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ARTICLE I. — *The Works of John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. With a Memoir and Annotations, by* ROBERT ASHTON, Secretary of the Congregational Board, London. 3 vols. 12mo. pp. 471, 506, 516. Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society. 1851.

WE hold ourselves under lasting obligations to the Congregational Union of England and Wales for the republication of these works; and to the Congregational Board of Publication in this country, for their introduction here. It is one of the signs of good which we are ever ready to hail from New England.

Among all Congregationalists or Independents, there is perhaps no name that stands higher than that of John Robinson. "Both English and American Independents look with affectionate interest to Leyden as the refuge and home of their predecessors; and to Mr. Robinson as their father and friend."* "The father of New England Congregationalists," is a term by which he is continually recognized among us.

Robinson was born in the year 1575. The precise place of his birth is uncertain. It was probably in Lincolnshire. He was graduated at Cambridge, and commenced his public labours in the Church of England. Dissenting from the ceremonies, the vestments, &c., of the Church, he was suspended. It was

* Vol. I. page 5.

for a time his desire to remain in the Established Church. This, however, he soon yielded, and fully joined the Separatists. His subsequent judgment of the Establishment was very severe. In parts of his works he argues earnestly and at length to demonstrate that the Church of England is no church of Christ. His arguments are such as these:

(1.) She was not gathered according to the word of God.

(2.) She is not constituted according to the word of God, being a national, and ungodly body.

(3.) The truth is not taught according to the word of God.

(4.) The sacraments are not administered according to the word.

Entire and absolute separation was of course the logical conclusion from these premises. How far it was lawful to hold any communion at all with that body, formed a subject of controversy between Robinson and some of his brethren. It should be stated, that he finally modified some of his sternest conclusions in reference to the Episcopal Church.

After labouring a while as a Dissenter in England, the violence of the Episcopal party forced his removal with his friends to Holland. This was in the year 1608. He went first to Amsterdam, and then to Leyden, where he was ordained pastor of the church which had chosen him for their guide. William Brewster, a name celebrated in the history of New England, was chosen "Ruling Elder" of the church. While Robinson was at Leyden, the Arminian controversy was raging violently there. He threw himself earnestly upon the Calvinistic side, and engaged in a three-days public discussion with Episcopius himself. After the meeting of the Synod of Dort, he wrote a "Defence of the doctrine propounded by the Synod." This is one of the most important of his works.

The church at Leyden finally resolved to remove to America. Permission was obtained for their settlement in Virginia. It was decided that a part of the church should go first, and prepare the way for the remainder; if a major part would go, then the pastor was to go with them, and the elder remain; if a minority should go, then the elder was to accompany them, and the pastor remain. A minority only went in the first company. The pastor gave them his charge, and waited to rejoin them.

The history of the May Flower and of Plymouth Rock is familiar. What would have been the result to the country, and the Church, if the May Flower had struck Virginia instead of Plymouth Rock, we leave the thoughtful to conjecture.

Robinson never saw his church united again. As good old Cotton Mather would say, he was not allowed to take New England on his way to heaven. He died suddenly in Leyden, March 1st, 1625, aged fifty years. Four or five years after his death, provision was made for removing his family to this country, where many of his descendants now live.

It is however, with the theological and ecclesiastical views of Robinson that we have been particularly interested; and we do not know that we can render our readers a more acceptable service than to present a brief outline of these views as contained in the volumes before us.

The first volume gives us a series of essays on various moral and religious topics, and the defence of the Synod of Dort; the second is occupied with a justification of separation from the Church of England; while miscellaneous treatises, letters, a catechism, &c., fill the third.

The style of Robinson's writings is the style of his time. In controversy, he is sufficiently intelligible and sufficiently pointed to be understood by his adversaries. He was aware of the hazards of controversy as well as of its obligation. "Disputations in religion are sometimes necessary, but always dangerous; drawing the best spirits into the head from the heart, and leaving it empty of all, or too full of fleshly zeal and passion, if extraordinary care be not taken still to supply and fill it anew with pious affections toward God, and loving towards men. * * * He that strives for error strives for Satan against God; he that strives for victory strives for himself against other men; but he that strives for truth against error, helps the Lord against God's and his own enemy, Satan, the father of lies."*

As there is probably no passage in all Robinson's writings that has been as much quoted, and as much used by a certain class of New England theologians, as one that is said to have occurred in his farewell address to the portion of his church

* Vol. I. pp. 36, 37.

that embarked at Delft Haven, it is worthy a moment's examination. The passage is this: "He charged us before God, and his blessed angels to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of his, to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth of his ministry; for he was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of his holy word. * * * Also he put us in mind of our church covenant, at least that part of it whereby we promise and covenant with God, and one with another, to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from his written word, &c." This passage will be recognized at once as a watchword by which place has been demanded for almost every kind and degree of theological error. Doctrines which good old Robinson's soul loathed as the gates of hell, have been thrust forward behind this covert of his authority. Even Unitarians have not hesitated to claim him for themselves as "a progressive man," and certainly with as much right and reason as some others who reject their claim.

But there are several things to be said in respect to this passage.

First, it does not prove at all that Robinson did not regard the great doctrines of the Scripture as known and fixed. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence, as we shall show, that he did so regard them. If there were some things that were not known, it is plain enough that he supposed some things were known—if there were some doctrines unsettled, it is sufficiently clear that he regarded *some* as settled. As the editor of the volumes under review, in defending him from the Unitarian claim, admirably remarks, "They imagine he would sympathize with themselves, who, discarding not only all 'creeds,' but the peculiar doctrines of the gospel, and retaining only a few elementary truths of revelation, are striving to form thereon a basis of catholic unity and charity among all Christians! Such an amalgamation of heterogeneous parties, Mr. Robinson would most surely have denounced. He contended earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints, as his defence of the Synod of Dort abundantly proves; and while he believed that "still more light would break out from the Scriptures," he

could never suppose that the truths already discovered would be eclipsed by any additional illumination to be vouchsafed from heaven."

In the second place, there are very serious doubts as to whether Robinson ever used these words at all. They occur nowhere in his own works. The first record we have of them is in a report *from memory* by Winslow, more than a quarter of a century after they are said to have been uttered. This is a very slim support to hang so authoritative a deliverance upon. As to the use made of the passage, however, it makes little difference whether it was ever uttered or not.

What the real sentiments of Robinson were in regard to the theological innovators, is expressed by himself in his essay on "Religion." "The complaint," he says, "is just and great of the vanity and wantonness of men and women in finding and following new fashions of apparel; but it were well if this vanity and newfangledness were to be seen only on people's backs; and that the complaint were not as just and more grievous of the profane wantonness of many in taking up new forms of faith and religion, specially in places of liberty and where men may profess any religion, or none if they will, without bodily danger. I have known divers that have more lightly and licentiously changed their religion, and that in no small points, than a sober man would do the fashion of his coat."*

The theology of Robinson was unequivocally Calvinistic. His frequent quotations from Augustine—his great respect for Calvin and the Reformers—his uncompromising hostility to Pelagianism and Arminianism in all their forms, indicate at once his place in the host that have contended for the faith once delivered to the saints.

It is to be observed, that as he lived when the Church was pressed by the errors of Arminianism, his writings bear particularly against those errors. The doctrines of the being of God—the Trinity—the inspiration of the Scriptures, &c., are everywhere assumed.

On the distinction between essential and non-essential truths, he says, "I do acknowledge a difference of truths, * * * yet

*Vol. I. pp. 37, 38.

do I wish more conscience in the application of this distinction. For * * * * this is made a salve for every sore—that they have the substance of the gospel, the doctrine of faith—all fundamental truths, &c. In which defence (as it is made) there are these evils. 1. In it men not only endeavour, which is too much, the curing of Babel, but indeed, to make Babel believe she stands in no great need of curing; and that her wounds are neither deadly nor dangerous. 2. It tends to vilify and make of small moment many of the Lord's truths and ordinances, &c. 3. This pleading by the ministers, that they hold and enjoy every fundamental truth * * * is injurious both to the growth and sincerity of the obedience of God's people."*

It would seem to be enough, in exhibiting the Calvinism of Robinson, to refer to the historical fact already alluded to, namely, that his most important work, as we conceive, is "A Defence of the Doctrine propounded by the Synod of Dort." From this defence, and from other parts of his works, however, we will present his views more in detail.

1. *In reference to the Divine Decrees, Predestination, Election, Reprobation.*

"I affirm," he says, "that God's decree and ordination about Adam's fall, was such, as that the same could not but follow thereupon; not as an effect upon a cause working it; God forbid! but as a consequent upon an antecedent; or as an event necessarily following upon a most holy, wise, and powerful providence, so ordering and disposing that the same should come to pass infallibly, though performed by Adam's free and freely-working will. If any demand how this can be, that God, who forbiddeth and hateth sin, yet should so order persons and things by his providence, and so from eternity purpose to order them as that the same cannot but be, I answer by free acknowledgment, that the manner of God's working herein is to me and to all men inconceivable; and withal avouch, that he who will not confess that God can and could in Adam's sin, by his infinite wisdom and power, most effectually and infallibly in regard of such event, order and dispose of things without violation to his holiness, or violence to the creature's will, as no mortal man is able to conceive the manner thereof, is himself in

* Vol. II. pp. 476—478.

a high degree guilty of that pride which was Adam's ruin, by which he desired to be as God in knowledge."*

He then goes on to prove from the Scripture, "that all events, even those most sinful in regard of the creature's work in and of them, come to pass necessarily, after a sort, in respect of God's providence."

"The drift (of Rom. ix.) is to show that the first and highest cause, why, of all mankind fallen in Adam, one is cleared and another not, is only the good pleasure and free will of God, and not man's deservings; and yet that God in so choosing or electing one before another, doeth nothing unjustly."† "God from eternity purposed in time to glorify his justice in the deserved destruction of Esau and not of Jacob."‡ "God wills and works the condemnation of some sinners because he judgeth fit, willeth and will work therein the manifestation of the glory of his justice; but this condemnation which otherwise he would not lay upon any, he both wills and works by and for the creature's sin according to his eternal and unchangeable purpose of will in himself."§

"The effectual calling of a Christian is that by which the Lord first differenceth actually, and in the person himself, the elect from the reprobate. God calls a man actually in time as he hath chosen him in his eternal decree."‖

"They (Arminians) contradict themselves in saying that God chooseth all men, good and bad, upon condition of faith and obedience * * *. To choose is to take some from the rest, and not to take all. He that takes all alike chooses none. Besides, by this the same persons are both elected and reprobated, chosen and refused; and every one alike either of both. Than which, nothing is more absurd."

"What if the holy and just God had left all men universally as having defaced his image in which they were at first created and made, without any means or hope of remedy as he did the angels that sinned, had it been any more than justice in him so to have done? (2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6.) And will these malaperts then sue him at the law if he have held the course of jus-

* Vol. I. pp. 274, 5.
† Vol. I. p. 349.
‡ Page 355.
§ Vol. I. p. 11.
‖ Vol. I. pp. 116, 117.

tice towards some which was due to all? Will they make the grace of the gospel a debt from God to men, or a matter of mere grace and mercy? Is it not of mere mercy that he calls any to life? and but just if he leaves all to themselves, and to their own affected ignorances and lusts?"*

In what sense election and reprobation are conditional, is thus stated: "We affirm that God predestinates none to salvation, but with condition of the death of Christ, and the person's coming to years of discretion, faith and repentance, and continuance therein to the end, to go before their salvation; nor to damnation, but with condition of sin, and impenitency therein, to go before their damnation. But our adversaries being bold and presumptuous, speak evil of the things which they neither know, nor are willing to understand. Only these two things we further hold in the case: First, that the former conditions, Christ and faith in him, are God's free gifts also, infallibly and effectually obtained by the former persons; the latter condition, impenitency in sin, the certain effect of Satan's malice, and their own corruption, being left of God thereunto. The second is, that other reason why God hath, of two alike corrupt in themselves, preordained the former to salvation by the former means; and the latter to condemnation, by the latter, the Scriptures do not acquaint us with, than the mere pleasure of Him who 'hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth,' and who hath loved Jacob and hated Esau, (to wit, in decree,) the children not being yet born, neither having done either good or evil." Rom. ix. 11, 15, 18.†

"Why God should thus choose some, and pass by others, in the general, we see reason, both by the light of nature and the Scriptures; namely, that the glory of his power and justice might be seen in the one, and of the riches of his mercy in the other. (Rom. ix. 21–23.) But why, in particular, the Lord God should rather choose *this* man or woman than *that*, we leave unto himself to know till the day of revelation of hidden things. Only let our care and diligence be, in the meanwhile, first to know assuredly that we are ourselves of that blessed number, and by such marks as cannot deceive; and so knowing, both to have in our hearts, and to express in word and deed, all

* Vol. I. p. 337. † Vol. I. p. 386.

thankfulness unto our good God and most gracious Father, who hath vouchsafed unto us, above many others, such singular mercy."*

2. *As to the relation of God to sin.* Robinson first denies that God is the author of sin; and, secondly, affirms that he might have prevented it if he had chosen. "That God is not the author or worker of sin, and that he gives no influence, instinct, motion, or inclination to the least sin, I embrace. * * * Since sin is the work of men and angels, it followeth that sin is from them, who are themselves from God, though the sin be not, but of themselves, &c. * * * God doth permit and suffer sin, and that both willingly and wisely, not by giving the creature leave to sin, for that is impossible, but by not putting the effectual impediments which might hinder sin, as he both could and lawfully might, if he would. He could and might, had he so pleased, not have created men or angels which have sinned: or by irresistible grace, restraint, or other disappointment, have prevented their sin. He therefore permitteth it willingly, and when he could hinder it if he would; otherwise it were no permission, though he did not hinder it; no more than a man can be said to permit or suffer the sun to shine or rain to fall, that hinders them not."†

3. *Imputation.* "The question . . . is whether all infants sinned in Adam, and so be guilty of death and condemnation naturally, &c. This I will prove, God willing, against them, [our adversaries.] * * * I grant that infants had then no life or being, as Adam had; to wit, actual and distinct; but affirm that they had both, after a sort, and as the branches in the root. * * * The punishment (Gen. iii. 17–19) reacheth to all Adam's posterity, and so the threatening, and by consequence the law. * * * 'That all sinned in Adam,' it is so plain from Rom. v. 12, as they have nothing at all to answer, though they object the place; only they bring certain other scriptures in such a manner as if they would disprove one scripture by another. And, indeed, what exposition can be given or evasion

* Vol. I. p. 328.

† Vol. III. pp. 239–241. See also, p. 256, and Vol. I. pp. 16, 274–282, 293, 393–399.

found, considering the expressness of the words? 'As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all for that,' or, as the original hath it, '*in whom* all men have sinned.' So, verse 19: 'As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners,' &c. If they say, as some do, that all are made sinners by imitation only, they are clearly confuted; first, by daily experience, in which it is plain that children coming to some discerning will lie, filch, and revenge themselves, though they never heard a lie told, &c. * * * Secondly, by the apostle's words, verse 19: 'For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.' If we are made unrighteous only by imitation of Adam's sin, and not by his performing it, as our root naturally, then we are made righteous only by imitation of Christ's righteousness, and not by his performing righteousness and fulfilling the law for us, as our spiritual root, in which we are grafted by faith. * * * As all that are Christ's are in Christ, and made alive by him, so all Adam's posterity were in him, and die in him; which death the apostle makes no less than judgment to condemnation," &c.*

Upon the imputation of the sins of believers to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to them, he says: "2 Cor. v. 21—As Christ became sin for us, not by having our sin *dwelling* in him, but *imputed* unto him, so we become the righteousness of God, that is, perfectly righteous before God, by his righteousness imputed to us, and not by that which dwelleth in us."†

4. *Original Sin.* As to the nature of sin in general, the author says: "Whatsoever swerveth from the law of God, (written in the table of the heart or of stone,) whether in our nature or actions, either in the not being of that which should be, or being of that which should not be, (which two are always joined together in original sin, and often in actual,) is sin and evil."‡

"Persons are in three respects conformable to the law of God: first, in habit; and so a godly man is a godly man, and conformable to God's law when he sleepeth: secondly, in

* Vol. I. pp. 403–409. See also, pp. 272, 330, 398; Vol. III. p. 246.

† Vol. III. p. 267. See p. 272.

‡ Vol. I. p. 210.

disposition or inclination; and so infants, considered either in state of creation, or regeneration, are conformable thereunto: thirdly, in performance of particular acts of obedience, &c.— As well may men deny that infants are reasonable creatures, as that they are lawless."*

"It is senseless to doubt but that when a wicked man sleepeth, and so practiseth no wickedness one way or other, he is notwithstanding a wicked man."†

"Infants bring sin properly into the world with them." "The apostle (in Eph. ii. 3) means plainly * * that all are born children of wrath; for to be so by nature, and to be born so, are the same. We are children of wrath by sin only; if therefore all be children of wrath by nature, it is by the sin of nature, which we call original sin, and not by actual sin only."‡

5. *Inability.* On this doctrine Robinson is sufficiently clear and ample. The distinction made so important of late between natural and moral ability, does not seem to have suggested itself to his mind. The only "natural" ability he could discover in fallen men, either from experience, observation, or revelation, was an ability to sin.

"These men (Arminians) err, 'not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God for the conversion of sinners,' in affirming that he doth no more but provide the medicine of grace, and outwardly persuade to the receiving of it; or that there is, (which they take wrongfully for granted) the same natural power in a wicked man to receive grace offered by the gospel, that there is in a sick man to take the medicine offered by the physician. This capital error of theirs is in this place to be refuted, and the contrary truth to be cleared; namely, that for the effectual converting of men, God not only provides the medicine, (Christ and his benefits) and by the gospel exhorts to the receipt thereof, and so leaves men to their own free-will, indifferently without further doing; but that withal and above the former, he, by the inward work of his Holy Spirit given them, makes effectual the outward means in opening the heart to attend to the things spoken with reverence; in enlightening

* Vol. I. p. 340. † Vol. I. p. 296; so, p. 405.
‡ Vol. I. p. 407, 409. See pp. 210, 244, 327; and Vol. III. p. 249, 252.

the understanding to discern and assent unto the same things as true and good, and that with particular applications; in bending the will efficaciously to consent to the same, and all the affections of the soul to love and like them. * * * So not only the medicine itself and the offer of it, but also the hand to receive it with, which is faith and a believing heart, is God's gift."*

"The wicked being left of God, cannot but do wickedly, any more than the Ethiopian can change his skin, or the leopard his spots.†"

In illustration of the fact that this inability is a sinful inability, and one which places no obligation on God to remedy it, Robinson says, "It is not my fault that a drunkard falls and lies in the street, though he cannot but both fall and lie there, except I hold and help him up, except withal I be bound so to help him; nor my fault that a prodigal spendthrift comes into debt, and is cast into prison, and cannot escape the one or the other unless I pay his debts, except withal I be bound to pay them; so neither is it God's fault that men remain and perish in that impenitency out of which they neither will nor can come without God's special gift of repentance, except it be God's bounden duty, as these men seem to make it, to bestow that grace upon them."‡

All the ability for good man has ever had, was that had and lost by Adam; and "they err egregiously [who say] that what Adam had in creation, and lost in transgression for himself *and his posterity*, that is restored through Christ, to wit, to all."§ "They conclude without and against reason, that if the unregenerate have power to resist, they have power not to resist; which is, as if a man should say, if a fool can do foolishly, then he can do wisely, or the like. * * * * The elect * * * whilst they are unregenerate can do nothing else but resist in spiritual things."‖ "The gospel * * considers man as a most miserable creature, drowned in sin, and *altogether* unable to help himself."¶

"Wicked and unregenerate men have neither power in them-

* Vol. I. pp. 312, 313, 314.
† Vol. I. p. 394.
‡ Vol. I. p. 395.
§ Vol. I. p. 399.
‖ Vol. I. pp. 401, 402.
¶ Vol. I. p. 418.

selves nor in Christ, (in whom they are not) to work out their salvation. They indeed who are in Christ by faith and have received his Spirit, are thereby enabled to work out their salvation; which Philippians i. 10, 11, proveth; as the rest also are able and have power to despise and reject the grace of God offered, to condemnation, and this the other two scriptures, Acts vii. 51, and xiii. 46, do prove."*

"The same scriptures which prove (this) natural and original sin, serve also to disprove all original and natural freedom of will, or other power to any good thing truly spiritual, or pleasing God. * * * Since all must be regenerate, or begot and born anew, before they can enter or see the kingdom of heaven, this wholly disarmeth the natural man of all power unto spiritual things, without a supernatural regeneration, &c. * * * If it be asked, why doth God then require it (ability) should be, or punish men where it is not; it is easily answered, that this inability cometh by man's own default. God made all men, in Adam, able to keep the law; and the obedience thereof is due debt unto God; now the inability of the debtor and his heirs, especially by their own default, is no sufficient discharge of the debt unto the creditor who lent it; so neither doth man's inability prejudice the Lord's right, but that he may in the course of justice, require the obedience to his holy law unto which by creation he enabled mankind."†

* Vol. III. p. 232.

† Vol. III. pp. 250, 251. See also, pp. 257, 267. Vol. II. p. 319. Vol. I. pp. 5, 51, 343, *et passim.*

This explanation, although a common one, is, as it seems to us, very unsatisfactory. If a man should voluntarily put out his own eyes, he would be guilty for that act, and might justly be punished for it; but his obligation to see would cease with the loss of his eyes. He could not be punished for not reading, however guilty he may have been for the act of destroying his sight. Much less could his descendants if born blind, in consequence of their father's crime, be required to see. Had the effect of Adam's sin been to destroy his reason and to render his posterity idiots, it is plain that neither he nor they could be any longer the subjects of moral government. There are two very different things confounded in the explanation quoted above from Robinson. First, the justice of permitting the posterity of Adam to be born in a state of sin, which involves an inability to love and serve God; and secondly, their continued obligation to love him, notwithstanding their inability. The first point the Scriptures meet, by teaching that our race had their probation in Adam, and

In reference to the *Freedom of the Will*, our author maintains that while the will is free to act as it does act, there is in man, since the fall, no ability to will anything spiritually good. When in this connection he uses the term "power," or "natural power," it is always to denote simply some faculty or faculties of the soul necessary to constitute man a man. He never, as we recollect, anywhere uses the term "natural ability."

"That Adam had as well freedom of the will after, as before the fall, is as true as that he was a man after as before. For take away will from a man and he ceaseth to be a man; and take away freedom from the will in that which it willeth, and it ceaseth to be will. But here is the difference, that the same natural power of free will, which before was rightly ordered, and disposed only to good actually, though changeably, was afterwards corrupted, disordered, and clean contrarily disposed, till by supernatural grace it was rectified and renewed."*

He contends that while wicked men can but sin they sin freely, and while holy beings can but obey they obey freely. He complains that his opponents "abuse the Scriptures in making them plainly to show that man hath free choice, to wit, alike to work with God, or against God in the work of his grace. It is true," he adds, "that men, whether receiving or refusing grace, do it freely and without compulsion; but the latter freely of themselves, being left of God to themselves; the former freely by God's special grace, giving them and effectually drawing them to Christ. * * * Oh!" he exclaims, "that any made partakers of this free grace of God's Spirit dwelling

that the loss of original rightcousness and the corruption of nature, are penal evils. The second point is met by a reference to the nature of the inability. It is not such as arises from the loss of reason, but arises entirely from the moral state of the soul. If original sin were not sin; if inherent corruption were a physical, as distinguished from a moral evil, then inability arising therefrom would be incompatible with continued obligation. But so long as the only inability under which sinners labour, arises from their moral state, has reference to their moral acts, and is removed by a moral change, it furnishes no excuse or palliation for the nonperformance of duty. Things dark to the understanding are often clear to the conscience. We feel that our inability to be perfectly holy, though real and lamentable, does not lessen our guilt.—*Editor.*

* Vol. III. p. 245.

in them, should deny the powerful work of it, to establish their own free will."*

Closely connected with the doctrine of inability is that

6. *Of Regeneration.* The quotations made above indicate the author's views upon this point. "Since all must be regenerate * * before they can see the kingdom of heaven, this wholly disarmeth the natural man of all power unto spiritual things without a supernatural regeneration, or new birth by that incorruptible seed of the word of God and Spirit of life; which must also be of the whole and of all the parts, as in the first generation. John iii. 3–5; 1 Pet. i. 23; * * * Eph. ii. 1. As no motion or action of natural life can possibly be made or performed by a man naturally dead, so neither any spiritual motion or action by any dead spiritually, till God breathe into him anew his quickening Spirit, the Spirit of life."† In reply to the question, "whether a man can do anything in the work of his regeneration," Robinson says: "They (who affirm it) may as rightly say that the life and motion of a child is its begetting. To regenerate is nothing else but to beget anew. Doth the child beget itself? or doth not the parent only beget it?"‡

The order of regeneration, repentance, and faith, he presents thus: "As God regenerates, and not man; so doth man, being regenerated, believe and obey, and not God." When God "regenerates them, he gives them faith and repentance, (Eph. ii. 8; 2 Tim. ii. 25,) which they must have before they can believe or repent; as the child must have life before it can live or do acts of life, and must be generated or begotten before it have life or being. Regeneration therefore goes before faith and repentance."§ "Repentance ariseth from a 'godly sorrow,' which can only be in a godly man, as a fruit of a good tree; and this godly man—all being ungodly by nature—must be a new creature, or regenerate of God. * * * So neither doth repentance go before faith, but followeth it as a fruit thereof; without which (faith) no man can please God, and so not repent aright, (Heb. xi. 6,) our repentance arising from a sorrow for the offending of God, this sorrow from the knowledge of his

* Vol. I. pp. 397, 398. † Vol. iii. p. 250. ‡ Vol. i. p. 400.
§ Vol. i. pp. 400, 401. See pp. 24, 313.

love towards us, which is faith; which faith purifies the heart, and is the beginning of all spiritual life," &c.*

7. *The Atonement.* "For Christ's redemption, it must be known that the word λύτρωσις, (redemption,) used in the Scriptures, is borrowed from the custom of freeing prisoners taken in war, from death or bondage, by paying a just price or ransom for them."† Christ, "to redeem us from the curse of the law under which we, with all flesh, were, was made a curse for us; paying a price for us, to satisfy the justice of his Father. * * * So that the chief and first work of our redemption by Christ is the freeing us from the guilt of sin, and most fearful wrath of God, by paying the price of his precious blood for a ransom to the justice of his Father."‡ "We acknowledge all the faithful perfect, and that perfectly, by Christ's perfect obedience and righteousness imputed unto them for their justification."§ That Robinson regarded the redeeming work of Christ as consisting in his voluntary obedience to the law, and suffering its penalty in the place of believers, is evident on almost every page of his works. It was the vicarious standing, obeying, and penal sufferings of the second Adam, that, to him, constituted the centre and sum of the gospel system.

Of course, to a mind of his logical power and reverence for the Scriptures, there could be no hesitation in reference to the

8. *Extent of the Atonement.* On this point we should be glad to transfer to our pages the whole of Robinson's clear and compact arguments; the more so as it is one now, with imputation and inability, so often rejected by theologians who call themselves Calvinists. We must content ourselves with brief extracts. He is meeting the affirmation, that "Christ died unfeignedly for all, without exception." He replies thus: "First, I here acknowledge that the death of Christ, being God, (Acts xx. 28; Rom. v. 10,) is in itself *sufficient* for all and every person in the world; and so might have been an effectual price for all, if it had pleased the Father, and him so to have ordained. But that it was the Father's purpose, in giving his Son, or his, in giving himself to the death, to pay the price of the sins of the whole world, and of every particular

* Vol. III. pp. 266, 267.
† Vol. III. p. 260.
‡ Vol. III. pp. 264, 265.
§ Vol III. p. 272.

person therein, and to satisfy God's justice for the same, we deny. * * * The apostle (Rom. v.) speaks of them, and them alone, as died for by Christ, who were justified by him."*

Sweeping away the objections of his opponents, he presses this point by what has been called "the tremendous logic of Calvinism." "From Rom. v. then, may be more truly, and I am persuaded, undeniably, concluded these two things: First, that Christ did not effectually die for, or reconcile by his death, all men in particular, for then should all be saved by his life; and, secondly, that whomsoever he so died for, and effectually reconciled, they shall be kept by the power of God, and of his grace, unto eternal life. * * * To conclude this point, they who either hold that Christ effectually redeemed all from their natural corruption, or that any truly justified and sanctified may wholly fall away and perish, do divide Christ from himself, and make him a party-Saviour; and a priest for some, to redeem them by his death, to whom he is not a king to save them by his life; and a Saviour in part to the very damned at the last day."† "Against this error of universal redemption, I thus argue: Them whom God and Christ love, to wit, with the special love of mercy, they love unto the end, (John xiii. 1,) and therefore never come to hate them, as they do the wicked and damned. But for whomsoever Christ died, God in giving his Son, (John iii. 16,) and he in giving himself to the death for them, (Rom. v. 6,) love with the most special love of mercy that can be; therefore, they for whom Christ died, never perish. * * * Christ therefore died effectually, and in his and his Father's intention of love, for them only that are saved, and perish not." To deny this is to "impeach the wisdom of God, in affirming that he would buy with so rich and precious a price as the blood and death of his only begotten Son, that and them whom he certainly knew before he should never possess by it, for the end for which he bought them, their justification, sanctification, and salvation. Secondly, it impeacheth God's power, and makes him unable, do he what he can, to save any more than he doth save, though he desire it never so much. For, look! for whom he would do the greatest thing that possibly he

* Vol. I. p. 329.

† Vol. III. pp. 262, 263.

could, which was the giving of his only begotten and beloved Son to the cursed death of the cross, for them and their salvation, without all doubt he will do whatsoever other good, as *less*, that possibly he can. Whereupon it should follow, that God cannot possibly give the gospel to more than he doth, and by it convert and confirm them to and in his grace—which are less things than the former."*

This doctrine is no more inconsistent with the general proclamation and invitations of the gospel than the doctrines of election or of foreknowledge. "The apostles not knowing, which in particular, were elect and redeemed in the secret purpose of God and Christ, were to sow the seed of grace upon all grounds, and to preach to all indifferently as they had occasion; * * * by whose preaching such as were preordained to life believed actually. Acts xiii. 48."†

9. *Justification.* Our author's views of faith and repentance have been perhaps sufficiently brought out in the preceding exposition. They are the conditions of life; they are the gift of God; they *follow* regeneration; what justification is by faith, on the grounds of the imputed righteousness of Christ, has also been shown as maintained by him. "Christ and his righteousness are so communicated with the members of his body, as every faithful person may truly say that both He and it (the righteousness) are his."‡

"The 'new creature' is ill and dangerously made a part of our justification before God; which the Scriptures do ascribe only to faith, and the free grace of God, through that redemption that is in Christ Jesus. Rom. iii. 24, 25, 28. Our redemption, then, or justification properly taken, is in Christ and not in ourselves, as it should be if it stood in our sanctification or the new creature. * * * Our sanctification or renovation is an inseparable work of that faith by which we are justified, (Acts xv. 9,) but doth not answer the rigour of God' justice, nor can present us innocent before his judgment-seat. * * * That only the righteousness of Christ can do, being imputed by grace, and by faith received. * * * 2 Cor. v. 21. Now, as Christ became sin for us, not by having our sin dwelling in him, but imputed unto him, so we become the

* Vol. I. pp. 333, 334. † Vol. I. p. 335. ‡ Vol. III. p. 247.

righteousness of God, that is, perfectly righteous before God, by his righteousness imputed to us, and not by that which dwelleth in us. * * * By the merit and purity of that one oblation of Christ, offered once for all, and applied by faith, are we cleansed from the guilt of sin, and reconciled to God for ever."*

That Robinson understood the terms, justify, righteousness, guilt, &c., in a forensic or legal sense, is evident both from the passages themselves and from the fact that he contends that a man may be perfectly justified, righteous, free from guilt, while very sinful in himself. "We acknowledge," he says, "all the faithful perfect, and that perfectly by Christ's perfect obedience, and righteousness imputed unto them for their justification, &c. * * * But for any such perfection in this world as wherein a man stands not in need continually to renew his repentance and to purge himself of the remnants of sin, casting off the old man and putting on the new man, and to grow in the knowledge and grace of God, * * * is none other but a most dangerous delusion of that prince of darkness transforming himself into an angel of light.†

10. It is needless to say that with these views Robinson maintained the doctrine of the final *Perseverance* of believers. "It is true that God neither purposeth nor promiseth to save any but such as persevere in faith and repentance unto the end; so is it also true that this perseverance in grace depends upon election, which is both to the end and means, Christ Jesus and perseverance in faith in him and obedience unto him. Eph. i. 3—5. * * * Considering him in himself we willingly grant that a faithful man may as easily fall away as did the angels in heaven, and Adam in paradise. * * * But considering the same faithful person as a living member of Christ's body, * * given to Christ by the Father, that he might save him, as having the Spirit of Christ dwelling in him * * in that regard we deny that it can come to pass possibly that such a one should wholly fall away from the grace received."‡ To the argument that the exhortations and warnings of the Scriptures to believers imply the possible loss of grace, Robinson replies, "It may

* Vol. III. pp. 267, 268. † Vol. III. p. 272. ‡ Vol. I. pp. 368, 369.

as well be concluded that therefore the fire goes out because it hath good and fresh fuel put unto it and is diligently blown."*

We are hardly willing to conclude this article without some notice of Robinson's views of Church Government. We have examined with some care, not only these works, but those of other leading writers among the early Independents, or Congregationalists, for the purpose of ascertaining precisely what their views were. As the result of our examination we have been constrained to the opinion that our Congregational fathers were not clearly settled upon the subject of church government. In common with Presbyterians they had suffered deeply and most unrighteously from the power of Prelacy. This naturally tended to make them fearful of all ecclesiastical authority. Whilst therefore, they were heartily at one with Presbyterians in all doctrinal matters, and "not only with one heart, but with one mouth, glorified God and our Lord Jesus Christ,"† they were not prepared to adopt the Presbyterian form of government. Neither were they prepared to do without it. This undoubtedly led them into confusion. Here they contend for strict Independency: there they practise Presbyterianism. Their platforms are a mingling of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism. Now one, and now the other element predominates according to circumstances. It seems impossible to reduce their statements or their practice to a consistent system. One thing is perfectly certain; their government was no more modern Congregationalism than it was Presbyterianism. The editor of the works under review, observes with much naïveté, "there are some shades of difference between the opinions and practices of Mr. Robinson, respecting church government and ordinances, and those of modern Congregationalists." There certainly are, and in some points the "shades" pass into very distinct colours. We shall present some of the most important of these opinions without any attempt at reconciliation.

1. The true church is the body of true believers. The visible church is the body of visible or apparent believers. But the church is not strictly a mixed body. "The church of Christ is no (such) mixed meslin, or monstrous compound, but a body simple, uniform, and one, proportionable in every

* Vol. I. p. 379.

† Preface to Cambridge Platform.

member unto the head, informed by one Spirit, and called in one hope. As for wicked and ungodly persons, so far are they from being the true, natural members whereof the body consisteth, as the whole of the parts, (that) they serve indeed for no other purpose than to infect and corrupt the rest."*

2. A particular church is composed of a limited number of believers—generally so many as may meet conveniently in one place—and is a church complete in itself, having full church authority and power. "This we hold and affirm, that a company, consisting though but of two or three separated from the world, * * * and gathered into the name of Christ by a covenant, made to walk in all the ways of God known unto them, is a church, and so hath the whole power of Christ."†

3. The ordinary officers of the church are five. "1. The pastor, (exhorter,) to whom is given the gift of wisdom for exhortation. 2. The teacher, to whom is given the gift of knowledge for doctrine. 3. The governing elder, who is to rule with diligence. Eph. iv. 11; 1 Cor. xii. 8; Rom. xii. 8; 1 Tim. v. 17. 4. The deacon, who is to administer the holy treasures with simplicity. 5. The widow, or deaconess, who is to attend the sick and impotent with compassion and cheerfulness." Acts vi. 2, &c.‡

Bradford gives the following account of the original Pilgrim Church and its officers. "At Amsterdam, before their division and breach, there were about three hundred communicants, and they had for their pastor and teacher those two eminent men before named, (Johnson and Ainsworth,) and in one time, four grave men for ruling elders, and three able and godly men for deacons, and one ancient widow for a deaconess, who did them service for many years, though she was sixty years of age when she was chosen. She honoured her place, and was an ornament to the congregation. She usually sat in a convenient place in the congregation with a little birchen rod in her hand, and kept little children in great awe from disturbing the congregation. She did frequently visit the sick and weak, and especially women; and, as there was need, called out maids and young women to watch and do them other helps as their necessities did require; and if they were poor she would

* Vol. II. p. 117. † Vol. II. 132. See also Vol. III. p. 427.
‡ Vol. III. p. 429. Catechism of Church Government.

gather relief for them of those that were able, or acquaint the deacons; and she was obeyed as a mother in Israel, and an officer of Christ."*

4. To the question, who may ordain ministers? Robinson replied, ordinarly only those already in the ministry; under extraordinary circumstances it may be done by the particular church itself. "We acknowledge that in the right and orderly state of things no ministers are to be ordained but by ministers."† But in cases where it is impossible to obtain such ordination, as in the Reformation, it may be done "by the people's choice or appointment." "If the church without officers may elect, it may also ordain officers; * * * if it *have* officers [already] it must use them as hands to put the persons by ordination into that office to which they have a right by election; but if it want officers it may and must use other—the fittest instruments it hath."‡

5. The office of ruling elder has passed entirely out of use in our Congregational churches. Our fathers did not think so lightly of it. "Wise men," says Robinson, "have approved, as good and lawful, three kinds of polities; monarchical, where supreme authority is in the hands of one; aristocratical, where it is in the hands of some few select persons; and democratical, in the whole body or multitude. And all these three forms have their places in the church of Christ. In respect of him, the head, it is a monarchy; in respect of the eldership, an aristocracy; in respect of the body, a popular state." "Cease," he exclaims to an opponent, "cease to suggest against us, unto such as are ignorant of our faith and walking, that we deny the officers to be governors of the church, or the people to be governed by them."§

"We believe that the external church government under Christ, the only mediator and monarch thereof, is plainly aristocratical, and to be administered by some certain choice men, although the state, which many unskilfully confound with the government, be after a sort popular and democratical. By this it appertains to the people freely to vote in elections and judgments of the church; in respect of the other, we make account

* "New England's Memorial." Cong. Bd. Pub. p. 355.
† Vol. III. p. 430. ‡ Vol. II. p. 445. § Vol. II. pp. 140, 142.

it behoves the elders to govern the people, even in their voting, in just liberty given by Christ whatsoever. 1 Cor. xii. 28; 1 Tim. v. 17; Heb. xiii. 17. Let the elders publicly propound and order all things in the church, and so give their sentence on them; let them reprove them that sin, convince the gainsayers, comfort the repentant, and so administer all things according to the prescript of God's word: let the people of faith give their assent to their elders' holy and lawful administration, that so the ecclesiastical elections and censures may be ratified, and put into solemn execution by the elders," &c.*

"We do not doubt but that the elders both lawfully may, and necessarily ought, and that by virtue of their office, to meet apart at times from the body of the church, to deliberate of such things as concern her welfare, as for the preventing of things unnecessary, so for the preparing according to just order of things necessary, so as publicly and before the people they may be prosecuted with most conveniency and least trouble that may be. Acts xx. 18."†

An interesting document in reference to the principles and practices of the Pilgrim Fathers is found in a letter sent by Robinson and Brewster—the minister and ruling elder of the Leyden church—to Sir John Wolstenholme.

