

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Article I.—*Theories of the Eldership.**

It is not intended in the present discussion to raise the question of the scriptural warrant of ruling elders in the church of Christ, nor any quarrel about the propriety of the designation—ruling elders—in the *general* meaning of both terms—as happily descriptive of their official dignity and office as the representatives of the Christian people, and assessors with the Christian ministry in the government of the church. But as names are things, and principles precede and prepare for practical results, it is, we think, of great importance to have it clearly understood and definitively established that the name of ruling elder is applicable only in the general, and not in the official sense affixed to it in the New Testament and by the early church, and indeed by the church universally until long

* As it is designed to make this a constitutional argument, it will be necessary to review all the works on the subject of ruling powers, from Dr. Miller's work to the present time, including the separate works of Dr. Wilson, Dr. King, McKerrow, Lorimer, Guthrie, and Robinson's Church of God, Dr. Addison Alexander's Primitive Offices, Dr. Breckinridge's Knowledge of God, vol. ii., Dr. Thornwell's Review of it, Dr. Adger's Inaugural Address, and Dr. Killen's Ancient Church. The nature of the argument will require the frequent exhibition of authoritative standards.

after the Reformation; and that the true basis and authority of these official representatives of the people are to be found in other terms contained in the only recognized constitutional code of doctrine, order, and officers in the church of God.

"It is a disreputable truth," says Dr. Thornwell, "that there are many Presbyterians and Presbyterian ministers who are very imperfectly acquainted with the characteristic principles of their own system," and that it "is still disputed whether he (the ruling elder) is the proxy of the congregation, deriving all his rights and authority from a delegation of power on the part of the people, or whether he is an officer divinely appointed, deriving his authority from Christ the Lord. It is still disputed whether he belongs to the same order with the minister, or whether the minister alone is the presbyter of Scripture, and the ruling elder a subordinate assistant. It is still disputed whether he sits in Presbytery as the deputy of the brotherhood, or whether he sits there by divine right as a constituent element of the body; whether, as a member of Presbytery, he can participate in all Presbyterial acts, or is debarred from some by the low nature of his office."* *Southern Presbyterian Review*, 1859, p. 615.

To this "disreputable" diversity and "imperfect acquaintance with the characteristic principles of their own system," Dr. Thornwell opposes what he approves and commends to Presbyterians as "indisputable"—the theory of Dr. Breckinridge—which with characteristic powers of analysis he thus sums up: "That all government is by councils; that these councils are representative and deliberative; that *jure Divino* they are all Presbyteries, and as Presbyteries composed exclusively of presbyters; that presbyters, *though one in order, and the right to rule, are subdivided into two classes;* that all Presbyteries, whether parochial, classical, or synodical, are radically the same; that the church in its germ, and in its fullest development, presents the same elements; that her whole polity is that of a free commonwealth," in which the ruling

* To this *argumentum ad invidiam* we may at once reply, that no office in the church of God can be *low*, and that Israel's greatest king would rather be a door-keeper in the house of God than be a ruler or an heir presumptive among the ungodly.

elder can participate in ALL Presbyterial acts, including, of course, ordination, imposition of hands, &c.

But is this theory—*novel* so far as it is different from the established doctrine and practice of Presbyterian churches—an Irenicum or an apple of discord? Even as a philosophical analysis it seems to us imperfect; for surely, in the last analysis, preaching the glad tidings of a glorious gospel is the chief end and characteristic of the church, as God's instrumental agency for the salvation of lost sinners. Preaching and preachers, and not ruling and rulers, must be the ultimate characteristic of that church which is the pillar and ground of the truth, and through which the manifold wisdom of God is made known unto principalities and powers in heavenly places. Neither does this theory give us a faultless classification or a real unity. A *class* is more general than an *order*, and includes it; and since they are distinguished from each other by constant forms of diversity, two *classes* or *orders* of officers cannot make *one order*. Besides, our Constitution, and that of probably every other Presbyterian church recognizes a third class or order of officers—DEACONS. These are united with the others in the oversight, ministration, and even government of the church within their sphere—that is, the management of the temporalities and charities of congregations. In the early Christian church, and in the church of Scotland, deacons actively united in the distribution of the elements in the Lord's Supper. In the First Book of Discipline they are spoken of as with elders having authority to judge in the kirk of God, and, like them, were elected "every year once." "One of the seniors and one of the deacons once in the year notified the life, manners, study, and diligence of the minister," &c. "They may also assist in judgment with the minister and elders, and may be admitted to read in the assembly if they be required, and be able thereto." The "Deacons' Court" is now a fundamental part of the constitution of the Free Church of Scotland, the members of which are—1. the minister or ministers of the congregation; 2. the elders; and 3. the deacons. According to the theory of the Presbyterian church, the greater office includes the less. The minister and elders can therefore be deacons, and can sit and act as mem-

bers of this court. All the members are thus deacons, and have equal rights, and hence the appropriateness of the name—the "Court of Deacons."*

Now, in the analysis given us of this theory so "ably, scripturally, and unanswerably established" by Dr. Breckinridge, the existence of such officers as "a characteristic principle of the Presbyterian system" is ignored as *one* of the three "ordinary and perpetual officers in the church."

To reduce our system to a philosophical unity, we must therefore generalize the officers of the church, so as by the omission of specific differences of order, to make one class for the united government and oversight of the churches. This is the unity to which the Presbyterian polity was reduced by the Second Book of Discipline in 1578. "The whole policy of the kirk consisteth in three things, viz. in doctrine, discipline, and distribution. With doctrine is annexed the administration of sacraments, and according to the parts of this division arises a three-fold sort of office-bearers in the kirk, to wit, of ministers or preachers, elders or governors, and deacons or distributors; and all these may be called by one general word—ministers of the kirk." But we may also arrive at a unity still more suggestive of the propriety of our Presbyterian name, by referring it at once to our doctrine concerning the presbyter, or, to use the language of the same Book, of "pastors, bishops, or ministers who are appointed to particular congregations, which they rule by the word of God, and over which they watch—in respect whereof sometime they are called pastors—sometime *episcopi* or bishops—sometimes ministers—and sometimes also presbyters or seniors." By their belief in this one and only order of ministers, Presbyterians are characteristically distinguished

* Forbes' Digest, pp. 8, 9. It is added in a note: "It must never be forgotten that the elders are also deacons." The Rev. Stuart Robinson speaks of the office of deacons as a power of government in the church for accomplishing its design in "the provision for and care of the revenues of the community." (See "Church of God," pp. 89 and 120.) We will have more to say on this subject however hereafter, and on no subject does our church require more quickening than on the true nature, relations, and functions of deacons. Dr. Breckinridge, however, if reported aright in the Assembly, seemed to attribute to them independent sovereign rule in their sphere, while he ignores them as rulers. This is an extreme.

from those churches which believe in an order of ordained ministers higher than presbyters, to whom is restricted, by divine right, the exclusive power of ordination and jurisdiction in the church. According to the Presbyterian church, the presbyter is the only order of permanent ministers in the church—the only order ordained by imposition of the hands of the Presbytery—the only order clothed with the power of ordination by imposition of hands—the only authorized administrators of the sacraments, and public teachers of doctrine; and an order which being, as our standards declare, "the first in the church both for dignity and usefulness," contains within itself both the eldership and the deaconship, and may therefore properly be taken as the representative of all. And that this is the true exposition of our modern denominational title, there is, as we will show, satisfactory evidence.

Let this however be as it may, the theory propounded by Dr. Thornwell as "ably, scripturally, and unanswerably established" by Dr. Breckinridge, has not relieved *even its friends* from the "disreputable charge of being ignorant of the characteristic principles of their own system," and cannot therefore be satisfactory *to us*. In the previous number of the same *Review*, in which Dr. Thornwell announces this theory, Dr. Adger proclaims the one which, as professor in the same Theological Seminary, he maintains. Says he:* "The other view, and *I think the true view* of the nature of this office, makes the ruling elder to be the *aboriginal* presbyter, and makes the *essence* of the Presbyterate to be *ruling*. It makes the overseers or bishops of the church at Ephesus, whom Paul summoned to Miletus, to be ruling elders. It makes the description which Paul gives to Timothy of the bishop, relate to the ruling elder. It makes those whom Titus ordained in every city, ruling elders, in distinction from teaching elders. It denies that presbyter and preacher were originally synonymous; but views preaching as a function—a *charisma* (or gift,) as Neander expresses it, which came to be superadded to certain of the rulers. They had suitable talents, and so were chosen and called to that work." Dr. Adger therefore simpli-

* Inaugural Discourse on Church History, &c., in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1859, p. 171.

fies the analysis by denying "one order subdivided into two classes," and by rejecting altogether any *office* or order of the ministry of the word and sacraments to be of divine institution, and admits only the *work* or *function* of the ministry by such presbyters as are *gifted* for it. The ministry, therefore, is not a permanent divine office, having spiritual relation to the whole employment of the ministry, in a person qualified and specially called and ordained thereto, but a *work* performed by those who were ruling elders—"a function, a *charisma* or gift, which comes to be superadded to certain of the rulers," as Neander thought was the case—only, however, in the very beginning of Christianity.* This is a very simple theory, and very confidently set forth by Dr. Adger. "Beginning," says he, "with the elders of Israel, in the days of Moses, and coming down to the elders of the synagogue, after the return from Babylon; and thence still further descending to the elders, or presbyters, or bishops, or pastors of the New Testament, this view finds them always to be *rulers*, in distinction from *teachers*. And scrutinizing carefully the testimonies of the apostolic Fathers also, and of the primitive church, this view finds the presbyter, or the elder in the early church, to be simply a ruler and a shepherd of Christ's flock." "Paul says that a bishop (or ruling elder) must be 'apt to teach,' but not because the duty of public instruction belongs to him officially. He teaches indeed from house to house, ... yet he is not himself a teacher, but simply a ruler in God's house." Again Dr. Adger says:

"In their own congregations, many elders there are whom the people respect as good citizens; industrious, honest men; kind neighbours and pious Christians; but they get none of the respect which is demanded by the high spiritual office they wear. The reason is, that the elder himself is not sensible

* Neander admits that *he was not able to say* "whether, in the appointment of presbyters, care was taken that only those who were furnished with the gift of teaching should be admitted into the college of presbyters." At a later period, as appears from Titus i. 9, he thinks "care was taken that overseers should be appointed who would be able, by their *public instructions*, to protect the church from the infection of false doctrine;" or in other words, the presbyters were all ministers and preachers.—See *History and Planting of Christianity*, vol. i.

that 'the Holy Ghost hath made him an overseer over the flock, to feed the church of God;' and, accordingly, he does not go about, as he ought, both with and without the minister, 'from house to house, warning every one night and day with tears.' The people do not have the remotest conception that he is a pastor of the flock, because there is no visitation or other pastorship of the flock by him. I have heard it said, that in the old country the children look on the visit of the elder with the same reverential awe, and yet the same filial delight, as on the visit of the minister. *There*, he is a minister; he is a pastor; he is a bishop of souls." "He is a shepherd of the blood-bought flock." "When he (Christ) ascended up on high, he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists. These were extraordinary officers, that do not belong to a settled state of the church. Then he gave also, for ordinary officers, some pastors and teachers. I (that is, Dr. Adger) do not say the office of rule is superior, nor yet in every respect even equal to that of instruction; *but I say*, the Holy Spirit here names it *first:* 'Some *pastors*, (i. e. *ruling elders*,) and (or *then*) teachers.' "

We have brought these passages together from the same article, because "extreme cases prove principles," and the theory we are considering is here presented in its plain and legitimate development.

Dr. Adger, however, is not alone in such conclusions. Dr. Thompson, of Buffalo, New York, in his opening discourse before the last General Assembly of the New-School Body, "denied," as reported in the *New York Observer*, "the propriety of the distinction which exists between clergy and elders, and declared that even if church law made such a distinction, the law of the Scriptures did not support the law of the church. The Scriptures know of no distinction in the office of elder, but all elders are bishops. A minister is an elder to labour in word and doctrine; an elder is a bishop called from word and doctrine to labour in the government and oversight of the church. Having defined the bishop's office in this comprehensive manner, the preacher devoted the remainder of his discourse to a presentation of the bishop's good work."

Dr. Thompson agrees and differs fundamentally with Dr.

Adger. He agrees in reducing all church officers to one order, but he diametrically differs in making that one the *clergy*, and not *elders*. Dr. Thompson's theory is the one which, by the irresistible necessity of logic and of facts, must be adopted in any attempt to reduce to one order the officers of the church. It has therefore found voice in our own church from independent investigation and analysis in a review of two publications on the Ruling Eldership, in the *Central Presbyterian* for September 17, 1859. Uniting with his author in lamenting the inefficiency of our church, he lays it down that "the theory of the Presbyterian church is defective in regard to the office of the eldership, and that defect militates against her efficiency in this work, and perhaps lays the foundation for most of her deficiencies in other respects. We accept Presbyterianism as a thoroughly scriptural system in its doctrines, and in all essential points of government. As a whole we believe it impregnable, but in one point we conceive it inconsistent with itself and with the word of God.

"In the tracts noticed, and in all the discussions of this subject, we have seen, as well as the Form of Government itself, it is assumed that there are two distinct and independent classes of elders, the ruling and the preaching. . . . . The teaching eldership is self-perpetuating, judged as to qualifications, elected and ordained by a Presbytery which may be constituted, and perform all its duties without one ruling elder. And in no case do the ruling elders participate in the 'laying on of hands.' The ruling elder is the representative of the people elected and judged by them, and ordained by their representatives. The distinction is an official and a permanent one. The ruling elder must be re-ordained, to become a teaching elder. The theory that makes this distinction we think defective and unscriptural. That there is a distinction between ruling and preaching elders made in the Scriptures, we admit; that it is official or permanent—we deny. In order to show this, we propose to examine briefly the common arguments for the office of ruling elder."

The reviewer then takes up the argument for such a distinction from the Synagogue, and shows that it is based upon ignorance of real facts, and upon contradictory and uncertain

traditions, and is clearly against Scripture in 1 Tim. v. 17. That passage he avers "does not necessarily, nor even naturally, make an official distinction," and it is the only one he has been able to discover. "Some passages speak indeed of 'governments' as distinct officers in the church, and also of 'teachers.' But if the 'teachers' include the 'governments,' by a parity of reasoning, the 'governments' might also include 'teachers,' and we would have still but one office. It may be very well doubted whether the whole of this theory is not a false one. It proceeds on the ground that teaching being the higher office of the two, necessarily includes the lower—which is only true when both offices belong to the same department of service. The first magistracy of our country, includes all the lower offices of the executive department, but not the judicial or legislative. And it can be just as easily proven, and by precisely the same argument, that the judicial branch of any government—because it expounds the laws, includes the executive that executes them, as that expounding God's law includes governing in his house. Two things in fact are assumed without proof, in order to make an argument: 1st. That teaching is a higher office than ruling; and 2d. That the higher must include the lower—both of which are, to say the least, questionable."

This reviewer next replies to the argument for the twofold distinction of ruling and teaching elders, based on the plurality of them ascribed to every church. This he conclusively refutes, by showing that it has no force as applied to the incipient state of the church, when no limitation of territory was assigned to any church; when all were missionaries, and all was missionary ground; that in no instance is a hint dropped leading us to suspect that two offices bearing the same name are held forth, both of which may and must teach, but one class alone do this publicly.

"It seems clear to our mind that the whole argument by which the fundamental principle of the Presbyterian system is supported, is just as strong against this particular point in the system. It establishes these points: 1st. That there is but one class of elders, having the same official character and standing, the same duties, and the same responsibilities. 2d. That there is but one ordination, and one standard of

qualification for ordination. The distinction between ruling and teaching elders, is a concession to Episcopacy—an attempt to construct three orders of church officers without diocesan bishops. The real distinction, recognized in the Scriptures, is not in official character, but arises naturally and necessarily from the diversity of gifts bestowed on different men. All elders have the same title—elders, bishops, pastors, preachers, watchers, and rulers; and of necessity ought to possess all the powers and prerogatives implied in the titles. The same qualifications are required in all—even in the matter of teaching—'apt to teach.' Hands are to be 'laid suddenly on no man.' No novice is to be admitted into any office. Elders are ordained in every church, but no intimation is given that one was ordained to teach *publicly* and rule, and the other to teach *privately* and rule. The very necessity which has led our church to distinguish her two classes of elders, in popular usage, by the different names—ministers and elders—would have led to a similar distinction in the writers of the New Testament, had such a distinction existed, as now exists. (It might be a question whether the effort of our General Assembly to ignore ministerial titles does not grow out of the felt inconsistency between *the* Book, and *our* Book.")

This calm and very candid and bold-spoken reviewer concludes on this wise: "Both the documents noticed, and the whole course of our recent newspaper discussions show, that the mind of the church is awakening, if not to the view presented above, yet to an approximate one. Now if the present distinction be erroneous, it is not difficult to see the bad effect it must have on the efficient working of our system. More than perhaps any other one thing, it had contributed to produce the present apathetic state of the eldership, by degrading the office below the scriptural standard—by introducing incompetent and unqualified men into it—by relieving those well qualified for the duties from a sense of responsibility. . . . This, however, we may affirm, that if our view be correct, every elder would be required to possess some gift both for ruling and teaching, and to exercise the gifts bestowed upon him. Every one would be a teaching elder, authorized to perform all the duties of the ministry, whenever and wherever, in the provi-

dence of God, he might be called to do so. All need not give themselves exclusively to the work of the ministry, but all might be required to work, as occasion demanded. Some would still give themselves exclusively to the work, and occupy the same positions they now do, save in the matter of official distinction. Rules might be adopted in accordance with this view, regulating the exercise of gifts—even demanding some superior attainments in those given wholly to the work. Then, without the evils resulting from the system adopted by some other churches, we would have all their advantages for the effective occupancy of both new and partially supplied fields."

"If these views are true, they show a great evil in our system. If they are not true, we would be glad to see some more full and satisfactory presentation of the authority for our present distinction between teaching and ruling elders. Nor are we alone in this wish."

Now this able reviewer is involved in his logical labyrinth by adopting as true, the reiterated dictum that our standards teach that there is one order of presbyters, divided into two classes—the teaching and the ruling presbyter. This, however, is not their doctrine. The order of *presbyter*, and its collateral terms, bishop and pastor, which the advocates of this theory apply to the ruling elder, and to this class of officers primarily, our standards restrict to ministers exclusively, and never apply to ruling elders. They recognize, therefore, but one order and one office of presbyters and bishops, and call it emphatically "the pastoral office;" and in proof of this they quote the very texts relied on by these theorists—1 Pet. v. 1; Tit. i. 5; 1 Tim. v. 1, 17, 19. They also declare that "the ordinary and perpetual officers in the church are of *three orders*, and *not one*, viz. bishops or pastors (or presbyters—see ch. iv.); the representatives of the people *usually styled* ruling elders; and deacons." (Form of Gov., ch. iii.) Ruling *elders* (*not presbyters*) are defined to be properly the representatives of the people, (lay delegates,) chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline in conjunction *with* pastors or ministers," who are therefore the primary, pre-existing, and essential rulers and teachers, and the only class of presbyters or bishops. Such is the definition

given by our standards of ruling elders and presbyters; and to *describe* the former, they add "*commonly called*," but not authoritatively *defined* to be, ruling elders. For the suggestive origin of this *common* name they quote 1 Tim. v. 17, in which the terms occur, and, as some suppose, in reference to it. That this was the purport of the quotation will be further apparent from the fact that the *definition* given of the office is an exact transfer from the Church of Scotland, from whom our church confessedly derived her nomenclature and her original standards, only that the official title given by her is *elders*—not *ruling* elders;—and in whose standards they are not even called elders, but "other church governors;" and in which this text is not quoted in proof. It was necessary, therefere, in introducing the name ruling elder, to show the ground on which the office is "commonly so called." But of this again.

We have quoted thus fully from this review, because it shows where we are tending, by the inevitable gravitation or magnetic power of the theory of two classes of divinely instituted and permanently distinct officers, with only one name and one order. And let it be further remarked, that the title by which "a great part (*great part* is added to the Scottish Standards) of the Reformed churches understood" ruling elders to be designated, was not *ruling elders*, but "governments;" (and hence their title as given by Calvin, Knox, the Books of Discipline, and the Westminster Assembly, of "*governors*,") "and of those who rule well, but do not labour in word and doctrine." Now, it is evident that this long description is not a title, otherwise it would be as long as that of some German princes. Neither are these the words of Scripture, but a paraphrase and addition of eight words, which just put into the text the thing assumed as true. "*Rule well*," in English, suggests the surname RULING, which the original (*οἱ καλῶς προεστωτες, those who preside, officiate, or administer well*) does not. The English word *elders* gives the name which the original (*πρεσβυτεροι*) only in its appellative or general sense does; and *in this sense only*, as we shall see, did a great part of the Reformed churches understand their "*governors*" to be *elders*, while many, and all the Presbyterian Standards, regard presbyters to be in 1 Tim. v. 17, as elsewhere, defined to be those

who specially, as their chief business, labour in word and doctrine, and yet also rule or officiate, and administer ordinances; so that while to do this latter acceptably and to edification, was deserving of all honour and support, the faithful performance of the former was eminently worthy of being esteemed very highly in love for the work's sake.

The Rev. Stuart Robinson, in his very beautiful analysis of the church of God in its relation to the gospel, and as a natural, necessary development of it, holds, with the Reformers and our church always and everywhere, that for the development and accomplishment of its great purpose—to gather an elect body out of the race during successive ages, and to train and prepare them for the kingdom of heaven—the church requires THREE classes of officers, and three only. These are what he terms "the ministry of the ordinances; the preserving the order and harmony of the body, that is, government and discipline; and the provision for and care of the revenues of the community." This rings with the sound of the genuine, sterling metal, and is indeed, as we have seen, the exact teaching of the Second Book of Discipline. "The Scriptures," he adds, "exhibit as the three divinely appointed officers, first, ministers, who both rule, and administer the ordinances—a double office, necessarily growing out of the essential connection between the word and the spiritual government founded upon it; second, ministers of rule only, and in spirituals only, . . .; third, the minister of temporal things, for the keeping prominent that ordinance through which is expressed the relation of one to another, and of one part to another part of this body, even as the other ordinances and government are expressive of the relation of one and all to the great Head." In pursuance of this design of the church, the apostles formally transferred to elders, (i. e. *presbyters*,) as to their successors in office, all the responsibilities which had devolved upon themselves as ordinary ministers, and all authority," &c. . . . . "Thus it is manifest that the ordinary and permanent ministry of the church was shared by the apostles with the elders (*presbyters*) as . . . . officially their equals in so far as concerns all the functions of an ordinary and permanent ministry in the church." In quoting as proof of this apostolical succession of presbyters,

Acts xx. 17—35, Mr. Robinson calls attention to the illative particle οὖν, in ver. 28, and remarks, "Take heed, *therefore* directly connects the charge to the elders (*presbyters*) with the previous recital of the apostles' duties among them, and implies that in his absence, *these*, as well as what follows, devolve upon them. He formally recognizes the elders (*presbyters*) as his successors." His conclusion, therefore, from all his premises is, that "the general familiarity with this branch of the subject, renders unnecessary any argument in detail to show that the *last* and complete development of the church, under the apostles, exhibits as the THREE ordinary and permanent officers thereof, elders, who rule, ...; elders, who both rule and labour in word and doctrine; deacons, who represent the fellowship of the members of the church in each other's gifts, and who have care of its revenues and the necessities of the poor." And yet, strange to say, within a page of the preceding classification, and under the same head of Church Government, Mr. Robinson puts that *second*, and as less "fundamental," which before he had made the *chief end* of the church, that is, the "ministry of the ordinances;" and he makes that "*the fundamental* office of the church, *from first to last*," which he had made *secondary* and *subservient*. And to sustain this arrangement, he quotes the two verses in Hebrews xiii. 17, 7, in both of which the very same term, ἡγουμένος, occurs in reference to the same parties, who, in ver. 7, are to be remembered and revered, though dead, and in ver. 17, to be obeyed while living; that is, those presbyters who *formerly* and those who *then* guided, ruled, and watched over them. So plainly do these passages refer to one and the same class of officers, and to the ministers of the gospel—to "all (as Owen on ver. 7 interprets) who had spoken or preached the word of God unto them, whether apostles, evangelists, or pastors"—that Poole, in his Synopsis, only alludes to Grotius as including, in ver. 17, "other spiritual guides." The reference to pastors, and to the work of the ministry, seems never to have been questioned until this theory required support.*

* See Bloomfield's Digest and his New Testament; McLean, Olshausen, and Ebard; Doddridge, Gill, Poole's Annotations, Matthew Henry (full on,) and Owen on ver. 7, which fixes the meaning. Cartwright, who himself believed

Still, however, Mr. Robinson chimes in with the old familiar song of Presbytery, as it has been chanted by our sainted martyr-fathers, by maintaining in Christ's church a THREEFOLD order of officers, even as there is in Christ a threefold order of offices. The ministry is analogous to Christ's prophetical office. The eldership accords with Christ's kingly office; and the deaconship with his priestly, self-sacrificing office. May we not also find adumbrated in the triplicity of church officers, the trinity of the church's God, the monarchy of the Father, the mediate rule and dominion of the Son, and the ministration of the Spirit?

The church of Christ is, as it always was, a supreme Theocracy, of which God the Father is the original founder, over which Christ is set as King, and of which the Holy Spirit is the Ruler. This Theocracy is perpetual and immutable, and is carried on through the ministerial agency of appointed men, especially through the ministry by which it hath pleased God to save them that believe, and by which He represents himself to the people; but also by elders, by whom all the rights and interests of the people are represented to Him and secured for them; and by deacons, by whom the people, in all the gifts and graces bestowed upon them severally and jointly by God, are represented to each other and hold fellowship and enjoy mutual communication one with another. Such is the ministration by which the body of Christ is edified in love and unity. No part is inferior or unimportant. Each in its measure is essential to the health and happiness, to the unity and liberty, and to the power of the church, as being in its Head a divine theocracy, and in its members a spiritual representative, conservative republic. An imitation and adaptation of this is found in the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country, in

in and framed a Discipline, including elders, confutes the Rhemish translation of *prelates*, by largely showing that it should be *pastors*, (Confut. of Rhemish Testament, pp. 650, 651.) Calvin interprets ver. 7 as exclusively referring to pastors, i. e. ministers; and ver. 17—though he thinks it includes "*other rulers*"—he enforces as chiefly and emphatically bearing on *pastors*, as opposed to *prelates*. Bengel is unusually full and strong, and Valpy's New Testament. Stuart says, "it is clearly used in the sense of teachers." Boyse also, in Doddridge. Chrysostom says he never read these words without trembling.

which the presbyters and lay representatives form a chamber of deputies, and the bishops a senate, and in which the joint concurrence of both houses is necessary to any legislation. In our government the one order of clergy meets in one body with the representatives of the people, and they deliberate and decide as one body, the ministry still remaining independent as the sacred order, and acting as such in the presidency and administration of all ministerial offices and acts. By this balance of power, the conservative and popular elements are both secured, and the church preserved from becoming either a hierarchy or oligarchy of ONE order, (as this theory would make it,) or a mere democracy.

Be this as it may, a threefold distinction of officers—ministers, elders, and deacons—has been held forth always, everywhere, and by every Presbyterian church throughout the world, and nowhere more clearly than in the Books of Discipline and Westminster standards appended by Mr. Robinson to his volume.*

Nowhere, also, we may here observe, will he find the principality and preëminence of the order of the ministry as the most especially to be honoured with a double honour, and as inclusive of all the others, more emphatically declared than in these noble declarations of the independence and spirituality of Christ's kirk and office-bearers? "According to the theory of the Presbyterian church, the greater office includes the less." Ministers are elders; the ministers and elders are deacons, and, as such, sit and act in the Deacons' Court, of which conjointly the pastor, elders, and deacons constitute the members.† The office of the elder (*presbyter*)—that is, the pastor, according to the Westminster standards, includes "that which the pastor is to do *from God to the people*"—such as "public reading of the Scriptures," "feeding the flock of God by preaching of the word," "catechizing," "the dispensation of

* In publishing these he has rendered valuable service. He might have added the Book of Common Order, Craig's Catechism, and other early documents.

† Forbes' Digest of Rules and Procedure of the Free Church. Edinburgh, 1856, p. 9. We repeat this remark and reference.

other mysteries," "blessing the people from God," "taking care of the poor;" and he hath also a "ruling power over the flock as pastor." "Other *church governors* are to join with the ministers in the government of the church." "For officers in a particular congregation there ought to be one, at the least, to labour in word and doctrine, and to rule."* "It is also requisite there should be others to join in government, (1 Cor. xii. 28.)" Calvin everywhere exalts the preëminent dignity and authority of the ministry. "The preaching of celestial doctrine is," he says, "committed to pastors." "Magnificent titles . . . are used for no other purpose than to procure respect, love, reverence and dignity to the ministry of heavenly doctrine; . . . therefore to teach us that God himself appears, and, as the author of this ordinance, requires his presence to be recognized in this institution." By these words (Eph. iv. 4—16) Calvin shows that the ministry of men, which God employs in governing his church, is a *principal* hand, &c. "Whosoever, therefore, studies to abolish this order and kind of government of which we speak, or *disparages* it as of *minor* importance, plots the devastation, or rather the ruin and destruction of the church; for neither are the light and heat of the sun, nor meat and drink, so necessary to sustain and cherish the present life, as is the apostolical and pastoral office to preserve a church in the earth."† In his commentary on 1 Tim. v. 17, Calvin says: "Yet he (the apostle) *prefers* those who labour in word and doctrine." In short, our own standards express the uniform testimony of every reformed church in the world when it pronounces "the pastoral office to be *first* in the church both for dignity and usefulness." *Form of Gov.*, ch. iv.

When, therefore, we find Mr. Robinson, with these ancient testimonies in his book and in his mind, and in contradiction to his own analysis, order of thought, and positive affirmations, making "elders who rule, the fundamental officers of the

* Proved by 1 Tim. v. 17, and other texts. See in Robinson's "Church of God," ch. lxxii.

† Institutes, B. IV., ch. i. and iii.

church, as a government from first to last,"* we are constrained to use the words of Dr. King, and say, "the language develops only the necessities of a system."† To sustain the unity of this theory of the eldership we are considering, Mr. Robinson, in his concluding parallel comparison of the three systems of church government, uses this language: "The fundamental office of government in the church is the eldership—of two classes. . . . Besides this, the *only* power of government in the church is the office of the deacons, which concerns temporalities *only*," (p. 120.) As if one *office* could have "two classes," with distinctive and exclusive offices; and as if deacons were any the less officers in the government of the church because their jurisdiction has reference only to *all its temporalities*, to all its charities, and to the poor. Deacons, though named, are ignored as a distinct, necessary, and important order of church officers, and yet he had previously declared this office to be "a power of government in the church," (pp. 89, 120.) This confusion is the necessary result of this new theory, which is based upon the indefinite and equivocal term πρεσβυτερος, as it is rendered by *elder* in English, and will be found inseparable from it, since it founds upon it both its two-fold distinction and its attempted unity, which is, however, only that of an equivocal name.

The presbyter or pastor is, we have seen, by his very nature, an elder and a deacon also—that is, *their* functions are included under the authority and rule implied in his office. The reverse, however, is admitted not to be true. In the presbyter, therefore, we have a *generic order*, including in it the other two, and a *generic name*, which, in its broad and comprehensive sense, is equally applicable to elders and deacons. But it is *only* in such a *general* sense it can be applied to orders and offices so essentially and permanently distinct in their sphere and functions. In this ambiguity and double meaning of the term, and especially in the English term *elder*, is to be

* The Westminster standards, under the very head of the ministerial functions, compare them with those of the priests and Levites under the law, and as having "as ample a charge and commission as they had." See in Robinson, p. lxxix. and lxxx.

† On the Eldership, p. 16, note.

found the source of confusion and disagreement in this and every other author who adopts the theory in question.

"The word *elder*," says the Second Book of Discipline, (ch. vi.) "in the Scripture sometime is the name of age, sometime of office. When it is the name of an office, sometime it is taken *largely*, comprehending as well the pastors and doctors as them who *are called* seniors or elders. In this our division *we call them elders* whom *the Apostles call presidents or governours.*" Thus plainly does this fundamental constitution of the Church of Scotland confine the term presbyter (or elder, in its strict official sense,) to ministers, and apply it only in its *large* sense to those representatives of the people whose proper name is governor or ruler, or as the Westminster standards, (which are now the actual constitution, and bound up with the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and Ireland, and England, and the numerous branches in Canada, in the United States, and elsewhere,) call them, "others to join in government," "other church governors," "other public officers as are agreeable to, and warranted by, the word of God, to be church governors, and to *join with* the ministers in the government of the church," and in the chapter of *Synodical Assemblies*, "other church governors, as also other fit persons when it shall be deemed expedient." Gillespie and Rutherford, who, with others, represented the Church of Scotland in the Westminster Assembly, had adopted the newly-coined title of *ruling elder*, founded, as Gillespie teaches, on "the elders that rule well."* They laboured long and earnestly, both by the press and by their powerful pleadings, to introduce their views into the Assembly and the Church of Scotland. Their first form of proposition to the Assembly was "that beside those presbyters who both rule well and labour in word and doctrine, there be other presbyters who especially apply themselves to ruling." This, however, was rejected as "*almost a novelty in England.*"† Gillespie preserves another form of the proposition voted upon—"ruling elder or church gover-

* See Works, vol. i., "Government of the Church of Scotland," ch. i., p. 10.

† Hetherington, Hist., p. 141.

nor."* Both terms in this proposed title were however rejected, and after ten days' discussion, and "many a brave dispute," which led Baillie to "marvelling at the great learning, quickness, and eloquence in speaking," the Assembly settled down upon the terms above given, and repudiated altogether, as a proof text for the office, 1 Tim. v. 17, from which the name of *ruling elder* was professedly drawn, and from which Gillespie infers not merely a twofold, but a threefold distinction of elders—the preacher, the doctor, and the ruler.†

A perfectly similar use of terms, *i. e.* in a strict official and in a large and general sense, is found in the name *deacon.* The word διάκονος, says the Second Book of Discipline, chap. viii., sometimes is largely taken, comprehending all them who bear office in the ministry . . . but now, as we speak, is taken only for them unto whom, &c. The office of the deacons so taken is an ordinary and perpetual function in the kingdom of Christ. And just as it would be absurd to say that the deaconship is the fundamental office of government in the church of Christ, or that ministers are only deacons, because they are called deacons—and yet in one sense of the term this is true;—so also, is it a mere sophistical play upon the double meaning and present general use of the term *elder*, to argue that because all ministers are elders, therefore all ministers are what are *now* understood by ruling elders.

The early advocates of this twofold distinction of ruling elder and teaching elder, founded upon 1 Tim. v. 17, recognized therefore the *general* and also the *strict official* sense of the term *elder.* They applied the term in its *general* meaning, as our standards do, to representatives of the people, and the term presbyter (the Greek word) exclusively to ministers. This will be found to be the case, with almost no exception, in all the old writers on Presbytery, as designedly as in our own standards, who employ 1 Tim. v. 17, as we have observed, only to justify the "common" use of the name ruling elder. These early writers prove the divine right of the office from the terms "governments," "rulers," "THE brethren," and, until the

* See Robinson's "Church of God," p. lxxii., and Gillespie's Works, vol. ii.

† See ibid. Beza and others did the same.

period of the Westminster Assembly, left all the other passages in which the term *presbyter* is translated in English as *elder*, to refer to the ministry.

Neander suggested the interpretation which gives to the word in every passage its general appellative sense, and this theory was adopted and ably presented by Dr. Miller in his work on the Ruling Elder. He quotes, therefore, in proof of the office of ruling elder every passage in which the term *elder* is employed, and justifies his doing so, by saying that the plurality of such elders existing in many churches, determined the fact that both teaching and ruling elders must have been referred to. Contrary to the opinion and practice of Calvin, Knox, Gillespie, and the Reformers generally, he agreed with later authorities in making the office of the ruling elder permanent and constant. He was of opinion that elders should be ordained with imposition of hands, but that they were still subordinate to ministers and incapable of uniting in the ordination of ministers by imposition of their hands.

While, therefore, Dr. Miller accepted the theory of one order of presbyters with two classes, originated by Neander, and referred all passages alluding to them indiscriminately to both, nevertheless his form of the theory differs essentially from his followers, and is an *a priori* protest against it. He agrees with our standards in believing that "there ought to be three classes of officers to carry into full effect the laws of Christ's kingdom; at least one teaching elder, bishop, or pastor; a bench of ruling elders and deacons." *Ruling Elders*, pp. 28, 29. He makes ministers primary, and the elders "to assist in the inspection and government of the church." *Ibid.* He applied the terms bishop and pastor properly to the ministry. *Christian Ministry*, 66 and 57. He regarded the ruling elder as "an inferior officer," and "denied his right to lay on hands in the ordination of a superior." *Christian Ministry*, p. 74; *Ruling Elders*, pp. 286, 293. He denied "this office or any particular form of government to be of divine right," or "essential to the existence of a church." *Ruling Elders*, p. 19.

Neander's premises, as adopted by Dr. Miller, have, however, been carried out to their legitimate logical conclusions in

contrariety to his own. There being but one name elder or many synonymous names; but one formula of qualifications, responsibilities, and duties; there is but one order of elders, who should ordain and be ordained, alike. If called to different functions by different gifts they are still one order, and yet so essentially different and distinct, that no lawful assembly or court of the church can take place without the presence and concurrence of both. The preacher and the ruler are both alike, bishops, presbyters, pastors, and teachers, "shepherds of the blood-bought flock," "made by the Holy Ghost overseers of the flock to feed the church of God, from house to house, warning every one night and day with tears"—and yet only *one class* of this *one order* can publicly preach or administer sacraments, or marry, or pronounce sentence of deposition or excommunication, or even moderate a session, (not to say a Presbytery, Synod, or Assembly), or publicly and authoritatively conduct public services on the Sabbath, by reading, praying, and blessing the people. "It is obvious," says Dr. Adger, "that this view of the office of the ruling elder (*the other class of this one order*) so far from merging that office into the ministry of the word, *distinctly separates it* from the ministry, and shows plainly wherein the ruling elder is *inferior* to the teacher. He is *inferior* to him in respect to the word and sacraments. Paul says, that a bishop (or ruling elder) must be 'apt to teach,' but not because the duty of public instruction belongs officially to him. He teaches, indeed, from house to house, and he teaches also, whenever in the church courts he helps, either by advice or by mere voting, to make the deliverance of the body which decides some question of doctrine or order. And he must, therefore, be an intelligent man, qualified to disseminate the truth he learns from the teaching eldership, and from the word of God. *Yet he is not himself a teacher*, but *simply* a ruler in God's house." *Southern Presb. Rev.* as before, p. 173.

But this theory, if it thus exalts *one class* of this *one order*, is not less efficacious in humbling this same class when represented in church courts. "So far is it from being 'the sense of our book,'" says Dr. Adger, "that in these courts the complete and regular members are ministers, while the elders are only

admitted for a particular purpose, and on a special ground—that, on the contrary, preachers or teachers, *as such*, have indeed *no place at all in them!* They are assemblies of ruling elders, many of whom have the superadded *charisma* of preaching, but all of whom belong to the order of rulers. These courts are not 'bodies of ministers,' nor yet bodies of ministers with certain 'delegates of the people' *admitted to sit with them* upon some special principle, such as that which admits 'corresponding members.' But both the ministers and the elders appear in that body as rulers."

"Moreover," says Dr. Adger, "it is provided that ministers themselves shall appear among the rulers or representatives, *because* they are themselves also rulers or *representatives*. Such is the representative government which the Lord has given to his church. Her ministers are her representatives, for none of them ordinarily is ordained except upon her call. She must choose them, and they appear in all the courts as *chosen* by her. It is as being a ruler that we meet the minister in the session." "When our Book says (chap. v.) 'Ruling elders are properly the representatives of the people,' it proceeds immediately to add, by way of explanation of this term, '*chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline.*' They are representatives of the people because they are *chosen rulers* of the people; and the Book says they are 'properly such representatives,' because they are *nothing more* than such representatives, or chosen rulers, and do not like ministers, have the function, also, of labouring in the word and administering the sacraments." Pp. 174, 175.

According to Dr. Adger there is but one order of officers in the church, and that is ruling elders, "the aboriginal presbyters," and "the essence of the presbyterate is ruling." Well, therefore, may he take up a lamentation over the inadequate and erroneous views of our church. "The whole volume (of Minutes) seems to say that the church does not value much her ruling eldership, that very special ascension gift of her Lord! Accordingly, when an elder is to be elected and ordained in a congregation, very often, simple personal respectability, conjoined with hopeful piety, is considered as amply qualifying any man for the office. Rarely is it insisted upon that he shall

be well acquainted with our Book, or thoroughly grounded in his attachment to our system—and yet he is to administer the rules of that Book and govern according to the principles of that system! Sometimes a very moderate share of ordinary education is deemed sufficient for this pastor or bishop—and yet this pastor or bishop must be 'apt to teach!' Frequently the office is given to a man deeply immersed in worldly cares —and yet he is a high spiritual officer, who must be devoted to the interests of the kingdom! How can it be imagined that an hour or two of some evening every week, or even perhaps every month, to be spent in attending the meetings of the session, is enough for the discharge by such an officer of *that awful cure of immortal souls which he has suffered to be bound for life upon his shoulders!*"

The facts of Scripture in reference to preaching and presbyters cannot, however, be arranged by all the advocates of a "one order" theory under that of ruling elders; and hence we have seen this one order must, as some of its advocates hold, be that of pastors or preachers. This undoubtedly would have been the last analysis, if compelled to make it, of all our fathers, as it is of all Congregationalists, and, indeed, of the whole Christian world. Presbyterians, according to Dr. Miller, believe "that there is but one order of gospel ministers, and that there are two other classes of church officers, viz. ruling elders and deacons; but that neither of these are authorized to labour in the word and doctrine, or to administer either of the sacraments."* "In the Presbyterian church, a presbyter without a pastoral charge is not a bishop. He is not an overseer of the flock. But when he is a presbyter placed in a pastoral charge, he is a scriptural bishop."† And again, in speaking of "ruling elders, or those who are appointed to assist in governing the church, but who do not preach or administer the sacraments," he says: "But this is not all; bearing rule in the church is *unequivocally* represented as *a less honourable* employment than preaching or labouring in word and doctrine. *The mere ruling elder*, who performs his duty well, is declared to be worthy of double

* Christian Ministry, p. 26. † Ibid. p. 28.

honour; but the elder who, to this function, adds the *more dignified and important one of preaching the gospel of salvation*, is declared to be entitled to an honour of a still higher kind."* Our conclusion therefore is, that a theory which leads its advocates to the most opposite and antagonistic conclusions, and to conclusions subversive of the intuitive instincts of the Christian heart, and of the doctrine of the ministry held with perfect uniformity, *ubique, semper et ab omnibus*, and on the supreme importance of which all Presbyterian churches are, and have ever been, most explicit and harmonious, must be sophistical, unscriptural, and un-presbyterian.

