

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Art. I.—*The Doctrine of Perception, as held by Doctor Arnauld, Doctor Reid, and Sir William Hamilton.*

It is our purpose in this article to offer a monograph upon one of the most limited questions in psychology. But inasmuch as the interest of the discussion must turn very much upon a particular controversy, and even on the opinions of an individual, we think it advisable to place at the beginning all that we have to say of a historical nature, in order that no details of fact may be left to embarrass us in recording the series of philosophical determinations. Working in a somewhat unfrequented field, we hope to be able to show, that in regard to the true doctrine of Immediate Perception, the great Jansenist was not only a successful co-worker, but that he approached singularly near a solution of the problem.

It is not quite ten years since we asked the attention of our readers to a special article on the Family of Arnauld.* Our purpose at that time was not so much philosophical as theological and religious. But the good and ascetic recluses of Port-Royal des Champs also entertained themselves in spare moments with questions of metaphysic; and one of these now concerns us.

Let memory be refreshed by the statement, that Descartes was born in 1596, and died in 1650; that Arnauld was born in

* Princeton Review, 1849, pp. 467—502.

1612, and died in 1694; and that Malebranche was born in 1638, and died in 1715. Antony Arnauld, Doctor of the Sorbonne, was the scourge of Jesuitism. He was condemned by the Faculty of Theology in 1656. About the same time appeared the Provincial Letters, in several of which he assisted Pascal. The Jesuits denounced him as a Calvinist and a Huguenot. We have in another place recorded the eulogies uttered concerning him by both Racine and Boileau. The more masculine style of French writing had not yet passed away. It was no mean era, when, if we may use the words of M. Cousin, "Descartes shared the esteem of the public with Corneille and Condé; when Madame de Grignan studied his works with passionate vivacity; when Bossuet and Arnauld, Fénelon and Malebranche boldly declared themselves his disciples."* Two schools divide the seventeenth century, in regard to French literature; that of Louis XIII. and the Regency, represented by Corneille and Pascal, and that which was created by Louis XIV., and exemplified by Racine and Fénelon. One has a negligent greatness, the other a bewitching art. It is to the former of these that Arnauld belongs.

The earliest philosophical writing of Arnauld is a mere thesis, prepared in 1641, for one of his pupils at the College of Mans. His next attempt was a series of bold strictures upon the system of Descartes. These raised his reputation, even among the Cartesians; but he was soon drawn off into the hotter conflicts of theology. Before the persecutions which drove him from his native land in 1679, he lived at Port-Royal des Champs, in constant intercourse with Nicole, Sacy, and the Duke de Luynes, who translated the Meditations of Descartes. It was then that, in connection with Nicole, he produced the Port-Royal Logic, or *Art de Penser*, which still lives, and of which Crousaz says, that it contributed more than either the Organon of Bacon, or the *Methode* of Descartes, to improve the established modes of academical education on the Continent.† But our principal concern is with his attack upon the universally received doctrine of Ideas, as set forth by Malebranche.

* Mad. de Longueville, Paris, 1855, p. ix.

† Preface to Crousaz's Logic, Gen. 1724.

It is well known that Malebranche maintained the doctrine that we see all things in God, and subordinately to this, that the immediate object of our perception can be nothing but those representative entities which are called ideas. Arnauld, who was preëminently a theologian, came to this debate by a theological route. Malebranche had written a treatise on 'Nature and Grace'; the principles of which seemed to the Jansenist to impugn the grand foundations of the Augustinian system. It was while preparing to combat these errors, that, ten years after its first appearance, Arnauld set himself to examine the famous *Recherche de la Vérité;* and, being arrested by the portentous dogma of our seeing all things in God, he instituted labours which resulted in the work on *True and False Ideas*, which appeared in 1683.* Arnauld wrote on his copy of Malebranche these words: *Pulchra, nova, falsa.* He is said to have been stirred up to the controversy by Bossuet, who for some years threatened to engage in it personally; on hearing this, Malebranche said he would be proud of such an adversary. In this discussion every thing turns upon the question whether ideas have any separate existence. After settling this to his own satisfaction in the negative, he proceeds to the particular system of Malebranche, which he denominates "the most ill-contrived and unintelligible of all hypotheses." He shows that his opponent leaves altogether undetermined the important inquiry, what it is precisely that we see in God. At first, he seems to say, it is all things. A little further on, he excepts our notion of the mind itself acquired by a direct internal consciousness, and the knowledge of other minds which we derive from analogy. Presently he represents the divine ideas as representing to us only space, number, and the essences of things; afterwards all the works of God. Equally vague is Malebranche when he undertakes to explain the nature and mode of this imaginary vision. He seems at first to have believed that each individual object has its individual idea in the Divine Mind. But he afterwards adopted the opinion, that the different objects of the universe are represented all together in an *intelligible and infinite space* which God comprises,

* Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, etc. Cologne, Nicolas Schouten, 1683. 12mo. pp. 338.

and in which the mind beholds them.* How little the matter is helped by this, will be apparent from a lively apologue of Arnauld, in which he reminds us of the greatest writers of his age.

"An excellent painter," says he, "who had been well educated, and who was also skilled in sculpture, had so great a love for St. Augustine, that in a conversation with one of his friends he avowed to him that one of his most ardent wishes was to know how this great saint looked: 'For you know,' said he, 'that we painters have a passionate desire to have to the life the countenances of those whom we love.' The friend thought this a laudable curiosity, and promised to seek for some way of gratifying it. And so, either for diversion or with some other design, he had a great block of marble carried the next day into the studio of the painter, together with a large mass of the best wax, and a piece of canvas; for as to pencils and a palette of colours, he expected to find them there of course. The painter, very much surprised, asked what could be the intention of bringing all these things to his house. 'It is,' replied he, 'that I may satisfy your wish to know the personal appearance of St. Augustine; in this way I put you in the way of knowing it.' 'And how so?' asked the painter. 'Why thus,' answered the friend; 'the exact countenance of the holy father is certainly in this block of marble, and also in this piece of wax. All that you have to do is to take away from around it what is superfluous; what remains will give you a head of St. Augustine to the very life, and you can easily transfer it to your canvas.' 'You are jesting with me,' said the painter; 'I admit that the exact image of St. Augustine is in this block of marble and this mass of wax, but so are the images of a thousand others. In cutting this marble then, or moulding this wax, how do you mean that the face which I shall hit upon shall be that of this saint, any more than of a thousand others, equally contained in the marble and the wax? And, even granting that by chance I should light on it—which indeed is morally impossible—I should be no nearer the mark; for not knowing how St. Augustine looked, I should never be able to tell whether I had found him or not. It is just so, also,

* Introduction of Jourdain, p. xxii.

with the face you would have me put upon this canvas. The means that you give me therefore, for knowing precisely how St. Augustine looked, is amusing indeed; because it presupposes that I know it already.'

"The friend seems to have had nothing to reply to this. But as our painter was a very inquisitive man, he asked if he owned Malebranche's *Inquiry after Truth.* He happened to have it, went to look for it, and put it into his friend's hands, who opening at page 547 resumed his discourse in the following terms: 'You seem astonished at the method which I give you for getting St. Augustine's face true to the life. I have done only what the author of this book does, in order to give us knowledge of material things, which he alleges we cannot know in themselves, but only in God; and the manner in which he says we know them in God, is by means of an *infinite intelligible extension* which God comprises. Now, I do not see that the method which he gives me of seeing in this extension a figure which I may only have heard named, but never known, differs at all from that which I have suggested to you in regard to St. Augustine. He says that as my mind can perceive one part of this intelligible extension which God comprises, it can perceive in God all figures, since every finite intelligible extension necessarily has an intelligible figure. And this is just what I have been telling you, that there is no face of man which may not be found in this block of marble, if only you cut it aright. But is it less necessary to know this figure (which I have supposed I could not know) in order to take a portion of intelligible extension, and circumscribe it by my mind as I must, in order that this figure should be its term, than as you most justly believe it is necessary to know the true face of St. Augustine, in order to the perception of it in this marble or this wax, where it is not less hidden than every figure in this intelligible extension?"*

But it is not our intention to analyze the work. It was the rudest brush which the subtle and elegant Malebranche had encountered; and he replied with mingled loftiness and chagrin.† He urged that Arnauld's coming out in reply to a

* V. et F. Idées, p. 132—134.

† 'Réponse au livre Des vraies et des fausses Idées.'

book which had been before the public ten years could be accounted for only by his spite against the more recent work on Nature and Grace; and he charges on him the *odium theologicum* and a spirit of party; alleging that he had purposely singled out one of the most difficult and abstruse of scholastic questions, in order to bring his adversary into discredit with the vulgar. When he complained that the Jansenist doctor did not understand him, Boileau said, "Whom then, my father, do you expect to understand you?"* Malebranche passes slightly over Arnauld's heaviest arguments, and closes haughtily with these words: "If I have not given particular answers to all his reasonings, it is not because I have no reply, but because they deserved none." Such however was not the method of Doctor Arnauld, who in due time appeared against Malebranche in an answer of six hundred pages. The tone in this work, of which we have seen only a part, is said to be much more indignant than in the original strictures. Malebranche deemed it necessary to set himself right, in regard to intelligible extension, by which term he protested that he always understood knowledge of extension, without supposing in God any material element; but as to other points he declared that he was unwilling to spend his life in useless disputations.† The controversy broke out afresh, in a small way, some years later, on the occasion of Malebranche's striking at Arnauld in reviewing another writer. Arnauld, "nothing loath," appeared in four letters; Malebranche rejoined in two several publications; when the death of his great adversary seemed to close the warfare. It is painful however to be obliged to add, that five years after this event, Malebranche issued a pamphlet, on Prejudice, in which he attempts to prove that Arnauld could not have been really the author of the works which go under his name, if he possessed the ordinary qualities of uprightness for which his friends give him credit.‡

* Oeuvres de Malebranche, ed. Simon. Introd.

† 'Trois lettres du P. Malebranche touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld.'

‡ Introduction of M. Jourdain. The titles of these publications are, 'Quatre lettres de M. Arnauld au P. Malebranche sur deux de ses plus insoutenables opinions,' 1694.—'Lettres du P. Malebranche à M. Arnauld,' 1694. 'Réponse, par le P. Malebranche, à la troisième lettre de M. Arnauld,' 1699.—'Ecrit contre la Prévention,' 1699.

The casual relations of great men to each other are sometimes striking; as an instance, take the only interview which ever occurred between Malebranche and Berkeley. "The conversation turned on the non-existence of matter. Malebranche, who had an inflammation in his lungs, and whom Berkeley found preparing a medicine in his cell, and cooking it in a small pipkin, exerted his voice so violently in the heat of their dispute, that he increased his disorder, which carried him off in a few days after."*

Having thus despatched the historical part of our task, we proceed to consider the teachings of Arnauld in regard to the cardinal point of Perception, with or without ideas. And in this inquiry we shall derive our information chiefly from his own writings, and particularly from his treatise on *True and False Ideas*, mentioned above.

The ingenious account given by Arnauld of the manner in which philosophers came to admit the necessity of ideas as objects of perception is alluded to by Reid. Accustomed from childhood to believe that the presence of the object of sense is necessary in order to perception, and finding that they had knowledge of things not visible or tangible, they readily came to think that the mind sees such objects, not in themselves, but by means of certain images. The representative entities are called ideas; and it is to disprove the existence of these, which he denominates chimeras, that Arnauld lays out his strength in this controversy. It is our purpose to consider only those parts of it which bear upon the question of immediate perception.

The great Sorbonnist, a man of war from his youth, as indeed his opponent urges in more than one deprecatory passage, goes to work in all the forms, opening with certain definitions, which are altogether too important to be omitted, when our inquiry is into his precise standing as to this cardinal question.

The definitions of Arnauld are these:

"1. I call soul or mind the substance which thinks.

"2. To think, to know, to perceive, are one and the same thing.

* Biographia Britann. Art. Berkeley.

"3. I also take in the same sense the *idea* of an object and the *perception* of an object. I waive the question, whether there are other things which may be called ideas. But it is certain that there are ideas, taken in this sense, and that these ideas are either attributes or modifications of our mind.

"4. I say that an object is present to our mind when our mind perceives and knows it. I do not consider the question, whether there is any other presence of the object, previous to knowledge, and which is necessary that it may be in a state to be known. But it is certain that the manner in which I say that an object is present to the mind, when the mind knows it, is incontestable; being that which causes us to say of a person whom we love that he is often present to our minds, because we often think of him.

"5. I say that a thing is *objectively* present in my mind when I conceive it. When I have conception of the sun, a square, a sound; the sun, the square and the sound are objectively in my mind, and this whether they are or are not external to my mind.

"6. I have said that I took for the same thing *perception* and *idea*. It must nevertheless be remarked, that this, though one, has a twofold relation: one to the mind which it modifies, the other to the thing perceived, so far as this is objectively in the mind; and further that the word *perception* more directly denotes the former relation, and the word *idea* the latter. Thus the *perception* of a square denotes more directly my mind as perceiving a square, and the *idea* of a square denotes more directly the square. So far forth as it is *objectively* in my mind. This remark is very important for the solving of many difficulties, arising solely from neglecting to consider that there are not two entities, but an identical modification of our mind, which involves essentially these two relations; since I cannot have a perception which is not at one and the same time the perception of my spirit as perceiving, and the perception of something as perceived; and since nothing can be objectively in my mind, (what I call *idea*) which my mind does not perceive.

"7. By *representative existences*, so far as I oppose them as superfluous, I design such only as are imagined to be really

distinct from ideas taken as perceptions; for I do not care to oppose every sort of representative existences or modalities; inasmuch as I maintain it to be clear to every one who reflects on what passes in his own mind, that all our perceptions are modalities essentially *representative.*

"8. When I say that our ideas and our perceptions (by which I mean the same thing) represent to us the things which we conceive, and are their images, it is in a sense quite different from that in which we say that pictures represent their originals, and are their images, or that words pronounced or written are images of our thoughts; for in regard to ideas the meaning is that the things which we conceive are *objectively* in our mind and thought. Now this *manner of being objectively in the mind* is so peculiar to mind and thought, as constituting their very nature, that the search would be vain for any thing similar in whatsoever is not mind and thought. And, as I have already remarked, it is this which has so much involved this matter of *ideas*, because the attempt has been made, by means of comparisons from corporeal things, to explain the manner in which objects are represented by our ideas, although in this respect there can be no true relation between bodies and minds.

"9. When I say that an *idea* is the same as a *perception;* I understand by perception every thing that my mind conceives, whether it be by the primary apprehension which it has of things, or by the judgments which it forms of them, or by what it discovers of them from reasoning. Thus, though there is an infinity of figures of which I know the nature by long reasonings, I nevertheless, having made these reasonings, have as veritable an idea of these figures as of a circle or a triangle, which I can conceive at once. And though perhaps it is only by reasoning that I am entirely assured that there truly exists an external earth, sun or stars, the idea which represents the earth, sun and stars as truly existing outside of my mind, deserves the name of idea no less than if I had acquired it without the aid of reasoning.

"10. There is still an ambiguity to be removed; namely, that we must not confound the *idea of an object*, with this same *object conceived*, unless we add, *so far as it is objectively in the*

mind; for *to be conceived*, in regard to the sun which is in the heavens is only an extrinsical denomination, which is nothing more than a relation to the perception which I have of it. Now this is not what we ought to understand when it is said that 'the idea of the sun is the sun itself so far as it is objectively in my mind'; and what we call being objectively in the mind is not merely being the object on which my thought terminates, but also being in my mind *intelligibly*, as it is customary for objects to be there; and the idea of the sun is 'the sun so far as he is in my mind,' not formally as he is in the heavens, but *objectively*, that is to say, after the manner in which objects are in our thoughts; a manner of being, which is far less perfect than that whereby the sun is really existing, but which nevertheless we cannot assert to be nothing or to have no need of a cause.

"11. If I should say that the mind does this or that, and that it has the faculty of doing this or that, I understand by the word *does* the perception which it has of objects, which is one of its modifications; nor do I give myself any trouble about the efficient cause of this modification, that is to say, whether God gives it to the mind, or the mind gives it to itself; for this does not concern the nature of ideas, but only their origin, which is a very different question.

"12. By *faculty* I mean the power which I certainly know that any thing spiritual or corporeal possesses, either of acting or suffering, or of existing in such or such a manner, in other words, of having such or such a modification.

"13. And since such *faculty* is certainly a property of the nature of the thing supposed, I then say, that it holds this of the Author of its nature, who can be no other than God."*

The axioms and postulates which follow have a mathematical formality usual in the scholastic encounters of that day. Arnauld then goes on to examine the locutions everywhere prevalent in the schools, that we do not see things immediately; that what we see is the ideas of the things; and that it is in the idea of any thing that we see its properties. It is in treat-

* Oeuvres philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld. Ed. Simon. Paris, 1843. pp. 51—54.

ing of this *ex professo* in his sixth chapter that he lays himself open to the strictures of Reid and Hamilton, by seeming to admit no less than his opponents, certain representative *manières d'être* distinguishable from both the real existence and the percipient act, with this peculiarity that these are not separate, intermediate entities, but modifications of the mind. We shall see that every thing turns upon the acceptation of this phrase, 'modification of the mind.'

Without rejecting, as perhaps he ought to have done, these consecrated expressions, he goes on to protest against their being taken to imply any thing like 'representative entities as distinguished from perceptions.' He then recalls the law, often neglected then and since, that 'our *thought* or *perception*,' a pregnant exegetical phrase, 'is essentially reflective upon itself,' or as the Latin has it more felicitously *est sui conscia*. "For," adds he, "I never think, without at the same time knowing that I think; I never have knowledge of a square, without knowing that I have such knowledge; I never see the sun (or to cut off all debate, I never imagine that I see the sun) without being certain that I so imagine. I may not be able, some time after, to remember that I had such or such a conception; but during the time of my conceiving it, I know that I conceive it."* This reflection he calls *virtual*, as distinguished from that turning of the mind to its own acts which he denominates *express*. The passage in which his language most vacillates, and where he seems too ready to use the terms of the other side, is this:

Now adding to this what we have said in the third, sixth, and seventh definitions, it follows that every perception is essentially representative of something, and being hence named *idea*, it cannot essentially be reflective on itself, without having for its immediate object this *idea*, that is to say, the *objective reality* of what my mind is said to perceive; so that if I think of the sun, the objective reality of the sun, present to my mind, is the immediate object of this perception; and the possible or existing sun, which is exterior to my mind, is, so to speak, its

* The acute observation of Hamilton is worthy of comparison here, not to the discredit of the great Frenchman.

mediate object. And thus, it will be perceived, that without having recourse to any *representative entities*, distinguished from perceptions, it is quite true in this sense, as well generally of all things as of those in particular which are material, that it is our ideas which we see *immediately*, and which are *the immediate object of our thought;* which however does not prevent its being likewise true that by means of these ideas we see the object which formally contains what is only *objectively* in the idea; for example, it is still true, that I conceive the formal essence of a square, which is *objectively* in the idea or perception which I have of the square."* In all this he clings to the phraseology of Descartes, whose words are: "Per realitatem objectivam ideæ intelligo entitatem rei repræsentatæ per ideam quatenus est in idea, eodemque modo dici potest *perfectio objectiva*, *artificium objectivum*, etc. Nam, quæcunque percipimus tanquam in idearum objectis, ea sunt in ipsis ideis objectivè." But in all these places, it is indispensable to remark the deflection of meaning which has since the scholastic age befallen the terms, 'subject,' 'object,' 'subjective,' 'objective;' so that in the writings of German philosophers the relation of the two is almost inverted; and we have come to take subject and object, respectively, as equivalent to the *Ich* and the *Nicht-ich*.

But the true acceptation of this definition is apparent from what Arnauld subjoins, namely, that what Descartes calls an idea "is not really distinguished from our thought or perception, but is our thought itself, so far as it contains *objectively* that which is in the object formally."

As our purpose is simply to report this great philosopher upon the one point of immediate perception, we shall, except so far as necessary to this end, omit any account of his ingenious and masterly demonstrations. These are five in number. The proposition which he first sets out to prove is this: Our mind has no need, in order to know material things, of certain *representative beings*, distinguished from perceptions, such as it is pretended are necessary to supply the absence of all that which cannot of itself be intimately united to our mind." In the second demonstration there is some pleasant raillery, quite

* Page 59, *op. cit.*

in the manner of his friend and fellow-sufferer Pascal, upon Malebranche's arguing for ideal entities, from this, that the mind could not leave the body, and go travelling into the heavenly spaces in order to see the sun: "It is all in vain for men to say that they see the sun; we have proved to them that they only dream, and that it is impossible they should see it. The argument would be conclusive; our mind can see only those objects which are present to it; this is indubitable. Now the sun is separated from our mind by more than thirty millions of leagues, according to M. Cassini; in order therefore to be visible, the mind must go to him, or he must go to the mind. Now you have no belief that your mind leaves your body in order to find the sun, nor that the sun leaves the heavens in order to unite himself intimately with your mind; you dote then when you say that you see the sun. But be not uneasy; we are going to extricate you from this embarrassment, and give you a means of seeing. Instead of the sun, who would not be likely to leave his place so often, which would be very troublesome, we have very ingeniously found out a certain *être représentatif*, which takes his place, and which shall make up for his absence by joining himself closely to our minds. And it is to this being representative of the sun (whatsoever it be, and whencesoever it came, for we are not agreed about this) that we have given the name of *idea* or species."*

Upon this extract, we beg leave to submit to the attentive and candid reader, whether the whole argument of Arnauld, thus veiled in fine irony, does not imply a seeing of the sun, as distinguished from seeing an idea of the sun. Great injustice would be done to this most acute writer, if we should transfer to the phenomenon of primary perception, those things which he predicates of our subsequent recalling of such perception; or, if we should forget his declaration, that our cognizance of the perception is necessary and simultaneous, and, as he calls it, *virtual*. The assertion of Malebranche and all the schools is that what I see, in a primary perception, is not the real, but the ideal, or intelligible sun; the assertion of Arnauld is, that what I see, in a primary perception, is the real sun, though by means of a mental change, or modification. "For," says he,

* *Op. cit.* pp. 71, 72.

"though I see immediately this *intelligible* sun by the virtual reflection which I make of my own perception, I do not stop at this, but this very perception, in which I see this *intelligible* sun, *makes me see at the same time the material sun which God has created.*"* We regard this as a key to the whole hypothesis of perception, held by Arnauld.

In Dr. Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, where he gives a historical statement concerning the theories of perception, there is an account of Arnauld's speculations. We shall abridge some of Reid's passages, though without otherwise altering his perspicuous language. "The most formidable antagonist Malebranche met with was in his own country,—Antony Arnauld, doctor of the Sorbonne, one of the acutest writers the Jansenists have to boast of, though that sect has produced many. Those who choose to see this system attacked on the one hand, and defended on the other, with subtilty of argument and elegance of expression, and on the part of Arnauld with much wit and humour, may find satisfaction by reading Malebranche's *Inquiry after Truth*, Arnauld's book of *True and False Ideas*, Malebranche's *Defence*, and some subsequent replies and defences." These are just remarks, and they are followed by an account of Arnauld's scheme, then little known in Great Britain. It might have been expected that the Scotch philosopher should have bestowed high applause, and exulted in the utterance, a hundred years before his day, of a doctrine concerning perception which so closely approached his own, and which has given direction to all following systems in England and America. And he certainly says all that a very observant reader needs in order to make this inference; yet in such a way as to draw undue attention to some of Arnauld's nomenclature, which savoured of a former system. "Arnauld," says he, "has employed the whole of his sixth chapter to show that those ways of speaking, common among philosophers, to wit, 'that we perceive not things immediately; that it is their ideas that are the immediate objects of our thoughts; that it is in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties'; are not to be rejected, but are true when rightly understood. He labours to reconcile these expressions

* *Op. cit.* p. 92.

to his own definition of ideas, by observing, that every perception and every thought is necessarily conscious of itself and reflects upon itself; and that by this consciousness and reflection, it is its own immediate object. Whence he infers, that the idea—that is, the perception—is the immediate object of perception."* We shall not interrupt our recital any further than to say, what the definitions above will substantiate, that this is a very insufficient and unguarded representation of Arnauld's theory. Sir William Hamilton, in his annotations, to a certain extent confirms the censure of Reid. "Arnauld," says he, "did not allow that perceptions and ideas are *really* or *numerically* distinguished,—i. e. as one thing from another thing; not even that they are *modally* distinguished, i. e. as a thing from its mode. He maintained that they are *really* identical, and only *rationally* discriminated as viewed in different relations; the indivisible mental modification being called a *perception*, by reference to the mind or thinking subject,—an *idea*, by reference to the mediate object or thing thought." We have given enough from Arnauld himself to show that it is only the latter half of this statement, which adequately represents him. He everywhere declares perception, thinking, cognizance and idea, to indicate one and the same function of the subject. Other judgments of Sir William are the following: "Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded *ideas*, *notions*, *representations*, as mere modifications of the mind, (what by his disciples were called *material* ideas, like the cerebral ideas of Descartes, are out of the question,) and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems." And elsewhere: "Reid's discontent with Arnauld's opinion—an opinion which is stated with great perspicuity by its author—may be used as an argument to show that his own doctrine is, however ambiguous, that of intuitive or immediate perception. Arnauld's theory is identical with the finer form of representative or mediate perception, and the difficulties of that doctrine were not overlooked by his great antagonist." Stewart, with a more liberal construction of his author, says: "Anthony Arnauld farther held,

* Reid's Essays, chap. v. § 5.

that 'Material things are perceived *immediately* by the mind, without the intervention of ideas.' In this respect his doctrine coincided exactly with that of Reid."*

The strictures of Reid and Hamilton have not escaped the notice of French metaphysicians, who have stood up for the honour of their countrymen. Among these we may cite M. Jourdain: "Notwithstanding the inexhaustible resources," says he, "of an argumentation always subtile and sometimes eloquent, Malebranche did not succeed in proving that between objects and the mind there are interposed any distinct images of our perceptions, and the contrary thesis was established by his antagonist with conclusive evidence; so that about a century before the publication of Thomas Reid's Inquiry, Arnauld had not only suspected, but developed, sustained and invincibly demonstrated the very theory which has caused the success and glory of the Scottish school. For what is it that the Scotch say, from Reid to Hamilton? That we take cognizance of bodies immediately and in themselves. And what ground do they take in support of this opinion? That in the fact of external perception, we have no consciousness, in addition to the very notion of material reality, of any intermediate notion which could have representative species for its object. Now both conclusion and argument belong to the *Traité des Idées*. Others have reproduced the analyses of the French philosopher, but without surpassing them, and his doctrine, perhaps clothed in less severe forms, has been on the whole quite faithfully exhibited. It is for this reason that we have never been able to comprehend how the leader of the Scottish school, with Arnauld's book under his eyes, could ever have written the following lines: 'Malebranche and Arnauld both professed the universally received doctrine, that we do not perceive material things immediately; that only the ideas of these are the immediate objects of our thoughts, and that it is in the idea of a thing that we perceive its properties.' And again: 'It would be wrong to conclude from the preceding remarks, that Arnauld denied without restriction the existence of ideas, and unreservedly adopted the opinion of the vulgar, which recognizes no object of perception but the external object. He

* Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. i. p. 80.

does not leave the beaten road at this point, and what he tears down with one hand, he builds up with the other. In these two passages," continues M. Jourdain, "Reid takes the reverse of truth. We do not question his good faith; but does not his own countryman Thomas Brown find reason to censure his grave errors in history, and his disposition to raise phantoms that he may have the pleasure of contending with them?" "It is just to say that M. Hamilton has relieved Reid from a part of the reproaches which Brown bestows on him in this regard."*

But something was needed more exact and searching than these assertions on one side and denials on the other; this is supposed to be afforded by Sir William Hamilton in that memorable article of the Edinburgh Review in which he gave the *coup de grace* to Brown. But there have prevailed such ignorance in some, and such indifference in others, in regard to Arnauld's opinions, that this abstruse passage in one of the subtlest writers of our day has perhaps awakened less attention in its original position than it will do in an extract. It will be remembered that he is there engaged upon the philosophy of perception, in treating of which he ascribes to Reid an error of omission in not discriminating intuitive from representative knowledge. In justifying this judgment, he begins by generalizing the possible forms, under which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realized, and reduces these to three: "1. The representative object not a modification of mind. 2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness. 3. The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness;—the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical." The third of these will arrest attention, as that which applies to Arnauld. The passage which relates particularly to this point is too curious and instructive to be omitted here. "In regard to ARNAULD," says Sir William, "the question is not, as in relation to the others, whether Reid conceives him to maintain a form of the ideal theory, which he

* Logique de Port Royal, Ed. Jourdain, Paris, 1846, pp. xxx. sqq.

rejects, but whether *Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical.* 'To these authors,' says Dr. Brown, 'whose opinions on the subject of perception Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom *even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system*, and to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct but the same, a modification of the mind and nothing more. I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who maintains *this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself*, and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Malebranche.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.) If this statement be not untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. A representative perception, under its *third* and simplest modification, is held by Arnauld as by Brown; and his exposition is so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avows the identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tantamount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is a scheme of representation; whereas, on the contrary, if he signalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the radical antithesis—and his sense of the radical antithesis—of the doctrine of *intuition*, to every, even the simplest form of the hypothesis of *representation.* And this last he does.

"It cannot be maintained, that Reid admits a philosopher to hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states:—'To profess the doctrine, *universally received*, that *we perceive not material things immediately—that it is their ideas which are the immediate objects of our thoughts*—and that it is *in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties.*' This fundamental contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise to believe, that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to maintain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind had no immediate knowledge of external things: Reid supposes, in the *first* place, that Arnauld,

in rejecting the hypothesis of ideas as representative entities really distinct from the contemplative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the material reality as the immediate object of that act; and, in the *second*, that Arnauld again deserted that opinion, when, with the philosophers, he maintained that the idea or act of the mind representing the external reality, and not the external reality itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld's theory is one and indivisible; and, as such, no part of it is identical with Reid's. Reid's confusion, here and elsewhere, is explained by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as Reid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we perceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves. Maintaining *that all our perceptions are modifications essentially representative*, Arnauld every where avows, that he denies ideas, *only as existences distinct from the act itself* of perception."

"Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two inconsistent doctrines;' and he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompatible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting between his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered *as a whole;* and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identical, and by Reid admitted to be the same."*

We have been induced to give this long extract, not only from our reverence for Hamilton, and our admiration of the characteristic acumen evinced by this particular criticism, but

* Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1830. The italics are the author's.

because it affords us a fit occasion to hazard a few explanatory remarks upon the nomenclature of Descartes and his immediate successors. It is observed by Hamilton himself that Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, and philosophers in general before Reid, employ the term *Perception* as co-extensive with *Consciousness*. It hence appears the more readily how any thing before the mind, or in its consciousness, came to be denominated a modification of the mind. This must be carefully regarded, lest we judge Arnauld too harshly. A statement in the history of philosophy which, though negative, is equally important, is that the writers of that day rarely predicated activity of the mind's contemplative perceptions; so that we do not find certain phrases which meet us on every page of modern works, such as 'the active powers,' 'the operations of the mind,' or its 'acts' or 'activities.' The question was thus left open, whether the subject or the object be active, or whether the action be reciprocal. And hence the class of phrases came to be, often harshly, substituted, which have given occasion to most of this controversy. Among these none is more common than 'modification of the mind.' If any one is tempted to ask, 'Why did not Arnauld cut off all debate, by declaring outright, that between the *percipient act* and the *real object*, there is nothing interposed?' we can only reply that such was not the way of speaking in that day, and that this would have presupposed the exactness, not merely of Reid, but of Hamilton. The writer last named has well said, in his notes to Reid, that "*modes* or *modifications of mind*, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by *states of mind*, and include both the *active* and *passive* phenomena of the conscious subject." This is deserving of special note. Where we should speak of an act, an exercise, an operation of the mind, they, in the spirit of their vaunted philosophical skepticism spoke of the mode, modality or modification of the mind, often expressed by the mind's *manière d'être;* and this included perception, thought, feeling and volition.* To take a single instance out of many, from Arnauld's rejoinder: "When a thing or a substance, remaining substantially the same, is sometimes after

* See Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité; l. iij. p. ii. chap. 1.

one manner and sometimes after another, we call that which determines it to be after one manner, rather than another, *manière d'être*, modality, or modification; for these three terms signify one and the same thing. This will be better comprehended by an example. I have a bit of wax in my hand, which I make sometimes round, sometimes square, or of any other shape: now though this bit of wax remains still the same bit of wax, I call its being round, being square, or being of any other shape, a *manière d'être*, a modality, or a modification of this bit of wax. Now my mind remaining the same thinks sometimes of a number; at other times of a square, or of its own body, or of God. It follows, that this thinking of a number, a square, one's own body, or God, are so many modes of being, modalities, or modifications of the mind. To think of a number or a square, to take notice of a number or a square, to have perception of a number or a square, are all one and the same thing, differently expressed. Since then to think of a number or a square is a modification of our mind, it clearly follows that perception of a number or a square is also a modification of our mind; and consequently, no one can doubt of my first position, namely, that all our perceptions, as is the perception of a number or a square, are modifications of our mind." And he adds: "When I think of a square, my mind is modified by this thought, and *the square is the object of that modification of my mind which is the thought of a square.*"*

This is certainly a nearer approach to the doctrine of Reid, Hamilton and Mansell, than can be found in any writer of the seventeenth century; an approach which, in spite of unsteady language, will appear still more striking, when we examine certain other modes of expression occurring in these works. We have seen how much importance the incomparable Scottish critic attributes to the distinction between presentative and representative perception, and how he connects with the latter his most serious charge against Arnauld. Is there not a possibility that we may urge too far inferences from the term *representation*, and thus fix upon the word as used in French a signification more distinct than it ought to bear. *Representa-*

* Defense, pp. 412, 413.

tive, as applied to perceptions, is ambiguous. It may mean first, that it puts the object before the mind, or secondly that it is vicarious of the object; in other words, a perception may be declared to objectify external nature in reference to the thinking subject, or it may further and more questionably be declared to be a modality which stands in the room of the external object before the mind. It is a question whether by representative modality Arnauld means more than what the Germans denote by *Vorstellung;* a term the most general of all those which indicate the presence of any thing in consciousness; and which is put as well for the *Act des Vorstellens*, as for *das Vorgestellte selbst.* Let us observe Arnauld's use of the term. Malebranche denied that "the perceptions which our minds have of objects are essentially representative of those objects."* In his view perception had no objectifying virtue, and required an intermediate entity or idea. He further charged, that according to Arnauld, *we do not see bodies*, but only *ourselves.* "Can any one imagine me to teach," replies Arnauld, "that we do not see bodies, and that we see ourselves only, or that we see only the modalities of the mind, when I actually teach that these modalities of our mind, that is the perceptions which we have of bodies, are essentially *representative of bodies;* [which he now expounds thus] that it is these *whereby our mind perceives bodies;* that they are the formal cause which makes our mind perceive bodies, knowing at the same time that it perceives them, because it is the property of the intelligent being to be *conscia suæ operationis.*"† This representation, however awkward the term may be, agrees with the definition of the schoolmen: *Conceptus sunt signa formalia rerum.* And this presentation is distinguished from proper representation, in the following passage from a writer whom he does not name: "Siquidem ideæ rerum formaliter sunt earum perceptiones, nec per intuitum ab idea diversum res ut in hac expressa videtur, sed per imaginem, seu ideam, *formaliter res ipsa percipitur:* quamvis idea reflexè cognosci, et ita *perceptionis perceptio* dari possit."‡

Immediate perception of the external object is not asserted

* Defense, p. 409. † *Op. cit.* p. 421. ‡ *Op. cit.* 415.

by Arnauld, in that unembarrassed and unequivocal manner which satisfies Hamilton; but neither is it so asserted by Reid; for Hamilton speaks of "the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Reid himself." Let us however give the great Sorbonnist all the credit of an approximation, which remained unique, until the days of Reid.* Let the following remarkable passage be considered, which relates to the dictum that when I look at the sun, it is the intelligible, and not the real sun, which I perceive: "As we may say that whatsoever is in our mind objectively is there *intelligibly*, we may in the same sense say that what I see *immediately*, when I turn my eyes towards the sun, is the *sol intelligibilis*, provided we intend by this no more than my idea of the sun, *which is not at all distinguished from my perception*, and if we are careful not to add, that I see nothing but the intelligible sun; for though I see immediately this *intelligible* sun by the virtual reflection which I have of my perception, I do not stop at this; but this same perception, in which I see the intelligible sun, *makes me at the same time see the material sun which God created.*"†

The incidental statement, in one of these extracts, that consciousness accompanies mental acts, brings to our remembrance Sir William Hamilton's arch remark, that the Greeks were happy in not having the term; and also his discontent with Reid, for "discriminating consciousness as a special faculty." Arnauld, as a quasi Cartesian, could not deviate on that side. As we have quoted before, "It is the property of the intelligent being, to be *conscia suæ operationis.*" And more fully: "There is reason to believe that in creating the human soul God gave it the idea of itself, and that it is perhaps this thought of itself which constitutes its essence; for, as I have said elsewhere, nothing seems more essential to mind than that consciousness, or internal sentiment of itself, which the Latins more felicitously call *esse sui consciam.*"‡ Amidst all the infelicities of nomenclature which Arnauld borrowed from the reigning school, he sometimes expresses himself in such a way as to fix in us the belief, that when he speaks of the modifica-

* Buffier. † Vraies et Fausses Idées, p. 92; partly quoted *antea*.
‡ V. et F. Idées, p. 246.

tion of mind called Perception as in any sense itself the object of thought, he means little more than that we are conscious of the perceiving act. This opinion, which we express with hesitation, derives colour from the following passage: "—Whatsoever it be that I know—I *know that I know*, by a certain *virtual reflection* which accompanies all my thoughts—I therefore know myself in knowing all other things. And in fact, it is herein principally, as it seems to me, that we have to distinguish intelligent beings from those which are not such, that the former *sunt conscia sui et suæ operationis*, and the latter are not."*

After this tedious investigation, we beg leave to sum up the result in a series of particulars. We seem to have discovered, then,

1. That, according to Arnauld, there are no representative entities, distinct from the external thing, such as are called ideas.

2. That he held the only ideas of external objects to be our perceptions of them.

3. That then, as against the prevalent tenet of the schools, Arnauld is an assertor of the great truth now universally believed.

4. That in Arnauld's opinion the mind takes cognizance of every perception, at the instant of its occurrence; and this by the very constitution of its nature.

5. That Arnauld considers the mind's perception to have for its direct object the external reality; but that this perception is itself at the same time the object of cognition, by what we should now call Consciousness, but what he calls Virtual Reflection.

6. That the language of Arnauld, if strictly interpreted, often does injustice to his opinion, causing him to appear more remote from the truth than he really is; and that this is especially true in regard to his constantly calling Perception a modification, and not an act, of the mind.

7. That, omitting lesser points in which they differ, there is remarkable consent between the three great masters, Arnauld, Reid and Hamilton.

* V. et F. Idées, p. 34.

8. That if to Hamilton belongs the honour of having given philosophical precision and completeness to the true doctrine of Perception, the praise is no less due to Arnauld of having first given it enunciation.

Having thus put it within the power of the reader to judge from Arnauld's own statements what was his doctrine as to sensible perception, and how far he deserves to be named among the precursors of Reid and Hamilton, we desire to spend a short time in examining the subsequent progress of analysis in this direction, and the bearing of certain fundamental discoveries upon the progress of philosophy in general.

The unpopularity of the religious party to which Arnauld belonged forbade his being frequently named in high circles as an authority, even when his reasonings were producing their effect upon certain leading minds. He was a Jansenist, indeed he was their theological champion; and hence Buffier, while borrowing his opinions, allows jesuitical prejudice to betray him into condemnation "with faint praise." To Buffier is ascribed by Stewart* the earliest exact enunciation of a distinction which he then quotes in the very words of Arnauld.† "It affords," says Stewart himself, "a remarkable illustration of the force of prejudice, that Buffier, a learned and most able Jesuit, should have been so far influenced by the hatred of his order to the Jansenists, as to distinguish the *Port-Royal Logic* with the cold approbation of being 'a judicious *compilation* from former works on the same subject.'"‡ Doctor Reid was therefore warranted in citing Arnauld, to the neglect of the other, though it is matter of record that Buffier was translated for the very purpose of annoying Reid, and was thus brought into undue prominence before the British public. His work on *First Truths* is of high value, as a real contribution to the great question of our age. Voltaire was not wrong in declaring him to be the only Jesuit who ever put a reasonable philosophy into his works. How indistinct have been the views of French writers generally upon the connection of the several great masters, may be seen in the remark of Professor Bouillier of

* Elements, Note to Part I. chap. iv. § 2.

† See Hamilton's Notes to Reid, chap. v.

‡ First Preliminary Dissertation, p. 81.

Lyons, upon the passage indicated above as borrowed from Arnauld: "Most scholastic philosophers, and even the Cartesians, had considered ideas as something intermediate between the mind which knows and the object known. Locke fell into the same error. Reid claims it as his principal merit, to have refuted this theory, and shown that ideas are nothing distinguishable from the knowing mind. Father Buffier had already acquired this merit, by defining ideas to be simple modifications of the mind. How is it then that Reid does not cite him along with Arnauld among philosophers who before himself attacked the legitimacy of what is called the ideal theory?"* This question has been already answered.

The services of Reid, in applying the principles of Bacon to the phenomena of thought, are only beginning to be esteemed at their due value. Omitting intermediate names, we would mark the great points of advancement by those of ARNAULD, REID and HAMILTON. The moments of Reid's discovery have not been noted in a more masterly manner by any than by Samuel Tyler, LL.D., in his Discourse on the Baconian Philosophy; in which he shows that his merit resides in his having made it clear, that, from his very constitution, man cannot but believe in the reality of whatever is clearly attested by the senses; as well as whatever is distinctly remembered;—that, further, he cannot but believe that like causes will produce like effects, and that the future will be as the past.† And in another treatise the same acute and perspicuous philosopher, in regard to our topic of Perception, has expressed the relation of Hamilton to Reid in terms equally comprehensive and exact. "In the act of sensible perception," says Dr. Tyler, "we are, equally and at the same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourselves as a perceiving subject and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other in the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestably the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible perception. This all

* Oeuvres de Buffier, ed. 1843, p. 187.

† Discourse of the Baconian Philosophy. By Samuel Tyler, LL.D., pp. 261, ff.

philosophers without exception admit as a *fact*. But then all, until Reid, deny the *truth* of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these representations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representations distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incontestably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind." With our ample citations before him, the reader will judge whether Arnauld is very far behind Reid, in their common inferiority to Hamilton.

Although at the present time no great constructive genius is making himself felt in shaping the opinions of the philosophical world, there are tendencies propagated by past investigations, which awaken hope of something more healthful. Instead of the leaning towards skeptical idealism, we observe everywhere an increasing disposition to settle upon those conclusions of which mankind, even in its unlettered portions, has had a catholic faith. Such is the manifest bearing of all inquiries like those of Reid and Hamilton. Such is the significancy likewise of all those studies which have to do with truths of intuition. There is thus opened a prospect into a wide field of inquiry as to those cognitions which are universal, immediate and necessary; a description which will include not merely our knowledge of the external world, but all such knowledge as is primary and underived from ratiocination, or any other intermediate process. The degree of limitation given to this field of immediate knowledge will always go far towards defining the ground of any philosopher or school. While the adventurous skepticism of the seventeenth century narrowed first-truths to the very smallest number, the equally adventurous rationalism of the nineteenth has led the German schools, even when disagreeing on other points, to enlarge the scope of Reason, in its higher designation. Philological causes, themselves consequent

on original peculiarities of notion, sometimes in turn react powerfully upon psychology. To this we have often been disposed to ascribe the tenacity with which all sects of thinking in Germany cling to the radical distinction between Understanding and Reason. These terms do not bring up to the English mind the same associations which a German has with *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. For example, the latter of these words has no kindred with trains of ratiocination, as has the English verb *to reason*. Reason, in the recent philosophy, imports the highest, deepest, widest intuition. Just at this point of certainty, immediateness, and necessity, this connects itself with all other kinds of knowledge which are founded on neither experience nor reasoning. There can be little question, we think, that Coleridge, in the *Biographia*, the 'Friend,' and the 'Aids to Reflection,' first drew the English and American mind to consider this distinction; the acceptance or rejection of which, as the grand basis of philosophy, serves to mark the line between the two conflicting hosts. Well do we remember the zeal and enthusiasm with which, many years ago, we heard Mr. Marsh, afterwards President Marsh, of Vermont, expound and vindicate these views, then so novel. Coleridge, following Jacobi and Hernsterhuis, defined Reason as "an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena."* This falls in well with our collation of Perception, with Intuition, whether narrowly or widely taken.

The relation of truth to mind is sublime, and is indicated by the scriptural figure of Light. In the last resort, all our knowledge must be immediate; for any truth clearly presented to an intelligent mind is self-evident; no foreign evidence is required. Suppose the given truth is not clearly before the mind; it may be so presented by ratiocination, that is, by the suggestion of intermediate propositions; but when once so presented it shines by its own light. At this point, therefore, our cognizance of the truth is *immediate*, and herein differs nothing from intuition or from sensible perception. In other words, (as we were taught by the wisest of our masters in youth,) the evidence

* Aids to Reflection, ed. Marsh, p. 308.

of all truth, when clearly presented to the judgment, is in itself, and the use of proof or foreign evidence is to bring it fairly before the mind. To a mind capable of comprehending a truth in all its relations, that truth must be self-evident; and therefore to the Supreme Reason all truths are self-evident. There are certain principles however which neither require nor brook the allegation of proof. These fall within the range of immediate vision. The wholesome tendency of these simple doctrines is to encourage our constitutional confidence in our own faculties. We may conceive of a being so constituted that his faculties should uniformly deceive him; but, by the very hypothesis, such a being could never detect the flaw in his own constitution; and nothing can be conceived more unreasonable than the existence of such a being. Before we erect into a new faculty that energy of the mind which accepts truth instantaneously and necessarily, we must consider well whether its actings in view of truth are not identical with those which terminate our trains of ratiocination. What is reasoning, but a distinct noticing of the relations which subsist between certain truths? Of certain truths our knowledge is immediate; we believe them as soon as they are presented to the mind. But there are other truths, which seem not clearly such, until viewed in connection with truths already known; but which, thus viewed, shine by their own light no less than the others. The only difference between the intuitive and the ratiocinative judgment is, that in the one we perceive a truth at once, and in the other we do not perceive it till other truths are presented; when this is done, the determination is as direct and necessary as the other.

