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ARTICLE I.—*A Discourse commemorative of the History of the Church of Christ in Yale College, during the first Century of its Existence.* Preached in the College Chapel, November 22, 1857. With Notes and an Appendix. By GEORGE P. FISHER, Livingston Professor of Divinity. New Haven: Thomas H. Pease. 1858.

ANY historical review of the course of any department in Yale College for the past century, cannot fail to bring to light facts of great interest and importance. This is peculiarly true of the history of the Christian church and religion in such an institution during a period so extended, so critical, and so formative for all public institutions in our country. Foremost among these is the church, in close relation to which are Christian colleges, which, deriving their sap from the church, seem beyond any other public institutions to partake of its life, vigour, and perpetuity. The history of the church in these seats of learning and culture, serves to illustrate the mutual relation and reciprocal influence of high education and vital Christianity. On these general grounds, therefore, the friends of religion and education will acknowledge their obligations to Professor Fisher for his careful and dispassionate survey of the formation, growth, and vicissitudes of the church of Christ in Yale College, and for the many curious and instructive facts which he has rescued from oblivion in executing the task.

The topics which naturally come into bold relief in such a discourse, are religion in colleges, the best means for its promotion, together with their present, as compared with their former, moral and religious state. These subjects are of commanding interest and importance. They receive ample illustration in Professor Fisher's discourse. Inviting as these topics are, we must pass them by at this time.

There is another topic which is more or less discussed in this pamphlet, owing to the peculiar relation which Yale College sustains to it. Says Professor Fisher: "In recounting its religious history, it is proper to notice what the College has done for theological science. The fathers of the New England theology—Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Smalley, Emmons, and Dwight—went forth from Yale. The younger Jonathan Edwards is the only one of the leading expounders of the New Divinity who was educated elsewhere. He was a graduate of Nassau Hall. The first and most eminent of these, after taking his degree, remained here for several years as resident graduate, and afterwards as tutor. Here, in his own judgment, his religious life began; here his principles were formed, and he received the discipline which prepared him to take the highest rank in the field of intellectual science. Bellamy, who was converted soon after leaving college, and Hopkins, were pupils of Edwards. From Hopkins, West derived his theology; Smalley studied with Bellamy, and Emmons with Smalley. These men, and especially the foremost one among them, who gave impulse to all the rest, have strongly influenced the thinking of the age. Whatever is distinctive of American theology as contrasted with the general theology of the church, may be traced to them. . . . The leaders of the various parties in theology among us, who have contended in recent times, were most of them instructed by Dr. Dwight, and profess to deduce their views from his teaching.* Yale College has borne a theological stamp from the outset." Pp. 36, 37.

* Foremost among these, as most of our readers are aware, were Drs. Tyler and Taylor, both deceased since the publication of Professor Fisher's discourse, and both graduates of Yale College. To these may be added, Dr. Griffin, and Professor Stuart, among the dead; Drs. Hewit, and Harvey, and

“Now add to these parties a third, which arose later under the lead of President Edwards, who was graduated here about twenty years before President Clap was placed at the head of the College. Its members were the most able and thorough adversaries of Arminianism; but in the process of defending the established faith, they were led to recast it in new forms and to change its aspect. Their system thus originated, was termed the New Divinity, and in later times has received the name of New England Theology. The younger President Edwards has enumerated ten ‘improvements’ on the theology of his day, made by his father and his father’s followers. *In truth, however, their distinction, especially at the outset, was not so much in the circumstance that they broached new opinions, as in the fact that their views were the result of independent reflection, and were maintained on philosophical grounds.*” Page 7.

The election of Dr. Dwight to the Presidency of Yale College, marked the triumph in New England of the Edwardean theology. According to Dr. Hopkins, there were in 1756 “not more than four or five who espoused the sentiments which have since been called the *Edwardean* or *New Divinity*; and since, after some improvement had been made upon them, *Hopkintonian* or *Hopkinsian* sentiments. In 1773 they had increased to forty or fifty. In 1777, under date of November 7th, we find the following passage in Dr. Stiles’s diary:*

“Rev. Mr. Edwards, of New Haven,† tells me there are three parties in Connecticut all pleased with my election, viz. Arminians, who, he said, were a small party; the New Divinity gentlemen, (of whom, he said, he was called one,) who were larger, he said, *but still small*; and the main body of the ministers which, he said, were Calvinistic.” In a letter written in 1796, Hopkins informs us, that “among the advocates of the New Divinity were included more than one

Drs. Lyman and Edward Beecher, Dr. Bacon, and Dr. Bushnell, among the living, as graduates of Yale College who have been conspicuous in the theological discussions of New England.

* Dr. Stiles was the immediate predecessor of Dr. Dwight in the Presidency of Yale College.

† The younger Jonathan Edwards.

hundred in the ministry." Whether the ministry of Connecticut, or New England, or North America, he does not say.

Professor Fisher further quotes President Stiles, as saying in 1787: "It has been the *ton* to direct students in Divinity, these thirty years past, to read the Bible, President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and Mr. Hopkins's writings; and this was a pretty good sufficiency of reading. But now the younger class, but yet in full vigour, suppose they see further than these oracles, and are disposed to become oracles themselves, and wish to write theology, and have their own books come into vogue. The very New Divinity gentlemen say, they perceive a disposition among several of their brethren to struggle for preëminence; particularly Dr. Edwards, (the younger,) Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Smalley, Mr. Judson, Mr. Spring, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Strong of Hartford, Mr. Dwight, Mr. Emmons, and others. They all want to be Luthers."

Our author winds up this theological retrospect in the following terms. "By a variety of agencies, the party professing the ancient Calvinism and eschewing 'the improvements' of the New Divinity, has been quite obliterated in New England. Eighty years ago, the followers of President Edwards* among the Calvinistic clergy, were said by his son, the younger President, to be few in number. At present there are some who are scarcely aware that there ever was a time, since his death, when the Calvinists of New England did not regard President Edwards as the most authoritative expounder of their principles. *His theology, however, it cannot be denied, had from the beginning the respect of many who refused to adopt the additions proposed by his disciples. It is still a mooted point among the interpreters of his writings, whether he deviated from Calvin in any thing except modes of statement.*" Pp. 80-82.

We have quoted at this length from this pamphlet in order that our readers may see for themselves, first, that intelligent and candid men, such as Professor Fisher shows himself in this discourse, and as we personally know him to be, do not hesi-

* Not Edwards's followers exactly, but New Divinity men.

tate to class the various speculative systems that have, or have had, currency in New England, under the title of New Divinity, or the still more conveniently respectable but indefinite designation of New England theology, as Edwardean, or as products of the school of which President Edwards was leader; and secondly, for the purpose of exhibiting the channels of mental association through which dispassionate and honest minds, with a one-sided view of the subject, can be led to connect the name of Edwards with a set of opinions which he gained his chief celebrity in demolishing. The animus of the foregoing extracts, certainly the impression they convey to the reader, whether designed or undesigned, is that Edwards was the father and leader of that theological party which includes Hopkins, Emmons, and Taylor, and that the various peculiarities of these and other men, which have had currency in the country under the assumed title of New England theology, are developments of Edwards's system, and may lawfully protect themselves with the shield of his mighty name. It is quite time that this claim should be investigated and settled. The propounders and abettors of all the ephemeral schemes of divinity that have successively risen to notoriety in the Congregational and Presbyterian bodies of our country, have successively and confidently made it, as if it were as certain as that Edwards wrote theology at all.

I. We propose to prove that Edwards held and devoted his labours to prove the doctrines commonly known as Old Calvinism, with the single exception theologically, that he taught Stapfer's scheme of the mediate imputation of Adam's sin; and with the further qualification, that he held an eccentric philosophical theory of the nature of virtue, as consisting wholly in love to being in general. This was invented as a corrective of the theory which founds moral excellence in self-love. Neither of these peculiarities, however, was allowed to act upon or modify other parts of his theology. Their connection with the subsequent forms of New Divinity, we shall indicate before we close. We think it easy to show, however, that the distinctive features of this New Divinity, in all its successive forms, are utterly abhorrent to his entire system. They have no more place in Edwards than in Turretin, or the Westminster stand-

ards. On all these and other points, with the single exception of mediate imputation above noted, it was his great labour, not to subvert but to vindicate the doctrines of those standards, not merely in some vague substance thereof, but in their most exact and literal import. And even in regard to original sin, his theory enabled him to say in the most literal sense, "we sinned in him and fell with him in the first transgression." He held, as a few now hold, that the posterity of Adam as branches did what he their root did, literally, not representatively according to catholic Calvinism, and in our belief, the Bible. In this, however, as elsewhere, he did not think of himself as discovering any new Edwardean theology. He avowedly takes the idea from Stapfer. In his concluding summation of the points which are vindicated and corroborated by his great treatise on the Will, he specifies among others the following.*

"The things which have been said, obviate some of the chief objections of *Arminians* against the *Calvinistic* doctrine of the *total depravity and corruption of human nature*, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is *utterly unable*, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight."

He, indeed, says, that the objections to such inability have been obviated by proving it a moral inability, and so inexcusable. But the same thing is said by Owen, Turretin, Pictet, and the older theologians. By moral inability he meant not such an inability as is consistent with the declaration that the unregenerate, as New Divinity men have uniformly taught, are, in any real sense, truly able to obey the gospel without sovereign grace. He meant, as we have already seen, that they are "utterly unable" to do this. This is the unvarying, unqualified language and spirit of his theology and his sermons—just as clearly so as of those of John Owen. His great treatises on the Will and Original Sin were written to establish, not to dilute this doctrine.

* Edwards's Works, New York edition. Vol. II. p. 282, et. seq. Our references will all be to the New York edition of his Works.

He proceeds to say, that his treatise obviates the objections of the Arminians to efficacious grace; which mainly amounted to this, "that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by the determining power and efficacy of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving power; because not the person in whom it is wrought is the determining author of it, but God that wrought it in him." Now this notion that the sinner's change in regeneration must be caused by his own will, not another's, else his repentance and faith would not be his own, but God's, who wrought it in him, was one of the most familiar, constant, and distinctive, in the New-school preaching a quarter of a century ago.

In like manner he claims to have demolished the various vulgar objections to the doctrines of God's universal and absolute decree, and of absolute, eternal, personal election; such as that they are inconsistent with the use of the means of grace, or the reasonableness of rewards and punishments; that they make God the author of sin, and imply a contradiction between his secret and revealed will.

But what shows conclusively that Edwards understood himself to have been confirming, not modifying or improving old Calvinism, in his Treatise on the Will, is the following consequence which he deduces from it. "From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world, by his death; yet there must be something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should be actually saved thereby. . . . God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other most strictly speaking; for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he has; he does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And indeed such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge as from that of the decree."

There is no subject in regard to which the improvements of New England theology have been more vaunted, than the penal nature of Christ's sufferings, the imputation of his righteousness

to believers, of their sin or guilt to him—in short, all that belongs to the old idea of Christ's standing in our law-place. It boasts of having cleared theology of these perplexities and incumbrances. But it is quite certain that Edwards strenuously maintained and defended them.

“The first thing necessary to be done, is, that the Son of God should become our representative and surety; and so be substituted in the sinner's room. . . . Who would have thought of a person of infinite glory representing sinful worms, that had made themselves by sin infinitely provoking and abominable! For if the Son of God be substituted in the sinner's room, then *his sin must be charged upon him; he will thereby take the guilt of the sinner upon himself*; he must be subject to the same law that man was, both as to the commands and threatenings. . . . Again, if the Son of God be substituted in the sinner's stead, then he comes under the sinner's obligation to suffer the punishment which man's sin had deserved.” Vol. vii. p. 71.

After asserting that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is a gospel doctrine, he says, “by that righteousness being *imputed* to us, is meant no other than this, that the righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that perfect inherent righteousness which ought to be in ourselves. Christ's perfect righteousness shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves. And so we suppose that a title to eternal life is given us as the reward of this righteousness. The Scripture uses the word *impute* in this sense, viz. for reckoning any thing belonging to any person to another person's account.” In proof he compares Philemon, 18, with Rom. v. 13, in which the original *ἐλλογεω* is translated, in the one case, impute, in the other, put to the account of.

“The opposers of this doctrine suppose that there is an absurdity in supposing that God imputes Christ's obedience to us; it is to suppose that God is mistaken, and thinks we performed that obedience which Christ performed. But why cannot that righteousness be reckoned to our account, and be accepted for us without any such absurdity? . . . Why may not his obeying the law of God be as rationally reckoned to our

account, as his suffering the penalty of the law." Vol. v. pp. 394-5.

"Justification is manifestly a *forensic* term, as the word is used in Scripture, and a judicial thing, or the act of a judge, so that if a person should be justified without a righteousness, the judgment would not be according to truth. . . . So that our judge cannot justify us, unless he sees a perfect righteousness some way belonging to us, either performed by ourselves, or by another, and justly and duly reckoned to our account." Pp. 397-9.

"Believers are represented in Scripture as being so in Christ that they are legally one." P. 399.

One of the distinctive features of New England theology, (especially the later forms of it,) "as contrasted with the general theology of the church," lies in its persistent refusal to recognize in the word *guilt* any meaning but personal moral ill-desert, and in reasoning against the old theology, as if it employed the term in the same sense, which is now its more common popular acceptation. Of course, it is easy to reason down the old theology, by attaching to its language a meaning which it never bore. The old meaning of the word *guilt*, as found in creeds and books of theology, was obnoxiousness to punishment, which indeed is the result of moral ill-desert, either in a principal, or substitute and representative. Such is its scriptural use, when it is said, "all the world may become guilty *ὀποδίκως* before God." Rom. iii. 19. "He is guilty *ἐνοχος* of death." Matt. xxvi. 66. In this sense Edwards used it in reference to these subjects. His words are, "Christ, by suffering the penalty, and so making atonement for us, only removes the guilt of our sins." "When he had undertaken to stand in our stead, he was looked upon and treated as though he were guilty with our guilt; and by bearing the penalty, he did, as it were, free himself from this guilt." P. 396.

A very important question of practical divinity which separates New England theology from the "general theology of the church," is whether faith in Christ is before and conditional to repentance, or repentance is before and conditional to faith; not indeed in the order of time, but the order of nature. As to the order of time, and as concerns actual existence, each sup-

poses the other. Faith must exert itself in repentance—repentance must have faith for its root. The sun and its radiance suppose each other; but the sun is before and in order to its rays. Now the New England theology, “as contrasted with the general theology of the church,” has largely maintained that love and repentance are the antecedents of faith in the soul.* The church theology held that there was no genuine repentance, which does not proceed from a believing “apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ.” So Edwards condemns the ignorance of those who suppose “that the repentance by which remission of sins is obtained, can be completed without any respect to Christ, or application of the mind to the Mediator, who alone has made atonement for sin. Evangelical repentance is an humiliation for sin before God. But the sinner never comes and humbles himself before God in any other repentance, but that which includes hoping in his mercy for remission. If sorrow be not accompanied with that, there will be no coming to God in it, but a flying further from him.” Pp. 432-3.

Another distinctive feature of the New Theology, closely related to the foregoing, as “contrasted with the general theology of the church,” is found in the doctrine, that evangelical feelings, affections, and purposes precede and give rise to that spiritual illumination, or perception of the beauty and glory of divine things, which the Bible everywhere ascribes to the saint. Whereas the standard doctrine has been, that while spiritual illumination and spiritual feeling are contemporaneous in fact, yet, in the order of nature, spiritual light is before and conditional to spiritual feeling. In effectual calling, the “enlightening of the mind” is requisite to “the renewing of the will.” The former is the condition of the latter, not the latter of the former. This arises from the very structure of the soul, whereby the understanding is the faculty of guidance, and it can only love and choose what it apprehends as in some sense lovely and desirable. Whoever desires to understand Edwards’s view on this subject may consult the fourth book of

* Smalley, one of the most moderate and judicious of these divines, says: “An apprehension of pardoning mercy is not necessary, however, to the first feelings of true repentance.”—*Sermon from Acts*, iii. 19.

the Treatise on Religious Affections. The very title of it is, "gracious affections arise from the mind being enlightened rightly and spiritually to apprehend divine things." The first sentence reads thus, "holy affections are not heat without light; but evermore arise from some information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge." It is not inconsistent with this that he sometimes speaks of this spiritual discernment, as a "sense of the heart." For the heart, the whole emotional, affective and voluntary power, in Edwards's view, and in truth, acts in view of the light furnished by the understanding. It is an æsthetic apprehension, the nature of which is that the perception of beauty is followed by pleasurable emotions. So he says, spiritual understanding *primarily* consists in this *sense or taste of the moral beauty of divine things*. It is because taste is, whether literary, moral, or spiritual, like conscience, both intellectual and emotional in its workings, that it and its operations are sometimes spoken of in one aspect, sometimes in the other. But this does not alter the fact, that the perception of the understanding is the antecedent ground of the emotion.

That men are not born sinless, that dispositions to sin or holiness, are themselves sinful or holy, is constantly maintained in the treatise on Original Sin, the former throughout, the latter especially in Part II., Chapter 1.

By that class of divines who maintain the native sinlessness of man, it is often mentioned as a peculiarity of Edwards's theology which lends countenance to their own, that he held depravity to be not any positive creation of God, but to originate in a privative cause, viz. the withholding of divine influences. But Edwards did not deem this view at all a discovery of his own. He regarded it as pertaining to the common theology of the church. He says: "It is agreeable to the sentiments of our *best divines*, that all sin comes originally from a DEFECTIVE or PRIVATIVE cause." But the absence of that principle of love to God, arising from the withdrawal of God's presence, leaves the lower principles in that *ἀραξία* and *ἀνομία*, that want of conformity to the law of God, which the Bible and the creeds, with Edwards, pronounce sin. While this deprives the later New Theology of all sanction from

Edwards, it for ever separates him from another sort represented by Emmons, who ascribe all sin to the immediate efficiency of God.

In view of all this, we submit to all candid minds, whether it is not proved beyond fair dispute, that Edwards differed in no respect from the "general theology of the church," except with Stapfer, and a small body of Reformed divines, in asserting the mediate, as distinguished from the immediate, imputation of Adam's sin: and whether the various speculative systems that have successively risen and decayed under the title of New England Theology, can, with even a show of justice, be ranked as of the school of this great divine, or claim the shield of his authority.

II. The younger Edwards enumerates ten improvements which he contends his father, and those whom he calls his followers, made in theology.* Some of these have reference to his philosophical views of the nature of virtue; and besides being somewhat overstated, are philosophical rather than directly theological. We shall return to this in due time. Some other points represented as improvements, had long been among the common places of theology. Thus the second and fourth on Liberty, Necessity, and the Origin of Evil, entirely depend upon that view of will which reduces all necessity in the moral acts of men, to the simple *certainty* that they will be what they are and not otherwise. Turretin, for example, in dealing with the question, whether the decree of God brings with it a necessity of the events decreed, in regard to acts of will, expressly puts out of the discussion, 1. Absolute and physical necessity, which pertains to causes in their own nature determined to one event and that only, as, for example, the necessity by which fire burns, or the sun shines. 2. The necessity of compulsion by a cause external to the will which forcibly counteracts it: and says, that the question only respects a hypothetical necessity, consisting in the connection of antecedent and consequent, with respect to the *certainty of the event*, and its futurity by virtue of the decree, which he

* See Dwight's Biography of Edwards, the elder. Edwards's Works, Vol. i. p. 613, *et seq.*

asserts.* It is not easy to state the doctrine of Edwards on this point more exactly. The novelty of his treatise lies not in the position it takes and defends, but in the multitude of proofs, the fecundity and cogency of the arguments by which he maintained it; making it, in the main, impregnable to all subsequent assaults.

Edwards the younger, in treating of this alleged improvement, represents that even the Westminster Assembly were groping in darkness on this subject, because they say our first parents fell in consequence of "being left to the liberty of their own will;" and that by God's foreordination, "the contingency of second causes is not taken away but rather established"! These divines, says he, "unquestionably meant that our first parents, at least, in the instance of their fall, acted from self-determination, and by mere *contingence or chance*." He might as well have said, that he or his father meant that men sin by chance, because they sin freely; and their acts though certain in themselves, are no less certainly contingent on the way in which they choose; while again it is quite certain that this is contingent on their pleasure.

The fifth improvement claimed regards the atonement. But this, like several which succeed it, is claimed not directly for Edwards himself, but for his "followers." The only error here is that which we are endeavouring to expose, in reference to this whole subject. Herein they were not his followers, but the antagonists of that general theology of the church, which he so ably vindicated.

The next point respects the Imputation of Adam's sin, and of Christ's righteousness. The improvements in regard to these he also claims for the followers of Edwards. The most noteworthy thing here is his statement of the difficulty which these followers found in the old doctrine. It was this. They assumed that to reckon anything to the account of another, is just the same as to reckon or think it his inherent or personal property; and hence, to use their own term, that to impute Christ's righteousness to the believer, is literally and personally to

* Sed quæritur de necessitate hypothetica et consequentiae, respectu certitudinis eventus et futuritionis ex decreto; quam asserimus. *Turretin; Loc. Quart. Quæst. IV.*

“transfer” it to him. “How,” (asks he,) “can the righteousness or good conduct of one person be the righteousness or good conduct of another? How can God, who is omniscient, and cannot mistake, reckon, judge, or think, it to be the conduct of that other?” It is a short way of demolishing a doctrine, first to misconceive and then misrepresent it. But how so clear a head as this writer possessed, could have studied his father’s writings, as already quoted, and entertained this misconception, we do not understand; much less why, in connection with this class of subjects, those who cherish such misconceptions should rank themselves as “followers” of the great divine.

The next improvement claimed is not attributed to Edwards but to Hopkins, and refers to his peculiar views in regard to the unregenerate, and the instructions to be given them. All that is peculiar in these is far enough from Edwardean, and has for the most part died out of the New Theology itself.

The eighth improvement claimed is ascribed to Edwards himself. It regards the nature of experimental religion, as elucidated in his great work on the Affections. No one questions the consummate ability of this treatise, or that it unfolded the distinctive and constituent elements of evangelical religion with extraordinary perspicuity and force; or that it set some sides of the subject in a clearer light than had been done before. The same thing is true, to some extent, of every work of permanent value on this or any other subject. It was true of Shepard’s Parable of the Ten Virgins, and Flavel’s Touchstone, from which Edwards so largely quotes. It was true of Edwards’s discourses on Justification by Faith. To set known principles in a stronger light, with new defences against new forms of antagonistic error, or with a more adequate and effective application, is one thing. To bring to light radically new truths, previously unknown or unregarded, is quite another. The younger Edwards says: “The accounts of Christian affection and experience which had before been given, both by American and European writers, were general, indiscriminate, and confused. They seldom, if ever, distinguished the exercises of *self-love, natural conscience, and other*

natural principles of the human mind, under conviction of divine truth, from those of the new nature, given in regeneration." (The italics are his.) Marvellous as this statement is, it is only more marvellous that it could have been made by one who had read the Treatise on the Affections, and the quotations from Shepard, Flavel, Preston, Owen, Calvin, &c., in the foot-notes. He might as well say that Dickinson had improved upon the theology of the Assembly's Catechism, because he had ably explained and defended the Five Points.

The ninth point respects disinterested affection. Especial reference is had doubtless to Edwards's theory of the nature of virtue, and the development and application of that theory by Hopkins. Here the simplest summation of the truth is, that the "new things are not true, and the true things are not new." So far as the scheme makes virtue a mere means of happiness, whether to ourselves or others, or to "being in general;" so far as it resolves all virtue into benevolence; so far as it makes a due regard to our own happiness inconsistent with or not requisite to holiness, it is contradicted by Scripture and the universal conscience of our race. So far, it has long been abjured by the New Theology itself, and in its place the opposite extreme of reducing all moral goodness to some form of self-love, or means of happiness to the agent, has been widely adopted. This latter scheme was earnestly and ably defended by the most distinguished modern improver of theology in New England, the late Dr. Taylor. It is, however, already on the wane even among his disciples.* So far, however, as Edwards

* Dr. Dutton, of New Haven, after avowing his opinion that Dr. Taylor is the greatest of the New England divines, not excepting the elder Edwards, adds: "Having said this, I must also say, in the spirit of fair criticism, that there is one part of his theological system which, in my view, will not bear the test of time and of light. That is the self-love theory, or desire of happiness theory, as it has been called; viz. that all motives that come to the mind find their ultimate ground of appeal in the desire of personal happiness, and that the idea of right, in its last analysis, is resolved into a tendency to the highest happiness. This theory, though advocated by him, was not peculiar to him, and never should be attributed to him as a peculiarity. It was plainly taught before him by Dwight and the elder Edwards; though, with his accustomed frankness and boldness, he gave it greater prominence than they." *Sermon on the death of Dr. Taylor, by S. W. S. Dutton, D. D.*

These last clauses are hardly consistent with the claim of Edwards the

and Hopkins meant to teach that pure religious affections, without excluding, have an origin higher than self-love; that their direct and immediate object is the excellency of moral goodness as such, of God and of divine things, and not merely our own selfish advantage or enjoyment, they taught what is true and important indeed, but not what was new; simply an old and precious truth which we have often been obliged to defend against the later champions of New Divinity.

The last improvement which he attributes to his father, "and those who adopt his views," pertains to regeneration. "It is their opinion, (says he,) that *the intellect* and *the sensitive faculties* are not the immediate subject of any change in regeneration. They believe, however, that in consequence of the change which the renewed heart experiences, and of its reconciliation to God, light breaks in upon the understanding. The subject of regeneration sees, therefore, the glory of God's character, and the glory of all divine truth." We think it has been abundantly shown, that whoever may hold this opinion, Edwards, "and those who adopt his views," are not among the number. It has characterized New England theology through all its improvements, since it took a distinctive name and bias from the decisive innovations of the younger Edwards. The Scriptures teach with the "general theology of the church," that we are "transformed by the renewing of the mind" as such, not exclusively in any one part, but in all its parts, intellectual, sensitive, and voluntary. Certainly, if any portion of the mind is signalized as preëminently the immediate subject of renovation in regeneration, it is the intellect. The eyes of

younger, that his father established the scheme of disinterested benevolence, among other alleged improvements in theology. The fact seems to be, that Edwards and Dwight made the highest happiness of the universe the only proper ultimate end of action, and placed the essence of virtue in its pursuit. Dr. Taylor, as Dr. Dutton avows, placed it in seeking our personal happiness. It is a question, however, whether if happiness be the ultimate and highest good of all being, it must not also be the ultimate and highest good of each individual; and therefore whether it is not his highest mission to get as much of it for himself as he can. Any theory which analyzes moral goodness into a means of something better than itself, or into elements simpler than itself, prepares the way for almost any conclusions, which an ingenious mind may take the trouble to deduce from it.

the understanding are enlightened. The soul is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created it. The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, for they are spiritually discerned. But if the intellect is the immediate subject of regenerating influence, it is not so exclusively of the affections and will. The love of God is shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost, and he works in us to will and to do, of his own good pleasure. But then as there is an order in which these respective faculties operate; as the affections and will act in view of the perceptions of the intellect; so, as we have already observed, and have seen that Edwards proved, spiritual illumination is the antecedent logical condition of spiritual feelings and choices. Christ must be seen to be chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely, in order to his being loved and chosen as such. It is when our eyes see God that we abhor ourselves, and repent in dust and ashes. The idea of the will being immediately wrought upon, without any attendant or antecedent operation on the "intellect and sensitive faculties," is absurd. It supposes that the will is an irrational power, acting irrespective of the views of the understanding, and that regeneration is a work not only above nature, but in contravention of its laws: not only supernatural, but a miracle. It supposes such a divorce and mutual isolation of the powers and operations of the one indivisible, intelligent, sensitive, voluntary soul, as has no existence.* Couple with

* "Nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and separately in this matter. When the mind is sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of a thing, that implies a sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it; and this sensibleness of the amiableness or delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very nature of it the sense of the heart." This passage from Edwards on the Affections is quoted with approbation by Hopkins in his chapter on *Divine Illumination*.

It is to be observed, that of those who have had name as expounders and promoters of the New England theology, there have been two sorts, sometimes in vehement conflict with each other: the abettors respectively of the Exercise-scheme, and of the Taste-scheme. The former scheme, which confined all moral quality to mere acts of volition, was developed in an extreme form by Emmons, and afterwards, with less extravagance, by Dr. Taylor. The abettors of the Taste-scheme, including Hopkins, Dwight, and probably Smal-

this the power of contrary choice, in opposition to the prevailing inclinations of the soul, which both the Edwardses, and all the New England schools claiming to be the successors of both or either of them, strenuously denied, previous to the time of Taylor and Beecher, and we have that scheme of plenary ability which has been the salient point of New Divinity for a quarter of a century, and has, more than all else, given rise to the embittered theological contests and disruptions of that period, yea, to a New and Old-school of New England theology itself.

Thus it appears beyond dispute that the novelties which gave form and being to the New Theology, when it came to be recognized as such, as contrasted with the general theology of the church, were, with scarcely an exception, unknown to Edwards. Nor did Hopkins go the length of the younger Edwards in innovation. Indeed, Professor Fisher himself says as much. "In truth, however, their distinction, especially at the outset, was not so much in the circumstance that they broached new opinions, as in the fact that their views were the result of independent reflection, and were maintained on philosophical grounds." To this we would add, especially with regard to Edwards, that their faith in divine truth was founded on the Scriptures, and their metaphysics were designed to show the

ley, were far nearer the truth. Many of their representations were in full accordance with it. Their chief error and source of error on this subject, arose from overlooking the circumstance, that taste is a cognitive as well as an emotional faculty. What they appear to have opposed, was the idea that regeneration imparts a perception of truths not set forth in Scripture, or increases our speculative faculties or knowledge. They were contending against false views of spiritual illumination, which virtually confounded it with revelation or inspiration. But here again they did not differ from the general theology of the church. They were not discoverers. The truth in their doctrine was not new. The only novelty was the error which some of them worked into their statement and defence of this truth, viz. that in regeneration the immediate change wrought is exclusively on the will or affections, and not at all upon the intellect, and in the separation which they at length, and emphatically of late, have recognized between the actings of intellectual and active powers, forgetting that mutual implication of each with each in all moral exercises which experience proves, and such scriptural phrases as the "carnal mind," "ignorance of heart," &c., constantly intimate. In nothing is the word of God more explicit than in the condemnation of spiritual blindness and perverse moral judgments.

accordance of Scripture doctrine with genuine philosophy. We agree with Professor Fisher, when he adds, "The boldness with which they declared in the pulpit the terror of the gospel, and the force of their appeals to the conscience, in contrast with what had been usual, made their sermons exciting and effective." This was more especially true of the elder Edwards and Bellamy, who gave emphasis to the terrors of the Lord, at a time when a prevalent reticence in regard to them, into which preaching in quiet times is always apt to subside, rendered such emphasis startling and potent. But this is no peculiarity of any new system of theology, in contrast with the old; it simply pertains to ministerial prudence and fidelity. It was no more characteristic of Edwards and Bellamy, than of Whitefield and the Tennents, who certainly had no vein of Neo-Calvinism. The whole class were called New Lights, rather with reference to the unusually startling and awakening character of their preaching, and the extravagances which marred the revival of which they were leading promoters, than to any theological tenets at variance with old Calvinism. It was not till Hopkins and the younger Edwards brought in their radical innovations, that a *New Theology* began to be much recognized, either by friends or foes. It was by them preëminently, and their successors culminating in Emmons, that a system was elaborated which infused into preaching not only the terrors of the Lord, but other terrors not of the Lord. Most of the preachers who adopted this system were indeed earnest supporters of some of the high doctrines of grace, and set them forth in preaching with remarkable distinctness and force. So far they were efficient and successful preachers. But this was due to the old truths, not to the new discoveries they proclaimed; which, as far as they went, according to our best knowledge, were an incumbrance and a clog to their usefulness. It is certain that Hopkins and the younger Edwards enjoyed but very meagre success as pastors and preachers. The view which President Stiles, who, before his accession to the Presidency of Yale College, was pastor of one church in Newport, Rhode Island, while Dr. Hopkins was pastor of the other, gives of this matter, is not very wide of the truth. Commenting on a letter from Dr. Hopkins to himself, after his removal

to New Haven, in which the former complains that the people in Newport "were going from bad to worse, and he saw no way for his continuing there longer than till spring," Dr. Stiles says, as quoted by Professor Fisher: "Remark 1. Very lamentable is the state of religion in Newport, and particularly that they will not attend public worship. But, 2. One occasion of this negligence is brother Hopkins's New Divinity. He has preached his own congregation almost away, or into an indifference. 3. Where the New Divinity ministers are liked, their preaching is acceptable, *not for the new tenets*, but for its containing the good old doctrines of grace, on which the new gentlemen are very *sound, clear and full*. In other parts, where the neighbouring ministers generally preach the Calvinistic doctrines, the people begin to be tired of the incessant inculcation of the unintelligible and shocking new points; especially that an unconverted man had better be killing his father and mother than praying for converting grace; that true repentance implies a willingness and desire to be damned for the glory of God; that we are to give God thanks that he caused Adam to sin, and involve all his posterity in total depravity," &c. When this system finally crystallized into the dismal dogmas of Emmons, hard, cold, and clear as polar ice—which, under the title of sermons, he would argue to Sabbath congregations by the hour—that God is the efficient cause of sin, in the same sense as of holiness; that the wicked are as much indebted to him for their iniquities as the saints for their purity;* that the soul is a chain of exercises; that it has no virtuous or sinful principles, but only acts, created by God;†

* "Since the Scripture ascribes all the actions of men to God as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude, that the divine agency is as much concerned in their bad as their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinction here, and to ascribe only the good actions of men to the divine agency, while they ascribe their bad ones to the divine permission. But there appears no ground for this distinction, either in Scripture or reason. . . . If he produced their bad as well as their good volitions, then his agency was concerned *in precisely the same manner*, (the italics are the author's) in their wrong as their right actions."—*Emmons's Sermons*, Boston edition of 1812, pp. 39, 40.