The sophistry of this theory will be painfully evident to any one reading the argumentative chapter of Dr. King on the ruling eldership.† He does little more than bandy the word *elder* in its double ambiguity of meaning, first to Prelatists, and then to Congregationalists. He *assumes* that "by elders and bishops, Scripture denotes *one order* of functionaries," and therefore as "the identical persons are called elders and bishops," elders and bishops are the same, and the *only* order of ministers. Thus far he says nothing about his *two orders or classes of elders*, nor does he seem to have remembered that while bishops—that is, the ministers authorized to preach and administer ordinances—may be the same as those who in the English version are called *elders*, they may not be, and are not, what is understood by *ruling elders*. Elders, and ruling elders—which is neither a scriptural, nor a patristic, nor an original, nor a constitutionally presbyterian title—are not the same. Dr. King having thus inconclusively determined that because, in the English version, presbyter is translated elder—in order, as we shall show, to avoid the more proper term *priest*,‡ (which is *presbyter* contracted,) because of its Romish perversion—that therefore the order of presbyters, or of *Priests* in

* Christian Ministry, p. 65.

† Rev. David King, D. D., LL.D. Carter's ed., Part I.

‡ The Westminster Form of Government, which is the standard of the Church of Scotland, and of all other Presbyterian churches, even in this country beyond our own and its off-shoots, declares that "under the names of Priests and Levites, to be continued under the gospel, are meant evangelical pastors." (Ch. on Pastors.) Priest is presbyter contracted—*prestre, priest.*

some Christian churches are *elders*, turns his attention to Independents. From Dr. Wardlaw, Mr. James, and Dr. Davidson, he quotes the statement that their "pastors," by the very nature of their office, are clothed with spiritual authority and rule, and he infers—by what process we cannot imagine—that "since all elders rule, ministers might all, *in this sense*, be *called* ruling elders. So a minister rules, and he *is* officially a ruling elder." And yet, in the next sentence, he states that Presbyterian churches call him who "*both teaches and rules*" minister or pastor, while they who are charged only with rule or superintendence, are ruling elders. (Pp. 14—16.) Again, Dr. King argues that because every church *originally* "had *bishops* and deacons," and because *now* Independency, (and every other church in ordinary cases,) "assigns to each church a single *elder*"—the *term in his proposition was bishops*—"therefore these *bishops* must include *ruling elders*." He is willing, with Dr. Davidson, that this plurality of bishops or presbyters in each church "should be pastors, and empowered to teach as well as rule," and earnestly wishes his denomination would reduce this scheme to practice—"call them teaching elders or call them ruling elders." The whole argument for *ruling* elders, whom he nevertheless distinguishes by essential functions from the more important office of the ministry, is founded on the use of the term *elder* "in *this sense*" in his premise, and "in *another* sense" in his conclusion.

This confusion and sophistry are, however, inseparable from the theory which identifies presbyters and ruling elders. In arguing with Episcopalians, and maintaining the divine right of presbyters to teach, rule, and ordain—in short, to do all that is permanently delegated to the successors of the Apostles "for the work of the ministry"—we are compelled to show that ALL THIS is attributed to PRESBYTERS in the word of God. But if the term means *rulers* in *general*—if ruling is the essence of the office designated by it—if "the best authorities are agreed," as Dr. King (p. 24) says they are, "that in the first instance the office of eldership had respect *only* to superintendence,"—if this ruling is the fundamental and permanent order in the church, then it is no argument for the divine right of presbyters, as the successors of Apostles in ALL the permanent

office and functions of the ministry, to prove that they may *rule*, (whatever that means) but not labour in word and doctrine, not publicly preach, nor pray, nor preside, nor administer ordinances, nor ordain. There is no argument in telling Prelatists that the terms presbyter, bishop, &c. are so indefinite that they may mean any office of authority in the church—even prelatic bishops themselves—for which any sanction may be found in the words, or in the facts, or in the precedents of Scripture. This is just what they want, and what most of them teach, and the very assumption upon which they rest the claims of their system.

This was the policy, as we shall show, of the opponents of Dr. Mason, and the position (unanswerably sustained) that the terms *presbyter* and *deacon*, are definite, fixed, and invariable in their meaning, so as to admit in no case of any doubt as to the office and officer intended, is his triumphant reply. The employment of one term to entitle *two* classes of offices and officers, distinguished by untransferable and permanent and essential prerogatives, powers, and functions, is an absurdity for which no precedent can be found in the universal language and uniform custom of man, and cannot, without disparagement to his wisdom, be attributed to God.*

And hence we find that it is *only* in their argument with Presbyterians, "the *large*" sense of this term is employed to sustain a novel theory of the eldership. The opinion that the reference to a plurality of other officers in the churches besides deacons was in every case made to ONE general class with TWO orders was, we think, first published by Dr. Miller, and yet no man could more carefully and powerfully sustain in all his arguments against Prelacy the fixed and full meaning of the terms presbyter and bishop, as referring to the office and work of the ministry. "The reader is earnestly requested," says Dr. Miller, 'to remember at *every step* that by a scriptural or primitive *bishop* is ALWAYS meant a *presbyter*, pastor, or whatever else *he* may be called who has the pastoral care of a particular congregation." *Christian Ministry*, p. 28. "The great question then to be decided is, does the New Testament teach,

* See Dr. Mason's Works, vol. ii., and our argument hereafter.

or intimate, that there are three classes or grades of gospel ministers, all of them authorized to labour in word and doctrine." P. 36. "The word *presbyter*, or elder, became in process of time an *established* title of office. . . . THE APOSTLES gave the name of ELDER to the PASTORS and rulers of the churches they organized, and the rather because *these pastors* were," &c. P. 52. "In short, the title of bishop, as applied to *ministers of the gospel*, occurs only four times in the New Testament; in THREE of these cases there is complete proof that it is given to those who are styled *presbyters*, and in the FOURTH, there is strong presumption," &c. P. 58. "Were these officers prelates, or did they belong to that class which Episcopalians denominate the second order of clergy, *priests*, or, in other words, *presbyters?*" P. 58. "The *presbyters* had in apostolic times, as they now have, authority to preach the word and administer sacraments," p. 62; "the power of government or of ruling also," p. 63; "to ordain," p. 67, &c.

Such is the tenor of Dr. Miller's able and conclusive arguments against the claims of *prelates* to a superiority by divine right over *presbyters*, and such is the course pursued by every standard writer on the question between Prelacy and Presbytery. Let the reader examine the very clear and masterly exposition of this argument by Principal Hill in his Lectures on Divinity; or the recent elaborate work of Dr. Killen, "The Ancient Church;" or *any other*, from Blondel's Apology for Jerome to the present time, and he will see that a *fixed official* application of the terms presbyter, bishop, pastor, &c. to ministers of the gospel, in the New Testament, and by the apostolical, primitive and ancient church, is the chief corner-stone of the whole argument for the claims of presbytery to be the scriptural and primitive polity of the churches.

It was only, therefore, when Dr. Miller turned his attention to Independency, and to the very defective condition of the eldership in our own church, he was led to adopt Neander's interpretation, though completely subversive of his prelatic arguments. In his work on the Eldership, therefore, we could scarcely know that such a word as presbyter occurred in the New Testament. "We find bishops, *elders*, and deacons everywhere appointed. We find a plurality of *elders* ordained in

every church. And we find the *elders* represented as overseers or inspectors of the church; as rulers in the house of God; and the members of the church exhorted to submit to them and obey them." P. 52. And as "a specimen of the New Testament representations on the subject" we have a rehearsal of every passage in which elders (in the original *presbyters*) are spoken of, although in his former volume the divine right of *presbyters* was made good against the claims of prelates by these very passages. Having thus prepared the way, Dr. Miller proceeds to the inference which he thinks inevitable from the (*assumed*) fact that in *every* church, and not merely in some of the largest, a plurality of *elders* were ordained. "The idea that it was considered as necessary, at such a time, that every church should have two, three, or four pastors or ministers, in the modern popular sense of these terms, is manifestly altogether inadmissible," and "some therefore were rulers who, as in the synagogues, formed a kind of congregational presbytery or consistory." P. 54.

Now in this statement, which is the foundation of the recent and variously developed theory, it is assumed, *first*, that in every case reference is made to a *single* congregation organized and complete within itself; limited in its sphere of operations to its immediate bounds; and not to a missionary centre of Christian evangelization, "from which," as the apostle expressly states to the praise of the church at Thessalonica, "sounded out the word of the Lord not only in Macedonia and Achaia but also in every place." But as the church at Philippi, like the church at Antioch, at Rome, and at Jerusalem, was a missionary centre of evangelistic labour in the word and doctrine, we are explicitly taught—what reason would necessarily presume—that every church in the beginning was a missionary station, where missionaries from all the region round about located, and lived, and loved together, and had all things in common, and in united prayer and pains-taking planned and carried out their schemes in works of mercy. Or, the body in each case may have been, not any *one* congregation, in any one place, but *all those* who at Jerusalem, at Antioch, at Rome, at Ephesus, at Philippi, called upon the name of the Lord and were called Christians. And that it is so, is *certain*, since the

address is not the congregation or particular church, but "ALL the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, and (ALL) the bishops and deacons," also, which are there. So again it is "ALL that be in Rome called to be saints . . . . whose faith is spoken of throughout the whole world"—by those of course who had been among them and who had gone forth everywhere preaching the word. So again, by "the church which is at Corinth," it is immediately declared is meant, "them (all) that are sanctified in Christ Jesus . . . with all that in *every* place (in the region round about) call upon the name of Jesus Christ." And thus it is that the apostle proceeds to mention several ministers, who had each of them a separate congregation calling itself by their name. In the second epistle to "the church of God which is at Corinth" is added, as included under this missionary station, "*all* the saints which are in *all Achaia*." So it is in every case. It is "the saints and faithful brethren—brethren in Christ—which are at Colosse" and elsewhere, and not to any *one* particular congregation, that allusion is made when a plurality of presbyters or bishops are spoken of, and the farewell address of Paul to the presbyters of Ephesus was doubtless to *all* within the bounds of that missionary circuit who could be gathered together.

The assumption of this theory, "that a plurality of presbyters was ordained in every congregation," is contrary, therefore, to the fact that reference is in *every* case made to ALL the Christians in every city or place, however numerous might be their private congregational assemblies, and to *all* in the missionary region round about them. The assumption that those early presbyters—that is, presbyter missionaries—were "pastors or ministers in the *modern*, popular sense of those terms, is manifestly altogether inadmissible." The assumption that even if there were a plurality of them in every missionary station, or even in every particular church, this would require us to consider them as in part not missionaries and ministers, is equally gratuitous, since, under their circumstances, believers could not depend on one, nor feel two or more burdensome on their plan of having all things common, of living plainly, of every one coöperating, and all freely giving as they were able. Even now, as Dr. Owen in several places admits, a plurality

of pastors is just as conformable to the nature of a single organized church—which is the only kind he thinks Christ authorizes—as one pastor; and yet in addition to a pastor, whom he considers to be the proper presbyter or bishop, he would add, as necessary to a complete church, one or more ordained doctors, who are also ministers, and not ruling elders.* And when this theory assumes, that because in a *general* sense the term *elder* may be given as a warrantable translation of the Greek word *presbyter* in its official sense during the apostolic age, (when the names of office were, it is said, used without scrupulosity and with much license,)† that therefore it includes *ruling elders* as now understood, there is a glaring *non sequitur.* In these assumptions, this theory abandons Presbyterian ground and our constant and irrefragable argument against Independency and Prelacy, and actually adopts and endorses the arguments of Prelatists in favour of the apostolical succession, name, and power of prelatical bishops on the one hand; and of Dr. Owen on the other hand for absolute Independency and the exclusive divine right of single churches, each complete within itself, and having power to elect and ordain its own officers, and officers only for itself. Dr. Owen ridicules the idea either of an universal or œcumenic minister or church which only a few could either see or hear.‡ From Owen also Dr. Miller received the idea that ruling elders should be ordained with imposition of hands—a novelty which, after experiment, he was constrained to abandon, and for which he could find no precedent in any Presbyterian church in the world.§ Dr. Owen fully understood, and explicitly states, the *wide* application of the term *elder* to *any one* having rule or office under another, and so little stress does he put upon either the name *elder* or *ruling elder*, that he considers the office no distinctive peculiar characteristic of *any* denomination. "The truth is," says Owen, "and it must be acknowledged, that there *is no known church in the world* but they dispose the rule of the church in part into the hands of per-

* See Works, vol. xvi., Edinb. ed., pp. 5, 44, 55.

† Dr. Miller on the Ministry, p. 66.

‡ See ibid., Pref., and pp. 24, 25, &c.

§ See Owen, ibid., p. 73, &c. Miller on Eldership, Pref.

sons who have not the power of authoritative preaching of the word and administration of the sacraments committed unto them;* and yet, to give more plausible weight to an argument in favour of ruling elders which do not define nor even distinguish the Presbyterian from Independent and other churches, this theory abandons the distinctive character of the presbyter, the fundamental argument for a presbytery from the multitude of Christians in one place, and the plurality of presbyters or pastors among them; and abandons every fence by which even Prelacy might be kept out of the fold. Dr. Owen exalts the ministry—his bishop, presbyter, or pastor. He proves its divine office, and authoritative rule, and preëminent dignity and responsibility by Acts xx., Eph. iv., and all those passages in which it is denominated *ποιμην, pastor, teacher;* and after quoting Acts xx. 17, 18, 28, he says: "If elders and bishops be not the same persons, having the same office, the same function, and the same duties, and the same names, it is impossible, so far as I understand, how it could be expressed." P. 45. Quoting for the same purpose 1 Pet. v. 1—3, where presbyters are to feed the flock, *ἐπισκοπουντες*, taking oversight, and Heb. xiii. 17, where they are *ἡγουμενοι*, who watched for souls, and "whom others were bound to obey," he reiterates, in even stronger language, adding to the preceding "the same qualifications and characters, account and reward," "concerning whom there is in no one place in Scripture the *least mention* of inequality, disparity, or preference among them; they are essentially and *every way* the same." Pp. 45, 46. The theory of Owen was precisely that of Gillespie, and Rutherford,† and other Presbyterian divines of that time, in regard to the officers of Christ in a *particular* church. And although in the work quoted, which was corrected by him immediately before his death, and published in 1689,‡ he reprobates any other kind of church, yet we know that he thought the two parties in the Westminster Assembly "did in his judgment agree well enough if they could have thought so," and that had Presby-

* Owen on the Ministry, pp. 107, 42, 43, &c.

† Due Right of Presbyteries, Pastors, Teachers or Doctors, Elders, and Deacons, pp. 14, 15.

‡ Works, vol. xvi., Pref., note, p. 2.

terian government been established at the Restoration, without a rigorous imposition of everything . . . Presbyterians and Independents would have been both to blame if they had continued in a state of separation from each other."*

We have thus dwelt on the theory of Owen, with his four classes of officers; his very limited and qualified appropriation of (what he admits to be of very general and of various application) the name *elder* to ruling elders as now known; his restriction of all the passages (except 1 Tim. v. 17,) in which it and the correlative terms bishop, shepherd, teacher, overseer, &c., are used, to the ministry; his general approval of the views agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly; and his persistent rejection of any other than particular churches;—because the promulgators of the novel theory of one order and two classes of elders, and the promiscuous application to it of all the passages above referred to, claim much consideration for it, from the supposed concurrence of this eminent man.

Next to Owen, if not above him in the scale of authoritative determination of this question, is the late illustrious Neander. Upon his profound antiquarian and linguistic knowledge the theory of an originally one order of elders, and these ruling elders, is mainly founded. By him, probably, was Dr. Miller led into his interpretation of the New Testament use of the word elder. Neander is now made the chief corner-stone of their building by Dr. King, Dr. Adger, and others. But surely Neander's theory of church polity cannot be understood, or it would never be made authoritative by those who believe that Christ has established, by divine right, a fixed and permanent order of government and officers in his church, and that that is the order of *rulers*. What Neander's theory of church polity was, may be learned not only from his general Church History, and his History of the First Planting of the Christian Church, but also from his more recent Introduction to Dr. Coleman's "Primitive Church," written in 1843. To understand Neander's views, it must be borne in mind that he believed the external polity of the church to be an outgrowth of its gradual development; so that it was not the same at any two periods

* Works, vol. xv., p. 433.

of the apostolic history. "The form of the church," says he, "remained not the same even through the whole course of the apostolic age from the first descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost to the death of John the Apostle." "Under the guidance of the Spirit of God they gave the church that particular organization which, while it was best adapted to the circumstances and relations of the church at that time, was also best suited to the extension of the churches in their peculiar condition. . . . But forms may change with every change of circumstances. Many of the offices mentioned in that passage (Eph. iv. 11) were either entirely unknown at a later period, or existed in relations one to another entirely new." And after stating that there was a difference between pastors and teachers as they possessed the qualifications for ruling or preaching the word, he remarks that "there may have been persons endowed with the gift of teaching, and qualified thus to be teachers, who still belonged not to the class of presbyters. The relation of these offices to one another seems not to have been the same in all stages of the development of Christian churches."* "The name *presbyter* was derived from the Jewish synagogue; but in the Gentile churches they took the name of bishops." "The name of presbyters denoted" not *ruling*, as our theorists assume, but "the *dignity* of their office. That of bishops was expressive rather of the nature of the office." "But in process of time, some *one* might . . . come to be designated by the name *bishop*, which was *originally* applied to them *all* indiscriminately." "This change in the relation of presbyters to each other was not the same in all the churches, but *varied* according to their different circumstances. It may have been as early as the latter part of the life of John, when he was sole survivor of the apostles, that ONE, as president of this body of presbyters, was distinguished by the name of *bishop*." In other words, episcopacy may have been established *during* the life of the apostles.† The angels of the churches he considered to be figurative and symbolical representations of the whole church.‡ Neander consistently be-

* Introduction to Coleman, pp. 16, 17. † Introduction, pp. 20, 21.
‡ Introduction, note. Dr. Killen adopts this theory.

lieved that not all the forms of church government which were adapted to the exigencies of the church at this early period, can be received as patterns for the church at other times; neither can the *imitation* be pressed too far. "Whenever at a later period also any form of church government has arisen out of a series of events according to the direction of divine providence, and is organized and governed with regard to the Lord's will, He may be said himself to have established it, and to operate through it by his Spirit."* Neander, therefore, believed not that an honest difference of opinion on these subjects was disreputable, or a sign of ignorance of fixed and certain principles, but that "men may honestly differ in their views on these minor points," since all else is mutable except "the great principles." He very affectionately urges all to abide by "the form of church government they find best suited to the wants of their own Christian community; only let them not seek to impose upon all Christians any one form as indispensably necessary. Only let them remember that the spirit of Christ may be carried on under other forms also;" and this he presses by name upon "Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Calvinists, and Lutherans."† Neander did not, therefore, have any views in accordance with our theorists, who found their inferences on his interpretation of the *first* temporary arrangements in the very beginning of Christianity, when *all* were rulers and all teachers, until necessity required a division of services corresponding to diversity of gifts. He admits, however, that soon "the gift of teaching, and the order of teachers who were endowed with it, are spoken of as constituting an entirely distinct function and order.‡ In the Epistle of Paul to Titus, when he requires the bishop to hold fast sound doctrine, and to be able to establish others in it, this, he thinks, certainly implies in it the bishop (and presbyter) must possess the gift of teaching or "the ordinary regular office of teaching." P. 258. He considered "the brethren" in the council at Jerusalem as "*as representing all, and acting in their name*," and, of course, as representatives of the people in distinction from the *presbyters* and apostles.§

* Introduction, pp. 16, 17, 18.
† Introduction, pp. 17, 22, &c.
‡ Church Hist., vol. i. p. 260, Lond. ed.
§ Ibid. p. 205.

The necessity which compelled the theorists under consideration to resort to Owen, the champion of Independency, who does not believe the officers called by him ruling elders to be *peculiar to any one church in the world*, nor that there exists any gospel church beyond particular congregations, nor any officers having authority beyond their particular churches;*—and to Neander, who found nothing in the apostolic churches settled, and believed no form or order of church polity permanent or prescribed;—proves the conscious weakness and insufficiency of the *foundation* on which they build, for they are all master workmen. But even master workmen cannot make brick without straw, nor build without brick, for assuredly the polity approved by Owen and Neander, whatever it may be, is not Presbyterian.†

But if deprived of any support from Owen and Neander, they fall back upon Calvin, as being *alone* a tower of invincible strength to any cause. But are these brethren, or are we, prepared to adopt and subscribe to the views of even Calvin, great and glorious as he was, and in his works and influence *still is*. The representatives of the people, associated by Zwingle in 1532, with the presbyters or pastors for discipline, were "pious men allowed him as his assistants." The members of the Consistory and Synod were preachers, "except the lay presidents. There were no representatives or deputies of several congregations. The protocols were issued by the court."‡ Calvin introduced such assemblies of "clergy and laity. But still these laymen were not representatives of the congregation." In 1535 Calvin, in his Institutes, in their first compendious form, defined preachers, bishops, and elders. His elders or presbyters were still spiritual teachers as opposed to Popish prelates. It was not till long after he found in 1 Tim. v. 17, a foundation for a distinction, in a *large* sense of the term, between teaching and ruling elders, and he always, even afterwards,

* He thought a church had no right to ordain a man to preach to the heathen. Works, vol. xx. p. 457, Lond. ed.

† On the alleged dying regret of Owen, and favourable opinion of Presbyterianism, see the confutation by the editor, in Works, vol. xvi. Pref. Note, recent Edinb. ed.

‡ Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 368, 369.

restricted the term presbyter in its proper official designation to pastors (who were preachers) as we might largely show. In expounding that very passage he is studiously careful to confine its full and proper application to pastors. The apostle, he says, "enjoins that support shall be provided chiefly for pastors who are employed in teaching," and quotes Chrysostom as understanding by "double honour" "support and reverence." With "the pastor," he says, "there were united in a common council men of worth and good character that were chosen from among the people." In verse 19 he identifies the term "presbyter" with "pastors and godly teachers." "All, therefore, to whom the office of teaching was committed they call presbyters, and in each city *these presbyters* selected one (a presbyter) to whom *they* gave the *special* title of bishop."* It is in this sense he uniformly uses the term presbyter in the *Institutes*, that is, as synonymous with bishop and pastor, as they "who receive in commission to preach the gospel and administer sacraments," who are ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God; "holding fast the faithful word," &c. "In giving," says he, "the name of bishops, presbyters, and pastors, indiscriminately to those who govern churches, I have done it on the authority of Scripture. To all who discharge the ministry of the word it gives the name of bishops." And in proof, he proceeds to quote Titus i. 5–7; Acts xx. 17; Eph. iv.; also, Phil. i. 1; Acts xiv. 23; 1 Peter v. 1, &c., *the very passages* adduced by our theorists to substantiate their application to ruling elders. These, however, Calvin immediately proceeds to notice as "*other* offices"—"two (*others*) of perpetual duration, viz. government and care of the poor. By these governors I understand SENIORS selected from the people to unite with the bishops."† "From the beginning, therefore, each church had its senate, (*conseil ou consistoire*) composed of pious, grave, and venerable men, in whom was lodged the power of correcting faults."‡

In 1538 Calvin gave an outline of his own church government at Geneva to the Synod of Zurich for imitation. The city was divided into parishes, each having its own minister,

* Institutes, B. IV. chap. iv. § 2. † Ibid, B. IV. chap. iii. § 8. ‡ Ibid.

with "respectable and prudent men selected from each quarter of the city to join *with us* in watching over the proper mode of its (i. e. excommunication) infliction. A becoming order must be observed in the call of the clergy, that the laying on of hands, *which belongeth only to the clergy*, may not be taken away."*

In his Plea for the Necessity of Reforming the Church, presented to the imperial diet at Spires in 1544, while under the head of Discipline, he dwells pointedly on "the pastoral *office itself* as instituted by Christ," and makes no allusion to elders or seniors. "Scarcely one in a hundred of the bishops will be found who ever mounts the pulpit in order to teach." "The pastoral office we have restored, both according to the apostolic rule and the practice of the primitive church, by insisting that *every one who rules* in the church, *also teach.*"† Ancient synods he quotes as defining the several duties of a bishop, among which is "holy discipline," and says, "in *all* these duties *presbyters* ought to be the *bishops'* coadjutors." In his Remarks (1544) on the Pope's Letter to the Emperor, in which he urges "restoring the ancient deaconship," "Then," says he, "this profane, that is as they term it, lay correction might not only travel to other churches, but," &c.‡

In 1548 Calvin introduced his famous Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques, in which it is provided that "the choice of preachers depends in the first instance on the clergy." The elders are to share with the ministers in watching over the conduct and education of the clergy; but THE COUNCIL (a political body) was to determine disputes and punish offenders. The preachers were to give the bread, the elders AND DEACONS the cup. The elders were chosen by the larger council, and confirmed by the preachers. They were also elected annually. The consistory was convened by the civil court. The elders were not chosen out of the congregation to represent them, but out of the civil courts.§ Surely these were laymen, and not clergy, with whom they are contrasted, and by whom their choice was ratified.

* Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 283, 284.

† Ibid. pp. 32, 85, 86, 175, Edinb. ed. ‡ Ibid. vol. i. p. 281, 282.

§ See Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 386, 389.

Calvin overthrew the caste of the Catholic clergy by establishing an order of presbyters who were ALL, as he declared, preachers and co-equal, and upon this is based the Presbyterian character of his polity. His *elders* were not spiritual officers appointed in and by the church, and could not possibly have given the name of Presbytery, first introduced by Beza, to the Presbyterian system. In France, where Calvin's Constitution and Confession were adopted, their courts consisted of preachers and laymen—*anciens* (the most *general* meaning of the term presbyter,) and *anciens diacres*, so that deacons were *elders* in the same sense with *elders*, and *were also members of the consistory*. Neither was the office of elder made obligatory upon the churches, but left to their own choice.* "We agree, says that church, in 1645, the office of deacon is of divine appointment, &c., and whereas divers are of opinion that there is also the office of ruling elders who labour not in word and doctrine, and others think otherwise, we agree that this difference make no breach among us."†

From all we have stated it is evident how very different were the views of Calvin from that theory, to sustain which his authority is pleaded. His presbyters were our pastors or ministers. His elders or *anciens* (for he never uses the title of *ruling elders*) were laymen, and appointed by laymen—representatives of the people, but not of particular congregations, and were annually elected; and so far from attaching to them the *name* or scriptural character, qualifications, functions, and responsibilities claimed by this theory for *ruling elders*, he attributes them exclusively to the pastors. And while he believed his system to be in accordance with Scripture and ancient usage, he did not hold any form of polity and discipline to be so perfectly and paramountly required by divine appointment as to be essential to the being of a true church, to the unchurching of those who hold the truth under other forms. This is made manifest by the whole tenor of his writings, but most plainly in his celebrated letter to Somerset; his form of polity proposed to Sigismund, King of Poland;

* See Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. p. 393, 395.

† Quick's Synodicon, vol. i. p. 229, and vol. ii. p. 472.

and from his retaining a permanent presidency over the clergy of Geneva until his death, although in 1580, as appears from the city registers, the preachers expressed their fears that the office of president, if its possessor were not elected weekly, might be converted at length into that of a bishop. Beza, as Casaubon declares, said to him that Calvin, who had rejected episcopacy, was in fact bishop of Geneva, and that a little before his death he proposed to make him his successor.* We know also that in 1543 Calvin established the Liturgy, which still constitutes the foundation of the Liturgies of the Reformed churches, and was adopted and introduced by Knox into Scotland, where it was incorporated with their book of Psalmody; and in this Liturgy, Calvin embodied the Confession of Sins from the Mass Book, and also the Preparation for the Communion.

No authority, therefore, can be pleaded for any one feature of the theory of the eldership, now put forth under great names and with confident boldness, from Calvin, Neander, or Dr. Miller. Dr. Miller, indeed, broached the principle of interpretation, and initiated the form of ordination from which it has gradually sprung. This was given only in his enlarged edition of his work on the Eldership, in 1831. In this he was "led to modify some former opinions," and acknowledges that in asserting the divine warrant and authority for the office, "and probably in several other opinions respecting the office advanced" in his pages, he "knew that some of his brethren do not concur with him," but "differed materially."

This opposition was manifested in a series of very able and learned articles by Dr. James P. Wilson, of Philadelphia, first issued in the *Christian Spectator*, and embodied, in 1833, in a considerable volume on "The Primitive Government of Christian Churches," and published, after his death, as "a defence against unfounded pretensions . . . and making *mute* presbyters a characteristic of the primitive church." The author employs his powerful and acute intellect, and close and cogent analysis and reasoning, upon an examination of the writings of the Fathers and later ages, and by a critical investigation of

* See Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, pp. 400, 401, 402.

Scripture, to prove that "but two orders or kinds of officers were instituted—*presbyters*, who were called also pastors, to teach, ordain, administer baptism and the eucharist, and to govern—and *deacons*, to serve. Among the presbyters—a bench of whom was at first in every church, and but one presbytery in a society or city—there was one who presided, denominated the προεστως, *angel*, and by other names. Our ruling elders are "but another name for deacon, and in a large portion of the American Presbyterian Church no other deacon exists." P. 6. The ordination, charge, authority, and duties of both being the same, they have, he thinks, been practically merged into one, which is true also, as Principal Hill remarks of the Church of Scotland, and, we may add, of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, provision being made for it in its Book of Discipline. See § 6, pp. 7, 8.

The controversy, and especially Dr. Miller's earnest, able, and spiritual appeal on behalf of a neglected eldership, excited very deep and general attention, and a growing interest both in the church and among elders themselves, the beneficial effects of which are yet increasingly manifest in the larger attendance of elders in our church courts, and in those conventions of elders and deacons which are so happily characteristic of our times, and so well adapted to lead to a proper appreciation of the dignity, the design, and the duties of both classes of officers. On Dr. Miller's principle of interpretation, the term *presbyter* is appellative, and not official. It designates one generic class, one order, one office, without distinction in name, nature, qualifications, or functions. The only difference is in work, not in office; and this is created by gifts from God and the call of the people, and not by a divine institution as well as a divine call. The efforts to sustain one order and two classes, where no difference exists in name, nature, qualifications, and functions, as set forth in Scripture, are manifestly and increasingly hopeless and insuperable. A choice must be made between one order of ministers or one order of rulers, labouring in common according to their diversified gifts and graces. To this conclusion, under the great weight of Dr. Breckinridge's lead and influence, a portion of our church has been tending. Since 1842 our General Assembly, and our

church generally, have been agitated by those who considered that the limitation of the power of imposing hands in the ordination of ministers, to ministers, involves the denial that they (i. e. ruling elders) are scriptural presbyters, which denial seems to them to undermine the foundation of Presbyterian order, "and who hold that it is *only* as ruling elders that ministers are entitled to seats in our church courts."* This, therefore, is the logical conclusion from the premises, that Scripture uses the term *presbyter* and its collateral names, appellatively, for one order, to which are to be referred all its deliverances concerning office, qualifications, functions, responsibilities, and rewards, the fundamental idea conveyed by the order being considered that of rule. But if, on the other hand, the idea fundamental to Christianity, as a dispensation of mercy, most unquestionably is the proclamation of a glorious gospel to guilty, but not abandoned sinners; and if presbyters are spoken of under every variety of form as the official agents through whom it pleased God, by this foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe, then the logical inference from the same premises is, that the one fundamental order of the church of God which has never been wanting, and never can be;—of which Christ himself was the *chief* Shepherd and Bishop, (or Presbyter) of souls; and with whom his apostles were also fellow-presbyters;—is *preaching* and not *ruling*, preachers and not rulers, and that ALL presbyters must therefore, as indeed the word of God imperatively enjoins, be *apt* to teach, and to convince gainsayers also—that is, be preachers of the word. In 2 Tim. ii. 24, speaking of Timothy, and of all the presbyters ordained by him, the apostle says, "for the servant of the Lord must be *apt to teach*." And such we have seen, is the conclusion of Dr. Wilson and others, and, as we shall yet see, of many more.

To one or other result the theory of the indiscriminate appellative character of presbyters inevitably leads. There is no *consistent* middle ground. A distinction adjectively between teaching and preaching presbyters can make no difference where name, nature, qualifications, functions, and responsibili-

* See Baird's Digest, pp. 74, 79.

ties are one and the same, and spoken of one and the same parties; and the difference between preachers, who are the only authorized heralds of the gospel, teachers of the truth, administrators of ordinances, ordainers of a perpetuated ministry, presiding officers in all ecclesiastical assemblies, and who are the only fixed, constant, and absolutely essential members of any one of them—the difference, we say, between these and ruling elders—*whom they ordain*, and authoritatively induct into office, can never be logically nor properly defined by an *adjective* distinction appended to the name of presbyter, which officially applies to ruling elders alone.

The unsatisfactory arguments and insufficient proofs brought to sustain such a nominal unity between two orders so essentially diverse, and a nominal distinction for a generic, fundamental, permanent difference in authority and functions, are palpable evidence that the failure is not in the theorists, but in the theory; not in the analysis, but in the facts. An agreement in one kind and measure of rule, while essentially differing in other kinds of rule—as in that of the word, and sacraments, and ordination, and presidency, and position, and publicity—is surely no reasonable warrant for applying to both the same name, nature, order, office, qualifications, and responsibilities. Deacons agree with both in a certain kind of rule, equally important and necessary in its place, and only differ in other kinds of rule; and the unity of name, nature, &c., might, therefore, as well be extended to them. And as their name certainly is applied to all church officers, so is presbyter, as an appellative name, applied to deacons, and both names may in this sense be properly applied to any church officer.

On the basis of this appellative use of the terms presbyter, bishop, &c., the argument from plurality as a proof of a plurality of *ruling elders* in each church, has led Mr. Guthrie, of Scotland, in a very able and lucid presentation of the entire substance of Dr. Miller's work, to prepare a form of church government for the Morrisonian body, adopting the principles of our system, only limiting them, as his argument requires, to *particular* churches as *alone* authorized by Scripture. He also rejects, as proofs of a *ruling eldership*, every passage

of Scripture, except 1 Tim. v. 17, and the admitted indiscriminate appellative use of the term *elders*.*

The Plymouth Brethren in England, and the Campbellites in America, on the contrary, have carried out the argument to the opposite extreme, and while holding only to particular churches reject all other officers than rulers, or managers under some name, leaving every man, as among the Quakers, to exercise his gift by becoming, for the occasion, or statedly, the preacher.

Dr. Breckinridge takes for granted the same premises, and delineates, as among the permanent officers of the church, "elders in whose hands the government of the church is permanently and exclusively lodged." Of this order the essence is rule. "Being presbyter, he is ruler." Ministers are a class under this one order. "They feed the flock; they have the oversight of the flock; they are its teachers, its rulers, its pastors, its bishops, all under the one name—elders." "The ministers of the gospel, therefore, are rulers—*not as ministers*, nor as stewards, but as elders. On account of *gifts* and callings of God, they become a separate *class of elders*—not by any means a *different order*."† "On ministers, however, great additional honours are laid by God." "The great function of the ministry in word and doctrine, and that of stewardship of the mysteries of the kingdom of God, is divinely committed to them; and this is a delegation from Christ, and the most glorious of all." P. 641. This function Dr. Breckinridge denominates "the power of order—*potestas ordinis*. The distinction between this and *potestas regiminis* (i. e. the power of rule or government,) is fundamental, and the difference in the use and exercise of the two powers is also fundamental." A minister is further distinguished from a ruler in that his "power is *several*, never *joint*"—that is, it is personal and inherent in him—"*ex ordine*, by virtue of his being what he is;" whereas "the power of regimen or rule (that is, of the ruling elder) is a joint power, and never several. No presbyter has any several powers of

* A Manual of Church Government, with a special reference to the office of Elder, by John Guthrie, Minister of Zion Chapel, Kendal. London: S. Ware & Co. 1846.

† Knowledge of God, vol. ii. p. 629 and 641.

rule; the power itself is joint, and can be exercised only by a tribunal, never by a single person, nor by any number of single persons taken severally."* And yet these powers, so diverse and so fundamentally distinct in use and exercise, are to be concentrated in one order!

But though there is but one order, with two functions or powers fundamentally distinct in nature and exercise, there are other office-bearers, deacons and evangelists; so that on the whole we have *one order* of office-bearers, and four classes.

Dr. Killen, in his recent elaborate, and, to some extent original, and in all respects able and interesting work, "The Ancient Church,"† has, we regret to find, adopted also Dr. Miller's premises, and with equally unsatisfactory and inconsistent results. No genius—no erudition—no logic—no eloquence—no dogmatism, however authoritative—can bring order out of confusion, unity out of diversity, or harmony out of discord. The premises being fallacious, the conclusions must be untenable, and the building unsound. A statement of Dr. Killen's attempted exposition of the officers of the Christian church will illustrate these remarks. And, for the present, this is all we propose doing, either as it regards his theory or that of Dr. Breckinridge, as they will come before us in an another article.

In his exposition of the ordinary office-bearers of the Christian church Dr. Killen finds it impossible to harmonize the statements of Scripture with the theory of a one order of elders with two classes—one ruling and one teaching. "The ordinary office-bearers of the apostolic church were pastors, teachers, and helps; or teachers, rulers, and deacons." There are good grounds for believing that the "pastors" mentioned before the "teachers" in one text are equivalent to the "governments" mentioned after them in the other. The *only reason*, however, given is, that "the *lay* council of the modern synagogue are called parnasim or pastors." "Nor is it strange that those intrusted with *ecclesiastical government* should be styled pastors or shepherds; for they were the guardians and rulers of the flock of God." Acts xx. 28; 1 Pet. v. 2. "The

* Knowledge of God, vol. ii. p. 642.

† The History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution of the Ancient Church for the first Three Centuries. New York and London, 1859.

elders, or bishops, were the same as pastors." 1 Tim. iii. 1, 2, 5. "Hence elders are required to act as faithful pastors under Christ, the chief Shepherd." 1 Pet. v. 1, 2, 4, and Acts xx. 17, 28. It appears, too, that while some of these (*same*) elders were only pastors or rulers, others were also teachers. 1 Tim. v. 17. "We may then see that the teachers, governments, and helps . . . are the same as the bishops and deacons mentioned elsewhere." Compare, he says, 1 Cor. xii. 28, Philip. i. 1, 1 Tim. iii. 1–8.

Now, let us try to arrange them. We have first, pastors, or rulers, or governments. Secondly, teachers or bishops. Thirdly, helps or deacons. But we are told that elders (and, of course, governments and pastors,) and bishops are interchangeable—that elders were also teachers—that when it occurs alone, *bishop* includes under it, pastors, governments, rulers, and teachers—that elders were not all preachers—that "these elders were appointed simply to 'take care' (!) of the church of God," and "it was not necessary that each individual should perform all the functions of *the pastoral office.*" He had just determined that the pastoral office is that of the ruling elder. And yet he is constrained by the necessary use of the universal and invariable *usus loquendi* of the church universal to employ it, in order to designate the ministry, for in the next sentence he says, "the preacher is to minister to a single congregation." But in further proof that *pastors* were ruling elders he affirms that, because the apostle (1 Tim. v. 5, 7) speaks of "presbyters who rule well," (which Dr. Killen, in contrariety to Dr. Breckinridge and others mentioned, admits to be a function, though a subordinate one, of the preacher *ex officio*,) therefore they did not preach also. This, however, is an evident *non sequitur*, since Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Adger also hold, that in order to be a preacher a man *must* first be a *ruler* —the rulers and the *charisma*, or function of teaching, constituting a minister. A good minister must, therefore, be a good ruler, though he may excel in one or other department. Another proof of his position is, that in enumerating the qualifications necessary for a bishop (1 Tim. iii. 2–7,) the apostle employs only one word alluding to his teaching, that is—"apt to teach;" while as to his ability "to propagate his principles," he

"scarcely refers to it or to his oratory at all." "It is *remarkable*, not that this is so, but how accurately it accords with the constant spirit of him who spake not in the words of man's wisdom—who was not ashamed of the despised gospel—who regarded the foolishness of preaching as God's appointed instrumentality—the power of God 'to save them that believe' —and who could write such passages as 1 Cor. i. 11—31."

But further, Dr. Killen urges that this teaching, and aptness to teach, does not imply that he must be qualified to "*preach*, for *teaching* and preaching are repeatedly distinguished in the New Testament," and yet we have been told by him, that *teachers* means preachers in passages where the same apostle uses the same word, (see 1 Cor. xii. 28, Rom. xi. 7, and Ephes. iv.) and that the *charisma* of *teaching*, (the very same word,) added to a ruling elder, makes a preacher. In confirmation, however, of his last position, Dr. Killen quotes 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25, where "the servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, *apt to teach*, patient *in meekness*, *instructing* those that oppose themselves if peradventure," &c. Here he says "apt to teach" refers apparently to a talent for winning over gainsayers by means of instruction communicated in *private conversation.* And yet, while all that has been ever deemed peculiarly solemn and authoritative as bearing upon a soul-saving, Christ-loving ministry, is thus weakened down to the generalities of private Christian instruction, we are reminded in the next paragraph that "still preaching is the grand ordinance of God, as well for the edification of saints as for the conversion of sinners." "It thus appears that, after all, preaching held the *most honourable position* amongst the ordinary functionaries of the apostolic church. Whilst his office required the highest order of gifts and accomplishments, and exacted the largest amount of mental, and even of physical exertion, the prosperity of the whole ecclesiastical community depended mainly on his acceptance and efficiency." "The preaching elder was very properly treated with peculiar deference. He was accordingly recognized as the stated president of the presbytery or eldership." "Even the apostles repeatedly testified that they regarded the preaching of the word as the *highest* department of *their* office. It was not as

church *rulers*, but as church *teachers*, (*although teaching had previously been distinguished from preaching*, and attached by highest sanctions and weightiest responsibilities and most solemn texts in all Scripture to *ruling elders*) they were specially distinguished, and the people were bound to respect and sustain and communicate to him that *teacheth* (who were just proved to be rulers) in all good things." P. 231—236.

Can it then be possible that the office, or work, or functions, or charisma—call it what you will—of preaching, is so transcendently important that Dr. Killen, as soon as he turns his attention from a foregone theory of the eldership he felt called upon to maintain, once more reminds us that "the business of *ruling* originally formed only a *subordinate* part of the duty of the church *teacher?*" P. 238. What will he, and our own theorists, say to that? Is it true that "the apostles instituted no class of spiritual *overseers* to whose jurisdiction all other preachers are amenable," and yet that Christ, with all his gifts to his church, and with preachers as the one and only order he personally commissioned (*eighty-two of them*)—and with preaching as the one all-comprehending commission given to his church—has not even honoured the ministry with a distinct official title? Can it be that this highest power and province, this final end, of the church, even the calling out, gathering, and garnering lost but blood-bought souls for eternal paradise of rest, has only a partial use of the name of a *subordinate* class or function;—has no existence apart from it;—has only, in distinction from it, a charisma, a superadded gift? Can it be that this great, and glorious, and life-giving, and life-preserving power of the church unto salvation to every one who will believe, is nowhere portrayed, had no institution, no commission, no defined qualifications, no supreme and solemn sanctions, no everlasting recompense holding it up to the reverential regard and the sanctified ambition of the world? Can it be that this more than angelic heraldry cannot even be spoken of in the language of Scripture without confusion of names, as is found in the last sentence quoted above, where the very term *overseer*, which Dr. Killen took pains (p. 232) to restrict to rulers, is employed to express *preachers;* and the very term *teacher*, which he laboured to identify with the same function, (p. 234,)

is employed as officially designative of the preacher, and *overseers*, and *rulers*, and *teachers* (his ruling elders) are identified not only in class, but in order with "all *other* preachers?" No, no!—it is impossible. God is not the God of "confusion worse confounded," such as we have seen the best men and the brightest minds have involved themselves in, and would involve the church of God in.

