

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ARTICLE I.—*Weissagung und Erfüllung im Alten und im Neuen Testamente.* Ein theologischer versuch von Dr. J. CHR. K. HOFMANN, Prof. Theol. in Erlangen. 8vo. pp. 362 and 386.

THIS work, which was published rather more than thirteen years ago, has been several times referred to in our columns. But its influence upon the opinions of an important class of continental scholars has been such, that we shall render, we doubt not, an acceptable service to our readers by presenting them with a summary of its contents. It should be distinctly stated in advance, that with whatever faults these volumes may be chargeable, they are free from all complicity with the principles or results of a sceptical criticism, which is upon proper occasions scored in a very wholesome way. Hofmann's aspirations after novelty have taken quite a different turn from this. The literal truth of the sacred narrative is everywhere adhered to, as opposed to all mythical conceits and legendary exaggerations. The integrity and genuineness of all the inspired writings, and in all their parts, are strenuously asserted, and the date to which unvarying tradition assigns them is unhesitatingly received. When even such men as Kurtz and Delitzsch have yielded to the torrent, it is deserving of commendatory mention that Hofmann should stand firm. While

for the most part he enters into no detailed discussion of these critical questions as foreign to his proper theme, his treatise is based throughout upon correct and well established views regarding them. And without such premises, manifestly no reliable examination could be instituted into the contents of the sacred volume, and of the divine scheme which they unfold. In fact there is some ground for our author's claim, that investigations such as he here conducts, though lying in a different field from critical inquiries, are sufficient to overturn their most boasted results. For if, by proceeding upon the assumption that the books of Scripture were written at the times and in the order that has been generally received, a regularly developed system can be traced in the whole, and each part be shown to fit precisely in its proper place; this is not far from a demonstration that the original assumption cannot be false. In the case of the book of Revelation, however, he departs from his usual custom so far as to spend eighteen pages in vindication of its apostolic authorship, and of the correctness of the tradition which assigns it to the reign of Domitian; for it was important to his interpretation of it to show that it could not have found its fulfilment in the Jewish war under Titus, which was already ended before the date of its composition.

The idea which lies at the basis of this work, and which with great ingenuity and boldness Hofmann endeavours to establish, is that of the organic unity of the Scriptures; that they are not only harmonious throughout, but they form one scheme, all whose facts and revelations from the very beginning conspire to one divinely purposed end. But this true principle is vitiated by a false philosophy, and by a reckless determination to make everything bend to the theory which he has adopted. According to him, it is history alone which is properly speaking prophetic; and the history of all nations is as really so, as that of the chosen people. The triumphal processions of Rome were predictive of the future emperor as truly as the paschal lamb was of Christ. The sole office of prophecy is to expound history, to interpret to the popular consciousness those germs of the future which are hid beneath the forms of the present. Nothing can at any time be included in its utterances, of which current events have not furnished in some way the indication.

The predictive element in both history and prophecy is evolved by the agency of the infinite and all-pervading and self-developing Spirit. The individuality and the personality of men are here distinguished. The former includes whatever is peculiar to any one as an individual, and in which he differs from others. In this he is not free; for a man's volitions have nothing to do with his physical or mental organization, with the original endowments of which he was possessed, or the influencing circumstances by which he is surrounded. The personality is the seat of freedom. Now in controling men as God's Spirit does, to make them his agents in prophetic history, or in the utterance of predictions, he acts upon their individuality, not their personality, so that his control is absolute, while at the same time they are left in full possession of their freedom. This is illustrated by Caiaphas's prophecy of the death of Jesus, John xi. 49–52: "That he spake came from the Spirit who impelled him, and without whom man does nothing; that he spake in precisely these words came from his special characteristics being such as they were, and from his state of mind at the moment, both of which were the work of God: in other respects it was wholly his own word and not that of God, uttered with consideration and in the full use of his senses, without the suppression of his rational consciousness, or of any of the faculties of his soul." "Nothing can happen, great or small, which is not necessarily conditioned by the essential qualities of the Spirit, and the form in which he is to find realization; * * and no prediction is casual, or could have remained unspoken."

All history repeats itself in successive stages corresponding with the progressive forms, in which the union of God with man is effected. The purpose of the whole is the exhibition of Christ, the God-man, his prefiguration under the Old Testament, his actual life in the flesh, and the manifestation of his glorified nature in the Church of the New Testament. These are to be followed by the state of final glory, when the Church shall be perfectly transformed into Christ's image. The common relation of all these stages to the same subject induces a pervading mutual resemblance, so that each becomes prognostic of those that follow after. The characteristic of the

period prior to the advent, is the dominion of nature or of the flesh, under which men came by the fall, when their personal will became enslaved to their fleshly will, these terms being employed to express not so much a state of spiritual corruption as the domination of the bodily appetites. The prevailing experience of this period was that of sin and death, the inadequacy of natural good to satisfy the soul, and the incompetency of man unaided, to emancipate himself from their control. The imperfections and limitations apparent even in the best estate then reached, served to awaken expectations and longings for the time when they should be removed. Natural good pointed forward to spiritual good held in reserve; natural evil to that power by which it was to be overcome.

The incarnation was designed not to put away sin by an atoning sacrifice, nor to work out by Christ's obedience a justifying righteousness, but to bring down a new element of life into mankind. Personal communion with God is now first made possible. This is the bond of union in the Church, as the bond in Israel had been the merely natural relation appropriate to the preceding period. Through Christ, who was the Son of God because supernaturally born of the Holy Spirit, they are made sons of God. Individuality in the sense above explained did not belong to the person of Christ. He was a free Spirit; and any particular temperament, anything which was so but might have been otherwise would have implied limitations which are not supposable in him. His physical nature, however, as born of a particular mother, and a particular people, and organized in a particular way, was possessed of individual characteristics. These limitations in the earthly life of the incarnate Redeemer, are so many predictions of his state of glorification, in which they have all been done away. The Lutheran doctrine of the infusion of divine attributes into the ascended human nature of Christ is thus justified.

The experience of the Church, in which the glorified life of Christ is operative, is that of righteousness and life. They are personally brought into communion with God, but their carnal nature is not yet removed. They wait their transformation into the likeness of the glorified Christ, when all individual diversities shall cease. The earthly life of Christ, and the pre-

sent state of the Church, are thus at once fulfilments of what had been previously foreshown, and are predictive of what lies yet beyond them.

From this outline of the leading features of Hofmann's theory, it is not difficult to see that the idea was born in the school of Schleiermacher. The great and decisive objection to it is, that if it does not deny, it sinks out of sight the personality and free agency of God. His spirit, it is alleged, unfolds itself in history by a regular process; and prophecy follows the same fixed method of development. God can communicate nothing to a prophet which has not already presented itself in the gradual unfoldings of history. This conception is at an endless remove from the true one, that God is conducting all events in his providence conformably to that sovereign purpose which he has freely formed; and in the communications which he makes to men he is restricted by no laws of necessity, by no obligation imposed *ab extra*, but he freely selects such lessons, be they what they may, as are appropriate to the end he each time has in view, conditioned solely by his own wise and holy and gracious plan. The idea of inspiration finding place among the heathen equally with Israel, and the events of their history being equally predictive with that of the latter, is also at variance with the nature of God, who is not a force universally diffused and acting everywhere alike, but a free agent who operates here or there, in this way, or in that, agreeably to his sovereign pleasure; and it obliterates the distinction so broadly drawn in the Scriptures, and in actual fact between his gracious or supernatural and his ordinary providence. The distinction made between individuality and personality, however it may exist in theory, is impossible in actual fact: a person without the distinctive peculiarities involved in the very notion of separate existence, is a chimerical abstraction. And the attempt by this means to reconcile man's free agency and God's absolute control, amounts to a virtual abandonment of the former, and is chargeable with containing the seeds of fatalism. The denial that individual characteristics as not being free, and implying limitation, are to be perpetuated in the glorified saints, is either unintelligible, or it involves a denial of the continuance of their distinct personality. The

state of glory must then be an absorption into the infinite indistinguishable essence of an abstract Deity. It is an unjust depreciation of the Old Testament, when personal and living communion with God is denied to the saints of the former economy, or when their aspirations are limited to temporal good. Though he not very consistently goes also to the opposite extreme of unduly exalting the restrictive local and temporary features of the former dispensation, claiming that they are to be perpetuated under the New Testament, that the natural Israel are to repossess their ancient privileges in the Christian Church, and Canaan and Jerusalem to be again the chosen seat of the Most High. It is a perversion of the end of the incarnation, which is a grand remedial scheme consequent upon the introduction of sin, to make it independent of the fact of the fall, and to regard it as simply a stage in the development of humanity, which would in any case have been necessary. The seat of sin is not the body but the soul; and its formal nature is not a predominance of the physical over the rational powers, but rebellion against God and the transgression of his will. The only true thing in his system in fact, is that which was remarked in the outset. There is an organic unity in the plan of redeeming mercy unfolded in the Scriptures, and developed in God's great scheme of gracious providence. And in virtue of this, each of its advancing stages furnishes premonitions of those which are to follow, and in each God has kept his people advised of what was still future in his counsels, by that sure word of prophecy which shines as a light in a dark place.

In the detailed application of this theory, Hofmann evinces an unflinching determination to carry it consistently through at all hazards. Many clear predictions are by forced interpretations almost emptied of their meaning, because the germs of them are not yet visible in the history, and they do not square with his notions of progressive development. Such a procedure can never be sanctioned. God's ways are not as our ways. That man will assuredly run into error, who first forms his idea of what God ought to do, and then strives to bring what God actually has done into accordance with his own previous conceptions. The plans of the Most High can only be learned from their execution, or from the exposition which he has fur-

nished of them himself. In interpreting the disclosures which he has made to the prophets, we have no right to limit the Holy One by insisting in advance that no more than a certain amount can be conceded to have been made known at any particular time. But these inspired utterances must be allowed to stand precisely as we find them; they must be taken in their obvious and natural import, and our ideas of what was appropriate and accordant with the divine plan must be determined by the facts, not the facts by our ideas. The large reduction which he thus makes in the gross amount of Old Testament prediction, is an inevitable consequence of his theory, that the prophetic element in its primary sense lies exclusively in the history, to which uttered prophecy is subsidiary as furnishing its explanation, but without proceeding any faster than the history itself advances. Its function is to detect those germs of the future, which are hid in the present, but it cannot anticipate those germs. For the same reason he admits very few direct and unequivocal predictions of the Messiah, and denies utterly that his Deity is foretold, though he finds an abundance of indirect anticipations and obscure premonitions of his coming, and his work, in the restlessness manifested under what is unsatisfying, and the longings indulged for a yet unaccomplished good. Yet he does not hesitate to admit real and definite predictions when they fit into his scheme, and the supernatural appears to follow the law he has prescribed for it. Thus he says of Ezekiel's specific and minute predictions regarding Zedekiah, xii. 12, 13: "This cannot possibly be reconciled with the rule set up by Hitzig, that the alleged foresight of the prophets must be restricted to an anticipation or a deduction from existing facts, or from real or imagined truths. Or if this only came to pass by chance, this chance would be as remarkable as that the king who allowed the Jews to return home from the exile, bore the name of Cyrus, the very name predicted by Isaiah." He also allows predictions to stand which contain definite measures of time, such as that of the seventy years exile, the sixty-five years to the completing of Ephraim's desolation by Esarhaddan's heathen colonists, Isaiah vii. 8, and others of similar character. He even finds definite notes of time in some passages where most probably none was intended; thus he subjects the one

month, Zech. xi. 8, to a process of computation, and finds it to correspond with the event as he understands it. Strongly as we feel ourselves compelled to protest against many of his views, and serious as would be the injury resulting from their indiscriminate adoption, his remarks are often highly ingenious and striking; and they not infrequently contain a prevalently neglected phase of the truth, even when they cannot be accepted as a complete and satisfactory exhibition of it.

The predictive features of the Old Testament are arranged in twelve sections. The first is entitled Man and Woman. The preposterous view is here maintained, that if Adam had eaten the forbidden fruit before the creation of Eve, its natural effect would have been immediate death; after her creation its effect was to make both ashamed of their nakedness. The creation of woman was thus a safeguard against that doom which otherwise would have been the instant effect of his transgression. This was accordingly God's first act of grace. "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh," was an implicit prophecy, the first ever uttered. The joy at Eve's creation was soon dimmed by the fall; but the imperfect points forward to the perfect, there shall be one to whom the Church shall sustain this same relation without any remaining consequence of the fall, and with nothing to mar her gladness.

The "seed of the woman," which is the title of the second section, denotes all her descendants; the seed of the serpent is snakes, and this though the presence and agency of a seducing spirit is confessed in the first temptation. Thus the prediction of ultimate redemption, the announcement that the injury which man had suffered should be but partial while the tempter should be crushed, is frittered utterly away; and the only promise which is admitted to be found in it is, that instead of dying at once, as they had reason to apprehend, the species should be perpetuated, a thought embodied by Adam in the name he gave his wife, Gen. iii. 20. Clothing man's now defiled body was God's second act of grace, showing the divine favour and regard for it, polluted as it was. This covering, while an occasion of thankfulness, since it was furnished by the divine mercy, was humiliating, inasmuch as it reminded him of his nakedness: it therefore prefigures a covering so united with

man that his nakedness shall not be hid, but shall absolutely cease. A living animal must die to afford this dress; the contradiction between joy occasioned by the favour of God, who spared not this life for them, and sorrow on account of a life irrecoverably lost for their sakes, is resolved by one who liveth and was dead. Joy over woman's maternity, and shame at her nakedness, is a contradiction for the present, which points to a birth that shall be an object of joy but not of shame, to that of him who was born of a woman, but supernaturally conceived.

The third section is the Righteous Man. Abel offered an acceptable sacrifice on the borders of paradise, but was not allowed to enter thither. Enoch was translated to paradise, but carried none others with him. Noah delivered his family into a new world, but not into paradise; for his offering of clean beasts speaks of transgression as still continuing, and his need of an altar as a sacred place shows that the new earth was not everywhere pure and holy. There was a limitation in every case. But all limitation is removed, and the particular traits belonging severally to these righteous men are combined in him who is our Righteousness. He offered himself to God, has gone to God, and brings his people safe to God from the judgment inflicted on the world. In sending the flood, God had forsaken paradise, which till then had continued to be his earthly seat, a view which he supposes to be proved by Psalm xxix. 10. Noah predicts that this loss would be repaired, that he would return once more from heaven to earth, and would dwell in the tents of Shem.

The next predictive element is afforded by the seed of Abraham. The promise to Abraham is explained to mean, not that all nations should derive blessings from his seed, but that such a blissful estate awaited his posterity that their name should be throughout the world a synonym for blessing: no better fortune could be desired than should be possessed by them. Abraham has a promise of good things in the future: Melchizedek as king of Salem has an inferior good in actual possession. Isaac is the child of him that had the promises. Melchizedek is what he is, independent of any line of descent. These partial and divided traits must be combined in him who is the end of human history. The promise must be converted

into possession: sprung from the seed of Abraham, he must owe his consequence not to his descent but to the dignity of his own person. Israel had become a great people before Christ came; they possessed the land of Canaan, and were the bearers of a hope that should embody everything that could be desired. But nothing had been reached comparable with such a felicity as had been anticipated. The promise, therefore, was not yet exhausted, but looks to something still in reserve. The promise to Abraham is to be fulfilled to the Jews, not merely as it is to the Gentiles. "Israel shall alone of all nations partake of the future salvation as a nation, Rom. xi. 26, while from others, individuals enter as individuals into the communion of Christ." The future glory of Christ shall be revealed in Canaan, and Jerusalem shall be the special place of its manifestation.

Next follows the Redeemer. The promise of Jacob to Judah is explained to mean, that he shall continue to possess his princely position and insignia until he, as the champion of his brethren, comes into the enjoyment of rest, and whole nations are obedient unto him. Moses with his staff manifests to the heathen that the people are truly the people of God; with the blood of the paschal lamb (not offered in sacrifice but sprinkled as an act of obedience on the part of the people, and eaten as a meal to strengthen them for their journey) he saves them from the fate of the heathen; with the pillar of cloud he leads them forth from bondage. The redemption of Moses did not adequately fulfil the hopes of Abraham; and the deliverer himself needed to have his human imperfection supplemented by other aids. The true Redeemer requires the aid of nothing external to himself. He employs no rod but that of his mouth. The sprinkling of his blood saves from the fate of an ungodly world, whilst his flesh strengthens them who eat of it for the journey from this world to another. Like the cloud too he is not of earth, nor bound to earth. The angel of the Lord spoken of in connection with the exodus, and who reappears in numerous instances in the Old Testament, is declared in opposition to the great body of the ablest interpreters from the earliest times, in opposition too to conclusive proofs, which evidence the contrary, to have been a created angel. Hofmann even denies that the original form of expression necessarily

implies that one definite angel was intended; though he expresses his belief that the relation of Jehovah to Abraham and Israel was from the beginning of Scripture to the end, conducted by one and the same finite angel. As Judah was to be the first to reach a state of rest, it is implied that the second Moses and the true angel of Jehovah must arise from amongst his descendants, and that the ultimate fulfilment cannot take place, while the people are under other conduct.

The sixth section is the Lawgiver. Moses needed an angel between himself and God, Gal. iii. 19; the book of the law as a revelation of the divine will between himself and the people; and the blood of the covenant sacrifice to mediate between God and the people. The true Lawgiver knows the will of God in virtue of his community of nature; that will is revealed in his own person, not in a multitude of ordinances external to himself; and he is likewise the offering presented unto God. And as in the covenant sacrifice the blood of the victim belonged to God, but when the people entered into fellowship with him, part was given to them by sprinkling it upon them; so the people submitting to the great Lawgiver receive their portion from his sacrifice.

The seventh section is the Priest. In consequence of the people's readiness to receive God's law, he comes down to live with them in a house of his own. The view presented of the Mosaic service is an extremely low and unsuitable one, though ingenious, and presenting some worthy thoughts. Instead of seeing in the tabernacle a material representation of the relations which God sustained to men, and in the ritual an incorporation of spiritual worship, the former is represented to be a copy of human habitations, and the latter drawn from the usages of domestic life, and all idea of vicarious satisfaction is obliterated from the sacrifice. God's house has a seat or throne in the ark. It has a table, a candlestick, and an altar for a fireplace. These are separated from the throne by a veil, to intimate that though it was appropriate to have them in his house he did not need them. Incense was not a symbol of prayer, but was to make the house fragrant and delightful. As none but fragrant fire could be admitted in the house, there was a second altar without for sacrificial gifts. This was con-

structed of earth, and so belonged to the earth, yet was raised above it toward heaven. From the chosen people God chooses a family to be his special attendants, to be the ministers of his house, and to make atonement for the people, not as men but as Israelites, not for sins against the conscience, but against a law of outward ordinances. The obedience of an external act of penitence in bringing an animal as a victim, outweighs the previous disobedience of a law which has to do simply with external relations. The true priest, however, must effect an atonement for men as men, and in matters pertaining to the conscience; he must not only wear a sacred dress, and have a body free from physical blemish, but be possessed of inward and perfect holiness; he must be anointed not with oil but with the Spirit. The ideas of God's house and of his people are united in the Church. The true priest makes the Church a fit dwelling for God by kindling therein a fragrant fire, the warmth of love which is pleasing to God; by placing on the table an offering prepared from God's gifts, and fit to be presented to him though he does not need it; and by illuminating it with the light of truth and wisdom. He offers for himself in so far as by suffering he becomes a fit priest for man. His obedience in laying down his life outweighs man's disobedience in venturing his life at the suggestion of the evil one. As the mercy-seat covers the accusing law, so God's presence in the world becomes gracious by his claims upon it being covered by his Son. Christ is thus at once the mercy-seat, the high priest, and the sacrifice.

The predictions centered in the King are considered in two parts, first as represented by David and Solomon, and then by the anticipated second David. In the lack of unity and quiet for the first few centuries after the conquest, the law could not be set in unembarrassed operation. As no Asiatic nation was fully organized without a king, Balaam assumes in his prophecy that Israel would have a king amongst them. The idea of a king appears in the proposal of the people to Gideon, in the song of Hannah, and in the threatening of the man of God against Eli. In David and Solomon the hopes of Israel from this source found a brilliant though only a preliminary realization. The promise, 2 Sam. vii. 16, that David's house and

kingdom should be established for ever, need not in strictness mean more than for an indefinite period, without absolutely excluding a termination. If a new order of things should arise in which the kingdom of Israel had no place, this would limit it; but so long as Jehovah employs the instrumentality of kings in his scheme of grace, these shall belong to David's descendants. We are authorized, however, in looking for the ultimate fulfilment of the hopes awakened by the kingdom, but which David and Solomon failed fully to realize, in the line of descent from them.

The author of Psalm 78 concludes his account of God's gracious dealings toward Israel with the selection of David, which brings Judah into the place of Ephraim, and begins the realization of the blessing belonging to the former. The sufferings through which he came to the throne, and his trust in God, are depicted in Psalms 59, 52, 56, and 57. The extremity represented in Psalm 22 corresponds with 1 Samuel xxiii. 25, 26. Psalm 40 begins, verses 1–6, with a record of deliverance from danger, and ends, verses 13–18, with a prayer for complete deliverance from evils which still surround him: in the middle portion he declares that he has already shown his readiness to do God's will, verses 7–9, and to speak his praise, verses 10–12. These are the feelings with which he looked forward to his reign. Psalm 2 shows him already recognized as king, and just beginning an important war like that mentioned 2 Samuel x. 6, whose dangers are described in Psalms 60 and 83: the feelings of the better portion of the people in view of these perils are presented Psalms 44, 80, 79, 74, 89. "This day have I begotten thee," refers to the time of his anointing by Samuel, when the Spirit of the Lord came upon him. Whatever nations, he would ask, in the rightful exercise of his sovereignty, to have subjected to him, God would subdue under him. This, according to Hofmann, does not promise him universal empire, any more than the disciples actually removed the mountain and cast it into the sea, when the Saviour said that this could be accomplished by faith. The trial caused by Absalom's revolt is the subject of Psalm 41, where, verses 9, 10, refer to Ahithophel's treachery. Psalm 16 belongs to the same period: verses 9–11 simply promise deliverance from death. In Psalm

21, David gives a picture of the Lord's anointed, suggested by what had been realized in himself. He had sorrows indeed, but they were merited; and it was not given to him to do all that a king of Israel might hope to accomplish, but he knew that the work begun by him would be completed by his posterity. Enough was granted to him, and performed by him, to teach him all that he here says of the blessedness and success of the divinely constituted king.

The selection of Jerusalem as the seat of the kingdom, and the locating of the ark in Zion, exerted an important influence upon the view thenceforward taken of the relation of the people to Jehovah and its ultimate manifestation. Psalm 68 refers to these events. The hopes of Israel henceforth cluster not barely about a king but about Zion, the seat of God's habitation. The intimate connection between the king and Jehovah, in virtue of which his people, enemies and throne are likewise those of God, is set forth in Psalm 110. On the morning of the battle he feels revived by the dew of youthful vigour. "Thou art a priest for ever," does not imply the union of the kingdom and the priesthood. But David should be, as long as he lived, possessed of the priestly prerogatives, (not trenching at all upon those of the house of Aaron,) which were involved in the possession of royalty, such as representing the people before God, praying for them, and blessing them in God's name. Verse 7 refers to the foes refreshing themselves on the way, perhaps a figure for their being joined by auxiliary forces, and proudly lifting up their heads. But God has smitten the head of him who is over a great land. The triumph here achieved belongs to the war begun in Psalm 2.

What David won, Solomon enjoyed. From their different circumstances, their anticipations and wishes for the kingdom were different. David had asked for and expected victory in every conflict, Psalms 20 and 21. Solomon desires a righteous and peaceful sway in Psalm 72, which contains not a promise but a prayer. In Psalm 45, Solomon is introduced in his regal glory. The connubial estate of the king, mentioned along with other particulars in this Psalm, is presented alone in the Song of Solomon. Notwithstanding the clear proofs of the allegorical nature of this song, Hofmann denies it. It is, according

to him, a simply human relation which is set forth in it, only worthily adorned to befit the splendour of the monarch. The highest form of royal life brings us back to the first and most general of human relations, the love of man to woman. In his entire realm, Solomon finds nothing to yield him a higher degree of happiness than his love. In like manner, David, in Psalm 8, presents the calling and the destiny of man as he gathered it from the experience of his own life. Victory over God's foes, and rule over God's world, was the function to which David was called; he recognizes that of man in general to be the same. By their personal history, and by the history of the kingdom in Israel, David and Solomon were put in positions which enabled them to describe more fully and truthfully than had ever been possible before, or in the case of any other, these general good things conferred upon the race, what was given to man in his creation, what to man in the creation of woman.

The achievements of the kingdom of Israel, however, and all the glory to which it attained, lay in the sphere of natural life. It brought Israel into the possession of the promised good, so far as this was possible in temporal things, and then its splendour waned. The memory of it, which alone survived, served but to produce a longing for its restoration in a more permanent form. David was sinful, and conceived in sin. Solomon found a wearisome sameness in the experience of earthly pleasure. Ecclesiastes bears witness to this, "a book which, in spite of all contradiction, can only belong to this period, and must have been written by Solomon." The people were unholy, Psalm 14, and rested on external rites of worship, Psalm 50. David could only hope, Psalm 15 and 24, that Zion would one day be tenanted by the holy. Solomon's splendid rule was burdensome to his subjects. Judah's happy peace had come as the result of victorious strife; but it was not without remaining causes of uneasiness, and it had the seeds of corruption in its bosom. The kingdom was rent, and became the prey of powerful neighbours. In the ultimate fulfilment there must be a release from all these imperfections, and especially from sin and death, which were their cause. The true king must be one from the house of David, but

begotten of God, not to an office merely, which he should administer under the leadings of the Spirit, while possessed still of a sinful nature, but to a communion of his own life. He should be one from among the people, of the same nature with them, yet separate from sinners. He should pass through suffering to a crown; and needing no son to complete his work, he should be David and Solomon both in one. The ultimate like the preliminary fulfilment shall take place in Canaan and in Zion.

The second branch of this section discusses the further prophetical import of the kingdom under the title of the Second David. The prominent evils of the period subsequent to Solomon were the schism of the ten tribes, and the consequent encouragement given to the hostility of foreign foes. These evils point forward to the period of their removal. Hope was directed to a descendant of David's royal house to effect the reunion of the former and the chastisement of the latter. This is the key-note of the prophecies uttered in this period. This is the idea at the basis of the prediction of Azariah the son of Oded, 1 Chron. xv. 1–7. Obadiah, whose book is alleged, notwithstanding the order in which it stands in the collection of the minor prophets, to be the oldest of the prophetical writings, has for his theme the vengeance which Edom should suffer for their maltreatment of Zion. In verse 16, he intimates that other nations would in their turn injure Zion, as Edom had done, and suffer a similar penalty. Joel, who, according to Hofmann's ideas of the progress of prophetic announcement, should be placed next, predicts an assault upon Jerusalem, not by individual nations merely, but by all combined; the judgment which follows is not that inflicted upon the various nations successively in the course of God's providential government, but one final act, which shall free Jerusalem from all her foes, and which shall take place in the literal valley of Jehoshaphat, so named from the victory gained by the king of that name, 2 Chron. xx. 26. Amos ix. 8 predicts that God would destroy the sinful kingdom, i. e. that of the ten tribes, but not the house of Jacob, i. e. Judah. He speaks of the tabernacle of David as fallen, not with reference to the foreseen condition of his royal race when Christ should come, but because Judah had by Ama-

ziah's folly become a dependency of the house of Jehu. The family of David should arise from its depression, and exercise sway over Edom and "all the heathen which were called by my name," those who had once been subjected by David to the theocratic state.

The earlier revelations of Hosea are contemporaneous and to the same effect. Chapter first records a literal not a merely symbolical marriage; the prophet had to experience a treatment such as the Lord had received from Israel. He pays the woman, to whom he is married, iii. 2, the equivalent of thirty shekels or thirty ephahs of barley, that is, Ex. xvi. 16, 36, a sustenance for three hundred days. From the first of Abib to the feast of weeks commemorating the giving of the law, was sixty-five days: this sacred period sets forth the time that God lived with his people; during the rest of the year they must sit solitary and deplore his absence. Not till the next year should open would he return to them and the alliance be renewed. It was in the beginning of the year the people left Egypt; and in the beginning of the year they entered Canaan. Such a new year of reconciliation and favour should return again, but with no such sin to mar it as that of Achan; the valley of Achor should be turned, ii. 15, into a door of hope. The assurance of this renewed prosperity is not found in the ten tribes, however, but in Judah, i. 6, 7. The former must unite with the children of Judah under a common leader, and thus go up from the land of their captivity, i. 11. This leader, whom the captives appoint themselves to conduct their return, is not the Davidic king, iii. 5, who was of divine appointment. There had as yet been no prediction of a total captivity of Judah. As far as the people or the prophet knew, the king of David's line would continue to reign in Jerusalem without interruption. After this all existing evils would be exchanged for good, and the symbolical names are accordingly reversed. Hofmann admits no interregnum after Jeroboam II., and thus reduces to that extent the length of Hosea's ministry.

The early part of the ministries of Isaiah and Micah exhibit the corruption of manners which had resulted from prosperity; and a period is predicted which should consist with God's holiness, and a prosperity of another sort than that which accorded

with the lusts of these sinners. Micah ii. 12, 13, puts the blessings which he predicts in designed contrast with the words of the lying prophets, verse 11, who promise impunity to men walking in their lusts. In Isaiah iv. 2–6, it is declared, that after the nobles and women of Jerusalem have been punished, they shall find their beauty and glory, not in silver, and gold, and horses, ii. 7, and not in finery, iii. 18, but in what Jehovah causes to spring up from the land, its blessed condition. And instead of reposing their trust in their mighty men, captains and judges, all distinctions would be merged in the common title, "holy," given to all who were written unto life. Purity from sin, and a protection not human, but divine, should characterize Jerusalem. Isaiah ii. 2–4, is from an oral discourse of Micah, subsequently committed to writing, iv. 1–3. Right shall be as mighty in Jerusalem as now injustice. Instead of bribed priests, judges, and prophets, Jehovah himself teaches what is right. Zion becomes in consequence the metropolis of the earth, even physical changes being wrought to effect it. To establish this, Ezek. xl. 2 and Zech. xiv. 10 are compared.

The views of Judah's future have thus far been influenced by the internal condition of the kingdom. External events now occurred materially affecting its fortunes, and these give a new turn to the prophecies. Upon the Syro-Ephraimitic invasion, Isaiah assures Ahaz of the failure of the schemes of the confederate kings, and gives him the son of a virgin as a sign. The virgin is the house of David. The Lord is the husband to whom she is to be married. The Messiah is her child. His eating butter and honey, the products of an untilled land, denote the desolation of the country. The fulfilment of this began with the ravages of the king of Assyria; it was completed by the appearance of the Messiah in such a prostrate condition of Palestine as is here described. This extraordinary interpretation is in a later publication of Hofmann's, his Schriftbeweis exchanged for one more extraordinary and untenable still. The virgin is the people of Israel; the child miraculously born is "the people of salvation," formed out of the midst of them by the exercise of a divine agency. The evangelist applies "this law of the history of God's people" to the birth of the Saviour, in which it also holds good.

The mere multiplication of the nation, ix. 3, would not produce joy, but God's presence would; "they joy before thee." This joy is presented under three particulars, deliverance from foreign oppression, verse 4, the end of war, verse 5, and the reign of the second David, verse 6, who is to be a wonderful counsellor, a divine hero, and a father, whose paternal care shall never cease. To attain this result, three things are needed, the chastisement of Ephraim, ix. 7, x. 4, breaking the rod of Assyria, x. 5–34, and the shoot from the stem of Jesse, xi. 1–10. This descendant of Jesse shall possess the fear of God himself, and be pleased with it in others. Neither wicked men nor noxious animals shall be allowed to do any harm in God's holy mountain, i. e. in Canaan, which is here regarded as a mountainous country. This king shall also be a centre of attraction to the rest of the world, which shall seek unto him by whole nations. They that have been exiled shall likewise partake of these blessings, verses 11–16. They shall come back, Judah and Israel shall be once more united, and shall be again victorious over the nations once subjugated by David, and literal miracles shall be wrought on their behalf, removing every obstacle, and overcoming all opposition. These conquests are not inconsistent with the peace of Messiah's reign, since this embraces a long period of successive epochs. These same things substantially had been predicted by other prophets before. But the form of their presentation is modified now by the knowledge just gained of the fact that the power in which Ahaz preferred to trust, rather than Jehovah, would reduce the house of David to a state of abject weakness; and only in the moment when complete destruction seemed inevitable, would the son of David overthrow this oppressing power, and exalt his people, purified by their distress.

The same progress is observable in Micah. He speaks of the ruin which is impending from Assyria, i. 8–16, v. 5, declares that Jerusalem shall become heaps, iii. 12, and that her people shall be carried captive to Babylon, iv. 10. This is a preliminary condition to the return of her former prosperity. She shall there be delivered and redeemed from the hand of her enemies. The stronghold of the daughter of Zion must first become a "tower of the flock," iv. 8, be reduced to a mere

lookout for watching sheep. The royal house must sink to the shepherd-state of David before he was made king, and then the dominion shall come back; the second David shall be found in the same obscurity that the first was. The "tower of the flock" is more particularly named as suggestive to the house of David, not only of a former state of obscurity, but of a change for the better. It was at the tower of the flock, Gen. xxxv. 21, that Reuben forfeited his supremacy, which passed from him to Judah; thence also David was brought to be anointed king by Samuel. In iv. 9–13, are described the carrying away of the people to Babylon, and the oppression which they should suffer from many nations, followed by their glorious triumph over them, in which a reference is supposed, not to the successes of the Maccabees, but to the final conflict yet future. The "daughter of troops" in v. 1, is the daughter of Zion, as accustomed to attack, and now besieged. She is directed not to "gather herself in troops," but to "cut herself," in token of grief at her lamentable condition. Jerusalem thus besieged and humbled, is contrasted with Bethlehem, which shall give birth to the mighty Ruler, the place of whose issue is from everlasting, i. e. from the house of David, as it was long before, from its primitive Bethlehem-condition. To such forced interpretations does the attempt to explain away the Deity of the Messiah, from this and other passages, where it is clearly taught, necessarily lead. Hofmann adds, "How any one can find in the first verses of chap. 5, the manifestation of Christ, which has already taken place, is perfectly inconceivable." The whole belongs, according to him, to the ultimate future.

What Jeremiah and Ezekiel say of the second David, and Zechariah of the king coming to the daughter of Zion, is a simple repetition of what other prophets had predicted before. Assyria fell, but Chaldea came in its place, and depopulated Jerusalem. The hope of salvation then gathered about the view granted to Jeremiah, of a termination of the exile after seventy years. Those years were, however, enlarged to weeks of years. There was a new Jerusalem, but it was enslaved; a Judah, but without a prince of David's line. They gained a brief independence under the Maccabees, but soon fell under a fresh conqueror. The abortive attempt to throw off the Roman

yoke ended in a new destruction and dispersion from the holy land. The unhappy people still await the second David and his blissful sway.

The ninth section is entitled the Prophet. By the law and its priestly ordinances Israel became Jehovah's holy people; by its history it became under David and Solomon a kingly, and then, under the yoke of foreign oppression, a prophetic and teaching people. Deut. xviii. 15 predicts not an individual, but the whole line of prophets. The prophet is one from Israel's midst, who speaks not his own will but God's. Nothing can obstruct his fulfilment of his commission or the accomplishment of what he has declared. Still there are limitations, which point forward to their future removal. He is a sinful man whose lips need purging; his inspiration is not permanent, but occasional; it is not his person, but his utterances that are instructive; he is the herald not of present, but of future good; he cannot impart to others the good which he foretells, nor even the power of predicting it.

Moses wished that all the Lord's people were prophets. Joel announces that they shall be. The gift of a teacher of righteousness, ii. 23, (Eng. Ver. Marg.) is followed by rain and fruitful seasons; but the prophesying of the entire people, ii. 28, (by which is understood, not barely their sanctification, but that condition of things in which none shall have to teach his neighbour,) is followed by judgment upon their foes. The "servant of Jehovah," spoken of repeatedly in the latter part of Isaiah, and the description of whose vicarious sufferings in chap. 53, excludes any other than a messianic explanation, is nevertheless declared to be Israel in their prophetic character. What is said of him is consequently true of the prophetic order in which this function of the people was prominently represented. It is also true of Isaiah and other individual prophets, in as far as they belong to this order, and share its character and fortunes.

The tenth section is the Universal Monarch. Nebuchadnezzar was God's servant, and was raised up to represent an idea, which should find a final and complete realization in Israel. The image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream and the four beasts of Daniel's vision, symbolize the empires of Babylon, Medo-Persia,

Greece, and Rome. The "one like the son of man," who succeeds them, vii. 13, is not the Messiah, but a symbol of Israel's kingdom, though this of course implies a king. This is human, while those are brutal; this is celestial, seen in the clouds of heaven, while those are earthly, running or flying on the earth. This goes beyond previous predictions, simply in showing through what forms the empires of earth must pass before the final triumph of Israel. To this general outline are added, in chap. viii., some details respecting the approaching period of affliction under Antiochus Epiphanes.

His explanation of Daniel ix. 24–27, is one of the most wretched failures in his whole book. The seventy years foretold by Jeremiah as the period of the exile, must be counted from the final destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, which, according to Hofmann, occurred B. C. 605. The seventy weeks of Daniel, chap. ix., come in their place, and must be reckoned from the same point. Of these weeks, seven extend to an anointed one, a prince, i. e. until Israel shall have a monarch of their own, not a vassal, but an independent and universal ruler. These weeks follow the sixty-two which are next mentioned, whether immediately or separated by an indefinite interval, is not foreshown. The event shows that such an interval must be assumed, or else, as is suggested, II., p. 280, an enlarged reckoning of these weeks as jubilee-periods must be coördinated with the other. During the sixty two weeks which succeed the destruction, the city should be built; not that the rebuilding should occupy all that time; but its condition should be the opposite of Zech. ii. 4, a city not needing walls for its protection, or unable to contain its inhabitants within such limits. These weeks reach to B. C. 171. After this, an anointed one (not the prince before mentioned) shall be cut off; not that he shall be put to death, but there shall cease to be a divinely appointed leader of the people. The phrase, "and not for himself," is rendered, "and there shall be no (such leader) to him" (the people.) The deposition of Onias is the event referred to. "The prince that shall come," is Antiochus Epiphanes. He shall make a firm covenant for one week with many who shall give in their adhesion to him. And during (the second) half of the week he shall abolish sacrifice and

oblation, even upon the abominable cover that maketh desolate, (this is referred to the idolatrous symbols put upon the altar, which effectually terminated all legitimate sacrifice,) until the end, and the decreed judgment which shall be poured upon the destined to destruction. Onias was deposed in the former part of the year 170 B. C. Antiochus died in the former part of the year 163 B. C. The altar was profaned the fifteenth day of Chisleu, 167 B. C.

God's servant Israel as a prophet, by suffering accomplishes the salvation of the world; glorified Israel shall, like Nebuchadnezzar, resistlessly rule the world. But even now Israel is not powerless; the prophet rules the world by his word. This lesson is found in Zechariah, chap. xi., of which the following novel and ingenious, but untenable exposition is given: Verses 1–3 are connected with the close of the preceding chapter; following upon the annihilation of the pride of Assyria and the sceptre of Egypt, they contain a general denunciation upon all that is lofty. The firs, cedars, and oaks, are symbols of worldly power. In verse 4, Zechariah, as a representative of the prophetic order, is told to act the part of a shepherd to mankind, who are called a flock of slaughter, because given over to be slaughtered by unfaithful shepherds, their wicked rulers. Obedient to the direction, he fed the flock of slaughter, and by consequence, "the poor of the flock," those who most needed care and attention, i. e. Israel, so called, as inferior to other nations in worldly advantages. The first staff, Beauty or Sweetness, is designed for the heathen nations, and denotes the nature of the treatment which they receive. They are led in the ways of worldly pleasure. The other staff was named Oppressors, and was designed for Israel; it was thus God corrected and guided them. The three shepherds cut off in one month, are the first three empires of Daniel, Babylon, Persia, and Greece. If by an extension of the principle of Daniel a week be made to mean, not seven years, but seven times seven, a month will be two hundred and ten; correspondent with which the period from the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus, to the death of Alexander, was two hundred and fifteen years. The pay of thirty shekels, offered to the shepherd, was that of a hireling, a shekel per day for this month in which he laboured for all

mankind, and so, in a general sense, for Israel; but no account is made of what he did for them specially. The casting this price to the potter, implies an indignant rejection of it, as if it were as worthless as the clay in which he wrought. His casting it in the temple, implies that it is to be a potter's field; it is a threatening of destruction to Jerusalem. Breaking the staff with which he ruled the heathen, broke his covenant with them, and implied that he would have nothing more to do with feeding them. Breaking his other staff is not said to dissolve his relation with Israel, but to rend the people themselves into opposing factions. As the rule of the prophet is thus not accepted, the world is given up, verses 15–17, to the power of a fourth evil shepherd, the last monarchy of Daniel.

The Restorer is the subject of the eleventh section. The restoration under Joshua and Zerubbabel was partial, but it was prophetic of one which would be complete. All that was precious and costly was then in the possession of the heathen, but Haggai, ii. 7, predicts that it should come to adorn God's sanctuary; and, ii. 23, in the coming commotions, God would protect one prince, Zerubbabel or his descendant. Of the visions in the early part of Zechariah, the first teaches that the heathen, though now at ease, are to be punished for their ill treatment of Jerusalem. In the second, the powers that scattered Israel are driven away, so that the exiled people can return. In the third, Jerusalem in consequence has become populous. In the fourth, the personal sins of Joshua the high priest are forgiven. In the fifth, the candlestick represents the work which God would complete by his Spirit, viz. his temple: the two sons of oil are Haggai and Zechariah, who supply the Spirit to the people, in virtue of which they shall succeed in their enterprise. The sixth and seventh represent the removal of all that is ungodly from the holy land. The eighth represents those providential movements by which the peace and safety of Palestine were to be secured. The two mountains are Moriah and Zion. Brass is the metal of war. The four chariots are the four empires of Daniel. In verses 6, 7, the bay horses are not mentioned, (for "bay," Eng. Ver., the original has "strong,") because the empire of Babylon was already at an end. The black horses of Persia go into the north country of

Babylon. They are followed by the white horses of Greece. The grizzled horses of Antiochus Epiphanes, who stands between the third and fourth empires, as in some of the later revelations of Daniel, go into the south country of Egypt. The strong, who go through all the earth, are Rome. The import of the symbolical action that follows is, that the priestly and kingly offices shall be united in the true Restorer of the glory of David and Solomon. The predictive elements of this epoch reside in the facts that the priest and the prince are engaged together in building the temple; that this is carried on by the people at home, and furthered by the distant exiles.

The coming of Jehovah forms the concluding section of the Old Testament prediction. Jehovah had often visited his people in mercy or in judgment, but the full blessing of his presence had not yet been realized. He had visited them in Egypt, to redeem them from bondage, and on Sinai, to give them his law. He had given them rest through David, and peaceful security through Solomon. But many a day of sorrow had arisen since, and many oppressions had been experienced. When will the Lord, in the full sense of the word, dwell with his people and be their God? When will that be accomplished which his former deliverances have prepared them to expect? Zechariah, chaps. xii. and xiv. shows that a new conquest of Jerusalem by the gathered nations shall precede the Lord's appearance on the mount of Olives before Jerusalem, for the salvation of his people and the destruction of their foes. Ezekiel had seen in a vision the glory of God come back to the new temple, and make it his perpetual abode. The Lord, says Malachi, shall suddenly, at an unlooked for moment, come to his temple.

The result of the anticipations furnished by the facts of the former economy is summed up thus: "Out of Israel is to come forth a redeemer and a lawgiver, who shall separate them from the world, and make them the congregation of the Lord; a priest, king, and prophet, who shall make them perfectly and in spiritual things what Israel once was in natural things. With him God shall come to the congregation of Israel, and give them dominion over the human race. For in Israel is the salvation of the world. Israel is the man of God, the seed of

salvation, the righteous. And what is true of Israel in the midst of the nations, is true of the son of David in the midst of his own people." The history of the Old Testament is thus regarded by Hofmann as predictive throughout, and furnishing in each of its successive stages the theme which it is the province of the prophets, under the guidance of the same Spirit, by whom the history is itself controlled, simply to develope and expand. The New Testament history presents at once fulfilment and prediction. It introduces to a certain extent those good things, of which the shadows had been possessed before, and to which the unfoldings of the divine plan, both in fact and in word, had for ages been teaching Israel to look forward; while at the same time the absolute consummation was not yet reached. It was but a new step in the direction of the end, not the end itself; or rather it was but the beginning of the end. It brought a part of the destined inheritance into possession; it brought also fresh promises of more. So that thenceforward there was not only the unfulfilled residue of Old Testament prediction, which continued to point to a more distant future, but the fresh sense awakened of previously unanticipated wants spoke of supplies to be granted, and benefits never before enjoyed became pledges of larger gifts held in reserve.

It follows from the theory already presented that the ideal kept before the minds of the Old Testament saints, that towards which the history was pushing its constant advances, and that which the prophets were perpetually sketching is to be contemplated in its unity, being the sum of every perfection as far as the necessities experienced or the blessings imparted had taught the people of God, wherein perfection consisted. This is at one period surveyed from one side, at another from another; but it is throughout one and the same. In its actual fulfilment, however, this unit divides itself into a number of particulars properly embraced within its scope, which are separately brought out as the history advances, each representing a series of cognate predictions. As no one prediction covers the entire sum of what was to be fulfilled, so no single item in the fulfilment embraces the whole of what had been predicted; only those points dispersed over the Old Testament which relate to

the same individual trait of the future, will be found reproduced together in the New. Special pains are taken by our author to show, though frequently with indifferent success, that the applications made by the sacred writers of Old Testament prophecies to New Testament facts sustain his theory, or are at least reconcilable with it. The course of fulfilment is traced from the incarnation to the complete establishment of the Christian Church, under the various heads of the Son of God, the Son of David, the Child Jesus, the Baptist and the Son of God, the Prophet of Galilee, the Sufferings and Death of Jesus, his Resurrection and Ascension, the Outpouring of the Holy Spirit, the Hardening of Israel and the Calling of the Gentiles, and the Church of Jesus Christ.

