested by miracle, and the inward revelation by the Holy Spirit, having one and the same infallible author, are of course mutually consistent; but the test by which all spiritual feelings and frames and ideas are tried, the security against all deception, is the written word. The Bible comes to man as he is a moral, rational agent, and addresses him accordingly.* It creates responsibility, not by gracious communications, earnest and assurances of the divine Spirit, but by its authoritative verbal utterances. These declarations by prophets and apostles are sent to men everywhere, and *as* and *when* they find men, create the duties of faith and obedience. The actual record of revelation authenticated by God is the *ultimate* ground and reason of all faith and godliness. To this we are indebted for whatever knowledge we may possess of "the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory." Intuition, spiritual faith, by whatsoever name we call the percipient faculty of the new philosophy, has no more ability to apprehend the nature of God, the mode of his existence, the incarnation of Christ, the work

* "This eternal life, which is offered to me in the gospel"—the gospel being not "a superfluous announcement of known moralities, but a revelation of truths quite unattainable by reason—is of universal aptitude in relation to human nature in its actual condition; and it must be so thought of, even although in fact it were but one in millions that should accept it. Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but a religion for man. I do not accept it because my temperament so disposes me, and because it meets my individual mood of mind, or my tastes. I accept it as it is suited to that moral condition in respect of which there is no difference of importance between me and the man I may next encounter on my path."—Isaac Taylor, *Restoration of Belief*, American edition, p. 313.

of the Holy Spirit, than has the common understanding of men.

Some writers of this school as before remarked, have sought to identify evangelical faith with their intuitive faculty. But in vain. The subjective principle of faith which is imparted by the Holy Spirit in regeneration, is in strictest accordance with the objective testimony God has given for the truths he requires us to believe. It has no such marvellous property as has been ascribed to it. Its distinction is, that it accepts as true, those things which God declares to be true, just as he declares them. If it does not of itself perceive them to be true and rational, it knows that they are both true and rational because they are from God, "by many infallible proofs." It receives with all the heart the record God has given concerning the spiritual and eternal states. Neither faith nor "reason" can prove the truth of the revelations from their nature or from their statement. This is established by an authenticated, "Thus saith the Lord," never by a "Thus saith faith," or a "Thus discerneth the reason."

The Bible utterly ignores, or rather summarily dismisses the claims of the new philosophy, declaring that God's word stands not in the wit or wisdom of men, but in the power of God, and the human revealers and expounders of the Christian scheme in the sacred Scriptures are abundantly proved to be men sent from God, by wonders and signs which God has wrought by them.

There are statements in the Bible that are self-evidently true. The mind instantly accredits them, just as it does any axiom in geometry, any first truth in morals. Many ethical maxims and practical precepts are of this character. Much in the Bible is identical with the teachings of natural religion. Besides these there are statements which may be known to be true by geographical or historical evidence, altogether independent of the Bible testimony. But in these instances there is nothing peculiar to Christianity; they are such as are common to Christianity and other systems.

Assuredly, the testimony of God is final, conclusive, all-sufficient on whatever subject he speaks. His well authenticated word is more reliable than the testimony of history,

geology, astronomy, geography, tradition—better than logic, or the moral sense or the intuitive reason of finite man. “If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater,” and having this, we ought to be satisfied. If we hold that God’s word is not enough, we put infinite dishonour on him. The witness of God is greater than the witness of all his creatures. We ought to believe God, though the voice of the entire human family were against him. “Let God be true, and every man a liar.”

✓ The admirers and advocates of the new philosophy talk much of the “essential unity of Revelation and Reason.” They attempt “a philosophical statement and vindication of the distinctively spiritual and peculiar doctrines of the Christian system.” They tell us that “Christian faith is the perfection of human reason.” They contend for “the faith that is insight, and the insight that is faith,” and affirm “the internal coherency of the whole scheme of revelation within itself to the eye of Reason and the Spirit.” Some, more cautious than others, though not so self-consistent, teach that the province of the “Moral Reason” is negative; that it decides what is not to be believed, though it cannot always affirm what ought to be. Now, this entire strain of remark, rather the philosophy that suggests and sanctions it, is radically *rationalistic*. It tends either to exalt human reason to a sphere God has never assigned it, or else to degrade and weaken the authority of divine revelation. There is nothing in the Bible to warrant it. What Omniscience and Omnipotence attest, is true because they attest it. The verdict of man’s reason, affirmatively or negatively, approving or disapproving, is of little worth. God has declared it, and this ends the matter. Having accepted the Bible as his word, we are thenceforth believers, not reasoners. Our standards are explicit on this point. “The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God, (who is truth itself,) the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God.”* His

* Confession of Faith, Chap. i. Sec. 4.

testimony, not that of any percipient faculty we may possess, makes the belief of Bible doctrines and precepts *reasonable*. On this ground they are true and righteous to us altogether. The ultimate unity of pure reason, even God's reason, and that of revelation is established upon an infallible basis. No humble believer in the Bible ever imagined that it was difficult, as this philosophy affirms, "to reach the most absolute and unassailable conviction that divine revelation was likewise divine reason." Of course it is; and the mind need not go "down into deeper and deeper depths of its own being to find it out." A philosophical statement and vindication of the Christian mysteries may be very desirable to those who have nothing better, but to such as receive God's own statement and vindication of them, the taper-light of human reason goes out in the refulgence. Christian faith is indeed the perfection of human reason, but it is so only because nothing is more *reasonable* than to believe the word of Him who cannot lie. And is it not plain, that if we join "spiritual insight" with the divine testimony concerning any revealed truth, thus making a double basis for faith, it then becomes, not simple faith in God, but faith in something else *and* God. And just in so far as we place anything on the same level with the testimony of the Deity, be it history, reason, or logic, we impart to that thing an authority which belongs to the Omniscient God alone. We measurably set aside the testimony of the Infallible One as insufficient and unworthy in and of itself to command our implicit confidence, and make the intuitions of fallen and finite man like that word which God has magnified above all his name.

The true doctrine on this subject is, that faith begins where reason ends. Reason has its sphere, but this is below, decidedly, always, wholly below that of faith. A clear, distinct, impassable line of demarcation divides them. They are not companions that go hand in hand to the same goal; they are separate powers operating in different methods, in different departments of moral and spiritual realities. Not that faith is or can be irrational, but faith often is then most rational, when it is most unreasoning, when it receives what God says,

simply because he says it, without any other reason than that he says it.

hermeneutics

Closely connected with the views now presented, of the fundamental evidence for the Christian religion, and directly growing out of them, is another subject, the statement of which is requisite to the complete divorcement of the Bible and the new philosophy. We refer to the interpretation of the Scriptures. We can only present a brief outline of argument, having already too long detained the reader. A false principle of interpretation is of course a principle of false interpretation; and any principle or method which subjects God's revealed will to man's critical sanction, or his intuitional insight, for its meaning, is a false principle. Unless the *meaning* of the word and the word itself are alike from God, unless inspiration and interpretation stand on the same basis, and are both the work of the Holy Spirit, we are destitute of any proper, legitimate revelation. The Bible in that case is little else than a book of dark sayings and riddles, the solution of which is dependent upon the understanding or reason of those to whom it is sent. God is his own interpreter. In this book he speaks directly to the mind of his own creature; the Father of spirits to the spirit of man. And no interposed expounder, no human interpreter is necessary in order to enable man to hear and understand the voice of his Maker. He has chosen the best words to express his own thoughts, which are as high above man's as the heavens are high above the earth. Not only are "the things of the Spirit," the ideas and thoughts of God, revealed, which would be all sufficient if every man was his own interpreter of the Bible; but the *words* which convey those divine ideas and thoughts. As the apostle affirms, "which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; joining spiritual things to spiritual words,"* or, explaining the things of the Spirit in the words of the Spirit. Men cannot make God's word any clearer than he himself has done by his own exposition of it. After all their explanations, the word of God shines only with its own inherent splendors. If God has not

verbal exp.

* 1 Cor. ii. 13.

made his truth so plain, that in all important matters, the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err therein, man cannot help his Maker. "God's own word," it has been well said, "must be as intelligible as any human interpretation of it."

The Bible is the infallible rule of faith and practice, and it is the only authoritative rule; all that we are to believe concerning God, and all duty that God requires of man is in this book. It is a revelation. It is not an inquiry, nor an investigation, nor an analysis, nor an argument, nor a speculation. It is an authoritative declaration from God of his mind and will. It is the simple and unmixed product of infinite intelligence. Human thought as such, does not belong to it. It has one author, and only one. It is God's book more completely than Newton's "Principia" is his book. We are, therefore, utterly incompetent to sit in judgment upon its contents. The Bible judges all things, but itself is judged by nothing. It tests and gauges all human reasonings and opinions, but itself is gauged and tested by nothing outside of its own record. Having but one Author, it has but one meaning. Christianity in its peculiar doctrines and precepts is a simple, unique, isolated scheme of truth. It is fixed and immutable. It is not one thing for one age, and something different for another. It is unimpressible by, and unconformable to, what is called the spirit of the age. The Christianity which God gave to his people in the first century, is precisely the same as that which he gives to them in the nineteenth century; and woe to him who adds anything to it, or takes away anything from it. If, therefore, the Bible does not declare and determine with infallible certainty its own meaning, it is the merest guess work for any finite creature to attempt to do it. Neither individual men, philosophers or Christians, nor the church, are endowed with the power of authoritative interpretation. "*Private judgment*" is of little value unless it is *correct* judgment; and it is correct only when it harmonizes with, and embraces God's own judgment of his own word.

The Bible always assumes to interpret itself, and human teaching concerning divine and spiritual things must always be referred to the Scriptures. Like the Bereans, every man must go to God's own declarations to verify whatsoever may be

uttered by preacher or by philosopher. "To the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." The higher reason, the spiritual insight, have no part nor lot in this matter, except, if they are willing to take it, that of humble obedient listeners to the divine oracles. Man must become a little child in the presence of this excellent glory, and like Samuel, say, "Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth." The Confession of Faith speaks with the utmost distinctness and emphasis on this subject; and we wonder that its noble words have not been more frequently cited in these days, when Rationalism has produced a "suspense of faith" in some quarters, and an eclipse of faith in others, and a wide-spread distrust of the absolute authority and self-interpretative character of the Bible. "The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture, (which is not manifold, but one,) it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly. The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture."* These statements are decisive. If accepted, they control every question pertaining to divine and spiritual subjects that arises. They send men directly to the Bible. This book settles its own meaning and tolerates no other. Its directions to preachers as the ambassadors of God, and its addresses to men, are all based on this assumption. Its utterances are authoritative and final. The word is not preached in order that men may subject it to the tests of the Practical Reason, and then approve or condemn as they please; but it is a word of immediate obligation. Men hesitate or doubt or reject it at their peril. And as they are bound here to accept it on its own authority and with its own interpretation, so this divine self-interpreting word will judge them at the last day: and any appeal which may be made in that day from this written state-

* Confession of Faith, chap. i. secs. 9 and 10.

ment of the mind of God, to the decisions of the intuitional reason or any other faculty of the soul, will be regarded as an aggravation of the sin which modified or rejected that word.

The principle of interpretation which we have now stated is that of the Reformed churches. It is the only principle recognized in the Scriptures themselves: and the only one which carries with it an authority from which there is no appeal. The words of the Bible are selected by God himself, and express the truths he has revealed more perfectly than any human language possibly could. All supernatural ideas that are not covered by and conveyed in "these words which the Holy Ghost teacheth," though supposed to be seen by a direct perception as plainly as the sun is seen by the human eye that looks upon it, are visionary and worthless. There are, if we look at the *sense* of the words, no verbal contradictions in the sacred oracles. The imperfect medium of language, in the mouth of God, becomes perfect, so perfect that we may not "think out" anything for truth which those words do not teach. We only know spiritual truths as they are expressed in the words of the Holy Spirit.

Of course, this doctrine of interpretation does not, in any manner, invalidate the importance of a just exegesis of Scripture, or affirm that no aid can be obtained from philology in understanding the meaning of the inspired word. Excellent as is our version of the Bible, we must bear in mind that it is a translation—a translation of, perchance, the hundredth copy of the original record. Most grateful, therefore, should mankind be to all those who render us any aid in discovering the exact words and their proper import, in which the Holy Spirit has revealed the Christian religion. And while in all essential matters there is no difficulty in apprehending the teachings of the Holy Spirit through our English translation, yet the view we have urged of the self-interpreting character of the Revelation God has made, only enhances the value of real scholarship and science in their applications to the sacred Scriptures. The human mind can be consecrated to no higher service than in removing whatever lets and hinderances may exist in the way of the direct intercourse of man with his Maker and Redeemer through the Bible. This book speaks

God's own mind; let us have it in as perfect a condition as is possible.

There are three maxims to be observed in the reading or study of this divine book: 1. That there is perfect unity in the Scriptures. Only one scheme or system of truth is to be found in them, and this is perfect, without any inconsistency or contradiction from the beginning to the end of the book. God's work is evermore perfect; and he has magnified his word above all his name. 2. That the substantive sense of Scripture, in all essential points, is self-evident. This appears to be an absolute necessity, upon the admission that the Bible is a divine revelation. And 3. That when there is obscurity, it is to be removed, if possible, by reference to the parts which are plain, and never understood as disagreeing with what is contained in these parts; so that the supreme authority of the Scriptures in interpretation is throughout maintained inviolate.

But we must bring this protracted discussion to a close. We have reverted to first principles, and searched among the foundations of the Christian religion. If these be destroyed, what shall the righteous do? Human philosophy cannot relieve the difficulties with which the Bible is encompassed and pervaded, in the apprehension of many minds. It cannot furnish the clew to the labyrinth. The difficulties and the obscurity are not in the Bible so much as in man himself. They are not so much intellectual, as moral. Light has come into the world, but men love darkness rather than light. The organ, not the object, of vision, is disordered; and this is remedied, not by the exercise of the intuitional faculty, or any other power belonging to the human mind, except as controlled and sanctified by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. The pride of human "Reason," and the perversity of the human heart, will account for nearly all the absurdities and inconsistencies which men have supposed they discovered in the teachings of the Scriptures. A single eye and an humble heart will enable us to see the light of the glory of God throughout their revelation. Men are unwilling to let God speak for himself; to hear no voice but his, when he utters his will; to allow no wisdom of theirs to mingle with his infallible declarations. Unable to ignore or set aside

the Bible, and refusing unconditional submission to its declarations, they profess faith in its mysteries "as they understand them;" and kindling the fires of their "Reason" about it, they have thought in the light of these sparks to see divine truth. Thus this one immutable oracle is made to utter the most diverse, often contradictory and absurd voices. They have speculated upon the revelations of this sacred book as though they "contained" the "germs and seeds of truth," forgetting that not the germs and seeds of truth, but perfect truth itself, is both contained in the Bible, and is the Bible; that this book contains nothing else. *Rationalism*, whether issuing from the ranks of avowed infidels, or from the bosom of the visible church, is the enemy that is coming in upon us like a flood. The Bible, in its divine majesty and might, is the standard which the Spirit of the Lord will lift up against it. The Bible, attested by real prophecy and miracle, self-interpretative, and shining in its own light—this is the *citadel* of all true religion, against which nothing can prevail. Omniscience and Omnipotence guard it, and spread their sheltering wings over all its sacred domain. ✓

ART. II.—*The Heathen inexcusable for their Idolatry.*

It is no uncommon thing to meet with those who feel much difficulty in understanding the relation of the heathen to the law of God. They see that the condemnation of those under the gospel is different from those without it. They who disobey Christ shall find that this will be the heaviest charge brought against them in the day of judgment. But they who have never known of a Saviour cannot be guilty of the sin of rejecting him. What then is the ground of their condemnation? This question is an important one, for if the heathen are not under condemnation, what is the use of sending them the gospel? If the heathen, or the greater portion of them, are to get to heaven through their ignorance, where is the neces-

sity for any clearer light, which, reasoning from all past experience, the great majority will not receive? The question in fact lies still further back, as to the necessity of any gospel at all. If we, or any single individual man, could have been saved without the atonement, then righteousness would have been by that method, and Christ would not have died. The gospel however looks upon all as in a state of condemnation, and that none can hope for justification and eternal life except through the righteousness of Christ alone. This is Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans. All are by law guilty, condemned, and therefore they need a righteousness without the law—a righteousness which after explaining its nature, he shows must be proclaimed in all the earth; for faith, the only means by which man can be saved, comes by hearing. "How then shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?" The fundamental fact then upon which rest all our efforts, is that the heathen are under condemnation and their condition hopeless without the gospel. This point the apostle argues by laying down as a fundamental principle or axiom the truth that the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness. Whoever is guilty of ungodliness or unrighteousness is exposed to the wrath of God, that is, is guilty and under condemnation. Who then are those that are guilty? He first shows that the gentiles are. They had such a revelation of God and his character as rendered them without excuse. Though they had no written revelation, no law written on tables of stone, they had a law written upon their hearts, and enough of God revealed in the things that are made, to prove them guilty.

The two special grounds of their condemnation are, 1st. Ungodliness, or impiety; and, 2d. Immorality. The former stands as the foundation of all iniquity, from which, as from a corrupt fountain, proceeded every form of wickedness. It was because of their impiety, which manifested itself particularly in idolatry, that "God gave them up to vile affections, and as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, he gave them over to a reprobate mind." The root of their offence was forsaking God,

because that when they knew God, that is, possessed the means of knowing him by the things that are made, they glorified him not as God, but changed his glory into an image made like unto corruptible man, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. He then speaks of their immorality—a picture just as true now as then of all heathen countries. But the great cause of this wickedness was their unwillingness to retain God in their knowledge. They had not lived up to what they might have known of God. In other words, the heathen then and now are inexcusable for their idolatry.

In illustrating and confirming this statement of the inexcusableness of the heathen, there are three lines of proof on which we may rely. These, for the sake of brevity, may be indicated, 1st. As the argumentative; 2d. The historical; 3d. The scriptural. We propose in the following article to examine these briefly in order.

First, then, we argue that the heathen, though they have not the written word, have still an abundant opportunity for gaining a knowledge of the true God. In order to prove this it will not be necessary to go into a formal statement of the arguments to prove the existence of God. But we commence with this plain fact, that all men adopt some belief in superior and invisible beings. Taking this for granted, which all history as well as the present state of the world proves, then we go on to say that the most direct and rational step is towards Monotheism.

Evidences for the existence of a superior being or beings are so present to the mind of man, that we find no nation or tribe of any importance who have not some object of worship. The question is, Which is the most logical or rational—to believe in one God, or many? We affirm that Monotheism is the only consequent and rational system even to the heathen, and that other systems such as Polytheism, Pantheism, and Atheism, are only the substitutes and subterfuges of a depraved heart.

Let us first compare Monotheism with Polytheism, and see how much more simple and obvious it would have been to have believed in one God than in many. We do, in fact, generally stop when we have proved the existence of God, and take for granted the proof of his unity. The arguments which show

that he *is*, show that he is one alone, and that besides him there is none else. The supposition of many gods involves endless contradiction and absurdity. A god for one element and a god for another, and gods for the earth and gods for the sea, places the control of these in separate and independent hands. If thus distinct, there would necessarily exist, if not confusion, rivalry and opposition, at least separate and distinct control and influence. There would be no mutual dependence and coöperation. But the mutual dependence and relation of the different parts of creation is one of the plainest facts written on the things that are made. The unity and harmony which pervades the whole creation proves that He who made and governs one part must have made and governs the whole. The whole range of animal creation, from the insect to man, though various in form, have the same animal wants, necessities, and appetites. The same laws of life and death govern all. Their dependence on the outer world also shows that he who made the animal made the vegetable world, and that he who made that must also have made the sunshine and the rain. These mutual links and dependencies go on twining into each other so closely and inseparably, that it is manifest that no one part of the visible creation could have been made without distinct reference to all the rest.

Of course the wider a man's range of thought, the more conversant he becomes with the workings of general laws, and the mutual dependencies of the various parts of creation, the stronger the reason for believing in one God. But even to the most unenlightened the answer is no divided one. If the heathen has evidence that there are any gods, he has still stronger proof that there is but one. Say he comes to the belief in the existence of superior beings from the idea of dependence. Whether this be the origin of belief in the existence of God or not, it is certainly one of the main reasons for man's continuing to worship him. He feels his need, his dependence on a superior power, and he comes for aid and assistance. But upon whom is man dependent, on one God, or many? Here also, as in reference to the world at large, man is an individual, a unit, so necessarily one, that he that supports one part must the whole. He that made must nourish and feed. He that gave

life must have the control of it. If a man desires health, or to be cured of any disease, he certainly can best cure who first made. If he desires wealth, he can best give it who holds the control of other things, the ordinances of heaven and earth. The question here is this, Is the dependence which man feels best answered by consulting different gods for each want or desire, as if the gods were storekeepers, one with one set of commodities to suit one set of desires, and another with another set for other wants? This might answer if man were a bundle of desires tied up in the body, each coming from different sources and owing allegiance to different beings. But man with his different wants and capacities is one, from one hand, and owing allegiance to one Being. The different wants are but the different parts or wheels in the same machine, all made and upheld by the same almighty power.

Again: men have an idea of government, of order, and control. They have set before them the family, the state, the tribe, or the kingdom. Over any one of these there is a head, some one controlling power. Now the control over the kingdom of heaven and earth, over all things visible, is not a divided control. There is no evidence of separate chieftainship, or even delegated power. All the evidence goes to prove that there is one Supreme Head or Ruler. In fact, the necessity for some such unity has forced itself on heathen nations, and they have had their Zeus, their Jupiter, their Brahm, and their Shang-ti—some one being whom they have acknowledged as head, and whom they have considered as exercising control over the rest.

Thus we see that in whichever direction the evidence is consulted it is all in favour of Monotheism. The only confusion and want of harmony apparent, can readily be traced to the existence of evil. But the moral faculty, showing what is right and that right ought to be done, is too strong in man to allow him to suppose evil to be the governing principle. How then it may be asked are we to account for the fact that those without a revelation are so universally worshippers of false gods? This arises, we believe, not so much from want of evidence, as in the moral state of man. From what we know of the truthfulness of God, we know that the simple and straight-

forward testimony of his works must be in favour of his existence. Even without argument we are bound to assume this as a fact. God cannot deny himself, and his works must therefore express his unity as well as his existence. The reason then of man's choosing Polytheism instead of Monotheism lies not in want of evidence, for if he worship gods at all, the evidence is more in favour of one than many. We must look for some other reason for his choosing Polytheism than in lack of evidence. This we believe can be found in man's moral state. The root of unbelief in any truth, we find more often in not wishing to believe it, than in any want of proof. So in reference to the knowledge of God. Along with this knowledge comes the knowledge, or the consciousness of distance from him and opposition to him. If we reason about God, as we necessarily must from our own nature, and thus ascribe to him intellectual faculties, we must also ascribe a moral character. For though we do wrong, yet the impulse to do right and the approval of it, show that he who gave us our moral nature is on the side of right and truth and justice. Conscience then brings to light a moral Being, one who hates sin, and at the same time it convinces us of sin. It reveals a moral God, and us guilty of immorality—a God in opposition to us and us to him. From this opposition there are two methods of escape—one by reconciliation—but without a revelation men are ignorant of that; or, second, by forgetting him, by hiding from him. Adam in this respect was the type of all our race. The consciousness of sin brought him in opposition to God, and he sought to hide from him among the trees of the garden. This has ever been man's device. As the apostle says, he has not liked to retain God in his knowledge. He has rejected the proof he has had of his existence, and substituted in the place of the incorruptible God, images made like unto corruptible man, and four-footed beasts. Not able to suppress the idea of a superior Being, upon whom we are dependent, and who demands our homage and worship, he has sought to fill his place by images, mere semblances of deity, but without his power, and without his holiness. Polytheism, by multiplying the personality of its deities, divides the attributes, and needs

not necessarily ascribe holiness to any. The idea of accountability is also very much lost sight of by the impossibility of being accountable to so many masters. The less power and authority these gods have, the less will be thought of disobedience. Men wish gods from whom they can ask favours, but who will not punish. They are thus led to take up with the more indirect and illogical, because they wish gods whom they need not fear, to whom they will not feel accountable, and who will not punish their sins. The immediate absurdity into which men fall by rejecting the true God is so manifest and glaring that certainly no reason or evidence can be claimed for it, especially when they resort, as all Polytheists do, to the worship of images. Nothing can be more illogical and unreasonable than man's worshipping the work of his own hands. Justly do the sacred writers represent the maker as like unto the thing made, as devoid of sense and understanding. (Ps. cxxxv. 18.) How sharply does the prophet Isaiah reprove the stupidity and folly of idolaters. "None," he says, "considereth in his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, I have burned part of it in the fire; yea, I have also baked bread upon the coals thereof. I have roasted flesh and eaten it, and shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? shall I fall down to the stock of a tree? He feedeth on ashes: a *deceived heart* hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand? Isa. xlv. 19, 20.

When once the downward step is taken in forsaking God, the apostle gives another reason why they continue in the same path, and that is, that God gave such over to a reprobate mind. Him who forsakes God, God forsakes. He will not always bear with those who, rejecting the evidences of his existence, refuse to glorify him as God, and are not thankful for his mercies. Such are given up. They become vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart is darkened. They conceive of foolish and vain objects of worship, and while professing wisdom, boasting of their ability to understand divine things, they become fools—fools in exchanging the glory of the incorruptible God for images made like to corruptible man, and birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Left

without the restraints imposed by a personal and holy God, impiety is followed by immorality. The gratification of the basest lusts and passions adds to the degradation of the intellect, until, besotted and darkened, the only hope of the heathen being brought to acknowledge the existence of one God, is by again repeating the truth, and calling attention to the lesson written before every man in the things that are made.

Instead of Polytheism, some have adopted another more subtle subterfuge, and that is Pantheism. But while boasting wisdom, it is equally the fruit of folly and a deceived heart. This system commences with a fundamental truth, namely, the consciousness of dependent existence. But here a dilemma presents itself—man is conscious of personality—that is, that he is self-active, not a mere machine. At the same time he is conscious of being dependent on a superior Being, who, as he conditions and governs all other beings, is not a mere lifeless substratum, but the acting, living principle in all that is.* Here, on these two apparently inconsistent facts, turns an important question. Man is personal, self-active, independent. At the same time he is dependent, governed, controlled. Taking both these facts, neither of which can be denied without contradicting our deepest feelings and our very nature, and we arrive at the conclusion of one God, who has given us being, and to whom we are accountable. Taking the first without the second, namely, that man is independent, self-active, and subject to no control of a higher power, and we have Atheism. Taking the second without the first, namely, that man is without personality and self-action, and is simply the acting out of the higher original existence, and we have Pantheism. Both Atheism and Pantheism deny plain facts—facts of which every man is conscious. The former, Atheism, which denies our dependent existence, is so repugnant to the consciousness of man, that it has only been adopted in isolated instances. Pantheism, however, more specious in its appearance, and apparently more logical, and, what has contributed not a little to its success, more religious in its form, has been the belief more or less among the heathen in all ages, vying with Poly-

* See Princeton Essays, p. 556, art. Tholuck's Hist. of Theology.

theism in the number of its votaries. It has, however, co-existed with, and has not been felt to be inconsistent with, the grossest Polytheism. In its more refined and logical form it has been defended and supported among Christian nations. It is peculiarly dangerous on account of its religious speciousness. More than once in the history of the church it has been preached from the pulpit, and taught from the theological chair. It can even quote Scripture, perverting such truths as "in him we live, and move, and have our being."

But if we look at the system, we see that it is more illogical and unnatural than Monotheism, denying some of the plainest facts in man's existence, and that it can only be preferred by the sinful and depraved heart. Pantheism, it is true, professes to be the most logical of all systems of belief, but then, one of its first steps is to deny a most plain and prominent fact, and that is man's personality. What man feels and is conscious of, namely, his individuality and free agency, is represented as only apparent, not real; and the only agent in the universe is God. He is not only the all in all—but all is God. All the actings out of the individual are simply the actings of the original existence. Of course the legitimate conclusion is, that man is a mere machine (and as such it has been defended *L'homme machine*—by Lamettrie) that his evil actings as well as his good, are the workings of the original existence. God thus becomes the author of sin, or rather no action is regarded as sinful. Sin and the punishment of sin can no longer exist, for God would not punish himself. Man without individuality here, can of course have none hereafter, when he becomes swallowed up by, or a part of Deity. These are some of the absurdities into which this system forces its followers. Of course, no reason can be found for embracing it, except the fact that man does not like to retain God in his knowledge. He does not wish to be brought into contact with a personal God to whom he feels accountable, and who will punish sin. And so he hides away from God, or, which is the same thing, hides his God away from him. He obscures his being, and hides his personality by confounding him with his works.

Lest it should appear that the course of argument here adopted, is one which grows out of our enlightened knowledge

rather than any ability which the heathen have to understand the logical proof in favour of the existence of God, it may be well, in the second place, to bring forward some historical facts to show that the worship of false gods has arisen not from any want of ability to understand the truth. The systems of false religions in heathen lands have been wrought out with more labour and ingenuity, than would have sufficed to come directly at the truth. The very want of reason has imposed the necessity for false reasons, until these last increase and swell in amount, imposing by their number, if not by their truthfulness. Not only are these works voluminous, but some of them are very acute, defending error with a skill which shows they were not wanting in logical understanding. As a general rule, from which probably there are no exceptions, the further we trace back any false system of philosophy or religion, the purer we find it. There are statements of truth which we are surprised at, as we look upon later developments of error and superstition. Whatever may be the origin of these clearer and purer ideas of antiquity, whether tradition, as some suppose, or the plainness of the evidence in the things that are made, the law of deterioration is certain, and the reason of it is well expressed by the apostle, that when men know God, and yet glorify him not as God, they become vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart darkened. The tendency of all religious beliefs is to become assimilated to the object of worship, and the mournful tendency of heathenism to debase and degrade the intellect, as well as blunt the heart and conscience, is but too apparent in the history of the world. How true and certain, as well as philosophically correct is the curse pronounced in the second commandment, that the iniquity of the fathers in bowing down to and worshipping graven images, is visited upon the children of the third and fourth generations of those that hate him. In fact, this curse, or as expressed by the apostle, this giving up, must be taken into account in estimating the degradation of the heathen. Deterioration is no less the inevitable result of worshipping false gods, than elevation and progress is the result of worshipping the true. It is not to be expected, therefore, that those who have grown up under any system of heathenism will renew the intellectual

effort of their fathers. Still they often have in the books which have been left them, a witness against the prevailing forms of idolatry. Idolatry begins by slow and gradual departures from the truth, and in the most populous heathen countries on the globe, there is no difficulty in tracing it back to Monotheism. If we examine the early forms of religious belief in India and China, there is ample evidence to show that their ancient worship was not polytheistic or idolatrous.

Let us begin with India, and the first testimony that we shall bring forward is that of an old standard and authoritative philosophical work of Southern India, written more than a thousand years before the Christian era.* One of the principles adopted in this work is, that an effect shows a cause, just as smoke shows the presence of fire. As there can be no effect without a cause, so this treatise says the existence of the world proves the existence of a cause.

In the beginning of the work a disciple is supposed to ask such questions as these, "Is the world eternal, or had it a beginning? Is it self-existent, uncreated, or was it produced? If caused, was its cause merely an inherent power, or fate, or was it an intelligent cause?" These questions, which have always pressed upon the mind of man from the outer world, are answered in favour of an intelligent cause, as the Author of all things. True there is not the rising up to the high and sublime statement of Scripture, that God created all things out of nothing. Three terms are introduced, one of which is the material cause, and is as clay to the potter's vessel. Another is the instrumental cause and is as the moulding stick and wheel are to the potter. While the third is the efficient cause or Deity, who acts as the potter. The world or universe, like the earthen pot, is the effect it is said of these three combined causes.

In reference to God, he is said to pervade all the world as the flavour does all parts of the fruit. • He is one with the world and yet separable from it. He is represented as perfectly filling every place. He is not divided so as to occupy indi-

* See Rev. Mr. Hoisington's Translations of Treatises on Hindu Philosophy, published under the auspices of the American Oriental Society.

vidual places as an individual. Just as the sun's light while it spreads everywhere is not confined or entangled by anything, so it is with God. It is asked by an objector, if God and the universe be thus, how do *Sathasivan*, who combines in himself the male and female energies of deity, and the other great gods, exist? It is replied, and here we see one of the sources of idolatry, *Sathasivan* and the other gods, and also the universe, are the servants of deity, and perform the work of servants in their respective places. A later work, written about two hundred years ago and intended to set forth in a clearer manner the philosophical tenets of the work already quoted from, holds the following language in reference to the nature of deity. This deity, called Paran or Brahm, and Tat-Sivan, is he says, neither purely spiritual nor embodied; is not possessed of any material organs; has neither qualities nor names; is ever free from impurity or evil; is *one* and *eternal*; is the source of understanding to innumerable souls; is fixed in position, illimitable in its nature; is the form of happiness; is difficult of access to unstable worshippers, but is easily approached by those who worship in the orderly course, and shines as the least of the little and the greatest of the great." These quotations show that the evidence for the existence of one God pressed upon these heathen writers, and that logically, they admitted the truth, and yet practically denied it, by admitting the worship of images and of inferior gods as servants of the Deity.