The same may be made apparent in the logical process. In any valid syllogism, the major and minor being admitted, the conclusion follows, and that instanter. Nothing can be interposed, or conceived to be interposed. Only let the terms be comprehended, and the formula be just as to mood and figure, and the conclusion is immediate and inevitable. There is no distinction appreciable at this point between ratiocinative judgment and intuition. Suppose, after having gone thus far, you should be challenged to make the case plainer, and to show why you so concluded; it would be impossible for you to reply

in any but one of these two ways, either to make the terms more intelligible, or to justify the logical process. But this last is not different from a bare re-assertion of this apodeictic judgment of the understanding—may we not say, the Reason? Hence my assent to the conclusion of a syllogism is as immediate, nay, when thus insulated, as unreasoning, as my acquiescence in the external reality of a material world. We are not quite sure that this was in the mind of Kant, when he wrote thus, in his section on 'Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory Appearance:' "In every syllogism I first cogitate a *rule* (*the major*) by means of the *understanding*. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the *minor*) by means of the *judgment*. And finally, I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is *conclusio*), consequently I determine it *a priori* by means of the *reason*."* The point to be observed is, how remarkably an extended inquiry into the law of cognition, reduces the varieties of knowing and strengthens the confidence which we repose in our own faculties. Inasmuch as all trains of ratiocination may be arrayed and verified in the shape of syllogisms, it follows that all the conclusive determinations of reasoning are equally immediate and necessary as the assertions of consciousness. Neither Intuitive nor Ratiocinative Reason (sit venia verbo) can vaunt, one against the other. The immediateness and absolute necessity of successive determinations in reasoning go to reduce them to the same condition with pure intuitions. That is to say, in the ultimate tribunal, when the judgment, as by a flash, gives forth decree, the probative force of argumentation results from a clear, instant, unavoidable, assertory conclusion: the premises being so and so—the conclusion is so and so—immediately and irresistibly. And we crave to know, why (as Kant seems to admit) this is not a determination of Reason; in which case, one of the chief grounds of distinction between the Understanding and the Reason is taken away.

* Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Meiklejohn's transl., p. 215.

ART. II.—*A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics.* By GEORGE CORNWALL LEWIS,* Esq. 2 vols. London: John W. Parker & Son. 1852.

Political Progress not necessarily Democratic; or, Relative Equality the true Foundation of Liberty. By JAMES LORIMER, Esq., Advocate. Pp. 303. London: Williams & Norgate. 1857.

How politics have come, in a Christian land, to be considered as beyond the pale of Christian restraints, and politicians to deem themselves entitled to impunity of the revealed law, is a very curious question, and one of no little practical import. In all other occupations, our citizens recognize it as the duty of him who ministers in holy things, to apply the doctrines of Scripture to their conduct, for reproof, for admonition, or comfort; and whether he does so or not, the more respectable hold themselves amenable thereto, as the law of their moral existence. Among politicians, however, it is becoming the fashion to reject the application of Scripture. Their acts are assumed to lie out of its range; not because immaculately righteous, it is clear, for they speak of them habitually in the opposite light; but because it is taken for granted that whatever touches the government of the nation or the movements of party, is entitled to special indulgence, or to be judged by the principles of a different code. To say of any topic that it is a political one, is deemed equivalent to saying that the pulpit must let it alone. Very convenient for the purposes of the sinner, to have an occupation into which the law of God is not to follow him; or, at least, which furnishes a plea for resisting, and telling the messengers of the Gospel that this is not in their line. But is statesmanship one of that kind? If we have rightly perused the page of history, no other branch of worldly business has been so largely indebted to the wisest and best of men, or to the word of revelation. Or have politicians, in the midst of their many exposures and temptations, and admitted sins, some recuperative powers, rendering them independent of

* Now Sir George C. Lewis.

that wisdom which cometh down from above—some peculiar resources from below, whereby, though they may fall, they will certainly rise again, with renewed rectitude, from the bosom of the democracy, as Antæus of old, from contact with the earth? Singular as it is, some such notion—vague, undoubtedly; it could not exist otherwise—seems to pervade the public mind, the principal symptom of which is a morbid sensitiveness to the application of gospel truth to the conduct of public men and public affairs.

Progressively, for many years, has this error been insinuating itself into the spirit of our politics, until it has seriously impaired both the moral and intellectual stature of political men. There was a time when citizens went to the polls under as true a sense of duty as they went to church, and when the wisdom and dignity of American councils filled the hearts of all advocates of human rights in every land with triumph. Well is it that many pious people do so still; but their number has certainly diminished, while that of a giddy and ignorant multitude has increased—a multitude disposed to jostle the more orderly aside, and with whom it is disagreeable for them to mingle. The effect is apparent in every branch of government. That sound principle, which separates the church and state, has, by the inactivity of Christians, and overbearing of the worldly, been forced into most unnatural distortion. An agency there is pervading all human affairs, which is skilful at engrafting evil upon every popular good; and an indispensable condition of orthodoxy in politics, as well as in theology, is sleepless watchfulness over interpretation of good doctrine, and over honesty of meaning in forms of sound words.

We fully appreciate the objection to political harangues from the pulpit, and regard with as much horror the act of turning the house of God into a place for advocating the merits of office-seekers, as we should that of making it a place of merchandize, or a rhetorical bazaar, in which to trade in the talents of a gifted minister; and hold it to be equally to the interests of religion and of the state that the church should not embroil itself as a party in the secular government; but a just abhorrence of such profanation has been carried by our people to an unwarrantable length. Though we would have the ser-

vice of God's house defended from all such contact, we cannot fail to see that pious people are under the most solemn obligations to avail themselves of the proper vehicles of political opinion, to make the gospel bear upon the policy of the country. It has been too much left out of view that the profession of politics, like every other occupation of man, has its moral and religious aspects, in which it stands, as truly as any other, in need of the correctives of the divine word. An act of violence perpetrated by a politician, in carrying forward his measures, is just as truly violence as if it occurred in any other hands; dishonesty in a politician, though generally covered by some plausible name, is nothing but dishonesty; drunkenness does not cease to be a vice, because the privilege of indulging in it is defended by a party; and yet it cannot be denied that the sentiment is prevalent, which holds every thing taken up by politics as thereby defended from the reproofs of the gospel. It behoves us to reflect and see whether we are prepared for it, before we admit the doctrine and carry it out, that, no matter what a man's character and conduct, as soon as he takes up the profession of politics, the minister of God is bound to refrain from disapproval of his vices, and to acquiesce in all he may say and do, and sustain all his measures, no matter how flagitious, by a docile silence; and that even against crime, if committed for political purposes, he must hold it indecorous to remonstrate. Such is positively the meaning of the political public. Are Christians prepared to accept it? In short, it is neither more nor less than the old intolerance of monarchical sovereigns, which we, in the capacity of sovereigns ourselves, are attempting to enforce, on our own behalf. King Majority, like King Ferdinand, must not have his measures questioned, nor his servants interfered with by either expostulation or criticism. Such also was the opinion of Ahab in olden time, but Elijah thought otherwise, and has had some credit for resisting him. It is the duty of the church to follow the operations of the civil government with a vision enlightened by the word of God, and without becoming a party in the conflict of its business and passions, its sectional or personal issues, to labour faithfully, by the use of scriptural means, to imbue the public mind with a due sense of religious obligation in poli-

tical conduct, and to refrain from the condemnation of no vice, because it has been adopted by government, or become a public or party measure.

The works named at the head of this article, though very different in their purpose, present kindred topics of grave importance in this connection; the former unfolding and establishing reliable methods of political reasoning, whereby the scientific position, and the moral purity and grandeur of the profession are brought to view, extricated from the wilderness of questionable and erroneous notions, with which they have been confounded; and the latter pursuing an inquiry into the vital principle of liberal government, whereby and to what extent power comes safely into the hands of the people, in the course of which, considerations of political education, and the legitimate influence of the church in the formation of political opinions, arise as essential elements.

The work of Sir George C. Lewis is a political *organum*, which, howsoever it may subserve the purposes designed, is addressed to a widely pervading want of the age. The impotency of reasoning, and consequent fluctuation of opinion, in which the world is actually involved by the vastness, and multitude, and manysidedness of political questions, make urgent demand for some help of this kind. Such is the diversity, not to say the perversity of reasoning, on such matters, that hardly a conceivable system of government is without its advocate among us. "Writers of the most dissimilar schools of philosophy, historians, and practical men, as well as the general public, seem to concur in thinking that the principles of political science are ill-ascertained, and that the maxims of political art are insufficiently established; while we see, from the daily experience of civilized nations, that there is no generally recognized standard of opinion with respect to the practical application of political theories and rules of conduct. So unfavourable, indeed, is the popular judgment with respect to political philosophy, that it is often inclined to proscribe the whole for the defects of a part; to disturb much that is sound on account of the rest that is unsound; and to involve the good with the bad, in one sweeping and indiscriminate condemnation."

Consequently the aim and limitations of the "Methods of

reasoning on Politics" are thus stated by the author. "The most effectual mode of removing this uncertainty, and of reducing the discordant chaos of political theories and doctrines to a uniform and harmonious system, would be to produce a complete body of political philosophy, which should, by the accuracy and completeness of its facts, the fitness of its arrangement, and the force of its reasoning, command the general approbation of competent judges, and, through their assent, gradually work its way to popular reception. Such a task, however, is more easily described than executed; and there may, in the present state of political investigation, be obstacles to the attempt, which, when we consider the failure which has attended the efforts of many eminent speculators, might fairly be deemed insurmountable.

"Whether, however, an attempt at a definitive treatment of the whole compass of political philosophy be, or be not, premature at the present moment, it will at least be conceded, that the success of such an attempt at some future period, may be facilitated by preliminary labours, intended to clear the way for other and more capable investigators. One of the most important of these labours consists in the determination of the subject-matter of politics, and of the methods by which it is to be investigated. When we have settled what political theory and practice are, and how we ought to reason respecting them, we may hope to have made some progress towards the attainment of that end, which all men, whatever their opinions may be, must concur in thinking desirable, provided it be attainable.

"In the present treatise, therefore, an attempt will be made to survey this foreground of political philosophy, with the view of furnishing a guide to the political student, who seeks to reason for himself, and to form an independent judgment upon any department of politics. On the one hand it does not aim at establishing any political theory, or inculcating any system of political doctrine; on the other hand, it does not pretend to be a logical treatise, but it avails itself of logical rules, established by professed writers on logic, and is merely concerned with their application to politics. It makes no claim to novelty or invention; but it seeks only to extend to politics those methods of observation and reasoning which experience has

proved to be most effectual, and which are employed with success in other departments of knowledge. Without proposing to determine truth, it proposes to be instrumental in promoting the determination of truth by others."

In pursuance of this purpose, the author proceeds to define the province of politics, which he afterwards subdivides into four departments. Of these the first pertains to the registration of political facts, including history and statistics, and all the methods adopted for preserving, in an authentic and permanent form, the memory of political facts, as they occur. The second is that of positive, or descriptive politics; or the treatment of what is necessarily involved in the idea of a political government. It undertakes to define the elements necessary to constitute a government, and to show how these are modified in its various forms. The third is that of speculative politics, which, upon the foundation laid by positive politics, seeks to determine how certain forms of government, and certain laws and institutions operate, and from observed facts, and from known principles of human nature, to determine their character and tendency; and attempts to frame propositions respecting their probable consequences, either universally or in some hypothetical state of circumstances. And the fourth department treats of maxims of political practice. "The second and third of these departments correspond with the science of politics; the fourth corresponds with the art."

Under these heads the author conducts an exhaustive treatment of the subject of political methodology, or the principles and apparatus of reasoning upon public affairs. It would be too much to hope for a work of this kind any direct popular effect, but certainly no man, accustomed to consecutive thinking, can read it without great practical benefit, assisting as it does towards the discrimination of facts, the detecting of fallacies, determining what kind of conclusions are ascertainable in a given case, and clearing them, as far as possible, of all grounds of doubt. The author's prolixity, which on some heads is excessive, is that of materials, not of words. Led away by the profusion and diversity of his knowledge, though he never turns aside from the subject, he illustrates by similitude, by contrast, example, and so forth, to an extent far

beyond what can be necessary for any reader of such a work as his. In both a moral and scientific point of view the book is one of inestimable value. Politics pursued in the spirit of its method must become a noble branch of the service of God.

The aim of Mr. Lorimer's little volume is to determine the principle of safety in political progress, with a more special view to its conditions under the present government of England. A limited monarchy is considered as having, in its liberal elements, a native tendency towards radical democracy, and democracy, as it is liable to fall into the hands of a demagogue, and thereby to lead to the restoration of despotism, is represented as a dangerous proclivity. To secure all the advantages of liberty without approaching that precarious brink, to foster progress up to a point where it may safely be stayed, and where the government, equally balanced on every side, may thereafter librate with equal freedom and security, is the consummation, on which all the argumentations of the treatise bear. The means proposed to that end is a distribution of political privileges graduated to the presumptive competence and good will of the people. And the author's strength is laid out in demonstrating that "political influence ought, as nearly as possible, to correspond to social weight and importance."

Mr. Lorimer elaborates his convictions in a cautious and scholarlike manner. His style is refined, compact, and subdued, presenting in small compass the fruits of much thinking. It is too late in the world's history to assume that any one *form* of government is, in all cases, the best; that is bad, of whatsoever form, which is unfitted to the conditions of the nation; but if a democracy, in its right working, is a good form, it does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting it, to say that it is liable to be corrupted. For that is true of most good things among men. Good institutions run the greatest risk from innovation, for the very reason that they are good. The inferior may be improved thereby, but that is certainly not a valid reason for preferring the inferior.

The considerations whereby the author would have his general proposition interpreted and applied, must, he says, "in each particular state, depend upon the peculiar circumstances

of that state." At the same time, he declares himself in favour of limitations formed upon property, rank, virtue and intelligence. Of these, the former two are no longer practical questions under our government, and we can foresee no benefit to us from their discussion. And as to intelligence and virtue, they can be maintained only by systematic effort to that end: which as it must be national, to answer the purposes of a popular government, should fairly extend to all the nation. It would be a mockery of the principle to admit its operation only in the case of professional men. The danger to be dreaded in any popular government is that the people, through vice or passion, or ignorance, may suffer their affairs to be mismanaged by the incompetent or designing. But that may be done by one million of voters as likely as by five millions. The evil is not to be met by diminishing the number, but by proper preparation of each individual for his political duties. A national system of education is indispensable, whether the number be one million or more. Mr. Lorimer remarks briefly, but well to the point, on the head of popular instruction, but why the agencies he recommends should not be addressed towards enabling all the people to take part in their public affairs, as well as only a large number of them, we cannot understand. His judgment is readily accounted for by the fact that, in his hands, this qualification is burdened by those of property and rank.

In the earnest inquiries awakened by agitation of further parliamentary reform in England, it was to be anticipated that every available example, and especially the Constitution of the United States, should undergo a thorough scrutiny; and the objections thereto presented, generally with the most respectful moderation of tone, but evidently under constraint of real apprehension, have received, of late, plausible support from certain occurrences among ourselves. We are by no means disposed to make light of the considerations of danger from vice and ignorance. On the contrary, we regard them as the most formidable that a liberal government has to encounter. How to meet and resolve them successfully, is the grand problem for us to solve. Their preponderance in our system of government would be the sure forerunner of dissolution. If

there is no way, consistent with justice to better citizens, whereby voters of the Paudeen and Bill Poole class can be excluded, it becomes absolutely indispensable to the safety of the commonwealth that their influence be countervailed.

The error to which our remarks apply is twofold. In the first place, it consists in leaving politics entirely to the occasional and heated excitement of party conflict, while no adequate provision is made for giving the subject that calm and systematic place in common education, which it ought to occupy in a free country; and secondly, in the fact that so many of those who are both morally and intellectually best qualified stand back from the post of citizen duty, thereby resigning the weight of power into the hands of such as are competent only to its abuse. By means of its commonness, franchise has come to be undervalued by that class, to whom a higher standard of qualification would have confined it. By no other civilized people is the subject of politics treated with such disrespect as it is by the religious public of the United States. Especially is this true of the cities; where it is notorious that political majorities are controlled by a class of persons, who themselves need the most stringent control of law; while the orderly and industrious are too much occupied with their private affairs to take any active hand in the matter, at least until moved by some glaring iniquity: and, even then, too often content themselves with an outburst of indignant language. And many pious people actually conceive that in thus neglecting their political duties, and, so far nullifying their own influence, they are commendable for eminent piety.

We are reaping the fruits of our error. It is certainly not other than might have been anticipated, if election movements are left in the hands of the idle, the ignorant, and the vicious, that office holders should in some degree correspond in character to their constituents, or that constituents should elect those congenial to their own likings. If the country has had to blush for disorder and profligacy in its high places, if even senators, with a view to outmanœuvre each other in party tactics, have perpetrated such undignified harangues as would have turned ridicule upon a country debating-society, the better class of citizens have had themselves to blame. The guilt lies

heavily upon the shoulders of American Christians, who in slighting their duty to their country, have thrown its interests into such hands. Were the fear of a well informed Christian constituency in all cases before the eyes of the national representative, we should be spared much of that *Buncombe* which it burns the cheek to read: and the manners of our legislative halls would receive some improvement in dignity, were the accounts always to be rendered to an orderly, right-thinking majority, instead of one mustered by pothouse bullies.

As a whole, doubtless, the people of the United States are superior to all other nations in political knowledge, and on emergency, do not fail to use it; but mere superiority to those, who are not called upon to exercise any such rights, or discharge any such duties, is too low a standard. Our measure is not what other nations are, but what we have to do, and spasmodic effort in time of danger will not always atone for the careless security, which gave occasion to it; and it will make little matter what is the wisdom existing in the country, if the Christian and well disposed classes suffer the political lead to be taken out of their hands by the enemies of social order. No other government in the world presupposes, and depends upon such an amount of political knowledge in the people. Christians did well under imperial Rome, and while they were comparatively few, to refrain from intermeddling with a government, which they could not affect otherwise than indirectly, by living quiet and peaceful lives; it is otherwise when they have a government of their own choice, shaped after their own views, and founded upon principles of the Holy Word. No Christian citizen can withhold his coöperation towards its right working, without dereliction of a most solemn duty. And that coöperation consists in both a prudent use of the right of suffrage, and execution of what falls to his own hand to execute, and in promoting such instruction as shall enable and dispose the succeeding generation to do likewise.

No form of government can be rationally condemned because its violation produces evil. If it is found impossible to prepare by education a majority of the people for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, we shall admit that our system is wrong; or if the work of government is itself such an evil that

pious people cannot put their hands to it without pollution, then there is nothing for us, under any constitution, but to submit to the domination of iniquity, and rest content if fortunate enough to be ruled by rogues of talent, who will spare us at least the humiliation of official imbecility. But these are hypotheses, which though largely acted upon, are too absurd for serious consideration.

Assuming what we have large ground for believing true, that Christians are more generally beginning to take just views of their duty in this respect, we shall address our remaining remarks to that branch of a republican education, which goes to prepare a citizen for the proper discharge of his duties as such.

Suffrage is not an innate and inalienable right. A man is not entitled by the laws of good sense to a voice in the government of his country just because he has been born. Intelligent preparation for the position of a freeman and constituent of legislators is implied in every liberal constitution, otherwise it would be preposterous. A liberal government is called upon by the very dictates of self-preservation, to be indefatigable in the use of systematic means for propagating and maintaining virtue and political intelligence among its citizens. The right working of a pure democracy is a state proper to the very highest civilization, and cannot be maintained without a suitable education, as general as the suffrage. Its most deadly ingredient is an ignorant or vicious class of citizens, led blindly by selfish and unprincipled demagogues. The vicious never governed themselves but to their own destruction, and the only step possible to ignorance is to obey. When the majority of any people sink to that condition, they are no longer democratic, and the sooner they find a master the better for them. Servile in spirit, despite their refractoriness, the only choice left them is whom they shall serve, anarchy or monarchy. For anarchy consists not in every man thinking for himself, but in a mass who do not think for themselves, having too many masters. Nor can we rely for security against this danger upon the recuperative power, the inevitable coming right of human nature. Examples are too abundant, in both past and present time, of the inevitable going wrong of human

nature, unless directed and followed up by the correctives of a moral, scientific, and religious training.

Rightly, and, we are happy to say, with most praiseworthy practical effect, have we been directed to popular education as the safeguard of liberty; but it still remains to discriminate in the well stocked arsenal of education what weapons are the best to be selected. One man cannot know all arts, nor possess himself of every accomplishment; and the labourer and artisan have only limited time for any thing beyond their daily task. Education should guide them as directly as possible to what they need. It is not every kind of education that will answer the purpose. All learning is not equally good for the same thing. What is suited to a lawyer would be no preparation for a surgeon. You may have a common school course which shall prepare its pupils to be submissive subjects, and to recognize a propriety in implicit obedience to a priest or a king, as readily as one that will prepare them to be freemen; and if you leave out of the school all reference to virtue and religion, you will certainly subserve the purposes of vice and infidelity. Not that any branch of truth depends upon education; but a human mind, as it cannot comprehend all knowledge, must be characterized by that portion which it knows, and cannot possibly take the bent of that which it does not know.

It becomes, therefore, a matter of the first importance to make a suitable selection of studies. Of course, there are certain indispensable elements lying at the foundation of all instruction, indispensable, because only instruments whereby the substantial work is to be done. A higher step, and the all important one is towards the use to be made of them. It is true that this latter pertains to a man's whole life, and education cannot follow him all his life; but it may give such an impulse and bearing to his life as to determine the whole of it for right or wrong. And this is just what it should most eminently aim at. His education should be such as to start a man right in the course of duties belonging to him. And what are the duties belonging to us? Those touching our private affairs, and those which we owe to the public. In regard to the former, it is not doubted that even learning may greatly err if not of a kind that is to the purpose, while in the latter it is deemed

secure, no matter of what kind it may be. Almost universal is the notion among us that if a man is educated he must be a republican—that if the people be only instructed in reading and writing English, and the use of numbers, they must, by a certain natural consequence, think correctly on all their public duties. A strange hallucination! As if multitudes of the educated in different countries were not both the subjects and advocates of monarchy. True liberty is the colleague of intelligence; but intelligence of certain things may exist without liberty. Knowledge is power. But knowledge of what? Why, knowledge of what you have to do, and how to do it. That is the only knowledge which is power. There is a branch of education which seeks to liberalize a man's thinking, and cultivate him in relation to himself; but the full work of instruction is not done until the man is prepared for his proper duties.

Popular education is always implied in a popular government, as truly as, in a monarchy, it is understood that whoever is born to the throne shall receive the instruction proper for a king. But as the education of a king must be royal, that of a citizen should be republican. No doubt a large amount of political information, though of a very unreliable kind, is scattered abroad among the people by conversation and the newspapers; and school study of the Constitution and History of the United States is very well, as far as it goes; but all that is far short of what is needed by a population, upon whom rest the awful responsibilities of sovereignty. Are they to be abandoned to the consequences of such meagre and defective rudiments, and the random discussions of the smithy and bar-room? Good, as well as evil is effected through the newspapers; but the newspapers do not teach politics, though generally occupied, more or less, with pleadings of party interests. What we stand in need of is a well devised course of political instruction, which shall go directly and systematically to prepare, at least, a majority of citizens for an intelligent and conscientious discharge of their citizen duties. Such an end cannot be effected by the simple adoption of any European system, however excellent in itself, and for its own purposes. The body of the Prussian system, for example, we may safely borrow as it stands, but

there is an element of its spirit which we must leave out, and another element which we must introduce, or we shall train up subjects and not citizens—shall shape the young mind to views inconsistent with the practice around it, and the duties to be exacted of it. Under a monarchy, it is wise to give such a bearing to all studies as to impress youth with the proper feelings of subjects, inasmuch as all the duties to be exacted of them spring out of the spirit of submission. A monastic training may be suitable for one whose life is to be spent within the walls of a monastery, or in obedience to the regulations which are there observed; but for those who are to tread the busy walks of life in a free country, it is not only preposterous, but disabling, like the bandages which imprison the feet of a Chinese lady. A youth brought up under any such method would feel himself growing into discordance with the spirit of his country, and must become, as far as his education takes effect, not merely unqualified, but positively *dis*qualified for the position of a citizen.

Nor is it enough to attempt to leave the mind of the pupil neutral—simply inculcating a disrespect for authorities, and inordinate esteem for himself, with the wild notion, that because we have no king in this country, we have no sovereignty; and because we are free, we are subject to no restraints. In the training of a subject, it may suffice to avoid every thing that has a liberal tendency, and so to order the "incidentals of education," that the pressure of royal authority shall be felt throughout, and obedience inculcated insensibly, like the sentiment of religion; but the citizen requires more than a negation of loyalty—more than a mere sentiment of the opposite. He needs positive instruction for positive and ever recurring duties. It is not enough to leave out the subject-training of monarchical countries, and give up its place to insubordination; to put into our books president instead of king, and patriotism for loyalty—we must substitute the citizen-training and instruction, which is to put a man into the proper moral attitude towards his country, and give him a just apprehension of its government, and of his own responsibilities under it. To be a citizen is something more than to toss one's cap in the air, and fire off powder and rhetoric on the Fourth of July—it is to

partake in the powers and responsibilities of sovereignty—most solemn responsibilities, not to be undertaken without careful preparation.

The first element of citizen character is reverence—reverence towards God and properly constituted human authority; connected, at as early a date as possible, with right instruction as to what it is to be rightly constituted. A feeling this, which, in itself one of the most valuable and beautiful of human nature, is more important to the success of a free government than of any other. Fear may subserve the purposes of order under a despotism, and a strong army may suffice for its moral power; but in a government dependent upon the will of the people, nothing can take the place of due reverence for the authorities of their own appointment.

Freedom differs, on the one hand, from vulgar license, in that it possesses reverence, and on the other hand, from servility, in that it entertains reverence only for what is good and noble. And how shall that emotion be most certainly directed to the noblest and the best? If common sense should answer, it would be by pointing us to God. But a higher authority than common sense has provided us with both an answer and a guide, in one. The word of God is the only complete text book on this subject. And the schools of a free country cannot be safe without it. Reverence to a priest must not be suffered to take the place of reverence to God. To pay to man what is due to God is the very essence of servility. The noblest independence is direct dependence upon God. And, if we deem our government to be according to the will of God, we shall reverence also the authorities which constitute it, and teach with diligence the revelation which inspired it. The most valuable element in the schools of a free country is the Bible. For he alone is the true "freeman, whom the truth makes free."

After the church, no other class of human affairs are more solemn than those of the state. Sovereignty may be abused; but cannot be degraded. If treated with irreverence by one occupant, it will only transfer the crown to another, and will neither die with us, nor at our hands. To exercise it with indignity is not mercly to lose possession of it, but also to sink

beneath its vengeance in another form. For, though its shape may be submitted to human choice, and even that within narrower limits than is commonly believed, its essential authority is of God—springs out of the same volition that created the human spirit. To rightly and deeply apprehend the solemn nature of political office, would go far in guiding to the proper choice of incumbents for its duties. Every thing that represents the authority should harmoniously conspire to its divinely appointed end.

With such a spirit of intelligent reverence, the citizen needs also to be imbued with a true and delicate discrimination of the rights of others, as well as of himself, and of the claims which, in the ordinary business and intercourse of life, his fellow-men have upon him. Constitutional freedom is not designed to protect a selfish man, in gratifying himself at the expense of others, while it positively does leave much more of the private intercourse of men to their own discretion. It becomes necessary, therefore, to include the proper culture of that individual discretion in the educational training of the future citizen, as well as to inculcate a right understanding of and due respect for those relations in which men stand to men by nature and through the same governmental system.

In political science every man among us claims to hold opinions; and it seems no more than reasonable that some care should be taken to have those opinions formed in consistency with truth. If the subject were one of an esoteric philosophy, on which it is possible to withhold discussion from the people, we might content ourselves with saying that it is above their capacity, they can do very well without it, why trouble them with such abstruse matters, away from their proper business? But as it is just about topics of political science that our people talk most frequently, it is no longer a question whether the subject is to be discussed before them, or whether they are to have the means of entertaining opinions about it. Opinions they will adopt, on that subject, instruction or no instruction, and act upon them too, in a way very deeply affecting every one of us. The sole question is whether they shall be helped to form their opinions correctly or not.

This subject is immediately practical also in another sense.

Whether considered as touching domestic or foreign affairs, the people, with us, are the ultimate resort, and their opinions, right or wrong, will find expression in the national policy. For men, who may be called upon to give their vote upon a question of government, it must be of importance to have some just ideas of what a government is, in itself, and as respects those for whom it exists. Here it is, on the very threshold of political science, that many a flattering promise of national independence has stumbled and fallen. A government is not an industrial institution, set up to find the people employment, nor an almshouse, to make provision for those who are unable or unwilling to provide for themselves; only Frenchmen accept the idea that it is both, and, consequently, fall into the hands of him who succeeds in providing for them best; and his servants they must be, while their views of government remain the same. But such an error, as well as others more or less dangerous, there can be no difficulty in exposing to a people, fond of political discussion, in such a light as to make its practical bearing perfectly clear. Much metaphysical speculation may be employed upon theories of government, but all that pertains to the necessary instruction of the people, for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, requires no such elaboration. The same may be said of that branch of the science which treats of public wealth. Because it has been handled philosophically, not the less is political economy a matter of solid, practical, every day business. All political measures, in greater or less degree, affect the material resources of the State; and few elements of government are more conducive to public comfort and independence, or more indicative of a wise and temperate management than an unembarrassed treasury. But with nations, as with individuals, the art of being economical—a very different thing from niggardliness—is one that calls for no little judgment and cautious forethought, drawn from the very heart of statesmanship. And when debt has to be incurred, those who stand at the sources of authority ought to have some ideas as to where, with least national danger, the liability may be created. On the other hand, it is not desirable that a government, as such, should be wealthy. National riches ought to lie in the hands of the people, not of their govern-

ment. But an ignorant populace, whether dazzled by, or jealous of official state and splendour, and military array, are continually prone to rush blindly into measures which involve both evils. In heat of party action, and from false notions of economy, they will adopt a policy which cuts off revenue, and involves deficit and debt; and from admiration of a favourite hero, indulge him in privileges and emoluments which put it in his power and tempt him to oppress them. Great erudition is not required, nor is it necessary that every man be an Adam Smith, or a Bentham; a few principles, in connection with knowledge of the particular case, are sufficient for citizen duty; but these cannot be mastered without set purpose to that end.

No small amount of government business in every country, but most of all in a commercial country, is concerned with its foreign relations. And these often involve the very national life, its dignity, its independence, its wealth or poverty, its peace, or the necessities of war—subjects that touch the interests of every individual. As there is no congress to determine what shall be the laws of international intercourse, but every great nation acts without recognition of an earthly superior, the people of a democratic government cannot help having to do with international law, and thereby, to some extent, affecting the policy of the civilized world. The subject is one inseparable from sovereignty. The sovereign may, indeed, be ignorant, and utterly incompetent to his place; but he is one in the community of sovereigns, and his conduct towards his peers, no matter how rude, or how stupid, must enter as an element into the character which marks the intercourse of the whole. But, as among gentlemen, there is an unwritten law, which gentlemen do not violate without detriment to their standing as gentlemen; so among nations there are principles of right and comity, which no one can disregard without impairing that respect of its peers, to which much of its power is due; and possibly, also, not without incurring the penalty of a deadly conflict. Those with whom are the powers of sovereignty, if they cannot always foresee who of their servants will act in accordance with the national interest and honour, should be well enough informed to make the weight of

their reproof fall correctly upon the head of him who violates them.

It need scarcely be added, that to such a course of instruction, the outlines of general history, and especially the constitutional history of England and of the United States, belong as essential ingredients. For these are the fruits of national experience, and sources of national wisdom. Civilized society implies provision for continually succeeding changes. Experienced prudence is required to adapt the constitution thereto. Blind adherence to old routine will not suffice. What was wisdom in one conjuncture, may be folly in another. The most conservative government in the world, to be well conducted, needs the aid of nice adjustment, continually renewed.

In its mutability lies the distinction of human nature, and its glory. Brute existence is one and the same from beginning to end. The mountains and the ocean may be now as they were on the day of their creation. There is sublimity in their everduring sameness; but grander far is the sublimity of that progressive change, every step of which, if taken in accordance with fundamental law, is a growth towards divine perfection. We have no knowledge of moral or intellectual progress, except in man. It is the peculiar condition of our kind. Aspects there are, in which this mutability is really painful to contemplate; but intrinsically it is the path of greatness for the life of man, and the only one. Man can attain to neither power nor happiness otherwise. At any stage of progress, to become stationary is to deny our human nature, and sink towards that of the irrational creation. No matter where a people ceases to advance, it there terminates its prosperity and its contribution to civilization. However wisely our fathers have done for us, there is still something we have to do for ourselves. We need continual study of present emergencies, in the light of past experience, and of sound political principle.

Such a course of instruction might be varied in extent and thoroughness to any degree. It is not necessary for every citizen to be a great jurist, any more than for every Christian to be a great theologian; but if any one denies that a knowledge of the proper bearing and fundamental principles of political science can be of use, except as followed up to great

legal learning, he controverts the whole doctrine of popular instruction. He might as plausibly say that the common principles of arithmetic are of no use, because every man cannot become a Newton; or that the practical elements of the gospel are of no use to any, who cannot hope to be theologians like Calvin or Edwards; or that there is no use in attempting to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, unless a man is to be a great moral philosopher. If he says that political principles cannot be communicated to the people, he assails the very foundation of all liberal government, on a hypothesis, which we hold to be untenable. For we can see no reason why this range of subjects should not be comprehended in popular education, as well as the elements of chemistry or astronomy, which are much more out of the range of common thinking, and require more recondite reasoning to understand. We would not undervalue any department of art or science; but as a selection has to be made for popular instruction, why not take those subjects most apt to citizen wants? Chemistry and the higher mathematics are very valuable, and richly repay all who have time to devote to them, but they are not every man's business. Every man is not called upon to analyze earths and acids—it is not every man's business to circumnavigate the earth, and weigh the stars in a balance; a man may be a good citizen although he knows no language save his vernacular, and cannot parse a sentence of Aristotle to save his neck; scarcely one of us in a hundred has occasion to read or to speak a foreign tongue, although it is sometimes very convenient to be able to do so; but every man needs a practical acquaintance with the duties belonging to him as a citizen, as truly as he needs instruction in his profession or handicraft.

Political philosophy is, by its very nature, the most easily accessible kind of knowledge. It requires no previous mathematics, no previous linguistics, no previous chemistry. Its logic is comprehended within itself, and it presupposes only a basis of good common sense and intellectual honesty. Nor would such a course of citizen education be either tedious or difficult; inasmuch as its design could not be to confer at once, all the information that the pupil should ever need, but

simply to start trains of thinking and habits of observation in the proper direction. People do not need to be taught to reason, but only how to avoid errors in reasoning. The humblest among us attempt to reason on politics, and do reason after their own fashion. On this very account it is that they stand in need of instruction, as well for the guidance of their own thinking, as for the detection of false argumentation when addressed to them. It is not true that the uneducated do not generalize. This they do only too rapidly, and to a degree that defeats itself. A man who has jumped at several contradictory inferences with equal facility, and seen them to be contradictory, is ready to lean upon any person who can give him confidence. To reach a conclusion in reasoning is so gratifying to the human mind that, without instruction touching necessary cautions, a man will hurry to an apparent conclusion by a very inadequate process. And, for the same reason, he is prone to fall in with the judgments of others even when scantily sustained. Perfectly charming to ill-regulated minds are wide and sweeping assertions, which seem to reach broad principles from a few facts easily apprehended. A cautious survey of a subject in all its aspects, leading to a fair estimate of it, tires and disgusts them. Greedy of excitement, impatient of proof, prone to infer rapidly, and confused by an opposite inference, whoever would fix their attention and carry their convictions must present only one side of a subject, adroitly adapted to their propensities. The demagogue is their only man. An audience of this kind can have no intelligent understanding of their political affairs. Their vote is only the expression of a passion, of a prejudice or haphazard. Calmness in thinking, patient hearing of adverse opinions, and suspension of judgment, until all accessible arguments have been weighed, are the work of education either given or taken.

The influences, under which an American citizen lives, impress him with the spirit of freedom; but as far as intellectual furniture goes, he is provided by his education with very little help towards the right formation of opinions. It is not unlikely that a consciousness of that lack accounts, in the case of many good men, for the utter neglect of their political duties, and

with a greater number, creates the necessity under which they are of following the leadership of a party. Such is not the manly part of a true republican; such is no addition to the national wisdom. The blind follower of a demagogue is only a make-weight to his leader. To him, as far as the party question is concerned, that leader is a king. It is really time that some elementary political instruction should be given to those upon whom such solemn political responsibilities are to rest. Why is it not given? Perhaps for no other reason than that it has not been given. We have copied our methods and subjects of education, from countries where such an element was not needed, or rather carefully shunned, and have not yet made all the amendments necessary. It is to be hoped, as well for the safety of our rights as for the style of our statesmanship, that the step will not be much longer delayed.

Elementary principles of political science, and of the methods of reasoning on politics might be introduced into the school, in connection with history and moral philosophy, to the extent of laying before the pupil clearly the nature and obligation of his citizen duties, and the sources of proper equipment for them. And lyceum lecture courses, which, in their present condition, without aim or plan, are good for nothing, might be wrought into a system, and turned to the valuable account of following up the discipline of youth with well graduated political instruction for maturer years. Thus a citizen, at some of the leisure hours which he now wastes, might enjoy the means of continuing the increase of political knowledge upon the basis of early education, throughout life.

It will certainly not be forgotten that we are advocating, not the education of statesmen—although in a country where so many are needed to fill places in township, county, state, and general government, and where, in the rapidity of rotation, almost any citizen may be chosen to almost any office, the education proper for a statesman ought not to be rare—but of the people, to the end that they may recognize a statesman in his work, and properly judge of the place in which to put him. It is much to have men competent to the work of government—a matter in which this land was, at one time, highly favoured. A true statesman is of no common growth—not to be picked

up at random on the highway. Few men have either the necessary breadth and force of character, truth and humanity, or the industry in acquisition. When found, his price is above rubies, and all the wealth of mines not to be compared with him. But what matters it how many such invaluable men a country may possess, if the power in whose hands is the gift of office, is equally incapable of understanding their value and the demands of the places that need them?—if the people, who appoint to such places, go to work so blindly, or so recklessly, as to pass by men equipped with every proper qualification, and set up those who have none? Of what use is it to be favoured by God with great statesmen, if they are to be trodden down, or hustled aside to make way for any militia captain, or empty demagogue who succeeds for the moment in getting up a shout? What is the use of jewels to those who trample them in the mire and crown themselves with straw? When great statesmen, whose equal the world has seldom seen, after long and invaluable service, and in the prime of their wisdom, have been turned over to neglect, to make way for second rate soldiers of a few months' notoriety—when party watch-words, slang epithets and nicknames go further towards securing elections than any consideration of solid merit, we can make little question that more is needed than great men to choose from. Successful sovereignty, whether wielded by a king or a people, must depend upon the discriminating disposal of right men in right places.

Length of days, and experience in political campaigns, and intercourse with political men, will give even the uneducated some adroitness in the duties of citizenship. But such a method is very imperfect, not to say corrupting. For a man must become accustomed to all that is bad in that course of things before he is able to discriminate for himself what is good. And familiarity with the bad blunts the perception of its iniquity.

But granting that such a method well attained its end, it is too slow. The greater number of citizens do not live long enough to profit by it, and the most favoured only when old. We want well equipped men in the prime of their days, with all the vigour and elasticity of youth, to carry forward the

operations of our liberal institutions, and to fill the numerous offices under them, to which any citizen may be called.

Without entangling the present question in discussion as to what party in the state is under special obligation to execute this work, we insist upon it as a duty of Christians, and of vital importance to the whole. All parties who wish the well-being of their country are interested in it. Self-defence imposes upon the state, at least, a sedulous encouragement of such instruction. The church may deem itself, or may be deemed, improperly employed, as a body, in conducting anything, even education, with a view to political good. It is not to the present point to dispute that position; none will deny that it belongs to Christians to use every influence of the gospel to make a government, which is their own, tell to the glory of God in the highest well being of the nation; nor that having the power so to do, they are recreant to a most holy obligation, if by neglect they throw sovereign power, with all the influence it wields, into the hands of vice. Politics of a Christian country, if Christians are faithful to their citizen duties, should not be unsuitable for pious people, or ministers of the gospel to put a hand to, or make their voices heard in. That the contrary belief extensively prevails is a reproach to the Christian character of the nation—a humiliating proof of our dereliction of duty.

Moreover, the church, in the discharge of its own proper office, is possessed of a power, which merits better than to be strangled by its own hand. Does any other power in the country so nullify itself, and is there any other so solemnly bound to give itself the widest possible effect? Whatever may be done by state or individual for political instruction, there will always be much that can be effected only through the church; to it must we look for that practical virtue, without which freedom would be only an evil, and there will always be many, whom no instructions save those of the church can reach.

This notion that it is inconsistent with Christian life to take any part in politics, has not arisen within the church. No man ever learned such a doctrine from intelligent study of his Bible, or of church history. It is due to a cry got up by unscrupulous men, who wish to be rid of the troublesome presence of

sensitive consciences—men who know that their ends and measures must conflict with those of pious men, and who naturally wish to have the whole field to themselves. Under cover of an excellent principle—the separation of church and state—they have boldly claimed politics for the ungodly; and Christians have tamely succumbed, and joined in the outcry against themselves. Well may the trickster laugh in his sleeve. Weakness is too mild a term for this submission on the part of a Christian community in a Christian land, under a government dictated by Christian principle, and for the establishment of which their Christian forefathers fought and bled, and toiled and suffered so much and so long. It is high time that the error were corrected, and that Christians took such a part in the affairs of their government that those affairs should bear their impress, and reflect to all the world the influence of a Christian public sentiment.

Public opinion consists largely in an echo of the opinions of a few. We have most fully and distinctly learned that the voice of the people is not the voice of God, and that there is no more confidence to be put in the infallibility of a public than in that of a pope. A few active minds are always the generators of popular sentiment. The masses of mankind, educated and uneducated, do not form, but adopt the doctrines which they hold. Consequently, it is no good defence of letting alone, to say that it permits every one, without bias, to form his own opinion; for, in that case, very few will have any political opinion, or it will be one inherited, or taken up at random or in a passion. The majority of people, in order to think rightly, must be taught rightly.

And yet, notwithstanding the proclivity of the human mind to err, and the disposition to rely upon authorities, the doctrines which everywhere are esteemed most respectable for opinions, are those which have the appearance, at least, of being in accordance with the divine law; and the active and consistent conduct of a good man will always exert a superior influence. A wise and consistent Christian, taking his legitimate place in public affairs, is not a mere isolated drop in the shower; he is rather to be compared to a wind on the surface of the waters. Each of those ten thousand waves seems to run

at its own free will; and yet they are all impelled by a touch unseen, which lights upon them as softly as the breath of persuasion. A formative influence some must and will exert to the creation of public sentiment, and direction of public action. None possess a means so powerful or benign to that end as the Christian. It certainly is no light matter to hide such a talent in the earth, and sin against the well-being of a nation.

ART. III.—*The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan.* Edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society by GEORGE OFFOR. 1847.

The Works of John Bunyan, with an Introduction to each Treatise, Notes, &c. Edited by GEORGE OFFOR, Esq. Edinburgh, 1856.

PERHAPS no book, with the exception of the Bible, has been so universally read and admired as Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress; and especially has it been the treasure of the humbler classes, for, as Baron Macaulay remarks, "it had been during near a century the delight of pious cottagers and artisans, before it was publicly commended by any man of high literary eminence. At length critics condescended to inquire where the secret of so wide and so durable a popularity lay. They were compelled to own that the ignorant multitude had judged more correctly than the learned, and that the despised little book was really a master-piece. Bunyan is indeed the first of allegorists, as Demosthenes is the first of orators, or Shakspeare the first of dramatists. Others have shown great ingenuity, but no other allegorist has ever been able to touch the heart, and to make abstractions objects of terror, of pity, and of love."

Mr. Offor, a great authority on editions of the English Bible, is also a great authority on the various editions of Bunyan. In this reprint of the Pilgrim's Progress, which he edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society, he has given us an exact reprint of the first edition; and not the least valuable part of this

work is the Introduction, in which he shows where the Pilgrim's Progress was written; the school in which the author was trained to compose his immortal allegory; an account of the various editions that have appeared; analyses of the many allegories which have preceded this in all the European languages; the various versions and commentaries upon it, and the opinions of the learned upon its merits, and the causes of its popularity.

In the third volume of the "Works of Bunyan," edited by Mr. Offor, and published nine years later, he has given us the substance of this Introduction, and some additions.

Mr. Offor has accomplished his work well, and the public and the Hanserd Knollys Socicty are under obligations to him. We suppose that it is because the Hanserd Knollys Society is a Baptist Society that Mr. Offor, in a single sentence, speaks disrespectfully of those who are not Baptists. We might contrast his sneers about "baby-baptism" with Bunyan's account of the reception of Christian at the House Beautiful. If Mr. Offor had been the author of the Pilgrim's Progress, he might have made Christian take a bath before he permitted him to sit down to supper; or he would have made the Porter and Christian take the bath together. Scott says, in his note on the passage, "Mr. Bunyan was an anti-pædobaptist, or one who deemed *adult professors* of repentance and faith the only proper subjects of baptism, and *immersion* the only proper mode of administering that ordinance; yet he has expressed himself so candidly and cautiously, that his representations may suit the admission of members into the society of professed Christians in every communion where a scrious regard to spiritual religion is in this respect maintained."