The New Testament is likewise predictive, because, though it contains gifts never before paralleled, there is a remaining incompleteness which needs to be supplied; that is bestowed which implicitly involves while it does not as yet actually confer the full perfection of the future. This is presented under four particulars. First: Christ came into the world, but he did so as a helpless babe. A son of David's royal house, he was nevertheless born of a poor virgin, espoused to a carpenter. Possessed of an infinite nature, he was yet subject to the law of Israel, and to the magistracy of the heathen. But the divinity of his person assures that this contradiction of the inward reality with the outward appearance shall be reconciled by the final and evident mastery of the former. The weakness of his human nature, and the meanness attaching to his estate of humiliation shall vanish in the state of glory. He partook of flesh and blood, and entered into the conditions of human life in order to effect a union between himself and fallen men. But the triumph over sin and the evil one, of which his immaculate nature affords a pledge, shall secure the transformation of both the persons and the nature of his people into his own glorious image. And that the wise men from the far off East pay him their homage and offer him gifts, while the king of Judea seeks his destruction, foreshadows his acceptance by the heathen and his rejection by the leaders of the Jews.

Secondly. The Redeemer showed himself publicly to the people, but it was in the character of a prophet and a teacher.

He does not introduce the new world of salvation, but makes declarations respecting himself and his salvation, and to these declarations he demands faith instead of rendering faith superfluous by sight. Occasion of offence is left both in his doctrine and the circumstances of its delivery, for those who choose to take offence; while its purity of itself awakens the hostility of them that love their sins, so that this prophet shares the same fortune with those who preceded him in Israel; but the limitation experienced from this people shall be compensated by an extension of his doctrine beyond their bounds. His selection and mission of the twelve and the seventy show that his teachings shall be borne by his followers to those whom his personal ministrations would not reach. His miracles of deliverance from physical evil assure both believers individually and his Church collectively, of redemption from evil of every form, and even from all exposure to it.

Thirdly. Christ was glorified, but not without first dying, and arose from the dead, but not without ascending from earth to heaven. An indication is thus given that for his individual followers and for the collective Church as for himself, the path to exaltation and glory lay through sufferings, through crucifixion to the world and separation from all that is earthly. Christ's people shall partake of the life of his glorified nature. This was fulfilled when the Spirit was poured out, and when the apostles could say that they were dead with Christ, but raised with him to newness of life, or when they could say of the Church that it was the body of Christ, and one with him as a wife with her husband.

This incipient fulfilment, however, became itself a fresh prediction, which is unfolded under the fourth head of the Church of Christ in the world. The same contradiction here exists between the inward reality and the outward manifestation, as existed in Christ himself in his humiliation: so that in like manner its present temporary condition points forward to its future and everlasting state, and what befalls it now is a premonition of what shall befall it until that state is reached. Everything in the individual and in the world at large shall be ultimately made tributary to the service of the Lord. Diversities of every grade shall cease, their only use being the

temporary necessities of the Church, which shall then be all fully and for ever supplied. The Church now suffers in two ways from contact with an ungodly world, from violence without, and from false doctrine within; but her hope in both rests upon the fact that God's Spirit is mightier as a witness for the truth than Satan as a teacher of error, and that Christ has received all power in heaven and on earth. The contest between Christ and the evil one will continue to grow in intensity until nothing remains wherewith Satan has not tried to assault the Church. Persecution and false doctrine will be carried to their highest pitch; and the same will be true of the divine chastisement of the foes of the Church and her steadfast testimony to the truth, before the victory shall be completely and gloriously won by her change from mortality to immortality, and by placing the dominion of the world in her hands. This struggle between the Church and organized communities or governments of men ending in the triumphant sway of the former, does not however of necessity conduct human history to its absolute termination. The empire of Christ and of his glorified Church having come into the place of those worldly empires, to which the task had previously been committed of moulding men into homogeneous masses, a new process of like character is set in operation on the part of the glorified Church toward that portion of mankind still extraneous to it. The divinity of this Church is now manifest in its whole state and character, but Satan may be allowed to exert an influence upon unsanctified men that shall array them in hostility to it. With the ultimate crushing of this hostility comes the end of all things. The history of empires closed with the glorification of the Church and the establishment of Christ's sole and universal empire. The history of mankind now ends with a judgment of all the inhabitants of the world outside of the limits of the glorified Church, by which the bad are finally sundered from the good. "For there are good, who did not in their life-time belong to the Church of Christ, but only died desiring redemption from their sins." These are now added to the Church, while all others go into everlasting perdition. To these indications of the future gathered from the present condition and experience of the Church, as these developed themselves already

in the apostolic age, it is added as a lesson from the Old Testament, that the calling of Israel and the setting apart of Canaan will find their highest verification in the ultimate future. Israel shall again be in contrast with the rest of the world the Lord's peculiar people; and against them the chief hostility of the ungodly empire of this world shall consequently be directed, a type of which according to the prophet Daniel is afforded by the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes. Canaan and Zion shall also again be the chosen scenes of God's mighty acts, and in the revelation of the Church's glory this land shall be distinguished beyond all others.

The New Testament history being regarded as predictive in the manner and to the extent now explained, the verbal predictions of our Lord and his apostles are arranged under these several heads; and, as in the case of the prophetic utterances belonging to the Old Testament, the attempt is made to show that they simply clothe in words indications respecting the future already furnished by the existing present. The Revelation of the apostle John is classed under the fourth head: a sketch of the interpretation given of this book shall conclude this survey of Hofmann's system.

Without reckoning the introduction and the conclusion the book of Revelation consists of five series of predictions. The first contains the letters to the seven churches, and relates to the condition of the then present. The second containing the seven seals covers the entire future, and discloses whatever shall conduce to the introduction and the laying open of the divine mystery of eternal salvation. The next three series belong to the ultimate future. The seven trumpets of the third are the final warnings by which the world is summoned to repentance, as precursors of the judgment. In the fourth, chaps. xii.–xiv., is exhibited the final struggle between the Church and her antagonists, worldly empire which seeks to crush her from without and false doctrine which aims to destroy her from within, the acmé therefore of the same twofold struggle which is depicted as already begun in the letters to the churches. The fifth, xv. 1—xxii. 5, reveals the last outpouring of God's wrath upon the world and the full redemption of his Church.

The letters severally addressed to the seven churches in Asia portray their existing spiritual condition, and add appropriate encouragements and warnings. These same conditions shall be reproduced not as seven consecutive phases of the Church's life, but as coexisting features of that state in which she shall be found when the ultimate period of trial described in this book shall arrive.

The scene presented in chap. iv. is a grand celestial council over which God presides. The four-and-twenty elders are not the representatives of the Church of both dispensations. They are not men but spirits. Their number is the product of the four cherubs and their six wings; or of the four quarters of the globe and the six days of creation, intimating that they are assembled to deliberate and pronounce judgment upon the world of creatures. The four beasts represent the attributes of Him who sits upon the throne. Their forms are indicative of courage, strength, wisdom and swiftness; their being full of eyes, omniscience; the sea of glass, that all is transparent before him. The sealed book does not contain a record of the events of the future in general, nor of the ultimate future, as though the disclosures that follow were copied from it; but it has written in it the future glory, that new condition of things to which the events of the present state are preparatory. Each seal, as it is opened, does not permit a portion of the book to be read which John then records, but is accompanied by such events or symbols of events as shall take a correspondent place in preparing the way for its final unloosing. The whole seven seals must be opened before the book can be unrolled, and the blessed mystery which it contains of the future world and everlasting life be brought to light.

The first four seals prepare the way for the end, and the events which they portend occur not successively but together through protracted periods. The word of salvation must travel victoriously over the earth. War, famine, and death, though subject to specified restrictions, shall terrify and plague the earth; and then shall the end come. The fifth seal informs the slaughtered saints that the period of persecution consequent upon the triumphs of the word is not yet ended, and shall not be until the number of martyrs is complete. The sixth is not

premonitory symptoms but the actual coming of the day of judgment and of vengeance upon the ungodly. In contrast with this is set forth in two paragraphs, vii. 1–8 and verses 9–17, the protection of God's people who should live at that day, and the safety of such as had died in the tribulations that had preceded. The tribes of the former passage are to be literally understood; and it would seem, according to our author, that while martyrs out of every nation had gone to heaven, none were sealed on earth but the literal Israel. The silence which follows the seventh seal is not the stillness that precedes a storm such as is supposed to be found, vii. 1, but the quiet of the Sabbath period which then begins. The last seal of the book is removed, and the new world of glory is opened. John does not see nor read its contents himself; he only sees the impression made upon those who do. As the whole of the revelations of this book were made in one day, the half hour's silence is proportionally a long period.

With the trumpets blown as signals of command a fresh series opens. The scene is in heaven with the same background as before, but the action begins anew. They are the last summons to a guilty world to repent of their sins. Here as in the case of the seals the first four are cotemporaneous, and the last three successive. The earth with all its adjuncts in a literal sense is smitten. One third of whatever is upon the earth, its products, or beside the earth, the sea, or flows through or from beneath the earth, its waters, or above the earth, the heavenly bodies, suffer the precise changes described, though the agents in effecting them, e. g. the burning mountain and the falling star are figurative. The fifth trumpet brings up locusts from the abyss. The powers of the world beneath are let loose to afflict men in the way and to the extent specified, though the agents are here again figurative and are perhaps to be understood of pestilential diseases. The five months of their duration appear to be literally understood; though an "inner reason" is assigned for the specifying of that particular period. Days would be too short; years would be too long, for the greatest length of time occupied by any event of the last times is forty-two months. And the number five is yielded by the five sins to be chastised, ix. 20, 21.

The sixth trumpet looses the four angels of death held in readiness for the appointed moment in the Euphrates, which was the boundary between the promised land and that region in which the great empires of antiquity arose to spread destruction over the earth. From this same spot this mighty spiritual host go forth to the four quarters of the globe, not to torture but to slay. The prominent feature in this calamity is its suddenness, as in the preceding, its duration. Before the seventh trumpet, as before the seventh seal, two scenes are introduced of a preparatory character. The little book eaten by John contains the mystery of God, the final glory. It is sweet to man so far as he belongs to God, (the mouth is the organ of the prophet's office,) and bitter in so far as he belongs to this world. The meaning of x. 11, is not that the eating of this book was intended to qualify the apostle to utter the prophecies which now follow, but it simply recalls him to the interrupted duty of prophesying after he had had in this book a foretaste of the end. Faith in the angel's oath, that time should shortly cease, is greatly needed to sustain the constancy of those who live when the seventh trumpet is impending, for then the holy city even to the outer court of the temple shall fall under the power of hostile heathen, and God's two servants clothed with miraculous powers shall be slain and lie unburied in the street of Jerusalem, which, from the desolating judgment it had experienced before John wrote this book, is likened to Sodom and Egypt. These events, as well as the resurrection of the two witnesses and the succeeding earthquake with its effects, are literally understood. Then follows the seventh trumpet terminating this series with the final judgment upon the enemies of God, though as in the case of the seventh seal the event itself is not described but only the impression which it produced.

With chap. xii. a fresh action begins. The seer is still in heaven, but the scenery of chap. iv. is not continued. The woman is not the Jewish nation, nor the Christian Church, but the Church of Israel. Her child is the Messiah. The dragon is the devil, who shows his power in heaven by drawing the third part of the stars, and his power on earth by the crowns upon his heads. Seven is the number of divine, and ten of

human possibilities. The heads are the various seats of Satan's worldly empire, or the various forms in which it successively appears, of which there are as many as the decree of God determines or allows. The horns are the instruments by which he at any one time exerts or displays his power; and these are determined by the ability of men. This monstrous shape represents the worldly empire of Satan, not at any single period but in the most comprehensive sense. The one thousand two hundred and three-score days of the woman's flight into the wilderness is not to be reckoned from the birth of the child, but is mentioned by anticipation, xii. 6, for the sake of putting in connection the provision respectively made for the safety of the woman and her child. The flight properly succeeds the war of Michael, Israel's patron, and Satan, which issues in the expulsion of the latter from heaven, so that he can no longer accuse Israel there, and they are henceforth in no danger of being deprived of God's favour. The wilderness is Palestine, which is so called because desolated at the time this book was written. The period of her protection there is the same as the forty-two months and the twelve hundred and sixty days of chap. xi., the three years and a half reign of the personal antichrist, the last foe of God's people. As Israel was thus protected against his attacks, the dragon goes to make war with the remnant of her seed, viz. the believing heathen.

Wo had been pronounced, xii. 12, upon the inhabiters of the earth and sea because of the dragon having been cast down from heaven. A beast now arises out of each to execute his designs. In xiii. 1, Hofmann adopts the reading, He (the dragon) stood upon the shore of the sea, and I saw, etc. The sea is the agitated mass of mankind, as the earth is the symbol of firmness and repose. The beast arising out of the former is characterized by violence; it is identical with the fourth or nondescript beast of Daniel symbolizing the empire of Rome, and is here viewed solely in the form which it shall assume at the last under the rule of the personal antichrist. Hence, while the seven heads remain, those various tendencies which were developed in the different empires of the world still continue, the crowns are no longer upon the heads. The sway has

passed from those seats of empire and is vested in the ten horns, the princes of this last impersonation of blasphemy, the agents or instruments of his power. This beast combines in itself characteristics of the three preceding as seen by Daniel, the lion, bear, and leopard, though most resembling the third or Macedonian, to which Antiochus Epiphanes belonged. The head slain and healed means that a form of empire which had already perished is in this revived; the same thing is indicated by the statement, xi. 7, that this beast ascended out of the bottomless pit. Antichrist is, as it were, Epiphanes brought back to life. In the number of the beast, six carried through hundreds, tens and units stands opposed to seven, the number of divine possibilities, or of the completion of the divine counsel. The dominion of the beast is the last peril of the Church, the last period before the day of her perfection. The manifestation of Christ ushers in the sacred seven after the six of the beast, the Sabbath after the six days in which the Church, a new creation, has arisen and grown up under the hostility of the world. All that the world, which knows nothing of this Sabbath, can bring to bear against the kingdom of Christ, is found concentrated in the beast, whose number is therefore 666, as the number of the name *Ἰησοῦς* the new man, is in contrast with the seven of the first creation, 888. The second beast with the horns of a lamb, employing the two instruments which the Lamb employs, viz. the word and miracles, is the lying prophet of this blasphemous ruler.

While the world has fallen completely under the influence of the dragon and his two beasts, John sees the Lamb and the one hundred and forty-four thousand previously sealed, not in heaven, but in a sacred spot on earth, the literal Mount Zion. The Lamb is present with them. He is seen in the vision, but he is at the time referred to, no more visible than the dragon is, who is in the world. They are blessed with divine protection while the rest of men are exposed to those judgments which now begin. Seven angels successively appear; three prepare the way, four act as executioners. The first summons the world to repentance by the annunciation that judgment is at hand; the second holds up the fall of Babylon in evidence that

judgment has begun. The overthrow of his metropolis and that of antichrist himself are here distinguished as by Isaiah, xiii. 1, xiv. 23, xiv. 24–27, the fall of Babylon and of the Assyrian monarch. The third angel warns of the eternal doom of those who submit to the beast. Four angels execute the two works of harvest or the ingathering of the people of God, and the vintage or the crushing of his foes. The "son of man," xiv. 14, is not Christ as is shown by his receiving an order from an angel, which he obeys. The wine-press was without the city of Jerusalem, the very place indicated by Joel, who locates the final overthrow of God's enemies in the valley of Jehoshaphat, where it shall literally occur.

The fifth and last series begins with chap. xv. The vials like the trumpets are introduced by an occurrence in heaven. It is now, however, not the acceptance of the prayers of saints still on earth, but the triumphant song of faithful confessors upon the crystal sea of heaven, which as they look through it to the earth appears mingled with fire from the reflection of the judgments there taking place. The inflictions, which follow, are upon the kingdom of the beast now rid of all the confessors of Jesus. The first three vials are in recompense for the sins of wearing the mark of the beast and shedding the blood of the saints. Fire and darkness are a foretaste of the outer darkness and the lake of fire. The drying up of the Euphrates leaves Babylon defenceless and gives free admission to the kings of the East, who like Cyrus and Cyaxares will accomplish her destruction. Before the seventh trumpet John had heard the oath of the angel and seen the two witnesses of God. Before the seventh vial he sees three spirits, messengers of Satan and his two earthly representatives, go forth to gather the world to battle against the saints at Armageddon, and hears the voice, "Behold, I come as a thief." The seventh vial completes the judgment and annihilates this host; the account of this vial ends with the first clause of xvi. 18. The "great earthquake" in the second clause begins a second section in this last series with a view to a more detailed account of the sixth and seventh plagues just announced, viz. the fall of Babylon and the overthrow of antichrist.

The earthquake divides the great city, which is explained to be Jerusalem, into three parts corresponding to the three hills on which it is built. A physical change is here intended, as also by Zechariah's prediction of the cleaving asunder of the mount of Olives. Jerusalem is shaken and the cities of the nations fall: Babylon shall not escape. She is represented by the woman on the scarlet-coloured beast. The five heads or kings already fallen are the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Antiochus, who for a special reason is here separately counted. The sixth then existing, when John wrote, was the Roman. The beast itself which is the eighth, and is at the same time one of the seven, is antichrist, which is the fifth head revived. The ten horns are not kings in the same sense that the beast is, but they belong to the beast and are used by him. And they are his agents in destroying the metropolis, whose fall is celebrated, chap. xviii. Then follows the next display of judgment in which the Word of God, the King of kings, destroys the beast and his armies. The glorified Church, all whose deceased members and not the martyrs only are raised from the dead, shall then reign over mankind for one thousand years, the eighth thousand of the world's history, corresponding with the eighth or Lord's day of Christ's resurrection. Satan is after that permitted to rouse the nations to rebellion against the sway of the glorified Church and to an attack upon the holy city. This is miraculously quelled. Then follows the second resurrection and the judgment of men outside of the Church. The lake of fire is the portion of the bad. The Church with the accessions now received is admitted into the new Jerusalem, which unlike the former city is of heavenly origin and located in a new earth. With the description of its glory these visions end.

ART. II.—*Confucianism.*

THERE are two things which make the study of any heathen system of philosophy or religion important. First: These systems form the best key for understanding the peculiarities of any people. They are usually not so short-lived as political changes, but shaping the current of thought and action they often endure through successive generations. Mightier in their conquests than the sword, they outlive dynasties, often bringing the conqueror in submission to the conquered. Not generals, but philosophers have exercised the greatest control over the destinies of our race. This has been eminently true among the Chinese. For more than two thousand years Confucius has been the teacher of emperors. No other mortal ever impressed the leading ideas of his philosophy on so large a portion of the race, and for so long a time. Though never considered by his followers as anything but a man, he has for centuries occupied a place more prominent than any of their gods. His system, in its natural growth and modifications, has had its peculiar civilization—a civilization which had passed its highest point before modern civilization began; it has had its peculiar education, which made men officers of government instead of priests of religion; it has had its morality, teaching what is the practice of so many everywhere, that man's highest duties relate to earth; it has had its peculiar worship, that of ancestors, one of the oldest, and in China the most rigidly observed of all systems of false worship. Thus in its long sway have the main features of this philosophy become the main characteristics of the Chinese.

Another thing which makes the study of heathen systems important is the opportunity which it affords of tracing the modifications through which they pass, and also their effects upon those who embrace them. Few systems, certainly no erroneous ones, remain at the stand-point from which they commenced. False principles first modify and then supplant; and

these false principles have no very wide range. Error moves in cycles. Some new speculation it is fancied is brought forward, with all its claims of novelty and improvement, but oftener than its author imagines it is found to be the reproduction of some worn-out theory. Remarkably true in philosophy is the saying of the wise man, "There is nothing new under the sun." So that error investigated in one place is an index of its effect in another. It may be moving before us in the same cycle in which it has moved in another place thousands of years ago. As an illustration of these remarks, Confucianism affords us an example on a broad scale of the effect of the theory that man's nature is originally good; first, in modifying monotheism into practical atheism, and finally into materialism and pantheism. Second, the external effects of such a downward progress might also be traced in the direct and indirect contributions it has made to superstition and idolatry.

In giving some account of this system, we shall take Confucianism in its wide sense as a system which owes its leading features to Confucius, and of which he is its most distinguished representative. Historically considered, however, he was not its founder, and much has been supplemented to it which would never have gained his consent.

The most convenient method of treating the subject will be to divide it into three periods.

First, that before Confucius, which is represented in the Shoo-King or historical classic.

Second period, from Confucius to Mencius, represented by the Four Books—books which hold the same relation to the Chinese .that the Shastres do to the Hindu, the Koran to the Mohammedan, or the Bible to the Christian.

Third period, that of the philosophers of the Sung dynasty, principally represented by Choo He or Choo-foo-tsze, who died A. D. 1200, and whose system is represented in the authorized commentaries on the Four Books.

The first period was an unphilosophical one. Its leading characteristic was monotheism. And what we know of it is mostly contained in the Shoo-King or historical classic, which was compiled by Confucius, and contains brief records relating

to the periods from the reign of Yaou, B. C. 2356,* to Ping-Wang, who died B. C. 721. As Confucianism became more

* It may perhaps be noticed that the first year of Yaou, B. C. 2356, or according to Gaubil, B. C. 2342, differs but very little from the date of the deluge as usually given in the margin of our Bibles. According to Usher, that event took place in the year B. C. 2348. Without going into the reasons for adopting a higher chronology as given by the Septuagint and Josephus, as corrected by Hales, it will be sufficient here to state the reasons urged in favour of the antiquity of the Chinese record. As a preliminary remark it should be stated that the well informed among the Chinese commence their chronology with the reign of Yaou, rejecting the fabulous period beyond.

The most convincing proof of the approximate correctness of the date above given is drawn from astronomical allusions in the Shoo-King. Gaubil, one of the Roman Catholic missionaries, has given an account of these in his translation of the Shoo-King. There is also a good *resumé* of the subject in an article on the credibility of Chinese early chronology, published in the *North China Herald* in 1853, from which the substance of this note is taken. So far as observations upon the stars are concerned, they were not made in those early times with sufficient exactness to fix the date with any precision. They only show the antiquity of the record. One of these astronomical allusions is in the first chapter of the Shoo-King, where it is stated that the group *Maou*, known by us as the Pleiades, culminated in the shortest days of winter. That constellation is now little more than a sign from the summer solstice, or nearly 150 deg. from the winter solstice. In order to make them 90 deg. from this latter point, an interval of 4000 years must be allowed, for the equinoctial points do not recede faster than a degree in 71.86 years.

Another allusion is contained in the names of two stars called *T'een Yih* and *T'ai Yih*, or the heavenly one and the great one. These two stars are about 60 deg. in advance of the present pole star, and are supposed to have received these significant names from having been the pole stars of early observers. If named for this reason, they must have been noticed as pole stars more than 4000 years ago. The star that was the pole star before these has no such significant name, thus furnishing a limit to the antiquity of these observations.

Gaubil arrives at the date of the first year of Yaou, the first authentic emperor mentioned by the Chinese, by means of an eclipse mentioned in the first part of the Shoo-King. The eclipse of the year B. C. 2155, fulfils more of the conditions than any other. It occurred in the ninth month, as required, and the sun at the time was in the constellation *Fang*, (Scorpio,) as is also required. But the eclipse, according to the tables which Gaubil consulted, was visible at Peking and not at Ngan-e-Heen, a place five deg. to the westward, which was the capital at that time. This discrepancy he ascribes to imperfection in the tables, and holds to the time indicated, B. C. 2155, and arrives at the first year of Yaou by adding the length of the intervening reigns as given in the Shoo-King.

The eclipses mentioned in the close of the Shoo-King, occurring 776 and 720 B. C., have been identified, and give certainty to this period of Chinese history, and strengthen the conviction of the correctness of the preceding dates.

fully developed as a social and philosophical system under the second period, we will confine our inquiries under this period chiefly to its teachings respecting God.

Any one reading the Shoo-King would be struck with its constant references to a superintending and controlling power, which is sometimes called *Shang-te*, or Supreme Ruler, and sometimes *Teen*, or Heaven. Thus Woo-Wang (a contemporary of Samuel, B. C. 1111) says, "I, who am but a little child, do not dare to set aside the decree of the Supreme Ruler. Formerly Heaven looked with favour upon the tranquillizing monarch, and elevated our small state of Chow to supreme authority." (Medhurst's Translation of Shoo-King, p. 219.) Here the two terms Heaven and Supreme Ruler occur as synonymous, and refer to a power above kings and emperors, and which disposed of their affairs. Intelligence, will, and personality, are necessarily involved in the way in which this power is spoken of. Thus it is said, "Heaven has formed mankind with various passions. * * Heaven has also produced the intelligent to regulate them. * * * Heaven has conferred on your majesty courage and wisdom," (Shoo-King, p. 131.) Again this Supreme Ruler is spoken of as rewarding virtue and punishing vice. Thus it is said, "The Supreme Ruler is not invariable in his decree, (that is, says the Commentary, the decree of Heaven sometimes leaves one family and is conferred upon another.) On those who do good he will send down a hundred blessings, and on those who do evil he will send down manifold calamities," (p. 143.) Again, "Heaven sends down calamities and confers blessings according to men's qualities," (p. 153.) On the same page it is said, "Heaven has a regard for single-eyed virtue." Passages like the above occur so frequently, and recognize in so many different ways the authority and control of one personal being, as to give a strong monotheistic character to this ancient historical classic.

There is a slight materialistic element in the name Heaven, which is so often used for the Supreme Ruler; but this is not made apparent until a later period. A single exception occurs in the phrase, "Heaven and earth are the parents of all things," which in later writings occurs so frequently, but only once here.

It is in the great oath of Woo-Wang, a name famous in Chinese history. "Heaven and Earth," he says, "are the parents of all things, the most intelligent of which are men; the most truly intellectual become the chief rulers, and the chief ruler is the parent of the people," (p. 182.) The Chinese are accustomed to speak of the Shoo-King as containing the seeds of all that is valuable in history, philosophy, and religion. Whether in such expressions we have the seeds of materialistic philosophy, it is difficult now to determine. The Yih-King, or Book of Diagrams, an obscure book written by Wăn-Wang, the father of Woo-Wang, from whom the above sentence is taken, has had more credit for materialism than any other ancient book. It is probable, however, that in that it has been made more prominent by commentators than was at first intended. The Yih-King has been supposed to contain much recondite meaning in symbols of straight lines, which are changed and subdivided so as to bring out certain fundamental truths. Confucius, and since his day, some of the greatest minds in China have spent much time in commenting on this work. A famous sentence of Confucius in his comments has been the occasion of much discussion; and in the third period, that of the Sung, philosophers had a thoroughly materialistic meaning given to it. The sentence is as follows: "The *Yih* has the *T'ae-Keih*, which produced the two figures, which two figures produced the four forms, which four forms produced the eight diagrams." The expression *T'ae-Keih* occurs only in this place in all the classical books, but is usually explained in the recent commentaries as meaning the Great Extreme, and is used as synonymous with the principle of order, or as we would say, law of nature, and this is considered as Shang-te, or Heaven. The four seasons and five elements are then represented as coming from this great extreme. From it as the primary substance all things are produced. But the explanation given by some early commentators gives a different meaning to this enigmatical sentence, and that is, "that *T'ae-Keih* signifies the condition or period before heaven and earth were divided, when the original vapory matter was formless and one." This interpretation agrees better with another sentence in the Yih-King, which ascribes

the production or the bringing forth of all things to the Supreme Ruler. It is said, "The (Supreme) Ruler (causes things to) issue forth under the Chin diagram, (representing thunder and corresponding to the commencement of spring;) he equally adjusts them under the Seuen diagram, (representing wind and corresponding to mid-spring;) he (causes them to be) mutually exhibited under the Se diagram, (representing fire and corresponding to the beginning of summer,") and so on through the four seasons.* This sentence would have a materialistic meaning to the philosophers of the Sung dynasty; but to those to whom Shang-te or the Supreme Ruler was a personality, the meaning was entirely different, and helps to sustain the monotheistic character of the Shoo-King, that the power which controls empires and punishes the wicked, also controls the changes which take place in nature.

The inclination to polytheism is more manifest in the Shoo-King than to materialism. Other beings, especially the spirits of ancestors, are recognized as objects of worship. In the very first part of the Shoo-King, at the commencement of the reign of Shun, the second emperor of China, we are told that "he offered sacrifice to Shang-te, or the Supreme Ruler, presented a pure offering to the six objects of veneration, looked with devotion to the hills and rivers, and glanced around at the host of spirits," (p 17.) The host of spirits, the commentator says, refers to the ancient worthies whose graves were on the mounds and hills. Of one Chow-Kung it is recorded that he prayed to his three ancestors, saying among other things "that on you three kings depends your great descendant's cause with Heaven," (p. 211.) Of the founders of the Yin dynasty it is said that they were associated with Heaven in worship, (p. 268.) In one place (p. 165) ancestors are spoken of as having power to send down unhappy events, and to be able to save from death. These other beings worshipped are generally spoken of

* See Medhurst's Theology of the Chinese, p. 234; also Notions of the Chinese concerning God, by Dr. Legge; and Defence of an Essay on similar subjects, by Bishop Boone. These works grew out of the controversy as to the proper term to use for God in Chinese, and though controversial, contain much valuable information respecting the religious notions of the Chinese.

as subordinate to Heaven, and as executing its will. Thus Woo-Wang on going forth on a military expedition is spoken of (p. 193) as announcing his determination to imperial Heaven and empress Earth, as well as to the surrounding famous hills and great rivers. As he draws near to battle he says, "only may you gods (*Shin*) be enabled to help me in saving the millions of the people, and not bring disgrace on your divinity-ships." At the successful close of his expedition he offered sacrifices in the temple of his ancestors. But though he thus called upon and sacrificed to other beings, he speaks of having received the commission of the Supreme Ruler to go forth on this expedition, and that he was moved alone by Heaven's excellent decree.

One thing which must have tended very much to the development of polytheism among the common people was the restriction of sacrificing to Heaven and Earth to the emperor. This is said to have occurred under the renowned Shun, the second emperor of China, though we have no account of it till about 950 B. C. A reference is then made to Shun's method of dealing with the people of one of his provinces. At that time he commanded two of his officers "to cut off the communication between Earth and Heaven, interdicting (the pretended) descents and visitations (of the gods)." Upon this statement the commentator, who wrote A. D. 1200, and adopted the prevailing philosophy of that period, says, "the people did not know the grounds of the offences they might commit, and having no one to whom they could appeal, they went gadding after the gods, and sacrificing to improper demons: thus the canons relative to heaven and earth, the gods and men, became mixed and confused; superstitions sprang up, and mankind became depraved. Shun's first endeavour, however, was to correct men's minds, and therefore he commanded the officers mentioned above to arrange the sacrificial canons; after which the emperor alone sacrificed to heaven and earth, the princes to the hills and rivers, while high and low, superiors and inferiors, each had their limits; the communication between earth and heaven was cut off, the distinctions between the seen and unseen worlds were rigidly observed, superstitious notions ceased, and their princes

and their subordinates all aided in the maintenance of the constant principles," (p. 213.) Sacrificing* to heaven and earth is to the present time restricted to the emperor, and is performed twice a year; on a round altar at the winter solstice, and on a square one at the summer solstice. It is probable that oftener than otherwise, that sacrifice is now offered to the material heavens and earth. But in former times, in the Chung Yung, one of the Four Books, it is said, "The ceremonies of the celestial and terrestrial sacrifices are those by which men serve the Supreme Ruler." (Sec. 19th.) As before remarked, there was an incipient materialism in the use of the term Heaven for the Supreme Ruler, which led on gradually to associating earth with heaven as an object of worship, and finally to ascribing to earth a power coördinate with heaven.

The worship of ancestors, which was introduced in the earliest

* On the subject of *sacrifice*, one or two items of information may be of interest. In the Shoo-King, a red cow is said to have been offered on one occasion, in connection with which offering was drawn up a form of prayer or supplication, and a libation poured out, (p. 255.) In the Book of Rites, it is said that in the autumn the sacrificial animals are to be inspected to see that they are perfect and whole. The provender, &c., is to be attended to, for the ox intended for the Supreme Ruler is to be kept three months in the stall, (Theol. of the Chinese, p. 228.) In the Book of Diagrams we have a reference to the mode of preparing the sacrifice in the caldron. It is said the sages boiled flesh in it in order to sacrifice to the Supreme Ruler, (p. 233.) In sacrificing, the blood was not made prominent, and so the flesh was always presented cooked. The main idea was the thankful acknowledgment of favours, and not atonement or expiation of sin. Like other thank-offerings, sacrifice of animals was not necessarily prominent. Wine, silks, and gems, are often presented; and frequently the name of the being worshipped or prayers are written on paper and burned. In the collected statutes of the Ming dynasty, the emperor is represented as saying, "We have worshipped and written the Great Name on this gem-like sheet. Now we display it before the (Supreme) Ruler, and place it in the fire. These valuable offerings of silks and meats we burn also with these sincere prayers, that they may ascend in volumes of flames up to the distant azure." (Notions of Chinese concerning God and Spirits, by Dr. Legge, p. 31.) A sacrifice is not infrequently termed a feast, and such is the usual appearance presented to foreigners now, when the offerings are spread out on tables in their temples in front of the idol or ancestral tablet. The resemblance to a feast is made more striking by the use of music, which, though not very musical to western ears, is said in the Book of Diagrams "to have been invented by the ancient kings, in order to promote virtue; and they especially performed it before the Supreme Ruler." (Theol. of the Chinese, p. 233.)

period of authentic history, was greatly strengthened by the teachings of Confucius, and has become the most prevailing and obligatory form of worship among the Chinese. At first, as we have seen, ancestors were associated with Heaven, and supposed to express its will; bnt this connection has long since been lost sight of and forgotten. There is no surer road to idolatry than allowing the introduction of other objects of worship, however subordinate to the one Supreme God.

Another thing which was early introduced, and which has given rise to boundless superstition, was divination, which seems at first to have been used to find out the will of Heaven. When Pwan-Kang, who flourished B. C. 1400, was about to move his capital, and had consulted the oracle, he says that "Whenever the former kings had any important affair to manage, they respectfully and cautiously (consulted) the will of Heaven by divination," (p. 156.) The former method of divination was by reeds and tortoises. An answer from this source was not however to be considered sufficient. The king was also to consult the will of his nobles and people, and not unless they all agreed was an answer to be considered entirely favourable. Other omens were also to have their significance, as dreams, the weather, eclipses, &c. If the astronomers did not give notice of an eclipse in the proper time, they were to be punished with death, (p. 127.) In the case of change of government, nothing was considered to indicate the will of Heaven so clearly as the will of the people. One of thc counsellors of Yu, the third emperor, said that "Heaven's approval and disapproval (may be known) from our people's approval and disapproval. There is a connection between the upper and lower world. Oh how careful should those be who rule," (p. 64.) Another says, "Heaven's views may be ascertained from our people's views." This is certainly an old form of the maxim, *Vox populi vox Dei;* and so far as divination is concerned, it is one of the most pardonable oracles which a ruler can consult.

The idea of the connection between the upper and lower world was not only early but strongly impressed on the Chinese mind. There may be occasion to speak of this more fully hereafter. All that is necessary here is to refer to one exhibi-

tion of this idea in the position given to the Emperor. He was the ruler below, as Shang-te was the ruler on high. He was called the Son of Heaven, and could assist the Supreme Ruler in the execution of his designs. One of the kings of the Chow dynasty said, "We have received from Heaven's glorious majesty a charge to carry out the royal inflictions, and arrange the affairs of Yin, and hereby completing the work of the Supreme Ruler," (p. 256.) A more extravagant expression is sometimes used, that the Emperor equalled Heaven. Thus it is said, in reference to one of the former kings, that he was perpetually exerting himself in rendering respectful his virtue, and thus he equalled the Supreme Ruler," (p. 151.) Another is said "to have attained merit equal to high Heaven," (p. 175.) If anything more than extravagant praise was intended by these expressions, it seems to have been that in their sphere or position they equalled Heaven. This exaltation of man became afterwards much more apparent, and man became associated with heaven and earth as one of the three powers.

This notice of the early theology of the Chinese would be much extended by examining later books, in some of which, notwithstanding the tendency to materialism and polytheism, shine out very conspicuously the authority and homage due to the Supreme Ruler. The great mass of the people soon sank away from monotheism. So far as this has been preserved, it has been principally in connection with the sacrifices of the Emperor at the winter and summer solstice. So late as the time of the Ming dynasty, in the sixteenth century, we find the Emperor in his prayer, or song, saying, "When *Te*, the Lord, had so decreed, he called into existence heaven, earth, and man." "Thy sovereign goodness is infinite. As a potter hast thou made all living things. Great and small are sheltered (by thee.) As engraven on the heart of thy poor servant, is the sense of thy goodness, so that my feeling cannot be fully displayed. With great kindness dost thou bear with us, and notwithstanding our demerits dost grant us life and prosperity." "For ever he setteth fast the high heavens, and establisheth the solid earth. His government is everlasting." (Quoted by Dr. Legge, in his "Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits," (p. 29.) These expressions of praise to

the Supreme Ruler at so late a period in Chinese history, would surprise us did we not know that notwithstanding the downward tendency of their philosophy, there were occasional returns to the purer worship of antiquity. Just as in the last days of the Jewish State, there were occasional returns from the introduction of images and groves and false gods to the pure worship of Jehovah.

In one of the pamphlets published by the chief of the insurrection, who established himself at Nankin in 1853, we have a brief historical statement respecting the early worship of the Chinese, and their departures from it. He says that from the earliest antiquity down to the time of the three dynasties, (which closed B. C. 220) both princes and people honoured and worshipped the great God, (Shang-te.) Some innovation on this practice, however, occurred in the time of Shaou-haou, when Kew-le first believed in corrupt devils, and extended the mischief to the Meaonites, who followed his bad example. (It was on their account that the Emperor Shun restricted sacrificing to Shang-te to the Emperor, as related above, p. 16.) In the time of the three dynasties, there was occasionally some attention paid to corrupt spirits, and the error was fallen into of employing men to represent the ghosts of the departed when funeral rites were performed. (This was usually done by the eldest son or grandson, who put on the clothes of the departed.) Still, he says, during all that time both princes and people honoured and worshipped the great God, as from the first. When the Tsin dynasty arose, (B. C. 192) a dangerous step was taken in the superstitious regard paid to genii and hobgoblins; while the people sacrificed to Shun and Yu, and in the extremity of their mad perverseness sent men to the sea to look for the genii. The great God is only one, and besides him there is none other. Wan, of the Han dynasty, (B. C. 163) thought that there were five." (This is the commencement of the worship of the five *Te's* instead of one Shang-*te*, or Supreme Ruler.) He relates other departures from the worship of the true God—among them the Emperor Ming, who sent to India in the first century for the priests of Budha. He dwells especially upon the fact that Hwuy, one of the Emperors of the Sung dynasty, (A. D. 1100) changed the appellation of God

from *Shang-te* to *Yuh-hwang* Shang-te—the pearly Emperor God. This Emperor favoured the Taouists, and it is under the designation which he introduced that the Taouists worship Shang-te, and have erected idols to him and celebrate his birth-day. The chief in his pamphlet goes on to speak of some who did not favour these corrupt practices. Among them was the Emperor Woo, who flourished A. D. 570, who prohibited Taouism and Budhism, and abolished sacrifices not prescribed in the ancient ritual. Again, A. D. 684, one of the Emperors destroyed seventeen hundred idolatrous temples, and another of the Ming dynasty inveighed against the performance of idolatrous rites.

To return again to our review of Confucianism, we find that in this, its first period, it was religious, strongly monotheistic in its character, and, to some extent, this has been more or less maintained in form; that there were, however, sown the seeds of materialism and polytheism, which were afterwards more fully developed. The consideration of the philosophy of the second period will enable us to see the causes which tended to this change.

The first thing which attracts our attention in passing to the second period is, that it is a consideration of philosophy and not of religion. The divine element is much less conspicuous, and instead we have the human element. In the Four Books the term Shang-te, or Supreme Ruler, occurs only four times, and two of these are quotations, one from the Shoo King, and the other from the Book of Odes. T'een, or heaven, is, however, frequently used in the same sense as in the preceding period.

The period to which we now refer falls chronologically in the lifetime of Confucius and his immediate followers. Confucius himself died 479 B. C., at the age of seventy-three. None of the Four Books were actually written by Confucius himself; but three of them are considered to be a digest of his sentiments, one of them being made up from conversations with his disciples. Mencius, who was born B. C. 400, was the author of the last and largest of the Four Books. He was the disciple of Tsz-sze, the grandson of Confucius, who wrote the Chung Yung, the most elaborate of these treatises.

The main features of what might be termed the moral philosophy of the second period may be arranged under the following queries: 1st. What does it teach concerning man's nature? 2d. What are the main principles of the virtue recommended? 3d. What are the duties urged? 4th. What are the motives by which they are enforced?

One of the main reasons why so little prominence is given to the divine element in the Four Books, seems to be owing to their teachings about man's nature. If man's nature is originally good, and if, though fallen, he may recover himself by his own exertions, what need is there of any superior power to assist him? Mencius (and still less Confucius) did not ignore all dependence on the decree of heaven, but inculcation of virtue or morality was their main object, and that they maintained was to be attained by man's individual exertions. "Man's nature is originally good," is the first sentence of the Trimetrical Classic, a book which is placed first in the hands of Chinese youth at school. There are many incidental references to this subject in the Four Books, but it is brought out more prominently than anywhere else in the 11th chapter of Mencius. In the 12th section Kaou-tsz says: "Human nature is like water. Cut a channel to the east, and it will run east. Cut a channel to the west, and it will run west. Man's nature does not originally incline either to virtue or vice, just as water naturally inclines neither to the east nor west." Mencius replied, "True, water inclines neither to run east or west, but has it no inclination to run up or down? The virtue of man's nature is like the downward flowing of water. As there is no water that does not flow downward, so there is no man that is not naturally virtuous. If you strike water and leap in it, you may cause it to rise above the head. Dam its course, and it will rise to the hills; but is this the nature of water? It is forced to do so. Man's nature may in the same way be impelled to do that which is wrong." This conversation is again taken up by a disciple called Kung-too-tsz, who quoted what Kaou-tsz said, that human nature is originally neither virtuous nor vicious. "Some," he added, "say that nature may be led to virtue or vice—others say that the nature of some is radically good, while that of others is bad," at the same time adducing ex-

amples to prove these statements. To which Mencius replied, "If you observe the disposition (the original word means the acting out of the nature,) you may see that it is virtuous, hence I say that the nature is virtuous. If any practise vice it is not the fault of their natural powers." To prove this statement, Mencius brings an argument, first, from man's loving and approving that which is right. "All men," says he, "have compassionate hearts—all men have hearts which are ashamed of vice—all men have hearts disposed to show reverence and respect, and all men have hearts which discriminate between right and wrong. A compassionate heart is benevolence; a heart which is ashamed of vice is rectitude; a heart which respects and reveres, is propriety; a heart which distinguishes right from wrong, is wisdom. Now benevolence, rectitude, propriety, and wisdom are not melted into us from without, we certainly possess them of ourselves." Another argument urged is from the similarity of men in reference to smell, taste, &c. If they resemble in these, they do also in other things. This seems specially directed to the idea advanced by his pupil, that some had good and some bad natures. As men are alike in the organs of sense, then as the sages were considered perfect, it was inferred that other men were originally like them.

It is interesting to see how Mencius accounts for men losing this good disposition. He introduces the illustration of a mountain once beautiful from its growth of trees. But as it was near a city, these were cut down. Yet the sprouts came up again, but were eaten by cattle and sheep until the mountain was a naked waste. The means by which man loses his virtuous heart resembles the cutting down of the wood by the axe. If you daily cut it down, how can it look well? The good feeling which he acquires at night, (alluding to the dews which descended upon the trees) are dissipated, checked, and destroyed by the pursuits of the day. At last the nightly feeling is not sufficient to keep his heart, and he is not far from being a brute. When men are such they suppose they never possessed a virtuous nature.

It will be seen that the proof of the goodness of our nature, relied upon by Mencius, is principally that a man approves and loves that which is right. It may be suggested by some that

this was all he intended to prove, and not that our nature or disposition was itself good. In fact, the distinction which we make between conscience and disposition does not appear to have been kept in mind by the Chinese moralists. To approve of right is, however, a very different thing from doing what is right. That Confucius and Mencius intended that we are able to do what is right, is evident from their whole system of philosophy. Virtue is practicable, attainable. Some preserve it, some lose it; but all can by dint of their own efforts attain it. One of Mencius's disciples remarked that it was said all might become Yaou's and Shun's, is it so or not? Mencius answered in the affirmative. * * "Why should men grieve themselves about want of ability? It is in want of exercise that the evil lies." (Mencius, chap. 12th.) Again he says, "That every man has the four principles of right action just as he has four members, two hands and two feet. These four principles are, 1st—benevolence, the germ or principle of which is compassion; 2d, justice, the germ of which is to be ashamed of vice; 3d, propriety, the germ of which is humility and modesty; 4th, wisdom, the germ of which is a sense of right and wrong. All have these four principles, and to have them, and yet say we are unable to act well, is to rob ourselves; and to say that a prince is unable to act right, is to rob him; or he that says he has not ability, robs himself, and he that says his prince has not ability, (i. e. to do that which is right,) rebels against him." (Chap. 3d.)

Since man's nature is upright and naturally tends to virtue, we would inquire, 2dly. What is the virtue recommended? Their definition of virtue includes only those principles which belong to the duties we owe to our fellow-men; and may be divided into the four principles given above, namely, benevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom. Fan-che, one of Confucius's disciples, asked what benevolence was? He replied, To love men. What is meant by loving men will be best seen by a few extracts. In the Ta-Heo, it says, "that which you hate in superiors do not practise in your conduct towards inferiors; that which you dislike in inferiors do not practise towards superiors." In the Lun-Yu, chap. 12th, Confucius says, "What you do not wish others to do to you, do not to them."

