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ARTICLE I.—*The Elements of Political Science.* In two Books. Book I. On Method. Book II. On Doctrine. By PATRICK EDWARD DOVE. Author of the Theory of Human Progression. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter, 1854.

THIS publication is not a very recent one; but it is quite new to us, and we have read it with considerable interest. The author is evidently a conscientious and religious man, and, we may add, a ready writer. He expresses very well what he clearly thinks, and his courage, in presenting his views, is much more obvious than his skill in ordering his thoughts, or his patience in reflecting on their correctness. We regard his book as a very useful study for those who wish to classify their ideas on many difficult portions of the form and substance of political philosophy; not, however, because of what is true in the book, for that is very simple; but because of the mental skill which may be obtained by seeking out and exposing to one's self its abounding logical vices, and its philosophical and political heresies. We cannot undertake to point these out in detail, for that can be more profitably done by each reader for himself; and our task can be much more acceptably performed by limiting ourselves chiefly to the fundamental conception of the whole work, its aprioral and abstract deductive method.

It will, however, facilitate this our principal undertaking, if we first expose a few of the author's conclusions; for this will not only prove that his premises or argument must be wrong, but it will aid us in showing the illegitimacy of the abstract deductive method in any such science.

It might be expected that, as such a science cannot move a step without definitions, we should begin by discussing those of the author. But we do not find any that seem to be used in the structure of the author's system. Indeed he tells us that all the most essential conceptions of political science are indefinable, as equity, justice, duty, crime, right, wrong, property, value. True, these words have often been defined, and he does not prove the definitions false. In one instance he attempts it, and we may look to see if he has succeeded. He takes Archbishop Whately's definition of value, as a capacity of being given and received in exchange, and pronounces it wrong because the thrust of a sword may be given and received in exchange, and a wife, though of value, cannot be. But this criticism is a mere play upon the words; four of them being used in the criticism in a perverted sense. Change the form thus—value, in political economy, is a word expressive of the relation of equality in the market of different objects of traffic —and then the criticism falls. The author's readers will look in vain for a science built upon definitions, and we must be content to accept the book as we find it.

It is quite obvious that the main purpose of the book is to prove that, according to natural law, no individual can have any right to an inheritable estate in land. His argument is quite summary, pp. 119, 170, 254; that, because the earth is the gift of God to all living men alike, therefore each man has a right to his share of it while he lives, according to a division to be made by the nation, with the consent of each individual. Now surely the assumption of this argument is not an obvious axiomatic truth, when it involves the assertion that no man can have any exclusive right to a portion of the earth without an agreement had with all other persons in it, and that all men, women, and children, savages and civilized men, are equally entitled to a share of the earth, irrespective of their capacity, or occupation, or desire to cultivate land; and that even

antipodes must be consulted about lands which they never heard of.

Philosophically speaking, the gift of the earth to man is an inference from his position on it, his wants, and his nature, and therefore his title, irrespective of social regulations, must depend on these, and cannot be apriorally determined. But assume that the gift is to all alike: then it is a title in common. No division can take place without the universal consent of the race. He says, not without the consent of each individual of the *nation*. But how one nation gets title to the exclusion of others, he does not say. And when one man dies and another is born, then there must be a new division. Surely this is practically absurd. But, farther, there never was such a division, and therefore no man or nation has any valid title to the land he or it possesses; and according to another principle of the author, often repeated—that every man may enforce justice for himself—any man or nation may assert his or its right to enjoy in common any portion of the earth. Hence the Saxons, and afterwards the Normans, had an absolute right to invade England, and insist upon a share of its lands. And no division ever can be made, for a universal agreement is impossible.

He proposes a periodical division by the state, p. 256, at a fixed rent, payable to the state. Well, let us suppose that the state has got title as against other states; that it is not subject to a call for repartition, when any one man or generation dies; and that every man in the state has agreed that the state shall lease the land and receive the rents: now what rent can be got? Nothing, if the people are all savages. But suppose them civilized; then many of them will want town lots, and houses, and not farms. And who is to build the towns? Not the renters; for their titles are not permanent enough. Then the state must do it, and all improvements must depend upon the state as lessor. And if it wants its land well cultivated, and drained, and manured, and its towns well built, it must be possessed of all science, and must oversee and direct and constrain all its tenants. On this system, the state must intermeddle in all matters, and there will be no inducement to individual excellence; no encouragement of taste and skill in

gardening, or farming, or architecture. But we are sure that our readers will excuse us from running out this scheme into all its absurd consequences.

Another of his conclusions is, that all men are equal in natural rights, pp. 139—160. His proof is, that becausc men are all of one natural class, reason and moral law can know no difference between them. It therefore imposes on all the same duties, and hence (because rights and duties are correlative) invests all with the same rights. In other words, God knows no difference among men, and therefore assigns to all alike the same rights and duties. We might carry out the idea, and add, nature knows no difference between the crab and the cultivated apple-trees, and therefore requires all to bear the same kind of fruit. Nature, reason, the moral law, or God, the author of them all, does distinguish among men, even to the extent of individualizing them. With him the rule is, "to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required." Even men do always distinguish so far as they are able, and do measure both rights and duties according to capacity. Benevolencc always distinguishes in this way. But human law, by its general rules, cannot do so; for laws so discriminating could not be administered. So far as possible it treats all men as equal, and speaks to all with the same voice, because it cannot possibly accommodate itself to all the differences of capacity among men, without leaving an open door to arbitrariness of administration; and because in this way all permanent social ranks are avoided, and no excuse is left for mere artificial distinctions. Yet the law does distinguish when it can do so with entire safety. It distinguishes in taxation; it has one rule for children and another for adults; and it allows judges to distinguish in the imposition of penalties, not to mention other cases. This view expresses the principal truth contained in the maxim regarding human equality. So far as we remcmber, Hobbes was the first to extend its meaning; and then he used it to aid in proving absolute monarchy as the only legitimate form of government.

This doctrine of *civil* equality has been, perhaps, more abused than any other that falls within the field of politics. In its true sense it is of inestimable value; but when used to

betray ignorant or wicked men into the supposition that they are morally, or intellectually, or even socially, equal to the most eminent around them, and ought to act accordingly: when used to excite in them a factitious idea of their importance, and to lead them to be ever asserting their rights and forgetting their duties; then it is sometimes most disastrous in its consequences. It is a violation of that instinctive respect which every virtuous and reasonably sensible man has for his fellow-men around him, who, by a careful cultivation of their powers, have attained a deserved degree of eminence in their respective spheres. It tends to extinguish that respect for true merit, which is the natural inner stimulus of all true progress, so far as it has any moral quality in it; to rub off the productive blossoms of the tree of moral life, and to leave it to utter barrenness, and to final and corroding disappointment.

In various forms the author insists upon the right and the duty of every individual to resist the action of government when it is doing wrong; and he often insists that the presumption is always against its rectitude, and the essay on Moral Dynamics is principally devoted to prove this. It follows of course that it is the right and duty of every person to resist every governmental act, until the government shall prove its title to act, and to act in the way proposed. He does not say who shall decide the question. Such a doctrine stands in no need of discussion, for any one can see that it would render all true government impossible, and yet government is an absolute need of our social nature. Society, even that of the family, cannot exist without it. We expect, however, to have something more to say on this subject in another connection.

The author does not pretend to inquire whether men ought or ought not to associate; but only on what principles they ought to associate, if they do associate, p. 199. This is very remarkable. He is discussing man's aprioral political duties, and yet he does not investigate the very first relevant question concerning man's nature, his social tendencies. Of course he cannot know that he has formed a single accurate deduction, this question being confessedly passed by. If it is a

demand of man's nature that he shall associate, then it is his moral duty to do so, and nature will fix the terms of his association according to his condition, circumstances, and purposes. We say moral, and not political duty, because politics comes as a consequence of the fulfilment of this moral duty. We do not imitate the author, in his confounding of the spheres of morals and politics, so far as to say that this moral duty gives rise to or flows from any correlative right in any other persons to demand association. We say only that, if such is his nature, duty to himself and to God demands that he shall associate, not according to the best bargain he can make, or if he can make a good one, but on the terms which God in his providence indicates to be adequate for the common welfare.

It did not suit the author to say that man ought not to associate, for then there ought to be no politics, and this book ought not to have been written. It did not suit to say the contrary, for then the whole scheme of the author would have been deranged. In all its essential elements and real powers, he makes political association a matter of contract. Government with him, in its primary capacity, is a set of men employed by others to prevent injustice among them, p. 168. But it must act according to rules of perfect and abstract political right, p. 33, varying not by lapse of time or change of circumstances, pp. 121, 141, 178, else the government must be resisted by every individual. And as no government can be sure of having such rules, it has no moral right to act, p. 360; and as the presumption is that all human institutions are wrong, of course these perfect, abstract, and immutable rules can never be enforced, and this primary capacity is null. For the rest, government is merely a set of men hired to make public improvements, and it can make none without the unanimous consent of all who are to be affected by the act, and who are joined in the expense. Such a government would be a mere common agency, binding only its employers. On this system, as is quite obvious to any reflecting man, there could be no public improvements, and thus this secondary capacity of government becomes null, and the association or state is dissolved into its original elements.

Hobbes seems to have been the first inventor of this doctrine of the social compact, and he used it to prove the right of the Stuarts to the absolute monarchy of Great Britain. Locke took it up, and used it to establish the right of the people to get rid of the Stuarts, and to call in William of Orange. Rousseau adopted and expanded it, and his followers used it to get clear of the Bourbons and all their institutions, and then founded the rule of the infidel mob of Paris. But, with them all, the social compact was a mere fiction, a sort of argumentative postulate for a foregone conclusion. As matter of fact, nothing of the kind ever took place in history; and if there had, no government could be maintained by it, for it could bind only the consenting parties, and would require renewal with every change of the persons composing the nation; not to mention crowds of other difficulties, any one of which would make this an impracticable governmental theory. We had thought that this fiction of a social compact, to account for past governments, or as a theory for future ones, had been long ago so completely exploded and abandoned, that we should never hear of it again from any thinker of reasonable intelligence.

The author does not assign social compact as the actual origin of existing or of any past governments; but urges it as the true rational ground of all valid institutions. If he had taken the trouble, before he began to weave his political fabric, to study the history of human associations, and the social elements of human nature, and the mode in which they most usually and naturally arrange themselves under given circumstances, and the works of authors who have pursued this method, he might have collected enough of sound and precious threads of social nature to form the warp and woof of a valuable web. But he chose the easier task of weaving his web out of his own bowels. It may succeed in catching a few insects; or, hanging across a path, it may fret the nerves of some passer-by, and then it will vanish from the atmosphere of history, to be followed, however, by many other cobwebs equally useless for human purposes. He has dabbled a little in the works of Kant and Whewell, and has caught a glimpse

of some valuable thoughts in both of them; but he has greatly misapprehended their meaning and their application.

With the author, a nation is a mere aggregate of individuals, and can have no rights that did not exist in the individuals, p. 55, and he often repeats this. He might as well have said that water has no other properties than the hydrogen and oxygen of which it is composed; or that a tree, a horse, or a man, has no other capacities or uses than the water and earths that enter into their respective structures. We may make garden out of these original elements; but when they assume an organic form, they must be treated as organisms. It was some mysterious affinity or vital force, and no rationalistic process, that brought them together, and constructed them with such wondrous skill. We have no aprioral faculty by which, from the idea of vital force, we can construct, in thought or in fact, a tree or a horse. But finding them constructed, we may inspect the process and obtain some knowledge of it. The author thought he had discovered an aprioral way of constructing society; but he has failed. He might have known that hundreds had failed before, and that all who have tried it have failed; and modern socialism would have furnished him many instructive examples. And on the other hand, he had before him a hundred examples of actual constructions, with their history of many centuries, and he might have learned something from them of the natural process of construction and improvement.

States are not at all a mere aggregate of individuals. Chemical, vegetable, and vital affinity is something more than mere aggregation, for they produce physical organisms out of scattered atoms. And intellectual and social affinity is more still, for it generates social organisms out of individual men. Man's nature abounds with germs of thought and sentiment that can find no development except in the atmosphere of social life; and it is only by observing their development under all the circumstances of social life, that their true nature can possibly be comprehended. Aprioral discussions of them are absurd; they can be nothing more than discussions of subjective thought, and the inquirer explains only his own thought-world, and not any real one. And without these social affinities

there never could have been any contracts; for men never could have been so associated as to obtain a language or common customs and interests, and to improve each other so as to arrive at the idea of regulating social intercourse in that way.

It is with amazement that we hear the author attribute all political evils to badly constituted governments, p. 14. The thought runs all through his book. Yet, as a religious and intelligent man, he certainly knew, and, but for the false position in which his partisan feelings have involved him, he would have felt and written that, not out of law, but out of the heart are the issues of moral life and death; that out of the heart proceed all the vices of which he complains; and his remedy for them would have been the moral and religious teacher, and not the political ruler; the spontaneous moral and religious faith of man, with its look directed upwards by the revealed word, and by the Divine Spirit; and not mere rationalistic and materialistic political theories such as this, having, for principal aim, the equalization of wealth and the construction of roads and harbours and social contracts; and resulting, if once tried, in nothing else than a continual struggle about rights of property and labour and position and power. Surely there is some higher purpose than this for human efforts and hopes and progress. We admit the importance of such things; but the whole purpose of politics is not to be bent in that direction.

All the views of the author that we have yet noticed, are governed by a barren and socially dissolvent rationalism, and they continue so throughout his work. They are so, because they totally ignore all the spontaneities of our nature, and thus cast down the scaffolding and the ladder by which we and our works have risen hitherto. It is this rationalism that dictates his belief that no country has or ever had a true political system. Why? Evidently because he has framed a subjective system of his own, that rejects all actual conditions, and proceeds solely from his ideas of justice and right. Of course it can have no application to real life. This aprioral condemnation of all political institutions, past and present, is only an expression of the author's sentiment; and as he does not seem to have studied them in their elements, and much less in their

relations of time, place, circumstances, and people, we cannot attach much value to it.

It is the *institutes of nature* that he wants, and by this he means those institutes that would naturally belong to man in his perfect normal and unfallen state. But we have no adequate evidence that the author has yet risen to that perfect condition; and, therefore, we cannot know that he has ascertained its nature, so far as to be able to deduce its laws. For ourselves, we admit our incapacity to legislate for such a condition of humanity. Indeed, we are not sure that in that state political laws will be needed. We are not free from a suspicion that government implies moral abnormity, and depends on it; and we have words of divine revelation that seem to mean this, when they say that "law was added because of transgressions," and "law is not made for a righteous man." And, therefore, we are not sure that the government required for our present condition bears any analogy to the form in which man will, in his perfect state, associate.

We are very sure that no political system, adapted to society under one condition of civilization, and of inner and outward circumstances and social aims, can be suitable for it under another. The author does not seem to have ever thought of this principle; his method excludes it. Suppose such a perfect law as the author insists on should be instituted; and then bring in the author's test of moral duty—that it demands an intelligent conception of the reasons for acting in a prescribed mode, and that obedience without a sufficient reason, subjectively appreciated, is mere superstition, pp. 102, 103, and then what have we? We have a law which is perfect, and yet which we are not obliged to obey, because we do not appreciate the reasons of it; and which, therefore, we cannot obey without acting superstitiously, which is a horrible sin in the eyes of rationalism.

Let us bear in mind that the law is to be the same for all, including children and savages, for it varies not for times, conditions, and circumstances, pp. 121, 141, 178. Now, what can the child or the savage do? Literally nothing. It would be at least superstitious to draw a bow, or shoot a marble for want of an intelligent and valid motive that he could appreciate;

and for anything he can know, it may be a very great crime before that perfect and incomprehensible law. Thus the law itself becomes a tyrant, and none but the perfect can have any part in its administration, for they alone can understand it, and all others must submit to their interpretation of it. This is a total extinguishment of all the physical, moral, intellectual spontaneities of our nature. It is, therefore, a suppression of our nature by laws called "the institutes of nature." Of course, the author had not those things in his intention; but his system is professedly one of strict deduction, and it must, therefore, submit to be deductively tested, and to be rejected if the results of the test are absurd.

We freely concede the justice of the author's indignation at many of the evils arising out of the relation of lord and serf, or the feudal system, as we have learned it from history; but we cannot consent to be so indiscriminating and unconditional in our condemnation of it. He has an abstract deductive standard by which he judges it, irrespective of all circumstances; we think the true standard can be found only by induction, according to the condition of man, and the circumstances of time and place. We find the relation of lord and vassal, in various degrees of intensity and under various names, existing among almost all nations from the earliest times down to the present; and this prevents us from charging it upon the mere arbitrariness of privileged classes, and naturally leads to the supposition that there must be some element of human nature which, under certain circumstances, must favour that form of institution and perhaps require it. It is now generally granted by learned historians, that this is really the case, and we shall endeavour to explain and illustrate the principle in such a form that our readers may readily gather our meaning. It is not the abuse of feudal power by privileged classes that ought to be first considered; but the principles that have given rise to privileged classes. This question is very important in the science of government, and the author has not considered it. Of course it would be out of place in a system of abstract deductive politics; but its consideration will aid us in showing the nullity of any such system.

Let us invite the reflection of our readers to the mode in

which all societies or assemblages of men ordinarily act in the face of a common danger, that may possibly be averted. If, before the danger shows itself, they had been in the habit of following any one as their leader, they instantly rally round him, and submit to his dictation until the danger is over. If they have no such customary leader, they submit to the first who shows himself courageous enough for the emergency; and most disastrous is it for them to divide their numbers between two discordant leaders. And the power attributed to the leader is in proportion to the universality and intensity of the sense of danger. If all feel the danger to be imminent and great, they unhesitatingly attribute to him full power over all, for the purpose of averting the danger, and no one dares to show any signs of rebellion. No doubt many of our readers will be able to recall unrecorded instances of this. All are familiar with the Roman custom, in times of great danger to the state, of appointing a dictator with absolute and irresponsible power to take measures for the public safety.

We see this again when a state or a multitude deliberately enters upon any undertaking requiring unity of action and involving great interests or great hazard. Hence the ready obedience to the commander of an army or navy, especially when there is a present prospect of hostile collision, or when it has actually commenced. And so it is in the ordinary command of a ship at sea. All the elements around it are dangerous to it, and safety depends on the united and ready activity of its crew. All, therefore, spontaneously as well as by custom, submit to the master, and feel that their safety requires this, especially in the midst of storms and other pressing dangers. And let one observe a confused and excited crowd at a conflagration in a country village; how readily their fears and sympathies and common aim gather them into working order at the call of some practical man of confidence and intelligence. And in times of popular reforms, a leader who truly represents the great principle of the movement, will be followed in the details with almost unquestioning alacrity. And when a general anarchy threatens, or has overtaken a people, they very soon find a leader whom they aid in crushing all whom he calls

anarchists, and in restoring order. Such were Cromwell and Napoleon.

All this illustrates the uncalculating spontaneity of human action in important and pressing emergencies. Abundant examples appear wherever there is a general disorganization of society, or where the people of a country are divided into many small tribes, hostile to or suspicious of each other. Continued danger begets a readiness for instant and complete order under the command of a chief; and the greater their intelligence and the more numerous their interests, the more strict is their submission. The lowest savages have much weaker social bonds than those tribes that have made some advance in civilization, and have larger interests and more numerous social relations demanding protection. Accidental dangers and transient purposes impress their transient character upon the means adopted. But permanent dangers give rise to permanent institutions suited to guard against them, and entering into the habits and affecting the character of the people.

For another instance, we refer to the history of Abraham. He was evidently the chief of a very considerable tribe that migrated from the East to Canaan. He was recognized and respected as a prince among the princes of the land. He was surrounded by many and quarrelsome tribes, and had very large interests to protect. The times and circumstances demanded a very strict form of social organization; and the greater the danger, and the greater the chief, the more strict would it be. Its character is indicated by the fact that, at an early period, Abraham had three hundred and eighteen trained warriors in his tribe, ready at his instant call. His tribe were called his servants. Perhaps the English word *vassals*, would more nearly express the relation in which they stood; but we cannot distinctly mark the degree of subjection; that was governed by their needs and their dangers. There may have been *vassals* as fighting men, and *villeins* as servants. It could hardly have been a mere slavery; for one man could not have that power over his whole tribe, especially a nomadic one; *that* exists only in large communities, where there is a ruling body to maintain it. It was the relation of lord and vassal, originating for the common safety, and adequate to the necessary

unity of action. The chiefdom descended regularly from father to son; and Isaac and Jacob succeeded in their turns. They, too, were princes in the land. This form of organization was a manifest necessity under the circumstances; for there could be no safety without it. No man or family could choose to live independently or out of connection with some tribe, for he or it could have no protection; and, joining a tribe, he must submit to its order. However strict might be his subjection to the chief within the tribe, it was freedom compared with an independence that was subject to the invasions, and spoliations, and insults of all surrounding tribes. And he would feel it so; for all men, who do not desire to live by the plunder and oppression of their neighbours, prefer even despotism to anarchy.

We advance another step in the history of social organization when we follow this tribe in its migration into Egypt. And we venture the suggestion that it was the whole tribe of Abraham, or of Jacob, that migrated into Egypt, and not merely Jacob and his descendants; though these only, as the ruling family, are specially spoken of. The suggestion may have some merit; but we do not discuss it here, though it has in our minds solved many difficulties, and appears plainly demanded by many circumstances in the narrative, and in their social and religious relations. Our present purpose requires only that we notice the change in the condition of the tribe or family in consequence of their having submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of a greater power, and of a different race. The result was exactly accordant with all subsequent historical experience in similar cases. They became the slaves of the Egyptians; as a body, perhaps, rather than individually. Differing in race, customs, pursuits, institutions, and religion, peace between them could not be maintained except by means of slavery. Fusion was impossible. The contact of civilization with barbarism, as well as between two differing forms of barbarism, has almost always shown this. Their differences and proximity would necessarily occasion a continual collision of interests and prejudices, and, at their stage of civilization, neither party could have intelligence enough, or respect enough for each other's social and intellectual rights, and indulgence

enough for differences to know how to manage and control the sources from which all conflicts flow. If either party, and especially if the stronger party, lacked this intellectual and moral skill, continual discord and collision could not be avoided, and they could know no remedy but the power of the stronger.

In the very nature of things no social organization can suffer the presence of any element or condition that it regards as endangering its own existence. Self-defence is an ineradicable principle of all vital organization; and it must act whenever it apprehends danger, even though its apprehensions be unfounded. As spontaneously as the oyster closes its shell, or the porcupine presents its quills against approaching danger, so spontaneously does every social organization guard against the inner and outer evils that it views as such. That it selects improper or unseasonable remedies is usually an intellectual fault, and is not to be cured by any complaints and censures of human depravity. People's individual condition cannot surpass their individual intelligence, and their social condition cannot surpass the intelligence of their leaders. This must be, so long as the responsibility of human training and progress is left to man himself; and it would seem that this responsibility is a necessary element of his progress. The slavery of the Israelites in Egypt appears to us to have come as an inevitable result of previous relations, which could not be maintained in the position of their original institution. And we are strongly impressed with the belief that it was this slavery that, under God, saved them from being completely fused and merged into the Egyptian nation, and thus losing entirely their religion and their nationality.

When the Gibeonites submitted themselves to the Israelites and obtained permission to dwell among them; how could they be anything else than a subject race, differing as they did in language, customs and religion? Two differing forms of civilization never can abide on the same territory, except when one is made subordinate to the other; and the degree or intensity of the subordination must depend upon circumstances. History presents it to us in all degrees—dependent allies; a subject people retaining their own country and laws, with governors appointed by the ruling people; a subject

people interspersed among the ruling people, and having some institutions of their own in subordination to the stronger power, or entirely governed by the laws of the other race with a severity proportioned to the danger of their rebellion; and finally mere slaves, where each of the subject race is under the control of a master and owner.

Mixture of races, thus differing in civilization, never was allowed without subordination, except where the foreign elements were so few as to excite no general apprehension. A fusion of different races on the same soil has never taken place except under the law of subordination in an appropriate degree. God makes this subordination provisional, a means of present order, and of education for order, and of future elevation. Man's foresight does not ordinarily reach so far; he intends such institutions as permanent. To produce equality by a direct fusion of principles is impossible, for neither party can abandon its own or accept those of the other: the nature of the human mind forbids it; as well may the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots. The ruling race cannot possibly give up its customs to the subject race, and the latter knows not how to make the concessions which its circumstances require. A fusion of power so as to put the two races on a political equality is impossible; for then no law or administration would be practicable except according to the will of the majority; for the majority can adopt no other standard of government than its own ideas of right and wrong, however these may be acquired. If the Chinese should acquire the majority in California, we should very soon discover that some of our American notions of equality require occasional modifications according to circumstances. Mormonism has already given us some warning of this.

If we refer to the history of any nation that ever acquired any prominence, we find there a subordination of classes; and this even appears as an element of their greatness. They knew not how else to manage difference of race. Greece and Rome are illustrious instances; and we are not apt to make complaints against them for this, because we do not recognize the influence of their institutions upon our own. We are more apt, like our author, to expend our indignation upon similar institu-

tions of modern Europe. But let us do it as wisely as possible, and we may as well do it at once.

We stop not to inquire into the morality of the invasions that broke up the old Romanized institutions of Europe. Our forefathers no doubt had a hand in them, and the roots of our own political institutions take their rise among those events. This great migration brought together on the same soil races and nations differing very widely in their pursuits, customs, languages, civilization, and all the elements that specialize the forms of political organization. Here then is the political phenomenon that we are to consider. Of course a new shaping of the political institutions became necessary. How was this to be effected? We have already seen that the principles of human nature, and even the law of self-defence, could admit no other form than that prescribed by the more powerful race. We know how much honest indignation has been expended against the law of the strongest, and our author joins in it. But what is the use? When they have the power, they do not give it up for such complaints. To them, at least, it would appear ridiculous to propose to substitute the law of the weakest. The complaint is just enough when directed against the mere arbitrariness of official power. But when founded on the fact that the more powerful race is the ruling race, it is little better than whining nonsense. Government exists for the exercise of power, and if there be two distinct races, one of which alone can have it, it must of course fall to the more powerful; for they cannot admit their inferiority to those whom they have had capacity to conquer and subject. They will rule as intelligently as they know how, and perhaps with as much moderation as the character of their subjects will admit of.

What form is such a government to take? The almost universal prevalence of feudal forms, more or less strictly combined, wherever such circumstances have existed, is evidence enough that this is a spontaneous form of political organization. It must be an organization that is always ready to meet the dangers that arise from the fact that it is power alone that can keep in subjection unwilling, disappointed and hostile subjects. It is an organization of king, counts, marquises and barons,

surrounded by their armed attendant vassals, and permanently distributed over the country in and around castles and walled towns, wherever interest suggests or danger demands. It could not be the mere power of the lord that gave him his great control over his vassals; but the force of circumstances of common danger, requiring a ready obedience to a common leader for its aversion.

But this order changes with time. When, in the course of time, the subject race, or villeins, become accustomed to the new order of things and thus less inclined to disorder and rebellion, the lords feel more free, and therefore more likely to engage in wars and marauding expeditions against each other, in which their followers join them from habit and the natural sentiment of *esprit de corps*. This was a form of disorder against which the first spontaneous feudalism made no provision; for the king had no such power as enabled him to control it. Hence disorder began to reign everywhere. There was no safety outside of feudal protection, and no rights within it to the disloyal. Property and protection were conditioned on feudal fidelity. Vassal and villein became subject to the same danger, and much the same lot befell them all—subjection to a chief for the safety of all. Now, all hopes of order rally around the king, and it was by the growth of the royal power that these disorders were suppressed, the people united and their differences fused. Then feudalism ceased to be necessary, and vassalage and villeinage began to give way. All this was the work of many centuries, and we have sketched a bare outline of it in order to expose the principles out of which these political forms grew.

Feudalism was the outgrowth of centuries of disorder, and it continually changed its form according to the permanent changes in the forms of the disorders. The church itself became feudal in its spiritual as well as in its material interests. The fundamental or crystallizing principle of the system was social spontaneity; it could not be political rationalism. And this principle is quite familiar to our modern and more rationalized experience. We all have leaders in a much larger portion of our acts than we are apt to be conscious of. He that boasts his freedom from the

leadership of others, is likely to be found the most subject to it; but in a disorderly form, as the follower of some Tom Paine or other, who assists his vanity for distinguishing himself from other men, by helping him to the expression of opinions which no mind can grow by, and which no orderly citizen can recognize as true.

We all live and grow in a common atmosphere of opinion, which furnishes the very bone and muscle of our social life, and, up to a certain point, of our spiritual life also; and, for the common business and intercourse of life, our reception of it and growth by it are the surest guaranty of our social success. It is now as it was in feudal times; no man can stand alone on peculiar and individual principles. The world moves on with its irresistible momentum, regardless of such solitary spiders, and wiping away all their fine-spun gossamers. We cannot avoid following leaders; for no man can know all things, or do all things. We all respect others in their several occupations, and concede them superiority in those matters which they have studied and practised and we have not: though many men show so little respect for others that it is hard to discover that they have any. Such men always fail of a true moral growth. We all have leaders in some part of the principles that direct our lives. We all have intellectual, political, and religious or irreligious leaders, and great part of the order of society depends on this fact. Blessed are those who have not quacks and charlatans for their leaders; and we are all liable to be seduced by them, in matters of which we are ill-informed. In such circumstances respect for common opinion is a great safeguard.

And why should the author forget his deductive rationalism, and call in sentiment to condemn the dead institutions of English feudalism? It was a waste of sentiment to vent it in wrath against this bygone form, as a government of mere brute force; he ought to have investigated its origin, and learned by the investigation. It did use such force whenever it was necessary or thought necessary, as all government does; it is the only governmental remedy for disobedience and resistance. They who were subjected to it might well call it force, and so it was, and so it still is. When physical work is to be

done, it is bone and sinew, and nervous energy that are wanted, and they are entitled to credit when they do their work well. But mere force never had attractive influence to gather up the scattered thoughts and sympathies and other principles that generate the social organism. It is intellect and sentiment, spontaneous and reflected thought, that presides in this process. The organism was not gathered and held together by mere force; but, as organism, it exerted such force when disobedience made it necessary. No doubt feudalism was often very cruel; but the social disorders that called it into being were cruel also. To avoid such forms of government, we must beware of the disorders that lead to them. Where the causal principle is, the resulting form follows.

The evils of the feudal system arose chiefly from its continuance long after the cessation of the causes out of which it arose. But this is the common lot of human institutions. Forms become indurated at the expense of life, and do not keep pace with its expansive power. They endure beyond the life that generated them, as the shell remains after the oyster is gone. Human forms cannot always be fitted to the social life which they represent. They hold, themselves, a prominent place in the habits and affections of the people, and cannot be rudely cast down without violence to public sentiment, and without causing much disorder before new forms have become fitted to the popular life. Even personal habits endure when principle desires to reject them. Almost all the stability of social progress depends upon this. Call it popular prejudice, if you please. Prejudices are natural to man, and it is quite unphilosophical to despise them, and quite ungenerous to treat them rudely and disrespectfully. We all have them, and are all trying to grow out of them. Call them mean and narrow views, still they may be better for us than no views at all. We are growing by means of them, and slowly securing each height attained. Perhaps there may be better means of ascent than the cumbersome ladders that we use; but we know of no better. Call them scabs on the intellectual system; but let them be useful as scabs; rub them not off until true skin has grown under them, and then they will slough off of themselves. They are rather the

bark of the tree, protecting the life within from summer's heat, and winter's cold, and from hostile insects, without preventing its growth. They are the walls of our moral and intellectual castle, bristling with arms against those who come as enemies, and yet with open gates and undrawn bridge for those whom we recognize as friends. If we shut ourselves up too closely, let our very weakness be our excuse, and not a cause of war against us. With much more respectful caution ought we to treat the habitual and customary forms of a whole people.

But the feudal rule was merely provisional. Its legitimate functions were exhausted when it had held the discordant elements of society together long enough to allow an assimilation and consolidation of interests and purposes to grow up among them, and to bring with them a reasonable degree of order. Then feudalism became itself a cause of disorder, and its office expired. Monarchy then called upon it to render its account and surrender its trust. The danger and the purposes of society had changed, and its old leaders were, by their disorders, mingling distress and ruin with all the hopes of humanity. For the suppression of this new form of disorder, the rallying cry is changed, and the hopes of men gather around the centre of larger sphere. The royal authority and power become enlarged by the spontaneous suffrages of society, so as to be adequate to the occasion.

Monarchy was also provisional, and it has not yet entirely settled its accounts; though it has laid aside many of its old functions. What new power shall arise to demand of it a full account, we know not yet. But monarchy crushed the life out of feudalism in every place where it had fulfilled its day, and was continued only as a usurping tyranny. This rallying around monarchy was a great blessing to Europe, for it produced union and harmony among the scattered members of European society, and substituted large and homogeneous states in the place of small and contentious tribes and clans. True, it did its work by force; but it was force employed, rather against the contentious, tyrannical, and disorderly petty chiefs, and selfish and partizan leaders, than against the people whom they governed; a force that compelled them to submit their

selfish wills to the popular need of peace, industry and progress.

It will aid us in understanding the importance of this compulsory union of scattered interests to refer to cases where union never was obtained. The Greeks never were able to form any permanent union, and by continual dissensions they destroyed each other. The Arabians, because of their divisions, have ever remained little better than nomadic barbarians. But we prefer Italy for an illustration, because we can content ourselves with quoting what has been said about it by two writers of acknowledged ability. After the fall of the Roman empire, Italy found itself divided into many small republics, with various degrees of popular freedom, and these were never successful in any permanent union, so as to be able to maintain themselves in harmony and against invasions. M. Guizot says: "This has led many Italians, the most enlightened and best of patriots, to deplore, in the present day, the republican system of Italy in the middle ages, as the true cause which hindered it from becoming a nation; it was parcelled out into a multitude of little states, not sufficiently master of their passions to confederate, to constitute themselves into one united body. They regret that this country has not, like the rest of Europe, been subject to a despotic centralization, which would have formed it into a nation, and rendered it independent of the foreigner." (*Gen. Hist. of Civ.* 221, *Lect.* 10.) And A. Comte says: "The Italian cities, which had been foremost in political liberty, paid for the privilege by fatal mutual animosities and internal quarrels, till their turbulent independence issued everywhere in the supremacy of a local family." (*Positive Phil.* 695.)

Mr. Dove rejects all this kind of human experience in matters of government, and insists that the method of observation and induction is totally incompetent as an instrument of political science, and that the only true method is that of aprioral and abstract deduction. He ought to have added his opinion that all history is useless for any political purposes. And because the abstract deductive method has been very largely successful in logic and mathematics, therefore, he insists, the same method must be successful in politics. We

do not stop to show that in his attempt he has not, in the most distant manner, followed the analogy of those sciences; but we shall spend a moment in showing that there is no analogy between them and the science of politics, and, therefore, they furnish no evidence that their method can be used in constructing political science.

Logic and mathematics, as pure sciences, have nothing to do with anything but thoughts and forms of thought. Logic treats of the necessary forms of thought in their consistent and accurate deductive development from given premises. Mathematics does the same with thoughts about space, time, number, and quantity. Their whole purpose, therefore, is, not to teach us of the qualities, or properties, or relations of things or persons; but only to give us a certain skill in the employment of our thoughts, when they come to deal with actual things. Their whole material is mere thoughts, abstract from all reference to persons or things.

But politics must, at every step, consider men and their relations, for man in society is the only subject of which it treats. It deals with thinking men, and, therefore, with systematized thoughts; yet not only with these, but also with spontaneous thought, and with sensation, sentiment, and will, and with all the complications of these, and all the relations and circumstances under which they arise, and to which they give rise: all which are excluded from logic and mathematics. Politics has principal reference to the actions of men, and incidentally to thought, sentiment, and will, because from these all acts proceed. It cannot, like logic and mathematics, perform its functions by abstracting thought from will and sentiment, because its objects are real persons and their nature and actions; and in real life, action involves thought, and sentiment, and will, in blended and inseparable synthesis. There is no conscious act that does not flow from the three united. As well might we expect animal locomotion from nerves alone, without bone and sinew, as expect will and action without thought and sentiment. And as well might we decide upon the whole system of animal action from a microscopic inspection of a few nerves, without ever having seen them in action in their organic combination, as decide upon the social duty

and action of man from an aprioral (hypothetical) inspection of rational thought, independent of sensation, sentiment, and will, and the circumstances in which he is to act. A science of vital functions, that would treat only of the analysis and structure of dry bones, would be quite as satisfactory as a science of politics that would treat only of abstract duties, or rather abstract ideas of duty.

We have no intellectual chemistry that enables us so to analyze human action as to obtain will, and sentiment, and thought separately, even if it were of use to treat them thus. With the barometer, thermometer, and hygrometer we may learn much about the condition of the atmosphere; but we have no instruments for measuring the proportions in which will, thought, and sentiment do actually combine in producing a given action, and we can have no aprioral measure of the proportions in which they ought to combine. We cannot even define the line between spontaneous and reflected thought; it is perhaps very different in different individuals. It is one of the elements of our freedom, that all such calculations are impossible. But we perceive that, besides showing that the author's analogy is unfounded, we have been proving that his method is a false one; and we pursue this thought.