There are very few of our readers who are not familiar with the life of John Bunyan, and therefore we do not propose in this article to speak of the school of affliction and persecution in which he was trained to write "the progress of a Christian from this world to that which is to come;" but in Mr. Offor's Introduction we shall find many facts connected with the Pilgrim's Progress and its publication both new and curious, and a statement of these facts will fully occupy the space allotted to us in this article.

On the 12th of November, 1660, the year of Charles the Second's return to England, John Bunyan, who had been preaching about five years, was seized and thrust into Bedford jail, where he remained for six years, until 1666, the year of the great fire in London, when he was released; but returning immediately to his old employment, of preaching the gospel, he was again thrown into prison, where he lay for six years more. After his second release returning to preaching again, he was for the third time imprisoned, but this proved but a short confinement of six months. During this imprisonment of twelve years and a half he wrote many of his works, and among these his Pilgrim's Progress. The fact that this wonderful allegory was written in Bedford jail, is proved by certain statements in the work itself, the date of its publication, the evidence of one of his personal friends, and the tradition handed down in the family of one of his fellow-prisoners.

As to his own testimony, he says: "As I walked through the wilderness of this world, I lighted on a certain place where was a Den; and laid me down in that place to sleep; and as I slept I dreamed a Dream." In the margin of the fourth edition he tells us that the word "Den" means the "Gaol"; thus indicating the place where the First Part of the Pilgrim's Progress was conceived. Had this work been printed when it was first written, the author, as in other of his books, would have dated his introduction from the jail, in which case there would have been no need of any note to connect the words "Den" and "Gaol." Nor did we feel the necessity of such a reference until after the second edition, when he inserted a plain indication that he wrote it while he was a prisoner, as may be seen in some verses added to the third edition.

Another proof that he wrote this book in prison is in the first edition of the book itself. This bears strong internal evidence of its having been written long before it was published. It must be remembered that the second edition issued from the same press, by the same publisher, also in the same year; and there will be found, in comparing the two editions, a very striking difference in the spelling of many words; such as "drownded," corrected to "drowned"; "slow" to "slough"; "chaulk" to "chalk"; "travailer" to "traveller"; "brast" to

"burst," &c. &c. This may readily be accounted for by the author's having kept the manuscript for some years before it was printed, and having taken the advice of many friends who had read the manuscript, upon the propriety of publishing it, he either had no inclination or leisure to revise it when he had decided upon sending it forth to the public. There is an apparent difference of twenty years between the spelling used in these two volumes which were published in the same year, and issued from the same press; besides which there were very considerable additions of new characters, and also to the text, in this second edition.

A third evidence of his having written it in prison, is the testimony of a pious gentleman, who was one of Bunyan's personal and "true friends," and who enjoyed the happiness of a long acquaintance with him. It is in the continuation to the "Grace Abounding," published in 1692, from which time it was very extensively circulated along with that deeply interesting narrative. This author says, that, "during Bunyan's confinement in prison he wrote the following books, namely, *Of Prayer by the Spirit; The Holy Citie; Resurrection; Grace Abounding;* PILGRIM'S PROGRESS, First Part." Nothing can be more conclusive than such evidence by an eye witness, one of Bunyan's intimate friends; for one hundred and fifty years it was never doubted, nor ought it ever to have been doubted.

Another proof that this book was written in prison is derived from the tradition handed down in the family of his fellow-prisoner, Mr. Marsom, an estimable and pious preacher, who with Bunyan was confined in Bedford jail for conscience sake. Thomas Marsom was an ironmonger, and pastor of a Baptist church at Luton; he died in January, 1726, at a very advanced age. This Thomas Marsom was in the habit of relating to his family many interesting facts connected with his imprisonment. One of these is, that Bunyan read the manuscript of the Pilgrim's Progress to his fellow prisoners, requesting their opinion upon it. The descriptions naturally excited a little pleasantry, and Marsom, who was of a sedate turn, gave his opinion against the publication; but on reflection requested permission to take the manuscript to his own cell, that he might read it alone. Having done so, he returned it with an earnest recommenda-

tion that it should be published. The reason why it was not published for several years after the author's release, appears to have arisen from the difference of opinion expressed by his friends as to the propriety of printing a book which so familiarly treated the most solemn subjects; and in addition to this opposition of friends, his own personal affairs after so long an imprisonment, added to his parochial duties, demanded all his time and attention. Indeed so great was his popularity at this time, that an eye witness testified, that when he preached in London, twelve hundred assembled on a week day in winter, at seven o'clock in the morning, to hear his lecture. At length he made up his mind:

> ——"Since you are thus divided,
> I print it will; and so the case decided."

How far Bunyan was assisted in the composition of his allegory has been a question much debated. He answers himself in some lines appended to the "Holy War;" and in the preface to "Solomon's Temple Spiritualized," he says: "I dare not presume to say, that I know I have hit right in every thing: but this I can say, I have endeavoured so to do. True, I have not for these things fished in other men's waters; my Bible and my Concordance are my only library in my writings."

The great store of ancient allegories and poems has been ransacked to find the original of Bunyan's Pilgrim without success. Dr. Dibdin in his "Typographical Antiquities," describing Caxton's "Pilgrimage of the Soul," says: "This extraordinary production, rather than Bernard's 'Isle of Man,' laid the foundation of Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress." Dr. Adam Clarke in a postscript to a life of Bunyan observes, that "his whole plan being so very similar to 'Bernard's Isle of Man, or Proceedings in Manshire;' and also to that most beautiful allegorical poem, by Mr. Edmund Spenser, oddly called the 'Faery Queen,' there is much reason to believe, that one or the other, if not both, gave birth to the Pilgrim's Progress."

Mr. Montgomery, a devoted admirer of Bunyan's genius, considers that the print and the verses in "Whitney's Emblems," published in 1585, might perhaps have inspired the

first idea of this extraordinary work. Southey, who investigated this subject with great ability, came to a very pointed conclusion: "It would indeed be as impossible for me to believe that Bunyan did not write the Pilgrim's Progress, as that Porson did write a certain copy of verses, entitled the 'The Devil's Thoughts.'" Now as these verses were doubtless written by Southey himself, he had arrived at a conviction that Bunyan was entitled to all the honour of conceiving and writing his great allegory. Still he says, "the same allegory has often been treated before him. Some of these may have fallen in Bunyan's way, and modified his own conceptions, when he was not aware of any such influence."

But there is a strong argument against this from the fact that Bunyan was an unlearned man, and indeed knew no language but his own. When he used five common Latin words in Dr. Skill's prescription, "Ex carne et sanguine Christi," he tells the readers in a marginal note, "*The Latine I borrow.*" And we cannot conceive that learned men read to him old monkish manuscripts, or the allegories of a previous age; for his design was unknown, he had formed no plan, nor had he any intention to write such a book until it came upon him suddenly while composing one of his other works.

Mr. Offor, who is high authority in this matter, says that he has investigated every assertion and suggestion of this kind which has come to his knowledge, and analyzed all the works referred to; and beyond this, every allegorical work that could be found previous to the eighteenth century has been examined in all the European languages; and the result is a perfect demonstration of the complete originality of Bunyan. "It came from his own heart." The plot, the characters, the faithful dealings are all his own. And what is more, there has not been found a single phrase or sentence borrowed from any other book, except the quotations from the Bible, and the use of common proverbs. To arrive at this conclusion, Mr. Offor has occupied much time and labour, at intervals, during fifty years; he is competent therefore to give, as he has done, a sketch of more than fifty of these works, beginning with the monkish manuscripts, and continuing through the printed books published prior to the Reformation; and from that time to

1678, when the first part of the Pilgrim's Progress appeared.

It may be interesting to the reader if we notice a few of the most prominent of these, and the reasons of Mr. Offor why they could not have been used by Bunyan. The first we shall notice is a little volume entitled "The Abbey of the Holy Ghost," written by John Alcocke, the founder of Jesus College, Cambridge, a learned and abstemious bishop in the reign of Henry VII. From this curious and very rare little volume, Mr. Offor conceives that Mr. Bunyan could not have gained any idea; but in it are some translations of passages of Scripture made fifty years before any version of the Bible was published in English, which prove the great liberties the Church took with the Scriptures, and the extent to which they misled the people when the holy oracles were locked up in a foreign tongue. Matt. iii. 2: "Shrive ye and do penance, and be ye of good belief; the kingdom of heaven nigheth fast." John viii. 6: "He stooped down and wrote on the ground with his finger all their sins, so that each of them might se how sinfull other was." Matt. xxvi. 38: "I have, he said, full much dread against that I shall die. Sit ye down, he said, and wake ye, and bid your beads till I come again to you."

Allusion has already been made to the "Pylgremage of the Sowle," printed by William Caxton, 1483. Mr. Offor gives an analysis of this book drawn from a careful perusal of the original edition, compared with the manuscript written in 1413, and the result is to establish conclusively Bunyan's originality, notwithstanding the laborious effort of Dr. Clarke to prove that this book was the original of the Pilgrim's Progress. There is in the British Museum a very fine and curious MS. copy of this book, illustrated with rude illuminated drawings. It closes with "Here endith the dreem of the pilgrimage of the soule, translated owt of the Frensch into Englysche, the yere of our Lord MCCCCXIII." The translator craves indulgence, if "in som places ther it be ouer fantastyk nought grounded nor foundable in Holy Scripture, ne in doctoers wordes, for I myght not go fro myn auctor." The original work was written by Guillonville, prior of Chaalis, about 1330. This old poem was beautifully reprinted in London in 1858, 4to, by

Basil Montegu Pickering, with notes by Nathaniel Hill, comparing it with the Pilgrim's Progress.

It is a matter of great regret, says Mr. Offor, that those who write and publish for the millions, too frequently circulate opinions and supposed facts, without personal investigation. Mr. Chambers, the popular publisher at Edinburgh, whose works find readers as far as the English language is known, has joined those who detract from Bunyan, by charging him with plagiarism. In his Encyclopædia of Literature, speaking of Gawin Douglas, the bishop of Dunkeld, a celebrated Scottish poet, he observes: "The principal original composition of Douglas is a long poem, entitled 'The Palace of Honour.' *** The well known Pilgrim's Progress bears so strong a resemblance to this poem, that Bunyan could scarcely have been ignorant of it." Mr. Offor, with some trouble, found a copy of this rare tract of Douglas, written in the ancient Scottish dialect, and with the aid of a good modern glossary, was enabled to read it through, but was surprised to find that it had not, either in the plot or detail, the slightest similarity whatever to the Pilgrim's Progress; and that it is written in terms that a poor unlettered minister could not have understood.

Passing by many works of this time, we come to a poem, entitled "The Vision of Pierce Plowman." "I am inclined to think," says Mr. D'Israeli, in his *Amenities of Literature*, "that we owe to Pierce Plowman an allegorical work of the same wild invention from that other creative mind, the author of Pilgrim's Progress. How can we think of the one without being reminded of the other? Some distant relationship seems to exist between the Plowman's *Dowell* and *Dobet*, and *Dobest*, Friar *Flatterer*, *Grace*, the Portress of the magnificent Tower of *Truth*, viewed at a distance, and by its side the dungeon of Care, *Natural Understanding*, and his lean and stern wife *Study*, and all the rest of this numerous company, and the shadowy pilgrimage of the 'Immortal Dreamer' to the 'Celestial City.'" Such a notice by so popular a writer, led Mr. Offor to examine closely this severe satire, and he found it written in a language that to Bunyan would have been almost as impenetrable as Hebrew or Greek. It is a very curious poem, composed about the time of Wicliff, by one of the Lollards, said to

be by Robert Langland. The printer (R. Crowley, 1550) states that it was written in the time of Edward III., "when it pleased God to open the eyes of many to see his truth, giving them boldness of heart to open their mouths, and cry out against the works of darkness." There is nothing in this very interesting book that could in the slightest degree have aided Bunyan, if he had been able to read it.

Another curious book in this series is "The Plaine Man's Pathway to Heaven," by Arth. Dent, 1601. This little volume made a considerable part of the worldly goods which Bunyan's first wife brought as her portion; and it became one of the means by which he was awakened from the dreary sleep of sin, and therefore an invaluable portion. It is singular, says Mr. Offor, that no one has charged him with taking any hints from this book, which is one of the very few which he is known to have read prior to his public profession of faith. The author in his epistle calls it "A Controversie with Satan and Sinne." It is a dialogue between a Divine, an Honest Man, an Ignorant Man, and a Caviller. This book must have been exactly suited to the warm imagination of Bunyan. It had proved invaluable to him as a means of conversion; but after a careful and diligent perusal by Mr. Offor, he could find no trace of any phrase or sentence having been introduced into the Pilgrim's Progress. The copy in Mr. Offor's possession is the nineteenth impression, 1625, and has the name of "Mr. Bunyoun" written on the bottom of the title; probably the very volume which his wife brought him as her dowry.

The book that has been most noticed as likely to have been seen by Bunyan, is Bolswert's "Pilgrimage of Duyfkens and Willeynkens. Antwerp, 1627." A copy of this rare edition is in the possession of James Lenox, Esq., of New York; it contains twenty-seven engravings, and was printed by Hieronymus Verdussen. This book was translated into French, and became somewhat popular. Mr. Offor relates that this volume was noticed by two gentlemen from Yorkshire, who had called to see his extensive collection of early English Bibles and books. Among other books they noticed a very fine copy of this rare volume of Bolswert's, the prints in which reminded

them of Bunyan's Pilgrim, and on their return to the north, a paragraph was inserted in a provincial paper stating that our Pilgrim's Progress was a translation. The falsehood of such a statement has been fully proved by Mr. Southey, to whom the identical volume was lent for the purpose of fully entering into the question, and there appears not to be the slightest similarity in the two stories. The cuts which attracted the attention of the visitors of Mr. Offor were—A man sleeping, and a pilgrim leaning over the bed; through the open door two pilgrims are seen walking; they stoop on the bank of a river, at the head of which, in the distance, the sun is setting. Another cut represents the pilgrims with foolscaps on their heads, driven by a mob, and one of them before a man sitting with his secretary at a table; a third shows the alarmed pilgrims in a circle of lighted candles, while a necromancer produces goblins, and sprites from an overhanging hill; a fourth shows the pilgrims going up a steep mountain, when one of them falls over the brink. Southey, after giving an analysis of the book, says, "and this is the book from which Bunyan is said to have stolen the Pilgrim's Progress! If ever there was a work which carried with it the stamp of originality in all its parts, it is that of John Bunyan's."

Bernard's "Isle of Man; or the Legal Proceedings in Manshire against Sin," is another book often referred to as having been used by Bunyan in the preparation of the Pilgrim's Progress. This little volume was very popular in its day. The author was a Puritan member of the Church of England, and profiting by the personal respect felt for him by his bishop, escaped punishment, and was permitted to enjoy his living at Balcomb. Dr. Adam Clarke considered that there was much reason to believe that the "Isle of Man," or Spencer's "Faery Queen," gave birth to the Pilgrim's Progress and Holy War. Dr. Southey imagines that Bunyan had seen this book, because his verses introductory to the Second Part have some similarity to Bernard's "Apology for his Allegory," which closes this volume. Mr. Offor, on account of the high authority of those holding this opinion, made a careful reperusal of the book, and was convinced that there is not the slightest similarity between it and the Pilgrim's Progress; and the only resemblance it has

to the Holy War, is making the senses the means of communication with the heart or soul—an idea usual and universal in every age, the use of which cannot subject the writer to the charge of plagiarism.

The last book we shall notice is Bishop Patrick's "Parable of the Pilgrim." This was written about the same time that Bunyan was writing his Pilgrim's Progress; and in comparing the two books, we think that all will agree with Mr. Offor when he says, "Whoever has patience to wade through the pages of Bishop Patrick's 'Parable,' must be fully convinced that his lordship's limping and unwieldy Pilgrim will never be able, with all his hobbling, to overtake or even get within sight of John Bunyan by many a thousand miles; a striking proof that exquisite natural ability casts a brighter and more captivating lustre than the deepest acquired parts."

We are compelled to pass by many works which Mr. Offor has examined, which are exceedingly interesting and curious, giving only the titles of a few of them. "The Pilgrimage of Perfection," supposed to be written by William Bond; printed by Pynson, 1526. "The Pype or Tonne of the lyfe of Perfection," 1532, an allegorical work for the instruction of nuns. "Le Voyage du Chevalier Errant," Par F. J. Cartheny, written about the year 1311; printed at Anvers, 1557. Translated into English about 1611. "Whitney's Emblems," Leyden, 1586. "The Pilgrim of Loretto Performing his Vow made to the Glorious Virgin Mary, Mother of God," Paris, 1630.

The editions of the First Part of the Pilgrim's Progress have been very numerous. Eleven editions were published during the author's lifetime, and four, perhaps five, editions of the Second Part. There were fourteen editions of the First Part, and seven of the Second Part, printed before the end of the seventeenth century; and there were at least thirty-six editions of the First Part, and twenty-one of the Second Part printed before 1800, and several others without any indication of the number of the edition.*

The first edition was published in a small 12mo. in 1678. Printed for Nath. Ponder. This volume is of extraordinary

* A brief notice of those published while Bunyan was alive is all that we can give.

rarity; only two copies being known to exist. One of them in the most beautiful preservation, in the original binding, clean and perfect, was discovered in a nobleman's library, and judging from its appearance it has never been read. It is now in the cabinet of H. S. Holford, Esq., of Weston Birt House, Tetbury, Gloucestershire. It was this copy which Mr. Offor used in preparing his edition for the Hanserd Knollys Society. It contains 233 pages, which does not include the title page and the apology, comprising five leaves; this would make the whole number 243 pages. The title is in a blackletter headline. It has no portrait or cuts. The edition of the Hanserd Knollys Society, of which only fifty copies were printed, is a most accurate reprint, not merely verbal, but literal, including the punctuation, and use of capitals and italics.

The only other copy of this edition known to exist is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. This copy has the title-page, the first two leaves of the apology, and the last page containing the conclusion, in fac-simile. The second edition was published also in the year 1678, for Nath. Ponder. The title is nearly similar to the first, with the words, "The second edition, with additions." A fine copy of this edition is in the library of Mr. Lenox. The text of this copy fills 276 pages, and the conclusion another page at the end, besides the title and four and a half leaves in the apology. It contains no portrait nor cuts. It has many more typographical errors than the first edition, but the spelling is greatly modernized and improved, an explanation of which has already been given.

The third edition appeared in the following year, 1679, by the same publisher. It contains 287 pages, with a portrait of the author, but no other cut or illustration. Mr. Offor, and a clergyman in Somersetshire have copies, but these do not agree. There must have been two third editions, or errors were corrected as the sheets passed through the press.* From this time every edition presents some little additions of side notes or references.

The fourth edition is by the same publisher in 1680; it contains 288 pages, and has a portrait. The copy in the library

* In this a considerable addition was made, and this completed the allegory.

of Mr. Lenox has upon the back of the portrait an "Advertisement from the Bookseller." It is worthy of notice:

"The *Pilgrim's Progress*, having sold several Impressions, and with good Acceptation among the People (there are some malicious men, of our profession, of lewd principles, hating honesty, and Coveting other men's rights, and which we call *Land Pirates*, one of this society is *Thomas Bradyll* a printer, who I found Actually printing my book for himself, and five more of his Confederates) but in truth he hath so abominably and basely falcified the true Copie, and changed the Notes, that they have abused the Author in the sence, and the propriator of his right (and if it doth steal abroad, they put a cheat upon the people.) You may distinguish thus, the Notes are Printed in Long Primer, a base old letter, almost worn out, hardly to be read, and such is the Book itself. Whereas the true Copie is Printed in a Leigable fair Character and Brevier Notes as it alwaies has been, this Fourth Edition hath, as the third had, the Author's Picture before the Title, and hath more than 22 passages of Additions, pertinently placed quite thorow the Book, which the counterfeit hath not."

N. PONDER.

"This is Brevier and the true copy."

"This is Long Primer Letter."

The additions alluded to above are quotations from Scripture and side notes. No copy of this pirated edition of Bradyll is known to exist. Mr. Offor has a copy of the fourth edition, containing the portrait and the above advertisement upon the back, and on the back of the title an advertisement of "Owen on the Hebrews." The text contains 287 pages, the apology four leaves, and the conclusion one page.

The fifth edition is also by Ponder, and was published in 1680. The copy in the library of Mr. Lenox has the portrait, title, and apology, on six leaves; the text from 1 to 220; the conclusion on an additional page, and five pages of books published by Ponder; and on the back of the portrait this advertisement: "The *Pilgrim's Progress* having found good Acceptation among the People, to the carrying off the Fourth Impression, which had many additions, more than any preceding; and the Publisher observing, that many persons

desired to have it illustrated with Pictures, hath endeavoured to Gratifie them therein: and besides those that are ordinarily printed to this Fifth Impression, hath provided Thirteen Copper Cutts curiously engraven for such as desire them." These copper cuts were advertised to be sold separately, and they afford the only proof of the authorship of the verses found under each of them. These verses took their place in the text after Bunyan's death. Mr. Offor has three different fifth editions: one, corresponding with the copy in Mr. Lenox's collection; a second, with portrait and the "thirteen copper cutts," as announced in the advertisement, with a cut of the Martyrdom of Faithful printed in the text on page 128; but though the date is 1680, every page shows that the whole book has been *re-composed:* a third copy, but without the title-page. It is supposed to be the fifth edition, and has the copper cuts; but they are rather *copies* than *fac-similes* of the originals, and there are proofs throughout the work of a different printer's composition. A very fine impression of the above mentioned plates is found in a German version published in London, 1766, with the English verses below. If these are not Sturt's plates, they are certainly copied from them. A copy of this version is in the possession of Mr. Lenox.

The sixth edition has not been found. The seventh, in very beautiful preservation, is in the library of R. B. Sherring, Esq., Bristol, England. It was printed by Ponder, 1681, containing 286 pages, handsomely printed, with the portrait, and the cut of the Martyrdom of Faithful, on a *separate leaf*, between the pages 164 and 165. It was a copy of this edition which Bunyan used in writing his Second Part, all the references in which to the First Part, are correctly made to this edition.

There were two eighth editions in 1682; they have 211 pages, and two leaves of a list of "Books" published for Ponder. On the back of the frontispiece is an advertisement similar to that in the fifth edition, with the change of one word. In the copy of Mr. Lenox there are three cuts; on page 121, the Martyrdom of Faithful; on page 145, misprinted 135, Doubting Castle; and on page 204, Christian and Hopeful received by angels into the clouds. The portrait, title, and apology, occupy six leaves; the text from 1 to 211, the con-

clusion on an additional page, and four pages of books printed for Ponder. The pages run from 1 to 144, then 135 to 211; the signatures are correct. It is on this second page 135, that the print of Doubting Castle is found.

The other issue, which is probably the first of the two, has the same error in the paging, but there is no cut of Doubting Castle. Mr. Offor thinks that the printer, wishing to insert this cut in the second issue, reprinted one whole sheet, using a sharper type on a thin body, and by thus adding a line to each page, managed to pack the 24 pages into 23, thus making room for the cut. The following signature seems also to have been re-composed.

There are two ninth editions, both bearing the imprint of N. Ponder: the first of these is dated 1683, comprised in 212 pages. It has a different portrait, but the same woodcuts as the eighth, with the addition of Doubting Castle on page 145, numbered 135. Another *distinct* edition is called the ninth, also by N. Ponder, with the same woodcuts as the last, but with a different type. This bears the date of 1684. On the back of the frontispiece is the advertisement of the thirteen copper-plates, in addition to those ordinarily printed to the eighth edition. Both of these editions are in the collection of Mr. Lenox; that of 1683 has the portrait with the advertisement, a copy of that in the fifth edition, with a few changes. It has the portrait, slightly varying from the previous one, and three cuts, on pages 121, 135, misprint for 145, and 204. The portrait, title, and apology, fill six leaves; the text pages from 1 to 211, and the conclusion on an additional page, and four leaves of books printed for Ponder: pages 135 to 144 are double, and 159 to 168 are omitted in the paging.

The tenth edition appeared in 1685, on two hundred pages. In the title the name of the author is spelt *Bunian*, but he signs the apology as usual Bunyan. This has the frontispiece and two woodcuts only, that of Doubting Castle being omitted. The copy in Mr. Lenox's library wants the portrait; there is an advertisement of the Second Part, by "John Bunian," price one shilling. The head line from page 73 to the end is in much smaller type than from page 1 to 72.

The eleventh edition appeared in 1688, the year in which

Bunyan died. Mr. Lenox has in his collection a copy of the twelfth edition, printed by Robert Ponder, in 1689. The portrait is in some respects altered, although it has the name of Nath. Ponder at the bottom. The advertisement on the back refers to the "carrying off of the 11*th* edition and *this* 12th Impression." There are twenty-four wood cuts with the verses below, printed in the text. The portrait, title page, and apology occupy six leaves; the text pages 1 to 204 including the conclusion; pages 196 to the end in much *smaller type* than the rest of the volume.

We refer while passing to a superb copy of the first edition of the Holy War, which is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. It is a 12mo., printed in London, 1682. From its clean and perfect condition it appears never to have been read. It has the portrait engraved by R. White, which is considered the most correct of all the representations of Bunyan; and the folding plate of the siege of the "Towne of Mansoul," with a full length likeness of Bunyan in the centre, and at the end of the volume the verses beginning,

"Some say the Pilgrim's Progress is not mine."

We are not surprised to learn that one hundred thousand copies of the Pilgrim's Progress in English were circulated during the life-time of the author. There were then also translations into French, Flemish, Dutch, Welsh, Gælic and Irish; and since then it has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Danish and German, into the various languages of Asia and into Hebrew; indeed it has appeared in nearly all the languages of the world. There is a Latin copy entitled *Peregrinantis Progressus.* And what is not generally known, there was an early American edition, "published in Boston by Samuel Green, upon assignment of Samuel Small, and are to be sold by John Vysor, of Boston, 1681," 12mo. But one copy of this edition is known, and that is imperfect. Bunyan probably refers to this edition, in the first edition of Part Second, 1684, in speaking of the circulation of Part First.

"'Tis in New England under such advance,
Receives there so much loving countenance,
As to be trimmed, new cloth'd, and decked with gems,
That it may show its features and its limbs."

He may perhaps speak of a later edition not now known, for this is a very plain and common production, and does not at all correspond with the third line quoted. There was an edition of Part First published at New York, in 1794, by Benjamin Gomez, a Jewish bookseller, probably a converted Jew, for he printed a New Testament in 1801.

The French translation, published in Amsterdam, 1685, is entitled *Voyage d'un Chrestien vers l'Eternité*, par Monsieur Bunjan, F. M., en Bedtford. No doubt Bunyan's colloquial English was a difficult task for the translator. The Slough of Despond is called, *Le Bourbier Mésfiance;* Worldly Wiseman, *Sage Mondain;* Faithful, *Loyal;* Talkative, *Grand Jaseur;* Pickthank, *Flatteur;* My Old Lord Letchery, *Mon vieux Seigneur Assez Bon;* No Good, *Vautrien;* Live-loose, *Vivant Mort;* Hate-light, *Grand Haineux;* Bye-ends, *Autrefin.* Instead of translating the poetry, it is supplied from French psalms or hymns. The only copy of this edition known to exist is in the collection of Mr. Lenox, and is in very fine condition. There is in the British Museum a copy somewhat modernized, printed in Rotterdam, 1722: another in 1757; another in Basle, 1728. These are French Protestant versions; besides which there have been many editions of a Roman Catholic translation into French, greatly abridged, and of course Giant Pope is omitted, and so is the remark about Peter being afraid of a sorry girl.

Bunyan gives a hint in the verses with which the First Part is concluded, of his intention to continue his allegory; but this was not done until 1684. But in the meantime a forgery appeared with this title—"The Second Part of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, from this present World of Wickedness and Misery to an eternity of Holiness and Felicity exactly described under the similitude of a Dream, &c. Printed in London, 1683, for Thomas Malthus, at the Sun in the Poultry." Mr. Lenox has a copy of this forged edition. It has a frontispiece representing two men (one sleeping) in clerical garb; and one plate of persons dancing round the edge of a pit. This is the only counterfeit that has been discovered, although Bunyan thus warns the public in the verses prefixed to the Second Part:

> "'Tis true some have of late to counterfeit
> *My* Pilgrim, to their own, my Title set;

Yea, others, half my name and Title too,
Have stitched to their Books to make them do;
And yet they by their features do declare
Themselves, not mine to be, whose ere they are."

It is probable that this book never reached a second edition, being eclipsed by the real Second Part, which appeared in 1684. There is in the library of Mr. Lenox a small 12mo. volume, which must be distinguished from the above, entitled "The Progress of the Christian Pilgrim from this world to the world to come. In two parts"—with the motto, "Joel xi. 23: *Your old men shall dream dreams.* The second edition: London and Westminster. Printed for the author, and sold by the booksellers. 1702."

Mr. Offor has a later edition, printed in 1705. This appears to be an imitation rather than a forgery, as it does not profess to be by Bunyan. Mr. Offor supposes it to be a Roman Catholic production, as Giant Pope is omitted, and Faithful, called *Fidelius*, is hanged, drawn, and quartered; that being the punishment inflicted on the Roman Catholics by Elizabeth and James I.

The real Second Part is a similar volume to the First Part, and appeared in 1684. A fine copy of this rare volume is in the possession of Mr. Lenox. In this, seven pages are in larger type than the rest, from page 100 to 106 inclusive. Page 106 is numbered 120. It was printed by Nathaniel Ponder, and has a frontispiece engraved by Sturt, representing Bunyan asleep below, and Christiana and her family above, setting out on their journey, with verses below. It has two plates, one representing Great Heart leading on the Pilgrims; the other the dance round the head of Giant Despair. On the back of the title is the following notice: "I appoint Mr. Nathaniel Ponder, But no other to Print this book, Jan. 1, 1684. John Bunyan." The text fills 224 pages, 106 to 109 being omitted in the paging; the title and verses, six leaves, are not counted in the paging.

The next edition known has a similar title to the first, but has no indication of what edition it is (perhaps the third or fourth,) but bears the date of 1687. A copy of this edition is

in the collection of Mr. Lenox. There is an advertisement of books upon the back of the title, but not the notice quoted above. It has an engraved frontispiece and two plates, as in the first edition. The paging is correct, but there are variations throughout from the first edition. The sixth edition appeared in 1693, "Printed for Robert Ponder, and sold by Nicholas Boddington, in Dutch Lane." On the back of the title, after an advertisement of books, is the following notice: "☞ The Third Part of *Pilgrim's Progress* that's now abroad, was not done by John Bunyan, as is suggested. But the true Copy left by him, will be published by Nath. Ponder." This notice refers to "Grace Abounding," which is advertised by Ponder on the back of the title of Part First, 13th edition, 1692, as "John Bunyan's life, writ by his own hand in a book entitled Grace Abounding, &c.; to which is added, The remainder of his life to his death by the hand of a friend, and reprinted this year." Below is a caution against the Third Part, "printed by an impostor," &c. The engraved frontispiece in this sixth edition is very much worn, and two wood-cuts printed in the text. The title and verses occupy six pages; the text pages 1 to 180, of which 167 to 180 are in smaller type than the rest. There is a copy of this edition in the library of Mr. Lenox.

The seventh edition appeared in 1696. The eighth in 1702. In the copy of Mr. Lenox, it is called on the title "the eighth edition, with addition of four cuts. Note—the 3d Part, suggested to be J. Bunyan's is an Impostor—and printed for W. P., and to be sold by Nicholas Boddington, 1702." The two additional cuts refer to Christian, and are copied from Part First.

The copy of the ninth edition in Mr. Lenox's collection, bears the imprint of N. and M. Boddington, 1712. Mr. Offor has a ninth edition dated 1708. It would be endless to continue this examination.

In 1692 a Third Part made its appearance, and although the title does not directly say that it was written by Bunyan, it was at first received as his. It is this Third Part of which notice is taken on the back of the title of the sixth edition of

of the Second Part, and denounced as an "Impostor" on the back of the title of the eighth edition.*

A copy of the first edition of this counterfeit is in the library of Mr. Lenox. The date on the title page is 1693, the life which is appended has the date 1692. The second edition appeared in 1694. In the first and second editions an indelicate paragraph was inserted respecting the "Revels of the Ranters." It is not known whether this was continued in the third, but in the fourth edition of 1700, the life is rewritten, and the objectionable paragraph omitted. The life thus altered was continued in almost all the editions, but the paragraph was reproduced in editions published in Glasgow as late as 1792. We find it in a Glasgow edition called the second, 1717, and in another of 1773.

John Newton asserts of this forgery, that "a common hedge-stake deserves as much to be compared with Aaron's rod, which yielded blossoms and almonds, as this poor performance to be obtruded upon the world as the production of Bunyan." Dr. Ryland observes, that "when the anonymous scribbler of the 'Third Part' of the Pilgrim's Progress, tried to obtrude his stuff on the world as the production of Mr. Bunyan, the cheat was soon discovered; every Christian of taste could see the difference as easily as we can discern the superior excellence of a Raphael or a Titian from the productions of a common dauber; and we can as easily distinguish Bunyan from all other writers, as we can discern the difference between the finest cambric and a piece of hop-sacking." The author of this forgery is as yet unknown.

A much more respectable attempt has since been made towards a Third Part, under the title of the "Pilgrims of the Nineteenth Century; a continuation of the Pilgrim's Progress, upon the plan projected by Mr. Bunyan, containing a history

* The same denunciation appears on the title pages of two editions of the Holy War, in the library of Mr. Lenox, printed in 1738, and 1759. Thus, "By John Bunyan, Author of the Pilgrim's Progress, 1st and 2d Parts. Note. The Third Part suggested to be his is an Impos*ter* (1738) Impostor (1759): and on the back of the woodcut frontispiece the verses beginning

'Some say the Pilgrim's Progress is not mine.'"

of a visit to the town of Toleration; with an account of its charter, and a description of the principles and customs of its inhabitants, under the similitude of a DREAM. By Joseph Ivimey, 1827." The object of this volume is to show the advantages which resulted from the Act of Toleration, by the adventures of Christian children; but it is hard to conceive what this had to do with the nineteenth century.

For many years the Pilgrim's Progress was printed on very poor paper; the wood-cuts, when worn out, were replaced by an inferior set; each Part was published separately in a cheap form. The first edition which made any pretension to elegance was published in 1728, "adorned and embellished with curious sculptures by J. Sturt." In comparison with its predecessors, this was a truly beautiful edition. The engravings were from old designs, and well executed. For many years this was considered the standard edition, and was reprinted many times. It is not known who was the editor; it was superseded by an edition with Mason's notes. This was considered good, but it abounds in errors. There is a very curious omission in this edition brought down from the eighth edition of the Second Part, where it first occurs.* In the catechizing of James by Prudence, she asks him, "How doth God the Son save thee?" The answer and the next question are left out, and it appears thus: "By his *illumination*, by his *renovation*, and by his *preservation*." The lines that are omitted are: "*James.* By his righteousness, death, and blood, and life. *Prudence.* And how doth God the Holy Ghost save thee?" Mr. Mason, in one of his notes, calls attention to the error, and seems to think that Bunyan was at fault in his theology; but in the next edition, having discovered his error, very properly inserted the missing lines, but as improperly continued his note reflecting

* We find this error in the following 12mo. editions in the possession of Mr. Lenox. In the 9th, 12th, 13th, and so on to the 28th inclusive; also in the following London 8vo. editions—22d, 23d, 28th, 30th, (two of that number, but different), and 32d. In the edition with Mason's notes, 1778, and an edition in 8vo. with notes by Bradford, 1792. It occurs also in an edition called the 17th, printed in Boston in 1744. It is corrected in the 31st ed. 12mo. London, 1770—8vo. edition, London, 1763, called the 54th; and Edinburgh 12mo. called the 56 ed. 1777; London 58 ed. 12mo. 1782; Cook's edition, London, 1792; T. Wilkins, Boston, 1806, 8vo.

upon Bunyan; and it was continued in every successive edition in which the text was printed correctly.

There is another extraordinary error which is found in many editions, and among others those of Southey and the London Art Union. It is in the conversation between Christian and Hopeful about the robbery of Little Faith. Bunyan refers to four characters in Scripture, who were notable champions, but who were very roughly handled by Faint-heart, Mistrust, and Guilt. "They made David (Psal. xxxviii.) groan, mourn, and roar. Heman and Hezekiah too, though champions in their day, had their coats soundly brushed by them. *Peter* would go try what he could do—they made him at last afraid of a sorry girl." Some editor, not acquainted with Heman (Psal. lxxxviii), and not troubling himself to find who he was, changed the name to one much more common and familiar, and called him Haman. More recent editions, including Southey and the Art Union, conceiving that Haman, however exalted he was as a sinner, was not one of the Lord's champions in his day, changed his name to that of Mordecai!

So great was the popularity of the Pilgrim's Progress, that it led some to attempt its improvement by turning it into verse. The first attempt of this kind was by Francis Hoffman, printed by R. Tookey, 1706. There were two issues of Hoffman's version, both in the possession of Mr. Lenox; they differ only in the title-page; the one has, the other has not, the name of the versifier. Both have a portrait and four cuts. We give a specimen from page 60: Apollyon says—

> "'Tis with professors now in fashion grown
> T' espouse his cause awhile to serve their own;
> Come, with me go occasionally back
> Rather than a preferment lose or lack."

Many attempts were made afterwards to versify the Pilgrim's Progress; the most respectable of which was by J. S. Dodd, M. D., Dublin, 1795: it is in blank verse, with good engravings. George Burder, the author of "Village Sermons," published, in 1804, "Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, Part First, versified," which passed through several large editions, and was much used in Sunday-schools. A very handsome edition of this, with the Second Part, has lately been published in Eng-

land, by the author of "Scripture Truth in Verse." T. Dibdin also published "Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress metrically condensed, in six cantos." This embraces only the First Part. The author claims to have kept the simplicity of the original, and a rigid observance of every doctrine enforcing the certainty of the one only road to safety and salvation. Dr. Adam Clarke considered that our Pilgrim might be more read by a certain class, if published as an epic poem. He observes: "The whole body of the dialogue and description might be preserved perfect and entire; and the task would not be difficult, as the work has the complete form of an epic poem, the versification alone excepted. But a poet, and a poet only, can do this work; and such a poet, too, as is experimentally acquainted with the work of God in his own soul. I subscribe to the opinion of Mr. Addison, that, had J. Bunyan lived in the time of the primitive fathers, he would have been as great a father as any of them."

A lady who uses the initials C. C. V. G., has recently made the attempt, and she does not appear to be aware that Dr. Dodd has gone over the same ground. It is, says Mr. Offor, a highly respectable production, divided into six cantos, but includes only the First Part. Mr. Offor remarks, that "little interest has been excited by these endeavours to versify the Pilgrim. All the attempts to improve Bunyan are miserable failures; it is like holding up a rushlight to increase the beauty of the moon when in its full radiance. His fine old colloquial English may be modernized and spoiled, but cannot be improved. The expression used to denote how hard the last lock in Doubting Castle 'went,' may grate upon a polite ear, but it has a deep meaning, that should warn us of entering by-path meadows."

It would be a culpable omission, in mentioning editions of Bunyan's Pilgrim, if we should not speak of one by the Rev. J. M. Neale, M. A., Warden of Sackville College, "for the use of children of the English Church;" (Oxford, J. H. Parker, 1853.) This is an alteration, at once arrogant and treacherous; being a jesuitical endeavour to make the glorious old Nonconformist utter the cant, not merely of the Anglican, but of the Puseyite. It is just in harmony with later proceedings of this ridiculous

priestling, in the well known case of a perverted lady, whose burial was profaned by the pertinacious interruptions of this Neale. The preface expounds the sapient plan of mutilation and forgery; but the counterfeiter's tools are so clumsy as to result only in the ludicrous. The poor Editor finds neither Baptism nor Confirmation mentioned by Bunyan, and is of course scandalized by "the whole story of Worldly Wiseman and Legality, the adventure with Faithful, with Adam the First, and Moses; much of the conversation with Talkative, and more of that with Ignorance." Accordingly, after the Slough of Despond, Christian has a threefold dipping into a baptismal spring, furnished by Mr. Neale. He receives a roll by which "we are to understand a state of grace." Although "his original sin was at once and for ever put away by Baptism," there is yet another burden on his back when he reaches the Interpreter's House. Our grim old enemies, "Pope and Pagan," are exchanged for "Mahometan and Pagan," (pages 14, 16, 54, 60.) The trick was too barefaced, even for Tractarianism, and we believe the edition has attained condign contempt.

We learn that a Poetical Pamphlet of Minor Poems, written by Bunyan, and published by him while in prison, has lately been discovered. An edition was to have been published in the beginning of this year. Mr. Offor, who superintends its publication, says in a private note, that there can be no doubt of its genuineness. It is supposed to have been written by Bunyan for the purpose of gaining a pittance with which to support his family during his confinement. It contains an autograph of John Bunyan.

It is an interesting fact, that during the revolution in Italy, in 1849, Italian versions of the New Testament and the Pilgrim's Progress, were circulated freely in sheets throughout Italy.

We close this article by enumerating the translations of the Pilgrim's Progress in the library of Mr. Lenox, which probably comprises the most complete collection of the editions of the English Bible and of the Pilgrim's Progress, in the world. *Dutch*—Amsterdam, 1682, probably the 1st ed. Do. 1684, 4to. Do. 1687, 5th ed. Utrecht, 1699. Amsterdam, 1718.

Groningen, 1718, with annotations. Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date, probably 1851. *French*—Amsterdam, 1685, 12mo., 1st ed. Part First, Rotterdam, 1764, 12mo., 6th ed. Part First, Paris, 2 copies, 1831 and 1834, 12mo., Protestant versions. Paris, 1821, 16mo., Roman Catholic version. Part First, London Tract Society, 1850, 12mo. Part First, Paris and Lyons, no date, Roman Catholic version—very much abridged. The figures in the plates are all dressed in modern costume. Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1853, 12mo. Part First, Valence, 1845, small 12mo. Part Second, Paris, 1855, 12mo. Part First, Brussells, Paris and Geneva, 1855, 12mo. Part First, Toulouse, 1852, 12mo. *German*—London, 1766, small 8vo., with portrait, and 15 plates noticed above in the text. Part First, Hamburg, 1837, 16mo. Parts First and Second, Hamburg, 1842, 12mo. Parts First and Second, New York American Tract Society, no date, about 1850. Part First, Hamburg, 1853, 12mo. *Bengali and English*—Calcutta, Baptist Mission Press, 1835, 12mo. *Bengali*—Lodiana, American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1835, 12mo. *Orissa Language*—Part First, Calcutta, Baptist Mission Press, 1838, 12mo. *Modern Greek*—Part First, Malta, 1824, small 8vo. *Welsh*—Parts First, Second, and Third, London, 1836–7, printed in parts, 8vo. Parts First and Second, New York, no plates nor date, but American Tract Society, about 1845. Parts First, Second, and Third, Caernarvon, 1848, 32mo. *Hebrew*—Parts First and Second, London, 1851, 1852, small 8vo. *Danish*—Parts First and Second, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1851. *Spanish*—Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date, about 1851. Part First, London, no date but about 1849, 12mo. *Honolulu*—Sandwich Islands, Parts First and Second, for American Tract Society, 1842, 12mo. *Swedish*—Part First, New York, American Tract Society, no date but about 1854, 12mo. *Italian*—Part First, Firenze, 1853, 12mo., printed surreptitiously without any title page, place, or date. The verses are translated into prose. Genova, (Genoa) 1855, Parts First and Second; a second edition of Part First, the poetry rendered in verse, 12mo. Parts First and Second, New York, American Tract

Society, no date, but 1858, 12mo. These three Italian editions are the same. The translation was made at Florence, by an Italian priest, under the superintendence of the Rev. Robert Maxwell Hanna, of the Scotch Free Church. The first edition was small and is rare; the second was larger, and printed at Genoa, and has been stereotyped by the American Tract Society. Almost all the volumes enumerated have plates or wood cuts.

Art. IV.—*On the authorized Version of the New Testament in connection with some recent proposals for its revision.* By Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Dean of Westminster, Author of "Synonymes of the New Testament"—"the Study of Words"—"the English Language, Past and Present"—"the Lessons in Proverbs"—"Sermons"—"Poems"—"Calderon," etc. London: 1858. pp. 146. 8vo.

In closing our review of Mr. Sawyer's new "New Testament," we quoted him as claiming to have forestalled nearly all the new suggestions of Dean Trench, and undertook to show, at some convenient season, the extraordinary difference between their methods of improving on the common version. Who and what Trench is, and how entitled to be heard as an authority in this case, if it were not known already to the great mass of our readers, might be gathered from the title of the book before us. His position at the head of the chapter of Westminster Abbey implies not only the esteem in which he was held by the appointing power, but a reputation previously acquired and established in the Church of England, and still further back, a finished academical training in one of the great universities. The fruits of this training, and the causes of this reputation, are unambiguously indicated by the subjects of his previous works, including those upon the Parables and Miracles, though not here specified, except by an etcetera. The very titles of these publications will sufficiently define the field of his successful labours, as including scriptural interpretation, general religious teaching,

poetry, the history and structure of the English language, and the nice distinctions of New Testament Greek usage. It would certainly be difficult to trace a course of study and of authorship more perfectly adapted to prepare a man for aiding, both by counsel and by act, in the responsible and delicate attempt to solve the problem now so generally interesting, as to the proper mode of dealing with our venerable English version. What is here required is not a high degree of any one qualification, but a rare concurrence or coincidence of many, corresponding to the multiform and complex difficulties of the question to be settled. No amount of Greek or Hebrew learning, or of mere sense, whether common or uncommon, or of personal religion and the best intentions, can supply the place, in this emergency, of that refinement and almost instinctive sensibility of taste, which is the joint product of a happy mental constitution and the rarest opportunities of culture, not scholastic merely, but professional and social. There are no doubt men who think themselves sufficient for the work in question, without any such diversified and complex preparation; but its usefulness, if not its absolute necessity, will be conceded by all who have themselves enjoyed the humblest measure of such varied culture. A strong proof, because a natural effect, of its possession in the case of Dr. Trench, is his remarkable modesty, and freedom from all arrogance, even in discussing matters, as to which he would require no apology for speaking with authority. Another mark of many-sided culture, as distinguished from pedantic, pedagogical excess in one direction and proportionate deficiency in others, is the absence of all overweening fondness for the antique, which is no less evident, though more surprising, because rarer in the class of scholars represented by him, than the absence of that swaggering contempt for what is old, and that exclusive deference for what is just now in fashion or in bloom, which savours more of ignorance than even of partial or distorted cultivation. Closely connected with this general attribute of Dr. Trench's mind and writings is a special moderation and exemption from extreme views in relation to the English Bible. While he treats its very errors with a filial reverence and tenderness, in striking contrast with the slashing and dogmatical depreciation of its very excellencies elsewhere, he is so far

from denying the necessity and lawfulness of doing something to improve the common version, that the volume now before us is expressly meant to show, or rather to inquire, how it may be most efficiently and safely done.