The πρωτον ψευδος, the source of all the difficulty, is in the adoption of the appellative interpretation of *presbyter* given by Neander, and of his theory of the primordial *planting* state of the Christian church in its progressive and even yet immature condition, as actually characteristic of that finished house of which Christ is the builder, and maker, and occupant, and whose foundation is the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. The confusion we have noticed will be found to run through the whole volume of Dr. Killen. We have been aware for many years that Dr. Killen had adopted the opinion that "ruling elders are very much the same as the presbyters referred to by the writers of the second and third centuries." In sustaining this opinion in his "Ancient Church," we have marked a multitude of passages in which he has substituted the English word *elder* for the original word *presbyter*, and its cognate terms; and sometimes in the same sentence or argument of a writer quoted, he uses the terms *elder*, *presbyter*, *minister*, *ruler*, *pastor*, *preaching elder*, *elders who only ruled*, *moderator*, *session*, *synod*, *brethren*, in evident unfairness to the real and manifest meaning of the writers.* After his discussion of the *ruling elder* question, as noticed above, the whole book is devoted to the question of presbytery *versus* prelacy, and the whole strength of his weighty and conclusive argument is in the fact that the presbyter of Scripture and the presbyter of the Fathers is a minister, and the *only* order of ministers instituted and clothed with the powers of jurisdiction and of order by divine right, what-

* See all these terms on one single page, p. 555. See, e. g., 548, 549, 559, 560, 576, 616, 619, 621, 622; 498, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 528, 532, 524, 533. On p. 525, in quoting Jerome, he uses *elders*, and in referring to it for another purpose on p. 534, *presbyters;* and so with Hilary, p. 541.

ever might be the *custom* of churches brought in, as Jerome Hilary and Tertullian very remarkably testify,—*paulatim*—little by little—as circumstances modified the condition and necessities of the church.

It will be unnecessary to dwell upon the short treatise of Guthrie (1726) on Ruling Elders and Deacons, as it perfectly accords with the views of Gillespie, Rutherford, and others, and only alleges in proof of the divine institution of ruling elders the three usual passages, Rom. xii. 6—8, 1 Cor. xii. 28, and 1 Tim. v. 17.*

The only other works distinctively on the office of ruling elder known to us, are those of Dr. McKerrow,† and the Rev. John G. Lorimer,‡ both of which present a re-statement and skilful adaptation of the views and arguments of Dr. Miller.

But we must close this article, and reserve for another the consideration of the real bearing of, and the magnitude of the interests involved in, these theories of the eldership. It will be our object not to propound another and still later theory, but to show what is the theory of the Presbyterian church throughout the world—for it is one uniform and fixed—and the true nature, dignity, and *relations of the eldership;* that the *one* order theory of the presbyter and elder in all its chameleon variety of forms is novel; contrary in all its assumptions to Scripture and to historical facts; in direct conflict with the standards of the Presbyterian church in Scotland, in Ireland, and these United States; and going back to the beginning—to the discipline of the Syrian, the Waldensian, the Genevan, the Puritan, and the patristic churches; and that it is subversive of Presbyterianism, of the ministry, of the eldership, and of the deaconship.

The discussion has been pressed upon us, and by friends, not foes. There is no rivalry among us but for the truth and order of Christ's blood-bought church. There is nothing personal or private. The question happily cannot be made a fundamental one except in the possible results of a practical working out of what is still, with little exception, *theory.* Our

* This will be found reprinted in Lorimer's work on the Eldership. Glasgow, 1841. † Edinb. 1846. ‡ Glasgow, 1841.

church only *requires explicit approval* of her Form of Government and Discipline from ministers, elders, and deacons, and *not even this* from licentiates.* She does not believe, as the ever candid and catholic-spirited Dr. Miller expresses it in his work on this very subject,† "with some zealous votaries of the hierarchy, that any particular form of government is in so rigorous a sense of *divine right* as to be essential to the existence of the church; so that where this form is wanting there can be no church. To adopt this opinion is to take a very narrow and unscriptural view of the covenant of grace." In the introduction to the Form of Government these views in relation to other denominations and our own are *authoritatively* delivered. Hence, also, while asserting "that it is agreeable to Scripture and the practice of the primitive Christians that the church be governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies," it is added, "in full consistency with this belief, we embrace, in the spirit of charity, those Christians who differ from us, in opinion or in practice, on these points." *Form of Government*, chap. vii. § 1. And in the whole course and correspondence of our church she has held the unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace with all evangelical denominations—Episcopalian, Lutheran, Reformed, Congregational, and Presbyterian. In his large, liberal, and catholic views every Presbyterian can cordially unite with Dr. Killen.‡ We rejoice in being members of a church of which no one can be *consistently* a member and be either a dogmatist or a sectarian or a bigot. With a catholic creed and catechism, and a church membership not requiring the adoption of all our standards, (which are bonds of *official* and not of *Christian* communion,) but only a profession of repentance toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ; with liberty of conscience, liberty of opinion, and liberty of action, as her motto and her watchword; and acknowledging the principle of common right in every Christian church, or union, or association of particular churches, to declare the terms of admission into its communion,

* See form of licensure and of ordination of bishops or pastors, and evangelists; and also of ruling elders and deacons, which, be it known and observed, is one and the same, and by the minister. *Form of Government*, chaps. xiii. xiv. xv.

† Page 19.

‡ See Preface and closing chapters.

and the qualifications of its ministers and members, as well as the whole system of its internal government; she is ever ready to unite, heart and hand, with all evangelical Christian churches, in all evangelistic efforts for the extension and glory of the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.

In these principles of catholic communion, none more cordially unite than the advocates of the theory we have developed, and towards whom we cherish nothing but love and veneration and admiring regard. Differ we do, but our difference is not "disreputable." Charles I. was wont to say of Presbyterians, "Let them alone. They are only silly folks, and will be sure to quarrel among themselves." Let us not take up the proverb against ourselves. Let us agree to differ, and divide to conquer, attending to the apostolic rule—Whereto we are agreed let us walk by that same rule; let us mind the same thing, and God, in due time, will make plain to us everything in which we differ. And if we must differ about words, let us not make it a wordy strife.

ART. II.—*History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain.* Translated from the Spanish of Dr. J. A. CONDE, by Mrs. JONATHAN FOSTER. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854.

How brilliant the colouring and how distinct the outline of this panorama of the civil discords that resulted in the dissolution of the empire of the Arabs in Spain! How often it reminds us of oft-repeated instructions of Scripture, such as: Fear God, honour the king, and meddle not with those who are given to change. It was of such rulers as Tiberius and Nero, Pilate and Herod, that Paul spake, when he said: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." "Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath (for fear of punishment,) but for conscience'

sake." "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." (We shall hereafter show that there is a natural qualification of such precepts.) Nothing in history affords us such solemn and impressive warnings of the importance of these precepts, as a description of the moral and social diseases consequent upon a disobedience of them, and of the gradual weakening of the vital powers of a nation engaged in distressing and exhausting civil discords, and of the final death-struggles that end in the dissolution of the body politic. No where are such scenes described with more vivid truth of nature than in the history before us. Arabs themselves have drawn the pictures of the different eras of their history, and our author has collected and translated them for our benefit. A proper study of them will certainly suggest reflections demanding a much higher regard for the above Scripture precepts than is common among us.

It was in A. D. 710 that the Arabs of the Caliphate of Damascus conquered and took possession of the Spanish peninsula. It was governed as a province of Syria until A. D. 755, when the people declared their independence of the Syrian Caliph, and chose a king of their own, Abderahman, the first of the dynasty of the Omeyas. The reign of this dynasty continued, though with much discord towards the end, until A. D. 1086, when a dynasty of Moorish princes, the Almoravides, was called in from Africa. During their reigns internal discords continued to multiply until A. D. 1146, when we find another Moorish dynasty, the Almohades, called over from Africa to establish order. This also was but a temporary relief, and in A. D. 1267 the Almohades had to give place to the Ben Merines, also Moors, who were as unsuccessful as prior dynasties; for diseases within the state and amputation by the Christians without continued to increase, until the Mohammedans were finally conquered by Ferdinand and Isabella, and their kingdom dissolved A. D. 1492, the very year of the discovery of America.

This final catastrophe was not a mere change of sovereigns or of the ruling families, as has so often been the case at the great national eras recorded in history. It was in fact an extinction of all that was peculiarly Arabian or Moorish in the

morality, religion, and customs of the people. The people were neither exterminated nor expelled the country; yet those that did not voluntarily leave it at the conquest were persecuted by the Inquisition, and operated upon by Christian teachings, customs, and intercourse, until they became fused into the common and undistinguishable mass of the Spanish nation; and Arabs and Mohammedans became entirely unknown where once they had swayed a magnificent sceptre, and exerted an immense literary influence.

To regard this as one continuing dominion of nearly eight centuries would be to have no proper idea of its character; for all the four changes of dynasties, to which we have referred, were real revolutions, affecting the people quite as seriously as did the Norman conquest in England. They were, in fact, conquests in the same sense that that was; and there were, besides, many intermediate revolutions of a transient character, which were immensely more distressing and destructive in their immediate effects than the American Revolution. The several African conquests bore some resemblance to the Gothic conquest of Spain, which endured about two and a half centuries without abolishing the language, religion, and customs of the country. The final conquest by the Christians was more like the conquest of the earlier inhabitants, the Lusitanians, Cantabrians, Celtiberians, and Asturians, by the Romans, which endured near five centuries, and effected an entire change in these particulars: it was even a greater change than this. The history which we have sketched embraces in fact a long series of most distressing political catastrophes, all repeating, for our instruction, the same political vices, and the same earnest and fruitless efforts of patriotic devotion. Let us look at it more in detail.

The original invaders and settlers were Moors, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, and many tribes of Arabs. They were all Mohammedans, but they differed widely in language and customs, and all had of course their national and tribal preferences and prejudices. Each were settled in different parts of the country or provinces, with their own leaders for rulers; for they could not be mingled. Each were, in their low state of

civilization, naturally jealous of their respective rights and influence, and ready to resent any real or apparent preferences given to others, and totally unable to make such allowances as were essential to harmony and union.

Here, then, at the very outset of their political organization, we find elements which could not fail in generating the most ferocious discord. Add to this, that few of them had ever learned to submit to any permanent political order, except so far as was necessary for their wild forays upon the territories of their neighbours, and we get some notion of the difficulty of reducing them to order in their new home under one central government.

For the first half century this disorderly and centrifugal tendency was necessarily much moderated by the circumstances in which they were placed. The country and the people of the country were divided among them. The people were reduced to a state of villenage, and the invading leaders were under the necessity of distributing themselves and their soldiers in castles and walled towns all over the country, in order to be able to maintain their conquest over the subject races that had preceded them, and to compel the payment of the rents and tributes which they thought proper to impose. These could not be freely rendered until, by long usage, they became customary, and in the mean time, the conquerors would need to devote the greater part of their vigilance and activity to their subjects, and would have but little leisure for those dissensions among themselves, which were sure to arise so soon as they could be ventured upon.

Even within the first half century there were insurrections and rebellions. Each tribe was offended when any one of another tribe was appointed Ameer or Lord-Lieutenant of Spain by the Caliph. One tribe rebelled because its Ameer had been deposed, and others joined them because they were dissatisfied with his substitute. Under different pretexts several Walies, or governors of provinces, impatient of all superior authority, would rebel against the legitimate Ameer; and if he kindly besought them, for the peace of the country and for the happiness of the people, to respect the institutions of the country and the organs of public authority, they at once

inferred that this patriotic kindness was proof of timidity and weakness, and used this argument to influence the passions and courage of their followers. The death of the Caliph Walid, A. D. 744, murdered by the Syrians, gave rise to a disputed succession, and divided the Walies, Alcaydes, and Xeques into hostile parties in Spain as well as elsewhere, each contending for the honour and power of its leaders. In view of these things their chroniclers moralize substantially in this manner.

The ambitious men of all nations are as the sea, which is always ready to rise, whatever wind may blow. Thus some took arms under the pretext of avenging the death of Walid and punishing the disloyalty of the Syrian people; others, as pretending to approve or defend them; while not a few, availing themselves of the occasion presented by the confusion prevailing in the state, took that opportunity for gratifying their covetousness or satiating their vengeance on such as they deemed their foes. The orderly and quiet portion of the community had no power to resist such combinations, or to suppress the contagion of their example. In some places the people arose against the new Caliph, and in other places in his favour. In some places they murdered their Walies and Alcaydes for their devotion to the new Caliph, and in other places for their opposition to him. Armed bands of miscreants roamed over the land, slaying all that offended them; and this was so especially at night; for men are bold and insolent at night, because not hindered by the blush that naturally arises by the light of day in the commission of a bad action. Thus it hath ever been with the sons of man, and so it will ever be while his nature remains unchanged.

The continued dissensions among the leaders soon divided all Spain into factions and parties, each crying aloud that right was alone with them, and that the safety of the state depended on adhesion to them; nor could the prudent counsels of the good Moslems avail to remedy the evil. If the peace-loving inhabitants could have known that they had power to disperse the local fevers of the state by a quiet resistance of them, matters might have been otherwise; but such is not human nature. The most orderly and patriotic people, in their general conduct

and intentions, followed in all social movements their accustomed leaders, and thus contributed to the spread and virulence of the social disorders.

Under such circumstances, power alone could provide the remedy, and many noble leaders combined in requesting the Ameer of their brethren in Africa to send them an Ameer that could reconcile the discords of the factions then raging, calling themselves Yemenies, Alabderies, Syrians, and Egyptians; a man of prudence, inclining to no party, the enemy of all faction, and desiring only the public good, and with power to compel submission where it should not be freely yielded. Such an Ameer they obtained in General Husam. He landed in Spain with some selected troops from Africa, and was joined by such numbers of patriotic inhabitants that he was soon able to suppress the rebellious spirits of the land, and so to separate the factions and accommodate their differences, as to restore to the afflicted country a reasonable degree of harmony and good order.

But this relief was only temporary. Their constitution had been violated and set aside by the murder of their Caliph and of his legitimate successors, and now they could not even approximate to unanimity in providing a substitute. The new Ameer was not appointed by the Caliph, but was partly chosen by themselves and partly forced upon them. His patriotism and capacity were not adequate warrants of his authority, for they were open to comparison with the patriotism and capacity of other leaders, and few were competent to make the comparison rightly. Other leaders felt that they were wronged by the preference that had been shown to a stranger. They did their best to wake up anew the spirit of discord by means of their partisans, the Alabderies and Egyptians. In the beginning, they confined themselves to secret murmurs and complaints; but contemptuous language and acts, and disobedience to the commands of rulers soon followed. The Ameer Husam laboured to extinguish the sparks of mischief before they should burst forth into a conflagration, and so carry the fires of discord over all Spain; but he did not succeed. The partisans of different leaders, gained over by false or exaggerated accusations against the government, or allured by promises of

plunder, broke out into open rebellion, and the clamor of their arms, the cries of their partisans, and the tumults of their discords prevented the voice of peace from being heard. Soon the tribes and factions divided the country among themselves. None thought of anything but of increasing their own power and influence; to which end they who held authority did their utmost to gain over the Alcaydes and Castellans of the frontiers by granting them immunities of all kinds, while these stood ready to defend all that they had been able to appropriate. Such was the state into which they fell by reason of their selfish jealousies, selfish demands upon each other, and selfish excitements, and the partisan contests that followed.

Sensible of the calamities of this state of things, the most noble and honourable of the Arabs and Egyptians, wearied by the ridiculous pretensions of the conflicting leaders, proposed to hold an assembly for peaceful deliberation for the welfare and protection of the people; but this patriotic proposition was opposed by the passions and interests of the rival leaders, each fearing that his selfish hopes would be thereby disappointed. Yet an assembly was held, and the necessity of one ruler for all Spain was agreed upon, a man who had been at the head of no faction, and who should on no account be a fervid partisan of any one of the numerous sects that held the people in division. Jusuf El Fehri was chosen A. D. 746. He had never raised his voice in favour of any faction, nor was he the rival or enemy of any leader. All Spain applauded the choice, the leaders were abandoned by their followers, and the people were now full of hope.

But, says our chronicler, it would seem to be a fatality attached to human affairs that fortune is ever ready to abandon the man of upright intentions, while she follows the triumphal car of the bold and ambitious evil-doer. The ambition and efforts of the leaders soon began to cause new divisions. The new constitution, or new Ameer, which in this instance is the same thing, had not the aureole of sacredness that encircles and illustrates all customary institutions which have been brightened by the achievements of ancestors, and which, like the banner which has waved in many triumphs, spontaneously attracts the favourable and respectful regards of all the people.

The new constitution could succeed in enforcing respect only by reason; and reason is very slow and uncertain in such conquests, for the rival projects may be infinite in number, and each must be discussed before the selection can be final. It did not succeed. Rival candidates for public favour divided the vote so that no one could permanently prevail. And here our chronicler remarks: Truly it is affirmed that the ambitious are as the sea, which is ever unquiet, and which the slightest wind suffices to put in movement. But such reflections only emphasize the difficulties, without helping us to their solution.

War again broke out between the rival Walies, and soon all Spain was in arms and subjected to the horrors of civil war. The inhabitants of the smaller towns fled their dwellings without knowing where to take refuge, seeing that it was the custom of both parties to burn the villages and hamlets for the purpose of depriving their opponents of the advantage of them. The people were hovering between hopes and fears, and yet from this cruel discord good men succeeded in evoking the general welfare by establishing the empire of the Omeyas.

Up to this period, A. D. 755, Spain was a mere province of Syria and subject to its Caliphs. It was, therefore, more or less subject to all the main disturbances that occurred in Syria, as well as to those that were natural to itself. Its Ameers or Governors were ministers of the Caliphs of Damascus, removable at their pleasure, and governing according to their directions. Thus the government in Spain was naturally somewhat unsteady. Because of the distance of the appointing and controlling power, it was often very weakly administered and badly obeyed or actually resisted; and often its commands were issued in entire ignorance of the real want of the occasion. Much of the sympathy between the two countries which had helped to maintain their union had died out, and there was no necessity of proximity or protection that demanded its continuance. The Ameers of the Caliphs could not receive that cheerful respect and obedience that would naturally be granted to their own independent sovereign, and his hands were often weakened by combinations at home, and by false accusations secretly transmitted to the court at Damascus. The natural position and internal and external circumstances of the country

combined in suggesting that it ought to be independent of the Caliphs, and in familiarizing the subject to the thoughts of the people. Indeed, several of the recent Ameers had been in fact independent of the Caliphs, though rather from necessity, and while still acknowledging their legal subordination. Like their predecessors, they were unable to maintain order. The war among the tribes continued, and every province was thrown into disorder by their violence. Towns were burnt, the cultivated fields were cut up, and all the fruits of the earth were destroyed. The people were without rule or justice, and their dwellings afforded no security to him who hoped for shelter beneath their roof.

Under these circumstances a convention of patriotic leaders and generals was privately held. Relief from the mad passions of selfish leaders and rival factions and disorganizing disputes was felt by them to be imperatively demanded. Conferring together without enmity towards either of the two great parties, and with the care and discretion demanded by the momentous nature of their task, they thought only of establishing a firm government for the security of peace and justice, and a tranquil and permanent succession of the constituted authorities. They felt that they could not get along in peace under the distant, and therefore weak rule of the Caliphs, and resolved to have an independent government of their own. And in order to satisfy their reverence for their ancient constitution, they concluded to depart from it no further than was demanded by the necessities of the case. They therefore chose for their sovereign, Abderahman, a son of a former Caliph, A. D. 755. He was then residing in Africa, far removed from all the factions and exciting influences of Spain, and thither they sent for him and he came. His advent was gloriously successful, and he became the head of a dynasty that was not finally set aside for more than three centuries. The spontaneous reverence of the people for a son of their Caliph stood instead of a demonstration of his right, and silenced all opposing arguments.

Of course this effect was not instantly universal. It is wonderful that it was so nearly so. The people had so long listened to the tirades of their provincial and lesser leaders against their

government, that one might suppose that their political demoralization had become complete, that no ruler could succeed in maintaining his position long after he had displaced his predecessors, and that no leader could be respected except while answering as an instrument of revolution or disorder. But such a vice did not spread so rapidly then as it does now-a-days, when the press lends itself to foster the habit. Yet the vice had taken deep root, and it required many years to suppress the insurrections and rebellions that grew out of it, and bring about a habit of orderly submission to the laws of the land. Now some disappointed leader headed a rebellion. At another time some inefficient alcayde suffered an insurrection by not duly restraining the inhabitants of his city. For, says our chronicler, with the populace of large towns there is no medium to be maintained; if they be not rendered anxious for their own safety, they seek to impose fear on others, and when they do not dread their rulers, they may well be dreaded by them.

But order was obtained, and it was reasonably well maintained until near the close of this dynasty. The whole peninsula, except a small portion in the north occupied by the Christians, was subjected to the rule of the Omeyas, and the people were gradually becoming fused into one homogeneous population. Internal peace prevailed everywhere. The farmer and the artisan were secure in their homes, and secure in the rewards of their industry, and in science and civilization no people of Europe surpassed the Arabs of Spain.

All history proves, however, that in the course of a long period of harmony and order, people are apt to forget its value, by forgetting the evils of a contrary condition, and the sacrifices, concessions, mutual self-restraints, and the actual social force that were required in order to obtain them. Forgetting these, they allow the same jealousies, animosities, and disorders to grow up anew, without being able to see whither they are tending; and before they are aware of it the dissolution of their political organism has actually made great progress. They are prone to become vain of their nation, and to flatter themselves that nothing within or without can shake the solid foundations of their social fabric. Then they refuse to listen to the solemn

warnings of the philosophy of history. Even their religion is to them a lying prophet when it tells them, of nations as well as of men, that pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall. When their attention is directed to the fact that the highest functionaries of government are habitually defamed as the worst of men, and that they have really no defenders but those who are called their partisans; they set aside the fact by saying: These are but the detractions of political brawlers for their own advancement; nobody regards them. Yet the fact is plain that partisan leaders act thus because thus only can they get a hearing, and thus they do get a hearing and make all their gains. O! but people know their interests too well to suffer their political organism to be destroyed by excited partisans. And how can they help it, when all their leaders are excited partisans? Men never see any interests equal to those about which they are excited. It is only when the partisan can suppress his excitement that he can see the interests of the state in their true value. And it is only then that his vision can be clear enough to distinguish the true patriot and statesman from those brawlers for freedom and for popular rights, who are the mere drummers-up of party recruits, who are to have much less individual freedom after their enlistment than they had before. This history tells the truth on this subject in terms that cannot be mistaken. Hear a prophetic parable, applied in this history to a ruler, and which we may apply to the process of national dissolution. "I saw a very vigorous vine around which rose a bright flaming fire, which burnt round it for a long time without seeming to do it any harm; but which eventually consumed it to ashes. That fire is civil discord, and that vine thyself: the end of all things is known to God alone."

Advancing some two and a half centuries in our history, about A. D. 1000, we take a survey of the state, and find it enveloped in the flames of civil discord. It began at first in the northern borders, where disorderly walies, alcaydes, and xeques or chiefs of clans found themselves encouraged to rebel by the aid which they could derive from the Christians of Gallicia. This being neglected or ineffectually extinguished, gradually spread itself southward until the whole social organism was

on fire. Some northern lord or castellan or count, accustomed to the disorders and conflicts of the border, and puffed up by successful forays upon his neighbours, became too proud to render due obedience to the commands of the more orderly capital. If force was exerted to reduce him to submission, he found most willing allies in his Christian neighbours, who, for a small slice of Mohammedan territory, were ever ready to help on the strife. Some neighbouring lord, encouraged by a weak reign, or jealous of some personal or factional rival preferred as Hagib or prime minister, and hoping to stir up other lords to follow his example, would join in the rebellion. Even when this was put down the disease was not extirpated; for the disappointments, chagrin, animosities, and faithless and contumacious dispositions which resulted from it, remained in the social soil as seeds for the dissemination of a more abundant harvest of insurrections and rebellions.

After the independence of Spain, Morocco had become annexed to it, and occasioned the introduction of many elements of discord. Rebellions and insurrections there always disturbed the peace of Spain. The two countries being regarded as one, it became a political necessity that the intercourse between them should be as free as possible. All were to be treated as one people. Officers and soldiers from each country aided in the government of the other, and in suppressing its disorders. And yet it seems to be a necessity of human nature, especially in its lower conditions of civilization, that such interferences are sure to give rise to jealousies, or to furnish pretexts for disorder. These circumstances being added to what remained of the old grounds of party divisions, were continually generating new and dangerous factions. Instead of Yemenies, Syrians, and Egyptians, we have now new parties called African, Algibies, Alameries, Aben Hudes, and Sclavonians. Sometimes one party and sometimes another, and sometimes both, call in the Christians of the North or the Moors of the South to aid them in their contests. Even Negro regiments were sometimes imported from Africa. The government gradually grows weaker and weaker, and then even its friends fall into discord among themselves. War is everywhere, and peace nowhere. Rival factions unite in war against

a common enemy, the government it may be, only to disagree and fight with each other in case of success. One king after another is slain in his palace or on the battle-fields of civil war. Even the faction that gave him power assassinates him for not allowing them sufficient license. Each lord is contending for the enlargement of his own power or territory. When he finds that his aid is necessary to his superiors, he refuses to grant it without the reward of some increase of his jurisdiction. Famine and pestilence follow the footsteps of civil war, and the people everywhere murmur against the government, or are rendered furious by their calamities. Thus all the cords of national sympathy are gradually sundered, and their political dissolution advances with rapid strides; for social sympathy is the very life of political union; nothing can supply its place; it is the very life of all true political authority and power. When all the nerves of the social organism centre in the government, and act promptly from it, the life and power of the organism is sound and safe. Each nerve dissevered weakens the functional action and starts the process of decay. Hence all vituperations and factional combinations against government, when not demanded by a most imperious social need, are truly moral crimes against society, even when they are not condemned by law.

When the last of the Omeyas "departed to the mercy of Allah," A. D. 1022, Spain had already become limited on the north and east, and divided into as many kingdoms as there had been provinces. Everywhere walies, alcaydes, viziers, and xeques attempted to become independent of every superior power; and each tried to enlarge his dominions, so that boundaries were nowhere settled, and there was no authority to settle them. Every town required walls and an army for its protection. Every frontier was guarded by castles and fortresses and bands of soldiers, always oppressing and insulting the peaceable inhabitants whom they were stationed to protect or to hold in subjection. The business of the citizens was practically limited to the town or province they inhabited; for in such disorders liberty of commerce was impossible. The cultivation of the fields was abandoned or prosecuted without energy; for man cannot labour without hope of reaping the

reward of his industry. The populace threw off all the restraints of reason, as they usually do when, under any pretext, they have overpassed the barriers of due submission; as though they sought, in wild license, indemnity for their former obedience to law. Often the mob of some city rose in insurrection, crowned their leader, and committed all sorts of violence, while the xeques, generals, and cadies had not the courage or ability to combine the orderly citizens to oppose them. The king stood instead of a constitution, and when he was murdered and his line extinct, their constitution was abolished, and the essential element of public order was hopelessly gone. A new king of another line afforded but a limited and transient relief.

The walies and kings could not live at peace with each other for the benefit of the state, and would not listen to the few wise men who implored them to offer an example of obedience and union to those who were under them. Even the preaching of the Sacred War against the encroaching Christians, who were everywhere beginning to oppress them, failed to rally the sympathies of the leaders. The evil seemed to be beyond remedy. The state, weakened by long disunion, could not contend with the disorderly principles which had so long prevailed. The habits of disorder had grown so inveterate that they could not and would not be cured, because they would not submit to the proper remedies. The good customs of the past were known no more; all had become vitiated and corrupted, and one of their last good kings said: "This generation can neither govern well nor be well governed." Well might they mourn the death of the last of the Omeyas—"Death fell upon him with unexpected haste, and translated him hence to the Alcazars and eternal dwellings of the after-life." "The duration assigned in the eternal decrees" to the rule of the sons of Omeya were ended. "God alone is eternal; He only is the Lord of a perpetual dominion." "The kingdom in whose chief there is not the principle of unity, and whose captains are of opposite minds, must perish as doth the wicked, and shall soon find its end."

The time had come when even an invader was welcome to all truly patriotic minds. In A. D. 1086 another convention was

called to deliberate on the means of obtaining unity. But it came to nothing, for only partisan leaders were represented in it, and they knew not how to abate any of their present pretensions and powers for the future peace, honour, and glory of themselves and their country. It was proposed to invite the prince of the Almoravides at least to assist them against the Christians; but it was feared that he might encroach on existing powers, and the conference terminated with an empty exhortation in favour of unity of action, where there was no corresponding unity of organization.

But the prince of the Almoravides was invited from Africa. He came with a powerful army of Moors, and having effectually repelled the incursions of the Christians, he then turned his attention to reducing the rebellious provinces to order by deposing or destroying all their disorderly kings and chiefs. "The omnipotent Arbiter of human fates and empires had thus prepared a glorious day of vengeance for the aggrieved and afflicted people, and no human craft or care can impede the events which God the Most High hath decreed." The state was again united under one head. The new dynasty reigned with more or less success for sixty years. We will not weary the patience of our readers by tracing the details of their history. They were succeeded by two other Moorish dynasties, each brought in by reason of renewed civil discords. To trace their respective histories would be only to repeat the unpleasant scenes over which we have already passed. But even at the risk of some repetition, we venture on an outline of the troubles of their later years, in order that we may the better comprehend the closing scene of the tragedy, the death-agony of the dominion of the Arabs in Spain. In doing so we shall, as we have hitherto done, endeavour to convey the very spirit of our historian, and as nearly as is convenient, often weave in his language.

At one time the discord is renewed by the advocates of the old constitution, partisans of a descendant of a deposed wali, who, by his liberality and eloquence, proves that he is wronged by a usurping government. He professes the patriotic purpose of restoring liberty to the cities, oppressed by real or fancied extortions, and of re-establishing the old rates of taxation

instead of the charges imposed by tyrants and heretics; for hard names were a material part of his eloquence. Even the ministers of religion aided his designs, by preaching in the mosques that the opposite party had profaned these sacred places; and they further imposed upon the popular fancy, and excited it to fanaticism, by solemn ceremonies of lustration, in which their political leaders appeared in vestments of mourning.

The very means of protection and defence are made a reason for despising their government after the danger has been averted; and their rulers are branded as heretics and infidels for having secured peace by the aid of the Christians. The energetic action that is essential to repress disorder or rebellion is called despotic, and all the arts of vituperative eloquence are resorted to in order to give to patriotic earnestness the appearance of tyranny. Prudent action or inaction is censured, by rash heads and bold tongues, or by disappointed selfishness, as shameful and treacherous cowardice. No language is too disrespectful, no accusation too gross to be made against the higher officers of government, if it has any chance of being listened to by suspicious ears. No insinuations are too despicable, no plot too dishonourable, no combinations too incongruous, no degree of earnestness too dangerous, when government is regarded as a rival party that is to be overthrown. Thus all the real patriotism that was in the country was suppressed or expelled by the constant presence of a more intense affection that was inconsistent with it. Habits of partisanship, disaffection, complaint, detraction, disorder, insurrection, rebellion, were gradually, but surely, wearing out the broader and nobler feeling that constitutes patriotism. A patriotism that cannot suppress such dangerous habits can find no adequate substitute in conventional arrangements or social compacts or constitutions. These are the expedients of a cold rationalism, and cannot supply the place of those enduring bonds which are wrought out in the fervent heat of patriotic sympathy. Even constitutions must have a foundation in the sentiments of the people. At the period we are speaking of, Spain was bound hand and foot in the bad habits to which we have just referred, and her own wisdom points to the consequences.

> "Do the moments pass,
> And give no sign and raise no hand to warn thee
> That they prepare thy fall? Yet know thou well
> That to this end they move and will not halt."

Again the bond of union is broken, now never to be re-welded. They are powerless to resist the Christians on the north and the Africans on the south. All their energies are exhausted in mutual discords and wars. Each city and province has its standing army for defence against its neighbours, or for encroachment on them. Every frontier bristles with distrust, if not with hostile intent. Taxes are multiplied to the great oppression of the people. Fields are laid waste and towns destroyed by hostile armies. Men and women are butchered in all directions, and whole families destroyed and left unburied, or buried in haste "without ablution, without a shroud, and without prayer." All property is depreciated, all business depressed, all commerce restrained and uncertain. The mass of the inhabitants could not now choose to be at peace, by refusing to join any party; for that would leave them unprepared for self-defence, and expose them to be overcome by the armies of all parties.

Only occasionally could they unite against the encroachments of the Christians. One city and province after another submitted to their conquerors, and "the mosques and towers thereof were filled with idols and crosses, while the sepulchres of the faithful were profaned." Yet their civil wars continued, because the bond of sympathy was sundered, and rivalry and enduring hostility had taken its place. All the counsels of prudence had but a transient influence over their rooted passions. The fears of wise men, the predictions of their prophets, and warning signs in heaven and earth, failed to overcome their inveterate habits of insubordination. Now many a leader had to mourn that in his partisan excitement and selfish earnestness his own arm and voice had aided the enemies of his country; and, when too late, he beheld with saddened spirit that dissension and discord had extinguished all possibility of united action. One leader after another submitted to the Christians, and with their followers became vassals of Christian kings or lords. The people rejoiced in the change, and many

towns sought protection from their rulers by becoming subjects of the Christians. Finally, the province of Grenada alone was left to the government of the Arabs, and its king also soon acknowledged himself as vassal of the Christian king.

But it could not yet be quiet. When the Christians were at war, it would rebel or refuse its service. Its own towns sought peace as direct Christian vassals, because they could have no peace under their own king. The habit of discord had so grown that now the most trifling matters had become great causes of dispute. None would listen to reason nor give thought to any other question than that of defeating their opponents. The royal influence was so feeble that if the king favoured one party he was deposed by the other. His civil wars desolated the Vegas of Grenada and watered its pleasant fields with the blood of his people. The throne of Grenada was floating in the midst of a stormy and tumultuous sea. Hear the appeal of the patriot. What fury is this, fellow-citizens? To what further point do you propose to carry this frenzy of rage? Forget not your wives and children and country. Follow not the mad ambition and selfish passions of others. What unspeakable folly, what fatal blindness! Devote your energies to peace and union, and not to discord and division. Turn, or your downfall and the downfall of your country is at hand. Brave and earnest you are; give these qualities to your country, and let party spirit die. If it cannot be thus, Woe! Woe! Woe to Grenada; its fall is at hand; desolation will dwell in its palaces; its strong men will fall beneath the sword; its children and maidens will be led into captivity. Zahara is but a type of Grenada.

But warnings and exhortations were now useless. "The immutable decree inscribed on the tablets of the Destinies had now attained the period of its fulfilment, and from no part did there come succour for the falling kingdom of Grenada." Misfortunes and defeats do not diminish the causes of discord, but only multiply them. Opposite leaders perpetually added fuel to the flames by which the heart of the empire was consumed, and by their private animosities and continual dissensions prolonged the war that was devouring the strength of the land.

At last the people had become so accustomed to be disappointed in their leaders that they had no confidence in any of them, and hence had no chance of union by their inner social forces, and were ready for a voluntary submission to a power without them. The kingdom of Grenada fell, and all its inhabitants that remained in the land became subjects of the Christians, and were finally merged in the mass of the Spanish nation.

And here we may venture the suggestion of a common result of such social disorders when they become chronic. It seems to be a general law of society that where the ruling race is gifted with a great organizing vitality in its social action, and especially when there is added to this a superior intelligence, the race is sure to maintain its position by preserving the predominating influence in the mixed nationality over which it presides, until the subject race, however numerous, becomes merged in it by adopting its language, customs, and principles. The influence of Rome in her best days over all the European nations subjected to her sway, is evidence of this. Her government maintained order among the discordant subject elements, and these gradually became assimilated to the ruling spirit. But when disorders continue after a conquest we see the principle in its reverse aspect. It seems to be a general law of society that, when the ruling race have a very weak organizing vitality in their social action, and are continually engaged in civil wars among themselves, they gradually become extinct or degraded, and the subject races, which were kept in order by their superiors, and not allowed to engage in their wars and political excitements, gradually become the controlling power, and the ruling race becomes merged in them by adopting their language, customs, and principles. There is much evidence of this in the history of all modern Europe, and the subject is worthy of careful reflection; but our chroniclers do not furnish sufficient facts to enable us to discuss it in this connection.

The principle might be further illustrated by the lives of families and individuals. It is only those individuals, families, and nations that are devoted to social order as well as to private virtue, that ever can maintain a permanent and continually rising position in society. Even the greatest names in his-

tory are often only enduring monuments of the consequences of social disorder. The teachings of the Bible are most earnest and frequent against all social disorders, against all social scorn, jealousy, pride, divisions and strifes, in its direct warnings and in its histories of the ruinous consequences of these vices. Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation. There should be no schism in the body; the members should have care one of another. Let not Ephraim envy Judah, nor Judah vex Ephraim. Mark them that cause divisions and avoid them. Cast out the scorner, and contention shall go out. As wood is to fire, so is the contentious man to kindle strife. Seek the peace even of the city where ye are captives, for in the peace thereof ye shall have peace. The period of national dissolution is always a distressing one. "In the last days perilous times shall come, for men will be selfish, covetous, boasters, proud, calumniators, truce-breakers, false accusers, despisers of the good, traitors, heady, haughty; from such turn away." 2 Tim. iii. 1—5.

We do not need to go back into the above details in order to show that the selfishness of leaders, of families, of tribes and of provinces is the principle that gave rise to the calamitous results which our history reveals to us. By its very nature this selfishness grew, as it always does when not kept under due control, into jealousy, suspiciousness, invidious comparisons of services or sufferings for the public, and of rewards received, detraction, factions, open hostility and actual war between leaders, tribes, or provinces, or between some of them on one hand and the general government on the other. This is the natural course of things when selfishness in the leading elements of the state overbalances their patriotism. It is often revealed in our history, and it would be in a great measure inferred from the results, if not actually revealed; for all social disorders have their natural germs in the heart of man. These are the beginnings of evil, and, if not repressed, must grow up into ruinous discord. Selfishness, envy, rivalrous comparisons, and malice, are sure to beget like sentiments and acts in others, and to grow to intensity of heat, until it becomes a necessity for them to break out into deadly hostility; and then "the just upright man is laughed to scorn," and all his counsels go for

naught. This truth is conspicuously prominent in the history of a people divided into small tribes in proximity to each other. A quarrel between individuals of different tribes is dangerous to the peace of both. But an offence against a chief is an insult to the very constitution of the tribe, and rouses the war spirit and rallies the powers of the whole tribe to vengeance.

We have already seen that exhortations to harmony did but little to mitigate the disorders of the state, for usually they were resorted to only in exciting times; and then nothing but a clear perception of fearful consequences can arrest the march of events; and people are then badly prepared to study into future consequences. Even the strong arm of a superior power so often called in, and their continual dangers from the Christians, could not suppress the evil, because its roots always remained, and therefore the relief was but temporary. In the family this selfishness is gradually moulded by parental authority and family influence, and grows into the more generous sentiment of family love; in the tribe it becomes clanishness, and in the nation it grows into the still more liberal and generous sentiment of patriotism. Yet patriotism itself may be so selfishly national as to be a quite disorderly element in the family of nations. Dangers without are often the most efficient conditions for suppressing this undue selfishness of individuals, parties, and tribes; for frequent contests together against a common enemy generate a habit of united devotion to the common welfare, which tends to beget a general harmony of principles, and which does not wear out until the sense of their dangers has entirely passed away, and the memory of their mutual sacrifices has grown dim.

Our history shows us further that there is no reliance to be placed on the most earnest and vociferous professions of devotion to the public welfare. Earnest advocacy of measures is no evidence of their wisdom or their honesty. The most despicable nostrums of quackery are urged in this way. Such professions cannot convert selfishness into patriotism, or partisan struggles into self-sacrificing devotion to the public good. Yet imposition is inevitable. Within the province of our ignorance we cannot distinguish between the confidence of the

man of science and the impudence of the charlatan, and charlatans know how to occupy this province, and honest inexperience is sure to favour their entrance. But charlatanism is naturally forward and imperious, while truth is naturally modest, unpretending, insinuating, and perfectly respectful to the mind which it designs to benefit. It is like seed; the smallest things in nature are the seeds of things. Men walk over them and know it not, and yet all the future is in them. Moral and religious, and political, as well as medical quackery starts on a more pretentious scale, with crowds of followers, lives faster, and dies sooner. Of course quietness and unobtrusiveness are not proof of worth, for they may result from laziness, pride, or incapacity; yet it must be true that a man who is sincerely devoted to fitting himself for public affairs, or to fulfilling the duties of a public office, has but little leisure or inclination for any public exhibitions, except such as naturally belong to the discharge of duty. It is not such men that are usually found as leaders of factions, stirring up the bitter waters of strife, and seeking new means of rousing the public mind into an excitement. They very soon learn that the normal condition of a healthy public progress is quiet earnestness, and not boisterous excitement. Their very selfishness is generous; for all its fibres are interlaced with the enduring sentiments of society around them, and it expects its advantage only as others derive advantage from its efforts for the social good. Their very ambition is patriotic, for it is not the transient honour of public position that they desire; but the enduring one of having done good to their country and to the world through it; and they feel that public excitement is obstructive of this end. Yet we would not judge public men harshly. A soft answer turneth away wrath, and a quiet and clear presentation of truth is usually the best answer to rant and bravado; yet it is a rare talent to be able to act out this principle, and hence it is often transgressed even by honest and ordinarily competent men.

There is a natural and essential distinction between the functions of the ruler and those of the teacher; and though, in practical life, it is impossible to keep them entirely separate, yet it is important to hold their ideas as distinct and separate

as possible; for a large share of our social disorders is due to the confusion of them. The parent, the schoolmaster, and the ruler must all both teach and govern; but the spirit and manner of each function are essentially distinct. As rulers they enforce order within their several spheres. As teachers in the family, the school, or in great or small deliberative assemblies, their aim is to impart higher ideas, to expose pernicious prejudices, customs, and errors, and to convince the judgment of something better; and for this the spirit and manner of the teacher are necessary. He is kind, attractive, persuasive, and insinuating, so as to draw out the hidden germs of mental life, and promote their growth. Even towards defects and sins he is kind and indulgent, in order that he may fully understand them and know how to warn against them, and to marshal the mental forces to their conquest. The spirit and manner of the civil ruler may be, and often must be stern, repulsive, indignant, and imposing; for he has to enforce obedience to the law and order of the state. Civil law is the guide of the civil ruler, except in legislation, and then harmony with the customs and civilization of the people is the essential consideration. But the very aim of the teacher is to elevate and purify the customs and civilization of the country, and thus to elevate the law with them, and by continual changes to bring it into continuous adaptation. This is necessarily a very slow process, for a nation is not new born in a day. The change is marked by centuries rather than by days and years.