Similar testimony in regard to the views of the early Hindus is found in the Sacred Vedas, which are said by the Brahmans to be co-eval with creation, and in all probability date back to a period about thirteen centuries before the Christian era. Professor Wilson, professor of Sanscrit in Oxford University, who himself resided for a time in India, says: "There can be no doubt that the fundamental doctrine of the Vedas is Monotheism."* In repeated passages of the Vedas are found such expressions as the following: "There is, in truth, but one Deity, the Supreme Spirit." "He from whom the universal

* See two Lectures on the Religious Practices and Opinions of the Hindus, delivered at Oxford, February, 1840.

world proceeds, who is the Lord of the universe and whose work is the universe, is the Supreme Being." Injunctions also repeatedly occur, to worship him and him only. "Adore God alone, know God alone, give up all other discourse." And the Vedant says: "It is found in the Vedas that none but the Supreme Being is to be worshipped, nothing excepting him should be adored by a wise man." "It was upon such passages as these," says Professor Wilson, "that Rammohun Roy grounded his attempts to reform the religion of his countrymen, to put down idolatry, and abolish all idolatrous rites and festivals, and substitute the worship of one God by means of prayer and thanksgiving." Such being the doctrine of the Vedas, that there is one God, and that he alone is to be worshipped, it may be inquired what are the steps by which Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, with the thirty-three millions of other deities, came to be objects of worship. It would seem that the attributes of creation, preservation, and regeneration, were personified under the names of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. But it does not seem that they were early worshipped under visible types. "Ministration to idols in temples," says Professor Wilson, "is held by ancient authorities as infamous." "The worship of images," he says, "was defended by later authorities only upon the same plea which has been urged in other times and other countries, that the vulgar cannot raise their conceptions to abstract deity, and require some sensible object to which their senses may be addressed."

In China, no less than in India, the earliest form of religious belief and worship was monotheistic. In their earliest historical records there are constant references to a superintending, controlling power. This power is sometimes called *Shang-te*, or Supreme Ruler, and sometimes Heaven. The very name applied to this being shows that he is only *one*. A Supreme Ruler could only properly be one. As there was but one heaven, so God was one and alone. Afterwards earth was associated with heaven as the parents of all things. But at first there was a distinct reference to the intelligence, will, and personality of this Supreme Ruler. He was represented as disposing of the affairs of earth, as determining by his decree who was to be emperor, as punishing vice and rewarding vir-

tue. Thus it is said in the Shoo King, the earliest of the Chinese historical classics, "On those who do good he will send down a hundred blessings, and on those who do evil he will send down manifold calamities." Even later in Chinese history, when the great mass of the nation had sunk into Polytheism, we find occasional returns to the simpler and higher forms of antiquity. Thus one of the emperors in the sixteenth century of our era says, in his prayer or song, which he prepared for the worship of the Supreme Ruler: "When *Te*, the Lord, had so decreed, he called into existence heaven, earth, and man." "Thy sovereign goodness is infinite. As a potter hast thou made all living things. Great and small are sheltered by thee. As engraven on the heart of thy poor servant is the sense of thy goodness, so that my feeling cannot be fully displayed. With great kindness dost thou bear with us, and notwithstanding our demerits dost grant us life and posterity." And with an approach to, and apparent imitation of, the true and sublime teachings of revelation, he says: "For ever he setteth fast the high heavens and establisheth the solid earth. His government is everlasting."

The monotheistic character of the early worship of the Chinese is strongly insisted upon by the leader of the insurrection, who established himself at Nanking in 1853. He says that "from the earliest antiquity down to the time of the three dynasties, (which closed B. C. 220) both princes and people honoured and worshipped the great God." Considering this as an established historical fact, he calls upon his countrymen to return to the worship of their fathers, and no longer to practice the idolatrous and polytheistic worship by which they were surrounded.*

This testimony† from ancient religious systems shows not

* For further statements respecting the early worship of the Chinese, see article on Confucianism in the April number of this *Review* for 1858.

† Had the task not been an endless one, testimony might have been brought from other and less civilized nations, to show that Monotheism is the fundamental belief among many nations, even when mixed up with gross idolatry. It is not necessary, however, to enlarge upon this point, as our only object is to show that Monotheism is an accessible belief to the human mind, that it is not as most seem to take for granted, a truth so far remote that men must of necessity adopt some polytheistic or idolatrous mode of worship. Let the

only that Monotheism is the most natural and logical conclusion of the human mind, but the heathen have actually attained to it, and have only turned away from it through a disposition to hide from or neglect what they knew of God. God has also raised up other witnesses besides his voice in the things which are made, to reiterate the truth of his existence, and thus render the position of the heathen still more without excuse. Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians, have at different periods repeated the truth of the unity and existence of God to most of the inhabitants of earth. Not to speak of modern efforts, Christianity was made known as far east as China early in the fifth century. At one time the Mohammedans were the ruling power in Asia, and the only living truth of their system is that there is one God. Not only did they rule for a long time with great power and splendor in India, where their number and influence is still so great that they hoped to triumph over British rule, their mosques are also scattered through China, and the Malays in the peninsulas and islands south-east of Asia number themselves among the followers of the false prophet. We are also not to omit the testimony of the Jews. How wide they were scattered at the captivity of Samaria and Jerusalem, we have not the means of determining accurately. We know that as early as the first century a flourishing colony settled in *Khaefung-foo*, a city in Northern China. Other colonies may have lost their distinctive peculiarities earlier than this, which kept up the reading of the law and the prophets in the ancient Hebrew, until about fifty years since. Whatever may have been the origin of that remarkable people—the Karens—they have preserved from some source, and by verbal traditions, the knowledge of God. In ancient times they say God created the world;

following suffice, in reference to the ability of man in smaller or more obscure tribes to arrive at the truth of one God. "In Yoruba," a country in central Africa, says the Report of the English Episcopal Missions, "as in other countries of Soudan, one God is acknowledged, but the real worship is to the orishas or idols. It is interesting, however, to mark that these are always viewed as intermediate agents or intercessors. The African says he cannot approach God directly; he needs some one to come between him and God." Here we have a belief in one God, combined as it often has been with idolatrous worship.

all things were minutely ordered by him. They have traditions respecting the fall and the dispersion of mankind. Respecting idolatry, they say, "O children and grandchildren do not worship idols or priests. If you worship them you obtain no advantage thereby, while you increase your sins exceedingly." Their fathers they believe once had God's book written on parchment, and they carelessly allowed it to be destroyed. Since then, as a punishment, they have been without a written language. If this tradition is correct, there is strong ground for the opinion that they are remnants of the ten lost tribes.*

Another fact which shows that the inclination to idolatry arises not from want of evidence, but from the evil and corrupt heart, is seen from this, that even when a revelation has been enjoyed, there is a constant tendency to leave the worship of God, and set up other objects and beings in his place. Take the case of the children of Israel. Notwithstanding God had appeared wonderfully for their deliverance in the land of Egypt, and had brought them out with a great and strong arm, and had in a special manner appeared unto them at Sinai, speaking unto them, yet in less than forty days from his divine and glorious appearance they had made unto themselves idols, saying, "These be thy gods that brought thee out of the land of Egypt." And throughout all their history until the Babylonish captivity, in spite of, and directly in opposition to, the plainest teachings of God's word, they were constantly falling into this sin. A wicked heart, disliking to retain the knowledge of God, was constantly leading them astray.

Equally strange is the fact that some of the strongest advocates of Atheism and Pantheism have lived under the light of the gospel. The worship of images also is defended by a church calling itself Christian, on precisely the same grounds which tolerated the introduction of idolatry thousands of years ago among the heathen. There is, in fact, an insidious tendency in our nature to idolatry. It is the tendency of the natural heart to worship and serve the creature more than the Creator. It is seen in hero-worship, in the way we exalt mere

* See "The Gospel in Burmah," by Mrs. McLeod Wylie. London, 1859.

men, magnifying their virtues and concealing their faults, until they stand out as something more than human. We may, for instance, in the laudation which we bestow on such men as Washington, pave the way for idolatrous regard, even if it do not terminate—which God forbid—in idolatrous worship. Confucius was a mere man, and is never styled anything else, yet he is considered in China as greater than any of their gods, and he is worshipped in the same way, with the same forms and ceremonies. There may be more reason than we allow ourselves to suspect for the admonition of the apostle, “Little children, keep yourselves from idols.” We are to avoid its beginnings, its tendencies—to take heed that when we know God, we neglect not to glorify him as God; to take heed lest we exalt the creature above or in the place of the Creator. Error arises not merely from the darkness without, from the want of evidence in the things that are made, but also from the darkness within, from the disposition of the natural heart to hide from God. Everywhere man is fighting against God; the truth pouring into his soul, and he rejecting it. Written or unwritten, be he Idolater, Pharisee, or Romanist, he seeks to make void the truth of God by his traditions. He does not like to retain God in his knowledge. The first Adam is still manifest in all his posterity seeking to hide from God. The voice of the Lord is heard, the sound of his steps echoes through all his works; but man is naked—has no robe of righteousness to cover himself—is afraid, and hides himself.

We have thus seen that the logical tendencies of the human mind would lead most directly to the worship of one God, instead of many. Again, we have seen that in actual experience in history, Monotheism has been the primary belief of the more prominent heathen nations, and that they have departed by slow but sure steps from this fundamental truth. We now wish to show that the testimony of revealed religion is in the same direction; that the Bible regards men, independently of its pages, as having sufficient opportunity for gaining a knowledge of the true God, and consequently as without excuse for their idolatry. This testimony may be considered as both direct and indirect.

If we take the indirect testimony, we are at once struck with

the fact that the existence of God is taken for granted. We are not told that in the beginning God was; but in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth. He is spoken of as already known, and the further fact of his being the Creator is asserted. In fact, it could not be otherwise. A revelation supposes a revealer. If the credibility of revelation rests upon the authority of God, we cannot turn round and make the evidence of his existence rest upon the authority of revelation.* Revelation can only be taken for proof of the existence of God in the same way that his other works can. The entire harmony of its different parts, its various excellencies, and nice adaptation to the wants of man, all show that as an effect it must have had a cause, and a cause adequate to produce these results. But if any question the existence of God, the statements of the Bible would form no proof of it, for if his existence be denied, revelation is of course denied, for there can be no revelation without a revealer. If the outer world, with all its glories and perfections, could have existed without a God, so might the Bible too. Man may write a book, though not such a book, but he cannot create a world. Some other foundation, some other prior proof, must exist for the belief in one God. Such foundation we have in man's religious nature, constraining him, as a dependent being, to worship some object or being; and such proof is there in the works of God, in the things that are made, that both reason and revelation unite in declaring him that rejects it to be without excuse.

Let us then, secondly, look at the direct proof which the Bible presents. In Acts xiv. 17, it is said that "God left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with joy and gladness." This was spoken by the apostles at Lystra, to a company of heathen, who, with the priest of Jupiter, were about to sacrifice to them in consequence of a miracle wrought upon an impotent man. God has not left himself without witness, a witness which is plain and legible to all men—to the heathen, for such was he addressing—for to all has he done good. The rain and fruitful seasons show a providential

* See Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, Appendix, note A.

government, attentive to, and able to supply the wants of all his creatures.

In the 17th chapter of the Acts, Paul reasoning with the Athenians, adduces from one of their poets a quotation that we are the offspring of God, and from it argues against their idolatry. They who were the offspring ought not to think the Godhead, their progenitor, like unto gold or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device. To have such views of Deity was to debase him of whom they claimed to be the offspring, not only below themselves, but to put him on a level with inanimate objects. Such ideas, such worship of images, they ought not to have entertained. They had an opportunity of knowing better. How could He who made all things, dwell in—that is, be confined to, a temple made by hands? How could He who gave life and breath, and all things, be served and supplied by men's hands, as though he needed anything? No! God had made all nations of one blood, and had appointed to each their habitation for this very object, that they should seek after the Lord; or, as we would say in our modern parlance, he had created and preserved man for the sake of leading him by these acts, and by his dependence on him, up to their Author. No hard and difficult task was this, for he is not far from every one of us. The existence of him in whom we live, and move, and have our being, lies too close to our own to be complained of as an out-of-the-way truth. How just and unavoidable then is the conclusion of the apostle that we ought not—that the heathen to whom it was addressed ought not, to think of the Godhead as like unto gold or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device!

Still more direct and conclusive is the passage in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which has been already referred to. The general course of the Apostle's argument having been pointed out, it is only necessary to add, in reference to the single statement in the 20th verse, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Here the Apostle expressly declares the heathen to be without excuse, from the fact that the invisible things of God are

clearly seen by the things that are made. God has not hid himself so that he cannot be known. Things made utter the truth of his existence in thousand forms, and there is no place where their voice is not heard. Man's not listening does not show there is no sound. His dwelling in and loving the darkness does not show that there is no light. If man could see, and yet does not, will not come to the light—justly is he condemned for his ignorance. Opportunity for knowing the truth is reckoned with, as well as actual sin. They might have known God, and yet they glorified him not; for this, and their consequent idolatry, God forsook them. Thus the decision of the Apostle is, that by the visible, God has so manifested his invisible power and Godhead as to leave the heathen without excuse.

In accordance with this view or statement of the Apostle, is the whole tenor of the teachings of the Scriptures in reference to the punishment coming upon the ungodly. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God." Ps. ix. 17. Idolatry in the Epistle to the Galatians (v. 20 and 21) is classed with other works of the flesh, and those who practise it are excluded from the kingdom of God. In Revelation, idolaters are classed with those who are without, who have no part in the New Jerusalem, and as having their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone. (xxi. 8.) From these passages it is plain that the heathen are considered as having abundant opportunity for knowing God, and as consequently inexcusable and exposed to righteous punishment on account of their ignorance of him.

It follows from the discussion of this subject that the evidence for the existence of God is so plain and legible that the heathen are without excuse for not seeing and acknowledging it. If this is so, we must discard the notion that the process by which we arrive at the truth of the being of one God is so abstract and requires such powers of generalization, that no man, unassisted by revelation, is able to arrive at this truth. Doubtless this truth cannot be reached any more than others, without thought given to the subject. But we are as much responsible for the right use of our reasoning faculties as of our moral. Truth, like duty, is placed where the reasons and

motives are clear, but still if man chooses to reject the light, he can, just as he can refuse to do that which his conscience urges upon him. That the evidence, however, is so plain that it need not be misunderstood without a revelation can be fully shown. It is indeed the only logical and natural conclusion from the works of God that he and he alone is their Author. And if, as the apostle says, the heathen are without excuse, the evidence must be sufficient. In fact, it is difficult to see how it could be more plain, or how man does at any time avoid the conclusion, forced upon him at every avenue, that there is a God. "The heavens declare his glory, and the firmament showeth forth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard." There is not one of all the works of God which does not utter a voice in proof of his existence. Especially is it difficult to see how any one can look upon the more great and sublime works of God without being sensible of his existence. How can man look upon the heavens without inquiring whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened, or who laid the corner-stone thereof? Who can count the stars, or look upon the sun in his strength, and believe that they came forth from nothing, and are urged on by a blind chance? When the heavens gather blackness, and God sendeth forth his lightnings, and thundereth with his voice, when the sea roars as if to break its bars and doors, who can suppress the thought that God reigns? And does not God in all his works summon us into his presence, as he did Job, and say, "Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me:" and as query after query comes from all the wonderful works of creation, how can man reply other than in the words of the patriarch, "I know that thou canst do everything, and that no thought of thine can be hindered." At the crucifixion, when the centurion saw the earthquake, and the things that were done, he feared greatly, saying, "Truly this was the Son of God;" so when man sees exhibitions of power and greatness in the things that are made, he must confess that it is God alone. He may go away and forget the impression, he may cling to old associations, but still the inner man must answer truly to the voice of its Maker. Man's

religious nature can only be satisfied with the truth of God's existence, and at remarkable providences or dispensations, when God gets a listening ear, even the most debased heathen must feel the insufficiency of his idols. These can satisfy no inquiry, meet no demand of an earnest soul. Man, the highest of all beings on earth, is dependent, clings to, and longs after, something still higher, and can stock and stone help and comfort him. The refuge is so irrational that no satisfactory reason can be found for its adoption other than man's not liking to retain God in his knowledge. He loves darkness rather than light, because his deeds are evil.

The state of the heathen, then, is one of sin as well as misfortune. The condemnation that awaits them is not only grievous but just. It is not only for the whole catalogue of sin and crime that they are to be condemned, but for that which is the root and source of them all—ungodliness; because that when they knew God, that is, had the opportunity of knowing him by the things that are made, they glorified him not as God.

The heathen are under condemnation, and to them a dark and hopeless one; they know of no escape. While, therefore, their sin is far less than of those who know the remedy and reject it, still their condition is one which should excite our deepest pity and compassion. The wrath of God is abiding on them. From the second death and all its terrors, they know of no escape, but to us the only remedy for them and us has been made known. It is not our object to dwell upon the practical conclusion which the apostle draws from the fact that the heathen are under condemnation, but the more we recognize the fact, the more important must we feel to be the inference from it, namely, that the only hope for Jew and Gentile is in justification through faith in Christ, that his is the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved. "But how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach except they be sent?"

ART. III.—*Theories of the Eldership—The Constitutional view of the Presbyterian Church.*

IN a previous article we delineated the nature, and endeavoured to trace the progressive development of a recent theory of the Eldership, which, in various forms, has obtained considerable currency. Based upon the English or modern versions of the Scriptures, and the frequent use in them of such words as *elder* for the original word *presbyter*, and upon the now established use of the official title, *ruling elder*, it has all the advantage of apparently carrying with its premises its conclusion. That conclusion is, that ruling elders are “the presbyters” of Scripture, and “the presbyters who rule well” of the apostle; that ruling is therefore the fundamental office of the presbyter—its essence; that as the terms bishop, pastor, teacher, shepherd, watchman, overseer, leader, president, governor, steward, householder, ambassador, angel, are all used interchangeably with presbyter, whatever is set forth in the way of qualification and office concerning any one of these, is spoken primarily of ruling elders; that as preaching is also found to be characteristic of some of these variously described officers, there is a twofold order of elders, one class who only rule, and another who preach and rule—first rulers, and then preachers—rulers by the essence of their office, and preachers by a superadded charisma or gift; that “it is this distinction which gives us our name of ‘The Presbyterian Church’—the church that holds to government by elders, the essence of whose office is ruling, and not teaching.”*

Such is the theory for which is claimed the indubitable authority of Scripture, the practice and writings of primitive Christianity, the sanction of ancient and reformed churches, and the standards of the Presbyterian Church, and the abettors of which say that the rejection of it “by many Presbyterians and Presbyterian ministers” is “disreputable,” and proves that they are “very imperfectly acquainted with their own system.”

* Dr. Adger's Inaugural Disc., Southern Presb. Review, 1859, pp. 165, 166.

“The ruling elder, even in the decisions of the General Assembly, occupies a very anomalous position.”

Now, the confusion we have found in every attempt to draw out this theory from Scripture, or state it in words, is its confutation. And when we remember that every prophet who expounds it has his own utterance different as well as distinct, and in some cases even contradictory and antagonistic, we use the language of Dr. Miller in reference to similar variations in the prelatic theory and among its defenders, when we affirm that “this very strife in their camp is a fatal testimony against their cause.”* “When they contradict, with so little ceremony, both the letter and spirit of their own public offices, drawn up by martyred fathers of their church, rendered venerable by the lapse of nearly three centuries, it would really seem as if to them victory or defeat must prove equally fatal. If they fail of establishing their argument, their cause, of course, is lost. If, on the contrary, they succeed in establishing it, they dishonour the venerated authors of their formularies.”

It will, at all events, be evident that the controversy, though about words, is not a mere logomachy, but involves all that is vital in the relations of the Eldership, the Ministry, and the Deaconship. This is the real question at issue. There is no manner of dispute whether the ruling elder is an officer, divinely appointed, deriving his authority from Christ the Lord; nor whether “he sits in Presbytery by divine right as a constituent element of the body;” nor even whether he may not be properly denominated, in a general use of the terms—ruling-elder—and especially as the original word, presbyter, and its cognate words, bishop, pastor, minister, &c., are in general usage, and in our standards, restricted to the office of the preacher. The status, in short, the dignity, the ecclesiastical and spiritual character of the ruling-elder as an office-bearer and ruler in the church of Christ, and as an essential element in Presbyterian polity;—these, none of them, are in question in this discussion. We claim, and it may be, shall establish, a greater honour for the ruling elder than this theory secures. We rejoice as much as any can rejoice, in every manifestation by our ruling elders of greater and growing interest in all that

* On the Christian Ministry, p. 60.

affects the prosperity of our church, and our heart's desire and prayer to God has been for thirty years, that he would send us ruling elders, able and willing to lead on and to sustain pastors in all pastoral visitation and instruction, and in the well-ordering and marshalling of the forces of the sacramental host.

What, then, is the Presbyterian view of the ruling eldership? It is very simple, and may be clearly, stated, both negatively and positively.

And first, negatively. The ruling eldership is not the ministry, nor of the same order or office as the ministry, which is the highest both for dignity and usefulness. And as the ministry combines both teaching and ruling, and ruling in order to teaching, IT is, on the last analysis, unquestionably the one fundamental order in the kingdom of Christ. On this point, we must omit a full exhibition of the decisive teaching of all Presbyterian standards. The remarkable harmony with which these all combine in exalting the ministry, in appropriating to the ministry the title of presbyter, and its collateral terms; in refusing so generally to give even the English term elder to our ruling elder, except under the explicit statement that it is in a "large" and comprehensive sense; the employment of *various* other terms for the official standard definition of ruling elders; the *rejection* of the title, ruling elders, and 1 Timothy v. 17, as proof, after long discussion, by the Westminster Assembly, whose form of government is that of the Church of Scotland, and of all affiliated churches, and the basis of, and for a time itself, our own form;—all this is completely subversive of the theory in question, which makes the ministry a class under the order of ruling elders or a function of the office of ruling elders.

The ministry, according to the Presbyterian system of doctrine and polity, is a distinct ORDER, and not a CLASS under an order. It is also the FIRST order in the church, both for dignity and usefulness, and not "a new function" of a more fundamental order. It is the order to which an analysis of the church of Christ, either as a doctrine or as a duty, or as a dispensation of God's gracious mercy, must ultimately lead—the instrumentality for making known authoritatively to lost and guilty men the glorious gospel of the blessed God. The

ministry is the radical and essential order in the church. It contains within itself, by necessity, both discipline and distribution, both ruling and relieving, watchful care for the interests both of the body and the soul.* The apostles accordingly are always named first, and all the other offices grow out of theirs, like branches from a common stock. The apostles were at the same time prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, and at first had charge even of the business of the deacons. This universal official character belonged in the highest sense to Christ. He is expressly called apostle, prophet, evangelist, (Eph. ii. 17); calls himself the Good Shepherd; and condescends to take even the title of deacon or servant; and all the various branches of the spiritual office are the organs through which Christ himself, in the Holy Ghost, continues to exercise on earth the offices of prophet, priest, and king. According to this fundamental idea of the Presbyterian church, therefore, the pastor includes in his official potentiality, the elder and deacon, as the elder does that of deacon, and thus as a missionary or evangelist, the pastor can call together and organize, and conduct churches, until God provides elders and deacons, whom he can then ordain.

Having thus shown what the system of the Presbyterian church in relation to the eldership is *negatively*, and that most assuredly it is not what this theory makes it, that is, the fundamental order of which the ministry is a class, or "a new function," we proceed to state what it is *positively*. On this point there ought to be no disputation, as our standards are unmistakably clear. They deliver no uncertain sound. They separate the eldership by a definite order from the pastorship, and from the deaconship by a distinct consideration of each in separate chapters. In our Form of Government (ch. v.) there has been even peculiar clearness of analysis, and we have both a lucid definition and a plain and popular *description* of ruling elders. In the definition we have first the *genus* or *class* to which ruling elders belong, viz. "the ordinary and perpetual officers in the church," (ch. iii.) of which there are *three kinds or orders*—(evangelists being properly considered as missionaries, and differing from ministers generally only in the

* Gillespie argues this against Stillingfleet, and quotes older writers.

nature and field of their work and not in office or order. The *species* or *order* to which ruling elders belong, and the particular mark—or relation—by which this office is distinguished from each of the others, is their being “the representatives of the people (ch. iii.);” or, as it is more fully given in chapter v., “Ruling elders are *properly* the representatives of the people, chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline, in conjunction with pastors or ministers.” Such is the *definition*. The *description*, as given in ch. iii. is, that they are those officers who are “*usually* (not *universally*) *styled* (not *are so by divine calling*, and hence not by divine right,) ruling elders.” In ch. v. it is: “This office has been *understood* by a great part of the Protestant Reformed Churches to be designated in the Holy Scriptures by the title of governments and (*described in their works as*) those who rule well, but do not labour in word and doctrine.”

We have here, therefore, a formal definition and a full description of ruling elders, and a candid admission that in regard to the name, and the application to that name of 1 Tim. v. 17, there has only been a “*common understanding*” (or *opinion*) by “a *great part*” of the churches. In the definition you will notice, that they are not called ruling *elders*, and that they are not—*here*, or anywhere else—called *presbyters*, which title is given exclusively to the bishop or pastor. And whereas “the *elders* that rule well,” in 1 Tim. v. 17, is quoted in proof, it is to be noted, that it is only in support of the “*commonly*” used title, “*ruling elders*,” for it lends no countenance whatever to the definition of “representatives of the people;” and also, that the suggestion of the name of *ruling elders* is founded upon the English rendering of “*rule well*” for οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες, (literally those who preside well or in an acceptable manner.)

Secondly, you will notice that they are “*properly* called representatives of the people,” which bishops are neither said to be, nor can be. The *people* can neither give nor take away their office, their call, their commission, their authority, their power of loosing and binding, their gifts and graces, their status as *representatives*, heralds and ambassadors of *Christ*, as lights of the world, salt of the earth, stars in Christ’s right

hand, angels, rulers, stewards, husbandmen, fathers, shepherds, builders, watchmen, the chariots and horsemen of Israel."* Logically and efficiently, and in the order of the divine instrumentality, preachers precede believing people, and preaching is in order to discipleship, the shepherd to his flock, and the pastor to his people. There are, for instance, presbyteries in India, China, and elsewhere, where no suitable materials for elders or deacons exist, and where, therefore, ministers are in no proper sense representatives of the people. And as surely as there is a catholic visible church, there are ministers whose primary relations are to that church. As *ministers* they represent Christ and his kingdom, and as *pastors*, in the present strict sense of that term, by virtue of their relation to, and covenant with a particular church, they represent it. This principle constitutes the vital distinction between Presbyterianism and Independency, as Dr. Owen admits. Ruling Elders are common and proper to both, so that neither elders nor deacons constitute the distinctive characteristic of Presbyterianism.

And hence ruling elders are defined to be "*properly* representatives of 'the people;' because, as Dr. Adger well expounds, "*they are nothing more.*" They are, he adds, "specifically representatives of the people for the reason also, that not every elder in any district may be a member of Presbytery;" but "each session shall send one elder *only* to represent that session, and so to represent that church or people."† Dr. Adger, however, is entirely mistaken in adding "with the minister," as if the people sent the minister to Presbytery. Every ordained *minister* is, *ex officio*, a member of Presbytery which consists of all ministers, "and ONE ruling elder from every congregation within a certain district." (Form of Gov. chap. x. § 2, See § 3—5.) "The pastor of the congregation also *shall always* be the moderator of the session, except when for some good reason some other *minister* be invited to preside."

The fundamental relation of the ruling elder is, therefore, to the people. For while it is true that the apostles go before the church, not the church before the apostles; nevertheless, as

* Divine Right of the Ministry.

† Inaugural Discourse, *Southern Presbyterian Review*. 1859, p. 175.

soon as a Christian community was called, nothing was done without its coöperation. As all authority and power inhere in Christ, the autocratic King and Head, so does it pertain ministerially to his theocratic kingdom, or house, or family, or body, as it is severally called. The supreme government is upon his shoulders, who is head over all, and King of kings to his church. All power in the church, by whomsoever *exercised*, is made binding or loosing only by the authority of Christ, as constitutionally declared in his word. This power is not imparted primarily to officers, but to the church, considered as a kingdom, for whose edification officers are given. "Whatever authority and dignity the Holy Spirit confers on priests, or prophets, or apostles, or successors of apostles, is wholly given *not to men themselves*, but to the ministry to which they are appointed, or to speak more plainly, to the word, to the ministry of which they are appointed."*

The Presbyterian system is distinguished from Popery, Prelacy, and Independency, by its belief in one holy catholic, visible church, UNTO WHICH Christ hath given the ministry, oracles and ordinances of God. (Conf. of Faith, chap. xxv.) Officers therefore are given to the church, and not the church to officers. Jesus Christ hath erected in this world a kingdom which is his church. (Form of Gov. ch. ii.) Our blessed Lord at first collected his church out of different nations, and formed it into one body by the mission of men.

This is a fundamental doctrine of the Presbyterian system. "The ministry, oracles and ordinances of Christ, are given† by" Jesus Christ to the general church visible. All church power is, therefore, resident ultimately in the body of the people, to whom was given the commission to evangelize the world. And as Christ greatly honours his people, calling them a royal generation, a holy priesthood, and the commonwealth of Israel, they have a right to a substantive part in the government of the church, through officers appointed by them, and by whom it is to be administered, according to the laws of the kingdom. This power extends to everything, whether pertain-

* Calvin's Instit. B. iv., Chap. viii. § 2.

† Form of Government, by the Westminster Assembly.

ing to doctrine, discipline, or distribution, and to ministers also, and is only limited and restrained by the revealed will of the King of Zion. The church therefore in its visible form, is neither a democracy, nor an aristocracy, nor an autocracy, but a spiritual republic. It is a representative commonwealth, in which ministers represent God to the people and the people to God, and are in many ways subject to the direct and indirect control of the people, and in all cases are approved, elected, sustained, and supported by the people; in which ruling elders are properly representatives of the people; and in which deacons are representatives of both pastor and people to each other, and to the wants of a perishing world. In order however to avoid the use of any civil terms, our reformers have adhered to the original terms, kirk, pastors, elders, ancients or governors, and deacons. In Scotland, the first name adopted for this commonwealth was "The Congregation."*

According to this system, therefore, ALL the officers of the church are alike of divine appointment and authority, and their difference in importance, in dignity, and in usefulness, arises out of their relations to Christ and his people, and to the work assigned them. The office, and the gifts fitting for it, are in all cases, exclusively from Christ, and in the case of the minister the personal call is also from Christ, and when recognized and ratified by his existing ministers and elders in solemn convention, he is by them recommended to the people.

But it is very different with ruling elders. These are instituted for the special purpose of representing the people. By them the people exercise a popular and controlling influence in all the courts of the church, and in all spiritual government, discipline, and order, just as a similar control over all the temporalities, and charities, and funds of each church is wielded by the deacons, who also represent and act for the people in all this department of fiduciary power. This is the *essential* character of the ruling elder and deacon. They represent the inherent rights and prerogatives of the people as the free and loyal subjects of the King of Zion—the *elders* in their relation

* See Hetherington, History.

to the *whole church* as one body, of which all are members, and the *deacons* in their relation to a *particular church*.

According, therefore, to our Standards, ruling elders "act in the name of THE WHOLE CHURCH." (Form of Government, ch. i. § 3.) The election, and the mode of their election, is left to each church. (Ibid. § 7, and ch. xiii. § 2.) When they become unacceptable to a majority of the congregation to *which they belong*, they may cease to be acting elders or deacons." (Ibid. § 6.) They cease also to be officers when they remove to a different congregation, and require a new election and installation in order to be elders and deacons in it. Neither can an elder by virtue of office sit in any court of the church higher than his own church session, unless he is personally and regularly delegated by his session to represent their church in said body, and when said court adjourns, said commission and representation cease.

The ruling elder and deacon can do, officially, nothing which, if supposed to be acting directly, the church as a body could not rightly do; and can do nothing officially and regularly which is by the word made the peculiar and solemn duty of the minister.

Neither elders, nor deacons, nor people, nor all combined, can in the ordinary organized condition of the church call or ordain to the *office* of the ministry. They may call a man to become *their* minister, and to labour as *their pastor among them*. But he may be, and often is, already a minister—in the *office*—and if he is *not*, then other ministers must ordain him and install him with imposition of *their* hands. Though ruling elders are required to coöperate, as representatives of the people, in all the acts by which Presbytery examines and judges of the qualifications of a candidate for the ministry, and to approve or disapprove, yet such a thing as elders uniting in the imposition of hands in the ordination of a minister *has never been heard of under the constitutional laws of any Presbyterian church in the world, so far as we can find*.

The ruling elder, according to our Standards, is neither ordained by imposition of hands, (see Form of Government, ch. xiii. § 4,) nor allowed to unite in imposing hands in the ordination of ministers, (ibid. ch. xv. § 14,) and the adequate rea-

son is given by Dr. Miller.* “It seems,” says this venerated father of our church, “to be a fundamental principle in every department both of the natural and moral world, that every thing must be considered as capable of begetting its like,” and in meeting the Episcopal objection against presbyterial ordination, “when it is well known that our Presbyteries are made up of clerical and *lay elders*, and that we do not permit the latter to impose hands at all in the ordination of ministers,” he replies: “There is no inconsistency here. We deny the right of an *inferior* officer to lay on hands in the ordination of a superior, and uniformly act accordingly. The Presbytery lays on hands when all its teaching elders do, although those who are only rulers do not.”† This is the law in the Church of Scotland—our mother church‡—in which ordination of elders is to be by the minister of the congregation, or by one of the Presbytery. “Then the elders chosen, still standing up, the minister is next by solemn prayer, to set them *apart in verbis de presententi*.”§ And in the same chapter on ruling elders, it is added, “The execution of some decrees of the church; *such as the imposition of hands*, the pronouncing the sentences of excommunication and absolution, &c. doth belong to pastors only.”|| In the ordination of ministers accordingly, the several parties “are to sit together with the intrant, (or *pastor elect*) so that all the ministers may conveniently give him the imposition of hands, and the others (elders, heritors) may *take him by the hand when thereunto called*.”¶ In 1698 the Assembly passed the following remarkable act, which will explain itself: “The Assembly unanimously declare that as they allow no powers in the *people*, but only in the pastors of the church, to appoint or ordain church officers, so they disclaim the error of the press in Acts vi. 3, . . . bearing ‘whom *ye* may appoint over this business,’ instead of ‘whom *we* may appoint’ . . . to prove the people’s power in ordaining their ministers, which error the Presbyterians are wrongously charged with.”**

In the very first Book of Discipline which was one drawn up

* Ruling Elders, p. 293.