The tone of the Preface must conciliate every cultivated reader by its mingled modesty and candour, as well as by its curious felicity of phrase, as when it speaks of some things as already escaping the confusion of manuscript and assuming the painful clearness of print, an expression which must come home to the business and bosom of every one who ever read a proof-sheet. We think, however, that most readers will dissent from Dr. Trench's condemnation of his own arrangement, even as compared with that of Dr. Scholefield's "Hints for an Improved Translation of the New Testament," and feel that what he had to say could scarcely have been better put together.

The first chapter is preliminary and intended to guard against the errors which too frequently accompany and mar all propositions to improve the common version. Such are, on the one hand, too exclusive a regard for settled habits and associations, as the ultimate criterion or test, which must of course condemn all innovation, whether good or bad, gratuitous or necessary; and, on the other hand, a coarse indifference to all the claims of long prescription and antique peculiarity; both which extremes the author, with a creditable though unnecessary caution, most explicitly repudiates.

The subject of the second chapter is "the English of our version," which is characterized under the two-fold aspect of lexicography and grammar. In reference to the first of these, the author praises the *delectus verborum*, the equal freedom from vulgarity and pedantry, undue familiarity and strangeness, and the happy mixture of Latin and Anglo-Saxon vocables. When he speaks of the Rhemish translators as having "put off their loyalty to the English language with their loyalty to the English crown," because they use such forms as "odible," "impudicity," "longanimity," "coinquinations," "commessations," "contristate," "agnition," "suasible," "domesticals," "repropritiate," or prefer such as "incredulity," "precursor," "dominator," "cogitation," and "fraternity," to "unbelief," "forerunner," "lord," "thought," and "brotherhood," he did

not know that this proceeding is now sanctioned, and more fully carried out, by "the greatest work of this" or any other age! The opposite extreme he exemplifies by quoting, from Sir John Cheke's version of Matthew, such Anglo-Saxonisms as "hundreder" (centurion,) "gainbirth" (regeneration,) and "freshman" (proselyte.)

Another merit of the English Bible recognized by Dr. Trench, is its careful retention of the most felicitous expressions found in older versions, and especially in Tyndale's, for example, "turned to flight the armies of the aliens," "author and finisher of our faith," while they introduced others of their own, such as "the prince of life," "the captain of our salvation," the "sin that doth so easily beset us," all which he regards as having now become, on account of their beauty and fitness, "household words," and fixed utterances of the religious life of the English people, but all which he will no doubt grieve to find materially changed in the American New Testament. We may add that we should have been glad to see connected with the author's just praise of the common version, as to this point, a distinct admission of the fact that it has copied Tyndale when it ought to have amended him sometimes.

Dr. Trench defends the common version from some charges of inaccuracy in the use of words, by showing that the usage of the language has since changed; for instance, that to "take thought" means to be solicitous or anxious, not only in Matt. vi. 25, but in Bacon and Shakspeare; that to "cumber" means to vex, annoy, and injure, not only in Luke xiii. 7, but in Shakspeare and Spenser; that "devotions" is a concrete term, not only in Acts xvii. 23, but in Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia; that "church" is applied to heathen temples, not only in Acts xix. 37, but in Holland's Pliny, and to that of Jerusalem in Sir John Cheke's version of Matt. xxvii. 51; that in old English, "carriages" means "baggage;" "endeavour" the most earnest energetic effort; "nephews" lineal descendants, as he proves from Hooker and from Holland, who expressly says, "their nephews, to wit, the children of their sons and daughters." This last fact had escaped even so accurate a scholar as the late Professor Blunt, who, in his "Church of the First Three Centuries," says (with reference to 1 Tim. v. 4,) "not children

only, but even nephews, were expected to support their aged relations."

In favour of revision, at least so far as to exclude words which have wholly changed their meaning, Dr. Trench shows that the authors of our version did the same, as when they substituted "separate" for "depart" (Rom. viii. 39,) though the same word was not changed to "do part" in the marriage service ("till death us depart") before the year 1661. On the same principle they substituted "robbery" for "bribery" (Matt. xxiii. 25,) and "hurtful" for "noisome" (1 Tim. vi. 9,) which were formerly synonymous; and Trench complains that the latter substitution was not carried out in other places, on the ground that "noisome" now suggests the idea of something offensive or disgusting, which may possibly arise from some confusion of a similar word ("nauseous") with the true synonyme ("noxious.") He notes the same inconsistency or incompleteness in the retention of the equivocal phrase "by-and-by," in four places, while they have exchanged it in all others for the unambiguous "immediately" or "straightway." Other examples of the same thing are "Easter," retained in one place (Acts xii. 4,) "grudging," in the old sense of murmuring, complaining (1 Peter iv. 9,) and "Jewry" for "Judea" in two cases (Luke xxiii. 5, John vii. 1.)

Dr. Trench's rule in reference to old words is, that only such should be expunged as now convey a false idea to the vast majority of readers, or none at all. Such are "taches," "ouches," "bolted," "ear" (in the sense of plough, *arare*,) "daysman" (in that of mediator.) Such words are described by our author as dark even to scholars, where their scholarship is rather in Latin and Greek than in early English; but he adds that they are almost entirely confined to the Old Testament. Their omission, in case of actual revision, would probably be regretted only by those to whom *omne ignotum pro magnifico est*, or those whose love of mystery takes pleasure even in the unintelligible, like one of Edward Irving's prophets whom we heard interrupting his majestic reading of the thirty-ninth of Exodus, by crying out, "O, ye people, ye people, ye people of the Lord! Ye have not the ouches, ye have not the ouches! Ye must have them, ye must have them!" With this kind of

archaism it is clear that Dean Trench feels no sympathy whatever, and that if the way were opened for a cautious and temperate revision, such as he afterwards proposes, he would not be much impeded by the cry from any quarter that we "must have the ouches."

On the other hand, our author utterly repudiates the favourite rule and practice of revisionists and versionists, according to which a word must be expunged if not now in common use, though perfectly intelligible to the plainest reader, and maintains that this antique phraseology is not an evil but a good, "shedding round the sacred volume the reverence of age; removing it from the ignoble associations which will often cleave to the language of the day" . . . . "just as there is a sense of fitness which dictates that the architecture of a church should be different from that of a house," (p. 36.) For our own part, we can scarcely believe that those who take the other course have ever asked themselves distinctly upon what ground old words, still universally intelligible, are to be rejected. To condemn them for the simple reason that they are old, is as cruel and uncivilized, in point of taste, as the practice of those savages, who put their aged relatives to death, is in social life and morals. It is no new thing, however, as we learn from Dean Trench, that Symonds thought "clean escaped," (2 Pet. ii. 18,) a very low expression; that Wemyss expunged as obsolete such words as "straightway," "haply," "twain," "athirst," "wax," "lack," "ensample," "jeopardy," "garner," "passion;" and that Purver (in 1764) denounced as "clownish, barbarous, base, hard, technical, misapplied, or new coined," many hundreds of words, among which are "beguile," "boisterous," "lineage," "perseverance," "potentate," "remit," "seducers," "shorn," "swerved," "vigilant," "unloose," "unction," "vocation."

Besides the reverence due to still intelligible archaisms, and the endless diversity of taste and judgment among those who would reform them, the least refined being commonly the most fastidious, our author deprecates the modernizing process on another ground, to wit, "that our translation would be no longer of a piece, not any more one web and woof, but in part English of the seventeenth century, and in part English of the

nineteenth." We hardly know indeed the value of this homogeneousness, until we see it marred by such darning and patching as distinguish almost every modern "improved version." The examples which the author cites (such as "impending vengeance" for "wrath to come," "unchaste and immodest gratifications" for "chambering and wantonness," Campbell's Scotch paraphrase of Mark vi. 19, 20, and even the American Baptist monstrosity, "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bend, of heavenlies and of earthlies and of infernals,") are almost tame and timid in comparison with some which have been since propounded.

The "grammar" of the English Bible our author thinks less perfect than its "dictionary," but defends it against some objections, such as the use of "his" and "her" for things as well as persons, arising from the fact that the possessive "its" was not in use at that time, in connection with which he brings to light the curious circumstance, that in the early editions of the authorized version, and in the Geneva Bible, Lev. xxv. 5, reads "of it own accord," a transition to the present usage also found in other books at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He likewise vindicates the syntax of Rev. xviii. 17 (riches is) on the ground that *riches* is a singular, formed from the French *richesse*, the *s* being radical and not a plural termination, any more than in *alms* and *eaves*, though now becoming plural through forgetfulness or ignorance of their origin.* In Wiclif's English the plural of *riches* is *richessis*, and in perfect agreement with our Bible, Shakspeare writes, "the riches of the ship is come ashore." The author objects likewise to the use of the subjunctive *were* instead of *was*, when no contingency is meant to be implied; but this confusion of the moods is almost as universal in the English writers of the present day as the reverse, or the exclusive use of the indicative, is among ourselves. Another inaccuracy, very common in our version, is the arbitrary and unmeaning junction of both moods in one construction (John ix. 31, If any man *be* a worshipper of God and *doeth* his will).

* Is there not an analogy to this in *suburbs*, which is not only treated as a plural, but provided with a corresponding singular form, *suburb*, in the latest usage?

The next of the Dean's criticisms, although just as against the common version, betrays, by a gratuitous addition, what might well have been suspected, that his scholarship, though varied and extensive, is not boundless. After correctly stating that *cherubim* being already plural, it is excess of expression to add another, an English plural, as our translators have done once in the New Testament (Heb. ix. 5) and constantly in the Old by writing *cherubims;* he unfortunately adds that "*Cherubins* of glory, as it is in the Geneva and Rheims versions, is intelligible and quite unobjectionable," because, "*the Hebrew singular* is there dealt with as a naturalized English word, forming an English plural." *Non omnia possumus omnes;* but any American "churchman" or "dissenter," though without a tithe of the learned Dean's advantages, would be severely handled for forgetting that *Cherubin* is not the "Hebrew singular," but the Chaldee plural of the same word (*Cherub.*) He might as well have represented the provincial plural, *housen*, used in some parts of America and England, as the singular of *houses*.

Another point, in which we think our author less felicitous than usual, is his lamentation over the frequent use of adjectives in "ly" as adverbs, ("behave itself *unseemly*," "soberly, righteously, and *godly*,") which appears to us to be only one example of a very common phenomenon in language, the contraction of two like forms into one, or the use of one for two distinct purposes, as in the English genitive or possessive plural, where the final *s* denotes both case and number, the apostrophe now added being a mere orthographical expedient to point out the omission of a letter. The Dean's analogical argument, which substitutes "improper" for "unseemly," is entirely fallacious, as there is in that case no adverbial form at all, whereas in the other it coincides with the termination of the adjective itself, the one being just as readily suggested as the other. That is to say, "godly" and "unseemly" are both adjectives and adverbs, both in sense and form; and though a morbid love of uniformity is tending to proscribe all adverbs except such as end in "ly," we cannot think that Dr. Trench would tolerate such phrases as to "smell sweetly," or to "look beautifully," which, besides their finical preciseness, really

convey a different idea from the one intended. But if "sweet" and "beautiful" may be employed as adverbs, without any distinctive termination, how much more may "godly" and "unseemly," which may be regarded as euphonic contractions of the uncouth full forms, "godlily," "unseemlily," of which an unabbreviated instance ("holily") is found in 1 Thess. ii. 10.

We concur in both parts of our author's last suggestion as to the grammar of the common version, namely, that the old English preterites, "spake," "brake," &c., ought to stand, as being perfectly well understood, and all the better for their antique form; but that "which" should be replaced by "who," when persons are referred to, and "his" or "her" by "its," when the reference is to things, not persons. We venture to add, as a grammatical suggestion, that such anomalous and unmeaning combinations as *but and*, and such gratuitous expletives as *the which*, should be carefully expunged, if not in the printing, in the reading of the Scriptures, as alike foreign from the form of the original and English usage, and yet necessarily suggestive of a false emphasis or spurious distinction, as appears from the extreme care with which some readers dwell upon these slight interpolations, and repeat them themselves, in order to supply them when they have been inadvertently omitted.

The third chapter presents, in a very interesting and instructive manner, some of the difficulties with which all translators of the Bible must contend, and over which our own have not invariably triumphed. After pointing out, with great solemnity and force, the fearful risks of mistranslation into new tongues, and the opposite embarrassments arising from deficiency and multiplicity of terms, the author shows how much the whole development of Latin theology has been affected by the use of the neuter *verbum* to translate the masculine *λόγος*, and of *pœnitentia* to represent *μετάνοια*, though he thinks both words, upon the whole, to have been properly preferred to *sermo* and *resipiscentia*. Another interesting statement has respect to the four modes of rendering technical expressions, such as measures and official titles, all of which have been promiscuously used in our translation, sometimes substituting English

equivalents (as in "Mars' Hill," "pavement;") sometimes putting the genus for the species (as in "measure," "piece of silver," "piece of money," "deputy," "magistrate," "wise men;") sometimes using a specific kindred term, approximating to the strict sense of the Greek one (as in "farthing," "penny," "firkin," "easter," town-clerk," to which Trench adds, "Mercurius" and "Diana," as mere Roman substitutes for "Hermes" and "Artemis;") sometimes retaining the original expression, with or without a slight modification (as in "paradise," "Messias," "tetrarch," "proselyte," "pentecost.") He shows the disadvantages attending all these methods and the impossibility of using any one exclusively. He supposes our translators to have commonly preferred the second, even where one of the others appears manifestly preferable, as when they translate *ἀνθύπατος* by "deputy," whereas "proconsul" was the proper Latin term, already introduced by Wiclif. We shall not repeat our author's just remarks upon the ill effects which have arisen from the various forms of the same proper names in the English version of the Old and New Testament, as this is now very commonly admitted, and some of the latest versions actually make them uniform. Nor need we dwell upon the less important want of uniformity in Greek and Latin terminations ("Sylvanus" and "Mercurius," but not "Paulus" or "Urbanus," while in other names both forms occur, as "Mark" and "Marcus," "Timothy" and "Timotheus," to which may be added "Jona" and "Jonas," "Cretes" and "Cretians.") Still slighter inconsistencies are those exemplified by "Ephesus," "Miletus," as compared with "Assos," Pergamos," or "beryl" and "jacinth," as compared with "sardius" and "chrysoprasus." In reference to one word of this last class ("chrysolite,") our author makes too sweeping an assertion when he says, that it is "mis-spelt 'chrysolyte,' and the etymology obscured, in all our modern editions;" whereas two of Bagster's, which we happen to have near us, give the true form, to say nothing of American impressions, with which of course we cannot expect the Dean of Westminster to be familiar. Another slight inaccuracy is the statement, that in Acts xxviii. 15, the sacred historian has merely written the name *Tres Tabernæ* in Greek letters, and not turned into

equivalent Greek words, whereas both in this name and in *Appii Forum*, he gives all four words a Greek termination.

The last grammatical point noted by the author, is the frequent resolution of a genitive into an adjective construction, (as "forgetful hearer" for "hearer of forgetfulness," "natural face" for "face of nature," "unjust steward" for "steward of injustice,") which he thinks is often well done, but at other times without necessity, and occasionally with manifest loss, (as in "beloved son" for "son of his love," "our vile body" for "the body of our vileness," "his glorious body" for "the body of his glory," "glorious liberty" for "liberty of glory," "uncertain riches" for "uncertainty of riches.") Upon this we have only to remark, that in some such cases the accompanying pronoun qualifies the whole phrase, so that "body of his glory" would be more exactly rendered "his body of glory," which is really the same thing with "his glorious body."

The fourth chapter treats of "some unnecessary distinctions introduced" into the common version, and opens with a cautionary notice, that its authors were really revisers rather than translators, being required not to make something altogether new, nor even to bring good out of evil, but to frame a better or a best translation out of several previous good ones; an advantage not without its accompanying drawbacks, and especially the danger of retaining inadvertently the errors of preceding versions, for which they thus become themselves responsible. This, though true in general, is particularly applicable to the false distinctions now in question, which arise in part, however, from the deficiencies of language itself, or rather from the want of perfect correspondence and exact equivalents in any two dialects whatever. There is no more prevalent mistake, among those who are conversant with one tongue only, than the notion that "words in one language cover exactly the same spaces of meaning which other words do in another; that they have exactly the same many-sidedness, the same elasticity, the same power of being applied, it may be, now in a good sense, now in a bad;" whereas "words are enclosures from the great outfield of meaning; but different languages have enclosed on different schemes, and words which are precisely co-extensive are much rarer than we incuriously assume."

As illustrations of this general statement Trench refers to *ἄγγελος*, *μάγος*, *παράκλητος*, *κύριε*, as having no exact equivalents in English, and correctly rendered therefore by different words in different connections ("angel" and "messenger," "wise man" and "sorcerer," "comforter" and "advocate," "lord" and "sir.") At the same time he regards the variations in our version as too numerous, and frequently gratuitous, and that not merely from neglect or inadvertence, but in application of a mistaken principle, or false taste on the part of the translators, as expressed in the preface to King James' Bible, namely, that the version should be varied, even where the sense remains the same, to please fastidious readers, and employ a greater number of good English words. This deprives the English reader of the help to be derived from a comparison of all the places where a word occurs, as there is nothing to suggest, for instance, that "atonement," (Rom. v. 11,) "reconciling," (Rom. xi. 15,) and "reconciliation," (2 Cor. v. 18,) all represent the same Greek word (*καταλλαγή*.) A still more striking instance is, that one Greek verb (*λογίζομαι*) occurs eleven times in a single chapter (Rom. iv,) and is twice rendered "count,' three times "reckon," and six times "impute," while in Gal. iii. 6, it is "account." Of less doctrinal importance, though injurious to the point and beauty of the passage, is the use of wholly different expressions to represent similar or kindred forms, as "seats" and "thrones," in Rev. ii. 13, iv. 4, xvi. 10, "preach" and "setter forth," in Acts xvii. 18, 23, (where the Vulgate has "annuntio" "annuntiator," and the Rhemish version "preach" and "preacher;") "unknown" and "ignorantly," Acts xvii. 18; "defile" and "destroy," 1 Cor. iii. 17; "wicked" and "miserably" (*κακοὺς κακῶς*) Matt. xxi. 41; "concluded" and "shut up," Gal. iii. 22, (where the Vulgate has "conclusit" and "conclusi;") "lust" and "covet," Rom. vii. 7; "work" and "do," Phil. ii. 13; "withhold" and "let," 2 Thess. ii. 6; "want" and "lack," James i. 4, 5; "comfort" and "consolation," Rom. xv. 4, 5; "witness" and "testimony," John iii. 11, 32; "hurt and damage," and "harm and loss," Acts xxvii. 10, 21; "householder" and "goodman of the house," Matt. xx. 1, 11; "governor" and "ruler," John ii. 8, 9; "goodly apparel" and "gay clothing," James ii. 2, 3.

The same objection lies against the use of different words to represent the same Greek ones in parallel passages, a case of frequent occurrence in the gospels, which are thus made to appear less alike in English than they are in the original. (For example, compare Matt. xxvi. 41 with Mark xiv. 38, and the threefold form in which Gen. xv. 6 is quoted in Rom. iv. 3; Gal. iii. 6; James ii. 23, to which our author adds, that the same familiar phrase from the Old Testament is once translated "a sweet-smelling savour," and once "an odour of a sweet smell.") In the same way similarities of language in writings of the same date are obliterated to the English reader, such as "working" (Eph. i. 19,) and "operation," (Col. ii. 2;) "lowliness" (Eph. iv. 2,) and "humbleness of mind," (Col. iii. 12;) "compacted" (Eph. iv. 16,) and "knit together," (Col. ii. 19;) with much more of the same kind, brought out by the late Professor Blunt, (in his "Duties of the Parish Priest,") as one chief reason why the clergy ought to study the original Scriptures. This chapter closes with a select list of instances in which this kind of variation, although often unavoidable, is carried to a needless excess. Of these the most remarkable is that of the verb *καταργέω*, which occurs but twenty-seven times in the New Testament, and is represented by no less than seventeen distinct English words and phrases.

The fifth chapter points out and illustrates the opposite error of employing one word to translate several not entirely synonymous. This arises partly from the absence of equivalents in English, which has only one word for man, life, temple, true, love, and new, every one of which in Greek has two or more equivalents. The most inconvenient instance of the kind, our author thinks, is the employment of the word "hell," both for *hades* and *geenna*, a confusion only to be remedied by limiting that version to the latter, and naturalizing the former as an English word. But besides these unavoidable deficiencies, arising from the poverty of language, there are others of the same kind which might easily have been avoided, such as the use of "beast" in the apocalypse, to represent both *θήριον* and *ζῶον*, an error which the Vulgate has escaped, but which is found in all the English versions, notwithstanding the analogy afforded by the use of "living creature" in the first chapter of

Ezekiel. Other cases of the same sort are the uniform use of "wise," "forgiveness," "basket," where the Greek term varies. In this last case, Dr. Trench commends the Vulgate for employing distinct terms (*cophinus* and *sporta*,) which is very different from Mr. Sawyer's method of avoiding the same error.* Again, our translators, for the most part, obliterate the distinction between παῖς and υἱὸς θεοῦ, by rendering both "son," and thus obscuring the allusion to the "servant of God," so often mentioned in the prophecies. Without dissenting from the justice of this criticism, we think it right to add, that Trench himself has not sufficiently brought out the important fact that παῖς, in the New Testament, is really a middle term between "son" and "servant," the prominent idea being now the one and now the other, but the word in every case suggesting the complex idea of a filial service, or (if we may so say) a servile sonship.

As concluding examples of the error now in question, he notes the fact, that "thought" is used to render six Greek nouns, and "think" twelve Greek verbs, while an equal number is translated by the verb "to trouble," though the language furnishes a number of equivalents, such as "vex," "disturb," "distress," "afflict," harass," &c.

The sixth chapter brings together the few instances, in which our author thinks an older version has been changed for the worse or banished to the margin; such as Matt. xxviii. 14, where the Geneva Bible had correctly rendered, "if this come before the governor;"† Mark xi., 17, where Tyndale rightly reads not "of" but "unto all nations;" Eph. iv. 18, where the marginal version ("hardness of their heart") is that of the Geneva Bible; 1 Thess. v. 22, where the same version more correctly reads, "from every kind of evil;" Heb. xi. 13, where "received" is less expressive than Wiclif's "greeted" and Tyndale's "saluted;" 1 Pet. i. 17, where the Geneva version is, "ye call him Father."

Over against these retrocessions, as he thinks them, from the best translation, Dr. Trench arrays examples of the much more frequent movement in an opposite direction, or of manifest improvement on the older versions; as in Heb. iv. 1, where they all have "forsaking the promise" instead of "a promise

* Vide supra, p. 66. † Vide supra, p. 68.

being left us;" and in Acts xii. 19, where they read "commanded to depart," instead of "put to death," which is itself too strong, however, being not so much a version as a gloss, though a correct one, the exact translation being that expressed by Trench himself in praising the common version, namely, "he commanded them to be led away" (i. e. to execution.) A more important and more manifest improvement is the use of "Him" in John i. 3, 4, where the older English versions have the impersonal or neuter "it." Sometimes the expression is improved although the sense remains the same; as in the substitution of "earnest expectation" for "fervent desire" (Rom. viii. 19;) or that of "tattlers" for "triflers" (1 Tim. v. 13;) or that of "whited" for "painted" (Matt. xxiii. 27;) or that of "distraction" for "separation" (1 Cor. vii. 35;) or "Crete" for "Candy" (Acts xxvii. 7;) or "profane" for "unclean" (Heb. xii. 16.)

As instances of better renderings placed in the margin, which our author looks upon as very much the same thing as omitting them, he cites John iii. 3, "born again" (marg. "from above;") Matt. v. 21, "said by them" (marg. "to them;") Matt. x. 16, "harmless as doves," (marg. "simple;") Mark vi. 20, "observed him" (marg. "kept or saved him;") Mark vii. 4, "tables" (marg. "beds;") Luke xvii. 21, "within you" (marg. "among you;") Col. ii. 18, "beguile you" (marg. "judge against you;") 1 Thess. iv. 6, "in any matter" (marg. "in the matter;") Heb. v. 2, "have compassion on" (marg. "reasonably bear with;") 2 Pet. iii. 12, "hasting unto the coming" (marg. "hasting the coming;") 1 Tim. vi. 5, "gain is godliness" (Coverdale, "godliness is lucre," i. e. a means of gain;) Heb. ix. 23, "patterns" (Tyndale, "similitudes;" Trench, "copies.")

The seventh chapter treats of the Greek grammar of our version, as its English grammar had been previously handled. The first deficiency here indicated and exemplified, is the omission and insertion of the article without necessity, and sometimes so as to obscure the sense, or at least enfeeble the expression; as in Rev. xvii. 14, where the strict translation is "THE great tribulation," with distinct allusion to the prophecies of Daniel (xii. 1,) and of Christ himself, (Matt. xxiv. 22. 29;)

Heb. xi. 10, "THE city which hath foundations;" John iii. 10, "THE teacher of Israel;" Rom. v. 15. 17, "THE one . . . THE many." These are given as examples of unauthorized omission, while the converse error of gratuitous insertion is exemplified in Rom. ii. 14, where the form of the original is simply "gentiles," not "the gentiles;" 1 Tim. vi. 10, "a root," not "the root;" Acts xxvi. 2, "Jews," not "the Jews;" Phil. iii. 5, "a Hebrew of Hebrews," not "of the Hebrews."

Another violation of Greek grammar, not infrequent in the common version, is the loose and inexact translation of the prepositions, as in John iv. 6, "on the well" for "by (or at) the well," as the same Greek word is rendered elsewhere, (e. g. Mark xiii. 29, John v. 2;) Heb. vi. 7, "by whom," where the margin renders more correctly "for whom;" Luke xxiii. 42, "into thy kingdom," more correctly, "in thy kingdom;" as in Matt. xiv. 28; Gal. i. 6, "into the grace" for "in the grace;" 2 Cor. xi. 3, "in Christ" for "to (or toward) Christ;" 2 Pet. i. 5. 7, "to your faith . . . . to knowledge, &c.," for "in your faith . . . . in knowledge, &c.," as in the older versions.

A third offence against the canons of Greek Grammar is the habit of confounding verbal tenses, or neglecting the precise shade of meaning indicated by the present, perfect, aorist, &c., as in Luke xviii. 12, where "I possess," is the meaning of the perfect, and the present should be rendered "I acquire (or gain;" Luke xxi. 19, where "possess ye your souls" should be "acquire them," i. e. get the mastery of them; Luke xiv. 7, where "chose" does not convey the full force of the imperfect, "they were choosing;" Acts iii. 1, "went up" for "were going up;" Luke i. 59, "called" for "were calling, (or about to call;)" Luke v. 6, "brake," more exactly or at least more expressively, "was breaking." (Trench, "was in the act of breaking," or "was at the point to break;) Luke i. 19, "I am sent," which Trench amends, "I was sent," but which seems to us to require the proper perfect form in English, "I have been sent;" Mark xvi. 2, "at the rising of the sun;" Trench, "when the sun was risen," but retaining the original construction, "the sun rising," or "the sun having risen;" as in Luke

xiii. 2, and Col. i. 16, where Trench himself would read "have suffered," and "have been created."

Another grammatical inaccuracy, which he points out, is the needless substitution of pluperfects for the simple preterite, as in John v. 16, "had done" for "did;" ib. v. 13, "had conveyed (for conveyed) himself away." So too the voices are sometimes confounded, as in Phil. ii. 15, where all the English versions follow the Vulgate in giving to the middle voice (appear) the sense of the active (shine,) although the distinction is uniformly made in Greek, (compare John i. 5; 2 Pet. i. 19; Rev. i. 16, with Matt. xxiii. 27; 1 Pet. iv. 18; James v. 14,) and although it was made even here by the old Italic version, as quoted by Augustine. The converse error is exemplified in 2 Cor. v. 10, where "appear" is a passive form in Greek, and means "must be made manifest," a distinction clearly pointed out by Chrysostom, whose exposition is supposed to have exerted no small influence on our translation. To these examples we add Acts ii. 40, where the passive (be saved) is needlessly, if not erroneously, translated as the middle (save yourselves.) The phrase "all manner," where the Greek has simply "all," (Acts x. 12,) is not so much a mistranslation, as a gloss, intended to preclude too strict an explanation, and suggest what was supposed to be the *writer's* meaning; a departure from their proper work which few translators have entirely avoided. Of more importance, because very frequent in occurrence, and by no means without positive effect upon the point, if not the sense, of many passages, is the habitual confounding of the two verbs of existence (εἰμί and γίνομαι,) one of which corresponds to *be*, and the other to *become*, (or to begin to be.) Hundreds of cases, still more striking, might be added to the two which Trench adduces, viz. Heb. v. 11, where "ye are" should rather be "ye have become;" and Matt. xxiv. 32, where it is not the *being* tender, but the *becoming* tender, of the fig-tree, that announces the approach of summer. It might have been added, that the sense is here reversed, not merely by confounding the two verbs, but by arbitrarily substituting "yet" for "already."

The last grammatical inaccuracy noticed by our author, is

the failure to express in English the precise force of the Greek interrogation with a negative, a point in which the idioms of the two languages are altogether different, so that "is not this the Christ?" (John iv. 29,) although in form an exact copy of the Greek, corresponds in meaning to our phrase, "is this the Christ?" as our translators have expressed it in Matt. xii. 23, though all the editions, since the middle of the seventeenth century, appear to have introduced the "not," either carelessly or as a supposed correction.

The eighth chapter under the title of "questionable renderings of words," suggests some new and some familiar changes of unequal plausibility; such as that of "stature" to "age" (Matt. vi. 27,) for which the usual arguments are stated; that of "about my father's business" to "in my father's house" (Luke ii. 49,) which is now the favourite interpretation; that of "bare" to "bare away" or "carried off" (John xii. 6,) which, it seems, is as old as Augustine (*ministerio portabat, furto exportabat;* that of "men" and "women" to "males" and "females" (Rom. i. 26, 27;) that of "causeth us to triumph" (2 Cor. ii. 14,) to "triumphs over us," as rendered by Jerome (*triumphat de nobis;*) that of "spoil you" (Col. ii. 8) to "make spoil (or prey) of you," as proposed by Bengel (*non solum de vobis sed vos ipsos spolium faciat;*) that of "show" (Col. ii. 23) to "reputation," which is rather modernizing than improving; that of "raiment" (1 Tim. vi. 8) to the more generic "covering," as in the Vulgate (*quibus tegamur;*) that of "matter" (James iii. 5) to the marginal translation, "wood" or Trench's "forest," as in better keeping with "the spirit and temper of this grand imaginitive passage," and recommended by the use of the same image both in Homer and Pindar. All these are modestly suggested, not as positive improvements, but as possible amendments, as to which there may be wide diversity of judgment. We should be most disposed to question two which we have not yet quoted, namely, 2 Cor. ii. 17, where Bentley's version ("corrupters of the word of God for filthy lucre") is not a mere translation but a gloss; and Rev. iii. 2, where the proposition to translate *τὰ λοιπά* as if it were *τοὺς λοιπούς*, though it may convey substantially the true sense, is as much a departure

from the form of the original as that which Trench himself condemns in the authorized version of Acts x. 12.*

The ninth chapter follows up these "questionable renderings" with a more positive specification of "words wholly or partially mistranslated;" such as "nests" (Matt. viii. 20) for "shelters" or "habitations;" "Canaanite" (Matt. x. 4) for "zealot" (Luke vi. 15;) "before instructed" (Matt. xiv. 8) for "urged on," or, as we should think still better, "prompted" (or "instigated,") without any implication of resistance; "on foot" (Matt. xiv. 13) for "by land," where the strict sense seems to us sufficiently inclusive or suggestive of the other; "a place where two ways met" (Mark xi. 4) for "a way round" (a crooked lane;) "men of like passions" (Acts xiv. 13) for "men who suffer like things;" "too superstitious" (Acts xvii. 22) for "very religious;" "able" (Acts xxv. 5) for "in authority;" "commit sacrilege" (Rom. ii. 22) for "rob temples:" "slumber" (Rom. xi. 8) for "torpor" or "stupor;" to "see Peter" (Gal. i. 18) for "to acquaint myself with Peter;" "seditions (Gal. v. 20) for "dissensions;" "first-born of every creature" (Col. i. 15) for "born (or begotten) before the whole creation;" "drowned" (Heb. xi. 29) for "engulfed" (or swallowed up;) "trees whose fruit withereth" (Jude 12) for "autumnal trees;" "use of edifying" (Eph. iv. 29) for "edifying of need" (or necessary edification.) In some other cases cited in this chapter, the proposed improvement seems to us to be not so much a corrected version as an exegetical addition, e. g. "think himself religious" for "seem to be religious" (James i. 26,) where the latter is the true translation, though the former may be a correct gloss. So too in Mark xii. 26, "in the bush" is the nearest approach that could be made to an exact translation, and the question whether it describes the place of the transaction or the place where it has been recorded is entirely exegetical, as Trench himself admits by saying, "how, indeed, to tell this story in the English version is not easy to determine, without forsaking the translator's sphere and entering on that of the commentator." This is a fair concession; but instead of being thrust in parenthetically near the close of this enumeration of "words wholly or partially mistranslated," it should

* Vide supra, p. 273.

rather have excluded from the list all instances in which the version only fails in making clear what is obscure in the original.

In the ninth chapter, the author vindicates the translators from the charge of doctrinal bias, either as Protestants or Calvinists, the passages alleged by Papists being Heb. xiii. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 27, ("and" for "or;") Gal. v. 6, (active for passive;) by Arminians Acts ii. 47, and Heb. x. 38. To show how groundless the first charge is, Trench directs attention to the fact that King James's Bible uniformly substitutes "idol" and "idolatry" for "image" and "image-worship," where the latter forms had been employed by the earlier versions, perhaps in their controversial zeal against the church of Rome. The famous equivoque in Matt. xxiii. 24, which though without any doctrinal importance, has perhaps occasioned as much misapprehension as any other passage in our version, it being "no doubt the supposition of most English readers, that to 'strain at' means to 'swallow with difficulty.'" Trench regards it as a mere typographical error, as the older versions have "strain out," and as misprints have been certainly detected in the first editions of King James's Bible, e. g. 1 Cor. xii. 28, "helps in governments" for "helps, governments,") and 1 Cor. iv. 19, ("approved" for "appointed.") In this last case, however, may not "approved" have been intended in some legal or forensic sense, a trace of which is still found in the technical usage of the term "approver?"

The eleventh and last chapter gives the author's views as to "the best means of carrying out a revision," in stating which he first enumerates the "difficulties and dangers," arising from the uncertain state of the Greek text; from the risk of shaking the popular faith in the English Bible as the very word of God, "supposing, as might only too easily happen, very much else to be disturbed with it;" from the risk of severing the only bond of union now existing between Churchmen and Dissenters, "the Roman Catholics and the Unitarians being the only bodies who have counted it necessary to make versions of their own;" from the less serious chance of wider separation between the Church of England and her daughter in America; and lastly, from the impossibility of stopping the emendatory pro-

cess when begun by one revision; the *Edinburgh Review* having seriously proposed a permanent commission to be always embodying the latest allowed results of biblical investigation, and another writer no less gravely urging a revision once in fifty years.

Far from extenuating these objections, Dr. Trench considers them sufficient to discourage all attempts at revision, if it were avoidable; but this, he is persuaded, is impossible. "However we may be disposed to let the question alone, it will not let us alone." The inconveniences of staying where we are, will, he thinks, soon be manifestly greater than the inconveniences of action; and although there will be danger in both courses, it is only in accordance with the dictum of the Latin moralist, "nunquam periclum sine periclo vincitur." The real question, as he understands it, is not whether change can be avoided, but how we should prepare ourselves to meet or make it, and how it may be rendered least dangerous and hurtful. His proposition is, in substance, to appoint a mixed commission, by ecclesiastical or royal authority or both, representing the Church of England and all the orthodox dissenters, except "the so-called Baptists, who demand not a translation of Scripture but an interpretation;" and to let this body draw out a list of certain and necessary changes, "avoiding all luxury of emendation . . . . and using the same moderation here which Jerome used in his revision of the Latin." These emendations should be left "to ripen in the public mind," until their actual insertion in the text is generally called for, and the public become weaned from the existing form, as churchmen were of old from the Bishops' Bible, and Puritans from the Geneva. The inconveniences, he thinks, would be but transient, and the very unsettlement of old associations salutary.

After the author's own concessions and provisos, it is needless to enumerate the difficulties which would necessarily attend the execution of this project; first, in selecting the revisers, organizing them, and giving them authority; then, in securing a sufficiently extensive recognition of their labours to avoid the evils of distinct and independent versions; then, in giving general circulation to the proposed changes, without inserting them in the text of the authorized version; and lastly, in con-

trolling the insensible and dilatory process, by which the Dean of Westminster expects that insertion to be ultimately brought about.

To many well-disposed and interested readers we are much afraid that this new proposition will be only an additional reason for despairing of all legal and authoritative emendation of the English Bible, and for seeking some alternative, some practical method of attaining the same end, by means better suited to the actual state of things than those employed two hundred years ago, when the crown and Church of England held a very different relation to the Protestant world, and to the English-speaking races. For the benefit of such, we may conclude this paper with a few suggestions growing out of Dr. Trench's book or founded on it, although not exactly coinciding with his practical expedients. The first point, as to which we are disposed to dissent from his conclusions, is the absolute and unavoidable necessity of some change in the text of the authorized version, which the author rather takes for granted than attempts to argue. If the necessity assumed be simply of a moral nature, and the author merely means to say, that if we could, we ought to make the version better, this is merely saying what is universally admitted, namely, that a perfect version is to be preferred to an imperfect one, and should be substituted for it, if the change is feasible, without the risk of doing more harm than good. But if the meaning be, that such a change, whether safe or unsafe, must take place by some external necessity, entirely independent of all questions as to its expediency, we must confess that we are so far from perceiving this necessity or certainty of its occurrence, that we think the very question to be solved is, how it may be rendered possible. Particular editions may exhibit what are thought to be improvements, and such editions may obtain more or less of currency and influence; but why "King James's Bible," or the "Authorized Version," must be changed in spite of those who still agree to use it, we are utterly unable to perceive or guess. To us there is at least a want of clearness in the Dean of Westminster's position as to this point, which we regret the more because it is the very point on which he speaks with most deci-

sion, and with least appearance of a previous balancing of reason upon both sides of the question.

We may go still further and express our own conviction, that the authorized version not only may be left *in statu quo* by simply letting it alone, but also that its preservation intact is upon the whole the safest and the wisest course to be pursued, both on the negative ground, that change is difficult and dangerous, and on the positive ground, that Providence has given it a historical position which entitles it to permanence, as a sort of quasi-original to all the English-speaking races, and requires or recommends some other method of correcting the evils which may flow from its deficiencies or errors. For ourselves we have no hesitation in affirming that the evils arising from the loss of the agreement now existing among Protestant Christians in the use of the English Bible, would be vastly greater than the evils now arising from its imperfections. Even admitting all the charges made against it to be well-founded, they are scarcely sufficient to detract perceptibly from its effect, or to modify its intellectual and spiritual influence upon its readers. There seems to be a strong disposition in some quarters to confound the desirableness of absolute perfection in the version, as an object to be aimed at and desired, with its absolute necessity to give the Scriptures due authority and efficacy as a revelation and a vehicle of saving truth. The error is analogous to that of the old Montanists and Donatists in reference to the church, who, not content with seeking its entire purity from hypocritical and unworthy members, made this absolute purity essential to its very being, and, of course, to the validity of all its acts and ordinances, and moreover undertook to secure the purity required by mere coercive discipline, an error against which our Lord himself has warned us in the parable of the tares. The same spirit is exhibited in both the ways just mentioned, by the loudest clamorers against the English Bible, as if any amount of emendation would secure an absolute perfection, or as if the want of this perfection must destroy or even sensibly impair its intellectual and moral influence. How much nearer to the standard of ideal faultlessness does the English Bible come than the Septuagint version, which is nevertheless quoted and applied in the New Testament, wherever it is right

as to essentials, notwithstanding its deficiencies or errors as to minor points! This does not prove that an inexact translation is as good as an exact one; but it does prove that when Providence has suffered an imperfect version to acquire the authority and influence of a quasi-original, the advantages arising from this circumstance are not to be rashly sacrificed to the chimera of an absolute perfection, which may be forbidden by the very laws of language, or at least be unattainable by the means proposed, or if attainable accompanied by incidental evils far more serious than those necessarily arising from the minor imperfections, even of the Septuagint, but still more of the English Bible.

But while we thus believe that the best and safest mode of dealing with the text of the English Bible is the simplest and the easiest, to wit, that of letting it alone, except so far as interference may be necessary to extirpate changes which have been already made without authority or need; we think it absolutely necessary to the vindication of this "masterly inactivity" in textual innovation, that it should be accompanied by corresponding and proportionate exertion to prevent the evils which may possibly arise from this conservative position.

In the first place we consider it incumbent upon all who take this stand, to repudiate themselves, and to discountenance in others, the habit of regarding the authorized or any other version as precisely equal in authority to the *ipsissima verba* of the sacred oracles, and still more the illiterate and indolent treatment of its very inaccuracies and deficiencies as part and parcel of the Christian revelation. Instead of making the retention of the version as it is a pretext for reposing in it as the only form of the Divine Word to be recognized or used, in humble imitation of the Tridentine recognition of the Latin Vulgate as "authentic," it becomes those who assume the ground which we have taken, to maintain in theory, and promote in practice, the continual comparison of this exclusive version and acknowledged standard with the immediately inspired originals, not only as a subject of scholastic or professional study, but in the actual instruction of the people, from the pulpit, through the press, and in private intercourse. The difficulties which attend this question call for more expository

preaching, and for printed expositions more directly tending and adapted to correct and perfect the translation, so that hearers and readers may, as far as possible, be put upon the same footing with the student of the Greek and Hebrew text. The feeble efforts which have been already made in this direction should be followed up and carried out by abler hands. This we cannot but regard as more important and particularly called for at the present time than merely homiletical or hortatory comment, which any minister or teacher can supply, if once acquainted with the true sense of the language, more especially in those parts where the meaning is inadequately given in our Bible, and where there is a risk of the translator's errors being taken for the word of God. All this, however, though connected closely with the question of revision, is connected with it only as an auxiliary or preliminary measure, leaving still unsolved the interesting problem, how the version itself may be improved, or its deficiencies supplied, without an alteration of its text. This may seem to be a contradiction, and it is so if there can be no change in our customary modes of editing and studying the Scriptures. Even Dr. Trench appears to take for granted, that because the Bible is now usually printed without the marginal additions of the translators themselves, this practice must continue, and all plans involving a departure from it are to be rejected as impracticable. But in a case where the only choice is one of difficulties, this foregone conclusion is equivalent to giving up the whole thing in despair. To remedy existing evils without making any change in our established or familiar modes and habits, is not only in itself an unreasonable proposition, but at variance with the Dean's own project of revision, which would still more rudely violate old habits and associations. If the cumbrous machinery of a new commission, and a general revision, and a gradual amendment of the text, is not impracticable, why should it be thought impossible to have the English Bible printed in its original integrity, i. e., with the alternative translations in the margin, which are really a part of the authorized version, and ought never to have been excluded from it, a mutilation which might well excite our wonder, if we did not know that editorial audacity or ignorance has some-

times gone so far as to omit the titles or inscriptions of the Psalms, as forming no part of the text.

Our next suggestion, therefore, is to restore the marginal translations of the first edition of King James's Bible to their proper place as an integral part of it, intended to afford the reader a choice, if not of senses, of expressions, and in many cases better than those given in the text. How this may be accomplished, is a question of detail and secondary interest. However difficult, it cannot well be more so than the imposition of a new text on the English-speaking races, by the virtual if not the formal act of Queen Victoria and the Church of England. To the obvious objection, that editions in the mutilated form would still be published, or that men would still refuse to read the margin, it may at least be answered as an argument *ad hominem*, that this result is far more likely in the case of Dr. Trench's revised version, and the provisional or tentative editions by which he proposes gradually to effect it. If the indisposition to read marginal matter is as great and invincible as Dr. Trench supposes, why not insert it in the text, where it really belongs, with brackets to prevent confusion? This would be a first step towards the restoration of King James's Bible to its integrity and pristine form. The next would be to rectify its errors and deficiencies by simply adding to the margin, not explanatory comments, but alternative translations, so as to allow the reader greater latitude of choice, or to make the meaning clearer by expressing it in different forms. This is the more desirable as no two languages can furnish absolute equivalents, so that paraphrase is often indispensable to a precise and full expression of the meaning.