Sir John was a member of the Council of the Virginia Colony. He "was anxious to know the religious opinions and practices of the community over which Robinson and Brewster presided, and wherein their practices differed from those of the Reformed churches of Holland, France, &c." In their reply they present two "Declarations," the one brief and general, the other more full. We copy the latter.‡

"Touching the ecclesiastical ministry, namely, of pastors for teaching, elders for ruling, and deacons for distributing the churches' contribution; as also for the two sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, we agree in all things with the French Reformed churches, according to their Public Confession of Faith; though some small differences be to be found in our practices, not at all in the substance of the things, but only in some accidental circumstances; as,

* Vol. III. pp. 42, 43. † Vol. III. p. 43. ‡ Vol. III. pp. 488, 489.

"1. Their ministers do pray with their heads covered; we uncovered.

"2. We choose none for governing elders but such as are able to teach; which ability they do not require.

"3. Their elders and deacons are annual, or at most for two or three years; ours perpetual.

"4. Our elders do administer their office in admonitions and excommunications, for public scandal, publicly, and before the congregation; theirs more privately, and in their consistories.

"5. We do administer baptism only to such infants as whereof the one parent at least, is of some church; which some of their churches do not observe; although in it our practice accords with their Public Confession and the judgment of the most learned amongst them.

"Other differences, worth mentioning, we know none.

"Subscribed, JOHN ROBINSON,
WILLIAM BREWSTER."

(Dated at Leyden, Jan. 27, 1617.)

6. The Presbytery, according to Robinson, was composed of the pastor and ruling elders of a particular church, and had no authority beyond that church. It should be said, however, that Robinson was strenuous for the government of the Presbytery, and the obedience of the people, just so long as the Presbytery ruled in the fear of God. The setting aside of the decision of Presbytery by the action of the people, was only as a last resort, and as a correction of evil and misgovernment, for which they had no other remedy. But how, if a difficulty should arise between a pastor and his church, or the Presbytery and the church? Of course the church decides it. The power that can make, can unmake. The authority that can raise to the ministry, can depose from the ministry. This was the theory. But is there no liability to injustice here? May not a minister be wronged as well as a church? May not questions arise in a church which the church is not the proper body to decide? Here was a weak point in Robinson's system, which his successors saw, and endeavoured to remedy. Possibly we may have occasion to refer to their testimony hereafter.

We have only to repeat, in conclusion, that, saving a few points, we have read with profound admiration these works of

the Father of New England Congregationalism; and the prayer has been often on our lips, that the prophet might arise through whom God would "turn the hearts of the children to the fathers."

We would plead with our brethren according to the flesh; not now for the government of the church—albeit her history might suggest that this is not a trifle—but for those high truths which rise above all forms and names, and from which has come everything that has made New England truly great. Is it not time that we looked away awhile from the novel theologies of the day—long enough at least to see where we are drifting—long enough to see that there is a theology of New England older than two-score years; not a New England theology, but a Protestant theology—a Christian theology—a theology of the word of God?

The history of the New England churches has a lesson of profound and solemn warning to the Presbyterian Church. Let her not be high-minded, but fear. Now is the day of her prosperity and her glory. But whenever she trusts in these—whenever she tolerates the cry, "The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, are *we*"—whenever she yields her fidelity to those glorious truths, that she now holds in unity and peace, the day of her decline will be dated.

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## Art. II.—*The Public Lecture considered as a Means of Diffusing Popular Information.*

There is something very taking in lectures. They are eminently labour-saving machines. The hard work has all been done in the orator's library or office, and what we, the people, have to do, is to walk to the hall, pay twenty-five or fifty cents, occupy our share of a comfortable stuffed seat, thump on the floor with canes or heels at stated times and go home with the fruits of our lecturer's labours, stowed snugly away, or lost, as the case may be. At all events, it is *cheap* fare.

It may be doubted, however, whether knowledge which costs so near to nothing in the acquisition, is worth much as a possession. It seems to be a law of the mind, as well as of the body, that we shall not have what we do not work for. "In all labour there is profit," says the wisest of men. Is it not equally true, that in all profit there must be labour?

To those who have time and opportunity for thorough study, popular lectures may prove a snare, while much advantage may be derived from them by such as have but very limited means of self-improvement.

The "Lecture," in our country, has taken its place (how permanently remains to be seen) as a chief instrument of popular entertainment. Some hundreds of men, and here and there a woman, are regularly employed in this service. A subject is selected from the boundless range of history, poetry, biography, philosophy, literature, art, or science, and one or more lectures, supposed to be suited to popular taste, elaborately prepared. If they hit the mark, they may be inventoried as a large item in the lecturer's assets. Twenty-five, fifty, one, two, or three hundred dollars, may be the figure at which the repetition of each lecture may be set down. Institutes, literary associations, lyceums, library companies, &c., of various grades, are eager to contract for the series. A thousand fifty-cent tickets for twelve lectures, or six dollars for the course, will pay one hundred dollars for each lecture, and leave four thousand eight hundred in hands, subject to contingent expenses. And who knows of a shorter way to turn a penny for the lecturer and his employers? So far as money is concerned, it must pass, even in an extravagant age, for a good speculation. It may be, too, that this method of enlightening or guiding public opinion, gives employment to peculiar talents, which would otherwise be unemployed. Those who would fail in preaching, book-making, or newspaper editing, may make quite a figure in lecturing.

It certainly gives exercise to a great diversity of gifts and a wide latitude for their display, while it would be difficult to contrive a scheme to bring into such close juxtaposition the names of men whose antipathies are so marked, that they might reasonably invoke, for their protection, the spirit of the Jewish law, which forbade an ox and an ass to be used before the same

plough. Indeed, the lecturers and their subjects are often so incongruously intermingled as to remind one of the old law of "hotch-pot,"* of which Lord Lyttleton quaintly says: "It seemeth that this word, *hotch-pot*, is, in English, a pudding, for in a pudding is put, not one thing alone, but one thing with other things (and often most unlike things) together."

It is worthy of observation, however, that in our country, thus far, comparatively few lecturers, and very few lecture-subjects, have had much reference to the great body of the people, and for the very good reason, that the great body of the people are not expected to be present to hear them; and even for the select few who attend, we hazard nothing in saying that the occasion is one of amusement or recreation, rather than of substantial improvement.

If we except a political harangue now and then, or a speech on some local or sectional subject which has passed under the name, it is rare that a popular lecture has been prepared with a view to inform persons who have but scanty means of informing themselves.† What, to three-fourths of the voters of the United States (were they in attendance with their wives and elder children) would be the value of the most eloquent and finished lecture on the kings, poets, or novelists of Europe? We are not depreciating the lecture in its proper sphere, nor impeaching its claim to liberal patronage; but can it be relied upon as an effective instrument of diffusing popular knowledge? The attempt to apply it to this purpose in connection with mechanics' and literary institutions has been tried with various success in Great Britain. More than six hundred such organizations were in existence some four or five years since, embracing one hundred and twenty thousand members, and nearly one million of volumes in their libraries. To these institutes not

* A statute of Charles II. provided that advancements made to some of the children during the life-time of the father, should be brought into *hotch-pot*—that is, mixed up with the other portions, and an equal division made of the whole—the children taking share and share alike.

† No reference is had in these remarks to lectures on scientific and literary subjects, delivered before select bodies of persons devoted to scientific and literary pursuits. We have in view only the modern system of courses by professed lecturers, designed chiefly to give support or relief to some scientific or literary association or enterprise.

less than six thousand public lectures were given in a single year. At a later period the popularity of the lectures declined, and a radical change took place in their character. "The plain and easily understood discourses on the elements of the sciences and their application to the useful arts, illustrated by numerous experiments, have been abandoned, and the preference shown for light literature, criticism, music, and the drama," has given just occasion for the statement, that even the elder metropolitan Mechanics' Institution, since its establishment, has given more attention to the drama than to the entire range of physical sciences.

The confidence that is felt in the utility and practicability of such methods of promoting popular intelligence in our country, has lately prompted to two munificent endowments. A wealthy citizen* of New York has erected in the heart of that city a stately edifice, in which he proposes to provide means for the diffusion of a more general knowledge of science and its application to all the varied uses and purposes of life. A department will be formed for the special purpose of "widening the sphere of female employment, by such applications of science and art as are best fitted for that end." There is to be a continual series of free day and evening lectures and discourses on scientific subjects, and also a "perpetual course of free lectures and instruction on the science and philosophy of a true republican government." The scale on which the movement is projected indicates the deep conviction of the founder that such means of popular improvement will be appreciated. The other instance to which we allude, is the generous donation of three hundred thousand dollars (to be hereafter increased to half a million) to the city of Baltimore,† for the combined purpose of forming a library, establishing a course of public lectures, and providing means for musical instruction and entertainment, and a gallery of painting and statuary. Whether in either of these cases the benefits intended to be conferred will reach those portions of the community that are least favoured with other opportunities of instruction, we have no means of judging.

In respect to the lectures adopted in connection with the British Mechanics' institutes, it was apparent at a very early period that those whose interests were chiefly sought by their estab-

* Peter Cooper. † By Mr. George Peabody.

lishment, were not likely to profit by them. Professional men, the principals of mercantile houses, confidential clerks, brokers, factors, &c., frequented them. Clerks and foremen were not disposed to push themselves into the company of their employers or directors; while "the warehouse-man, the packer, the carter and the mill hand" were equally inclined to turn away from the clerk and the foreman. So that the conviction forced itself upon many minds that a class of societies and lectures was needed to which only working operatives should be admitted. "It is essentially necessary," it was said, "that another attempt should be made to provide entertainment and instruction for the bulk of working men and their families, to whom, as yet, the rays of knowledge have not penetrated; who form the hard-pressed *substratum*, the rich mine of thought and intelligence which the mining tool of education has scarcely reached." Strange as it may seem, this was exactly the conviction which prevailed fifty years before, when Dr. Birkbeck commenced his philanthropic efforts for the elevation and instruction of the masses.

Having been a witness of the vices and misery of the population that crowded the manufacturing districts of Glasgow, he conceived the idea of bettering their condition, by giving them the opportunity of intellectual improvement. His appointment to the chair of Natural Philosophy in Anderson University, then recently founded, prepared the way for the inauguration of his plans. In the absence of a philosophical instrument maker, to whom he could apply for such apparatus as he needed, he was obliged to resort to the workshops of the city; and was thus brought into personal communication with the joiner at his bench, the smith at his forge, the glass-blower at his furnace, and the turner at his lathe. This intercourse disclosed to him so much of native genius in these operatives, and such an eager desire for knowledge, that he resolved to make an effort for their special improvement. It seems that the university to which he was attached, though founded expressly for "the good of mankind," and requiring an annual course of lectures to the ladies of the city, in the hope of making them "the most accomplished ladies in Europe," overlooked all provision for the instruction of the greater part of the community—working men

and women—in the knowledge which is of most service to themselves and others.

In one of Dr. Birkbeck's interviews with the "unwashed artificers," his attention was particularly arrested by the inquisitive countenances of a circle of operatives, who had crowded around a somewhat curious piece of mechanism, (a model of the centrifugal pump,) which had been constructed for him in their workshop. "I beheld," he says, "through every disadvantage of circumstance and appearance, such strong indications of the unquenchable spirit, that the question was forced upon me, Why are these minds left without the means of obtaining the knowledge they so ardently desire, and why are the avenues to science barred against them because they are poor?"

He determined to see what attraction a course of free lectures on the elementary principles of philosophy would present to them, and suggested his scheme to some friends, who regarded it as to the last degree visionary. Mechanics will not come, said they; if they do come, they will not listen, and if they come and listen, they will not comprehend.

The plan of the lectures was advertised as "abounding with experiments, and conducted with the greatest simplicity of expression and familiarity of illustration, solely for persons engaged in the practical exercise of the mechanic arts."

"I have become convinced," he says, in advertising the course, "that much pleasure would be communicated to the mechanic in the exercise of his art, and that the mental vacancy which follows a cessation from bodily toil, would often be agreeably occupied by a few systematic, philosophical ideas, upon which, at his leisure, he might meditate. Perhaps to some it may appear that the advantages derivable from these lectures will be inconsiderable, or even that they will be disadvantageous, on account of the extent of the subjects they embrace, and because those to whom they are addressed do not possess the means, nor enjoy the opportunity to engraft on the elementary truths they learn, the extensive researches of the illustrious philosophers by whom the boundaries of science have been enlarged. Whatever the arrogance of learning may have advanced in condemnation of superficial knowledge, and however firmly I may be persuaded that the people cannot be profound,

I have no hesitation in predicting that vast benefits will accrue to the community by every successful endeavour to diffuse the substance of great works, which cannot be perused by the people at large, by making them reach the shop and the hamlet, and converting them from an unproductive to a useful, though unobserved, activity."

This paragraph defines with sufficient precision the section of society whose interests we have at present in view; and the question is far from an insignificant one, whether, with the eminent advantages which our political institutions and social habits furnish for spreading useful knowledge, especially among the bulk of the people, we have not still to institute an efficient and reliable scheme for this end. Indeed, few persons who have not reflected on the subject, are probably aware how weak and imperfect are the agencies by which general intelligence—unconnected with politics, religion, or some particular art or science—is at this moment promoted in the country at large. Yet, where in the wide world should such agencies be multiplied indefinitely and made permanently effective, if not in these United States?

If this were the place and time, it might be profitable to analyze the product of the educational machinery of the country—especially the public school and the press. And if we do not misapprehend the purpose of such machinery, or its force as worked among us, such an analysis would not fail to show its utter inadequacy to maintain what the theory of our institutions contemplates as having a growing and unquestioned ascendency—general intelligence, virtue, and patriotism.

Our present purpose, however, concerns but one of these agencies; and our attention has been called to it, just now, by the appearance of a little volume from the English press, under the title of "*Evening Recreations, or Samples from the Lecture-room*, edited by J. H. Gurney, M. A., Rector of St. Mary's, Mary-le-bone, London." It contains eight specimens of lectures delivered at the Mechanics' Institute, in Mr. Gurney's parish, on the following subjects:—English Descriptive Poetry, Sir Thomas More, the Starry Heavens, John Bunyan, Recollections of St. Petersburg, the Fall of Mexico, the House of Commons, and the Reformation.

It is obvious that either of these topics might be treated in a way to suit the taste of the most intellectual and best educated audience; but the task of the lecturer was to bring the subjects, in their most interesting and impressive bearings, within the ready apprehension of persons of limited intellectual power and inferior education. As we have no means of knowing the average grade, in these respects, of the members of the Mary-le-bone Mechanics' Institute, we cannot determine how successful the lecturers were in adapting themselves to it. But our readers can conceive of a body of men from the factories and workshops of any of our cities, coming together at the close of a day's severe toil, to hear some reverend or honourable gentleman discourse to them on such a topic as the "Reformation," or "English Descriptive Poetry," either of which would probably be as familiar topics to them as to their fellow-craftsmen on the banks of the Thames. Just imagine a placard:

*Lecture to Working-men! Tickets fifty cents!*
A Popular Lecture on
ENGLISH DESCRIPTIVE POETRY,
Will be delivered on Friday evening, the 21st instant,
By the author of the "Poems and Poets of Rome,"
At the Hall of the Mechanics' Association.

How many men, on their way from work, would be reminded by such a placard, of an opportunity to pass an agreeable hour, at a very profitable entertainment, or would lay aside fifty cents to secure it?

It is certainly possible to conceive of an address to such a company, on either of the topics above named, that would rivet their attention, and send them home wiser and happier for their attendance. But how few have the skill, and who would use it for *them?* For example, were the Reformation the subject of discourse, an idea might be given of the condition of the world at the time the fearless Reformer came upon the stage. The leading incidents of his life and their connection with the grand events which attended or followed them, might be so set forth that the hearers would go away with as distinct an impression of them as they would have of the principal points of a picture of the battle of Bunker Hill or Waterloo. No one who has seen a picture of the former forgets General Warren;

nor does he who has seen the latter, fail to remember "the Duke." There are facts and principles connected with the Reformation which are intimately associated with the privileges and enjoyments of the humblest home in the United States; and it is practicable, we have no doubt, to present them to an assembly of men who earn their daily bread by the labour of their hands, in such wise as to command their attention and their admiration. We need not say how surprisingly the effect would be increased by the aid of pictorial representations, however coarse. Such events as Luther's discovery of the Bible, the nailing up of the Theses, his bearing before the Diet, &c., might thus be indelibly impressed on the memory.

Another subject—English descriptive poetry—would be susceptible of much easier treatment and more impressive illustrations. In selecting poets and poetry it would not be difficult to find those whose early history and favourite themes connect them closely with the sons of toil. And by combining simple biographical sketches with the local scenes, popular manners and customs, and the prevailing temper of the times in which they lived, and using such illustrations to the eye as even a very unskilled artist might furnish, a series of profitable and impressive addresses might be adapted to the comprehension of the rudest popular assembly that could be convened in our country. We might suggest Burns's "Cotter's Saturday Night," Goldsmith's "Village Schoolmaster," or Gray's "Elegy in a Country Churchyard," as among the selections which would afford ample scope for every variety of method, in adapting one's self to the capacities and sympathies of an illiterate, but by no means unintelligent, audience.

To what extent and in what way a lecturer should connect the personal qualities or characteristics of an author with descriptions of the natural scenery and domestic relations in which he was born and reared, would be a matter of taste or judgment. That there should be enough of this to give to the descriptive poetry that effect, which in refined and highly cultivated minds is produced without any such aid, is quite obvious. There would be no need, for example, that a lecturer to the *élite* of a city population should introduce a critical lecture on Gray's Elegy by a description of the "curfew," but a most

interesting and impressive use might be made of the custom which that term calls to mind, if the audience were of a character to justify the lecturer in dwelling upon it. We need not say in how many ways and with what telling effect the Village Schoolmaster might be exhibited, with comments, in presence of a popular assembly; popular we mean, in the sense in which we are now using the term. The power to arrest and hold the attention of a mixed assembly under such circumstances would not depend on rhetorical skill or eloquent utterance; these would utterly fail to awaken and sustain an interest. If it were an argument to a jury in a case of deep concern, or a debate in a deliberative assembly upon a subject that would engross the common mind, the pending issue might secure for the argument or the speech, a large measure of close attention; but where the lecturer is to warm his subject into life, and then to clothe it with grace and interest in the eyes of such a class of persons as we are supposing to be present, the task is not easy. There must be something that awakens the curiosity, or lays hold of the earnest sympathies of the untutored mind.

Much of the success of a lecture to the class of persons we now have in view, must depend on its adaptation to the present interest and pressure of the times which are necessarily in or near their thoughts. When brown sugar is ten or twelve cents a pound, a statement of the reasons of its rise, or of the probabilities of its becoming cheaper, would be listened to with exemplary patience; and if introduced into a lecture on the uses and abuses of the custom-house, together with some explanation of the causes of such frequent fluctuations in the price of coal, wool, flour, iron, or money in the last thirty years, it would be found that the impressions which are carried home are those which touch upon yesterday's, to-day's, or to-morrow's necessities; not abstract principles or policies.

Most of the eight topics above enumerated would need to be discussed with great simplicity and profusely illustrated, to make them of commanding interest to the great body of mechanics and manual labourers in our country. "Recollections of St. Petersburg" might embrace a survey of its commercial resources, its police, literature, benevolent institutions, manufactures, markets, &c. &c. The probable mistake of a popular

lecturer would be to assume that his audience know what they do not, and to expatiate on topics which, for want of such knowledge, are quite uninteresting to them. The art of the lecturer would be to take them, as he would a party of friends who had never been there before, through the chief avenues of the city, stopping here and there as objects of interest presented themselves, and giving ample time to gratify, without exhausting curiosity. The supply of fuel, water and light, the markets and prices of the necessaries of life, taxes and the manner of imposing them, factories and workshops, hours of business and meals, wages and demand for labour, customs and manners of the common people, schools and children, religious edifices and observances; all these, and kindred topics will bear discussion in considerable detail, and the more familiar and colloquial the style, the better; for, as it has been well observed, "a lecturer who wishes to succeed, must not stand too much on his dignity. The audience are generally in good humour with themselves, and are disposed to be equally so with the lecturer, if they see that he is doing his best to please them. So that an animated style, rich in illustrations of a homely kind, not unmixed with fun, should be sought, rather than any attempt at fine speaking. Then, as to the choice of a subject and mode of treatment, it is wonderful what an interesting lecture may be given on a very narrow topic, if the lecturer be a man of well improved mind, and brings out the details of his subject with graphic power. Many persons err in trying to give too much information, instead of expending a great deal of thought in making a little information interesting and impressive. It must be remembered, also, that it should be one great aim of a lecturer to be suggestive, to open here and there a chamber in the temple of divine and human wisdom, and to allow his audience to gaze into it for a few minutes."

It must not be inferred from anything we have said, that we regard the interest of a popular lecture as dependent altogether on the degree to which it is comprehended by an audience. If the subject itself is of a cast to command the sympathy of the common mind, and the orator throws into it earnestness and true pathos, the least understood of his effort will not unfrequently pass for the most beautiful. "If what we could under-

stand was so grand," say they, "what must have been the grandeur of that which surpasses our comprehension!"

It has been a mooted point with some, what it is that makes a dramatic entertainment so universally attractive to the mass of men. It is simply that the stage play is exactly adapted to the gratification of their tastes. They would rush in crowds to see, in real life, what is represented by the scenery and players. We all laugh at comical scenes and anecdotes. No one can read "the diverting story of John Gilpin" without enjoyment; and that enjoyment would be greatly enhanced to the mass of men if the localities in which the successive mishaps occurred were represented (no matter how coarsely) in the scenery. And if the representatives of the unfortunate couple were to be present, in a living form, with the nearest possible resemblance in figure, costume and action to the veritable originals, who can wonder that pit, galleries and boxes should be crowded by all lovers of amusement to witness the exhibition? It would all but literally answer the wish of the narrator of the tale,

> That when John next should ride abroad,
> He might be there to see.

This natural and (when duly controlled) perfectly innocent love of amusement seeks indulgence in such places as are most easily accessible, whether it be the circus, a theatre, an exhibition of ventriloquism, or legerdemain, or a comic song-singing. To a class of corrupt and reprobate minds mere excitement is amusement, and such as these glory in prize fights, bear-baitings, and bloody riots.

Those who want amusement will go where it is to be had. Knowing the power of such attractions to those who have few higher sources of enjoyment, the panderers to vicious pleasures resort thither also, for there they are sure to find such as are least able to resist the allurements they present. The grand purpose of such scenes being the gratification of the lower grade of intellectual appetites, vitiated and perverted as they generally are, it is not surprising that rudeness and vulgarity, obscenity and profaneness, with a prevalent and undisguised contempt of what others regard as laudable and sacred, should

become a characteristic of them, nor that this should be regarded as one of the chief elements of the entertainment.

Indeed, it may be fairly presumed that if the features of this class of public amusements which are justly reprehensible, were removed, a very considerable number of those who delight in them would withdraw, while others might remain to partake of what would then be a comparatively harmless amusement. For we should greatly err if we supposed that *all* who attend theatres and similar places of resort, are drawn thither by what is vicious and degrading in their influence. Many, doubtless, flatter themselves that they can take the good and shun the evil, though as well might one take coals in his bosom and expect not to be burned.

The people, whose desire for amusement and excitement is as natural as their desire for food or sleep, are urged to turn their backs on all these places, and seek its gratification—where? "In a musical entertainment," says one. Very good; there are few men or women of any class or grade who are not prepared to enjoy a song, the words of which they can relish. The style of music which would be most acceptable to them, however, must be very simple, touching, requiring little cultivation in the listeners, and withal, in harmony with their habits of thought and feeling. The "Negro Melodies," as they were called, owe much of their unprecedented popularity to their adaptedness in words, if not in music, to captivate a taste but little above instinct. If we could have enough singers and enough songs to entertain, in this way, groups of five hundred or one thousand persons every evening in the week, save the Lord's day evening, in some suitable hall, access to which should be as cheap as a glass of whiskey, and as easy as the tavern or the street corner, we should find the throng at many objectionable places of amusement sensibly thinned at once.

It is vain to expect that those appendages to theatres, circuses, &c., which render them so obnoxious to all right-minded persons, will be discarded. They will continue to be places of resort for those who are least disposed and least able to resist temptations to vice, until some other recreation, as cheap and as attractive, is offered to supplant them. It may be said, perhaps, that the depraved tastes which lead people to such low

exhibitions, demand these objectionable appendages, and would be pleased with nothing that dispenses with them. To some extent this is doubtless true; and hence any general inquiry on the subject must embrace the means of improving those tastes.

To a large proportion of persons who most keenly enjoy the low dramatic exhibition, or the fantastic contortions and grimaces of a circus-clown, nothing more pure or elevated is just now presented to them. That is the cleanest place they are in during the twelvemonth. There is the best company they meet anywhere; and the most licentious and profane words or deeds which are uttered or done there, are less profane and less licentious than those which meet their eyes and ears in the daily associations of life. Before they can be expected to relish anything purer or better, their moral and intellectual appetencies must be radically improved.

But of the attendants at these places, a large number (and those, too, who contribute most to keep them in countenance,) are capable of a much higher order of amusements or recreations, and to them, we apprehend, far too little consideration has been given in the ordering of our lecture system. It is quite possible that a different choice of topics, or a different mode of treating them, might meet, to some extent, their peculiar circumstances. There is scarcely any person who is not grateful for knowledge—important knowledge. The gratification of mere curiosity is, to most men, an appreciated boon. But the means must be skilfully adapted to the end. A man who would go to sleep under a well written and well delivered lecture on the ruins of Nineveh, or the catacombs of Rome, can be kept wide awake a whole evening by accurate and striking diagrams; so accurate and striking, that he can almost fancy he feels the dampness of the gloomy vault, and fears he may slip on the green mould that covers the ruin. Panoramas have been the medium of much popular entertainment and instruction, and if they were of countries with which the mass of people are familiar, they would be more generally attractive to those who cannot afford to pay much for the privilege of visiting them. A good panorama of some parts of Ireland, or California, to be seen for three or five cents, would probably draw thousands of persons who would have but little interest in much

more finished panoramas of Jerusalem, Italy, or the Arctic regions, though accessible on the same terms.

How far familiar discourses on the daily arts of life, building, gardening, preparation of food, operations of machinery, &c., or the more complicated subjects of domestic, social and political economy, and the various influences that affect it, or on those arrangements of the government which most nearly concern individual interests, as taxes, post-offices and banks, custom-house duties and internal improvements, would attract the mass of the people, is not easy to determine. If those who attend one lecture of such a course, were conscious of receiving valuable knowledge at a cheap rate, we should have strong confidence that they would come to the second, and bring one or more new hearers with them. That this is not an exaggerated expectation, appears from the fact, that when Dr. Birkbeck commenced his philanthropic efforts in Glasgow, to which we just now referred, only seventy-five persons attended his first lecture, two hundred the second, upwards of three hundred the third, and at a fourth, all the five hundred seats which the hall contained were taken, and tickets were refused to numbers who were equally anxious to secure the benefit.

In order to make the lecture, or the concert, or the panorama a point of attraction for the multitude, it must be at least as accessible and as cheap as other sources of amusement, and to this end the number of either must be indefinitely increased. Of the population of New York or Philadelphia, we may suppose that at least one in ten would find one evening out of the six in each week, the year round, to attend for one hour at some place of recreation or instruction; while it is obvious that all such places now open, including the very lowest, would not furnish comfortable sitting room for one in thirty; so that we may safely calculate on some thirty or forty thousand in either city, as being at liberty to listen to any new proposal for their entertainment. A quarter of a million invested in a single opera house for the few, would accomplish wonders in providing for the more natural and not less earnest cravings of the many.

But where shall we look for the means and agencies to supply so large a want? This inquiry was evidently present to the mind of Mr. Gurney, and we cannot but commend to favour-

able consideration his appeal to those who have the ability, but who have not yet improved the opportunity, to contribute to the stock of popular intelligence.

After enumerating the parties who stand in need of the excitement and entertainment which the public lecture is supposed to supply, he says,

"To these several classes, sensible, judicious addresses on subjects well selected and widely varied, will be a precious boon; addresses, I mean, not from hired lecturers, but from persons known and respected in their own neighbourhoods, who will undertake the task as a labour of love. It is a great mistake to fancy that this sort of teaching need be confined to towns. In country parishes it is most wanted, and often will be most welcome. I would not wish for a better audience than I have sometimes found crowding a village schoolroom to hear a tale for an hour or more about Luther, or Columbus, or Joan of Arc, or Sir Isaac Newton; and if they knew little besides the glorious name before, I have learnt afterwards that their curiosity was excited, and that books were in request to teach them more than the lecturer had told them. Reading in poetry would often be found very popular; or a well-selected book might supply the place of an original composition, and suggest remarks and conversation which would be still more instructive. What more easy for a man of fortune than to make his summer tour something better than a mere selfish mode of enjoyment, by telling neighbours and dependents, in an easy lively way, when he comes home, some of the wonders which he has seen abroad, and which they can never hope to visit? I have seen a volume by a lady, whose tales have instructed and delighted thousands, containing her journal of foreign travel in letters to her own school-children in the Isle of Wight. To me, the book appeared much less interesting than 'Katharine Ashton,' or the 'Experience of Life;' but the idea was a most happy one; the letters made a holiday, no doubt, in the Bonchurch school when they arrived; and I dare say many of the girls who heard them will have clearer notions of scenes and customs which were thus described to them, than they will get from all their schooling and reading put together.

"A spoken address, accompanied with a few illustrative

sketches, would be more lively still, and very popular, I am sure; and very useful in many ways would be this simple mode of letting the poor man share the rich man's pleasures.

"In towns, where a higher style of lecture is wanted, there are a number of professional men whose acquirements might be laid under contribution for the public service. Many have their own line of study, their own favourite authors, their own loved and cherished names on the long roll of men who have blessed the world in bygone ages, or have been the champions of some noble cause in recent times. There is an ample range of subjects, all of which may be made popular to a little-learned audience; and it is curious to find by experiment how such persons will welcome the details of some heart-stirring chapter in the history of mankind, when they have long been familiar with the bare outline, but have wanted the filling up to give life and reality to the scene. Some reading may be necessary to do the theme full justice, then the lecturer will learn as well as teach; and if it should chance, as in some cases it may chance, that the composition, when finished, is the first fruits of his pen since school or college days, except what the post has carried to his friends, he will doubtless improve his own style while he tries to impart some information to his hearers.

"I am particularly anxious to claim the help of intelligent laymen for this work, because their special studies and vocations would often suggest subjects of the best kind, and because many of the working classes are more afraid of something in the sermonizing style if the lecturer is a clergyman. It will be seen that six out of the eight lecturers in my volume are ministers of religion. That, I believe, is not an unusual proportion, as respects unpaid lecturers both in town and country; but surely there is no reason or propriety in our having so large a share in the secular teaching, besides having the pulpit to ourselves. It is not because we seek to monopolize the lecture-room; quite the reverse. I can answer for it, that where clergymen have influence with committees, they will advise them to prefer the good lay lecturer where he can be had; but the difficulty is immense of inducing busy men, and greater still, inducing men of leisure, to take the necessary trouble. Some are modest; some are lazy; some see no good in meddling with their neigh-

bours; some think it a vulgar kind of thing to be announced in placards, and stand up like showmen before an audience of strangers. Yet surely, if some useful or elevating theme has been well treated, and a little kindness has been done to a man's neighbours at some cost, and even a score or two of intelligent inquiring minds have had their interest awakened in some new branch of knowledge, or their sympathies drawn towards some noble specimen of humanity, an evening thus spent is better than the common dinner party, where men fare sumptuously, converse languidly, and meet and part with little said to make any creature wiser or better."—(*Preface*, p. ix.)

We have put this subject before our readers merely to introduce it. We feel entirely incompetent to discuss it. It has very important and interesting bearings, not less on the religious than on the social and moral interests of the community, which we are sure are not appreciated. Whoever shall devise a plan to attract to places of innocent recreation and entertainment the multitudes who have neither, or who seek and find both in connection with vicious influences and indulgences, will be a rare benefactor. The popular lecture system, as now administered, we fear, cannot be relied on for such a result.

As one of many methods of diffusing knowledge in an easy way and at a cheap rate, among those who have not leisure, inclination, nor means, to acquire it otherwise, the success or failure of the lecture is a matter of comparatively little consequence. But it has a much more positive character than this. It can scarcely fail to be effective for good or evil. Multitudes of those who attend it are incapable of distinguishing between truth and error, except when presented in striking contrast, and even those who have the power of discrimination are not always proof against the seductions of an eloquent orator, or a subtle sophist.

From a desire to make a course of lectures generally popular, the tastes and preferences of many must be consulted, and hence the grotesque combination which a programme of a course often presents, of persons whose views are diametrically opposite on topics of vital importance. It is scarcely to be supposed that such an opportunity to propagate the opinions which constitute the idiosyncrasy of the lecturer should not be improved; and though considerations of courtesy or prudence

may check the too free utterance of such opinions, the mere fact that the individual who is known to entertain them is so creditably associated, gives them a sort of currency.

But there is a still more definite and direct use made of the lecture to inculcate false views. Let the subject be man or woman—social advancement or decline—physics or philosophy —the past, the present, or the future—indeed, any conceivable topic, the door is opened wide for their admission. Established principles are questioned—respectful reference is made to authors and books of equivocal, if not positively mischievous tendency—a well turned period, a playful jest, or an amusing anecdote, must be allowed, at the expense, it may be, of reverence, virtue, or truth. Institutions and customs which are interwoven with the fabric of society and constitute no little part of its coherent power, are covertly assailed, and a bold thrust at the obligations and ordinances of religion, and through them at religion itself, is sometimes given, though generally in a way to show the malignity, rather than the skill or power of the assailant. The lecture must be popular, let what will be the sacrifice.

If new editions of *Tom Jones*, *Joseph Andrews*, or *Jonathan Wild*, are called for, and widely circulated among our schoolboys, clerks, and collegians, we must thank a popular lecturer from abroad for commending them to public favour. Their author, whom one of his nearest relatives describes as "most happy when nearest a haunch of venison or a bottle of champaigne," is held up to thousands of our young men as one of "the manliest and kindest of human beings, infinitely merciful, pitiful, and tender."* A reckless man of fashion, "a rake, who had dissipated his fortune, and passed from high life to low without dignity or respect," is presented to successive metropolitan audiences in the United States, as "a man of noble spirit, unconquerable generosity, of brave and gentle heart, the manly, the English Harry Fielding."†

On the other hand, it is eminently due to some of our most popular lecturers to say, that they have often embraced and well improved their opportunity to advocate and enforce the

* Thackeray's English Humourists. Harper's edition, p. 216.

† Ibid. p. 237.

cardinal principles of religion and moral duty. They have seized the occasion, which the discussion of historical or scientific subjects has offered, to expose the errors and sophistries of the times, and have not feared to deal justly with vice and folly, however specious their defence, or importunate their plea for mercy.

It is to be feared, however, that in the aggregate of popular impression made by the lecture-room, religion has lost far more than it has gained. That it need not be so, is too obvious to require proof; for there is, surely, nothing in her character or claims that does not elevate, dignify, and adorn whatever is associated with her. Art, science, and philosophy cannot exalt themselves more highly than by rendering to her all the homage she claims. And if the public lecture opens an avenue to the popular mind, why should it not be used for the noble purpose of disseminating the sacred and saving principles of divine truth? Why cannot the "sons of toil," the "unwashed artificers," go home from such discussions, not only with some new conceptions of the power of steam, or the application of machinery, but with just thoughts of the might, the majesty, the goodness and glory of Him who hath made all things by the word of his power, and whose dominion is over all the works of his hands?



ART. III.—*Cours d'Etudes Historiques: par* P. C. F. DAUNOU, *Pair de France, Ancien Professeur d'Histoire au Collège Royal de France, &c.* 20 vols. Paris: Firmin Didot frères.

IN 1819, M. Daunou was appointed to the Professorship of History in the College Royal of France. For twelve years he continued to fill the duties of that office. The fruits of his labours appear in the volumes above quoted, which were published after his death. A portion of the work, amounting to the first volume and about half the second, was prepared for the press by his own hand; the rest was printed without alteration from his college lectures.

Daunou is a conscientious writer, who employs no artifice to attract admiration; but honestly endeavours to establish a reliable criticism and to illustrate its application, and, under every head, to exhaust the demands of his duty as an instructor. He considers, in the first place, the sources of history, and treats of the investigation and choice of facts, under the two subdivisions of historical criticism and the uses of history. In the second part, he treats of the classification of facts, which comprehends the subordinate topics of geography and chronology. The third part is of the exposition of facts, and takes up the subject of style, and the art of writing history, adducing and weighing the opinions of the ablest authors on the subject, of both ancient and modern times. He then, in order to sustain his doctrines by the authority of the most illustrious examples, analyzes with great care the principal historians of antiquity, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Livy and others. Their narratives are taken up in order, reviewed at length, and compared with ancient monuments relating to the facts they recount, and thus form a complete course of profane history, anterior to the Christian era. The work closes with an investigation of the philosophic systems applied to history, and a summary of the history of philosophy from Plato to the nineteenth century.

Throughout, a clear discrimination is observed between the several elements of the subject, while their common aim is contemplated from each. The practical purpose, which it is the business of history to serve, and without which it would be no better than romance, is before the author's eye from every step in his course. The would-be philosophy which generalizes by obliterating distinctions, and the near-sighted detail, which loses the recognition of law in the particulars of its operation, are equally avoided. A minute and exhausting analysis is made to subserve the exposition of a great idea comprehending the whole.