Again, chap. 14th, some one asked, "what may be said of rewarding hatred by kindness? Confucius said in that case with what will you reward kindness? Reward bad treatment with justice, and kindness with kindness." Again, Tsze-kung asked if there was any one word which expresses the conduct proper for one's whole life? Confucius replied, Will not the word *Shoo* do it? (i. e. do not to others what you do not wish them to do to you.)" Mencius says, "Let us vigorously exert ourselves to act toward others as we wish them to do to us." (In the original *Keang-Shoo*, i. e. be diligent in carrying out the precept of Confucius contained in the character *Shoo*.) Again he says, "The benevolent love all, but love the virtuous with the greatest ardour." There is a letting down of this precept in the Chung Yung, section 20th, where it says, "the highest exercise of benevolence is tender affection to relatives."

The second principle of virtue is said to be justice. By this is meant "what is right or proper." (Chung Yung, section 20th.) The word translated *justice* seems at times to correspond to our word, according to the definition just given, but immediately after this definition it is said that its highest exercise is to honour men of virtue and talents. Again, Mencius says to reverence superiors is justice. (chap. 12th.) There is connected with the idea of right which is prominent in our idea of justice, that of public spirit.* The teachings of the Four Books were so much directed to government, that morality and moral definitions have a political bearing. Thus Mencius says, "it has never happened that the just have been slow in serving their king." (chap. 1st.) As an exemplification of the meaning of both words, benevolence and justice, and the importance attached to them, let us take another example. "Teen, son of the king of Tse, asked what the business of the scholar consists in? Mencius replied, in elevating his will or inclination. What do you mean, he inquired, by elevating the will? It consists solely in being benevolent and just. To kill an innocent person is not benevolent. (This it will be noticed is addressed to the son of a king in a despotic country.) To take

* The idea of public spirit attached to the word justice is still more prominent in later writings. It is even applied to public granaries, charity schools, &c., where the term translated justice is used as the adjective.

what is not one's own is unjust. Where is the scholar's abode? It is in benevolence. Where is his road? It is in justice. To dwell in benevolence and walk in justice is the whole business of the great man."

The third principle included in virtue was propriety, the germ of which is said to be humility and modesty; or, as Confucius says, "Propriety of conduct has its foundation in respect." (Heaou King, sec. 12th.) Perhaps no nation has had a higher regard for, or more universally practised this principle of virtue than the Chinese. Confucius seems to have been a model in this respect. He is represented by one of his disciples as having been "benign, upright, respectful, polite, and condescending." (Lun Yu, chap. 1st.) Another says, "Confucius was perfectly void of four things; he had no selfishness, no prejudice, no bigotry, no egotism." (Ib., chap. 9th.) In all the externals of right behaviour, he is held up as irreproachable, as he was considered to be correct in his doctrines. And it must be confessed that his maxims for regulating the conduct are full of sound wisdom, and show an intimate understanding of the human heart.*

One of the five Classics, the *Li Ki*, or Book of Rites and Ceremonies, is entirely taken up with this subject, giving particular directions as to all the proprieties of life. It enters into the details of polite behaviour, and is interspersed with truly

* The course to be pursued by the superior or model man, in case of disrespectful treatment, is well put by Mencius: "That by which the superior man differs from other men, consists in keeping his heart. The superior man keeps his heart by benevolence and propriety. The benevolent love others, and the polite (lit. propriety men) respect others. Men constantly love those who love them, and he who treats others with respect is always respected by others. If any one treat the superior man in an unreasonable manner, he will turn around on himself, and say, I must be deficient in benevolence or propriety, else why should I meet with such treatment? If after self-examination he finds that he is both benevolent and polite, and that the other still treats him rudely, he will again turn around on himself, and say, I must be unfaithful, or why should I be treated thus? If on turning around and examining himself, he finds that he is faithful, and the other still treats him rudely, he says to himself, This wild fellow, in what respect does he differ from a brute? Why should I trouble myself with a brute? Hence the superior man has not one morning's distress from wrangling with others." (Collu's translation, chap. 8th, p. 115.) A much better code of honour this, than that practised by some of higher pretensions to morality.

excellent observations regarding mutual forbearance and kindness in society. (See Williams's Middle Kingdom, vol. i., p. 509.)

The fourth point or principle of virtue enumerated by Mencius, is wisdom, the germ of which he says is a sense of right and wrong. Wisdom and knowledge appear to be used interchangeably. Learning, with the Chinese, is not science, not acquisitions of what we term great stores of knowledge, but it is understanding the principles of human nature, and of knowing what is right. Thus, in the Lun Yu, chap. 1st, Tsze-Hea said, "He who esteems the virtue of others, and turns his mind from the love of lust, who with his whole might serves his parents, devotes his person to the service of his prince, and is sincere in his intercourse with friends, although he may be deemed unlearned, I must esteem him truly learned." Confucius describes the lover of learning as one who does not seek to pamper his appetite, nor live at ease; who is diligent in the practice of his duty, cautious in his words, and comes to men of right principles, that he may be corrected." (Lun Yu, chap. 1st.) A little further on he says, "Be not sorry that men do not know you, but be sorry that you are ignorant of men." Not to know men, the Commentary says, is not to be able to discriminate between right and wrong, true and false.

In the Chung Yung, Sec. 20th, knowing men is connected with knowing Heaven: "As it is necessary, in order to serve our parents aright, to know men, so in order to know men, we must know Heaven." In the passage of which this is a part, personal virtue is traced back through its various steps to knowing Heaven; right action is made to depend on right knowledge. What Confucius really meant by knowing Heaven, he does not explain, and there is no parallel passage in the Four Books with which to compare it. Mencius has a passage which bears a nearer analogy to the later philosophy. He says, "He who employs his mind to the utmost, will know his nature; he who knows his nature, knows Heaven." (Chap. 12th.) Here, knowing himself, makes a man acquainted with Heaven, while in the Chung Yung, the very different idea is taught, that in order to know himself, man must know Heaven; which last statement lies at the foundation of the Christian and of all true

morality. It is possible that Confucius spoke out a truth here, which in other places both he and his disciples too much lost sight of. He himself knew and worshipped Heaven; he acknowledged that Heaven rewarded the good, and punished the wicked; but the whole tenor of his system was to inculcate the plain and the practical, leaving out the obscure and mysterious. Said he to one of his disciples, "If not able to serve men, how can you serve spirits? and if you do not know life, how can you understand death?" His teachings related to duties instead of speculations, to morality instead of religion. He made the experiment, the failure of which ought to suffice for all future experimenters in the same direction, of building up a system of high-toned morality and virtue, without that wisdom the beginning of which is the fear of the Lord. Virtue was traced up in the neighbourhood of its source; but the last and important link was lost, or spoken out once, and then forgotten. Thus, in the beginning of the *Ta-Heo*, the dependence of right action on right knowledge is elaborately traced out. But when we would know what the knowledge is, then we find it is lost or wrongly given. The passage in the *Ta-Heo* is as follows: "The ancient princes, who felt desirous that virtue in its purity should shine through the empire, first established order in their provinces. Wishing to establish order in their provinces, they regulated their families. In order to regulate their families, they first adorned their own persons with virtue. In order that they might adorn their persons with virtue, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they looked to the sincerity of their motive. Wishing to be sincere in motive, they extended their knowledge to the utmost. The perfection of knowledge consists in understanding the nature of things." The root of the matter, the way in which the heart is to be rectified, and the motive made sincere, is by knowledge. But unfortunately the knowledge here stated to be necessary, is of the nature of things; and the section which was intended to illustrate what was meant by that, has been lost. The commentator, Choo-foo-tsze, attempts to supply its place, but in doing so, brings in a later philosophy, which will be considered hereafter, and says it refers to the knowledge of the *le*, or animating principle, which pervades all things.

But, to return again to the more usual definition of knowledge, we find in the Lun Yu, chap. 12th, Fau-che asking Confucius, "What is knowledge? He replied, To know men." Fau-che, meeting Tsze Hea, said he had just had an interview with Confucius, and asked what knowledge is. He replied, "Elevate the upright, and dismiss the depraved; thus you may make the depraved upright." It will be seen that the kind of knowledge here referred to related to human nature, and that its object was, especially on the part of the ruler, to select suitable persons to administer the affairs of government. Thus when Yaou selected Shun, instead of his own son, as his successor in the empire, vice is said to have fled to a distance.

From the definition of the elements of virtue given above, it will be seen that the superior or model man, so often mentioned, is one who has a knowledge of man, and can therefore discriminate between right and wrong in human conduct; who in his sentiments and feelings is just, public-spirited, unselfish; who in his dealings with others is benevolent and kind, dutiful to parents and superiors, faithful to friends;* and who governs all his conduct by the established rules of propriety and politeness. Such, according to this system, is the truly great man. "The great man," says Mencius, "is one who follows his superior faculties; the low are those who follow their inferior faculties." "There is a divine, and there is a human nobility," he says. "Benevolence, justice, uprightness, fidelity, and delighting in virtue without weariness, constitute divine nobility. To be a prince, a prime minister, or a great officer of state, constitute human nobility." As it was not station, so neither was it great talents which constituted greatness. The model man must be great morally, as well as and more important than intellectually. Confucius, with reference to this, says, "A fine horse is praised, not for his strength, but for his docility and

* "Faithful to friends," is sometimes enumerated as another principle of virtue, making five, especially by the later philosophers. Confucius usually enumerated but three, namely, wisdom, benevolence, and fortitude. "He who loves study," he says, "is near knowledge or wisdom. He who acts vigorously is near benevolence, and he who knows shame is near bravery or fortitude. He who knows these three, knows by what means to cultivate personal virtue."

tractableness." (Lun Yu, chap. 14th.) How much more virtue was to be esteemed than wealth, may be seen from what Confucius says in the Lun Yu, (chap. 7th:) "Coarse rice for food, water for drink, and one's bended arm for a pillow, even in the midst of these there is happiness; but riches and honour gained by injustice are to me light as the fleeting cloud." Again he says, "The superior man fixes his mind on virtue, the worthless man thinks on a comfortable living; the former regards the sanction of law, the latter regards gain." Mencius, in his visit to King Hwuy of Leang, shows that benevolence and justice are first to be sought for, before the profit and glory of his kingdom. With all their reverence for superiors, they were far from inculcating any compliance with authority at the expense of virtue. Confucius says, "Maintain virtue, and yield it not even to your teacher." (Lun Yu, chap. 15th.) And so when "iniquity lies in the way of one's parents, a son may not refrain from remonstrating with them." (Heaou King.) Kings and emperors were also to be reproved. Mencius inculcated this by example as well as by precept, and many times since his day has it faithfully been carried out. Perhaps no government, certainly no despotic government, has allowed the liberty of reproof so much freedom as the Chinese, or held so clearly to the right of the subject. Mencius was once asked by the king of Tse, how a prime minister should act. "If of the blood royal and a prince was guilty of great errors, he should reprove him. If, after doing so again and again, he does not listen, he ought to dethrone him and put another in his place." At this the king suddenly changed countenance. "Be not astonished," said Mencius. "When your majesty asked me, I dared not do otherwise than give a correct reply." The king again asked what was the duty of a prime minister of a different family name. "If the prince be guilty of errors, he should reprove him; and if after he has done so repeatedly, he is not listened to, he should leave his place." (Chap. 10th.)

The above will serve as a specimen of the many excellent things that are said in praise of virtue. Many of the maxims given are worthy of all commendation. Our only wonder in respect to the inculcation of virtue between man and man is, that they have come so near the truth. The great radical fault

is that the divine element is overlooked in the cultivation of virtuous feeling. And, as will presently be seen, in the enumeration of the duties incumbent on us, those which man owes to his Maker are left out. Had these been inculcated, even as they are sometimes alluded to, the teachings of the system in regard to the purity of our nature and ability to perform good actions in our own strength, might have been different.

3d. Let us pass on, however, to notice the duties, which, according to this system, are considered as especially incumbent on man. They are given by Confucius in the Chung Yung, (section 20th) "The path of duty for all men embraces five branches. These are the respective duties of prince and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and the treatment of friends." These, he says, "constitute the rule of life for all men." These are the channels in which virtue is to flow; as Mencius says, "Benevolence is the duty of father and son; justice of the prince and minister; propriety or politeness of host and guest, and wisdom of the virtuous." (Chap. 13th.) Of these different duties none is reckoned so important as filial piety. This, as has already been seen, is considered as the highest exercise of benevolence or philanthropy. As their teachings on this subject constitute one of the main peculiarities of Chinese morality, and have had great practical effect upon the customs and institutions of the country, it is necessary to consider the subject with some particularity. A treatise on filial duty, (*Heaou King) mostly compiled from the sayings of Confucius, makes one of the Five Classics, and shows very fully the importance which the sage attached to this subject.

"Filial duty," he says, "is the root of virtue and the source from which religion springs." (Sect. 1st.) Religion, according to the Confucian school, consists in the duties which we owe to our fellow-men, and these are traced in their origin or source to filial duty. A similar sentiment to that quoted from sec. 1st is found in the 9th sect. "Of all things which derive their

* The character *Keaou*, translated religion, is derived from *Heaou*, filial duty, and *Wan* to urge, that is, the urging or inculcation of filial duty is religion. This is one of the many instances which might be adduced in which the philosophy has moulded the language of this people.

nature from heaven and earth man is the most noble, and of all the duties which are incumbent on him, there is none greater than filial obedience." In the 7th sect. it is called "the law of heaven, the justice of earth, and the prescribed duty of man." The nature of filial duty is thus explained in sect. 1st: "The first thing which filial duty requires of us is that we carefully preserve from all injury and in a perfect state the bodies which we have received from our parents; and when we acquire for ourselves a station in the world, we should regulate our conduct by correct principles, so as to transmit our names to future generations, and reflect glory on our parents; this is the ultimate aim of filial duty. Thus it commences in attention to parents, is continued through a course of services rendered to the prince, and is completed by the elevation of ourselves. It is said in the Book of Odes,

> "'Think always of your ancestors,
> Talk of and imitate their virtues.'"

(See trans. of Heaou King in Chinese Repository. Vol. 4th, p. 345.)

The connection of this duty with other duties is shown first, in regard to the emperor. "If he loves his parents, he cannot hate other people; and if he respects his parents, he cannot treat others with neglect." And on the other hand, it is said, "If the scholar respect his parents, he will his prince." Care also in reference to themselves and the practice of economy is enforced on the common people, that they may have sufficient to support their parents. "Those who perform aright the services they owe their parents, if they are in elevated stations will not be proud; nor insubordinate if in inferior ones; nor contentious if they are among the multitude." "For teaching the people to love one another, there is nothing better than the practice of filial duty." Propriety is founded upon respect, and that is taught by the duties which we owe to parents and elder brothers.*

* The high estimate placed upon filial duty is well illustrated in a supposed case put to Mencius by one of his disciples. "Taou Ying asked, saying, When Shun was Emperor and Kaou Yaou was minister of penal law, suppose Koo Sow (Shun's father) had killed a man, what ought Kaou Yaou to have done? Mencius replied, Why, he would have seized him, to be sure. But would

Not only are the relative duties connected with filial duty, but also that which we owe to Heaven. Thus, in sect. 16th, Confucius said, "The ancient kings served their fathers with true filial respect; hence they could serve Heaven intelligently. In the same way they honoured their mothers, and hence could honour the Earth with an understanding mind."

But in order to enforce the feeling of respect still further, the worship of ancestors is inculcated. In sect. 9th, it is said, "that of all the duties there is none greater than filial obedience, and in performing it there is nothing so essential as reverence; and as a mark of reverence there is nothing more important than to place our ancestors on an equality with Heaven. Thus did the noble lord of Chow, (the brother of Woo-Wang, who founded the Chow dynasty about 1100 B. C.) Formerly he sacrificed on the round altar to the spirits of his remote ancestors as equal with Heaven; and in the open hall he sacrificed to Wăn-Wang (his father) as equal with the Supreme Ruler."*

not Shun have prohibited him? How could Shun have prohibited him when he had received power from the laws? What would Shun then have done in this case? He would have viewed relinquishing the imperial throne, like casting away a pair of grass shoes, and would have stolen his father, put him on his back, fled to the sea-coast, and lived there the remainder of his days in joy, forgetting the Empire." (Mencius, chap. 12th.) A much more doubtful example is given in the Lun Yu, (chap. 13th.) The Governor of Yih, conversing with Confucius, said, "In my village there is a truly upright man. His father stole a sheep, and he proved the theft." Confucius said, "The upright in my village differ from this. The father conceals the faults of the son and the son those of the father—uprightness lies in this."

* At the death of parents, the following are the instructions in the 19th sect. "At the death of parents, filial sons will not mourn to excess; in the ritual observances, they will not be extravagant, nor too precise in the use of language; they will not be pleased with elegant dress, nor enchanted with the sound of music, nor delighted with the flavour of delicate food. Such is the nature of grief. After three days they may eat. The sages taught the people not to destroy the living on account of the dead, nor to injure themselves with grief. The term of mourning is limited to three years, to show the people that it must have an end. When a parent dies, the coffin and a case for it are made ready, and the corpse wrapped in a shroud is laid therein. The sacrificial vessels are arranged, and lamentation is made for the deceased. The members of the family, moving by the side of the coffin, weep as they advance. A felicitous burial-place is selected, and the body is there laid down to rest. Then an ancestral temple is erected, and offerings are there made to the departed spirit. And in the spring and autumn, sacrificial rites are performed,

To the Chinese moralist, man seemed placed in the centre of several concentric circles; over the inner one presided a man's ancestors, and over the outer one, Heaven, or the Supreme Ruler. Between the two lay the circle of relative duties—duties to his superiors and to the emperor. All that was needed in the outer circles was to expand the duties which belonged to the inner.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the manner in which the other duties are to be performed. They are all connected in their practice with filial duty. The peculiar features of the system will be better seen by considering the motives urged for the practice of virtue. The motives urged are the renovation or perfecting of one's self, and the renovation of others. What is meant by these is more fully explained in the Chung Yung than in any other of the Four Books. This treatise commences with the radical principle that man's nature is derived from Heaven, and therefore good. To preserve this nature, or to bring back a man's practice to accord with it, is the primary duty of man. To accord with nature is called *Taou*, which primarily means a path or road, and is used abstractly for the way or path in which this Heaven-derived nature acts. Some preserve this nature; they never depart from *Taou*. Such are born sages,* or holy men. "They hit the due medium without effort, obtain it without thought, and practise it spontaneously." Others only acquire this state by long exertion and continued effort; yet it is within the reach of all. It is to be cultivated by attention to the duties already referred to.

The *Taou*, or path in which the superior man is to walk, is compared to going a long journey, where you must commence at the nearest point; or to the climbing of an eminence, where

in order to keep the dead in perpetual remembrance. Thus, with affection and respect, to serve parents while living, and mourn and lament for them when dead, constitute the fundamental duty of the living; and thus the claims of parents, both while living and when dead, are fully satisfied. This is the accomplishment of filial duty." A note in the Shoo-King (p. 154) says, that after seven generations the relationship ceases, and the shrine is removed.

* Of such sages, the Chinese only reckon six, namely, Yaou, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wăn and Woo-Wang, and Confucius. Wăn and Woo-Wang are reckoned as one, the son having completed what the father began. Confucius is the only private individual in the list.

you must begin at the lowest step. (Sect. 13th.) "*Taou*," says Confucius, "is not far removed from man. The ode says, Take one handle to cut another, that is, we are to take man (i. e. what is in man) to reform man. He who is faithful and benevolent is not far from *Taou*. What he himself likes not, he does not do to others." In every situation in life he is to act according to it. If rich, as a rich man ought to; if poor, as a poor man ought. If in a superior station, he is not to treat those below him with contempt; and in an inferior station, he is not to court the favour of superiors. He corrects himself, and blames not others. He feels no dissatisfaction. Above, he grumbles not with heaven; below, he feels no resentment towards man." Such is the easy but difficult path of duty. The ignorant come not up to it, and the well-informed pass over it. "All men eat," says the sage, "but few know the true flavour of things. There are those (he says) who can govern a country with equity, refuse a lucrative salary, and tread on the edge of the sword, who are still unable to reach the due medium." To encourage those who would walk in *Taou*, or the right path, the example of the sages is referred to. "How great," said Confucius, "was the filial piety of Shun. In virtue a sage, in honour the son of Heaven; as to riches, possessed of all within the four seas. He sacrificed to his ancestors in the ancestorial temple, and his posterity maintained the throne. Such eminent virtue could not but obtain the throne, riches, fame, and longevity. Therefore Heaven, in producing and nourishing things, regards them according to their true nature; hence what is upright it nourishes, what is bent and inclined to fall it overthrows. * * Hence great virtue must obtain the decree," (i. e. the empire.) Here by example is taught the benefit of the practice of virtue, especially of that which has its foundation in filial piety, of which Shun is cited as a renowned example. Heaven also is said to have rewarded him with blessings in this life; for Confucius is always silent about any life to come. He brings no motives from that source to stimulate men in the performance of duty.

The practice of personal virtue results not merely in benefit to himself, others also are renovated or reformed. This is usually exemplified in reference to government. Next to the attainment

of high personal virtue, the great end of the practice of virtue was to secure good government. It was often set forth as the expected reward, and always as the best preparation to rule. "He who knows wisdom, benevolence, and fortitude," says Confucius, "knows by what means to cultivate personal virtue. He who knows how to cultivate personal virtue, knows how to rule men. He who knows how to rule men, knows how to govern the whole Empire." Good laws were felt to be of little value without good men to execute them. Thus Confucius said, "That while men like Woo Wang reign, good laws flourish, but when they are gone then the laws cease to operate. The principles of such a man naturally produce good government, just as the earth naturally produces trees."

Thus far Confucius: but his grandson, in enlarging upon his words, and showing their excellence, carries the doctrine respecting the *Taou* still further. He introduces another term nearly equivalent to *Taou*, and which he frequently uses for it. It is possible that the use of *Taou* by other philosophers, especially the Taouists, led him to substitute another term. This new term, *Ching*, so far as it differs from *Taou*, seems to mean its complete realization. It is *Taou* complete. The commentators define it "as the true, the real, the naturally right—it is the radical nature of the fixed order of heaven." "*Ching* is the fundamental characteristic of the sage or holy man."* Tsze Sze says of it that "It is only the man possessed of *Ching* that can perfect his own nature; he who can perfect his own nature, can perfect the nature of other men; he who can perfect the nature of other men, can perfect the nature of things; he who can perfect the nature of things, can assist heaven and earth in producing and nourishing things. When this is the case, then he is united with heaven and earth in equality;" or as the Commentary says, he stands equal with heaven and earth, so as to form a triad. (Sect. 22d.) The two

* Meadows, in his "Chinese and their Rebellions," (p. 366,) gives other definitions of *Ching*, taken from the *Sing Le Tsing e*, or Essence of True Philosophy, which bring this term into correspondence with the later philosophy. "That which makes the holy man holy is nothing but his complete personal realization of the real order of the universe; it is what is called *Tae Keih*, or the ultimate principle."

reasons for this remarkable statement are to be found first in the exaltation of humanity. In praising the ancient sages even Confucius had compared them with heaven, (as in the *Heaou King*—see above, p. 250,) and in the *Lun Yu*, chap. 8th. "How great," he says, "was the regal conduct of Yaou! Vast and extensive, equalled only by heaven." The next reason is to be found in the connection which was supposed to exist between the upper and lower world. Hence heaven as well as man was conceived of as acting according to *Taou*. "*Ching*" is said to be the *Taou* of heaven, and to aim at it, the *Taou* of man." (Sect. 20th.) That is, perfection or truth (we have no one word to express what is meant by *Ching*, or conformity to a right nature,) is the *Taou* or path of heaven; it is the way in which heaven manifests itself, and to aim at the same perfection or conformity to a right nature is the *Taou* or right way for man. Heaven, then, does possess and man ought to arrive at this state expressed by the term *Ching*. Some have, according to their ideas, arrived at it, and hence they equal Heaven. This comparison is repeated more than once. In sect. 30th Confucius is said to have taken his principles from Yaou and Shun, and elegantly exhibited those of Wău and Woo Wang. He imitated the season of Heaven above; and below the laws of water and earth. He may be compared to heaven and earth in their supporting, containing, and overshadowing all things; to the regular revolutions of the seasons, and to the successive shining of the sun and moon. The Commentary says, "He united in his own person all the virtue of heaven and earth. * * The revolutions of the seasons are fixed, and move on with self-existent power, hence the sage made them his pattern. There exists nothing whatever which is not supported, overshadowed, and nourished by heaven and earth; in the same manner the astonishing, all-moving virtue of the sage pervaded the universe. Thus it is evident that Confucius united in his own mind all the virtue of the holy gods, and in his conduct all the laws of the ancient and sacred kings."

The complete realization of the *Taou*, or when it is perfected in *Ching*, is said to enable those who possess it to foreknow things, so that they are said to be equal to the gods. (Sect. 24th.) A kind of inherent efficacy is ascribed to this *Taou*. It will

endure long, become manifest, extend far, rise high, and shine forth. It is compared to earth in its thickness and substantiality, and to heaven in its height and splendour. He who possesses it will shine forth without showing himself, and will without moving renovate others. (Sect. 26th.)

It is unnecessary to quote further. We have here the seeds of that philosophy which sprung up in the Sung dynasty, and has its type in Choo-He, or Choo-foo-tsze, the principal commentator on the Four Books, who died A. D. 1200. Confucius began by exalting human virtue, by comparing it to heaven; Tsz-sze made them equal. The *Taou* of the one could be obtained by the other. It ended by making the *Taou* of each the same; the same immateral principle which works in nature and in man.

The third period brings us back again into the range of Theology. In the first period, the prevailing characteristic was monotheism—a constantly recognized dependence on one personal being. In the second period, practical atheism prevailed. Morality and virtue were largely dwelt upon, but man was considered sufficient in himself to perform all good. This developed a philosophy which was not only practically but theoretically atheistic; the perfect man embodied within himself the perfection of the universe. There was no higher principle than that which was found in man. The perfect man was equal to heaven and earth. That which was found equally in both was an immaterial principle. This immaterial principle was called by the term T'ae Keih, or great extreme, the same term which Confucius once used (p. 11) in his comments on the Yih King. This term was now used "to express the extreme point to which man's speculations on the nature of existence have been able to reach." (See Meadows' Chinese and their Rebellions, p. 342. The 18th chap. of this work contains a valuable exposition of the philosophy of this period.)

In stating more particularly the character of this philosophy, we might begin by tracing the influence of erroneous doctrines concerning man's nature and perfectibility back to errors in theology; but the more simple and natural way will be to begin with the T'ae Keih, or great extreme, and trace its actings out in mind and matter.

The consideration of this philosophy is made the more important, as it is that of authorized commentaries on the Ancient Classics, and its interpretation is received by the great majority of the literati of China. The exposition in many cases is so necessary, and often so clear and well expressed, that its philosophy has been generally received without question. Opposition has occasionally been excited against it, and expositions exist more in accordance with the teachings of the ancients; but the undoubted ability with which Choo-He and those of the same school wrote, has left other expositions in comparative obscurity.

Choo-He, and the philosophers of that school, evidently intended to bring the classics into harmony with one another. They saw also the unity of design which there is in the works of creation and providence, and felt the desire which exists in the human mind to harmonize and classify separate facts and truths under general laws; and they therefore attempted a logical and consistent theory which would explain, first, all the facts in the universe, and, second, the teachings of the ancients, which, to say the least, were founded upon a philosophy differing from their own. The grand principle which was to harmonize all, was that all things in the universe were only the various forms and modifications of the one ultimate principle which, in its highest and most unresolvable manifestation, was called *T'ae Keih*, or, as has usually been translated, the Great Extreme. In the 4th sect. of the Book of Rites, with the comment upon it, we have the method stated in which all things are derived from the Great Extreme. "Ceremonies," it is said, "date their origin from the Supreme One; he, dividing, constituted heaven and earth; revolving, he produced light and darkness; changing, he brought about the four seasons; and arranging, he appointed the *Kwei Shins*, or spirits." The Commentary says, "that which is infinitely great is called Supreme, and that which is undivided is called one; this is the principle of the Great Extreme, (T'ae Keih,) which including three consists of one."* This expression, "including three, consists of one," probably means the three powers, heaven, earth, and man, which may be traced up to this one Supreme. In further explanation of this

* Quoted by Medhurst, in his Theology of the Chinese, p. 82.

process of development, we are told, in the Commentary on the Yih King, that "when the Great Extreme moved, it produced the male principle;* when it had moved to the uttermost it rested, and in resting produced the female principle. After it had rested to the utmost extent, it again moved, and thus went on in alternate motion and rest without cessation." (Theology of the Chinese, p. 115.) By this alternate motion and rest, all things animate and inanimate were produced. It is thus that the five elements of the material world were produced, viz. fire, water, wood, metal, and earth. Things immaterial come under the same general law, the alternate motion and rest of the ultimate principle. This ultimate principle is sometimes considered as a breath or essence, which advancing or expanding is called *Shin*, and returning or resting is called *Kwei*. Choo-He says "there is not a single thing between heaven and earth which is not *Kwei Shin;* for all the first advancings of the breath of nature belong to the male principle, and constitute *Shin;* while all the revertings of this breath belong to the female principle, and form *Kwei*. Thus the day during the forenoon is *Shin*, and in the afternoon *Kwei;* the moon in its waxings is *Shin*, and in its wanings *Kwei;* trees just budding forth are *Shin*, and when withering and drooping, *Kwei;* man from youth to manhood is *Shin*, and in old age and decrepitude is *Kwei*." (Comments on 16th sect. of Chung Yung, quoted in Theol. of Chinese, p. 9.) This male and female principle, or positive and negative essence, pervade all things, and the spiritual beings of the ancient classics are thus reduced to the alternate pulsations of the breath of nature.†

* Meadows translates these terms, "positive and negative essence," which in most cases would be the better rendering of the original terms.

† It has been a matter of much controversy among the missionaries in China, to determine what is the best term to use for God. The Romanists introduced the combination *T'een Choo*, or Lord of Heaven. Protestant missionaries are generally divided between the use of *Shang-te*, or Supreme Ruler, which occurs so often in the Shoo-King, and *Shin*. It has been contended that *Shin* means spirit, and is not properly applicable to God. The truth of the matter seems to be that *Shin* is used in different senses, according to the writer's philosophical views. Choo-He's idea of *Shin* is, that it is the male principle, or positive essence in nature. It is the acting out of the ultimate principle, and is found everywhere in the sun and moon, trees and man. In the ancient classics, the *Shin* seem to be considered as a class of spiritual beings, subordinate to the

According to this philosophy, man consists of this positive and negative essence in the same way with immaterial things. The finer part is the *Shin*, and the grosser the *Kwei*. As one of the commentators says, "the *Kwei Shin* of any one person are the *Kwei Shin* that are sacrificed to in ancestral worship, and the *Kwei Shin* that are the object of sacrifice are the *Kwei Shin* of the breath of nature, or the primordial substance, which is declared in other places to be the same with the *T'ae Keih*, or ultimate principle. At death this distinction is generally spoken of as more apparent; the body and grosser parts of the man descend to earth, and are the *Kwei*, while the finer part mounts aloft, and becomes the *Shin*."* Confucius, in

Supreme Ruler. They were the spirits of the hills, of ancestors, the gods of land and grain. In the popular belief of the present day, apart from the influence of Choo-He's philosophy, *Shin* is any object of worship, be it an image of wood or stone, or a spirit properly so called. The objection to *Shang-te*—apart from its use by the Taouists, and application to one of their chief idols—is the difficulty of its use as an equivalent for *Elohim* and *Theos*. Both of these terms are used in their plural signification, and are applicable to false gods. *Shang-te* can only be used in the singular, as there is only one Supreme Ruler. And an inveighing against false Supreme Rulers, aside from the incongruity of the expression, touches but a small part of the idolatry of the Chinese, while the worship of false *Shin* has been their sin from the beginning. *Shang-te*, in its original signification as Supreme Ruler, is undoubtedly a good term, and it would not be surprising if both terms should be used; *Shin* as equivalent for *Elohim* and *Theos*, and applicable to true and false gods; while *Shang-te* is often a peculiarly appropriate term, and ought not to be lost in bringing the Chinese to a purer monotheism than that of their forefathers.

* The Chinese classics dwell but very little on the *immortality of the soul.* Their views are mostly contained in such allusions as the one just quoted. There is a similar allusion in the Shoo-King, recording the death of Yaou, the first emperor of China. The expression used for his departure is, to ascend and descend, which the commentator says denotes that at death the intellectual spirit ascends to heaven, and the animal soul descends to earth. Of Shun, the second emperor, it is said he ascended far away and died. Han-tsze, one of the commentators, says, in the annals of the bamboo books, "the death of kings is always called an ascending, meaning that they ascended to heaven." (Shoo-King, p. 40.) Dr. Medhurst says the most distinct reference which we have in the Chinese classics to the intelligent soul, is in the following quotation from the Book of Rites, sect. 4th: "When people die, the survivors go up to the house-top, (whither the spirit mounts aloft,) and call out, saying, Oh you! (such a one,) come back, (to the body you have left.) (But if that prove unavailing,) they offer the unboiled rice and raw flesh, (of high antiquity,) or the boiled dumplings (of latter ages) to the manes of the departed: thus they look towards heaven, (whither the spirit is gone,) and store up in the earth,

his anxiety to uphold ancestral worship, approaches to this semi-deification of the human spirit. In fact, it is a natural growth of his system, that a man who is worthy of worship after death, should have the same elements of divinity in him before death. This making men gods, helped to prepare the way for making God man. Polytheism and pantheism, the widest apart of all extremes, meet.

But to go on with the doctrines of the Sung philosophers respecting man. Not only do the *Yang* and the *Ying*, the positive and negative essence, enter into the constitution of man, forming the constituent elements of his body and mind; they also enter into and determine the quality of his actions. In the Yih King, (quoted in Theol. of the Chinese, p. 115,) it is said, "The *Yang* and the *Ying* may be called the *Taou*. The connection of these two constitutes goodness, and the perfection of them constitutes the virtuous nature." When the essence or primordial substance is spoken of, it is called the Great Extreme, or ultimate principle. Moving and resting, it is called the *Yang* and *Ying*, or positive and negative essence. The rule or method of its action is called *Taou;* the positive and negative are both united in *Taou*, and constitute goodness. Thus, the Commentary says, "the activity of benevolence constitutes the positive principle, and the sedateness of wisdom

(the corpse of the deceased.) They do this becanse they suppose the body and the grosser parts of the animal soul descend (to earth,) while the intelligent spirit mounts aloft." The commentator says that "knowledge is all-pervading, and the spirit is in no case divested of knowledge; both these are light and pure, and belong to the male principle of nature, therefore they ascend and mount aloft." (Theol. of the Chinese, p. 76.) The argument presented by the commentator from knowledge, in proof of the immortality of the sonl, aside from revelation, is certainly one of the best which can be presented.

The belief in the immortality of the soul, however, made so little impression upon the Confucianists, that in their controversy with the Budhists they did not hesitate to deny it. One of them, writing A. D. 483, says, "The soul is to the body as sharpness to the knife; the soul cannot continue to exist after the destruction of the body, any more than sharpness can remain when the knife is no more." A Budhist, writing in the time of the Sung dynasty, says, "The instructions of Confucius include only a single life; they do not reach to a future state of existence, with its interminable results." This writer brings forward an imaginary Confucianist, who argues, "that to be urged by the desire of heaven to the performance of virtue, cannot bear comparison with doing what is right for its own sake." (Notices of Budhism in China, by Rev. J. Edkins.)

the negative principle." These are united in the good man, and constitute the virtuous nature. Thus the *Taou*, or right order of things both in nature and man, inheres in the *Yang* and the *Ying*, or the all-pervading motion and rest of the Great Extreme.

We are now prepared to see the connecting link between this philosophy and that of the preceding period. We must again refer to what is said in the commencement of the Chung Yung, that "man's nature is derived from Heaven, and therefore good; that to preserve this nature, or to bring it back, is the primary duty of man." (See above, p. 250.) The accordance with this Heaven-derived nature is there expressed by *Taou*—the right path—and afterwards by *Ching*—perfection, or truth. This *Taou*, or path of man, was considered first as according with Heaven, and then spoken of in its complete realization as equalling Heaven. Now this *Taou*, this perfection of goodness, is explained by the union of the *Yang* and the *Ying*, the positive and negative essence. When united, the *Taou* of man not only equals, but is the same with the *Taou* of Heaven. Wisdom and benevolence are the motion and rest of the Great Extreme.

Instead of this term, *Taou*, the way or path, the Sung philosophers often used the term *le*, or principle of order. This *le* in man is his *sing* or nature, which is to be cultivated to the utmost. The mind or heart (for the Chinese term *sin* includes both) contains this *le* or principle of order, just as heaven is the place from which this *le* originates. Man thus forms a complete organism or microcosm. Hence, by pushing this complete organism to the utmost, he carries to the utmost the *le* of Heaven, and there is nothing beyond he does not know. Knowing this *le*, he knows whence it originates; and there is nothing beyond or outside of this. As there is nothing beyond or outside of this *le*, or principle of order, he who knows it in his own nature, knows all things—knows Heaven. This explanation occurs mostly in the Commentary on the beginning of the 46th sect. of Mencius, in which he says, that "he who employs his whole mind or heart, knows his nature; he who knows his nature knows Heaven. To keep the mind or heart, and cherish the nature, is the way to serve Heaven. To cultivate nature with undeviating singleness of intention, is the way

to fulfil the divine decree." These last two sentences appear to be Mencius's explanation of the former, though it must be confessed that the expression, "he who knows his nature knows Heaven," is too near akin to the later philosophy. According to this system, the knowledge which is to rectify the heart, is the knowledge of this *le*, or principle of order, which enters into and constitutes the nature of all things. (See above, p. 244.)

It will be seen that these views of man's nature are essentially pantheistic. Man is but the alternate pulsation of the Great Extreme; his nature or disposition is the same with the principle of order which pervades all things; and the moral quality of his actions is only this same inanimate pulsation of the immaterial principle. Each man is a microcosm "having the divinity within," (Commentary on 46th sect. of Mencius,) just as heaven contains it, and therefore knowing himself he knows heaven.

There are two ways in which pantheism may arise. One from reasoning abstractly about existence and God, until man is forgotten and God considered the only being in the universe. This would seem to have been the more usual method with the German philosophers, and with the Brahminical philosophy of India. Chinese pantheism, on the other hand, grew up in an opposite direction, out of the exaltation of man. Man was first considered sufficient to all good, then equal to, and finally the same as Heaven. Though in the end the result of the one is just as much pantheism as the other, yet the process through which the latter was reached had the advantage of a previous philosophy which dwelt upon man's responsibility. This sense of individuality, arising out of the responsibility of every man to cultivate virtue, restrained it from some of the grosser forms of pantheism. Thus the harmony and unity which was sought by reducing all things to the actings out of the Great Extreme, placed the moral quality of actions on the same level with its actings out in inanimate nature. This was the logical conclusion to which the Sung philosophers were brought. But the morality and intrinsic excellence of virtue had been too strongly insisted upon by Confucius and Mencius to be thus blotted out. In fact these logical conclusions of pantheism, so repugnant to the common sense of mankind, are its best refutation.

The insufficiency of a pantheistic philosophy to meet the wants and cravings of the human soul have been abundantly manifest in China. Though it professes to be the development of a system which had its origin forty centuries ago, harmonizing the wisdom of ancient sages, yet the Chinese unsatisfied with its teachings, have resorted to other systems to find some guide about death as well as life, some knowledge of spirits as well as men. Morality has been found a poor substitute for religion; and Atheism has followed up the disowning of God with deifying its founder; while the unsatisfied cravings of the multitude have gone after gods many, seeking in Taouism and Budhism what they have not found in Confucianism.

ART. III.—*Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy.* By WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M. A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the Author's Manuscripts, with Notes, by William Hepworth Thompson, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1857.

THESE two volumes of Lectures on Ancient Philosophy by Professor Butler show him to have been one of the most gifted men of his day. With all the disadvantages of posthumous publication, many of them having been not only not designed for publication, but prepared in haste to meet the immediate emergencies of his class, they betray rich learning, and keen philosophic insight, brightened by a certain poetic glow, and a rhetorical magnificence—often too gorgeous and diffuse for topics which rather demand a severe simplicity of style. This defect, however, may attract a class of readers to the great subjects of which he treats, who would be repelled by the dry light of exact and concise philosophic diction. At the same time it interferes with the clear and direct evolution of abstract truths, and often hinders the reader's ready apprehension of the

successive steps of the author's reasoning, in their mutual connections. This fault is more obtrusive in the first volume, whose contents are far more fragmentary, immethodical and immature, than those of the second, which consists chiefly of a thorough and masterly review of the Platonic philosophy. This bears evidence of being a ripe product of the author's mind, and affords the true gauge of his philosophic power. Viewed as a whole, we know not its equal or rival in our language, as an exposition of Platonism. It will remain a durable monument of the author's genius. The lectures on the preceding schools of Grecian philosophy are also searching and valuable. Those which follow on Aristotle and Neo-Platonism, though less exhaustive, are yet profound and luminous, and form a worthy contribution to our means of understanding these subjects. We will add that the disadvantage of not being prepared, nor, to a great extent, designed for publication by the author, is compensated, as far as possible, by the high qualifications of the accomplished editor, who gives unmistakable evidence of his accomplishments as a scholar and metaphysician. We have only repeated his own declared judgment, in regard to the comparative fitness of the lectures in the first and second volumes, to represent the author's power in this department of inquiry. It would have been his choice, had it been in his power, to omit the introductory and some other lectures.

Yet, although they do poor justice to their author, both in themselves, and especially considered in their relation to the unity and completeness of the whole, they are not without value. They offer many solid as well as brilliant suggestions in support of the possibility, the utility, and the royal preëminence of mental and metaphysical science. Whether we view this as culminating in theology, as the science of the first causes and reasons of things, as the knowledge of the power which gives birth to all science, and investigates the grounds and validity of all our knowing, or as a gymnastic and tonic for the intellect of the student, it readily takes the rank so often accorded to it, and so eloquently claimed for it by Professor Butler, of *Prima Philosophia, Scientia Scientiarum.*

Beyond this, he discusses, in the introductory part, the appropriate spheres of Psychology, Metaphysics, and Ontology.

His contributions toward a just apprehension of their mutual boundaries and relations are important, and, with some qualifications, just. Various circumstances have led to more or less confusion of thought and language on these matters. A common idea of Metaphysics has been that they simply stand in contrast with Physics, and comprise every department of inquiry but the physical sciences, or that world of matter which we cognize through the senses. In short, they are regarded as the science of immaterial, or the genus under which all the non-material sciences range as species. Viewed in this light, they of course include Mental and Moral Philosophy, Logic, Rhetoric, the principles of Jurisprudence, Political Economy, and Civil Government, and eminently, Christian Theology, which, in any view, has its strong metaphysical side. There has been no age in which the reigning theology and metaphysics have not exercised a powerful reciprocal influence. Accordingly, the study of Mental Philosophy has been deemed very commonly to be simply and purely the study of Metaphysics. Yet those who recognize not the distinction between them, here as elsewhere, often show that they are possessed by it, if they do not possess it. They imply it in their use of language, if they have never stated it clearly to themselves, just as idealists will show that they believe in an external world, although they have reasoned it out of being. Let any man speak of proving a proposition by metaphysical reasoning, and he means something quite different from what he does when he speaks of ascertaining any point psychologically, or by an analysis of the faculties and operations of the soul. He means that he proves it by evidence, *a priori*, and not by induction, observation, testimony or experience. If one argues that the essence of Deity is incommunicable to creatures, because self-existence cannot be predicated of the created and dependent without a contradiction, his argument is metaphysical, and recognized as such by all who have any notion of the word metaphysical, but it has no special relation to mental philosophy or psychology; no more than the argument that salt preserves meat by detaching its moisture, because it always effects this, and moisture is found to promote animal putrefaction. In either case the mind pronounces the judgment, in accordance with its

own laws, as it does in every act of knowing, in any science. But in neither case is there any special relation to Mental Philosophy, more than in any judgment in any sphere of human investigation.

As the distinction between metaphysics and the mere science of mind has come to be more distinctly discerned and defined in philosophic thinking, the term psychology has grown into very general use to denote the latter distinctively. It has the advantage of sharply defining its significate, the science of the mind or soul; of indicating it by a single word; of affording the convenient and indispensable adjective psychological; and of being less vague in relation to the term *metaphysics*, than the broader and vaguer phrases, philosophy of the mind, of the intellectual powers, &c., popularized by the Scotch school of philosophers. Reid and his successors had reason for introducing these titles. He found himself called partly to combat and partly to harmonize two opposite tendencies in philosophic method, each of which, employed exclusively of the other, had been pressed to the most extravagant results. The one, of which Descartes may be taken as a strong type, was the metaphysical. His ignoring all original knowledge but the simple *cogito*, and erecting the whole superstructure of belief by *a priori* reasoning from this one datum of consciousness, is a simple method of spinning out a universe from a single subjective fact of personal experience. This single fact is no more a fact than innumerable others pertaining to our souls, our bodies, or the external world, attested by evidence equally certain and immediate. And the chances of success in such a method are about as great as they would be to reason out, *a priori*, a system of astronomy from one observation of the sun, without observing any of the immense number of facts equally certain and equally accessible in the stellar universe. This method of reasoning out *a priori* what is matter of fact ascertainable only by observation and experiment, had vitiated not only mental, but physical science, until Bacon put forth his Novum Organum, which established the great principle that all conclusions relative to the sphere of *contingent* truth or existence, are to be founded on duly ascertained facts, must be tested by facts, and harmonize with all known facts. This principle, as all know, regen-

erated physical science. The simple principle of founding it on duly ascertained phenomena has inaugurated that career of marvellous and magnificent discovery, which has vastly widened man's original dominion over nature.