† "Since, in regeneration, God does not create any new nature, disposition, or principle of action, but only works in men holy and benevolent exercises, in which they are completely free and active, there is a plain absurdity in calling

that there is no virtue but disinterested benevolence;* that men must exercise holy love and genuine repentance before they can be warranted to believe on Christ;† the capacity of the public mind for the monstrous and dreadful was overstrained. Recalcitration was inevitable. We would, in the language of a distinguished statesman, recently deceased, as soon “toss icebergs into a Christian congregation, or before inquiring souls, as such theories.”

III. The reaction came, and in a two-fold way. First,

the renovation of the heart a miraculous and supernatural change.”—*Id.* pp. 180.

“But if a new heart consists in new holy exercises, then sinners may be as active in regeneration as conversion. Though it be true, that the divine agency is concerned in the renovation of the heart, yet this does by no means destroy the activity of sinners. Their activity in all cases is owing to a divine operation on their minds. . . He always works in them to will and to do in all their free and voluntary exercises.”—*Id.* pp. 178-9.

* In a discourse from Gal. v. 22, the doctrine is that the Holy Spirit produces only love in regeneration, which he says is “the love of benevolence, not the love of complacency,” p. 157; he infers from this premise, 1. That there is no distinction between “regeneration, conversion, and sanctification.” 2. That men are equally active in them all. 3. That regeneration is “no more a supernatural work than any other divine operation upon the minds of men.”

† In a sermon on Gal. v. 6, one of his concluding inferences is thus stated, “If there can be no true experimental religion, but what originates from that supreme love to God which is before faith in Christ; then there is ground to fear, that there is a great deal of false religion among all denominations of Christians. For many of their most devout teachers inculcate the doctrine that faith in Christ is before love to God.” P. 288.

The doctrine of a sermon from Prov. viii. 17, is that God does not love sinners until they first love him; and the third inference is thus stated: “If God does not love sinners before they love him, then they must love him, while they know that he *hates* them, and is disposed to punish them for ever.” P. 110.

The love of the Scriptures implies trust and confidence. Who can stand in this relation to a being that he knows is bent on his perpetual and irremediable ruin, “disposed to punish him for ever,” however righteous he may know such a purpose to be? The very idea involves a contradiction. This necessity of perceiving the mercy of God in Christ, as a prerequisite to the cordial love of him, is not inconsistent with our loving him for his intrinsic excellency, as well as for his love to us. But it is an indispensable prerequisite to our loving him truly and confidently, on any ground whatever. To love God because he first loved us, is not in itself sordid; it is doing what we ought, but not all we ought. But to admire and delight in his glory, as it shines in Christ, does not cease to be a duty, or an element of piety, because his glory demands the believing sinner’s salvation.

and in a direction almost entirely salutary, in the person of Dr. Dwight, whose system of theology, although unsatisfactory at some points, betraying a too imperfect acquaintance with the general theology of the church, and with theologians outside of New England, is nevertheless marked by a rebound from the extravagances we have noted, towards standard divinity. This is eminently so with the practical, which is far the most significant side of his theology. Professor Fisher, as we have seen, regards his accession to the Presidency of Yale College, as "marking the triumph of the Edwardean theology." The degree of truth in this statement, depends on what is meant by "Edwardean theology." Was it the theology of Edwards the father, or Edwards the son and his confederates and successors? Professor Fisher says, "he (Dwight,) gained strength by discarding the eccentric theory of Hopkins and Emmons concerning Resignation, which he had espoused in early life, and especially by vigorously opposing their odious propositions relative to the divine efficiency in the production of sin." P. 82. This is very true. And it is true also that he "gained strength, i. e. mitigated the opposition of old Calvinists, by rejecting some other eccentricities, and "odious propositions," that excited great repugnance in New England, among men like President Stiles, and among those Presbyterians who had rejoiced to welcome the elder Edwards to their bosoms, and whose successors now feel honoured with the custody of his precious dust. It is further true, that it was not Edwardean theology, but Hopkinsianism, Emmonsism, and Taylorism, that awakened the repugnance felt in the Presbyterian Church to that variable and uncertain thing called New England theology. The doctrine that moral character attaches not merely to acts, but to the antecedent dispositions or principles, whence those acts flow, is radical in old Calvinism, and the general theology of the Church. In regeneration, says Dr. Dwight, "God gives him (the sinner) a new and VIRTUOUS disposition; styled in the Scriptures a new heart; a right spirit; an honest and good heart; the treasure of a good heart; and by several other names of a like import. . . What I intend by this disposition is *the cause, which, in the mind of man, produces all virtuous affections and volitions; the state in which the*

mind is universally possessed of a character, or the tendency, itself, of the mind towards all that which in the character is morally excellent."* As Dr. Dwight is the author of these italics, this statement may be taken as deliberate and emphatic. Indeed, he seizes every opportunity to make his readers feel his abhorrence and contempt for the dogmas of Emmons. Even in regard to that idea which is so common among New England theologians, that love and repentance precede faith, he says it is impossible and unimportant for us to know in what particular order they occur;† while, at the same time, in describing them, he specifies faith first.‡ Unfolding the subject in more practical relations, he says, that of true "obedience, the Scripture informs us, evangelical faith is the genuine spring, and the only spring in the present world;"|| and finally, that "the obedience which precedes the existence of faith, is destitute of any virtuous character."

In regard to the use of the means of grace in seeking salvation, and the prayers of the unregenerate for grace, he most earnestly repudiated the views of the New Divinity men, who shocked the pious, and perplexed inquiring souls, by raising the question in their minds whether it was not wicked to pray before they were conscious of being new creatures. His round common sense, profound practical sagacity, and earnest piety, led him to recoil from ultrasisms in the midst of which he was reared. They enabled him to curb the extravagance and narrow the influence of the Emmons party. They conciliated the confidence, and quieted the opposition of the Old-school divines. But this was a triumph of "Edwardean theology," so far as this term is used to designate opinions contrasted with the general theology of the church," by renouncing rather than procuring acceptance for the most obnoxious of those opinions. It is true that in regard to imputation, atonement, and some affiliated points, Dr. Dwight kept on in the track in which he had been educated. Yet he was not wont to be obtrusive upon points in which he differed from standard church theology. He rather softened and rounded the hard, angular

* Dwight's Theology, New Haven edition; Vol. 2. p. 450.

† *Id.* p. 451.

‡ *Id.* p. 355.

|| *Id.* p. 363.

points. Although he took up the doctrine substantially handed down from Edwards, that virtue consists wholly in benevolence and is founded in utility, he rejected its Hopkinsian application. One of his sermons is devoted to proving that seeking our own salvation is not inconsistent with benevolence. His argument against the imputation of Adam's sin, goes strongly to indicate that he had been trained in that school, which, in the language of President Stiles, regarded a few New England divines a "pretty good sufficiency" of theological reading. It is this. "The verb *λογίζομαι* which is the original word *impute*, denotes originally and always, *to reckon, to count, to reckon to the account of a man, to charge to his account*; but never to transfer moral action, guilt, or desert from one being to another." Vol. i. p. 498. Now, is it necessary to say for the thousandth time, that those who hold to imputation, hold to no transfer of personal qualities, but simply a reckoning them to the account of another as a ground of dealing with him? Is not this a remarkable case of misapprehending a doctrine, and then urging against this misconception the very doctrine itself? Even so, it is above the average arguments against imputation, for it betrays a knowledge of the meaning of the word—a rare circumstance with its impugnors.

While Dr. Dwight, by redeeming the New England theology from some of its objectionable features, as well as by the influence of his eminent piety, sound judgment, and commanding eloquence, quieted opposition to it, still his system differed in several points from the theology of the church, and was destitute of that systematic coherence which, along with its scriptural supports, gives this system its enduring vitality. It was destined to disintegration, and either to be lost in Old Calvinism; or in a development of those portions of it which were antagonistic to the ancient theology, into a more determined and positive antagonism to this theology. Many of the disciples of Dr. Dwight were, in the conflicts of the last quarter of a century, found in the former position. Many more were nearly so, of whom Dr. Griffin may be taken as an example. But another class, of whom the late Dr. Taylor was the most conspicuous leader and representative, developed out of the novel elements previously introduced into New England theology,

with the help of some inventions of their own, what has been known as the New Divinity of the last thirty years.

IV. This scheme advanced beyond any form of the New Divinity that preceded it in four radical points: 1. In asserting the native sinlessness of our race; 2. In asserting the plenary ability of the sinner to renovate his own soul; 3. In asserting self-love, or the desire of happiness, to be the primary cause, and the happiness of the agent the end, of all voluntary action; 4. The inability of God to prevent sin, without destroying moral agency. The proofs of this have so often been laid before our readers, that we need not here consume space in reproducing them. It is to be observed, however, that not all the adherents of the New Divinity who accepted the first two principles, could tolerate the third and fourth. The third, especially, was chiefly confined to Dr. Taylor and his immediate pupils, some of whom, as we have seen, are renouncing it, and even in their eulogies upon him, predicting its universal discredit. And it is still further to be observed, that, as to the other points, many embraced them with various degrees of qualification and allowance. Still, these are the radical principles of the late New Divinity, which has stimulated the conflicts of the last quarter of a century.

It is obvious that the self-love scheme was the product of an extreme reaction from the previous theory, which resolves all virtue into disinterested benevolence, and its affiliated "eccentric theories of resignation," &c. But here, as in many other cases, the opposite of error is not necessarily the truth. The radical error in each case was the taking a part for the whole of virtue, and viewing virtue and vice, not as intrinsically good or evil in their own nature, but only as they are resolved into a means of some higher good beyond themselves, viz. the happiness either of the agent himself, or the universe. These theories, however, are dying out, if not *in articulo mortis*. We wish as much could be said for some of the speculative ethical and theological dogmas to which they have been ancillary.

In regard to native sinfulness, it is susceptible of the clearest proof, that it was asserted by all divines of standing in New England, of whatever school, prior to the era of Taylorism—

particularly by both the Edwardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, Smalley, Emmons and Dwight.* While this was earnestly maintained, the mere denial of imputation caused less alarm and opposition among old Calvinists, although many of them feared, what afterwards came to pass, that the denial of Original Sin altogether would result from this loosening of its foundations. For if the arguments adduced against imputation are admitted as valid, they are still more conclusive against any other ground of the derivation of sin and guilt from Adam. But it was not till the actual appearance of a large party in the church who assailed the doctrine of native sinfulness with perseverance and adroitness, that energetic, extensive, and inexorable opposition was aroused.

The same things substantially may be said of the doctrine of ability, and its attitude before and after the recent New Theology. The New England divines of all classes have asserted, with the general theology of the church, that the sinner's inability is moral, i. e. pertains to the moral nature. They, however, have also asserted, since the time of Edwards, that this *moral inability* was coupled with a *natural ability* to obey the will of God. But, the exercise school excepted, they had uniformly explained themselves to mean by natural ability, that the sinner possesses all the essential *faculties* of humanity, of moral agency, and accountability; that his only inability lies in a corrupt disposition of heart or soul, which is culpable, and being dominant, is invincible by the man himself, or by any power short of sovereign grace. The chief difference between this view and the theology of the church, lay in using the word *ability* to denote the natural relation of man to the requirements of the gospel. It was justly objected to as adapted to perplex plain people, to introduce confusion into questions carefully defined by a scriptural terminology, and to furnish a shelter to the advocates of the Pelagian theory of

* *Instar omnium*, Dwight, who, it will not be claimed, was of a higher tone than the others, on this subject, says: "With these facts in view, we are compelled to one of these conclusions; either that infants are contaminated in their moral nature, and born in the likeness of apostate Adam; a fact irresistibly proved, . . . or that God inflicts these sufferings on moral beings who are perfectly innocent. I leave the alternative to those who object against the doctrine." Vol. i. p. 486.

plenary ability. Still it was borne with until this last result was actually developed, and the most unqualified ability of sinners to change their own hearts was asserted by the school which impugned native sin and guilt, while they sheltered themselves in this convenient distinction of natural and moral ability. Smalley was the most authoritative expounder of this distinction among the distinctive New England divines, before the appearance of the recent New Divinity. He expresses himself thus:

“*Besides all the powers and senses required to constitute man a rational, voluntary, and conscious agent, something further is necessary to his actually performing good works; namely, a good disposition. This we suppose to be radically wanting in mankind, as born of the flesh; and to be the thing created radically anew when any are born of the Spirit. A man will not and cannot act right, as long as he is not so disposed, however capable he may be of willing and acting agreeably to his own mind. . . ‘A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit.’*” *Smalley’s Sermons*, Hartford edition, p. 282.

Dr. Dwight’s view is sufficiently evident from what we have already seen to be his doctrine, that a new disposition or relish is communicated in regeneration. “In this (says he) lies the real difficulty of regenerating ourselves, and not in the want of sufficient natural powers; and, so long as this continues, an extraneous agency must be absolutely necessary for our regeneration.” Vol. ii. p. 403. It is very clear from this, and from the whole current of his writings, that however he may have used the term *natural ability*, he meant by it simply the faculties or powers of moral agency, not any actual sufficiency to make ourselves new hearts. And even Emmons, holding that all our volitions are the immediate product of divine efficiency, was compelled to explicate natural ability into harmony with this theory: so that without the agency of God, men are not sufficient for their own regeneration.

Dr. Taylor’s system has been tersely, but as justly as can be done in a brief phrase, styled, “Emmonsism with the divine efficiency part cut off.” That moral quality pertains to exercises only, not to dispositions lying back of and causing them; that

these exercises are from the self-originating power of the will, excluding every other efficient cause within or without the man; that the will is a power of choosing either way, not only as the man is pleased to choose, but the contrary; that hence the sinner is in the most absolute sense able, truly competent to obey God *propriis viribus*; that there is no sinful taint in the human soul prior to the first exercises of intelligent moral agency, (which exercises Emmons regarded as occurring in some rudimental way from birth;) that the will has "power to act despite all opposing power," and defeat the effort of the Almighty to prevent sin in the moral system—these, with the self-love theory, which was an obvious and powerful adjuvant of the sinner's plenary ability, were the salient points of this system. They chiefly, except the last, radiate from and converge in the unqualified power of contrary choice.

With equal means of knowledge, a like desire to do justice, and a not less warm admiration of the genial personal traits, the intellectual acumen, and self-reliance of Dr. Taylor; while we differ from Dr. Dutton in our estimate of the merits of his theology, we recognize as mainly just his statement of this cardinal feature of it, as well as of another already adverted to. He says, in his eulogistic sermon, "The doctrine of human freedom, which he justly [?] defined, not merely and only to do as we will, but also as liberty to will, *power to will either way*, he illustrated, fortified and defended, and carried through all parts of his system of morals and theology." In a foot note he adds, with reference to the statement, "They can if they will," he (Dr. Taylor) used to say, in his terse and strong way, "they can if they wont." Again, Dr. Dutton speaks of the plea of inability which was in vogue when Dr. Taylor entered on the stage, as "with some a natural inability or want of natural power, with others a misnamed [?] moral inability, which differed from the other only in name—in either case a real and total *incompetency* to accept the offers of the gospel." He tells us Dr. Taylor showed that "what God commands man to do, man *can* do." It would be difficult to find language which more completely expresses the doctrine of plenary ability, or more unmistakably affirms that Dr. Taylor took a position on this subject before unknown, even in what

was called New England theology; that, in short, he rejected what this theology meant by moral inability. Is it not strange that the adherents of this class of opinions should claim to be of the Edwardean school, as against those from whom Edwards differed theologically only on the simple point of mediate imputation?

There is one circumstance which may have helped to connect the name of Edwards with speculations alien to his own system. His own son bearing his name, and Hopkins who studied with him, but preëminently the former, gave development and shape to those modifications of theology which he ascribes to Edwards and his followers, and which constituted what was first known as New Divinity in New England. It might very naturally be called Edwardean without any definite reference to the views of the elder Edwards. But the mere fact that some theologians are pupils of others, affords no evidence of unity of doctrine, or even of a catena of continuous derivation. Many who have been trained in the different Theological Seminaries of this country, have proved defenders of principles quite contradictory to those which were taught them. Professor Fisher mentions that Emmons studied with Smalley, as if there were some continuation or derivation of doctrine from one to the other. The most casual reader of the two must be struck with the frequency and point of Emmons's attacks and inuendoes upon his teacher's theology.

There is another circumstance mentioned by Professor Fisher, however, which goes to prove conclusively that the theology of the elder Edwards was distinguished in the public mind from that New Divinity of which his son and Hopkins were representatives. When Dr. Stiles became President of Yale College, the younger Edwards informed him that the great body of the ministers were old Calvinists, and that the New Divinity party to which he belonged was small. In 1756, Dr. Hopkins had said, it numbered only four or five persons. Now it is utterly impossible that at these dates the theology of Edwards should have been that of a small number, or that his writings should not have ranked as of standard excellence among a large portion of those styled by his son, old Calvinists, in distinction from himself. Indeed our author furnishes a key to the whole

relation of Edwards to the successive forms of the New Theology, when he says with great candour and justice, "His theology, however, it cannot be denied, had from the beginning the respect of many who refused to adopt the additions proposed by his disciples." This disposes of one important ground of his alleged complicity with them.

If Edwards's name cannot, without flagrant injustice, be used to sanction the various fleeting systems already considered, which have had currency under the title of New England theology, much less can it be, without inexcusable dishonesty, implicated with still later and looser speculations which sweep away every vestige of the doctrine of native corruption, vicarious atonement, impugn the Trinity, or set the truths recognized by the devout heart in conflict with the judgments and convictions of a sound understanding.

V. Having thus shown the broad and irreconcilable difference between the theology of Edwards, and of the successive parties claiming under him, it remains, in order to complete a just view of the subject, that we show the precise extent of their indebtedness to him. We have seen that he differed from old Calvinism, in holding to the mediate imputation of Adam's sin, and further, that he promulgated a peculiar philosophical theory of the nature of virtue, as consisting in *love to being in general*, or benevolence, or devotion to the greatest happiness of the universe. This he designed as a barrier to theories which found religion in mere self-love, and it was applied by him for this purpose, and no further. These two peculiarities might have attracted no special attention, and led to no important results, as has often been the case with occasional eccentric views of great men, aside of the general track of their thinking. In this case, however, it was otherwise. These points were by subsequent divines worked out to their most extreme results, logical and illogical, in reference to the whole circle of doctrine, until they were themselves indeed generally repudiated, but not till they had been made instrumental in undermining many of the most precious truths, which Edwards put forth his chief strength in defending.

In regard to the imputation of Adam's sin, the great problem is to account for what all parties concede to be the corrupt

and degraded condition of our race. All parties having any title to be considered Christian, admit this to be, in some way, due to the sin of Adam. That the Scriptures teach this, does not admit of a show of question. But what is the connection of this estate with Adam's sin? Apparently the Scriptures teach that Adam so acted as the representative of the race that his sin was reckoned to their account and judicially dealt with as such; that they were condemned for it, and hence come into being with that want of rectitude and the divine favour, that consequent inward pollution and subjection to wrath and misery, which are found to be universal. "By the offence of one, judgment come upon all men to condemnation." "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." "The judgment was by one to condemnation, *χρῖμα εἰς κατάκριμα.*" Rom. v. Now if this apparent meaning of the apostle be explained away, it must be because it seems unjust that the sin of one should be so reckoned to the account of others as to subject them to its penal consequences. The first and germinant penal consequence, whence all else flows, is that withdrawal of the divine favour and influence which are the source of all holy principles in the soul, and, in the absence of which, its mere natural principles which are of the essence of human nature, instantly relapse into *ἀταξία* and *ἀνομία*, disorder and lawlessness, the prolific source of all other penal evils. So Edwards represents inherent depravity in its germinating root, in a passage already quoted, and more at large. Vol. ii. pp. 535—7. Now the question is, how shall this privation of divine favour and support, which is in itself so great an evil, and the spring of all other evils which degrade, corrupt, and afflict our race, be accounted for? We say, because we think the Scriptures say, it was a penal visitation for the sin of Adam acting as their federal head. But Edwards, following Stapfer, says, we were in Adam as the branches of a tree in its root, so that his act was literally and physically the act of each of his posterity. In order to sustain this view, he tasks his wonderful metaphysical dexterity in unsettling and confounding our first notions of personal identity. It is of course impossible that a supposition so contradictory to the first truths of reason should stand. Its adherents have always been few. Like Dr. Edward Beech-

er's solution of the present condition of our race, it lacks believers. It has scarcely been heard of since Edwards's day, until its late reproduction by some good brethren, who are trying to restore deeper doctrines than have been current in New-school circles, in a German mould. But while this scheme disappeared, its effects in undermining the Reformed doctrine of imputation remained. The principle that lived after the root-scheme died, is, that our first evil disposition is "not properly a consequence of the imputation of Adam's first sin; nay, it is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself." *Edwards's Works*, vol. ii. p. 544. The main drift of the arguments and representations of his treatise on Original Sin presupposes, indeed, and often directly expresses the current view of reformed theology. But the principle just quoted outlived and overbore them all, until it leavened the whole lump of New England theology. And its logical and actual consequences were far reaching.

1. If the scriptural representation, that our present state is a penal visitation arising from condemnation for the sin of Adam acting as our divinely appointed representative, be rejected, then, whatever difficulties it involves, they are ten-fold greater on any other hypothesis. If this solution of our deplorable state be rejected, as implying injustice in God, what shall be said of any other hypothesis which makes it a mere sovereign infliction, without any probation on our part either personal or by a fit representative, and without respect to any sin of which it is a punishment? If it is unjust that so dire an evil should be visited in a penal way, must it not, *a fortiori*, be conceded that it is unjust that it should be visited at all? If the doctrine of human corruption will not stand on this basis, much less can it stand on any other. The effect was inevitable; gradually and surely the doctrine of human corruption was attenuated, till the residuum became what it is. First, the exercise scheme of Emmons reduced native sinfulness to so much of it as could be found in the exercises of moral agency at birth. Then it was entirely denied as to the period of life which precedes intelligent moral agency, and the voluntary violation of known law, and as to all dispositions of soul lying back of acts. Then we find Dr. Edward Becher contending that the present condi-

tion of our race on any theory, old or new, implies monstrous injustice in God, unless we admit what next to none believe, a probation of each individual in a pre-existent state. And finally, Miss Catharine Beecher condemns the whole doctrine of natural corruption, in any form of it, as absurd and monstrous! Such is the terrible crevasse which the denial of the scriptural view of immediate imputation opens upon the whole doctrine of Original Sin and Human Corruption.

2. By denying the imputation of Adam's sin, the nexus between the visitation of evil and sin in moral beings, under the government of God, is broken. This is a great and perilous stride. It reduces the divine administration to the sway of expediency. It accords with the theory that God is governed by a sole regard to happiness or utility, or by mere will, instead of the immutable laws of holiness and justice. It saps the foundation of vicarious atonement, which lies in the necessary bond between sin and penal suffering. It weakens our confidence in the immutable truth and faithfulness of God, if expediency or mere sovereignty of will may be ascendant over them.

3. It is so plain as almost to have precluded question, that the Apostle draws a parallel in Rom. v. between the manner of our ruin by the sin of the first Adam, and of our salvation by the righteousness of the second Adam. It is condemnation by the sin of the former: justification by the obedience of the latter. If the sin of the former condemns us mediately, and only by inducing that inherent sin which is the only real and immediate ground of condemnation, then it follows that the righteousness of the latter justifies us by inducing that inherent righteousness which is the real ground of our justification. If, on the other hand, the sin of Adam procures our condemnation by being immediately reckoned to our account or imputed to us, the righteousness of Christ justifies us in the same way. Thus the whole doctrine of atonement and justification is implicated with that of imputation. The various attenuating processes put upon these doctrines by the younger Edwards and some of his successors down to Dr. Bushnell, show the gradual and ultimate effect of loosening such a stone in the arch of Christian truth as the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity.

The consequences of Edwards's theory of the Nature of Virtue, have been in some respects coincident with the foregoing, and probably still more extended and pervasive. When virtue was once reduced to the rank of a mere means to the general happiness as something better than itself, and the fall of our race was no longer accounted for by the imputation of Adam's sin, this catastrophe was very naturally accounted for by the theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good or happiness. As virtue consists in love to being in general, and God, who is infinitely good, ordained the existence of sin, why did he ordain it unless because it was a necessary means to the good of being in general? This accordingly was the dominant theory of the improvers of theology up to the time of Dr. Taylor. But already the difference between sin and holiness is obliterated, as it must be, sooner or later, on every theory which does not make that difference intrinsic and immutable as the unchangeable holiness of God, which is the first source, standard, and norm of all excellence. What more can holiness be, on this scheme, than "the necessary means of the greatest good?" Is it not far wiser and safer to say in reference to this whole subject of the permission and ordination of sin, "O, the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" This theory could not stand. Dr. Taylor supplanted it by another still less tolerable, which resulted from the power of contrary choice as held by him; viz. that the existence of sin may be accounted for by God's inability to prevent it in a moral system. Still less will this command any permanent or lasting assent. Is anything too hard for the Lord? Is he dependent on the will of his creatures for the accomplishment of his pleasure? We know not why sin exists. But we do know that it is not lack of goodness or of power to prevent it in God. Even so Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight!

It scarcely needs to be pointed out that this conception of sin as the necessary means of the greatest good, was auxiliary to Emmons's theory, that God is just as much the efficient cause

of sinful as of holy exercises in man. It in fact subverts the radical distinction between them.

The natural rebound from the disinterested-benevolence, or love-to-being-in-general theory, to the self-love theory of the later New Divinity has already been set forth. The bearing of this latter, especially when coupled with the power of contrary choice, upon regeneration, conversion, and experimental religion is too patent to need explanation.

The connection of this theory, that all goodness consists exclusively in benevolence or a regard for the greatest happiness of the universe, with the scheme of the younger Edwards and his successors on the Atonement, is vital and indissoluble. The substance of this scheme is, that distributive justice, or the disposition of God to render to sin its proper desert of evil, is not satisfied by the Atonement. Christ's sufferings and death were not penal, they were not endured by him as the sinner's substitute, standing in his law-place. They were simply an expedient to satisfy general justice, which he defines as a regard to the highest good of the universe, i. e. to satisfy benevolence. In the later forms of stating this theory, Christ's death serves the same purpose in impressing the moral universe with a sense of God's regard for his law, which the eternal punishment of the sinner would have done. It is simply a governmental expedient, not a true proper satisfaction of divine justice. Into the merits of this scheme we cannot now enter. It has already had ample discussion in our pages.

If we have succeeded in executing what we undertook in beginning this article, we have shown that Edwards's theology was, with scarcely a variation, one with Old Calvinism, and at war with all those successive forms of New Divinity which have been so industriously and adroitly linked with his name; and that the early forms of the New England Theology "as contrasted with the general theology of the church," developed by his son, and others, differ from his system on cardinal points, while they themselves differ widely from the later forms of New Divinity.

On the other hand, we have tried to show in what sense and degree one or two eccentricities of his theology and philosophy,

afterwards lifted to extreme prominence, exerted an influence in promoting developments of doctrine at war with the system he spent his life in promulgating and defending. These are not the offspring of his system, but have been aided by one or two eccentric theories outside of his system. We hope we have succeeded in shedding some light on a subject which has come, from various causes, to be enveloped in great and increasing obscurity. We feel indebted to Professor Fisher for the aid which his facts and his candid statement of them have afforded us, although we do not always put his construction upon them. And we leave the subject with a new strength of conviction, that the system of theology known as Old Calvinism, and developed in the Reformed and especially the Westminster symbols, has a depth of truth, a logical consistency, and a scriptural support, which will enable it to outlive the future, as it has the past assaults and alleged improvements attempted upon any of its marked and characteristic features.*

* Since this article was written, we have received the sermon of Dr. Cleveland of New Haven, preached on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his settlement there. He says, in reference to what is known as New Haven Divinity, or Dr. Taylor's scheme, "The enthusiasm felt here a quarter of a century ago for the then recent scheme of theology has greatly abated. New parties have arisen, contending for new issues. The current of theologic opinion and speculation is seeking other channels, and assuming other phases. In this process of disintegration and reconstruction, some have fallen back on positions more in sympathy with the older theology, and into a style of preaching less rationalistic and more scriptural; while others are pushing their investigations in the opposite direction," &c.

ART. II.—*The Old Regime and the Revolution.* By ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. Translated by John Bonner. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1856.

On Civil Liberty and Self-Government. By FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D. 2 vols. Lippincott, Grambo, & Co. Philadelphia. 1852.

IN this article, we propose to offer some considerations on political science. By political science, we mean that system of doctrines which, in practice, by means of institutions, secures civil liberty to a people. We shall therefore exclude what is called political economy from our view; though it is a branch of what is usually embraced in the name, *political science*. We are thus explicit about what we mean by political science, in order that there shall be no cavil about our definition.

A new civilization, fundamentally different from that of Asia, began in Europe. Its first phase opened in Greece. A beauty in art, a refinement in literature, an intuition in philosophy appeared, which betokened that humanity had stepped up higher in the career of progress. This the Greeks fully realized in their national consciousness. And in nothing did they more intensely feel their superiority to the Asiatics, than in the spirit and forms of their governments and laws. As the Greeks never speak of Asiatic thought but to contrast it as error in illustrating truth, so Asiatic political institutions are only spoken of to illustrate free governments by the contrast. True to this spirit, Aristotle, in his *Politics*, speaks of "the cruel institutions of the Persian monarchs," and concludes his enumeration of the maxims of tyranny by calling them Persian and barbarian. The history of more than two thousand years has proved that the Greeks were not mistaken in thinking that they had begun a higher civilization. Overlooking, therefore, the politics of Asia, as effete, we will confine our observations to the politics which began in Greece, for the purpose of seizing the truths of political science which European history has

developed. In order to do this, it will be necessary to notice the successive writers who have contributed to the sum of political doctrine.

The political writings of Plato have been shown, by Aristotle, to be worthless; being speculative and not confined to experience. They promulge the grand heresy of communism. On the other hand, Aristotle confines his views of politics to experience, and deals with the science of government in the spirit of a statesman. His theory of the origin of government is as satisfactory as any which has been propounded by modern writers. To his theory, political science has added no new light, much less given any better doctrine. The opinion that all legitimate government is founded only in contract; whether giving an unlimited power to government, according to Hobbes; or a conditional power, according to Locke; or only a temporary special power, granted by an immediate particular vote of each individual, according to Rousseau, was ignored by Aristotle. He made government an institution of nature, founded on the necessities of human condition, and springing up independent of choice or design. Its germ is the family, which springs out of the involuntary instincts that form the combining principle between male and female. "A commonwealth (says Aristotle) is not less congenial to human nature, than the association of a family or village. It is the goal to which all preceding associations tend; and the perfection of civil society, being the matured state of man, is like the perfection of every other progressive object, that stage of his existence which peculiarly ascertains, characterizes, and essentiate his nature. Whoever, therefore, is unfit to live in a commonwealth, is above or below humanity. Such a wretch can only delight in carnage—a solitary, ravenous vulture."

Political society is, therefore, according to Aristotle, "an institution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from which it is constituted." Man is born into the protection and under the dominion of political society, with his individual rights and duties in the state, just as he is born into the protection and under the dominion of his parents, with his individual rights and duties in the family. He has no more choice in the one condition of his birth than the other.

According to this view of the origin of government, Aristotle approaches politics through ethics. Having determined what are the rules which should govern individuals and families in performing the private duties which spring out of the domestic relations in which nature has placed man, he proceeds to consider the rules which ought to govern men in the public duties that spring out of their relations to the commonwealth. In doing this, he determines the nature and the end of government. "The general end of the political partnership (says Aristotle) is the well-being of the partners. Men associate together and unite their efforts, that the operations of the whole community may terminate as nearly as possible in the happiness of each individual citizen."