Is abstract deductive politics possible? From what are they to be deduced? We admit the transcendental, so far as the term expresses those original principles, or intellectual and moral instincts of our nature that are the condition of all thought and morality, and experience in general, and in so far as it acknowledges that their origin is inexplicable, except by faith that God made us so. But it is only by experience and induction that we can know the character, properties and operations of these principles, and thus we learn that they are continually varying and developing. And we admit the transcendent, in so far as the term expresses the character of ideas that are beyond our present capacity of definition and clear thought, and also of those that are beyond all possible definition of finite minds. But from the undefined no reliable deduction can be made. We cannot from uncertain premises proceed to any definite and certain conclusion. If we try to mend the matter by an arbitrary definition expressive

of what we understand by some first principle; we may start from that, and by deduction build up a perfectly consistent system. But it will be merely systematized thought, without a semblance of evidence that it answers to any system of things, events, or principles in the world. The result is a mere ideal structure.

Kant, in order to get a footing for aprioral deduction, assumed that the world must regulate itself according to our knowledge; and Des Cartes had done the same before, or what was, by some, taken in the same way. On this principle, philosophical systems became mere constructions of consequential thought, without reference to real things. Of this character is Spinoza's construction of God and the world out of his idea of substance. And the deductive theories of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are of the same character, though differing in their assumption of first principles. This seems very like a return to the old realism of the schools, which treated ideas as being real things, and, in a certain sense, as the only true things. But the world cannot afford to retrace its steps. It will insist that substance, being, and reason, in the abstract, and divested of all properties, accidents and relations, are nothing for the mind, and that they have no existence. In nature all is concrete and nothing abstract, and systems built on abstractions must be systems of nothing but thought. The builder first creates the material—abstract substance, for instance—by chipping off all its natural properties; and then proceeds with his edifice. Surely, if any truth comes out of such labour, it is not from any virtue in the principles that it starts with. If the abstract deductive method is the true one, then man has always been learning by an inverse process; and when he abandons this, and resorts to the new road, he will have to abandon nearly all the best principles of his nature, and will find himself in total darkness and helplessness.

The author adopts the abstract deductive method, and professes to erect a system of politics out of our ideas of justice and duty. We pronounce this utterly and most obviously impossible. If he had attempted to erect a concrete deductive system, founded on the nature of man, ascertained by a careful induction, he might have obtained some principles of great use

in a more proper method. The ideas of justice and duty are necessarily relative. Applied to man, they are ideas of human relations, and for man they can have no abstract value. All our ideas of justice and duty are concrete and particular, or generalizations of particulars. It is quite as absurd to attempt to construct a system of politics out of abstract ideas of justice and duty, as to attempt to construct a true representation of the real world out of the abstract idea of substance or being.

It is the province of pure politics, says the author, "to lay down its rules of perfect and abstract political right;" rules "investigated by the intellect alone, and capable, like mathematical propositions, of universal verification," p. 33. And again he says, "just as pure mathematics seeks to determine the universal and abstract qualities of spaces, numbers and quantities, so does politics seek to determine the universal and abstract relations of man, and to found them on axioms that are capable of universal verification," p. 37. Again, "politics is the science that treats of the original and immutable relations of man," p. 56.

We stop not for verbal criticism. It is apparent that the author's politics is intended as a system of mere ideas. He is not at all to consider man in his actual relations, circumstances, and conditions; but merely ideas of what he calls relations of man, and which yet arise out of no real beings. We say that there can be no such relations; and therefore, taking him at his word, his politics is a science of nothing. But he does not mean this. What then can he mean? Evidently nothing more than that he has certain ideas of social perfection and of perfect human relations; and that, as these ideas can be constructed into a system, it must be the design of Providence that the world shall conform to them. His system is therefore entirely subjective, and his politics is the supposed law of the social world, under whatever moral, intellectual or physical conditions and circumstances it may be. We are not sure that the author saw all this; but we are very sure that we have rightly translated his confused thought.

It might be thought that such empty speculations stand in no need of being exposed; but herein the author is a type of a very large class of talkers and writers, who cause great dis-

turbance to the progress of society. This form of reasoning, more or less developed and comprehended, seems to be the natural and almost the necessary form of philosophizing for youthful and immature zeal; for, lacking a large observation of appropriate facts, and the clear conceptions and generalizations derived from them, it has not the materials for inductive philosophizing. And, lacking the patience necessary to obtain them, and the caution and sobriety which they nourish, it is easily seduced into the open paths of abstract deduction, where no shadows of real things obscure the scientific vision, and where its progress is embarrassed by no undergrowth of error, imperfection, ignorance or prejudice. And when such persons obtain, in this way, what they regard as new and important ideas, they are almost sure to regard themselves as apostles commissioned for their immediate propagation; not merely as ideas to be learned, and which will, of themselves, grow with practice when learned; but also as ideas that are at once to be enforced upon all, irrespective of any rule of fitness in time and place.

But surely the teaching and progress of truth is well compared to the sowing and growth of seed; and in both it is wise to consider the adaptation of soil and season and climate to the work to be done, and also the preliminaries of clearing and ploughing. The Great Teacher did not leave us without instructions in relation to this. He taught in parables to many, because they were not in a condition to receive the truth in a more abstract form. The concrete form of parables might be received and remembered, and might some day find a fitting place in their minds, where it could grow and develop its healing virtues. Even for his disciples, he had truths which were withheld, because they could not bear them then. And when he sent them to teach, it was with the caution, that where the people did not receive them kindly or persecuted them, they should depart and seek a soil ready for the seed. For those who would disseminate truth, it is surely an appropriate instruction—"Be ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves;" not for fear of those who persecute and kill; but because the normal growth of truth requires a favouring soil, and suitable conditions of the social atmosphere.

As a man may have seed which he knows not how to plant and cultivate, so a man may have knowledge which he knows not how to communicate. The teacher needs prudence and skill, rather than great learning. Truth cannot be forced by either the power or the intellect of man. It must be received and grow by the combination of its vital force with favouring intellectual and moral conditions. That is not true skill that scatters principles indiscriminately as to soil or season. Order is an element of truth, and truth must be communicated in order. We do not teach the differential calculus to those who have not learned arithmetic and algebra, nor do we teach human equality to boys and savages. There is much truth that cannot be received truly, until there is a prior preparation of the intellectual soil, and being untruly received, it produces only weeds. The stomach that can digest only milk, rejects stronger food or turns it into a poison of the system. The science of teaching has not yet received its proper share of thought.

This abstract deductive method can make no allowance for differences in intelligence, condition, age and circumstances; and hence, when applied by ignorant or narrow minded men, it is essentially arrogant, intolerant, uncharitable and disorderly. There the one law for all is the subjective law of him who sets himself up as the censor of other men. He would teach those that are willing to receive his doctrine; and rule, by his doctrine, those who would not receive it. The course of history reveals many sects that have been generated out of this system, and have died by it. The Gnostics, Novatians and Donatists, and numerous monastic orders are examples of this. Many such sects exist in our own day. In politics also, socialism and the history of parties furnish many examples.

On this principle life may be an activity according to certain fixed laws to which it must necessarily conform, like the activity of an engine, or of a perennial spring; but it is not a growth, in which principles and tendencies are gradually developed, and in which new hopes and duties arise according to capacity and moral condition and external circumstances. It must measure all acts and all persons by its one standard, and by it the poor widow's mite is a worthless contribution com-

pared with that of pharisaic ostentation. It gets its standard of truth by the abstraction and rejection of all that we do know about anything, and by analysis and synthesis of the pure substance, or being, or reason, or something else that remains, about which we can know nothing. Moreover it starts with an abstraction by which reason is set apart by itself and sentiment rejected altogether. As well might the blossom, just beginning to form its fruit, disown all the growth of the tree, and the process by which it was itself developed. The sentiments may be purified and elevated, but they can never be discarded as elements of human action. There is a necessary synthesis in all living nature. The crucible and the microscope may sharpen our powers of investigating nature, but they can never control its activities. They may reveal the gases and fibres that enter into its constructions, and may turn them to other purposes, but by no manipulation can they control the principles of life. In all the abstractions of Hume, Berkeley, Spinoza and Fichte, they could never get clear of the synthetic power of common sense, or our mental spontaneities; it ruled them still. It holds the world in order and stands as an adamantine rampart against all the assaults of mere deductive philosophy. A breach is now and then made in it, but common sense is full of vital force and soon supplies the materials for its repair. One valiant philosophic knight after another falls, and his armour is hung upon the wall, and his retainers are dispersed; and the real power of the world—its intellectual instincts, or common sense in the common mind—still moves onward to the accomplishment of the world's destiny, honouring and following other leaders, who do better work, and with less noise.

A mere deductive logic may, by a long course of training, force its cold rationalism into several generations of men in particular localities, and then it partially suppresses many of the finest sympathies of our nature. It may thus save from temptations to which those sympathies subject us; but it also deprives of the hopes, and joys, and moral improvement which they tend to develop. It does not suppress the sentimental elements of our nature, but forces them into an abnormal growth, making men arbitrary, censorious, obstinate, and

uncharitable. Those who are thus trained have a system complete in all its parts, admitting of no growth from within, professing uncompromising hostility to every sentiment, thought or act, that surpasses or falls short of their standard, and condemning all men who do not grow according to their rule, even though greatly their superiors. Their selfishness and vanity are offended at differences which they do not comprehend, and for which they make no allowance; and hence they are very apt to be disorderly radicals in relation to all customs and institutions that do not fit their system, however well they may fit in with the life of a people, and however necessary they may be for its harmonious and orderly development.

Referring to natural analogies, we see that all growth is inductive. All life is nourished by the concrete, and not by the abstract. We have divine authority for the analogies between truth and seed, and between truth and food, and we need not fear that a cautious use of these analogies will mislead us. Seed manifests its vitality only when placed in favouring circumstances of earth, moisture, warmth, and light; without these it can have no development, and with them, in unsuitable proportions, its development must be irregular and incomplete. Abstracted from these conditions it is as dead matter. It grows by pushing out its roots and leaves in all directions, seeking after the concrete elements of nature, and appropriating them to itself by means of a spontaneous analysis, followed immediately by a new synthesis, by which they enter as constituent parts of its organic nature. This process of analysis and synthesis is an essential part of its vital action; when this ceases life is ended; and this cannot be performed for it by any external agency. The analyzed elements of earth, and air, and water, though imparted in due proportions, could not sustain its growth; for it can live only by its own process of analysis and synthesis. In its growth, it is continually changing its form and structure, and it is only when it has advanced to an appropriate maturity, that it has any tendency to bear blossoms and fruit.

So it is with food and animal life. The stomach acts not on abstract, but on concrete food. The pure nourishing elements

of food would be poison to the system. Analysis, digestion, is a necessary function of its life, and it can synthetize or assimilate only what it has itself analyzed. It must do its own analysis and synthesis, for part of its functions are applied to the rejection of the residuum which cannot enter into its organic system; discrimination is part of its life; and the animal, in its growth, is continually changing, and developing new tendencies. It is especially so with man, because of his much more various faculties. From childhood to old age, the physical tendencies are continually undergoing change, and producing altered habits of action. Youth cannot entirely comprehend this, and age is apt to forget it, and to expect even youth to be conformed to its standard.

We know of no analogies equal to these for representing the process of spiritual growth by means of truth. Mental growth commences by a spontaneous observation of the concrete things and facts of external nature, followed in due time by a spontaneous analysis and synthesis of them. The child begins life by simply noticing what exists and takes place around it, naming things and facts, and retaining them in its memory. Without this process it can have no mental growth, nothing to draw out its physical and mental activities, and nothing that can ever be an object of its thoughts. In all this process, its sentiments are developing themselves in joyous activity, and drawing it in earnest race after new objects of intellectual gratification. It is in this manner, all spontaneous and not reflecting, that it acquires its power and its materials for subsequent abstraction and generalization, when the time for reflecting and reasoning comes. Without this spontaneous process, in which the sentiments and perceptive faculties have the field to themselves, reflection and reasoning could never take place, for they could have no object. The mind cannot know even itself without observing with the utmost care the forms in which it acts in its spontaneous, as well as in its reflective and calculated development. All its generalizations are necessarily derived from observing nature within and without it. All its abstractions are from known objects, and they are results, rather than principles of mental processes. The mind cannot feed on abstractions, any more than the plant or

the animal on pure carbon. Its life consists in doing its own work; and making abstractions and generalizations is part of that work. All our faculties act spontaneously in the first steps of their development, and it is by observation that we discover their existence and nature, and learn how to apply and improve them. As spontaneously as the plant pushes out its roots and leaves, seeking after food and growing by it, so spontaneously does the mind direct its perceptive faculties to the acquisition of the facts of nature, and its analytic and synthetic faculties to their comprehension and generalization, and grows by the knowledge thus acquired, and by its own activity exercised in assimilating and using it. Rationalism is helpless without these God-given spontaneities, which it desires to disown.

Of the same spontaneous character is the origin of all political association and its institutions. Not rationalism, but sentiment, presides over the process. We have many sentiments, as those of love, sympathy, friendship, patriotism, justice, respect, shame, and the desires of society, esteem, power, eminence, and of receiving and imparting knowledge, that could have no development without society. These are the elements of that social affinity that is essential to human nature, and that forces it into social combination. Social organization is, in its origin, quite as spontaneous, starting its practical development in the respect, obedience, and unity of the family relations. All nature tends to a kind of social harmony and organic form, from the elements of the earth to the elements of cosmical systems—from the crystal up through all the grades of the vegetable and animal world to man himself. Even in the insect and higher animal races, the instinct of social organization is everywhere manifest. Man cannot be without it. Its elements may be found in the sentiments already named, in man's natural desire for order, his natural respect for his superiors, and his natural tendency to form social customs. The organic form is subject to great modifications according to the purposes in which the association takes most interest, to its degree of civilization, and to the dangers that beset it. There can be no absolute or irrelative form. Self-defence is the first law of all organization, and every association will spontaneously take the

form best suited for this, as nearly as they know how, if danger be the absorbing idea of organic action.

There can be but very little rationalism in the forms of social organization, until man has made a large advance in the science of mind; for without this we can no more anticipate the results of any given forms, than we can calculate an eclipse without a knowledge of astronomy. Spontaneity first, criticism afterwards, is the natural order of all human progress. Language and reasoning are spontaneous forms of the organization of thought; and grammar and logic are reflected forms of criticism of this organization, and the derivation of rules for its accuracy and improvement; and mathematics is a species of logic, devoted to the criticism of thought about space and number. Poetry, art, and oratory take the same course. But criticism can never enable us to lay aside our spontaneities. No rational or physiological skill can ever enable the intellect or the will to take a conscious and intelligent control over each atom, or even each fibre, that is active in producing our muscular activity. And so it is with the mind itself: clusters of mental fibres are concerned in every act of thought; and our analytic skill can never reach the point of being able to combine, proportionate and command the action of these several fibres at our pleasure. And so it is with society. No analysis can follow the fibres of social thought and sentiment through all their infinitely varying diversities, or measure out the rational forces by which they are to be commanded. It is only by observation and careful generalization, that the hidden laws of social development and action are to be brought to light. We can have no well-founded philosophical deductions except such as proceed from such generalizations. All valid deduction is, therefore, founded on a previous induction, and can never have a greater degree of certainty than the general principles from which it starts; and, because these can never, in social matters, have the definiteness and necessity of mathematical axioms, the deduction stands in need of all possible verifying aids, before it can be proclaimed as anything more than merely probable truth.

The inductive method is most modest and orderly in all its characteristics. It is not abstract reason, first creating

itself, and then dictating to nature how it must manifest itself; but it is the human understanding, studying with the utmost care the tendencies and affinities of dead matter, and the growth and operations of all vegetable and animal beings, with the utmost respect for the very nature of each, in order that man may know the laws of the relations between him and them. It is especially respectful to nature, when it approaches the study of man and society in order to ascertain the natural laws which preside over all the relations of men with each other. It dictates no political laws for the government of man, except such as it has ascertained, by the careful study of man, to be consistent with the developed principles of his nature, and with his condition and his hopes. It proceeds according to the analogy of growth, and regards all life as a constant anticipation of the future and a preparation for it, by the collection and assimilation of the materials that are to fit it for its higher destiny. With it, life is always a growing upward to flower and fruit; and not a starting from the flower itself, as abstract deduction does. With it, laws change according to the development produced by cultivation and teaching; and therefore, as legislator, it follows in their wake, leaving to the crabtree its thorny growth until cultivation has improved its disposition, and to the savage his wild customs until the teacher has elevated his aims and his faith. When society rises high enough to place a proper value on its higher moral and intellectual rights, politics will know how to protect them, and not till then.

Induction has none of the impotence that the author and other mere deductive philosophers charge against it, as never being able to rise above actual experience: for it has within it vital principles that are continually elevating experience itself, and enlarging its spiritual sphere. Its power is proved by the immense advance which the physical sciences have made, by its method, in modern times, and by the respectable progress which it has caused in the intellectual, moral and political sciences. These may hope to make still more rapid progress, when they learn to reject the alchemy of abstract deduction, with all its aprioral, transcendent, and pretentious gropings, and its sublimated and illusory manipula-

tions of empty thought. Induction is the natural method of enlarging and generalizing our knowledge, and it has within it a vital force that insures its growth. This demands generalizations, which, though founded on experience, far surpass any individual experience in extent and comprehension; and it urges experience itself onward to still larger experience. There are many spontaneous sentiments of our mental nature—such as wonder, hope, courage, reverence, desire to hypothetize and to test and verify hypotheses, and discontentment with confused and imperfect conceptions—which, when obeyed and cultivated, continually impel us onward to broader generalizations and higher principles; and these are aided by the sentiments of relief and joy that follow and crown successful effort. And accompanying or involved in them all, there is philosophic faith, reaching out after causes and principles, and urging the mind onward and upward after larger and nobler and higher attainments than it has yet accomplished, and ever repelling the thought of impotence for further progress.

ART. II.—*Elements of Physio-Philosophy.* By LORENZ OKEN, M. D., Professor of Natural History at the University of Zurich, &c. Translated by Alfred Tulk. London, 1847, pp. 665.

As critics of Philosophy, we feel it to be a duty to expose, by an analysis of its products, that false method of philosophizing which ignores the humble induction that Newton did not think too low for his genius, and affects to pursue a higher and more intellectual path of investigation. The Rational Cosmology of Dr. Hickok, which is a product of this ambitious method, has recalled to our mind another product of it, the Physio-Philosophy of Oken, the late distinguished Zurich Professor. In our earlier days we read such works as Hickok's and Oken's, with the same emotions that in our childhood we listened to the narratives of Munchausen. But since the his-

tory of speculation has taught us the truth of the remark of Varro, that no doctrine is too absurd for philosophical credulity, we have almost lost the faculty of wonder, and like the anatomist we dissect doctrinal monstrosities for the sake of contrast with that which is true. Dr. Hickok professes to have revived the philosophical method of Plato; and if our readers wish to know what that method is by its fruits, we refer them to the Timæus, in which Plato has propounded a Cosmology that is only nonsense, so much so as to call in question its authorship. Dr. Hickok's first sentence is:—"There must somewhere be a position from whence it may clearly be seen that the universe has laws which are necessarily determined by immutable and eternal principles." Now, it behoved Dr. Hickok to inquire, whether such a position be within the sphere of legitimate thought; for if it be beyond the limits of human understanding, it must be by shuffling off human consciousness and ascending by intellectual intuition after the method of Schelling, that such an exalted Pisgah can be reached by man. In fact Dr. Hickok, in the third sentence of his book, admits, that only the absolute reason can stand on such an intellectual eminence. And he adds: "But the finite reason, with its partial insight, must have too limited a comprehension of the eternal principle, to be able adequately to follow out all its determined results from itself, without reference to the facts that have been determined by it to guide his intuitive processes." And in the ninth sentence he says: "Hence his [finite reason] only sure progress must be, first an apprehension of the principle, more or less inadequately, and then following out the principle in its necessary laws by reference to the actual facts that have already been determined by it." Now, this is a great coming down from the scientific apocalypse which was foreshadowed in the first sentence. The first sentence is now seen to be a wholly impertinent declaration, like telling us that God is omniscient, as a preliminary to telling us that man has only partial knowledge. But the assumption that the principles of science are apprehended before the facts of the science, is absurd enough, without claiming for man the ability to stand on the position first pointed out by our author as "somewhere"! But so far as man is concerned, we make bold to

say, it is *nowhere.* The glaring errors, defying even the laws of mechanics, to which this false method has led Dr. Hickok, have already been sufficiently exposed in this journal for April last. And although Dr. Hickok repudiates the method of German transcendentalists, his, after all, is but a modification of the one common error, that in physics there is another method than the inductive, which starts out from facts of experience and climbs to principles. It would be easy to show that Dr. Hickok's doctrine involves the assumption that man can attain to a point of knowledge where *cause* and *reason* are identical. That nature is a *rational* creation and subjected to *rational* principle, is the opening harmony with which the book begins; but the reasonings soon show the doctrine to be utterly out of tune with the facts that have to be *rationally* explained in a *rational* cosmology. The one test problem of a possible *rational* cosmology is, *Are physical causes rational?* Can *cause* and *effect* be brought to human conception, as under the *rational* law of reason and consequent? Can the *reason* for gravity be assigned? We do not mean by *reason*, the adaptation of end and mean. But we mean by reason, such an exclusive necessary antecedent of gravity, that, without thinking of adaptation, to deny it involves an insuperable contradiction upon the mere relation of the antecedent and consequent. This is the test question of a possible rational cosmology.

But let us go from Hickok to Oken! In his book Oken professes to deduce the All from the Nothing. He boldly assumes that the processes of nature and the processes of ratiocination are parallel and identical; and that reasoning and creating are the same.

His book is in three grand divisions, Mathesis, Ontology, and Biology. As nature or the universe is a development from unity to multiplicity, so these divisions bear a relation of development to each other. Mathesis treats of the whole; Ontology, of singulars; and Biology, of the whole in singulars. *Nothing* is the starting point, and *everything* is the goal to which the ratiocination conducts. Such being the plan and the scope of the book, we will show how its purposes are accomplished, and what doctrines it teaches, by quoting from each division a few sentences as samples.

The fundamental doctrine of the book is enounced in these words: "The universe or world is the reality of mathematical ideas, or in simpler language, of mathematics." And "this (says the book) is not to be taken in merely a quantitative sense . . . . but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things are numbers themselves." Such being, according to the book, the nature of the universe, the science which explains it must, of course, be mathematical. Accordingly, the book says: "Philosophy is the recognition of mathematical ideas as constituting the world, or the repetition of the origin of the world in consciousness." In conformity with this notion of the province and end of philosophy in general, the book defines its own special science in these words: "Physio-Philosophy has to show how, and in accordance indeed with what laws, the material took its origin; and therefore, how something derived its existence from nothing. It has to portray the first periods of the world's development from nothing; how the elements and heavenly bodies originated; in what method by self-evolution into higher and manifold forms, they separated in minerals, became finally organic, and in man attained self-consciousness." This is the doctrine of development, which made such a noise in the Vestiges of Creation, and which Swedenborg in his Principia thus articulately propounded: "We finally show that in every drop of water is contained every single thing which had hitherto existed from the first Simple, as also the whole genus of Finites, Actives, and Elementaries; consequently that in a single drop of water is latent the whole Elementary world both visible and invisible." As Man, according to Oken, is the last object whose origin and nature is to be accounted for, his book tells us, at once, Man's relation to all of nature that originates before him in these words: "Man is the summit, the crown of nature's development, and must comprehend everything thas has preceded him, even as the fruit includes within itself all the earlier developed parts of the plant. In a word, Man must represent the whole world in miniature. Now, since in Man are manifested self-consciousness or spirit, Physio-Philosophy has to show that the laws of spirit are not different from the laws of nature: but that both are transcripts or likenesses of each other." Such is the con-

ception of science given in the Introduction to the book. And it is clear, that every *rational* cosmology must, in logical consistency, assume that the laws of spirit and those of nature are likenesses of each other. On no other hypothesis is such a science possible.

With such doctrines enounced in the Introduction, the book proceeds to the first division, Mathesis. It is in this fundamental part of the treatise, that Oken puts out his strength; for it is here that he has to educe something from nothing. And mathematics is the instrument by which he is to do this. The marvellous ratiocination thus performs the creative process: "The highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental principle of all mathematics is zero = 0. The whole science of Mathematics is based upon zero. Zero alone determines the value in mathematics. Zero is nothing in itself. Mathematics is based upon nothing, and consequently arises out of nothing. Out of nothing therefore it is possible for something to arise, for mathematics, consisting of propositions, is a something in relation to 0. Mathematics itself were nothing if it had none other than its highest principle zero. In order, therefore, that mathematics may become a real science, it must, in addition to its highest principle, subdivide into a number of details, namely, first of all into numbers, and finally into propositions. What is tenable in regard to mathematics must be equally so of all the sciences; they must all resemble mathematics." This reasoning reminds us of the Irishman's mode of casting cannon: "Take a *hole*, to be sure, and pour the melted iron around it."

But let us see how Oken steps from Mathematics to Nature. "The Eternal (says he) is the nothing of Nature. As the whole of mathematics emerges out of Zero, so must everything which is singular have emerged from the Eternal or Nothing in nature." And further: "The continuance of Being is a continuous positing of the Eternal, or of the nothing, a ceaseless process of being real in that which is not. There exists nothing but nothing, nothing but the Eternal, and all individual existence is only a fallacious existence." As the book proceeds it becomes a little more specific; and, therefore, we find the nothing becoming more tangible, as in the following: "The

line is a long nothing, the surface a hollow nothing, the sphere a dense nothing; in short, the something is a nothing which has received only predicates. All things are nothings with different forms." And these nothings are combined and held together in a world by nothing. For the book says: "Gravity is a weighty nothing." So much for the doctrine of *nothing* pregnant with *everything*.

As the book, as we have shown, declares in the outset, that all things are composed of mathematical ideas, the reader will doubtless be curious to know how such a doctrine can be applied to man. "Man (says the book) is the whole of arithmetic compacted, however, out of all numbers; he can, therefore, produce numbers out of himself." And nothing daunted in his convincing ratiocination, Oken tells us—"Theology is arithmetic personified." From this notion of theology, we will show what are Oken's ideas of God.

"God (says the book) is a rotating globe. The world is God rotating." Again: "God previous to his determination to create a world was darkness; in the first act of creation, however, he appeared as fire. God's whole consciousness, apart from individual thoughts, is fire—the world is none other than a rotating globe of fire." "Every thing that is has originated out of fire." The presumption of such declarations as the foregoing, calls to our mind what old Emerson, the British mathematician, said in his Algebra, of John and Daniel Bérnouilli: "These men talk as if they were God Almighty's privy councillors, and that nothing was made without their advice."

We will now proceed to the second division, Ontology, and exhibit some of its doctrines. And we will first quote a luminous passage on the nature of light: "Light is time that has become real." And the nature of water is thus expounded: "If the essence of water consists in the contest between form and formlessness, it must thus seek to produce fluidity everywhere." And the metaphysical nature of rain is revealed in this intelligible sentence: "All rain is the extinguished function, the dying spirit of air." And of the sun it is taught: "The sun is a true gelatinous animal, a body trembling through its whole mass, and therefore phosphorescent." The follow-

ing consummation in geology is instructive: "Salt concludes the growth of the earths; it is the eruption or breaking out of the soul, as the metal was the body of earths completed. Both finally pass into a higher world, the metal into the *corporeal*, the salt into the *psychical*."

Our readers are perhaps tired of such philosophy, we, therefore, will conclude, after we have given a few sentences from the last division, Biology: "Galvanism is the principle of life. There is no other vital force than galvanic polarity. . . . A galvanic pile pounded into atoms must become alive. In this manner nature brings forth organic bodies." "Light shines upon the water and it is salted. Light shines on the salted sea, and it is alive." "The whole sea is alive."

We will finish our citations with the following: "Gazing upon a snail, one believes that he finds the prophesying goddess sitting upon the tripod. What majesty is in a creeping snail, what reflection, what earnestness, what timidity, and yet at the same time what firm confidence! Surely a snail is an exalted symbol of mind slumbering deeply within itself."

We have given our readers a glimpse of the last consummation of German speculation. Jacobi said, that when he read Oken, he did not know whether he was standing on his head or his feet. We have read the ponderous volume more than once, to see how baneful is a false method of philosophizing, destroying the common sense of the ablest minds. For it must not be supposed by our readers that Oken was either a fool or a madman. Professor Agassiz, in his masterly essay on classification prefixed to his Natural History of the United States, thus speaks of Oken: "About the time Cuvier and the French naturalists were tracing the structure of the animal kingdom, and attempting to erect a natural system of zoölogy upon this foundation, there arose in Germany a school of philosophy, under the lead of Schelling, which extended its powerful influence to all the departments of physical science. Oken, Kieser, Bojanus, Spix, Huschke, and Carus, are the most eminent naturalists, who applied the philosophy to the study of zoölogy. But no one identified his philosophical views so completely with his studies in natural history as Oken.

"Now (proceeds Agassiz) that the current is setting so strongly

against everything which recalls the German physio-philosophers and their doings, and it has become fashionable to speak ill of them, it is an imperative duty for the impartial reviewer of the history of science, to show how great and how beneficial the influence of Oken has been upon the progress of science in general and of zoölogy in particular. It is, moreover, easier, while borrowing his ideas, to sneer at his style and his nomenclature, than to discover the true meaning of what is left unexplained in his most paradoxical, sententious, or aphoristical expressions; but the man who has changed the whole method of illustrating comparative osteology—who has carefully investigated the embryology of the higher animals, at a time when few physiologists were paying any attention to the subject, who has classified the three kingdoms of nature upon principles wholly his own, who has perceived thousands of homologies and analogies among organized beings entirely overlooked before, who has published an extensive treatise of natural history containing a condensed account of all that was known at the time of its publication, who has conducted for twenty-five years the most extensive and complete periodical review of the natural sciences ever published, in which every discovery made during a quarter of a century is faithfully recorded, the man who inspired every student with an ardent love for science, and with admiration for his teacher—that man will never be forgotten, nor can the services he has rendered to science be overlooked, so long as thinking is connected with investigation."

We quote this passage from Agassiz, both to show the position of Oken in the history of science, and to censure the unqualified praise bestowed on a philosopher with so false a method of philosophizing. The "thinking connected with investigation" must be subordinated to facts. And especially must the physical and the spiritual be discriminated, which is not done by Oken, and we are sorry to say, is not sufficiently done by Agassiz himself in his writings on natural history. We therefore set off the nonsense which we have adduced from Oken against the praise by Agassiz, without putting ourself to the trouble of showing that Agassiz underrates the pernicious influence of the German physio-philosophical method of investigation, in proving, from his own writings, that he often employs

it himself. At the same time, however, we cannot withhold our admiration of his contributions to natural history, and our expression of thanks to him for his noble essay on classification, while we demur to his notion about the unity of the human species.

Art. III.—*Classification and Mutual Relation of the Mental Faculties.*

The subject indicated by this title will vindicate its importance, as we proceed in the discussion of it. It will be seen to have a bearing on some of the most important questions relative to the sphere of human responsibility, sin and grace, anthropology and soterology. Besides the intrinsic importance of the subject, the publication of Hamilton's Lectures offers an additional motive for surveying it under the fresh and strong light which they throw upon it.

The accepted classification of the powers of the mind, until a comparatively recent period, was twofold—intellectual and voluntary, under the respective heads of understanding and will. The following statement of Reid describes with sufficient accuracy the doctrine on this subject in and before his day.*

"The powers of the mind are so many, so various, and so connected and complicated in most of its operations, that there never has been any division of them proposed which is not liable to considerable objections. We shall, therefore, take that general division which is the most common, into the powers of understanding and those of will. Under the will we comprehend our active powers, and all that lead to action, or influence the mind to act; such as appetites, passions, affections. The understanding comprehends our contemplative powers, by which we perceive objects, by which we conceive or remember them, by which we analyse or compound them, and by which we judge and reason concerning them."

* Reid on the Intellectual Powers: Essay I. Chap. 7.

To the same effect Edwards says:*

"I humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though there were two faculties. All acts of the affections are in some sense acts of the will, and all acts of the will are acts of the affections. All exercises of the will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the soul's appetition or aversion; or, which is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another; but love and hatred are affections of the soul. Therefore all acts of the will are truly acts of the affections; though the exercises of the will do not obtain the name of passions, unless the will, either in its aversion or opposition, be exercised in a high degree, or in a vigorous and lively manner."

According to this distribution and nomenclature, will is used to include all the powers of the mind except the cognitive; that is, all whose functions terminate in action or prompting to action rather than in knowing. Dugald Stewart classifies all these powers which had been previously included under the term *will*, under the generic designation of "moral and active powers"—a phrase which has since had extensive currency. According to this method, will, instead of being the genus under which all the appetitive, emotional, and optative powers rank as species, is simply one species co-ordinate with the various other species of faculties, included in the genus, "moral and active powers."

This is a considerable advance towards that threefold primary distribution of the mental faculties, which has been adopted by nearly all later psychologists, and which sets intermediate between the intellect and will, a class of powers under the generic title of feeling, or sensibility, or susceptibility, or emotion, or other equivalent phrase. Under this head are included all mental powers which lie between cognition on the one hand, and deliberate choice or matured volition on the other—the appetites, passions, affections, emotions, desires, inclinations, etc. The more common phraseology in vogue to

* Edwards's Works, New York edition, vol. iv. p. 83.

denote this distribution of the powers of the mind is, intellect, sensibility, and will.

In themselves, the particular classification of the mental powers, and the nomenclature denoting it, are of small moment, so long as, under the various modes of distribution, the same essential faculties or modes of activity, in themselves and their reciprocal relations, are recognized and admitted. Up to this point, it is a question not of truth or fact, but of convenient arrangement, and perspicuous expression or definition. But it is quite obvious that the two-fold classification rules out certain theories in regard to the will's independency of the desires and feelings which some contend for, and which is compatible with, though not demanded by, the three-fold distribution above mentioned. If the dependence of the will on the feelings and desires be admitted, this inevitably implicates it with the intellect, since it cannot be denied that the feelings and desires are dependent on, as they are shaped and evoked by, the apprehensions of the intellect. This mode of conceiving of the mind and its powers, is wholly incompatible with that style of reasoning which treats the different classes of faculties, or modes of the soul's activity, as if they were different agents or entities—either a triad, a thinking substance, a feeling substance, a willing substance, or a duality, i. e. a cognitive substance, independent of the sensitive and optative. No one of course consciously or intentionally maintains any such dual or tripartite constitution of the soul. But there are many modes of thinking and reasoning which depend upon some such covert hypothesis for even the appearance of plausibility. The following are specimens. Dr. Taylor's celebrated formula for solving the mystery of the existence of moral evil, that the will or "power of choice is a power to choose morally wrong or morally right *under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action*,"* is utterly inexplicable and absurd, except on the hypothesis, (which the author never meant to adopt,) that the will is an agent independent of the intellect and the feelings. Dr. Tappan defines the will as that "which has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will

* Taylor's Moral Government, vol. i., p. 307.

indifferent, for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its action would be necessary."* Again: "The only escape from necessity, therefore, is the conception of will as above defined—a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly which may act in the indifferency of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion."† Again: "The reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or creative or modifying power in itself, self-moved, self-directed."‡ Such representations are plainly inconsistent with the unity of the human soul, and the most familiar facts of consciousness. Instead of one cognitive, sentient, optative agent, whose thinking, feeling, and willing, all mutually interact and determine each other, it sets forth the will as a separate and independent agent, with "creative or modifying power in itself," so that it may act either in opposition to the views of the understanding, to the highest pleasure and strongest inclination of the soul, or in "the indifferency of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion." Such language implies a pair or a triplet of agents in the human soul. Yet this is not the author's doctrine, although it is logically implied in his theory of the will. He tells us elsewhere, "the will is so conditioned in its relations to the other faculties, and in the unity of the mind, that it cannot go into action, unless supplied with objects, aims, and laws, by the reason and the sensitivity."§ Is not here a plain contradiction? Can the will at the same time act "without reference to the reason and the sensitivity," and be dependent on them for its "objects, aims, and laws"? This mode of reasoning, which implies not only distinction, but the separate being of the intelligent, emotional and voluntary powers, is no necessary consequence of this threefold distribution of the mental faculties. As we shall presently see, it is far from

* Tappan's Review of Edwards on the Will, p. 221.

† Id. p. 227. ‡ Id. p. 244.

§ Tappan on the Will, p. 300.

being embraced by the highest authorities in favour of such a distribution.