This inductive method is clearly applicable to the phenomena of consciousness, which are in their nature, facts contingent and ascertainable. Under the prevalence of the metaphysical method, psychology was, like physical science, overborne before the Baconian era. The inductive method in relation to the mind was first displayed most signally by Locke, whose *Essay on the Human Understanding* gave a most decisive impetus to the psychological investigations of cotemporaneous and subsequent philosophers. But while Locke developed a real, and in many respects true psychology, it was nevertheless too exclusive and destructive. In his zeal against innate ideas, he swept away all *a priori* truths, jeopardized some of the first principles of morals and religion, annihilated the groundwork of metaphysics, and, so far forth, taught a false psychology, by giving a false view of what is contained or implied in the indubitable facts of human consciousness. Yet, while maintaining that the mind obtains all its ideas through the senses, and through reflection upon its own operations upon the sensuous matter thus furnished, he teaches that, even in regard to these, "the mind hath no immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate;" and therefore "the mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things." But how is it possible to be sure of this "conformity between our ideas and the things themselves," unless we have an immediate knowledge of the things themselves? It is not possible. All certain knowledge of any thing material or immaterial, outside of our own ideas, is annihilated. Nothing remains but pure subjectivity or idealism, an odd finality for what was begun with an assault on original, or *a priori*, under the title of "innate ideas." This is a type of the exclusive psychological method, in its way resolving all certain objects of knowledge into mental states or acts—modifications of the percipient or sentient Ego. The idealism of

Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume were easy and inevitable superstructures on such a foundation. This hyper-psychological extreme thus met the hyper-metaphysical, which has tended in all ages to turn the actual universe into an ideal structure formed out of the *a priori* ideas and reasonings of the mind. All systems whether psychological or metaphysical in their germ, whether Buddhist, Grecian, Transcendental, or Sensual, whether advanced by Locke or Hume, Kant or Hegel, which confound object and subject in knowledge, or which resolve all the objects of knowledge into ideas or feelings of the mind knowing, do so far forth tend to scepticism. In most cases they end in that Pantheism which makes All One, and One All, of which Professor Butler's lectures on Ancient Philosophy only afford numerous striking and instructive illustrations.

Dr. Reid entered the field when this sceptical chaos, arising from an exclusive and exaggerated use of either the metaphysical or psychological methods, by their respective masters, reigned. Without tracing the minute philosophic causes, he discerned the fact that nearly all philosophers agreed that the mind has no immediate knowledge of external objects, but only of some ideal images, or subtle media, which represent them. He saw that if we do not cognize external objects immediately, we do not know them at all with any certainty. So a basis is laid for scepticism. He further saw that certain first truths, not derived through the senses, are intuitively perceived by the mind, with as much certainty as external objects through the senses; that they embrace the first principles and conditions of ethics, theology, mathematics, logic, and indeed of substantial existence: and that these first truths were undermined or imperilled by the principles of Locke, especially as developed or perverted by the sophistical art of Hume. The great work which he undertook was to bring order out of this chaos, by showing that, within their proper sphere, our faculties are trustworthy, and the knowledge they afford sure. This he attempted chiefly by a psychology more exact than Locke's, the cardinal feature of which lay in proving incontestably that we perceive external objects immediately, and not mediately through some vicarious idea or other representation; that in touching a stone, we touch a stone and not a mere idea of a stone. This sim-

ple and impregnable truth, which it requires the astuteness of a philosopher to unsettle or mystify, it is the great merit of Reid, not to have discovered—all the world knew it before—but to have rescued from the assaults of speculatists, who reared and still continue to rear upon the denial of it, in various forms, their fabrics of scepticism, idealism, and pantheism. While his system required to be perfected in some points by his successors, yet the service he rendered in putting the doctrine of Sensitive Perception on a right footing, has won for him an enduring and deserved renown. But beyond restoring the senses to their normal authority within their own sphere, it was necessary to recover those intuitive *a priori*, metaphysical truths and ideas which underlie all reasoning, all supersensual knowledge, and, in a sense, all existence, from the uncertainty in which Locke, Hume, and the Materialists had shrouded them. This also he accomplished by a psychological process, showing that the universal human mind is conscious of affirming that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, &c., with the same confidence as it affirms its own existence. Here he found his psychology passing into metaphysics, as all sound psychology must. But in the same sense, if not to the same extent, physics have their root in psychology. For what true science of material things can exist, if we have no sure and immediate perception of material objects, of aught beyond our own ideas or sensations? Physical science also has its root in metaphysics. For what valid science of matter can there be, if events have no cause, and qualities no substance? So it is impossible fully to analyze the operations of the mind in vision without reference to the laws of optics, or its mode of apprehending the primary and secondary qualities of matter, without reference to some principles of Natural Philosophy. But this does not make psychology natural philosophy, although they are to this extent mutually related. In this way, and to this extent, Reid's work was both psychological and metaphysical. As his work was the organizing of a sound philosophy out of the confusion produced by metaphysics overdone at the expense of psychology, and by a psychology overdone at the cost of a metaphysical truth, and to reclaim it from the disrepute arising from both these sources, by founding it on undisputed facts of the univer-

sal consciousness, (*communis sensus,*) he and his followers adopted the convenient titles, Philosophy of the Intellectual Powers, of the Active and Moral Powers, of the Human Mind, of Common Sense, to indicate their sphere of operations; including not merely psychology proper, but as much metaphysics as they saw fit to deal with. Owing to the fortunate ascendency of the Scotch school in Britain and America, these terms have continued in use to denote indiscriminately metaphysics and psychology, so that many confound the two, not knowing where one ends and the other begins.

Mental Philosophy *strictly understood* is indeed simply Psychology. And Psychology is simply *the science which investigates and determines the operations, laws and faculties of the mind, as these are given in, or inferrible from the phenomena of consciousness.* It is therefore a science of phenomena, of facts, of contingent truths. It classes therefore with the inductive sciences. In this respect it classes with the physical sciences, and has even by some writers been styled physical. As such, its province is, first, to ascertain the facts of consciousness, and next, to propound that and that only concerning the mind, which is fairly implied in these facts. Its simple function is to find and teach what the mind *does* and *suffers*, and thence what it *is;* not what by any *a priori* reasoning it may be shown that it ought to be. This, it may be remarked in passing, rules out all claims of Phrenology to be in any sense a philosophy of mind, since, whatever may be its uses, it never can give us a single phenomenon of consciousness. It may serve a great many good purposes, to map out the skull, and take the mensuration of its parts, but this can never reveal a single mental act. On the other hand, it rules out the pretensions of Rational Psychology, which some transcendentalists elevate above that derived from consciousness, and insist upon as a method of demonstrating *a priori* the possibility and validity of the latter. This method culminates in cosmogonies *a priori*, showing how potential, infinite, absolute being becomes actual, finite, and conditioned in the mere process of existing, instead of finding what the creation really is, and thence deducing those "invisible things" of its Creator, which are clearly seen and known from the things that are made.

And thus Psychology as a science of the phenomena of consciousness is effectually distinguished from Metaphysics, which is the science of *a priori*, necessary, meta-phenomenal truths. There are those who deny that there are any such truths. We shall not now stop to dispute with those who deny that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, that no two substances occupying space can occupy the same space at the same time; or that these are not phenomena; or that, however originally suggested by experience, they go beyond experience, are affirmed by the mind *a priori* with a certainty and necessity independent of experience. These characteristics broadly separate this class of truths from Psychology. True, Psychology shows that the mind affirms them, and that this affirmation is valid. But so it shows that the mind cognizes matter and that the cognition is valid, that the memory recalls past events, but it is not therefore the science of material objects, or of the past.

At this stage, it is important to observe that metaphysics are only in a partial and subordinate sense, (although a most important sense,) a science of real existence. For all real existences, except the Supreme God, are contingent on his sovereign will. Had he not seen fit to exercise his creative power, there would have been no created universe, and its non-existence would have involved no contradiction or absurdity. The necessity which characterizes metaphysical truths, so far as it affects real existence, is *hypothetical, conditioned on facts of actual existence otherwise proved.* It is a necessity of relation or consequence whereby, on the supposition that certain forms of existence are otherwise shown, certain other forms of existence must or must not be admitted. This proposition seems to us important and pregnant, and therefore we dwell a little upon its illustration.

For example, the propositions that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, that what may be predicated of a whole class can be predicated of every individual included in that class, that every equilateral triangle must be equiangular, do not of themselves prove any fact of actual existence. They only prove, in case events, qualities, classes having common properties, equilateral triangles, exist, then, *quoad haec*, ade-

quate causes, substances, the possession of these common properties by each individual of the class, equiangular triangles exist. The propositions that of two contradictories both cannot be true, and that one must be true, and that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same moment, of themselves prove no fact of real existence, or non-existence. But if one of two contradictories be otherwise proved true, the other must be false, and *vice versa;* if one body is shown to fill any given space, at any time, no other fills it at the same time. But let no one deem this principle unimportant, though thus hypothetical, as a means of proving actual existence. It is true that the principle of causal necessity proves no fact, till some other fact is proved. But the facts of creation being proved, and the most important of them perceived intuitively, or without the aid of science, this principle demands the admission of a Great First Cause adequate to the production of such effects. It gives us the Invisible God, the greatest of real existences. The highest of all truths, even the divine power and Godhead, is a non-phenomenal truth, deduced by a metaphysical principle, from phenomena. Rom. i. 20. We thus know that things seen are not made of things which do appear, *μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων.* Heb. xi. 3. On such principles rest the whole sciences of Mathematics and Logic, which are justly styled Formal and Hypothetical science, as distinguished from those that refer to real existence. Yet, while Logic of itself can prove no fact till facts are given it, it can give laws for determining indefinitely what other facts are implied or denied in such facts as are given. Mathematics alone could not determine a single fact or principle of Astronomy. Yet, when sufficient facts were ascertained by observation, to afford a basis for mathematical computation, how immense is the number of astronomical truths which mathematics have proved to be necessarily consequent upon those otherwise discovered, till it has become as much a mathematical as an inductive science?

If there is any exception to this, it is found in the case of Space and Time, of which we cannot conceive as non-existent or limited, although we do not know them as actual phenomena. They are indeed first suggested to the mind by the phenomena of bodies which we see must be in space, and of events which

we see must be in time. But when once suggested to the mind, its conviction of their existence and infinitude is not dependent on or derived by inference from bodies or events. Whatever become of bodies or events, it conceives of time and space as existent and unlimited irrespective of them. Nor can we, without violence to our intellectual constitution, follow Kant in denying them objective reality, and evaporate them into mere ideas or necessary forms of thought. And yet again, if we undertake to define what they are, it seems difficult to regard them so much as substances, as the spheres or containers of all substance. If nothing had existence but space and time, how much of existence would there be? But we are only indicating the difficulties which beset us when we attempt to carry our speculations beyond the narrow limits for which we are fitted. They only show us how soon we confront heights which our intellects are not winged to reach;

> How short the powers of nature come,
> And can no further go.

It is hard to think time and space mere relations of other things, much less mere ideas or forms of thought; we can say no less than that they are illimitable, contain all else in their capacious bosom; we cannot conceive their non-existence, nor yet dare we think them independent of the Creator, who made all things and fills eternity and immensity; yet what they are, with Reid, we cannot say.

With just views of Metaphysics, we can readily dispose of Ontology, or the science of Being. If by this we meant simply the solution of questions as to the validity of our belief in the actual existence of ourselves or other objects known by our cognitive faculties—in other words the science of objective reality as assailed by sceptics and idealists—it is past all doubt that there is a room for such a science. There is a valid Ontology to this extent. It emerges immediately from the first principle of a sound psychology. That principle is simply this: All acts of intelligence suppose an object known as well as a knowing subject. The reason why we *know* objects as such and such, (if we know at all,) is that they *are* such and such, not that the mind makes them appear so, when they are not so.

These objects determine the mind's differing apprehensions more than the mind itself. A horse and a barley-corn are apprehended differently because they differ from each other, not because the mind differs or causes them to differ. When we know objects therefore, it is simply because they are present to our intelligence. All mankind live and act on this faith. They have no idea that all objects are mere mental phantasies. It takes philosophers who overfly their own humanity, to make nature a lie, and intelligence a sheer delusion, a grand transcendental imposture. As then we know that things exist without us, we learn by observation and induction what they are; and from things so known we go by legitimate metaphysical deduction to non-phenomenal truths, "things invisible," that do not "appear." Heb. xi. 3. So far as by Ontology is meant finding ground for a valid belief in what is certified to us by sense, reason, or revelation, so far it is to be admitted. The grounds for such a belief are abundant and indisputable.

There is another idea of Ontology, according to which we have no faith in it. We refer to attempts to explain the nature, grounds, or genesis of being by metaphysical and *a priori* reasoning: which usually amounts to a process of attempting, not to find what the universe or any part of it is, in the legitimate use of the faculties given us for that purpose, but to show *a priori* how it *must* be, either as to some of its particulars, or how it must have been evolved into actual existence from some vague potentiality called the Absolute, some "Brahma sleeping on eternity." Metaphysics, as we have seen, do not, of themselves, give immediate and original knowledge of actual existence. They only furnish formulas by which, from actual existence otherwise ascertained, we may and must conclude something else. In the study of Being, therefore, we are first to find in the use of the faculties given for this purpose, what is, and how it is, as far as possible. Then we are to find what necessarily results therefrom, taking due care that our conclusions contradict no known facts. This is one thing. To show first metaphysically what must or should be, and then to strain all known facts into a forced consistency with it, is quite another. It is one thing, to ascertain that the world is full of objects, having a distinct yet dependent existence, which imply

a self-existent creator. It is quite another, to reason out metaphysically that all things are manifestations or forms of the Infinite become finite in the process of becoming actually existent, and to turn what we have taken for a distinct man, horse, or tree, into a phenomenon of God. Metaphysics have no commission, no competency for such a work. It is sheer transcendental fatuity. This sort of Ontology has run into pantheism or close approximation to it in all ages. It is the staple of that continental philosophy which has shot its poison through so much of our current literature, history, and theology. If we open a German history of philosophy, we are very apt to find that it is largely a history of the progress of the solution of the question, how Being passes into Becoming, and that little else is recognized as appertaining to philosophy. One of these,* with a prefatory recommendation from a prominent theological professor, pronouncing it "one of the best works for a text book in our colleges, upon this neglected branch of scientific investigation," comes to this grand summation of past philosophic discovery in its closing paragraph; that in Christianity, "stripped of its form of religious representation, we have now the stand-point of the *Absolute Philosophy*, or the thought knowing itself as all truth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from itself, having the system of philosophy for its development—a closed circle of circles!" This is enough. We have no difficulty in disposing of this volume, without further notice. It is in no proper sense a history of philosophy, or valuable, except to show how astute minds may mistake nullities for ultimate truths—*lucus a non lucendo.* We heartily agree with the repugnance felt by so many eminent physicists to this kind of metaphysics and ontology. But we see no reason why some of them, because of this abuse, should denounce all metaphysics, and repudiate all *a priori* and necessary truths. The inductive sciences themselves imply the metaphenomenal at their base, and employ it in rising to their summit. One of their most eminent cultivators, Dr. Whewell, in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, has shown this with sig-

* *A History of Philosophy in Epitome, by Dr. Albert Schwegler* Translated from the original German by Julius H. Seelye, with a prefatory recommendation by Prof. H. B. Smith, of Union Theological Seminary, New York.

nal ability. To abjure metaphysic because false, destructive, or ridiculous theories have been propounded by its abettors, is about as rational as it would be for us to denounce physical science, because a Compte and Mill pervert it into a support of atheism.

If the foregoing analysis is just, it follows that Psychology and Metaphysics, as dealing, in diverse ways, with the thoughts of the mind, are, on one side, the science of the ideal, while, on the other side, they go deepest of all sciences into reality and the ground of all reality. This interferes not with the supremacy of Christian theology, which largely interpenetrates and interlocks with both these sciences. Viewed on the former side, some, though with indifferent success, have sought to have them all included under the comprehensive title of Ideology. But viewed from the other side, as the science of Truth, Reality, and Being, they, and more especially metaphysics, have in all ages obtained the title of Philosophy, not as it is used to denote the philosophy of this or that subordinate department, but philosophy in general, *eminenter*, underlying all particular philosophies, *Prima Philosophia*, *Scientia Scientiarum*. Thus, while psychology deals with the operations of the mind or ideas, it at the same time deals with the most indisputable of realities, for whatever else may be brought in doubt, no one can possibly doubt that his own consciousness and its phenomena are what they are. But when we inquire whether these phenomena belong to any thinking substance, we resort to metaphysics for proof. The principle that all qualities, accidents, or phenomena must belong to some substance is metaphysical and ideal. It does not of itself prove the existence of phenomena or substance. But phenomena of thought being otherwise proved, this principle proves the existence of a mind or thinking substance, which, though not itself a phenomenon, is evinced by the phenomena of conscious intelligence. So metaphysics, though conversant, in the first instance, about principles which are mere ideas or necessary forms of thought, and do not, of themselves, prove real existence, yet, when phenomena are actually proved, conduct us necessarily to the substantial being which underlies them.

This brings us to the sempiternal, archetypal ideas, which

form the salient point of the Platonic philosophy, so ably and beautifully treated by Professor Butler. Probably no word has been impressed into such varied and onerous service, or is liable to greater vagueness of meaning than idea. To be sure, it is always employed to denote some act or object of intelligence, or some synthesis or relation of the two. Yet within this limit Reid defines idea as a thought of the mind, while Coleridge says, "a distinguishable power self-affirmed, and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence, is, according to Plato, an Idea." In its true and proper sense, it is essentially one with conception which, in the first instance, signifies a mental image εἶδος of an external object before perceived, and thence almost any intellectual apprehension whatever. But as the mind itself and its acts may become objects of thought, so those metaphysical truths, which show themselves in the form of mental affirmations that some things exist, on condition that other things exist, are often called ideas—as the idea of cause, substance, &c. In this phrase, we often refer, not only to the separate notions of cause and effect, substance and accident connected in the mental affirmation, as subject and predicate, but to the judgment connecting them. So also in regard to the properties which distinguish any individual or class, whatever in the view of the mind constitutes the essence of it, is often and properly called the idea of that thing or class.

Plato's system was a natural exaggeration of this, resulting from his lofty effort to rise above the transient, variable, and manifold, to one Great Supreme, the fountain of Good, of Life, of Being. All his perplexities at this point would have been solved by a single ray of Christian light, showing us what instantly, when clearly suggested, commands the assent of reason, that the Almighty at his sovereign pleasure creates, upholds, and destroys all things by the word of his power, whether material or immaterial. But to Plato's eye, matter, because subject to change and dissolution, was hardly a substantial and real existence. It was rather a transient and shadowy phenomenon of the real, which was spiritual and eternal, and was obscured and disparaged by its sensuous embodiment. This spiritual and eternal element, which was the only real substance of things, was, in another view, according to Professor Butler,

their "mental ground," yet not merely the constructive plan in the mind of God, according to which he made them; although in a sort distinguishable from the divine essence, while inseparable from and participant of it. Such, for substance, were Plato's ideas, the archetypal essential of things, the only genuine realities. In the apprehension and contemplation of these, especially in their unity with God, we have genuine knowledge and philosophy. The perfection of the soul is attained by rising above the sensuous and phenomenal to these eternal ideas, until, at last, cleared of its material integuments, it resumes its normal state, (whence it had inexplicably fallen,) in the sphere of the super-sensual and eternal. It is easy to see that this system had strong Pantheistic leanings, although Plato was careful to maintain, often vaguely, the distinction between God, man, and nature, which parts of his philosophy tended to confound. Nor can we wonder that the germs thus developed flowered out subsequently into complete pantheism in the hands of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic schools. Nor can we doubt the substantial accuracy of Coleridge's terse and pregnant account of the Platonic idea, as a "distinguishable power self-affirmed and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence." He impressed it into good service in his efforts to anglicise the philosophy of Schelling. His most feasible method was to take the Platonic idea as a solvent, and he used it not in vain upon some of the finest intellects in Britain and this country. Still, when we compare Plato with preceding heathen philosophers, we wonder, not at his errors, but at the caution with which he guarded them against their worst consequences, a caution which many of those who aspire to be the philosophic leaders of our own age, have not had the wisdom to imitate. We wonder at his pure and lofty ethics, the glimpses he caught of some of the sublimest spiritual truths, approximating sometimes to the highest mysteries of revelation. Extravagant, and therefore perilous, as was his antagonism to matter, yet this is a noble error in an age which deified flesh and blood. It is nobler to rise above our nature than to sink beneath it, an alternative to which philosophy is ever doomed when it either has not, or scorns, the light of divine revelation. Hence whenever there has been a reaction from a dominant sensism or

materialism, Plato's writings have commanded high regard, and he has never failed to elicit a genial and sympathetic admiration from the most lofty thinkers and accomplished scholars. This is well on the part of those who, like Professor Butler, see his defects as well as his merits, and master his philosophy instead of being mastered by it. His able analysis and vindication of the merits of Plato's philosophy is happily concluded with the following summation of its faults, which we quote for the purpose of giving our readers a specimen of what they will find in these volumes, and as an expression of our own judgment.

"In the first place, then, there runs through Plato a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial *κάθαρσις*. This arises partly from his conception of the divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, inasmuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath or its results inapplicable to the Deity; from the latter, because, in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connection as incidental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat its inalienable rights. He must be a very uncandid critic who could censure Plato severely for these misconceptions; but he would be a very imperfect expositor who should not mention them as such. There is probably no single point in the moral relations of the creation for which we are so much indebted to revelation as this of the enormity of sin and the severity of the divine judgment. Thus instructed, it is possible that the demands of the divine justice may be demonstrated accordant with the antecedent notices of the moral reason. But there is a wide difference between proving a revealed principle and discovering it before it has been revealed. We are not then to blame Plato for overlooking that mystery of divine righteousness which even the reiterated and explicit intimations of Inspiration can scarcely persuade even ourselves practically to adopt. But we *are* to censure those (and it is for this reason I mark the matter distinctly) who labour by un-

warrantable glosses to dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God. These teachers have abounded in every age, and in one remarkable era of our English Church history were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title. Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts nobly expressed, but they are all marked with the characteristic defect of a Platonized Christianity—a forgetfulness, or inadequate commemoration, of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for sin—the fact of the Christian Atonement." (We add that this tendency is quite as conspicuous in Coleridge and nearly all the schools of transcendental theology in our day, as in rationalistic and ritualizing Cudworth, More, John Smith, and other Platonizing divines of the seventeenth century.—*Reviewer.*)

"The next point in which the exclusive cultivation of Platonism may become injurious, is its indirect discouragement of *active* virtue. I need not say that no moral teacher can recommend in higher terms the usual exercises of social duty; but the true influences of any moral system depend less on the duties it verbally prescribes than on the *proportion* it establishes between them. And no one that remembers the Platonic conception of the contemplative 'philosopher' as the perfection of humanity, can hesitate in pronouncing that Plato inclines the balance to that very side, to which the students of his writings, from their reflective and sedentary habits, may be supposed already too much biassed. The results of this tendency are obvious. To contemplate ideas is, in a certain sense—if the soul and its ideal objects are ultimately blended—to introvert the mind *upon itself;* to do this exclusively, or as the main excellence of man, is—if constitutional temperament combine—to endanger sinking into moral egotism, intellectual mysticism." . . .

"Nor can it be denied again, that Platonism is defective in those engagements for *the affections*, which no system of human

nature can omit without fatal imperfection. We saw how, in the scheme of social life advocated in the *Republic*, the whole body of domestic affections are annihilated by a single provision, (the community of wives)." . . .

"Much, doubtless, of this practical deficiency in Platonism arose from its illustrious author's extravagant conceptions of the essential evil of *Body*, in all its possible *human* forms. Wholly engaged with the immortal essence it imprisoned, and attributing to matter the organization of almost all which restrains that glorious stranger from asserting its native skies, Plato was accustomed to regard with coldness and suspicion every principle which could not trace its connection directly with the rational part of our complex constitution. . . . In proclaiming the bodily organization, the Christian system has for ever dried up the source of those delusive dreams of superhuman purity, which proceed, more or less, upon the supposition that there is something inherently debasing in the very possession of a material frame. And when we enumerate the internal proofs which establish the fact that this divine system never could have been the natural growth of (at least) the fashionable or popular philosophy, we ought not to forget that, so universal and so deep were these impressions of the ineffaceable malignity of body, that the earliest internal dissentients from the general creed of the Christian Church were those who could not believe it possible that an Immaculate Redeemer could have been invested with an earthly body, and therefore maintained that the Divine Sufferer was but the shadowy apparition of a human frame."

"After all—it must be said in behalf of Plato—and I rejoice in a qualification which allows me to close this subject in that tone of sympathy and admiration in which I began it—after all, it must in fairness be allowed that these errors are rather the tendencies of his system, than his own original representation of it." Vol. ii., pp. 281–5.

Art. IV.—*Old Redstone; or, Historical Sketches of Western Presbyterianism, its early Ministers, its perilous times, and its first records.* By Joseph Smith, D. D. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1854.

2. *The History of Jefferson College;* including an account of the early "Log Cabin" Schools, and the Canonsburg Academy. By the same author.

The first of these books is a very important contribution to the history of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The author deserves the thanks of the community and especially of Presbyterians, for the labour and care with which he has rescued from oblivion important facts respecting the individuals through whose labors churches were established West of the Alleghenies.

Few if any now survive whose memory reaches to the period when the Gospel banner was first unfurled west of the mountains: yet there are those living who were personally acquainted with the men who permanently located themselves and their families west of the mountains, and collected congregations and organized churches on the borders of civilization. They can testify to the accuracy with which the characters of those heroic men who carried the gospel over the mountains, are delineated in the work before us. This testimony, together with the records of the first Presbytery formed in Western Pennsylvania, leaves very little to be supplied by uncertain tradition. And when it was necessary to use tradition, only a single step was to be taken: the actors reported to their sons what the historian communicates to us.

The author gives to his work the quaint name of "Old Redstone;" because Redstone was the name of the first Presbytery formed west of the mountains. A stream of water which empties into the Monongahela near Brownsville is called Redstone; because the stone or clay on its banks is of a reddish color. This stream is the first which travellers meet in descending from the last mountain (Laurel Hill) near Union Town. As this was the road usually travelled in early times, when any one was going to cross the mountains, he was said to be going

to Redstone; so that the part of Pennsylvania and of Virginia west of the mountains was called Redstone. The name "Redstone," was therefore very appropriately given to an ecclesiastical body extending over a territory which now constitutes several counties. At present Redstone has a much more limited signification. The first Presbytery organized west of the mountains before other Presbyteries were formed from it, is what the author calls "Old Redstone." And it is the history of this original Presbytery before it was divided that the author has given us. And no man has a better right to speak, or had better opportunity to become correctly informed than the author of "Old Redstone;" for he is the grandson of two of the original members of this Presbytery. His father was the son of the Rev. Joseph Smith, of Buffalo, Washington county, and his mother the daughter of the Rev. James Power, of Mount Pleasant, Westmoreland county, Pennsylvania. As early as 1760, with the approbation of their Presbytery, the Rev. A. McDowel and the Rev. H. Allison went as chaplains with the Pennsylvania forces, and probably were the first who preached the gospel west of the mountains. Their services were confined chiefly, if not altogether, to the army. So sparse were the inhabitants at that time west of the mountains, that it would have been difficult to collect at any one place, twenty persons to hear the gospel. In 1763, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, the highest judicature of the Presbyterian Church at that time in this country, appointed the Rev. Messrs. Beatty and Brainerd to visit the frontier settlements in Pennsylvania to preach the gospel, and to report the spiritual condition of the people. At that time the frontier was the eastern foot of the mountains; so that Chambersburg, Shippensburg, and Carlisle were within the reach of savage foes. This mission was not fulfilled, because at the time they were to have commenced their mission, a most violent and destructive Indian war broke out. Families residing in the valleys between Chambersburg and Bedford were murdered, their cabins burnt, their cattle and grain destroyed and every thing laid waste. The Indians having been chastised and become more quiet, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia appointed the Rev. Charles Beatty and the Rev. George Duffield on a mission of

three months. They visited the military station at Fort Pitt, preached to the small settlements on the way, and extended their journey as far as Muskingum, and preached to the Delaware Indians collected there. In 1767, the Rev. Messrs. Cooper and Brainerd reported that they had not fulfilled a mission to which they had been appointed, because they had heard unfavourable reports respecting the Delaware Indians, for whom their mission was chiefly intended. Every year, for several years, with very little success, attempts were made by the same ecclesiastical body to send missionaries over the mountains. In 1771, the Rev. James Finley, brother of the Rev. Samuel Finley, D. D., the fifth President of the College of New Jersey, crossed the mountains and spent one or two months as as a missionary. From that time the heart of this good man was fixed on the West, and he several times passed the mountains, and in 1777 he asked his Presbytery to dismiss him, with a view of removing his family west of the mountains; but his request was refused, in consequence of the strong remonstrance of the congregation of which he had been pastor several years.

In 1775, Mr. John McMillan, having obtained license to preach the gospel, made a tour through the great valley of Virginia, crossed the mountains, and entered the western country through Taggart's valley, on the borders of Virginia. The year following he accepted a call from the congregations of Chartiers and Pigeon Creek; but he did not remove his family and reside permanently with his congregations until 1778.

The Rev. James Power removed his family west of the mountains in 1776, and resided on Dunlap's creek, about four miles from Brownsville, Fayette county, and preached in different places until 1779, when he became pastor of the congregations of Mount Pleasant and Sewickly.

The Rev. Thaddeus Dod crossed the mountains in 1778, preached to the people of Upper and Lower Ten-Mile, living the greater part of the time in block-houses, to protect themselves from the attacks of the Indians. The following year he removed his family, which he had left in Virginia, and became the pastor of the congregations of Ten-Mile.

The Rev. Joseph Smith became pastor of the congregations of Buffalo and Cross Creek, in Washington county, in 1780.

In May, 1781, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia directed the Rev. Messrs. Joseph Smith, John McMillan, James Power, and Thaddeus Dod, to form themselves into a Presbytery, to be called the "Presbytery of Redstone." The first meeting, appointed at Laurel Hill, Fayette county, was transferred to Pigeon Creek, Washington county, on account of danger from the Indians; and the Rev. Joseph Smith was prevented from attending at Pigeon Creek for the same reason. In 1782–3, a quorum of the members of the Presbytery could not attend at the time and place appointed, on account of incursions of the Indians.

In 1781, the Rev. James Dunlap and the Rev. John Clark removed their families west of the mountains. The former accepted a call from the congregations of Dunlap's Creek and Laurel Hill, in Fayette county, and the latter from the congregations of Bethel and Lebanon, west of the Monongahela, about twelve miles from Pittsburg. The Rev. James Dunlap became a member of the Redstone Presbytery in 1782, and the Rev. John Clark the year following.

The Rev. James Finley, although he had removed his family over the mountains in 1783, and located them between the Monongahela and Youghegany rivers, where he spent the remainder of his days, did not become a regular member of the Presbytery until 1785, on account of delay in obtaining a dismission from his Presbytery east of the mountains.

All the ministers above named were graduates of the College of New Jersey, except James Finley, who had received a good classical education in a school under the direction of the Rev. Robert Smith, or at what was called the Log College. If the College of New Jersey had done nothing more than send forth six such men as Joseph Smith, John McMillan, Thaddeus Dod, James Power, James Dunlap, and John Clark, it would have been an ample recompense for all the labour and expense employed in its establishment. Through their instrumentality, very extensive and powerful revivals of religion took place in Western Pennsylvania; many were converted; schools and colleges were established; young men of talents were prepared for usefulness in various departments of public life, and especially in the gospel ministry. The influence of these pious men, who formed

the Presbytery of "Old Redstone," is felt to this day through the vast regions west and south-west, reclaimed since their day from barbarism. Members of the churches established by these men emigrated farther west, carried with them gospel principles and gospel habits, and enabled the ministers who followed, trained under the same teachings with themselves, to collect congregations, and to raise up churches in new regions; and at the same time, enough remained on the old ground to maintain more than double the number of the original churches.

In order to estimate the self-denial and labours and dangers of the ministers of the gospel who first located themselves and families west of the mountains, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the state of the country at the time the enterprise was undertaken and executed. Our author has entered into some detail on this subject. And his work is valuable for the secular information which it contains of the state of that part of the country, from the time it was first trodden by the foot of civilized men. We can give only a brief summary, hoping to excite a desire to read the work before us. We omit the whole period preceding the time the members of the "Old Redstone" Presbytery went to the region appropriately called the "Back Woods." From 1775 to 1785 was the most trying time that this country ever witnessed. Every part of the country was exposed to the dangers and sufferings of the Revolutionary war, but peculiar dangers and sufferings awaited those who fixed their residence west of the mountains. To pass a hundred and twenty or thirty miles over mountains, on a path dangerous for men on horseback, was no small undertaking, when women and children were a part of the company. The cabins on the mountains would scarcely afford room to spread a bed on the floor at night, or to give shelter in case of rain or snow. When the travellers arrived at the end of their journey, accommodations very little better awaited them. A cabin of the roughest kind was the best residence that could be expected, and even that was not always found prepared when the minister with his family arrived. No household furniture of any kind could be obtained in that country; and nothing except what could be carried on horseback could be brought over the mountains.

Dr. John McMillan, in a letter to Dr. Carnahan, has given a

graphic, and we doubt not a true account of his accommodations when he arrived with his wife at the place of his residence in 1778. We quote his words, as they are probably descriptive of more cases than his own. "When I came to this country, the cabin in which I was to live was raised, but there was no roof on it, nor chimney or floor in it. The people however were very kind, assisted me in preparing my house, and on the 16th of December I moved into it: but we had neither bedstead nor table, nor chair, nor stool, nor bucket. All these things we had to leave behind us, there being no wagon road at that time over the mountains, we could bring nothing with us but what we carried on pack-horses. We placed two boxes on each other, which served as a table, and two kegs served as seats, and having committed ourselves to God in family worship, we spread a bed on the floor and slept soundly till morning. The next day, a neighbour coming to my assistance, we made a table and stool, and in a little time we had everything comfortable about us. Sometimes we had no bread for weeks together, but we had plenty of pumpkins and potatoes, and all the necessaries of life, and as for luxuries we were not much concerned about them. We enjoyed health, the gospel and its ordinances, and pious friends, and we were in the place where we believed God would have us to be, and we did not doubt but that he would provide for us everything necessary; and glory be to his name, we were not disappointed." The reason why Mr. McMillan and his family had no bread for weeks, probably was that the streams on which the first mills were built in that country, failed in the summer and autumn, and wheat and corn could not be ground. Several causes checked the prosperity of that country, and kept the people poor and unable to contribute to the support of ministers of the gospel.

For a long time it was uncertain whether what is now Fayette, Green, and Washington counties, belonged to Virginia or Pennsylvania; and for that reason the titles to land were uncertain. The Legislature of Pennsylvania gave three or four different kinds of land titles; the consequence was that controversies and lawsuits respecting land were multiplied and permanent improvements neglected. Articles such as iron and salt, indispensable in carrying on farming operations, had to be

carried on horse-back over the mountains, and could not be procured except at a high price. Trade was cut off by the mountains on the one side, and hostile Indians on the other. In many parts of the country farmers placed their families in block-houses, and cultivated their crops and harvested their grain in parties, some keeping guard while others performed the work. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the people however willing, could contribute very little towards the support of their ministers. It was not expected, nor was it possible, that ministers could remain at home and labour on their farms. All of them had charge of two, and some three congregations, some ten or fifteen miles apart; of course they were frequently from home, and when at home they were at their studies, for they did not appear in the pulpit without preparation—some of them wrote their sermons in full and delivered them without notes, from memory. The care of their farms, for they all lived in the country, was left to their wives and children, and such help as they were able to hire.

The following extract, taken from an account written by the Rev. James Miller, and quoted by the author of "Old Redstone," will give the reader a clearer idea of the pecuniary embarrassments of early ministers and of the general state of the country, and also of the remarkable interposition of divine Providence for the relief of one of these ministers, than anything that we can say. "Our story," says Mr. Miller, "will carry the reader back to the period when all north of the Ohio river was almost an unbroken wilderness—the mysterious red man's home. On the other side, a bold hardy band from beyond the mountains had built their log cabins, and were trying to subdue the wilderness. To them every hour was full of peril. The Indians would often cross the river, steal their children and horses, kill and scalp any victim that came in their way. They worked in the field with weapons at their side, and on a Sabbath met in a grove or rude log church to hear the word of God, with their rifles in their hands. To preach to these settlers, Mr. Joseph Smith, a Presbyterian minister, had left his paternal home, east of the mountains. He, it was said, was the second minister who had crossed the Monongahela. He settled in Washington county, Pennsylvania, and became the pastor of

Cross Creek and Upper Buffalo congregations, dividing his time between them. He found them a willing and united people, but still unable to pay him a salary which would support his family. He, in common with all the early ministers, must cultivate a farm. He purchased one on credit, promising to pay for it with the salary pledged to him by his people. Years passed away. The pastor was unpaid. Little or no money was in circulation. Wheat was abundant, but there was no market. It could not be sold for more than twelve-and-a-half cents in cash. Even their salt had to be brought across the mountains on pack-horses, was worth eight dollars per bushel, and twenty-one bushels of wheat had often to be given for one of salt. The time came when the payment must be made, and Mr. Smith was told he must pay or leave his farm. Three years salary was now due from his people. For the want of this, his land, his improvements upon it, and his hopes of remaining among a beloved people must be abandoned. The people were called together, and the case laid before them, and they were greatly moved; counsel from on high was sought; plan after plan was proposed and abandoned; the congregations were unable to pay a tithe of their debts, and no money could be borrowed. In despair they adjourned to meet again the following week. In the meantime it was ascertained that a Mr. Moore, who owned the only mill in the county, would grind for them wheat on reasonable terms. At the next meeting it was resolved to carry their wheat to Mr. Moore's mill; some gave fifty bushels, some more. This was carried from fifteen to twenty-six miles on horses to mill. In a month word came that the flour was ready to go to market. Again the people were called together. After an earnest prayer, the question was asked, 'Who will run the flour to New Orleans?' This was a startling question. The work was perilous in the extreme; months must pass before the adventurer could hope to return, even though his journey should be fortunate; nearly all the way was a wilderness, and gloomy tales were told of the treacherous Indians. More than one boat's crew had gone on that journey and had come back no more. 'Who then could endure the toil and brave the danger?' None volunteered; the young shrunk back, and the middle-aged had their excuse. At length

a hoary headed man, an elder in the church, sixty-four years of age, rose, and to the astonishment of the assembly said, 'Here I am; send me.' The deepest feeling at once pervaded the whole assembly. To see their venerated old elder thus devote himself for their good, melted them all to tears. They gathered around Father Smiley to learn that his resolution was indeed taken; that rather than lose their pastor he would brave danger, toil, and even death. After some delay and trouble, two young men were induced, by hope of a large reward, to go as his assistants. A day was appointed for starting. The young and old, from far and near, from love to Father Smiley and deep interest in the object of his mission, gathered together, and with their pastor at their head came down from the church, fifteen miles away, to the bank of the river, to bid the old man farewell. Then a prayer was offered up by their pastor, and a parting hymn was sung. Then said the old Scotchman, 'Untie the cable, and let us see what the Lord will do for us.' This was done, and the boat floated slowly away. More than nine months passed and no word came back from Father Smiley. Many a prayer had been breathed for him, but what was his fate was unknown. Another Sabbath came; the people came together for worship, and there, on his rude bench, before the preacher, composed and devout, sat Father Smiley. After service the people were requested to meet early in the week to hear the report. All came again. After thanks had been returned to God for his safe return, Father Smiley rose and told his story:—That the Lord had prospered his mission; that he had sold his flour for twenty-seven dollars a barrel, and then got safely back. He then drew a large purse and poured upon the table a larger pile of gold than most of the spectators had ever seen before. The young men were paid each one hundred dollars. Father Smiley was asked his charge. He meekly replied, that he thought he ought to have the same as one of the young men, though he had not done quite as much work. It was immediately proposed to pay him three hundred dollars. This he refused till the pastor was paid. Upon counting the money it was found there was enough to pay what was due Mr. Smith, to advance his salary for the year to come, to reward Father Smiley with three hundred dollars, and then have a

large dividend for each contributor. Thus their debts were paid, their pastor relieved, and while life lasted he broke for them the bread of life. The bones of both pastor and elder repose in the same church-yard; but a grateful posterity still tells this pleasing story of the past."

In some respects there was a general similarity in the character of the first ministers of the gospel who fixed their permanent residence west of the mountains. They were all, except Thaddeus Dod, of Scotch-Irish descent. They were all men of good education, graduates of the College of New Jersey, except James Finley; all had the same theological views; all animated with the same spirit of piety; all inspired with the same zeal for the glory of God, and for the salvation of men; all possessing the same self-denial, and willingness to labour and suffer in the cause of their Lord and Master. Yet the individual character of these men was vastly different. The apostle Peter was not more different from his fellow disciple, John, than the character of any one of these men was from that of any other. Each one had his peculiar natural temperament and acquired habits. Each one had a particular work to perform, suited to his natural disposition and special gifts. And notwithstanding the vast difference in their characters and gifts, all acted together in perfect harmony. No two men could be more different in their habits and acquirements than Joseph Smith and Thaddeus Dod, and yet they were special friends, more attached to each other and more frequently associated together than any other. In Mr. Smith we have a zealous, flaming preacher, who poured torrents of divine wrath upon the conscience of the impenitent sinner, opening to his view the lake burning with fire and brimstone; or if the future happiness of the believer was his theme, he seemed to open the gates of the celestial city and let you hear the songs of the redeemed. Mr. Dod presented the same doctrines in a more subdued manner, causing every sentence which he uttered to contain a clear, distinct proposition, expressed in words so simple as to be understood by every hearer. The discourses of Mr. Smith produced an immediate effect, causing the sinner to tremble or to rejoice. The discourses of his friend were lodged in the memory, recurred to the hearer after he had withdrawn from

the public assembly, and afforded him a subject of meditation for days and weeks. Mr. Smith, like all his brethren associated with him, was a good Latin and Greek scholar, as well as an impassioned and eloquent speaker. Mr. Dod, in his knowledge of the Hebrew language, and also of mathematics and natural science, was superior to all his associates. The estimation in which his mathematical talents and acquirements were held, when a student in college, is learned from the following incident. When the late Albert B. Dod was nominated as a candidate for the mathematical chair in the College of New Jersey, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, one of the Trustees, remarked, that he was not acquainted with the candidate, and did not know his qualifications as a mathematician; nevertheless, he would vote for him. "When," said the Judge, "I was a student in the College, there was one Thaddeus Dod, a student at the same time, who seemed to understand mathematics by instinct; all the students applied to him when anything difficult occurred in their mathematical studies. I presume," he continued, "the candidate is of the same stock, and I will vote for him."*

The contrast was still greater between the Rev. John McMillan and the Rev. James Power. The former in his aspect was austere, in his dress negligent, in his manners rough. The latter was graceful in his person, polished in his manners, and always dressed in a neat and becoming manner. The style of preaching of these two men was as variant as their personal appearance. When fairly under way, Mr. McMillan was loud, boisterous, rolling out his words in a torrent, without regard to emphasis or natural pauses, manifesting an earnestness in what he uttered, to the neglect of all the rules of correct speaking. The elocution of the Rev. James Power was clear, distinct; no rambling, inarticulate sounds were heard; every word and every syllable was uttered with a distinctness which left no

* The Judge did not err in his conjecture. Albert B. Dod was elected Professor of Mathematics in the College of New Jersey; and in the few years that it pleased a sovereign and righteous God to permit him to remain on earth, he attained an eminence, not only in mathematical knowledge, but also in mental, physical, and theological science, such as few men of his age, in any country, have reached.

room for mistake on the part of the hearer. Although the volume of his voice was less, he could be heard and understood at a much greater distance than his friend and fellow-labourer. We have said Mr. McMillan was rough in his address, and forbidding in his aspect, yet justice requires us to say, that connected with this unfavourable external appearance, he had a heart as kind and a hand as liberal as ever fed the hungry or clothed the naked. We could name many instances of his kindness to indigent young men, who were preparing for the gospel ministry, giving them both food and clothing. One case of his benevolence, not generally known, but which we have heard from the lips of an eye-witness, we must be permitted to record. One year, we think it was in 1784, there was a great scarcity of grain in Western Pennsylvania. Until about the first of May, it was supposed there was abundance of grain in the country. Those who wished to purchase, began to inquire; and it was found that those who usually had abundance, had not sufficient for themselves. The alarm was great, and more than four times the usual price was offered for wheat or corn. It so happened that Mr. McMillan had a large quantity of wheat on hand. When persons came from a distance, wishing to buy, Mr. McMillan would ask, with a stern countenance and a harsh voice, whether or not they had money to pay for wheat. If they said they had, he would reply, that he had none for them; they could go and buy elsewhere. That he knew many who had no money, and his wheat was not more than sufficient to keep them from perishing. And to persons of this description, it was added, that he distributed all his wheat, on condition that after harvest they would return to him the same quantity of wheat, equally good.

The Rev. James Finley and the Rev. John Clark were farther advanced in years than any of the other pioneers, and they had both had the pastoral charge of congregations east of the mountains several years. Both of them were men of exemplary piety, not remarkable for talents or pulpit eloquence, but they were very useful as pastors and members of Presbytery; especially Mr. Finley, who by the mildness of his disposition and conciliating manners, secured the confidence of all who knew him. In conducting the discipline of the church, in reconciling

persons at variance, and in giving instruction to young persons his services were invaluable. The Rev. James Dunlap who had been two years a tutor in the College of New Jersey, under Dr. Witherspoon, excelled all his brethren as a Latin and Greek scholar. As a preacher he was didactic—presented the doctrines of the gospel in a regular systematic way, without any appeal to the heart, except through the understanding. Yet his ministry was greatly blessed in the edification of believers and in the conversion of sinners. These seven men may be considered as the founders of the Presbyterian Church in Pennsylvania, west of the mountains. They received no aid from abroad of any value until after 1790, when the dangers and trials were chiefly past. During the Revolutionary war, very few young men turned their attention to the gospel ministry. The schools and colleges east of the mountains were nearly broken up, and those who became preachers during these troublous times, were not sufficient to supply the churches established east of the mountains.