The aim of all history is one. But in order fully to perceive this truth and what it amounts to, we need to think separately of things really separable. Instead of confounding after the common fashion, the art of writing history with the science on which it is based, and the subject of which it treats, in one

crude mass, we need even further to assign their proper boundaries to its own subordinate divisions. The path to all true art lies through nature and science. Nature furnishes the material. Science observes, classifies, and ascertains its laws. And Art, by following those laws, reconstructs for the expression of human thought. Nature utters the purpose of God, Art, those of man. Science stands between them and interprets the former for the use of the latter. Historical *science* is one thing, history, as written, is another; and the vast and varied subject, of which they treat, extends far beyond them both.

As, in geography, we never rightly apprehend the position of any province until we know by what districts or seas it is bordered, as well as to what kingdom it belongs; so, in science, the only effective way of studying the aim of one department is to settle those lines which separate it from others. The broad domain of universal history is wide as the ascertainable facts of creation. Bounded on one side by Philosophy, which aims to set forth the laws and causes of things; on another by Fiction, picturing them as they might be; on a third by Poetry, which expresses the affections they evoke; and, on a fourth, by Oratory, wielding all these considerations to control the conduct of men, history confines her policy to the presentation of the states and changes of actual existence.

Again, the products of the several provinces of history call for different culture, and give rise to different lines of commerce. Objects may be presented as they are at any given moment, or in respect to the changes which pass upon them; so history consists of the two fundamental elements of description and narrative.

Inanimate and animal nature are affected by few and regular changes, and those restricted to a narrow round. Their story told for one of a class is, in the main, told for all. Natural History consists chiefly of description. Still, there is narrative enough to render the word *history*, as qualified by a suitable epithet, the proper designation of the literature which pertains to them.

In mankind, on the other hand, we find change, of one sort or another, occurring continually, and taking a much wider

range. Even the natural history of our race demands an amount of narrative far beyond what belongs to all the rest of nature. But, it is in the moral, intellectual and social being that the changes increase beyond comparison. Consequently, there is a perfect propriety in the established usage whereby, when the word history is separated from all adjectives and qualifying epithets, it pertains singly to the narrative of human events. Thus limited, it still indicates a field of intellectual labour, which may fairly be said, in relation to human capacity, to be unlimited—limited, indeed, as not trenching upon the domains of other arts, but unlimited in the variety and abundance of the productions proper to its own. Concerning itself, with every path of change, whether towards improvement or degeneracy, its claims cover the whole world of human progress.

The natural changes which pass upon material things will be found to return into themselves after completing a very small cycle. Man alone can be said to *make progress:* that is, to advance by conscious efforts in a direction that does not necessarily return into itself. The course of nature in humbler life leads always back to its beginning. The plant springs out of the seed, grows to maturity, throws out its flowers, ripens its fruits, and sheds them on the earth, and the end of the process is precisely the same kind of seed with which it began. Human nature partakes of this animal cycle also; but that which distinguishes it above all other nature upon this globe is that, over and above, it is capable of a non-re-entrant progress, either upward or downward, but, in either case, tending into infinity. You cannot say of a man that he has reached such a degree of virtue as must necessarily coincide with the beginning of that course of iniquity out of which he emerged; nor will any persistency in vice ever bring him round to virtue.

Society is the aggregate of individuals, but not of all that pertains to the individual. The course of man's spiritual action, whether for improvement or degeneracy, points to no cycle, and continuance in either never works its own termination. It goes on as if it were infinite and immortal. But the individual, who pursues it, vanishes from our sight through the gates of death, and his contribution to society is paid. That contribution is

but a part of himself, and is therefore finite; and, although a very great number make such contributions, the sum of the whole must be finite.

In like manner, we never learn each other completely. No man, however much he may have acted, written, or spoken, has laid the whole breadth of his spiritual being before the world. One feels, as he turns from one thing to another, that mortal life does not furnish time enough to demonstrate all his capacities and feelings. Though possessed of a nature capable of endless expansion, he can only bequeath the fruits of a few efforts to the world. Society is only the aggregate of mortal portions of immortal individuals: and as its constituents are constantly passing away, and being replaced by others, it must be liable to frequent elevations and depressions. To such a degree is this the actual state of the case, that to the observer of only a few successive generations, it is often impossible to say whether after much agitation, society has lost or gained. A larger view perceives something like routine in its changes, nations emerging out of barbarism, by degrees reaching an elegant refinement, and then insensibly sinking back into the obscurity out of which they came.

While these conclusions are perfectly correct in view of their own facts, a more comprehensive generalization detects a persistent progress making its way through all these fluctuations. Even when society in one quarter has sunk the lowest, and its hope of revival perished, it has emerged, in another, after a time, to a higher civilization than before. Though the society to which it belongs is finite, yet, strange to say, civilization is found, when viewed as a whole, to be tending into infinity. Like each of the individuals from whom it springs, it seems to be pressing on towards a beautiful and blessed immortality; while vice and vulgarity, like the spirits to whom they belong, are as irretrievably taking the downward way to degradation and obscurity. The movement of evil, as well as of good, is never backward; but, notwithstanding fluctuations and occasional appearances of self-amendment, is always onward in the direction of its own destination. Thus the spokes of a carriage wheel do not advance in a straight line, but only by revolving round the axle, their depression, at one time, as truly

as their elevation at another, contributing to the forward motion of the whole.

The central problem, then, of historical science, is to determine the law of this wonderful progress; the true work of historic art to follow it in all its conflict with opposing elements, and faithfully to record its victories and defeats, and the series of events belonging to its increase and occasional decline; and the narrative will not be true to the spirit of the whole, if it fails to give encouragement to further effort, and to hopes of ultimate victory.

Progress belongs to time and starts from an act of creation. Any other hypothesis would land us in absurdity. The general current of events wells up from the same fountain-head with Revelation. If the latter is a message directly from God, and addressed to man alone, and therefore of peculiar interest to him, the field of natural observation is a broader page inscribed by the same hand. Man's daily experience is itself a revelation. Every moment some hitherto unpublished purposes of Almighty God are embodying themselves in fact, and issuing through the present into the past. Time is but the unrolling of the mighty scroll of God's decrees. It is the function of human memory to retain the impress which they make; and as memory to the individual, so is history to the race. True, its achievements are far from complete, and amount to little more than epitomized chapters from a few columns of the transient page; but these epitomes contain the great events of human duration, and enable us to understand the principal changes which have affected the government of the world for the last three thousand years.

Now, if there are found to be any regular principles, or laws pertaining to human progress, this record of it may become, if rightly studied, a book of invaluable moral instruction, furnishing a scale whereby to graduate our expectations, and a counsellor in the best means of effecting our designs.

Why the Creator, knowing the importance to us of a right anticipation of the future, should yet have withheld direct intuition of things to come, is a difficulty that admits of satisfactory resolution; but from the relative importance of the things it might have been expected to be otherwise. The past

can never be retrieved nor amended, and, in itself considered, might seem to be as unimportant to us as the breeze which rippled the surface of the flood; the present is independent of all accident or calculation; as it is, so must we enjoy or bear it; the only relation in time over which our deliberations can exercise any control is that of which directly we know nothing; the events for which alone it is our business to labour are hid from our eyes.

This first and *a priori* view of the subject becomes singularly modified upon further inspection. In the first place the evanescence and disconnection which seem to pertain to all temporal things, are found to be only apparent when viewed in relation to historical mankind. There is a vital tie which binds all civilized communities in one. "Let the dead past bury its dead," was an unfortunate saying for a poet. The past is not dead. The past of a progressive humanity cannot die. For the very condition of improvement is its continuation into the present. Even of the years beyond the flood there is a portion which history testifies is living still; not in the scanty record upon her page alone; that were only a figurative use of words; but in their shaping agency upon the present life of man and condition of his abode, as well as in the bliss and woe of spirits then assigned to their respective rewards. No transaction or condition is all over when it has ceased to be present. It has woven more or less of its own nature into the web of life, which passes not away. The realm of Cyrus was obsolete two thousand years ago; yet, in one of the highest senses, it may be said to be living still. For had it never been, many of the elements of Hellenic refinement would have been lacking. The struggle which developed the strength of Athens, the dominion which it yielded to Alexander, the hellenizing of the East, and ultimately of the Roman empire, the diffusion of the Greek language, fitting it to be the medium of later revelation, the oriental elements thus transmitted through accidental channels to modern times; their still greater effect upon mediæval orientalism, and then again upon modern times, are some of the means whereby the still living action of that ancient kingdom has survived the lapse of ages. This state of existence is ramified beyond calculation, not only into

elements in law and government, fundamental ideas in art and forms of society, but even into words and phrases, and figures of speech, and the infinitesimals that go to make up manner of thought and sentiment and conduct. It is equally true of the individual man. He is not free to regard himself as isolated, and responsible for himself and to himself alone. Nor does his earthly existence all perish when he dies. The contribution which it made to society, whether by way of benefit or injury, holds its place indefinitely, and goes to mould the character of ages yet to come. It is impossible to say how much of good and evil we owe to persons of the humblest rank, who were never known beyond their own neighbourhood, and the record of whose being, perhaps, was never made. We know nothing of the nations of Kufa, of Mennahom and Rebo, but the names; of other nations, who must have flourished in the same early times, even the names are unknown; but we know that their accumulated experience built up those arts which appeared already well established in the very dawn of history, and we know that national character is the resultant of the various forces pertaining to that of the persons composing it; and consequently, that multitudes of persons must have contributed to each one of those elements, which were afterwards embodied in a higher progress. Who knows but at this very moment there may be still living in our lives some element that first saw light in some Assyrian cottage, in some unrecorded age? There is such a continuity in the series of events, which constitute the civilization we enjoy, that every part belongs to the whole. Generations are not separate sets of communities. No period of human duration is independent of another. As in a web unrolling from the loom, the most distant extremity is one with that portion just parting from the beam: the whole constitutes a unit, having features, laws, and responsibilities belonging to it as such. In one sense, a man is complete in himself; in another, he is but an integer in a great numerical series. The mystery of our singular being is that it is not confined to the present, but lives in the past, present and future at once. As beneath the starry heavens, the light which we enjoy is not a present effulgence merely, but congregated from various times, as the sources of the component rays

are near or more remote. Some of those radiant messengers have reached us only after the lapse of months, and many a one has been years and even perhaps ages on its journey down. We stand actually in a light collected from various periods of time, and see, at present, things that are long since past. So in the progress of human existence, the contributions of many ages combine in the civilization which now prevails. We are clothed in and sustained by the past. A more or less distant future is the object of our every desire and aspiration. Out of that time to come do we draw all considerations and emotions that prompt to activity, whether in the formation or execution of plans. From the past we receive our instructions, from the future our motives. And the only moment for action is the present. God has bound all relations of time together. They are actually one, like the diorama, though appearing to the spectator in successive aspects, to the eye of the Maker one great picture, comprehensible at a glance. Nay, the unity of civilization is by much the more intimate, being not mechanical, but organic, having not only such a connection of parts as pertains to orderly arrangement, but also that of a plant or a living being.

When we inspect more closely this wonderful progress, by which we are borne along, in one sense, like the particles of water in a stream, we find operating there all the essential laws that govern the development of life. Its parts are bound together by a connection that is necessary. No one period thereof could, without a miracle, have existed but for that which preceded. The nineteenth century is as necessarily connected with the eighteenth as one joint of the cane is with that beneath it. Its parts are inseparable. Not one of them could sustain life by itself, nor could have been what it is but for that connection.

And secondly, we find that the various parts are each in themselves perfectly adapted to their places. It is in the nature of the preceding to prepare the way for and give birth to the succeeding, and the succeeding is always in its nature precisely adapted to follow its predecessor. The fitness of periods of time for their positions in relation to each other is as natural as that of the different members of the animal body.

However capricious certain facts may appear to cursory glance, further observation will ascertain them to be the natural results of a preëxisting but unnoticed state of things. To the student of France under the Bourbons, and the state of public opinion in the latter part of last century, the French revolution is as natural as the fall of grain when fully ripe.

And further, there is found to be a reciprocity of services among all the parts of which this progress consists; a common activity pervades the whole. Through all countries belonging to civilization, through all times, through all grades of society, and every person composing it, there is the operation of an organism as true as that of a plant or living creature. The action of our material frame does not pertain to one set of parts alone, nor does any one communicate without receiving. The hand cannot say to the foot, nor the foot to the hand, I have no need of thee. It also extends to every fibre and molecule; so that if we should inspect a living muscle we should find every particle of it partaking in the all-pervading action, each one sustaining that adjoining to it, and the whole both giving and receiving from each of its minutest parts a reciprocal action which cannot stop except in death. If any part ceases to act its part, it spreads disease around it, and eventually death, unless the other parts are vigorous enough to cast it out, or otherwise defend themselves from its contact. It is this reciprocity and pervasive action which most remarkably distinguishes organic from mechanical structure. And nothing short of living organism can adequately illustrate the intimacy of that connection of parts which belongs to human progress.

Each process of development in nature is endowed with a peculiar power of its own, complete in itself, yet most definitely circumscribed. That germ which is wrapt up in the little seed of the elm, alone has the power to generate an elm-tree; and that condition of its existence is not merely a potentiality, but an imperative command, which in the proper circumstances it cannot disobey. Until the tree is complete, and everything that belongs to an elm fully formed and arranged, it gives not a symptom of incapacity. But there its force is bounded. It can only go on to enlarge that type of being, and cannot add a leaf nor twig of a different kind. In this respect every process in

nature is as sharply circumscribed as if it grew within a mould; while within those bounds it operates with as much certainty and as just a use of means as if possessed of the highest intelligence, invariably taking the right way, and never failing from any fault of its own. In like manner, every element in social development is all-powerful for the work to which it is ordained. Within those limits it is gifted with sole and undivided sovereignty. But anything new it can no more make than it could create itself at first. Consequently the result of any one case of development is a perfect unit; and the process, amid all the changes which belong to it, remains one and the same. It is the fiat of the Creator operating through the germ, which he has originally so endowed. Beyond this it cannot go. To speak, as some do, of development producing new elements, matter generating mind, for example, is a contradiction of terms. Out of a grain of corn culture will develope the stalk and leaves, and pollen and ears, whose elemental germs are in it; but no culture could ever develope from it an ear of wheat or a living creature. Development cannot bring out of a thing what creation has not put in it. It cannot make something out of nothing. In its best estate it can only obey the constituent command. Humbler nature finds no choice. Mankind, created in wisdom and holiness, have by some original calamity become possessed by another element contradictory thereto; and, accordingly, instead of developing homogeneously and consistently into greater and still greater breadth of power, and glory, and wisdom, choose more commonly the downward road, and develope the sin and folly whose original germs are bound up in the heart by nature, into greater and more shameless iniquity. Development is not necessarily improvement. That depends entirely upon the nature of the original germ. To develope is only to carry into actual existence the full operation of a principle. Development of good is greater good; but development of evil can only give ripeness to wrong. The one is not a misdirection of the other. Good is not the end at which evil aims; nor is evil a mistake of good. Though evil may be overruled for good, it never contemplates such an end. Its own object in that case is always defeated utterly, while the development of good is never overruled to evil. They have

no kindred, nor partnership. "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Though the course of wisdom and righteousness alone unfolds all the best powers of our nature, and is, therefore, the only true and full development of our being; yet if we observe the sinner's course of sin, we shall find it a true development of an element or germ whose existence can be detected in every one of the race. Mysterious, indeed, is the nature of that principle in the seed of a plant, which collects around it the juices kindred to its nature, and builds a structure after a peculiar type of its own; but still more mysterious is that in man, which goes forth towards the apprehension of good and evil, of truth and error, and expands its own being in appropriating them. That secret of creation no analysis has ever yet laid bare. The law of its action, however, is an open truth, which, to man, whose business is culture of nature and himself, is really the thing most important to know.

As far as the course of human events is a simple development of known elements, we may consider the knowledge of its future perfectly attainable, from the example of its past. And if it consisted of nothing more than the unfolding of one or two original germs, the problem would be as easy as to foretell a crop of the same kind of grain that was sowed. But the grand difficulty of the subject lies in the fact, that while exhibiting all the process of development, it is not governed solely thereby. Events are continually turning up, which cannot be included under that head. There is always mingling with the present some new ingredient, which did not belong to any preceding state of things, and which consequently could not be foreseen by the most learned and thoughtful. While the promise made to the heart of man is entirely fulfilled in the sequence of events, the designs of Deity are advancing to completion by the gradual introduction of what no human sagacity could anticipate. The Creator has not planted our race like a seed in the earth, and left it to the operations of those laws, then once for all constituted in relation to it. He follows us with the frequent, if not ceaseless insertions, or communications of his own power. We are not mere outgrowths of a germ—not mere plants of a higher nature. The civilization, to which we belong, has always

enjoyed more or less additional to all that could have sprung out of itself. As the individual man consists of a spiritual life erected upon the basis of an animal life; so the progress of the race exhibits the working of supernatural agency upon the basis of natural laws. To admit development alone as the whole philosophy of history, is to eliminate from the problem what most distinguishes the progress of mankind from the cycles of brute and inanimate nature. It is certainly a simplification of the treatment; but it simplifies not by explaining, but by leaving out the real difficulties, and seizing upon that alone, which is most obvious and easy. As if one should attempt to explain animal life by circulation of the blood alone, his account might be very simple and beautiful in theory, but the student of the living phenomena would see in it a mere evasion of the complexities of the subject. The progress, which manifests the life of society, is a movement of most complex nature, proceeding not from a single seed, as in vegetation, nor, as in the lower animals, only from a common instinct actuating all alike; but from the free action of each one of thousands of millions, from age to age, as well as from a higher agency transcending human scrutiny.

Common language recognizes cause and effect, and is constructed upon the assumption of that relation, and yet employs familiarly a class of words to represent things as occurring without a cause. And common language never acts without sufficient reason. Following back any one of those words, we shall find that it idiomatically applies to such events as no human mind could have foreseen, nor, when past, can trace to any determinate order of things. A fleet is the offspring of human volition, and a storm the development of powers in nature; but the destruction of the Persian fleet off mount Athos belongs to neither category. It is not organically connected with either the one or the other. Most people would call it an accident—that is, a thing which has occurred without a cause, and induction from only a few examples would hardly justify us in saying that they are wrong. But the startling fact in regard to such cases is that, though they are exceedingly numerous in all ages, and connected with every variety of human action, yet a faithful study of them in series demonstrates that there is a

method pervading the whole. In nothing pertaining to history is the evidence of superior wisdom more cogent, than in the bearing of what are called accidents. And by this, we do not mean merely that they have contributed to bring about the present state of things; but we mean that their aggregate always works out strict national justice, to the reward of national virtue, and the punishment of national wrong. These fortuitous conjunctures appear as if they were controlled by a power which respects the right, and which, though long suffering, will ultimately inflict a just retribution for wrong. One man's life may be too contracted to furnish conviction to any observer of it save himself, but the duration of any people will confirm the truth of this position. Those apparently unintended incidents are not found to sustain one principle in one nation, and another in another nation; but in all ages, and in all countries, they vindicate the same moral code. With such a view of their aggregate, we dare not say that they are undesigned. Though not springing from, they sustain a relation to, the exertions of the persons whom they concern. "The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," yet righteous effort is the permanent path of prosperity, and the people who should abandon it for a vague and idle reliance upon fortune, would reap the reward in being deserted by good fortune.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to estimate the true historical value of such elements. Who, for example, shall make the calculation, and show what the state of the world should have been, but for those accidents, which, in the Punic wars, gave preponderance to Rome? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that, as a general thing, they are undervalued at the time of their occurrence, and afterwards lost sight of in the splendour of effects which men are ambitious to credit to their own designs. Sometimes also the apparently trifling are followed by momentous results. An arrow glances aside from a tree, and piercing the heart of a king, affects the government of a nation for ages; a falling apple suggests to a philosopher a train of thought which renovates the science of the world. Things, not of such extensive and obvious influence, but of a similar nature, are of daily and hourly occurrence in the

experience of mankind. They take their place in succeeding development; but cannot be said to issue by organic process from any germ previously existing in human life and affairs. They are providential conjunctures, forming the starting points of new series, manifesting the hand of Him, who by some higher and unrevealed law is overruling to some unrevealed end all the varieties of order here below.

A similar insertion of new elements, but more declared, and more distinctly independent of previous development, is to be found in the case of those connected with sin and redemption.

It is beyond dispute that there is in man's moral being an element contradictory of improvement, which is not merely a negation, but an active principle, misguiding, thwarting, perverting and corrupting the whole, which is certainly not the outgrowth of an originally holy taste, and the correction of which is never effected by mere development of the original man.

Neither was the translation of Enoch a particular development of the nature inherited from Adam. The revelation to Noah, the call of Abraham, the exode from Egypt, the giving of the law and all the wonders which attended the Hebrew sojourn in the desert, as well as their subsequent independence in their own land, the birth of Christ, his life, death, resurrection and ascension, the day of Pentecost and so on, are obvious examples of the same kind. They have all regularly and in perfect order taken their places as living elements in the civilization we enjoy; and evidently belong to a series existing in unbroken connection with natural things in the Divine mind, but to call any of them a development of the original human germ would go to defeat the very definition of the term.

Thirdly, there is the continually occurring communication of the grace of God to the child of faith, which moulding his heart, enters through it into the life of society, and constitutes the very highest element of social improvement. The Spirit of God still broods over the race, and sustains its efforts by supernatural help at every point of emergency. Development belongs to the Christian life; but it is always from the implanting of a new element.

And, fourthly, if not every soul that comes into the world,

certainly very many bring with them each their own peculiar tinge of character, which, after commerce with the world, takes its place as a new element in the civilization of succeeding times. The genius of an Æschylus, Archimedes, Aristotle, Milton, or Shakspeare, is something more than mere development of a common germ.

To that element in human life seeming to consist of events without a cause, or springing from such a conjuncture of causes as no person ever designed or could command, the common term *Providence* is most properly employed. Such events differ from miracles in that, though additional, they are not contradictory of previously existing elements, and in the fact that such may be expected again; while miracles, and all that follow as their sequel, belong to the system of grace.

Although the operations of Providence and of grace are not the mere outgrowth of a seed already planted in nature, yet when we consider them for the time they have been recorded, they are found to observe certain laws peculiar to themselves, from which the docile and attentive student may learn something of the designs of the Almighty Ruler.

The works of Providence belong to an economy of such grandeur, that the observations of many successive ages are necessary to give even an inkling of its nature. At the time when they occur, it is impossible for any human mind to understand the bearing of the several facts; nor perhaps for an hundred years will their meaning appear. And sometimes facts which in their occurrence were deemed of but trifling moment, turn out in the lapse of ages to be of vital importance. Why the first Persian invasion of Attica landed at Marathon, at a time when Athens had not the means of defending Piræus; why the second, after really securing everything, should have been urged into an unnecessary battle to its own utter ruin, it was impossible for any man of that day to perceive. It required the lapse of nearly a thousand years to teach the world the bearing and importance of those events; and even the succeeding thousand years added so much to their elucidation, that although we now understand their bearing, we cannot feel assured that all their importance is before us yet. The boy Petrarch lighting upon the classical treatise which fascinated

his ear before he understood its meaning; the conscience-stricken monk of Wittemberg meeting with the long-neglected Bible, are facts of a similar nature. It was impossible for any man of those days to estimate or even conceive of the nature of their importance. Most of a generation was needed to exhibit their bearing, and succeeding centuries have not unfolded all their value.

These are, indeed, uncommon instances; but the same truth pertains to incidents of the most ordinary occurrence, myriads of which, doubtless, entirely elude all human notice: and of none among even the most minute, and most fully studied, can it be said that we have seen the end.

The system of Providence is the largest of all that intermingle their operation in human affairs. As in the case of some distant planet, years of observation are necessary to the computation of even the curve of its orbit. It presents, indeed, subordinate series springing within individual lives, which the individual may himself to a great extent understand, as far as they pertain to himself and his neighbours; but these also enter as elements into the grander system comprehending the whole race; as in the solar system, each planet, and satellite, and comet, and meteor, has its own motion, while all pertain to and partake of the motion of the whole. The former may be calculated from comparatively brief observation; but the latter cannot even be detected in less than centuries, and its orbit not even then determined with certainty.

It is this one economy which renders, and probably will always render, the future to a large extent inscrutable to human eye. It interlocks itself with the economy of nature and of grace, but is vaster than both. That of grace requires no analysis here, inasmuch as its very object is to declare itself. But by that declaration it belongs only to mankind, having its beginning and end in the decrees of God regarding the race as fallen.

The natural development of the original germs of humanity is of course an economy that belongs solely to the nature of those germs, and can pertain to nothing that is not in man. Its elements are, therefore, all subject to scrutiny and computation.

The economy of Providence, which overrules and interweaves itself with both, seems to belong to and be part of a system wider than earth—that portion of the constitution of God's empire which extends to us—while the other economies embrace the local laws of our particular province. It might be represented as the path of the moral universe, not only tending into a future eternity, but also coming from an endless past, on which mankind occupy a very scanty segment. It constitutes the infinite and inscrutable in human events.

Men continually and habitually confess their inability to fathom this economy of the Divine government, by such words as—it happened, it turned out, accident, chance, incidentally, and so forth—which are merely expressions admitting ignorance of a cause. Vast and inscrutable, however, as is the economy of Providence, some of its principles as bearing upon man have been well determined. Though often appearing to oppose, it invariably coöperates with both the other economies, and evidently comprehends them. Apparent conflict, wherever the connection can be conclusively followed, is always found to be harmony upon a larger scale, like certain discords in music, which for the instant that they strike the ear, seem to spoil the melody; but the moment they are resolved, are found to have been the very best for the place they occupied in relation to the whole passage. The narrower sphere of nature, the particular system of grace it takes up upon the circumference of its mighty orbit, and sustains in their place in the endless revolution of the years of God—the primary cycle of His government, with whom a thousand years are but as one day. Providence never contradicts either nature or grace, while it is continually pouring into existence something additional of its own. We cannot tell what a day may bring forth, but we know the certain effects of natural causes, and that the revealed promise of the Lord standeth sure.

Thus, the progress of human events is found to be affected by three economies; consisting respectively of natural development of the original germs of humanity, of Revelation, and of Providence. The first has been diverted into a course of deterioration. The second has been devised to restore it. And the third is the universal system out of which they have both

arisen. The first is the local law of a province, the last, the constitution of the whole empire. The second is a remedy for a particular evil. Both the former two are designed for men alone, and therefore submitted to the understanding of men. The great primal and over-ruling system is not submitted to the knowledge of men. They have no more right nor power to comprehend it, than they have to comprehend the universe of which it is the law. At the same time, its obvious action among them, and over them, demonstrates daily their dependence upon an inscrutable Jehovah, and daily declares in their ears that, after all the learning in theology and in natural laws which it is incumbent upon them to acquire, they must not flatter themselves that they can comprehend the divine government, or "find out the Almighty unto perfection."

Now, the work of man in this system is simply the development of elements; but not merely of those planted once for all by the original act of creation. Had that been the case, it would never have amounted to more than revolution in a cycle. We are as much under obligation to cultivate the gifts of Providence and grace, as to improve our inheritance from Adam, and have this consideration for encouragement, that the Almighty Donor ever follows the steps of diligence with new supplies. The Creator calls upon his intelligent creature to coöperate herein with himself, and pours forth new elements in proportion as the already communicated are employed. It is thus that the non-reëntrant progress, which we find belonging to civilization, is constituted. As the stream of water draws its resources not only from the moisture of the valley in which it flows, but also from the showers that descend directly on its breast from heaven; so, human progress is the work of human effort ever sustained by fresh communications from on high.

But, as this work of man is not instinctive, but intelligent and voluntary, every new step must be taken from a right understanding of the past; as in one of those vast cathedral structures, whose erection occupied several centuries, each succeeding architect had to begin with the study of what his predecessors had accomplished. History is therefore an art indispensable to human progress: and the existing state of the world demonstrates that none is made without it. Where one genera-

tion forgets the experience of another, the whole must be confined to the revolution of brief cycles in the manner of the lower animals. To throw off the debt of the past, and disregard obligation to the future, if it were possible, would reduce man to the level of inanimate things. The very tendency thereto it is which renders him, in some cases, a savage. The case of barbarism and that of iniquity are one. They do not fulfil the demands of creation and of Providence upon them. Whatever development they make is towards deterioration. Civilized life, and in these days, Christian civilization, alone approaches the distinctive duties of humanity.

If human actions should quietly die, when their lessons are neglected, the importance of this whole subject would be less than it is; but man is not permitted thus to become a harmless brute. If not better, he must be worse. The transactions of his past, whether intelligently listened to or not, will press themselves into his actual present, for evil, if not for good. Not only do their effects positively abide, but the persons who did them continue to be responsible for them, and to enjoy the good or suffer the evil which follows in their train. And what is true of the individual, in this respect, is more plainly so in the case of nations, and races of mankind. We cannot act, and then be just as if we had not acted, nor be idle and reap the fruits of activity: and active or idle, we are, by the lapse of every day, carried into a further debt of moral accountability, which neither ourselves nor our posterity shall be able to cancel. As we inherit the vice and virtue of the past, our conduct now is going to make up the aggregate of which future generations shall receive the reward or punishment. Accordingly, instead of foreknowledge we are endowed with the native belief that similar causes will always produce similar effects. And although, by means of providential modifications, we never have a recurrence of precisely the same combination of circumstances, the progress of human events never returns upon its own steps, and not the *same*, but only *similar* things are to be expected; yet the careful student of the past may with safety calculate many of the most important results of still operating causes. And by knowing the present, and preparing for the future, in this way he is made better acquainted with

the different relations of time, and better instructed in his duties than if he had direct intuition of things to come. For, in that latter case, men would certainly disregard the past and present, live in giddy anticipations or depressing fears, and be equally without hope and experimental knowledge. As it is, a careful study of the laws of human development as far as that process has been recorded, will enable us to restore much of the unrecorded past, as well as to anticipate the future, as an architect, from a few elements in a ruin, can reconstruct, in all its essentials, the building to which it belonged. Had full and faithful records of the states and events of society been kept from the beginning, the ascertainable knowledge of historical cause and effect would, by this time, have been very extensive. But the world, like the individual, had an infancy, of which it remembers nothing, and a childhood and youth, of which only few and fragmentary notices remain, and those, in many cases, so highly coloured by the pencil of romance that no discrimination is able with certainty to separate the fictitious from the real. The voice of its Author alone has transmitted to the mature years of the world any trustworthy records of that early time: and those are scanty, except as bearing on the history of sin and of redemption.

Though past events will continue, more or less, to retain their place in the present, the benefits accruing from them will differ according as they are, or are not, intelligently apprehended. The fact that their effects still live, and the fact that they are recognized for what they are, and the fact that a proper use is made of them, are three entirely separable things, and as different as those parallel ones that we have natural powers, that we are intelligent of their operation, and that we employ them aright. And, as an incalculable amount of intellectual power, and thereby of means of good to each other, is wasted by individual ignorance and neglect, so by far the larger amount of public experience has run to waste from lack of records, of care in preserving those made, and of industry in turning them to account. Historical nations, ever since the dispersion at Babel, have been greatly in the minority. The original and natural state of man is civilization; but conscious effort is necessary to sustain it. Vice leads to ignorance and barbarism,

and barbarism keeps no record of itself. When a people sinks out of civilization it sinks also out of history; and persistent neglect of history, on the part of any nation, will as certainly stamp their public conduct with fatuity, as that the man whom experience cannot teach will be through all his life a fool. It is inconceivable what the world has lost of knowledge and practical wisdom by the neglect of proper records: and it will not be in vain to regret, if thereby we are prompted to greater diligence in studying and turning to practical account the treasures which we have. For though the breadth of historical philosophy is less than it might have been, yet what we do possess of historical fact is actually more than can be fully mastered by any single human life.

In order to study history with profit, attention must be given to the connection of actions with their effects, arranging them in the mind, according as they are followed by success or failure, by good or evil, as they obtain the praise or blame of succeeding times, as they recommend themselves to the approval or disapproval of our own hearts, and as they coincide with or vary from the revealed law. Large induction must be made, if one would arrive at confident moral conclusions. Nothing is easier than to make a show of argument on any side of a question with two or three partial facts. Truth cannot be expected unless the specimens examined are, both in number and kind, fair representatives of their respective classes. Many readers jump at a conclusion from one fact, and prejudge all the rest. Reliable instruction can accrue only from patient comparison of many examples impartially collected.

In the classification of facts we shall often need the application of a strict criticism of their moral character; for that is not unfrequently misrepresented by even the best historians.

It is necessary also to discriminate between what is human and what is divine. The latter we cannot hope to reproduce—the attempt is a common source of failure—but we may learn from it how to improve upon the use of means. Providence, by bringing about for us what we cannot do, teaches us, in future, the better to execute what we can do. And thus, upon some other occasion, by the same divine aid, we may succeed in reaching higher results than were at first attainable.

Thus it is that history subserves the same ends with revelation and true philosophy, being, in short, the practical illustration of the doctrines of both, presenting the realities of which their doctrines are the laws. Instead of reading it, therefore, as the giddy read romances, under the impulse of a shallow curiosity, we should treat it with the most serious attention, as a treasury of profound practical lessons, respecting both classes of human duty, acting and trusting, works and faith, human enterprise and overruling Providence, inasmuch as nothing teaches better how to work while it is to-day, nor demonstrates more clearly that

> "There's a divinity that shapes our ends
> Rough-hew them how we will."

And in the still profounder utterance of the Hebrew psalmist, that "a man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps."

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## ART. IV.—*Some Account of the Writings of the Reverend Philip Doddridge, D. D.*

THE first publication of Mr. Doddridge was entitled "Free Thoughts on the most probable Means of reviving the Dissenting Interest; occasioned by the late Enquiry into the Causes of its Decay." It was printed in 1729, when the author was about twenty-seven years of age, and was addressed to the querist alluded to in the title, who, as afterwards transpired, was a young dissenting minister named Gough, who afterwards conformed to the Established Church, and who, in 1750, published a volume of sermons. This early production of Doddridge evinces much of the taste and talent which mark his later writings. Some of the opinions which characterize all his labours are here made prominent. With an undeniable affection for the Nonconformist Churches, he discloses, as we cannot but think, an erroneous estimate of the cause of decline, which was not so much want of culture as decay of zeal. The star of Dissent began to pale, when the holy ardours of Owen,

Flavel, and Baxter, gave place to the smooth and often effeminate elegancies of the eighteenth century. He saw this in part, and quotes Burnet as having said, forty years before, "that the Dissenters had then, in a great measure, lost that good character for strictness in religion, which gained them their credit, and made such numbers fall off to them." But he lays out his strength in pleading for such accomplishment as shall make them popular preachers. The pamphlet is graceful, but diffuse, and has little to reward perusal.

In 1732 he published four "Sermons on the Education of Children." From first to last, this subject lay near his heart; indeed such a consequence would naturally ensue upon acquaintance with the venerable Dr. Watts, who, beyond all men who ever wrote, deserves the love and honour of juvenile readers. As Doddridge had not the depth and originality, so he had not the vivacity and versatility of his honoured Mentor. Yet here and elsewhere, he walks in the same steps. The discourses were preached to his own people at Northampton, and were published upon the recommendation of Dr. Watts. They mark a great advance upon the former work, and indicate that decided leaning towards practical topics, which is more and more observable in the author, and which led to his becoming one of the most useful and edifying Christian authors who have employed our language. These counsels may be perused now, with the greatest advantage.

Urged by the same benignant disposition, he gave to the public in 1735, his well-known "Sermons to Young People." They are seven in number, and are worthy of being perpetuated in our literature as long as the language shall be intelligible to English readers. The subjects speak for themselves: The Importance of the Rising Generation—Christ formed in the Soul the only Foundation for Eternity—Evil Company—The Young Christian Invited to Communion—The Orphan's Hope—Absalom—Youth Reminded of Judgment. The author was now in his prime, and if he had stopped here would have remained a public benefactor. The discourses are remarkable for wise choice of topics, judicious treatment, great method and perspicuity, evangelical orthodoxy, weighty and ingenious use of Scripture, and natural pathos. They are wisely kept in circu-

lation by the London Religious Tract Society. The late Robert Hall was accustomed to make this volume his frequent gift to young persons, as esteeming it the best of all human compositions for the promotion of youthful piety. Indeed, such was his admiration of the sermon on "Christ Formed in the Soul," that, in one of his eccentric moods, he actually delivered it from memory on a Sunday afternoon.*

The next work of Dr. Doddridge was his "Ten Sermons on the Power and Grace of Christ, and the Evidences of his Glorious Gospel." This was in 1736. The last three of these discourses constitute a treatise on the Evidences of Christianity, and as such have often been published separately. Like the preceding work, this evinces the solicitous desire of the author to benefit the young, to whom he particularly addresses himself. This led the way in that series of awakening and experimental volumes which rendered Doddridge so distinguished among practical writers; indeed the preface shows that the entire series was at this early date distinctly before his mind. He says, with feeling: "To intend well is a foundation of the most solid happiness in life; and to be rightly understood in those intentions, is one of its most sensible delights." When we find him expressing the hope that the sermons may be useful by being read in families on the evening of the Lord's-day, we are reminded of a domestic custom, which has given way before the influx of miscellaneous reading and popular lectures. "In 1735," says the author himself, recounting some of these labours, "I printed a single sermon, 'On the Care of the Soul, as the One Thing Needful,' at the desire of a person of quality, at whose house it was preached. In 1736, a sermon, preached on the preceding fifth of November, entitled, 'The Absurdity and Iniquity of Persecution for Conscience sake, in all its kinds and degrees.' It was proposed as an appendix to the sermons against Popery, preached at Salters' Hall that year, as the growth of Popery in and about London had been observed to be very great. In the same year I published 'Ten Sermons, on the Power and Grace of Christ, and the Evidence of his Glorious Gospel.' These sermons were preached at the desire of that munificent benefactor to the cause of non-conformity,

* Hall's Works, vol. iv., p. 16, Harper's ed.

William Coward, Esq.; and the three last were so agreeable to Dr. Secker, then Bishop of Oxford, that he expressed his desire to me that they might be published alone, for the use of junior students, whose office calls them to defend Christianity; and perhaps I have not written anything with greater accuracy, or which will be found more adapted to the use of junior students in theology." In Orton's Memoir we are informed that two Deists were enlightened by this treatise, and that one of these became a zealous preacher of the gospel. Here it is that we first perceive tokens of that assiduous application to the Greek and Latin classics and the Fathers of the Church, which afterwards secured for Doddridge so honourable a place in the esteem of such scholars as Secker, Warburton, West, and Lardner.