But how or by whom are these marginal additions and corrections to be made? We answer, by the hands of individual and irresponsible correctors. But what is to give them authority and currency? We answer, their own merit, as determined by the public judgment. This, we know, is a precarious and dubious reliance; but we have no better, and we see no reason why a gradual adoption of the best amendments might not take place upon this plan as well as upon Trench's, with the great advantage of leaving the text itself untouched. For ourselves, we should expect far more from individual exertion than from

the joint action of any commission that could now be constituted by authority. But what is to become of the Bible Societies, with their numberless editions "without note or comment?" We will not alarm our readers by suggesting as a possible contingency, that these institutions may confine themselves hereafter to the collection of the necessary funds, and leave the printing of the Scriptures to the trade, and its distribution to be regulated by the churches. We make no such practical proposal, and express no wish upon the subject. But if the improvement of the authorized version should be found incompatible with actual arrangements, and the clamor for the former should grow louder, it may some day overbear the latter. But if this should not be so, we are prepared to see the authorized version circulated as it is, believing that with all its imperfections, it will do as little harm in future as it has in time past, and that while any tampering with its text would be like the letting out of water, fraught with error and confusion, truth contained in the existing version will to countless generations be found able (or sufficient) to make wise unto salvation.

ART. V.—*Morality and the State.* By SIMEON NASH. Columbus, Ohio: Follett, Foster & Co. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1859.

MORALITY and the State! How noble the theme in itself, and how urgently requiring treatment at the hands of a master, with special reference to our own time and our own country! Amid the shameless venality and profligacy which scarcely try to veil themselves under the mask of a decent hypocrisy in our American politics, and which taint our national, state, and municipal legislation, the voice of a judge and civilian expounding and enforcing the obligations of morality in the state, seems like a living spring bubbling up in a stagnant pool.

The purpose of this book, therefore, commands our warmest sympathy. And we are happy to add, that the execution of

that portion of it which bears directly upon the subject indicated by the title, is, in many respects, successful. This portion is exclusively the latter half of the volume, beginning with chapter eighteen, on "Social Morality." Here the ethics of sociology, as applied to the family, to society, and the state, are discussed with vigour. The moral standard set up is lofty, and, at times, even severe. In defining details of duty, the author sometimes runs into extravagance and ultraism. Thus he strenuously insists that every "individual has a right to a portion of the earth; to a portion sufficient by the application of his labour to provide for his physical wants." If this means any thing more than that those who have no land, may take to themselves a portion of the earth's surface not yet appropriated by man, we see not how it can stop short of agrarianism. Besides, it is inconsistent with what he says of the right of property, as that which "cannot be limited in time; a right of disposition whether by sale or gift, whether to be delivered in his (the owner's) lifetime, or after his decease." No way can be devised by which property, and the right to dispose of it at pleasure, can consist with its universal distribution. The right to dispose of property is a right on the part of the improvident and unfortunate to transfer it to the prosperous and prudent; and it is the right of the latter class to keep for themselves and their heirs what they honestly acquire.

Again he says, "a thing is worth what it cost to make it, on the principle of paying labour a fair day's wages for a fair day's work, and capital a fair return. It is a sin to sell or buy at a less price." Such unqualified language as this refutes itself. A thousand cases may be supposed, and are of constant occurrence, in which it is a duty to buy and sell at less than cost.

"The same view strips slavery of all legality, of all justification, even of all apology. Slavery is inconsistent with the right of education, of moral culture, of free thought. Man is bound to all these; but slavery deprives him of these rights, forbids him to perform these duties," p. 298. Slavery is involuntary servitude, in which the law gives the master the title to the services of the slave, without his consent. But it is clear that all this may be without interfering with his right of suit-

able education, moral culture, or free thought. The law may guaranty all these rights to him while it makes him a slave. Or if the law comes short in this respect, the master may not. The above language of the book is in direct conflict with the Bible. It pronounces that a sin, in all circumstances, which the word of God treats as no sin in some circumstances. A super-scriptural morality is an infidel morality. It can do no good. It works evil and evil only in church and state. Abolitionism only binds the burdens and fetters it seeks to loose. It has yielded nothing as yet but the apples of Sodom and the clusters of Gomorrha. Its most significant achievements thus far, are open infidelity in its foremost leaders, and a school of extremists in opposition, who advocate slavery as the ideal form of society, and the slave-trade as a means of invigorating and perpetuating it.

While a certain radicalism of the kind we have indicated detracts from the value of the political part of the treatise, we are happy to say that it is largely compensated by a sound conservatism in other respects, and by a high moral tone, whereby it brings politics, in every aspect, attitude and relation, under the most stringent applications of Christian ethics. Judge Nash repudiates the popular infidel theories as to the origin of government, and the ground of its obligation. He rejects the social compact theory in all its forms. He denies that superior numbers, power, or the consent of the governed constitute the ground of the obligation to obey government. He takes the Christian ground, that it is the ordinance of God, and therefore, within its proper sphere, its ordinances bind the conscience by a divine authority. And so long as it duly fulfils its functions, the obligation to obey it holds, whatever be its form—monarchic, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. The obligation to obey any government ceases, when it transcends its sphere, and commands us to disobey God. To obey it then is to abet a creature in his rebellion against the Creator. There is no room for doubt, when the only question is "whether we ought to obey God rather than man." Yet, if one is conscience-bound to disobey human laws, in fealty to God, our author teaches, that he must quietly bear the penalty, committing his cause to him that judgeth righteously; unless when government

has become oppressive, to that degree that renders revolution both justifiable and feasible. All mere insurrections and rebellions are condemned, while the right of revolution is asserted, in cases where the people have outgrown their form of government, or are hopelessly oppressed by the reigning dynasty, and have the spirit and probable power to apply an adequate remedy by overturning it. According to our author, the state and its authority are one thing; the particular organization or persons by whom its authority may be exercised for good or evil, are another. The former always live without intermission. The latter may be changed for cause, either under the forms of law as in free governments, or in conformity to the behests of eternal justice, and the only end for which government of any sort ought to exist—as in the case of our own Revolution. We do not, however, endorse the opinion, more than once advanced by the author, that there can be no revolution, rebellion or other general uprising of the people, which is not stimulated by oppressions or grievances, such as either absolutely justify it, or would justify it, if it could succeed. We think history furnishes abundant examples of popular outbreaks stimulated by artful and aspiring leaders, where the oppression is slight or imaginary.

The earnestness and force with which Judge Nash insists that the state should subordinate all material interests to the moral and spiritual well-being of the people, in providing education, protecting and encouraging Christian institutions, in suppressing licentious and demoralizing publications, is well fitted to enlist that attention to these high themes, which they deserve and now urgently need. His vehement denunciation of that popular Political Economy which ignores man's spiritual and immortal nature, and treats of him as a being of exclusively material wants, is both deserved and needed. In all his utterances he is perfectly outspoken and uncompromising. While he insists on the duty of voting for the most upright and able men for all public offices and trusts, and on goodness as the most indispensable requisite in public officers, he urges upon good men the duty of accepting and discharging public office. The demagogue, the partisan, the mere politician as distinguished from the statesman, are held up to reprobation, with

indignant and excoriating eloquence; while he forcibly shows that the chief peril of democracy lies in ignorance and vice among the masses, combined with able, adroit and unprincipled leaders, who use them without scruple for their own aggrandizement. Of the partisan he says:

"He never has any opinions of policy but those which are considered popular; hence he never originates, but servilely follows. With him the question is not, what is right, what is best for national dignity and true progress; but what course will secure votes at the next election; what policy will keep him in office? . . . His speeches are not made to elucidate truth, to establish right, to enlighten the public mind, and advance great national interests; they look lower; their object is to secure a personal and party triumph at all hazards; hence the staple of them is crimination of all political opponents, and a studied effort to make the worse appear the better reason, to dash and perplex maturest counsels. His haunts are crowds and bar-rooms, and party-caucuses, and secret party meetings; he is more familiar with the cunning devices and tricks by which an election may be carried, than with the science of politics, or the nature of governments, or the manifold applications of political and moral truth." . . .

"Out of such men is constituted that party organization which seeks personal aims, not national good. They are envious of the really great and good; and hence combine to put them down by slanders, which may render them unpopular with the ignorant and the bad, unsuccessful at the polls. Party machinery is worked to prevent such men from occupying public positions, lest once there they cannot be displaced. . . . . Against such minds, smaller and narrower minds ever conspire and plot, well knowing that their own success depends upon keeping all intellectual and moral suns below the horizon, so that mere political moons may become the light of humanity. They are right in their schemes; but their schemes are schemes of deceit, and fraud, and wickedness, tending to dwarf, instead of elevating the head and heart of a great people." pp. 395–7.

We are sorry that this is no fancy-sketch, but a true portrait of a large proportion of those who make politics their

vocation in this country, and worming their way into various offices of state, are contributing to debase the people, and degrade the government. In taking leave of the portion of the book which deals with the topic indicated by the title, while we regret the exaggerations and ultraisms which occasionally deform it, we appreciate its elevated and even intense ethical tone, and the sledge-hammer blows which it visits, with crushing effect, upon various noisome social and political corruptions.

The first half of the book is another matter. It does not treat, except incidentally, of "Morality and the State." It consists of a series of essays on Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology. It seems to us mostly out of place. Not that these topics are not implicated with political morality. They interlock with it in various points. So, in their way, do Physiology, Medicine, Logic, Physical Geography, whatever sheds light upon Anthropology, Sociology, or Theology, in any of their departments. It is impossible, however, in treating any one subject, to give formal treatises on all topics that mingle with it, or conduce to its illustration. Plain and unquestionable truths in other related sciences must be assumed and taken for granted. Debatable points must be ventilated as they arise in prosecuting the discussion of the principal theme, otherwise the disquisitions on related subjects overshadow the principal topic. They obstruct the way to it, tire the reader in his search for it, divert attention to irrelevant issues, and, at best, serve as an incumbrance to the main work. We think this is the effect of the author's method in this volume. We have no doubt that, so far as "Morality and the State" are concerned, the portion of the book which treats of it, would be far more widely read and influential, if it were published by itself, and eased of its preliminary burden of discussions philosophical and theological. We suspect, however, that, in the author's view, this would have been giving us the house without its frame or foundation, the appetizing condiment without the substantial nutriment, the chief thing to which the other is accessory. In other words, we fancy that he had the propagation of his philosophy and theology quite as much at heart, as his political and social ethics. We judge so from the position

and emphasis, and apparent elaboration, given these topics. Were this all, we should drop the matter here. But the philosophy and theology are of a peculiar stamp. They belong to a mode of thinking unknown in this country until a recent period. They are somewhat crude, but bold and vigorous specimens of a type of theologizing and philosophizing that has worked its way from Germany, mostly via France and England, to this country, and is now actively obtruding itself on the public mind from various quarters. We will proceed forthwith to show more definitely what we mean.

The following from the Preface will indicate the sources of the author's inspiration. "The two modern writers who have exerted and are still exerting upon the thinking minds of England and America more influence than all other writers, are Coleridge and Carlyle. Now, this patent fact could not exist unless these men, with all their errors, had got hold of some vital truths hitherto overlooked; some new views of humanity, not hitherto developed; views approved by consciousness, and hence the ground of their power."

The following also from the Preface, reveals, in some measure, the conscious animus or drift of the author in this work. "I have written this work with no feelings of hostility to *evangelical Christianity;* my object has rather been to reconcile its teachings with those of human consciousness. If, therefore, any reader discovers reasonings coming in conflict with his own cherished views, and sapping some of his venerated dogmas, let him not deal in hard and unkind epithets, but let him be assured that in my view there is here no vital conflict with the *truths* of revelation, only with the errors and dogmas enunciated by human minds." The italics are the author's. As any assailant of evangelical Christianity who was not an avowed infidel would be likely to try, in advance, to conciliate his Christian readers by writing in this strain, while no sincere defender of such Christianity would use such language, we are furnished, at the very threshold, with a clew to the real scope and purpose of the book. Before we go further, we take occasion to say, that Judge Nash wholly overestimates the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle on British and American thinking. It is undoubtedly considerable, and has been more considerable

than it now is, since the German philosophy which is filtrated through their writings, and is the source of most of their speculative novelties, is coming to be more fully and extensively understood. It is a great mistake to suppose that the immediate coterie or circle with which the author is conversant, constitute the mass of thinking minds that use the English tongue. There is no doubt that the influence of Dr. Mahan at Oberlin and Cleveland, and of Dr. Hickok at Hudson, have given this type of thinking a certain currency in parts of Ohio, and that through other agencies, it has obtained a foot-hold in some colleges and seminaries of the north-east and north-west. It has also struck more deeply and widely into the centres of learning and culture in this country than in Britain. Indeed it was in this country that this class of authors first found the ardent welcome, and admiring appreciation, that lifted them to the rank of guides and oracles. Their significance in the sphere of theology and philosophy in their own country, has not been so much indigenous, as a reflection from the oracular authority conceded to them by their American admirers. These, however, never amounted to more than a thin stratum among the various orders of our thinkers. They have, nevertheless, been forward and pretentious. They have pressed and obtruded their views with the earnestness of men who felt that they had a mission and a message; a body of new and precious truths to unfold to their fellow-men.

Among these are two late works, besides that here under review, significant both from their authors and their contents, which have simultaneously appeared to claim the attention of the public. We refer to Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," and Dr. Hickok's "Rational Cosmology." We refer to them here, irrespective of what we may say elsewhere, for the purpose of signalizing the fact that they, with the book under review, are all largely founded on one radical principle borrowed from Coleridge, which they make their starting point. In the book now under examination, the source of it is explicitly acknowledged, and presented in full and formal quotations from Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection."

Says our author, (p. 72.) "Before proceeding with the question which the last chapter (on "Moral Psychology,") clearly

propounds, let us for a moment consider the meaning of a few words, which are necessarily being repeatedly used. A clear understanding of these terms, will contribute to a clear understanding of the views here set forth.

"The first of these words is NATURE. For our explanation of this, a remark of Coleridge may be cited. It will be found in his 'Aids to Reflection.' 'I have attempted then,' he says, 'to fix the proper meaning of the words *nature* and *spirit*, the one being the antithesis of the other; so that the most general and *negative* definition of nature is, whatever is not spirit; and *vice versa*, of spirit, that which is not comprehended in nature, or, in the language of our elder divines, that which transcends nature. But nature is the term in which we comprehend all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and subjected to the relations of cause and effect, and the cause of whose existence, therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in something *antecedent*. The word itself expresses this in the strongest manner possible; *nature*, that which is *about to be born*, that which is always *becoming*. It follows, therefore, that whatever originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be *spiritual* and consequently *supernatural*.'" This passage will be found on page 155 of Marsh's edition of the Aids to Reflection, and others of like purport appear elsewhere in that volume, and in his other works.

To the same effect says Dr. Hickok: "Take then this free personality; this spontaneous agency with its law written upon and rising out of its own being; and we have made a long advance in our way to the Idea of the Absolute. We have found that which may absolve itself from the domination of nature, and stand forth *wholly supernatural*. . . . . But truly an activity that goes out of its own accord, as is the rational in humanity, and *thoroughly supernatural* as it is, yet is ever subject to the colliding influences of flesh and sense." *Rational Cosmology*, pp. 80–1. The second chapter of Dr. Bushnell's *Nature and the Supernatural* is only the development of this germ from Coleridge. Indeed it runs as woof through the whole treatise. As we have here found the seed-principle of three separate works, on subjects widely different, yet all of

unsurpassed importance, it will not be amiss to offer some suggestions upon it, as it is presented by the master, as well as in the various dilute forms and applications of it given by his disciples. We do not mean to imply that what is novel in it is original with Coleridge. It bears unmistakable traces of a German paternity.

1. There is no fallacy more common than that of arguments founded on etymology. The force of the terms *nature* and *supernatural* is to be ascertained from good usage, which is constantly advancing beyond the original etymological import of words, and is controlled by the growth of human thought and knowledge, of which language is the inevitable exponent. We even speak of the nature of God. Does nature here mean that which is "*about to be born*," or that God is not supernatural? This argument from etymology, a favourite one with this class of writers, is wholly impotent and unworthy. If valid, it is a two-edged sword, which is quite as fatal to them as to their adversaries. Horne Tooke argued that there could be no eternal and immutable truths, because the word *truth* is derived from *trow*, to believe! How would they relish such an application of etymology?

2. Nature as contrasted with the supernatural is not necessarily contrasted with the term *spirit*. The established sense of the term supernatural confines it to beings, forces, and works, above man and physical nature. It is contrary to all usage to apply it to any thing that man can be or do of himself, *propriis viribus*, or with the aid of any mere powers or laws of the physical world. There is, indeed, a narrower sense of the word nature, in which it is sometimes used for the physical universe in contrast with man. But when used in contrast with the supernatural it always includes man, both as to his corporeal and spiritual nature. Any other use of it confuses and vitiates all discussions on this subject. Men claim to be supernaturalists, or to have established supernaturalism, by maintaining that man has reason or free-will. It is in no sense true that whatever is a spirit is "*consequently* supernatural."

3. Neither is it true, that whatever "*in any sense* contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be spiritual." Does not the acorn or egg contain in itself that which is in some

sense the cause of the various states into which it passes in becoming the oak or the ostrich? Or did not these contain in the germs whence they were developed, the causes of their being what they are? On the other hand, if the Christian doctrine of regeneration is true, the spirit in fallen man does *not* contain in itself that which is the cause of its purest and most perfect state as a spirit. So far from this, God maketh it to differ by his Spirit dwelling in it. And so false is it that "being the cause of its own state" is a criterion of spirituality, that the word of God styles those, by way of eminence, spiritual and spiritually minded, who are born of the Holy Ghost.

4. Still less is it true, that it is a criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit, that "the cause of its existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent." Is not the cause of the existence of every created spirit to be sought in something antecedent—the creative fiat of God? What then can such language mean, unless that all spirits are but the Infinite Spirit in varied manifestations? Is this "the hidden mystery in every, the minutest, form of existence," of which Coleridge discourses so sublimely, (Aids, p. 315,) and which, he says, "freed from the phenomena of Time and Space, and seen in the depth of *real* Being, reveals itself to the pure Reason, as the actual immanence of ALL in EACH?" The italics and capitals are all his. Or if this pantheism be not intended, what is? Is it that the cause of the acts and states of the soul, or the will, are not to be sought for "in any thing antecedent?" But this is untrue. No act of will or choice is without its cause in the antecedent bias, desires, views of the soul, and the objective motives which address them. Every man knows this as surely as he knows that he ever put forth a free act of choice. Is not the cause of every act of God to be found in his Infinite Goodness and Wisdom? This is not, indeed, a physical or compulsory cause. It does not militate against the most absolute freedom of choice between contrary objects. But it is the cause of that choice being what it is and not otherwise, and of its being impossible to be otherwise, *and at the same time free.*

5. Being "representable in the forms of Time" is no criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit; and being "repre-

sentable in the forms of Time and Space," is no criterion of nature as distinguished from the supernatural. Can any spirit be conceived to be or to act otherwise than in time! And are not nearly all psychologists agreed that the idea of time is suggested to the mind by the succession of which it is conscious in its own acts and states? On the other hand, it is not representable in space. Yet it is not supernatural in any known or appropriate meaning of that word.

Finally, although the spirit is out of "the relation of cause and effect" so far as physical or any other causation inconsistent with freedom is concerned, yet it is not beyond the reach of the great law, that every event must have a cause. Every act of the will is an act of causation which in the first instance suggests to us the clearest idea of cause. Nor is any volition of the mind irrespective of antecedent, subjective states and objective influences which ensure the mind's choosing as it does and not otherwise, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all.

The application by our author of his views of nature and the supernatural, coupled with another Germanism borrowed from Coleridge, will appear in the following passages.

"We have already seen that the mind presents two aspects, two sides as it were; one toward the *natural* and the other toward the *spiritual*; the first is sometimes called the *understanding*, the faculty judging according to sense; the other the *reason*, the faculty judging according to the *spiritual*. . . These two principles are ever in conflict, the one against the other; the reason ever tending to subject the body, its passions and appetites to the wholesome restraints of law, of moderation and of temperance; the understanding ever tending to subdue the reason and spirit to nature, to govern it by natural causes, and to bring it in subjection to matter. . . These various ideas shadow forth the prevalence of the notion of an irreconcilable antagonism between these two faculties of man, these two forms of development, called here the understanding and the reason. The same idea is developed by Paul in Romans vii. 23, 'For I behold another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members.' Again, 'For they who live after the flesh

mind fleshly things; but they who live after the spirit mind spiritual things.' Here the apostle clearly recognizes two distinct sources of action for man; what he calls in the one case the law of sin and death, in the other the law of the spirit. . . This view clearly corresponds with our division of the understanding and reason, the one partaking of the flesh, the other of the spirit; the one leading the mind to carnal gratifications, the other to spiritual acts of duty." Pp. 178–80. The same exegesis is also applied elsewhere to Romans viii. 5—13. On this we remark:

1. That we do not object to the use of the words Reason and Understanding to denote different faculties or classes of faculties or modes of knowing in the soul, provided such use be clearly defined and steadily adhered to. There is doubtless a distinction recognized in the *usus loquendi* so far as this, viz. that whereas understanding or intelligence of some sort may be ascribed in a low degree to animals as well as men, reason or rationality cannot be ascribed to the brutes. When we think of a nature as rational we also think of it as immortal, not necessarily so, however, when we think of it merely as, in some sort, intelligent. There is certainly a faculty of intuition called sense, by which we immediately perceive external objects And there is certainly a faculty by which we perceive certain intuitive ideas and self-evident truths not given through the outward senses. We have no objection to calling this inward eye Reason in contrast with the Understanding as the discursive faculty. This, at times, appears to be all that Coleridge and others intend. But they sometimes mean a vast deal more, as may be seen from the passages quoted from the work under review. And they often give vague and mystical intimations of much more than they express. But, at times, they let out enough to appal us. Thus Coleridge says (Aids, pp. 307–8) "I should have no objection to define Reason with Jacobi, and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that *it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the Soul, eternal Truth, &c., are the objects of Reason: but they are themselves*

reason." To the same effect he says, p. 137, "Reason is the power of universal and necessary Convictions, *the Source and Substance* of Truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves." And, p. 142, "The Reason in all its decisions appeals to itself, as the ground and *Substance* of their truth." In this last passage the italics are his, thus proving it no incautious statement. We see not how it could be more explicitly or emphatically affirmed that the Reason in man is no mere cognitive faculty, but that it is God in the soul. It is not probable that Judge Nash means to teach pantheism, because he says much of a contrary purport, and does not appear to be aware of the abysmal depths in which he is floundering. This indeed may be said of Coleridge and most others who have caught up pantheistic theories. But what less than that the spirit in man, be it reason or will, is God, can be implied in the doctrine he adopts from Coleridge, that it is not that "the cause of whose existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent?" He often speaks of the "divine in man," and of Reason as being the divine. What is the meaning of the following passage? "Hence it may be said that man's life is hid in God; since *God's life in its fulness includes all life, the life of humanity entire, as well as of each individual man.* All men will in this ideal state live upon God's truths and laws, so far as their capacities can take them in and work them out in life; and yet *all humanity can exhaust but a fraction of that infinite fulness of life, which is found alone in God.* . . This unity of life is entirely consistent with distinct personality; it by no means destroys either man's or God's individuality. Each lives his own life, though all live the same life. . . In this explanation is seen the error as well as *the truth of pantheism.* God does in one sense live and work in humanity, but yet in entire consistency with the distinct personality of each," pp. 420—1. This certainly indicates the author's adhesion, so far forth, to the "truth of pantheism." What "error" of that system it points out is less apparent. Pantheists usually hold that each separate phenomenon of God has it own individuality, as well as an identity with God. All the waves of the ocean have their separate individuality; they "exhaust but a fraction of its infinite fulness." Yet they are

phenomena of it, consubstantial, all-one, with it. So of the relation of man and nature to God, in modern Monism or Pantheism.

2. Admitting the distinction between Reason and Understanding in the only sense which, as we have shown, is allowable, there is no such "antagonism" between them as the author maintains, herein not only following, but outrunning his master. The understanding is not, in its own nature, a "faculty judging according to sense," any more than according to spirit. The discursive faculties, which Coleridge identifies with the understanding, act indifferently upon the matter furnished by our external and our internal intuitions, by sense or reason. The discursive operations of thinking under the forms of abstraction, generalization, judgment, reasoning, take place just as freely with reference to self-evident mathematical, moral, logical, or metaphysical, truths or ideas, as in reference to objects of sense. Indeed, these processes could be carried on to only a limited degree, if at all, upon objects of sense, without the aid of these primitive internal cognitions. Such an "antagonism" as that set up by our author supposes a dualism in the human soul; not a mere conflict of passions and desires, resulting from its depravity, but two constituent elements in its normal state, in its very essence as a human soul; the divine and the human; the natural and supernatural; the one judging solely according to sense, the other according to spirit; the one lifting us to God, the other sinking us to the dust. According to this, one part of the human soul is corrupt and corrupting, the other pure and purifying. The author fitly illustrates his theory by the old oriental notion of "two souls, the good and the bad, which were ever in conflict, each striving for the supremacy, and the man became good or bad, as the good or bad soul obtained the mastery." P. 179. The doctrine of Christianity supported by consciousness is, that the mind is one, indivisible substance, with various powers, sensitive, cognitive, volitional; that, in its normal sinless state, all these act harmoniously, and so far from being "antagonistic," mutually complete each other; that the senses are not antagonistic to the spirit, but are the inlets of knowledge, which is its needful food; that the body in sinless man is not antagonistic

to the soul, but is its appropriate residence and organ; that sin or depravity pollutes and depraves the whole soul, in all its moral and spiritual states and activities, sensitive and intellectual, emotional and volitional; not that it infects one part, and leaves the other stainless, making the man half-angel, half-fiend. The understanding is darkened. The mind and conscience are defiled. The heart is deceitful and desperately wicked. As to the will, men will not retain God in their knowledge. As to desire, they desire not the knowledge of his ways. The senses, and the members of the body, so far as it is an organ of the soul, partake of the depravation. The eyes are full of adultery; the poison of asps is under their lips; their feet are swift to shed blood. The conflict delineated by the apostle between the flesh and the spirit, the law in the members and the law in the mind, is simply the conflict between remaining sin and holiness dominant, but, as yet, imperfect; between the residuum of sinful nature pervading the man in all his parts and faculties, and the sanctifying Spirit whose work is progressive but as yet incomplete. It has not the remotest reference to the distinction between reason and understanding. The words *flesh* and *fleshly* are used to denote the depraved state of the soul, not because it is debased through the influence of the understanding operating as a "faculty judging according to sense," but because, when it swerves from holiness and God, from fealty to the supreme law by which it ought to be regulated, of necessity the lower and animal propensities acquire an undue sway. But this does not imply that depravity has its exclusive seat in the body, or its origin in any faculties exclusively sensuous. This is not what is meant by carnal as contrasted with spiritual mind. On the contrary the desires of the wicked are expressly styled "the desires of the flesh and the mind (*διανοιῶν*)," Eph. ii. 3. The word *νοῦς* translated "mind," Rom. vii. 23, is also used Rom. i. 28, in the phrase "reprobate mind," also Eph. iv. 17, in the phrase "vanity of their mind," and elsewhere in like manner. So far is it from signifying that which is of itself antagonistic to another class of faculties which are, in their nature, debased and debasing.

3. It is a fatal objection to the author's view, that it traces the origin of depravity, not to the perverse action of free-will

in a being created every way upright, as God made man in paradise; not even to a privative cause; but to the very structure of the intellect as originally created, and the necessary antagonism in the working of its different faculties. This is only tracing its source beyond man to his Maker.

4. The necessary consequence of this is, that what the author calls depravity he denies to be sin. According to him the genesis of human depravity is as follows: "A mind left to itself would be left to the teachings of nature, and only its understanding could, under such teachings, be developed; the reason or spirit would remain unborn, unconscious, inactive, undeveloped; and the man, acted upon only by nature, would become a little more intelligent than the beaver or elephant, and as ravenous for the gratification of his own appetites as the hyena and the tiger.

"*Herein lies human depravity.* Our nature is disturbed, unbalanced . . . That there is anything like *sin* in this state of depravity is impossible, since sin is a personal thing, the violation of an admitted law; while this depravity is in nature, though its fearful consequences, like the pestilence, and the earthquake, and the storm, afflict all humanity. Still it cannot be *sin*, a personal act, for which the individual is responsible or can be held responsible. It is depravity, or spoiling, or rendering crooked, a distortion of humanity for which all suffer, but for which no one will be punished. If the human soul lives up to its present duties, it will not fail of its reward in consequence of this depravity, this spoiling of its nature.

"Such then is the condition of humanity, the understanding and reason in perpetual conflict; the understanding born first, the reason last; the understanding strong, the spirit weak, the understanding taught by that exacting teacher, nature; the reason by a feebler one the spirit of another." Pp. 182–4.

How then, we ask, are men "by nature children," not only of depravity, but "of wrath?" How has "death passed upon all men for that all have sinned?" And how is depravity seriously to harm us, if "living up to such present duties" as we may, still retaining it, "we shall not fail of our reward." Where is the need of cleansing by the blood of Christ, and the washing of

regeneration, of anything more than natural religion? We shall see. He says:

"The death of Christ is the peculiarity of Christianity, the corner-stone of the whole scheme. The necessity of this is laid in the necessity that some act should be presented to the universe, by which, while the repentant were forgiven, the sanctity, and goodness, and holiness of the law might be maintained. To pardon without some great act of this kind, might leave upon the mind of intelligence the impression, that there was little difference between obedience and disobedience." P. 187. This, however, can hardly be necessary for those "who are living up to present duties." However this may be, according to the above representation, the death of Christ is not penal, substitutional, expiatory, in satisfaction of divine justice. It is, like his life and teaching, designed simply to create an "impression" that there is not a little difference between "obedience and disobedience."

"Man, left to himself, would never attain to the spiritual, never attain to the ideal, to the conception of a God. Hence God revealed his existence, his law, his truth, to the spirit of man; and it is still necessary for our spirit to reveal to another these spiritual ideas, which can be derived in no other way. It is literally true that there is a spiritual birth; for what is born of the spirit is spirit. The spirit of the child is brought into consciousness by the spirit of another, and so is born of it. 'I have begotten you,' says St. Paul, (1 Cor. iv. 15,) 'through the gospel.' Here he calls himself their father; he has begotten them by the truth, which he has poured into their minds; and which truth became to them a source of new life, a spiritual life." P. 182. According to this, regeneration seems to consist in imparting truth to the mind, and thus bringing the reason to birth or consciousness. It is no supernatural transformation of the soul by the immediate energy of the spirit of God, except in the transcendental sense of the word "supernatural," which is only another name for natural. We discover no regeneration in this system, beyond the Socinian moral culture and development of the germinal forces of nature.

The author's views on this subject will still further appear, if

we notice the kind of truth which he deems necessary to beget moral goodness, effective for regeneration, and the class of persons who are partakers of it. He says, (p. 128,) "what man *believes* to be this correct expression (of the universe) is *truth* to it, and must have the influence of truth on the life." "Even error *believed*, is better than unbelief; since the first will develope the spiritual in man, which the latter cannot do." P. 141. "From our previous analysis of human consciousness, it is clear that *sin consists in acting in contradiction to and in violation of our moral judgments.* These moral judgments are subjectively the law of God, to violate which is sin." P. 163. "All that is required of humanity is to act up to its own standard of rectitude, and all feel that they have ability to do that." P. 169. "This view of conscience presents important practical results. It gives a clew to the best mode of moral teaching, and takes away all ground for uncharitableness on account of a difference of conduct. There may be as much of moral worth in the one case as in the other; each acting up to his moral belief of what is right." P. 70. "The moral life, the spiritual life, the divine life in humanity are all equivalent expressions, and are all equally a life of faith." P. 110. "It seems a narrow view of God's mercy to suppose that earnest, sincere pagans are beyond the reach of his Spirit." P. 197. Referring to Livingstone's account of the conversion of the rain-doctor who found the belief in his power to make rain the most difficult of his pagan principles to abjure, he says: "Here we have the declaration of a most remarkable man, after his conversion, that he honestly did believe in his power to make rain; that with him this was no sham, no imposture; that he followed his incantations because he believed in the truth of his power. This single fact shows in what absurd things, absurd to us, but *God's truth to them*, the mind may honestly indulge. It will not do, therefore, to consign all pagan populations to the world of shams, and hypocrites, insincerities and impostures. And we learn from consciousness that *what the mind receives as true, is true for it*, and will develope its moral and religious emotions. It is certain then that there must have been pious souls, even under pagan superstition." P. 199. "The Greeks and through them other nations were educated to form moral

judgments, and taught the vital importance of obedience to them. *Hereby was the truly spiritual in man developed.*" "Is the Hindoo mother a lie when she sacrifices her infant to her idol god?" Even the Sepoys are canonized, and the adage "there is honor among thieves" is adduced in illustration and support of the author's view. Pp. 64, 65.

We have quoted at this length, that there might be no mistaking the author's meaning, in regard to what is the most dangerous sentiment of his book, and runs, as our quotations indicate, like a thread all through it. It is a legitimate offspring of transcendentalism—a logical deduction from it. We are glad to say, however, that while he thus erects subjective beliefs of whatever sort into virtual truths or truth-powers for him who entertains them, and makes conformity to them moral goodness, he admits the reality of objective truth independent of personal faith. He asserts the obligation to seek this objective truth, and that we suffer loss so far as we are ignorant of or reject it. It is something for one who goes so far as he has done to escape the vortex of absolute subjectivity. We will further add, that there is no dispute that every man sins who disobeys his own conscience. But it does not follow that we escape all sin when we obey conscience, or that men are of course good and acceptable to God who live up to their own sincere convictions. The most common sins are sins of ignorance, secret sins. Sin does not cease to be such because we believe it right, nor are men of course good because they think they are, or sincerely mean to be so. The sin and woe of those who form false moral judgments, lie in forming such judgments, in calling good evil and evil good, putting light for darkness and darkness for light. Blindness to moral and spiritual truth is sin, and is among the most unequivocal proofs of moral corruption. Were the crucifiers of Christ blameless who knew not what they did? Was not Paul in need of mercy as a persecutor and blasphemer, albeit he did it ignorantly and in unbelief, nay verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth? Is not sin in its nature deceitful? Is it not declared "corrupt according to the deceitful lusts?" There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, though the end thereof is death.

In fact, on this system, there is an end of moral distinctions. Error, no less than the truth it denies, "developes the spiritual in man." Absurdities believed in are God's truth to the mind believing them, and will "develope its moral and spiritual emotions." Is not this monstrous? As to their effect on the soul, are Paganism, Atheism, Deism, Infidelity, one with pure Christianity? Will they all alike develope the spiritual in man? What then becomes of our author's invectives against persecutors? Are not they often sincere? Was not Paul sincere in persecuting the church? What becomes of his consistency, when he tells us that demoralizing publications ought to be suppressed by the state? Above all, what becomes of the gospel, and the command to preach it to every creature? Is it not true that Jesus Christ is the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved? Is it not true that without faith it is impossible to please God? And how shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? What Christian is not shocked to be told that the bloody orgies of Paganism, as truly as Christianity, wake the spiritual in man? What doctrine more dangerous, demoralizing, and subversive of all foundations can be propagated in the community, than that all is well with those who live up to their honest belief? What more does Deist, Infidel, or Universalist ask?

We might further notice the crude attempt of the author, in imitation of Coleridge, to invalidate the argument for the being of God from his works; on which the Bible founds in part the inexcusableness of idolatry; his denial of any source of knowledge except sense, consciousness, and revelation; and this in contradiction of his emphatic distinction between Reason and Understanding—a distinction unmeaning, unless Reason, as the inward eye, as really and intuitively discerns some first truths, as the outward eye perceives external objects; his assertion that all "discussions having for their object to prove an external world, and the manner in which we come to the knowledge of it, are not only idle, but wicked," p. 19; while he also tells us that "*by the study of sensations*, perceptions of an external world arise," when in fact, if we do not perceive external objects immediately, the "study of sensations" would never carry us beyond themselves, i. e. beyond our own sub-

jective states, i. e. beyond ourselves, which ends in idealism and monism; his attempted refutation of the argument for divine decrees from divine foreknowledge, on the alleged ground, that "time cannot be predicated of the Deity," p. 24; as if this, whether true or not, could at all undo the fact that known to God, and therefore certain and determined before the foundation of the world, was whatever should come to pass; his accounting for sin on the ground that free-agency implies inability in God to prevent it, without impairing that free-agency; as if the acts of men could not be rendered certainly good and yet be free; when he tells us that "in the character of God we find a necessity resting upon Him, and *necessitating* the character of creation, of the laws, and government, which He shall create and organize," and that "in all this the divine will acts freely in the highest sense of the term." "An honest man cannot steal; the very definition of such an act precludes the possibility of its being done by him; and *still this condition is no limitation on his freedom and ability.*" Pp. 123–4.

We have thus taken pains to lay bare the real principles of this book, some of which are probably imperfectly comprehended by the author. His blunt, earnest, and assured style, notwithstanding the marks of slovenly haste which it often bears, will give it currency and power among a large class, who are poorly qualified to judge of its speculative principles. We understand that efforts are in progress to put it by the thousand in the libraries of the public schools of the country. The fact that suitable books are wanting, for the instruction of the young on political ethics, will facilitate its circulation. We greatly regret, therefore, that under cover of "Morality and the State," it should be a vehicle of transcendental, rationalistic theology, and of formidable errors in psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. We deem it our duty to expose the virus which saturates it, and more than neutralizes all the high and precious truth it teaches. We have thought it worth signalizing too, as an evidence that the transcendentalism which has been imported among us, is no mere ghostly shadow, haunting only the retreats of learning, and the closets of recluse thinkers; but a living, growing, pervasive thing, that begins to mould the thinking of our judges and counsellors, and worm itself into

the solution of the great problems of life, moral, religious, social, and political. As such, its subtle movements cannot be too closely watched.

ART. VI.—*Rational Cosmology: or the Eternal Principles, and the Necessary Laws of the Universe.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. D. Appleton & Co. New York and London.

THE work whose title we have thus given in full, exhibits the results of much and earnest thought. Its aim is high; its field of research immense. We respect the author's talent; we honour, in themselves, his energy and industry; and what is more—much more—we have an abiding confidence in his piety. We desire to make this declaration frankly and fully at the outset of our remarks, that we may not afterward be misunderstood, if we shall be found, even conscientiously, and therefore very earnestly, to indicate our utter disagreement with many of Dr. Hickok's positions and conclusions.

The object of the book is to develop all that the title indicates. After an Introduction, the contents of which are "Facts and Principles—Facts determined by Principles—General progress of philosophical investigation—Theology and philosophy possible"—the author presents what he regards as "a concise and independent mode" for the "attainment of a clear idea of an absolute Creator and Governor." Then, much more at large, he discourses of the plan "of the creation itself;" of which he remarks in the general, that "To no finite reason, is it to be anticipated that this plan will ever reveal itself in all the clearness and completeness of the divine Ideal; yet nothing hinders, since such a plan certainly is, that the human reason may not earnestly and reverently apply its powers to the attainment of its grand outlines, and in the teaching of eternal principles find, by a rational insight, what and how creation must have been, and read her great laws, not as mere arbitrary

facts, but as the necessary result of a work rationally begun and wisely accomplished."

"When the cosmos is" thus regarded as "attained in its plan and principle," he then proceeds to take "the facts" as he conceives them to have been "actually given in experience, and study them with the direct design to find their law as plainly determined in the eternal principle." This furnishes "the work" for the concluding portion of the book, but which, as the author states, "might be prolonged indefinitely." (Pp. 56 and 57.)

It will readily be perceived that the subject matter, as thus stated, admits of being viewed under two aspects, which may be designated, respectively, the one as the *physical*—the other as at once the *metaphysical*, *psychological* and *theological*. We shall have regard to these in the order in which they are here named.

In accordance with the plan of the book, as already briefly sketched, as near as may be in the very words of the author, we not only find (Chap. I. 4) "the Absolute as given in the Reason," but also (Chap. II. at p. 101) how God did, or using the present tense, how God does create matter; and that too in a way which would seem to leave very little room for the exercise of his good pleasure. For we are told on p. 15, that "By the insight of the reason, which no animal can exercise, man attains in many facts the principle which was before the fact, and which, wholly unmade itself, controlled and guided the maker of the fact in all its construction." Also (p. 17) that "Universal nature is more than bare fact; it is something made under the determining conditions of unmade principle: and this immutable principle, under which its being and all its ongoings have been determined, has now its counterpart in nature as the perpetual law of its working," &c. Also (p. 256) that "The universe in its eternal principles gives the creation in Idea, and in this we know what is possible." . . . "A universe so may be; yea, if a universe of working central forces be brought into existence, so it must be; but that the universe shall be so in actual fact there is demanded the exertion of creative Omnipotence."

It is the comparison of these and other passages of similar

import or tendency, that has led us to the conclusion already intimated—that the creation which lies at the foundation of the "Rational Cosmology" is one in which very little room would be left for the exercise of the good pleasure of the Omnipotent.

True indeed we learn (p. 20) that "This Creator of the cosmos must" (himself) "be wholly absolved from all the conditions which determine the cosmos"—he is not finite—he is not limited in himself—but then, if the principle which was before the fact *controlled* and guided the maker of the fact in *all its construction*, where is that perfect freedom which must belong to the Ever Blessed One revealed in Scripture—"the *Living God*" and "*Everlasting King*" of the Bible; whose perfection place him as much above all control in the exercise of his "good pleasure," as he is above being "tempted of evil?" Infinite wisdom and goodness unitedly, and always *spontaneously*, fix upon the plans best in themselves, and best adapted to secure the end in view, without the necessity of reference first to any principle, made or unmade, other than such as Infinite Excellence, because it is infinite, will spontaneously and in itself *prescribe*, not *follow*—much less be *controlled by:* and *that* is what we mean, when we say that God's "good pleasure" is gloriously above control. In what the creation of the "Rational Cosmology" consists, it will be easier to describe after an exhibition more or less distinct of those "eternal and unmade principles" to which reference has already been made more than once in the preceding quotations. But with respect to the very question—how God did or does create, we will say here what we desire to say, once for all, in unmistakable terms.

We have not forgotten the sensible shudder which we experienced some three years ago, on hearing it declared by one of the most gifted and pious men of our country, that there were some relations or qualities of things which were out of the region of will, and which, he proceeded to say, "not even the *will of the Almighty* could change." It was, we confess, with somewhat similar feelings, that we read the announcement in the "Rational Cosmology" of how, in accordance with—aye more, controlled by—certain eternal principles, how God, thus *circumstanced*, creates. Our first impulse was to exclaim—witness men, witness *angels*, while a being whose imperfect

knowledge of God's lower works is derived to so large an extent indirectly, through the restricted avenues of his senses, and who has had but "an atom of time" in which to view those works—witness men, witness angels, while a being thus circumstanced *determines* what the angels might well "desire to look into," if they *could*—witness all ye intelligences, while man, with the Bible in his hands to inform him of God's infinite perfections, determines how, within the stringency of eternal and necessary laws, the Almighty exercises the exclusive prerogative of omnipotence in its first great outgoing act—witness *man determining* how *God creates!*

Does not duty, in view of all this, clearly demand, that, feeble as may be the effect of the declaration, we should characterize every such attempt as being, in the very light of revealed truth, presumption of a very high order; though it be even perpetrated by good men—by those whom we verily believe to have a true love and reverence for the Father of Mercies of the Bible? All the rather do we conceive this to be duty in their case; for their goodness lends sanction and gives countenance to what we feel bound to regard as being in very strange association with that goodness itself.

We have endeavoured to express unequivocally what was our first impulse, nor are we prepared to say that we have recovered from it; but our astonishment was the less, when we found that it was such a conception of creation as might be "subjected to" that "insight of the reason" which sits in judgment, as we learn, on the conceptions of other human minds, (p. 92,) that it was such a conception of creation as this, with regard to which we were to be fully informed; a conception of a creation so called: which, being human after all in the *extent* of its horizon, would even thereby prove itself to be human also in its *level.*

The infinite propriety of the first and leading precept of the Second Commandment is ever illustrated by the fact that the idolator *first* himself *forms* an image of the deity which he would worship, and thus brings down his god to his *own level:* to worship afterward what he has thus degraded, seems, in comparison, to be almost a minor offence.

In like manner the exclusive prerogative of Omnipotence, viz.

creation, is here sought to be made intelligible by degrading it in the way already intimated; i. e. to a process within the purview of "the rational insight," which has somehow ascertained that among the foremost of "the eternal principles" of the material "universe" is this, that "matter is force." (P. 90.)

We are well aware that to the force here spoken of are attributed very marked peculiarities; yet the declaration that matter is force, would seem to us to find a very special embodiment in this—an elephant is strength; which sounds to us very much as would the declaration that Homer is the Iliad; Sir Isaac Newton is the theory of gravitation; or—what we rejoice to think is not true—that Dr. Hickok is the "Rational Cosmology." Nay more, might not the philosopher, in full hearing of a very fine echo, after a long and careful scrutiny by the "rational insight" come consistently also to the conclusion, that speaking *itself* was an articulate sound, just such as that which so interested and pleased him—that we do not need the corporeal and mental device of a speaker—and so the fable of Echo was not wholly a fable after all; even with respect to the physical facts of the case.

Yet, if matter be indeed force, it must be important to know exactly how this force is situated. That there may be no misapprehension with regard to this, we quote the author's own description of force, and of how it is situated. Being first concerned with the presentation of his own views, we omit, for the present, his reasoning to show that the ordinary conception of matter is a mere negation. At the conclusion of his remarks upon that, he proceeds to say:

"Simple activity is spiritual activity, and has nothing in it that can awaken the thought of force; and it is only as it meets some opposing action and encounters an antagonist that we come to have the notion of force. In all push and pull there is counteraction, complex action, action and reaction, while simple spiritual agency can never be made a conception of physical existence. It cannot be thought as taking and holding any fixed position; it cannot become a permanent and have a 'where' that it might be conceived to pull from, nor a 'there' that it might be conceived to push to. It could not be determined to any time nor to any place, for it has no constant

from whence the determination might begin nor where it might end. When, however, the conception is that of simple action in counteraction, an activity that works from opposite sides upon itself, we have in it at once the true notion of force. From the difficulty of clearly apprehending counteraction or antagonism in a single activity, as always acting in opposite directions upon or against itself, and which must be the true conception, for the notion is that of one source for the antagonism, it will be more readily taken and equally available in result, if we here, and generally through the work, conceive of two simple activities meeting each other, and reciprocally holding back, or resting against, each other, and thus of the two making a third thing at the limit of meeting which is unlike to either. In neither of the two activities can there be the notion of force, but at the point of antagonism force is generated and one new thing comes from the synthesis of the two activities. To distinguish this from other forces hereafter found we call it *antagonist force*. In this position is taken, and there is more than the idea of *being*, which the simple activities each have; there is being *standing out*, AN EXISTENCE; being *in re*, *reality*, A THING.