From this view of the nature and end of government, it is at once seen, that right and duty are its two foundation stones. The principle, by which government is kept poised on these foundation stones of right and duty, is justice. Accordingly, Aristotle says: "But justice is the fundamental virtue of political society; and since the order of society cannot be maintained without law, laws are instituted to declare what is just."

As laws cannot originate or execute themselves, it becomes necessary that there shall be some kind of government or authority to enact laws and to enforce them. Here then emerges the question, What is the best form of government to secure the end of political society, which we have determined is justice, and justice is an equipoise between right and duty? It is to this question that this article shall be confined, passing by the question of political ethics, or the equipoise between political right and duty, with the single remark, that Aristotle has, here and there in his treatise on politics, discussed political ethics with ability and truth.

In practical statesmanship, the question as to the origin of government is absurd; nor does political ethics require an answer to the question. As we have seen, government originates in the necessities of man—is imposed on him by nature, while its particular form may be modified by the will of the community. In some form or other it must exist. Anarchy is against the will of God, as well as the instinct of man. And governments *de facto* are not often far from being *de jure*, i. e.

best suited to the people over whom they are established. The only question, therefore, for political science, is, *What is the best form of government for man in the highest stage of civilization?* and for practical statesmanship, *What is the best form of government for a particular people?* These questions Aristotle has discussed with as much success as the political experience of his time rendered possible. He was only on the threshold of those experiments in the more rational and comprehensive governments of Europe, which have, since his time, presented in history such terrible struggles between rulers and the ruled.

The comparatively petty republics of Greece soon perished; and by the very means which Aristotle had, with profound forecast, pointed out as the causes of the decay of states; leaving behind them, however, the priceless riches of their literature and art, to attest to all after nations, that the Greeks had once been free. The Greeks attained only to what may be called the city government. The rural population were not citizens, or, in Aristotleic language, were not political partners. They were under the irresponsible dominion of the city population. This form of polity is doomed to short life. It dies of over action, resulting in paralysis.

Next rose up in history, out of the congregated plundering tribes of Italy, the august polity of Rome, combined in all its strength to carry those ravages of warfare against other nations, which its barbarian ancestors had waged against each other as separate hostile tribes. In the political conflicts which emerged out of the different rights claimed by the contending tribes which came to constitute the Roman people, a peculiar polity was gradually built up, strongly republican in its best estate, but finally terminating in an imperial despotism. It might be anticipated, that a polity which its own people fabled to have drawn its first nurture from the milk of wolves, and which, even in its highest civilization, still breathed the spirit of violence, and war, and plunder, would at last turn its hostilities upon itself, and be driven to seek repose for its exhausted energies in the despotic rule of a master. But in the destroying peace of despotism the Roman state consummated the great work of its destiny. Out of the ruder jurisprudence of

the Republic, the lawyers of the imperial times, under the influence of the equitable doctrines of Christianity, constructed a system of law, which, if thrown into the scale of civilization, will equal in value to humanity the precious literature of Greece. But Rome, though she developed many elements of an enduring polity, still did not get beyond the type of the city government. The principle of representative government had not yet been evolved as the basis of a broader polity. Rome, therefore, perished of that mortality which was inherent in its polity.

The next practical scene, which opens in the dissolving views of European history, is the whole people encamped, as it were, in the feudal system, a political organization framed chiefly with reference to war, by barbarous races that had overrun Europe, and thrown down the decayed government of Rome. This uniform polity, based upon individual relations cemented by dependent interests in land, out of the profits of which both the owner and the tiller lived, became the bases of those covenants which now exist over Europe. In the formation of modern European governments, the feudal system may be considered in conjunction with the Roman towns established here and there during Roman rule, as furnishing the element of local self-government, rural and urban. And out of these sprung the principle of representation in the national governments, which gradually emerged from the broad bosom of modern society. Individuality had been so strongly developed in these local governments, that they could not be fused into one population without resistance. Representation in the national government was the legitimate political result.

In the civilization out of which modern governments have emerged, a wider and a deeper politics is presented to the philosopher. It is out of the experience, and beyond the scope of the political science of Aristotle. New elements, and consequently new political arrangements and organizations have appeared in the widening progress of civilization.

In this political cycle, the first great writer on politics is Machiavel. Born in Italy at the transition period between the ancient and the present politics, and at a time of extraordinary general corruption, and in a country especially corrupt in that corrupt time, and in a petty Republic

lic amidst other petty Republics, the struggling victims of alternately Papal and Imperial despotism, Machiavel propounded, in a system, the political ethics of his age. It is the extreme ethics of political self-preservation for states struggling for existence. And after all the allowances which an indulgent criticism can make, the doctrines of Machiavel must be condemned as a code of deceit, of which the chief corner-stone is the base doctrine, that the end justifies the means. Religion, morals, and liberty are recognized as really better than their opposites; and as they are sacred in the eyes of mankind, rulers should, as a matter of policy, always seem to respect them, though state necessity justifies a disregard of them, is the fundamental doctrine of Machiavel. In his discourses on the first ten books of Livy, he shows, that he prefers a government with a preponderant democratic element, and a system of laws; but in his Prince he propounds a political ethics by which the interest of the Prince is the great good in politics, and his will the supreme law. On the subject of the organization of governments and subordinate institutions, the writings of Machiavel treat only incidentally and superficially.

We will now come down, several centuries further, to a writer near our own times. No one can be familiar with the progress of the science of politics in modern Europe, who has not studied the "Spirit of Laws" by Montesquieu. Montesquieu was amongst the first to signalize the importance of a separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government; and he selects the British as a model of a free government, and points out its excellences in a more enlightened spirit than any previous continental writer. But highly as we esteem Montesquieu, we must consider him as having betrayed a want of political sagacity in failing to see that, in the mixed politics of Europe, the aristocracy is more nearly allied with the people in the development of free institutions, than with the crown in upholding monarchy. Lord Bacon, in those marvellously profound essays of his, a century and a half before Montesquieu, had said: "A monarchy where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny as that of the Turks; for nobility attempts sovereignty." Montesquieu taught a doctrine the opposite of this,

which we shall see, in the sequel, proved by the histories of France and England, is a fatal heresy.

We now come to the nineteenth century, which forms a new cycle in politics. A new polity has been formed in America, based on the principles of government and the institutions which had been developed in the progress of European civilization. The two works at the head of this article have been produced in this political cycle, and are the most important contributions which have been made to political science during the century. Indeed, the work of Lieber is the most important, if we consider the number and the value of the political truths which it teaches and the ability with which they are discussed, that has been contributed to any century. Both works belong to the same school—the school which opposes centralism, and contends for local self-government through institutions organized as living members of one general polity over the territory occupied by a nation. In the mere literary art of luminous and animated expression, and of symmetrical form in composing a treatise, we give a decided preference to De Tocqueville before Lieber. But as a political philosopher, comprehensive in his knowledge of the literatures of history and of politics, and of the practices of governments; and profound in understanding the guaranties of liberty, and the institutions and arrangements of governments for their protection; and sagacious in knowing the instincts and schemes and artifices of despotism, Lieber stands far in advance of De Tocqueville. The work of the latter, at most, can only be considered a supplement to that of the former. It merely exhibits, with great force it is true, the evidences of the means by which institutional local government was overthrown in France, and an imperial central despotism was at first gradually, and at last by a terrible popular insurrection, established in its stead. There is not a political idea, much less a principle of political science propounded by De Tocqueville which Lieber had not before announced in his “Civil Liberty.” Still, as exhibiting the march of absolutism, and its devices and strategy, over the provincial institutions of France, De Tocqueville has supplied what Lieber’s work, from its scope, is deficient in, and perhaps

so deficient, as to need a more detailed exposure of the steps in the march of centralism.

De Tocqueville, twenty years ago, gave us the initial of the work now before us, in his "Democracy in America." In that work he signalized his preference for institutional local self-government over absolutism; and indicated in many passages the pregnant fact, that the kings of France had levelled all orders to their rule. "In France, the kings," says De Tocqueville, "have always been the most active and constant levellers. When they were strong and ambitious, they spared no pains to raise the people to the level of the nobles; when they were temperate or weak, they allowed the people to rise above themselves. Some assisted the democracy by their talents, others by their vices. Louis XI. and Louis XIV. reduced every rank beneath the throne to the same position; Louis XV. descended himself and all his court into the dust." The friends of absolutism, who maintain that government is established not for freedom but for administration, with a view to make the centralized power in France popular, maintain that it was one of the innovations of the Revolution. It is to disabuse the French people of this delusion, that De Tocqueville has written this book. He goes back to an early period, and shows that the political institutions of France, and Germany, and England, were once alike. Their political assemblies were formed out of the same elements, and organized on the same plan. Their communities were divided into the same classes. Their nobles possessed the same privileges. Their municipal institutions were the same. Their rural districts were governed in the same manner. And their governments were administered on the same maxims. "In the fourteenth century," says De Tocqueville, "*no tax without the consent of the taxed*, appears to be as firmly established in France as in England. It was frequently quoted; to contravene it always seemed an act of tyranny; to conform to it was to revert to the law. At that period, as I have already remarked, a multitude of analogies may be traced between the political institutions of France and England: but then the destinies of the two nations separated, and constantly became more unlike as time advanced. They resemble two

lines starting from contiguous points at a slight angle, which diverge indefinitely as they are prolonged." The whole aim of De Tocqueville's book is to account for this divergence of the politics of England and France, and especially to show how the monarchs of France, simply by obeying the instinct of all governments to take the management of affairs, by encroachment after encroachment through successive ages, obtained the surrender of all local government, by superseding the local officers, both judicial and administrative, by its own agents. De Tocqueville has shown all this with amazing copiousness of proof. But, though he does all that is required for the special end he had in view, he does not look back far enough into the history, nor deep enough into the foundations of European institutions, to satisfy the demands of political science in ascertaining the directing and modeling causes of the French polity, and of the wide divergence between it and that of England, which were once so nearly alike. We will endeavour to indicate these causes; and in so doing, truths will be elicited that will throw light upon the work of Lieber, and give point to the criticism on it, which we purpose to make in the sequel.

At the downfall of the Roman Empire, there were two great antagonist influences operative in moulding the future polities and governments of the European nations that were to be formed out of the peoples who had spread over the countries once subdued by Rome. These influences were the Roman civil code, and the rude customs of the Teutons, with their peculiar half-formed institutions, administrative, legislative, and judicial. The Teutonic spirit was more fully exemplified by the Saxons in England than by any other family of the race. Therefore, we will take as our proofs the evidences of that spirit furnished in the codes and institutions of the Anglo-Saxons.

It is only in their *political* bearings that we shall examine the Roman and the Teutonic laws. In this view, the fundamental text of the Imperial Roman code is, "The will of the Prince has the force of law." On the other hand, the elective chieftains of the Germanic tribes, we are told by Tacitus, governed "by dint of persuasion rather than by the power of

command." And in the preamble to one of the Saxon codes, the king is said to make the enactments by the advice of the wise men; "for that he durst not attempt to do otherwise." The great contest in modern European politics has been between the law as an independent organism, and the will of the Prince. The Teutonic spirit has, as its chief political aim, striven to organize justice in such a way as to make the law supreme. This aim is the grand *epos* of English history.

With Alfred began the establishment of a native common law, for the monarchy of England, formed out of the various local customs which prevailed before the West Saxons swallowed up the lesser polities. In subsequent times this law was considered the birthright of the people. The Norman conquest shook somewhat the supremacy of this law. But this supremacy was fully established by the will of the nation politically exerted in Magna Charta. And this charter, so rich in the guaranties of civil liberty, was afterwards ratified thirty times by the successive English kings, at successive demands of the nation. But the nobles having been weakened by the wars of the Roses, and Henry VII. having united the houses of York and Lancaster, his successor, Henry VIII., thought his crown so secure, that he strove to make his prerogative supreme, and his will law. But Lord Chancellor Gardner, when consulted by Henry as to whether his will was law, told the king—"I have read of kings that had their will always received for law, but the form of your majesty's reign, to make the law your will, is more sure and quiet, and by this form of government you are established; and it is agreeable with the nature of your people. If you begin a new manner of policy, how it may frame no man can tell." But the Stuarts brought to the throne of England a spirit more after the Roman Imperial law than even the Tudors. They undertook to delegate judicial functions to extraordinary courts, and to make law by proclamations. And when James I. inquired of his judges, as is the practice of the English government in matters of law, whether he could not, as sovereign, administer laws in his own person, Lord Coke, with the assent of all the other judges, told him that it was contrary to law for the king to administer law in his own person, and that the king was under the law. At last

the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights established on still firmer foundations the supremacy of the law.

But it was the law itself, as an independent organism developed by its own vigorous spirit, that maintained its supremacy, sometimes even against Parliament itself. From first to last, through the courts at Westminster, the common law resisted the encroachments of the civil law and the canon law, and even a long time contested the establishment of equity. At the very time when the Tudors and the Stuarts were reaching after high prerogative, the common law was maturing its vigour in the courts. Coke, one of their judges, did more to develop and organize it for the protection of individual freedom than any other man in English history. In him the professional instinct of the common law judge reached its sublimest sense of human right. And when he declared, that Parliament itself had no authority to enact laws against natural justice, he but foreshadowed the principle which the spirit of the common law has incorporated into the American constitutions, clothing the judiciary with authority to declare a statute unconstitutional. The English constitution is built upon the common law, is, in fact, only its fuller growth, and draws its whole life from the living roots that spring out of the sturdy hearts of the Saxon tribe, the freest family of the Teutons.

The national progress of France has been in a wholly different path. Though Teutonic feelings, and principles, and institutions prevailed so far as to have produced in the fourteenth century, a polity similar to that of England in the same century, yet the Imperial Roman element gradually prevailed and gained strength with the progress of empire. As soon as the Frankish nobles began to give up their political duties in participating in the government, as De Tocqueville shows they did, and jurists began to take a share in administration, the king of France very soon became, in the professional theory of lawyers, and gradually in the eyes of the people, the Princeps of the Roman code whose will is law. So completely had this sentiment pervaded France at an early period, that Houard, a Norman lawyer, in translating the work of Bracton on the laws of England, written in the reign of Henry III., which asserts the supremacy of the law over the king's will, avowedly

suppressed the passage as too inconsistent with French constitutional law to be circulated in France. And Fortesque, the Chancellor of Henry VI., in his treatise, "In Praise of the Laws of England," written while he was exiled in France, contrasts the free institutions of England with the then despotism of France. And this contrast, so favourable to English institutions, has from early times been made by such French writers as Philippe de Commenes and Montesquieu, and since the revolutions of the past and the present century, by the Remusat, and Montalembert, and above all, by De Tocqueville.

But here the question arises, Why did the Roman element root out the Teutonic from French polity? The answer is, in a great degree, to be found in ethnological considerations. The Gauls, who constituted the great mass of the population of France were a Celtic race. Their character is given by Cæsar. In the third book of his Commentaries, he speaks of their characteristic fickleness in these words: *Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, the sudden and unexpected counsels of the Gauls*. In domestic morals, especially in the chastity of their women, the Gauls were greatly inferior to the Teutons. They were warlike and fond of show. This population had been long conquered by the Romans and moulded to Romanesque sentiments, before the Franks under Clovis invaded and subdued them. This is shown by the fact that, upon the conversion of Clovis to Christianity, he was at once invested by the provincials with the attributes and powers of a Roman prince; and the laws and customs of the lower empire were brought to support his authority. But the Franks themselves did not recognize this Imperial authority of their chiefs. They became proprietors of large tracts of country, and were soon a landed aristocracy. They despised the Gauls as beneath them in blood: and consequently did not intermarry with them. The Franks became, too, the military portion of the population; and not even the great military and administrative genius of Charlemagne could build up a consolidated empire over these still sturdy Teutons. The family of Charlemagne passed away. The country was formed into some sixty feudal states. The laws of these states were, to a very great extent, derived

from the Roman code, as the sixty collections of the *Pays Coutumiers of France* show. But, from causes not necessary to narrate, the monarchy again sprung up. And now the Frankish nobility became idle and dissipated; and as they held themselves entirely aloof from the people, they lost all sense of their feudal obligations to them, and abandoned to the king and his emissaries the entire administration of government even in the rural districts, while as feudal lords they levied on the people all the feudal exactions. Indeed, this nobility had the baseness to allow the people to be taxed on condition that themselves should be exempt. Hence grew up an animosity of the people for the nobles only equalled by the contempt of the nobles for the people. The king and his agents also inflamed the hatred of the people more and more, by telling in public documents of this oppression. This separation, from the beginning, between the Frankish and Gallic populations, and the Frankish being the superior, and abandoning their political trust at the turning point in the formation of French polity, has ended in the exclusion of the Frankish nobility from the government of France. And by the Revolution, that Gallic population which had lost all their local institutions by the faithlessness of the nobility, and the despotic aggressions of the crown, came forth to manage their affairs for themselves. And the *Gallorum subita et repentina consilia* of Cæsar, crop out above the surface of French politics in the eight alternate governments which have arisen in France within a lifetime, showing that it is the fickle old Gallic race returned to the theatre of political action, after an unprofitable tutelage of many centuries. The stage in civilization when a nobility can take root has passed for France; and the epauletted and ribboned nobility of the Napoleons is but a parody, a political humbug, which can neither prop a throne nor lead a people. The true nobility of France, born when it was a legitimate birth in the order of progress, lies buried, for its misdeeds, under the lava of the Revolution, never to be restored to political life. If the French are ever to be free, it must be without the aid of this institution no longer possible in its society. "The prejudice of a nobility is a thing that cannot be made. It may be improved, it may be corrected, it may be

replenished; men may be taken from it or aggregated to it, but the thing itself is matter of inveterate opinion, and therefore cannot be matter of positive institution."

In contrast with this, the Saxon population of England was the most Teutonic of the Teutons, and came from that part of Germany where Roman influence never reached. And their Norman conquerors were also Teutons, and after a few generations intermarried with the Saxons, and both soon formed one people, and established for themselves one common liberty in Magna Charta. Henceforward, the free spirit of the Saxons became the chief formative influence in English institutions. The nobles were no longer, if they ever were, a mere caste founded on blood, but were a political division of the people; the eldest son only being noble and all others commoners; and the nobility being constantly recruited, by the ordinary practice of the government, from the commons, as a reward of merit. From these ties of blood and of interest between the nobles and the people, neither class was liable to oppression, and respect for law became a part of English character. The nobles, therefore, from the first led the people in building up free institutions for their common benefit.

Having now considered the chief points suggested by the work of De Tocqueville, that bear on the science of politics, we have prepared the way to consider intelligently the work of Lieber. Lieber is a man who stands on the altitudes of history and not on a mere political platform. His work is therefore based upon the grand memories of the past, and not upon the shifting politics of a day. Most political writers have looked at political life from one point of view, that of their own times. But Lieber has looked at it from every point presented in each successive cycle of human progress; and has not only appreciated the results of the working of the various institutions, but has noted the growth and the mutations, from age to age, of the institutions. From these two considerations he has ascertained from the successes and the failures of nations, what are the guaranties of civil liberty. If, therefore, Lieber, like the great French writers just now mentioned, finds the great guaranties of liberty in the institutions of the Anglican tribe, it is because history so teaches. When Lieber there-

fore, in expounding the guaranties of civil liberty, for the most part only comments upon English and American institutions, his work is not thereby reduced from the comprehensiveness of science to a specialty. Political science is based on experience; and that experience is the political life of nations. So when Lieber expounds the institutions of despotism, he comments upon such as all despotic nations have possessed as their distinguishing feature. But in the true scientific spirit, Lieber brings, to his expositions of principles, all the resources of abstract reasoning; well knowing and, indeed, so declaring, that all progress is founded both on historical development and abstract reasoning. While, therefore, Lieber lights the torch of science at no lights but those of experience, he adds to it that prescience of reason which is to direct the statesman's forecast into the future. All true science has in it a contribution from the resources of the mind itself in its own forethought of what the past foreshadows. Without this purely intellectual basis science is impossible; and what would stand in the stead of science, would be only the rehearsal of consecutive facts once transpired but indicating nothing to come.

As, in tracing the course of political life through its successive cycles, we have noted the causes which have moulded the institutions of both freedom and despotism, and have pronounced as the one prime condition of civil liberty, *the supremacy of the law*, it may be anticipated that Lieber has recognized this principle as the basis of political science. He has done so. He has, too, shown, as we have already intimated, that the principle has received its highest development in America. In our federal as well as in our State constitutions, the judiciary is clothed with authority to declare an Act of Congress and of the State legislatures unconstitutional. This is emphatically an American contribution to political science. But the courts cannot by a general dictum or proclamation declare the law void, but by deciding upon its validity in some case between parties in which the law is involved. In republican governments like those of our States, but especially in a federal one like our general government, involving a great diversity of widely separated local interests, and where the relative populousness of the different States

is different, and yet the votes of the States are equal in one branch of the legislature, it would be impossible to preserve civil liberty without this guaranty. In times of great emergency in political strife, the legislature would enact laws which, by repeated enactments in the same direction, would undermine the constitution. But in order to secure the supremacy of the law, every department of government must be organized in submission to it. The executive must be so confined within its own administrative sphere, and so subordinated to the constitution, as to be unable to interfere with the enactment of laws, except by a qualified veto; and with the judicial application of the law, only in favour of mercy, by a cautiously guarded pardoning power. The legislature must be confined within the limits of only making law: and it must so far represent the nation as to speak its deliberate will, instructed and formed by means of the free institutions organized over the whole country. But above all, the judiciary must be independent of all external influence, holding its office free from executive, legislative, and popular control, as well as clothed with the authority to decide upon the constitutionality of the enactments of the legislature.

But the mere supremacy of the law, unless the law embodies the guaranties of civil liberty, cannot ensure free government. The law may be a bloody code; and may be unequal in its impositions and exactions. Lieber has therefore inquired into the guaranties of civil liberty, proved to be such by history. A free press, free speech, publicity in legislation, and especially in judicial proceedings, are amongst the most vital guaranties of liberty. Truth is powerful in deterring tyrants, as well as in rousing the governed to a sense of right and of wrong. And in the conflict with either written or spoken falsehood or error, truth is an antagonist fitted by nature to gain the victory. All of intelligent life must rest on this principle. With this free communication of thought, any injustice done can be wafted over the land, rousing the sympathy of the national heart into determined wrath against the oppressor.

The *habeas corpus*, by which a citizen, confined for any cause, can demand to be brought before a judge and have the cause of his detention inquired into, and if not warranted by

law, can be set at liberty, is another indispensable guaranty of liberty. This is the great writ by which the kings of England were baffled in their attempts to have persons punished for political offences. These attempts were a covert mode of making their will law. But by this great writ, in one form or other, in the hands of the courts, the subject effectually resisted the encroachments of the crown. The writ is, in all forms of government, indispensable to freedom.

But, in our judgment, the greatest guaranty of liberty, and the most important institution ever framed by man, if indeed man can be said to have framed that which grew out of the seeds of self-government, that were sowed in the first embryo arrangements of Saxon government, is the trial by jury. Without this institution England never could have developed her liberties. It is the great business and political school of the people, qualifying them for self-government. It connected the administration of the law, which in early times was in the hands of the nobles, with the people. In the courts, the people were represented as well as in the legislature. The nobles and the people were thus knit together in the whole polity. The reason why the imperial law was so effectual in making the will of the Prince supreme, was that the imperial courts and their practice without the jury went along with the law itself. It was "*the frame and ordinary course of the common law*," its modes of procedure, that insured in English courts a law so favourable to civil liberty. The mode of procedure was worth as much as the principles of the law; the last being useless without the first. At no time did jury trial or any thing like it exist in France. The nobility and people were too far asunder. If there had been sympathy enough between the people and the nobles to have permitted jury trial to grow up, such an institution by its working might have knit together the two classes into a polity like that of England, and have preserved the local self-government and the provincial liberties. For in England the legal constitution preceded the political; in fact, the constitution grew out of the law.

The trial by jury is the best possible means for ascertaining facts in disputes at law. The transactions of every day constitute the best discipline to qualify men for judging of

the force and meaning of ordinary facts, and particularly of the fact of malice in criminal trials. Before such a tribunal as a jury, it is impossible that facts can get into anything like technicality—fall under rules of artificial construction—which they would do in time before the same judges sitting in cases where the same combination of facts is constantly recurring. The very diversity in thought, in knowledge, and in sentiment of the members of the jury, with the superintending vigilance of the court, insures a more thorough sifting of the facts than any other possible form of tribunal. And we believe that the unanimity principle is more efficacious in getting their collective wisdom, than that of any less number. We therefore enter our strong dissent from the opinion of Lieber, that the unanimity principle is a traditionary absurdity, being in fact only an accident in the formation of the jury, which has been retained as one of its essential virtues. We confess to the creed, that what have been mere accidents so far as man's agency is concerned, are often wise orders of Providence. And this is emphatically so in regard to the unanimity principle, and perhaps the number twelve of the jury, just as it is in regard to the two houses of a legislature, rather than any larger number. The expediency of both has been determined by experience, though hard to be justified by abstract reasoning.

Of course freedom of worship, as Lieber justly prefers to call it, is an indispensable liberty. Here the great law of freedom seeks to connect earth with heaven. And for man to interfere, except by teaching the truth, is to substitute might for right, which is the essence of tyranny.

Many other guaranties of liberty pointed out by Lieber we must pass by, and consider only one more.

The legislature is the chief guaranty of liberty, and is the department which especially distinguishes a free government. The absolutists, by way of ridicule, call the English a Parliamentary government. They view Parliaments as mere hinderances to administration. Their debates they consider intolerable loquacity. And well they may, when they read such a passage as that uttered by Chatham, in regard to general warrants, "Every man's house is called his castle. Why?

Because it is surrounded by a moat, or defended by a wall? No! It may be a straw-built hut; the wind may whistle around it, the rain may enter it, but the king can not."

It must be admitted as no longer a matter of speculation, but as well established by political experience, that a legislature of two houses is its proper form. As this bicameral form of legislature is so important a principle in political science, we will look into the genesis of it in England. Immediately after the Norman conquest, the nobles, then called barons, were purely a governing order. They were barons by tenure, and their dignity was territorial. To have so much land was to be a baron. These barons held courts, and governed within their domains. The king, at the great festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, consulted with the barons on home affairs and foreign wars. None but these barons by tenure and the prelates had the right to attend these great councils. Such was the first form of aristocracy, and of legislative council after the conquest.

In the mutations of empire, this baronage by tenure was substituted by baronage by writ. About the beginning of the thirteenth century the king obtained the right to call to his great council only such persons as he chose to summon; so that the writ of summons, without proof of baronage by tenure, came to constitute evidence of a lord of Parliament. The lords of Parliament were now called peers. At this stage of its growth, the English nobility began to assume that mixed character which, as heretofore shown, distinguished it from that of France. Families which, for a generation or so, became baronial by being summoned to Parliament, relapsed into mere gentry by the discontinuance of the summons. And the moneyed interest began to insinuate itself into the landed organization; for in 1366, Michael de la Pole, the son of a great merchant, was summoned to Parliament, and in 1385 was made Earl of Suffolk.

And now another mode of creating peers began to be practised. In October, 1387, Richard II. created one of the Beauchamps a peer by letters patent. And this became the established mode of creating peers. In all this time the nobility was the highest type of the manhood of the country, and the

leaders of the lower orders. The wars of the Roses weakened the nobility; and new men and families rose to political power. The law and trade became more and more regular sources of nobility; and the foundation of the Whig aristocracy was laid, which has acted so important a part in English history.

The rise and progress of the House of Commons as it is now consolidated in English polity, has been as gradual as that of the House of Lords. It was the practice of the Crown from early times, in any matter of public importance, to summon those who were more particularly interested or acquainted with the subject, and get their advice. A custom, so in accordance with the institutional spirit of the nation, led to the clause in Magna Charta, requiring knights of the shire to be summoned by the king to the great council. In 1265 De Monfort summoned, in the king's name, a representation from the boroughs. Thus the House of Commons came to consist of knights of the shire and burgesses. From the reign of Charles II., Parliament has been the chief power of the government, and the Commons the preponderant House. The power of the purse, based on the principle that the Crown cannot lay a tax, has drawn after it all other power. The government of England is theoretically founded on the broadest basis that is consistent with the proper influence of intelligence, property and rank. Under its protection, humanity has certainly reached a high eminence in history. Nowhere else in the old world, has stability and progress been so fully established.

History is the great precedent. The Parliament of England having grown into two houses as we have described, and in all the struggles of political life, having kept the polity on the corner-stones of right and duty, had assumed the fixedness of an ideal type in the political instinct of the Anglican race. The American colonies, therefore, instinctively formed legislatures after the same model. The provincial polity of counties had been adopted in the colonies, and furnished a territorial basis for one House, while population furnished the basis for the other. The great political ideas, formed under the influence of monarchy and aristocracy, were now laid at the foundation of a future Republic. The Anglican race, in their

career of progress, seek to establish a still nobler polity in a new world.

In the order of history, thirteen separate States had been formed in North America. The irresistible forces of history had severed these States from England. It was manifest, that without union among themselves they must soon perish. In the war with the mother country, a common interest had caused them to form a league. But very short trial proved that this loose bond did not answer the end of a permanent government. History furnished no precedent, deemed by our ancestors to be exactly suited to the new polity, which seemed to them to be needed for this new political crisis in history. They had, therefore, to resort to that prescience of reason which reaches beyond the present. Abstract reasoning had to yield its contribution to the development of history. The grand scheme was conceived, of organizing the separate States into one representative republic, embracing all the guaranties of civil liberty then known to man, and having a principle of expansion which should extend these guaranties to every new polity which might arise in all the future of America, by bringing new States into the Union. This grand political fabric our forefathers succeeded in rearing. It breathes the spirit of Gothic architecture, grand, complex, and unlimited. For the first time in politics, the principle of representation in a legislature of two branches was applied to a confederation of States. This is the great American contribution to the science of free government. It was the boldest political contrivance ever conceived by man. Through it civil liberty can be guaranteed to a larger nationality than has appeared in all past history. Already, these guaranties are afforded to a people bounded by two oceans and by distant parallels of latitude stretching across a continent. Under its vast shield, the States are by a coöperative action developing a higher civilization than has yet illustrated the goodness of Providence and the dignity of man. The form of government which had been developed by monarchy and aristocracy, and perhaps could only have been developed by them, has been animated with the democratic spirit, and so successfully applied to a pure republic, that Americans, while feeling that they are a new people,

realize in their national consciousness, that they are the great Anglican tribe struggling to act out, on a still nobler theatre, the *epos* of freedom.

Every legislature must be based upon the two great principles of stability and progress. Legislation must be both permanent and changing. The change must, however, be the change of development and not of abrogation. There must be continuity. In the past are the seeds of the future. To this end, one branch of the legislature must rest upon a longer, and the other upon a shorter term of office. The former will represent the opinion of the country at an earlier day, the latter that of the present. The conservatism of the former will moderate the impulse of the latter; and the impulse of the latter will revivify the conservatism of the former. This polity based in nature itself, and therefore universal in time, though developed by the agency of different political orders in the mixed governments of Europe, is a permanent contribution to political science, which our forefathers were wise enough to appreciate, and to establish as American polity against strong opposition, contending for a legislature of one house.

With a national legislature thus organized, and with all the institutions of local self-government in the States, with their separate governments organized on similar principles, and guaranteed to be republican by the national constitution, it seems to us, that we are destined as a nation to withstand the vicissitudes of time, until a great purpose is accomplished worthy a record in history, as one of the noblest achievements of humanity.

In contrast with this complex articulated government of the United States, is a centralized government, based on universal suffrage, and reposing on the absurd dogma, *vox populi vox Dei*. Lieber has shown the hollowness of the pretended liberty which is founded on the will of an unorganized multitude erroneously called a people, expressed through the medium of universal suffrage. A public opinion, not elaborated through institutions organized over a country, is but the whim of the moment. It is but that democratic voice which always, as history testifies, declares for an Imperial despotism; proving that no government is less democratic than such an unorganized

multitude. It is, in fact, the mad acclaim of their own apotheosis, by the multitude, at the very moment they find that they must, from their incompetency for self-government, choose a master. This government is exemplified in France. The centralized administration, first thoroughly organized by Richelieu, so completely superseded and destroyed all local self-government, that it became necessary to send up to Paris from the remotest part of the kingdom, for an order in council to allow a church steeple or the falling gables of a parsonage to be repaired. "There was (says De Tocqueville) no city, town, borough, village, or hamlet, in the kingdom—there was neither hospital, church fabric, religious house, nor college, which could have an independent will in the management of its private affairs, or which could administer its property according to choice." By this centralized administration, the French people were disorganized and dissolved into a mere multitude of individuals, as tempestuous as the sea.