Several years elapsed before he set forth, in 1741, his "Practical Discourses on Regeneration." They were first preached on Sunday evenings. It is impossible not to recognize, in the very subject, the earnestness and discrimination with which the author seized not only on great, but on the greatest topics; those which concern the vitals of religion, an example which may well be followed by all young preachers in our own day. The opening words of the Preface may also be held up as comprising a ministerial maxim. "It is undoubtedly the duty of every wise and good man to be forming schemes for the service of God and his fellow-creatures in future years, if he be continued to them; and it will be his prudence to do it in early life, that he may be gradually preparing to execute them in the most advantageous manner he can." From the practical object set before him, the author is led to treat Regeneration more in its subject and fruits, than in its cause and mode. Hence, while the discourses are awakening and tender in no common degree, they will disappoint such as look to them for a scientific exposition of theological points. It is quite a surprise to find a work like this brought into any connection with such a learned and worldly champion as Warburton. This scholar and divine, afterwards so famous, and who is stigmatized in the title of Lord Bolingbroke's "Familiar Epistle to the Most Impudent Man Living," thus addresses Doddridge, August 5, 1741: "I have received the very valuable present of

your Ten Sermons, which I have read with much pleasure and improvement; they are excellent; and I have the additional obligation and pleasure of finding the author of the Divine Legation honoured by your friendly mention of him. You speak of your *Sermons on Regeneration;* and a further prosecution of that subject under the title of the *Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul.* I think you need make no apology for writing so many things on practical subjects. They are, when well written, by far the most useful to the interests of Christianity, as vast numbers of such tracts are a disgrace to it. But, without a compliment, I have never yet seen any writings equal to yours on practical subjects."

In the year 1742 an insidious attack was made upon the foundations of religion, in a pamphlet entitled "Christianity not founded on Argument;" which awakened an attention quite disproportionate to its intrinsic merit, and went far towards duping some real but weak friends of vital piety, who had smarted under the goads of rationalism, and were willing to accept the supposed relief of this alleged opposition between faith and reason. The superficial writer employed tactics, which are familiar to the readers of Voltaire and Gibbon: religion is not so much impugned, as cut away from all the supports of reason. With gaiety, and even flippancy, the pamphleteer assumes the guise of a defender of the gospel. Rejecting all the external evidences, he founds the belief of Christianity solely on an immediate impression from the Holy Spirit on the individual soul. He asserts that Christianity is not susceptible of such a rational proof, as can be made intelligible to the generality of mankind, so as to oblige them to receive and obey it. Under this general proposition he undertakes to show, that children and common people are not, and cannot be, brought to receive the Christian faith on the ground of any rational evidence. By this empty, but malignant harangue, Dr. Doddridge was led into what may be considered the only formal controversy of his life; and here, therefore, more than in his other and gentler treatises, we discern a manly earnestness and energy. Although the particular array of objections here met is no longer urged, there are portions of the three letters in reply, which can never lose their value. We would particularly invite

attention to a delightful passage of the first letter, in which an account, more distinct than we have elsewhere met with, is given of the method by which common Christians do, under due cultivation, even without erudition, come to a rational acquiescence in the truth of God's word. When the theological student peruses this valuable tractate, he should collate with it, as its complement, Dr. Owen's Treatise on the Grounds of our Faith in Scripture.

Dr. Doddridge's answer appeared in 1742. His correspondence shows that the book had produced what we now call a sensation. Writing to Mrs. Doddridge, he says, September 29, 1742, "I have also read the three pamphlets I bought at Bath, with one of which I am much impressed. It is a most artful attempt, in the person of a Methodist, but made, indeed, by a very sagacious Deist, to subvert Christianity; and it wounds as a two-edged sword, tending most dangerously to spread mad enthusiasm among some, and utter irreligion among others. It is said to be written by a son of the Earl of Bristol, and is in high reputation among the nobility and gentry. On this account I am fully determined, by the assistance of God, to answer it, and have already planned the general scheme of my answer, which I design to begin this very day, and to dispatch it as soon as possible, which I judge the more necessary, as the answer already written is one of the most childish things I ever saw; and I much fear that my dear friend, good Mr. Jones, is the author." As to its origin, however, he learned at a later date more correct news from the Rev. John Barker. "The author is Mr. Dodwell, a drunken Templar, son of the Nonjuror, no Christian for many years, so much as by profession or in appearance; and I am afraid has as few cares about natural religion as revealed." In November we find him writing thus to the Rev. Dr. Wood: "Perhaps, sir, you will wonder to hear it, but so it is, that I am now engaged in a controversy with one whom I take to be one of the most dangerous writers I have met with. It relates to the evidences of Christianity, and the impossibility of communicating them in a rational manner even to the generality of Christians; this, which is indeed its most obnoxious side, has been most artfully assaulted, and I have taken the opportunity of searching into

the question more largely than any writer whom I have met with, and have proposed a plan on which, if parents and masters would proceed, I am fully persuaded it would be greatly for the public service. I hope to send my letter to the press in a few days, and desire your prayers for its success." The precise intention of the work is more clearly indicated in a letter to his wife, who, it is pleasing to remark, was always in his literary confidence: "It is far from being my design to satisfy weak Christians in the grounds of their faith, but to show (what has never yet been fully shown by any author I have met with) that they may have a rational satisfaction; and that the arguments with which we have again and again been insulted by the Deists, to prove Christianity incapable of any rational proof, are utterly inconclusive." Again he writes to her, February 19: "I have finished half my Third Letter, which may perhaps reach Bath before you leave it. It is on a very nice and difficult subject; but I hope you will renew your prayers that I may be suitably assisted in handling it. It is the credit of the gospel which is concerned: my own is as nothing in comparison of that." One of the author's correspondents assures him, that some of the Methodists were beguiled into an approval of the pamphlet, as favouring certain of their enthusiastic views.* How far the controversy was likely to spread, appears from what Dr. Doddridge writes to the Rev. Dr. Samuel Clark: "I have just now before me an author who was represented to me as a kind of second to Dodwell, for that I understand is the name of the man I have opposed. This author calls himself the Gentleman of Brazenose College, and calls his book 'The Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature.' I am well persuaded his design is really and honestly to serve the cause of Christianity, but I think he has taken the most unhappy method imaginable for that purpose; for he maintains that it is absolutely impossible to attain any knowledge of Divine things by reason, and that consequently there is no Religion of Nature, or Law of Reason, and that all the true religion that ever has been in the world has been the effect of revelation; and that every gleam of truth to be found among the wisest of the

* Correspondence, IV. 224.

heathen (whom he extols and decries in a very inconsistent manner) is to be traced up to instruction received from the Patriarchs, Jews, or Christians. You will judge of the rest by this one passage, on which, while I dictated, I happened to open, that 'there is no Scripture which so much as intimates that God intended his works as a means of leading men to the knowledge of himself.'" Answers to Dodwell were written by Dr. Benson, Dr. Randolfe, and Dr. John Leland. Doddridge's was universally regarded as the best; indeed Dr. Leland formally withdraws from the field, out of regard to what his friend had "already so worthily done." Even from America he received commendations, and found himself already raised to an important eminence among Christian authors.

Before leaving this part of his labours, we dwell for a little upon some literary curiosities, arising out of remarks made by Dr. Watts. The venerable man writes from his retirement at Newington: "That day on which I sent my last letter to you, I was seized with something of a paralytic disorder, which, though it soon went off, has yet left various nervous disorders behind it, so that I was confined to my chamber till this day. Your second part of the Defence of Christianity, &c., I have not yet quite finished, my head being never well. I could in a great measure allow your excuses for the haranguing method which your adversary has chosen, if your printer had but favoured us with running contents in the margin; it is a very great loss to want them." Upon which the author writes to Dr. Clark: "I propose to add a table of contents to them, which may help to give a clearer view of the state of the argument, and its connection. I was sorry I could not persuade Mr. Godwin to put running contents in the margin, for I really think they greatly assist the understanding, especially where it is necessary to write in what Dr. Watts calls one continued harangue, or as I should rather express it, without distinguishing subordinate thoughts by numbers, as particulars under those generals that are marked out. I am fully convinced every well written piece is capable of being thus analyzed; and I have been told that the French Academy, with their harangues, as they may justly be called, insist upon receiving such a skeleton of the thoughts, in their proper ranks." Literary observers

will find several interesting reflections suggested by these old-fashioned remarks; and comparing the old books in their libraries with the new, will note the disposition now prevalent to neglect the formal indication of subjects to be treated. It prevails in books and sermons; we love to be taken by surprise, and choose to make our voyages under sealed orders. *Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes*, is the motto of the author or preacher. On close inquiry this may be found to have some parallelism with the decline of school-debate and formal logic, and also with a growing fondness for analytic as compared with synthetic reasoning, due in some measure to the direction taken by investigations in mixed mathematics. Among our fathers, to announce the proposition of a theorem, to display the construction, and to proceed with the proof, was as common in morals as in geometry. Any one who turns to the vellum-bound quartos of Leyden, Utrecht, and Franeker, will find the disquisitions of Marckius, Witsius, Leydecker, and Schultens, provided not only with complete "arguments" at the beginning, and indexes at the end of the volume, but with those marginal helps and catch-words, which Watts desiderated. The extreme method and lucid order of French treatises on science is universally recognized by *savans;* but most readers are struck with the novelty of rigid analyses of sermons, annexed to every volume of Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Fléchier, and Massillon. In the case of Doddridge, the formality of partition in the sermon is rigid.

We return to consider a work, by which, more than all his other labours put together, Doddridge "being dead," is destined to grow in influence, and to honour God. It appeared in 1745, and was entitled, "The Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul, illustrated in a course of serious and practical Addresses, suited to persons of every character and circumstance, with a Devout Meditation or Prayer added to each chapter." If to have had the approving suffrage of the soundest and best men in several countries and churches, for five or six generations; if to have been translated into every language of civilization, and carried to almost every mission among the Gentiles; if to have been adopted and perpetuated by great societies, and to have kept its ground fully, amidst all the rivalries of an

immensely increasing literature of its own sort; if to have conducted thousands to the feet of Christ and a crown of righteousness, be high praise, then few uninspired books have greater honour than the RISE AND PROGRESS. It was placed in our hands in early childhood by parental wisdom; it guided us in youth, when the greatest anxieties of life began to swell; it is suggestive of new lessons now, when we have grown grey; and we prize the closing lessons with which it seeks to rob death of his terrors. If any book was ever planned and composed in piety and love, it was this book. The germ was in the writer's thought ten years before. An inspection of its contents shows that it was written for usefulness and not for fame. He says in the fervid and affectionate dedication to the aged Watts, "Permit me, sir, while I write this, to refresh myself with the hope, that when that union of hearts, which has so long subsisted between us, shall arrive at its full maturity and endearment, it will be matter of mutual delight to recollect that you have assigned me, and that I have in some degree executed a task, which may, perhaps, under the blessing of God, awaken and improve religious sentiments in the minds of those whom we leave behind us, and of others who may arise after us, in this vain, transitory and ensnaring world." The plan, especially of the former part, and the final correction of the whole, are due to Dr. Watts. The "Prayer for the success of the work," subjoined to the first chapter, reveals the author's wishes; we judge it to have been a prayer of faith, from the abundant answer it has received.

Most of the works which are put into the hands of inquirers, leave them at the point of conversion, or of their making profession of their faith; and we fear that many readers employ this manual without any further view; but some of its very best portions relate to the "progress of religion," communion with God, resistance to temptation, returns from declension, great sorrows and great joys, and the closing scenes of life. And it is highly edifying to observe, that on his own dying bed, at Lisbon, the author chose to employ the devotions of the last chapter as the vehicle of his final prayers and praises on earth. It is almost superfluous to say, that the theology of the book has satisfied the severest judges of our own and other evangelical

communions. Safely may it be averred, that no one of the many excellent works in this department is so rich in biblical citation, and so sparkling with the ingenious setting of apposite Scripture gems; an art in which Doddridge and Jay were disciples of Flavel and the Henrys.

The only serious objection which we have known to be urged against the "Rise and Progress," is one which must lie against any composition proceeding on the plan of series, or consecutive stages; and it is an objection which cannot be made against more than six chapters out of the thirty which compose the work. It is this: that an impression, almost unavoidable, is made upon inexperienced readers, that precisely such and such stadia must be passed through in just such and such an order. That there is some general law of spiritual phenomena in the work of the Spirit, and that this ought to be stated, and is always stated, in every treatise of the kind, none will deny. The only peculiarity of Doddridge is, that he states this order with characteristic formality and distinctness. It would be grossly unjust to allege, that he prescribes a stereotype series of sentiment and emotion in things which are variable, or that he does not fully admit the "diversity of operations," with which the Holy Spirit vouchsafes to conduct the saving work. How truly he thus guards the subject, may be seen by reference to his own frequent remarks: indeed, nothing can be more conclusive than his own caveat in the preface: "I would by no means be thought to insinuate, that every one who is brought to that happy resolution, arrives at it through those particular steps, or feels agitations of mind equal in degree to those I have described." That the book should fall into disuse, and be treated with repugnance, during the period of those revivals which proceeded upon the corrupted theology of certain New England divines, is nowise marvellous, when we recall the terms in which the author invites the chief of sinners to the Lord Jesus Christ, and asserts the substitution and plenary satisfaction of the Redeemer, and the imputation of his righteousness. We continue to regard it, after all that has been written, as the safest, completest, and most affecting manual for anxious inquirers.

If some of the notices, which we are about to gather from unfrequented sources, should seem to any to be trifles, let it be

admitted that they are such trifles as affection loves to cherish and retain. Good old Dr. Watts, the father of the project, was afraid he should die before it saw the light. In 1742 he writes: "Your Sermons on Regeneration still go through our family on the Lord's day evenings, and that with great acceptance among us all: our ladies send you their hearty salutations. I hope you will not lay aside for any long time the 'Rise and Progress of Religion,' however some other things may intervene." Next year he says: "Since you were pleased to read me some chapters of the Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul, I am the more zealous for its speedy conclusion and publication, and beg you would not suffer any other matters to divert your attention, since I question whether you can do anything more necessary. I wait hourly on the will of God." Some months later: "I thank you that your heart is so much set upon the book I recommended you to undertake: I long for it, as I hope it will be a means of great usefulness, and shall be glad to see the first appearance of it; and hope that by that time I shall be able to read a little more." And Dr. Doddridge writes to Dr. Clark, December 15, 1743, "I am hard at work on my book of the Rise and Progress of Religion, which Dr. Watts is impatient to see, and I am eager to finish, lest he should slip away to Heaven before it is done. It indeed appears a piece of such importance that I transcribe it [out of stenography] into long-hand myself, which at first I did not at all intend to do. I have written out more than a fourth part, and it presses me the harder, as my secretary has had a pain in his breast, which has prevented his writing for me these two months." Again, in September 1744, Dr. Watts continues thus: "I long to have your Rise and Progress of Religion appear in the world. I wish my health had been so far established, that I could have read over every line with the attention it merits; but I am not ashamed, by what I have read, to recommend it as the best treatise on practical religion which is to be found in our language, and I pray God that it may be extensively useful."

As this work was on hand for some years, it was interrupted by several minor publications, and in time it interrupted and delayed his great expository labour, which was slowly advancing.

But when it at length appeared, it speedily won the good opinion, not only of all the great contemporary Nonconformists, but even of eminent churchmen. Secker, who was then Bishop of Oxford, wrote, in 1745, an exceedingly kind letter to Doddridge, in which he says of the work, "I thank God, and thank you." Even the worldly and bitter Warburton expressed his pleasure. People of quality vouchsafed to carry about with them the treatise of a Dissenter; a condescension on which we fear many Dissenters set too high a value. Dr. Francis Ayscough, tutor to the children of the Prince of Wales, conveyed to him the approval of "her Royal Highness;" and adds, "I must tell you that Prince George," afterwards George III., "to his honour and my shame, has learnt several pages in your little book of verses, without any direction from me." Dr. Thomas Hunt, afterwards Canon of Christ's Church, and Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, writes in high praise. The Duchess of Somerset gives him her thanks, and speaks of distributing copies among her servants. Even worthy deaf old Dr. Lardner, whom all orthodox men were ready to address with a *Utinam noster esses*, admits the value of the book, in a letter of February 26, 1745, in which he says: "I heartily thank you for the kind present of the Rise and Progress, which is written with all your usual life and spirit. And I sincerely pray that it may be useful for awakening and quickening many." The author mentions a fifth edition in 1748, and he lived to see it translated into several languages of Europe. His own judgment of the performance is thus expressed in a letter to Mr. Wilbaum: "This is the book which, so far as I can judge, God has honoured for the conversion and edification of souls more than any of my writings. The editions and translations of it have been multiplied far beyond my hope and expectation, and I cannot mention it without humbly owning that great hand of God, which has been with it, and to which I desire, with unaffected abasement of mind, to ascribe all the glory of its acceptance and success."

"The Life of Colonel James Gardiner" appeared in 1747; when the impression made by the death of this gallant officer and fervent Christian was still fresh upon the public mind. The interest which it aroused may be understood by those who have

watched the progress of the recent life of Captain Hedley Vicars, a little work of which a hundred thousand copies have already been circulated. Both go to show that a soldier may be a holy man; but the Life of Gardiner contains traits so extraordinary, that it has survived the contemporary excitement, and continues to be a favourite volume in religious libraries. Gardiner was the intimate friend and correspondent of Doddridge, so that the work was written under the peculiar glow of lively attachment and admiration. The author, by means of this plain biography, found himself most innocently embroiled with some of the Moderates in the Kirk of Scotland. A pamphlet appeared at Edinburgh, full of ire against the following statement: "The most plausible objection that I ever heard to Colonel Gardiner's character is, that he was too much attached to some religious principles, established indeed in the churches both of England and Scotland, but which have of late years been much disputed, and from which, it is at least generally supposed that not a few in both have thought proper to depart; whatever expedient they may have found to quiet their consciences in subscribing those formularies, in which they are plainly taught. His zeal was especially apparent in opposition to those doctrines, which seemed to derogate from the divine honours of the Son and Spirit of God, and from the freedom of divine grace, or the reality and necessity of its operations in the conversion and salvation of sinners." This was wormwood and gall to those Presbyterians who subscribed "for substance of doctrine." The angry pamphleteer, stung by the observation which we have cited, calls it "a murdering stroke, a murdering stroke indeed, if the traducing of them as arrant knaves may be reckoned so; representing them as a set of men, who subscribe that they believe doctrines, from which they have thought proper to depart, to be agreeable to the word of God, and founded thereupon, (for in those terms does the subscription of the ministers of the Church of Scotland run,) and then are employed in finding out expedients (which you cannot so much as guess at) to quiet their consciences in so doing." He denies this, as a calumny, in regard to ministers of the Kirk. No reader of Scottish Church-history will fail to recognize this as the period of Dr. Robertson's leadership, of Moderatism in

power, and of the "Riding-Committees." Doddridge made no reply. In a letter to his friend Dr. Clark, he says, January 1, 1748: "I thankfully own the goodness of God in the kind reception which Colonel Gardiner's Memoirs have met with, at which I wonder much more than at the faults found by some, or even at the virulent Scotch pamphlet addressed to me on the occasion, in which I am treated as the pest of human society, and the murderer of reputation and usefulness, and insulted as envying the preferments of an Establishment, as grapes that hang beyond my reach. I have the satisfaction to hear that the rude libeller is held in great contempt at Edinburgh, even by those of his own sentiments in general; but it is a much greater satisfaction to hear that a blessing seems to have attended the book to some military men of considerable rank, and to some persons of quality about the Court."

We need not apologize for culling from these neglected letters the testimonials of two men of the very highest celebrity; we mean West, the writer on the Resurrection, and Warburton. West thanks Doddridge for the work, which he highly commends. At the same time he censures the introduction of "so many of those rapturous strains of piety, which Colonel Gardiner poured into the bosom of those friends to whom he opened all his heart." But he adds his tribute to the great merits of the work. "One," says he, "I cannot help taking notice of to you upon this occasion, viz. your remarks upon the advantage of an early education in the principles of religion, because I have myself most happily experienced it; since I owe to the early care of a most excellent woman, my mother (whose character I dare say you are no stranger to,) that bent and bias to religion, which, with the coöperating grace of God, hath at length brought me back to those paths of peace, from whence I might have otherwise been in danger of deviating for ever. The parallel betwixt me and Colonel Gardiner was, in this instance, too striking not to affect me exceedingly; I hope, therefore, that you will pardon me for mentioning it." Warburton writes as follows: "I had the favour of your letter, and along with it Colonel Gardiner's Life, which I have just read through with great pleasure. Nothing can be better or more judicious than the writing part. Many considerations made the

subject of great importance and expediency. The celebration of worthy men, who sacrificed themselves for the service of their country; the tribute paid to private friendship; the example, particularly to the soldiery, of so much virtue and piety, as well as courage and patriotism; the service done to the survivors of their families, are such important considerations as equally concern the writer and the public. I had a thousand things to remark in it which gave me pleasure; but I have room but for two or three. The distinction you settle between piety and enthusiasm, in the 78th page, is highly just and important, and very necessary for these times, when men are apt to fall into the opposite extremes. Nor am I less pleased with your observations on the 'mutilated form of Christianity,' in the 30th page. We see the terrible effects of it. The same pleasure your 162d and 163d pages afforded me. Your hymns are truly pious and poetical. The note at the bottom of page 175 is fine. I entirely agree with you in your sentiments concerning the extraordinary circumstances of the good man's conversion. On the whole, the book will do you honour, or what you like better, will be a blessing to you by its becoming a means of public good." That this great man, but latitudinary Christian, should have written thus of a book which goes to the very extreme of what he would himself, in some moods, have denounced as methodistical ecstacy, is a problem which we leave for our readers to solve.

The greatest of Dr. Doddridge's productions began to see the light in 1740, but was some years in progress. Its early title was, "The Family Expositor: containing the former part of the History of our Lord Jesus Christ, as recorded by the Four Evangelists, disposed in the order of an Harmony. And also, a Paraphrase on the former part of the Acts of the Apostles." It reached six volumes quarto; and none of the numerous later impressions are comparable for elegance to the large paper copies of the first editions. The early volumes were issued by subscription, and the list of names contains many of the very highest distinction. The last three volumes were printed after the author's death. It was providentially allowed him to finish the whole work in short-hand, with the exception of a few notes towards the end; indeed, the greater part had been transcribed

for the press. The fourth volume was published in 1754, as were the fifth and sixth in 1756, under the editorial care of Mr. Orton. From the friend just named, we derive an anecdote which is worthy of preservation. "In June, 1750, a fire broke out in his study, occasioned by a wax candle being left on his writing-desk, and consumed many of his papers, and in particular, part of one volume of the short-hand copy of the Family Expositor. The light of the fire being, however, providentially discovered by an opposite neighbour, who gave an immediate alarm, it was speedily extinguished. When the doctor was informed of the accident, he seemed most anxious about the preservation of this manuscript; and, when the flames were quenched, it appeared, to his great joy and surprise, that only that part of the volume which had been transcribed was destroyed; that the transcript lay in another place, out of danger; and that all the untranscribed pages were perfectly legible, the edges of them only being singed." In giving this account, Mr. Orton says, "Being an eye-witness of the danger and deliverance, I record it, chiefly as it seems to denote a particular care of Providence in preserving this work, and a favorable omen that God intends it for extensive and lasting usefulness." We agree with the good biographer, despite the characteristic sneer of Dr. Kippis.

It was the fashion of the day not to expect much learning from Dissenters, who, though really carrying on the succession of the church catholic in England, had been ungenerously shut out from the universities. But in the case of Doddridge, as in that of Lardner, the work instantly took rank among the most learned performances of its age, and was welcomed by scholars of the Establishment, as well as others. All works of this kind are at length superseded to a certain extent by others; but if this commentary is at all set aside, it is not from any want of erudition, diligence, or hermeneutical skill and acumen. It still remains a monument to the care, studious toil, and ardent piety of the author; and in regard to the historical books, we are not prepared to say, after all that has been written, that there is even now any single work which we would place before it. This remark we make with some deliberation, after almost weekly resort for many years of parochial

exposition, and with a distinct reference, not so much to the popular and devotional, as the strictly learned portions. Measured with respect to the *apparatus biblicus* of the time, Doddridge's Notes remain among the most valuable scholia which we possess on these portions of Scripture; and his suggestions and even conjectures have been confirmed by modern research and comparison as frequently as those of any writer. If sometimes he gives too much place and honour by citations to writers of mediocrity, whose books have not survived, the fault may be forgiven by any one who looks at the catena of hard but perishable German names, adduced by such gatherers after the learned host as Davidson.

It is a great evil to be hampered by an ingenious plan; and this was never more signally exemplified than by the Family Expositor. The work is from beginning to end cast into three distinct portions; the Paraphrase, the Notes, and the Improvement. The method of perpetual paraphrase is inevitably wearisome; and though the excellent author piously destined this very part to be read in families, we imagine that for any long time it would have proved too much for even Nonconformist patience. We confess we have often been gratified with it, on consultation, as a means of giving the precise meaning of a place, and cutting off all chance of evading a difficulty; but for the most part, paraphrasing is only a putting of more water to one's ink. For the writer, it must have been running in clogs, and working with a ball-and-chain; because he religiously bound himself not only to interweave the text, but in every instance to distinguish it by the italic character. It moreover included an original version of the whole New Testament; which indeed was extracted from the paraphrase and published separately by Dr. Kippis, in 1765. What Dr. Doddridge calls the Improvement, contains pious and devotional reflections on the passage; and this part is almost unrivalled, for ingenuity, vivacity, serious tenderness, appropriate application of Scripture to experience, and almost unfailing ardour.

Agreeably to what has been said, Dr. Doddridge shines most upon the historical books. Not that he is less diligent or less learned in the epistolary and argumentative parts; but that in these his principal defect was most likely to betray itself. The

truth must be admitted, that the age of Nonconformist theology in which he lived, was one of decay; and although he may be regarded as by comparison a champion for orthodoxy, it was not with the strength, sinew, and grasp of the old Owens and Charnocks. Though without his high philosophic wing, Doddridge reminds one more of Howe, and though without his matchless density of genuine English, he reminds one also of Baxter. His zeal for general evangelical truth far outwent his zeal for particular points of Westminster Divinity. In ninety-nine cases this may not be apparent, but unhappily the hundredth case is some great knot in Romans or Galatians, involving the whole quinquarticular controversy. Yet even here we are far from meaning to class his interpretations with those of the Arminian New Divinity, compared with which, he may be regarded as rigorously orthodox.

When we turn to the voluminous correspondence, we find that the Expositor, as was just, occupied the great and increasing attention of his closing years. During some of these years his rule concerning it was, *Nulla dies sine linea*, and this whether at home or abroad; and these labours were carried on along with constant services as a preacher and professor. As early as 1737 he writes to Dr. Clark: "I have now proceeded to the burial of Christ, in my Family Expositor; and the importunity of some friends has engaged me to determine on such an alteration in the form, as will occasion a delay in the publication. My present scheme is, first to print an edition in quarto, and then another in duodecimo, or small octavo, like the Spectators, without notes, and for the service of poorer families. I think it will only be decent to give the learned world my reasons for some translations and glosses which I have not elsewhere met with, on several texts, which could not be inserted in the paraphrase. I shall beg your review of some part of it at least; and it will be a great encouragement to me if it pleases so accurate a judge. I do indeed fear, that all my orthodoxy will be little enough!" And in a subsequent letter to the same friend, "How much of my character in life will depend on this work, and especially the first volume of it, I need not say. I well know with what strong prejudices against the author it will be read by the bigots in both extremes; but

I have the testimony of my conscience in the sight of God, that I have not willingly, in any single passage, corrupted his sacred word, and that the performance has been conducted in the spirit of seriousness and of love. How laborious it has been, and still is, you, sir, will easily perceive." The price to non-subscribers was a guinea for the volume. As the work advanced, the author was constantly in correspondence with the learned of his acquaintance, in regard to particular points. Letters of this sort might be cited from Watts and Lardner, which have much intrinsic value. From Warburton, the testimonials have a peculiar weight, as he was so austere a judge, and so little tinctured with evangelical opinions. Before the work appeared, he wrote, in 1738, thus: "I have read your proposals for the Family Expositor, and have entertained from the specimen, so high an opinion of your notes and paraphrase, that had I any material remarks on the gospels, I should be very cautious (without affectation,) of laying them before so accurate a critic, notwithstanding all the temptations I should have of appearing in so honourable a station." After the publication, he writes from Cambridge, in 1739: "Before I left the country, I had the pleasure of receiving your Family Expositor. My mother and I took it by turns. She, who is superior to me in everything, aspired to the divine learning of the Improvement, while I kept grovelling in the human learning of the notes below. The result of all was, that she says she is sure you are a very good man, and I am sure you are a very learned one. I sat down to your Notes with a great deal of malice, and a determined resolution not to spare you; and let me tell you, a man who comments on the Bible affords all the opportunity a caviller could wish for. But your judgment is always so true, and your decision so right, that I am as unprofitable a reader to you as the least of your flock." Warburton, moreover, quotes Doddridge in his works with very marked respect.

The private devotional papers of Dr. Doddridge show how near this great labour of his life lay to his religious affections; its progress from year to year is noted as among his special mercies. Thus at the close of 1749 he makes this record: "I find the mercies of the year to have been many and great; I was particularly struck with the thoughts of that uninterrupted

state of health which God has given me; so that I think I have not been one Lord's-day through the whole year entirely silent, and seldom prevented from preaching once by any indisposition; and I have actually written some of my Family Expositor every day this year, having been urged to it by a solicitation to print much more than I intended. I have not only ended all the other notes, but a few on the last chapter of the Revelation; and I have also transcribed, since the end of the vacation, the whole Epistle to the Romans and the six first chapters of the first Epistle to the Corinthians. God has this year given me many choice and happy opportunities of speaking in his name, insomuch that I have found, upon a review, that besides repetitions, which have been thronged, I have preached a hundred and fifty times, and our auditory has generally been as full as it has been for some time."

The system of theology taught by Dr. Doddridge at Northampton was published in 1763, after his death, under the editorial care of his friend, the Rev. Samuel Clark, and was in later editions amended and furnished with notes by Savage, Kippis, and Parry. It was entitled, "A Course of Lectures on the Principal Subjects in Pneumatology, Ethics, and Divinity; with references to the most considerable Authors on each subject." The work may be regarded as obsolete. The vice of the original plan pervades every portion, and has made it repulsive in no common degree; for the cramping system is carried to its extreme, by the attempt to carry out all the reasoning in mathematical form, so that we have not merely Axioms, Propositions, Solutions, and Demonstrations, but Scholia, Corollaries, and Lemmas. This was at an early period borrowed from the author's preceptor, Mr. John Jennings of Hinckley, who used to give his students a Latin Syllabus, digested after this fashion. It must have been a common whim among the Independents, as we find it followed, to a certain extent, even by the late Dr. John Pye Smith, in his "First Lines of Christian Theology," (London, 1854.) But by whomsoever adopted, it is both clumsy and deceptive; and one is apt to find the probative force in the inverse proportion of the array of demonstrative technicalities. It is the juvenile logician who treats us to the formidable names of mood and figure.

The book has a certain value, as a repository of theological opinions, *pro* and *contra*, but is sadly defective in revealing the conclusions of the author himself. These are often not stated, or if stated, in a way so loose and deprecatory, as to awaken doubt. Unless the declarations were greatly expanded and substantially supplemented in oral lectures, we need no longer wonder that so many latitudinarians proceeded from the Northampton school. Some of the most vexed questions in evangelical theology are either ignored, or touched only at their outer margin. As an instance, we would refer to Lecture CLXI., on the Distinction of Persons in the Godhead. There is no heterodox tenet suggested, but there is no satisfactory confirmation of the sound tenet. The truth is, amidst all this show of system, and with all his manifold excellencies, Doddridge had neither a deep theological interest, nor a strenuous theological mind. He did not always conceive of nice distinctions clearly; he did not value them highly when conceived. Hence he flees to authorities, recites catalogues, and balances opinions, and continually slides from the scientific to the historical. From one end of the lectures to the other, we look in vain for a thorough, masterly, and exhaustive treatment of any one theological point. The method of the work scarcely allows such a result. Continuous perusal, if indeed such a thing were endurable, would, we think, engender vacillation and skepticism. Such seems to have been the effect upon his students, who heard him announce every variety of opinion, without decided and weighty assertion on his own part. Great liberality and mildness are beautiful in their time; but this is not when the enemy is assaulting the citadel; which was true of Nonconformist theology a hundred years ago. The decadence might have been predicted, down to the lamentable "Rivulet Controversy" of our own day, and the recent mutual laudations and self-purgations of the Congregational Union. But we have only to look at the hushing policy, as practised in New England, in regard to the errors of Taylor, Bushnell, and the like, to learn how the highway towards Unitarianism is macadamized by the removal of all doctrinal and symbolical rocks of offence. We owe apology to the memory of Doddridge, who himself taught no such errors, for connecting such a caveat with his honoured name.

The "Lectures on Preaching, and the several branches of the Ministerial Office," are only notes, which the author filled up in the delivery; but they will amply reward the student who consults them. They include lessons on Ministerial Study, Homiletics, and the Pastor. Here the practical judgment of the author shines forth; and we wonder that this little work should have been allowed to go entirely out of print. In regard to visiting, and other parochial work, it contains a treasury of useful suggestion for the young pastor.

The Sermons of Dr. Doddridge, when thrown together, occupy several volumes. Of these, some form regular series on particular subjects, as has been already stated, while others were published singly, soon after the occasions which drew them forth. They are remarkable for soundness of doctrine; though the selection is not usually of controverted points; for rigid method, and clear statement of the line of procedure, with due division and subdivision; for abundant and often felicitous citation of Scripture; for earnest application to the heart and conscience of the hearer; and occasionally for an unction and even a pathos which give us to understand why the author was so extensively sought after as one of the very first preachers of his day. Let any reader who would see how a writer usually equable may rise upon the wing of a high argument, turn to the judgment on the sins in the sermon on Capernaum; or the fine peroration of that on the One Thing Needful. We have a pleasing remembrance of the warmth with which the late Dr. Archibald Alexander expressed his admiration for these sermons, upon renewing his acquaintance with them near the close of life.

Something may properly be added in regard to Dr. Doddridge's style. That the manner of writing upon which he finally settled, was the result of great pains, is obvious at a glance; but it is equally true that he did not reach the first class. He is always perspicuous, but often at the cost of energy; and generally harmonious, yet in a sort of inelegant way. We know not how to indicate a fault constantly appearing in his style, and that of other Dissenters of that day, otherwise than by saying it is inordinately genteel. Many turns of expression which temporarily floated on the surface of elegant parlance,

are incorporated into his works, and now appear undignified, if not ridiculous. Yet there are occasions upon which his native genius and familiarity with good authors got the better of this mannerism, and produced a diction both beautiful and expressive. And it is beyond a question, that his mode of conveying religious truth was so acceptable in his own time, as to gain the attention of many to sacred subjects, who would otherwise have treated them with disgust.

The poetical attempts of Dr. Doddridge fill many pages of his collected works, and ought not to be altogether overlooked. Stimulated by the happy flights of his venerable friend, Dr. Watts, whom he equalled in piety and desires of usefulness; conscious of sentiments too fervent for the vehicle of his ordinary prose; and not sufficiently warned by the *mediocribus esse poetis*, he effected a large amount of versification. His hymns are in number, three hundred and seventy-four. A few of these, along with his epigram, have lived; such, for example, as "Let Zion's watchmen all awake," "God of my life, through all its days," "Ye hearts with youthful vigour warm," "See Israel's gentle Shepherd stand," "What if death my sleep invade," and "Remark my soul the narrow bound;" but in general they are measured prose. In circumstances very similar, and with community of interest on most points, Watts and Doddridge met with different success in their poetic endeavours. On this we will build no hypothesis, though perhaps we might speed as well as a late writer. This amusing critic upon sacred poetry has undertaken to show that the Presbyterian polity and discipline are specifically preventive of the hymnic afflatus. The very statement carries something so ludicrous on its face, as must ensure diversion to any mind trained to ratiocination. The reasoning might serve bravely in a class-room among samples of logical non-sequiturs, and would assort well with the old hackneyed school fallacy, *Baculus in angulo, ergo pluit.* But when produced with sober face, it can only provoke sarcastic laughter. Did our eager hasty theorist need to be informed that a too exclusive adherence to the Psalter was of itself enough to keep the sterner Presbyterians from indulging the muse in this direction? Does he stand up for the Miltonic powers of the "Roxbury poets" and other pilgrim fathers, as if

they were better than Rous, who, by the way, was no Scotch Presbyterian? Must he be told that there are other Presbyterians, besides those of Great Britain and America? Has he intentionally or unintentionally neglected all notice of the German poets of the Reformed Church, of whom at least twenty, including the two Blaurers, are in Wackernagel's great collection? But we will not pursue a sophism which stands so weakly on its legs, nor attempt to father Doddridge's heaviness of verse upon his creed respecting Church Government.

The learned and excellent man concerning whom we have been writing, died in 1751, in the fiftieth year of his age. When the Rev. Samuel Davies was in England, two or three years later, he found the grief of the non-conformists still fresh, for the loss of this their great ornament. But he also found that many of Doddridge's pupils had "imbibed the modern sentiments in divinity."

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by Lyman Atwater

ART. V.—*Institutes of Metaphysic the Theory of Knowing and Being.* By I. F. FERRIER, A. B., Oxon. Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St. Andrews. Second edition. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1856.

THE term Idealism is familiar to all who have the slightest knowledge of the great questions and schools of philosophy. It has not, however, been used in a constant and uniform signification. It has been sometimes employed to mark a scheme simply opposed to sensualism or materialism, because it recognizes the existence of something more than matter, or contends that the soul has inlets of knowledge higher than the senses. With such Idealism we have no controversy. It is our own creed. It is quite another scheme which philosophic, and now indeed, common usage, generally denotes by this term. We understand by Idealism a philosophic theory, which denies to matter, including the whole material universe, any existence independent of, or separate from the mind which apprehends it.