For reasons already in part indicated, those who class all the faculties of the mind under the heads of understanding and will, seldom tend towards any such breach of the soul's unity. Since, on this theory, the desires are included under the will and determine its choices, while they are guided and evoked by the views of the intellect, which in its turn is largely excited and determined in its activity by the feelings and will; all these are thus but diverse yet reciprocally intertwined modes of the energizing of the one rational sentient, voluntary mind. So Reid well represents in a passage immediately following that already quoted from him.

"Although this general division may be of use in order to our proceeding more methodically in our subject, we are not to understand it as if, in those operations which are ascribed to the understanding, there were no exertion of will or activity, or as if the understanding were not employed in the operations ascribed to the will: for I conceive there is no operation of the understanding wherein the mind is not active in some degree. We have some command over our thoughts, and can attend to this or that, of many objects which present themselves to our senses, to our memory, or to our imagination. We can survey an object on this side or that, superficially or accurately, for a longer or a shorter time; so that our contemplative powers are under the guidance and direction of the active, and the former never pursue their object, without being led and directed, urged or restrained by the latter." * *

"And as the mind exerts some degree of activity even in the operations of the understanding, so it is certain, that there can be no act of will which is not accompanied with some act of understanding. The will must have an object, and that object must be apprehended or conceived in the understanding. It is therefore to be remembered, that in most, if not all the operations of the mind, both faculties concur; and we range the operation under that faculty which hath the largest share in it."

It is only in this view that the maxim, "nothing is moral which is not voluntary," which Chalmers felt constrained to

enounce with "all the pomp and circumstance of a first principle," can be accepted—at least if it be applied beyond external acts to the interior exercises and states of the soul. If the will be regarded as including the desires and feelings, as both influenced by and itself influencing the judgments of the intellect, the maxim will hold, otherwise not. For nothing is more surely attested by consciousness, by the universal language and conduct of men, and by the most explicit testimonies of the word of God, than that the desires, affections, feelings, and even judgments of the mind in regard to things moral and spiritual, are themselves moral and responsible. Dr. Chalmers, overlooking the breadth of the word will, voluntary, &c., according to former usage, sought to reconcile these undeniable facts with the foregoing maxim, by making the character of the desires and feelings contingent on the choice of the will, viewed in its restricted sense, as the mere faculty of choosing or purposing distinct from them. The difficulty with this solution is, that the facts are all the other way. Regarding the will as distinct from the desires, its choices are directly determined by them; they are in accordance with the preponderant desires, while it in turn can only very indirectly and partially control these desires.

This threefold distribution of the powers of the mind has served the exigencies of those who deny all moral character to the desires, feelings, and dispositions. Using will in the restricted sense, and applying the maxim that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, they easily reach the conclusion that only volitions and acts consequent on them have moral quality; and not only so, but that these volitions must be acts of a power of self-determination or contrary choice, "despite all opposing power," "without reference to reason or passion," judgment or inclination. This, however, may be easily shown to be rather a perversion of this classification than a disproof of its validity. The most thorough and trust-worthy thinkers now adopt it, so drawing their lines of demarcation, and explaining the grounds and nature of the partition, as to avoid the pestilent errors to which we have alluded. We will quote first from Dr. McCosh, and then from Hamilton, whose de-

velopment of the same essential view is more scientific and complete. Says Dr. McCosh:

"We think it high time that writers on mental science should be prepared to admit that there is a separate class of states of the mind, which, for want of a better, we may call by the term WILL, or, as we should prefer, the OPTATIVE states of mind."*

"We hold the will to be a general attribute of the mind and its operations manifested under various forms. It says of this object, It is good—I desire it; of that, It is evil, I reject it. In its feeblest form, it is simply wish, or the opposite of wish; and according as it fixes on the object as more or less good or evil, it rises till it may become the most intense desire or abhorrence. In its most decisive form, it is resolution or positive volition. When inconsistent objects present themselves, and the mind would choose both if it could, there may for a time be a clashing or contest. Where there is no clashing of desires, or where one of the contending desires has prevailed, and the object is declared to be better or best, and where it is also ascertained to be attainable, then the will assumes this form—I choose this; I resolve to obtain it. This, the consummating step, is commonly called volition, to distinguish it from simple wish or desire. And we hold that it is the same attribute of the mind which says, this object is good, I wish it, and desire it; and which says, on there being no competing good, or no good esteemed as equal to it, I choose it."

"It is of the utmost moment, even in a psychological point of view, to distinguish between the emotions and the will. We cannot comprehend man's nature and constitution, without conceiving of him as endowed with more than a mere emotional impressibility or receptive sensibility."†

This distribution differs from that of Hamilton, only in the terms used to denote it. For the word "optative," Hamilton uses "conative," and he does not, like McCosh, use the word will to denote desire. We quote at some length his exposition of his views, both for the sake of the intrinsic light it sheds on a subject so important and so difficult, and as evidence of the

* "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," p. 275. † Id. pp. 277–8.

doctrine of the most eminent of recent philosophers in relation to it.

"But taking, again, a survey of the mental modifications, or phenomena, of which we are conscious—these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great classes. In the first place, there are the phenomena of knowledge; in the second place, there are the phenomena of feeling, or the phenomena of pleasure and pain; and, in the third place, there are the phenomena of will and desire.

"Let me illustrate this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of all—I am conscious of perceiving a certain complement of colours and figures—I recognize what the object is. This is the phenomenon of cognition or knowledge. But this is not the only phenomenon of which I may be here conscious. I may experience certain affections, in the contemplation of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be unalloyed; but if it be an unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon of feeling—or of pleasure and pain. But these two phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the picture long—to see it often—to make it my own, and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so to do. This is the complex phenomenon of will and desire.

"The English language, unfortunately, does not afford us terms competent to express and discriminate, with even tolerable clearness and precision, these classes of phenomena. In regard to the first, indeed, we have comparatively little reason to complain—the synonymous terms, *knowledge* and *cognition* suffice to distinguish the phenomena of this class from those of the other two. In the second class, the defect of the language becomes more apparent. The word *feeling* is the only term under which we can possibly collect the phenomena of pleasure and pain, and yet this word is ambiguous. For it is not only employed to denote what we are conscious of as agreeable or disagreeable in our mental states, but it is likewise used as a synonym for the sense of touch. It is, however, principally in relation to the third class that the deficiency is manifested. In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of ade-

quately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the *nisus* or *conatus*—the tendency towards the realization of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire, a blind and fatal, tendency to act. Now, to express, I say, the tendency to overt action—the quality in which desire and will are equally contained—we possess no English term to which an exception of more or less cogency may not be taken. Were we to say the phenomena of *tendency*, the phrase would be vague; and the same is true of the phenomena of *doing*. Again, the term, phenomena of *appetency*, is objectionable, because, (to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression,) *appetency*, though perhaps etymologically unexceptionable, has both in Latin and English a meaning almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin *appetentia*, the Greek ὄρεξις is equally ill-balanced, for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in English the term *orectic*. Again, the phrase, phenomena of activity, would be even worse; every possible objection can be made to the term *active powers*, by which the philosophers of this country have designated the *orectic faculties* of the Aristotelians. For you will observe, that all faculties are equally active; and it is not the overt performance, but the tendency towards it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The German is the only language I am acquainted with which is able to supply the term of which philosophy is in want. The expression *Bestrebungs Vermögen*, which is most nearly, though awkwardly and inadequately, translated by *striving faculties*—faculties of effort or endeavour—is now generally employed, in the philosophy of Germany, as the genus comprehending desire and will. Perhaps the phrase, phenomena of *exertion*, is, upon the whole, the best expression to denote the manifestations, and *exertive* faculties, the best expression to denote the faculties of will and desire. *Exero*, in Latin, means literally *to put forth*—and, with us, *exertion* and *exertive* are the only endurable words that I can find which approximate, though distantly, to the strength and precision of the German expression. I shall, however, occasionally employ likewise the term *appetency*, in the rigorous

signification I have mentioned—as a genus comprehending under it both desires and volitions."

"This division of the phenomena of mind into the three great classes of the cognitive faculties—the feelings, or capacities of pleasure and pain—and the exertive or conative powers—I do not propose as original. It was first promulgated by Kant, and the felicity of the distribution was so apparent, that it has now been long all but universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of every school; and, what is curious, the only philosopher of any eminence by whom it has been assailed—indeed the only philosopher of any reputation by whom it has been, in that country, rejected, is not an opponent of the Kantian philosophy, but one of its most zealous champions. To the psychologists of this country, it is apparently wholly unknown. They still adhere to the old scholastic division into powers of the understanding and powers of the will; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into intellectual and active powers."

"By its author, the Kantian classification has received no illustration; and by other German philosophers, it has apparently been viewed as too manifest to require any. Nor do I think it needs much; though a few words in explanation may not be inexpedient. An objection to the arrangement may, perhaps, be taken on the ground that the three classes are not co-ordinate. It is evident that every mental phenomenon is either an act of knowledge, or only possible through an act of knowledge—for consciousness is a knowledge—a phenomenon of cognition; and, on this principle, many philosophers—as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Platner, and others, have been led to regard the knowing, or representative faculty, as they called it—the faculty of cognition, as the fundamental power of mind, from which all others are derivative. To this the answer is easy. These philosophers did not observe that, although pleasure and pain—although desire and volition, are only as they are known to be; yet, in these modifications, a quality, a phenomenon of mind, absolutely new, has been superadded, which was never involved in, and could, therefore, never have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowledge. The faculty of knowledge is certainly the first in order, inas-

much as it is the *conditio sine qua non* of the others; and we are able to conceive a being possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and yet wholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, and of all powers of desire and volition. On the other hand, we are wholly unable to conceive a being possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same time, without a knowledge of any object upon which his affections may be employed, and without a consciousness of these affections themselves.

"We can further conceive a being possessed of knowledge and feeling alone—a being endowed with a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the exercise, and of grieving at the restraint, of his activity—and yet devoid of that faculty of voluntary agency—of that conation which is possessed by man. To such a being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be determined to energy through a pain or pleasure—through an estimate of the relative worth of objects."

"In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters;—in nature they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyze the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination. These elements are found, indeed, in very various proportions in different states—sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another; but there is no state in which they are not all co-existent."

"Let the mental phenomena, therefore, be distributed under the three heads of phenomena of cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; phenomena of feeling, or the capacities of pleasure and pain; and phenomena of desiring or willing, or the powers of conation."

"The order of these is determined by their relative consecu-

tion. Feeling and appetency suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, therefore, stand first. But as will, and desire, and aversion, suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and painful, the feelings will stand second as intermediate between the other two."*

Few who have attended to this subject, and felt its difficulties, will fail to appreciate the aid which this luminous discourse contributes to its elucidation. It clears much of the obscurity and confusion which have so long clouded it. Still it is not exhaustive, or in all respects unquestionable. And here we take occasion to say, that while few set a higher value than ourselves on Hamilton's contributions to philosophy, we hope that his writings will warm into life no school characterized by a servile adherence to his opinions. Those opinions on some subjects, especially the "relativity of human knowledge," causality, the absolute and infinite, in our opinion, require to be subjected to the test of a rigorous, competent, and impartial criticism, and to be severely qualified, in order to leave a sure foundation either for knowledge or faith. In regard to the foregoing passage, we have simply two comments to offer.

1. Both Hamilton and McCosh imply, if they do not expressly affirm, that mere feeling or emotion, as distinguished from desire and will, has no moral character. This is true of some feelings and emotions, but not of others. It depends wholly on what the feeling is, subjectively and objectively, in itself and its object. Feelings of pleasure in view of acts of injustice, fraud, violence, licentiousness, malice; of pain at the triumph of truth, or the presence and influence of holy men, are plainly immoral and criminal. So to rejoice in the moral improvement, the conversion, or growth in grace of another, and to grieve over his downfall and apostasy, are morally right and praiseworthy. Those who were "glad" at the diabolical proposal of

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., pp. 127—131. We quote from the Boston edition, published by Gould & Lincoln, an excellent reprint of the British edition, on fine paper, and in large clear type, which it is a pleasure to read. We take this method of bringing the American edition to the notice of our readers, which we inadvertently omitted to do in our last number—the article on Hamilton in it making exclusive reference to the Edinburgh and London edition.

Judas, were certainly and deeply criminal therefor. Luke xxii. 5. Such as "have pleasure in those" that do things worthy of death incur the condemnation of God and all right-minded men. Rom. i. 32. In short, while other feelings are indifferent, feelings in regard to things of a moral and spiritual nature are morally right or wrong according to their nature. They are energizings of soul which emit and evince its purity or corruption. This we deem a principle of great moment in morals, religion, and especially Christian doctrine and experience.

2. In the passage just quoted, Hamilton says: "By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal tendency to act." Such a statement demands earnest and profound consideration. That which may properly be described as a "blind and fatal tendency to act," is thereby divested of moral quality and responsibility. There are, doubtless, desires of this description, as we shall presently see. But our desires in regard to things strictly moral are neither "blind" nor "fatal" nor irresponsible. Desire is distinguished from volition by being spontaneous rather than deliberative. But it is none the less free and intelligent for that.* Are not covetousness, inordinate ambition, all malevolent desires free, intelligent, and culpable, although they have not as yet ripened into any deliberate volition or purpose? Are not benevolent desires, holy aspirations, the desire to glorify God and bless man, free, intelligent, and morally worthy and commendable, even when no opportunity is offered for volitions, purposes, and overt acts in gratification of these desires? No unper-

* Dr. Archibald Alexander, speaking of the maxim that all moral actions are voluntary, says: "The word *voluntary* as employed in the maxim under consideration, includes more than volition; it comprehends all the spontaneous exercises of the mind; that is, all its affections and emotions. Formerly all these were included under the word *will*, and we still use language that requires this latitude in the construction of the term. Thus it would be consonant to the best usage to say, that man is perfectly voluntary in loving his friend and hating his enemy; but by this is not meant that these affections are effects of volition, but only that they are the free spontaneous exercises of the mind. That all virtue consists in volition is not true, as we have seen; but that all virtuous exercises are spontaneous, is undoubtedly correct. Our moral character consists radically in our feelings and desires."—*Moral Science*, pp. 207, 208.

verted conscience can waver as to the true answer to such questions. And whoever may hesitate, the word of God places the matter beyond all controversy. For to those who do not otherwise know lust as sinful, the law says, "Thou shalt not covet." It condemns fleshly lusts, which war against the soul. It denounces emulations, wrath, strife, hatred, as works of the flesh lusting against the Spirit, and therefore excluding from the kingdom of God. (Gal. v. 19—21.) But to adduce all the scriptural proofs, express and implied, of this truth, would be to quote the whole Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse.

There is, however, a class of desires that are both "blind and fatal," and therefore irresponsible, except so far as indulging or curbing them is concerned. These are the animal appetites, which are uneasy sensations generating a desire for what will allay them, and returning periodically after they have been allayed. These are the *coecae cupiditates* of the ancients. They arise without any exercise of reason, and are entirely irrespective of any apprehensions of the mind. This is their specific difference which distinguishes them from the desires we have been considering. Those are evoked by the cognitions of the intellect, and reach forth towards the objects thus set before them. Now it is obvious that these desires in themselves possess no moral quality. Our whole responsibility terminates with our agency in restraining or denying, indulging or enkindling them. The following observations by Dr. Archibald Alexander on this subject seem to us eminently sound and judicious.

"We cannot extinguish the animal feelings by an act of the will; they arise involuntarily, and therefore cannot be in themselves of a moral nature. Yet as man has other principles and powers by which he should be governed, he becomes faulty when he neglects to govern these lower propensities in accordance with the dictates of reason and conscience. But in regard to other desires and affections, they are good or bad in every degree in which they exist. For example, not only are malice and envy sinful when ripened into acts, but the smallest conceivable exercise of such feelings is evil; and as they increase in strength, their moral evil increases. It does not require an act of volition, consenting to these feelings, to render them

evil; their very essence is evil, and is condemned by the moral sense of mankind.

"A clear understanding of this distinction might have prevented or reconciled an old dispute, viz. whether concupiscence was of the nature of sin, in the first rising of desire, prior to any act of the will."*

This, as all competent persons must see, strikes at the very root of the great controversies respecting sin and grace. And it is no less evident that the psychological and metaphysical questions which emerge out of the subject we are now discussing, reach very far into the field of anthropology and soterology. It is on this account that these questions are invested with permanent importance and dignity.

With this dissent from some of Hamilton's statements in connection with the distribution of the mental faculties, we think the distribution itself eminently luminous and philosophical. Not the least important of his observations are those in regard to the necessary dependence of the powers of feeling on the intellect, and of desire and will on both feeling and intellect together with the fact that these various forms of the soul's activity, though capable of being distinguished, are inseparable from, and mutually implicated in, each other. We shall devote the residue of this article to some remarks on the unity of the soul, and the reciprocal interaction of the cognitive and optative faculties—of the intellect and will, in the broad sense of the latter term.

It is a cardinal principle, which rises almost to the eminence of a first truth, that the mind or soul of man is one, however diverse its faculties or modes of operation; even as the body is one organism and substance, however various its members and forms of activity. This truth is often forgotten or obscured by modes of reasoning which imply that the will is a separate substance from the intellect, just as independent of it, as one soul is from another: also that the desires and affections are not less separate from the will and intellect; and that all three departments of our nature, the voluntary, the emotional, and the intellectual, are not like the pulse and lungs, and blood,

* Moral Science, pp. 145, 146.

the mutually dependent workings and developments of one common life, but the separate and independent activities of different agents—as it were of an angel, man, or devil. How common is it for men to reason on these subjects as if the same person might be in intellect an angel, in will a man, in feeling a fiend! Now the human soul is no such double or triple essence as this. It is one, indivisible, self-same soul, that knows and thinks, that feels and wills. This is a first truth. Let it not be supposed that a man can be in thought an angel, in feeling a fiend; in opinion an atheist, in his affections devout; in his thoughts a hero, in his feelings a coward; in his intellect an unbeliever, in heart a saint. "As a man *thinketh in his heart*, so is he." That there is in fallen humanity greater or less conflict between the decisions of conscience and other judgments, apprehensions, feelings, and purposes of the soul, is true. But this is not so much a war between the thinking and feeling faculties, as between the judgments and emotions of conscience on the one hand, and other judgments and feelings of the one identical mind on the other, as we shall yet more fully see. But whatever this conflict be, it is the effect and the evidence of a fallen state of the soul. In its original integrity and normal actings, there is no discord. All is harmony, not only between the different faculties, but between the different actings of the same faculties.

The intellect and will plainly differ from each other, as it is the province of the one to know; of the other to desire or choose. The formal object of the one is truth, of the other good; i. e. if we know anything, we know it as true. If we desire or choose anything, we desire or choose it as good; i. e. as worthy, lovely, or pleasant. It may, however, happen through the imperfection of our faculties that what we take for truth may prove false—and, through our depravity, that what we take for good, may be evil. Nevertheless, what the will chooses, it chooses under the notion of its being good; just as the intellect perceives a thing under the notion of its being true. As Edwards says, "The will is always as the greatest apparent good." "Apparent good," observe, not necessarily, of course, real or intrinsic good; good in the sense of

being pleasant, fitted to gratify the longings of the soul at the time. It is impossible to give a definition or analysis more philosophically accurate than the inspired record presents in its description of the origin of the first sin of our race. Mark the language; Gen. iii. 6, "And when the woman saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree *to be desired* to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." When the will chooses any object, therefore, it does so in view of its being on the whole, *in the existing state of its desires*, better, i. e. more to be desired than any competing objects. It is in short "as the greatest apparent good." This being evident and undeniable, a great principle follows, which brings to view the first nexus between the operations of the will and the intellect. It is this. Before anything can be chosen or desired by the will as good, it must be seen or apprehended as such. How is it possible to choose or desire what is not seen to be good or desirable? Every one's consciousness teaches him that it is not. Now to see or apprehend is an act of the intellect. Hence it follows,

1. That there can be no act of the will or optative faculties without some corresponding cognition of the intellect to guide it. It cannot choose to desire without light from the intellect to direct it. In the order of nature, too, if not of time, this intellectual apprehension or discernment, must precede the choice of the will, else how can it guide that choice? This however needs not to be argued. If any one says he can conceive of a choice, without first knowing or discerning the object chosen, he is plainly beyond the reach of argument. Not only, however, is there this *a priori* necessity that the mind can choose nothing which it does not first perceive; but,

2. As has already been hinted, the mind can only choose what is viewed as good or desirable. It can only desire what is viewed as attractive; and among the things thus viewed as pleasing or desirable, it will, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all, elect that which seems best, i. e. most pleasing or desirable. Here again the exercises of the intellect are not only implicated with, they take the lead of, they guide, they in a high degree determine the exercises of will and desire. There

is no such divorce between the will and intellect, and their respective actings as many have contended for. It is one and the same mind in the same complex act, discerning, desiring, wishing, choosing one and the same object. But among its faculties it is past all doubt that the understanding is, or of right ought to be, at the head. The will, including the sensibility and inclinations, is the motive energy—(hence called moral and active) like the engine of a steamship. But the understanding is the helm, the directive power which determines the course of this motive energy, and of the whole man as moved by it.

3. But if the understanding leads the will, in the sense explained, the will reacts upon and leads the intellect. Their influence is reciprocal, although that of the understanding is first in order and power. It is a familiar fact that the judgments of the intellect are much affected by our desires and preferences, our likes and dislikes. Men are very apt to think as they desire to think—as interest, taste, passion, prejudice, a friendly or unfriendly bias disposes them to think on all subjects. How constantly do they make their thinking and reasoning powers the slaves and dupes of their passions!

This is emphatically so in regard to moral and religious truths. When the will and desires are corrupt or averse to truth and righteousness, they suborn the intellect to do their bidding—to call evil good and good evil; to put light for darkness and darkness for light; to become a false, because a prejudiced witness. Thus the language of inspiration exhibits the perverse will as enticing the mind away from the true knowledge of God; while right feelings restore it to true wisdom. The language of the wicked is declared to be, "Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways. Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him? and what profit should we have, if we pray unto him?" On the other hand, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding." Let a man in his feelings dislike any just person, or any duty, and all his judgments and reasonings in regard to them will be perverted and poisoned thereby. They will be dragooned into subserviency thereto. To

vindicate what is liked; to make the worse appear the better reason, are among the most familiar intellectual phenomena.

It must not be forgotten, however, that these feelings of aversion or preference (for reasons already indicated,) in their rise, were implicated in the views of the intellect, as these evoke, guide, and shape our emotions, desires, volitions. The common phrase, "to *conceive* an aversion or preference," shows how, in the common judgment of men, the intellect is concerned in the genesis of our desires and feelings. The constant phraseology of Scripture shows how indissolubly united are the will and understanding in all moral acts and states. We are there told of the thoughts of the heart; the desires of the mind; the understanding darkened; of men being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart. But it is needless to accumulate authoritative testimonies and arguments. It is enough to refer each one to his own consciousness. And among its most obvious phenomena is this, that in reference to objects of choice we generally think as we feel, and feel as we think. It is no argument to the contrary, that men in their desires, purposes, and conduct, fall below their convictions of duty. This only proves that the soul is seduced by some competing attraction, which, for the time being, and without good reason, is viewed by it as more desirable. The judgments of conscience, its emotions of pleasure or pain, have not been allowed their rightful supremacy. Other views and emotions have been allowed to thrust themselves into the foreground; to usurp the command which belongs to the decisions and emotions of conscience—the true monarch *de jure*, if not *de facto*.

But it may be inquired, how is it possible for the intellect, which is made to apprehend truth and evidence, to evade their force, or fail to be controlled by them? How can the will prevent the natural working of the intellect or forestall its judgments, especially since, as we have already seen, the understanding is or should be the ruling faculty? This is a fair question. In regard to the first upspring of desire and volition, it has undoubtedly been shown, that the cognitive faculties must take the lead. How then can will or desire prevent

or blind the intellect? This brings us to another and most important point of correlation between conative and intellective powers, showing the influence of the former over the latter. We say then,

4. That the will largely controls the judgments of the intellect, by controlling its acts of attention. *Attention is in most cases a voluntary act.* We attend to objects, only as we will or determine so to attend to them. Hence, the world over, men ask attention to what they have to say, as if they considered such attention a purely voluntary act. Belief they do not ask for as if it were at the option of the will to give or withhold it, when evidence is fairly attended to and appreciated. But they ask whether, in view of the proofs they offer, any can help believing the proposition they advocate. They treat the act of attention as depending on the will—conviction as depending upon the proofs adduced, attended to, and duly weighed.

Although then our intellectual judgments and convictions depend upon and are controlled by evidence, yet, without attention to this evidence, it can never be effectively before the mind, or be estimated, or followed by its due effect. And this attention is a voluntary act. Here, in our view, we find the clew to some of the most mysterious and perplexing facts in our mental operations. The first is, that it is the nature and office of the intellect to discern and be convinced by truth and evidence. The second is the undeniable fact that it is often swayed by passion, prejudice, wilful (will-*full*) resistance to truth and evidence. How can these two things co-exist—an intellect whose convictions must be controlled by evidence, and yet in fact often judging in utter defiance of all evidence, in obedience to the behests of a depraved will? Simply because the will can often divert the mind from such evidence or aspects of evidence as are unwelcome to the mind. Is not this the secret of the mistaken, perverse, and even wicked judgments so often formed in spite of evidence? Is it any excuse for errors thus imbibed, that they are honestly entertained? Is not the cause of them manifestly culpable? Can good intentions sanctify wrong acts, which, if we had candidly searched and weighed the evidence, we could not but have known to be

wrong? Then are the greatest cruelties of tyrants and persecutors justified. Paul was innocent in hunting the saints to death. The barbarous atrocities of the French Revolution, and of the Hindoo idolatry, can be alike justified. Jesuitism is the only true morality, and the end sanctifies the means. The immutable distinction between right and wrong is obliterated. Men then are responsible for their opinions on moral subjects.

The fact that attention is a voluntary act, leads to another important practical consequence. We have shown that it gives the will great control over the truths and evidences that may be brought to bear on the mind. We have also seen that the purposes and desires are largely swayed by the views and conceptions of the intellect. Hence it follows that the will, though it cannot change the affections and desires immediately by any purpose or determination to do so, may yet often indirectly exercise a considerable influence over them. It may and constantly does decide what objects and truths shall occupy the attention of the mind. But the objects and truths held in the mind's view go very far to determine the character of its affections and desires. No emotion can arise in the soul, unless in view of its appropriate object. The feeling of filial affection cannot arise unless we think of our parents. The fear and love of God cannot arise if God be banished from the thoughts. The love of truth, goodness, beauty, cannot arise in a soul which ignores them, or keeps them out of sight. If one allows his mind to gloat over the pleasures of sensuality and licentiousness, and turns it away from the excellence and loveliness of purity and goodness, he will nourish pollution in his soul. They who will not retain God in their knowledge, will not of course keep him in their affections. Thus we see that in most exercises of the will, the intellect and the desires are mysteriously implicated, that they interact with and upon each other in reference to all objects of choice; that the will is dependent on the intellect for light, and is governed by its views, while in turn it reacts upon the intellect, affecting its judgments, controlling its attention to the evidences and facts on which its judgments depend; in short, that it is not will alone, nor intellect alone, that is concerned in choice, but

the one individual soul at once choosing as it sees, and seeing, to a great extent, as it chooses. Agreeably to this, the Scriptures teach that it is one and the same thing to love and to know God. Both are eternal life. To know him truly is to see that in him which awakens love. To love him is impossible for those who do not thus know him.

There is indeed much knowledge which excites no desire, and leads to no act of will. To know that there are innumerable grains of sand on the sea-shore does not necessarily awaken any desire for them. The whole optative faculty may be indifferent to them, and to a multitude of objects. The converse, however, is not true. There can be no *desire* or volition without knowledge. And in regard to rational desires and choices on the one hand, and all cognitions of the intellect relative to objects of choice on the other, it is clear that they can no more be sundered, than the flesh can be torn from the bones, or the bark from the tree, without disintegration and death.

And it can scarcely be doubted which is the guiding faculty. In so far as the intelligence or reason fails to have the lead, our desires, choices, and actions, can neither be intelligent nor rational. We become the creatures of blind fortuitous impulse —even as the beasts that perish. To this issue does all depravity tend—hence so often termed FLESH in Scripture. Neither desires nor feelings can have any moral character that are in no sense dependent on or related to reason or intelligence. If our desires and volitions become corrupt, the intelligence shares in that corruption. It constantly happens, indeed, that men do violence to their conscience and better judgment. But it is none the less true, that they persuade themselves for the moment that they have a reason for doing so, which excuses them, or mitigates the atrocity and baseness of their conduct. All such errors of principle are culpable, because they arise from a culpable refusal or neglect to ascertain and weigh the facts in the case. They hate the light, and will not come to the light, because their deeds are evil.

In general, it may be said, that we know that we ought to obey conscience and to seek all possible light to guide its judgments. This is both an intellectual and emotional faculty—

adapted at once to guide and to determine, as we know it ought, the choices of the will. We know that we cannot refuse to give it all due light, or to obey its enlightened dictates, or allow false views, apprehensions and desires to overbear it, without the deepest criminality. Whether we commit sin knowingly, or not knowing what we do, we are guilty. For we ought to have known, desired, chosen, done our duty. There is nothing that we know more intimately and surely than that all the thoughts and desires and actions ought to be subject to the conscience, and that conscience an enlightened one.

It is here to be observed, in accordance with what has been said before, that the intellect views things under a twofold aspect. 1. In pure cognition, as true. 2. When acting as a guide to the will, as good or desirable. Now many things may be viewed as true, under the first aspect, without being viewed either as things to be desired or shunned. That the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles—that here is a forest and there a plain—are things known as true—but it does not necessarily follow that they are viewed with desire or aversion. On the other hand, we may view things as desirable, which we cannot believe to have any real existence except in our own imaginations—as that the earth were a theatre of painless and paradisaic bliss. Again, we may see a tree—and viewed as simply having existence, we may be indifferent to it. But if it be viewed as beautiful in shape and foliage; as affording a grateful shade; as a decoration of our premises, it may thus be apprehended as in the highest degree good and desirable.

This leads us to repeat another remark, viz. that while there may be, and are, many acts of the intellect that are merely and exclusively cognitive, which incite no exercises of desire or volition; i. e. which view objects simply as existent and true, without thinking of them as desirable or undesirable; yet the reverse is not true; there can be no outgoing of desire or volition without an antecedent exercise of intellect which perceives the object chosen or desired, and apprehends it as desirable or otherwise.

Here we have the clew to one of the most undeniable and important truths of religion, while it is among the most difficult to be logically defined and explained. We refer to the

blindness which the word of God everywhere ascribes to sin and unbelief; and the spiritual illumination which it affirms to take place in regeneration—and this in regard to those truths which in some respects are perfectly known, understood, and believed. Many who know and believe speculatively the truths of Christianity are the subjects of this blindness, and need to have it dispelled before they will ever love or choose religion. How then is this to be explained? Simply thus. They discern everything in these truths but that which is most important, their infinite beauty and attractivenes, that which once apprehended at once draws the heart after it. They see everything in Christ, but that he is chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. To them there is no form nor comeliness in Him or his religion that they should desire Him. They apprehend, in short, all but that which if seen would make them desire him, even as according to the example just noted, one may see in a tree everything but that which makes it grateful or attractive—or a rustic would see all the words and letters of Paradise Lost, or all the parts of a splendid edifice, without detecting the element of beauty or attractiveness.

It is further true that, in these moral æsthetics—if we may so call them—this blindness to the beauty of moral excellence is itself sin. It is mysteriously implicated with the workings of desire and will. It cannot exist without a culpable closing of the eyes to the evidence in the case; it constitutes but does not excuse a material part of our depravity; it is on the footing of all moral blindness which arises from the deceitfulness of sin; and is no more excusable than that state of mind in which a man sees nothing better or more desirable in virtue than in vice.

If the foregoing analysis of the connection between the intelligence and the emotional faculties be correct, then we learn where to rank that sentimentalism which places all virtue in mere sensibility and beautiful emotion, uninformed by intelligence, and unguided by principle. This mawkish sensibility, substituted for intelligent and high-toned conscientiousness, forms the ideal standard of excellence which is glorified at the expense of knowledge and virtue, in novels as frail as the paper and the gilt in which they are bound; and for the most part

forms the web and woof of our Pickwick literature. If any are in danger of adopting a standard of character so impotent and effeminate, so degrading and demoralizing, let us remind them that it is in keeping for irrational brutes and dead matter to be the passive creatures of unintelligent impulse, the sport of blind fortuity. But man is rational and intelligent. He abnegates his higher nature, when he disowns his reason to be swayed by mere emotion—when, for the pole-star of clear and manly principles he takes the fire-fly light of passion for his guide and law!

Practical and Speculative Reason. We have noted the difference between those exercises of the understanding which take a purely speculative view of an object, and those which take that view which apprehends it as good, as a thing which is or ought to be desired and chosen. To this latter class belong the judgments of conscience, and not only these, but also those perceptions and judgments regarding objects which tend to incite desire or volition. With reference to this distinction in the exercises of the mind, and more particularly with reference to the judgments of the moral faculty, Kant made a distinction between the Speculative and Practical reason. In the sense which we have already pointed out, there is a solid ground for such a distinction, i. e. if by practical reason we understand the faculties of the mind which take those views of objects that directly excite or tend to excite desire, volition, action, as distinguished from those which have no such tendency. It is to be observed, however, that in all cases of right feeling, the practical view harmonizes with, it does not contradict, the speculative view, although it may go beyond it. The two are parallel or concentric. They do not cut or cross each other. In other words, before I can desire or choose, or try to obtain a tree, I must speculatively believe its existence; and still farther, that it is desirable to possess. Kant's object in setting up the distinction between the Speculative and Practical Reason was wholly inconsistent with this view. His theory of the Speculative Reason led logically to scepticism as to all things outside of the Ego or Reason; in other words to subjective Idealism. Of course it subverted Religion and Morals. To escape this dire consequence, with a "noble inconsistency,"

as it has been justly called, he asserted the existence of the Practical Reason, meaning thereby the conscience which gives the ideas of freedom, God, immortality, right; whose judgments, he said, are valid, although directly contradictory to the conclusions of the Speculative Reason, when rightly exercised. They are indeed valid against all arguments to the contrary. The only mistake lies in supposing that the Speculative Reason rightly exercised, asserts the contrary.

It is in this region, we apprehend, that we find whatever of truth lies in some analogous and cognate distinctions between the theology of the intellect and of the feelings, Christianity as a doctrine and as a life. There is just as much and as little ground for them as for Kant's distinction between the Practical and Speculative Reason, to which, in the form in which it is now fashionable to present them, they may trace their fatherhood. The only truth in them is that the æsthetic, moral and spiritual view of objects is more and better than the barely speculative, but not that it is contrary to or subversive of any true speculation or doctrine. It may overbear a false dogma or speculation; but it supposes and requires true doctrine as the ground in which it roots itself, the trunk on which it is engrafted. A rustic may spell the syllables and words of Paradise Lost and be utterly blind to its beauty. But then how can one perceive its beauty who knows not its syllables and words? Many persons believe orthodox doctrine and scriptural truths who are wholly void of spiritual life and right feeling. But then, how can one feel aright towards God and Christ, who rejects the truth concerning them as absurd and monstrous? How can he be devout in his feelings, who, with his intellect disowns the truth which awakes devotion? How can he live unto Christ, who rejects the truth as it is in Jesus? But we need not multiply questions which speak their own answers.

By W^m H. Green

ART. IV.—*Jeremias librorum sacrorum Interpres atque Vindex:* scripsit AUGUSTUS KUEPER. 8vo. pp. 202.

De Jeremiæ Versione Alexandrina: scripsit JOANNES WICHELHAUS. 8vo. pp. 188.

WHILE the unbelieving criticism of modern times has denied and to its own satisfaction disproved the genuineness of the Pentateuch, Daniel, large sections of Isaiah, and other books of the Bible, it is remarkable that Jeremiah has not been similarly assailed. This is, we confess, attributable solely to the forbearance of the critics, and they are entitled to all the credit which such unexpected generosity deserves. Jeremiah has no claim to any better treatment than his compeers. His writings are no more certainly his, than theirs belong to them. The external testimony to his authorship, and the internal evidence by which this is corroborated, though conclusive, have no peculiar weight in this case more than in the others. And grounds of cavil might as readily be found here as there. Indeed the great advantage of the mode of reasoning employed by our critical opponents is, that they are never at a loss for proofs whatever may be the conclusion that they wish to establish. This facility of argumentation is, it is true, attended with the inconvenience of setting the critics at irremediable strife with one another, each deducing with equal positiveness from the same premises his own foregone conclusion. And this might give rise to the suspicion that arguments so readily gathered on behalf of any cause and made to sustain the most opposite results, are of no great intrinsic worth. This variance, however, it is to be remarked, is an amicable one; being all agreed upon the main point of refusing credit to whatever establishes prophetic foresight or the reality of a supernatural revelation, the mode of compassing this end is esteemed of secondary importance, and the most irreconcilable diversities may here be tolerated as of small account.