We have, in the foregoing sketch, attempted to trace the rise and progress of political science since the dawn of European civilization, and to present the genesis and nature of the two opposite polities of institutional self-government and centralized absolutism. These are the two great polities which have grown up in modern times. And Lieber, in the work at the head of this article, has discussed the natures of these two opposite polities in all the light both of history and of political science. In fact, he is the first political philosopher who has thoroughly disentangled them from a confused treatment, and presented them in all their broad contrast. And the definiteness with which he has exhibited the nature of institutional self-government, and particularized the guaranties of civil liberty, and elucidated their respective functions in free governments, is an advance in political science. Those who wish to see the progress which has been made in political science since the Greek phase of European history, need but read Aristotle's *Politics*, and Lieber's *Civil Liberty*. For with all the ability of Aristotle, and none can rate it higher than we do, the simple political arrangements of mere city governments depicted in his work, seem trifling enough in comparison with the complex schemes of security and administration sketched by Lieber as

the great polities of modern times. But it is no matter for wonder that modern governments should be so much more complex, when the multiform and manifold employments which diversify modern civilization are compared with the more simple business of ancient nations. It must be noted too, that modern politics has to deal with nations connected together into a family, while in ancient times only one nation appeared at a time in the general barbarism which characterized mankind. Modern governments must therefore be organized with reference to diplomacy as well as to internal affairs.

Lieber, it is true, has the advantage over all European writers on politics, in thoroughly understanding American institutions. In this country, institutional self-government has reached the highest development it has attained. And that an advance has been made in political life by the Anglican tribe, may be seen in the progress of constitutional law. It was in criminal trials that English constitutional law has been developed by the courts; while American constitutional law has received its judicial exposition in civil trials involving the obligation of contracts and other civil questions. And since the revolution of 1688, the progress of English constitutional law has been more peaceful than in earlier periods, betokening an advance in the stability of the government and the political morals of the nation. So that we have reason to hope, that both nations will make further advances in civil liberty; and that with the advance of government, a wiser political economy will so regulate business in nations and between nations, that capital and labour will be better satisfied with the division of profits, and that the rich and the poor will more and more realize the great truth that the world was made equally for both, and that they have one common interest, swayed to and fro in the vicissitudes of commerce by the same gain and loss.

It is all important, that, at times when unstable opinions prevail in regard to any great interest, a resort to first principles should be had, so that the path of safety running through the past, in which humanity has walked, may be descried, and the journey continued in it. It certainly becomes us, at this time, to call attention to one of the greatest of the moral sciences, when physical science has almost entirely engrossed popular

attention. Ever since Bacon made the auspicious marriage between science and labour, civilization has striven too much after the riches of the earth. In some countries a knowledge of physical science and a cultivated literature are rated above civil liberty; and hence such works as "Guizot's History of Civilization," concealing, in a name, the great fact that liberty and progress have not walked together in France. The scientific treatment of politics is absolutely necessary to teach man the grave and binding duties which he takes upon himself when he assumes self-government; as well as to furnish him with the landmarks of political truth and the essential character of civil liberty.

ART. III.—*The Life of Cardinal Mezzofanti; with an Introductory Memoir of eminent Linguists, ancient and modern.* By C. W. RUSSELL, D. D., President of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. London: Longman, Brown & Co. 1858. Pp. 502.

JOSEPH CASPAR MEZZOFANTI, the son of a carpenter of Bologna, was born in that city, September 17, 1774. He was sent to school before he was three years old—on the barbarous plea of providing a place of safe-keeping for the day. The dame wisely allowed the infant to go free of lessons, but it was soon found that he was catching by ear the recitations of the other children, and was able to repeat them. Upon this discovery he was put into a class, and passed rapidly through the infant school, and afterwards the more advanced academy of the Abate Cicotti, where the peerless linguist made his first acquaintance with a foreign language—the Latin.

The priest, Respighi, observing the uncommon promise of the child's memory, persuaded his father to give him a better education than the mechanic had thought proper for his son, and procured his admission to one of the "Scuole Pie" of Bologna, where the higher studies were cultivated under the tuition of several ex-Jesuits. These teachers, representing various countries, furnished thus early in Mezzofanti's career,

the opportunity and inducement for indulging his natural taste for languages. Father Aponte was a Spaniard. Father Escobar was from South America. Father Thiulen was a native of Sweden, but had lived in Portugal and Spain, as well as Italy. Greek and Spanish were among the earliest languages which the young scholar added to his infantile Latin and vernacular. His memory was from first to last the main prodigy. At school he could repeat a folio page of Chrysostom after a single perusal.

Mezzofanti early preferred the ecclesiastical profession. His religious as well as studious disposition was in this direction, and about the year 1786 he was advanced to the archiepiscopal seminary of Bologna, where he took his degree in philosophy before he was fifteen. His application to books had now so affected his health, that he was obliged to drop study for a time; but in 1793 he began the direct reading of theology under the Canons Ambrosi and Bacciali. The Hebrew, Arabic, and it is supposed the Coptic also, were added to his stock of languages before he was nineteen. French and German were acquired about this time as light tasks compared with the oriental tongues. From its affinities to the German he had no difficulty, after a few days' examination of some Swedish books, in holding fluent conversation with the people of that country.

In 1795 the future Cardinal received the first sign of the sacred office—the tonsure, and in 1797 reached the priesthood. Although but twenty-three years of age, he was almost simultaneously appointed professor of Arabic in the University of Bologna. He had scarcely commenced his lectures when political events drove him from the chair: for when Bonaparte compelled the Pope to cede Bologna to the Cisalpine Republic, Mezzofanti was too firm a Papist to acknowledge in any manner the unholy usurpation, and was consequently deprived of his professorship.

His parents were dependent on him for their maintenance, and so, in a good degree, was his sister, with her large family. He resorted to private teaching, and soon had for his pupils the sons of some of the most distinguished Bolognese families. His new occupation abridged the time he would have devoted

to his own favourite studies, but was the means of opening access to the library of one of his patrons, which was rich in the languages. The indefatigable linguist turned the martial agitations of the day to another good account for himself. The Austrian army, occupying Bologna for nearly a year after the battle of Trebbia in 1799, a variety of European tongues was to be heard among the officers and soldiers. Mezzofanti was all ear in the midst of Teutonic, Slavonic, Czechish, Magyar, and other foreign sounds. This pursuit of languages, as spoken by, or as found in the books which the strangers carried with them, had doubtless its influence, as well as the obligations of his ecclesiastical office, and the promptings of his natural benevolence, in making him a constant visitor of the camps and hospitals. His services were useful as interpreter, and were in demand as a confessor. "In such cases," he said, "I used to apply myself with all my energy to the study of the languages of the patients, until I knew enough of them to make myself understood; I required no more. With these first rudiments, I presented myself among the sick wards. Such of the invalids as desired it, I managed to confess; with others I held occasional conversations; and thus in a short time I acquired a considerable vocabulary. At length, through the grace of God, assisted by my private studies and by a retentive memory, I came to know not merely the generic languages of the nations to which the several invalids belonged, but even the peculiar dialects of their various provinces." (P. 154.) This was his school for the Hungarian, Bohemian, Polish, and Russian languages, and the Gipsy tongue; and from a young student in the university, he was, about the same time, acquiring the Flemish.

Another source of the polyglot attainments of the insatiable scholar lay in the hotels of his city. Bologna was then on the route to Rome. The innkeepers kept Mezzofanti informed of the arrival of travellers with strange names, and there was usually a mutual desire for an interview, for the fame of the man of many tongues was already spreading, and modest as he himself was, he could not forego an opportunity of learning, pronunciation at least, from the lips of a native. He was sought for as the foreigners' confessor, and doubtless listened

as critically to the sounds, as the sins that were whispered in his ear. If he had first to learn the language of the penitent, it was rather an incentive than otherwise to undertake the spiritual part of the case. If the stranger could read for him the commandments, or creed, or other parts of the common liturgy, he would manage by some instinct of comparative philology to get at the construction of the new language, and make his way to an intelligent hearing and speaking of it. In two weeks he qualified himself to shrive a servant who could speak nothing but the Sardinian dialect, by spending an hour daily in the family to which she was attached.

In January, 1803, the subject of our article attained a position finely suited to his taste. At that date he was appointed assistant librarian of the Institute of Bologna—a name suggestive of very humble literary ideas in our familiar associations of it with circulars, and advertisements, and lectures, but designating, in the present instance, an establishment founded in the seventeenth century, and richly endowed by successive ages with collections and museums of nature and art, and a library of a hundred and fifty thousand volumes. The close of the same year found the librarian restored to the faculty of the University, in the capacity of Professor of Oriental languages: but his most engrossing occupation for two years was the preparation of a descriptive catalogue of the Oriental manuscripts of the library of the Institute. There is no record of the order or rapidity in which he filled up the list of the languages acquired in his lifetime, but in 1805 we find him sending to Professor J. B. De Rossi of Parma, a translation of a Latin sentence in twelve languages; and a book of travels, published at Milan in 1806, refers to Mezzofanti as “commonly reputed to be master of more than twenty-four languages, the greater number of which he speaks with fluency and purity.” Allowances, however, are always due for matters of common repute, caught up by travellers.

Mezzofanti, in 1808, had another experience of the unsparing jealousy of political power. A year before, the Emperor Napoleon had sought to persuade the preëminent linguist to transfer his residence to Paris. But disaffection to the intruder, not less than attachment to his native city and the

University, made the priest unfavourable to the proposal. When the Emperor made the Pope his prisoner, and occupied Rome with his troops, Mezzofanti, quiet as he had kept himself with his bookshelves and lectures, was not overlooked in the proscription which swept even literary men if they did not bow the knee. He was not expelled, but the Oriental Professorship was extinguished, and the incumbent put upon a pension. He again received private pupils, and found another library to catalogue. In 1812 he was appointed deputy librarian of the University, with whose collections the French had incorporated the library of the Institute. In 1815 he became the chief librarian.

When the Pope was on his return from exile, (1814,) he passed through Bologna, and invited Mezzofanti to accompany him to Rome, and take the office of Secretary of the Propaganda. This position was likely to attract a scholar, on account of the great variety of languages spoken in that vast missionary institution, and to attract an ecclesiastic, from the fact of the office being regarded as in the line of promotion to the cardinalship. But even Rome, and the importunity of a Pontiff, could not draw the student from Bologna; and he more gladly accepted the restoration which the Pope now had it in his power to effect, of his chair of Oriental Languages.

Dr. Russell has collected into his pages a number of testimonies from the printed travels of tourists of various countries, for the purpose of showing in some detail, from different witnesses, the wonderful extent of the attainments reached by the perseverance of this insatiable student, in his favourite specialty. A professor in the University of Breslau testifies to the fluency of his German. He read before the Bologna Academy, a paper on the Wallachian language, another on that of the seven parishes of Vicenza, and a third on a Mexican manuscript. An English author found him not only fluent and correct in the standard language of England, but familiar with the provincial dialects, so as to be able to give ludicrous specimens of the brogue of Yorkshire and Somersetshire. The same visitor found him at home in Welsh. Another literary Englishman heard him tried in Turkish and modern Greek. Lord Byron declared, that he exhausted upon this "monster of

languages, this Briareus of parts of speech," every tongue he had ever learned himself, but that the Italian, who had scarcely been out of Bologna, astounded him, even to his English. The Emperor of Austria had an interview with him, attended by a suite selected to represent the chief languages of his empire, and the Professor replied accurately and promptly in their respective tongues, as they addressed him in German, Magyar, Bohemian, Wallachian, Illyrian, and Polish.

A philologist from Denmark, who spent a couple of hours with him, began the conversation in German, but Mezzofanti immediately replied in Danish, and so continued through the interview. Compelled to spend a few months of 1820 in an excursion for recreation, he made his journey serve the end of learning the Hebrew psalmody, and the accentuation of that language, by visiting synagogues, and conversing with Jews; and the pronunciation of modern Romainic, by mingling with Greek sailors at Leghorn. Von Zach, who made an astronomical visit to Bologna in 1820, was accosted by the learned priest in Hungarian, then in good Saxon, and afterwards in the Austrian and Swabian dialects. With other members of the scientific corps he conversed in English, Russian, Polish, French, and Hungarian. Von Zach mentions that his German was so natural, that a cultivated Hanoverian lady in the company expressed her surprise that a German should be a professor and librarian in an Italian university. Professor Jacobs, of Gotha, was struck (1825) not only with the number of languages acquired by the "interpreter for Babel," but at the facility with which he passed from one to another, however opposite or cognate their structure.

Dr. Tholuck heard him converse in German, Arabic, Flemish, Swedish, English, and Spanish, received from him an original distich in Persian, and found him studying Cornish. He heard him say that he had learned, to some extent, the Quichua, or old Peruvian; and he was then employed upon the Bimbarra. Dr. O'Connor, now of Pittsburgh, witnessed Mezzofanti's first visit to the Propaganda, and saw him address the Turkish, Greek, Romainic, English, and other students, as he met them, in their respective languages; and adds to his testimony, that during the many visits he subsequently made to

the institution, Mezzofanti never failed to remember the vernacular of each student whom he had previously addressed, though the whole community had been presented to him. "Having spoken," says an English traveller in 1834, "in French, English, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and Dutch, I said at last, 'My friend, I have almost run out my stock of modern languages, except some which you probably do not know.' 'Well,' said he, 'the dead languages, Latin and Greek, are matters which every one learns. We shall not mind them. But pray tell me what others you speak.' 'I speak a little Welsh,' I replied. 'Good,' said he, 'I also know Welsh.' And he began to talk with me at once, like a Welsh peasant. He knew also the other varieties of Celtic, Gaelic, Irish, and Bas-Breton." Maltese visitors, like so many others, needed an interpreter. Anecdotes abound of his accurate grammatical knowledge of many of the languages he read, wrote and spoke, not unfrequently detecting errors in the pronunciation or orthography of natives themselves. His readiness, too, is shown by a number of examples of appropriate contributions to albums, and replies to compliments. "He can distinguish," says a German, "the Hamburg and Hanoverian German very well. Even of Wendish he is not ignorant." A native Armenian scholar testifies that he "spoke the vulgar Armenian with perfect freedom, and in all its dialects." Dr. Wiseman met him on his way to give a lesson in California Indian to some natives of that country, having first learned the tongue for himself from their own conversation, and now teaching them the unwritten grammar. In like manner, he heard for the first time the patois called "Nigger Dutch," from a Curaçoa mulatto, and in less than two weeks wrote a short piece of poetry for the mulatto to recite in his own rude tongue. From an ex-missionary he learned the language of the Algonquin Indians. He "knew something," according to his own modest terms, "of the Chip-pewa and Delaware," and had read the works of Mr. Dupon-ceau of Philadelphia on Indian philology. A Ceylon student gave him his first introduction to Cingalese, and in a few days he was able to repay him by assisting the youth in getting up a speech for a public exhibition. This witness remembers many of the strangers with whom Mezzofanti was in the habit of con-

versing in the Propaganda, those whose vernaculars were Peguan, Abyssinian, Amarina, Syriac, Arabico-Maltese, Tamulic, Bulgarian, Albanian, besides others already named. The facility with which he accommodated himself to the tongue of each new colloquist, justifies the epithet of one of his encomiasts—"The chameleon of languages." From this variety, the Congo, Angolese, and other African dialects were not missing, nor the languages of Oceanica. "The Romanic of the Alps and the Lettish," writes a correspondent of a German journal in 1842, "are not unfamiliar to him; nay, he has made himself acquainted with Lappish, the language of the wretched nomadic tribes of Lapland. He is master of all the languages which are classed under the Indo-German family, the Sanscrit and Persian, the Koordish, the Armenian, and the Georgian. He is familiar with all the members of the Semitic family, the Hebrew, Arabic, Syriac, Samaritan, Chaldee, Sabaic, and even the Chinese, which he not only reads, but speaks. As regards Africa, he knows the Coptic, Ethiopic, Abyssinian, Amharic, and Angolese." The quickness of his ear to pronunciation, the flexibility of his organs of speech, and his amazing memory of words, enabled him to enjoy the diversity of sounds which are given to the same letters by speakers of different nations—as, for example, the English and Irish. He had this knowledge of the diversity of pronouncing the dead languages. "One day," says Dr. Russell, "I was speaking to him in company with Guido Gorres, [of Munich,] when he had occasion to quote to me Horace's line,

"Si paulum a summo decessit, vergit ad imum.

He turned at once to Gorres, and added—

"Or as you would say:

"Si paulum a sommo detessit, verghit ad imum.

introducing into it every single characteristic of the German manner of pronouncing the Latin language. 'O!' said Mezzofanti to a Burgundian, "you have two Burgundian dialects; which of them do you speak?" 'I know,' replied our friend, 'the patois of Lower Burgundy.' Thereupon the Cardinal began to talk to him in Lower Burgundian, with a fluency which the vine-dressers of Nantes or Beaune might envy."

These citations will give some idea of the authority on which the statements of Mezzofanti's gifts are made, and of the extent to which they were manifested. We shall consider the sum total after resuming the thread of his biography, at the date of his reinstatement as Professor.

The life of Mezzofanti was thus far busily occupied in the duties of the Professor and Librarian, in teaching various languages to private pupils, in pushing his own linguistic researches and multiplying his tongues, in priestly visits to the sick, confessing foreigners, and receiving curious travellers, as the chief curiosity of Bologna. Pius VII. had more than once renewed his efforts to draw him to Rome, and his successor, Leo XII., respecting his partiality for his home, gave him an honorary ecclesiastical office in Bologna. It was the friendship of Cardinal Capellari, however, that at length drew Mezzofanti to the capital. Soon after he had become a Cardinal, Cappellari was placed at the head of the Propaganda, and in that character had a correspondence with the great scholar of Bologna, in reference to an oriental manuscript. Mezzofanti was so useful in this matter, that the Cardinal's previous admiration of him was increased, and their friendship confirmed. When Cappellari became Pope Gregory XVI., Mezzofanti was one of the three delegates sent by Bologna to present the congratulations of the city. The Pope at once appointed him "domestic prelate and proto-notary apostolic;" and after long persuasion, he consented to take up his residence in Rome, which he effected in October 1831, and had his abode in the Quirinal palace. He was soon made a canon.

The College of the Propaganda probably presented stronger attractions to the great linguist than St. Peter's or the Vatican. More of the tribes and tongues of the earth are represented in the missionary candidates of that school, than in any other spot in the world. In one year there were specimens of forty-one distinct nations in the hundred and fourteen students then in attendance. The Chinese, however, was missing—the pupils of that country being then educated in the college at Naples, founded for them specially. Unwilling to lose a chance for this mine, Mezzofanti paid an early visit to the Neapolitan institution, and was initiated, or more properly,

initiated himself, in the celestial language, which a subsequent transfer of some of the native Chinese to the Propaganda, enabled him to complete; so that he actually preached in Chinese, and spoke not only the Mandarin, but other dialects.

Besides the classes of the Propaganda, the various convents, colleges, seminaries, communities and foreign embassies of the Papal city, supplied the self-teaching scholar with living appliances for his special pursuit. At the great College, he mingled freely and daily with the students, listening, talking, inquiring, teaching, and correcting. One day the Pope (who called him "a living Pentecost") amused himself with contriving to have a select number of the young men of many countries come suddenly upon Mezzofanti during a private walk with the pontiff in the gardens of the Vatican, and each to address the librarian in his own dialect, and all at once. The subject of this ordeal was not intimidated, but poured forth his multilingual replies without delay or mistake.

In 1833, the priest who seemed most at home and best content as a plodding investigator of grammars, and as an oral learner of new forms of speech, was promoted to be Chief Keeper or Prefect of the Vatican Library, (in succession to Angelo Mai,) and also to a canonry in St. Peter's. There was no doubt now that the Pope was preparing him for the highest rank below his own. The actual librarian of the Vatican is always a Cardinal, and usually the Cardinal Secretary of State. This office is honorary, and the work is done by two keepers and seven secretaries. Mezzofanti stood on the next step to the office that was considered fit for a Cardinal. He was also made Rector of the College for the Education of Ecclesiastics attached to the Basilica of St. Peter's; Consulter of the Sacred Congregation for the Correction of Oriental books, and a Censor of the Academy. In 1838 he attained the purple and the hat.

The business of the Roman Church, as administered by the Pope, the College of Cardinals and Prelates, is distributed among twenty congregations, or committees. The prefect of each congregation (or chairman of the committee) is usually a Cardinal. They all hold stated meetings, and submit their minutes to the approval of the pontiff. Mezzofanti was put

into several important congregations, viz. the correction of the Liturgical Books of the Oriental Church; of Studies; of the Propaganda; the Chinese Mission; the Index; Rites; and examination of Bishops. He was also President of an hospital, and Visitor of the House of Catechumens.

The salary of a Cardinal-resident is less than forty-five hundred of our dollars. His household must contain a chaplain, secretary, and servants. Mezzofanti cared nothing for equipage, and saved all he could for charity. A nephew and niece resided with him; and he had other relatives whom he assisted. Forty-three (on another page the number is given as fifty-three, pp. 379, 394) students of the Propaganda came to greet him on his accession, and though no two spoke the same language, the new Cardinal found no difficulty in replying to each. His new occupations and increasing age (he was about sixty-four) did not prevent his making additions to the stock of his vocabularies. One of the most formidable of the new acquisitions was the Basque; which has eleven moods and a great variety of tenses. In this instance, as in many others, his study of the principal language was extended to its various dialects. A couplet which he wrote in the Basque was criticized by two eminent authorities, both of whom agreed that "Zu" would have been better "Zure," but native Guipuscoans to whom it was referred, declared in favour of the Cardinal's "Zu."

The death of Pope Gregory, in 1846, was a great blow to the heart of our amiable and affectionate Cardinal, as a strong personal attachment existed between him and the illustrious defunct, but it made no change in the routine of his employments. The political events of the new reign involved all the institutions of Rome in their turmoil. The Cardinal refused to leave his post, and follow the flying pontiff to Gaeta; but the confusion of the times wore upon his strength and spirits, and in the beginning of 1849 an attack of pleurisy, followed by gastric fever, gave him intimation that his time was coming to an end. He gave his mind to the prescribed devotions of his faith; was earnest in prayer for his soul, his country, church, and Pope, and on the night of the 15th of March, (the text says 1849, the epitaph 1848,) died, after speaking his last dis-

tinguishable words in his native Italian, "I am going—I am going—soon to Paradise." His family declined the public funeral offered by the anti-Papal (Republican) authorities, and the Cardinal was buried in the most private and simple manner, in the same church where lie the remains of Tasso.

That which made Mezzofanti in the eyes of the world, a prodigy, was the number of languages he acquired. It is not as a grammarian, a lexicographer, a philologist, a philosopher, or ethnologist that he is famous. He contributed nothing to any of the departments of the "study of words." His publications of all sorts did not extend beyond half a dozen papers. One discriminative critic says he never had an original thought. The only permanent value of his literary existence will be found in the specimen which his peculiarities add to the psychological museum. But even in this character too little is known to be of practical use. He has not told the world the secret of his art. He probably had none to tell. The capacity he possessed was a natural endowment, and could not be taught. The wonderful talent of his specialty was of little more use to mankind than to enable him to serve as an interpreter while he lived. Had his mind been less of a Babel, and given itself to the comparison of the structure of languages, he might, by confining himself to the generic few, have established some great principles for the study. But he was just a *helluo linguarum*. If he searched into the grammatical niceties of a language, or studied its analogies, it seemed to be less for the scientific discovery of the principles, than for the utilitarian purpose of helping himself to add it to his accumulations in the shortest time.

Dr. Russel has made a careful estimate of the actual number of the Cardinal's trophies. He adopts as his definition of a thorough knowledge of language, an ability to read it fluently and with ease, to write it correctly, and to speak it idiomatically. Judging the subject of his biography by this standard, he comes to the following result—his work giving the details at length:

1. Languages frequently tested and spoken with rare excellence—thirty.

2. Stated to have been spoken fluently, but hardly sufficiently tested—nine.

3. Spoken rarely, and less perfectly—eleven.

4. Spoken imperfectly; a few sentences and conversational forms—eight.

5. Studied from books, but not known to have been spoken—fourteen.

6. Dialects spoken, or their peculiarities understood: thirty-nine dialects of ten languages, many of which might justly be described as different languages.

This list adds up *one hundred and eleven*, exceeding by all comparison, (as is shown by the learned introductory memoir prefixed to the life,) everything known in history. Jonadab Almanar and Sir William Jones are not claimed to have gone beyond twenty-eight: Mithridates and Pico of Mirandola have been made famous by twenty-two.

We have indicated, in passing, some of the methods practised by Mezzofanti in his favourite, it might be said, exclusive pursuit. It was not, however, only from the conversational phrases of foreigners, learned and illiterate, in palaces and hotels, hospitals and confessionals, that he picked up his multifarious vocabulary. He was a painful student of grammars and lexicons, paradigms and "praxes." He had to drudge it like the dullest of us. "I made it a rule," he said, "to learn every new grammar, and to apply myself to every strange dictionary that came within my reach. I was constantly filling my head with new words."

He seems to have had no order or method in his studies that would help others in following him. For years he scarcely allowed himself a reasonable amount of food, sleep, fuel, or exercise, that he might devote his utmost time and means to the one object. He attributed part of his success in quickly catching a new language to physical advantages: "In addition to an excellent memory, God had blessed me with an incredible flexibility of the organs of speech." At another time, he said that the ear and not the eye was for him the ordinary medium through which language was conveyed. He studied a language by its rhythm, as containing the principle of its inflexions and of its changes of letters, according to the organs called into use.

The comparative ease with which he made his own way from one tongue to another, made him think less of the wonder in himself, which astonished every one else; and less of the importance of ascertaining and communicating whatever of science was in his method. "He positively assured me," says a learned writer, "that it was a thing less difficult than was generally thought; that there is in all languages a limited number of points to which it is necessary to pay particular attention; and that, when one is once master of these points, the remainder follows with great facility. He added, that when one has learned ten or a dozen languages essentially different from one another, one may, with a little study and attention, learn any number of them." But all this is very tantalizing while he keeps from us the lessons of his experience. He probably would have said to all inquirers, as he did to one, "I cannot explain it; of course God has given me this peculiar power; but if you wish to know how I preserve these languages, I can only say, that when once I hear the meaning of a word in any language, I never forget it."

In reference to the faculty of using many languages in succession without confusion, he used this illustration. "Have you ever tried on a pair of green spectacles? Well, while you wore these spectacles, everything was green to your eyes. It is precisely so with me. While I am speaking any language, for instance Russian, I put on my Russian spectacles, and for the time, they colour everything Russian. I see all my ideas in that language alone. If I pass to another language, I have only to change the spectacles, and it is the same for that language also." This illustration, Dr. Russell adds, "perfectly describes the phenomenon, so far as it fell under observation; but so far as I am aware, no one has attempted to analyze the mental operation by which these astounding external effects were produced. The faculty, whatever it was, may have been improved and sharpened by exercise; but there is no part of the extraordinary gift of this great linguist so clearly exceptional and so unprecedented in the history of the faculty of language."

He also possessed the power of thinking in his various languages in succession. That his acquisitions were principally

through memory, and not made on any communicable system, is implied in the regret he once expressed, that his youth had fallen upon a time when languages were not studied from that scientific point of view from which they are now regarded. "What am I," he would say, "but an ill-bound dictionary!" He quoted a saying ascribed to Catherine de Medici, when told that Scaliger knew twenty languages—"That is, twenty words for one idea; for my part, I would rather have twenty ideas for one word." "You have put your knowledge of languages to some purpose," said he to the author of *Horæ Syriacæ*; "when I go, I shall not leave a trace of what I know behind me."

Dr. Russell has studied the intellectual phenomenon with the aid of the few facts which exist to form an opinion, and his conclusion appears to be, that Mezzofanti's great power was mainly a gift of nature; that his faculties of perception, analysis, judgment and memory, were each extraordinary, and in a perfect balance; that his memory was that faculty in its spontaneous, intuitive exercise, rather than that of elaboration or reminiscence; that his power of analysis enabled him at once to seize upon the whole system of a language, while his ever-ready memory supplied the analogous materials out of each department of his mental stores, *ad libitum*. This being the inward process, the practical power of utterance was owing to a remarkably delicate organism of the ear and tongue, which not only assisted him in pronunciation, but in some inexplicable way suggested to his mind the secrets of the structure and philosophy of the language.

Baron Bunsen's opinion is, that "his linguistic talent was that of seizing sounds and accents, and the whole (so to say) idiom of a language, and reproducing them by a wonderful, but equally special, memory. I do not think he had ever his equal in this respect; but the cultivation of this power had absorbed all the rest."

It would be unjust to leave the impression that Mezzofanti knew nothing but words; that, according to one sarcasm—he spent his life in making keys for rooms he never entered; or, according to another—that, with all his languages, he never said anything. There is abundant evidence that his literary

knowledge, though not profound, was extensive and varied. Authors of all countries, in poetry as well as prose, grave and gay, were known to him. His English list was not confined to Chaucer, Milton, and Gray, but included *Hudibras* and *Moore's Melodies*. He read *Cooper's novels*. His biographer gives many incidental proofs that he was much better acquainted with the biography, history, and literature, both of the ancient and modern world, than would seem to be possible to a mind so full of the mere signs and expressions of knowledge. An eminent scientific Italian was surprised, on the incidental mention of a Hindoo treatise on mathematics, to hear Mezzofanti converse for half an hour on the astronomy and mathematics of the Indian races, "in a way which would have done honour to a man whose chief occupation had been tracing the history of the sciences."

The personal character of this remarkable man transpires through his biography in such a way as to draw to him the affection as well as the admiration of the reader. Gentle, humble, modest, humane, he seems to feel himself most at home in the seclusion of the library, or by the pallets of the sick and dying. The reader wonders how such a quiet, plain, unambitious person could have got into a path the history of which would come out in binding of scarlet and gold, stamped with the insignia of one of the proudest stations open to the envy of mortals. He was, after the manner of Rome indeed, but as it clearly appears, with a sincere heart, a devout man. "Ah, Don Ubaldo, give thyself entirely to the Lord!" if this were his exhortation to a novice in the priesthood, we may trust it was the principle of his own soul. If he spoke of the blessedness of that same friend and pupil, on his early death, as consisting in being "close to the Divine fountain, and then admitted to the hidden source of the divine oracles, to the study of which he addressed himself here with such indefatigable application," we may trust that those oracles were much more than scholastic studies to himself. "Alas! what will all these languages avail me for the kingdom of heaven, since it is by works, not words, that we must win our way thither!" this exclamation of his, in reply to a compliment to his talents, may be interpreted by Protestant charity to be as consistent with the doctrines of

grace as “not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven:” then we may trust that the paragon of languages has attained that state so appropriately designated in the motto of the great Bible-publishers of London:

Πολλὰ μὲν θνητοῖς γλώτται, μία δ' ἀθανάτοισιν.

Multæ terricolis linguæ, cœlestibus una.

Earth speaks with many tongues, heaven knows but one.

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the Greek Prepositions, and on the cases of Nouns, with which these are used.* By GESSNER HARRISON, M. D., Professor of Latin in the University of Virginia. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1858.

It is a remarkable fact, and one, which the public ear may be slow to admit, that modern scholarship has done more for the philosophical exposition of the Greek language, and possesses larger and juster views of its structure, than did the Greeks themselves. With all their acumen, the ancients were poor etymologists. The best of them could derive a primitive word from one of its own derivatives: and although they had juster ideas of syntax, even those were comparatively superficial. Language was to them a practical instrument or the vehicle of art, which the spontaneous, but unanalyzed dictates of their spiritual nature disposed of with the most delicate sense of fitness; but the anatomy of what went to constitute that fitness they never comprehended. Of course, its idiomatic proprieties were felt and understood by those to whom it was native, with a degree of truth and discrimination which can never be recalled; but in as far as pertains to the structure of the language, the philosophy of its syntax, the system of its etymology, its ethnological relations, and the laws which governed its whole development, modern scholarship is instructed to a degree that certainly was never dreamed of by the greatest analyst of ancient times. Moreover, this result, though one of

progressive effort from age to age, has been chiefly effected within our own day. It belongs to the latest achievements of inductive science.

After the revival of Greek learning in the West of Europe, the first two or three generations of scholars depended upon oral instruction of native Greeks, who, themselves, had learned their language at the mouth of tradition. The contemporaries, respectively, of Petrarch and Poggio trod the beaten track of traditional grammar, only to reach the enjoyments of literary art. For the path itself, they took it as they found it, and did little to remove its difficulties. Not the language, but its literature was their aim. And such was the proper work of their times.

The Grammar of Constantine Lascaris, one of the earliest products of the printing press, issued at Milan in 1476, laid the foundation-stone of a new structure. It was written with the view of improvement by combining the merits of preceding works: and was soon followed by a Greek Lexicon from the same press. The apparatus for study was thus thrown open to the public; and a practical knowledge of Greek having been attained by Western scholars, the treatment of its grammar subsequently passed entirely into their hands.