In view of the wide field opening before them, and despairing of receiving labourers from abroad, these good men, at a very early period, turned their attention to the education of young men for the gospel ministry. Who was the first to open a school for this purpose, has been a subject of controversy. This honour has been claimed for Messrs. Smith and McMillan, and Dod and Dunlap. Our author has discussed this subject, and has assigned reasons for believing that his ancestor, the Rev. Joseph Smith, was the first who opened a Latin school west of the mountains. The fact is, all these men were competent to teach what in those days was usually taught in academies and colleges, and all of them opened a school as soon as the providence of God called on them to do so. It was from no motives of honour or profit that they undertook to teach young men having the gospel ministry in view. The young men who offered were generally poor, and had to be boarded as well as taught, without reward by the minister under whose care they were; thus imposing on the wives of these ministers a very heavy burden; for let it be remembered, that they had to perform with their own hands all the kitchen work, until their daughters were able to assist them. Mrs. Smith gave up a cabin erected

for a kitchen, to the young men studying with her husband. And these pious heroic women made these sacrifices, and performed these labours joyfully, thanking God that they had an opportunity of doing these menial services. The pious John Newton has somewhere said, that if an angel were sent on a mission from heaven to earth, he would obey the mandate with equal alacrity whether it were to sweep the streets of London or to rule the empire. That good woman, Mrs. McMillan, is said to have expressed a similar sentiment, who, after hearing a young man, for whom she had done gratuitous services, preach, remarked that she had had the privilege of glorifying God by patching clothes, wrestling with pots, and washing dishes.

The devoted men who carried the gospel west of the mountains, convinced of the importance of an educated as well as a pious ministry, did not hurry ignorant, uncultivated young men into the sacred office, on the ground that labourers were greatly needed. They required their candidates to be able to read the sacred Scriptures in the original tongues, and they provided the best means in their power to give a good education to all who sought it. Several young men, educated and trained by individual ministers were licensed and ordained by the "Old Redstone" Presbytery, became able and efficient labourers in the gospel field. What the Presbytery of Redstone thought of the importance of education in ministers of the gospel will appear from the sarcastic reply of Mr. T. Dod to a friend in Morris county, New Jersey. A few ministers in Morris county separated from their Presbytery and formed an independent Presbytery, not because they differed in doctrine, but because so few men of education offered themselves as candidates for the gospel ministry, they thought it necessary to license as preachers men who had very little education or knowledge of theology. Several such were licensed, and remained unemployed. A friend in Morris county wrote to Mr. Dod, who was from that place, inquiring whether or not some of those young men could not be usefully employed in Western Pennsylvania. Mr. Dod replied to this effect: That Western Pennsylvania was a very rough, hilly country, and that the roots of trees still green required a very strong, well-trained

team to break up the ground, and he did not think that two-year old steers would answer!

We learn from its records, that the Presbytery of Redstone only in three cases departed from the general rule of requiring a knowledge of the languages in which the sacred Scriptures were written, and also of the elements of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. And in these cases they had no reason to regret their departure from their general rule. The three men introduced into the holy ministry without a full course of classical study, were above thirty years of age, were married, had children, and were also in straitened worldly circumstances. Besides, they were men of more than common talents, of ardent piety, and had a good English education, and withal, a large share of common sense. These men were Joseph Patterson, Samuel Porter, and Thomas Marquis. Their memory is still precious in Western Pennsylvania.

The Rev. Joseph Patterson collected two large congregations, had several extensive revivals under his ministry, and continued to preach to the same people with acceptance and profit, until the infirmities of age compelled him to retire; and even then he did not cease to labour in the cause of his Lord and Master. In Pittsburgh he went about doing good, distributing Bibles and tracts, and talking to boatmen and travellers on the margin of the river, and saying a word in season to all he met. How kind, how appropriate, how solemn were his words! "Father Patterson"—not without meaning—was on the lips of many who spoke of him with reverence and affection. He was a native of Ireland.

So also was Samuel Porter. He was a bold, frank, open-hearted Irishman, and withal, a man of humble and devoted piety. He was an able and popular preacher; and the more attractive, because he had a natural vein of humour which he could not entirely conceal in the pulpit, and which caught the attention of a large class of hearers. He was one of those few men who could tell in the pulpit an anecdote that would excite a smile and yet not destroy the solemnity of the occasion.

The Rev. Dr. Elliott, in a biographical notice prefixed to the writings of Mr. Porter, has given an interesting sketch of

his character. We add two or three incidents showing the peculiarities of this remarkable man.

His congregations were in Westmoreland county, on the borders of the white population, and for some time were exposed to the incursions of the Indians. Alarms were sometimes given when the people were assembled for worship. Mr. Porter would come down from the pulpit, take up his rifle, mount his horse, and with the young men of his congregation, pursue the savage foe. In debate he was able, and in Presbytery and other judicatures of the Church he indulged his natural turn for pleasantry more freely than in the pulpit. He was a commissioner to the General Assembly convened in Philadelphia, when it was proposed to raise a general fund to aid in defraying the expenses of members from distant parts of the Church. A member from a Presbytery east of the mountains remarked that the expenses of commissioners from distant Presbyteries need not be much, if they would act as ministers of the gospel ought to act; that is, if they would let their character as ministers of the gospel be known, and call together the families with which they lodged, read a chapter in the Bible, give a short comment and make a prayer; that, if this were done, no family would be so unreasonable as to charge them for their meals and lodging. Mr. Porter rose, and in a few words gave such a graphic and ludicrous description of the people in whose houses the western members were compelled to lodge, in passing the mountains, and of the treatment clergymen and their prayers would receive, if prayers in the family were offered, that several members burst out into an immoderate laugh. The Moderator rapped and called to order, and in the act of doing so, although a very grave man, he had himself to laugh. Mr. Porter then turned from the ludicrous to the serious, and in a few words he gave such a true and touching description of the trials, and labours, and sufferings which ministers of the gospel and their families in the West had to endure, that those who had laughed, had through sympathy to shed tears. After this short speech, the proposition to raise a fund to pay the expenses of distant commissioners was carried, *nemine contradicente*. On another occasion, Mr. Porter manifested the fearlessness of his character, and used the power of ridicule to good purpose. In 1794,

the Whiskey Insurrection broke out in Western Pennsylvania, and spread like fire in the mountains. Ministers of the gospel disapproved of the lawless acts committed; but very few of them dared to raise their voice in public against the riotous conduct. Not so, Mr. Porter. He came out boldly at the beginning against the lawless violence, and he restrained the people of his charge from a participation in the violation of the laws.

Dr. McMillan (within whose congregation there were many persons concerned in the insurrection,) from timidity, or because he was unwilling to speak on politics in the pulpit, said nothing publicly on the subject. But when the time of securing the benefit of the amnesty offered by the government was approaching, he became alarmed, as he understood some of his neighbours had determined to sign no promise to obey the laws respecting the excise. At this juncture he invited Mr. Porter, who resided forty miles distant, to make him a visit and to address the people on the subject of the insurrection. The invitation was accepted and a day appointed. When it was understood that Mr. Porter had agreed to come, various conjectures were made as to the result. Such was the excitement, that some thought as Mr. Porter had to pass through the neighbourhood where the insurrection commenced, and where atrocious acts had been done, he would be seized and tarred and feathered. Others thought he would be dragged from the pulpit and maltreated, as soon as he urged submission to the laws. The day appointed was a week day, and many concerned in the rebellion came from a distance. After the preliminary services of prayer and praise, Mr. Porter read a portion of sacred scripture enjoining obedience to civil rulers and laws enacted by those in authority, and he showed the nature and the necessity of civil government; and he particularly explained the nature of our own government, and showed that the people ought to obey existing laws however unjust and oppressive they might be, until they were changed in a regular way. During this part of the discourse, some uneasiness and restlessness was manifested; but when he came to apply the subject, showing that the acts recently done in resisting the excise law were rebellion and treason, there was an evident commotion and indications of

resentment. Mr. Porter, who spoke without notes, kept his eye on his hearers, and when he noticed the appearance of an outbreak, or an attempt to leave the house, he introduced a humorous anecdote bearing on the subject, and when he had produced a good feeling he would again return to a serious strain. These changes from the serious to the laughable he repeated several times, until he had his audience entirely under his control; so that they were prepared to hear anything he wished to say. He then described in the most solemn manner, the awful consequences of persisting in rebellion against the general government—that an army would be sent against them which they could not resist—that all who continued their opposition would be seized—fathers would be taken from their children, sons from their parents, husbands from their wives, carried to the extremity of the State, imprisoned, condemned and hung as rebels against the government of their country. He reminded them also of their responsibility to God, whose laws as well as those of men they had broken. And finally he besought and entreated them in the most tender and affecting manner, to pause and consider, and comply with the conditions of the amnesty offered, before it was too late. The effect was the most salutary, and it is believed none who heard the discourse neglected to give the pledge required. At this distant day it is difficult to conceive what physical and moral courage it required to speak to an audience so excited, and also what address and knowledge of human nature were necessary to overcome prejudices and passions so fixed and violent.

Mr. Marquis, the third one licensed to preach, without a regular education, was a native of Virginia, and had removed to Western Pennsylvania at an early day. He was a man of a sound intellect, had a lively imagination, a ready command of language, and a powerful and harmonious voice. It is sufficient praise to say he succeeded the Rev. Joseph Smith, and preached with great acceptance and effect for several years to the congregations of Cross-Roads and Buffalo.

In 1793, that is, twelve years after it was organized, the Presbytery of Redstone became so large that it was divided into two Presbyteries, one retaining the old name, and the other called the Presbytery of Ohio. This increase of ministers was

chiefly by means of those educated and introduced into the ministry by the Presbytery of Redstone. Here the history of "Old Redstone" ends.

Dr. Smith has added to the value of his work by giving us copious extracts from the minutes of the original Presbytery; giving us, in notes, the subsequent history of the churches collected by the early ministers, and much valuable information respecting the changes which have occurred in these churches down to the present time. It would be interesting could we know all the ministers of the gospel who were converted through the instrumentality of the members of the Presbytery of "Old Redstone," and all the ministers who have sprung from these, down to the present time. We know that from the Presbyteries of Redstone and Ohio, many other Presbyteries, and even Synods, have sprung; that the extensive region situated north of the Ohio and Allegheny rivers, and extending to Lake Erie, has been supplied with ministers of the gospel chiefly from this region. From the same quarter, ministers have gone to Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and other western States, and even to distant heathen lands. It is well known that powerful awakenings and revivals of religion occurred under the ministrations of the early preachers west of the mountains. Many of these converts, as the country filled up, removed farther west, and they became centres around which churches were collected, and the hands of ministers were sustained, when they carried the gospel to new settlements.

The history of "Old Redstone" Presbytery furnishes the most powerful argument that can be offered in favour of home missions. What field in our extensive country is less promising than Western Pennsylvania, when McMillan, and Power, and Smith, and Dod crossed the mountains? Where are greater dangers and trials to be endured? and where has God bestowed a greater blessing, and rewarded the labours of his servants with greater success? There were a few pious laymen settled west of the mountains before any preacher entered the country. Suppose these praying men had died off before the gospel was carried to them? Their children would have grown up in sin, and in a short time have been as difficult to be reclaimed as if they had been born in heathen lands. Our population is moving

on and on, west and south-west; a few pious men and women are going with the tide, and are ready to welcome the heralds of salvation. Let them not pass away before ministers of the gospel go to their aid. Let good seed occupy the virgin soil, lest noxious weeds, difficult hereafter to be eradicated, spring up.

The second work of Dr. Smith, placed at the head of this article—"History of Jefferson College"—is, in many respects, equal in its interest and excellence. It has been a far more difficult task. The facts and persons of this history are too recent, for the calmness and fairness of historical literature. Even the remotest of them, the first classical school west of the mountains, in which this college originated, whether it was a school established by Dr. McMillan, or one by the Rev. Thaddeus Dod of Ten-Mile, or one by the Rev. Joseph Smith of Buffalo, grandfather of the historian, seems to perturb the writer himself at the beginning of the volume, and to give a sharp polemical cast to a great part of his valuable appendix. This controversy seems to have excited much feeling in the region of Jefferson College, and has called forth specimens of keen historical criticism between the author and Robert Patterson, Esq., Professor in Oakland College, Mississippi. This gentleman is the grandson of the venerable "Father" Patterson, one of the first men licensed to preach in Western Pennsylvania, and also of Colonel John Canon, whose name is given to the town where the College is located, and whose liberality contributed essentially to nourish the academy from which it arose. Professor Patterson is a very able and beautiful writer. He has done well to forsake the comparatively barren toil of the legal profession for the labours of science and literature, in which we hope his accomplished mind will achieve something to the credit of his *Alma Mater*, of more importance immeasurably, than the clearest vindication of the Canonsburg traditions, that Jefferson College is the lineal descendant of Dr. McMillan's "Log Cabin," and that this Log Cabin was the first academy of Latin and Greek in all the West.

Dr. Smith seems to have shaken these traditions, and to have made out, with great plausibility at least, that the academy at Canonsburg was successor to one at Washington, where the

Rev. Messrs. McMillan, Dod, Smith, and others, had united to establish it permanently; but, owing to the churlish refusal of a Mr. Hoge, proprietor of the place, to grant them a lot, after the court-house, in which the school had been kept, was burned down, and the contrasted generosity of Colonel Canon, who offered not only ground to build on, but liberal contributions to the building also, they transferred their patronage to Canonsburg. The charter for an academy at Washington was obtained in 1787; that for one at Canonsburg in 1794. But, twelve years before this latter date, Dr. McMillan had a school at his own house, for, the celebrated James Ross, a great lawyer, and Senator in Congress from Pennsylvania, in the administration of Washington, had been a teacher for him and a pupil at the same time; and Mr. Ross was admitted to the bar in 1784. We may well suppose that Dr. McMillan's school was opened years before this; as early as 1780. But, while it is conceded that his school was the first in time, the question is, whether it was a Latin school before 1785, and Mr. Ross an assistant teacher of Latin and Greek, or an English school, and the usher, so renowned in after time, merely a learner in the classics, under the instruction of Dr. McMillan. Dr. Smith, in the work before us, maintains the latter view, and Professor Patterson the former, whose ingenious argument the author has the magnanimity to spread at full length before his readers. We have no space here for the merits of a controversy so minute and unimportant. We might as well attempt to settle which spring it is, among the rich hills of Washington county, that we are to identify as the source of the beautiful Chartiers, as to settle which patriarch it was, McMillan, Smith, or Dod, that started the stream, which, for more than half a century, "has made glad the city of our God."

The academy was made a college by a charter from the Legislature of Pennsylvania, dated January 15, 1802. It has often been considered strange, that such an institution, so founded and so nurtured, should have been called after Thomas Jefferson, whose antipathy to the religion of Christ, in every form, was peculiarly derisive and spiteful towards that very kind of it which belonged to the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of Western Pennsylvania—a religion of creeds, catechisms, prayer-

meetings, and revivals. The late Dr. M. Brown was always dissatisfied with this name, and in his manuscript "Life of Dr. McMillan," he says:—"It has been a matter of surprise and regret, that an institution, founded in piety and prayer, and professedly designed to be devoted to religion, should bear the name of one, who, though distinguished and honoured justly as a philosopher and statesman, an advocate of the principles of liberty, yet must be acknowledged to have been an infidel, a deist, if not an atheist, and a bitter opposer of the Christian religion. It must, however, be recollected, that the principles of Mr. Jefferson, at that time, were not fully developed, as afterwards. Occasional rumours respecting his opposition to religion were disbelieved and denied. It cannot otherwise be supposed that these trustees and conductors of the Institution would have consented to such a name."

The most probable conjecture, as to the origin of this name, is, that William Findley, Esq., a Representative of that district in Congress, and a warm political partisan of Mr. Jefferson, persuaded the trustees to adopt it, he being at that time a trustee himself. It is also a fact, of no little historical interest, that the original inhabitants of Washington county were Virginians in feeling, and considered themselves as occupying a territory fairly belonging to that old mother of States. The dissatisfaction pervading most of the settlers at being, as they thought, tortuously appended to the colonial domination of the Penns, probably contributed very much to that memorable outbreak, a few years before the chartering of this College, which has been stigmatized as "The Whiskey Insurrection." At any rate, the name of Jefferson was decidedly popular, just then and there, as he was now in the height of his power and influence, and the recent inauguration of his government was considered a triumph to the political policy which the people of that region thought the best for their prosperity. And, strange as it may seem to us that such a people should give such a name to this child of prayer and faith, there is little doubt that the place which this College has always had in the hearts of the masses, west of the mountains, originated in the association of this name, at that particular conjuncture.

From this time onward to the present, the history of Jefferson

College has been very much like that of any other American institution; with only a more uniform tide of prosperity than common, occasioned by the singular interest of the population around it in the cause of education. So great has been the advantage of its location, that another College, only seven miles distant, at Washington, has existed, with great respectability for numbers, nearly as long as Jefferson itself. The rivalry which has existed between these Colleges, while it has, no doubt, occasioned a greater diffusion of the benefits of education, by the emulous bidding for students, and consequent increase of facilities, may be regarded as the source of nearly all the trouble that either has experienced in its career. The most remarkable illustration of this remark occurs about the year 1817, when, after certain fruitless efforts of committees, appointed to confer about a union, the President of Jefferson, the Rev. Andrew Wylie, was suddenly transferred to Washington, and the President of the latter, the Rev. Matthew Brown, was summarily superseded by a secret concert of certain Trustees, in both Institutions. "The war of the Colleges," which followed, was one of intense bitterness. That old giant of literature and theology, Samuel Ralston, the pastor of Mingo, and for nearly forty years President of the Board of Trustees in Canonsburg, struck the hardest blows; and the long result was, that Jefferson College gained the sympathies of the people more than ever. President Wylie, in his new situation, with all his acknowledged ability, was unsuccessful; and President Brown, who still remained at Washington, as pastor of the church, was, by a singular providence, within five years after his ejection at Washington, elected President of Jefferson. His accession was the era of great enlargement and unprecedented prosperity. With energy, and tact, and scholarship combined, which would have made him successful under almost any circumstances, everything seemed to favour him; and Washington College dwindled, almost to extinction, at his side.

At length, however, before his administration closed, Washington College rallied, and advanced nearly to equal numbers, under the presidency of the late venerable Dr. McConaghy; and then another evil became painfully manifest to the friends

of both Institutions—the competition for students, tending to lower the standard of attainment, and slacken the reins of discipline. The venerable Presidents, between whom there existed the most cordial amity and honourable friendship, saw and deplored the evil, and held it in check by their mutual good will; but constituted as the Colleges were by the same kind of charters, in the same religious denomination, subsisting alike on the pay of tuition, so near to each other, and so embittered in their antecedents, it was inevitable that the rivalry would become detrimental to the standard, if not debasing to the officers of both Institutions, by the scramble for students, with all its attendant acrimony and meanness.

But Divine Providence seems to have interposed in a marvellous manner to save both these Colleges from a degradation so much feared, but so lately. Washington College has shifted her basis, and become a strictly denominational College, under the Synod of Wheeling; while Jefferson remains upon her old charter, like the College of New Jersey—Presbyterian—in the majority of her Trustees and Faculty, but under no immediate control by any ecclesiastical body. At the same time, each has become self-sustaining, by securing endowment in the shape of cheap scholarships. Although considerable strife attended the gathering of these scholarships in the same community, the work being once done, there is no reason why these Institutions should not both stand and prosper in concord, and elevate high the standard of education.

The scheme of endowment for Jefferson College has been much condemned by some of the wisest and best of her friends, among whom was the late Dr. M. Brown. An education for six years may be had on a certificate of scholarship for twenty-five dollars! It is hard to see how a disproportion of values so palpable can succeed, without injustice to some party. Future generations may reap advantages from a well invested patrimony, in whatever way it may now be secured; but the claims of posterity will never justify us in sacrificing the rights of the present generation. One of these rights is a reasonable amount of labour, and an adequate remuneration for the teacher. At less than five dollars a year for tuition, teachers cannot be supported in these times. The crowd of students which this rate

may gather, must have a proportionate number of Professors and Tutors, to do justice to the work of teaching and governing; and unless there be help outside of this operation, the burden and hardship must be crushing to the corps of instructors. It is said there is hardly a single student at Jefferson College now paying for tuition, even at a greatly reduced rate.

Scholarships in the College of New Jersey are one thousand dollars each, entitling to tuition alone. These have been founded by rich men, for the most part; and they have the happiness of exercising Christian charity, as well as public spirit, in the benefaction. At the same time, the beneficiaries feel themselves to be a privileged, more than a disparaged class of students; there being always a choice made of them, with more or less discrimination, on the ground of merit and promise. And such is already the affluence of facilities, induced by this operation, that no young man of any promise, who has the ministry in view, is refused an education at Nassau Hall, for want of means to pay his tuition. At the same time, the tuition is paid by the great majority of the students, at even an advanced rate; and the consequence is, that the corps of Professors and Tutors keeps pace with every demand of a thorough education, both in number and character; and they are supported with a liberality which corresponds, in some good measure, with the expensiveness of the times.

Such is the wide difference between these colleges in the scheme of endowment; and it remains for time to prove which has the advantage in being more useful to the kingdom of our Lord, with which both have been signally identified. Within the last three years, since the plan of endowment began to tell on the graduating classes, it must be admitted, that very large accessions to the ministry are coming from Jefferson College, as the report of matriculations in our Theological Seminaries will show, especially that at Allegheny. But, it is believed, that no college in our country has contributed more to the seminaries of theology, this year, than the College of New Jersey. *Twenty-four* have been matriculated at the Theological Seminary at Princeton alone.

The history of a college is worthy of a good writer. Such corporations have wonderful vitality, and are ordinarily the

most enduring institutions in the world. The Universities of Oxford and Bologna, in the old world, have survived mutations which swept away dynasties, and codes, and even forms of religion, so much, that these venerable seats of learning are almost the only identities which history can trace back so far, that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." How firmly Harvard and Yale continue to grow and prosper, in wealth and numbers, notwithstanding all the deflection which may be alleged from the simplicity of aim with which they were founded. Our Presbyterian Colleges are destined to similar perpetuity. And, if they could have a chronicler for every half century, like Dr. Smith, who represents so well the faith and piety of the men who founded Jefferson College; if one who is faithful to God and his truth would only stand up once in a century, "with a writer's ink-horn by his side," to mark the forehead of unfaltering adherence to the principles which laid the foundations of these cherished schools, there would be far more certainty of an unperverted transmission of endowments and memorials.

It was almost inevitable, that the author would make honourable mention of men and things, according to his own partialities; and scarcely another graduate, perhaps, would agree with him in every expression of estimation for some, and total oblivion for others, who belong to the same *Alma Mater*. There are also mistakes, here and there, of minor importance, to be seen. And there is rather too much ambition to make a volume, by large collections, which are almost heterogeneous. For example, the sketch of Dr. Anderson, a Professor of Languages in the College for a short time, though well written, is out of all proportion in length. But these blemishes are atoned for in the general execution of his task; and there are gems in his incorporated biographies which compensate for any unskilfulness in proportion.

The sketch of Dr. Ramsay is one of these, though not as well written as some of the others. It gives a record to one of the best men of his age—a true man, and therefore a great man—an extremely modest man, and connected with a small ecclesiastical body, the Associate Presbyterian Church, and therefore but little known to the world. He was sole Professor

in the Theological Seminary of his Church for years, at Canonsburg, having generally about twenty students; and at the same time pastor of a large congregation, and Professor of Hebrew in Jefferson College. He was a man of primitive simplicity, conscientiousness and self-denial, along with uncommon acuteness and profound acquaintance with human nature, as well as theological lore. He was very much like our own Dr. A. Alexander, except in the power of eloquence, and the extent of acquirements.

Art. V.—*Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will.* By Joseph Haven, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1857.

We have before signified our high appreciation of this work, as to its general characteristics. Altogether, it is in advance of the manuals for elementary instruction in this department, which have been given to the public. By this we mean, that it has merits not found in its predecessors, while its faults are for the most part still more glaring in most other works of this sort. It consists of two principal parts, which, by the Scotch writers, and often by others, are dealt with in separate treatises. The first treats of the cognitive, the second, of the active and moral powers; the former terminating in knowledge, and having for their object the true; the latter terminating in action, and having for their object the good. Two faculties, taste and conscience, being both cognitive and emotional, overlap both departments. In his classification of the intellectual powers, Professor Haven is quite felicitous; and in this, as well as his analysis of the faculties and operations of the intellect in detail, he turns to good account most that is valuable in the discussions and suggestions of recent writers, American and European. Indeed, he sometimes goes too far in citing opinions from late authors, that have little importance, except what they derive from his sanction or refutation of them. The

style is simple, clear, and animated, fitted not only to instruct, but to please the learner; in happy contrast to many works in this department. Difficult points are elucidated by apt illustrations. The whole is divided into chapters, sections, and paragraphs, with appropriate titles, greatly facilitating the labours of teacher and learner. With this high estimate of the work as a whole, we now call attention to a few of the more important points of doctrine or opinion, in which we dissent from it. These chiefly refer to the second part, relative to the will and affections.

Although the author decisively distinguishes psychology from metaphysics, he neglects to define their respective spheres, and to show clearly where they diverge, and where they intermingle. The chapter on reasoning seems to us to go further into the technicalities of logic than is requisite for developing the nature of reasoning as a psychological process, and too meagre to amount to an adequate and satisfactory system of logic, especially for the instruction of beginners. There should have been more or less of it. He adopts the doctrine of Mill, that "every deduction implies a previous induction," p. 217. "Each is a perfectly valid method of reasoning, and each is, in itself, a distinct and valid kind of syllogism. Each requires the other. The deductive is wholly dependent on the inductive for its major premise, which is only the conclusion of a previous induction; while, on the other hand, the induction is chiefly valuable as preparing the way for a subsequent deduction," p. 209.

In our judgment, all this is utterly erroneous. So far from every deduction being founded on a previous induction for its major premise, every induction is a form of deduction. Induction is reasoning from particulars to generals; deducing general laws from particular instances in which such laws have been found operative. Why do we judge horned animals to be ruminant? Because they have been found so in all known instances. But how does this prove that it will be so in the innumerable instances not known to us? Why does the child once burnt dread the fire, believing that a second touch will give pain like the first? Is it not from a belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature, or that what has occurred once, will, in like circumstances, occur again? So Professor Haven signifies, p. 217.

Has the conclusion in these or other cases of induction any greater certainty than this *a priori* fundamental law of human belief? If we find, in such experiments as we make, that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, this constitutes the minor premise of a syllogism, of which the proposition that the laws of nature are uniform is the major. The conclusion that all water is composed of these gases, is just as certain as this major premise, and no more so. But in the case of the child above referred to, is this premise an induction from previous particulars, or can it be? Induction is therefore only a form of deductive reasoning—with the major premise usually suppressed, always implied. If it were not so, then no particulars could ever warrant any conclusion, or lead to any law more extensive than themselves. Nor is this view invalidated by Hamilton's fundamental canon of the inductive syllogism, that it goes from parts to the whole constituted by them. If it did no more than this, it would reach no whole more extensive than those parts, i. e. the sum of the particular instances observed. If induction does no more than this, it does nothing to any purpose. But it does more than this—just as much as is warranted by that major premise before spoken of, which renders it essentially deductive.

But aside from this, there is a class of intuitive *a priori* truths which form the original premises, on which all reasoning ultimately rests. That a proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true, and that one of them must be true; that action implies an agent; thinking, a thinker; events, a cause; qualities, a substance, &c., are not inductive conclusions. They are the necessary intuitive truths from which all reasoning originally proceeds, and without which it is but a chain without a staple. But on this point, there is the less need of argument, as we can cite our author against himself. He says, "all science and all reasoning depend ultimately on certain first truths, or principles, not learned by experience, but prior to it, the evidence and certainty of which lie back of all reasoning and all experience. Take away these elementary truths, and neither science nor reasoning is longer possible, for want of a beginning and foundation. Every proposition which carries evidence with it, either contains that evidence in itself, or de-

rives it from some other proposition on which it depends. And the same is true of this other proposition, and so on for ever, until we come, at last, to some proposition, which depends on no other, but is self-evident, a first truth or principle. Whence come these first principles? Not, of course, from experience, for they are involved in and essential to all experience. They are native, or *a priori* convictions of the mind, instinctive and intuitive judgments," pp. 238–9. How then are they inductive conclusions? The author's two positions on these points seem to us flatly contradictory. As the latter is demonstrably true, the former must be false.

Professor Haven teaches in one passage, p. 430, that the "feeling of the beautiful is the condition and source of our perception of the beautiful." This appears to us the reverse of the truth, and out of harmony with all else which he copiously and happily sets forth in regard to it. Nothing is more evident than that the agreeable feeling which arises in the mind in view of the beautiful, *is in view of it*, i. e. arises from the perception of it, and is otherwise impossible. It must be so, or the feeling is no longer a rational emotion, as our author justly represents it, but a mere blind, instinctive sensation. And by strict logical consequence, taste itself is no longer a faculty of intelligence, as he justly represents it, but a mere faculty of feeling, like the animal appetites. It is no answer to this to say, that the mind still judges in regard to these feelings and the objects which excite them. So it judges in regard to the sensations produced by sugar or aloes, and the objects which excite these sensations. But, in both cases alike, the sensation or feeling is the primary object or groundwork of its judgment. Intelligence differs from mere sentimentality, and rational from instinctive emotion, in just this, that in the one case cognition precedes and shapes the feeling, while in the other feeling precedes and shapes the cognition. The author has no difficulty in placing intellect and feeling in their due positions in the case of conscience. Indeed, his universal doctrine is, that "the intellect properly precedes the sensibility," p. 378. But his reasons for reversing them in the case of taste, apply equally well to that of conscience. On this account we deem the subject of considerable importance. The greatest evils result from

the theory which makes the moral and regal faculty a mere blind feeling, a theory which our author wholly repudiates. We confess, however, to a jealousy of all reasonings which furnish apparent premises for such a conclusion. The subject also has an important bearing upon the whole subject of spiritual illumination in regeneration. According to the view we oppose, men love God and divine things, before they behold their beauty and glory, and in order to behold them. They become beautiful and glorious in their eyes because they are first made to love them. But according to the scriptural, the evangelical, the true psychological view, the eyes of their understanding are enlightened so as to behold the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, in the order of nature, if not of time, before they can have right feelings in view of it. It is when their eyes see God, that they repent in dust and ashes. We know that we here run counter to a system of theology which has had great currency, and in which Professor Haven has doubtless been trained. It tends to exclude the intellect from complicity with our moral and spiritual states, and to limit these to feelings and volitions, chiefly to the latter. But the fact is, there can be no rational and responsible feelings or volitions which are not implicated with, and largely shaped by, the views of the intellect, and which do not in various ways react upon its views. It is one sentient intelligent mind which feels as it thinks, and thinks as it feels. But the understanding is the guiding faculty. This accords with the phraseology of Scripture and the testimony of experience. We wish to add, however, to prevent misconstruction, that the chapter on the idea of right, and the various questions connected with the nature of virtue and moral obligation, is highly satisfactory with reference to this most fundamental subject.

We thus come to that portion of the book which treats of the Moral and Active Powers—the sensibilities, including emotions, desires, and affections—and the will, together with conscience, or the moral faculty, which is both intellectual and emotional. With regard to the distinction between rational and instinctive emotions, we think it valid, but our author fails to draw any definite or reliable line of demarcation between them. He vaguely assigns the higher emotions to the former class, the

lower to the latter. The true distinction we apprehend to be, that the rational emotions or feelings arise in view of the apprehensions of the intellect. The animal and instinctive arise irrespective of any such intellectual excitation. Cheerfulness and melancholy, sorrow at the loss of friends, sympathy with the happiness and joy of others, which our author classes with instinctive, are awakened by the views taken by the understanding—just as much so as "emotions of joy or sadness arising from the contemplation of our own excellence, or the reverse," which he ranks as rational emotions.

We pass to a far more important topic—the morality of the emotions, affections, and desires, which our author deals with most directly, in treating of resentment. Speaking of this, and, by parity of reason, of all feelings having reference to matters of moral obligation, he says, and says truly, "Within due limits, and on just occasions, it is a virtue; when it passes these limits, when it becomes excessive, or is uncalled for by the circumstances of the case, it becomes a vice," p. 468. This is a good deliverance, and will endure all tests. Along with this, however, he adopts the maxim, which is current in most of our popular treatises on psychology and ethics, and for which he cites the authority of Reid and Chalmers, that "Nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary." This maxim is true with a certain interpretation, and within due limits. Beyond this, and in the sense intended by most of these writers, it is false. It is true with regard to all external acts, all bodily movements. It is true with regard to all internal exercises, provided the word *voluntary* be extended, as it is in the popular sense of this maxim, so as to include the free and spontaneous outgoings of desire, affection, inclination, and also the habitual disposition of soul which prompts such exercises, with regard to things morally right or wrong. But it is not true, if the will be regarded as it is by most of these writers, as the mere faculty of choice or volition, the executive, perhaps, of the desires of the soul, but still distinct from desire, affection, inclination. The voice of unsophisticated men as surely pronounces the hidden dispositions, the desires and affections of the heart, whether determined by volition or not, whether natural, acquired, or gracious, with respect to moral

objects, to be morally good or evil, as that "nothing can be moral or immoral which is not voluntary." Therefore the common sense of men sanctions the latter principle only in a sense consistent with the former. The Bible surely condemns all inordinate affections and lawless covetings, from whatever cause they arise. Their merit or demerit is determined by their nature, not their origin. As Professor Haven says, "Within due limits and on just occasions, it is a virtue; when it passes these limits, when it becomes excessive, or is uncalled for, it is a vice." Take the very instance he selects. Suppose any one possessed of such a malign disposition, that without any volition, or even against his purpose, he breaks out into infuriate rage against another who has denied him some unreasonable request; suppose that he does so "instinctively," if thus you choose to call it, is he not blamable? Suppose one a "lover of good things," so that without volition or purpose his heart goes spontaneously towards good men and good works, is not this morally good? To deny this is going further in the line of vocating and confounding moral distinctions than many of those intend, who assert that the affections and desires have no moral character, further than as they are moulded by the action of a will distinct from themselves. For they are quite apt, when this theory is out of sight, to teach that the morality of the affections is determined by their nature rather than their origin. The bearings of all this upon the theological questions implicated with it, are too patent to require illustration. Some of the chief questions relative to the scope of regeneration, repentance, Christian experience, and human ability hinge upon it. And it is just at this point of ability that our author's mind appears to have been perplexed in regard to it. This is needless. For as we shall soon see, his views of the will, at the most, leave only a theoretical unavailable power over the affections. We deem it proper, however, to say, that though he falls into the mistake so common among writers on mental philosophy, especially the compilers of manuals for beginners on this subject, he is more guarded than most of them. The only manual for young students, that treats this whole subject satisfactorily, so far as we know, is the little work on Moral Science by the late Dr. Alexander. For one

thing not altogether alien from this subject, we especially thank Professor Haven. He denies that the "term natural is properly opposed to the term moral as designating distinct and opposite things," p. 390. Had this been kept in mind, the distinction between the faculties of the soul and their moral state would never have been indicated by the now nearly effete phrase, "natural and moral ability," which, in its day, was so pregnant with perplexity to good men, so convenient a refuge for Pelagians, and so fruitful both of logomachy and substantial controversy in the Church.

Our readers will look, with the greatest interest, after the author's views of the will, both from the intrinsic importance of the subject, and because they have already, to some extent, been made the subject of public discussion. This, in common with most modern writers, he distinguishes from all forms of mere desire or sensibility, and makes simply "the executive power of the mind," the power which it has "of determining or deciding what it will do, and of putting forth volitions accordingly." We may remark here, that even if this be taken for the normal idea of will, the extension of the term voluntary to the dispositions, desires, and affections, in common speech, admits of a ready explanation. For as the will acts in accordance with the dominant inclination of the soul, no act is voluntary which is not in accordance with the ruling desires.

The first question in regard to the will is not, whether it is free—this all admit—but wherein does its freedom consist? Some say that it consists in acting from indifference, independent of any bias or inclination of the soul towards the objects of choice. Others locate it in what amounts to the same thing, if it amounts to anything—an alleged power of contrary choice. But the orthodox view, which accords with consciousness, with the highest possible conception of liberty, and with the fundamental doctrines of providence, sin, and grace, is that it consists in the power of the mind to will as it pleases. This, we are happy to say, is so clearly the doctrine of our author, that it can scarcely be necessary to cite passages. *Instar omnium*, "my will is free, when I can *will to do* just what I *please*," p. 545. He goes on to say, "that mere *strength of inclination* can by no means impair the freedom of the will.

Be the inclination never so strong, it matters not. Nay, so far from interfering with freedom, it is an essential element in it. Freedom presupposes and implies inclination." Still further, "it is of no consequence *how I came* by that inclination or disposition. The simple question is, am I at liberty to follow it?" "Interference must be from without, and must affect the choice," in order to impair freedom. "If there *be* an act of the will, it is, in its very nature, a *free* act, and cannot be otherwise." Against this, "all that could *possibly* be contended is, that the supposed inclination to a given choice is likely to prevent my having *another* and *different* choice. But that has nothing to do with the freedom of my will, which depends, as we have seen, not on the power to choose *otherwise* than as one is inclined, or than he likes, but *as* he likes," p. 547. The italics are the author's. This is the radical view of the freedom of the will presented by him. Of course, if we have any difference with him, it must respect either passages contradictory to these, or other aspects of the subject, or his manner of using certain terms.

Professor Haven deviates from the use of terms which has been common since the days of Edwards, in distinguishing choice from volition, as in the following passage: "But suppose now that I am not prevented from choosing, but only from carrying out my choice in actual volition; from willing according to my choice," p. 546. As choice and volition have very commonly been regarded as synonymous terms, some might be led to infer that our author's theory is, that a volition is free only when caused by a preceding volition. If so, he would expose himself to the famous refutation of Edwards, who demonstrates that, on such a theory, no volition can be free unless preceded by an infinite series of volitions. This, however, is not our author's meaning. By volition he means that mental determination, in obedience to which the man exerts his faculties in any given way, as I will to raise my arm, and directly consequent on that volition it rises. By choice he appears to mean that antecedent mental preference out of which every free volition flows, and, so far as it is free, must flow. The *usus loquendi* of ordinary discourse does not militate against this use of terms, if they be carefully defined.

In fact, however, this preference is nothing more nor less than the preponderant desire, which, in common speech, is called the mind's choice. The cases cited by our author from Locke, Reid, and Upham, do not show the contrary. They only show that the strongest desire, of which the will is the executive, may run counter to and prevail against feebler desires. Abraham offering up Isaac, indeed did violence to some of the strongest feelings of his soul; but he did so in conformity to a desire mightier than them all, the desire to please God. In this sense, too, and no other, we have power over our own volitions, i. e. the power of willing as we please. In this sense, and no other, can the power of contrary choice be admitted; i. e. that we might will otherwise than as we do, were we so disposed or inclined. This is all that we understand Professor Haven to mean, so far as he seems to assert such a power, pp. 543, 451–2. Indeed, it is all that can be maintained in consistency with his radical definition of the freedom of the will, which by logical necessity sweeps away most other heresies relative to this subject. This is precisely what the author explains himself to mean: "The actual choice of any given moment is by no means a necessary one. Another might have been in its stead. A different inclination is certainly possible and conceivable, and a different inclination *would* have led to a different choice. If, instead of looking at the advantage or agreeableness of a proposed course, and being influenced by that consideration, I had looked at the right, the obligation in the case, my choice would have been a different one; for I should have been influenced by a different motive," p. 552. According to this, the inclination remaining the same, the choice cannot be otherwise than as it is, and still be free. Contrary choice is possible only on the supposition of the inclination being different from what it actually is. The only question that remains is, whether it is proper to call this a power of contrary choice; and this depends on the question whether the term is likely to mislead or not. That it is extensively employed by those who assert a power to will in opposition to the prevailing bias or inclination of the soul, to indicate such a power, is undeniable. As employed in theological controversy, it has been used chiefly in this sense, and intent.

While therefore we accept the idea which our author maintains under this phrase, we object to the phrase as being a common vehicle of a very different and mischievous notion.

Professor Haven objects to Edwards's formula, that "the will is as the greatest apparent good." But the propriety of this depends on the meaning of the terms good, or apparent good. If we take good in the sense of desirable, with Edwards, it will be hard to deny that it chooses what on the whole, in the view of the mind, and the state of its feelings at the moment of choice, seems *pro hac vice*, most desirable. To deny this, would be to deny that we will as we please. To be sure, in a multitude of cases, we ought to have felt and thought differently. But this does not affect the principle in question.

As to the question whether motives are the causes of volitions, this too is a mere question of words. We agree with our author, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts. We agree with him further, that its own desires and inclinations are the motives which influence or determine it to will as it does, and not otherwise. If the question then be, whether motives are the causes of the volitions which they prompt, we answer, that they are not in such a sense that the mind is not the cause or agent of its own acts; they are, as Professor Haven concedes, in such a sense that they are the reasons why it wills one way rather than another. Now it is not mere willing that is to be accounted for, but choosing as we do rather than the contrary. As every event must have a cause, what is the cause of, not the mere act of willing, but of willing in this particular way? Plainly the motive or inclination which excites the mind to will thus and not otherwise. Professor Haven concedes it to be the *reason* of the choice being as it is. It is, therefore, the *cause* of its being so. But although a cause, it is not a physical cause, moving a blind passive object, but a moral cause acting upon, or influencing the free action of, a free moral agent. Our author objects to the use of the word cause in this connection, because he apprehends it may be construed to imply that the will is passively determined by forces *ab extra*. This by no means follows. If I am hungry, and take bread because it is at hand, while I would prefer meat which is at some distance, the urgency of my appetite is the cause of

my choosing the bread rather than meat; but not a cause which interferes with my own free activity in the premises. Says our author, "there is a *cause* why the apple falls. It is gravitation. There is a *reason* why mind acts and wills as it does. It is motive." True. But is it any the less a cause because it is a reason? Moreover the real motives, whence all others derive their power, are within the mind itself—its active desires.

The author combats the great argument of Edwards in which he contends that the doctrine of his adversaries involved the absurdity of an infinite series of free acts, in order to any one free act. He selects for attack the statement of this argument given by his son, which, by proving too much, proves nothing. We think, however, that there is a certain degree of truth and force in the celebrated demonstration of the elder Edwards. He was opposing the theory that volition is not free when we will as we please, unless it be an act or product of a self-determining power beside. This is altogether aside of the question, whether the choices and determinations of the mind are from within itself, and not from exterior forces. Nor is it necessary to maintain that Edwards's phraseology was always so precise, as to give no appearance of aiming at something more than this. But if a volition is not free in its own nature, when, in willing as we please, we exercise according to our author, "the highest practical freedom of which it is possible to conceive," without some other free act of self-determination added to it, the same must be true of this other free act, and so on in an infinite regress *ad infinitum*, till free agency is driven out of sight, and out of existence.

A very important question in this connection respects the control of the will over the inclinations, desires, and affections. That these may change, as circumstances or our views of things change, is agreed on all sides. That whatever we may do, if we are inclined to do it, may be said to be within our power, is what few will question. But the question is, has the will power, *propriis viribus*, to change the affections and desires? Consciousness answers, No. The nature of the will as a faculty of choice in obedience to our inclinations, not against them, answers, No. Yet, no one doubts that indirectly we may exercise much influence over our inclinations and desires on many

subjects by the associations we cherish, the objects to which we give attention, the habits we form. On the other hand, it is a capital truth, certified by Scripture and Christian experience, that divine grace alone can change the aversion of the heart to God, to holy love. And to this we understand our author to come, after having, by the usual arguments on that side, maintained that one whose "heart is wrong can do right." "It must be admitted, however, that so long as the heart is wrong, so long as the evil disposition continues, so long the man *will* continue to do evil, notwithstanding all his *power* to the contrary. . . . This is precisely the want of his nature which divine grace meets. It creates within him a *clean heart*, and renews within him a *right spirit*. This is the sublime mystery of regeneration. The soul that is born of God is made *willing* to do right. The inclinations are no longer to evil, but to good, and the man still doing what he pleases, is *pleased* to do the will of God. The change is in the disposition; it is a change of the affections, of the *heart*. Thus the Scriptures always represent it." The chief question that arises here then, respects words more than things, except as in such matters words are things. It is not indeed a question whether unrenewed man has "power to do right" in his external acts, as to the matter of them, or to do many things which tend to promote right feelings rather the opposite, in some respects. But is it correct to say that he can, without divine grace, make an unholy heart holy? Can he please God without a right heart? Ought he not to please God? Can he then, at this cardinal point, do right of himself, in his own strength? Let those say yes, who will. For ourselves we answer with Scripture, with all Christian creeds, with the deepest consciousness of every convinced sinner, with the daily confessions of all Christians on their knees, no, never. "They that are in the flesh cannot please God."

To the pleasing evidences we have already given that our author rejects the Pelagian notion of free agency, is to be added the fact, that he labours to show that God's universal providence can determine all the actions of free agents without impairing their freedom, because it can reach and shape, in ways innumerable, those inclinations of the heart

which the will obeys in all its free acts. We greatly rejoice in the amount of truth which the volume so clearly sets forth. That the author should have tried to reconcile this with some phrases and ideas which are the outgrowth of another system long dominant in the sphere of his life and culture, and for which its abettors claim the dignity and authority of first truths, is not surprising.

Art. VI.—*The Providential Government of God.*

A large proportion of the heresies by which the Church has been corrupted, in respect to the nature of man, and the remedy which his ruin demands, have originated from error on the subject of second causes;—either in the denial of causation to the creatures, or the recognition of such a force in the nature of moral agents—such a power of will and action—as is independent of God, and uncontrollable by his power and sovereignty. In respect to second causes, four several theories have obtained more or less currency. Some deny them any efficiency whatever, and make the laws of nature to be nothing but the uniform modes of divine operation; so that God is not only the first, but the only cause. The opposite extreme is held by others, who look upon the universe as a machine, from the natural operation of which all things take place, without the interposition of the Creator; who continues for ever an inactive spectator of the fated process. Another opinion is, that the powers of nature are ordinarily left to their own operation; but that on special occasions the Creator interposes, as in miracles. The fourth, and as we believe, the scriptural doctrine, is, that whilst the creatures are endowed with a real efficiency and true causation, they are at the same time under the constant and universal control of God;—that he, "the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according

to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy."