† On the Ministry, p. 74.

‡ Laws of the Church of Scotland, vol. i. p. 222. Pardovan, Book I. Title vii. § 1. § Ibid. § 5. || Ibid. § 9. ¶ Ibid. Title i. § 34, p. 196.

** Compendium of Laws of Church of Scotland, vol. ii. p. 202.

by Bullinger in 1536, and translated by Wishart in 1540, the ministers are called presidents, heads, and teachers, and ruling elders, *officers chosen by the minister or magistrate*, and only ministers imposed hands.* “It (the election of ministers,) is well and justly approved by the voice of the church, and the imposition of the hands of the priests,” i. e. presbyters. By the Second Book of Discipline, which continued in force in Scotland until the adoption of the Westminster Standards, the office of elders is made permanent, but the incumbents of it may rotate in the actual discharge of its functions, and it was not required that there should be an *eldership* in every church, but only in towns and famous places. This view of the eldership as held by the Reformers, is given by Dr. Miller, as the reason why, “although they with one accord retained this rite, (the laying on of hands,) in the ordination of Teaching Elders, they seem *quite as unanimously*, to have discarded it in the ordination of Ruling Elders.”† Calderwood in his *Altare Damascenum*, says, “the administrators of this rite are pastors—presbyters—only. Still the others will not thereby be excluded from Presbytery, because the laying on of hands does not belong to them. For the imposition of hands may be called the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery, though each and every one of the presbyters have not the power of imposing hands. It is enough that the leading part of the Presbytery have that power, as the tribe of Levi is said to offer incense, when it was the prerogative of the priests only.”‡

Alexander Henderson, in his treatise on Church Government, written two years before the Westminster Assembly, confirms this opinion. Rutherford, also, who was commissioned to that Assembly, not only affirms this to be the doctrine of the church, but confirms it by scriptural arguments.§ James Guthrie, of Sterling, in his treatise on Elders and Deacons, says this rite, and other prerogatives, “do belong to ministers alone.”

* Art. xviii. See in Miscellany of the Wodrow Society, Vol. 1, Art. 1. Edinb. 1844.

† On the Ruling Elder, p. 285—288.

‡ Cap. xii. De administr. laicis, p. 689.

§ Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbytery, p. 57.

The Westminster Form of Government was solemnly adopted by the Church of Scotland in 1645, and has ever since formed a part of their constitutional standards, and of all the branches of the Presbyterian Church affiliated with it throughout the world. Now, on the doctrine and order of ordination by imposition of hands, it is both explicitly and emphatically strong, having no less than six distinct sections on "The Ordination of Ministers," "Touching the doctrine of Ordination," "Touching the power of Ordination," "Concerning the doctrinal part of the Ordination of Ministers," "The Directory for the Ordination of Ministers," and "The Rules for and Form of their Ordination;" and repeating over and over again, that "every minister of the word is to be ordained by imposition of hands, by those preaching presbyters to whom it doth belong." "Preaching presbyters, orderly associated, are those to whom imposition of hands doth appertain."*

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland, in addition to the Westminster standards, have their own Constitution and Discipline. The form for ordination of ruling elders and ministers is very similar to that of the Church of Scotland. The elder is "set apart to his *office* by prayer only." (Ch. iii. § 2.) The minister is "ordained by prayer on the part of the minister appointed to ordain, the candidate reverently kneeling . . . in some part of the prayer the officiating minister shall lay his hands upon the head of the candidate, and be joined by the rest of the ministers present." (Ch. iv. § 14, p. 39.)

At a later period, the Church of Scotland, in allusion to the act of 1698, quoted above, reaffirmed that law. "Our church doth condemn any doctrine that *tends* to support the *people's* power of ordaining their ministers."†

We are thus full in our presentation of the Presbyterian system in the Church of Scotland on the question of ordination *of* and *by* ruling elders, because it not only determines her view of ruling elders to be, that they are *not* ministers, nor of

* See in every Scotch Confession of Faith, and all published elsewhere, except under our own Form of Government.

† Compendium of Laws, vol. i. p. 194. Pardovan, B. I. tit. 1, § 21.

the same order; but also because it determines the proper interpretation of their nature and powers.

But we can carry this authoritative constitutional interpretation of the nature and powers of ruling elders up to the very first standards of Presbyterianism—to the Institutes of Calvin, and to the standards and practice of the Waldensian, and other primitive churches of God.

Calvin did not originate the Presbyterian system, combining as it does the order of the ministers—the fundamental rulers and teachers of the church of God—with the orders of ruling elders and deacons.

All Calvin had to do was to complete the system by adding the bench of ruling elders, and even this he did not invent, but confessedly borrowed from that branch of the Waldenses called the “Bohemian Brethren.”* This Zwingle had also done. Let us then hear on this subject the ancient discipline of the Waldenses: “God has given to his *people* to choose from themselves guides of the people, (*that is, pastors,*) and *ancients* in their carriages according to the diversity of the work in the unity of Christ;” and as it regards ordination, it is expressly provided (Article 93,) that “*the body of the pastors of the church shall give the imposition of hands.*”† The Bohemian Brethren carried these ancient confessions and forms of discipline from Picardy, some two hundred years before the time of Huss.

The precise relation between the doctrine of our own standards, and these original ones on the subject of ruling elders, will be clearly perceived by quoting the original form of the language in which they were expressed by the Church of Scotland, which is as follows, “and it is also agreeable to, and warranted by, the word of God, that *some others* (not *ruling elders nor even elders,*) besides those who labour in the word and doctrine, be (*not ruling elders,* but) church governors to *join with* ministers of the word (*already presupposed and prescribed as rulers*) in the government of the

* Dr. Miller as above, p. 21.

† See given in Blair's History, in Appendix, in full; and also in Muston's recent able History in two vols. 8vo.

church and discipline, which office-bearers Reformed churches do commonly call ruling elders.”*

Here also, it will be noted, we find, as in our book, a *definition*—“church governors to join with the ministers of the word in the government of the church,” or as they are termed in section 4, “the representatives of that congregation;” and also a *description*, “which office-bearers Reformed churches do commonly call ruling elders.”

We have now established, beyond dispute, the constitutional doctrine of the Presbyterian system concerning ruling elders on these points—that they are not ministers, nor of the same order of officers as ministers, that they are defined to be *properly*—that is, in their very nature or essential character—representatives of the people; that they are not officially, nor by divine assignation, the presbyters of Scripture who are ministers; that it is only “commonly,” and in the common or “large” sense of the term, they are styled elders; that they represent, and cannot transcend the power ultimately inherent in, the people, to whom and for whose benefit they are instituted; that their power is strictly representative, and capable of exercise beyond their particular “people” only by special, personal, and temporary delegation, and may cease to be exercised even over that people in case they become unacceptable; that they are not as ministers are, *ex-officio*, necessary, and constant members of any superior court; and that they never have been ordained by imposition of hands, nor considered as officially capable of uniting in imposition of hands, in the ordination of ministers, by the constitution of any Presbyterian church in any part of the world.†

But further, the antagonism of the theory in question to the Presbyterian system will be made more manifest by proving *distinctly*—what is implied in the positions already established—the lay, or popular, and non-clerical character of ruling elders. Ruling elders are laymen—that is, as the word literally and in universal usage means—they are not clergymen, but are distinct from the clergy; individuals of the people who

* Compend. of Laws, vol. 1, p. 187. Pardovan, Title 1, Sec. 1.

† “It was the practice of the Church for three hundred years to ordain bishops or presbyters with imposition of hands of neighbouring bishops or presbyters.” (Jus. Div. Regim. Eccl. p. 60.) Elders not sixty, ordained. (See Pref.)

are not in orders. The term *laity* is altogether relative, be it observed, to *office* and *order*, and not to *dignity*, or *worth*, or *rank*. The layman may in all these respects be exalted, and the minister be humble and poor. The term only distinguishes that relation which the clergy sustain to God and to his sacred services which the laity do not. In any invidious sense ruling elders are not laity; but neither are deacons, nor believers generally, for all are kings and priests unto God. But in every proper sense ruling elders are laymen, just as certainly as deacons are, since they are both called, elected, and ordained by the same formula. (*See Form of Government.*) It is idle work, therefore, to controvert this distinction, since it would only necessitate some other. The truth in the case was evidently this. In a high and holy sense all Christian people are *κληροι*, *cleroi*, or clergy, but ministers are in a peculiar and distinguishing sense, clergy. There is, therefore, an order of Christian laity as well as of Christian ministers or clergy, and it is in accordance with Christ's appointment that both orders should be represented in the government of the church, by a double class of officers, combining in the one, permanency and conservative wisdom as a Senate; and in the other, popular representation, prudence, activity, and authority, as a House of Representatives; united as one; acting as checks and balances to each other; coöperating as one court in everything common; and discharging, by each, everything peculiar to the character and office of each; and thus combining the greatest liberty with the highest security, and avoiding the extremes of a simple democracy and a spiritual hierarchy.

The defined nature of ruling elders, as properly the representatives of the people, implies and requires that they be laymen. A representative is one who bears the character, is clothed with the power, and performs the functions of others; who is one of them, united with them in interest, in power, and privilege, and chosen by them, from among themselves, to support their interests, and act in their name. Now if by becoming an elder, a man ceases to be a layman and becomes a clergyman, then he is no longer properly a representative of the people, and the Presbyterian government ceases to be representative, and a free commonwealth, and

becomes a clerical aristocracy, or in other words, a hierarchy. In their original form, as found in all modern and reformed churches, as among the Waldenses, in Switzerland at Geneva, in France, in Scotland, elders were unquestionably laymen, chosen from the civil state and not from the ecclesiastical, *and by the civil authorities* in many cases, as by the Confession of the churches of Switzerland, and the first adopted in Scotland. Blair,* “one of the most profound writers on the Waldenses,” as Dr. Miller justly styles him, (on Presbyterianism, p. 18, 19,) “points out the difference between the lay elders of the Waldenses and of the Church of Scotland, by stating that the former were chosen by the Waldensian *congregations*, meeting annually and appointing the elder.” “Calvin,” says Principal Hill, “in 1542, admitted *lay* elders into his church.† The admission of *lay* elders into church courts having the sanction of these early authorities, Calvin thought it expedient to revive the primitive practice as an effectual method of preventing the return of inordinate power *in a superior order of clergy*. With some variation of name and privilege, the office of *lay* elders is found in all the Presbyterian churches on the Continent. Ever since the Reformation it has formed an essential part of the constitution of the church of Scotland.” (*View*, pp. 24, 25.) “The Kirk session is composed of the minister of the parish, who is *officially* moderator, and of *lay* elders.” P. 48. “The Presbytery is composed of the ministers of all the parishes within its bounds, and of *lay representatives* from the consistories.” P. 26. Speaking of these lay elders as assisting the minister in everything which concerns discipline, Principal Hill adds, “They are called *laymen* in this respect, that they have no right to teach or to dispense the sacraments, and on this account they form *an office* in the Presbyterian church, *inferior in rank and power to that of pastors*.” ·Ibid. p. 23.

The very learned Vitringa, in his elaborate treatise on the Ancient Synagogue, in discussing the question of ruling elders as maintained by Calvin, and as commonly adopted in his own church, uniformly styles them *presbyteros laicos*. (See p. 484.)

* In vol. ii. p. 540, he calls them *lay*, five times.

† View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, by George Hill, D. D. Principal of St. Andrews College, Third edition, p. 23.

That ruling elders have always been considered as laymen in every branch of the Presbyterian church, will be clearly seen further, from the variety of names by which they have been called. In the Syrian churches of Malabar, the Romish inquisitor addressed them as “representatives and procurators of the people.”* In the laws of Geneva they are called “inspectors, seniors, and commissioners for the Seniory.”† Among the Waldenses they received the names of rulers, ancients, and elders; among the Bohemians, of guides, elders, and censors; by Comenius they are called “seniors, judges of the congregation, or censors of the people.” Ecolampadius styles them elders of another kind, that is, “senators, leaders, and counsellors.” In the Helvetic Confession, “The elders are the agents, as it were the senators and fathers of the church, governing it by holy counsel.”‡ In the Books of Discipline, no one term is employed, but several, such as seniors, other governors, elders. In the Westminster Standards, and in the notes preserved by Gillespie, they are spoken of as—ruling officers—other church governors, *ruling* elder or others, church governør, others to join in government.” We have not found the full term “ruling elder,” until about the time of the Westminster Assembly, when it is introduced and reprobated in speeches preserved by Neal,§ and is used in the commission given by the Church of Scotland to its delegates to that Assembly. After ten days of elaborate discussion in the Westminster Assembly, both names, *elder* and *ruling elder*—were abandoned, and “other church governors,” and as in ch. on Presbytery, “other public officers,” were adopted. In the early churches in the United States, many had no elders.|| They were frequently called “assistants, representatives of the people, and sometimes the minister’s assistants, representatives of congregations.”¶

The lay character of ruling elders is not trivial nor unimportant. It is fundamental to the Presbyterian system and to

* See the Confession imposed on them in Hough’s Christianity in India, vol. iv. Append. p. 515.

† See Name, Nat. and Functions, of Elders, p. 11.

‡ See *ibid.* and auth. pp. 78, 79, 80, 84, 86, and Harmony of Confessions.

§ See Hist. of Puritans, vol. i. and Appendix.

|| Hodge, Constit. Hist., i. p. 96, 97.

¶ Do. 95, see example.

the true character and importance of the ruling eldership. It is their lay character which brings the lay element into our form of government and imparts voice and power to the people; indeed gives into their hands the *controlling* power in particular churches and sessions, and *equal* power in every other court and in every department. These lay representatives constitute the house of representatives united with the senate in one body in all the courts of our church.

“Our divines,” says Mr. George Gillespie in his Assertion of the government of the Church of Scotland, Part I. chap. 4, “prove against papists that some of these, whom they call laics, ought to have a place in the assemblies of the church, by this argument among the rest; because otherwise the whole church could not be thereby represented. And it is plain enough, that the church cannot be represented, except the hearers of the word, which are the far greater part of the church, be represented. By the ministers of the word they cannot be represented more than the burghs can be represented in parliament by the noblemen, or by the commissioners of shires; therefore by some of their own kind must they be represented, that is, by such as are hearers, and not preachers. Now some hearers cannot represent all the rest except they have a calling and commission thereto; and who can these be but ruling elders? And again, when the Council of Trent was first spoken of in the Diet at Wurtemberg, Anno 1522, all the estates of Germany desired of Pope Adrian VI. that admittance might be granted, as well to *laymen* as to clergymen, and that not only as witnesses and spectators, but to be judges there. This they could not obtain, therefore they would not come to the council, and published a book, where they allege this for one cause of their not coming to Trent, because none had voice there but cardinals, bishops, abbots, generals, or superiors of orders, whereas *laics* also ought to have a decisive voice in councils. If none but the ministers of the word should sit and have a voice in a synod, then it could not be a church representative, because the most part of the church (who are the hearers and not the teachers of the word) are not represented in it. A common cause ought to be concluded by common voices. But that which is treated of in councils, is a com-

mon cause pertaining to many particular churches. Our divines, when they prove against papists, that the election of ministers, and the excommunication of obstinate sinners, ought to be done by the suffrages of the whole church, make use of this same argument; that which concerneth all, ought to be treated of and judged by all."

So argued one of Scotland's noblest sons, and a representative in the Westminster Assembly of Divines. And such, also, are the general views of the early fathers of the Presbyterian church. (See Jamieson's *Cyprianus Isotimus*, pp. 554—556, 540—544.)

One of the ablest and most effective works written in favour of the Presbyterian system, in 1641, two years before the Westminster Assembly, and by some who were members of that body, was what—by the union of the initial letters of the names of its combined authors—was called *Smectymnuus*. "By all these testimonies," they say, (at the close of their argument for *governing elders*, whom they call *lay presbyters* and *lay elders*) "it is apparent, first, that in the ancient church there were some called *seniors*. Secondly, that these seniors *were not clergymen*. Thirdly, that they had a stroke in governing the church and managing the affairs thereof. Fourthly, that the seniors were distinguished from the rest of the people." P. 74.

We need not do more than refer to the biennial election of elders in the Dutch Church, and to the character of the eldership in the French and Swiss Churches.*

It is very remarkable that the proofs given by Dr. Killen for his theory from the Synagogue, prove also that if similar to the Parnasim, elders must be laymen. "In every synagogue," as he quotes from Lightfoot, "there was a *civil* triumvirate, that is, three *magistrates*, who judged of all matters in contest, advising within that synagogue." "The same writer," adds Dr. Killen, "declares that in every synagogue there were elders that ruled *in civil affairs* and elders that laboured in word and doctrine."† Dr. Miller admits all that we desire. 1. That

* See Lorimer on Eldership, p. 165.

† Lightfoot's Works, xi. 179, Killen, pp. 233, 234.

the earliest fathers distinguished ministers by the title of *clergy*, and the people by that of *laity*. 2. That in the time of Cyprian this use was general. 3. That the name of clergy was given to presbyters and deacons, and to any others who in the growing multiplication of orders were *ordained by imposition of hands*. 4. That this distinction is found even in Scripture. (Acts iv. 13.) 5. That in any *invidious* sense, ruling elders are not laymen, nor ministers, prelates or popes. 6. But that "so far as it is intended to designate those who are clothed with office and authorized to discharge important spiritual functions which the body of church members are not authorized to perform, and to mark the distinction between these two classes, the language may be defended, and that either that (*i. e.* laity) or some other of equivalent import, *ought to be, and must be used*, if we would be faithful to the New Testament view of ecclesiastical office as an ordinance of Christ." "Let all necessary distinction be made by saying, ministers or pastors, ruling elders, deacons, and the laity or body of the people." (Ruling Elders, pp. 211, 212.) Amen. So let it be.*

We are not left to put any sense possible or plausible upon our Book of Government. "Our whole arrangement of judicatories, and *our whole ecclesiastical nomenclature*, are, with few exceptions, borrowed from Scotland," and although "Presbyterianism in Scotland, Holland, France, Geneva, and Germany, are in substance the same . . . yet as those who commenced the Presbyterian church in America were chiefly emigrants from North Britain and Ireland, so the Church of Scotland was more than any other their model." Thus speaks Dr. Miller, who must be considered as being himself one of the most venerated fathers and upbuilders of our church.†

This constitutional interpretational authority of the Westminster standards is confirmed by the fact that, as Dr. Archibald Alexander remarks, "the *immediate* mother of our American

* Several names are employed in Scripture to denote the body of the Christian people, such as *brethren—one heritage—disciple*, as opposed to *Master—taught*, as opposed to *teachers—soldiers and leaders—ἱ λαός, the people—παιμὸν, the flock, the church—private persons, ἰδιαιται—and later, βίαιτοι, laymen, or men devoted to secular pursuits.*

† See "Presbyterianism the truly Prim. and Apostolic Church," pp. 21, 22.

Presbyterian Church was the Synod of Ulster, from one of whose Presbyteries, the Lagan, the Rev. Francis Mackemie, its founder, was formally commissioned and ordained to labour in this country. Now, in a minute of the Synod of New York in 1751, it is said: "We do hereby declare and testify our constitution, order, and discipline to be in harmony with the established Church of Scotland. The Westminster Confession, Catechisms, Directory for Public Worship, and *Church Government*, adopted by them, are *in like manner* received and adopted by us. We declare ourselves united with that church in the same faith, order, and *discipline*.*

In conclusion, on this point, we remark, that either ruling elders are laymen, or deacons are not; and that if deacons are laymen, then ruling elders must be also, since both are elected and ordained by the same formula, word for word—(see *Form of Government*)—and therefore since deacons are universally recognized as lay officers in the church, so also are ruling elders. They are both laymen, and so understood and felt to be by themselves, by the church, and by the world—chosen from the people and by the people, to represent the people; and separated from them by no form of ordination peculiar to the sacred order of the ministry.

But we proceed to remark, that ruling elders and deacons, though laymen, are not incumbents of a *lay office*, nor *lay officers*, in the sense of being originated or authorized by man. They occupy a divinely instituted office, and are clothed by divine right with all the dignity and honour of ecclesiastical officers. In other words, they are authorized by Scripture and by sound reasoning from established scriptural truths, and are agreeable to, and approved by, scriptural examples, and by its general teaching.†

It is also to be remarked that this view of the office of the elder is the only one which gives a proper explanation of the nature and functions of ruling elders. Whatever can promote

* See in Hodge's Constitutional History, vol. i. p. 18, and his multiplied proofs of the fact.

† A divine right is supported by any one of these arguments. See Dr. McLeod's Ecl. Catech., p. 12, Q. 39, and note. Also, Jus. Div. Regiminis Ecl., ch. i.

the spiritual interests of the people, preserve their rights, and secure their prosperity, peace and purity, and the godly upbringing of the children of the church—all this pertains to the eldership, and is expected from them, according to their several ability and opportunity.

This view gives to the eldership the power of the church in a very large measure, and to the church itself its popular representative character. This view gives to the church also its spiritual character. As elders are, the church will be; and as elders are, the ministry itself will, in all ordinary cases be; and either be as greatly hindered in what they would be, or helped in all they would accomplish. Elders can vitalize and popularize the church. There are no limits to their usefulness. They are the palladiums of the church's liberty and rights, and the preservers of its purity, both of doctrine and of life.

Such then is the Presbyterian theory of the eldership, as found in its standards, and in the history and practice of every Presbyterian church. The question, therefore, between this and the new theory is not, what *ought* to be, but what is *constitutional*—not what might be constitutionally altered, if a better is pointed out; nor even what is most scriptural, and most authoritatively maintained; but simply what is the Presbyterian system as it regards ruling elders? and are Presbyterian ministers and officers under solemn and covenant engagement bound to maintain and preserve it?

Is this then, we ask, the theory of the Presbyterian church in these United States on the subject of the eldership? The answer can be definitely given. That our church does not hold the theory propounded by Dr. Breckinridge, Dr. Thornwell, Dr. Adger and others, is admitted. "The ruling elder," says Dr. Thornwell,* "even in the decisions of the General Assembly occupies a very anomalous position, and it is still disputed† . . . whether he belongs to the *same order with the minister*, or whether the minister alone is the presbyter of Scripture, and the ruling elder a subordinate assistant. It is still disputed whether he sits in Presbytery as the deputy of

* *Southern Presbyterian Review*, October 1859, p. 615.

† What is not at all disputed by the church, is here omitted.

the brotherhood, or whether he sits there by divine right as a constituent element of the body; whether as a member of presbytery, he can participate in ALL presbyterial acts (*i. e. ordinations, &c.*) or is debarred from some by the low nature of his office."

Now, passing by the invidious imputation of a design to lower the eldership by magnifying, as the apostles do, the high calling of the ministry, we have in this statement a full admission of the fact, that the theory of Dr. Breckinridge, which he adopts, is in antagonism to the Presbyterian system as interpreted by our General Assembly.

For three successive years (1842—1844,) our General Assembly was agitated by overtures to allow ruling elders to unite in the imposition of hands in the ordination of bishops. "The denial of this right," it was alleged by those who protested, "involved the denial that they are scriptural presbyters, which denial seems to us to undermine the foundations of Presbyterian order."* In accordance with the *unanimous* report of the Committee, the General Assembly resolved, "that in its judgment, neither the constitution nor the practice of our church authorizes ruling elders to impose hands in the ordination of ministers," (yeas 138, nays 9); and in a long and able reply to a long and able protest, the Assembly in 1844, † says: "These views are contrary to Scripture, and to the constitution of our church, and to the practice of our own and all other Presbyterian churches, and tend to subvert the office of ruling elder, by confounding it with that of the minister of the word. It was the doctrine of the Independents, and not of Presbyterians, that ruling elders had the right to impose hands in the ordination of ministers, as could be abundantly shown from authorities not to be questioned. In favour of the decision of the Assembly, or rather of the last three Assemblies, it can be shown, 1. That the decision accords with the word of God; 2. With the very words of our constitution; 3. With the uniform practice of those who framed the constitution; 4. With the uniform practice of all other Presbyterian churches; and we cannot but express the hope that a matter

* Protest, Baird's Digest, p. 77.

† By a vote of 154 to 25.

which has been decided, after a full and careful examination, by our whole church, and by such large majorities, may be considered as settled, and that it will not be made a subject of further agitation."

The question, therefore, which theory of the eldership is the Presbyterian system, according to the deliberate and almost unanimous judgment of our church, against the ablest opposition, and during three successive years of agitation, is no longer an open question, nor one of doubtful disputation. The positions here affirmed have to this day never been assailed. If the new theory of the protestors is the Presbyterian system, let the *proof* be given.

In another and closing article we will examine the grounds assumed as the basis of the new theory, and after proving that it has no foundation in Scripture, exhibit its tendency to destroy Presbyterianism, the ministry, the eldership, and the deaconship.

ART. IV.—*Reid's Collected Writings*. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. Third edition. Edinburgh, 1852. (Referred to in the following article by *R.* and the page.)

Discussions on Philosophy, &c. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. (Referred to by *Dis.* and the page.)

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. Vol. I., Metaphysics. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859. (Referred to by *Lect.* and the page.)

HAMILTON's doctrine of the Conditioned is a modification of Kant's Critique of the Reason. Kant's Critique is a development of the doctrine of Hume. To explain Hume, we wish to say a few words of Locke.

In the epistle to the reader which Locke prefixed to his Essay on the Understanding, he says, "five or six friends

meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with." Accordingly he announces that it was a purpose to "take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted," which gave rise to the *Essay concerning the Understanding*. He concludes that we have two fountains of experience—external sensible objects and ourselves. Besides the power of observing objects (ideas) simply, we also observe them as modes (qualities), and as having certain relations—cause and effect, identity and diversity, time, place, power, proportion, social relations, moral relations, and an infinity of others. Ideas in these relations constituting complex ideas, or the relations themselves as abstractions, having been experienced, may afterwards themselves become objects of thought, or ideas; but no ideas are innate. Relations may be perceived intuitively, demonstratively, or by sensation. The distinction now familiar under the names Subjective and Objective was not much in Locke's mind: his opinions of ideas in this respect are vague and vacillating, but it seems certain that he did not distinctly and fixedly perceive that the action of the mind is in any case such as to presuppose an implicit possession of any truth prior to experience; the pure capacity of perceiving a relation was a sufficient account of the subjective part of the process;—it never involved a prior conception of the relation. The practical result was, as he intended, that his followers looked to experience as the only source of knowledge, and considered the mind not as a closed book, but as blank paper. The following are his opinions on those subjects which are specially treated in the doctrine of the Conditioned. He thinks the ideas of space and eternity are an indefinite repetition of ideas of perceived extension and time: we have "ever growing ideas" of quantity, but not an idea of an infinitely grown quantity. Our idea of infinity

is from the endless "addibility" of number: an infinite quantity can have only a negative idea. "The great and *inextricable difficulties* which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow faculties;" and he instances at great length the same puzzles which Hamilton brings forward. God is incomprehensibly infinite. (*Essay* ii., xvi., xvii.) We have no clear idea of substance. Power and cause are known both by sensation and reflection. (ii., xxiii.) The existence of things is to be known only by experience. (iv., iii., 31.)

Hume held similar views in general to these of Locke, but started the opinion that some of the supposed relations of objects are only relations of ideas. Definitely holding that our ideas are states of mind, he says, "there is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the power and forces by which the former is governed be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature." (*Essays*, 2, 64.) The relation of cause and effect especially engaged his attention, as that on which all reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded, that by which alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. He examines in detail the information from the outward senses, and that from the operation of our own minds, and, Hamilton says, has decided the opinion of philosophers that the idea of power or necessary connection is not derived from either of these sources. Whence is it then? Hume says that when we have several times had ideas in succession where there is a change in the object, the one idea draws the other after it by an instinct or "mechanical tendency," so that when we see the first, we feel that the other is coming, and this instinctive subjective connection of the ideas is the original from which we conceive the causal connection between the objects which the ideas represent. All inferences from effect to cause, or cause to effect, must proceed from experience of connection between their ideas. As we never have had experience of the making of worlds, for example, we

cannot infer their cause. The inference must be doubtful in every case, and scepticism is the legitimate philosophy.

Reid, believing that we know external objects as they are, affirms that we have original instinctive beliefs which assure us indubitably of general necessary objective truths, causation being one.

Kant, on the contrary, held by the doctrine that we know only our own states of mind directly; it was therefore consistent for him to hold that relations are also primarily subjective. Started in this track by the study of Hume, he generalized and developed Hume's doctrine of causation into the principle that whatever appears as necessary to us, must be given *a priori* by the mind itself,—and must be a form of mind,—a law of thought and not a law of things. Applying this principle to all our thinking, he found that space and time are forms of sensuous thinking and not external realities; all we know by intuition contains nothing more than phenomena—relations. Substance and cause are categories of the understanding, or forms in which the understanding produces conceptions. The laws of nature are only the laws of our perception, and have no objective validity. The ideas of absolute substance (the free ego), of an absolute totality of phenomena (the universe), of a Supreme Being which is the one all-sufficient cause, cannot be proved to have objective reality; they are to be used solely in systematizing our judgments, and when we apply them directly to experience, or assert their objective existence, series of judgments are produced which terminate in contradictory results.* These contradictions, which Kant calls antinomies of the pure reason, prove that reason is here out of her sphere.

Kant's negations are thus more thoroughgoing than Hume's. But he stands on the ground of critique instead of scepticism. He has examined all the powers of the mind, and having ascertained their limits and their illusions, is now in no danger

* 1. The world has a beginning in time and limits in space. . . . It has not.

2. Every thing is simple or composed of simple parts. . . . Nothing simple exists.

3. A free causality is necessary to account for the phenomena of the world. . . . There is no freedom.

4. There exists an absolutely necessary being. . . . There does not, &c. These are briefly the four antinomies of Kant.

of error, or doubt. As one who understands the laws of optics, and how the natural illusions of sight result from them, is no longer embarrassed by these illusions, so Kant knowing when and how we must have the illusions,—ideas of God, and freedom, and the world, uses his faculties, notwithstanding, with perfect confidence within their proper domain of the phenomenal, and knows the illusions as illusions. He is in no danger of throwing his inkstand at the Devil.

It is plain that no philosopher could advance from the ground of Kant without offering a new solution of his antinomies. Three have been offered, for it has been generally thought that for reason to positively affirm contradictions on the most vital subjects of human thought, is going beyond the limits of an allowable liberty in illusion, and entirely destroys her character for truth.

The first we mention is Hegel's. His doctrine is that the law of contradiction is not a law of being. Time is the key to this enigma. Contradictories may be true; one now, the other afterwards. Finite existences move on in time, oscillating from one pole to its contradictory, and making progress in their development only by perpetual tacking. Their nature therefore must involve contradictions. And absolute being combines in itself all possibilities of all time.

A second solution, which is the obvious one, is, that reason does not affirm any contradictions, that Kant's show of making it do so, arises from the peculiarities of his system, and is a proof that his system is false.

The third is the solution of Hamilton, who, standing in general on the ground of Kant, admits that the laws of thought necessarily lead to contradictions, and affirms that non-contradiction is a law both of thought and being; but who will not stand upon the ground of critique, yet thinks to clear reason of falsehood by showing that the laws of thought involved (e. g. causation) are consequences of the imbecility of the mind, and not positive affirmations of intelligence; so that the mind is weak but not false; and who claims that he is thus enabled without self-contradiction to advance beyond the limits of positive thought, and affirm that one, and one only of the inconceivable contradictories must be true in fact. Before entering on the discussion of Hamilton's peculiar doctrines, a few remarks

must be made on what seems to be a kind of axiom with him, as with Kant,—that all our knowledge is relative. What he means by relative has been a matter of discussion, because his general statements about our knowledge by perception are naturally taken to mean that we know the primary qualities of matter as they are in themselves, and it has therefore been said that by *relative* he must mean *partial*. In our last number we showed the true relations of his doctrine of perception. Moreover he distinctly says, “I have frequently asserted, that in perception we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. . . . To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation or mediately. . . . Our knowledge is only of the relative.” (*R.* 866.) Again he says: “Absolute is used in two senses: 1°. as opposed to the partial; and 2°. as opposed to the relative. Our knowledge is not of the absolute, and therefore only of the partial and relative,” (*Lect.* 99.) He means by relative then something different from *partial*. He means (1) that the only objects of our knowledge are phenomena, and that these are always a relation between two substances, and never expressive of the simple existence or unmixed quality of one substance (*Lect.* 97.) We do not know substance, either matter or mind, at all. He means (2) that every phenomenon known to us is known only under the special conditions of our faculties; it must be of a peculiar kind, so as to come within their scope; and (3) it cannot be known in its native purity without addition, but only under various modifications determined by the faculties themselves, (*Lect.* 104.) The only doubt that can fairly arise is, whether he will admit that we can in any case separate the subjective from the objective element, so as to come at pure objective fact even in regard to relations. Without undertaking to decide whether he had any consistent opinion on this point, we make the following remarks on the general subject.