During the first half of the next century, the language was handled chiefly as an instrument in theological controversy, and grammarians did little more than re-state and re-arrange the precepts of the earlier teachers. Then followed the period which, of all occidental history, may be described most properly as that of erudition. Researches into the literature, antiquities, history, and mythology of the Greeks, compiled materials for a more scientific treatment of their language. And the very men who thus furnished the material, pointed the way to that use of it.

As early as 1557, the Grammar of Peter Ramus presented evidence of enlarged resources. Further improvements were attempted by Sylburgius, Vossius, and the author of the Port Royal Grammar. But this course of progress was stayed. On the continent succeeded a more self-indulgent age, which looked with dismay upon such gigantic compilations as those of the Stephenses, of Turnebus, of Gruter, and of Muretus; while in

England the dangers of a political and ecclesiastical revolution absorbed the energies of the nation. As far as attention was turned to Greek, it was less with a view to comprehend its spirit, than to reproduce the forms of its literature, or copy its treasures in the modern tongues.

Another period of Greek scholarship found its pioneer in Richard Bentley, who, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, set the example of that independent criticism, which has since, notwithstanding many extravagances, yielded results of the utmost value. It was, however, long employed in editions of the classics before systematic grammar derived much benefit therefrom. Succeeding scholars continued to expend their efforts upon the niceties of classical diction and prosody.

Subsequently, a new auxiliary arose in the science of comparative philology, which conferred unexpected resources and an unprecedented dignity upon the whole subject of grammar. A wider knowledge of the ethnological relations of Greek, added to ripened learning in its own stores, gave occasion to a more complete and scientific exposition of its structure.

The publication, in 1819, of the first volume of Buttman's large Grammar, and of the first part of Passow's Lexicon, led the way to a method of treating the language, which has been followed up by others, with the most satisfactory results. Facilities are now furnished for the study of Greek unknown in any previous time, and the means provided of drawing from it richer stores of instruction, and of giving to them a breadth of influence upon the world, which it never has enjoyed since it ceased to be spoken by a free people. Its operation upon society, literature, and art, of the present day, is no longer confined to externals, but pertains to their spirit. And the present method pursued in its study, is calculated to promote that tendency, leading ultimately not to a bald imitation of Greek works, but to a following of Greek example, in acquiring a bold yet prudent and reverent intellectual and æsthetical independence.

We are happy to say, that the work before us is in the spirit of its time. Without being able to adopt all the author's conclusions, we have been truly gratified by the examination of his method. Not that we deem it the best for instruction. In that

light it is not to be thought of. A distinction must be made between the method which is good for an amateur of Greek, and for the instruction of a class. According to the former, one may make a nice little volume out of the virtues of a particle, which shall find its well pleased audience, fit, though few; while a class in college, which has yet to learn the radical philosophy of the language, would only be retarded in their progress, and lose their bearing, by having to delay upon matters so minute. The latter, it is our belief, can be better effected by a just and clear statement of general laws, sustained by a few pertinent examples. Profuse illustration, and still more exhaustive pursuit of a subject into all its minutest ramifications, wearies the patience, and deadens the zeal, of a class, by leaving them no room nor spirit for original suggestion. Such, however, we do not understand to be the design of the present work. It is addressed to Greek scholars; to those, who, with a cordial interest in the subject, are pleased to delay upon all the particulars wherein lie its most delicate beauties.

It is the design of this treatise to demonstrate that each preposition in the Greek language has one fundamental meaning, which, though subject to variation, is always present, as well as to show what that meaning is. And in order thereto, the author enters first into a consideration of the respective cases of the noun, and of the relations which they are intended to express. The latter he presents as it stands in connection with the verb, and with the verb and adverb. Consequently, the verb and its attendant preposition are regarded as representing only one notion, and the case of the noun which follows, expresses its own proper relation to that notion: in other words, that the case is not governed by the preposition, as separate from the verb, but by the notion which is contained in both. "Thus, for example, in the phrase *εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἦλθεν*, 'he came into the city,' *πόλιν* is to be regarded as defining more exactly the notion of 'coming in, or within,' expressed by *ἦλθεν*, as qualified by *εἰς*; for the meaning of this example is, 'he came in, or within . . . as regards the city.'" Having adopted this general principle, the author is careful to add that, notwithstanding there are instances in which the case is employed to mark an object affected by the peculiar sense of the prepo-

sition itself," and alludes to "some examples of the use of ἐπί and σὺν with the dative, of which he remarks, that in such instances "alone it may be allowable to say, that the case depends upon, or, as it is sometimes expressed, is governed by the preposition." Thus, the adverb and preposition are regarded as both equally belonging to the verb, with this difference, that the preposition shows its direction and the adverb its other modifications.

As respects the meaning of the different cases, the author holds that the idea of special reference lies at the basis of the genitive, that of limitation, of the accusative, and that of ultimate object, means or place of the dative, while of these relations the prepositions are employed to distinguish the manifold varieties. The second and larger part of the work consists of a detailed treatment of the prepositions one by one with a view to ascertain and classify the various modifications of their meaning.

In the main, Dr. Harrison's generalization is just, yet there is a point where it seems to us to come short. Why was it deemed necessary to subdivide the dative any more than the genitive? The philosophy of the language is as harmonious in one as the other. To make two or three cases out of either of them, after the example of the Latin, Polish or Sanscrit, is to impose upon the Greek the defective generalization of languages, which were the outgrowth of less comprehensive and less subtle thinking. It is also inconsistent with the spirit of Dr. Harrison's own work. We cannot regard the dative as merely a common termination upon which two or three different cases have accidentally fallen. For if that were so in one declension, it would be very strange should it happen in all three. It is beyond a doubt that the Greek mind intended the dative to be one. On this point, it seems to us that Jelf's theory covers the true doctrine of the Greek language. "A sentence expresses a thought or succession of notions, standing in certain relations and order to each other." To the principal notion any other "must stand in one of three relations; it must either have preceded it, or be implied in it as part of it, or must follow it; whence these three relations may be called antecedent, co-incidental,

dent, and consequent. Hence, strictly speaking, no language can have more than three cases; but as the development of the original powers of the language kept pace with the requirements of a more civilized state of society, in which the various relations of things and persons were more accurately perceived and distinguished, it followed naturally that in many languages, the original relation of each case was, as it were, split into several, and the parts so separated were expressed in language by a corresponding modification of form. In Greek, however, the original number was retained," "the genitive case expressing the notion, which, in the mind, precedes the principal notion of the thought, that is the antecedent," the accusative, the co-incident, and the dative the consequent. Of course, there is no invariable order, in which those elements of a sentence are necessarily regarded by all minds, and whether an author would use the genitive or dative in certain circumstances would depend greatly upon the order existing in his own mind; but the same exception must be made whichever theory is adopted.

It is not that we reject the distinctions so carefully and justly made; but that we claim for the Greek language the comprehension of them all under a more general principle. True philosophy, at the same time, separates the ramifications of its subject, and more nearly and firmly unites them at their source. The tendency to multiply causes is as unphilosophical as that of confounding effects.

Yet this remark should not be unattended with a full statement, that the very spirit and aim of Dr. Harrison's book, as a whole, are those of the principle now alluded to. It is a genuine product of philosophical scholarship; in style, plain, clear, and unaffected, remarkably free from the hardness almost native to the subject, it spreads out the manifold, and sometimes apparently contradictory particulars, in the light of their common kindred, until the humblest intellect cannot fail to be impressed with both. A calm and sober reliance for determination of meanings upon classical usage, is another commendable feature of the work, and the more commendable where previous practice has indulged so largely in fanciful

speculation, and where even a scholar like Donaldson could lay out his strength in mere splitting of syllables, and torture of the alphabet. Etymology is an indispensable key to classification, as Dr. Harrison uses it, but a very unreliable guide to actual idiom. And without idiom the student gets only the hard machinery of a language. The etymological frame-work, no matter how beautiful in its order, how nice in its adjustments, is but the skeleton. It is the rich and varied meaning associated therewith in the usage of society, and springing from all the endless wants, and thoughts, and emotions of men, that clothes it with life, and makes it at once, history, prophecy, and poetry, as well as philosophy. And yet how often is this fact forgotten by gentlemen into whose hands the interpretation of ancient authors sometimes comes, and who seem to think that, however far an English word may follow the course of suggestion from its etymological home, in ancient languages such a thing was not to be anticipated. Certainly we do meet with renderings of ancient writings, and, we are sorry to say, not unfrequently of the Holy Scriptures, which seem to be constructed on that assumption; as if Greek and Hebrew had never indulged in following the wants of human life, but been imprisoned all their days in the narrow canals of etymology, and a grammar as stiff and invariable as the rules of algebra. And we suppose that nothing short of an occasional stumble into obvious absurdity will ever open the eyes of such persons to their error. For, as you cannot give a rule for every delicate shade of idiom, you can never convince them that it exists. Nothing but a large acquaintance, familiar, thoughtful, and genial, with the literature of the ancient tongues, can entitle any one to the honours of a critic of their idioms. We deem it the highest praise of Dr. Harrison's book, to say that its results are reached through that most scholarlike channel. Much of his material has, it is true, been obtained at second hand, as is obvious upon inspection, but he merits the high praise of having rightly estimated it.

Such scrupulous discrimination of words may appear to many a matter of little value—the trifling exactness of the pedant. It is to be borne in mind that the most beautiful

shades of thought, like those of colouring, are the most delicate, and consist of the most minutely divided elements; and that it is precisely by attention to the smallest things that the highest approaches to truth, in art as well as science, are attained. These nice distinctions are the portals alike of philosophy and poetry. It is thereby that we have access into the most sacred places of thought, and are enabled to behold the great and beautiful conceptions of Plato and of Æschylus in their true magnitude, and something like the brilliancy of their pristine colours. When an astronomer is preparing his lenses, and adjusting his levels, and screws, and pivots, and cobweb lines, an uninstructed observer might say that he is expending a ridiculous amount of attention upon small things. Why not take in the great idea of the heavens, in the gross, without these little cares? Nay, these little things are his only means of grasping true conceptions of the great. It is by the cobweb lines in his telescope, the infinitesimals in his calculations, that he measures the magnitudes of distant worlds, and tells their revolution in their spheres. So in language, the mind, which takes no cognizance of fine distinctions, is necessarily blind to much of the truth which it contains, and to all the world of its beauty.

Although in working out the system presented in this volume, and in demonstrating its correctness and universality, there was needed a nicety and fulness of detail, which is more than practical, yet the final results, thereby attained, are principles of hourly application by the scholar, which, if correct, must throw their light upon every sentence he reads.

ART. V.—*Adoption of the Confession of Faith.*

CIRCUMSTANCES have recently awakened public attention to this important subject. It is one on which a marked diversity of opinion exists, between the two portions into which our church has been divided: and as in May last a direct proposition was made on the part of one branch of the New-school body, to our General Assembly, for a union between them and the Old-school, this original point of difference was brought into view. Not only on the floor of the Assembly was this matter referred to, but it has since been the subject of discussion in the public papers, especially at the South. A passing remark made in the last number of this journal, which we supposed expressed a truth which no man could misunderstand or deny, has given rise to strictures which very clearly prove that great obscurity, in many minds, still overhangs the subject. We either differ very much among ourselves, or we have not yet learned to express our meaning in the same terms. It is high time, therefore, that the question should be renewedly discussed. We have nothing new to say on the subject. As long ago as October, 1831, we expressed the views which we still hold, and which in a passing sentence were indicated in our number for July last. Those views have passed unanswered and unheeded, so far as we know, for thirty-six years. How is it that the renewed assertion of them has now called forth almost universal condemnation from the Old-school press? They have been censured by men who adopt them, and who in private do not hesitate to admit their correctness. This does not imply any unfairness, or any other form of moral obliquity. It is easily accounted for. The proposition, that the adoption of the Confession of Faith does not imply the adoption of every proposition contained in that Confession, might mean much or little. It might be adopted by the most conservative, and is all that the most radical need claim. Still the proposition is undeniably correct. The fault of the writer, as the *Presbyterian of the West* sensibly remarked, is not in what is said, but

in what was left unsaid. This fault would have been a very grave one, had the subject of subscription to the Confession been under discussion, and had the above proposition been put forth as the whole rule in regard to it. The remark, however, was merely incidental and illustrative. To show the impossibility of our agreeing on a commentary on the whole Bible, we referred to the fact, that there are propositions in the Confession of Faith in which we are not agreed. Does any man deny this? If not, where is the harm of saying it? Are we living in a false show? Are we pretending to adopt a principle of subscription, which in fact we neither act on for ourselves, nor dream of enforcing on others? Or are we so little certain of our own ground, that we are afraid that our enemies will take advantage of us, and proclaim aloud that we have come over to them? If we really understand ourselves, and are satisfied of the soundness of our principles, the more out-spoken we are the better; better for our own self-respect, and for the respect and confidence of others towards us. If the Christian public, and especially those who have gone out from us, hear us asserting a principle or rule of subscription which they know we do not adopt, it will be hard for them to believe both in our intelligence and sincerity.

The question put to every candidate for ordination in our church, is in these words: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" It is plain that a very serious responsibility before God and man is assumed by those who return an affirmative answer to that question. It is something more than ordinary falsehood, if our inward convictions do not correspond with a profession made in presence of the church, and as the condition of our receiving authority to preach the gospel. In such a case we lie not only unto man, but unto God; because such professions are of the nature of a vow, that is, a promise or profession made to God.

It is no less plain that the candidate has no right to put his own sense upon the words propounded to him. He has no right to select from all possible meanings which the words may bear, that particular sense which suits his purpose, or which, he thinks, will save his conscience. It is well known that this

course has been openly advocated, not only by the Jesuits, but by men of this generation, in this country and in Europe. The "chemistry of thought," it is said, can make all creeds alike. Men have boasted that they could sign any creed. To a man in a balloon the earth appears a plain, all inequalities on its surface being lost in the distance. And here is a philosophic elevation from which all forms of human belief look alike. They are sublimed into general formulas, which include them all and distinguish none. Professor Newman, just before his open apostasy, published a tract in which he defended his right to be in the English church while holding the doctrines of the church of Rome. He claimed for himself and others the privilege of signing the Thirty-nine articles in a "non-natural sense;" that is, in the sense which he chose to put upon the words. This shocks the common sense and the common honesty of men. There is no need to argue the matter. The turpitude of such a principle is much more clearly seen intuitively than discursively. The two principles which, by the common consent of all honest men, determine the interpretation of oaths and professions of faith, are, first, the plain, historical meaning of the words; and secondly, the *animus imponentis*, that is, the intention of the party imposing the oath or requiring the profession. The words, therefore, "system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures," are to be taken in their plain, historical sense. A man is not at liberty to understand the words "Holy Scriptures," to mean all books written by holy men, because although that interpretation might consist with the signification of the words, it is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the phrase. Nor can he understand them, as they would be understood by Romanists, as including the Apocrypha, because the words being used by a Protestant church, must be taken in a Protestant sense. Neither can the candidate say, that he means by "system of doctrine" Christianity as opposed to Mohammedanism, or Protestantism, as opposed to Romanism, or evangelical Christianity, as distinguished from the theology of the Reformed (i. e. Calvinistic) churches, because the words being used by a Reformed church, must be understood in the sense which that church is known to attach to them. If a

man professes to receive the doctrine of the Trinity, the word must be taken in its Christian sense, the candidate cannot substitute for that sense the Sabellian idea of a modal Trinity, nor the philosophical trichotomy of Pantheism. And so of all other expressions which have a fixed historical meaning. Again, by the *animus imponentis* in the case contemplated, is to be understood not the mind or intention of the ordaining bishop in the Episcopal church, or of the ordaining presbytery in the Presbyterian church. It is the mind or intention of the church, of which the bishop or the presbytery is the organ or agent. Should a romanizing bishop in the church of England give "a non-natural" sense to the Thirty-nine articles, that would not acquit the priest, who should sign them in that sense, of the crime of moral perjury; or should a presbytery give an entirely erroneous interpretation to the Westminster Confession, that would not justify a candidate for ordination in adopting it in that sense. The Confession must be adopted in the sense of the church, into the service of which the minister, in virtue of that adoption, is received. These are simple principles of honesty, and we presume they are universally admitted, at least so far as our church is concerned.

The question however is, What is the true sense of the phrase, "system of doctrine," in our ordination service? or, What does the church understand the candidate to profess, when he says that he "receives and adopts the Confession of Faith of this church as entertaining the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures"? There are three different answers given to that question. First, it is said by some, that in adopting "the system of doctrine," the candidate is understood to adopt it, not in the form or manner in which it is presented in the Confession, but only for "substance of doctrine." The obvious objections to this view of the subject are:

1. That such is not the meaning of the words employed. The two expressions or declarations, "I adopt the system of doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith," and, "I adopt that system for substance of doctrine," are not identical. The one therefore cannot be substituted for the other. If there were no other difference between them, it is enough that the one is definite and univocal, the other is both vague and

equivocal. The latter expression may have two very different meanings. By substance of doctrine may be meant the substantial doctrines of the Confession; that is, those doctrines which give character to it as a distinctive confession of faith, and which therefore constitute the system of belief therein contained. Or it may mean the substance of the several doctrines taught in the Confession, as distinguished from the form in which they are therein presented. It will be at once perceived that these are very different things. The substance or essence of a system of doctrines is the system itself. In this case, the essence of a thing is the whole thing. The essential doctrines of Pelagianism are Pelagianism, and the essential doctrines of Calvinism are Calvinism. But the substance of a doctrine is not the doctrine, any more than the substance of a man is the man. A man is a given substance in a specific form; and a doctrine is a given truth in a particular form. The substantial truth, included in the doctrine of original sin, is that human nature is deteriorated by the apostasy of Adam. The different forms in which this general truth is presented, make all the difference, as to this point, between Pelagianism, Augustinianism, Romanism, and Arminianism. It is impossible, therefore, in matters of doctrine, to separate the substance from the form. The form is essential to the doctrine, as much as the form of a statue is essential to the statue. In adopting a system of doctrines, therefore, the candidate adopts a series of doctrines in the specific form in which they are presented in that system. To say that he adopts the substance of those doctrines, leaves it entirely uncertain what he adopts. The first objection then to this view of the meaning of the phrase, "system of doctrine," is, that it is contrary to the simple historical sense of the terms. What a man professes to adopt is, "the system of doctrine," not the substance of the doctrines embraced in that system.

2. Another objection is, that it is contrary to the mind of the church. The church, in demanding the adoption of the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, demands something more than the adoption of what the candidate may choose to consider the substance of those doctrines. This is plain from the words used, which, as we have seen, in their plain import, mean something more, and

something more specific and intelligible than the phrase "substance of doctrine." The mind of the church on this point is rendered clear beyond dispute by her repeated official declarations on the subject. The famous adopting act of the original Synod, passed in 1729, is in these words: "Although the Synod do not claim or pretend to any authority of imposing our faith on other men's consciences, but do profess our just dissatisfaction with, and abhorrence of such impositions, and do utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the church, being willing to receive one another as Christ has received us to the glory of God, and admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances, all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven, yet we are undoubtedly obliged to take care that the faith once delivered to the saints be kept pure and uncorrupt among us, and so handed down to our posterity; and do therefore agree that all ministers of this Synod, or that shall hereafter be admitted into this Synod, shall declare their agreement in, and approbation of the Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, and do also adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith. And we do also agree, that all Presbyteries within our bounds shall always take care not to admit any candidate of the ministry into the exercise of the sacred functions, but what declares his agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession, either by subscribing the said Confession and Catechisms, or by a verbal declaration of their assent thereto, as such minister or candidate shall think best. And in case any minister of this Synod, or any candidate for the ministry, shall have any scruple with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms, he shall at the time of making said declaration, declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge his scruple or mistake to be only about articles not essential and necessary in doctrine, worship, or government. But if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge

such ministers or candidates erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith, the Synod or Presbytery shall declare them incapable of communion with them. And the Synod do solemnly agree that none of them will traduce or use any opprobrious terms of those who differ from us in extra-essential and not necessary points of doctrine, but treat them with the same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if they did not differ in such sentiment.”

On the afternoon of the day on which the above act was adopted, the following minute was recorded, viz. “All the ministers of this Synod now present, except one,* that declared himself not prepared, namely, Masters Jedediah Andrews, Thomas Craighead, John Thompson, James Anderson, John Pierson, Samuel Gelston, Joseph Houston, Gilbert Tenant, Adam Boyd, John Bradner, Alexander Hutchinson, Thomas Evans, Hugh Stevenson, William Tenant, Hugh Conn, George Gillespie, and John Wilson, after proposing all the scruples that any of them had to make against any articles and expressions in the Confession of Faith, and Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, have unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples, and in declaring the said Confession and Catechisms to be the confession of their faith, excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters, concerning which clauses the Synod do unanimously declare, that they do not receive those articles in such sense, as to suppose that the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over Synods, with respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority, or power to persecute any for their religion, or in any sense contrary to the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain.

“The Synod observing that unanimity, peace, and unity, which appeared in all their consultations relating to the affair of the Confession, did unanimously agree in giving thanks to God in solemn prayer and praises.”

This fundamental act, passed in 1729, has never been either repealed or altered. It has on several occasions been inter-

* The Rev. Mr. Elmer, who gave in his adhesion at the following meeting of the Synod.

preted and reaffirmed, but it has never been abrogated, except so far as it was merged in the readoption of the Confession and Catechisms at the formation of our present Constitution, in the year 1788. This important document teaches, first: That in our church the terms of Christian communion are competent knowledge, and a creditable profession of faith and repentance. The Synod, say they, "admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances, all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven." Second: That the condition of ministerial communion is the adoption of the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms. This is expressed by saying, "We adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith." For this is substituted as an equivalent form of expression, "agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession." That is, "all the essential and necessary articles" of the system of doctrine contained in the Confession. Third: That the only exceptions allowed to be taken were such as related to matters outside that system of doctrine, and the rejection of which left the system in its integrity. That this is the true meaning and intent of the act is plain, first, because the Synod in 1730 expressly declared, "that they understand those clauses that respect the admission of entrants or candidates, in such sense as to oblige them to receive and adopt the Confession and Catechisms at their admission, in the same manner, and as fully as the members of the Synod did, that were then present. Those members adopted the whole system in its integrity, excepting only to certain clauses relating to the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion. Again, in 1736, they say, "The Synod have adopted, and still do adhere to the Westminster Confession, Catechisms, and Directory, without the least variation or alteration . . . and they further declare, that this was our meaning and true intent in our first adopting of said Confession." In the same minute they say, "We hope and desire that this our Synodical declaration and explication may satisfy all our people, as to our firm attachment to our good old received doctrines contained in said Confession, without the least variation or alteration." This

minute was adopted *nemine contradicente*.* Second: Not only this official and authoritative exposition of the "adopting act," given by its authors, but the subsequent declarations of the several Presbyteries composing the Synod, and of the Synod itself, prove that "the system of doctrines" was adopted, and not merely the substance of those doctrines. The common form of adoption may be learned from such records as the following, from the Presbytery of Philadelphia. Mr. Samuel Blair was licensed after "having given his assent to the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms as the confession of his faith." David Cowell was ordained "after he had adopted the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms as the confession of his faith." In 1741, the great schism occurred by the exclusion of the New Brunswick Presbytery, which being subsequently joined by the Presbyteries of New York and New Castle constituted the Synod of New York. This body, composed of the friends of the Whitefieldian revival, say: "We do declare and testify our constitution, order, and discipline, to be in harmony with the established church of Scotland. The Westminster Confession, Catechisms, and Directory, adopted by them, are in like manner adopted by us." The first article of the terms of union, by which the two Synods were united, in 1758, and which was unanimously adopted, is as follows: "Both Synods having always approved and received the Westminster Confession of Faith, Larger and Shorter Catechisms, as an orthodox and excellent system of doctrine, founded on the word of God; we do still receive the same as the confession of our faith, and also adhere to the plan of worship, government, and discipline, contained in the Westminster Directory: strictly enjoining it on all our ministers and probationers for the ministry, that they preach and teach according to the form of sound words in the said Confession and Catechisms, and avoid and oppose all errors contrary thereto." When the General Assembly was constituted, the Westminster Confession and Catechisms were declared to be parts of the Constitution of the church, and every candidate for

* These documents may be seen in full in Baird's Collection, and in Hodge's Constitutional History, Vol. i., chap. 3.

the ministry was required, previous to his ordination, to receive that Confession, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures. From the beginning, therefore, the mind of our church has been that that "system of doctrine" in its integrity, not the substance of those doctrines, was the term of ministerial communion. For a fuller discussion of this subject we would refer our readers to *Hodge's Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church*, Vol. i., chap. 3. It is there shown that no exception to the Confession of Faith, touching any of the doctrines constituting that system, was ever allowed.

3. Not only are the plain meaning of the words, and the *animus imponentis* opposed to the interpretation of the ordination service now under consideration, but that interpretation is liable to the further objection, that the phrase "substance of doctrine" has no definite assignable meaning. What the substance of any given doctrine is, cannot be historically ascertained or authenticated. No one knows what a man professes, who professes to receive only the substance of a doctrine, and, therefore, this mode of subscription vitiates the whole intent and value of a confession. Who can tell what is the substance of the doctrine of sin? Does the substance include all the forms under which the doctrine has been, or can be held, so that whoever holds any one of those forms, holds the substance of the doctrine? If one man says, that nothing is sin but the voluntary transgression of known law; another, that men are responsible only for their purposes to the exclusion of their feelings; another, that an act to be voluntary, and therefore sinful, must be deliberate and not impulsive; another, that sin is merely limitation or imperfect development; another, that sin exists only for us and in our consciousness, and not in the sight of God; another, that sin is any want of conformity in state, feeling, or act, to the law of God; do all these hold the substance of the doctrine? What is the substance of the doctrine of redemption? The generic idea of redemption, in the Christian sense of the word, may be said to be the deliverance of men from sin and its consequences by Jesus Christ. Does every man who admits that idea, hold the substance of the doctrine as presented in our Confession? If

so, then it matters not whether we believe that that deliverance is effected by the example of Christ, or by his doctrine, or by his power, or by the moral impression of his death on the race, or the universe, or by his satisfying the justice of God, or by his incarnation exalting our nature to a higher power. The same remark may be made in reference to all the other distinctive doctrines of the Confession. The general idea of "grace" is that of a remedial divine influence; but is that influence exercised only by ordering our external circumstances; or is it simply the moral influence of the truth which God has revealed; or that influence exalted by some special operation; is it *praeveniens* as well as assisting; is it common without being sufficient, or sufficient as well as common; is it irresistible, or efficacious only through its congruity or the coöperation of the sinner. Does the man who holds any one of these forms, hold the substance of the doctrine of grace? It is perfectly obvious that there is no authoritative standard by which to determine what the substance of a doctrine is; that the very idea of a doctrine is a truth in a specific form, and, therefore, those who do not hold the doctrines of the Confession in the form in which they are therein presented, do not hold the doctrines. It is equally obvious, that no definite, intelligible, trustworthy profession of faith is made by the man who simply professes to hold the substance of certain doctrines. Such a mode of adopting the Confession of Faith is morally wrong, because inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words, and with the mind of the church, and because it renders the adoption nugatory.

4. This system has been tried, and found to produce the greatest disorder and contention. Men acting on the principle of receiving the Confession for substance of doctrine, have entered the ministry in our church, who denied the doctrine of imputation, whether of Adam's sin or of Christ's righteousness; the doctrine of the derivation of a sinful depravity of nature from our first parents; of inability; of efficacious grace; of a definite atonement; that is, of an atonement having any such special reference to the elect, as to render their salvation certain. In short, while professing to receive "the system of doctrine" contained in the Westminster Confession and Cate-

chisms, they have rejected almost every doctrine which gives that system its distinctive character. It was this principle more than any other cause, and probably more than all other causes combined, that led to the division of our church in 1838, and it must produce like disasters should it again be brought into practical application among us.

The second interpretation given to the question, "Do you receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this church as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" is, that the person who answers that question in the affirmative does thereby profess to receive and adopt every proposition contained in that Confession as a part of his own faith. The objections to this view are substantially the same as those urged against the view already considered.

1. It is contrary to the plain, historical meaning of the words. To adopt a book as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, and to adopt every proposition contained in that book, are two very different things. The book, although a confession of faith, may contain many propositions by way of argument or inference, or which lie entirely outside the system, and which may be omitted, and yet leave the system in its integrity. The words "system of doctrine," have a definite meaning, and serve to define and limit the extent to which the Confession is adopted.

No man has the right to put upon them his own sense. He must take them in their historical sense, i. e. in the sense which by historical proof it may be shown they were intended to bear, just as the phrase "Holy Scriptures" must be taken in its historical sense. By the words "system of doctrine," as used in our ordination service, as remarked on a preceding page, are not to be understood the general doctrines of Christianity, nor the whole system of a man's convictions on politics, economics, morals, and religion, but the theological system therein contained. That is the established meaning of the phrase. The Westminster divines did not intend to frame a new system of doctrines, nor have they done it. They have simply reproduced and presented, with matchless perspicuity and precision, the system of doctrines common to the Reformed churches. That is the system which the candidate professes to adopt, and

no one can rightfully demand of him either more or less. It is one thing to adopt the system of doctrine and order of worship contained in the Book of Common Prayer, and quite another thing to "assent and consent" to everything contained in that book, as the clergy of England are required to do. So it is one thing to adopt the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession, and quite another to adopt every proposition contained in that Confession. Many a man could do the one, who could not do the other.

2. A second objection to this interpretation of the adoption of the Confession is, that it is contrary to the *animus impo- nentis*, or mind of the church. The mind of the church on this subject is indicated and established, first, by the words employed; secondly, by the official explanations of the sense in which those words are to be taken; thirdly, by the contemporaneous testimony of the men who framed the constitution, or acted under it; and, fourthly, by the uniform action of the church. First, as to the words employed. If the church intended that the candidate should adopt every proposition contained in the Confession of Faith, why did she not say so? It was very easy to express that idea. The words actually used do not, in their plain, established meaning, express it. The simple fact that no such demand is made, is evidence enough that none such was intended. The church makes a clear distinction between the terms of Christian communion, of ministerial communion, and the condition on which any one is to be admitted to the office of professor in any of her theological seminaries. For Christian communion, she requires competent knowledge, and a credible profession of faith and repentance; for ministerial communion, the adoption of the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession; for admission to the office of a professor, she exacts the promise, "not to teach anything which directly or indirectly contradicts anything taught in the Confession of Faith, Catechisms, or Form of Government in this church." Does all this mean nothing? Do these differently worded demands all amount to the same thing? This is impossible. The words have not only a different meaning, but there is an obvious reason for the different demand in these several cases. More

is in Scripture required for admission to the office of a minister, than is required for admission to church privileges; and more may reasonably be demanded of a professor than of a minister. Whatever a professor's private convictions may be as to anything not included in the system of doctrines, he is bound to avoid going counter to the standards of the church whose servant he is. He may think that ministers and ruling elders do not differ in office, but he cannot properly officially inculcate that idea. The mind of the church, therefore, as to the meaning of the ordination service, is already indicated by the words employed.

Secondly, This is placed, as it seems to us, beyond dispute, by the official explanations given of the words in question. The original Synod of Philadelphia officially declared that there were certain clauses in the Westminster Confession relating to the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion, which they did not adopt. This was no less true of the two Synods of Philadelphia and New York after the schism, and of the Synod of New York and Philadelphia after the union. Yet all these bodies uniformly declared for themselves, and required all candidates to declare, that they received that "Confession as the confession of their faith," or that they "received and adhered to the system of doctrines" therein contained. Every minister received, and every candidate ordained, was required to make that declaration. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the church understood the adoption of the Westminster Confession as not involving the adoption of every proposition contained in that book. Let it be remembered that the formula of adoption was not, "Do you receive the Westminster Confession, with the exception of certain clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters, as the confession of your faith?" but simply, "Do you receive that Confession," or "the system of doctrine in that Confession?" It was not considered necessary to make that exception, because the language was not intended to extend to every proposition, but only to "the system of doctrine." This is the church's own official explanation of the sense of the words in question.