Substances and their phenomena constitute the whole sum of things that exist. A substance is an existence, which is invested with certain properties or powers. In other words, it is an efficient cause, of which the phenomena which attach to it are the effects. The word substance, designates the being or existence of which those powers are predicated; and cause, the powers converted into forces—the substance in action. The possession of powers is essential to the very existence of a substance; and they are thus essential, not as sustaining an outside relation to it, but they reside in the very substance itself, as elements of it, without which its existence is not conceivable. The powers thus residing in substances, are derived originally from God, sustained each instant by his power, and controlled by his sovereign will; yet have they a real existence, which is distinct from the omnipotence of God; and an activity which is their own, and not the agency of the Creator.

These powers give to each several substance its peculiar character, and constitute it a motive force—a machine, so to speak—adapted to perform given functions, to occupy a specific place, and hold specific relations to the combination of the whole. This remark holds good alike in regard to animate and inanimate nature, the minute as well as the great. An atom, for instance, is endowed with gravitation, as certainly as the earth or the sun. It is also characterized by certain other affinities or attractions, with kindred repulsions; the effect of which is, that it refuses to combine with certain substances, and in certain relations; and at the same time seeks combination in different relations, and with other bodies. Thus the elements constituting a mass of fuel, which at an ordinary temperature adhere with the tenacity of hickory, or the hardness of anthracite, when subjected to the influence of heat, so repel each other as to dissolve the entire mass. Thus are all material substances composed of particles held together by mutual attractions, resulting in every variety of texture, and every degree of solidity, from the rarity of the gases to the density of gold.

An interesting example of the fact which we wish to illustrate, is presented in the process of the assimilation of food. An ox feeds on grass or corn. The mass of food is thrown into the stomach; and so wonderfully has the Creator formed that living machine, that, with its auxiliary organs, rejecting what is unsuitable, it separates the rest, and recombines it in the necessary forms, conveying the requisite elements, and elaborating them into horns to cover the head, or hoofs to protect the feet; to other parts, as required, are borne the elements of bone, and combined in the ivory texture of the teeth, or the porous and yielding structure of the ribs. Nutriment is thus ministered to every part, and elaborated into flesh and sinew, horn and hair or scales, constituting, in some animals, a covering firm as steel; in others, soft as silk. It thus appears that the animal organization exerts a force to lay hold of the food, when deposited in the stomach, and apply the requisite elements to the nutrition of the body; and that the elementary atoms have natures susceptible to the influences thus exerted, and endowed with attractions to hold them in proper combination in the animal frame.

Illustrations to the same effect might be multiplied without limit. What has been presented is sufficient to justify the statement already made, that each material substance is a motive power, endowed with a capacity of putting forth and propagating influences and forces upon others; and in like manner susceptible to influences propagated from them. The only knowledge we can have of any substance is in the form of a list of the attributes of efficiency possessed by it. Of its essence we can know nothing, except that it is endowed with these. Let the reader test this suggestion upon any substance—this work, for example. It has length, breadth, and thickness; that is, it exerts resistance to pressure, in three directions; it throws off the coloured rays of light in a manner which makes a specific impression on the organs of vision, which we express by saying that it is visible, and of a given colour; it mutually attracts and is drawn toward the earth, which we indicate by ascribing to it weight. Thus, we would know absolutely nothing of the existence of any substance, but for the influences it exerts, the effects it produces; and of the substances which

are thus discovered to us, our acquaintance is strictly limited to a knowledge of those attributes of efficiency which constitute them causes—sources of propagated effects. When, therefore, it is said that God made a given substance, we must not suppose that the creature thus announced, may or can be viewed irrespective of these its active principles. On the contrary, even the idea of such a creation can be conceived in no other sense, than as the production of an essence clothed with such and such principles of efficient relation to others. These principles, or powers of nature, may by position and combination assume an exceedingly complex character. Yet are they still to be reduced to the principle above stated. Thus, when it is said that God at the creation clothed the earth with grass and trees, we are not to conceive of the trees, for example, as mere branching and leafy pillars; but as substances containing in themselves, in determinate energy, a principle of growth; a capacity of shedding and renewing their foliage at stated times; and, among still many other attributes, a power of producing a seed, each after its kind; which in given circumstances shall germinate and develope to maturity other trees after the kind of the parent; and so on continually.

The following remarks of McCosh on the nature of the relation of cause and effect, are precisely to the present purpose.

"'Every effect has a cause,' is the aphorism. But what do we mean by an effect? If we analyze it, it will always be found to imply a change, or something new. Dr. Brown admits that an unformed mass could not of itself have suggested the idea of a cause; and that there must be something uncaused. But let this mass be seen springing into being, or let it be seen assuming a new form, and the idea of a cause is at once suggested. We must limit the general maxim accordingly. When we say that every effect has a cause, we do not mean that every existing thing has an antecedent, invariable or necessary. There is a change implied, in the very conception of effect; it is something effected; something new; something which did not exist before, or, put in a new state. Whenever such a phenomenon is brought under cognizance, the mind rises intuitively to the belief in a cause.

"Having endeavoured to limit and define what is meant by

an effect, let us now attempt to determine what is meant by a cause. Looking as before at existing things, we find substances with their several properties. Dr. Brown has endeavoured to show that substance is nothing but 'the co-existence of certain qualities.' Into this curious speculation we do not feel ourselves called to enter. We assume the existence of substances, material and spiritual, possessing their several properties, or if any prefer the statement, composed of their several properties, cohering together. Now a cause is always to be found in some existing thing, or in a substance, spiritual or material, simple or compound. In producing its effects that substance produces a new substance, or a change upon some existing substance; and we are led to the conclusion, that existing things, in producing new existences, or changes on old existences, act according to certain definite rules, which it is the business of experience to discover. The same existing thing in the same state, is always followed by the same change in that existing thing, or in some other existing thing. The same existing substance in the same state, is thus always followed by the same change; and *vice versa*, the change always presupposes the same preëxisting substance. When we discover what are the precise changes or productions resulting from a given substance, we call this a property of the substance; and we know that this substance, in the given state, will ever produce this change, or exercise this quality. It is the office of observation and experience to discover the properties of objects.

"We are now in circumstances to define more accurately the ideas contained in the words cause and effect. There is the idea of universal sequence; but there is something more definite. Dr. Brown challenges those who affirm that there is something more than invariable antecedence and consequence, to say what it is. We answer the call, and affirm that in a cause there is *a substance acting according to a definite rule.* Again, in every effect there is a change, or a new object."

"Dr. Brown has shown, beyond the possibility of a refutation, that in the production of changes there is truly nothing but the substances that change and are changed. Mix them as we please, 'the substances that exist in a train of phenomena are

still, and must always be, the whole constituents of the train.' But he has not shown as fully as he might, how much is implied in these substances. The German metaphysicians are right, in affirming that power is implied in our very idea of substance; and Dr. Brown, in one passage admits, though casually, the same thing, when he says, 'all this regularity of succession is assumed in our very notion of substance as existing.' These philosophers might have further affirmed that there is power in the very nature of a substance, as well as in our idea of it. This power, these properties of substances, are permanently in them, and ready to be exercised at all times. With the exception of those who deny the existence of an external world, all admit that properties are of an abiding nature, and constantly resident in the substance. We thus arrive at a power in nature, constant and permanent, and ever ready to be exercised. We cannot, perhaps, speak of a cause as existing, when not exercised; but we can most assuredly speak of a power abiding, whether exercised or not—that power abiding in every substance that comes under our notice, and in the very nature of the substance itself, as it is implied in the very idea of substance."*

The great mind of Augustine saw the intimate relation of this subject to the doctrines of religion, and speaks thus justly upon it:—"The whole of this ordinary course of nature has certain natural laws of its own, according to which even the spirit of life, which is a created substance, has its specific appetites, but bounded in a certain way, which even the corrupted will cannot pass. And the elements of this material world have a definite power and quality—what each one can or cannot do, and what can or cannot be done respecting each. From these, as the primordial sources, all things which are generated take each in its turn their origin and growth, and the limits and modifications of their respective kinds. Hence it happens that pulse is not produced from wheat, nor wheat from pulse; man from beast, nor beast from man. But besides this natural movement, and course of things, the power of the Creator hath in itself a capacity to do concerning all these otherwise than

* McCosh on the Divine Government, p. 97.

their own (*quasi seminales rationes*) natural powers can do. Yet neither can that which he has implanted in them relative to these powers, be exercised independently of him, nor yet does he assert his omnipotence by the exercise of an intrusive arbitrary force, but by the power of wisdom; and concerning each particular thing, in his own time, he does that which he had before created in it a capacity to have done. It is therefore a different mode of things by which this plant germinates so, and that in a different way; this time of life is prolific, and that is not; a man can speak and an animal cannot. The (*rationes*) efficient causes of these and the like modes of operation are not only in God, but are also by him implanted and concreted in the things he has made. But that wood cut from off the earth, dry, polished, without any root, without earth or water, should suddenly flourish and bear fruit; that a woman, barren in youth, should have a child in old age; that an ass should speak; and whatever there is of this kind, he gave it indeed to the natures he created, that these things might take place with them. So that he does not with them, what in creating them he had made impossible to be done with them; since he is not more powerful than himself. But he constituted things in a distinctive manner; so that they should not have these phenomena in the natural course of things, but in that way for which they were thus so created, that their nature should be fully subject to a more powerful will. God, therefore, has in himself the hidden causes of certain acts, which causes he has not implanted in the things he has made; and these causes he puts in operation, not in that work of providence by which he creates natures as they are, but in that by which he manages after his pleasure the things which according to his pleasure he made. And here is the grace by which sinners are saved. For as it respects nature, depraved by its own corrupted will, it has in itself no return, except by God's grace, whereby it is aided and restored. Nor need men despair by reason of that saying, Prov. ii. 19, 'None who walk in it shall return.' For it was spoken of the burden of their iniquity, in order that whoever returns should attribute his return, not to himself, but to the grace of God; 'not of works, lest any should boast.' Therefore the apostle speaks of the

mystery of this grace as hidden—not in this world, in which are hidden the causal reasons of all things which arise naturally, as Levi was hid in the loins of Abraham—but in God, who created all things. Eph. iii. 9."*

This eminently clear and discriminating statement accords with the common sense and with the Scriptures. Men intuitively recognize power as a permanent and inseparable characteristic of all created substances. They perceive in them severally, forces, which in action constitute them the causes of the varied phenomena of nature. In vain the dreams of theorists, and the oppositions of acute and subtle metaphysics, against this fundamental fact. The consciousness of the philosopher himself revolts from the folly of his conclusions; and his soul instinctively receives and acts upon the truth, which his theory denies. In fact, the rejection of the truth of which we speak, is only consistent with a universal and atheistic scepticism. For its evidence is precisely the same upon which we recognize the existence of a great First Cause, an eternal God—the evidence of intuition—the last and highest form of evidence to which appeal can be made—that of the Creator's attestation, written with his own finger on the human heart.

It would seem that the Scriptures so unequivocally attribute efficient causation to the creatures, that no one who has a reverence for the sacred volume could for a moment doubt it. Thus—to confine ourselves to the narrative of the creation—what can be more explicit on this point, than the language of Genesis i. 11, 12? "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so. And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good." In what plainer terms could it be stated, that God bestowed upon the earth a power of fertility, which was an efficient cause of the vegetation that followed? And so of the power of fructification, attributed to the grass, herbs, and trees, after their kind. If it should be said, that the language is merely expressive of

* Augustine De Genesi ad Literam. IX. 17, 18.

the appearance of things, let it be considered, that such expressions would convey no meaning whatever to us, but for that ineffaceable intuition of cause and effect which God has implanted in our minds; that we are in this place addressed as we are endowed with this intuition; and that the language makes direct appeal to this principle, and under its guidance can be understood in but one way. We need not dwell in detail on the other statements of this chapter, each one of which is subject to similar remark. We will cite a single example: "And God said, Let us make man, in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God, created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion." Is this language reconcilable with the idea that man is a mere puppet, assuming postures, and going through a set of fated actions at the mere will of his Creator, operating on him from behind the screen? Was there no real power conveyed, when he was told to subdue the earth, and have dominion? Is not a generative causation attributed to him, when the creative Word says, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth"? In this language, addressed to the first pair, in the instant of their creation, before their introduction to the garden, was indicated and confirmed a fruitful energy of nature—a propagative power—by virtue of which, flowing from them through the generations of the race, every human being receives existence. God rested the seventh day from all his works. "The works were finished from the foundation of the world."—Heb. iv. 3. How is it consistent with this, to suppose the existence of each plant, animal, and man, now in turn to call into requisition the same creative power which originated the first?

But whilst we assert the investiture of the creatures with a true and real causation—an efficiency which is proper to them, apart from God's immediate agency, and which has a distinct operation of its own—on the other hand, the creation is con-

structed with such wisdom and forecaste, and so upheld and controlled by the immediate power and providential government of God, that nothing can fall out but in precise accordance with his will.

That the phenomena of nature are features in the plan of God—elements in the harmonious scheme of his government—is unquestionable. He at the first certainly knew the whole energy of the various forces which he set in his works, and anticipated and designed all the results; and this, not only as those forces are viewed simply, and apart from each other, but in their complex and multifarious combinations, which all were ordained by him. If the feeble powers of man can determine the time, place, and extent of every eclipse of sun, moon, or planet, for thousands of years to come, how much more did the Creator know the whole future of the powers of nature; which, having created, he must fully comprehend. We hence conclude that the results which flow with unfailing certainty from the causes to which God thus intelligently gave origin, were as truly comprehended in the original plan, as were the several forces which work out those ultimate results.

A striking illustration to our purpose occurs in the solar system. It had been observed by astronomers that the general symmetry of that system was marred by an extraordinary vacancy intervening between Mars and Jupiter, which apparently should have been filled by an additional planet. On the first day of the present century a planet was discovered, revolving in that space, but too small to satisfy the law of the case. That discovery was soon followed by others; until no less than fifty asteroids have been found to revolve in the vacancy;* and—what is true of no other bodies in the solar system, except the comets—all these, though taking different courses in their revolutions round the sun, still cross a common track. The result is little short of demonstration, that they once constituted a single planet, revolving in the path, which they all twice cross in their annual course; and that by some tremendous catastrophe, it was rent to pieces, and the fragments hurled abroad. Facts familiar to science render it probable

* Since this article was written, the discovery of a fifty-first is announced.

that events as extraordinary have occurred in the heavens even under the astronomer's eye. Luminaries which once shone with a steady brightness, have been seen gradually, for years, to acquire an increasing glare, until they rivalled the brightest stars; then by degrees to decline with changing colour, and go out in utter darkness! Thus, we are assured, must this world at length be burned up. Upon the supposition that the asteroids are the scattered fragments of a planet, rent asunder by some convulsion, it must be admitted that the Creator knew as well what effect would result, when he originated the forces engaged, as he does now; and that in creating and setting the forces in motion, he designed from the first, this, no less than the other effects which have resulted. A machinist is not always to be held as having designed all the effects which follow the construction of his engine. Either he may be ignorant of the forces which are employed, or others may be introduced which he did not design. But if he knew precisely the proportion and relation of all the forces concerned, and designed the machine to be used precisely as it was, it is apparent that any result which follows must have been included in the design. So of God;—generating himself all the forces in the universe, and therefore knowing perfectly all their relations—the conclusion is inevitable, that in laying the train, he intended the explosion which occurred. Thus, then, all natural events, as they are the effects of causes wisely originated by God, are elements in the operation of his hand—features of his perfect plan.

But the Creator has not limited himself, in the administration of his government, to the original disposition of causes, in harmonious adaptation to his purposes. On the contrary, this entire system of nature, in all the variety of its parts, in all their forces and functions, and the adaptations which everywhere abound, was constructed for the express purpose of constituting the creatures fitting instruments, through whom and upon whom the Creator himself might work; instead of being in and of themselves the adequate causes of the contemplated results. In one department of the divine government, this is so manifest, that no one who accepts the Scriptures as the word of God can fail instantly to admit it. The intercourse of God

with man has always been conducted by a continual series of immediate divine interpositions. The whole plan of salvation—the incarnation and work of the Son of God, and the mission and operations of the Holy Spirit, both in his ordinary influences, and in his renewing and sanctifying agency—all these are examples of such interpositions, entirely distinct from the original adaptations of nature. The miracles to which the Bible bears witness, constitute formal and emphatic pledges, that God has not surrendered the universe to the government of mere natural laws; although these are all established by him, in perfect fitness for their offices; but that he himself is ever present, ever active, swaying a providential sceptre over his creatures.

On this subject the language of McCosh is certainly unguarded, and if we are not mistaken as to what he means to teach, we think his doctrine clearly erroneous. Through several sections of his work on "The Divine Government," he discusses the connection of God with his works, and the manner in which he accomplishes the particular purposes of his will. In these discussions there is much said in respect to the universal and particular providence of God, to which we most cordially assent; and in some places he seems to assert all that we are disposed to require. Thus, at the close of the discussion on The Connection of God with his works, he says: "We are satisfied if the old Epicurean view of Deity, inactive and unconcerned, be discarded, and it be acknowledged that God is ever active, and ever benevolent in his activity; ever benevolent, and active in his benevolence; and in all places, and at all times, the guardian and governor of all his creatures, and the judge of all their actions."* He alludes, too, with a just indignation to the philosophy of Pope. And yet, when we come to inquire into the precise theory which he himself inculcates, we cannot see wherein it is materially different from that which he reprobates.

> "Think we, like some weak prince, the eternal Cause,
> Prone for his favourites to reverse his laws;
> Shall burning Etna, if a sage requires,
> Forget to thunder, and recall her fires;

* McCosh, p. 158.

> On air or sea new motions be imprest,
> Oh blameless Bethel, to relieve thy breast;
> When the loose mountain trembles from on high,
> Shall gravitation cease if you go by;"*

"We expect not the Eternal to change his laws," says McCosh; "but it is because they have been so skilfully arranged, that they do not need to be changed; and arranged, too, in order to accomplish all and each of his purposes. . . . Should these individuals not be rushing recklessly against the known laws of Heaven, or should it be the will of God to preserve them, provision will be found to be made for their escape; and that, not through the powers of nature disobeying their own laws, but through other powers in nature opportunely presenting themselves, to stop, to turn aside, or otherwise to modify their operation. The volcano may burst, the tempest may rage, and the cliff may fall in an instant before or after the time when they might have been followed by such fatal consequences; some passing impulse of feeling may have hurried the individual away; or some other power of nature may have hastened to shelter and defend him; and all by a special arrangement intended by God from the very beginning. It is by means of these prearranged adjustments that God can make general laws accomplish individual ends."†

Again: "By means of this preëstablished harmony, God can accomplish not only his general, but his individual purposes, and at the time and in the way intended by him. As entertaining this view of the perfection of the original constitution of all things, we see no advantage in calling in special interpositions of God acting without physical causes—always excepting the miracles employed to attest divine revelation. But speaking of the ordinary providence of God, we believe that the fitting of the various parts of the machinery is so nice, that there is no need of any interference with it. We believe in an original disposition of all things; we believe that in this disposition there is provided an interposition of one thing in reference to another, so as to produce the individual effect which God contemplates; but we are not required by philosophy or

* Pope's Essay on Man, v. 121–128. † McCosh, p. 184.

religion to acknowledge that there is subsequent interposition by God with the original dispositions and interpositions which he hath instituted. 'This is, in fact, the great miracle of Providence, that no miracles are needed to acccomplish his purposes.' "—*Leibnitz.**

In reference to the answer to prayer, he brings forward and rejects the supposition of Chalmers, that God may interpose among the physical agents, beyond the limit to which human sagacity can trace the operation of law. His own solution he thus states: "How is it that God sends us the bounties of his providence?—how is it that he supplies the many physical wants of his creatures?—how is it that he encourages industry?—how is it that he arrests the plots of wickedness?—how is it that he punishes in this life, notorious offenders against his law? The answer is, By the skilful preärrangements of his providence, whereby the needful events fall out at the very time and in the very way required. When the question is asked—How does God answer prayer? we give the very same reply:—It is by the preordained appointment of God, when he settled the constitution of the world, and set all its parts in order."†

The doctrine of "preëstablished harmony" was the invention of Leibnitz. It originated from the denial of the possibility of mind and matter mutually influencing each other. Hence he supposed the soul to be incapable of acquiring any information through the bodily senses; or that the body is at all influenced or controlled by the powers of the soul. But the soul and body are mutually adapted to each other, in such a way, that while the body, under the operation of merely physical causes, enacts its part in the drama of life, the soul evolves from within a series of states and a continuous consciousness which precisely correspond with the cotemporaneous states and condition of the body,—a panorama being, as it were, unfolded within, to the recognition of the intellect, *pari passu* with the development of the corresponding phenomena in the body and external nature. In this respect man is a microcosm—the harmony thus instituted between body and soul

* McCosh, p. 190. † Ibid., p. 233.

being typical of what is universal throughout the creation. Thus men "perceive what passes without them, by what passes within them, answering to the things without; in virtue of the harmony which God has preëstablished, by the most beautiful and the most admirable of all his productions; whereby every simple substance is by its nature, if one may so say, a concentration and a living mirror of the universe, according to its point of view."* This theory was, in the then condition of science and philosophy, a monument of the learning and ability of its illustrious author, who carefully guards against the error into which McCosh has fallen. It being objected to his doctrine, that it would bring the whole economy of grace, the mysteries of revelation, the incarnation and work of the Son of God, the influences of the Holy Spirit, and the special interventions of the Father, within the province of natural laws, and the instrumentality of second causes, Leibnitz replies, that "God, by supernatural influences, supplies natural defects; and so succours the soul by his grace, that it accomplishes what by natural powers it could not do. Since, then, God from the beginning purposed to bestow these special favours upon his creatures, he made things so that in the natural world all results should so present themselves as to correspond with these effects in the kingdom of grace. And wherever the forces with which the creatures are invested are not sufficient to this, he provides by miracle that which may serve to keep up the parallel; the operations which belong to the kingdom of grace being included in the nexus of things, not excluded from it."† In another place he remarks, that "when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace."‡ These positions, however they fall short of the whole truth on the subject, are much less exceptionable than those of McCosh. The one provides a margin of indefinite extent for the interposition of the hand of

* Leibnitz, in his Letters to Clarke, p. 241.

† Leibnitii Tentamina Theodicææ, Part I. § 64, note. Of miracles he distinguishes two classes, viz. such wonders as are wrought by the ministration of angels; and miracles proper, to which nothing short of omnipotence is adequate. Correspondence with Clarke, p. 113.

‡ Correspondence with Clarke, p. 3.

God. The other limits it to the single case of attesting revelation.

We confess this view is to us very meagre and unsatisfactory. When carefully examined it does not seem to differ essentially from the philosophy of deism, unless it be in recognizing a more complex disposition of the powers of nature at the first, and a more special regard for each particular result of that complex organization. What we regard as the radical error of this theory is in respect to the specific office to which creation was constructed. It is assumed that such is that office that the admission of the hand of God, in the exercise of an immediate agency, would imply a discovery of imperfection in the structure of nature. "The fitting of the various parts of the machinery is so nice, that there is no need of any interference with it." A class of miracles is indeed excepted, but all else is subjected to the exclusive disposition of second causes. But if the nature of the system be such, that the interposition of God's immediate agency would imply a defect in it, the assumption is as fatal to the admission of any sort of miracle, as of any other interposition whatever.

In fact, if we are to understand the phrase "divine revelation" in any such restricted sense as the argument of our author requires, the suggestion that the sole or chief office of miraculous interpositions is to attest particular communications from God, implies an exceedingly defective conception of their true significance. Whilst it is a fact that miracles have served to attest divine revelations, it is equally true and of as great significance, that to the greater part of the human family the order is reversed, and it is the Scriptures which attest the miracles. Many indeed of the most sublime and signal miracles which the world has ever witnessed, were wrought ages before the oldest book of Scripture was written; and whatever purpose they may have served in attesting communications from God to the contemporary populations of the earth, they could not, in the nature of the case, fulfil such an office, to the subsequent generations; to whom they have been made known, through the revelation of the Holy Spirit. Such—to omit all that respects the immediate family of Adam—was the translation of Enoch—the deluge—the confusion of tongues—the

destruction of the cities of the plain—and the various miraculous events in the lives of the patriarchs. So far from filling the subordinate office of mere attestation to particular revelations, miracles constitute, in and of themselves, a revelation the most interesting and important, and which is fundamental to every other. They testify unequivocally to the very fact which our author denies—that the omnipotent God exercises a direct and personal providence over all his works; in which he employs second causes, when he sees good; but is always and altogether unrestricted by them;—and whether acting in them or aside from them, puts forth his own power in an influence which is intimate, immediate and all-pervasive. Such was the principle to which the youth David attributes his victory over Goliath. 1 Sam. xvii. 46. To it Joshua refers the wonders wrought for Israel in Egypt and the wilderness—"that all the people of the earth might know the hand of the Lord, that it is mighty." Josh. iv. 24. Such was the plea of Hezekiah, in answer to which the angel of the Lord smote in the camp of the Assyrians, an hundred fourscore and five thousand—"O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord God, even thou only." 2 Kings xix. 19. And for this purpose was the proud king of Babylon driven forth among the beasts;—"until thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will." Dan. iv. 32.

The original system and structure of nature was unquestionably perfect. But to what office? Certainly not to work out its own results, to the exclusion of the agency of its Author. Creation is not a great clock, wound up at the first, and then left to tell off its fated periods, minute and great; but a vast and complicated instrument, perfect in all its parts, symmetrical and harmonious in the multiform play of its various forces; each of which has an energy of its own; but all are inspected by the watchful eye, and ruled and guided by the immediate hand of the omnipresent Creator. By his agency, governing and controlling all those powers, and modifying the motions by his omnipotent will, in a way of perfect harmony with the structure of the several parts, and order of the whole—all is made

to conform, in a system of manifold wisdom and goodness, to the accomplishment of his purposes of grace and glory. "Of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen." Rom. xi. 36.

Viewed in any other light, miracles are altogether anomalous; conveying the unworthy imputation that the Creator has been reduced by unforeseen contingencies, to the alternative of failure in his designs, or of turning aside the actual tendency of events by violence, and forcing them into such channels as will suit his plans. Hence the infidel's false and insidious definition of a miracle—"a violation of the laws of nature." On the contrary, when we view the whole scheme of creation and providence, as framed with the one object of providing instruments, in the use of which the Creator may actively reveal the glory of his various attributes, all such unworthy conceptions vanish. The laws of nature show themselves fully adapted to accomplish the part for which they were designed—flowing on in undisturbed current to the final consummation; whilst, gliding harmoniously into their channel, and mingling in the common tide, special providences and miracles occur, to give a voice to all, and testify in living tones to the hearts of men, that He whom sun, moon, and stars proclaim, is not the Fate of Epicurus, rolling on in undeviating course, crushing all beneath its iron wheel—no blind abstraction enthroned in heartless severance from human cares and sympathies; but a living, active, personal providence, the lord and life of all; and though unapprehended by sense, still very near to every one of us. Creation, viewed apart, presents a noble form—a structure, the contemplation of which is suited to exalt the soul, filling its expanding capacities with sublime and amazing conceptions. But still, it is, like some piece from the chisel of a Phidias, a study of delight to the artist; but marble, cold and lifeless, mocking the expectant ear with its silence, and tiring the eager eye with its lofty but unchanging look. But as we gaze in trembling awe—as with beating hearts we behold the tremendous train rolling on for ever and for ever, in headlong, resistless, hopeless career—as we begin to hear the ensnaring whispers of atheistic unbelief, and ask ourselves whether creation itself be not a living thing, a very God, we are recalled from such false and fatal specula-

tions. There is a sudden pause, without confusion or jar! The sun, which, from the birthday of man, had continually swept across the heavens, in his seemingly fated and unending course, rests from his career on Gibeon; and the moon, in the valley of Ajalon. We behold again, whilst insatiate death sees his bars of steel burst asunder, and his victims set free. Foul diseases fly the touch of sharers of flesh; and even the insensate elements listen, and obey their voice! As we witness these things, and observe their occasion, nature to our ears acquires speech; the lifeless marble becomes warm with vital heat, and in sublimest and soul-moving accents, her voice proclaims, that the God who made all things, governs all things still, and can even condescend to man;—that his gracious providence is active in our low affairs; that "this God is our God for ever and ever, and will be our guide even unto death."

So, in the communication to us of the Scriptures; in the incarnation and work of Christ; in the controlling, the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit—in all these have we illustrations of the habitual and immediate intervention of God with his works, as constituting a clearly marked and most conspicuous feature of his government. These cannot therefore be inconsistent with, but constitute a cardinal element in, the original plan—a feature in its perfection.

Further, we may not forget that there are other created powers in the universe, beside laws and physical causes. The angels—"Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth, to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" Heb. i. 14. On the other hand—Satan and his angels—"The prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." Eph. ii. 2. These all are agencies most potent, and produce effects most important, not only moral but physical, as is seen in the afflictions of Job, (Job i. 12, 16, 19,) and the temptation of the Son of God. Mat. iv. 5, 8. And above all these is the Spirit of God, ruling over the powers of men and devils; making their wrath to praise him, and restraining the remainder thereof; working in men's hearts—the righteous and the wicked—both to will and to do of his good pleasure.

So completely has this method of immediate interposition characterized the whole history of the government of the world,

that so far as man is concerned, there are absolutely no results which first and last flow from the pure and unmixed operation of second causes. In one form or other the agency of God's own hand has entered into and modifies everything. There is no event of which we may not truly say, in this special sense, "this is the finger of God."

Nor may we limit the sovereignty of God to the modes of intervention which have been already named. These attest that he does not stand an idle spectator, but actively interposes his immediate agency in the government of his creation. And the Scriptures abundantly testify that these are but examples and illustrations of the whole policy of his administration;—that he is no more really present in his sovereign power, in those amazing displays of omnipotence and majesty, in the presence of which the earth trembles, and the mountains are shaken, than in that ordinary providence, by which "he worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." Eph. i. 11. In fact, no doctrine is more constantly and emphatically taught in the Scriptures, than that of a particular providence, exercised by the immediate hand of God. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered." Matt. x. 29, 30. "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil; I the Lord do all these things." Isa. xlv. 7. "O Lord, thou hast searched me and known me. Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising; thou understandest my thought afar off; thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my tongue, but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me." Psalm cxxxix. 1–5. "He giveth to all, life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. For in him we live and move and have our being." Acts xvii. 25–27. "The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them." Psalm xxxiv. 7. "God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble." Psalm xlvi. 1.

Such are the assurances on which faith relies—the pledges to which prayer appeals. To say that such places only mean to teach that the frame of nature was so constructed at the beginning, as mechanically to work out provision for the case of the afflicted, is to deny the express terms of the assurances often repeated, and attested by the Spirit in the believer's heart. It is to mock his hunger with ashes. Not mere escape does he want. Not mere conscious security does he seek. But he seeks covert in the bosom of a present God—a living, active, loving protector. Such a refuge the Holy Spirit offers in the word. Such a refuge the Comforter within persuades him to expect. The alternative is the atheism of contradicting these testimonies—or the admission that God does exert a constant and immediate agency in all events—a special and sovereign providence over all things.

McCosh has well observed, that the system of God's government is so ordered, that whilst in certain departments the whole arrangement is regular and unvarying, and the results therefore easily anticipated; on the other hand, there are departments in which the causes that operate are so numerous and inscrutable, and their action so complex, that all appears fortuitous; and the precise results are beyond the utmost human penetration to anticipate. This uncertainty is more especially exhibited in those departments which bear the closest relation to man. The design of this feature, McCosh supposes to be, to render man more dependent on the providence of God.* Whilst we acquiesce in this interpretation, we take a much higher view of the providence upon which man is thus dependent, than does our author.

In viewing the subjects of the providential government, all are naturally resolved into two elements—the one comprehending the whole material system, the worlds, and the lower orders of creation, which, in all its extent, constitutes the stage and its furniture, upon which the scenes of divine providence are enacted, rather than the proper subjects of that providence. The general characteristics here, are uniformity and permanence. The other element comprehends the moral universe,

* McCosh, pp. 170, 240.

constituting the subjects of God's government, the objects for whom, in subserviency to the divine glory, the material system was created. The moral system, again, is subdivided into the two classes of men in the flesh, and disembodied spirits, human and angelic. In the general government of the material system, the reign of mere natural law would seem to be undisturbed and universal, except at points where the system is implicated in more or less intimate connection with the intellectual and moral world. The great masses belonging to this system are uniform in their motions, and their phenomena unvarying through successive cycles. In the animal kingdom too, this uniformity is marked; although, placed as they are at the portals of the moral world, endowed with a measure of intelligence, which constitutes them harbingers of the higher system, and related to man in an intimate subordination to his authority, and identity in his relations to God's government, they realize something of the vicissitude which is characteristic of his condition. But the instant we enter the moral world, we find ourselves surrounded by evidences of a dispensation operating upon entirely other principles. The difference in the system of government is as essential and as great, as is that between the nature of the unconscious clod and of the seraphic intelligence. In the one world the bond of allegiance to the Creator's throne is that of physical laws, and through these is the government of that system dispensed. In the other, the bond is that of moral law, addressed to the reason, attested by conscience, and claiming the allegiance of the will. The government in this system is conducted by the agency of Jehovah, in a manner which is continually more and more intimate and immediate, as we ascend the scale of moral being. Whilst men in their native state, apostate from God, are left in a great measure slaves to earth's vicissitudes, and the to them uncertain operation of nature's physical laws, the child of God constantly realizes increasing evidence of the habitual interposition of God in his behalf; and anticipates with joy the time when he will be emancipated altogether from the bondage of physical causes, in the immediate presence of Him, of whom he exultingly cries, "All my springs are in thee!" and experience for ever the dispensa-

tion of infinite love, from the immediate hands of infinite Wisdom and Power.

The field of inquiry at which we have thus glanced, would richly repay an extended survey. We can only at present suggest the conclusions bearing upon our present subject, which seem to flow alike from all the facts that are accessible, and from the whole tenor of the Scriptures. These are,—that the two spheres of divine operation, the physical and the moral, are to be carefully distinguished from each other, in searching out the manner of God's government;—that the principle of administration, in the one, is by physical causes; in the other, by immediate dispensation;—that whilst in the mere material universe the operation of physical causes seems to be universal and exclusive, and in the world of spirits the divine administration is immediate, our world, as the abode of spirits clothed in flesh, and fallen, is the scene of a complicated dispensation, in which the ordinary operation of physical causes, and mediate instrumentality, is modified by continual interpositions of the divine hand—interpositions growing in frequency and demonstration, in proportion as he who is their subject draws nearer, and is qualified for the realm of light in God's immediate presence. We would, therefore, modify the statement above quoted, as to the final cause of the growing complexity and inscrutability of the operation of second causes, which is observable as we approach the immediate sphere of man's existence; and regard this, as designed indeed to induce an entire dependence upon God's providential hand; but as a condition of things necessarily incident to such a mixed dispensation as that under which man is at present governed.

In regard to the manner of the ordinary dispensation of this providential government, in its details, there are several things to be observed, at which we can but glance.

1. God is everywhere and immediately present among his creatures, "upholding all things by the word of his power." Heb. i. 3. Two opposite ideas are here to be avoided; to wit—the attributing of independent existence to the creatures; and the supposition that their necessary dependence militates against the reality of a continuous existence and identity in them. The supposition of a delegated self-existence is a contradiction in

terms; and hence of necessity, the creatures must be dependent each instant, upon the power of the Creator, for the instant's continuance in being. Not only so, but the finite being, the springs of whose continued existence were in itself, would seem to be endowed with power to put off that existence. How gladly would the devils plunge into the gulf of annihilation! But they for ever live, because the omnipotent God, in justice, for ever says to them—Live, to endure the curse! On the other hand, the existence which is thus momentarily enjoyed at the will of Omnipotence, is not the result of a succession of new creative acts. Logically the two ideas—that of a continued existence sustained by God, and that of a perpetual series of new and transient creations, of the same form and character, and sustaining the same relations—are altogether distinct, and cannot by any process be reduced to identity. Morally the latter breaks up all ties of relation between the creatures, and of them toward God; and reduces the universe to an unreal phantasm. Scripturally this conception has no countenance, but is utterly ignored; and, on the contrary, God's upholding power, sustaining the creatures in a really continuous existence, is constantly asserted. This upholding agency has regard both to the material and spiritual creation, every part of which alike has its being in God. The following points have more immediate respect to man.

2. In all men the Holy Spirit exerts a continually restraining energy, so as to keep their corruptions, as well as all their powers, within the bounds which he has appointed, for his own holy purposes. Man having so departed from God, as to be altogether disinclined to reverence or love him, or to obey his laws, all bonds of moral restraint are broken; and the only reason why men, thus lost to holy motives, are not rivals in wickedness to the lost inhabitants of hell, is that God in mercy, by his providence and Spirit, puts a restraint upon their native corruptions; allowing them to flow out so far as may serve to accomplish his holy purposes; but otherwise holding them under his omnipotent restraint. Hence the language of the Psalmist: "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Psalm lxxvi. 10. In this fact we have the key to Paul's statement, that "whom he will he

hardeneth." Rom. ix. 18. By relaxing the bonds, and allowing corruption to flow, he permits the heart to grow hard, and the conscience to become seared.

3. Even where there is not an absolute restraint put upon the corruptions, the natural impulses and dispositions of men, they are so limited that they may take no other than that direction which will fulfil the divine purposes. Thus in the case of the hostility of the brethren of Joseph, they were restrained from putting him to death, but left to sell him into Egypt; so bringing to pass the very thing which they were endeavouring to prevent; so that Joseph truly says, "It was not you that sent me hither, but God." Gen. xlv. 8. The rulers of Israel were thus restrained in regard to the murder of the Son of God, so that they who were continually breaking out into factions, and imbruing their hands in blood,—they who but a short time after stoned Stephen, come to Pilate, and urge the execution of Christ by the governor, with the plea that it was not lawful for them to put any man to death. But this came to pass that the Scriptures might be fulfilled, that thus it should be;—his body must be lifted up from the earth as a curse, and his blood must flow as a sacrifice; two circumstances which did not meet in any Jewish mode of execution. The feature of the divine administration here pointed out, solves the difficulty that is sometimes apprehended in such places as that of Peter: "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Acts ii. 23. God gave not nor stimulated wrong dispositions in the actors in that atrocious scene; nor did he give a bare permission; "but such as had joined with it, a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends, yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceeded only from the creature, and not from God."

4. A controlling influence of a somewhat different kind is illustrated in the sixth chapter of the book of Esther. Sleep is withheld from the king, and his wakeful thoughts are led to the records of his reign; the reading of which gives occasion to the honouring of Mordecai, and the defeat of all the plans of Haman. Essentially similar in its nature was the influence

exerted on the minds of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, inducing their prophetic dreams, which were interpreted by Joseph and Daniel. Thus it is evident that God can and does exert a direct influence over the minds of men, even the ungodly, inducing thoughts suited to the accomplishing of his purposes. "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will." Prov. xxi. 1.

5. On the other hand, in all holy exercises and right actions, the immediate power of the Holy Spirit is active, creating right affections, and leading and impelling his people to do such things as are in accordance with God's holy will; so that whilst on the one hand, the liberty of the agent is not taken away, but he is freed from his previous bondage to corruption and sin, and by the exercise of his natural faculties, "worketh out his own salvation with fear and trembling;" on the other hand, as to the real efficiency and power, "it is God that worketh in him, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Phil. ii. 12, 13. It is to this, especially, that the apostle James refers, when—declaring that we are not tempted of God, but of our own corruptions—he on the contrary adds, that "Every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." James i. 17.

6. Besides these modes of operation in the ordinary providence of God, who shall forbid, that in many ways, untraceable by us, but adoringly witnessed by blessed spirits, the immediate power of God should interpose in human affairs? We are persuaded that the whole analogy of his government, and the tone of the entire Scriptures, lead directly to this conclusion. We are confident that we express but the common experience and the common sentiment of his people—those with whom is "the secret of the Lord"—in declaring our conviction, that in multitudes of instances they are indebted to a fatherly care, and an almighty hand, which, concealed from carnal observation, but recognized by faith, dispenses blessings, which the natural action of second causes would never have conveyed.

The government of God, thus variously administered, is universal in its dominion, and constant in its exercise—it has respect to the most minute, as well as the greatest results; and is absolute in its sway. It is not a mere influence, but a

power. On the one hand, omnipotent to arrest the sun in its course; to loose the fountains of waters; or to command the sea back to its appointed place;—on the other, it with equal sovereignty rules the will of men and devils. To assert man's will to be of such a nature as to be necessarily independent of God, is to say, that he, in making it for his own purposes, placed it beyond his own power. To say that it cannot be subject to an effectual control, without destroying its moral agency, is to pretend to have fathomed all its depths, and measured the whole extent and nature of its relations to the creative hand;—it is to assume that there cannot be in the soul any susceptibilities, accessible even to the power of its Maker, outside the sphere of its self-conscious activity—which is most absurd. To deny that God can rule the creature he has made as it is, endowed with attributes bestowed by him, is to limit God—which is atheism.

In short, the universe was framed to reveal the very truth concerning the nature of that God who is everywhere and ever present, the sovereign of all, essentially active, and infinitely wise, kind and good. This it does, not by presenting him, once active in creation, and then for ever quiescent;—once sovereign in decreeing the order of creation, and the events of providence, and then for ever an inactive spectator;—once present with his creatures, in giving them existence and attributes, and then for ever withdrawn within himself;—once, in the beginning, exhausting the stores of his beneficence, and then for ever ceasing to bestow. Such is not the God of the Bible, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the glorious Worker whom nature proclaims. The creatures were formed with two objects, to be witnesses of the divine glory, and to be subjects in whom it should have display. As finite, they could not apprehend the glory of God, or perceive his activity, except as displayed upon finite things. Hence, in this aspect of it, the creation; presenting, on the one hand, an expanse vast enough, alike in physical and moral dimensions, to exhaust the loftiest created powers; and on the other, in its details, stooping to the reach of the meanest capacity. Again, in but two ways could our infirmity trace the working, and in it, the glory of God, in the universe thus created—as he works *through* the creatures, that is,

by the mediation of second causes, and as he acts *upon* them, by his own immediate power. The uniformity of the one mode of operation is requisite alike to the happiness of the creatures, and the revelation of the wisdom and unchangeableness of the Creator. The speciality of the other is as necessary and important, both to the creatures, and to the revelation of the living God. By this mode is it made known that it is God, and not nature, that ruleth; and that everywhere and in all things, he is—the ever present, ever active, ever sovereign and gracious God. Said the Saviour, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." John v. 17. The attempt to ignore his immediate agency in the orderings of special providences, out of respect to the orderly working of the laws of nature, is as unphilosophical and unscriptural, as is the denial of second causes, and the reference of all things to God, as not only the first, but the only cause. "God in his ordinary providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at his pleasure." In all it is the same God. In all he works with equal and absolute sovereignty. In all he is most holy and good. In all there is the most perfect harmony, and concurrence to the wise and holy designs. In the interpositions of his own hand he does no violence to the laws and order of nature, which he himself has ordained. In the procession of second causes and ordinary providence, he does not preclude, but anticipate and provide for the immediate exertions of his power. In each are unfolded alike the harmonious elements of the perfect plan, which, formed in the beginning, shall be displayed in the amazing glory of the whole results, at the consummation of all things, to the unspeakable blessedness of his saints, and the infinite honour of their wonderful God.

ART. VII.—*The Tecnobaptist:* A Discourse, wherein an honest Baptist, by a course of argument to which no honest Baptist can object, is convinced that Infant Christians are proper subjects of Christian Baptism. By R. B. MAYES. Boston: Printed by John Wilson & Son, 22 School street. 1857. pp. 172.

THIS is a piratical little book. It sails under false colours. It purports to be an argument in support of infant baptism. It is in fact an argument against it. The reader is not prepared for a trope on a title-page. He presumes that the word infant is used in its literal sense, and that "infant Christians" means children born within the pale of the Christian Church. He takes up the book, therefore, under the impression that he is about to read the process of argument by which a Baptist was converted into a Pedobaptist. Every thing favours this impression. The book is a colloquy. The interlocutors are Mr. A., an Episcopalian; Mr. C., a Presbyterian; and Mr. B., a Baptist. Mr. B. allows Messrs. A. and C. to have everything their own way. They begin the argument; lay down the premises; and draw the conclusions. Mr. B. seems to be entirely at their mercy. He lies still, as Napoleon did at Austerlitz, and permits his adversaries to gather their forces all round him, and to feel sure of victory. All at once the scene changes. Mr. B. takes things into his own hands. Admits the premises of his opponents, as he has allowed them to be stated, and then runs them into all manner of contradictions and confusion. Poor Mr. A. particularly is made to flounder ridiculously in very shallow water. Mr. B. acknowledges himself to be in favour of infant baptism, but by infant, he means a babe in Christ. He is the advocate of the baptism of those born of the Spirit, as soon as they give satisfactory evidence of regeneration. The maxim that all things are fair in war, our author has transferred to polemics, and he has certainly outmanœuvred his antagonists, and gained over them not only a complete, but an easy triumph. It is, however, hardly fair thus to mystify his Pedobaptist readers. They open their lips for a bonbon,

and he inserts a lump of aloes. The consequence is that the aloes is rejected with an emphasis which an honest pill would not have provoked. We do not think that our author has gained much by his ruse. It must be admitted, however, that the thing is well done. The book is very adroitly written, and is the best Baptist argument we are acquainted with. We do not propose to review it in detail. The principles involved in the discussion may all be presented, as we hope, more effectively, by avoiding the specialities of refutation. The whole of the author's argument is condensed in the following statement, to be found on page 93.

"*In the Old Testament Church.* 1. The carnal descendants of Abraham were the chosen people of God. 2. The carnal descendants were begotten with carnal and corruptible seed. 3. The carnal descendants were carnally generated, and entered the kingdom of God, or the Church, by a carnal birth. 4. The outward sign of membership was circumcision, a carnal ordinance, performed by cutting the flesh of the subject. 5. The carnal descendants were required to be circumcised not before nor at, but after, their carnal birth.