Thus, to evaporate matter into ideas, or acts and states of mind, is Idealism. It is difficult to go thus far, and stop short of resolving all things into pure subjectivity, a sort of infinite ego, of whose consciousness all things are phenomena, in a word, Monism or Pantheism. Some, like good Bishop Berkeley, have paused before plunging into this bottomless profound. The greater number of idealists, however, who have been charmed thus far within the sweep of this maddening vortex, have been borne down, almost without a pause, to its nethermost "hell of waters." If there is good reason for regarding matter as only a phenomenon of consciousness, of the mind or ego, the same reasons are no less stringent for classing all known objects and truths in this category. They are all forms or manifestations of the same radical substance. Whether this one substance be regarded as the ego in the person perceiving, or the universal, absolute ego, manifesting himself in the consciousness of the individual of the race, the result is substantially the same. In either case we have the doctrine of All-One.

This Idealism, so far as it has fallen under our notice, is of three kinds, which may be conveniently distinguished, according to the methods pursued in supporting it, as the empirical, the transcendental, and the demonstrative. The empirical is that which reasons from our supposed experience as to the actual character of our knowing. It affirms that, in fact, *we* know nothing but our own mental states; therefore we know nothing more than these; therefore we know nothing of any material worlds over and above these mental states. But, while it affirms this as a fact with regard to *our* intelligence, it does not affirm it to be a necessary characteristic of all possible knowing, by any possible intellect. God and other grades of creatures may have powers of knowing what we, with our faculties, cannot know, *i. e.* the independent existence of matter. This was the idealism of Berkeley. Yet, even Berkeley sometimes uses language which would seem to imply the utter impossibility of material things existing out of the mind. He says, "As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds of the thinking

beings who perceive them." Further on, he speaks of this supposed possibility as involving a "manifest contradiction." While this seems to deny the *possibility* of any other than ideal existence to matter, yet from the general scope of his writings, it is reasonable to conclude, with Professor Ferrier, that he affirmed this relatively to human intelligence; not presuming with Mr. Ferrier to affirm it impossible *in rerum natura*, and to every possible intelligence. It had its basis in the theories of sense-perception, generally current before the time of Reid. It was an almost undisputed doctrine, that the mind does not cognize external objects immediately. It discerns only ideas of such objects. And through the medium of these ideas, it, by inference or intuition, comes to the belief of the reality of external objects corresponding to them. The process by which we know external things was often vaguely apprehended, without any distinct theory, only that it seems to have been taken for granted that we have no immediate perception of anything but our own ideas or mental states. On this foundation some reared systematic idealism, of whom Berkeley may be taken as the representative. Others built upon it the fabric of scepticism as to the certainty of any knowledge, and the trustworthiness of any belief. Of this class David Hume may be taken as the type. His dexterous use of this principle to accomplish his favourite work of undermining all faith, roused Reid and Kant to a new investigation of the faculties of the mind, and the extent and modes of its intelligence. The former confirmed that sound and safe habit of British thinking, which is intolerant of any pretended philosophy that discredits the original and intuitive beliefs of the human race. The latter, while he demolished the sensual scheme, and gave an autonomic authority to moral and super-sensual ideas, nevertheless subverted the legitimate confidence due to the senses as avenues of knowledge. He started that course of subjective, transcendental speculation, which, in the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, absorbed all objects known or thought of into the subject knowing or thinking, and developed itself as transcendental idealism, and unmitigated pantheism. This transcendental idealism is fitly so named, because in its methods it really, if not avowedly and boastfully, overflies all the recognized metes and bounds of

reason, and finds its solutions in some so-called "intellectual intuition" or other blind leap into that chaotic speculation which transcends all normal human insight. This account of this system is sufficiently justified by the following representations of Professor Ferrier, who undertakes to establish clearly and systematically, what Transcendentalism gives out in misty shadowings. So far as they imply commendation, we of course do not vouch for them.

"Passing over at present all intermediate approximations, we find anticipations of this first proposition, (on which Professor Ferrier rears his whole system,) in the writings of the philosophers of Germany. It puts in no claim to novelty, however novel may be the uses to which these Institutes apply it. Kant had glimpses of the truth; but his remarks are confused in the extreme in regard to what he calls the unity (analytic and synthetic) of consciousness. This is one of the few places in his works from which no meaning can be extracted. In his hands the principle (that we ourselves are a part of all we apprehend) answered no purpose at all. It died in the act of being born, and was buried under a mass of subordinate considerations before it can be said even to have breathed. Fichte got hold of it and lost it—got hold of it and lost it again, through a series of eight or ten different publications, in which the truth slips through his fingers when it seems just on the point of being turned to some account. Schelling promised magnificent operations in the hey-day of his youth, on a basis very similar to that laid down in this first proposition. But the world has been waiting for the fulfilment of these promises, for the fruits of that exuberant blossom, during a period of fifty years. * * * Hegel, but who has ever yet uttered one intelligent word about Hegel? Not any of his countrymen—not any foreigner—seldom even himself, with peaks here and there, more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe. * * A much less intellectual effort would be required to find out the truth for one's self than to understand his exposition of it. Hegel's faults, however, and those of his predecessors subsequent to Kant, lie, certainly, not in the matter,

but only in the manner of their compositions. Admirable in the substance, and spirit, and direction of their speculations, they are painfully deficient in the accomplishment of intelligible speech, and inhumanly negligent of all the arts by which alone the processes and results of philosophical research can be recommended to the attention of mankind." Pp. 94–6.

These criticisms by an admirer of the spirit and aim, fully sustain all that we assert in regard to the methods of the transcendental philosophy, as passing beyond any normal sphere of human consciousness and intelligence.

This brings us to the third type of idealism developed by Professor Ferrier, in the volume under review. We have called it demonstrative idealism, because the author attempts to prove, by a series of demonstrations, successively flowing from each other, by a necessity as stringent as the propositions of Euclid, that nothing can be known, or exist, dissevered from the self, or ego, or percipient mind. He is not content, with the empirical idealists, to maintain that this *is* so with respect to all human knowledge: nor does he lose himself in the dark platitudes of transcendental metaphysic; but he undertakes and claims to prove that this *must* be so, from the necessary laws of thinking, which are binding, not only on human, but upon all possible intelligence. He claims to have established his position, that matter cannot be separate or independent from the percipient mind, by a chain of reasoning, from a single necessary first truth, just as irrefragable as that by which, from the first axioms of geometry, we prove the three angles of a triangle equal to two right angles. According to him, close philosophic reasoning, which corrects the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking, shows any other view to be as unthinkable, as much a *surd* in contradiction of the necessary laws of thought, as that two straight lines should enclose a space. This he does, not in the barbarous and unintelligible nomenclature of German transcendentalists, but in clear, rich, vigorous and beautiful English. He resembles Cousin and Morell in his command of that luminous and glowing diction, which have done far more to commend continental metaphysics to the British and the American mind, than could have been accomplished by the cumbrous obscurities of their German masters for ages

and generations. Whatever else may be complained of, none at all familiar with questions of this sort, can complain that he does not make himself intelligible.

And it must be conceded, that in thus attempting a demonstration of idealism by a clear exhibition of all the parts and steps thereof, in a style as lucid as Reid, and after the manner of the most rigid, mathematical and syllogistical reasoning; as a doctrine, the opposite of which must be absurd not only to our intelligence, but to all intelligence, from its very nature as intelligence, the author has taken a stride as vast as it is bold, in advance of previous speculators. Of this he is fully conscious. So far from shrinking from such a work, he glories in it, and magnifies his office. He labours under no burdensome feeling of responsibility, if he be wrong. He rather triumphs in the undoubting assurance that he cannot be wrong, and has achieved the grand problem of philosophy. To doubt that he has brought to light the primal truth, and cast his sounding line to the very bottom of the *scientia scientiarum*, would be as absurd to him, as that two and two are six. To the consequences he is sublimely indifferent. He goes remorselessly where his logic carries him. It is no concern of his, if he destroys all the foundations of human faith, hope and action. But it is time he should speak for himself.

"What philosophy is called upon to exhibit is not what any individual may wish or choose to think, but what thinking itself thinks, whenever it is permitted to go forth free, unimpeded, guided by no law except the determination to go whithersoever its own current may carry it, and *to see the end*, turning up with unswerving ploughshare, whatever it may encounter in its onward course, trying all things by the test of a remorseless logic, and scanning with indifference the havoc it may work among the edifices of established opinion, or the treasures it may bring to light among the solitary haunts of disregarded truth." Few philosophers have conformed more "remorselessly" to their own ideal. It is only casually that he betrays any shrinking from the most destructive results of his system. And he treats not only the natural intuitive beliefs of men, but the whole science of Psychology which defines and validates them, with the flippant contempt due to childish delusions or

philosophic quackery. This exuberant scorn, over and over again vented in the most opprobrious epithets, for the methods of a science, which, especially in modern times, has tasked the mightiest intellects of our race, simply because its conclusions annihilate his own scheme, is among the most discreditable features of the work. He speaks of the science of the human mind as having "for its object, nobody knows what, some hopeless inquiry about 'faculties,' and all that sort of rubbish," p. 37. He speaks of the doctrine that "mere material things have, or may have a true and independent being, as a part of the *debris* of a defunct and exploded psychology!" p. 473. Professor Ferrier claims to demolish the whole fabric by reasoning out to its logical results a single assumption, on which his whole work is founded, and without which, he himself being judge, it is *brutum fulmen*. This is assuming to do a great deal. To think of overturning all the principles reached by the great masters of our race, as the result of life-long inquiry into what our knowing and faculties of knowing actually are, by a single argument reasoned out from a single principle, aiming to show *a priori* what our knowing *must* be, and that it must be the opposite of what human consciousness tested by ages of philosophic inquiry declares it to be,—this indeed, is no humble project. Professor Ferrier is the last to think it so.* He exults in the grandeur of his work, and the vastness of the ruins it has left. He says: "If any flaw can be detected in this reasoning, its author will be the first to admit that these Institutes are, from beginning to end, a mere rope of sand; but if no flaw can be detected in it, he begs to crave for them the acknowledgment that they are a chain of adamant." p. 422. The branch of this alternative, which relates to himself, he is clearly bound by. But we by no means admit his right to impose the opposite upon others. If a man claims to have proved metaphysically that fire will not consume wood, and calls upon us

* Says the author: "The best way of attaining to correct opinions on most metaphysical subjects, is by finding out what has been said on any given point by the psychologists, and then by saying the very opposite. In such cases we are sure to be right in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. Indeed, no better receipt than this can be prescribed for those who are desirous of compassing the truth." Is not this the language of the sciolist rather than the genuine philosopher?

either to find a flaw in his reasoning, or to set our houses on fire, we respectfully decline the proposal. We deny his jurisdiction. No man has a right to impose such an alternative, and we have no right to accept it. There is still another, which we are not only at liberty, but are bound to take in preference. It is to presume that there is and must be some flaw in his reasoning, and that, if we knew all the facts in the case, this flaw would be palpable, whether we can now detect it or not. The same is true of all "reasoned" attacks upon first truths, of which we are as intimately conscious as of our own existence. There have been a thousand "reasoned" attempts to disprove free agency and responsibility, the providence of God, the existence of any law of right or moral obligation more than a regard to our own happiness, the flaws in which were far less palpable, at first sight, than in Professor Ferrier's great demonstration. What then? Are men to distrust their own consciousness, and dehumanize themselves, in obedience to some pretended chain of metaphysical demonstration, which, among a hundred of adamant, conceals one wooden link, as they know full well, whether they can point it out or not? No; these original beliefs will hold their ground against all attempts to displace them by speculation. Even the speculatists who discard them, betray, in manifold ways, an underlying faith in them, which triumphs over their speculations. Are we then to give up our faith in the separate and independent existence of ourselves, and the objects which we know without us, to merge ourselves in nature, and nature in ourselves, because we cannot show up the flaw in his demonstrations? But it is time to show, from the author's own statements, just what he undertakes to prove, and the means by which he prosecutes this attempt.

The following passages indicate with sufficient clearness the conclusions which he attempts and professes to establish. "A rigorous inquisition into the structure of the known and knowable, shows that *oneself* must always be a part of everything that is known or knowable. * * Thus many things—indeed, everything—which we heretofore regarded as objects of cognition, turn out, on examination, to be only *part-objects* of cognition," p. 505.

"And, finally, it must be borne in mind that although all cognition has been characterized by this system as a fusion or synthesis of two contradictories, (the ego and non-ego) *i. e.* of two elements, which out of relation to each other, are necessarily unknowable—this does not mean that the synthesis is brought about by the union of two elements, which *existed* in a state of separation *previous* to the formation of the synthesis. The synthesis is the primary or original; the analysis is the secondary or posterior." Thus the mutual in-being of mind, and what it knows as requisite to the existence or conception of either, is the original and necessary condition of their existence. It is no artificial union of two elements previously separate. The analysis by which we conceive them as two factors of cognition or existence, is indeed a mere artificial product of our thinking. His tenth proposition in Ontology is: "Absolute Existence is the synthesis of subject and object—the union of the universal and particular—the concretion of the ego and non-ego: in other words, the only true, real, and independent existences are minds, together with that which they apprehend. * * This proposition solves the problem of ontology. * * If we are cognizant of Absolute Existence, it must be object *plus* subject, because this, and this alone is what any intelligence can know. If we are ignorant of Absolute Existence, it must be still object *plus* subject, because we can be ignorant only of what can be known—and object *plus* subject is what alone can be known, (*i. e.* by any possible intelligence.) Thus the concluding truth of the ontology is demonstratively established, and comes out all the same, whether we claim a knowledge, or avow an ignorance, of that which truly exists. Thus the ultimate end of the system is compassed—compassed by legitimate means, and its crowning pledge triumphantly redeemed."

"The solution of the ontological problem affords, moreover, an answer to the ultimate question of philosophy—What is truth? Whatever absolutely is, is true. The question therefore, is, but what absolutely is? And the answer, as now declared, is, that object *plus* subject, is what absolutely is—that this, and this alone, really exists. This synthesis, accordingly is THE

TRUTH; the ground, below which there is neither anything nor nothing." Pp. 511–13.

"These points having been demonstratively established, it is conceived that people should have now no difficulty in understanding how oneself or the ego must form a part of everything which really and truly *exists.* * * Expressed more popularly, the conclusion is that every true and absolute existence is a consciousness, together with its contents, whatever those contents may be." Pp. 514–15. To prevent mistake, we observe that the author uses the word Absolute with reference to existence, as equivalent to true or real. Thus, he says, "the absolutely existent which each of us is individually cognizant of, is himself apprehending things *by the senses.*" P. 517. Prop. 6, of the chapter on Ontology is thus enunciated. "Absolute existence is not matter *per se;* in other words, *mere* material things have no true and independent Being." P. 472.

The whole work, with its thirty-nine formal propositions, and corresponding demonstrations, explanations, and counter-propositions, drawn out for the purpose of showing precisely what the author denies, as well as what he maintains, culminates in the following grand finale, which needs little exegesis, beyond what we shall give in his own words. It is the last formal proposition of the book.

"All absolute existences are contingent, *except one;* in other words, there is One, but only one, Absolute Existence, which is strictly *necessary;* and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting Mind, in synthesis with all things," p. 522. "Here metaphysics stop; here ontology is merged in theology. Philosophy has accomplished her final work; she has reached by strict demonstration the central law of all reason, (the necessity, namely, of thinking an infinite and eternal Ego in synthesis with all things;) and that law she lays down as the basis of all religion," p. 525. The nature of this synthesis of the Infinite and Eternal Ego with all things, is not merely that he is their Creator, Upholder, and Disposer, but that he is *a part of* them, as the author everywhere sets forth, when explaining the synthesis of any ego with what it apprehends. And since he as often affirms that the ego is the only permanent and invariable element in cognition, and so in exist-

ence, and all else is fleeting and accidental, it follows that God is the only permanent element in whatever exists, and that man, nature, and the universe, have no existence which is not his existence. All is God or phenomena of God. If there be any ranker pantheism than this, we have not found it. And we do not see why this scheme does not involve the transcendental pantheistic notion, that the ego in each man is the Absolute or Universal Ego coming into consciousness. If it can be shown in any respect to differ from this, we do not see that the difference is of any moment. And, beyond all question, if this scheme be true, Professor Ferrier may well be bold, not only to suggest, as he does, but to aver, that "nothing but error comes to us from nature; that the ordinary operation of our faculties involves us in interminable contradictions." Assuredly, if anything like this be true, nature, including our natural faculties, and psychology, which ascertains them and their workings, is a "liar from the beginning."

Having shown what our author professes to prove, we shall take the liberty, before we adopt his startling conclusions, to inquire by what evidence he proves it. In doing this, he offers some forty demonstrations in three chapters, on the theory, 1, of Knowledge, 2, of Ignorance, 3, of Being, which he respectively denominates Epistemology, Agnoiology, Ontology. A single glance reveals the fact, that the whole stands or falls with the first proposition or two on the subject of knowledge, or on the necessary constituents of every knowable thing. He says of his Institutes: "They are reasoned, and they are true. They are reasoned, inasmuch as their conclusions follow necessarily and inevitably from their initial principle; and they are true, inasmuch as their initial principle is a necessary truth or law of reason," p. 527. What then is this initial principle, this alleged necessary truth or law of reason? He starts with the following proposition, which he pronounces the "primary law or condition of all knowledge." "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of *itself*." This is given rather as a primary postulate, on which the subsequent catena of demonstrations is founded. This is the *ens unum in omnibus notitiis*, the one feature in all intelligence, from which

its radical traits must be deduced. How far this is so, and with what qualifications it is to be admitted, will be considered, when we ascertain the sense in which the author holds it, from the portentous conclusions he derives from it. This appears in the second proposition, which he thus states: "The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object, with the addition of one's self—object *plus* subject—thing or thought, *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." As this proposition is the hinge of the whole, we add the author's

DEMONSTRATION.

"It has already been established as the condition of all knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the intelligence which apprehends it knows itself at the same time. But if a thing can be known only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and oneself *together* must, in every case, be the object, the true and complete object of knowledge; in other words, it follows that that which we know always is and must be object *plus* subject, object *cum alio*, thing or thought with an addition to it, which addition is the *me*. Self, therefore, is an essential and integral part of every object of cognition. Or, again, suppose a case in which a thing or a thought is apprehended, without the *me* being apprehended along with it. This would contradict proposition I., which has fixed the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowledge. But Proposition I. is established, and therefore the *me* must in all cases form a part of that which we know, and the only object which any intelligence ever has, or ever can have any cognizance of, is itself in union with whatever it apprehends." Pp. 97–8.

What the author intends by this demonstration, appears not only on its face, but from his explanations, and the doctrines which he puts in contrast with it. Thus he says, "The ordinary distinction of subject and object in which they are contrasted as the knowing and the known, and in which the subject is virtually denied to be any part of the object of our knowledge, is erroneous and contradictory, and has had a most mischievous effect on the growth and fortunes of philosophy,"

p. 99. "We are cognizant of ourselves and of a number of surrounding objects. We look upon ourselves as numerically different from each of these, just as each of them is numerically different from its neighbours. That is our ordinary way of counting. The speculative computation is quite different. Each of the things is always that thing *plus me*," p. 100. "Indeed to lay down the dualism of subject and object as complete and absolute, (that is as an out-and-out duality which is not also a unity,) which psychology not unfrequently does, is to extinguish every glimmering of the scientific reason," p. 116.

But while the subject and object are thus inseparably united, they are not undistinguishable, says this philosopher. A stick cannot have one end without another end joined to it. Yet they may be distinguished. A circumference of a circle cannot be detached, though it may be distinguished from its centre. The ego or mind cannot be disjoined from the objects of knowledge, though it may be distinguished. This view presents the scheme in its strongest, most plausible, and confounding aspect. But it is easily disposed of. Our appeal must be to every man's consciousness. A circle without centre and circumference, a stick without two ends, is indeed incogitable. Is a stone or a tree incogitable, except on the condition that it be at the time perceived by ourselves, or indeed any intelligence? Is it not the self-same, substantive, real thing, whether known or unknown by us? Does its existence depend for one moment on our perception of it? Is it not *because* it has, and *as* it has, this independent separate existence, that it is known or knowable by us as a distinct existence? And is it or can it be known as anything else, anything of which the percipient mind is a part?

This brings us at once to the real issue. What is the simple fact on which this formidable series of demonstrations is built? It is not merely that wherever there is knowledge, there must be a subject that knows, and an object that is known. Professor Ferrier would hardly strain our credulity to the point of believing that the necessary co-presence of two objects in order to some given result, makes them parts or complements of each other, either in cognition or existence. The junction of food and the vital principle is necessary to growth. The presence of air

and lungs is requisite to respiration. Is, therefore, food the vital principle, or air the lungs, or are they parts of each other, or is either inconceivable, impossible, or a non-existent without the other? Something more than this then must be alleged, or seem to be alleged. What is it? Why surely, that in knowing any object we must know ourselves. But to what extent is this true, and what conclusions does it warrant? It is true indeed that in knowing any object, we know that we know it. This is only saying that knowledge is a state of consciousness, that to know is indeed to know. But it is equally true that this reference to ourselves is ordinarily so latent and unobtrusive as to elude our notice. But be it more or less, what does it amount to? Put it in the form which Professor Ferrier has chosen in the following example. Let a man "suppose himself to be looking at something—a tree, for example; he will find that the true and total object of his mind is himself seeing the tree." Grant that all this occurs in the cognitive process. Even according to this representation, is not "seeing the tree" a condition prerequisite, in the order of nature, if not of time, to his being cognizant of himself as seeing it? And does he not know that he sees it as an object distinct and separate from himself, whenever he knows himself as seeing it at all? If consciousness testifies to anything, it is that, so far as we know ourselves when we know the object tree, we know ourselves and the tree as not only mutually distinct, but separate and independent existences. The object of cognition *tree*, is no part of the object of cognition *myself*. They are in no wise parts of each other. That this is the deliverance of the consciousness of our race, and not only so, but of the philosophers who have devoted themselves to the rigid examination of their own consciousness and that of the race, Professor Ferrier does not affect to deny, though he strives to account for the fact without damage to his system. The whole foundation on which he builds his system, is the allegation that when we know other things, we know ourselves. Therefore self is a part of everything we know. As well might we say, that perceiving a horse, an ox, and an oak simultaneously, makes these objects of cognition parts of each other; and thence infer from an alleged synthesis in cognition, a synthesis of existence. On such a slender basis do this

"initial principle, and necessary law or truth of reason" on which is reared this stupendous structure of Idealism, rest. But we submit as an absolutely conclusive answer to the whole, the following statement of the question and issue by Sir William Hamilton, whose reasonings against the fundamental position of our author, we think it would have been respectful at least to notice; and all the more so, as they are the ablest which philosophical literature affords in so short a compass, and Professor Ferrier is understood to have been an aspirant to the chair made vacant by his death.

"In perception, consciousness gives as an ultimate fact, *a belief of the knowledge of something different from self.* As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced to a higher principle; neither can it be truly analyzed into a double element. We only believe that this something *exists*, because we believe that *we know*, (are conscious of) this something as existing; the belief of the existence is necessarily involved in the *belief of the knowledge of the existence.* Both are original, or neither. Does consciousness deceive us in the latter, it necessarily deludes us in the former; and if the former, *though* a fact of consciousness be false, the latter, *because* a fact of consciousness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions; 1. *I believe that a material world exists;* 2. *I believe that I immediately know a material world existing*, (in other words,) *I believe that the external reality itself is the object of which I am conscious in perception*, though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually identical."* Again, "in our perceptive consciousness, there is revealed as an ultimate fact, a *self*, and a *not-self*—each given as independent—each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is more *intuitive*, *universal*, *immediate*, or *irresistible*, than that this antithesis is real and known to be; no belief, therefore, is more true.

"If the antithesis be illusive, *self* and *not-self*, *subject* and *object*, *I* and *thou*, are distinctions without a difference; and consciousness, so far from being the 'internal voice of our Creator,' is shown to be, like Satan, 'a liar from the beginning.' "†

But Professor Ferrier in contradiction to this universal testi-

* Discussions in Philosophy and Literature, p. 93. † *Id.* p. 100.

mony of consciousness, undertakes to reason us into the belief that there can be no *not-self*, of which self is not an essential and integral part. This is the consequence of a necessary law of reason, he contends, to deny which involves a contradiction. But if we cannot trust our consciousness here, when can we trust it? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* If we cannot trust our immediate self-evidencing intuitions, how can we trust our lengthened processes of deduction and inference?

That the author should proceed from the premises he has thus attempted to establish, to argue, that matter *per se*, and the whole material universe are unknowable, and therefore non-existent, aside from the mind beholding it, is matter of course. Of course also, in common with all destructive thinkers, he pours contempt on the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, so fundamental in sound psychology and philosophy. This appears to be doomed to the perpetual assaults of sceptics, and especially idealists. Professor Ferrier dashes it aside by a stroke of the pen, as a "mere bubble on the sea of speculation, which ought now to be quietly suffered to break and die." He offers no refutation of it, however, except his standing demonstration that self must be a part of all it knows. The importance of this distinction in the controversy between idealists and their opponents is apparent. By the primary qualities of matter, we mean those which are perceived immediately through the senses, as belonging to it objectively, and which furthermore, our reason teaches us must inhere in it, from its very nature as substance occupying space. Such are extension, figure, mobility, solidity, &c. These qualities belong to all matter. They are discerned by sensitive perception in all matter. They are apprehended in our consciousness as being objective properties in all matter, and, in no manner, as subjective sensations in ourselves. Now, since matter is known to us only by its properties, it is clear that it can be known only as objective and outside of ourselves, through those properties that are so known, *i. e.* through the primary qualities.

The secondary qualities, on the other hand, are occult in the bodies to which they belong, and known only by inference from

the subjective sensations they produce in us, such *e. g.* are its odorous, sapid, calorific qualities. Heat and sweetness are subjective sensations within us, and, in the first instance, known only as such. But since they are known to arise on the presence, and to disappear in the absence, of certain bodies, they are inferred to arise from some properties in those bodies, in themselves occult, and known to us only through these subjective feelings which arise on occasion of their presence. Now, it is plain, that if all our immediate cognizance of matter consists in knowing sensations within us, to the exclusion of any direct and immediate knowledge of the properties of matter as objective and without us, we can have no knowledge of the separate and real existence of matter at all. We could never know its existence at all by its mere secondary qualities. It is because we have first known it as existing outside of ourselves, and all modifications of ourselves, that we are able to ascribe to it its secondary qualities. These would not be known at all, were it not that bodies in certain forms, previously known through their primary qualities, whenever present excite those sensations, which, because they then arise, we ascribe to some unknown property in these bodies as their source. But were it not for this antecedent knowledge of body by its primary properties, we should never look beyond ourselves for any external cause of these sensations. We should be utterly ignorant of the secondary qualities of body, and so of body itself, at all events as anything distinct from ourselves.

As those who consistently believe in a real (*i. e.* non-ideal) external world, therefore maintain this distinction as of capital importance, so all idealists task themselves for its overthrow. For if the primary properties of matter are, like the secondary, known only as sensations or subjective states within us, or as occult causes of such states, no valid ground remains for the belief of a real external world. We cannot refer these sensations, on this hypothesis, to any external object, because we know of no such object to which we can refer them. To annihilate this distinction then, is to identify matter with mind, to make all, either matter, or mind, or a *tertium quid*, which is neither matter nor mind. We are not surprised, therefore, that the great Organon of the Positive Philosophy assails this

distinction.* Compte is not a whit behind Professor Ferrier, in denouncing psychology as "illusory." Extremes meet: Materialists and Idealists are one in obliterating the line of demarkation between mind and matter. If these methods are so far alike, there is little to choose in their respective results. It is of little consequence whether they idealize nature or materialize the soul.

It is to be regretted that Brown, in what appears to us an ungenerous eagerness to disparage Reid's claims to originality, has laboured with partial success to envelope this distinction, together with the whole doctrine of Sensitive Perception, in confusion. Apparently bent on showing that Reid had discovered nothing valuable, he toils to show that we have no direct and immediate knowledge of matter or its primary properties, as without ourselves, and separate from our own sensations. Yet he asserts an intuitive and well-grounded belief of an external world outside of ourselves. It is true indeed that this belief is intuitive and well-grounded. But it could not be so if it were not founded on knowledge. It is because we *cognise* matter and its properties as without us, that we believe them to be so. Otherwise such belief would be impossible and inconceivable. The notion of natural beliefs contrary to natural knowledge, or not founded thereon, erects a dualism of intelligence, and guards the integrity of truth, by impeaching the veracity of consciousness, the only witness to the truth in the premises. Such a system opens the road to modern scepticism, idealistic, and materialistic.†

Nor do we think that Reid forfeits his title as the discoverer of a solid theory of External Perception, because in some of his arguments and illustrations, which Brown selects for his criticism, he is crude or inconsistent. As well might we say that Fulton or Fitch had no merit as inventors, because in their hands the steamboat was clumsy and rude, in comparison with our present floating palaces. He was the founder of a school in philosophy and psychology, sound, vigorous, and fruitful,

* Mills's Logic; Harper's edition, p. 41.

† See Brown's Lectures on Reid's Theory of Perception and the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter; also, Hamilton's Review of the Subject in the Article already referred to.

while opposing schools have run into endless extravaganzas, and subverted the very foundations of knowledge and belief. It is quite in keeping, that Professor Ferrier should turn off him and his system with a few flippant and cavalier thrusts. Sir William Hamilton, as we have already noted, is ignored altogether by this contemptuous philosopher. He developed Reid's system, and cleared it of most of its crudities and imperfections. He reduced to its last analysis the testimony of our consciousness to a real external world, and by bringing the idealist to the clear, naked issue of crediting or impeaching this witness, swept away his gossamer refinings, like mist before the sun-beam. Yet we are not sure that he has not himself gone into excessive refining on parts of this subject. That he has elucidated the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter with unexampled power; that he has vindicated the veracity of consciousness, and proved that, as surely as it affirms an ego, it also affirms a non-ego, of which the ego is no part, in a style more masterly and irrefragable than his predecessors, it is no exaggeration to say. It is a praise which cannot justly be denied him. But when he carries his analysis so far as to assert, not only that our first, but our only immediate knowledge of matter as a non-ego is in our own bodily organism, and that our knowledge of all other matter is mediate and inferential,* we think he runs to extremes. He so far contributes to the support of scepticism, and the undoing of his own work. This looks like reducing the *not-self* to a *minimum scibile*—a mere vanishing point. We see no need of these endless and destructive refinings, which destroy our direct, immediate knowledge of extension, figure, and resistance in the table on which we write, and the floor we tread. If we have no direct knowledge of anything material outside of our own bodies, how can we by inference attach any properties to them, while we do not as yet know that they exist? This process of elimination pares down to the quick. Pressed a little further, it leaves for the residuum of what is knowable without us, the shadow of an image. The more philosophers, even the mightiest and soundest, analyze away, under colour of elucidating, the great landmarks, as shown in revelation or the *communis sensus* of our race, the

* Hamilton's Reid, p. 881.

less we trust them. Professing themselves to be wise, they become fools. They enter depths, for which human reason has no sounding-line. The more we study Reid's critics in reference to the whole subject of Sensitive Perception, the more we appreciate the solidity of the basis on which he rested it, however crude his development of his theory may be in some particulars. We abide by the normal judgment of our own minds, and all human minds, that we know, and know immediately, not mere ideas of things without us, not mere sensations produced by them, but the things themselves as present to the mind in their apprehended properties. This does not imply that we therefore thus know everything about them. Here, as elsewhere, man's knowledge is not so complete or perfect as to exclude all ignorance, or room for progress. But be his ignorance what it may, it does not thence follow that he knows nothing. He knows something in order to be capable of learning more. He may have much to learn in regard to the secondary qualities of body, or the various modifications which the primary may take on. But he *knows* that bodies exist without himself, that they are extended, figured, solid, mobile. What amount of space any given body fills; what any given optical phenomenon may proceed from, whether from a body of the same form and colour, or its image, or from what peculiar combination of the rays of light; whether a given noise proceeds from the discharge of a cannon or the bursting of a locomotive, and innumerable other questions, mechanical, chemical, physiological, may be originally doubtful, and determinable only after long inquiry. In regard to such subjects many mistakes may occur, which will require to be corrected. And herein the different faculties correct and supplement each other. But that in all cases of touch there is body with its primary qualities; that in vision the rays of light as reflected and refracted by some body or bodies, are really seen, and much more of the like, no man can bring himself to doubt. Moreover, the senses in correcting, do not invalidate each other. Neither does reason, in correcting, invalidate them. The different faculties in perfecting each other's intelligence at the same time, corroborate their normal accuracy within their appropriate sphere. Given substance in space, or matter, and reason affirms that its primary properties

*must be*, what, through our senses, we perceive them *actually to be*. Given the fact that the earth recedes from the sun, although to our vision the sun seems to move, yet a thorough analysis of this fact does not subvert, it establishes the accuracy of our vision. For all of motion that vision discerns is the increasing distance between the same objects. Which moves, and which is stationary is a matter of inference to be determined by other *data*, which, in this case, it required the discoveries of astronomy to furnish; just as when we sit in a rail-car by the side of another, on an adjacent track, motion is often seen, while we feel uncertain for the time, which car moves. This fact of the sun's rising we rarely fail to find impressed into service, as often as we read a sceptical book, which essays to nullify, either the obvious affirmations of Scripture, or of human consciousness. On the score of good taste, at least, it seems entitled to a discharge from further duty in this behalf.

The real identity of Professor Ferrier's scheme with the Pantheistic philosophy is apparent, not only from his general method and results, as already indicated, but from various incidental and collateral developments. Although he claims the merit of originality, this is true, not of any great elements of his theory, but rather of the clearness and systematic order with which he unfolds them. Thus he pronounces (p. 324) "objects, whatever they may be, the phenomenal in cognition; matter in all its varieties the phenomenal in cognition; * * * the ego, or mind, or subject, the phenomenal in cognition." His fourteenth proposition is, "There is no mere phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal by itself is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable," p. 321. Mind and matter then, object and subject, are *per se* mere phenomena, and as such unknowable. Phenomena of what? Of absolute existence, which is the synthesis of the two. What then, is this absolute ground of which these are phenomena? What else, surely, than that in which his system avowedly terminates, "a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting mind in synthesis with all things?" And what is this but resolving all things into God and phenomena of God? And what else does Pantheism attempt?

Moreover, if it be inquired how this infinite ego becomes the non-ego, Pantheism answers, in coming into consciousness, which necessarily involves distinction, therefore limitation, developing itself, the finite phenomena of man and nature. How does Professor Ferrier stand here? "It (the ego) must know something particular, whenever it has any sort of cognisance," p. 246. On the other hand, "the ego cannot be known as a *particular* thing at all, but only as the One Known in the All Known," p. 328. "It is redeemed into the region of the cogitable, by the power of self-determination," p. 252. This is plain enough. Whatever else is meant by it, it implies that the infinite can know itself only in and through the finite. It accordingly must pass into the finite, in passing into consciousness. This is but a Scotch echo from the continent. We do not think the merits of Pantheism, with its ethical and theological consequences, require formal discussion now and here.

Our readers can judge, how we rate Professor Ferrier's lofty pretensions to have laid the foundations of a firm and impregnable theism. No doubt the pantheist is a great theist, even an all-theist. He who should argue that man is rational, because animals are rational, would doubtless do a great work. He would brutify man quite as much as humanize brutes, by putting them on a level. He alone is a theist who believes in a personal God, Almighty, Eternal, All-wise, All-holy, the Maker and Upholder of all things, whose being is distinct from and independent of all his creatures. To talk of maintaining the existence of God, by identifying the universe with him, is like maintaining the preciousness of diamonds, by arguing that they are only common pebbles. We are tired of this pretentious and magniloquent trifling with the most sacred themes. We advert to it as an illustration of the most dangerous and insidious feature of this fearful system. While denying a personal God, whose existence is separate from his creatures, it yet holds that all things are divine. It finds God everywhere. Thus it can impose upon the simple and unwary, by simulating, adopting, and even intensifying, all the deepest expressions of Christian truth and piety. We do not accept such aid, or such apologists:

——Danaos et dona ferentes.

We think, moreover, that much of what is plausible in the author's reasonings, is due to certain assumptions which are adroitly inwoven with them. Absolute existence with him, means simply real existence. To hold to the real existence of matter aside from the percipient mind, is according to him to hold to its absolute existence. This he calls materialism. So it would be, if absolute meant here what it usually does—*i. e.* unconditioned and underived existence. But as it simply means in his use of its real existence, it implies neither materialism, nor any approximation to it. If it did, the whole Christian world, who believe in the real existence of body as such, and of spirit as such, would be materialists. He says in a note on p. 156, "Here and generally throughout this work, the word 'cognition' signifies the *known*, the *cognitum*. This remark is necessary, lest the reader should suppose that it signifies the *act* rather than the *object* of knowledge." Yet, although "generally," he does not always thus use it. And he could not so use it at all, except on the assumption of the truth of his system, which makes us capable of knowing only the phenomena of our minds. So he speaks of our knowing our own perceptions and nothing beyond them. Perceptions of what? Of something without or within us? This is the very gist of the whole inquiry, which calls for proof instead of assumption. Such reasoning is not strengthened, however disguised, by the length of the circle that contains it. We will not, however, multiply instances. We have discussed the extraordinary positions of this book at this length, only because the fascinating style, the vigorous thought, the chair which its author occupies, as well as that for which he was a candidate in the Scottish Universities, all conspire to give it significance and influence; of which we have no light indication in the fact that, some time ago, it reached its second edition.

ART. VI.—*Commentar über das Buch Hiob, von* H. A. HAHN u. s. w. Berlin, 1850. 8vo. pp. 337.

*Das Buch Hiob, verdeutscht und erläutert von* LIC. KONSTANTIN SCHLOTTMANN. Berlin, 1851. 8vo. pp. 507.

*The Book of Job; a Translation from the original Hebrew, on the basis of the common and earlier English versions.* For the American Bible Union, by THOMAS J. CONANT, D. D. New York, 1856. Part First, The Common English Version, the Hebrew Text, and the Revised Version, with Critical and Philological Notes. 4to. pp. 165. Part Second, The Revised Version, with Explanatory Notes for the English reader. 4to. pp. 85. Part Third, Revised Version. 4to. pp. 52.

THE poetical books of the Old Testament fall naturally into two divisions of three each. These are distinguished both by their subject and by the style of their poetry. The first class embraces in addition to the Psalms two brief books, which from their character might naturally have been included in the same collection, had not their length and importance been such as to justify the assigning to them an independent position. The Song of Solomon is an extended 45th Psalm. And the Lamentations of Jeremiah find counterparts in the Psalms, as well in their theme (Comp. Ps. lxxix. lxxx.) as in their alphabetic structure. These are all purely lyrical, and express the devout feelings of the heart, in the contemplation of the character of God, the truths of his word, or the dispensations of his providence.