Nor are there wanting sufficient motives for the application of the critical knife. If the mere love of novelty and paradox were not enough of itself, as it often is, there is much in

this book to awaken suspicion of its genuineness in any mind imbued with the principles of the modern school. According to the first chapter, Jeremiah foresaw at the outset of his ministry in the thirteenth year of Josiah, the character and subject of his future predictions and the opposition with which he would meet in their delivery. "This," says Hitzig, (Der Prophet Jeremia erklärt p. 2,) "is only conceivable as a deduction from actual experience, as a prediction *ex eventu*. He could not know this until the middle or the end of his course, and *therefore* the composition belongs to this later time." Fortunately for the genuineness of the chapter, this, like many other predictions of Jeremiah, was fulfilled during the prophet's own life. The great burden of his prophecies, in fact, as it was the grand lesson demanded at that period, was the approaching destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the people. The application of the argument just recited will convince its author at least that a large majority of these prophecies could not have been originally delivered with the definiteness with which they are now recorded. But here again it is only necessary to suppose, that when the prophet committed his discourses to writing, after the destruction had occurred, or at least after things had gone so far that this issue was plain to ordinary sagacity, he consciously or unconsciously modified the form of his earlier anticipations so as to include his later knowledge and experience. Thus the maxim "prophecy is impossible" may be made to consist with Jeremiah's authorship. This to be sure would involve an imputation upon the honesty of the prophet and the sense of the people, which it might be difficult to explain, that he should claim to have predicted repeatedly, long in advance and with the utmost particularity what he never did predict at all, and that they who had been his constant hearers should admit the truth of his claim; still the ends of unbelief are answered, and its advocates are content.

When, however, predictions occur of so stubborn a sort that they cannot thus be compounded with, it might be expected that they would without further ceremony be declared fit subjects of the ban, which criticism stands ever ready to pronounce upon unmanageable cases. When, for example, Jeremiah

xxvi. 11, xxix. 10, fixes the duration of the captivity at seventy years, and chap. l. 51, announces the overthrow of Babylon by the Medes, combined with other Asiatic nations, there is a knot which no patience nor ingenuity can untie, which only the sword can sever. The fulfilment is too signal to be denied. The prophet did not outlive the event. The conclusion would seem to be inevitable, that these chapters did not come from Jeremiah, and yet the critics hold their hand! Hitzig himself, the very last from whom such a favour could have been looked for, enters (p. 391) into a formal argument to establish the genuineness of the prophecy against Babylon, remarking that there is not one spurious prophecy in the entire book.

It must, however, in justice to Hitzig and his fellows, be remarked here, that they have no idea in all this of abandoning their principles. This departure from their accustomed method of procedure elsewhere, is to be accounted for by the fact that the desired end is sought to be accomplished in another way. Each prophecy as a whole is suffered to stand unchallenged, but every passage which is irreconcilable with their ideas of what Jeremiah could have spoken, is set down as an interpolation, or a corruption of the text.

There are two external grounds from which it has been argued that there are errors in the existing Hebrew text of Jeremiah. One is found in the verbal discrepancies in parallel passages in the Hebrew itself, and the other from the comparison of the Septuagint translation of this book, which departs from the Hebrew to a remarkable extent. Before inquiring into the reality of the alleged disordered state of the text, however, it is important to observe that the amount of the corruption, if any exist, must be determined by the evidence, and is not to be assumed *ad libitum*. If the Hebrew requires correction from parallel passages and from the Septuagint, be it so: let the requisite correction be applied. But let it not be left at the mercy of the critics to expunge what they please, on the pretence of errors and interpolations, of whose existence there is not the shadow of a proof, and which there is no reason for suspecting, other than the maxims of unbelief. The interpolations most insisted upon, are in fact passages in which all external authorities concur in the exist-

ing text. Whether the readings of the Hebrew, the Septuagint or of the parallel passages, be adopted, no important evidence of prophetic foresight will be called in question.

The differences between the Septuagint and the Hebrew are, as has already been intimated, very considerable, and abound in all parts of the book. In a vast number of instances individual words, clauses, or sentences, are omitted, altered, or transposed; whole verses, and even paragraphs of considerable length, are not to be found in the Greek, e. g. x. 6—8. 10; xvii. 1—4; xxvii. 1. 21; xxix. 16—20; xxxiii. 14—26; xxxix. 4—13; xlviii. 45—47; li. 45—49; and the predictions respecting foreign nations, chapters xlvi. li., not only succeed each other in a different order, but the entire section containing them is in the Greek transferred to a different part of the book, so as to stand immediately after xxv. 13. The twofold arrangement of these predictions is as follows, viz.

	Hebrew.	*Greek.*
1.	Concerning Egypt.	Concerning Elam.
2.	" the Philistines.	" Egypt.
3.	" Moab.	" Babylon.
4.	" Ammon.	" the Philistines.
5.	" Edom.	" Edom.
6.	" Damascus.	" Ammon.
7.	" Kedar.	" Kedar.
8.	" Elam.	" Damascus.
9.	" Babylon.	" Moab.

These discrepancies are remarked upon by Origen and Jerome, the latter of whom, in addition to his frequent censures of the negligence or license of the translators, brings here the charge of carelessness against the transcribers. Buxtorf repeats, without adopting it, the opinion of R. Azarias, that the Septuagint version was made from a faulty manuscript. The idea of two varying texts of the original thus suggested, has given birth to numberless theories in which their existence is assumed, and various speculations indulged as to their origin and respective merits. Thus according to J. D. Michaelis, one edition of

the prophet's writings was prepared in Egypt after his death, which was followed by the Greek translator, and another in Chaldea, which was preserved in its original Hebrew form by the Jews of Palestine. The ingenious and complicated hypotheses of Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers, will be presented with more detail hereafter. It will be sufficient here to say, that in the judgment of Eichhorn the Palestine edition, or the common Hebrew text, contains the writings of Jeremiah with his latest additions and emendations; while the Egyptian edition was drawn from his unrevised papers, which, as they consisted not of a connected roll but of separate sheets, were by some accident deranged to the extent that we now find them. Bertholdt attributes the differences of text mostly to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor, whose taste was offended by the diffuseness and repetitions of Jeremiah, and who accordingly allowed himself great liberties in abbreviating. The prophecies against foreign powers he thinks to have been at first put into circulation singly, then separately collected and incorporated with the rest of the book both in Palestine and in Egypt, whence their various order and the different location assigned them. According to Movers two independent collations were made of the manuscripts of this book, one in Palestine by Nehemiah, and the other in Egypt, about B. C. 330, which resulted in the establishment of a distinct text in the two countries respectively. With regard to these he lays down the maxim, which is at variance with the evident characteristics of Jeremiah's style, that the briefer is in all cases to be regarded as the true reading. This rule leads him to the conclusion that neither edition was entirely accurate; most commonly he decides in favour of the Egyptian, though sometimes he prefers that of Palestine, and sometimes he thinks both to be erroneous.

The decisive objection to all these theories, and others like them, is that an Egyptian, or any other edition of the original differing from that represented in the common Hebrew Bible, is a figment unsupported by a particle of evidence. Movers, it is true, endeavours to prove a variant text from 2 Kings, Baruch and Josephus. He supposes that he has found in 2 Kings, chap. xxv. the primary form of the text by which the

corresponding verses in Jeremiah, chaps. xl., xli. and lii. may be judged, and he avers that the comparison establishes that the Septuagint has in the main followed the correct edition. But the verbal variations in these and other parallel passages of Scripture can be better accounted for than as errors in the text of one or both. There is no good reason for the assumption that they were at first coincident in every word and letter, and that the existing divergence between them is proof of want of care in their preservation. The differences, such as they are, are without doubt original. The similarity is such as to afford convincing proof that they were derived from a common source, and they may possibly have proceeded from the same pen. But as written in the books of Jeremiah and of Kings there is no reason to believe that the passages were ever more nearly identical than they are now. The general fact brought out by a minute comparison of them is that the language of Jeremiah is fuller even to redundancy, and that of Kings is more concise. Now as the Greek translator betrays the constant tendency to abbreviate and lop off what seemed to him a needless amplification and unessential to the sense, and as moreover he may have had the text of Kings in his thoughts, it has happened in four instances, but only in four, that the Greek version of Jeremiah agrees with Kings in opposition to the Hebrew text of Jeremiah. In other places, however, the translator departs from the text of Jeremiah where it is the same with that of Kings, or agrees with it where that of Kings diverges.

That Baruch, in which large use is made of the language of Jeremiah, mostly follows the Septuagint, is simply because that book was written in Greek. This, therefore, has no bearing upon the question of a Hebrew original with the readings of the Septuagint. The argument from Josephus is, if possible, feebler still. He almost always follows the Hebrew; but inasmuch as in Ant. x. 7, 4, he speaks of Jeremiah as threatening such as stayed in the city with famine and sword, the Hebrew adding in such passages, e. g. xxi. 9; xxvii. 9, 13, a third evil, the pestilence, which is omitted in the Greek, this is adduced as showing that he there drew from a manuscript exhibiting the same text as that from which the Septuagint version was

made. But apart from the fact that Josephus, who wrote in Greek, might readily have drawn from the version itself, he speaks in the very same paragraph of a pestilence prevailing in the city during the siege, which he could not have learned from the account in Kings, and Ezekiel who, in v. 12, vi. 11, etc. according to Movers himself, imitates the language of Jeremiah, names the three evils together, and consequently must have found them all in his Hebrew copy.

The entire subject of the relation of the Greek to the Hebrew text is examined in detail by Kueper, and still more elaborately and exhaustively by Wichelhaus, by the former in an appendix, and by the latter in the body of his treatise named at the head of this article. It is shown by them both conclusively, from the nature as well as the multitude of the variations, that they are not traceable to the ordinary liabilities to error in transcription. The changes have been purposely made, and from the general consistency of the principles on which this has been done they are in all probability the work of the same hand throughout: and they may be more naturally referred to the translator than to some editor of the original, inasmuch as there is no evidence that any Hebrew copy ever existed in which they were to be found. They consist of 1. Abbreviations; the omission or contraction of the customary formulas at the beginning or in the course of a prophecy, vii. 1, 2, xvi. 1; the omission of unimportant words, or of one of two synonymous words or parallel clauses, xxx. 19, xxxi. 28; of a passage which has occurred before, viii. 10—12: comp. vi. 13—15, xxvii. 12—14, (where *αὐτοὶ* of verse 14 has thus been deprived of its subject,) or one which the translator could not reconcile with his ideas, e. g. xxxiii. 14—26, where the perpetuity and multiplication promised to the house of David and of Levi appeared to him not to consist with the fact. 2. Additions; these are much less frequent than the preceding. Words which seem necessary to the sense are occasionally supplied from the connection, xlix. 4, and expressions are sometimes enlarged from parallel passages, xix. 3; comp. xvii. 20. 3. Alterations affecting either the matter or the form. There are many errors in translation, which appear to be due to the incompetency of the translator. Some words are rendered

differently every time that they occur, or nearly so, any sense being given to them apparently that would suit the connection; e. g. שָׁם, iii. 2. 21, iv. 11, xii. 12, xiv. 6; for others the sense of some word which resembles it has been substituted, iv. 6, שָׂם *φεύγετε*, as if from נוס; or they are omitted entirely, xxv. 26. 34, שִׁשַּׁךְ, תְּפוּצוֹתֵיכֶם. Some passages seem to be translated at random, iv. 15, xxix. 24, 25. Frequent changes are also made in number, person, and tense, xxx. 5; or, in the order of words or verses, xxxii. 35—37, 39. In like manner, as has been stated already, chaps. xlvi.—li. are removed from their true position and the prophecies which they contain are disposed in a different order. Chap. xxv. 13, speaks of what Jeremiah prophesied against all the nations. This seemed to the translator the appropriate place to introduce the predictions referred to, and he accordingly inserts them, although he is thereby led to drop verse 14 altogether. It is difficult to see upon what principle the re-arrangement of them has been made. It has the appearance of a purely artificial inversion. Each alternate prophecy is first transposed with the one before it. Egypt, which heads the list, is carried back before Babylon, Moab is set before the Philistines, Edan before Ammon, Kedar before Damascus. The three great powers, Elam, (or Persia,) Egypt, and Babylon, are then transferred to the beginning of the series, exchanging places with Moab, which, as the subject of the largest prediction relating to the minor powers, seemed to form the most fitting close.

That these discrepancies are due to the translator is further apparent, from the general character of the Septuagint, which nowhere confines itself to the original with the rigorous exactness demanded in a modern version. And in the various fidelity with which different portions have been executed, some other books have suffered as seriously as Jeremiah. The order is greatly disturbed in Exodus, chapters xxxvi., xxxix. The passage 1 Sam. xvii. 12—31 is omitted. In Proverbs chapter xxx. xxxi. 1—9 is removed from its proper place, and attached to chapter xxiv. Several entire chapters are added to Esther and Daniel; and the latter was besides so badly translated that a different version was substituted for it in ecclesiastical use. That the author of Chronicles had before

him the present Hebrew text of the book of Jeremiah may be inferred from the reference in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 20 to Jer. xxvii. 7, a verse which has been dropped in the Greek.

The relation of the Septuagint version of this book to the Hebrew has been so complicated with the question as to the plan of this book itself, as to require some consideration of this topic in order to its proper exhibition. The manifest departures from the chronological order have led many commentators to complain of a confusion and an entire want of arrangement. Thus Lightfoot: "The prophecies of Jeremiah are either utterly undated, and so not easily if at all to be referred to their proper time, or those that are dated are most generally dislocated, and it is not easy to give the reason of their dislocation." And Blaney: "The disorder complained of is common to both the Hebrew and Greek arrangements, and consists in the preposterous jumbling together of the prophecies of the reigns of Jehoiakim and Zedekiah, in the seventeen chapters which follow the twentieth according to the Hebrew copies; so that without any apparent reason many of the latter reign precede those of the former, and in the same reign the last delivered are put first, and the first last. As such an unnatural dislocation could not have been the result of judgment, nor scarcely of inattention in the compiler of these prophecies, it follows that the original order has most probably by some accident or other been disturbed." Blaney has consequently rearranged these chapters with the view of restoring their true order, in the following way, viz.

Chapters xx.	xxx.	xxxix. 15—18.
xxii.	xxxi.	xxxix. 1—14.
xxiii.	xxvii.	xl.
xxv.	xxviii.	xli.
xxvi.	xxi.	xlii.
xxxv.	xxxiv.	xliii.
xxxvi.	xxxvii.	xliv.
xlv.	xxxii.	xlvi. etc.
xxiv.	xxxiii.	
xxix.	xxxviii.	

There has been no lack of hypotheses to account for this condition of the book. Spinoza fancied that the prophecies of

Jeremiah were brought together as they were gathered out of several different records of his life. Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers seek to explain, each in his own way, both the duplicate form of the text, and the supposed derangement of the book.

According to Eichhorn, Jeremiah's predictions were unwritten until the fourth year of Jehoiakim. The prophet then dictated to Baruch, xxxvi. 1, 2, what he had up to that time delivered, and after the destruction of that first copy, repeated the dictation, verse 32. As his discourses were thus drawn from memory, no strict order was observed in recording them. Some were recalled only in part, others were blended together, and no definite dates were given. His subsequent prophecies were written upon their delivery, and their dates recorded, these last like the first being preserved not on one connected roll, but upon detached pieces of paper. After the destruction of the city, he prepared an edition of his prophecies for the exiles, which was transcribed from his private papers, the casual order in which they were used upon this occasion being maintained ever after. At a later period, he revised this edition, and introduced numerous emendations and explanatory remarks; the book thus corrected has been perpetuated in the Masoretic or common Hebrew text. Subsequently after the prophet's death, his unrevised papers were transcribed in the order in which they were found, only the prophecies against foreign powers, which had accidentally become deranged, were transferred to the middle of chapter xxv. as their most appropriate place. This was the Egyptian edition afterwards translated into Greek. The agreement and the difference of these two editions seem thus to be explained; and the confusion existing alike in both is laid to the account of an imperfect memory and loose papers.

To all this Bertholdt objects that Jeremiah *read* וַיִּקְרָא xxxvi. 18, his prophecies to Baruch; they must therefore have been already in writing, and a failure of memory can have had no share in deranging them. Besides the same confusion reigns in prophecies since that date, as is observable in those before it, which leads to the suspicion of a common cause. Baruch also wrote upon a single roll xxxvi. 2. 32, and not upon a

number of papers. Or if the prophecies were upon detached papers, as Eichhorn assumes, it would for that reason have been the easier to arrange them chronologically, and it is the less explicable that the first casual order was adhered to in spite of its manifest incorrectness. Nor is it easy to see why the revised form of the prophecies was not circulated among the Jews in Egypt as well as in Chaldea or Palestine.

Bertholdt's own hypothesis is that the prophecies of Jeremiah were put in circulation singly as they were delivered, but no collection of them was undertaken by him nor during his life. When at length this came to be thought of, the prophecies were so dispersed that it could only be accomplished by successive steps. Those concerning foreign powers, chapters xlvi—li. were gathered first in Palestine. Some one who had seen this collection and consequently incorporated none of its contents in his own, succeeded in getting together chapters i.—xxiv. transcribing them upon his roll just as he happened to discover them without any regard to their proper order. This second collection finding its way into Egypt, incited some one who had not seen the first to a fresh search after Jeremiah's predictions respecting foreign nations; he found the same that his predecessor had done, but put them together in a different order. A further collection made in Egypt upon the hap-hazard principle embraced chapters xxvi.—xlv. This did not at first contain xxxiii. 14—19 and xxxix. 4—14; but these passages were afterwards discovered in Palestine and introduced into copies circulating there. Chapters xxv. 1—14 and xxv. 15—38 remained by themselves on separate manuscripts. The work of putting all these together was performed independently in Palestine and in Egypt, and resulted in the twofold form of the book as represented in the Hebrew and the Greek. The derangement common to both is upon this theory referred to the casual order in which the scattered prophecies were recovered; the differences of arrangement to independent collections, and the divergencies of text for the most part to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor.

This notion of partial collections is pushed to still greater lengths by Movers, who fancies six successive publications by Jeremiah, each comprising a portion of his prophecies, and

each being in itself arranged in the true chronological order. 1. The prophecies written by Baruch in the fourth year of Jehoiakim in two parts; (*a*) chap. i.—xx. xxvi. xxxv. xxxvi. xlv.; (*b*) chap. xxv. xlvi.—xlix. 2. Chap. xxii.—xxiv.; and 3. Chap. xxvii.—xxix. in the beginning of Zedekiah's reign. 4. Chap. xxx. xxxi. xxxiii.; and 5. Chap. l. li. after the destruction of the city. 6. Chap. xxi. xxxiv. xxxvii. xxxii. xxxviii.—xliv. published in Egypt. The collection of Baruch forms the basis of the book in its present form; and the existing derangement arises from the fact that the subsequent collections were incorporated into this piece-meal upon no just principle, but according to some accidental association. Thus chap. xxi. was put next to chap. xx. because Pashur occurs in the first verse of both: and chap. xxxii. follows chap. xxxi. because of the resemblance of Hanameel xxxii. 7, and Hananeel xxxi. 38.

Hitzig seeks to account for the constitution of the book by a theory of its gradual accretion; but this is so complicated in its details, and so interwoven with his individual critical conclusions, that it could not here be made intelligible.

In regard to these various hypotheses, and others like them, it may be remarked, 1. That they are built upon a false assumption. The disorder, for which they are professedly framed to account, can be shown not to exist; of necessity, therefore, they fall to the ground. 2. They are mere figments of the brain. There is no external evidence in their favour. The only solution which they offer of the assumed fact of confusion and derangement is to resolve it into chance or accident; and thousands of other chances might be suggested equally plausible and equally unentitled to credit. 3. Nothing can be safely built upon the contents of the roll dictated to Baruch, chapter xxxvi; for the particular prophecies which were found in it are not known and cannot be ascertained. There is no reason to suppose that it was incorporated in that form in the present book, for the prophecies delivered up to that time are not preserved distinct from later ones; and Baruch's roll was prepared not for permanent preservation but for a special occasion, and it is distinctly stated that it embraced much upon the second writing which had not been contained in it before,

xxxvi. 32. 4. These theories regard the formation of the book as a purely mechanical affair. Pieces are thrown together at random in violation of any proper order; and this preposterous relation once established is retained inviolate, while other changes are freely made for much slighter cause. This excludes almost of necessity the participation of the prophet in the construction of the book in its existing form, and imputes such a method of procedure to the nameless and gratuitously assumed collector as no sane editor in ancient or in modern times was ever guilty of. It would be better frankly to confess the thing inexplicable than to rest in such explanations.

Germany itself has at last grown weary of these insipid theories, and Ewald, one of her acknowledged masters in hypotheses, has led the way in a wholesome reaction toward a more rational construction of the book. He enters upon the inquiry, which had been strangely enough overlooked by his predecessors, whether there is not after all an orderly distribution of the materials, and finds cause to answer it affirmatively. In this he is followed with some modifications by Hävernick, in his Critical Introduction, and Stähelin in an essay published in the third volume of the Transactions of the German Oriental Society. They all, however, assume a structure which is needlessly cumbrous and artificial. The most recent attempt which we have seen to exhibit the connection of the book of Jeremiah is that by Neumann in his Commentary upon this book. This is highly ingenious and sufficiently simple, but not adequately borne out by the facts of the case. He thinks that the two visions of the first chapter contain a summary of the entire after ministry of the prophet, which is therefore to be regarded as a simple expansion of these initial lessons. The vision of the almond tree is expanded in the first seventeen chapters; and after two symbolic actions significant of the people's rejection, the vision of the seething-pot is expanded in the chapters which follow. Without dwelling, however, upon the various views of these and other writers, we proceed to develop what we conceive to be the true state of the case.

That the book in its present form proceeded from the prophet's own hand, is shown among other things by the frequent use of the first person, not only in the body of various prophe-

cies, but in the headings and formulas of transition. This, in the extent to which it occurs, proves that he was not only the author of the individual discourses, but that he likewise collected and arranged them. This is particularly evident from xxvii. 12, where, after reciting a prophecy delivered in the reign of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah, speaking in the first person, assigns as a reason for adding in immediate connection, one delivered in the reign of Zedekiah, that it was upon the same subject. This affords us also the welcome hint from an authoritative source, that the guiding principle in the arrangement was topical rather than chronological.

In the fourth and fifth years of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah twice reduced the prophecies to writing, which he had delivered up to that date, xxxvi. 2, 32. He was again directed, xxx. 2, probably in the reign of Zedekiah, to write what had been communicated to him. That the present book could not have been produced upon any of these occasions is apparent from the fact that some of its contents bear a still later date. That it was not gradually prepared, receiving fresh accessions as new prophecies were delivered, but is in so far a single composition that it received its present written form about one time and under a single impulse, appears from several considerations. 1. Prophecies from different portions of his ministry are often put together, while those belonging to the same period are dispersed through the book. 2. Remarks are occasionally introduced which are manifestly of later date than the prophecies in connection with which they are found. Thus, xxvii. 1, introduces a prophecy from the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim; but that this was not recorded as we now have it until the reign of Zedekiah, appears from verse 3, which states that an injunction here made was carried into execution at that time. Chap. xxv. belongs to the fourth year of Jehoiakim, verse 1, but was not written until the prophet could speak of the desolation of Jerusalem as already accomplished, verse 18. 3. There are allusions in the course of the book to succeeding portions of it, which show that the prophet as he wrote had a definite conception of what was to follow. Thus, xxv. 13, refers to the prophecies against Babylon and against all the nations, which are "written in this book." These not only stand at its

close, chap. xlvi.—li., but some of them were delivered in the following reign of Zedekiah, and it would appear that this was the case with that against Babylon in particular, xlix. 34, li. 59. 4. The systematic disposition of the matter, as that is now to be exhibited, shows that the writer began his work with all his materials before him, and proceeded throughout upon one consistent plan.

Leaving out of view chapter lii., which is a historical appendix, the book divides itself into three parts, viz.

1. Chapters i.—xxxiii. Prediction of the judgment upon Judah, and the future restoration.

2. Chapters xxxiv.—xlv. The history of the judgment.

3. Chapters xlvi.—li. Predictions respecting foreign nations.

The first section is again divisible into four parts, viz.

(1.) Chapters i.—xx. General denunciation of the people as a whole.

(2.) Chapters xxi.—xxiii. Denunciation of their civil and spiritual leaders.

(3.) Chapters xxiv.—xxix. The design and duration of the judgment.

(4.) Chapters xxx.—xxxiii. The blessings which would succeed it.

In this whole section rebuke and threatening greatly preponderate, there being but a few words of promise in each division, except the last, which is entirely occupied with encouragement and consolation. The first division does not consist of separate discourses delivered upon different occasions, and in different reigns, as may be inferred from the absence of dates, or of anything to indicate the existence or mark the limits of such discourses. The same predictions substantially were uttered by him from the beginning to the end of his ministry, and there was consequently no reason for keeping what he said at one time separate from what he said at another. Only one date is given, viz. iii. 6, "In the days of Josiah the king," in order to show that these warnings were uttered even at that early period, and under the reign of so pious a monarch. The substance of all that he

delivered upon the subject of this first division is wrought up into a connected form, in which he follows a definite train of thought, and the only partition to be made is that which arises from the logical distribution of his theme. Promises are here made to Israel, iii. 12—iv. 2, whom Judah regarded as utterly apostate and cut off, and to the gentiles, xii. 14—17, who were thought to be excluded from the covenant of mercy, but there is scarcely a word to break the heavy and reiterated denunciations upon Judah. The only words which bear the semblance of a promise to this branch of the people, iii. 18, xvi. 14, 15, respect the distant future, and contain an implication of the woe which was just at hand. If they are to be brought back from their captivity, they must first be carried into captivity.

In the second division sentence is passed upon the unrighteous leaders of the people, who are guilty of their ruin, and in contrast the reign of a better prince is promised, xxiii. 3—8. In the third division the true intent of the judgment thus far denounced is declared to be to separate the people. The abandoned portion are left in Jerusalem to be extirpated; the better portion are carried into exile. And with the heavy doom pronounced upon the former, and the protracted sentence which even the latter must bear, are mingled a few words of promise to the exiles, xxiv. 4—7, xxix. 10—14. These denunciatory chapters are followed, and the entire section closed, by the fourth division, in which upon the eve of the catastrophe the assurance was given, that amidst the apparent wreck, nothing which was really precious should be lost. The covenant which secured it was as unalterable as that of day and night.

The second main section of the book, in which the history of the judgment is traced, may be subdivided as follows, viz.

(1.) Chapters xxxiv.—xxxviii. Evidences of ripeness for judgment.

(2.) Chapter xxxix. The destruction of the city.

(3.) Chapters xl.—xlv. The fortunes of the surviving remnant.

Before reporting the grand catastrophe, it is justified in the

first division of this section, by the recital of various facts adduced as specimens and evidences of the universal corruption and the desert of judgment. Their reprobation was proved by their persistence in transgression in the prospect of the divine retribution, and by the evident hypocrisy and hollow-heartedness of the seeming submission which was extorted from them. Chapter xxxiv. In the extremity of the siege the people had solemnly bound themselves to set their Hebrew servants free, but upon the siege being temporarily relaxed, they reduced them to bondage again, in palpable violation of the law of Moses, and their relation to them as brethren equally in covenant with God. Chapter xxxv. The Rechabites obey generation after generation the arbitrary requirements of their ancestor, but Judah, even with the enemy at their gates, verse 11, will not hearken unto God. Chapter xxxvi. Jehoiakim, instead of heeding the divine warnings read before him on the day of the public fast, commemorative of the recent capture of the city, verses 6—9, showed his contempt and defiance of them, by deliberately cutting up the roll on which they were written, and throwing it into the fire, and seeking to take the prophet's life. Chapters xxxvii. xxxviii., Jeremiah's instructions are unheeded by Zedekiah and his princes, and the prophet himself is cast into prison, and his life is repeatedly in peril.

Then upon the account of the destruction of the city and the captivity of the people, follows in the third division, the sequel to this sad history, in which the fortunes of the surviving remnant and Jeremiah's ministry among them are traced to its abrupt termination. The slight reviving under Gedaliah's administration was soon extinguished by his murder, chapters xl. xli. In opposition to the divine mandate, the people remove into Egypt, chapters xlii., xliii., deserting of their own accord the Holy Land, distrusting God's protection, and preferring that of a heathen power. There they, chapter xliv., openly and boldly renounce the worship of God, and declare their determination to serve instead the queen of heaven. Whereupon the curtain drops upon the prophet's labours, his last recorded utterance being the Lord's solemn oath of their utter rejection and extirpation. They have by this

avowal of apostasy cut themselves off from being the Lord's people, and they shall be dealt with accordingly.

There is not in all these chapters a single promise to the people as a whole, only three promises to individuals are in each division, that they should be preserved amidst the general ruin, to the Rechabites, xxxv. 18, 19, to Ebed-melech, xxxix. 15—18, and to Baruch, chapter xlv.

The other quarter from which unfavourable conclusions have been drawn respecting the text of Jeremiah is parallel passages. Mention has already been made of the deductions of Movers from the slight verbal discrepancies between this book and Kings in a section common to them both. There have been inferences of a like character from the numerous phrases and expressions borrowed by Jeremiah from earlier writers. Every discrepancy in a word or letter has been charged to inaccuracy of transcription, whereas these diversities are properly to be regarded as original. In transfering or alluding to the language of other inspired writers, Jeremiah is in the habit of introducing slight alterations, in place of making exact citations. The allusion remains evident, though a different turn is frequently given to the thought or form of expression; and the seal of inspiration rests upon it in the shape in which it proceeded from his pen, no less than in that which was employed by his predecessor. Thus for קרקר, Num. xxiv. 17, Jeremiah substitutes קדקד, xlviii. 45; for גדועה, Isa. xv. 2, גרועה, Jer. xlviii. 37; for אשרשי, Isa. xvi. 7, אנשי, Jer. xlviii. 31; for נמרים, Hab. i. 8, נשרים, Jer. iv. 13.

A more serious and sweeping charge, however, has been based not upon the discrepancies, but the correspondences of this class of passages. It is alleged as the result of a recondite investigation, that many of them are interpolations, and it is contended on this ground that certain chapters must have been wrought over again by a later writer. Some elucidation is needed to discover the secret spring of this conclusion.

The dependence of the sacred penmen upon their predecessors in thought and language was denied by some of the older writers, under the impression that such an admission would be to the prejudice of their plenary inspiration. They

preferred to assume in all cases of coincidence of language, even where this was continued through considerable paragraphs, as in Isa. ii. 2—4, Micah iv. 1—3, that the words were independently suggested to each writer by the Holy Ghost. But while this assumption is plainly unnecessary, it is quite as foreign from the truth to regard these coincidences as indolent appropriations of the language of their predecessors, or as evidencing a lack of original and independent thought, or a period of declining taste. They serve to mark the unity of the book of revelation. Each writer by adopting and repeating what had been uttered before, both recognizes the inspiration and authority of his predecessors, and gathers confirmation from them for his own announcements. This is done not only by intentional citation and direct appeal to antecedent revelations, but incidentally likewise, and perhaps even unconsciously by the frequent employment of language shaped by intimate familiarity with those writings, which were at once the standard authority in religion and models of good composition.

This conscious or unconscious relation of the sacred writers to those who went before them, is attended to us with the incidental advantage of establishing the existence of the books referred to, and the manner in which they were understood at the time that the citation or allusion was made. And hence these references from Scripture to Scripture, found throughout the sacred volume, interpose a formidable barrier in the way of those who would bring the genuineness of any of its parts into discredit, or who would impose upon them a false interpretation. Hengstenberg was one of the first to exhibit this in its true importance and bearings in respect to the Pentateuch, and to add to the other proofs of its Mosaic origin, that derived from the fact that its existence is recognized or pre-supposed in the entire subsequent history and literature of the Israelitish people. And what is of special significance, its binding obligation was confessed not in Judah alone, but in the schismatical kingdom of the ten tribes, who were from their fundamental organization under the strongest temptation to reject it if that were possible: yet its institutions and laws were still perpetuated amongst them, in spite of their apostasy, with only such

modifications as their severance from Jerusalem and their worship of the calves compelled them to make, and even these were made with a consciousness of their sin. This is abundantly proved from the history of the disruption in Kings, and from the books of the two prophets of that kingdom, Hosea and Amos.

Kueper, as the title of his treatise indicates, has undertaken to exhibit what the prophecy of Jeremiah contains toward vindicating the genuineness or establishing the correct interpretation of earlier books of Scripture. All the coincidences of expression between him and other Old Testament writers are carefully examined in detail with a view to the light shed upon the points referred to. At the time of Jeremiah's ministry a great crisis in the affairs of Judah was just at hand. The cup of the people's transgressions was almost full, and the punishment long ago foretold, was about to be meted out to them. The prophet Jeremiah in labouring to arouse the besotted people, plants himself upon these ancient predictions, and reiterates them with the greater earnestness, as the period of their accomplishment was approaching. Hence the great abundance of his allusions and appeals to the earlier Scriptures, particularly to the Pentateuch, especially the book of Deuteronomy with its solemn recapitulation of the law and words of warning, and to the books of the preceding prophets. It is conclusively shown by Kueper, among other interesting and important consequences, that Jeremiah performs the same service in relation to the book of Isaiah, which, as has been already mentioned, Hosea and Amos perform in relation to the Pentateuch. The use which he makes of Isaiah, and the frequent expressions which he borrows from him, prove him to have been in possession of the book of his prophecies, and that the book was of the same compass then as now. His references to the book in all its parts are abundant and undeniable, not only to those portions which modern criticism allows to pass as genuine, but quite as frequently to those which have been pronounced spurious, and alleged to proceed from some nameless author at or near the close of the exile. So that to the other evidence by which all the prophecies found in the book accredited to him

are proved to be the production of Isaiah, is added the proof that they were actually in existence, and were used by Jeremiah before the exile had begun.

But then forsooth the conclusion from which neological criticism revolts, will be established. The Babylonish exile, and the deliverance by Cyrus will have been predicted not only before Cyrus was born, but before the empire of Babylon itself had attained to separate and independent existence. This must not be admitted. Hypothesis must be brought to sustain hypothesis; the baselessness of both is nothing in the account, if they afford escape from so unwelcome a conclusion. The allegation of the spuriousness of the suspected writings of Isaiah must therefore stand at every cost, and in spite of any conclusiveness of evidence. If Jeremiah quotes them, his own writings must in consequence fall under the ban. The forger of Isaiah's prophecies has had the book of Jeremiah, and re-written some of its chapters, introducing passages here and there in his own peculiar style. Everything which looks like a testimony to Isaiah's genuineness is straightway dismissed as an interpolation. "Die Schreibart ist pseudo-jesaianisch"; and this settles the matter. It might not be difficult upon the same method to maintain that the American Declaration of Independence was a forgery produced within the last decennium; and when confronted with proof that it had been mentioned, quoted, and referred to long before, the reply would be always ready, that all such allusions prior to the date assumed were interpolations, made by the forger himself in these various works. Such proofs of an erroneous text may be estimated at what they are worth.

ART. V.—*Primeval Period of Sacred History.*

IN former numbers of this journal,* we have had occasion to present what we believe to be the most correct, though not perhaps the most familiar, view of the Old Testament history in general, and of the structure and immediate purpose of the first book in particular. The last of the two articles referred to, enters, at some length, into the patriarchal history, prefixing a mere sketch of the foregoing narrative, to which, or rather to a part of which, we now propose to call the attention of our readers somewhat more minutely, recapitulating only so much of our previous and more laconic summary as may serve to render what we say intelligible.

The unity of Genesis being once established or assumed, as well as its preliminary, introductory relation to what follows, it may be divided, in accordance with the view already taken of the history as a whole, by making the call of Abraham a line of demarcation. The first eleven chapters will then be an introduction to the patriarchal history, which occupies the remainder of the book. And this introductory design or character may be observed, not only in this whole division, (chapters i.—xi.,) but in the mutual relation of its minor parts. Thus the history of Noah and his sons would not have been complete without that of the flood; and this could not be understood without a knowledge of the previous corruption; and this again could only be explained by going back to the fall; and that implies a previous condition from which man fell; and that previous condition is the one in which he was created; and the origin of man is but a part of the whole work of creation, with which this primeval history begins. There is something more in the connection which has now been pointed out than simple chronological succession. This view of the design and purpose of the history, and of its several parts, is not without its use, as a key to the

* See Biblical Repertory for July 1854, page 284; and for January 1855, page 24.

interpretation. It teaches us, at least, not to look for that which the historian did not mean to give, and not to judge either the truth or the completeness of the narrative by an unfair standard. If, for instance, the creation of the world is here recorded, not for its own sake, not even to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, much less to answer the demands of physical science, but for a moral purpose, that of tracing back the history of man to its commencement, this very view of its design precludes a large class of objections which have been made to the cosmogony of Scripture, namely, all those founded on the fact, that the form of the description is rather popular than scientific.