"*In the New Testament Church.* 1. The spiritual descendants of Abraham are the chosen people of God. 2. The spiritual descendants are begotten with spiritual and incorruptible seed. 3. The spiritual descendants are spiritually regenerated, and enter the kingdom of God, or the Church, by a spiritual birth. 4. The outward sign of membership is baptism, performed with water, which you believe to be an emblem of the Spirit. 5. The spiritual descendants should be baptized, not before nor at, but after, their spiritual birth."

In other words, under the old dispensation, the Church was an external society, and the condition of membership was natural descent from Abraham; whereas, under the new dispensation, the Church is a spiritual society, and the condition of membership is regeneration. In the Hebrew Church those born after the flesh were the proper subjects of circumcision. In the Christian Church, those born after the Spirit are the proper subjects of baptism. Every thing, it will be seen, in this argument depends on the idea of the Church, and on the conditions of church membership.

It is obvious that men can understand neither themselves nor others, on this subject, unless they agree in the meaning of the terms which they employ. The flaw in the preceding argument, the vitiating mistake in the whole theory of the Baptist is, that although right in his idea of the Church, he is wrong in his idea of Church membership. In other words, he confounds two entirely distinct questions, first, What is the Church? and, second, Whom are we bound to regard and treat as church members? We admit that the Church, considered as the body of Christ, consists of the regenerated. No man can be a member of Christ's body who is not a partaker of his life, and governed by his Spirit. But does it thence follow that we are bound not to recognize or treat any as members of the Church who are not born of the Spirit? Because it is true that no man is a Christian who does not believe Christ's doctrines and obey his commands, are we therefore to recognize and treat no man as a Christian who has not true faith, and is not obedient in heart and life? No man, says the apostle, is a Jew, who is not a true worshipper of God. But did it follow that none were to be recognized and treated as Jews but such as were Jews inwardly, and had experienced the circumcision of the heart? It is a sheer impossibility to carry out the principle of treating men according to their state in the sight of God. We must recognize many as Christians who are not real Christians; we must regard and treat as Church members many who are not the members of the body of Christ. In other words we must recognize the distinction between the Church visible and invisible, between the nominal and the real, between the true and the professed followers of the Lord. The whole argument of the Baptist is, that the Church under the new dispensation is a spiritual body, consisting of true believers, therefore none can be members of the Church but those who being regenerated by the Holy Ghost believe in Christ, and none can be properly regarded as members of the Church who do not give satisfactory evidence of regeneration. But as infants, whether capable of regeneration or not, cannot give evidence of being renewed by the Spirit, or profess faith in Christ, they cannot properly be regarded as members of the Church. And as baptism, being

the sign and seal of the covenant of grace, is the recognition of Church membership, children are not the proper subjects of baptism.

On the other hand, the great body of Christians, (in their confessions of faith,) and especially the great body of Protestants teach: 1. That the Church consists essentially of the true people of God, i. e. of all who have been, or who shall hereafter be, gathered into the fold of Christ, and made partakers of his salvation. 2. That since God has not given to men the power to read the heart, he has not imposed on his people the obligation to sit in judgment on the regeneration of their fellow-men. Consequently, we not only are not required, but we are not allowed, to demand evidence of regeneration satisfactory to ourselves, as the condition of church membership. In other words, Christ has not committed to men the impossible task of making a church which shall consist exclusively of the regenerate. He requires us to recognize as Christians all those who, having competent knowledge, profess their faith in him, and are free from scandal. No matter how well satisfied we may be in our own minds, that a man has not been really renewed by the Holy Ghost, we have no right either to refuse to receive him as a member of the Church, or to exclude him from it after such recognition, if he possesses the qualifications above-mentioned. This is not only a matter of divine command, but of inevitable necessity. Every Church on earth acts on this principle; that is, it receives to its communion, or retains in it, many who in its own judgment are not the true children of God. The task of separating the tares from the wheat, which the Master has reserved to himself, willing as many have been to undertake, all have been obliged practically to abandon. Such being both the law of Christ, and the necessity of the case, it of course follows, that while in the sight of God no men are true Christians but the regenerate, and no men are really members of the Church, which is Christ's body, but true believers, yet we are obliged to regard and treat as Christians, or as members of the Church, multitudes who are unrenewed in heart. Hence the unavoidable distinction between the Church visible and invisible, between those who are members of the Church in the sight of God, and those who are members in the sight of man.

It is therefore part of the faith or practice of all Christendom, that although regeneration is an essential condition of church membership in the sight of God, (i. e. no unrenewed person is an actual member of the Church in his sight,) yet it is not the condition of church membership in the sight of men. That is, we are bound to regard and treat as members of the Church, many who are not truly regenerate. 3. It is also part of the general faith of Christendom, that as we are required to regard many unrenewed adults as members of the Church, so we are bound to regard and treat the children of believing parents as members of the Church, although we do not know whether they are renewed or unrenewed.

When, therefore, it is asked, Who constitute the Church in the sight of God? we answer, The true people of God. When asked, Who constitute the Church in the sight of man? we answer, The professors of the true religion, together with their children. When asked, What is the condition of actual church membership in the sight of God? we answer, Regeneration, or the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. If asked, What is the condition of church membership in the sight of man? we answer, The credible profession of the true religion, or the filial relation to a parent who professes the true religion. The meaning of the last question is, Whom are we bound to regard and treat as members of the Church? For, to be a member of the Church in the sight of men, is to have the recognized right to be regarded and treated as such. A citizen of a country is one whose right to the privileges of citizen is duly recognized; and a member of the Church is one whose right to be so regarded and treated is duly recognized. When, therefore, we assert the church membership of the infants of believing parents, we do not assert their regeneration, or that they are true members of Christ's body; we only assert that they belong to the class of persons whom we are bound to regard and treat as members of Christ's Church. This is the only sense in which even adults are members of the Church, so far as men are concerned. When we say that any man is a member of the Episcopal, or Methodist, or Baptist Church, we mean that he has a right to be so regarded and treated, and is in fact so regarded and treated by his fellow-men. How he stands in the sight of God is a

different question. That is a point we are not capable of deciding.

It is easy to see, in the light of these elementary principles, the fallacy of the common argument of our Baptist friends against the church membership of infants. They say that because regeneration, or saving union with Christ, the condition of actual church membership in the sight of God, therefore children who cannot give evidence of such regeneration, are not to be regarded or treated as church members. But we are required to treat as members of the Church, many who are not regenerated. We constantly do it; we must do it, because we cannot avoid it. It is absurd to say, that because we cannot know that an infant is renewed, therefore he cannot be baptized. As it is undeniable that God never intended that the visible Church on earth should consist exclusively of the regenerated; as from the first he permitted and intended to permit tares to grow with the wheat until the harvest; as, in other words, he has always required his people to recognize as church members, many who were not really united to Christ, the only question is, Has he required us so to regard and treat the infants of believing parents? It will be seen that the question whether such infants are regenerate, has nothing to do with the controversy. Actual regeneration is not a *sine qua non* for membership in the visible Church. This is an undeniable proposition; for there is not a Baptist or a Brownist on earth who does not admit that there are unrenewed persons in the visible Church, who must be regarded and treated as members. The only question is, Are we bound by the command of God so to regard the infants of believing parents? All Christendom (Baptists excepted) answer this question in the affirmative, and answer it in such a way as to show that the answer comes from the heart. The reasons for this answer are substantially the following.

1. The intimate relation between children and parents. They are not only partakers of the same nature, but the child is of the very substance of the parents, bone of their bone, and flesh of their flesh. The life of the one is continued in the other. This natural bond is the ground of the instinctive natural affection, which on the part of the parent is one of the strongest

elements of our nature. There is moreover the bond of common interest. The destiny of the child is involved in that of the parent. The parent is responsible for the child, and the child is dependent on the parent. It is in virtue of this intimate relationship that, by the will of God, and the very nature of human society, the act of the parent is, in a multitude of cases, the act of the child. If the father becomes a citizen of a country, he makes his children citizens. If he turns Jew or Mohammedan, his infant children are included in the change. This is unavoidable. It arises out of the very nature of the parental relation. All the analogies of human society, therefore, are in favour of the doctrine, that when a parent becomes a Christian, his infant children are to be regarded as Christians. If this ought not to be done, it must be for some specific reason, making this an exception to all analogous cases. There is, however, no such reason. The fact that the child cannot understand what it is to be a Christian, cannot profess the Christian faith, nor give evidence of Christian character, is nothing peculiar. All this may be said in similar cases. When a foreigner becomes a citizen of this country, his children becomes citizens also, although they cannot understand our political system, nor make any profession of fidelity to our government. The parent is recognized as having the right in such cases to act for his child, and it is assumed, or presumed, or taken for granted, that the child will ratify the act of the parent. In like manner when a man becomes a Christian, when he lays hold of the covenant of grace for himself, his children are to be regarded as doing the same thing. He has a right to represent them and act for them. And it is to be assumed, or presumed, until the contrary appears, that the children are included in his act. At any rate they are to be so regarded and treated, until they become old enough to act for themselves. This was the law of God under the old dispensation. When any foreigner became a Jew, his children became Jews. Exodus xii. 48. They were included in the covenant embraced by the father. It was not a mere external political relation, but a spiritual or religious one, which was thus assumed for the child. He came under covenant obligations to adopt the Jewish religion, to acknowledge Jehovah to be the

only true God, and to obey the law, and trust the promises of Moses and the prophets. All this was included in becoming a Jew, and all this was done, by divine command, whenever a gentile having minor children embraced the religion of the Jews. The church membership of the infants of believing parents is, therefore, in accordance with the analogy of all human social institutions, and is sanctioned by the approbation and command of God. It is founded on the intimate relationship between the parent and child, which, from the will of God and the constitution of our nature, makes the parent the representative of the child, authorized to enter into covenant with God and man in its behalf. Our Baptist friends are wont to object to this argument, that a man may join a masonic lodge and not thereby make his infant children freemasons. This is true, and it shows that a child stands in a very different relation to freemasonry, from that which it sustains to the plan of salvation. The parent acts for the child, only where the act of the former of necessity determines the relations and obligations of the latter. Man is a social and religious being by the constitution of his nature. He must be the subject of civil and religious relations and obligations. During infancy he cannot determine these relations for himself. They must of necessity be determined for him by his parents. By becoming an English citizen, a man makes his infant children the subjects of the English crown, entitled to the protection and privileges, and burdened with the obligations of English citizenship. There is no analogy between this case and a parent joining the army or navy, or entering a masonic lodge, because there is nothing in the nature of a child which makes it necessary for him to belong to some army, or navy, or to be a member of some masonic fraternity. He must, however, be a citizen of some country, and he must have some religion. As the father chooses for the child his country, so he chooses for him his religion. This is a matter, so to speak, of necessity, both by the law of God, and the constitution of society. The Baptist doctrine, therefore, that a man in becoming a Christian, or entering the Christian Church, does not thereby make his children Christians, is opposed to all the analogies of political and religious life. No wonder that the Baptists stand alone in the vast field, not of

Christendom only, but of humanity. So wide is the application of the principle that children are included in their parents, and enter with them in the civil or religious relations which they assume, that an eloquent Irish Episcopal minister exclaimed, "There are but two places into the whole universe of God from which infants are excluded. The one is hell; the other is the Baptist Church." There must be something wrong in a doctrine which leads to such a violation of all analogies human and divine.

2. In all covenants which God has ever formed with men, their children have always been included. The covenant made with Adam was not only for himself, but for all his posterity descending from him by ordinary generation. Without their assent or consent, and even without the possibility of their knowledge and coöperation, he was constituted their federal head and representative, authorized to decide for them their character and destiny. His choice was regarded as their choice. It is a plain historical fact, that his apostacy was the apostacy of his race. When God entered into covenant with his Eternal Son, as the representative of his people, it was without their assent or consent, knowledge or coöperation. And yet they, in virtue of that covenant, are made partakers of all the benefits of redemption. And Christ will stand at last before the throne of God and say, "Behold, I and the children whom thou hast given me." The covenant with Abraham included all his natural descendants in the line of Isaac and Jacob. When Abraham embraced the promise and received in his own person the seal of the covenant, all connected with him and represented by him were included in the compact. When God renewed at Mount Sinai the covenant with the chosen people, and made the law of Moses the law of the covenant between him and them, it was not with those of adult age only, but also with their little ones. Exodus xix. and xx.; Deut. v. and Deut. xxix. 9–13. "Keep therefore the words of this covenant and do them, that ye may prosper in all that ye do. Ye stand here this day, all of you, before the Lord your God, your captains of tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood, unto the drawer of thy water;

that thou shouldest enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day; that he may establish thee to-day for a people unto himself, and that he may be unto thee a God, as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob." The fundamental law of this covenant was the Decalogue. "The Lord our God," says Moses, "made a covenant with us in Horeb . . . saying, I am the Lord thy God which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image," &c. The whole people, therefore, the adults for themselves, the parents for their children, and masters for their servants, entered into a solemn covenant with God, in which he promised to be their God, and they promised to be his people; to have no other God but Jehovah; to make no graven image to bow down to or worship; to keep holy the Sabbath; to honour their fathers and mothers; to do no murder; not to commit adultery; not to steal; not to bear false witness; and not to covet. In this solemn transaction parents acted for their children, as they again were to act for theirs, from generation to generation. The parent made for the child a profession of faith, and a promise of obedience. He introduced his child into the covenant which he himself embraced, and circumcision, the seal of that covenant, was therefore enjoined to be administered to children. The principle, therefore, which lies at the foundation of infant baptism, and which renders it obligatory upon all Christian parents, is here solemnly recognized; not for a time, nor for a special occasion; not for a peculiar form of religion, nor for any one dispensation of the Church, but as a general principle to govern all analogous cases, in all ages, and under all dispensations. That principle is, that the child is represented in the parent; and, therefore, when the parent enters into covenant with God, when he takes God to be his God, and consecrates himself to his service, he does for his child what he does for himself, and the child is not ouly bound by the parent's act, but is to be regarded and treated as though he had done in his own person what his parent did in his name. It is undeniable, that this principle is sanctioned in the Bible, and therefore that all objections to infant baptism,

(or infant church membership,) which assume this principle to be false, are unscriptural. The principal objection to infant baptism is founded on the incompetency of infants to understand the import of the rite, or to assume the obligations which it imposes. Christian baptism assumes the profession of the Christian faith, and consecration to the worship and service of the Lord Jesus. Children cannot make such a profession, nor can they consecrate themselves to God; therefore they cannot properly be recognized as Christians by baptism. But this assumes that the parent cannot properly make this profession of faith and this promise of obedience in the child's name; that he has no right to do it; and that the child would not be bound if the parent did assume to act in its name. According to the command of God, however, the parent was not only authorized, but he was required to make a profession of faith and promise of obedience in the name of the child; and the child by God's command was to be regarded as having done what his parent did in his behalf, and was accordingly held to the contract. He was denounced and punished as a covenant-breaker, if he proved unfaithful to the engagements thus legitimately assumed in his name.

It is objected, however, that the old dispensation was external, typical, and ceremonial, whereas the new is spiritual; and therefore we cannot argue from the one to the other. Under the old dispensation natural birth and outward profession were the condition of church membership; whereas under the new, spiritual birth and saving faith are the conditions. The premise in this argument is incorrect. When a man entered the Jewish community, or when a Hebrew parent presented his child for circumcision, he made a profession of the true religion, and the promise of spiritual obedience. Any Hebrew who did what he professed to do, was as surely saved, as any Christian who is sincere in his baptismal vows. The Hebrew took God to be his God; he promised obedience to all his laws, and faith in all his promises. What more does the Christian? All this the Hebrew parent did for his child; more than this no Christian parent can do for his child. What God, therefore, authorized and commanded Jewish parents to do for their children, is pre-

cisely what the opposers of infant baptism say Christian parents have no right to do for their children; and they found their objection on the very nature of the thing to be done. That is, they pronounce that to be wrong which God enjoined as right. The argument goes further than this. It is not merely that Christian parents may do what Jewish parents were allowed to do, but that they are bound to do it. They violate one of the most obvious and important of their parental obligations, if they fail to present their children for baptism. They are bound to profess in their name the Christian faith, to promise for them obedience to the laws of Christ, and to consecrate them to his worship and service. If the Hebrew parent was bound to do this, because he was a parent in covenant with God; so is the Christian parent for the same reasons. It is not a privilege merely, but a duty arising out of the nature of the relation between parent and child, and their common allegiance to God. It may be objected, that if the parent thus represents his children, and is bound to act for them in matters of religion, and if children are bound by the acts of their parents, it would follow that if a Christian should turn Pagan, he would be bound to devote his children to the service of idols, and that they would be under obligation to become idolaters. This is equivalent to arguing that because a parent, when he obtains food for himself, is bound to give a portion of it to his children; therefore when he poisons himself, he is bound to poison them. The only fair inference for the principle in question is, that in the present constitution of society the parent must be allowed to judge for himself what is suitable food for himself and his children. This he does at his peril. If he chooses well, it is well for him and for them. If he chooses ill, it is ill for himself and for them. So it is with his religion. He is bound to profess the true religion both for himself and for his children. But if he professes a false religion, he not only injures or ruins himself but those also committed to his charge. It is, therefore, an ordinance of God, having its foundation in the nature which he has given us, that whenever a parent professes the true religion, and covenants with God to believe his truth, and to obey his will, he is bound to make the same profession, and the same engagements, in the name and in behalf of his infant children, and they are

bound by the act. God requires us to regard them as doing for themselves what is done for them by their parents, and to treat them accordingly. That is, to attach to them the seal of the covenant, to mark them as of the number of God's professing people, to watch over, and cherish them as belonging to him, and as entitled to all the inestimable benefits of membership in his Church. God commanded this of old. He enforced his command by dreadful threatenings in case of disobedience, and by the most abundant promises in case the duty was faithfully performed.

3. We have seen that the Scriptures clearly teach, that when a man professes the true religion, and enters into covenant with God, his infant children are to be regarded and treated as making the same profession, and as included in the same covenant. This of itself is conclusive in favour of the church membership of the infants of Christian parents. The Bible, however, goes much further than this. It not only teaches a general principle which leads to the conclusion that such infants should be regarded and treated as members of the Church, but it teaches that from the beginning they have in fact, by God's command, been so regarded and treated. The Church is not of yesterday. It was founded on the promise of redemption given to our first parents, and has existed ever since. It has varied in its organization, in its external arrangements, in its amplitude, and in other nonessential circumstances; but it has remained always one and the same—the same in its nature, its faith, its promises, its conditions of membership, or terms of communion. The true Church has always consisted of true believers. The visible Church has always consisted of the professors of the true religion. This idea of the Church suits all dispensations, from Adam to the present time. Or if we take the more formal definition, which declares the Church to be the congregation of faithful men, called out from the world, and united in the profession of the same faith, for the purpose of divine worship, and the exercise of mutual watch and care, there has always been such a Church, and it has always been the same. If, therefore, by divine command the children of believing parents were included in the Church of old, they are included in it now.

Although the Church existed from the beginning, it was, before the calling of Abraham, for the most part in a state of dispersion. Too little is recorded of it, prior to that event, to give us definite knowledge of its nature and requirements. Our written constitution, so to speak, dates from the father of the faithful. God made a covenant with Abraham. By covenant is meant, a contract between two or more parties, in which there are mutual stipulations and promises. The transaction with Abraham was of this kind. God promised certain blessings to the patriarch, and he promised faith and obedience to God. Not only, therefore, in the Old Testament is this transaction called a covenant, but in the New Testament the same designation is applied to it. And, further than this, the New Testament writers, referring to the transaction with Abraham, not only call it a covenant, but they argue from its nature as such, to show that its original stipulations can be neither annulled nor altered. Rom. iv. 13, 14; Gal. iii. 15–18. "The covenant," says the apostle, "that was confirmed before (to Abraham) of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul." It is of importance, therefore, that this word should be retained, not only because it is scriptural, but because the idea which it expresses is essential to a proper understanding of the case. Many modern theological writers discard the word entirely, and stigmatize the system of the Reformers as the *federal* theology. In discarding the word, the truth which it was intended to convey is almost always discarded with it. If we would retain the truth, we must retain the forms in which God has seen fit to reveal it. God then formed a covenant with Abraham. The question is, What was that covenant, and who were the parties to it? We answer, in common with all Christendom, The covenant was the covenant of grace, and the parties were Abraham and those whom Abraham represented. Of course this does not mean that the covenant of grace originated in this transaction, or that none are included in it but Abraham and those whom Abraham represented. Nor does it mean that all represented by Abraham were savingly interested in its benefits. It only means that the covenant in question was a reënactment or renewed revelation of the covenant of grace in relation to

Abraham, and that those represented by him were to be regarded and treated as included in it.

By the covenant of grace is meant the plan of salvation, in which God promises to give to believers all the benefits of redemption, and they promise faith and obedience. If, therefore, in the covenant with Abraham, God promised to him the benefits of redemption on the condition of faith, that covenant was the covenant of grace. In other words, it was the gospel; for the gospel is nothing else than the proclamation of salvation through faith in Christ. That such was the nature of the covenant made with Abraham, is too clearly revealed to admit of doubt. When God promised that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed, he promised to send Christ to be the Redeemer of men. It is the fulfilment of this promise and the exposition of it in the New Testament, which authoritatively determines its meaning. Our Lord himself said, "Abraham saw my day and was glad." This can only mean that Abraham foresaw the advent of Christ, and rejoiced in the accomplishment of the work which Christ came to perform. The apostle therefore says, "God preached before the gospel unto Abraham." The gospel, in the New Testament sense of the term, is the glad news of salvation through Jesus Christ. This therefore was, according to the apostle, what was preached to Abraham, when it was said, "In thee shall all nations be blessed." The apostle Peter also, after he had healed the lame man, told the astonished multitude that Christ, in whose name the miracle had been performed, had been promised to Abraham, and predicted by the prophets. "Ye," he added, "are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed. Unto you first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities." Acts iii. 25, 26. It is here clearly taught that the Abrahamic covenant, of which the Jews were the children, had reference to Christ; that the promise, "In thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed," was fulfilled in the advent of the Son of God; and that the blessedness promised, was turning men from their iniquities. To the same effect Paul said in the synagogue at

Antioch, in Pisidia, "We declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus." Acts xiii. 32, 33. When arraigned before Agrippa he said, "Now I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made unto our fathers: unto which promise the twelve tribes, instantly serving God day and night, hope to come: for which hope's sake, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews." Acts xxvi. 6, 7. The great promise made to Abraham and to the other fathers, according to this passage, was the promise of Christ, on whose behalf Paul was a prisoner; and this was the promise toward which the eyes of all who served God were constantly fixed. Paul said to the Romans, "Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision, for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers." Rom. xv. 9. That is, Jesus Christ came and exercised his ministry among the Jews, to set forth the truth or veracity of God, in fulfilling the promises made to the fathers. In all these passages, "the promises made to the fathers," means the promise of Christ thrice made to Abraham, Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxii. 18, repeated to Isaac and Jacob, Gen. xxvi. 4, xxviii. 14, and which thenceforth became the burden of prophecy, renewed to every generation, constantly unfolded in its inexhaustible contents until the fulfilment came. Nothing, therefore, can be plainer than that the covenant made with Abraham was the covenant of grace, i. e. the promise of redemption through faith in the Messiah. This, however, is not a doctrine which rests on such general allusions or declarations merely, it is taught in the most explicit terms by the apostles. The design of the epistle to the Galatians was to convince them of the folly of apostatizing to Judaism. To do this the apostle raises them above the Mosaic period, and sets them back into communion with the great Abrahamic covenant, to which the law of Moses was not only posterior but subordinate. The special purpose of the third chapter of that epistle is to prove that justification is by faith, and not by the law. His first argument is from the fact that the Holy Ghost, in his manifold miraculous and sanctifying influences, had been given in confirmation of the doctrine of justification by faith. His second argument is from the case of Abraham. He was

justified by faith, and therefore those who share his inheritance, i. e. who inherit the blessing of redemption promised him, are believers. Know therefore, he says, that believers are the sons (i. e. heirs) of Abraham. The third argument is from the impossibility of rendering the perfect obedience which the law demands. The fourth, from the explicit declaration of the Scriptures, that those who are just by faith shall live. The fifth, from the fact that Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law in order that the blessing of Abraham, (i. e. the blessing promised to Abraham,) might come upon the gentiles. The only blessing, however, promised to Abraham, which comes upon the gentiles, is redemption. And finally, Paul argues from the nature of the covenant made with Abraham. He reminds his readers that even a human covenant cannot, when once ratified, be either annulled or altered, much less can a divine covenant be changed, either in its promises or conditions. In the covenant with Abraham in reference to Christ, the inheritance, (that inheritance in which the gentiles share,) was suspended upon faith in the promise. The law, therefore, which was long subsequent, could not alter this covenant, or make the inheritance to depend upon works. Here everything is taught, first, the Abrahamic covenant had reference to Christ; second, the thing promised was that inheritance of which Christ is the author, and all nations (not the Jews only) the heirs; third, the condition on which a participation in this inheritance is suspended, is faith and not works.

After thus clearly proving his point, the apostle goes on to answer the question, For what purpose was the law? He shows that it was not designed to interfere with the Abrahamic covenant, or to prescribe any new condition of salvation, but to convince men of sin, and to be as a schoolmaster to lead them to Christ. And as Christ was the person to whom the covenant with Abraham referred, and in whom all nations were to be blessed, it follows, he says, "If ye are Christ's, then are ye the seed of Abraham, and heirs according to the promise." In having Christ and belonging to him, we are the heirs of Abraham, partakers of the inheritance promised to him. All these passages teach not only that the covenant with Abraham was the covenant of grace, but that it is still in force; that Gentiles

and Jews, Christians and Hebrews, the circumcised and the baptized, are included in that original contract, and are saved according to its conditions. The covenant with Abraham was not one thing, and the gospel of Jesus Christ another. They are one and the same. What we are required to do in order to be saved is precisely what was required of the patriarchs and prophets. We must embrace the covenant made with Abraham. We must become his sons, partakers of his faith, and heirs of his inheritance.

The fourth chapter of the epistle to the Romans contains nearly the same course of argument. Having in the latter paragraph of the third chapter set forth the gospel method of salvation, which, the apostle says, had been previously taught both by the law and the prophets, he proceeds in the fourth chapter to establish his doctrine from the case of Abraham. He shows that we are to be saved in the same way that he was. We are under the same covenant of mercy. Abraham was justified by faith, and so are we. To him righteousness was imputed without works, and so it must be to us. Salvation by grace was as clearly the doctrine of the Old Testament, he says, as it is of the New. Abraham's circumcision was neither the ground nor the condition of his justification, for he was justified before he was circumcised. Circumcision was only the seal of the promise to regard as righteous those who believe. The paternity of Abraham, therefore, extends far beyond the Jews. He is the father of all who believe, whether circumcised or uncircumcised, whether Jews or Gentiles. This, says the Apostle, was the tenor of the original covenant. The promise to Abraham, he says, was not of the law, but of faith; i. e. it was not suspended on the condition of legal obedience, but on the condition of faith, in order that it might be sure to all the seed; i. e. to all his spiritual children, whether Jews or Gentiles, for he is father of us all. This, he adds, was the very thing which God intended when he said, "I will make thee the father of many nations." All believers, of every nation, are included in the Abrahamic covenant. The promise to Abraham has come on them. That is, what was promised him, is promised to them; what was demanded of him, is demanded of them, viz. faith. Whoever believes is an heir of Abraham.

Our limits would be soon exhausted were we to attempt to present a tithe of the evidence which the Scriptures contain, in support of the position that the covenant of grace, under which the Church now lives, and upon which it is founded, is the covenant made with Abraham. The whole of the Old Testament is nothing more than a record of the historical development of the promise, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." Of that Seed, (the promise, says the Apostle, is to be understood not "of many," but "of one," viz. Christ,) Moses, Aaron, David, and Solomon, were types. His work as priest was prefigured in the Mosaic priesthood and sacrifices. His person, his parentage, his sufferings, his death, his resurrection, his kingdom, and triumphs, form almost the whole drift of the prophecies. The extension of his dominion over the Gentiles, the introduction of the heathen into the covenant of God with Abraham in relation to his Seed, (viz. Christ,) was clearly predicted. The prophets rejoiced when they saw the nations flocking like clouds, or as doves, not to the narrow inclosure of Judaism, but to the broad field of the Abrahamic covenant—when they saw even Ethiopia and the isles of the sea stretching out their hands to the long promised Seed. And accordingly, as we have already seen, the apostles take up the same strain, and tell the people, Gentiles and Jews, that God had fulfilled the covenant made with Abraham in that he had raised up his Son Jesus and sent him to bless them. In the New Testament, therefore, the constant representation is, that the Gentiles are made fellow-citizens of the saints and of the household of God, they are introduced not into the covenant from Mount Sinai, but into the earlier, broader covenant made with the fathers. They were not planted as a new tree, but grafted into the old stock. They did not bear the root, but the root them. All this is too plain to be denied; and we presume few even of the opponents of infant church membership do deny that the Abrahamic covenant was the covenant of grace, and that it includes the whole Church from that day to this; that the only way in which we, under the Christian dispensation, can be saved, is by embracing the covenant made with Abraham, in which righteousness, salvation, the inheritance, was promised on the condition of faith.

The only question is, Were children included in this covenant? The meaning of this question is not, whether children were the subjects of grace, and made partakers of the redemption promised to Abraham. Nor whether they were, or still are, included in the covenant of grace in such a sense as secures to them all, and with absolute certainty, the benefits of that covenant. But the meaning is, whether they were included in that class of persons who, by divine command, are by the Church to be regarded as embraced in the covenant, and treated as such. It is admitted that we are to regard and treat as within the covenant those who make a credible profession of faith in Christ, and of obedience to him. The question is, Were the children of believing parents to be thus treated, and are they still to be thus regarded? This is not a question about the kind or degree of benefit which was secured to the children of believers, but simply whether by the command of God parents, in accepting the covenant of grace for themselves, were bound, as representing their children, to lay hold of the same covenant in their behalf. That is, were they to profess in their name the same faith, and promise the same obedience for them which they did for themselves? As children were by divine command to be circumcised, and as every male child which was uncircumcised was pronounced to have broken the covenant, there can be but one answer to the above question, if circumcision was the badge of the covenant of grace as made with Abraham. This, however, is denied. It is said that it was the seal of the national covenant made with Abraham; that it was intended to mark the nationality of his descendants, and to secure their interest in the national promises made to the patriarch. It matters very little whether we say that there were two covenants made with Abraham, the one spiritual, relating to Christ, the other national, relating to the possession of the land of Canaan, or whether we say there was but one covenant including both classes of promises. If it can be proved that circumcision was the seal of the one as well as of the other; or that whatever else it did, it marked those visibly included in the covenant of grace, the argument for the Church membership of infants is conclusive. By church membership, it will be borne in mind, is meant nothing more than member-

ship in that class of persons whom the Church is bound to regard and treat as included in the covenant of grace. Infants are in this sense members of the Church, because circumcision was the sign and seal of the covenant of grace. Infants by the command of God were circumcised, therefore, by the command of God, we are bound to recognize the infants of professing parents as members of the Church. The only point to be proved in this syllogism is, that circumcision was a sign and seal of the covenant of grace. It has already been proved that the covenant of God with Abraham in reference to Christ, was the covenant of grace, and that circumcision was the seal of that covenant. 1. Because no man could be a Jew without professing to embrace the covenant with Abraham which referred to Christ. The Bible does not distinguish two Abrahamic covenants. If we make the distinction it is only for the purposes of perspicuity and convenience. The two are in such a sense one, that no man could embrace the promise relating to the land of Canaan, without professing to embrace the promise that in the seed of Abraham all nations should be blessed. The fact is, that God made to Abraham three great promises. First: That he should be a blessing, or that all nations should be blessed in him or in his seed, and that he would be his God. Second: That his posterity should be exceedingly numerous. Thirdly: That his descendants should inherit the land of Canaan. Of the covenant containing these promises, circumcision is expressly declared to be "the token." "Thou shalt keep my covenant therefore, thou, and thy seed after thee, in their generations. This is my covenant, which ye shall keep between me and you, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised. And ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you. And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every man-child in your generations, he that is born in the house, or bought with money of any stranger, which is not of thy seed. He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised; and my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant. And the uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his

foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant." Gen. xvii. 9—14.

That circumcision was the badge of this covenant in its spiritual, as well as in its temporal aspect, is obvious, because the two were united as the soul and body in man. The soul may exist without the body, but the body cannot exist without the soul. A man might embrace the promise of redemption made to Abraham, and have no interest in the promise of the land of Canaan. Ishmael, for example, was circumcised as soon as this covenant was made with his father Abraham, although he was expressly excluded from any portion of the inheritance. So also Esau was circumcised as well as Jacob, although he was not to inherit the land of Canaan. So far, therefore, from circumcision having exclusive reference to the national covenant, it had primary and special reference to the spiritual covenant, being administered to those who were excluded from all share in the national privileges of the children of Abraham. When the father of the faithful received the great promise of redemption, and bound himself to take Jehovah to be his God, he made this profession and engagement for Ishmael as well as for himself. Isaac made the same profession and covenant for Esau as he did for Jacob. Ishmael and Esau were as much bound to take Jehovah to be their God, and to look for salvation through the promised seed, as were Isaac and Jacob. Although the spiritual element might be professedly embraced by those who had no part in the temporal blessings of Abraham, the reverse was not true. No man could be circumcised with exclusive reference to the national covenant. He could not enroll himself among the children of Abraham, and claim as one of his descendants a part of the national inheritance, without at the same time entering into covenant with God. By the very act of circumcision, he took God to be his God, and promised to be one of his people, i. e. to believe what God had taught, trust in what he had promised, and do what he had commanded. A Jew who did not thus profess allegiance to God, who renounced all interest in the promise of the Messiah, was an impossibility. By being a Jew, he professed the whole Jewish faith, and promised fidelity to the whole religion of the Hebrews. The evasion therefore to which the opposers of

church membership of infants are obliged to resort, is absolutely untenable. No man ever was circumcised in obedience to the command given to Abraham, who did not thereby profess faith and allegiance to the Abrahamic covenant; and no child was presented by its parent for circumcision, in whose behalf a profession of faith in the true religion and fidelity to the true God were not thereby made.

That circumcision was "a token," or seal of the covenant of grace, is further evident from its spiritual import. It was a sign of regeneration. It signified the removal of the defilement of our nature; or, as the apostle expresses it, the "putting off the body of the sins of the flesh." Col. ii. 11. It was the symbol of the circumcision of the heart. On the ground of the covenant into which they had entered by circumcision, Moses exhorted the people, saying, "Because the Lord had a delight in thy fathers to love them, and he chose their seed after them, circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart." Deut. x. 15, 16. The prophets presented the rite in the same light. Jer. iv. 4; and so does the apostle, in Rom. ii. 28. The true circumcision, he says, that which the outward ceremony signified, was the circumcision of the heart by the Spirit. The "uncircumcised in heart" are the unrenewed and disobedient. Lev. xxx. 41; Jer. ix. 26; Acts vii. 51. As baptism with water is the symbol of the baptism of the Spirit, so circumcision of the flesh was the symbol of the circumcision of the heart. If infants cannot be baptized, because the symbol of regeneration can be applied to those only who give evidence of regeneration, neither could circumcision. The import of the one was the same as the import of the other. It is obvious, therefore, that if circumcision was the symbol of regeneration, the covenant of which it was the badge was the covenant in which regeneration was promised, i. e. the covenant of grace.

This is still further evident from the nature of the promises made to those who were circumcised, whether adults or infants. The great promise was, "I will be their God, and they shall be my people," (Gen. xvii. 7;) a promise which is declared to be the substance of the gospel. Hosea ii. 23; Zech. viii. 8; Heb. viii. 11. This was the blessing promised to Abraham, and his seed after him; and this was the promise which every Hebrew

claimed for himself and for his children. Still more explicitly it is said, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." Deut. xxx. 6. "The mercy of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children; to such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his commandments to do them." Ps. ciii. 17, 18. And the prophet says, "As for me, this is my covenant with them, saith the Lord; My Spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, saith the Lord, from henceforth and for ever." Isa. lix. 21. Such were the promises included in the covenant of which circumcision was the seal.

This is placed beyond dispute by the express declaration of the apostle in Rom. iv. 11. Circumcision is there declared to be a sign, a seal of the righteousness of faith. That is, the seal of the promise of God to regard as righteous all who believe. But this by common consent is the covenant of grace as distinguished from the covenant of works. God having originally promised life on the condition of perfect obedience; in the gospel he offers life on the condition of faith. This was the gospel preached to Abraham. This is the gospel preached to us. Of this covenant or promise circumcision was the seal. It cannot be pretended that the declaration of the apostle was true only of Abraham, that to him, but not to others, circumcision was the seal of the righteousness of faith. There is not only no ground for this assumption, but it is contrary to all elsewhere taught of the relation of circumcision to the covenant of grace, and inconsistent with the apostle's argument in the context. His special design was to correct the doctrine of the Jews that circumcision secured the favour of God. Paul tells them it was not intended to secure acceptance with him, but to assure those of his favour who truly believed.

Circumcision, therefore, being the token or seal of that covenant in which God promised salvation through Christ by faith on him, those to whom that seal was applied professed to accept

of that covenant. They were *fœderati.* And as children of professing Jews were circumcised, those children were, in the sight of man, included in the covenant. In other words, they were by divine command to be regarded as members of the Church.

The idea of the opponents of the common doctrine, that under the old dispensation the Church was an external society, membership in which depended on natural birth, whereas under the new dispensation it is a spiritual society, in which membership depends on spiritual birth, is altogether chimerical and unscriptural. The distinction between the Israel *κατὰ σάρκα* and the Israel *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, that is, between the Church visible and invisible, existed then as much as it does now. No one was a member of the true Church of old who was not a Jew inwardly, and no one is a member of the true Church now, who is not born of the Spirit. But then as now, those who professed the true religion were members of the visible Church; and then as now the children of professing parents were by divine command regarded as church members. Children are as much born within the Church as they were under the patriarchal or Mosaic dispensations. Church membership has always been the birthright of the children of believing parents.

It being the recognized law of God that whenever a man embraced the true religion, he was bound to embrace it for his children as well as for himself, they being regarded as members of the religious community to which the parent associated himself. When our Lord commanded his apostles to make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, he commanded them to baptize the children of all who professed to be disciples. It is impossible that the apostles could have put any other interpretation on the commission. Had they been commanded to make disciples by circumcising them, would not they have considered themselves bound to circumcise the children of their converts? Such was God's command. Parents represent their children by a perpetual ordinance of God. The apostles, therefore, could not fail in receiving parents to receive their children also into the pale of the Church, and to enroll their names in the list of disciples. We accordingly find that when God opened

the heart of Lydia, she was baptized and her household; when the jailor at Philippi believed, he was baptized and all his straightway, Acts xvi. 33; and in 1 Cor. i. 10, Paul says, he baptized the household of Stephanas. The connection in which these facts are stated, renders it plain that the baptism of these families was on the ground of the faith of the parent. It was because Lydia received the gospel that her household was baptized. Paul assumes it as a recognized principle that if the parents are holy so are the children. He does not prove it or assert it, but what is more to the point, he assumes it as a fact too plain to be either unknown or denied. 1 Cor. vii. 14. If the parent is within the covenant, so also are the children. He carries this principle to its extremest length in Rom. xi. 16, when he applies it even to the present condition of the Jews: "If the root be holy, so also are the branches." "They are still beloved for the father's sake, for the gifts and calling of God are without repentance."

This great ordinance of God reveals itself, so to speak, so instinctively in the consciousness of men, that the world over children go with their parents. In all the Oriental Churches, in the Greek Church, in the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches, the children of Christians are regarded as Christians, as fully and really members of the visible Church as are their parents. Although the fact of the church membership of infants is thus universally acknowledged, (except by the Baptists,) there is far from being the same agreement as to the grounds of that membership. The scriptural ground, as we have endeavoured to show, is their birth. They are born, as our standards express it, within the pale of the visible Church. As the children of Adam are born under the covenant (i. e. under its curse) made with him; as the children of Abraham were born under the Abrahamic covenant; and the later Jews under the Mosaic covenant; so the children of those who embrace the new covenant are born within its pale. Circumcision did not make a man a Jew, it was a solemn recognition of his birthright, of which the neglect of circumcision was the rejection. Neither does baptism make children Christians. It is the divinely appointed mode of recognizing them as members of the Church, and of claiming for them a part in its promises and privileges.

The neglect of infant baptism is therefore the rejection of those promises and privileges. It is refusing to acknowledge them as belonging to our children. In popular language indeed it is often said that circumcision introduced a child into the Hebrew theocracy, and that baptism introduces children into the Church, just as a man is inducted into an office by the ceremony of inauguration. Coronation does not make a king; neither does baptism make a Christian.

The doctrine that parents represent their children, and that therefore children of professing parents are born within the Church, and on that ground are to be baptized, is the distinctive doctrine of the Reformed Churches. In opposition to this view, Romanists and Lutherans place the duty of infant baptism on the ground that all children are born outside of the Church, and by baptism are inwardly renewed by the Holy Ghost, and thus become members of Christ's body. They become members of the Church, therefore, by baptism. They are not merely recognized as included in the covenant and treated as *fœderati*, but are made partakers of the Holy Ghost and members of the invisible Church as the consequence of their union with the Church visible.

Did our limits, already unduly extended, permit, it would be easy to prove, first, that the Reformed Churches place the right and duty of infant baptism on the ground that the children of believers are born within the Church; secondly, that they repudiate not only the doctrine of innate grace, i. e. holiness derived by birth from their progenitors, but especially the Romish and Lutheran doctrine that children are made members of the Church by baptism, by being regenerated or inwardly renewed in that ordinance; and thirdly, that the doctrine of the Reformed Churches on this subject is the doctrine of the Bible. A few words on each of these points is all for which we can now find room.

First, the doctrine of the Reformed Churches as to the ground of infant baptism. On this subject, Hase, in his "Dogmatik," p. 438, after remarking that Calvin did not make baptism necessary to salvation, says, "Hiernach haben die reformirten Symbole die Pflicht der Kindertaufe auf ein Geburtsrecht der Christenkinder an das Gottesreich begründet." That is, *The*

Reformed Symbols rest the duty of infant baptism on the birthright of Christian children in the kingdom of God. He quotes from Calvin's Inst. iv. 15, 22, the following explicit passage: Unde sequitur, non ideo baptizari *fidelium liberos, ut filii Dei tunc primi fiant*, qui ante alieni fuerint ab ecclesia, sed solemni potius signo ideo recipi in ecclesiam, quia promissionis beneficio jam ante ad Christi corpus pertinebant.* Calvin's doctrine on

* The January Number of the *Mercersburgh Review* contains a long article on "The Efficacy of Baptism," being a review of two articles which appeared in the *Princeton Review* for January, 1857. The respected writer endeavours to prove that the Reformed Churches, and the Westminster Confession in particular, teach "that grace and salvation are inseparably annexed to baptism," p. 20; "that, in the right use of the ordinance, the party baptized is engrafted into Christ, regenerated, receives the remission of sins by the working of the Holy Ghost," p. 31. He expresses astonishment that the Princeton writer should say that the standards of our Church deny "intrinsic efficacy to the sacrament." He professes "to be utterly at a loss to comprehend how a gentleman of candor and a Christian scholar can make such an assertion. If the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism is not intrinsic, he asks, "What then is it? Is not efficacy from the very nature of the case intrinsic? Does it not lie in the subject of which it is predicated? If not, if it lies in something else, it is an evident impropriety to speak of its efficacy. If the efficacy of baptism does not lie in baptism itself, where can it lie? In faith? but faith, as such, is not baptism. In the Holy Ghost? but the working of the Holy Ghost is not baptism," &c. p. 36. When a man lives long in a foreign country, he sometimes forgets his native language. This is the case with our Mercersburgh brethren. They have been so long conversant with Lutheranism and with the speculative theology of modern Germany, that they have forgotten the a, b, c's of their own theology. They denounce as heretical the simplest elementary principles of the Reformed Churches, and make the Reformed symbols teach the very doctrines they were constructed to deny. Dr. Gerhart's article is almost on a par with Mr. Newman's famous Tract, Number Ninety. The standing reproach of the Romanists and Lutherans against the Reformed from the beginning was, that the latter denied all intrinsic efficacy to the word and sacrament. It was the shibboleth of the Reformed Churches, that the efficacy of the sacraments is due "not to any virtue in them, nor in him that doth administer them, but *only* to the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit in them that do by faith receive them." They have indeed an intrinsic æsthetic, doctrinal, and moral efficacy, but what is denied is, intrinsic efficacy to produce grace. The clay had intrinsic efficacy as clay, but what efficacy had it to open the eyes of the blind? The word of God is quick and powerful—powerful to convince, to terrify, to confound—but what efficacy has it to produce grace, to quicken the spiritually dead, without the working of the Spirit? So the sacraments have intrinsic power, as significant signs, to enlighten the understanding, to rouse the imagination, and to stir the feelings, but what supernatural power have they apart from the influence of the Holy Ghost? The whole question is how

this subject ought not to be a matter of dispute. It is determined not only by the most explicit assertions, but by his system. It is uncandid to interpret his language, in particular passages, in a way inconsistent not only with his express decla-

they become "efficacious means of grace." The doctrine of the Reformed Churches on this subject is too plain to be fairly controverted. The reader, however, may judge what a learned, able, and doubtless, honest man, has courage to attempt, when his mind is thoroughly preoccupied by a theory, from the fact that Dr. Gerhart endeavours to show that the Westminster Confession and Catechisms teach the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, and that children are made members of the invisible Church by baptism, p. 38.