1°. Our knowledge of external objects in the concrete is always mixed, but easily analyzed. Perception of extension is not a phenomenon expressing the result of interaction between mind and matter; but an intuition which mirrors

purely the state of the object. So Reid says that "there appears no reason for asserting that, in perception, either the object acts upon the mind or the mind upon the object;" "to be perceived, implies neither action nor quality in the object perceived;" "every body knows that to think of an object, and to act upon it are very different things." (*R.* 301.) This draws two notes from Hamilton, who appears to differ, though as is too often the case, his remarks, while making a show of confuting Reid, are really addressed to the precision of his language.

2°. It does not seem to be an accurate statement that we perceive only phenomena and not substance. In using the senses, the object on which thought fastens is the substance. I see a tree. I feel a pen. I see or feel the thing as having certain qualities, and not the qualities as residing in the unknown. Is perception confined to the thinking an unknown external correlative of a sensation, as a quality, leaving out altogether the intuitions which give us extension, motion, force, substance? These intuitions are the true perceptions, and their objects stand in consciousness as the ground-work to be dressed up in phenomena by sensation. Hamilton illustrates at great length the statement, that however many additional senses we might have, we should still learn nothing of matter in itself. That is true enough. We do not want senses for that purpose, but sense, intuition. What is meant by knowing a thing as it is in itself? Do we not know a geometrical circle as it is in itself? We know its innermost nature, and that in such a form that we can deduce all its properties and relations from it. Such a knowledge of matter as that would seem to be knowing it in itself. But such a knowledge is readily conceived. We now have theories of atomic constitution and organization, which explain many of the phenomena; and it is by no means an impossible advance in science, that a theory be found which shall explain with mathematical precision everything that we know about matter, and enable us to predict the future, just as we do now the movements under the law of attraction: and it is easy to conceive that, just as now on the suggestion of sensations, we have intuitive perceptions of extension and force: we might have an intuitive perception of the innermost nature of the

atoms, distinguish the point of origin of force, the polarity, the arrangement; so that like some arithmetical prodigy, who intuitively knows the nature of numbers, and understands their results in the most complicated combinations, we might tell with mathematical precision the precise nature (as intelligent or unintelligent), the organization, action and interaction of all the forces in a given mass of matter. Sensations give us the relation of matter to us, but the intuitive perceptions give us knowledge of matter as it is in itself, permanent, extension-occupying substance; exactly as it would be if we did not perceive it—exactly as it is when we do not perceive it. This knowledge is partial indeed, but pure.

3°. As to our knowledge of mind. It does not appear that the distinction of subject and object in consciousness of self is at all like the phenomenal relations of two masses of matter. On the contrary, consciousness assures us that the same indivisible unit is both subject and object; that we know this unit as it is in itself—a person; that we know our mental states exactly as they are; and that we have power over them; and that they have a positive quality as right and wrong. Consciousness is not a distorting lens, it is clear light; conscience is not a liar, nor a prejudiced witness, it is “the voice of God.” In regard to all these points we have knowledge, partial indeed, but pure.

4°. Size does not prevent knowledge from being pure, or continued existence. The purity of our knowledge of extension, for example, is not affected by the fact that we have not examined all extension, nor by the fact that we did not know it a century ago. What we do know we may know purely, though there is much more to know, and though it may change in an instant. Any inability to follow through and complete a knowledge of the infinite does not render less pure the knowledge which we do attain. The infinite God acts in finite relations; the knowledge of him which we have from these acts is not less pure, because we do not know all.

The fundamental principle of Hamilton’s own doctrine of the conditioned may be stated as follows in his own words. All that is conceivable in thought lies in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, viz. the absolute and the infinite; each of which is altogether incon-

ceivable, but of which, according to the law of excluded middle, one must be true, though, according to the law of non-contradiction, both cannot, (*Lect.* 526, 527, 530. *Dis.* 22. 581.) The most important doctrines supposed to be involved in this law, so far as appears, are these. (1) We can know only phenomena, and phenomena of the finite. We can have only a relative knowledge of ourselves, or of any thing else, (*Dis.* 60. 574.) (2) It demonstrates that there is existence which is inconceivable. (*Dis.* 22. 586; *Lect.* 528.) (3) It demonstrates that space and time are forms of mind, "laws of thought and not laws of things." (*Dis.* 572.) (4) Several of the fundamental laws of thought, e. g. that of cause and effect, and that of substance and phenomenon, are not positive affirmations of intelligence, but only results of our inability to think the unconditioned. (*Dis.* 575; *Lect.* 532.) Free-agency is an inconceivable fact; a created free-agent, it seems, impossible. (*Dis.* 586+; *Lect.* 556+.) Creation adds nothing to existence. (*Dis.* 583; *Lect.* 553.) (5) God is nothing; an infinite God, nihil cogitabile; an infinite and absolute God, it seems, nihil purum, impossible. (*Dis.* 21, 22, 567.) A principle enforced by the great name of Hamilton, which is supposed to involve such truths, or errors, may well be marked, as it is in the margin of his lectures—"grand law of thought," and demands a thorough study. Our first effort should be to find out exactly what it means. "Conceivable in thought," "conditioned and unconditioned," "interval between," "contradictory extremes or poles," "absolute" and "infinite," all need close scrutiny. But the only method which we have found practicable in the absence of satisfactory definitions and illustrations, is to examine his applications of the law, and his reasonings upon them. We premise, however, a few words on contradictories. Hamilton introduces the subject to his class thus. "The highest of all logical laws, in other words, the supreme law of thought, is what is called the principle of contradiction, or more correctly the principle of non-contradiction. It is this: a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Alpha est, Alpha non est, are propositions which cannot both be true at once. A second fundamental law of thought, or rather the principle of contradiction viewed in a certain aspect, is called the principle of Excluded Middle, or, more fully the principle of Excluded Middle between two

Contradictories. A thing either is or it is not,—aut est Alpha aut non est; there is no medium, one must be true, both cannot.” (*Lect.* 526.) Then follows the grand law. But in order that it may be seen how “absolute” and “infinite” are the contradictories in the law, we will state the sense of the term in another way. Two predicates are contradictories when to affirm the one and to deny the other are the same thing; *green* and *not-green* are such. It is the same thing to deny that any thing is *green* and to affirm that it is *not-green*. True contradictory predicates may be predicated of any thing nameable, and in every case one must be true and the other false; they divide the nameable—including all things real, impossible, thinkable, unthinkable, whatever a word can stand for—into two mutually exclusive classes, one of which is marked by a positive quality, the other includes all the rest of the nameable. Virtue is *green* or *not-green*. A round-square is *green* or *not-green*. The first of each of these contradictories is false, the second is true: but the second affirms nothing, except that the subject (virtue: round-square) belongs somewhere else among *nameables* than among green objects. It affirms nothing as to its existence, or qualities.

A second sense of contradictories, or opposites, is two mutually exclusive predicates which together embrace the whole of a genus, and nothing more. If such are predicated of any subject belonging to the genus, one must be true and the other false; but if they are predicated of any thing out of that genus, they will both be false. We may divide visible objects into coloured and black, and say that grass as visible must be coloured or black; but virtue is neither coloured nor black. If infinite and absolute do not include every thing nameable, but are only subdivisions of the unconditioned, then they cannot be predicated as contradictories of any thing that is conditioned.

If *infinite* and *absolute* are true contradictories, to *lie between them* must mean, to be the Excluded Middle between them, that is, to be impossible. The grand law will then enounce that all which is conceivable is impossible, and all which is possible is inconceivable. From this stand point it would be easy to grasp the sense of Hamilton’s maxim, “the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy.” Hamilton certainly dallied with this thought; he

pronounces motion to involve a contradiction (*Lect.* 530), time to involve a contradiction, (*Dis.* 571), a free act to be inconceivable, yet known. (*Dis.* 587.)

If *infinite* and *absolute* are only contradictory subdivisions of the unconditioned, as Hamilton seems to say, (*Dis.* 21.) to *lie between them* means that all we can know under any relation (space, time, degree) is not enough to assure us whether there exists under that relation an absolute whole or an infinite extent. However far we may carry our knowledge, the object of knowledge still lies indefinite between a whole and infinity, we do not know which it is. That the law in this sense amounts to nothing will appear as we proceed.

We are now ready to examine the first statement; namely, that the grand law demonstrates that there is existence which is inconceivable. The demonstration is as follows. We cannot positively conceive an absolute whole; that is, a whole so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of some greater whole; on the other hand, we cannot positively conceive an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would require an infinite time for its accomplishment. But an absolute whole and an infinite whole are contradictories, and as such, on the principles of contradiction and Excluded Middle, which are laws of objective existence, one of them must be true, must exist. There must therefore be existence which is inconceivable. (*Dis.* 20—22.) In answer to this,

1°. Infinite and absolute are not true contradictories. It is not the same thing to affirm that 20 is an infinite number, and to deny that 20 is so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of a greater whole. They do not include all the nameable. Indeed, Hamilton describes them as species of which the Unconditioned is the genus. (*Dis.* 21.) If predicated of anything out of the genus they are both false.

2°. Supposing absolute and infinite to be mutually exclusive species including the whole genus Unconditioned, so that we can say of any Unconditioned object that it must be either absolute or infinite, does that prove that any unconditioned object exists? Let *round-square* be a genus, of which *green* and *not-green* are species; does the fact that the specific names are contradictories prove that round-squares exist? Contra-

dictory predicates can be affirmed of nothing just as easily as of something. No skill in logic can deduce the existence of Alpha from "Alpha est aut non est," or the existence of the Unconditioned from "the Unconditioned must be absolute or not." Let Hamiltonians explain by what new process any one can imagine that it can be done.

But 3°. Absolute and infinite in Hamilton's sense do not include all the unconditioned. He says in a note added to the original article, "*Absolutum* means *finished, perfected, completed*; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total; in this acceptance I exclusively use it." It is thus distinguished from what is "aloof from relation, condition," &c. (*Dis.* 21.) Here the Unconditioned is conditioned to be made up of a progressive quantitative series; it is not complete, but *completed*. We quote further, "We tire ourselves either in adding to or taking from. Some, more reasonably, call the thing unfinished—*infinite*; others, less rationally, call it finished—*absolute*. (*Dis.* 28.) Absolute and infinite are species then only of such unconditioned objects as are made up of parts or progressive series; here is quietly begged by suffixing a *d* to *complete*, the portentous assumption that all our thinking, and it seems all existence thinkable and unthinkable, is of objects made up by a quantitative addition. This is still further illustrated by an appendix to the lectures, headed "Contradictions proving the psychological theory of the Conditioned," which consists of a collection of those puzzles with which teachers of mathematics try to clear up the ideas of beginners upon the infinite series. We quote the following: "An infinite number of quantities must make up either an infinite or a finite whole. I. The former.—But an inch a minute, a degree contain each an infinite number of quantities; therefore, an inch, a minute, a degree are each infinite wholes; which is absurd. II. The latter.—An infinite number of quantities would thus make up a finite quantity; which is equally absurd." Again: "A quantity, say a foot, has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quantity, say an inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another. Therefore, an inch is equal to a foot." (*Lect.* 682, 683).

There are two very different meanings of *infinite*, which

we shall have to refer to often as we proceed; (1) that which is so great that nothing can be added to it or supposed to be added; (2) a quantity which is supposed to be increased beyond any determinate limits. It is by confounding these two meanings, and taking for granted that what is true of an infinite in the second sense must also be true of an infinite in the first sense; that any appearance of contradiction can be drawn from the doctrine of mathematical infinites. That it should seem absurd to any one that an infinite number of infinitely small quantities equal a finite quantity, indicates a sad lack of mathematical training. But what is the drift of bringing forward these puzzles as contradictions? It cannot be to illustrate Hegel's position that contradictions to thought are truths in fact. Is it that we cannot know the infinites of mathematicians, and that any attempt to deal with the infinite series involves us in contradictions? That the calculus is not to be trusted, and Berkeley was right in holding it up to contempt as grasping altogether beyond the reach of man's wit? Such would seem the purpose which would accord best with the other applications of this grand law of the Conditioned. This is plain, that Hamilton will admit no other infinite than one made up of parts, and this shows us how he was led into the supposition that the existence of the inconceivable could be demonstrated; he assumes the existence of the unconditioned, in the known existence of conditioned parts. This will be plainer as we pursue our examination. There can be no pretence then that the law demonstrates the existence of anything not made up of parts. On the contrary, if its claims were admitted, it would prove that all the unconditioned must be so made up, a position which gives little satisfaction in regard to an infinite God. But we have shown that its claims are baseless. We pass on to the next doctrine.

Secondly; space is a form of mind, a law of thought and not a law of things. (*Dis.* 572.) Hamilton's course of thought is this. Space is an *a priori* form of imagination; this implies that we make a mental picture of it, not as a copy of anything, but prior to any perception of extension. We do this by "thinking out from a centre," and "carrying the circumference of the sphere" onward and onward indefinitely. Space in conception is necessarily spherical. It is also black. If we

try to carry it to infinity, no one effort will do it; and as we cannot do it at once by one infinite act, it would require an eternity of successive finite efforts—an endless series of imaginings beyond imaginings. The very attempt is contradictory. Infinite space is inconceivable. (*Lect.* 386, 387, 402.) We cannot however, in this process, ever complete a whole beyond which we can imagine no further space. “It contradicts the supposition of space as a necessary notion; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space; and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole.” Absolute space is inconceivable. (*Lect.* 527.) But, applying the grand law, one of these two inconceivable contradictories must be true. Space must be either absolute, or infinite. Real space, therefore, is inconceivable. Space as conceived being an excluded middle, is impossible. There cannot be any space such as we conceive; it is only a form of mind, a law of thought and not a law of things. On this we remark:

1°. The statement of facts does not agree with consciousness. We stated in our last number briefly the common-sense doctrine of perception and conception, and their relations to space.* Space is perceived, or known as an external object, and is the field wherein we both perceive and conceive all other extended objects. That we know space as an external object in perception, extending indefinitely beyond all material objects perceived, we think plain. Conception or imagination is not so simple. The language used about it generally implies that in imagination our phantasms of extended objects are mental states, unextended themselves, and involving the existence of no extension; of course that the accompanying space is also a mental picture, and unextended. In opposition to this view, we believe that in every true phantasm of a material object there is a perception of space; and that the process of conception or phantasy consists in distinguishing some points of

* For conception, see p. 295, note, where after “1st” should be inserted “perception of space, 2d.”

this true extension by imaginary qualities—copies of perceived qualities of objects. Certain it is that the process just described exists. To drop the reviewer's *we* for a moment, and ramble in personal experience, I look up from my paper and describe a triangle on the walls of my room in phantasy. It is pretty nearly equilateral, and the sides are about a foot long. I see each line and angle in perceived space, and it as truly involves real extension, as a painted figure of the same size. So far as I can judge, all my phantasms are similar. I can think, of course, by words and associations without this phantasy-work. With the eyes open, the field of phantasy is co-extensive with that of perception, if I choose; but with them closed it is very small. The early sun wakes me these charming spring mornings. I open my eyes on the casement. When I close them, I see a glimmering square. By comparing its size with that of the window from which it is copied, I easily tell how far it is from the eyes. I can vary its distance, by varying the direction of the optical axes, probably; but it is never far, and yet I am sure that it is a little beyond my usual field of view. The whole stage on which I play my puppets is within the compass of a few inches. I demonstrate propositions, I muse on my friends in vivid dreams, I gaze in imagination beyond the farthest star, but diagrams, friends, stars are all pictures, and the pictures are close by me. When I view the stars, I imagine a bright point, and say to myself, This is Jupiter; another point, and say, This is Sirius; another, and as with a great effort, I say, This is the farthest star, but all the points are near me. It is as easy to visit stars as to view them. Space is all alike, and I have only to say to myself, This space shall represent the neighbourhood of the star, and I am there. I find that by my best effort I cannot, with closed eyes, extend the canvass of my pictures much beyond the reach of my fingers. In that small sphere astral systems move in phantasy. This is the same sphere in which Cheselden's patient saw objects with his newly-couched eyes. I doubt not he had long been in the habit of watching vague lights there.

If I read my consciousness aright, Hamilton deceives himself in supposing that he can swell out a spherical phantasm of space in his imagination. I can draw a circle in space, but not into any place where I do not perceive space before. I

can run out an arc with a pretty long radius, but not an arc that has all the space within it which I perceive. He mistakes describing figures in space, for producing space itself.

When he says we must imagine space a spherical figure, I fear he draws on his logic for his psychology. I find I cannot at all make myself the centre of a great sphere. I can run out a pretty good arc of a circle horizon-fashion, but the top of the sphere will flatten down. He says there can no reason be given for varying from the spherical form. No logical reason, perhaps, but the perpetual habit of seeing this flattened concave of blue sky has got the better of any logical necessity I ever was under of imagining myself in a perfect black sphere. I often amuse myself in the twilight by travelling in perception from a bright star to a fainter, then still farther to a still fainter, and so on, trying to make real each receding distance, till I feel as though penetrating the depths of space, when suddenly my eye rests on the landscape before my window, the far receding vista, hill behind plain, fading far away into indistinguishable mountain and cloud, where the river threads its way; and I am at once made aware that all my efforts have left the faintest stars near me, when compared with those far off mountains. The star, as a point, gives no data to the judgment for accurately adjusting its size and distance. The sky still stoops to us. Unaided conception cannot equal perception in the extent of space it occupies with its figures.

We do not then imagine or make space by adding part to part; we perceive it already existing and stretching beyond all other extended objects.

2°. Space as absolute. That space is a necessary notion does not account for the fact that we cannot conceive or believe any extension which we think as occupied in perception or conception to be the whole of space. We might have a necessary notion of the finite as well as the infinite. It might have been a law of thought that when we reach a given limit in pure extension, thought should definitely end; every thing possible to thought might be embraced therein, and any suggestion of going farther be impossible to the human mind—that is to say, we might have the subjective assurance that there extension ends.

Hamilton's argument, that if we could imagine space bounded, and nothing beyond, we should not be obliged to think every thing in space, is a transparent fallacy; as though thinking all objects in space implied thinking space itself to be in a second space, and that in a third, and so on *in infinitum*.

The reason that we cannot conceive any finite extension to be the whole of space is, that to the perception of space as indefinite is attached an intuitive knowledge or belief that space is infinite. The only reason that we cannot conceive it contained in any sphere that we make is because we know that is not so contained. We can conceive bounds, and perceive bounds; it is not an incapacity to that which affects us. If space were bounded within bounds possible to our perception or conception, we could conceive it easily enough; if we did not know that it is not bounded, we could easily conceive some bounded phantasm as a representative of it. We perceive it extending indefinitely beyond any bounds which we can make either in perception or conception. We intuitively know that it is not bounded, and therefore we know that no figure can represent it.

3°. Space as infinite. We have already pointed out the two senses of the word infinite, which Hamilton confounds. Space is infinite in the higher sense; it is given in an indefinite perception not as made up by increase, but as an existence to which nothing can be added or supposed to be added; but Hamilton describes its infiniteness as of the lower kind, made up of endlessly added parts, and argues that we can never complete the series because it would take an eternity to do it.

We remark therefore in regard to the statement that infinite space and absolute space in Hamilton's sense are two inconceivable extremes, that they are inconceivable,—i. e. not to be pictured in phantasy, for very different reasons. Space cannot be pictured as absolutely finite, (Hamilton's absolute,) because we know it is not so; it is implied as the canvass, for every picture, and seen to exceed the picture;* while it cannot be wholly pictured in a phantasm made up of an endless number of finite parts, (Hamilton's infinite,) because it is truly infinite.

* This may be the fact in the structure of our minds, by which the intuitive knowledge of the infinity of space is conditioned.

The one inconceivability is an inability to conceive the contradictory of a fact of which we have necessary intuition, the other an inability to limit infinite extension. Hamilton is wrong then in making them co-ordinate weaknesses. The inconceivability of the absolute here depends on the positive intuitive necessary belief of a true infinite.

4°. Absolute and infinite in the sense in which they are applicable to space are not contradictories. Space is known to us intuitively as a whole which is no part, in the higher sense as absolute. It is also known to us intuitively as so great that nothing of its own kind can be added to it, or supposed to be added—in the higher sense as infinite. These are not contradictories. On the contrary, it is because space is not finite, that we know it is not a part of anything.

In the sense in which Hamilton uses *absolute* and *infinite*, namely, a finished or unfinishable progression of finite parts, neither of the terms are applicable to space. So far from its being necessary that space should be either a finished series of finite parts, or an unfinished series, as Hamilton affirms, the fact is that it is neither one nor the other.

5°. The conclusion that space is a form of mind does not follow, even if the premises were true. That space cannot exist as we conceive it, would seem to show rather that it cannot be a form of conception. That which is perceived to exceed conception should be objective rather. (b) The element of necessity which belongs to space is taken as proof that it is a form of thought and not of things; necessity belongs to the intellect not to the senses. But an intuition of necessity can attach as well to a perception as a conception; and it seems to contradict the testimony of consciousness, when what we know as a necessity in external objects, is declared to be the consequence of a necessity of thinking.

6°. The result is sceptical. That space as conceived cannot exist, and space as it exists cannot be conceived, is a good foundation to build scepticism or nihilism. We have already in our discussion of perception (p. 295,) remarked the connection of the statement that space is a form of mind, with idealism.

Thirdly. Hamilton concludes that time present is wholly inconceivable as anything positive, a *nihil cogitabile*. He seems

to say also that he can prove that it is impossible, *nihil purum*. (*Dis.* 571;) for he says a demonstration of it may be made as insoluble as Zeno's of the impossibility of motion, and he elsewhere pronounces that satisfactory. (*Lect.* 530.) Time past and time future he speaks of, as he does of space. We remark that while our intuition assures us that all of space is a reality now existing, it assures us that time present is the only existing time. We are always conscious of present duration. We know the past and future to be non-existent; objects* perceived or conceived, may be conceived as they were in the past, or will be in the future, and the present flow of duration answers representatively for the duration then passing or hereafter to pass. So that in regard to time, Hamilton's nihil is the only reality. Time implies, we think, something to endure. Eternity presupposes necessary Being.

Fourthly. This doctrine claims to show that several of the fundamental laws of thought are only results of our inability to think the unconditioned. Hamilton mentions the law of substance and phenomenon, but he has made the application of the doctrine only to the law of cause and effect. Of all the words that have entangled thought, *cause* is the worst. Material, efficient, formal, and final causes are too unlike to be confounded under the same name; mechanical, chemical, crystalline, vegetable, animal, moral causes, if called causes at all, ought to be clearly distinguished. If Hamilton had discriminated the different senses of the word by clear definitions, and stamped each with some brave, long Greek name, which would have taken our ears and filled the lines of our Quarterlies, and established itself in use, he would have done us noble service. As it is, he has introduced a new ambiguity, and made the confusion worse confounded.

The idea of cause or necessary antecedent is given indefinitely when reflection commences. All the antecedents of a fact, and everything involved in them and in it, whether (loosely) phenomena, substances, powers, relations, occasions, motions, or changes,—and all the consequents under the notion of final causes or the like, are objects of interest and examination,

* We know the here in the now, the there in the then. The remote takes time for perception. We see it as it was.

when one would thoroughly investigate a fact, and they have all at one time or another been confounded under the name *cause*.

It seems that the relation of substance and quality should be definitely distinguished from that of cause and effect. (1.) The material world is made up of substances having permanent qualities, which do not change either in reality or appearance, unless some change of relation is produced among them by a force external to them. These qualities are adjusted to space, so that a change of position with regard to the substance gives a new appearance. A spark explodes gunpowder only when they are brought together. A large element of the chemical and mechanical powers should be counted as quality, not cause. (2.) It seems that beside these material particles, there are units of existence which are conceived as permanent subjects of the properties of crystallization,—that there is an order of existences which show themselves in arranging particles of matter in definite geometrical forms, and in the other facts in which crystals differ from uncrystallized matter. These existences are endowed with permanent affections as substantial created existences, and should be classified as substances rather than modes. (3.) It seems that there is an order of existences which have power to display themselves to us by taking up and arranging matter in the form of plants, and by exhibiting the peculiar phenomena of vegetable life; these too, it seems, should be classified as substances, and their permanent capacities be referred to them as qualities rather than as effects to causes. (4.) It seems that there is also an order of existences which have power to organize matter into animal forms, and display themselves in it, and in the peculiar phenomena of animal life, and that here too we have substances and qualities. (5.) Consciousness assures us of the existence of the human soul, having various permanent capacities analogous to states or qualities in other substances; but which also has the control of power, and can originate motion and change on a simple prevision of a mere ideal future, or in obedience to a moral law.

Now, whatever is found on examination to be referred to these or other like substances as a permanent quality, may with propriety and advantage be dismissed in so far from the

relation of causation. A world of substances with their permanent qualities, if it were possible to conceive it unadjusted and unmoved, would exhibit no change and call forth no judgment of causation. The projecting matter in space with such a distribution that the qualities shall produce by their proper action and reaction the successive phenomena of an astral system, implies a power over and above matter. The facts of motion are those which are most obtrusive in their demand for a cause. Changes in quality—brightness, colour, savour, smell, resistance, are results of motion producing changes in the relations of bodies in space. It is to this succession of changes by motion considered not merely as the expression of a permanent quality of a created substance, but as the effect and expression ultimately of a force external to the material world and to all substances incapable of free-act, that the suggestion of causation seems legitimately to point. Every change must be preceded by another change of which it is a necessary consequence. Change is a mark of force which is not quality—that is to say, a mark ultimately of free-force.

The creation of substances is therefore a different thing from the arrangement and ordering of a cosmos; the timely and orderly introduction of successive vital substances, or living beings, is a different exhibition of infinite power from that which is displayed in their creation: the providential ordering of the human race, that progress of the work of redemption which renders a philosophy of history possible, implies forces which cannot be refunded into the constitution of man, and displays the Creator as Governor of his creatures. It seems then that the suggestion of causation legitimately leads to the tracing of free-force among created substances. It seems to us that the necessity that simple substances in space and time should be thought created existences is a consequence involved in the master necessity of God as a Governor, and in the special intuition of ends (final causes) in their natures, rather than a consequence of causation proper. In common use the word cause is not so confined, but certainly includes the permanent qualities or properties of substances considered as communicating motion or change to other substances. We have premised thus much to distinctly point out that there is free force in the

world in addition to its created substances, and to open the way to a discussion of Hamilton, who seems to ignore both free force and final causes. It would be a great service could all the known qualities or properties of all created substances be distinctly given them even in generals, that the atheistic supposition which makes them everything, might not be able to lurk longer in the chaotic confusion of causes, substances, qualities, properties, and powers; and that the power which moves all in wisdom from use to use, but belongs to none, might be clearly seen ever active, the quick witness of God.

His course of thought is this:—we put certain comments of our own in parenthesis. (1) We are aware of a new appearance, (2) and cannot but think an object existent in time (the substance of the phenomenon); (3) we cannot but think this object existed before (this substance, not this phenomenon), (4) and existed as plural objects; (5) because we cannot annihilate anything in thought (any substance, it should seem) or because—in equivalent statements (6) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement of time. = (7) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement in time of existence (i. e. all existence). = (8) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement in time of any individual object. = (9) we cannot conceive the sum of existence (existence in time, it should seem) to be increased or diminished; but (10) to be obliged to think the same existence which now shows a new appearance, was in being before under other appearances, is the law of causation, i. e. Every change must have a cause, which is thus shown to be (11) only an inability to think an absolute commencement in time.

On this we remark 1°. It seems that we can perceive and conceive phenomena to commence in time. It is such a perception that in fact calls forth the judgment of causation, and therefore, if it is impossible to conceive a beginning of substance, this impossibility must be a consequence of something in the nature of substance, and not of anything in the nature of thinking in time. But this negatives the theory.

2°. According to Hamilton, substance itself is nothing; our negatively thinking it, even as an inconceivable correlative of quality or phenomenon, is only a necessity of imbecility, like causation. (*Lect.* 532. *Dis.* 570.) How can it be then, if we

can annihilate all we can conceive—namely, the phenomena, that we must think the unthinkable negation to remain? Is it because we cannot get hold of it at all in thought, and if therefore we smuggle it into the mind by any logical trick, we cannot get it out again?

3°. How is the necessity of thinking plural objects accounted for? The inability to annihilate one object in thought is certainly not equivalent to the necessity of thinking two.

4°. The different forms used in stating the alleged inability confound in the one numbered 5, all thinkable objects with substance; in 6 and 7, time and objects thought in time; in 7 and 8, the sum of all existence with the separate existence of an individual thing; in 9, the sum of existence in time (created existence) with the total of God and the universe, and so existence in fact with the existence *in posse* involved in the divine omnipotence. We do not see how these confusions to common sense can be made consistent with any philosophy of existence except Monism, i. e. a philosophy which holds that the existence of individuals is not distinguishable in thought, one from the other, or the whole from God; that power and effect are one only; that existence is one unvarying total, of which the thinkable is phenomenal—but of this farther on.

5°. The inability to conceive that the same existence which now shows a new appearance, was not in being before, is not equivalent to the law of causation. (a) Change is required as the starting point to call forth the judgment of causation. Change implies a substance in two states or places, (for creation see further on). Now the necessity of conceiving continued existence would only operate to render the first of the perceived states of the change permanent; but the affirmation of causation really is, that change, i. e. all the perceived states must have been preceded by some other change or cause—that the antecedent state *of* the change must have been preceded by some different state antecedent *to* the change. The true affirmation of causation is that change has preceded change back to the first creation of things. The enunciation of Hamilton's principle is that so far as it can tell, everything must have for ever before been permanent in the state in which we first have knowledge of it. The inability to conceive an absolute begin-

ning of time may, by a (slight!) confusion with regard to *of* time and *in* time, be said to prevent our conceiving a beginning of substance; but by no possibility can it be made to necessitate the conception of beginning after beginning of phenomena in endless succession. Motion is the most common appearance which excites the causal judgment. My friend before me raises his hand. There must have been a cause of the motion. Does that mean that I cannot conceive that his hand was not in existence before? Surely not. The question relates not to change of existence or form, but to change of place. Is it the motion which cannot be conceived to begin? That confounds, in the doctrine, cause and substance, effect and quality—and the motion does begin. Is it said we must conceive it to have virtually existed in the will? If that is a continuation of the same existence, we have all facts and possibilities resolved into one existence.

(*b*) The law of causation at the lowest involves necessary connection. Hamilton's principle only asserts that we must think the substance in its present form was preceded by the substance in some other form. The necessity of an antecedent is confounded with a necessary antecedent. He is in exactly the position he charges upon Brown; he gives us an antecedent, but has eviscerated the necessity. The proposition "this substance must have existed in some former state," is confounded with "this substance must have existed in some former state of which this state is a necessary consequence."

(*c*) We think it also a clear affirmation of common sense that the necessity of thinking a relation is a very different thing from perceiving a necessary relation. Hume, as we have before said, started the notion in respect to causation that ideas of objects become associated by the laws of the mind, so that one idea draws the other after it, and that we, feeling that the idea draws the idea, conceive that the object is attached to the object. That would do for a sceptic. Kant developed this notion into the far-reaching principle that all necessity is only a necessity of thought, and this will do for an idealist; if we know nothing but ideas, the laws of connection among ideas would seem to be all that we can know of necessary connection. But common sense and Hamilton declare that we immediately

know an external world, and with this seems to be inseparably connected the statement that we perceive or know as objective fact real relations among real objects ; that we must think such relations does not go to the point. The instant we think ourselves as possessing created powers of thought, adjusted to our uses by design, we have a stand-point from which our necessity of thinking gives only a contingency. In fact, Kant holds that our necessary thinking may not correspond to objective fact. Common sense, if it claim certainty, must hold fast to the statement that we believe objective facts and relations to exist, because we perceive and know them to exist, and not that we know, inasmuch as we cannot help believing. Pantheism and Monism alone, which see our faculties as a necessity, and subject and object as one, can logically claim that they can give objective necessity in their *a priori* subjective announcements. We hold then that if Hamilton had claimed with Kant that the law of causation is a positive subjective necessity, that would not be enough ; there must be a subjective necessity to perceive or know an objective necessity, and neither necessity explains or involves the other.

(d) Necessity cannot be founded at the last on simple inability to conceive ; that we cannot conceive a thing to-day does not prove that we may not be able to conceive it to-morrow. Inability as a mere fact of experience can no more give necessity than can any other fact. The inability must be seen as a necessary consequence of some positive affirmation of intelligence, or it must be accompanied by an intuitive positive affirmation of its own necessity ; otherwise it is only experience : and how often has Hamilton repeated after Leibnitz and Kant, that experience cannot give necessity ? We put this dilemma then. Either Hamilton's exposition of the principle is as weak as that of the weakest sensationalist whom he laughs to scorn, or he must admit a positive intuitive affirmation of necessary inability, and annihilate his whole theory.

Hamilton further illustrates the excellencies of this theory of causation, by applying it to creation and free-agency. We will follow him up.