"Let, then, an indefinite number of such positions contiguous to each other be conceived as so taken and occupied, and a space will thereby be filled and holden; an aggregate force will maintain itself in a place; and a ground is given on which other things may rest. A substantial reality here exists. This antagonism may be conceived to be of any degree of intensity, and the substantial ground will hold its place with the same amount of persistency, and stand there permanent, impenetrable, and real. Nothing else may come into its place until it has itself been displaced. It is not *inertia*, but a *vis inertiæ;* a force resting against itself, and thus holding itself in place. It *rests*, because it has intrinsically an equilibrating *resistance*." (Pp. 93 and 94.)

But this alone being regarded as insufficient to provide for "combinations and resolutions," "perpetual changes and processes through successive stages," he continues—"Our very primitive idea of matter must comprehend more than the idea of pure antagonist force, even that which may dissolve and

become a combination with pure antagonism. We conceive then of an activity going out in exactly the reverse process of our antagonism, even a beginning in the same limit of the meeting simple activities and working on each side away from the limit; a throwing of simple activities in opposite directions from the limit of contact. Not a counteracting and resisting, but a divellent and disparting activity; not an antagonistic, but hereafter known as distinctively a *diremptive* movement. Such an activity could not be conceived as space-filling of itself. Wherever the limit in which there might be conceived the contact of two simple activities should be, the diremptive movement would be away from the limit on each side, and thus a space-vacating and not a space-filling activity. The diremptive movement alone would be a disparting and going away of the activities from each other, and leaving a void. But if this diremptive movement be conceived as at the very limit and point of contact of the antagonism, the antagonist activity working toward itself in the limit, and the diremptive activity working from itself out of the limit, then must the diremptive movement on each side encounter the antagonist movement, and the simple diremptive activity going out on one side from the limit will meet the simple antagonist activity on the same side coming in to the limit, and these two simples of the opposite kinds of forces must make a new counteraction among themselves. And equally so with the going out and the coming in of the opposite kinds of forces in their simple activities on the other side of the limit, the one must encounter the other, and engender a new counteraction among themselves on this other side. The result thus must be that while the diremptive activity disparts and loosens the antagonism, the antagonist activity on the other hand restrains and binds in the divellency, and thus the diremption can neither go off wholly on either side and leave the limit void, nor the antagonism come up from each side and make the limit full, but both antagonism and diremption meet in the limit and make a third thing, which may be called indifferently an antagonist force loosed, or a diremptive force fixed.

"The pure forces in their contact in the simple limit may be known as units under the term of *molecules*, or molecular

forces; the working to the limit constituting an antagonist molecular force, and the working away from the limit constituting a diremptive molecular force. The combination of these forces in their joint interaction making a new compound as a third thing unlike either alone, may be known as also a unit, constituting a material *atom*, and may further on be known as a *chemical* atom or molecule. Our conception of matter must therefore be of this combination of distinguishable forces, though we shall find it convenient for the more clear apprehension of the principles of the universe to follow out the workings of each distinctly and separately." (Pp. 95 and 96.)

We have quoted the author at some length, in order that the "principle" which he advances, and to which he attaches no ordinary value, may be exhibited precisely as he has defined and expounded it, in the use of his own specially adapted terms.

The quotations, even thus far, are also illustrative in another way. They show how much circumlocution becomes requisite, when every thing like symbol or concentrated representation of quantity or of mode of action, is studiously avoided. We say studiously, for although the author informs us in his preface, that "In portions of the intuitive processes here pursued, a help might at the outset have been given to some minds by the interposition of more diagrams," he adds, "and yet in the end the fastest and pleasantest progress will be found to have been secured by casting off all dependence on any such helps, and fixing the mind's eye directly upon the subjective ideal, as the pure ground in which the insight is to attain determinations of the developed principle. In two cases only, from the extent and complication of the intuition, has it seemed best to resort to the interposition of figures; in other cases care has been taken to use precise language, and to give descriptive illustrations and analogies, so that to a careful and clear inspection the process may be followed without much difficulty or discouragement. Nothing can make the journey easy to a mind that refuses to go alone and waits to be carried. The truths sought are not in the sensible phenomenon, nor at the conclusion of a logical process, but must be clear to the rational insight in their own necessity, if apprehended at all.

To the intellect that does not so apprehend them, all forms of expression will be empty; to the mind that does so apprehend them, no interposed figures are needed or would be tolerated." (Pp. 6 and 7.)

Now although all this should even be conceded, yet when the attention of the reader is to be directed to what the "rational insight" of the author so clearly discerns, this cannot be done directly, but only through the medium of some symbols of thought; and it is vastly important that those symbols be not only accurate or even illustrative, but that, withal, they should be presented in a form so far *concentrated* as to make a synopsis or connected view not merely practicable, but easy. There may be more ways than one in which "the words of the wise are as goads;" and more ways than one in which we may be instructed by the proverb, without an irreverent use of it.

The usual adjuncts for the attainment of a concentrated exhibition of truth, and of that *precision* which belongs to true science, cannot be discarded, and no loss ensue. Casting them away on "principle" even, will not free us from the penalty. This is abundantly evident throughout the whole of Dr. Hickok's book, especially in so far as the communication of the author's ideas to others is concerned; and we are constrained to think that such an omission has sometimes led him to conclusions inconsistent with even his own premises: untenable as we must regard them to be.

It is after all conceded that help might have been given to some minds by the interposition of more diagrams; and we will go so far as to confesss that our own ideas have been thus aided. Even before we had reperused the passage here quoted, we had arranged a few simple symbols for ready reference which we will here exhibit and explain:



In this representation it will be observed:

1. The "activities" in question are noted as being "simple" and "spiritual."

2. "The very limit and point of contact of the antagonism" of the "two simple activities meeting each other, and reciprocally holding back, or resting against each other," must be understood to be at L, though the representatives of "the forces in their simple activities" are outspread from these both ways, in order that they may be separately and so distinctly exhibited.

3. "The forces in their simple activities" are represented by arrows; those of the same "kind" which are "*antagonistic*" by arrows turned *inward*, and those of the same "kind" which are "*diremptive*," by *broken* lines, indicating arrows turned *outward;* and thus "the going out and coming in" tendencies "of the opposite kinds of forces in their simple activities" are manifested.

4. The arrows looking inward press against and hold in the arrows represented by the broken lines; so we see that "the diremption" cannot "go off wholly on either side and leave the limit (L) void;" the "diremptive force" is thus visibly "fixed." Neither can the outer arrows "come up from each side and make the limit" (at L) "full;" they being kept asunder by the outward thrust against them of the diremptive arrows; the crowding in of the "antagonist force" is thus seen to be "loosed."

5. The direction of the movement of the diremptive arrows away from L, shows them to be "space-vacating" as respects L, while the others act the other way as "space-filling."

6. Each of the two broken arrows has, moreover, for its own special opposite an arrow of the other sort; and thus we see that "two simples of the opposite kinds of forces must make a new counteraction among themselves;" and that this must take place on both sides of L.

7. Two opposed arrows of the *same* sort, "in their contact in the simple limit," would represent a single "*molecule;*" "the working to the limit," seen in the arrows turned inward, "constituting an antagonistic molecular force," and the working away from the limit, seen in the arrows turned outward, "constituting a diremptive molecular force."

From all that has now been exhibited, it will be seen that the principle that "matter is force" must not be confounded

with the hypothesis which regards atoms as special centres of force. This hypothesis not unfrequently advanced—of which Faraday makes such use—Dr. Hickok does not notice; though he heartily condemns the ordinary one. The hypothesis of centres of force was devised and adopted because the bare necessities of physical investigation did not require anything more than *the laws of action*, as to intensity, &c., of forces. This surely could not be the reason why the author of the "Rational Cosmology" left of matter nothing but force. He certainly intended in that very simplification to seize upon a "principle" behind the law. For he says, distinctly, that "If we have not the unmade principle determining the fact of gravity so to be, and with just such ratios, then we have no rational science of nature, and what we call a law of nature is still a bare fact; an arbitrary making; and no philosophy interpreting the making by its principle" (p. 17.) And again (p. 57) "Facts teach nothing until they are seen in their principles; but when the principle is applied to the fact, and the fact is read and expounded in the principle, then have we and only then, a rational philosophy." Although then the author might strangely seem to be one of a company who throw away every thing material but force, because they have no occasion for anything besides law to work with—however much more they may believe must lie behind it; although this is all so, yet the author of the "Rational Cosmology" is to be acquitted of all sympathy with them, not only because he eschews their deeds, but because his is "a principle" discerned by "a rational insight;" and, "in the teaching of eternal principles" we are to "find by" this "rational insight, what and how creation must have been, and read her great laws not as mere arbitrary facts, &c." (p. 57.) Moreover there are features of the force which he defines, so peculiar, that it requires a special designation, and so it is termed, by way of distinction and emphasis, "*antagonist force.*" This is a force which finds no place among the formulas employed by the dealers in mere laws; except as being the *zero* of forces mutually destructive.

But does the announcement that matter is force, however understood, put us in possession of a principle after all? To us it seems very plain that it is no more than the statement

of a more remote *fact* than that indicated by the other statement, that there is force where matter is; and (if it were becoming in us so to do) we would, therefore, respectfully suggest that the enunciation might have been improved by saying that matter *must be* force. The declaration (it seems to us) would then have been the appropriate expression of "an eternal and necessary principle," which we do not discern in the *fact* that matter *is* force *now*. This we cannot help thinking would have been more consistent; though our own objections to it would still have been as uncompromising as ever. We shall now endeavour to state what those objections are.

And here our difficulty "of clearly apprehending counteraction or antagonism in a single activity" being so great that we fear it will be insuperable, we avail ourselves, as we have heretofore, of the alternative suggested—of what we are informed "will be more readily taken and equally available in result;" viz. "if we here," "conceive of two simple activities meeting each other and reciprocally holding back or resting against each other."

Now, while we disclaim either the right or the wish to advise, we must yet beg to be indulged in one other suggestion. We cannot but think that the hypothesis (or "principle") would be improved, if provision were made for the antagonism all around the point, instead of two opposite directions only; in order that the peculiarities of the "*antagonist force*" might exhibit themselves in all directions around the point, when we attempt to influence that force from without, and thus provide for the phenomena exhibited in the actual world: but our objections are just as real against two such mere simple activities, as they would be if more were introduced at the same place, and we proceed therefore to observe:

1*st*. With respect to all that concerns either activity or counteragency, all physical force however derived, tends to produce similar effects; and these are appropriately described by saying, as physicists do, that force is that which tends to produce, or to modify, or to prevent motion. The elastic force of steam in a boiler may be kept completely in check by the opposing elastic force of a powerful spring, applied to the

safety-valve. Or the same effect may be attained by the application of a sufficient weight, thus counteracting elastic force by the action of gravity. Or, again, for the action of the weight may be substituted that of energetic human muscle, subjected to the continued control of personal effort, of which the man himself is all the while sensible.

Now all these—different it would seem in their origin—all severally serve to hold the *elastic* force of the steam in equilibrio; and however great they may be, if not of a crushing intensity, they will expend their extra energy in pressure on the boiler and its supports. Yet when the same steam is permitted to act upon appropriate machinery, the elastic force, which belongs to the steam, will set the machinery *in motion*, and that with an energy (if the force accumulated be sufficient) such as would overcome and drag away captive more than one thousand horses.

The physical effects or tendencies of force under all these circumstances, are then the same; however they may either be called into action, or else made to hold one another in check; or, under all these relations, force is *force*, however we may get at it, or however apply it; whether we compel rest by the antagonism of opposing forces (i. e. bring about an equilibrium) or, setting force free, let it exhibit its appropriate effect in superinducing the motion of *matter*. Only those who would give force a new place in physics, and require it to do, or tend to do, what it refuses to do at all, only they and no others will find it either "necessary" or *credible* that under the very arrangement of "two countervailing spiritual activities" (p. 139) there should "a new thing" "come from their synthesis;" viz. "*antagonist force.*"

2*d*. Should we be otherwise disposed to adopt the dictum of the "Rational Cosmology" that matter is force, we might well pause in view of the seemingly inevitable consequence of such a step; when we see one who reverentially assents to the fact that God "upholdeth all things by the word of his power," but who yet also maintains that matter is force, express himself thus:—"The antagonism and diremption" are to "be apprehended" "to be the one agency of the Absolute Spirit in one and the same limit of their action" (p. 101.) Now as the anta-

gonism and the diremption are the very phenomena confessed of the matter which is force; insomuch that "at the point of antagonism" of the "two countervailing spiritual activities," "one new thing comes from their" mere "synthesis;" which new thing is represented to be an element of the "substantial reality," matter, the "diremptive" force being also associated with this, "at the very limit and point of the antagonism;" so that "matter is force; distinguishable as antagonist and diremptive" (def. at p. 90)—as all this is expressed in the very terms here exhibited in connection—and withal "the antagonism and diremption" are to "be apprehended" to be "one agency of the Absolute Spirit in one and the same limit of their action;"—are not the phenomena of matter then the veritable phenomena of the Absolute Spirit, and no *thing* else, except in their mere synthesis:—and what is this but the *very verge of pantheism*, if not PANTHEISM ITSELF?

We hesitate to embark in a boat which is so evidently drifting to the edge of such a cataract, and which has cast away its anchor in the rejecting of all matter except that which is force; and Dr. Hickok, as we should think he would, shrinks from any such plunge, though still endeavouring to hold to the boat. Let us hear him:

"The creation of the material is from God; its genesis is in him; its perpetuation and sustentation is from the continual going out of his simple activity; but this material is not God, nor at all competent to rise from its imposed conditions into the place of the Absolute. The Logos, or divine working word, is *in* the world; is the life and light of the world; and yet he was in the beginning with God, and ever is God, while the world is not he but his creature." (P. 102.)

3*d*. If the difficulties already specified were removed, then another would (and it actually does) present itself; which (making use of the terms of the "Rational Cosmology") we shall first exemplify, and then state distinctly. We can well conceive of two pugilists, each of whom has contrived, by his antagonism, to hold the one arm of his opponent completely in check; while the other arm of each, being left free, will show itself to be intensely diremptive; insomuch that it might seem as if it would be much more comfortable, if these *mere* activities

might be put in antagonism and show forth their diremption, without the intervention of any brawny muscles at all; but we have yet to learn how it could be done in this world of ours, or (in so far as we can discern) in any material world of which we have cognizance. Indeed we are taught as much in the "Rational Cosmology" itself. For on p. 99 we find that, "man is utterly merged in matter; and can thus put out no act that shall immediately meet another act in counteraction, but his every act of energizing must first encounter the forces," (matter "which is force," we presume) "in which he is incorporated." How then can any *mere* activity, in the sense of the "Rational Cosmology," be brought into antagonism with any other *mere* activity; when the very condition prerequisite to the putting in antagonism of such activities at all, seems to be that of the *interposition* of *matter itself?** The way of escape from this is indicated as follows: "But with the conception of a Supreme Absolute Spirit all these difficulties are excluded. He can begin action in counteragency with no forces intervening," (no matter between) "and whatever positions he may thus take and hold by permanent forces, though subjective to himself, or within his own sphere of agency, they may be objective to all other being, for all being will be subjective to Him in whom all live and move and have their being." (P. 100.)

To escape thus, is to open the door more widely to *Objection 2d;* and, if we unhesitatingly shun that, the demand that we should admit that *mere* activity may be antagonistic to *mere* activity, requires us to admit a state of things the distinct exhibition of which is nowhere found; it requires, thus, that arrangements should first be present to constitute that very matter which is always itself interposed between activities, whenever we either find them or else place them in antagonism. Even gravitation and other kindred exhibitions of force are, none of them, either found or to be placed in *antagonism*, without the intervention of matter in some way. All the postulates, therefore, have about them too much of the character

* Even those who approach nearest to the "Rational Cosmology," in arguing from the "principle" of the *sufficient reason*, even they suppose a *material point*, on which, at the outset, their elementary forces are to act.

of the *petitio principii*. The matter which is force, in these aspects also, of its relations, exhibits so much of the very marked peculiarity of the "antagonist force," that we must respectfully decline its acquaintance: we doubt its credentials.

4*th*. Several of the phenomena of gravitation especially (to mention no other exhibitions of force) are unprovided for, even with the aid of the additional postulates of the "Rational Cosmology;" particularly the action of that force *through* other bodies than those whose attraction may be in question—the veritable increase of the force in the same body or bodies under new circumstances—and that the appropriate changes in the action of gravitation occupy no appreciable time: all of which will be noticed hereafter.

5*th*. On the plan of the "Rational Cosmology," we would seem to need an additional postulate to account for the difference between solidity and fluidity; and how it is to be introduced does not appear, nor does the "Rational Cosmology," in so far as we have discovered, any where discuss just that.

6*th*. We fear that if we adopted the "principle" of the "Rational Cosmology," it would, moreover, be requisite to provide for something like fits of diremptive excess of force and of the contrary, alternately prevalent within very narrow limits, close to the places held by the forces; to provide for the *alternations* of attraction and repulsion, which *are* exhibited when the molecules of bodies are brought nearer and nearer together; all which changes are contemplated in the atomic theory of Boscovich.

7*th*. If all these difficulties were not more than enough in themselves: the continued co-existence, at the same limit of the antagonist and diremptive activities, with nothing else interposed or associated but just what those activities are asserted to produce—all this is itself incompatible with the laws of force and motion, now universally recognized, and which Dr. Hickok would establish as "principles" in his own way.

For that the activities, or else the urgencies with which those activities either press or draw, that these are so many measures of the forces in action, or else kept in equilibrio, is what all the researches of science everywhere justify; insomuch that when

the activities are kept in equilibrio, the forces also are in equilibrio; &c., &c. Now either the activities of both sorts (antagonist and diremptive) would altogether keep one another in equilibrio, and the resultant (the force, in effect) be a *zero* of force; and thus the matter which is force be annihilated—nothing remaining as any effect of force or of activity: or else the efficient result (mechanical resultant), which must be single, would be in the *one direction* of the greater force, or of the more efficient combination of forces, and so two resultants, and their appropriate manifestations, could no longer have place.

To those who are at all familiar with physical science, this must be sufficiently evident, upon the bare statement of these conditions. Others may find an imperfect parallel, by trying to think of something like a cartridge in a cannon holding itself in shape in the direction of its length, while it, at the same time acts explosively, and thus speeds the ball on its errand, and withal produces the recoil of the piece.

8*th.* Apart from *Objection* 7*th*, as it is distinctly stated, we learn withal that we are to take for "'the independent action of force" "the conception of two countervailing spiritual activities." (P. 139.) What the resultant of such activities must be we have distinctly stated before, but we repeat the statement here that the objection which it involves may have its place with the others. Being countervailing, the activities must, in accordance with the laws of force, be equivalent; and in the reasoning which follows the enunciation here quoted they are so regarded, and the symmetrical spherical form of creation is exhibited as a consequence of that condition of the forces.

Now the resultant of two such countervailing activities all nature, everywhere, proclaims to be an activity reduced to *utter helplessness;* and yet it is at the point of antagonism of activities (or of one activity and part of another) situated just so, that the "*antagonist force*" itself is said to be "generated"—in the passages already quoted;—and this is the force, for which it is claimed, that it does so much besides.

It is a very grave fact, that this helplessness—this *zero*-force—does just what might be expected of it in its true character, when the author of the Rational Cosmology employs it

with the expectation of producing such effects as we actually find in nature; as—with a sincere respect for him, but under the uncompromising pressure of a duty to be discharged with respect to his "philosophy" and its tendencies—we shall endeavor to make entirely manifest. Previously to that however some other things remain to be noticed.

We pause for the present in our enumeration of objections, and shall now try to show in what light we are to regard the "principle," that "matter is force;" if (waving everything that has been advanced) we might after all accept of it.

We have already ventured to suggest that, in its present form, it is only expressive of a more remote fact than would be apparent if the laws of force alone were our limit. But whether matter *is*, or whether it *must be* force, what have we gained by knowing that, as long as the "rational insight" even can inform us of nothing more than the *mode* of action or of antagonism of the activities in question; or, if *accurate measure* as well as mode be clearly signified, it is at most with the *law* of action or of antagonism that we have to do? These working "principles" whether we gain them "by an immediate insight into things themselves;" or discover that they are "necessary determinations of the reason in its insight into the grounds of force;" or whether we, "at the best, only creep up from one fact to another on the ground of assumed uniformity in experience" (pp. 139 & 120); and then, withal, call these "principles" by their name when obtained by the "clear insight;" but laws of nature, and so only "bare facts" (p. 17,) when otherwise determined—no matter how we get them, they only inform us, after all, of *how* force, or activity, &c., is efficient or else countervailing, but still leave unanswered the question, *What* is force? To say that it is "generated at the point of antagonism" of "two countervailing *spiritual* activities" only makes that same question the more difficult to answer. We hope this is not beyond the reach of illustration?

As we describe force by stating what it does or tends to do, let the same be attempted in the instance of a piece of machinery: we will take for our example a sewing-machine. A sewing-machine, thus described, is an instrument so contrived as to *do just this*—to penetrate the cloth so as to intro-

duce the thread, and take a suitable stitch; and then to draw the stitch closely together, so as to hold all securely in place. Or, if we may, without offence, apply philosophical terms to such a case, we may say, that every machine of this sort must needs carry out the principle of being diremptive of the cloth, and place-holding in its adjustment of the stitch, just where the diremption was effected. But all this would give us no idea of the actual construction of any such machine itself.

Thus whatever insight we may gain, or however we may gain it, we only learn what force does or tends to do, or, if any more, at most how it is compassed about or situated, but *what* force is we do not know after all. When we know that, we shall perhaps know what matter is;—not force, we are well persuaded. And when we know what force is (if we ever do in *this* world,) we shall very probably be able to deduce from that *principle* what force may do or tend to do, and what, under the existing system of nature, it must do or tend to do (because it is force) everywhere; and then too we may hope to learn how force associated with matter, so that both may do work, (i. e. *power*) can be bottled up, as it were, for centuries in a ton of coal, and then suddenly set free under a steam boiler, developing somehow the efficiency which drives the engine. Until we are better informed with regard to *veritable* principles, which lie concealed here, while we as yet know only the laws which govern the tendencies or the effects of force or of activity, we may make use of the terms *antagonist* and *diremptive*, as being presumed to be more accurately descriptive of *modes* of action; but the question will still remain, "what has been gained except simply removing the mystery and our ignorance one step further back;"* and we would add, in the case before us, placing the matter to be explained more deeply in the shade?

Having obtained the view that matter is itself a combination and resultant of mere activities, the author of the "Rational Cosmology," as might have been anticipated, shows himself vehemently opposed to the old doctrine of *inertia* and all that pertains to it; or at least to what he understands by that doctrine. Thus, among other things, he says—"The sense

* Dr. Hickok's own words with reference to gravitation in comparison with the old notion, "that nature abhors a vacuum." (P. 147.)

conception of matter can by no possibility admit of anything static or dynamic in nature. The supposed matter is wholly dead; mere *inertia;* and can possess nothing by which it may be conceived as holding itself in place whereby it may sustain anything, nor as moving from its place whereby it might push or pull anything, &c., &c." (Pp. 117 and 118.)

Our objections to regarding matter just thus, as *mere* inertia, are quite as intense—though we would rather state them, if need were, in our own way. Indeed we might even be more inclined to believe that "matter is force," than that it is inertia. But while we feel free to say this, we also feel nearly as free to say, that the inertia which Dr. Hickok has thus characterized is an inertia in which nobody believes. The statement involves a mere straining of the term beyond the sense in which it is employed in physics. We must be allowed an illustration again:—

The drones in a bee-hive do nothing toward the making of honey &c., nor toward the housing or preservation of it either —they are so far *inert*—they are veritably *non-workers;* but, alas, they have excellent appetites, and so consume that which they cannot produce. But will any one assert that, when we say, with this distinct explanation, that inertia is a very special characteristic of the drones, and say so truly, that we thereby make the drones to be mere laziness? That could not even be asserted, if it were also true, that it was not unusual for three or four workers at once to seize upon a well-developed drone, and guiding the paws, &c., of the unresisting inert, make good use of them in adjusting the waxen walls of the cells.

A live body (or what is consciously in it) may, moreover, through its activity, oppose any energy which we may put forth, and sometimes even weary us out by such an opposition. But when the same body is dead its derived activity is gone, and can no longer be brought into antagonism with ourselves; the dead body is a non-worker—it is inert: but we should find ourselves most unpleasantly situated if we should stumble over it, or our strength (our *energy*) tried, if we should endeavour to move it. We would find *reaction embodied somehow*, to oppose our energy, and to be, *in effect*, an opposing energy,

and so a *force-waster*, as far as we were concerned, in the sense, and to the same extent, that the activity we thus must *lose* was itself efficient (or might be efficient) in the live body opposing us before. Like the drone, the inert body cannot work, but it makes way with the product of the efforts of others, that can and do exert themselves.

And yet this non-working, this inert matter, may be set in motion by the application of *extraneous* force, and will then be found to be in *a state of power;* i. e. it will somehow have a force accumulated in it, or accompanying it, which is adequate to do work, to break up or even to wholly displace other matter, and to tell powerfully *against* any living energy that may be brought to oppose it;—to produce thus the appropriate effects of *energetic force.* The inertia of matter, its *persistence* in a state of rest, because it could not start itself, has been overcome, and its persistence in a state of motion established; a persistence which matter itself cannot *check*, much less *overcome;* to do *that* would require again the application of *extraneous* force. Even gravitation, that intimate associate of all matter termed ponderable, even gravitation has this characteristic of extraneous force, in its being more or less accumulated in the same body, according to circumstances. The *mutual* action of this sort in the case of the earth and the moon when they are nearest to one another is more intense than when they are farthest asunder, nearly in the ratio of 37 to 29; yet the matter itself of neither has been increased, nor has the size of either been changed thereby; and hence they both continue to turn around their respective axes in the same time as before, and with the same moment of inertia. Matter in a state of power is withal anything but "a mere negation," it is the *substantial* club in the hands of him who wields it, it is the *somewhat with* which he strikes; and if he, or something else, do not check it before it comes down, it may strike with terrible effect. Dr. Hickok would have the club made of something like mere human strength properly antagonized, but diremptive still.

The facts involved in the statement that matter is *inert* or non-working in the sense or senses thus illustrated, are these; that matter can neither *originate* its own *transference* through

space, nor yet *control* that *transference* when extraneous force has compelled it. These are facts as incontrovertibly established as are the laws of motion themselves, which indeed involve these very facts.

To explain and reconcile all the several facts in question may not be easy; but, rightly understood, the knowledge of them, and of the laws dependent upon them, is among the most precise and well ascertained that we possess. They are among the well ascertained affections and relations of things; and with instruments such as these of well determined form and measure, science has wrought out her well proportioned and beautiful results.

In accordance with the doctrine of inertia as here exhibited, it is found that the smallest force applied to the greatest mass will produce some motion, whenever the mass is left free to obey the force; i. e. when the mass is not restrained by an obstacle, or any other completely countervailing energy apart from that mass itself; though some considerable *time* may be consumed in superinducing the motion, under ordinary circumstances.

Now, if indeed some fraction of the extraneous force is, withal, consumed in changing the state of the mass from rest to motion, that portion is always in a constant ratio to the force itself; so that, be that force great or small, a similar fraction of the force will be left to transfer the body: and thus the law is maintained that motion produced by even the momentary action of force is proportional to the force impressed—a law confirmed everywhere.

Let it be seen, how the principle of the Rational Cosmology will deal with this: "A static force is that antagonism which holds itself at rest in its balanced counteraction. A dynamic force goes to the overcoming of a static. It may draw or expel, but it goes to the removing another force at rest, or to the retarding or accelerating another force in motion. Should the dynamic not be sufficient to overcome the static, still, in so far as its intensity of antagonism goes toward this, it is thus far dynamic though the static does not yield to it." (P. 118.) "The original intensity of antagonism is its *quantity of matter*." (P. 129.)

"The intensity of antagonism in any point of force is its measure to resist motion. If this intensity be small, a small measure of excess in the energy of one activity over the other will generate motion; and if this intensity be great, a greater excess of energy on one side of the activities must be necessary to generate motion. If then one point of force is to move another point of force," (one molecule to move another molecule, we presume,) "the former must have one of two prerogatives; either a greater intensity, and when just moved its impulse will overcome the latter and displace it, or, a strong excess of energy in one side of its activities that may move to a violent impulse, and then, though of less intensity, the strenuous movement of the former may displace the latter." "The force moved is as its static intensity; the force moving it as its static intensity combined with its excess of energy on one side, and however this be made up so as to exceed the force of the former, or force moved, whether by more static intensity, or more excess of energy in one activity, when thus exceeding it must generate motion.

"And the rate of motion, or velocity, must be proportioned to this excess of dynamic over the static force. The least degree beyond equilibration of intensity must move; and the augmentation of preponderance must so much more move, and thus as nothing but this excess generates motion and all the excess generates its own measure of motion, the degree of motion, or velocity, must be as the moving exceeds the moved intensity of force." (Pp. 127 and 128.)

In accordance with all that is here quoted, it will be seen that the intensity of antagonism or quantity of matter may readily be so great that no small force or excess of energy could move it all; whereas the *facts* as already stated are all the other way, the smallest force moving the greatest mass, &c. The case as presented by the "Rational Cosmology" has only the laws of nature against it, in their working, everywhere; and this is what comes of the "thought-conception of space-filling force as the true substantial matter," which it is stated "involves the full conception of both statics and dynamics:" to which it is added that "counteraction in equilibrium must stand self-fixed." (P. 118.) The "philosophy" which involves

such conclusions is self-convicted as soon as it is applied; for matter, however great its "original intensity of antagonism," refuses to be "self-fixed," but quits its place when the smallest force is applied.

Here again, the counteraction in equilibrium proves itself to be effectually good for nothing or *zero;* viz. in its special self-fixing energy, as respects holding its place in space; and so it will, again and again, in other relations hereafter. Just *how*, after all, it is supposed that it can have any energy apart from its antagonism, will be considered in its appropriate place; but the truth *must* be told: this counteraction in equilibrium, this *zero*-force, (as it is in effect, in this and other operations attributed to it,) is force with all its energy so effectually checked, that it can do, or tend to do, nothing else; it is force with all efficient force for other purposes taken out of it, and finds its parallel in that rare condiment *fresh*-salt; which, if we could but obtain it, might be employed in a well recognized but suppositious experiment.

Nay more, "the intensity of antagonism in any point of force is its measure to resist motion." This we may accept, when we believe that a man who has large debts, with a credit which will exactly balance them—or whom we may regard as having had a large estate, which he has just entirely squandered—has really any greater riches than another who never had much property, but who has just fully expended all that he had. Has either of these (we would ask) any better defence against the attacks of coming want in the balance which he owns, over and above that of his fellow? There may indeed be reasons why the situation of the one is more *deplorable* than that of the other; but each has an equal "landed estate somewhere in Terra Incognita," and each has an equal amount deposited in the Utopian Bank.

We are withal told that "In this third principle of motion there is involved the conception of *momentum*, which on account of its wide application to physical science, it is important should be made clear and exact," (p. 129.) With this we entirely agree; and now append the explanation.

"In the body moving, its power of impulse or capacity to act on other bodies is an aggregate of force from two sources. It

has received the excess of intensity over its own in the body moving it, and this now becomes one part of its force to strike and move another body. This is measured by its own velocity, for it is this excess that has made the whole movement, and we may thus represent the force acquired by the *velocity* imparted. But its measure of intensity that it originally had, and which had neutralized just an equal amount of intensity in the body which impinged upon it, has not all been annihilated. It neutralized its own measure in the other body to produce motion, and left only the excess to pass over into the moved body, but itself remained in, and goes along with, and is indeed the very essence of, the moved body, and this original intensity it now has also, wherewith to strike and move other bodies. This original intensity of its antagonism is its *quantity of matter*. The aggregate of force in the excess imparted from the moving body, and which is represented by the acquired velocity together with its own original intensity of antagonism, and which is its quantity of matter, now constitute the capability the body possesses to generate motion in some third body; and this whole aggregate of motion generating force is what we comprehend under the term *momentum*. It is commonly said to be compounded of the velocity and quantity of matter, but it should not thereby be understood that mere motion has itself any moving force, or capacity to generate motion, but only that the motion is the index of the moving force which generated it, and which has been transferred to it from the force moving it."

"The principle involved in *virtual velocities*, when the less quantity of matter balances the greater, or more generally in all cases of equilibrium, refers at once to the conception of momentum. The less force balances the greater, because the motion of the less would be more rapid in the inverse ratio of its comparative weight." (Pp. 129 and 130.)

By the moving body spoken of in the beginning of this explanation, is evidently to be understood the body put in motion—the body moved. And "the measure of intensity that it originally had," "has neutralized its own measure in the other body," &c.; "but itself remained in, and goes along with, and indeed is the very essence of the moved body, and

this original intensity it now has also, wherewith to strike and move other bodies."

How do such intensities appear when brought into antagonism, &c., in actual experience? The two pugilists referred to in one of our former illustrations, had each "neutralized" his "own measure in the other" body's arm, by holding that arm fast, "and left only the excess" of strength, if any, which his opponent might possess, "to pass over" and overthrow or otherwise maltreat his adversary. But the strength of the *restrained* arm of the weaker man, "itself remained in, and goes along with and indeed" (matter being force) "is the very essence" of the arm itself, and "this original intensity," this strength of the restrained arm, (this "very essence" of the arm itself,) "it now has also wherewith to strike and move other bodies;" though the opponent of the weaker man, all the while holds the same arm fast. The strength is there—that is conceded, but the man *now* has it not with which to strike and move other bodies: he *will* have, when the strong man sets him free.

We desire not to comment on the other steps of the reasoning, but must leave them, as we have quoted them in full, to speak for themselves. That the intention has been to bring out the doctrine of momentum *right*, is evinced by what is afterwards said of virtual velocities: the exposition will be entitled to be called a demonstration, when it is admitted that 8 times 10 *zeros*, or 80 *zeros*, will amount to just 4 times as much as 5 times 4 *zeros*, i. e. 20 *zeros*.

"The first principle of motion is *that it must be rectilineal and uniform*." P. 120. The motion is represented as being produced by an excess of energy of one of two activities; and it is stated that "the excess of energy" in the stronger, "having nothing to balance it, will forbid that it should be holden in any one point; and yet, as the weaker activity continues its antagonism to the amount of its energy, there is a perpetual space-filling force, which cannot be holden in any one point of space. The result must be a constant force which cannot abide in any one position, and it is thus the idea of the generation of motion." (P. 121.) The deductions from this are, 1. That the motion must be *incessant*. 2. That it must be *rectilineal*. 3. That it must be *uniform*.

The first of these cannot be disputed, as the force is all the while acting; but the effect must even therefore be *cumulative*. When unobstructed force continues to act in the same direction, it continues to produce its appropriate effect in that direction; it inevitably *accelerates*. The motion will go on, faster and faster. The case becomes that of falling bodies. The veritable case contemplated here, but not reached, is that of the *momentary* action of force. Very remarkable it is, that *that* should superinduce a *uniform* and rectilineal motion. The conclusion of the "rational insight," apart from all experience, would, as it seems to us, be (as is usual in this connexion) the other way; viz. that the effect of a *momentary* action must, after a time, be worn out; but it is not so; it remains, and will remain (if unobstructed) ever, *in all its intensity*. How the "principle" of the "Rational Cosmology" would provide for *that* does not appear; unless it might be on the impracticable plan exhibited in the explanation of momentum. That the direction of the motion should also be *rectilineal* is the most simple arrangement supposable. It appears to us the most natural withal, because we have always been accustomed to its working. That such an arrangement is necessary, even in a subordinate sense, we had rather not assert, before we know what force is, at the very least. The fact, that a momentary force is ever afterward efficient, is itself specially emblematical of what must ensue from the application of a *wrong* "principle."

What will be the resultant of two forces acting at an angle, is also discussed. We are not disposed to analyze the reasoning, nor have we room for such an analysis: the conclusion is quite sufficient to condemn the whole as a demonstration of truth. It is, that if forces which act at an angle are "of unequal excess of energies, their composition must give the line dividing their angle in the inverse ratio of the excess of energy, viz. the greater excess to have proportionately the less space, and the less excess to have proportionately the greater space, on their respective sides of the divided angle between them." (Pp. 125 and 126.) The ratio is *not* that of the partial *angles* in question, but that of their respective *sines*. The contrary would introduce confusion everywhere, in ways to be specified hereafter. What is here stated of course vitiates also the conclusion with regard to the *inclined plane*.

The results being thus contradictory to fact, the inquiry may well arise, what were the phenomena in which the author of the "Rational Cosmology" supposed that he most distinctly discerned the working of his principles; and also in what precise way the "antagonist force" acts? He has not left us in the dark in either of these respects. He seems to have derived his idea of *place-holding* force from those complex phenomena of elasticity which are always due to a molecular *displacement* of *matter*. For on pp. 119 and 120 we have:

"It is also obvious that a static is nothing in nature without a dynamic, for were there no push nor pull there could be no holding place by an equal antagonism; and so also that there can be no dynamic in nature that has not also its static, for no push nor pull could be without a stand-point. In nature there is complete sophism of the ὕστερον πρότερον; and were there no way of attaining to the supernatural, both the perpetuation of rest and the beginning of motion would be absurdities; for you must first have your motion in the very act of *holding* at rest, and you must first have your rest as the hold-point or spring-board of your *moving* some other body. The only way out of such an antinomy, between nature in the understanding and nature in the sense, is the apprehension of a supernatural in the reason. An absolute spirit has the spring to an originating act in himself, in that he is ethical law in his spiritual excellency to govern himself. He may originate action, directly from the claims as known to be due from himself to himself. He has an *ethical* stand-point and spring-board, and can thus put forth his spiritual act in counteraction and make a beginning. Spiritual activity put in counteragency makes a *physical* stand-point; takes a position and holds it; and in that a static force already is, from which all physical mechanics may go out in operation."

The author's idea of the precise mode of action of the antagonist forces is first discerned in the complex phenomena which would be presented if "two rigid metallic rods" were pressed "together at their ends," and then one "should procure a complete fusion of the metal in the two rods at the point of contact." The result is stated to be "an accumulation of the metal from both in a rude globe of molten matter about the point of contact." (Pp. 134 and 135.)

From this result, in which ten thousand oblique molecular

actions are concerned, it is actually inferred that the resultant of two antagonistic activities of this sort is not *zero*, but "a growth, a new-birth of forces from the original point of counterworking," (p. 140,) and that this veritable resultant is *at right angles* to the line of antagonism of the two activities; i. e. in a direction, or in directions, of the greatest accumulation of matter in the globe about the point of contact. We cannot be mistaken in this respect; for the idea is carried out in full, through ten entire pages, under the head of "The Material Creation a Sphere:" as well as abundantly elsewhere.

This supposed action is also exemplified by the effect produced by dropping a stone into a lake; also by the progress of sound.

We observe, in passing, that the waves of sound are compared to the waves on the disturbed surface of the lake; thus—"The percussion of solid bodies, or the force of the human voice, make their similar circular, or, as entirely surrounded, their spherical waves in the atmosphere," &c. (p. 138.) The waves in the water rise and fall in directions at *right angles* to their *respective lines* of outward progress: the waves of sound are those of alternate condensation and rarefaction *in the respective directions* of their lines of progress.

Two of the conclusions which have now been distinctly exhibited and on which we have already commented, would, if true, be so important in their consequences, that they deserve to be restated, together with a declaration and description of what those consequences would be. The first of these conclusions is—that two countervailing forces (or activities) have a veritable resultant, or resultants, at right angles to their line of antagonism; the second, that when forces of "unequal excess of energies" act at an angle, their composition "must give the line dividing their angle in the inverse ratio of the excess of energy:" which would imply that in the two triangles into which the parallelogram of forces is divided, the *sides* should be as their opposite *angles*, instead of being as the *sines* of those angles. Now the prevalence of only these two as laws in the world actual, would lead to the following results:

It would derange the motions of all the heavenly bodies, at once—would render utterly unsuccessful all astronomical prediction—would make nugatory every computation of the

architect—it would change the rate of all our clocks—it would do much more:—it would urge the ocean to career over the land; and thus go far to even falsify the promise held forth in the rainbow: for the effects would be cumulative. It would modify all the analogous actions of the imponderable substances; rendering twilight different in extent and duration from what it really is—make every telescope a happy accident—and change all the climates of the earth more or less. It would (unless some unforeseen compensation should arise) introduce discord into every stringed instrument of music ever made—it would toss the atmosphere into storms such as the world has never seen. All these effects, and more than we can think of, would take place;—and of all that is here asserted *we fearlessly challenge the contradiction* by any one who knows enough of the physical forces, to know how the Great, the Almighty Sovereign of All is really pleased to order them.

It is truly gratifying to turn from the paralogisms of the Rational Cosmology, and behold their author in a very different light. The introduction to his description of what he regards as the creation of matter, contains a paragraph which we regard as one of the very finest in his book; and there are many which indicate his ability. He says of "a Supreme Absolute Spirit:" "But in the knowledge he has of his own supreme excellency of being, there is an end in his own dignity and glory ever before him. He knows what is due to himself, and nothing can intervene that he should not be true to himself. 'He remaineth faithful, he cannot deny himself.' He sees that it behooves him, as a right consciously due to himself, to manifest himself in creation. Under such ethical behest, and not at all before the impulse of any constitutional craving, God arises to the work of creation, and becomes a beginner and Author of an existence which before was not." (P. 100.)

This is no appropriate part of the "Rational Cosmology"—it seems almost out of place in it. It is Dr. Hickok himself, when he has, with humble reverence, looked into the mirror of divine truth; and, having been cheered and reanimated by its reflected beams, he then skilfully holds up the mirror to others.

But "he straightway" forgets "what manner of man he was" —philosophically we mean, not otherwise—for, on the very

next page, the author of the "Rational Cosmology" begins his description of "creation, as an origination of matter," thus:—

"Solely from the reason (*this* reason?), and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counteragency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertiæ*, or a force actively holding itself still. Combined with this antagonist activity, in the same limit of counteraction, is the diremptive activity;" as described in the passages heretofore quoted. We have already expressed ourselves with regard to any such exposition. What is intended by it, the views already commented on will sufficiently indicate.

After this we are informed as to how the material creation progressed; how it became a sphere.

"Taking then the independent action of force, as the conception of two countervailing spiritual activities, and following out the action directly according to the necessary laws of motion, we come to the knowledge that matter must accumulate itself about the point of counteragency in the form of a sphere, and must take on all the properties of a solid globe, which has the whole space filled from the centre to the circumference with successive forces, in their contiguous positions, sent off from the central action of the original simple antagonism." (P. 139.)

As we have heretofore indicated and shown by quotation, the conception of the mode of action of the two activities is discerned in the reaction of an elastic spring-board. Thus, "you must first have your rest as the hold-point or spring-board of your *moving* some other body." Also it is said of "an absolute spirit" that "he has an *ethical* stand-point and spring-board." (P. 119.) The author, therefore, must suppose a reaction of the activities backward, "each agency turning its opposite back upon itself," (p. 140); a recoil, such as spiral springs crowded up between two arrows would have

Only *one* pressed spring would be needed; hence we presume

the idea of "counteraction or antagonism in a single activity," (p. 94,) heretofore spoken of; and the "conception of matter" as being a "combination of distinguishable forces," (p. 96); both the crowding in, and the reacting outward being where the spring is.

This arrangement might be practicable in the case of a pressed spring, a spring of a veritable elastic *material;* but the reaction would be the resultant of ten thousand molecular forces, instead of only two. But whether this be all so or not, the subsequent processes described are all in accordance with the impracticable laws of force already condemned; because found to be either inadequate, or else wrong, everywhere. The



processes are these: The simple reacting forces go out from the limit L, in the two directions backward from the arrow-points, toward P and P'.* Then it is asserted that, "while the simple reacting force would go out in right lines directly back each way from the point of contact, the compounded forces will rise, as it were in a ring, at the point of contact directly transverse of the original line of action." This ring E E' is here seen edgewise, and so appears like a straight line; it is afterward styled "the equatorial ring." Then the accumulation begins at right angles to the ring itself, as represented by the short arrows, and so two other rings are formed parallel to the ring E E'; and this "will be, in fact, the turning of the whole ring on each side from itself, and making it to flow in newly engendered streams of forces on both sides backward toward

* The figure is, of course, our own.

the polar points" P and P′. These polar points are represented as keeping "the continued activity" "from going back any further in a right line" (P P′) "as an axis;" and so those activities "must perpetuate this flowing back, on each side of the equator, in new generations of forces, till they meet in their respective polar points, and a proper globe is thus formed by a spherical layer all about the central point. This primitive globe is now self-balanced in all its points, but as the central action goes on, it must again push each way in the axis and generate two other polar points beyond, thereby elongating the axis," (as is represented in the figure) "and in this elongation there comes as before a static rest in the axial direction, and the central working must rise again in a new transverse ring, and repeat a new flow of forces in their rings from the equator each way to the poles, and augment the globe by another ensphering layer," &c. &c.;—"and so on indefinitely, till the reactions in the accumulating forces of the globe balance the energy of the central working, and the globe ceases to grow." (Pp. 140–142.) Moreover "the continual working at the centre continually generates new balls within the old, expanding the old as the new are generated within them," . . . . "and the whole globe is held in one as it were by a perpetuated agency that runs through and connects every position. No portion of the material force is isolate from the rest, but the whole ball is concrete from the centre through its entire sphere." It is stated, moreover, that "By no way can the created matter be lost except through a dissolution of the central force," and, that gone, "the outlying forces in the globe would have nothing to rest upon, and they must all dissolve, and literally,"

> 'Like the baseless fabric of a vision,
> Leave not a wreck behind.'—(Pp. 143, 144.)