Another striking fact in this part of the history is that we have two distinct accounts of the creation, one comprising the first chapter and three verses of the second, the other filling the remainder of the second. Between these accounts there are two very obvious diversities, one of form, and one of matter. The material difference is, that while the first briefly records the formation of the first man, in its proper place, as a part of the general creation, the other seems to be designed to amplify this portion of the narrative and make it more particular, in order to prepare the way for what ensues, by distinctly recording the formation of woman, and describing the position in which man was placed. The difference of form is, that while the second and more definite account is simple and prosaic, there is something rhythmical and strophical in the arrangement of the first, as marked by the periodical recurrence of the formula, "it was evening, it was morning, the first day," etc. As metrical arrangements of this sort are commonly supposed to have originated in mnemonical contrivances, designed to aid the memory in retaining compositions of some length, especially before the art of writing was invented or in common use, it is not impossible, though insusceptible of proof, that this cosmogony is older than the time of Moses, perhaps as old as that of Adam, handed down by tradition, as much longer passages, and even entire books, have been in other cases, and at last incorporated, by divine authority, in this most ancient history, or perhaps prefixed to it as a kind of text or theme, like the genealogy of Christ at the beginning of Matthew's Gospel.

This last hypothesis enables us the better to account for two distinct cosmogonies, by supposing that Moses, having introduced the old traditional account, proceeds to comment on it, as an introduction to the history of redemption. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that this hypothesis of older documents embodied in the history is altogether different from that of subsequent interpolations, and preserves intact the inspiration and canonical authority of the whole book, while it greatly increases the prestige of antiquity in certain parts. It ought however to be looked upon rather as a pleasing speculation, than a necessary inference or certain fact.

The poetical character ascribed by this hypothesis to the first cosmogony in Genesis, has reference merely to the metrical or rhythmical arrangement of the narrative, and not to any thing fictitious or imaginative in its substance. On the contrary, the simple, unadorned, historical recital of events in this most ancient of all histories, when taken in connection and comparison with the monstrous combinations and inventions of all other cosmogonies, without exception, is among the strongest proofs of authenticity. The further we go back in tracing ethnic traditions of the origin of all things, the more childish and incredible, the more contradictory of one another and themselves, do they become; whereas the very oldest of the Jewish Scriptures, the relative antiquity of which, whatever be their absolute or actual date, cannot be reasonably questioned, furnish not only specimens but models of coherent, natural, self-evidencing, self-explaining history.

As our design is not minute interpretation, nor the solution of specific difficulties, but the suggestion of more general views which may conduce to both, no further notice will be taken of the scientific difficulties urged against the biblical cosmogony, than to remind the reader that the truth of Scripture, as a whole, does not rest upon the vindication of particular parts, any more than man's belief in his existence is dependent on his capacity to solve the metaphysical objections which may be urged against it. On the contrary, the proofs of its divine authority are so convincing as to justify us in withholding our assent to the most plausible objections, founded on specific difficulties, even where we cannot satisfactorily solve them. This

right becomes a duty, when there is a method of solution even possible, to which the benefit of every doubt ought to be given; much more when we are at liberty to choose from a plurality of such solutions. It is not even indispensable to make the choice, in order to confirm our faith in the entire revelation, of which the disputed passage forms a part. It is enough to know that there are solutions of the difficulty, any one of which is more probable than the supposition of an error or a falsehood. A striking illustration is afforded by the geological objection to the narrative in Genesis. Even admitting the results of geological investigation to be certain, with respect to the age of the earth, nothing can be more unreasonable than to deny the inspiration of the narrative, so long as both the witnesses may be harmonized by modifying the meaning of the verb *create*, so as to make it presuppose a previous formation out of nothing; or by assuming an indefinite interval between the first and second verse of Genesis; or by distinguishing the demiurgic days, as periods of great length, from the natural *νυχθήμερον;* or by supposing a creation *statu quo*, analogous to man and other animals in their maturity. However improbable any one of these hypotheses may be considered, it cannot possibly be so improbable as that of a gross error, much more of a deliberate deception, in a book which is proved to be from God by such abundant, various, and cumulative evidence. How much less rational is this last supposition, when the very facts assumed in the dispute are far from being certain, or at least admit of very different explanations! It is not necessary, therefore, to go through the whole inquiry for ourselves, or even to adopt implicitly the positive conclusions reached by others upon all these intricate and doubtful points, in order to justify a steadfast adherence to the biblical account of the creation as a true one.

What is called the astronomical objection to the scriptural account of the creation is still less entitled to impair our faith, because philosophers themselves are not agreed as to the nature of light, and among their many theories there is more than one that may be reconciled with what is said in Genesis, as to the creation of light upon the first day, and of the sun and moon upon the fourth. Let science understand itself, and its ex-

pounders come to an agreement with each other, before either shall presume to charge the word of God with ignorance or error, even as to scientific matters.

All that is here intended to be urged upon this subject, is the right and duty of all those whose minds are satisfied with the positive evidence in favour of the Scriptures as a revelation, to prefer any mode of solving scientific difficulties, not intrinsically absurd or impossible, to the irrational conclusion that a book so attested can teach falsehood, simply because it does not agree with our view of scientific facts and principles.

The account of man's original condition is not only very simple and historical in form, but very brief in compass, being plainly intended, not to gratify a morbid curiosity, but merely to introduce and make intelligible the account that follows of the great apostasy. The image of God, in which man was created; his dominion over the inferior creation; the simple but inexorable test of his obedience; the prospect of immortal life as its reward; the possibility of learning by experience the distinction between moral good and evil; the institution of the Sabbath, and of marriage; and the absence of that shame which has its origin in sin; these are the main points of the narrative, and all of them are stated in the most laconic manner, without explanatory amplification, even where the enigmatical expression might seem to require it, as in the case of the two trees—that of life, and that of the knowledge of good and evil. Upon one particular of this original condition, on the other hand, the history does dwell with a minuteness which at first sight may seem unaccountable; to wit, the place of man's primeval residence. The precise situation of the garden of Eden is as much a mystery, and as much a subject of dispute as ever. The latest and most learned dissertations on the subject contain little more than an enumeration of the various solutions which have been proposed, together with a tacit or express admission, that no one of them is wholly satisfactory. These hypotheses have now become so numerous, that a full exhibition of them, if it were practicable, could have no effect but that of perplexing and confounding. Nothing more will be attempted here than to classify the theories, according to their principle, in which way they may all be reduced to

three great classes. I. Those which deny the literal historical character of the description. II. Those which regard it as a literal description of a state of things no longer in existence. III. Those which suppose it to refer to boundaries and landmarks, which may still be traced and ascertained.

The theories of the first class are chiefly of two kinds; those which regard the passage as a sort of philosophical myth, in which certain facts, as to the origin and progress of mankind, are set forth under the disguise of topographical description; and those assuming it to be a fanciful poetical picture, in which real and familiar facts are blended with fictitious ones, as in the old Greek fables of the Happy Islands and the Garden of the Hesperides. All these hypotheses suppose a previous denial of the truth and inspiration of the record, and are therefore entitled to no further notice.

The second general hypothesis proceeds upon the supposition that the flood made such changes in the surface of the earth as to render this description no longer applicable. This view has the advantage, or at least the convenience, of rendering all investigation needless. The objection to it, independent of all scientific difficulties, is that it affords no reason for the description being introduced at all, and still less for its being expressed in terms belonging to postdiluvian geography.

By far the greatest number of these theories fall under the third head, and assume that the description is, or was meant to be, a literal account of places still in existence. They also coincide in taking as their starting-point the identity of the third and fourth rivers with the Tigris and Euphrates; the latter being only a Greek modification of the Hebrew name, and the former a demonstrable, though much less obvious derivative of *Hiddekel.* The only question, therefore, is in reference to Gihon and the Pison, and to the mutual relation of the four, as fixing the position and extent of Eden. The expression *eastward*, (Gen. ii. 8,) is so vague as to throw little light upon the subject, and is commonly admitted to mean east of the meridian under which the book was written.

The difficulty of the problem is enhanced by the fact, that the two remaining names of rivers are significant of *overflow* or *outburst*, and might therefore be applied to various streams, as

one of them actually is in Arabic geography; while, on the other hand, the names of countries joined with them are variably and loosely employed elsewhere. The innumerable combinations which have grown out of the attempt to ascertain these vague particulars, may be reduced to two great classes; those which assume the tract described to be a small part of Asia; and those which make it co-extensive with a large portion of the surface of the earth, or of the eastern hemisphere. The usual course of theorists has been to determine this point *a priori*, and then seek for the Pison, and the Gihon, Cush and Havilah, either near together or in distant regions, as may best agree with this foregone conclusion.

Each of these general assumptions may be plausibly defended from the context and from usage. In favour of the first, is the admitted fact, that the third and fourth rivers are the Tigris and Euphrates; and as these are never very far apart throughout their course, it is alleged to be improbable that the other names denote streams more remote from these or from each other. In favour of the second, is the fact that *Cush* (as given in the margin of the English Bible, in the text translated *Ethiopia*,) however variably or doubtfully applied, always elsewhere signifies a land much further to the south than the one watered by the Tigris and Euphrates, to include which the two remaining rivers must be sought at a considerable distance.. On the first of these grounds, the Pison and the Gihon have been identified with the Phasis, the Oxus, the Araxes, and other streams in Eastern Asia; on the other, with the Nile, the Ganges, the Indus, and the Danube. Ancient tradition, as recorded by Josephus and the Christian fathers, is decidedly in favour of the wider hypothesis, towards which the course of modern speculation seems to be now tending, after having long inclined in the opposite direction.

The description of Havilah, as abounding in gold, bdellium, and the onyx-stone, may seem to give a clew to the precise locality intended, but has not, in point of fact, served to reconcile discordant opinions, as the meaning of the last two words is doubtful, and more than one country, far and near, might be described as producing gold and precious stones.

Besides the doubt which overhangs the names of these two

rivers, and the bounds which they encompass, no small difficulty has arisen from the four streams being not called "rivers" but "heads," into which one river was divided "thence," i. e. on leaving Eden or the garden. The difficulty here is twofold; first, in the expression, and especially the strange use of the word "heads"; then, in the thing itself, to wit, the representation of one river as becoming four, which seems directly to reverse the ordinary course of nature. Among the numberless attempts which have been made to solve this enigma, there is none more ingenious than that of Calvin, who supposes the one river of Eden to be the Tigris and Euphrates *after their junction*, while the "four heads" are the two streams above that point, and the two into which they again diverge before they reach the sea. The objections to this explanation are, that it puts the two unimportant arms of the united river on a level with the two great streams of the Tigris and Euphrates; that it takes the verb *went* (or more exactly, *going*) *out*, in two different senses; and that it leaves the unusual term "heads" as mysterious as ever.

If it be worth while to add one more to the many vain attempts which have been made to solve this riddle, it may be suggested as a possibility, though far from certain, that "went out," or "going out," refers not at all to the natural course of the stream downwards, but to the ideal line of its direction when traced upwards; as if it had been said, "Follow this stream up, and you will find it branching off in the direction of four sources." The Pison and Gihon would then denote the two main tributaries of the Tigris and Euphrates respectively. The sense thus put upon the verb may not be obvious or justified by usage, but it is easily deducible from it, and is not double, as in Calvin's explanation, while, on the other hand, the noun (*heads*) has its usual and proper geographical meaning.

To this unsatisfactory but faithful view of the disputed question, in all its darkness and confusion, may be added a suggestion with respect to the simultaneous meagreness and fulness of this singular description. That these should be the only geographical details which have survived the flood, and that al-

though brief they should be so circumstantial and minute, is a very striking fact in itself, and rendered more so by the singular collocation of the passage, as a kind of parenthesis between the ninth and fifteenth verses, as if this account of the river were in some way necessary to explain the connection of what follows with what goes before. However dubious this connection may be, to suppose that the choice of topics in a history so brief and pregnant was made at random and without design, is, if not irreverent, at variance with analogy, and with the view already taken of the book, as an explanatory introduction to the law of Moses and the history of Israel. In this relation of the Antediluvian Annals to the later Scriptures, the solution of the question now before us is no doubt to be sought, and will be ultimately found.

The next great subject of primeval history is the Fall, which is recorded, with some particularity, in the third chapter of Genesis. According to the plan which we have hitherto pursued, we shall confine ourselves to general suggestions as to the relation which this great event sustains to the whole history, without going into questions of minute interpretation. The first suggestion which we make is, that the narrative is evidently not an allegory but a history, and intended to be literally understood; because there is nothing to intimate the contrary; because it is preceded and followed by plain history, unless the whole book must be viewed as allegorical; because if this part may be so explained away, there is no part that may not be; and because the later Scriptures and especially the books of the New Testament, refer to Adam's fall as an actual occurrence.*

This historical character of the passage requires us to believe, that a literal serpent was the visible agent in seducing Eve; but not that it was the responsible prime agent. Reason itself would have led to the conclusion, that the serpent was the organ of a wicked spirit; and accordingly we find the two ideas often blended by the later inspired writers.†

* E. g. Job xxxi. 33, Hosea vi. 7, Isaiah xliii. 27, 2 Cor. xi. 3, 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14, Rom. v. 12, etc.

† See, for example, John viii. 44, 2 Cor. xi. 3, Rev. xii. 9, xx. 2.

In like manner, the divine denunciation, although terminating really upon the spiritual agent, is clothed in the garb of a curse upon the more irrational and animal instrument, in which indeed it was fulfilled symbolically, whether we assume, with some, that the relative position of the serpent in the animal creation was now lowered; or with others that this relative position underwent no physical or outward change, but was judicially invested with a humiliating punitive significance, in which case the natural repugnance of the human to the serpentine genus must be recognized as one of the most striking tokens of fearful retribution.*

Our next suggestion has respect to the mode of the temptation, as to which there are two points worthy of attention; first, the artful duplicity of the Satanic assurance, which keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the hope. In one sense, but not the one which they attached to the expressions, our first parents did not die, but were enlightened in the knowledge of moral good and evil, and became as gods unto themselves, emancipated from that childlike dependence on their Maker which belonged to their primeval state. But this change, far from rendering them happy, was itself their misery and ruin.

The other salient point in the mode of the temptation, is the threefold aspect under which the bait was offered to the woman, corresponding to the threefold temptation of our Saviour, Matt. iv. 3—9, to John's trichotomy of worldly lusts, 1 John ii. 16, and, as some imagine, to the various temptations incident to different periods in the life of man, and in the history of nations.

But by far the most important part connected with this great apostasy is the first promise of a Saviour, included in the very curse pronounced upon the tempter, and significantly called in later times the protevangelium (or embryo gospel.) It predicts a hereditary warfare between two great parties, to be waged throughout a course of ages, and diversified by

* These arguments against the allegorical interpretation of the passage will be found more fully and most ably stated in Hengstenberg's Christology, vol. i. pp. 5—18, ed. 1854.

many fluctuations, each of the belligerents obtaining temporary partial advantages, till one should become finally triumphant, and destroy the other. The descriptive terms applied to the two parties admit both of a wider and a narrower interpretation, or rather there are three distinct gradations, all of which are verified by the event. The "seed of the woman," in the widest sense, is the whole human race, as opposed to evil spirits; in the narrowest sense, it is Christ, the Head and Representative of redeemed humanity, as opposed to Satan, or the Prince of Devils. But between these two there is an intermediate sense of much importance to the first interpretation of the later history, which indeed derives its whole complexion from it. According to this third view, which is really involved in both the others, and therefore perfectly consistent with them, these figurative terms denote two great divisions in humanity itself; those akin to devils in their character and destiny, and thence, by a familiar oriental idiom, called the "seed of the serpent;" and those who, through Divine grace, should escape from this infernal parentage and doom, by faith in the promised "Seed of the woman," and may therefore, as his spiritual brethren, be distinguished by a wider application of the same expressive phrase. Into these two classes the apostasy divided the whole race, and in their mutual relations we may trace, not only the most vivid exhibition of the deadly and protracted warfare here foretold, but also the great furrow which the ploughshare of God's righteousness and mercy was to run throughout the whole extent of human history, determining its character, and furnishing its primary division into two great antagonistic but inseparable portions.

ART. VI.—*Die Lehre von der Person Christi* geschichtlich und biblisch-dogmatisch, dargestellt von J. A. DORNER. Berlin: Gustav Schlawitz. 1852—55.

THIS learned, thorough, and important work has already become settled in its place as a standard contribution to Christian theology. The exegetical and dogmatic treatment of the subject, as promised in the above title, has been carried no further than some more or less incidental discussion at the close of what is thus left a purely historical work. The first sub-title becomes the title proper. *Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die neueste: "Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ from the earliest times to the present." We take it up now neither for review nor for criticism strictly speaking, but for some reflection on the fact itself of such a history—the nature and office of such theological labour as this work represents.

The work is not a mere indifferent history, written for its own sake. It is a great argument; and we have to do with it now in this particular aspect. In one sense it does not claim to be a disinterested representation: in the sense, we mean, in which rationalism would demand all prepossession of Christian faith to be laid aside. "A historical picture without a theological back-ground I have not attempted." Yet in the only proper and positive sense it does aim to be impartial; and herein lies all its force. It truly disclaims all arbitrary construction, and disowns all interest to put into the history as its reigning principle, a foreign and spurious idea; but not so as to leave the history without any reigning principle at all. It professes to reproduce the mental movements of christendom in developing and settling the doctrine of the person of Christ in their original spirit and intent. The prepossession which it confesses, it holds to be simply that Christian spirit or consciousness which is essentially the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. And this it carries in no spirit of bigotry and intolerant assertion, virtually taking for granted the very thing to be

proved; but simply with a view to present it fairly, and submit it to the candid judgment of the great public of the present age. If the personages, and tendencies, and events concerned be shown up instinct with the present faith of christendom as their proper life and power, the object is accomplished. Then let the same phenomena be set in due array in the spirit of any other prepossession, or in the pretence of none at all; and let the world judge which is the body breathing its own natural life, and which the galvanized corpse.

A general impulse towards historical work, especially on the theological field, seems to exist in the reflective spirit of our age; in the prevailing and hopeful disposition to investigate the past as the substratum, the root, the key of the present. But besides this, the monograph before us had an immediate occasion in a peculiar and powerful anti-christian phase of speculative philosophy. The reaction of theology against the recent rationalism had fully set in, and the Christian mind of Germany was fairly come to itself again, and awake to the new task, or rather the new form of the old task, now devolved upon it. Dr. Dorner's work itself has a history with reference to the tactics of the enemy. It began in two quarterly articles in 1835, '36, dogmatically and exegetically discussing the orthodox view of the person of Christ. In the modern cycle of the conflict between faith and reason, it had come to be matter of fresh interest, that "the forces of both parties were all collecting around the person of Christ, as the point where the contest must be decided," the key to the whole territory on either side. "Certainly a great advance towards the decision. And all depends on whether such a Christ as is presented in the spirit of the church, if not always in her words—a Christ in whom the full personal unity of the divine and the human appears as historical fact—is necessary and has actually existed. Should philosophy succeed in convincing all thinking men that the idea of such a person is self-contradictory and impossible, the contest were closed and all Christian theology reduced to a mere province of philosophy. Should philosophy, on the other hand, be brought to acknowledge the necessity of a Christ historical as well as ideal, should a philosophy of the

person of Christ be attained, the antagonism were resolved in essential inward harmony."

The heresy in view is, in a word, only a special form of the familiar one, which makes Jesus a mere man. It now proceeds, indeed as by necessary consequence, to construct a Messiah for itself; and as it cannot go back to Jesus and find a docetistic Messiah there, it goes forward and finds the Christ in the ideal perfection of the human race as a whole, and its present theanthropic constitution on the pantheistic principle; the very denial of the Deity of Jesus Christ still involving a certain deification of mankind, and Ebionism and Gnosticism meeting together. A speculative and biblical vindication of the Christian doctrine against this error was Dr. Dorner's original effort.

To much the same purpose these articles were reproduced three years later in a volume. And finally, in 1846, the author began a very much enlarged and entirely reconstructed edition of his work, which was completed in its present form some four years ago. Meantime appeared a new development of the heretical philosophy, which called for this reconstruction. So mighty is this ideal Messiah, so sweeping the momentum of this ultra free thinking, that it proposes to carry all history with it. Instead of conforming itself to history, it would conform all history to itself. It must in the nature of the case come to this. If it reconstruct the present faith of Christendom, it must reconstruct the whole genealogy of it. If it idealize the present, it must idealize also the past. Men do not gather figs of thistles. So this Tübingen school, as it is sometimes called, with the masterly and unscrupulous Dr. Baur at its head, and the almost fanatical Dr. Strauss at its foot, proposed the famous mythical scheme of history, to supplant the whole biblical argument for the actual appearance of God-man in Jesus Christ. According to this scheme the dogma of the Logos, as the second person of the Godhead incarnate in Jesus Christ, was a mere notion, hit upon amidst the great Ebionistic and Gnostic controversies, a spark struck out by the concussion of thought. Then, at the instance of this happy idea, Jesus and the apostles were taken up by the glowing imagination of the church, and like the heroes of the pagan mythology, decked out

in every way needful to furnish what might be thought a sufficient historical basis for the new faith. And the ruse has imposed upon the world from that time to this. The rise of Christianity is thus detached from the actual person of Jesus Christ, and traced only to the Logos doctrine of the second century, or at earliest to the religious and philosophic conceptions of Paul. To meet this radical revolutionary theory Dr. Dorner's Christology took its present historical form. The history of the doctrine for the first four centuries, which had before only been referred to by way of introduction, became by far the most important part of the work, and occupies almost as large a part of the whole work as that devoted to all the fourteen centuries since.

Thus at the same time that the contest between reason and faith comes to centre upon the person of Christ, the defence of faith is cast into this historical form. The nature and validity of this species of apologetics is well worth our earnest reflection. It is to the same purpose with some recent earnest discussions, which have been called forth in our own country by the diffusion of virtually the same naturalistic spirit here, but which have approached the question from a different direction, and seem to us to stand on less firm and positive ground; particularly the masterly volume of Dr. Bushnell on "Nature and the Supernatural."

The question is precisely, whether the mythical or the orthodox system of history in the case is the true one. And of course there is no criterion outside of the history itself. The evidence on either side must be altogether of the internal sort, although it covers the whole field of what is commonly called external evidence also. The external evidence of Christianity given by history has to be weighed according to its intrinsic character. The veracity of the witness himself is in question. The argument before us is virtually a direct appeal to the moral judgments of men; and an appeal on the grandest scale in a cause of vital importance to the world. It assumes the standard conception of the person of Christ. That the actual Jesus of Nazareth was constitutionally God man, organically uniting the divine and human natures in one person for ever, without conversion, composition, or confusion. It holds that this concep-

tion in its very nature gives evidence of having originated in the veritable fact of such a person; and that the history of it does actually trace it home to a source in real life. And then it traces the history of opinions concerning Christ from beginning to end, especially during the first four centuries of the Christian era—the period most directly in dispute—to show at once that this conception is, and always has been, precisely the one contended for; that it has been insisted on with the most discriminating resistance of all deviation from it; and that it takes its rise legitimately and solely from Jesus himself. It leaves the history thus breathing its original life, to make its own silent appeal to mind and heart, and stand or fall upon its merits alone.

Not that Christianity betakes itself to this sort of argument in desperation, as if to the forlorn hope of its army, but as if to its real and true stronghold. Indeed the appeal of all truth is, in the last instance, to intuition or faith. Mathematical demonstration rests throughout upon its axioms, its *self-evident* truths, as they are significantly called. A result reached by what appears at the time a sound logical chain may *show itself* such as to lead to the detection of a fallacy in the logic itself. In scientific speculation that theory will always in the end be accepted, which meets this intuitive perception. And in religion, God comes not to demonstrate himself to men, but demands their faith. This self-evidencing power is infinitely greater than a mere logical chain or mathematical calculation. In the bosom of this, all logical science lives and moves, and has its being. It is true, history may come in here with a certain dialectic force, by way of exposing fallacy in the reasoning of heresy. We value an opinion more or less, when we see how it strikes others; and on this principle a clear historical survey of the struggles, through which the doctrine of Christ as God-man has made its way and established itself in the public mind, must have great weight in favour of the truth of that doctrine. That, which has so thoroughly enlisted the most earnest speculations; which so stirs the world of mind to its centre; which so takes hold upon the deepest interests, the religious interests of men, whence all thought primarily springs;—must be some real and paramount fact. Else the world of mind is never to

be trusted; much less, therefore, that small portion of it, which would repudiate its great perceptions. But the pantheistic theory before us rather refines and idealizes, than denies, the Christian doctrine of God-man. And this brings out history in her highest office, simply *showing herself*, as the positive assertion of her own objective reality; as, when Berkeleyism reduces all the objective to a mere idea, every object stands a positive protest against such negation.

The history of the doctrine of the person of Christ has chiefly two elements of force for the enlightened mind, as against the mythical system, and at the same time against all skeptical effort to undermine religion, and all the troublesome intrusions of doubt upon those who cannot give up their faith. In the first place, it presents the doctrine as intrinsically probable. In the second place, it traces the doctrine to an adequate basis of fact.

1. It presents the doctrine as intrinsically probable. And that not in the sense of mere analogy or parallel to nature, as the characters of a fictitious story or a picture may be probable; not only such as *may* be real, but such as *must* have been; at once lying in a sphere above nature, yet constitutionally real, natural, *life*-like—natural, we mean, not as opposed to supernatural, but to unnatural. The Christian conception of the God-man is not fantastic, grotesque, monstrous, or superstitious, like the myth of the centaurs, or of the springing of Minerva from Jupiter's head. It is not constitutionally fabulous, but reasonable, commending itself as a conception of *real life*. This is no secondary and incidental matter. It is but a special application of the great principle, on which the belief in God rests, as intrinsically reasonable and necessary; or on which the spirit of faith infallibly distinguishes miracles and the word of God from all Satanic caricatures, or merely natural productions, by their self-evident divine character. If the Christian conception look like a mere freak of fancy, if it be unnatural and monstrous in its very constitution, putting together things palpably incongruous, and thus contradicting itself upon its face, it were absurd to bring history to support it as objectively valid and true. The idea were *un*historical, unfact-like, so to speak, in its nature. No one would ever think

of claiming that Æsop's fables were historically true. And there may be, on the other hand, just the opposite appearance in the doctrine of the God-man; an appearance, which not only allows of the doctrine being founded in fact, but demands such foundation as positively as the fable forbids it. It may be such that, even if we had the history yet to discover, we might expect to find the doctrine to be but the statement of a fact. We instinctively demand a foundation of fact, and could not be satisfied unless we should find, that the idea had originally cropped out in concrete form somewhere in the history of the world. The thought is evidently a copy of life; too *life-like*—though it be like a higher than any natural life —to have risen from the fancy; the *thing* must have been seen.

It is doubtless in this view, at least in part, that Dr. Dorner devotes much of an elaborate introduction to the precise defining of the Christian idea of God-man over against both heathen and Jewish ideas, with which it might be compared. The particular object in this is indeed to show, that the Christian doctrine cannot be attributed either to heathenism or to Judaism as its source. It cannot be regarded as a development of the dreamy, docetistic incarnations of the eastern heathenism, nor of the fabulous demigods of the western, nor of the angelophanies and theologic ideas of the Jewish religion. It does not belong in a region so above the world, the region of superstition, or of theophany. It comes not in the train of a history which had no beginning in the world, and whose course lies through the air. This demonstration in itself, however, proves nothing; for if the Christian doctrine did not originate *from* the heathen ideas, it might still have originated *like* them. To show that it has no direct affiliation with the myths of Vishnu or Prometheus, does not of itself prove it not a myth. But it does gain no little ground against the mythical system, to show a specific difference between that doctrine and all heathen conceptions of the same subject, and a difference in favour of the intrinsic probability of the Christian doctrine. If the Christian idea have not the look of a myth, in all probability it had not the origin of one. The

character of the doctrine must be a strong witness as to its pedigree.

This is so in every department of knowledge and judgment. The appeal is here to no mere logical postulate or mathematical axiom, but to the vital principle of all our intellectual comfort and progress. On this principle, for example, our present system of astronomy commends itself to every scientific judgment. It looks and feels true. We never think of its being merely provisional, but consider it substantially unchangeable, *the* theory of the solar system. To be sure it is supported by ever new inductions. But there is a certain *a priori* satisfaction with it, which makes induction rather demonstrative than tentative in the case. It bears in itself the impress of origin in truly scientific reflection. It is an intrinsically scientific view, not a fabulous one, nor a mere fantastic guess, or empiric theory, like the old Ptolemaic system. It seems to go to the bottom. It feels like fact, and we feel it to be the true point of observation for all the relevant circle of facts. On the other hand, even scientific men feel that in the way of geological theory they have not yet fairly touched bottom. Even many who consider it certain that the traditional idea of creation must go the way of the Ptolemaic firmaments, and the Cartesian vortices, are yet not prepared to say upon what positive terms that idea is to yield. And the present suspense in the geological department is as instructive as the present satisfaction in the astronomical.

Is it objected that the Christian doctrine early took the form of a decree of an œcumenical council, and has, therefore, stood upon external authority rather than upon its intrinsic merits; that this implies internal weakness, and forbids the illustration we have just employed? Even supposing the doctrine to be received on that œcumenical authority, the reception is not necessarily unfree. Where it may most decidedly seem so, where the receiver may never have had a choice, nor have struggled with a doubt, it may still be a free and earnest consent from intelligent perception of truth. But apart from this: the symbolical form of our idea is rather a testimony *for* than *against* its vital importance. It presents

the definition as the fruit of the most earnest and concentrated exercises of Christian thought; thought which could not rest till it rose to be outwardly, as it was ever to be inwardly, a supreme power in the world. Those œcumenical decisions are great facts, perfectly unique. They are not to be despised, nor neglected, nor set aside, at the pleasure of an individual. No theory of history can be true, which does not satisfactorily, scientifically account for them. They *have actually* determined the faith of christendom ever since, and are at least as significant and mighty as the Reformation itself, on the authority of which free-thinking professes to proceed. They are not superseded by the Reformation. History repeals none of its acts.

Another illustration of the acknowledged validity of this intrinsic evidence, appears in the satisfaction often gained by a student mind after long wandering upon some subject of earnest thought. The planning of a sermon, an essay, or a book, of comprehensive philosophical thought, would often exhibit a singular growth, were the whole process arrested and examined. The mind passing from one point of view to another; working awhile upon one train, till a better opens; at last hitting upon one which satisfies, which it could not exchange for any former one, and upon which as a whole it has no wish to improve. This is, for that mind, *the* view of the given subject. The search ends in finding; the fact of the search itself implies the possibility of such an end; and the mind knows when it reaches the end. So the rationalistic speculators in fact pass restlessly from one theory to another; they have no reason in one theory, why they should not take another; and Dr. Dorner in his prefaces mentions several distinct phases of the rationalistic philosophy appearing in the same school within the compass of a few years. *Their* searching leads not to rest, because they begin not *with* the old doctrine, but *behind* it, or rather repudiate it. But the œcumenical definition of the person of Christ remains a *settlement.* The mass of mind will feel it to be so, and call for no improvement or revision of it. It is *the* view of that highest subject of human thought, the relation of God and the world.

Once more: In every day experience one meets with

thoughts, which approve themselves as those of a true *man*, an intelligent and sensible man, amidst the throng of superficial ideas, which are more like mere chatterings than like thoughts. The suggestion may be entirely new and unique in its sphere, as much so as the veriest fable or fairy-tale; it may be disguised in some allegoric dress; yet commend itself to every thinking mind as weighty and true, as bespeaking deep discernment, and opening the reality of things. We may not have known the particular author before; we may still not know his name. But we feel as if we knew the man. We judge him at once a man, a thinker. We judge not the thought by the man, but the man by the thought. The conception certifies itself as that of a mind not rambling in the air of commonplace, or nonsense, or superstition, but in vital sympathy with the real world. So with the conception of the God-man. It might appear alone among the motley mass of myths, with no pretence of a history at all, yet acknowledge no possible affinity with its company, and surprise and win the merchantman of ideas, amidst the profusion of painted trash, as a pearl of great price. *That* looks like truth. He may hardly care from what individual it comes, or whether it come from any. Howsoever it got form in words, it came from fact.

It is therefore a very familiar and most valid law of evidence, to which the historical apology before us appeals; in fact *the* fundamental principle and law of all certitude. This sort of argument brings the question of Christianity home to the intuitive judgments of men; not only to that spiritual perception, which belongs peculiarly to devout doers of the truth, but to that religious common sense, so to speak, which is the living soul of Christendom, and the substratum of Christian civilization. Before that tribunal Christianity is ever to be tried, and before that she will ever prevail, until error prove stronger than truth. It is not to our purpose to pursue the particular application of this great argument, and show what the peculiarity of the Christian conception is, as compared with the heathen superstitions, or the Jewish provisional revelations.

2. We need now hardly do more than mention again the second element of force in the historical argument before us: that it traces the Christian doctrine to an adequate basis of

fact. In the first place, it presents the actual divine-human person of Jesus, which could not have been a fiction, because it is at once altogether too natural, and altogether too supernatural. And in the second place, it brings down the idea of theanthropy without interruption from him; showing his own associates and the next succeeding generation full of the same consciousness respecting him, which dwelt as self-consciousness in him. And besides, it shows the later actors in the history of the doctrine not at work to invent and construct a dogma, so much as to define and state a mysterious fact, which they had seen. This finishes the argument by showing, that the recorded and accredited facts sustain and verify the presumption; at least by boldly professing and offering to show it as credibly as any facts can be shown. The Christian doctrine is not afraid to give its authority in history. The pagan mythologies could never make such an offer. Like meteors they seem to form themselves in the air, and of the substance of the air itself. We do not ask an authority for them. But when the soberest history offers us in Jesus a divine-human person as a fact, it solves a riddle for us. Whatever difficulties it gives are as nothing, both in number and especially in character, compared with those which it saves.

The question might here arise (in this line of all possible questioning:) Why not *allow* Christ to be thus ideal? Is the mere interest of history worth all this trouble, if Christ be not denied, but only thus refined? The great point is safe after all, that is, the final and the progressive elevation of the race, the salvation of the world. Christ will still appear at last in his body, the church. Is not such an ideal Messiah enough? But the fact, that a Christ thus merely ideal *is not allowed*, ought to be a sufficient answer. And to reason the matter, we might say that our nature demands objective authority. The idea of God is itself a reaching after something *objectively* supernatural; the heart can be satisfied with nothing less; and that objective authority must show itself upon earth as an integral element of history, in order to be *real* for man, to take hold of him practically, and give the yearning heart something to rest upon outside of itself. There was a deep and broad truth, a reference to the interest not of a mere dogma, but of human

nature itself in these words of John: "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God." The very activity of mind, which shows itself in the Gnostic speculations, can find a basis of true satisfaction only in historical fact. Of this the heathen mythologies give incontestable proof, though it be but of a negative sort; and the hypothesis of the modern mythical sytsem itself adds testimony all on the same side. Why *did* the Christians of the third and fourth centuries take up Jesus at all, and pretend the historical verity of their high and glowing fancies; but that the heart *must* have a reality without and above itself to rest upon? As God had his revelations in actual fact for the Jews, and even in some way for the Gentile world, in ancient times, so in these last days he has given his Son. The philosophy which would deny the latter, must and does deny the former also, and, could it live long enough, would have to deny the realization of its own ideal Messiah. If man has an outward world of history to live in, he must have a God in history, a Christ of history, to live under. The philosophy which would deny the God of objective revelation, might as well deny the world at the same time. It proves quite too much.

It were most interesting to consider from this point of view the fact itself of such attempted refinements of the Christian doctrine as are here in hand. It also would go only to commend the established Christian theory. It would show how the Christian theory can account for all the facts in the case—the fact of the pantheistic tendency among the rest—while the mythical theory, whatever else it may seem to explain, can give no reasonable and worthy account of the church and objective Christianity. For example: The anti-christian excesses, from the primitive Ebionism and Gnosticism down to their latest and most refined posterity, may be regarded at best as very natural anticipations of the great result; the fantastic ambitions of the childhood of the church (if we consider them as working within the church) in haste to reach its manhood. They are the risings of natural self-dependence, false independence, upon the strength of a paternal gift already received. They presuppose some suggestive fact or facts in veritable history, looking in the pretended direction, as certainly as the youth's conceits

and precocious mannishness presume the existence of actual manhood before him and around him. When history shows such a fact as the actual theanthropy of Jesus, it accounts for these overweening assumptions. It does not at all conflict with them, save in referring the power of human progress to heaven instead of earth, to grace instead of nature, to God instead of man himself; and there every true heart must feel that it ought to condemn them. But with *such* a promise given to man, he might be expected sometimes to run wild, forget the Giver, and set up for himself. He were far more likely to do so with such promise, than without it. Where in fact does this school get its notion of a theanthropy of humanity, or of theanthropy at all, if there has been no theanthropic fact in the world? The pretensions of idealism can be explained from the basis of reality; but the pretension of reality is inexplicable on the presumptions of idealism. Thus rationalism itself, though its words go the other way, by its nature confesses the probability of divine revelation in history.