Creation. The course of thought should be as follows. In a place where there was nothing material existing, we suddenly

see matter appear. We are unable to conceive a commencement of matter, we therefore believe this existing matter to have before existed under some other form, and God being by hypothesis the only former existence, it is as a part (or as the whole) of Him, that it existed before. Creation then is only a transfer of the same substance from existence in eternity to existence in time. With this compare Hamilton's statements. "When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself." (*Lect.* 533.) "We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world, but not as the springing of nothing into something,—only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality by the fiat of the Deity. We cannot conceive that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted in the Deity alone; there cannot be an atom added to or taken away from existence in general. All that is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the Creator." (*Dis.* 583.) These statements are the least repulsive form in which this doctrine that cause and effect are different forms of an identical substantial existence, can be applied to creation. There are two lights in which they may be viewed. One is that they verbally confound existence in time with that which has a place only in the eternal counsels of God,—existence in fact with existence as a possibility to Omnipotence,—the material universe with the being and power of God,—cause and effect,—the many and the one. The other is that they are intended scientifically to identify the whole. If this latter is the truth, they constitute as rigorous a system of Monism as Spinoza's. We incline to think that it is. It has been an insoluble puzzle to many not acquainted with Kant, where Hamilton slips in the idea of cause,—how he comes to think that his law has anything to do with causation at all. It seems that he thinks that a new appearance implies *present* force; and so begs an efficient at the start; this force he in some way merges in substance and thinks does not involve necessary connection; it is not given by, and does not give the law of causation. It is only in view of thinking in time, which

makes it impossible to conceive a beginning of this substance (with the force) that we get the idea of a necessary connection of the present substance (and force) with some antecedent substance (and force.) Of this we have to say, first, that force and necessary antecedence in time are truly indissolubly connected in thought, but the connection grows out of the nature of force, and not of the nature of thinking in time. These views of the connection of causation and the inconceivableness of a beginning, are fully brought out in Kant—indeed are obvious enough; only the necessity of causation produces the inconceivableness of a beginning without a cause, and not the inconceivableness, the causation. Hamilton merely gives us Kant under the form of a metaphysical hysteron-proteron. Again, it seems that all force is refunded to the substances whose phenomena are observed: the doctrine wholly ignores that free-force, as we termed it, which moves and arranges substances, and so produces the interaction of their qualities, and the exhibition of harmonious and orderly phenomena. Hamilton's favourite illustration of causation is a neutral salt. This he expounds as an effect of which an acid and an alkali are the causes. Everything that is in the salt was in the acid and alkali; but when he happens to mention this example where he is not thinking of his theory, he mentions a third cause, namely, "the translating force (perhaps the human hand) which made their affinities available, by bringing the two bodies within the sphere of mutual attraction." (*Lect.* 42.) What needs be said of a doctrine that either coordinates the human hand with an acid and alkali as three substances with which a neutral salt is to be identified, or omits the translating force wholly from its account of causation? It seems to us that this theory does omit the translating, and designing force in nature; and does therefore in representing cause and effect as one, represent all that is thinkable as the successive phenomena of one identical existence, which passes from state to state without order or design, unless such may exist in its own nature; and that this account of creation carries back the same identical existence to form a part or element of the eternal being of God.

Free agency. The essence of this, Hamilton declares to be

an absolute commencement in time. (*Dis.* 585.) It is therefore wholly inconceivable according to the grand law, but its contradictory, an infinite retrogressive succession of existence, is also inconceivable: and since as contradictories one or the other must be true, the true one may as well be freedom, which is vouched for by conscience.

We remark (1) this is not an accurate application of the law. The law is, "there cannot be conceived an absolute beginning of existence," i. e. substance, not phenomenon, not act. There is no difficulty in having a phenomenon begin, an act begin; such a beginning is the very starting point of the causal judgment. Is volition a substance? Does every act of free-will add to the amount of existence in the universe? A correct application of the law seems to be as follows; we are conscious of the *Ego* putting forth a volition; we are unable to conceive that the same existence, *Ego*, should not have been in existence before; we therefore are compelled to think the mind as existing in some antecedent state; or to use the other form of statement, we cannot conceive that the volition did not exist *in posse* before, i. e. we must believe that there was before existent some power to put forth the volition. All of which is true but impertinent. Necessary continuity of substantial existence does not interfere with freedom of the will. It is the necessary connection between the successive acts which troubles us, and this necessity Hamilton has eviscerated. This is one illustration of the total inapplicability of this theory of causation to any facts. (2) But if we inject the idea of necessary connection into the law, more serious consequences follow. Freedom is then inconceivable, but created freedom impossible. Freedom being an absolute beginning of existence, and creation a change in an identical existence, created freedom is a contradiction in terms. A peculiarity of Hamilton's metaphysics, it will be remembered, is that he has a demonstration that one of the two contradictory poles between which thinking is conditioned, is true, that the other is false, and that a combination of both in being is absolutely impossible—*nihil purum*. We are not allowed to take refuge in our ignorance and believe that both are true. His ignorance is a learned ignorance, which penetrates into the deepest mysteries of being, and there author-

atively enounces that we must take our choice between beliefs which to other philosophers have seemed to stand together. He indeed brings forward only the necessity that one must be true, and in this discussion for example, seems to be proving freedom. Nor does he put the foreknowledge and predestination of God as contradictories of free-will, but holds them both to be true though incomprehensible. (*Dis.* 588.) But we have not been surprised to see some of his admirers counting free agency and the omnipotence of God among the great contradictions which illustrate the profundity of his metaphysics. That one of these "anti-current truths" must be true, is good; but that the other must be false! a law to prove that, would be no triumph for philosophy.

Fourthly. God is nothing; as infinite he is *nihil cogitabile*; as absolute and infinite, *nihil purum*, impossible. We remark, 1°. A philosophic nomenclature is objectionable, which establishes this as the proper way to speak of God. What odium have the Hegelians met for this feature of their system! Even Hamilton uses it against them. "Jacobi (or Neeb?) might well say," writes Hamilton, "that in reading this last consummation of German speculation, he did not know whether he were standing on his head or his feet," (*Dis.* 28.) With which compare, "Both (the philosophy of the absolute and the philosophy of the conditioned) agree that the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy." (*Dis.* 574.)

2°. That we are in measureless ignorance with regard to God; that there are many realities neither revealed nor within our comprehension, is a truth universally admitted so far as we know. Even Spinoza defines God to be "*substantiam constantem infinitis attributis*," of which attributes infinite in number, we know but two, extension and thought, (*Eth. def.* 6), Hamilton's system undertakes to prove that we know, and can know nothing of Him truthfully. This is its statement. Existence (God) must be either infinite or absolute. We cannot conceive it (Him) as either, therefore our conceptions are untruthful. Infinite and absolute are contradictories and cannot both be true, i. e. an infinite and absolute God is a contradiction, a *nihil purum*, an impossibility. Now, in complete opposition to this statement the truth is, that in any sense in

which infinite and absolute are either of them true of God, both are true; and each true in that the other is. God is truly without bounds—infinite, and truly a whole and no part—absolute, and truly absolute in that he is infinite.

We will speak briefly of our knowledge of God, its nature and conditions, first more objectively, and then more subjectively.

Objectively.—The material universe is made up of parts; it is in a progress of change; its adjustments to space and time, as shown in gravity and decay, for example, indicate it to be finite both in space and time. It appears to be absolute in Hamilton's sense, and not infinite, and there is no difficulty in so conceiving it—in conceiving it to begin and to end both in space and time. Hamilton admits this. If we could think of matter only, construct only extension in thought, we could not think an infinite God. But we have higher powers. We know another kind of existence which is not thought under any such conditions; we know mind, a person, a free person, in knowing ourselves. We are not made up of parts; indeed so totally removed are we from any such condition, that we know not what relations we sustain to extended substances. We are removed from them by the whole diameter of being. In ourselves we know substance and power. Our actions are not like the movements of matter conditioned to quantitative degree, but have the absolute qualities of right and wrong, benevolent and malevolent. God also is a free person, just, benevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent. We know this, conceive it, can reason from it. We do not understand his relations to extension more than we do our own. We can only repeat the mystical dogma of the schoolmen, that He is all in the whole, and all in every part; or the still older and more mystical figure, that His presence is a sphere whose centre is everywhere, its circumference nowhere. He is totally unconditioned by any laws of progressive series of quantity.

More subjectively.—Our bodily organs are such that we cannot perceive an object unless it is of a certain size, or perceive it as a whole, if it is too large; nor can we perceive a state unless it lasts a certain time; or a motion unless it is of a certain slowness, and quickness. A sound may be too high or too low to be heard; a light too faint or too bright to be seen. The power of conception or phantasy, which limns

phantasms in space, follows perception and is confined within similar limits. The same nerves are used in both. What is too small to affect a fibril is also smaller than the fibril can limn. A microscopic point or form can be represented in phantasy, but only by a magnified picture of it. That our bodies are adjusted to our animal wants, and bring us into definite relations with a very limited part of things and facts is plain. But the ability to invent and make instruments by which we improve the organs which nature gives us, and perceive objects, and measure motions and forces a thousand times removed from the utmost reach of unassisted ken; the fact that reason can see the invisible and weigh the intangible by its mathematics just as well as the visible and the tangible; the ability to know the remote starry heavens, and find delight in their beautiful order; the ability to perceive necessary truth, and to reason out in detail how things must be wherever the same substances and same laws exist, which we know here,—all bespeak a being who is not to accept as final these adjustments of the senses; while the moral sense speaks out loud and clear, and bids us know the infinite worker as a moral Governor, and know moral acts as right and wrong in the eternal necessity of His nature. How far can we know the infinite God? Can a finite mind have an idea of an infinite? Hamilton seems to think it a contradiction; but an idea of the infinite is a different thing from an infinite idea, as an idea of extension is a different thing from an extended idea; the total want of necessary resemblance, or proportion, between knowledge as a state of mind and the thing known, is such, that it seems impossible to say from a consideration of the nature of any object, that it cannot be known. The reference must be to consciousness. Do we know it? If so, under what conditions? And what are the elements subjective and objective that enter into the act of knowledge? By way of introduction, we remark that the fact seems to be that the indications of spirit are not quantitative. How do we know the existence of our fellow-men? How do we know an intellect or will of mighty power? a soul absolutely devoted to right? a loving heart? Not by quantity of act, but by quality. It seems to be of the nature of the soul that it may concentrate its total greatness

and express it in a single act or thought; its whole power may be put forth, its wisdom shown, in a single act. There is a certain indubitable mark which a single act may have, there is a meaning in a single tone or glance, which renders it as impossible to doubt the heroism or devotion of a man or woman, as to doubt the proven equality of two geometrical figures. And in like manner, it seems to us, the infinite wisdom, justice, mercy and love of God are revealed to us in Christ, and by his grace we may see them in such infinite fulness that no repetition could augment our knowledge.

Reid counts it one of the first principles, or fundamental truths, "that there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men, with whom we converse" (*R.* 448,) and another, "that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind." (*R.* 449.) We believe Reid was right in enumerating these as instinctive perceptions. It has been too often taken for granted, that whenever it can be seen how the exercise of mature reason might have given knowledge, no further discussion of that knowledge is required. The facts of childhood seem to us to show that we are kindly fitted out with peculiar powers of perceiving certain things as if by instinct, which we could have ultimately learned, after a fashion, by the conscious exercise of our faculties. Such perceptions are worthy of a careful enumeration as having, like other first principles, a peculiar sanction.

We believe the existence of the infinite God to be known by such a perception. We could arrive at it by the conscious exercise of reason; but it seems we instinctively perceive it in the marks of design in nature, and in providence. Sir Isaac Newton used to say, that there was a peculiar style in all the works of nature. These works are the works of the infinite God acting in a finite relation. We can certainly know them to be works of a being of peculiar power, and wisdom, and goodness. Can we know them as works of the infinite God? Hamilton says we cannot (*Lect.* 687.) Those who have assented to our prefatory remarks, will not hesitate to say we can. Just as to our perception of a particular example of cause is added a more remarkable power of perceiving its necessity; just as to

the perception of space as indefinite is added the more wonderful power of perceiving it to be incapable of increase, so we think to the perception of the peculiar acts of God in design and providence, is annexed the more remarkable power of perceiving these acts to be the acts of an infinite Being, of perceiving this wisdom to be His wisdom, this goodness to be His goodness, this moral law to be His moral law. It seems further, that in the very frame-work of our own minds is felt the same power, carrying with it the same knowledge of God, even without the cognizance of reflective consciousness, since the general laws of mind, as they are called, are obviously the same energy running through and through the Ego, consciously distinct from acts of the Ego, and shaping our consciousness to the designs of infinite wisdom. In a similar manner it seems that to the perception of a particular right or wrong act, is annexed the perception that this right or wrong is also an announcement of the nature of the infinite God, and that the imperative accompanying it is the command of the absolute Governor of the world. Such appears to us the testimony of consciousness as to our ability to know the infinite God. He acts in finite relations. As having power to perceive wisdom, goodness, and justice, we recognize them in these acts; as having power to know the acts of the infinite and absolute God, as distinguished from the acts of a finite being, we recognize these acts as His. "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." With the first two statements Hamilton agrees; with the last he disagrees. The element of it which implies a recognition of an infinite and absolute Being, in a manner corresponding to that which he calls an *a priori* conception, he declares to be impossible. We began by showing that the nature of the object does not render it impossible; we close by appealing to consciousness for the affirmation that it is a fact.

3°. Hamilton's "learned ignorance" is a very different thing from simple silence on a subject too deep for thought. It boasts itself to have sounded the depths of being, and enounces what is possible and what impossible to the divine existence, on points which are usually passed in silence—its absoluteness and

infinity; and it claims to know that our conceptions of justice and goodness are merely relative, and cannot be true for Him. We see no good ground for saying that Hamilton was merely humbling those who pretend to grasp the whole infinite nature of God, by showing that there can exist no such infinite or absolute as we can conceive—that both, as involving contradictions, are predicates of nothing—have nothing to do with real being. On the contrary, in the first place, he rests a proof of the existence of God, and a proof of the reality of free-agency, on the alleged necessity that one of these predicates must be true. It is in fact his great claim for the doctrine, that it proves the actual and necessary existence of one of these inconceivable facts. In the second place, it is not necessary to affirm any positive knowledge of the infinite or absolute, to bring one within the grasp of the “grand law.” Hamilton’s statement is, that the infinite and absolute are only negations, (*Dis.* 23.) According to him, then, it makes no difference what we think infinite to mean, provided only it is not finite; or what we think absolute to mean, if it is not a part. If the demonstration is anything, it is that in the whole compass of being, thought, language, there is nothing not finite that infinite can mean, and nothing not a part which absolute can mean, which it is possible in the nature of things should both be true of God. To a modest Christian who should say, I know I am totally ignorant of the real nature of God in this respect, but I certainly think that God is not finite, and I certainly think that he is not a part of anything—the grand law is made to say, “Make your thinking definite on this subject, and you will find that you have been thinking a contradiction; that He must be one or the other, and cannot be both of the negations which you say you think He is.”

4°. The truth is, that this whole application of the law of contradictories is totally baseless. The absolute and infinite defined by Hamilton, i. e. the completed and uncompleted, (*Dis.* 21,) are not contradictories; they do not include all being; do not include all unconditioned being; neither of them is a character of uncreated being; neither of them a character of spirit; neither has anything to do with God. The first lie from which all the rest here spring is, that we can know

or think of nothing except as a quantity to be completed—to be made up by addition of parts, either extensive, protensive, or intensive; that all thoughts and all things exist in degrees as an indefinite more and less. But we have already pointed out that a person is a unit to whom more and less do not apply; right and wrong are absolute, and not produced by addition; necessity has no degrees; intuition has no degrees; demonstration has no degrees; knowledge is not a sum of probabilities; God is not made up of a sum of parts. He is a spirit, a person, an uncaused cause, an infinite and perfect one, a righteous governor. He who stands on this ground has only to say that Hamilton's progressive infinities and absolutes are altogether impertinent, and his grand law is words, *vox, et præterea nihil*.

We have now been over and through the philosophy of the Conditioned, and have seemed to find that it is utterly baseless, and that if its claims were granted, it would destroy all knowledge on the most vital subjects of human thought. We must now qualify the latter conclusion. Hamilton is one of the most difficult writers to fully understand; partly because he deals with such excessive generalizations that they cannot be trusted; as in perception, the *ego* and *non-ego*; in the Conditioned, *existence, thing, the thinkable, the unconditioned, &c.*; partly because his views are not thought out, but are really critical shifts from particular views of some preceding philosopher; but chiefly, we think, because these critical shifts formed mostly on the meaning of words, while he gives the discussions the form of a critique on thought; thus in treating perception he narrows its meaning as we have before explained; so in the discussion of causation, he treats other philosophers as though he and they were treating the same facts, yet he has really shifted the meaning of the law. So in regard to knowledge, he has perhaps only narrowed the meaning of the word, and made a merely verbal transfer of whole classes of topics into the domain which he calls faith, or belief. If so, this domain becomes the most important province of philosophy, and his critique of our faculties of knowledge is of no practical worth in limiting speculation, as long as the faculties of belief are uncriticised, and the region of faith open to all excursions, with as good promise of certainty and satisfaction, as

that of knowledge. But in regard to almost all the topics here treated, it would seem there can be no such resort, because the deductions are drawn from supposed general laws of consciousness, and would negative belief, just as much as knowledge. An absolute and infinite God being an impossibility—an absolute nothing, He could not be an object of belief, any more than of knowledge: a created free-agency is in the same condition; nor is it easy to see how belief can be brought to bear at all on that which general laws of consciousness render nothing to us—*nihil cogitabile*.

Hamilton informs us that his confidence in this system rests in part upon finding in it “a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions.” (*Dis.* 588.) Yes; from this centre we see how Hume was right in declaring that we do not know any substantial external world; that we do not know ourselves as substances capable of thought; power is to us nothing; cause and effect a trustless subjective suggestion; God unknowable; the phenomena only which bubble up in our consciousness—the fleeting succession of relations of the unknown is all our knowledge. In all this Hume was right; he was only wrong in letting these speculations land him in scepticism. A “learned ignorance,” which dogmatically and undoubtingly knows that its ignorance is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is the true philosophy. And yet this passage is found in Hamilton, “Doubt is the beginning and the end of all our efforts to know; for as it is true—‘*Altè dubitat qui altiùs credit,*’ so it is likewise true, ‘*Quo magis quærimus magis dubitamus.*’ ” (*Dis.* 591.)

From this centre we see also that Reid was right in maintaining that we have an immediate knowledge of the material world; though he did not see that we only know it, as being ourselves part and parcel of the same subject with it—that sensations are states of mind and matter at once, and in knowing sensations, we know mind and matter equally; that is to say, we know neither, but a relation of both.

From this centre, also, we see that Kant was right in holding that all our speculative thinking is confined to the relative, and that the laws of belief are laws of thought alone, and mislead if used as laws of being. He is only wrong in giving a

special place to the ideas of reason which direct our thinking towards that absolute it can never attain, and in trusting in a practical reason as giving us absolute knowledge of right and wrong, and of an infinite and absolute moral governor.

From this centre also, we understand the position of Schelling, in his first philosophy. He was right in confining our conceptions to the relative, and his intellectual intuition of the absolute was a blind grasping after the grand law of the conditioned, according to which, "by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." (*Dis.* 22.)

Here also is the identity system in all its vague immensity. Here, subject and object, substance and attribute, power and effect, whole and part, God and the world, intermingling and interchanging, float and flow phenomenally on the currents of the unknown, the ocean stream of identical existence; power is nothing; substance nothing; God is nothing. Hegel only missed it, that when he had everything shut up in this dark closet of annihilation, he had no grand law of the conditioned to turn the lock and hold all fast for ever.

Here also we are at one with the last philosophy, the Eclecticism of France: only in place of the principle that all the positive thoughts of all systems are to be taken and the negative left, we here learn that all the negative are to be taken and the positive left. "The knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy." (*Dis.* 574.) We have no confidence in this idea of comprehension by universal conciliation; it implies that there is error in all thinking, and that truth is to be *sought* (not found) in a compromise of all opinions. We want thinkers in these times who will brace themselves stoutly on the old stable truths, and draw men to them, not meet them half-way. And we may here mention Hamilton's doctrine of education, that the pursuit of truth is better than the possession and loving contemplation of it. (*Lect.* 61.) It is of a piece with his whole philosophy;—but we have no room here to expose it. We can only protest against it.

It is, however, in the interest of religion that most is claimed for this philosophy, as “abolishing a world of false, pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning in theology.” (*Dis.* 588.) The writer of this article will not follow the disciples of Hamilton into this field of thought. They have given up, most of them, the peculiar position of Hamilton, and fallen back on the old negatives of the positive school and the sceptics, in regard to natural religion. As to anything added by Hamilton himself to the familiar teachings of our divines in regard to the incomprehensibility of God, we believe we have shown that his claims are totally baseless; that they are either a tangle of verbal confusions, or spring from a metaphysical system which grounds in Monism or Nihilism. It has been represented as a merit of this philosophy by one of its ablest defenders, that it teaches in regard to the greatest truths of religion, that in themselves they are incomprehensible, and that it is only in their relation to each other, and in their mutual relation to our understanding, that we can comprehend them. We believe that the converse and opposite of this statement expresses a more important view of these truths—that is to say, we know, in some degree, the great truths of religion as they are in themselves, but we are largely ignorant of their relations to each other, and to the intuitions which give them to us, or enable us to receive them intelligently from nature or revelation. We have what we have called *pure* knowledge of the infinite as a reality, and also of the finite as a reality; but we do not know their relations to each other—we cannot deduce one from the other. We have pure knowledge of free agency as a fact, and of foreordination as a fact; but we do not know their relations to each other; we cannot co-ordinate them; but not because our knowledge has a hidden subjective element which renders it impure, so that we ought to modify our statements to express these truths,—the admission of such an element would fling the doors wide open to all “pestilent reasonings;” we know the truths, but not all their relations. So we have a pure knowledge of the unity and of the three-fold personality of God; and however much learning and eloquence may be exhausted to show that the three-foldness is only the result of a relation to us—an appearance which the infinite

must show to the finite, we must still stand on the firm ground that these are veritable objective truths. We know that they are true, but do not understand their mutual relations. A Christian introduced by the Spirit into the glorious temple of truth, may well be blinded by excess of light, but he can still clasp in his arms the great pillars of the faith.

That right and wrong are relations to us, and are not of the nature of God; that natural religion, if logical, must be a tissue of contradictions, would seem to annihilate all possibility of religion;—certainly all possibility of convincing unbelievers. If pantheism and nihilism are the only propædeutics to Christianity which reason can legitimately use, she will lead very few to Christ. Locke says—“He that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to perceive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.” Hume closes one of his most destructive essays—that of miracles—by saying, “I am the better pleased with this method of reasoning, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason.” That it is founded on faith is true, but only a half-truth. It is a faith which does not destroy or demand the destruction of reason, but elevates and perfects it.

If we have, in the foregoing criticisms, injuriously misconstrued Hamilton, none will more sincerely than ourselves rejoice to have such misconstruction shown. At all events, we think it has been demonstrated that he is not that infallible oracle in philosophy which many flattered themselves had appeared in these last times. Much yet remains to be done before we have a truly Christian philosophy, or a perfect conciliation of philosophy with Christianity. With all the precious truth which Hamilton has so ably vindicated, are mixed some formidable and monstrous errors, against which all need to be put on their guard. While we yield to none in legitimate admiration of this wonderful man, we are clear and earnest against any indiscriminate acceptance or endorsement of his opinions.

ART. V.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America convened in the city of Rochester, New York, May 17, 1860. The Assembly was called to order by the Rev. Dr. Magill, the Permanent Clerk, who stated that the Rev. William L. Breckinridge, D. D., the Moderator of the last General Assembly, was providentially absent. Whereupon the Rev. William A. Scott, D. D., of San Francisco, the last Moderator present, was requested to preach the sermon, and preside until a new Moderator should be chosen. Dr. Scott accordingly ascended the pulpit, and delivered a discourse on 1 Cor. ii. 2.

After sermon, the Assembly was constituted, and the Rev. Dr. J. W. Yeomans of the Synod of Philadelphia, Dr. Adger of the Synod of South Carolina, and Dr. William M. Scott of the Synod of Chicago, were severally nominated for the Moderator's Chair. Dr. Yeomans received 150 votes, Dr. Adger 91, and Dr. Scott 56; whereupon Dr. Yeomans was declared duly elected. In the absence of Dr. Leyburn, the Stated Clerk, Dr. Willis Lord was appointed to officiate in his place, and the Rev. A. G. Vermilye was elected Temporary Clerk.

Reorganization of the Boards.

The first subject of importance which occupied the attention of the Assembly, was the reorganization of the Boards of the Church. On this and its collateral subjects, the last General Assembly had appointed two Committees, and directed them to report to the present Assembly. Of one of these Committees, the Rev. Dr. B. M. Smith, of Virginia, was the Chairman, and of the other, the Rev. Dr. Humphrey, of Kentucky. On the first day of the sessions, Dr. Smith offered the following resolution, which was adopted, viz.

Resolved, That a Committee of fifteen be appointed, to whom shall be referred the overture of the last Assembly on the subject of Reorganizing the Boards of the Church, and the Church Extension Committee.

To this Committee was referred the report of the Committee appointed last year, without reading it to the House, and other papers connected with the subject. Towards the close of the sessions this Committee of fifteen reported the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. That at each meeting of the Assembly the Boards shall present their Records with their Annual Report.

Resolved, 2. That the Boards and Church Extension Committee shall elect to office their Secretaries for not less than four years; and the Assembly shall have power always to remove a Secretary for neglect of duty, or other sufficient ground.

Resolved, 3. That the Boards and Church Extension Committee be hereafter composed of twenty members each, to be elected in four classes, as formerly; besides, the Secretary or Secretaries to be members *ex officio*.

Resolved, 4. That these Boards shall henceforth conduct the business without the employment of Executive Committees.

Resolved, 5. That five members shall be a quorum, except for the election of officers, when fifteen shall be a quorum.

Resolved, 6. That this Assembly now proceed to elect members of the Boards.

Resolved, 7. That all acts inconsistent with this action be repealed.

On motion of Rev. Dr. Armstrong, these resolutions were laid on the table without debate, with the view of taking up another series presented by Dr. Krebs.

The Committee of the last Assembly, of which Dr. Humphrey was chairman, was, in his absence, represented by Dr. Boardman, who read the report and offered a series of resolutions. The first of these was, that it is inexpedient to make any organic change in the constitution of the Board of Domestic Missions. The second resolution, which recommended that there should be no Executive Committee but the one in Philadelphia, was referred to the next Assembly. The third resolution, so far as it recommended the appointment of an Advisory Committee at San Francisco, was adopted. The fourth, which proposed that the Board should appoint one Corresponding and one Travelling Secretary, was laid upon the table.

The first of these resolutions, as it brought up the whole subject, was discussed with great earnestness, and at great length. The debate was continued from day to day, until the close of the eighth day of the sessions, when the resolution was adopted. The yeas and nays were called, and the result was, yeas 234, nays 56. These numbers were slightly increased by absentees being permitted to record their votes, making the yeas 240, and the nays about 60. On the ninth day, Dr. Thornwell presented a protest against the above decision, which was referred to a committee, of which Dr. William Brown of Virginia, was made chairman, to be answered. When, however, the resolutions above referred to, introduced by Dr. Krebs, were adopted, Dr. Thornwell withdrew his protest, with the leave of the house.

The resolutions presented by Dr. Krebs are as follows:

Resolved, 1. By this General Assembly, that the Secretaries of the Boards of the Church be instructed to notify the members thereof of their appointment, and of all the meetings of the Boards, whether stated or special; and when such meetings are for special purposes, the subject for discussion shall be mentioned in the notice.

Resolved, 2. That it shall be the duty of the above-named Boards to send up to the Assembly, with their Annual Reports, their books of minutes of the respective Executive Committees, for examination; and it shall be the duty of said Committees to bring to the attention of the Assembly any matters which, in their judgment, call for the notice of the Assembly.

Resolved, 3. That it is not lawful for either of the above-named Boards to issue certificates of life-membership to any person, or any testimonial, by virtue of which any person is permitted to sit, deliberate, and vote with the Boards; but the Boards may devise and grant certificates or testimonials of special donations to the class of persons hitherto known as honorary members—it being understood and provided that such persons can in no sense be allowed, by purchase or gift, to exercise any sort of right or position to deliberate and vote with the members appointed by the General Assembly.

Thus was this exciting subject finally settled, as by common consent; and it is to be hoped that it will not again be agitated,

but the Church be allowed to go on unimpeded and united in her great work of missionary labour.

It would be in vain to attempt to present any adequate report of this protracted debate. To reprint the speeches as furnished in the papers, would fill up our pages with matter already in the hands of our readers. We shall attempt nothing more than the merest synopsis of the arguments urged on either side. 1. It was argued by Dr. B. M. Smith, that there were two kinds of government in the church—the one founded on principle, the other on expediency. Voluntary societies were the product of the latter. They had proved among Congregationalists very efficient. It was natural that men coming into our church from New England, should bring with them some of the leaven of the system to which they had been accustomed. As a counterweight to these voluntary societies, our Boards were created. They were the fruit of expediency. They were intended to do for us what voluntary societies had done for New England—to enlist the influence of leading men in all parts of the church, by making them members of these boards; which were a fungus growth, mere excrescences on our system. 2. He urged that the Boards did nothing. The whole work was done by the Executive Committees. The Boards were therefore an unnecessary incumbrance. 3. The mode of their election was ridiculous, and showed that the whole thing was a farce. Nobody took any interest in the choice, because everybody saw that those elected were not expected to do anything. Sometimes the wrong men had been elected. 4. He thought there was danger that these large Boards might pack the Assembly, and control its action. A small body could be more easily managed, and kept in due subordination to the Assembly. He admitted the right of the Assembly to act by an organization outside of itself; but insisted that this organization should be a small body, and immediately dependent on the Assembly, without the intervention of any unnecessary corporation.

Dr. Adger's argument was founded principally on the inefficiency of the present system. He said that \$118,000 a year was a very poor contribution for a church which could and should raise a million dollars annually for this great work. Your report says that the average salaries of your missionaries

is \$536, when \$1000 would not be too much. Only 1705 churches contribute to this fund, while 1783 churches are non-contributing. They do not contribute, he said, because they do not like the system. 2. He insisted that the system was wrong. God has given us a divine system of government—sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods. The Synod should not do the work of a Presbytery, nor a Presbytery of a session; much less should a Board be allowed to do the work of the Presbyteries. Every Presbytery should attend to the work of missions within its own bounds; the proper field for the Board was outside and beyond our ecclesiastical territories. It is its business to follow the emigrants to New Mexico, Utah, Dacotah, &c., with the missionary and the means of grace. Each Presbytery having performed what was necessary within its own borders, should send its surplus funds to a Central Committee, by which they should be used for missionary operations beyond the borders of the church, and to aid the feebler Presbyteries who need help to do the work within their own limits. 3. The Board system is not only wrong in principle, and inefficient in operation, but it fails to unite the church, and call forth its energies. We want, he said, to co-operate with you, but we must work apart if you insist on your present system. We want to operate through our Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assembly. Boards have no life in them. The Presbyteries do not feel any interest in the work of missions. They say the great Board in Philadelphia will attend to it. 4. It was strenuously urged on this side of the question, that the Boards were an incumbrance; that they did nothing; that they stood in the way between the Assembly and the Executive Committees, shielding the latter from direct responsibility to the church, and yet exercising no real inspection or control over them.

Dr. Thornwell took higher ground. He argued the question as one of principle, as involving radically different views, on the one side, and on the other, of the nature and powers of the church. His speeches on this subject were very long and very ardent. They are of course imperfectly reported, and we can only give the heads of his argument as presented in the public papers. 1. He insisted that God had laid down in the Scrip-

ture a form of church government, from which we are not at liberty to depart. We can neither add to it nor detract from it. We can no more create a new office, or a new organ for the church, than we can create a new article of faith, or a new precept for the moral law. It is not enough that a thing is not forbidden in the word of God, it must be expressly enjoined or implied by necessary inference. We must be able to plead a "Thus saith the Lord" for every organization or agency which we employ in carrying on the work of the church. We have "no discretionary power to create a new church court, or judicatory, or anything to stand in the place of, or to perform the duty which belongs to the church of God's creation and ordination." As Christ gave his church with its officers, courts, and laws, with a specific mission to accomplish in this apostate world, we cannot appoint another co-ordinate body to do the work which he appointed us to do. The General Assembly is the Board of Missions, the body which must be appealed to to do the work; Christ never authorized us to put it into other hands. 2. The powers which Christ has given his church cannot be transferred. She cannot impose her responsibilities on any other body. A Christian cannot pray or live a holy life by proxy. Congress cannot delegate its right of legislation to any organization of its own creation. It must itself make the laws. In like manner this General Assembly cannot transfer the power or the obligation to conduct the work of missions. It must be done by the Assembly itself. 3. It follows from these principles that the Boards are unscriptural. No one pretends that they are expressly enjoined in the Bible. It is not enough that they are not forbidden. Neither are they absolutely necessary to the exercise of the functions of the church. And if neither expressly commanded nor necessarily implied in the powers explicitly granted, they are absolutely unlawful. 4. That the Boards are thus uncommanded and unauthorized creations was argued because they are distinct organizations. They are bodies complete in themselves, with members, heads, and hands. They have their presidents, executive committees and other officers. They are therefore as complete self-acting organizations as our Presbyteries or Synods. The General Assembly, indeed, can either

review its action or dissolve them at its pleasure; but the same may be said of Presbyteries and Synods. 5. The existence of these Boards, therefore, is derogatory to the church, as implying that her divine constitution is not sufficient. They are an indignity to the great Head of the Church, as implying that he has not furnished her with an organization adequate to the work which he has given her to perform. 6. This discretionary power of the church, the principle that what was not forbidden is permitted, was the point of difference between the Puritans and the Church of England. Herber's idea was that the only limitation of the power of the church was the non-contradiction of the Bible; it does not forbid the liturgy, the sign of the cross, and kneeling at the Eucharist, therefore these things are right; while the Puritans contended they are not enjoined in the Bible, and an absence of a grant is a negation of the power. Our covenant fathers in Scotland fought for the same principle. 7. This is with us a *res adjudicata*. The General Assembly at Nashville refused to constitute a *Board* of Church Extension, but did constitute a *Committee* for that purpose, which had operated successfully. 8. Special objection was made to honorary or life members of these Boards. Although not allowed to vote, such members were entitled to meet with the Boards, and deliberate on all questions which come before them. Thus for money, any man can secure for himself or for another this position in the church, or in its organisms, for the conduct of the work of missions. This was represented as a great enormity. These, as far as we can gather from the report, were the principal heads of Dr. Thornwell's argument. The points made by the other speakers on the same side, were of course, with more or less prominence, made by him.