With very great diffidence we venture to think that our Saviour expressed something like this to the Jews; and that, abandoning the literal translation of their forms of language and following the analogy of our own, we may express his thought thus: I came not as civil ruler to abrogate your institutions; but as a teacher and a subject to obey and develope them: in their nature they cannot pass away until they have done their work; the most important visible possessions change more readily, and he little understands the principles of true religion who violates or teaches the violation of the least important social institutions, but obedience to them is high evidence of religious character. Matt. v. 17–19. We may not read this rightly; but surely we cannot be mistaken in saying

that this doctrine is not absent from the Saviour's instructions. He paid tribute to a government instituted by conquest, without questioning the authority or the justice of its exaction. He associated freely with tax-gatherers under that government, and chose one of them as an apostle, and yet uttered no condemnation of their office. He alludes to such laws as sanctioned the selling of a debtor and his family into servitude for his debts, and punishments by scourging, beheading, and crucifixion, without stopping to condemn them. He teaches the moral duty of a better practice than was required by law in the matter of divorces, but he refused to announce this moral duty as law, saying: Let him receive it that can. He teaches obedience to law as understood by its authorized interpreters, though they be not themselves good citizens. Matt. xxiii. 3. He forbade covetousness as obstructive of the true life of man; but he refused to decide a dispute between brothers about property. He taught the strictest moral purity, but refused to act as judge of the woman taken in adultery, saying only as a good teacher, Go, sin no more. He adopted freely the synagogue forms of worship, though they were not of positive, divine, but only of customary, origin. He attended, and founded parables on, existing social festivals, without condemning anything in them; while he taught principles which would in time set them aside. He adopted or admitted their expressive symbols and participated in their customs, such as anointing the body and feet and head, repenting in sackcloth and ashes, artificial funeral mournings, shaking the dust off the feet, and ordinary salutations and dress, without thereby changing their nature from transient, into perpetual institutions. He joined in the temple services and did not condemn them, though they were soon to be sloughed off by a new spiritual growth, and though the priesthood were not the legitimate successors of Aaron; but were imposed on the church by a heathen and usurping sovereign. He taught that religious and civil law is founded on love to God and to man, and that, as this principle advances in society, the laws must advance without any necessary shock to the social system, and with that harmony that always exists when laws are measured by the civilization of the people; and that it was not proper to criticise the fitness of institutions by

the true principle of love, because this love is not yet full. Matt. xxii. 40. He was perfectly serene in his knowledge that pure principles will, in proper time, beget their appropriate forms, and set aside all bad ones.

There is a natural order in the growth of mind as well as in the growth of a tree, though we have not yet found it out. There is an order in the hierarchy of opinions and principles of a man and of a people; and if this be deviated from further than is proper for the essential variety of human functions, the mental and national character is out of balance. In the normal order of mental growth, some degree of intelligence, and then desire, go in advance of practice, and yet not so far in advance as to endanger the harmony of the system. Intelligence must appreciate, well or ill, before desire can arise to furnish the stimulus for the necessary skill. Naturally the child has no desire for the sports and occupations of manhood. It is only by artificial stimulants that woman can be turned into man. Ignorance does not aspire to the functions of the man of science. The savage does not envy the order, and decorum, and wealth of civilized society. Thus nature provides that all shall be contented with their position in life, saving only those moderate aspirations after better things which are necessary to progress.

Of course, this contentment may be disturbed by artificial and abnormal processes—as by exciting envy towards those in higher positions; for men can have an apprehension of the honour that accompanies high social position long before they can understand the intelligence and force of character that fit one to fill such positions with advantage to society and with credit to himself. It is seldom that the intelligence of men, who grow rich fast, keeps pace with their wealth, and they fail in making a good use of it. If some of the branches of a tree become unduly developed, some others must be stinted. The mind may dwell upon the superior advantages of others until envy becomes its predominant characteristic, and its generosity is shrivelled up. It may dwell on the evil of certain sins until hatred becomes a rooted element of its character. Even love, unduly excited or indulged in one direction, becomes malice the most demoniacal towards all opposing objects. And the

order or hierarchy of principles may even become so far thrown out of their normal harmony as to amount to actual mental derangement.

And so it is with the hierarchy of political principles. National ambition may grow so strong as to endanger the peace of all surrounding states. Tribal and personal ambition or envy may unbalance their internal harmony. Much intelligence and great purity of private life are not, in fact, inconsistent with a very disorderly social character; for it may be accompanied by a selfishness that has no appreciation of the natural laws of individual and social development, no respect for any customs that do not come up to its standard, no charity for differences of training, and no comprehension of a superior development in a different direction. Such men may really become as legitimately outcasts from society as robbers and assassins, for they may be more dangerous. A very high talent of speaking or writing may become, in its exercise, a mere literary rowdyism. Thus, too, tribes and nations may become so far disorderly as to demand the interference of their neighbours in order to prevent the contagion of their teaching and example from spreading among themselves. For political, as well as for physical diseases, society stands in need of quarantines, and hospitals, and boards of health; but our skill is not yet adequate.

Very obviously the wild conquerors of Spain never succeeded in finding means of settling this conflict between the selfish individualism of their nature and the demands of its political principles; their selfish or individual sentiments were continually overbalancing the political or patriotic ones. This evidently arose from the remaining barbarism of their character; for, of these qualities, selfishness is evidently the first to be developed and to grow by practice into a habit, while the larger patriotic sentiments do not naturally arise until afterwards. The extreme of individualism is shown in savage life, while a large civilization is shown in the harmony of great national systems. Of course, this may run into an extreme, and thus beget or prove a very partial or declining civilization; and this has often happened. We ought to be able to find a way of obtaining some diminution of the librations of the social

scales. When rationalism or sentiment is undermining either of these parts of the social structure, we ought to be able to marshal the forces of an opposite rationalism or sentiment in order to countermine and to foil the effort.

Nothing is plainer than the fact of man's social nature. His intellectual, and moral, and physical instincts make him social, and it belongs to his intelligence to cultivate and train those instincts in accordance with his circumstances and in improvement of them. He is born in society, and it is necessary for a proper development of all the elements of his character, and it is his duty to strive to live in harmony with it, and to promote its moral growth. There can be no schism of the body politic; we cannot divide it as we may a polypus. The hand cannot say to the foot, nor the eye to the ear, I have no need of thee. And there must be approximate symmetry in the growth of society as in that of a tree. The too aspiring growth is sure to have a weakness somewhere, which will yield to the storms. The individual has no strength against society. At his start in life, and in all his ordinary growth, he derives essential portions of his moral life and strength from it. And when he rises above its ordinary level, society is the foundation and the buttresses which alone can, under God, secure his stability.

Society is one of God's appointed means of man's improvement, and no man can with impunity contemn it or its institutions. There are defective and perverted principles producing tares all through the grainfield of the world; but let all grow together till the harvest; their roots are all imbedded in the same soil and intertwined, and you cannot pull up any without injuring the roots, and weakening the supports of all around it. Watch against the *seeds* of evil, if you would be freed from its results. Even in cutting away the deformities, and repairing the defects of the social structure, all its foundations, and columns, and braces, must be respected, else the whole is weakened and may fall to ruin. The growing tree can overcome its crooks and twists only by the force of its inner life, with favouring conditions. If the body politic is diseased, and you have no remedy that you can rely on, or that will be accepted, leave it at least to the *vis*

medicatrix naturae, and it may recover the equilibrium of its vital forces.

Man's nature demands social organization. The meeting of social elements gives rise to social life, and the very first act of all life is a spontaneous commencement of organization, or taking form. The primary purpose of a seed is to contain life, and the very first act of a seed is germination, or the production of an organized plant, and the whole life of this is an effort at perfecting its form or organism for the production of its proper fruit. The very first effort of associated men is the fundamental one of all social life, politism, social organization, taking form. The product of this effort is very various, often very defective, always falling short of our ideas of a perfect social organism. But however defective, let no *man* despise it, let no man condemn it. Even in its most barbarous state, society is making its best efforts at organization. Its structure may be a hut, it may be a palace. Whatever it is, some will despise it. But whatever it is, it is the very home of the social life, and every rent made in its walls, exposes the life within to chilling and shriveling storms.

Life without its forms is incomprehensible. Social life without social organization is nothing for men. The most sacred earthly thing for individual man is his physical organism—the body; and the most sacred earthly thing for social man is the social organism; yet both are often badly treated. Without the latter, all is moral chaos. Even man's individualism is barren without it. The branch cut off from the vine withers and dies. All growth, and improvement, and production are ended. And small tribes have but a small life. They are prone to run into narrow and contracted views of human nature and polity, and to be vain and boastful of their intelligence and independence, even when living under the shadow and protection of larger communities, and used by them for their purposes. In pride and vanity the kindred tribes of Greece never were surpassed, and they did perform heroic deeds; yet they never had sufficient intelligence of political principles to form a permanent union or confederation, and by their continual dissensions they finally destroyed

each other's independence, and brought upon themselves several successive conquering nations, some of them barbarous. Thus their independent national life was much shorter than that of the Arabs in Spain. The splendour of it scarcely lasted a century and a half. This was fast living; and, in accordance with the usual course of human affairs, it left an inheritance of most enduring evil to posterity.

We have said that society necessarily and spontaneously organizes. A part of this process is legislation. Society necessarily and spontaneously legislates: it cannot live without doing so. Legislation is an essential form of social activity. Every man naturally, and most often unconsciously, legislates for himself, and for his own individual life, in naturally forming habits which become the rules of his conduct, and have something of the permanence of laws, in that they yield very reluctantly to inner resolves, or to outer influence. Every society as naturally and inevitably legislates by means of the customs which unconsciously grow up within it; and it cannot lay them aside even with the facility that a man does his habits, though discovered to be defective; for they are naturally enduring, and they exist in such combination with other customs, that people have not skill enough to separate the bad, without injuring the good customs, or to fill up the gap in their institutions which the separation would occasion. Some of these customs arise out of the different forms of combined action of a people with regard to external dangers or aims, giving rise to leaders and to the subordination and coördination of the members of the society. Others arise out of the ordinary intercourse of the individuals with each other, and become the rules regulating that intercourse; and others grow out of violations of those already specified, and give rise to the forms by which the former are enforced, or the violation of them is punished. All of these customs are true laws of society; being at first simple and spontaneous in their character, and awaiting their improvement by the slow processes of experience. In all nations the customs of the country constitute the large majority of its laws; nearly all its written laws are but written definitions of its customary ones.

In all their migrations, people carry their laws with them: they cannot help it, for their laws are part of their life. When the Arabs took possession of Spain, it was still Arab customs that governed them; and Arab customs, varying according to tribes, and modified by their new circumstances, became the law of Spain, however far the subject race may have been allowed their own customs among themselves. No family migrates to a wild country without carrying the customs and relations of the family with them, and these are law. No number of families can migrate thus together without carrying social customs and relations with them, and these are their laws. They go with all their inequalities of natural and cultivated talents and powers, and with all their actual inequalities of age and conditions, and these must constitute laws for them; for this is the natural mode in which laws of the land first arise. Naturally and spontaneously people recognize these differences and act with reference to them; and it is only in so far as this is well done that there can be any harmonious growth in society. If people of differing customs meet on the same land and spontaneously associate, there must be a gradual fusion of these customs until harmony is obtained. Thus it is apparent that legislation about every important interest of social man is a spontaneous and inevitable result of the mere fact of society; and thus legislation appears to be a natural right of every separate society of men. Thus also every branch of human business has its necessity and its right of legislation or forming customs, so far as not to injuriously affect the rights of other portions of the community.

Now here is the result of these principles. If it is a natural necessity for society to legislate for its members, it is the natural duty of individuals to obey. In so far as, and according as society feels legislation to be necessary, it must make laws for the government of its members, and they must act according to them. Customary legislation is always a necessary product of society, because it grows up naturally out of its circumstances and mental and social condition. Even direct and formal legislation by a body constituted for the purpose has a character of necessity about it. Many may not see its necessity, or may even feel that it is wrong; but the legislative

body must have regarded it as necessary, and therefore it is a necessary product of the people's institutions, and to violate it is to violate the very nature of society, which no individual can have a right to do.

This is a startling conclusion; but it seems to be an inevitable logical result of undoubted facts of experience. Yet it cannot be absolutely true; for it is nothing less than the divine and indefeasible right, or absolute sacredness, of human law; and this is little better than the divine right of kings: it is substantially the same. It is apparent then that some essential element of the argument has been overlooked; for all national experience proves that human nature can neither endure nor administer the principle in this extreme strictness. Still it seems to us to come so near to perfect truth as to make every case of violation or resistance of law truly exceptional in its character, and as, therefore, to require the most clear and convincing evidence to justify or excuse it. Our conclusion is therefore true as a general, though not as a universal, proposition.

One omitted element in the argument is doubtless this, that there are other human spontaneities that are quite as natural as the social ones, and that must, therefore, be allowed to act. There are, on one hand, the great social spontaneities of a united people, and, on the other, those of tribes, trades, professions and classes differing in circumstances and intelligence, and those of individuals, including herein those of the individual conscience, guided, or supposing itself guided by divine law. Some one or more of these classes of human spontaneities may become unduly developed to the prejudice of others, and then it is nature itself that resents the encroachment. The mode in which the resistance shows itself, must naturally depend upon the measure of human intelligence that is called in to direct it. Rashness and selfishness will perform it with violence, or attempt to defeat it thus. Respect for the interests of all concerned in the problem, and for all minds that are concerned in its solution, is the sentiment that ought to preside in balancing the conflicting results. When this respect is withheld on either side, a rational accommodation is hopeless, and a change by violent means is the natural

result, if this be possible, and if the interests involved are large enough to induce so fearful a risk.

Different circumstances, dangers, aims, pursuits, conditions, must necessarily give rise to different laws, customs, and institutions. Thus different tribes, classes, and occupations, must naturally have different customs; and nature makes a complete fusion of them impossible. So far, then, as any portion of the body politic has customs which distinguish it in the nation, so far it stands apart from the general laws of the nation. Naturally it cannot give up its customs at the mere command of others; for a people's customs are naturally permanent, even while naturally transient in long periods. They pass away, not by a calculated and voluntary rejection of them, so much as by the spontaneous rise of new and inconsistent ones, growing out of a change of moral and intellectual character, and of external circumstances. A sudden and forcible interference with the existing customs of a people is, therefore, a violation of their very nature, and it cannot be patiently submitted to. God has so created us that our nature enforces resistance, if we have power to resist. Even a subject race gradually acquires customs of thought and action adapted to its position, and then it can have no sympathy with those who come to force relief upon it. The germs of better things are in them, and they ought to be allowed to grow, and in their growth they will generate better customs according to circumstances, and even so as to effect a change of circumstances.

Naturally no tribe can bear any forced invasion of its customs by the power of other, even confederate, tribes. It cannot help insisting that its customs shall be treated with respect, for its customs are part of itself. Without this principle, a man or a people could have no character, no fixed tendencies, or settled purposes, and nothing that would enable us to make any calculations of future conduct. The very language of a people is entirely customary, and the permanence of its nature indicates the true character of all customs. The language of a people is always changing, though the change is perceptible only to a few close observers, unless when we look back a century or two. No people could bear an instant

change of their language; and so it is with other customs. All change in the forms of society must, in order to be permanent and secure, be founded on a change of inner principles. Change the principles, and the forms must change. Our Saviour gives us the thought: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you." And we may adapt it to the narrower sphere of our present subject thus: Let a people have a clear and firm reception of the true principles of social life, and their institutions will gradually and surely grow into accordance with them.

As the actual or possible interests of society are very numerous and various, and demand great variety of skill and talent, every people naturally and spontaneously classifies itself according to its developed interests; and as it advances in civilization, these interests multiply, and the classification becomes more various and complex. Among savages there is but little distinct classification, except to distinguish the mass of the people from their civil or military and religious chiefs, and different tribes from each other. No human institutions can disregard such classifications without suffering the penalty of disregarding the natural laws of humanity. Selfish rationalism is always violating this principle by endeavouring to force human nature into conformity to its deductive theories.

These classifications are naturally founded on facts, and not on the will of any one. It is because a man has studied and practises the art of a shoemaker, or physician, or merchant, that he is classified as such; and if he is not then treated as such, his very nature is violated. Naturally, every man is free to belong to any class he may reasonably choose, provided he learns and practises the art that distinguishes it; and without this he cannot belong to it without violating natural distinctions. A people always violates these principles when it inaugurates incompetent men into public offices; and it must suffer for it. Its will cannot set aside the natural law of such relations. It is apparent, therefore, that people's rights vary according to their several classifications. One, and only one law for all is impossible; each class must have its own special customs, which are truly the laws of the class. All laws, im-

posed upon a class by the general will, which are not truly necessary for the general welfare, are really and truly unnatural restraints upon its action and development, as much as when individual action is unduly restrained.

Apart from the inevitable distinctions of parent and child, men, women, and children, the first class that arises in society is that of rulers, leaders or chiefs. Society cannot possibly do without them; and their functions depend on its aims, occupations, and general interests. The firmness of the social organization, in all spontaneous institutions, depends upon the character of the chiefdom; that is the key-stone of the structure. If that has no stability, the whole social system is essentially unsteady, and society makes no advance. The weakness of the social bond makes all united aims and actions fitful and uncertain; and this weakness is not cured until the affections of the people concentrate around a chief and his family, and continue long enough to become habitual and customary, and the chiefdom becomes settled in a particular line. This movement and clustering of popular affections is all spontaneous and natural, and it requires great caution, and a very high exercise of intelligence in departing from it. There is no known degree of civilization in which it can be disregarded. Political intelligence should learn how to use it in the construction of its more studied and more rational systems. Society, in its spontaneous development, has always taken this course. This customary organization becomes thus the very constitution of the state. All its principles are simple, and, for ordinary purposes, perfectly defined. No other constitution is possible until the spontaneous forms of social organization have been ascertained by experience and observation, and until their principles become so developed that they can be reasoned upon and systematized.

Such a constitution, if written, would simply declare that the civil power is vested in the king and his heirs; that in all ordinary matters, he shall rule according to the customs of the country and with the aid of his customary officers; and that, in extraordinary emergencies, controlled by no custom, his will shall control. Yet very few of the people, perhaps not even the king himself, would know that such was the constitution of

the state, much less that it must be so. It was not, therefore, respect for their invisible and even unknown constitution that gave stability to their social organism; but respect for its impersonation in the royal family and in the king's ministers. They could not reverence an abstraction. So long as the king and his ministers respected the customs of the country, and the people respected the king as the keystone of the social arch, the peace and development of the state were safe, except so far as they were endangered by discordant customs among the different tribes or classes of society which were not wise enough to respect each other's differences.

It requires a very high state of civilization in order to maintain an equilibrium of respect among the different tribes, classes, and interests of a nation. When this does not exist, the king, or the governmental organization encroaches on the people, or the people on the government, or one tribe or interest on another, and disorder begins to show itself: and the evil is only made worse, or shifted to another position, when violence of temper, language, or action is resorted to, instead of calm and generous deliberation. It requires very high intelligence for a people to perceive how entirely dependent all their various interests are upon the stability of their government; and when this is not seen, or when religious principle does not involve it as a matter of living faith, then all the interests that feel themselves oppressed must necessarily resent the injustice, even at the risk of anarchy.

It requires very high intelligence for a whole people to look through the changing functionaries of their government to the more permanent constitution, written or unwritten, which they represent; and therefore their respect for their social organism must generally be measured by their habitual respect for their rulers. Hence also it is quite common for different parties and interests to respect their leaders much above the constitution, and to follow them with such earnest devotion as to despise their government, and even violate the very essence of the constitution. These facts are abundantly illustrated in the history before us. If people were wise enough to institute a better government or better officers on every such occasion, and could

be convinced that they were better, then their experiment would not be unreasonable; but that cannot be a better government which lacks the public confidence that is necessary to give it stability.

To every serious and reflecting mind there is a character of real sacredness about all that is future and unknown, and especially about the unknown consequences to individuals and society, that follow from human conduct. The presence or absence of this feeling marks the distinction between prudence and rashness, and has much to do with the distinction between religion and infidelity. When the social organism is affected with a serious disorder, all positive interference with it is dangerous, and then it is this feeling that makes prudent patriotism anxious, hesitating, and even inactive, and that

> "puzzles the will
> And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
> Than fly to others that we know not of."

> "There's the respect
> That makes calamity of so long life."

It could act more wisely, and with more true public spirit than most of those who do act, and who falsely pride themselves on their courage, chivalry, high spirit, and self-sacrificing devotion; but it sees that most portentous results hang upon all its movements; results which it cannot measure either in kind or degree. It hesitates because of the thought,

> "If 'twere *done* when 'tis done,
> Then 'twere well it were done quickly."

It knows that personal interests, and class interests, and sectional interests, and party interests, are all eager in forcing their prescriptions on the social organism; and it knows no antidote for all this, except some mighty man of faith, who can disperse their besieging and destructive regiments. Every other man of prudence feels his utter weakness under such appalling circumstances.

But the Arabs of Spain could understand but very little of these principles; and therefore could not act upon them. They

could not read the lessons even of their own experience aright. Barbarism is always narrow minded, and can make no adequate allowances for popular customs that differ from its own: and hence no union among barbarous tribes can ever be secure and permanent. Even its generosity and its courage are ignorant and selfish; for it will have its own way in exerting them. It forces its favours on others who do not feel them to be favours, or in a mode that is disagreeable. It resents injuries with heroism, and without regard to consequences to itself; but without regard also to the peace and order of the country. Chivalry may be noble barbarism, but it is usually low civilization. That only is high civilization which has a generous respect for society and its customs and institutions, and which studies to do no wrong to either, even by acts, which, on a narrow and one-sided view, would be called generous and courageous. The Arabs were too barbarous to entertain such generous views of human affairs, and hence there could be no permanent peace or union among them. Differences of tribal customs, and the jealousies and rivalries of tribal leaders were continually causing civil wars. Their tribal attachments were always so absorbing as to prevent them from feeling the paramount importance of their union; and hence its integrity was always sacrificed to their sectional passions, and thus the final destruction of the state became inevitable. We might give very full illustrations of the same destructive principles from the history of the Israelites, and show that they led to the same results; but we have exhausted our space, and must stop. We commend the history of the Arabs in Spain to the careful study of our readers.

ART. III.—*Reid's Collected Writings.* Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. Third edition. Edinburgh, 1852. (Referred to in the following article by *R.*, and the page.)

Discussions on Philosophy, &c. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. (Referred to by *Dis.* and the page.)

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. Vol. I., Metaphysics. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859. (Referred to by *Lect.* and the page.)

THERE are probably many grateful and reverent students of Sir William Hamilton, who have yet found much difficulty in understanding him, and seen many objections to his views, and who have been anxiously waiting for light from his own promised development of his doctrines. With the publication of his lectures, which are understood to be the last help such will have from his own pen, the time seems to have come for them to state their thoughts, that his more favoured friends and expounders may explain misapprehensions and answer objections, and that truth may the sooner prevail.

This Review has already spoken the praise of Hamilton so freely and warmly, that we shall not be suspected of indifference to his preëminent genius and accomplishments, if we begin at once, and state, as simply as we can, some critical views of his theory of Perception, and of his Philosophy of the Conditioned—the two subjects treated in the lectures on Metaphysics, on which he has expended most labour, and of which his views are most peculiar, and have attracted most attention. The present article will be devoted to Perception.

Hamilton came out on this subject first in the *Edinburgh Review*. He had a three-fold purpose—to vindicate Dr. Reid; to annihilate Dr. Brown; and to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism on a refutation of idealism, materialism, and scepticism.

A brief statement of the position of the Scottish philosophy

on this subject at the time the review was written seems to be a necessary introduction to a discussion of its value.

Bishop Berkeley was troubled by materialists, and so by matter. He could not see that the hard particles are of any use, except as a basis for infidel arguments. He says that all we know of the external world is the sensations, or ideas, which it excites in us. Now matter cannot be the cause of these ideas, for by supposition it is inert; it cannot be imaged or represented by them, for they are in the mind, and as mental, totally unlike anything material; it cannot be the substratum of extension, colour, &c., for these are ideas which exist as they are perceived, and cannot therefore be in any unperceiving substance. The external cause of our sensations, or ideas, must be, he says, a spirit; because that is the only cause which we know; because its ideas alone can be the objects imaged or represented by our ideas; and because in spirit alone can ideas of extension, colour, &c., reside as in a substratum. He concluded, therefore, that God is the external cause of our ideas of sense; that He needs no reminders in the shape of hard particles, of the proper time to act on us; and that spirits are the sole substances—spirits and their ideas our sole knowledge.*

David Hume was troubled by theologians and metaphysicians. He thought scepticism useful to keep them within the proper bounds of inquiry by showing them the utter unfitness of their faculties to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed, and to make them cautious and modest in all their thinking. Among other sceptical reasonings, he argues that our senses and reason contradict each other with regard to our perception of the external world. We see a white table. An instinct common to man and the lower animals compels us to believe that the object of sight is external to our minds, and independent of our perception—the table, namely, which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. The slightest philosophy however teaches us that we are mistaken in these uni-

* Three Dialogues, Works, vol. i. p. 109, ed. of 1784.

versal and primary opinions. When we change our place, the object of sight changes its size and figure. The object of sight cannot then be the table, for that remains unchanged. Philosophers moreover agree that colour is a mere sensation, and that the whiteness is not only no quality of the table, but does not even represent anything external. "No man, who reflects," says Hume, "ever doubted that the existences which we consider when we say *this house* and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent." But reason cannot successfully defend itself in this opinion that these perceptions are copies or representations of anything external. It cannot plead instinct, for that has now proved false; nor experience, for that supposes a prior knowledge of the objects copied; nor understanding of the process by which body impresses an image of itself on mind, for it is incomprehensible; nor the veracity of the Supreme Being, for that would assure us of the truth of the primary instinct which has proved false. (*Phil. Es.* 2, 167.) By showing in this manner that our primary beliefs and our reason contradict each other, and that neither gives us intelligible and consistent knowledge of the external world, a universal doubt was introduced into all subjects of human knowledge and inquiry. The knowledge of mind as distinct from ideas, that of cause and effect, of a future state of rewards and punishments, of a revealed religion, were special points to which Hume directed his sceptical inquiries.

Rev. Thos. Reid, minister of New-Machar, afterwards Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen, had embraced the whole of Berkeley's system; but the consequences of Hume's reasonings gave him more uneasiness than the want of a material world; and he thought that Hume's system was as coherent in all its parts and as justly deduced as Berkeley's. It at last occurred to him, that, as these reasonings turn on the statement that all our knowledge of the external world is by ideas, they might be refuted by showing that there are no such things as *ideas* in the sense which philosophers mean. In common language, *having an idea of a thing* means *thinking of the thing*, and "implies a mind

that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But, besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth—to wit, the *idea*, which is the immediate object." (*R.* 226.) Reid thought that if there were no *idea* imagined for an object, the object of knowledge in perception must be admitted to be the external world; and if no *idea* of a cause, a substance, or God, were used in thinking of a cause, a substance, or God, all sceptical deductions would be nought, which had been drawn from the relations of causes and substances to our *ideas*. Reid himself laid great stress on this negative part of his writings. In a letter to Dr. Gregory he says that he thinks the merit of his Philosophy "lies chiefly in having called in question the common theory of *Ideas, or images of things in the mind* being the only objects of thought." "I think there is hardly anything that can be called *mine* in the philosophy of mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice." (*R.* 22.) Reid was perhaps right in this, for this rejection of the current language of philosophers obliged him to re-state the facts of psychology. The Baconian philosophy, concentrated very much in the cry of "no hypotheses; plain facts," was now ruling vigorously, and Reid himself was fully imbued with its spirit. (*R.* 97.) The refutation of definite hypotheses would have been comparatively a small matter. The whole body of language as applied to mind is more or less figurative, and implies, if used as scientific, a perpetual succession of hypotheses of the analogy of mind and matter. Descartes had, to be sure, signalized the fundamental antithesis between them, and it was generally admitted and stated; but in reading Locke, Berkeley, Hume, or Descartes, Malebranche or Arnauld, it is easy to see that language is continually twisting their reason; "verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant." (*Bacon, Nov. Organ.* 1, 59.) There was no labour so needed in psychology, as to go through the masses of observation which lay involved in figurative and ambiguous diction, and distorted with every extravagance of hypothesis and polemic bitterness, and restate in simple language the exact facts of consciousness. This work Reid did—did it with clearness, candour, patience, mo-

desty, and good sense, and with an unfeigned piety, which reminds one always of Sir Isaac Newton. His writings are perhaps the most important contribution to Psychology ever made by one man, and he will never suffer in the minds of those who love truth better than search for truth—better than intellectual gymnastics; (*Dis.* 46, 47; *Lect.* 9.) by comparison with his brilliant successors, Brown and Hamilton, or with the greatest names of France or Germany.

The positive side of Reid's system rests on the doctrine, that, in addition to what Locke and his followers mean by the knowledge of ideas and their relations, we have certain "original and natural judgments" or beliefs; "the inspiration of the Almighty;" "the common sense of mankind;" "on which all the discoveries of reason are grounded:" "anything manifestly contrary to which is absurd;" a disbelief in which is lunacy. (*R.* 209, 108, 425, 791.) Such a belief is involved in Perception. Reid's statement is as follows. When certain impressions are made upon our organs, nerves, and brain, certain corresponding sensations are felt, and we have certain perceptions. Perception has two ingredients,—first, the conception of the object perceived, (e. g. Hume's table;) secondly, an irresistible belief in its present existence. (*R.* 325, 326, also, 327, 258, 123, and *passim.*) "In this train of operations nature works in the dark, we can neither discover the cause of any one of them, nor any necessary connection of one with another." (*R.* 327.) The sensations are "a sort of natural signs," which "do suggest," or "conjure up as it were by a kind of natural magic," "the conception of the object," and "create a belief of it." (*R.* 122, 450.) When these impressions are made, by whatever cause, the sensation follows; and if the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us. (*R.* 320.) He further held that "our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities of matter, and inform us what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion." (*R.* 313.)

Dr. Thomas Brown was the first person, so far as we know, to shake the ascendency of Reid in the Scottish schools. He re-affirms the Baconian method, and attempts to carry it farther

by classifying all the phenomena of mind according to their antecedents or causes. He also re-affirms the existence, and the necessity to science and life, of "first truths" or "principles of intuitive belief," and lays down their characteristics, viz. they are "immediate, universal, and irresistible." He thinks, however, 1st. That Reid is mistaken in supposing that modern philosophers in general believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind. 2d. That Reid was mistaken in supposing that the refutation of such a theory of ideas would be a refutation of the idealism of Berkeley or the scepticism of Hume. 3d. That the sceptical reasonings apply as forcibly to Reid's doctrine of perception by *conceptions*, as to the doctrine of perception by *ideas*. The conceptions of which alone we are conscious, are states of mind, and the relation between these states of mind and any states of matter, is just as uncertain and inexplicable, and is exposed to just the same sceptical reasonings as the relation between ideas and matter. 4th. Reid's distinction between our knowledge of the primary and of the second qualities of matter is null. Our states of mind embrace all our knowledge, and anything else than a state of mind can be known only relatively, as the external cause or correlative of a state of mind. Brown's discussion of these four points has been called by eminence his attack on Reid. But he combatted many other opinions of Reid and Stewart. We mention only the following points of difference, regarded by Hamilton as fundamental to the doctrine of perception, and in which Hamilton agrees with Brown. (1.) He rejects consciousness as a distinct faculty. (*B. Lect.* xi., *Dis.* 53, *R.* 297.) (2.) He asserts the relativity of all knowledge. (*B. Lect.* xxv., *Dis.* 60.) (3.) He affirms the representative character of imagination, memory, &c. (*B. Lect.* xxxiii. xxxiv. *Dis.* 58.) (4.) He rejects the doctrine of perception by a medium, e. g. we see light, not Hume's table. (*B. Lect.* xix., *R.* 814.) (5.) He holds the whole nervous system as a unit to be the organ of sensation, not that impressions are transmitted to the brain. (*B. Lect.* xix., *R.* 821, 861.) (6.) He holds extra-organic matter to be known as a resisting object, not by a special instinct. (*B. Lect.* xxii. Hamilton similar only, *R.* 882.) How Brown and Hamilton stand in regard to the four first points—"the attack on Reid"—will soon be carefully considered.

Brown had early fixed on the relation of cause and effect as the true constitutive idea of genuine philosophy; and he attempted to rear by it the fabric of a truly scientific psychology. It is a brilliant conception, and his analysis and shaping of the great facts of mind are a splendid display of metaphysical genius. A young physician, wasting with consumption, his erudition could not be like that of Hamilton; but he played the same part in regard to the modern French philosophers, and the literary philosophic Latin writers, which Hamilton has since played towards the Germans, Greeks, and schoolmen, and the forgotten authors of all centuries and countries. He decorated his temple of mental science profusely with splendid ornaments from these abundant mines. The reception his writings met with, may be judged from the following criticisms:

Brown on Darwin's Zoonomia is "the perhaps unmatched work of a boy in the eighteenth year of his age." (*Sir Jas. Mackintosh, Prog. Eth. Phil.*, ed. 1851, p. 108.)

"His first tract on Causation appeared to me the finest model of discussion in mental philosophy since Berkeley and Hume; with this superiority over the latter, that its aim is that of a philosopher who seeks to enlarge knowledge," &c. (*Same*, p. 109.)

"He very justly considered the claim of Reid"—"as a proof of his having mistaken their (philosophers') illustrative language for a metaphysical opinion." (*Same*, p. 112.)

"An inestimable book." (*Dr. Parr, in Lowndes' Bib. Man.*)

"Neither Bacon, nor Hobbes, nor Berkeley, nor Locke, possessed powers of mind so splendid and so various. Brown is, beyond comparison, the most eloquent of philosophic writers. So much power and delicacy of intellect were never before united in an individual." (*Tait's Magazine, in Allibone's Dict. of Authors.*)

"The style is so captivating, the views so comprehensive, the arguments so acute, the whole thing so complete, that I was almost insensibly borne along upon the stream of his reasoning and his eloquence." "In the power of analysis he greatly transcends all philosophers of the Scottish school who preceded him." (*Morell's Hist. Mod. Phil.*, p. iii. 376.)

"That philosopher having, in the author's judgment, taken

a more correct view than any other English writer on the subject, of the ultimate intellectual laws of scientific inquiry, while his unusual powers of popularly stating and felicitously illustrating whatever he understood, render his works the best preparation which can be suggested for speculations similar to those contained in this treatise." (*J. S. Mill, Logic*, p. v.)

We add, also, the following from Mackintosh. It will explain one motive of the next few pages—we love this man:

"The character of Dr. Brown is very attractive, as an example of one in whom the utmost tenderness of affection, and the indulgence of a flowery fancy were not repressed by the highest cultivation, and by a perhaps excessive refinement of intellect. His mind soared and roamed through every region of philosophy and poetry; but his untraveled heart clung to the hearth of his father," (a Scottish minister) "to the children who shared it with him, and, after them, first to the other partners of his childish sports, and then almost solely to those companions of his youthful studies who continued to be the friends of his life." "He was one of those men of genius who repaid the tender care of a mother by rocking the cradle of her reposing age. He ended a life spent in searching for truth, and exercising love, by desiring that he should be buried in his native parish with his 'dear father and mother.'" (*Prog. Eth. Phil.*, p. 110.)

For twenty years from Brown's first delivery of lectures in 1808–9, and ten years from their posthumous publication, he seems to have been generally regarded as triumphant in his "attack on Reid," and to have worn the honours of a victor. But the avenger came in Sir William Hamilton. The article, which Hamilton's admirers speak of as having "annihilated" Brown, can hardly be matched in all polemic literature for its fierceness (δεινότης,) its art, its diction, its "inexorable march of ratiocination,"* its substantive importance as a contribution to the mastery of the theory of its subject. We do not think so highly of its equal and exact justice. Hamilton begins with charging Brown's posthumous lectures with "radical inconsistencies in every branch of their subject," "unacknowledged appropriations," "endless mistakes," "frequent misrepresentations," an "ignorant attack on Reid." (*Dis.* 50.)

* Jeffrey, quoted in this Review, 1859, p. 655.

He does not undertake to prove the "unacknowledged appropriations;" to establish the other charges he makes four points, which we purpose to examine, in order, first, to compare his statements, while annihilating Brown, with those he afterwards made while commenting on Reid; and secondly, to air the incunabula of his own theory of perception.

First. Brown "has completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position" (*Dis.* 52;) for, (*a*) Reid's position is Natural Realism—i. e. the doctrine that our knowledge of mind and matter is equally immediate and intuitive, (*Dis.* 60, 61;) while (*b*) Brown, by "a portentous error," "a transmutation without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy," thought it Cosmothetic Idealism, i. e., (so far as Brown is concerned,) the doctrine that our immediate knowledge is all embraced in consciousness, or states of mind, and that knowledge of the external world is by means of states of mind to which it sustains some perceived relation, or of states which necessitate a belief in its existence. (*Dis.* 62, 63.) As to (*a*) we remark, 1st. Hamilton admits that neither Reid nor Brown had ever distinguished Natural Realism from Cosmothetic Idealism. (*Dis.* 63.)

2d. He admits, also, that Reid's doctrine must be relieved of errors as to consciousness, memory, imagination, &c., to make it a consistent system of Natural Realism. (*Dis.* 52.)

3d. Reid's statements of his doctrine (see above, page 277) are inconsistent with what Hamilton calls Natural Realism, and do constitute what he calls Cosmothetic Idealism. Hamilton is explicit, and in many places unqualified in making this statement. "Reid, (and herein he is followed by Mr. Stewart) in the doctrine now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Idealism establishes its conclusions." (*R.* 128.) "In all essential respects, this doctrine of Reid and Stewart is identical with Kant's." (*R.* 128.) "It is to be observed that Reid himself does not discriminate *perception* and *imagination* by any essential difference. According to him, perception is only the conception (imagination) of an object, accompanied with a belief of its present existence; and even this last distinction, a mere 'faith without knowledge,' is surrendered by Mr. Stewart. Now, as concep-

tion (imagination) is only immediately cognizant of the *ego*, so must perception on this doctrine be a knowledge purely *subjective*," a system of idealism. (*R.* 183.) He again and again speaks of this idealism in the notes without qualification as "his (Reid's) doctrine," (*R.* 209, 289,) repeating Brown's proof that it is idealism, but, I think, never giving Brown any credit: ("unacknowledged appropriation.") "The doctrine of Reid and Stewart" "bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance." (*R.* 257.) "This appears to be an explicit disavowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception," (*R.* 310,) "a doctrine which cannot be reconciled with that of an intuitive or objective perception." (*R.* 321.) "On this point it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one." (*R.* 269.)

4th. Dugald Stewart, Royer Collard, and the other philosophers of Reid's school before Hamilton, held, like Reid, a doctrine which Hamilton considers Cosmothetic Idealism. The quotations already given show that Hamilton admits this in regard to Stewart; for further details of him and of Reid, and for similar statements in regard to Collard and other philosophers, we refer to Hamilton's Reid. (*R.* pp. 882, 297.)

5th. Hamilton's attempt to show that Reid was what he calls a natural realist is inconclusive. In the first place, his citations do not bear out his conclusions. He gives but two. He cites Reid's statement that "we have the same reason to believe the existence of external objects, as philosophers have to believe the existence of ideas," to prove that Reid maintains that "perception of external things is convertible with their reality;" and as he finds in another part of the book that Reid says that philosophers do consider themselves certain of the existence of ideas, because they perceive them, the march of ratiocination seems to be inexorable. But what does such ratiocination amount to against Reid's positive, detailed, and illustrated statement found in the treatise containing his maturest views, and mentioned above, (page 277,) "that whenever the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us." (*R.* 320.)

The second citation seems to be what Hamilton would call a "misrepresentation." It is quoted as though it were a classi-

fication made by Reid himself, (arranging all the vulgar on one side for Natural Realism, and the philosophers on the other for Cosmothetic Idealism, in order that he might take his stand with the vulgar.) But Reid is speaking of Hume's statement referred to above, (page 274,) about seeing the table. (*R.* 302.) The statements are Hume's. Again, when Reid takes his place among Hume's vulgar, who think they see a table, or tree, he takes arms against Hamilton and Hamilton's natural realism; for they say that we never see any such thing. (*R.* 303.

In the second place, if we admit the reasoning, it does not go to the point. The conclusion is only that the aim of Reid's philosophy was a doctrine of intuition, not at all that it did not wholly miss its aim. If Reid's aim was a doctrine of common sense, and his doctrine actually was Cosmothetic Idealism, the logical conclusion would seem to be clear that Reid, as well as Brown, thought Cosmothetic Idealism to be the genuine doctrine of common sense.

But (*b*) Brown thought Reid's doctrine to be Cosmothetic Idealism. 1st. It is not true that he thought it a simple and consistent doctrine, and that it distinctly held that we have no immediate knowledge except of mind. On the contrary, Brown charges Reid with thinking that there is something mysterious in knowledge by perception, as though perception could be something more than a state of mind, and argues at length against Reid's statements. Dr. Reid's view of perception involves, he says, "a false conception of the nature of the process." (*Lect.* xxv.) "Dr. Reid was not sufficiently in the habit of considering the phenomena of the mind merely as the mind affected, but as something more mysterious." (*Lect.* xxvii.)

2d. Hamilton represents (misrepresents) Brown's arguments against these views of Reid as a "vindication of his interpretation," implying that the arguments are an appeal to the consistency of Reid as an avowed Cosmothetic Idealist. But we find nothing of that sort. They are addressed to common reason on the supposition simply that Reid believed mind and matter to be different things. To say that Brown interprets Reid to hold a doctrine, because Brown seems to think that every reasonable man must hold it after it is clearly stated, and then, as he attacks Reid for not holding it, to call

that a "vindication of his interpretation" seems to us more skilful than just. We shall again take up the arguments here referred to, as they are the turning point from Reid's theory of perception, to Hamilton's.

We are now prepared to judge how far the first charge, that of completely misunderstanding Reid's philosophy, is valid. Hamilton himself announces the triumphant conclusion that Brown has been proved guilty of an absolute reversal of its "unambiguous import." But we have now seen that the plausibility of Hamilton's "ratiocination" flows from his obtruding a classification of theories of perception, which neither Reid or Brown had ever thought of, and which their systems will not fit into at all without destructive stretching and lopping, deciding from their inferential aim where they would have chosen to go, and inexorably crushing them in; and from his representing Brown as having treated Reid in the same way; as though Brown represented Reid to actually hold a doctrine, because Brown thinks that as a reasonable man he must have held it, if he had heard the arguments. We have also seen that Hamilton, the annotator, himself states Reid's actual doctrine to be the very doctrine which Hamilton, the reviewer, considers its unambiguous opposite, and that he only argumentatively, and by inferences of the second degree, decides for himself what he admits to be a point not without difficulty; that Reid "intended" a doctrine of Natural Realism. (*R.* 820.) Under these circumstances it is not strange that in republishing the Review, he appends to the word "unambiguous" in his announcement of Brown's guilt, the note, "this is too strong." (*Dis.* 66.) The following *is* rather strange, "This admission does not, however, imply that Brown is not from first to last—is not in one and all of his strictures on Reid's doctrine of perception, as there shown, wholly in error." (*R.* 820.)

We know little of Hamilton except his writings; but we do know a class of men of whom nothing could be more characteristic than these two notes. Their views may be modified, as they word it, of some particular statement of a truth, but never of their personal relations to absolute truth. To find themselves to-day holding the opinion which they last year

denounced as monstrous, does not ruffle for an instant their constitutional prepossession that any one they have attacked is wholly in error, and that they themselves are, and always were, wholly right—only a little too strong. We cannot bestow unqualified confidence on such men.