The other three books constituting the second class, are Job, the Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes. Their common theme may be suggested to us by the use which they make of one characteristic word, "wisdom." Their aim is to show that piety is wisdom; that it is the one course promotive of man's true and highest welfare. They seek in other words to exhibit the consistency between the truths of God's revelation and the lessons of his providence, by making it appear that what the former sanctions as right, is attested by the latter as good. The book of Proverbs presents the harmony of the divine law and of the actual experience of the world as a general fact. It contains

a great number of maxims bearing upon every department of human life, and embodying the results of long continued and careful observation, which prove conclusively that piety conduces to human welfare, and that wickedness is opposed to it. Such is the present constitution of things on the whole; such is the native tendency of these respective courses, unless obstructed by casual and outside influences. General rules are, however, liable to exceptions: this is the case with many of these inspired maxims. The conclusion as to the usual course of things cannot, it is true, be invalidated in this way; but anxious questionings and perplexing doubts may be awakened, which demand a satisfactory solution, if one can be furnished. If the identity of piety and wisdom is not only a general truth with occasional exceptions, but a universal truth with no exceptions, it is important that this should be shown, and the apparent interruptions of the general law explained in such a way as to show that it is at no time suspended or reversed. It is to this that the books of Job and Ecclesiastes are directed. There are but two possible cases which could be regarded as exceptions to the general rule, and these in various forms and degrees are perpetually presenting themselves in the actual life of the world. These are, first, piety without prosperity; and, second, prosperity without piety. The first is discussed in Job, the second in Ecclesiastes. In both, to make the argument perfectly conclusive, the difficulty is presented in its extreme form. In Job, a man without his equal for piety in the world, is overwhelmed by a sudden and most extraordinary accumulation of disasters; he is stripped of his possessions, bereaved of his family, afflicted by sore disease, despised and shunned by his acquaintance, and made the victim of cruel suspicions and censures, until life became a burden; and yet in it all it is shown that God was not unfaithful, and piety did not fail of its reward. On the other hand, the book of Ecclesiastes exhibits the spectacle of a man, who is raised to the summit of earthly felicity, who has surrounded himself with every source of gratification that power or wealth can command, or his heart desire; who leaves no project unfulfilled, no wish ungratified, and gives himself of set purpose to extract solid satisfaction from the world, conducting his efforts with a sagacity and a wisdom such as no other man

has possessed before or since; and the result of all was disappointment and failure, vanity and vexation of spirit; and the conclusion to which he came after the baffling experiments of a life-time was, that the world without God can yield no solid good. Or as he states the issue himself, Eccl. xii. 13: "Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole of man;" this sums up at once his duty and his happiness.

These three books, forming thus a complete cycle, and covering together the entire range of the subject to whose illustration they are devoted, belong to one common style of poetry, the gnomic or aphoristic. This style, with its brief sententious apophthegms, seems specially suited to bring out clearly and forcibly the truths of experience, embodying them in such a shape as shall strongly affect the mind, and lodge firmly in the memory. It appears in its purest and most unmixed form in the Proverbs; less so in Ecclesiastes, as the nature of the discussion demanded; least of all in Job, where the lyrical element rises to greater prominence than in either of the others, although the aphoristic is not discarded.

According to a subscription added to this book in the Septuagint, Uz lay upon the borders of Idumea and Arabia; and Job was the grandson of Esau, the same with Jobab (Gen. xxxvi. 33) one of the kings of Edom. Though little reliance is to be placed upon this latter statement, the correctness of the former is generally conceded. The authority of the translator is itself something, as it is not improbable that the land may still have been known by its original name in his day. It seems to be even mentioned by Ptolemy. And all the indications in the book itself, and in other passages of Scripture where the name occurs, conspire to fix it somewhere in that region. Whether it was so called from the descendant of Seir, (Gen. xxxvi. 28) or the son of Nahor, (xxii. 21) or of Aram, (x. 23,) this location of it would not be unlikely. It is favoured by the fact that Job is called a son of the East, (i. 3,) that his property was exposed to incursions of the Sabeans and the Chaldeans, that his friends were from Teman, Shuah, (Gen. xxv. 2,) and Naamah, (possibly that mentioned Josh. xv. 41,) that in Lamentations iv. 21, Uz is associated with Edom, and in Jer. xxv. 20, is distinguished from it.

That Job was a real person, and his history is a record of actual events, may be inferred from the fact that the localities are real, that the names are not significant, (except Job, which may mean the one assailed or treated with hostility,) that there is no analogy in ancient writers, and particularly in the Bible, for such a purely fictitious tale. The question is settled, however, by the allusions to Job as an historical person in Ezek. xiv. 14, &c., James v. 11. This does not render it necessary to assume that everything occurred precisely as is here narrated, that the speeches are reported *verbatim*, that the Lord pronounced a long discourse, or that Satan literally appeared in heaven among the sons of God. Still less can the round numbers in which Job's possessions are stated, and their exact duplication afterwards occasion any embarrassment. The history is given substantially as it occurred, not with an eye to precision in trivial details, but with the view of developing in their full extent the important lessons which it was adapted to convey.

The period when Job lived is nowhere expressly stated. But his great longevity, the patriarchal simplicity of the worship, as well as of the life and manners, reflected in this book, the absence of all allusion to the miracles or revelations which marked the period of the exodus, the fact of such piety existing out of the line of the covenant people, incline to the belief that he was not subsequent to the time of Moses. And the mention of names (ii. 11; vi. 19; xxxii. 2,) which occur among the descendants of Nahor, Keturah, Ishmael, and Esau, render it probable that he did live very long before this time.

The mystery which invests the origin of this book, as well as that of some others belonging to the Old Testament, will probably never be dispelled. Our ignorance of its author, however, does not prejudice its canonicity, for we may safely acquiesce in the decision which admitted it to its present rank while the evidence of its inspiration was still in being, attested as it is by the infallible sanction of our Lord and his apostles, given to the integrity of the Jewish Scriptures, and by repeated citations in the New Testament from this individual book. The opinion that Job was written in the later times of the kingdom of Judah, or even during or after the Babylonish exile, has little

in its favour. It is less easy to decide between two other epochs, to which it has been assigned, viz. that of Moses, and that of David and Solomon. The ablest continental scholars appear to be settling down in favour of the latter, which is maintained not only by Hahn and Schlottmann, but by Hengstenberg, Hävernick, Delitzsch, Vaihinger, Hofmann, (in his later publications,) Welte and others. We are pleased to see that Professor Conant advocates the former, not so much because we have any settled conviction upon the point, as because no sufficient reason has yet been given for abandoning the old traditional opinion.

The highly artistic structure of this book and the exquisite finish of its poetry, are urged as showing that the poetic art must have been long cultivated, and brought to a great degree of perfection; and that some such golden period of the sacred muse as the age of David must be pre-supposed, before such a production as this could have been conceived or executed. But the finest specimens of a people's poetry stand sometimes among the earliest monuments of their literature. The epics of Homer furnish an irrefragable answer to every objection from this quarter directed against the antiquity of Job. Poetic genius was needed for its production, rather than any formal rules of art; and it is impossible to determine upon any general principles the time when such a genius must have appeared.

It has been argued from the relation in which this book stands to the law as an enlargement of its teachings relative to divine retribution, that the law as the foundation must have been first, and then Job as the superstructure, must have been built upon it. The law says, Fear God, and be blessed. Job shows that the truth of the law is still preserved, even when the righteous do not externally prosper. The law, it is alleged, must have been promulgated, before the question as to its consistency with the facts of experience could have arisen. But as this declaration of the law is a direct consequence of the divine rectitude, it was equally a tenet of the patriarchs by whom this attribute of God was known. And at a time when the piety of men, like Abraham and Isaac, was reflected in their fortunes, such a question as this in the case of Job would be peculiarly liable to arise and to occasion the most painful misgivings.

And if, as is alleged by those who would bring its composition down to the time of the exile, a period of national distress would make the subject here discussed one of wider interest and importance, would not its consolations be especially needed when Israel was groaning beneath the cruel and undeserved oppression of Egypt, or was pining in the wilderness, while abominable idolaters held possession of the promised land? Why may not the great legislator have been commissioned under these circumstances to expound, in what sense the promises of prosperity and blessing given of God were meant?

The striking resemblance which undoubtedly exists between several passages in this book, and such as occur in the Psalms and Proverbs, is quite as consistent with its priority as with that of the latter. It was naturally to be expected that a work of such originality and power should leave its traces on all the subsequent poetry of the nation. And if we find phrases, words or turns of thought common to it with other books, the presumption is, until the contrary is shown, that Job was imitated, not the imitator. This is admitted in the case of Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Isaiah, Amos; why not in that of David and Solomon?

That the whole air of this book is patriarchal, and that it never refers to any event subsequent to the time of Moses, might be explained on the hypothesis of the later origin of the book, by the assumption that the writer whose subject lay in the olden time, strictly observed the proprieties of time and place; though it would evidence extraordinary skill that he has not by the slightest expression betrayed that his assumed differed from his real position. The natural impression, however, antecedent to proof of the contrary, must be that the book was written in or near the times and scenes which it so admirably portrays. It is a remarkable coincidence, even if it be a casual one, that so many of the things that we expect to find in the writer, meet in Moses. His long sojourn in Midian explains his acquaintance with the facts, while his personal experience and that of his suffering people impressed their lessons on his heart. This too may furnish a solution of the Arabisms of the book. The writer's familiarity with Egyptian objects (which is such that Schlottmann insists that he must have seen what he describes,)

and the knowledge which he displays of nature and of the arts, will also be readily accounted for, since Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. That Ophir (xxii. 24, xxviii. 16,) was not known to the Hebrews before the days of Solomon is asserted by Hahn; but it might be difficult to prove that Egyptian conquests or Egyptian trade had not extended there. The powerful and versatile genius of Moses none can dispute; a specimen of the various and exquisite poetry he was capable of producing, is furnished Ex. xv. Deut. xxxii. and xxxiii. and Ps. xc.

We do not venture to say that Moses did write this book, nor that it was written in his time; but only that the contrary is not proven. The chief repugnance, which we confess to having it assigned to a later period, arises from the manifest disposition in those who do so, though it is by no means a necessary consequence, to entertain lax notions of its historical character. Schlottmann distinguishes between the event itself and the tradition of it as it came to the writer. And Hengstenberg, after maintaining (Kitto's Cyc. II. p. 121) that there might be some intangible historical basis for what is recorded of Job, has at length (Lecture before the Evangelical Union in Berlin, pp. 12, 13) reached the conclusion that there is none whatever, and that all which the allusions of Ezekiel and James compel us to assume, is that the lesson of the book is true and that the writer had passed through some such conflict in his own experience.

The different views which have been held of the design and teachings of this book, have mostly arisen from not taking a sufficiently comprehensive view of the whole, confining the attention mainly or exclusively to one portion, and exalting it to an undue prominence. This is also the secret of the disposition manifested by several critics to dispute the genuineness of one section or of another, which they find incompatible with what they have arbitrarily assumed to be the governing idea. It is decisive against any view of the book at the outset, if such forcible measures are necessary in order to carry it through. No theory can be admitted which will not furnish the solution of it in all its parts just as it exists, without the necessity of its being mutilated or altered; in which it shall not appear that there is nothing wanting, and nothing superfluous, but that all

harmonizes and conspires together in its just proportion to produce the contemplated end.

The supposition that it is the design of this book to develope the idea of true wisdom, takes its shape from chap. xxviii. and makes that the key of the whole. Baumgarten-Crusius, who maintains this view, thinks that the different speakers represent the different stages in the progress of this idea. Job personates a simple, unsophisticated piety; the three friends a legal mind; Elihu a loftier and more comprehensive intelligence; while a thoroughly instructed religion and wisdom in its highest form are embodied in the discourse of the Lord. But besides that this is not a just view of the parts sustained by the respective speakers, the discussions relate not to wisdom in the abstract, nor in the general, but in its bearings upon one particular case.

Ewald thinks that the aim of the book is to teach the immortality of the soul, and by means of the hope of a future state to reconcile to the inequalities of the present. This is taking the key from chapter xix; a chapter which plays an important part in the economy of the book, as will appear hereafter, but which is not entitled to the predominance here given it. It is there shown how the man of God can rise to an assured triumph even in the most desperate case, by holding firmly to his faith that the God whom he serves is his friend in spite of everything that seems to establish the contrary, and that he will surely make this appear, if not on this side of the grave, yet beyond it. But this is not the solution given to the problem of suffering righteousness. It is possible to vindicate the present as well as to make an appeal to the future. Accordingly the subsequent speeches of Job show that, notwithstanding the triumphant assurance which he had gained respecting his actually existing relation to God, and the certain manifestation of it in the future, yet the distressing enigma of its present obscuration, remained to him as insolublc as before. And in the discourses of Elihu and of the Lord, where we look for the final scttlement of the matter at issue, man's immortality is not once referred to. Whatever placc this may have, therefore, in the complete view of the question, it is not its ultimate solution.

According to others, the design of the book is to inculcate unconditional submission to the will of the infinite God. His ways are inscrutable. Man's duty is, without murmuring, to submit humbly to his dispensations. But instead of solving the enigma, this would be to dismiss it as insolvable. The book of Job goes far beyond this. The infinite perfections of God are presented as a sure ground of confidence, even in his darkest dispensations, while his gracious purpose in affliction, and its happy issue, are distinctly brought to view. The resignation of the truly pious, on such grounds as these, is at a world-wide remove from the submission of the Stoic to inexorable fate. This view has led several of its advocates to rid themselves of the difficulties which the historical introduction and conclusion lay in their way, by denying their genuineness. But the alleged discrepancies between these and the body of the book are of no account. The grounds assigned for Job's sufferings in the introduction, and the issue to which they are conducted in the conclusion, teach nothing incompatible with the intermediate portion of the book, if this be only properly understood. That Job was a man of eminent holiness, and bore his calamities with becoming resignation, is not falsified by the subsequent language of impatience and despair, wrung from him by their long continued intensity, and by the cruel censures of his friends. The Lord's rebuke of Job, xxxviii. 2, xl. 2, involves no such approval of his friends, as would conflict with xlii. 7. Chapters xix. 17, and xxxi. 8, are not at variance with the account of the death of Job's children, i. 18, 19. Professor Conant translates the second passage correctly, "Let my *products* be rooted up." And the first he renders, "I am offensive to the sons of the same womb;" whatever question there may be as to the first part of this clause, there can be little as to the last; the allusion is not to Job's children, but to his brethren, xlii. 11. The death of his children is in fact alluded to in the body of the book itself, viii. 4, xxix. 5. That the introduction and conclusion are in prose, (as historical sections always are,) that they speak of sacrifices, while no mention is made of them in the rest of the book (for the reason that there was no occasion for it,) that they use the divine name Jehovah, (though not exclusively,) while in the rest of the book the

divine name employed is Eloah, God, (yet see xii. 9, xxxviii. 1, xl. 1, 3, 6, xlii. 1,) can scarcely be considered serious arguments. On the other hand, the positive and invincible argument of genuineness is, that the beginning and the end of the book are essential to the understanding of it. Apart from these, there is no intimation who the parties are who are here speaking, nor what is the occasion of their discussion. It is especially necessary that the reader should be made aware of Job's character at the outset, or how could it be known that there was any enigma in his suffering, or that the suspicions of his friends were unjust, and that he was not merely pretending to an innocence which he did not possess: and the book would be manifestly unfinished, if it were to stop where the poetic portion ends; that is no suitable conclusion. This is so clearly the case, that some who deny the genuineness of the present introduction and conclusion, assert that it must have had others in their stead originally, and that these were removed to make way for those we now possess. But this is bringing hypothesis to support hypothesis, and only involves the matter in still greater difficulties. What has become of that original preface and termination? What motive was there for expunging them to introduce new ones? And how was it possible that such a forgery in so remarkable a book as this, and one, too, included in the sacred canon, could succeed? Not to speak of the fresh obstruction interposed by the authority of the New Testament, for the allusion in James v. 11, is to the historical conclusion.

Others think the book designed to show the inadequacy of the Mosaic doctrine of a temporal retribution. Their notion is, that, according to the law of Moses, righteousness is to be invariably rewarded and sin punished in the present life, in proportion to their deserts; and that the writer of Job meant to prove on the contrary that men are not treated in this world according to their characters. But, 1. It would be inconceivable that a book whose design was to contradict the Mosaic law, should be written by a pious member of the theocracy, or that it should be admitted to the canon if it was. The law of Moses was sacred in the eyes of every Israelite, and antagonism to it would not have been tolerated. Those passages in the prophets, which have been alleged to be antagonistic to the law, in

which they speak of ceremonial observances as inferior to spiritual religion, are not in reality such, for this is the very spirit of the law itself. If this book, therefore, takes ground opposed to the law, it is without analogy in the whole Old Testament. 2. The defenders of this view identify the position taken by the friends of Job with the statements of the law, and regard the censure passed upon the former as falling equally upon the latter. But this is not correct. It is not the law, but partial or erroneous conclusions drawn from its teachings, which are here condemned. Just as in his sermon on the mount, our Lord rebuked not the law itself, but the false glosses and interpretations which the Jews had put upon it. Because life and prosperity are promised to the righteous, and calamities are threatened to the wicked, the friends inferred that the external prosperity of the good must be uninterrupted, and that severe calamities always evidence gross wickedness. This book does not oppose the law, but confirms it, by freeing it from the burden of these erroneous inferences. It shows that a man of eminent piety may, for reasons inferring no antecedent crime on his part, be cast down from his prosperity, and involved in the greatest misfortunes. It shows moreover that the promises of God were after all fulfilled in the case of Job, and the mystery which overhung the ways of Providence is dispelled by raising him in the end to a higher prosperity than ever; thus revealing that temporary sorrows may be conducive to a future higher good, and may be themselves blessings in disguise. It is to be observed likewise that the discourses of the three friends are not to be condemned *in toto*. Many of their sentiments are correct, and much that they say is just and proper. In fact, even where they are wrong, their error is often not so much in what they say as in what they intimate. Taken as abstract propositions, what they oppose to Job is commonly true; it is only the application of it which they design, that is false. Their statements, though capable for the most part of being understood in a sense that is correct, are rendered incorrect by their being adduced as the full explanation of a case which they do not really meet, and to which they could only be applied by the most unjust and unfounded assumptions of the guilt of Job. 3. The law of Moses, in teaching the righteousness of God's

dispensations in the present life, is most strictly true, and is in entire accordance with the doctrine of the New Testament on this same subject. Piety has its temporal as well as its eternal rewards. Our Saviour (Matt. v. 5) blesses the meek; for they shall inherit the earth. In Mark x. 29, 30, he says that whoever has left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for his sake and the gospel's, shall receive an hundred-fold now in this time, and in the world to come eternal life. The apostle Paul tells us (1 Tim. iv. 8) that godliness has the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. The essential righteousness of God in fact secures the righteousness of all his dispensations in this world, as much as in the future state. The retributions of the world to come are not to be regarded as a compensation for present inequality and injustice. He who admits that men are not dealt with justly here, and treated according to their characters, cuts the nerves of the argument for a future retribution, instead of strengthening it. For if God is not just now, what assurance can we have that he ever will be? But in claiming for the righteous the favour and blessing of God here, it must be distinctly understood what that means. For external worldly prosperity is no certain gauge even of present happiness, much less of men's true welfare. God consults for the highest interests of his people. He sends upon them what he sees to be most for their good. Affliction thus sent is not an evil, but a benefit; while worldly prosperity without the divine favour is a curse instead of a blessing. Besides it must be borne in mind, and this is one of the truths insisted upon in the book before us, that even the holiest of men are not free from sin. Conscious, therefore, of ill-desert, they should receive with humility and resignation whatever sufferings are sent upon them. These sufferings have a direct connection with their sin. They may not be penal, indeed, but they are disciplinary. They are needed and designed to purge from sin. Their proper effect was produced upon Job as soon as he said, (xlii. 6,) "I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." When that state of mind was produced, the discipline had gained its end, and was at once removed.

This book has also been regarded as an allegory, designed to

set forth the fortunes of the Jewish people. According to Bishop Warburton, Job represents the nation of the Jews, and his sufferings the calamities which befel them, including their captivity; the three friends were those who obstructed the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, particularly, Neh. vi. 1, Sanballat, Tobiah and Geshem; Elihu represents the writer of the book himself. Others make the three friends stand for the prophets; others explain them differently still. But without going into the details of any of these schemes, it will be sufficient to show them to be impracticable in regard to their chief character, in which alone they all agree. Job cannot possibly represent the Jewish nation, for the whole mystery of his sufferings lies in their arising from no fault on his part, whereas those which befel the Jews are always represented as the penalty of their transgressions. And there is no allusion in the whole book to the circumstances of the people at the time of the exile, and nothing whatever from which an intimation can be gained that it is to be allegorically understood. Everything indicates the subject to be a case of individual not of national suffering. This view too would require the assumption that the book was written in or after the exile; it is contradicted likewise by the historical character of Job already proved.

The real theme of this book is, as it has been well expressed, "the mystery of the cross." It is intended to throw light upon that perplexing enigma, so trying oftentimes to faith, of the sufferings of the righteous. How are they to be reconciled with the justice of God, or with the declaration of his law, "Do this, and thou shalt live?" This purpose is accomplished by adducing the case of a man, in whose history the truth to be taught is strikingly illustrated. God himself testifies regarding Job, that "there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and escheweth evil." This man, not for any special transgression, but at the solicitation of Satan, is suddenly cast down from his prosperity, and made to endure the severest inflictions in his property, his family, and his person, in order to try the strength of his piety, and that his steadfastness may be exhibited to the confusion of the tempter. The secret of Job's sufferings is thus far explained

to the reader, before the discussion begins; but it is a mistake, however common, to suppose that this is the whole mystery. So Delitzsch, (Herzog's Encyklop. art. Hiob,) after enumerating the four kinds of suffering to which men may be subjected, viz. punishment, chastisement, trial, and martyrdom, insists upon it that the third is the only one applicable to this case, in which "there is not the remotest connection between the suffering and the sinfulness of the sufferer." This initial error leads him, as we shall see hereafter, to deny the genuineness of an important section of the book. Others who are not prepared for this extreme, go at least to the length of declaring that it contributes nothing toward the proper settlement of the question at issue. Even Professor Conant says of the section referred to, "Elihu has contributed his suggestions, without advancing a step towards the solution of the problem. For there is no place in his theory, any more than in that of the three friends, for the actual case presented." It will be sufficient to say here, that it is not the design of the introduction to dispose of the case, but simply to place it before the reader. It prepares the way for the discussion, but without anticipating its result. It acquaints the reader with the fact, concealed from the human speakers, of Satan's agency in these inflictions. But it does not profess to give in full the reasons by which the Lord was moved in allowing Satan to deal with Job as he did. No haste is exhibited anywhere in this book to disclose the hidden purposes of God. They are suffered to unfold themselves in his actual providence, and their ripened issue is their ample justification. In fact, a similar course is pursued with most of the great lessons here inculcated, and herein lies one of the evidences of the wonderful skill of the writer. These lessons are strongly brought out, and the impression which they leave is perfectly distinct and clear; but this is effected less by precise and formal statements, than by the combined effect of the whole course of the history and the discussion.

That Satan was used to accomplish results on behalf of this pious man, very different from any that he designed or imagined, is suggested by the representation of his appearing statedly among the sons of God, when they came to present themselves before the Lord. Satan is like them, God's servant, employed

in ministrations to men which are directed (or controlled) by God's sovereign will, and of his performance of which he comes like the rest to render his report. It is not given to this malicious spirit to torture men as he may please. His office is to spy out the faults of good men, and to tempt them to sin, labouring to crush where he cannot seduce them. But this is an agency, which God employs for ends of his own. He does not originate the evil, but he uses it. So too, when Satan misleads the wicked to their ruin, as we are taught in 1 Kings xxii. 19–23, a passage strikingly similar to that before us, it is by the same divine permission and in just judgment for their sins. This subordination of evil to the designs of the Most High is a leading lesson impressed upon the very front of Job's history. Perhaps it may be called one of the original conditions of the problem. What those designs were, or how evil can be employed to effect them, we must be content to learn as the progress of events shall disclose them.

One purpose which God had in view, as shown by the event particularly of the first trial (i. 22, ii. 3,) was, as has been stated already, to test the fidelity of Job, not of course for the satisfaction of the Lord, who had previously given his unerring judgment of his character, but to confound the tempter and to present an example of the sustaining power of faith to men. But it is nowhere intimated that this was his sole design. From subsequent developments we learn that he had another purpose quite compatible with the former, but additional to it and distinct from it. The fire was designed not only to prove the existence of the gold, but to purge away its dross. The trial was a chastisement likewise, not for overt acts of sin, but for the yet unsubdued corruption of the heart. God would not have subjected a perfectly sinless being even temporarily to Satan's power, however gloriously his steadfastness might thereby be made to appear. If there had been no discipline in them for Job himself, permission would not have been given for these inflictions. This antecedent presumption is confirmed by the fact that latent sin is detected in Job and brought to light under the terrible pressure of his sorrows. There is an unmistakable leaven of self-righteousness in his vindications of himself and in his complaints of God. Job would never have sus-

pected himself of this, nor have sought its correction, but for this affliction. This element of corruption in his soul it is the evident aim of the writer to depict with a strong hand. And this explains the puzzle, that so eminently good a man, as Job is known from divine testimony to have been, could speak so presumptuously as he sometimes does. He had been touched with divine skill precisely upon his tender point, and this previously undeveloped evil sprang up at once in full power. And his speeches are so framed as to allow us to look directly in upon the struggles of his heart, which is here laid open without disguise. The bare discussion of the problem would not call for these culpable expressions on the part of Job. But they were necessary to bring out the lesson that there is evil in the best of men, which the searching test of affliction may discover. Additional confirmation is given to this view by the speech of Elihu, who is an interpreter of the will of God, and who makes the correction of men's inward pride one of the grand aims of affliction. The fact too that Job is ultimately brought to penitence, and that this is the condition of the removal of his affliction, warrants the conclusion that this was one of the things to be accomplished by sending it. While, therefore, Satan sought Job's ruin, God designed both to exhibit the sincerity of his piety, and to elevate that piety, thus preparing him for a higher measure of happiness.

All this, however, is unknown to Job and to his friends. They are left to confront this mysterious dispensation, without any clue being afforded them as to its design. The friends of Job having no other idea than that of the invariably penal character of suffering, conceive the suspicion that he must have been guilty of some gross iniquity to account for such unexampled sorrows. Job, conscious of his own integrity, cannot admit the unjust aspersions of his friends; but is himself in utter perplexity as to the cause of what he suffers, and is strongly tempted to arraign the righteousness of God's providence. The answer given to this difficult problem consists substantially of two parts, viz. 1. Men must confide in God; not only because they must expect in the dealings of infinite wisdom much that transcends their finite understandings; but because his glorious perfections should be a sufficient guaranty

that all he does is right and good, however dark and unexplained. 2. Affliction has its uses. It not only tests the constancy of faith, but is a necessary discipline which will conduct those who properly receive it to higher holiness and happiness.

The structure of this book is eminently regular. It consists of three parts of unequal length—the historical preface and conclusion in prose, and the main body of the book in poetry. The first contains such statements of fact as are necessary to the right understanding of the problem to be discussed. In the second, this problem is largely treated and its proper solution shown. In the third, the history is brought to a close, and the providential issue of the whole matter exhibited; this last we regard, for reasons already hinted at, but which shall more fully appear presently, as really forming part of the solution.

The rest of the book after the historical preface, is also divisible into three parts: the discussion of the problem by Job and his three friends, and its twofold decision, first as rendered by the instrumentality of a man, Elihu, then as given immediately by the Lord himself. The discussion again consists of distinct sections. After the opening discourse of Job, in which the theme is, as it were, propounded, the discussion is continued in three successive rounds of debate, or three systems of discourses, in each of which there is a discourse from the three friends severally, in regular order, together with the rejoinders made by Job, except that in the last, for a particular reason, the third friend, Zophar, says nothing. We have consequently the following scheme:

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| Introduction, | | Chaps. i. ii. |
| The Problem treated, | | Chaps. iii.—xlii. |
| The Discussion, | | Chaps. iii.—xxxi. |
| Job's opening discourse, | Chap. iii. | |
| First series of discourses, | Chap. iv.—xiv. | |
| Second series of discourses, | Chap. xv.—xxi. | |
| Third series of discourses, | Chap. xxii.—xxxi. | |
| Decision rendered by man, (Elihu) | | Chaps. xxxii.—xxxvii. |
| Decision rendered by God, | | Chaps. xxxviii.—xlii. |

According to the view commonly entertained of this book, it is plainly not a drama, or can only be called one in a very

improper sense. If it is simply the discussion of a grave and solemn question, to which a decision is subsequently rendered, there is no more propriety in saying that it is a drama than there would be in saying the same of the philosophical dialogues of Cicero, or a report of Congressional debates. Action is essential to the drama, as is implied by its very name. To be successful, there must be a plot which becomes gradually complicated, the interest growing more intense as it proceeds, while the issue is kept in suspense until the final denouement, when all is explained. Schlottmann has presented an exceedingly ingenious and captivating view of this book, according to which it will be a proper drama, though of course not designed for scenic representation; for the Hebrews knew nothing of such shows, and it would be beneath the sacred dignity of this inspired composition if they did. It is not maintained that this presents a precise parallel to any of the dramatic compositions, whether of the ancient Greeks or of modern times, but simply that it possesses all that is essential to that species of poetry, having unity of action and a consistent, regularly developed plot, the progress of which is disclosed in the speeches of the actors; and that it bears a closer analogy to these than to any other productions of the muse. The action of this piece is not external and palpable to the senses, but inward and spiritual, and has place among the deepest experiences of the soul. Its subject he states to be The temptation of Job. The interest of the piece consists in watching the effect produced on Job by his aggravated sufferings, and seeing whether the tempter gains his end, which he pursues so unremittingly, of driving him to abjure his God. The alternate speeches of Job and his friends will then still contain a discussion of grave truths respecting the providence of God in relation to suffering; but it will not be as a mere discussion that they appear here. The part which they sustain in the plot, is that the stinging censures of his friends are taken into the service of the tempter; they are a fresh aggravation of Job's distress, and by exasperating him add to the strength of the temptation to give up his confidence in God and to renounce his worship. The speeches of Job himself on the other hand exhibit the tumult of his soul under the temptation, and show how far the tempter succeeded in

driving him to the use of expressions sometimes, which sound as though he were on the very point of giving up his trust in God, and his allegiance to him, and we almost dread to hear him open his lips again, lest the fatal word should be spoken and Satan gain his end. But though often on the verge of the precipice, Job holds fast his integrity, and the tempter is foiled. Then the discourses of Elihu, and of the Lord, may be regarded as the means employed by God to rescue his servant from this perilous position, to check his presumption and bring him to humble penitence and submissive faith; whereupon all the clouds are dispersed, the malice of Satan falls harmless at his feet, and when the curtain drops upon the scene, Job is possessed of a loftier and more secure felicity than ever.

Schlottmann has bestowed great pains upon the poetical structure of this book, and has certainly improved upon the previous attempts of Köster, Stickel, Ewald and others, to prove that it is throughout arranged in stanzas or strophes. The true theory of Hebrew verse has long been a matter of curious inquiry amongst scholars. Following the lead of Josephus, Philo, Eusebius, Jerome and other ancient testimonies, who speak of trimeters, pentameters, hexameters, etc., in the Old Testament, some made numerous and persevering attempts to discover there the different styles of Greek and Latin verse; others acting upon a suggestion of Sir William Jones, sought for Syriac and Arabic measures; others endeavoured to develope a peculiar system of prosody from the masoretic accents. All these efforts failed. It was found impracticable to carry out any one of these views without unwarrantable assumptions, arbitrary changes of the text, and the constant violation of the simplest and most obvious prosodial rules. It is in fact demonstrable that Hebrew verse could not have been regulated by the number or quantity of syllables, nor by any succession of feet, for the variety in the length or character of lines is palpably such as could be embraced within no conceivable rules of that description. Syllables were no doubt so disposed as to produce a rhythmical and harmonious flow; but that is all that can be maintained.

The productions of the Hebrew muse took on quite a different form from that developed in other lands, though growing out of

the same ultimate idea. The ordinary flow of prose resembles a quiet stream, through which the thought pours itself in an even current until it is expended. Poetry, as the language of excited emotion, reflects the state of mind in which it takes its rise. It expresses itself in more brief and rapid utterances; whence it follows that the thought not expended in the first flow, gushes forth again, thus returning upon itself, and a relation of correspondence being established between the first movement and the second. Now in Greek verse, and in occidental poetry generally, the outward form took precedence of the inward conception. The correspondence of successive lines was indicated by a determinate arrangement of syllables and recurrence of feet, so that the reiterated movement was marked to the ear by the rhythmical effect. In Hebrew poetry, on the other hand, in which the primitive, unfettered simplicity was better preserved, the thought predominated over the form, and the correspondence established lay in the repetition or fuller expression of the idea in varied style; in other words, in the parallelism of clauses.

Parallelism being thus the governing principle of Hebrew verse, as it is fundamentally of all other, the question arises whether this is confined to clauses, or whether it has been extended likewise to paragraphs and sections. The same law of correspondence, which regulated the measure of successive lines in Greek verse, gave birth to strophes and antistrophes, in which, after a series of varying measures, the same were repeated again in precisely the same order. Is there anything similar to this in Hebrew poetry? The writers above alluded to maintain that there is; that every poem or leading section of a poem resolves itself into portions of corresponding length, containing the same or nearly the same number of verses, the predominance of the thought over the form being here maintained as before, and the transition from one thought to another marking the points of division between the strophes. There is nothing to be said against this theory but the difficulty of establishing its truth. In many cases there is a singular conformity in the length of the paragraphs or divisions, into which the various speeches of this book naturally fall. But it seems doubtful whether this conformity is due to any conscious design

of the writer, or is not a simple consequence of his presenting in their order several thoughts of nearly equal moment, so that he naturally dwells to a similar extent upon each. This explanation is rendered more probable by the fact that in many cases the conformity is not obvious, and can only be educed by arbitrary means. Schlottmann's divisions are highly ingenious; and sometimes, by a new grouping of verses, he succeeds in setting them in a different light, or in giving them additional force. But on the whole, his straining after strophes has been to the injury of his exposition, and has frequently led him to propose divisions which an unbiassed examination of the passage would certainly never dictate. Besides, his strophes are reached by masoretic verses; whereas, if there were anything in the theory, it is obvious that the only proper mode would be by clauses as indicated in the parallelisms.

The discussion between Job and his friends takes its point of departure from the opening discourse of the former, chap. iii. Weighed down by the intensity of his anguish, he complains of three things; that he was ever born, vs. 3–10, that he was suffered to live after his birth, vs. 11–19, that he is compelled to live on still in his misery, vs. 20–26. The following argument turns upon the question of Job's right thus to complain; the friends deny, Job affirms. Much of the art with which this discussion is managed, is lost by those who fail to observe how both the parties gradually shift their ground, or at least modify their tone, receding from each other and departing from their own early positions as they become warmed in the vehemence of debate. Wonderful skill is displayed by the writer in portraying in the speeches the growing vehemence of the speakers. It is not proper to impute to Job in all his discourses the same presumptuous chiding with God, which breaks forth in some of them. Nor must the friends be supposed to have begun the discussion with the same harsh suspicions of Job that they cherished afterwards. Their seven days' silence indicated no such suspicion; it was the natural impulse of profound sympathy in the presence of overwhelming grief, (ii. 13.) Job's opening speech implies no thought of his friends' unkindness; it is the piteous moaning of a man under intolerable sorrows. And the first speech of Eliphaz, though without the tenderness and

consideration that Job had reasonably expected, (vi. 15, etc.) and already betraying the radical error that the external condition of men invariably corresponds with their characters, yet assumes throughout that Job is a good man, and rebukes him for entertaining the thought that being such he could perish, (iv. 1–11,) charging him only with that general sinfulness which is common to all men.

In each of the three series of discourses Eliphaz is the leading speaker, not only preceding, but, as it were, guiding the others. They take their cue from him, reiterating in other forms what he had already substantially said. In the first series Job is treated with comparative leniency and each of the friends closes with an exhortation to Job to receive his sufferings submissively, promising him in that case a return and enlargement of his former prosperity. In the second series the tone of the friends is much harsher and more irritated. They are provoked that Job should continue, in spite of their arguments and exhortations, to maintain a position which they consider so indefensible and wrong. They now hold out no promises for the future, but dwell largely on the uniform and necessary connection of sin and suffering, intimating in no doubtful terms, what yet they do not declare in express words, that Job had brought his sufferings upon himself by his sins, and that nothing but ruin awaited him in the course he seemed determined to pursue. In the last series Eliphaz comes out distinctly with explicit charges of aggravated crime. That these cannot be substantiated, however, is intimated by Bildad's failing to repeat them; while the brevity of his speech and his falling back upon arguments which had been adduced at the very beginning of the discussion and which Job had answered long before, showed that he had nothing new to bring forward. Zophar's not replying at all is an admission that they have no more to say, and that they cannot answer Job.

The discourses of Job are divided into two portions by the triumphant confidence expressed in chap. xix. This chapter is both in form and in fact the centre of the whole. It occurs in the middle series in the answer to the second friend; and it is the turning point in the discussion. This is the culmination of all that precedes, for which it has been preparing the way, and

to which it has been tending by gradual and marked advances. What follows is of quite a different character. The prominent feature of the first portion is the struggle of Job's own mind against despair. The prominent feature of the second portion is the refutation of the position taken by his friends. What gave its chief poignancy to Job's distress was that God seemed to have become his enemy. It was because the principle urged by his friends led directly to this result, that their speeches stirred such a tumult in his soul. They could see nothing in suffering but the penalty of sin. As he was conscious of his freedom from crime and of the sincerity of his piety, the tendency of their language is to make him feel that God is treating him as a criminal without his being one, that he is employing his omnipotence to crush him for no cause, except that he has arbitrarily determined so to do. This idea of God as cruel and inexorable, as infinite power without regard to justice or mercy, bent on his destruction, is the phantom which is perpetually rising before him, and with which he has to contend. A fierce conflict is awakened in his soul between his faith in God's rectitude and love, and this phantom, which the sense of his misery and the arguments of his friends are ever afresh forcing upon him. On his first opening his mouth, chap. iii., we hear his groans under unutterable woe, and in his despair he piteously begs for death as a coveted relief from his sufferings. His replies to the first series of his friends' discourses show him to be still in unrelieved despair. They are divided between upbraidings of his friends for their hard-hearted aggravation of his woe, the justification of his complaint by the intensity of his misery, and the fresh utterance of it, coupled with remonstrances with God that he should so torment his frail and helpless creature. In the later speeches of this series, the replies to Bildad and Zophar, we meet the first dawnings of a thought, which is soon to overspread his soul with the clear effulgence of triumphant exultation; but as yet there is only glimmer enough to make the blackness blacker. In ix. 34, 35, he says, that if God would but lay aside his terrors and suffer him to meet him as he might an equal, he could vindicate himself; and in x. 7, that God without such a vindication, knew that he was not wicked. But this only aggravated his hopeless misery,

that in spite of this knowledge of his integrity God had resolved upon his destruction. In xiii. 13–22, he expresses his conviction that if he could only succeed in bringing his case before God for judgment, and were permitted to argue it there, he could make his integrity appear, and would obtain sentence in his favour. In xiv. 13–15, he adds, that if death were only a temporary evil he could bear it. He could lie down in the grave resignedly, if a limit was set to the period of God's anger, and when that was past he could return once more to life and to the enjoyment of his favour. Gloomy as these words appear, and vain as are these wishes in the form in which they are expressed, they nevertheless contain the seeds of hope, which from this moment begins to kindle in his bosom. It is a desperate struggle; but his pious trust in God shall gain the victory.