Dr. Spring and the Hon. Mr. Galloway made short and effective speeches, the one in reply to Dr. Smith, and the other in answer to Dr. Adger, and the debate was continued principally by Drs. Krebs, Boardman and Hodge. 1. It was shown that the assertion, that our Boards had a New England origin and were founded on expediency as distinguished from principle, is contrary to historical facts. The men who originated our Boards were not men of New England origin or imbued with New England ideas, but precisely the reverse. Our church from the be-

ginning had acted on the principle that the church itself was bound to preach the gospel to every creature; that this commission involved the duty and the authority to train men for the ministry, to send them forth, to sustain them in the field, and to furnish them with all the appliances requisite for the successful prosecution of their great object. This work the church cannot perform by its scattered members, nor by its regular judicatories meeting at long intervals and for short periods, and therefore there was a necessity for the appointment of distinct organizations for the accomplishment of the object. Hence the original Committee of Missions. But as the church enlarged, there was a call for a division of labour, and for more efficient arrangements. This gave rise to the formation of the Boards of Domestic Missions, Foreign Missions, Education, Publication, and Committee of Church Extension. These were the legitimate outgrowths of our own principles, and not foreign organisms engrafted into our system. 2. As to the principle that everything must be prescribed in the word of God as to the government and modes of operation of the church, or be unlawful, it was urged that no church ever existed that was organized on that principle. Every church that pleaded a *jus divinum* for its form of government, was content to claim divine authority for the essential elements of their system, while they claimed a discretionary power as to matters of detail and modes of operation; that it was absurd to do more than this with regard to our own system. The great principles of Presbyterianism are in the Bible; but it is preposterous to assert that our whole Book of Discipline is there. This would be to carry the theory of divine right beyond the limits even of the Old Testament economy, and make the gospel dispensation, designed for the whole world, more restricted and slavish than the Jewish, although it was designed for only one nation, and for a limited period. It was further urged, that this theory was utterly unscriptural, as the New Testament was far from exalting matters of government and external organization to the same level with matters of doctrine and morals. It was shown also to be an utterly impracticable and suicidal theory. If this doctrine were true, we could have no church-schools, nor academies, colleges, nor theological seminaries. No one pre-

tended to claim for these an explicit "Thus saith the Lord." The work of missions on this theory would be impracticable, for it would be impossible to carry it out among heathen converts. The church must have freedom to adapt herself to the varying circumstances in which she is called to act. The great objection, however, to this new and extreme doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with our Christian liberty, our liberty of conscience. It inevitably leads to the imposition of human ordinances as the commandments of God. The inferences which one draws from Scripture bind him, but they have no authority for others. It is not only revolting, but ridiculous, to say that the Bible forbids a Board and commands a Committee; that to organize the one is rebellion, while to constitute the other is obedience. And finally, as to this point, it was shown that every objection urged on this high *jus divinum* theory against the Boards, bears with equal force against Committees. The one is no more enjoined than the other. The one can be just as well inferred as the other. We have a work to do, and it is admitted that we are to adopt the best means for doing it. If we think a Board better, we may take that; if we think a Committee better, we may take that. There is as much a transfer of authority in the one case as in the other. A Committee is just as much an organization, acting of itself after the appointing body ceases to exist, as a Board. The only difference between the Committee of Church Extension and the Board of Missions is, that the one consists of some eighty or ninety members, the other of thirty or forty. To make this difference a matter of vital principle, a question of divine right, the dividing line between rebellion and obedience, is utterly unreasonable. But if it should be admitted that there is some minute difference in principle between such a Committee as that of Church Extension and a Board, what was to be said of the Boards of our Theological Seminaries? No objection is made to them, and yet they stand in the same relation to the Assembly as the Board of Missions. If the one is an organization outside the church, so are the others. If the one has delegated powers, so have the others. If the one is forbidden, so must the others be. It is plain that this principle of divine prescription for every detail, cannot be, and is not carried out. 3. Dr.

Boardman, with marked ability and effect, referred to our standards, and to the modest and moderate language therein employed, as utterly inconsistent with this extreme high-church doctrine. Our fathers were content with claiming that our system is "agreeable with Scripture," and never assume an explicit divine prescription for all its details.

4. If the matter is viewed in the light of expediency, the argument is not less decisive against any radical change. Such change without any imperative necessity would itself be a great evil. It would be an inconsistency. After having for years contended not only for the lawfulness, but the necessity of Boards, for us now to cast them aside would be a dishonour to those who have gone before us, and utterly inconsistent with proper respect for the dignity of the church. The Boards have been signally owned and blessed by the great Head of the church, and made the means of incalculable good. The objection that certain Presbyteries do not coöperate with our present organizations, is met by the fact that those who dissent on the ground of principle are a very small minority, such as must be expected to exist in any free church under any system of operation; and as to efficiency it is enough that the Presbyteries which coöperate most liberally with the Board of Missions are precisely those which do most to promote the work of missions within their own borders. To throw our weak Presbyteries, covering immense districts of thinly populated parts of the country, on their own efforts, and to confine the central committee to the region beyond our ecclesiastical limits, would be virtually to give up the work altogether, and to abandon the growing parts of the country to irreligion or to the labours of other denominations. The objection that the Boards are a mere incumbrance, a useless intervention between the executive committees, and the General Assembly, is met by saying: 1. That these Boards, consisting of members widely scattered, serve to increase interest and responsibility in the work. 2. They can be called together on emergency for consultation and direction when the Assembly is not in session. They can meet and spend days in the examination of records and sifting out evils or errors which an Assembly of three hundred members could not possibly do. Occasions have

occurred and must be expected to occur more or less frequently when, in absence of such Boards, the Assembly would be obliged to create them *pro re nata*. The large size of these bodies instead of being an objection is a decided and great advantage. It is not necessary that all the members should attend every meeting. It is enough that they can be called together on emergencies. It is very inexpedient that every thing should be in the hands of a few men in Philadelphia, New York, or Louisville. If unwise measures are adopted, if personal likes and dislikes, or sectional feeling, should be found to influence the action of the members living in or near the seat of operations, a general summons of the Board can correct the evil. This has happened already. It is illustrated in other cases. Had the Bible Society been in the hands of a few men in New York, the Society would have been ruined. It was by appealing to a wider constituency that that great Institution was saved. The same is true with regard to the Tract Society, and may prove true with regard to the Sunday-School Union. It is not safe to entrust such interests to a few hands; and although we have a safeguard in the supervision of the Assembly, yet as that body meets only once a year, first in one place, and then in another; as it is cumbered with so much other business, and sits for so short a time, it is eminently wise not to have the supervision of all the five great benevolent operations of the church centralized and monopolized by that body. We might as well abolish all the Boards of Directors of our Theological Seminaries and impose the work of supervision and direction on the Assembly. It is enough that the supreme power over these Boards is invested in our highest court; the power of appointment, supervision, and control. The stockholders of no railroad or bank in the country undertake the direct supervision of the executive officers at their annual meeting. They all find it necessary to confide that supervision to a board of directors. And when such institution is a state or national concern, those directors are never chosen from any one place or neighbourhood. These are the common-sense and scriptural principles on which the Boards have been constituted, and which have secured for them the general confidence of the church.

The overwhelming vote by which the Assembly declared any organic change in these institutions inexpedient, and the withdrawing of Dr. Thornwell's protest against that vote, on the adoption of the slight modifications suggested by Dr. Krebs, give ground to hope that the policy of the church in this matter will not be again called into question.

Dr. McGill.

Dr. Krebs moved that Dr. McGill be requested to address the Assembly with regard to the remark made by Dr. Thornwell, a day or two ago, about the disagreement between Drs. McGill and Hodge on the subject of Church Government.

Dr. McGill said—It is true that Dr. Thornwell had authority to say that I agree with his doctrines of Presbyterianism. They are substantially my theory of Presbyterianism. But I have no sympathy with this agitation with regard to Boards. On the other hand, I do not discard the theories of Dr. Hodge; on the contrary, I endorse them entirely, and circulate them among my pupils. With regard to the "Divine right" of Presbyterianism, I probably go farther than Dr. Hodge, but not so far as Dr. Thornwell. But an article has appeared in the *Princeton Review*, on the Eldership, to which I am opposed. If Dr. Hodge endorses it, we differ, and that is the first point of divergence. But what of that? Do you expect men to agree on all points? When I first went to Princeton, six years ago, Dr. Hodge took me by the hand, and he has given me his aid and counsel ever since. There is perfect harmony among the Professors at Princeton. There always has been, and I believe there always will be, as long as the present Professors remain together. What!—I at enmity with Dr. Hodge!—I had rather go to Africa, and die there, than live in a state of alienation from my beloved brother, Dr. Hodge.

Board of Domestic Missions.

The following is an abstract of the Annual Report of the Board, from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860.

Missions.—The number of missionaries in commission March 1, 1859, was 408, to which have been added to March 1, 1860,

283, making the whole number 691, and more by 91 than the year previous. The number of churches and missionary stations wholly or in part supplied, (as far as reported by our missionaries,) is 1179. The number of newly organized churches is 53. The number of admissions on examination is 2665, and on certificate, 2113; making a total of admissions of 4778. The number in communion with churches connected with the Board is 28,107. The number of Sabbath-schools is 429; of teachers, 3460; and of scholars, 22,035. The number of baptisms is 3197.

Appropriations.—The appropriations made to our missionaries from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, have been, at the office in Philadelphia, \$75,011.57; at the office in Louisville, \$48,580.58, and on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, at New Orleans, \$2212.50; making a total of \$125,804.65. The appropriations made to our missionaries from March 1, 1858, to March 1, 1859, were, at the office in Philadelphia, \$58,360.17, and at the office in Louisville, \$36,116.66; making a total of \$94,476.83. From this statement it appears that the appropriations made at the office in Philadelphia were greater than those made the year before, by \$16,651.40, and at the office in Louisville they were more by \$12,463.92; thus making the total appropriations this year, including those made on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, greater than the year preceding by \$31,327.82. For the purpose of further comparison, we may state that the *average* appropriations made during the preceding seven years, from 1852 to 1859, were, at the office in Philadelphia, \$51,062.17, and at the office in Louisville, \$31,896.88; making a total average of \$82,959.05. From this statement it appears that the appropriations made from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, at the office in Philadelphia, exceeded the average of the seven previous years, by \$23,949.40, and at the office in Louisville, \$16,683.70; thus making a total excess of appropriations this year, including those made on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, above the average appropriations of the seven preceding years, \$42,845.60.

Receipts.—The total amount of receipts from all sources from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, is 118,904.21, to which

add balances on hand in the different treasuries March 1, 1859, \$28,422.19; making the available resources of the Board during the year \$147,326.40. The amount paid out at the office in Philadelphia, including the Presbyterial treasuries, was \$100,318.74; at the office in Louisville, \$13,554.12; and at the office in New Orleans, \$3542.25; making the total amount of payments during the year, \$117,415.11; leaving in all the treasuries, on the 1st of March, 1860, \$29,911.29, which is a greater sum by \$1489.10, than that reported on the 1st of March, 1859. The amount due the missionaries at the same date was \$15,514.87; leaving a balance to meet appropriations already made, and accruing next year, of \$14,396.42. Even of this comparatively small balance a considerable portion cannot be appropriated by the Board to the general field, as it is held by the South-western Advisory Committee, for disbursement within the field assigned to them. The aggregate receipts from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, have been greater, as compared with the receipts from March 1, 1858, to March 1, 1859, \$19,231.18. The increase has been, in individual or special donations and legacies, \$13,052.24, and in contributions of the churches, \$6178.94. The receipts at the office in Philadelphia, including the Presbyterial treasuries, were greater by \$10,861.43, and were less at the office in Louisville by \$4708.66.

New Missions.—During the year, the Board have established new missions in various sections of our country. They have also, to the extent of their ability, reinforced missionaries in the newer States and Territories. One missionary has been added to the number in California, one to Connecticut, two to Florida, four to Georgia, seventeen to Illinois, six to Indiana, one to Iowa, five to Kansas, four to Kentucky, two to Maryland, seventeen to Missouri, two to Nebraska, four to New Jersey, six to New York, three to North Carolina, three to Ohio, two to Oregon, eight to Pennsylvania, three to Texas, four to Virginia, two to Washington Territory, and four to Wisconsin. The Board have also commissioned one missionary in Massachusetts, and one in Dakotah Territory. The number of missionaries in Alabama has been reduced two, in Arkansas one, in Louisiana one, in Mississippi two, and in South Caro-

lina four; and the two missionaries who were last year reported in Rhode Island have left the State. Thus we have a total increase of *ninety-one* missionaries.

Clothing.—Clothing valued at \$17,295.86 has been received during the year, and distributed among the missionaries who needed it. Of this amount, \$13,289.72 was received at the office in Philadelphia; \$2331.48 at the office in Louisville; and \$1514.66 at the depot in Pittsburgh, and \$160 at the office in New Orleans.

Board of Foreign Missions.

The Hon. Walter Lowrie, one of the Secretaries, gave a general review of the missionary work.

1. The great field of *India*.—The country yet feels the effects of the mutiny. There is, however, an increased attention to religious subjects on the part of the natives. Instances are not uncommon of the conversion of Brahmins and Mohammedans; and there are instances of the conversion of distinguished native chiefs. As to the losses of our Board in India, it will take time to make them up. It will be a gradual work; labour is high, and material scarce. The British government will do something toward repairing our loss, but nothing of consequence. Eighteen thousand dollars have been given for this special purpose.

2. *China*.—There are eighteen provinces or states in China. An immense population; and among such a population we can do but little. Our missions occupy three provinces, namely: Canton, in Canton province; Shanghai, in Keongsoo; Ningpo, on the Keong. The first-mentioned has a population of nineteen millions; the second thirty-seven millions; and the third twenty-six millions—making a population of eighty-two millions of souls. Printing-presses are wanting for the purpose of printing editions of the Bible and Testament in the language of the natives; and there is no danger of the destruction of these books by the people, as they universally respect sacred writings, and lay them up in their temples. The Bible is, therefore, safe among them. Some friends in New York have given twenty-five thousand dollars for the purpose of purchasing presses for printing the Bible. We need one hundred thousand New Testa-

ments, requiring three years and a half to produce them; and fifty thousand Bibles, which it will require four years to print. The difficulties between the Chinese and English have interrupted the facilities for missionary labour. He here referred to a most interesting work of grace, as the result of the labours of our missionaries at Ningpo. For a full account of this work, he would refer the brethren to that part of the Annual Report.

3. *California*.—This mission is connected with the China mission. There is but one missionary of the Board in California, (Mr. Loomis,) who has been lately sent out. He finds as much as he can do, and with many discouragements, is well received by the Chinese in that State. The Board is very much indebted to Drs. Scott and Anderson for the aid and countenance which they have given to the mission; but especially to a ruling elder of the Calvary Church, San Francisco, now present in the Assembly; and he had great pleasure in having this opportunity to present to Mr. Roberts the warmest thanks of the Board.

4. *Japan* gives every indication of being a difficult and discouraging field, requiring much faith and patience from the church and missionaries. He then referred to the embassy from Japan now in this country, and the invincible prejudices of the people against strangers, which this embassy might have a tendency to remove.

5. *Siam*.—The Annual Report states this field to be, first, wide open for missionary enterprise; but hard and difficult, and requiring great labour, great patience, and great faith. Secondly, as the seat and the head-quarters, the stronghold of Buddhism. But he referred the Assembly to Mr. Mattoon, a missionary returned to this country, and present in the Assembly, who would address them upon the subject.

After speaking in detail of all the missionary stations, he concluded with a statement and brief illustration of some general principles.

1. There is but one agency in the church for Foreign Missions, but many blessed agencies at home. The Board of Foreign Missions ought, therefore, to receive a greater support. Not that he wanted to take anything from the other Boards,

but for the salvation of those there are many agencies at work—Domestic Missions, Educational Societies, the Boards of Publication, and Church Extension, Theological Seminaries, Male and Female Schools, Bible and Tract Societies, Sunday-school Union—but only one agency used by the church to send the gospel to the heathen. We are giving twenty-five dollars at home for every dollar we give for the foreign cause. This calculation is made on the ground that the population is the same, whereas the population of the foreign field vastly exceeds the home population.

2. The cause of Foreign Missions cannot stand still. If you do not go forward, you must go backward. It is such a work as must be carried on in all its parts. The Mission work is: 1. To preach; 2. To translate and print the Scriptures; 3. To raise up a native agency. It requires much study to translate, and if you do not print, this labour is lost. You have learned missionaries who are engaged in translating the Bible; and, this being done, then it is to be printed. But we have no money to print with; and when we ask it from the churches, they reply—"The missionaries are doing very well, and we cannot give money for this purpose." How comes it that this large church does so little? One-half of the churches do nothing. He was aware that many of these were struggling for their own existence. But cannot they do something to connect themselves with this great cause? Is there no way to reach these brethren? Tens of thousands of heathen are perishing every year. In view of the passing away and perishing of the nations of heathendom, Mr. Lowrie stated the fact, that the Chinese have a remarkable respect for their parents. A converted Chinese, when told of the perishing state of the heathen without the gospel, immediately inquired of the missionary, with great distress—"What has become of our parents?"

3. The Missionary work is a work of faith. This proposition the speaker illustrated by stating that our foreign missionaries were obtained from all parts of the church, and must have confidence in one another—the church have confidence in the missionaries, and the missionaries confidence in the church. The missionaries send a calculation to the Board of what their probable wants will be for the year; and then the Board makes

a calculation of the amount which the church will probably put at their disposal, and sends the missionaries promises accordingly. It is faith all around. We have sent them word this year that we will expend \$240,000. We *must* have it, and do it. In this connection he made an affecting allusion to our martyred missionaries, first in the China seas, which terrible calamity had inflicted a wound which had not yet ceased to bleed; and then in India, a providence which required great faith in God. A mother of one of the martyred missionaries said, "I have another son to send to India;" and a brother then pursuing his study in one of our Theological Seminaries, said, "I am ready to go and take the place of the murdered." Reference was made to the native Christians in India, who chose death rather than deny the Lord Jesus. We were afraid of the native ministers, but they proved faithful. The missionary brethren have since that time gone on with more faith.

Board of Education.

Dr. Boardman, chairman of the Committee, presented the report.

The number of *new* Candidates received during the year is 181; making in all from the beginning (in 1819) 2952; the whole number on the roll during the past year is 492; increase during the previous year (1859) 141; excess in favour of the present year (1860) 40; excess of the aggregate of this year over that of last year 101.

It should, however, be stated in this connection that the present year overruns the last by ten days; and that during this period the number of new students has been increased by ten or twelve.

State of the Treasury.—Total receipts of the year from all sources \$71,132.39; total receipts of the Candidates' Fund \$64,637.19; increase of this fund over last year \$12,559.27; balance in this fund \$12,105.38; total receipts from all sources in School and College Fund \$7537.84; balance in this Fund \$239.62.

After the adoption of the usual resolution, the Rev. Mr. Watts who, since the illness of Dr. Van Rensselaer, has discharged the duties of the office with great acceptance, addressed

the Assembly at length. Subsequently, Dr. Boardman read the following letter written in the name of the Assembly, to the Rev. Dr. Van Rensselaer, now lying dangerously ill. The letter was heard in the midst of tearful silence, and adopted by all the members rising from their seats.

TO THE REV. CORTLANDT VAN RENSSELAER, D. D.

Beloved Brother in Christ Jesus:—The General Assembly has learned, with deep solicitude, of the afflictive dispensation which detains you from its present sessions. It has pleased Him whose “way is in the sea, and his path in the great waters,” to visit you with a painful illness. We cannot permit you to suppose that the church which you have loved and served so well is unmindful of you in this season of trial. And we should do injustice to ourselves, not to assure you of our united and cordial sympathy.

We are well aware, that one who feels himself drawing near to eternity, and around whose couch of suffering the light of that “better country” is shedding its heavenly radiance, can stand in no need of earthly consolations. Nor would we offend your Christian humility by enlarging upon the services you have rendered to the cause of Christ. But we may, nay, we must, magnify the grace of God in you, which has wrought so effectually to the furtherance of the gospel amongst us, through your instrumentality. We cannot accept your resignation of the important office you have just relinquished, without bearing our formal and grateful testimony to the manner in which its duties have been performed. With devout thankfulness to God, and under him, beloved brother, to you, we record our sense of the eminent wisdom, fidelity and efficiency, and the noble, disinterested liberality with which you have for fourteen years conducted the affairs of our “BOARD OF EDUCATION.” Under your administration it has risen from a condition of comparative feebleness to strength and power. Its plans have been matured and systematized. Its sphere has been greatly enlarged. It has assumed new and most beneficent functions. Your luminous pen has vindicated the principles which lie at the basis of true Christian education. And by your numerous publications, your sermons and addresses, your extended cor-

respondence, and your self-denying activity in visiting every part of the church, you have, by God's blessing, accomplished a great work in elevating this sacred cause to its just position, and gathering around it the sympathies of our whole communion. Nor may we forbear to add, that in prosecuting these manifold official labours, you have greatly endeared yourself personally to the ministry and membership of the church.

Rejoicing as we do in the auspicious results of these unwearied exertions, we mourn this day the sacrifice they have cost us. While the church is reaping the harvest—a harvest which we fully believe she will go on gathering until the Master comes to present her unto himself, a glorious church—the workman, who has done so much to prepare the ground and sow the seed, falls exhausted in the furrows. There, dear brother, we doubt not you would choose to fall—upon that field, to the culture of which you had dedicated your life.

On behalf of the church we represent, we once more thank you sincerely and gratefully, for all your labours and sacrifices. We lift up our hearts in humble and fervent supplication to our common GOD and FATHER, that his presence may be with you in this hour of trial. We hear with joy that he does not forget you; that he is giving you strength according to your day; and that your peace flows like a river. We plead with him that if it be possible, this blow may still be averted, and your health restored. But we desire to commit you into his hands. That Saviour in whom you trust, will not forsake you. The Divine Comforter will comfort you and *yours*. Your covenant God will be the God of your children.

To Him, the TRIUNE JEHOVAH, we affectionately commend you—praying that his rod and his staff may comfort you, and that whenever the summons shall come, an entrance may be ministered unto you abundantly, into the everlasting kingdom of our LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST.

On behalf of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church, in session at Rochester, N. Y., May 23, 1860.

JOHN W. YEOMANS, *Moderator*.

WILLIS LORD, *Stated Clerk*.

ALEXANDER T. MCGILL, *Permanent Clerk*.

A. G. VERMILYE, *Temporary Clerk*.

[Signed also by the whole Assembly.]

While the members were still standing, Dr. Spring, at the request of the Moderator, led the Assembly in prayer. Few members of the house ever witnessed a more solemn scene. It is the greatest honour ever rendered by our church to one of her servants. It was rendered with the full assent and consent of every heart. It was a tribute spontaneously granted to goodness, disinterestedness, humility, and fidelity. A well-deserved tribute, as grateful to those who were permitted to offer it as to the honoured servant of God to whom it was rendered. The whole church seemed to stand weeping around his bed, and saying, "Well done good and faithful servant, enter now into the joy of thy Lord."

Board of Publication.

Rev. Dr. Krebs presented the Report of the Committee to whom the Annual Report of the Board of Publication was referred.

The progress of the Board during the past year has been most cheering. In every branch of its operations it has been largely in advance of the preceding year, and nearly every item of its statistics shows larger results than in any former year of its existence. The temporary effect which the commercial embarrassments of the country during the years 1857-59 had upon the receipts and sales of the Board in common with nearly every Publishing House in the country, has passed away, leaving its affairs in a more prosperous and hopeful state than ever.

Total number of copies of books and tracts published by the Board since its organization, 8,790,188.

This exhibits the largest number of *new* books and tracts ever issued in one year, as well as the largest *aggregate* of publications by 141,000 copies.

The total of distribution is as follows:

Sales of volumes at the depository,	-	-	-	241,050
Sales of volumes by colporteurs,	-	-	-	124,638
Given by colporteurs,	-	-	-	14,920
Granted by the Executive Committee,	-	-	-	6,101

Total of volumes distributed, 386,709

which is an increase of 54,712 volumes on the distribution of the previous year.

The distribution of pages of tracts has been as follows:

Sales at the depository,	- . - - -	869,405
Distributed by colporteurs,	- - - - -	2,162,594
Granted by the Executive Committee,	- - - - -	413,222

Total pages of tracts distributed, 3,445,221
being an increase of 389,770 pages in the distribution over the year before.

The Treasurer's account shows an aggregate of receipts of \$125,394.45, an increase of \$15,854.74 over last year. The expenditures have amounted to \$126,033.04, an increase of \$18,472.02. Cash received from sales of books, tracts and periodicals, \$93,851.72, an increase of \$11,620.27 over last year, and the largest amount the Board has ever received from these sources in any one year.

Rev. Dr. Schenck, Secretary of the Board, followed with a lucid and impressive exhibition of the progress of the work; showing the efficiency, economy, and usefulness of its operations, explaining the system on which its business is conducted, showing that the publications of this Board are as cheap and well made as those of any other concern. He took up some books published by the Board and similar books by private publishers and publishing societies, showing that *this* Board's books are generally 25 per cent. cheaper than others.

Church Extension.

The Rev. Dr. S. J. Baird read the report of the Committee on Church Extension, recommending the work to the increased support of the church; changing the name from "Committee" to "Board," without any organic change in the body, and continuing its present immediate responsibility to the General Assembly. It was suggested that the change of the name would give the cause a higher place in the public estimation: and also prevent confusion arising from the fact that the New School Assembly has a "Committee" with the same objects in view.

The following is an abstract of the Report:

The present year's report names 617 contributing churches, against 565 specified last year, and records an increase in

receipts of \$6197.62. While an unusually large proportion of the receipts were special donations, showing rather what the church is doing in this department, than the amount at the disposal of the Committee, still, after these are deducted, the sum received for general purposes is somewhat larger than that received in any former year. The number of appropriations reported is 85, against 76 reported last year; and the amount appropriated is \$10,603.72 greater than during the previous twelve months. The amount paid 90 churches this year is \$11,106.43 greater than the amount paid 76 churches last year.

The year closed with one hundred applications on file and undisposed of, calling for \$43,000. None of these were in a condition to be acted upon by the Committee immediately, but a large number of them will, probably, soon furnish the necessary information.

During the year five applications, calling for \$6000, were declined, chiefly for want of means to respond to them.

The appropriated balance in the Treasury of the Church Extension Committee, April 1, 1859, was \$14,795.34.

The receipts from all sources from April 1, 1859, to April 1, 1860, were \$35,440.01. Of this sum \$26,505.63 was from churches, and \$2223.33 from legacies. The available means of the year were therefore \$50,335.35.

The expenditures of the year as shown by the Treasurer's statement appended to this report, were \$34,749.64, leaving in the Treasury April 2, 1860, an appropriated balance of \$15,585.71. There were, however, unpaid at that date, appropriations to fifty-three churches amounting to \$17,825.61, The liabilities of the Committee, therefore, exceed their means on hand at the close of the fifth fiscal year.

The Rev. Mr. Coe, Secretary of the Committee, made a strong statement and appeal in behalf of this work, showing that *one-third* of the organized churches of the Assembly actually need help to build or improve, and this is saying nothing of unoccupied fields to which aid ought to be extended forthwith.

Father Chiniquy's Mission.

Rev. W. M. Scott, D. D., presented and read a memorial from the Presbytery of Chicago, on the wonderful work of grace in the colony of French Canadians in Kankakee county, Illinois. This memorial was referred to a Special Committee, of which Dr. Atwater was Chairman, who subsequently presented an interesting report, which was adopted, and ordered to be printed in the Appendix to the Minutes. One evening was set apart to the consideration of this subject, on which occasion Father Chiniquy addressed the Assembly, and gave a most affecting account of the history and progress of this extraordinary work of God. Several thousands of Canadians have removed to the State of Illinois. These colonies have been visited by Dr. Willis Lord and Dr. Scott, commissioners from the Presbytery of Chicago, who bear the fullest testimony to the reality and power of this religious movement. Owing to successive failures of the crops in all that region of country, the colonists have been reduced to the greatest extremities, and are still in great straits. Three thousand dollars were raised or pledged by members of the Assembly, in answer to Father Chiniquy's appeal; and the Assembly earnestly recommended to the churches under its care to make contributions for the relief of these suffering converts from Romanism.

Revised Book of Discipline.

Dr. Thornwell presented the Book of Discipline, as revised and corrected by the Committee appointed for that purpose. His report was accepted and printed, and copies of the Book were distributed among the members. The discussion of the subject did not come on until towards the end of the session. It was soon found that the diversity of opinion as to some important features of the new Book was so great, that time could not be secured for its satisfactory consideration. Before any vote was taken on any proposed amendments, it was resolved to recommit the Book to the same Committee, with additions, and direct them to report to the next Assembly. This delay seemed unavoidable, and is perhaps not to be regretted. The prejudice excited against the Book, on account of some of its features, is passing away; and it is to be hoped

that its merits will, in the course of another year, be so generally recognized as to secure for it the cordial adoption of the next General Assembly.

Theological Seminaries.

Rev. Dr. Spring, Chairman of the Committee on Theological Seminaries, reported that the several institutions under the care of the Assembly were in a prosperous condition. The report recommended, that agreeably to the request of the Board of Directors, a Professor should be elected to the chair vacated by the death of the Rev. J. Addison Alexander, in the Theological Seminary at Princeton; and also that a fifth Professor be chosen to take part of the duties now resting on Dr. McGill in that institution. There was no real objection made to granting this request for a fifth Professor. Some of the brethren said that it was well to consider the matter before it was decided, because if the corps of teachers was increased in one Seminary, it must ultimately be done in all the others, and thus an increasing demand on the ministers and resources of the church would be made. Dr. Hodge spoke in favour of the measure, and said:

Mr. Moderator, there is no indelicacy in my addressing the Assembly on this subject. We are seeking no personal object. We have full confidence in the members of this house. As this is a court of Jesus Christ, it must be assumed to be governed by his Spirit. Its members, I doubt not, will act not from personal or sectional motives, but from considerations which they can present before the eyes of their Divine Master.

Princeton claims no superiority. We cheerfully admit that all our Seminaries stand on the same level, and should be treated on precisely the same principles. And, therefore, whenever any Seminary appears here by its authorized representatives, and says that it cannot discharge its duties to the church without additional aid, not a friend of Princeton will hesitate to vote that it should be granted.

There are two things, indeed, which give Princeton a special hold on the feelings of the church. The one is that she is Alma Mater of some two thousand five hundred preachers of the gospel. That is her crown. As it is impossible that a

son should fail to look with tenderness and respect on the face of his mother, so it is impossible that the Alumni of Princeton should not regard that Institution with peculiar affection. A matron surrounded by her children grown to maturity, and filling stations of usefulness, must be the object of feelings which a blooming maiden cannot excite. The maiden may be more attractive and more promising, but she is not the mother of children. The other thing is, that Princeton is on the frontier of our church. Our other seminaries are safe in the interior. We stand on the borders in near proximity to the great institutions, Andover and Union Seminary in New York. Unless Princeton is able to stand erect by the side of those Seminaries, and present equal facilities for a thorough theological training, we shall lose our young men; our most promising students will be educated outside of our church. This would be a calamity not to Princeton only, but to the church at large.

But, Mr. Moderator, this is not the main ground on which we rest her application for a fifth Professor. We are unable without additional assistance properly to cultivate the field assigned to us. Princeton has been prostrated in the dust. We come to you to beg you to raise us up. In the death of Joseph Addison Alexander we have lost our great glory and defence.

Permit me, Mr. Moderator, to express my own individual convictions. I regard Dr. Joseph Addison Alexander as incomparably the greatest man I ever knew—as incomparably the greatest man our church has ever produced. His intellect was majestic not only in its greatness, but in its harmonious proportions. No faculty was in excess, and none was in defect. His understanding, imagination, and memory, were alike wonderful. Everything was equally easy to him. Nothing he ever did seemed to reveal half his power. His attainments in classical, oriental, and modern languages and literature were almost unexampled. His stores of biblical, historical, and antiquarian knowledge seemed inexhaustible. To all these talents and attainments were added great force of character, power over the minds of men, and a peculiar facility in imparting knowledge. His thorough orthodoxy, his fervent

piety, humility, faithfulness in the discharge of his duties, and reverence for the word of God, consecrated all his other gifts. His complete mastery of every form of modern infidelity enabled him to vindicate the Scriptures as with authority. He glorified the word of God in the sight of his pupils beyond what any other man I ever knew had the power of doing. Princeton is not what it was, and can never expect to be what it has been. You cannot fill his place. The only compensation for such a loss is the presence of the Spirit of God.

The department of New Testament Literature and Biblical Greek, to which this extraordinary man consecrated his life, and which he felt called for all his time and efforts, is vacant. You must put some one into it, to do what he can.