In reference to the doctrine of the writer in the *Princeton Review*, that "membership in the visible Church is founded on presumptive membership in the invisible," he says, "Membership in the invisible Church is vital union to Christ, or regeneration by the Holy Ghost. The word *presume* means to admit a thing to be, or to receive a thing as true, before it can be known as such from its phenomena or manifestations. To presume an infant to be a member of the invisible Church, is therefore to believe it to be ingrafted into Christ and regenerated, before it gives any ordinary evidences of the fact. If, now, the author means that the presumptive membership of an infant in the invisible Church is constituted by baptism, his position harmonizes with the teachings of the Presbyterian symbols. . . . . He holds that in the right use of baptism an infant is ingrafted into Christ, and is regenerated by the Holy Spirit. Interpreted philologically, and with logical propriety, it [his doctrine] can mean nothing less than this. His language teaches the doctrine of baptismal regeneration with all needful plainness." "If, on the other hand, he means that the presumptive membership of an infant in the invisible Church, or its vital union with Jesus Christ is effected by natural birth, his position is entirely different. 1. He contradicts the standards of the Presbyterian Church. . . . . 2. He teaches a very novel doctrine." p. 38. Dr. Gerhart goes on to say that it follows from this view of the matter, "that children of believers are ingrafted into Christ, or regenerated by the Holy Ghost, in virtue of natural birth. A new doctrine for a *Presbyterian!*" Here is another example of a learned man forgetting the lessons taught him by his mother. Membership in the invisible Church is *not* "vital union with Christ, or regeneration by the Holy Ghost." Dr. Gerhart was taught in his infancy, (so long since that it has slipped his memory,) that the invisible Church "consists *of the whole number of the elect*, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof." It includes, therefore, probably millions of the unborn and millions of the unconverted. Consequently presumptive membership in the invisible Church is no presumption of "vital union with Christ, or regeneration by the Holy Ghost." Consequently, again, making this presumptive membership in the invisible Church to depend on natural birth, is not to make "natural generation a channel of grace." The simple doctrine of the Princeton Reviewer, is the doctrine of all the Reformed Churches, of Dr. Gerhart's no less than of our own, viz., that since the promise is not only to parents but to their seed, children are, by the command of God, to be regarded and treated as of the number

rations, but with his whole doctrinal theory. Especially is it unfair to quote passages which speak of the efficacy of baptism in the case of believers, and make them apply to the case of infants. The sacraments are efficacious means of grace to those who receive them in faith. So is the word. But neither the one nor the other have any sanctifying power when received by unbelievers, or when unattended by the power of the Holy Ghost. It is only by overlooking this most essential distinction, viz. the distinction between what is true of believers and what is true of those destitute or incapable of faith, that any plausibility can be given to the attempt to prove that the Reformed Symbols, the Westminster Confession, and the Bible, attribute intrinsic, sanctifying power to the sacraments. Calvin, in the passage above quoted, explicitly denies that baptism makes children of believers the children of God, and expressly asserts that they are baptized because, being included in the promise, they are regarded as pertaining to the body of Christ. Why were Hebrew children circumcised? Because they were included in the promises made to their fathers. They were circumcised because they were presumptively within the covenant. That is, it was presumed that they would adhere to that covenant, and

of the elect, until they give undeniable evidence to the contrary, or refuse to be so considered. They are to be baptized, as the First Helvetic Confession says, *cum de eorum electione piè est præsumendum.* Chap. 21. It is not their vital union with Christ, nor their actual regeneration by the Holy Ghost, that is presumed, but their election. This is no more than is done when we baptize an adult, or when he is received to the Lord's table. We presume he is one of the elect. Whether he is so or not, we cannot tell; but he belongs to the class which, by the command of Christ, we are required so to regard and treat. The infants of believing parents belong to the same general class. This presumption of election is not founded on their baptism, but their baptism is founded on this presumption; just as the presumption that Jewish children would take Jehovah to be their God was not founded on their circumcision, but their circumcision was founded on that presumption. This is precisely what Calvin says in the passage quoted in the text. Infants are not made the children of God by baptism, but they are baptized because in virtue of the divine promise they are regarded as belonging to the body of Christ, i. e. to the elect. The passages which Dr. Gerhart quotes from Calvin as to the efficacy of baptism, have nothing to do with this subject. They relate to the baptism of believers. Who denies that the sacraments are efficacious means of grace to believers? Dr. Gerhart might as well quote passages descriptive of the power of the word of God in those who believe, to prove its effect on children.

share in its promises. Why are Christian children baptized? Because they are included in the promises made to their believing parents. They are baptized because they are presumptively within the covenant. That is, it is presumed (we are required by God to act on the assumption) that they will be faithful to the covenant, and share in its promises. That this was Calvin's doctrine is abundantly evident. In his Inst. iv. 16, 5, 6, he distinctly places the baptism of children on the ground of the covenant: "Quodsi fœdus firmum et fixum manet, Christianorum liberis non minus hodie competit, quam sub veteri Testamento ad Judæorum infantes spectabat." "Siquidem evidentissimum est, quod semel cum Abrahamo Dominus fœdus percussit, non minus hodie Christianis constare, quam olim Judaico populo, adeoque verbum istud non minus Christianos respicere, quam Judæos tum respiciebat." "Quamobrem et Judæorum liberi quod ejus fœderis hæredes facti ab impiorum liberis discernerentur, semen sanctum vocabantur, eadem etiamnum ratione sancti censentur Christianorum liberi, vel altero duntaxat fideli parente geniti: et apostoli testimonio differunt ab immundo idololatrarum semine." "Fœdus commune est, communis ejus confirmandi causa. Modus confirmandi tantum diversus est, quod erat illis Circumcisio, in cujus vicem Baptismus nobis successit." It is hard to quote passages from an extended argument. It is plain, however, even from the above quotations, that Calvin placed Circumcision and Baptism on the same ground. The children of Christians are baptized for the same reason that the children of the Jews were circumcised. Baptism assumes our children to be holy in the same sense that circumcision assumed the Jewish children to be holy. All the Reformed Confessions take the same ground. In the First Helvetic Confession, Art. 22, it is said, "Quo quidem sancto lavacro infantes nostros idcirco tingimus, quoniam e nobis, qui populus Domini sumus, genitos populi Dei consortio rejicere nefas est, tantum non divina voce designatos, præsertim quum de eorum electione piè est præsumendum." The Gallican Confession, Art. 35: "Præterea quamvis Baptismus sit fidei et resipiscentiæ sacramentum, tamen quum unâ cum parentibus posteritatem etiam illorum in ecclesia Deus recenseat, affirmamus infantes sanctis parentibus natos, esse ex Christi auctori-

tate baptizandos." The Belgic Confession, Art. [illegible] [infantes e fidelibus parentibus natos] eadem ratione [illegible] dos et signo fœderis obsignandos esse credimus, qua olim in Israële parvuli circumcidebantur, nimirum propter easdem promissiones infantibus nostris factas. . . . Præterea quod circumcisio præstabat populo Judaico, idem infantibus fidelium nunc præstat baptismus." The Second Helvetic Confession, ch. 20, says that the children of believers are to be baptized: "Nam juxta doctrinam evangelicam, horum est regnum Dei, et sunt in fœdere Dei, cur itaque non daretur eis signum fœderis Dei?" Such is the uniform representation. No other ground for the baptism of the children of believers is ever assigned, than the fact that they are included in the covenant made with their parents. As the promise which God made to Abraham he made to his descendants, they, as well as he, received circumcision, which was the seal of the promise. And, as under the Christian dispensation of the same covenant, the promise is to the children as well as to the parent, baptism is administered to the infant children of believers. This idea is expressed in the Reformed standards, either by saying that children are within the covenant; or, that they are born within the pale of the Church; or, that they are presumed to belong to Christ, i. e. to be of the number of the elect.

Second: In opposition to the Reformed doctrine, Romanists and Lutherans teach that the children of believers are not, in virtue of their birth, members of the Church (visible or invisible) until they are baptized. Their doctrine is, that children are made members of the Church by baptism, because it is the appointed means of inward spiritual regeneration. Romanists and Lutherans (as well as other advocates of baptismal regeneration) hold that baptism is essential to salvation, and that all the unbaptized, adult and infant, perish. Such is the express symbolical teaching of both those Churches. The Reformed deny all this. They deny that baptism is necessary to salvation, because they deny that it is the means of regeneration. To understand the state of the question as to this point, let it be remarked, 1. The question is not whether baptism is an effectual means of grace. The Reformed admit that both baptism and the Lord's supper, as well as the word, are

made effectual in conferring grace on believers. This efficacy, however, whether of the word or sacraments, is to be referred not to any intrinsic or objective power in them, but solely to the attending influences of the Spirit. 2. The question is not whether the baptism of an infant may not be attended by its regeneration by the Holy Ghost. The Reformed admit that children are susceptible of regeneration, and that it may take place at any time God sees fit to effect it: but they deny that there is any divine promise that the outward act shall be attended by the inward change, or that baptism, in the case either of adults or infants, is the appointed means of effecting that change. 3. The question, therefore, is, whether infants are regenerated by the Holy Ghost in baptism. In other words, whether infants are made members of the church by baptism, because they are thereby vitally united to Christ. This Romanists and Lutherans affirm, and the Reformed deny.* As to Calvin's own convictions on this point, they are plain from his express assertions, from his arguments (as he labours to disprove the Lutheran and Romish doctrine) and from his whole theological system. Before proceeding further, we must remark, that the word *regeneration* is used by all parties to this discussion in substantially the same sense. It means that change in the state of the soul, wrought by the Holy Ghost, by which it is transferred from spiritual death to spiritual life; or, as Romanists express it, transferred from a state of sin, to a state of habitual (i. e. inherent) grace. Lutherans and Romanists alike hold that in baptism the merits of Christ are conveyed, and the recipient of the rite is vitally united to Christ. He is brought into a state in which his salvation is certain, unless he falls from it. In opposition to this view of the ground and effect of baptism, Calvin says, Inst. iv. 14, 14. "The whole sophistical school teach that the sacraments of the

* There is an important difference between the Lutheran and Romish doctrine of the sacraments. Romanists deny that faith in the recipient is a necessary condition of the efficacy of the sacraments. The Lutherans maintain that it is. They, therefore, freely denounce the *opus operatum* theory of the Romanists. This, however, is a difference which does not here come into consideration; because both assert that infants are regenerated in baptism. Luther of course was forced, in order to save his principles, to maintain that infants have faith.

new covenant, i. e. the Christian sacraments, justify and confer grace, provided we do not interpose the obstacle of mortal sin." And as infants, according to the doctrine in question, do not and cannot oppose any obstacle to the efficacy of the baptism, on them it is assumed always to confer grace. "It is impossible," adds Calvin, "to say how fatal and pestilent is this doctrine. It is certainly diabolical, because as it promises righteousness without faith, it precipitates souls into perdition. . . . Nothing is conferred by the sacraments beyond what, being offered in the word of God, is perceived by faith." It was the constantly avowed doctrine of Calvin that the sacraments confer grace only upon believers. The Lutherans escape this denunciation by holding that infants have faith—that true, actual, saving faith is produced in their hearts, by the Holy Ghost, and therefore baptism communicates grace to them. But this doctrine of infants actually believing is well nigh obsolete, and is not held by the ordinary advocates of baptismal regeneration. On them, therefore, falls the denunciation of Calvin in all its weight. In section 17 of the same chapter, he says, "We are not to think that any latent virtue is intrinsic or inherent (*annexam affixamque*) in the sacraments, by which of themselves they confer the graces of the Spirit; since their only office is to testify and seal to us the benevolence of God; and they do us no good unless attended by the Holy Spirit, who opens our mind and heart, and renders us capable of receiving that testimony." In chapter 15, 17, he says, "Baptism profits us nothing so long as the promise therein offered lies neglected;" and in the following section, "The sacrament follows as a seal, not to give efficacy to the promise, as though it were of itself invalid, but only to confirm it." Then comes the passage, quoted on a preceding page, in which he says, "Hence it follows that the children of believers are baptized not to make them the sons of God, but because, in virtue of the promise, they already pertain to the body of Christ." The body of Christ, it will be remembered, consists of all the elect. In a previous section, the 15th, Calvin argues against the doctrine that baptism confers grace, from the case of Cornelius, the centurion, who received the Holy Ghost before he was baptized, and was baptized, he adds, "not for a freer remission of sin,

but to increase his faith. If any one," he continues, "should object that if sins are not washed away by the virtue of baptism, why did Ananias say to Paul, (Acts xxii. 19,) that he should wash away his sins by baptism?" To this Calvin answers, "Ananias meant to say, Paul, that thou mayest be assured of the remission of thy sins, be baptized. In baptism, God promises remission; receive this rite, and be assured." It was and is a favourite doctrine of the Romanists, that while the New Testament sacraments confer grace, those of the Old Testament only signified it. This doctrine Calvin repudiates. "The scholastic dogma," he says, "which makes such a difference between the sacraments of the two dispensations, as though the one only prefigured grace, and the others confer it, is to be utterly exploded." Chapter xiv. 23. And further on, in the same section, he says, "nothing more is to be attributed to baptism, than Paul, in Rom. iv. 11, attributes to circumcision, verse 12, that it is the seal of the righteousness of faith." To suppose that Calvin believed that every circumcised Jewish child was vitally united to Christ, and regenerated by the Holy Ghost, would be to make him more Roman than Rome. No less foreign to his system is the doctrine that baptized infants as such are regenerated.

The "Consensus Tigurinus" drawn up and signed by Calvin and the ministers of Zurich, is the most formal and authoritative exhibition of the Reformed doctrine on the whole subject of the sacraments. In the 16th article it is said, "We sedulously teach that God does not operate in all promiscuously by the sacraments, but only in the elect." In article 17, "Hence the doctrine that the sacraments of the New Testament confer grace on all who do not oppose the obstacle of mortal sin, is overthrown. For nothing is in the sacraments but what is perceived by faith, and therefore we are not to suppose that grace is so bound to the sacrament, that all who receive the sign have the thing signified. For the signs are given equally to the elect and the non-elect, but the thing signified only to the elect." In article 19, it is said, "Inasmuch as unbelievers receive no more from the use of the sacraments than from the neglect of them. . . . . so what believers receive in them, they receive without them. Paul's sins were washed away in

baptism, but they were washed away before. Baptism was to Cornelius the washing of regeneration, although he had already received the Holy Ghost." Article 20, "The utility of the sacraments is not tied to the time of their administration. . . . For those baptized in infancy are sometimes regenerated in old age."

In the Belgian Confession it is said, "What circumcision did for the Jewish people, the same baptism does for the children of believers." This of course precludes the idea of baptismal regeneration. The Heidelberg Catechism in the answer to the 74th question says, that inasmuch as children no less than adults pertain to the covenant and the Church, they are to be ingrafted into the Church by baptism, and separated from the children of unbelievers, as under the Old Testament was done by circumcision, in the place of which baptism is now substituted. The Second Helvetic Confession, chapter 19, says, "We do not approve of the doctrine of those who teach that grace, and the things signified, are so bound to the sacraments, or included in them, that all, without distinction, who externally receive the signs, internally receive the grace and the things signified." It is useless to multiply citations. If any fact in doctrinal history is plain, it is, that the Reformed Church rejected the doctrine of "sacramental grace," i. e. that the sacraments have inherent efficacy and confer grace on all who receive them, provided they do not resist.*

The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is not only repudiated by all the Reformed Confessions, but, what perhaps, will to many minds be more convincing, it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine with their theology. Every one knows that the Reformed Churches adopted the theological system of Augustin. They all taught that none are born of the Spirit but those who are finally saved. If a man is called (regenerated,) he is justified; and if justified, he is glorified. There is no

* We have not quoted from our own standards for two reasons. First, they are in the hands of all our readers. Second, no one pretends that they teach any higher doctrine on the sacraments than is taught in the earlier confessions of the Reformed Churches. On the contrary, they are usually regarded as teaching a lower doctrine. Our standards are printed in Niemeyer's Collection as the *Libri Symbolici Puritanorum;* a term of reproach in our days.

such thing, according to their doctrine, as falling from grace. If the Reformed therefore believed that all who are baptized are vitally united to Christ, and regenerated by the Holy Ghost, then they held that all the baptized are saved. They assuredly did not hold the latter, and therefore it is no less certain that they did not hold the former. It is impossible for a man to be a Calvinist, and believe the doctrine of baptismal regeneration.

The point on which we proposed briefly to dwell is, that the doctrine of the Reformed Church as to the ground and efficacy of infant baptism is the doctrine of the Bible. So far as the doctrine that the Abrahamic covenant, which is still in force, is the ground of infant baptism, or the warrant which the Church now has for regarding the children of believers as born within her pale, is concerned, the greater part of our article is devoted to that point. The other point, viz. that children are not constituted by baptism members of the invisible Church by a vital union to Christ, or regeneration of the Holy Ghost, needs no proof, so far as Augustinians or Calvinists are concerned. That doctrine, as just remarked, cannot be included in their system. If all the regenerated are saved, all the baptized are not regenerated.

2. A further invincible argument against baptismal regeneration is this. Baptism is not assumed to have greater efficacy in the case of infants than in the case of adults. But by the clear teaching of the Scriptures, regeneration in the case of adults is assumed to precede baptism. No man was ever baptized in the Apostolic Church until he professed faith and repentance. When the Eunuch asked, "What doth hinder me to be baptized? Philip said, If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest." On this principle the Church has always acted. Men have always (except in the most corrupt days of the Romish Church) been required to profess faith in Christ and repentance toward God, before they were admitted to baptism. But faith and repentance are the fruits of regeneration. A man had, therefore, to profess to be regenerated before he could be baptized; therefore baptism could not be, according to Scripture, the means of regeneration.

3. This is involved in the very nature of the service, so far

as adults are concerned. In baptism the candidate lays hold of the covenant of grace. He takes God the Father to be his father, God the Son to be his Saviour, and God the Holy Ghost to be his sanctifier; and he consecrates himself to the worship and service of this Triune God. This he must do before he is baptized. But that is faith. What is saving faith but this reception of the gospel as presented in baptism? A man, therefore, must be a true Christian before, in the sight of God, he is a proper subject of baptism. Baptism was not designed to make him a Christian. It was the appointed mode in which he was to profess Christianity, and by which he was to be assured of his interest in its blessings.

4. A fourth argument is from the analogy of the word. If baptism is said to save us, to unite us to Christ, to make us the sons of God, &c., all this, and far more than this, is said of the word. We are begotten by the truth; we are sanctified by truth; the gospel is the power of God unto salvation. But who ever infers from these declarations that all who hear the word are thus regenerated, sanctified, and saved? Why then should it be inferred from similar declarations concerning baptism, that all the baptized are regenerated? Both classes of passages are to be understood in the same way. The gospel saves us if we believe. Baptism saves us on the same condition. Without faith the one is as ineffectual as the other.

5. This is Paul's doctrine on the whole subject. Circumcision, he says, profiteth if thou keep the law; but if thou be a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision is become uncircumcision. Baptism profits if we are faithful to the covenant to which it is attached; if we have not such faith, our baptism is of no account. It will only aggravate our condemnation.

6. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, so far at least as it has infested the Protestant Church, is easily traceable to a misunderstanding of certain passages of Scripture. Luther understood John iii. 5, and other passages, to teach the absolute necessity of baptism to salvation. But if thus necessary, he inferred that there must be some reason for it. If no man, not even an infant, can enter the kingdom of God without baptism, baptism must be the means of accomplishing what the Scriptures

declare to be necessary for the admission of a sinful creature into heaven. The Scriptures teach that the remission of sins and the renewal of the Holy Ghost are necessary for admission to heaven; therefore, this remission and regeneration must be conferred in baptism. But all this rests on a false foundation. It is very doubtful whether the passage in John has any reference to baptism. But conceding that point, and conceding, moreover, that baptism is there said to be necessary to salvation, it is evidently only the necessity of precept, and not the necessity of a means that is intended. Confession with the mouth is said to be necessary to salvation. That is, if men, when the opportunity offers and the occasion calls for it, do not confess Christ before men, he will not confess them before the angels. But this does not teach that confession is a necessary means of salvation; that no man, and even no infant, who does not publicly confess faith in Christ can be saved. Baptism is the appointed mode of confession, and is necessary in the same, and in no other sense. Ten times more is said in the Old Testament of the necessity of circumcision, than is said in the New, of the necessity of baptism; and yet Paul not only says that the circumcision of a disobedient Jew would avail him nothing, but that if the uncircumcised kept the law, their uncircumcision would be counted for circumcision. Many things are commanded of God, baptism among the number, which if neglected in a disobedient, unbelieving spirit, those who thus neglect them forfeit his favour, although the things in themselves have no connection with salvation, as a means to an end.

7. No doctrine can be more radically opposed to the spirit and teaching of the New Testament than this doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The grand idea of the gospel (so far as the essential nature of religion is concerned) is, that God looks on the heart; that rites and ceremonies are no more essential to religion than clothing to the being of a man; that he is not a Jew who is one outwardly, and that true circumcision is not of the flesh, but of the heart; that the righteousness which God requires must be something different from that of the Scribes and Pharisees; that a man's state before Him does not depend on anything external, but on what is internal and spiritual; that neither grace nor salvation is to be attained by works,

least of all by ceremonies. It is the burden of the gospel, that whosoever believes shall be saved, whether Jew or Gentile, circumcised or uncircumcised, baptized or unbaptized. There is nothing on earth which Paul would have more execrated than the doctrine, (unless perhaps the man who taught it,) that a true believer and worshipper of Christ would perish for the want of external baptism. This would be to contradict a hundred assertions of the word of God, and utterly pervert, transmute, and degrade the religion of the Bible. Luther felt this as deeply as any man, and therefore, no man was more vehement in his denunciations of the Romish doctrine, that the sacraments confer grace on unbelievers. He held that unless infants believe, baptism avails them nothing. The modern doctrine of baptismal grace was as abhorrent to Luther as to Calvin; because abhorrent to the spirit of the gospel. All experience shows the evil tendency of the doctrine in question. Who are the advocates of baptismal regeneration? Of course there are exceptions, many and great; but speaking in general terms, they are not the spiritual and evangelical class among Christians. The most zealous advocates of the doctrine are the irreligious, the worldly, the fashionable, and even the vicious. It is most vehemently defended by those who make religion a form; who carry out the theory, and ascribe sanctifying power to a bishop's hands, to relics, to holy water, to consecrated oil, to amulets and talismans; who fast on Friday, and rob or murder on Saturday; who believe in priestly absolution, and think they can sin with impunity so long as they keep within the pale of the Church, and have access to her cleansing manipulations. It is part of a great system; an element in the great apostacy from apostolic teaching to christianized Judaism. This doctrine of baptism is only a revival of the doctrine of the Pharisees concerning circumcision. It pains us to write thus, when we recollect that dear, glorious Luther retained this with other elements of Romanism. But Luther was a wonder. He had the stomach of an ostrich, and could digest iron. There was nothing which his faith could not master. He believed that the words, "this is my body," teach the local presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist; therefore he believed that Christ's body fills all space. He believed that the Bible teaches that infants

cannot be saved without baptism; therefore he believed that baptism regenerates them. But he believed that the Bible teaches that baptism is useless without faith; therefore he believed that infants exercise faith. He would just as readily have believed that they read and write, had he thought the Bible called him to do so. His great fault was being too confident that he understood the Bible. We are not to be unfaithful to the truth, or to shut our eyes to the dreadful effects of false doctrine, because many, at whose feet we are not worthy to sit, through misinterpreting Scripture, believed it.

8. This, after all, is a question of fact. Are children regenerated in baptism? If a man should say that pouring water on tombstones would bring the dead to life, the shortest method of deciding the matter would be to try the experiment. If the operation were repeated thousands and even millions of times without success, it would be irrational to believe the theory. It would not do to say, that although there were no signs of restored life, still the life was there. Life cannot fail to manifest itself; or even if the signs of life were doubtful, the signs of death are certain. If all the indubitable evidences of death remain, notwithstanding these monumental ablutions, it would be absurd to believe that the dead were alive. No less decisive is the evidence of fact against the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The baptized are not regenerated. They are not vitally united to Christ. They not only give no evidence of this vital union, but they give decisive evidence, in the vast majority of cases, to the contrary. God never contradicts the testimony of his word, by the testimony of his providence or grace. If he had promised that washing with water in his name should regenerate the soul, we should find the fact in accordance with the promise. The fact however is notoriously otherwise; and to assert the existence of the fact without evidence, and against evidence, is to delude ourselves and others, and the delusion is apt to prove fatal. It has been a fatal delusion to many. What is regeneration worth, according to this theory? How is the indwelling of the Holy Ghost degraded and made a thing of naught, if we affirm such indwelling of the mass of the baptized? The whole nature of religion is of neces-

sity perverted; it is turned into Judaic formalism, by thus attributing to external rites effects which are due only to the power of the Spirit, whose presence in the soul is always manifested by the fruits of holinesss.

When Paul had proved to the Jews that circumcision could not save them; that it was neither designed as the means of effecting the circumcision of the heart, nor so interested them in the promises made to their fathers, as to render their salvation certain, they ungratefully and unreasonably asked, What then is the profit of circumcision? We may as well neglect it as not, if it does not secure us an interest in the Messiah's kingdom. These are precisely the question and complaint addressed to those who deny that baptism is the means of regeneration, and who teach that it does not secure, as a matter of course, a portion in the salvation of the gospel. The answer in both cases is the same. There were great advantages connected with circumcision. The circumcised were separated from the world as the people of God; they were the depositaries of the true religion, and of the true worship; to them pertained the covenants, and the promises. All the religion to be found in the world (rare cases excepted) was to be found in their ranks; God had commanded them by circumcision to consecrate their children to him, and had threatened to cut them off from his people if they failed to do so. Was all this nothing? What circumcision did for the Jews, baptism does for us. Are we so ungrateful and rebellious as to say baptism is nothing, unless it is the means of regeneration; unless it vitally unites our children to Christ? Is it nothing to belong to the Church, to be of the number of those who in God's own way are separated from the world, and consecrated to his service? Is it nothing to be within that covenant in which God promises to be our God? Is it nothing to belong to that class in which almost without exception the blessings of redemption flow? Do we wish to exclude our children from all interest in the special promises made to the baptized, that is, to those who bear the seal of the covenant? We may rest assured that any parent who neglects or refuses to dedicate his child to God in baptism, who abstains from entering into covenant with God in its name

and behalf, in his appointed way, endangers its salvation as effectually as a Hebrew parent would endanger the salvation of his children by refusing to permit them to be circumcised.

The status, therefore, of baptized children is not a vague or uncertain one, according to the doctrine of the Reformed Churches. They are members of the Church; they are professing Christians; they belong presumptively to the number of the elect. These propositions are true of them in the same sense in which they are true of adult professing Christians. Both classes have professed the same faith; both have covenanted with God to be his people, to trust his grace, and to obey his will. Both are included in the general class of persons whom God requires his Church to regard and treat as within her pale, and under her watch and care. When these baptized children come to a suitable age, and have the requisite knowledge, they should be required to assume for themselves their baptismal vows, and should, as other church members, be disciplined for any neglect or violation of their covenanted obligations. Such is the doctrine of our standards. "CHILDREN born within the pale of the visible Church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the Church; and are to be taught to read, and to repeat the catechism, the apostles' creed, and the Lord's prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed that it is their duty, and their privilege, to come to the Lord's supper." *Directory*, chap. ix.

Orestes A. Brownson's Development of Himself.

Editor of the Repertory—In the last number of your valuable Quarterly, there is a review of Mr. Brownson's last work, which seems to demand a brief notice by myself. In the work thus reviewed, ("*The Convert; or, Leaves from my Experience,*") Mr. Brownson has seen fit to honour with a protracted notice the church at Ballston, Saratoga county, New York, and certain of its acts, as a leading cause of his abandoning Presbyterianism. As the object of his book is to show his own moral and intellectual integrity in all his subsequent changes, it is certainly fair to give him the advantage of having the beginning of his divergency exhibited as it was.

I will state, therefore, that I was the "*pastor*" of the church so often alluded to by him; and although "the time is long since," all the circumstances of Mr. Brownson's short connection with us are still vivid in my mind; if it were otherwise, the records of the church, and many living witnesses, can testify to the facts as I now state them.

Mr. Brownson came to our church in the year 1822, and was examined and received in the usual manner. He communed with us once; went to the West, to teach a school, I think; came back a Universalist, and then entered upon that downward course of changes which has marked his history since. As to his representation of having professed peculiar views at the time of his examination, as *if he had renounced his own private opinions, and wanted an infallible guide in the church*, and that we received him on this ground—it is wholly fabricated, or the merest dream of after years. We had an intelligent Session, but did not, I fear, do our duty faithfully as to this man's evidences of piety.

His next statement, which I deem it my duty to correct, is still more remarkable. "On Monday following his admission into the church," he says, "a meeting of its members was held, at which we all pledged ourselves, not only to pray for the con-

version of sinners, but to mark them wherever we met with them—to avoid them, to have no intercourse with them that could be helped; and never to speak to them, except to admonish them of their sins, or so far as it would be necessary on business. There was to be no interchange of social or neighbourly visits between us and them, and we were to have even business relations with them only when absolutely necessary. We were, by our manner, to show all, not members of the Presbyterian Church, that we regarded them as the enemies of God, and therefore hated by us; and we were, in business relations, always to give the preference to church-members, and as far as possible, without sacrificing our own interests, to treat those not members as outcasts from society—as *pariahs*—and thus to compel them to join the Presbyterian Church."—*Review*, p. 130.

No such thing, or the semblance of it, ever occurred. That we might have held a meeting on Monday, is highly probable. It was a time of revival of religion, and we were probably exhorted to attempt more separateness from the world; we may have even renewed our church covenant, (for I have sometimes known this to be done,) but that we ever made *such a pledge*, or used such language in relation to *sinners*, as is here charged, we utterly deny and repudiate. We do not believe it was done anywhere; not even in Western New York, as he alleges, in 1827.

How to account for such a representation I am utterly at a loss to determine. But if astonished here, I am still more so at his third and last charge, which is express and personal in regard to myself. Mr. Brownson says, according to the Review, "that his pastor agreed with him, that the article in the Confession of Faith, on foreordination, was harsh; *and informed him that he had moved in the General Assembly to have it altered, in which he failed by only two or three votes.*" P. 134.

Here, I confess, my amazement is about used up, and I hardly know what to say. To deny that I ever offered such a motion in the General Assembly would be superfluous, since any well-informed Presbyterian would know, that a direct vote of this kind could never be thought of there; and to the assertion

that I was silly enough to say I did, (thus telling a most foolish falsehood,) I can only give a flat and unqualified denial. Yet, Mr. Brownson says his pastor told him so! Is he wilfully false? or can we adopt the charitable conclusion of his reviewer, and conclude that "he has probably forgotten, or retained only a hazy remembrance of what transpired." And yet Mr. Brownson has written these reminiscences of his early experience, mainly for the purpose of *showing his moral and intellectual integrity!* I am not his judge; but thus much I feel bound to show—and will show it more abundantly if Mr. Brownson requires it. In accounting for his opposition to Presbyterianism Mr. Brownson *has caricatured and slandered a worthy church; stated as fact what never occurred in it; and affirmed a saying of myself in particular, which directly or indirectly, in sum or in substance, I never uttered.*

I am no enemy to Mr. Brownson. The time was, when (long after he had departed from us) I attempted to do him good. But though he treated me respectfully, and acknowledged all his changes, he was at that time fully in the belief that "he had found the truth now." I became discouraged, and our correspondence ceased. Long afterwards, when I met him again, (he will recollect, perhaps, that it was in a steamboat cabin on Lake Champlain,) he told me he had concluded "the truth was not to be found by private individuals, and thought he should go to the Catholic Church." When a friend on that occasion asked him, "Whether he had been happy during all these changes—have you been '*lying on a bed of roses?*'" "*Spikes*, sir,'" was his energetic answer, "Spikes!" No; I feel for this man; I think as I should think of him; I pity him, if he will permit me to say so; for I am sure he is unhappy still, and must be until he is a changed man. It is evident he is still on Spikes!

Reuben Smith.

Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, February, 1858.

SHORT NOTICES.

Memorials of the Chaunceys, including President Chauncey, his Ancestors and Descendants. By William Chauncey Fowler. Boston: 1858. Royal 8vo. pp. 304.

A superb volume, every way worthy of the subject, the author, and the Boston press. Professor Fowler, in paying due tribute to the ancestry of which he comes, has really made a valuable addition to the materials of American history, and has done his pious work with apparent accuracy, and various tokens of scholarship and taste. We can recall no single work among the numerous genealogical volumes issued by our New England neighbours, which is more full or elegant than this. The early Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, though not our forefathers, are knitted to us by a theological tie; their holding in religious truth was that of our predecessors; their tenets are those which we maintain. Whitefield, the elder Edwards, Brainerd, and the Tennents, did but maintain or revive that theology which had languished among the sons of the Pilgrims, but which even now lives in the adherents of the Westminster Confession.

Charles Chauncey, the second President of Harvard College, was the emigrant ancestor of all who bear the name in America. The ramifying households are too numerous for mention here. Our early recollections are revived, and our veneration renewed, for those eminent citizens of Philadelphia, the late Charles and Elihu Chauncey, whose names have ample honour in these biographies. We lay down this sumptuous edition, with an avowal of our judgment, that such works cannot be too much multiplied.

Three Eras of New England, and other Addresses; with Papers Critical and Biographical. By George Lunt. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1857. Pp. 264.

This is a collection of the occasional productions of an accomplished writer; printed in the attractive style characteristic of the Boston press. The author, who, during President Tyler's administration, was the United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, has been frequently called to address literary

bodies; and some of the more extended of these addresses are presented in this volume. We have read with most interest the paper on Macaulay's celebrated essay on Warren Hastings. Mr. Lunt not only presents in a strong light the revolting atrocities of Hastings's conduct in India, but he exhibits no less clearly the low standard of moral principle on which Macaulay's judgments are pronounced. It is deeply to be regretted that a man so highly gifted as Macaulay, whose historical works will exert a powerful influence on public sentiment for centuries, should in all his writings evince such incapacity to appreciate moral and religious excellence. If the best man in the world spoke through his nose, Macaulay could not endure him.

Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of various Denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year 1855. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D. D. Vols. III. and IV. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1858. Pp. 632 and 829.

These two volumes of Dr. Sprague's great work are devoted to the clergy of the Presbyterian Church. It is a monument of zeal and diligence, and will long continue to be the storehouse of interesting and important historical information. Hoping to be able to present, in our next number, an extended review of this valuable contribution to the history of our Church, we shall not dwell longer on its merits.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia: Being a condensed Translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia. With additions from other sources. By Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D. Assisted by distinguished Theologians of various denominations. Part VI. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858.

We have repeatedly called the attention of our readers to this valuable work. We know of no source whence the English reader can obtain, in such convenient form, reliable information of the latest results of German erudition and research.

English Grammar. The English Language in Elements and Forms. With a History of its Origin and Development. Designed for use in Colleges and Schools. Revised and Enlarged. By William C. Fowler, late Professor of Rhetoric in Amherst College. New York: Harper & Brother. 1857. 8vo. pp. 754.

It is eight years since we gave our opinion of this elaborate work, then first published; the judgment of American scholars has since confirmed our favourable award. The revised edition has a number of additions, some of which are real improvements. Among these we do not reckon the Questions for

teacher and pupil, which surely pertain to a lower stadium of education. More than fifty sections have been furnished for the work by Dr. Gibbs, of New Haven, whose name carries weight in all that concerns either the origin or the structure of our mother tongue; and whose recent "Philological Studies," though fragmentary, curt, and even eccentric in their form, take rank, we think, with any researches ever made into the recondite but fascinating domain of syntactical phenomena. Such inquiries as those of Gibbs, Fowler, Brown and Mulligan, differing as they may among themselves, will at length result in an awakening of studious minds to the rarest of all attainments among our academic youth—the mastery of pure English. Irreparable harm is doing to our idiom by the gross, unscholarly inventions of wrong-learned pedagogues, half-learned preachers, and unlearned congressmen and editors. As population spreads beyond the circle of classic usage, we encounter, at hustings, caucus, and camp-meeting, such forms as these: "It was *approbated;*" "this sum was *donated;*" "while the house was *being built;*" "the rose by any other name would smell as *sweetly;*" "the ice feels *coldly;*" "between you and *I;*" "*on* yesterday;" "*on* to-morrow;" and possibly "*on* to-day." Nothing but early training, with such books as this, can prevent our degeneracy.

Messiah's Reign; or, The Future Blessedness of the Church and the World. By Rev. W. Ramsey, D. D. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. Pp. 267.

Dr. Ramsey has recently closed his earthly career, after a laborious and devoted life. He has left this book as a testimony to what he considered truth in reference to the future glory of the Redeemer's kingdom. It advocates the doctrine of the premillenial advent of Christ, and of the return of the Jews to their own land. It presents in a very convenient form the arguments in favour of that view of the doctrine of the millennium.

Commentary on the Book of Kings. By Karl F. Keil, D. D., P. H. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology and of the Oriental Languages in the University of Dorpat. Translated by James Murphy, LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast. Supplemented by Commentary on the Books of Chronicles. By Ernst Berthen, Professor in Gœttingen. Translated by James Martin, B. A., Edinburgh. Vols. I. and II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 38 George street. 1857. Pp. 450 and 462.

These are two additional volumes of the Messrs. Clarke's "Foreign Theological Library," which we have so often had occasion favourably to notice. Professor Keil is one of the most orthodox of modern German theologians.

Gnomon of the New Testament. By John Albert Bengel. Now first translated into English; with original Notes, Explanatory and Illustrative. Revised and edited by Rev. Andrew R. Fausset, M. A., of Trinity College, Dublin. Vols. I. and III. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 38 George street. 1857. Pp. 577 and 437.

We should have noticed this work in our last number. Every scholar is familiar with the character of Bengel's Gnomon. It is, for conciseness, suggestiveness and felicity, unrivalled. More than a hundred years have elapsed since its first publication, and it is still one of the books most frequently quoted, or referred to as an authority by modern exegetical writers. The translation has been made by the editor whose name is given above, and by the Rev. J. Bandinel, M. A., of Wadham College, Oxford, Rev. James Bryce, late of Aberdeen, and Rev. Dr. Fletcher, Head Master of the Grammar-School, Wimborne, Dorsetshire. These names are a guaranty for the scholarlike execution of the difficult task. Messrs. Smith & English inform us that they are the agents for the publication of the work in this country, and that the subscription price is eight dollars, or ten, prepaid, when sent by mail. It is to be completed in five volumes. The remaining volumes are expected to appear early this year.

Expository Thoughts on the Gospels. For Family and Private use. With the Text complete. By the Rev. J. C. Ryle, B. A., Christ Church, Oxford; Rector of Helmingham, Suffolk. St. Mark. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1858. Pp. 370.

This is a continuation of the work commenced in the publication of "Expository Thoughts on St. Matthew." The author's object is the religious edification of his readers. A few verses, containing a connected portion of the evangelical narrative, are given, and these are followed by a series of remark, very much in the manner of Dr. Scott's Practical Observations attached to his Commentary.

English Hearts and English Hands; or, the Railway and the Trenches. By the author of the "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1858. Pp. 343.

This is a record of the successful efforts made for the spiritual benefit of a peculiar and interesting class of English labourers; the sturdy men employed in the construction of great public works. The author's object is to show how much "of high and delicate feeling" is to be found among those who are called to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow. The numerous readers of the Memoirs of Captain Vicars may know what to anticipate in the perusal of the present volume.

Memories of Gennesaret. By the Rev. John R. MacDuff. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 387.

The author of this work is the writer of numerous religious books, of the sentimental order, which have obtained favour with a large class of readers. This work belongs to the same class with "Morning and Night Watches," "Words of Jesus," "Evening Incense." The sentimental as distinguished from the devotional, is not to our taste; but works of the kind indicated have no doubt a good work to do, and do it.

The Bow in the Cloud; and the First Bereavement. By the Rev. John R. MacDuff. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1858. Pp. 150.

A book of the same general class as the preceding.

Political Progress not necessarily Democratic; or, Relative Equality the True Foundation of Liberty. By James Lorimer, Esq., Advocate. London: Williams & Norgate.

Another volume preliminary to the discussion of parliamentary reform. Its aim is to present the dangers to which a liberal monarchy is exposed in the progress towards a pure democracy. The latter is assumed as the certain path to anarchy and injustice, and thence to despotism, where the liberal process would be landed at its original point of departure. Accordingly, the argument is addressed to the means of stopping liberal progress short of democracy, or, more precisely, short of universal suffrage. The method proposed is set forth in very general terms, but is designed to embody the principle that "Political influence ought, as nearly as possible, to correspond to social weight and importance."

The Historically received Conception of the University considered with especial reference to Oxford. By Edward Kirkpatrick, A. M., Oxon. London: Williams & Norgate.

A valuable treatise, chiefly occupied with the distinctive principle of the University and the history of such institutions in Europe. The excellences and defects of German and English Universities, and most fully of Oxford, are passed in review, and suggestions of improvement made, which seem, at least in the case of the last mentioned, to be most urgently demanded. The work is one of a scholar every way qualified to offer opinions on the subject, worthy of the gravest consideration.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

H. E. Howard, The Books of Numbers and Deuteronomy according to the version of the Seventy, translated into English. 8vo. pp. 430.

Goodwin, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew.

J. Stephen, Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, in a series of lectures. 12mo. pp. 592.

C. J. Ellicott, Commentary on Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon, with a revised translation. 8vo. pp. 282.

H. Linton, Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul. 12mo. pp. 579.

W. Williams, Commentary on Isaiah. 8vo. pp. 370.

J. Cumming, Sabbath Morning Readings on the Old Testament—Joshua and Judges. 12mo. pp. 518. Sabbath Evening Readings on the New Testament—Corinthians. 12mo. pp. 466. Benedictions or the blessed Life. 12mo. pp. 326.

A. Jukes, The Types of Genesis briefly considered, as revealing the development of human nature in the world within and without, and in the dispensations. 8vo. pp. 440.

The New Testament, with the Greek text of Scholz, the readings of Griesbach, and the variations of the editions of Stephens 1550, Beza 1598, and the Elzevir 1633, with the English authorized version. 4to. pp. 620. Bagster.

E. M. Goulbourn, The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. 12mo. pp. 136.

J. H. Balfour, The Plants of the Bible—Trees and Shrubs. 8vo. 22 oil coloured illustrations.

Presbyterian Liturgies, with specimens of forms of prayer for public worship, as used in the Continental Reformed and American churches. Edited by a minister of the Church of Scotland, 8vo. pp. 38.

J. J. Blunt, On the right use of the early Fathers. 8vo. pp. 650.

W. Osborn, The Religions of the world, being historical sketches of ancient and modern Heathenism, Romanism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. 12mo. pp. 352.

J. Stoddart, Glossology, or the Historical Relations of Languages. 1st Division. 8vo. pp. 386.

B. H. Cowper, The principles of Syriac Grammar. Translated and abridged from the work of Dr. Hoffmann. 8vo. pp. 184.

R. C. Trench, On some deficiencies in our English Dictionaries. 8vo. pp. 56.

FRANCE.

J. Ferrari, History of the Revolutions of Italy. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1030.

A. Gabourd, History of France from the origin of the Gauls to the present time. Vol. 8. 8vo. pp. 620. To be completed in 20 volumes.

GERMANY.

J. G. Vaihinger on Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon, with a metrical translation. 8vo. pp. 327. This is the 4th volume of the author's Commentary on the poetical books of the Old Testament.

A second edition of P. Schegg on the Psalms, in 3 vols.

F. Hitzig, Translation and Exposition of the Proverbs of Solomon. 8vo. pp. 347.

J. H. Kurtz, The marriages of the sons of God with the daughters of men. Gen. vi. 1—4. As an appendix to the 1st volume of his history of the Old Covenant. 8vo. pp. 100.

J. P. Land, Disputation concerning the blessing of Jacob in Gen. xlix. 8vo. pp. 100. In Latin.

F. Himpel, The doctrine of Immortality in the Old Testament. 1st Part. 4to. pp. 32.

Delitzsch has published a Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and Huther on the Epistle of James. 8vo. pp. 208. This latter forms volume 15, in Meyers' series of Commentaries on the New Testament.

H. Sengelmann, The book of Tobit explained. 8vo. pp. 122.

W. Zimmermann, The History of the Church. Vol. 2. 8vo. pp. 520.

A. Messner, The History of Revelation. Vol. 2. 8vo. pp. 315.

Aurora, or Selections from the writings of those who strove to reform the Church before Luther. Vol. 4. Hugo St. Victor. 8vo. pp. 51.

Corpus Reformatorum, Vol. xxvi. Part 1. 4to. pp. 416. Still continues the works of Melancthon.

J. Zhishman, Transactions relating to the union of the Oriental and Romish Churches, from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the Council of Ferrara. 8vo. pp. 258.

C. F. Keil, Hand-book of Biblical Archæology. Part 1. The Religious affairs of the Israelites. 8vo. pp. 452.

A Knötel, System of Egyptian Chronology. 8vo. pp. 124.

M. Uhlemann, Hand-book of Universal Egyptian Archæology. Part 3. Chronology and History of the Ancient Egyptians. 8vo. pp. 278.

J. H. Krause, Plotina, or the fashion of wearing the hair among the nations of the ancient world. 8vo. pp. 270.

C. Lassen, Antiquities of India. Vol. 3. Part 2. Section 1. 8vo. pp. 417—784.

A. Castréns, Ethnological Lectures on the Altay Nations. 8vo. pp. 259.

J. W. Wolf, Contributions to German Mythology. Part 2. 8vo. pp. 468.

J. Kepleri Astronomi, Opera omnia. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 672.

A Manual of the Chaldee Language: Containing a Chaldee Grammar, chiefly from the German of Winer; a Chrestomathy, consisting of selections from the Targums, and including notes on the Biblical Chaldee; and a vocabulary adapted to the Chrestomathy, with an Appendix on the Rabbinic and Samaritan dialects. By Elias Riggs, D. D. Second edition, revised. 8vo. pp. 152.

The Chaldee has claims upon the attention of Biblical scholars, from the facts that portions of the Old Testament are written in this language; that it bears so close an affinity to the Hebrew as to be a valuable aid to its more perfect understanding; that it is the key to important paraphrases of the Old Testament, held in high repute among the Jews, and containing their traditional interpretation, and that it is necessary to any extended acquaintance with Jewish writings generally. We welcome this republication of Dr. Riggs's Manual, which is the best extant, and hope that many may be induced to avail themselves of the aid thus afforded them for the acquisition of this tongue.