Thirdly, The mind of the church as to this point is determined by contemporaneous testimony. There were three forms of

opinion on the subject of confessions in our original Synod. First: There was a very small class, represented by President Dickinson, who were opposed to all creeds of human composition. They entered a protest, signed by four ministers,* against the overture for the adoption of a confession as a test of orthodoxy. On this subject President Dickinson said: "The joint acknowledgment of our Lord Jesus Christ for our common head, of the Sacred Scriptures as our common standard both of faith and practice, with a joint agreement in the same essential and necessary articles of Christianity, and the same methods of worship and discipline, are a sufficient bond of union for the being and well-being of any church under heaven."† This small class, therefore, made no distinction between Christian and ministerial communion, requiring for the latter as well as for the former, simply agreement in the "necessary and essential articles of Christianity." Another class, represented by Mr. Creaghead, who afterward left our church mainly on account of the imperfect adoption of the Confession of Faith,‡ desired unqualified adherence to the Confession, and to all that it contained. The third class, including the great body of the Synod, insisted on the adoption of "the system of doctrine" contained in the Confession, admitting that there were propositions in the book, not essential to the system or even connected with it, which they did not receive. With this class the whole body of ministers subsequently concurred, and established this as the permanent condition of ministerial communion. Mr. Thompson, the leader of the Synod, and author of the overture for the adoption of the Confession, says, that the object of the measure was to protect our infant church from the inroads of error; "of Arminianism, Socinianism, Deism, and Free-thinking," especially, he says, from Ireland, whence the larger supply of ministers was expected. Although the Synod unanimously declared that they adopted everything in the Confession, except certain clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters, yet as there was this exception, they were forced to limit

* Those ministers were Malachi Jones, Joseph Morgan, Jonathan Dickinson, and David Evans. Of these, Messrs. Jones and Evans were Welsh, and Mr. Morgan probably either Welsh or English.

† See Constitutional History, page 170.

‡ Ibid. Page 197.

the adoption to "the necessary and essential articles," or, as it is elsewhere expressed to "the system of doctrine." As, however, the words of the preamble to the adopting act, declaring that the Synod received the Confession "in all the essential and necessary articles," were interpreted by some to mean the essential doctrines of the gospel, these words became a bone of contention, and called for frequent explanations. Mr. Creaghead made them the ground of his secession, saying that the Synod had never adopted the Confession in all its articles or chapters. To him Mr. Samuel Blair replied, that the Synod did expressly adopt the Confession in all its articles or chapters, excepting only to certain clauses. On the other hand, the Rev. Samuel Harker, having been suspended from the ministry for certain Arminian doctrines, complained that his suspension was a violation of the adopting act, which required only agreement in the essential doctrines of Christianity. In his published reply to this complaint, Mr. John Blair says, that Mr. Harker takes the words cited "in a sense in which it is plain the Synod never intended they should be taken." "The Synod," he adds, "say essential in doctrine, worship, or government, i. e. essential to the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith, considered as a system, and to the mode of worship, and to the plan of government contained in our Directory. Now what unprejudiced man of sense is there, who will not readily acknowledge that a point may be essential to a system of doctrine as such, to our mode of worship, and to Presbyterian government, which is not essential to a state of grace?" "That, therefore, is an essential error in the Synod's sense, which is of such malignity as to subvert or greatly injure the system of doctrine, and mode of worship and government, contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith and Directory."* Such is the explanation of the adoption of the Confession of Faith, given by the original framers of the act, and by their contemporaries. They did not merely receive it for "substance of doctrine," nor did they

* See, "The Synod of New York and Philadelphia vindicated. In reply to Mr. Samuel Harker's Appeal to the Christian World. By a member of the Synod."

adopt all the propositions which it contains, but they received "the system of doctrine" therein taught in its integrity.

Fourthly, The mind of the church on this subject is clearly evinced by the uniform action of our church courts, from the highest to the lowest. So far as we have been able to learn from the records, no man has ever been refused admission to the ministry in our church, who honestly received "the system of doctrine" contained in the Westminster confession, simply because there are propositions in the book to which he could not assent. And no Presbyterian minister has ever been suspended or deposed on any such ground. It is a perfectly notorious fact, that there are hundreds of ministers in our church, and that there always have been such ministers, who do not receive all the propositions contained in the Confession of Faith and Catechisms. To start now, at this late day, a new rule of subscription, which would either brand these men with infamy, or exclude them from the church, is simply absurd and intolérable.

This introduces our third objection. The principle that the adoption of the Confession of Faith implies the adoption of all the propositions therein contained, is not only contrary to the plain, historical meaning of the words which the candidate is required to use, and to the mind of the church in imposing a profession of faith, but the principle is impracticable. It cannot be carried out without working the certain and immediate ruin of the church. Our Confession is a large book; beside the system of doctrine common to all the Reformed churches, it contains deliverances on many other topics relating to the church, the state, and to our social relations. No doubt the original framers of the Westminster Confession, or the majority of them, thought these deliverances both important and scriptural. No doubt also the majority of our own church have concurred in so regarding them. But this is a very different thing from making the adoption of these judgments, all and several, a condition of ministerial communion. One man may dissent from one of them, and another from another, while some may adopt them all; and to many of them they may attach very great importance, without recognizing them as terms of communion. Thus our standards distinctly teach,

that the church is bound to admit all true Christians "to fellowship in sacred ordinances." Yet there have always been, and there still are, some among us who deny this. They press so far the idea of the church as a witnessing body, that they will not commune with any Christians whose creed they cannot adopt; neither will they receive to the communion of the Presbyterian church any who do not adopt its doctrinal standards. This rejecting from our communion those whom Christ receives into fellowship with himself, is revolting to the great body of our ministers and members. Yet who would think of making departure from our standards on this point, the ground either of reproach or of judicial process. Again, our book recognizes the right of a woman to divorce her husband, as well as that of a man to divorce his wife. Some of our most distinguished men, however, hold that the Scriptures give the right of divorce solely to the husband. Our book also teaches that wilful desertion is a legitimate ground of divorce, *a vinculo matrimonii*, but many of our brethren in the ministry do not believe this. Other Presbyterians again, knowing that our Lord says, "Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery," cannot bring themselves to believe that there can be any such divorce as renders a second marriage lawful. Our standards deny the lawfulness of the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife, yet it is notorious that a large portion, probably a large majority, of our ministers openly reject that doctrine. Now what is to be thought of a rule, which, if applied, would cast out of the ministry all these classes—a rule which would have strangled the church in its infancy, and which would kill it now in a week—a rule which would have deposed from the ministry the venerable Dr. Ashbel Green, and scores of men among our fathers of like standing? If the rule that no man should be allowed to exercise the ministry in our church, who did not adopt every proposition contained in the Confession of Faith, should be carried out, we verily believe we should be left almost alone. We are not sure that we personally know a dozen ministers besides ourselves, who could stand the test. We should have to mourn the exodus of our valued friends, the editors of the *Presbyterian*, and should doubtless be called to

bid a tearful adieu to the venerable "G.," of Richmond, Virginia. As we have no desire to sit thus solitary on the ruins of our noble church, we enter a solemn protest against a principle which would work such desolation.

4. There is another view of this subject. We all admit that the preservation of the truth is one of the most important duties of the church, and that she is bound to guard against the admission of unsound men into the ministry. We all admit that the Holy Ghost calls men to preach the gospel, and that soundness in the faith is one of the marks by which that call is authenticated to the church. We admit further, that the church has no right to call men to the sacred office; that the authority to preach does not come from her; that the prerogative of the church is simply to judge of the evidence of a divine call. Her office is purely ministerial, and should be exercised cautiously and humbly. She has no more right unduly to lower, or to raise unduly the evidence which she demands of a vocation to the ministry, than she has to alter the evidence of a call to grace and salvation. If she does not, and dares not, require perfect holiness of heart and life, as proof of a call to fellowship with the Son of God, neither can she demand perfect knowledge, or perfect freedom from error, as evidence of a call to the ministry. Now, who is prepared, standing in the presence of Christ, and acting in his name, to say, that so far as the Presbyterian church can prevent it, no man shall be ordained to the ministry, no man shall be a pastor, no man shall be a missionary, no man shall preach the gospel anywhere, to the poor and the perishing, who does not believe that wilful desertion is a legitimate ground of divorce? Who is ready to shut up every church, silence every pulpit, abandon every missionary station, where that principle is not maintained? There doubtless have been, and there still may be, men who would do all this, and in the mingled spirit of the Pharisee and Dominican, rejoice in the desolation they had wrought, and shout, "The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord are we." God forbid that such a spirit should ever gain the ascendancy in our church. Let us keep our hands off of God's ark, and not assume to be more zealous for his truth, or more solicitous for the purity of his church, than he is him-

self. We may well bear with infirmities and errors which he pities and pardons in his servants.

There is another great evil connected with these inordinate demands. Whenever a man is induced either to do what he does not approve, or to profess what he does not believe, his conscience is defiled. Those who lead their brethren thus to act, the Apostle says, cause them to offend, and destroy those for whom Christ died. To adopt every proposition contained in the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, is more than the vast majority of our ministers either do, or can do. To make them profess to do it, is a great sin. It hurts their conscience. It fosters a spirit of evasion and subterfuge. It teaches them to take creeds in a "non-natural sense." It at once vitiates and degrades. There are few greater evils connected with establishments, than the overwhelming temptations which they offer to make men profess what they do not believe. Under such strict requirements, men make light of professions, and are ready to adopt any creed which opens the door to wealth or office. The over strict, the world over, are the least faithful.

The third interpretation of the formula prescribed for the adoption of the Confession of Faith, is the true *via media*. It is equally removed from "the substance of doctrine"-theory, which has no definite meaning, leaving it entirely undetermined what the candidate professes; and from the impracticable theory which supposes the candidate to profess to receive every proposition contained in the Confession. What every minister of our church is bound to do, is to declare that he "receives and adopts the Confession of Faith of this church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." The words "system of doctrine" have a fixed, historical meaning. The objection that it is an open question, what doctrines belong to the system and what do not, and therefore if the obligation be limited to the adoption of the system, it cannot be known what doctrines are received and what are rejected, is entirely unfounded. If the question, "What is the system of doctrine taught by the Reformed churches?" be submitted to a hundred Romanists, to a hundred Lutherans, to a hundred members of the Church of England, or to a hundred sceptics, if

intelligent and candid, they would all give precisely the same answer. There is not the slightest doubt or dispute among disinterested scholars, as to what doctrines do, and what do not belong to the faith of the Reformed. The Westminster Confession contains three distinct classes of doctrines. First, those common to all Christians, which are summed up in the ancient creeds, the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian, which are adopted by all churches. Secondly, those which are common to all Protestants, and by which they are distinguished from Romanists. Thirdly, those which are peculiar to the Reformed churches, by which they are distinguished, on the one hand, from the Lutherans, and on the other, from the Remonstrants or Arminians, and other sects of later historical origin. From the Lutherans the Reformed were distinguished principally by their doctrine on the sacraments, and from the Arminians, by the five characteristic points of Augustinianism, rejected by the Remonstrants, and affirmed at the Synod of Dort by all the Reformed churches, viz. those of Switzerland, Germany, France, England, and Scotland, as well as of Holland. What those points are everybody knows. First: The doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, i. e. that the sin of Adam is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, so that their being born in sin is the penal consequence of his transgression. Second: The doctrine of the sinful, innate, depravity of nature, whereby we are indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good. Therefore there can be no self-conversion, no coöperation with the grace of God in regeneration, as the Arminians taught; and no election not to resist as the Lutherans affirmed. With this doctrine of absolute inability consequently is connected that of efficacious, as opposed to merely preventing and assisting grace. Thirdly: The doctrine that as Christ came in the execution of the covenant of redemption, in which his people were promised to him as his reward, his work had a special reference to them, and rendered their salvation certain. Fourth: The doctrine of gratuitous, personal election to eternal life; and, Fifth: The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. It is a matter of history that these doctrines constitute the distinguishing doctrines of the Reformed churches. And, therefore, any man

who receives these several classes of doctrine, (viz. those common to all Christians, those common to all Protestants, and those peculiar to the Reformed churches,) holds in its integrity the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession. This is all that he professes to do, when he adopts that Confession in the form prescribed in our Constitution. A man is no more at liberty to construct a system of theology for himself, and call it the system contained in the Confession of Faith, than he is authorized to spin a system of philosophy out of his head, and call it Platonism. The first argument, therefore, in favour of this interpretation of our ordination service, is that it is in accordance with the literal, established meaning of the words, and attaches to them a definite meaning, so that every one knows precisely what the candidate professes.

2. A second argument is, that such was and is the intention of the church in requiring the adoption of the Confession. This has already been proved from the meaning of the language employed, from the official explanations given of that language, from the declarations of the framers of our Constitution, and from the uniform practice of the church. No case can be produced from our annals of any man being censured or rejected, who received the system of doctrines contained in the Confession of Faith, in the sense above stated. The church, in point of fact, never has required more, and no man has now the right to exalt or extend her requirements. What is here said does not imply that the deliverances contained in the Confession relating to civil magistrates, the power of the state, conditions of church membership, marriage, divorce, and other matters lying outside of "the system of doctrine" in its theological sense, are unimportant or without authority. They are the judgments of the church solemnly expressed on very important subjects; but they are judgments which she most wisely has not seen fit to make conditions of ministerial communion. As she does not require the adoption of her whole system of doctrine as the condition of church fellowship; so she does not require the adoption of these collateral and subordinate judgments as the condition of ministerial communion. And as her receiving gladly to her bosom thousands who are not able intel-

ligerly to adopt her whole system of faith, does not imply that she does not value that system, or that she does not strive to bring all her members, even the weakest, to adopt it in its integrity; so her not making her judgments of points lying outside of that system a condition of ministerial communion, does not imply that she undervalues those judgments, or that she would not rejoice to see them universally embraced. There are many things both true and good which cannot be made the condition of either Christian or ministerial fellowship.

3. A third argument in favour of this view of the meaning of the formula used in the ordination service, is, that it is the only one consistent with a good conscience, and with the peace and union of the church. To make every minister affirm that he adopts as a part of his faith every proposition contained in the Confession of Faith, would make the vast majority of them profess an untruth, and what those demanding the profession know to be untrue. This is a dreadful evil. And it is a very great evil for any portion of our brethren to represent the great majority of their fellow ministers as guilty of a false profession. This is done by every man who asserts, that to adopt the system of doctrine contained in the Confession means to adopt every proposition in the book. He thereby asserts that every minister who does not believe that desertion is a scriptural ground of divorce, or that every true Christian should be received to sealing ordinances, or that a man may not marry his deceased wife's sister, is guilty of a breach of his ordination vows.

Does not the doctrine concerning subscription here advocated answer all desirable or practicable purposes? We can agree, and to a wonderful extent, to an extent greater than in any other age, in so large a communion, we do agree as to "the system of doctrine." Our ministers hold the faith of the Reformed churches in its integrity. This they are bound to do, and this they do with exceptions so few that it would be difficult to point them out. If we are not satisfied with this, we shall soon split into insignificant sects, each contending for some minor point, and all allowing "the system of doctrine" to go to destruction. If there is any dependence to be placed on the teachings of history, the men who begin with making the

tithing of anise and cummin of equal importance with justice and mercy, are sure in the end to cling to the anise, and let the mercy go.

As so many of our brethren have taken exception to the remarks in our last number, we deem this extended exposition of our views on the matter of subscription, due to them no less than to ourselves. We are confident there is no real disagreement between us on this subject. It is a misunderstanding, as we hope and believe, due to the absence of all explanation or limitation of a passing remark, which, although true in itself, and true in the sense intended, was capable of an application wide of the truth.

ART. VI.—*The Revised Book of Discipline.*

THE General Assembly of 1857 appointed Drs. Thornwell, James Hoge, R. J. Breckinridge, E. P. Swift, A. T. McGill, and Charles Hodge, with Judges Sharswood, Allen, and Leavitt, a Committee to revise the Book of Discipline. That Committee met at the call of the chairman in Philadelphia, on the first Thursday of August last. All the members were present, except Messrs. Leavitt and Allen, who, to the great regret of their associates, were unable to attend. The Committee in a good degree represented the different phases of thought and theory which prevail in our church. Their cordial agreement in any doubtful point may, therefore, afford ground to anticipate a like agreement in the church. The plan of conducting the revision, proposed by the chairman and adopted by the Committee, was to read over the present Book, chapter by chapter, and section by section, and discuss each point until an agreement was arrived at. In the great majority of cases the decisions were unanimous. In some the form adopted was a compromise; and in a few the majority had to decide. This was necessarily a slow process. It took a good while for the Committee to understand each other; still more to produce

mutual conviction. Fundamental principles, underlying these questions of detail, were constantly brought into view, and it was in reference to those principles the greatest diversity of opinion and difficulty of adjustment were experienced. We may be allowed to say, that we never passed a pleasanter week under similar circumstances. Courtesy, mutual deference, kind feeling, sincere desire to meet each other's views, and to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to all parties, marked the discussion from beginning to end. We believe the Committee separated with increased respect, confidence, and fraternal affection, so that the meeting was at least edifying to themselves, even should their labours prove unprofitable to the church. The severest part of the work fell to the lot of the chairman, the Rev. Dr. Thornwell. He had not only to preside, but to take the initiative, to keep the records, and to reduce to writing the amendments agreed upon. This was a laborious task, and we are sure that every member of the Committee feels under no small obligation to him, for the courtesy, skill, and diligence, with which he discharged the irksome duties of his position. The Committee have a common responsibility for the report adopted. All agreed to it. There was no formal dissent, or minority report as to any point. This, however, does not render it improper for any member to have his preferences. A man may vote against the adoption of his own recommendations, if he has new or clearer light. We propose in the following pages to indicate, at least, the more important changes proposed, and, as far as we understand them, the reasons for them. In so doing, however, we speak only for ourselves; we do not pretend to speak for the Committee.

The Committee proceeded on the assumption that the Assembly intended that they should revise the old Book and not make a new one. They therefore made as few alterations as possible, and endeavoured to retain, as far as consistent with higher objects, the language with which our church courts have become familiar. The objects aimed at were, first, condensation. The old Book contains a good many sections which are merely hortatory, and in many instances rules are repeated, or principles amplified, where the whole that is important appeared to admit of being stated in better order, and in fewer words.

Secondly, perspicuity of arrangement, and precision of statement. Thirdly, where experience had shown that the modes prescribed in the present book, are cumbrous or unintelligible, simpler and plainer rules have been suggested. Fourthly, in a few cases where the principles hitherto recognized seemed at variance with justice or expediency, not only new modes of proceeding, but new principles have been introduced. These changes are not novelties, so far as the suggestion of them is concerned. The appointment of the Committee is a proof that serious objections were felt to the present Book, and numerous suggestions as to the alterations which are desirable, have for years, under one form or another, been presented to the church. We presume, therefore, that little surprise will be felt at the changes proposed by the Committee.

CHAPTER I.

This chapter has been reduced from seven sections to three, and from forty-three lines, to twenty-three. The design of the chapter is to state, first, The nature of discipline; secondly, Its grounds; and thirdly, Its subjects. The word *discipline* is used in different senses. It sometimes has the general sense of training, whether of the mind, heart, or life. In this sense, it includes all instructions, exhortations, admonitions, and directions. Sometimes it means a mode of government, as when we speak of the Methodist discipline. Sometimes the word is taken in the restricted sense of punishment; and a Book of Discipline, when distinguished, as it is with us, from "the Form of Government," is a book which gives direction for the administration of discipline in the restricted sense of the term. It concerns, not teaching, but the administration of justice, and exercise of authority. It is therefore defined to be, "the exercise of that authority, and the application of that system of laws which the Lord Jesus Christ hath appointed in his church. Its ends are the rebuke of offences, the removal of scandal, the vindication of the honour of Christ, the promotion of the purity and general edification of the church, and the spiritual good of offenders themselves." It appears from this, that discipline, as here used, includes the ideas of oversight and punishment.

The second point which this chapter is designed to settle, is

the grounds of discipline, or the occasions which call for its exercise. What are those things which the church is authorized and bound to visit with ecclesiastical censures? In other words, what is an offence, in the ecclesiastical sense of that word? The answer given to this question in the second section of this chapter is, 1. That an offence is something "in the faith or practice of a professed believer contrary to the word of God." An offence, therefore, is something contrary to the word of God. This is a very important provision; no man and no church has the right to alter the terms of Christian communion; or to prescribe any new conditions on which we may maintain our church and standing unquestioned. We may think many things—drinking wine, for example—to be wrong, because inexpedient, but unless drinking wine is forbidden in the word of God, it cannot be made an ecclesiastical offence, or ground of discipline. We may reason with a man, or exhort him, or admonish him, who, as we think, is acting in a way which injures the cause of Christ; but unless the thing done be forbidden in the word of God, we have no right to arraign him before a church court, or to interfere with his full enjoyment of church privileges. The reason of this is plain. His acting in a way which we regard as inexpedient, may be compatible with his being a true Christian. His views of expediency may differ from ours. His views may be right, and ours wrong. He has as good a right to his opinion as we have to ours. Expediency can never be made the ground of determining the terms of church communion; because expediency depends on circumstances, and is a matter on which men may honestly differ. Uniformity and security depend on our adhering to the rule, that nothing shall be regarded as an offence but what the word of God forbids. If we abandon this principle, we shall be at the mercy of every new theory and every form of fanaticism which for the time gains ascendancy. Matters of dress, modes of living, meats and drinks, fasts and festivals, and a thousand other things about which God has left us free, will be made terms of communion, or grounds of church discipline.

2. Among us, as Presbyterians, nothing can be regarded as an offence which is not contrary to the Westminster Confession

of Faith or Catechisms. No man has a right to interpret the Scriptures as a rule of discipline for others than himself. He may think that the Scriptures condemn certain forms of opinion, or certain modes of conduct, but he has no right to make his private judgment the rule of faith and practice to others. We have agreed among ourselves to take the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms as a faithful exposition of the system of doctrines and rule of duty taught in the Bible, and by that recognized exposition, and not by our own private judgment, we are bound to act in the administration of discipline. One man may think that the Bible forbids slave-holding, or the use of intoxicating liquors. Another, with equal honesty, may regard these opinions as not only contrary to Scripture, but subversive of their authority, by putting another rule in their place. The abolitionist, or the ultra-temperance man, cannot make his opinions the rule of discipline; nor can his opponent. We have agreed to abide by our own standards in the administration of discipline. Outside of that rule, so far as our church standing is concerned, we may think and act as we please. Every man, therefore, in joining the Presbyterian church, knows beforehand what he has to expect, and by what standard of faith and practice he is to be judged.

3. But although nothing is an offence which is not contrary to the Scriptures, it does not follow that everything contrary to the Scriptures is an offence. The words *offence* and *discipline* are relative terms. An offence is anything which is a proper ground of discipline. If, therefore, you take the word discipline in its wide sense, every sin is an offence; but in the restricted meaning of the word discipline, nothing is an offence, which is not incompatible with the terms of Christian or ministerial communion as laid down in our standards. An offence bears to ecclesiastical law, the same relation that a crime does to the civil law. It is something for which a man may be legally prosecuted, and if convicted, punished. Hence in our Book, both in its present, and in its revised form, it is said nothing is to be regarded as an offence "which does not involve those evils which discipline is intended to prevent." A church member may be admonished, or rebuked on account of his want of proper zeal, or for lukewarmness, or for his covetous-

ness, pride, despondency, and the like, but he cannot, on these grounds, be arraigned before a church court, unless they are of such a character as to prove that he is not a Christian. These, in their ordinary form, are not the evils which discipline, in the restricted sense of the word, is designed to prevent. The end of discipline is to secure conformity on the part of members and ministers to the terms of Christian and ministerial communion. And as our church does not pretend to demand perfection of Christian character and conduct as a condition of church-fellowship, nor perfect knowledge or entire freedom from error, as a condition for ministerial fellowship, so every shortcoming from the standard of perfection in either case, is not to be regarded as an offence. Nothing is an offence, but what, if persisted in, would justify either suspension from the privileges of the church, or from the office of the ministry. The importance of this distinction between a sin and an offence; will be at once perceived. No minister or church member would ever be safe from prosecution, and no judicatory could ever know whether they were called upon to prosecute or not, if every sin were an offence, or a just ground of judicial process. Minor evils are to be corrected by admonition, instruction, and the ministry of the word. It is only those evils in the faith or practice of a church member which bring disgrace or scandal on the church, as tolerating what the Bible declares to be incompatible with the Christian character, which can be a ground of process. Such is not only the theory but the practice of the church. We never hear of any professing Christian being arraigned and put on trial, unless for some immorality, or some such denial of the truth, or such neglect of his duty as a professor of the religion of the Lord Jesus, as affords good ground for calling the sanctity of that profession into question.

Thirdly. Such being the nature and grounds of discipline, who are its subjects? To this question the natural answer is, church members. But who are church members? Some say only communicants. This answer is founded on the assumption that the church is, as it is defined by Independents, a body of believers united by covenant for the purpose of worship and mutual watch and care. Those only, therefore, who have entered into this covenant are members of the church,

and consequently the proper subjects of discipline. Others say that the visible church consists of all those who profess the true religion together with their children. Therefore, all baptized children, as well as those who make a personal profession of religion, are the subjects of discipline.

Others again say, that although baptized children, so long as they are, in the church sense of the term, minors, are members of the church, and therefore under its watch and care, yet when they become adults, unless they personally profess faith in Christ, they forfeit their church standing, and are not the subjects of discipline in the strict sense of that word.

According to this last mentioned theory, the visible church consists of those only on whose conversion the church has pronounced in charity a favourable judgment, in receiving them to the Lord's table, together with their infant children. According to the other view, we are bound to regard and treat as members of the church all baptized persons, who have not renounced their baptismal vows, are free from scandal, and acknowledge themselves to be amenable to the authority of the church.

In our present Book, the question, Who are the subjects of discipline, is answered in these words: "All baptized persons are members of the church, are under its care, and subject to its government and discipline; and when they have arrived at the years of discretion, they are bound to perform all the duties of church members." This is founded on the last of the views of the nature of the visible church mentioned above. In the revised Book the answer proposed is: "All baptized persons, being members of the church, are under its government and training, and when they have arrived at years of discretion, they are bound to perform all the duties of members. Only those, however, who have made a profession of faith in Christ, are proper subjects of judicial prosecution." This answer does not seem to differ in principle from the old one. It admits that all baptized persons are members of the church, and, therefore, subject to its government and training. But it makes a distinction between baptized and professing members; declaring the latter alone to be the subject of judicial process. This section bears on its face evidence of being a compromise,

and, as is apt to be the case with compromises, it does not hang well together. We voted for it, however, and share the responsibility of recommending its adoption, although we prefer the old form. The fact that we never knew of any baptized person, not a communicant, being made the subject of judicial process, reconciled us to the adoption of the rule as it is reported. So long as it is admitted that all baptized persons are under the government of the church, the principle involved in the case is saved.

CHAPTER II.

The object of this chapter is to classify offences. In the present Book they are distinguished as private and public; here the discrimination is carried further. They are distinguished, 1. As personal, when committed against one or more individuals; such as acts of defamation, or defrauding. 2. As general, when they have no such relation to individuals, as drunkenness. 3. As private, when known only to a few persons. 4. Public, when they are notorious. These distinctions are important, as they become the grounds of different modes of proceeding.

CHAPTER III.

In the present Book, chapter ii. and iii. are devoted, the one to private, the other to public offences. In the revised Book, the different classes of offences having been briefly stated in the second chapter, the third is devoted to determining the parties in cases of process, and specifying their responsibilities and duties.

1. In the case of a personal offence, the injured party is bound to take the steps prescribed in Matt. xviii. 15, 16, before bringing the matter into court. In the case of private offences the same course is to be pursued.

2. General offences may be brought before a church court, either by an accuser, or by common fame. An effort was made to have this latter provision stricken out. It was urged that in no other church, and never in any state court, is a man arraigned unless charged with a specific offence, by some responsible accuser. He must be presented by some person or

persons who will undertake to establish the charge. The Committee, however, thought that such is the indisposition on the part of even good men to assume the invidious office of accuser, that many offences, bringing scandal on the church, would be allowed to pass without censure, if our courts were required to wait until a prosecutor should voluntarily present himself.

3. Charges are not to be taken up on the ground of common fame, if there is hope, in any other way, of removing scandal and of bringing the party concerned to repentance.

4. Defines what common fame is. It is not any and every vague rumour. It must be specific, serious, notorious, and generally believed.

5. A person against whom an evil report is circulating, may demand a judicial investigation, should the church-court not see fit of its own motion to institute process.

6. In cases of prosecution on the ground of common fame, the judicatory *may* appoint some one to represent common fame, and to conduct the prosecution. Such prosecutor must be a member of the church, and subject to the same court with the accused. The appointment of a prosecutor is thus left optional with the court. It seems to us that it should be obligatory wherever it can be done; because in case of appeal, some one must appear before the higher court to sustain the charge.

7. The only parties to a trial are the accuser and the accused, and in appellate courts, they appear as appellant and appellee. This is a very important section. It simplifies greatly the whole process of trial. The lower court does not appear before the higher, in cases of appeal, as an accused party called upon to defend its decision. If a man is charged before the session with any offence, the session decides in favour of the accuser or the accused. If either party be dissatisfied, he appeals to the Presbytery, and they, i. e. the accuser and the accused, plead their cause there, and the Presbytery decides. If still not satisfied, they plead it before the Synod, and then before the Assembly. The parties are the same from first to last. We are done, it is to be hoped, for ever with the puzzle about "original parties." This matter, however, will be brought up in a subsequent chapter.

8. The eighth section directs that great caution should be exercised in entertaining charges presented by malignant, disreputable, or interested parties.

CHAPTER IV.

This chapter relates to actual process. The corresponding chapter of the present Book contains twenty-three sections, which are here reduced to fifteen. This chapter directs, 1. What is to be done at the first meeting of the judicatory, which has determined to institute process against an accused person. The trial may proceed at once by consent of parties. If either party is not prepared, copies of the charges shall be given to the accused, together with the list of the witnesses *then known*, (not, as before, all the witnesses,) and citations are to be issued to all concerned, to appear at the next meeting of the judicatory to have the case heard and decided. Ten days are to intervene between the date of the citation and the day of trial. At the second meeting the accused is to plead in writing to the charges; and if he fail to do so, at the third meeting they shall be taken as confessed, provided he has been duly cited. This seems to be a new provision. It does not contemplate a case of contumacy, or refusing to answer a citation, for which a different provision is made in a subsequent section. We are not sure that we understand this clause, but presume the intention was to provide for the case in which an accused party should refuse or fail, when arraigned, to answer the charges against him. If he fail to plead not guilty, it is to be assumed that he acknowledges himself guilty. In which case there is no need of a trial. In the case of contumacy, the trial is to proceed.

2. Citations to be issued by the moderator or clerk in the name of the court.

3. Charges to be specific as to time and place, so as to give the accused the opportunity to prove an *alibi*.

4. If the accused refuse to appear after a second citation and due warning, he is to be suspended from the communion of the church, and the case proceeded with as though he were present. The court may appoint some one to represent the accused, which representative, if a member of the court, shall

not sit in judgment on the case. The representative of the accused party need not be a member of the court.

5. The time between the second citation and the trial is left to the discretion of the court; but should be sufficient to allow of the citation being served and answered.

6. Judicatories to be careful that their citations are duly served.

7. Trials to be fair; the witnesses to be examined in the presence of the accused, and he to have the privilege of cross-examination. This, of course, supposes that he has answered the citation, and put himself on trial.

8. If found guilty the accused may be admonished, rebuked, or suspended from church privileges.

9. The judgment to be recorded; parties to be allowed, at their own expense, copies of the whole proceedings; if the case be carried up to a higher court, an authenticated copy of all the proceedings is to be sent up with it.

10. The publication of the judgment left to the discretion of the judicatory.

11. In extreme cases excommunication may be resorted to.

12. A church session may debar an accused person access to the Lord's table, until his case is decided. If an accused person evades citation, he may be suspended from church privileges.

13. No professional counsel shall appear and plead before a church court. But an accused person may be represented by any communicating member of the church, who is subject to the court before which he appears. A man cannot, however, be a judge in a case in which he is an advocate.

14. Questions of order arising during a trial, are to be decided by the moderator; if an appeal be taken from his decision, the appeal is to be decided without debate. His decisions are to be recorded, if either party demand it.

15. The record in judicial cases shall contain the charges, the specifications, the sentence of the court, the testimony, and all the circumstances which influenced the judgment. And nothing not contained in the record shall be taken into consideration, in reviewing the proceedings in a higher court.

CHAPTER V.

This chapter relates to process against a minister. As the general principles which regulate the trial of a minister are the same with those prescribed for the conduct of the trial of a private member of the church, its contents are therefore substantially the same as those of chapter iv. Very little change is proposed in the revised Book. The first four sections are the same in both Books. They prescribe great caution in entertaining charges against a minister; require that he must be tried by the Presbytery to which he belongs; if the offence charged was committed without the bounds of that Presbytery, the testimony may be taken by the Presbytery within whose bounds the offence is said to have been committed. If the offence is known only to a distant Presbytery, that body is to send notice to the Presbytery to which the offender belongs, who are then to proceed as above directed. Section 5 requires that process shall not be commenced against a minister (unless the scandal be notorious,) except charges are presented by one or more persons. To this is added in the new Book, "Nevertheless, each church court has the inherent power to demand and receive satisfactory explanations from its members concerning any matters of evil report."