Secondly. Hamilton charges that Brown's own theory of perception is Cosmothetic Idealism, and as such is an unnecessary hypothesis, (*Dis.* 68,) annihilates itself, (*Dis.* 69,) is a see-saw between hypothesis and fact, (*Dis.* 70,) destroys and re-creates the phenomena for which it would account, (*Dis.* 71,) attempts to explain a mere hyperphysical chimera, (*Dis.* 71,) and needs subsidiary miracles to eke it out, (*Dis.* 72.)

1st. It takes the chill from the contempt which is poured over Brown for all these absurdities, to learn, that, except a few sceptics and idealists, Reid is the first "among not forgotten philosophers," who has tried to embrace any other system, (*Dis.* 73,) and that Hamilton is the first who has actually escaped this one.

2d. The cosmothetic process has two parts, (*a*) "mind can form a representative conception of external objects." This power is no hypothesis. It is a fact. The phenomena of dreams, of ocular spectra, of tangible and audible illusions, as in mania a potu; more unquestionable still, the facts of memory and imagination prove it. So in perception;—in listening to a familiar language, for example, our true perceptions are pieced out by conceptions so nicely that they cannot be accurately distinguished. We learn the fact when we hear a foreign language. Would they match so, if they were totally unlike? Hamilton calls space an *a priori* form of imagination, see p. 295. (*b*) "An external world does exist, and is perceived through our conceptions of it." It exists, and we have no doubt, that if a world of minds having conceptions such as Cosmothetic Idealism says, and no reliance on belief except as a fact to be accounted for, were to be left to reason (we do not suppose, or suggest, that mankind have been so left,) to find out the causes and relations of the mental phenomena, a scientific system of the world would in due time be established exactly as it is now, with just the same conclusiveness as the Copernican astronomy is established. Nothing else

will explain the facts. General assertions that externality cannot be inferred from knowledge of mental states, are null. We must look at the nature and relations of the mental states. Again, is the external world perceived by conceptions? The mind must be in some state in perception. What objection is there to supposing that this state is like the state in conception; and if so, should not reflection inform us of it? It certainly seems to clear up many things to suppose that in perception the mind is forcibly put in a state like that which it afterwards voluntarily assumes in conception.

3d. Most of the alleged absurdities of the doctrine grow out of its alleged assertion that consciousness is a liar. At every turn, it, like all other systems, has to rely on consciousness, and at every turn Hamilton shows up this reliance as a contradiction. The alleged lie is, that we have an *immediate* knowledge of the external world. We deny that consciousness stakes its character for veracity on the *immediateness* of the knowledge. *Immediateness* is not a direct object of consciousness; knowledge begins in the indefinite. The mind may be conscious of no mean, while yet there is one. Hamilton himself advocates the doctrine of unconscious mental acts. (*Lect.* 235.) Brown does not assert that consciousness is deceptive any more than Hamilton, as we shall show by and by.

4th. Much of the talk does not apply at all to Brown, whose theory is not one of representation, properly so called. He holds that we know the external world as the cause (correlative) of certain states of mind, not that there is any ratio of representation between the two. But this is Hamilton's favourite mode of refutation,—to draw up a classification of all possible systems, argue the system he is attacking to be number three, say, in the classification, and then refute his own description of number three.

Thirdly. Hamilton charges that Reid is right, Brown always wrong, as to Reid's opinion that modern philosophers in general—"all modern philosophers," (*R.* 210)—believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind.

Brown says that before Reid's day this old hypothesis had ceased to be distinctly held, and that the language implying it would have been admitted figurative by most of the philosophers

to whom Reid imputes the theory. He mentions six authors in whom the statement is to be found, that ideas are perceptions merely, or states of mind—Descartes, Arnauld, Hobbes, Locke, Le Clerc, Crousaz. We will give a few words to each.

Descartes: Hamilton, reviewing Brown, says that "to determine what Descartes' doctrine of perception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps impossible." (*Dis.* 76.) Hamilton, the commentator of Reid, has determined it to be exactly what Brown says, and, moreover, that it is less ambiguous than Reid's own doctrine. (*R.* 207, 272, 273, 296, 297.*)

Arnauld: Hamilton admits Brown to be right as to Arnauld's doctrine, but says the question is, whether "Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical?" If he does, Hamilton gives up the whole argument. (*Dis.* 80.) Hamilton the commentator says: "On this point (perception) it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one." (*R.* 269.) And further: "I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes' doctrine, Arnauld is right." Arnauld claimed his own doctrine to be that of Descartes. (*R.* 296.) Notice, also, that Stewart approves Arnauld's doctrine. (*R.* 297.)

Hobbes: Hamilton admits that he did hold idea and perception to be one; but poor Brown, notwithstanding, is more wholly wrong than if he had not been right. (See *Dis.* 79.)

Locke says, as quoted by Brown, that "having ideas" and "perception" is "the same thing." (*Hum. Underst.*, B. II. chap. i. § 9.) So also—"our ideas being nothing but actual

* Hamilton states that the cardinal point of Descartes' system is, that mind and matter are *naturally* to each other as zero; but we find no such statement in Descartes. On the contrary, he explains at length the mutual action of mind and matter, stating in so many words that they act immediately on each other (agens immediate,) being of that nature (quæ talis est naturæ.) (*De Pass.* xxxiv., xxxv.) Hamilton being perhaps aware of this fact, adds a note, in which he proves that his cardinal point must be involved, by a choice bit of ratiocination, in our language and with our exposition, as follows: Descartes considers extension the essence of matter, and that its motions are due to the ordinary concourse of God; but if extension (not being a force) cannot move extension without ordinary concourse, *a fortiori* mind (being more like God than extension) cannot move it, but must have *supernatural* concourse. (*Dis.* 77.)

perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them." (*Same*, II. x. 2.) Hamilton does not seem to have made up his mind to anything about Locke, except that Brown is wholly wrong. (*Dis.* 83, *R.* 210, 273.)

LE CLERC, CROUSAZ: Brown says the doctrine that *ideas* are states of mind, is to be found in the text-books of schools and colleges, and cites these two. Hamilton admits they have the doctrine, but commenting on Brown's language, asserts that "Reid exploded it (the doctrine) altogether." (*Dis.* 86.) And this language he republishes, without note or comment, after he had printed in his Reid, that "Reid, unfortunately, did not accomplish—did not attempt" what it was "incumbent on him," "indispensably necessary for him" to do, in order to establish Natural Realism against Idealism (*R.* 842, 824); and also, after having asserted over and over again, that Reid's doctrine is not to be distinguished from the one he is here said to have exploded. (*Former citations, and R.* 824.) He adds, secondly—"It is false that this doctrine of perception (Arnauld's) had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools." (*Dis.* 86.) Now compare the following citations from Hamilton's Reid.

"It (the opinion of Arnauld and Brown) is found fully detailed in almost every systematic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first promulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Representations, as mere modifications of the mind, ... and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems." (*R.* 297, 207.) "This," (a great unanimity as to the existence of ideas,) "as already once and again stated, is not correct." (*R.* 373, 140.)

With this we finish what we have to say on this third charge. No one, who reads what we have adduced, will think the critical opinions of Brown contemptible. On the contrary, it seems plain that he had a remarkable power of seizing the points of a philosophic system, in comparison with his predecessors (whom Hamilton perpetually corrects,) and that he had penetrated

those systems here discussed more deeply than Hamilton himself had at the time of writing this review.

Fourthly. Hamilton charges that Brown totally misconceived Hume's sceptical reasoning, and Reid's argument against Hume.

We have already stated Hume's argument (pp. 274, 275.) In order that it may be seen in its application, we will give the following colloquy, re-written from Hume, (*Phil. Ess.*, vol. ii. 169,) and Hamilton's attack on Brown, (*Dis.* 99.) "Do you follow," says Hume, "your instinctive beliefs in assenting to the veracity of sense?" "I do," says Hamilton, (*Dis.* 90, and elsewhere.) "But these," continues Hume, "lead you to believe that the object of perception is the very table which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion?" "It is certain," says Hamilton, "that whiteness is no quality of the table; it is in the strictest sense a passive affection of the sentient ego, (*R.* 858); and it is a fundamental article of my system that the mind must be present in space to what it perceives. (*R.* 809.) The table cannot be an object of perception at all. (*R.* 814.) I must so far recall my admission (*Dis.* 61, *comment first*,) and give the lie to this natural belief." "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," (*Dis.* 92) proceeds Hume; "you renounce all reliance on your natural beliefs. Can you now bring me any convincing argument from experience, to prove the existence of an external world?" "I cannot," says Hamilton; "the reality of our knowledge cannot be inferred. It is to be presumed from the veracity of our constitutive beliefs." (*Dis.* 90.) "Since then," concludes Hume, "you admit that you cannot answer me by reasoning, and since you have given up all reliance on natural belief, you must either admit that I am right in my scepticism, or refuse your assent on no ground whatsoever—Pyrrhonism or absurdity?—choose your horn."

Brown is charged with not seeing that this reasoning turns on the destructive nature of a denial of any single fact of consciousness. Hamilton says that Brown thought he could deny one fact of consciousness, and still appeal to its veracity as to other facts; and that he supposed Reid to admit that reason

teaches that consciousness deceives us in perception, and yet to assert that we must believe our consciousness because we cannot help it. 1st. We cannot find anything in Brown which gives probability to this statement.* What gives it its little plausibility is, that Brown and Hamilton differ as to the precise nature of our belief in an external world. Brown thinks it a belief in the existence of external causes of our sensations, while Hamilton "enounces" it to be "I *immediately* know in perception an external world as existing." Surely to differ with Hamilton in his interpretation of consciousness is not to give the lie to consciousness itself. 2d. Hamilton seems to treat Brown's remarks on the idealistic portion of Hume's argument—namely, the argument against inferring an external world from ideas—as though they were remarks on Hume's Pyrrhonism as a whole. 3d. Hamilton, though he attacks Brown for applying the idealistic argument to Reid, does yet admit its validity, adopt it as his own, and repeat it again and again in his notes on Reid, and without giving Brown credit for it. (*R.* 128, 129, 183, 282, 290, 318, 446, 820, &c.)

We here finish our special criticism of Hamilton's treatment of Brown, with one remark. It seems to us not only that Hamilton did Brown injustice in holding him up to contempt as an ignorant blunderer, but that admirers of Hamilton who love his reputation as a lover of truth, and who themselves love truth more than they admire intellectual gymnastics, should not exult over the dialectic skill, which, in such a state of facts, could "annihilate" the object of its attack, but should rather regret that the amiable prejudices of affection for Reid and Stewart, or other prejudices, could have so blinded or warped the great logician.

We now proceed to develop the progress towards a theory of perception from Hume onwards.

REID *saw that to answer Hume's sceptical argument he must adhere to the instinctive beliefs.* He, therefore, held to it that he verily saw the white table. The general point he made good in a general way, and it may be considered a solid acquisition to psychology. He purposed further to state the facts of

* Note also that Brown argues against Kant, that having denied consciousness in one point, he can no longer appeal to it. (*Ed. Rev.* vol. i. pp. 266, 267.)

perception free from all hypothesis. The danger which he saw, however, lay in asserting that something else than mind and matter are concerned in perception. He did not see any contradiction of our beliefs, or foundation for Idealism in the statement, that in connection with certain sensations, a conception of extension is suggested, which is accompanied by an instinctive belief in the existence of an extended substance, the object of our perception.

Brown *demonstrated that Reid's description of perception by conceptions affords as firm a basis for Idealism, as perception by ideas.* Yet he accepted the description. His relation to Reid is like Hume's to Locke. *He also attempted a demonstration that no state of mind can give more than a relative knowledge of matter*, against Reid's statement that we know the primary qualities, as they are in themselves. The gist of it follows.

A perception (conception and belief) of extension is a state of mind. We know nothing of the way in which it is caused. God could have so made us that it would have been suggested on other occasions than those on which it is now suggested. He could make it arise if there were no matter in existence. *Matter cannot be necessary to the existence of any other phenomenon than a state of matter.* To assert then that matter is necessary to a perception of extension, is to assert that a *perception is a state of matter.* (It is a state of matter, says Hamilton, see page 293.) But Reid holds that states of matter and states of mind are totally unlike and incompatible; therefore Reid could not consistently hold that perception of extension is a state of matter, (therefore Reid must have held it, says Hamilton,) (*Dis.* 66;) nor, therefore, that matter *in any given state* is necessary to a perception of extension; i. e. he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is the necessary external correlative of a perception of extension; i. e. he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is known in the perception of extension. (He could not hold it, says Hamilton, repeating the reason.) (*R.* 313.)

Hamilton then it behooved, (1) *To state the precise extent of our fundamental belief in respect to the external world;* (2) *To re-state the process of perception, so as to afford no basis for idealism*, showing, one would think, where Brown's argu-

ment is weak against our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, as they are in themselves.

We have found that a statement can often be made about material facts, which, if not exactly illustrative, will yet be suggestive of the central idea of a psychological theory, and aid even clear minds in readily thinking out its details. We throw out the following.

Reid's idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a plain mirror endowed with consciousness. When brought face to face with an external object, it sees it just as it is. Sight was the sense his thought most turned to.

Brown had dwelt much on cause and effect in the material world. His favourite illustrations are drawn from attraction, magnetism, &c. His idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a conscious pile of steel-filings affected by the action and motions of a remote and invisible magnet. The filings know themselves and their own motions, and that there is some external cause of all the motions. All they know of the magnet is how it moves them. Feeling is his sense.

Hamilton, too, had been worried by cause and effect. He conceives an effect as a result of two or more causes. (*R.* 625.) Allow us to define a burning lamp as oil and so much luminiferous ether as pervades it; then (discounting other conditions) the flame is a phenomenon of the lamp and the oxygen of the air—a phenomenon of ether, oil, and oxygen equally—of any one just as truly as of either of the others. Hamilton's idea of man (mind and body) in perception may be suggested by thinking of a burning lamp which is conscious of its flame, and in that consciousness knows at once a phenomenon of ether (mind) and oil (body) directly, and of oxygen (external world) in relation to them. Feeling is his sense also. Knowledge is limited to phenomena, each of which is the joint product of substances within the sphere of our personal presence.

He addressed himself first to the fundamental belief. He was to make it the contradictory of materialism, and of all idealism overt or implied, especially of Brown's Cosmothetic Idealism. The result is as follows, in his own words, but brought together and arranged. In the act of sensible perception I am conscious of two things; of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an extended external reality in relation

with my sense as the object perceived, i. e. known immediately in itself as existing—each apprehended at once as independent, out of, and in direct contrast to the other. (*R.* 745, 747.)

1st. *Conscious of the object* contradicts the idealism lurking in saying that perception is a conception and belief, and that we are conscious of them, but not of their objects. 2d. *Immediately*, i. e. with no intervening thing, which might exist, though the object did not—so that there is no mistake possible, no consciousness of perceiving possible, unless the object actually exists. (*R.* 805.) This position also requires, it should be added, that perception should not be regarded as an effect of any antecedents in time. Reid asserts an intervening conception, and an antecedent sensation, both of which may be grounds of illusive perception. See p. 277. 3d. *In itself as existing*, this involves the *when* and *where* of the object—its presence to the mind both in space and time. (*R.* 809.) Reid asserts immediate perception of remote objects by sight, and immediate knowledge of remote objects in time. As he places the mind in immediate connection only with the brain, all perception is of remote objects. 4th. *Extended*, against Brown's denial of knowledge of extension as it is in the external object itself. But see above, p. 291. (*R.* 745.) 5th. *Each apprehended*, &c., contradicts materialism. (*R.* 747.) Having in this way, as a good logician, injected his whole system into the fundamental belief, the next step was to restate the facts of sensation and perception by our several senses, into agreement with the assumed belief. Reid's statements contradict it at every step. Let us see what Hamilton makes of it. We may be permitted for convenience of statement to suppose that Hamilton saw the following connections of thought. He probably did.

1st. To answer to the statement that we are "*conscious of mind and matter at once*," he asserts that a sensation is a state of mind and equally a state of matter. (*R.* 884, 881.)

2d. To answer to the word "*immediately*" as explained above, he asserts that the mind is present to all sensations, and knows them in their several places, (as phenomena of parts of the body,) (*R.* 821, 2: 880, 16: 884, 39: 809, 11,) so that knowing must be convertible with reality, (*R.* 810, 18: 811, 25;) and that sensation and perception are coexistent

states of mind, perception being only the consciousness of two or more sensations as phenomena of body in their relation in space. (*R.* 880, 17: 881, 21: 882, 31: 883, 34.)

3d. To answer to "*in itself as existing*" he asserts that the mind is present at the periphery of the nerves—the outside of the body, and so present at once to the nerves and to the external object touching them, (*R.* 821, 2: 861: 319, 320,) and that it is only then and there that we have perceptions. (*R.* 145, 302.) All our senses are modifications of touch. (*R.* 247.) Nothing else is perceived than our bodies and things touching them. (*R.* 247.)

4th. To answer to "*extended*," he asserts that we know our bodies to be extended by being consciously present in sensation to different parts of them at once, and perceiving the relations in space of the sensations, and so of the parts of the body of which they are phenomena, (*R.* 884, 39: 883, 31,) and that we perceive the extension of external objects by knowing where they touch the body. (*R.* 881, 26.)

5th. That the mind apprehends matter as independent of, and in contrast with itself, rests as affirmation. Hamilton has written a volume of elaborate distinctions on the generals of his theory; but has never given detailed statements of the operations of the several senses, and it is very hard to make out what he thought actually occurs, in sight, for example. We know no better way to show distinctly what his system is, and display it as justly exposed to strong objections, than by a discussion of vision.

The true philosophy of realism and of common sense rests on two capital facts, which must be accepted as ultimate on the authority of consciousness. We ask attention to the statement that they are given as *indefinite*, as Comparative Philology shows (all) other human knowledge to have been, and brought to precision by the action of our faculties. Sensations and their external correlatives are given indefinitely, e. g. heat, and the hot iron; pain, and the tooth; reflection, by making our knowledge more precise, separates them. So distance and size are given indefinitely in sight, but made definite. (See after, p. 297.)

FIRST. WE PERCEIVE SPACE IMMEDIATELY. (*a*) *We;*—all

conscious minds in the act of consciousness, recognizing self as finite. (*b*) *Perceive;*—know as real existence, different from, and out of self;—a simple act incapable of explanation. On being confronted with an object, the mind perceives the object as it is:—not its effect on the mind, nor a joint phenomenon of it and mind. Space actually exists, and we know it to actually exist;—know it as it actually exists;—*perceive* it. (*c*) *Space*;—extension such as it really is in respect to limit and quality. *Space* is one thing; *perception* of space a totally different thing; a *conception* of space, were it possible, would also be totally different from space. (*d*) *Immediately;*—not by means of any special sense;—in connection with all the senses, and with other acts of consciousness. We are posited in space, and directly know it, as well when the eyes are shut as when they are open. We cannot get out of it, or imagine ourselves out of it.

We think it impossible to have a consistent scheme of real perception without this first principle. The object of perception is perceived in space. No mode of mind can sustain such a relation to extended objects, as we see space sustain. Objects known as *in* a state or mode of mind, as bodies are in space, or any way like it, or analogous to it, must be admitted to be mental states, as Kant supposes, or we are involved in an inextricable tangle of words without thoughts.

Hamilton pronounces space "an a priori form of imagination"—"a mere subjective state." (*R.* 841.) Kant's analysis of space into a form of mind is to him conclusive. (*Lect.* 346.) He admits, however, that it is essential to realism that we *perceive extension* in objects. (*Lect.* 346, *R.* 126, 882, 30.) His *a priori* conception is a mere *obiter* conception, a fifth wheel, as far as perception is concerned; but it will turn up again in his philosophy of the Conditioned, where it works wonders.

Second. We perceive the external correlatives of our sensations (and muscular efforts) as actually occupying positions in space.*

* We add to complete this view: *Conception*, or *imagination*, whenever an actual phantasm of an extended body is a direct object of thought, involves, 1st. the distinguishing some part of this space with imagined qualities. A

These external correlatives are different for different sensations. 1st. Some sensations are intended to give us knowledge of our own bodies chiefly. The correlatives of these are those parts of the body to which they call instinctive attention. They vary greatly in definiteness of location, from toothache to hunger. 2d. Others are intended chiefly to give us notice of the relations of external objects to our physical well-being. These are mostly modifications of touch. The external correlative is two-fold, the body and the object touching it, to which attention is instinctively called. These, too, vary greatly in their definiteness. Smell, so far as use in location is concerned, seems in man to be a sort of rudimental sense, meant for animals of prey. 3d. Two senses we have whose eminent office is communication of mind with mind, and knowledge of material things as they are in themselves, and of their relations to each other; the senses of love and reason, music and beauty;—hearing, namely, and sight. Of these, hearing deals chiefly with the sensations, and its perfection lies in the precision of its distinctions in time—not space. In its higher uses it locates its correlatives but indefinitely. Music, dilating the soul into its highest capacity for worship and the infinite, has something of the infinite in its pervading presence. The perfection of sight, on the contrary, lies in precise distinctions of the correlatives in space.

We may sum up our knowledge of the material world by perception thus: We know that there are objects occupying particular parts of space, which are correlative to certain sensations, or muscular efforts. 2d. Memory being implied in perception, we perceive motion or change of place among these

geometrician draws a diagram in the air with his finger, letters it, and demonstrates upon it, as though it were chalked on a board before him. His object of thought is a part of space dressed in imaginary colours, but as different from a mental mode as the perception of a chalk diagram of the same size.

Fact. The organism of any sense is essential to conceptions of the objects of that sense. *Hypothesis*, (1.) the nerves in a state like that in sensation; (2.) mind in a state like sensation; (3.) space *perceived;* (4.) state of mind like perception; i. e. external correlatives of sensation are now *conceived*, i. e., imagined as located in space under laws like those governing perception.

bodies, and can learn its laws, and all other facts and laws which depend upon, or are connected with motion in bodies or their parts. We perceive also change of qualities—brightness, colour, savour, smell, force; the last is generally ascertained by instruments in which motion indicates it. Hamilton would say of this statement, that, after all, matter is only the *unknown* correlative of certain sensations; that being a logician's way of saying that all we know of it is that it is the correlative of certain sensations, and has certain laws of motion, and change. Having dubbed it an *unknown* correlative, he considers it as labeled for limbo. So might we dispose of gravity, as a name for an unknown cause, and yet there is perhaps nothing in nature more thoroughly and exactly known than gravity. The knowledge we have of matter is by no means slight, though it is limited as we have stated, in its original elements.

HAMILTON'S STATEMENT IS THAT WE PERCEIVE OUR SENSATIONS AS ACTUALLY OCCUPYING DIFFERENT POSITIONS IN SPACE.

We proceed to consider sight. The known facts may be classed as (1) sensation and its antecedents, or (2) facts of perception.

Sensation and its antecedents. 1st. A luminous object.

2d. The forming, by rays of light from the object, of an inverted picture of it on the nervous fibrils which stand in the back of the eye, separate like the hairs of a brush, and receive the rays on their ends, and which run separate to the brain.

3d. Some definite effect on the brain through the action of each fibril; or, possibly, some mutual action of brain and fibrils. The 2d and 3d antecedents are unknown to consciousness.

4th. A sensation of colour for each nervous fibril affected.

Facts of perception. We perceive the external correlative of the sensation for each fibril, as a coloured point, in its true direction from the fibril. A number of coloured points, corresponding to the number of fibrils affected, all seen in their true direction, and, by the action of the entire apparatus of vision, seen instinctively in their true distance and size (indefinitely,) constitutes a perception of the object emitting the rays, in its true colour, size, shape, and distance. Direc-

tion, distance, and size, are all seen, but indefinitely, and to be mutually adjusted by the judgment. Judgment adds no elements, but brings to precision.

The *antecedents of sensation* should not be identified with the *objects of perception.* The mind may, perhaps, not have to travel back the same route to the object. They serve to put the mind in relation (en rapport) with the object; then it sees directly.*

Hamilton identifies sensation and the 3d antecedent, or, perhaps, separates this antecedent into a double affection, of which one part is identified with the sensation, and the other is not, and he supposes the mind present to the 2d, and unconscious of the 1st. He holds that the sensation of colour (state of mind) is at the external end of the fibril, and is a state of matter as well; i. e. a phenomenon of (light+nerve;) (nerve =matter+mind.) (*R.* 160, 299, 861.)

Perception is the knowledge by the mind present at the end of several fibrils at once of its sensations as arranged in space just *as*, and just *where*, the ends of the fibrils are. (See above, pp. 293, 294.)

A common-sense man, who was no metaphysician, would get about as near the thought as he ever could, from being told that the mind is spread out behind the eye, and has a feeling just the shape, and size, and colour of the picture on the retina. We do not see the image on the retina (*R.* 160,) but have a bunch of feelings there just the shape of it.

To this theory of perception we make the following objections, placing first those which apply specifically to the sense of sight.

1st. It is untrue as a statement of facts. It is not true that colour is seen at the end of the nervous fibrils. We know

* The elaborate and exact machinery of our organs, which might be used in perception, but of which we are unconscious, strongly suggests some relation equivalent to use between the mind and organs—the latent mental modifications of Leibnitz. Such a doctrine would agree substantially with the perception by intentional species of the schoolmen. (*R.* 814.) A true eye might note a ray in more than one place, as it moves through it, and so give direction, (the superficial eye-spots of some lower animals seem sensitive to light, without giving distance;) but the received law of direction is adverse.

nothing, from consciousness, of the fibrils or the pictures in our own eyes, and colour is seen outside the eye. (*a*) If the coloured points seen were at the ends of the nervous fibrils, the forms seen as the result of the combination of points would be inverted, as compared with the forms felt; but this is not the fact, the coloured object is right side up. (*b*) We see coloured points with each eye, as the phenomena of double vision prove. If these points were seen at the ends of the fibrils, we never could see an object single, with both eyes open on it. It is only by seeing the coloured points at a certain fixed distance from the eyes that these points can coincide and we can have single vision; but consciousness assures us of single vision.

2d. It is an abuse of the word *perception* to call by that name the recognition of light as present at the eye and tattooing it in figure. The perception of a white table was the problem of Hume. Such was also that of Descartes, Locke, Reid, and Brown; so that if it could be admitted that we perceive the ends of our optic nerves, the problem of the table still remains, and we have still the real difficulty left, to explain what then truly becomes, as Swift called sight, the art of seeing things that are invisible.

Hamilton seems to have been so devoted to his refutation of all possible idealisms, that perception came to mean with him nothing but a fact that contradicts Idealism. But other philosophers in discussing perception were not seeking the special point where we so come in contact with matter that its existence is most incontestable, but were treating all the knowledge which we have in using the senses.

3d. As a solution of the general problem of sight, (e. g. seeing a table,) Hamilton's theory would seem to be what he stigmatizes as the grossest form of the representative hypothesis, i. e. the perception of the external object by means of a material image present to the mind. That he in effect asserts that the direct object of sight is a material image of the table present to the mind is to us certain. He only escapes "the grossest form of representation" by asserting that we do not perceive the table at all.

4th. Denying the perception of the table, his theory does not give us data for any knowledge of it corresponding to con-

sciousness. He says it is a belief, the result of judgment, and the like; but it seems plain that when we look at the table, we do not contemplate a belief, or a judgment, or any combination of either. It is either a white space-filling table, or something that looks amazingly like one. The passages which bear on this general problem are hard to reconcile.

(*a*) Some imply perception of the table.

He defends the propriety of saying that he is conscious of an inkstand which he sees. (*Lect.* 158.) Now, as he could be conscious of it only if immediately known, the ratiocination would be inexorable, which would convict him of holding that inkstands are perceived by sight, in opposition to his hundred-times-repeated assertion to the contrary. He describes the perception of a book by sight. (*Lect.* 103.) So he quotes Hume as assenting to his statement of perception in saying that we see a white table. (*Lect.* 201.) So a rose is seen (*R.* 129,) and a wall is known as the subject in which colour inheres. (*R.* 805, 301.)

(*b*) Some imply the table to be a subject of inference, or a cause of the perceived object.

He generally lets it go with, "all else" (but what is in immediate contact with its organ) "is something over and above perception" (*R.* 145;) but we find "it is only reached by reasoning" (*R.* 186;) "by inference" (*R.* 247;) "only the causes of the object we immediately perceive" (*Lect.* 375;) "by inference, acquired, mediate, and at best always insecure" (*R.* 177;) "only known through something different from itself in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagination" (*R.* 810.)

(*c*) Now what are the data on which inferences are to proceed? What the materials which are to be constructed in imagination?

We find but three passages that give us any light on these points. "We always see in a particular direction," &c. (*R.* 160.) Vision is "a perception by which we take immediate cognizance of light in relation to our organ"—"and likewise as falling on it in a particular direction." (*R.* 160.) "This natural perception of outness, which is the foundation of our acquired knowledge of distance, seems given us in the

natural perception we have of the direction of the rays of light." (*R.* 177, *Lect.* 393.) These passages seem to contradict Hamilton's principles. What is it we see in a particular direction from the eye?—a ray of light?—but that is known only by its sensation of colour, and is seen only as a luminous point. Is the luminous point seen in a particular direction from the eye?—but Hamilton says it is seen in its true *where*, i. e. where the mind is present to it at the end of the nerve; it is a sensation, and cannot be outside the eye. To perceive the direction of a ray is to perceive a relation between two perceived points of the ray, and involves an immediate knowledge of the ray before it arrived at the organ of sense, "which is a contradiction in terms." (*R.* 305.) It presupposes the perception of outness, which is the unambiguous contradictory of contact; and, sure enough, here is *outness* asserted. Outness of what? Can we perceive outness, and nothing out? Hamilton goes on to say that in the case of the blind boy couched by Cheselden, "the objects seemed to touch his eye, as what he felt did his skin;" "but," adds Hamilton, "they did not appear to him as in his eyes, far less as a mere affection of the organ." This would seem a distinct statement that the objects of sight are seen at a distance.

The materials for imagination to construct the remote object in this case must be either our sensations, or copies of these sensations. To suppose the first contradicts Hamilton's theory that the sensations are known where they are. To suppose the second contradicts consciousness, which knows nothing of a double object.

We do not find these views of outness repeated, and the notes in which they occur are embarrassed and unsatisfactory in other respects; neither, though Hamilton has notes on single vision, and classifies in his fashion all possible modes of explaining it, does he give the slightest hint of his own views (*R.* 163, 814;) nor, though the occasion presents itself often, does he show how his inverted direct object is yet seen right side up—except so far as these statements just quoted may go to explain it.

If, under these circumstances, we may hazard "a wide solution," it is, that Hamilton never could make his theory of

perception agree with the admitted facts of vision, and that he never made up his mind what is the true account of seeing a table. He might have called his essays on Perception, as well as his remarks on the relations of Consciousness to mind and matter, what he does call his essays on the Conditioned—"Hints of an Undeveloped Philosophy." (*Dis.* 587.)

OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY AS A WHOLE.

5th. In limiting knowledge to objects present to the mind in space and time, it reduces knowledge to an infinitesimal—to nothing. The mind is unextended; but Perception is a knowledge of the remote. To obtain any knowledge by Perception, Hamilton has (contradictorily) to extend the mind over the body. Time present is a vanishing point between past and future; but consciousness is a knowledge of the identical. To obtain knowledge by consciousness he has (contradictorily) to declare memory essential to consciousness. (*Lect.* 141.)

6th. It is untrue as a statement of facts.

(*a*) The mind is not present at the periphery of the nerves, having immediate knowledge—i. e. knowledge convertible with fact—of sensations as *there*. Impressions on any part of the nerves of touch may be located at the periphery. In disease the pain is often located at a part remote from the part affected. A person who has lost a limb still locates sensations in the non-existent member. The elaborate machinery which connects the brain with all parts of the body, and the effects on consciousness of disordering it, are satisfactory evidence to most men that the mind is not an organism, but uses remote organs, and communicates with them through the nerves, as the telegraph operator communicates through his wires.

But when we admit that the mind is primarily present in space only to some sensorium, all perception, except possibly of the unknown sensorium, becomes representative, and Hamilton's immediate knowledge dislimns into judgments and images.

(*b*) Perception is not dependent on the presence of the mind in space to the thing known. That would involve either that the mind is extended, or that extension cannot be *perceived*. As long as knowledge is thought of as the consciousness of a joint phenomenon of two contiguous substances, one of which is unextended, the sphere of perception cannot embrace extension; but consciousness assures us that it does

embrace it—that the sphere of knowledge is very different from the sphere of personal presence in space.

7th. It is contradictory in placing the nervous organism both within and without the mind. Hamilton himself propounds this difficulty, re-affirms the fact, makes no attempt to explain it, and pronounces it "the mystery of mysteries to man." (*R.* 880.) It is a single illustration of the results of placing mind under the category of quantity. Let it go for what it is worth!

8th. It is skeptical: for, by denying the testimony of consciousness that the objects of sight are perceived at a distance from the eye, it destroys the veracity of consciousness, and so establishes Pyrrhonism. (See p. 289.)

9th. It compares unfavourably with Cosmothetic Idealism. The statement that knowing sensations of colour (states of mind) in space (a form of mind) constitutes perception, is, so far, pure idealism. Hamilton makes this statement. (*R.* 881, 21: 885, 48.) If now he had added to it this other statement —that the consciousness now described is accompanied by, or involves the necessary belief that these states of mind arranged in this form of mind are the correlatives of external forces (matter) analogously arranged in an external space, that would have been Cosmothetic Idealism—Cosmothetic Idealism, that complex of all absurdities; since any phenomena of an extended substance in an external space are wholly unlike, and incompatible with any mental states, so that to suppose any ratio even of representation between them is absurd.

Observe now how Hamilton avoids this absurdity. He affirms that these two totally unlike and incompatible sets of phenomena are identically one and the same; they are not simply thought as one—they positively are, and are positively known and felt to be one: the mind is immediately present in time and space to the whole thing, and embraces it as one in its consciousness.

Surely this may be characterized in the "matchless style of Hamilton" by saying that "in place of simply originating from the incomprehensible, it ostentatiously departs from the absurd."

10th. It will promote materialism, or, more accurately, Spinozism, or monism.

(*a*) The proof of the independent and contrasted nature of mind and matter has been, since the time of Descartes, rested on the incompatibility of their phenomena.

"To mark the boundaries of physiology, and psychology, we must simply inquire—what are the phenomena which we learn by *consciousness*, and what those which we learn by outward *observation?* These two regions lie entirely without each other; so much so, that there is not a single fact known by consciousness, which we could ever have learned by observation, and not a single fact known by observation of which we are ever conscious. A sensation, for example, is known simply by consciousness; the material conditions of it, as seen in the organ, and the nervous system, simply by observation. No one could ever see a sensation, or be conscious of an organic action; accordingly, the one fact belongs to psychology, the other to physiology." (*Morell's Modern Philosophy*, 304.)

But Hamilton makes all sensations phenomena of both mind and matter.

Consciousness is to be the sole authority as to what are the objects of thought. The object of perception, for example, is that, and only that, which is perceived. But Hamilton *seems* to use *observation* instead. He says that the direct object of sight, for example, is the light and nerve in relation; but consciousness knows nothing of either; it rests on the luminous object. Such an obtrusion destroys psychology.

(*b*) The philosophy of a portion of the followers of Descartes, founding on the independent and contrasted existence of mind and matter, had held that there are two parallel series of phenomena, one in matter, the other in mind; any connection, or mutual intercourse between which is maintained by the concourse of the Deity. Spinoza, taking up this system, welded the two series together by the simple statement, that they are phenomena of one substance viewed under different relations. "*Et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur,*" (*Eth.* II. 6,) and, applying the statement to man, "*quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit, quæ jam sub cogitationis, jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur.*" (*Eth.* III. 2.) The consequences of this

doctrine may be there seen, drawn out with a ratiocination as inexorable as that of Hamilton.

Now when Hamilton affirms that the mind is present to the whole body, (nervous organism,) and that our sensations are known in self-consciousness to be states of mind, and the same sensations known in perception to be states of body; especially when it is added that the sphere of our perceptions is limited by that of our bodily presence, and coincident in time and space with that of our sensations, he holds a doctrine which could not become common without making Spinozism common.*

Hamilton is indeed an emphatic dualist. He even holds that his doctrine is the only one on which dualism can stand, as strongly as Berkeley did that his doctrine was a vindication of the external world of common sense. He is emphatic in the assertion that the mind is unextended, the external world extended; and that they are known as independent of, out of, and in contrast to each other; their relation in sensation is the mystery of mysteries. But we feel sure that to most persons who should receive his views as we have set them forth, it will appear an easy solution of the mystery to say that consciousness is the interior experience of the same substance of which perception gives the exterior appearance.

(*c*) One of the best services of Reid is his adopting, and bringing into use, entirely different sets of terms for our knowledge of mind and our knowledge of matter—consciousness, &c. on the one hand, opposed to perception, &c. on the other; stamping with his approval what the common sense of mankind had indefinitely asserted in language, that consciousness is limited to mental states, and does not embrace external objects. This use has not arisen, as Hamilton says, from the prevalence of the ideal system, but because our knowledge of self is different in kind and in certainty from that of matter. We all feel our liability to mistake an object of perception. We have been mistaken a thousand times; but we are sure that

* Hamilton's doctrine that consciousness gives only a relative knowledge of self, coupled with that of latent modifications of mind, also strongly favours the monistic conception of the conscious Ego as an observer who sees some portion only of the phenomena of a great power or substance (mind, God,) of which it is thus only a mode.

we *think* we perceive. Consciousness is not, in the English speech, a general name for all our states of mind and their objects. It is a light in which our mental states go on,* varying in intensity with different degrees of attention, and, perhaps, in quality with the character of the Ego. Unless we believe with Hamilton that the sphere of knowledge is confined to that of our personal presence in space, we must admit, on his principles, that objects of knowledge may be outside the sphere of consciousness. He does not claim that the objects of representative knowledge are within it. The strength of the popular hold on a doctrine varies almost exactly as the extent to which language conforms to it. Materialism will never gain so much ground among the people, as long as the English idiom will not let us say that we are conscious of matter. We cannot bear to be taught to say that we are conscious of inkstands. (*Lect.* 158.)

11th. Reid and Stewart take pleasure in referring the succession and adjustment of the facts of perception to the arrangement of the all-wise and good Framer of man. Hamilton thinks this *mystical* and *hyperphysical.* (*Lect.* 355.) He wishes to postulate statements which shall logically involve the facts. This leads him to make immediate knowledge a different thing from instinctive knowledge. The lower animals, for example, have an instinctive perception of distant objects by sight (*R.* 182;) but this could not be true perception in man, for that can only exist where the mind is present to the object. He must assert of phenomena instinctively connected that they are one and the same phenomenon, or connected only by inference. It leads him also to decline the argument from the veracity of God (*R.* 130, &c.,) as distinguished from the veracity of consciousness. But when the sceptic throws doubt on the existence of matter by an appeal to the power of God to produce our present states of mind though there were no matter in existence, it is certainly not only a legitimate, but *the* legitimate argument to appeal to the veracity of God, which is as sure as his power.

This feature seems to us objectionable. The constitution

* Hamilton holds that states of mind may go on without consciousnss. (*Lect.* xviii.)

of man will be best understood by him who looks at it as the workmanship of infinite wisdom, and who delights to refer what he cannot, as well as what he can understand, to the power and wisdom of God—*Deus in machina.*

Finally. We remark, as an argumentum ad hominem, that a doubt is thrown on the whole theory as the only possible statement of real perception, by the alleged facts of animal magnetism, which Hamilton affirms to be in themselves "certain and even manifest" (*Dis.* 600;) since these would seem to show that perception may take place in other ways—since, in Hamilton's own language, it is proved that "*perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.*" (*R.* 246.)

Hamilton's theory, on the whole, seems retrograde from Reid's. His fundamental principles—every phenomenon (e. g. knowledge) involves two causes—knowledge of opposites (e. g. mind and matter) is one—give no sure footing here. In moving the sphere of perception from the external world to our own bodies, he has moved from the clear to the obscure; from the field of science to that of use; from the most definite of knowledge to the most indefinite, where consciousness least protests against confounding mind and matter. Reid, perhaps, did not guard every point against the idealist; Hamilton must "distinguish and divide," and *affirm* strenuously, to keep us from believing that in perception and consciousness we are looking at the outside and the inside of the same substance. Monism is a more fascinating doctrine than idealism. Spinoza and Hegel have a more comprehensive and inexorable grasp than Berkeley.

The relations between mind and matter are little known. Hamilton's theory may be the true explanation of some of our perceptions—of those in which we are most certain of the existence of a *non Ego;* while in other unlike perceptions we learn most of the properties, qualities, and motions of this *non Ego.* The final judgment may even be that he has succeeded in touching the very heart of truth in this matter; but the authority of his great name ought not so radically to change the old views without a thorough discussion. In another article we purpose to examine the Philosophy of the Conditioned.

Art. IV.—*Man, Moral and Physical: or the Influence of Health and Disease on Religious Experience.* By the Rev. Joseph H. Jones, D. D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

The history of this book may interest most of our readers. We have understood that the manuscript of the first edition, which was published in 1846, was shown to the late Rev. Dr. Archibald Alexander, who was supposed to be preparing a work on the subject which would supersede the necessity of this. The writer was informed that this was not the case, and was advised to publish, and immediately prepare for a second edition of his volume. This, however, was delayed until, at the earnest solicitation of friends, and especially of the late Rev. Dr. James W. Alexander, the author resumed his labours, which have resulted in the present enlarged edition. To confirm our statement it may not be amiss to quote the affectionate and grateful tribute which Dr. Jones has paid, in the preface, to these venerated friends, whose names and efforts have been for so many years connected with this *Review*.

"The last two letters that we ever received from our lamented friend and correspondent, Dr. James W. Alexander, related mainly to its reproduction and enlargement 'on several points,' which he thought 'should be treated more fully.' None of all our friends ever expressed a deeper interest in the subject of this book, nor helped us more by their counsel, than the late Doctors Alexander, both father and son. The removal of the former, *like a shock of corn in his season*, though causing wide spread sorrow, did not take us by surprise.

> Multis ille bonis flebilis, occidit;
> Nulli flebilior, quam mihi.

The death of the latter, *in his full strength*, and at the time of so great and increasing usefulness, was painfully abrupt, and seemed to be premature. He was taken from a large circle of admirers, whose memory lingers on their irreparable loss, with

the mournful reflection expressed in that 'exquisite inscription of Shenstone's,' whose aroma no translation can preserve,

> Heu! quanto minus est cum reliquis versari, quam tui meminisse!

They almost forget the living in their reminiscences of the dead."

The changes made in the present work consist in the addition of many interesting facts, and in the amplification of some of the practical portions, such as the chapters on Temptation and Counsels. Large use has been made of the best medical authorities, both French and English, and particularly of works upon subjects nearly related to that of this volume, such as Pritchard, Pinel, Prout; Voison on the Moral and Physical Causes of Mental Maladies; Tissot on the Health of Men of Letters; Hitchcock's Lectures on Diet, Regimen, and Employment; Shepherd's Sincere Convert; Robe on Religious Melancholy; and the very scarce and remarkable "Discourse" of the Rev. Timothy Rogers on Trouble of Mind and the Disease of Melancholy. These, with many well known works on Christian Casuistry, ancient and modern, have supplied a range of facts from which the chief difficulty has been to make proper selections.