The heightened intensity of Job's inward conflict is finely expressed by the fact that his complaint and remonstrance from being a single section, beside other sections of equal length, as in his previous speeches, swell in those that follow over almost the whole discourse. He now says little to his friends in the way of justifying his complaint to them. He merely, in a few verses at the beginning, begs them to be silent and to desist from their cruel treatment, and then turns from them to God; or even when his words are not in form addressed to him, his thoughts are occupied about his relation to him. The seeming proofs of God's hostility stare him in the face; and yet he is thrown back upon God as his only helper. His friends scorn him; he has no hope nor expectation from them. His tearful prayer is that God, the witness of his integrity, would take his part with God his seeming foe. In the most eloquent and impassioned language he makes his appeal from God to God himself, xvi. 17—xvii. 3. In spite of this present hostility, which he cannot understand, he reposes a trust in God which he cannot abandon. This tearful appeal is not unheard. The certainty takes possession of Job's bosom that God will vindicate his innocence, and is even now his friend, for whatever inexplicable reason he does not so appear, xix. 25–27. Every prospect of earthly good, he had already said, had vanished, xvii. 11–16. There was nothing for him to look for here, but the grave.

And yet he knows, notwithstanding all this, that his Redeemer lives, and he shall see him after death in that character, no longer his foe, but his Saviour and his Friend. Faith here rises to its loftiest triumph. To outward sense all is cheerless despair. No earthly hope remains. God still appears to be pursuing him as an implacable foe. The mystery of his sufferings is as unexplained, and as seemingly insolvable as ever. But let the worst come to the worst, Job still trusts in God. He may die under the cloud; but he knows that God is his Redeemer, and that he will certainly vindicate him yet. The struggle with despair is now over, and never reappears. He does not understand this dark dispensation any better than he had done before; but the question of his personal relation to God is settled, and that gives him comparative peace. The phantom of a cruel and inexorable Deity has given place to the vision of his Redeemer. And though for some mysterious reason, which he knows not how to comprehend, he does not act toward him in this character now, but in one that seems to be its opposite, he will sometime manifest himself as such.

In favour of the correctness of the view which has been taken of this important passage, and which finds in it the assurance of a divine vindication in a future state, may be argued—1. Its position as already exhibited in the plan of the book. It stands in the relation of climax to corresponding passages in Job's former speeches. It winds up that intense mental struggle in which he has been engaged from the outset, by one gigantic exercise of faith, clearing away those dark clouds of distressing doubt which had previously overhung his soul, so that henceforward we find him in a very different state of mind. The enigma remains, but his apprehensions of God's enmity do not reappear. All this shows that something extraordinary is to be expected here; something which rises far above the level of any of his previous declarations, and which could lift him, as nothing else had done, from the depths of despair to a triumphant hope. Such is the marked prominence, in fact, of this passage in the economy of the book, that Ewald, as already stated, considers it the key of the whole, and thinks that its grand lesson is concentrated at this point, viz. that the doctrine of the soul's immortality can reconcile the inequalities

of the present state. But it is manifest that the immortality of the soul is not presented as a solution of the enigma. That is as obscure as ever; though he can stand up in the face of it, now that he knows he shall be vindicated hereafter. But it is still a puzzle why God makes him suffer so in the present. Although this passage, therefore, does not solve the problem of the book, it is the focus in which the scattered rays of faith, which appear in Job's former speeches, are gathered and intensified. He had expressed before the confidence that if he could bring his cause before God, he would be justified; he had wished for another life after death, which might be blessed with God's returning favour; he had claimed God as the witness of his integrity, and had prayed that his blood, causelessly shed, might not be covered by the earth nor remain unexpiated. What more fitting climax could there be to these thoughts than that God would vindicate him and appear on his side in the future state?

2. This view is rendered necessary by the formality with which this passage is introduced, and the stress which is laid upon it, vs. 23, 24. That he should thus mark out these words, and put so broad a distinction between them and all else that he had uttered; that he should wish them engraved in the rock, to endure as his testimony to all future time, warrants us in expecting to find something in them which shall be worthy of so formal and impressive an introduction.

3. This view alone gives its natural and proper sense to the language which is here employed. We might not perhaps lay much stress upon the expression, "at the latter day," or its original equivalent, signifying "last," or "at the last," if it were by itself. For though it is the same word which stands in the designation of God as the first and the last, it might be claimed that it had here only the general sense of futurity. But the period intended is more clearly explained in what follows. Of the two clauses of ver. 25, the first states the character in which Job was by faith enabled to contemplate God, and the second, the time when he was assured that this character would be displayed by him on earth. These clauses are then expanded separately in the verses that follow, the second, in ver. 26, the first in ver. 27. The latter day referred to, accordingly finds its

explanation in the words, "And after my skin [which] they destroy, [even] this, and out of my flesh shall I see God." There is no need of supplying "worms" with the common English version as the subject of the verb "destroy;" it is in the third person plural indefinite, a frequent equivalent in Hebrew of the passive construction. The agents of the destruction are not named, perhaps not distinctly thought of. It is at any rate after the destruction of his present skin or body, that the vision of God as his Redeemer is to take place. This cannot mean less than after death; mere emaciation by disease not attended by dissolution could not be so described. The next expression, "out of my flesh," (Eng. ver. marg.) has the same ambiguity in the original as in the translation. It may mean either in the body or disembodied. It may describe the position to be occupied by the speaker, and out from which he would look to see God. In that case, taken in connection with the other expressions previously employed, it would mean, that after the destruction of his present body he would be clothed with it afresh at the resurrection, and from out of it he would see God, who had now hidden himself from view. It is more probable, however, that "out of my flesh," here means disembodied, separated from my flesh, in the future state. The two clauses of the verse being connected not by "yet," but by "and," the expressions "after my skin," and "out of my flesh," are not contrasted, but parallel, and are both alike descriptive of the period intended by "at the latter day," ver. 25.

4. This is the oldest, as it has always been the most prevalent interpretation. The Fathers in fact generally found in this passage an allusion not only to a future state, but to a corporeal resurrection. So Clemens Romanus, Origen, Cyril, and others. Jerome incorporated this idea in his Latin version, and was followed by the writers of the Western Church generally. It is likewise expressed in the Septuagint, notwithstanding Stickel's denial; for even if *ἀναστῇσαι τὸ δέρμα μου* might be explained of a raising up to health, the beginning of the apocryphal section at the close of the book, "It is written, that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises up," leaves no doubt as to its sense in the intention of the translator.

According to another view of this passage, the meaning is,

that Job expected a divine vindication in the present life; he felt assured that God would make his innocence appear by the removal of his present sufferings, and by restoring him to a state of prosperity. This explanation is first found in Chrysostom, and was adopted from him by some later writers in both the Greek and Latin churches. During the prevalence of rationalism in Germany, it became the reigning interpretation in that country. But, 1. This is opposed to the whole previous tenor of the book. Job always appears just on the verge of the grave, and invariably rejects the idea of any earthly expectation, whenever it is presented to him. 2. It is inconsistent with the position maintained by Job, in opposition to his friends. They assert that men are rewarded in this life according to their characters. Job denies it. If now the confidence he here expresses, is that of an earthly reward, he comes over to their ground. 3. It is inconsistent with the obvious meaning of the language, as that has been exhibited already. 4. There is nothing in such an earthly expectation to justify the solemn and imposing manner in which these words are introduced. The idea especially of graving upon rock, to endure for ever, a statement which was to meet its fulfilment during his own life, is grandiloquent if not absurd.

It has been said in recommendation of this view, that the doctrine of a future state is elsewhere denied or ignored in this book, e. g. vii. 9, xiv. 7–12. Even if this were so, to understand this passage of a vindication in the world to come, would involve no greater inconsistency than to refer it to a restoration in the present life, when the possibility of that had been over and over again denied. But, as a simple inspection of those passages will show, they merely declare the impossibility of another earthly life after the present, (see vii. 10.) To suppose a future state denied, would not only involve an unwarrantable rejection of the inspiration of this book, but would be inadmissible even on the assumption of its merely human origin. Although the Old Testament saints had less light than we have upon the nature of that existence upon which the soul enters at death, they were never ignorant of the fact of its continued existence. Had they been, they would have been behind the very heathen. The account of the original creation of man itself contains

enough to settle this question for ever, Gen. ii. 7. The two elements of our nature are there plainly distinguished, the body made of dust, and to return to dust again, and the immaterial, immortal part breathed by God into man's nostrils to make him a living soul. That the doctrine of immortality is not spoken of before in the book of Job, is simply because it was designedly reserved for this passage as the sublime utterance of a faith secure of the future, though without a visible prop in the present. It does not recur afterwards, because the aim of its introduction is now accomplished. Job's despair is stilled by it, but it is not the solution of the question to whose discussion the book is devoted. Hofmann, who (Schriftbeweis II. 2, p. 471) supposes an earthly restoration to be the thing intended in this passage, is peculiar in his attempt to show from that the writer's certain knowledge of a future state. He says that the very emphasizing of the present, involves a tacit opposition to the future.

We are amazed to find Hahn, who is usually so correct in his opinions, giving a view of this passage, which empties it still more of its meaning than that just opposed. According to him, no future vindication is referred to at all, by God or man, in this world or the next; all has relation to the present moment, and the statement is merely a repetition of what he had said several times before, that God was at that very time aware of his innocence, though he still allowed him to suffer. The process by which this sense is arrived at is as extraordinary as the sense itself. He translates thus: "I know that my Redeemer lives, and a proctor (this rendering of אחרון is about matched by his making ברק xx. 25, mean 'a stream of blood') stands above the earth (in heaven.) Even after my skin which is thus destroyed and bare of flesh (in my present emaciated condition) I see God" (I know what his judgment is of my character; he does not regard me as guilty.) There is the less need of spending words upon the refutation of this view, as it has since been abandoned by its author, who has reverted to the old and only tenable ground. And there is quite as little necessity of delaying to discuss such notions as that of Aben Ezra, that the Redeemer here spoken of, is some man then living, who would come forth after Job was dead, and vindicate his memory; or

of Hirzel, that Job entertained the fanatical expectation that God would instantaneously and visibly appear for him, and against his friends.

Job's own inward conflict being thus stilled, he no longer acts merely on the defensive, but proceeds in his remaining discourses to assail the position of his friends. And the first blow which he deals is really decisive of the conflict. In his reply to Zophar, chap. xxi. he demonstrates by undeniable facts that suffering is not invariably attendant upon sin, and graduated by it. With their first principle thus hopelessly demolished, only one course remains open to the friends, if they will continue to maintain the show of an argument; and this Eliphaz takes in his next discourse which opens the third and last series. The discussion can no longer be kept up as heretofore on general grounds. The universality of the connection between sin and punishment in the external lot of men, cannot be reasserted in the face of what Job has now said, and the facts of experience which he has adduced. The only thing that can be done, is to claim that in this particular case that connection has been observed. Eliphaz accordingly comes out with a direct and explicit attack upon the life and character of Job, maintaining that his enormous criminality sufficiently accounted for the extraordinary sufferings he was enduring. The question at issue was thus brought down to a very narrow compass. It was now a simple matter of fact, which could readily be ascertained. Was Job the guilty man, which he had been alleged to be, or was he not? In his reply he takes up the challenge thus thrown down. While he considers it beneath him to notice particularly these unfounded charges of specific crime, he solemnly appeals to the tribunal of the Searcher of hearts, as vouching for his innocence; and then proceeds to show more conclusively than before, that there were cases of aggravated suffering not the fruit of sin, and of aggravated sin not succeeded by suffering. This puts an end to this argument, upon which the friends have been ringing changes from the beginning, and which has been the main staple of their discourses. It has now been refuted both in the general and in its application to this case. There is nothing left for Bildad, therefore, but to present, which he feebly does, their other

standing argument; the infinite exaltation of God, before whom no man can pretend to absolute purity.

As the defeat of the friends is intimated by Zophar's failing to answer Job's next speech, so the victory of Job is intimated by the unusual length to which his closing speech is extended, and by his pausing twice as though he was waiting for a reply, which they do not make. This peculiarity of external form must not, however, be allowed too much effect upon the interpretation. It is not three speeches, but one speech in three distinct but closely related parts, and of gradually increasing length, and is to be regarded as a general reply to all that had been urged upon the other side, a summing up of the whole argument. In the first section, chap. xxvi., Job concedes the fact upon which one of the arguments of the friends, that just reiterated by Bildad, is built, viz. God's infinite greatness; but shows its inapplicability by outdoing Bildad in the description, without yielding his position. In the second section, chaps. xxvii., xxviii., he does the same with their other main argument, the rectitude of God's retributions. Though insisting that this is inapplicable to his own case, he concedes the fact and exhibits the true ground upon which it rests. For while man, though able to uncover the secrets of nature, cannot find, and the world cannot teach, wherein true wisdom lies, God has revealed that it consists in the fear of God, and in departing from evil. It is a lesson, therefore, resting on higher authority than any human experience, that ruin attends wicked courses, and happiness is only for the good. A large number of commentators, and among them Hahn and Schlottmann, understand chap. xxviii. differently, supposing it to teach the inscrutable nature of divine providence, and the impossibility of man's comprehending the wisdom by which God manages the world. We prefer, however, the view already given, which is substantially that of Hengstenberg and of Prof. Conant.

Considerable embarrassment has been created by the fact that Job seems to assert in this section, what he had strenuously denied in his previous speeches. Hence some have been disposed to think that the missing speech of Zophar has, by some error and confusion of the text, been assigned to Job. The whole difficulty may be explained, however, by attending to the

design of the respective passages. Job had denied the universality of a providential retribution, by showing that there were multitudes of cases, his own among the number, to which that rule would not apply. But he had no idea of denying that God exercised a moral government, on account of these inexplicable anomalies. He never meant to say that the course of the sinner was the path of wisdom and the high road to happiness. Accordingly he does not here contradict, but merely qualifies and explains his previous statements. He first provides for the exceptional cases which he had before exclusively insisted upon, by maintaining his own integrity notwithstanding his afflictions. He then freely concedes, what he had never doubted nor disputed, the existence of a righteous government in the world. In fact so far from being foreign to Job's views, it was this very conviction of God's essential righteousness, which enabled him to rise to that triumphant expression of his faith in chap. xix.

The fundamental idea of wisdom common to this book with the other two of the same class, and their mutual relations, have already been remarked upon. The resemblance of chap. xxviii. to various passages in Proverbs chaps. i.—ix. has been often observed, and is one of the grounds urged in favour of the composition of this book in the age of Solomon. But it may be worth while to notice the occurrence of a similar thought with a remarkable similarity of expression in the writings of Moses, Deut. xxx. 11–16, where he speaks of the life and good which he set before the people, as obtained not by searching for it in heaven, nor by going beyond the sea, but as brought nigh them by the revelation of God.

In the third section of his discourse Job proceeds to show that in spite of the concessions just made, the enigma of his own case remained unsolved. The problem in fact was one not reached by their arguments; it was that of suffering righteousness. He dwells (chap. xxix.) upon his former happy condition; then states in contrast (chap. xxx.) the present dismal reverse, and (chap. xxxi.) his freedom from any crime which could account for the change. The opinion expressed by Delitzsch and others, that xxxi. 35–37 has been shifted from its proper place, and that this solemn appeal to God and asseveration of

innocence ought to stand at the close of the chapter, could only have arisen from overlooking the plan upon which the whole is arranged. This plan is to group together a number of hypothetical statements of his guilt of various crimes, with the occasional introduction of a parenthesis denying the fact of the crime hypothetically assumed, and to terminate the entire series by the imprecation of a severe penalty upon himself, if he were really guilty. Thus ver. 22 is the imprecation following the various hypothetical statements of criminality found in vs. 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, while vs. 14, 15 and ver. 18 contain parentheses declaring his abhorrence of, or freedom from the forms of criminality named. So ver. 40 is an imprecation closing the series of hypothetical statements beginning with ver. 24, the form of the imprecation being determined as in the previous instance by the sin last named. In the course of this series of assumed possibilities he introduces parenthetical clauses denying the truth of the suppositions made, c. g. vs. 28, 30, 32. So also vs. 35–37; having supposed the case that he might have concealed crimes of which he was really guilty, he introduces this parenthesis affirming in the most emphatic terms that he had no cause to do so. Then after another hypothetical statement of crime he adds to the whole an imprecation. And there are few probably, who would not say that the imprecation is the most fitting and emphatic close.

Job is thus the victor in the argument. His friends have failed in their attempt to show cause why he should not complain. All that they have been able to advance, has fallen before his double appeal to the inequalities existing in the world, and to his own internal consciousness of rectitude. So far he stands justified, and his complaint against the providence of God appears to be well founded. The matter cannot of course be suffered to rest here. The question has only become more and more perplexed as the discussion has advanced; and some foreign aid is needed to disentangle it; some umpire to set both parties right, point out what is wrong in each, and show where the truth lies—to show how it is that a righteous man like Job can suffer as he did, and yet no reproach be cast upon the providence of God, nor the sufferer have any just ground to complain. This want is supplied in the remaining

chapters, which contain the decision. It is two-fold, as rendered by Elihu, and as rendered by the Lord.

No part of this book has given more trouble to interpreters than the speech of Elihu. It has been an exceedingly vexed question, what he is intended to represent, in what relation his decision stands to that of the Lord, or why two decisions are given, in place of settling the controversy by one. Many German critics, instead of patiently untying the knot, cut it by the assumption that the discourse of Elihu is an interpolation.

In proof of this it is urged, 1. That its language and style are different from the rest of the book. But a degree of individuality is given to each of the speakers by peculiarities of language; it was natural that this should be done for Elihu as for the rest. And if words and expressions occur here which are not met with again in the book, the same might be said of any portion of equal extent which could be selected in any part of it; for the whole abounds in unusual words and forms. Besides these are more than balanced by a still greater number of characteristic expressions which do occur in other parts of the book and betray identity of authorship.

2. No mention is made of Elihu elsewhere than in this single section. But there is no professed enumeration of the *dramatis personæ* in the previous part of the book. The three friends are spoken of because with them the discussion is carried on. Elihu only speaks because they cannot answer Job. To announce him at the beginning, therefore, would be to anticipate their failure before their incapacity had been actually shown. That nothing is said of him after his speech is concluded, is just because there was nothing to be said about him. Job makes no reply because he is silenced by the force of what is presented; and Elihu was not one of the parties to the contest, in reference to whom a judgment was to be expressed. His decision is impliedly sanctioned by the Lord, and that is all that could be asked.

3. This speech is alleged to be inconsistent with the plan and purpose of the book, but upon grounds mutually repugnant, and which may very properly be allowed to neutralize each other. Some object that it anticipates the Lord's decision, and so renders it superfluous; others, that it contradicts his deci-

sion, and consequently cannot be admitted. Neither charge is true, as a correct exposition will show.

A good illustration of the facility with which some German critics can believe or disbelieve just what they please, is furnished by Delitzsch's assertion that this speech, which he thinks to be greatly in advance of the rest of the book in its teachings, and to have been added to it by way of correction, is an interpolation, but is nevertheless canonical.

Among those who admit the genuineness of this discourse, there is still a wide difference of opinion as to the function assigned to it in the plan of the writer. Some have thought him to be the representative of human reason, and his decision to be not true but false, the true decision being subsequently given by the Lord. The purpose of his introduction will then be to show that here is an enigma, which unaided reason cannot solve. This is not a recent opinion. Jerome found in Elihu the representative of philosophy as opposed to faith, which latter was taught in the discourse of the Lord. Gregory the Great regarded him as a boastful, conceited stripling, presumptuously undertaking to solve a question to which older and wiser men had shown themselves incompetent. These lights in the western Church had a great influence upon subsequent commentators, down to the time of the Reformers, with whom a different view prevailed. The majority of Rationalistic writers take a like depreciating view of the part of Elihu. Eichhorn says that Job does not reply, for the reason that a giant would not measure himself with a boy. Among those who regard Elihu as the exponent of human reason, there is quite a diversity of judgment as to the ability which marks his discourse; some regarding it as empty and shallow in the highest degree, others as clear and forcible, and representing the loftiest result of the unaided wisdom of man, which fails, it is true, to give a just solution, but only because the problem itself transcends man's capacity, and requires the intervention of God himself in order to explain it. The advocates of this view, however modified, generally assume that Elihu stands upon the same platform essentially with the three friends, that of the invariable connection of suffering with sin, and that his doctrine is tantamount to theirs, or so nearly so, as not to embrace the case

in hand; while the doctrine of the decision given by the Lord is on the other hand, that these providences are inscrutable by man, as God's other works are. Man must bow to the infinite greatness of God, and submit without murmuring to his sovereign though inexplicable pleasure.

This seems to be a defective view of the case. For, 1. It is antecedently very improbable that a character to whom so large a space and so much prominence are assigned in the book, should contribute nothing or next to nothing to its main design. If the speech of Elihu does little more than repeat what had been said by the friends, and especially if it is mere twaddle and empty declamation, it is unworthy of its place and of the writer.

2. The positions taken by Elihu are not identical with those of the friends, and ought not to be confounded with them. The writer evidently did not intend them to be identical, for he says expressly (xxxii. 3) that Elihu blamed the friends for not having found the proper answer to Job. His own must consequently stand upon different ground from theirs. All that is plausible in this view of the matter arises from the fact that Elihu in several cases repeats the language of the friends, or uses expressions similar to those which they had employed. But he does so discriminatingly. They had said much that was just and true, and was only vitiated by the wrong application made of it. Elihu sanctions what was right, condemns what was wrong, and puts the whole matter upon its proper basis. The intimate relationship between the discourse of Elihu and that of the Lord is also such as to lend a divine sanction to the former, and attest the truth of his claim to inspiration.

3. The solution of the sufferings of the righteous furnished in this book is something more than that they must be resigned to an arbitrary allotment, which admits of neither justification nor explanation. That would leave the problem entirely unsolved, and would not remove the difficulty at all. A man may be crushed under an infinite force, and have to submit to it. But such a view of the matter will not satisfy his higher nature, and it will be impossible, except upon stoical principles, to acquiesce unmurmuringly in such an allotment.

The relation of these two decisions, as we conceive it, may be

expressed by calling the first the theoretical, and the second the practical decision. As far as there was any need of argument to justify the ways of God, this task was committed to Elihu. He meets Job like an equal, takes up the various points involved in the controversy, and shows Job that he was wrong in his complaint, and that God was right. The way is thus prepared for the Lord to appear and bring the whole matter to a final issue, rendering a decision not by mere words, but by acts.

The position of Elihu is distinguished from that taken by the friends, mainly by two particulars. He, like them, maintains a constant connection between suffering and sin. That this is not inconsistent with what is said of this infliction in the historical preface, has already been seen. Unlike them, however, he regards suffering as disciplinary, whereas they considered it as exclusively penal, with the exception of v. 17, which solitary passage had no influence on the general tone of their discussion; and sin is understood by him, not of gross external crimes merely, but as including inward states of heart, such as pride, xxxiii. 17, xxxv. 12, xxxvi. 9. His speech consists of four divisions. In the first (chap. xxxiii.) he establishes that suffering is sent upon the same errand with God's revelations to reclaim from sin; and if, when God's messenger explains its design, it is submissively received, its end is answered, and it will be removed. In the second (chap. xxxiv.) he shows that God is righteous in all his dealings; in the third (chap. xxxv.) that man can have no such merit before God as to claim exemption from suffering as a right; in the fourth (chaps. xxxvi. xxxvii.) that grace is joined with power in God. Job's silence is an admission that these principles are conclusive, and that they have effectually put an end to his complaint.

The discourse of the Lord is, as was fitting, far the sublimest portion of the book. Though the former speeches abound in lofty and striking passages, where one would think that the writer was exhibiting his full power, it is plain, when we see the new grandeur and majesty which are here developed, that he has been consciously holding back his strength to the last, with the view of making a worthy contrast between the divine speaker and the men who had preceded.

The principles upon which the question between Job and his

friends should be settled, having been stated by Elihu, nothing remains but to give to this the seal of the divine attestation by the actual issue to which God shall conduct the whole matter. This is the aim of the personal intervention of the Lord himself, and of his practical decision. He enters into no explanation of the principles upon which he conducts his providence; he makes no statement even of what had been his design in this instance; he brings no argument to justify to men the course which he had taken, or which he might at any time please to take. As far as it had been thought necessary or proper to give explanations and arguments, this had been devolved upon Elihu, who as God's agent and ambassador might very properly reason with his fellow-man, and labour to correct his misapprehensions, and justify to him the ways of God. It would not have been compatible with the divine dignity, however, to suffer the impression to be made that God regarded himself as amenable to human opinion or to the tribunal of his creatures. He is not responsible to them; nor are they authorized judges of his acts. The event itself is the only explanation which he deigns to furnish. The wisdom and goodness which mark the issue, afford sufficient proof that, in spite of previous appearances, he has been wise and good throughout. The issue to which God brings the sufferings of Job, and by which consequently his decision of the case is practically rendered, consists of two parts. It is, 1. Internal and spiritual, xxxviii. 1—xlii. 6, concerning the feelings and heart of Job; 2. External, xlii. 7–17, concerning his outward circumstances.

The spiritual effect or issue produced upon the heart of Job is, that he is brought to penitence and humiliation, xlii. 6. He is brought to say, "I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." That which immediately produces this effect is his seeing God, ver. 5, "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee." These verses are the key to what precedes, and must guide us in its interpretation. The great thing done by the Lord in this first part of his decision is, that he manifests or reveals himself to Job in such a way as brings him to humble penitence. He so appears as to make upon Job a profound impression of his presence and glory. The discourse, which he utters, is subordinated wholly

to this design of deepening Job's sense of the present God, of bringing home to his soul the thought of how great and glorious that Being is, who has appeared and who speaks to him.

In unfolding his greatness and glory to Job, the Lord dwells chiefly and almost exclusively upon those displays of it which are found in creation and in the external world, which he has made and which he upholds. It is to misconceive the purport of the decision which the Lord here renders, to see in it only an appeal to his omnipotence; so that the lesson would simply be, it is man's wisdom to submit to a power which it is vain for him to think of resisting. This would reduce its teaching to the heathen idea of submission to inexorable fate. Besides, if this were the meaning of the Lord's discourse, it could never have produced the effect upon the heart of Job, which it did produce, and to which allusion has already been made. In fact it was his being tempted to take this very view of God, and of his providential dealings toward him, which had awakened the previous struggle in his mind and been the source of his bitterest complaints. The whole art of the tempter lay in representing the Most High as an almighty force, crushing him without right or reason to the earth. God is more than power; or the heart of the sufferer could never be so melted into acquiescence as Job's was.

Nor again is it the design of this discourse simply to present the evidences of God's infinite wisdom, observable everywhere in the works of his hands; as though the lesson to be inculcated were exclusively this, that his orderings are infinitely wise and lifted immensely above the comprehension of man. His duty, therefore, in relation to afflictive dispensations, is to bow implicitly before a mystery which he cannot comprehend, but which is not on that account less profoundly wise. The real lesson is much broader than this. More is done towards solving this mystery than thus to pronounce it insolvable. And more comfort is given to the sufferer in view of the divine dealings than would be afforded by saying simply that they are inscrutable.

These incorrect or rather partial views of the design of the Lord's discourse have arisen in the first place from the erroneous supposition that it is designed as the direct answer to Job's

difficulty; whereas it makes no immediate nor express allusion to the case in hand. It is not directed to the solution of the enigma, but is subsidiary to the fact that God now appears before Job. It is simply designed to make a vivid impression upon Job's mind and heart of his character and greatness. It is but, as it were, the speaker's announcement of himself, I am God. A second source of these partial views has been the dissevering of this discourse from that of Elihu, as though they were two independent things; whereas Elihu's was a preparation for this, and his statements and reasonings are here presupposed. Elihu had dwelt upon the grace and the holiness of God, and had shown that these attributes are not impaired by the afflictions which he sends. He is gracious and just even in these afflictions. He is just, because no man has any such merit or claims, that God deprives him of his rights by afflicting him. He is gracious, because these afflictions are sent with a merciful design. These reasonings and explanations of Elihu removed the stumbling-block out of Job's mind, reconciled to him what he had found it impossible to reconcile before, and took away that obstacle which had prevented him from seeing God in his true character. When God now appeared, he was prepared to discern in him the possession of all his glorious attributes. He carried with him into his view of the divine nature those lessons which Elihu had taught him. He now saw the justice and benevolence of God. So that as soon as God appeared to him, and a practical impression was made upon his heart of the majesty and glory of the Most High, these attributes which had been so long obscured, shone out brightly with the rest. The words uttered by the Lord are occupied, it is true, with appeals to his works in nature, which may be said to yield a direct proof, only or at least mainly of his power and wisdom. But it is because these works palpable to every eye, give the grandest impression of his exalted being. They carry with them the irresistible conviction that he is the all-perfect One; and if this is so, he must be perfect in every attribute. No such monstrous conception could be admitted, as a being perfect in power, and perfect in wisdom, but devoid of goodness and of holiness. And hence after the instruction given by Elihu, and the preparation which his discourse afforded, it was

only necessary for the Lord to bring vividly to view the sublime greatness of his nature in any one of its manifestations, in order to dispose Job to accept it in every other. Job had himself discoursed before at length of the wisdom and power of God. But he had contemplated these too much as isolated attributes; and this knowledge did not humble him. But now, when he not only hears of God, but sees him, and consequently views these in their indissoluble connection with the other divine perfections; when he views them as exalting the infinite nature of Him who is possessed of every lofty and glorious attribute, all disposition to murmur is hushed, and Job bows subdued in penitent submission.

The decisive reason, therefore, here given why he had no right to complain, is found in God's infinitely glorious nature; not in his power merely, nor in his wisdom abstracted from his other perfections, but in that exalted nature which embraces within itself the whole assemblage of divine perfections. The perfections of God present a ground for the most assured trust of his creatures; they can confide in him and ought to confide in him, under all circumstances. Such a being as he is, cannot do anything but what is wise and right and good. As soon as Job felt God's presence, he was instantly ashamed, and abhorred himself for what he had said. It was God who had done it, and that was enough. He could acquiesce without a word of complaint.

The second lesson brought to view by this issue of Job's affliction is, that the design of God in sending or permitting it, was to bring Job to this increased acquaintance with himself. Or, as the practical knowledge of God is identical with true piety, this is equivalent to saying that it was designed to lead him to a more elevated piety. The design of God in this matter is to be learned not from any verbal explanation which he makes, that would have comported less with the divine dignity—but from the event. That event is that Job is brought to a better and fuller acquaintance with God than he had before. The only solution of his enigma is found in God's infinitely perfect nature being brought practically home to his inmost feelings and convictions. He can find peace and satisfaction in no other. In that he finds instant repose. And as Job's case is

proposed as an example for the whole class of sufferers to which he belonged, the design of God here rendered apparent by the event may be safely taken as evidence of the design entertained by him in every like instance. Suffering and trial put a man in a position, in which an ordinary amount of faith in God will not answer; in which a faith that might maintain itself in times of prosperity will not hold out. It requires an increased persuasion of God's infinitely glorious attributes to give a man comfort and peace then; and this persuasion the severity of his affliction will lead him to struggle after, and by God's grace to attain. A condescending disclosure of himself made, if not like this to Job by an audible voice from the whirlwind, yet by the inward voice of his Spirit confirming and applying the word sent by his human messengers, such as Elihu, is the customary end of the afflictions of the pious.

The Lord's discourse is divided into two parts, at the close of each of which Job gives expression to the feelings of abasement, awakened by the view of God now vouchsafed to him. God first speaks of the displays of himself made in the inanimate and the animate creation, xxxviii. 1—xl. 2. Job can only reply that his unutterable sense of his own meanness in the contrast has silenced his complaint, xl. 3–5. God speaks again of the absurd presumption of his venturing a conflict with the Creator, who could not even contend with his creatures, xl. 6—xli. 34. Job replies more deeply humbled still. The inner workings of his thoughts are finely portrayed. We hear him repeating over to himself the words of God, which had so deeply penetrated his heart, and echoing their justice and their force. He first charges home upon his soul the opening words of God's first address, containing the theme to which it had been directed, (xxxviii. 2,) "Who is he that hideth counsel without knowledge?" Who is he that in his folly obscures or denies the wisdom of the divine proceedings? He admits the justice of the reproof, and owns that he has been talking of things above his capacity. He then repeats to himself the challenge with which God began his second address, (xl. 7,) rebuking his presumption for contending with him, and to which that branch of the Lord's discourse had been directed. But the new views now obtained of the glory of the divine nature,

made him loathe himself that he had been guilty of such arrogance.

The spiritual design of the affliction being thus accomplished, the Lord proceeds to the second or external part of his practical decision, by rectifying Job's standing in relation to his three friends, and then reversing his calamities and doubling his previous prosperity. The friends had been looking down upon him as justly condemned of heaven. The Lord, however, pronounces against them, and in his favour. He had, it is true, spoken some things rashly and presumptuously, but for these he had now expressed the deepest penitence. Meanwhile, in spite of the sorest temptation, he had held fast to his confidence in God, and even risen to a triumphant statement of it. They had not only cruelly assailed instead of succouring their distressed friend, but in their professed defence of divine providence, had really limited God more than Job had done. They had prescribed a scheme of providential retribution, as though that were the only one consistent with equity and righteousness, which yet was very different and palpably so from the one God actually pursues. It was tantamount, therefore, to an indirect charge of injustice, even more serious than that made by Job, and for which they had no similar extenuation, in that they were not exposed to a like temptation. Their pardon being suspended upon his intercession, the first step in his restoration is made to test the thoroughness of that humiliation which his affliction has wrought. Will he forgive his friends for the unkind speeches which had so provoked and embittered him against them? As Job sustains this test, the next and concluding step is taken in his restoration.

Seeking again the design of God in the event, we learn that it was his purpose, by means of this affliction, to enhance Job's happiness. As far as Satan was concerned, this affliction, sent at his instigation, was designed for his confusion by the exhibition of Job's constancy; and this end was answered, notwithstanding any weakness he may have betrayed in the hour of its greatest severity. But as far as Job himself was concerned, we are taught, by combining the leading points of the Lord's decision, that the grounds of acquiescence in afflicting dispensations are to be found, first, in God's glorious perfections, and,

secondly, in his gracious design thereby to advance the holiness and the highest welfare of the sufferer. And this is precisely the teaching of Elihu, though presented in a different form. What he says in words, the Lord confirms by deeds. The two decisions are in entire harmony, yet each is indispensable.

That the mystery of this perplexing subject is not so fully opened up in this book, belonging to the former dispensation, and perhaps to its earlier periods, as it is in the New Testament, is a matter of course. The Comforter was not yet given to the saints so largely as he is now. And we find holy men all through the Old Testament, and especially in this book and in the Psalms, uttering their complaints in their afflictions as though they were suffering beneath God's frowns. The full revelation of divine love had not then been made, nor the perfection of the triumph of divine grace over evil been exhibited. So that it might be thoroughly and practically felt how completely afflictions have changed their nature, and instead of being frowns and tokens of displeasure, though merited and temporary, they are become positive fruits and evidences of love, according to the munificence of that gospel grant, "All things are yours," "All things work together for good." The great Pattern of submissive suffering had not then appeared, nor could the argument so full of consolation be employed, "Seeing that Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves with the same mind." And as life and immortality were not then so fully brought to light, it could not be said with the joyful confidence of an apostle, "These light afflictions, which are for a moment, work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." And yet it will be perceived that the germs of the whole gospel doctrine are already here, only needing to be expanded to New Testament dimensions. There is not only the utmost harmony, but absolute identity; only one pursues the same course to a further point than the other. Perhaps it may not be improper to seek here the germs of future doctrine to even a greater extent than has now been intimated. It may be that the Messianic contents of this book, (for Christ cannot be absent from any leading portion of the Old Testament,) is to be sought less in detached passages than in its prominent figure, and in the idea presented

of the righteous sufferer. The struggle with Satan's malignity under the seeming hidings of God's face, conducted to Satan's overthrow; the being made perfect through sufferings, and the heightened blessedness consequent upon them, present a conception to the mind which was to be realized in its most perfect ideal. This thought we find freshly pursued under the guidance of the Spirit in those Psalms, in which the righteous sufferer is again depicted, with a basis, perhaps, in the actual experience of the writer, but with unmistakable reference to the future ideal. A line of typical or prophetic reference is thus drawn, culminating in Isaiah liii. in a clear statement of the doctrine of a suffering but sinless Messiah. The counterpart is written in the Gospels.

Every one who reads it, must be struck with the sublime power of this wonderful book. And certainly no one can study it without an ever heightening admiration. The marvellous fertility of its imagery, the grandeur of its descriptions, the masterly treatment of its high and solemn theme, the skill with which its various characters are managed, the vivid boldness with which the workings of a soul in the intensest inward struggles are depicted, and the delicate nicety displayed even in minute points of its structure and arrangement, place it among the loftiest productions of genius, even were it to be considered in no other light. That the author of such a book as this should have wholly dropped from sight, and have made no figure with his transcendent abilities in the history of Israel, seems scarcely supposable. It has often and justly been remarked, that the writer must have drunk deeply of the cup of affliction himself, have known in his own experience the inward conflict he portrays, and had brought home to his own heart the lessons that are here set before others. Can it be only another, in a series of fortuitous coincidences, that the reputed son of Pharaoh's daughter was driven forth an exiled fugitive for forty years for the crime of sympathizing with the Lord's people?—"choosing rather to *suffer affliction* with the people of God, than to enjoy the temporary pleasures of sin." Who can tell what it cost him to submit to this sudden reversal of fortune, and this apparently utter blasting of long cherished hopes, instilled even by a mother's faith into his infant mind? We see a momentary

trace of it dimming his joy at the birth of his first-born son, Ex. ii. 22. We read its permanent effects in the transformation of the impetuous youth into the man of self-distrust, and of meekness beyond that of any upon the face of the earth.