6. Section sixth is unchanged. It directs that if any one knows a minister to be guilty of a private fault, he is to warn him in private; and if the fault be persisted in, he is to advise with some other member of the Presbytery.

7. In section seventh, instead of saying that the accuser shall be censured should he fail to establish the charges made against a minister, it is proposed to say, "if he fail to show probable cause of the charges."

8. At the first meeting, unless by consent of parties, nothing shall be done but read the charges, issue citations, &c., as directed in the case of a trial before a session.

9. This section corresponds with the tenth of the present book, the ninth being omitted. It is considerably modified in the revised form. The section as proposed, directs that when the trial is entered upon, the charges shall be read to the accused, and he be called to say whether he is guilty or not.

If he confess, the Presbytery shall deal with him according to their discretion; if he plead and take issue, the trial shall proceed. If found guilty, the Presbytery shall award what ecclesiastical censure they see fit.

10. If a minister, accused of atrocious crimes, refuse to obey a second citation, he shall be suspended; if he refuse to answer a third citation, he shall be deposed, and suspended or excommunicated from the church.

11. Relates to heresy and schism, and is the same as section thirteen of the present book.

12. Is the same as section fifteen of the present form, and directs that if the offence charged is not serious, the Presbytery shall endeavour to correct the evil.

13. If a minister be deposed for scandalous conduct, he is not to be restored until public sentiment demands his restoration.

14. When a minister is deposed, his congregation shall be declared vacant; if he is suspended, it is discretionary with the Presbytery so to declare it or not.

CHAPTER VI.

This is a new chapter, and provides for cases in which the necessity of a trial is precluded. Section 1. directs that if the offence be committed in open court, or if the accused party confess, the judicatory may pass judgment without process. This seems to be a dictate of common sense. The end of a trial is to ascertain the facts of the case; if these be confessed, or if they are patent to all concerned, there can be no use in a trial. We presume our courts have felt at liberty to act on this principle, when occasion calls for it. We have known it to be done in several instances. It is well, however, to have it distinctly recognized in our book of discipline. 2. Should an appeal be taken from such summary judgment, some communicating member of the church shall be appointed, subject to the jurisdiction of the same court with the appellant, to defend the sentence, and shall be the appellee in the case. 3. If a communicating member of the church shall declare that he is persuaded, he has no right to come to the

Lord's table, and desire to withdraw from the communion of the church, his name shall be struck from the roll, provided he has committed no offence. This provision we trust will find general favour. No man should be coerced to violate his conscience; nor should he be visited with ecclesiastical censure simply for believing that he is not prepared to come to the Lord's table. The church is so far a voluntary society, that no one can be either made to join it, or required to remain in it, against his will. The principle involved in this rule is constantly acted on. Hundreds of cases are occurring from year to year, of members silently withdrawing from the communion of the church. They move away, are soon lost sight of, and their names are dropped from the rolls.

CHAPTER VII.

Relates to witnesses. The first three sections concern their competency and credibility. According to the revised Book, nothing is to be considered a sufficient ground for the exclusion of a witness as incompetent, except the denial of the existence of God, or of a future state of reward and punishment. In the present Book, several other grounds are admitted, such as near relationship to one or other of the parties, want of any of the senses essential to the knowledge of the fact to which he is called to testify, weakness of understanding, infamy of character, being under church censure for falsehood, and "various other considerations which cannot be specified in detail." All these specifications, and others of a like kind, are transferred, in the new form, to the head of credibility. They serve properly to affect more or less the weight due to a man's testimony; but do not render him incompetent to testify. For the same reason, the parties themselves are to be admitted as witnesses. This is a principle recently introduced into the jurisprudence of England, and of several of the States in this country. It seems to be eminently wise. No one can be so competent to testify to the facts in a contested matter, as those who were parties to the transaction. That they are personally interested may affect their credibility, but affords no sufficient reason why they should not be allowed to tell their own story.

4. A husband or wife shall not be compelled to bear testimony against each o'her, in any judicatory. This rule is not founded on the assumption that the husband is not a competent witness against the wife, or the wife against the husband, but upon a regard to the sacredness of the conjugal relation. It is better that a guilty party should escape conviction, than that the harmony of the marriage relation should be endangered. Some think the rule should be carried further, so as not to allow a husband or wife to testify the one against the other. To this, however, it may be objected, that in some cases an injured wife would have no protection, if not allowed to testify to the violence or ill-conduct of her husband.

5. The testimony of more than one witness is necessary to establish any charge, unless similar acts can be proved against the accused, or unless confirmatory circumstances are established. 6. No witness to be present while others are examined, unless he has already given his testimony. 7. This section relates to the order in which the examination is to be conducted, and is unchanged. 8. Prescribes the form of the oath to be administered to witnesses. The following provision is added: "If, however, at any time, a witness shall present himself before a judicatory, who, for conscientious reasons, prefers to swear or affirm in any other manner, he shall be allowed to do so." 9. Questions to witnesses to be recorded if either party demand it. 10 and 11. Testimony taken in one judicatory, when duly authenticated, to be valid in any other judicatory. 12. Testimony, when necessary, may be taken by commission. 13. Parties shall be heard after the testimony is taken, 14. A member of the judicatory may be a witness, and judge in the same case. 15. A member of the church refusing to bear testimony, when duly cited, is liable to censure for contumacy. 16. The testimony to be signed by the witnesses. 17. If new testimony, deemed important, be offered in an appellate court, the case shall be remitted to the lower judicatory for a new trial, or, with consent of parties, the appellate court may take the testimony, and decide the case. This provision is in lieu of the whole of the ninth chapter, including seven sections of the present Book.

CHAPTER VIII.

This is a long chapter, divided into four parts, besides the introduction. It relates to the different methods in which a cause may be carried from a lower to a higher judicatory. The word *cause* in this connection is not to be understood in the limited sense of a case of process, but includes all acts and decisions, or matters proposed for the action or decision of a church judicatory. Our judicatories are not merely courts for the administration of justice. They unite in themselves, as does the Senate of the United States, legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The word legislative is used in two senses. It may mean the power to make "laws to bind the conscience." In this sense our standards deny to the church all legislative authority. This is a Protestant principle, and stands opposed to the Romish assumption of the right to make things to be sins or duties, which the word of God does not forbid or enjoin. Legislative power, in a wider sense, is the power to enact laws or rules for the conduct of affairs. This is expressed in the Westminster Confession, by saying the church has power "to set down rules and directions for the better ordering of the public worship of God, and for the government of his church." Chap. xxxi. § 2. Our whole Book of Discipline is a system of such rules. This form of legislative authority does belong to church judicatories; a power which, under our constitution, is exercised under certain prescribed forms and limitations. This distinction between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of our church courts is important, because it determines not only our nomenclature to a certain extent, but the modes of redress and revision. A judicial act, according to our system, is not a mere act of a judicatory, for in that case every act of a church court would be judicial. It is an act of a judicatory when sitting as a court of justice. To ordain a licentiate, to divide a congregation, to dismiss a pastor from his charge, are executive, not judicial acts. These remarks are made, because in the subsequent parts of our Book of Discipline the expression "judicial cases" frequently occurs; and it has often been misinterpreted. A judicial case, in the sense of our Book, is a case of process or trial for some offence.

The introduction to this chapter consists at present of two paragraphs which remain unchanged in the revision. The first states the importance of the principle of review and control; and the second says that any and every kind of decision (i. e. whether legislative, executive, or judicial) may be carried up for the review of a higher judicatory, in one or the other of the four following ways, viz. general review and control, reference, appeal, or complaint. To these paragraphs or subsections, it is proposed to add a third, in these words, viz. "When a matter is transferred in any of these ways, from an inferior to a superior judicatory, the inferior judicatory shall, in no case, be considered a party; nor shall its members lose their right to sit, deliberate, and vote, in the higher courts." This is, perhaps, the most radical change proposed in the new Book. The rule, as it now stands, makes every inferior court a party as the cause goes up. The objections to this mode of proceeding are so serious, and consequently the reasons in favour of the proposed change are so strong, that we trust the amended rule will meet with universal approbation. In the first place, it is a false and derogatory principle that a judge becomes a partisan by the exercise of his prerogative of judgment. This is assumed in our present Book. The lower court is arraigned, as for an offence, before a higher, and is put on its defence. It is turned out of the house, and judgment is passed upon it. This surely is derogatory. A session's deciding that a professing Christian has been guilty of falsehood, or a presbytery's deciding that a minister is a heretic, is no offence, even if the judgment be not borne out by the testimony. It may be an erroneous judgment, but it is not a crime; and, therefore, furnishes no good reason for making the lower court a party in the future conducting of the case. It is of great importance that it should be assumed that judges are upright, and to have the contrary assumption engrafted into our very laws is a great evil. In the second place, there is no reason for the present rule. A man's having tried a cause once is no disqualification for his trying it again. To say that he has prejudged the case, and is not fit to participate in the rehearing, is to say that he is prejudiced, or influenced by corrupt motives, or that he is so opinionated as not to be open to conviction.

These are all gratuitous, and generally false assumptions. Besides, the lower court may be nearly equally divided; why should the appellant, or complainant, be deprived of the votes of those who agree with him? The Book turns both parts of the lower court out of the house, and treats both as wrong doers. In the third place, this is contrary to the usage of all other courts. In no civil government are the judges of a lower court made parties in an appellate court. They are not arraigned before the higher court, and made to defend themselves for having given a certain judgment. On the contrary, when an appeal is taken, the original litigants carry up the cause, and it is reheard either by a new set of judges, or by the same judges associated with others. Often the appeal is from a single judge to a full bench. Thus the cause has the advantage not only of the learning and skill of other minds, but of being reconsidered by those already familiar with the case. In the fourth place, our present plan is cumbrous and almost impracticable. A session may decide that a certain man was intoxicated on a given occasion. The man appeals to the presbytery. The session and the accused appear at the bar of that court, and plead their cause. The presbytery decides in favour of the session. An appeal is taken to the synod. Then the presbytery, the session, and the accused, are parties before the synod. The synod may confirm the action of the presbytery, and the case be carried before the Assembly. There the parties are the synod, the presbytery, the session, and the accused. They all have a right to be heard; they are all on trial at one and the same time. When the original parties are called for, they are uniformly lost in the crowd. Nobody knows who they are. In the case supposed, who are the original parties? The accused may be one, but who is the other? Is it the session? or common fame? Such is the confusion, complication, and prolixity, attending the present mode of process under the most favourable circumstances. We have supposed a case in which all the inferior courts come to the same conclusion. It often happens otherwise. A session may find a man guilty. The presbytery may reverse that decision. The session appeals to synod. Here the session and the presbytery are the parties. The

accused has nothing to do with the case. The synod may reverse the judgment of the presbytery. Then the presbytery appeals, and the synod and presbytery become the parties before the Assembly. Thus we have court accusing and arraigning court, all the way up, and all about what? Often about the merest trifle—some petty neighbourhood quarrel, in which no general interest of either truth or holiness is involved. This upas tree will be cut up by the roots at one blow, if the church sees fit to adopt this little section of three lines and a half. There is another objection. If we refuse to let the lower court sit and vote in the appellate court, we often change essentially the character of the latter body. A synod may consist of three presbyteries; one may be larger than the other two combined. If an appeal be taken from the large presbytery, it is determined in the synod by a minority of the lawful members of that body. The action of the General Assembly may be, and doubtless often has been, determined by the presence or absence of a particular synod. If one synod is excluded the Assembly votes one way; if another is shut out, the vote is exactly opposite. This is surely unreasonable and unfair. We trust, therefore, that the important change proposed by the addition of this paragraph will be unanimously adopted.

CHAPTER VIII.—SECTION 1.

The first section of this chapter relates to General Review and Control. No change is proposed in any of its provisions. Sub-section 1. directs the annual review of the records of an inferior judicatory, by the one next above. 2. States the objects of that review, viz. to see whether the proceedings have been regular, whether they have been wise and equitable, and whether they have been correctly recorded. 3. The strictures of the superior judicatory may be recorded simply in its own minutes, or also in those of the inferior judicatory, and in cases of serious irregularities, the inferior judicatory may be required to revise and correct its proceedings. 4. No judicial decision can be reversed on mere review of records. 5, 6. If an inferior judicatory neglects its duty, or is guilty of unfaithfulness to the constitution, it may be cited before the higher court to give an account of its doings, and, if found to have acted im-

properly, the matter complained of shall be remitted by the higher to the lower court with directions.

CHAPTER VIII.—SECTION 2.

In this section no change is proposed, except the omission of the sixth paragraph, which becomes unnecessary if the proposed new paragraph is added to the introduction of the chapter. 1. Defines a reference to be a judicial representation by an inferior judicatory, of a matter not decided, to a superior. 2. States the cases in which references are proper. 3. These references may be either for advice, or for decision. 4. In the former case, the reference suspends the action of the lower judicatory; in the latter, its action is superseded. 5. It is in general desirable that each judicatory should exercise its own judgment, instead of referring cases to a higher court. 6. The higher court may either decide the cases referred, or remit them with or without advice. 7. References as a general rule are to be made to the next superior judicatory. 8. When a case is referred, all the documents requisite for its decision should be sent up with it.

SECTION 3.

It is in this section, relating to appeals, that the Revised Book differs most from the old one. To this the greatest labour was devoted by the Committee; and, if this should be ultimately adopted, it matters comparatively little what becomes of the rest of their recommendations. It is here, and in the following section, on complaints, that the principle that an inferior judicatory can never be made a party in an appellate court comes into play.

In our present Book an appeal is defined to be, "The removal of a case already decided from an inferior to a superior judicatory, by a party aggrieved." In the revised Book it is declared to be, "The removal of a case already decided, from an inferior to a superior judicatory, the peculiar effect of which is to arrest all proceedings under the decision, until the matter is finally decided in the last court." These definitions are essentially different. In the former an appeal is distinguished from a complaint, by its source. It must be made

“by a party aggrieved.” In the latter it is correctly distinguished by its effect. Its peculiar effect is “to arrest all proceedings under the decision.” The former is really no definition at all, because an aggrieved party, according to our present Book, can complain as well as appeal, or complain and appeal at the same time and for the same thing. And, therefore, so far as this definition goes, there is no difference between the two. Another objection to the present definition is that it confines the right of appeal to “an aggrieved party.” This is very well in judicial cases, but in non-judicial cases, others than “parties” in the ordinary sense of that word, have the right of appeal. After stating what an appeal is, the revised Book goes on to specify the cases in which this mode of redress is allowable; that is, in what cases it is allowable to arrest all proceedings under a given decision. Those cases are, “1st. In all judicial cases, by a party to the cause, against whom the decision is made. 2d. In all other cases, when the action or decision of a judicatory has inflicted an injury on any party or persons, he or they may appeal; and when said action or decision, though not inflicting any personal injury or wrong, may nevertheless inflict directly, or by its consequences, great general injury, any minority of the judicatory may appeal.” These are very important provisions. A cloud of obscurity rests on the present Book, both as to the cases in which an appeal is allowable, and as to the persons authorized to appeal. From the necessity of the case, from the uniform practice of the Scottish church, and of our own for the first hundred years of its existence in this country, appeals have been allowed in other than judicial cases; i. e., in other than cases of process. But as appeals are most common in cases of trial for an offence, much of the language of the book contemplates such cases, and would seem inapplicable to any others. Hence, of late years, the ground has been assumed, and in one instance received the sanction of the Assembly, contrary, as just stated, to all usage, as well as to the necessities of the church, that an appeal can only be taken where a party has been put on trial. This obscurity is now removed by an express distinction of two classes of cases in which appeals are allowed, the one judicial and the other non-judi-

cial. This distinction is of importance on another ground. These cases differ not only in their nature, but in the mode in which they are to be conducted. In an appeal from a judicial sentence, the whole form and order of a trial must be observed in the prosecution of the appeal. The testimony is to be read, the parties heard, the sentence judicially pronounced. In non-judicial cases, there is no testimony, no accuser and accused, no judicial sentence to be rendered. Hence the importance of distinguishing between cases which are essentially different, a thing which our present book does not do.

The specific nature of an appeal is, that it arrests the operation of the decision appealed from. This determines at once the class of cases in which it is to be allowed, and the persons who have the right to avail themselves of this power. There are certain evils which must be arrested, or they admit of no redress. If a man is sentenced to be hung, it would avail him little to have a superior court decide that he had been illegally condemned, unless the execution of the sentence can be stayed. So in church matters there are many decisions which, if carried into effect, cannot be redressed. It is this class of evils which appeals are designed to meet. There are other evils, in which all that is desirable is to have an erroneous decision pronounced wrong, or censured, so that it may not be drawn into a precedent, or be allowed to pass as of authority. For this class complaints are the appropriate remedy. This being the nature of an appeal, it is clear, that when a man is on trial for an offence, if pronounced guilty, he has the right to arrest the execution of the sentence, until the question of his guilt be decided in the court of last resort. Or if he be pronounced innocent, the accuser, if still satisfied of his guilt, has the right in behalf of the church, to prevent the sentence of acquittal taking full effect, until the matter is finally decided. The right of appeal is, therefore, properly given in judicial cases, to "the party in the cause, against whom the decision is given," and to him alone, whether the accused or the accuser. The party in whose favour the decision is given, has no occasion to appeal; and a member of the judicatory cannot appeal from the decision of a court of which he was a member. He may complain of it, if he regards it as unjust, or as unconstitutional; but he

has no right to arrest its operation. There are, however, other than judicial cases, in which the evil would be incapable of redress, unless the execution of the decision of the judicatory were arrested. If a pastor, for example, should be dismissed from his congregation against his own will, or the will of the people; if the decision of the presbytery could not be arrested by an appeal, the pastor might be dismissed, the congregation be declared vacant, another minister called and installed, no matter how great the injustice or hardship, before the case could be reviewed in a higher court. So also if the proposition be to divide a congregation. Should the division be effected, two churches constituted, pastors called and settled, neither complaint, nor review and control affords any redress. Here again the right of appeal is secured to the aggrieved party, and to it alone. They only are exposed to injury by the execution of the decision of the judicatory. It would be unreasonable to give to a captious member, to an impracticable minority of a court, the right to prevent, in cases of this kind, the execution of the will of the majority. When, therefore, there are two parties interested in a case, as in the dismissal of a pastor, or division of a church, either party, whose interests would be injuriously affected by the decision, has the right to interpose with an arrest of the proceedings by an appeal. There are, however, cases in which there is, properly speaking, no aggrieved party, where the decision of a court would work irreparable injury if carried out; injury, not to particular individuals, but to the church in general. Should a presbytery, for example, from party, or other corrupt motives, resolve to ordain one, five, or ten men, *sine titulo*, who were unsound in the faith, it is clear that unless such action could be arrested, irreparable injury might be occasioned. Such men in times of conflict might decide the fate of the church. Things very like this have been done. It is for such emergencies the right of appeal is recognized as belonging to "any minority of the judicatory." It is not on every occasion, nor from every decision of a church court, that the minority have the right to appeal. This would be a power too liable to abuse. Any one member may tie the hands of a session or a presbytery for a year, and from one year to another. It is only when the act contemplated, if done,

cannot be undone, or its evil consequences remedied, that the right exists. On account of the liability of this power of a minority to arrest the action of the majority, to be abused, it was strenuously urged in the Committee, that the right of appeal should be confined in all cases to aggrieved parties. We are not sure that this would not have been the wiser course. We were strongly in favour of extending the right, from the idea, that by "aggrieved parties" would be understood parties decided against in a judicial process. As, however, the Book as revised distinctly recognized the right of appeal in non-judicial cases, we are now inclined to think, that the church will coincide with the brethren of the Committee, who were in favour of confining appeals to aggrieved parties. The extreme cases in which the right would be of importance to minorities, are, perhaps, of too rare occurrence to need special provision.

2. The second subsection is altered so as to read, "In cases of judicial process, those who have not submitted to a regular trial, are not entitled to appeal." In the present Book it is in the affirmative form, "All persons who have submitted to an inferior may appeal to a higher judicatory."

3. States the reasons which justify an appeal, and is unchanged. The sub-section numbered four in the present Book is omitted. It only says that the appeal may be taken from a part of the proceedings, or from the *définitive* sentence; which is a matter of course.

4. Notice of the intention to appeal, and the reasons therefore, are to be given to the judicatory within ten days after its rising. They are to be lodged with the Moderator or *Stated Clerk*, (the latter words are added,) if the judicatory be not in session.

5. Appeals are generally to be from a lower judicatory to the one next above.

6. Notice of the appeal, and the reasons, to be lodged with the clerk of the higher court, before the close of the second day of its sessions, "and the appearance of the appellant and appellee shall be either personal or in writing." This is an additional clause. It is intended to provide for cases in which the personal attendance of parties might be attended with inconvenience. As the ends of justice do not require a personal

attendance, it is enough that the parties signify in writing their desire that the appeal be duly presented.

7. "In taking up an appeal in judicial cases, after ascertaining that the appellant, on his part, has conducted it regularly, the first step shall be to read all the records in the case from the beginning; the second to hear the parties, first the appellant, then the appellee; thirdly, the roll shall be called, and the final vote taken. In all appeals in cases not judicial, the order of proceeding shall be the same as in cases of complaint, substituting appellant for complainant.

8. The parties denominated appellant and appellee are the accuser and accused who commenced the process. The appellant, whether originally accuser or accused, is the party which makes the appeal; the appellee, whether originally accuser or accused, is the party to whom the decision appealed from has been favourable."

This is a great improvement on the old mode of proceeding. In the first place, a broad distinction is made between judicial and non-judicial appeals, demanded by the essential difference between the cases; the neglect of which is the source of endless embarrassment under the present system. In the second place, the whole process is simplified and shortened. According to the present plan, the higher court after the reading of the record, must hear the original parties, and then the inferior judicatory. Members are appointed to defend the synod before the Assembly, or the presbytery before the synod, or the session before the presbytery. The original parties (if you can find out who they are) and the lower judicatory are on trial at the same time. You have to hear first one and then the other. You have to go over and over the same ground, and the uniform result is confusion and prolixity. On the proposed plan all is simple and comparatively brief. A man is arraigned for some offence before the session. Charges are tabled either by an accuser or on the ground of common fame. In the latter case some one is appointed to conduct the prosecution. These two persons, the accuser and the accused, plead the cause before the session, and the session deliberate and decide. If either party is dissatisfied, he appeals to presbytery. The same men now appear as appellant and appellee before the

presbytery, the session having nothing to do in the matter except as it is represented in the presbytery. If either party be again dissatisfied, the same persons plead their cause before the synod; and if they choose to go farther, they again appear before the Assembly; the accuser and accused, therefore, are the only parties before each successive court. The session is present by the pastor and elder in the presbytery, the presbytery is present in the synod, the synod is represented in the Assembly; and thus the lower judicatory has in every case the opportunity of explaining and vindicating the grounds of its action.

Every one feels and acknowledges that our judicial system is the weak point in our form of government. The difficulties or objections to it are, first, that every insignificant neighbourhood quarrel, may be made to occupy the time and attention, first of the presbytery, then of the synod, and then of the General Assembly. The scandal is thus multiplied and diffused a thousand fold. Secondly, the time required to hear and decide these cases is more than can reasonably be given to them; and more than courts can, in many instances, be induced to sacrifice. A trial may, and often has, taken up ten, twenty, and even fifty days before a presbytery, and when brought to the synod or Assembly, those bodies in utter despair sometimes refuse on any plausible pretence to take it up, or if forced to go into the matter, have to devote several days to the subject, to the neglect of other important business. Every one remembers the Brown case in Kentucky, the Skinner case in Virginia, the Scott case in Louisiana, and many others even within the last few years. This expenditure of the time of hundreds of ministers and elders is an enormous evil. Another difficulty is, the inherent unfitness of a numerous body, such as a Synod or General Assembly, for judicial business. Any sensible man would rather be tried by twelve men, than by two hundred. At least the cause of truth and right would have a much better chance in the one case, than in the other. To meet these difficulties, various plans have been proposed. Some would stop all appeals from the session at the presbytery, and those from the presbytery at the synod. Others would have a commission appointed by the appellate

court, to hear and decide all judicial cases. Judge Sharswood, of Philadelphia, proposed, in the public papers, a plan, which would, in a great measure, meet the difficulty, if the church could be induced to adopt it. He suggested that the decision of the lower court should be final as to the facts of the case, as the verdict of a jury. If an appeal be taken, it must be in the nature of a bill of exceptions, as in civil courts. This would carry up for the decision of the appellate court simply the regularity of the proceedings and the justice of the judgment. If the decision of the higher court should be, that any unfairness, or serious error, prejudicial to either party, such as the refusing to receive proper, or admitting improper, testimony, had been committed, the case would be remitted for a new trial. Thus, if a man be found guilty by a session of intemperance; the decision would be final as to the fact that he was thus guilty; but the fairness of the trial or justice of the sentence could be reviewed in the higher court. Or if a minister were found guilty of holding unsound doctrines by his Presbytery, that finding would be final as to the fact he did hold the opinions charged, but whether they are sound or unsound, and whether they merited the sentence pronounced, could be carried up to the higher courts. This, as we understand it, is substantially the Judge's proposal. It would be an immense relief. There would be no new trial, no reading of volumes of testimony, no hearing of parties, but only the specific points presented in the appeal would be discussed before the higher courts, and decided on their merits. This or something equivalent, or the appointment of commissions, we are persuaded, will ultimately be demanded by the general voice of the church. In the mean time we trust that the recommendations of the Committee will be approved and adopted as a great improvement on our present plan.

9. This subsection corresponds with number 10 in the present Book, and is unchanged. 10 in like manner corresponds with 11, and is the same in both books. Numbers 12 and 13 of the present Book are omitted from the new. The former denies to the members of the lower judicatory the right to vote in the higher court on any question connected with the appeal; and the latter states when the lower court

shall, and when it shall not be censured for its decision. Both of these sections are precluded if the lower court be no longer regarded as a party in cases of appeal.

11. Relates to the case of the exhibition of an unchristian spirit on the part of an appellant, and is unchanged. It corresponds with number 14 in the present Book. 12. Corresponds with number 15, and is the same as before. It states that when the sentence appealed from is suspension or excommunication from church privileges, or deposition from office, it shall be considered as in force until the appeal be issued. This is analogous to the usage of the state courts. If a man is found guilty of murder, an appeal suspends the decision of the question as to his legal guilt or innocence, and arrests the execution of the sentence, but the man is detained in prison. So in the cases specified in the above rule. Though the appeal arrests the decision of the question whether the party is to be cut off from the church or not, yet for the honour of religion, he is provisionally debarred from the Lord's table, or from the exercise of his office. There is an ambiguity in this section which ought to be removed. It is said that during the pending of an appeal from a sentence of suspension or excommunication from church privileges, or of deposition from office, the sentence shall be considered as in force until the appeal is issued. But how is it when the sentence is one of suspension from office? As that is not expressly specified, it would seem not to be included in the excepted cases; and yet analogy would lead to the opposite conclusion. If both suspension and excommunication from church privileges are excepted from the ordinary operation of an appeal, why should not suspension as well as deposition from office be excepted? In a well known case, which occurred a few years ago, this point, as many of our readers will remember, gave rise to no little doubt.

13. This subsection states that it shall always be deemed the duty of the judicatory, whose judgment is appealed from, to send up a full copy of their records, and of the testimony relating to the case, to the appellate court, and that the neglect of this duty shall subject them to censure. 14. In *judicial* cases an appeal shall, in no case, be entered except by one of the original parties. The insertion of the word *judicial* in this

clause is necessary to bring this provision in harmony with other provisions of the Book.

CHAPTER VIII.—SECTION 4.

1. The fourth method by which a decision of a lower court may be carried before a superior is by complaint. 2. Any body has the right to complain of the action of an inferior judicatory. The right is not limited to members of that judicatory, nor to the members of the church. "Any person or persons," it is said, may complain of any act of the inferior court, which in their opinion is irregular or unjust. According to this, a member of another denomination may summon one of our lower courts before a higher, to answer for its acts. This is not unreasonable. It not unfrequently happens that difficulties arise about ecclesiastical limits, or the reception by one church of the dissatisfied members of another denomination, which involve the honour of the body to which the church belongs. In such cases it is well that the acts of an inferior court should be reviewed by a higher court. 3. "The cases in which complaints are proper and advisable, all those cases of grievances, whether judicial or not, in which the party aggrieved has declined to appeal; and cases in which the party complaining is persuaded that the purity of the church, or the interests of truth and righteousness, are injuriously affected by the decision complained of." This short section takes the place of a long paragraph of nineteen lines in the present Book.

4. Notice of a complaint must be given before the rising of the judicatory, or within ten days thereafter.

5. "In taking up a complaint, after ascertaining that the complainant has conducted it regularly, the first step shall be to read all the records in the case; the second to hear the complainant; and then the court shall proceed to consider and decide the case." This is perfectly simple and satisfactory. There is no complication arising from the lower judicatory being made a defendant. Being always represented in the higher court, and a constituent part of it, they have full opportunity of vindicating their decision, or of reconsidering it. It will be remembered, that appeals in nonjudicial cases are to be

conducted in the same way as complaints. In such cases, after reading the records, the appellant and appellee will plead their cause before the judicatory, which then considers and decides the case. There is no formality of a trial, no arraignment of the lower court, no calling of the roll, as in judicial cases, but a simple decision of the point in dispute between the appellant and appellee.

6. "The effect of a complaint, if sustained, may be to reverse the decision complained of, in whole or in part, and to place matters in the same situation in which they were before the decision." The whole of the corresponding section in the present book, except this sentence, is omitted.

7. "In a judicial case, a complaint shall be admitted only where an aggrieved party has declined to appeal, and in such cases an aggrieved party shall not be allowed to complain." This is a new provision. The aggrieved party has his appropriate mode of redress by appeal; if he does not choose to avail himself of it, he cannot adopt another method of carrying the cause any higher. But though he may not choose to trouble himself further in the matter, others may think that substantial wrong has been done, and they have the right to have the case reviewed. This they can effect by a complaint, which, however, must be of some specific wrong; for according to the above provisions for conducting a complaint, it is not to be laid as an appeal. The complainant can merely present the grounds of his complaint, and the higher court decides whether they are valid or not.

CHAPTERS IX. X. XI.

The first relates to Dissent and Protests; the second to Jurisdiction; and the third to Limitation of Time. In neither of which is any change recommended.

SHORT NOTICES.

Notes, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Numbers; Designed as a General Help to Biblical Reading and Instruction. By George Bush, late [qu. lately?] Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature in New York City University. New York: Ivison & Phinney. 12mo. pp. 475.

We can confidently recommend this volume as the best help in the language to the study of the Book of Numbers. In addition to the author's own grammatical remarks upon the meaning of the words and their construction, which his habits as a student of the Hebrew text entitle to respectful attention, he enables the reader to compare the ancient versions with a frequency almost excessive, quotes abundant illustrations from geographers and travellers, and adorns his text with many sparkling gems from Bishop Hall and Matthew Henry. His own devotional and doctrinal remarks, so far as we have noticed, are in perfect harmony with these authoritative Calvinistic writers. It is, indeed, a striking psychological phenomenon, that one who has so long been not only a member, but a leader of the "New Church," an editor, translator, and devout admirer of the Scandinavian prophet, and a most successful imitator even of his style and diction, should be able to resume his exegetical labours at the very point where he suspended them, perhaps a score of years ago, and now continue them precisely in the old strain, with the same characteristic merits and defects, the same eloquence, and the same diffuseness, but with scarcely a discoverable trace of his new notions, or a taint of the bad English, which appears to be regarded as a necessary vehicle or channel of the "Heavenly Doctrine." It is not the will but the capacity to do this that surprises us. We can readily conceive of one enlightened by the Swedish revelation condescending to accommodate his exoteric teachings to a lower stage or sphere of spiritual life, in which a knowledge of "the letter" may be useful, if not necessary, as a preparation or a substitute for loftier attainments. But the question is, how such accommodation is subjectively conceivable or possible. Is Swedenborgianism, then, a garment which can be completely laid aside on leaving home, and donned with equal ease when

the proprietor re-crosses the threshold of the New Jerusalem? Without attempting to explain this riddle, which, on any supposition, must reflect the highest credit on the author's versatility of talent, we accept the palpable result with pleasure, and are thankful that the gifted and accomplished writer has been able, even at his present altitude of mystical experience, to produce a book which can be safely put into the hands, not only of the chosen few who bask in the intense light of the "New Church," but of the many who still cherish the delusion that "the Old is better."

A Manual of Church History; by Henry E. F. Guericke, Doctor and Professor of Theology in Halle. Translated from the German, by William G. T. Shedd, Brown Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. (Ancient Church History, comprising the first six Centuries.) Andover: W. F. Draper. 8vo. pp. 422.