The author is evidently familiar with medical reading, which for many years has been steadily directed to this object; and this, with his long experience as a pastor, who has acted upon the principles embodied in the work before us, must recommend its intrinsic value. The need of such a manual for pastors, theological students, and many intelligent Christians, the peculiar difficulties of preparing it, and the fact that this, so far as we have learned, is the only work in the English language expressly devoted to this subject, entitle it to larger consideration in these pages than is usually given to practical works. We propose, therefore, to present some account of this peculiarly interesting book, satisfied that we can scarcely do a better service to many of our readers. The author has not written for professional men, as a class, yet the lucid, polished, terse, vigorous, classical style, the profuse illustration of principles by striking facts, and its literary and religious attractions, combine to make it interesting and instructive to any intelligent

mind; but its chief value must be to pastors, students, pious physicians, and those who either suffer or are brought into intimate contact with the victims of spiritual maladies.

The grand difficulty of such a work lies in the fact that its field is a border-land, where the boundaries of two realms of human experience meet. Where does the physical end, and the moral begin? How does the one affect the other? Where are the functions of the physician and of the minister of religion most demanded? The relations between the brain and the intellect, or between the nervous system and the spiritual powers—the physiological and the divine life—the passions and the graces—the physical effects of sympathy and of the imagination—the bounds of morbid and the natural experience—in fine, the whole subject of the health of the body and of the soul is complicated with the greatest difficulties. Then again, how shall we apply religious truth to the ever varying cases of spiritual trouble whose tap-root may be in a diseased stomach, liver, or spleen? The writer of this article has several times been obliged to say to parishioners, after most perplexing and fruitless interviews, "You need the physician more than the minister." In another case of one who has late gone up higher, in Christian triumph, whose disposition was morbidly infected by a self-reproachful spirit, he was constrained to reply to a question about giving up her music, because she thought that it was wrong to indulge the passion—"No; re-open your piano, take up your old music, and get new pieces. Your taste and talent for it are God's gifts; use them cheerfully and freely." She looked astonished, but took the advice, and profited by it.

Ministration to the sick and dying must always be greatly modified by their physical state. Disease and medicines cloud many a devout soul which would otherwise exult like the sun in his strength. Medical jurisprudence, which treats of the application of the principles and practice of medicine to doubtful cases in courts of justice, has grown into the dignity of a noble science, whose decisions govern courts and juries, and determine questions of crime or innocence, of life and death. The church needs just such a branch of theological casuistry, in proportion as its interests are superior to those of mere law, and medicine, and common life. But no man is competent to

such a work "who is not furnished with a suitable education, theological and medical, profoundly and experimentally acquainted with the Scriptures, fond of research, and gifted with good powers of generalization and induction." We must have good theology, large practical experience, discriminating views of character and truth, and other requisites of a safe counsellor in the most delicate mission of soul to souls. We want not a book of mere learning, but of principles well illustrated by authentic facts, and applicable, like the medicines of the physician, to the entire range of practice. The chief danger of such a work is that of running it into materialism, as in the case of phrenology and some of its kindred quackeries. A man may make too much or too little of it, and in both cases do great harm. But we think that the present work is a fine specimen of that "via media tutissima" which grants all that is necessary to the mutual influence of the body and the mind, without violating the principles of sound philosophy or orthodox theology. The author combats this tendency with vigour, both in the line of direct argument and in the pervading spirit of the book. We shall have full occasion to see that while there is a "prima facie" plausibility in the objection, the most sensitively pious reader need not afflict himself with the shadow of a shade of misgiving as to his orthodoxy to humanity or to religion. But more of this hereafter.

The first chapter contains a clear and somewhat elaborate detail of the testimonies of science and of Scripture respecting the connection between body and mind. The various organs of the body are passed in review—the brain, stomach, lungs and heart, liver and spleen, and their connection with thought, temperament, mental functions, the emotional nature, sympathy, and imagination. As an example of his method of treating this part of the subject, we quote what is said about the Liver and Spleen:

"Liver. What are all the uses of this organ in the human economy, is still a subject of inquiry. The main service which it performs, so far as is generally understood, is merely the secretion daily of a few ounces of bile. But when we consider its dimensions—the largest gland of any kind in the human system—the number and size of its parts, and its peculiar

structure, we cannot resist the impression that this great constituent of the vital mechanism is used for a higher purpose than this. And hence the opinion has obtained, both among the ancients and moderns, that the liver has a powerful influence on the temperament, the mental functions, and the passions of the man, thus affecting his moral and religious feelings. We presume to offer no solution of the fact, nor even a conjecture, why a certain class of mental phenomena should be developed by the condition of this particular gland; why the liver should exhibit its affinities for that which is gloomy and sad, rather than the lungs or heart? But the fact is witnessed every day, that such is the power of many of the depressing passions when suddenly excited, that they cause a gush of bile into the system at large, which gives a yellow tinge to the eye, and overcasts the mind with the most rueful forebodings and ineffable despondency. Why it should cause this mental dejection, is just as inexplicable as is the hopeful, buoyant spirit of the hectic patient, whose more desperate malady is seated in his lungs. The contrast is remarkable, whatever may be the cause. While in the last stage of consumption the sufferer is cheerful and incredulous as to the issue which is so obvious to others, the man labouring under disease of the liver is often oppressed with a heaviness of heart which repels relief from any suggestion of reason or the consolations of religion. The classical reader will recollect the frightful story of the misérable Tityus, as told by both Homer and Virgil, who, for his nameless crime, was condemned to be eternally tormented by the preying of a vulture upon his liver, which was supernaturally reproduced as fast as consumed.

> Rostroque immanis vultur obunco,
> Immortale jecur tundens.
>
> A huge vulture, with his hooky beak,
> Pouncing his immortal liver.—*Davidson.*

"Whether our poets designed that fable should receive a physiological gloss, and were prompted, in part, by their own morbid experiences or not, it is certainly a most graphic allegory, descriptive at once of the seat, the intensity, and hopelessness of that unspeakable wretchedness which so often pro-

ceeds from a diseased condition of this organ. Such would seem to have been the opinion of Lucretius, who, in giving the moral of various heathen fables, furnishes the following interpretation of this, as translated by Dryden.

> No Tityus torn by vultures lies in hell,
> Nor could the lobes of his rank liver swell
> To that prodigious mass for their eternal meal.
> But he's the Tityus, who by love oppressed,
> Or tyrant passions preying on his breast,
> And ever anxious thoughts, is robbed of rest.

"Hippocrates, Galen, Aretæus, and other illustrious ancients, were accustomed to describe a great variety of mental disease under the general term 'melancholy,' because they believed a pensive and desponding state of the mind to arise from a superabundance of 'black bile,' the literal meaning of the compound word 'melancholy.' Others supposed the hidden cause of this mental depression to be the

"Spleen—and hence, 'to be spleeny,' as descriptive of the gloomy and disconsolate, has come down to us traditionally as a saying of antiquity. What is the use of this spongy viscus has never been determined. Dr. Good says various hypotheses have been offered by learned men; but they are hypotheses, and nothing more. Archdeacon Paley thinks it is employed as needful in the package of the animal mass. It is possible, he says, that the spleen may be 'merely a stuffing, a soft cushion to fill up a vacancy or hollow, which, unless occupied, would leave the package loose and unsteady.' The same opinion concerning the influence of the liver in producing emotions of sadness is conveyed in the word 'hypochondriac,' applied by the ancients to the melancholy, and which has been domesticated by the moderns. Every reader who can analyse the term, knows that it designates the position of this organ, *ὑπὸ χόνδρον, under the cartilage.* Thus the opinion obtained early, that by some mysterious generation, affections of this sombre cast were the offspring of the liver.

"The writer is indebted to a lady of genius, and various accomplishments of both mind and person, for a critical remark and suggestion in relation to the subject of hepatic influence, as furnished by her own experience. She is favourably known

to the literary and religious community by several instructive and interesting works, and has paid the common penalty of the studious in those physical ailments which are too often the price of their success. She had very soon discovered that the fluctuations in her animal spirits, religious enjoyment, and spiritual exercises generally; the changes in her temper, mental energy, and cheerfulness, to which she is painfully subject, were symptomatic of a corresponding change in the condition of this sensitive organ. But the exhibition of some simple remedy, by which its healthful functions are restored, brings back at once her elastic freedom of thought and cheerfulness." Pp. 39—44.

The influence of the passions upon the physical system is then exhibited at length. One of the most remarkable illustrations of the power of hope and fear upon great masses of men is drawn from the late Italian war. After stating that army surgeons have testified to the great contrast between the mortality of the wounded in conquering and defeated armies, and the fearful predominance of the worst diseases of the camp in the latter, the author quotes the opposite statements made by two correspondents of the *London Times*, who wrote respectively from the allied and Austrian armies, after the great battle on the Mincio, in 1859, which resulted in the defeat and pursuit of the Austrians.

"The difference in views and statements of the same place, scenes, and events, is remarkable. The former are said to be marching through a beautiful and luxuriant country during the day, and at night encamping where they are supplied with an abundance of the best provisions, and all sorts of rural dainties. There is nothing of war about the proceeding, except its stimulus and excitement. On the side of the poor Austrians it is just the reverse. In his letter of the same date, describing the same places, and a march over the same road, the writer can scarcely find words to set forth the sufferings, impatience, and disgust existing around him. What was pleasant to the former was intolerable to the latter. What made all this difference? asks the journalist. 'One condition only; the French are victorious, the Austrians have been defeated. The contrast

may convey a distinctive idea of the extent to which moral impressions affect the efficiency of the soldier.'"

Cases are frequently mentioned of persons whose hair has turned partially gray, or entirely white, in a single night, from excessive fear. We well remember a gentleman, now deceased, whose head was made white as the driven snow by an attack of cholera. But the subjoined case is perhaps the only one on record in which this marvellous change has actually occurred in so short a space of time, and before witnesses who saw the process going on, as distinctly as any transformation of the chemist's laboratory.

"A correspondent of the *London Medical Times*, writing from India, February 19, 1858, says that a Sepoy of the Bengal army, having been made a prisoner, was brought before the authorities for examination. The man trembled violently; intense horror and despair were depicted on his face, and he seemed to be almost stupefied with fear. The writer, who was present, adds, that within the space of half an hour his hair became grey on every portion of his head. 'When first seen by us, it was the glossy jet-black of the Bengalee; his age was twenty-four. The attention of the by-standers was first attracted by the Sergeant, whose prisoner he was, exclaiming, 'he is turning gray!' and I, with several other persons, watched its progress. Gradually, but decidedly, the change went on, and a uniform gray colour was completed within the period above named." Pp. 52, 53.

In treating of the effects of the Imagination on the nervous system, Dr. Jones has given ample illustrations from the phenomena which attended the great Revival in Kentucky, of which Dr. Davidson has rendered a very interesting account in his History of the Presbyterian Church in that State. The re-appearance of somewhat similar "physical manifestations," in connection with the present or late great awakening in Ireland has imparted a new interest to this subject, both among its opposers and its friends. An interesting account of these very singular manifestations is contained in a little volume recently published in this country, entitled, "The Revival in Ireland—consisting of Letters from Ministers and Medical Men in Ulster, on the Revival of Religion in the

North of Ireland, addressed to the Rev. Henry Grattan Guinness," the well known Evangelist, whose labours in Great Britain and in this country have been so greatly blessed by the Head of the Church. Having carefully examined a number of these cases in various places, Mr. Guinness publishes the statements of his clerical and medical friends, whose position and character he fully endorses, without committing himself to their opinions. He regards all the theories hitherto put forth on the subject as very unsatisfactory, and adds in a spirit, which is characteristic of the man, "As to their being the work of the Spirit of God, all things being considered, I think we should tremble either to assert or deny that they are so, lest we should grieve the Holy Spirit."

The general opinion of intelligent Christians in Protestant Ireland on the subject, is embodied in the ensuing extract from the letter of Dr. J. Macaldin of Coleraine, "a Christian physician who has laboured much during the revival, both for the welfare of the souls and bodies of men in the town of Coleraine." As the matter is of permanent importance, belonging to the universal church and the human race, and as it is from a competent witness to facts of recent occurrence, which are nearly related to the subject of the work now under review, we need not apologize for introducing to our readers this striking collateral testimony.

Under date of September 17, 1859, Dr. Macaldin first states the fact that these manifestations, physical and psychical, largely accompanied the earlier, and occasionally the later cases of conversion in *most* places where the work of God has appeared, (for in some places, as in Connor, during two years of revival, there have been no such phenomena,) and then he continues:

"The physical phenomena which appeared to be intimately associated with a real work of conversion in this neighbourhood, and of which I have witnessed throughout their whole course a vast number, I would rank under two classes: 1st, those with loss of muscular power, perfect consciousness remaining; and 2d, those in which both muscular power and consciousness are temporarily suspended. To these may be superadded various nervous symptoms in different degrees of exaltation or intensity,

according to the temperament, age, and sex of the individual. But these are mere accidents in the history of the case, and exceptional. As might be expected, where men have stood at a distance, and have not personally witnessed any of these cases of prostration or 'striking down,' from the first cry of anguish of the heavy-laden sinner, when he has just looked on Him whom his sins have pierced, until the final burst of joy, when, fixing his eye on that fountain opened for sin and uncleanness, he has suddenly apprehended Jesus as his Saviour, and felt the whole burthen of his guilt removed at the sight of the cross—these so-called medical authorities, writing of things they do not understand, have vouchsafed the most erroneous explanations, and have created in the minds of parties at a distance, really desirous of arriving at the truth, impressions unfavourable to the whole movement. One man calls the seizure catalepsy; another calls it hysteria; another, mesmeric ecstasy; another, a physical influence in the hand of the Spirit. This may be all very simple, and appears so very satisfactory, that even non-medical divines have caught up the phrases, and so familiar are they with all the symptoms of hysteria, &c., that they have become instructors in physiology and pathology of their less learned brethren.

"That there has been much of an unreal character about many of the cases of which I have heard in other places, and somewhat of hysteria even here, I am free to admit; but to any one who has had experience of the real work, and has studied it in all its phenomena, there is no difficulty in distinguishing the real from the false—what is merely the effect of excitement, fear, sympathy, or imitation, from the genuine working of a broken and a contrite heart. For example, a strong man, in robust health, who has never been to a meeting—a child of twelve years—a young girl, or middle-aged woman, as the case may be, have begun to realize that they have souls to be saved or lost—uneasiness is felt; a weight on the heart or spirits; a 'crushing' is complained of; they cannot look cheerful, or give the ordinary attention to their daily duties. This may go on for days, with many but a few hours; some do not know what is the matter; others discover the truth—it is the burthen of sin; they cannot get rid of it, divert their minds and

dissipate as they may. In either case a crisis comes; the Spirit of God seizes them in his strong grasp; a sight of their sins, in all their enormity, as regards Christ and his dying love, is suddenly given. In others, the terrors of a coming judgment are presented to the mind. They fall prostrate and powerless, as in a swoon, or writhe in agony, with loud cries and supplications to Jesus, for his Holy Spirit to remove the load by the application of his blood. The prayer is heard; the blood is applied. Jesus is revealed as their Saviour; the burthen is gone; and now succeeds a paroxysm of joy, in which the hitherto prostrate, powerless man, starts to his feet; the full vigour of a new life is given; and in the ecstasy of his new-born happiness he embraces all around; his heart, formerly narrow and selfish, now large enough to take in the whole world.

"Now, what is this?—hysteria? Hysteria rarely attacks an able-bodied man; does not give man or woman a sight of their sins, and lead them to surrender their hearts to Christ. Catalepsy? Catalepsy, so rare that I never saw but one case in my life, leaves the sinner where it found him, dead in trespasses and in sins. A 'physical influence?' Electricity, magnetism, light, heat, are physical 'agents,' and have an influence on the bodies, but not on the souls of men. No, no; these cannot explain it; it is incomprehensible and inexplicable by natural laws. I do not pretend to understand it; I accept the fact, and am thankful that God has in his wisdom and his love seen fit to smite down, if it so please him, the stubborn and rebellious heart, whether of man or child; to throw it into the furnace of contrition for a season; to keep it there, until, like the gold in the refiner's crucible, purified from the dross, it reflects his image; and then to bring it out washed and justified, a vessel meet for the Master's service.

"As for the visions, supposed revelations, prophesyings, deafness, dumbness, &c., to which weakly, nervous, and highly excitable individuals attach so much importance, I do not deny that the Spirit of God *may* make use of these, seriously to impress a hitherto dead, carnal mind with a sense of spiritual things, but I look on them as mere accidents in the history of the work, and they may occur either in connection with, or

independent of, any work of grace in the heart. It is much to be regretted that any prominence should have been given to them, as they are apt, not only to withdraw the mind from the real ground of a sinner's hope, and to lead him to look within, instead of without, by the eye of faith to the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, but to lead to positively sinful results, damaging to the cause of God. To this description of cases unfortunately friends of the 'counterwork,' rather than of the 'work,' refer as examples of the 'so-called revival' in the North of Ireland.

"I cannot close without referring to those cases in which the individual has been stricken several times. I believe the subjects of these distressing occurrences to be weakly, nervous persons, who have really been seeking Christ, and have had deep conviction of sin, but have never had their peace firmly established on that foundation which cannot be moved. They have a very tender conscience, are imperfectly instructed in the word of God, and think they never can sin again. Their first love begins to wane; temptation assails them; they look for evidence of their safety to their own hearts, instead of to Christ and the written word. What wonder that they should again be surrounded in darkness, and be agitated by fears? The issue of such cases, when properly treated, I am happy to believe, is in the end most satisfactory."

We cannot regard the view given in the above extract as at all satisfactory. There is great danger in ascribing to the Holy Spirit mere physical effects, thus leading men to regard as evidence of his presence and work what is purely natural and incidental. The fact, familiar to all readers of medical history, is, that bodily agitations, various forms of hysteria, catalepsy, and epilepsy, are at times epidemic, manifesting themselves commonly in persons of a peculiar temperament, and induced by any strong emotion of any kind. They have been quite as frequent at the tombs of Popish saints and within the walls of French nunneries as in Irish or American revivals. Such phenomena, therefore, may attend a genuine work of grace, but they are no evidence of its genuineness. They are the physical concomitants, under certain conditions, of strong feeling, but do not determine its character. Tears, sighing, trembling,

may attend the operations of the Spirit of God in the heart, but no one pretends that they are discriminating characteristics of his work. The bodily agitations in question being mere nervous effects of excited feeling are not in themselves to be desired or cherished. On the contrary, they are to be dreaded and counteracted, just as much as any other form of disease, or abnormal action of the physical system. Excitement gives many men a headache or congestion of the lungs; endeavouring to prevent or cure these corporeal states involves no condemnation of the moral character of the feeling which produces them, and does not tend to counteract its legitimate effects. We may, therefore, lament the prevalence of the bodily agitations attending the Irish revivals, and disapprove of the encouragement given to them, without at all doubting the genuineness of the revival itself. That is to be judged of by its spiritual, and not by its corporeal effects. When the writer of the letter above quoted asks, Whether hysteria can lead men to surrender their hearts to Christ? or catalepsy convert the soul? the answer is plain enough; but the question betrays great confusion of mind. Suppose it should be asked, whether a bad headache could lead a man to Christ, or oppression at the chest convert the soul, because these effects so often attend the agitation and weeping caused by religious feelings. The Holy Ghost may be the author of the feeling, and the feeling the incidental cause of these bodily effects, ordinary or extraordinary; but reverencing or fostering these abnormal or diseased corporeal concomitants is not only unreasonable but highly dangerous. These bodily affections are dependent on the nervous state, and that is greatly influenced by the imagination and the judgment. If they are approved and cherished, they increase; if disapproved of and counteracted, they disappear. In the great American revival of the last century it was found that bodily agitations prevailed almost exclusively in the congregations of those ministers who regarded them as signs of the Spirit's presence. Edwards discountenanced them, and consequently his church was exempted from the visitation; while his neighbours who favoured, or would not resist their manifestation, had them in abundance. In France, the only way in which their progress could be arrested was by fear.

Death was threatened to the first man who went into convulsions, and the epidemic soon ran out. It gives the world a great handle against religion, when bodily agitations are made evidences of a work of grace.

Returning to the work of Dr. Jones, we remark the happy way in which he brings the physical part of his subject into the domain of Christian experience. Nothing strikes like a fact. Metaphysical reasonings, and abstract theological discussions can do little, in the most favourable circumstances, to pierce the thick darkness of religious melancholy, and to bind up a broken heart. The surgeons of the French hospitals, after the battle of Solferino, might as well have passed among the couches of mutilated and dying men explaining the anatomy of their bodies, or the theory of gun-shot wounds, instead of applying their skill to the immediate relief of the wretched sufferers. The author wisely deals with principles and facts. The cases of Baxter, Payson, Dean Milner, Cowper and others, are cited with a discriminating sympathy and judicious application, which will appeal to every appreciative reader.

Never does the minister of Christ require more of the Master's Spirit than when engaged in this class of pastoral duties. He needs the gentleness of the "nurse cherishing her children," the skill of the physician in the diagnosis and treatment of the most delicate patient, the grace of the apostle manifested in "becoming all things to all men," and yet making Christ "all and in all." The best pastor will be a Christian philosopher, a true Baconian, attentive to the smallest minutiæ of surrounding circumstances, reasoning from particulars to generals, overlooking nothing that governs the mutual relations of the physical and moral. He will not forget that neither body nor mind is proof against a north-east wind, a sultry August noon, a February frost, or an equinoctial gale. He will not be above considering the effects of a foul atmosphere, or the badly-lighted back-room, in which poverty wrings its hands and its hearts together. He will not expect the sick mother, with her helpless babes around her, and with no servant or helper near, and a husband at his daily toil or in a drunken bout, to manifest the same freedom from spiritual despondency as the next suffering parishioner he visits in a fine house, with com-

forts, and books, and friends, and everything that love and money can procure, even down to the frail flowers which overshadow the medicines on the stand.

Constitutional difficulties, hereditary maladies, troubles which have resulted from bad habits, or from sensual indulgences, though long repented of; the legacies left by the sins of youth, or by fierce diseases in the partially recovered frame; family traits, defective bodily organization—these and kindred circumstances must inevitably modify mental action and spiritual life. The converting grace of God does not cure dyspepsia, rectify a wry neck, straiten a broken back, or change the mental constitution. A very striking case known to the writer is that of a gentleman, whose piety none can for a moment doubt, but whose whole experience is affected by a peculiar sensitiveness, which is often expressed in unbidden torrents of irrepressible tears, especially in view of the soul-moving truth of Redemption; and which almost entirely prevents his active participation in the social worship of the sanctuary. He traces this tendency directly to the period before his birth, when his mother was similarly affected; thus illustrating the remark quoted from Coleridge by our author, and fortified by sadly stirring facts, "that the history of a man for the months that precede his birth, would probably be far more interesting, and contain events of greater moment than all that follow it." Surely such a man is not to be treated in the same way as one whose temperament is of an opposite or a more equable nature. Again, take the case of the paralytic. Even though the mind may be at first unaffected, it suffers with the shattered body. But soon the spiritual man, too, has a withered hand and a stammering tongue, and a dragging foot. Darkness comes over the bright sky and the divine life of the once gigantic preacher fluctuates with every change of bodily sensibility or want of feeling, until the sad end comes. Thus the soul is like the victim of shipwreck, reeling in a broken vessel, until at last with one fatal plunge she carries all down into the deep sea. Cases like these are not rare, and their fearfulness compels attention; but they are only extreme types of innumerable others, where more subtle diseases often elude the keenest detection, until at the last, some almost volcanic upheaval star-

tles us with its dread solution of the real causes, just as death reveals the secret disease which, for months, mysteriously preyed upon the noble frame, which housed a still more noble soul. How keenly do we then feel the mistakes we may have made in treatment, or the rebukes which offended charity rolls in upon our too censorious judgments; and we sit, like a physician, at the bedside of the dying patient, to whose real malady his eyes were shut, until the last agony proclaimed his fatal want of care and skill, when they might have been of use.

These thoughts are well developed in the second chapter, which treats at large of the uses of knowledge on this subject. We commend this portion of the book especially to those who have not thoroughly examined the matter, convinced as we are that they will find it profitable for doctrine, for charity, for reproof, for correction, and for consolation. Under the head of "Reproof and Correction," we find an important discussion of the supposed relations of insanity to religion. By a careful induction from well attested facts, and by the cumulative evidence of competent witnesses, the author completely explodes the popular error which charges upon religion the blame of certain mental disorders and epidemical delusions. These are its parasites, but never its products. We give a few quotations:

"This one thing I must testify," (Dr. Archibald Alexander says,) "that I never knew the most pungent convictions of sin to terminate in insanity, and as to the affections of love to God and the lively hope of everlasting life producing insanity, it is too absurd for any one to believe it." Fanaticism, excitement, and overwrought enthusiasm lead out legions of physical, mental, and spiritual evils. A very large proportion of the insane in France, previous to the Revolution, were Romish monks. Moral and religious epidemics are governed by laws of human nature, which faithful philosophical analysis shows to run in parallel lines with those fearful scourges which periodically sweep with the power of death over the bodies of men. Whatever may be their procuring cause, it is not Christianity. The most reliable medical authorities concur with the statement of Dr. Burrowes in his standard work on insanity, "that there is not a tittle of evidence to substantiate that Christianity

abstractedly, ever made a person insane. Such an accusation is only one of the abortions of infidelity, or of those who lack knowledge." P. 117.

"In Dr. Cheyne's interesting work on partial derangement of mind in supposed connection with religion, he says: "I never saw a case of mental derangement, even where it was traceable to a moral cause, in which there was not reason to believe that bodily disease could have been detected before the earliest aberration, had an opportunity of examination been been offered. Not only does every deranged state of the intellectual faculties and the natural affections depend upon bodily disease, but derangements of the religious and moral sentiments also."

The author confirms his views by stating at length the theory of Dr. James Johnson, justly called "the ablest and most effective writer of the age, on every subject to which his attention was directed." That theory is to this effect, that mind is merely an invisible agent, manifesting itself solely through the bodily organs; that when these are deranged, the mental manifestations must also be deranged, but the mind itself being immaterial is not liable to disease or death; that even insanity is not a disease of the mind but of the brain, which imparts its morbid action to the mind, and this because if the mind itself can be diseased, it may just as easily die. But as the mind is immortal, it "remains unchanged, unassailable, imperishable," and we can speak of its being diseased "only by a figure of rhetoric." Insanity is, therefore, really a corporeal malady, which affects mental action, and to this source, not to religion, are we to trace the origin of so-called religious melancholy or mania.

The best medical authorities, and the statistics of insanity prove the assertion, "that the hallucinations of those persons whose mental disorder is imputed to religion, 'are the result of pre existing disease, and only take their form from the accidental habits and feelings of the patients.' This has been so fully demonstrated that scarcely any modern writer of eminence advocates the opposite opinion." Pp. 114. 119.

Our space allows only one more quotation from this interesting section, in which the memorable case of the amiable Cow-

per is used to vindicate our faith against the malicious assumption of certain writers that Calvinism was the procuring cause of his fearful malady.

"Thus, a writer in the Encyclopedia Britannica at that time, with great confidence ascribed his mental malady to the theory of justification which he had adopted, his natural disposition fitting him to receive all the horrors, without the consolations of his faith. Macaulay also favours the same opinion, by pronouncing the religious teachers of the poet 'worthy of incineration.' Nor is there anything, we are constrained to say, in the over cautious, imperfect, and disingenuous, however interesting Memoirs by Haley, that forbids this inference. And yet, it could not but have been known by the author, or rather compiler of that work, that the period of his life, during which he enjoyed, together with the unclouded sunshine of reason, the peace and joy of religion, was the interval from 1764 to 1773, when he believed and openly professed every article of his faith, the effect of which was represented as afterwards being so calamitous. It was then that his character was exhibited in all its attractiveness, unveiled by any of the mists that had come over it before, and which gathered again toward the close of his life. He was more cheerful and affectionate in his intercourse, partaking with lively interest in the common concerns of society, and happy in the enjoyment of his religion; and when he became subsequently the victim of his afflictive hallucination, he could not avoid acknowledging that his gloomy persuasion was at variance with every article of his creed, and he was driven to regard himself as an inexplicable exception to his own principles. We have shown already that religious truth of any kind had nothing to do as a procuring cause of Cowper's malady. It was as clearly a case of hypochondriasis as are those instances in which the patient has fancied himself a tea-pot or a sack of wool; or as was that of the baker of Ferrara, mentioned by an Italian Count, who thought himself a lump of butter, and durst not sit in the sun, nor come near the fire, for fear of being melted, and his thinking substance destroyed."

The consolatory part of this chapter is richly suggestive. Principles, cases, experiences, scriptures, are interwoven with

rare skill. One paragraph is devoted to a subject which certainly claims more attention than it has received, viz. the great lack of sound judgment and of competent knowledge of mental disorders and morbid spiritual experiences in the writers of Christian biography. It seems to be taken for granted by many, that a memoir must be a mirror of a man's inmost thoughts, feelings, passions, motives, and deeds, as complete as the Confessions of Augustine or of Rousseau. The consequence is that our biographical collections are, to a great degree, like museums of morbid anatomy, in which malformations, cancers, tumours, deformities of all kinds, diseases in their most hideous shapes, are carefully preserved, and the healthy system has scarcely a representative. We would by no means have biographies that ignore the peculiar defects of their subjects. Christianity leaves it to profane novelists to pourtray their monsters of perfection. But the grace of God does not require its heralds to unbare to a gossipping curiosity all the wretchedness which it has covered with its mantle. To understand the system of sewerage in a great city, we need not explore its foul labyrinths upon our hands and knees. We cannot think that the author has overstated the true doctrine on this point. "Indeed, we are by no means convinced that there is not virtually a breach of trust in exposing the records of Christian experience, perhaps meant to be secret, to the inspection of the public. Such relations, moreover, while they have not benefitted the pious, have been subjects of merriment to the profane." The remark is justly added, that even the memoir of Payson would have been more valuable by the omission of some portions which many regard as indications rather of the state of his health than of the condition of his soul; and that the journal kept by Cowper, during the whole period of his melancholy, was published despite the earnest expostulations of friends, who regarded it "as a heartless violation of the secrets of the sepulchre—a throwing open of the closet of the anatomist, and a yielding to the pryings of a prurient curiosity under a pretence of correcting certain false notions of religion."

Perhaps this part of the work may be adduced as a most successful reply to the objection which we noticed above, of its begetting materialistic views. No candid reader can enter-

tain such an opinion who will remember that the author has strictly confined himself to the limits of his subject. Practical works abound, and are filled with an almost endless diversity of spiritual advices; but they generally ignore the physical influences to which this volume is devoted. Excellent in their place, they seem to have been written more for people "out of the body" than "in the body." A wise regard to facts would never permit us to forget that religion is for the whole man—body, intellect, heart, will, conscience—for man as he is in this world, compassed about with the earthy and the spiritual—creature of circumstances, victim of the whole tempting world, whose ungodliness is "earthly, sensual, devilish," and whose godliness is "profitable for all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." The glory of the Bible is, that it treats man just as he is. But the tendency of some of our best practical works has been to etherialize religious experience to such a degree, that one is tempted to feel that our guides forget, at times, that we are not angels or glorified spirits, and that we are only sinners housed in flesh and blood, and tempted in all points by a cunning devil, who knows how to use "the flesh against the spirit," and to haunt our earthly house with demoniac spite. While physical education, so long neglected, is imperiously pressing its way into our families and educational institutions; while the natural, social, and political sciences, so long wrested by unbelief to its godless purposes, are compelling the studies and strengthening the armories of the defenders of the faith; while even the great questions of peace and war are linked with the majestic religious movements of the world; and while thus all departments of the Creator's dominions unite their testimonies to his wisdom, goodness, and love, is it too much to ask that our practical religion shall be taught rightly to regard the true relationships of the outward and the inner man, and to obey the physical as well as the spiritual laws of our being? Because some "fool, who hath said in his heart, No God," declares "that his brain secretes thought, as his liver secretes bile; that believing and disbelieving are acts of the soul, as is tasting of the body, and one is as destitute of any moral character as the other, and therefore that it is as absurd to

suppose a man blamable for being an atheist, as for being afflicted with an attack of the gout"—and because some thoughtless or hyper-cautious person thinks it a heresy to send a certain troubled soul to a good physician to be treated for "black bile" or dyspepsia, instead of putting him down to the study of Edwards on the Affections, can these reasons justify the positive disregard of the manifest laws of health and disease, and the reciprocal action of body and mind? It is our firm belief that a better physical education, in multitudes of cases, is quite as necessary to a healthy religion as to a robust literature. On the other hand, there are instances not a few in which the body suffers because the soul is in trouble; and here the remedy must be just the opposite of the former. The patient needs not narcotics, nor astringents, nor alteratives—but pardon, peace, and "comfort in the Holy Ghost." In both cases it may be difficult to convince the sufferers that the proposed remedy is the right one. But in neither should the mere fear of the charge of naturalizing our faith deter us from a careful examination of the true state of things, and from corresponding action. We should as soon think that Natural Theology is at variance with its revealed sister, or that the millennium will be the reign of materialism, because "in that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses HOLINESS UNTO THE LORD."

Yet, let us not be misunderstood. Our religion cannot be too spiritual; but to be truly so, it must adapt itself to humanity in all its varieties of constitution and circumstance. Hence the need of great discrimination in the application of the principles of this subject, which, like sharp tools, or poisonous medicines in unskilful hands, may do more harm than good. That our author has guarded himself with great care, may be seen from the ensuing remarks, selected from a whole section on the same topic.

"As may be well presumed, this doctrine of physical influences is easily capable of being perverted. Some may mistake the buoyancy of animal spirits for the influence of the Comforter, and others may ascribe the *motions of sins which are by the law*, to the power of bodily disease. But it is not intended by this admission of the effect of physical causes upon

the soul, to offer an apology for sin, to furnish a convenient excuse for indolence, sullenness, a cynical temper, or any other culpable dispositions to which a man may be constitutionally prone. All these may be natural, but very criminal nevertheless. The difference is wide between a neglect of prayer and watchfulness occasioned by great fatigue in the performance of other duties, as in the case of the disciples in the garden, and an omission caused by giving way to an inbred laziness. As a question in morals, the point is material whether a man's hastiness of spirit be a symptom of hepatic disease, or the habitual prompting of a depraved and neglected heart. We are not accountable to God for the difference in our complexion, or in the length of our limbs, but he justly makes us responsible for the envy and jealousy and malice of our dispositions. Nor is it enough to refer such perplexing cases to the tribunal of conscience, in view of the well-known influence of various moral, as well as physical causes, in misguiding its decision." Pp. 131, 132.

The chapter entitled "TEMPTATION," opens an interesting and important part of Christian casuistry, in which is shown how much of mental distress, how many fears, self-reproaches, and dejections, and how much of despair, which is ascribed by the pious to Satan, or to an unsanctified heart, are often the direct results of bodily disease, or of imagination as affected by a bad physical condition. Among the common temptations of the morbid, is that fearful one of having committed "the sin against the Holy Ghost." This leads to extended remarks on the nature of this sin. The opinions of Austin of the fourth century, of the Mediæval Schoolmen, of Calvin, Arminius, Chalmers, and others, are quoted, together with striking cases, which illustrate the position quoted from Kemper, "that in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred it is a symptom of bodily disease, 'of which state Satan takes advantage to annoy and distress them. This appears,' he adds, 'for two reasons—first, that so many recover, become comfortable, and cease to charge themselves with the commission of that most frightful of all sins; the second is, that others know their characters to be better than they say they are, and from the unreasonable

charges which they bring against themselves, which others, in their sober senses, can see were impossible.'"

Another temptation, familiar to many pastors, is that of adopting false standards of duty and tests of the new life, such as the sudden occurrence of texts of Scripture of cheering or alarming import, and dreams or visions. Under the former impression, a story is told of a certain Mr. Lackington, who, in a moment of religious excitement and of Satanic delusion, opened his Bible at the passage, "He shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their hand they shall bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone." Without a moment's hesitation, he ran up two pair of stairs to his own room, and leaped out of his window to the ground. Subsequent experience of pains and bruises taught him a lesson on the interpretation of Scripture that he never forgot.

The influence of dreams and visions upon religious life is illustrated by physiological facts, showing that these "visions of the night" are most frequently traceable to the physical condition, and "the multitude of business." A dyspeptic, a glutton, or a drunkard, will be far more likely to dream of hell than of heaven. Baron Trenck said that when almost famishing in a dungeon, he dreamed every night of the groaning tables of Berlin. Lieutenant Swain, in the story of his terrible expedition across the Isthmus, relates that when subsisting upon scanty roots, or bitter nuts, or a foul buzzard, and when for days together deprived of all food, his sleep was sometimes charmed by visions of the richest banquets. Coleridge states that after reading Khan Kubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that situation composed an entire poem of not less than two hundred lines, some of which he afterwards committed to writing. President Edwards used to observe his dreams, to find out what were his ruling tendencies; "so firmly did he believe that they were shaped by the events, thoughts, and feelings of the day." The author also mentions the case of an old lady, not remarkable for piety, whose only ground of hope in God was a dream. Other instances are stated, showing that while implicit or general credence is not to be given to these modes of spiritual influence, yet it is not denied that many things occur in religious experience which are inexplicable on

natural principles. We are nowhere told that God has debarred himself the privilege or power of making supernatural communications to human souls for the purposes of his good providence and grace. William Tennent's memorable trance is a case in point. The writer of this article once enjoyed the fellowship and help of a devotedly pious elder, a man of calm, earnest spirit, whose only account of his conversion was in substance as follows: One day, while engaged entirely alone at his work in an open field, he heard a voice crying out to him, "Prepare to meet thy God!" At that time he was an utterly irreligious and profane man, skeptical in his views, and full of enmity to the cross of Christ. Alarmed, he looked around him, but finding no person near, he resumed his labour, when suddenly the same voice again arrested him. Persuaded that some one must be trying to frighten him, or at least to play upon his credulity, again he sought but could not find the supposed human caller. A third time the dreadful sound rang in his ears, "Prepare to meet thy God!" The cold sweat burst from every pore, and staggering homewards through utter weakness, he entered his house; and soon after retired almost unconsciously to his chamber, where he fell upon his knees to pray. In that posture he fell asleep, and dreamed that he was just poised upon the brink of a fearful precipice, and about falling, when a strong hand grasped him, and above him shone a face of such unearthly beauty that he thought it could only have been that of Christ. He awoke exhausted, a convicted sinner, and remained in deepest wretchedness of soul until a short time afterwards—a few days, as we remember—when he found peace in believing in that glorious Jesus whom he has long served as an humble and useful Christian. Perhaps he could not have been reached by any of the ordinary means of grace. In this instance the dream was but an arresting process, followed by those undoubted exercises which characterize the new birth. The case is worthy of record, both for its unusual circumstances, its conformity to the great laws of the kingdom of God, and for its happy results. But while occasionally such instances of the supernatural occur, as if on purpose to remind us of the infinite methods by which God can change enemies into friends, our grand resource is in the ordi-

nary modes of gracious interposition. Many a supposed divinely-given dream has little better origin than that which our author happily quotes from Shakspeare's description of "Queen Mab," sallying forth by night in her hazle-nut chariot on her dream-inspiring missions:

> "When in this state, she gallops night by night
> Through lovers' brains, and then they dream of love;
> On courtiers' knees, that dream on court'sies straight;
> O'er lawyers' fingers, who straight dream on fees:
> O'er ladies' lips, who straight on kisses dream:
> Sometimes she gallops o'er a courtier's nose,
> And then dreams he of smelling out a suit;
> And sometimes comes she with a tithe-pig's tail,
> Tickling a parson's nose as 'a lies asleep,
> Then dreams he of another benefice:
> Sometimes she driveth o'er a soldier's neck,
> And then he dreams of cutting foreign throats,
> Of breaches, ambuscadoes, Spanish blades,
> Of healths five fathoms deep; and then anon
> Drums in his ear; at which he starts, and wakes;
> And, being thus frighted, swears a prayer or two,
> And sleeps again."

The remainder of this chapter treats with discrimination those temptations which arise from a disposition to make too much of religious frames of feeling; the habit of melancholy introspection; the tendency to "make an idol of comfort," and those fierce Satanic temptations to despair which form the climax of a morbid spiritual state, and which in most cases are traceable to some lurking or open forms of bodily disease.

Passing over these valuable topics, we come to the last chapter, (not the least useful part of the work,) containing "Counsels to the Troubled and Desponding." These are arranged under eight heads, some of which are copiously treated, and all are abundantly attested by facts. A simple enumeration of the chief topics will best show the importance of these counsels. For instance, the desponding should ascertain, if possible, the cause of their spiritual disquietude. They should seek judicious medical advice whenever there is probable evidence of a physical cause. They should seek suitable society; should be temperate, "keeping the body under;" should be habitually occupied; should watch and promote bodily health.

The author has evidently bestowed great care upon this latter point, which it appears was suggested and urged upon his attention by the late Rev. Dr. J. W. Alexander, whose experience was greatly affected by "the precarious state of his own health;" and "whose sympathy, tenderness, and heart-reaching power, in discourses, conversation, and intercourse," were largely increased by the stern discipline of bodily infirmities and of "some of the most poignant and overwhelming distresses that can oppress the human soul."

The writer makes many suggestions which evince much familiarity with the subject of dietetic economy—embracing food and drink, rest, the injurious effects of narcotics, exercise in the pure open air. On the subject of narcotics, he has presented an argument against the use of tobacco, which we can hardly hope will be very acceptable to the clerical or lay devotees of that stygian test of orthodoxy, but which, nevertheless, contains a series of facts whose cumulative argument cannot be set aside, however it may be overridden. We quote two or three impressive testimonies.

One of the most celebrated of the living professors of medicine, "Dr. Dunglison (of Philadelphia) told the writer, that of the many cases of functional affections of the heart that he had seen, particularly among young men, a large proportion appeared to be owing to an immoderate use of tobacco." P. 240.

Again—"Contemplate its havoc of life. According to the estimate of discerning physicians, not less than twenty thousand die in the United States every year from the use of tobacco. In Germany, where this pernicious habit is far more common, it is said that of all the deaths between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, one-half originate in the waste of constitution by smoking. But in unnumbered cases where it does not destroy life, it exhausts and deranges the nervous powers, and produces some of the most distressing and unmanageable ailments. M. Bouisson, a French writer, has lately published some startling facts upon the danger of smoking. He states that cancer in the mouth has grown so frequent from the use of tobacco, that it now forms one of the most dreaded diseases in the hospitals. From 1845 to 1859 he has himself performed sixty-eight operations for cancers in the lips in the Hospital

St. Eloi. The use of tobacco rarely produces lip cancer in youth. Almost all Bouisson's patients had passed the age of forty. The disease is also more frequent with individuals of the humbler class, who smoke short pipes, and tobacco of inferior quality, while with the orientals, who are careful to preserve the coolness of the mouth-piece by the transmission of the smoke through water, it is unknown; showing that it is generated more by the constant application of heat to the lips, than by the inhaling of nicotine. It is a common cause of disease in the stomach, and especially those forms that go under the name of dyspepsia, with all their kindred train of evils. It also exerts a disastrous influence upon the mind, and frequently produces an enfeebling of the memory, a confusion of ideas, irritability of temper, want of energy, an unsteadiness of purpose, melancholy, and sometimes insanity. These are the ultimate effects of the use of tobacco; and though one may not perceive them in his own case, we are assured that the tendency of the drug is always toward disease." Pp. 244, 245.