The volumes named at the head of this article are the best with which we are acquainted, that have appeared upon Job within the present decennium in Europe or America. That of Professor Conant is a translation with notes; each of the others is a commentary with a translation. The very cursory examination which we have been able to bestow upon the work of Professor Conant satisfies us of the scholarship and ability with which it has been executed; and we have no hesitation in commending it to students of this book as a valuable aid toward its interpretation. That we find ourselves to differ from him in some of his views, does not surprise us in a book which confessedly presents so many difficulties.

While such is our judgment, however, of this work as a private enterprise, we must not be understood for one moment to endorse the action of the Society, under whose auspices it is given to the public, nor to consent that this new translation should supersede in general and ecclesiastical use the common authorized version. It savours of no small presumption, in our judgment, for the fraction of a single denomination to arrogate to itself the work of altering that version, which is the common property of English-speaking Christendom. We do not claim perfection for the common version, but we do say that it is the best version in use in any language, ancient or modern. And the chances are ten thousand to one, that if the attempt was now made to prepare a substitute, it would be worse instead of better. And judging by representations made by those who ought to know, we should rate the chances in the attempt made by this Society at an immensely higher figure than that. The evils of making any change will be so serious, that nothing but the certainty of a great and positive good can justify the experiment. The common agreement of all Christian bodies upon the existing version, the familiarity of the people with it, the reverence with which it is regarded, the extent of its introduction into our religious literature, are advantages which will all be thrown away, the moment it begins to be tinkered

with. And what, even upon the most favourable assumption, is to be gained by the change? In the great body of the Bible the common version is the very best for the popular reader that could be made even at this day. The parts, where improvement is possible, form not the rule, but the exception, and a very limited exception too. It is almost exclusively in the most difficult passages of such books as Job, or the obscurer prophets, that corrections could be made. In none of these is any important point of doctrine or duty involved; in most, the essential meaning of the passage as a whole would be little if at all affected by the changes to be introduced; while in many, the best scholars are still far from being agreed as to the precise rendering to be preferred. To give a single instance of this diversity, Professor Conant translates Job xxx. 24, "Yea, there is no prayer, when he stretches out the hand; nor when he destroys, can they cry for help." Hahn, "May not a man in falling even raise his hand, nor in his destruction cry thereat?" Schlottmann, "Only let no one lay hands upon ruins; or is his fall another's weal?" Besides it is not impossible that there may be a reaction in Hebrew philology, and at least a partial return to old traditional interpretations from which it has departed. Of whatever service, therefore, such a translation as that of which we are speaking may be in the study of the Bible, and however it may serve as one of the preparatory steps toward an improvement of the existing version at some future time, we are more than ever convinced that the proper time for making any changes in the authorized version has not yet come. And if ever a time should come, when such a thing shall be feasible or expedient, let it be not a sectarian but a Christian enterprise, undertaken by the entire Church using the English language.

# SHORT NOTICES.

*The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, its Nature and Proof.* Eight Discourses preached before the University of Dublin. By William Lee, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1857. 8vo. pp. 478.

WE are glad to see this important work placed, by its republication in this country, within the reach of our ministers and students. The doctrine of Inspiration lies at the foundation of our Christian faith; it is a difficult doctrine, and has of late years been assailed from within and from without the Church. Any elaborate discussion of the subject is therefore a matter of general interest. The work before us has much to recommend it. It teaches the truth. It is devoted to uphold the authority of the whole Bible. This is a characteristic of the book, of which the reader is not immediately aware. He is at first a little startled by hearing the author stigmatize the old doctrine of plenary inspiration, which the Church has held from the beginning, as the "mechanical" theory, which he tells us has been tacitly abandoned, "by all who are capable of appreciating the results of criticism." The author's own theory, however, is precisely that of the old writers. It is a mere change of phraseology. There is no difference either as to the nature of the influence of which the sacred writers were the subjects, or as to the resulting authority of what they wrote. We do not mean to say that there are not many exaggerated and infelicitous forms of expression on this subject in the old writers; much which would seem to imply that the intelligent consciousness of the sacred penmen was in abeyance, so that they were the passive instruments of the Spirit in the composition of the Bible. But such expressions are so explained as to make it evident that they recognized the intellectual activity of the sacred writers. They say as Gaussen, by whom the old doctrine was reproduced in all its strictness, that the "Scriptures are entirely the word of man, and entirely the word of God;" that, "in passing from one book in the Bible to another, we recognize a new author" as readily as though they were mere human compositions. All that the old writers intended to teach was, that the Scripture, both in substance and form, both as to the thoughts and as to the words, is from beginning to end the infallible word of God. And this is Mr. Lee's doctrine. He rejects the idea, that one

part of the Bible is more inspired than another. On the contrary, he says that inspiration "extends to every part of every book," and stamps the whole as the word of God, p. 43. He also denies that inspiration is confined to the thoughts, in distinction from the words, which he calls "a fantastic notion." He asserts that "the language" of the sacred writers "is the word of God," p. 45. This is the old orthodox doctrine of plenary inspiration. This is what the German writers and their followers in England and America stigmatize as "the mechanical theory." This is the doctrine which Coleridge ridicules, and which Morell endeavours to refute. This is the doctrine which the whole school of Schleiermacher, in both its great divisions, the religious and the sceptical, represent as unphilosophical and untenable. We admit that the more guarded statement of the subject which Mr. Lee has adopted is preferable to the looser expressions of the older writers. Our object is not to find fault with him, but simply to vindicate our fathers. This work is not only correct in doctrine, it is also replete with learning. The author appears familiar with all the literature of the subject, ancient and modern. He furnishes his readers with elaborate discussions on collateral points of interest, and everywhere writes in a courteous and Christian spirit. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the work is very diffuse. The whole matter might be compressed into one-half the space. The notes, which make up a large part of the book, are inordinate, both in number and extent, and in many cases have very little connection with the text. There is also a deficiency in logical arrangement. The same topic comes up in different places, a little here and a little there. The opposing theories, especially those of modern origin, although stated and condemned, are nowhere fully unfolded or philosophically examined. We therefore fear that Mr. Lee's book, with all its excellencies, will fail to meet the doubts which modern scepticism has produced. We can however heartily recommend the book as one of great value. We hope to be able in our next number to resume the consideration of this important subject.

*Life in its Lower, Intermediate, and Higher Forms;* or, Manifestations of the Divine Wisdom in the Natural History of Animals. By Philip Henry Gosse, F. R. S. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1857. Pp. 363.

The wonders of nature are so numerous and so profound that it requires a firm faith in the uninitiated to credit the revelations made by men of science. That a thousand millions of living forms are contained at times in a drop of water; that eight hundred thousand millions of such minute organisms could

be contained in a cubic inch, not only confounds the intellect, but startles the imagination. It is commonly supposed that the telescope, in penetrating the unmeasured depths of space, and bringing into view systems of worlds, in which our sun with its planets is lost as a mere speck, gives us the most overwhelming conception of the grandeur of the universe, and of the infinite power and wisdom of God. But it may well be doubted whether the revelations of the microscope are not still more wonderful. The world beneath us is as great as the world above us. It is estimated that the common house fly occupies the central point in the scale of animated nature so far as our earth is concerned. Such works as this of Mr. Gosse, written in a devout spirit, and with the design of illustrating the wisdom of God, are deserving of the special attention of all intelligent readers.

*Travels and Researches in Chaldea and Susiana;* with an account of excavations at Warka, the "Erech" of Nimrod, and Shush, "Shushan the Palace" of Esther in 1849–52, under the orders of Major General Sir W. F. Williams of Kars, Bart. K. C. B. M. P., and also of the Assyrian Excavation Fund in 1853, 4. By William Kennet Loftus, F. G. S. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 8vo. pp. 436.

This extended title gives the reader full information both as to the design of the work, and the position and opportunities of the author. We judge from the inspection we have been able to give it, that it will not disappoint the expectations of those who resort to its pages for information concerning the buried cities of the East. The revelations which the enterprise and learning of recent explorers have already made, are of the highest value in illustrating and confirming the history of the Bible.

*The Desert of Sinai.* Notes of a Spring Journey from Cairo to Beersheba. By Horatius Bonar, D. D., Kelso. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1857. pp. 408.

This journey was not undertaken for learned research. The reverend author notes from day to day the incidents of travel, and strives on every occasion to gather information illustrative of scripture. In an Appendix he gives a list of passages of the Bible which his journey enabled him to illustrate.

*The Suffering Saviour;* or Meditations on the Last Day of Christ upon Earth. By Rev. Frederick W. Krummacher, D. D., Chaplain to his Majesty the King of Prussia.. Translated under the express sanction of the author. By Samuel Jackson. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Philadelphia: Smith & English. 1856. pp. 481.

This work has all the characteristics of its author with whom the religious public in America are already familiar. Few

writers of the present day have enjoyed a more extensive or lasting popularity. Many of his works have been translated into most European languages, and his Elijah the Tishbite, has even been printed in Chinese.

*Village Sermons;* or Fifty-two plain and short Discourses on the principal Doctrines of the Gospel: intended for the use of Families, Sunday-schools, or companies assembled for religious instruction in country villages. By Rev. George Burder. Revised. American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau Street. Pp. 561.

These excellent sermons are familiar to the great body of our readers. There are few volumes of the kind better adapted to answer the purpose for which it was written. This new reprint is in an attractive form and style.

*The Family Bible;* containing the Old and New Testaments, with brief Notes and Instructions, including the References and Marginal Readings of the Polyglot Bible. Vol. II. Psalms to Malachi. American Tract Society, 15 Nassau Street, New York.

This is part of an important and responsible work in the course of publication. It appears to be executed judiciously, though the brevity of the Notes of necessity gives it a rather unsatisfying character.

*The Russell Family.* By Anna Hastings. New York: M. W. Dodd, 59 Chambers Street. 1857. pp. 201.

The Preface to this work is dated "Fairfield, Iowa." It purports to be a narrative founded on fact, and is designed "to encourage the heart and strengthen the hands of praying Christian mothers."

*The Presbyterian Juvenile Psalmodist.* By Thomas Hastings. Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. Pp. 257.

The author states that in the selection of poetic pieces he confined himself, as requested, chiefly to the "New Hymns for Youth." In setting these to music he has endeavoured to supply simple, striking melodies, adapted to the tastes of the young, yet as free as possible from all profane and secular associations."

*A Spiritual Treasury for the Children of God.* Consisting of a meditation for the Morning of each day in the Year, upon Select Texts of Scripture. By William Mason. Presbyterian Board, 821 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. Pp. 506.

A well-known work, of which the celebrated Mr. Romaine says, in his address to the reader, "I have found a sweet savour of Jesus's precious name, free grace, and perfect salvation in these meditations; and therefore, I am persuaded it will be doing thee great service to recommend them to thy perusal."

*Gems of the Coral Islands;* or Incidents of Contrast between Savage and Christian Life of the South Sea Islanders. By the Rev. William Gill, Rarotonga, Eastern Polynesia: comprising the Rarotonga Group, Penrhyn Islands, and Savage Island. Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. Pp. 285.

This volume is an illustration of the attractive style in which our Board issues its publications. It is of interest to the naturalist, the philanthropist and the Christian. It treats of some of the most wonderful of the products of nature in the formation of those coral islands which seem to be the beginnings of a new continent; of man in his most degrading forms of existence; and of the transforming and elevating power of the gospel, as well as of the devoted fidelity and self-denial of the missionaries of the cross.

*Memories of Bethany.* By the author of "Morning and Night Watches," "Words of Jesus," &c., &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1857. pp. 268.

A work addressed to mourners, and consisting in reflections and meditations on incidents of Scripture history connected with the village of Bethany.

*Christian Associations.* The Nature and Claims of Young Men's Christian Associations. By Rev. Thomas Smyth, D. D., Charleston, S. C. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1857. pp. 123.

*By Whom is the World to be Converted?* or Christians Christ's Representatives and Agents for the Conversion of the World. By Thomas Smyth, D. D. Published by Request of the Synod of South Carolina. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 108.

*Calvin and his Enemies; a Memoir of the Life, Character and Principles of Calvin.* By Rev. Thomas Smyth, D.D. New edition, revised and enlarged. Presbyterian Board, 821 Chestnut Street. Pp. 180.

These works, from the indefatigable pen of Dr. Smyth, are useful and lively publications. The vindication of Calvin is indeed, in one view, a hopeless task. Most men believe what they like. If they hate Calvinism, they will believe evil of Calvin. We might as well attempt to make Romanists regard Luther as a good man, as to induce the mass of men to look with approbation on the character of the Geneva Reformer. The usefulness of such vindications as that produced by Dr. Smyth we think consists principally in satisfying the minds of those who are disposed to look upon him with reverence; and therefore the less of a controversial form they assume the more effective will they be.

*Practical Truths.* By the Rev. Archibald Alexander, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. Pp. 396.

"This volume comprises about forty articles written by Dr. Alexander, in the latter years of his life, for the American

Messenger; seven standard Tracts on high evangelical themes, for the Tract Society's General Series; six small books written in simple style, and issued in large type to gain the attention of common readers; selections from his cheering correspondence with the Society, and brief sketches of his life and character."

*The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopædia:* being a condensed translation of Hertzog's Real Encyclopædia, with additions from other sources. By Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., assisted by distinguished theologians of various denominations. Part. III. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blackiston. 1856.

We have already expressed a favourable opinion of this valuable work. The present number goes as far as the letters *Bes.* It is published in parts, at 50 cents each.

*Central Africa.* Adventures and Missionary Labours in several Countries in the Interior of Africa, from 1849 to 1856. By J. T. Bowen. Charleston: Southern Baptist Publication Society, No. 229 King Street. 1857. Pp. 359.

Africa is fast becoming the most inviting and promising of all fields of missionary labour. Humanly speaking it is easier to lead a new people which has never experienced a civilization, and which has no rooted system of false religion, to the knowledge of the truth, than it is to bring a dead nation to life. It seems to be part of the plan of God that one division of the human race after another should become the subjects of his grace, his representatives and agents in the conversion of the world. Africa's turn is likely to come next. She is probably destined to exhibit Christianity and human society under a new phase, just as western Christianity and society differ circumstantially from the Christianity and society of the East. It will be to angels and men a glad sight to see Africa among the leading nations of the Christian world, as it will exhibit in a new light the power and the grace of God. The recent explorations of that great continent, bringing new tribes and new regions to the knowledge of the Christian public, opening the way for commerce, civilization and the gospel; the earnest desire of the people for religious instruction, and the steady progress of the colonies and missions, are the grounds of the hope just expressed. Mr. Bowen's explorations and labours seem to have been confined principally to the regions north of the Bight of Benin, while those of Dr. Livingstone were directed to the region about the same distance south of the Equator. Thus from the north-western coast, from the western coast in the region of the Equator, from the southern extremity of the continent, and from its eastern side, the light of Christianity is beginning to penetrate the land, and before long, we, or those

who come after us, may see these converging rays unite, and the glory of the Lord cover that long benighted region, as it is ultimately to cover the whole earth. We rejoice in the publication of such works as that of Mr. Bowen, as they serve not only to increase the knowledge, but to excite the zeal of the Christian public.

*Commentary on the Book of Joshua.* By Karl Friederich Keil, D. D., PH. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology and the Oriental Languages in the University of Dorpat. Translated by James Martin, B. A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George St. 1857. Pp. 501.

This is the fourteenth volume of the New Series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, in which so many of the more important orthodox productions of German scholars have already been published. The work of Keil is designed to vindicate the historical verity of the Old Testament records as well as to illustrate and explain them. It is every way worthy of the high reputation which it enjoys.

*Assurance of Faith and Possession of Salvation.* A Scottish anecdote. By Cæsar Malan, D. D. Second American, from the Sixth French Edition. Board of Publication of the Dutch Reformed Church.

The venerable Dr. Malan is a highly gifted man; a poet, musician and painter, as well as earnest preacher and copious writer. He has faithfully employed his various talents in the defence and propagation of the gospel. His little work entitled, "Témoinage de Dieu," is a concise exposition of the doctrines of the Reformed Churches, as those doctrines were unfolded by Calvin and Beza. It has been generally understood that Dr. Malan held some peculiar views on the subject of Assurance; and we doubt not, that at one time at least, he did incline to the doctrine that assurance is essential to faith. This, however, is not the doctrine of this little tract. It is designed to controvert the idea that our warrant to appropriate the promises of the gospel is to be found in our own holiness, that we must first be satisfied of our regeneration before we are authorized to lay hold of the righteousness of Christ, and hope for acceptance with God. This is so entirely opposed to the whole Protestant system, that we are surprised to find a Scottish Christian such as the tract describes, labouring under the delusion that "salvation was a privilege procured by the Saviour for men, of which a man must make himself worthy by his good conduct," p. 16, or, as she is made to express it, "It seemed to me that I could not appropriate to myself the gift of salvation which is in Christ, until I had more self-renunciation, humility, and holiness, more consecration to God." That is, that she could not accept salvation from Christ until she had first saved herself.

So long as the soul believes that it must seek its warrant to receive Christ in its own experience, it will be in a state of painful doubt whether it has a right to believe or not.

The different views on this subject arise from diversity of opinion either as to the nature or object of faith. Some regard faith as mere speculative assent, and take a very short and easy method of determining the question. The Scripture says, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." "I believe that Jesus is the Christ, therefore I am born of God." Those who reason thus, forget that the word faith stands for very different states of mind; that, in one sense, the devils believe that Jesus is the Christ. Mere assent to that proposition therefore is no evidence of regeneration. Others, who have a higher view of the nature of faith, make its special object the promise that God will save all who come to him through Christ. This many firmly believe, but they doubt whether they really come to God in the sense intended in the promise, and therefore they doubt of their acceptance. The only way in which they can solve their doubts, as they suppose, is to examine their hearts for the evidences of regeneration. Their hopes, therefore, rise and fall just as their regeneration is more or less proved to their satisfaction. This is the foundation of the distinction so often made between the assurance of faith and the assurance of hope. A man may have a very firm faith in the truths of the gospel, and very little hope of his personal interest in them. There is no doubt a form of truth in all this, but it is not the way in which evangelical believers have commonly regarded the subject. Others say that the precise thing we are required to believe is, that God for Christ's sake is propitious, or that he is reconciled to us. This is the view taken by all the Reformers. Saving faith, therefore, is not believing merely that God can consistently save sinners, or that he actually saves others, but that he is willing to save us. It is an actual receiving and resting on Christ alone for our own salvation. It involves therefore in its very nature a belief in our acceptance with God. There may be all degrees of strength in this faith, from the faintest hope up to the strongest assurance; but the thing believed is, in all cases, the same, and that is, that God in Christ is our reconciled Father. This is the faith which works by love and purifies the heart. This is the view given by the apostle when he said, "I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." What Paul believed was, that Jesus is the Son of God, that he loved him, and that he gave himself for him. And he elsewhere teaches that until a man believes

that God is his friend, he is under the law, and brings forth fruit unto death. His whole doctrine of salvation is founded on the assumption that justification precedes sanctification, not in the order of time, but in the order of nature. The idea that we cannot rightfully hope in God's favour until we are holy, is the radical principle of justification by works.

*The American Sunday-School and its Adjuncts.* By James W. Alexander, D. D. American Sunday School Union, 316 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. Pp. 342.

The necessity of religious education; the important place belonging to the Sunday-school in the agencies designed to accomplish that end; the best means for rendering these schools efficient; the value of books; the mode of using them, are among the topics discussed in this volume. The felicity of style, the savour of devotion, the fertility of thought, the practical wisdom, characteristic of all Dr. Alexander's writings, are found in rich abundance in this new production of his prolific pen. It will no doubt take its place among the standard works of our religious literature.

*The Young Lady's Guide to the Harmonious Development of Character, on Christian Principles.* By Harvey Newcomb. With an Appendix containing Thoughts on the Education of Women. Revised Edition. New York: M. W. Dodd, 36 Chambers Street. 1857. pp. 330.

This is really a treatise on experimental and practical religion; as it treats of the nature of true religion, temptation, prayer, study of the Bible, meditation, self-examination, as well as of mental cultivation and social virtues. Its having reached a new edition is a proof that it has met with a favourable reception from the Christian public.

*Internal History of German Protestantism since the middle of the last Century.* By Ch. Fred. Augustus Kahnis, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Leipzig. Translated from the German, by Rev. Theodore Mayer, Hebrew Tutor in the New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 58 George Street. 1856. pp. 328.

*Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie.* Von Karl Schwarz, ausserordentlichen Professor zu Halle. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1856. pp. 437.

These are two exceedingly interesting and instructive works. They cover the same ground, but are written by men standing at opposite poles. The former is the work of an ultra Lutheran; the other of an independent disciple of the speculative school. They throw great light on the extraordinary state of the theological and philosophical public in Germany. The lesson which they both teach, though not designed by either, is that the

human mind, without implicit submission to the teachings of the Scripture, can, in the department of theology and philosophy, produce nothing more than a perfect chaos of inconsistent and unsatisfying speculations.

*Macaulay on Scotland, a Critique.* By Hugh Miller. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. 1857. Pp. 64.

A melancholy interest now attaches to everything bearing the name of Hugh Miller. Scotland, fruitful as she has ever been in great men, has few names for which she has more reason to be grateful, on the long list of her distinguished sons. It is principally as a writer on Geology that Hugh Miller is known in this country. But the readers of the *Witness*, of which he was the editor, know that he was scarcely less eminent in the departments of theology, literature, finance, history, the fine arts, politics, and political economy. Indeed there was no subject which came up in a paper devoted to religion and general intelligence, on which he did not write with the hand of a master. Mr. Macaulay with all his brilliant talents and varied attainments is a small man in the hands of Hugh Miller. The moral elevation due to the religious convictions of the latter, give him a strength for which the brilliancy of the former is no match whatever. Of this the readers of this Critique we think will be fully convinced.

*A Discourse, Reviewing a Ministry of Fifty Years.* By the Rev. William Neill, D. D. With an Appendix of Anecdotes and Reminiscences. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson. 1857. Pp. 63.

The venerable author of this discourse entered the College of New Jersey in the year 1800. After graduating in 1803, he accepted the office of Tutor in the College, and commenced the study of theology. In 1805 he was licensed to preach the gospel, and received a call to Whitesboro', N. Y., which he accepted, and remained the pastor of the church in that place until 1809, when he was called to the First Church in Albany. From this post he was called, in 1816, to become the pastor of the Sixth Church in Philadelphia. After a pastoral service of eight years, he accepted the Presidency of Dickenson College, Carlisle, Penn., in which position he remained until 1829. He then accepted the post of Secretary and General Agent of the Board of Education; but finding the duties too arduous for his strength, he resigned in 1831, and took charge of the church in Germantown, Penn., where he laboured for eleven years. Since 1842, Dr. Neill has resided in Philadelphia, frequently preaching the gospel as occasion offers, and assisting, by his wisdom and experience, the various Boards and Institutions of our

Church. Few men are permitted to look back over so long and honoured a course of public usefulness.

*Yahveh Christ;* or, The Memorial Name. By Alexander MacWhorter. 12mo. pp. 179.

This is a book of uncommon pretension. Its author fancies himself to have made a discovery which sheds immense light upon the Scriptures, and makes a reconstruction of the prevalent Christology both possible and necessary. This discovery is that Jehovah should be written "Yahveh;' and that it means "he, who is to come" "the promised Redeemer." We may be prepared to admit the former, when it shall be thought necessary to write Yitzhak for Isaac, Yehizkiyyahu for Hezekiah, and Koresh for Cyrus. And as to the latter, it has been the common doctrine of the church from the earliest periods that the Jehovah manifested under the Old Testament, was the second person of the Trinity. The presentation of this well-known and easily established truth is unfortunately encumbered with an amount of theorizing, and, to say the least, of dubious speculation on both this and other matters, which robs the book of whatever value it might otherwise possess. That Jehovah, equivalent to "he, who will be" (or exist) can mean "he, who is to come," then "a deliverer," and then "the author of a past deliverance," p. 74, is a specimen of the philosophical acumen here displayed.

*Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared in their essential Nature, theoretic Grounds and practical Influence.* By James Buchanan, D.D., LL.D. Divinity Professor in the New College, Edinburgh. Two volumes. Edinburgh: James Buchanan, Jr. 1855.

These volumes have been long lying on our table, waiting an opportunity, which we have not yet found, to give an extended review of them. They have recently been republished in this country by a Boston house. They embody the substance of the author's lectures on Apologetics, before assuming the chair of Systematic Theology. They treat the various forms of Atheism, vulgar and learned, pantheistic and materialistic, with that clearness and force which are characteristic of the author, and which fit them for extensive usefulness.

*The Classmates; or, the College Revival.* By a Presbyterian Minister. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

We take the greater interest in this work, from our personal knowledge of the author, and of some of the scenes and persons he depicts. He describes with a graphic pen, and, in the form of narrative dialogue, disposes of the common arguments for unbelief, as they arise in the minds of educated youth, in a con-

vincing and attractive way. The book will do good in colleges, and among intelligent young men.

*The Child of the Covenant;* or, How Christian Parents should train up their Households. By J. B. Waterbury, D. D. Boston: S. R. Marvin. New York: M. W. Dodd.

*The Church and her Children.* A Sermon delivered at the opening of the Synod of New York and New Jersey, in the First Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., October 21, 1856, by the Rev. James P. Wilson, D. D., Pastor of the South Park Presbyterian Church, Newark, N. J. Published by direction of the Synod. New York: John A. Gray.

These two works are indications of the fact, that the mind of the Church, in its several communions, is beginning to be exercised on this important subject. Dr. Waterbury's excellent volume abounds in wise suggestions and discreet counsels, with regard to the church-state and Christian nurture of baptized children. We do not accept every opinion which he advocates. He justly complains of the tendency in some churches, which recognize the Abrahamic covenant, "to think lightly of its privileges; to neglect them; to leave the young heritage of God among the aliens," (p. 119;) "as if her duty consisted only in marking them with the sign of the covenant, and then sending them into the wilderness to be lost, to be devoured by wild beasts," (p. 153;) and asks, (p. 171,) "if it would be inconsistent for me, a professor of religion, to be seen at such places, (theatres, &c.,) why is it not equally inconsistent for me to allow my children, who are also in a sense professors of religion by their baptism, to resort to them?" We have no doubt, the longer such views are pondered by Christian people, the more thoroughly they will command their assent.

Dr. Wilson's discourse acquires importance, not merely from its intrinsic qualities, but from the position of the author, and the circumstances of its delivery and publication. We do not think it perfectly satisfactory in all its views and reasonings. He, however, reaches the common ground of the Reformed symbols and theology in regard to infant baptism and church-membership. His language is: "We believe as a Church, that infants are *capable* of all the necessary scriptural qualifications for baptism. The ordinance exhibits regeneration, sanctification, the mystical union, and salvation, which are the essence of Christianity. Faith and repentance are not characteristic of a Christian as such, but of an adult Christian; and if an infant is capable of a duly constituted union with the glorious Redeemer, and with the Holy Spirit's influence, no less than an adult, then why should the symbol of this be withheld? We believe it is the will of Christ that our children should be baptized; and with these views, we should make the ordinance *mean something*,

and thus redeem our principles from reproach, and remove the inconsistency charged so justly upon us by those who reject this most important privilege. We strengthen and deepen prejudice against the truth, by our criminal neglect."

In regard to their recognition and treatment as presumptively young disciples, he says: "Let all the baptized children of the Church, in short, from the hour of their receiving the seal of the covenant, be *recorded*, and recognized, and treated, as infant disciples. Let them be followed with Christian instruction, with ever wakeful and affectionate interest and prayer, from their mother's lap to maturity. Let them be often assembled by the pastor, and faithfully instructed and encouraged, and led along the shining way. Let them be frequently told of their interesting relation to Christ's holy family, and of their high and peculiar privileges. Let them be reminded constantly of Him who for their sake shrank not from the crown of thorns, the cross, the tomb—and let the just claims of the Redeemer of men to their affections and service, be often brought up, with distinctness and solemnity and affection. Let them be thus followed up, even out into the world, as they enter into its conflicts, and prepare to encounter its perils. And such fidelity shall not miss its reward! God will not fail in his promises, and will save their souls."

Of course, no one would infer from this, what is abundantly contradicted in other parts of the discourse, that he holds that all the children of the pious are, or ever will be, truly regenerate children of God. As Witsius, Vitringa, and other Reformed divines say, we may entertain such a presumption, (*presumimus,*) (*quandiu nobis non liquet contrarium*) till the contrary appears. Witsius's words to the same effect are, (*donec contrariis se indiciis prodant.*) All these separate, independent movements of evangelical mind, seem to be in one direction, however variously developed. The nature of the covenant, of Calvinism, of logic, all constrain to it.

It is an obvious, and not very creditable fact, that truths, once familiar as household words, are allowed in a measure to die out of the consciousness of the Church. Thus the doctrine which underlies the whole system of Protestantism, and which furnishes the only justification of the renunciation of Popery, that the Church, considered as the body of Christ, to which the attributes of holiness, unity, perpetuity, apostolicity, and catholicity belong, and to which the promise of the Spirit and his indwelling and guidance are given, consists of true believers, when recently presented, was received as some new German speculation; although there is not a Lutheran or Reformed

Confession of Faith of the time of the Reformation, in which that doctrine is not distinctly asserted. Thus, too, the doctrine that the children of believers are the proper subjects of baptism, because they are to be regarded and treated as included in the covenant of grace, it seems, falls on some ears with a startling sound. Yet the principle involved in that doctrine underlies the whole system of revealed religion. That principle is, that children are considered as in their parents, who represent and act for them. It was so in the case of Adam, in the case of Abraham, in the covenant of which Moses was the mediator, and, blessed be God, it is so now. Why were children circumcised under the old dispensation, unless it was that their parents accepted of the covenant, of which circumcision was the seal, in their name, and therefore the children were presumed to have accepted it, until the contrary was manifested? Was it not presumed that the children of Jews would be Jews? If not, why where they circumcised? And what was a Jew? A professor of the true religion: one who professed to embrace the covenant formed with Abraham. And was not that the covenant of grace? Will it be denied that circumcision was the seal of the righteousness of faith? Does not the Christian parent in like manner represent his child, and in its name accept the covenant of grace? And is it not on the presumption that the child will ratify the parent's act that the seal of the covenant is applied to it? And is it not therefore to be regarded and treated as being included within that covenant, or, in other words, is it not to be presumed to belong to the number of God's true people, until the contrary appears? If this be new doctrine, then the Bible is a new book.

We have received the following minor publications of the Presbyterian Board of Publication:

*Gleanings from Real Life.* By S. S. Egliseau, author of Lizzie Ferguson, Written for the Board of Publication. Pp. 180.

*Children of Abraham;* or, Sketches of Jewish Converts, being in part a sequel to Leila Ada. Pp. 119.

*Backbiting Reproved.* The Visit, and other Sketches. By Charlotte Elizabeth. Pp. 144.

*Lessons for the Little Ones.* By a Teacher of Infants. Pp. 130.

*The Bishop and the Monk;* or, Sketches of the Lives of Pierpaolo Vergerio and John Craig, converts from Popery. Pp. 166.

*Method for Prayer;* with Scripture expressions proper to be used under each head. By the Rev. Matthew Henry, author of the Commentary on the Bible. Pp. 173.

*Ella Clinton;* or, By their Fruits ye shall know them. By Cousin Martha. Pp. 206.

*The Christian in the Church.* By John M. Lowrie, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Pp. 47.

# LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

## ENGLAND.

A. B. Evans, Lectures on the Book of Job. 8vo. pp. 250.

B. Weiss, New Translation and Exposition of Ecclesiastes. 12mo. pp. 330.

F. D. Maurice, The Gospel of St. John: a Series of Discourses. 8vo. pp. 510.

H. Bagge, Epistle to the Galatians. 8vo. pp. 260.

H. Howard, Exodus and Leviticus translated into English from the version of the Seventy. 8vo. pp. 418.

W. Wright, Jonah in four Semitic versions, Chaldee, Syriac, Ethiopic and Arabic, with Glossaries. 8vo.

Tenth edition of Horne's Introduction, in four vols. Vol. I. The Genuineness and Inspiration of the Scriptures, and Vol. III. Biblical Geography and Antiquities, by Rev. T. H. Horne. Vol. II. Criticism and Interpretation of the Old Testament, by S. Davidson. Vol. IV. do. of the New Testament, by S. P. Tregelles. The dissatisfaction at the manner in which Dr. Davidson has executed his part of the work is so great, that the second volume will probably be rewritten.

Goode's Nature of Christ's Presence in the Eucharist. 2 vols. 8vo.

Beard's Letters on the Grounds and Objects of Religious Knowledge. 2 vols. 8vo.

F. D. Maurice, Mediæval Philosophy. 8vo. pp. 250.

H. Bonar, The Desert of Sinai, Notes of a Journey. 8vo. pp. 410.

P. Lorimer, Precursors of Knox. Part 1. Memoirs of Patrick Hamilton, the first Preacher and Martyr of the Scottish Reformation. 8vo. pp. 272.

W. K. Loftus, Travels and Researches in Chaldea and Susiana. 8vo. pp. 450.

H. G. Liddell, History of Rome to the Establishment of the Empire. 12mo. pp. 790.

J. S. Northcote, The Roman Catacombs. 12mo. pp. 150.

A Treatise on the Antiquities of Kertch and the Cimmerian Bosphorus is promised by Duncan Macpherson.

## FRANCE.

P. Doumergue, Authenticity of 1 Timothy. 8vo. pp. 40.

E. Maurial, Scepticism combatted in its Principles. 8vo. pp. 340.

A. Lièvre, History of the Protestants of the Reformed Churches of Poitou. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 320. To be completed in four volumes.

J. Denis, History of Moral Theories and Ideas in Antiquity. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 892.

Seven volumes of the new edition of H. Stephani Thesaurus Græcæ Linguæ have been issued, and five numbers of volume eighth, reaching to the letter X.

Bartholemy St. Hilaire, Letters on Egypt. 18mo. pp. 440.

Voyage to the Eastern Coast of Africa in 1846, 1847 and 1848, published by order of the Government. 3 vols. 8vo.

Univers Pittoresque, History and Description of All Nations, in 65 vols. 8vo. 37 are devoted to Europe, 7 to Africa, and 11 to Asia.

Jerusalem, Photographic Reproduction of the Monuments of the Holy City, by A. Salzmann; 175 Photographs, 24 centimetres by 34, and a volume of text, small folio, illustrated with wood engravings. Also a smaller edition of 40 photographs selected from the former, and reduced to one-half the size.

The Orient, by Eugène Flandin, 3 vols. folio, 150 lithograph plates.

Le Caucase Pittoresque, by G. Gagarine, folio, 400 lithograph plates.

The public libraries of Paris contain 2,974,000 printed, and 104,000 manuscript volumes; of these 1,700,000 books and 80,000 manuscripts belong to the Imperial Library.

## ITALY.

S. D. Luzzatto, The Prophet Isaiah.

Lelio della Torre, The Written Word. An inaugural oration.

C. Passaglià, Five Books on the Church of Christ, (in Latin.) Vols. I. & II. contain the first three books. 8vo. pp. 998.

## GERMANY.

The third volume of Drechsler's Commentary on Isaiah, completed since his death by Hahn and Delitzsch. 8vo. pp. 416.

H. Ewald, The Epistles of Paul, Translated and Explained. 8vo. pp. 496.

C. Dalmer, Exposition of Colossians i. 23. 4to. pp. 20.

O. Zöckler, On the Force and Meaning of *Ἐλπίς* in the New Testament. 8vo. pp. 92.

C. Zezschwitz, Christ's descent into hell, 1 Peter iii. 19. 8vo. pp. 68.

A. Oettingen, The Sin against the Holy Ghost. 8vo. pp. 178.

The second edition of Domer's History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ from the earliest period to the present, is now complete.

E. Ranke, Fragmenta Versionis Latinæ Antehieronymianæ Prophetarum Hoseæ, Amosi et Michæ. 4to. pp. 52.

J. Land, John, Bishop of Ephesus, the first Syrian Church Historian. 8vo. pp. 200.

Condensed Exegetical Manual to the Apocrypha of the Old Testament. No. IV. 2d, 3d and 4th Books of Maccabees explained by C. Grimm. 8vo. pp. 371.

H. E. Bindseil, Corpus Reformatorum. Vol. XXV. 4to. pp. 992.

C. G. Seibert, Hellenism and Christianity in their reciprocal relation. 8vo. pp. 409.

G. Roskoff, Hebrew Antiquities. 8vo. pp. 271.

A. de Lagarde, Reliquiæ Juris Ecclesiastici Antiquissimæ. Syriace. 8vo. pp. 144. Eædem Græce. 8vo. pp. 96.

M. Uhlemann, Three Days in Memphis. 8vo. pp. 201.

M. Uhlemann, Outlines of the Astronomy and Astrology of the Ancients, particularly the Egyptians. 8vo. pp. 108.

Wollheim da Fonseca, Universal Comparative Mythology. No. 1. 8vo. pp. 72.

C. Bœtticher, The Tree Worship of the Hellenes. 8vo. pp. 544.

R. Lepsius, On the Gods of the four Elements among the Egyptians. 4to. pp. 56.

M. A. Levy, Phœnician Studies. No. 1. Explanation of the great Sidonian and other inscriptions. 8vo. pp. 68.

F. J. More, Celtic Researches into the History of Central Europe. 8vo. pp. 348.

Professors Roth and Whitney have issued, in a second part, 4to. pp. 70, the last chapter of the Atharva Veda, which it was not their original intention to publish entire. The text of the Veda is now complete.

Amude Ha-Avoda, List of the Authors of Hebrew hymns and their productions, with biographical and bibliographical notes. No. 1. 8vo. pp. 130.

The Academy of Berlin has offered a prize of ten ducats for a General Collection of the fragments of Aristotle, and of the passages of Greek and Latin authors which relate to his lost writings, to be prepared by March 1, 1859.

C. Lassen, Antiquities of India. Vol. 3, Part 1. 8vo. pp. 416.