But when you have done that, Dr. McGill remains burdened with the duties of two complete departments—the Pastoral and Historical. This is more than the most robust man can bear. Justice to him and to the Institution therefore requires that a fifth Professor should be appointed to share his duties. Full provision has been made for the support of the new Professor. The church will be asked for no contributions, and the finances of the Institution will not be burdened. I am sure, Mr. Moderator, under these circumstances, the request of the Board of Directors will be cheerfully granted.

The Rev. Dr. Adger said he could not conceive on what ground the Assembly should hesitate to grant the request of the Directors of Princeton Seminary. Grant that it will place Princeton at a vantage over the other Seminaries; if it will advance the cause, why should it not be so? He had no objection to it. If theological education is costly, let it be; everything good is costly, and he had no idea of keeping Princeton, or any other Seminary that was favoured with the means, from being placed in the very highest position favourable to success. He could not see on what ground the Assembly could refuse. The funds were forthcoming; no demand to be made upon the people or the churches, and he trusted the request would be promptly and cordially voted.

The request of the Board for a fifth Professor was granted *nemine contradicente*. With the same unanimity a fifth Professor was granted to the Western Theological Seminary at

Allegheny, at the request of the Directors of that Institution. In accordance with these resolutions, the Rev. Dr. Palmer was elected to the chair of Pastoral Theology and Sacred Rhetoric, and the Rev. Caspar Wistar Hodge to that of New Testament Literature and Biblical Greek in the Seminary at Princeton. The Rev. William M. Paxton was elected as Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in the Western Theological Seminary. The Rev. Joseph T. Smith, D. D., was elected Professor of Pastoral Theology and Church Government in the Seminary at Danville. All these elections were unanimous. With the same unanimity the Assembly confirmed the election of the Rev. Dr. Peck as Professor in the Union Seminary in Virginia.

The following resolutions in relation to the death of Dr. Addison Alexander, presented by Rev. William M. Paxton, were unanimously adopted:

1. *Resolved*, That we record our devout gratitude to the great King and Head of the church for his great favour in raising up and continuing to us for so many years, one so eminently gifted and qualified by such a rich variety of powers and acquirements for the work of training a ministry for the church.

2. *Resolved*, That whilst we bow in humble submission to the sovereign hand of God, we cannot forbear to express our deep sorrow under the inscrutable dispensation which has deprived the Seminary of a sound, faithful, experienced and eminently learned Professor, the church of an eloquent herald of the gospel, an able defender of the faith, a wise and skilful expounder of the truth as it is in Jesus, and the world of a noble mind, a potent pen, a praying voice, a great heart to feel for its sorrows, and a ready will to relieve its woes.

3. *Resolved*, That whilst we express our high estimate of the distinguished ability and rare erudition with which he enriched his professional instructions, and our deep appreciation of the industry and self-sacrifice with which he devoted himself to the great end of the church's mission in the world, we feel cheered by the tokens of the Divine favour which attended his life and crowned his death. And we hereby record our thankfulness for the grace which made his dying moments a testimony to the efficacy of the Christian's hope, and his memory an incen-

tive to follow after, if "that we also may apprehend that for which we are apprehended of Christ Jesus."

4. *Resolved*, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to the family of the deceased.

Cumberland Presbyterian Church.

Overture No. 33, proposing to appoint a delegate, and to open correspondence with the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church.

The overture stated that they have received overtures from the Cumberland Presbyterian church, through individuals, expressing a wish to have correspondence with this Assembly. The Committee recommend that a delegate be appointed to the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church.

Rev. Dr. Edgar said this measure met with his hearty approbation; indeed, he had recommended that this step be taken, and he was glad it had been proposed. That body had sprung from us; they had become a highly energetic, respectable, earnest, and in the main, orthodox body. Their General Assembly were probably at this moment meeting in his place.

A motion to docket the overture was made and lost. The House called loudly for adoption.

Rev. Dr. Scott, of San Francisco, said he only asked leave to say that it would be exceedingly gratifying to him if this measure prevails; the proposal recalled to him early and very dear associations, for he once was of them, and it was in his heart to say much, and give some account of this large branch of our brethren; but, as he saw the Assembly was anxious to adopt the Report, he would not detain them.

Rev. Dr. William Brown—It was not his purpose to offer an argument, but he could not allow the occasion to pass without giving some expression to the satisfaction and joy with which he should vote for this important motion. It is surely a movement in the right way, and, he trusted, a token for good. The true unity of the church, we should remember, was, and is an object dear to the Saviour, and should be so to all his followers. We cannot, dare not, sacrifice any principle; nor does a proposal of this kind at all bring in peril any part of our testi-

mony to the truth of God. But whatever may be wisely, safely done to increase that unity, or to manifest more conspicuously to the world the measure of it already existing, are we not plainly, sacredly bound to welcome and adopt? Especially did he say, and from the bottom of his heart, that it is right, wise, and pleasing in the sight of God, and good for us all to do whatever we righteously may, to bind together the whole Presbyterian family, holding in common as it does, in all its branches, and notwithstanding acknowledged and important differences, so much precious truth both of doctrine and of order. Let us all, sir, be united more and more heart to heart, and then shall we see more eye to eye.

He did rejoice in the persuasion that these sentiments—these feelings are wide-spread, and growing fast. To the providence of God, and the shedding forth of his Spirit it is due, and to his name be all the praise. This action proposed may be all that is practicable now, but there are others of the great Presbyterian name, to which he hoped, to which he knew the hearts of many are turned, and to which he could not doubt there will soon be extended, in sincerity and brotherly love, a similar invitation.

The overture was adopted.

Dr. Baird nominated Rev. Dr. Edgar as delegate to the next General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church, and the Rev. Dr. McMullen as his alternate, who were unanimously appointed.

Province of the Church.

Several memorials had been referred to the Committee of Bills and Overtures relating to Colonization, Temperance, the Slave trade, and Slavery, in reference to which the Committee recommended the adoption of the following resolution, viz.

Resolved, While the General Assembly on the one hand disclaim all right to interfere in secular matters, and on the other, assert the right and duty of the church as God's witness on earth, to bear testimony in favour of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrine and sin, wherever professed or committed, yet, in view of the repeated action of the Assembly in

reference to the subjects above referred to, it is inexpedient to take any further action in reference thereto.

More apprehension was felt in reference to this subject than any other which was expected to come before the Assembly. The ground understood to be taken last year at Indianapolis, was that the church was bound to restrict her deliverances to her own members, and to matters under her own control; that organizations outside of her pale, however objectionable or praiseworthy, could be neither recommended nor objected to; and the action of the state, however inconsistent with the word of God, could not be testified against. The repeated action of the church inconsistent with this principle, it was understood, was pronounced to be unwarranted and wrong. Very great and very general dissatisfaction was excited by this new doctrine concerning the right and duty of the church. It was felt that this would put a muzzle over her lips, and forbid her exercising one of her highest and most important prerogatives. It was also seen that if it was once admitted, that it was wrong for the church now to bear her testimony for or against anything not pertaining to her own action, or the faith and practice of her own members, all her past deliverances of this kind, which still stand as her testimony, must be expunged from her records; that everything she ever uttered on Bible Societies, Colonization, Temperance, Slavery, or the Slave-trade, must be recalled. It is now clear that the advocates of what was regarded as a new and revolutionary doctrine, and that the action of the last Assembly, had been misapprehended. The above resolution, which distinctly asserts the right and duty of the church, as God's witness on earth, to bear her testimony in favour of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrine and sin, wherever professed or committed, was adopted with cordial and intelligent unanimity by the Committee of Bills and Overtures, consisting of nineteen members, and representing all parts of the church. When reported to the Assembly, it was received without the least opposition, and adopted by an absolutely unanimous vote. Thus was this cloud rolled away, and every member of the House rejoiced in the goodness of God, in enabling so large a body to join hearts and hands on common ground.

Conclusion.

The Rev. Dr. Thornwell said that he rose to make a very unusual motion; but he did it by request. A resolution had been offered, tendering thanks to the citizens of Rochester for their hospitality. Never, in his estimation, was a tender of gratitude more richly deserved, and he felt sure the *heart* of the entire Assembly went forth with the vote of thanks. The citizens of Rochester desired permission to express their sentiments in regard to the sojourn of the Assembly amongst them; and he moved that an opportunity be now afforded. Carried.

Rev. Dr. McIlvaine, pastor of the church in which the Assembly met, said—Moderator, this call upon me is wholly unexpected, and I shall say but little, because what I *would* say cannot be expressed in words. We received the General Assembly with high expectations that on this “Plan-of-Union” ground, we should be able to give our people a more favourable view of the Presbyterian church than they had before an opportunity of obtaining; and our expectations have been more than *realized*. The influence of this Assembly, composed of persons from different parts of our common country, will be greater than it is possible for you to understand;—I mean its influence in mitigating acerbities and removing prejudices, which interested and imprudent parties on both sides have been diligent in fostering. Most pleasant to us, and happy in its influence has been your sojourn amongst us; and when it shall be the pleasure of this Assembly to withdraw from us, we shall bid you farewell, as one of our Committee of Arrangements has this moment instructed me to say, with the regret of every citizen of Rochester.

The resolution of thanks previously offered by Dr. Boccock was then *unanimously* adopted.

It was then

Resolved, That this General Assembly be now dissolved, and another, constituted in like manner, be required to meet in the Seventh Presbyterian church in the city of Philadelphia, on the third Thursday of May, 1861.

The Moderator then gave a few words of parting, expressing his thanks to the Assembly for the uniform and universal kind-

ness and courtesy with which they had sustained him whilst presiding over their deliberations. He expressed gratitude to God for the urbanity, dignity, and brotherly kindness which had prevailed. He reminded his brethren that the parting moment was approaching, and that it was certain we would not all meet together again in any earthly assembly; but expressed the hope that we would all meet in the General Assembly and church of the first born, written in heaven; in that glorious gathering,

“Where the Assembly ne'er breaks up,
And Sabbaths have no end.”

The hymn,

“Blest be the tie that binds
Our hearts in Christian love,”

was then sung by the whole Assembly, standing; prayer was offered by the Moderator, the benediction pronounced, and then the Moderator formally dissolved the Assembly, according to the previously adopted resolution.

In the commencement of this account of the General Assembly, it was stated that Dr. W. L. Breekinridge, the Moderator of the preceding Assembly was absent. It is proper that the reason of his absence should be given, that he may not be supposed voluntarily to have neglected an important duty. We, therefore, append his letter to the Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of Louisville:

OAKLAND COLLEGE, MISS., April 23.

Rev. Dr. HILL, Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of Louisville:

Dear Brother—The *Presbyterian Herald* of the 12th inst. has brought me the proceedings of our Presbytery, in session at Owensboro' on the 5th inst. They make known to me that I was chosen a Commissioner to the General Assembly, and, further, that “the Presbytery heartily approves (and requests the Commissioners to sustain) the action of the General Assembly of 1859, and also that of 1848, on the subject of the relations of the church of Christ, and voluntary societies formed for the purpose of Art, Literature, and Secular Morality.”

In the report of the proceedings it is added that "this resolution called out an earnest and animated discussion, in which its passage was advocated by Messrs. Robinson, Rice, and others, and opposed by Messrs. Matthews, Hopkins, Hill, and others. The motion was finally adopted without a count."

I recognize the absolute freedom of the Presbytery in the choice of its Commissioners. I acknowledge the right of the Presbytery to see that its mind is represented in the Assembly—whether by positive instruction, or by making known its wishes, and controlling the subject in some other way. I disown all claim to a seat in the next Assembly in virtue of my position as Moderator of the last, except such as may arise from the usage of the Presbyteries, and the courtesy which is due to the General Assembly and to a minister who has not forfeited the respect and confidence of his brethren. The duty imposed upon me by the will of the last Assembly, of opening the next with a sermon, and presiding until another Moderator shall be chosen, is subject to the pleasure of the Presbytery; and by the Presbytery I mean the actual majority in a lawful meeting, whether that majority be accidental, or whether it truly express the mind of the persons who properly and usually compose the body.

There is a very clear and wide distinction to be taken between the action of the Assembly of 1859 and that of the Assembly of 1848, cited by the Presbytery. The latter declares that the church has no power to require of its members the support of the societies in question; while it asserts the right, and, on occasion, the duty of the church to favour or oppose them, according to its judgment of their merits. This view of the subject I do heartily approve. I trust that I shall be ready at all times to defend and support it.

But the action of the Assembly of 1859 denies to the church all right to have anything to do with such institutions. Believing this view of the subject to be false in its principles, narrow in its spirit, and every way hurtful in its influence, I do heartily condemn it, and I can do nothing, under any circumstances, to support it. It is plainly in conflict with the sentiments and usages of our branch of the church, from the beginning. I think it has been justly described as setting forth a "new and

startling doctrine." I find no warrant for it in the letter of the divine word, or in the spirit of the gospel. I believe that it was inadvertently uttered by the last Assembly, without arresting the attention of the body; and now that it has fairly engaged the thoughts of the church, I do not doubt that it will be disavowed by the coming Assembly.

My brethren were not ignorant that I entertain these opinions. They were not uttered in the Assembly, because I was in the chair, and not on the floor. But they were freely expressed in the Synod of Kentucky, and came into the newspapers through the report of the proceedings of that body, whose mind was very clearly and strongly declared to the same effect. And they have never been concealed in private, while they have not been pressed upon others.

My brethren certainly do not expect me to change them, unless on the conviction of reason. They can hardly expect me to support the opposite of them in the General Assembly. Under these circumstances there seems to remain nothing for me to do, with a becoming respect for them and myself, but to decline the service to which they have appointed me.

You will be assured that I do this with much regret, while the necessity for it has taken me altogether by surprise. Had any of my brethren intimated to me, before I left them, the purpose which has now been executed, I would have relieved us all of the present embarrassment by declining the appointment in advance, excusing myself to the Assembly as well as I could. It would afford me great pleasure, if the will of God were so, to represent the Presbytery of Louisville in the General Assembly once more, before dissolving my connection with it, which must follow my removal to my new and distant home—a connection which has subsisted very happily through so many years. I shall not cease to cherish a deep concern for my brethren in the ministry, and for the churches in this venerable and honoured Presbytery. Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ. Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity.

Will you do me the kindness to give this letter an early place in the *Presbyterian Herald*, that the members of the Presby-

tery, and of the churches belonging to it, and our brethren of the General Assembly, may know why I shall not be present to perform the service which the ancient usage of that church requires of me.

I am, very truly, yours,

W. L. BRECKINRIDGE.

Charles Hodge

ART. VI.—*Presbyterianism.*

MUCH time was devoted, at the late meeting of the General Assembly at Rochester, to the discussion of the question, What is Presbyterianism? That question, indeed, had only a remote connection with the subject before the house. That subject was the Boards of the church. These, on the one side, were pronounced to be not only inexpedient, but unscriptural and unlawful; not only useless excrescences, but contrary to the divine rule prescribed in the word of God, and a reproach to our blessed Saviour. We were called upon to reject them as a matter of duty, or forfeit our allegiance to Christ. On the other side, it was contended that the Boards were not only highly useful, as experience had proved, but that they were entirely within the discretion which Christ had granted to his church, and therefore compatible with obedience to his will, and with our allegiance to his authority.

To make out any plausible argument in support of the doctrine that the Boards are anti-scriptural, required, of course, a peculiar theory of Presbyterianism; a theory which should exclude all discretionary power in the church, and tie her down to modes of action prescribed as of divine authority in the word of God. That theory, as propounded by Dr. Thornwell in his first speech on the subject, was understood to embrace the following principles: 1. That the form of government for the church, and its modes of action, are prescribed in the word of God, not merely as to its general principles, but in all its details, as completely as the system of faith or the moral law;

and therefore everything for which we cannot produce a "Thus saith the Lord," is unscriptural and unlawful.

2. Consequently, the church has no more right to create a new office, organ, or organization, for the exercise of her prerogatives or the execution of her prescribed work, than she has to create a new article of faith, or to add a new command to the Decalogue.

3. That the church cannot delegate her powers. She must exercise them herself, and through officers and organs prescribed in the Scriptures. She has no more right to act by a vicar, than Congress has to delegate its legislative power, or a Christian to pray by proxy.

4. That all executive, legislative, and judicial power in the church is in the hands of the clergy, that is, of presbyters, who have the same ordination and office, although differing in functions.

5. That all power in the church is joint, and not several. That is, it can be exercised only by church courts, and not in any case by individual officers.

In opposition to this general scheme, "the brother from Princeton" propounded the following general principles:

1st. That all the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit, and consequently, where he dwells, there are those attributes and prerogatives.

2d. That as the Spirit dwells not in the clergy only, but in the people of God, all power is, *in sensu primo*, in the people.

3d. That in the exercise of these prerogatives, the church is to be governed by principles laid down in the word of God, which determine, within certain limits, her officers and modes of organization; but that beyond those prescribed principles and in fidelity to them, the church has a wide discretion in the choice of methods, organs and agencies.

4th. That the fundamental principles of our Presbyterian system are first, the parity of the clergy; second, the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the church; and third, the unity of the church, in such sense, that a small part is subject to a larger, and a larger to the whole.

Without attempting any development of these principles, the

remarks of the speaker in reply to Dr. Thornwell's first speech, were directed to the single point on which the whole question in debate turned. That was, Is the church tied down in the exercise of her prerogatives, and in the performance of her work, to the organizations or organs prescribed in the New Testament? In other words, is everything relating to the government and action of the church laid down in detail in the word of God, so that it is unlawful to employ any organs or agencies not therein enjoined? If this is so, then the Boards are clearly unlawful; if it is not so, the having them, or not having them is a matter of expediency. Dr. Thornwell, in his reply, instead of answering the arguments on that point, which was really the only point properly at issue, confined himself almost exclusively to attempting to prove that his brother from Princeton "was no Presbyterian." In doing this he first assailed the position that where the Spirit is, there the church is; or, as it was really stated on the floor of the Assembly, that the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit; and, therefore, where the Spirit is, there are those attributes and prerogatives; and secondly, he attempted to show that the parity of the clergy, the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, and the unity of the church are not the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism. As this question has a general interest, it may be proper to consider it more fully than respect for the time of the Assembly permitted in the presence of that body. A single statement of principles was all that was then deemed allowable.

As to the first of the above-mentioned principles, it was not presented as anything peculiar to Presbyterianism. It is simply an axiom of evangelical religion, admitted and advocated in every age of the church by all opponents of the ritual or hierarchical theory. As no man is a Christian unless the Spirit of Christ dwells in him, so no body of men is a church, except so far as it is organized, animated and controlled by the same Spirit. We may be bound to recognize men as Christians who are not really such, and we may be bound to recognize churches who are, in fact, not governed by the Spirit. But in both cases they are assumed to be what they profess.

We might as well call a lifeless corpse a man, as a body without the Spirit of God a church. The one may be called a dead church, as a lifeless human body is called a dead man. Nevertheless the Spirit makes the church, as the soul makes the man. The Bible says that the church is a temple, because it is the habitation of God through the Spirit. It is the body of Christ, because animated by the Spirit of Christ. It is said to be one, because the Spirit is one. "For," says the apostle, "as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body." It is the baptism, or indwelling of the Spirit, therefore, which constitutes the church one body. And as (so far as our present state of existence is concerned,) where the soul is, there the body is, so in like manner, where the Spirit is, there is the church, and where the Spirit is not, the church is not. The motto inscribed on the banner which the early evangelical fathers raised against the assumption of ritualists was, *UBI SPIRITUS DEI, IBI ECCLESIA*. That banner Popes and Prelatists, Patriarchs and Priests have for a thousand years striven in vain to trample in the dust. It has been handed down from one band of witnesses for the truth to another, until it now waves over all evangelical Christendom. The dividing line between the two great contending parties in the church universal, is precisely this—Is the church in its essential idea an external body held together by external bonds, so that membership in the church depends on submission to a hierarchy? or is it a spiritual body owing its existence and unity to the indwelling of the Spirit, so that those who have the Spirit of God are members of the church or body of Christ? The Papists say we are not in the church, because we are not subject to the Pope; we say that we are in the church if the Spirit of Christ dwells in us. Of course Dr. Thornwell believes all this as firmly as we do. He has as fully and clearly avowed this doctrine as any man among us. In the very latest published production of his pen, he says, "The idea of the church, according to the Reformed conception, is the complete realization of the decree of election. It is the whole body of the elect considered as united to Christ their Head. As actually exist-

ing at any given time, it is that portion of the elect who have been effectually called to the exercise of faith, and made partakers of the Holy Ghost. It is, in other words, the whole body of existing believers. According to this conception, none are capable of being church members but the elect, and none are ever, in fact, church members, but those who are truly renewed. The church is, therefore, the communion of saints, the congregation of the faithful, the assembly of those who worship God in the Spirit, rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh. That this conception is fundamental in all the Reformed Confessions, and among all the Reformed theologians worthy of the name, we will not insult the intelligence of our readers by stopping to prove. The church was co-extensive with faith. As true faith in the heart will manifest itself by the confession of the mouth, it is certain that the children of God, wherever they have the opportunity, will be found professing their faith; and as there is no method of searching the heart, and discriminating real from false professors but by the walk, all are to be accepted as true believers whose lives do not give the lie to their pretensions. The body of professors, therefore, is to be accepted as the church of Christ, because the truly faithful are in it. The gospel is never preached without converting some—these will profess their faith, and will vindicate to any society the name of a church. As to those professors who are destitute of faith, they are not properly members of the church; they are wolves among sheep; tares among the wheat; warts and excrescences upon the body. The visible church is, accordingly, the society or congregation of those who profess the true religion; among whom the gospel is faithfully preached, and the sacraments duly administered. And it is simply because such a society cannot be destitute of genuine believers that it is entitled to the name of the church. Profession must be accepted in the judgment of men as equivalent to the possession of faith, and the body of professors must pass for saints, until hypocrites and unbelievers expose themselves.”*

This is the idea of the church almost *totidem verbis*, which

* *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1860, p. 15.

was presented years ago in this journal. Dr. Thornwell derived his doctrine from the same source from which we drew ours, viz. the Scriptures and the Confessions of the Protestant churches, and writings of the Reformed theologians. This is the doctrine which was presented in few words on the floor of the General Assembly, where it was stated that the indwelling of the Spirit constitutes the church, so that where the Spirit is, there the church is. Dr. Thornwell, however, then denounced that doctrine. He said, speaking of his opponent, "His principle is no, no, no Presbyterianism; no, no, no churchism. He alleges that the church is where the Holy Ghost is. Moderator, is not the Holy Ghost in the heart, in the soul of the individual? Who can conceive of, where is the authority for believing that the Holy Ghost dwells in the church, in any other sense than as he dwells in the hearts of those who are members of the church?" He went on at some length to represent the doctrine that where the Spirit is, there the church is, as destroying the visibility of the church, resolving it into an impalpable invisible communion. "It is idle," he argued, "to say that when the apostle says God 'has set in the church,' he is speaking of the invisible church. Where would the apostles, and pastors, and teachers, &c., be in an invisible church? The thing is preposterous, and yet to such resorts have good men been driven, in order to get rid of the force of the arguments which go to establish our views." "The brother from Princeton," against whom all this was directed, had not said one word against the visibility of the church; he had said nothing on the idea of the church, further than was contained in the simple statement, that the Spirit stands in the same relation to the church that the soul does to the body, as its organizing principle, and the source of its attributes and prerogatives. Dr. Thornwell fully believes that doctrine. He taught it clearly and publicly in the month of April last. That he denounced it as preposterous in the month of May is to be accounted for only by the exigencies of debate. It would be hard to hold a lawyer responsible for all the arguments he may urge for his client. Dr. Thornwell had undertaken to prove *that* to be no Presbyterianism

which he and every other Presbyterian in the land fully believed. It was a mere passing phase of thought.

It has been strangely inferred that if we hold that all the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit, we must also hold that nothing relating to the organization of the church is prescribed in the word of God. It might as well be inferred from the fact that the soul fashions and informs the human body, that the body may at one time have the form of a man, and at another, the form of a beast. There are fixed laws assigned by God, according to which all healthful and normal development of the body is regulated. So it is with regard to the church. There are fixed laws in the Bible, according to which all healthful development and action of the external church are determined. But as within the limits of the laws which control the development of the human body, there is endless diversity among different races, adapting them to different climes and modes of living, so also in the church. It is not tied down to one particular mode of organization and action, at all times and under all circumstances. Even with regard to doctrinal truth, we may hold that the Spirit dwells in the believer as a divine teacher, and that all true divine knowledge comes from his inward illumination, without denying that a divine, authoritative rule of faith is laid down in the word of God, which it is impossible the inward teaching of the Spirit should ever contradict. We may believe that the indwelling Spirit guides the children of God in the path of duty, without at all questioning the authority of the moral law as revealed in the Bible. A Christian, however, may believe and do a thousand things not taught or commanded in the Scriptures. He cannot rightfully believe or do anything contrary to the word of God, but while faithful to their teachings and precepts, he has a wide field of liberty of thought and action. It is precisely so with regard to the organization of the church. There are certain things prescribed, to which every church ought to conform, and many things as to which she is at liberty to act as she deems best for God's glory, and the advancement of his kingdom. All we contend for is that everything is not prescribed; that every mode of organization or action is not

either commanded or forbidden; that we must produce a "Thus saith the Lord" for everything the church does. We must indeed be able to produce a "Thus saith the Lord" for everything, whether a truth, or a duty, or a mode of ecclesiastical organization or action, which we make obligatory on the conscience of other men. But our liberty of faith and action beyond the prescriptions of the word of God, is the liberty with which Christ has made us free, and which no man shall take from us.

What we hold, therefore, is, that the leading principles thus laid down in Scripture regarding the organization and action of the church, are the parity of the clergy, the right of the people, and the unity of the church. With respect to these principles, two things were asserted on the floor of the Assembly. First, that they are *jure divino*. That is, that they are clearly taught in the word of God, and intended to be of universal and perpetual obligation. By this is not meant either that they are essential to the being of the church, for nothing can be essential to the church which is not essential to salvation; nor is it meant that these principles may not, under certain circumstances, be less developed or called into action than in others. The right of the people, for example, to take part in the government of the church, may be admitted, and yet the exercise of that right be limited by the ability to exercise it. We do not deny the right of the people in civil matters, when we deny the exercise of that right to minors, to felons, or to idiots. The other position assumed was, that the three principles just mentioned are the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, in such sense as that those who hold those principles in their true intent are Presbyterians, and that those who deny them forfeit their claim to be so regarded.

That the above-mentioned principles are, in the sense stated, *jure divino*, may be proved, as we think, in very few words. If the Holy Spirit, as dwelling in the church, is the source of its several prerogatives, it follows that there can be no offices in the church, of divine authority, to which he does not call its members by imparting to them the appropriate gift. The apostle informs us, that the Spirit distributes his gifts to each one as he wills. Apart from those sanctifying influences com-

mon to all the children of God, by which they are incorporated into the body of Christ, he made some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers. Some had the gift of speaking with tongues, others the gift of healing, others the gift of miracles, others of government, others of helpers. Of these offices thus created, some were extraordinary and temporary, others permanent. Of those connected with the ministry of the word, were the apostles, prophets, and presbyters. The question, therefore, whether there is any permanent class or order of ministers higher than these presbyters, depends on the question, whether the apostolic and prophetic offices were permanent or temporary. It is admitted that in the apostolic church the apostles and prophets were superior to presbyters. If, therefore, we have now apostles and prophets in the church, then there are still two orders of the clergy above ordinary ministers. But if there are now no such offices, then the parity of the clergy is a necessary consequence. That the apostolic and prophetic offices were temporary, is rendered certain from the fact that the peculiar gifts which made an apostle or a prophet are no longer imparted. An apostle was a man endued with plenary knowledge of the gospel by immediate revelation, and who was rendered infallible in the communication of that knowledge by the gift of inspiration. A prophet was a man who received partial revelations and occasional inspiration.

It is not necessary that we should stop to prove that such were the gifts of the apostles and prophets. It is proved by the fact that they claimed them, that they exercised them, that their claim was divinely authenticated and universally admitted, and that the possession of those gifts was essential to their authority as teachers and rulers, to which all men were required to submit on the pain of perdition. It requires no proof that these gifts are no longer possessed by any order of men in the church, and therefore it requires no further proof that the apostolic and prophetic offices are no longer extant. This conclusion as to the temporary nature of those offices is confirmed:

1. By the consideration that there is no command to continue them.
2. That there is no specification of the qualifications to be required in those who sought them.
3. That there is no record of their continuation. They disappeared from the stage

of history as completely as the prophets, judges, and high priests of the Old Testament economy. On the other hand, the gifts of teaching and ruling, which constituted a presbyter, are continued; the command to ordain such officers is on record; their qualifications are minutely laid down; the account of their appointment is found in the Scripture, and they continue in unbroken succession wherever the church is found. These presbyters are therefore the highest permanent officers of the church for which we have any divine warrant. If the church, for special reasons, sees fit to appoint any higher order, such as are found in bishops of the Lutheran church in Europe, and in the superintendents, clothed with presbyterial power, (i. e. the powers of a presbytery,) in the early church of Scotland, this is merely a human arrangement. The parity of the clergy is a matter of divine right. They all hold the same office, and have the same rights, so far as they depend on divine appointment.

As to the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, this also is a divine right. This follows because the Spirit of God, who is the source of all power, dwells in the people, and not exclusively in the clergy; because we are commanded to submit ourselves to our brethren in the Lord; because the people are commanded to exercise this power, and are upbraided when unfaithful or negligent in the discharge of this duty; because the gift of governing or ruling is a permanent gift; and because, in the New Testament we find the brethren in the actual recognized exercise of the authority in question, which was never disputed in the church until the beginning of the dark ages. This right of the people must, of necessity, be exercised through representatives. Although it might be possible in a small congregation for the brotherhood to act immediately, yet in such a city as Jerusalem, where there were five or ten thousand believers, it was impossible that government or discipline should be administered by the whole body of Christians. And when the churches of a province or of a nation, or of all Christendom, united for the decision of questions of general interest, the people must appear by their representatives or not appear at all. Under the Old Testament, in the assembly or congregation of the people, in

the Synagogue and in the Sanhedrim, this principle of representation was by divine appointment universally recognized. By like authority it was introduced into the Christian church as a fundamental principle of its organization. This is the broad, scriptural *jure divino* foundation of the office of ruling elder, an officer who appears with the same credentials, and with equal authority as the minister in all our church-courts, from the session to the General Assembly. The third principle above-mentioned is the unity of the church. This unity is not merely a union of faith and of communion; not merely a fellowship in the Spirit, but a union of subjection, so that one part is subject to a larger, and a larger to the whole. This also is *jure divino*. 1. Because the whole church is made one by the indwelling of the Spirit. 2. Because we are commanded to be subject to our brethren. The ground of this subjection is not proximity in space, nor a mutual covenant or agreement, but the mere fact that they are our brethren, and, therefore, it extends to all brethren. 3. Because in the apostolic, as in the Old Testament church, the whole body of professors of the true religion were thus united as one body. 4. Because by the instinct of Christian feeling the church in all ages has striven after this union of subjection, and recognized its violation as inconsistent with the law of its constitution. This, again, by necessity and divine appointment is a representative union, and hence the provincial, national and oecumenical councils which mark the whole history of the church. We hold, therefore, to a *jure divino* form of church government, so far as these principles go.

The second position assumed in reference to the points above stated was, that those principles constitute the true idea of Presbyterianism. Dr. Thornwell's second speech was devoted to ridiculing and refuting that position. He objected to it as altogether illogical. It was a definition, he said, without any single distinctive characteristic of the subject. Let us look, he said, at these principles. 1st. Parity of the clergy. Why, sir, this is not a distinctive mark of Presbytery. All the evangelical sects except the Episcopal hold to it. 2d. The power of the people. That is not distinctive of Presbyterianism. The Congregationalists carry this further than we do.

3d. The unity of the church. Is this peculiar to us? Is it a peculiar element of our system? Rome holds it with a vehemence which we do not insist upon. "That Presbyterianism!" he exclaimed, "a little of everything and anything, but nothing distinctive."

This is extraordinary logic. And the more extraordinary, considering that Dr. Thornwell had just informed the Assembly that he had studied Aristotle, and every other great master of the science; that he had probably the largest private library of works in that department in the country, and felt prepared to measure swords on that field with any man alive. We do not question either his learning or his skill. We only know that the merest tyro, with logic or without it, can see the fallacy of his argument. He assumes that the only mode of definition is to state the genus of the subject and its specific difference. Thus we define God by saying that he is a Spirit, which states the genus, or class of beings to which he belongs; and we distinguish him from all other spirits by saying he is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. Another method, however, equally legitimate and equally common, is to enumerate the attributes of the subject which complete or individualize the idea. We may define man to be a rational creature, invested with a material body. Should any professor of logic ridicule this definition, and say it includes nothing distinctive, he would only show that his logic was in abeyance. Should he imitate Dr. Thornwell, he would say, "Rationality is no distinctive characteristic of man. God, angels, and demons are all rational. Neither is a dependent created nature such a characteristic. There are other creatures in the universe besides man. Nor is the possession of an organized body anything peculiar. Birds and beasts have bodies. Here, then, we have a little of everything and anything, and nothing peculiar. Is that a man?" Nevertheless, so long as, in the sphere of our knowledge, man is the only rational creature invested with a living body, the above definition is perfectly logical, all the followers of the Stagirite to the contrary notwithstanding. Now, as the principles above stated, the parity of the clergy, the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the church, and the subjection of one part of the church to a larger, and a larger to

the whole, are recognized by Presbyterians, and are not found among Papists, Prelatists, and Independents, or any other historical body of Christians, they are, in their combination, the characteristic or distinguishing features of the Presbyterian system.