Verily, if King James were living yet, we should have a new counterblast against the weed that produces results like these. Prejudice apart, this section commends itself to the calm consideration of those who resort to it or other drugs, opiates, or beverages, for solace and stimulus, or from mere habits which have grown into tyranny over their entire moral, intellectual, and physical system. The despondent will find in their reaction a deeper gloom, the unhealthy their need of new remedies and antidotes, and the healthy—might remember the old proverb—"Let well enough alone."

The extract from Dr. N. L. Rice, on "Ministerial Depression," with the concurrent excerpts from Dr. Archibald Alexander, occupies a well-deserved place in this chapter. Every minister may here find timely suggestions from wise counsellors.

The concluding counsel directs the desponding to "LOOK TO CHRIST." A simple, child-like faith in Him is the great remedy, and sometimes the only one, that can take away the sadness of heart which the book discusses. We have not space to quote from this admirable portion of the book. It is rich with the records of varied Christian experiences like that of the Rev. Timothy Rogers, whose work on Melancholy is fre-

quently referred to, and whose good counsels to the despondings were the teachings of his own protracted sorrows, and subsequent deliverance, as recorded in his interesting narrative. Like a good shepherd, the author leads his troubled readers gently, directly, lovingly to "the Chief Shepherd and Bishop of their souls," and beside His cross he points them upward to the "*rest* that remaineth for the people of God."

We have thus endeavoured to give our readers an idea of the only work in our language which traverses this delicate ground. It is due to the respected author to say that he has so thoroughly accomplished his purpose as to leave us little more to do than present an outline, and quotations from his careful pages. That his work will be a standard with those who can appreciate its value, we have no doubt, and we shall be amply repaid, if the readers of this article may thereby be led to profit by a volume which has given us clearer views of pastoral duty, and has brought us into closer sympathy with the afflicted, and with Him who "knoweth our frame, who remembereth that we are dust," and who was "tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin."

Charles Hodge

ART. V.—*The First and Second Adam. The Elohim revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1860. Pp. 688.

THE opinion which we expressed of this work in our last number was founded, as there stated, on a very casual inspection. That opinion has been somewhat modified by a more extended examination. Although we still think that it is an able, laborious, and valuable work, its faults are greater than we then apprehended. There is throughout an overweening and unfounded confidence, a great display of half-knowledge, a lack of discrimination and power of analysis, and the advocacy of principles more entirely subversive of the system of doctrine

taught in our standards, than we were at first aware of. The writer seems, of set purpose, rather than from any logical relation of the subjects, to have introduced every specially mysterious and difficult doctrine in the whole range of theology. The Trinity, the inscrutable relations of the several persons of the Godhead, the councils of eternity, the relation of God's efficiency with second causes, the nature of sin, the origin of evil, the origin of the soul, the propagation of sin, the freedom of the will, God's agency in human actions, the person of Christ, the mystical union, are all discussed and searched out to their utmost limits. Here, therefore, if anywhere, diffidence, caution, and discrimination are preëminently needed. But these are the attributes in which Dr. Baird's book is specially deficient. He speaks as though "the deep things of God" had been all revealed to him. Nothing is obscure and nothing doubtful. He marches through rivulet and river, puddle and ocean, with equal ease, finding bottom everywhere. He is equally confident on all subjects. Everything is "incontestable," and everything is represented as all but essential. To deny that universals are objective realities, or that souls are propagated, or that the substance of our souls is numerically the same as that which sinned in Adam, is to deny original sin altogether, or to endanger the whole system of scriptural doctrine. That man's nature was designed to reveal the relations of the persons of the Trinity, that Adam's "generative nature" was an important element in his likeness to God, is declared to be incontestable; and that he breathed is "demonstrated" to be a designed outshadowing of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other persons of the Godhead. Arguments which have not the weight of a feather are declared to be irresistible, and objections to which every other mind succumbs are pronounced futile. The language of Edwards "in the very statement of his doctrine," is said to be "a contradiction in terms," because he speaks of "a privative cause," whereas "a cause is a force of some kind, by the positive action of which the contemplated effect is produced." If Dr. Baird were sinking in the water, and a spectator should refuse to stretch out a hand to save him, he might learn that there are other kinds of causes than positive forces. The tendency of Edwards's philosophy is said to

be to Pelagianism and also to Pantheism; that is, it has diametrically opposite and incompatible tendencies. A doctrine of divine efficiency held by every Augustinian theologian, Romish, Lutheran, and Reformed, until within a recent period, is constantly spoken of as "Edwards's doctrine." With the same propriety he might speak of Edwards's doctrine of immutability, or of the deity of Christ. The doctrine of simultaneous and predetermining concurrences is no peculiar doctrine of Edwards. He says the venerable President makes motives "as external forces" the efficient causes of volition. The distinction "which Edwards draws between the freedom of the soul and the freedom of the will," is declared to be "altogether inconclusive and impertinent." We could fill half our number with quotations exhibiting the same want of discrimination, and the same absence of modesty. Such overweening confidence is not to be referred exclusively to the will; it arises in no small measure from the character of the intellect. The less clear-sighted a man is, the less can he see differences. A man may have very considerable ability in dealing with things in the concrete, in investigating and arranging facts; he may be an effective writer; he may be able to construct a luminous argument founded on such facts, and yet be a very indifferent metaphysician. And a book may have very great merits as a record and classification of facts and opinions, and yet be sadly disfigured by serious blemishes arising from the mistaken assumption on the part of the author that he has a special gift for philosophical discrimination and analysis. We should be very sorry to speak as we have done of the faults of the work before us, if we did not conscientiously believe that it is likely to do the cause of truth serious harm, should its readers allow themselves to be deceived by the tone of confidence and mastery with which its erroneous principles are announced, and the doctrines of the Reformed Church are misrepresented. It is no want of respect for Cicero to think he was a bad poet; and it is no disrespect for Dr. Baird to think or to say that his forte does not lie in metaphysics. His book goes over so much ground, so many important subjects are brought to view, the opinions of so many theologians of different schools are adduced, that the volume will prove eminently suggestive, and will take a high

rank in the theological literature of our country, although the writer may be regarded as neither sound nor discriminating.

The Lutheran and Reformed churches, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and to Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man; the covenant with Adam; the nature of the union between him and his posterity; the effect of his sin on his descendants; and they consequently are of one mind as to imputation, depravity, and inability; and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. Not only in the symbols of these churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned. They all acknowledge that our union with Adam and our union with Christ, the relation of the sin of the one and of the righteousness of the other to our condemnation on the one hand and our justification on the other, the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam, and of a holy nature from Christ, are included in the analogy between the first and second Adam, as that analogy is presented in the Bible. It would, however, have been little short of a miracle had a whole system of theology been evolved perfectly from the beginning, had there been no confusion or inconsistency, no undue prominence given to one principle over others no less true. This would be contrary to all the ordinary methods of God's dealings with the church. The truth is usually elicited by conflict; agreement is the result of comparison and adjustment of divergencies. We accordingly find in the history of Protestant theology much more of inconsistency and confusion during the sixteenth than during the seventeenth century. It was not until after one principle had been allowed to modify another, that the scheme of doctrine came to adjust itself into the consistent and moderate form in which it is presented in the writings of Turrettin and Gerhard. Nothing human, however, is either perfect or permanent. While the Protestant theology retains its power over the minds of the vast body of the purer churches of the Reformation, there has been not only open defection from it as

a whole, but also the revival of the one-sided views which, in many instances, were presented during its forming period. These views have been either advocated singly, or wrought up into entirely new philosophical systems.

All Protestants at the Reformation, and afterwards, agreed in teaching, 1. That Adam was the natural head or progenitor of the whole human race. He was admitted to be the father of all men. 2. That he was the covenant head or representative of all mankind. 3. That all men are born in a state of condemnation, destitute of original righteousness, and morally corrupt; needing redemption by the blood of Christ, and sanctification by his Spirit from the commencement of their existence. 4. That this ruin of our race, or the fact that men are born in this estate of sin and misery, is due to their connection with Adam. All men were in such a sense, in him, that they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. All these points are affirmed in the symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed churches; and no one of them is denied in the writings of any standard theologian of the period of the Reformation. There is, however, no little diversity as to the relative importance ascribed to these several points. In accounting for the fact that the sin of Adam involved the race in ruin, the principal stress was sometimes laid on the covenant relation between him and his posterity; at others, on the natural relation. The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others to the corruption of nature derived from him. What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz. that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity. It was

this that determined the theology of the Lutheran and Reformed churches as to all this class of doctrines. Those churches, therefore, came to teach with extraordinary unanimity, 1. That Adam, as the common father of all men, was by divine appointment constituted not only the natural, but the federal head or representative of his posterity. The race stood its probation in him. His sin was the sin of the race, because the sin of its divinely and righteously constituted representative. We therefore sinned in Adam in the same sense that we died in Christ. 2. The penalty of death threatened against Adam in the event of his transgression was not merely the dissolution of the body, but spiritual death, the loss of the divine favour and of original righteousness; and the consequent corruption of his whole nature. 3. This penalty came upon his race. His sin was the judicial ground on which the favour and fellowship of God were withdrawn or withheld from the apostate family of man. 4. Since the fall, therefore, men are by nature, or as they are born, the children of wrath. They are not only under condemnation, but destitute of original righteousness, and corrupted in their whole nature. According to this view of the subject, the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such sense that it would not have been imputed had he not been constituted their representative. It is imputed to them not because it was antecedently to that imputation, and irrespective of the covenant on which the imputation is founded, already theirs; but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him. Moreover, the corruption of nature derived from Adam is not, as Dr. Baird, with strange confusion of thought persists in regarding it, a physiological fact, but a fact in the moral government of God. Our author treats it as a question of physics, belonging to the general category of propagation, to be accounted for on the ground of what he calls "the mysteries of generation;" ignoring the distinction between physical laws and the principles of God's dealings with rational creatures.

In strict analogy with the relation, as above stated, between Adam and his posterity, the Lutheran and Reformed theology teaches, 1. That Christ, in the covenant of redemption, is con-

stituted the head and representative of his people; and that, in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf. They died in him. They rose in him; not literally, so that his acts were their acts, but representatively. 2. That the reward promised to Christ in the covenant of redemption, was the justification, sanctification, and eternal salvation of his people. 3. That the judicial ground, therefore, of the justification of the believer is not their own personal righteousness, nor the holy nature which they derive from Christ, but his obedience and sufferings, performed and endured in their name, and which became theirs in virtue of the covenant and by the gracious imputation of God. 4. That the believer is not only justified by the righteousness of Christ, but sanctified by his Spirit. These two things are not to be confounded, because they differ not only in their nature, but in their source. Justification is a forensic or judicial act, by which the sinner is pronounced just on the ground of a righteousness which is not subjectively his, and which therefore does not constitute his character. Sanctification is an efficient or executive work, in which God by the power of his Spirit renovates the corrupted nature of man, and restores him to his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant church, and as exhibited by the apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of our race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation.

It has already been remarked, that in the early writings of the period of the Reformation, the imputation of Adam's sin and

the corruption of nature as derived from him, are often confounded, and, without intending to deny the former, more stress is in many cases laid upon the latter. This is the more easily accounted for, inasmuch as just the opposite tendency was at that time prevalent in the church of Rome. Many of the Popish theologians made the sin of Adam the only ground of the condemnation of his race, and seemed inclined to hold, (although contrary to the decisions of their own church,) that inherent corruption was not properly of the nature of sin, or in itself a ground of condemnation. Calvin, therefore, was accustomed to say, that men are condemned not *per solam imputationem*, not on account of the imputation of Adam's sin alone, but also on account of their own inherent corruption. This was not a denial of imputation, but the assertion of another and equally important ground of the condemnation of the race. By *death* was understood eternal death, and the Reformers were anxious to show that they did not teach that those personally innocent and pure were condemned to eternal perdition. They therefore made original sin, in its wide sense, to include two sins; original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*. The latter they regarded as the penal consequence of the former. On the ground of the personal sin of Adam, as the representative of the race, God withdrew from men his favour and Spirit; they thereby lost his image, and became inwardly depraved. This depravity being truly and properly of the nature of sin, subjects those infected with it to the penalty of sin. God in his infinite mercy, through the merits of Christ, saves from that penalty all who die in infancy, that is, all who have no other sins to answer for than sin imputed and sin inherent. This we may, and do believe, without denying the fact that we fell in Adam, and without questioning the righteousness of that divine constitution.

These two things, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent corruption, thus often confounded or combined in the writings of the Reformers, came afterwards to be so separated that the former was entirely denied or left out of view. Placæus, in the French church, taught that the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, was the only ground of the condemnation of men, apart from their own personal transgressions. This theory

received the name of *Mediate Imputation*—not because it involved the idea, properly speaking, of the imputation of Adam's sin, but simply because Placæus was content to use the words, provided they were understood in accordance with his theory. Men are first depraved, and because of this inherent depravity, it may be said the sin of Adam is imputed to them, inasmuch as it is derived from him. *Hoc posito*, inquit Placæus, *distinguenda est Imputatio in immediatam seu antecedentem, et mediatam seu consequentem. Illa fit immediatè, hoc est, non-mediante corruptione; haec mediatè, hoc est, mediante corruptione: illa ordine naturæ corruptionem antecedit, haec sequitur: illa corruptionis causa censetur esse, haec effectum: illam D. Placæus rejicit, hanc admittit.* This was said in answer to the decision of the National Synod of France, condemning his denial of the imputation of Adam's sin. The meaning of Placæus was not that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but that on account of the inherent corruption derived from him, we are regarded as being as deserving of death as he was. Imputation, therefore, is not the judicial ground of corruption, but corruption is the ground of imputation of guilt. 1. The obvious objections to this theory are, that it denies any probation to the race. They come into the world under the burden of spiritual death, infected with a deadly spiritual malady, by a sovereign or arbitrary infliction. To put a man to death in consequence of a righteous judicial sentence, is one thing; to put him to death without any offence or sentence, is another thing. According to Placæus, men being born in sin, and having no probation in Adam, are condemned without trial or offence. 2. It refers the propagation of sin to a mere physical law. Like begets like. All lions inherit the nature of the first lion; and so all men inherit the corrupt nature of fallen Adam. God deals with moral and immortal beings as he does with brutes. There is no distinction admitted between physical laws and the principles on which a holy God deals with responsible creatures. 3. The principle on which this doctrine is founded subverts the whole evangelical system. That principle is, that it is not only inconsistent with the justice of God, but irreconcilable with his very nature as an omniscient and truthful being, that his judgments of rational creatures should be founded on anything else

than their inward, subjective character. He cannot regard and treat those personally innocent as guilty. Then by parity of reason, he cannot regard the personally unrighteous as righteous, he cannot justify the ungodly. Then what is to become of us sinners? The objections against the imputation of sin bear with all their force against the imputation of righteousness. Those, therefore, who reject the one, have, as a general and necessary consequence, rejected the other. This is a fact familiar to every one acquainted with the history of theology in our own, and other countries. 4. A fourth objection to his doctrine is, it destroys the analogy between Adam and Christ, or it necessitates the adoption of the doctrine of subjective justification. We must either deny that the sin of Adam (as *alienum peccatum*) stands in a relation to our condemnation analogous to that in which the righteousness of Christ, as distinguished from our own, stands to our justification; or we must admit the analogy to be, that as we derive a corrupt nature from Adam and are on that account condemned, so we derive a holy nature from Christ, and are on the ground of that nature justified. But this, as every one knows, is to give up the great point in dispute between Romanists and Protestants; it is to renounce Luther's famous doctrine, *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ.* 5. This doctrine is in direct conflict with the declarations of Scripture. The design of the apostle in Romans v. 12—21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life; but it is to illustrate *the mode* or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification. From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offence of one. To deny this, and to

assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another. This doctrine, which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed churches, and even of the church catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placæus belonged. It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, "Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere iis qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀμέσως imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatæ et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæreditariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt."

It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion. It was, therefore, no exaggeration when the theologians of Holland declared the doctrine of mediate imputation to be "contrary to the consent of almost all Christians." Dr. Baird does not adopt that doctrine. He pronounces medi-

ate imputation a figment. He devotes a whole section to prove that his view is not identical with that of Placæus. This was the more necessary, as he adopts all the principles on which that doctrine is founded, and urges all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placæus, or by Pelagians, Socinians, or Remonstrants. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other. It is neither the old intelligible doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin as not our own act, but the act of our divinely constituted head and representative; nor is it the equally intelligible, although, as we think, erroneous and dangerous doctrine, that the thing imputed to us, and the primary and only ground (apart from our personal actual transgressions) of condemnation, is the corrupt nature derived from Adam. This, we say, is intelligible. We know what a man means when he refers everything to the law of propagation, and explains the derivation of a corrupted nature from Adam on the same principle that the asps of to-day get their poison from the asps before the deluge. This is in one sense intelligible; but we defy any man to put any intelligible meaning on what Dr. Baird says. Wherein he differs, or supposes he differs from this doctrine, he deceives himself with words. He does not see that what he says means nothing. He makes distinctions where there is no difference; and supposes himself to be saying something when he is saying nothing. On the justice of this judgment our readers will decide. In our opinion Dr. Baird's theory, when stripped of its words without meaning, is nothing more than the familiar doctrine adopted by the more orthodox of our New England brethren, who repudiate the idea of imputation, and yet maintain the propagation of a morally depraved nature from Adam to his posterity.

The following extracts may suffice to give an adequate idea of his views. "In the angelic hosts each several individual is possessed of a several nature, original in and peculiar to him. The history of the person and of the nature is contemporaneous and the same. But in man it is different. The nature of the entire race was created originally in Adam, and is propagated from him by generation, and so descends to all his seed. Hence arise two distinct forms of responsibility; the nature being

placed under a creative obligation of conformity to the holiness of God's nature, and each several person being, in a similar manner, held under obligation of personal conformity of affections, thoughts, words, and actions, to the holy requirements of God's law. The apostasy of this nature was the immediate efficient cause of the act of disobedience, the plucking of the forbidden fruit. Thus there attached to him the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience. The guilt thus incurred attached not only to Adam's person, but to the nature which, in his person, caused the act of transgression. Thus, as the nature flows to all the posterity of Adam, it comes bearing the burden of that initial crime, and characterized by the depravity which was embraced therein. In both respects the nature is in variance with the law. In both respects it is guilty of sin, (the sin of nature.) In addition to this, Adam's posterity find the depravity thus embraced and indwelling, an unfailing and active cause of other sins. The apostate nature works iniquity. Thus originate the personal sins which fill the world. Such is the ground upon which the apostasy of man's nature from holiness and its embrace of depravity, is called sin, and, as such, charged upon the race of man." P. 256.

According to this statement, the nature of man being a unit, and that one nature being concentrated in Adam, the sin of his nature was the sin of the entire race to which that nature was propagated. We, that is, our nature, sinned in Adam as truly, properly, and strictly, as he himself did. On p. 311, it is said, "We are *not* held accountable for Adam's breach of the covenant, in consequence of the transaction respecting the tree; but because of the inscription of the covenant in Adam's nature, and our in-being in him in whose nature it was inscribed." Again, it is said, "the offence of Adam is ours immediately;" "when Adam sinned, all his seed were in him, and so sinned in him in the same act with him." P. 422. The cause of actual sin is depravity, "the cause of which was the wicked apostasy of our nature from God, in the person of Adam, an apostasy in which we are as truly criminal as Adam was, because the nature by which it was committed is as really in us as in him." P. 502. The doctrine of this book, therefore, is that we sinned in Adam actually and in the proper sense of the

term. His sin is imputed to us because it is "intrinsically" ours. It is ours, not in a forensic and legal sense, but literally, because of the identity of nature between him and us. The ground, therefore, of the imputation is this community of nature, and not the covenant by which he was constituted our head and representative. It would have been ours had no such covenant been established. The only effect of the covenant was to limit the period of man's probation. "To object, therefore, to the positive transaction between God and Adam," says our author, "is to complain that God did not give us a myriad chances of falling instead of one; since the only effect of that transaction was, to secure confirmation and eternal life to man, upon condition of Adam's temporary obedience; instead of the race being held to a perpetual probation in Adam and in themselves. To complain of being held responsible for Adam's sin, is to object to being held to obedience at all; since, in any case, Adam's sin was our sin; the forces which are in us, the nature which we inherit from him, is the very nature which in him rebelled; the same, not in kind merely, but as flowing continuously from him to us." P. 302. "Had Adam, made as he was, been placed in probation without limit as to time, and had he remained upright, whilst one of his posterity became apostate, the crime and corruption thus introduced would have flowed to the family of the apostate precisely as that of Adam does to us his seed." P. 509. This is a great truth, our author intimates, which few have sense enough to see.

Such is the doctrine which is here set forth as the faith of the Reformed churches, and specially as the doctrine of the Westminster Confession. It rests on the following principles: 1. The identity of the race with Adam; or, the assumption that humanity is a generic life, a substance, a nature, a "sum of forces" numerically the same in Adam and all his descendants. 2. That a nature can act impersonally; or, the apostasy and rebellion of human nature is to be distinguished from the personal act of Adam. 3. That souls are propagated. 4. That community, in a propagated nature, involves all those to whom that nature is communicated in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it originated. 5. The real germinating principle from which the whole theory

springs is, that God cannot regard and treat a rational creature otherwise than he is in himself; if he is not subjectively a sinner, he cannot be treated as such, and if he is not subjectively righteous, he cannot be treated as righteous.

The first remark which we think must occur to every intelligent reader in reference to such a system is, that it is simply a physiological theory. It is a peculiar view of anthropology, of the nature of man as an animal, and the laws of his propagation. Had there been no God, or had God nothing to do in the government of the world, or did he take no cognizance of the character and conduct of men, all that this system supposes would be just as it is. When God created the first oak, he gave it a certain nature, and impressed upon it a certain law of propagation. All subsequent oaks are the development of the identical life-principle embodied in the first oak. So when the first lion, tiger, or elephant was created, a generic leonine, feline, or elephantine nature was called into being, and that identical original substance is communicated, with all its peculiar characteristics, from one generation to another. So too when man was created, the same thing happened. There was no covenant with the first lion that all other lions should inherit his nature; and the propagation of Adam's nature to his posterity, with its guilt and pollution, is altogether independent of any covenant—it is simply a physiological fact. A second remark no less obvious is, that we need no divine revelation on which to rest our faith in this fact. Physiologists teach us what is the law of propagation in the animal world; to that world man belongs; he falls under the general category. Human character is transmitted by the same law which regulates the transmission of the nature of other animals. What need then have we for any special divine revelation on the subject? It is very evident that the theory does not rest on the testimony of the Bible. It has a purely inductive basis. A man may hold it and not believe in the Bible; he may reject it, and his faith in the Scriptures be undisturbed. A third remark is, that even as a physiological theory it has no substantial foundation. From the nature of the case, it is merely a hypothesis to account for certain phenomena; it cannot be anything more. The fact is, that like begets like. Genera and species are,

within certain limits, permanent and indestructible. An oak never becomes an apple-tree, a lion never becomes an ox, a man never becomes a monkey, nor a monkey a man. Even distinct varieties of the same species of plants and animals become permanent. There are therefore fixed types in nature, either original or acquired. Men, as men, have a common nature—that is, they have the same anatomical structure, the same φύσις, the same rational and moral faculties, the same social dispositions and constitutional principles. These are permanent and universal, and belong to men as men, and therefore to all mankind. But within the limits of this specific identity we see all the varieties of the Caucasian, Malayan, and African races; the national, and even family peculiarities transmitted from generation to generation. These are admitted facts. How are they to be accounted for? How are we to explain this immense diversity and this permanency in the different forms of life? One hypothesis is, and that the most simple and sublime, the most captivating to the imagination, the most specious to the natural understanding, the oldest and most persistent of all the forms of human thought, underlying the philosophy and religions of ages and nations, viz., that all these diversified forms of life are manifestations of one all-pervading principle—God, in the various forms and states of self-development. This is a hypothesis, which is to the theory which Dr. Baird adopts, what the ocean is to a gutter. Another hypothesis, less ambitious than this pantheistic system, is that this world is a living organism, imbued with one life, of which all that lives are different forms, and man the apex of the pyramid. Another, that humanity is a generic life, a substance having objective reality which reveals itself, or comes to personality in connection with individual material organisms. As light is a subtle fluid diffused through space, and becomes luminous only on certain conditions, so this diffused principle of humanity comes to existence or self-manifestations only in combination with appropriate corporeal forms, which it fashions for itself under specific conditions. Still another is, that each genus or species of plants and animals is something, it is hard to say what—a force, a law, a life, a substance, a something having objective reality, and which

propagates itself, each according to its kind, the individuals being only the extension of the original force, principle, or substance. This is the hypothesis which constitutes Dr. Baird's book, without which it is nothing. This is the foundation on which rests his theology. If this fails, his theology disappears. On page 25 he says, Nominalism, as opposed to Realism, gave a great impulse to Pelagianism. "According to the philosophy," he says, "which prevailed before the rise of that sect, such universal conceptions, as those of genera, species, and nature, have as their ground some kind of objective realities. They are not the mere result of thought, but have in some proper sense, a real existence, and lie as essences at the base of the existence of all individuals and particulars." According to the Platonic doctrine, as we all know, these universals existed from eternity in the divine mind. They are the ideas of which individuals are the manifestations. The universal is alone real; the individual is simply apparent. This was the original form of Realism as taught by Scotus and Anselm. According to another statement of the doctrine, it was held, "Eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse individuis; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas." To the word *homo*, man, there answers, therefore, one substance or essence, which is distinguished in individuals only by accidental diversities. Dr. Baird says that according to one theory, "general conceptions are the mere product of the imaginative faculty—results of logical deduction from the observation of many like individuals. A second theory represents universals as being realities which have actual objective subsistence of their own, distinct from and independent of that of the particulars and individuals. A third holds that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own, separate from the individuals through which they are manifested." "The third," he says, "is the scriptural doctrine, according to which the substances were at the beginning endowed with forces, which are distinctive and abiding; and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order, to the successive generations of the creatures. Of these forces the word *nature* is the expression.

In its proper use it conveys the distinct idea of permanent indwelling force. It expresses the sum of the essential qualities or efficient principles of a given thing, viewed in their relation to its substance, as that in which they reside, and from whence they operate. Such is the sense in which the word is constantly employed in the Scriptures." P. 149. "Thus the human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces, which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not express the fact merely, that we and Adam are alike; but that we are alike, because the forces which are in us, and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and his likeness." P. 150.

According to this view, humanity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propagation communicated to all his descendants, so that the substance, with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is numerically the same as that which was in him, and made him what he was. The principle here involved is asserted to be true in its application to all the genera and species of plants and animals. The lion of to-day is the same numerical substance with the lion first created; the oak of to-day is the same numerically as the original oak in Eden. What is meant by this? We take up an acorn in the forest—in what sense is it identical with the first created oak? Not in the matter of which it is composed, for that is derived from the earth and atmosphere; not in its chemical properties, for they inhere in the matter, or result from its combinations. These properties are doubtless the same in kind with those belonging to the first acorn, but they are not numerically the same. No one assumes the existence of any chemical substance, in which those properties inhere, as transmitted by the laws of propagation. Wherein then does this assumed numerical identity exist? Is it in the principle of life? But can any one tell what that is? Is it a substance? Has human skill ever yet discovered what life is, whether in plant or animal? And must a whole system of theology be founded on a conjecture as to its nature? Is a confidence on this point, which can only spring from ignorance, to be allowed to control the faith of the church?

There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency, but what necessity is there for assuming that principle to be a substance, numerically the same with the first of each kind? If the chemical properties belonging to an acorn, or to the germ of a nascent animal, may be the same in kind, from generation to generation, without assuming the transmission of a chemical substance, why may not the principle of life remain permanent, without any such transmission of substance? The realistic hypothesis of the objective reality of genera and species is not only purely gratuitous, but it overlooks the continued presence and agency of God in nature. The development of a plant, and the growth of an animal body, are not to be referred to blind forces, inherent in matter, nor in any substance, material or immaterial, but to the omnipresent Spirit of God. The intelligence manifested in organic structures is clear evidence of the presence of mind guiding the operation of natural forces. It might as well be assumed that a book was written, and the letters arranged by such forces, with no present mind to control their operation. If a plant or human body can be fashioned by a transmitted substance, then a world can be so constructed. The principle on which the argument from design in favour of the being of God is founded is, that the adaptation of means to an end is evidence of a present, active intelligence. As all organic nature teems with manifestations of such adaptations, it teems in like measure with evidence of the omnipresent, active intelligence of God. We are not about to enter on the mediæval controversy about universals. All we are concerned about is, that the assumption of a generic human nature, as an objective reality, constituting all men numerically one in substance with Adam, is a pure figment, unentitled to any weight or authority in determining Christian doctrine.

The second principle on which our author's theory rests, is that natural acts are to be distinguished from personal acts; or, that a nature may act independently of the person to which that nature belongs. We are not responsible for Adam's personal act, but we are held to have performed the act of his nature, because that nature is numerically the same in him and in us. The rebellion and apostasy of his nature,

which preceded and caused his personal transgression, were our rebellion and apostasy. On this subject, the author says in a passage already quoted, "There attached to him (Adam) the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience." P. 256. "It is certain that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature, and if this must be admitted, there appears no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt." "The nature which was the cause of my person was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows *inevitably*(?) that everything in me, upon which resistance to apostasy might be imagined, was actually there and took part in the rebellion." P. 257. "Throughout the entire argument Paul carefully distinguishes two features which are essentially united in Adam's apostasy. The one is the violation of the positive precept, which he designates as the offence, the disobedience, and the transgression. The other is the violation of the law written in Adam's heart, and so in the nature of the race, and by the offence transgressed in both. Its violation was the embrace of that which the apostle calls sin." P. 419. "There are two classes of actions—which should be carefully distinguished. Of these, one is such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, &c." To this belong, he says, all the sins of our immediate ancestors, for which we are not responsible. "The other consists of such agency, as springing from within constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referrible to this class is that of apostasy, the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but with itself the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it and thus conveyed." P. 509. "The sin was the apostasy of man's nature from God; apostasy by the force of which Adam was impelled into the act of transgression as an inevitable

consequence of the state of heart constituted by the apostasy. Now let it be carefully observed that apostasy is an act, not a habit; and, on the other hand, depravity and corruption is a habitual state, and not an act." P. 497. The obligation of the law, he says, extends "to the *substance* of the soul." "It is to the *very substance* of the soul that the law is addressed; and upon it the penal sanctions of that law are enforced. The soul is that, which, in its substance and powers intrinsically, as much as in their exercises, was created and ordained to be the image and glory of God. Conformity of this substance to this its exalted office is holiness; the reverse is sin." P. 258.

If there is any meaning in all this, we confess ourselves to be too blind to see it. We have no idea what is meant by the law being addressed "to the very substance of the soul," or by saying "conformity of substance to the image of God is holiness, and the reverse, sin." It is as unintelligible to us as speaking of the moral character of a tree, or the correct deportment of a house. It has often happened to us in reading German metaphysics, not to comprehend at all the meaning of the author; but we have always had the conviction that he had a meaning. We do not feel thus on the present occasion. The distinction which the author attempts to draw between *sinful* acts of nature and personal sins is a distinction which means nothing, and on this nothing his whole theory is founded. There are, of course, actions of very different kinds in a creature composed of soul and body; some of these may properly enough be called natural, and others, personal. But this does not apply to moral acts, whether good or evil. The mere natural functions of the body, as the process of respiration, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are acts of nature in the sense of not being acts of personal self-determination. There is also a distinction between outward acts and acts of the soul. And this is what our author seems sometimes to have in his mind, as when he tells us we must distinguish between the act of Adam in plucking and eating the forbidden fruit, and the act of his heart. The former, he tells us, was personal, and peculiar to himself; but the latter was natural, and belongs equally to us. But at the same time he admits there is no moral character in an external act in itself considered, and

this distinction between outward and inward acts is nothing peculiar to Adam's first sin. It is no less true of every sin of word or deed he or any one else ever committed, and every such sin is a personal sin. There can, indeed, from the very idea of sin, be no *actual* sin which is not personal, because that which acts rationally and by self-determination, two elements essential to actual sin, is a person. *Actual* sin can no more be predicated of a nature as distinguished from a person than of a house. There is also, beside the different kinds of actions already mentioned, another equally obvious distinction, viz. between those which, being consentaneous with nature, do not change it, and such as from their peculiar character produce a permanent change in the nature itself. Thus of the physical acts of Adam, his eating and drinking were perfectly normal acts, belonging to his nature as originally constituted, and producing no change in its character. It is conceivable, however, that he might have performed some act which should change his physical constitution. For example, he might have done something which changed his skin from white to black. Such change might have been permanent, and all his descendants been black. Or, he might have so poisoned himself as to have made his body perishable instead of immortal, and his descendants inherited his disease. So, also, as has already been admitted, it is conceivable that as by his apostasy from God, his moral nature became depraved, that corrupt nature, by the general law of propagation, might be transmitted to his posterity. This is the view presented by many Augustinians, before and after the Reformation, and also at times by the Lutheran and Reformed during the forming period of their theology. This also is the doctrine of a large class of our New England and New-school brethren, of Dr. Dwight and of Dr. Richards, and the class whom they represent. This is Mr. Barnes's doctrine, as presented in many of his writings. This, too, is what Dr. Baird has in his mind about one-half the time. But this is very different from the doctrine that *we*, as persons, committed Adam's sin, because our nature committed it. This supposes that actual sin can be committed by persons before they are persons. That *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was

framed. The doctrine of preëxistence, as held by Origen, revived in our day by Dr. Müller and others in Germany, and by Dr. Edward Beecher in this country, is, compared to that proposition, clear sunshine. Apostasy, we are requested carefully to consider, "is an act," it is "a voluntary act," it is an act of "*self*-depravation," and it is affirmed to be our act. That is, we performed a personal act—that is, a voluntary act, an act of self-determination, before that *self* had any existence. There is no definition of a personal act more precise and generally adopted than an "act of voluntary self-determination." Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that act, then we were in him—not by community of nature merely, but personally. For we are said to have done what nature, as nature, cannot do; what of necessity implies personality. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says. Dr. Baird, however, asserts that he did thus act in Adam, and that he feels sorry for it. He teaches that we are bound to feel remorse and self-reproach for this act of *self*-determination performed so many centuries before self existed. This is represented as a genuine form of religious experience, an experience due to the teachings and influence of God's Holy Spirit. This is a very serious matter. To attribute to the Spirit of God the mistakes and figments of our own minds—to represent as a genuine form and manifestation of the divine life what is a mere delusion of our own imagination, or offspring of our pride of intellect, is a very grave offence, and a very great evil. It is very true that when the father of a family commits a disgraceful crime, the whole family is disgraced; or if a son or daughter is led astray from the paths of virtue, the whole household hide their faces, and weep in secret places. It is also true that when our country is honoured or degraded, we feel that it is our honour or our shame. We share in the common life of the community. The same is true of the whole human race. The sins of men are a disgrace to humanity. We may well blush for our common

nature when we read of the vileness and enormities by which our fellow-men have in all ages been guilty. But this is a very different thing from saying that we performed their acts. When a father commits murder, or a son forgery, the whole family, although humbled and distressed, although they feel a participation in the shame which does not pertain to strangers, yet do not pretend that they were guilty of the crime, and were partners in the act. Such confusion of ideas is not found in the common life. It is peculiar to those who are not content to take things as they are, who are not satisfied with phenomena, but must search into being.

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated; hence some assume that we existed in a former state, where, by an act of self-determination, we depraved our own nature. Others assume that humanity is a person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature as a generic life, and that individuals are the forms in which its comprehensive personality is revealed; a conception as incongruous as the hundred-headed idol of the Hindoos. Others again, as Dr. Baird, distancing all competitors, insist that *we* performed the act of self-depravation thousands of years before we existed. All these are not only gratuitous but impossible assumptions, to account for the admitted fact that innate corruption is truly sin, which they say it cannot be unless it have an origin in an act of our own. Things are, however, what they are, no matter how they originated. If a man is black, he is black, whether he was born so, or made himself so. If he is good, he is good; if bad, he is bad, whether he is the one or the other by birth or self-determination. If Satan had the power to create, and should create fiends, they would not be innocent angels. Adam was created righteous. Original righteousness in him had a moral character. It was truly of the nature of holiness. It constituted Adam's moral character in the sight of God, although not self-originated. It is a first principle of Pelagianism, that moral character can attach only to acts of self-determination and their consequences. All Pelagians, there-

fore, deny that Adam was created holy. He could not be holy, they say, unless he originated his own character. So all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated. If we are born corrupt, that corruption must have sprung from our own act, either in a former state of existence, or in the person of Adam. When God, by the almighty power of his Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness. It is not essential to its moral character that it should be our own work. The graces of the Spirit, although due to the divine energy, constitute the moral and religious character of the believer. In like manner the depraved nature which we inherit from Adam constitutes our moral character, although it did not originate in any act of our own. It is clearly revealed in Scripture that we are born in sin, that we are by nature the children of wrath. This divine declaration is authenticated by our own convictions and experience, and by the history of the world. To account for this fact, to reconcile it with the justice and goodness of God, may be as difficult as to account for the origin of evil. But it is to darken counsel by words without knowledge, and even without meaning, to assert that *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed. The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this. Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam's sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ's righteousness, and not something self-originated and self-deserved.

A third general principle on which Dr. Baird's theory is founded is, the propagation of souls. On this point he is just as dogmatic and confident as on all others. On page 19, the immediate creation of the soul, as opposed to the theory of propagation, is declared to be "the fundamental doctrine of the Pelagian system." On page 364, he complains of orthodox theologians as uniting "with Pelagians in explaining away the teachings of the scriptures on the origin of the soul, in obedience to the dicta of an intuitive philosophy." The doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation, he says, "introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct ele-

ments of soul and body. In the unity of these elements, there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character." On the same page it is said, "There is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative (in Genesis) seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect, inseparable identification with it." P. 365. This is as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of "dualism" in man's nature; and the assertion of "a perfect and inseparable identification" of soul and body. Then the soul and body are one and the same thing, or, at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence. This is the doctrine, on the one hand, of such materialists as Priestley, and, on the other, of the mystical school of modern Germany, as shown in our last number. Dr. Baird, however, is so characteristically incorrect and undiscriminating in his language, that it is by no means certain that he intended, even when he wrote what has just been quoted, to assert that the body and soul are identical, or even that they are inseparable.

On page 377, our author says, that "on the admission that the soul is created, the doctrine of original sin becomes altogether inexplicable." "It is in fact irreconcilable with that doctrine." It is irreconcilable with Dr. Baird's gross, materialistic theory of original sin, but not with the scriptural and church doctrine on the subject, as has been shown a hundred times by the most eminent theologians of the Reformed churches. Our author quotes Van Mastricht as saying that the first error of those who insist on the propagation of the soul, is "that they suppose corruption (in us) numerically the same with Adam's to be propagated; whereas it is only the same in species." To this Dr. Baird replies, "If not numerically the same, it comes not to us from him. Its origin is not, then, in him. He was only the first sinner in the order of time. The alternative is that each soul successively apostatizes, or that they are created corrupt. Such are the inconsistencies to which the most orthodox writers are led, when they attempt to vindicate the creation theory in consistency with the testimony of scripture respecting the nature of man."

He pronounces the theory of creation to be "Manichean-Pelagianism," that is, a mixture of Manicheism and Pelagianism. The opposite doctrine of propagation of souls, he says, is "inevitable," "unavoidable," &c., &c., from the plain teaching of the Scriptures.

On this subject we would remark, 1. That it is from its nature inscrutable. It lies beyond the sphere of observation or experiment. It lies no less beyond, or aside from the purpose and design of the teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures are designed to teach us facts, and not metaphysics, psychology, or ontology. They teach us that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, but they are silent as to the mode of propagation. They teach us that we are regenerated by the power of the Spirit of God, but directly assert that the mode of that new birth no man can know. All positive dogmatism on this subject, therefore, is unseemly and injurious. 2. It is a point on which the church has always differed, and as to which the most profound have been the least confident. In the early church Jerome was decidedly for creation, Tertullian for propagation; Augustine for creation, but with admissions of difficulties on both sides which he could not solve. The Augustinians of the middle ages were for creation; the Lutherans in the general for propagation, the Reformed or Calvinists almost in a body for creation. Such being the historical facts in the case, we think it would require a very ordinary degree of modesty to prevent any man from pronouncing the doctrine of propagation, renounced as it ever has been by the great body of the Reformed churches, a matter perfectly plain, clearly taught in Scripture, inevitable and unavoidable. Still less should we expect any one to denounce the opposite doctrine as Manichean-Pelagian, as irreconcilable with original sin, &c., &c. All this is rather unseemly, somewhat hard to bear with becoming equanimity. 3. The origin of the soul has no necessary connection with Pelagianism one way or the other. A man may hold the theory either of creation or of propagation and be a Pelagian, and he may hold either and be a thorough and consistent opponent of Pelagianism. If he holds that responsibility is limited by ability; that we are responsible only for our acts, and only

for that class of acts which are under our own control, then he must deny original righteousness and original sin. Moral character can be predicated only of voluntary action, and consequently nothing concreated, innate, or hereditary, can be of the nature either of holiness or of sin. It is clear that a man may hold all these principles, and yet believe that the soul is the product of generation; and he may deny them and yet believe the soul to be immediately created. The two things have no logical connection whatever. And hence the most thorough Pelagians are the advocates of propagation of the soul, as Priestley and men of his school. On the other hand, the most thoroughly anti-Pelagian body in the whole history of the church, has been the most strenuous advocates for the theory of immediate creation. It is, therefore, a manifestation of no small degree of courage, for any man to assert that theory to be the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, and totally irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin. He might as well assert that it is the fundamental principle of conic sections. The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is, that original sin is propagated NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM. It is not a material infection of the blood; it is not a substance either corporeal or spiritual, to be transmitted by physical laws, but it is a punitive infliction. It is the consequence of the withdrawal of the fellowship and favour of God from the descendants of Adam, as the judicial consequence of his apostasy. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is a thousand times better than the doctrine of "the identification of soul and body," which Dr. Baird would have us believe is essential to orthodoxy.

A fourth characteristic principle of this book is one which is announced with great formality, and often repeated, and which is made of the last importance. That principle is thus stated. "Community in a propagated nature constitutes such a union or oneness, as immediately involves the possessor in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it springs." P. 317. This does not mean, and is not intended to mean simply, that a progenitor transmits

his own nature to his posterity; that as genera and species are permanent and transmissible in the animal world, so moral character is transmissible in the human race. This is the Placæan and New School doctrine. More than that is intended by the principle above stated. Community in a propagated nature involves community not only in moral character, but in guilt. We are said, on account of this community of nature, not only to inherit a depraved nature from Adam, but to have sinned his sin, and to bear the criminality of his apostasy. His act of self-determination in turning from God was our act, and imposes the same responsibility on us as it did on him. "We share in the moral responsibility of his apostasy as though we had wrought it for ourselves." We are "morally chargeable with that sin." "No man is held to answer for the first sin as it is Adam's; and if it is not his own, as it is sin or crime, justice will not account it his, as it is a ground of condemnation." The principle is that what a nature does in the progenitor of a race, all who receive that nature coöperated in doing. Being an act of nature it is common to all who possess that nature, and involves all in the same criminality.