What shall we say then, when we remember that this very "central force" is the activity reduced to helplessness, the *zero*-force, which we have heretofore described and characterized? Why truly that what we have here quoted, accurately describes what the whole globe is, and what its fate must be.

Even if this were not so, we see, withal, that it is not nature in general, but the central force that *abhors a vacuum;* and, as

it used to be said, there is *a limit* to the abhorrence, so here: for though "an infinite energy at the centre may generate new layers infinitely," yet we are also told, that when the power that created "ceases to augment the central action against the ensphered reactions, the globe will have attained its determined magnitude." (P. 142.) The question then recurs as to "what has been gained, except simply removing the mystery and our ignorance one step further back," (p. 147;) but it is visibly applicable to the "philosophy" of the "Rational Cosmology," instead of the Newtonian theory of gravitation.

Another illustration of the actual state of things here supposed, seems to us to be precisely in point; but we forbear to employ it, lest our object should seem to be mere ridicule. But unfortunately for the "Rational Cosmology" there is a point beyond the ridiculous; and that the "philosophy" here in question has attained to it may readily be shown, for, in this connexion, that philosophy has ventured again into the region of exact science; the region of ascertained fact and well-determined law.

For "the insight of the reason" is next "turned" "to the eternally necessary and immutable law of gravity." (P. 148.) The ensphering action is reviewed, and farther exhibited, and it is stated, that "the central point expels the outlying points on all sides;" while the other points are so situated, that "each point" "must on the side towards the centre act upon it, and only on the side from the centre act upon the layer exterior to it," &c. (P. 150.) Then, besides, that "It is a necessary determination that a globe so generated should have in every molecular force a centrifugal and a centripetal tendency just balancing each other, and thus holding the molecule at rest. The centrifugal force, it is said, "is properly *expulsion*," and the centripetal "*repulsion;*" though the terms attraction and repulsion are retained under protest. (P. 151.)* Under the

* There have been several attempts to account for gravitation; among others the elastic fluid supposed by Newton himself. Playfair found, by rigid investigation, that for this purpose, there is only required an elastic fluid, of which the density is as the distance from the central body, and the elasticity as a certain given magnitude diminished by the reciprocal of that distance. Here repulsion comes in at least appropriately.

head of "the principle of falling bodies" we have, what would seem to be an additional postulate, of "one simple activity of a greater energy working toward the centre, and one activity of a less energy working from the centre." (P. 155.)* Be that as it may, it is with the laws of repulsion and attraction here deduced from the consideration of the forces that we are principally concerned. On page 153 we have "the necessary law for repulsion," expressed thus: "*directly as quantity of matter, and inversely as the cube of the distance.*"

Now as the cube of the distance is *zero* at the centre, the law will of course require an *infinite* repulsion at *the centre*, as the resultant of the *finite* "working" originally begun *absolutely there.* But an infinite repulsion once seated there, what is to prevent *it* from acting in the manner before described; and then "an infinite energy at the centre may generate new layers infinitely," (p. 142); and the globe must very soon be beyond all bounds.

The inconsistencies do not even end here. For "the attractive force," withal, "must be *directly as the quantity of matter and inversely as the square of the distance.*" (P. 154.) Now as in approaching the centre the repulsive force increases by a more rapid law than the attractive; if then, in the instance of any molecule, we have "a centrifugal and centripetal tendency just balancing each other, and thus holding the molecule at rest," then repulsion must prevail for points nearer the centre; and so, if matter under these circumstances could exist at all, it would be driven away from the centre, to the limit of the just balancing forces, and the sphere be hollow; while beyond the limit it must at first increase in density, &c., &c. Nay more, the attractive force, separately considered, is itself all false to nature. For it is "*in* all globes" (p. 154) that the law "must" prevail. Now the attractive force of the earth (its

* Physical astronomy has demonstrated that gravitation is not modified by the interposition of the bodies which transmit it. How will "*place-holding*" force and the "principles of motion" dispose of this?

Gravitation withal exhibits itself not as an *emanation*, requiring (like light) *time* for its transmission. Its velocity, if not infinite, must be at least *fifty million* of times greater than the velocity of light, (Méc. Céleste.) How can so much *more, or so much less* force be there, without loss of time, when circumstances require it, if matter *be itself force*, definitely arranged already?

intensity we mean) has been determined in at last four different ways; and all involve the doctrine, abundantly confirmed otherwise, that every molecule attracts every other directly as its mass indeed, and inversely as the square of the distance between them. But just in accordance with that, the attractive force at the centre of a symmetrically arranged globe must be *zero* instead of the *infinity* due to the law of the "Rational Cosmology;" for the forces all around the centre hold one another in equilibrio there: it is the case of millions of countervailing forces, all reduced to *zero*, of course. With respect to other points *within* the globe, the well digested investigations of physics with respect to central forces show that in a sphere of a uniform density, the force varies *directly as the distance from the centre*; but when the globe is more dense toward the centre, the attractive force would not vary quite so rapidly with the increase of distance: the former is the case in question. The law as expressed in the "Rational Cosmology" is that of attraction on a particle *outside* of the sphere, instead of *within*.

Thus, with respect to both the attractive and the repulsive force, the solution of the "Rational Cosmology" has surpassed the point *beyond* the ridiculous to an extent that cannot well be exceeded; and this with its central force veritably *zero*. The despised inductive method would seem here not out of place, in leading as it does to the generalization;—That all false philosophies have this feature in common; the attempt to veritably make something out of nothing.

Afterward it is said, with respect to the law of attraction, that it "is true again, not only of all globes in respect to each one's own portions of matter among themselves, but of all globes relatively to each other." The law indeed prevails with respect to the action of a sphere on a molecule without it, and hence controls the action of one sphere on another; but the mode of illustration in the "Rational Cosmology" is peculiar. For, we learn that, "when any two globes come within each other's range of attraction so that the peripheries of their spheres cut each other, the point of contact is at once a point of antagonism, and their acting central forces must so work this commencing antagonism as to push each one back upon itself and begin an ensphering anew, with the central point at

the first point of contact, and the forces of each globe must be successively turned back in a hemisphere within itself, and both together must form a new globe around the central point, and like 'kindred drops both ultimately mingle into one.'"

We find, withal, that "Any masses of matter less or more, must stand to each other as two such globes when they have their gravitating forces brought in contact, and their common centre of gravity must work after this eternal principle." (Pp. 154 and 155.)

We *must* leave this illustration (as such) to speak for itself. In no other way scarcely, could all we have before said about precision and other matters connected with it, be so well justified.

The author's remarks on p. 268 convey an idea to which we would earnestly demur; viz. a central point of revolution for all the visible creation, as being the last conclusion to which the doctrine of gravitation must tend. The author of the "Rational Cosmology" however, or any one else, will find it difficult to make it even probable that absolute rest exists anywhere in all this wide domain. That there may be absolute rest, is derived by an *induction:* we do not find it realized.

We have no room for a criticism of the explanation of capillary attraction (p. 262, &c.) It leaves out we may say several of the facts; and those omitted will be found to condemn it; especially the *depression* of mercury in a glass tube of a fine bore, below the level of the mercury in the basin in which the tube is plunged; the very decidedly *convex* surface of the top of the column even then; &c.

We have already spoken incidentally of the principle of falling bodies, we can only speak here of results; having already occupied a greater space than we had intended.

On pages 157 and 158, the spaces traversed in successive and equal times seem to be correctly stated, after the *principal* fact has been *assumed;* and the reasoning, after the veritable quantities are introduced, goes on consistently, though involving errors already commented on before that. But then the law, when summed up, is on pages 158 and 159 applied to the *velocities last acquired* instead of the *spaces variably traversed.* Now the action of gravitation near the surface of the earth

being in effect constant, the velocity acquired during each successive moment is the same; and thus the *velocity* is twice as great at the end of two moments from the beginning of the fall as at the end of only one, &c., &c.: the velocities acquired being directly as *the times*, instead of the *squares* of the times. A different result established as a law would derange the action of gravitation everywhere.

At the top of page 160 we have the old error of angle for sine. Farther down the page we have the ratio of the height of an inclined plane to its length, which gives the sine and not the angle; and so contradicts the other statement.

The *principle of heat* finds the "diremptive force" in place, (pp. 179, &c.;) the diremptive force being, in some of its relations, another name for the repulsive force of heat. Every thing else in connection with heat is marred by the presence of the old helpless antagonist force.

When the water in a canal is disturbed by the motion of a boat on the surface, the ripples are propagated faster than the motion of the boat on the surface, and so, far outrun the actual forward thrust in the water of the boat itself; and thus predict the boat's approach. So when a carpet is held at one end, so that it cannot travel along the ground, but then is violently shaken, we see waves, like those in the canal, rapidly exhibited in the successive folds of the carpet. When a stone is dropped into a lake, the waves superinduced are circular, but it is the wave that is propagated, the water is scarcely more moved onward than was the shaken carpet, as we may see by observing the light substances which float on the surface.

In his exposition of the *principle of magnetism*, (pp. 163, &c.,) Dr. Hickok supposes waves similar to these; but instead of attributing the motion to them after the manner here described, he supposes two such circular disturbances of the substance, or matter, or force, in question, themselves to be moved until their *centres coincide*, and they coalesce and give one circular arrangement, after an impracticable fashion; very much as in the instance of gravitation. We need not pursue the reasoning after this. It gives to a globe two poles situated at the extremities of the same axis, &c.

It will be quite enough here to add several questions, to

which any theory or explanation of magnetism is bound to reply. Why is the development of magnetism at or near the surface of the magnet much greater than it is in the region within? How is it that the earth has very possibly *four* magnetic poles; and that these are so far from the astronomical poles? Why do not the positions of greatest intensity coincide with those respectively at which the dip is 90°? What is the connection between the isothermal lines, and the lines of equal magnetic intensity? What shall we do with thermo-magnetism? Scarcely one of these does the "Rational Cosmology" consider at all; nor could it solve them without ruinous postulates.

Electricity (p. 171, &c.) is derived from the interrupted action of magnetism; which is the case after a special fashion with magneto-electricity. The careful inductions of science point all the other way with respect to electricity under other circumstances; and the ingenious and beautiful, though highly artificial, theory of Ampère, derives magnetism from currents of electricity; and explains the phenomena with unsurpassed success.

We seem to see a man of great intellect standing beside that special exhibition of science and art conjoined, a railway train with the locomotive attached. The philosopher having well considered what is before him, comes to a distinct persuasion, which is to him a clear insight, of how the whole ought to move. He then seizes upon the magnificent quartos of Tredgold on the Steam Engine, and without looking into them, exclaims they have their use, and forthwith converts them into a footstool, by means of which he mounts into the engineer's seat. He then announces the conclusion, that it is reasonable that the passenger-cars should have the precedence, because of the great value of the freight which they carry. He therefore "backs" the engine, and puts all in motion in conformity to that reasonable arrangement; and so in the end arrives at the place from which the train had started some time before, instead of that which they had been destined to reach.

On page 210 the vibrations of *Light* are represented as being spheroidal or rather ellipsoidal, involving a change of shape in spherical layers of masses; instead of those molecular

changes which the undulatory theory so imperatively requires; which theory withal has received such ample confirmations. The interference of light (p. 217) is attributed to cross-vibrations. Their direction is almost anything but that. Also (p. 297) we are told that "the angle of refraction is the same in all cases for the same substance." That the vibrations of the atmosphere which give sound were incorrectly stated, we have heretofore noticed.

On page 214 we find it stated of the sun, that "its light and heat are as determinate principles as its gravity, yea, they are eternally determined in its gravity." The late Professor Hassler had we believe some such idea. But if this be so, how is it that the same principle does not illuminate the dark bodies in space; such as the companion to Sirius which must yet be many times heavier than our sun; to say nothing withal of the relative light of red, yellow, blue, white, and green stars?

On page 219 we are informed that "the first geological formations must be plutonic, the crystallized and partially crystallized will underlie the composite, and the inner heat will at length be so confined and softened, that an atmosphere shall form, and the combination of water commence, &c."

On page 203 and elsewhere the tangential force is naturally enough put for the centrifugal force. This would accord better with the doctrines of force as laid down in the "Rational Cosmology;" but the substitution is just as incorrect as it is natural. The relations of central forces are among the things well-ascertained. They cannot now be overturned.

On page 204 we find, in effect, that the course of one of two fixed lines which meet a tangent, *at the point of contact*, will "evince a curve to be a hyperbola, or a parabola," &c. We cannot but think that this will be new to mathematicians. An embodiment of the idea may be found in this. If a target be placed so as exactly to touch the more remote bank of a river, and then a ball be fired from a *given station*, so as to strike the target at any angle, and then be reflected at an equal angle; then the *precise course* of *the ball in its rebound*, will "evince" the *special form* of *the turns and bends* of *the river*, both above and below the target.

Besides other errors of tangential force, &c., we find (p. 207)

that the radius-vector of a planet varies inversely as the velocity. When the velocity is variable at all, it varies inversely as the *perpendicular* from the centre of force on the tangent, and not as the radius-vector.

"The *squares of the times of revolution*" (of the planets) "*must be as the cubes of the mean distances.*" In the proof of this we find (p. 208) "a less or greater force, in carrying the planet through the same orbit," &c. A less or greater force could *not carry* the planet through the *same* orbit, the central force remaining constant. When *impossible quantities* are introduced into calculation, they must be represented as in *impossible relations;* in order that what is *not* to be found among the *impossibles* may appear among the *possibles.*

On the same page, and the next the relations of distances and times, are made to depend on the form of body from which a planet is thrown off. They depend essentially on the law of central force, its intensity, and the velocity of projection.

On page 209 we read, moreover, this comparison between a planet thrown off from "the circumference of a circular plane," and that "expelled from the equatorial surface of a sphere:"

"But when a planet has been expelled from the equatorial surface of a sphere, although revolving at the same time within the same orbit, yet must its force have been far greater. Every radius of the sphere has thrown off its own portion, and here the principle must be as the cube of the distance" (instead of the square, when thrown from the circle,) "and we shall have the determined formula that the squares of the periodic times will be as the cubes of the distances." Here we have the former difficulty of revolving in the same orbit with a far greater force which (if provided for) may possibly be compensated by a greater central force. But then we have every radius of the revolving sphere throwing off its own portion; though all revolve about the axis in the same time. The force could not be gravitation which admitted of that. Then, lastly, we have squares of distances for the planetary fragment of a circle, and cubes of distances for that of the sphere; because, it would seem, circles are as the squares of their radii, and spheres as the cubes of the same. We have heard of a conjecture that the days were longer in summer, because heat

expanded all bodies. The cases certainly are not quite parallel; but the connexion is no less unreal.

On page 330 we have a reproduction of the error exploded some two years ago at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, viz. "The satellites revolve but *do not rotate.*" If one person should take his seat in the middle of a room and another walk around him looking always north; the traveller would turn his back to the other when he was on the north side of the apartment; his face when he was on the south side; be turned sidewise when he was on the east and west sides respectively, &c., &c. He would revolve around the central body but would not rotate; and therefore would so present himself to the central body as to exhibit himself on all sides. So does *not* the moon; she shows nearly the same face always. Therefore it cannot be true that she does *not* rotate. But a body going round another and fastened to it by a rod so as to turn its face always inward, must *face around on all sides once* in doing so. *That* is what a body always facing another must do whether the connecting rod be there or no. This is the case with the moon and perhaps some other satellites.

On p. 331 we have—"The same conformity with the principle is found in the facts of the very *slight excentricity* of the moon's orbit, and the *absence of all flattening at the poles.* If the moon had been ejected from its primary with sufficient force to rotate, it must have been considerably elliptical in its orbit; and if it had rotated on its axis it must have been oblate proportioned to the rapidity of rotation. The facts all correspond to the determinations of the rational principle."

The stubborn facts are all the other way. The excentricity of the moon's orbit is very nearly the same with that of most of the larger planets, and it is more than three times as great as that of the earth's orbit. The moon does rotate, as has been shown already: and the form of the moon is that of an approximation to an ellipsoid; the shortest equatorial diameter being longer than the polar, and the longest of all, the equatorial diameter pointing to the earth.

On the same page the result of M. Hansen's profound analysis as regards the shape of the moon is thus gotten rid of—

"This general law of the satellites, that they constantly turn one face to the primary, has been sometimes accounted for by supposing that one hemisphere of the satellite is protruded towards the planet and is thus held in place, by an excess of gravity in the protruding part; but no fact of such protuberance appears, and the true principle determines the facts as they are given, without any gratuitous hypothesis." There is the usual fatality here as regards all the facts. The gratuitous hypothesis is a careful deduction. The part of the moon formed of more dense material, but not really heavier, is that turned away from us, and not toward us. Being more dense it *is* less protuberant. The lunar irregularities (and not the regular turning of the same face toward us,) led to this conclusion.

In regions such as these, which the most profound analysts enter with a wholesome dread, and within which they step with caution, the "Rational Cosmology" moves along with a step which it evidently regards as being well-assured, and specially becoming to itself. It here also displays its *triumphs;* as we have just now seen. Witness, moreover, its prediction that such retrograde comets as Halley's must become direct in their movements; which *means*, as we see, that "the line of ascending node" shall "revolve" "till the point is reached in the particular orbital plane of the comet, that equilibrates the right and left hand attractions through the whole revolution, and must then remain with slight oscillations to and fro that incidental disturbances will occasion." (Pp. 356 and 357.)

We add but one other exemplification, which may serve, withal, specially to illustrate what here immediately precedes.

On p. 337, "Because the axis of the earth is more than 90° turned from the axis of Uranus, the moons of Uranus must from the earth appear to move in a westerly direction."

Passing by minor criticisms on this, we observe that the sun, the moon, and very commonly the planets, *appear* to turn around their axes in a direction from east to west, while they really are turning from west to east—all because we must look upon them from the outside. Such motions may then in one part of their circuit appear the reverse of what they really are; but any method of measuring the angle between the axis of Uranus (or rather its parallel) and the axis of the earth,

which would make that angle *greater* than 90°, must itself succeed in putting *south* for *north*, and of course, also, *west* for *east*.

Are not exemplifications such as these among the *triumphs* of the "Rational Cosmology?" Let us hear what it says:

"That the moons of Uranus are retrograde has been a surprising anomaly from its first discovery, but that this exceptional fact is found to leap within the necessary determinations of the eternal principle, and is found anomalous only in appearance, the principle itself expounding why it must so appear, is a most conclusive example of that accordance of fact and principle, which is alone true science." (P. 338.)

The concluding remark rightly understood is indeed true; and therefore it must be abundantly manifest by this time, that the "Rational Cosmology" is *not* true; or if true, that it must be true in other worlds than those of which astronomy has any knowledge. It stands condemned by a just criterion of its own selecting. Its author has failed, conspicuously failed; but he has failed where no *man* can hope to succeed. The philosophy, or rather science, at which he aims may be that of angels; it has not in this world yet been attained by unaided men. There is another path for them—"Nay, it is a point fit and necessary in the front, and beginning of the work, without hesitation or reservation to be professed, that it is no less true in this human kingdom of knowledge, than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall enter into it, 'except he become first as a little child.'"*

In obedience to this noble aphorism (though not always in view of it) all veritable progress in physical science has been made. The science thus built up may be decried. It may be misrepresented as having "its full mission" "accomplished" "in complete and final positivism." That will be true when Mormonism is the perfection of civil liberty. It may be told "that it can vindicate its possession logically to no fact that it assumes beyond actual experiment." That may be true when it is shut out from the use of certain of its mental powers, or agrees to make use of only a portion of them: but it cannot invalidate its

* Bacon's Valerius Terminus Of the Interpretation of Nature, Montague's Edition, Vol. I. p. 267.

mode of gathering its own facts. It may be told by those who would shut it up to less than this, that it "is in the end atheistic or" (*mirabile dictu*) "Pantheistic." It were sad indeed if that were true, for its method is evidently the humble child-like one of first carefully studying what God has permitted to be, without a previous determination of what it must be. This is the only way in which the book of nature can be successfully studied. That some of its students have wrongly read, and wilfully misinterpreted it, may be an argument against the only proper use of the book itself, when the abuse of a doctrine makes it untrue.

But this method has no philosophy; it terminates in mere facts. Its investigations can indeed go no farther, in themselves, than general facts, and those *great pervading relations* of facts, *the laws of nature.* But in the knowledge of these *precise* relations lies its strength, of their *precision*, not merely of their generality.

But has it no principles—no philosophy? Yes! But both are heaven-born, and not of man's devising; and therefore they will be *eternal.* For there is one science which *can* begin where the "Rational Cosmology" would put itself; it is heaven-descended theology, which finds its perfection in Christianity; and derives its knowledge from Him who "was in the beginning with God," and "who hath declared him."

With the Bible before him the *Christian philosopher* accepts as his great hypothesis the God of the Bible; and attributes creation to his "good pleasure;" and having learned the resources of that good pleasure, the Christian philosopher considers it *philosophical* to conclude that Infinite Wisdom might have devised a plan different, even very different, from that which we find; nay, that it would be very *unphilosophical* to think otherwise. This philosophy accepts withal the Bible's account of creation, which (in the words of the author of the Rational Cosmology,) "makes God a beginner and Author of an existence which before was not;" but *that* a veritable *substance*, infinitely beneath the blessed Creator himself. This the Christian philosophy receives in the simple faith of the little child, believing as it does that it cannot comprehend God's first great formative act. Other principles there may be, inferior to these; but the

humble student of the book of nature, is every day more perfectly convinced that the knowledge of them is still lodged where the Bible came from.

The unexpected length to which our remarks on the physical aspect of Dr. Hickok's book have run, constrains us to the most brief and general comments upon its psychological, metaphysical, and theological views. The points to which, in closing, we call attention are the following.

1. We encounter on the very first page, and repeatedly elsewhere, a characteristic infirmity of this class of writers—the attempt to give a decisive turn to the discussion of fundamental questions, by arguments drawn from the etymology of words. This is done by the author, in establishing his doctrine of principles as uncreated in contrast with facts as things made: his theory of the functions of understanding as distinguished from reason; his contrast between existence and being; his objection to the Scottish philosophy of common sense; his distinction between nature and the supernatural. Of this last we give a single specimen, because we shall have cause to refer to the passage for another purpose. On the fallacy of this kind of argument, it is needless here to expatiate.

Dr. Hickok tells us: "Nature, *natura*, (*a nascor*,) is a birth, an outspringing, a growth. . . . It is applied properly to every created individual thing, inasmuch as each separate thing has its own peculiarly constituted forces which make it to be what it is, and gives to it its own essential identity, and which secure that it must develop itself after the conditions of its original constitution. . . . That which was not created, or constituted of such conditioned forces, has not a nature, but must be wholly supernatural. Of all created existence we may say in general, it is Nature." Pp. 131–2. We need not repeat here the criticisms we have offered in another article, in regard to this view of nature and the supernatural, as it is given by Coleridge.

2. Dr. Hickok pronounces man's "free personality," "the rational in humanity," to be "wholly supernatural," "wholly above nature." Pp. 80, 81. Much more might be cited to the same effect. But, as we have just seen, he pronounces "all

created existence" to be nature. Where then are we? Are the free personality and the rational faculty in man uncreated? What else does all this mean? If uncreated, are they simply an effluence of the Uncreated One, consubstantial with Him? If any clew to a different meaning can be shown, we shall be thankful. We shall need a keener "insight of reason" than we yet dare profess, to detect it. This "unmade" part of our being, what is it? Is it, or can it be anything which God made, when he created man in his own image? We do not see how it differs from the "impersonal" reason of Cousin, which can only be a one divine essence permeating humanity, or from that of Coleridge which he pronounces "identical with its own objects, *God*, the soul, immortality." The prerogatives which Dr. Hickok ascribes to the reason are commensurate with its supreme dignity. "Reason," says he, "is not a *fact;* a somewhat that has been *made;* but from its own necessity of being, can be conceived no otherwise than a verity which fills eternity and immensity." P. 85. No wonder then that "the created facts being given, the reason may in them detect the laws by which they are governed, and *when the insight of reason also determines that these very laws in the facts are such as the eternal principles made necessary*, we have then a true and valid science of the universe, and may safely call the result of our work a Rational Cosmology." (P. 256.) "This immutable principle, which determines how the fact *may*, and, if the fact be at all, how it *must* be, is given in pure thought alone, and is no appearance in the sense." P. 18. "If the creator *must* make and guide the universal cosmos after the determination of immutable principles," &c. p. 56.

According to this, if God puts forth any creative act, he can do so only in conformity with certain eternal laws, which necessitate the production of the results actually accomplished, and no other. The only election left to the Creator respects the degrees and times of the forth-putting of his creative energy, but not the quality or manner of the working thereof. These latter are determined by immutable necessary laws. It is the province of reason to detect these laws, and their eternal necessity; how a creation *must* be if it be at all. Such insight and nothing else is true science. Dr. Hickok then proceeds to

unfold these laws, as seen by the insight of reason; to show how force, i. e. the antagonisms and diremptions of activities, and the necessary laws seen by the reason to govern its working, *must* develop all the forms and properties of matter, mechanical, chemical, organic, and inorganic, physiological, vegetable, animal; gravity, cohesion, repulsion, heat, light, electricity. magnetism, &c.! Such is the prerogative of reason, according to Dr. Hickok; not to see what creation is, and that being such, it must have had a creator, but to see how it must be, and the eternal laws which necessitate that the creative act produce what is produced, if it be exerted at all! That faculty which can do this, he may well assert "fills eternity and immensity." We hardly know how to speak of the stupendous daring, the heroic audacity of such an attempt on the part of a mortal. The utter failure of the attempt, already made too apparent in the examination of the physical part of his book, is no discredit to Dr. Hickok's powers. His only discredit lies in not knowing better than to essay an insight into what is beyond mortal ken. We will just here, before discussing another point that arises in this connection, note another prerogative which he awards to reason, in which its divine dignity culminates. "The being is bound to be his own end." P. 84. "It (the rational) can make its own conscious worth and dignity its end of action." We think so too, if Dr. Hickok's account of it be correct. With the exception of its being incarnate, and, according to the author, susceptible of some kind of subordination to the Supreme Reason, (we can hardly see what,) wherein does it differ from Him, of whom, and through whom, and *to* whom are all things, to whom be glory for ever?

But who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Who by searching can find out God? Who can fathom the great deep of his counsels? We see enough indeed of the outbeamings of his infinite excellence and uncreated glory, to know that he is entitled to our absolute homage and devotion. But the light which reveals this, also discloses an infinitude beyond, utterly unsearchable by us. The beams which disclose also veil him. He *covereth* himself with light as a garment. What we know, are only parts of his ways, and how little a portion is heard of him? But, as Dr.

Hickok portrays *man* and his Maker, is God the being who dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath seen or can see? Dr. Hickok says that he is. But we see not why he should say so without renouncing his system.

3. As to these necessary laws or truths, which the reason sees to be such, and which govern uncontrollably the whole construction of the material universe, and by which the human mind can develop the necessary forms of matter, animate and inanimate, as it develops the science of geometry from its axioms; we say, 1. There is no evidence of their existence; 2. There is evidence that, whether they exist or not, we cannot know them. The question is not, whether, or in what sense, there are any necessary truths or relations. On this we may presently say something. But it is whether there are necessary unmade principles, which necessitate that, if the Creator puts forth creative energy at all, it must issue in the precise laws and products which we find in the material universe. We say there is no proof of them. If they have being, we are incapable of ascertaining them. By laborious experimentation, observation, and induction, we are constantly learning that certain laws do exist, some governing all matter, others particular kinds of matter. But by no human "insight of reason" can it be proved that these laws could not be otherwise, if such were the good pleasure of God. Dr. Hickok, in attempting to prove it, as has already been shown, has undertaken to prove not a few things to be *necessarily* true, which are *actually* false. Is it not too much to deserve serious refutation for any man to claim, that if God exerts his energy at all, it must be in such a way as to produce light, heat, and electricity, and the precise laws which now shape their action? that "matter *must* impress itself upon the senses?" (p. 110;) that, "with the complicated and nicely adapted organism of the eye given in conception, it may be a clear insight of the reason that matter, as a space-filling force, must give all the conditions requisite for vision?" (P. 116.)

Can any knowledge be more purely empirical than all that we know or can know in regard to the susceptibility of the

senses, or any of them, to impressions from material objects? Is it possible to know the first fact in regard to the capacity of any bodily sense, or the power of other objects upon it, except by experience and consciousness? Is it possible to demonstrate before-hand that vision will result from the structure of the eye, or that it will be destroyed by lesion of the optic nerve or brain? Would it not be quite as easy to prove that the brain must be intensely sensitive, while, in fact, as Sir Charles Bell has observed, "that part of the brain which if disturbed or diseased takes away consciousness, is as insensible as the leather of our shoe?"

The same writer observes, "When the bones, joints, and all the membranes and ligaments which cover them, are exposed, they may be cut, pricked, or even burned, without the patient or the animal suffering the slightest pain." If *a priori* reasoning has place in regard to the existence, kind, and degree of animal sensibility, would it not quite as easily prove the contrary of all this, as that a "space-filling force" must furnish the conditions requisite for vision, or that matter must impress the senses?

With regard to necessary truths, in the strictest sense, they are those, the contradictories of which to the human mind are neither supposable nor conceivable. These, however, are, with slight exceptions, truths of relation rather than of actual existence, and chiefly pertain to the formal sciences of Logic and Mathematics. A close analysis will show the necessary judgments in these sciences, to be chiefly reducible to the simple principles of identity and contradiction: viz. that we must think a thing to be what it is, and not what it is not. Space and time are necessary in our thought, as the illimitable void receptivities in which all bodies and all events must have place. The metaphysical ideas of causality and substance have this conditional necessity; that, if events are given, they must have a cause, if qualities are given, they must have a substance. The mind is unable to judge otherwise. The idea of the good is necessary on the supposition of the existence of moral beings; of the beautiful, on the supposition of esthetic faculties; of the true, on the supposition of intellectual and rational faculties. While, however, we cannot conceive of a perfect God as desti-

tute of either of these ideas and attributes in absolute perfection, it is conceivable that man, had it been the will of God, might have been made a sentient, but not a rational being, or an intelligent being, to a certain extent, and yet not an esthetic or moral being. But within the realms of actual existence, the range of necessary principles, ascertainable by us as such, is exceedingly narrow. As to all created substances, or events, what can we pronounce to be necessary regarding them even in our conception, that is not implied in saying, that bodies must be in space, events in time, and that they must have a cause? But this in no appreciable degree limits the divine activity, or the possibilities open to creative energy. It determines not how, nor where anything must be brought to pass. It limits not the Holy One, and leaves all things possible with God, to be executed according to the good pleasure of his will. The laws of nature are uniform, not by any compulsory necessity that they should be so, as that the sum of the angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles; not because God could not, for cause, wholly change their working, as he has been pleased to do in the case of miracles; but because, for wise and holy reasons, it has pleased him that they should abide, and that seed-time and harvest should not fail during the present dispensation. But how long this system of physical nature shall last, we know not. The scoffers of old and of late, who reluctate against the reign of a personal God in nature, providence, and grace, have asked "Where is the promise of his coming? Do not all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation?" But the answer of the Supreme Reason to this is, that as he destroyed the wicked of old by a deluge of water, and a rain of fire, so "the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto judgment and perdition of ungodly men." See 2 Peter ii.

On Dr. Hickok's theory, nothing, so far as matter is concerned, is left to the free disposal of God, except the bare supply of the "force" requisite to the creation and sustentation of created things. All else is remanded to the domination of "immutable principles," as relentless in their necessity as fate. He may exert more or less of the *vis creativa*. But that is all.

The manner and measure of its working, and the results to which it comes, are determined by an overbearing necessity, which is beyond the reach of Omnipotence. Where then is Providence? What rules us and the universe? A free personal God, or a fatalistic necessity?

4. The fundamental doctrine out of which Dr. Hickok evolves his whole system of "Rational Cosmology" is that "matter is force," purely and simply force. What then does he mean by force? Recurring to what we have already frequently referred to, he tells us, "When, however, the conception is that of simple action in counteraction, an activity that works from opposite sides upon itself, we have in it at once the true notion of force." (Pp. 93, 4.) This subject has been sufficiently discussed in its relations to natural philosophy. We wish now to consider it as related to metaphysics and theology. It appears then that force is the resultant of counter activities. Whose activity, whose action in counteraction? Certainly that of some agent or substance. Certainly we may insist on this with one who postulates necessary truths on so liberal a scale. If there be any truth, which the "insight of reason" cannot avoid discerning as a first truth, it is that all qualities belong to some substance, all attributes to a subject, all actions to an agent. Whose action and counteraction then is it that thus develops itself as force, i. e. as matter? Surely it can be no other than God's. What else then is matter than the activity of God, God in act? Says Dr. Hickok, "Solely from the reason, and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts *his simple activity* in counter-agency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing; a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity." (P. 101.) "This material is not God, nor at all competent to rise from its imposed conditions into the region of the absolute." (P. 102.) We are glad that Dr. Hickok disclaims and tries to escape monism. But whether he can do it logically, without renouncing the fundamental principle of his Cosmology, is another question, which fealty to God and truth requires us to put and answer. After all disclaimers, he teaches that God's "act

mecting and holding his act," gives the "antagonism which constitutes force," or matter. If this is any "new thing" beyond God's activity in antagonism "standing out for objective manifestation," or in any other sense "distinct from his own subjective simplicity," we do not see it. Indeed Dr. Hickok explicitly declares, "the antagonism and the diremption to be the one agency of the Absolute Spirit." (P. 101.) "All being will be alike subjective to Him." (P. 100.) At all events, most pantheists will be satisfied with such a *που στω*, and will readily found their systems upon it. Dr. Hickok says truly, "there is a dualism; the world is not without its Maker, and the maker is not in and of the world." (P. 21.) But we confess that this dualism does not "exist or stand out" on his theory, any further than the dualism between the agent and his activity. The most common pantheistic formula is, that the Absolute being comes to *exist* or *stand out in objective manifestation*, by becoming an object to himself in Nature and Humanity. Some say that He does this in coming into self-consciousness. Self-consciousness implies distinction; distinction limitation: thus the Infinite evolves itself and becomes objective to itself in the finite. Still these men would say "there is a dualism," in the monism. The finite is not the infinite, although of it, as the flower is of the plant, the wave of the ocean. The main thing is that the finite is not a created substance distinct from the Infinite Creator, but an act or evolution of him. When we consider the divine prerogatives ascribed by Dr. Hickok to the reason in man, along with his definition of matter as force or the antagonism of divine activities, we feel ourselves nearing that awful vortex of modern German philosophy, from which all but the most dauntless speculatists must recoil with horror. Says Chalybäus, in his historical survey of Schelling's philosophy: "If in all this, we never forget the main point, namely, that apart from this living impulse, movement, and activity, there is nothing material or real whereupon or wherein these indications of power occur, *but that the very real and material itself consists intrinsically of the play of these mutually determining activities, we may then be enabled to grasp at once intelligibly and intuitively the principle of the whole system; that all is in its essence one and*

the same."* Coleridge, whose dissertation on this subject has been stigmatized by some as a plagiarism upon Schelling, and by himself acknowledged to evince a "coincidence" with him, dicourses in a similar tone. "There is strictly speaking," says he, "no proper opposition but between the *two polar forces of one and the same power.* Every power in nature and in spirit, *must evolve an opposite, as the sole means and condition of its manifestation.*" *Aids to Reflection*, *p.* 287. "The transcendental philosophy demands, first, that two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature; secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible." *Biographia Lit. p.* 169. "The *identity* of Thesis and Antithesis is the substance of all *Being;* their opposition the condition of all existence, or Being manifested." *Aids*, p. 287. All this seems to us so very like Dr. Hickok's divine activities in antagonism, constituting matter, as to show very clearly, their substantial identity. And when once the antagonism is posited, his process of world-building, or evolution, seems to us little more than a modified reflection from that given by Schelling, and the Pantheistic Transcendentalists. Notwithstanding his analysis and rejection of the schemes of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, the germinal elements of that monism which is common to them all, seem to us to lie in his radical principles. The variations are such as enforce themselves upon a Christian man. But as to their real character, and logical consequences, they are circumstantial rather than fundamental.

The simple doctrine of Scripture and reason we take to be this: that the physical universe and its constituent parts are not mere acts of God in mutual antagonism; but that they are entities, substances, created from nothing by his omnipotence, distinct and separate from him, yet dependent upon his sustaining, and subject to his governing power; that these substances or entities are also made the subjects or media of certain physical forces, acting according to uniform laws, which forces and their laws exhibit the distinct and invariable modes of the the divine control over matter; that he governs and disposes and acts in and through them, by his all-controlling provi-

* We quote from Tulk's Translation, p. 222.

dence; that it is his prerogative to make or unmake, or modify this whole material frame or any part thereof, according to his good pleasure, not being necessitated otherwise than by that moral necessity which forbids him to deny himself, and ensures that he doeth all things well. We do not believe, that, to any extent of the least moment, in such a discussion, he is constrained by any eternal necessity, so that he can produce nothing but his own activity in antagonism and diremption; or that he is unable to impart to matter, if he be pleased to create it, any properties, he may please, not mutually self-contradictory. If he cannot create material substances other than his own "act holding his own act," much less can he create immaterial or spiritual essences or substances. Indeed Dr. Hickok tells us, p. 84, that spirit as being "self-activity and self-law," is "essence which is not substance." Still if it is activity, it must be the activity of some person or thing;—of what, or whom? Whose activity is the free, responsible, rational "essence" within us? Whose, ours or God's? Does the trans cendentalism of Schelling develop a more "insoluble ego?" There is no escape from these difficulties but in the simple recognition not only of the absolute substance and absolute cause, but of derivative, dependent substances, and second causes, distinct from God's mere act, yet created and sustained by his act. Otherwise the distinction between God and the creature, holiness and sin, freedom and fatalism, is a sublime fiction. Is it demanded that we explain how this is possible? How God by his Almighty working can create and uphold that which is not his mere activity? We freely confess ourselves unequal to such a demand. We have no "rational insight" which can fathom the measureless profound of divine possibilities. These are things too high for us to meddle with. We rest in the Apostle's solution, in which our faith and philosophy begin and end, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out!"

ART. VII.—*Demission of the Ministry.*

THE last General Assembly adopted the following overture, viz.

"*Resolved*, That it be referred to the Presbyteries whether the following sections shall be added to the 15th chapter of the Form of Government, namely,

"16. The office of a minister of the gospel is perpetual, and cannot be laid aside at pleasure. No person can be divested of it but by deposition. Yet, from various causes, a minister may become incapable of performing the duties of the office; or he may, though chargeable with neither heresy nor immorality, become unacceptable in his official character. In such case he may cease to be an acting minister.

"17. Whenever a minister, from any cause not inferring heresy, crime, or scandal, shall be incapable of serving the church to edification, the Presbytery shall take order on the subject, and state the fact, together with the reason of it, on their record. And when any person has thus ceased to be an acting minister, he shall not be a member of any Presbytery or Synod, but shall be subject to discipline as other ministers, provided always, that nothing of this kind shall be done without the consent of the individual in question, except by the advice of the Synod; and provided, also, that no case shall be finally decided except at a stated meeting of the Presbytery.

"18. Any minister having demitted the exercise of his office in the manner herein provided, may, if the Presbytery which acted on his demission think proper, be restored to the exercise thereof, and to all the rights incident thereto, provided, that the consent of the Synod be obtained, in case his demission was ordered by the Synod in the manner above recited."

This overture makes a distinction between the exercise of the ministry and the ministry itself; the former may be demitted, the latter cannot be laid aside either at the pleasure of the party, or by the action of the Presbytery. Once a minister, always a minister, unless in cases of deposition. The

overture proposes that the want of ability to discharge the duties of the ministry, or want of acceptableness, shall, provided the party consent, be a sufficient reason for the demission of the exercise of the office. Should, in the judgment of the Presbytery, these reasons exist, the Presbytery may, with the advice of Synod, enforce this demission, without the assent of the party concerned. The effect of the demission contemplated is not to deprive the minister of his office, but only of certain of its prerogatives. He ceases to have the right to sit and act as a member of Presbytery; but he does not become a layman. He is subject, not to the session, but to the Presbytery; and may be restored to all the privileges of his office, by the simple vote of the Presbytery, without any renewed trials or ordination.

To have any intelligent opinion as to the propriety of the proposed measure, we must, in the first place, understand what the ministry is. Is it a work, or an office? If the latter, what are its peculiar characteristics? In what sense is it "perpetual?" Why may it not be resigned as other offices may be? There is a large body of distinguished men, ancient and modern, and some Christian sects, who deny that the ministry is an office. They assert that it is simply a work. The distinction between the clergy and laity is said to be not merely human as to its origin, but altogether arbitrary. No such distinction, it is said, is recognized in Scripture, or consistent with the common prerogatives of Christians. It is maintained that, in virtue of the universal priesthood of believers, all Christians have equal right to preach, baptize, and to administer the Lord's Supper. Such was the opinion of some of the Fathers, and such is the opinion of some of the most eminent modern scholars. It is not, however, the common doctrine of the church; and it is not the doctrine of our church. The ministry is properly an office, because it is something which cannot be assumed at pleasure by any and every one. A man must be appointed thereto by some competent authority. It involves not only the right, but the obligation to exercise certain functions, or to discharge certain duties; and it confers certain powers or prerogatives, which other men are bound to recognize and respect. Lawyers, physicians, merchants, and

mechanics, are not officers. Any man may be a physician or merchant. No man is bound to discharge the duties of either. But judges and magistrates are officers. They are appointed to the posts which they occupy; they are bound to discharge its duties; and they are invested with certain prerogatives in virtue of their appointment. That the ministry is in this sense an office is plain from the numerous titles given in the New Testament to ministers, which imply official station. They are not only teachers, but overseers, rulers, governors. The qualifications for the office are carefully laid down, and the question, whether these qualifications are in any case possessed, is not left to the decision of those who aspire to the office, but to the church, through her appointed organs. Men are, therefore, said to be called, appointed, or ordained, to the work of the ministry, by those who have authority thereto. And accordingly, the people are required to obey those who have the rule over them, and whom the Holy Ghost has made their overseers.

But what is the nature of this office? Is it a temporary, or a permanent one? According to one view, the office of the ministry has relation to one particular church and is dependent on that relation. A man is a husband in relation to his own wife, and to no other woman. If legally separated from her, by her death or otherwise, he ceases to be a husband. A man is a governor of a particular state; he is no governor in relation to any other commonwealth; and when his term of office expires, or he resigns his post, he ceases to be a governor, and becomes a private citizen. According to this theory, minister and pastor are convertible terms. A man is a minister only in relation to the church which chooses him to be its pastor. Outside of that church he has no official power or authority; and when his connection with his particular congregation is dissolved, he becomes a layman. If elected by another church, he is reordained. This is the pure Independent theory. Many cases of such reordinations occur in the early history of the Puritans of New England. It is very evident that this is an unscriptural theory. All the ordinations specifically mentioned in the New Testament, i. e. all the persons therein mentioned as ordained to the work of the ministry, were thus ordained, not in

reference to any particular church, but to the church at large. According to this Independent theory, no man can be ordained to preach the gospel to the heathen; and some of its advocates are consistent enough to teach that no provision is made in the New Testament for the conversion of nations outside the church. It need not be said that this is not the common doctrine of Christians, or that it is not the doctrine of Presbyterians. We hold in common with the great mass of believers, that the ministry is an office in the church universal, designed for her enlargement and edification; that it is not dependent on the choice of any particular congregation, or on the relation which the minister may sustain as pastor, to any particular people. It is in this repect analogous to naval and military offices. A captain in the navy is as much a captain when on shore, as when he is in command of a ship; and he may be transferred from one ship to another. His office is permanent. The Romish theory on this subject is, that orders, or ordination, is a sacrament; and a sacrament is a rite instituted by Christ, which has the power of conferring grace; and grace is an internal spiritual gift. In every case therefore of canonical ordination there is this peculiar grace of orders communicated to the soul. In ordination to the priesthood this grace is, or includes supernatural power, giving ability to transubstantiate the bread and wine in the Eucharist into the body and blood of Christ, to remit sin, to render the sacraments efficacious, &c. &c. Here then is an internal something constituting a man a priest, of which he cannot divest himself, and which by no act of man can be taken from him. It may however be forfeited. As baptismal grace, including the remission of sin and the infusion of a new principle of spiritual life, may be lost by mortal sin, and can be restored only by the sacrament of penance; so the grace of orders may be lost by certain crimes, such as heresy or schism. Hence in the Romish church a priest, when convicted of such crime, is degraded before he is delivered over to the secular power to be executed. This service of degradation however is declarative, rather than effective. It declares in a solemn and official manner that the offender has forfeited the grace received at his ordination and has become a layman. It is evident that the ministry, according to this theory, must be in

a peculiar sense a permanent office. It can neither be voluntarily laid aside, nor can a man be deprived of it. If the Holy Ghost is received in a specific form, or mode of manifestation, in ordination, he remains, until the condition occurs on which he has revealed his purpose to withdraw. If the gift of prophecy, or of miracles, or of tongues, were conferred on any man, he could not divest himself of that gift, nor could he be deprived of it by any act of the church. It is so with the grace of orders. This however is not a Protestant doctrine. It is one of the essential and necessary elements of that cunningly devised system of Romanism, which is after the working of Satan with all deceivableness of unrighteousness.

Protestants however also teach that the office of the ministry is permanent, though in a very different sense from that just stated. It is permanent, first, because it is not assumed or conferred for any limited or definite time. And, secondly, because the candidate in assuming the office is understood to consecrate himself for life to the service of God in the work of the ministry. This is also the light in which the church regards the matter when she, through her appropriate organs, ordains him to the work. There is nothing however in the Protestant, and especially in the Presbyterian, doctrine of the nature of the ministry or of ordination, to forbid the idea that the office itself, and not merely the exercise of the office, may, for just reasons be laid aside, or demitted.