Having thus analyzed the argument residing in such historical discussion of the Christian faith against the idealizing rationalism, let us think a moment of its importance. Its simplicity may deceive us as to its force, and in many cases as to its pertinence.

In regard to the argument itself, for example, it might be replied: If the doctrine of the person of Christ as it stands in the ancient creeds so intrinsically commends itself, it can be trusted to take care of itself. Why all this labour to defend it? Of course the simple answer is: This is the way it takes care of itself. It takes possession of earnest minds, and they insist on giving it a fair exhibition. Men know not what they do when they oppose it. They mistake it. They do not feel its real power. And it is not willing to go down unheard. If it is to sink out of the world, it will at least not be cast overboard through sheer misapprehension. So far as in it lies, it will have itself known. And the Christian heart delights to see the truth thus turn itself every way, becoming as it were all things to all men. It delights to be the agent of the truth in thus turning itself, and showing its full proportions.

But this granted, such an analysis of the argument as we

have endeavoured to present, might be thought quite superfluous. It might be thought that such common-place considerations are taken for granted on both sides; that thus to expatiate on them, is like proving a truism, makes no progress, does not help at all to clear the question; or, that the point in discussion needs not such urging, need only be suggested to be admitted to all proper weight. We are persuaded, however, it is otherwise. The law or fact of self-evidence in the case is indeed taken for granted; but we may say it is more than taken for granted. It is considered so secure as to be quite forgotten. Its force is not practically felt. Carried away by their own speculations the theological visionaries do not stop to think. They do not take time to look at the bearings of their notions, and fairly compare them with the standard conceptions in calm, disinterested judgment. Idealism in its soaring loses sight of common-place truths. It lacks the general conservative sense. It throws out all ballast of authority and tradition, and cuts loose from all hold upon the past, and therefore upon the present real world (for the present is the fruit of the past,) and rises by its own gaseous lightness in the atmosphere of reality, which continually closes in under it and drives it ever further from the reach and sight of men. It does need to be urged upon minds of this turn, which are still within reach, that the great facts of the past are reasonable and demand attention, and that all true progress must be made in good faith upon the basis of the past. The old doctrine of Christendom on the person of Christ is worthy to be compared with any scheme of modern illuminationism as to solid reasonable and intuitive truth. It must be insisted, that the Christian doctrine be fairly allowed that test.

We are equally persuaded that such reflections as these are both timely and in place. Such an apologetic work as Dr. Dorner's has not exhausted its mission, when it has refuted the particular school against which it was at first directed. The humanitarian or naturalistic tendency, which is embodied in the various forms of Unitarianism and Universalism, and which is so widely spread, and so insinuating in our own day and country, is of the same blood with that speculative rationalism of Germany. It not only organizes its own special body or bodies

of confessors as a denomination or congregation of Christians, (where it does not lead them even to throw away the Christian name and all religion,) but also works its way into the bosom of the evangelical church, and steals away the hearts especially of intelligent youth. It is the theoretical side of the practical religious looseness, which every earnest observer sees with growing concern in the rising generation. It disturbs the mind. It shakes the foundations of faith. It may overthrow in a day what it has taken centuries to build; simply because those formation centuries cannot be reviewed and appreciated in a day. In some respects it is most useful. It creates a basis for delightfully fresh interest in the truths of the gospel. It raises profound questions, which must be met and answered, before the Christian theology can fully triumph. It must in the end sink the foundations of faith more deeply than ever in the general mind. But in other respects it is painful, and for the present dangerous, exposing multitudes even to shipwreck of the faith. It works discomfort in many minds unable or unwilling to follow it to its skeptical results. It makes them long for a new kind of satisfaction with their old faith. These especially are within reach of help, and in them the most precious fruits of a scientific apology are to be expected. And this naturalistic turn of thought, account for it as we may, has the peculiar fascination of an opening sense of strength and freedom, which leads not only to the healthful play of youth, but also to waywardness of every kind. It involves denial of the person of Christ. If it begin not in Unitarianism, it ends in that; and that is its central fallacy.

This state of mind some such truly critical and scientific historical investigation as that before us is precisely adapted to meet. Into this age of radicalism, which casts off all tradition and claims to see and judge for itself, it comes with great facts for the age to see and judge. It does not merely offer proof-texts from Scripture, or exegetical or dogmatical speculation upon biblical doctrine, and require implicit submission. It can accomplish nothing so; for Scripture itself is in question, and stands or falls with the historical verity of the person of Christ. In this case Christ is the proof of Scripture, not Scripture of Christ. Or, if we take it the other way, it is not enough that

the Scriptures commend themselves as divine; the history of them, or the history of the church, must do so likewise. The Bible and history must go together, the history of opinions consistently carrying out the character of the Holy Scriptures. Not that the religious spirit of the age really rejects all authority. It wants authority still; but the authority must be that of *fact* and *life*, not of letter and tradition. In the progress of physical science and metaphysical speculation, the civilized mind is all fresh, and proud, and wakeful in its own strength. In the new, scientific cycle of its development, it can no longer take truth on what seems to it an abstract divine authority. It must see that authority rooted organically in the nature of things, and in the history of the world. Before this spirit religion must and can appear in the peculiar forms fitted to command its faith and submission. As Christ came in the flesh attested by the laws of Moses, and by the superstitions of heathendom; so now he must, as it were, come again in his church, his word, and all his institutions, attested by the laws of nature. As the Jewish mind was then shaped to receive him in the form of a prophet like unto Moses, and the Gentile in that of an incarnation like unto the avatars and apotheoses of old; so now it is shaped to see him through the glass of nature and reason, as real life, and indeed the great phenomenon of the world. The active mind now wants a theology as agreeable to reason as its cosmology is; that is, a theology clearly based on real and unmistakable facts, not upon anything which it can charge with being an abstraction or an assumption, like the apparent motion of the sun. The charm of the pantheistic speculation lies in its offer to meet this want; but in the nature of the case it cannot make that offer good, because it leaves some of the most solemn facts unaccounted for. And the Christian truth can be and must be so shown up as to meet all the real wants struggling in humanitarian and pantheistic error. So with regard to religious institutions and ordinances, the church, the ministry, the sacraments, and all the means of grace. We cannot but feel even among ourselves a want of definite and uniform views of their nature and import, views worthy of our general intelligence and rational culture in other respects. Questions connected with these are per-

plexing our highest theological authorities from year to year. This is one form of the great call, of which we speak, for a rational conception of spiritual authority in general. The naturalistic state of mind still in many ways acknowledges its need of supernatural ordinances; but it cannot receive them upon what is to it blind authority, that is, as *abstractly* supernatural. It would see their divine authority through the nature of things, as a living fact, of a piece with the real world. It would see, in other words, the supernatural and the natural, the divine and the human, vitally united in them all, as they are in the person of Christ, according to the standard conception of that person. The better nature even of avowed Unitarianism feels its own central tendency to be astray, and half unconsciously confesses its weakness in such vague and random proposals as the "Broad Church" of Dr. Bellows, and in the more considerate, tangible, and earnest argument on "Nature and the Supernatural" of Dr. Bushnell; though not even the latter of these rests on the basis of full and proper Christian conceptions.

All this want can only be met by bringing fairly home to the public mind the great doctrine of the person of Christ, the way, the truth, and the life, as only a straight-forward history of its symbolic development can present it. We need not fear an exorbitant demand. The same great substratum of religious common sense, whence these natural demands arise, forms also a safe foundation on which to meet them. Though it asserts its claims without reserve, yet it will know when they are met. And history will meet them. It reminds men of the great things which have undeniably taken place in the world; it brings them in their original spirit before the eye, and asks men to judge what those facts mean. It is the preaching of fact to science, as in its original occurrence it preached to Jewish and Gentile religious instincts. It is the cord which binds us to the kingdom of objective reality; the spinal column which roots the mind in the system of the real world, and the disturbance of which sets the brain reeling amidst a chaos of wild conceits. With no mere chimerical superstition on the one hand, nor pantheistic idealism on the other, but with a positive, living supernaturalism, it meets the wants of reason and of faith alike.

ART. VII.—*Christian Life and Doctrine.* By the Rev. W. CUNNINGHAM, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh. 1859.

Ueber den unterscheidenden Charakter des Christenthums, mit Beziehung auf neuere Auffassungsweise. Von C. ULLMANN, Professor an der Universität zu Heidelberg. 1845.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, in its Relation to Mankind and the Church. By ROBERT ISAAC WILBERFORCE, A. M., Archdeacon of the East Riding. First American from the second London edition. Philadelphia: H. Hooker & Co. 1849, pp. 411.

IN his lecture at the opening of the recent session of the Free Church College in Edinburgh, Dr. Cunningham chose as his subject the nature of Christianity. It might seem that in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, it was rather late to discuss that question. There is, however, very little that is stable in human thought. The questions which now agitate the church are those about which Athanasius and Augustine contended, in their respective ages. Every man and every age have to determine anew for themselves all really life questions. We cannot take our faith by inheritance, if it be really ours. We are under the necessity of thinking it out for ourselves, and incorporating it into our own consciousness. The same general problems are constantly presented under new conditions, and must be perpetually rediscussed. The question, therefore, What is Christianity? although the same which engaged the earnest inquiries of our predecessors, comes up before the minds of this generation in a new form, and complicated with new modes of thought. In discussing this subject Dr. Cunningham says there are "two notions which seem to pass very much current in the present day as received maxims, but which, I think, can easily be shown to be specimens of real one-sidedness, and at the same time to be fitted, when believed and acted on, to exert an injurious influence

on theological study." These notions are, "First, that Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life; and, second, that the proper object of true faith is not a proposition, but a person." With his characteristic discrimination and force, the writer proceeds to show that these are indeed one-sided notions, that Christianity is both a doctrine and a life, and that the object of true faith is both a proposition and a person. It is not what the foregoing notions affirm, but what they deny, that is to be objected to. It is true that Christianity is a life, but it is untrue that it is not a doctrine. It is true that Christ as a person is the object of faith, but it is untrue that the proposition, "Jesus is the Son of God," and others of like kind, are not the objects of faith. All language is either ambiguous or inadequate, and hence all controversy degenerates into logomachy, unless we understand each other as to the use of terms. Christianity objectively considered, is the testimony of God concerning his Son, it is the whole revelation of truth contained in the Scriptures, concerning the redemption of man through Jesus Christ our Lord. Subjectively considered, it is the life of Christ in the soul, or, that form of spiritual life which has its origin in Christ, is determined by the revelation concerning his person and work, and which is due to the indwelling of his Spirit. In one sense, therefore, we may affirm that Christianity is a doctrine, and in another sense we may with equal truth affirm that Christianity is a life. This subject, however, is not to be disposed of in this summary way. What is meant by those who in our day assert that Christianity is a life? They answer by saying, "The life of Christ is Christianity." If we ask, What is meant by the life of Christ? the answer is, "It is Divinity united to our humanity." In consequence of this union, the divine and human are made one. "Christ's life is one." His Divinity, soul and body, are united in one life. Wherever, therefore, this life is, there are Christ's soul, body, and Divinity. If we inquire how this life of Christ is Christianity, we are told that the law of life is development; that Divinity and humanity united in Christ as a truly human life, is a germ which unfolds itself in the way of history, and constitutes the church. God became incarnate not in a man, but in humanity. In the church God

is still manifest in the flesh. That is to say, "Christ's life as a whole, (i. e. including his Divinity, soul, and body,) is borne over into the person of the believer as a whole," so that each individual believer and the faithful as an organic whole (the church,) are the dwelling place of this theanthropic life. The church is the form in which this life of Christ projects itself in space, and unfolds itself in history. The church, therefore, is theanthropic as truly as Christ himself was. The only difference is, that in him the Divinity is immediately united with humanity, whereas in us the union is mediate. That is, the Logos does not dwell in us personally and individually, but he dwells in that nature which comes to personality in the believer. Our connection, therefore, is with the human life of Christ, but in that life the Divinity enters and combines as one life. The church, therefore, in which God is incarnate has supernatural powers, and her sacraments are "the bearers of the Divine-Human life of the Redeemer," "divinely instituted for the purpose of bringing this theanthropic life into real contact with our nature." Vastly more, therefore, is meant by saying that Christianity is a life than strikes the ear. The words are few and simple, but they contain a whole system of Anthropology, Christology, Soterology, and Ecclesiology.

As the system above referred to has been adopted by men of the highest eminence, not only in Germany, the land of its birth, but also in England and America, as it has exerted a very extensive and powerful influence on the whole department of modern theological literature, doctrinal and practical, and as it has worked its way even into the popular mind so that its formulas and phrases are constantly reappearing, even in quarters where its principles are either not understood or not adopted, it is entitled to serious attention. Its advocates claim for it absolute truth. All other views of Christianity are represented as behind the age, and treated with contempt. We propose a brief exposition of this system that our readers may know the answer given to the question, What is Christianity? by many of the leading minds of the present day. We are aware that we have undertaken a very difficult task which we have little hope of accomplishing to the satisfac-

tion of the advocates of the system itself. This difficulty is manifold. It arises partly out of the fact that the subjects involved are in their nature the most profound which can engage the human mind—the nature of man, the nature of God, his relation to the world, the constitution of Christ's person, his union with his people with all its consequences here and hereafter. Besides this, every theology is in one sense a form of philosophy. To understand any theological system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives it its peculiar form. But the philosophy of which this system is the expression is almost entirely foreign to the ordinary modes of thought among Americans and Englishmen. It is, therefore, not to be expected that it should be thoroughly understood or appreciated without much previous training. Then again, the system itself is presented by its adherents in very different forms. The general school of Schleiermacher has been split into numerous divisions, all of which depart more or less from the great master whose authority they recognize. One man, therefore, is not responsible for the teachings of another. The substratum of Schleiermacher's system was Pantheism, yet most if not all his disciples are avowed Theists. Such being the difficulties which surround this subject, we shall not be so bold as to attempt any philosophical account of the genesis of the system. We shall not attempt an exposition of the philosophical principles to which it owes its character, but content ourselves with presenting in a concrete form the doctrines to which those principles have led.

It may be proper before entering on this exposition to remark that this system is new. It does not pretend to be in harmony with the church doctrines, whether Romish or Protestant. Ullmann, one of its most amiable and effective advocates says, indeed it is "Nicht etwas schlechthin Neues," (*not out and out new.*) "We find it," he says, "in another form in ancient mysticism, especially in the German mystics of the middle ages. With them too, the ground and central point of Christianity is the oneness of Deity and humanity effected through the incarnation of God and deification of man." P. 59. The Mystics, he adds, ignored the sinfulness of men, and the necessity of redemption. At the Reformation, the conviction

of sin and a sense of the need of a Redeemer, determined the form in which Christianity was conceived and presented. The Reformers, however, looked too much to the work of Christ, and too little at the constitution of his person. They did not recognize the fact that it was the perfect unity of Divinity and humanity in him which made him not only the Redeemer, but the ideal man, the model and type of manhood. We must, therefore, go back to the German Mystics of the middle ages, according to Dr. Ullmann, to find the generic idea of this modern conception of Christianity. That idea is, as Dr. Ullmann states, the oneness of God and man, of Divinity and humanity. Another admitted fact is that this system is the product of the German pantheistic philosophy. The results, says Ullmann, which were reached by the Mystics under the guiding impulse of religious feeling, have in our days been attained in the way of speculation, thought and reflection. The unity of the divine and human, of God and man, is the conclusion at which modern speculation in the hands of Hegel and Schelling has arrived. This, too, is the central truth of Christianity. Hegel therefore said that "Christianity is the absolute truth of religion." It was on this ground that he endeavoured to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, that is, with pantheism. This, however, was but a sham alliance. What Christianity asserts of Christ, the perfect union of the divine and human in his person, Hegel, in another form, asserted of the race. It is the nature of God to become man, and of man to recognize himself as God. The absolute spirit comes to existence, consciousness and self-manifestation in the race of men, and they return to God. This is not the uniting of two different principles in one life, but it is only the manifestation of an original and eternal oneness, in virtue of which men at a certain stage of their development come to the knowledge that they are God. P. 37. This view of the matter is utterly destructive of the true idea of God and of man. It is the worst form of Atheism, for it is the deification of man—besides it acknowledges no God. The doctrine of Schelling and Hegel, therefore, was soon recognized both by its advocates and opponents as irreconcilable with Christianity. Nevertheless their philosophy was regarded as a great advance. Its

great principle of the union of the divine and human, not merely in an individual, but in the race, was in some form to be retained. The *Mercersburgh Review*, January 1851, pp. 57, 58, acknowledges the intimate relation between the speculative philosophy and this theological system, and represents "the christological ideas" of Hegel especially, as "very significant and full of instruction." "If we are bound," says the Reviewer, "to allow this much even to Hegel, who will pretend that a still greater regard is not due to the professedly Christian speculations of Schleiermacher and others following more or less his theological influence, as occupied with the same profound and deeply interesting themes?" Schleiermacher, whose philosophy was scarcely less avowedly pantheistic than that of Spinoza or of Hegel, had a profound devotional spirit, which he retained from his Moravian training. He proposed therefore to divorce theology from philosophy, to allow the latter full swing in her own sphere, and to construct a theological system out of the religious consciousness alone. This, from the nature of the case, was an impossibility. No such divorce is possible, and in no system is the union of these elements more apparent and pervading than in Schleiermacher's own. The attempt, however, has had far reaching consequences. It served to present, in a Christian garb and under orthodox names, many philosophical ideas which could not otherwise have made their way into the church. Even in his theology, Schleiermacher, in the judgment of one-half of Germany, is pantheistic in his doctrine concerning God and his relation to the world, and in the judgment we presume of all parties his doctrine concerning sin is not essentially different from that of Schelling and Hegel. See *Martensen's Dogmatik*, p. 188. The great problem with Schleiermacher's more orthodox successors has been to bring the main idea of the modern philosophy, the union "of the divine and human fully as one life," into harmony with Theism and the gospel. This has given rise to that system of which we are now speaking, and has led to the modification of all the great doctrines of the Bible.

I. As to anthropology. The doctrine concerning the nature of man which underlies the common theology of the church is, that he consists of two distinct subjects or sub-

stances, the soul and body, associated in an intimate life-union in the same person, but capable of separate existence, and as regards the soul, susceptible of continued consciousness and activity in a disembodied state. The common doctrine also supposes that the soul is a distinct subsistence, a substance constituting an individual being. It is evident that these views of the nature of man which seem to be everywhere assumed in the Bible, must determine in large measure the view taken of our relation to Adam, of the nature of original sin, of the constitution of Christ's person, and of other important doctrines of the Scriptures. If Christ took upon him our nature, we cannot agree as to what he assumed, unless we are agreed as to what human nature is. In the modern mystical system, the old doctrine concerning man is repudiated. That system denies the essential dualism between the soul and body, and it represents humanity as a generic life. As to the former of these points, Schleiermacher in his Dialektik, pp. 245—255, says: "There is not a corporeal and spiritual world, a corporeal and spiritual existence of man. Such representations lead to nothing but the dead mechanism of a pre-established harmony. Body and spirit are actual only in and with each other, so that corporeal and spiritual action can only be relatively distinguished."* The late President Rauch says of the theory which admits of two substances in the constitution of man, that "it supposes the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter as the engine the steam. . . . . A dualism which admits of two principles for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life."† Soul and body are only a two-fold expression of the same energy. "It would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances of earth and soul; but he is *soul only*, and cannot be anything else. This soul however unfolds itself externally in the *life* of the body, and internally in the life of the mind." "The soul has no real existence without the body, which is as necessary to

* Thomsen. † Rauch's Psychology, pp. 180, 184.

it as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow." Olshausen in his Commentary, 1 Cor. xix. 20, denies that (die Seele für sich subsistirend zu denken ist,) the soul subsists of itself. Dr. J. W. Nevin says that "commonly the idea of human life is split for the imagination into two lives, and a veritable dualism thus constituted in our nature, in place of the veritable unity that belongs to it in fact." "This," he adds, "is as false to all true philosophy, as it is unsound in theology and pernicious for the Christian life. Soul and body in their ground are but one life; identical in origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding for ever in the presence of the self-same organic law. We have no right to think of the body as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form *one* life. The soul to be complete, to develop itself as soul, *must* externalize itself, throw itself out in space, and this externalization is the body. All is one process, the action of one and the same living organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete."* It may be here remarked in passing, that if the soul and body are thus one life, mutually dependent and inseparable, if the soul externalizes itself in the body, we can well understand how God, according to the same mode of philosophizing, may externalize himself in the world, and God and world be thus mutually dependent, the different forms of one and the same life, "dividing itself that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete." Schleiermacher accordingly taught, that although God and the world are distinguished in thought, they are in fact "nothing but two values for the same postulate (tzwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung.")† He says it is vain to attempt to conceive of God as existing either before or out of the world, just as Olshausen, Nevin, and others teach, that it is vain to conceive of the soul as existing without the body. Ohne Leib keine Seele, (no body, no soul) and "no world, no God," are propositions very nearly allied, and are inseparable at least in Schleiermacher's system.

What then is man according to the mystical system? The

* Mystical Presence, p. 171. † Dialektik, p. 433.

answer to this question is by no means uniform. Schleiermacher himself says, "Der mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in seinem ewigen Seyn, und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet."* *Man as such is the recognition of the earth in its eternal existence, and in its perpetually changing development: or God* (der Geist) *in the form in which he comes to self-consciousness on our earth.*" If this definition had been adhered to by his followers everything would be plain. But it is so obviously pantheistic in its origin and bearing, that the theistic portion of his disciples have modified it in various ways. In the *Mercersburgh Review* for November, 1850, p. 550, we are told that "the world in its lower view is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the midst of its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life, which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." To the same effect in the number for January, 1850, p. 7, it is said: "The world is an organic whole which completes itself in man; and humanity is regarded throughout as a single grand fact which is brought to pass, not at once, but in the way of history, unfolding always more its true interior sense, and reaching onward towards its final consummation." According to this view, man is only one form in which "the power of a single life" pervading the world reveals and completes itself. It is hard to see wherein this differs from the previous statement. The two become identical by substituting (der Geist) God, for "the power of a single life." And that substitution would make little change in the meaning of either, as both seem to proceed on the assumption of "the essential oneness of God and man," which is the admitted groundwork of Schleiermacher's system.†

* Dorner's Christologie, (first edition,) p. 488.

† Schleiermacher distinguishes between two kinds of Pantheism. The one he denounces as a mere "masked materialistic negation of Theism;" the other, which retains the formula "one call," still makes God and the world at least as to their functions different. This latter form he maintains is perfectly consistent with the highest state of the religious feeling. The religion of such a Pantheist, he says, differs little from that of many Monotheists. B. i. p. 54.

The more common mode of statement among the avowed theists of this school is, that humanity is a generic life, revealing itself in a multitude of personalities. The *Mercersburgh Review*, November, 1859, says: "Personality unites in itself the presence of a spiritual universal life, which is strictly and truly the fountain of its own activity in the form of intelligence and will, and a material organization as a necessary medium and basis of its revelation." P. 559. Take away her material organization (the body,) and you have only "this spiritual universal life," which, however, has no active existence in and of itself, that is, apart from the material organization by which it is revealed, any more than vegetable life has active existence out of vegetable organism. "The human race," says Dr. Nevin, "is not a sand heap. It is the power of a single life. It is bound together not outwardly but inwardly. Men have been one before they have been many, and as many they are still one." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. Archdeacon Wilberforce, who is endorsed by Dr. Nevin as a true representative of the system in all its main features,* insists much on this point. From page 41 to page 57 of his work on the Incarnation he labours to prove the reality of human nature as a generic whole, of which individual men are the partakers and manifestations. Of this generic nature it is taught, 1. That it has "a real objective existence." "It would be vicious nominalism," says Archdeacon Wilberforce, "to deny an objective reality, where an inherent law prevents the possibility of re-arrangement, and confines individuals to the peculiar classes to which they severally belong." P. 49. This generic nature is declared to be an "entity." Dr. Nevin calls it "a substance." "Such a collective existence," he says, "in the case of our race, not the aggregate of its individual lives, but *the underlying substance*

* *Mercersburgh Review*, March, 1850. Ullmann's Treatise on the Nature of Christianity, originally published in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1845, is translated and attached as a "Preliminary Essay to Dr. Nevin's work on the Mystical Presence. The principles of that Essay are developed in Dr. Nevin's book with more clearness and thoroughness than by Ullmann himself. And the principles of Wilberforce on the Incarnation "agree substantially," says Dr. Nevin, "with views presented in our own book." All these works are re-productions of the Schleiermacher school of theology.

in which all these are one, is everywhere assumed in the Bible as a fact entering into the whole history of religion."* 2. It is not only a substance, a real objective entity, but it is declared to be a life, a life power, the real source of all the activity, "of intelligence and will," as well as of the physical organism in individual men. 3. Everything, therefore, that ever comes to actual existence in the individual lies potentially in this generic life. Everything that is in the oak was potentially in the acorn, and nothing can be in the oak that was not in the life of the germ. 4. This generic human nature as a life is of course subject to all the laws of life. It is governed by fixed laws. It remains immutably the same. Vegetable life cannot pass into animal life, nor the form of life peculiar to one animal pass into that which belongs to another. Like uniformly begets like. It is subject also to organic development. "It is a universal property of life to unfold itself from within, by a self-organizing power, towards a certain end, which end is its own realization, or in other words, the actual exhibition and actualization in outward form of all the elements, functions, powers, and capacities which potentially it includes. Thus life may be said to be all at its commencement which it can become in the end." 5. Partly from this view of humanity as a generic life unfolding itself from within, containing potentially in itself all that can become actual in its manifestation, and partly from the primary idea of the whole system, viz. the essential unity of God and man, it would seem to follow that humanity in its process of development must come at last to the conscious union of the divine and human in one life; that this is involved in the very idea of humanity, so that Christ as God-man is the ideal man, our nature reaching in him the state potentially involved in its original constitution. The incarnation, therefore, is not a grand supernatural interposition for the redemption of man from sin. It is the necessary result of the law of humanity itself, and would have occurred though sin had never entered the world. This is the avowed doctrine of some of the advocates of this general theory. Dr. Liebner of Göttingen, in his Christology, carries

* Mercersburgh Review, March 1850, p. 177.

out this idea to its full extent. Dr. Nevin teaches, in less explicit terms, but in our apprehension no less clearly, the same doctrine. In his review of Dr. Liebner's work in the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1851, he says, "That must be a false and mutilated view of the nature and history of man, which rests not on a firm apprehension of his true relationship to God, as this comes out ultimately in the constitution of the Messiah. That must ever be a false and defective view of the nature of God as related to the world, which stops short of the theanthropy, as the true and necessary central sun that serves to irradiate and complete all other revelations by which he is known." P. 56. There is not a word of objection to Liebner's doctrine which it is the design of the review to unfold. All that is said is on the side of defence. The objection of Thomasius, one of the first and most mystical of the modern Lutheran theologians in Germany, that the system is essentially pantheistical, Dr. Nevin pronounces, in his usual authoritative way, "a mere sound without any force whatever." He says, we need "a truly Christian pantheism" to oppose to the antichristian pantheism of the day. Pantheism, however, is pantheism, whether baptized Christian or antichristian. It is not, however, only in that particular article that this idea is advanced. It is involved in his whole system as developed in his "Mystical Presence." "Humanity," says Dr. Nevin, "is never complete till it reaches his [Christ's] person. It includes in its very constitution a struggle towards the form in which it is here exhibited, which can never rest until this end is attained. Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The *idea* which it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form. The incarnation then is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal Man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is of course the crowning sense of the world, or that in which it finds its last and full signification." "History, like nature, is one vast prophecy of the incarnation, from beginning to end. How could it be otherwise, if the idea of humanity, as we have seen, required from the first such an union with the divine nature in

order that it might be complete? What is history but the process by which this idea is carried forward according to the immanent law of its own nature, in the way of a regular development towards its appointed end?" Pp. 200, 201. Nothing can be more explicit than this. Humanity includes in its original constitution the idea of that union with God which is found in the person of Christ, and it reaches that end according to a law immanent in its own nature, by a regular process of historical development. We are not surprised, therefore, to be told on page 174 that Christ's "divine nature is at the same time human in the fullest sense." In man there is self-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of self; world-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of the world; and God-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of God. Schleiermacher over and over says, that the only difference between Christ and other men was that the Gottesbewusstseyn, (God-consciousness) which he represents as a real Seyn Gottes (existence of God) determined in him all his activity from beginning to end. Thus he was the ideal man, that is, the man in whom the true idea of humanity was realized. But as Christ was God manifest in the flesh, the true idea of humanity must be the unity of divinity and humanity in one life, or God in the fashion of a man. "The Grundbestimmung (the fundamental idea) of Christianity," says Ullmann, "is the oneness of Christ and God, but therewith connected the equally original certainty that this oneness is not to remain individual, isolated, transient, but passes over with the Spirit and life of Christ to believers, and gradually to mankind."* Humanity reaches its culminating point of essential unity with God, first in Christ, and then through him in his people. The object of the whole system is to find some middle ground between pantheism and dualism, that is, between the doctrine that God and the world are one, and the doctrine that they are two. This middle ground must be narrower than a hair, rather too narrow for the foundation of a stupendous structure of Christian doctrine. It is a wonderful hallucination of self-conceit which leads these builders to condemn as rationalists, and, worse yet, as Puritans, those who will not trust their souls to their cobweb edifice.

* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 40.

Such then is the anthropology of the mystical system.* It denies any real dualism in the constitution of man. He is soul, and soul only, revealing itself outwardly in the body, and inwardly in mental activity. A man is not an individual subsistence, but the revelation of a generic life in connection with a particular external organism. And in virtue of the essential unity of Divinity and humanity, the latter by a process of organic development arrives at last to a conscious oneness with God. This view of man's nature is made consciously and avowedly to determine the whole scheme of Christian doctrine. It determines the nature of our relation to Adam, and of original sin. It decides all questions concerning the constitution of Christ's person. It determines the nature of redemption, and the mode in which believers are made partakers of its benefits. And it involves also the decision of every important question concerning the nature of the church, and the design and efficacy of the sacraments. Our immediate object, however, is to expound the teachings of this system in reference to the present state of man.

Those of its advocates who retain sufficient reverence for the Scriptures, (which was not the fact with Schleiermacher,) to feel bound to attempt a conciliation between their doctrine and the admitted facts of the Bible, apply their anthropology to explain our connection with Adam, and the nature of original sin. As humanity is a generic life, Adam was not merely *a* man but *the* man. He was humanity itself; its original germ and fountain-head. His act, therefore, was not the act of *a* man, but of humanity. That generic life, including intelligence and will which afterwards was developed in a multitude of personalities, then existed solely in his per-

* We have felt no little embarrassment in determining on a suitable designation for the system under consideration. It might be called "The Schleiermacher System," from its acknowledged author, but that designation is too restricted, considering the numerous and important modifications the theory has undergone since it left his hands. It might be characterized as *Transcendental*, but that term is vague and indeterminate. The word *mystical* has much to recommend it. It is inoffensive. It refers to the remote genesis of the system as connected with the mysticism of the middle ages, and it is occasionally employed by the advocates of the system themselves. At any rate it serves to distinguish it from the common doctrine.

son, and acted in and by him. Adam's sin was, therefore, strictly and properly, and not merely representatively or by imputation, the sin of the race. The intelligence and will which comes to self-consciousness in the successive generations of men, were the agents of that sin in the person of Adam. The only sense, therefore, in which that sin is imputed to us, is that it is strictly and properly our own act, not of our persons but of our nature, of that generic life which we have in common with Adam, and which is as much ours as it was his. "In him was comprehended in its generic form a general life, which was to develop itself by the course of natural generation to the end of time. As such he was called upon to say in the name of the general life which he embodied, whether or not he would take the Lord to be his God. In his response we have the act of not only *a* man but of *the* man, of humanity as a general conscious life." *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, p. 256. "Humanity was not an abstraction while Adam the individual was conscious. . . . . It found in him a real conscious existence, in the free exercise of its mighty powers—a living personality, reasoning and willing for itself." P. 258. "Humanity rebelled." P. 259. "We all were comprehended in Adam in the form of a general conscious life. The *will* of this life perpetuated the rebellion. . . . . So that his act was in fact our act." P. 260. "His individual personality was limited wholly to himself. But a whole world of like separate personalities lay involved in his life at the same time, as a generic principle or root. And all these, in a deep sense, form at last but one and the same life. Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he ever lived in his own person. They participate in his whole nature, soul and body, and are truly bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. "The fall of Adam is adjudged to be the fall of his posterity because it was so actually. The union in *law* here is a union in *life*. The fall itself forms a certain condition or state, which supposes life as its subject, and how then could the one be imputed without the presence of the other? May an attribute or quality be made to extend in a real way beyond the *substance* to which it is attached, and in which only it can have any

real existence? The moral relations of Adam, and his moral character too, are made over to us at the same time. Our participation in the actual unrighteousness of his life, forms the ground of our participation in his guilt and liability to punishment." P. 160. Everything, therefore, is made to depend on the real objective existence of a generic life, which is an "entity," a "substance," which is at once corporeal and incorporeal, that is, which is one life developing itself outwardly and inwardly. In this life is consciousness, intelligence, will. It is "a conscious life." Individual men are but the separate manifestations of this life in connection with an external organism. On this ground, it is assumed that the act of Adam was the act of his posterity, being the act of the intelligence, will, and conscious life common to them all. And the moral character and relations, the inward pollution as well as the guilt which attached to him attach also to us, because they pertain to the life common to him and to the whole human race.

As our object is exposition and not refutation, we might pass this exhibition of the anthropology of the mystical system and its application to our relation to Adam without remark. It may be well, however, before proceeding further, just to say a few words on the subject. First, in reference to the assumption that there is no real dualism in the constitution of man, that the body is the necessary condition of the existence of the soul, that the two are only the different forms of manifestation of one and the same life, we would remark that this doctrine is inconsistent with the common consciousness of men, who uniformly refer certain acts and states to the mind as one subject or substance, and certain others to the body as a different subject or substance. The attributes of mind and of the body are in their nature so different as to render it impossible to refer both classes to the same subject. Both belong to the same person, but the person in our present state of existence, is mysteriously constituted of two distinct substances. As this is a fact revealed in the common consciousness of men, it enters into the avowed convictions of men of all ages and in all parts of the world. Every nation, ancient or modern, civilized or

savage, has believed in the separate existence of the soul. This is manifest from their doctrines concerning a future state. This is also the faith of the universal church. The Greeks, the Latins, the Lutherans, the Reformed, in short the whole Christian world believe that the soul lives and acts in the full exercise of all its faculties, after it has left the body. This the mystical system, as we have seen, denies. Olshausen in support of his position, "No body, no soul," reduces the consciousness of the departed soul to a minimum, and then asserts that this feeble flickering of its life is sustained in connection with the scattered elements of its body.* The theory, therefore, is

* The reader may be interested in seeing what Dr. Nevin has to say in answer to this fatal objection to his whole theory. Anything feebler or more unsatisfactory we have never seen in print from the pen of an able man. "To some," he says, "possibly this representation (viz. that the body is the necessary condition of the activity of the soul) may seem to be contradicted by what the Scriptures teach of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection; and it must be admitted that we are met here with a difficulty which it is not easy at present to solve. Let us, however, not mistake the true state of the case. The difficulty is not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory; but to bring it into harmony with itself. For it is certain that the Scriptures teach such an identification of soul and body in the proper human personality, as clearly, at least, as they intimate a continued consciousness on the part of the soul between death and the resurrection. The doctrine of *immortality* in the Bible, is such as to include always the idea of the resurrection. It is an ἀναστάσις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν. The whole argument in the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, as well as the representation, 1 Thess. iv. 13—18, proceeds on the assumption, that the life of the body, as well as that of the soul, is indispensable to the perfect state of our nature as human. The soul then, during the intermediate state, cannot possibly constitute, in the biblical view, a complete man; and the case requires besides that we should conceive of its relation to the body as still in force, not absolutely destroyed but only suspended. The whole condition is interimistic, and by no possibility of conception capable of being thought of as complete and final. When the resurrection body appears, it will not be as a new frame abruptly created for the occasion, and brought to the soul in the way of outward addition and supplement. It will be found to hold in strict organic continuity with the body as it existed before death, as the action of the same law of life; which implies that this law has not been annihilated, but suspended only in the intermediate state. In this character, however, it must be regarded as resting in some way, (for where else could it rest?) in the separate life, as it is called, of the soul itself; the slumbering power of the resurrection ready at the proper time, in obedience to Christ's powerful word, to clothe itself with its former actual nature, in full identity with the form it carried before death,

in direct conflict with the Scriptures, which not only everywhere teach the distinction between the soul and body as two subjects, but specially the full conscious existence of the soul between death and the resurrection. With difficulties of this sort, however, the authors of this system were untrammeled. They received nothing on the mere authority of the Bible, and discarded what did not harmonize with their theory. Schleiermacher did not believe in a creation in time, an extra-mundane God, in angels, Satan, or sin, or disembodied souls. Those who adopt his principles are reduced to the sad necessity of either holding a philosophy in conflict with their theology, or of explaining away the plainest teachings of the Bible. The latter alternative is sure to be chosen.