Dr. Thornwell stated his own as an antagonistic theory of Presbyterianism. 1. That the church is governed by representative assemblies. 2. Those assemblies include two houses, or two elements, the preaching and ruling elder. 3. The parity of the eldership, all elders, preaching and ruling, appearing in our church courts with the same credentials, and having the same rights. 4. The unity of the church, as realized in the representative principle.

It is obvious that these principles do not involve anything to distinguish Dr. Thornwell's system from that advocated on the other side. He entirely overlooked the main point, and the only point in debate. It was asserted that the Boards are unscriptural and unlawful. They are unlawful, because not commanded in Scripture, and everything not commanded is forbidden. In opposition to this, it was said that the principle, that every mode of organization or action is unlawful which is not prescribed in the word of God, is utterly anti-Presbyterian and unscriptural. In his rejoinder, Dr. Thornwell does not say a word on that point, on which the whole argument turned, but devoted all his strength to prove that "the brother from Princeton" is no Presbyterian. Suppose that to be true, what had it to do with the question? Our being no Presbyterian would not prove the Boards to be unlawful. But even as to that subordinate, irrelevant object, the speech was a failure. Every one of his four principles is involved in those stated on the other side. 1. The principle of representation, as we have seen, is of necessity included in the doctrine of the unity of the church, and the subjection of a part to the whole. This theory can be carried out only through representative assemblies. 2. The union of two elements in these church courts is also embraced in the assertion of the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, for this right can only be exercised through their representatives sitting as constituent elements in ecclesiastical

courts. 3. The parity of the elders and ministers in these representative assemblies, is also included in the one system as well as in others. 4. The unity of the church was avowed on both sides, and was not claimed as peculiar to either. This is not an after thought. All these principles were presented years ago, in the tract, "What is Presbyterianism?" and shown to be involved in those which Dr. Thornwell repudiated as any just description of our system.

The true peculiarities of the new theory, Dr. Thornwell left out of view in his rejoinder. Those principles are, 1. A new doctrine concerning ruling elders. 2. The doctrine that all power in the church is joint and not several. 3. That every thing not prescribed in Scripture is forbidden. We shall say a few words on each of these points in their order.

First, as to the eldership. There are only two radically different theories on this subject. According to the one, the ruling elder is a laymen; according to the other, he is a clergyman. According to the former, he belongs to a different order from the minister, holds a different office, has a different vocation and ordination. He is not a bishop, pastor, or teacher, but officially a ruler. According to the latter, the reverse is true. The ruling elder belongs to the same order with the minister. He is a bishop, pastor, teacher, and ruler. This is all the minister is. They have, therefore, the same office, and differ only as to their functions, as a professor differs from a pastor, or a missionary from a settled minister. It is to be noticed that the point of difference between these theories is not the importance of the office of ruling elder, nor its divine warrant. According to both views, the office is *jure divino*. The Spirit who calls one man to be a minister calls another to be an elder. The one office is as truly from Christ as the other. Nor do the theories differ as to the parity of elders and ministers in our church courts. Both enter those courts with the same credentials, and have the same right to sit, deliberate and determine. The vote of the one avails as much as that of the other. On all these points, the theories agree. The point of difference between them which is radical, affecting the whole character of our system, relates to the nature of the office of the ruling elder. Is he a clergyman, a

bishop? or is he a layman? Does he hold the same office with the minister, or a different one? According to the new theory the offices are identified. Everything said of presbyters in the New Testament, this theory applies equally to elders and ministers of the word. What constitutes identity of office, if it be not identity of official titles, of qualifications, of vocation, of duties, of ordinations? This new doctrine makes all elders, bishops, pastors, teachers, and rulers. It applies all directions as to the qualifications and duties, as to election and ordination of presbyters, as much to the ruling elder as to the minister of the word. It therefore destroys all official distinction between them. It reduces the two to one order, class, or office. The one has as much right to preach, ordain, and administer the sacraments, as the other. The conclusion cannot by possibility be avoided on the theory that elders are pastors, bishops, and teachers, in the same sense with ministers.

The first objection to this theory is that it is entirely contrary to the doctrine and practice of all the Reformed churches, and especially of our own. In those churches the ruling elder is a layman. He has a different office from the minister. He has different gifts, different training, duties, prerogatives, and ordination. The one is ordained by the minister, the other by the Presbytery. The one ministers in the word and sacraments, the other does not. The one is appointed specially to teach and to preach the gospel; the other to take part in the discipline and government of the church.

Secondly, in thus destroying the peculiarity of the office, its value is destroyed. It is precisely because the ruling elder is a layman, that he is a real power, a distinct element in our system. The moment you dress him in canonicals, you destroy his power, and render him ridiculous. It is because he is not a clergyman, it is because he is one of the people, engaged in the ordinary business of life, separated from the professional class of ministers, that he is what he is in our church courts. Thirdly, This theory reduces the government of the church to a clerical despotism. Dr. Thornwell ridiculed this idea. He called it an argument *ad captandum*. He said it was equal in absurdity to the argument of a hard-shell Baptist, who proved that his sect would universally prevail,

from the text, "The voice of the turtle shall be heard in all the land." Turtles, said the Hard-shell, are to be seen sitting upon logs in all the streams, and as you pass, they plunge into the water, therefore, all men will do the same. Such, said Dr. Thornwell, was the logic of the brother from Princeton. Whatever may be thought of the wit of this illustration, we cannot see that it proves much. Does it prove that all power in our church is not in the hands of ministers and elders? and if elders and ministers are all alike bishops and teachers, all of the same order, all clergymen, does it not follow that all power is in the hands of the clergy? But, says Dr. Thornwell, the people choose these elders. What of that? Suppose slaves had a right to choose (under a veto,) their own masters, would they not be slaves still? If, according to the Constitution of the United States, the President, senators, representatives, heads of departments, judges, marshals, all naval and military men holding commissions, in short, all officers from the highest to the lowest, (except overseers of the poor,) must be clergymen, every one would see and feel that all power was in the hands of the clergy. It would avail little that the people choose these clergymen, if the clergy had the sole right to ordain, that is, to admit into their order. All power, legislative, executive, and judicial, would be in their hands, the right of election notwithstanding. This is the government which the new theory would introduce into the church. This doctrine is, therefore, completely revolutionary. It deprives the people of all substantive power. The legislative, judicial, and executive power, according to our system, is in church courts, and if these courts are to be composed entirely of clergymen, and are close, self-perpetuating bodies, then we have, or we should have, as complete a clerical domination as the world has ever seen. It need hardly be said that our fathers, and especially the late Dr. Miller, did not hold any such doctrine as this. There was no man in the church more opposed to this theory than that venerable man, whose memory we have so much reason to cherish with affectionate reverence. We do not differ from Dr. Miller as to the nature of the office of the ruling elder. The only point of difference between him and us relates to the

method of establishing the divine warrant for the office. He laid stress on one argument, we on another. That is all. As to the importance, nature, and divine institution of the office, we are faithful to his instructions. And this we understand to be the ground which our respected contributor in the April number of this *Review* intended to take. It is only as to the point just indicated that we could sanction dissent from the teachings of our venerated and lamented colleague.

Dr. Thornwell himself, in the last extremity, said that he did not hold the new theory. Then he has no controversy with us, nor we with him, so far as the eldership is concerned. The dispute is reduced to a mere logomachy, if the only question is, whether the ruling elder is a presbyter. Dr. Thornwell asked, If he is not a presbyter, what right has he in the Presbytery? You might as well, he said, put any other good man there. It is on all sides admitted that in the New Testament the presbyters are bishops—how then are we to avoid the conclusion that the ruling elder is a bishop, and therefore the same in office as the minister, and the one as much a clergyman as the other? This is the dilemma in which, as we understood, Dr. Thornwell endeavoured to place Dr. Hodge, when he asked him, on the floor of the Assembly, whether he admitted that the elder was a presbyter. Dr. Hodge rejoined by asking Dr. Thornwell whether he admitted that the apostles were deacons. He answered, No. But, says Dr. Hodge, Paul says he was a *διάκονος*. O, says Dr. Thornwell, that was in the general sense of the word. Precisely so. If the answer is good in the one case, it is good in the other. If the apostles being deacons in the wide sense of the word, does not prove that they were officially deacons, then that elders are presbyters in the one sense, does not prove them to be presbyters in the other sense. We hold, with Calvin, that the official presbyters of the New Testament were bishops; for, as he says, “Quicumque verbi ministerio funguntur, iis titulum episcoporum [Scriptura] tribuit.” But of the ruling elders, he adds, “Gubernatores fuisse existimo seniores ex plebe delectos, qui censuræ morum et exercendæ disciplinæ una cum episcopis præessent.” *Institutio*, &c. IV. 3. 8. This is the old, healthful, conservative doctrine of the Presbyterian church. Ministers of the word are clergy-

men, having special training, vocation, and ordination; ruling elders are laymen, chosen from the people as their representatives, having, by divine warrant, equal authority in all church courts with the ministers.

The second point of difference between the new and old theories of Presbyterianism is, that all power in the church is joint, and not several. The objection to this doctrine is simply to the word *all*. It is admitted, and always has been admitted, that the ordinary exercise of the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of the church, is in church courts; according to our system, in sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, and Assembly. About this there is no dispute. But, on the other hand, it is contended, that according to the theory and practice of our own, and of all other Presbyterian bodies, ordination to the sacred office confers the power or authority not only to preach the gospel, but to collect and organize churches, to administer the sacraments, and in the absence of a session, to decide on the qualifications of candidates for admission to those ordinances; and when need be, to ordain, as is done in the case of ruling elders. This is a power which our ministers and missionaries have, and always must exercise. It can never be denied by any who are not the slaves, instead of being the masters of logic. On this point it is not necessary to enlarge.

The third point of difference between the two systems is the extent to which the liberty of the church extends in matters of government and modes of operation. According to the old, and especially the genuine American form of Presbyterianism, while it is admitted that there is a form of government prescribed or instituted in the New Testament, so far as its general principles or features are concerned, there is a wide discretion allowed us by God, in matters of detail, which no man or set of men, which neither civil magistrates nor ecclesiastical rulers, can take from us. This is part of that liberty with which Christ has made us free, and in which we are commanded to stand fast. The other doctrine is the opposite of this. It is, that every thing that is lawful as to the mode in which the church is to be organized, and as to the methods which she is to adopt in carrying on her work, is laid down in Scripture. It is not enough that it is not forbidden; it is not enough that it is in accord-

ance with the principles laid down in the word of God. Unless it is actually commanded, unless we can put our finger on a "Thus saith the Lord," in its support, it is unlawful. God, it was said, has given the church a particular organization, a definite number of offices, courts, organs, agencies; and for us to introduce any other, or even any new combinations, is an indignity to him, and to his word. On this ground, as we have said, the Boards were pronounced unscriptural. Their abrogation was made a matter of duty. It was urged upon our conscience as demanded by our allegiance to God. It is our firm belief that there were not six men in the Assembly who held this doctrine. There were sixty who voted for some organic change in the Boards, but so far as we know, there were only two who took the ground of this superlative high-churchism. It is utterly repugnant to the spirit of the New Testament, to the practice of the church universal, to the whole character of Protestantism, and especially of our Presbyterianism; it is so preposterous and suicidal, that we have no more fear of its prevalence among us, than that the freemen of this country will become the advocates of the divine right of kings. We have no intention of discussing this question at length, which we deem altogether unnecessary. We shall content ourselves with a few remarks on two aspects of the case.

In the first place, this theory never has been, nor can be carried out, even by its advocates. Consistency would require them to repudiate all organizations, not Boards only, but Committees also, and confine the joint agency of the church to sessions, Presbyteries, Synods and General Assemblies. They hold these only to be divinely instituted organs for joint action. And it is perfectly clear that if these be departed from, or if other agencies be adopted, the whole principle is given up. Accordingly, the first ground assumed by the advocates of the new theory, was that missionary operations could be carried on only by the Presbyteries. The law of God was said to forbid everything else. When this was found impracticable, then it was discovered that a board or court of deacons, was the divinely instituted agency, and the word of God was made to forbid any other. This, however, would not go. Then followed other discoveries, and at last it was found out that a

committee was the thing. God permits a committee, but to institute a board is an act of rebellion. But what is the difference? A committee is no more commanded than a board. The one is as much a delegated body as the other. Both continue as a living organism after the Assembly appointing them is dissolved and dead. We were referred to the Committee of Church Extension as an illustration of the radical difference between the two organizations. The only difference, however, is that one is larger than the other. There is not a single principle involved in the one, which is not involved also in the other.

It may be said, and it was said in the last extremity, that an executive committee appointed directly by the Assembly, is a simpler device than a board, and that the church is limited in her choice of agencies to what is absolutely necessary. But, in the first place, this is an admission that everything necessary is not prescribed in Scripture which is contrary to the theory. In the second place, the Committee of Church Extension, which was held up as the model, is not the simplest possible, by a great deal. A single executive officer is a simpler device than an executive committee, and much more so than a committee of thirty or forty members. In the third place, when it is said we are forbidden to adopt any means not absolutely necessary, the question arises, Necessary for what? For doing the work? or, for doing it in the best and most effectual manner? If the latter, which is the only rational view of the matter, then again the whole principle is abandoned; for it must rest with the judgment of the church to decide what measures are best adapted for her purpose, and this is all the discretion any body desires. It is obvious that the principle advocated by these brethren is one which they themselves cannot carry out. The church is getting tired of such hair-splitting. She is impatient of being harassed and impeded in her great operations by such abstractions. If, however, the principle in question could be carried out, what would be the consequence? Of course we could have no church-schools, colleges, or theological seminaries; no appliances for the education of the heathen, such as all churches have found it necessary to adopt. The boards of directors of

our Seminaries must be given up. No one pretends that they are commanded in Scripture, or that they are absolutely necessary to the education of the ministry. We had educated ministers before Seminaries were thought of. So far as we heard, not a word was said in the Assembly in answer to this *argumentum ad hominem*. The brethren who denounced the Board of Missions as unscriptural, had nothing to say against the boards of the Seminaries. Any one sees, however, that if the one is unlawful, the others must be.

The grand objection urged against this new theory, the one which showed it to be not only inconsistent and impracticable, but intolerable, was, that it is, in plain English, nothing more or less than a device for clothing human opinions with divine authority. The law of God was made to forbid not only what it says, but what may be inferred from it. We grant that what a man infers from the word of God binds his own conscience. But the trouble is, that he insists that it shall bind mine also. We begged to be excused. No man may make himself the lord of my conscience, much less will any man be allowed to make himself lord of the conscience of the church. One man infers one thing, another a different, from the Bible. The same man infers one thing to-day, and another thing to-morrow. Must the church bow her neck to all these burdens? She would soon be more trammelled than the church in the wilderness, with this infinite difference, the church of old was measurably restricted by fetters which God himself imposed; the plan now is to bind her with fetters which human logic or caprice forges. This she will never submit to.

Dr. Thornwell told us that the Puritans rebelled against the doctrine that what is not forbidden in Scripture is allowable. It was against the theory of liberty of discretion, he said, our fathers raised their voices and their arms. We always had a different idea of the matter. We supposed that it was in resistance to this very doctrine of inferences they poured out their blood like water. In their time, men inferred from Romans xiii. 1, ("Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation,") the doctrine of passive submission. From the

declaration and command of Christ, "The Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do," they inferred the right of the church to make laws to bind the conscience. On this ground tories and high-church men sought to impose on the church their trumpery vestments, and their equally frivolous logical deductions. It was fetters forged from inferences our fathers broke, and we, their children, will never suffer them to be rewelded. There is as much difference between this extreme doctrine of divine right, this idea that everything is forbidden which is not commanded, as there is between this free, exultant church of ours, and the mummied forms of mediæval Christianity. We have no fear on this subject. The doctrine need only be clearly propounded to be rejected.

SHORT NOTICES.

Sermons. By Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner, Grand street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1860. Vols. I. II.

The unexpected death of Dr. J. Addison Alexander in the prime of life, and in the full maturity of his extraordinary talents, is a loss to the church and the world which cannot be estimated. It was natural that those best acquainted with his worth, should at once do all they could, by the publication of his literary remains, to compensate for so great a loss. It is to be lamented that these are so few. It was perhaps an incident of his mental superiority, that he could never satisfy himself. His ideal was always above the actual. The consequence was that he left many works unfinished. Many collections of materials in such a state as to be intelligible only to himself. Happily, this was not the case with his sermons. Many, indeed, of his discourses, the recollections of which, those who heard them cherish most fondly, cannot now be found. These volumes, however, are proof that a sufficient number were written out in full, and escaped destruction at his own hands, to give some idea of his power as a preacher. The impression which he made in the pulpit was less due to

any charm of voice and manner, than to the intrinsic excellence of his discourses. His sermons are of very different kinds, but all have certain characteristics which belong to all the productions of his pen. We find everywhere the same exquisite felicity of expression; the same freedom from redundancy; the same perspicuity and order; the same refined taste; the same weight of thought, soundness of doctrine, and devotional spirit. With these general characteristics, which never failed to delight his hearers, those accustomed to attend upon his preaching are aware that no two consecutive discourses were often constructed on the same plan. Sometimes he obviously had for his object, even when he selected a single verse for a text, to bring out all the richness of the context, and to show the intimate relation of the several parts of the discourse of which his text was only a fragment. At other times he would take a single idea and exhibit it in its manifold bearings. In some sermons the impression is produced mainly through the imagination, by a succession of imagery and graphic description, filling the mind with the radiance of truth. In others, the largest views are presented of the whole scheme of divine dispensations as unfolded in the Scripture, bringing everything to converge on a single point. Examples of these several modes of sermonizing may be found in these volumes. He rarely, if ever, preached a doctrinal sermon, that is, he was not wont to take up a theological subject, such as justification, regeneration, or the like, and give it a formal discussion. His discourses were all biblical in their form, and truth was always presented as he found it in the Bible. In everything he showed the hand of a master; and we doubt not that these sermons will go wherever the English language is known, and be read as long as that language is understood.

Forty Years' Familiar Letters. By James W. Alexander, D. D. Constituting, with Notes, a Memoir of his Life. By the surviving correspondent, John Hall, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner, Grand Street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1860.

The reputation of few men could stand the publication of their familiar letters, written almost weekly for forty years. That the reputation of Dr. James W. Alexander passes through this ordeal unscathed; that he appears from first to last, in the most unreserved self-revelations, the same man, the same gentleman, Christian, and scholar we contemplate, in the more formal and public exhibitions of himself, is the clearest proof of his sterling worth. It is natural that those who have been accustomed to contemplate him themselves, or who wish him to be remembered by others, as the preacher and author,

should feel some solicitude as to the effect of this clear revelation of his character, as seen at the fire-side. We think such fears are altogether unfounded. It is only a small part of the man which is seen in public; and still less can be exhibited in history. It is at home, among his friends, that the man is known; and in his familiar letters he is most faithfully portrayed. De Wette's collection of Luther's Letters, in five volumes, is worth manifold more than all the biographies of the Reformer, and all the histories of the Reformation, to give us a real knowledge of the man. He nowhere appears so great, so amiable, so disinterested and genial. It would be an unreasonable objection, that these letters are often on trivial subjects; sometimes thanks to the Elector for a present of game, or a petition for a new gown; or, as more frequently happens, intercessions for some poor widow or necessitous student. It is precisely these little things which let us into the real character of the man. In the letters before us, there are many which have no higher value in themselves than these begging letters of Luther, but they are nevertheless parts of the many-sided mirror which reflect the image of the writer, now at one angle and now at another. The collection extending over so long a period, constitutes not only a history of his inner life, but a history of his times, as viewed from his position. There is scarcely an important event in church or state, scarcely a noticeable production of the press, which is not the subject of remark. His pure English diction, his scholarly attainments, his zeal for truth and religion, his sound judgment and warm feelings, as here manifested, give not only an exalted opinion of the writer, but add a lasting value to this publication as a record of personal, ecclesiastical, and literary history. We doubt not that these volumes will be more and more highly estimated, the farther the flow of time removes the author and his age from the view of the reader.

The Epistle to the Romans, in Greek and English; with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary. By Samuel H. Turner, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Revised and Corrected. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. 1859.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, in Greek and English, with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary. By Samuel H. Turner, D. D., &c. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1859.

These handsomely printed volumes are revised editions of works already extensively and favourably known. The learned and venerable author has exhibited everywhere the evidence of mature scholarship, judgment, and moderation.

A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of John, for the use of Ministers, Theological Students, Private Christians, Bible-classes, and Sunday-schools. By John J. Owen, D. D. New York: Leavitt & Allen, 24 Walker street. 1860.

This volume completes the series of Dr. Owen's Commentaries on the Gospels, leaving only the one on Acts to the full accomplishment of his plan. The volumes already published have secured for their author a high reputation as a learned and judicious commentator, which cannot fail to secure for this work a cordial reception from the Christian public.

The Province of Reason: a Criticism on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By John Young, LL.D., Edinburgh, author of "The Christ of History." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. pp. 305.

Sir William Hamilton has earned for himself so high a name, and rendered such real service to philosophy, that there is danger that some of his principles, borrowed unconsciously, or rather, as it were, absorbed, from the German transcendentalists, and rendered more popular in the writings of his disciples, may gain a hurtful influence in the public mind. We rejoice, therefore, to see this vigorous protest from the pen of a writer of so much ability as Dr. Young. We cannot, in this short notice even indicate the points in controversy, much less express any judgment of the merits of the case. We can only commend the book to the attention of students in this department of science.

Analytic Orthography: an Investigation of the Sounds of the Voice, and their Alphabetical Notation; including the Mechanism of Speech, and its bearing on Etymology. By S. S. Haldeman, A. M., Professor in Delaware College, &c. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: Trubner & Co. Paris: Benjamin Duprat. Berlin: Fred. Dummler. 1860. Quarto, pp. 148.

This is a work evincing great research and knowledge in the department of comparative grammar. It is replete with facts and suggestions, presented in a fragmentary form. It is rather a preparation for a full examination of the subject of which it treats, than a complete treatise of itself.

The Revelation of John its own Interpreter, in virtue of the Double Version in which it is delivered. By John Cochran. D. Appleton & Co., 443 and 445 Broadway. 1860. pp. 358.

The author's idea is that the events predicted in the Revelations, are first set forth briefly in a series of visions; and then these same events more fully described and disclosed in those which follow. The latter thus present, according to his theory, the prophet's own interpretation of the former. We must

refer the reader to the work itself for a further insight into its plan, of which we have not had time to get a more definite idea.

Memoir of the Life, Character and Writings of Philip Doddridge, D. D., with a Selection from his Correspondence. Compiled by the Rev. James R. Boyd, A. M., Editor of "English Poets," with Notes, &c. American Tract Society.

Mr. Boyd has made good use of the materials at his command, and given the Christian public in this country a pleasing and instructive memoir of one of the most useful men of the last century.

The Biblical Reason Why: a Family Guide to Scripture Readings, and a Hand-book for Biblical Students. By the author of "The Reason Why . . . General Science," "The Reason Why . . . Natural History." Illustrated with numerous engravings. New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, No. 18 Ann street.

The publishers, in giving the American public access to this pithy and comprehensive work, have rendered a good service, the nature and value of which those who have read the works on the same plan by the same author mentioned on the title-page, will be able to understand. It asks one thousand four hundred and ninety-three questions on all topics of Scripture history and antiquities, to which it gives concise and in general satisfactory answers.

The Signet Ring and other Gems. From the Dutch of the Rev. J. De Liefde. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Philadelphia: Smith & English. 1860.

The first part of this volume was published some years ago, and was favourably received. The American publishers have obtained two other small works by the same author, and included them in this work. The new Testament parables are the models from which Mr. De Liefde has derived his method of instruction, which is commended for its simplicity and rich vein of experimental piety.

Memoir of the Rev. Peter Labagh, D.D., with Notices of the History of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church in North America. By the Rev. John A. Todd, Pastor of the Second Dutch church of Tarrytown, New York. New York: Board of Publication of the Protestant Reformed Dutch Church. Synod's Rooms, No. 61 Franklin street. 1860. Pp. 339.

Dr. Labagh being long settled in this immediate vicinity, and highly respected beyond as well as within the bounds of his own denomination, this account of his life will be specially acceptable to his friends in New Jersey. The volume has its value also as a contribution to the ecclesiastical and religious history of the country.

Lessons About Salvation; from the Life and Words of the Lord Jesus. Being a Second Series of Plantation Sermons. By the Rev. A. F. Dickson, Orangeburg, S. C. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 264.

These simple discourses are well adapted for the instruction of the class of persons for whom they were intended.

Seed-Time and Harvest of Ragged Schools. By Thomas Guthrie, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

The religious education of the poor, particularly in our large cities, is the grand necessity of our age and country. The mass of the population in such great centres is growing up in heathenism or worse. In Europe, among Protestants on the Continent, the law provides for this great object. Scarcely a bare-footed boy in Berlin can be found who cannot read and write, repeat Luther's Catechism, and give a good account of the facts and doctrines of the Bible. Here men are without law in this matter. Whatever Christians and philanthropists can do to supply this great need by voluntary and systematic effort, it becomes them to do with their might, for the evil, actual and prospective, is portentous.

The Divine Purpose Explained, or All Things Decered; yet Evil not caused, nor Moral Freedom impaired, and the Glory of God the end of all. By the Rev. George Morton. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson.

The high themes here discussed have never ceased to enlist the interest, and task the powers of all grades of thinkers. They involve an insoluble element which men never tire of attempting to solve. Even among those who agree as to the essential truths concerned, and accept the Calvinistic system, considerable diversity obtains as to their methods of explaining and vindicating them, and still more as to how far the problems presented by the existence of evil admit of any rational solution, i. e., whether the facts and truths on this subject, which are undeniably proved, can, with any light at command in this world, be explicated, on all sides, to the perfect satisfaction of mere human reason. Among the great mass of Calvinistic divines, however, the following points may be considered as established and catholic, and all contrary opinions exceptional and casual. 1. That God is absolutely sovereign, and hath foreordained all events, including the acts of free agents. 2. That man is absolutely free in all his acts, which are thus pre-appointed. 3. That man is the immediate cause or efficient of his own acts. 4. That these acts are determined as to matter and quality by the motives, i. e. the desires and dispositions which prompt them. 5. That God is the efficient cause of all holy desires and dispositions, and controls the

outward circumstances which soothe and direct all outgoings of desire and disposition, both holy and sinful. 6. That God is the cause of evil dispositions, desires, and consequent volitions, only in a privative way—only as the sun is the cause of night, or food of hunger. He is the privative cause of sin, as by his absence or withdrawal, he takes away those regulative and purifying influences, without which the more natural principles of humanity relapse into disorder and lawlessness, i. e. sin. 7. That this withdrawal of God from man, which results in his debasement, is the penalty of the first sin of Adam, committed while he was on trial as the representative of his posterity. 8. That Adam was created upright, perfectly good after his own kind, with every motive and aid for remaining so, and that he fell, not through any original evil in his nature, or any necessity inherent in him as a created and dependent being, but through the perverse exercise of his own free will. Although made holy, he was also made mutable. 9. God makes his own glory the ultimate end of all his decrees and procedures, not excepting those relating to the sins of his creatures. 10. The moral quality of the acts and dispositions of moral agents depends on their nature, not on their origin.

These are among the common-places of standard theology. Along with them it recognizes points in relation to the origin of evil, and the connection between the divine decrees and free agency, that are shrouded in mystery, and insoluble to human reason. From time to time, however, excellent and able men have struck out theories which have seemed to them to clear these difficulties, and solve all the problems they involve. These theories have never commanded permanent and general assent.

This work of Mr. Morton maintains with considerable ability most of the great principles of standard theology, which we have specified above. Beyond this, it undertakes to solve the perplexities which overcloud the subject by referring the origin of sin to necessary "creational imperfection." Though he says much that is ingenious, we find all the mysteries remaining as thick and deep as before. Does this "creational imperfection" render the holy angels and redeemed men liable to apostacy? The work has value in its true things, rather than its new things.

The Bible and Social Reform; or the Scriptures as a Means of Civilization. By R. H. Tyler, A. M., of Fulton, New York. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1860.

The doctrines maintained in this volume are excellent. That the Bible is the word of God, clothed with his authority, and

in all its parts obligatory on the conscience; the only true light for the guidance, elevation, and felicity of our spiritual and immortal nature; that it is the only source of permanent and trustworthy progress for our race, even in this world; that it is the only effective spring of true civilization and genuine philanthropy; that the declaration of some of our statesmen, that the government of the United States is "not in any sense founded on the Christian religion," is false—all these are truths of paramount importance, which are earnestly advocated in this volume.

We think, however, that in an esthetic and artistic view, the book is at fault. The style is careless, and too diffuse. It would be greatly improved by condensation, and a stronger tinge of classic neatness and elegance. It also suffers from an undue egotism. Of all which, the following, from the preface, is a small specimen: "I trust that to do good is the object of my effort; and the ultimate result will depend upon the ability with which the effort shall be made. The subject is abounding in merit, and herein I rely for success."

Morning Hours in Patmos: The Opening Vision of the Apocalypse, and Christ's Epistles to the Seven Churches of Asia. By A. C. Thompson, author of *Better Land*, &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

The accomplished author of this volume adds to his other qualifications for it, the advantage of foreign travel over the very localities which are chiefly referred to in the portion of the sacred volume upon which he comments. This circumstance helps him to shed light and interest over his expositions. These cover the introductory portion of the Apocalypse, but stop short of the prophetic parts of it, which that prince of commentators, John Calvin, said he could not understand. The doctrinal and practical significance of this part of the book of Revelation are evolved by the author with great beauty and force. We find here what is so precious—the union of evangelical unction and devout feeling with raciness of thought and expression. The book belongs decidedly to the higher grade of our current popular religious literature.

Historical Vindications: A Discourse on the Province and Uses of Baptist History; delivered before the Backus Historical Society, at Newton, Massachusetts, June 23, 1857. Repeated before the American Baptist Historical Society, at New York, May 14, 1859. With Appendixes, containing Historical Notes, and Confessions of Faith. By Sewall S. Cutting, Professor of Rhetoric and History in the University of Rochester. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

While it is unnecessary for us to say that we do not accept such views in this volume as are peculiar to Baptists, it gives

us great pleasure to add, that we highly appreciate the able and scholarly character, and the high-toned Christian spirit of the discourse, which is the nucleus of this volume. It has a still higher value, as an important contribution to the history of a numerous branch of the church. The Creeds and Confessions of the Baptist bodies in Great Britain and America, which are found in the Appendix to this volume, are of great interest, both in themselves and as contributions to the history of Christian symbolism. That framed by representatives of the Baptist churches in London, in the year 1680, is of especial interest to us, on account of its close adherence, in matter and expression, to the Westminster standards.

The Homilist: A Series of Sermons for Preachers and Laymen. Original and Selected. By Erwin House, A. M. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1860.

These sermons are midway between mere skeletons, or the dry, dead frame-work of discourses, and the fully developed and finished sermon. They exhibit all stages of growth, between the first swelling of the germ and the matured product. They are more instructive and interesting to common readers than ordinary sermons, because they are more compact, go more directly to the heart of the subject, and stir the mind to think, in developing the germs of thought which are set in contact with it. At the same time, they are by no means bare of imagery and other accessories, which infuse the *vis vivida* into thought and expression. They are in a high degree suggestive and quickening. So far as these sermons are designed for preachers, they are quite above the average grade of helps of this sort which have been provided for them. It is, however, only under the most stringent limitations that we can commend, or even tolerate, the use of such helps to sermonizing. So far as they quicken, feed, and invigorate the mind—are digested and assimilated by it, and appear only in the effect they work upon its own living insight and thought—so far their use is both allowable and commendable. They are on the same footing with whatever nourishes or invigorates the mind, or goes to furnish it for any particular service. But so far as they are taken up simply as substitutes for one's own thoughts and acquisitions, and dealt out bodily as if they were his own mental products, the effect is most pernicious. It enervates the moral and intellectual faculties; it tends towards the paralysis of the soul, and often ends in utter moral and intellectual impotence. This volume will be most useful to those who employ it as a means of suggesting and quickening, most injurious to those who make it a substitute for, thought. Its tone is decidedly

evangelical. It is only occasionally that we detect even a tinge of Arminian theology.

A Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, intended for Popular Use. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This is an addition to our stock of Commentaries on the Gospels, so constructed as to be useful to all, but especially to private Christians and Sabbath-school teachers. It is well written, and will be welcome, not only to the Methodist body, to which its author belongs, but to many in other communions, who seek the aid of various interpreters in the study of Christ's life and teachings.

History of the Great Reformation in England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, France, and Italy. By the Rev. Thomas Carter. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1860.

For those who desire to read an account of the Reformation reduced to a compass of one volume of moderate size, this work may be suitable, provided they rate at their true value its feeble thrusts at Calvin and Calvinism.

The Life of Jacob Gruber. By W. P. Strickland. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This is the biography of a Methodist minister, a Pennsylvanian by birth, who laboured in the early half of the present century. He was a man of rude, uncultivated strength, of narrow views, of intense energy. Often crude and rough in thought and expression, he has found a fit biographer in the writer of this volume, who tells us of "the Young Americas of Gruber's day, who regarded age as a synonym of fogyism," etc. One portion of the work, however, redeems it. It gives an account of the indictment and trial of Gruber, on the charge of preaching insurrection to the slaves in Maryland. The able arguments of Chief Justice Taney and his associate counsel, in defence of Gruber, are given in full. For various reasons, these monuments of the past will now be studied with interest and profit.