The Protestant doctrine, as we understand it, on this subject is this. First, that the call to the ministry is by the Holy Ghost. The Spirit of God is said to dwell in all the members of Christ's body, and to each member, as the apostle teaches us, is given a manifestation of the Spirit. 1 Cor. xii. 7. That is while the Spirit manifests his presence in his enlightening and sanctifying influence, in different measures, in all the followers of Christ, he gives special gifts and qualifications to different individuals of their number; dividing to every man severally as he wills. In the apostolic church, he gave to some the gifts of plenary knowledge and infallibility, and thus made them apostles; to others, the gift of occasional inspiration, and thus made them prophets; to others, the gift of teaching, and thus made them the teachers or preachers of the word;

to others again, the gift of healing, of miracles or of tongues. Some of these gifts we know, both from the New Testament and from actual observation, were designed to be confined to the first age of the church. They have accordingly ceased. We have no inspired and infallible men—no workers of miracles, no speakers with tongues. In other words, we have no apostles, nor prophets, nor men endowed with supernatural power.

There are other gifts, however, which we learn from Scripture observation were designed to be permanent. The Holy Spirit confers the gifts for the ministry; and by thus conferring them, and exciting the desire to exercise them for the glory of God and the service of Christ, thereby manifests his will that those thus favoured should consecrate themselves to the preaching of the gospel. This is the true, divine call, to the ministry.

Second: The evidence of this call to him that receives it, is the consciousness of the inward gift and drawing of the Spirit, confirmed by those external workings of providence which indicate the will of God as to his vocation. The evidence of the church is everything which tends to prove that the candidate has the qualifications for the office of the ministry, and that he is led to seek it from motives due to the operation of the Holy Ghost.

Third: Ordination is the solemn expression of the judgment of the church, by those appointed to deliver such judgment, that the candidate is truly called of God to take part in this ministry, thereby authenticating to the people the divine call. This authentication, or ordination, is, under all ordinary circumstances, the necessary condition for the exercise of the ministry in the church; just as the judgment of the session that the candidate for baptism or for admission to the Lord's table, has the qualifications for church membership, is the necessary condition of church-fellowship.

As, however, neither the candidate nor the church is infallible, there may, and doubtless often is, mistake in this matter. A man may honestly believe that he is called of God to the ministry, when he has never, in fact, been thus called. The Presbytery may concur in this erroneous judgment. If a mistake is made it ought be corrected. If both the man himself

and the Presbytery become convinced that he never was called to the ministry, why should they persist in asserting the contrary? So long as the man clings to his office, he thereby says, he believes he is called to it by God; but this he may be thoroughly convinced is not true. Why then should he be required to assert what he knows to be false. The Presbytery join in this false testimony; nay, they take upon themselves the whole responsibility of the falsehood, if they interpose their authority, and refuse to allow a man to demit an office to which both he and they are convinced he never was called. It is not merely, therefore, a man's right to demit the ministry, if he is satisfied God has not called him to the work; but it is his solemn duty to do it. And the Presbytery have not only the right to allow him to do it, but they have no right to prevent it. They cannot force a man to be a minister against his will, and against his conscience; much less can they righteously force him to lie to the church, and to the Holy Ghost, by making him say he is called, when he knows that he is not called.

There is nothing in the Protestant doctrine of the ministry, or of ordination, which stands in the way of the demission of the sacred office. We do not hold that the judgment of the church is infallible; so that it can in no case be recalled or reversed. We do not hold that an inward gift, the grace of orders, is conferred in ordination, so as to be beyond recall. Neither is there anything in the ordination vows, or the obligations assumed by the candidate, to prevent his laying the office aside. He does indeed promise to devote himself for life to the work of the ministry. But this promise is obviously conditional. It is conditioned on the possession of physical ability. If rendered paralytic or voiceless, the promise does not bind him. In like manner it is conditioned on the inward call of God. The man believes that it is the will of God that he should be a minister; and, on the ground of that belief, he promises to devote himself to the work. If he becomes satisfied that he never was called, in other words, that it is not the will of God that he should preach the gospel, then the ground on which the promise was made no longer exists.

The principle of demission is clearly recognized in our stand-

ards. That is, it is distinctly recognized that a minister may cease to be such, and become a layman. What is deposition but the declaration, on judicial grounds, on the part of a Presbytery, that a minister of the gospel is no longer to be regarded as such? And what is that but a reversal of the judgment pronounced at his ordination? It is saying that the Presbytery erred in deciding that the person in question was called of God to the ministry; for if he had been thus called, it was for life, and no Presbytery could take away a permanent office conferred by God. The only difference between deposition and demission lies in the nature of the evidence on which the Presbytery reverses its former judgment. In the case of deposition, it is some grave offence, some heresy or crime, which clearly proves that the minister convicted of such offence is not called of God to preach the gospel. In the case of demission, it is anything, not involving a moral or religious offence, which satisfies the judgment and conscience of the man himself, and of the Presbytery, or even of the latter alone, that the minister demitting his office, or called upon to demit it, was never called of God to the sacred office. Of course mere physical infirmity, or the weakness or imbecility of age, can never be such a proof. A minister or missionary, nay, Paul himself, after a life devoted to the service of God, in the ministry of his Son, crowned with every manifestation of the divine favour, might be superannuated or paralytic, yet no one would dream that this was any evidence that he had entered the ministry without a call from God. The evidence in question must be the opposite of the evidence of a divine call, viz. the want of fitness for the office, the want of a desire to discharge its duties, the want of success, and the consequent inability to serve God or the church in the work of the ministry. All this may, and in many cases is apparent, where there is every evidence of Christian character, and therefore where any act of discipline would be uncalled for and unjust.

As therefore there is nothing in the nature of the ministerial office, nor in the nature of ordination, nor in the obligations assumed by the candidate when he is ordained, nor in the infallibility of the Presbytery, incompatible with the demission of the sacred office, it follows that for proper reasons, it may be

laid aside. In the second place, as before remarked, it ought in the case supposed to be laid aside. To continue to profess to be called of God, when we are satisfied that such is not the fact, and when the Presbytery and the Christian public are equally convinced on the subject, is to profess a conscious untruth. This at first was a mistake in all concerned; but when the mistake is discovered and made apparent, then to persist in it, gives it the character of falsehood. In the third place, it is highly desirable that those who have thus mistaken their vocation, should be allowed to correct the error. It is not only wrong to constrain a man against his judgment, will and conscience, to retain the ministerial office; but it cannot be done. The office is in fact, in multitudes of cases, laid aside. Men once ordained give up their ministry. They not only cease to exercise it, but they virtually renounce it. They lay aside the title, they do not attempt to discharge its duties; they do not claim any of its prerogatives. They devote themselves to some secular pursuit, and are merged in the general class of laymen. For this, in the cases supposed, they are not to blame, and therefore they cannot be justly censured. They are often useful members of society and of the church; but they are not ministers. Now if this is done, and must be done, it is surely proper that it should be done regularly; that provision should be made to meet cases of this kind. Besides, it is a great evil that our church courts should be encumbered with nominal members, who are incapable of discharging the duties of membership. And it is a still greater evil that men should be allowed to sit in those courts, and exercise the powers of an office, to which all concerned are satisfied they have no legitimate call, and the duties of which they cannot fulfil. Such ministers are not only an incumbrance to our church courts, disturbing the natural balance of our system, but it is a disgrace to the ministry and to the church, to have men notoriously incompetent, (however worthy they be,) and who are merely nominal ministers—men who are laymen in their whole spirit and pursuits, designated and recognized as invested with the sacred office. It is best that things should be called by their right names. If a man is not a minister of the gospel (i. e. one

who either does or has served God in the gospel of his Son) he should not be so designated or so regarded.

It is objected to all this, that if we make it thus easy to get rid of the ministry, less care will be exercised in entering it. We doubt the fact. The ministry in our country and in our church, is not often entered from worldly motives. It is not sufficiently attractive to the mercenary. It is commonly an honest mistake on the part both of the candidate and of the Presbytery, when men are ordained by the church who are not called of God. But even if the fact be admitted which the objection assumes, it would be unwise to make the ministry a *cul-de-sac*, which whoever wanders into in the dark, must stay in it. It would be far better to make the egress from the ministry so wide that all who want to leave, or who ought to leave it, may do so with the least possible difficulty or delay.

If our readers agree with the principles above stated, they must regard the overture submitted to the Presbyteries as an illogical, half-way measure. It assumes that the office of the ministry cannot be demitted; but that a man may lay aside its exercise and be divested of its prerogatives. It assumes that the office is in such a sense permanent that it cannot be got rid of, except by deposition. But this assumption is illogical. It necessarily follows from the Protestant and Presbyterian doctrine of the ministry, of ordination, and of the fallibility of all church courts, that the office is not permanent in any such sense. That doctrine supposes that both the candidate and Presbytery may err; and it supposes that the error when discovered may be corrected. It is only on the assumption of the Romish doctrine of "the grace of orders," that the ministry can be regarded as in any such sense permanent as that it cannot be demitted. Besides, deposition implies that the office of the ministry is not in such a sense permanent as to be inconsistent with demission. Deposition merely does for one reason, what demission does for another. Both reduce a minister to the condition of a layman. The one, therefore, is just as consistent with the true permanency of the office as the other.

Another objection to the overture as it now stands, is that it undertakes to separate things which in their nature are inseparable. If the ministry is an office of divine appointment, if men

are called of God to be ministers, then the obligation to discharge its duties, and the right to exercise its prerogatives, are inseparable from the possession of the office. If God calls a man to be a minister, what right have we to say he shall not act as such? By allowing him to retain the office, we say he has a divine call to it; and if so, he has a divine right to exercise all its functions. The overture, therefore, in our view, involves a contradiction. It in effect says, that a man is, and is not a minister, at the same time; that he was mistaken in supposing he was called by the Spirit to be a minister, and nevertheless he is a minister. These are contradictory judgments.

We would greatly prefer a simple clause providing that whenever any minister, in good standing, is fully satisfied in his own judgment and conscience, that God has not called him to the ministry, he may, with the consent of Presbytery, resign the office; and in case the Presbytery is satisfied that a minister has no divine vocation to the ministry, although he himself may think otherwise, they shall have the right, (with the consent of the Synod, if that be thought desirable) to cancel his ordination without censure, as in deposition it is done with censure.

SHORT NOTICES.

A New History of the Conquest of Mexico; in which Las Casas' Denunciations of the popular Historians of that War are fully vindicated. By Robert Anderson Wilson, Counsellor at Law: Author of "Mexico and its Religion," &c. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1859.

Whether the sources of popular Mexican history are authentic or legendary, is a question which was started years ago, and now begins to be discussed thoroughly and elaborately. Nearly twenty years since, General Cass, whose official life, largely devoted to Indian affairs, and whose scholarly habits invest his opinions, on such a subject, with high authority, called in question the accuracy of the documents on which the historians of Mexico have relied, in an able article in the North American Review. This volume by Judge Wilson is a copious

and able contribution to the same side of the question. The author proves, from facts ascertained by his own personal observation, that many of the statements made in the reports and narratives sent to Spain by the original conquerors of Mexico must be false, and that many of the sketches and historical accounts given by ecclesiastics are but monkish legends. He also adduces other evidence in support of this view. These are the materials out of which the modern popular histories of Mexico have largely been constructed. It is painful to be obliged to think that a large part of the rare manuscripts and obsolete works, which Prescott grudged not the most lavish outlays to procure, is but legendary lore, and that many of the scenes he invests with a dramatic fascination, are but splendid illusions, which the author mistook for facts verified at immense cost. This volume, however, arrays many facts in support of this view. It will not, however, antiquate Prescott's history. Whatever may become of its historical authority—even if it should be proved, to any extent, a fiction—it is still a thing of life as a beautiful artistic creation. There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that Judge Wilson's work sheds valuable light upon the history and antiquities of Mexico. The following language of General Cass, in a letter to the author, shows the need of such a work. "I was led, some years since, to investigate the truth of the early reports of the state of civilization among the Mexicans at the time of the Spanish Conquest. I became satisfied, to use your language, that the accounts were not merely exaggerations but fabrications; and I am glad to find that that impression has been confirmed by the able and critical inquiry you have made." The large and beautiful typography of the work enhances its value.

Religious Cases of Conscience, Answered in an Evangelical Manner. By the Rev. S. Pike, and the Rev. S. Hayward. New Edition, with an Introduction by the Rev. Henry A. Boardman, D. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: R. Carter & Brothers.

Those Christians who are acquainted with this book need no endorsement of it from us. We are of opinion, however, that it is less known now, than it was in the last generation. It stands as a type of a kind of preaching and religious instruction less in vogue of late than in a former period. Our practical treatises have been more occupied with urging the church to a becoming aggressive activity, than with elucidating the manifold cases of conscience in every attitude and relation of the Christian life, that must and will arise, where experimental religion prevails. We have no doubt, that the church and ministry suffer loss, so far as this kind of spiritual instruction is wanting.

Dr. Boardman, justly says, in his judicious introduction, "it is only necessary for a preacher to announce one of these themes from the pulpit, to enkindle a feeling throughout his congregation, which will reveal itself by the most unambiguous tokens." No preaching is so powerful as that which sheds scriptural light upon the conscience; which alarms the presumptuous, guides the erring, comforts the desponding, strengthens the faint-hearted, establishes the doubting—"by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God."

This book consists of lectures on the various questions with which the minds of serious Christians are liable to be exercised, delivered in London more than a century ago. The questions discussed respect our own spiritual state, and the means of promoting it, our dangers and temptations, our duties to others in various stations and relations. They are discussed with great clearness and force, and in the concentrated light of evangelical truth. The work has characteristics which have given it life for a century, and the church will not now "willingly let it die." Its wide diffusion at this time would aid in giving depth and strength—a sound and robust development—to that new-born Christian life, with which God has of late been pleased so wonderfully to bless our church and land. In saying this, we do not of course imply approbation of every statement or opinion which it contains.

Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of the Future Life. By C. F. Hudson. Fourth edition. Boston: John P. Jewett and Company. 1858.

The doctrine elaborately maintained in this work is, that the eternal punishment of the wicked consists in their annihilation at death. Whatever support can be contributed to this doctrine by affluent learning, scholarly culture, brilliancy and force of style, and dialectic astuteness, is subsidized for the purpose in this massive and compact volume. The number of editions it has reached, notwithstanding the immense burden of quotations from ancient and modern sources, which the author's exhaustive reading has enabled him to pack into it, evinces its power. Little can be said in defence of his position, which he has left unsaid. As the alleged annihilation continues for ever, he wastes no time in reducing the significance of the terms "eternal," "everlasting," as applied to the future punishment of the wicked. He labours to show that the terms "destruction," "perdition," "lost," &c., as used in reference to unbelievers in the Bible, import their annihilation, while

such terms as fire, &c., denote the instruments thereof. Of course, we have no room here to undertake a refutation of this subtle and dangerous book, which is likely to promote what we believe to be one of the most threatening and pestilent heresies just now crowding upon us. We will only say in the most general way:

1. The future existence of the wicked in a sentient and agonized state, is so palpably set forth in the constant representations and implications of Scripture, as to enforce itself upon all plain, unbiassed readers. It requires an endless amount of special pleading to vacate the Bible of this obvious meaning. If it does not, therefore, teach this doctrine, it is no sufficient guide to the people of God, on a subject most fundamental.

2. The church, in all ages and countries, has taken this to be the mind of God as set forth in his word. We speak not of the opinions of individuals, or of exceptional cases. We speak of the mind of the church as expressed in her symbols, her literature, her theology. Has the Holy Ghost left her to grope into utter error on so fundamental a point?

3. One test prescribed by our Saviour for trying teachers and doctrines is their fruits. The doctrine of the future and eternal punishment of the wicked, however it may startle delicate sensibilities, may safely abide this ordeal, as compared with any and all creeds which deny or impugn it—especially annihilation. A doctrine which has these three marks will still hold its place. All efforts to overthrow it, however they may subvert the faith of some, will prove abortive. They might, if it were possible, deceive the very elect. But, happily, this is not possible.

The State of the Impenitent Dead. By Alvah Hovey, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This well written little volume appears to be designed as an antidote to the foregoing, and is well adapted to its purpose. Without following the arguments, suggestions, and rejoinders of Mr. Hudson, into all their labyrinthine windings, which would only divert the reader from the main issue, Dr. Hovey confines himself to this issue. He clearly proves from Scripture, that the state of the impenitent after death is a state of consciousness and of misery, which will know no end. His reasoning is clear, compact, and conclusive. As an antidote to an insidious, ruinous, and spreading heresy, his little book meets a present and urgent want.

Infant Salvation in its Relation to Infant Depravity, Infant Regeneration and Infant Baptism. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., Pastor of the Race street Evangelical Reformed Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

Dr. Bomberger has set forth many precious truths in a perspicuous and interesting manner in this little volume. So far as the first three chapters are concerned, the most important qualification of its merit which we have noticed is some language that looks toward universal redemption and grace, founded on the Arminian construction of some passages in Rom. v. This of course involves the amissibility of grace, unless we take Universalism as the alternative. Out of this emerge all the questions in issue between Arminians and Calvinists, which we do not feel required now to discuss.

In his fourth chapter, Dr. Bomberger says, "in Baptism the child receives . . . immediate release from the penalty of original sin;" "the removal of the stain or pollution of native depravity;" "the present renewal of the nature of the child, in Christ Jesus, by the Holy Ghost;" the promise of "such spiritual blessings as will promote the growth of the grace granted them at their baptism." If we understand this, along with the context, it means, 1. that saving grace is always imparted at baptism: 2. that it is liable to be lost afterwards. After the recent full discussion of these subjects in our pages, it is hardly necessary for us to reiterate our objections to such a doctrine.

A Memoir of the Life and Times of the Rev. Isaac Backus, A. M. By Alvah Hovey, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in Newton Theological Institution. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859.

The Rev. Isaac Backus was pastor of a Congregational church in the eastern part of Massachusetts during his earlier ministry. His previous Christian development had been in one of the separate churches of Connecticut, which came into being in the great revival of 1840, by separation from the churches under the Saybrook Platform, chiefly in order to clear themselves from the fellowship of unconverted members and ministers. This training, as all must see, was a good propaideutic for the ultimate adoption of the Baptist system, i. e. the exclusive church-membership and baptism of professing converts. He in due time became a Baptist preacher of great zeal and influence. He did much to disseminate the principles and promote the early growth of his sect in New England and other parts of the country. He compiled an ecclesiastical History of New England, as viewed from a Baptist stand-point. We are glad to learn from the Preface to this volume, that the "Backus Historical Society," are about to publish a new edition of this work,

now out of print. This Memoir by Dr. Hovey is designed as an introduction to this history. It is itself a repository of considerable historical matter, that probably would not have been published in any other form. Of course it has a higher value for Baptists than for others. It is not to be expected that the author should see events in which his denomination is deeply implicated with the eyes of a Congregationalist or a Presbyterian. But, with all needful abatement for this sectarian feature of the work, we still recognize its value as a contribution to our materials for catholic American church history.

The Pioneer Bishop: or, The Life and Times of Francis Asbury. By W. P. Strickland. With an Introduction by Nathan Bangs, D. D. Third Thousand. New York: Carlton & Porter.

A full biography of the Apostle of American Methodism has been a desideratum. This want has been met by Dr. Strickland in this volume, which bears the imprimatur of Dr. Bangs and Bishop Jones. The author has shown exemplary diligence in gathering facts, and a good degree of skill in weaving them together. While he, of course, takes a Methodist rather than a Presbyterian view of the materials with which he deals, yet the spirit manifested is generally candid and catholic. The book is neatly printed, and supplies a mass of information in regard to the planting and early growth of the great Methodist communion in our country, which will be interesting to Christians of every name, and augment the materials for perfecting our ecclesiastical history.

The New England Theocracy: A History of the Congregationalists of New England to the Revivals of 1740. By H. F. Uhden. With a Preface by the late Dr. Neander. Translated from the Second German edition by H. C. Conant, author of "The English Bible," &c. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859.

This work is the first fruits of an attempt by Dr. Uhden, begun at the instance of Neander, to present in German an account of American revivals. As he set himself to the accomplishment of this work, he became satisfied that it was necessary to bring to view those peculiarities of our early history which have largely conditioned our religious development. Among these peculiarities, none is more distinctive or potential, than the ecclesiastico-civil regime of congregationalism in New England, during the first century of its history. Out of this arose various ecclesiastical customs, conditions of church membership, half-way covenants, &c., which acted powerfully on the state of religion, and produced the peculiar attitude of things in which the first of our great awakenings appeared. Of course, an understanding of the character and

effects of this theocracy, is requisite to an understanding of many of the distinctive features of this revival. This book is interesting to us, chiefly as showing the view which a competent German takes of this part of our early religious history. We do not remember any other treatise which occupies the same ground completely and exclusively. We hope that this "monograph" will be followed by the complete survey of American revivals, of which we understand it to be an earnest. It is not to be expected that the subject will be treated as it would be by one who had lived our religious life. For this very reason, it may shed a light upon our condition, which could not emanate from ourselves. Even its errors may instruct us.

The Primeval World: A Treatise on the relations of Geology to Theology. By the Rev. Paton J. Gloag. Author of a "Treatise on the Assurance of Salvation," &c. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1859.

The title of this book suggests at once a volume devoted to the controversy about the creative days in Genesis. This subject is not neglected by the author, but it does not form the chief matter of his book. He treats of Geology as affording a refutation of the development-theory, corroborating the doctrine of a personal Creator of all things out of nothing, and furnishing new and copious illustrations, of His Goodness. We are glad to notice, "that he has been unable to think the period has arrived, when a satisfactory theory reconciling the Mosaic cosmogony with the facts of Geology, can be confidently advanced." This modesty is grateful to those who are familiar with the dogmatism so prevalent on this subject.

Salvation by Christ: A series of Discourses on the Important Doctrines of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The discourses in this volume are substantially those which appeared some time since, under the title of "University Sermons." A few have been omitted and a few added in order to adapt the volume to wider circulation. The topics treated are those which pertain to our common salvation. The matter is solid, judicious and evangelical. The spirit, earnest and catholic.

The Four Gospels, according to the Authorized Version, with original and selected Parallel References and Marginal Readings, and an original and copious critical and explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. David Brown, D. D., Professor, Free Church College, Aberdeen. Philadelphia: Wm. S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

This copious title explains the general character of the volume to which it is prefixed, and its adaptation to meet an existing want. Whatever contributes to increase the knowledge of the Scriptures among the people, by promoting the intelligent study

of them, will be readily appreciated by the Christian public. This Commentary is thoroughly evangelical, and turns the best fruits of modern exegesis to good account in elucidating the doctrinal and practical import of the Gospels. Although the amount of matter is large, the ingenuity of the printer has compressed it within a convenient and portable compass, adapted to general circulation.

The True Psalmody: or Bible Psalms, the Church's only Manual of Praise. Philadelphia: Wm. S. Young. 1859.

This is the production of a committee of ministers and elders of the Reformed and United Presbyterian churches of Philadelphia, appointed for that purpose, at a meeting held in the Cherry street Church, Philadelphia, August 16th, 1858. Whoever wishes to see the argument for the exclusive use of scriptural Psalms in public praise clearly and strongly presented, will find it in this little volume. The authors make skilful use of the criticisms which have been made upon various collections of psalms and hymns in use in different churches. This, however, proves nothing. It is precisely what would be, if the use of human compositions were expressly and confessedly authorized by Scripture. The great mass of Christians cannot be persuaded that they are forbidden to praise God in "hymns and spiritual songs," which set forth, in metrical form, those clearly unfolded Christian truths of the New Testament, which were revealed but dimly, in germ and shadow, before the incarnation. If they are to be confined to the Psalms, most would prefer the version of the common English Bible to that of Rouse.

The Types of Genesis briefly considered as revealing the development of Human Nature in the World within, and without, and in the dispensations. By Andrew Jukes. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts. 1858.

There is a genuine typology of the Old Testament which, interpreted by the spiritual mind, according to the analogy of faith, is highly instructive and edifying. There is a fanciful typology, which educes the most extravagant conceits from purely fictitious analogies, until the plain word of God is turned into a mere hieroglyph, the meaning of which it requires a Swedenborg, or other new revelator, to evolve. A large class of writers on the types are intermediate between these, fanciful at times, yet, on the whole, having a strong ground-work of truth, which they present in fresh and vivid aspects. To this order we assign this book. It shows a refined culture. It is suggestive even when fanciful. There is a quaint, devout, and quietistic vein, which, along with other signs, reveals the

type of the later productions of the school which grew out of the labours and peculiarities of the late Edward Irving. The peculiar doctrines of that school, however, are not explicitly enounced.

The Great Day of Atonement: or Meditations and Prayers on the Last Twenty-four Hours of the Sufferings and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Translated from the German of Charlotte Elizabeth Nebelin. Edited by Mrs. Colin Mackenzie, author of "Delhi, or Six Years in India," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This copious title exhibits the character of the book to which it is prefixed. The meditations on the successive events of our Saviour's expiring day are brief, sententious and fervid.

Life at Three-Score: A Sermon delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, November 28, 1858. By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1859.

Mr. Barnes has chosen the following among the things confirmed by his long experience, as those which he thought most worthy to be signalized in this discourse. 1. He has found life more and better than his early hopes. 2. The world is disposed to favour young men. 3. He is confirmed in his practice and advocacy of total abstinence from intoxicating drinks. 4. In his conviction of the importance of industry. 5. Of the value of personal religion, and that the Bible is a revelation from God. These positions are maintained with his usual ability. Under the head of industry, Mr. Barnes shows himself a model of that virtue, and an illustration of its efficacy, from whom most of us may learn something to our advantage. All his commentaries, he tells us, have been written before nine in the morning, and are due to the fact that he has risen at four. Four hundred thousand volumes of them have been circulated in this country, and as many or more in foreign lands. A close economy of time works wonders. One octavo page a day, "would account for all that Jerome, or Chrysostom, or Augustine; that Luther, Calvin, or Baxter have done." We are sorry to see that he characterizes the opposition he encountered in his early ministry, on account of his doctrines, as "efforts made from without to crush a young man," and represents the Assembly which sustained his appeal from the decision of the Synod of Philadelphia, as giving "its sanction to the views of doctrine for which we (Mr. Barnes and others) had struggled." Resistance to doctrines deemed in conflict with truth, it is unfair to represent as an "effort to crush a young man." This is simply a misrepresentation of the real issue, adapted, if not designed to make his adversaries odious. And it is quite certain that many voted to sustain Mr. Barnes's

appeal, who were the life-long antagonists of his doctrines. It is one thing to "sanction" a man's opinions, and another not to think them extreme enough, or that he has proved himself so incorrigible in regard to them, as to warrant his immediate suspension or deposition from the ministry.

Christian Brotherhood: A Letter to the Hon. Heman Lincoln. By Baron Stow, D. D., Pastor of the Rowe street Church, Boston. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The late wonderful outpouring of God's Spirit has done much to quicken in Christians the consciousness of their essential unity, and of the duty of more effectually manifesting that unity. This volume from a leading Baptist clergyman is a timely and judicious effort to promote this feeling in his own communion, with respect to other bodies of Christians. We think, however, that the more large-hearted among our Baptist brethren will experience peculiar difficulties in exorcising the sectarian spirit from their body, until they can see their way clear to commune with other Christians at the Lord's table. So long as they are cut off from this most simple manifestation of Christian unity, the tendency to divisive and proselyting sectarianism will be formidable. The yearning for more intimate fellowship and manifest unity with other Christians, which we rejoice to see is beginning to show itself, must induce questionings as to the propriety of exclusive sectarian communion at the Lord's Supper. Such questionings, we also rejoice to see, are becoming urgent in that denomination. While fidelity requires us to bear this respectful testimony, we warmly appreciate the appeal of Dr. Stow, and cannot doubt that it will be blessed in furtherance of the unity it seeks to promote. He utters wholesome truths and counsels which would not be heeded if given from without his communion. Indeed all may do more to promote catholicity in their own denominations than elsewhere. This is eminently that sort of charity which begins at home.

The Earnest Christian; Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Harriet Maria Jukes, wife of the late Rev. Mark R. Jukes. Compiled and edited by Mrs. H. A. Gilbert. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859.

The Memoirs, Letters and Journals which compose this volume exhibit a Christian lady of devoted piety. The book belongs to the class sought for in Sabbath school libraries, and is fitted to be useful. We think it would be improved, however, by being wrought more into the form of a continuous narrative, and by a somewhat more fastidious selection from letters and journals not designed for publication.

Palissy the Potter: or the Huguenot Artist, and Martyr. A True Narrative. By C. L. Brightwell. New York: Carlton & Porter.

A volume made up chiefly from Morley's "Life of Palissy," a Huguenot martyr, who displayed high artistic genius, and is described by Lamartine, as "showing how to exalt and ennoble any business, however trivial, so that it has labour for its means, progress and beauty for its motive, and the glory of God for its end."

The Harvest and the Reapers: Homework for All, and How to do it. By Rev. Harvey Newcomb, Author of "Cyclopedia of Missions," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

This book deals with the great religious problem of our time and country—indeed, of Protestant Christianity:—Through what appliances can the masses be reached by evangelical influences? How can we impress that great under-stratum of society that surrounds our sanctuaries, but never enters them? Mr. Newcomb answers, very justly, that the members, as well as pastors of churches, must enlist actively in the work; and makes many valuable suggestions as to the best mode of doing it. This is an urgent matter, which already commands the earnest consideration of the Church, and must command it more and more.

The Accepted Time for Securing Gospel Salvation, and from the Analogy between Temporal and Spiritual Affairs, answering certain Doctrinal Excuses sometimes urged for neglecting it. By L. H. Christian, Pastor of the North Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia; Author of "Faith and Works." Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson. 1859.

The usual cavils of the impenitent in apology for their apathy, founded on election, decrees, inability, &c., are refuted in this volume, mainly by showing, that, if well founded, there is the same ground for indifference and inaction in temporal affairs. In temporal, as well as spiritual things, all success is dependent on the help and sovereign pleasure of God.

Historical Tales for Young Protestants. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Among the innumerable books of religious reading for the young, those issued by our Board of Publication have a certain select and reliable character, which is obvious in this volume.

Grace Triumphant; or, a Sketch of the Life of Lieut. R. W. Alexander, who fell at the siege of Delhi. By the Rev. David Herron, Missionary in India.

A Word to Parents, or the Obligations and Limitations of Parental Authority.

The above are well written little volumes or tracts published by our Board, whose title speaks their object and character.

A Mother's Gift to her Little Ones at Home. A Book of Sweet and Simple Talk about Serious Things, founded on easy texts of Scripture, and fitted for children between the ages of four and eight years. New York: Carlton & Porter.

The Former Days. History of the Presbyterian Church of Geneva, by Hubbard Winslow. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1859.

This discourse not only gives the history of one of the important churches of our country, but the Appendix also gives much interesting information in regard to the town in which it is located—one of the most beautiful in our country.

The Life of John Milton, narrated in connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his time. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature in University College, London; with Portraits, and specimens of his Handwriting at different periods. Vol. I., 1608—1639. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 658.

This age is prolific in historical works of the highest order. The productions of Sparks, Bancroft, Prescott, Irving, Motley, and others, in our own country; of Alison, Macaulay, Milman, Grote, &c., in England, to say nothing of those of the French and German historians, take rank with the standard works of Gibbon and Hume. To this list must now be added the work of Professor Masson. To English and American readers no period of the history of their common ancestors is more interesting or more important than that designed to be embraced in these volumes. It is the intention of the author to exhibit "Milton's life in its connections with all the more notable phenomena of the period of British history in which it was cast, its State politics, its ecclesiastical variations, its literature and speculative thought." Commencing in 1608, the life of Milton proceeds through the last sixteen years of the reign of James I., includes the whole of the reign of Charles I., and the subsequent years of the Commonwealth and of the Protectorate; and then passing the Restoration, extends itself to 1674, or through fourteen years of the new state of things under Charles II. "Milton's life divides itself, with almost mechanical exactness, into three periods, corresponding with those of the contemporary social movement; the first extending from 1608 to 1640, which was the period of his education and of his minor poems; the second extending from 1640 to 1660, or from the beginning of the civil wars to the Restoration, and forming the middle period of his polemical activity as a prose writer; and the third extending from 1660 to 1674, which was the period of his later muse and of the publication of Paradise Lost. It is the plan of the present work to devote a volume to each of these periods." A more extractive programme could

hardly be presented. The research, fidelity, and ability, of which the present volume exhibits abundant evidence, are a guaranty that the work of Prof. Masson will be worthy of its high and interesting theme.

The Whole Works of Robert Leighton, D. D., Archbishop of Glasgow. To which is prefixed a Life of the Author. By John Norman Pearson, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge. With a Table of the Texts of Scripture, and an Index of the subjects, compiled expressly for this edition. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Large 8vo. pp. 800, double column.

The two most important British editions of the works of Leighton are those of London in 1835, and of Edinburgh in 1840; the one, however, contains some materials not found in the other. In this American edition the deficiencies of the one are supplied from the other, so that this is the only edition which includes all the literary remains of the illustrious author. It contains his Commentary on the First Epistle of Peter, and other practical exegetical pieces; between thirty and forty sermons; his Exposition of the Creed, of the Lord's Prayer, and of the Ten Commandments; twenty-four Theological Lectures, with many minor pieces. This is a rich treasury, as no writer in the English language is superior to Leighton in the rare gift of exhibiting doctrinal truth in such a form as to excite devotional feeling.

Memoirs, Select Thoughts, and Sermons of the late Rev. Edward Payson, D. D., Pastor of the Second Church in Portland. Compiled by the Rev. Asa Cummings, Editor of the *Christian Mirror*. In three volumes. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1859.

The republication of Dr. Payson's works by a Philadelphia house, will, we hope, bring them to the notice of a new and large class of readers. Payson's religious experience, although to so painful a degree marked and marred by a desponding spirit, was so profound, and led to such zeal in his Master's service, and his labours were so eminently blessed, that his memory is dear to American Christians. So far as the influence of his holy life can be perpetuated and extended by the perusal of his writings, a most desirable end will be accomplished.

Hermeneutical Manual; or, Introduction to the Exegetical Study of the Scriptures of the New Testament. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Principal and Professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, Glasgow, Author of Typology of Scripture, &c. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., No. 40 North Sixth Street. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859. Pp. 526.

This work consists of three parts; the first, "Discussion of facts and principles bearing on the language and interpretation

of New Testament Scripture;" the second, "Dissertations on particular subjects connected with the exegesis of New Testament Scripture; third, "The use made of Old Testament Scripture in the writings of the New Testament." This statement, considering the established reputation and high standing of the author, is sufficient to call the attention of biblical students to this important work.

A Grammar of the New Testament Diction; intended as an Introduction to the Critical Study of the Greek New Testament. By Dr. George Benedict Winer. Translated from the sixth enlarged and improved edition of the original, by Edward Masson, M. A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1859.

Ever since the first publication of this work in Germany, in 1822, it has remained without a rival, and has become a standard in England and America, as well as in its native land. No work is so often referred to as an authority in the interpretation of the New Testament as this book of Winer. It is easily accessible, in this new translation, to American students, as Messrs. Smith & English, of Philadelphia, have imported an edition of the work, which is already on hand. The second volume is expected by the 1st of June.

A Collection of the Acts, Deliverances, and Testimonies of the Supreme Judicatory of the Presbyterian Church, from its origin in America to the present time; with Notes and Documents explanatory and historical: constituting a complete illustration of her polity, faith, and history. By Samuel J. Baird. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chesnut street. Pp. 880.

This is a second edition of an admirably executed and indispensable work. The author says in the preface, "The present edition, although numbering no more pages, is so condensed as to contain, besides all that is in the former work, sixty or seventy pages of additional matter, which will be found to add materially to the value of the whole." Mr. Baird has fairly earned the thanks of the whole church, so cordially tendered him by the General Assembly of 1856, for the manner in which he has performed a most laborious and responsible task. His work is to the records of the Presbyterian church, what Cruden's Concordance is to the English Bible.

A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians. By John Eadie, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859. 8vo. Pp. 293.

This Commentary is constructed on the same plan as that of the exposition of the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians

by the same author. Prof. Eadie's writings have an established reputation in this country as well as in Great Britain. He is familiar with the modern exegetical writers, as well as with those of an earlier date. His own commentaries are learned, accurate and orthodox.

Annual of Scientific Discovery: or, Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art. For 1859. Exhibiting the most important Discoveries and Improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Zoology, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, &c. Together with Notes on the Progress of Science during the year 1858; a list of recent Scientific Publications, Obituaries of eminent Scientific Men, &c. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., Author of Principles of Natural Philosophy, Principles of Chemistry, Science of Common Things, &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington st. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. London: Turner & Co. 1859. Pp. 410.

This long descriptive title gives all the information concerning this work that is needed to exhibit its nature and value. There are hundreds of educated men, not specially devoted to scientific pursuits, to whom such a compend must be in a high degree interesting and valuable. They can find in this volume what it would require weeks or months of study to gather from the numerous scientific journals, and other publications of the past year.

Illustrations, Expository and Practical, of the Farewell Discourse of Jesus: Being a Series of Lectures on the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Chapters of the Gospel of St. John. By the late John B. Patterson, M. A., Minister of Falkirk. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1859. Pp. 478.

This is a posthumous work. The lamented writer died while engaged in delivering to his people a course of lectures on the Gospel of St. John. The impression made by these discourses led to a desire for their publication. Those contained in this volume were selected for the purpose, on account of the special interest attached to the portion of Scripture to which they relate. The work has met with a cordial reception, as is evinced by a call for a second edition.

Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews: With an Introductory Essay on Civil Society and Government. By E. C. Wines, D.D., Professor of Greek in Washington College, Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut St. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1859. 8vo. Pp. 640.

This work was originally published six years ago by Putnam & Co. We can but repeat the judgment which was then expressed in this journal. "We commend the volume to our readers as exhibiting the results of an extensive and discrimi-

nating research; as offering the fruits of enlightened and patient thought; sound in its general principles, and lucid and instructive in its illustrations; elevated and often eloquent in language, and presenting comparisons of great force and beauty between the principles of the Hebrew Commonwealth and those of our own."

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac, and Annual Remembrancer of the Church. For 1858–59. By Joseph M. Wilson. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 8vo. Pp. 316.

This is a novel enterprise. The design of the work is to present the condition and operations of the whole body of Presbyterians in Great Britain and America during the past year. With this view the author, evidently with much care and labour, has collected the published minutes or records of no less than twenty-eight distinct and independent ecclesiastical bodies, and from these authentic documents compiled these accounts. The volume contains a great body of valuable information, nowhere else accessible in so convenient a form. It is embellished with the portraits of fourteen ministers, Moderators of the bodies whose proceedings form the bulk of the work, and with representations of twelve churches in which their late sessions were held. We hope Mr. Wilson will find such encouragement as to induce him to continue the publication of this work from year to year.

Poems by Rev. T. Hempstead. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, 509 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 190.

Mr. Hempstead has become extensively known by the numerous occasional pieces which have appeared in the public journals over his initials. Most of these poems are conversant with natural objects, and exhibit a fine sense of the beauties of nature. Others are intended to give expression to the tender affections of domestic life. In all, the versification is smooth and the language felicitous. The thoughts and images are elevated, and a strain of pious feeling pervades the whole. Mr. Hempstead was born, not made, a poet.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia: Being a condensed Translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia, with additions from other sources. By Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D. Assisted by Distinguished Theologians of various Denominations. Part VIII. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

We have repeatedly called the attention of our readers to this valuable work. It is issued in Parts of 128 double column

pages at 50 cents each, and will form, when complete, three super-royal octavo volumes. The numbers are sent free of postage to those who send the subscription price in advance. Part VIII. comes down to the word "Ezra." This is by far the most comprehensive and important work of the kind in the English language.

Bitter-Sweet, a Poem. By J. G. Holland, author of "The Bay Path," "Titcomb's Letters," etc. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. Pp. 220.

So it appears that "Timothy Titcomb, Esquire," is Mr. J. G. Holland; and as the Preface to his former volume is dated from the "Republican Office, Springfield," we presume he is editor of a newspaper at that place. We have read this poem, which we think is saying not a little, of more than two hundred pages of poetry, for to us this species of writing, unless it has decided merit, is most unreadable; we would greatly prefer to sit down to a table of logarithms. We found this volume increase in interest to the end. "Bitter-Sweet" might be translated "The Mission of Evil, or the Permission of Evil, and the manner in which it is overruled for good." We need not say that it is a difficult subject to be handled satisfactorily in prose; and we doubt whether it gains anything in this respect by substituting poetry. The poem, however, contains many striking thoughts, beautifully and powerfully expressed. It is in the form of a dialogue, and enlivened with narratives of touching pathos.

The Theology of Christian Experience, designed as an Exposition of the "Common Faith" of the Church of God. By George D. Armstrong, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Norfolk, Va. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1858.

The title so clearly expresses the object of this volume, as to supersede the necessity of any attempt to state it in different language. It was a happy idea thus to set forth (or to make the attempt) an exposition of the common faith of evangelical Christendom. The people of God are agreed on all those great fundamental truths, which enter into Christian experience; and it is important that this should be made known, and proved to the world. As Dr. Armstrong is a distinguished minister of our own branch of the church, our favourable opinion of his success in this somewhat difficult undertaking, must of course be of less account than that of our brethren of other communions. We must be permitted, however, to say that we think he has done well. We should be glad to know how our Baptist

brethren, (Dr. A. has written a very able work on Baptism,) and Methodist, and others regard it.

A Commonplace-Book of the Holy Bible; or the Scripture's Sufficiency practically demonstrated. Wherein the Substance of Scripture respecting Doctrine, Worship, and Manners, is reduced to its proper Heads; Weighty Cases are resolved, Truths confirmed, and Difficult Texts illustrated and explained. By the celebrated John Locke, author of the Essay on the Human Understanding, who died in 1734. From the fifth London edition. Revised by Rev. William Dodd, LL.D. With an enlarged Index. Published by the American Tract Society.

A long use of this manual has given us a very high appreciation of its value. It affords great facilities for comparing Scripture with Scripture, on all the great points of Christian faith and practice. It shows the Bible to be a self-interpreting, sufficient, and perspicuous rule of faith and life; and also that it contains the evangelical and orthodox system of doctrine, beyond all doubt or gainsaying. The Tract Society has done a good work in making it easily accessible to ministers and private Christians.

The Mother's Mission. Sketches from real Life. By the author of "The Object of Life." Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. 1859. Pp. 330.

The Evening of Life; or, Life and Comfort amidst the Shadows of Declining Years. By Rev. Jeremiah Chaplin. A new edition, revised and much enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 281.

Pleasant Pathway; or, Persuasives to Early Piety. Containing explanations and illustrations of the beauty, safety, and pleasantness of a religious life; being an earnest attempt to persuade young people of both sexes to seek happiness in the love and service of Jesus Christ. By Daniel Wise, author of "The Pathway of Life," &c. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. 1859. Pp. 285.

Story of Bethlehem. A Book for the Young. By John R. McDuff, author of "The Morning and Night Watches," &c. &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 202.

Youth's Bible Studies. Part V., the Gospels. American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau street. Pp. 228.

Opposite the Jail. By the author of "Carey Hamilton," &c. Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. Chicago: William Tomlinson. Pp. 333.

The Huguenot Potter. A True Tale. Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. Chicago: William Tomlinson. Cincinnati: George Crosby. 1859. Pp. 239.

The Parlour Preacher; or, Short Addresses to those who are determined to win Christ. By W. Mason, Author of "The Spiritual Treasury." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. No. 821 Chesnut street. 18mo. Pp. 108.

What Think Ye? or, Questions which must be answered. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 18mo. Pp. 88.

The Gospel Fountain; or, The Anxious Youth made happy. By James Wood, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 18mo. Pp. 295.

Bethlehem and her Children. By the Author of "That Sweet Story of Old." American Tract Society. Pp. 128.

Geschichte der Erzväter für die Iugend. History of the Patriarchs, for Youth. English and German. American Tract Society. Pp. 384.

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Little Jane; or, Sunshine in the House. Written for the Board of Publication. Philadelphia: 821 Chesnut street. Pp. 119.

The Pastor of Gegenburg. Translated from the German. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 91.

Early and Latter Rain; or, The Convict's Daughter. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 234.

Jessie Morrison; or, The Mission of Flowers. By Harriet B. McKeever. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 156.

The Children of the Church, and Sealing Ordinances. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 110.

Clouds and Sunshine; or, The Faith-brightened Pathway. By the author of "Annandale." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 223.

Ye Will Not Come; or, The Sinner without Excuse. Written for the Board of Publication, by a Disabled Minister of Bethel. Philadelphia: 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 36.

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Thomas Aquinas, in omnes D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentarii. 3 vols. 12mo. pp. 1436.

G. Estius, in Omnes D. Pauli Epistolas Commentarii. Second edition in 3 vols. Vol. I. containing Romans and 1 Corinthians. 8vo. pp. 792.

T. Schott, Epistle to the Romans explained. 8vo. pp. 319.

R. Stier, Epistle to the Ephesians explained. 8vo. pp. 427. An abstract of his larger commentary.

C. A. Harless, On Ephesians. 2d edit. 8vo. pp. 574.

B. Weiss, The Epistle to the Philippians explained, with a critical history of its exposition. 8vo. pp. 356.

K. E. Dalmer, Exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians. 8vo. pp. 220.

K. F. Keil is publishing a second edition of his Introduction to the Old Testament, in which the Apocrypha is to be included.

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Spicilegium Solesmense, containing hitherto unpublished works of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writings. Vol. IV., Monuments of the African and Byzantine Church. 8vo. pp. 608. Paris.

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Journal of Sulaiman the Legislator (Kanūnī), on his march to Vienna in the year 935 of the Hejira, A. D. 1529. Now first published in the original Turkish, with a German translation and remarks by W. A. Behrnauer. 8vo. pp. 61.

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J. Zimmermann, A Grammatical Sketch of the Akra or Gā language, with some specimens from the mouth of the natives, and a vocabulary, with an appendix on the Adānme dialect. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 667.

J. Zanardini, Plantarum in Mari Rubro hucusque collectarum enumeratio, cum tabulis xii. 4to. pp. 101. Venice.