This is a principle which is of wide application. It cannot be taken up and laid aside at pleasure. If true at all, it is true universally. If community of nature involves community in guilt and pollution for acts of nature, then it must be for all the acts of that nature. It is purely arbitrary and contradictory to confine it to one of those acts, to the exclusion of all others. If, in virtue of community of nature, we are agents in Adam's first sin of nature, and morally chargeable with its criminality, then we are morally chargeable with all his moral acts. If the ground of imputation of his guilt is the covenant, then it is limited to his first sin; but if that ground be community of nature, it must extend to all his sins. Dr. Baird (unconsciously perhaps) admits this. "Any exertion of Adam's will or powers," he says, "the effect of which had been to strengthen holy principles within him, affecting as it would his nature, would have been imputed to those who in him were partakers of his native holiness. Any act of his will, or exertion of the powers of his being, the tendency of which had been to weaken those principles in his nature, would have been in like

manner imputed. On the contrary, actions which bore no relation to such effects as these, were personal to the actor, and not imputed to others. To the former class belong acts of obedience to God, such as tilling the ground, observing the Sabbath, and worshipping God—acts which, by the force of habit, gave increasing strength to the holy nature in which he was created; or any want of watchfulness, in view of the dangers which were at hand, or failure to seek divine strength to uphold him in integrity. To the latter class of actions pertained such as partaking of food, and indulging in nightly slumbers—acts which had no special moral character, and exerted no plastic influence on his nature." P. 306. This is a fair carrying out the principle. Community of nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of our progenitor. But what is to limit the application of the principle to our original progenitor? What is the specific difference between our natural relation to Adam and our natural relation to Noah? Human nature, as common to the extant race of men, was as truly and completely in the latter as in the former. We are as truly the descendants of the one as of the other. If community in a propagated nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of a common parent, why are we not responsible for the moral acts of Noah? Again, what difference, as to community of nature, is there between our relation to Adam, and the relation of the Hebrews to Abraham? If we, on the ground of that community, are responsible for all Adam's moral acts, why are not the Hebrews responsible for all the acts of Abraham? Nay, why are we not responsible for the acts of our immediate progenitors, and of all our progenitors back to Adam? What is to hinder our being morally chargeable with every act ever committed by all our ancestors? Can Dr. Baird answer that question? He does indeed answer it, and just as might be expected, by denying his principle, and upsetting his theory. He says this objection confounds two classes of actions—"of these, one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring therein; but constitute mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known." "To

this class," he adds, "belong the sins of our immediate ancestors;" which, therefore, are not imputable. "The other class," we are told, "consists of such agency as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed." P. 509. But, in the first place, this is not the principle. The principle is, that community of nature involves us in *all* the moral and legal responsibilities of our progenitor, and not in a single class of his responsibilities only. And, in the second place, it is not the author's own exposition and application of his principle. He distinctly states that we share the responsibility of all Adam's moral acts; everything which tended to strengthen or to weaken his nature is imputable, and nothing, according to our author, can be imputed, which is not morally chargeable. It is not therefore merely acts which change nature, but acts which strengthen or weaken it, that is, all moral acts, the guilt and pollution, or merit and holiness, of which are transmitted. If this principle is true at all, it must involve us in moral responsibility for all the moral acts of the nature which we have inherited. Besides all this, the author tells us that it is acts or agencies which change nature, in which the recipients of that nature are involved; and, therefore, that if all men had remained holy, save one individual, and he should apostatize, his descendants would be involved in his crime and depravity. Then, if a man's nature is changed by the power of the Holy Ghost, why is not that holy nature transmitted? The fact that it is not, is proof that this whole theory is a chimera. It is not by physical transmission of substance that sin or holiness is propagated.

A more serious consequence of this theory arises from its application to Christ. It is admitted by our author that Christ partook of a human nature derived from Adam. The Scriptures, he says "lay much stress on the derivation of his human nature and person from the common fountain of the race."* P. 582. He was the Son of man, the Son of David, the Seed of Abraham. His genealogy is carefully traced up to Adam. He was a partaker, therefore, of the nature which apostatized from God in the progenitor of the race. He was

* Dr. Baird speaks of the derivation of Christ's *human person* from Adam, as though he were two persons. This of course is an inadvertency.

consubstantial with those whom he came to redeem. If, however, he was truly the Son of David according to his human nature; if he was, in the strict and proper sense of the words, the seed of Abraham; and if community of nature involves community in the guilt and pollution belonging to that nature, how are we to avoid the inevitable, although shocking, conclusion, that Christ was guilty and polluted? If we, because we are descendants of Adam, are partakers in his apostasy, why is not Christ, who also was a descendant of Adam, also a partaker in that crime? If it is morally chargeable on us, *on the ground of community of nature*, why is it not in like manner chargeable on him? Dr. Baird's answer to this difficulty is again a denial of his theory. He refers to the mystery of the miraculous conception. But this does not avail him. It is indeed supposable (even on the theory of propagation) that the *pollution* of our nature was removed by "the power of the Highest," before its assumption into personal union with the Son of God. But *guilt* cannot be removed by power. If a man commits a crime he is guilty, and even Omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true that we apostatized in Adam, Omnipotence cannot make it untrue. And if it is true that all who partake of Adam's nature shared in his apostasy, and are morally chargeable with its guilt, then it must be true of Christ. That his human nature sinned in Adam is a simple fact of the past, according to the theory of this book, and all the power in the universe cannot make it no fact. Contradictions and absurdities are not the objects of power. They have no relation to it, and do not fall within its sphere. It is, therefore, only by a denial of the principle which the author admits underlies his whole book, that he can escape a conclusion which no Christian can admit. The principle, therefore, must be false—the whole fabric which it sustains falls to the ground. It may indeed be said that all sin is personal, and that as the human nature of Christ is not a person it cannot be chargeable with sin. But, in the first place, this is not Dr. Baird's doctrine. He holds to the distinction between personal sins and sins of nature. He teaches that the nature sinned in Adam, and that the guilt and depravity resulting from that sin attaches to all the persons to

whom that nature belongs. In the second place, although the human nature in Christ is impersonal, yet it was assumed into personal union with the divine nature, so that all that belongs essentially to that nature belongs to the one person Christ. He could say, *I* thirst, *I* am exceeding sorrowful. If, therefore, the nature assumed by Christ had sinned in Adam, he assumed it with the moral criminality of that act. It was his sin morally as being the sin of his nature.

The answer given by the Protestant theologians to this difficulty, shows that they held a very different doctrine from that contained in this book. They say that although Christ was in Adam naturally, he was not in him federally. He was not embraced in the covenant made with Adam as the natural head of the human family; and, therefore, he had no part in the guilt of his sin. This of course supposes that the federal, and not the natural union is the essential ground of the imputation; that the sense in which Adam's sin is ours, is a legal and not a moral sense; and that the sense in which we sinned in him is that in which we act in a representative and not a literal sense. And as to the pollution inherent in human nature, as has already been remarked, the Protestant theologians teach that it did not flow to Christ, because it is propagated "neither through the body nor through the soul, but through guilt." If there were not community of guilt, if Adam did not represent Christ in the covenant of works, then spiritual death, the punitive infliction for that offence, would not affect him. Thus Hornbeck, in his Confutation of Socinianism, after saying that men are in Adam, first, as their natural head; and, secondly, as their federal head, adds: "Illâ ratione etiam ex Adamo naturæ suæ humanæ originem trahit Christus. Sed non posteriori ratione consitus in Adamo fuit, ut in capite morali et foederali, qui non pro Christo legem aut tenuit aut prævaricatus fuit;—quique proinde nec cum peccato originali (cujus in Adamo non fuit particeps, haud censitus in ejus federe) concipiendus erat." And Ursinus in his Explication of the Heidelberg Catechism, says: "Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas, dum creat, simul privat originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hâc lege contulerat,

ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent. Neque Deus hoc faciens fit injustus vel causa peccati. Nam hæc privatio respectu Dei eam infligentis ob culpam parentum, non peccatum, sed justissima poena est; etsi respectu parentum sibi et soboli suæ eam attrahentium, peccatum sit." See *De Moor's Comm. Perpetuus*, Caput xv., § xxxii. How Dr. Baird can quote these and other authors of the same class in support of his views, we cannot understand. They distinctly contradict every point in his peculiar theory, and affirm the contrary. They deny the propagation of the soul, and assert its immediate creation. They deny that the communication of original sin is through community of nature, and assert that it is through the federal relation. They deny that the loss of original righteousness is due to our own sin, and assert that it is (ob culpam parentum) on account of the fault of our first parents. In short they hold one system of doctrine, and he another.

The only other principle involved in the theology of this book, to which our limits permit us to advert, is the denial that anything can be imputed to a person which does not personally belong to him; any act which is not his own act; any sin that is not morally chargeable upon him as his own; any righteousness which is not subjectively his. No one can be punished who is not personally a sinner, and no one can be justified who is not inherently righteous. It need not be remarked how thoroughly this overthrows the whole system of evangelical doctrine and of evangelical religion.

1. The general principle is laid down, that nothing can be imputed to a man which is not really his own; his own, that is, not on the ground of a legal relation, but his own morally, as constituting his personal character. "If there is any one principle which shines forth," says the author, "on the pages of the Scriptures, with a light as of the noon-day sun, it is that thus attested. It is, that at the bar of God every man shall be judged and rewarded in precise accordance with his deserts; which certainly have respect to the attitude of the soul and its affections, as well as the actions of the life. When the Scriptures speak of the justice of God, the meaning is not obscure or doubtful. We are plainly and abundantly taught that the

rule of all his judgments is his law, which is the only criterion of merit or crime; that there are but two classes of cases recognized at his bar, namely, those who are conformed to the law, or righteous, or those who are not conformed, and are therefore criminal or sinners; and that God's justice consists in the fact, that to these severally he will render a reward appropriate and precisely proportionate to their desert." P. 489. On another page, Dr. Baird says: "He who supposes that God's dealings with his creatures are, in any case or manner, controlled by relations, or imagined relations, not in accordance with the intrinsic state of the case, as it is in every respect, not only denies that the judgments of God are in accordance with truth, but involves himself in the further conclusion that the Almighty is without a moral nature at all. For, to imagine that he can look upon one as guilty, in a matter in which he is not guilty, or liable to be punished as a sinner, when in fact he is not a sinner, is to assume that holiness is no more in harmony with God's nature than sin, truth no more pleasing to him than a lie." P. 330.

2. In the second place, he applies the general principle, that the only ground of God's judgment is subjective character and personal merit or demerit, to the case specially of sin. Sin he defines to be that which includes criminality and pollution. He therefore insists that sin can be imputed only to one who is criminal and polluted, and on the ground of such criminality. Thus, as we have seen, he constantly teaches that Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, unless we are morally chargeable with it. He devotes a whole section to prove that men cannot be regarded and treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, unless it is theirs in such a sense as to constitute their moral character. "It is only because truly and immediately ours, that a God of infinite goodness and mercy charges it upon us." P. 422. We are partakers "of the moral enormity of his deed." "We were so in Adam, that we share the moral responsibility of his apostasy, as really as though we had wrought it for ourselves personally and severally; and that in consequence we are guilty, and condemned under the curse at the bar of infinite justice." P. 475. The word *guilt*, he says, means "criminal liability to punishment." It includes, we are

told, two ideas: "The one is violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated, depends the moral enormity which the word implies. . . . The second element in the meaning of the word is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. Hence no one can be guilty except he has violated the law which condemns him." P. 462. By parity of reason, no one can be righteous who does not fulfil the law which justifies him.

3. In accordance with the above principle, our author teaches that none but sinners can be punished; and by sinners, he means those chargeable with moral criminality and pollution. On page 488, he says, the idea of criminality can never be separated from the word sin; "the primary conception always contained in the word is, crime—moral turpitude." The language of the Bible, he says, "knows not even how to threaten punishment, without uttering the charge of sin." "The only way in which," he adds, "we can conceive the attempt to be made to evade the force of this argument is by the assumption that, although there must be sin in order to the infliction of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that they coexist in the same party. If a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned; but it does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! To this subterfuge, two insuperable objections may be sufficient. The first is, that the entire argument of the apostle is predicated upon directly the opposite doctrine, to wit, that wherever there is punishment, it is conclusive proof of sin, (i. e. 'of moral turpitude.') . . . The second is, that it sweeps utterly away the whole doctrine of the Scriptures respecting God's justice. The doctrine involved in the justice of God, and proclaimed in his word, is, that every intelligent creature shall be dealt with in precise accordance with his works," [and yet the author expects to be saved!] "under the provisions of the law, and the covenant therein incorporated. That provides that the sinner," [he who is chargeable with crime and moral turpitude,] "and the sinner only, shall be punished, and that in precise proportion to the enormity of his sins."

If then sin cannot be imputed where there are not crime and pollution in the person or persons to whom the imputation is made, then it follows that our sins were not imputed to Christ.

And if sinners only are punished, if punishment implies crime and moral turpitude in the person punished, then Christ's sufferings were not of the nature of punishment; and the doctrine of atonement, as that doctrine has ever been held in the church, and as it is the foundation of the believer's hope, must be given up. It would be difficult to find in the writings of Socinians or Pelagians more sweeping, emphatic, and bitter denials of the principles on which the great doctrines of satisfaction and justification rest, than are to be found in this book. How does Dr. Baird avoid these conclusions from his principles? He attempts it in two perfectly inconsistent and contradictory ways. First, by denying the principles themselves in their application to Christ, making him an exception; and secondly, by asserting that after all they do apply to him. This latter course is taken in a confused and faltering manner; it is, however, attempted. First, he denies the application of his principles to Christ: "It may be said that the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded and treated as a sinner. To this proposition we must emphatically except. He is regarded and treated no otherwise than as being precisely what he was, God's spotless Son, the spotless substitute, the vicarious sacrifice for sinners. But, that he was regarded and treated as a sinner, NEVER!" P. 440. The only exception to the principle that rational creatures shall be treated according "to their deserts," he says, "is the Lord Jesus Christ, in his atoning work. And unless we are disposed to deny the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ, and the wonderful wisdom, as well as grace, displayed in the plan of redemption, we must admit that this very exception confirms and establishes the rule. In God's own Son, and in him alone, shall innocence ever be visited with the inflictions appropriate to crime; and in his people, and in them alone, shall sin ever fail of the curse of God." P. 490. On the same page, "The doctrine which we oppose, involves the confounding of all moral distinctions—the infliction on the sinless, of the punishment of crime—the endurance by innocence, of the curse of the just and holy One. If this be so, then we are forced to conclude that there is no essential difference between holiness and sin; or else, that whatever the distinction, the Lawgiver and Judge of all is indifferent to it." This is certainly most extraordinary writing. The

punishment of the innocent, on the ground of the sin of others, is declared to be a violation of justice, inconsistent with the very nature of God, involving the assumption that he is indifferent to the distinction between holiness and sin; and yet it is admitted that Christ, although perfectly innocent, was punished! That is, God did, in the case of Christ, what his very nature forbids to be done, and what it is atheistical to say a holy God can do! On page 492, our author says, "Had Christ's sufferings been involuntary, they would have been a violation of justice, instead of being a signal display of it." But how does this help the matter? If a thing is essentially wicked, our consenting to its being done, cannot make it right. "If the infliction on the sinless, the punishment of crime," is a moral enormity, it is an awful thing to say that God has done it. How can what is impossible be done? If sinfulness in the victim is the necessary condition of punishment, then consent is no vindication of the justice of its infliction. A man may consent to suffer, but consent does not make him a sinner, and therefore, according to this doctrine, cannot render punishment just, or even possible.

The principle on which this whole book rests, renders a satisfaction to justice by vicarious punishment an absolute impossibility, because it makes sinfulness in the victim an essential condition of its infliction. All this difficulty and confusion arises out of the unwillingness or inability of the author to see that punishment has nothing to do either with the degree or nature of the suffering, or with the character of the sufferer. Everything depends on the design of the infliction. Suffering endured in satisfaction of justice is punishment, whatever be its nature or degree, and whatever be the character of the victim. If Christ suffered to satisfy divine justice for the sins of his people, his sufferings were penal.

Dr. Baird, when speaking of our relation to Adam, says it is subterfuge to say that the sin may be in one party and the punishment on another,—that Paul insists that wherever there is punishment it is conclusive proof there is sin in the sufferer. Although, as we have seen, in some places he makes Christ an exception to this principle, in others he seems disposed to carry the principle through. Community in a propagated nature

involves all who partake of that nature in the moral character and responsibilities of the progenitor whence the nature originated, is a principle which he expressly says applies to Christ. P. 317. "Unless Christ occupied such a relation to the sins of his people that they may, in some proper sense, be called his sins, they cannot be imputed to him, nor punished in him." P. 607. He had just before said that Christ's "position must be such that justice, in searching for the transgressors, shall find him in such a relation to them, to render him the party responsible to justice for their sins." All this, and much more to the same effect, may be interpreted in a perfectly good sense; but when it is interpreted in the light of the principle that community of nature involves community of character; that sin cannot be punished except in the person of the sinner; when it is remembered that our participation in Adam's sin, which is said to involve us in the charge of its moral criminality, is placed on the same ground, and declared to be analogous to the participation of Christ in our sins; then it must be admitted that the language above cited comes dreadfully near to charging the adorable Redeemer with crime and pollution. That this is in words denied is very true. But to say that sin cannot be imputed to the sinless; that it cannot exist in one person and be punished in another, is to say, either that it was not imputed to Christ and punished in him; or, that Christ was personally a sinner. A man cannot assert a thing in his premises, and deny it in his conclusion.

4. The fourth application of the principle that God's judgments are founded on subjective character, is to the doctrine of justification. Here again we are referred to our relation to Adam for illustration. The method of our justification, Dr. Baird says, "resembles the method of our condemnation in Adam." "The sentence of the law, whether condemnatory or justifying, must have some real ground; since the judgment of God is according to truth. The condemnation of sinners is for sin. The justification is of righteous ones, for righteousness." P. 425. But as the sin for which we are condemned is, and according to Dr. Baird must be, our sin, so the righteousness for which we are justified is subjectively our own. As we are chargeable with the moral criminality of Adam's apos-

tasy, so we are morally meritorious for Christ's righteousness. The one is ours in the same sense that the other is. And as the one is ours in such a sense as to constitute our moral character, and to expose us to the curse of God on the ground of that character; so the other is ours so as to constitute our character, and entitle us on the ground of our subjective state to justification before God. And as Adam's sin is a proper ground of remorse, so Christ's righteousness is a proper ground for self-complacency. P. 448. We are justified not by Christ's righteousness extrinsical to us and only nominally ours, but "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death." Bellarmine teaches the doctrine of subjective justification more consistently than Dr. Baird does, but we do not think that he teaches it more explicitly, or that it flows more necessarily from the principles of the former than it does from those of the latter.

The principle that God's judgments must be according to truth, that if he pronounces a man guilty, he must be guilty; and if he pronounces a man just he must be just, is indeed self-evidently true. It is, however, no less true, that the same man may be at the same time both guilty and not guilty, righteous and unrighteous. In other words, the terms guilty and righteous have each two distinct, recognized, and perfectly familiar meanings. They are used in a moral, and also in a forensic sense. A man, therefore, may be guilty in one sense, and righteous in another. God pronounces the ungodly righteous. This is the very language of the Holy Ghost. Should any one convicted of theft, or of any other crime, bear full penalty of his offence, his moral character and ill-desert remain the same, but in the eye of the law he is righteous. It would be unjust to inflict upon him any further punishment. Justice, so far as his offence is concerned, is satisfied. In justification God pronounces us righteous, legally, not morally. His declaration is according to truth, because in the sense intended, we are righteous. The demands of justice have been satisfied in our behalf. When Christ is said to be guilty, or to bear our guilt, the word is of course used not in its moral, but in its legal sense. He assumed the responsibility to satisfy justice for the sins of his people. And thus when we are said

to bear the guilt of Adam's first sin, it does not mean that his sin is crime and pollution in us, but that, in virtue of our relation to him, we are justly exposed to the penalty of his sin. That such is the plain doctrine of the Scripture is the faith of the church in all ages. It is the doctrine of all the Augustinians in the Latin church; it is the faith of the Lutherans and of the Reformed, and it is the foundation, more or less distinctly apprehended, of the hope of salvation in every true believer. In opposition to this system, Dr. Baird would have us believe, that God's judgments are founded exclusively on the moral character or subjective state of his creatures; that if he pronounces any creature guilty, that creature must be morally criminal and polluted; if he pronounces him righteous, he must be subjectively holy; that only sinners, in the moral sense of the word, can be punished, and only the righteous, in the moral sense of that term, can be justified. With whatever orthodoxy in phraseology, with whatever earnestness of protestations against heresy, these principles may be set forth, they are none the less subversive of the whole system of evangelical religion. If none but sinners can be punished, then Christ did not bear the penalty of the law; and if none but the subjectively righteous can be justified, then no human being can be saved.

It is one of the infelicities of a review, that it is commonly written *currente calamo*, and sent piecemeal to the press before the ink is thoroughly dried. It is, therefore, apt to bear the impress of the feelings which the book reviewed makes at the time on the writer's mind. If it could be laid aside, and allowed to cool, much might be softened or modified. It is very possible that when we come to see this review in print, we may wish that some things had been otherwise expressed. We would very gladly have written in a style of laudation all the way through. Our first short notice of this volume is evidence that we were even too ready to commend. If we have said anything in this more protracted review which offends in the other extreme, we shall be sincerely sorry. But an author who does not hesitate to pronounce principles held by nineteen-twentieths, and we believe by ninety-nine hundredths of his brethren, to be Manichean, Pelagian, and atheistical; who

represents the advocates of those principles as Pharisees, who make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, can have no right to complain that those who hold these principles should speak their minds with all frankness. We at least feel bound to enter a solemn protest against doctrines which we firmly believe subvert our whole system of faith, and to be inconsistent with the preservation of evangelical religion.

SHORT NOTICES.

A Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Boston: Hickling, Swan & Brewer. 1860. Quarto; pp. 1854.

This great work, which the public have been long looking for with excited expectations, has at last made its appearance. So far as we are competent to judge, on a cursory examination of its principles and contents, we are disposed to regard it as the most reliable and useful book of the kind in our language. It contains about one hundred and four thousand words. Many of these of course are obsolete, provincial, local, or technical. They nevertheless deserve a place in a work which professes to be a complete glossary of the language for common use. Matters of orthography may be determined either by principle and analogy, or by usage. Dr. Worcester has wisely adopted the latter as his guide. Usage is law in matters of language. As regards pronunciation, the same rule has been adopted. In doubtful cases, different authorities are cited. In all disputed points relating to the English language, the English are surely entitled to be judges. It is not desirable to get up an American language. It is one of the great recommendations of this Dictionary, that the author is disposed to defer to the authority of the standard writers of the old country. Our language is so rapidly spreading over the earth, that the only plan by which anything like uniformity can be preserved, is to have some standard to which all shall conform; otherwise we shall soon have American, Australian, Indian, Polynesian English, in endless confusion. The most difficult department of a Dictionary is the definitions. They require not only knowledge, but power of discrimination and of expression. The true rule, so

far as a rule can be given, is, as we think, that which Dr. Worcester has adopted, viz. to give first the signification of the word as determined by its etymology, which commonly contains its generic idea, and then its various meanings, in logical order, as determined by usage, each supported by one or more citations from standard writers. The illustrations introduced into this volume are a valuable addition. The eye is more informing than the ear. The delineation of an Abacus gives a clearer idea of the thing than can be communicated by any verbal description. We must leave to abler hands the full discussion of the merits of this important work; and can only express our gratitude to the indefatigable author for the herculean labour which he has so patiently endured for the benefit of others.

Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians. By John Lillie, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Kingston, N. Y. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 580.

Dr. Lillie is one of the most accomplished biblical scholars in our country. He is already extensively and favourably known as the author of several valuable contributions to the translation and interpretation of the sacred text. These lectures are printed as they were delivered from the pulpit, and furnish a fine illustration of the way in which the stores of learning, and the results of the most critical research, may be made available for popular instruction and edification.

The Organon of Scripture; or the Inductive Method of Biblical Interpretation. By J. S. Lamar. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1860. Pp. 324.

This "purports to be," as the author informs us, "radically and essentially, a new work, and not a remodelled edition of Ernesti, Michaëlis, Stuart, or Horne. True, it does not claim to have discovered a new method of investigating phenomena; it merely adopts and applies to the Scripture a method which has been satisfactorily tried in other departments of study, but which, it is believed, has never been presented and urged as *the* method of Biblical Interpretation." By method, as distinguished from rules, is meant "the way or manner of investigation;" rules are determined by the method adopted; they are the principles employed in carrying it out. The author discusses successively the Mystical, the Dogmatic, and the Inductive Methods of Interpretation. The last is the one which he adopts, and regards as something new in its application to exegesis. Protestants, he says, although they started right, soon abandoned their principles, and adopted the Dogmatic method, exalting creeds and confessions into the place formerly occupied

by tradition and decretals; changing masters, but remaining slaves.

Commentary on the Pentateuch. Translated from the German of Otto Von Gerlach, by Rev. Henry Downing, incumbent of St. Mary's, Kingswinford. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. Pp. 585.

Otto Von Gerlach was an eminently pious and lovely man. He was educated for an academical career, but finally determined to accept office as a pastor, and was ordained as minister of the Elizabeth Church in Berlin. He died at the early age of forty-eight. His principal work is his Scripture Commentary, designed for the people, of which this exposition of the Pentateuch is a part. It is not a learned work, but it is a sound, practical exposition, characterized by clear good sense, and an intelligent appreciation of the text.

Christianity in the First Century; or, The New Birth of the Social Life of Man through the Rising of Christianity. By Chr. Hoffman, Inspector of the Evangelical School in Salou, near Ludwigsburg. Translated from the German. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860. Pp. 294.

"It would be difficult," says the translator, "to find the great central truth of Christianity, personal union of the believer with Christ, or the satisfaction and joy consequent on that union, portrayed in more vivid colours" than they are in this volume. "The great object of these dissertations," however, he adds, "is to set forth this principle as the powerful and only bond and cement of society." A volume replete with new and suggestive trains of thought, is well worthy of an extended circulation.

The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, stated anew, with special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times; in Eight Lectures delivered in the Oxford University Pulpit in the year 1859, on the Bampton Foundation; by George Rawlinson, M. A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Editor of the "History of Herodotus," &c. From the London edition, with the Notes translated, by Rev. A. N. Arnold. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 454.

This work is directed against the latest form of modern unbelief—that which attempts, by the process of historical criticism, to destroy the authority of the Scriptures. It is therefore an historical argument, designed to show that on the principles on which, by common consent, the facts of history are to be established, the Bible is to be received as a trust-

worthy record of actual events, and is not a mere collection of myths and legends. It belongs to the same series of lectures with those of Professor Mansel on the Limits of Religious Thought, but is adapted to a wider class of readers. The author, from his relationship with the celebrated traveller and antiquarian, Col. Rawlinson, has been led to pay special attention to the recent discoveries of historical monuments in the East, which serve to confirm the sacred narratives. This, however, is only a subordinate object of this work. It embraces a survey of all the historical testimonies to the veracity of Bible history. It is a timely and valuable contribution to apologetic literature.

The Stars and the Angels. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1860. Pp. 358.

This work consists of two parts. The first is a scientific discussion of the structure of the moon, sun, earth, planets, the nebular hypothesis, &c. The second part relates to Angels, who are represented as embodied spirits of the same species as man. This part includes the discussion of many questions, within and without the limits of human knowledge, as the Natural History of Devils—The Unfallen Sons of God in other Worlds—Death and Carnivorous Animals in the Stars—The Soul, or Psyche—Mesmerism, and Spirit Rapping, &c.

The Story of a Pocket Bible; a book for all classes of readers. Ten Illustrations. New York: published by Carlton & Porter. Sunday School Union, No. 200 Mulberry Street. Pp. 412.

In this volume a Pocket Bible, which passes through many hands, is made to relate its own history. The child, the youth, the man of business, &c., are its successive possessors, on all of whom the truth is represented as making a more or less salutary impression. It is handsomely printed, and the illustrations are in good taste.

The Life of Daniel Wilson, D. D., Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India: by Joseph Bateman, M. A., Rector of North Cray, Kent, his Son-in-Law and First Chaplain. With Portraits, Map, and Illustrations. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 744.

As Bishop Wilson in early life came under the influence of the Rev. John Newton, was the associate of Richard Cecil, and prominent among the evangelical clergy of the church of England during the early part of the present century, his biography becomes in a measure a history of the recent revival of evangelical religion in the Established Church. His appoint-

ment to the bishopric of Calcutta in 1832, and his indefatigable labours in India until his death, January 1858, bring to view the state and progress of Christianity in that important part of the British empire. Independently, therefore, of the interest which attaches to the personal history and character of this eminent servant of God, his biography has an important bearing on the history of religion during the last fifty years. This large and handsome volume has, therefore, a great and permanent value.

History of the Old Covenant. From the German of J. H. Kurtz, D. D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. III. Translated by James Martin, B. A., Nottingham. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1859. Pp. 532.

An additional volume of a work which we have repeatedly noticed and recommended.

Inaugural Addresses at the Opening of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the North-West, Chicago, Ill. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street, below Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 93.

The North-Western Seminary, although it had its birth in the midst of conflict, has begun its career under unusually auspicious circumstances. It has a full Faculty, a competent endowment, and a favourable location. With all these elements of success, it can hardly fail to answer the wishes of its friends, and the expectations of the church. These addresses are worthy of their several authors, and will serve to strengthen the conviction of their fitness for the important and peculiarly responsible positions to which they have been called. The lithographic portraits of the Professors are gloomy caricatures, a disgrace both to art and taste.

The Resurrection of Christ and of His People. A Discourse preached, March 7, 1859, at the funeral of the Rev. James Carnahan, D. D., LL.D., Ninth President of the College of New Jersey: containing a Brief Sketch of his Life and Character. By James M. MacDonald, D. D., Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1860. Pp. 39.

This is an affectionate tribute to the memory of an excellent man. Dr. Carnahan had the respect, the confidence, and love of all who knew him. He filled his high station with dignity and success. There was in him a slumbering power of intellect and will which was called into exercise only on rare occasions, but on which his friends knew they could rely when the emergency arose. Few men ever gave less cause of offence to others, and few were less disposed to take offence. Dr. MacDonald has skilfully performed the task of delineating his character, and estimating his worth as a man, as a minister, and as President of the College of New Jersey.

Annual of Scientific Discovery; or, Year Book in Facts of Science and Art, for the year 1860; exhibiting the most important discoveries and improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, &c., &c., &c. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., author of "Principles of Natural Philosophy," &c., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, No. 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. London: Trübner & Co. 1860. Pp. 430.

The extended title-page of this Annual is a sufficient index of its design. Our readers, indeed, are already familiar with the former volumes of this valuable repository of facts, and record of the progress of science.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. By the Rev. James McCosh, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast: Author of "The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral," and joint author of "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 504.

Intending to present our readers with an extended review of this work, in the next number, as we hope, of this Journal, we content ourselves for the present with its simple announcement.

The Puritans; or, the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, during the Reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In Three Volumes. Vol. II. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 539.

This volume continues the history of the Puritans from 1575 to 1586. Another volume will complete a work which is certainly deserving of a very high place in historical literature, a department in which our countrymen have been remarkably successful.

A plain Commentary on the Four Holy Gospels: Intended chiefly for Devotional Reading. In two vols. Vols. I. and II. St. Matthew—St. Mark. Second American Edition, complete from the London Edition. Philadelphia: published by Herman Hooker, S. W. corner Chestnut & 8th streets. 1859. Pp. 938.

There is a very grateful savour of the antique about these comments, both as to expression and spirit. They are written under the inspiration of the Prayer-Book, and of the theological and religious life of the second century of the history of the English church, when the Catholic element had not come to leaven the Protestant mass. These volumes are rich in religious truth, in a reverential and devout spirit. They abound with pertinent scriptural references, and would, we think, prove a healthful condiment to Presbyterian and Puritan reading.

The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary upon the Epistle of St. James. By Rudolf Stier, Doctor of Theology, Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkeuditz. Translated from the German by the Rev. William B. Pope, Manchester. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859. Pp. 501. Also Vols. V. and VI. Pp. 513 and 518.

Dr. Stier's works have had such an extensive circulation in this country, that our readers need only be apprized that additional volumes have issued from the press.

Bishop Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Edited, with an Analysis, by J. T. Champlin, D. D., President of Waterville College. Boston: J. Jewett & Co. 1860. Pp. 278.

The design of this edition of Butler's Analogy is to present it in a convenient form for a text-book. For this purpose, the longer paragraphs are divided, and the subjects of each prefixed. Notes of explanation are occasionally added.

The Power of Jesus Christ to save unto the uttermost. By Rev. A. J. Campbell, Melrose. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 329.

This is an argument and an appeal meant specially for the people of the author's charge, when he was about to leave them for a distant land. The plan of the work is to present, in successive chapters, the grounds of faith in Christ's power to save. As may be inferred from its source and object, it is a book well adapted to guide men to the knowledge of salvation.

The Titles of our Lord adopted by Himself in the New Testament. By J. Montague Randall, Vicar of Langham, Norfolk. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 249.

This book was written in pencil, by a man nearly blind. It is not a compilation from books, but the outpourings of a pious and cultivated mind.

The Holy Bible, containing The Old and New Testaments; Translated out the Original Tongues, and with the former Translations diligently compared and revised. In which all the Proper Names are divided and accented as they should be pronounced, and a copious and original Selection of References and numerous Marginal Readings are given; together with Introductions to each Book, and numerous Tables and Maps. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

One prominent feature of this edition of the Scriptures—its indications of the pronunciation of proper names—will be highly prized by a large number of readers. The other peculiarities specified in the title-page also add to its value for ordinary use by individuals and families. But there is an additional feature not mentioned, so far as we have observed, in title-page

or preface, which we think, in justice to all readers and purchasers, should have been distinctly announced. We refer to the text and readings being according to the amended version of the American Bible Society, which, after being used a brief period by that institution, was, after most thorough discussion, deliberately discarded by it. We do not propose here to discuss the merits, the propriety, or the expediency of that revised version of the Scriptures. We have sufficiently expressed ourselves on these matters in a former article, published when the mind of the church was agitated on the subject. We do not complain of any publisher for adopting this version, if he sees fit. We only insist, that if he takes this course, he should announce it explicitly in the title-page, or in a manner equivalent thereto. This edition is in large octavo, in good clear type, and, with the qualification above noted, well adapted to general use.

Esther and her Times, a Series of Lectures on the Book of Esther. By John M. Lowrie, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

A series of instructive and interesting lectures on a portion of the word of God, which has received less attention from common Christians than it otherwise would, owing to the absence of helps like this, for the due understanding and application of its teachings.

Annie Leslie, or the Little Orphan. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

One of those safe and interesting books for children, for a copious supply of which, we are indebted to our Board of Publication.

Sketches of New England Divines. By the Rev. D. Sherman. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

The author gives in this volume sketches of twenty-one ministers, whose chief theatre of action was in New England. Beginning with John Cotton, he passes on to the Mathers, and Roger Williams, and introduces for the eighth portraiture, Jesse Lee, the pioneer of Methodism in New England. After reaching the Methodistic era, his sketches number fourteen—five Congregationalists and nine Methodists! He condescends to notice Presidents Edwards, Stiles, and Dwight, Lemuel Haynes and Nathaniel Emmons. These exhaust his catalogue of Congregational luminaries after the sun of Methodism arose in overshadowing splendour. But besides the Methodist celebrities, Lee, Hedding, Fisk, Olin, who are known to fame, he unveils the hitherto hidden greatness of George Pickering, Joshua Crowell,

Jonathan D. Bridge, Timothy Merritt, and *Billy Hibbard.* Our readers can judge for themselves whether such a list answers the reasonable expectations raised by the title of the volume—"Sketches of New England Divines."

The *animus* of the author in this and other respects, as well as some of his other characteristics as a writer, will be further indicated by the following extracts from a passage in which he sets forth the religious and theological condition of New England, when Lee made his pioneer visit there in the interest of Methodism. He pronounces the Congregational clergy of that day "a sort of Puritanical Popes. They usually lived aside from the laity, on their farms, mingling little with them, save on the Sabbath, when they issued from their privacy to ascend the high pulpit, and dispense to the hungry multitude a wisp or two of ecclesiastical straw, in the shape of a dry disquisition on the fall, election, perseverance, or divine sovereignty. The people, in the meantime, looked reverently from their square pews up to the eminent position of their teacher; and what they received was masticated sufficiently to meet the demands of the most ultra vegetarian; thence becoming incorporated with their spiritual organism."

"Whatever the pulpit uttered was regarded as one of the eternal verities; unconditional election, reprobation, infant damnation, *et id omne genus*, went down with an appetite, because, forsooth, the minister had thrown them out as wholesome articles of spiritual diet. We laugh at the tatterdemalion regiment of the Pope, who nab at any old bone or mouldy relic his Holiness may deign to throw down to them; but their credulity in regard to the holy father is hardly more preposterous than was that of the Pilgrims in regard to their clergy. What the clergy said, they seized up, very much as the baboon is said to scrape his food into his mouth—good, bad, and indifferent—dust and vegetables altogether, leaving nature to make selections to her liking. . . . Any moral Columbus that might spring up, ought to be imprisoned or exiled for promulgating such novel and pernicious notions among the people. . . . The ecclesiastical blood-hounds would be found baying on their track. . . . The piety which then existed in the land was too sombre and gloomy, overcast as it was by the dark shadows of persecution, and depressed by the influence of a severe, pitiless theological system, which could consign men to perdition by a divine decree, and without any fault on their part." Pp. 119–23.

Such passages speak the character of this volume, and of the "moral Columbus" who wrote it, better than any description which we can give. The narrowness, ignorance, and utter

incompetency to master the subjects treated which are everywhere conspicuous, are aggravated by corresponding deformities of style. The pointless vulgarisms, the turgid puerilities, the sesquipedalian flourishes with which the work is replete, neither disguise nor atone for its contracted spirit, its erroneous statements, and its imbecile reasonings.

The Christian Lawyer; being a Portraiture of the Life and Character of William George Baker. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1859.

The subject of this memoir was a lawyer in Baltimore, who had achieved distinguished success at the bar, and in the Legislature of Maryland, long before his death, which occurred in the prime of his manhood. He was a zealous and exemplary Christian in the communion of the Methodist Church. While he was an efficient supporter of his own church, he took an active part in evangelical and charitable enterprises in which Christians of all communions coöperate. He was one of those large-hearted, symmetrical Christians, whose sympathies are rather catholic than sectarian.

We have taken an especial interest in the book, as showing the broad sphere of usefulness which opens itself to educated, able, and earnest laymen. We think a due proportion of this class is indispensable to the stability and prosperity of religion. There are educated men who can better serve God and the Church in the capacity of Aarons and Hurs, who uphold pastors in their work, than in the direct exercise of the pastoral office in their own persons.

The Life of the Rev. Adam Clarke, LL.D., F. A. S., M. R. I. A., &c. &c. By J. W. Etheridge, M. A., Doctor in Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg, and Member of the Asiatic Society of Paris. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1859.

The name of Adam Clarke is historical. Next to Wesley, and perhaps, through his Commentaries, even more than Wesley, he has exercised a powerful influence in moulding the mind and heart of the great Methodist communion in Britain and America. Of course, an accessible memoir of him is a want not only of his own denomination, but of all Christians who are interested in the great leaders and lights on whom God has put the honour of being representative men of any large portion of his people. The life of Dr. Clarke by his son, in three volumes, published in 1834, very imperfectly met this want, being too bulky and prolix to be available to the mass of readers. The present volume is an attempt to supply this desideratum by condensing the delineation of his life and character within the compass of one portable volume. It bears the impress of fidelity and accuracy in the author. We do not

discern the high artistic skill which imparts to this class of compositions their strongest fascination. The facts stated, however, speak their own importance, and kindle their own interest. Of course, the book advances many views which Presbyterian eyes see in another light. It will, nevertheless, be welcomed by the Christian public as a valuable addition to our biographical literature.

Autobiography of Dan Young, a New England Preacher of the Olden Time. Edited by W. P. Strickland. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This narrative of his life and labours by a prominent Methodist preacher of New England, is, in a fair degree, readable and entertaining. It is, however, instinct with the sectarian and anti-Calvinistic mania which is so apt to deform this sort of books. Thus he says, "Calvinism, Universalism, and Deism had been the order of the day, but these crumbled and fell before the glorious testimony of the gospel, like Dagon before the ark." P. 34. "If, then, God had decreed all things, and the decree preceded his knowledge, there must necessarily have been a period, anterior to the decree, in which God knew nothing." P. 60. We are sorry that a book, not devoid of interest and instruction, should be marred by blemishes of this kind.

History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland: Condensed from the standard work of Messrs. Reid and Killen. By Rev. Samuel D. Alexander. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

As our own church is the child of the Presbyterian Church of Ireland, which furnished most of the people and ministers who first planted and organized Presbyterianism in this country, this volume by Mr. Alexander possesses a special interest for American Presbyterians. It will also be valued by all who desire to understand the history of this large and influential body of Christians in our land. The thanks of the public are due to Mr. Alexander for his very faithful and successful labour, in condensing the ponderous work of Reid and Killen within a compass which meets the exigencies of ordinary readers. The work was undertaken at the instance of the author's brother, the late lamented J. Addison Alexander, D. D., whose teeming mind was not more prolific of matchless works of his own, than of apt and felicitous suggestions to others of appropriate literary undertakings. Few came into free intercourse with him, who did not find themselves encouraged and stimulated to literary effort by his genial proposals. We are glad that the suggestion in this case resulted in this well-wrought volume, which the Christian public will not fail to appreciate.

Christ in History. By Robert Turnbull, D. D. New and Revised Edition. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

The work of Dr. Turnbull, of which this is a new and revised edition, had, by its first publication, won a high position among scholars and divines, thinkers, and cultivated Christians. "It takes the Incarnation as the central or 'turning point' in the history of mankind, and attempts to show how all the forces of society converge around it, how all preceding history prepares for it, and all succeeding history dates from it." Historical facts are so arrayed and expounded by the author, as to show that they find their highest significance in Christ. The rationalism and scepticism of Strauss *et id genus omne* are vigorously refuted. The relations of all events to Christ are shown, not in the pantheistic or transcendental meaning now so fashionable with certain writers, but in the scriptural and evangelical sense. The work indicates large reading and culture, and is animated by a fervent Christian spirit.

The Still Hour; or, Communion with God. By Austin Phelps, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

We hail the appearance at this time of little manuals like this, designed to stimulate and inform the devotional spirit of Christians. This little treatise, the author informs us, is a growth from a sermon delivered with manifest happy effects in the chapel of Andover Seminary and elsewhere. It is brief yet thorough. It is searching and faithful without being censorious or disheartening to contrite souls. It is discriminating and instructive without undue casuistical refinings. We rejoice to believe that many will find it profitable for correction, consolation, and edification.

ERRATUM.

Page 296, line 4 of note, *dele* the perception of.