As to the doctrine of a generic life as a real objective reality, an "underlying substance" in which all individual men are one, we would say that it is a sheer hypothesis. From the nature of the case there can be no direct evidence of its existence. It is an assumption to account for certain phenomena. If those phenomena can be as satisfactorily accounted for on another hypothesis, the whole foundation of the theory is gone. Again the theory in its present form, notwithstanding its affinity with ancient realism, is new. Both Ullmann and Dr. Nevin teach that the ignoring of this idea of a generic life vitiated the theology of the Reformers. Then again this modern theory is neither one thing nor the other. If men would say with Schleiermacher that God is "not a Being by the side of other beings," (nicht Ding neben Dingen) but the "Totality and system of all things;" if they would say that he is the "underlying substance in which all lives are one," that as the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God externalizes himself variously in the world, then we could understand what is meant by this generic life. But although this seems to be the esoteric sense of many of the utterances of the professedly theistic portion of the Schleiermacher school, yet it is so baldly pantheistic that it has to be stated with so many limitations and

though under a far higher order of existence. Only then can the salvation of the soul be considered as complete. All at last is one life; the subject of which is the totality of a believer's person, comprehending soul and body alike from the beginning of the process to the end."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 171.

modifications that the real idea intended becomes altogether confused.* There is nothing in the Scriptures in favour of this doctrine of a generic life of the race having objective reality of its own apart from the personalities in which it is revealed. It is not indeed the design of the Bible to teach us ontology, but the Bible teaches facts. It teaches, for example, the fact that the soul is in a state of conscious activity when separated from the body, and it therefore teaches that the doctrine which denies the possibility of such an existence is false. There are no facts of this kind in the Bible which contradict the common doctrine concerning the nature of man, and necessitate the assumption of this generic life. The Scriptures indeed recognize a common nature as belonging to all men; that is, that all men belong to one and the same class and species of beings, have a common origin, the same physical structure, the same rational and moral faculties, and that they are in the same state of alienation from God as they are born into this world. They also teach that this nature, thus identical in all its essential elements and characteristics, is propagated from parent to child, and thus comes down to us from the progenitors of our race. With this scriptural teaching all the facts of experience agree. Experience also teaches that this nature, thus common to all mankind, may be modified by circumstances of climate, culture, social habits and other causes, so as to assume permanent varieties or types; and still further, that within these varieties there may be lesser peculiarities induced and rendered permanent, as seen in different nations and even families. All this is agreeable to the analogy observed in other departments of nature, animal and vegetable. Every distinct species, whether of animals or vegetables, is found in permanent varieties, more or less marked and more or less permanent. To account for these facts of Scripture and experience, there is no necessity to adopt the theory of a generic life having objective reality. There is no need to

* This is a vice inherent in the whole system. Strauss says of Schleiermacher himself, "That he betrayed philosophy to theology, and then again theology to philosophy, and precisely this double-facedness and double-meaningness is the essence of his position in the history of theology. And hence his influence from both sides can only be regarded as a blessed curse, or a curse-bearing blessing."—*Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 175.

assume that there is an entity or substance in which the lives of all horses, or all tigers, or all elephants, or all oaks, or all palms inhere, and in which they severally are all one. Who believes in any such generic life of tigers or of oaks? Why then should it be assumed in the case of man? All the Bible assumes, and all that experience teaches, is that God ordained the permanence of species, and fixed the law that like should beget like. If it be demanded how this permanence of species is secured, it may be answered that the knowledge of the *how* is not at all necessary to faith in the fact. If a further answer is required, it may be enough to say that the greatest naturalists assume that the organic germ received from the parent plant or animal is imbued with an immaterial life principle, which determines not only the species but the variety. This life principle is just as individual as the source whence it is derived. Thus in the case of Adam, he was an individual man, with no more of the generic life of the race than any other man. He transmitted to his children his own nature, just as in any other case of reproduction in the animal or vegetable kingdom. The race were no more physically *in* him, than the Hebrews were *in* Abraham, or the Ishmaelites *in* Ishmael. His act was no more the act of the race, except on the ground of a divine covenant, than an act of Abraham was an act of all his posterity. It is very true that any act of Adam which altered his physical or moral constitution, i. e. his nature, might lead to a corresponding change in the physical or moral constitution of his descendants. If he had done anything to change his complexion from the olive of an Asiatic to the black of the African, he might, and probably would, have transmitted that hue to his posterity. But the same may be said of any head of a family or tribe. If any man chooses to account for the hereditary corruption of our race on this principle, though we regard it as both unsatisfactory and unscriptural, as a solution of that dreadful fact, it is at least intelligible. The statement contains a meaning. But when it is said that the act of Adam was truly the act of the race, because he was a generic man, or that humanity as a general life acted in him, the words have no meaning. They convey no idea. As Dr. Nevin would say, they are an empty sound. An act implies an agent, and a

rational act a rational agent, that is, a person. Unless, therefore, humanity is a person, it could not as a generic life have acted in Adam. This, however, is not the theory; humanity as such is impersonal; it comes to personality only in the individual. Into the application of this theory, however, to the solution of the question of original sin, we designedly do not enter. We have far too much work on our hands, in the further exposition of the mystical system, to be accomplished in any reasonable limits of a single article. We must, therefore, content ourselves with remarking, that the consequences drawn from this particular theory of a generic life, in its application to the great doctrines concerning the person of Christ and the method of salvation, are its most effectual refutation. These consequences are such, as we shall proceed to show, that the theory itself must be renounced, or the faith of the church universal be given up.

II. This leads us to the second great division of our subject. The Christology of the mystical system is its centre and sum. All its other doctrines are subordinate to this, and are held for its sake, or are determined by it. There are three general classes of theologians included in the school of Schleiermacher. First, those who are in fact, as he himself was, pantheistic in their interior convictions; secondly, those who are Theists but not Trinitarians; and thirdly, those who sincerely endeavour to bring their theory into harmony with the doctrines of the Bible, and especially with the doctrine of the Trinity. Of course the Christology of these several classes must present important differences, into which it is impossible for us here to enter. We must content ourselves with the general features of the system, and especially in the form in which they are presented by those belonging to the third of the three classes just mentioned. The three principles which determine the Christology of the mystical system, as we have before stated, are, 1. That there is no real dualism in the constitution of man; 2d. That humanity is a generic life, a real entity or substance; and 3d. That there is a (Wesenseinheit) real oneness between God and man. As to this last point, Dorner, after endeavouring to show that the old church doctrine as adopted by the Reformed, and as generally modified by the

Lutherans (to suit their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body) is beset with insuperable difficulties, says that these difficulties and contradictions can only be avoided by giving up the idea that the divine and human in Christ are two different natures, and admitting that they are (innerlich eines) inwardly one.* On a subsequent page (182) he says, we must either reject the doctrine of the Incarnation, or construct a Christology without the assumption of a twofold nature in Christ.

The general statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in which all Christians agree, is that the Word was made flesh, God was found in fashion as a man, or, God assumed our nature. This may mean what the Church universal understands it to mean, as her faith is expressed in the decisions of the first six œcumenical councils, adopted by the Greeks, the Latins, the Reformed, and Lutherans. Those councils declared that in the one person of the Lord Jesus Christ the two natures, human and divine, are united without mixture or confusion, inseparably and perpetually, so that he is perfect God and perfect man. The union does not destroy the difference of the natures, but the properties of each are retained. In the Council of Constantinople it was decided that there are in Christ two wills and operations, the one human and the other divine. To the integrity or completeness of the human nature "a true body and a reasonable soul" are declared to belong. Christ, therefore, is declared to be as to his divine nature consubstantial with the Father, and as to his human nature consubstantial with us men. In opposition to this catholic statement of the doctrine, some modern theologians, such as Martensen and Ebrard, seem to adopt a view very similar to that of Beron in the early ages, who held that the Logos assumed the form of a man, that is, subjected himself to the limitations of humanity. The infinite became finite, the eternal and omnipresent imposed on himself the limitations of time and space, God became man.† The statement of Ebrard is, the Logos assumed "the existence form of man." He illustrates his idea thus. "In the case of a king's son, his

* Christologie, p. 178 of the first edition.

† See Dorner, vol. i. p. 541 of the edition of 1851.

royalty is his original nature, servitude an assumed form of existence." In other words, he adds, Der ewige Sohn Gottes sich in freiem Selbeschränkungsakte bestimmt hat, in die Existenzform eines menschlichen Lebens-centrums einzugehen, sodass er nun als solches agirte von der Empfängniss an, und als der in diese Form eingegangene sich einen menschlichen Leib bildete u. s. w." i. e. *The eternal Son of God, by a free act of self-limitation, determined to assume the existence form of a centre of human life, so that he acted as such from the conception onward, and having assumed this form, he fashioned for himself a body, &c.** By God's becoming flesh, therefore, he understands, ein Eingehen des Logos in eine neue Seynsform. According to this view there are not two natures in Christ (in the established sense of the word nature), but only two forms of existence, a prior and posterior, of one and the same nature. Another form of statement is, as we have seen, that humanity, by a regular process of historical development, attained the point of oneness with God in the person of Christ. Another is, that this process having been disturbed, or being in its nature inadequate, God by a supernatural act constituted the person of Christ, as the ideal man, and made him a new life-centre, or point of departure; so that from him a new development of humanity begins. The most common mode of presenting the doctrine is, that the Logos assumed our fallen humanity. By this, we are told, is not to be understood that he assumed an individual body and soul, so that he became *a* man, but generic humanity, so that he became *the* man. And by generic humanity is to be understood a life-power, that peculiar law of life, corporeal and incorporeal, which develops itself outwardly as a body, and inwardly as a soul. The Son, therefore, became incarnate in humanity, in that objective reality, entity, or substance, in which all human lives are one. Having assumed this life-power, whose law is to develop itself inwardly and outwardly, Christ had a soul and body, but the incarnation was in the "substance" lying back of these. On this fact the whole significance and efficacy of the union is made to depend. Otherwise it would be a theophany, without

* Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 77.

permanent value to the race. Olshausen, in his comment on John i. 14, says, "It could not be said that the Word was made man, which would imply that the Redeemer was a man by the side of other men, whereas, as the second Adam, he represented the totality of human nature in his exalted comprehensive personality." To the same effect he says in his remarks on Rom. v. 15, "If Christ were *a* man among other men, it would be impossible to conceive how his suffering and obedience could have an essential influence on mankind; he could then only operate as an example; but he is to be regarded, even apart from his divine nature, as *the* man, i. e. as realizing the absolute idea of humanity, and including it potentially in himself spiritually as Adam did corporeally." To this point Archdeacon Wilberforce devotes the third chapter of his book, and represents the whole value of Christ's work as depending upon it. If this be denied, he says, "the doctrines of atonement and sanctification, though confessed in words, become a mere empty phraseology." Dr. Nevin, in his *Mystical Presence*, p. 210, says, "The word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but *flesh*, or humanity, in its universal conception. How else could he be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such? How else could the value of his mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only? The entire scheme of the Christian salvation requires and assumes throughout this view of the incarnation, and no other. To make it a mere individual case, a fact of no wider force than the abstract person of Jesus himself, thus resolving his relationship to his people into their common relationship to Adam, is to turn all at last into an unreal theophany, and thus to overthrow the doctrine altogether." Thus the whole scheme of salvation is made to depend on a certain view of anthropology. Unless we believe in a generic humanity as an objective reality, a substance underlying all individual lives, we cannot believe the gospel. And unless we believe that the Son of God became incarnate, not "in an individual case," but in this generic nature, we deny any real incarnation, and resolve the whole matter into a mere ocular illusion. In the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1850, in

answer to an article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Dr. Nevin says of the critic, "His own idea of the incarnation is plainly that it did not enter into the organization of the world at all, as a fact of permanent force. Probably he has no sense whatever of this organization as a vast whole completing itself in man, and thus reaching forward as a single historical process from the beginning of the world to the end. The world is for him neither organism nor history, but a vast sand heap, in which men are thrown together outwardly, to be formed for eternity as so many separate units, each perfect and complete by itself. The incarnation, of course, in such view becomes one of those naked units only, the man Jesus mysteriously made God for himself alone, an abstraction that comes into no real connection with our general humanity beyond the limits of his person. He stands in the world a mere theophany, not of a few hours only, as in the days of Abraham, but for thirty-three years; a sublime avatar, fantastically [!] paraded thus long before men's eyes only to be translated to heaven, and continue there (for the imagination) in no real union with the world's life whatever. This, thus left behind by the transient apparition, pursues its old course, including in its living stream nothing more than has belonged to it from the beginning." P. 7. It belongs to the force of Dr. Nevin's character to outherod Herod on all occasions; and he generally does it, as in the above extract, by the way of implication and negation rather than by direct assertion. We have to transmute his negative statements into the relative affirmations to get at his real meaning. The world is an organism. Men are not units. Humanity is a stream of life. Individual men stand related to that stream as the waves to the sea. The Son of God became incarnate, not in one of those waves, but in the stream itself. Jesus alone did not become God in virtue of the incarnation. The race becomes God. Humanity is deified and flows on, not as of old, a stream of mere human, but of theanthropic life. Unless we take this view of the incarnation, he elsewhere says, "all pretended orthodoxy is reduced to a mere empty sham." *Review*, March 1850, p. 173. What Christ assumed we are told was "that living law or power, which, whether in Adam alone, or in all his pos-

terity, forms at once the entire fact of humanity, irrespectively of the particular human existences in which it may appear." P. 178. In the *Review*, April 1853, Christ is said to have assumed "our nature as a general life," "the substance of the human world," "the whole humanity generically," which was brought "into union with Divinity in his person," and thus it was "restored to its lawful relation to its Creator." "This for all time is henceforth the measure of its true idea." "This is true humanity." "Christ did thus restore our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea." P. 263. It was not, therefore, an individual human body and soul that was brought into personal union with the eternal Son of God in the incarnation, but humanity as a general life, as it was henceforth to exist in the persons of believers. "This is true humanity," that is, humanity in that personal union with God which took place in Christ is the true idea of human nature; and the normal relation of man to God is that which Christ, who was at once God and man, sustains to the eternal Father. "This divine-human life, as it has come to exist in Jesus Christ" "perpetuates itself by its own inherent law," and is Christianity. We have here the answer to the question, What is Christianity? It is a life. It is the life of Christ. It is the "conscious union of Divinity and humanity in one real life."

It is to be remembered that humanity as a life includes body and soul; the one cannot be without the other. That is, such is the law of this life, that it manifests itself not only in thought and feeling, but in an external physical organism. Christ, therefore, in assuming humanity as a life-power, developed for himself a true body and a rational soul, and wherever his humanity is, there it is both corporeally and incorporeally, and as it is inseparably united with his divine nature, and as that nature is omnipresent, so is Christ everywhere present as to soul, body, and Divinity. "Christ's life," says Dr. Nevin, "was one; to enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality. To divide the humanity of Christ is to destroy it; to take it away and lay it no man can tell where. . . . Christ's humanity is not his soul separately taken;

just as little as it is his body separately taken. It is neither soul nor body as such, but the everlasting, indissoluble union of both." "Either Christ's human life is not formed in us at all, or it must be formed in us as a human life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form and project itself in space." *Mystical Presence*, p. 170. "We may divide Christ in our thoughts, abstracting his Divinity from his humanity, or his soul from his body. But no such dualism has place in his actual person. If then he is to be received by us at all it must be in a whole way." P. 181. Calvin, he says, "dwells too much on the life-giving virtue of Christ's *flesh* simply; as if this was not necessarily and inseparably knit to his soul, and to his Divinity too, as a single indivisible life; so that where the latter form of existence is present in a real way, the other must be present too, so far as its utmost nature is concerned, to the same extent." P. 157. In the *Mercersburg Review*, March 1850, it is taught at length that there is a perpetual presence of "Christ's manhood" in the world, that his man's nature is here now; that the acts of Christ in the world are the acts not of his Divinity only, but of his manhood, and therefore that manhood must be here. This ubiquity of Christ's human nature is not to be conceived of as an ubiquity of his individual body, or as a material extension. A distinction is to be made between "the simple man and the universal man here joined in one person." This universal man or humanity is "a law," "a life power," raised above the limitations of time and space, but it is nevertheless the whole of humanity in its true force and idea. "The flesh of Christ, as begotten by the Holy Ghost, and as rising generically into, and uniting with, his divine life, becomes itself a *πνευματικόν;* so that whilst all its attributes, holding only in time and space, are left behind, its inward power comprehending all that is really necessary as the germ of an actual humanity, remains permanently and for ever linked with his person." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 512. It was very generally objected to Schleiermacher that he reduced the historical to a mere ideal Christ, or if he admitted a historical God-man, he represented his existence after his course in this world as merged in a general life. To this the above representation

would seem to agree. The flesh of Christ rises "into his divine life;" all that belongs "to time and space," i. e. all the limitations of time and space are left behind; nothing remains but "a power." The common statement, however, is that Christ is both an individual and universal man, so that while his human nature, as the germ of a new life, is ever and everywhere present in the world, his own human body and soul are in heaven.

The hypostatic union, therefore, is the assumption on the part of the eternal Son of God not simply or primarily of a true body and a reasonable soul, but of humanity as a generic life, of our fallen humanity, of that entity or substance in which all human lives are one. The effects of this union are, 1. That humanity is taken into Divinity, it is exalted into a true divine life. The life of Christ is *one*. It may be designated as divine, or as human. It is both, it is "divine human." On this point, more than any other feature of the mystical system, its advocates are specially full and earnest. We have already seen that Schleiermacher, the father of the system, ignores all essential difference between God and the world. They differ in our conception, and functionally, but are essentially one. We have seen that Dorner, the learned and accomplished historian of the doctrine concerning Christ's person, avows that the church view of two distinct substances in the same person involves endless contradictions, and that no true Christology can be framed which does not proceed on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man. We have also seen that Ullmann makes this Wesenseinheit, (essential oneness) between the divine and human, the fundamental idea of Christianity. We have further seen that Dr. Nevin denies any real dualism in Christ, saying that while we may separate the Divinity from the humanity as united in his person in thought, they are nevertheless one; that his divine nature is human in the strict sense of the term. It is, therefore, taught, "that the properties of the divine nature attach, through the central consciousness, to the human," and "the properties of the human attach, in the same way, to the divine." The Lutherans had taught that divine attributes in virtue of the hypotastical union belong to the human nature of Christ,

but the assertion that human attributes were transferred to the divine nature, they pronounced with one voice to be *blasphemia horribilis*. This difficulty, or rather the contradiction of infinite attributes belonging to a finite subject, and of the attributes of the divine nature and not the nature itself being transferred to humanity, has been gotten over, as we have seen, in the mystical system, by denying any essential difference, any difference in substance, between the divine and human. As in man there is no dualism between soul and body, so in Christ there is no dualism between his divine and human nature. They are *one* life. But human nature is a life and the divine nature is a life; if the life is one, the nature is one. As, therefore, in man the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God reveals himself in human nature. He takes it up into his Divinity so as to constitute with it one nature or life. The divine and human, therefore, in Christ can only be distinguished in thought. They are one. The hypostatic union is only humanity in its ideal state. The human nature is thereby exalted into a "higher sphere;" it becomes divine but remains human. These are only different forms of one and the same life. Therefore, it is said that humanity itself is raised into the sphere of the same life [i. e. the divine life] and completely transferred with its power, in the everlasting glorification of the Son of Man." *Mystical Presence*, p. 224. "The glorification of Christ then was the full advancement of our human nature itself to the power of a divine life." p. 226. The divine Logos, it is said on the same page, "sunk for the moment into the limitations of the fallen mortal nature with which it became thus incorporated," for the purpose of raising that nature "into the same order of existence." The great design and effect of the incarnation was thus to raise our nature into "the same order of existence" with the eternal Logos; in other words, to bring humanity to the knowledge and consciousness of its oneness with God. This idea pervades the whole system. Divinity and humanity are united as one life. The latter is so far identical with the former as to be only different as the mode of manifestation. When we receive the one we receive the other. If Christ dwells in us, it is this divine human life which dwells in us, the incarnate

Logos. If in the Lord's supper we are partakers of the body of Christ, it is "the divine human life of the Son of Man himself" of which we are the participants.

2. As, however, the humanity which God took into personal union with himself was our fallen humanity, the elevation of that nature to the sphere of a divine life required a protracted and painful conflict. Our nature had to be healed before it could be merged as one life in the life of God. The second effect of the incarnation, although the first in order of sequence, was this struggle or conflict by which it was reconciled to God, and brought back to its normal relation of oneness with the divine nature. In consequence of the entrance of the Logos into the generic fallen humanity, a new life-power was communicated to it, which overcame all its infirmities, and raised it ultimately into the life of God. This was at once the work of redemption and atonement. The reconciliation of God and man, as Ullmann and all other advocates of the system say, was effected not *by* Christ, but *in* him. The personal union of the divine and human in him was the reconciliation of heaven and earth. The two natures became united and merged in one life. Generic humanity, therefore, before and apart from its manifestation in individuals, was healed, sanctified, imbued with righteousness and holiness, and in this restored and elevated state was prepared to pass over to Christ's people, and as Ullmann says, gradually to the whole word. The whole work of redemption and reconciliation was effected *in* the person of Christ, by the mere fact of the incarnation. This idea is more or less distinctly brought into view in the numerous citations already given. It is not necessary, therefore, to multiply proof passages. In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said, "If Christ did take up the life, and so the substance of the human world, *the whole* humanity generically, into union with Divinity in his person, and restore it to its lawful relation to its Creator, then verily are its sins taken away, and it will be, rather it *is* saved." P. 263. In the *Mystical Presence*, p. 166, it is said, "The assumption of humanity on the part of the Logos involved the necessity of suffering, as the only way in which the new life with which it was thus joined, could triumph over the law of sin and death it was

called to surmount. The passion of the Son of God was the world's spiritual crisis, in which the principle of health came to its last struggle with the principle of disease, and burst forth from the very bosom of the grave itself in the form of immortality. This was the atonement, Christ's victory over sin and hell." That is, the atonement was the successful struggle of the Logos with "the law of sin and death," in that generic humanity which he had assumed. The advocates of this system, it may be remarked in passing, always speak of Christ as sinless. They say he assumed "our fallen human nature, sin excepted." It is hard, however, to reconcile this with their other statements. The nature which he assumed is said to be fallen, to be diseased, which can hardly mean anything else than morally corrupt; it was infected with "a law of sin and death." At the same time it is said that his life was *one*, and therefore he had in himself, in his own conscious life, not a pure, but a diseased humanity, a law of sin in his own person. They doubtless have some way of reconciling these apparent contradictions. What that way is we do not understand, unless with Schleiermacher's other doctrines they adopt his view of the nature of sin, as only a necessary and temporary limitation, and having no existence for God as sin. That the work of redemption was effected by the fact of the incarnation, and in the person of Christ, is taught by Ullmann very distinctly when he says, Christianity "represents God and humanity as united not merely in idea, but in a real human life, and, therefore, assumes a real redeeming power as infused into our nature, which, not indeed by a single act of consciousness, but by a severe moral process, but thus only the more thoroughly, effects the union of God and man." P. 40. The healing process effected in Christ by the union of the Logos with fallen humanity in his person, is repeated in the case of every believer by the power of Christ's sanctified humanity, introduced as a new principle of life into that humanity, as manifested in the believer's person. "It is the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ, which not simply qualifies him for the work he was appointed to perform, but of itself involves in his person that reconciliation between heaven and earth, God and man, which the idea of redemption requires, and for which

there could be no room in any other form." March 1849, p. 154. "The reconciliation of heaven and earth" it is said, p. 161, "lies in the mystery of incarnation itself, and involves potentially and necessarily all the atonement and redemption that follow." Such is also the doctrine of Wilberforce, "The name Mediator," he says, "is not bestowed by reason of any work," but because "of the permanent union in one person of God and man." "His incarnation," says Dr. Nevin, "is not to be regarded as a device *in order* to his mediation, the needful preliminary and condition of this merely as an independent and separate work; it is itself the mediatorial fact, in all its height and depth, and length and breadth." *Review*, March 1850, p. 170. "Christ has redeemed the world, or the nature of man as fallen in Adam, by so taking it into union with his own higher nature as to deliver it from the curse and power of sin; meeting the usurpation of this false principle with firm resistance from the start; triumphantly repelling its assaults; and in the end carrying captivity captive by carrying his man's nature itself, through the portals of the resurrection, to the right hand of God in glory." P. 181.

3. The third effect of the incarnation was the introduction of a new principle into the life of the world. As the Son of God took upon him the universal life of the world, and as the effect of the hypostatic union was to overcome "the law of sin and death" with which that life was infected, this renovated, sanctified human nature by the law of development passes over to others. As generic humanity once existed in Adam, and was communicated by him to his posterity, so that same humanity united with Divinity as one life, is communicated to those in Christ. It is as much a germ, as much an universal life to be revealed in numberless personalities, in the one case as in the other. This idea is abundantly asserted in the passages already quoted. In no other way, it is said, can we be made partakers of the benefits of the incarnation. "That the race might be saved, it was necessary that a work should be wrought, not beyond it, but in it; and this inward salvation to be effective must lay hold of the race itself in its organic, universal character, before it could extend to individuals. . . . Such an inward salvation of the race required that it should be

joined in a living way with the divine nature itself, as represented by the everlasting Word or Logos, the fountain of all created light and life. The Word accordingly became flesh, that is, assumed humanity into union with itself. It was not an act whose force was intended to stop in one man himself, to be transplanted soon afterwards to heaven. Nor was it intended merely to serve as the necessary basis of the great work of atonement, the power of which might be applied to the world subsequently in the way of outward imputation. It had this use indeed, but not its first and most comprehensive necessity. The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos, as a permanent source of life." *Mystical Presence*, p. 165. The incarnation "is the supernatural linking itself to the onward flow of the world's life, and becoming thenceforth the ground and principle of the entire organism." P. 167. This new life "is in all respects a true human life. It is in one sense divine. It springs from the Logos. But it is not the life of the Logos separately taken. It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his own person, but passes over to his people." "The process by which the whole is accomplished is not mechanical, but organic. It takes place in the way of history, growth, regular living development." P. 167. This is the grand idea of the whole system. Humanity as developed from Adam impeded and weakened by sin could never work out its true idea, could never attain the end contemplated in its original constitution. But united with the divine Logos it is imbued with a higher life, and being developed from him it attains in his people, by a regular process of growth, its full perfection. The life of the believer is as much an organic continuance of the humanity of Christ, as the life of the men of this generation "holds" in organic continuity with the life of Adam. The generic human nature, the substance which underlies the lives of men, and in which they are all one, is, since the incarnation, (so far as the church is concerned) the divine human nature of Christ, that is, Divinity and humanity united as one life. Christ's humanity constitutes the church.

III. Soterology. The whole theory of salvation as modified by the mystical system, is determined by the idea presented at the close of the preceding paragraph. Humanity as a whole was in Adam. He was the race. Human nature. as a generic life, sinned in him—became guilty and polluted; and, as this same life is the underlying substance, in which all men are one, it follows that the act of Adam was the act of all men—its guilt and pollution belong to them in the same measure and for the same reason that they belong to him. There is no imputation of his sin to his posterity further than the recognition of the fact that it is their sin. In like manner, humanity, as a whole, was in Christ in personal union with the eternal Logos. "He was the race." Human nature, as a generic life, united with the divine nature, conquered the law of sin in the old nature, fulfilled all righteousness, triumphed over death, and was exalted to the right hand of God. This divine human life, this sanctified human nature, is the generic life of believers, in which they are all one. They therefore did all Christ did, performed all his acts. Those acts were the acts of the life which passes over to them, or is inserted in them, with all its merits, its righteousness, its holiness and power. At first it is feeble, (as in the case of our natural life, derived from Adam,) but it is gradually developed, and ultimately triumphs over sin and death. The resurrection of Christ was not a miracle. It was the natural, legitimate working of his divine human life, as much as waking out of sleep is the proper working of our ordinary nature. In like manner, the final resurrection of believers is not miraculous; it is the development of their theanthropic nature, the legitimate result of the law of life which they derive from Christ. The following points are involved in the above statement: viz. 1. That the divine human life of Christ is communicated to his people; 2. That that life includes his body, soul, and Divinity; 3. That it bears with it the merits, the righteousness, the holiness and power of Christ, and *is* their salvation; not its ground or procuring cause, but the salvation itself; 4. That this generic humanity, in union with the divine Logos, is the common life of Christ's mystical body, constituting all his people one. All these points are included in the passages already quoted from the advocates of the

theory. Our time and space admit of only a few more citations in support of the representation just given. Ullmann, in a passage already quoted, says that the "oneness of Christ with God" is not something individual, isolated, or transient, but with his life is communicated to believers.* In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said: we do not "partake of his Divinity alone, but of his manhood, his glorified humanity, bound with his Divinity in the bond of a common life." P. 273. The saint "partakes of his divine human life as really as by nature he partakes of the corrupt life of Adam." P. 272. The resurrection of Christ was not "the fruit of his creative and omnipotent energy, as is the case with miracles in the world of nature." His "life asserted its victorious power over death, and raised the body of Christ from its bondage, just as our natural life asserts its power over sleep, and by its own energy throws it off." The saints will be raised at last not "by a miracle in the ordinary sense," but "by the activity of their Saviour's life, which has its abode in them." P. 270. Christ himself is "the ground and source of salvation, rather than his works. His merits are reached only through his life." P. 267. "Christ's acts were the acts of the life which dwelt in him, the activity of his divine human personality, and, as such, are the acts of that same life, whatever form it may put on in the process of outward development;" that is, were the acts of all his people in whom it is developed. "Christ restored our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea. And if we, as individuals, would stand in the like relations, we can do so only by standing in living union with this new humanity, in it as our life element. No simple reckoning is sufficient in the case. It requires an actual transfer of our whole being, an ingrafting into the stock of living humanity. Thus do we partake of the salvation of Jesus Christ, only as we are penetrated with its true idea, with human nature in its true relation to God; that is, in living union with him. Christ, therefore, himself gives us the true mode of imputation, when he says, 'Ye must be *born again*.'" P. 263.

* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 41.

The points insisted upon by Dr. Nevin in Section II. Chap. iii. of his *Mystical Presence*, are, 1. That our nature as derived from Adam is incapable of raising itself to its true relation to God. 2. That the union in which we stand to Adam "extends to his entire person, body as well as soul." 3. That in Christ our fallen "humanity was exalted again to a new imperishable divine life." "The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos as a permanent source of life." 4. The value of Christ's sufferings depends on this view of the incarnation. 5. "The Christian salvation, as comprehended in Christ, is a new life." "It is a new life introduced into the very centre of humanity itself." 6. This new life "is in all respects a true human life." "It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." 7. "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; thus constituting the church." 8. "As joined with Christ, then, we are one with him in his life." "Christ communicates his own life substantially to the soul on which he acts, causing it to grow into his very nature. This is the *mystical union;* the basis of our whole salvation; the only medium by which it is possible for us to have an interest in the grace of Christ under any other view." 9. Our relation to Christ is immeasurably more deep and intimate than our relation to Adam. 10. "The mystical union includes necessarily a participation in the entire humanity of Christ." "The life of Christ is *one*. To enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality." 11. So we too "are embraced by it in a whole way." This new life "must extend to us in the totality of our nature," body as well as soul. "We have just seen it to be a true human life before it reaches us. It is the life of the *incarnate* Son of God." Christ's human life "must be formed in us a *human* life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form, and project itself in space." 12. This is effected, not by different forms of action, one for the soul and another for the body, but by one undivided process, as the humanity of Christ is one living organic process. 13. This does not involve a material, or actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people; nor, 14, any ubiquity or

idealistic dissipation of his body. "Adam was at once an individual and a whole race." So in the case of Christ. 15. This union is more intimate than any other. 16. It is effected by the Holy Ghost. 17. It is apprehended by faith. 18. This new life includes degrees and is completed in the resurrection. "The bodies of the saints in glory will be only the last result, in organic continuity, of the divine life of Christ implanted in their souls at regeneration." "We can make no intelligible distinction here," it is said, p. 181, "between the crucified body of Christ and his body as now glorified in heaven. Both at last are one and the same life." "We partake not of his Divinity only, nor yet of his Spirit as separated from himself, but also of his true and proper humanity." On page 189, it is said, "The judgment of God must be according to truth. He cannot reckon to any one an attribute or quality which does not belong to him in fact. He cannot declare him to be in a relation or state, which is not actually his own, but the position merely of another." No federal union or legal fiction, we are told, will here answer. "Righteousness, like guilt, is an attribute which supposes a subject in which it inheres, and from which it cannot be abstracted without ceasing to exist altogether. In the case before us, this subject is the mediatorial nature, or life of the Saviour himself. Whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy, or moral value in any way, in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in his life, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the presence of which only it can have either reality or stability." P. 191. "That which is imparted to us through our faith, by the power of the Holy Ghost, is the true divine human life of the Son of Man himself." P. 243. And this divine human life which wrought all Christ's righteousness, is imbued with his holiness and power; becoming our life, we thereby have his righteousness, holiness, and power inherent in us, as truly and really as they are in him. "The supernatural, as thus made permanent and historical in the church, must, in the nature of the case, correspond with the form of the supernatural as it appeared originally in Christ himself. For it is all one and the same life or constitution. The church must have a theanthropic character throughout. The union of the divine

and human in her constitution must be inward and real, a continuous revelation of God in the flesh, exalting this last continuously into the sphere of the Spirit." P. 247.

It is not worth while to multiply citations. The whole thing is plain. We are one with Adam because he was the race; humanity was in him as a generic life, and sinned his sin, and incurred his guilt and pollution. Guilt and pollution are attributes which must inhere in a subject or substance; that substance is generic humanity, which unfolds itself in a multitude of individual persons. Its acts, therefore, are their acts, its qualities or attributes belong to them. The eternal Son of God assumed this fallen humanity into personal union with himself, whereby it was constituted a divine-human life. That life triumphed, through suffering and conflict, over "the law of sin and death," inherent in our fallen humanity, and sanctified it, and exalted it into the divine nature. This new life, therefore, is divine-human. It is truly divine and truly human. It is the union of Divinity and humanity as one life. This divine-human life is communicated to the people of Christ by the new birth, as they receive the nature of Adam by their natural birth. And as the nature derived from Adam comes laden with guilt, pollution, and death; as it develops itself outwardly in a frail, natural body, and inwardly in a blinded, guilty, and polluted soul; as it begins feebly in the infant, and gradually reaches maturity, and then succumbs to death, and ripens in perdition; as it develops itself not only personally in individuals, but in the whole course of history; so on the other hand, this divine-human, or theanthropic nature of Christ comes to the believer fraught with righteousness, holiness, and immortality; it develops itself in him as body and soul, as a glorious spiritual body, and a righteous, holy soul; it begins feebly, but matures gradually, until it bursts into the resurrection, and culminates in glory; and as a generic life it reveals itself not only in the individual, but in the church, which is a living organism. It is Christ's divine humanity in a concrete form. That is, it is the form in which Christ's theanthropic nature unfolds itself in the world. This is the foundation of

IV. The Ecclesiology of the mystical system, of which our limits forbid our saying anything more than is involved in the

preceding exposition. The church, as we have seen, is declared to be a real and permanent "revelation of God in the flesh." The church "is not a mere outward organization, but a divine-human life power, originating in the person of Christ, with an inward, historical connection with the world, containing the very help we need and must have as sinners." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 529. "Christ's presence in the world is in and by his mystical body the church. As a real human presence, carrying in itself the power of a new life for the race in general, it is no abstraction or object of thought merely, but a glorious living reality, continuously at work, in an organic and historical way in the world's constitution. . . . . This is the idea of the church. It comes from within, and not from without. It grows out of the mystery of the incarnation, apprehended as an abiding fact." *Review*, March 1850, p. 186. "The idea of the church, as thus standing between Christ and single Christians, implies of necessity visible organization, common worship, a regular public ministry and ritual, and, to crown all, especially grace-bearing sacraments. To question this is to give up to the same extent the sense of Christ's mediation as a perennial fact, now and always taking effect upon the economy of the world, through the church as his mystical body. Let it be felt that the incarnation is a mystery not simply past, and not simply beyond the world, but at this time in full force for the world, carrying in itself the whole value of Christ's sacrifice and resurrection as an undying "ONCE FOR ALL"—the true conception of the mediatorial supremacy, as the real headship of Christ's manhood over all in behalf of the church, and for its salvation; let it be felt at the same time that this mystery teaches men in and by the church, which itself is made to challenge their faith for this reason, as something supernatural and divine; and it becomes at once impossible to resist the feeling that the powers of the world to come are actually at hand, in its functions and services, with the same objective reality that attaches to the powers of nature, under their own form, and in their own place. To see no more in the ministry and offices of the church, in this view, than the power of mere outward declaration and testimony, such as we might have in

any secular school, betrays a rationalistic habit of mind, which only needs to be set free from the indolence of uninquiring tradition, that it may be led to deny altogether that Christ has ever or at all come in the flesh." P. 187. "The church contains ordinances and sacraments divinely instituted, for the purpose of bringing this *theanthropic* life of the Redeemer into real contact with our nature." October 1854, p. 518. "The divine-human merits of Christ's life are not received immediately and directly from his person by faith, in an abstract way, but mediately through the church, and especially by the sacraments which are instituted definitely for this purpose." P. 519. "The sacraments are bearers of the divine-human life of the Redeemer." P. 520.