It is now just a quarter of a century since Guericke appeared as a historian, though previously well known as a teacher, and the author of some valuable monographs in this department. The appearance of no less than eight editions, notwithstanding the unpopularity of the author's principles and style, is a sufficient proof that the work met a real and a widely felt necessity. We believe we are entitled to the credit, whether great or small, of having introduced the work to the acquaintance of American readers. In the number of this journal for October, 1834, (vol. vi. pp. 407-416,) we gave a succinct statement of its merits as a full, but compendious exhibition of Neander's system, and the fruits of his prodigious labours, so far as they had then been carried, with an original continuation to the date of composition, and with a doctrinal and practical tendency more in accordance with our usages and standards. We also pointed out the fitness of the work for use among ourselves, and discussed the question whether a translation was desirable, suggesting the difficulties springing from the stiff pedantic German method, the obscure and awkward style, and the author's ultra-Lutheran prepossessions, with their natural effects upon his estimate of other churches. The conclusion which we then reached and announced (p. 416) was, "that a work of about the same dimensions, founded upon this, and embodying all its valuable matter, yet without adopting all the author's sentiments, or retaining his expressions, would be a welcome addition to the stores of our theological literature." Those convictions are unaltered by an intimate acquaintance with the work in its more recent forms, and with the author's last improvements. We sincerely wish that such a writer as Professor Shedd could have taken the same view of the matter, and

enriched our literature with a work at once original and borrowed, in the best sense of both expressions. Though disappointed in this wish, we gratefully acknowledge the good service rendered to the cause of truth and sound historical learning, by the elegant volume now before us, but at the same time cannot dissemble our conviction, that the work is still unfit for use as an exclusive text-book in our institutions, and that the style of the translation, although far superior to that of the original, has not entirely escaped contamination.

Hymns of Worship; Designed for use especially in the Lecture-room, the Prayer-meeting, and the Family. Selected and Arranged by a Pastor. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1858.

The title of this book intimates its peculiar characteristics, which the respected author more fully and explicitly sets forth in the preface. The special collections of hymns for use in the free and familiar services of the lecture-room, the prayer-meeting, and the family, have usually been constructed for the specific purpose of furnishing a larger supply of hortatory or other hymns expressive of pious feelings, and of the various phases of Christian experience, but which, at the same time, are not formally and immediately addressed to God, than are found in the standard collections of church psalmody, prepared for the public services of the house of God on the Sabbath. But this is a collection specifically of *Hymns of Worship*, for the more free and familiar religious services of Christians in the lecture-room and elsewhere. The distinctive feature of the collection is, that the compiler has ruled out, as far as practicable, all hymns in which the Most High is not directly, expressly, and chiefly addressed. Another principle which has guided him in the collection is, that praise in the family and the church is a social and collective act of a plurality of persons. "It is the voice, not of the separate and independent *I*, but of the collective and united *we*. The Divine Head of the church bids us say, 'Our Father.' The heavenly choirs invite us to sing, 'Unto him who loved us, and washed us from our sins in his blood,'" p. 5. This principle has excluded from the collection all hymns having in them the pronoun *I*, so far as we have observed, without a solitary exception. "The former," says our author, "touches hymns of a purely didactic character. Admirable as they often are as a means of instruction, they are too indirect as a means of worship. They are therefore not numerous in this collection. Where admitted, an attempt has been made to give them an upward bearing—a look towards God; to render them, to some extent, the utterance of prayer and praise, as well as of doctrine."

With reference to another class of hymns, he adds, "This principle is still more exclusive. In religious acts, it is as incongruous to sing to creatures as to pray to them. We condemn the Papists for the one, with what consistency can we practise the other? A glance, however, into almost any existing collection, will discover a large number of hymns addressed wholly to creatures; now to saints, and now to sinners; sometimes to the living, and sometimes to the dead. . . Such compositions are here omitted. Whatever their merits in other respects, they do not meet the idea of divine worship."

We do not doubt that the author, who is pastor of one of the most important congregations of our church, has aimed at the correction of a serious evil. This may safely be admitted without requiring us to go all lengths with him, either in his theoretical views or practical methods. Much undevout prose, much unspiritual poetry, much that offends sound taste, whether spiritual or literary, has crept into many of the popular books of psalmody. This is especially true of the collections that have been made for lecture-room and other like services. Many of these compilations consist largely of the common-places of exhortation put in metre. They are painfully barren of those hymns which fill the soul with all the fulness of God, and lift it up to him in strains which at once utter and excite reverence and awe, confidence and gratitude, wonder and adoration, love and praise. Some of these compositions are weak and drivelling in every point of view, and others not devoid of strength, minister to fleshly excitement, as much as to pure and genuine spiritual emotion.

Not wholly disconnected with this, is the perversion of the ordinance of singing, which has so long and widely prevailed, to the damage of religion, and the offence of pious souls, that it has become intolerable, and is now enforcing its own cure. We refer to the limitation of the singing in public worship to the choir, and its disuse by the congregation. If the main object of singing be regarded not as the offering of praise to God *by* the people, but as a didactic or hortatory address or performance directed *to* the people, for the purpose of more effectually awakening certain views and feelings, then a natural consequence is, that it is not the appropriate work of the people to sing praise to God, but of certain persons to sing to them, for the purpose of impressing them. Hence the choir feel called upon to try to interest and impress the congregation by novel tunes, artistic flourishes, and all sorts of devices for exhibiting their musical skill. Hence they feel justified in rejecting tunes with which the congregation are, to any extent,

familiar, on the ground that if any portion of the congregation sing, it mars the harmony and effectiveness of their own performance. Hence the feeling, for a long time so rife, that fine music must be provided in order to attract young people. Hence the correlative feeling of many of the young, that they could not be expected to attend churches that did not entertain them with rich music; thus setting the sanctuary in competition with the opera, and bringing in opera performers, and organists figuring with operatic touches and marches, if nothing worse, to conduct this part of divine service.

We rejoice in the reaction, which these abuses are so rapidly accelerating, towards congregational singing, and that choirs and organs are fast assuming their proper function of guiding and assisting, instead of extinguishing this part of public worship. It is a natural consequence of this movement, that the standard, simple, devotional church tunes should resume their place in the sanctuary from which they had so long been excluded. Of course, the reform must reach the hymns sung, restoring to their due prominence those songs of praise which are fullest of holy breathings towards God, and excluding more and more those compositions which are not "hymns of worship."

While this is so, it by no means follows that the criteria of fitness in hymns, proposed and adopted by our author, are not too narrow. A hymn may be none the less a hymn of worship because it is doctrinal, or puts some great Christian truth into a metrical form suitable for public singing. The matter and substance of all hymns of praise to God, must of course be some truth pertaining to God. All hymns expressive of pious feeling, in any of its varieties, must have a strong and principal aspect towards God, since he is the ultimate and chief object of such feeling, whether it be penitence, humility, zeal, brotherly love, or faith, gratitude, adoration. If a metrical composition, suited for singing, expresses Christian truth and feeling, it must have some, nay, a chief "look towards God." Have the celebrated hymns beginning, "Sin, like a venemous disease," "Not all the outward forms on earth," any the less of a devotional character, because they are especially designed to teach and impress the doctrines of sin and regeneration, while they prostrate the soul in dependence on a sovereign God? When, in our author's collection, God is declared the "undivided three, the great and glorious One," p. 93, and the Holy Ghost as "the consubstantial breath of God, the co-eternal one," p. 164, are not the sublimest mysteries stated with the scientific exactness of the Athanasian creed? But is

this language any the less an expression of adoring wonder for this? On the other hand, are not the creeds of the church sometimes constrained to use metaphor and poetry, in order to set forth mysterious truths with adequate didactic precision, as in the image "light of light" to express the mysterious truth that the Son is the only begotten of the Father, yet consubstantial with him? A doctrinal hymn is indeed liable to be dull and heavy; but so is one of any other sort. This objection is good against dry and lifeless hymns, but not against didactic ones as such. But on this point we have authority above all argument. The apostle surely charges us to "teach and admonish one another in psalms and hymns, and spiritual songs, singing with grace in our hearts to the Lord." Col. iii. 16.

This, moreover, seems to settle the question, whether it is proper to use hymns addressed to men, in which they are in some form "taught and admonished to render unto God the glory due to his name. Surely this is one form of singing to God, when in our songs we invoke others, to glorify him. This principle is recognized in many of the hymns of this book, as in the hymns," p. 108, beginning, "Joy to the world, the Lord is come," and p. 140, "Come, let us join our songs of praise." Whatever may be true of this volume, we know that it is abundantly recognized in the Book of Psalms, which constantly summons men to the work of serving, and worshipping God. Nor is it always requisite that there should be a formal address to God, in order that he should be the chief object of praise. This is evident enough from what has been already said, and from the instances already produced. Will the first Psalm bear this or some other tests of legitimacy offered by our author?

Still less weight do we attach to his objection to the use of the first person singular in public singing. Are such psalms as the twenty-third and thirty-second to be interdicted in the public and social singing of God's people? Are such hymns as, "Lord, I am thine, entirely thine." "A charge to keep I have, a God to glorify," to be banished from social worship for such a reason? It will be long, we apprehend, before the people of God give their verdict for this. Who does not see that the social character of such hymns is preserved, because every worshipper is presumed to adopt the sentiment expressed for himself, while he utters it in unison with the great congregation? This form only gives a little more intensity of self-application; so far as the social element is concerned, it remains unimpaired.

While, therefore, we do not accept the author's theory in full, because truth is not always at the contrary extreme from error, we nevertheless appreciate his effort to contribute to the correction of a serious evil. And, according to the standard he set before himself, his work seems to us exceedingly well done. The number of hymns in the collection is between six and seven hundred. We know not where else to find, within the same compass, so large a number of standard hymns, that have been dear to the church in all ages, and are fitted to awaken pure and deep devotional feeling—so rarely interlarded with anything offensive to a refined and intelligent Christian mind. If the principle he has adopted has served to winnow out some wheat, it has, doubtless, winnowed out a larger amount of chaff. While we give only a partial acceptance to his theory, we welcome his work as a valuable contribution to our hymnology.

A Consideration of the Sermon on the Mount. By Major D. H. Hill, Professor of Mathematics in Davidson College, North Carolina. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1858.

Religious books written by laymen are seldom of medium quality. So far as our observation extends, they are among the best or the poorest in our religious literature. The non-professional writer, in any department, is liable to overlook some things which are essential to any adequate treatment of the subject, and thus to produce a one-sided, superficial, perfunctory work. If, however, he masters his subject sufficiently to surmount this danger, he is apt to display a freshness and force in handling it, which are rare with routine writers of the profession. This book of Major Hill is decidedly of the latter kind. We have had cause to know that he is a man of mark in his own department. His power does not forsake him, when he passes into the sphere of Christianity.

This volume unfolds the doctrinal and practical teachings of the Sermon on the Mount. It is critical and exegetical only so far as is incidental and subservient to its main design. Without adopting every minute point in the author's interpretations, we are free to say, that he has evolved the solid doctrinal and practical import of our Saviour's discourse with great justness and force. His analysis of the varied topics that arise is lucid and vigorous, his discussions of experimental casuistical points are able and terse, his enforcement and application of truth is searching and pungent. We have seen few recent books of this class, containing more than this, that is "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness."

We take occasion to notice a form of statement relative to the function of conscience, which has had considerable currency among a class of writers, who, like our author, in the main hold correct views of the subject, and are aiming to express an important truth, in the very phraseology to which we except. The truth which they aim to express is, that conscience is liable, like other faculties, to be misguided through negligence, or wilful inattention to the light within our reach: that the erroneous judgments it thus forms do not alter the inherent quality of moral actions performed under their influence; that they cannot make or unmake right or wrong; that hence men are culpable for wrong acts done with the sanction of a misguided conscience, and that the true seat of their culpability lies in their neglect, refusal, or unwillingness, to see the light which would correct their error. In this sense, and within these limits, it is true that conscience is not an infallible guide. And there is scarcely any truth of greater importance.

This, however, is one thing. To say as our author says, p. 106, "Conscience is not a moral guide," is, in our view, quite another. If conscience is not a moral guide, what is it? What other faculty for moral guidance have we? The judgments of conscience are simply judgments of the mind that certain actions are right or wrong, that we ought to do or not do them. Can a man do or be the reverse of what he judges he ought to do or be, without sin? Never. If he can, then sin is impossible. If conscience is misguided, the subject of the delusion, is, in the language of the late Dr. Alexander, "in a deplorable dilemma." If he obeys its dictates, he does wrong, he sins. If he disobeys its dictates, he sins, for all disobedience to conscience is and must be sin. He has placed himself in this dilemma by his sinful refusal to enlighten his conscience. His only remedy lies in coming to the light, as Paul did at his conversion.

It is perfectly true, that the Bible is the only infallible rule of right. To this then we are bound to repair for the due enlightenment of the conscience. But how can we see and judge this to be our duty until the mind, opening itself to the evidence of their divinity and infallibility, judges that we ought to repair to the Holy Oracles, and submit to their guidance? And must not conscience, i. e. the mind judging on moral subjects, be "our moral guide," in indicating this to be our duty, and impelling us to perform it? The truth is, it is only through the conscience as a "moral guide," that we can see our obligation to guide it by any superior light or authority. Whatever other guidance we ought to adopt, still conscience must be our

moral guide to that guidance. In no fair meaning of the terms can we adopt the broad proposition, "conscience is not a moral guide," while it is a fundamental truth, that without the light of revelation, it is a wholly inadequate guide. But even then we sin in disobeying it, for to disobey it is to do what we are convinced we ought not to do. That there is sin in this, is intuitively evident. It seems to us, that the doctrine, that conscience is not a moral guide, at once dethrones it from its supremacy over the man, which all feel that it possesses *de jure*, if not *de facto*: that it lends sanction to that disregard of the dictates of conscience which saps the very foundations of religion and morality; and that it is by no means requisite in order to maintain the fallibility of conscience when the due means of enlightening it are neglected, or to support the infallible authority of the Scriptures as a rule of life. Men may err and commit sin indeed, in obedience to the behests of a blinded conscience. But the spinal cord of religion and morality is paralyzed, when they abjure fealty to conscience as their moral guide. What we object to in the mode of statement upon which we have animadverted, is not so much what we understand is intended to be said, as the mode of saying it.

A Poor Fellow; By the author of "Which: the Right or the Left?" New York: Dick & Fitzgerald. 1858.

The title of this book does it injustice. It raises the impression that it is of a vulgar and trivial character. From the partial examination we have been able to give it, we find it quite otherwise. It is one of those religious dramatic stories, which few will begin to read without reading to the end. Through a variety of characters, all of which have their numerous representatives in the real life of our great commercial cities, it gives us an impressive exhibition of the power of evangelical truth and piety, as the effectual and only cure of scepticism, vice, avarice; of the arrogance, heartlessness, and cruel pride, generated by immense wealth suddenly and dishonestly acquired; as the only spring of enduring and effective philanthropy, and of genuine relief from the miseries induced by sin, social, individual, temporal, and eternal.

The Model Merchant; or Memoirs of Samuel Budgett. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Mr. Budgett's life and character were, we believe, first brought into public prominence in Mr. Peter Bayne's work on the Christian life, which also first made its author, (now editor of the *Edinburgh Witness*,) known to the American public.

This was one of the few characters portrayed in that book, in illustration of the workings of spiritual life in different spheres of action. It was used to show how Christian piety develops itself in a merchant of the highest grade. The energy, system, and order, which prevailed in his immense establishment, were inspired and regulated by Christian principle, as much as by the desire of that gain which they signally promoted. The Christian integrity and fidelity exercised and enforced between himself and all his agents and servants; the efforts made to promote vital religion among them, which transfused the Christian life into all the ramifications of his vast business, conduced to the same result. They proved it a reality, that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. While, in all business transactions, he was rigidly exact, and counted every farthing, in all other relations he showed a munificent liberality. The cause of Christ, the poor, the afflicted, the destitute, the tormented, found unfailing succour in his unstinted bounty, and his benign ministries of love. He in turn found ample time to attend to all the private duties, and public calls, of religion and charity. His whole career was a signal illustration of the blessed results, for time and eternity, of seeking first the kingdom of God and his righteousness. The Board have done well in publishing this sketch of his life and character, as furnishing a model example to the Christian merchant. The commercial crisis of the past year has revealed a state of things, which shows the need of a large infusion of Christian morality into our American mercantile life. The wreck of fortune has followed swiftly and widely upon the wreck of integrity. At this very time, the financial articles of our metropolitan journals allude to the fact, that directors of railroads, in which millions of the small savings of labourers, and of the dependence of widows and orphans are invested, purposely adopt measures injurious to the property with which they are entrusted, in order to make money by speculations based upon the prospective fall of the stock. They not only mention these facts, but state them without comment or rebuke, as if they were matters of course. Such is the moral degradation to which the love of money sinks men. We should greatly prefer the unduly severe standard of the old Dutch merchants, who made bankruptcy *ipso facto* evidence of fraud, to that moral, legal, and financial atmosphere, in which colossal gamblers win the property of widows and orphans, who break all faith, violate the most sacred trusts, desolate innumerable homes, and regard not God or man, are suffered to breathe freely, luxuriating in palatial mansions, and bewitching and

debasing the young with the glare of their "shabby splendour."

The Sinlessness of Jesus an Evidence of Christianity. By Dr. C. Ullmann. Translated from the sixth German edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1858. Pp. 323.

Dr. Ullmann belongs to the Schleirmacher school; an amiable man, and a polished writer. This work has gradually grown to its present size, from an article in the *Studien und Kritiken*, published 1828. It has, doubtless, done good in Germany. Its chief interest in this country or in England, arises from the insight which it affords into German philosophical theology.

A New Latin-English School Lexicon; On the Basis of the Latin-German Lexicon of D. C. F. Ingerslev. By G. R. Crooks, D. D., Late Adjunct Professor of Ancient Languages in Dickinson College, and A. J. Schem, A. M., Professor of Hebrew and of Modern Languages in Dickinson College. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1858. Pp. 982.

The Lexicon of Dr. Ingerslev is one of the most generally esteemed works of the kind, as we understand, in Germany. The authors of the present work have endeavoured to preserve the excellencies of his plan, while they have modified and enlarged its details. The work is designed to meet the necessities of students, and not the wants of masters. References to authors seldom read in schools are therefore omitted. The etymology of the words, the logical arrangement of their meanings, and their combinations with other words in phrases or idiomatic expressions, are carefully given. The quantity of each syllable is marked, and different type is used to aid the eye in discriminating the words defined from the definitions themselves. The book is neatly printed, and strongly bound, and seems in every respect admirably adapted to the end which it was designed to answer.

The Sheepfold and the Common, or, The Evangelical Rambler. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 530.

This is the republication of a work originally printed thirty years ago, under the title, *The Evangelical Rambler*, of which some sixty thousand copies were circulated in England. In the present edition, the work has been thoroughly revised. Its design is to afford instruction and amusement by the narration of the events of every day life. Some of the events are imaginary, but far the most are records from the author's own history. His great object is to convey evangelical truth in the dramatic

rather than in the didactic form. The great success of the work is proof of adaptation to the public taste and necessities.

Christian Hope. By John Angell James. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 333.

This Christian grace is discussed under all its aspects, its nature, grounds, object, author, effects, &c., &c., in the pious edifying strain which distinguishes the writings of the venerable author, with which the religious public has been so long familiar.

Of the Authorized Version of the New Testament, in Connection with some recent Proposals for its Revision. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Dean of Westminster. Redfield, 34 Beekman street, New York. 1858. Pp. 184.

The object of the distinguished author of this work is neither to advocate a revision of the authorized version of the New Testament, nor to dissuade from it; but to consider the actual worth of our present translation, its strength and its weaknesses, and the arguments for and against a revision. His own mind is inclined to the opinion that a revision is desirable, and that it will ultimately be made. As to the mode of effecting it, he suggests that by authority a commission be appointed representing all classes of the British public, who adopt the doctrinal articles of the Church of England, to suggest emendations, and to give the reasons for them. These suggestions should then be printed and circulated, until they had gradually worked their way into public confidence, and then they could be introduced one or more at a time into the common text. We trust it will be a long time before such an attempt shall be made. The English version of the New Testament, although not faultless, satisfies ninety-nine hundredths of the Christians who speak the English language. It is the great bond which binds them together. It is their common heritage and property. The evils to be dreaded from a revision are far greater than the benefits which can reasonably be expected from the attempt. What Greek text is to be assumed as the standard? What is to be done with 1 Tim. iii. 16, Acts xx. 28, 1 John v. 7? How are all denominations to be brought to unite in such a work and to acquiesce in the scheme? If, however, a formal revision is to be made, let it be done by persons appointed for the purpose, representing not the Christians of England only, but of all other countries using the English Bible. Do not let us have an English Bible, and an American Bible, an Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Baptist Bible. We believe that all which is really desirable may be effected by those gradual, un-

perceived changes, which creep into any version, much in the same way that changes in orthography are introduced. Such changes might be entrusted to the authorities which control the printing of the Bible in Great Britain, acting in concert. It being understood that any change against which a serious protest should be made by any respectable body of Christians using the English version should be retracted.

The Voice of Christian Life in Song; or, Hymns and Hymn-Writers of many Lands and Ages. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1859. Pp. 303.

This is a scholarly and most interesting book. It gives specimens of the early Greek and Syriac hymns, and then of those Ambrosian and Mediæval periods, and subsequently those of the Reformation, and the German, Swedish, and English, with some account of the writers. Much the larger part of the work is taken up with historical matter. The translations are original, except in a few cases, and seem to us to be skilfully executed. It is, of course, impossible to preserve in a translation the peculiar aroma of the original. It is hardly fair to the author to select as a specimen his version of one of the most exquisite verses Paul Gerhard ever wrote, but it will make the Christian's heart glow, notwithstanding:

“And when at last thou ledest me
 Into thy joy and light,
 Thy blood shall clothe me royally,
 Making my garments white;
 Shall place upon my head the crown,
 Shall lead me to the Father's throne,
 And raiment fit provide me;
 Till I, by Him to thee betrothed,
 By thee in bridal costume clothed,
 Stand as a bride beside thee!”

This is far short of Gerhard's own words:

Wann einstens ich soll treten ein
 In deines Reiches Freuden,
 So soll dies Blut mein Purpur sein,
 Derein ich mich will kleiden.
 Es soll sein meines Hauptes Kron',
 In welcher ich will vor den Thron
 Des ew'gen Vaters gehen,
 Und dir, dem er mich anvertraut,
 Als eine wohl-geschmückte Braut
 Zu deiner Seite stehen.

The author is an Episcopalian, but with a heart large enough to know that a man is a man, however he may be dressed; a Christian a Christian, by whatever name he may be called.

The Indian Rebellion; its Causes and Results. In a Series of Letters from Alexander Duff, D. D., LL.D., Calcutta. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 408.

These letters were addressed to the Rev. Dr. Tweed, Convener of the Free church of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, and published from time to time as they were received. They have since been collected in a volume in England, and the Messrs. Carter have republished them in this country. The subject and the author's name preclude all necessity of recommendation of such a book. The letters are instinct with the fervour and strength of the ablest and most vehement men of modern times. Though written at the spur of the moment, they reveal views and convictions which are the fruit of thirty years' experience and observation on Indian ground. That they are free from extreme statements, or from views due to the status of the writer as a Scotch missionary, is not to be expected. It is enough that they are the production of one of the greatest and best men the church has to bless God for.

The Earth and the World; or, Geology for Bible Students. By S. R. Pattison, F. G. S. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. New York: Standford & Delisser. 1858. Pp. 139.

The author assumes the absolute authority of the word of God, and the absolute truth of geological facts, as far as yet ascertained. Where he sees their harmony, he rejoices in its manifestation; where he is unable to reconcile the two records, as at present understood, he humbly waits, assured that their full consistency will ultimately be made to appear.

The Progress of Philosophy in the Past and in the Future. By Samuel Tyler, of the Maryland Bar. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1858. Pp. 232.

This volume includes two contributions of the author to the periodical press. The former of the two was published in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, November, 1856; the latter in the *Princeton Review*, October, 1855. Both have been revised and modified. Mr. Tyler is second to no American metaphysical writer of the present generation. The two articles above mentioned have attracted much attention both in Great Britain and America; and their republication in the present form, by rendering them accessible to a larger class of readers, is a valuable service to the cause of sound philosophy.

Life of a Risen Saviour. By Robert S. Candlish, D. D. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858. Pp. 410.

"I have endeavoured," says the distinguished author, "in these discourses, to illustrate the line of argument pursued by

the apostle in the fifteenth chapter of first Corinthians. It is not, as I apprehend it, an argument about the resurrection generally. It has respect to one particular view of the resurrection—its bearing on the believer's spiritual and eternal life." Such a subject, in the hands of a man of so much genius, guided by a reverence for the word of God, as Dr. Candlish, will doubtless prove a rich treat to the Christian reader.

Sermons. By the Rev. John Caird, M. A. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 398.

The celebrity attained by Mr. Caird's sermon on "Religion in common life," preached before Queen Victoria, has led to the publication of other productions of his pen, marked by the same general characteristics.

Memories of my Life's Work. The Autobiography of Mrs. Harriet Cooke. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 356.

This is the record of the labours and experience of a religious woman and successful teacher, dedicated to her co-labourers and pupils.

Luther still Speaking. The Creation: A Commentary on the first Five Chapters of the Book of Genesis. By Martin Luther. Originally published in Wittenberg, A. D. 1544, now first translated into English. By Henry Cole, D. D., of Clare College, Cambridge. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1858. Pp. 474.

Any one who has once listened to the trumpet tones of Luther's writings will be glad to hear them again. With the exception of his polemical writings on the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, there is scarcely anything he ever wrote which might not be read with profit by Christians of our day. He was a great believer, and we might catch something of his strength by communing with his spirit as bodied forth in his writings.

Sketches for You; By S. S. Egliseau, author of *Gleanings from Real Life,* &c. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

A series of sketches, written in a lively and entertaining style, suited to impress various duties and obligations upon the reader.

Bridget Sullivan; or, The Cup Without a Handle.

How to Die Happy.

Fanny the Flower Girl; or, Honesty Rewarded. By Selina Bunbury.

Ragged Tommy; or, The Boy and the Bishop.

The foregoing are late issues of our Board of Publication, increasing their excellent stock of works for juvenile reading, and Sunday-school libraries.

The Coming and Reign of Christ. By David M. Lord. New York: Franklin Knight, 138 Nassau street. 1858. Pp. 430.

Anything which an able and good man writes is worth reading, whether we agree with him or not. We do not know that the reader can find anywhere in so convenient a form, an exhibition of the writer's principles of prophetic interpretation, and of the conclusions which he derives from the application of those principles to the unfulfilled predictions of Scripture.

The Bud, Blossom, and Fruit; or, Early Piety permanent and progressive; Illustrated by some Incidents in the Life of Emily J. Goodhue. By Rev. John Pike. Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath-School Society, No. 13, Cornhill.

This work was written with the design of confirming and spreading the conviction, that children may be converted very early, and walk with God for years before they die.

END OF VOLUME XXX.



INTERESTING RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY.

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BY MAJOR D. H. HILL,

Professor of Mathematics in Davidson College, North Carolina.

12mo. Price 75 cents.

NOTICES OF THE PRESS.

A careful perusal of this volume induces us to express emphatically our high opinion of its excellent tone and execution. Disconnected from any name, it is a book which will stand on its own merits; but it unquestionably has a deeper interest as the production of one whose education was military, and who distinguished himself in all the principal battles of the Mexican war, and was several times brevetted for his conduct; but of one whose love for peaceful pursuits has induced him to lay aside the ambitious aspirings of the successful soldier, and to discourse with his fellow-men on the rich truths of the gospel as he has found and experienced them in the inimitable teachings of Jesus.—*Presbyterian*.

We have been much pleased with the author's thoughts and spirit, and we think any one who will give the volume an attentive reading, will be much profited. It has struck us that the *lay* style of the work will make it the more useful. The author's thoughts and language are free from that professional cast which often takes away freshness from what is well written.—*Boston Recorder*.

The remarks of the author upon the different verses are interspersed largely with anecdotes and incidents illustrative of the subject, so that the volume will be perused with an interest far superior to that of a mere commentary. The style is pleasing and attractive, the views presented sound and sensible, and the doctrinal teachings generally unexceptionable. The volume will have some peculiar value as a manual of Christian morals.—*New York Evangelist*.

These expositions of the Sermon on the Mount, without displaying the learned research of Tholuck's work on the same theme, exhibit greater analytic power, and a far more satisfactory explanation of the spiritual teachings of this most interesting portion of Scripture. The reader will be charmed by the perspicuous style of the author, the numberless scientific and historical illustrations by which he has elucidated the text, and the clear and logical discussions of his propositions. Nor is the least merit of this excellent work its eminently practical character.—*Central Presbyterian*.

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THE
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AND

Annual Remembrancer of the Church,

FOR 1858-9.

COMPILED AND ARRANGED BY

Joseph M. Wilson.

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Is to supply a want often felt and expressed by our Ministers and Elders, by publishing in a convenient form a volume containing all the details and operations of THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH during the year ending with the Annual Sessions of 1858.

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As we deem this, the most direct way of calling attention to the volume, we give a brief synopsis of its Contents.

The work will contain a *Calendar* showing events of interest to Presbyterians, Ecclesiastical and Historical, to correspond with the days of each month, arranged with care, by a Literary gentleman of this city [Philadelphia].

The Opening of the Seventieth Session of THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH in the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, La, on Thursday the 6th of May, 1858, by Rev. CORTLANDT VAN RENSSELAER, D. D., Moderator of the last Assembly, with an outline of his discourse.

A List of the Members of the Assembly, arranged alphabetically, with the names of the Presbyteries and Synods which they represented.

The Election of the Moderator, Rev. WILLIAM A. SCOTT, D. D., of San Francisco—with a fine *Portrait* engraved expressly for this Almanac, by NEWSAM.

The Acts and Resolutions passed by the General Assembly, viz:

The Bills and Overtures, The Judicial Cases, The Synodical Reports, and Miscellaneous Resolutions offered—with the action of the Assembly.

The Narrative of the State of Religion, to which will be appended a *Table*, showing the names of Ministers who have died during the year, their Presbytery, the year of their Ordination, their death, their age, and the disease which closed their life.

A full and complete exposition of the Annual Reports of the Boards and Committees connected with the Church; also, the Theological Seminaries,

The Meeting of the ASSOCIATE REFORMED SYNOD OF THE SOUTH; held in Old Providence Church, Augusta county, Virginia, Oct. 12th, 1857, was opened with a discourse from Rev. D. G. PHILLIPS.

A List of the members of Synod, (arranged as the others.)

The Acts and Resolutions passed and the Presbyterial Reports.

A List of Ministers, &c.

The REFORMED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH in North America, met in Northwood, Ohio, May 1857, and was opened with a Discourse by the Moderator, (this body did not meet in 1858.) We give a list of its Ministers, &c.

A Sketch of the *Presbyterian Historical Society*. Also a large number of matters of general interest.

BRITISH PROVINCES.

The meeting of the *Presbyterian Church of Canada*, was held in the McNab Street Presbyterian Church, Hamilton, C. W. A Synopsis of the Proceedings and such details as come within the design of this work. The Election of Moderator, Rev. THOS WARDROPE, of Ottawa, C. W., with a fine *Portrait*.

An Historical Sketch of the McNab Street Presbyterian Church, Hamilton, by Rev. D. INGLIS, Pastor, and a *fine view of the building*.

We will give an account of the various Presbyterian bodies in Canada West, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, the names of Ministers, with Presbytery and Post-office—but the limits of this circular prevents a full detail.

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

The Meeting of the Irish General Assembly in the Presbyterian Church, Londonderry. The Election of Rev. JOHN JOHNSTON, of Banbridge, Ireland, Moderator, with a fine *Portrait*. Also a full account of the proceedings.

An Historical Sketch of the Church, Londonderry, by Rev. WM. McCLURE, Pastor, and a *fine view of the building*, including *Walker's Monument*.

An account of the Free Church of Scotland. The Presbyterian Church of Scotland; the various Synods—English and Scotch.

☞ We would call attention to the fact that the *Portraits* are all from Daguerreotypes or Ambrotypes taken expressly for the Almanac, and are by an artist who is one of the best in the country; they are crayon lithographs.

The *views of the Churches* are also new and prepared from drawings for this Almanac. The *Publisher* hopes this effort will be sustained, as from the character of the volume its sale is limited to the *Presbyterians*.

The *Historical Almanac* will be a large octavo volume, printed on good paper. Price will be \$1.00 sent by mail, free of postage. As it is necessary to know the size of the Edition to print, those wishing copies will send their names as early as possible. Address,

JOSEPH M. WILSON, Publisher,

No. 111 South Tenth St., below Chesnut,
PHILADELPHIA.

P. S. The Publisher will also receive, to be published with the Almanac, *Advertisements* for Schools, Academies, Colleges, Books, Insurance Companies, &c. &c. Those wishing to advertise will please apply immediately. The work will be issued the latter part of October or November, 1858.