Such is the answer which modern speculation has given to the question, What is Christianity? It is the theanthropic life of Christ. The eternal Logos having assumed our fallen humanity, and taken it into life union with himself, his divine-human life is generic human nature, exalted and sanctified; and, developing itself in the church, it is communicated to individuals by the sacraments, which are "the only channels of his grace." It is unfortunate that the sun does not rise on America until it begins to set on Germany. This Vermittelungstheologie, (*mediating-theology*,) as it is there called, of which Ullmann is the great representative, standing, as Schwarz says, *im centrum des centrums*, has, if we may credit the Germans themselves, already passed away.* It served for a while to occupy the German mind, and then was shipped to America. Here it has been seized upon with avidity, and presented as the only possible form of Christian theology. It is, however, Christian only in name. You may leave out the name of Christ and every distinguishing fact of Christianity, and the system retain everything essential to it. That humanity, as a generic life, became impeded in its development so as to be unable to realize its true idea without assistance *ab extra;* that God united himself with the world as an organism, and thus enables humanity to attain a true life-union with himself, is the whole system. All the rest is formulas and phrases. The theory, as a theolo-

* See Schwarz's Geschichte der neuesten Theologie, 1856.

gical theory, as an exposition of the method by which sinful men may be restored to the life of God, may be held by a pagan or Mohammedan as well as by a Christian. Even as a philosophy underlying Christian doctrines, it is so uncongenial that it alters the whole nature, objective and subjective, of Christianity. That is, it changes essentially its doctrines, and it alters the whole character of our inward religion. 1. In the first place it alters entirely our relation to Christ. To the believer, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the eternal Son of God, clothed in our nature, very God and very man, in two distinct natures and one person for ever, is the supreme object of love and worship. All the religious affections terminate on him. The believer lives in daily and hourly communion with him; relies on the merit of his righteousness as something out of himself, neither done by him nor wrought in him, as the ground of his acceptance with God. Everything either done by himself or wrought within him, he knows to be finite, human, polluted, and insufficient. He needs an infinite righteousness; he demands immeasurably more than he can either do or experience, to give him confidence with God. He looks to the Lord Jesus as a priest for ever at the right hand of God, continually presenting before God the merit of his satisfaction, and making intercession for us. He looks to him as his Shepherd to guide and feed him day by day; as his King to rule in, reign over, and to protect him from all danger and every enemy. He longs for his personal presence, to be with him that he may behold his glory, worship at his feet, and be perfectly devoted to his service in heaven. According to this new system, all this is altered. We have nothing *now* specially to do with Christ. Adam corrupted humanity, which we receive as a generic life from him. But what have we now to do with Adam? He is nothing to us, any more than the first acorn is to the present oak. So Christ healed and sanctified humanity, which we derive from him. This is an infinite good which he did two thousand years ago, as Adam did us a great harm six thousand years ago. But we are just as much separated from the one as from the other. The life of the one, as of the other, comes to us in the regular course of organic, historical development. No true Christian will allow any philosophy thus to separate him from his Saviour.

He cannot do it. The whole religion of the New Testament and the whole experience of the church suppose each individual soul to be in immediate contact and intercourse with the incarnate Son of God AS A PERSON, and not as an internal life; coming to him directly, each for himself, and living in constant and conscious fellowship with him.

2. Not only does this system change our whole relation to Christ as a person, but our whole relation to his mediatorial work. All that Christ did or does in the way of atonement, or satisfaction, or sanctification, according to this theory, was done in humanity as a generic life. He withstood and overcame the law of sin in our fallen nature, he suffered, but triumphed in that conflict, and transmits that sanctified humanity to us. This was the atonement, this is redemption. This system, therefore, sends the sinner naked and shivering into the presence of God, with nothing to rely upon but the modicum of theanthropic life that flickers in his own bosom. He has no righteousness but what is inherent. All he has of righteousness, holiness, joy, or glory, is in himself, in that life which is as much his as the life he derived from Adam, the heights and depths of which are sounded by his own consciousness. If he feels himself to be wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, he is so, and there is no help for him. All his treasures are within himself. If his theanthropic life does not make him righteous, and holy, and blessed, there is nothing else can do it. The nature he derived from Adam made him subjectively unrighteous as well as miserable; so the nature he derives from Christ must make him subjectively righteous and inwardly blessed, or he must for ever remain unrighteous and condemned. We have nothing but ourselves. Words are of no avail here. It does not help the matter to call our poor, cold, worldly, polluted, sinful life, "divine-human," "theanthropic," "humanity raised to a higher sphere," "imbued with divine power," &c. It is nevertheless something which our own conscience condemns, and our own consciousness tells us is poor and wretched. So that if our inherent righteousness is all we have, we are of all men most miserable.

3. This system not only takes from us Christ and his right-

eousness, but the Holy Ghost. According to the real author of the system there is no Holy Ghost. Schleiermacher did not believe in the Trinity. So far as he was theistic at all, he was a Sabellian. God as God he called the Father; God in the world, the Son; God in the church, the Spirit. It was a mere modal distinction. The common life of the church he designated as the Holy Spirit, but that life was not a person. It had no existence except in the church. In those of his followers who retain speculatively the doctrine of the Trinity, the office of the Spirit almost entirely disappears. It may be safely said that the Holy Spirit is mentioned on the pages of the New Testament one hundred times, where he is mentioned once in the same compass in the writings of the theologians of this school. We do not recollect that he is mentioned more than once, and then only by the way, in the sixty-one passages of Ullmann's dissertation. And no wonder; the system makes no provision for his person or work. What need is there of the supernatural work of the Spirit, in conveying to us the nature of Adam, or in its historical development? And what need is there of his intervention, if the divine-human nature of Christ is the source of all life and even of the resurrection to believers? Or, if we assume that the Spirit by regeneration must insert us in the theanthropic nature of Christ, as our natural birth inserts us in the generic life of the Adam, it is an unnecessary assumption. It lies outside of the system. It is simply a shred of traditional orthodoxy not yet shaken off. The theanthropic life of Christ is propagated by the law of development just as naturally as the life of Adam. "The supernatural," says Dr. Nevin, "has become natural." Exactly so; and therefore it ceases to be supernatural. It is all nature, since the incarnation, just as much as it was before. The blessed Spirit of God, for whose presence, illumination, guidance, sanctifying and consoling power the whole church longs and pants, as a thirsty land for the rain from heaven; whose fellowship with the individual believer and with the whole body of the faithful, is invoked daily and hourly, somewhere in the church, in the apostolic benediction, this blessed Spirit, *τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιοῦν*, is in this system reduced to a name. One writer in the *Mercersburg Review* says the

Spirit is the *modus* of Christ's theanthropic nature in the soul. Dr. Nevin says, it is the force of that life. So far as the system is concerned it is nothing. We need say no more. A theory which takes away a present, personal Saviour; which takes away his righteousness; which ignores the blessed Spirit of God; which makes faith a mere consciousness of the divine-human life within us, and represents regeneration as imputation, the feeble principle of life therein implanted being all our interest in the righteousness of Christ, all we have to plead at the bar of conscience or the tribunal of God, is not a doctrine on which a soul can live.

CORRECTIONS.

Page 124, foot note, *for* Thomsen, *read* A. U. Thomsen's Die Schleiermachersche Philosophische Grundansicht, page 10.
Page 126, foot note, *for* "one call," *read* "one and all."
Page 127, line 9, *for* her, *read* the.
lines 11 and 13, *for* active, *read* actual.
Page 146, line 17 from bottom, *for* "transferred," *read* "transfused."
line 3 do. do. *for* "as," *read* "in."

SHORT NOTICES.

The First Adam and the Second. The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man. By Samuel J. Baird, D. D., pastor of the Presbyterian church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860. 8vo. pp. 688.

This imposing volume has just issued from the press. It is so large and so full of important matter, that its perusal is a serious task. For this task we have not as yet been able to command the time. We have examined it sufficiently to satisfy ourselves that it is a work of no common value. It evinces ability, research, careful preparation, and earnest zeal for the truth. It is a remarkable illustration of what may be done by a man of talents giving years to a special object, reading and digesting everything within his reach which bears on his subject of inquiry. Dr. S. J. Baird has thus been able to produce a book on the two great themes of the fall and redemption of man, which is an honour not only to himself, but to the country. There are not many works in the history of American theology of higher rank than this volume is destined, in our judgment, to take. It is immeasurably above many of the productions of the last century, which have secured for their authors a lasting reputation. It is to us a matter of deep regret, that a work which has so much to recommend it, and which we believe will vindicate for itself a permanent place in the theological literature of the country, takes ground on the subject of imputation, which we are fully persuaded is unscriptural, and contrary to the standards of our church, and to the theology of the great body of Protestants. This, however, although in our judgment a great drawback to the value of the work as a means of theological training, will not diminish its worth to mature scholars.

The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks. With an Introductory Essay, by Edward A. Parks, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology, Andover, Mass. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, Chauncy street. 1859. 8vo. pp. 596.

The name of EDWARDS stands so prominently before the world, that, "The Edwardian Theory of the Atonement" cannot fail to be understood to mean the theory of the atonement

taught by EDWARDS. There is but one historical Edwards, as there is but one Luther or Calvin. This book, however, does not pretend to give the theory of Edwards, but of his successors, and especially of his son, the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, D. D., President of Union College. There is, therefore, some historical propriety in the designation, but as it is adapted to mislead, it is on that account to be regretted. This work presents in a single volume the ablest and most authoritative exhibition of that theory of the atonement, which entered so largely into the New-school theology of this country. It belongs, indeed, to the past, rather than to the present. The public mind has passed beyond the standpoint occupied by the authors of the discourses here republished. The past, however, belongs to history, and the history of doctrine, and of religious thought, is of all departments of history the most interesting, and the most important. It is as a record of the light in which many great and good men of the last generation regarded this great doctrine, rather than as either a representative or guide of modern thought, that this volume is to be welcomed and estimated.

Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edited by the Rev. Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D. Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. 8vo. pp. 718.

In our notice of this work in a preceding number, it so happened that a copy of the English edition was before the writer, and consequently no reference was made to that which had already been published in this country, by Messrs. Gould and Lincoln of Boston. We regret this oversight, not only because the American edition is eminently creditable to the distinguished house whence it issues, but because some of our readers may have been led to infer that the work was accessible only by the costly method of importation. As the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is daily attracting more and more the attention of students, it is important they should know that the work has been published in an elegant form in our own country.

The Puritans: or, The Church, Court, and Parliament of England during the reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Vol. I. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. 8vo. pp. 549.

There is no period in the history of England more important, either in a civil or religious aspect, than that contemplated in this work. Of the great parties which then struggled for

the ascendency, the Romish, the Anglican, and the Puritan, the last, as the true authors, defenders, and propagators of English liberty and English religion, has the greatest claim on the gratitude of posterity. To Americans, especially, as the political and religious descendants of the Puritans, such a work as this is of peculiar interest. The word Puritan, indeed, had in the age of Elizabeth a much wider sense than we commonly attach to it. But the general principle and spirit of the party, in its more comprehensive, as well as in its more restricted form, were the same. The grand idea with all Puritans was, that God is to be obeyed rather than man, and man only so far as God commands. To develop the history of a party animated by that idea, is a great work. The present volume contains the history of the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, from 1549 to 1575. We have reason to be proud of such a work as this, which bids fair to sustain the reputation of our country, earned by such historians as Bancroft, Prescott, and Motley.

The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolf Stier. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition. By the Rev. William B. Pope, London. New Edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

As our readers are acquainted with the well established character of this work, we simply subjoin the bookseller's notice for their information. It is to be published by subscription in five volumes, 8vo., averaging for the first four volumes nearly a thousand pages each. The fifth volume is to contain a translation of the author's recent addition to his work, "The Words of the Risen Jesus." The price is three dollars per volume for the first four volumes, and two dollars for the fifth. Though published by subscription, the book may be obtained from booksellers in the usual way.

The History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the Continent to the close of the first Session of the Thirty-Fifth Congress. By J. H. Patten, A. M. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. 1860. 8vo., pp. 806.

The design of this work is to meet the wants of those who need a history intermediate between a mere compend and elaborate works extending through many volumes. The class of readers to which such a work is adapted must be large. Almost every family contains members who have not time nor courage to attempt the mastery of our larger national histories, and who yet desire more information than can be obtained from school books. It is another advantage of this work that it brings down the history almost to the present time. The period from

the inauguration of Washington as President to the time of Jackson is almost a *terra incognita* to the majority of middle-aged persons. It is not embraced in ordinary histories, nor does it fall within their personal recollections. The work of Mr. Patten is clearly and pleasantly written, and, as far as we have examined it, the spirit of the book is temperate, and the views which it expresses just.

Letters of John Calvin, compiled from Original Manuscripts, and edited with Historical Notes. By Dr. Jules Bonnet. Vol. III. Translated from the Latin and French Languages, by Marcus Robert Gilchrist. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street.

This is an additional volume of the valuable collection of Calvin's letters, noticed in our last number, to be completed in four volumes. It is a work essential to a due knowledge and appreciation of the character of the Reformer, and to a proper insight into the nature and hinderances of the great religious movement in which he was engaged.

The Book of the Twelve Minor Prophets, Translated from the original Hebrew. With a Commentary, Critical, Philological, and Exegetical. By E. Henderson, D. D. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author, by E. P. Barrows, Hitchcock Professor in the Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: John Wiley. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860. 8vo. Pp. 458.

Dr. Henderson was born in Scotland, A. D. 1787. His father was an agricultural labourer, and his early education was very defective. He was for some years devoted to mechanical employments; but his talents and piety attracting attention, he was placed for two years in a seminary at Edinburgh, and then devoted himself to the work of foreign missions. He went to Denmark in hopes of being able to obtain a passage to Serampore, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. Finding abundant opportunities around him, he continued to labour several years in Denmark; then went to Sweden, and then to Russia. He was engaged for twenty years, principally in efforts to promote the circulation of the Scriptures on the continent of Europe. In 1826 he was appointed Theological Tutor in the Missionary College at Hoxton, and in 1830 he accepted the Tutorship in the Ministerial College at Highbury, where he remained until 1850. His laborious and useful life was closed on the 16th of May, 1858. He was a copious writer; his Biblical Researches and Travels in Russia, his work on Inspiration, Commentary on Isaiah, and this work on the Minor Prophets, are among his most esteemed publications. This, as well as his other biblical works, evinces great labour, a familiar acquaintance with the Hebrew and its cognate languages, and a religious spirit. As

a prophetical interpreter, he is a good deal of a literalist, and too much disposed to limit the Old Testament predictions to specific events; but everything he wrote is replete with valuable information.

Graham Lectures. Human Society: Its Providential Structure, Relations, and Offices. Eight Lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, New York. By F. D. Huntingdon, D D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. 8vo. Pp. 307.

Mr. Graham of Brooklyn left an endowment for an annual course of lectures in the Brooklyn Institute, "On the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested in his works." The first series of lectures was delivered by Richard S. Storrs, Jr., D. D., "On the Constitution of the Human Soul." These lectures have already been published in a style uniform with this volume, which is one of the most beautiful of the publications of the Messrs. Carters. The subject chosen by Dr. Huntingdon is not only of great importance but specially suited to the present state of the country. All questions relating to the constitution of society and the social relations of men are now exciting unusual attention. The reputation of the author as a sincere, thoughtful, and highly cultivated man, is universally known, and constitutes the only recommendation this volume can need.

The Palace of the Great King: or, The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, illustrated in the Multiplicity and Variety of his Works. By the Rev. Hollis Read, author of "God in History," "India and her People," "Commerce and Christianity," &c. New York: C. Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. Pp. 408.

This is a form of natural theology. The facts of geology, zoology, anthropology, astronomy, and other branches of science, are here presented in their relations to God, as revelations of his being and perfections. The book, therefore, combines instruction with religious culture. It is an interesting and valuable work.

The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua. With an Original and Copious Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By Robert Jamieson, D D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1860.

The Historical Books of the Holy Scriptures, with a Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. Robert Jamieson, D. D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow, Scotland. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 360.

A compendious, popular commentary on the historical books of the Old Testament is a real desideratum, which these works are designed to supply. The English text is printed on the left

hand page, and the notes on the right hand. The one therefore occupies no more space than the other. This allows room only for the briefest comments, which however meet and illustrate the main points in the history. The two together form a very available help in the study of all the historical books of the Old Testament.

The Eighteen Christian Centuries. By the Rev. James White, author of the History of France. With a Copious Index. From the second Edinburgh edition. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1859. Pp. 538.

The history of the church for eighteen centuries, compressed in a volume of little more than five hundred pages, must of course be a mere compend. As such, however, it may serve a valuable purpose both for students and for general readers.

Family Religion; or, the Domestic Relations as regulated by Christian Principles. By the Rev. B. M. Smith, Professor in Union Seminary, Virginia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 210.

This is a prize essay. It consists of six chapters, in which the family constitution, the duties arising from it, the means of securing the ends of that constitution, its relation to the church, the importance of the subject, and the pleas for the neglect of family religion, are discussed at length. The book is fraught with wisdom, and is adapted to be eminently useful.

The Hart and the Water-Brooks. A Practical Exposition of the Forty-Second Psalm. By Rev. J. R. McDuff, D.D., author of "Morning and Night Watches," &c., &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 229.

Leaders of the Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Latimer, Knox, the Representative Men of Germany, France, England, and Scotland. By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. Author of "Theism," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati; George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 309.

As this book is printed in a condensed form, though with a clear type and fair page, it contains a good deal of matter, and serves to present the characteristic aspects of the great work of the Reformation in the four countries mentioned in the title page.

Historical Vindications; A Discourse delivered before the Backus Historical Society, &c. With Appendices, containing Historical Notes and Confessions of Faith. By Sewall S. Cutting, Professor of Rhetoric and History in the University of Rochester. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 224.

The Discourse on "The Province and Use of Baptist History" occupies fifty-four pages of the volume, much the larger portion being taken up with the Notes and Confessions. As

an authentic exposition of the views and faith of a large denomination of Christians, this work has an interest for the religious public generally.

A Dictionary of the Holy Bible, for General Use in the Study of the Scriptures. With Engravings, Maps, and Tables. Published by the American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau street. Pp. 533.

This work is founded on Dr. Edward Robinson's Bible Dictionary, first published in 1833. About two-thirds of that work have been retained in this, and large additions made from other sources.

Haste to the Rescue; or, Work while it is called To-day. By Mrs. Charles W. With a Preface, by the author of "English Hearts and English Hands." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 324.

"This book contains a series of facts and incidents which occurred during an intercourse of eighteen months with above five hundred working men and their families in the town of Shrewsbury." It is designed to awaken the sympathy of the educated classes with the sufferings of the poor, and to excite to greater efforts for their improvement.

The Three Wakings. With Hymns and Songs. By the author of "The Christian Life in Song." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 228.

The three wakings are three periods of life. The volume is made up of sacred songs and hymns, breathing a devotional spirit, and evincing much poetical skill.

The Christian Home; or, Religion in the Family. By the Rev. Joseph A. Collier, Kingston, N. Y. Author of "The Right Way." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 198.

This also is a prize essay. It is inferred from the fact that the rather larger work of Dr. B. M. Smith on this subject received the first prize, as stated in a preceding notice, that this production of Mr. Collier's was deemed by the Board too valuable to be allowed to pass with the unaccepted essays. It goes over much the same ground as that indicated in the notice of Dr. Smith's work; and its publication, under the circumstances, is an indication of the high estimate placed upon it by the Board.

History of the Old Covenant, from the German of J. H. Kurtz, D.D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. III. Translated by Rev. James Martin, B.A., Nottingham. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

This volume of a well-known standard work, contains the history of the chosen people during a period of forty years,

whilst sojourning in Arabia Petræa and the land of Moab. This monument of the learning and piety of Dr. Kurtz has already often been noticed in our pages.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia; being a condensed translation of Hertzog's Real Encyclopedia, with additions from other sources. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D.D. Part X. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston.

We continue to call attention to this valuable work, which has been some time in the course of publication. Each part contains 128 pages in double columns, and is sold at fifty cents. The whole will form three super-royal octavo volumes. In no other work within our knowledge can the same amount of varied and valuable information be found in the same compass.

Bunsen's Bibelwerk. Vollständiges Bibelwerk für die Gemeinde. In drei Abtheilungen. Von Christian Carl Josias Bunsen. Erste Abtheilung. Die Bibel. Uebersetzung und Erklärung. Erster Theil: Das Gesetz. Erster Halbband. Einleitung und Genesis, Capitel 1—11. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. B. Westermann & Co., 290 Broadway, New York.

This is the first half volume of the first of the three divisions of Bunsen's great work on the Bible, for the Christian public. He addresses himself to the congregation, the mass of readers, and not exclusively to the learned. This half volume is in quarto, containing cccxciv. pages of introduction, and thirty-two pages devoted to the translation of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, with annotations. The introduction is made up of many separate dissertations, on the need of a new version of the Bible, on the canon, on the names of God, on the principles of interpretation, comparative view of the different translations of the Scriptures, chronological tables and discussions, &c. The author tells us he has been consciously preparing himself for this work for forty years. He had it, more or less, definitely in view during his academical career, while studying Arabic and Persian with De Sacy, in Paris, through his twenty-two years residence in Rome, and fifteen years residence in England, in the most diversified studies and pursuits, and in intercourse with all the most distinguished literary men of the age. During this protracted period, he published numerous fragmentary and preparatory biblical works; as, for example, on the Life of Christ, on the Gospels, on the Psalms, a translation of the prophets Joel and Jonas, &c. At last, after an absence of forty years, he returned, in a vigorous old age, to his native country, to devote himself to giving form and completeness to the great work of his life. Its central idea is a new German translation of the Bible, with explanatory notes, but this is to be attended with accompanying introductions,

dissertations, excursus, appendices, and tables, to serve as receptacles for the stores of learning and speculation accumulated during his long and most laborious career. In this first half volume the translation and notes stand to this accessory matter in the proportion of thirty-two pages to three hundred and ninety-four. Whether this is to be the rule for the rest of the work we cannot say. In any event, the accumulated results of the labours of such a man as the Chevalier Bunsen, must prove a treasure-house, whence the less favoured, the less laborious, and the less able men of this and coming generations may derive stores of knowledge. He is a man, however, to be thankfully used, but not blindly followed.

Turrettin on the Atonement of Christ. Translated by the Rev. James R. Willson, D. D. A new edition, carefully revised by collation with the last edition of the Latin original. New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, 61 Franklin street. 1859. Pp. 195.

Turrettin is almost the only theologian, among the immediate successors of the Reformers, whose writings are still sought after with avidity, and kept in constant use. This is conclusive evidence of their intrinsic merit, and especially of their scriptural character. It is because they so nearly represent the mind of God as revealed in his word, that they answer the convictions of Christians now as well as when they were first published. Although his discussion of the Atonement had special reference to the form of opinions prevailing centuries ago, it meets the popular objections of our own times, and expresses substantially the views of the great body of the theologians of the Reformed church. We understand the religious public are indebted to Dr. T. W. Chambers, of New York, for this new and improved edition of this valuable work.

Preachers and Preaching. By the Rev. Nicholas Murray, D. D., author of "Kirwan's Letters to Bishop Hughes," "Romanism at Home," "Men and Things in Europe," "Parish and other Pencillings," "The Happy Home," &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1860. Pp. 303.

The author of this volume was appointed to deliver the charge to the Rev. Dr. McGill, on his inauguration as Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, in September 1854. He took for his subject "The Ministry We Need." That discourse was the germ of the present book. It has, therefore, borne good fruit. Dr. Murray has here recorded the lessons derived from an experience of thirty years in the ministry. This volume abounds in wise counsels, not only in reference to the preaching and conduct of ministers, but also

to many related subjects—as the pastoral office, duties of parishes, the education of candidates, and others of like kind. It is also enriched by his personal recollections of distinguished preachers, and with the fruits of his diversified studies. It will probably prove one of the most useful and acceptable of the author's numerous publications.

History of Independence Hall; from the Earliest Period to the Present Time; embracing Biographies of the Immortal Signers of the Declaration of Independence, with Historical Sketches of the Sacred Relics preserved in that Sanctuary of American Freedom. By D. W. Belisle. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Brown, Taggard & Chase. Cincinnati: Rickey, Mallory & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1859. Pp. 396.

This long title-page is a full account of the work. It is animated with fervent patriotism, and it will prove a blessing to the country, should it in any measure serve to rekindle the spirit with which Patrick Henry closed one of his most eloquent orations, in Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia, where the first Congress met, with the words, "I am not a Virginian, I am an American."

Thoughts and Reflections on the Present Position of Europe, and its probable consequences to the United States. By Francis J. Grund. Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, publishers, No. 602 Arch street. 1860. Pp. 245.

The attention of the civilized world is turned with anxiety to Europe in its present state of transition. Old things are there passing away. The accession of Louis Napoleon to the imperial throne of France, the Crimean and Italian wars, the changes thereby effected, and the still greater changes thereby foreshadowed, may well call for the serious consideration of all interested in the welfare of Christendom. For the time being God has placed the controlling power in the hands of the French Emperor, and he has mercifully made it his interest to use that power for the promotion of civil and religious liberty in Europe. This work of Mr. Grund, discussing the recent past and the present of European affairs, with evident familiarity with facts, and with a clear and strong mind, cannot fail to command general attention.

A Commentary, Explanatory, Doctrinal, and Practical on the Epistle to the Ephesians. By R. E. Pattison, D. D., late President of Waterville College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 244.

The writer says that in preparing this work he has had his eye "kept steadily on one class of readers—intelligent experienced Christians." The matter is arranged under twenty-one

separate lessons, which form in part so many lectures or expository discourses. At the close there is a series of questions for each lesson, for the benefit of those who use the volume as a text book. As far as we can judge from the hasty examination we have been able to give it, it is a pious, sound, and judicious exposition of the doctrines and precepts of the Epistle.

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac and Annual Remembrancer of the Church for 1860. By Joseph M. Wilson. Volume Second. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1860. Pp. 316.

This volume contains a wonderful amount of statistical information laboriously collected and skilfully arranged. The only thing of which we are disposed to complain is the lithograph portraits.

Youth's Bible Studies. Part VI. The Acts, Epistles, and Revelation. American Tract Society. 12mo. pp. 246.

The Deaf Shoemaker, and other Stories. By Philip Barret. New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1859. 12mo. pp. 216.

Shadows and Sunshine, as illustrated in the history of Notable Characters. By Rev. Erskine Neale, M.A. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1859. 12mo., pp. 281.

Who is my Neighbour? or, The Two Great Commandments. By the author of "Little Bob True." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 216.

A Basket of Chips for the Little Ones. By Luola. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 237.

The Pastoral Office, embracing Experiences and Observations from a Pastorate of Forty Years. By the Rev. Reuben Smith. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 105.

The Divine-human in the Scriptures. By Taylor Lewis, Union College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

This volume, the author informs us, "has grown out of what was intended as an introduction to another work on the Figurative Language of the Scriptures, and which, with the divine permission, he hopes soon to give to the public." It is substantially a plea for, including a refutation of some modern plausible objections against, the plenary, verbal inspiration, and self-evidencing divine light and authority of the Sacred Scriptures. By the term "divine-human," the author does not mean that monistic, transcendental theory of the person of Christ, and of the mutual relation of God and man, which denies or confounds the proper dualism of essence and nature as between the human and divine, of which the phrase, as used of late, is so ominously suggestive. He rather means that God in becoming incarnate assumes true and proper manhood, not a

superhuman or angelic nature; and that in discoursing to men, he uses a true and proper human language, and not some instrument of discourse that is either superhuman or extra-human. He contends that the plain unscientific, yet intensely human phraseology of Scripture, is stronger proof that it is the word of God, than if it were cast in abstract and philosophic moulds. These views he maintains with his usual affluence of learning and force of logic.

We regret to notice that Professor Lewis adopts that perversion of the word "supernatural," as we must consider it, which Dr. Bushnell and others have taken from Coleridge, and which forms the key-note of his recent work, entitled, "Nature and the Supernatural." This is simply, that whatever is above or can control physical laws is supernatural—therefore the human will, or man, is supernatural. Says Dr. Lewis, "Is there in us a power of will, and do we exercise that power to control the physical forces around us within certain limits . . . . is there in us, we say, such a supernatural power, and shall it be no where else in the worlds above us—in God, or in higher superhuman beings acting as the ministers of God?" P. 50. Such a conception of supernaturalism deranges the whole discussion between its advocates and their adversaries. The only supernaturalism, which rises above mere naturalism, is that which rises above the powers of man as well as of physical nature.

The Life of the Rev. Richard Knill of St. Petersburg: being Selections from his Reminiscences, Journals, and Correspondence. By Charles M. Birrell. With a Review of his Character; by the late Rev. John Angell James. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

This biography may be read with interest and profit by ministers and private Christians. It is a memoir of a most zealous, discreet, and successful minister of Christ, whose labours in his own and foreign countries were remarkably honoured of God. His labours as missionary in the East, then for a long period at the Russian capital, and afterwards in home evangelism, give the memoir the interest arising from varied incident, and the value which attaches to information concerning the spirit and methods of Christian activity, which have been crowned with success in various and difficult circumstances.

The Missing Link: or Bible-Women in the homes of the London Poor. By L. N. R., author of "The Book and its Story." New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

This volume consists of a series of graphic narratives of efforts made to relieve the sufferings and improve the character of the London poor. It abounds in matter of interest to the

Christian and philanthropist. Its special object is to illustrate the peculiar efficiency of Christian females among the destitute and degraded strata of the population of cities—of women as distinguished from ladies—and especially of women who have themselves been reclaimed from the debasement from which they undertake to rescue others. To state the conclusion towards which the book tends, in its own words: "It certainly seems that a Native Female Agency, drawn from the classes we want to serve and instruct, has hitherto been a *Missing Link*, and that such supplementary work might now perfect the heavenly chain, which shall lift the lost and the reckless from the depths of their despair."

Sermons by the Rev. H. Grattan Guinness. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The extraordinary power of Mr. Guinness's preaching over crowded auditories in our great cities, will of itself serve as a passport for this volume to the reading Christian public. This peculiar power, so far as we can judge from a cursory inspection of this volume, lies in the simple, clear, fervid articulation of evangelical truth, in such a way as to bring it home to the hearts and consciences of the people. It does not, so far as we can see, lie in any originality of thought, in exuberance of imagery, or magnificence of diction, but in the plainness and force with which it sets forth the simple and pure gospel. Indeed this, and not any merely human excellency of speech or wisdom, must always constitute the power of preaching, because it is itself the "power of God unto salvation."

The Precious Things of God. By Octavius Winslow, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

Those who are acquainted with the devotional and experimental character of Dr. Winslow's writings, will be led from the title of this volume to look for a high degree of unction in its pages. They will not be disappointed. They will find it laden with rich scriptural thought, adapted to enlighten, correct, comfort, and edify all who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

Parochial Lectures on the Psalms. By the late Rev. David Caldwell, A. M. Psalms 1—50. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

The lamented author intended, had his life been spared, to prepare and publish similar expository lectures on the entire Psalms. He was, however, arrested in his useful labours by death. His object was to supply a practical commentary and

exposition more suited to the wants of the people, especially those of his own communion, than such as have been within their reach. He was a zealous and successful Episcopal clergyman in Virginia. These lectures breathe that catholic, evangelical spirit which has so generally and honourably characterized Virginia Episcopalians. They are full of sound, judicious, spiritual, and edifying reflections.

Gotthold's Emblems; or, Invisible things understood by things that are made. By Christian Scriver, Minister of Magdeburg in 1671. Translated from the twenty-eighth German edition. By the Rev. Robert Menzies, Hoddam, England. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

The facility and felicity with which the most familiar objects and events are here turned into mirrors, through which spiritual and divine truths are seen in this volume, are truly marvellous. The author detects beams of divinity in everything. Nothing is so insignificant that he does not contrive to extract from it sententious, devout, quickening suggestions; to

> "Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and God in everything."

The quaint and beautiful thoughts of this book are all aglow with the fervour of ancient German piety, free of any taint of modern German scepticism.

The Crucible; or, Tests of a Regenerate State. Designed to bring to light suppressed hopes, expose false ones, and confirm the true. By the Rev. J. A. Goodhue, A. M. With an Introduction, by the Rev. Edward N. Kirk, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

We have here a work quite beyond the average grade of recent experimental and casuistical works, for depth of insight and delicacy of discrimination. It more nearly approaches the grade of works of which Edwards's Treatise on the Affections, Shepard's Parable of the Ten Virgins, and Flavel's Touchstone, are types, than any recent production that has fallen under our notice. The author thoroughly abjures all Pelagian and naturalistic views of whatever kind or degree. The absolute dependence of man on the Spirit for all genuine piety; the absolute sovereignty of God in the gift of the Spirit; the utter spuriousness of all supposed symptoms of a regenerate state which are not the work of the Holy Ghost, are cardinal principles of the work, which interpenetrate all its teachings. The author shows uncommon skill in probing the heart, and indicating the tests which distinguish genuine piety from its counterfeits. In fact, sometimes we find ourselves ready to

fear that the white heat of his "Crucible" will consume not only the dross of carnality and hypocrisy, but the fine gold of weak, yet genuine, faith. Viewed in other portions, and on other sides, however, the work seems peculiarly designed and fitted to cheer and invigorate the trembling believer, and to evoke into palpable manifestation a latent, undeveloped faith. Indeed, we think the chapter on "unrecognized regeneration," which maintains that a regenerate state sometimes exists, especially in children, and from childhood onward to maturer age, although not recognized as such by the subject of it, or, in all cases, even by others, of great importance at this time. It will awaken attention to a truth that has been widely ignored or rejected, to the great damage to the church, and discouragement of youthful piety. The chief drawbacks to these and other high merits of the book, as they strike us on a very rapid glance at its contents, are: 1. A disposition to place all genuine religious experience in a state of mystical or "indescribable feeling," aside from intelligent apprehension. 2. It teaches that "it will be unsafe to urge the distressed sinner to put his trust in Christ, just as he is." 3. Hence it makes faith not the initial and fontal, but a subordinate Christian grace. 4. In a righteous revulsion from the selfish scheme, it seems at times almost to imply that any regard to our own happiness vitiates religious experience. There is also an occasional tendency to overfly a just moderation in some analogous things. 5. It argues at great length, that Christians and church officers may so judge of the internal state, as to be "certified of the regeneration of others," or the absence of it. This is a false and pernicious principle.

The Gospel in Leviticus; or, An Exposition of the Hebrew Ritual. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., author of "Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews," "The Last Times,"&c. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

Dr. Seiss is the pastor of St. John's Lutheran church, Philadelphia. This exposition of Leviticus was delivered in lectures, first in Baltimore, and afterwards in Philadelphia, which are now published at the request of large numbers who heard them. They appear to be well worthy of this honour, and adapted to benefit those who may read, as well as those who heard them. Some of the interpretations of the ancient ritual may be fanciful; but, on the whole, the gospel is ably shown to be its truest, deepest meaning. This is highly important to be apprehended by the church, not only that the profound unity which pervades

the Bible may be seen, but also that all its parts may appear reciprocally to illumine each other, and converge all their scattered rays in Him who is the light of the world, the Sun of Righteousness.

Manual of Public Libraries, Institutions, and Societies in the United States, and British Provinces of North America. By William J. Rhees, Chief Clerk of the Smithsonian Institution. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1859.

The vast amount of statistical information in this work could hardly have been collected by one less favourably situated than the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. It will be specially prized by all who take an interest in the literary, scientific, educational, religious, and charitable resources of our country. Of course, in such a work, some defects and omissions are unavoidable. Our wonder, however, is not that these are so many, but so few. The volume contains a valuable chapter on the proper construction of rooms and buildings for public libraries.

The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical; with Quotations and References. For the use of Students. By William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Second edition, revised and enlarged. London and Glasgow: Richard Griffin & Co. 1858.

The great value of such a work as this title-page describes, must be evident to all intelligent men. It is well executed. The technical terms of philosophy are not only defined, but the definitions are sustained and illustrated by copious quotations from the best authors in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy generally. It must, therefore, be useful not only to students of philosophy, but to all scholars and cultivated men. We call the attention of our publishing houses to it. We do not doubt that by republishing it, they would serve their own interests as well as the cause of philosophy.

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